Category: Economy

  • MIL-OSI NGOs: Deep sea mining ‘piracy in policy’: Greenpeace condemns Trump, The Metals Company for mining support

    Source: Greenpeace Statement –

    Washington/Sydney, Saturday 26 April 2025 — Greenpeace Australia Pacific has slammed Donald Trump’s support of deep sea mining as a ‘gross betrayal of the Pacific’ after the Trump administration signed an executive order advancing U.S. ambitions to launch deep sea mining in U.S. and international waters.

    This rogue action is highly politically controversial for appearing to bypass the International Seabed Authority (ISA), the regulatory body set up by the United Nations to protect the deep sea as the common heritage of humankind and decide whether deep sea mining can start in the international seabed. 

    The Metals Company (TMC) – a deep sea mining company – recently declared its intention to work with the Trump Administration outside of the UN-established regulatory framework, to try to start mining in the Clarion Clipperton Zone (CCZ) in the Pacific – a region that sits outside jurisdiction. The Executive Order instructs the Secretary of Commerce to expedite the process for reviewing and issuing exploration and commercial recovery permits under the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act (DSHMRA), breaking the longstanding tradition of the US being a good-faith actor on UNCLOS (The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea). 

    The order outlines that the Trump administration seeks to identify minerals for defence, infrastructure and energy purposes, and makes no mention of addressing the climate crisis.

    Shiva Gounden, Head of Pacific at Greenpeace Australia Pacific, said: “By authorising deep sea mining outside of international law, the Trump Administration is dressing up a disaster in a suit and tie, signing policies in boardrooms that will drown Pacific nations in financial, economic, cultural and environmental disaster. It’s neocolonialism with a letterhead.

    “The Metals Company steam-rolled its way over multilateralism at the ISA and straight through the doors of Donald Trump, without a look back at the Pacific nations it is betraying. Pushing ahead with deep sea mining is a slap in the face to multilateralism, an insult to the UN’s regulatory body, and a gross betrayal of the Pacific.”

    If approved, the plans could allow TMC to start mining in the CCZ – a region known for an abundance of polymetallic nodules – and threaten to derail years of negotiations between TMC and its sponsoring states including Nauru, Tonga and Kiribati.

    “This move risks leaving Nauru, Kiribati and Tonga high and dry; TMC promised the people of Nauru jobs and prosperity from this agreement, saying that mining their waters would help fix the climate crisis. But it has taken the first chance it got to turn its back on Nauru and it will do the same to any other Pacific country. TMC is a money-hungry machine, using and abusing its Pacific partners without a care for the people, their cultural connection to the ocean, jobs, prosperity or the climate crisis,” Gounden said. 

    “Deep sea mining is piracy in policy – allowing governments to raid resources and leave wreckage behind. The Trump administration is looking for minerals to build weapons for America – not help the Pacific. This should be a warning to all Pacific leaders: the deep sea mining industry is not our friend, it is an industry of lies and betrayal. Pacific leaders must now unite to protect our Pacific Ocean and call for a moratorium on deep sea mining.”

    According to The Metals Company, it will apply for permits “in the second quarter of 2025”, with reports stating intent to commence mining operations as soon as 2027. Gerard Barron, the Australian CEO of The Metals Company, has gone on the record with his company’s willingness and desire to bypass internationally agreed regulations, stating in reference to the ongoing negotiations at the ISA “by all means, go ahead and sign your treaty…we’ll be out there”.

    Currently, 32 countries have backed a moratorium or precautionary pause on deep sea mining, including Tuvalu, Palau, Solomon Islands, Marshall Islands, Fiji, the Federated States of Micronesia, Vanuatu and Samoa. Australia has not.

    —ENDS—

    For more information or to arrange an interview, please contact Kimberley Bernard on +61 407 581 404 or [email protected]

    Photos available in the Greenpeace Media Library

    MIL OSI NGO

  • MIL-OSI USA: ICYMI: Shaheen Discusses Impact of Tariffs on Businesses and Supply Chains at NH Ball Bearings, Visits New LaValley Family Community Center Made Possible by Funds She Helped Secure

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for New Hampshire Jeanne Shaheen

    (Newport, NH) – U.S. Senator Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH), a top member of the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, on Wednesday visited New Hampshire Ball Bearings (NHBB) – a Granite State manufacturer of parts that are integral to global aerospace and defense machinery – to discuss how the administration’s tariffs raise costs for businesses like theirs and exhaust supply chains they rely on. Later, Shaheen visited the newly opened LaValley Family Community Center in Newport to tour the state-of-the-art facility that was constructed using Congressionally Directed Spending funds the Senator helped secure. Photos from the events can be found here. 

    In Peterborough, Shaheen toured the New Hampshire Ball Bearings (NHBB) factory with NHBB President Dan Lemieux and members of the leadership team. Afterwards, the Senator heard from NHBB about how the expansion of U.S. tariffs increases costs for their business and further exacerbates existing shortages of aerospace raw materials.  

    “NH Ball Bearings supports local jobs, contributes to our national defense and strengthens America’s military readiness – and still, they’re facing higher costs and uncertainty due to the administration’s reckless trade war and harmful tariffs,” said Senator Shaheen. “With the increasing globalization of supply chains, President Trump’s unnecessary trade war with many of America’s allies weaken an already strained defense supply chain and forces our small businesses to pay. I intend to take what I heard back to Washington to make clear the administration must reverse course.” 

    In a letter to U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth last week, Shaheen raised concerns about how the President’s trade war harms defense supply chains and ultimately weakens America’s military readiness. The Senator expressed how tariffs on imports from virtually every country in the world will increase prices for the Department of Defense’s defense acquisitions – harming its purchasing power and further raising costs on small businesses. 

    Senator Shaheen is helping lead efforts in Congress to mitigate the harmful impacts of President Trump’s tariffs. Earlier this month, Shaheen took to the Senate floor to highlight the devastating impacts that President Trump’s tariffs and trade war will have on American families and the economy. In January, Shaheen introduced the Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes on Imported Goods Act which would limit the president’s ability to leverage sweeping tariffs that increase costs for American consumers and families. Her effort to pass this bill by unanimous consent was blocked by Senate Republicans. In recent months, Shaheen has traveled across the Granite State to visit businesses including Chatila’s Bakery, C&J, DCI Furniture, Mount Cabot Maple and American Calan Inc. to hear directly from Granite Staters impacted by the administration’s tariffs.     

    Shaheen then visited the LaValley Family Community Center in Newport, which opened its doors last month and serves as a hub for youth programs, recreational sports, health and wellness activities and community events. Shaheen helped secure $4,785,000 in Congressionally Directed Spending in Fiscal Year 2023 that was crucial to the community center’s construction. 

    “I was incredibly pleased to see firsthand how the vibrant new center fosters a sense of community and boosts quality of life for the entire Newport region,” said Shaheen. “I’m proud to have worked with local leaders and advocates to secure critical funding to bring the LaValley Family Community Center to life – and I look forward to seeing how the center will help Newport thrive for years to come.” 

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Africa: G20 supports plans to address barriers to Africa’s development

    Source: South Africa News Agency

    Members of the Group of Twenty (G20) have endorsed a work programme that identifies policy solutions that will address the barriers that limit Africa’s development and growth.

    “During the discussion on the impediments to growth and development in Africa, members welcomed the work on strengthening institutions, addressing macroeconomic vulnerabilities, infrastructure development and the cost of capital,” a joint statement by National Treasury and South African Reserve Bank said on Thursday.

    Members endorsed a work programme proposed by South Africa’s Presidency to identify and submit tailored policy solutions to the impediments to help address the individual challenges that countries face.

    The Second Meeting of the G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors (FMCBG) took place on 23 and 24 April 2025 on the sidelines of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank Spring Meetings in Washington, DC.

    Under the chairship of Minister Enoch Godongwana and Governor Lesetja Kganyago, the meeting delivered productive and constructive discussions on global macroeconomic and financial stability, the international financial architecture, and Africa-specific priorities.

    “There was broad consensus on the central role of the G20 in fostering stability and strategic direction during this period of global economic turbulence. 

    “There was broad consensus on the central role of the G20 in fostering stability and strategic direction during this period of global economic turbulence. 

    “Many urged the need to reaffirm our commitment to multilateralism and a rules-based global trading system and renewed efforts to restore cooperation. 

    “There was also an acknowledgement that low-income countries will be the most severely affected by trade fragmentation. Members agreed on the need for the G20 to lead macro-financial policy responses to safeguard growth and financial stability,” the statement said.

    The international financial architecture discussion focused on advancing the Monitoring and Reporting Framework to track implementation of the G20 Roadmap for bigger, better and more effective Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs). 

    The G20 confirmed plans to develop monitoring indicators with clear, measurable and focused outcomes.

    “In addressing the need to increase the level of development financing, members supported new initiatives to promote blended finance and private capital mobilisation. 

    “They further agreed to strengthen multilateral cooperation to tackle heightened debt vulnerabilities and liquidity challenges, and to promote augmented debt transparency,” the statement said.

    Members also approved a process to improve the Common Framework, informed by recommendations from a G20 Note on the lessons learned from the Common Framework’s first cases. 

    Broad support was also expressed for the work of the Global Sovereign Debt Roundtable and the release of a Playbook on debt restructuring by the International Monetary Fund and World Bank. – SAnews.gov.za

    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI USA: News 04/22/2025 Blackburn, Colleagues Introduce Bipartisan Legislation to Make Adoption Tax Credit Refundable

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator Marsha Blackburn (R-Tenn)
    NASHVILLE, Tenn. – U.S. Senators Marsha Blackburn (R-Tenn.), Kevin Cramer (R-N.D.), Amy Klobuchar (D-Minn.), and Ben Ray Luján (D-N.M.) released the following statements after introducing the Adoption Tax Credit Refundability Act to restore the refundable portion of the Adoption Tax Credit, which allows adoptive families to deduct up to $16,810 in qualified expenses By allowing the tax credit to be refundable, families will be able to access the full amount as a refund, even if the credit exceeds a family’s tax burden. The credit was previously refundable in 2010 and 2011.
    “Offering permanent homes to adoptive children strengthens families and is a blessing,” said Senator Blackburn. “The Adoption Tax Credit Refundability Act would reduce the financial burden of adoption and make adoption more accessible.”
    Adoption is a true joy for families, but it is not without significant financial cost,” said Senator Cramer. “Our bill will make the credit refundable to help all adoptive families access the full amount of the adoption tax credit, regardless of their tax burden. Support for adoptive families is essential to ensure more children find the stable, loving home they deserve.”
    “Minnesotans have a long and proud tradition of adoption to welcome children into safe and loving homes,” said Senator Klobuchar. “Our bipartisan legislation will allow more families to access the full adoption tax credit, helping ensure a smooth and successful transition for children and families. As co-chair of the Congressional Coalition on Adoption, I’ll keep working to improve the adoption process and help every child find the permanent home they deserve.”
    “For families across the country, adoption is a blessing that provides children with a loving, stable home,” said Senator Luján. “Families should not face steep financial costs for opening their arms and offering a permanent home to adoptive children. That is why I’m proud to join my colleagues in introducing the Adoption Tax Credit Refundability Act to lower the financial cost of adoption and help more children find loving homes.”

    CO-SPONSORS
    Senate co-sponsors include U.S. Senators Tim Scott (R-S.C.), Mark Warner (D-Va.), James Lankford (R-Okla.), Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.), Josh Hawley (R-Mo.), Jeff Merkley (D-Ore.), Chris Van Hollen (D-Md.), Angus King (I-Maine), Tim Kaine (D-Va.), Tammy Duckworth (D-Ill.), Jacky Rosen (D-Nev.), John Fetterman (D-Pa.), and Mark Kelly (D-Ariz.). 
    The legislation was introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives by Representatives Danny K. Davis (D-Ill.), Blake Moore (R-Utah), Gwen Moore (D-Wis.), Randy Feenstra (R-Iowa), Sydney Kamlager-Dove (D-Calif.), Don Bacon (R-Nev.), Don Beyer (D-Va.), and Robert Aderholt (R-Ala.).
    This legislation is endorsed by the Adoption Tax Credit Working Group Executive Committee and 100 national, state, and local groups.
    Click here for bill text.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI: U.S. Rep. Young Kim Joins Orange County Business Council and FHLBank San Francisco for Affordable Housing Roundtable

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    SAN FRANCISCO and IRVINE, Calif., April 25, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — In a continued effort to address the growing affordable housing crisis in Southern California, U.S. Rep. Young Kim (CA-40) convened a roundtable discussion today with the Orange County Business Council and the Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco (FHLBank San Francisco) in Irvine, California. Kim co-chairs the bi-partisan Congressional Financial Literacy and Wealth Creation Caucus and serves on the House Committee on Financial Services. The roundtable convened housing advocates, financial institutions, community organizations, and other key stakeholders that hold a vested interest in creating generational wealth through homeownership and a greater understanding of financial well-being.

    “Rising housing prices are making life unaffordable for too many hardworking families in our community,” said Rep. Kim. “We need all hands-on deck to combat this housing crisis, which is why I appreciate local community leaders from public and private sectors for joining me for a productive roundtable discussion on how we can create more affordable housing options and help families struggling to make ends meet.”

    Kim represents California’s 40th District, covering portions of Orange, San Bernardino, and Riverside Counties. She serves on the House Financial Services Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and is a strong advocate for economic development, financial literacy, and regulatory frameworks that support growth. She also co-chairs the Women in STEM Caucus and the Maternity Care Caucus. Through her partnership with FHLBank San Francisco and its member financial institutions, Kim is advancing practical solutions to support her constituents and strengthen the Southern California business community.

    “Housing availability at all levels is fundamental to OCBC’s mission of advancing economic development in Orange County,” said OCBC President and CEO Jeff Ball. “We are fortunate to have leaders like Congresswoman Kim who understand that expanding our housing supply is essential to sustaining the region’s growth and quality of life. By supporting increased housing options, we can ensure that our workforce has the opportunity to live closer to their jobs. Congresswoman Kim has been a steadfast advocate for Orange County, and we look forward to continuing our partnership with her.”

    FHLBank San Francisco has joined public officials at 10 roundtables over the past year as part of its mission-driven focus to partner with its member financial institutions, housing developers and community stakeholders to foster economic growth and resilience across communities.

    “Today’s conversation with Congresswoman Kim and regional leaders underscores the urgent need for collaborative, cross-sector action,” said Joe Amato, interim president and chief executive officer of FHLBank San Francisco. “The aftermath of recent Southern California wildfires has only deepened the housing challenges in this region. We’re committed to working alongside our members and community partners to increase access to affordable housing, expand financial literacy, and support economic opportunity throughout Arizona, California, and Nevada.”

    Attendees at the roundtable included:

    Rep. Young Kim Congresswoman (CA-40)
    Stephanie Cuevas California and Nevada Credit Union Leagues
    Irma Gorrocino California and Nevada Credit Union Leagues
    Adam Wood California Building Industry Association
    Jeremy Empol FHLBank San Francisco
    Greg Ward  FHLBank San Francisco
    Laura Archuleta Jamboree
    Ana Fonseca Logix Federal Credit Union
    Michael Ruane National Core
    Jeff Ball Orange County Business Council
    Tim Shaw, RCE Pacific West Association of REALTORS®
    Diana Kot SchoolsFirst Federal Credit Union
    William Shopoff Shopoff Realty
    Cesar Covarrubias The Kennedy Commission
    Matthew Kemfer The Kennedy Commission
    Maggie Pacheco Wescom Credit Union
         

    FHLBank San Francisco’s Impact in California’s 40th District 

    Since 1990, FHLBank San Francisco has awarded $4.5 million in grants for affordable housing and to boost homeownership in California’s 40th Congressional District, supporting the development of 401 affordable housing units for low-income individuals and families. In addition, through its Workforce Initiative Subsidy for Homeownership (WISH) program, FHLBank San Francisco has partnered with member financial institutions to provide $887,000 in grants since 2003, helping 57 first-time homebuyers — including teachers, healthcare workers, and service industry professionals — achieve homeownership.

    Across its three-state district of Arizona, California, and Nevada, FHLBank San Francisco is committed to supporting a range of housing initiatives in partnership with its member community financial institutions. Since the Affordable Housing Program’s inception, the Bank has awarded over $1.38 billion in grants, helping to construct, rehabilitate, or purchase more than 155,000 affordable housing units — including $61.8 million awarded in 2024 alone. As part of the Federal Home Loan Bank System, FHLBank San Francisco is one of the nation’s largest privately capitalized sources of affordable housing grant funding.

    About Orange County Business Council

    For 30 years, Orange County Business Council (OCBC) has been representing and promoting the region’s business community together with government and academia to enhance the economic development of Orange County, California. The Council’s core initiatives include developing pro-business solutions that lead to economic growth, education development that leads to a competitive workforce, advocating for a range of housing alternatives, and promoting appropriate investment in regional and statewide infrastructure for the nation’s sixth most populous county. Member organizations include businesses and local organizations representing a diverse cross section of industries including biomedical, construction, education, financial services, health care, manufacturing, municipalities, nonprofit, technology, tourism, transportation, real estate and utilities. For more information, visit ocbc.org.

    About Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco

    The Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco is a member-driven cooperative helping local lenders in Arizona, California, and Nevada build strong communities, create opportunity, and change lives for the better. The tools and resources we provide to our member financial institutions — commercial banks, credit unions, industrial loan companies, savings institutions, insurance companies, and community development financial institutions — propel homeownership, finance quality affordable housing, drive economic vitality, and revitalize whole neighborhoods. Together with our members and other partners, we are making the communities we serve more vibrant and resilient.

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Africa: AI policies in Africa: lessons from Ghana and Rwanda

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Thompson Gyedu Kwarkye, Postdoctoral Researcher, University College Dublin

    Artificial intelligence (AI) is increasing productivity and pushing the boundaries of what’s possible. It powers self-driving cars, social media feeds, fraud detection and medical diagnoses. Touted as a game changer, it is projected to add nearly US$15.7 trillion to the global economy by the end of the decade.

    Africa is positioned to use this technology in several sectors. In Ghana, Kenya and South Africa, AI-led digital tools in use include drones for farm management, X-ray screening for tuberculosis diagnosis, and real-time tracking systems for packages and shipments. All these are helping to fill gaps in accessibility, efficiency and decision-making.

    However, it also introduces risks. These include biased algorithms, resource and labour exploitation, and e-waste disposal. The lack of a robust regulatory framework in many parts of the continent increases these challenges, leaving vulnerable populations exposed to exploitation. Limited public awareness and infrastructure further complicate the continent’s ability to harness AI responsibly.

    What are African countries doing about it? To answer this, my research mapped out what Ghana and Rwanda had in place as AI policies and investigated how these policies were developed. I looked for shared principles and differences in approach to governance and implementation.

    The research shows that AI policy development is not a neutral or technical process but a profoundly political one. Power dynamics, institutional interests and competing visions of technological futures shape AI regulation.

    I conclude from my findings that AI’s potential to bring great change in Africa is undeniable. But its benefits are not automatic. Rwanda and Ghana show that effective policy-making requires balancing innovation with equity, global standards with local needs, and state oversight with public trust.

    The question is not whether Africa can harness AI, but how and on whose terms.

    How they did it

    Rwanda’s National AI Policy emerged from consultations with local and global actors. These included the Ministry of ICT and Innovation, the Rwandan Space Agency, and NGOs like the Future Society, and the GIZ FAIR Forward. The resulting policy framework is in line with Rwanda’s goals for digital transformation, economic diversification and social development. It includes international best practices such as ethical AI, data protection, and inclusive AI adoption.

    Ghana’s Ministry of Communication, Digital Technology and Innovations conducted multi-stakeholder workshops to develop a national strategy for digital transformation and innovation. Start-ups, academics, telecom companies and public-sector institutions came together and the result is Ghana’s National Artificial Intelligence Strategy 2023–2033.

    Both countries have set up or plan to set up Responsible AI offices. This aligns with global best practices for ethical AI. Rwanda focuses on local capacity building and data sovereignty. This reflects the country’s post-genocide emphasis on national control and social cohesion. Similarly, Ghana’s proposed office focuses on accountability, though its structure is still under legislative review.

    Ghana and Rwanda have adopted globally recognised ethical principles like privacy protection, bias mitigation and human rights safeguards. Rwanda’s policy reflects Unesco’s AI ethics recommendations and Ghana emphasises “trustworthy AI”.

    Both policies frame AI as a way to reach the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals. Rwanda’s policy targets applications in healthcare, agriculture, poverty reduction and rural service delivery. Similarly, Ghana’s strategy highlights the potential to advance economic growth, environmental sustainability and inclusive digital transformation.

    Key policy differences

    Rwanda’s policy ties data control to national security. This is rooted in its traumatic history of identity-based violence. Ghana, by contrast, frames AI as a tool for attracting foreign investment rather than a safeguard against state fragility.

    The policies also differ in how they manage foreign influence. Rwanda has a “defensive” stance towards global tech powers; Ghana’s is “accommodative”. Rwanda works with partners that allow it to follow its own policy. Ghana, on the other hand, embraces partnerships, viewing them as the start of innovation.

    While Rwanda’s approach is targeted and problem-solving, Ghana’s strategy is expansive, aiming for large-scale modernisation and private-sector growth. Through state-led efforts, Rwanda focuses on using AI to solve immediate challenges such as rural healthcare access and food security. In contrast, Ghana looks at using AI more widely – in finance, transport, education and governance – to become a regional tech hub.

    Constraints and solutions

    The effectiveness of these AI policies is held back by broader systemic challenges. The US and China dominate in setting global standards, so local priorities get sidelined. For example, while Rwanda and Ghana advocate for ethical AI, it’s hard for them to hold multinational corporations accountable for breaches.

    Energy shortages further complicate large-scale AI adoption. Training models require reliable electricity – a scarce resource in many parts of the continent.

    To address these gaps, I propose the following:

    Investments in digital infrastructure, education and local start-ups to reduce dependency on foreign tech giants.

    African countries must shape international AI governance forums. They must ensure policies reflect continental realities, not just western or Chinese ones. This will include using collective bargaining power through the African Union to bring Africa’s development needs to the fore. It could also help with digital sovereignty issues and equitable access to AI technologies.

    Finally, AI policies must embed African ethical principles. These should include communal rights and post-colonial sensitivities.

    – AI policies in Africa: lessons from Ghana and Rwanda
    – https://theconversation.com/ai-policies-in-africa-lessons-from-ghana-and-rwanda-253642

    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: LCQ10: Nurturing and attracting innovation and technology talents

    Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region 3

    LCQ10: Nurturing and attracting innovation and technology talents 
    Question:
     
    There are views that in order to realise the vision of developing Hong Kong into an international innovation and technology (I&T) centre, as well as to develop new quality productive forces and promote sustainable economic development, Hong Kong needs to nurture and attract sufficient I&T talents. In this connection, will the Government inform this Council:
     
    (1) of the respective numbers and ratios of senior secondary students who took the subjects of Physics, Chemistry, Biology and the Extended Part of Mathematics, as well as those who took two or more of the above subjects at the same time in the past three school years;
     
    (2) of the measures the Government has put in place to encourage students to take science subjects including Physics, Chemistry, Biology and the Extended Part of Mathematics, etc, so as to further nurture local I&T talents;
     
    (3) as there are views that in order to realise Hong Kong’s positioning as centres for development in eight key areas as set out in the Outline of the National 14th Five-Year Plan, relevant human resources plans are a crucial complementary part, of the Government’s plans in place to further nurture and attract talents, so as to achieve the objectives of the relevant human resources plans;
     
    (4) as there are views that artificial intelligence (AI) has become a major element required for future development, whether the Government will study making coding and AI applications compulsory subjects in primary and secondary schools and provide relevant teaching guidelines for teachers; if so, of the details; if not, the reasons for that;
     
    (5) as there are views that there is currently a shortage of teachers in STEAM (Science, Technology, Engineering, the Arts and Mathematics) education, whether the Government will consider introducing AI-assisted teaching and “Massive Open Online Courses” (i.e. opening up courses to a large number of online users for participation in learning through the Internet) to enable students to receive multi-model software application training online and equip themselves early, so as to meet the needs of the future job market; and
     
    (6) as there are views pointing out that at present, generative AI has already been integrated into life, for example, free chatbots such as DeepSeek can be downloaded and used free of charge on the Internet, whether the authorities will consider providing teaching guidelines for teachers to make full use of AI-assisted teaching, such as allowing AI to act as classroom assistants and assist teachers in drawing up curriculum frameworks, and at the same time encouraging students to interact with AI, so as to enable students to master as early as possible the skills of using AI?
     
    Reply:
     
    President,
     
    The government continues to proactively promote science and mathematics education in primary and secondary schools, and strengthen digital education so as to provide talent support for developing Hong Kong into an international innovation and technology (I&T) hub as well as fully implementing the national strategies of invigorating the country through science and education, strengthening the nation with talents, and driving development through innovation. The Education Bureau (EDB), by optimising the curriculum and enhancing teacher training, creates a learning atmosphere of science and I&T in schools and cultivates students’ interest and ability in learning mathematics, science and technology from an early age, as well as their digital literacy, fostering their aspirations in science and I&T, and enabling students to embrace the opportunities brought by the development of I&T and meet the requirements of the future workplace. 
     
    Regarding the various parts of the question raised by the Hon Elizabeth Quat, our reply is as follows:
     
    (1) and (2) Following the implementation of the optimisation measures for senior secondary curriculum introduced by the EDB in the 2021/22 school year, which has provided students with more space, the number of students taking three elective subjects at the senior secondary level has increased significantly. Among them, the number and percentage of students taking Physics, Chemistry, Biology and the Mathematics Extended Modules (M1/M2), as well as those taking two or more of these subjects have shown a steady increase from the 2021/22 school year to the 2023/24 school year. Details are as follows:
     

     
     
    School Year(32.7%)(25.9%)(19.7%)(34.7%)(34.6%)(33.1%)(25.6%)(20.1%)(35.5%)(35.0%)(33.1%)(25.8%)(20.8%)(36.1%)Source:
    The Survey on Senior Secondary Subject Information conducted by the EDB. The data is provided by approximately 440 schools (including government and aided secondary schools, caput schools, and secondary schools under the Direct Subsidy Scheme) offering the local senior secondary curriculum. Data for the 2024/25 school year is still being collected.
     
    The EDB is taking a multi-faceted approach to strengthen students’ foundation in science and mathematics so as to further nurturing local I&T talents. In respect of curriculum, the EDB will continue to optimise the curriculum, including reviewing the current senior secondary curricula of Physics, Chemistry and Biology, and enhancing I&T elements. We are also strengthening mathematics education by launching more school support programmes on promoting mathematical modelling education, fostering students’ ability to apply mathematics and their interest in learning mathematics.
     
    Regarding teacher training, the EDB continuously organises professional development programmes in science, mathematics, and I&T for teachers, enabling teachers to stay abreast of the latest developments in I&T and incorporate innovative elements into classroom teaching. Topics in these programmes cover biotechnology, robotics, energy technology, and mathematical modelling, with an aim to enrich students’ learning experiences.
     
    On student activities, we continue to collaborate with I&T related organisations, such as tertiary institutions, Cyberport, professional engineering bodies, and the Hong Kong Academy for Gifted Education, to provide students with I&T related experiential activities, lectures, competitions, and training programmes both within and beyond the classroom. Examples include the Distinguished Lecture Series on Applications of Mathematics in STEAM World, the Hong Kong Student Science Project Competition, and the Innovative Engineering Education Programme for Primary and Secondary Schools. All these initiatives aim to inspire students to pursue careers in scientific research and I&T, so as to meet the future demand for innovative talents in society.
     
    We will set up an ad hoc committee under the Curriculum Development Council Committee on Science Education to engage various stakeholders in exploring options for further optimising science education.
     
    (3) Education is the key to nurturing talents. For the University Grants Committee (UGC)-funded universities, the Government has set the target in the 2022 Policy Address to continue to enhance post-secondary education by encouraging them to offer programmes with greater relevance to future economic development, such that students from the UGC-universities studying in disciplines relevant to the “eight centres” will reach around 60 per cent by the 2026/27 academic year. Through the triennial Planning Exercise of UGC, the UGC-funded universities will offer more new programmes relevant to the “eight centres” in the 2025-28 triennium, thereby nurturing more talents to meet the development needs of Hong Kong and creating impetus for the development of the “eight centres”.
     
    (4), (5) and (6) The promotion of digital education (including artificial intelligence (AI)) in primary and secondary schools by the EDB focuses on enhancing students’ digital literacy and laying a solid foundation for the development of digital skills, nurturing students to become responsible citizens and lifelong learners.
     
    To encourage schools to adopt AI in supporting teaching, the EDB launched the “AI for Science Education” Funding Programme on a pilot basis for Junior Secondary Science in the end of 2024. This funding programme is open to applications from publicly funded secondary schools. Successful applicant schools will receive a one-off grant of $100,000 to arrange for science teachers to enroll in training courses offered by tertiary institutions or relevant professional bodies, fostering pedagogical innovation.
     
    To enable students to master coding and AI skills from an early age, the EDB has launched the “Module on Artificial Intelligence for Junior Secondary Level” and the “Enriched Module on Coding Education for Upper Primary Level” in 2023, which further cultivate students’ computational thinking more systematically and enhance students’ understanding of the foundation and application of AI. The curriculum modules include suggestions and guidelines of learning and teaching for teachers’ reference. Almost all publicly-funded schools have implemented the enriched coding education and AI education in upper primary level and junior secondary level respectively.
     
    Regarding teacher training, the EDB continues to provide professional development programmes related to coding and AI. These programmes focus on guiding students to effectively utilise I&T and information technology tools to solve problems, thereby enhancing learning and teaching effectiveness. The training courses also cover the application of AI tools in teaching across various subjects, including helping teachers master essential skills to teach students how to effectively pose questions to generative AI tools, enabling them to fully leverage AI to support teaching. The courses also share the good practices from schools on integrating AI technology into teaching, such as using these tools to design lesson plans and develop teaching materials. Additionally, the training assists teachers in developing school-based arrangements or guidelines for the use of AI, tailored to their specific teaching contexts. The training courses are conducted in both online and offline modes to benefit a greater number of teachers.
     
    With regard to e-learning platforms and resources, the Quality Education Fund of the EDB has reserved $500 million to provide schools with a total of 22 projects, which have commenced at the beginning of the 2023/24 school year. The projects will deploy innovative technologies such as big data and AI to enhance learning and teaching effectiveness in a wide array of subjects/areas, including mathematics and science education, coding, robotics. It is expected that in mid-2025, the deliverables of projects will be successively released for use by schools. In addition, we are collaborating with the Hong Kong Education City to launch an online learning platform on AI and computational thinking, as well as a webpage featuring expert lecture videos by 2025, aiming to promote self-directed online learning among students (including learning the application of various software).
     
    The higher education in Hong Kong has always been bold in innovation and growing together with technological development. With the advent of generative AI, innovative and breakthrough technologies have presented new challenges and enormous opportunities in transforming pedagogies and student learning experiences. To this end, the UGC, with the support from the Quality Assurance Council, has allocated $100 million to set up the Fund for Innovative Technology-in-Education to provide impetus for universities to harness innovative and breakthrough technologies in transforming pedagogies and enriching student learning experiences, and to nurture a digitally competent and technologically responsible generation, for the future success of their students in the digital economy. Universities also actively explore the application of AI in teaching and learning, such as providing AI learning tools and introducing AI lecturers, etc. In addition, a number of universities are currently providing Massive Open Online Courses for students from all over the world to study programmes online, with some being free of charge. Through a more flexible and innovative learning mode, these courses provide a more convenient progression pathway for students who aspire to self-enhancement.
    Issued at HKT 11:50

    NNNN

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Non-means-tested Subsidy Scheme for Self-financing Undergraduate Studies in Hong Kong

    Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region 3

    From the 2017/18 academic year, the Government provides a non-means-tested annual subsidy for eligible students pursuing full-time locally accredited local and non-local self-financing undergraduate (including top-up degree) programmes in Hong Kong (save for those enrolling in places already supported under the Study Subsidy Scheme for Designated Professions/Sectors) offered by eligible institutions.

    The non-means-tested annual subsidy is up to $35,120 in the 2025/26 academic year. The subsidy will apply to both new and continuing eligible students, and is tenable for the normal duration of the programmes concerned. Eligible students enrolling in the relevant programmes will pay a tuition fee after subsidy. Students in need may still apply for student financial assistance from the Student Finance Office of the Working Family and Student Financial Assistance Agency in respect of the actual amount of tuition fee payable.

    To understand the eligibility, participating institutions and programmes of the scheme, please visit www.cspe.edu.hk/nmtss for details.

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Washington State Sues Trump Administration Over Unlawful Conditions on Funding for K-12 Schools

    Source: Washington State News

    $1.4 billion in federal financial assistance at risk in Washington 

    SEATTLE — Washington State Attorney General Nick Brown today, as part of a coalition of 19 attorneys general, filed a lawsuit challenging the U.S. Department of Education’s threat to withhold federal funding from state and local agencies that refuse to abandon lawful programs and policies promoting equal access to education.

    The federal government provides Washington with approximately $1.4 billion in congressionally mandated financial support each year for a wide variety of needs and services related to children and education. Federal funding supports programs that ensure students from low-income families have the same access to education as their peers, help schools support migrant students and English learners, and provide special education and related services to students with disabilities. To receive these funds, state and local education agencies provide written assurances they will comply with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits discrimination in education. Washington state has consistently and regularly certified its compliance with civil rights laws.

    However, an April 3 U.S. Department of Education letter to state and local educational agencies stated continued federal education funding depends on certifying they are not operating programs that support diversity, equity, and inclusion.

    “A complete education depends on students learning in a safe and inclusive environment,” Brown said. “Washington state’s policies put students first, and I will not let the Trump administration roll that back.”

    The department’s April 3 letter to state and local educational agencies forces them to choose between two options:

    • Refuse to certify compliance based on vague guidelines of what constitutes unlawful diversity, equity, and inclusion programs then place federal funding in peril; or
    • Certify compliance with its vague guidelines then attempt to identify and eliminate lawful diversity, equity, and inclusion programs.

    Even if the state complies with the department’s demands, it could still face liability for failing to fully comply with the vague and ill-defined federal order.

    Faced with these choices, Washington state informed the department that it continues to stand by its prior certifications of compliance with civil rights laws and would not comply with the department’s extraneous and improper certification request.

    In filing today’s lawsuit, Attorney General Brown and the multistate coalition seek to bar the department from withholding any funding based on these unlawful conditions. Brown and the other attorneys general assert that the department’s attempt to terminate federal education funding violates the Spending Clause, the Appropriations Clause, the Administrative Procedures Act, and the separation of powers. 

    Attorney General Brown joins the attorneys general of California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Wisconsin in filing the lawsuit.

    A copy of the complaint is available here.

    -30-

    Washington’s Attorney General serves the people and the state of Washington. As the state’s largest law firm, the Attorney General’s Office provides legal representation to every state agency, board, and commission in Washington. Additionally, the Office serves the people directly by enforcing consumer protection, civil rights, and environmental protection laws. The Office also prosecutes elder abuse, Medicaid fraud, and handles sexually violent predator cases in 38 of Washington’s 39 counties. Visit www.atg.wa.gov to learn more.

    Media Contact:

    Email: press@atg.wa.gov

    Phone: (360) 753-2727

    General contacts: Click here

    Media Resource Guide & Attorney General’s Office FAQ

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI NGOs: Stakes high as G20 ministers miss opportunity to pursue solidarity, wealth tax

    Source: Greenpeace Statement –

    Washington, D.C. – A meeting of G20 Finance Ministers has failed to deliver a key signal of solidarity as ongoing economic turmoil led to difficult talks in Washington D.C. and slowed progress on critical reforms to tax the world’s super-rich.

    In a disappointing outcome at the 2nd Finance and Central Bank Ministerial Meeting, no reference was made to earlier agreements focused on cooperative efforts to effectively tax the ultra-rich as momentum around the initiative appeared to stall. 

    Fred Njehu, Global Political Lead, Greenpeace Africa, said: “Turbulent economic times like these demand a unified, multilateral response and G20 ministers have an historic obligation to help steer the global economy and environment towards safer waters. This starts with supporting South Africa’s focus on Solidarity, Equality and Sustainability to find real solutions.”

    “G20 ministers must boldly stay the course for what is fair and just, acting in solidarity with each other in opposition to wrecking ball diplomacy to deliver equality and a sustainable future for all. That means international cooperation, not tariff wars or economic blackmail or corporate plunder.”

    “Equality is not the accumulation of wealth and power in the hands of a few billionaires. G20 Finance Ministers have an incredible opportunity to achieve a breakthrough on wealth taxation. We need to stand up to the power of billionaires who are a threat to our safety, security and wellbeing.”

    “The hoarding of wealth and power is eroding democracy, fueling inequality and driving the climate crisis and environmental destruction. We cannot afford to sit idly by and the G20 must show bold and collaborative leadership in times of global need.”

    ENDS

    Contacts:

    Lee Kuen, Global Communications Lead, Fair Share Campaign, Greenpeace International, +60176690211, lkuen@admin

    Greenpeace International Press Desk, +31 (0)20 718 2470 (available 24 hours), [email protected]

    MIL OSI NGO

  • MIL-OSI NGOs: US government confirms their support for deep sea mining plans that bypass United Nations, Greenpeace response

    Source: Greenpeace Statement –

    Greenpeace USA activists unfurl a banner calling on the US government to Stop Deep Sea Mining in front of Trump Tower on 5th Avenue in New York City.

    Washington DC, USA, (April 24, 2025) – President Trump today signed a sweeping executive order advancing U.S. ambitions to launch deep sea mining in U.S. and international waters. This rogue action is highly politically controversial for appearing to bypass the International Seabed Authority (ISA), the regulatory body set up by the United Nations to protect the deep sea as the common heritage of humankind and decide whether deep sea mining can start in the international seabed. 

    This unilateral action by the U.S. government fundamentally undermines multilateral cooperation and the United Nations. The Metals Company – a deep sea mining company – recently declared its intent to work with the Trump Administration outside of the UN-established regulatory framework to try to start mining in the Clarion Clipperton Zone in the Pacific – a region that sits outside US jurisdiction. This was met with swift and strong international rebuke. The Executive Order instructs the Secretary of Commerce to expedite the process for reviewing and issuing exploration and commercial recovery permits under the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act (DSHMRA), breaking the longstanding tradition of the US being a good-faith actor on UNCLOS (The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea). 

    Arlo Hemphill, Project Lead on Greenpeace USA’s campaign to stop deep sea mining, said: “Authorizing deep-sea mining outside international law is like lighting a match in a room full of dynamite — it threatens ecosystems, global cooperation, and U.S. credibility all at once. We condemn this administration’s attempt to launch this destructive industry on the high seas in the Pacific by bypassing the United Nations process. This is an insult to multilateralism and a slap in the face to all the countries and millions of people around the world who oppose this dangerous industry.”

    “But this Executive Order is not the start of deep sea mining. Everywhere governments have tried to start deep sea mining, they have failed. This will be no different. We call on the international community to stand against this unacceptable undermining of international cooperation by agreeing to a global moratorium on deep sea mining. The United States government has no right to unilaterally allow an industry to destroy the common heritage of humankind, and rip up the deep sea for the profit of a few corporations.”

    Despite now fundamentally moving to undermine the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the United States has benefited significantly from the Convention [1].  Although these benefits have been disproportionately favorable to a single nation, the Executive Order now undermines this agreement, signaling an end to U.S. leadership in global maritime affairs.

    Hemphill continued: “This is a clear sign that the U.S. will no longer be a global leader on protecting the oceans, which support all life on this planet.”

    Today’s act follows recent negotiations at the ISA, where governments refused to give The Metals Company a clear pathway to an approved mining application via the ISA. This March, the ISA meeting took a notably different tone from previous meetings, with over 20 countries voicing support for a general environmental policy to be developed at the ISA. 

    According to The Metals Company, they will apply for permits “in the second quarter of 2025,” with reports stating intent to commence mining operations as soon as 2027. Gerard Barron, the CEO of The Metals Company, has gone on the record with his company’s willingness and desire to bypass internationally agreed regulations, stating in reference to the ongoing negotiations at the ISA “by all means, go ahead and sign your treaty…we’ll be out there”.

    32 countries around the world publicly support a moratorium on deep sea mining. Millions of people have spoken out against this dangerous emerging industry. ISA Member states and the body’s newly appointed Secretary-General, Leticia Carvalho, swiftly condemned an earlier announcement from TMC, on the penultimate day of the ISA’s 30th Council session, as a blatant attempt to sidestep international law and undermine multilateral governance of the global commons.


    Notes:

    Photos are available in the Greenpeace Media Library.

    [1]

    • UNCLOS codifies the principle of freedom of navigation, advancing U.S. maritime power globally by preserving the right of the U.S. military to use the world’s oceans and for U.S. commercial vessels to carry cargo globally.  It also provides a framework for maintaining maritime security and stability, vital for U.S. national interests. 
    • UNCLOS protects U.S. interests across maritime industries, including fishing, shipping, and offshore extractive industries.
    • In 2024, the U.S. government filed an extended continental shelf claim for a million square miles of the Arctic seabed, a provision authorized to States via UNCLOS for the purposes of securing mineral and oil rights in areas beyond a country’s 200 nautical mile EEZ in places where the continental shelf extends beyond this measure.  The move to claim this extension was criticized by a number of countries due to the U.S.’s failure to ratify the agreement, while continuing to benefit from it.

    Contact: Tanya Brooks, Senior Communications Specialist at Greenpeace USA
    (+1) 703-342-9226, [email protected]  

    Greenpeace USA is part of a global network of independent campaigning organizations that use peaceful protest and creative communication to expose global environmental problems and promote solutions that are essential to a green and peaceful future. Greenpeace USA is committed to transforming the country’s unjust social, environmental, and economic systems from the ground up to address the climate crisis, advance racial justice, and build an economy that puts people first. Learn more at www.greenpeace.org/usa.

    MIL OSI NGO

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Press Briefing Transcript: European Department, Spring Meetings 2025

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    April 25, 2025

    PARTICIPANTS:

     MR. HELGE BERGER, Deputy Director, European Department, IMF

     MS. OYA CELASUN, Deputy Director, European Department, IMF

     MR. ALFRED KAMMER, Director, European Department, IMF

    MODERATOR: 

    MS. CAMILA PEREZ, Senior Communications Officer, IMF

    *  *  *  *  *

    P R O C E E D I N G S

    (10:00 a.m.)

    MS. PEREZ: Hi everyone.  Thank you so much for joining today’s press conference on the European Economic Outlook.  I’m Camila Perez.  I’m a Communications Officer with the IMF.  We’re pleased to be joined today by Alfred Kammer, sitting next to me, Director of the European Department here at the IMF.  Also, with us we’ve got Oya Celasun and Helge Berger, both Deputy Directors of the Department. 

    We’ll begin as usual with some opening remarks from Alfred, and then we’ll take your questions.  I see some colleagues joining online, so we will also go to your questions online.  Alfred, over to you. 

    MR. KAMMER: Welcome to this press conference on Europe. I have posted my opening remarks and also circulated.  You should have them.  So, I will just make a few points for emphasis. 

    First of all, in terms of the outlook, we have had a meaningful downgrade for Europe that reflects the impact of tariffs, partially compensated by an increase in infrastructure spending and defense spending, in particular from Germany.  But the biggest impact is coming from uncertainty and tighter financial conditions.  The impact is different for the Euro area versus CESEE (Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe).  CESEE is more affected as it has a larger manufacturing sector and is more exposed to tariffs. 

    Second point to make is when we are looking at the medium term, we see rather weak growth, and that has not changed from our previous outlook.  And that is a clear result of a large productivity gap Europe has to the global economy.  And that is something which clearly needs to be fixed.  We were talking about internal barriers; we are talking about financial barriers which need to be overcome.  So that’s part of the medium-term growth story, and that is something for the policy part. 

    On the policy recommendations, first, our recommendation is more trade is better and therefore we are very encouraged that the European Union is continuing to move forward on trade agreements.  Those who have been — which have been negotiated, they should be brought to a conclusion. 

    The second policy advice is on the monetary side.  In the Euro area, we had success in the disinflation effort.  We are forecasting now that we hit the target in the second half of 2025.  What does that mean for ECB monetary policy?  One more cut in the summer of 25 basis points and then keep the rate on hold at 2 percent until — unless major shocks ask for a recalibration of that monetary stance.  A bit different in CESEE, where inflation is more persistent and still higher, and there needs to be taken more caution in terms of the easing part.

    On fiscal consolidation, fiscal consolidation should continue.  Europe needs to build up buffers for the next shock.  But also, Europe needs to build fiscal space for long-term spending pressures, which we have on aging, health care, the energy transition, and of course, now an accelerated need is on defense spending. 

    Final point, focus needs to be on structural reforms.  In Europe, we have been making suggestions on reforms which could be taken at the EU level.  Draghi Letta, we have a shared diagnostic.  We also have an understanding of the policy solutions.  These reforms should be undertaken with urgency.  We selected a number of key reforms which are under discussion.  If we are looking at the benefit of the implementation, it would add 3 percent to the level of GDP in Europe.  So, these reforms need to be pushed forward with urgency. 

    There’s also a need for national structural reforms.  There’s lots of benefit to those.  Priority in Europe actually is on the labor market side, including on upskilling and reskilling of workers.  We put together, country by country, a set of priority reform areas.  If countries actually close the gap to the best-performing countries, best-practice countries in these areas by only 50 percent, it would give a boost to the level of GDP by 5 percent for advanced European countries, by 6 to 7 percent for CESEE countries and for the Western Balkan countries, the number is 9 percent increase in GDP.  So, the reform areas are discussed, the reform areas are agreed.  What now needs to happen is the political will, and that is not easy to overcome vested interests, but it needs to be done because this is to secure the future of Europe.  Thank you. 

    MS. PEREZ: Thanks so much, Alfred. We can now start with your questions.  We will go to the room.  Please raise your hand when called, identify yourself, name, and outlet.  We’re going to get started with the lady sitting here.  Thank you.  First row. 

    QUESTIONER: Hi, good morning.  Thank you for taking my question.  So, in recent weeks financial market has shown increasing pressure on U.S. Treasury while demand on the European debt appears to be rising.  Do you believe this shift represents a sustainable trend?  And more broadly, do you think that what some have termed European exceptionalism could eventually supplant the American exceptionalism in the global economic and financial order?  Thank you. 

    MR. KAMMER: First, to move to European exceptionalism. It’s still a long and hard road away, and it starts with utilizing the single market in order to create the productivity gains necessary actually to create markets to scale and to create financing to scale so that we get a dynamic business sector going.  And that is a must, which needs to be done in order to increase growth, and also, given all of the spending needs coming to secure the European welfare state. 

    On your other question, we should not overinterpret the shifts which have taken place on the portfolio side over the last few weeks.  When markets are adjusting, you would expect rebalancing to take place.  At this stage, way too early to say whether there has been a structural shift. 

    MS. PEREZ: Thank you, Alfred. We’re going to go now to the gentleman in the fourth row with the blue jacket, please. 

    QUESTIONER: Mr. Kammer, Germany has been very praised here during the Spring Meetings for its new fiscal stimulus package.  But in Germany we have a little bit of different discussion.  A lot of economists criticize the lack of structural reforms in Germany.  Do you have already a first assessment of how the fiscal stimulus package could boost the weak German potential growth?  And do you think that the expenditures are in line with the EU fiscal rules, or must the EU fiscal rules be reformed again so that Germany just can spend the money in the end?  Thanks.

    MR. KAMMER: On your first question, yes, we do. And I hand over to Oya. 

    MS. CELASUN: Thank you very much. So, you’re asking how the fiscal stimulus will impact the German economy and how it fits in with the broader structural reform agenda.  So, it will bring some — blow some energy into the economy after several years of weak growth.  We don’t expect the ramp-up in expenditures to be very quick.  We expect the peak effect in 2026.  Basically in ’25, it will bring some partial offset to the increased drags we are seeing from the trade side from global uncertainty, weak consumer and business confidence.  But as we move into 2026 and 2027, it will be a dominant factor offsetting the expected ongoing drag from trade tensions.  So, it will certainly lift aggregate demand. 

    And the part on infrastructure spending is very welcome.  For years we’ve pointed to deficient public infrastructure as a factor holding back growth in Germany.  So not only will it help growth in the near-term through aggregate demand, but it should have, if fully spent, it should have an effect on lifting potential growth in the long-term as well.  It is one of the important areas we see for lifting potential growth as Germany moves into a period with weak growth in its workforce — in fact, a sharp contraction in the coming five years.  So that’s very welcome.  But there are other important areas.  One of them is cutting red tape, actually important for lifting public infrastructure spending as well.  It’s important for Germany to be a leader in pushing European integration and also deal with its shrinking labor force by helping women work full-time.  Thanks. 

    MS. PEREZ: Thanks, Oya. We’re —

    QUESTIONER: [off mic]

    MS. CELASUN: So maybe the important thing to mention is that Germany has fiscal space, it has low debt, it has low deficits, it has low borrowing costs. So that’s very important.  We, our own forecasts suggest that Germany, once you exclude defense spending of about 1.5 percent of GDP relative to 2021, will keep its deficits below 3 percent.  Thank you. 

    MS. PEREZ: We’re going to go now to the center. Gentlemen on the second row.  Thank. 

    QUESTIONER: Thank you.  In the updated World Economic Outlook, the IMF downgraded its projection for Ukraine up to 2 percent this year compared with the November forecast, which was 2.5-3.5 percent.  Could you please elaborate on the aspects that have affected the current forecast?  What share of this is due to the global and regional slowdown, domestic factors, war, or external support?  And secondly, may I ask you to comment on the issue of debt restructuring for Ukraine?  Do you have communication with the Ukrainian government on this, and how do you evaluate the risks for Ukraine if they couldn’t reach a deal on this issue?  Thank you.

    MS. PEREZ: Let me see if there’s any other questions on Ukraine. The lady in the third row.  Thank you.

    QUESTIONER: I also want to ask you about the crisis and there are — have many — many different cases, many countries have had their debt written off.  And do you recommend the creditors write off part of Ukraine’s debt, and is this option being considered now?  Thank you.

    MR. KAMMER: So, let me start with a question on growth first. What we are seeing is lower growth momentum carrying forward from 2024.  That is a reflection of the bombing of the energy infrastructure and that is hampering the economy.  It’s also reflecting a very tight labor market and it’s reflecting continued uncertainty of the length of the war and how the war will evolve and affect the economy.  And that is clearly weighing on growth in 2025. 

    I should say, of course, and emphasize again that the Ukraine economic team, Minister of Finance, Central Bank Governor are doing an extraordinary job to maintain macro stability under these conditions and also to prepare the economy for a post-war reconstruction period.  And important for that is the need to work on the medium-term national revenue strategy because Ukraine will need revenue in order to provide all of the necessary service of a modern state and their support the reconstruction.  So, I think that’s very important.  But praise again for the economic team to operate and attain macro stability in this difficult situation. 

    On the debt part, what we are seeing is that there is a credible process underway with private creditors that is proceeding, and that is an important element of the Fund program.  So that in the end, under the Fund program, we are going to see that sustainability in Ukraine emerging. 

    MS. PEREZ: Thank you. We’re going to go to this side of the room.  The lady in the second row.  Thank you.

    QUESTIONER: Hi, good morning.  A question on the UK.  There’s a lot of speculation in the UK about a potential trade deal with the U.S.  Will it make any difference to growth?  And our finance minister was on the radio this morning saying our trading relationship with Europe was arguably even more important because they’re nearer to us.  Do you agree with that?

    MR. KAMMER: Helge?

    MR. BERGER: We agree with everybody who concludes that more trade is better than less trade. We understand that trade has been sort of in the past and will be in the future, I’m sure, an engine for growth and productivity improvements. So, in that spirit, sort of any trade agreements that the UK will be concluding with any country going forward that will improve sort of the trading relationships that they already have are very welcome.  And we would generally encourage all countries to follow this path. 

    MS. PEREZ: Thank you. We’re going to go.  The gentleman in the second row. 

    QUESTIONER: Hi. I was just wondering, during the meetings this week, there seem to be differing opinions among European leaders about the prospects of a trade deal with the United States.  The French saying they think perhaps a deal might be some way off.  The Germans expressing more optimism.  I just wondered from your vantage point how important you think it is that a deal be done for growth for the European Union and for Europe more broadly.  Thank you. 

    MR. KAMMER: Yeah, so clearly our message is more trade is better. Trade tensions are bad for growth.  And so, we are encouraging to have constructive negotiations.  And the U.S. is a large trading partner of the European Union, so we are hoping that there will be successful negotiations taking place.  And in our discussions with European leaders, I don’t sense any difference of views with regard to the importance of that relationship and that an effort needs to be made to de-escalate and to negotiate a deal. 

    MS. PEREZ: We’re going to go online now. Go ahead please.  You can unmute yourself. 

    QUESTIONER: Good morning.  Thank you so much.  Trade between Russia and Europe has shrunk dramatically due to sanctions and counter-sanctions.  How does the IMF characterize the current state of Russia-Europe trade flows?  Are we essentially seeing a permanent decoupling of the Russian economy from its European trading partners, or are there still significant economic interactions that could influence the outlook?  Moreover, what does the IMF foresee for the future of these trade relations?  Is any normalization expected within the forecast horizon, taking into account U.S. tariffs, or will they remain at minimal levels?  Thank you. 

    MR. KAMMER: So, it would be speculative on my side to pronounce on what the future will bring with regard to the European Russian relations. Fact is that there has been a decoupling taking place, or trade has been reduced quite considerably. And Russia, in response, has increased domestic production, import substitution, and reoriented trade relations, in particular to China and India.  So that has taken place.  When we are looking at the Russian economy, what we are seeing is a quite sharp slowdown this year from last year’s growth, and that shows the strain the war is imposing on the Russian economy.  Importantly, what we see is if this isolation of Russia is going to continue, it will impact, of course, on the transfer of technology.  And we are forecasting that potential growth in Russia has fallen significantly to 1.2 percent.  And with such a potential growth rate, it will not converge to Western European living standards.  Thank you. 

    MS. PEREZ: Thanks. We’re going to go with the first row.  The gentleman in the jacket, please. 

    QUESTIONER: Thank you.  Italy’s growth forecast was cut in half, almost from 0.7 to 0.4.  Was it just on account of trade or for other factors?  And if you have any policy recommendation for the government.  And also, another question on the ECB, you are recommending that they cut 2 percent.  Most economists expect the rate to go down below 2 percent.  Are you suggesting they should stay at that level.

    MR. KAMMER: Yeah, maybe I’ll start with the ECB question, and Helge can take the question on the growth performance of Italy. So, what we are seeing is that inflation is coming down as expected. The uncertainty at this stage is at the wage side.  But here we also see a slowdown, and we are expecting wages to converge to projections by the end of this year.  And the bottom line of this is that we expect that the inflation target of 2 percent will be sustainably met in the second half of 2025.  We will see that headline inflation may be a bit below and that reflects the impact of lower energy prices.  We will see that core inflation may stay a bit above 2.  The bottom line on our side is we are looking at a monetary policy stance which will maintain sustainably this inflation rate at 2 percent.  And we are seeing that can be achieved with another 25-basis point cut and then hold at 2 percent.  We don’t see a need for going lower than 2 percent. 

    This, of course, is subject to major shocks affecting the monetary policy stance in the future.  We should not forget.  And we are emphasizing major shocks because the impact on monetary policy on inflation is not going to become evident within the first 18 months.  So, this is a long-term endeavor whenever you are changing the monetary stance.

    MS. PEREZ: Helge. 

    MR. BERGER: Italy.  So, thanks for the question.  The downgrade as in 2025, this year, 2.4 from 0.7, and next year from 0.9 to 0.8, is roughly in line what we have seen in other countries.  So, there are two factors at play.  One is the trade tensions.  They have a direct element, so there’s an exposure to tariffs.  But there’s also trade uncertainty.  And this uncertainty has also left its marks on financial conditions which have tightened.  So, all these factors sort of slow down growth. 

    In ’26, the downgrade is a bit lower because some of these effects are less urgent.  But we also do have some countervailing factors such as the NRP public investment surging as the program comes to an end.  And that’s something we welcome.  The government is making good progress in this area, and we like the public investment and reforms attached to it.  It is also clear that after ’26, when this program is over, there is an opportunity to ramp up domestic structural reforms.  The country has a comprehensive agenda which we encourage it to continue on.  That includes reforms in education and upskilling, includes business environment reforms.  And finally, labor market participation is a perennial issue in Italy, as we heard.  It’s also an issue in other countries, but I think Italy is part of this. 

    MS. PEREZ: Thank you.  We’re going to go towards the back of the room.  The lady in the light green jacket, please. 

    QUESTIONER:  Thank you.  I would like to ask about Turkish economy.  In the World Economic Outlook report, unlike most countries, we see a slight upward revision in Türkiye’s growth forecast this year.  And the country’s economic growth is also projected to accelerate next year.  How do you assess the current state of Turkish economy?  Also, how does the IMF view the country’s progress in controlling inflation? 

    MR. KAMMER: Yeah, so what we are seeing under growth performance is to some extent a carryover from a very strong momentum in the second half of 2024.  And that led to a growth upgrade, a small one, but compensating.  And that is important for the negative impact of tariffs and uncertainty on the outlook. 

    With regard to the government’s disinflation program that is moving forward.  The economic team is implementing disinflation program.  Our recommendation remains, disinflation should happen faster and that requires a tighter macroeconomic policy mix.  And the linchpin of that needs to be tighter fiscal policy.  And why do we advocate that?  The longer the disinflation effort is dragging out the longer the time of vulnerability and being hit by shocks which we don’t know yet to even think about it.  So, disinflation program accelerate linchpin is tied to fiscal policy. 

    MS. PEREZ: Thank you.  We’re going to go with the gentleman on the fifth row.  Thank you. 

    QUESTIONER:  Good afternoon.  Mr. Kammer, you strongly advocate trade agreements between Europe and other countries.  As you well know, France is quite reluctant to sign the Mercosur Agreement.  The whole political spectrum is very reluctant, saying that there are issues on farming and environment.  What would you say to convince France and other maybe reluctant countries to sign this Mercosur Agreement? 

    MR. KAMMER: Yeah, I would say first, it’s not just Mercosur.  Mercosur is one aspect.  There are other trade agreements in place.  And when you’re looking at the success of technology and of trade in terms of lifting up living standards globally, is just immense.  It’s not just putting people out of poverty, it is helping the rich world also grow richer. 

    There’s no question that whenever you have technological changes or when you are getting rid of trade barriers, that some sectors and some industries and the people working there will be negatively affected.  And on that our recommendation has always been and continues to be, and this has to be a continuous focus when you’re looking at the transformation which will be triggered by technological progress and artificial intelligence in particular, to make sure that the people have a social safety net to fall into.  It’s one part. 

    But then also, and that is as important, and that needs to be strengthened, to upskill skills of the labor force so that they find jobs in growing new dynamic sectors.  And that has to be a focus.  If I see one model which works and worked very well in the global economy, it’s the Flexicurity program in Denmark, which allows workers to move to jobs quickly, including getting the reskilling and upskilling.  And I think that needs to be the focus. 

    But it’s very clear we need to take care of those who are displaced and who are losing their jobs.  And we know how to do this, but it needs to be done. 

    MS. PEREZ: Thank you.  We’re going to go to the first row here, please. 

    QUESTIONER:  Thank you.  In the context of European and European market integration, do you see that it’s possible Bulgaria to become next member of the euro area in the next year?  Thank you. 

    MR. KAMMER: The answer is definitely yes.  But Helge, you may want to elaborate. 

    MR. BERGER: Thanks for the setup.  So, yes, we’re following this closely, of course.  I think it’s clear that Bulgaria has made major progress towards fulfilling the conditions for the access to the eurozone.  We have seen deficits in line with the EU fiscal framework of 3 percent.  We have seen inflation coming down.  So, the next step is for the European authorities to speak to this, the European Commission, the ECB, will speak to accession and then we expect the process to continue.

    From our end, this would be a welcome step for the country.  EU accession, sorry, euro accession means lower trading costs, more beneficial environment for the FDI flows, and so on.  So, there’s, there are a lot of upsides for the country, but of course it should enter strongly, just as strongly as it has performed in the last few years.  That means sort of taking care of fiscal policy, remain prudent, have an open eye on any financial sector risks that could come, including from accession, and last, not least, sort of work to complete the structural form agenda that the government has.  You know, you want to enter the euro, but you want to enter it on a strong footing. 

    MS. PEREZ: Thank you.  We’re going to go online now.  Olena, please unmute yourself.

    QUESTIONER:  Hi, everyone.  I have a question related to Europe.  Although you mentioned that increased defense spending is an upside risk, do you think that trade wars and tariffs can undermine its role for growth on European continent?  And if we compare, how do you evaluate the implementation of your policy recommendations by Europe comparing to the previous outlook? 

    MR. KAMMER: Sorry, I didn’t get the last part. 

    QUESTIONER:  How do you evaluate the implementing of policy recommendations in Europe comparing to your previous outlook? 

    MR. KAMMER: Okay, good.  So, clearly tariffs do have an impact and the longer they last, the more pronounced the impact will be, including on the medium-term outlook.  And therefore, our call on talking in terms of de-escalating and negotiating agreements, but also in general the idea of trade matters and more trade is better to look for new opportunities to lower trade barriers. 

    When it comes to our recommendations with regard to Europe, I would say on the macroeconomic front, both on the monetary policy side and also on the fiscal policy side, the right steps were taken, and the right steps are being implemented.  And clearly, on the monetary policy side, they are already showing the results.  Monetary policy, again, showed that it works in order to bring inflation down.  That was doubted at one point in time over the last few years.

    Where we seem to be repeating our policy recommendations is under EU reforms and also under structural reform sides.  And those reform areas are more difficult to tackle.  They are facing political economy considerations and resistance.  And so, clearly what we are happy about is that there is a shared diagnostic and there is a shared understanding of the policy solutions. 

    And I could tell you in our discussion with the European policymakers during these meetings, that is the case.  They all agree on the diagnostics and they all agree also on what needs to be done on the policy solution side.  And what we discussed was, so how to actually do it.  There’s willingness to do it, but it is some of the things are technical.  But there’s a lot of resistance, of course, from certain sectors and in certain countries towards change.  And what one needs to consider is maybe have a bigger approach to that and to start not discussing and negotiating just individual areas of reform where you have perceived winners and losers, but to think about more of a package deal where everybody can see something which is a win situation, and they need to make compromise on other parts. 

    I think on our side, what we are trying to do in messaging, it is very little understood, and it’s not really communicated by policymakers and politicians of the huge value an integrated single market is created for Europe.  You usually hear a point towards net contribution to a very small European budget, which is 1 percent of European GDP.  That is just a rounding mistake in the bigger scheme of things, of what wealth that single market already has created for all of the member countries and what it can create in the future by deepening this market.  And I think that is something where we are trying to help policymakers with, to change that narrative that Europe is a burden.  No.  Europe is a winner for all the 27 countries which are participating in the European Union.  And I think that’s an important message to make. 

    MS. PEREZ: Thank you.  We’re running out of time, so we’ll take one or two more questions.  We’re going to go with the gentleman on the fifth row, please. 

    QUESTIONER:  Thanks.  I have two questions.  One is, could you a little bit elaborate more on your policy advice?  For example, in Austria we have a big debate about should wage costs go down in order to bring back industry.  But if I’m correct, I hear that you see more potential in kind of a stronger integration in Europe. 

    And my second question is, I was just at the Peterson Institute where they said basically that this 10 percent appreciation of the euro versus the dollar is more or less equivalent to the 20 percent additional tax.  So what was your assumption on the exchange rate of the dollar and the euro?  And is there a danger that this might lead to more trouble if the dollar keeps getting weaker?  Thanks.

    MR. KAMMER: Mm-hmm.  Oya, do you want to take this question? 

    MS. CELASUN: Sure.  On the Austrian side, basically what we have, we’ve recently concluded a consultation with Austria and the reforms that we found to be the most important ones were to lift female and elderly labor force participation because Austria, like others, is aging rapidly.  And for that, childcare and elder care availability and access are very important.  Also, Austria is yet another country where we would see a strong push, we would like to see a strong push for European integration.  Especially the regulatory growth financing environment for startups need to be bolstered and that those require, in our view, reforms at the European level. 

    On the second side, I don’t think I caught everything. 

    MR. KAMMER: Okay.  So, on the euro, first of all, we shouldn’t translate swings and volatility into long-term trends.  We need to be careful about that.  But, of course, the exchange rate will have an impact on Europe, including on the inflation outlook, if persistent.  But what I would point towards is, there is a narrative out there that Europe is not competitive.  And that narrative is actually wrong.  Europe is competitive.  Europe has a current account surplus versus the rest of the world.  What we are arguing is that Europe has a gap in its productivity and in particular a gap in labor productivity.  And it is that to focus on in order to actually create more income.  And that’s the important stuff. 

    Now, how to deal with changes in the external environment.  The key message to Europe for that is external shocks are going to persist.  Transformations will have to take place because technology is moving, energy security needs to be established.  The green transition is a key policy priority for Europe.  And for that we need a more dynamic business sector.  And we don’t have that in Europe.  When you’re looking at startups in particular, it’s not that Europe doesn’t have the capacity to innovate, it does.  Does Europe have the startups?  Europe has the startups.  But we don’t have the environment for these startups to flourish.  They don’t need bank loans, bank loans need collateral.  And many of the startups are in the intellectual sphere in terms of what they’re providing.  And so, what you need for that is risk capital, equity and venture capital for those startups to move forward.  Many will die, but there will be winners, and they need to scale up.  And for that you need to have this risk capital.  And what happens right now is they’re going to the U.S. for that.  And that’s one part of the business dynamism which is actually taken away from Europe because companies cannot scale up.  We have these internal barriers. 

    And companies cannot scale up because we have the financial barriers.  And the financial barriers are, in Europe, we don’t have deep capital markets which can provide debt risk capital to these young startups.  We have an abundance of small and medium-sized enterprises in Europe and when you’re looking at comparison to the U.S. these small and medium term and medium sized enterprises, they are old, and their productivity is not that high.  But the young spectrum is missing.  And when we have successes, then you need to for these success stories to have the market to operate in and scale up.  We don’t yet.  And you need the capital for those companies to grow to scale.  And again, many of these companies who reach that state, they list at the New York Stock Exchange because European capital markets are too small. 

    So, if I point towards a big issue in order to address many of the problems we are seeing in the future, it must be a more dynamic business sector, including more exit of firms which are not viable. 

    MS. PEREZ: Thank you so much.  I’m afraid we’re going to have to leave it here, but please do come to us bilaterally for the questions we couldn’t take.  I would like to thank our speakers and thank you here, joining us, and colleagues joining us online with this.  We can wrap it up.  Have a good day everyone. 

    MR. KAMMER: Thank you. 

    *  *  *  *  *

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Camila Perez

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/04/25/tr-04252025-eur-press-briefing-transcript

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Press Briefing Transcript: European Department, Spring Meetings 2025

    Source: International Monetary Fund

    April 25, 2025

    PARTICIPANTS:

     MR. HELGE BERGER, Deputy Director, European Department, IMF

     MS. OYA CELASUN, Deputy Director, European Department, IMF

     MR. ALFRED KAMMER, Director, European Department, IMF

    MODERATOR: 

    MS. CAMILA PEREZ, Senior Communications Officer, IMF

    *  *  *  *  *

    P R O C E E D I N G S

    (10:00 a.m.)

    MS. PEREZ: Hi everyone.  Thank you so much for joining today’s press conference on the European Economic Outlook.  I’m Camila Perez.  I’m a Communications Officer with the IMF.  We’re pleased to be joined today by Alfred Kammer, sitting next to me, Director of the European Department here at the IMF.  Also, with us we’ve got Oya Celasun and Helge Berger, both Deputy Directors of the Department. 

    We’ll begin as usual with some opening remarks from Alfred, and then we’ll take your questions.  I see some colleagues joining online, so we will also go to your questions online.  Alfred, over to you. 

    MR. KAMMER: Welcome to this press conference on Europe. I have posted my opening remarks and also circulated.  You should have them.  So, I will just make a few points for emphasis. 

    First of all, in terms of the outlook, we have had a meaningful downgrade for Europe that reflects the impact of tariffs, partially compensated by an increase in infrastructure spending and defense spending, in particular from Germany.  But the biggest impact is coming from uncertainty and tighter financial conditions.  The impact is different for the Euro area versus CESEE (Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe).  CESEE is more affected as it has a larger manufacturing sector and is more exposed to tariffs. 

    Second point to make is when we are looking at the medium term, we see rather weak growth, and that has not changed from our previous outlook.  And that is a clear result of a large productivity gap Europe has to the global economy.  And that is something which clearly needs to be fixed.  We were talking about internal barriers; we are talking about financial barriers which need to be overcome.  So that’s part of the medium-term growth story, and that is something for the policy part. 

    On the policy recommendations, first, our recommendation is more trade is better and therefore we are very encouraged that the European Union is continuing to move forward on trade agreements.  Those who have been — which have been negotiated, they should be brought to a conclusion. 

    The second policy advice is on the monetary side.  In the Euro area, we had success in the disinflation effort.  We are forecasting now that we hit the target in the second half of 2025.  What does that mean for ECB monetary policy?  One more cut in the summer of 25 basis points and then keep the rate on hold at 2 percent until — unless major shocks ask for a recalibration of that monetary stance.  A bit different in CESEE, where inflation is more persistent and still higher, and there needs to be taken more caution in terms of the easing part.

    On fiscal consolidation, fiscal consolidation should continue.  Europe needs to build up buffers for the next shock.  But also, Europe needs to build fiscal space for long-term spending pressures, which we have on aging, health care, the energy transition, and of course, now an accelerated need is on defense spending. 

    Final point, focus needs to be on structural reforms.  In Europe, we have been making suggestions on reforms which could be taken at the EU level.  Draghi Letta, we have a shared diagnostic.  We also have an understanding of the policy solutions.  These reforms should be undertaken with urgency.  We selected a number of key reforms which are under discussion.  If we are looking at the benefit of the implementation, it would add 3 percent to the level of GDP in Europe.  So, these reforms need to be pushed forward with urgency. 

    There’s also a need for national structural reforms.  There’s lots of benefit to those.  Priority in Europe actually is on the labor market side, including on upskilling and reskilling of workers.  We put together, country by country, a set of priority reform areas.  If countries actually close the gap to the best-performing countries, best-practice countries in these areas by only 50 percent, it would give a boost to the level of GDP by 5 percent for advanced European countries, by 6 to 7 percent for CESEE countries and for the Western Balkan countries, the number is 9 percent increase in GDP.  So, the reform areas are discussed, the reform areas are agreed.  What now needs to happen is the political will, and that is not easy to overcome vested interests, but it needs to be done because this is to secure the future of Europe.  Thank you. 

    MS. PEREZ: Thanks so much, Alfred. We can now start with your questions.  We will go to the room.  Please raise your hand when called, identify yourself, name, and outlet.  We’re going to get started with the lady sitting here.  Thank you.  First row. 

    QUESTIONER: Hi, good morning.  Thank you for taking my question.  So, in recent weeks financial market has shown increasing pressure on U.S. Treasury while demand on the European debt appears to be rising.  Do you believe this shift represents a sustainable trend?  And more broadly, do you think that what some have termed European exceptionalism could eventually supplant the American exceptionalism in the global economic and financial order?  Thank you. 

    MR. KAMMER: First, to move to European exceptionalism. It’s still a long and hard road away, and it starts with utilizing the single market in order to create the productivity gains necessary actually to create markets to scale and to create financing to scale so that we get a dynamic business sector going.  And that is a must, which needs to be done in order to increase growth, and also, given all of the spending needs coming to secure the European welfare state. 

    On your other question, we should not overinterpret the shifts which have taken place on the portfolio side over the last few weeks.  When markets are adjusting, you would expect rebalancing to take place.  At this stage, way too early to say whether there has been a structural shift. 

    MS. PEREZ: Thank you, Alfred. We’re going to go now to the gentleman in the fourth row with the blue jacket, please. 

    QUESTIONER: Mr. Kammer, Germany has been very praised here during the Spring Meetings for its new fiscal stimulus package.  But in Germany we have a little bit of different discussion.  A lot of economists criticize the lack of structural reforms in Germany.  Do you have already a first assessment of how the fiscal stimulus package could boost the weak German potential growth?  And do you think that the expenditures are in line with the EU fiscal rules, or must the EU fiscal rules be reformed again so that Germany just can spend the money in the end?  Thanks.

    MR. KAMMER: On your first question, yes, we do. And I hand over to Oya. 

    MS. CELASUN: Thank you very much. So, you’re asking how the fiscal stimulus will impact the German economy and how it fits in with the broader structural reform agenda.  So, it will bring some — blow some energy into the economy after several years of weak growth.  We don’t expect the ramp-up in expenditures to be very quick.  We expect the peak effect in 2026.  Basically in ’25, it will bring some partial offset to the increased drags we are seeing from the trade side from global uncertainty, weak consumer and business confidence.  But as we move into 2026 and 2027, it will be a dominant factor offsetting the expected ongoing drag from trade tensions.  So, it will certainly lift aggregate demand. 

    And the part on infrastructure spending is very welcome.  For years we’ve pointed to deficient public infrastructure as a factor holding back growth in Germany.  So not only will it help growth in the near-term through aggregate demand, but it should have, if fully spent, it should have an effect on lifting potential growth in the long-term as well.  It is one of the important areas we see for lifting potential growth as Germany moves into a period with weak growth in its workforce — in fact, a sharp contraction in the coming five years.  So that’s very welcome.  But there are other important areas.  One of them is cutting red tape, actually important for lifting public infrastructure spending as well.  It’s important for Germany to be a leader in pushing European integration and also deal with its shrinking labor force by helping women work full-time.  Thanks. 

    MS. PEREZ: Thanks, Oya. We’re —

    QUESTIONER: [off mic]

    MS. CELASUN: So maybe the important thing to mention is that Germany has fiscal space, it has low debt, it has low deficits, it has low borrowing costs. So that’s very important.  We, our own forecasts suggest that Germany, once you exclude defense spending of about 1.5 percent of GDP relative to 2021, will keep its deficits below 3 percent.  Thank you. 

    MS. PEREZ: We’re going to go now to the center. Gentlemen on the second row.  Thank. 

    QUESTIONER: Thank you.  In the updated World Economic Outlook, the IMF downgraded its projection for Ukraine up to 2 percent this year compared with the November forecast, which was 2.5-3.5 percent.  Could you please elaborate on the aspects that have affected the current forecast?  What share of this is due to the global and regional slowdown, domestic factors, war, or external support?  And secondly, may I ask you to comment on the issue of debt restructuring for Ukraine?  Do you have communication with the Ukrainian government on this, and how do you evaluate the risks for Ukraine if they couldn’t reach a deal on this issue?  Thank you.

    MS. PEREZ: Let me see if there’s any other questions on Ukraine. The lady in the third row.  Thank you.

    QUESTIONER: I also want to ask you about the crisis and there are — have many — many different cases, many countries have had their debt written off.  And do you recommend the creditors write off part of Ukraine’s debt, and is this option being considered now?  Thank you.

    MR. KAMMER: So, let me start with a question on growth first. What we are seeing is lower growth momentum carrying forward from 2024.  That is a reflection of the bombing of the energy infrastructure and that is hampering the economy.  It’s also reflecting a very tight labor market and it’s reflecting continued uncertainty of the length of the war and how the war will evolve and affect the economy.  And that is clearly weighing on growth in 2025. 

    I should say, of course, and emphasize again that the Ukraine economic team, Minister of Finance, Central Bank Governor are doing an extraordinary job to maintain macro stability under these conditions and also to prepare the economy for a post-war reconstruction period.  And important for that is the need to work on the medium-term national revenue strategy because Ukraine will need revenue in order to provide all of the necessary service of a modern state and their support the reconstruction.  So, I think that’s very important.  But praise again for the economic team to operate and attain macro stability in this difficult situation. 

    On the debt part, what we are seeing is that there is a credible process underway with private creditors that is proceeding, and that is an important element of the Fund program.  So that in the end, under the Fund program, we are going to see that sustainability in Ukraine emerging. 

    MS. PEREZ: Thank you. We’re going to go to this side of the room.  The lady in the second row.  Thank you.

    QUESTIONER: Hi, good morning.  A question on the UK.  There’s a lot of speculation in the UK about a potential trade deal with the U.S.  Will it make any difference to growth?  And our finance minister was on the radio this morning saying our trading relationship with Europe was arguably even more important because they’re nearer to us.  Do you agree with that?

    MR. KAMMER: Helge?

    MR. BERGER: We agree with everybody who concludes that more trade is better than less trade. We understand that trade has been sort of in the past and will be in the future, I’m sure, an engine for growth and productivity improvements. So, in that spirit, sort of any trade agreements that the UK will be concluding with any country going forward that will improve sort of the trading relationships that they already have are very welcome.  And we would generally encourage all countries to follow this path. 

    MS. PEREZ: Thank you. We’re going to go.  The gentleman in the second row. 

    QUESTIONER: Hi. I was just wondering, during the meetings this week, there seem to be differing opinions among European leaders about the prospects of a trade deal with the United States.  The French saying they think perhaps a deal might be some way off.  The Germans expressing more optimism.  I just wondered from your vantage point how important you think it is that a deal be done for growth for the European Union and for Europe more broadly.  Thank you. 

    MR. KAMMER: Yeah, so clearly our message is more trade is better. Trade tensions are bad for growth.  And so, we are encouraging to have constructive negotiations.  And the U.S. is a large trading partner of the European Union, so we are hoping that there will be successful negotiations taking place.  And in our discussions with European leaders, I don’t sense any difference of views with regard to the importance of that relationship and that an effort needs to be made to de-escalate and to negotiate a deal. 

    MS. PEREZ: We’re going to go online now. Go ahead please.  You can unmute yourself. 

    QUESTIONER: Good morning.  Thank you so much.  Trade between Russia and Europe has shrunk dramatically due to sanctions and counter-sanctions.  How does the IMF characterize the current state of Russia-Europe trade flows?  Are we essentially seeing a permanent decoupling of the Russian economy from its European trading partners, or are there still significant economic interactions that could influence the outlook?  Moreover, what does the IMF foresee for the future of these trade relations?  Is any normalization expected within the forecast horizon, taking into account U.S. tariffs, or will they remain at minimal levels?  Thank you. 

    MR. KAMMER: So, it would be speculative on my side to pronounce on what the future will bring with regard to the European Russian relations. Fact is that there has been a decoupling taking place, or trade has been reduced quite considerably. And Russia, in response, has increased domestic production, import substitution, and reoriented trade relations, in particular to China and India.  So that has taken place.  When we are looking at the Russian economy, what we are seeing is a quite sharp slowdown this year from last year’s growth, and that shows the strain the war is imposing on the Russian economy.  Importantly, what we see is if this isolation of Russia is going to continue, it will impact, of course, on the transfer of technology.  And we are forecasting that potential growth in Russia has fallen significantly to 1.2 percent.  And with such a potential growth rate, it will not converge to Western European living standards.  Thank you. 

    MS. PEREZ: Thanks. We’re going to go with the first row.  The gentleman in the jacket, please. 

    QUESTIONER: Thank you.  Italy’s growth forecast was cut in half, almost from 0.7 to 0.4.  Was it just on account of trade or for other factors?  And if you have any policy recommendation for the government.  And also, another question on the ECB, you are recommending that they cut 2 percent.  Most economists expect the rate to go down below 2 percent.  Are you suggesting they should stay at that level.

    MR. KAMMER: Yeah, maybe I’ll start with the ECB question, and Helge can take the question on the growth performance of Italy. So, what we are seeing is that inflation is coming down as expected. The uncertainty at this stage is at the wage side.  But here we also see a slowdown, and we are expecting wages to converge to projections by the end of this year.  And the bottom line of this is that we expect that the inflation target of 2 percent will be sustainably met in the second half of 2025.  We will see that headline inflation may be a bit below and that reflects the impact of lower energy prices.  We will see that core inflation may stay a bit above 2.  The bottom line on our side is we are looking at a monetary policy stance which will maintain sustainably this inflation rate at 2 percent.  And we are seeing that can be achieved with another 25-basis point cut and then hold at 2 percent.  We don’t see a need for going lower than 2 percent. 

    This, of course, is subject to major shocks affecting the monetary policy stance in the future.  We should not forget.  And we are emphasizing major shocks because the impact on monetary policy on inflation is not going to become evident within the first 18 months.  So, this is a long-term endeavor whenever you are changing the monetary stance.

    MS. PEREZ: Helge. 

    MR. BERGER: Italy.  So, thanks for the question.  The downgrade as in 2025, this year, 2.4 from 0.7, and next year from 0.9 to 0.8, is roughly in line what we have seen in other countries.  So, there are two factors at play.  One is the trade tensions.  They have a direct element, so there’s an exposure to tariffs.  But there’s also trade uncertainty.  And this uncertainty has also left its marks on financial conditions which have tightened.  So, all these factors sort of slow down growth. 

    In ’26, the downgrade is a bit lower because some of these effects are less urgent.  But we also do have some countervailing factors such as the NRP public investment surging as the program comes to an end.  And that’s something we welcome.  The government is making good progress in this area, and we like the public investment and reforms attached to it.  It is also clear that after ’26, when this program is over, there is an opportunity to ramp up domestic structural reforms.  The country has a comprehensive agenda which we encourage it to continue on.  That includes reforms in education and upskilling, includes business environment reforms.  And finally, labor market participation is a perennial issue in Italy, as we heard.  It’s also an issue in other countries, but I think Italy is part of this. 

    MS. PEREZ: Thank you.  We’re going to go towards the back of the room.  The lady in the light green jacket, please. 

    QUESTIONER:  Thank you.  I would like to ask about Turkish economy.  In the World Economic Outlook report, unlike most countries, we see a slight upward revision in Türkiye’s growth forecast this year.  And the country’s economic growth is also projected to accelerate next year.  How do you assess the current state of Turkish economy?  Also, how does the IMF view the country’s progress in controlling inflation? 

    MR. KAMMER: Yeah, so what we are seeing under growth performance is to some extent a carryover from a very strong momentum in the second half of 2024.  And that led to a growth upgrade, a small one, but compensating.  And that is important for the negative impact of tariffs and uncertainty on the outlook. 

    With regard to the government’s disinflation program that is moving forward.  The economic team is implementing disinflation program.  Our recommendation remains, disinflation should happen faster and that requires a tighter macroeconomic policy mix.  And the linchpin of that needs to be tighter fiscal policy.  And why do we advocate that?  The longer the disinflation effort is dragging out the longer the time of vulnerability and being hit by shocks which we don’t know yet to even think about it.  So, disinflation program accelerate linchpin is tied to fiscal policy. 

    MS. PEREZ: Thank you.  We’re going to go with the gentleman on the fifth row.  Thank you. 

    QUESTIONER:  Good afternoon.  Mr. Kammer, you strongly advocate trade agreements between Europe and other countries.  As you well know, France is quite reluctant to sign the Mercosur Agreement.  The whole political spectrum is very reluctant, saying that there are issues on farming and environment.  What would you say to convince France and other maybe reluctant countries to sign this Mercosur Agreement? 

    MR. KAMMER: Yeah, I would say first, it’s not just Mercosur.  Mercosur is one aspect.  There are other trade agreements in place.  And when you’re looking at the success of technology and of trade in terms of lifting up living standards globally, is just immense.  It’s not just putting people out of poverty, it is helping the rich world also grow richer. 

    There’s no question that whenever you have technological changes or when you are getting rid of trade barriers, that some sectors and some industries and the people working there will be negatively affected.  And on that our recommendation has always been and continues to be, and this has to be a continuous focus when you’re looking at the transformation which will be triggered by technological progress and artificial intelligence in particular, to make sure that the people have a social safety net to fall into.  It’s one part. 

    But then also, and that is as important, and that needs to be strengthened, to upskill skills of the labor force so that they find jobs in growing new dynamic sectors.  And that has to be a focus.  If I see one model which works and worked very well in the global economy, it’s the Flexicurity program in Denmark, which allows workers to move to jobs quickly, including getting the reskilling and upskilling.  And I think that needs to be the focus. 

    But it’s very clear we need to take care of those who are displaced and who are losing their jobs.  And we know how to do this, but it needs to be done. 

    MS. PEREZ: Thank you.  We’re going to go to the first row here, please. 

    QUESTIONER:  Thank you.  In the context of European and European market integration, do you see that it’s possible Bulgaria to become next member of the euro area in the next year?  Thank you. 

    MR. KAMMER: The answer is definitely yes.  But Helge, you may want to elaborate. 

    MR. BERGER: Thanks for the setup.  So, yes, we’re following this closely, of course.  I think it’s clear that Bulgaria has made major progress towards fulfilling the conditions for the access to the eurozone.  We have seen deficits in line with the EU fiscal framework of 3 percent.  We have seen inflation coming down.  So, the next step is for the European authorities to speak to this, the European Commission, the ECB, will speak to accession and then we expect the process to continue.

    From our end, this would be a welcome step for the country.  EU accession, sorry, euro accession means lower trading costs, more beneficial environment for the FDI flows, and so on.  So, there’s, there are a lot of upsides for the country, but of course it should enter strongly, just as strongly as it has performed in the last few years.  That means sort of taking care of fiscal policy, remain prudent, have an open eye on any financial sector risks that could come, including from accession, and last, not least, sort of work to complete the structural form agenda that the government has.  You know, you want to enter the euro, but you want to enter it on a strong footing. 

    MS. PEREZ: Thank you.  We’re going to go online now.  Olena, please unmute yourself.

    QUESTIONER:  Hi, everyone.  I have a question related to Europe.  Although you mentioned that increased defense spending is an upside risk, do you think that trade wars and tariffs can undermine its role for growth on European continent?  And if we compare, how do you evaluate the implementation of your policy recommendations by Europe comparing to the previous outlook? 

    MR. KAMMER: Sorry, I didn’t get the last part. 

    QUESTIONER:  How do you evaluate the implementing of policy recommendations in Europe comparing to your previous outlook? 

    MR. KAMMER: Okay, good.  So, clearly tariffs do have an impact and the longer they last, the more pronounced the impact will be, including on the medium-term outlook.  And therefore, our call on talking in terms of de-escalating and negotiating agreements, but also in general the idea of trade matters and more trade is better to look for new opportunities to lower trade barriers. 

    When it comes to our recommendations with regard to Europe, I would say on the macroeconomic front, both on the monetary policy side and also on the fiscal policy side, the right steps were taken, and the right steps are being implemented.  And clearly, on the monetary policy side, they are already showing the results.  Monetary policy, again, showed that it works in order to bring inflation down.  That was doubted at one point in time over the last few years.

    Where we seem to be repeating our policy recommendations is under EU reforms and also under structural reform sides.  And those reform areas are more difficult to tackle.  They are facing political economy considerations and resistance.  And so, clearly what we are happy about is that there is a shared diagnostic and there is a shared understanding of the policy solutions. 

    And I could tell you in our discussion with the European policymakers during these meetings, that is the case.  They all agree on the diagnostics and they all agree also on what needs to be done on the policy solution side.  And what we discussed was, so how to actually do it.  There’s willingness to do it, but it is some of the things are technical.  But there’s a lot of resistance, of course, from certain sectors and in certain countries towards change.  And what one needs to consider is maybe have a bigger approach to that and to start not discussing and negotiating just individual areas of reform where you have perceived winners and losers, but to think about more of a package deal where everybody can see something which is a win situation, and they need to make compromise on other parts. 

    I think on our side, what we are trying to do in messaging, it is very little understood, and it’s not really communicated by policymakers and politicians of the huge value an integrated single market is created for Europe.  You usually hear a point towards net contribution to a very small European budget, which is 1 percent of European GDP.  That is just a rounding mistake in the bigger scheme of things, of what wealth that single market already has created for all of the member countries and what it can create in the future by deepening this market.  And I think that is something where we are trying to help policymakers with, to change that narrative that Europe is a burden.  No.  Europe is a winner for all the 27 countries which are participating in the European Union.  And I think that’s an important message to make. 

    MS. PEREZ: Thank you.  We’re running out of time, so we’ll take one or two more questions.  We’re going to go with the gentleman on the fifth row, please. 

    QUESTIONER:  Thanks.  I have two questions.  One is, could you a little bit elaborate more on your policy advice?  For example, in Austria we have a big debate about should wage costs go down in order to bring back industry.  But if I’m correct, I hear that you see more potential in kind of a stronger integration in Europe. 

    And my second question is, I was just at the Peterson Institute where they said basically that this 10 percent appreciation of the euro versus the dollar is more or less equivalent to the 20 percent additional tax.  So what was your assumption on the exchange rate of the dollar and the euro?  And is there a danger that this might lead to more trouble if the dollar keeps getting weaker?  Thanks.

    MR. KAMMER: Mm-hmm.  Oya, do you want to take this question? 

    MS. CELASUN: Sure.  On the Austrian side, basically what we have, we’ve recently concluded a consultation with Austria and the reforms that we found to be the most important ones were to lift female and elderly labor force participation because Austria, like others, is aging rapidly.  And for that, childcare and elder care availability and access are very important.  Also, Austria is yet another country where we would see a strong push, we would like to see a strong push for European integration.  Especially the regulatory growth financing environment for startups need to be bolstered and that those require, in our view, reforms at the European level. 

    On the second side, I don’t think I caught everything. 

    MR. KAMMER: Okay.  So, on the euro, first of all, we shouldn’t translate swings and volatility into long-term trends.  We need to be careful about that.  But, of course, the exchange rate will have an impact on Europe, including on the inflation outlook, if persistent.  But what I would point towards is, there is a narrative out there that Europe is not competitive.  And that narrative is actually wrong.  Europe is competitive.  Europe has a current account surplus versus the rest of the world.  What we are arguing is that Europe has a gap in its productivity and in particular a gap in labor productivity.  And it is that to focus on in order to actually create more income.  And that’s the important stuff. 

    Now, how to deal with changes in the external environment.  The key message to Europe for that is external shocks are going to persist.  Transformations will have to take place because technology is moving, energy security needs to be established.  The green transition is a key policy priority for Europe.  And for that we need a more dynamic business sector.  And we don’t have that in Europe.  When you’re looking at startups in particular, it’s not that Europe doesn’t have the capacity to innovate, it does.  Does Europe have the startups?  Europe has the startups.  But we don’t have the environment for these startups to flourish.  They don’t need bank loans, bank loans need collateral.  And many of the startups are in the intellectual sphere in terms of what they’re providing.  And so, what you need for that is risk capital, equity and venture capital for those startups to move forward.  Many will die, but there will be winners, and they need to scale up.  And for that you need to have this risk capital.  And what happens right now is they’re going to the U.S. for that.  And that’s one part of the business dynamism which is actually taken away from Europe because companies cannot scale up.  We have these internal barriers. 

    And companies cannot scale up because we have the financial barriers.  And the financial barriers are, in Europe, we don’t have deep capital markets which can provide debt risk capital to these young startups.  We have an abundance of small and medium-sized enterprises in Europe and when you’re looking at comparison to the U.S. these small and medium term and medium sized enterprises, they are old, and their productivity is not that high.  But the young spectrum is missing.  And when we have successes, then you need to for these success stories to have the market to operate in and scale up.  We don’t yet.  And you need the capital for those companies to grow to scale.  And again, many of these companies who reach that state, they list at the New York Stock Exchange because European capital markets are too small. 

    So, if I point towards a big issue in order to address many of the problems we are seeing in the future, it must be a more dynamic business sector, including more exit of firms which are not viable. 

    MS. PEREZ: Thank you so much.  I’m afraid we’re going to have to leave it here, but please do come to us bilaterally for the questions we couldn’t take.  I would like to thank our speakers and thank you here, joining us, and colleagues joining us online with this.  We can wrap it up.  Have a good day everyone. 

    MR. KAMMER: Thank you. 

    *  *  *  *  *

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Camila Perez

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    MIL OSI Economics

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Practical Guides on Packaging Reduction And Management

    Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

    Body

    Packaging has been playing its indispensable role in business activities and our daily lives. Yet, many of these packaging are intended to be used only once or a limited number of times before disposal. In Hong Kong, environmental problems caused by excessive packaging have been a growing concern, of which consumers are demanding more for products with simple packaging.

    Therefore, it is high time to rethink how business could balance various environmental criteria of packaging with other functional and commercial considerations, and look at ways of tackling packaging and reducing the amount of materials.

    To facilitate the trade in kick-starting their journey on packaging reduction and management, the Environmental Protection Department (“EPD”) has developed a set of “Practical Guides on Packaging Reduction and Management” (“Guides”) for specific sectors to provide practical tips and experience sharing on how to avoid and reduce packaging consumption and achieve sustainable packaging management in their daily operations. In addition, in response to the requirements of the Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited (“HKEX”) on the Environmental, Social, and Governance Report (“ESG Report”) of the listed companies for financial years commencing on or after 1 July 2020, these Guides also offer guidance and reference for trade to prepare packaging reporting and disclose packaging data in a harmonised structure so as to identify areas of improvement beyond their current practices.

    You may view the guides by clicking above links.

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: “Smart Parent Net” Recommendation: (Video)Let’s get a good night’s sleep! ─ Tips to sleep healthy(Chinese version only)

    Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

    The Study Subsidy Scheme for Designated Professions/Sectors (SSSDP) will subsidise a total of 2 276 places under 32 sub-degree programmes offered by seven post-secondary institutions, including Caritas Bianchi College of Careers, HKCT Institute of Higher Education, HKU SPACE Po Leung Kuk Stanley Ho Community College, Hong Kong College of Technology, Hong Kong Metropolitan University (including Li Ka Shing School of Professional and Continuing Education), Saint Francis University and Tung Wah College, for the cohort to be admitted in the 2025/26 academic year. The programmes and number of subsidised places, which fall under seven disciplines with keen manpower demand, namely Architecture and Engineering, Computer Science, Creative Industries, Health Care, Sports and Recreation, Testing and Certification, and Tourism and Hospitality, are determined by the Education Bureau in consultation with relevant policy bureaux and departments.

    In the 2025/26 academic year, the annual subsidy amounts for non-laboratory-based programmes and laboratory-based programmes are up to $23,390 and $40,730 respectively. The subsidy amounts are applicable to both new and continuing eligible students. The subsidy is tenable for the normal duration of the programmes concerned. Subsidised students will pay a tuition fee with the subsidy applied. Students in need may still apply for student financial assistance from the Student Finance Office of the Working Family and Student Financial Assistance Agency in respect of the actual amount of tuition fee payable.

    The subsidised places are allocated according to existing admission arrangement of the self-financing sub-degree programmes, i.e. through direct admission by institutions. Students can apply for admission to the designated sub-degree programmes directly through the institutions concerned. The subsidy for sub-degree programmes under SSSDP is applicable to local students who have attained (a) Level 2 or above in five subjects, including English Language and Chinese Language, in the HKDSE Examination; (b) Diploma of Applied Education / Diploma Yi Jin; or (c) Diploma of Foundation Studies awarded by the Vocational Training Council. The participating institutions are allowed to admit local students with other relevant qualifications, subject to a ceiling of 50% of the subsidised places of the designated programmes.

    For details of SSSDP, please visit www.cspe.edu.hk/sssdp.

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Should parents let their children go to school under inclement weather conditions?; Study Subsidy Scheme for Designated Professions/Sectors – Sub-degree programmes

    Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

    The Study Subsidy Scheme for Designated Professions/Sectors (SSSDP) will subsidise a total of 2 276 places under 32 sub-degree programmes offered by seven post-secondary institutions, including Caritas Bianchi College of Careers, HKCT Institute of Higher Education, HKU SPACE Po Leung Kuk Stanley Ho Community College, Hong Kong College of Technology, Hong Kong Metropolitan University (including Li Ka Shing School of Professional and Continuing Education), Saint Francis University and Tung Wah College, for the cohort to be admitted in the 2025/26 academic year. The programmes and number of subsidised places, which fall under seven disciplines with keen manpower demand, namely Architecture and Engineering, Computer Science, Creative Industries, Health Care, Sports and Recreation, Testing and Certification, and Tourism and Hospitality, are determined by the Education Bureau in consultation with relevant policy bureaux and departments.

    In the 2025/26 academic year, the annual subsidy amounts for non-laboratory-based programmes and laboratory-based programmes are up to $23,390 and $40,730 respectively. The subsidy amounts are applicable to both new and continuing eligible students. The subsidy is tenable for the normal duration of the programmes concerned. Subsidised students will pay a tuition fee with the subsidy applied. Students in need may still apply for student financial assistance from the Student Finance Office of the Working Family and Student Financial Assistance Agency in respect of the actual amount of tuition fee payable.

    The subsidised places are allocated according to existing admission arrangement of the self-financing sub-degree programmes, i.e. through direct admission by institutions. Students can apply for admission to the designated sub-degree programmes directly through the institutions concerned. The subsidy for sub-degree programmes under SSSDP is applicable to local students who have attained (a) Level 2 or above in five subjects, including English Language and Chinese Language, in the HKDSE Examination; (b) Diploma of Applied Education / Diploma Yi Jin; or (c) Diploma of Foundation Studies awarded by the Vocational Training Council. The participating institutions are allowed to admit local students with other relevant qualifications, subject to a ceiling of 50% of the subsidised places of the designated programmes.

    For details of SSSDP, please visit www.cspe.edu.hk/sssdp.

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI Submissions: Asia Pacific – NORTH GUADALCANAL CONSTITUENCY CHAMPIONS CDF ACCOUNTABILITY

    Source: Government of the Solomon Islands

    The era of desired change has arrived for the North Guadalcanal Constituency (NGC) as it takes the lead in Constituency Development Funds (CDF) audit compliance.

    This marks a significant step in promoting transparency and accountability in the delivery of its CDF under the national government’s Constituency Development Programme (CDP).

    Recently, the Ministry of Rural Development (MRD) conducted an internal procurement audit and compliance spot check on the constituency’s 2024 CDF budget expenditures and was satisfied to note the high-level of compliance established by the Constituency office in relation to the government’s procurement and financial management guidelines particularly the Public Financial Management Act (PFMA) 2013 and the CDF Act 2023.

    The spot-audit was conducted as part of the initial legislative and administrative reform program and work plan to be undertaken by the MRD in 2025 as provided for under the CDF Act 2023 and other public financial management requirements.

    The exercise was undertaken with the invitation made by and fully supported by the NGC through the proactive support of its, MP Honourable Dr. Paul Bosawai.

    Compliance spot checks are important for ensuring organizations’ ongoing adherence to guidelines, internal financial management procedures, and best practices to avoid and minimise fiduciary risks and legal consequences in the administration and implementation of the CDP and CDF as the source funding. They also help detect and address weaknesses in internal controls which are important mechanisms whenever public funds are being utilised on behalf of the people.

    Financial Controller Paul Gregory Alalo, who led the MRD team for the compliance check, recognized Hon. Minister Bosawai and his constituency team for the job well done.

    “I am satisfied. Your compliance with the government’s procurement guidelines, procedures, and policies is outstanding. You have set the precedence, and this is the standard that we encourage other constituencies to emulate,” Mr. Alalo emphasized.

    Mr. Alalo then encouraged the constituency team to continue the good work and to keep supporting their MP for the constituency’s prosperity, and, most importantly, to always adhere to the government’s procurement guidelines and principles.

    MRD Director of Rural Development Division (RDD) Milfred Delemani shared similar sentiments.

    While acknowledging Hon. Dr. Bosawai for his bold step, Mr. Delemani highlighted that NGC is the first-ever constituency to support the MRD reform efforts and particularly in this spot audit on its CDF expenditures.

    “This really paves the way forward for good governance, transparency, and accountability, in alignment with the CDF Act 2023.You are setting the pace for all constituencies in financial and procurement audit,” Mr Delemani said.

    “I am heartened to see such proactive, passionate, and energetic leaders like you taking the courage to initiate and set out new directions and setting the standards for the betterment of your people and the wider Solomon Islands,” Mr. Delemani underscored.

    MRD Director of Governance, Noel Matea, stressed that audit compliance has been a challenge for the ministry over the years, but with the enforcement of the CDF Act 2023, it become legally necessary for every constituency to comply with the legislative guidelines and policies to avoid legal implications.

    “You have set a standard, and this is the highest standard we encourage every constituency to fulfill,” Mr. Matea said.

    Meanwhile, Hon. Dr. Bosawai acknowledged the MRD team for accepting his invitation to initiate the audit spot-check with his Constituency.

    “It is good to start something, somewhere as an example for other constituencies because we are using Public Funds.

    “I have a big dream, and that is to build and create a better Solomon Islands that one day everyone can enjoy its prosperity. My intention in involving myself in politics is not to win elections but to bring the change that my people have long hoped for. To realize that change, we must unite in our determination and efforts. The change must begin with us. Navigating change is tough, and as leaders, we cannot expect change to happen miraculously unless we are willing to reflect, learn, and grow,” Hon. Dr. Bosawai emphasized.

    Hon. Dr. Bosawai also asserted that as part of the transformative leadership and change he is advocating for his constituency; he has also directed his constituency office and informed his constituency that no member of his immediate family will receive assistance or project under the NGC CDF allocation.

    “I have restricted my own Bosawai family from the NGC CDF support, not because I wanted to attract attention and admiration from people, but because I know God has already blessed my family with just enough, and now it is time to prioritize the needs and well-being of others. More importantly by doing this, I am limiting myself from any form of conflict of interest which may jeopardise my own integrity as a leader for my own constituents and the country,” he explained.

    Hon. Dr. Bosawai also took the opportunity to discuss his greater plans for his constituency development aspirations, aiming to deliver tangible developments that will grow the rural economy and support rural communities’ livelihoods for a better life.

    Hon. Dr. Bosawai is a first-time MP for NGC. His first major project delivered last year was the improvement of road infrastructures within his constituency.

    This year, NGC focuses on income-generating projects to support communities and constituents who are keen to participate in economic initiatives and improving rural livelihoods.

    Under the CDF Act 2023, Section 30, the CDF is subject to audit.  

    MIL OSI – Submitted News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Wyden Demands Trump Administration Restore Travelers’ Rights

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator Ron Wyden (D-Ore)

    April 25, 2025

    Mistreatment of travelers to U.S. has generated international travel safety warnings and may hurt upcoming global sporting events hosted in our country like the World Cup, Summer Olympics and the Paralympics

    Washington D.C. –U.S. Senator Ron Wyden today demanded the Trump Administration restore the rights of the one million travelers who routinely enter the U.S each day, taking note of major upcoming global sporting events like the World Cup, Summer Olympics and Paralympics to be hosted in our country

    In today’s letter to Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem, Wyden noted, “Over the past couple months, there have been numerous troubling reports of due process violations, mistreatment, prolonged questioning and detention, lengthy visa interview wait times, visa revocations, and arbitrary denials of entry of visitors and returning residents of the United States. This has turned ordinary travel into a needlessly grueling ordeal for tourists, business travelers, lawfully permanent residents, and U.S. citizens.” 

    Wyden pointed out that this administration’s approach to international travelers has prompted many countries around the world–including our allies–to issue warnings to their citizens against travel to the U.S. Additionally, law-abiding noncitizens are expressing concerns with travel to and within the U.S. and have either canceled travel plans or refrained from making them. This is leading to a noticeable decline in travel to the United States, resulting in a loss of revenue for businesses and American job losses. 

    Wyden went on to warn, “The United States is slated to host three major international sporting events in the coming years. These events should be a boon for local economies and the broader U.S. economy, but your actions toward travelers will jeopardize their success. The 2026 Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) World Cup is expected to be the largest sporting event in U.S. history, likely bringing five million international visitors and generating $5 billion in expected economic activity. Similarly, the 2028 Summer Olympic and Paralympic games are expected to generate an additional $5 billion in economic activity for the United States. 

    Wyden expressed concern for the travelers seeking entry to the U.S. for these events, including the “extraordinary athletes, support staff, government officials, journalists, business owners and spectators,” who may be hesitant, or unable, to travel here because of this administration’s harsh and chaotic treatment of incoming travelers, including foreign-born athletes who proudly and lawfully represent U.S. teams.   

    “The United States has been preparing for these sporting events for years — billions of dollars are being spent — and your Departments should be working to ensure their success. Your Departments’ policies and practices must uphold travelers’ rights and maintain the security interests of the United States — these are not mutually exclusive. I therefore ask that you immediately cease activities that harm the constitutional rights of travelers, which in turn harm the U.S. economy, and rectify your practices to support the needs of those traveling to and from our country,” Wyden concluded.

    Full text of the letter is here. 

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI: Credicorp Ltd.: “Credicorp Announces Filing Form 20-F 2024”

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Lima, April 25, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Lima, PERU, April 25th, 2025 – Credicorp Ltd. (“Credicorp”) (NYSE: BAP | BVL: BAP) has filed its Annual Report on Form 20-F for the year ended December 31st, 2024, with the Securities and Exchange Commission. The 2024 Form 20-F includes audited consolidated financial statements of Credicorp and its subsidiaries as of December 31st, 2023 and 2024 and for the years ended December 31st, 2022, 2023 and 2024 under International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS).

    The 2024 Form 20-F can be downloaded from Credicorp’s website (Annual Materials). Holders of Credicorp’s securities and any other interested parties may request a hard copy of our complete audited consolidated financial statements, free of charge, by filling out the form located on the link “mail request” at Credicorp’s website.

    About Credicorp

    Credicorp Ltd. (NYSE: BAP) is the leading financial services holding company in Peru, with a diversified business portfolio organized into four primary lines of business: Universal Banking, through Banco de Crédito del Perú (BCP) and Banco de Crédito de Bolivia; Microfinance, through Mibanco in Peru and Colombia; Insurance and Pension Funds, through Grupo Pacifico and Prima AFP; and Investment Management and Advisory, through Credicorp Capital and ASB Bank Corp.  Credicorp has a presence in Peru, Chile, Colombia, Bolivia, and Panama.

    For further information, please contact the IR team:

    investorrelations@credicorpperu.com

    Investor Relations
    Credicorp Ltd.

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI: AIFU Files Annual Report on Form 20-F on April 25, 2025

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    GUANGZHOU, China, April 25, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — AIFU Inc. (Nasdaq: AIFU) (the “Company” or “AIFU”), a leading AI-driven independent financial services platform in China, today announced that it has filed its 2024 annual report on Form 20-F (the “2024 20-F”), which contains its audited financial statements for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2024, with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) on April 25, 2025. The 2024 20-F can be accessed on the SEC’s website at http://www.sec.gov as well as on the Investor Relations page of the Company’s website at http://ir.aifugroup.com/financial-information/sec-filings. Hard copies of the annual report are available, free of charge, to its shareholders upon request.

    About AIFU Inc.

    Founded in 1998, AIFU Inc. (“AIFU”, or the “Company”, formerly known as AIX Inc.) is a leading AI-driven independent financial services platform in China. Through strategic partnerships and deep integration across the value chain, AIFU has created a comprehensive ecosystem that connects various financial institutions, service providers, agents, and independent insurance intermediaries.

    Building on this ecosystem, the company delivers comprehensive support and tailored solutions for individual agents and insurance intermediary organizations. By harnessing the power of AI, the Company enables precise matching of customer needs, enhances business development efficiency, and offers personalized, full-lifecycle insurance protection and value-added services.

    Furthermore, through its proprietary AI, big data analytics, and robotic automation platforms, the Company offers a full spectrum of services including automated underwriting, claims processing, risk management, intelligent customer engagement, smart marketing and client education, as well as compliance and security solutions. These advanced capabilities substantially improve intermediaries’ operational efficiency, empower partners to expand market presence, and enable more seamless personalized experiences for end customers.

    Forward-looking Statements

    This press release contains statements of a forward-looking nature. These statements, including the statements relating to the Company’s future financial and operating results, are made under the “safe harbor” provisions of the U.S. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. You can identify these forward-looking statements by terminology such as “will”, “expects”, “believes”, “anticipates”, “intends”, “estimates” and similar statements. These forward-looking statements involve known and unknown risks and uncertainties and are based on current expectations, assumptions, estimates and projections about AIFU Inc. and the industry. Potential risks and uncertainties include, but are not limited to, those relating to its ability to attract and retain productive agents, especially entrepreneurial agents, its ability to maintain existing and develop new business relationships with insurance companies, its ability to execute its growth strategy, its ability to adapt to the evolving regulatory environment in the Chinese insurance industry, its ability to compete effectively against its competitors, quarterly variations in its operating results caused by factors beyond its control including macroeconomic conditions in China. Except as otherwise indicated, all information provided in this press release speaks as of the date hereof, and AIFU Inc. undertakes no obligation to update any forward-looking statements to reflect subsequent occurring events or circumstances, or changes in its expectations, except as may be required by law. Although AIFU Inc. believes that the expectations expressed in these forward-looking statements are reasonable, it cannot assure you that its expectations will turn out to be correct, and investors are cautioned that actual results may differ materially from the anticipated results. Further information regarding risks and uncertainties faced by AIFU Inc. is included in AIFU Inc.’s filings with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, including its annual report on Form 20-F.

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI: AGF Investments Announces Revised Final Distribution for AGF Systematic Global Multi-Sector Bond ETF

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    TORONTO, April 25, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — AGF Investments Inc. (AGF Investments) (TSX:AGF.B) today announced a revised final distribution amount for AGF Systematic Global Multi-Sector Bond ETF (ticker: QGB) (the “ETF”).

    This is an update from the distribution previously announced on April 17, 2025.

    Unitholders of record on April 25, 2025 will receive notional distributions payable in respect of the ETF on April 25, 2025.

    The final distributions will not be paid in cash but will be reinvested in the form of a notional distribution and reported as taxable. A notional distribution is when the units from a reinvested distribution are immediately consolidated with the units held prior to the distribution. The number of units held after the distribution is therefore identical to the number of units held before the distribution. The unitholder’s adjusted cost base for the ETF may increase.

    Details regarding the revised final “per unit” distribution amount is as follows:

    ETF
    Ticker Exchange Revised Final
    Distribution Per Unit
    ($)
    AGF Systematic
    Global Multi-Sector
    Bond ETF
    QGB Cboe Canada Inc. $2.336902

    Further information about the AGF ETFs can be found at AGF.com.

    About AGF Management Limited

    Founded in 1957, AGF Management Limited (AGF) is an independent and globally diverse asset management firm. Our companies deliver excellence in investing in the public and private markets through three business lines: AGF Investments, AGF Capital Partners and AGF Private Wealth.

    AGF brings a disciplined approach, focused on incorporating sound, responsible and sustainable corporate practices. The firm’s collective investment expertise, driven by its fundamental, quantitative and private investing capabilities, extends globally to a wide range of clients, from financial advisors and their clients to high-net worth and institutional investors including pension plans, corporate plans, sovereign wealth funds, endowments and foundations.

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  • MIL-OSI Russia: Press Briefing Transcript: African Department, Spring Meetings 2025

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    April 25, 2025

    PARTICIPANTS:

    Speaker: ABEBE AEMRO SELASSIE, Director, African Department, IMF

    Moderator: KWABENA AKUAMOAH-BOATENG, Communications Officer, IMF

    *  *  *  *  *

    MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: Good morning, good afternoon, and good evening to all of you here in the room and those joining us online. My name is Kwabena Akuamoah-Boateng.  I am with the Communications Department of the IMF, and

    I will be your moderator for today. 

    Welcome to today’s press briefing on the Regional Economic Outlook for Sub-Saharan Africa. I am pleased to introduce Abebe Aemro Selassie, Director of the IMF’s African Department.  Abebe will share key insights from our new report titled Recovery Interrupted

    But before I turn to Abebe, a reminder that we have simultaneous interpretation in French and Portuguese, both online and in the room.  And the materials for this press briefing, the report, are all available online at IMF.org/Africa. Abebe, the floor is yours.

    MR. SELASSIE: Good morning and good afternoon to colleagues joining us from the region and beyond. Thank you for being here today for the release of our April Regional Economic Outlook for Sub-Saharan Africa.

    Six months ago, I highlighted our region’s sluggish growth, and the steep political and social hurdles governments had to overcome to push through essential reforms.  Today, that fragile recovery faces a new test: the surge of global policy uncertainty so profound it is reshaping the region’s growth trajectory.

    Just when policy efforts began to bear fruit, with regional growth exceeding expectations in 2024, the region’s hard-won recovery has been overtaken by a sudden realignment of global priorities, casting a shadow over the outlook.  We now expect growth in Sub-Saharan Africa to ease to 3.8 percent in 2025 and 4.2 percent in 2026, marked down from our October projections, and these have been driven largely by difficult external conditions: weaker demand abroad, softer commodity prices, and tighter financial markets.

    Any further increase in trade tensions or tightening of financial conditions in advanced economies could further dampen regional confidence, raise borrowing costs further, and delay investment.  Meanwhile, official development assistance to Sub-Saharan Africa is likely to decline further, placing extra strain on the most vulnerable population.

    These external headwinds come on top of longer-standing vulnerabilities. High debt levels constrain the ability of many countries to finance essential services and development priorities.  While inflationary pressures have moderated at the regional level, quite a few countries are still grappling with elevated inflation, necessitating a tighter monetary stance and careful fiscal policy.

    Against this challenging backdrop, our report underscores the importance of calibrating policies to balance growth, social development, and macroeconomic stability.  Building robust fiscal and external buffers is more important than ever, underpinned by credibility and consistency in policymaking.

    In particular, there is a premium on policies to strengthen resilience: mobilize domestic revenue, improve spending efficiency, and strengthen public finance management and fiscal framework and fiscal frameworks to lower borrowing costs.  Reforms that enhance growth, improve the business climate, and foster regional trade integration are also needed to lay the groundwork for private sector-led growth.  High growth is imperative to engender the millions of jobs our region needs. 

    A strong, stable, and prosperous Sub-Saharan Africa is important for its people but also the world.  It is the region that will be the main source of labor and incremental investment and consumption demand in the decades to come.  External support as the region goes through its demographic transition is of tremendous strategic importance for the future of our planet. 

    The Fund is doing its part to help, having dispersed over $65 billion since 2020 and more than $8 billion just over the last year.  Our policy advice and capacity development efforts support more countries still. 

    Thank you and I’m happy to answer your questions. 

    MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: Thank you, Abebe. Before we turn to you for your questions, a couple of ground rules, please. If you want to ask a question, raise your hand, and we’ll come to you.  Identify yourself and your organization and please limit it to one question.  For those online, you can use the chat function, or you can also raise your hand, and then we’ll come to you.  I will start from my right. 

    QUESTIONER: Good morning.  Thank you for taking my question.  You mentioned several things in your report.  The recovery that is going on the continent as well as some of the challenges that the continent is facing and the dividends that the continent currently has in its youth.  Leaders on the continent are working — I was at an event yesterday where they are looking at ways to raise funds to develop projects.  So, what is your recommendation for projects?  We’re seeing a need for projects like this as well as revenue mobilization on the continent.  So, is your recommendation to leaders on the continent on how to source these funds that are needed, given that some of the advanced economies are cutting back? 

    MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: All right, any related questions before we go to Abebe?

    QUESTIONER: Abebe, you just made the point that the recovery has been hit by these uncertainties.  Beyond just policy direction, is there any scope to do anything in terms of, for example, maybe you dispense some money though, but maybe a little more to expect — to countries that are coming off defaults and what have you to help in this recovery, even at such a time?  This is also aided by, beyond the fact that some are coming, they have no buffers whatsoever.  And then, coming from defaults, things become very difficult for some of these countries to even have the money to do this.  Could there be any extra funding, even if on a regional level, to back the policy prescriptions that you have proposed? 

    MR. SELASSIE: I think there’s two different points here. The first one is more of a broader meta point, whether financing is the only constraint that is hindering more investment, more robust economic activity, and job creation. Of course, financing plays a role, but it is not the only constraint. It depends on country-to-country circumstances, what sectors we are talking about.  But it really is important to recognize that there are many other things that can be done to engender higher growth to facilitate more investment. 

    One of the issues that we have seen in our region over the years is that a lot of growth has –in many countries– been driven by public spending and public investment for many years.  That, of course, has made a major contribution.  It has facilitated all the investment that we have seen in infrastructure, building schools, building clinics.  So, that has a role to play. But I would say that going forward it will be as important to see if we can find ways in which the private sector is the main engine of growth. So, there are reforms that can be done to facilitate this growth. 

    The second one I am sensing from both your questions is about the circumstance right now where a combination of cuts in aid [and] tighter financing conditions are causing dislocation [and difficulties for governments. We have been, more than anybody else, stressing just what a difficult environment our governments have been facing.  We have been talking about the brutal funding squeeze that countries are under.  It has ebbed a little bit and flowed, you know, like the external market conditions, for example. There have been periods when they have been opened and some of our market access countries have been able to borrow, and then other periods where they have been closed, and we are going through one right now.  And this is on top of the cuts in aid that we have seen and tighter domestic financing conditions.  

    When this more cyclical point is playing out, I think it’s important for countries to be a bit more measured in how they are seeking to tackle their development needs.  So, maybe it means a bit more relying on domestic revenue mobilization, expenditure prioritization when conditions are particularly difficult as they are now, and, as I said earlier, going back to see what can be done to find ways to engender growth over the medium-term.  But it is a difficult period, as we note in our report, and one that is causing quite a bit of dislocation to our countries. 

    MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: I will come to the middle. The lady in the front.

    QUESTIONER: My first question is around recovery, of course, your reports are called “interrupted”.  So, with recovery slipping, growth downgraded, debt pressures mountain, is Sub-Saharan Africa at risk of another lost decade?  Because in your report you mentioned that the last four years have been quite turbulent for Africa, and we are trying to get back on track.  What is IMF’s message on bold actions that leaders must take now to avoid being left behind in the global economy and to avoid Africa being in a permanent state of vulnerability?  Because we always hear that we are in a permanent state of vulnerability.  Then for Nigeria, macros are under threat right now.  How can the government — what are your suggestions on how the government can actually push through deep reforms that deliver tangible growth for its people?  Of course, for your report, you did mention the millions and millions of people that you know live below $2.15 a day. 

    MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: Any more Nigeria questions? I will take the gentleman right here.

    QUESTIONER: In your report you said that debt has stabilized.  And when you look at Nigeria’s debt profile, what insights can you share as to where the borrowings are going to?  Are you seeing more of long-term loans or short-term loans?  So that’s one.  So, what — recently the World Bank expressed concerns about the performance of Nigeria’s statistical body, saying that the institution is performing Sub optimally.  Do you share that sentiment?  Thank you very much. 

    MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: I will take one more on Nigeria. The gentleman in the first row.

    QUESTIONER: I [would] like to know in specific terms, Nigeria has already undertaken several reforms, especially removed oil subsidies and floated the naira.  What more specific things do you expect of Nigeria in terms of reform?

    MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: All right, thank you. Abebe?

    MR. SELASSIE: So, in terms of the reforms that have been going on in Nigeria and the particularities of the challenge, the first thing to note is that we have been really impressed by how much reforms have been undertaken in recent years. Most notably, trying to go to the heart of the cause of the macroeconomic imbalances in Nigeria, which are related to the fact that, oil subsidies were taking up a very large share of the limited tax revenues that the government have and not necessarily being used in the most effective way to help the most vulnerable people. The issues related to the imbalances on the external side with the exchange rate extremely out of line. 

    So it’s been really good to see the government taking these on, head-on, address those, and also beginning to roll out the third component of the reforms that we have been advocating for and of course, the government has been pursuing, which is to expand social protection, to target generalized subsidies to help the most vulnerable.  This has all been very good to see, but more can be done, particularly on the latter front, expanding social protection and enhancing a lot more transparency in the oil sector so that the removal of subsidies does translate into flow of revenue into the government budget.  So, there is still a bit more work to do in these areas. 

    We just had a mission in Nigeria where there was extensive discussions on these and other issues on the macroeconomic area, but also other areas where there is a need to do reforms to engender more private sector investment and also how more resources can be devoted to help Nigeria generate the revenues it so desperately needs to build more schools, more universities, and, of course, more infrastructure.  So, there is a comprehensive set of reforms that Nigeria can pursue that would help engender more growth and help diversify the economy away from reliance on oil.  And this diversification is, of course, all the more important given what we are seeing happening to commodity prices.  So, I think this is an important agenda. 

    Second, as the government is doing this, of course there will be a financing need.  And here what is needed is really a judicious and agile way of dealing with the financing challenges the country faces.  In the long run, the financing gap can only be filled by permanent sources such as revenue mobilization.  But in the interim, carefully looking at all the options the country must borrow in a contained way will be part of that solution.  And I think the government has been going about this prudently and cautiously so far, and we are encouraged by that. 

    And lastly, on data issues in Nigeria we really applaud the effort the government’s making to try and revise and upgrade data quality in Nigeria.  This task is not an easy one in our countries, given the extent of informality there is, given the extent of relative price changes that play out in our economies.  So doing this cautiously is what is needed methodically.  And that is exactly what we see happening.  We welcome, though, the efforts the government is making because without good data, it is difficult to make good policies.  So, we really applaud the effort the government is making to try and upgrade data quality. 

    MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: We will take a round of questions online.

    QUESTIONER: There are bills in the UK Parliament and the New York State Assembly that aim to force holdout private creditors to accept debt treatments on comparable terms to other creditors and to limit or stop such litigation.  Are these bills needed, do you think, or is the current international debt architecture sufficient?  So, you know, IMF, DSAs, creditor groups, the common framework, where applicable. 

    MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: Please go ahead with your question.

    QUESTIONER: Earlier this month, the IMF reached a staff-level agreement with Burkina Faso to complete the Third Review of the country’s program.  So as part of the review, the IMF allowed a greater fiscal flexibility, allowing Burkina Faso to raise its public deficit target to 4 percent, up from the 2 percent cap set by the West African Economic Monetary Union.  So, given that the country’s challenges, such as persistent insecurity, high social demands, are common across the region, wouldn’t it be wiser to consider applying this flexibility more broadly to the West African Economic Monetary Union?  And my second question will be about the downward revision of the growth forecast for 2025 and 2026 in Sub-Saharan Africa.  Does the IMF view this new crisis – I am talking about the global uncertainty and the recent U.S. tariff measures.  Does the IMF view this crisis as potentially more severe and with broader consequences for the region than previous shocks such as COVID and the war in Ukraine? 

    MR. SELASSIE: On the first question on debt workouts and the challenges there, I am not fully informed about the specifics of the bills that Rachel, you are talking about, indeed, we have seen from time to time some private creditor groups holding out, trying to hold out, but I am not sure that a bill is what’s needed, but rather, force of argument to try and bring people to the table. And in recent restructurings, at least I am not aware of this being the main hindrance in advancing discussions.  There have been many other factors, including just the complexity of the current creditor landscape, that have played a role. 

    On Burkina Faso, flexibility under the program or the deficit targets for the WAEMU countries more generally, just it is important to distinguish between particular years’ fiscal deficit targets that the government wants to pursue and we, incorporate in the program and just the more medium-term criteria, convergence criteria that there is for the WAEMU countries. 

    So, the 3 percent target criteria are for the medium- to long-term.  And it has been very clear that when there are shocks or when there are pressing social development needs, countries do have the scope to deviate from that.  In fact, often the constraint on the Sahel countries has been not having enough, sufficient, enough financing to be able to meet these to advance development objectives.  The other constraint of course is that overall, the more you exceed this 3 percent target and add to the overall debt burden, the more you are going to have – you are likely to build up debt vulnerabilities. 

    So, in the work that we do with countries, whether it is Burkina Faso or other WAEMU countries or indeed beyond, what we try and help with is of course to help countries strike this balance between addressing the immediate and pressing needs that they have while avoiding medium-term debt sustainability problems.  I think one is just thinking about how to strike this balance.  And then second, we put resources on the table very cheaply to help countries, avoid, at least in the near term, more difficult financing difficulties.  So, for Burkina and others, it is just about striking this balance.

    And on growth, whether this latest shock is as bad for the region as the previous ones. I think it is really important also to point out that as difficult, I mean the last four or five years have been incredibly difficult time for our countries, a lot of challenges, a lot of dislocation, but there is also been quite a lot of resilience, and I think that is important to stress.  I would note that, even now, it is this year, 11 out of the 20 fastest growing economies in the world are from Sub-Saharan Africa.  So, there are quite a lot of countries that are going to be sustaining significant growth in the region.  So, we should also not lose sight of this resilience. 

    Second, and more broadly, the buildup of uncertainties I think is very negative.  And this is interrupting what we are seeing in terms of a recovery.  But growth is not, we are not projecting growth to collapse.  And our hope is that as things calm down, the region can resume its growth trajectory also.

    MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: We will take three more questions online, then we will come back to the room.

    QUESTIONER: I wanted to know about Senegal, in terms of whether funds would be repaid after the misreporting of data and if the IMF has learned anything from that?  And also, just if you can, the status of the IMF’s programs and even operations in Sudan and South Sudan? 

    MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: Please go ahead.

    QUESTIONER: The IMF is urging countries to focus on domestic revenue mobilization.  But you may have seen that South Africa’s Finance Minister has withdrawn the VAT increase that he had proposed in the budget, in the face of opposition from coalition partners.  Does the IMF see any alternative sources of revenue that are feasible for the South African government as the parties hoped?  And are there any lessons here for other countries trying to mobilize domestic revenue?                                                         

    QUESTIONER: Building on the question that Hilary has asked that the REO does make the case for domestic revenue mobilization, and you made that argument, I believe, in the last two Regional Economic Outlook reports as well.  But poverty is still endemic.  Incomes, as far as I can tell, have not really recovered to pre-pandemic levels.  So other than broadcast to tax exemptions what else can be done to raise tax-to-GDP ratios?  One last question on this.  Has there been any progress that has been made in the Sovereign Debt Roundtable in deciding how debt from Afreximbank, and Trade and Development Bank should be treated, at least under the common framework for countries like Ghana and Zambia?  Now, do they qualify to not have their debt restructured in the same way that the IMF, the World Bank’s credit lines?

    MR. SELASSIE: On Senegal, I was recently in Dakar for discussions building on work that our team has been doing. What we are waiting for is the government to finalize the work that’s ongoing.  Right now, the audits are going on and reconciliation work is going on. 

    On the extent of domestic and external debt.  We have been very clear in welcoming the transparency and really robust and collegial way in which the government has been engaging on the issues that have arisen in the misreporting case and we look forward to the numbers stabilizing, and engaging in discussions on the next steps in terms of bringing the, the findings to our Executive Board and next steps in our engagement with Senegal. 

    On South Sudan, it has just been a difficult period of course for South Sudan.  They have been hosting hundreds of thousands of refugees fleeing from the conflict in the north.  The conflict has also interrupted, disrupted heavily their main source of tax revenue, oil exports through the pipeline.  So, it’s been a really wrenching period.  Over the last three, four years we have provided, you know, we have been trying to provide South Sudan with emergency financing and trying to find a way in which we can engage with a more structured longer-term program.  We remain hopeful that we are going to be able to do that.  But first and foremost, I think we need to see what can be done to make sure that the policy making environment is as robust and as strong as it is, and as transparent, so we can come in, step in and support South Sudan.

    On revenue mobilization, I want to just first link this to the point I made earlier that what we have observed and again there is a risk of generalizing, but what we’ve observed over the last 10, 15 years in the region is that governments have made a very significant effort to invest in really important infrastructure needs in building schools, in building health clinics and much else.  And you see very positive outcomes.  Look at the electricity coverage in our region, look at the human development indicators and how much they have moved over the years in the region. 

    But we have also seen that despite a lot of investment, for example, in electricity generation capacity and electricity coverage in our countries, many roads are being built.  The returns of all this investment have not been captured in the tax revenue, which is one of the points, the pressure points where debt levels have gone up and the interest-to-revenue ratio.  So, the interest payment-to-revenue ratio has also been rising.  And this has been one of the key points of vulnerability in many economies and why a few countries have gotten into debt difficulty and needed to restructure. 

    So going forward, I think it’s very clear that to be able to continue investing; to be able to continue expanding economies and the government doing its core function, it has to find more ways other than borrowing to address this. 

    Now, in the past, governments have been quick to cut spending, and that has, we found, again and again, to be very detrimental to development progress and growth outcomes.  I think this, again, at the risk of generalizing, was the approach that was generally pursued in the 1980s and found to be very problematic, very challenging, very depressing to growth.  So, we would very much love for countries to avoid this. When there are pressing spending needs, there’s generally only a couple of ways that you can finance this.  Spending cuts or revenue mobilization.  You can borrow, of course, but as I said, borrowing is not optimal. 

    Now, this doesn’t mean revenue mobilization is easy.  Far, far from it. It requires not only political engagement, but also a lot of communication, a lot of effort to show that the resources the government is trying to generate are going to be going to the right areas to help strengthen the social contract.  So, it’s a deep and engaged process, and we are very, very cognizant of that.  But I do think that this is the most optimal way, the most economically sensible way in which our countries can help address the tremendous development needs that we have.

    Now, specifically on South Africa, ultimately when issues like this arise, these are deeply domestic political issues to be resolved as to what the best way to do the financing is.  So, if a tax rate increase for a particular tax is not possible, then maybe finding ways to expand the tax base, maybe trying different tax angles or if all of those are not possible, then revisiting spending priorities may be one of the ways that countries must handle this.  And this is typically what we see playing out in countries in the region when financing constraints are binding. 

    So, whether it is in Kenya, South Africa, or other countries the issue of revenue mobilization is a live one, but one that is extremely complex.  We are very cognizant of that.  And one that requires quite a lot of consensus building, quite a lot of discussion to be able to advance, and of course, broader societal support.  And we absolutely see countries engaging in this and do what we can to help bring lessons from other countries where we are asked to.

    Then there was a question about the GSDR.  So, this Global Sovereign Debt Roundtable, this is the initiative launched by the Fund and the Bank to try and bring creditors and debtors together around the table to find ways in which debt work[outs] can be easier because you are discussing general principles rather than country-specific debt restructuring issues. And we have seen this making quite a lot of progress. Perhaps the most recent development has been the preparation of a debt work[out] playbook that is a very helpful document that has been put out building on the experience of recent work[outs].  What has worked particularly well.  What kind of information sharing ahead of debt work[outs] have been helpful in terms of accelerating debt processes.  Debt restructurings are one of the most contentious and challenging issues that there are between states, between creditors and debtors, and it requires quite a lot of discussion, and it is not such an easy thing to do, including what the parameter of debt should be.  I think one of the questions that was raised is about the debt parameter.  This is fundamentally an issue for the debtor countries and creditors to resolve, and intra-creditor disputes also have to be done. 

    So, in terms of the principles that generally we see creditors apply when these kinds of disputes arise about what the right parameter should be or not and who gets preferential treatment. I think there’s generally been two rules of thumb. One is that the terms in which new financing is being provided or the financing is provided, whether it’s commercial or concessional has been a factor that most creditors look at in terms of whether a particular credit should be included in the parameter or not, and then also the extent to which new financing is being made available.  So, what differentiates senior creditors like the IMF, the World Bank, of course, is that for most countries we operate providing concessional financing very long-term.  And we are the ones that come in and provide financing consistently through crisis and otherwise. 

    MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: We have time for one more round of questions. I will start with the gentleman in the front here. 

    QUESTIONER: The U.S. is your largest shareholder, and we are seeing mixed messages this week from the Treasury Secretary mentioning that he remains committed to the Fund but also calling on you to hold countries accountable to program performance, empower staff to walk away if reform commitment is lacking. 

    So, I wanted to ask you, should we expect the IMF spigot to start closing in response to U.S. pressure?  Or if not, are you changing your approach to countries, what you are telling them and how to deal with their issues?  Are you being a little more stringent in your requirements? 

    You have talked about Senegal, maybe Ghana, Ethiopia, related to that issue of the U.S stepping in.  The CEMAC negotiations this week, we saw American energy companies working with the CEMAC on repatriation of funds dedicated to the rehabilitation of oil sites.  I’m wondering if you have a stance on that, what the IMF position is?  I understand the U.S is trying to get the IMF involved in that.

    MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: All right, thanks. Gentleman. 

    QUESTIONER: Kenyan authorities here have indicated the need to present a credible fiscal framework as they try and unlock a new program for Kenya.  Would you offer more color into the discussions this week, noting again that the same credibility questions led to the cancellation or the termination of the program at its final review?  

    MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: We have a question online “what is the IMF’s view on Kenya’s debt position?”

    MR. SELASSIE: So, on the first question, I would like to refer you to Kristalina who gave comprehensive responses to the Secretary’s IMFC Statement. What I want to add though is that in the region, in Sub-Saharan Africa, in terms of programs, the calibration of reforms, incorporation of reforms, I would say that we are always in terms of each program has its particularities and what we always try and do in these programs is make sure that we’re striking a balance of helping countries address the long term challenges and also the cyclical challenges that are often the ones that cause them to come to us.  And I would say that I don’t think there are many countries that think that the adjustment efforts that they’re being asked to make are easy ones.

    On CEMAC.  Just to be very clear there is this dispute that is going on between member states, the BEAC, and oil companies with respect to what are called restitution funds.  The funds under contracts that countries have with oil companies are meant to be available to help restore the sites where oil is extracted back to their pre-extraction standards. 

    What has been a bit frustrating is that we are not privy to the contents of these documents. We have been calling on members and the companies involved to be transparent about this, to publish these documents.  They are after all documents that are about how countries natural resource wealth are used.  And we’ve been on record going seven, eight, nine years pushing for production sharing agreements, the terms of these things to be published so that each side can hold the other accountable.  I think that is the first thing that could be done to bring more transparency and light and understanding to the rest of the world about what is going on in these discussions. 

    Second, we have also made it clear to both parties that given that we do not have full information, it is difficult for us to know what to say.  But in general, any encumbrances in terms of how we look at foreign exchange reserves and these standards are published, any encumbrances like the type that we think there may be in the document, i.e., that is the expectation that these resources will be used for specific purposes means they’re not general use reserves.  So, they would not be classified as part of reserves. 

    On Kenya, we have had a very strong engagement with Kenya over the years and will continue to have such engagement going forward.  As we have noted, government has asked for a follow-on program to try and address the remaining challenges in Kenya, and we are discussing how to do that including in the context of these meetings. 

    It has been good to hear and see that the economy has been performing quite well in some parts.  Particularly the external adjustment front seems to have been proceeding well.  The current account has been narrowing.  So, there are quite a lot of strengths.  But also of course there remain fiscal challenges which were a significant part of the last program’s objectives that need to be advanced.  So, we are going to engage with the government and do everything that we can to be able to help it go forward. 

    MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: Unfortunately, that is all the time we have. So, if you have any questions that we didn’t get to, please send them to me or to Media at IMF.org and we will try and get back to you as soon as possible.  So, also to mention that the report is now available at IMF.org/Africa.  The Spring Meetings continue.  Later this morning, we have the press briefing for the European Department and later in the afternoon we have the IMFC, and the Western Hemisphere Department press briefings. 

    On behalf of Abebe and the African and Communications Departments, thank you all for coming to this press briefing and see you next time. 

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Kwabena Akuamoah-Boateng

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/04/25/tr-04252025-african-department-press-briefing-transcript

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  • MIL-OSI Russia: Press Briefing Transcript: IMFC, Spring Meetings 2025

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    April 25, 2025

    Speaker:

    Kristalina Georgieva, Managing Director, IMF

    Mohammed Aljadaan, IMFC Chair, Minister of Finance, Saudi Arabia

     

    Moderator:

    Julie Kozack, Director, Communications Department, IMF

     

     

    Ms.  Kozack: I am delighted to have with me the Chair of the IMFC, His Excellency Mohammed Aljadaan. He is also the Minister of Finance of Saudi Arabia. And of course, our Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva.

    Minister Aljadaan and the Managing Director will first share some takeaways with you and then when that is concludes we will turn to you for your questions.  Your Excellency, the floor is yours.

    Minister. Aljadaan: Thank you, Julie. Thank you, Kristalina. And thanks to all of you for being here. At the outset, let me highlight an important development that took place the first time in these meetings, which is the IMFC welcoming its 25th member, the third chair of Africa. Obviously, this is an important milestone that strengthens the voice and representation of the African continent in a global economic dialogue. I would like to thank all members who made this possible.  

    On the IMF agenda, going forward, the Fund must continue to focus on its core mandate, including supporting international monetary cooperation, encouraging the expansion of trade and economic growth, and discouraging policies that would harm prosperity.

    In recent days, the IMFC members welcomed steps to further strengthen the effectiveness of the IMF’s three core functions, its surveillance of global economic trends, its lending where we welcome the review of program design conditionality, and its capacity development assistance, which helps ensure growth in so many member countries and within countries.

    Addressing global debt vulnerabilities remains a priority for our members, especially for low‑income and vulnerable countries. They welcome the progress made in debt treatments under the G20 Common Framework. They also express their commitment to addressing global debt vulnerabilities in an effective, comprehensive, and systemic manner.

    Members encouraged the IMF and the World Bank to help advance the implementation of the three‑pillar approach to address debt service pressures. We appreciate the tremendous efforts of the members in shaping the medium‑term direction of the IMF and contributing to the Diriyah Declaration.

    The Diriyah Declaration represents a forward‑looking approach to strengthening the IMFC process and advancing governance reforms and has received full support from the members. Just to clarify, when I say the Diriyah Declaration, this is the Declaration that was prepared by the Deputies in their meetings in Saudi Arabia earlier this month in preparation for this meeting.

    Here we aim to ensure that the Fund remains well‑equipped to meet future challenges in line with its core mandate. Before I hand it over to Kristalina, I have to comment on the topic of the day, which I think a lot of people are talking about, trade tension. Many members have told me how the trade situation has created significant uncertainty. Indeed, the buzz word was uncertainty all over this week, and indeed it also carries with it market volatility, presenting real risks to the global growth and financial stability. But as Kristalina said recently, these threat conflicts have been like forgetting a pot boiling on a stove. Well, now that pot is boiling over. In other words, we should not be surprised that there are trade tensions. And this situation is an opportunity for us all to have constructive conversations about how we will move forward together. This is a challenging time, but I have always been optimist and absolutely make no apologies for that. I will explain to you why. History tells us that the bigger the challenge, the more it requires us to come together to convene and to have an honest conversation. That is exactly what happened this week. That is exactly the power of the IMF to actually be able to convene everybody around the same table in closed rooms and discuss issues in a constructive way.

    I have told colleagues, I arrived in Washington a week ago with a lot of noise in my ears from reading the news and following social media. I have told them, everyone that I met in the early days, please keep your thoughts cool, and we will see where we are going to end. Actually, today we are ending in a lot better position than when we started the week. People understand the consequences and are working together in a constructive manner to resolve tensions.  

    I am also confident that because of the IMF, the IMF is really watching us very closely, following the global situation and is really providing advice to its members in real‑time, offering an assessment of the potential impacts and the best way to proceed.  

    This week we have seen an incredible assurance confirming the position of the IMF and its convening power and contributing to positive development, including in relation to Syria. Gathering together to talk about Syria and building on our meetings in AIUla has given us a new sense of urgency and purpose, to turn a conflict‑affected state, which is Syria, into a stable and economically successful one, benefiting the region and the world. It is not just about the money. It is about the work that the IMF and other partners can deliver on capacity development, quality data, and timely advice.

    Again, I would like to thank Kristalina and the IMF staff. And I can tell you, it was an incredible, unanimous position today to thank the IMF for their incredible, incredible brain cells power, which was able really to produce a very comprehensive report about what is happening in the world in a very short period of time, and it was fantastic. Thank you, Kristalina. Thanks to all the IMF staff and thank you again for being here. The floor is yours.

    Managing Director: Thank you very much, Minister Aljadaan, for your kind words now, but above all for your exemplary leadership of the IMFC. I want to tell everybody here that the way you chaired the meetings brought the members together to speak openly, frankly and as a result to find a path to common understanding that is so necessary in the current environment because, as we all know, our meetings take place against a challenging backdrop. You have seen our World Economic Outlook. It shows that the global economy is facing a significant slowdown and also that risks are on the downside.

    Understandably Ministers and Governors are concerned, but at the same time they have also exhibited a remarkably constructive spirit in these meetings, coming together, showing willingness to take on the challenges facing the global economy. Minister Aljadaan laid out the substance and achievements of our discussions. Let me add just three points. First, Ministers and Governors agreed on the importance of reducing uncertainty and working together to clarify policies.

    Second, importantly, they recognized that they need to seize the moment to put their own houses in order. And I saw very firm resolve to tackle difficult and, in many cases, delayed reforms at home, to strengthen resilience, to remove impediments to productivity and lift up their medium and long‑term growth prospects, and to address underlying domestic imbalances which drive external imbalances. To put it simply, addressing external imbalances starts at home.

    Finally, we discussed how the IMF can help countries successfully navigate this period of change and build resilience. I was very heartened to hear from the membership strong support for our work to promote macroeconomic and financial stability and to do it through robust bilateral, multilateral and regional surveillance, be there for our members when they need to cope with balance of payments problems, finance—finance them, but also finance them with the clear objective that they can strengthen their economies. I can say the words of support for our capacity development, in other words, helping countries have strong institutions, strong policies. That support was overwhelming.

    At this period of complex challenges for the membership, they also gave us homework. I want to emphasize two areas where we will further deepen our work. One, do more work on external imbalances, dig deeper, when they could become a source of concern and provide advise how to address them through policies. Two, continue to scan the financial sector to identify potential sources of instability, especially in the non‑bank sector, and provide advice on how best to enhance resilience.

    Overall, what I can tell you is that what I heard this week was an incredible determination by our members to steer economies through this period of change and uncertainty. And it gave me confidence that we actually can take challenge and make opportunity, that we can have a more resilient, more balanced world economy.

    Like Minister Aljadaan, I started the week more anxious of our capacity as a global community to come together, and I finished the week with more confidence that this is exactly what we will do.

    Ms. Kozack: Thank you very much, Minister, Managing Director. We will now open the floor to your questions, so please raise your hand if you have a question and please identify yourself and your outlet. I will start here in the middle. I am going to go to the gentleman in the kind of White shirt. Yes, right here.

    Question: Thank you, Julie. Question for Minister Aljadaan and Managing Director Georgieva. You both pointed out that we ended a week in a way better position than when we started it. Managing Director, during your Curtain Raiser Speech, you also raised the hope that this week might be an opportunity for everybody to discuss. How do you feel like? Could you elaborate perhaps on how this week dialing down the uncertainty that you talked about and the global tensions when it comes to trade? Thank you very much.

    Managing Director: Finding a path to solutions starts from looking at the problem from a—seeing the problem with the same eye view. Let me start this again. To resolve a problem, you have different parties. To resolve a problem, they need to have information about the problem that allows them to have a meaningful conversation. I can say that I am very, very grateful to the staff of the IMF because what we did was to offer the members information that allows them to see what is ahead of them and expand their horizon. If you look at a problem only from a narrow point of view, it is difficult to have a meaningful conversation to resolve it.

    Secondly, what I saw was a genuine openness to present views in a candid way and to listen to each other.

    Third, and the third is the most important, it is a traction and engagement among members that could then bring a better—faster and better outcome. I do not want to sugarcoat. We still have quite a challenging time. It is challenging not just because of the tariffs and the uncertainty. It is also challenging that there are other transformational forces in play. Because of the overwhelming attention to tariffs, we stopped talking about other things, like artificial intelligence, demographics transition, and I think that that sense that we can have an engagement in a comprehensive way on a complex set of challenges, that came during the meetings quite strongly. Does it mean that everybody agrees with everybody else? No. But do we have an open conversation, engaged conversation with the fair space for everybody to present their views? Yes.

    Minister Aljadaan: Thank you. If I may, Julie, I think just to complement the Managing Director’s views, I think overall what do you need to resolve conflicts like this or tensions like this? A, you need to make sure that you understand the parties’ positions, where they are coming from, why they are taking these positions, and what are they seeking to achieve. Second, make sure that they actually talk. And that is largely what happened this week. So to have everybody who is party to all this trade tensions, which is almost everybody, all the members, around the same table in a candid discussion that is closed even—some of it has been in the restricted sessions—to really be open and talk about what are they doing, why they are doing it, what is their view of what is going to happen in the next even short period of time is very assuring. Sharing that information is very assuring. Understanding the implications of these actions on other nations, including low‑income countries, emerging economies and implications of that is actually very helpful for them to appreciate the consequences of their positions.

    I can tell you without—I cannot disclose some of the discussion that has taken place, but I can tell you there was a very clear, frank discussion, including a projection of a timeline for a resolution of some of these issues. So that is very assuring.

    Managing Director: Can I just add one point, that when people are in the same room, the abstract policies become more human because then we understand these policies are affecting people, and the whole world—the people of the whole world are then present, and that makes the conversation different. No longer it is an academic conversation. It is a very real-life conversation.

    Ms. Kozack: Thank you. I will go to this side. I will go to the second row, gentleman with the blue jacket and the glasses.

    Question: Thank you so much for taking my question. I am from Bangkok. Your Excellency, you have mentioned uncertainty around the world in your opening remarks. So, I want to ask specifically on the consequences for the emerging markets as a whole, and what is your policy advice for the situation and also do you see any short‑term lasting impacts to these countries? Thank you.

    Minister Aljadaan: I will give it a time and then you can complement. First of all, I look forward to our renewal meeting in Thailand next year and seeing the preparations from now, I think a lot of people are excited and waiting for our meetings there. I am sure it will be very constructive in the hospitable country of Thailand and the Kingdom of Thailand.

    Obviously emerging economies, particularly emerging economies with limited fiscal space have little room to maneuver to deal with shocks. And even if these shocks have been resolved, there is some lasting impact. The earlier, the faster that these shocks or trade tensions in this context is resolved, the better for everybody. But we are not in a perfect world and things may take time and countries may get an impact, and that is where the IMF excels. That is where is IMF capacity building, advice comes into actual real play. So, the Managing Director is here and her staff with an incredible talent will be able to actually provide that support to emerging economies.

    Managing Director: As a group, emerging markets by and large are generally highly open. They rely on—many of them rely on exports as an engine for growth. They are quite active in international bond markets, so because they are highly exposed, the impact on emerging markets is quite significant. Some of the emerging markets, especially those that were in a tougher position after the multiple shocks, also face very limited and some of them non‑existing policy space to act.

    We have downgraded growth projections for emerging markets and developing economies to 3.7 percent for 2025. This is a 0.6 percent downgrade. And to 3.9 percent for 2026. What does that mean? It means that some of them would see a significant slowdown in their convergence to higher‑income countries. And they are also seeking ways to overcome the challenges ahead. What works for them is emerging markets have been fantastic in building resilience to shocks. And when I look at the universe of emerging market economies, quite a number of countries have become more agile in their policymaking, are more mature in how they approach their fiscal and monetary policy. That puts them in a better position.

    To use an analogy, it is like they have gone through multiple periods of being tested and they got immune to shocks to a certain degree. They would be seeing possibly somewhat less inflationary pressure. Why? Because when you are on the receiving end of tariffs, what it means is that actually domestically you do not have pressure on prices. We can expect emerging markets to look at their policy tools very carefully. We urge them, be very careful with fiscal measures. Do not rush to provide fiscal support willy‑nilly because you cannot afford to lose fiscal space. Have a medium long‑term framework to rebuild this fiscal space. On the monetary policy side, watch pressures. We are saying inflation is likely to slow down but watch it and watch inflation expectations. Do what is necessary, given the data you have. And very important, allow the exchange rate to be a shock absorber.

    We have the integrated policy framework that offers advice to countries how to approach exchange rate issues with great care. You are an emerging market. Actually, the Minister is not saying that, but one thing emerging markets can do for themselves is, get your own house in order. Pursue reforms relentlessly because this is what makes you stronger.

    Ms. Kozack: We have time for just one last question. So, I am going to go second row, the gentleman in the blue suit.

    Question: Thank you, Ms. Kozack. Mr. Aljadaan, Managing Director Georgieva. I am from Lebanon. My question is addressed to both of you. How will the IMF support Syria and what role will it play in Syria’s reconstruction. Thank you.

    Ms. Kristalina Georgieva: Minister Aljadaan in the opening recognized that Syria has returned to the international community. We had a meeting with Syrian representatives in AIUla during an emerging market conference. We had a meeting on fragile and conflict‑affected states. And at that time, we made the first step to create a coordinating group so different institutions that can support Syria can start working together. We held a meeting here in Washington during the Spring Meetings. It was co‑chaired by Minister Aljadaan, President Banga and myself, with the Finance Minister and the Central Bank Governor of Syria. In this meeting we discussed how we can start rebuilding institutions and policy capacity in Syria and how different institutions can play on their comparative advantage to help. For the Fund specifically, what it means is, of course, cautiously but engage to first define data, what is available, how we can rebuild credible data capability.  

    Second, central bank capacity. How can we rebuild the functioning of Syria’s central bank.

    Third, tax policy and how can the country rebuild capacity to create revenues for its functions.

    We have appointed a Mission Chief for Syria. We have not had Article IV Consultations with Syria for a long, long time. We hope that we can contribute in putting the foundation of knowledge, economic policy knowledge in Syria to get the country back on track. 

    I mean, just imagine, they have been in a Civil War for 14 years. A big part of the population is not in Syria. They are in Lebanon. They are in Iraq. They are in Jordan. The fabric of the Syrian society is deeply wounded. It is going to take a lot of work by the Syrians themselves to rebuild it. This is when international organizations can play a constructive role. Lebanon, you are not asking about Lebanon.

    Question: I heard the meetings went quite well by the end, especially since the Lebanese Parliament voted about the banking sequencing. That is more in line with international standards, so what are you—

    Managing Director: You are not asking because you know. That is very good.

    Ms. Kozack: Minister, would you like to have the last word?

     

    Minister Aljadaan: I have a few things. First of all, I really thank the IMF and the World Bank in stepping up their support to Syria and other states who are emerging from fragility. Syria in particular is a case where we have an opportunity. We have a government that is willing, and we have regional partners who are also providing support and willing really to provide whatever it takes to make sure that we bring back Syria, support its people and make sure that we also move cautiously through that process, recognizing that obviously there are sanctions that we need to deal with and other impediments. But even with that, I think standing with them, providing capacity support and advice and some regional and bilateral, even financial support is very crucial. The Syrian people deserve that support. And that does not stop at Syria. We are talking about Syria as an example, we have Yemen, we have Palestine, we have Sudan, we have other countries that really need the support, including Lebanon. They need to know that the international community, if they put their act together, the international community will stand by them, so we will continue that.

    Ms. Kozack: We are almost five minutes over our time.

    Managing Director: Ask your question short, and we will try to answer.

    Ms. Kozack: And have a very brief answer.

    Managing Director: It is my fault. I am the one that is professorial.

     

    Question: My question is to the MD concerning the global uncertainty on trade tensions shaping sub‑Saharan Africa’s debt risk, servicing costs as well as our fiscal future and its coordination with creditors such as you, so how are Africa also in all of these conversations? Thank you.

     

    Managing Director: As Minister Aljadaan said, Africa was more present this time because we now have three sub‑Saharan African representatives in the IMFC. But beyond that, very much on our minds, quite a number of the Governors of the Fund spoke about the importance to pay attention to countries that are particularly severely affected by this turbulence because they have a high level of debt and that suppresses their ability to cope.

    By the way, countries with high level of debt are not just in sub‑Saharan Africa. We have them all over the world.

    What has been done during these meetings is threefold. First, very strong emphasis on the three‑pillar approach of the IMF and the World Bank for countries that experience liquidity constraints. They are not yet facing debt sustainability problems, but they are on the way to there. And for these countries to concentrate support for domestic resource mobilization, concentrate attention to how to mobilize more international financing and very important, concentrate on how the private sector can play a bigger role in the economy.   

    Second, for countries where debt is not sustainable, how to make debt restructuring faster and more effective. We have issued this week a playbook for debt restructuring that was the outcome of the Global Sovereign Debt Roundtable. What it shows are the steps that need to be taken.

    As you recall under the Common Framework, there was some confusion around how exactly to go about it, what is the timeline, what is the exact sequencing of steps. This is now being clarified. If we follow the playbook, we play by the book, we get debt restructuring in less than 12 months. And the third thing, very important for the Fund, is that our members have put in place a way to expand our capacity to finance low‑income countries through the Poverty Reduction Growth Trust so the Fund can step up financing for countries, so they do not need to—they do not need to go through a super painful adjustment because of this burden of debt. We can ease their path. But, again, we want to see countries act decisively on reforms so they—you do not borrow your way out of debt. You grow your way out of debt. So, when countries have that growth potential enhanced, then they can also reduce debt vulnerability. It was not very short. My apologies.

    Ms. Kozack: Minister, would you like to add?          

    Minister Aljadaan: I am fine. I think the Managing Director did a great job in answering.

    Managing Director: Look, you have to forgive me. I was for 14 years a professor. It kicks in.

     

    Minister Aljadaan: We enjoy it, Kristalina

    Managing Director: Thank you very much, everybody.

    Ms. Kozack: This does bring us to an end, so thank you for joining us. And let me just add that the full transcript of the press briefing will be available online on the IMF website. And, of course, should you have further questions, please do not hesitate to reach out to my colleagues at IMF media.org. Thank you.

     

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Wafa Amr

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/04/25/tr-04252025-imfc-press-briefing-transcript

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Rep. Mike Levin and Toy Manufacturer Reveal Tariff’s Consequences on the Cost of Living and Local Jobs

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Representative Mike Levin (CA-49)

    April 24, 2025

    Rep. Levin discusses the impact of tariffs

    Watch full press conference here

    Carlsbad, CA—Today, Rep. Mike Levin (CA-49) held a press conference with The Op Games, a toy manufacturing company based in Carlsbad, to sound the alarm on the impact of the Trump Administration’s tariffs on small businesses, consumer prices, and the cost of living.

    “Trump’s tariffs are nothing more than a hidden tax on everyday goods,” said Rep. Mike Levin. “Other countries aren’t paying these costs—California families and companies like The?Op?Games are. When prices rise, demand drops, revenue dries up, and jobs disappear. I’m calling on the President to lift these reckless tariffs and negotiate smart, targeted agreements that punish bad actors, not American consumers.”

    The?Op?Games—maker of fan-favorite versions of Clue, Monopoly, and Telestrations—sources about 80% of its production in Asia. Management estimates the import taxes could double manufacturing costs and push retail prices out of reach for many households.

    Additionally, tariffs directly unravel supply chains both at home and abroad, making it costlier for manufacturers to source goods and creating a domino effect that punishes consumers. This drives up costs for everything from board games to groceries, electronics and cars. In February, Rep. Levin wrote to President Trump urging him to rethink the policy, warning it hurts more than it helps. In response to President Trump’s across-the-board tariff taxes in April, Rep. Levin cosponsored the Prevent Tariff Abuse Act, which would limit the President’s ability to impose sweeping tariffs unilaterally. Tariff powers belong with Congress – not one individual who can implement them unilaterally and wreak havoc on the U.S. economy.

    “Creating joy, laughter and lifetime memories through board games is at the essence of what we do at The OP. Board games are among the very few forms of highly affordable entertainment still available to families. For less than the price of parking at a concert or sporting event, The OP can deliver to consumers endless hour of fun. Tariffs of 145% will make it impossible to maintain this low-price option we provide consumers,” said Dane Chapin, CEO of The Op Games.

    ###

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: EIB extends over €525 million to Poland’s top utility PGE for renewable energy production

    Source: European Investment Bank

    EIB

    • European Investment Bank and PGE Polska Grupa Energetyczna seal new financing agreement worth PLN 2.25 billion (over 525 million).
    • EIB loan will support Poland’s energy transition, helping strengthen economic competitiveness and security.

    The European Investment Bank (EIB) granted PLN 2.25 billion to Poland’s top utility PGE Polska Grupa Energetyczna (PGE) to support renewable energy production. The favourable loan will allow PGE to develop its network of photovoltaic installations throughout the country and to modernise an existing pumped-storage power plant.

    The seventh agreement between the EIB and PGE will support the firm’s decarbonisation strategy by enabling planned investments in photovoltaic installations with a shared production capacity of nearly 730 MW, and the upgrade of a pumped-storage power plant (540 MW) in southern Poland. Provided under REPowerEU, the funding will support energy transition, as well as climate and environmental action in Poland, in line with the EIB’s role as the climate bank of the EU.

    “Developing green energy is a key part of energy transition, and a precondition for security and economic competitiveness. This agreement between the EIB and PGE will increase the available renewable energy capacity, supporting strategic development needs of Poland and the European Union as a whole,” said EIB Vice-President Teresa Czerwińska. “Providing financing for climate projects and energy transition is one of the EIB’s top priorities. Last year, we invested €2.5 billion in this area in Poland alone, including €850 million in power grid projects. This year, we have already provided a leading contribution to the construction a major offshore wind farm, Baltica 2, and today are adding further PGE renewable energy projects to our portfolio.”

    The planned investments will help reduce greenhouse gas emissions and air pollution related to power generation based on fossil fuels. They will mainly be located in regions of Poland where GDP per capita is below the EU average, thus strengthening territorial and economic cohesion.

    The development of renewable energy sources like wind and solar requires increased grid flexibility, including storage capacity, which is made possible by pumped-storage hydropower plants. PGE’s Porąbka-Żar plant, the second-largest pumped-storage power plant in Poland, can store clean energy during periods of higher production or lower demand.

    “Expanding renewables is a crucial element of Poland’s energy transition. We need to ensure stable supplies of clean energy to consumers in order to be able to effectively decarbonise the energy sector. The European Investment Bank’s support will allow PGE Group to increase the share of green energy in our mix,” said Dariusz Marzec, President of the Management Board of PGE Group.

     Background information

    The European Investment Bank (ElB) is the long-term lending institution of the European Union, owned by its Member States. Built around eight core priorities, we finance investments that contribute to EU policy objectives by bolstering climate action and the environment, digitalisation and technological innovation, security and defence, cohesion, agriculture and bioeconomy, social infrastructure, the capital markets union, and a stronger Europe in a more peaceful and prosperous world. 

    The EIB Group, which also includes the European Investment Fund (EIF), signed nearly €89 billion in new financing for over 900 high-impact projects in 2024, boosting Europe’s competitiveness and security. The Group’s financing in Poland increased to €5.7 billion last year.
    All projects financed by the EIB Group are in line with the Paris Climate Agreement, as pledged in our Climate Bank Roadmap. Almost 60% of the EIB Group’s annual financing supports projects directly contributing to climate change mitigation, adaptation, and a healthier environment.   

    Fostering market integration and mobilising investment, the Group supported a record of over €100 billion in new investment for Europe’s energy security in 2024 and mobilised €110 billion in growth capital for startups, scale-ups and European pioneers. Approximately half of the EIB’s financing within the European Union is directed towards cohesion regions, where per capita income is lower than the EU average. 

    PGE Polska Grupa Energetyczna is the largest electric power company and supplier of electricity and heat in Poland. By combining its fuel and power generation resources with distribution networks, PGE guarantees safe and stable supply of electricity and heat to nearly 6 million customers. The Group’s generating units produce over 40 percent of electricity in Poland. In the coming years, PGE plans to continue developing renewable energy sources – especially based on wind and sun energy – as well as carrying out investments in energy storage, distribution and decarbonisation of the heat generation segment. The PGE Group investment plan covers Poland’s largest offshore wind projects, the most advanced of which – Baltica 2 with a capacity of 1.5 GW and planned commissioning date in 2027 – is being implemented in cooperation with Ørsted.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Briefing – Malta’s National Recovery and Resilience Plan: Latest state of play – 25-04-2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Malta’s National Recovery and Resilience Plan (NRRP) had an initial value of €344.9 million, while its amended plan is worth €336.3 million. Under the EU’s Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), at the core of the Next Generation EU (NGEU) instrument, Malta’s RRF grant allocation decreased from €316.4 million to €258.3 million. In April 2023, Malta submitted a request to amend its NRRP, to which it added a new REPowerEU chapter with an additional grant allocation of €30 million. It also requested to transfer a portion of its share of the Brexit Adjustment Reserve to its plan (€40 million). With these funds, and cutting some measures, the overall EU financial contribution to the amended plan amounts to €328.2 million in grants, with the rest to be covered by national means. Malta has not requested loans. While in nominal terms, Malta has the second smallest allocation, it ranks higher in terms of RRF grants per capita. The value of Malta’s grants under the RRF equals about 2.3 % of its 2019 gross domestic product (GDP), less than the average for the EU overall (the RRF equals 5.2 % of EU-27 GDP in 2019). So far, Malta has received its pre-financing, the REPowerEU pre-financing, and two result-based payments, which has brought the total disbursements to date to €166.3 million, or 50.7 % of its RRF allocation (above the EU average of 47.4 %). A third payment request is currently under assessment. The plan takes into account the Council’s 2019 and 2020 country-specific recommendations, and aligns with both national economic and investment plans and funding under EU cohesion policy programmes for the 2021-2027 period. The plan’s overall objective is to contribute to sustainable, equitable, green and digital recovery, embracing major common EU challenges. The amended plan has a stronger focus on the green transition, devoting 68.8 % of the funds to it (up from 53.8 % in the original plan), making Malta’s NRRP one of the greenest; 26.2 % of the amended plan (excluding the REPowerEU chapter), or 20.6 % (including the chapter), will contribute to the digital target. The European Parliament participates in interinstitutional forums for cooperation and discussion on the implementation of the RRF, and scrutinises the European Commission’s work. This briefing is one in a series covering all EU Member States. Fifth edition. The ‘NGEU delivery’ briefings are updated at key stages throughout the lifecycle of the plans.

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Inadequate consideration of eastern EU countries’ significance and contribution to European security in EU defence industry initiatives – E-001541/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-001541/2025
    to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
    Rule 144
    Michał Dworczyk (ECR)

    For decades, eastern European countries have been covered by the security umbrella provided by the United States, neglecting their own defence investments and not fulfilling their commitments as allies. Now, with the security situation deteriorating, countries such as Poland – which has been allocating over 2% of its GDP to defence for many years, thereby fulfilling its NATO commitments and responding to threats from Russia – find themselves at the heart of EU defence. However, in the Commission’s latest initiatives on the defence industry and EU security[1], these countries’ committed and long-standing positions have been neither appreciated nor reinforced. Also lacking are any preferential mechanisms and a recognition of the scale of their financial effort and strategic commitment. The need for a geographically even distribution of investments and to support the development of eastern EU countries’ potential has also been overlooked.

    In light of the above:

    • 1.In its initiatives on defence and the defence industry, why has the Commission not provided for any mechanisms to support, give preference to or, at the very least, recognise Member States that have been allocating at least 2% of their GDP towards defence for years and which, in practice, guarantee the security of the whole EU?
    • 2.Will the Commission also consider Member States’ level of defence spending and geostrategic location, particularly for countries on the EU’s eastern flank, in current and future initiatives?

    Submitted: 15.4.2025

    • [1] White Paper for European Defence – Readiness 2030, ReArm Europe Plan, draft SAFE regulation, draft EDIP regulation.
    Last updated: 25 April 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Experts of the Committee against Torture Praise Measures to Prevent Torture in Ukraine, Ask about Alleged Torture of Russian Prisoners of War and Reports of Corruption and Torture in Prisons

    Source: United Nations – Geneva

    The Committee against Torture today concluded its consideration of the seventh periodic report of Ukraine, with Committee Experts praising the State’s legislative and policy measures to prevent torture, and raising questions about alleged torture of Russian prisoners of war, as well as reports of torture and corruption in prisons.

    Claude Heller, Committee Chair and Country Co-Rapporteur, said Ukraine had suffered a devastating war since the full-scale invasion by the Russian Federation on 24 February 2022, in flagrant violation of international law and the United Nations Charter.  More than three years of war had led to numerous military and civilian deaths and serious violations of international human rights law, including summary executions, torture and ill-treatment, and arbitrary detentions.

    Mr. Heller said that, over the past decade, Ukraine had made considerable amendments to legislation and ministries, including with respect to the occupied territories.  He welcomed that the national strategy for human rights had been updated to include strategic goals for combatting torture, the appointment of human rights inspectors in places of detention, and the State’s ratification of the Rome Statute in 2024.

    Since February 2022, Mr. Heller said, 240 Russian prisoners of war had reported suffering torture during the armed conflict in Ukrainian detention centres.  What measures had been taken in cases where torture had been confirmed?  The Committee was concerned about reports of illegal detentions by Ukrainian authorities. How many people had been detained illegally?

    Peter Vedel Kessing, Committee Expert and Country Co-Rapporteur, said prisons under Ukrainian control were suffering under the war. Some faced frequent shelling by Russian troops, and were reportedly becoming hotbeds of torture and corruption. Newly arrived prisoners were reportedly routinely beaten, and there was reported overcrowding in prisons.  What steps had been taken to reduce overcrowding and improve prison conditions?

    Introducing the report, Liudmyla Suhak, Deputy Minister of Justice for European Integration of Ukraine and head of the delegation, said Ukraine was systematically implementing measures to prevent and combat torture at the national level. The 2021 strategy for combatting torture in the criminal justice system introduced a system for combatting torture by law enforcement, while the national human rights strategy had been updated to include specific strategic goals for combatting torture.

    Ms. Suhak said that the conditions of detention for Russian prisoners of war complied with international humanitarian law and had been inspected 112 times by the International Committee of the Red Cross between 2018 and 2024.  To ensure that prisoners of war were not tortured during transfers to detainment camps, the delegation added, clear legal procedures had been developed.  Military officials were trained on the rights of prisoners of war.

    The delegation said that the State party had undertaken measures to combat corruption and ill-treatment of inmates in the penitentiary system.  An internal security unit had been created to investigate reports of violations by penitentiary staff and inmates.  In 2024, persons responsible for observing the rights of convicts and preventing torture were also introduced into the staff of 56 penal institutions.

    In closing remarks, Mr. Heller said that the State party’s efforts to engage in the dialogue were commendable in the context of the bloodthirsty war.  The issues discussed were not issues of the past but were ongoing.  Ukraine sought to protect its territorial integrity and the well-being of its population.  The rest of the world was hoping for an end to the war that respected the territorial integrity of Ukraine.  The Committee hoped that its next dialogue with Ukraine would take place in conditions of peace, prosperity and democracy.

    In her concluding remarks, Ms. Suhak said that Ukraine would actively work to implement the Committee’s concluding observations.  Tens of thousands of Ukrainian citizens were being held by Russia, and virtually every Ukrainian citizen who had been returned from Russia had suffered some form of torture.  Ukraine urged Russia to fully comply with its obligations under international law and to end its illegal war.  The Committee’s efforts would help to hold Russia to account.

    The delegation of Ukraine consisted of representatives from the Ministry of Social Policy; Coordination Centre for Legal Aid Provision; Prosecutor General’s Office; Security Service; Ministry of Defence; Ministry of Justice; State Migration Service; State Bureau of Investigation; National Police; Ministry of Health; the Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the United Nations Office at Geneva; and the European Court of Human Rights.

    The Committee will issue concluding observations on the report of Ukraine at the end of its eighty-second session on 2 May.  Those, and other documents relating to the Committee’s work, including reports submitted by States parties, will be available on the session’s webpage.  Summaries of the public meetings of the Committee can be found here, and webcasts of the public meetings can be found here.

    The Committee will next meet in public on Tuesday, 29 April at 4 p.m. to hear the presentation of reports on follow-up to articles 19 and 22 of the Convention and reprisals.

    Report

    The Committee has before it the seventh periodic report of Ukraine (CAT/C/UKR/7).

    Presentation of Report

    LIUDMYLA SUHAK, Deputy Minister of Justice for European Integration of Ukraine and head of the delegation, said Ukraine was systematically implementing measures to prevent and combat torture at the national level.  The 2021 strategy for combatting torture in the criminal justice system outlined the development of a national system for combatting torture committed by law enforcement personnel.  The national human rights strategy had been updated to include specific strategic goals for combatting torture and ensuring the right to liberty and security of person. The strategy for the reform of the penitentiary system 2021-2026 aimed to address structural problems and create a humanistic system for the execution of criminal penalties.

    During the reporting period, several amendments were made to criminal legislation.  The Criminal Code had been revised to bring the definition of torture into line with the provisions of the Convention, and to introduce criminal liability for the crime of enforced disappearance. Additionally, legislation was revised to guarantee the right of detainees to be held in proper conditions and to facilitate the consideration of complaints about improper detention conditions.  The criminal penalty system now also included probation supervision. 

    In 2024, amendments were made to the Code of Administrative Offences to distinguish between domestic violence, gender-based violence and sexual harassment, to increase administrative liability for such acts.  Several legislative initiatives were currently under consideration by Parliament, including a draft law on the penitentiary system, as well as other draft laws that would introduce a standard for minimum cell space of four square metres per detainee, the right of convicts to short-term visits outside the colony under certain conditions, and revised procedures for detaining persons.

    New internal regulations for the temporary detention centres of the national police adopted in 2023 stipulated that police officers were not allowed to carry out acts of torture or other forms of inhuman treatment on detainees.  In 2018 and 2019, internal regulations for pre-trial detention centres and penitentiary institutions of the State Penitentiary Service were approved.  These rules were regularly updated.  In 2024, the Security Service’s procedure for holding persons in temporary detention facilities was revised. 

    Ukraine provided unhindered access for both national and international monitoring mechanisms. In 2024, the national preventive mechanism of the Ombudsperson conducted 543 visits to penitentiary institutions, and the United Nations Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine carried out 44 visits between 2018 and 2024.

    Efforts were being made to develop a child-friendly juvenile justice system.  As a result, over the past five years, there had been a steady reduction in juvenile crime, and over the past seven years, the number of minors registered by probation authorities had dropped three-fold.

    In 2024, a Commissioner for Missing Persons under Special Circumstances was appointed within the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and a specialised unit for combatting torture and other ill-treatment of persons, staffed with 157 investigators, had been launched within the State Bureau of Investigation.  Within the Office of the Prosecutor General, separate specialised units had been established to combat human rights violations in the law enforcement and penitentiary sectors, as well as to combat crimes committed in the context of the armed conflict.  The Ministry of Justice also had a separate Department of Penitentiary Inspections.

    In 2024, persons responsible for observing the rights of convicts and preventing torture were introduced into the staff of 56 penal institutions.  The State had developed the digital infrastructure of both law enforcement agencies and the penitentiary system, launching registers of convicted persons, persons taken into custody, and missing persons under special circumstances.  An automated exchange of information on detained persons between law enforcement agencies and free legal aid centres was being introduced.  In cases of violence or torture against detainees and convicts, they had the right to free legal representation in court.

    State social programmes aimed at preventing and combatting domestic violence, gender-based violence, and human trafficking were being implemented.  Free secondary legal aid was provided to victims of domestic violence and human trafficking.

    In response to Russia’s armed aggression against Ukraine, Ukrainian law enforcement agencies had initiated investigations into 163,700 war crimes and crimes of aggression on Ukrainian territory.  In 2024, the Criminal Code was amended to ensure criminal prosecution for the most serious international crimes, as well as to bring it into line with the Rome Statute, which entered into force for Ukraine in 2025. 

    In 2022, the procedure for the detention of prisoners of war was approved.  It stipulated that the interrogation of prisoners of war should be carried out in a language they understood, without the use of torture or other coercive measures.  The conditions of detention for Russian prisoners of war complied with international humanitarian law and had been inspected 112 times by the International Committee of the Red Cross between 2018 and 2024.  Conversely, Russian authorities continued to deny access to Ukrainian prisoners of war, as well as civilian detainees, held by Russia in violation of international humanitarian law.

    Ukraine had also been taking measures to support victims and those affected by armed aggression. Since 2022, victims of a number of criminal offences, including torture or cruel treatment, had been entitled to free secondary legal aid.  In 2024, the legal status of victims of sexual violence related to Russia’s armed aggression and the legal basis for providing them with urgent interim reparations were determined at the legislative level.  An international compensation mechanism for damages caused by Russia’s aggression was being developed.  In 2024, 40 categories of claims that could be submitted to the International Register of Damages were approved, including some related to torture, deprivation of liberty, and sexual violence.

    Questions by Committee Experts

    CLAUDE HELLER, Committee Chair and Country Co-Rapporteur, welcomed the delegation’s presence, considering that Ukraine had suffered a devastating war since the full-scale invasion by the Russian Federation on 24 February 2022, in flagrant violation of international law and the Charter of the United Nations.  After more than three years of war, hundreds of thousands of military personnel on both sides were estimated to have died, with many more wounded, missing in action and in captivity.  From February 2022 to February 2025, there had been more than 12,800 civilian deaths and more than 30,000 injuries in systematic attacks on civilian towns, cities, and infrastructure, while the number of deaths of Russian civilians was expected to have risen to 360.  These were very conservative elements.

    The war had led to serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law, including summary executions; torture and ill-treatment; arbitrary detentions; forced transfer of people, including minors, to the occupying State; and acts of sexual violence. More than 13 million people required humanitarian assistance, more than two million homes had been destroyed in Ukraine, and there were 10.6 million displaced people in Ukraine.

    Over the past decade, Ukraine had made considerable amendments to legislation and ministries, including with respect to the occupied territories.  The national strategy for human rights had been updated to include strategic goals for combatting torture.  The adoption of the strategy to combat torture and the related plan of action and the appointment of human rights inspectors in places of detention would contribute to preventing torture and facilitating investigations.  It was also welcome that in 2024, a commissioner for disappeared persons was appointed within the police force, and that Ukraine had ratified the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance.

    The Committee was concerned that not all the elements of the Convention had been incorporated in the Criminal Code, which did not establish the State’s responsibility to hold public officials accountable when they committed acts of torture under orders from superiors.  Why was the number of cases of torture that reached court much smaller than the number of investigations carried out?

    The Ombudsperson carried out independent monitoring of constitutional rights and freedoms.  However, the body lacked financial resources and experts on monitoring.  There was a lack of transparency in the selection of its staff, and a lack of balanced regional representation.  The national preventive mechanism had also been criticised for its lack of experts and funding, delays in its investigations, and its lack of cooperation with civil society. There was a low level of implementation of recommendations made by the Ombudsperson; only one-third of the recommendations made in 2023 were addressed.  Could the delegation comment on these issues?

    State bodies responsible for guaranteeing the rights of detainees appeared to have been ineffective. Victims of torture were allegedly subjected to reprisals by authorities and the Istanbul Protocol was not applied well by the State.  Could the delegation comment on this?

    In 2015, Parliament had adopted a decision to suspend certain obligations stemming from the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the European Convention of Human Rights and impose martial law until the cessation of the Russian aggression. The Committee was concerned by acts carried out by armed groups in eastern Ukraine from 2014 to 2017. During this period, more than 100 criminal cases were brought against Ukrainian security officials, including related to offences of torture and sexual violence.  Had court proceedings concluded?

    The State party had taken a significant step by ratifying the Rome Statute in 2024.  The implementation law partially harmonised criminal law with the Statute, requiring acts of torture systematically committed against the civilian population to be tried as crimes against humanity.  However, the law did not amend legislation on war crimes to bring it in line with the Statute.  Would the State do this?

    Both Russia and Ukraine had mutually accused each other of acts of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment against civilians.  There were more than 6,000 Ukrainian prisoners under Russian custody, who reportedly lacked access to food and medical support.  There were credible reports that Russian authorities had carried out around 80 executions of Ukrainian forces.  The United Nations Independent Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine had reported widespread torture of civilians in areas under Russian control. Persons arrested in these territories were tried by non-recognised courts and were not granted access to lawyers of their choice.  Information on trials was not provided to families.  Could the State party provide information on the number of such trials carried out?

    Since February 2022, 240 Russian prisoners of war had reported suffering torture during the armed conflict in Ukrainian detention centres.  Could the delegation comment on these accusations?  What measures had been taken in cases where torture had been confirmed, and how was the State party preventing torture?  The Committee was concerned about reports of illegal detentions by Ukrainian authorities.  How many people had been detained illegally?  There had also been allegations of arbitrary detention of civilians suspected of collaborating with Russia after territories were reclaimed.

    The Committee was also concerned about the impact of the conflict on the rule of law.  Several cases of threats and violence against journalists had been reported.  Ukraine introduced a procedure in 2022 to prohibit broadcasts that “could jeopardise the independence and sovereignty of the country”.  Some journalists had been criminalised after working in occupied territories, despite there being no evidence of having committed unlawful acts. Could the delegation comment on this issue?

    More than 2,000 criminal lawsuits had been filed on the glorification of Russian actions.  This had reportedly given rise to 443 guilty verdicts involving non-custodial sentences.  Authorities had imposed security restrictions, including limiting access to information.  A bill before Parliament sought to restrict access to court decisions until the cessation of martial law, and several other bills had sought to limit certain rights for human rights defenders.  There was deep-rooted impunity for crimes against activists.

    There had been an unprecedented increase in gender-based violence in Ukraine.  The number of cases of domestic violence had increased by more than 30 per cent in 2024, with a number of these cases involving men returning from the front. The State was seemingly reluctant to hold members of the armed forces accountable for such crimes.

    A 2017 law amended legislation regarding psychiatric care in response to past violations of patients’ rights. Norms allowing for involuntary sterilisation were eliminated.  However, there were reports of excessive hospitalisation of persons with psychosocial disabilities, including children, and a lack of provision of alternative, community-based care services.  There were allegations of torture and ill-treatment in psychiatric hospitals; could the delegation comment on this?

    PETER VEDEL KESSING, Committee Expert and Country Co-Rapporteur, said that the situation in Ukraine was tragic after three years of war.  Mr. Kessing commended Ukraine’s commitment to its human rights obligations in these difficult times, adopting laws and policies to strengthen human rights protections.  Ukraine had continued to engage with the European Court of Human Rights since 2022, resulting in the closure of 75 cases.

    What steps had been taken to ensure that Ukrainian soldiers and State officials did not engage in torture? What training did these officials receive on the Convention?  Could the delegation confirm that its derogations from international law in the martial law period did not relate to the Convention?  Did Ukraine continue to apply international human rights law in situations of armed conflict?

    The State party needed to prosecute and hold accountable all those who committed torture on occupied territories when it regained control of the territory.  What steps had been taken to document such acts?  How had the State party ensured that Ukrainian citizens who were victims of torture had access to remedies when they returned to Ukraine? Ukraine had developed a draft law on compensation for victims of violent crimes and a related State fund.  Had this law been adopted?

    There had been reports of beatings of men who sought to avoid conscription.  In one case, a man claimed he had been drafted illegally as he had not undergone a medical examination.  Could the delegation provide statistical information on injuries and deaths linked to hazing and investigations into such incidents?  How did the State ensure that conscripts were treated in line with international obligations?

    There had been reports of excessive use of force by Ukrainian police over the reporting period.  Detainees in police detention did not have access to food or drinking water.  What steps had been taken to prevent ill-treatment in police detention? Access to a lawyer was not always provided for arrested persons; how would the State ensure this?  Video recording of interrogation was discretionary. Would the State make recording mandatory and ensure that recorded footage of interrogations was kept?  Were Russian prisoners of war and civilians arrested by Ukrainian forces provided with procedural safeguards?  How many children had been held in pre-trial detention over the last three years?  Were there time limits on the detention of children, and were children separated from adults in detention?

    Prisons under Ukrainian control were suffering under the war; some faced frequent shelling by Russian troops, and were reportedly becoming hotbeds of torture and corruption.  Since winter 2024, there had been increased raids on prisons by special forces.  The Committee commended that human rights observers had been appointed in some prisons. What actions did they carry out and were they now appointed in all prisons? 

    Newly arrived prisoners were reportedly routinely beaten, and special forces used illegal force against inmates. Was it necessary to deploy special forces in prisons?  Would the State abandon this practice?  There was reported overcrowding in prisons, with inmates in one prison forced to alternatively sleep on the floor.  There were also reports of limited access to fresh air, clean drinking water and sunlight in some prisons.  What steps had been taken to reduce overcrowding and improve prison conditions? Some prisoners were appointed as “duty” prisoners and given duties to oversee other prisoners.  Had steps been taken to eliminate this practice and protect all prisoners’ rights?

    Medical staff in prisons reportedly did not document inmates’ injuries.  Could the delegation provide information on the number of deaths in custody over the last three years?  What steps had been taken to strengthen healthcare in prisons?  There were no rules banning force-feeding in prisons; did the Government intend to elaborate such rules?  Did the Ukrainian Ombudsperson have access to all places of detention and could it conduct unannounced visits?  To what extent could non-governmental organizations access places of detention?  Article 391 of the Criminal Code made it an offence to disobey orders by prison staff. This provision was reportedly abused by staff to engage in corrupt practices; would it be revised?

    Other Committee Experts asked questions on measures taken by State authorities to respond to and prevent domestic violence; the status of the draft bill criminalising domestic violence and sexual violence; measures to ensure penalties for domestic and sexual violence were commensurate with the gravity of the crime; the number of investigations and convictions for domestic violence cases over the reporting period; efforts made to establish civil registries to facilitate birth registration and prevent trafficking of children; whether the State party held Ukrainian forces that were returned to the State accountable when they were accused of torture; how the State treated prisoners of war from third countries; and whether the clergy and staff of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church had been provided with support after the banning of the Church.

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said the State party provided training on the Convention and other international and European human rights norms for penitentiary staff.  Currently, there were 119 children held in pre-trial detention and 177 children held in juvenile detention facilities, including just one girl. Judges assessed the necessity of detention for children once every three months.

    The State party had undertaken measures to combat corruption and ill-treatment of inmates in the penitentiary system.  An internal security unit had been created to investigate reports of violations by penitentiary staff and inmates and to initiate criminal proceedings against accused persons; the Government was currently recruiting staff for the unit. The State party had recruited 54 out of 56 human rights inspectors for its prisons and adopted a resolution on their scope of activity.  These inspectors reported directly to the State about the problems they witnessed.

    Currently, there were 37,000 inmates in places of deprivation of liberty in Ukraine.  The prison population was declining gradually.  More than 8,000 prisoners had been voluntarily mobilised at the beginning of the war.  The Government had allocated funds to build a new detention facility in Kyiv that could accommodate more than 1,000 detainees and decrease the population of other prisons. Norms on construction had been revised to protect prisons from shelling and improve security.  Despite budget cuts, over 7,500 places had been newly created in detention centres since 2022.

    The State party was fighting the spread of criminal influence and a criminal subculture in prisons.  It sought to proactively prosecute crimes occurring within prisons and to adopt a law on prison labour, which would increase salaries paid to prisoners who engaged in labour and improve conditions for prison labour.

    There had been 432, 376 and 368 deaths in prisons respectively in 2022, 2023 and 2024.  Some 98 per cent of prisoners infected with AIDS and 93 per cent of prisoners with disabilities were held in inclusive settings.  The Ministry of Justice supported the idea of transferring the management of healthcare services in prisons to the Ministry of Health; discussions on this would begin soon.  Rules on force-feeding were adopted two years ago.

    The Ombudsperson had not complained about not being able to access any detention facilities.  Some non-governmental organizations had been granted access to penitentiary facilities.  An anonymous, online complaints system for prisons had been set up; last year, 6,000 complaints had been submitted by prisoners on various topics. A commission was also being created that would handle complaints of improper conditions in prisons. Discussions were underway on the revision of article 391 of the Criminal Code.

    All prisoners of war were kept in common conditions.  Persons with criminal records were separated from those without.  Ukraine fully followed its international obligations under the Geneva Conventions.  It had allowed 400 monitoring missions to visit its detention facilities for prisoners of war.

    Since 2014, the State party had lost 34 penitentiary institutions located in occupied territories, including seven since 2022, in which more than 3,000 inmates were held.  More than 1,000 of these inmates had already served their sentences, but had no money or documents needed to return to Ukraine. The State was working with non-governmental organizations to support their return.  More than 500 persons had thus far returned.

    On 10 October last year, Parliament adopted a law on the ratification of the Rome Statute.  Ukraine had taken on board comments from the International Criminal Court regarding its legislation on crimes against humanity and the responsibility of superiors; the State had amended its Criminal Code in response.

    Certain restrictions could be imposed on rights and freedoms under martial law, but Ukraine had not restricted the right to freedom of religious belief.  The President had last year signed a Presidential Order that banned the activities of the Russian Orthodox Church, which was based on the ideology of the regime of the Russian Federation and condoned Russia’s war crimes.

    Ukraine had not introduced severe restrictions on freedom of expression.  Domestic media faced challenges, including the mobilisation of journalists as soldiers, dwindling resources, and damaged infrastructure caused by the Russian aggression.  The State party sought to bring its media legislation in line with that of the European Union.  Ukraine had risen 18 places in the World Press Freedom Index thanks to the reforms implemented.

    The national police continued to manage custody records, which recorded arrests, pre-trial detention and releases, as well as detainees’ injuries.  These records were kept for 25 years.  There was constant video surveillance of police detention sites and independent monitoring visits were carried out.  The Criminal Procedural Code had been amended to ensure that officials involved in arrests were not responsible for managing detainees’ stay in police detention. Detainees in temporary detention were provided with three hot meals per day.  Standards for detention facilities stipulated that cells needed to have a water supply that detainees could access.

    Since February 2022, 83,000 criminal proceedings had been instigated related to missing civilians and military officers.  Some 9,000 missing persons had been found alive, while many deaths were also identified. Specialised departments for the investigation of crimes committed in the armed conflict had been established in police departments in several regions and a centre for tracing missing persons had been established in Kyiv.

    The police force had recorded 179,000 administrative offences related to domestic violence, registered 19,000 perpetrators for monitoring, and had set up specialised units for tackling domestic violence in more than 60 regions.  In 2024, more than 5,000 officers were trained on combatting domestic and gender-based violence.

    The State constantly looked for crimes of human trafficking and took prompt responses when cases were identified. As of May 2025, 1,500 criminal offences of human trafficking had been investigated.  International organizations supported training for State officials on trafficking in persons.  Ukraine had joined two international taskforces to combat trafficking in persons, through which more than 3,000 Ukrainian victims of trafficking were identified across the world.

    Eleven years since the Maidan revolution, investigators were continuing to investigate crimes related to it. Courts had issued 11 guilty verdicts against 14 people.  The State Bureau of Investigation had suspected 340 people. The former President of Ukraine and other former high-level officials were under suspicion of having facilitated the murders of more than 67 persons between 2013 and 2014.  In this period, police officers were deployed to supress protests, and courts had found activists guilty on spurious grounds.  In some cases, police officers beat activists and even participated in premeditated murders.  In total, there were more than 4,000 cases of criminal activity and more than 2,000 victims.  There was now an opportunity to bring justice for these past crimes. There were three criminal proceedings underway related to armed gangs that had attacked individuals and homes.

    War crimes were investigated by the national security service and the police.  In 2024, 149 Ukrainians had been executed by Russians, and 54 had so far been executed this year.  These were conservative estimates.  Almost every Ukrainian prisoner of war had suffered some form of violence. 

    There were around 20 cases under examination of war crimes committed by Ukrainians.  Doctors who provided medical examinations of prisoners of war were required to document signs of torture.

    According to Ukrainian law, information about persons in detention was immediately communicated to the legal aid centre.  If evidence was gathered while a defence lawyer was absent, there was a high likelihood that courts would not admit it.  The State was providing legal support for prisoners who had been illegally transferred to Russia and supporting them to serve the remainder of their sentences in Ukraine.  Persons with disabilities and older persons could access legal aid if they had low income or were internally displaced.  Legal aid was provided to minors and victims of gender-based violence and trafficking in persons.

    National standards on detention of prisoners of war stipulated that detainees’ human dignity and international law needed to be respected.  No violations of human rights or cases of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment had been found while monitoring visits of places of detention.

    Pre-trial investigations were underway into alleged war crimes against Ukrainian prisoners of war by Russia, including extrajudicial executions and the use of physical, psychological and sexual violence.  These prisoners were systematically subjected to violence over the course of their detention; this had been confirmed by medical examinations.  Some 4,000 prisoners had been returned to Ukraine.

    Since February 2022, some 433 persons were detained for crimes of collaboration with Russia.  The draft law of December 2022 on collaboration included provisions to improve liability for collaboration; it was currently under consideration.  Some 819 investigations were underway on cases of collaboration related to healthcare and education.  The teaching of school subjects based on the standards of the aggressor State did not constitute an offence.  Some teachers deliberately carried out propaganda in educational institutions; this could constitute an offence. 

    Around 22 doctors had been notified of being under suspicion of collaboration.  Criminal liability was excluded for actions carried out while providing healthcare to patients.  Since February 2022, pre-trial investigations on collaboration had been carried out into 97 affiliates of religious organizations, including more than 20 clerics of the Orthodox Church.  The security service had declared 197 minors as suspects in offences such as high treason, sabotage and damage to property.  Many cases involved minors who were recruited by the Russian special services. Training was provided for investigators who interviewed children on the best interests of the child.

    To ensure that prisoners of war were well-treated and not tortured during transfers to detainment camps, clear legal procedures had been developed.  The Chief of Defence had issued orders to ensure that international human rights law was strictly followed in this process. Military officials were trained on capturing enemy combatants and on the rights of prisoners of war.

    To ensure that human rights were followed during mobilisation and conscription, clear legislation had been established.  Persons could apply for deferment of conscription for medical or family reasons. An investigator had been appointed within the Land Force Command to investigate allegations of human rights violations occurring during conscription.

    The Ministry of Health had made changes to ensure that only psychiatric patients who posed a danger to themselves or others were isolated for legally defined periods.  All primary health care providers were obligated to undergo training on identifying mental health issues and referring patients to mental health care services.  These measures would help to decrease the number of patients needing institutionalisation.

    More than 34,000 persons with disabilities and older persons lived in residential institutions.  The Government had developed a strategy to reform these institutions and support community-based care and assisted living. Approximately 7,000 people received day care services.  There were around 4,600 children cared for in institutions.  The Government had approved a strategy to ensure the right of every child in Ukraine to grow up in a family environment by 2028.  A law preventing violence against children had been adopted in 2024 and the State was currently developing a procedure for responding to cases of violence against children.

    In 2024, around 182,000 reports of domestic violence had been received by the State.  A programme for addressing traumatic war experiences had been developed. Measures had been implemented to coordinate policies on domestic violence and protect victims.

    In 2022, Parliament adopted a law on amending the Criminal Code in line with the Convention.  The revised law’s definition of torture addressed the liability of persons who conspired to commit torture.  Discriminatory motives for the crime of torture were considered to be aggravating offences and carried a harsher penalty.  The law also addressed the criminal liability of officials who ordered acts of torture.  Amnesty was not issued to persons who committed torture crimes.

    No derogations had been made from the State party’s obligations under international human rights law during the martial law period.  Martial law foresaw the ability to prohibit peaceful assembly, but in practice, this restriction had not been applied.  The Government took steps to provide compensation for victims of various types of crimes.

    A special draft law had been developed that sought to improve the institutional capacity of the Ombudsperson, including by lowering the age limit for members of the Ombudsperson’s Office and imposing restrictions on reductions to the Office’s budget.

    Questions by Committee Experts

    CLAUDE HELLER, Committee Chair and Country Co-Rapporteur, welcomed information on measures to provide compensation for victims of human rights violations.  Up to mid-February 2025, 159,000 criminal cases had been recorded related to the armed conflict, but it was unclear how many of these cases related to torture.  The justice system had not been prepared to deal with the challenges brought by these cases.  Acts of torture committed in occupied territories, difficulties in verifying evidence, and the internal displacement of victims hindered investigations.  There was a lack of guarantees of a fair trial for trials in absentia, in which 95 per cent of accused persons were sentenced. Articles 27 and 28 of the Criminal Code needed to be amended to protect the victims and witnesses of serious international crimes.

    Crimea was annexed 11 years ago, and the freedom of the media had been called into question under the Russian occupation.  Russian authorities reportedly curtailed the rights to freedom of expression and assembly. Lawyers and human rights defenders had been victims of persecution and had been unable to perform their work. The European Court of Human Rights had recently found that Russia followed a pattern of criminally sentencing persons in Crimea who discredited the Russian forces.  Had there been cases of torture in Crimea?

    PETER VEDEL KESSING, Committee Expert and Country Co-Rapporteur, said it was positive that overcrowding had been reduced, that a new prison facility had been established, that an electronic register had been established, and that measures were taken to remove the prison hierarchy and improve access to health care.  How could prisoners access the internet to make complaints to the Prison Service?  How did the Service respond to complaints?  Did any concern torture?  Human rights monitors in prisons were commendable.  Did these monitors also perform other functions in prisons?  How many complaints had been received from human rights monitors and what follow-up had been conducted?  There was reportedly a risk of reprisals for prisoners who lodged complaints.  What measures were in place to counter reprisals against prisoners?

    Prisoners of war were at a high risk of ill-treatment.  What measures were taken to monitor that Russian prisoners of war were treated in line with requirements under international law?  Did they undergo medical exams and was there video recording of interrogations?  Was there a procedure for releasing prisoners of war who required medical treatment?

    Another Committee Expert asked follow-up questions on the situation of prisoners and prison conditions in Crimea, including on the transfer of prisoners and cases of torture occurring during transfers; the situation in closed psychiatric institutions and steps taken to protect vulnerable groups such as children, and to improve conditions and oversight of these institutions; and measures taken to promote the return of children forcibly transferred from Ukraine to Russia and to ensure accountability for such acts.

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said around 7,000 complaints had been submitted by prisoners, around 1,700 of which were submitted electronically.  Inmates could access specific web pages where they could submit complaints using tablets in a dedicated room.  Human rights inspectors reported suspected cases of torture to the Chief of Police. Their work was supplemented by the internal security unit, which started disciplinary proceedings that could result in criminal investigations.  There had been complaints submitted to the Ombudsperson regarding reprisals against prisoners.  These were under investigation.

    The State party was gathering evidence on war crimes and crimes against humanity occurring in occupied territories. It transferred evidence of such crimes to the International Criminal Court on request.  A working group had been established to improve the implementation of the Rome Statute in Ukraine, including through legal amendments.  Last year, the State had documented over 2,800 Ukrainian civilians and over 4,000 prisoners of war who were victims of torture. Many liberated civilians chose to move to different countries rather than return to Ukraine, making investigations difficult.

    Ukrainian non-governmental organizations had reported that there were at least 4,700 transfers of detainees from Crimea to the territory of the Russian Federation, including 220 female detainees. The Russian Federation had failed to provide information in response to the judgement of the European Court of Human Rights that obliged Russia to return these prisoners to Ukraine.

    The Government had adopted several measures to address the issue of the forcible displacement of Ukrainian children, including a procedure for identifying and returning such children, a register of deported and forcibly displaced children, and an inter-agency commission on the issue.

    Concluding Remarks

    CLAUDE HELLER, Committee Chair, said that, based on the dialogue, the Committee would issue concluding observations, which would include recommendations that the State party could implement within one year, as well as other recommendations that would require more time to implement.  The Committee believed that its recommendations would support the implementation of the Convention in Ukraine.

    The State party’s efforts to engage in the dialogue were commendable in the context of the bloodthirsty war.  The issues discussed were not issues of the past but were ongoing.  The last dialogue with Ukraine happened over 11 years ago and many things had happened since.  Ukraine sought to protect its territorial integrity and the well-being of its population. The rest of the world was looking on, hoping for an end to the war that respected the territorial integrity of Ukraine. The dialogue had been constructive and frank.  The Committee hoped that its next dialogue with Ukraine would take place in conditions of peace, prosperity and democracy.

    LIUDMYLA SUHAK, Deputy Minister of Justice for European Integration and head of the delegation, thanked the Committee for the dialogue and civil society organizations that had submitted alternative reports.  Ukraine would actively work to implement the Committee’s concluding observations.

    Tens of thousands of Ukrainian citizens were being held by Russia.  More than 170 torture chambers had been identified in Russia and virtually every Ukrainian citizen who had been returned from Russia had suffered some form of torture, which was carried out in a systemic, widespread manner by Russian authorities.  The State party was grateful to the Committee for keeping the issue of Russian war crimes on the international agenda.  Ukraine urged Russia to fully comply with its obligations under international law and to end its illegal war of aggression.  The Committee’s efforts would help to hold Russia to account.

    ___________

     

     

    Produced by the United Nations Information Service in Geneva for use of the media; 
    not an official record. English and French versions of our releases are different as they are the product of two separate coverage teams that work independently.

     

    CAT.007E

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Experts of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination Hold Half Day of General Discussion on Reparations for the Injustices from the Transatlantic Trade of Enslaved Africans

    Source: United Nations – Geneva

    The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination this afternoon held a half day of general discussion on reparations for the injustices from the transatlantic trade of enslaved Africans, their treatment as chattel, and the ongoing harms to and crimes against people of African descent.  The half-day consisted of opening statements two panel discussions, hearing from Committee members, experts in international law, representative from the diplomatic corps, and political and civil society leaders.

    Speaking in the first panel discussion on “Reparations and International Law: Legal Frameworks, Obligations and Enforcement” were Pela Boker-Wilson, Committee Expert; Joshua Castellino, Executive Dean, College of Arts, Law & Social Sciences, Brunel University of London; Patricia Sellers, former Special Advisor to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court; Britta Redwood, Assistant Professor, Seton Hall School of Diplomacy and Seton Hall Law School; Adejoké Babington-Ashaye, former Investigator at the International Criminal Court; and Bernard Duhaime, Special Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence.

    Speaking in the second panel discussion on “The Legacy of Chattel Slavery: Structural Racism and Institutional Accountability” were Tendayi Achiume, former Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance; Matthew Anthony Wilson, Permanent Representative of Barbados to the United Nations Office at Geneva; Eric Phillips, Vice-Chairperson of the Caribbean Community’s Reparations Commission; Ibrahima Guissé, Committee Expert; and Dennis O’Brien, Founder of the Repair Campaign.

    The programme of work and other documents related to the session can be found here.  Summaries of the public meetings of the Committee can be found here, while webcasts of the public meetings can be found here.

    The Committee will next meet in public on Monday, 28 April at 3 p.m. to begin its consideration of the combined twenty-fourth and twenty-fifth periodic reports of Mauritius (CERD/C/MUS/24-25).

    Opening Statements

    MICHAL BALCERZAK, Committee Chairperson, welcomed participants to the half-day of general discussion to advance the development of a general recommendation on reparations for the historical injustices rooted in the chattel enslavement of Africans and the enduring harms experienced by people of African descent.  The proposed general recommendation sought to clarify the scope and content of the right to reparations under international human rights law and address the harms caused by the forced capture and transatlantic transport of Africans, their enslavement as chattel, and the lasting consequences of these crimes. 

    To inform this process, the Committee had issued a public call for input on 14 February 2025 and had been encouraged by the engagement, with 56 submissions received from a wide range of stakeholders.  Today’s discussion provided a space to reflect on the submissions received, deepen the collective understanding of applicable international legal standards, and further examine the contemporary legacy of the transatlantic trade in enslaved Africans.  In the coming months, the Committee would prepare a draft text of the general recommendation, which would be made publicly available for input from all stakeholders prior to finalisation. 

    MAHAMANE CISSÉ-GOURO, Director, Human Rights Council and Treaty Mechanisms Division, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, said today’s topic addressed a matter of deep historical significance and urgent contemporary relevance: reparatory justice for the injustices arising from the trade in enslaved Africans, their treatment as chattel, and the continuing harms and crimes suffered by people of African descent.  In 2001, at the World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, States adopted by consensus the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action, which recognised slavery and the slave trade as a crime against humanity, and among the major sources and manifestations of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance.  Contemporary structures and systems, such as racial profiling, police brutality, unequal access to education and employment, disparities in health and housing, and the denial of political participation and justice were rooted in these enduring harms.

    International human rights law and political commitments by States provided a clear framework for attaining substantive racial justice and equality.  A central element of dismantling systemic racism was addressing the past and redressing its legacies through reparatory justice, to transform the present and secure a just and equitable future.  The High Commissioner had called for reparatory justice to transform structures and systems which were designed and shaped by enslavement, colonialism and successive racially discriminatory policies and systems. States and others that had benefited and continued to benefit from these legacies should make amends for centuries of violence and discrimination through wide-ranging and meaningful initiatives, including through formal apologies, truth-telling processes, and reparations in various forms.  This called for political leadership, and creative, effective and comprehensive responses to legacies of the past.  Since the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action, the international community had taken important steps; however, as the Convention commemorated its sixtieth anniversary, it was evident that these commitments and recommendations had not resulted in durable, transformative change. 

    The development of this general recommendation was timely and necessary.  It would clarify the scope and content of the right to reparations for historical injustices under international human rights law and provide States with guidance to fulfil their obligations under the Convention.  Mr. Cissé-Gouro encouraged all participants to engage and emphasised that the Office of the High Commissioner supported the process. 

    GAY MCDOUGALL, Committee Vice-Chairperson, said this year marked the sixtieth anniversary of the Convention, which remained the normative centre of international efforts to end racism. In commemoration of the anniversary year, the Committee had decided to prepare a general recommendation on reparations to clarify and elaborate the legal obligations of States to repair the harms inflicted by the forced capture of Africans, the transatlantic transport of those captives, their enslavement as chattel, and the massive and continuing harms suffered by them and their descendants.  The transatlantic trade in enslaved Africans constituted the largest and most concentrated forced deportation of human beings ever recorded, implicating several regions of the world during more than four centuries. Between 12 to 13 million Africans were violently uprooted from Africa for sale and enslavement. 

    The system of colonial rule had enabled and facilitated the development of the uniquely brutal system of chattel enslavement, and the resulting massive gross abuses of human rights that followed for centuries.  The transatlantic slave trade was inextricably tied to European colonial domination of Africa, the Americas, the Caribbean and parts of Asia.  It was a system that enriched Europe, and the institutions in power, and it existed today in many contemporary forms.  Now it was widely agreed that all forms of slavery were violations of international law and most domestic laws gave rise to the responsibility to ensure reparations.  However, the harms inflicted by these events had never been addressed, including how they negatively impacted the economic, social, political, civic and cultural rights of countries around the world.   The Committee’s proposed general recommendation would provide guidance on the scope and content of the right to reparations under international human rights law. 

    Panel Discussion One on Reparations and International Law: Legal Frameworks, Obligations and Enforcement

    Opening Remarks by the Moderator of the Panel

    PELA BOKER-WILSON, Committee Expert and Panel Moderator, said the chattel enslavement of Africans was a human rights violation, and victims had a right to reparations based on their right to a remedy.  At the same time, today the legacies of chattel enslavement could be seen in daily lives.  Chattel enslavement and its legacies were the foundation on which systematic racism permeated and the history which drove discriminatory laws and policies based on race. Several legal challenges remained which would be discussed during the panel. 

    Summary of Remarks by the Panellists

    Some speakers, among other things, noted that the trade in enslaved Africans began in the fifteenth century, when Portuguese traders established sugar plantations in the Atlantic islands of Madeira, the Azores, and São Tomé.  At the time, the justification for the enslaved status of African labourers was based on the notion that these labourers had been enslaved because they had been taken captive in just wars.  The slave trade was the reduction of a free person to the status of being enslaved, by whatever means, including kidnap, capture, transfer, or sale.  Slave trading comprised not only the initial transatlantic passages, but internal acts of trade in enslaved persons throughout the Americas and the Caribbean.  These two prongs of the slave trade, trans-Atlantic and internal or domestic slave trading, had occurred for centuries. 

    One speaker said the photograph of a South African billionaire of European descent, arm raised in a Nazi salute, was perhaps the most apt icon for that particular civilization.  It epitomised success in generating wealth by extraction, disregarding surroundings in constructing systems where some had an inherent sense of entitlement to everything, even if it devastated others.  Another speaker said an immeasurable toll of sexual, reproductive and gendered practices and institutions had persisted throughout the hundreds of years of slavery and of slave trading in North and South America and in the Caribbean. 

    A speaker underscored that the transatlantic chattel slavery had created and entrenched anti-Black racism. Although slavery had been abolished, the persistence of the social, psychological, and economic harms of racial discrimination persisted until today.  Another speaker noted that the racial hierarchy that was at the root of the slave trade and slavery had no foundation in international law at that time, just as it had no legitimacy under international law today.  One speaker said reparations for people of African descent were not only a matter of justice for the past, but also a foundation for a more equitable and peaceful future.

    Reparations were vital in seeking justice for colonial crimes, but also to eliminate the root cause of historic and continuing colonial existence.  States must ensure that reparations were not merely symbolic, but concrete and enforceable, through judicial rulings as well as administrative or legislative reparation programmes.  These programmes could be supported by national or international funding and must be accessible, gender-sensitive, victim-centred, and rights-based.  In line with established standards, reparations needed to be comprehensive, encompassing restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction, and guarantees of non-repetition.  States should establish robust legal and institutional frameworks and ensure stable financial allocations that were protected from political or economic fluctuations.  Crucially, reparation measures must be proportional to the gravity of the harm and address the full scope of the violations.  It was also important to ensure that victims participated in the reparations process. 

    Successful reparations had stemmed from attempts to seek victim-oriented justice. These included local revolutions achieving regime change and victims’ framing of legal arguments to hold power to account.  The dismissal of reparations as solely pertaining to the past needed to be confronted; reparations appeared to be about the past but they were also about the present.  Redress by reparations required recognition that sexual abuse was omnipresent in the lives of the enslaved.  The quest for reparations needed to be achieved through evidence-based reasoning. They had to be shaped to show how the few, irrespective of race, had benefitted from the exploitation of the many, irrespective of race. 

    The Convention was a power instrument for redress.  Under article 11, States could bring complaints against other States for violations of the Convention.  Article 14 allowed individuals and groups to submit petitions directly to the Committee provided that the respondent State had recognised the Committee’s jurisdiction to receive individual petitions.  The Basic Principles on Reparations, a United Nations resolution from 2005, established five aspects of reparations that must follow a significant human rights violation, including the need to guarantee the non-recurrence of the human rights violation at issue. 

    The Convention and subsequent jurisprudence of the Committee required material compensation and policy changes to address the legacy of transatlantic chattel slavery and the system of racial discrimination that was created to entrench it. 

    Structural discrimination that arose from anti-Black racism was an ongoing human rights violation and needed to be addressed by States parties to the Convention.   The Committee was urged to recognise the gendered injustices intrinsic of the transatlantic slave trade and slavery and to include them as germane to the redress considered in the forthcoming general recommendation on reparations. 

    Discussion 

    Several speakers spoke from the floor. One speaker welcomed the Committee’s initiative to develop a general recommendation on reparations, which was a vital step towards accountability.  Reparations were grounded in international law, carrying legal consequences which could not be erased by time.  Another speaker said that at the minimum, States parties were required to provide reparations for their failure to eliminate the systemic racism and inequality arising from their inadequate remediation of chattel slavery and its legacies.  The Committee was urged to adopt a comprehensive and transformative approach to address both systemic racism and structural economic inequalities arising from chattel slavery and colonialism in the general recommendation.  A speaker said the time had come to move from rhetoric to concrete measures for reparations for historical and cultural monuments destroyed and looted during centuries of colonialism and slavery. One speaker said reparations were not a favour, but were moral and political obligations of States. 

    Panel Discussion Two on the Legacy of Chattel Slavery: Structural Racism and Institutional Accountability

    Summary of Remarks by the Panellists

    Some speakers, among other things, commended the Committee for the draft general recommendation, which dealt with a vital issue and was long overdue.  The Committee should be applauded for its work and the call for input, and those who had answered the call were thanked.  The call for input document prepared by the Committee did an excellent job of highlighting the history, global responses and objectives, while pointing out the milestones along the way. 

    Chattel slavery was the first global regime of State-legalised racial capitalism, speakers said.  The laws that built it had been dismantled in name, but never in consequence.  The transatlantic slave trade was not just a chapter in history, but was a crime against humanity.  Slavery had funded the economic development of colonial countries, particularly the industrial revolution, and put Britain in the wealthy position that it was in today. The European Union and its members, particularly France, Holland and Spain, and other countries like Germany and Denmark had also participated in this genocide as well. 

    Racism was not a relic of the past; it was present, global, systemic and was still taking lives.  Yet Europe had yet to fully confront this issue.  One speaker commented that Black communities across Europe were too often overlooked, marginalised and ignored by those in power; this must change.   

    There was a painful trail of historical legal construction of racial hierarchy that had occurred during chattel slavery.  This included the British Board of Trade that codified economic enslavement through slave codes and land seizure laws; and France’s Code Noir that created racialised personhood in law.  Portugal and Spain had used religious sanction known as Papal Bulls to erase African legal identity, while the Colonial Laws Validity Act of 1865 insulated colonial laws from challenge.  Today, these laws had mutated into many forms of structural, perceptual and institutional racism, including through education exclusion, Afrophobia, epistemicide and religious erasure.  These laws must be named, acknowledged, and formally repudiated by the United Kingdom and France as a first step in reparatory processes.

    Some speakers noted that chattel slavery was not just a legal and economic construct, it was also a social construct.  When the laws had changed and the cost benefit of slavery was eroded, what remained was institutional racism and structural racism – global inequalities caused by historical injustices.  Those who were descendants of the enslaved lived with the emotional scars of a society that kept ancestors as slaves for longer than people had equal rights under the law.  Chattel slaves were still impacted in deep and wide-ranging ways, with effects spanning economic, social, psychological, and cultural dimensions.  The descendants of the slave owners and the perpetrators of slavery should live with generational repentance. 

    One speaker noted that the 2013 Caribbean Community’s Reparations Commission continued to lead the call for reparations.  The Commission recognised that the persistent harm and suffering experienced today by victims of slavery and colonialism was the primary cause of development failure in the Caribbean.  Through its Ten-Point Reparations Plan, it sought to reposition reparations not in terms of a simple transfer of funds, but rather through a plurality of actions such as debt cancellation, education programmes and technology transfer, amongst other elements.

    The call for reparations and restorative justice did not come from a void; it had always been part of decolonisation.  The need for reparations was a pressing and current issue across all parts of the world affected by the African slave trade.  Reparations should be accessible in the form of compensation, addressing the deficits in equity and opportunity.  Reparations were about transforming systems, narratives and institutions, and creating a Europe where black lives were not just tolerated but celebrated and empowered. 

    Some speakers noted that the Convention needed to be more concertedly mobilised as a framework which was central to achieving reparations directly, including through article 6.  The Committee needed to underscore that reparations were required under the Convention.  It was recommended that European governments begin with a sincere formal apology.  However, apologies without material or structural redress were merely symbolic and could never compensate for the wealth extraction, trauma, or the ongoing inequalities faced by African descendants.  Reparations were about reforming entire legal, economic and social structures that still had forms of racism at their core in the present.  It was not just about addressing harms in the past, but also dealing with those in the present.  The Durban Declaration and Programme for Action and its framework provided for combatting racism and should be powerful guidance for the Committee as it prepared the general recommendation. 

    A speaker said the European Union and its Member States should ensure that the European Union’s anti-racism action plan was renewed, with a focus on reparatory justice.  The European Union and the United Kingdom should jointly fund a reparations programme on an intergenerational basis.  This was not a development issue; it was a justice issue. The United Kingdom and the European Union should start engaging with the political leadership of the Caribbean Community to achieve reparatory justice. 

    Discussion

    Several speakers spoke from the floor. One speaker said during the Second International Decade for People of African Descent, the international community should act to acknowledge and rectify longstanding economic and social inequities, which had economically stagnated the region and resulted in protracted inter-generational trauma.  Another speaker reiterated strong support for the general recommendation.  The sixtieth anniversary of the Convention should also be used as an opportunity to acknowledge the victories of civil society led by African people, including the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action. Racism was a disease, and the actions by the Committee to combat all forms of racism were appreciated.  A speaker said that according to research, stakeholders across the region in all 15 Caribbean Community countries had emphasised the connection between the transatlantic slave trade and unequal access to land ownership, which constituted a continuation of historical injustice. 

    Closing Remarks

    VERENE ALBERTHA SHEPHERD, Committee Vice-Chairperson, in closing remarks, thanked everyone for the amazing discussion which was a social justice exercise that would hopefully reset global relations.  Racism and racial discrimination were creatures of colonialism and many States parties to the Convention still suffered from the legacies of colonialism, especially those that suffered the ravages of the transatlantic trafficking in enslaved Africans, chattel enslavement, and socio-economic underdevelopment in the post-slavery period.  The interventions this afternoon had raised awareness on the racialised nature of the transatlantic trade in enslaved Africans and the ways in which, along with chattel enslavement and unjust enrichment, race and racism were attached to people from Africa and skin shade discrimination was further used to deny them rights.

    There had been several key takeaways from the discussion, including that African chattel enslavement was the first global regime of State-legalised racial capitalism.  Chattel enslavement, an invention of Europeans, was an organised and intentional system based on the legal determination that enslaved Africans were non-human.   

    Chattel enslavement was not gender neutral.  Racism was a direct legacy of the institution of transatlantic chattel slavery, and was an ongoing harm to all who experienced it.  Another takeaway issue was that as chattel enslavement ended, new anti-Black institutions were developed to maintain racial hierarchies, creating persistent economic and social disadvantages for Africans and people of African descent that continued to this present day.  Chattel slavery had no foundation in international law at that time, just as it had no legitimacy under international law today.

    However, as some of the legal experts on the panels had shown, there were legal tools which made reparations unavoidable.  The law could now be rightfully and effectively applied to deliver justice for the profound and continuing harms caused by the trafficking in Africans, chattel enslavement, and the colonisation of Africa.

    It was time that such an injustice be reversed by the payment of reparations to the descendants of those harmed, to ensure the development of areas exploited for the development of Europe. This must start with restitution of the ransom extracted from Haiti and the modern equivalent of the 20 million pounds paid by Britain to enslavers.

    Ms. Shepherd thanked all those who had made the discussion possible and pledged her support to the general recommendation. 

    GAY MCDOUGALL, Committee Vice-Chairperson, thanked all those who had been involved in the panel discussions and those who had made the half day of general discussion possible. 

    MICHAL BALCERZAK, Committee Chairperson, thanked everyone who had been involved in the discussion, which would help inform the work of the Committee. 

    ___________

    Produced by the United Nations Information Service in Geneva for use of the media; 
    not an official record. English and French versions of our releases are different as they are the product of two separate coverage teams that work independently.

     

    CERD25.004E

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI: Park National Corporation reports financial results for first quarter 2025

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    NEWARK, Ohio, April 25, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Park National Corporation (Park) (NYSE American: PRK) today reported financial results for the first quarter of 2025. Park’s board of directors declared a quarterly cash dividend of $1.07 per common share, payable on June 10, 2025, to common shareholders of record as of May 16, 2025.

    “Our first quarter performance reflects our commitment to providing consistent financial support and a measure of predictability in dynamic market conditions,” said Park Chairman and CEO David Trautman. “In a world buffeted by extremes, our greatest opportunity to serve more is through continuing to build authentic relationships and showing up as a steady, reliable partner.”

    Park’s net income for the first quarter of 2025 was $42.2 million, a 19.8 percent increase from $35.2 million for the first quarter of 2024. First quarter 2025 net income per diluted common share was $2.60, compared to $2.17 for the first quarter of 2024. Park’s total loans increased 0.9 percent (3.5 percent annualized) during the first quarter of 2025. Park’s reported period end deposits increased 0.7 percent (2.9 percent annualized) during the first quarter of 2025, with an increase of 2.3 percent (9.5 percent annualized), including deposits that Park moved off balance sheet as of March 31, 2025. The combination of solid loan growth and steady deposits continue to contribute to Park’s success in 2025.

    “Our bankers’ ability to serve others well is reflected in our first quarter results,” said Park President Matthew Miller. “We’re deeply grateful for the trust our communities, customers and neighbors place in us every day. We look forward to growing these and new relationships, consistently delivering on our promises and expanding our impact.”

    Headquartered in Newark, Ohio, Park National Corporation has $9.9 billion in total assets (as of March 31, 2025). Park’s banking operations are conducted through its subsidiary, The Park National Bank. Other Park subsidiaries are Scope Leasing, Inc. (d.b.a. Scope Aircraft Finance), Guardian Financial Services Company (d.b.a. Guardian Finance Company), Park Investments, Inc. and SE Property Holdings, LLC.

    Complete financial tables are listed below.

    Category: Earnings

    SAFE HARBOR STATEMENT UNDER THE PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM ACT OF 1995

    Park cautions that any forward-looking statements contained in this news release or made by management of Park are provided to assist in the understanding of anticipated future financial performance. Forward-looking statements provide current expectations or forecasts of future events and are not guarantees of future performance. The forward-looking statements are based on management’s expectations and are subject to a number of risks and uncertainties, including those described in Park’s Annual Report on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2024, as updated by our filings with the SEC. Although management believes that the expectations reflected in such forward-looking statements are reasonable, actual results may differ materially from those expressed or implied in such statements.

    Risks and uncertainties that could cause actual results to differ include, without limitation: (1) the ability to execute our business plan successfully and manage strategic initiatives; (2) the impact of current and future economic and financial market conditions, including unemployment rates, inflation, interest rates, supply-demand imbalances, and geopolitical matters; (3) factors impacting the performance of our loan portfolio, including real estate values, financial health of borrowers, and loan concentrations; (4) the effects of monetary and fiscal policies, including interest rates, money supply, and inflation; (5) changes in federal, state, or local tax laws; (6) the impact of changes in governmental policy and regulatory requirements on our operations; (7) changes in consumer spending, borrowing, and saving habits; (8) changes in the performance and creditworthiness of customers, suppliers, and counterparties; (9) increased credit risk and higher credit losses due to loan concentrations; (10) volatility in mortgage banking income due to interest rates and demand; (11) adequacy of our internal controls and risk management programs; (12) competitive pressures among financial services organizations; (13) uncertainty regarding changes in banking regulations and other regulatory requirements; (14) our ability to meet heightened supervisory requirements and expectations; (15) the impact of changes in accounting policies and practices on our financial condition; (16) the reliability and accuracy of assumptions and estimates used in applying critical accounting estimates; (17) the potential for higher future credit losses due to changes in economic assumptions; (18) the ability to anticipate and respond to technological changes and our reliance on third-party vendors; (19) operational issues related to and capital spending necessitated by the implementation of information technology systems on which we are highly dependent; (20) the ability to secure confidential information and deliver products and services through computer systems and telecommunications networks; (21) the impact of security breaches or failures in operational systems; (22) the impact of geopolitical instability and trade policies on our operations including the imposition of tariffs and retaliatory tariffs; (23) the impact of changes in credit ratings of government debt and financial stability of sovereign governments; (24) the effect of stock market price fluctuations on our asset and wealth management businesses; (25) litigation and regulatory compliance exposure; (26) availability of earnings and excess capital for dividend declarations; (27) the impact of fraud, scams, and schemes on our business; (28) the impact of natural disasters, pandemics, and other emergencies on our operations; (29) potential deterioration of the economy due to financial, political, or other shocks; (30) impact of healthcare laws and potential changes on our costs and operations; (31) the ability to grow deposits and maintain adequate deposit levels, including by mitigating the effect of unexpected deposit outflows on our financial condition; and (32) other risk factors related to the banking industry.

    Park does not undertake, and specifically disclaims any obligation, to publicly release the results of any revisions that may be made to update any forward-looking statement to reflect the events or circumstances after the date on which the forward-looking statement was made, or reflect the occurrence of unanticipated events, except to the extent required by law.

    PARK NATIONAL CORPORATION  
    Financial Highlights  
    As of or for the three months ended March 31, 2025, December 31, 2024 and March 31, 2024              
                     
        2025       2024       2024       Percent change vs.  
    (in thousands, except common share and per common share data and ratios) 1st QTR 4th QTR 1st QTR   4Q ’24   1Q ’24  
    INCOME STATEMENT:                
    Net interest income $ 104,377     $ 103,445     $ 95,623       0.9   % 9.2   %
    Provision for credit losses   756       3,935       2,180       (80.8 ) % (65.3 ) %
    Other income   25,746       31,064       26,200       (17.1 ) % (1.7 ) %
    Other expense   78,164       83,241       77,228       (6.1 ) % 1.2   %
    Income before income taxes $ 51,203     $ 47,333     $ 42,415       8.2   % 20.7   %
    Income taxes   9,046       8,703       7,211       3.9   % 25.4   %
    Net income $ 42,157     $ 38,630     $ 35,204       9.1   % 19.8   %
                     
    MARKET DATA:                
    Earnings per common share – basic (a) $ 2.61     $ 2.39     $ 2.18       9.2   % 19.7   %
    Earnings per common share – diluted (a)   2.60       2.37       2.17       9.7   % 19.8   %
    Quarterly cash dividend declared per common share   1.07       1.06       1.06       0.9   % 0.9   %
    Special cash dividend declared per common share         0.50             N.M.   N.M.  
    Book value per common share at period end   79.00       76.98       71.95       2.6   % 9.8   %
    Market price per common share at period end   151.40       171.43       135.85       (11.7 ) % 11.4   %
    Market capitalization at period end   2,451,370       2,770,134       2,199,556       (11.5 ) % 11.4   %
                     
    Weighted average common shares – basic (b)   16,159,342       16,156,827       16,116,842         % 0.3   %
    Weighted average common shares – diluted (b)   16,238,701       16,283,701       16,191,065       (0.3 ) % 0.3   %
    Common shares outstanding at period end   16,191,347       16,158,982       16,149,523       0.2   % 0.3   %
                     
    PERFORMANCE RATIOS: (annualized)                
    Return on average assets (a)(b)   1.70   %   1.54   %   1.44   %   10.4   % 18.1   %
    Return on average shareholders’ equity (a)(b)   13.46   %   12.32   %   12.23   %   9.3   % 10.1   %
    Yield on loans   6.26   %   6.21   %   5.99   %   0.8   % 4.5   %
    Yield on investment securities   3.25   %   3.46   %   3.90   %   (6.1 ) % (16.7 ) %
    Yield on money market instruments   4.46   %   4.75   %   5.48   %   (6.1 ) % (18.6 ) %
    Yield on interest earning assets   5.85   %   5.82   %   5.66   %   0.5   % 3.4   %
    Cost of interest bearing deposits   1.76   %   1.90   %   1.94   %   (7.4 ) % (9.3 ) %
    Cost of borrowings   3.94   %   3.86   %   4.25   %   2.1   % (7.3 ) %
    Cost of paying interest bearing liabilities   1.86   %   1.99   %   2.08   %   (6.5 ) % (10.6 ) %
    Net interest margin (g)   4.62   %   4.51   %   4.28   %   2.4   % 7.9   %
    Efficiency ratio (g)   59.79   %   61.60   %   63.07   %   (2.9 ) % (5.2 ) %
                     
    OTHER DATA (NON-GAAP) AND BALANCE SHEET INFORMATION:                
    Tangible book value per common share (d) $ 68.94     $ 66.89     $ 61.80       3.1   % 11.6   %
    Average interest earning assets   9,210,385       9,176,540       9,048,204       0.4   % 1.8   %
    Pre-tax, pre-provision net income (j)   51,959       51,268       44,595       1.3   % 16.5   %
                     
    Note: Explanations for footnotes (a) – (k) are included at the end of the financial tables in the “Financial Reconciliations” section.  
       
    PARK NATIONAL CORPORATION  
    Financial Highlights (continued)  
    As of or for the three months ended March 31, 2025, December 31, 2024 and March 31, 2024  
                     
              Percent change vs.  
    (in thousands, except ratios) March 31, 2025 December 31, 2024 March 31, 2024   4Q ’24   1Q ’24  
    BALANCE SHEET:                
    Investment securities $ 1,042,163     $ 1,100,861     $ 1,339,747       (5.3 ) % (22.2 ) %
    Loans   7,883,735       7,817,128       7,525,005       0.9   % 4.8   %
    Allowance for credit losses   88,130       87,966       85,084       0.2   % 3.6   %
    Goodwill and other intangible assets   162,758       163,032       163,927       (0.2 ) % (0.7 ) %
    Other real estate owned (OREO)   119       938       1,674       (87.3 ) % (92.9 ) %
    Total assets   9,886,612       9,805,350       9,881,077       0.8   % 0.1   %
    Total deposits   8,201,695       8,143,526       8,306,032       0.7   % (1.3 ) %
    Borrowings   270,757       280,083       295,130       (3.3 ) % (8.3 ) %
    Total shareholders’ equity   1,279,042       1,243,848       1,161,979       2.8   % 10.1   %
    Tangible equity (d)   1,116,284       1,080,816       998,052       3.3   % 11.8   %
    Total nonperforming loans   63,148       69,932       71,759       (9.7 ) % (12.0 ) %
    Total nonperforming assets   63,267       70,870       73,433       (10.7 ) % (13.8 ) %
                     
    ASSET QUALITY RATIOS:                
    Loans as a % of period end total assets   79.74   %   79.72   %   76.16   %     % 4.7   %
    Total nonperforming loans as a % of period end loans   0.80   %   0.89   %   0.95   %   (10.1 ) % (15.8 ) %
    Total nonperforming assets as a % of period end loans + OREO + other nonperforming assets   0.80   %   0.91   %   0.98   %   (12.1 ) % (18.4 ) %
    Allowance for credit losses as a % of period end loans   1.12   %   1.13   %   1.13   %   (0.9 ) % (0.9 ) %
    Net loan charge-offs $ 592     $ 3,206     $ 841       (81.5 ) % (29.6 ) %
    Annualized net loan charge-offs as a % of average loans (b)   0.03   %   0.16   %   0.05   %   (81.3 ) % (40.0 ) %
                     
    CAPITAL & LIQUIDITY:                
    Total shareholders’ equity / Period end total assets   12.94   %   12.69   %   11.76   %   2.0   % 10.0   %
    Tangible equity (d) / Tangible assets (f)   11.48   %   11.21   %   10.27   %   2.4   % 11.8   %
    Average shareholders’ equity / Average assets (b)   12.64   %   12.47   %   11.74   %   1.4   % 7.7   %
    Average shareholders’ equity / Average loans (b)   16.22   %   16.08   %   15.48   %   0.9   % 4.8   %
    Average loans / Average deposits (b)   93.56   %   93.00   %   91.11   %   0.6   % 2.7   %
                     
    Note: Explanations for footnotes (a) – (k) are included at the end of the financial tables in the “Financial Reconciliations” section.  
       
    PARK NATIONAL CORPORATION
    Consolidated Statements of Income
               
        Three Months Ended  
        March 31  
    (in thousands, except share and per share data)   2025   2024  
               
    Interest income:          
    Interest and fees on loans   $ 120,648   $ 111,211  
    Interest on debt securities:          
    Taxable     7,130     11,899  
    Tax-exempt     1,269     1,410  
    Other interest income     3,153     2,120  
    Total interest income     132,200     126,640  
               
    Interest expense:          
    Interest on deposits:          
    Demand and savings deposits     18,436     19,855  
    Time deposits     6,770     7,338  
    Interest on borrowings     2,617     3,824  
    Total interest expense     27,823     31,017  
               
    Net interest income     104,377     95,623  
               
    Provision for credit losses     756     2,180  
               
    Net interest income after provision for credit losses     103,621     93,443  
               
    Other income     25,746     26,200  
               
    Other expense     78,164     77,228  
               
    Income before income taxes     51,203     42,415  
               
    Income taxes     9,046     7,211  
               
    Net income   $ 42,157   $ 35,204  
               
    Per common share:          
    Net income – basic   $ 2.61   $ 2.18  
    Net income – diluted   $ 2.60   $ 2.17  
               
    Weighted average common shares – basic     16,159,342     16,116,842  
    Weighted average common shares – diluted     16,238,701     16,191,065  
               
    Cash dividends declared:          
      Quarterly dividend   $ 1.07   $ 1.06  
     
    PARK NATIONAL CORPORATION
    Consolidated Balance Sheets
         
    (in thousands, except share data) March 31, 2025 December 31, 2024
         
    Assets    
         
    Cash and due from banks $ 154,536   $ 122,363  
    Money market instruments   83,078     38,203  
    Investment securities   1,042,163     1,100,861  
    Loans   7,883,735     7,817,128  
    Allowance for credit losses   (88,130 )   (87,966 )
    Loans, net   7,795,605     7,729,162  
    Bank premises and equipment, net   66,327     69,522  
    Goodwill and other intangible assets   162,758     163,032  
    Other real estate owned   119     938  
    Other assets   582,026     581,269  
    Total assets $ 9,886,612   $ 9,805,350  
         
    Liabilities and Shareholders’ Equity    
         
    Deposits:    
    Noninterest bearing $ 2,637,577   $ 2,612,708  
    Interest bearing   5,564,118     5,530,818  
    Total deposits   8,201,695     8,143,526  
    Borrowings   270,757     280,083  
    Other liabilities   135,118     137,893  
    Total liabilities $ 8,607,570   $ 8,561,502  
         
         
    Shareholders’ Equity:    
    Preferred shares (200,000 shares authorized; no shares outstanding at March 31, 2025 and December 31, 2024) $   $  
    Common shares (No par value; 20,000,000 shares authorized; 17,623,104 shares issued at March 31, 2025 and December 31, 2024)   459,529     463,706  
    Accumulated other comprehensive loss, net of taxes   (34,659 )   (46,175 )
    Retained earnings   1,002,110     977,599  
    Treasury shares (1,431,757 shares at March 31, 2025 and 1,464,122 shares at December 31, 2024)   (147,938 )   (151,282 )
    Total shareholders’ equity $ 1,279,042   $ 1,243,848  
    Total liabilities and shareholders’ equity $ 9,886,612   $ 9,805,350  
     
    PARK NATIONAL CORPORATION
    Consolidated Average Balance Sheets
           
      Three Months Ended  
      March 31  
    (in thousands)   2025     2024    
           
    Assets      
           
    Cash and due from banks $ 127,229   $ 143,714    
    Money market instruments   287,016     155,511    
    Investment securities   1,069,620     1,368,527    
    Loans   7,833,234     7,482,650    
    Allowance for credit losses   (88,825 )   (84,067 )  
    Loans, net   7,744,409     7,398,583    
    Bank premises and equipment, net   68,992     74,919    
    Goodwill and other intangible assets   162,938     164,137    
    Other real estate owned   918     1,088    
    Other assets   584,485     556,899    
    Total assets $ 10,045,607   $ 9,863,378    
           
           
    Liabilities and Shareholders’ Equity      
           
    Deposits:      
    Noninterest bearing $ 2,578,838   $ 2,569,030    
    Interest bearing   5,793,915     5,644,088    
    Total deposits   8,372,753     8,213,118    
    Borrowings   269,254     361,703    
    Other liabilities   133,341     130,373    
    Total liabilities $ 8,775,348   $ 8,705,194    
           
    Shareholders’ Equity:      
    Preferred shares $   $    
    Common shares   464,046     463,518    
    Accumulated other comprehensive loss, net of taxes   (39,942 )   (67,343 )  
    Retained earnings   997,399     917,645    
    Treasury shares   (151,244 )   (155,636 )  
    Total shareholders’ equity $ 1,270,259   $ 1,158,184    
    Total liabilities and shareholders’ equity $ 10,045,607   $ 9,863,378    
     
    PARK NATIONAL CORPORATION
    Consolidated Statements of Income – Linked Quarters
               
      2025 2024 2024 2024 2024
    (in thousands, except per share data) 1st QTR 4th QTR 3rd QTR 2nd QTR 1st QTR
               
    Interest income:          
    Interest and fees on loans $ 120,648   $ 120,870   $ 120,203   $ 115,318   $ 111,211  
    Interest on debt securities:          
    Taxable   7,130     8,641     10,228     10,950     11,899  
    Tax-exempt   1,269     1,351     1,381     1,382     1,410  
    Other interest income   3,153     2,751     1,996     1,254     2,120  
    Total interest income   132,200     133,613     133,808     128,904     126,640  
               
    Interest expense:          
    Interest on deposits:          
    Demand and savings deposits   18,436     19,802     22,762     20,370     19,855  
    Time deposits   6,770     7,658     7,073     7,525     7,338  
    Interest on borrowings   2,617     2,708     2,859     3,172     3,824  
    Total interest expense   27,823     30,168     32,694     31,067     31,017  
               
    Net interest income   104,377     103,445     101,114     97,837     95,623  
               
    Provision for credit losses   756     3,935     5,315     3,113     2,180  
               
    Net interest income after provision for credit losses   103,621     99,510     95,799     94,724     93,443  
               
    Other income   25,746     31,064     36,530     28,794     26,200  
               
    Other expense   78,164     83,241     85,681     75,189     77,228  
               
    Income before income taxes   51,203     47,333     46,648     48,329     42,415  
               
    Income taxes   9,046     8,703     8,431     8,960     7,211  
               
    Net income $ 42,157   $ 38,630   $ 38,217   $ 39,369   $ 35,204  
               
    Per common share:          
    Net income – basic $ 2.61   $ 2.39   $ 2.37   $ 2.44   $ 2.18  
    Net income – diluted $ 2.60   $ 2.37   $ 2.35   $ 2.42   $ 2.17  
     
    PARK NATIONAL CORPORATION
    Detail of other income and other expense – Linked Quarters
               
        2025     2024     2024     2024     2024  
    (in thousands) 1st QTR 4th QTR 3rd QTR 2nd QTR 1st QTR
               
    Other income:          
    Income from fiduciary activities $ 10,994   $ 11,122   $ 10,615   $ 10,728   $ 10,024  
    Service charges on deposit accounts   2,407     2,319     2,362     2,214     2,106  
    Other service income   2,936     3,277     3,036     2,906     2,524  
    Debit card fee income   6,089     6,511     6,539     6,580     6,243  
    Bank owned life insurance income   1,512     1,519     2,057     1,565     2,629  
    ATM fees   335     415     471     458     496  
    Pension settlement gain       365     5,783          
    (Loss) gain on the sale of OREO, net   (229 )   (74 )   2     (7 )   121  
    Loss on sale of debt securities, net       (128 )           (398 )
    (Loss) gain on equity securities, net   (862 )   1,852     1,557     358     (687 )
    Other components of net periodic benefit income   2,344     2,651     2,204     2,204     2,204  
    Miscellaneous   220     1,235     1,904     1,788     938  
    Total other income $ 25,746   $ 31,064   $ 36,530   $ 28,794   $ 26,200  
               
    Other expense:          
    Salaries $ 36,216   $ 37,254   $ 38,370   $ 35,954   $ 35,733  
    Employee benefits   10,516     10,129     10,162     9,873     11,560  
    Occupancy expense   3,519     2,929     3,731     2,975     3,181  
    Furniture and equipment expense   2,301     2,375     2,571     2,454     2,583  
    Data processing fees   10,529     10,450     11,764     9,542     8,808  
    Professional fees and services   7,307     10,465     7,842     6,022     6,817  
    Marketing   1,528     1,949     1,464     1,164     1,741  
    Insurance   1,686     1,600     1,640     1,777     1,718  
    Communication   1,202     1,104     955     1,002     1,036  
    State tax expense   1,186     1,145     1,116     1,129     1,110  
    Amortization of intangible assets   274     288     287     320     320  
    Foundation contributions           2,000          
    Miscellaneous   1,900     3,553     3,779     2,977     2,621  
    Total other expense $ 78,164   $ 83,241   $ 85,681   $ 75,189   $ 77,228  
               
    PARK NATIONAL CORPORATION
    Asset Quality Information
                   
          Year ended December 31,
    (in thousands, except ratios)   March 31, 2025   2024     2023     2022     2021     2020  
                   
    Allowance for credit losses:              
    Allowance for credit losses, beginning of period   $ 87,966   $ 83,745   $ 85,379   $ 83,197   $ 85,675   $ 56,679  
    Cumulative change in accounting principle; adoption of ASU 2022-02 in 2023 and ASU 2016-13 in 2021           383         6,090      
    Charge-offs     3,605     18,334     10,863     9,133     5,093     10,304  
    Recoveries     3,013     8,012     5,942     6,758     8,441     27,246  
    Net charge-offs (recoveries)     592     10,322     4,921     2,375     (3,348 )   (16,942 )
    Provision for (recovery of) credit losses     756     14,543     2,904     4,557     (11,916 )   12,054  
    Allowance for credit losses, end of period   $ 88,130   $ 87,966   $ 83,745   $ 85,379   $ 83,197   $ 85,675  
                   
    General reserve trends:              
    Allowance for credit losses, end of period   $ 88,130   $ 87,966   $ 83,745   $ 85,379   $ 83,197   $ 85,675  
    Allowance on accruing purchased credit deteriorated (“PCD”) loans (purchased credit impaired (“PCI”) loans for years 2020 and prior)                         167  
    Allowance on purchased loans excluded from collectively evaluated loans (for years 2020 and prior)   N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A.   678  
    Specific reserves on individually evaluated loans – accrual                     42     44  
    Specific reserves on individually evaluated loans – nonaccrual     1,044     1,299     4,983     3,566     1,574     5,390  
    General reserves on collectively evaluated loans   $ 87,086   $ 86,667   $ 78,762   $ 81,813   $ 81,581   $ 79,396  
                   
    Total loans   $ 7,883,735   $ 7,817,128   $ 7,476,221   $ 7,141,891   $ 6,871,122   $ 7,177,785  
    Accruing PCD loans (PCI loans for years 2020 and prior)     2,139     2,174     2,835     4,653     7,149     11,153  
    Purchased loans excluded from collectively evaluated loans (for years 2020 and prior)   N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A.   360,056  
    Individually evaluated loans – accrual (k)     13,935     15,290         11,477     17,517     8,756  
    Individually evaluated loans – nonaccrual     47,718     53,149     45,215     66,864     56,985     99,651  
    Collectively evaluated loans   $ 7,819,943   $ 7,746,515   $ 7,428,171   $ 7,058,897   $ 6,789,471   $ 6,698,169  
                   
    Asset Quality Ratios:              
    Net charge-offs (recoveries) as a % of average loans     0.03 %   0.14 %   0.07 %   0.03 %   (0.05) %   (0.24) %
    Allowance for credit losses as a % of period end loans     1.12 %   1.13 %   1.12 %   1.20 %   1.21 %   1.19 %
    General reserve as a % of collectively evaluated loans     1.11 %   1.12 %   1.06 %   1.16 %   1.20 %   1.19 %
                   
    Nonperforming assets:              
    Nonaccrual loans   $ 61,929   $ 68,178   $ 60,259   $ 79,696   $ 72,722   $ 117,368  
    Accruing troubled debt restructurings (for years 2022 and prior) (k)   N.A. N.A. N.A.   20,134     28,323     20,788  
    Loans past due 90 days or more     1,219     1,754     859     1,281     1,607     1,458  
    Total nonperforming loans   $ 63,148   $ 69,932   $ 61,118   $ 101,111   $ 102,652   $ 139,614  
    Other real estate owned     119     938     983     1,354     775     1,431  
    Other nonperforming assets                     2,750     3,164  
    Total nonperforming assets   $ 63,267   $ 70,870   $ 62,101   $ 102,465   $ 106,177   $ 144,209  
    Percentage of nonaccrual loans to period end loans     0.79 %   0.87 %   0.81 %   1.12 %   1.06 %   1.64 %
    Percentage of nonperforming loans to period end loans     0.80 %   0.89 %   0.82 %   1.42 %   1.49 %   1.95 %
    Percentage of nonperforming assets to period end loans     0.80 %   0.91 %   0.83 %   1.43 %   1.55 %   2.01 %
    Percentage of nonperforming assets to period end total assets     0.64 %   0.72 %   0.63 %   1.04 %   1.11 %   1.55 %
                   
    Note: Explanations for footnotes (a) – (k) are included at the end of the financial tables in the “Financial Reconciliations” section.
     
    PARK NATIONAL CORPORATION
    Asset Quality Information (continued)
                   
          Year ended December 31,
    (in thousands, except ratios)   March 31, 2025 2024 2023 2022 2021 2020
                   
    New nonaccrual loan information:              
    Nonaccrual loans, beginning of period   $ 68,178 $ 60,259 $ 79,696 $ 72,722 $ 117,368 $ 90,080
    New nonaccrual loans     14,767   65,535   48,280   64,918   38,478   103,386
    Resolved nonaccrual loans     21,016   57,616   67,717   57,944   83,124   76,098
    Nonaccrual loans, end of period   $ 61,929 $ 68,178 $ 60,259 $ 79,696 $ 72,722 $ 117,368
                   
    Individually evaluated nonaccrual commercial loan portfolio information (period end):
    Unpaid principal balance   $ 51,134 $ 58,158 $ 47,564 $ 68,639 $ 57,609 $ 100,306
    Prior charge-offs     3,416   5,009   2,349   1,775   624   655
    Remaining principal balance     47,718   53,149   45,215   66,864   56,985   99,651
    Specific reserves     1,044   1,299   4,983   3,566   1,574   5,390
    Book value, after specific reserves   $ 46,674 $ 51,850 $ 40,232 $ 63,298 $ 55,411 $ 94,261
                   
    Note: Explanations for footnotes (a) – (k) are included at the end of the financial tables in the “Financial Reconciliations” section.
     
    PARK NATIONAL CORPORATION  
    Financial Reconciliations        
    NON-GAAP RECONCILIATIONS        
      THREE MONTHS ENDED  
    (in thousands, except share and per share data) March 31, 2025 December 31, 2024 March 31, 2024  
    Net interest income $ 104,377   $ 103,445   $ 95,623    
    less purchase accounting accretion related to NewDominion and Carolina Alliance acquisitions   175     250     352    
    less interest income on former Vision Bank relationships   1,019     38     2    
    Net interest income – adjusted $ 103,183   $ 103,157   $ 95,269    
             
    Provision for credit losses $ 756   $ 3,935   $ 2,180    
    less recoveries on former Vision Bank relationships   (1,097 )       (953 )  
    Provision for credit losses – adjusted $ 1,853   $ 3,935   $ 3,133    
             
    Other income $ 25,746   $ 31,064   $ 26,200    
    less loss on sale of debt securities, net       (128 )   (398 )  
    less pension settlement gain       365        
    less impact of strategic initiatives   (914 )   117     (155 )  
    less Vision related (loss) gain on the sale of OREO, net   (229 )       121    
    less other service income related to former Vision Bank relationships   3     299     7    
    Other income – adjusted $ 26,886   $ 30,411   $ 26,625    
             
    Other expense $ 78,164   $ 83,241   $ 77,228    
    less core deposit intangible amortization related to NewDominion and Carolina Alliance acquisitions   274     288     320    
    less building demolition costs       44     65    
    less direct expenses related to collection of payments on former Vision Bank loan relationships   276     215        
    Other expense – adjusted $ 77,614   $ 82,694   $ 76,843    
             
    Tax effect of adjustments to net income identified above (i) $ (126 ) $ (83 ) $ (104 )  
             
    Net income – reported $ 42,157   $ 38,630   $ 35,204    
    Net income – adjusted (h) $ 41,682   $ 38,319   $ 34,811    
             
    Diluted earnings per common share $ 2.60   $ 2.37   $ 2.17    
    Diluted earnings per common share, adjusted (h) $ 2.57   $ 2.35   $ 2.15    
             
    Annualized return on average assets (a)(b)   1.70 %   1.54 %   1.44 %  
    Annualized return on average assets, adjusted (a)(b)(h)   1.68 %   1.52 %   1.42 %  
             
    Annualized return on average tangible assets (a)(b)(e)   1.73 %   1.56 %   1.46 %  
    Annualized return on average tangible assets, adjusted (a)(b)(e)(h)   1.71 %   1.55 %   1.44 %  
             
    Annualized return on average shareholders’ equity (a)(b)   13.46 %   12.32 %   12.23 %  
    Annualized return on average shareholders’ equity, adjusted (a)(b)(h)   13.31 %   12.22 %   12.09 %  
             
    Annualized return on average tangible equity (a)(b)(c)   15.44 %   14.17 %   14.24 %  
    Annualized return on average tangible equity, adjusted (a)(b)(c)(h)   15.27 %   14.06 %   14.08 %  
             
    Efficiency ratio (g)   59.79 %   61.60 %   63.07 %  
    Efficiency ratio, adjusted (g)(h)   59.39 %   61.63 %   62.72 %  
             
    Annualized net interest margin (g)   4.62 %   4.51 %   4.28 %  
    Annualized net interest margin, adjusted (g)(h)   4.57 %   4.50 %   4.26 %  
    Note: Explanations for footnotes (a) – (k) are included at the end of the financial tables in the “Financial Reconciliations” section.
     
    PARK NATIONAL CORPORATION  
    Financial Reconciliations (continued)        
             
    (a) Reported measure uses net income
    (b) Averages are for the three months ended March 31, 2025, December 31, 2024, and March 31, 2024, as appropriate
    (c) Net income for each period divided by average tangible equity during the period. Average tangible equity equals average shareholders’ equity during the applicable period less average goodwill and other intangible assets during the applicable period.
             
    RECONCILIATION OF AVERAGE SHAREHOLDERS’ EQUITY TO AVERAGE TANGIBLE EQUITY:  
      THREE MONTHS ENDED  
      March 31, 2025 December 31, 2024 March 31, 2024  
    AVERAGE SHAREHOLDERS’ EQUITY $ 1,270,259 $ 1,247,680 $ 1,158,184  
    Less: Average goodwill and other intangible assets   162,938   163,221   164,137  
    AVERAGE TANGIBLE EQUITY $ 1,107,321 $ 1,084,459 $ 994,047  
             
    (d) Tangible equity divided by common shares outstanding at period end. Tangible equity equals total shareholders’ equity less goodwill and other intangible assets, in each case at the end of the period.
             
    RECONCILIATION OF TOTAL SHAREHOLDERS’ EQUITY TO TANGIBLE EQUITY:
      March 31, 2025 December 31, 2024 March 31, 2024  
    TOTAL SHAREHOLDERS’ EQUITY $ 1,279,042 $ 1,243,848 $ 1,161,979  
    Less: Goodwill and other intangible assets   162,758   163,032   163,927  
    TANGIBLE EQUITY $ 1,116,284 $ 1,080,816 $ 998,052  
             
    (e) Net income for each period divided by average tangible assets during the period. Average tangible assets equal average assets less average goodwill and other intangible assets, in each case during the applicable period.
             
    RECONCILIATION OF AVERAGE ASSETS TO AVERAGE TANGIBLE ASSETS  
      THREE MONTHS ENDED  
      March 31, 2025 December 31, 2024 March 31, 2024  
    AVERAGE ASSETS $ 10,045,607 $ 10,008,328 $ 9,863,378  
    Less: Average goodwill and other intangible assets   162,938   163,221   164,137  
    AVERAGE TANGIBLE ASSETS $ 9,882,669 $ 9,845,107 $ 9,699,241  
             
    (f) Tangible equity divided by tangible assets. Tangible assets equal total assets less goodwill and other intangible assets, in each case at the end of the period.
             
    RECONCILIATION OF TOTAL ASSETS TO TANGIBLE ASSETS:
      March 31, 2025 December 31, 2024 March 31, 2024  
    TOTAL ASSETS $ 9,886,612 $ 9,805,350 $ 9,881,077  
    Less: Goodwill and other intangible assets   162,758   163,032   163,927  
    TANGIBLE ASSETS $ 9,723,854 $ 9,642,318 $ 9,717,150  
             
    (g) Efficiency ratio is calculated by dividing total other expense by the sum of fully taxable equivalent net interest income and other income. Fully taxable equivalent net interest income reconciliation is shown assuming a 21% corporate federal income tax rate. Additionally, net interest margin is calculated on a fully taxable equivalent basis by dividing fully taxable equivalent net interest income by average interest earning assets, in each case during the applicable period.
             
    RECONCILIATION OF FULLY TAXABLE EQUIVALENT NET INTEREST INCOME TO NET INTEREST INCOME
      THREE MONTHS ENDED  
      March 31, 2025 December 31, 2024 March 31, 2024  
    Interest income $ 132,200 $ 133,613 $ 126,640  
    Fully taxable equivalent adjustment   607   617   616  
    Fully taxable equivalent interest income $ 132,807 $ 134,230 $ 127,256  
    Interest expense   27,823   30,168   31,017  
    Fully taxable equivalent net interest income $ 104,984 $ 104,062 $ 96,239  
             
    (h) Adjustments to net income for each period presented are detailed in the non-GAAP reconciliations of net interest income, provision for credit losses, other income, other expense and tax effect of adjustments to net income.
    (i) The tax effect of adjustments to net income was calculated assuming a 21% corporate federal income tax rate.
    (j) Pre-tax, pre-provision (“PTPP”) net income is calculated as net income, plus income taxes, plus the provision for credit losses, in each case during the applicable period. PTPP net income is a common industry metric utilized in capital analysis and review. PTPP is used to assess the operating performance of Park while excluding the impact of the provision for credit losses.
     
    RECONCILIATION OF PRE-TAX, PRE-PROVISION NET INCOME
      THREE MONTHS ENDED
      March 31, 2025 December 31, 2024 March 31, 2024
    Net income $ 42,157 $ 38,630 $ 35,204  
    Plus: Income taxes   9,046   8,703   7,211  
    Plus: Provision for credit losses   756   3,935   2,180  
    Pre-tax, pre-provision net income $ 51,959 $ 51,268 $ 44,595  
             
    (k) Effective January 1, 2023, Park adopted Accounting Standards Update (“ASU”) 2022-02. Among other things, this ASU eliminated the concept of troubled debt restructurings (“TDRs”). As a result of the adoption of this ASU and elimination of the concept of TDRs, total nonperforming loans (“NPLs”) and total nonperforming assets (“NPAs”) each decreased by $20.1 million effective January 1, 2023. Additionally, as a result of the adoption of this ASU, accruing individually evaluated loans decreased by $11.5 million effective January 1, 2023.
     

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