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Category: Economy

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Funding of ‘The European Qur’an’ project by the European Research Council – E-001515/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-001515/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Fabrice Leggeri (PfE)

    On 13 April 2025, an investigation published in the ‘Journal du Dimanche’[1] highlights particularly worrying issues connected to the ‘European Qur’an’ project[2], the recipient of EUR 9.8 million in funding from the Commission’s European Research Council.

    The project aims to demonstrate that the Qur’an shaped European identity between the 12th and 19th centuries. Behind its scientific façade, however, the article reveals:

    – the involvement of researchers linked to networks close to the Muslim Brotherhood;

    – a desire to use ideology to rewrite European history;

    – an educational component and plans to reach the general public, the scope of which is concerning (exhibitions, cartoons and publications);

    – direct links to institutions known for their ties with political Islamism.

    In view of the above:

    • 1.What scientific and ethical criteria were behind the decision to award EU funding to this project?
    • 2.Does the Commission find it acceptable that the EU is indirectly funding work connected to the Muslim Brotherhood’s ideology?
    • 3.What oversight, evaluation and suspension procedures are provided for in the event of ideological abuses that run counter to EU values?

    Submitted: 13.4.2025

    • [1] https://www.lejdd.fr/Societe/10-millions-deuros-pour-un-coran-europeen-enquete-sur-un-projet-polemique-finance-par-lunion-europeenne-157015
    • [2] https://institut-islamologie.fr/projet-erc-le-coran-europeen-euqu-2019-2025/#:~:text=Le%20Coran%20Europ%C3%A9en%20%3A%20l%27%C3%A9tude,Culture%20et%20Religion%20Europ%C3%A9enne%20(EuQu)&text=EuQu%20est%20un%20projet%20de,Conseil%20europ%C3%A9en%20de%20la%20recherche
    Last updated: 23 April 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Increasing frequency and intensity of wildfires – E-001412/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-001412/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Gerben-Jan Gerbrandy (Renew), Grégory Allione (Renew)

    March 2025 was the driest month ever recorded in the Netherlands, leading to a record number of wildfires. France has already experienced nearly as many wildfires so far this year as in all of 2024. Climate change will exacerbate droughts and extend wildfire seasons. This trend is reflected by the increasing solicitation of the EU Civil Protection Mechanism. Between 2007 and 2024, nearly 20 % of all requests for assistance were in response to wildfires. Considering the increasing frequency and intensity of wildfires, we have the following questions:

    • 1.What is the Commission’s projection of the costs of wildfires in the EU in the coming 10 years, and will these costs be taken into account in the next multiannual financial framework and in the EU’s industrial strategy, in particular as regards the funding of the EU Civil Protection Mechanism, the development of European firefighting aircraft and the strengthening of the European aerial firefighting industry?
    • 2.How will the increasing frequency of wildfires impact insurance for citizens and entrepreneurs in high-risk areas, and what steps is the Commission taking to address this?
    • 3.What amount of the LIFE Programme subsidies is allocated to drought prevention and what other EU programmes are (partly) dedicated to this, and how much EU funding is allocated in total to drought prevention?

    Submitted: 7.4.2025

    Last updated: 23 April 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Addressing digital inequality in education, treating it as a threat to EU cohesion – E-000814/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The Council Recommendation on the key enabling factors for successful digital education and training[1], a flagship deliverable of the Digital Education Action Plan 2021-2027[2] adopted in 2023, promotes equitable and impact-focused investment in digital education.

    The recommendation calls on Member States to provide equal access to all learners by investing in high-speed Internet connectivity in all education and training institutions and closing territorial and socioeconomic gaps.

    The recommendation suggests ways to increase the efficiency of spending on digital education in Member States, for example by considering alternative approaches to investment, including public-private partnerships, donation schemes, and the refurbishment of second-hand equipment. The Commission will report on the progress made in implementing the recommendation five years after its adoption.

    Several EU funding instruments are devoted to digital education and skills : the Recovery and Resilience Facility[3], the European Social Fund Plus, the European Regional Development Fund and the Erasmus+ programme[4].

    The European Court of Auditors concluded in 2023 that EU supported actions helped schools in their digitalisation efforts, but that Member States lacked strategic focus in the use of EU financing[5].

    As announced in the Union of Skills package[6], based on a review of the Digital Education Action Plan, the Commission will present by the end of 2025 a 2030 Roadmap on the future of digital education and skills.

    Throughout the consultations so far, stakeholders have called for an expanded and more inclusive Action Plan. In the 2030 Roadmap, the Commission will look into how to further promote equal access to digital education for all.

    • [1] Council Recommendation of 23 November 2023 on the key enabling factors for successful digital education and training (OJ C, C/2024/1115, 24.1.2024).
    • [2] https://education.ec.europa.eu/focus-topics/digital-education/action-plan
    • [3] https://commission.europa.eu/business-economy-euro/economic-recovery/recovery-and-resilience-facility_en
    • [4] https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2766/833629
    • [5] Special report 11/2023: EU support for the digitalisation of schools https://www.eca.europa.eu/en/publications?ref=SR-2023-11
    • [6] https://commission.europa.eu/topics/eu-competitiveness/union-skills_en

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Ensuring a level playing field for European businesses by tackling imports of counterfeit goods – E-000400/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    1. The Commission published a communication on e-commerce[1] highlighting the need for joint enforcement actions to combat counterfeiting, including in the next European Multidisciplinary Platform Against Criminal Threats cycle 2026-2029[2].

    The Commission adopted a recommendation to combat counterfeiting[3] and is working with the EU Intellectual Property (IP) Office Observatory[4] on monitoring its effects before assessing it by March 2027.

    The small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) fund offers the ‘IP scan’ enforcement service which provides general IP advice to EU-based SMEs on how to enforce their IP in case of infringements and how to avoid infringing the IP rights of others[5].

    2. A positive impact has been observed in the reduction of counterfeit listings, collaboration and information sharing with law enforcement authorities, and the development of proactive measures among the memorandum of understanding (MoU) signatories[6], who are currently considering a modernisation of the MoU with the aim of updating and adapting it to the changes in legislative framework (Digital Services Act, DSA[7]) and new counterfeiting practices.

    The Commission is conducting a study on the implementation and application of certain aspects of Directive 2004/48/EC[8] to provide evidence on potential new challenges and discrepancies in implementation. The Commission has launched a full evaluation of the functioning of Regulation (EU) No 608/2013[9] to assess if the measures in place are still fit for purpose.

    Additionally, the Commission is enforcing the DSA[10], together with national competent authorities and has launched several investigations against some of the very large online platforms to assess whether they may have breached the DSA obligations.

    • [1] https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/e-commerce-communication-comprehensive-eu-toolbox-safe-and-sustainable-e-commerce
    • [2] https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/law-enforcement-cooperation/empact-fighting-crime-together_en
    • [3] https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/publications/commission-recommendation-measures-combat-counterfeiting-and-enhance-enforcement-intellectual_en
    • [4] https://www.euipo.europa.eu/en/observatory
    • [5] Further information available at https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/news/launch-2025-sme-fund-help-smes-protect-intellectual-property-2025-02-03_en
    • [6] https://ec.europa.eu/docsroom/documents/42701
    • [7] Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act), available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32022R2065
    • [8] Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights, available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32004L0048R%2801%29
    • [9] Regulation (EU) No 608/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 June 2013 concerning customs enforcement of intellectual property rights and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1383/2003, available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2013/608/oj/eng
    • [10] https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/dsa-enforcement
    Last updated: 23 April 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – IMEC’s strategic importance and development challenges – E-000876/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The EU is committed to the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) as an ambitious project of major geopolitical and economic relevance.

    To this end, the Commission plans to intensify contacts with all relevant stakeholders, including the co-signatories of the memorandum of understanding signed in 2023 as well as other interested countries, Member States, and financial institutions to discuss implementation of the different segments of the corridor.

    The EU is also looking at supporting IMEC through EU initiatives, such as Trans-Mediterranean Energy and Clean Tech Cooperation Initiative , and via its transport and digital connectivity programmes under the Global Gateway strategy; as well as exploring possible contributions in the form of technical assistance for feasibility studies and soft connectivity elements; and trilateral cooperation efforts to leverage private and public investments for the relevant infrastructure.

    It is not foreseen that the transport-related components of the corridor would pass through the Red Sea. Rather, a railroad is envisaged to connect the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean through the Arabian Peninsula and the Middle East.

    Should any other connectivity-elements of IMEC (such as cables) need to pass through the Red Sea, the security implications would be assessed thoroughly before deploying any concrete projects.

    Türkiye and Iran are not currently part of IMEC. As for any project of this kind, the Commission will assess and address scrupulously any potential risk to the EU’s economic, security or other interests, including strategic dependencies on any third country.

    Last updated: 23 April 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – New own resources – E-000475/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    In the Interinstitutional Agreement of 16 December 2020, the European Parliament, the Council[1] and the Commission agreed on a roadmap towards the introduction of new own resources.

    The Commission has fulfilled its commitments: a comprehensive package on the next generation of own resources was presented in 2021 and adjusted in 2023[2], ahead of schedule.

    In February 2025 the Commission called on the Council to resume work on the issue of new own resources as a matter of urgency[3].

    The proposal for the next multiannual financial framework will build on a broad consultation, with input at political, institutional and stakeholder level, alongside with active citizens’ involvement.

    Given that the EU has to adequately finance EU priorities and respond to unexpected challenges while many Member States are facing fiscal constraint, and the reimbursements of the NextGenerationEU loans is due to start soon, the status quo is not an option.

    Strengthened and modernised revenues, notably via new own resources, are required to ensure sufficient and sustainable financing for the common priorities. The Commission stands ready to facilitate Council discussions.

    • [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32020Q1222(01)
    • [2] https://commission.europa.eu/publications/own-resources-legal-texts_en
    • [3] https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/6d47acb4-9206-4d0f-8f9b-3b10cad7b1ed_en?filename=Communication%20on%20the%20road%20to%20the%20next%20MFF_en.pdf
    Last updated: 23 April 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Support measures for people with coeliac disease – E-001496/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-001496/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Margarita de la Pisa Carrión (PfE)

    An estimated 1-3 % of people in the world have coeliac disease. The only possible treatment and diet for those people is a gluten-free diet. Gluten-free products entail considerable extra costs, however. The Spanish Federation of Coeliac Associations’ 2025 price report shows that those extra costs can be more than EUR 1 000 per family every year.

    Some Member States provide financial support or reimbursement to cover the cost of gluten-free food. Others, including Spain, however, provide little or no support, which makes it harder to acquire a basic necessity – food – and the treatment people with coeliac disease need.

    Given that the Commission has presented recommendations or guidelines in other areas of health:

    • 1.Is the Commission planning to study and compare support measures for people with coeliac disease in place in Member States?
    • 2.Does the Commission believe it appropriate to include the issue in its forthcoming programmes to encourage Member States to take measures so people with coeliac disease have access to the specific food they need?

    Submitted: 10.4.2025

    Last updated: 23 April 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Full transparency on the green non-governmental organisation lobbying scandal in the Parliament – E-000529/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The Commission adheres strictly to its transparency obligations as outlined in the Financial Regulation[1], its Article 38 requires publishing information about recipients of funds financed from the EU budget.

    All required information on recipients of EU funding, including the names of recipients and amounts are already public and available in the Financial Transparency System[2]. The objectives and results of the projects may be found on the Funding and Tenders Portal[3].

    Furthermore, interest representatives that register in the Transparency Register (TR)[4] as not representing commercial interests, which would typically include non-governmental organisations (NGOs), are required to report their lobbying activities and declare their main funding sources as well as the amount of each contribution above EUR 10 000 exceeding 10% of their total budget and the name of the contributor in their registrations in the TR.

    The Commission’s assessment confirms that all ongoing grant agreements are in full compliance with the relevant legal framework, as adopted by the European Parliament and the Council. The Commission does not require NGOs to lobby against or to support specific EU policy initiatives.

    The existing regulatory framework already sets out clear obligations regarding ethics and integrity, both for Commissioners and staff members.

    Rules on the avoidance of conflicts of interest and the obligation to act with impartiality are well established, as is the reporting obligation for staff when their impartiality may be compromised.

    In such cases the institution may impose mitigating measures. In cases where there is evidence of a breach, the Commission has established clear procedures for internal administrative inquiries and disciplinary action and where necessary refers the matter for further examination to the competent investigative bodies and authorities.

    • [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=OJ:L_202402509
    • [2] https://ec.europa.eu/budget/financial-transparency-system/analysis.html
      Example: go to ‘Analyse’ and choose the criteria of interest (e.g. year, EU programme, type of contract, type of organisation). ( The annual publications are based on Article 38 of the Financial Regulation whereby data on recipients is not disclosed for very low value contracts below EUR 15 000 and where disclosure risks threatening the rights and freedoms of the persons or entities).
    • [3] https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/opportunities/portal/screen/opportunities/projects-results?isExactMatch=true&order=DESC&pageNumber=1&pageSize=10&sortBy=title
      Example: go to Home>Projects & results>EU Funded projects>choose the project of interest.
    • [4] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32021Q0611(01)
    Last updated: 23 April 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – NRRP funds and university housing – E-000211/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The Italian Recovery and Resilience Plan includes a reform of the student housing regulation coupled with an investment aimed at creating additional sleeping accommodations units (beds) for students (reform 1.7 of Mission 4, component 1).

    The Council Implementing Decision does not include a reference on single rooms. The Commission is working closely with the Italian authorities to ensure the effective implementation of the Italian Recovery and Resilience Plan, and regular dialogues are held to ensure compliance with its requirements, including those relevant to this reform and investment.

    The Commission’s Communication on a comprehensive approach to mental health[1] supports Member States in strengthening their mental health systems with 20 flagship initiatives and close to EUR 1.3 billion in funding opportunities from EU financial instruments.

    It focuses on supporting young people through initiatives such as the development of a prevention toolkit with the United Nations Children’s Fund (Unicef), and the provision of tailored capacity-building from the World Health Organisation (WHO) to Member States.

    • [1] https://health.ec.europa.eu/publications/comprehensive-approach-mental-health_en
    Last updated: 23 April 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2023, Section X – European External Action Service – A10-0069/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    2. MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    with observations forming an integral part of the decision on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2023, Section X – European External Action Service

    (2024/2024(DEC))

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to its decision on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2023, Section X – European External Action Service,

    – having regard to Rule 102 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

    – having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Foreign Affairs,

    – having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0069/2025),

    A. whereas in the context of the discharge procedure, the discharge authority wishes to stress the particular importance of further strengthening the democratic legitimacy of the Union institutions by improving transparency and accountability, and implementing the concept of performance-based budgeting and good governance of human resources;

    B. whereas the European External Action Service (the ‘EEAS’) is responsible for the management of the administrative expenditure of its Headquarters in Brussels and for the network of the 144 Union delegations and offices;

    C. whereas the EEAS’ responsibility has been extended to cover the administrative management of the Commission staff in the delegations through a series of Service Level Arrangements (SLAs);

    D. whereas the role of the delegations is to represent the Union and its citizens around the world by building networks and partnerships, and to promote the values of the Union;

    E. whereas the peculiarity of the EEAS remains in its nature and origin, as it was when it was formed by the merging of staff belonging to the former external relation departments of the Council and of the Commission, into which diplomats from the Member States have been integrated;

    F. whereas under the EEAS Internal Rules, the Secretary-General of the EEAS acts as authorising officer by delegation for the institution and the director-general for resource management has the role of principal sub-delegated authorising officer;

    G. whereas the powers conferred by the Staff Regulations on the Appointing Authority are exercised by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice President (‘HR/VP’) in respect of staff of the EEAS;

    H. whereas the implementation of the budget is governed by the Financial Regulation and by the Internal Rules of implementation of the Budget of the EEAS;

    1. Notes that the budget of the EEAS falls under MFF heading 7, ‘European public administration’, which amounted to EUR 12,3 billion in 2023 (representing 6,4 % of the total Union budget); notes that the EEAS budget of approximately EUR 1,1 billion represents approximately 9,2 % of the total administrative expenditure of the Union;

    2. Notes that the Court of Auditors (the ‘Court’), in its annual report for the financial year 2023 examined a sample of 70 transactions under administration, 10 more than were examined in 2022; further notes that the Court writes that administrative expenditure comprises expenditure on human resources, including expenditure on pensions, which in 2023 accounted for about 70 % of the total administrative expenditure, and expenditure on buildings, equipment, energy, communications and information technology, and that its work over many years indicates that, overall, this spending is low risk;

    3. Notes that 21 (30 %) of the 70 transactions contained errors but that the Court, based on the five errors which were quantified, estimates the level of error to be below the materiality threshold;

    4. Notes with concern that the Court, in its annual report for the financial year 2023, found a quantifiable error in one of the 13 payments examined and raised six non-quantifiable findings concerning the EEAS; notes that the quantifiable error concerned the absence of a valid procurement procedure before a rental contract was signed for a Union delegation; notes that, in 2023, the EEAS took measures to address the two quantifiable errors found by the Court in its 2022 annual report and took measures to avoid such issues in the future;

    Budgetary and financial management

    5. Notes that the final EEAS budget for 2023 was EUR 821 900 280, representing an increase of 4,45 % compared to 2022; notes that the EEAS also disposed of an amount of EUR 259,7 million (including assigned revenues and carried over amounts) from the Commission to cover the administrative costs of Commission staff working in Union delegations; notes further that the EEAS received additional fixed-amount contributions to cover common costs of European Development Fund staff in delegations and co-locations, as well as other amounts received under co-location and other agreements; notes that the total budgetary amount managed by the EEAS in 2023 therefore amounted to EUR 1 198,2 million (commitment appropriations), which represented an increase of 4,8 % compared to the previous year;

    6. Notes that, in 2023, the budgetary implementation rate of commitment appropriations stood at 100 %, whereas the implementation rate for payments was 91,9 % compared to 90,6 % in 2022; notes that the average time for payment was 13,57 days but notes nevertheless that 8,63 % of the total amount was paid late, which led to EUR 50 253,91 in late interest payments in 2023; urges the EEAS to pay its commitments on time; urges the EEAS to continue its efforts in improving the number of electronic payments and the digitalisation of workflows, in particular in delegations;

    7. Notes that the EEAS informed the budgetary authority of two budgetary transfers in accordance with Article 29(1) of the Financial Regulation and made 11 autonomous transfers in accordance with Article 29(4), for an overall value of EUR 55,7 million; notes that the main purpose of the transfers was to increase budget line 3003 on buildings and associate costs in delegations by EUR 18,97 million and budget lines 3001 on External Staff and outside services in delegations by EUR 5,6 million; notes that further to the transfers, the final budget for the EEAS headquarters amounted to EUR 327,8 million and the final budget for delegations amounted to EUR 494,1 million;

    8. Notes that, in 2023, the EEAS has faced growing political and financial challenges, as well as challenges with respect to Human Rights and the Rule of Law; notes that Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and its geopolitical consequences continued to be a key issue in 2023, leading the EEAS to ensure wide-range support for Ukraine, exert pressure on Russia and continue its global outreach to address the wider consequences of the war, including the implementation of the Action Plan on the geopolitical consequences of Russian aggression against Ukraine; acknowledges the EEAS’s role in gathering evidence against EU-sanctioned Russian state-backed outlets and individuals involved in spreading disinformation and manipulating information to justify Russia’s war of aggression; underlines the need to provide adequate resources to the Strategic Communication and Foresight division of the EEAS to effectively combat disinformation campaigns deployed as strategic tools by authoritarian and illiberal regimes; calls on the EEAS to reinforce the Union Delegations in the Eastern Partnership countries to support those countries heavily affected by Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine; notes that the financial ceiling of the European Peace Facility managed under the authority of the HR/VP was increased from EUR 5,6 million to more than EUR 12 million in 2023; calls on the EEAS to collaborate with DG ENEST to ensure effective oversight and monitoring of the projects funded by the Facility; notes that the reignited Israel-Palestine conflict following the Hamas attack on 7 October 2023 required the EEAS to engage in intense diplomatic efforts, encourage Union institutions to urge regional de-escalation, respond to humanitarian needs and support regional peace efforts; emphasises that Union and EEAS assistance must align with broader human rights and peace objectives in the region, with strong safeguards in place to ensure that the funds do not, either directly or indirectly, support terrorist or violent activities; emphasises that Union funding for the reconstruction of Gaza should only commence once all hostages taken by Hamas have been released; emphasises the importance of transparency in the allocation of financial resources in third countries to ensure accountability in the use of the Union budget and the new financial instruments;

     

    9. Urges the EEAS to work closely with the Commission to ensure that the complete restitution of the Romanian National Treasure, along with the national heritage of other Member States, is on the agenda of any potential future actions regarding the Russian Federation;

    10. Recalls that there have been allegations regarding the involvement of UNRWA employees in Gaza in the terrorist attacks by Hamas against Israel on 7 October 2023; notes that in response to these allegations, nine staff members had their employment formally terminated by the UNRWA; underlines that the Commission has been working with the UNRWA to improve control systems, in line with recommendations from the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS), including the screening of staff and the strengthening of internal investigative and ethical frameworks; stresses that following the concerns repeatedly raised by Parliament regarding the misuse of Union funding, any Union aid should not under any circumstances be financing terrorism; urges continued vigilance in ensuring that the taxpayer money is not misused; stresses the importance of controls to ensure compliance with Union rules and international law by beneficiaries of Union funds, as well as the need for enhanced measures to prevent misuse of Union financial support; encourages the EEAS to reinforce efforts to safeguard Union funding, and to monitor the implementation of the milestones outlined in the agreement between Commissioner Várhelyi and the UNRWA Commissioner General Lazzarini in April 2024, which includes provisions for conducting Union audits and reinforcing internal oversight at the UNRWA; underlines the need for the Palestinian Authority to align all educational materials with UNESCO standards, particularly removing any content that includes antisemitism or incitement to violence; stresses that Union financial support for the Palestinian Authority in the area of education should be provided on the condition that these standards are met; encourages the EEAS to support diplomatic efforts for a comprehensive and sustainable solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and to keep Parliament informed about any developments in Union cooperation with the Palestinian Authority;

    11. Notes that, for 2023, the EEAS reported significant budgetary constraints, leading to drastic cuts and budget optimisation in order to cope with inflation in third countries, fluctuations in local currencies, an increase in prices, in particular the cost of renting office space, IT, security and energy prices, which exposed the EEAS to much higher running costs in foreign countries, thus affecting its ability to function effectively and to fulfil its duty of care towards the staff posted in delegations; regrets that, as a result of the budgetary pressures, the EEAS postponed infrastructure maintenance, set aside or cancelled security expenditures in delegations and made cuts to budget posts, such as cuts to the mission and representation budget, office supplies and training courses; deplores that, for budgetary reasons, the EEAS had to prioritise staff participation in election observation missions over other types of missions, such as follow-up missions; emphasises the necessity of establishing an EU diplomatic service;

    12. Notes that, in 2023, the EEAS, both at the EEAS headquarters and in delegations, launched a total of 28 open public procurement procedures, 27 competitive procedures with negotiations, 14 negotiated procedures without prior publication of a contract notice, 6 restricted procedures and 2 negotiated procedures for middle-value works contracts, which were successful and led to the award of a contract in 52 % of cases on average; notes that the high standards and complexity of Union procurement rules might be one of the reasons for the relatively high number of failed procurement procedures, as the application of those rules might be challenging for tenderers, especially in third countries; requests the EEAS to investigate the reasons behind the relatively high number of failed procurement procedures and to propose solutions to ensure their effective implementation while maintaining the standards set by the Union; regrets that, for external actions, procurement rules have been simplified in the recast of the Financial Regulation; underlines that procurement rules are intended to ensure that funded projects maintain high standards and are not prone to fraud; calls on the EEAS to always strive for the highest possible level of scrutiny in any tender process; believes that a lack of familiarity in third countries with the high standards of Union procurement rules should never be a pretext or excuse to lower the bar;

    13. Welcomes that the number of co-locations with Member States and other Union partners in Union delegations was 138 at the end of 2023, 12 more than in 2022; notes that, out of the total number of co-locations in 2023, 42 were concluded with Member States and Partner Countries, 91 with other Union partners and five were reverse co-locations; notes that, in 2023, co-locations represented 8 % of the total office surface in Union delegations and involved more than half of the Union delegations (75), which can be seen as an example of successful optimisation of the EEAS building management, but also as an indicator of the increased interest of partners in sharing premises in third countries and the relevance of co-location in diplomatic affairs;

    14. Notes that the budget for missions was EUR 18 948 650 in 2023, representing a limited increase of 1,46 % compared to the previous year, the aim of which was to compensate the increase in costs due to inflation, but was insufficient when compared with the actual rise in travel costs in 2023; regrets that the EEAS does not have a separate budget line for missions and travel for the HR/VP and that the missions and travel costs for the HR/VP are shared between the EEAS and the Commission depending on the purpose of the mission; notes finally that for 2023, the EEAS had costs of EUR 2 995,14 on 6 missions for the HR/VP and air-taxi costs of EUR 288 145, corresponding to a decrease of 51% compared to 2022 when air-taxi costs were EUR 588 103; underlines that the leaders of the Union’s institutions should act as good examples to the public and citizens, especially when using Union resources in the performance of their duties; stresses that the flight options should be chosen on the basis of sound financial management criteria, provided that such alternatives are available and in line with the agenda and venue of meetings; stresses that transparency and sound financial management in using the Union’s public funds must remain a core principle for all Union institutions;

    15. Underlines the negative impact cuts may have on the implementation of the external affairs instruments, such as Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe (NDICI – Global Europe) and Global Gateway; underlines the need to provide adequate resources to the Strategic Communication and Foresight division of the EEAS to continue to effectively combat disinformation campaigns deployed as strategic tools by authoritarian and illiberal regimes; welcomes in this regard the announcement of the creation of the Task Force for Strategic Communication and Countering Information Manipulation in DG COMM of the Commission;

    16. Insists on the budgetary increase for Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) actions and other appropriate peace, conflict and crisis response instruments, as well as IT and security protocols, in order to fully match the Union’s activities and capabilities with current challenges and conflicts worldwide;

    Internal management, performance and internal control

    17. Notes that, following an internal reorganisation, the EEAS created a new Corporate Governance Service in October 2023, composed of three divisions in charge of inspections, internal audit and planning, reporting and compliance, to enable the EEAS to achieve greater accountability, better management and better monitoring of activities; welcomes that a Corporate Governance Board was also established to ensure coherence on corporate management issues in the EEAS; notes furthermore that the EEAS created the Managing Directorate for Peace, Security and Defence (MD PSD), the Peace, Partnership and Crisis Management Directorate and two new Divisions dedicated to “Hybrid Threats and Cyber” and “Maritime Security” in order to better support the Union’s work in security and defence matters;

    18. Notes that, in 2023, the Corporate Governance Service performed a fitness check on governance processes and policies; welcomes that, as part of that process, the EEAS updated the Audit Progress Committee charter, revised its internal control framework, its annual management plan and its risk management framework;

    19. Notes that, in line with the EEAS Audit Plan for 2023, three audits were finalised in 2023, namely an audit on the management of the registry of exceptions and non-compliance and two audits on the management of local agents’ salaries and the recruitment and management of local agents and equivalent local staff; notes furthermore with great concern that, due to an organisational restructuring and corresponding staff turnover in the internal audit function, a planned audit on security could not be launched in 2023 and that such audit will be reassessed in the framework of the preparation of the 2025-27 multiannual strategic internal audit plan; stresses the importance of conducting internal audits diligently and regularly; deeply regrets that 4 critical and 49 very important audit recommendations related to finalised audits remained open in 2023; requests that the Parliament be informed on the implementation of the recommendations;

    20. Notes that, in December 2023, the Court adopted its final report following its audit on the coordination role of the EEAS, the scope of which was to assess whether the coordination, in particular with regard to information management, staffing and reporting, both internally and with the Commission and Council, was effective; notes that, in 2023, some of the audit recommendations had already been covered by ongoing initiatives, such as the sending of mission letters to the newly appointed Ambassadors before taking up duty and the efforts made by the EEAS since 2019 to implement its Information Management Strategy; calls on the EEAS to fully implement the ECA’s report recommendations to address identified weaknesses in information management, both within its headquarters and EU delegations in non-EU countries, as well as within the High Representative/Vice-President’s private office; asks that Parliament be kept informed on the follow-up of the Court’s recommendations;

    21. Notes that, based on the 26 inspections carried out in delegations in 2023, security, buildings and administrative burden were identified as the main challenges for delegations; notes that the EEAS has put in place security risk management measures in delegations based on international standards and best practices; notes that, in 2023, five critical recommendations were formulated by the EEAS inspection service, all related to the management of three delegations; notes that in all cases, the recommendations were addressed through increased oversight and support from the EEAS headquarters; welcomes the toolbox developed by the EEAS to respond to internal management situations;

    22. Notes that, in 2023, three EU Delegations (Central African Republic, Sierra Leone, and Syria) submitted reservations in their Declarations of Assurance, primarily concerning operational budget lines managed by the European Commission; highlights that these reservations did not have a substantial financial impact on the administrative budget under the responsibility of the EEAS;

    23. Calls on the EEAS and on the Commission to closely collaborate with the EPLO office in Washington, D.C., and the EU delegation in the United States to identify, fund, and implement initiatives aimed at strengthening the Transatlantic Relationship, including exchange programs for professionals working in public institutions in both the EU and the U.S.;

    24. Calls on the EEAS and Union delegations to intensify monitoring of the state of democracy in various countries and to enhance logistical and technological support for human rights defenders and indigenous individuals, with a particular focus on women;

    25. Recalls that is crucial to further strengthen our support to human rights, democracy and development in third countries through the NDICI – Global Europe, as a world of democracies is a safer world; underlines that resources to the EU’s Digital Diplomacy should be further increased given the current context of rapid technological advancements and geopolitical competition; insists that “green diplomacy” and the green transition, as one of the Union’s priorities, should be enhanced towards third countries through the Union’s External Action; emphasises the need for EEAS to play a central role in promoting peace and stability in the Middle East, to increase funding to ensure humanitarian aid in Lebanon, Gaza, and Syria, and to strengthen human rights monitoring; highlights financial support for the EEAS delegations deployed in the Middle East, Gulf countries, and Africa to ensure they can continue implementing the Union’s External Action in the region;

    26. Notes that the Special Report 14/2023 of the Court found deficiencies in the methodologies used by the Commission and the EEAS for allocating funding to partner countries and in the setup of the monitoring framework and recommended that the Commission and the EEAS notably improve the methodology for allocating funding and the assessment of the impact of Union support, focus the scope of the programming process and simplify and consistently use the indicators in the multiannual indicative programmes.

    27. Welcomes the appointment of the first EU Special Representative for the Gulf region;

    28. Highlights that recent events, notably Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and its hostile attempts to influence democratic processes in Europe as well as growing instability in the Middle East, have brought Union foreign policy and its implementation to the forefront of concerns among the Member States and institutions; underlines the central role played by the EEAS and its delegations in conducting the Union’s external policy and in fighting foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI); stresses the importance of the EEAS for the Union’s relations with the 25 to 30 million Union citizens living outside the Union; acknowledges that the EEAS budget, already structurally underfunded, was disproportionately affected in comparison to other Union institutions by the higher inflation rates and subsequent energy crisis caused by Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine, and is concerned of these negative consequences for the EEAS and the performance of the Union institutions and the lack of action to rectify the current budgetary situation that can severely impact the Union’s relations with third countries;

    29. Welcomes the steadfast support provided to Ukraine, including through the civilian EU Advisory Mission (EUAM Ukraine) and the training of Ukrainian soldiers under the EU Military Assistance Mission (EUMAM);

    30. Underlines that the Union must increase funding to reinforce the dedicated budget line within the Union’s foreign policy actions specifically for gender equality and the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda, in order to ensure consistent financing for initiatives that promote gender-responsive leadership, protect women’s rights, and combat sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) in conflict and post-conflict settings; stresses that such funding is essential to support local civil society organisations, provide survivor-centred support, and integrate gender perspectives into Union diplomatic and security efforts.

    31. Stresses that the Gender Action Plan (GAP) III dictates that 85% of new Union actions must contribute to gender equality and women and girls’ empowerment; calls on the EEAS to accelerate the progress towards the goals of GAP III by meaningfully focusing in its every day work on the GAP III’s key areas of engagement, including ending gender-based violence, promoting sexual and reproductive health and rights, economic and social rights and empowerment, equal participation and leadership; notes that GAP III will expire in 2027 and urges the EEAS, to this end, to develop a more ambitious GAP IV that will ensure a stronger connection between women’s rights and empowerment and the Union’s foreign and security policy, ready for implementation as of 2028;

    32. Underlines the extremely vulnerable situation of children in the world, specifically in armed conflict; expresses serious concern about the tens of thousands of children that were affected by armed conflict across the globe and suffered abhorrent abuses and violations of their most basic rights in 2023; calls on the EEAS to put children’s rights at the centre of their efforts;

    33. Recalls the dire situation of women’s rights and LGBTQI+ rights in many parts of the world; stresses the urgent need to better protect these rights; highlights the central role of the EEAS in advancing human rights around the world; calls on the EEAS to enhance their efforts in this regard;

    34. Sees electoral observation mission as a practical and effective foreign policy instrument that remains central to the Union’s democracy support policies and strategies; calls on the Union to ensure adequate resources to the EU electoral observation missions, in view also of extending them to elections in candidate and neighbouring countries;

    Human resources, equality and staff well-being

    35. Notes that, at the end 2023, the occupation rate of the establishment plan was at 96,7 %; notes that the EEAS was employing a total of 2 812 members of staff, including 1 245 officials, 450 temporary agents, 603 contract agents and 514 seconded national experts (SNEs); notes that out of the total number of officials and temporary agents employed by the EEAS, either in its headquarters or in delegations, 62,5 % was made up of administrators, 32,8 % was made up of assistants and 4,8 % was made up of secretaries;

    36. Notes that 5 252 people in total were working in the EEAS at the end of 2023, employed either directly by the EEAS or through external contractors, from which 46,2 % were working in the EEAS headquarters and 53,8 % in delegations; notes that out of the total number of people working in the EEAS, 46,5 % were non-statutory staff or external contractors; notes that the largest number of external staff employed by an external contractor but working in the premises of the EEAS provide services in the areas of information technology, security and safety and medical care;

    37. Notes that, in 2023, the EEAS received 36 full-time equivalents from the budgetary authority, including 31 contract agents and five cost-shared SNEs; notes that the additional resources were allocated to crisis management functions, to the implementation of the Strategic Compass and to other EEAS priorities; notes that, at the end of 2023, the EEAS received an additional 20 cost-free SNEs for the Military Planning and Conduct Capability structures;

    38. Notes that, by the end of 2023, the EEAS statutory population comprised 52,7% men and 47,3% women, reflecting a slight increase in female representation compared to 2022, when 46,8% of staff were women; welcomes the modest progress in gender balance within senior management, where the representation of women increased from 6,3% in 2022 to 7,6% in 2023, and in middle management, where it rose from 30,1% in 2022 to 30,4% in 2023; calls on the EEAS to intensify efforts to achieve a more substantial and visible gender balance across all levels of the organisation;

    39. Welcomes the publication of the mid-term report on the implementation of the EU Gender Action Plan (GAP III) by the HR/VP and the Commission at the end of 2023, as well as the decision to extend its timeline to 2027 to align with the multiannual financial framework (MFF); acknowledges GAP III’s significance in promoting gender equality as a strategic priority in EU external action and enhancing its role in this area; welcomes the organisation of the first executive trainings on Gender-Responsive Leadership (GRL) for senior managers in late 2023 by the team of the Ambassador for Gender and Diversity;

    40. Welcomes the first EEAS report on FIMI activities targeting LGBTIQA+ individuals, aimed at enhancing understanding of FIMI tactics and fostering cooperation, including with ENISA, to protect the LGBTIQA+ community; expresses concern about the global status of LGBTIQ+ rights and the increasing resistance to gender equality, women’s rights, and sexual and reproductive health and rights in developing countries; calls on the Commission and the EEAS to address these setbacks and prioritise targeted support for civil society organisations advocating for these rights;

    41. Notes that, in its decision adopted in July 2023, the HR/VP clarified that the maximum duration of the engagement by the EEAS of temporary and contract staff was 8 years in a reference period of 13 years or, in exceptional circumstances and in the interests of the service, 10 years in a reference period of 15 years and that the minimum lapse of time between successive engagements for temporary agents seconded from national diplomatic services of the Member States was 2 years from the termination of their last contract;

    42. Notes that at the end of 2023, out of 1695 officials and temporary agents, 863 (51 %) were men and 832 (49 %) were women, which represents a slight increase from 2022; notes that among contract agents 57,4% were women , which is a slight increase from 2022; however regrets that women are still notably underrepresented in senior positions, both in headquarters and in delegations, and overrepresented mainly in AST positions; calls on the EEAS to publish a gender and nationality breakdown of middle and senior management positions; asks the EEAS to address this issue, while at the same time respecting the competences and merits of the candidates; welcomes that the 2023 rotation exercise offered 42 management posts in Delegations and resulted in a 12% increase in the number of women Ambassadors, whereas in 2023 35,50 % of them were women (up from 31,70 %), which, nevertheless, is still an underrepresentation;

    43. Observes that although all Member States are represented in the EEAS staff, significant imbalances persist with Belgium being the most overrepresented Member State making up 12,1 % of total staff employed by the EEAS; points out that a significant geographical imbalance is also concentrated between Western and Eastern Member States; notes also that among managers, Italy is the most overrepresented Member State, with 15 % of all managerial positions being occupied by Italians; notes that out of 141 Union Ambassadors, three Member States still do not occupy any Ambassador posts (Hungary, Luxembourg and Malta), whereas the Member States with most Ambassadors are France with 22, Spain and Italy with 16, Germany with 12 and Belgium with 10, meaning that these five countries occupy 54 % of all Ambassador posts; strongly reiterates its call on the EEAS to continue to ensure a sound geographical balance throughout its organisation and on all levels; also reiterates its concern about gender balance; notes that women are notably under-represented in senior positions, while in AST positions in particular, they are overrepresented; calls on the EEAS to publish a gender and nationality breakdown of middle and senior management positions; asks the EEAS to address this issue, while at the same time respecting the competences and merits of the candidates;

    44. Notes that a major rotation exercise of 52 management posts in delegations was organised in 2023; welcomes the efforts deployed by the EEAS to raise the awareness of Member States in relation to the need to attract a wide range of candidates to the published posts and to propose qualified candidates for the Union Ambassador posts;

    45. Notes with satisfaction that, in 2023, the EEAS adopted its Agenda for Diversity and Inclusion 2023-2025, a detailed action plan to promote a safe and respectful working environment and a zero tolerance approach towards harassment; notes that staff representatives, staff associations and the Joint Committee for Equal Opportunities, which was renamed as the Joint Committee on Diversity and Inclusion, were consulted on both documents; notes that the action plan contains anti-harassment preventive measures, such as a mandatory e-learning training course for all staff on “Recognising and addressing harassment at work” and a mandatory management training on “How to create an harassment free work environment”; calls on the EEAS to continue to regularly train managerial and non-managerial staff on issues regarding diversity, equity, inclusion, and belonging;

    46. Notes with concern that, in 2023, the EEAS received three requests for assistance for allegations of psychological harassment involving two officials which led to two administrative enquiries, one of which is still ongoing and the other was closed with a disciplinary sanction; notes that, under the informal procedure, the EEAS mediation service dealt with 28 cases involving allegations of psychological harassment and 10 cases of sexual harassment and that the Confidential Counsellors dealt with 21 cases of allegations of psychological harassment and 6 cases of sexual harassment in 2023; notes that, in 2023, the EEAS prepared a decision on anti-harassment for local staff in delegations, which was adopted in June 2024; acknowledges the efforts made by the EEAS to strengthen its anti-harassment policies, including the introduction of mandatory e-learning modules to raise awareness and the establishment of an ‘Istanbul Convention Task Force’ aimed at identifying measures to ensure a safer workplace for all; however, expresses serious concern about the persistently high number of harassment cases; calls on the EEAS to implement stronger prevention, victim support, strict disciplinary measures to ensure zero tolerance for harassment and a safe working environment;

    47. Notes that, in 2023, the EEAS took several measures to ensure the physical and mental wellbeing of its staff, including a systematic health check for all staff before being posted to a delegation, psychological support and awareness-raising actions; notes that, in October 2023, two decisions on working time and flexible working arrangements were adopted, following which flexitime became the default working time regime in the EEAS headquarters and in delegations for all staff, except managers; notes furthermore that the decisions authorise teleworking for up to two days per week in the EEAS headquarters, one day per week in delegations and 10 days per year away from the place of employment for all; notes that, exceptional teleworking for a longer period has remained possible in the event of crises, for medical or other imperative reasons;

    48. Is concerned that the EEAS members of staff on long-term sick leave for more than 50 days increased from 111 members of staff in 2022 to 171 members of staff in 2023, equivalent to an increase of 54 %; notes that the medical service implemented several measures to prevent the risk of burnout, such as the recruitment of a psychiatrist in December 2023 and a more systematic follow-up of sick leave by the medical service, psychological support and guidance to both staff and managers, awareness-raising activities and the creation of a mental health first aiders network; stresses the need for managers to ensure fair task allocation and implement guidance and flexible working arrangements; calls on the EEAS to take a proactive approach to prevent long-term sickness and burnout, prioritising the mental wellbeing of its staff through effective support measures;

    Ethical framework and transparency

    49. Notes that, in 2023, the EEAS improved its ethical framework by issuing new instructions to prohibit or limit the missions with costs partially or totally paid by external sources to avoid risks of conflicts of interest by sending a reminder on ethics to all staff; notes that the EEAS also focused on organising specific training courses on ethics, conflicts of interest, internal control and anti-fraud targeted at and adapted to different audiences in the EEAS headquarters and in delegations; notes furthermore that the 16 ‘principles of professional behaviour’ adopted in 2022 continued to be distributed to newcomers and promoted widely, in particular during the ‘Ethics and integrity’ and ‘Anti-harassment policy’ courses; asks that Parliament be kept informed by the EEAS of any further development of its ethical framework; calls on the EEAS to provide regular mandatory trainings on ethics, including ethical usage of AI, and accountability;

    50. Welcomes that, in October 2023, the EEAS adopted a new Anti-Fraud Strategy, applicable to all staff in the EEAS headquarters and in delegations, which resulted from a thorough review process of fraud-related risks and was formally endorsed by OLAF; welcomes that the EEAS devoted particular efforts to staff training and guidance, in particular through the anti-fraud cell established in December 2022; notes that the EEAS staff posted in Union delegations actively participated in a series of workshops and seminars on fraud awareness and prevention, that staff newly assigned to a Union delegation systematically received training on these issues prior to taking up posts and that the intranet page related to anti-fraud was further revamped with the aim of facilitating the reporting of potential fraud cases and providing a wider range of options for anti-fraud training; asks the EEAS to conduct mandatory regular fraud awareness and prevention trainings for all staff;

    51. Notes that the EEAS did not receive any whistleblowing cases in 2023; notes with satisfaction that, in 2023, the EEAS started to develop a dedicated whistleblower protection policy in line with the new Anti-Fraud Strategy; asks that Parliament be kept informed about its adoption, scheduled for 2025, and its implementation across the service;

    52. Notes that, in 2023, the EEAS received five declarations of conflicts of interest, which were handled in accordance with the applicable rules; notes that, in a case related to a member of an evaluation committee in a procurement procedure, the authorising officer by subdelegation concluded that there was a potential conflict of interest and relieved the member of staff from the duty of member of the evaluation committee;

    53. Notes with concern that OLAF opened eight investigations in 2023, which are still ongoing, concerning potential misconduct in the context of procurement procedures and implementation of contracts, grant agreements or potential irregularities related to human-resource matters; notes that the open cases in 2023 concerned officials, temporary agents and local agents both in the EEAS headquarters and in delegations; asks that Parliament be kept informed regarding the follow-up to those investigations; notes that eight older cases involving former and current staff were closed, with recommendations to take further action in five cases; notes that the EEAS is in regular contact with OLAF through its anti-fraud cell and ensures the timely follow-up of OLAF recommendations; asks that the Parliament is kept informed on the implementation of the recommendations;

    54. Notes that, in 2023, the EEAS handled ten requests from the Ombudsman, nine of which related to administrative files and one to a request for access to documents; notes that the Ombudsman found no instances of maladministration or partial maladministration and did not issue any recommendation to the EEAS;

    55. Takes note of all activities undertaken to raise awareness on outside activities; reminds the Parliament’s request to adopt self-standing implementation provisions on outside activities and assignments, in order to protect the image and reputation of the Union in particular in case of Heads of Delegations;

    56. Notes that, in his/her capacity as Vice-President of the Commission, the HR/VP is bound by the rules of the Transparency Register; stresses that while the EEAS is not an Institution within the meaning of Article 13 of the Treaty on European Union and does not have a direct role in Union law, it does, however, have an important role in Union law with regard to decisions concerning sanctions and the negotiation of international trade agreements, which have a considerable regulatory impact; notes that it would be of great relevance for the EEAS to adopt transparency measures, notify them to the management board of the Transparency Register and join the Register; invites the EEAS to publish all meetings with all types of lobby organisations, including those of Heads of Union Delegations, in order to improve transparency; asks that Parliament be kept informed of any new initiative taken by the EEAS to improve transparency; reiterates the importance of further strengthening the democratic scrutiny of the Union and of upholding high standards of accountability and transparency when engaging with civil society organisations; asks Union delegations to ensure that Union funds awarded to civil society organisations and social partners in third countries are used in line with the Union values, policies, and financial rules;

    57. Urges the EEAS to join the EU Transparency Register to align its practices with the European Parliament and Commission, ensuring full disclosure of lobbying activities and financial interests related to defense and diplomatic matters;

    Digitalisation, cybersecurity and data protection

    58. Notes that the expenditures for IT projects, equipment and cybersecurity increased from EUR 19,7 million in 2022 to EUR 29,9 million in 2023, corresponding to an increase of 52 %; notes that, in 2023, the EEAS launched important digitalisation projects, such as its collaborative platform ‘HIVE’ for all users at headquarters and delegations and deployed its Corporate Classified Communications and Information System (EC3IS) at the EEAS headquarters, before its progressive rolling out in sensitive delegations and interconnecting it with the corresponding systems at the Commission and at the Council;

    59. Notes that, in 2023, the EEAS started to host and control an AI environment so that a complete AI governance model could be put in place; notes that this technical step established the grounds for the adoption of guidelines on the use of generative AI and of an AI Strategy in 2024, as well as running proofs of concept; asks that the Parliament be kept informed of the development of the AI Strategy;

    60. Notes that, as part of the implementation of the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence adopted in 2022, the EEAS was involved in the adoption of major policy documents and toolboxes related inter alia to cyber defence, cyber diplomacy, hybrid threats, foreign interference and information manipulation; notes that, internally, the EEAS continued to improve its cybersecurity capabilities via the recruitment of specialised staff and to provide cyber-awareness activities to different audiences including the Security Management Team, members of the delegations, newcomers and managers; asks that the EEAS provides regular mandatory cybersecurity training to all staff; calls further for enhanced Union support for Moldova in combating disinformation, hybrid threats, and cyberattacks; calls on the EU Delegation to Moldova to enhance its efforts to promote a more proactive and effective communication strategy regarding the European perspective, including outreach in the Russian language;

    61. Welcomes the establishment of EU Partnership Mission in Moldova (EUPM Moldova); highlights the essential role of the EUPM Moldova and calls the EU and its Member States to extend the mission’s mandate beyond May 2025 while increasing resources to enhance its effectiveness;

    62. Notes with concern that, in 2023, the EEAS recorded over 29 623 cyber alerts via the Security Incident and Event Monitoring – SIEM, out of which 92 incidents were confirmed as cyberattacks; notes that four cyberattacks had an impact on EEAS operations and only one had significant consequences; warns that the EEAS is a highly likely target for well-resourced actors, including those sponsored by foreign states, seeking to disrupt Union Institutions; notes that the EEAS Security Operations Centre (SOC) is a key actor in dealing with real time threat monitoring and identification of system vulnerabilities; requests the EEAS to continue to consider the need for users’ cyber discipline and cyber awareness as key elements in its cyber security framework; emphasises the importance of the EEAS continuing to prioritise cybersecurity and hybrid threat mitigation while collaborating closely with other Union Institutions and Member States to identify and counter such threats;

    63. Notes that the EEAS followed up on one European Data Protection Supervisor enquiry in 2023, following a request from a member of staff concerning the publication of his/her personal data on the EU online directory; notes that a case pending since 2018 was dealt with in 2023 and closed in 2024 with a positive outcome for the EEAS; notes the awareness-raising activities and guidance issued by the EEAS to ensure a level playing field in the area of data protection across its network, notably the Joint Guide on the use of third party AI tools from the double perspective of data protection and cybersecurity;

    64. Notes that the fight against FIMI remained a priority for the EEAS in 2023; welcomes that the FIMI toolbox was endorsed by the European Council in December 2023 based on the pillars of situational awareness, resilience building, disruption and diplomatic responses; notes that, in 2023, the EEAS scaled up its analytical capacity to collect FIMI evidence and build responses to the increasing number of incidents and threats, in particular in the run up to the 2024 European elections; notes that the EEAS also launched new flagship projects to raise awareness and counter Russian disinformation, such as the EUvsDisinfo initiative which reached approximately 20,3 million people in 2023, and to create sustainable partnerships to counter FIMI globally; calls on the EEAS, together with the Commission to dedicate adequate resources to effectively combat FIMI; supports the pledged establishment of a “European Democracy Shield” to detect, track and delete deceitful online content, hereby strengthening the Union’s ability to counter FIMI and enhancing its support for protecting democracies in third countries, especially within the Union’s neighbourhood; calls on the EEAS and EU Delegations in third countries to further strengthen their respective capacities in fighting and countering disinformation and propaganda linked to the Union’s CFSP and; calls on the EEAS to scale up its efforts to empower citizens from across the Union to fight against foreign information manipulation and interference;

    Buildings and security

    65. Notes that, in the course of 2023, the budget line 3003 on buildings and associated costs was reinforced by EUR 19 million but that important maintenance works were nevertheless deferred; is deeply concerned that the accumulation of maintenance and security needs poses significant challenges to the EEAS with regard to how to operate the delegations’ network safely and effectively, and ensure the duty of care towards delegations staff; requests the EEAS to develop multi-annual contingency plans for buildings maintenance and security;

    66. Notes that the EEAS occupies and manages real estate covering about 87 618 sqm in the EEAS headquarters and 379 300 sqm around the world with 174 office buildings and 152 residences for Ambassadors; notes that, in 2023, the EEAS presented a working document outlining its purchase policy to the budgetary authority, which currently stands at 22 % of office buildings and 20 % of residences for Ambassadors, thereby achieving the best value for money;

    67. Notes that the purchase policy of real estate for Union delegations of April 2023 and the working document on the real estate policy of the EEAS for 2024 aims to achieve the most advantageous long term solution for the Union budget; highlights that none of these documents include any ideas with regard to reducing the number of delegations or creating regional hubs; urges the EEAS to keep Parliament informed of any possible future developments in that direction;

    68. Invites the EEAS to maintain its important network of Delegations around the world with sufficient staff in order to improve its ability to reach out to third countries;

    69. Notes with concern that these budgetary constraints could lead to excessive closures of EU embassies and postponing security installations in a number of EU Delegations hampering the EEAS’ ability to fulfil its mandate and defend EU values and properly ensure the duty of care to all staff in Delegations; urges the Members States to provide enough financing to the EEAS and the Commission to ensure that the EU maintains its network of Delegations untouched as a signal of its global engagement;

    70. Notes that, since 2020, the EEAS has been developing its office management policy towards collaborative and flexible office concepts both at the EEAS headquarters and in delegations; notes that the EEAS started to renovate the Schuman building complex, starting with the 6th and 7th floors, with a view to achieving more efficient use of office space; notes furthermore that the EEAS crisis response centre in the Schuman building was finalised in 2023; notes that, in delegations, the collaborative space concept was implemented in the new premises of 6 delegations;

    71. Welcomes that the EEAS is focused on ensuring that its buildings are accessible to people with disabilities and reduced mobility; notes that the Belmont building in Brussels already fulfils the legal requirements for barrier-free buildings and that the refurbishment of the NEO building complex also accommodates the needs of users with disabilities and reduced mobility; welcomes that, for delegations, the EEAS selection procedures envisage barrier-free construction as a key selection criteria for new office buildings;

    Environment and sustainability

    72. Welcomes that, in 2023, the EEAS continued to implement the Eco-management and Audit Scheme (EMAS/EMS), notably by setting up an Environment Steering Committee and by adopting an Environmental Policy and a relevant communication strategy highlighting the EEAS commitment to environmental sustainability in real estate management; notes that the EMAS Steering Committee worked on new objectives in 2023, the aim of which is to further reduce its carbon footprint by 2030; notes that the measures approved include the reduction of the use of natural gas by 35 %, the reduction of the use of paper, water and waste production by half, an increase in the share of short to medium distance flights for missions in economic class and the better use of green public procurement;

    73. Welcomes that the EEAS started to introduce sustainability clauses in the new co-location agreements, including both compulsory actions and voluntary practices; notes that, as regards the co-location agreements already in force, instead of including explicit environmental sustainability clauses, such agreements mention as an overarching principle that any co-location hosted partners adhere to procedures and practices applicable within the local context of Union office premises;

    74. Notes that, in 2023, the EEAS continued to work on the implementation of a policy towards greener commuting and more sustainable travel for staff, which led to the adoption of important measures in 2024, such as the increase of the reimbursement rate for public transport subscriptions to 90 % for all staff relinquishing parking access and the objective of at least 60 % of the kilometres travelled by plane during missions should be in economy class;

    75. Stresses the importance of strong political engagement, bilateral leverage, public and cultural diplomacy to promote Union values and combat disinformation; emphasises the need for a robust and resilient external service with clear political leadership to address current challenges and ensure coherence in the Union’s foreign policy; urges Union delegations to strengthen support for genuine democratic actors and civil society in the Western Balkans, while firmly and publicly condemning actions by illiberal and undemocratic actors that undermine the Union’s interests, and to ensure that IPA III funding is implemented in line with the Union’s objectives; calls on the EU Delegations in the region to apply a more credible and merit-based approach based on the Copenhagen criteria, notably on the rule of law, democracy and the protection of human rights, especially given the limited progress made by some countries in the Western Balkans;

    76. Welcomes the EEAS’s excellent cooperation with bodies such as OLAF, the EPPO, the Court, and the EDPS, reflected in regular meetings and exchanges of information; notes the conclusion of dedicated working arrangements in June 2024; calls nevertheless on the EEAS to institutionalise structured cooperation with those bodies, ensuring systematic fraud detection mechanisms for the Union’s external action funding, particularly in high-risk conflict zones and fragile states;

    Interinstitutional cooperation

    77. Notes that, in 2023, the Parliament, the Council and the EEAS continued their technical discussions regarding the replacement of the 2002 Institutional Agreement between Parliament and the Council in the field of Common Foreign and Security Policy; regrets that a single technical meeting took place in 2023 following which the Council was not able to find an agreement on the compromise solutions put forward;

    78. Notes that, in 2023, the EEAS opened the negotiation process for a working arrangement with the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, which was signed in 2024; notes that the working arrangement take into account the special context in which the EEAS operates, putting emphasis on the protection of information, the confidentiality of information and the protection of immunity of staff;

    79. Notes that, in its 2023 budget, the EEAS earmarked EUR 990,5 million for a pilot project to launch the European Diplomatic Academy, whereby 50 junior diplomats from Member States and the Union institutions are trained on Union foreign and security policies with the aim of building a true European Diplomatic corps to promote Union foreign policy and external interest; encourages this initiative as a step towards fostering a cohesive and well-trained European diplomatic corps that can effectively represent and defend the Union’s values and interests on the global stage; underlines the necessity to improve the visibility of the European Diplomatic Academy across all Member States and to strengthen its role and capacities;

    80. Welcomes that the EEAS scaled up its cooperation with the European Ombudsman in 2023 to improve awareness amongst its staff of the principles of good administration; notes that the new layer of cooperation involves inviting the European Ombudsman Office to present their work at the EEAS pre-posting seminars and in the EEAS annual staff seminars;

    Communication

    81. Notes that the EEAS has a budget allocation of EUR 22,2 million, spread over different budget lines covering publications, events, strategic communication, outreach activities and press; welcomes that standing up for democracy and the rule of law remained a priority for the EEAS, also by targeting Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference via strengthened policies and instruments;

    82. Points to the rise in the number of violations of freedom of religion worldwide; calls on the EEAS to adequately equip its staff in view of this in countries where there is no religious freedom or where religious freedom is under pressure (including by means of training courses); with a view to entering into discussions on this topic with the relevant authorities at all levels in countries where freedom of religion is being violated; and make this a key focus of its external action;

    83. Notes that, as part of its communication activities, the EEAS reaches out to the general public via public events, open days and the reception of visitors’ groups; notes that, in 2023, the EEAS launched several thematic communication campaigns across different channels on the support to Ukraine, the consequences of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and the respect for Union values; welcomes that Ukraine remained a top priority for the EEAS; notes that, in 2023, the EEAS consolidated its presence on social media and increased the number of its followers by 41,5 % on LinkedIn, by 13,8 % on Instagram, by 5,4 % on Twitter and by 4,7 % on Facebook; urges the EEAS to enhance its communication of Union policies to citizens in third countries and to strengthen coordination efforts aimed at increasing the visibility of Union-funded projects, particularly in candidate countries, in order to counter the attempts of malicious actors to undermine the Union’s efforts;

    84. Welcomes the involvement of the EEAS in the institutional communication campaign of Parliament for the 2024 European elections, in particular the information campaign targeting the 25 to 30 million European citizens living in third countries on the possible ways to vote in the European elections, in particular via the delegation’ network; notes that this campaign reached out to 11 million recipients, via 26 video campaigns and over 2 000 posts on social media;

    85. Highlights the EEAS’s contribution to the Union’s overarching efforts to demonstrate steadfast support for Ukraine with initiatives like the #StandWithUkraine campaign and targeted communication projects such as Faces of Ukraine, Art vs War, and Share Your Light;

    86. Continues to encourage Union Delegations to promote and engage with local actors, civil society organisations and social partners in third countries to stimulate social dialogue and dialogue regarding the rule of law, fundamental rights and the fight against corruption; notes that, in 2023, under the thematic programme for civil society organisations, based on which Union partnerships are concluded with accountable and transparent organisations, EUR 50 million was allocated to the Union System for an Enabling Environment for Civil Society, which monitors and promotes civic space in 86 partner countries.

    OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS (31.1.2025)

    for the Committee on Budgetary Control

    on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2023, Section X – European External Action Service

    (2024/2024(DEC))

    Rapporteur for opinion: Michael Gahler

     

     

    OPINION

    The Committee on Foreign Affairs calls on the Committee on Budgetary Control, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following into its motion for a resolution:

    1. Highlights that recent events, notably Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the former’s hostile attempts to influence democratic processes in Europe as well as growing instability in the Middle East, have brought EU foreign policy and its implementation to the forefront of concerns among the EU Member States and institutions; underlines the central role played by the European External Action Service (EEAS) and its delegations in conducting the Union’s external policy and in fighting foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI); stresses the importance of the EEAS for the EU’s relations with the 25 to 30 million EU citizens living outside the Union; acknowledges that the EEAS budget, already structurally underfunded, was disproportionately affected in comparison to other EU institutions by the higher inflation rates and subsequent energy crisis caused by Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine, and is concerned of these negative consequences for the EEAS and the performance of the EU institutions and the lack of action to rectify the current budgetary situation that can severely impact the EU’s relations with third countries;

    2. Emphasises the need for the European External Action Service (EEAS) to play a central role in promoting peace and stability in the Middle East, to increase funding to ensure humanitarian aid in Lebanon, Gaza, and Syria, and to strengthen human rights monitoring.

    3. Highlight financial support for the European External Action Service (EEAS) delegations deployed in the Middle East, Gulf countries, and Africa to ensure they can continue implementing the EU’s External Action in the region.

    4. Insists on the budgetary increase for CFSP actions and other appropriate peace, conflict and crisis response instruments, as well as IT and security protocols, in order to fully match EU’s activities and capabilities with current challenges and conflicts worldwide;

    5. Highlights the EEAS’s contribution to the EU’s overarching efforts to demonstrate steadfast support for Ukraine with initiatives like the #StandWithUkraine campaign and targeted communication projects such as Faces of Ukraine, Art vs War, and Share Your Light;

    6. Reminds that is crucial to further strengthening our support to human rights, democracy and development in third countries through the NDICI – Global Europe, as a world of democracies is a safer world; underlines that resources to the EU’s Digital Diplomacy should be further increased given the current context of rapid technological advancements and geopolitical competition; insists that “green diplomacy” and the green transition, as one of the EU’s priorities, should be enhanced towards third countries through the EU’s External Action;

    7. Acknowledges the EEAS’s role in gathering evidence against EU-sanctioned Russian state-backed outlets and individuals involved in spreading disinformation and manipulating information to justify Russia’s war of aggression;

    8. Regrets that the European Court of Auditors in its Annual Report for the financial year 2023 observes that they found quantifiable error in one of the 13 payments examined, concerning the absence of a valid procurement procedure and six non-quantifiable findings concerning procurement at EU Delegations, including weaknesses in the methodology for selecting tenderers and evaluating tenders, as well as entering into a legal commitment before making the budgetary commitment;

    9. Notes that the Special Report 14/2023 of the European Court of Auditors found deficiencies in the methodologies used by the Commission and the EEAS for allocating funding to partner countries and in the setup of the monitoring framework and recommended that the Commission and the EEAS notably improve the methodology for allocating funding and the assessment of the impact of EU support, focus the scope of the programming process and simplify and consistently use the indicators in the multiannual indicative programmes.

    10. Welcomes the Court of Auditors’ Special Report regarding the coordination role of the EEAS and its conclusions that coordination is mostly effective, allowing the service to properly support the High Representative/Vice-President to deliver their mandate; notes that nevertheless some weaknesses in information management, staffing and reporting remain; calls on the EEAS to prioritise the implementation of the recommendations of the Special Report by the deadline in 2025 as timely action is important in reinforcing its operational capacity and enhancing its contribution to the EU foreign policy objectives.

    11. Notes that that the EEAS is committed to make itself more cost-effective while continuing to face significant budgetary constraints in 2023 despite increasing geopolitical challenges; acknowledges that the EEAS has substantially cut its mission and representation budget, which impacts the core functions of a Diplomatic service, and has reduced non-compulsory expenditure and freezing and postponing building maintenance, infrastructure and IT projects; notes with concern that these budgetary constraints could lead to excessive closures of EU embassies and postponing security installations in a number of EU Delegations hampering the EEAS’ ability to fulfil its mandate and defend EU values and properly ensure the duty of care to all staff in Delegations; urges the Members States to provide enough financing to the EEAS and the Commission to ensure that the EU maintains its network of Delegations untouched as a signal of its global engagement; underlines the negative impact cuts may have on the implementation of the external affairs instruments, such as NDICI and Global Gateway; underlines the need to provide adequate resources to the Strategic Communication and Foresight division of the European External Action Service (EEAS) to continue to effectively combat disinformation campaigns deployed as strategic tools by authoritarian and illiberal regimes; welcomes in this regard the announcement of the creation of the Task Force for Strategic Communication and Countering Information Manipulation in DG COMM of the Commission;

    12. Welcomes the steadfast support provided to Ukraine, including through the civilian EU Advisory Mission (EUAM Ukraine) and the training of Ukrainian soldiers under the EU Military Assistance Mission (EUMAM);

    13. Welcomes the appointment of the first EU Special Representative for the Gulf region;

    14. Underlines that the EU must increase funding to reinforce the dedicated budget line within EU foreign policy actions specifically for gender equality and the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda, in order to ensure consistent financing for initiatives that promote gender-responsive leadership, protect women’s rights, and combat sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) in conflict and post-conflict settings; stresses that such funding is essential to support local civil society organisations, provide survivor-centered support, and integrate gender perspectives into EU diplomatic and security efforts.

    15. Stresses that the Gender Action Plan (GAP) III dictates that 85% of new EU actions must contribute to gender equality and women and girls’ empowerment; calls on the EEAS to accelerate the progress towards the goals of GAP III by meaningfully focusing in its every day work on the GAP III’s key areas of engagement, including ending gender-based violence, promoting sexual and reproductive health and rights, economic and social rights and empowerment, equal participation and leadership; notes that GAP III will expire in 2027 and urges the EEAS to this end to develop a more ambitious GAP IV that will ensure a stronger connection between women’s rights and empowerment and the EU’s foreign and security policy, ready for implementation as of 2028;

    16. Underlines the extremely vulnerable situation of children in the world, specifically in armed conflict; expresses serious concern about the tens of thousands of children that were affected by armed conflict across the globe and suffered abhorrent abuses and violations of their most basic rights in 2023; calls on the EEAS to put children’s rights at the centre of their efforts;

    17. Continues to encourage the EEAS and Union delegations to promote and engage with local actors and civil society organisations in third countries to stimulate dialogue about the rule of law, fundamental human rights and the fight against corruption and the misuse of EU funds;

    18. Calls on the EU Delegations to enhance support to genuine democratic actors and civil society in the Western Balkans, go strongly and publicly denounce actions by illiberal and undemocratic actors that go against the Union’s interest and to ensure that the implementation of the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) III funding is in line with the EU’s objectives; calls on the EU Delegations in the region to apply a more credible and merit-based approach based on the Copenhagen criteria, notably on the rule of law, democracy and the protection of human rights, especially given the limited progress made by some countries in the Western Balkans;

    19. Calls for enhanced EU support for Moldova in combating disinformation, hybrid threats, and cyberattacks; calls the EU Delegation to Moldova to enhance its efforts to promote a more proactive and effective communication strategy regarding the European perspective, including outreach in the Russian language;

    20. Recalls the dire situation of women’s rights and LGBTQI+ rights in many parts of the world; stresses the urgent need to better protect these rights; highlights the central role of the EEAS in advancing human rights around the world; calls on the EEAS to enhance their efforts in this regard;

    21. Sees electoral observation mission as a practical and effective foreign policy instrument that remains central to the EU’s democracy support policies and strategies; calls on the EU to ensure adequate resources to the EU electoral observation missions, in view also of extending them to elections in candidate and neighbouring countries.

    22. Welcomes the establishment of EU Partnership Mission in Moldova (EUPM Moldova); highlights the essential role of the EUPM Moldova and calls the EU and its Member States to extend the mission’s mandate beyond May 2025 while increasing resources to enhance its effectiveness;

    23. Urges the EEAS and the EU Delegations to closely monitor the state of democracy in the different countries and to provide logistical and technological support to human rights defenders and indigenous persons, in particular women;

    24. Emphasises that freedom of religion and belief is a fundamental value of the free world and the European Union; urges the European External Action Service to incorporate faith diplomacy into its actions, recognising religion as a part of the solution to global challenges; underlines that this approach should include actively safeguarding the rights of Christians and other religious groups especially in countries where they are a minority, as well as promoting tolerance, and ensuring that religious freedom is part of all relevant external engagements and policies of the EU;

     

    ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS
    FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR FOR THE OPINION HAS RECEIVED INPUT

     

    The rapporteur for opinion declares under his exclusive responsibility that he did not receive input from any entity or person to be mentioned in this Annex pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the control of the financial activities of the European Investment Bank – annual report 2023 – A10-0068/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on the control of the financial activities of the European Investment Bank – annual report 2023

    (2024/2052(INI))

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to the European Investment Bank Group (‘EIB Group’) 2023 activity report of 1 February 2024 entitled ‘A Blueprint for Sustainable Living’, and to the EIB Group document of 2 February 2023 entitled ‘EIB Group Operational Plan 2023-2025’,–  having regard to the European Investment Bank (‘EIB’, ‘the Bank’) Investment Report 2023/2024 entitled ‘Transforming for competitiveness’, published on 7 February 2024,

    – having regard to the EIB document of 8 May 2023 entitled ‘Mid-term review of the EIB Energy Lending Policy’,

    – having regard to the EIB Group report on the implementation of the EIB Group Transparency Policy in 2023, published on 1 July 2024,

    – having regard to the EIB Group document of 27 November 2023 entitled ‘The EIB Group PATH Framework – Version 1.2 of November 2023 – Supporting counterparties on their pathways to align with the Paris Agreement’,

    – having regard to the EIB Group and EIB documents of 21 June 2024 entitled ‘EIB Group 2024-2027 Strategic Roadmap’ and of 29 November 2023 entitled ‘EIB Global Strategic Roadmap’,

    – having regard to the EIB Group Sustainability Report 2023, published on 25 July 2024,

    – having regard to the EIB information note of 6 February 2023 entitled ‘The European Investment Bank’s approach to human rights’,

    – having regard to the EIB Group Complaints Mechanism Report 2023, published on 10 June 2024,

    – having regard to the EIB Group document of 14 October 2024 entitled ‘Diversity, Equity and Inclusion at the EIB Group’,

    – having regard to the EIB publication of 23 September 2024 entitled ‘EIB Audit Committee Annual Reports for the year 2023’,

    – having regard to the EIB Group report of 15 July 2024 entitled ‘EIB Group activities in EU cohesion regions 2023’,–  having regard to the EIB report of 19 October 2023 entitled ‘EIB Investment Survey 2023 – European Union overview’,

     – having regard to the EIB Group report of 26 June 2024 entitled ‘EIB Group support for EU businesses: Evidence of impact in addressing market failures’,

    – having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 5 March 2024 entitled ‘A new European Defence Industrial Strategy: Achieving EU readiness through a responsive and resilient European Defence Industry’ (JOIN(2024)0010),

    – having regard to European Court of Auditors Special Report 22/2024 entitled ‘Double funding from the EU budget’,

    – having regard to the EIB Group report of 29 December 2023 entitled ‘European Investment Bank Group Risk Management Disclosure Report – June 2023’,

    – having regard to the joint communication of 19 March 2025 from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy entitled ‘Joint White Paper for European Defence Readiness 2030’ (JOIN(2025)0120),

    – having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

    – having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0068/2025),

    A. whereas the EIB Group includes the EIB and the European Investment Fund (EIF); whereas the EIB stands as the world’s largest multilateral development bank; whereas the EIB is treaty-bound to contribute to EU integration; whereas the EIB’s key priorities include providing funding for projects to foster European integration and social cohesion; whereas the EIF acts as a dedicated body for supporting the European Union’s policy objectives in the areas of entrepreneurship, job creation and economic cohesion;

    B. whereas, as a bank owned by the EU Member States, the EIB is governed by a Board of Governors, a Board of Directors and a Management Committee, and it maintains robust internal mechanisms for accountability, governance and audit; whereas the EIF is owned by the EIB (60 %), the EU (30 %) and financial institutions (10 %) from the Member States, the UK and Türkiye, and is managed by the General Meeting of EIF shareholders, the Board of Directors and the Chief Executive, with independent internal mechanisms for accountability, governance and audit, some of which are shared at the Group level;

    C. whereas both the EIB and the EIF operate within a competitive market but are held to high standards of transparency and stakeholder engagement as EU bodies;

    D. whereas the EIB Group promotes EU policies both within and outside the EU and collaborates closely with other EU and national institutions, aligning its financing with the EU’s political priorities; whereas the EIB Group outlined eight strategic priorities in its Strategic Roadmap for 2024-2027: climate action, digital transformation, defence, cohesion, agriculture, social infrastructure, external financing and promoting the Capital Markets Union;

    E. whereas the EIB is also tasked with securing resources through borrowing activities, which are crucial for implementing the EU’s policies;

    F. whereas the European Council’s strategic agenda for 2024-2029 envisages an enhanced role for the EIB Group as a driver of EU defence and security, and emphasises the need to boost EU competitiveness and improve citizens’ economic and social well-being through significant collective investment efforts, leveraging both public and private funding;

    G. whereas the Draghi report on the future of European competitiveness[1] proposed numerous ways to expand the EIB’s role in financing EU policies and to enable the EIB to assume more risk;

    H. whereas the EIB Group’s core mission is to bolster Europe’s potential for job creation and economic growth; whereas its investments should tackle inequalities by improving access to jobs, training opportunities, housing and education in order to address poverty and unemployment; whereas it is crucial to overcome barriers to financing for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and mid-caps; whereas public lending and guarantee schemes serve as vital countercyclical policy tools, especially during economic downturns, and help mitigate structural market failures;

    I. whereas the EIB is a cornerstone of the European financial architecture for development and the largest multilateral lender in the EU’s neighbouring regions, including the Eastern Neighbourhood countries, the Western Balkans, the Middle East, and North Africa; whereas the EIB is expected to help close the gap in productive investment between Europe and its main competitors by increasing investment in innovation, communication technology and intellectual property;

    J. whereas the success of the EU’s policy objectives and their effective implementation increasingly depend on the EIB Group; whereas the depth and quality of Parliament’s oversight of the EIB’s financial operations should therefore be in line with the intensity of EIB-Commission cooperation, which has become very significant;

    K. whereas the EIB’s business model requires the highest standards of integrity, accountability and transparency, and robust measures must be implemented and regularly updated to combat financial fraud, corruption, money laundering, terrorism, organised crime and both tax evasion and avoidance; whereas the EIB Group has a control framework aimed at preventing and mitigating sanctions risks;

    L. whereas the EIB Group adheres to the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s definition of compliance risk, with the aim of preventing the risk of legal or regulatory sanctions, material financial loss, or damage to reputation; whereas the Bank takes appropriate measures to mitigate such risks by ensuring strict compliance with legal and regulatory frameworks, both at EU and international level;

    Financial operations and performance

    1. Acknowledges that the EIB has operated effectively and efficiently in a landscape marked by significant global challenges, including geopolitical tensions, climate change impacts and other factors influencing the global economy; suggests exploring both the EIB’s effectiveness and efficiency through thoughtful analysis, particularly focusing on the impact on competitiveness and growth;

    2. Recognises that EIB financing is becoming increasingly crucial in the context of high interest rates and constrained public finances; expects the EIB, in the context of a challenging economic outlook and increased global competition, to address constraints to EU competitiveness, such as volatile energy prices, skills shortages in key sectors and insufficient investments in innovation and new technologies;

    3. Notes that the EIB Group achieved strong consolidated results amounting to EUR 2.272 billion in 2023 under the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), compared to EUR 2.327 billion in 2022, reflecting a year-on-year decrease of 2.4 %; calls for a detailed analysis of the factors contributing to this decrease, especially since the period was marked by steady economic growth; observes that EIB reserves reached over EUR 56 billion in 2023, up from EUR 53.9 billion in 2022 and EUR 36 billion in 2014;

    4. Notes that the EIB’s total liquidity ratio remained well within internal limits to the end of 2023 and that the EIB’s Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) ratio stood at 33.1 % in 2023, significantly higher than the average ratio of significant institutions supervised by the European Central Bank (ECB) at that time; emphasises that maintaining the EIB’s AAA rating with a ‘stable’ outlook is crucial for securing favourable market financing at preferential rates and should be preserved; underlines that the EIB’s high credit standing is key to its successful business model;

    5. Calls on the EIB to maintain its strong capital position and consistently high profits, but notes that the Bank has potential to absorb potential fluctuations in returns without compromising shareholder capital or its credit rating, has the capacity to take on more risk in strategic investments and is well-equipped to invest more in higher-risk innovative projects where private capital remains hesitant;

    6. Highlights that the EIB’s total disbursements reached EUR 54.4 billion in 2023, with EUR 53.4 billion from its own resources, compared to EUR 54.3 billion (EUR 53.3 billion from its own resources) in 2022; observes that the EIF’s disbursements on private equity investments amounted to EUR 139.7 million in 2023, compared to EUR 113.7 million in 2022; notes that, according to an economic model developed jointly by the EIB’s Economics Department and the Commission’s Joint Research Centre, the EIB Group’s overall investment within the EU in 2023 is expected to create around 1 460 000 new jobs in the EU-27 by 2027 and boost the EU’s GDP by 1.03 percentage points; calls on the EIB Group to ensure a more balanced geographical distribution of investments to maximise their impact across all EU regions, promoting cohesive and inclusive growth throughout the Union, with particular attention to under-represented and less developed areas;

    7. Recalls that the EIB’s Statute mandates geographical balance among its staff and that the selection of staff members must be based on merit, while also considering fair representation of nationals from all Member States; encourages the Bank to continuously monitor geographical balance among its staff and to adjust the recruitment process accordingly, if needed;

    8. Welcomes the fact that the EIB Group upholds a rigorous policy against tax fraud, tax evasion, tax avoidance, money laundering and terrorism financing;

    InvestEU, the simplification of the multiannual financial framework, and the Recovery and Resilience Facility

    9. Welcomes the adoption, on 13 December 2023, of the EIB Group Operational Plan 2024-2026, which outlines the priorities and activities for implementing the EIB Group’s strategy over the next three years; calls for adjustments to new market conditions, including simplification and a reduction of bureaucracy to remove barriers to financing for SMEs, which must be significantly increased; acknowledges that increasing higher-risk activities and mandates is crucial for providing effective support to high value-added and innovative sectors;

    10. Recalls that the EIB Group has been allocated 75 % (EUR 19.6 billion) of the EU budgetary guarantee under the InvestEU Regulation[2]; highlights that, in 2023 alone, the EIB approved 30 operations under InvestEU totalling EUR 9.1 billion; believes that in order to stay competitive, significant investments are needed, primarily from the private sector; believes that focusing on innovative projects, start-ups and scale-ups would enhance European competitiveness and growth; notes that this requires mobilising private investments; calls, therefore, on the EIB to play a more significant role in strategic de-risking through guarantees, thereby encouraging private capital investment;

    11. Stresses that, within the current 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework, the EIB manages 87 mandates from the Commission, increasing to about 130 if those relating to shared management and assigned by local governments and the Member States are included, and notes that the EIB produces no fewer than 457 reports a year for these; points out that de-bureaucratisation and simplification are deemed necessary to enable better use of resources;

    12. Emphasises that the EIB is managing six Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) mandates in four Member States, signed in 2021 (Greece and Italy), 2022 (Romania) and 2024 (Spain), totalling EUR 8.7 billion; acknowledges that the adoption of ‘financing not linked to costs’ instruments, which have significantly expanded with the RRF, inherently raises the risk of errors and double funding; expresses its concern about the transparency, auditing and monitoring of the implementation of the RRF; calls on the EIB to cooperate with Member States to address government capacity constraints and the lack of technical skills so as to ensure that RRF resources are managed as effectively as possible, in alignment with national structures and complying with all RRF reporting requirements, especially in the implementation of investment projects and reforms; urges the Commission and the EIB, in its advisory role, to refrain from proposing new financing mechanisms based on the RRF model without taking corrective measures, including in the upcoming post-2027 multiannual financial framework; stresses that, while the EIB seeks simplification, it must not compromise the soundness of EU resource management or the ability to maintain oversight and accountability, as mandated by the Treaties;

    Energy security

    13. Notes the EIB’s continued support for security of supply, which mainly takes the form of reinforcing electricity grids and cross-border infrastructure, of reducing energy demand through energy efficiency projects and of fostering low-carbon power generation; commends the fact that the EIB has supported new dimensions of energy security, such as demand response and energy storage, and has promoted the development of a sustainable supply of critical raw materials (CRM) needed for the energy transition; calls for an urgent analysis of the real impact of these projects implemented to date, especially of their impact on the availability and cost of energy and thus on the general competitiveness of European companies;

    14. Reiterates the need to address energy poverty and emphasises the need for a fair and inclusive energy transition; recalls that the energy crisis is exacerbating inflation, increasing food insecurity and straining household budgets; encourages the EIB to leverage the Just Transition Mechanism and the Modernisation Fund to support regions and populations most affected by the energy transition; stresses the importance of using the Just Transition Mechanism to support workers and regions affected by the phase out of fossil fuels, ensuring access to retraining and quality jobs; recognises that numerous sectors are grappling with challenges stemming from the combined effects of adaption to European Green Deal objectives and the repercussions of the energy crisis and inflation; stresses that accelerating the deployment of innovative low-carbon technologies requires bringing their costs to a level that is competitive with fossil fuels and adjusting to the ongoing reform of the green policies;

    15. Acknowledges that the REPowerEU plan is a crucial new element in the EU policy response to the energy crisis; notes that, in July 2023, the EIB Group increased the financing targets of the October 2022 commitment from EUR 30.0 billion until 2027 to EUR 45.0 billion (REPowerEU+), in order to scale up its efforts to support the EU’s energy security; calls for a clear overview of potential double funding of energy projects;

    16. Underlines that in 2023, the EIB provided approximately EUR 21.4 billion in financing for energy-related projects, of which around EUR 19.8 billion in the EU and EUR 1.6 billion outside the EU; considers it necessary to increase not only the volume of financing for energy-related projects, but also the efficiency of the investments; underlines, in this regard, the importance of the EIB’s combined offer of competent technical assistance and innovative financial support, and encourages the Bank to expand the range of innovative financing products offered to economic operators, going beyond the standard market offer;

    17. Believes that hydrogen and its derivatives, particularly when sourced from renewable energy, can significantly contribute to the EU’s decarbonisation goals and reduce dependence on fossil fuels; urges the EIB to take a leading role in mobilising private investments, which are essential for scaling up hydrogen production across the EU, while ensuring technological neutrality and supporting a diverse range of innovative solutions for decarbonisation, including further scientific research aimed at enhancing and stabilising the efficiency of hydrogen technology; encourages the Bank to consider the cost-effectiveness of such projects from the perspective of their total life cycle;

    Defence and security policy

    18. Welcomes the significant role that the EIB Group plays in supporting the EU’s defence and security policy by providing funding and leveraging private investment to enhance the Union’s strategic autonomy and resilience; stresses the importance of the EIB’s investment capabilities, supporting initiatives that contribute to strengthening the EU’s defence industry, advancing cybersecurity infrastructure and promoting innovation in critical defence technologies;

    19. Appreciates that security and defence is set as one of the Bank’s core priorities in its Strategic Roadmap for 2024-2027; highlights that in May 2024, the EIB’s Board of Directors approved the EIB Group Security and Defence Industry Action Plan, which follows the EIB Group 2022 Strategic European Security Initiative aimed at supporting innovation in dual-use technology, in order to enhance support for the EU’s security and defence industry; notes, with satisfaction, that EIB Group support is provided to SMEs and innovative start-ups within the security and defence sector under the ‘dual-use’ principle, upholding the ‘credible civil use’ criterion, but waiving the revenue test; welcomes the decision of the EIB Board of Directors of 21 March 2025 to expand the Bank’s eligibilities for financing Europe’s security and defence industry and infrastructure, by ensuring that excluded activities are as limited as possible in scope;

    20. Welcomes the EIB’s targeted investments in both defence and civilian infrastructure and emphasises the need for strategic investment in technologies that serve both civilian and defence purposes, in line with the EU’s broader goals of promoting innovation and enhancing the Union’s security; calls on the EIB Group to conduct a review of the impact of the extension of its new dual-use goods policy;

    21. Stresses the importance of SMEs, start-ups and mid-caps in the security and defence industry and in developing a common European market for defence; believes that smaller actors play a crucial role in strengthening the Union’s capacity and autonomy to develop innovative defence products; encourages the EIB to further support cross-border research and development (R&D) cooperation, particularly by paving the way for smaller actors to take part in the defence supply chains; stresses that greater EIB investment in the defence sector can encourage investment by commercial banks in the same area and considers it necessary to increase the flexibility of lending to SMEs in this regard;

    22. Notes that the resources allocated to support the defence and security sector mainly come from the European Defence Fund (EDF) (EUR 8 billion), the EIB Strategic European Security Initiative (SESI) (EUR 8 billion) and the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP) (EUR 1.5 billion); calls for a dedicated capital allocation on defence and the further adjustment of the scope of eligible investments in order to meet the ambitious role of contributing to Europe’s peace and security set by the White Paper on European Defence Readiness 2030 for the EIB Group; welcomes the integration of the EIB’s existing EUR 8 billion SESI into a cross-cutting and permanent public policy goal and the removal of a predefined ceiling for financing in this area; believes that these measures will allow the Bank to respond to the investment needs in security and defence, while safeguarding its operations and strong financial position; believes that the decision by the Board of Governors in June 2024 to increase the gearing ratio of the Bank will enable increased investments in areas of strategic importance, including in security and defence;

    23. Underlines the added value of the innovative measures that the EIB has adopted to accelerate investments in security and defence, and of the ‘one-stop shop’ that acts as the single point of entry for clients and external stakeholders, to whom it offers expert assistance to streamline access and speed up deployment of financing available under the SESI; encourages the EIB to continue developing and implementing agreed upon measures that simplify client procedures and further accelerate investment processes, while ensuring that the AAA rating is preserved;

    24. Notes, with appreciation, that in June 2023, the EIB approved an increase in SESI for security investments in the EU from EUR 6.0 billion to EUR 8.0 billion for the period from 2022 to 2027, also including the space and cybersecurity sectors; encourages the EIB to strengthen institutional partnerships with the EU Agency for the Space Programme and other potentially relevant partners, in accordance with EU competition rules;

    25. Commends the EIB’s cooperation with all relevant stakeholders, including Member State governments, the European Defence Agency (EDA) and the NATO Innovation Fund; appreciates, in particular, the EIB Group’s cooperation with the EDA and welcomes the signing of an update to the memorandum of understanding between the two bodies on 3 October 2024, which will allow them to strengthen strategic partnerships and jointly identify financing needs to better support research, development and innovation (RDI) in the area of security and defence in the Union;

    26. Invites the EIB to further strengthen such collaboration with key stakeholders with a view to increasing impact, synergies and complementarity with EU defence programmes, ensuring that its investments complement broader EU defence policy goals and contribute to achieving economies of scale in European defence capabilities; asks the EIB to enhance regional security and resilience, particularly in Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean through the creation of infrastructure that supports regional security and fosters greater cooperation between EU Member States on defence matters; stresses, furthermore, the importance of exploring cooperation with the NATO Innovation Fund in order to improve access to financing for technology start-ups, in parallel to the deployment of the EIF Defence Equity Facility;

    Social infrastructure and housing

    27. Asks the EIB to increase risk-taking for projects providing essential services with long-term clear and measurable benefits; welcomes, in this vein, the EIB Group’s actions and measures in the area of housing and social infrastructure that contribute to affordable housing, social inclusion and regional development, while also supporting sustainability and innovation; calls on the EIB to prioritise its investments towards these goals in order to achieve better economic growth, social inclusion and regional cohesion, while also supporting the EU’s sustainability objectives; invites the Bank to focus on sustainable urban development and inclusive growth by ensuring that the EU’s housing and infrastructure needs are met for a stronger, more cohesive and prosperous Europe;

    28. Emphasises that housing purchase and rental costs have surged significantly in recent years, reducing the affordability of many metropolitan areas in the EU and limiting access to housing; stresses that the EIB must play a stronger role in addressing the housing crisis; welcomes the inclusion of support for social infrastructure in the EIB Group’s eight strategic priorities for 2024-2027 and agrees that investments in energy-efficient, sustainable and accessible housing, and education within easy reach are crucial for boosting productivity and fostering strong and resilient societies; encourages the EIB to prioritise investments in housing cooperatives, energy-efficient social housing and renovation projects targeting low-income households; believes that addressing the EU’s major housing investment gaps requires overcoming both financial and non-financial investment barriers and the large-scale mobilisation of resources and capacities;

    29. Welcomes that the EIB, in collaboration with the Commission, has initiated a pan-European investment platform aimed at promoting affordable and sustainable housing, combining advisory services and financing, and encourages the participants to continue this initiative;

    30. Welcomes the EIB’s commitment to easing the pressure on housing markets in Europe; stresses that housing purchase and rental prices have increased significantly in recent years, reducing the affordability of many metropolitan areas in the EU and compromising access to these; emphasises that EIB analysis shows that the EU needs about 1.5 million new housing units per year to cope with demand, and that about 75 % of the EU’s building stock needs to be renovated, representing an additional 5 million units per year; welcomes the fact that the EIB supports the reconstruction of existing housing and the construction of new social and affordable accommodation; encourages the EIB to mobilise more funding for affordable housing projects among the Member States;

    31. Calls for the strengthening of technical assistance and financial expertise in support of local and regional authorities, especially in areas with low investment capacity, in order to improve access to EIB funding; believes that cooperation with local authorities, local governments and civil society representatives should foster the development of social housing suitable for all, and especially for the most vulnerable citizens of the concerned Member State; is aware that the effectiveness of the EIB’s action in the housing and social infrastructure sector also depends on the removal of policy and regulatory hurdles;

    32. Notes that, in 2023, the EIB signed EUR 8.3 billion in financial support for energy efficiency operations, of which 65 % was for energy efficiency in buildings; invites the EIB to prioritise long-term affordable and accessible solutions, and sustainable investments, such as energy-efficient renovations and the reuse of vacant buildings;

    33. Believes that the related investments should ensure sufficient durability before any change of destination or use is authorised;

    34. Invites the EIB to build on its long-standing experience as an accelerator of European investments and to also deploy its potential in the education and training and healthcare sectors, including through advisory services; calls on the Bank to strengthen support for healthcare capacities, both within and outside the EU, thus  ensuring a stronger role for Europe in the world;

    Support for SMEs, mid-caps, start-ups, scale-ups and businesses in rural and remote areas, the Capital Markets Union and the role of the EIF

    35. Highlights that SMEs, start-ups and scale-ups are vital for the EU’s economy; notes that these businesses encounter significant hurdles in accessing financing, markets and talent, which constrains their growth; asserts that business growth, dynamism and public investment are essential for fostering innovation, competitiveness and productivity; encourages the EIB Group to continue addressing these challenges, notably in the current geopolitical context, through customised financial programmes, risk-sharing mechanisms and targeted financial instruments, while ensuring the additionality of public resources for these purposes and avoiding the crowding out of private capital; notes that different instruments to support lending to businesses can be combined depending on the context, and that different EIB Group instruments target different market failures and firm types; stresses the need to provide technical assistance to SMEs before project approval, in order to improve access to EIB funding;

    36. Notes that the development of a well-functioning securitisation market can be a key first step towards establishing a strong Capital Markets Union (CMU); believes that the CMU will benefit consumers and SMEs by offering high-yield investment opportunities in the real economy and will eventually boost the venture capital market by improving access to diversified funding sources; believes that financing European scale-ups with European capital should be a priority, as exemplified by the European Tech Champions Initiative, which was launched in February 2023 to finance promising European tech companies and prevent the sale of businesses to foreign investors because of the lack of European investment; encourages the EIF to explore establishing the second generation of this initiative; observes that the European Tech Champions Initiative is complemented by the European Scale-up Initiative, which aims to provide crucial financing for Europe’s high-tech companies in their late-stage development; notes that these investments should be in line with policy actions at EU and national level; is aware of the comparative weaknesses of the European venture capital market in respect of other competitors’ markets, and that European start-ups and scale-ups are often obliged to relocate or search for foreign buyers or rely on sources of financing other than venture capital, hence less suited to high-growth;

    37. Acknowledges the mission of the EIF to support access to financing for European micro, small and medium-sized enterprises; believes that the EIF should significantly step up its activities for the development of the European venture capital ecosystem, while maintaining a geographical balance; calls for the EIF’s activities to be strengthened, enabling increased investment in high-growth sectors, enhancing risk-sharing between public and private investors, and promoting innovation throughout Europe; considers it necessary to monitor the rate of increase in support for micro, small and medium-sized enterprises;

    38. Encourages the EIF to further develop its monitoring tools to better track the long-term performance of venture capital funds and SME financing operations, especially in terms of job creation, innovation diffusion and regional impact; stresses also the critical role of large European companies in Europe’s economic structure, particularly those operating in essential sectors such as energy, defence and infrastructure; calls for a balanced approach that ensures the EIB continues to support large European companies in securing investment capital for major projects and research and development initiatives, thereby enhancing Europe’s global competitiveness;

    39. Praises the support provided by the EIB Group to about 400 000 SMEs and mid-caps in 2023 alone, with EUR 31.1 billion in financing, including loans and guarantees for businesses (of which EUR 14.9 billion was deployed by the EIF), resulting in the mobilisation of over EUR 134 billion, and notes that it teamed up with almost 300 partner institutions across Europe to this end; encourages the EIB to continue its role in improving access to financing for SMEs, which often face barriers to funding from traditional financial institutions, providing targeted financing to ensure sufficient resources to grow and thrive; welcomes and calls for the constant expansion of the number of partner institutions to reach a wide geographical and sectoral coverage;

    40. Recalls that the deployment of the European Guarantee Fund ended in 2023 and that its disbursements to help SMEs to recover from the adverse impact of the pandemic reached approximately 200 000 SMEs across the EU; recalls the concerns expressed in previous resolutions about the transparency of the decision-making processes and information about final recipients;

    41. Welcomes that EIF measures on anti-money-laundering, countering the financing of terrorism and tax avoidance encompass risk assessments for products and transactions, thorough due diligence on counterparties and screening the ownership structures and key individuals against sanctions and adverse media; welcomes the introduction of mandatory staff training and the conclusion of an agreement with the Financial Intelligence Unit of Luxembourg on the reporting of and follow-up on any suspicious transactions detected;

    Key policy areas of cohesion, climate action and environmental sustainability, and digitalisation

    42. Appreciates that in its 2021-2027 Cohesion Orientation, the EIB committed to dedicating at least 40 % of its total financing in the EU between 2022 and 2024 to projects in cohesion regions; notes that, in 2023, such financing amounted to EUR 29.8 billion, equivalent to 45 % of the Bank’s total signatures in the EU; underlines that the share of EIB financing allocated to less developed regions increased from 24 % in 2022 to 26 % in 2023, totalling EUR 17.2 billion, well above the 21 % target set in the EIB Cohesion Orientation for 2023; reiterates the call for the EIB to continue monitoring, analysing and addressing the shortcomings that prevent certain regions or countries from fully benefiting from the EIB’s financial support and assistance;

    43. Acknowledges the role played by the EIF in contributing to economic and social cohesion in the Union through a wide range of financial instruments; notes that EIF commitments to credit guarantees, venture capital and private equity investments for cohesion regions in 2023 stood at EUR 6.8 billion, representing 48 % of total EIF commitments in the EU; notes that in 2023, the EIF was especially active in Central and Eastern Europe;

    44. Notes that the EIB Environmental and Social Sustainability Framework includes revised environmental and social policy and standards promoting an integrated approach to impact and risk assessment and management;

    45. Acknowledges that over the past 15 years, EIB Advisory has supported over 1 000 projects in cohesion regions; calls on the Bank to actively promote financing opportunities in less developed and transition regions, including by boosting the presence of advisory services in EIB local offices; considers it necessary to also take into account the geographical distribution of EIB support for increasing social cohesion;

    46. Highlights the EIB’s initiatives in cohesion regions to support the healthcare sector, including the HERA Invest programme, a EUR 100 million guarantee established with the Commission to support research and development in addressing pressing cross-border health threats; encourages the EIB to promote targeted investments in key systemic enablers such as healthcare, education, social housing, digital connectivity and local financing for cities and regions, ensuring a better geographical balance, either through direct lending or financial instruments, and to leverage synergies between EU grants and EIB loans to enhance cross-border rail connectivity, which is crucial for better integration within the EU single market;

    47. Acknowledges the EIB’s strategic orientation since 2019 to be the EU Climate Bank; emphasises that in 2023 alone, the EIB signed EUR 41.8 billion in financing for climate action and EUR 25.1 billion for environmental sustainability (EUR 35.1 billion and EUR 15.9 billion respectively in 2022); notes that EIB financing for climate change adaptation totalled EUR 2.7 billion in 2023, corresponding to 6.4 % of its total climate action (compared to EUR 1.9 billion, or 5.4 %, in 2022); welcomes that climate action and environmental sustainability financing, as a whole, accounted for 60 % of EIB financing in 2023; calls for maintaining technological neutrality in its investment strategy in climate and sustainable financing;

    48. Recalls that the EIB Energy Lending Policy (ELP), adopted in 2019, established a ‘phase out support to energy projects reliant on unabated fossil fuels’ and introduced a transition period during which the Bank could continue to approve projects already under appraisal, but the Board of Directors did not approve any such project after the end of 2021; remarks that, in 2022, the EIB Group introduced a temporary and exceptional extension of the exemptions to the Paris Alignment for Counterparties Framework (so-called PATH) in support of REPowerEU, to cover projects with high innovative content and renewable energy projects and electric vehicle charging infrastructure in the EU; observes that, in 2023, the EIB Group decided to apply the same temporary and exceptional extension also for projects in the spirit of REPowerEU outside the EU; notes that such temporary and exceptional extensions are expected to run until 2027, subject to a Climate Bank roadmap review expected in 2025; recalls its previous resolution[3] and maintains that PATH offers the appropriate framework for supporting counterparties on their pathways to align with the Paris Agreement objectives; emphasises that the EIB is expected to intensify its engagement with all of its clients to foster the development of their decarbonisation plans;

    49. Notes the EIB Group Climate Bank Roadmap mid-term review, approved in 2023, which includes a simplified Paris Alignment framework for microenterprises, the revision of the PATH framework’s disclosure requirements for financial intermediaries and a temporary extension of the list of countries in which the EIB can act as a sole financier of climate adaptation projects due to their particular vulnerability to climate change;

    50. Welcomes the EIB Group’s inclusion of agriculture and bioeconomy among its key priorities, but notes that agriculture, fisheries and forestry received only 1.1 % of the EIB’s lending stock in 2023; considers it important for the EIB to programme significant amounts for financing the agricultural sector and through simplified procedures;

    51. Underlines that agriculture is a key driver of growth and development in rural areas; acknowledges the increasing challenges faced by the agricultural sector and the need for EU farmers to adapt to the European Green Deal objectives, cope with the energy crisis and manage rising inflation; calls on the EIB Group to enhance support and foster innovation for this vital sector, which plays a significant role in ensuring food security, leveraging the EU’s One Health approach by integrating human, animal, plant and environmental health to create sustainable, resilient and productive agri-food systems; highlights the financial challenges faced by farmers, particularly young and small operators, noting that farmers and the enterprises in this sector experience lower success rates when applying for financing;

    52. Stresses that EIB support should have a just transition approach in order to achieve sustainable agriculture that protects the environment, human health and animal welfare, while improving farmers’ livelihoods, in particular for small and medium-sized farms; maintains that supporting rural areas is essential for promoting balanced and inclusive development, generational renewal and equal access to financial opportunities for women and men; reiterates its call on the EIB Group to increase its involvement in the agricultural sector by improving access to funding;

    53. Appreciates that the EIB Group is one of the key supporters of digitalisation in the EU, particularly in financing digital infrastructure and supporting innovative digital start-ups; encourages the EIB to enhance its support for digital networks strengthening the EU’s technological autonomy and innovation in key technologies;

    54. Believes that reducing digital inequality and preventing social exclusion requires significant public investment in telecommunications infrastructure, particularly in rural areas; encourages the EIB to support European citizens in acquiring adequate digital literacy to fully participate in society, with a special focus on the elderly and those with disabilities;

    55. Recognises the critical role of the cybersecurity sector in protecting businesses and governments from advanced digital threats and foreign influence; welcomes the increase in security investments from EUR 6 billion to EUR 8 billion, financed through the SESI to address security challenges, including those in the New Space industry;

    56. Welcomes the EIB’s focus on gender equality and women’s economic empowerment, resulting in a total of EUR 5.8 billion in investment in this field in 2023 (compared to EUR 5.1 billion in 2022); believes that the EIB could further increase microfinance loans to women-led businesses, which still face discrimination in access to financing;

    57. Highlights that the security of supply of critical raw materials is crucial for both the green and digital transitions, as well as for the defence sector and the EU industrial base in general; calls on the EIB to increase investments in the CRM sector to help diversify the supply of both primary and secondary raw materials and to develop circular economy solutions, in particular R&D for alternative materials, such as bio-based materials; welcomes, in this regard, the adoption on 21 March 2025 of a new CRM strategic initiative, with an expected EUR 2 billion in financing for CRM investment in 2025, a new CRM Task Force and a dedicated one-stop shop to build and manage a pipeline of CRM operations and advisory activities and increased technical expertise and partnerships;

    The EIB’s activities outside the EU

    58. Underlines that in EIB Global’s second year of existence, it provided financing amounting to EUR 8.4 billion (compared to EUR 9.1 billion in 2022); notes that, as EIB Global financing is limited to 50 % of the total cost of a project, investment co-financing with development finance institutions and multilateral development banks is recurring; calls on the EIB and the Commission to invest in internal audit and independent control functions to guarantee the integrity and soundness of all operations;

    59. Recalls that EIB Global is among the key implementing actors of the European Global Gateway and, as such, is expected to apply the highest standards of transparency and accountability;

    60. Notes the adoption by the EIB Board of Directors of the EIB Global Strategic Roadmap and its commitment to respect and promote human rights and the rule of law in the projects it supports;

    61. Highlights the importance of ensuring that the EIB Group’s interventions in Ukraine are guided by the priorities for the country’s reconstruction agreed with the EU, and are consistent with the methods and frameworks laid out in the Ukraine Plan and with the provisions of the EU Treaties; notes that the EIB is further enhancing its efforts to address fraud and corruption in relation to the EIB Group projects implemented in Ukraine; calls for the continued application of appropriate conditionality on the financial assistance provided to Ukraine, with a focus on ensuring effective oversight mechanisms, such as access to information and premises, and the monitoring of visits, and calls for conditionality to be extended to all non-EU countries for which it provides financing;

    62. Urges the strengthening of the administrative and audit capacity of Ukrainian authorities responsible for implementing, monitoring, controlling and supervising funded actions, in particular for the prevention of fraud, corruption, conflicts of interest and irregularities; reiterates that the EIB should have clear and unrestricted oversight at all times;

    63. Believes that a greater role for the EIB will bring added value for both the reconstruction of Ukraine and the enlargement process and for prospective partnerships under the EU’s Global Gateway agenda and neighbourhood policy and in support of the Sustainable Development Goals; encourages the Commission to maximise cooperation with the EIB to leverage the EU’s strategic autonomy, particularly on energy and raw materials;

    64. Welcomes the adoption, in 2024, of the Ukraine Facility, which follows the EIB’s EU for Ukraine (EU4U) initiative and establishes a support mechanism based on EU budget resources; encourages the Member States to ensure that solid support continues to be provided to the country, in line with its needs;

    65. Stresses that, in order to support Ukraine, the EIB has built up a loan portfolio of over EUR 7 billion since the beginning of the conflict with Russia in 2014; underlines that, as of 31 December 2023, the EIB’s exposure (disbursed and not yet disbursed) amounted to EUR 5.750 billion, predominantly covered by EU guarantees under the External Lending Mandate; notes that, in addition, the Bank also granted financial guarantees on exposures to counterparties located in Ukraine, fully covered by EU Comprehensive Guarantees, for a signed amount of EUR 388.7 million at the end of 2023 (compared to EUR 478.8 million at the end of 2022);

    66. Notes the growing financial engagement of the EIB in Ukraine; calls on the Bank to provide regular, detailed updates to the budgetary authority and relevant audit bodies regarding the disbursement and implementation of funds covered by EU guarantees;

    67. Underlines the disproportionate impact of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine on eastern EU regions bordering Russia and Belarus; draws attention to the costs borne by these regions and Member States as a result of their shared border with hostile neighbouring countries, notably their need to increasingly redirect public funds towards security, defence and preparedness, while dealing with severely reduced resources due to a disruption in economic activities, cross-border trade and other exchanges, and in cohesion programmes; calls on the EIB to take this into account in its financing decisions;

    68. Welcomes the significant investments made in Moldova to support economic resilience, improving energy security, enhancing infrastructure and aiding the country’s progress towards EU integration; acknowledges that in the Western Balkans, EIB Global invested EUR 1.2 billion in 2023, plus an additional EUR 700 million to enhance road safety and improve railway networks; welcomes the adoption of the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans in 2024 and the Reform and Growth Facility for Moldova approved by the European Parliament;

    69. Recognises the role played by the EIB in supporting the Western Balkans on their path to Union membership, in line with the EU’s enlargement policy; observes that EIB Global invested EUR 1.2 billion in the Western Balkans in 2023, mobilising a total of over EUR 6 billion in investments; notes that the majority of the financing was allocated to sustainable connectivity, followed by credit lines for SMEs, infrastructure projects in the healthcare, education and skills sectors, and water supply and sanitation;

    70. Asks the EIB to collaborate with other bilateral and multilateral institutions to develop and apply common methodologies for development impact analysis, with a view to ensuring added value and long-term, positive impacts;

    EIB accountability architecture

    71. Recalls that internal oversight at the EIB is headed by the Inspectorate General (IG), which comprises three accountability-related divisions – operations evaluation, the complaints mechanism and fraud investigation – that hold complementary roles, contributing to the consistent handling of allegations and complaints;

    72. Observes that the EIB Complaints Mechanism (EIB-CM) handled a total of 104 cases in 2023 (97 in 2022); notes that 60 new complaints were received in 2023 (54 in 2022), of which 44 were considered admissible and 29 were related to EIB-financed projects, of which 27 were located outside Europe;

    73. Notes that the EIB Procurement Complaints Committee is the independent EIB committee handling complaints about project procurement procedures relating to EIB-financed projects outside the EU;

    74. Welcomes the efforts of the Investigative Division (IG/IN) to cooperate and coordinate efforts with the other components of the EU’s anti-fraud architecture, in particular the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO), which received 37 % of the referrals made for investigations in 2023 (27 cases out of 74); encourages the IG/IN to strengthen its cooperation with all components of the EU’s anti-fraud architecture;

    75. Notes that the IG/IN carries out proactive fraud detection activities using the Fraud and Integrity Risk Scoring Tool and the Corruption Risk In Procurement robot and that, in 2023, 24 reviews identified targets for three full and in-depth proactive integrity reviews; invites the Bank to assess how these digital tools could be further enhanced to support transparency and financial accountability;

    76. Regrets the fact that, despite repeated calls by Parliament, the IG/IN annual report does not provide adequate information about the financial magnitude of the cases it handles, the funds or mandates affected, the kinds of projects concerned, the mitigating measures adopted, the role of the EIB services and of the intermediaries or partners in the cases, or even the Member States concerned; invites the representatives of the IG/IN to increase the level of engagement, interactions and transparency with Parliament, especially regarding the control of the financial activities; reiterates its call to the IG/IN to go beyond providing a mere narrative description of a few case studies, and to periodically report valuable insights into the extent to which financial interests are safeguarded; suggests that the IG/IN adopt a reporting model similar to those used by other investigative bodies, such as EPPO and OLAF, where a proper balance between transparency and duty of confidentiality or of professional secrecy is pursued;

    77. Is aware that the EIB Exclusion Policy provides for an autonomous exclusion process that is not fully equivalent to the Commission’s Early Detection and Exclusion System in terms of decision-making standards, results and remedies; reiterates its call on the EIB Group and the Commission to cooperate in identifying the potential gaps and proposing remedies, including an expedited procedure to enforce EIB exclusion decisions via the Early Detection and Exclusion System; observes that in 2023, exclusion proceedings based on IG/IN findings excluded five companies from participating in any EIB-financed activity for a period of five years;

    78. Welcomes the approval, in 2023, of the EIB Group’s Internal Control Framework Policy; acknowledges the results of the group alignment process between the EIB and the EIF insofar as they reflect the different business models and governance structures of the two entities; refers, in particular, to the Audit Committee’s remarks that both internal audit and the internal control framework should evolve to become group functions;

    79. Notes that the EIB’s independent external auditor is the third line of defence; points out that the regular rotation of auditors and assignments allows fresh perspectives, and therefore observes that the EIB external auditor should be rotated periodically, yet its mandate was extended until 2027 and it has been the auditor of the EIB Group since 2009;

    80. Appreciates that the EIB Group Risk Management Framework and EIB Group’s semi-annual Risk Management Disclosure Reports are effective and are aligned with the requirements and technical standards of the European Banking Authority;

    81. Stresses that, in 2023, despite difficult market conditions, the EIB’s portfolio continued to exhibit very low levels of non-performing exposures (NPEs); takes the view that even if a significant portion of the Bank’s loan portfolio benefits from credit enhancements or from EU Member State guarantees, the high quality of the EIB’s portfolio results from the diligent implementation of very effective EIB lending policies;

    82. Highlights that the EIB does not fall within the scope of application of the EU’s legislation applicable to credit institutions, in particular the Capital Requirements Regulation[4] and Directive[5] (CRR, CRD), thus the Bank is entitled to determine its capital and liquidity requirements in a manner that is adequate and appropriate to its activities, its mission and the market conditions; points out that the EIB Group is committed to conform to the best banking and market practices and can determine their applicability in line with the proportionality principle; stresses that the implementation of these norms should not create unwarranted burden; welcomes the fact that the EIB Group voluntarily performed the Review and Evaluation Process; points out that this should be in line with the EIB’s governance structure and mission;

    83. Understands that, in line with the EU’s evolving needs, the EU institutions approved, in 2024, the change in statute proposed by the EIB Board of Governors by amending the statutory limit on its gearing ratio[6] and raising it from 250 % to 290 %, to enable the EIB to invest more without increasing its equity base;

    84. Notes that the amended gearing ratio paves the way for increased risk-taking; acknowledges that investments in renewable energy, sustainable infrastructure and innovative technologies are crucial for the EU’s competitiveness, but often carry greater risk because of the uncertainty of returns; points out that increased risk-taking may increase the volatility of the EIB’s returns, but observes that the EIB maintains capital buffers that would support expanded risk activities;

    85. Is alarmed by the situation of Northvolt AB, a battery manufacturer considered pivotal in the green transition; stresses that Northvolt has benefited from a substantial EIB lending package of slightly over EUR 942.6 million as part of the debt financing to expand a gigafactory site; notes that Northvolt filed for bankruptcy in March 2025; calls on the EIB to provide details about the evaluation and decision-making process to fund Northvolt AB and the causes that led to the failure of the project;

    86. Stresses that the expansion of the gigafactory site was expected to increase the annual output capacity for battery production and was of strategic importance for global competitiveness and was consistent with the EU’s strategies in the sector;

    87. Calls on the Commission and the EIB Board of Directors to launch an in-depth internal review without undue delay to verify the financial damage, the reasons for and the background to the failure of this flagship project and to learn from this experience in order to prevent the recurrence of a similar situation or enable the early detection thereof;

    88. Maintains that the greatest added value of EU support lies in fostering higher-risk investments in innovative projects, scaling up EU strategic goals and enabling long-term transition projects that cannot get funding from the private sector; believes that to effectively pursue its targets in innovation and competitiveness, the InvestEU programme should focus on financing higher-risk and more scale-up investment and that the EIB Group should take on more and larger high-risk projects, which should involve primarily and preferentially European investors, combining a more risk-absorption-oriented deployment of InvestEU resources with an equivalent orientation in the use of the EIB Group’s own financial resources; urges the EIB to introduce stricter conditions to prevent EU public financing from being used to subsidise companies relocating production outside Europe, ensuring that all EIB-funded projects contribute to long-term European industrial resilience;

    89. Is aware that members of the EIB’s Management Committee are often civil servants in their countries of origin before beginning their terms at the EIB, which typically last for two to six years, and that they are therefore entitled to pursue professional development opportunities subject to certain conditions during the cooling-off period (which has been extended to a period of 24 months after the end of their term at the EIB); notes that Management Committee members are asked to inform the Ethics and Compliance Committee and seek approval as soon as possible for any negotiations regarding prospective employment;

    90. Strongly echoes Parliament’s repeated calls to strengthen the mechanism to prevent conflicts of interest within the EIB and to improve the handling of such cases, and to better define the terms under which EIB vice-presidents can participate in decisions about operations in their countries of origin, and insists that these matters be addressed in a future revision of the Management Committee code of conduct;

    91. Highlights that on 31 October 2023, the European Ombudsman ruled in Case 611/2022/KR that a former vice-president had participated in approving financing agreements between the EIB and a national promotional bank[7] in his country of origin just weeks before becoming the Chief Executive Officer of that national promotional bank, despite the EIB’s Chief Compliance Officer advising against such actions during the appointment process; understands that this case predates the entry into force of the current Management Committee code of conduct, which now includes specific provisions regarding the prospective employment of its members; notes that, in the future review of the rules applicable to its Ethics and Compliance Committee, the EIB has committed to consider the European Ombudsman recommendation to make public the Committee’s decisions;

    92. Observes that mitigating measures, such as ring-fencing and cooling-off periods, are the most common precautionary clauses to be used when handling a revolving-doors case and understands that such measures are implemented and are complied with by the members of the Management Committee, including those recently reported on in the media;

    93. Shares the view of the European Ombudsman that the role of the EIB Ethics and Compliance Committee should be strengthened when it comes to overseeing the intended new jobs of Management Committee members and that it should be able to impose and enforce risk-mitigating measures; understands that the role of the Ethics and Compliance Committee has become more prominent in recent years and that internal discussions are ongoing on how to enhance its efficiency;

    94. Invites the Bank to boost the participation of European companies in procurement processes launched for projects financed by the EIB; encourages the Bank to advise borrowers to prioritise eligibility for European companies in order to strengthen European competitiveness;

    95. Reiterates its call on the EIB to ensure proper geographical representation, including at middle and senior management levels, and calls on it to publish an annual breakdown of the gender and nationality for middle and senior management positions;

    Scrutiny, transparency and oversight

    96.  Strongly regrets the fact that the European Court of Auditors (ECA) still lacks full access to all data relating to EIB operations; acknowledges that not all the activities of the EIB are directly financed by the EU and, therefore, not all activities are automatically accessible to the ECA; insists that the ECA should have access to the necessary information to comprehensively and exhaustively assess all EIB operations involving EU funds, including those conducted through financial intermediaries, designed to implement EU policies; calls on the ECA to fully scrutinise, to the best of its abilities, all operations involving the EU budget to any degree;

    97. Observes that the main relevant audit tasks are entrusted to the EIB Audit Committee, which is a fully independent body; believes that the participation of qualified external representatives in specific Audit Committee tasks could enhance the objectivity of the Audit Committee’s analyses;

    98. Notes that the EIB’s Transparency Policy strikes a compromise between the principle of openness and the need to safeguard sensitive information; observes that the policy indicates what information should be published proactively and when – stipulating, for instance, that project summaries should be published at least three weeks before the project’s financing is considered for approval by the EIB Board of Directors – and sets out the relevant derogations; calls for these summaries to provide meaningful information to stakeholders;

    99. Notes that in 2023, 449 projects were approved by the EIB Board of Directors and that almost all (94 %) of the project summaries were published, in the majority (57 %) of cases before approval; observes that all EIB operations conducted through financial intermediaries are published on the EIB’s website and that the EIB provides details on request;

    100. Recalls that all EIB documents are accessible to the public in line with the presumption in favour of disclosure; emphasises that all applicants should be informed in advance about public access to documents, and any refusals should be based solely on specified exceptions; stresses that the EIB should consider publishing, in a timely manner, information regarding the rationale and context for projects and the explanation of their alignment with and contribution to EU policy goals; calls on the EIB to systematically publish audit results of its largest financial operations, ensuring independent scrutiny of its risk management and impact assessments; expects the EIB to limit non-disclosure to the applicable exceptions listed in Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001[8] and Regulation (EC) No 1367/2006[9]; calls for the full implementation of the Ombudsman’s recommendations issued following its inquiries into EIB disclosure policy and related requests for access to documents;

    101. Recalls that all recipients of EU funding have a general obligation to acknowledge its origin and ensure the visibility of any EU funding received; calls on the EIB Group to ensure that final recipients comply with the visibility criteria of the EU’s financial support;

    102. Highlights that the Bank is working to reduce the time needed to bring a product from conception to market availability (time to market) by fully digitising its project cycles; calls for the Bank to intensify its efforts in the digitalisation of its operations;

    103 Reiterates its call on the EIB to strengthen and fully implement its policy on tax fraud, evasion and avoidance, including by refraining from funding beneficiaries or financial intermediaries which have been found to be, or are at high risk of being, involved in such practices;

    104. Reiterates that more structured dialogue between Parliament and the EIB would be enhanced by the adoption of a memorandum of cooperation; praises, in this connection, the EIB’s unprecedented cooperation with Parliament for the preparation of this resolution, noting that it is a tangible expression of openness and transparency;

    Follow-up on Parliament’s recommendations

    105. Urges the EIB to continue reporting on the status of previous recommendations issued by Parliament, particularly regarding the outcomes achieved and the impact of the actions taken to implement its priorities and the EU’s policies, especially as regards:

    (a) impact (economic, environmental and social) of its investment strategy and results achieved in contributing to the balanced and steady development of the internal market in the interests of the Union;

    (b) actions adopted to enhance the prevention and countering of conflicts of interest, fraud, corruption and other potential forms of misconduct;

    (c) new measures to strengthen transparency;

    (d) measures to strengthen support for SMEs and eligible economic operators during the implementation of EU policies;

    (e) follow-up on the calls and requests adopted via the present resolution;

    °

    ° °

    106. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission, and asks that the Council and the EIB Board of Directors hold a debate on Parliament’s positions presented herein.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Accountability for delays to the first flights of the day (first wave and knock-on effects) – E-001487/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-001487/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Benoit Cassart (Renew)

    Every day, European airlines experience significant delays, owing to a shortage of staff shortages at certain air navigation service providers. The first flights of the day, which are critical to the smooth running of the day’s schedule, are particularly common casualties. In 2024, only 79% of first flights departed on time, with a 31% increase in delays caused by air traffic control. These disruptions lead to missed connections, long waits or cancellations for passengers. To ensure that first-wave flights leave on time and to prevent knock-on delays in subsequent rotations, a sufficient number of controllers is needed.

    Does the Commission intend to propose binding accountability mechanisms and financial penalties for air navigation service providers if they fail to meet their performance obligations, particularly with regard to first-wave flights?

    Submitted: 10.4.2025

    Last updated: 23 April 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2023, Section IV – Court of Justice – A10-0050/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    2. MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    with observations forming an integral part of the decision on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2023, Section IV – Court of Justice of the European Union

    (2024/2022(DEC))

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to its decision on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2023, Section IV – Court of Justice of the European Union,

    – having regard to Rule 102 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

    – having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Legal Affairs,

    – having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0050/2025),

    A. whereas in the context of the discharge procedure, the discharge authority wishes to stress the particular importance of further strengthening the democratic legitimacy of the Union institutions by improving transparency and accountability, and by implementing the concept of performance-based budgeting and good governance of human resources;

    B. whereas the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) is the judicial institution of the Union, having the task of ensuring compliance with Union law by overseeing the uniform interpretation and application of the Treaties and ensuring the lawfulness of measures adopted by the Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies;

    C. whereas the CJEU helps preserving the values of the Union and, through its case-law, works towards the building of Europe;

    D. whereas the CJEU comprises two courts: the Court of Justice and the General Court;

    E. whereas Parliament and Council amended Protocol No 3 on the Statute of the CJEU (the ‘Statute’)[7] in 2024 with respect to the transfer of preliminary rulings in specific areas to the jurisdiction of the General Court;

    1. Notes that the budget of the CJEU falls under MFF heading 7, ‘European public administration’, which amounted to EUR 12,3 billion in 2023 (representing 6,4 % of the total Union budget); notes that the CJEU’s budget of approximately EUR 0,5 billion represents approximately 3,9 % of the total administrative expenditure of the Union;

    2. Notes that the Court of Auditors (the ‘Court’), in its Annual Report for the financial year 2023 (the ‘Court’s report’) examined a sample of 70 transactions under the heading ‘Administration’, 10 more than were examined in 2022; the Court further states that administrative expenditure comprises expenditure on human resources, including expenditure on pensions, which in 2023 accounted for approximately 70 % of the total administrative expenditure, and expenditure on buildings, equipment, energy, communications and information technology (IT), and that its work over many years indicates that, overall, this spending is low risk;

    3. Notes that 21 (30 %) of the 70 transactions contained errors but that the Court, based on the five errors which were quantified, estimates the level of error to be below the materiality threshold;

    4. Notes that the Court’s report did not identify any specific issues concerning the CJEU;

    Budgetary and financial management

    5. Notes that the budget allocated for the CJEU in 2023 amounted to EUR 486 025 796, which represented an increase of 3,9 % compared to 2022; notes that this increase was mainly related to salary adjustments forecasted for 2023; stresses that the budget of the CJEU is essentially administrative, with around 75 % of the appropriations related to expenditure for its members and staff, and almost all of the rest related to expenditure for buildings and IT;

    6. Notes that the overall implementation rate of the budget at the end of 2023 was 97,72%; notes that five transfers were submitted to the budgetary authority in accordance with Article 29 of the Financial Regulation to reinforce the budget lines for ‘Energy consumption’, ‘Purchases, work, servicing and maintenance of equipment and software’ and ‘buildings’ from other budget lines, mainly the budget line for staff ‘Remuneration and allowances’; notes that Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine continued to create budgetary pressure for the CJEU, including through rising inflation and salary adjustments, strongly increasing energy costs and costs for a number of goods and services;

    7. Notes with satisfaction that the authorising officer by delegation declared that the resources allocated had been used for the purpose intended and in accordance with the principle of sound financial management and that the control procedures put in place provided the necessary guarantees as to the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions;

    8. Notes that the average payment time stood at 23,1 days in 2023 compared to 24,32 days in 2022; calls on the CJEU to continue its efforts to reduce the time for payment, particularly considering that 81 % of invoices were received electronically in 2023;

    9. Notes that the CJEU’s mission budget, which stood at EUR 638 000 for both staff and Members in 2023, continued to decrease by 3,3 % in 2023 compared to 2022; notes that 85,1 % of the appropriations for missions in 2023 were used compared to 46,6 % in 2022 due to the persistent travel restrictions in application at that time;

    Internal management, performance and internal control

    10. Notes the significant steps taken by the CJEU in 2023 towards its judicial reform which has led to the partial transfer of jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings from the Court of Justice to the General Court; notes that a political agreement with Parliament and Council was reached at the end of 2023 in view of the amendment to the Statute of the CJEU and with a view to improving the functioning of the CJEU against the background of a steady increase in the caseload and in the complexity and sensitive nature of questions raised; notes that, further to the adoption of the reform in 2024, detailed rules and procedures were adopted in order to complete the reform and allow the implementation of the new regulatory framework as of 1 October 2024;

    11. Notes that, in 2023, the Court of Justice ruled on five cases concerning the principle of primacy in the context of four preliminary rulings brought by the courts in Germany, Ireland, Poland, and Romania, as well as one infringement case concerning Poland; stresses the fundamental importance of the principle of primacy of Union law, which ensures the uniform interpretation and application of Union law across all Member States and safeguards the rule of law as a core value of the Union; strongly reaffirms that the primacy of Union law is the cornerstone of the Union’s legal order and highlights the pivotal role of the CJEU in upholding the rule of law across the Union. Furthermore, notes that the General Court ruled on six cases related to measures for the protection of the Union budget against breaches of the principles of the rule of law by the Hungarian government, which systematically undermines core Union values; urges the Commission to take decisive enforcement actions against any Member State that challenges or disregards the binding nature of CJEU rulings;

    12. Condemns any national measures or legislative actions that seek to undermine the codification and enforcement of CJEU judgments; calls for the establishment of a formal monitoring mechanism to track Member State compliance with CJEU rulings and recommends linking compliance with EU funding disbursement under the rule of law conditionality framework;

    13. Notes that 821 new cases were submitted to the Court of Justice in 2023, compared to 806 in 2022, out of which 63% were references for preliminary ruling and 28,6% were appeals against decisions of the General Court; notes that the General Court saw a major increase of cases with 1 271 new cases in 2023 compared to 904 in 2022, including an exceptional series of 404 joint cases submitted in October 2023; notes that in 2023 for the General Court, 37% of the new cases, including the series of 404 joint cases, concerned actions relating to institutional law, 24,3% concerned actions relating to intellectual property and 6 % concerned disputes between institutions of the Union and their staff; notes that the total number of pending cases remains stable when compared to previous years: considering the previously mentioned 404 cases as a single case, 2 587 cases were pending at the end of 2023, compared to 2 585 at the end of 2022 and 2 541 at the end of 2021;

    14. Notes that the Court of Justice closed 783 cases in 2023, compared to 808 in 2022, and that the General Court closed 904 cases in 2023, compared to 858 in 2022;

    15. Welcomes the decrease in the average length of proceedings for the cases closed by the Court of Justice, whereas in 2023 that average was 16,1 months, compared to 16,4 months in 2022; notes that the average duration for the cases closed by the General Court was 18,2 months, compared to 16,2 months in 2022, which the General Court explained was due to the nature and related complexity of the proceedings managed in 2023;

    16. Notes the decrease in the average time taken to deal with direct actions before the Court of Justice (from 23,5 months in 2022 to 20,8 months in 2023) and with references for preliminary rulings (from 17,3 months to 16,8 months); notes that, as regards the litigation before the Court of Justice, there was a significant increase in the number of direct actions, in particular in the field of the environment, and that the questions referred to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling in 2023 related principally to the area of freedom, security and justice, followed by taxation, consumer protection and transport; notes that, as regards the litigation before the General Court, there was an increase of cases in the fields of intellectual property and economic and monetary policy, including banking;

    17. Notes with satisfaction the high use rate of e-Curia in 2023, with 10 502 e-Curia accounts being registered: 94 % of lodgements before the General Court were made via e-Curia, which is the same as in 2022, while the use rate of e-Curia at the Court of Justice went up to approximately 89 %, compared to 87 % in 2022;

    18. Appreciates the progress made in digitising the judicial archives with a view to preserving documents for future consultation and facilitating access for researchers and the public by means of a digital portal;

    19. Welcomes the performance-based approach developed by the CJEU, allowing the CJEU to take decisions based on performance outcomes and the level of achievement of its objectives, measured through a set of workload and operational indicators; notes that the key performance indicators used by the CJEU cover a wide range of specific areas in support of the five management objectives relating to the proper functioning of the CJEU, digitalisation and emerging technologies, openness and transparency, multilingualism and human resources management;

    20. Notes that the internal control framework of the CJEU was subject to an in-depth evaluation in 2022-2023, which confirmed its soundness; notes that, as part of that evaluation, the financial control circuits were adapted in order to make the controls more efficient;

    21. Notes that the main internal audits carried out in 2023 concerned the CJEU’s expenditure on the cleaning of buildings, the effectiveness of the internal control system to safeguard the CJEU’s IT assets and the staff selection procedures; notes that an internal audit also carried out a study on the use of artificial intelligence in the area of justice in relation to the implementation of a “strategy for integrating tools based on artificial intelligence into the operation of the CJEU”; notes that, in many cases, the services of the CJEU took actions to implement the internal audit recommendations before the formal finalisation of the internal audits and that those actions were considered satisfactory by the internal auditor;

    Human resources, equality and staff well-being

    22. Notes that, at the end of 2023, the CJEU employed 1340 officials (58 %), 765 temporary agents (33 %) under Articles 2(a), 2(b) and 2(c) of the Conditions of Employment of Other Staff of the EU, and 198 contract agents (9 %); notes that, at the end of 2023, the occupation rate of the establishment plan stood at 97,11 %; notes further that the annual turnover of staff was 7,8 % in 2023, which was particularly due to the 20% of those staff who left the CJEU by taking retirement;

    23. Notes that the Court of Justice is composed of 27 Judges and 11 Advocates General and that no new Judge or Advocate General took office in 2023; notes further that the General Court is composed of 54 Judges and that two new Judges, one woman and one man, took office during 2023; notes further that a new Registrar for the General Court was elected in 2023;

    24. Welcomes the CJEU’s detailed responses to the questionnaire from Parliament’s Committee on Budgetary Control, provided as part of the current discharge procedure, particularly regarding staff distribution at the end of 2023; notes that the gender composition of the Court of Justice and the General Court continues to be very unbalanced; expresses its appreciation of the letter from the President of the General Court to the President of the Conference of the Representatives of the Member States in 2024, calling on Member States to take the need for gender balance into account when nominating candidates for the replacement of Judges and Advocates General; calls on Member States to take the need for gender balance into account when nominating candidates for the replacement of judges;

    25. Takes note that, of the 2 303 officials and agents serving at the end of 2023, 61 % are women; welcomes the fact that the proportion of women in administrative positions is 55 %, and especially the fact that, in managerial posts, the proportion has increased to 43 %, compared to 40 % in 2022 and 2021, confirming the upward trend recorded since 2018 (41 % in 2020, 39 % in 2019 and 37,5 % in 2018); notes however that representation of women was the highest in assistant grades, whereas it was the lowest in senior management positions; calls on the CJEU to ensure a greater representation of women in senior management positions and take further measures to promote gender balance at all levels; welcomes the efforts deployed by the CJEU in favour of equality, inclusion and diversity, especially at recruitment stage;

    26. Calls on the CJEU to publish an annual Gender and Diversity Report to provide transparency on gender representation at all levels of the institution, including Judges, Advocates General, and administrative staff, as well as to provide for concrete measures of improving gender parity in senior positions;

    27. Welcomes that all Union nationalities are represented in the staff of the CJEU, but notes that certain nationalities are more represented than others; welcomes the continued efforts of the CJEU to promote a better geographical balance among its staff, in particular by fostering the visibility and attractiveness of its job vacancies, creating and offering more favourable job conditions to attract temporary agents from certain less-represented Member States and communicating widely to varied audiences on the job opportunities at the CJEU in 2023; notes that a significant effort was made to attract many talented young people from different Member States though the CJEU’s internship programme; invites the CJEU to examine whether trainees are proportionally represented from all member states;

    28. Urges the CJEU to promote a multilingual working environment, recognizing its potential to enhance the fair distribution of nationalities among its staff; calls on all EU institutions to uphold and ensure the principle of multilingualism;

    29. Welcomes the work done by the High Level Interinstitutional Group on enhancing the attractiveness of Luxembourg as a place of work for staff; calls on the CJEU to maintain and enhance cooperation with other Luxembourg-based institutions across different initiatives; notes with appreciation that the budgetary authority approved for the financial year 2025 the necessary appropriations in order to allow the granting of a housing allowance to staff at lower grades, as recommended by the High Level Interinstitutional Group; asks that Parliament be updated on the progress of such initiatives intended to improve the attractiveness of Luxembourg as a place of work;

    30. Notes that, in 2023, the CJEU implemented several initiatives to promote physical and mental wellbeing of staff through specialised workshops and awareness-raising activities; notes that the teleworking scheme, which entered into force on 1 May 2022, was assessed positively by the managers, among whom 92 % replied that the productivity of staff teleworking was either equivalent or better than prior to the existence of the teleworking scheme; notes that, with a view to achieving a better work and personal-life balance, in 2023, the CJEU renewed the possibility for its staff to telework from outside the place of employment up to 10 days per year, especially during the judicial vacations;

    31. Welcomes the ongoing awareness-raising, information and training campaigns aiming at promoting inclusion, mutual respect, cooperation and support for people with disabilities and their helpers;

    32. Notes that the number of working days of sick leave was 20 198 in 2023, corresponding to a reduction of 14,78 % compared to 2022; notes with concern that the medical service reported 11 cases of burnout in 2023; welcomes a thorough analysis of diagnostic reports undertaken by the CJEU to identify instances of professional burnout and the CJEU’s focus on preventive measures, especially the reinforcement of its medical and social workers’ team, the prevention of psychosocial risks in the workplace and the introduction of awareness-raising activities for management on the right to disconnect and the risks of over-performance; encourages the CJEU to maintain focus on this problem in order to prevent any further cases associated with burnout and inform the Parliament of the measures taken in this regard;

    33. Notes that an administrative enquiry was launched in 2023 on an alleged case of sexual harassment concerning a member of staff and that this case was closed in 2024 with a sanction; expresses concern that a procedure of assistance for alleged harassment concerning a judge was also filed in 2023 but no harassment was established in that case; notes that an interdepartmental working group, established in March 2023, therefore ahead of the ratification of the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence, examined the rules and procedures in place in the CJEU to prevent harassment and made some recommendations with a view to improving these rules and procedures; encourages the CJEU to follow up and continue to show no tolerance for harassment in the workplace by introducing mandatory training on unconscious bias and ethical standards for all judges and senior officials to prevent abuse of power;

    Ethical framework

    34. Notes with satisfaction that, as requested in previous discharge recommendations, the new code of conduct on the rights and obligations of officials and other servants of the CJEU reflecting the CJEU’s values and commitment to ethics was drawn up in 2023 and adopted in March 2024; notes that the code of conduct includes provisions on conflict of interests, duty of loyalty, duty of confidentiality and discretion, outside activities, occupational activities after leaving the service and publications and also applies to seconded national experts and trainee judges hosted under the European Judicial Training Network; notes that, in 2023, awareness-raising activities and revamped training on the code of conduct were organised for staff and managers, with a particular focus on newcomers; calls for a mandatory training for all staff on a regular basis and asks that Parliament be kept informed about the implementation of the code of conduct;

    35. Notes that, before the code of conduct entered into force, two potential cases of conflict of interest were declared and handled in accordance with the procedures in place, with the aim of ensuring that the new members of staff concerned were not involved in the management of files that they knew from a previous job;

    36. Notes that, further to the adoption of the code of conduct for Members and former Members of the CJEU, the declaration of interests of the Members have been published online to avoid any potential conflict of interest in the handling of cases; notes that the CJEU is constantly reassessing its internal rules on this matter with a view to updating those rules and to ensuring the highest possible standards of ethical behaviour; calls on the CJEU to establish an independent ethics committee to oversee compliance with the code of conduct and investigate potential breaches; calls for mandatory annual ethics training for all CJEU personnel, including Judges and Advocates General to preserve the integrity of the Court; asks the CJEU to inform Parliament about the results of any further assessment of the effectiveness of that measure aimed at the prevention of conflicts of interest;

    37. Welcomes the publication of the declarations of interests of the Members of the CJEU but calls for the introduction of a standard pre-appointment screening process to identify and mitigate potential conflicts of interest at an early stage; urges the Council to establish transparent guidelines for Member States when nominating candidates for judicial positions at the CJEU;

    38. Urges the CJEU to introduce a mandatory recusal policy for judges in cases where they have past professional affiliations with litigants appearing before the Court; calls for stricter conflict-of-interest screening for judges and high-ranking staff, including regular updates to financial disclosure requirements; asks for the publication of real-time recusal decisions in cases where judges declare a conflict of interest, ensuring greater transparency in the judicial process and reinforcing public confidence in the impartiality and integrity of the CJEU;

    39. Notes that in 2023, all Members of the CJEU were resident of Luxembourg in accordance with Article 14 of the Statute;

    40. Notes that the list of external activities carried out by the Members of both the Court of Justice and the General Court has been published on the CJEU website since 2018; further notes that the list is difficult to read for the general public and recommends its revision to ensure greater clarity and informativeness; notes that the prior authorisation by the general meeting of the Court of Justice or by the plenary conference of the General Court is only granted when the external activity is compatible with the requirements of the code of conduct and with the Members’ obligations to be available for judicial activities; asks the CJEU to inform the discharge authority about any initiatives to improve the readability of the information related to external activities, in line with previous discharge recommendations;

    41. Notes that the rules governing Members’ travels, missions and use of drivers and cars, as updated in 2021, provide that only the running costs resulting from the car use for purposes related to the execution of a mission order or to the exercise of his or her mandate within a limit of 10 000 km are borne by the CJEU; reiterates its opinion that the use of the car fleet outside of the strict performance of the duties of the Members of the CJEU should not take place under any circumstances, notes that the CJEU reported to be in discussion with other institutions in order to obtain a harmonised set of rules for the use of official vehicles, while respecting the autonomy of each institution; invites all Union institutions to agree on a single system to be applied horizontally, which would reduce the confusion and increase transparency and efficiency in the use of public money; asks the CJEU to keep Parliament informed of any progress in this matter;

    42. Notes that an OLAF case, referred to in previous discharge resolutions, which dealt with the conduct of a  member of staff that might have constituted a serious failure to comply with their obligations, was closed in 2023; notes that the CJEU is not aware of any new OLAF investigation or recommendation in 2023;

    43. Notes that the CJEU did not report any cases of fraud, corruption or misuse of Union funds in 2023; notes that the CJEU’s anti-fraud strategy is an integral part of its integrated internal control and risk management framework, with a particular focus on the risks of improper disclosure of information;

    Transparency and access to justice for citizens

    44. Welcomes the CJEU’s engagement to enhance transparency, access to justice and public openness, thus contributing to foster public trust in the Union institutions;

    45. Notes that, in 2023, the CJEU consolidated the streaming service for hearings of the Court of Justice and of the General Court on the Curia website, thus facilitating the access of citizens to the judicial activities of the CJEU; welcomes the improvement of the CVRIA website, in terms of its structure, functionalities and content; welcomes that the delivery of judgments of the Court of Justice, the reading of opinions of the Advocates General, the hearings of the Grand Chamber and certain hearings of chambers sitting with five Judges have been broadcast live on the Curia website since 2023; calls on the CJEU to further improve transparency by broadcasting all hearings of the two Courts on its website and permanently storing them online;

    46. Welcomes that, further to the reform of its Statute, the CJEU will publish statements of case or written observations lodged in preliminary ruling proceedings after the closure of such proceedings, except in cases of objection to the publication of a person’s statement of case or observation; underlines that such publication will improve transparency and access to justice for citizens and calls on the CJEU to publish all documents related to a file on its website; calls on the CJEU to implement a procedure that could be used by any person to access in house all the documents related to a case;

    47. Notes that rules on the use of videoconferencing were adopted by the General Court in April 2023 and by the Court of Justice in September 2024, according to which a party may request the use of videoconferencing where security or other serious reasons prevent that party’s representative from participating in a hearing in person;

    48. Notes that the rules laid down by the CJEU decision of 26 November 2019 concerning public access to documents held by the CJEU in the exercise of its administrative function do not apply to judicial documents for which access is governed by the Rules of Procedure of the Courts; notes that the CJEU registered 21 requests of public access to administrative documents in 2023 and granted access to administrative documents in 12 cases; notes that the European Ombudsman found no instances of maladministration on the part of the CJEU in 2023;

    49. Invites the Court to simplify the process of finding specific rulings on e-curia; welcomes efforts to make the interface more client-friendly and intuitive;

    Digitalisation, cybersecurity and data protection

    50. Notes that compared to 2022 the budget expenditure increased by 10,9 % for IT projects, by 13 % for IT equipment, by 59 % for cybersecurity projects and by 72 % for cybersecurity services, licences and equipment in 2023;

    51. Notes that the implementation of major digitalisation projects under the digital transformation strategy remained a priority for the CJEU in 2023, such as the development of the integrated case management system (SIGA), the promotion of the use of the e-Curia application for the lodging and notification of procedural documents by electronic means, the adoption of eSignature and the adoption of HAN/Ares electronic document record and management system; notes that the CJEU tracks the return on investment in digitalisation projects in terms of costs and resources efficiency and asks the CJEU to keep the discharge authority informed of its findings in that area;

    52. Notes that, as part of its comprehensive initiative to increase accessibility and inclusion for persons with vulnerability, the CJEU has continued to implement the “accessibility by design” approach for any change and evolution of its IT systems; notes that, following an audit of the Curia website, the CJEU started to improve the site’s accessibility to a wide range of users, such as people with visual impairments, hearing impairments or learning disabilities;

    53. Notes that the CJEU implemented several projects based on artificial intelligence (AI), such as the automation of document analysis for references to applicable legislation and assistance with invoice verification through robotic processes and hearing transcription, in line with its new AI integration strategy adopted in June 2023; underlines that it is of vital importance that AI is used in a manner which fully preserves the independence, the quality and the serenity of the legal processes, is in full consideration of ethical matters and is used under human oversight and allowing human intervention in order to avoid negative consequences or risks, or stop the system if it does not perform as intended; notes that, as part of that strategy, the CJEU set up an AI management board composed of members of the Court of Justice and of the General Court to oversee the ethical aspects of AI use within the CJEU and to set clear boundaries for its application; welcomes the staff guidelines on the use of AI issued by the board; welcomes the initiatives in place to upskill employees in digital competencies through the training path developed in cooperation with the Interinstitutional Committee for Digital Transformation (ETA); emphasises that the digitalisation of justice and the adoption of emerging technologies such as AI will offer significant advantages for the efficient functioning of the Court; recommends however that the Court of justice anticipate the associated cybersecurity risks and strengthen even more its collaboration with the EU Agency for Cybersecurity and CERT-EU;

    54. Notes that no EDPS enquiries were communicated to the CJEU in 2023; notes that, in 2023, EDPS had not addressed any specific recommendation to the CJEU following its investigation regarding the use of cloud services by Amazon web services; notes that EDPS published a decision in 2023 confirming compliance of the CJEU’s use of cloud videoconferencing services with data protection law; reiterates however its concerns regarding the use of external cloud services, given the growing threats about cybersecurity and digital sovereignty;

    55. Welcomes the CJEU adoption of a cyber roadmap in 2023 and strengthening of its cybersecurity operational capabilities to better protect its systems against the increasing number of cyberattacks; underlines furthermore that a robust cybersecurity strategy is an essential tool to fight against foreign interferences aiming to undermine the integrity of the European Institutions; notes that the CJEU has taken various measures to reinforce its cybersecurity preparedness and ability to recover from security incidents, including through its participation in the governance of the Interinstitutional Cybersecurity Board and through a combination of cybersecurity controls and tools in line with the recommendations of CERT-EU; notes that the budgetary authority approved for the financial year 2025 the necessary appropriations for two additional posts in order to reinforce the CJEU’s staff capacities in the field of cybersecurity;

    56. Welcomes the measures taken, such as cybersecurity audits, staff training and rapid incident response protocols, to protect the CJEU’s technological infrastructure from cyber threats; stresses that the digitisation of justice and the use of new technologies such as artificial intelligence will bring many benefits in terms of the smooth functioning of the CJEU, but also entail risks that the Court needs to pre-empt and protect itself against; suggests in this regard that the Court of Justice develop a cybersecurity strategy and step up collaboration with other Union institutions, in particular ENISA (the EU Agency for Cybersecurity), on the prevention of cyber-attacks, the number and sophistication of which are growing exponentially in Europe;

    57. Welcomes the initiative to assign fictitious names to anonymised cases, by using a computerised automatic name generator, in order to strengthen the protection of personal data and facilitate the identification of individual cases;

    58. Notes with satisfaction the amendment to the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, which will clarify and simplify judicial procedures, including the possibility of using videoconferencing for hearings, electronic signature of decisions and the designation of pilot cases;

    Buildings

    59. Notes that, following-up on the cross services reflection about the most efficient use of the CJEU’s premises, that was concluded in 2023, pilot projects were launched; notes that the results of those projects, together with other factors, such as environmental and budgetary aspects, quality of justice, well-being at work, inclusion, accessibility and the attractiveness of the CJEU, will be taken into account in the final decision on the use of the CJEU’s buildings; asks that Parliament be kept informed about the implementation of those conclusions and the consequences for the organisation of the workspace;

    60. Notes that, in 2023, the CJEU further pursued its comprehensive initiative to increase accessibility and inclusion for persons with disabilities, with the aim of guaranteeing access to the CJEU, physically or virtually, to all individuals, participants in proceedings and visitors; notes further that, in 2023, the CJEU started to make an inventory of its infrastructure with a view to complying with the new national accessibility legislation as of 1 January 2032; asks that Parliament be kept informed about further initiatives in this area;

    Environment and sustainability

    61. Notes with satisfaction that, in 2023, the CJEU continued to significantly reduce its energy consumption and carbon footprint compared to 2015, which is the baseline for the implementation of the CJEU’s eco-management and audit scheme strategy, thanks to energy-saving measures and optimisation of its heating, cooling  and lighting infrastructures; notes that heating consumption was reduced by 33,5 %, electricity by 28,7 %, water by 20,1 %, office paper by 63 %, office and canteen waste by 43% and greenhouse gas emissions by 30,2 % in 2023 compared to 2015; welcomes that the CJEU applied green procurement criteria in 10 calls for tender above EUR 60 000; welcomes the CJEU’s commitment to the Eco-Management and Audit Scheme (EMAS); encourages the CJEU to continue its efforts in reducing its environmental impact, with a strategy to reach carbon neutrality by 2035;

    62. Welcomes that the CJEU has taken several initiatives to support and increase sustainable mobility for its staff and Members, including subsidies for public transportation, subsidies for self-service bicycles, improved bike parking facilities and improved facilities for hybrid and electrical cars;

    Interinstitutional cooperation

    63. Welcomes the budgetary savings achieved through cooperation with other institutions and in particular the shared applications and hosting services based on service-level agreements with the Commission as well as the participation in interinstitutional procurement procedures, which have allowed the CJEU to optimise costs and resources;

    64. Welcomes the efforts of the European Judicial Training Network (EJTN) in training national judges on EU law; notes with appreciation that, in line with the CJEU’s declaration entitled “Supporting the EJTN to shape a sustainable European judicial culture”, the CJEU and the EJTN sought to increase the diversity of long-term trainees in 2023, with the aim of ultimately increasing their number to one per Member State; notes that the measures taken have already been successful since the CJEU has trainees from some Member States which previously did not actively participate in the programme; notes that 15 remunerated traineeships were offered for the year 2023-24; calls on the CJEU to further develop its knowledge-sharing initiatives, including joint case-law databases and virtual collaboration platforms to support national courts in complex legal interpretations;

    65. Emphasises that traineeships should be remunerated in compliance with the European Parliament’s resolution of 14 June 2023 on Quality Traineeships in the Union (2020/2005(INL)), which calls for all internships in Europe to be paid; welcomes that currently all trainees at the CJEU receive a grant during their stay, mainly from the CJEU and, in some specific cases, from other sources; take notes that the CJEU only accepts a few trainees (less than 10 per year) paid by other sources, and for short periods (on average 2 months); welcomes that in such cases, the CJEU administration carefully checks that these trainees receive a grant, allowance or remuneration for this traineeship, paid directly by their employer or academic institution;

    66. Appreciates that the CJEU fully cooperates with OLAF, the Court of Auditors, the EDPS and the European Ombudsman; notes that, in 2023, the CJEU has continued to work towards maintaining the established dialogue with national courts, and in particular with the constitutional and supreme courts, and that the CJEU hosted a number of meetings, including the annual meeting of national judges; encourages deeper cooperation between the CJEU and national courts to strengthen uniform application of Union law; recommends establishing a permanent judicial exchange programme for judges from Member States to work alongside their CJEU counterparts, fostering best practices in the interpretation of Union law;

    Communication

    67. Notes that, in 2023, the CJEU strengthened its efforts to engage with Union citizens by enhancing its outreach on social media; notes that, at the end of 2023, the number of subscribers to the CJEU’s LinkedIn account increased by 32 % and the number of followers on the CJEU’s two accounts on X (formerly Twitter) by 9 %,while the views on its YouTube channel increased by 84,96 % compared to the previous year;

    68. Welcomes the CJEU’s efforts to enhance strategic communication and transparency towards Union citizens on the judicial activities of the CJEU, especially through the organisation of an open day, the offer for visitors, in particular the special virtual visits, in which 800 students participated in 2023, and the review of the drafting of its press releases and online publications in an accessible style, about matters of media interest or which have an impact on the lives of citizens.

    OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AFFAIRS (30.1.2025)

    for the Committee on Budgetary Control

    on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2023, Section IV – Court of Justice of the European Union

    (2024/2022(DEC))

    Rapporteur for opinion: Ilhan Kyuchyuk

     

    OPINION

    The Committee on Legal Affairs calls on the Committee on Budgetary Control, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following suggestions into its motion for a resolution:

    1. Appreciates the CJEU’s very high budgetary implementation rate for 2023 (99,2 %), a further increase as compared to previous years (98,4 % in 2022 and 98,7 % in 2021);

    2. Stresses that the budget of the CJEU is essentially administrative, with around 75 % of the appropriations related to expenditure for its members and staff, and almost all of the rest related to expenditure for buildings and IT;

    3. Welcomes the recent amendment to Protocol n° 3 on the Statute of the CJEU, enacted by Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2019 of the European Parliament and of the Council[8], that transfers part of the Court of Justice’s jurisdiction for preliminary rulings to the General Court and extends the mechanism for the Court of Justice to decide whether appeals shall be allowed to proceed or not, for considerations relating to legal certainty and expedition, in order to preserve the ability of the Court of Justice to deliver high quality judgements in a timely manner, hence serving to guarantee the right to effective remedy by the national authorities; as well as strengthening access to justice by facilitating intervention in judicial proceedings by the European Parliament, the Council and the European Central Bank where a particular interest is invoked; Welcomes that with the amendment to Protocol n° 3 on the Statute of the CJEU, transparency and openness of judicial proceedings will be strengthened through the publication of written submissions submitted by an interested person on the website of the CJEU, after the closing of the case, unless that person raises objections to the publication of that person’s own written submissions; stresses in this regard the need for a reflection on the implementation of the Statute through the constructive dialogue between the European Parliament and the CJEU;

    4. Notes that the number of cases brought before the Court of Justice in 2023 was just one short of the exact average for the last three years –  in 2023, 821 new cases were registered, 15 more than in 2022 (806 cases) and 17 fewer than in 2021 (838 cases); takes note that the breakdown of litigation by type of case is also broadly similar to that in previous years – with the number of requests for preliminary rulings and appeals still accounting for over 90 % of all the cases brought before the Court; also notes the increase in the number of direct actions brought before the Court in 2023;

    5. Welcomes the fact that the average length of proceedings for cases completed before the Court of Justice decreased to 16,1 months in 2023, compared to 16,4 months in 2022, and notes that the average length of proceedings before the General Court was 18,2 months, compared to 16,2 months in 2022, which increase was mainly due to the closure of several complex cases or groups of cases, in particular in the fields of state aid and competition;

    6. Notes the decrease in the average time taken to deal with direct actions before the Court of Justice (from 23.5 months in 2022 to 20.8 months in 2023) and with references for preliminary rulings (from 17.3 months to 16.8 months);

    7. Notes that the number of cases brought before the two courts in 2023 exceeded, for the first time, the emblematic threshold of 2 000 (2 092 cases), including a series of 404 essentially identical cases brought before the General Court, and that, even if those cases are counted as a single case, the number of cases remains at a very high level (1 689), close to that of the preceding years (1 710 cases in 2022 and 1 720 in 2021);

    8. Underlines that, together, the Court of Justice and the General Court were able to complete 1 687 cases in 2023, compared to 1 666 cases in 2022, with an average duration of proceedings of 17.2 months, and notes that the total number of pending cases remains stable when compared to previous years: considering the previously mentioned 404 cases as a single case, 2 587 cases were pending at the end of 2023, compared to 2 585 at the end of 2022 and 2 541 at the end of 2021;

    9. Notes with satisfaction the high use rate of e-Curia in 2023, with 10 502 e-Curia accounts being registered: 94 % of lodgements before the General Court were made via e-Curia, which is the same as in 2022, while the use rate of e-Curia at the Court of Justice went up to approximately 89 %, compared to 87 % in 2022;

    10. Notes that, as regards the litigation before the Court of Justice, there was a significant increase in the number of direct actions, in particular in the field of the environment, and that the questions referred to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling in 2023 related principally to the area of freedom, security and justice, followed by taxation, consumer protection and transport;

    11. Notes that, as regards the litigation before the General Court, there was an increase of cases in the fields of intellectual property and economic and monetary policy, including banking; 

    12. Points out that dialogue and cooperation with national courts is central to the Court’s mission; acknowledges and welcomes the pursuit of the activities carried out by the Judicial Network of the European Union, which contributes to fostering and facilitating the cooperation between the CJEU and the national courts, and especially with the constitutional and supreme courts, and welcomes the strengthening of the cooperation between the CJEU and the European Judicial Training Network, which allows for the presence of national judges for traineeships, study visits and annual seminars at the CJEU; welcomes the adoption by the Court, in 2023, of the declaration entitled ‘Supporting the European Judicial Training Network to shape a sustainable European judicial culture’, which shows the Court’s commitment to that network;

    13. Appreciates the progress made in digitising the judicial archives with a view to preserving documents for future consultation and facilitating access for researchers and the public by means of a digital portal;

    14. Welcomes the adoption by the CJEU of an Artificial Intelligence Strategy of the Court of Justice of the European Union’, which seeks to improve the efficiency and efficacy of administrative and judicial processes, enhance the quality and consistency of court decisions and improve access to justice and transparency for EU citizens, followed by the setting up of an AI Management Board and the adoption of certain guidelines for the use of AI-based tools;

    15. Welcomes the measures taken, such as cybersecurity audits, staff training and rapid incident response protocols, to protect the CJEU’s technological infrastructure from cyber threats; stresses that the digitisation of justice and the use of new technologies such as artificial intelligence will bring many benefits in terms of the smooth functioning of the CJEU, but also entail risks that the Court needs to pre-empt and protect itself against; suggests in this connection that the Court of Justice develop a cybersecurity strategy and step up collaboration with other EU institutions, in particular ENISA (the EU Agency for Cybersecurity), on preventing of cyber-attacks, whose number and sophistication are growing exponentially in Europe;

    16. Welcomes the initiative to assign fictitious names to anonymised cases, through the use of a computerised automatic name generator, in order to strengthen the protection of personal data and facilitate the identification of individual cases;

    17. Notes with satisfaction the amendment to the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, which will clarify and simplify judicial procedures, including the possibility of using videoconferencing for hearings, electronic signature of decisions and the designation of pilot cases;

    18. Notes with satisfaction the adoption of a code of conduct for the staff or the CJEU, which code of conduct entered into force in March 2024;

    19. Appreciates the CJEU’s inter-departmental project that is focused on physical and digital accessibility and inclusion of persons with disabilities; accessibility is essential to enabling persons with disabilities to exercise their basic human rights;

    20. Takes notes that, of the 2 303 officials and agents serving at the end of 2023, 61 % are women; welcomes the fact that the proportion of women in administrative positions is 55 %, and especially the fact that, in managerial posts, the proportion has increased to 43 %, compared to 40 % in 2022 and 2021, confirming the upward trend recorded since 2018 (41 % in 2020, 39 % in 2019 and 37,5 % in 2018).

    21. Notes, however, the still existing imbalanced situation in terms of women’s representation among the judges of both the Court of Justice and the General Court; exhorts, once again, the Members of the Council to address this situation by actively promoting gender parity in the appointment of judges, in line with the principles enshrined in Article 8 TFEU and Article 23 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, and with the commitments taken under Regulations (EU, Euratom) 2015/2422[9] and (EU, Euratom) 2019/629[10] of the European Parliament and of the Council.

     

    ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS
    FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR FOR THE OPINION HAS RECEIVED INPUT

     

    Pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure, the Chair in his capacity as rapporteur for opinion declares that he received input from the following entities or persons in the preparation of the opinion:

     

     

    Entity and/or person

    Court of Justice

     

     

     

     

    The list above is drawn up under the exclusive responsibility of the Chair in his capacity as rapporteur for opinion.

     

    Where natural persons are identified in the list by their name, by their function or by both, the Chair in his capacity as rapporteur for opinion declares that he has submitted to the natural persons concerned the European Parliament’s Data Protection Notice No 484 (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/data-protect/index.do), which sets out the conditions applicable to the processing of their personal data and the rights linked to that processing.

     

    INFORMATION ON ADOPTION BY COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION

    Date adopted

    30.1.2025

     

     

     

    Result of final vote

    +:

    –:

    0:

    16

    4

    1

    Members present for the final vote

    Maravillas Abadía Jover, José Cepeda, Ton Diepeveen, Mario Furore, Juan Carlos Girauta Vidal, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, Sergey Lagodinsky, Mario Mantovani, Victor Negrescu, Kira Marie Peter-Hansen, Pascale Piera, René Repasi, Krzysztof Śmiszek, Dominik Tarczyński, Adrián Vázquez Lázara, Axel Voss, Marion Walsmann, Michał Wawrykiewicz, Dainius Žalimas

    Substitutes present for the final vote

    Angelika Niebler, Jana Toom

    Members under Rule 216(7) present for the final vote

    Lara Wolters

     

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on Banking Union – annual report 2024 – A10-0044/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on Banking Union – annual report 2024

    (2024/2055(INI))

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to its resolution of 16 January 2024 on Banking Union – annual report 2023[1],

    – having regard to the Commission’s follow-up to Parliament’s resolution of 16 January 2024 on Banking Union – annual report 2023,

    – having regard to document published by the European Central Bank (ECB) on 25 March 2024, entitled ‘Feedback on the input provided by the European Parliament as part of its resolution on Banking Union 2023’,

    – having regard to the ECB’s 2023 Annual Report on supervisory activities, published in March 2024,

    – having regard to the 2023 Annual Report of the Single Resolution Board (SRB), published on 28 June 2024,

    – having regard to the adoption of the Anti-Money Laundering Directive (AMLD)[2] and the Anti-Money Laundering Regulation (AMLR)[3], and to the establishment of the Anti-Money Laundering Authority (AMLA)[4],

    – having regard to the implementation of the Basel III standards, namely to the adoption of amendments to the Capital Requirements Directive[5] and to the Capital Requirements Regulation[6],

    – having regard to the adoption of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/2795 of 24 July 2024 amending Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to the date of application of the own funds requirements for market risk[7],

    – having regard to its position at first reading of 24 April 2024 on the proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 as regards early intervention measures, conditions for resolution and funding of resolution action[8],

    – having regard to its position at first reading of 24 April 2024 on the proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2014/59/EU as regards early intervention measures, conditions for resolution and financing of resolution action[9],

    – having regard to its position at first reading of 24 April 2024 on the proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2014/49/EU as regards the scope of deposit protection, use of deposit guarantee schemes funds, cross-border cooperation, and transparency[10],

    – having regard to the report of its Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of 23 April 2024 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 806/2014 in order to establish a European Deposit Insurance Scheme,

    – having regard to the Commission proposal of 14 March 2018 for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on credit servicers, credit purchasers and the recovery of collateral (COM(2018)0135),

    – having regard to the Five Presidents’ Report of 22 June 2015 entitled ‘Completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union’,

    – having regard to Enrico Letta’s report of 10 April 2024 entitled ‘Much more than a market – Speed, security, solidarity: empowering the Single Market to deliver a sustainable future and prosperity for all EU Citizens’,

    – having regard to Mario Draghi’s report of 9 September 2024 entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness’,

    – having regard to the Eurogroup statement of 11 March 2024 on the future of Capital Markets Union, and to the Eurogroup statement of 16 June 2022 on the future of the Banking Union and the Eurogroup follow-up thereto of 28 April 2023,

    – having regard to the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s disclosure framework for banks’ cryptoasset exposures and to the targeted amendments to its prudential standard on banks’ exposures to cryptoassets, both published on 17 July 2024,

    – having regard to the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s core principles for effective banking supervision, published on 25 April 2024,

    – having regard to the ECB’s Financial Stability Review of May 2024,

    – having regard to the ECB Occasional Paper No 328 of 2023 entitled ‘The Road to Paris: stress testing the transition towards a net-zero economy’,

    – having regard to the Financial Stability Board publication of 9 November 2015 entitled ‘Principles on Loss-absorbing and Recapitalisation Capacity of G-SIBs in Resolution’,

    – having regard to the Financial Stability Board report of 10 October 2023 entitled ‘2023 Bank Failures – Preliminary lessons learnt for resolution’,

    – having regard to Peterson Institute for International Economics Working Paper No 24-15 of 25 June 2024 entitled ‘Europe’s banking union at ten: unfinished yet transformative’[11],

    – having regard to the Single Supervisory Mechanism supervisory priorities for 2024-2026, published in December 2023,

    – having regard to the SRB’s biannual reporting note to the Eurogroup of 13 May 2024,

    – having regard to the outcome of the 2023 EU-wide transparency exercise of the European Banking Authority, published on 28 July 2023,

    – having regard to Special Report 12/2023 of the European Court of Auditors of 12 May 2023 entitled ‘EU supervision of banks’ credit risk – The ECB stepped up its efforts but more is needed to increase assurance that credit risk is properly managed and covered’,

    – having regard to the statements by Claudia Buch, Chair of the Supervisory Board of the ECB, at the hearings conducted by Parliament’s Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs on 21 March 2024 and 2 September 2024,

    – having regard to the statements by Dominique Laboureix, Chair of the SRB, at the hearings conducted by Parliament’s Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs on 21 March 2024 and 23 September 2024,

    – having regard to the European Banking Authority’s risk assessment reports of July 2024 and December 2024,

    – having regard to its resolution of 14 March 2019 on gender balance in EU economic and monetary affairs nominations[12],

    – having regard to its resolution of 25 March 2021 on strengthening the international role of the euro[13],

    – having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

    – having regard to the report of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (A10-0044/2025),

    A. whereas the Banking Union (BU) encompasses the Single Supervisory Mechanism, the Single Resolution Mechanism and a European deposit insurance that is still missing;

    B.  whereas the main objective of the BU is to safeguard the stability of the banking sector in Europe and prevent the need to bail out banks at risk of failure with taxpayers’ money;

    C. whereas a completed BU would be a positive development for citizens and the EU economy, as it would improve the competitiveness and stability of the banking sector, reduce systemic risk, improve supply and consumer choice and offer increased opportunities for cross-border banking that enhances access to financing for households and businesses, thereby reducing costs for banks’ customers, while ensuring that public funds are not used to bail out the banking sector; whereas the ‘too big to fail’ risk has not yet been fully addressed;

    D.  whereas concluding the reform of the EU frameworks for bank crisis management and deposit insurance, focusing particularly on small and medium-sized banks, is fundamental in order to provide Europe’s banking sector with security, stability and resilience; whereas a complete BU with a true European deposit insurance scheme is a basic condition for ensuring that citizens trust European banks;

    E. whereas fragmentation and the lack of cross-border consolidation of the EU banking sector is affecting its global competitiveness; whereas the profitability gap between EU and US banks has widened;

    F. whereas a strong and diversified banking sector is key to delivering economic growth, increasing the possibility of home ownership, fostering investment and job creation, financing small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and start-ups and ensuring the transition to a green and digital economy;

    G. whereas around 80 % of external financing for EU companies comes from banks, while only 20 % comes from the capital markets; whereas only 30 % of credit for US firms comes from banks, while 70 % is funded via capital markets, including corporate bond holdings and shares;

    H. whereas the EUR 356.1 billion in non-performing loans recorded at the 110 supervised institutions in 2024, compared with EUR 988.9 billion in non-performing loans recorded at the 102 supervised institutions in the second quarter of 2015, reflects a significant downward trajectory, leaving the total non-performing loan stock at 36 % of its 2015 level; whereas further efforts are required;

    I. whereas in April 2024, it adopted its position on the review of the crisis management and deposit insurance framework;

    J. whereas in April 2024, its Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs adopted a report on the Commission’s proposal to establish a European deposit insurance scheme;

    K. whereas financial institutions rely increasingly on the use of information and communications technology (ICT); whereas the digitalisation of finance provides key opportunities for the banking sector and has brought about significant technological advances in the EU banking sector through increased efficiency in the provision of banking services and a greater appetite for innovation; whereas it also poses challenges, including with regard to data protection, reputational risks, anti-money laundering and consumer protection concerns; whereas the EU banking sector must increase its cyber resilience to ensure that ICT systems can withstand various types of cyber security threats; whereas the ECB is currently studying the establishment of a digital euro;

    L. whereas EU banks have withstood the impact of Russian aggression; whereas they play a pivotal role in ensuring the ongoing implementation of and compliance with the sanctions imposed by the EU against Russia in response to the invasion; whereas further coordination is needed to avoid circumvention of sanctions;

    M.  whereas climate change, environmental degradation and the transition to a low-carbon economy are factors to be taken into account when assessing the risks on banks’ balance sheets, as a source of risk potentially impacting investments across regions and sectors;

    General considerations

    1. Acknowledges the progress made over the last 10 years through the establishment of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM); notes that the BU will not be completed without the establishment of its third pillar, the European deposit insurance scheme;

    2. Asks the Commission to ensure that the completion of the BU and the Capital Markets Union remains a key priority; highlights that these projects offer households and SMEs access to broader funding, reduce the high reliance on bank credit to foster investments and job creation, increase financial stability, reduce the impact of economic downturns, support competitiveness, give additional investment opportunities, fund the transition to a green and digital economy and unlock the EU’s growth potential; notes that the Commission is requested to take into consideration the specificities of the different banking models, while preserving a level playing field;

    3. Notes the need to be prepared for episodes of banking stress that could potentially lead to bank runs such as those witnessed in some jurisdictions outside the EU in March 2023, and the need to ensure the stability of deposits;

    4. Points out that cyber resilience is a key element for the competitiveness of the EU banking sector, in particular taking into account the geopolitical situation and the need to preserve financial stability;

    5. Notes that a more integrated BU would help to make the EU banking sector more resilient, improve access to credit and reduce costs; notes that better cross-border integration of banking business would increase the potential for private risk sharing and ensure diversification in the EU banking market; points out that a more integrated BU is not necessarily the same as a more consolidated banking market and that there are benefits for competition in a diversified banking market; stresses that a fully developed BU would allow EU banks to grow and put them in a better position to compete in the international arena;

    6. Regrets that EU banks’ ability to finance major investments is constrained by lower profitability that is not sufficient to ensure their competitiveness; notes that the profitability gap as compared with other jurisdictions is due to both structural and regulatory factors and calls for a review to streamline the regulatory framework; notes that the specific character of the EU banking system, with its large number of smaller banks, calls for proportionate solutions that take this into account and are tailored to its characteristics, without undermining financial stability; remains mindful of the ‘too big to fail’ risk;

    7. Calls on the Commission to assess the need to develop targeted frameworks within the BU to enhance access to finance for SMEs and start-ups, recognising their role as the backbone of the EU economy;

    8. Regrets that EU banks’ cross-border activity is still rather limited, particularly with regard to granting loans; takes the view, therefore, that it is important to complete the BU in order to uphold the free movement of capital in a fully integrated internal market;

    9. Calls on the EU banks still operating in Russia to exit the Russian market as soon as possible; calls on supervisory institutions to ensure that those banks push ahead with exiting the Russian market swiftly;

    10. Invites the Commission to further explore whether the creation of a separate jurisdiction for EU banks with substantial cross-border operations[14] could help to complete the BU or whether this would increase banking sector fragmentation;

    11. Notes that a review of the securitisation framework to strengthen European markets and the introduction of European Secured Notes as a dual-recourse funding instrument for SMEs for long-term financing could be explored, taking due account of financial stability risks;

    12. Underlines that financial literacy is essential in modern economies, contributing to the resilience of the banking systems across Member States and encouraging cross-border financial activity;

    13. Underlines that a high level of consumer protection will make the BU more resilient;

    14. Takes the view that the Commission should focus on aspects that contribute to achieving the goals of digitalisation, modernisation, simplification, streamlining and increased competitiveness; maintains that legal certainty, security, predictability and stability are essential for EU banks to be able to operate under favourable conditions;

    15. Notes that, in addition to traditional loans, diverse sources of financing can be beneficial for EU growth and EU competitiveness, and recognises the low-risk nature of asset-backed financing solutions;

    16. Notes the ECB’s progress on the digital euro and the parliamentary dialogue being held with the ECB on the topic; understands existing reservations, such as with regard to its offline functionality, given that offline transactions reduce visibility and impair financial crime prevention; recalls that the digital euro should complement, not replace, cash; considers that the decision on whether or not to introduce a digital euro is ultimately a political decision that has to be taken by the EU’s co-legislators, given the profound potential impact of this decision on a wide range of EU domains, including privacy, consumer protection, financial stability, financial policy and other areas that go beyond the strict remit of monetary policy;

    17. Regrets the failure of some financial institutions to ensure gender balance, especially in their management bodies; stresses that gender balance on boards and in the workforce brings both societal and economic returns; calls on financial institutions to regularly update their diversity and inclusion policies and help to foster healthy working cultures that prioritise inclusivity; calls on private and public entities to address the lack of diversity and gender balance in the management bodies of financial institutions;

    Supervision

    18. Welcomes the adoption by the co-legislators of the new banking package implementing Basel III standards in the EU; notes the current lack of clarity concerning the implementation of the Basel III standards in some other jurisdictions and the potential risk for an international level playing field; stresses that the Commission should evaluate whether targeted changes could help to maintain the international competitiveness of EU banks without weakening their resilience; recalls that the delegated act on the date of application of the own funds requirements for market risk postponed the date of application of the new market risk framework by one year to 1 January 2026; calls on the Commission to assess whether the equivalence decisions taken with the jurisdictions not implementing the Basel III standards need to be reviewed in order to preserve the financial stability of the EU financial sector;

    19. Recalls that the Banking Package contains a high number of mandates to the European Banking Authority; calls on the European Banking Authority to respect these mandates;

    20. Notes that even within the existing regulatory framework the banking sector has shown its resilience during the market events of recent years, and that the average Common Equity Tier 1 ratio has remained at high levels, at 15.81 %;

    21. Notes that the non-performing loans ratio has remained stable at 2.30 % and the liquidity coverage ratio at 159.39 %;

    22. Notes the varying levels of exposure to non-performing loans and recalls that there are Member States which have exposure levels in the order of 1 % or even lower, while other Member States have exposure levels exceeding 4 %; considers that efforts to reduce European banks’ exposure to this type of loan should continue as good risk management practice;

    23. Highlights the fact that adverse macroeconomic conditions, geopolitical headwinds and the rapid development of deferred payment services may lead to a deterioration in asset quality and affect the level of non-performing loans in the future; highlights, therefore, the importance of prudent risk management and appropriate provisioning;

    24. Notes that the current levels of banking sector profitability may provide an opportunity for an increase in macroprudential buffers and help to preserve banking sector resilience; invites the Commission to further explore this option and carefully evaluate how to revise the macroprudential framework, taking into consideration the potential impact on capital requirements and bearing in mind a level playing field with other jurisdictions;

    25. Notes that the banking sector plays a role in supporting the transition to a digitalised and carbon neutral economy, in channelling funds to renewable energy sources and in supporting the achievement of the objectives of the EU Green Deal and the EU Climate Law;

    26. Notes that the ECB takes account of climate- and nature-related financial risks in its supervisory practices and monitors growing physical and transition risks closely;

    27. Welcomes the idea of increasing venture capital and unlocking capital to finance fast-growing companies in the EU; notes Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s commitment to put forward risk-absorbing measures to make it easier for commercial banks, investors and venture capital to finance fast-growing companies[15]; notes that this must be done in a way that does not pose a systemic risk or moral hazard;

    28. Welcomes the creation of the new Authority for Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism, which will allow more effective ways to combat money laundering and terrorist financing via direct supervision of certain financial entities and better cooperation, a better flow of information between national authorities and better coordination among sanctions enforcement authorities in Members States to help close gaps in the implementation of targeted sanctions;

    29. Stresses the need to enhance the resilience of non-bank financial intermediaries, including by designing specific regulatory and supervisory tools; points out that such measures must guarantee the security of the financial system and be in the best interests of the customer; welcomes the Commission consultation on macroprudential policies for non-bank financial intermediaries; supports the Eurosystem’s recommendation to introduce system-wide stress tests to identify and quantify risks to the resilience of core markets; invites the Commission to investigate whether there are any gaps in the supervisory toolkit, including in relation to potential liquidity crunches and implications for systemic risk;

    30. Notes that crypto-assets create new challenges and opportunities for the financial system but also pose risks to it, and that these require attention from the national supervisors, the SSM and the European Systemic Risk Board;

    Resolution

    31. Recalls that the position adopted by Parliament in April 2024 on the crisis management and deposit insurance framework ensures a more consistent approach across all Member States to the application of resolution tools and deposit protection to enhance financial stability, taxpayer protection and depositor confidence; notes that small banks have some specificities that may warrant a proportionate approach; stresses that European and national competent authorities should have at their disposal appropriate and sufficient tools to respond effectively to bank failures and safeguard financial stability, and that banks need to operate in an effective regulatory environment that fosters their development;

    32. Highlights the importance of preserving shareholders’ and creditors’ primary responsibility for bearing losses in the event of a bank’s failure; stresses that resorting to using taxpayers’ money must be avoided, which is still a key lesson learned from the global financial crisis; stresses that the bail-in of shareholders and creditors must remain the main source for resolution financing before any recourse is made to industry-funded sources;

    33. Recalls that a sufficient minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL) is crucial for a credible resolution framework and for ensuring that resolution authorities have sufficient flexibility to effectively apply the resolution strategies needed in a specific crisis situation; underlines that this minimum requirement should be sufficient to effectively implement any of the resolution strategies included in a bank’s resolution plan; recalls that the resolution framework should avoid undue increases in MREL calibration and disproportionate contributions to the Single Resolution Fund;

    34. Stresses that if a bank’s eligible liabilities are issued to non-EU investors, the write-down or conversion of these liabilities should be enforceable with full certainty to safeguard the effective application of resolution tools;

    35. Notes that any reliance on taxpayer money for the resolution of banks, including for liquidity support, should be avoided, in keeping with the principles of fiscal and social responsibility and market discipline;

    36. Recalls that banks need to continue to meet their obligations and perform their key functions after the implementation of a resolution decision;

    37. Recalls the importance of clarifying the role of the ECB as liquidity provider in resolution, paying due attention to appropriate guarantees and the ECB’s mandate;

    38. Underlines the SRB’s announcement that it will enhance its capabilities for launching enforcement action to remove substantive impediments to resolvability; calls for the publication, at the end of each resolution planning cycle, of an anonymised list of identified impediments to resolvability and the actions adopted to address them;

    39. Welcomes the ‘SRM Vision 2028’ strategic review initiated by the SRB to set its long-term goals, address new challenges and further strengthen collaboration with the national resolution authorities and other stakeholders; notes, in particular, the SRB’s intention to identify areas where sustainability can be embedded further in its daily operations and core business; highlights the need to ensure efficiency and cost-effectiveness in the implementation of the new strategy;

    40. Welcomes the SRB plan to streamline the annual resolution planning cycle to ensure that it is increasingly efficient and has a greater focus on testing banks’ resolvability and the operationalisation of resolution strategies;

    41. Welcomes the fact that the Single Resolution Fund has now been built up; calls for the full ratification of the Amending Agreement to the ESM Treaty by all Member States, including the establishment of a common backstop to the Single Resolution Fund;

    42. Highlights the need for additional efforts to ensure full resolvability for all banks falling under the scope of resolution; recalls that achieving resolvability cannot be considered a ‘moving target’ and therefore calls for more standardisation and harmonisation of the resolvability assessment; recalls, nonetheless, the important role played by national resolution authorities in the assessment of resolvability;

    Deposit insurance

    43. Underlines the fact that the Commission’s proposal to establish a European deposit insurance scheme was published back in 2015 and that the landscape has changed significantly since then;

    44. Recalls that the position of its Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs on a European deposit insurance scheme was adopted in April 2024; notes that that position deviates from the Commission’s 2015 proposal and adopts a new approach; is waiting for, and encourages the Council to move forward with, the negotiations on a European deposit insurance scheme;

    45. Notes that national deposit guarantee schemes were introduced successfully and have proved their functionality in a number of cases; underlines the need to take specific national characteristics into account and to preserve the well-functioning systems for smaller banks that are already in place in some Member States, such as institutional protection schemes, in a way that ensures a level playing field across the BU;

    °

    ° °

    46. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the European Central Bank, the Single Resolution Board and the European Banking Authority.

    EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

    While the Banking Union – annual reports 2022 and 2023 focused on the war in Ukraine and the ongoing Russian aggression against Ukraine, this report focuses more on the challenges for the EU and for the European Parliament, as mirrored in the new mandate of the Commission, namely the EU priorities to foster competitiveness, to strengthen the European single market and to boost economic growth.

    The Union is currently at a turning point, which will determine the economic future in the upcoming decades. The 2024 reports of Enrico Letta and Mario Draghi underline that the EU needs a major turnaround to be able to compete with the US or China. Against this background, the Banking Union is a major cornerstone of competitiveness. A strengthened Banking Union will enable the EU to generate the necessary capital to make the European economy fit for the future.

    EU banks play a key role in financing the required investments since bank loans are still the most important source of external financing for companies. However, EU banks suffer from a lower profitability compared to their US counterparts caused by too many regulatory hurdles and by an incomplete Banking Union. A robust and competitive banking sector is necessary to finalise the BU. In the last year, while co-legislators made much progress on crucial legislation for the Banking Union, the EU still has to monitor closely if the EU economy, EU citizens and EU banks benefit from those adopted proposals. This report provides realistic and achievable recommendations, which could help to strengthen further the Banking Union.

    However, not only EU businesses need better access to capital. EU citizens are currently struggling to afford housing or to finance investments in sustainable renovations. It is therefore crucial to boost the profitability of EU banks, since this would in turn allow them to provide private households with better and easier access to affordable loans.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the EU joint undertakings for the financial year 2023 – A10-0056/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    1. PROPOSAL FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT DECISION

    on discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the Clean Aviation Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023

    (2024/2031(DEC))

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to the final annual accounts of the Clean Aviation Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023,

    – having regard to the Court of Auditors’ annual report on the EU Joint Undertakings for the financial year 2023, together with the Joint Undertakings’ replies[1],

    – having regard to the statement of assurance[2] as to the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions provided by the Court of Auditors for the financial year 2023, pursuant to Article 287 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    – having regard to the Council’s recommendation of 17 February 2025 on discharge to be given to the Joint Undertaking in respect of the implementation of the budget for the financial year 2023 (05757/2025 – C10‑0025/2025),

    – having regard to Article 319 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    – having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, amending Regulations (EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU) No 1316/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) No 283/2014, and Decision No 541/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012[3], and in particular Article 71 thereof,

    – having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union[4], and in particular Article 71 thereof,

    – having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2021/2085 of 19 November 2021 establishing the Joint Undertakings under Horizon Europe and repealing Regulations (EC) No 219/2007, (EU) No 557/2014, (EU) No 558/2014, (EU) No 559/2014, (EU) No 560/2014, (EU) No 561/2014 and (EU) No 642/2014[5], and in particular Article 26 thereof,

    – having regard to Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/887 of 13 March 2019 on the model financial regulation for public-private partnership bodies referred to in Article 71 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council[6],

    – having regard to Rule 102 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

    – having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Transport and Tourism,

    – having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0056/2025),

    1. Grants the Executive Director of the Clean Aviation Joint Undertaking discharge in respect of the implementation of the Joint Undertaking’s budget for the financial year 2023;

    2. Sets out its observations in the resolution below;

    3. Instructs its President to forward this decision and the resolution forming an integral part of it to the Executive Director of the Clean Aviation Joint Undertaking, the Council, the Commission and the Court of Auditors, and to arrange for their publication in the Official Journal of the European Union (L series).

     

    2. PROPOSAL FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT DECISION

    on the closure of the accounts of the Clean Aviation Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023

    (2024/2031(DEC))

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to the final annual accounts of the Clean Aviation Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023,

    – having regard to the Court of Auditors’ annual report on the EU Joint Undertakings for the financial year 2023, together with the Joint Undertakings’ replies[7],

    – having regard to the statement of assurance[8] as to the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions provided by the Court of Auditors for the financial year 2023, pursuant to Article 287 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    – having regard to the Council’s recommendation of 17 February 2025 on discharge to be given to the Joint Undertaking in respect of the implementation of the budget for the financial year 2023 (05757/2025 – C10‑0025/2025),

    – having regard to Article 319 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    – having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, amending Regulations (EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU) No 1316/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) No 283/2014, and Decision No 541/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012[9], and in particular Article 71 thereof,

    – having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union[10], and in particular Article 71 thereof,

    – having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2021/2085 of 19 November 2021 establishing the Joint Undertakings under Horizon Europe and repealing Regulations (EC) No 219/2007, (EU) No 557/2014, (EU) No 558/2014, (EU) No 559/2014, (EU) No 560/2014, (EU) No 561/2014 and (EU) No 642/2014[11], and in particular Article 26 thereof,

    – having regard to Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/887 of 13 March 2019 on the model financial regulation for public-private partnership bodies referred to in Article 71 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council[12],

    – having regard to Rule 102 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

    – having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Transport and Tourism,

    – having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0056/2025),

    1. Approves the closure of the accounts of the Clean Aviation Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023;

    2. Instructs its President to forward this decision to the Executive Director of the Clean Aviation Joint Undertaking, the Council, the Commission and the Court of Auditors, and to arrange for its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union (L series).

     

     

     

    3. PROPOSAL FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT DECISION

    on discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the Circular Bio-based Europe Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023

    (2024/2031(DEC))

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to the final annual accounts of the Circular Bio-based Europe Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023,

    – having regard to the Court of Auditors’ annual report on the EU Joint Undertakings for the financial year 2023, together with the Joint Undertakings’ replies[13],

    – having regard to the statement of assurance[14] as to the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions provided by the Court of Auditors for the financial year 2023, pursuant to Article 287 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    – having regard to the Council’s recommendation of 17 February2025 on discharge to be given to the Joint Undertaking in respect of the implementation of the budget for the financial year 2023 (05757/2025 – C10‑0025/2025),

    – having regard to Article 319 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    – having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, amending Regulations (EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU) No 1316/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) No 283/2014, and Decision No 541/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012[15], and in particular Article 71 thereof,

    – having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union[16], and in particular Article 71 thereof,

    – having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2021/2085 of 19 November 2021 establishing the Joint Undertakings under Horizon Europe and repealing Regulations (EC) No 219/2007, (EU) No 557/2014, (EU) No 558/2014, (EU) No 559/2014, (EU) No 560/2014, (EU) No 561/2014 and (EU) No 642/2014[17], and in particular Article 26 thereof,

    – having regard to Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/887 of 13 March 2019 on the model financial regulation for public-private partnership bodies referred to in Article 71 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council[18],

    – having regard to Rule 102 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

    – having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Transport and Tourism,

    – having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0056/2025),

    1. Grants the Executive Director of the Circular Bio-based Europe Joint Undertaking discharge in respect of the implementation of the Joint Undertaking’s budget for the financial year 2023;

    2. Sets out its observations in the resolution below;

    3. Instructs its President to forward this decision and the resolution forming an integral part of it to the Executive Director of the Circular Bio-based Europe Joint Undertaking, the Council, the Commission and the Court of Auditors, and to arrange for their publication in the Official Journal of the European Union (L series).

     

    4. PROPOSAL FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT DECISION

    on the closure of the accounts of the Circular Bio-based Europe Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023

    (2024/2031(DEC))

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to the final annual accounts of the Circular Bio-based Europe Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023,

    – having regard to the Court of Auditors’ annual report on the EU Joint Undertakings for the financial year 2023, together with the Joint Undertakings’ replies[19],

    – having regard to the statement of assurance[20] as to the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions provided by the Court of Auditors for the financial year 2023, pursuant to Article 287 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    – having regard to the Council’s recommendation of 17 February 2025 on discharge to be given to the Joint Undertaking in respect of the implementation of the budget for the financial year 2023 (05757/2025 – C10‑0025/2025),

    – having regard to Article 319 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    – having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, amending Regulations (EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU) No 1316/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) No 283/2014, and Decision No 541/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012[21], and in particular Article 71 thereof,

    – having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union[22], and in particular Article 71 thereof,

    – having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2021/2085 of 19 November 2021 establishing the Joint Undertakings under Horizon Europe and repealing Regulations (EC) No 219/2007, (EU) No 557/2014, (EU) No 558/2014, (EU) No 559/2014, (EU) No 560/2014, (EU) No 561/2014 and (EU) No 642/2014[23], and in particular Article 26 thereof,

    – having regard to Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/887 of 13 March 2019 on the model financial regulation for public-private partnership bodies referred to in Article 71 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council[24],

    – having regard to Rule 102 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

    – having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Transport and Tourism,

    – having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0056/2025),

    1. Approves the closure of the accounts of the Circular Bio-based Europe Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023;

    2. Instructs its President to forward this decision to the Executive Director of the Circular Bio-based Europe Joint Undertaking, the Council, the Commission and the Court of Auditors, and to arrange for its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union (L series).

     

    5. PROPOSAL FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT DECISION

    on discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the Clean Hydrogen Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023

    (2024/2031(DEC))

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to the final annual accounts of the Clean Hydrogen Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023,

    – having regard to the Court of Auditors’ annual report on the EU Joint Undertakings for the financial year 2023, together with the Joint Undertakings’ replies[25],

    – having regard to the statement of assurance[26] as to the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions provided by the Court of Auditors for the financial year 2023, pursuant to Article 287 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    – having regard to the Council’s recommendation of 17 February2025 on discharge to be given to the Joint Undertaking in respect of the implementation of the budget for the financial year 2023 (05757/2025 – C10‑0025/2025),

    – having regard to Article 319 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    – having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, amending Regulations (EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU) No 1316/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) No 283/2014, and Decision No 541/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012[27], and in particular Article 71 thereof,

    – having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union[28], and in particular Article 71 thereof,

    – having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2021/2085 of 19 November 2021 establishing the Joint Undertakings under Horizon Europe and repealing Regulations (EC) No 219/2007, (EU) No 557/2014, (EU) No 558/2014, (EU) No 559/2014, (EU) No 560/2014, (EU) No 561/2014 and (EU) No 642/2014[29], and in particular Article 26 thereof,

    – having regard to Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/887 of 13 March 2019 on the model financial regulation for public-private partnership bodies referred to in Article 71 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council[30],

    – having regard to Rule 102 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

    – having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Transport and Tourism,

    – having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0056/2025),

    1. Grants the Executive Director of the Clean Hydrogen Joint Undertaking discharge in respect of the implementation of the Joint Undertaking’s budget for the financial year 2023;

    2. Sets out its observations in the resolution below;

    3. Instructs its President to forward this decision and the resolution forming an integral part of it to the Executive Director of the Clean Hydrogen Joint Undertaking, the Council, the Commission and the Court of Auditors, and to arrange for their publication in the Official Journal of the European Union (L series).

     

    6. PROPOSAL FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT DECISION

    on the closure of the accounts of the Clean Hydrogen Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023

    (2024/2031(DEC))

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to the final annual accounts of the Clean Hydrogen Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023,

    – having regard to the Court of Auditors’ annual report on the EU Joint Undertakings for the financial year 2023, together with the Joint Undertakings’ replies[31],

    – having regard to the statement of assurance[32] as to the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions provided by the Court of Auditors for the financial year 2023, pursuant to Article 287 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    – having regard to the Council’s recommendation of 17 February 2025 on discharge to be given to the Joint Undertaking in respect of the implementation of the budget for the financial year 2023 (05757/2025 – C10‑0025/2025),

    – having regard to Article 319 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    – having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, amending Regulations (EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU) No 1316/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) No 283/2014, and Decision No 541/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012[33], and in particular Article 71 thereof,

    – having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union[34], and in particular Article 71 thereof,

    – having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2021/2085 of 19 November 2021 establishing the Joint Undertakings under Horizon Europe and repealing Regulations (EC) No 219/2007, (EU) No 557/2014, (EU) No 558/2014, (EU) No 559/2014, (EU) No 560/2014, (EU) No 561/2014 and (EU) No 642/2014[35], and in particular Article 26 thereof,

    – having regard to Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/887 of 13 March 2019 on the model financial regulation for public-private partnership bodies referred to in Article 71 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council[36],

    – having regard to Rule 102 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

    – having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Transport and Tourism,

    – having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0056/2025),

    1. Approves the closure of the accounts of the Clean Hydrogen Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023;

    2. Instructs its President to forward this decision to the Executive Director of the Clean Hydrogen Joint Undertaking, the Council, the Commission and the Court of Auditors, and to arrange for its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union (L series).

     

     

    7. PROPOSAL FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT DECISION

    on discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the Europe’s Rail Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023

    (2024/2031(DEC))

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to the final annual accounts of the Europe’s Rail Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023,

    – having regard to the Court of Auditors’ annual report on the EU Joint Undertakings for the financial year 2023, together with the Joint Undertakings’ replies[37],

    – having regard to the statement of assurance[38] as to the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions provided by the Court of Auditors for the financial year 2023, pursuant to Article 287 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    – having regard to the Council’s recommendation of 17 February 2025 on discharge to be given to the Joint Undertaking in respect of the implementation of the budget for the financial year 2023 (05757/2025 – C10‑0025/2025),

    – having regard to Article 319 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    – having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, amending Regulations (EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU) No 1316/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) No 283/2014, and Decision No 541/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012[39], and in particular Article 71 thereof,

    – having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union[40], and in particular Article 71 thereof,

    – having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2021/2085 of 19 November 2021 establishing the Joint Undertakings under Horizon Europe and repealing Regulations (EC) No 219/2007, (EU) No 557/2014, (EU) No 558/2014, (EU) No 559/2014, (EU) No 560/2014, (EU) No 561/2014 and (EU) No 642/2014[41], and in particular Article 26 thereof,

    – having regard to Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/887 of 13 March 2019 on the model financial regulation for public-private partnership bodies referred to in Article 71 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council[42],

    – having regard to Rule 102 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

    – having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Transport and Tourism,

    – having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0056/2025),

    1. Grants the Interim Executive Director of the Europe’s Rail Joint Undertaking discharge in respect of the implementation of the Joint Undertaking’s budget for the financial year 2023;

    2. Sets out its observations in the resolution below;

    3. Instructs its President to forward this decision and the resolution forming an integral part of it to the Interim Executive Director of the Europe’s Rail Joint Undertaking, the Council, the Commission and the Court of Auditors, and to arrange for their publication in the Official Journal of the European Union (L series).

     

    8. PROPOSAL FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT DECISION

    on the closure of the accounts of the Europe’s Rail Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023

    (2024/2031(DEC))

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to the final annual accounts of the Europe’s Rail Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023,

    – having regard to the Court of Auditors’ annual report on the EU Joint Undertakings for the financial year 2023, together with the Joint Undertakings’ replies[43],

    – having regard to the statement of assurance[44] as to the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions provided by the Court of Auditors for the financial year 2023, pursuant to Article 287 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    – having regard to the Council’s recommendation of 17 February 2025 on discharge to be given to the Joint Undertaking in respect of the implementation of the budget for the financial year 2023 (05757/2025 – C10‑0025/2025),

    – having regard to Article 319 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    – having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, amending Regulations (EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU) No 1316/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) No 283/2014, and Decision No 541/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012[45], and in particular Article 71 thereof,

    – having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (recast)[46], and in particular Article 71 thereof,

    – having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2021/2085 of 19 November 2021 establishing the Joint Undertakings under Horizon Europe and repealing Regulations (EC) No 219/2007, (EU) No 557/2014, (EU) No 558/2014, (EU) No 559/2014, (EU) No 560/2014, (EU) No 561/2014 and (EU) No 642/2014[47], and in particular Article 26 thereof,

    – having regard to Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/887 of 13 March 2019 on the model financial regulation for public-private partnership bodies referred to in Article 71 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council[48],

    – having regard to Rule 102 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

    – having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Transport and Tourism,

    – having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0056/2025),

    1. Approves the closure of the accounts of the Europe’s Rail Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023;

    2. Instructs its President to forward this decision to the Interim Executive Director of the Europe’s Rail Joint Undertaking, the Council, the Commission and the Court of Auditors, and to arrange for its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union (L series).

     

     

    9. PROPOSAL FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT DECISION

    on discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the European High Performance Computing Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023

    (2024/2031(DEC))

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to the final annual accounts of the European High Performance Computing Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023,

    – having regard to the Court of Auditors’ annual report on the EU Joint Undertakings for the financial year 2023, together with the Joint Undertakings’ replies[49],

    – having regard to the statement of assurance[50] as to the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions provided by the Court of Auditors for the financial year 2023, pursuant to Article 287 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    – having regard to the Council’s recommendation of 17 February 2025 on discharge to be given to the Joint Undertaking in respect of the implementation of the budget for the financial year 2023 (05757/2025 – C10‑0025/2025),

    – having regard to Article 319 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    – having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, amending Regulations (EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU) No 1316/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) No 283/2014, and Decision No 541/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012[51], and in particular Article 71 thereof,

    – having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (recast)[52], and in particular Article 71 thereof,

    – having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2021/1173 of 13 July 2021 on establishing the European High Performance Computing Joint Undertaking and repealing Regulation (EU) 2018/1488[53], and in particular Article 19 thereof,

    – having regard to Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/887 of 13 March 2019 on the model financial regulation for public-private partnership bodies referred to in Article 71 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council[54],

    – having regard to Rule 102 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

    – having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Transport and Tourism,

    – having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0056/2025),

    1. Grants the Executive Director of the European High Performance Computing Joint Undertaking discharge in respect of the implementation of the Joint Undertaking’s budget for the financial year 2023;

    2. Sets out its observations in the resolution below;

    3. Instructs its President to forward this decision and the resolution forming an integral part of it to the Executive Director of the European High Performance Computing Joint Undertaking, the Council, the Commission and the Court of Auditors, and to arrange for their publication in the Official Journal of the European Union (L series).

     

    10. PROPOSAL FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT DECISION

    on the closure of the accounts of the European High Performance Computing Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023

    (2024/2031(DEC))

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to the final annual accounts of the European High Performance Computing Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023,

    – having regard to the Court of Auditors’ annual report on the EU Joint Undertakings for the financial year 2023, together with the Joint Undertakings’ replies[55],

    – having regard to the statement of assurance[56] as to the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions provided by the Court of Auditors for the financial year 2023, pursuant to Article 287 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    – having regard to the Council’s recommendation of 17 February 2025 on discharge to be given to the Joint Undertaking in respect of the implementation of the budget for the financial year 2023 (05757/2025 – C10‑0025/2025),

    – having regard to Article 319 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    – having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, amending Regulations (EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU) No 1316/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) No 283/2014, and Decision No 541/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012[57], and in particular Article 71 thereof,

    – having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (recast)[58], and in particular Article 71 thereof,

    – having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2021/1173 of 13 July 2021 on establishing the European High Performance Computing Joint Undertaking and repealing Regulation (EU) 2018/1488[59], and in particular Article 19 thereof,

    – having regard to Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/887 of 13 March 2019 on the model financial regulation for public-private partnership bodies referred to in Article 71 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council[60],

    – having regard to Rule 102 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

    – having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Transport and Tourism,

    – having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0056/2025),

    1. Approves the closure of the accounts of the European High Performance Computing Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023;

    2. Instructs its President to forward this decision to the Executive Director of the European High Performance Computing Joint Undertaking, the Council, the Commission and the Court of Auditors, and to arrange for its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union (L series).

     

     

    11. PROPOSAL FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT DECISION

    on discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy for the financial year 2023

    (2024/2031(DEC))

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to the final annual accounts of the European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy for the financial year 2023,

    – having regard to the Court of Auditors’ annual report on the EU Joint Undertakings for the financial year 2023, together with the Joint Undertakings’ replies[61],

    – having regard to the statement of assurance[62] as to the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions provided by the Court of Auditors for the financial year 2023, pursuant to Article 287 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    – having regard to the Council’s recommendation of 17 February 2025 on discharge to be given to the Joint Undertaking in respect of the implementation of the budget for the financial year 2023 (05757/2025 – C10‑0025/2025),

    – having regard to Article 319 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    – having regard to Article 106a of the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community,

    – having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, amending Regulations (EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU) No 1316/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) No 283/2014, and Decision No 541/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012[63], and in particular Article 70 thereof,

    – having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union[64], and in particular Article 70 thereof,

    – having regard to Council Decision No 2007/198/Euratom of 27 March 2007 establishing the European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy and conferring advantages upon it[65], and in particular Article 5 thereof,

    – having regard to Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/715 of 18 December 2018 on the framework financial regulation for the bodies set up under the TFEU and Euratom Treaty and referred to in Article 70 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council[66],

    – having regard to Rule 102 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

    – having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Transport and Tourism,

    – having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0056/2025),

    1. Grants the Director of the European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy discharge in respect of the implementation of the Joint Undertaking’s budget for the financial year 2023;

    2. Sets out its observations in the resolution below;

    3. Instructs its President to forward this decision and the resolution forming an integral part of it to the Director of the European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy, the Council, the Commission and the Court of Auditors, and to arrange for their publication in the Official Journal of the European Union (L series).

     

    12. PROPOSAL FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT DECISION

    on the closure of the accounts of the European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy for the financial year 2023

    (2024/2031(DEC))

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to the final annual accounts of the European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy for the financial year 2023,

    – having regard to the Court of Auditors’ annual report on the EU Joint Undertakings for the financial year 2023, together with the Joint Undertakings’ replies[67],

    – having regard to the statement of assurance[68] as to the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions provided by the Court of Auditors for the financial year 2023, pursuant to Article 287 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    – having regard to the Council’s recommendation of 17 February 2025 on discharge to be given to the Joint Undertaking in respect of the implementation of the budget for the financial year 2023 (05757/2025 – C10‑0025/2025),

    – having regard to Article 319 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    – having regard to Article 106a of the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community,

    – having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, amending Regulations (EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU) No 1316/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) No 283/2014, and Decision No 541/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012[69], and in particular Article 70 thereof,

    – having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union[70], and in particular Article 71 thereof,

    – having regard to Council Decision No 2007/198/Euratom of 27 March 2007 establishing the European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy and conferring advantages upon it[71], and in particular Article 5 thereof,

    – having regard to Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/715 of 18 December 2018 on the framework financial regulation for the bodies set up under the TFEU and Euratom Treaty and referred to in Article 70 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council,[72],

    – having regard to Rule 102 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

    – having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Transport and Tourism,

    – having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0056/2025),

    1. Approves the closure of the accounts of the European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy for the financial year 2023;

    2. Instructs its President to forward this decision to the Director of the European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy, the Council, the Commission and the Court of Auditors, and to arrange for its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union (L series).

     

     

    13. PROPOSAL FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT DECISION

    on discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the Global Health EDCTP3 Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023

    (2024/2031(DEC))

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to the final annual accounts of the Global Health EDCTP3 Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023,

    – having regard to the Court of Auditors’ annual report on the EU Joint Undertakings for the financial year 2023, together with the Joint Undertakings’ replies[73],

    – having regard to the statement of assurance[74] as to the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions provided by the Court of Auditors for the financial year 2023, pursuant to Article 287 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    – having regard to the Council’s recommendation of 17 February 2025 on discharge to be given to the Joint Undertaking in respect of the implementation of the budget for the financial year 2023 (05757/2025 – C10‑0025/2025),

    – having regard to Article 319 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    – having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, amending Regulations (EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU) No 1316/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) No 283/2014, and Decision No 541/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012[75], and in particular Article 71 thereof,

    – having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union[76], and in particular Article 71 thereof,

    – having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2021/2085 of 19 November 2021 establishing the Joint Undertakings under Horizon Europe and repealing Regulations (EC) No 219/2007, (EU) No 557/2014, (EU) No 558/2014, (EU) No 559/2014, (EU) No 560/2014, (EU) No 561/2014 and (EU) No 642/2014[77], and in particular Article 26 thereof,

    – having regard to Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/887 of 13 March 2019 on the model financial regulation for public-private partnership bodies referred to in Article 71 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council[78],

    – having regard to Rule 102 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

    – having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Transport and Tourism,

    – having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0056/2025),

    1. Grants the Executive Director of the Global Health EDCTP3 Joint Undertaking discharge in respect of the implementation of the Joint Undertaking’s budget for the financial year 2023;

    2. Sets out its observations in the resolution below;

    3. Instructs its President to forward this decision and the resolution forming an integral part of it to the Executive Director of the Global Health EDCTP3 Joint Undertaking, the Council, the Commission and the Court of Auditors, and to arrange for their publication in the Official Journal of the European Union (L series).

     

    14. PROPOSAL FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT DECISION

    on the closure of the accounts of the Global Health EDCTP3 Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023

    (2024/2031(DEC))

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to the final annual accounts of the Global Health EDCTP3 Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023,

    – having regard to the Court of Auditors’ annual report on the EU Joint Undertakings for the financial year 2023, together with the Joint Undertakings’ replies[79],

    – having regard to the statement of assurance[80] as to the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions provided by the Court of Auditors for the financial year 2023, pursuant to Article 287 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    – having regard to the Council’s recommendation of 17 February 2025 on discharge to be given to the Joint Undertaking in respect of the implementation of the budget for the financial year 2023 (05757/2025 – C10‑0025/2025),

    – having regard to Article 319 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    – having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, amending Regulations (EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU) No 1316/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) No 283/2014, and Decision No 541/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012[81], and in particular Article 71 thereof,

    – having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union[82], and in particular Article 71 thereof,

    – having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2021/2085 of 19 November 2021 establishing the Joint Undertakings under Horizon Europe and repealing Regulations (EC) No 219/2007, (EU) No 557/2014, (EU) No 558/2014, (EU) No 559/2014, (EU) No 560/2014, (EU) No 561/2014 and (EU) No 642/2014[83], and in particular Article 26 thereof,

    – having regard to Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/887 of 13 March 2019 on the model financial regulation for public-private partnership bodies referred to in Article 71 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council[84],

    – having regard to Rule 102 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

    – having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Transport and Tourism,

    – having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0056/2025),

    1. Approves the closure of the accounts of the Global Health EDCTP3 Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023;

    2. Instructs its President to forward this decision to the Executive Director of the Global Health EDCTP3 Joint Undertaking, the Council, the Commission and the Court of Auditors, and to arrange for its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union (L series).

     

     

    15. PROPOSAL FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT DECISION

    on discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the Innovative Health Initiative Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023

    (2024/2031(DEC))

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to the final annual accounts of the Innovative Health Initiative Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023,

    – having regard to the Court of Auditors’ annual report on the EU Joint Undertakings for the financial year 2023, together with the Joint Undertakings’ replies[85],

    – having regard to the statement of assurance[86] as to the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions provided by the Court of Auditors for the financial year 2023, pursuant to Article 287 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    – having regard to the Council’s recommendation of 17 February 2025 on discharge to be given to the Joint Undertaking in respect of the implementation of the budget for the financial year 2023 (05757/2025 – C10‑0025/2025),

    – having regard to Article 319 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    – having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, amending Regulations (EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU) No 1316/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) No 283/2014, and Decision No 541/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012[87], and in particular Article 71 thereof,

    – having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union[88], and in particular Article 71 thereof,

    – having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2021/2085 of 19 November 2021 establishing the Joint Undertakings under Horizon Europe and repealing Regulations (EC) No 219/2007, (EU) No 557/2014, (EU) No 558/2014, (EU) No 559/2014, (EU) No 560/2014, (EU) No 561/2014 and (EU) No 642/2014[89], and in particular Article 26 thereof,

    – having regard to Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/887 of 13 March 2019 on the model financial regulation for public-private partnership bodies referred to in Article 71 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council[90],

    – having regard to Rule 102 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

    – having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Transport and Tourism,

    – having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0056/2025),

    1. Grants the Executive Director of the Innovative Health Initiative Joint Undertaking discharge in respect of the implementation of the Joint Undertaking’s budget for the financial year 2023;

    2. Sets out its observations in the resolution below;

    3. Instructs its President to forward this decision and the resolution forming an integral part of it to the Executive Director of the Innovative Health Initiative Joint Undertaking, the Council, the Commission and the Court of Auditors, and to arrange for their publication in the Official Journal of the European Union (L series).

     

    16. PROPOSAL FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT DECISION

    on the closure of the accounts of the Innovative Health Initiative Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023

    (2024/2031(DEC))

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to the final annual accounts of the Innovative Health Initiative Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023,

    – having regard to the Court of Auditors’ annual report on the EU Joint Undertakings for the financial year 2023, together with the Joint Undertakings’ replies[91],

    – having regard to the statement of assurance[92] as to the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions provided by the Court of Auditors for the financial year 2023, pursuant to Article 287 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    – having regard to the Council’s recommendation of 17 February 2025 on discharge to be given to the Joint Undertaking in respect of the implementation of the budget for the financial year 2023 (05757/2025 – C10‑0025/2025),

    – having regard to Article 319 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    – having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, amending Regulations (EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU) No 1316/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) No 283/2014, and Decision No 541/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012[93], and in particular Article 71 thereof,

    – having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union[94], and in particular Article 71 thereof,

    – having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2021/2085 of 19 November 2021 establishing the Joint Undertakings under Horizon Europe and repealing Regulations (EC) No 219/2007, (EU) No 557/2014, (EU) No 558/2014, (EU) No 559/2014, (EU) No 560/2014, (EU) No 561/2014 and (EU) No 642/2014[95], and in particular Article 26 thereof,

    – having regard to Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/887 of 13 March 2019 on the model financial regulation for public-private partnership bodies referred to in Article 71 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council[96],

    – having regard to Rule 102 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

    – having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Transport and Tourism,

    – having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0056/2025),

    1. Approves the closure of the accounts of the Innovative Health Initiative Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023;

    2. Instructs its President to forward this decision to the Executive Director of the Innovative Health Initiative Joint Undertaking, the Council, the Commission and the Court of Auditors, and to arrange for its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union (L series).

     

     

    17. PROPOSAL FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT DECISION

    on discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the Chips Joint Undertaking (before 21.9.2023 Key Digital Technologies Joint Undertaking) for the financial year 2023

    (2024/2031(DEC))

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to the final annual accounts of the Chips Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023,

    – having regard to the Court of Auditors’ annual report on the EU Joint Undertakings for the financial year 2023, together with the Joint Undertakings’ replies[97],

    – having regard to the statement of assurance[98] as to the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions provided by the Court of Auditors for the financial year 2023, pursuant to Article 287 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    – having regard to the Council’s recommendation of 17 February 2025 on discharge to be given to the Joint Undertaking in respect of the implementation of the budget for the financial year 2023 (05757/2025 – C10‑0025/2025),

    – having regard to Article 319 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    – having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, amending Regulations (EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU) No 1316/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) No 283/2014, and Decision No 541/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012[99], and in particular Article 71 thereof,

    – having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union[100], and in particular Article 71 thereof,

    – having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2021/2085 of 19 November 2021 establishing the Joint Undertakings under Horizon Europe and repealing Regulations (EC) No 219/2007, (EU) No 557/2014, (EU) No 558/2014, (EU) No 559/2014, (EU) No 560/2014, (EU) No 561/2014 and (EU) No 642/2014[101], and in particular Article 26 thereof,

    – having regarding to Council Regulation (EU) 2023/1782 of 25 July 2023 amending Regulation (EU) 2021/2085 establishing the Joint Undertakings under Horizon Europe, as regards the Chips Joint Undertaking,

    – having regard to Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/887 of 13 March 2019 on the model financial regulation for public-private partnership bodies referred to in Article 71 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council[102],

    – having regard to Rule 102 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

    – having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Transport and Tourism,

    – having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0056/2025),

    1. Grants the Executive Director of the Chips Joint Undertaking discharge in respect of the implementation of the Joint Undertaking’s budget for the financial year 2023;

    2. Sets out its observations in the resolution below;

    3. Instructs its President to forward this decision and the resolution forming an integral part of it to the Executive Director of the Chips Joint Undertaking, the Council, the Commission and the Court of Auditors, and to arrange for their publication in the Official Journal of the European Union (L series).

     

    18. PROPOSAL FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT DECISION

    on the closure of the accounts of the Chips Joint Undertaking (before 21.9.2023 Key Digital Technologies Joint Undertaking) for the financial year 2023

    (2024/2031(DEC))

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to the final annual accounts of the Chips Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023,

    – having regard to the Court of Auditors’ annual report on the EU Joint Undertakings for the financial year 2023, together with the Joint Undertakings’ replies[103],

    – having regard to the statement of assurance[104] as to the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions provided by the Court of Auditors for the financial year 2023, pursuant to Article 287 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    – having regard to the Council’s recommendation of 17 February 2025 on discharge to be given to the Joint Undertaking in respect of the implementation of the budget for the financial year 2023 (05757/2025 – C10‑0025/2025),

    – having regard to Article 319 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    – having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, amending Regulations (EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU) No 1316/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) No 283/2014, and Decision No 541/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012[105], and in particular Article 71 thereof,

    – having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union[106], and in particular Article 71 thereof,

    – having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2021/2085 of 19 November 2021 establishing the Joint Undertakings under Horizon Europe and repealing Regulations (EC) No 219/2007, (EU) No 557/2014, (EU) No 558/2014, (EU) No 559/2014, (EU) No 560/2014, (EU) No 561/2014 and (EU) No 642/2014[107], and in particular Article 26 thereof,

    – having regarding to Council Regulation (EU) 2023/1782 of 25 July 2023 amending Regulation (EU) 2021/2085 establishing the Joint Undertakings under Horizon Europe, as regards the Chips Joint Undertaking,

    – having regard to Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/887 of 13 March 2019 on the model financial regulation for public-private partnership bodies referred to in Article 71 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council[108],

    – having regard to Rule 102 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

    – having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Transport and Tourism,

    – having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0056/2025),

    1. Approves the closure of the accounts of the Chips Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023;

    2. Instructs its President to forward this decision to the Executive Director of the Chips Joint Undertaking, the Council, the Commission and the Court of Auditors, and to arrange for its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union (L series).

     

     

    19. PROPOSAL FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT DECISION

    on discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the Single European Sky ATM Research 3 Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023

    (2024/2031(DEC))

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to the final annual accounts of the Single European Sky ATM Research 3 Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023,

    – having regard to the Court of Auditors’ annual report on the EU Joint Undertakings for the financial year 2023, together with the Joint Undertakings’ replies[109],

    – having regard to the statement of assurance[110] as to the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions provided by the Court of Auditors for the financial year 2023, pursuant to Article 287 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    – having regard to the Council’s recommendation of 17 February 2025 on discharge to be given to the Joint Undertaking in respect of the implementation of the budget for the financial year 2023 (05757/2025 – C10‑0025/2025),

    – having regard to Article 319 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    – having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, amending Regulations (EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU) No 1316/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) No 283/2014, and Decision No 541/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012[111], and in particular Article 71 thereof,

    – having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union[112], and in particular Article 71 thereof,

    – having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2021/2085 of 19 November 2021 establishing the Joint Undertakings under Horizon Europe and repealing Regulations (EC) No 219/2007, (EU) No 557/2014, (EU) No 558/2014, (EU) No 559/2014, (EU) No 560/2014, (EU) No 561/2014 and (EU) No 642/2014[113], and in particular Article 26 thereof,

    – having regard to Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/887 of 13 March 2019 on the model financial regulation for public-private partnership bodies referred to in Article 71 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council[114],

    – having regard to Rule 102 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

    – having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Transport and Tourism,

    – having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0056/2025),

    1. Grants the Executive Director of the Single European Sky ATM Research 3 Joint Undertaking discharge in respect of the implementation of the Joint Undertaking’s budget for the financial year 2023;

    2. Sets out its observations in the resolution below;

    3. Instructs its President to forward this decision and the resolution forming an integral part of it to the Executive Director of the Single European Sky ATM Research 3 Joint Undertaking, the Council, the Commission and the Court of Auditors, and to arrange for their publication in the Official Journal of the European Union (L series).

     

    20. PROPOSAL FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT DECISION

    on the closure of the accounts of the Single European Sky ATM Research 3 Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023

    (2024/2031(DEC))

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to the final annual accounts of the Single European Sky ATM Research 3 Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023,

    – having regard to the Court of Auditors’ annual report on the EU Joint Undertakings for the financial year 2023, together with the Joint Undertakings’ replies[115],

    – having regard to the statement of assurance[116] as to the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions provided by the Court of Auditors for the financial year 2023, pursuant to Article 287 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    – having regard to the Council’s recommendation of 17 February 2025 on discharge to be given to the Joint Undertaking in respect of the implementation of the budget for the financial year 2023 (05757/2025 – C10‑0025/2025),

    – having regard to Article 319 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    – having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, amending Regulations (EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU) No 1316/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) No 283/2014, and Decision No 541/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012[117], and in particular Article 71 thereof,

    – having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union[118], and in particular Article 71 thereof,

    – having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2021/2085 of 19 November 2021 establishing the Joint Undertakings under Horizon Europe and repealing Regulations (EC) No 219/2007, (EU) No 557/2014, (EU) No 558/2014, (EU) No 559/2014, (EU) No 560/2014, (EU) No 561/2014 and (EU) No 642/2014[119], and in particular Article 26 thereof,

    – having regard to Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/887 of 13 March 2019 on the model financial regulation for public-private partnership bodies referred to in Article 71 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council[120],

    – having regard to Rule 102 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

    – having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Transport and Tourism,

    – having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0056/2025),

    1. Approves the closure of the accounts of the Single European Sky ATM Research 3 Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023;

    2. Instructs its President to forward this decision to the Executive Director of the Single European Sky ATM Research 3 Joint Undertaking, the Council, the Commission and the Court of Auditors, and to arrange for its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union (L series).

     

     

    21. PROPOSAL FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT DECISION

    on discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the Smart Networks and Services Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023

    (2024/2031(DEC))

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to the final annual accounts of the Smart Networks and Services Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023,

    – having regard to the Court of Auditors’ annual report on the EU Joint Undertakings for the financial year 2023, together with the Joint Undertakings’ replies[121],

    – having regard to the statement of assurance[122] as to the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions provided by the Court of Auditors for the financial year 2023, pursuant to Article 287 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    – having regard to the Council’s recommendation of 17 February 2025 on discharge to be given to the Joint Undertaking in respect of the implementation of the budget for the financial year 2023 (05757/2025 – C10‑0025/2025),

    – having regard to Article 319 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    – having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, amending Regulations (EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU) No 1316/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) No 283/2014, and Decision No 541/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012[123], and in particular Article 71 thereof,

    – having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union[124], and in particular Article 71 thereof,

    – having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2021/2085 of 19 November 2021 establishing the Joint Undertakings under Horizon Europe and repealing Regulations (EC) No 219/2007, (EU) No 557/2014, (EU) No 558/2014, (EU) No 559/2014, (EU) No 560/2014, (EU) No 561/2014 and (EU) No 642/2014[125], and in particular Article 26 thereof,

    – having regard to Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/887 of 13 March 2019 on the model financial regulation for public-private partnership bodies referred to in Article 71 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council[126],

    – having regard to Rule 102 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

    – having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Transport and Tourism,

    – having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0056/2025),

    1. Grants the Executive Director of the Smart Networks and Services Joint Undertaking discharge in respect of the implementation of the Joint Undertaking’s budget for the financial year 2023;

    2. Sets out its observations in the resolution below;

    3. Instructs its President to forward this decision and the resolution forming an integral part of it to the Executive Director of the Smart Networks and Services Joint Undertaking, the Council, the Commission and the Court of Auditors, and to arrange for their publication in the Official Journal of the European Union (L series).

     

    22. PROPOSAL FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT DECISION

    on the closure of the accounts of the Smart Networks and Services Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023

    (2024/2031(DEC))

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to the final annual accounts of the Smart Networks and Services Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023,

    – having regard to the Court of Auditors’ annual report on the EU Joint Undertakings for the financial year 2023, together with the Joint Undertakings’ replies[127],

    – having regard to the statement of assurance[128] as to the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions provided by the Court of Auditors for the financial year 2023, pursuant to Article 287 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    – having regard to the Council’s recommendation of 17 February 2025 on discharge to be given to the Joint Undertaking in respect of the implementation of the budget for the financial year 2023 (05757/2025 – C10‑0025/2025),

    – having regard to Article 319 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    – having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, amending Regulations (EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU) No 1316/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) No 283/2014, and Decision No 541/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012[129], and in particular Article 71 thereof,

    – having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union[130], and in particular Article 71 thereof,

    – having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2021/2085 of 19 November 2021 establishing the Joint Undertakings under Horizon Europe and repealing Regulations (EC) No 219/2007, (EU) No 557/2014, (EU) No 558/2014, (EU) No 559/2014, (EU) No 560/2014, (EU) No 561/2014 and (EU) No 642/2014[131], and in particular Article 26 thereof,

    – having regard to Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/887 of 13 March 2019 on the model financial regulation for public-private partnership bodies referred to in Article 71 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council[132],

    – having regard to Rule 102 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

    – having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Transport and Tourism,

    – having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0056/2025),

    1. Approves the closure of the accounts of the Smart Networks and Services Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023;

    2. Instructs its President to forward this decision to the Executive Director of the Smart Networks and Services Joint Undertaking, the Council, the Commission and the Court of Auditors, and to arrange for its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union (L series).

    23. MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    with observations forming an integral part of the decisions on discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the EU joint undertakings for the financial year 2023

    (2024/2031(DEC))

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to its decision on discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the Clean Aviation Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023,

    – having regard to its decision on discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the Circular Bio-based Europe Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023,

    – having regard to its decision on discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the Clean Hydrogen Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023,

    – having regard to its decision on discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the Europe’s Rail Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023,

    – having regard to its decision on discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the European High Performance Computing Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023,

    – having regard to its decision on discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy for the financial year 2023,

    – having regard to its decision on discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the Global Health EDCTP3 Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023,

    – having regard to its decision on discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the Innovative Health Initiative Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023,

    – having regard to its decision on discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the Chips Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023,

    – having regard to its decision on discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the Single European Sky ATM Research 3 Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023,

    – having regard to its decision on discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the Smart Networks and Services Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023,

    – having regard to Rule 102 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

    – having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Transport and Tourism,

    – having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0056/2025),

    A. whereas the Single European Sky ATM Research 3 Joint Undertaking, the Clean Aviation Joint Undertaking, the Innovative Health Initiative Joint Undertaking, the Clean Hydrogen Joint Undertaking, the Circular Bio-based Europe Joint Undertaking, the Europe’s Rail Joint Undertaking, the Smart Networks and Services Joint Undertaking and the Global Health EDCTP3 Joint Undertaking were set up by Council Regulation (EU) 2021/2085 of 19 November 2021 establishing the Joint Undertakings under Horizon Europe and repealing Regulations (EC) No 219/2007, (EU) No 557/2014, (EU) No 558/2014, (EU) No 559/2014, (EU) No 560/2014, (EU) No 561/2014 and (EU) No 642/2014[133], the latter being referred to as the Single Basic Act (SBA);

    B. whereas the Key Digital Technologies Joint Undertaking was set up by Council Regulation (EU) 2021/2085 of 19 November 2021 establishing the Joint Undertakings under Horizon Europe and repealing Regulations (EC) No 219/2007, (EU) No 557/2014, (EU) No 558/2014, (EU) No 559/2014, (EU) No 560/2014, (EU) No 561/2014 and (EU) No 642/2014; whereas the Key Digital Technologies Joint Undertaking was transformed into the Chips Joint Undertaking in July 2023 pursuant to Council Regulation (EU) 2023/1782 of 25 July 2023 amending Regulation (EU) 2021/2085 establishing the Joint Undertakings under Horizon Europe, as regards the Chips Joint Undertaking[134];

    C. whereas the European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy was established in April 2007 by the Council Decision of 27 March 2007 establishing the European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy and conferring advantages upon it (2007/198/Euratom)[135];

    D. whereas the European High-Performance Computing Joint Undertaking was set up by Council Regulation (EU) 2021/1173 of 13 July 2021 on establishing the European High Performance Computing Joint Undertaking and repealing Regulation (EU) 2018/1488[136];

    E. whereas the Single European Sky ATM Research 3 Joint Undertaking is a public-private partnership for the development of modernised air traffic management (ATM) in Europe and for the acceleration through research and innovation of the delivery of the Digital European Sky;

    F. whereas the Clean Aviation Joint Undertaking is a public-private partnership focusing on research and innovation in order to transform aviation towards a sustainable and climate neutral future;

    G. whereas the Innovative Health Initiative Joint Undertaking is a public-private partnership focusing on interdisciplinary, sustainable, and patient-centric health research and innovation;

    H. whereas the Clean Hydrogen Joint Undertaking is a public-private partnership in the field of hydrogen and fuel cells technology research and innovation;

    I.  whereas the Chips Joint Undertaking is a public-private partnership focusing on research and innovation in key digital technologies essential for Europe’s competitive leadership in digital economy, in particular in the electronic components and systems sector;

    J.  whereas the Circular Bio-based Europe Joint Undertaking is a public-private partnership focusing on research and innovation for a sustainable and competitive circular bio-based industries sector;

    K. whereas the Europe’s Rail Joint Undertaking is a public-private partnership for research and innovation in the railway sector;

    L. whereas the European High-Performance Computing Joint Undertaking is a public-private partnership enabling the pooling of resources for the development and deployment of high-performance computing in Europe;

    M. whereas the Smart Networks and Services Joint Undertaking is a public-private partnership focusing on strengthening Europe’s technological leadership and its strategic alignment with the telecommunications industry and fostering the uptake of digital solutions;

    N. whereas the Global Health EDCTP3 Joint Undertaking is a public-private partnership focusing on reducing the socioeconomic burden of infectious diseases in sub-Saharan Africa thanks to new and improved health technological applications as well as improving the preparedness and response to infectious diseases for global purposes;

    O. whereas the aim of the European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy is to provide the Union’s contribution to the ITER international fusion energy project, to implement the broader approach agreement between Euratom and Japan, and to prepare for the construction of a demonstration fusion reactor and related facilities;

    General

    1. Notes that the role of the joint undertakings should be to support research and innovation activities in the areas of transport, energy, health, circular bio-based industries, key electronic components, supercomputing, and network systems; calls on the joint undertakings to promote the transformation of scientific knowledge into marketable innovations, and to establish mechanisms to ensure that their activity leads to an increase in European competitiveness in the world;

    2. Underlines that under the current multiannual financial framework, according to the Court of Auditors, joint undertakings are expected to receive a combined budget of EUR 17 billion from the Union cash contribution and to leverage EUR 21,1 billion of contributions from other members;

    3. Notes that the nature of joint undertakings is based on public-private partnerships that steer investment and leverage public and private funds to fund common goals; reminds, in that regard, that the contributions of private members must meet established targets in order for such partnerships to remain mutually beneficial; calls on joint undertakings which allow in-kind contributions to additional activities (IKAA) to avoid, where possible, an excessive reliance on such contributions in order to meet established targets;

    4. Acknowledges the significant contributions of the joint undertakings in advancing research, innovation, and technology development across various sectors, including aviation, rail, and air traffic management, as integral to achieving the Union’s strategic objectives of sustainability, digital transformation, and competitiveness.

    5. Welcomes the annual report of the Court of Auditors on the European Union’s joint undertakings for the financial year 2023 (the ‘Court’s report’); underlines that the mission of the Court of Auditors is crucial for the sound implementation of the Union budget and for oversight of the budget;

    6. Welcomes the fact that the Court of Auditors provided the discharge authority with an annual report on EU Joint Undertakings which contains a specific statement of assurance for each of the joint undertakings as regards their annual accounts and underlying transactions; shares the view that in addition to the legal provisions binding the Court, the institutional framework of joint undertakings renders these worthy of specific attention from the Court of Auditors; calls for the continuation of this good practice; welcomes the good cooperation of joint undertakings with the Court during the drafting of the Court’s report and welcomes the explanations provided on some of the observations and emphases of matter made in the replies provided by the joint undertakings;

    7. Welcomes the fact that two joint undertakings attained financial autonomy during the financial year 2023, namely the Smart Networks and Services Joint Undertaking on 24 October 2023 and the Global Health EDCTP3 Joint Undertaking on 23 November 2023; notes furthermore that as a result, the Court of Auditors audited these two joint undertakings for the first time, in addition to the nine joint undertakings the Court of Auditors had already audited for the financial year 2022;

    8. Stresses its awareness that some joint undertakings were affected significantly during the financial year 2023 by important events with an impact likely to alter their performance; emphasises, more precisely, that:

    (a) Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has had a significant impact on the Union economy and on supply chains, affecting greatly the activities of some joint undertakings;

    (b) the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic is still felt throughout Europe today and during the financial year 2023, still constituted a massive shock to economic and administrative activities;

    (c) the high levels of inflation caused by the two aforementioned events had an impact on the supplies and delivery time for the joint undertakings;

    9. Acknowledges the benefits of joint undertakings, the importance of public-private cooperation in fostering innovation, promoting research and development and the economic benefits of the partnerships; notes that by pooling resources and expertise from both sectors, public and private, joint undertakings can face the challenges more effectively; underlines the importance of transparency, accountability and efficient use of public funds by joint undertakings;

    10. Recognises the value of initiatives fostering stakeholder engagement and participation, such as open calls for expressions of interest and joint calls across the joint undertakings, as instrumental in leveraging the collective expertise and resources; draws particular attention to the joint call for proposals launched by Europe’s Rail Joint Undertaking and the Single European Sky ATM Research 3 Joint Undertaking – the first joint call of its kind from joint undertakings aimed at developing an integrated air and rail network for a sustainable multimodal transport system;

    11. Recalls that joint undertakings must conduct their operations according to sound financial management, thereby contributing effectively to Union policy objectives as well as to the sound implementation of the Union budget; nevertheless is concerned with a series of elements, in light of the findings of the Court of Auditors, as presented in this resolution;

    Annual accounts

    12. Notes that the Court’s report finds that the 2023 annual accounts of the eleven joint undertakings audited present fairly, in all material respects, their financial position as of 31 December 2023, the results of their operations and cash flows, and changes in net assets for the year ended, in accordance with their financial regulations and the accounting rules adopted by the Commission’s accounting officer; notes furthermore that as a result, the Court issued unqualified audit opinions on the reliability of the annual accounts of the joint undertakings;

    13. Notes that the Court’s report finds that the underlying transactions to the annual accounts are legal and regular in all material respects; notes furthermore that as a result, the Court issued unqualified audit opinions on the legality and regularity of both the revenue and the payments underlying the accounts of the joint undertakings;

    14. Takes note of the fact that, in the view of the Court of Auditors, insufficient guidance was provided to the Smart Networks and Services Joint Undertaking and the Global Health EDCTP3 Joint Undertaking on their first-time annual accounts, especially as regards the need for clarity in distinguishing the financial resources managed by the Commission before they attained their financial autonomy and by the joint undertakings after they attained it; echoes the Court’s recommendation for action in this regard which recommends that accounting guidelines should be developed in a clear and comprehensible way which should specify the rules for the presentation of the first annual accounts of new joint undertakings and that these guidelines should include instructions on how to separate the financial resources implemented by the Commission from those implemented by a joint undertaking after it attained its financial autonomy; notes that the risk to the reliability of annual accounts was deemed to be low for all joint undertakings except for the Smart Networks and Services Joint Undertaking and the Global Health EDCTP3 Joint Undertaking, for which the risk to reliability was deemed to be medium, due to the complexities brought about by the transfer of budget appropriations and assets from the responsibility of the Commission to the responsibility of the joint undertaking;

    15. Takes note of the fact that the annual accounts of the European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy are produced on the basis of the baseline of the ITER project in place in 2023 but that the latter is the subject of an ongoing revision, the result of which is likely to result in significant changes for the European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy and its estimated total cost at completion; underlines that the joint undertaking concerned should take all actions necessary to ensure that the future baseline and its consequences for the need for Union cash contributions to the joint undertaking do not constitute a liability for the Union budget; notes from the hearing of the joint undertaking concerned in the Committee on Budgetary Control that at the time of the hearing and according to the joint undertaking concerned, it was too early to provide an estimate of the financial impact of this revision; is furthermore concerned by the delays impacting the ITER project, due to factors beyond the joint undertaking’s control;

    16. Is concerned by the potential impact that the reorganisation of the European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy will have on its activities, notably the short to medium-term instabilities and operational risks for the joint undertaking; welcomes the awareness of the joint undertaking concerned of these issues and the explanation provided on its views on the situation; welcomes the additional information provided during the hearing of the joint undertaking concerned in the Committee on Budgetary Control, notably as regards the fact that the risk for business continuity has so far been mitigated thanks to a strong reliance on existing programmes and projects; welcomes the flexibility brought along by the new matrix structure;

    17. Takes note of the fact that the risk to the legality and regularity of revenue was deemed to be low for all joint undertakings;

    Budgetary and financial management

    18. Notes that the total available budget in 2023 for the eleven joint undertakings audited by the Court amounted to EUR 4,25 billion in commitment appropriations and EUR 3,87 billion in payment appropriations, according to the Court of Auditors, which considers that the total available budget includes unused appropriations from previous years, which the joint undertakings entered again in the budget of the current year and assigned revenues and reallocations to the next year; notes more precisely that:

    (a) the total available budget in 2023 for the Single European Sky ATM Research 3 Joint Undertaking amounted to EUR 111,2 million in commitment appropriations (compared to EUR 158,8 million in 2022) and EUR 241,5 million in payment appropriations (compared to EUR 146,9 million in 2022); understands furthermore that according to the report on budgetary and financial management of the Single European Sky ATM Research 3 Joint Undertaking, its total budget execution rate for the financial year 2023 reached 92 % for commitment appropriations and 81 % for payment appropriations, indicating that there were no severe issues related to the pace of implementation of the budget; nevertheless stresses the low execution rate of its payment appropriations dedicated to infrastructure and operating expenditure, which reached 55 %; notes the explanation of the joint undertaking and generally calls on the joint undertaking to ensure a healthy pace of implementation for each section of its budget;

    (b) The total available budget in 2023 for the Clean Aviation Joint Undertaking amounted to EUR 269 million in commitment appropriations (compared to EUR 411,2 million in 2022) and EUR 486,4 million in payment appropriations (compared to EUR 415,3 million in 2022); understands furthermore that according to the report on budgetary and financial management of the Clean Aviation Joint Undertaking, its total budget execution rate for the financial year 2023 reached 98,58 % for commitment appropriations and 51,18 % for payment appropriations, indicating that there were serious issues related to the pace of implementation of the budget; notes in particular that the execution rates of its two operational expenditure titles stand at 80,50 % and 81,11 % respectively for payment appropriations; furthermore stresses the low execution rate of its payment appropriations dedicated to infrastructure expenditure, which reached 60,52 %; deeply regrets the important amount allocated to title 5 of its budget for unused payment appropriations of EUR 177 million, which has a technical execution rate of 0 %; notes the explanation of the joint undertaking and generally calls on the joint undertaking to ensure a healthy pace of implementation for each section of its budget;

    (c) The total available budget in 2023 for the Innovative Health Initiative Joint Undertaking amounted to EUR 223,2 million in commitment appropriations (compared to EUR 272,4 million in 2022) and EUR 225,9 million in payment appropriations (compared to EUR 174,8 million in 2022); understands furthermore that according to the report on budgetary and financial management of the Innovative Health Initiative Joint Undertaking, its total budget execution rate for the financial year 2023 reached 92,65 % for commitment appropriations and 90,29 % for payment appropriations, indicating that there were no severe issues related to the pace of implementation of the budget; nevertheless stresses the low execution rates of its commitment and payment appropriations dedicated to infrastructure expenditure, which reached 68,67 % and 67,30 % respectively; notes the explanation of the joint undertaking and generally calls on the joint undertaking to ensure a healthy pace of implementation for each section of its budget;

    (d) The total available budget in 2023 for the Clean Hydrogen Joint Undertaking amounted to EUR 268,9 million in commitment appropriations (compared to EUR 314,3 million in 2022) and EUR 327,8 million in payment appropriations (compared to EUR 118,3 million in 2022); understands furthermore that according to the report on budgetary and financial management of the Clean Hydrogen Joint Undertaking, its total budget execution rate for the financial year 2023 reached 96,62 % for commitment appropriations and 85,43 % for payment appropriations, indicating that there were no severe issues related to the pace of implementation of the budget; nevertheless stresses the low execution rate of payment appropriations dedicated to its operational expenditure financed under Horizon 2020 which reached 69,41 %; moreover stresses the low execution rate of its commitment and payment appropriations dedicated to infrastructure expenditure, which reached 71,21 % and 60,60 % respectively; notes the explanations of the joint undertaking and generally calls on the joint undertaking to ensure a healthy pace of implementation for each section of its budget;

    (e) The total available budget in 2023 for the Chips Joint Undertaking amounted to EUR 835,7 million in commitment appropriations (compared to EUR 261,4 million in 2022) and EUR 518,4 million in payment appropriations (compared to EUR 222,2 million in 2022); understands furthermore that according to the report on budgetary and financial management of the Chips Joint Undertaking, its total budget execution rate for the financial year 2023 reached 100 % for commitment appropriations and 37 % for payment appropriations, indicating that there were serious issues related to the pace of implementation of the budget; in particular, stresses the extremely low execution rate of payment appropriations dedicated to operational expenditure, which reached 36 %; notes the explanation of the joint undertaking but deeply regrets such a low execution rate and generally calls on the joint undertaking to ensure a healthy pace of implementation for each section of its budget; takes note of the fact that these elements, in relation to the increased funding that the Chips Joint Undertaking benefited from in 2023 and which the Chips Joint Undertaking had to implement, led the Court to consider the risk to budget management to be medium for this joint undertaking;

    (f) The total available budget in 2023 for the Circular Bio-based Europe Joint Undertaking amounted to EUR 227,4 million in commitment appropriations (compared to EUR 264,2 million in 2022) and EUR 137,4 million in payment appropriations (compared to EUR 80,3 million in 2022); understands furthermore that according to the report on budgetary and financial management of the Circular Bio-based Europe Joint Undertaking, its total budget execution rate for the financial year 2023 reached 97,6 % for commitment appropriations and 90,3 % for payment appropriations, indicating that there were no severe issues related to the pace of implementation of the budget; nevertheless stresses the low execution rates of commitment and payment appropriations for the part of its administrative expenditure dedicated to salaries, which reached 64 % and 57 % respectively, as well as the low execution rate of payment appropriations for the part of its administrative expenditure dedicated to other administrative expenditure, which reached 54 %; notes the explanation of the joint undertaking and generally calls on the joint undertaking to ensure a healthy pace of implementation for each section of its budget;

    (g) The total available budget in 2023 for the Europe’s Rail Joint Undertaking amounted to EUR 102,6 million in commitment appropriations (compared to EUR 171,4 million in 2022) and EUR 120,3 million in payment appropriations (compared to EUR 180,8 million in 2022); understands furthermore that according to the report on budgetary and financial management of the Europe’s Rail Joint Undertaking, its total budget execution rate for the financial year 2023 reached 97 % for commitment appropriations and 82 % for payment appropriations, indicating that there were no severe issues related to the pace of implementation of the budget; nevertheless stresses the low execution rate of payment appropriations for the part of its operational expenditure financed under Horizon 2020, which reached 67 %; notes the explanation of the joint undertaking and generally calls on the joint undertaking to ensure a healthy pace of implementation for each section of its budget; points out that Europe’s Rail Joint Undertaking postponed final payments to 2024 due to technical issues experienced by beneficiaries; takes notice of the several projects that did not fully claim their budgets, reducing the need for operational payments by approximately EUR 4,1 million; calls on the joint undertaking concerned to elaborate a plan on how to improve the accounting reporting obligations; highlights the importance of supporting the joint undertaking given rail’s inherent advantages in terms of environmental performance, land use, energy consumption, and safety;

    (h) The total available budget in 2023 for the European High-Performance Computing Joint Undertaking amounted to EUR 1136 million in commitment appropriations (compared to EUR 1374,5 million in 2022) and EUR 1058 million in payment appropriations (compared to EUR 629,9 million in 2022); understands furthermore that according to the report on budgetary and financial management of the European High-Performance Computing Joint Undertaking, its total budget execution rate for the financial year 2023 reached 83% for commitment appropriations and 19 % for payment appropriations, indicating that there were serious issues related to the pace of implementation of the budget; in particular, stresses the extremely low execution rate of payment appropriations dedicated to operational expenditure, which reached 19 %; notes the explanation of the joint undertaking but deeply regrets such a low execution rate; moreover stresses the low execution rate of its commitment and payment appropriations dedicated to administrative expenditure, which reached 45 % and 42 % respectively; notes the explanation of the joint undertaking and generally calls on the joint undertaking to ensure a healthy pace of implementation for each section of its budget; takes note of the fact that these elements, in relation to the increased funding that the European High-Performance Computing Joint Undertaking benefited from in 2023 and which the European High-Performance Computing Joint Undertaking had to implement, led the Court to consider the risk to budget management to be medium for this joint undertaking; welcomes the additional information provided during the hearing of the joint undertaking concerned in the Committee on Budgetary Control on the reasons behind this slow execution rate;

    (i) The total available budget in 2023 for the Smart Networks and Services Joint Undertaking amounted to EUR 134,7 million in commitment appropriations and EUR 122,9 million in payment appropriations; understands furthermore that according to the report on budgetary and financial management of the Smart Networks and Services Joint Undertaking, its total budget execution rate for the financial year 2023 reached 99 % for commitment appropriations and 89 % for payment appropriations; deems that given the short period of time during which the joint undertaking had attained financial autonomy in the financial year 2023, there are no sufficient grounds on which the European Parliament could express its view on the quality of the financial management of the joint undertaking while doing so in good faith; nevertheless notes that due to this situation, the risk to the legality and regularity of administrative expenditure was deemed as medium for the joint undertaking;

    (j) The total available budget in 2023 for the Global Health EDCTP3 Joint Undertaking amounted to EUR 136,4 million in commitment appropriations and EUR 2,2 million in payment appropriations; understands furthermore that according to the report on budgetary and financial management of the Global Health EDCTP3 Joint Undertaking, its total budget execution rate for the financial year 2023 reached 100 % for commitment appropriations and 47 % for payment appropriations; deems that given the short period of time during which the joint undertaking had attained financial autonomy in the financial year 2023, there are no sufficient grounds on which the European Parliament could express its view on the quality of the financial management of the joint undertaking while doing so in good faith; nevertheless notes that due to this situation, the risk to the legality and regularity of administrative expenditure was deemed as medium for the joint undertaking;

    (k) The total available budget in 2023 for the European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy amounted to EUR 807 million in commitment appropriations (compared to EUR 981,2 million in 2022) and EUR 631,5 million in payment appropriations (compared to EUR 844 million in 2022); understands furthermore that according to the report on budgetary and financial management of the European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy, its total budget execution rate for the financial year 2023 reached 73 % for commitment appropriations and 95 % for payment appropriations, indicating that there were serious issues related to the pace of implementation of the budget; in particular, stresses the low execution rate of commitment appropriations dedicated to operational expenditure, which reached 70 %; notes the explanation of the joint undertaking and takes note of the resulting transfers made back to the initially planned Euratom and ITER Host State contributions and generally calls on the joint undertaking to ensure a healthy pace of implementation for each section of its budget; takes note of the fact that these elements, which are related to delays and implementation difficulties, led the Court to consider the risk to budget management to be medium for this joint undertaking;

    19. Echoes the Court’s concerns as regards unused appropriations in the implementation of programmes of certain joint undertakings and calls on the joint undertakings concerned to avoid the reoccurrence of similar situations, as the accumulation of unused appropriations leads to cash surpluses, which are therefore not available to the Union for the financing of other activities and programmes; underlines that this is not in line with the principle of sound financial management and has resulted in a total of EUR 1,5 billion of cash surplus for the financial year 2023; echoes the Court’s recommendation for action in this regard which recommends that the joint undertakings concerned should develop corrective mechanisms to reduce their cash surpluses to a reasonable level and subsequently align their cash requests for each financial year with their estimated spending needs, in coordination with the Commission; is aware of possibilities under the financial rules of the joint undertakings concerned for unused appropriations to be entered in the estimate of revenue and expenditure of up to the three financial years following their reception; is nevertheless concerned more precisely with:

    (a) the shortcomings in the cash planning of the Clean Aviation Joint Undertaking, following the request for additional Union financial contributions of EUR 178 million in excess of cash needs for planned payment in 2023, resulting in a cash surplus of EUR 237 million at the end of 2023; takes note however of the explanation of the joint undertaking; nevertheless repeats its call for the Clean Aviation Joint Undertaking to avoid the reoccurrence of similar situations and welcomes the adjustments announced by the joint undertaking for 2024;

    (b) the shortcomings in the cash planning of the Chips Joint Undertaking, following the request for additional EU financial contributions of EUR 196 million in excess of cash needs for planned payment in 2023, resulting in a cash surplus of EUR 438 million at the end of 2023; takes note however of the explanation of the joint undertaking; nevertheless repeats its call for the Chips Joint Undertaking to avoid the reoccurrence of similar situations and welcomes the ambition announced by the joint undertaking for 2024;

    (c) the shortcomings in the cash planning of the European High-Performance Computing Joint Undertaking, following the request for additional Union financial contributions of EUR 488,6 million in excess of cash needs for planned payment in 2023, resulting in a cash surplus of EUR 840,7 million at the end of 2023; understands the situation faced by the joint undertaking which led to this surplus and welcomes the additional information provided during the hearing of the joint undertaking concerned in the Committee on Budgetary Control, notably as regards the expectations for projects related to Artificial Intelligence to provide an opportunity for an important cash-out; nevertheless repeats its call for the European High-Performance Computing Joint Undertaking to avoid the reoccurrence of similar situations;

    20.  Stresses that all joint undertakings shall strengthen internal financial controls and public transparency mechanisms, ensuring that funds are distributed efficiently and in a manner consistent with EU strategic objectives;

    21. Echoes the Court’s concerns as regards the contribution of members to certain joint undertakings, in particular as regards the possibility that some joint undertakings could not meet their contribution targets or only do so through high reliance on in-kind contributions to additional activities and calls on the joint undertakings concerned to take all actions necessary to prevent these situations from arising in the future; underlines that meeting contribution targets is the responsibility and obligation of the concerned joint undertakings and that failing to meet contribution targets goes against the founding idea of joint undertakings; is concerned, more precisely, with:

    (a) the situation of the Single European Sky ATM Research 3 Joint Undertaking, whose operational contribution target of its member Eurocontrol only reached a level of 70 %, which resulted in the joint undertaking not having the planned contributions at its disposal to fully implement its part of Horizon 2020; takes notes of the fact that this element did not however lead the Court to consider the risk to programme implementation to be medium or high for this joint undertaking, as it was deemed to be low;

    (b) the situation of the Circular Bio-based Europe Joint Undertaking, which performed well in reaching its contribution target under Horizon 2020, however notably did so through a revision of the balance between the targets for in-kind contributions to operational activities and for in-kind contributions to additional activities, the latter being raised to EUR 2 444,5 million, which corresponds to 90 % of the overall target; underlines that such a reliance on in-kind contributions to additional activities presents a risk to the implementation of the Horizon 2020 programme; underlines the substantial impact of the revision performed by the joint undertaking; takes notes of the explanation of the joint undertaking and of the fact that additional activities contribute to the overall objectives of the joint undertaking; nevertheless stresses that this constitutes an excessive reliance on in-kind contribution to additional activities to meet established targets and calls on the joint undertaking to avoid the reoccurrence of such a situation; takes note of the fact that these elements led the Court to consider the risk to programme implementation to be high for this joint undertaking;

    (c) the situation of the European High-Performance Computing Joint Undertaking, whose contribution from private members under Horizon 2020 only reached a reported amount of EUR 18,4 million against a target of EUR 420 million, which constitutes a severe difference; notes furthermore that such a situation might occur again under Horizon Europe and Digital Europe as the contribution target for private members has increased significantly to EUR 900 million while the financing arrangements that caused difficulties for private members under Horizon 2020 remain in place; takes note of the fact that these elements led the Court to consider the risk to programme implementation to be high for this joint undertaking; understands from the additional information provided during the hearing of the joint undertaking concerned in the Committee on Budgetary Control that this issue is being dealt with in cooperation with the Governing Board; nevertheless echoes the Court’s recommendation for action in this regard which recommends that the European High-Performance Computing Joint Undertaking should support the Commission’s reassessment of the current target in order to ensure that it can attain its contribution target for private members under Horizon Europe and Digital Europe and stresses once again that reaching contribution targets should not simply be considered as an ambition but as a duty;

    22. Underlines that to promote better efficiency, the Single Basic Act of the joint undertakings provides for an obligation for joint undertakings to achieve synergies via the establishment of back-office arrangements operating in a series of identified areas; understands that four areas have been identified as a priority by the joint undertakings concerned, namely accounting activities, legal activities, information and communication technologies and human resources; particularly welcomes in that regard:

    (a) the fact that the back-office arrangements dedicated to accounting activities have been operational since December 2022 and were therefore in operation for the entirety of financial year 2023, which could be observed in the production of the annual accounts as well as the fact that the Europe’s Rail Joint Undertaking took the lead in operating these back-office arrangements;

    (b) the fact that the Circular Bio-based Europe Joint Undertaking and the Innovative Health Initiative Joint Undertaking took the lead in operating back-office arrangements for the management of common recruitment, the legal framework of human resources and the digitalisation of human resources;

    (c) the fact that the Clean Hydrogen Joint Undertaking and the Innovative Health Initiative Joint Undertaking took the lead in operating back-office arrangements for the management of Information and Communication Technologies services;

    (d) the fact that the Clean Aviation Joint Undertaking, the Europe’s Rail Joint Undertaking and the European High-Performance Computing Joint Undertaking took the lead in operating back-office arrangements for the management of administrative procurements;

    (e) the fact that joint undertakings are further implementing the joint strategic ICT plan of the joint undertakings located in the White Atrium building;

    23.  Calls on the joint undertakings concerned by the obligation under the Single Basic Act to keep reporting on their establishment of back-office arrangements, to provide clear information on which joint undertakings operate tasks for other joint undertakings in certain areas, to include as soon as possible communication, logistics, events and meeting room management as well as the support for audit and anti-fraud strategies on the list of priorities and to provide information on the areas to be considered for the establishment of back-office arrangements in the future, once arrangements in the areas identified as a priority have been concluded;

    Procurement and tenders

    24. Echoes the Court’s concerns as regards procurement procedures and calls on joint undertakings to ensure that the compliance with relevant legal provisions and the necessary complexity of certain procurement procedures do not lead to an increased risk to the legality and regularity of operational expenditure; is concerned, more precisely, by:

    (a) the situations of the Innovative Health Initiative Joint Undertaking and of the Chips Joint Undertaking, for both of which the Court of Auditors observed weaknesses in the design and evaluation of one significant procurement procedure; takes notes of the fact that this element did not however lead the Court to consider the risk to operational control expenditure to be medium or high for this joint undertaking; nevertheless stresses the fact that such weaknesses may result in irregular contracts and payments if not addressed in future procurement procedures; welcomes the readiness of the joint undertakings to take action on these specific cases and to improve their procurement processes;

    (b) the fact that the Court of Auditors has evaluated the risk to operational contract expenditure to be medium for the European High-Performance Computing Joint Undertaking and the European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy because of their complex procurement procedures for high-value contracts;

    25. Underlines the financial exposure of the European High-Performance Computing Joint Undertaking to a supplier facing difficulties which is evaluated by the joint undertaking as ranging from a potential low impact of EUR 0 to an estimated maximum impact of EUR 88 million; understands from the annual accounts of the joint undertaking that this situation is being carefully scrutinised; calls on the joint undertaking to take all actions necessary to minimise financial liabilities; welcomes the additional information provided during the hearing of the joint undertaking concerned in the Committee on Budgetary Control, especially as regards the additional guarantees requested by the joint undertaking concerned to minimise this financial liability as well as the explanation provided on the key role of this specific supplier;

    26. Takes note of the fact that the levels of detail and the level of accessibility vary when it comes to the quantitative data provided by the joint undertakings on the gender balance of experts selected to work with the joint undertakings; calls on all joint undertakings to increase transparency and to include clear quantitative data on gender balance among the experts selected in their future Annual Activity Reports; calls on all joint undertakings to intensify their efforts to promote gender equality at all levels and to ensure that gender balance remains a horizontal priority in all activities related to procurement, grants and tenders and to provide explanations when gender balance cannot be achieved;

    27. Takes note of the fact that the levels of detail and the level of accessibility vary when it comes to the quantitative data provided by the joint undertakings on the geographical distribution of experts selected to work with the joint undertakings; calls on all joint undertakings to include clear quantitative data on the geographical distribution of the experts selected in their future Annual Activity Reports; calls on all joint undertakings to ensure that geographical distribution remains a horizontal priority in all activities related to procurement, grants and tenders and to provide explanations when sufficient geographical distribution cannot be achieved;

    28. Calls for a fair and equitable geographical distribution of funding from the joint undertakings, ensuring that regions with lower innovation capacity and SMEs receive adequate support;

    Staff and recruitment

    29. Is concerned with the state of play of recruitment within the European High-Performance Computing Joint Undertaking, which received 39 additional posts to be recruited by the end of the financial year 2023 in order to implement the significant funds received under the current multiannual financial framework but which only managed to recruit 21 additional staff; is furthermore concerned with the assessment of the Court of Auditors which determined that the recruitment procedures of the joint undertakings were not sufficiently transparent due to a lack of clear and previously agreed upon scoring-grids to assess candidates and their qualifications as well as due to a lack of sufficient documentation on the underlying decision-making process; regrets that in the view of the Court of Auditors, this situation may have resulted in a lack of equal treatment of candidates; reminds that it is paramount to avoid the application of double standards during the recruitment process and requests for all necessary actions to be taken in this regard; echoes the Court’s recommendation for action in this regard which recommends that the European High-Performance Computing Joint Undertaking should use its increased staff effectively to achieve its recruitment target by the end of 2024 and that, in order to increase the transparency of its recruitment procedures and to substantiate the decision-making processes of the selection committee, the European High-Performance Computing Joint Undertaking should use a pre-agreed scoring grid during the pre-selection phase, in line with the practice of other joint undertakings and Union bodies; welcomes the readiness of the joint undertaking to integrate recommendations for improvements;

    30. Emphasises the need for a coherent and fair staffing policy across all Joint Undertakings to ensure adequate and inclusive working conditions, career development opportunities, and work-life balance for staff; calls for the implementation of measures to prevent excessive reliance on temporary contracts and precarious employment; underlines the importance of mental health support structures, flexible working arrangements, and fair internal promotion opportunities to improve staff well-being;

    31. Calls on all joint undertakings to implement concrete measures to improve gender balance in leadership positions and decision-making bodies, including setting gender balance targets and regularly monitoring progress; stresses the need to address gender pay gaps and ensure equal opportunities for career advancement;

    32. Takes note of the fact that the Court considered the risk to the legality and regularity of administrative expenditure to be low for all joint undertakings except for the Chips Joint Undertaking and the European High-Performance Computing Joint Undertaking for which it was deemed to be medium due to their high recruitment level, as well as for the Smart Networks and Services Joint Undertaking and the Global Health EDCTP3 Joint Undertaking, due to their recent financial autonomy;

    33. Is concerned with the situation of the European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy as regards different aspects related to the management of human resources observed by the Court of Auditors, especially as regards the use of external service providers, notably:

    (a) the important reliance of the joint undertaking on external service providers, as it was observed that near to half of the staff of the joint undertaking consisted of external service providers (361 external service providers and 429 statutory staff in 2023) which makes that situation a critical issue with a potential large-scale impact on the capacity of the joint undertaking to manage its human resources in a sustainable manner while ensuring a capacity for retention of knowledge and institutional memory, which also allow for financial gains in the long run;

    (b) the fact that the joint undertaking did not adopt a unique formal definition of external service providers, which resulted in a lack of clarity in its assessment of their impact on statutory staff needs; notes furthermore that the risk register of the joint undertaking did not include all the potential risks related to a high level of reliance on external service providers in the long term, which might prevent the internal control of the joint undertaking from having adequate mitigating measures put in place to address those risks;

    (c) the findings of the audit conducted on this matter by the Commission’s internal audit service which revealed that the joint undertaking had not set up a centralised function for the coordination and management of external service providers, nor had it set up a methodology for assessing its aggregate human resources needs, and in particular its needs for external service providers; underlines that it was observed that the joint undertaking’s decision on the use of external service providers was therefore based on budgetary concerns rather than human resources needs;

    (d) the lack of transparency in the reporting of the joint undertaking on its human resources; particularly as regards the presentation of permanent and non-permanent staff figures, given that 224 of the 386 temporary and contract staff had in reality an indefinite contract and could therefore have been considered as permanent staff from a practical point of view; calls on the joint undertaking to underline such nuances in the future in its reporting on human resources;

    (e) echoes the Court’s recommendation for action which recommends that the European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy should establish a centralised coordination and management function for external service providers and adopt a comprehensive methodology to regularly assess its total human resources needs based on the expected workload and required skills and that the joint undertaking concerned should also supplement its risk register with the most important risks deriving from its high level of use of external service providers in the long run;

    (f) welcomes the commitments made by the joint undertaking and welcomes its explanation of the challenges leading to an important use of external service providers; is nevertheless concerned with this important dependency and the related risks; calls on the joint undertaking to provide more detailed information in the future on the decision-making processes leading to the use of external service providers;

    34. Takes note of the fact that the levels of detail and the level of accessibility vary when it comes to the quantitative data provided by the joint undertakings on the gender balance among their staff and within their governing bodies and structures in their Annual Activity Reports; calls on all joint undertakings to include a clear section dedicated to quantitative data on gender balance among their staff and within their governing bodies and structures in their future Annual Activity Reports, including the disaggregation of data between different levels of responsibility and different types of contract; calls on all joint undertakings to ensure that gender balance remains an objective at all levels of responsibility and to persist in their efforts to enhance it, in order to ensure a fair representation of society within their staff and to promote a healthy and productive working environment and to provide explanations when gender balance cannot be achieved;

    35. Takes note of the fact that the levels of detail and the level of accessibility vary when it comes to the quantitative data provided by the joint undertakings on the geographical distribution within their staff and within their governing bodies and structures in their Annual Activity Reports; calls on all joint undertakings to include a clear section dedicated to quantitative data on geographical distribution among their staff and within their governing bodies and structures in their future Annual Activity Reports, including the disaggregation of data between different levels of responsibility and different types of contract; calls on all joint undertakings to ensure that a satisfactory geographical distribution remains an objective at all levels of responsibility and to provide explanations when a sufficient geographical distribution cannot be achieved;

    36. Welcomes the work of the EU Agencies Network (EUAN) and its Working Group on Diversity and Inclusion which led to the EUAN Charter on Diversity and Inclusion; invites joint undertakings to adopt this Charter;

    37. Underlines that joint undertakings shall ensure that funded projects contribute to social well-being and inclusivity, respect workers’ rights and labour conditions and align with the principles of a just transition to sustainable technologies;

    Management and control systems

    38. Welcomes the work of the Court of Auditors on the examination of grant payments made by the ten joint undertakings implementing research and innovation projects, especially as regards its complementary audit of a sample of grant payments at beneficiary level under Horizon 2020; is concerned with the results of this examination which showed that there were persistent systemic errors, especially as regards declared personnel and equipment costs; calls for correction of the systemic errors;

    39. Underlines that the Court of Auditors found one case of quantified and serious error in payments under Horizon 2020 for the Clean Aviation Joint Undertaking, the Innovative Health Initiative Joint Undertaking, the Clean Hydrogen Joint Undertaking, the Circular Bio-based Europe Joint Undertaking, as well as for the Europe’s Rail Joint Undertaking; welcomes the initiatives taken in this regard to raise awareness at beneficiary level; calls on all joint undertakings to ensure the legality and regularity of operational expenditure and underlines that the Court of Auditors deemed the risk to the interim and final grant payments of the joint undertakings to be medium;

    40. Calls on the Commission to implement: i) mandatory financial training for beneficiaries of the joint undertakings to prevent recurrent accounting errors; ii) automated verification tools to enhance accuracy in personnel cost calculations; iii) stronger ex-ante audit procedures to ensure proper use of Union funds;

    41. Welcomes the fact that according to the extrapolation of the Court of Auditors for all joint undertakings, the average error rate is just below the materiality threshold of 2% for grant expenditure, as well as the fact that the residual error rates calculated by the Commission’s common audit service were also below the materiality threshold;

    42. Takes note of the fact that the number of Horizon Europe and Digital Europe interim payments was too small to feature in the sample audited by the Court of Auditors in 2023;

    43. Takes note of the fact that there were several changes to the internal control framework of joint undertakings under Horizon Europe, notably the fact that the Commission no longer intends to make specific representative ex-post audits on behalf of individual Horizon Europe stakeholders, such as joint undertakings; notes furthermore that the Commission plans to apply the same change to grant payments under Digital Europe;

    44. Is concerned with the lack of communication, collaboration and coordination between the risk management of the European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy and its internal audit functions, as well as with the related lack of an integrated risk management process and the fact that the joint undertaking could not provide satisfactory evidence that it regularly uses risk management information when planning internal audit activities; echoes the Court’s recommendation for action in this regard which recommends that the joint undertaking concerned implement an integrated risk management process in its internal control framework in order to manage its risks effectively; welcomes the plans of the joint undertaking to take action on this issue;

    45. Underlines the importance of implementing a comprehensive and up to date business continuity plan and disaster recovery plan for the joint undertakings; regrets in that regard that at the end of the financial year 2023, the joint undertakings, with the exception of the European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy, did not have a satisfactory policy in place in this regard; welcomes the plans of the joint undertaking to take action on this issue;

    46. Points out that the Smart Networks and Services Joint Undertaking and the Global Health EDCTP3 Joint Undertaking still had not fully implemented the Commission’s internal control framework and calls on these two joint undertakings to fully implement that framework;

    Fraud, ethics and conflicts of interests

    47. Takes note of the fact that the Court of Auditors made one notification of suspected fraud to the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) during its audit of the financial year 2023; understands that the case was later dismissed by OLAF as no fraud was observed in relation to the staff matter concerned; welcomes the diligence of the Court of Auditors and the cooperation within the anti-fraud architecture;

    48. Underlines the importance of implementing an internal control policy on sensitive functions for the joint undertakings; stresses that such a policy can prevent and mitigate the risk of inappropriate or fraudulent action; regrets that at the end of the financial year 2023, the Single European Sky ATM Research 3 Joint Undertaking, the Clean Hydrogen Joint Undertaking, the Chips Joint Undertaking, the European High-Performance Computing Joint Undertaking as well as the European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy did not yet have a policy in that regard; stresses the critical nature of this situation and urges the joint undertakings to take action without unnecessary delays;

    49. Takes note of the situation in the Chips Joint Undertaking referred to by the Court of Auditors, which saw one of its former senior staff members who had left the joint undertaking recently take up a new occupational activity without prior notice to the joint undertaking concerned; calls on the joint undertaking concerned and all other joint undertakings to conduct active monitoring of the new occupational activities of former senior staff members as well as of staff members occupying a sensitive function; welcomes the additional information provided by the joint undertaking concerned on this specific case;

    50. Calls on all joint undertakings to enhance their transparency policies, particularly regarding potential conflicts of interest; urges joint undertakings to publish declarations of interest for their members of boards of management, scientific committees, and external experts, ensuring that any financial, professional, or personal ties to entities benefiting from funding from the joint undertakings are disclosed; insists on the introduction of a mandatory ‘cooling-off’ period for senior staff of the joint undertakings before they can take up employment in organisations that receive funding from the joint undertakings;

    51. Takes note of the information reported by the joint undertakings on their activities related to prevention, detection, and correction of fraud; calls on all joint undertakings to strengthen their role and identify their weaknesses by engaging further in anti-fraud discussions and to report on such elements and to include in their future reports a clear presentation of the legal framework and policies put in place in this regard;

    Remarks on the follow-up of Joint Undertakings to the previous discharge exercise

    52. Welcomes the fact that joint undertakings have produced a follow-up report to the European Parliament resolutions with observations forming an integral part of the decisions on discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the joint undertakings for the financial year 2022; notes that these reports provide the views of the joint undertakings on the issues underlined by the European Parliament to a satisfactory extent;

    53. Welcomes the fact that the Court’s report also includes an analysis of the follow-up of joint undertakings to previous observations and recommendations for actions published by the Court; notes in this regard that out of 37 observations not sufficiently addressed at the end of 2022, 16 were closed and 21 remained open at the end of 2023; furthermore notes that out of the 15 recommended actions in the annual reports of 2021 and 2022, 9 had been fully implemented, 2 in most respects, 3 in some respects and 1 not implemented at all; understands that some recommendations that still need to be implemented further mainly relate to human resources issues which the joint undertakings can only implement in cooperation with the Directorate-General for Budget of the Commission and once applications are ready to be implemented; understands that the recommendations that had to be implemented before the end of 2023 were implemented in due time;

    54. Welcomes the fact that the Court of Auditors has now provided a deadline for implementation for each of its open recommendations for action, which were defined in cooperation with the joint undertakings to ensure their feasibility; calls on all joint undertakings to continue to report back to the Court of Auditors and the European Parliament on these issues;

    55. Notes with concern the persistent challenges related to cost overruns, delays, and governance issues in the implementation of the ITER project; calls for improved financial oversight and enhanced budgetary transparency, including more detailed public reporting on cost developments, spending efficiency, and progress toward key project milestones; stresses the need for stricter auditing mechanisms to ensure that Union contributions to the project are effectively utilised; urges the joint undertaking to strengthen internal governance by ensuring regular and independent evaluations of project risks and by increasing accountability mechanisms for senior management;

    Other priorities for the joint undertakings

    56. Is aware of the administrative and budgetary constraints of joint undertakings and in respect of these constraints, calls on joint undertakings to better disseminate their contribution to research and innovation activities through accessible communication material intended for academic and research institutions, public and private organisations and European and national authorities; calls for this accessible communication material to promote the opportunities for procurement contracts and grants offered by the joint undertakings in the area of research and innovation activities;

    57. Calls on joint undertakings to proactively engage in communication activities in order to reach a wide range of EU citizens in a pedagogical effort to present their contribution to common goals and the need for institutionalised partnerships that involve private members;

    58. Calls on the joint undertakings to establish the cooperation with universities in order to reach out to young European graduates to strengthen their future recruitment processes;

    59. Calls on joint undertakings to continue to report effectively and to the extent of their capacity on their contribution to employment and to the competitiveness of the European economy, in light of the necessity for all important stakeholders of the European Union in the area of research and innovation to focus on the reindustrialisation of the European Union;

    60. Calls on joint undertakings to continue to ensure a sufficient level of participation of private firms, especially of small and medium-sized enterprises, which constitute the strongest asset of the European economy;

    61. Calls on joint undertakings to report effectively on their contribution to horizontal priorities of the budget of the European Union, including as regards climate mainstreaming and to provide explanations where relevant on how their activities can contribute to the objectives of the European Green Deal;

    62. Calls on all joint undertakings to continue to act with diligence in the conduct of their activities when dealing with international stakeholders, especially in light of the regime of restrictive measures put in place by the European Union; underlines the particular situation of the European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy in this regard and welcomes the explanations provided during the hearing of the joint undertaking concerned in the Committee on Budgetary Control on measures put in place to prevent any issues in the framework of the ITER project;

    63. Calls on all joint undertakings to ensure that their staff are making a good use of possible synergies with other entities from the European Union, such as agencies, in all relevant areas and in order to increase the efficiency and impact of their operations; calls on all joint undertakings to ensure that their staff are making good use of the platform that constitutes the EU Agencies Network (EUAN);

    64. Emphasies the need for digital sovereignty in research funded by the Union; in that regard puts special emphasis on the Chips Joint Undertaking, Euro European High Performance Computing Joint Undertaking, and the Smart Networks and Services Joint Undertaking who shall prioritise projects that enhance Union autonomy in semiconductor manufacturing, artificial intelligence, and cybersecurity; asks the Commission to ensure that projects funded by joint undertakings: i) are not excessively reliant on third-country suppliers for critical technologies; ii) contribute to the Union’s industrial resilience and strategic independence; iii) foster domestic R&D in key digital sectors;

    Call for a follow-up

    65. Calls on each joint undertaking considered for the granting of discharge for the financial year 2023 to produce an individual follow-up report on all actions taken to address the specific issues mentioned in this resolution and to submit this follow-up report signed by the (Executive) Director of the joint undertaking to the European Parliament by no later than 30 September 2025;

    66. Underlines that follow-up reports may also contain the general views of the joint undertakings on this resolution and on other matters relevant for the discharge authority; expects the joint undertakings to draft this report with a comprehensive approach, to touch on all issues addressed by the European Parliament concerning their activities, and to do so in good faith and cooperation.

    ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    Pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure, the rapporteur declares that he received input from the following entities or persons in the preparation of the report, prior to the adoption thereof in committee:

    Entity and/or person

    European Court of Auditors

    European High Performance Computing Joint Undertaking

     

    The list above is drawn up under the exclusive responsibility of the rapporteur.

    Where natural persons are identified in the list by their name, by their function or by both, the rapporteur declares that he has submitted to the concerned natural persons the European Parliament’s Data Protection Notice No 484 (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/data-protect/index.do), which sets out the conditions applicable to the processing of their personal data and the rights linked to that processing.

     

     

    OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORT AND TOURISM (29.1.2025)

    for the Committee on Budgetary Control

    on discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the EU joint undertakings for the financial year 2023

    (2024/2031(DEC))

    Rapporteur for opinion: Gheorghe Falcă 

     

    OPINION

    The Committee on Transport and Tourism calls on the Committee on Budgetary Control, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following into its motion for a resolution:

    1. Welcomes the ‘clean’ opinion for the 2023 financial year provided by the European Court of Auditors (‘the Court’) in relation to the reliability of the annual accounts, as well as the legality and regularity of the revenues and payments underlying the accounts of the Clean Aviation Joint Undertaking (CAJU), the Single European Sky ATM Research 3 Joint Undertaking (SESAR 3 JU), and the Europe’s Rail Joint Undertaking (EU Rail);

     

    2. Notes the Court’s observations directed at all three Joint Undertakings (JU) concerning their outdated business continuity and disaster recovery plans; welcomes the measures taken by the JUs following the Court’s assessment to ensure that these plans are regularly updated and adapted to organisational changes and emerging risks in the operating environment;

     

    3. Welcomes the 2023 activities related to the calls for proposals and grant management carried out by the three JUs under their respective programmes; recognizes the value of initiatives fostering stakeholder engagement and participation, such as open calls for expressions of interest and joint calls across the JUs, as instrumental in leveraging the collective expertise and resources; draws particular attention to the joint call for proposals launched by EU-Rail and SESAR 3 JU – the first ever cross-joint undertaking synergy topic call aimed at developing an integrated air and rail network for a sustainable multimodal transport system;

     

    4. Takes notice of the back-office arrangements signed by the three JUs in 2023, facilitating their collaboration with the other joint undertakings for efficiency gains in various shared areas, including human resources, accounting, ICT, and procurement;

     

    5. Acknowledges the significant contributions of the JUs in advancing research, innovation, and technology development across various sectors, including aviation, rail, and air traffic management, as integral to achieving the EU’s strategic objectives of sustainability, digital transformation, and competitiveness.

     

    Part I – Discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the Clean Aviation Joint Undertaking (CAJU)

     

    1. Takes notice of the reduced 2023 commitment budget of CAJU (EUR 269 million, down from EUR 411,2 million in 2022), reflecting the lower value of the Horizon Europe calls launched in 2023; points out that its increased 2023 payment budget (EUR 468,4 million, up from EUR 415,3 million in 2022) covered the interim payments for the ongoing Horizon 2020 projects and the significant pre-financing for grant agreements planned by the end of 2023 under the Horizon Europe programme;

     

    2. Observes that the members’ commitments for the JU’s operational and additional activities under Horizon 2020 programme exceeded their operational contribution targets, therefore, at the end of 2023, CAJU still had to pay around EUR 41 million (or 2,4%) in the coming years for projects yet to be completed, and to validate in-kind contributions to its operational activities of EUR 244,3 million and in-kind contributions to additional activities of EUR 153,4 million;

     

    3. Notes that the implementation rate for the 2023 operational payment appropriations under the Horizon Europe programme decreased to 51%, primarily due to the slower start of the CAJU’s technically complex activities and delays in ongoing Horizon 2020 activities; notes that in 2023, CAJU requested EUR 178 million in additional EU financial contributions, exceeding the cash needs and resulting in a EUR 237 million cash surplus, which indicates shortcomings in its cash planning; notes that it is imperative to make the accumulated cash surplus available for other urgent EU needs and urges CAJU to define its goals and future financial resource needs more clearly, to prevent similar situations in the future[137]a;

     

    4. Notes that the technical activity under the Clean Sky 2 (CS2) programme mostly completed in 2023 and acknowledges the progress made in finalisation of the remaining technology maturation and demonstration activities, notably in delivering a series of key demonstrators in the programme’s different System & Platform Demonstrator (SPD) areas;

     

    5. Points out that the 20 projects selected in the first call for proposals of the Clean Aviation programme successfully kicked-off in January 2023, committing 40% of the funding available over the life cycle of the programme (EUR 736 million); takes notice of the second call launched in February 2023, which resulted in the signature of 8 grant agreements for a maximum amount of approximately EUR 137 million (7,5% of the funding available), that will aim at definition of novel aircraft concepts, innovative propulsion architectures, as well as new fuselage and wing designs;

     

    6. Draws attention to the open call for expression of interest published by CAJU in May 2023, targeting private stakeholders to become Associated Members of CAJU; notes that, following the evaluation, 20 new Associated Members from 12 different countries acceded to the Clean Aviation Partnership in December 2023, bringing the number of its Members to 59.

     

     

    Part II – Discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the Single European Sky ATM Research 3 Joint Undertaking (SESAR 3 JU)

     

    1. Takes notice of the reduced 2023 commitment budget of SESAR 3 JU (EUR 111,2 million, down from EUR 158,8 million in 2022), reflecting the lower number of calls for Horizon Europe projects; points out that its increased 2023 payment budget (EUR 241,5 million, up from 146,9 million in 2022) covered the interim payments for the ongoing Horizon 2020 projects and the significant pre-financing payments for the grant agreements and contracts planned by the end of 2023 under the Horizon Europe programme;

     

    2. Highlights that by the end of 2022, EU and the JU’s private members met their operational contribution targets, while Eurocontrol committed only 70% of its target; notes that this shortfall prevented SESAR 3 JU from receiving all planned contributions necessary for the full implementation of its part of the Horizon 2020 programme; further notes that by the end of 2023, the JU had EUR 36,8 million (6,6%) in outstanding payments for incomplete projects and contracts, and needed to validate in-kind contributions of EUR 105,1 million;

     

    3. Regrets that at the end of 2023, SESAR 3 JU still lacked a policy on the management of sensitive functions, essential to prevent or mitigate the risk of inappropriate actions and corruption, in accordance with the European Commission’s Internal Control Principles; notes that in 2023, the Commission’s Internal Audit Service observed that the JU’s business continuity plan (BCP) and the related disaster recovery plan (DRP) had not been updated since 2016; calls on SESAR 3 JU to regularly update its BCP and DRP1b[138];

     

    4. Welcomes the successful closure in 2023 of the remaining projects funded under the SESAR 2020 programme, integrating their outcomes into the new Digital European Sky (DES) programme; points out that the 2023 exploratory and industrial research calls under DES resulted in 50 projects, covering the nine SESAR flagship areas; welcomes three new Digital Sky Demonstrator projects funded under the Connecting Europe Facility along to the five already managed by the SESAR 3 JU; notes that 58 DES projects that involve more than 300 different beneficiaries, represent a total investment of more than EUR 600 million;

     

    5. Welcomes the update of the European ATM Master Plan, commenced by SESAR 3 JU in order to set out the vision and prioritize the digital solutions necessary to deliver DES; points out that the update campaign includes extensive consultations with stakeholders to ensure a collaborative and aligned approach towards achieving the strategic objectives leading to ATM modernization; expects the Governing Board to have it adopted by December 2024.

     

     

    Part III – Discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the Europe’s Rail Joint Undertaking (EU-Rail)

     

    1. Notes that the reduced commitment and payment budgets for 2023 (respectively, EUR 102,6 million and 120,3 million, down from EUR 171,4 million and 180,8 million in 2022) reflected the lower value of calls for Horizon Europe projects and the diminishing level of payments related to Horizon 2020 projects;

     

    2. Observes that the members’ commitments for the JU’s operational and additional activities under the Horizon 2020 programme exceeded their operational contribution targets, noting that at the end of 2023, EU-Rail still had to pay around EUR 40,5 million (or 10.8%) for projects and contracts yet to be completed, and to validate in-kind contributions to its operational activities of EUR 44,7 million;

     

    3. Remarks that although the 2023 implementation rate for operational payment appropriations of Horizon 2020 programme increased to 67% (from 47% in 2022), it remained below expectations; points out that EU-Rail postponed final payments to 2024 due to technical issues experienced by beneficiaries; takes notice of the several projects that did not fully claim their budgets, reducing the need for operational payments by approximately EUR 4,1 million; calls on EU-Rail to take action to improve the implementation rate for operational payment appropriations and to elaborate a plan on how to improve the accounting reporting obligations1c[139];

     

    4. Commends the strong cooperation of the JU with the European Union Agency for Railways to ensure the interoperability of the developed projects; commends the collaboration with the sectoral associations, third country programmes and other programmes, partnerships, and bodies, to establish further synergies;

     

    5. Welcomes the commitment of the JU to facilitate R&I activities to deliver an integrated European railway network by design, eliminating interoperability barriers and delivering smart, sustainable, and resilient railway system to ensure a harmonized approach to the evolution of the Single European Rail Area; commends the integrated EU-Rail programme for its continued efforts to disseminate information on the benefits of rail transportation and travel to European citizens, and recognizes the complementarity between its R&I output, particularly in fostering interoperability, and the key objectives outlined in the European Green Deal and the Smart and Sustainable Mobility Strategy; acknowledges the progress made under the programme, based on its System Pillar, the “generic system integrator” for the future of the EU rail, providing governance, resources, and outputs to support a coherent and coordinated approach to railway system development, as well as on its Innovation Pillar, which encompasses advanced operational and technological solutions aimed at creating a more efficient railway system, including large-scale demonstrations and exploratory research; takes notice of the 2023 decision of the Governing Board to establish the Deployment Group to advise on the market uptake of rail innovation developed by EU-Rail and to support the deployment of innovative solutions;

     

    6. Welcomes the 2023 achievements under the European Digital Automatic Coupler (DAC) Delivery Programme that facilitated cooperation among rail stakeholders, enhancing the implementation of DAC for European rail freight;

     

    7. Congratulates the JU for its continued, active reporting on its contributions to the United Nation’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), as well as its contribution to completing the Single European Railway Area;

     

    8. Highlights the importance of supporting the JU given rail’s inherent advantages in terms of environmental performance, land use, energy consumption, and safety.

     

    ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS
    FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    The rapporteur for the opinion declares under his exclusive responsibility that he did not receive input from any entity or person to be mentioned in this Annex pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure.

     

    INFORMATION ON ADOPTION BY COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION

    Date adopted

    29.1.2025

     

     

     

    Result of final vote

    +:

    –:

    0:

    31

    6

    6

    Members present for the final vote

    Oihane Agirregoitia Martínez, Daniel Attard, Tom Berendsen, Rachel Blom, Nikolina Brnjac, Nina Carberry, Benoit Cassart, Carlo Ciccioli, Anna Maria Cisint, Vivien Costanzo, Johan Danielsson, Valérie Devaux, Siegbert Frank Droese, Gheorghe Falcă, Jens Gieseke, Borja Giménez Larraz, Sérgio Gonçalves, Roman Haider, Sérgio Humberto, Dariusz Joński, François Kalfon, Martine Kemp, Sophia Kircher, Elena Kountoura, Luis-Vicențiu Lazarus, Julien Leonardelli, Vicent Marzà Ibáñez, Alexandra Mehnert, Ştefan Muşoiu, Jan-Christoph Oetjen, Philippe Olivier, Matteo Ricci, Rosa Serrano Sierra, Stanislav Stoyanov, Kai Tegethoff, Elissavet Vozemberg-Vrionidi, Kosma Złotowski

    Substitutes present for the final vote

    Alberico Gambino, Jutta Paulus, Dario Tamburrano, Kris Van Dijck, Ana Vasconcelos

    Members under Rule 216(7) present for the final vote

    Elisabeth Grossmann

     

    FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL IN COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION

    31

    +

    PPE

    Tom Berendsen, Nikolina Brnjac, Nina Carberry, Gheorghe Falcă, Jens Gieseke, Borja Giménez Larraz, Sérgio Humberto, Dariusz Joński, Martine Kemp, Sophia Kircher, Alexandra Mehnert, Elissavet Vozemberg-Vrionidi

    Renew

    Oihane Agirregoitia Martínez, Benoit Cassart, Valérie Devaux, Jan-Christoph Oetjen, Ana Vasconcelos

    S&D

    Daniel Attard, Vivien Costanzo, Johan Danielsson, Sérgio Gonçalves, Elisabeth Grossmann, François Kalfon, Ştefan Muşoiu, Matteo Ricci, Rosa Serrano Sierra

    The Left

    Elena Kountoura, Dario Tamburrano

    Verts/ALE

    Vicent Marzà Ibáñez, Jutta Paulus, Kai Tegethoff

     

    6

    –

    ESN

    Siegbert Frank Droese, Stanislav Stoyanov

    NI

    Luis-Vicențiu Lazarus

    PfE

    Rachel Blom, Julien Leonardelli, Philippe Olivier

     

    6

    0

    ECR

    Carlo Ciccioli, Alberico Gambino, Kris Van Dijck, Kosma Złotowski

    PfE

    Anna Maria Cisint, Roman Haider

     

    Key to symbols:

    + : in favour

    – : against

    0 : abstention

     

     

    INFORMATION ON ADOPTION IN COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE

    Date adopted

    18.3.2025

     

     

     

    Result of final vote

    +:

    –:

    0:

    20

    4

    2

    Members present for the final vote

    Georgios Aftias, Arno Bausemer, Damian Boeselager, Gilles Boyer, Olivier Chastel, Caterina Chinnici, Tamás Deutsch, Dick Erixon, Daniel Freund, Esteban González Pons, Niclas Herbst, Monika Hohlmeier, Virginie Joron, Kinga Kollár, Giuseppe Lupo, Marit Maij, Csaba Molnár, Fidias Panayiotou, Jacek Protas, Julien Sanchez, Jonas Sjöstedt, Carla Tavares, Tomáš Zdechovský

    Substitutes present for the final vote

    Bert-Jan Ruissen, Annamária Vicsek, Michal Wiezik

    Members under Rule 216(7) present for the final vote

    Vilija Blinkevičiūtė, Gaetano Pedulla’

     

    FINAL VOTES BY ROLL CALL BY THE COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE

    Final votes on proposals for decisions

     

    Clean Aviation Joint Undertaking

     

    21

    +

    ECR

    Bert-Jan Ruissen

    NI

    Fidias Panayiotou

    PPE

    Georgios Aftias, Caterina Chinnici, Esteban González Pons, Monika Hohlmeier, Kinga Kollár, Jacek Protas, Tomáš Zdechovský

    Renew

    Gilles Boyer, Olivier Chastel, Michal Wiezik

    S&D

    Vilija Blinkevičiūtė, Giuseppe Lupo, Marit Maij, Csaba Molnár, Carla Tavares

    The Left

    Gaetano Pedulla’, Jonas Sjöstedt

    Verts/ALE

    Damian Boeselager, Daniel Freund

     

    4

    –

    ECR

    Dick Erixon

    ESN

    Arno Bausemer

    PfE

    Virginie Joron, Julien Sanchez

     

    2

    0

    PfE

    Tamás Deutsch, Annamária Vicsek

     

    Key to symbols:

    + : in favour

    – : against

    0 : abstention

     

    Circular Bio-based Europe Joint Undertaking

     

    22

    +

    ECR

    Bert-Jan Ruissen

    NI

    Fidias Panayiotou

    PPE

    Georgios Aftias, Caterina Chinnici, Esteban González Pons, Niclas Herbst, Monika Hohlmeier, Kinga Kollár, Jacek Protas, Tomáš Zdechovský

    Renew

    Gilles Boyer, Olivier Chastel, Michal Wiezik

    S&D

    Vilija Blinkevičiūtė, Giuseppe Lupo, Marit Maij, Csaba Molnár, Carla Tavares

    The Left

    Gaetano Pedulla’, Jonas Sjöstedt

    Verts/ALE

    Damian Boeselager, Daniel Freund

     

    4

    –

    ECR

    Dick Erixon

    ESN

    Arno Bausemer

    PfE

    Virginie Joron, Julien Sanchez

     

    2

    0

    PfE

    Tamás Deutsch, Annamária Vicsek

     

    Key to symbols:

    + : in favour

    – : against

    0 : abstention

     

    Clean Hydrogen Joint Undertaking

     

    21

    +

    ECR

    Bert-Jan Ruissen

    NI

    Fidias Panayiotou

    PPE

    Georgios Aftias, Caterina Chinnici, Esteban González Pons, Niclas Herbst, Monika Hohlmeier, Kinga Kollár, Jacek Protas, Tomáš Zdechovský

    Renew

    Gilles Boyer, Olivier Chastel, Michal Wiezik

    S&D

    Vilija Blinkevičiūtė, Giuseppe Lupo, Marit Maij, Csaba Molnár, Carla Tavares

    The Left

    Gaetano Pedulla’

    Verts/ALE

    Damian Boeselager, Daniel Freund

     

    3

    –

    ECR

    Dick Erixon

    PfE

    Virginie Joron, Julien Sanchez

     

    3

    0

    ESN

    Arno Bausemer

    PfE

    Tamás Deutsch, Annamária Vicsek

     

    Key to symbols:

    + : in favour

    – : against

    0 : abstention

     

    Europe’s Rail Joint Undertaking

     

    21

    +

    ECR

    Bert-Jan Ruissen

    NI

    Fidias Panayiotou

    PPE

    Georgios Aftias, Caterina Chinnici, Esteban González Pons, Niclas Herbst, Monika Hohlmeier, Kinga Kollár, Jacek Protas, Tomáš Zdechovský

    Renew

    Olivier Chastel, Michal Wiezik

    S&D

    Vilija Blinkevičiūtė, Giuseppe Lupo, Marit Maij, Csaba Molnár, Carla Tavares

    The Left

    Gaetano Pedulla’, Jonas Sjöstedt

    Verts/ALE

    Damian Boeselager, Daniel Freund

     

    4

    –

    ECR

    Dick Erixon

    ESN

    Arno Bausemer

    PfE

    Virginie Joron, Julien Sanchez

     

    2

    0

    PfE

    Tamás Deutsch, Annamária Vicsek

     

    Key to symbols:

    + : in favour

    – : against

    0 : abstention

     

    European High-Performance Computing Joint Undertaking

     

    22

    +

    ECR

    Bert-Jan Ruissen

    NI

    Fidias Panayiotou

    PPE

    Georgios Aftias, Caterina Chinnici, Esteban González Pons, Niclas Herbst, Monika Hohlmeier, Kinga Kollár, Jacek Protas, Tomáš Zdechovský

    Renew

    Gilles Boyer, Olivier Chastel, Michal Wiezik

    S&D

    Vilija Blinkevičiūtė, Giuseppe Lupo, Marit Maij, Csaba Molnár, Carla Tavares

    The Left

    Gaetano Pedulla’, Jonas Sjöstedt

    Verts/ALE

    Damian Boeselager, Daniel Freund

     

    3

    –

    ECR

    Dick Erixon

    PfE

    Virginie Joron, Julien Sanchez

     

    3

    0

    ESN

    Arno Bausemer

    PfE

    Tamás Deutsch, Annamária Vicsek

     

    Key to symbols:

    + : in favour

    – : against

    0 : abstention

     

    European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy

     

    20

    +

    ECR

    Bert-Jan Ruissen

    NI

    Fidias Panayiotou

    PPE

    Georgios Aftias, Caterina Chinnici, Esteban González Pons, Niclas Herbst, Monika Hohlmeier, Kinga Kollár, Jacek Protas, Tomáš Zdechovský

    Renew

    Gilles Boyer, Olivier Chastel, Michal Wiezik

    S&D

    Vilija Blinkevičiūtė, Giuseppe Lupo, Marit Maij, Csaba Molnár, Carla Tavares

    Verts/ALE

    Damian Boeselager, Daniel Freund

     

    5

    –

    ECR

    Dick Erixon

    PfE

    Virginie Joron, Julien Sanchez

    The Left

    Gaetano Pedulla’, Jonas Sjöstedt

     

    3

    0

    ESN

    Arno Bausemer

    PfE

    Tamás Deutsch, Annamária Vicsek

     

    Key to symbols:

    + : in favour

    – : against

    0 : abstention

     

    Global Health EDCTP3 Joint Undertaking

     

    22

    +

    ECR

    Bert-Jan Ruissen

    NI

    Fidias Panayiotou

    PPE

    Georgios Aftias, Caterina Chinnici, Esteban González Pons, Niclas Herbst, Monika Hohlmeier, Kinga Kollár, Jacek Protas, Tomáš Zdechovský

    Renew

    Gilles Boyer, Olivier Chastel, Michal Wiezik

    S&D

    Vilija Blinkevičiūtė, Giuseppe Lupo, Marit Maij, Csaba Molnár, Carla Tavares

    The Left

    Gaetano Pedulla’, Jonas Sjöstedt

    Verts/ALE

    Damian Boeselager, Daniel Freund

     

    4

    –

    ECR

    Dick Erixon

    ESN

    Arno Bausemer

    PfE

    Virginie Joron, Julien Sanchez

     

    2

    0

    PfE

    Tamás Deutsch, Annamária Vicsek

     

    Key to symbols:

    + : in favour

    – : against

    0 : abstention

     

    Innovative Health Initiative Joint Undertaking

     

    20

    +

    ECR

    Bert-Jan Ruissen

    NI

    Fidias Panayiotou

    PPE

    Georgios Aftias, Caterina Chinnici, Esteban González Pons, Monika Hohlmeier, Kinga Kollár, Jacek Protas, Tomáš Zdechovský

    Renew

    Gilles Boyer, Olivier Chastel, Michal Wiezik

    S&D

    Vilija Blinkevičiūtė, Giuseppe Lupo, Marit Maij, Csaba Molnár, Carla Tavares

    The Left

    Gaetano Pedulla’, Jonas Sjöstedt

    Verts/ALE

    Damian Boeselager

     

    4

    –

    ECR

    Dick Erixon

    ESN

    Arno Bausemer

    PfE

    Virginie Joron, Julien Sanchez

     

    2

    0

    PfE

    Tamás Deutsch, Annamária Vicsek

     

    Key to symbols:

    + : in favour

    – : against

    0 : abstention

     

    Chips Joint Undertaking (before 21.9.2023: Key Digital Technologies Joint Undertaking)

     

    21

    +

    ECR

    Bert-Jan Ruissen

    NI

    Fidias Panayiotou

    PPE

    Georgios Aftias, Caterina Chinnici, Esteban González Pons, Monika Hohlmeier, Kinga Kollár, Jacek Protas, Tomáš Zdechovský

    Renew

    Gilles Boyer, Olivier Chastel, Michal Wiezik

    S&D

    Vilija Blinkevičiūtė, Giuseppe Lupo, Marit Maij, Csaba Molnár, Carla Tavares

    The Left

    Gaetano Pedulla’, Jonas Sjöstedt

    Verts/ALE

    Damian Boeselager, Daniel Freund

     

    3

    –

    ECR

    Dick Erixon

    PfE

    Virginie Joron, Julien Sanchez

     

    3

    0

    ESN

    Arno Bausemer

    PfE

    Tamás Deutsch, Annamária Vicsek

     

    Key to symbols:

    + : in favour

    – : against

    0 : abstention

     

    Single European Sky ATM Research 3 Joint Undertaking

     

    23

    +

    ECR

    Dick Erixon, Bert-Jan Ruissen

    NI

    Fidias Panayiotou

    PPE

    Georgios Aftias, Caterina Chinnici, Esteban González Pons, Niclas Herbst, Monika Hohlmeier, Kinga Kollár, Jacek Protas, Tomáš Zdechovský

    Renew

    Gilles Boyer, Olivier Chastel, Michal Wiezik

    S&D

    Vilija Blinkevičiūtė, Giuseppe Lupo, Marit Maij, Csaba Molnár, Carla Tavares

    The Left

    Gaetano Pedulla’, Jonas Sjöstedt

    Verts/ALE

    Damian Boeselager, Daniel Freund

     

    3

    –

    ESN

    Arno Bausemer

    PfE

    Virginie Joron, Julien Sanchez

     

    2

    0

    PfE

    Tamás Deutsch, Annamária Vicsek

     

    Key to symbols:

    + : in favour

    – : against

    0 : abstention

     

    Smart Networks and Services Joint Undertaking

     

    21

    +

    ECR

    Bert-Jan Ruissen

    NI

    Fidias Panayiotou

    PPE

    Georgios Aftias, Caterina Chinnici, Esteban González Pons, Monika Hohlmeier, Kinga Kollár, Jacek Protas, Tomáš Zdechovský

    Renew

    Gilles Boyer, Olivier Chastel, Michal Wiezik

    S&D

    Vilija Blinkevičiūtė, Giuseppe Lupo, Marit Maij, Csaba Molnár, Carla Tavares

    The Left

    Gaetano Pedulla’, Jonas Sjöstedt

    Verts/ALE

    Damian Boeselager, Daniel Freund

     

    3

    –

    ESN

    Arno Bausemer

    PfE

    Virginie Joron, Julien Sanchez

     

    3

    0

    ECR

    Dick Erixon

    PfE

    Tamás Deutsch, Annamária Vicsek

     

    Key to symbols:

    + : in favour

    – : against

    0 : abstention

     

    Final vote on motion for a resolution

     

    20

    +

    ECR

    Bert-Jan Ruissen

    NI

    Fidias Panayiotou

    PPE

    Georgios Aftias, Caterina Chinnici, Esteban González Pons, Niclas Herbst, Monika Hohlmeier, Kinga Kollár, Jacek Protas, Tomáš Zdechovský

    Renew

    Gilles Boyer, Olivier Chastel, Michal Wiezik

    S&D

    Vilija Blinkevičiūtė, Giuseppe Lupo, Marit Maij, Csaba Molnár, Carla Tavares

    Verts/ALE

    Damian Boeselager, Daniel Freund

     

    4

    –

    ECR

    Dick Erixon

    ESN

    Arno Bausemer

    PfE

    Virginie Joron, Julien Sanchez

     

    2

    0

    PfE

    Tamás Deutsch, Annamária Vicsek

     

    Key to symbols:

    + : in favour

    – : against

    0 : abstention

     

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2023, Section IX – European Data Protection Supervisor – A10-0053/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    2. MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    with observations forming an integral part of the decision on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2023, Section IX – European Data Protection Supervisor

    (2024/2028(DEC))

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to its decision on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2023, Section IX – European Data Protection Supervisor,

    – having regard to Rule 102 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

    – having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs,

    – having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0053/2025),

    A. whereas, in the context of the discharge procedure, the discharge authority wishes to stress the particular importance of further strengthening the democratic legitimacy of the Union institutions by improving transparency and accountability, and implementing the concept of performance-based budgeting and good governance of human resources (HR);

    B. whereas data protection is a fundamental right, protected by Union law and enshrined in Article 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union;

    C. whereas Article 16 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union provides that compliance with the rules relating to the protection of individuals, with regard to the processing of personal data concerning them, is to be subject to control by an independent authority;

    D. whereas Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 provides for the establishment of an independent authority, the European Data Protection Supervisor (the ‘EDPS’), responsible for protecting and guaranteeing the right to data protection and privacy, and tasked with ensuring that the institutions and bodies, offices and agencies of the Union embrace a strong data protection culture;

    E. whereas the EDPS carries out its functions in close cooperation with fellow Data Protection Authorities (DPAs) as part of the European Data Protection Board (EDPB), and it serves the public interest while being guided by principles of impartiality, integrity, transparency, pragmatism and respects Union legislation;

    1. Notes that the budget of the EDPS falls under MFF Heading 7 ’European public administration’, which amounted to a total of EUR 12,3 billion, i.e. 6,4 % of Union budget spending, in 2023; notes that the budget of the EDPS represented 0,18 % of MFF Heading 7 appropriations;

    2. Notes that the Court of Auditors (the ‘Court’), in its Annual Report (the ‘Court’s report’) for the financial year 2023, examined a sample of 70 transactions under MFF Heading 7, of which 21 (30 %) contained errors; further notes that for five of those errors, which were quantified by the Court, the Court estimated a level of error below the materiality threshold;

    3. Notes from the Court’s report its observation that administrative expenditure comprises expenditure on HR including pensions, which in 2023 accounted for about 70 % of the total administrative expenditure, and on buildings, equipment, energy, communications and information technology; welcomes the Court’s renewed opinion that, overall, administrative spending is low risk;

    4. Notes from the Court’s report that in 2023 it audited a salary payment of an official who had last made a declaration concerning rights to family and child allowance in 2020; echoes the Court’s concern that delays in receiving and verifying such declarations increase the risk of ineligible payments;

    Budgetary and financial management

    5. Notes that the final adopted budget for the EDPS was EUR 22 711 559 in 2023, which represents an increase of 12,06 % compared to 2022; notes that the budget of the EDPS also covers the work of the independent Secretariat of the EDPB; notes from the Annual report of the EDPS for 2023 (the ‘Annual Report’) that the adopted budget of the EDPB was EUR 7,67 million in 2023, including EUR 300 000 granted by means of an amending budget which was needed due to an increase in litigation activities in 2023;

    6. Acknowledges that the budget monitoring and planning efforts of the EDPS in the financial year 2023 resulted in a budget implementation rate of current year commitment appropriations of 96 % in 2023 (slightly lower than in 2022 when that rate was 98 %); further notes from the report on the EDPS annual accounts for 2023 that the current year payment appropriations execution rate was 84 % (lower than 88 % in 2022); notes in addition, from EDPS replies to the questionnaire submitted by the Committee on Budgetary Control for the 2023 budgetary discharge (the ‘Questionnaire’), that the execution rate of payment appropriations overall was 91,33 % in 2023 (lower than 94,09 % in 2022);

    7. Notes further that the amount of carry-overs (C8) from 2023 to 2024 was EUR 2 517 942,67 or 11,08 % of the total budget for 2023, compared to EUR 1 827 354,23 or 9,01 % of the total budget for 2022; notes that the execution rate of the C8 budget in 2023 was 76,65 % (higher than 73,77 % in 2022);

    8. Welcomes an improvement in the average time to pay from 25 days in 2022 to 19 days in 2023, with 97,50 % of payments processed on time; notes that that improvement is also due to the EDPS having solved an old bug with the electronic payment system for invoices linked to mission costs; notes further a significant increase in the number of payments from 799 in 2022 to 1335 in 2023; observes in that context that the number of transactions is still lower than pre-pandemic levels due to changes in the way of working (such as hybrid meetings or virtual events for experts);

    9. Notes that the effects of illegal Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine continued to create budgetary pressure on the EDPS in 2023, including through rising inflation and the consequent increase in energy costs, with the most affected budget lines being staff salaries, building security and rental costs, mission costs and services provided by external staff; commends in that context the EDPS for having re-adjusted its priorities and having implemented internal reallocation within budget chapters; understands that budgetary optimisation was necessary in order to successfully manage the indexation of staff salaries and rental costs, as well as an increase in the costs of external lawyer support services due to an increased number of EDPS binding decisions which led to a bigger number of cases to be defended before the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) with the help of external legal assistance; regrets in that context that the EDPS had to postpone some of its activities, such as a feasibility study on artificial intelligence; calls on the EDPS to abide to the competences of its mandate with a collaborative approach with the Union institutions and agencies and to avoid initiating any legal action, especially those which are manifestly inadmissible, in order to avoid negative repercussions on the management of resources, which do not allow the EDPS to carry out its activities as an Institution;

    10. Expresses concern about the significant increase in EDPS staff mission costs, from EUR 28 789 in 2021 and EUR 176 903 in 2022, to EUR 284 580 in 2023; calls on the EDPS to assess whether the resources spent on missions are being used appropriately and effectively; notes that the EDPS ceased making public the number of missions funded by organisers, as well as information on which unit or sector participated in each mission, thus reducing transparency regarding mission expenses; calls on the EDPS to reinstate this practice; encourages the EDPS to promote the use of video-conferencing tools where suitable, as this could contribute to lowering the number of missions and reducing costs; calls on the EDPS to assess whether the resources spent on missions are being used appropriately and effectively.

    Internal management, performance and internal control

    11. Notes that the EPDS used nine key performance indicators (KPIs) to monitor its performance in 2023, in alignment with the main objectives of the EDPS Strategy 2020-2024 which is implemented through the Annual Management Plan; notes from the Annual Report that the EDPS over-delivered in almost all areas, as indicated by the results of KPIs for 2023, except for one KPI (the number of EDPS followers on some social media accounts); notes with concern that the EDPS encountered considerable challenges due to a growing workload and intricate data protection issues arising from the rapidly evolving digital landscape, as well as due to the extension of the EDPS mandate to supervisory activities (such as audits and investigations) and replies to consultations and prior consultations, all in the context of a limited budget; notes from the EDPS’ follow-up report to Parliament’s resolution on the implementation of the EDPS’ budget for 2022 (the ‘Follow-up Report’) that several legislative developments in the last two years have impacted the work and resources of the EDPS, due to the extension of Eurojust’s mandate, new information to be received by Europol under the Digital Services Act, the roll out of the new Union’s large-scale databases and interoperability framework in the justice and home affairs field and the entry into force of the Artificial Intelligence Act (the “AI Act”); calls on the Commission and on the budgetary authority to take those matters into consideration during the annual budgetary procedure;

    12. Welcomes the fact that, in 2023, the EDPS strengthened its ability to assess and prepare for emerging technological trends and their potential impact on privacy and data protection; notes that this was achieved through a foresight-based approach, with a focus on monitoring developments in areas such as large language models, digital identity wallets, the internet of behaviours, extended reality, and deep fake detection; welcomes in that context the publication by the EDPS of its third TechSonar initiative on emerging technologies; congratulates moreover the EDPS for having been awarded the GPA Global Privacy and Data Protection Awards 2023 in the category of innovation;

    13. Notes that 2023 was marked by several organisational changes or updates that were needed in order to respond and adapt to the evolving data protection challenges; welcomes in this context the appointment of a Secretary-General from 1 July 2023; notes in addition the transition of two sectors into units such as ‘Information and Communication’ and ‘Governance and Internal Control’ and the creation of three new specialised sectors under the ‘Technology and Privacy’ (T&P) unit: ‘Systems Oversight and Audit’, ‘Technology Monitoring and Foresight’ and ‘Digital Transformation’;

    14. Emphasises the role of the EDPS in supervising the processing of personal data by Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies; notes with concern the length of proceedings before the EDPS, as the EDPS did not close a single investigation in 2023, but in comparison to the previous year, in 2023, the number of notifications beyond the 72 hours significantly decreased;

    15. Notes that the EDPS received 420 complaints, i.e. 53 more than in 2022, out of which 73 were admissible and 347 inadmissible in 2023; notes that the EDPS issued a final decision, opinion or reply in 31 out of 73 complaint cases received in 2023 within 44 days on average and responded to all 347 inadmissible complaints received; notes that, out of all admissible complaints (ongoing and received in 2023), 55 cases were finalised in 2023, which represents an increase of 17 % compared to 2022; acknowledges the efforts made by the EDPS to reduce the high number of complaints by developing a dynamic tool on the EPDS’ website, although the volume of complaints remained challenging due to limited resources in 2023; notes with satisfaction that the EDPS developed various procedural tools and policies to enhance its investigatory processes in 2023; commends in that context the EDPS for having amended its Rules of Procedure, whereby the “review procedure” is replaced by a “preliminary assessment” in order to safeguard the right to be heard of all the involved parties, thus contributing to a fair and timely handling of complaints and investigations;

    16. Underlines the important role of consultation and advice of EDPS in the legislative process; notes that, pursuant to Article 42(1) of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725, the EDPS responded to 80 formal legislative consultations and its advice took the form of 54 opinions (27 in 2022), 26 formal comments (49 in 2022) and 34 informal comments (30 in 2022) to the Commission and to the co-legislators in response to legislative consultation requests in 2023; commends the EDPS for its input with regard to the AI Act, in particular EDPS’ own-initiative opinion on the AI Act and advice on the AI liability rules, as well as for EDPS’ input to the GPA resolution on generative AI systems; acknowledges a significant increase (+93 %) of consultation requests over the last five years;

    17. Notes that, in 2023, the EDPS carried out eight investigations and five pre-investigations, marking a significant increase compared to previous years; notes that in 2023 the EDPS was actively involved in a total of 13 investigations and seven pre-investigations, either launched in 2023 or carried over from prior years; notes that the EPDS continued two complex and resource-intensive formal investigations from 2021 into the use by European Union Institutions, Bodies and Agencies (EUIBAs) of cloud services from non-EU/EEA entities, including a focus on the Commission’s use of Microsoft 365; urges the finalisation of those investigations on time because of their significant impact on the working of institutions; notes further that the EDPS also launched five investigations based on complaints about EUIBAs’ websites, focusing in a broad way on privacy and data protection issues, with preliminary assessments expected in 2024;

    18. Urges the EDPS to prioritise and enhance procedures for handling the personal data of minors under 15, particularly in the context of Europol’s systems, where such individuals may be marked as suspects; recognises the heightened vulnerability of that group and the need for robust safeguards;

    19. Notes that the EDPS investigated the Commission’s alleged use of micro-targeting on platform X and continued two pre-investigations: one case concerning EUIBAs’ use of Trello cloud service, which was closed in 2023 and another one on EUIBAs’ use of profiling, which was carried out in 2024; notes that a total of six investigations and four pre-investigations (one pre-investigation in 2022) were launched in the Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice (FSJ), reflecting a significant increase from 2022; notes the EDPS’ concerns with regard to the challenges that may arise in the case of investigations where joint action between national authorities and EUIBA’s is needed; notes in addition that, as part of its audit plan for 2023, the EDPS audited the following bodies: the European Personnel Selection Office, the European Investment Bank, the European Central Bank, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control and the European Medicines Agency;

    20. Recalls that in 2022 the EDPS brought an action for annulment of two provisions of the amended Europol Regulation before the General Court, which was later rejected; notes that meanwhile the EDPS decided to appeal the order of the General Court in case T-578/22[8], believing the issues raised should be addressed at the highest level; regrets that the EDPS did not realise the manifest inadmissibility of its appeal, even if the institution did not intend to challenge an act by Europol, but a retroactive change in the legal framework aimed at neutralising the effects of the EDPS’ enforcement actions; calls on the institution to cooperate with Union institutions and agencies, before initiating legal proceedings that prevent the fulfilment of its mandate and the use of its resources for purposes for which they were intended; notes further that the EDPS also followed up on the implementation of its Order of 3 January 2022, including checks on Europol’s reporting; regrets that the final report on that matter was communicated by the EDPS only on 22 July 2024;

    21. Notes that, after the pilot implementation of the new risk management framework at the EDPS in late 2022, an anonymous satisfaction survey was conducted in May 2023 to assess its effectiveness and gather additional suggestions; notes further that the survey results were positive, leading to the formal adoption of the framework on 26 June 2023;

    22. Notes that the internal audit service (IAS) carried out an audit on the methodology for the planning of EDPS audits in the EDPS in 2023; notes that the audit was concluded with two recommendations for which the EDPS submitted an action plan to the IAS; calls on the EDPS to keep the discharge authority informed on a regular basis on the progress made in that matter;

    23. Recalls the Treaty on the European Union that the EU and its institutions shall promote solidarity and equality between women and men;

    HR, equality and staff well-being

    24. Notes that, at the end of 2023, the EDPS had 129 members of staff, compared to 127 in 2022; notes that the EDPS employed 50 contract staff (CA) under Article 3(b) of the Staff Regulations of Officials and the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants (52 CA in 2022), 7 temporary agents (TA) under Article 2(b) and 2(c) (6 TA in 2022) and used the services of 12 external services providers (EXT) working intra-muros in 2023 (8 EXT in 2022); encourages the EDPS to continue its efforts towards a more balanced geographical representation among all Member States specifically at managerial level; welcomes the increased diversity of nationalities represented, but notes with regret the continued underrepresentation of women in senior management positions; calls for the adoption of a gender parity roadmap, including proactive recruitment measures and leadership training programs for female staff members;

    25. Notes that the EDPS had 23 nationalities (from the Member States) represented among its staff in 2023, which is an improvement in comparison with 22 nationalities in 2022; notes with dissatisfaction the over-representation of five nationalities and an underrepresentation of other nationalities; urges the EDPS to continue its efforts to achieve a balanced geographical distribution of nationals from all Member States within its staff, by improving communication, fostering visibility, and enhancing job conditions to attract underrepresented nationalities;

    26. Observes that, in 2023, the EDPS maintained a workforce comprising 65 % women and 35 % men, consistent with trends from previous years; regrets the absence of women in senior management roles, despite achieving gender parity among the six middle management positions; urges the EDPS to intensify its efforts to ensure gender-balanced representation across all staff levels, and invites the EDPS to promote the application of women also with a view to the next election of the Supervisor by Parliament;

    27. Notes a high occupancy rate of the establishment plan of 95,65 % but also a high turnover rate of 13 % in 2023; notes that most of the unfilled positions were a result of candidates being unsuitable, given the EDPS’ need for highly specialised profiles and the small pool of eligible candidates; welcomes the addressing of those challenges through republication with a wider or more targeted dissemination of the vacancy or by redrafting the requirements; welcomes the steps taken by the EDPS regarding the hiring process; calls on the EDPS to continue to address the challenges in finding suitable candidates and to keep the discharge authority informed about improvements on staff recruitment and turnover;

    28. Notes that, in the second half of 2023, the EDPS’ HR team launched a pilot for a new on-boarding process for newcomers, with sessions that cover, inter alia, presentations of core units’ work, ethics, procurement procedures and information security, whereas three on-boarding sessions were offered in 2023; invites the EDPS to continue offering to newcomers “on-boarding” and to all members of staff mandatory sessions that remind the importance of principles such as ethics, conflicts of interest, transparency, internal control and anti-fraud, as they have become the standard in the Union institutions; notes moreover that 12 individual sessions were offered for EDPS and EDPB staff, six sessions of group coaching in which participants (manager level) learned from each other, as well as a one-year team coaching with a designer for leadership development at the European School of Administration in 2023;

    29. Notes, from the Questionnaire, that the EDPS offers flexible and hybrid working arrangements, that are well-received by members of staff who can benefit, inter alia, from parental leave, time credits, part-time work or working from abroad for a limited number of days per year; notes that, in 2023, the majority of staff made use of those working conditions, whereas 86,30 % of staff made use of teleworking arrangements in 2023; considers that the building infrastructure should be optimised to reflect that high rate of teleworking, which could contribute to reducing operational costs and ensuring more efficient use of office space; welcomes the EDPS’ continued efforts to actively improve physical and mental well-being of its staff;

    30. Commends the EDPS for carrying out several awareness-raising actions during the year 2023 with information sharing on elimination of racial discrimination, International Women’s Day, EU diversity month and learning about neurodiversity; notes that currently the EDPS does not employ staff with disabilities but has an equal opportunities clause included in all EDPS vacancy notices and actively encourages applications from candidates with disabilities;

    31. Notes from the Questionnaire that the EDPS considers confidential any information on burnout cases, including the number thereof; disagrees with that opinion and calls the EDPS to provide the discharge authority with the number of burnout cases on a yearly basis; notes with satisfaction that, in 2023, there were no harassment cases reported at the EDPS; welcomes the fact that, in 2023, the EDPS continued to provide an anti-harassment presentation delivered by one of the EDPS’ confidential counsellors, as part of the induction training called the ‘EDPS Welcome Day’; commends the publication of the decision on anti-harassment and the role of the confidential counsellors on the EDPS’ intranet;

    Ethical framework and transparency

    32. Notes that, in 2023, the EDPS focused its efforts on increasing staff awareness of the EDPS/EDPB ethical framework by organising mandatory dedicated training sessions for all staff and induction trainings for EDPS/EDPB newcomers, appointing a new ethics officer and participating in the ‘Comité Paritaire des Questions Statuaries’ working group on ethics; welcomes the establishment of a mailbox by the EPDS, where members of staff can submit their requests regarding any ethics related inquiries, as well as the use of Commission’s Ethics module in Sysper; encourages the EDPS to continue raising awareness and organising surveys to assess the level of staff awareness of the EDPS/EDPB ethical framework;

    33. Welcomes the overall high level of transparency achieved by the EDPS concerning its activities, in particular as regards the publication of the agenda and the declaration of interests of the Supervisor and of the Head of EDPS Administration, in line with the Supervisor’s code of conduct of 2019; notes from the Follow-up Report that the EDPS has adopted two codes of conduct, whereas one of them applies to the Supervisor and the other one applies to the EDPS staff; understands that in cases when the Secretary-General is called to replace the Supervisor, the latter’s code of conduct also applies to the Secretary-General;

    34. Notes with satisfaction that the EDPS has never been involved in any investigations by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) since its establishment;

    35. Notes that, out of five inquiries opened by the Ombudsman in 2023 concerning the EDPS, four were closed without any further inquiry; notes that, for one enquiry, the decision was still pending and expected for Q4 2024; calls on the EDPS to keep the discharge authority informed as to the outcome of this enquiry;

    36. Regrets that the EDPS has still not formally joined the Union’s Transparency Register (TR); nevertheless notes from the Follow-up Report that, with a view to formally joining the TR, the EDPS has launched an internal assessment on transparency measures, whereas, in 2023, exploratory meetings and exchanges of the EDPS with secretariat of the TR took place; calls on the EDPS to inform the discharge authority of the outcome of that assessment exercise; reiterates its call on the EDPS to join and use the TR, including for the proactive disclosure of meetings with any third parties, to ensure transparency in EDPS’ regulatory and advisory functions;

    37. Notes with satisfaction that, in 2023, the EPDS established internal rules applicable to the hearing of persons that could be affected by an EDPS final decision adopted in own-initiative investigations and inquiries in order to ensure the proper exercise of their fundamental right to be heard in such proceedings; commends the EPDS for publishing a new factsheet on EDPS Investigations and a new EDPS Investigation Policy as well as for ensuring that all financial reports, including annual budgets, accounting and audit reports, are made publicly accessible through a Union institution website and other official channels, as the EPDS takes a leading role in enhancing the cybersecurity preparedness of the Union institutions;

    38. Notes with satisfaction from the Questionnaire that no cases of conflicts of interest, whistleblowing or fraud were reported in the EDPS in 2023; notes that the EDPS has set up a framework to prevent conflicts of interest at the level of senior management and staff through codes of conduct, awareness raising and declarations of absence of conflicts of interest and confidentiality; notes that, in addition to the mandatory introduction to the ethical framework of the EDPS for all new members of staff, new members of staff are also introduced to the EDPS’ anti-fraud strategy;

    39. Notes from the Questionnaire that the EDPS has internal rules on whistleblowing, which define safe routes and channels through which staff may raise concerns about fraud, corruption or any other serious wrongdoing, without prejudice to the confidentiality of the identity of the whistleblower and of the information reported; notes that, so far, there has never been a whistleblowing case reported to the EDPS;

    40. Urges the EDPS to publicly disclose any recusals due to conflicts of interest in its enforcement decisions, ensuring full transparency in regulatory oversight and decision-making;

    Digitalisation, cybersecurity and data protection

    41. Notes from the Questionnaire that the 2023 budget for IT equipment and projects was 9,5 % lower compared to 2022; notes that that decrease was primarily because no new IT feasibility studies were being commissioned in 2023, as opposed to 2022 where such studies represented a substantial portion of the IT budget; notes further that other cost elements remain relatively stable between the two years, including general IT services and maintenance;

    42. Notes from the Follow-up Report and the Questionnaire the conclusions of the IT feasibility study carried out in 2022, whereby there are gaps between what the IT tools and services provided by the Commission and Parliament can offer and the specific needs of the EDPS; notes that those gaps should be addressed by developing in-house capabilities and applications for which a minimum of five IT staff and partial outsourcing EDPS was deemed necessary; regrets that, due to budgetary constraints, implementation of the recommendations of the study remained on hold; calls on the EDPS to consider a step-by-step approach by starting with those recommendations and projects that would require fewer resources;

    43. Commends the progress made in 2023 by the EDPS in digitalising its workflows and processes, with the introduction of ARES, the qualified digital signature (e-IDAS) and a collaborative platform (Nextcloud) for drafting documents and video-conferencing, as well as updates to the tool (Website Evidence Collector) that automates the collection of personal data processing on websites of data controllers and processors, the adoption of the acceptance environment of EU Send Web, a service/channel to exchange sensitive non-classified information with other EUIBAs and further progress made towards implementing services that cannot be outsourced, such as the form and the electronic workflow to manage data breach notifications; notes nevertheless issues with regard to the use and maintenance of the e-procurement system;

    44. Welcomes the EDPS’s focus on ensuring that external contractors meet the necessary moral and ethical standards expected of all Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, particularly in light of the previous use of external companies by EDPS that, according to Yale University’s ranking, continue to operate in Russia;

    45. Acknowledges that the EDPS successfully relies on many of the administrative systems used by the Commission, particularly in the field of HR and business administration processes, as well as on some of Parliament’s services, including the provision of laptops, network infrastructure and video-conferencing; commends the fact that the project to improve the quality and performance of the computers provided to EDPS staff, in collaboration with Parliament, with a view to the generalisation of hybrid work, has been completed;

    46. Acknowledges the leading role of EDPS in enhancing the cybersecurity preparedness of the Union institutions, while working closely with bodies such as European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) and cybersecurity hubs such as CERT-EU; urges it to develop a structured audit framework for cybersecurity risks within Union bodies; notes that, in 2023, the EDPS continued to improve its readiness to protect personal data and sensitive information against cyber-attacks in view of the rapidly changing cybersecurity threat landscape; commends in that context the EDPS for reviewing its security policies and methodologies in preparation for the impact of the Cybersecurity Regulation (Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2023/2841); notes from the Questionnaire that the EDPS introduced a request for two additional full-time equivalents to cover cybersecurity infrastructure in connection with EDPS’s obligations under that Regulation as well as the EDPS’ role as a member of the Interinstitutional Cybersecurity Board (IICB); notes further with appreciation that the EPDS upgraded its Information Security Policy and the EDPS Acceptable Use Policy to address specific cybersecurity threats in relation to teleworking, use of personal mobile devices and banning of dangerous applications (TikTok); notes that the EDPS did not encounter any cyber-attacks in 2023; calls for annual public reporting on detected threats, response measures, and institutional cyber resilience;

    47. Commends the EDPS for updating cybersecurity training for all staff and revamping the security training model for newcomers; appreciates that the EPDS has been proactive in raising awareness about cyber security risks, for instance by preparing fact sheets, conducting surveys with EUIBAs and running awareness campaigns; encourages the EDPS to ensure that staff receives compulsory training on the safe and ethical use of AI tools to enhance their understanding and mitigate potential risks;

    Buildings

    48. Notes that in 2023, as in 2022, the EDPS and EDPB were the sole tenants of Parliament’s building where they were located, following the move of the Ombudsman at the end of 2021 and that by renting their premises from the Parliament rather than the private market the EDPS intends to keep the rental and maintenance costs at a reasonable level; notes that the EDPS had to request an additional EUR 81 856,84 for paying rental costs to Parliament, given that the indexation rate was 8,82 % and thus higher than the 2 % ceiling for administrative expenditures;

    49. Notes that, in terms of accessibility of its building, the EDPS relies on the decisions taken and implemented by Parliament, as part of their building policy; notes from the Follow-up Report that the EDPS employs staff with physical impairments due to serious illness; welcomes the commitment of the EDPS to explore the possibilities of hiring trainees with reduced mobility or disabilities;

    Environment and sustainability

    50. Notes that the EDPS has not joined the Eco-Management and Audit Scheme (EMAS) but has implemented several measures to reduce its environmental footprint, such as regulating the temperature automatically and centrally, turning lights off automatically when there is no movement in the room, purchasing eco-friendly products and services and automating the workflows with the introduction of ARES; notes from the Follow-up Report that according to the information received by Parliament’s Directorate-General for Infrastructure and Logistics, responsible for the management of the building rented by the EDPS, solar panels are installed on that building; asks the EDPS to inform the discharge authority to report on the share (%) of the solar-panel produced electricity in the EDPS’ total energy consumption needs per year; calls further on the EDPS to inform the discharge authority of any new developments regarding the EMAS certification process;

    51. Notes that the EPDS has not assessed its carbon footprint in 2023; welcomes, however, that the EDPS continues to apply measures that reduce the carbon footprint by reducing the travel of journey to the office through teleworking possibilities, reimbursing 50 % of staff’s monthly/annual subscriptions for the use of public transport, encouraging the staff to favour videoconferencing and train travel for short distances, managing the cycle for invoices electronically and achieving an entirely paperless selection procedure and appraisal exercise as regards HR;

    52. Urges the EDPS to adopt the EMAS to systematically monitor and improve its environmental footprint, particularly in terms of energy consumption, waste reduction, and sustainable office policies;

    53. Notes that the EDPS addresses sustainability-related risks (such as environmental, social and governance risks) in a comprehensive way through an annual risk assessment exercise; welcomes in that context that the EDPS adopted its new risk management process in 2023, which should help the EDPS to target and better analyse those risks and consequently better calibrate mitigating actions;

    Interinstitutional cooperation

    54. Welcomes the budgetary and administrative savings achieved by the EDPS through inter-institutional cooperation, particularly the conclusion of service-level agreements with Parliament for the rental of its premises and the use of IT system applications, hardware supplies and maintenance and with the Commission for HR and business administration processes, as well as through participation in large interinstitutional framework contracts in areas such as IT consultancy, interim services and office supplies; commends in addition the EDPS for maintaining a structured cooperation with the Ombudsman, the Agency for Fundamental Rights and CERT-EU through memorandums of understanding;

    55. Notes that the EDPS participates in meetings of various interinstitutional bodies; welcomes in this context the participation of the EPDS in meetings of the Heads of Administration and the Interinstitutional Online Communication Committee, led by Parliament’s Directorate-General for Communication; acknowledges that interinstitutional cooperation with EDPS, in his supervisory role, is of key importance for the other Union institutions to enhance their level of compliance with the data protection legal framework;

    56. Calls for closer cooperation between the EDPS, the Court of Auditors, OLAF, and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) to develop common protocols for fraud detection in digital data and financial transactions within EU institutions; stresses the need for joint audits on AI-based fraud risks;

    57. Welcomes the pivotal role played by the EDPS in 2023 in the coordination of the Data Protection Authorities of the Member States (DPAs) to promote consistent data protection across the Union; notes that the EDPS joined 26 DPAs in a coordinated enforcement action on the role and tasks of data protection officers (DPOs), assessing their compliance with Regulation (EU) 2018/1725; notes the continued active involvement of the EPDS in the Coordinated Supervision Committee (CSC) within the area of FSJ addressing issues such as handling complaints against Europol and enhancing cooperation processes; appreciates furthermore all the other steps taken to improve cooperation between the EDPS and the DPAs such as the conduction of a joint Europol inspection with national authorities (Poland and Lithuania) and the participation in the coordinated supervisory action on processing minors’ data in Europol systems, the participation in an operational visit to the European Delegated Prosecutor’s office in Lisbon under a Working Arrangement with Portugal’s DPA and the coordination of an onsite inspection in Lesvos with Greece’s DPA to verify data collection practices during Joint Operations by Frontex; acknowledges that those interinstitutional engagements help the EDPS align with best practices of Union institutions and benefit from the exchange of information with peer departments;

    Communication

    58. Notes that the budget for public communication and promotional activities in 2023 amounted to EUR 468 000, which represented an increase of 54 % compared to 2022;

    59. Notes with satisfaction that the EDPS organised several communication events online as well as in person in 2023, aimed at raising awareness of EDPS’ role and mission among a wider public and the importance of respecting Union data protection rules, such as Data Protection Day, the EDPS Trainees’ conference (twice a year), the EDPS Seminar on the essence of the fundamental rights to privacy and data protection, and other international events;

    60. Notes that the EDPS communicates online via its website and its social media accounts on X (ex-twitter) (29 400 followers), LinkedIn (71 000 followers), YouTube (2 900 followers), EU-Voice (5 900 followers) and EU-Video (750 followers);

    61. Notes that the pilot project of the platforms EU Voice and EU Video (free and open-source social media networks, privacy-oriented and based on Mastodon and PeerTube software) continued in 2023; welcomes in that context the EDPS’ contribution to the Union’s strategy on data and digital sovereignty in order to promote the Union’s independence in the digital world and compliance with the data protection legal framework.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2023, Section VIII – European Ombudsman – A10-0055/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    2. MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    with observations forming an integral part of the decision on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2023, Section VIII – European Ombudsman

    (2024/2027(DEC))

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to its decision on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2023, Section VIII – European Ombudsman,

    – having regard to Rule 102 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

    – having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0055/2025),

    A. whereas in the context of the discharge procedure, the discharge authority wishes to stress the particular importance of further strengthening the democratic legitimacy of the Union institutions by improving transparency and accountability, and by implementing the concept of performance-based budgeting and good governance of human resources;

    B. whereas Article 228 of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union provides for the election of a European Ombudsman (the ‘Ombudsman’) by the European Parliament who shall be empowered to receive complaints from any citizen of the Union or any natural or legal person residing or having its registered office in a Member State concerning instances of maladministration in the activities of the Union institutions, bodies, offices or agencies, with the exception of the Court of Justice of the European Union acting in its judicial role, and to examine such complaints and report on them;

    C. whereas Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2021/1163 of the European Parliament of 24 June 2021[7] lays down the regulations and general conditions governing the performance of the Ombudsman’s duties (Statute of the European Ombudsman);

    D. whereas, following the adoption of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2021/1163, the Ombudsman adopted its revised implementing provisions[8] on 21 June 2023;

    1. Notes that the budget of the Ombudsman falls under MFF heading 7 ’European public administration’, which amounted to a total of EUR 12,3 billion, i.e. 6,4 % of Union budget spending, in 2023; notes that the budget of the Ombudsman represented 0,11 % of MFF heading 7 appropriations;

    2. Notes that the Court of Auditors (the ‘Court’), in its Annual Report for the financial year 2023 (the ‘Court’s report’), examined a sample of 70 transactions under the heading ‘European public administration’, of which 21 (30 %) contained errors; further notes that for five of those errors, which were quantified by the Court, the Court estimated a level of error below the materiality threshold; notes with satisfaction from the Court’s report that for 2023 the Court did not identify any significant issues concerning the Ombudsman;

    3. Notes from the Court’s report its observation that administrative expenditure comprises expenditure on human resources including pensions, which in 2023 accounted for about 70 % of the total administrative expenditure, and on buildings, equipment, energy, communications and information technology; welcomes the fact that the Court concluded, as it did in previous years, that, overall, administrative spending is low risk;

    Budgetary and financial management

    4. Notes that the budget of the Ombudsman amounted to EUR 13 212 447 in 2023, which represents an increase of EUR 990 339 (i.e. +8,1 %) compared to 2022; takes note, from the Ombudsman’s replies to the questionnaire submitted by the Committee on Budgetary Control for the 2023 budgetary discharge (the ‘Questionnaire’), that this increase is mainly due to salary adjustments and two additional posts that were needed to reinforce the Ombudsman’s core activities;

    5. Notes that the budget monitoring efforts during the financial year 2023 resulted in a budget implementation rate of 95,39 %, representing a decrease of 1,58 % compared to 2022; notes that the current year payment appropriations execution rate was 97,58 %, representing an increase of 1,31 % compared to 2022, which led to a decrease in automatic carry-overs from 3,73 % (or 442 209) in 2002 to 2,42 % (or 304 550 EUR) in 2023; regrets, nevertheless, the lower execution rate of the automatic carry-overs of appropriations from the previous year, which in 2023 was 73,27 % compared to 92,59 % in 2022; calls for an improvement in this regard;

    6. Notes that in the course of 2023, the Ombudsman made nine budgetary transfers pursuant to Article 29 of the Financial Regulation, representing a total of EUR 241 150 or 1,8 % of the appropriations for that financial year, compared to 2,8 % in 2022; notes that those transfers were needed for the reinforcement of various budget lines on, for example, furniture, security and surveillance buildings, digitalisation of archives or informatics; observes in this context that the IT expenditure has increased by 41 %, from EUR 159 714 in 2022 to EUR 224 698 in 2023;

    7. Notes a further increase, for the third consecutive year, of the average time for executing payments; acknowledges that, despite increasing the time for payments from 11,35 days in 2021 to 13,50 days in 2023, the average time for payments continues to be relatively short and below the regulatory maximum payment time (30 days); welcomes in this context the fact that the Ombudsman has meanwhile fully implemented an electronic invoicing system which should further improve the efficiency of the payment process as of 2024;

    8. Notes that, for 2023, the European Parliament had not passed onto the Ombudsman any significant increase with regard to the rent and the lump-sum building charges, which has allowed the Ombudsman to reduce its budget line for rent by 8,06 % in order to reinforce other budget lines in 2023; takes note, however, that for 2024 the Ombudsman expects an increase of building related expenses by 170 % (or EUR 122 260);

    9. Welcomes the fact that the budget for staff missions decreased from EUR 120 000 in 2022 to EUR 100 000 in 2023 thanks to an extensive use of videoconference facilities in both places of work; commends, in this context, the Ombudsman for the reduction in its staff missions’ budget for the fourth consecutive year; notes that the missions and travel budget for the Ombudsman remained the same in 2023 as in the previous years (2021 and 2022), i.e. EUR 35 000;

    Internal management, performance and internal control

    10. Notes that the Ombudsman has linked to the high level objectives of its strategy ‘Towards 2024’ nine Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) consisting of 19 components, as set out in the Ombudsman’s Annual Management Plan for 2023; observes that 14 of those KPI components have been reached or exceeded in 2023;

    11. Observes an overall increase in the Ombudsman’s workload compared to the previous year, whereas in 2023 the Ombudsman handled 2 392 new complaints (2 223 in 2022), opened 398 inquiries (348 in 2022), including 56 inquiries of public importance (60 in 2022), closed 372 inquiries (330 in 2022) and dealt with a record number of public access complaints which has increased from 117 in 2022 to a record number of 167 in 2023, 118 of which were followed up with inquiries; commends, in this context, the Ombudsman for the efficiency gains made in 2023 to lower the number of complaints by simplifying the handling of the ‘failure to reply’ inquiries, and streamlining the processing of the ‘out of mandate complaints’ and information requests; calls on the Ombudsman to work on more targeted communication to address this issue in the future; welcomes its efforts to continue  streamlining and process simplification for the following years;

    12. Commends the Ombudsman for having reduced the time needed to process files at different levels of the procedure, such as the time taken on admissibility (from 16 days in 2022 to 11 days in 2023) or the average time taken to close cases in the area of public access to documents (from 46 days in 2022 to 42 days in 2023); regrets however that the average time (165 days) for dealing with an inquiry remained high in 2023; understands, nevertheless, the Ombudsman’s explanation that this average was impacted by delayed closing of inquiries due to repeated exchanges with the institutions concerned;

    13. Notes further an improvement with regard to positive replies by the Union institutions to the Ombudsman’s proposals to improve their administration, with an overall acceptance rate of 81 % in 2023 (compared to 79 % in 2022); asks the Ombudsman to continue working towards generating greater compliance with its findings, recommendations and suggestions;

    14. Acknowledges the efforts made by the Ombudsman in 2023 to enhance awareness and understanding of the Ombudsman’s mandate; observes with satisfaction in this context an increase of 20 % in the number of complaints within the mandate from 740 in 2022 to 885 in 2023, as well as an increase in the share of that type of complaints, from 33 % in 2022 to 37 % in 2023;

    15. Recognises the efforts made by and the positive impact of the Ombudsman in the areas of ethics, transparency and accountability in 2023, especially as a result of inquiries on public access to documents and conflicts of interest concerning various Union institutions, agencies or the European Investment Bank; expresses its appreciation for the special report the Ombudsman issued in September 2023 on the Commission delays in dealing with access to documents requests;

    16. Takes note, from the Ombudsman’s report to the discharge authority entitled ‘Report on the follow-up to the discharge for the financial year 2022’, of the issues observed in the area of the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), namely significant delays encountered by the European Commission in replying to requests for access to information, especially the delayed publication of the largest RRF recipients by Member States, undermining transparency, as well as with regard to the reasoning on the basis of which the Commission established the level for granting public access to documents in some cases; expresses concern with regard to the Commission’s decision not to accept all the suggestions and solution proposals that the Ombudsman made in that regard, recalling the importance of the good practice principles for governmental transparency in the use of recovery funds produced in cooperation with the OECD; regrets that significant divergences persist at the national level regarding the timeliness and completeness of information on final recipients; calls on the Commission to intensify its efforts to address these shortcomings as part of its ongoing monitoring and control functions; stresses the importance of consistent and complete reporting across all Member States to ensure transparency and accountability; calls on the Ombudsman to maintain its monitoring of the Commission’s efforts to ensure transparency and effective supervision of the RRF; calls further on the Ombudsman to continue informing the budgetary authority periodically about the difficulties encountered in its work on the transparency and accountability of the RRF;

    17. Highlights the fact that, in 2023, following an own-initiative inquiry that revealed that, when individuals seek a review of an access decision, known as a confirmatory request, the Commission misses the deadlines set out in the law in 85 % of cases, the Ombudsman urged the European Commission to promptly address systemic delays in processing access to documents requests; calls for the swift implementation of the Ombudsman’s urgent recommendation for a thorough reassessment to ensure compliance with the deadlines set out in Union law, such as Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001; commends the Ombudsman for its special report to the European Parliament, asking the institution for its formal support in getting the Commission to act on her recommendation; recalls that the Ombudsman discussed the report with Members of the European Parliament in the Committee for Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs in November 2023[9];

    18. Notes with great concern that the Ombudsman receives many  complaints from citizens about extreme delays in gaining access to requested documents; supports the Ombudsman’s views that access delayed is effectively access denied and that administrative processes should be streamlined to ensure that citizens receive access to documents in a timely manner[10];

    19. Notes that the internal auditor carried out a review of the Ombudsman’s risk management framework; notes that the parties agreed on a nine-point action plan to be implemented by the end of 2024; calls on the Ombudsman to inform the discharge authority on progress made in implementing that plan;

    Human resources, equality and staff well-being

    20. Notes an increase of 11 % in the total number of the Ombudsman’s staff from 74 in 2022 to 82 in 2023, mainly due to an increase in the number of contract staff and temporary staff; notes further that, in 2023, 40 officials were employed by the Ombudsman, compared to 39 and 38 in 2022 and 2021 respectively, 33 temporary staff, compared to 28 and 30 in 2022 and 2021 respectively, and 9 contract agents, compared to 7 and 6 in 2022 and 2021 respectively; notes with satisfaction an increase in the share of staff working on the core-business of the Ombudsman (complaints and inquiries), from 40,54 % in 2022 to 42,68 % in 2023; notes with satisfaction that the staff occupation rate increased from 91,8 % in 2022 to 95 % in 2023 and the turnover rate decreased from 9,9 % in 2022 to 5,2 % in 2023;

    21. Regrets that the post of the Secretary-General of the Ombudsman has been vacant for more than two years, namely since 1 September 2022; notes from the Questionnaire that “as a courtesy to the new Ombudsman, who will be elected by the end of 2024, the current Ombudsman decided to leave the post vacant for her successor to decide on the appointment”; calls on the next Ombudsman to make sure that the periods of vacancy of management positions remain as short as possible and are not longer than the time necessary for recruitment of new staff in those positions;

    22. Commends the Ombudsman for its call for expressions of interest for jobs (inquiry officers) which was successfully concluded in 2023 with the establishment of a reserve list of 19 candidates, 6 of them having been recruited the same year; notes that this has allowed the Ombudsman to reduce the time needed for recruitment which has been an issue in the past; notes further that the Ombudsman organised, with the help of EPSO, three internal competitions in 2023, in order to retain in-house talent; acknowledges that such actions help to improve the institution’s efficiency;

    23. Notes that, despite being a small institution, the Ombudsman managed to have 19 nationalities represented in its staff in 2023, as a result of proactive communication and outreach activity, notably through social media and online platforms to advertise vacancies; notes with dissatisfaction, however, an overrepresentation of some nationalities (for example French and Irish) and an underrepresentation of other nationalities (for example Romanian and Spanish); urges the Ombudsman to continue its efforts to achieve a balanced geographical distribution of nationals from all Member States within its staff, in particular at management level, by improving communication, fostering visibility, and enhancing job conditions to attract underrepresented nationalities;

    24. Notes that, in terms of gender balance, the Ombudsman employs more women than men in all categories of staff, in particular at management level, with the women-to-men overall ratio in 2023 remaining the same as in 2022, i.e. 67 % women and 33 % men; encourages the Ombudsman to continue its efforts towards achieving a more balanced gender representation among its staff;

    25. Notes that the Ombudsman makes efforts to ensure the physical and mental well-being of its staff at work and focuses on reinforcing team-spirit; welcomes in this context the  result of the general staff survey conducted in 2023 showing an overall staff satisfaction rate of 87 %, with, in particular, 95 % of the survey participants having responded positively to the question regarding the Ombudsman caring for the wellbeing of its staff, 97 % were satisfied with the Ombudsman’s hybrid and flexible working arrangements and 90 % were satisfied with the equipment and material their employer supplied to them to work remotely; notes with satisfaction that in 2023 the Ombudsman decided to provide ergonomic chairs to all staff who request them;

    26. Acknowledges that the small size of the Ombudsman’s Office allows managers to closely monitor the staff workload and make necessary adjustments, enabling the early detection of potential burnouts; notes that the 2023 staff survey indicated no issues with workload distribution or work-related health problems, and that the European Parliament’s medical service reported no long-term illnesses related to burnout;

    27. Notes with satisfaction that no harassment cases were reported in 2023; acknowledges the efforts made by the Ombudsman to provide a working environment that is free from sexual and psychological harassment, in particular through awareness raising and training; notes with satisfaction that a survey carried out in 2023 in the context of an internal audit on the ethical framework showed that 90 % of staff were aware of the policy and guidelines regarding harassment of any type;

    28. Notes with satisfaction that the Ombudsman welcomed 18 paid trainees in 2023 (the same number as in 2022), one of which was selected following the Ombudsman’s first call aimed at candidates with disabilities; acknowledges that this initiative promotes inclusivity and equal opportunities by providing trainees with valuable experience in the EU institutions;

    Ethical framework and transparency

    29. Welcomes the Ombudsman’s continued efforts to strengthen and raise awareness about the ethical framework of the institution; notes with appreciation that in 2023 the Ombudsman revised the whistleblower policy to strengthen protections for potential whistleblowers, ensure better alignment with data protection standards, enhance confidentiality and support, and incorporate provisions on ethics correspondents; further welcomes the full deployment of the SYSPER ethics tool that allows staff to update declarations (on their conflicts of interest and on their spouses’/partners’ professional activities) and organised an interactive training course entitled ‘Respect and dignity at work and our roles as actors, recipients and bystanders’; welcomes the result of the general staff survey carried out in 2023 confirming high levels of staff awareness about ethical matters; calls for the publication of all high-level meetings of the Ombudsman’s office with external actors, including corporate entities, interest groups and EU agencies, to ensure transparency in decision-making and advocacy efforts;

    30. Notes that the internal audit (report 22/03) on the Ombudsman’s ethical framework was finalised in 2023 with six issued recommendations to be implemented by 31 December 2024; notes from the Questionnaire that four of those recommendations have been fully implemented; invites the Ombudsman to report to the discharge authority on the implementation status of the remaining two recommendations;

    31. Notes that the anti-fraud strategy of the Ombudsman is largely based on the ethical framework in place and the principle of the segregation of duties for financial functions; notes that in 2023 the Ombudsman reviewed and adopted the code of professional standards applicable to staff involved in the control of financial operations setting out the duties and responsibilities in the detection of fraudulent transactions, including the procedure to follow in cases of suspected fraud;

    32. Notes with satisfaction that no cases of conflicts of interest and no cases of whistleblowing were reported in 2023;

    33. Notes from the Questionnaire that the Ombudsman did not formally join the EU transparency register (set up by the Interinstitutional Agreement of 20 May 2021 between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on a mandatory transparency register) in order to ensure that she can also look into potential complaints concerning the secretariat of that transparency register; notes, however, that the Ombudsman has aligned its practices on the principles of the transparency register, checking that speakers or interlocutors in events or meetings organised by the Ombudsman are registered therein; welcomes the high degree of transparency achieved by the Ombudsman by the publication on its website of information on inquiries, missions, meetings and events in which the Ombudsman takes part;

    34. Calls on the Ombudsman to introduce a mandatory declaration of financial interests for senior staff, with real-time public access to information regarding potential conflicts of interest, external engagements, and financial assets;

    Buildings

    35. Welcomes the fact that the Ombudsman’s final (after transfers) budget for buildings and associated costs decreased by approx. 15 %, from EUR 1 622 200 in 2022 to EUR 1 373 000 in 2023; notes that the appropriations for rent decreased by 26 %, from EUR 1 177 700 in 2022 to EUR 866 100 in 2023, with a payment execution rate in both years of close to 100 %;

    36. Notes that, following the move of the Ombudsman Brussels’ Office to new facilities provided by the Parliament in 2021, the building was organised as a collaborative workspace with very few individual offices and flexible collaborative meeting facilities; notes with satisfaction that the Ombudsman does not practice hot-desking and that all members of staff have their own desk with ample storage; notes that no changes were made to the offices in 2023 and that a general staff survey conducted in 2023 showed that the majority of staff (56 %) replied positively regarding the physical arrangements in their offices in Brussels;

    37. Recalls that the Ombudsman does not own its own buildings but rents a building in Brussels and office space in Strasbourg; notes with satisfaction that the Havel building in Strasbourg is fully accessible to persons with reduced mobility or other disabilities and strongly regrets that accessibility to the building rented in Brussels needs improvement; calls on the Parliament to improve accessibility to the building rented to the Ombudsman in Brussels;

    Digitalisation, cybersecurity and data protection

    38. Acknowledges the  success of the Ombudsman’s long-standing approach of leveraging integrated systems and resources from other Union institutions, in particular the Parliament and the Commission, in order to optimise budget utilisation and enhance coordination, for example in the area of digitalisation; notes, in this context, the successful implementation of the Commission’s machine translation tools that have been integrated into the Ombudsman’s systems (e.g. the website) in 2023; notes with satisfaction from the Questionnaire that this project has led to a reduction in translation costs estimated at over 30 % per year, as well as to a reduced administrative burden;

    39. Welcomes the full implementation of the qualified electronic signature allowing staff to sign documents in a secure way, as well the use of the Commission’s QSign allowing staff to sign and manage documents, including procurement and contractual documents;

    40. Notes that, since 2023, the Ombudsman has been actively exploring the opportunities that the use of artificial intelligence (AI) could bring; welcomes in this context the Ombudsman’s partnership with the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre to experiment with large language models, and test and evaluate AI use cases; notes further that the Ombudsman purchased several AI tools which have successfully contributed to video content creation; welcomes the adoption by the Ombudsman of internal guidelines to ensure that external AI tools are used in a responsible and transparent manner; encourages the Ombudsman to ensure that staff receives compulsory training on the safe and ethical use of AI tools to enhance their understanding and mitigate potential risks; invites the Ombudsman to keep the discharge authority informed of the progress made in testing and using AI solutions;

    41. Notes that, in terms of IT, the Ombudsman relies on Parliament’s infrastructure and cybersecurity framework and cooperates closely with the Commission concerning the integration and maintenance of the Union’s corporate tools (SYSPER, ABAC, MiPS and ARES) and the use of IT framework contracts; notes that, given that its level of control over the data is limited, the Ombudsman concluded service-level agreements with the institutions concerned to ensure that the handling of personal data complies with the applicable legal framework; notes with satisfaction that the Ombudsman did not encounter any cyberattack in 2023;

    42. Encourages the Ombudsman to work in close cooperation with ENISA (the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity); suggests that regularly updated cybersecurity-related training programmes be offered to all staff within the Ombudsman;

    43. Notes, with regard to the Internal Audit Report 21/03 on the review of the Ombudsman’s Data Protection Framework, that one action remained open in the fourth quarter of 2023 and, with regard to the internal audit report 20/04 on the Ombudsman’s ICT security, that there were seven ongoing actions in 2023; invites the Ombudsman to keep the discharge authority updated as to the progress made in these matters;

    Environment and sustainability

    44. Welcomes the fact that, over the years, the Ombudsman has reduced its environmental footprint, in particular through the digitalisation of its processes, the removal of individual printers, the non-replacement of central processing units when they reach end of life, measures to make events more sustainable and the extensive use of videoconference systems to avoid missions; notes that, in terms of the environmental footprint of its buildings, the Ombudsman relies on the measures taken by the Parliament in its capacity as owner of the buildings; notes with satisfaction that both buildings where the Ombudsman has offices run on 100 % clean energy; welcomes the installation by the Parliament of solar panels, including on the Havel building in Strasbourg in 2024;

    45. Notes that the Ombudsman continued to encourage sustainable mobility in 2023; welcomes, in this sense, the fact that the Ombudsman adopted a new mobility policy that provides for the payment of a flat-rate contribution to staff up to grade AST8/AD8 who use sustainable modes of transport to get to work; notes further from the Questionnaire that the initiative whereby the Ombudsman provided bicycles for staff use during working hours was unsuccessful, as bicycles were hardly used during the trial period;

    Interinstitutional cooperation

    46. Welcomes the financial and administrative savings achieved through inter-institutional cooperation, in particular the wide-range of service-level agreements (SLAs) concluded with the Parliament and the Commission and the participation in interinstitutional procurement procedures; welcomes the formalisation of the collaboration between the Parliament and the Ombudsman in the field of cybersecurity through a revised inter-institutional agreement which provides a framework for the Parliament to continue providing solid cybersecurity support to the Ombudsman; notes further that in 2023 the Ombudsman signed a SLA with EPSO for the organisation of internal competitions;

    47. Commends the Ombudsman for its good collaboration with OLAF, ECA and EPPO which in 2023 took the form of meetings and exchanges of views on, for example, ways to improve the transparency and integrity of Union institutions or the Union’s oversight framework; recalls that the Ombudsman and OLAF have put in place a system to avoid duplication of investigations; notes from the Questionnaire that the Ombudsman and the EDPS cooperate mainly on an ad-hoc and informal basis aiming for a quick and efficient collaboration when needed; encourages the Ombudsman to work closely in cooperation with the other institutions and European Agencies;

    48. Calls on the Ombudsman to establish a formalized annual dialogue with the European Parliament’s CONT and LIBE Committees, ensuring systematic follow-up on institutional transparency, governance reforms and fundamental rights protection;

    49. Recognises the importance of maintaining a high level of exchanges and coordination with the European Network of Ombudsmen (ENO); welcomes the organisation of the ENO annual conference with sessions on topics such as migration, artificial intelligence and ethics in public administration in 2023; notes with satisfaction that, through the query procedure, the Ombudsman assists ENO members in resolving investigations at national and regional level, whereas, in 2023, the Ombudsman concluded five queries originating from five Union Member States; commends the organisation of the ENO annual conference in 2023 as a valuable platform for dialogue on key issues influencing the activities of Ombudsmen across Europe;

    50. Welcomes the fact that the Ombudsman in 2023 continued its close cooperation with relevant European Parliament Committees on important inquiries, either by presenting the work directly in Committee meetings or through information being sent to the Committee Chairs; underlines that the strategic initiatives and inquiries conducted by the Ombudsman are key to improving the transparency and accountability of the Union’s administration;

    Communication

    51. Notes that the overall budget for communication and promotional activities (publications, event organisation, digital communication etc.) increased by 17,20 % from EUR 132 400 in 2022 to EUR 155 200 in 2023;

    52. Welcomes the efforts of and actions taken by the Ombudsman in 2023 to raise citizens’ awareness about its role and the possibility of recourse to it in the event of maladministration by a Union institution; notes in this sense the communication campaigns carried out in 2023 around a series of videos presenting the Ombudsman’s work and explaining three of the key areas of its interventions, an explainer in the form of a scrollable story on the impact of the Ombudsman’s work over time and an access to documents guide; welcomes moreover the organisation of the ‘Award for Good Administration’ ceremony and the participation of the Ombudsman at the EU Open Day in Brussels and Strasbourg, where it hosted targeted stakeholder events with academics and think tanks, and at the European Youth Event in Strasbourg in 2023;

    53. Recognises the efforts undertaken by the Ombudsman to provide transparent information and publish data (including statistics on its caseload) in an informative and user friendly format on the Ombudsman website (although such data are not available in open format); welcomes the publication on the website of a timeline for all inquiries into complaints providing information about past and future milestones in each inquiry;

    °

    ° °

    54. Notes that the Ombudsman has social media accounts on Instagram, LinkedIn, X (ex-Twitter), where the number of followers and the engagement rates continued to grow in 2023; welcomes the participation of the Ombudsman in a pilot project led by the EDPS aimed at bringing Union institutions onto EU Voice and EU Video, which are two free, open-source social media networks, based on Mastodon software, allowing Union institutions to interact with the public by sharing texts, images, videos and podcasts.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2023, Section II – European Council and Council – A10-0052/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    2. MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    with observations forming an integral part of the decision on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2023, Section II – European Council and Council

    (2024/2021(DEC))

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to its decision on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2023, Section II – European Council and Council,

    – having regard to Rule 102 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

    – having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs,

    – having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0052/2025),

    A. whereas in the context of the discharge procedure, the discharge authority wishes to stress the particular importance of further strengthening the democratic legitimacy of the Union institutions by improving transparency and accountability, and implementing the concept of performance-based budgeting and good governance of human resources;

    B. whereas, under Article 319 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), the Parliament has the sole responsibility of granting discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the Union, and whereas the budget of the European Council and of the Council is a section of the Union budget;

    C. whereas, pursuant to Article 15(1) of the Treaty on European Union, the European Council is not to exercise legislative functions;

    D. whereas, under Article 317 TFEU, the Commission is to implement the Union budget on its own responsibility, having regard to the principles of sound financial management, and whereas, under the framework in place, the Commission is to confer on the other Union institutions the requisite powers for the implementation of the sections of the budget relating to them;

    E. whereas, under Articles 235(4) and 240(2) TFEU, the European Council and the Council (the ‘Council’) are assisted by the General Secretariat of the Council (the ‘Secretariat’), and whereas the Secretary-General of the Council is wholly responsible for the sound management of the appropriations entered in Section II of the Union budget;

    F. whereas, over the course of more than twenty years, Parliament has been implementing the well-established and respected practice of granting discharge to all Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, and whereas the Commission supports that the practice of giving discharge to each Union institution, body, office and agency for its administrative expenditure should continue to be pursued;

    G. whereas, according to Article 59(1) of the Financial Regulation, the Commission shall confer on the other Union Institutions the requisite powers for the implementation of the sections of the budget relating to them;

    H. whereas, since the 2009 budget discharge, the Council’s lack of cooperation in the discharge procedure has compelled Parliament to refuse to grant discharge to the Secretary-General of the Council;

    I. whereas the European Council and the Council, as Union institutions and as recipients of the general budget of the Union, should be transparent and democratically accountable to the citizens of the Union and subject to democratic scrutiny of the spending of public funds;

    J. whereas Article 15(3) TFEU requires the EU institutions to ensure in their Rules of Procedure that their proceedings are transparent, while in several of its inquiries and decisions Ombudsman has criticised the Council for its lack of transparency suggesting that the Council has failed fully to grasp the critical link between democracy and the transparency of decision-making;

    K. whereas the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union confirms the right of taxpayers and of the public to be kept informed about the use of public revenue and that the General Court in in its judgment of 25 January 2023 in Case T-163/21[7], De Capitani v Council, stated on transparency within the Union legislative process that documents produced by the Council in its working groups are not of technical nature but legislative and are therefore subject to access to documents requests;

    1. Notes that the budget of the Council falls under MFF heading 7, ‘European public administration’, which amounted to EUR 12,3 billion in 2023 (representing 6,4% of the total Union budget); notes that the Council’s budget of approximately EUR 0,6 billion represents approximately 5,2% of the total administrative expenditure of the Union;

    2. Welcomes that the Court of Auditors (the ‘Court’), in its Annual Report for the financial year 2023 examined a sample of 70 transactions under Administration, 10 more than were examined in 2022; further notes that the Court writes that administrative expenditure comprises expenditure on human resources, including expenditure on pensions, which in 2023 accounted for about 70 % of the total administrative expenditure, and expenditure on buildings, equipment, energy, communications and information technology, and that its work over many years indicates that, overall, this spending is low risk;

    3. Notes that 21 (30 %) of the 70 transactions contained errors but that the Court, based on the five errors which were quantified, estimates the level of error to be below the materiality threshold;

    4. Notes that the Court, in its Annual Report for the financial year 2023, made an observation on the duration of a building maintenance framework contract awarded by the Council; notes that the Court did not identify any quantifiable errors in the four payments examined concerning the Council;

    State of play of the discharge procedure

    5. Deeply regrets that, since 2009, and again for the financial year 2022, Parliament has had to refuse discharge to the Council because the Council continues to refuse to cooperate with Parliament on the discharge procedure, preventing Parliament from taking an informed decision based on a serious and thorough scrutiny of the implementation of the Council’s budget;

    6. Notes that, on 20 September 2024, the relevant Parliament services, on behalf of the rapporteur for the discharge procedure, forwarded a questionnaire to the Secretariat of the Council containing 90 important questions for Parliament in order to enable a thorough scrutiny of the implementation of the Council budget and of the management of the Council; further notes that similar questionnaires were sent to all other institutions, all of which have provided Parliament with detailed answers to all the questions;

    7. Regrets that, on 23 September 2024, the Secretariat informed Parliament once again that it would not be answering Parliament’s questionnaire and that the Council would not be participating in the hearing organised on 12 November 2024 as part of the discharge process and in which all other invited institutions participated;

    8. Reiterates Parliament’s prerogative to grant discharge pursuant to Article 319 TFEU as well as the applicable provisions of the Financial Regulation and Parliament’s Rules of Procedure in line with current interpretation and practice, namely the power to grant discharge in order to maintain transparency and to ensure democratic accountability towards Union taxpayers;

    9. Underlines that Article 59(1) of the Financial Regulation states that the Commission shall confer on the other Union Institutions the requisite powers for the implementation of the sections of the budget relating to them and, therefore, finds it incomprehensible that the Council believes it appropriate that discharge should be granted to the Commission for the implementation of the Council budget;

    10. Stresses the well-established and respected practice followed by Parliament over the course of more than twenty years of granting discharge to all Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, including the European Council and Council; recalls that the Commission has declared its inability to oversee the implementation of the budgets of the other Union institutions; stresses the reiterated view of the Commission that the practice of giving discharge to each Union institution for their administrative expenditure and implementation of the EU budget should continue to be pursued directly by Parliament to preserve the compliance of the principle of sound financial management;

    11. Stresses that the current situation implies that Parliament can only check the reports of the Court and of the Ombudsman as well as the publicly available information on the Council’s website due to the Council’s persistent lack of cooperation with Parliament; underlines that this lack of cooperation undermines Parliament’s ability to effectively fulfil its oversight role and to make an informed decision on granting discharge;

    12. Deplores that the Council, for more than a decade, has shown that it does not have any political willingness to collaborate with Parliament in the context of the annual discharge procedure; underlines that this attitude has had a lasting negative effect on both institutions, has discredited the management and democratic scrutiny of the Union budget and has damaged the trust of citizens in the Union as a transparent entity; underlines that the Council must adhere to the same standards of accountability it expects from other Union institutions;

    13. Reiterates that the Council’s continued refusal to engage in the discharge procedure is an unacceptable breach of democratic accountability. Calls for legal and procedural amendments to withhold budgetary appropriations to any Union institution that fails to comply with transparency obligations;

    14. Recalls that the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union supports the right of taxpayers and the public to be kept informed about the use of public revenue; demands, therefore, full respect for Parliament’s prerogative and role as guarantor of the democratic accountability principle; calls on the Council to duly follow up on the recommendations adopted by Parliament in the context of the discharge procedure and insists on the full application of article 14 (&) TEU;

    15. Calls on the Council to  resume negotiations with Parliament without undue delay and to actively engage with Parliament at the highest level as soon as possible involving the Secretaries-General and the Presidents of both institutions, in order to break the deadlock and  resolve the long-standing discharge impasse, while respecting the respective roles of Parliament and the Council in the discharge procedure and ensuring transparency, credibility and proper democratic control of budget implementation; requests that Commission and the Council legal services provide an opinion on potential Treaty-based solutions to enforce Council’s accountability in the discharge procedure;

    16. Stresses that, while the current situation needs to be improved through better inter-institutional cooperation within the framework of the Treaties, a revision of the Treaties could make the discharge procedure clearer and more transparent by giving Parliament the explicit competence to grant discharge to all Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies individually; stresses, however, that pending such a review, the current situation must be improved through enhanced inter-institutional cooperation; urges in this sense the Council to actively engage with the Parliament;

    17. Notes that despite the Council being unwilling to cooperate in the discharge procedure, Parliament, nevertheless, stresses some political priorities and sets out some observations concerning the budgetary and financial management of the Council and other observations relevant for the discharge procedure in this report;

    18. Notes that, given the Council’s lack of cooperation with Parliament, observations in the following sections primarily rely on aggregated information publicly available, which provides limited detail;

    Political priorities

    19. Regrets that the Council exerts its prerogative in the nomination and appointment procedures for many Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies without taking into account the views of the interested parties or the recommendations of the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF);

    20. Notes the Council’s tradition of not questioning the appointments of individual Member States for most positions;

    21. Recalls that, pursuant to Article 286(2) TFEU, the Council appoints the members of the Court of Auditors, in accordance with proposals made by each Member State, after consultation with Parliament; recalls that, on the basis of this prerequisite, Parliament delivers an opinion on the candidates; regrets that the Council has repeatedly disregarded Parliament’s recommendations in its consultative role regarding the appointment of the members of the Court; recalls that although Parliament’s opinion is non-binding on the Council, candidates who received an unfavourable opinion withdrew their candidatures by accepting Parliament’s decision, thereby recognising the role of  Parliament as the democratic supervisory authority linked to the safeguarding of the Union budget; calls on the Council to recognise Parliament’s role by cooperating in the discharge procedure;

    22. Recalls that the judges and advocates-general of the Court of Justice of the European Union are appointed by common accord of the governments of the Member states after consultation of a panel responsible for giving an opinion on prospective candidates’ suitability to perform the duties concerned;

    23. Calls on the rotating Council Presidencies to stop using corporate sponsorship to contribute to covering their expenses as this runs the risk of creating conflicts of interest, in line with the conclusions of the workshop held by Parliament’s Committee on Budgetary Control on 27 June 2023; notes that, in her decision of 9 September 2024 on the strategic initiative on sponsorship of the presidency of the Council of the European Union, the European Ombudsman encouraged the Council to take stock of how the non-binding rules adopted by the Council for the use of sponsorship by its presidency (the Guidance) have been implemented and to explore other possible measures that could help mitigate the risks associated with the use of sponsorship; reiterates its call on the Council to provide a budget for the Council Presidencies to ensure adequate and uniform standards of efficiency and effectiveness in the work in the Council in general;

    24. Expresses deep concern over the Hungarian government’s misuse of its role in the EU Presidency to pursue bilateral engagements that contradict the Union’s core values, such as Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s meetings with Russian President Vladimir Putin, despite Union sanctions and the International Criminal Court arrest warrant against the latter for war crimes; notes with alarm similar engagements with other authoritarian leaders, undermining the EU’s credibility; calls on the Council to firmly condemn such actions and to take all necessary measures to ensure that Member States holding the Presidency act in alignment with EU principles, safeguarding the Union’s integrity and values;

    Budgetary and financial management

    25. Regrets that the budget of the European Council and the Council has not been divided into two clearly separated budgets as recommended by Parliament in previous discharge resolutions in order to improve transparency and accountability, not least concerning the European Council, given that it is currently impossible to get reliable information regarding its costs; stresses the importance of reliable data for objective control; calls on the compliance with the recommendation of the discharge authority;

    26. Notes that the Council’s budget was EUR 647 908 757 for 2023, representing an increase of 6 % compared to 2022, which is higher than the increase of 2,3 % between 2021 and 2022; notes that this increase is mainly related to the revision of salary update parameters due to inflation;

    27. Notes that the overall implementation rate of the Council’s budget in 2023 was 97,0 %; notes that almost EUR 20 million in appropriations were cancelled at the end of 2023, half of which originated from the staff expenditure budget line;

    28. Notes that, in accordance with Article 29 of the Financial Regulation, the Council carried out 41 budgetary transfers in 2023 for a cumulated amount of EUR 6,5 million; notes further that three of those transfers required that the budgetary authority be informed in accordance with Article 29(2), for the purpose of reinforcing various budget lines including “Fitting-out and installation work”, “Water, gas, electricity and heating”, “Acquisition of equipment and software” and “Cost of renting, maintenance and repair of service cars”;

    29. Calls on the Council to publish an annual breakdown of travel and representation expenses of senior officials, including the President of the European Council, the High Representative, and the General Secretariat, in a user-friendly format accessible to the public;

    30. Notes that appropriations carried over from 2023 to 2024 totalled EUR 85,5 million covering mainly computer systems, cost of interpretation provided in 2023, for which invoices have not been yet agreed with the European Commission services at the time of the closure, buildings, information and communication, audio-visual and conference equipment, other staff expenditure: and transport;

    31. Expresses concern over insufficient control mechanisms regarding the Council’s use of consultancy services and external contractors; calls for full disclosure of all contracts exceeding EUR 50,000, detailing the scope, deliverables, and awarded entities, to prevent potential misuse of public funds;

    32. Notes that the average time for payments of invoices decreased from 18 to 13 days from 2022 to 2023, well below the maximum time-limit of 30 days, thus avoiding interest on late payments;

    33. Notes that mission expenses, comprising both mission expenses from the Secretariat and mission expenses of staff related to the European Council, increased by 25 % between 2022 and 2023, and that travel expenses of delegations incurred by Presidencies and national delegations increased by 36,6 % during the same period; calls on the Council to assess this significant increase in mission expenditure; in the absence of access to detailed information, encourages the Council to use these resources in the spirit of sound financial management;

    Internal management, performance and internal control

    34. Notes that the Council laid down objectives for the performance of its budget in 2023, namely to ensure ongoing decision-making in the European Council and the Council; to ensure continuous support for the European Council and the Council through the effective and efficient use of financial resources, particularly in view of the persistent pressure of inflation and the resulting price increases due to contract indexation and to further proceed with the process of administrative digital modernisation with the objective of enhancing the quality of the Secretariat’s organisation and the appropriate use of resources;

    35. Notes that, in order to ensure the efficient use of its budget in 2023, the Secretariat continued to improve its financial management processes, notably based on the recommendations of a number of internal task forces; welcomes, in particular, the new performance tools, such as the inclusion of human resources and skills elements in the integrated management planning exercise, the full digitalisation of the financial workflows and the introduction of the electronic signature;

    36. Welcomes the greater use of data in decision-making, notably based on the monthly financial dashboard, showing key performance indicators across the Secretariat services and the Managers’ dashboard with key insights from HR data in order to facilitate daily management and decisions in the area of human resources;

    37. Notes that the Secretariat organised 4 429 meetings in 2023, which was relatively stable compared to 2022; notes further that the number of physical meetings increased by 11 % compared to 2022, while the number of meetings held by videoconference or in hybrid mode decreased substantially, by more than 60 %;

    38. Notes the Secretariat launched 17 open procurement procedures, 12 new negotiated procedures, as well as 21 inter-institutional procedures (any value) with the Council not in the lead; notes that, by the end of 2023, 41 contracts were signed, compared to 42 in 2022, and 47 Lots (any category) were being worked on; notes that contracts were awarded for a total amount of EUR 124,1 million in 2023, which corresponds to 19,15 % of the Council’s annual budget; notes, that out of the total contracted amount, 0,5 % was committed in low and middle value contracts, 58 % in specific contracts under framework contracts where Council is the sole contracting authority and 69,5 % in specific contracts awarded under inter-institutional framework contracts;

    39. Notes that the Council transmitted its annual report on internal audits carried out in 2023 to the discharge authority, in accordance with Article 118 of the financial regulation; notes that, at the end of 2023, 81 % of the recommendations issued during the years 2020-2022 had been implemented, 18 % were still open and for 1 %, risk had been accepted by management or the recommendations were no longer applicable; notes that four internal audits planned in the 2023 work programme were concluded during the year and two were still ongoing at the end of 2023; notes that the internal auditor issued high priority recommendations in three audits of the 2023 work programme related to transport services, IOLAN servers and core services and IOLAN endpoint systems;

    Human resources, equality and staff well-being

    40. Notes that, out of 3 116 members of staff at the end of 2023, 79 % were permanent staff, 12,8% were temporary staff, 7,2% were contractual agents and 1% were seconded national experts; notes that the repartition of permanent and temporary staff between job categories remained stable with 1 474,25 administrators (AD), 1 159 assistants (AST) and 230 secretaries (AST-SC) in 2023,  compared to 1 519, 1 284 and 190 in 2022; notes that the occupation rate of the establishment plan was 97,4 % at the end of 2023;

    41. Notes that, given the Council’s lack of cooperation with Parliament, observations in this section primarily rely on aggregated information published on the Council’s website which provides limited detail;

    42. Notes the other initiatives taken by the Secretariat to become a more diverse and inclusive workplace; welcomes that the Council received the 2023 Ombudsman’s award for Good Administration in the category ‘Excellence in diversity and inclusion’ for its Positive Action Programme for Trainees with Disabilities which meant that 6 trainees with disabilities were hosted in the Secretariat in 2023;

    43. Regrets the lack of publicly available information concerning the gender and geographical distribution of staff in the Secretariat; calls on the Council to provide information to Parliament on gender balance, geographical distribution and disabilities of its members of staff and on the related internal policies; encourages the Council to promote geographical balance of its staff by offering a wider pool of candidates from underrepresented Member States;

    44. Welcomes the Secretariat’s efforts in 2023 to attract and retain a qualified and younger workforce through various initiatives such as the recruitment of eight junior policy administrators under the new Junior Policy Team programme, the revision of the internal mobility rules and the participation of 41 of the Secretariat’s members of staff in an Interinstitutional Job Shadowing Exercise; emphasizes that traineeships should be remunerated in compliance with the European Parliament’s resolution of 14 June 2023 on Quality Traineeships in the Union (2020/2005(INL)), which calls for all internships in Europe to be paid; regrets the lack of information on the implementation of the Council’s Employer Branding Action Plan prepared in 2023;

    45. Notes that, in 2023, the 2020-2023 Psychosocial Risk Prevention plan was the subject of a review, the results of which have been taken into account in preparing a new Risk Prevention plan and updating the Psychosocial Intervention Plan as part of the Council’s initiatives to promote staff wellbeing, both individually and as teams or units; notes that several forms of support and courses were offered to members of staff and managers of the Secretariat, such as a dedicated management training session on psychological safety, Guidance for Managers on mental health, specific workshops on psychosocial risk prevention organised on demand and stress management workshops for the Spanish and Belgian Council Presidencies;

    46. Notes that the Secretariat completed the New Ways of Working (NWOW) pilot project, which was launched in 2018, and conducted an evaluation providing valuable insights especially in terms of change communication, user involvement and staff engagement in change processes; notes that the Council shared the results of the pilot project with other organisations conducting similar programmes; calls on the Council to also share the lessons learned with the discharge authority;

    Ethical framework and transparency

    47. Regrets that two key components of the ethical framework of the Council, the ‘Guide to Ethics and Conduct’ for Secretariat staff and the ‘Code of Conduct for the President of the European Council’, are available on the Council’s website without further guidance or date of publication; criticises that, despite several requests by Parliament, the code of conduct for the President of the European Council has not been brought in line with those of Parliament and the Commission, in particular in terms of post term-of-office activities; calls on forthwith rectification of foregoing deficiencies;

    48. Reiterates that ethical conduct contributes to sound financial management and increases public trust and that, as stressed by the Court in its Special Report No 13/2019, there is scope for improvement in the ethical frameworks of the Union institutions; recalls in particular the recommendation issued by the Court with regard to improving the Council’s ethical framework; expresses concern about the lack of a common Union ethical framework governing the work of the representatives of Member States in the Council as identified by the Court;

    49. Notes that, as part of the implementation of the Secretary-General’s Decision 23/2021 concerning psychological and sexual harassment at work, several actions were taken in 2023 such as the publication on the Secretariat’s intranet of the Guide to preventing harassment in the workplace, awareness-raising activities for newcomers regarding the zero tolerance approach of the Council and the organisation of compulsory trainings on anti-harassment and inappropriate behaviour for new managers and staff with management responsibilities;

    50. Notes that the Secretariat publishes an annual report with information regarding the occupational activities of former senior officials of the Secretariat after leaving the service in accordance with Article 16, third and fourth paragraphs, of the Staff Regulations of officials of the European Union; notes that, according to the report concerning 2023, one former senior official declared their intention to engage in occupational activities less than 12 months after they left and was granted permission from the Appointing Authority to engage in one activity subject to a certain condition which was aimed at respecting the mitigation period of the second paragraph of Article 16 of the Staff Regulations;

    51. Urges the Council to establish stricter post-term employment rules for senior officials, including an extended cooling-off period and mandatory public disclosure of private-sector affiliations; calls on the Council to make the participation of Member States’ Permanent Representations in the EU Transparency Register mandatory;

    52. Regrets the fact that the participation of the Member States’ Permanent Representatives in the mandatory transparency register, set up by the interinstitutional agreement of 20 May 2021 between Parliament, the Council and the Commission, is completely voluntary as the application of the conditionality principle is left to the discretion of each Member State’s Permanent Representation; notes that only eight Member States and the Union institutions abide by the best practice of applying a mandatory broad-scope definition of lobbyist in their regulatory framework and insists that all Permanent Representations should take an active part in the mandatory transparency register before, during and after their Member State’s presidency of the Council; calls for stronger and harmonized ethics rules on conflicts of interest, revolving doors, and lobbying transparency; regrets that the Council does not fully use the mandatory transparency register or accept proposals to improve it; reiterates its call on the Council to refrain from engaging with unregistered lobbyists;

    53. Regrets that the Council does not fully utilise the mandatory transparency register beyond its current limitations, rejecting any recommendation for improvements; reiterates its call on the Council to refuse to meet with unregistered lobbyists;

    54. Urges the Council to mandate that all high-ranking officials, including Permanent Representatives and Heads of Delegation, publicly disclose their meetings with interest groups and lobbyists in a standardised transparency register, similar to the obligations imposed on Members of the European Parliament and the European Commission;

    55. Strongly regrets that the Council continues to systematically withhold or delay access to legislative documents and the decision-making process in the Council is still far from fully transparent, thereby hindering public scrutiny of its decision-making, negatively affecting citizens’ trust in the Union as a transparent entity and jeopardising the reputation of the Union as a whole; recalls and supports the recommendations of the European Ombudsman regarding the transparency of the Council legislative process in strategic inquiry OI/2/2017/TE; urges the Council to take all the measures necessary to implement the recommendations of the Ombudsman and the relevant rulings of the Court of Justice of the European Union without undue delay; recalls that the Court of Justice of the European Union, in its judgement in Case T-163/21, De Capitani v Council, underlined that clearer legislative transparency is needed from the Council in order to ensure access to legislative documents, corresponding to the Council’s obligation in terms of public scrutiny and accountability of the co-legislators as the basis of any democratic legitimacy;

    56. Is concerned that, in 2023, the European Ombudsman once again called on the Council to make legislative documents available at a time that would allow the public to participate effectively in the discussions; notes that the European Ombudsman also called on the Council to continue its efforts with regard to informing the public adequately about the restrictive measures adopted against Russia, to the greatest extent possible; welcomes the strategic enquiry launched by the European Ombudsman in 2023 on how the institutions handle requests for public access to legislative documents, based in particular on six recent complaints to the Ombudsman concerning public access to Union legislative documents handled by the Council;

    57. Notes that the Access to Documents team reported that they received and replied to an unusually high number of requests for public access to documents in 2023, 3 732 initial requests for access to documents and 40 confirmatory applications, which required the analysis of 13 912 documents; notes that, among the initial requests for access, full access was granted to 10 908 documents (78,4 %) and partial access to 1 600 documents (11,5 %) while access was refused to 1 404 documents (10,1 %); notes that for the confirmatory applications, full access was granted to 53 documents and partial access to 45 documents, while access was refused to 48 documents; notes that initial requests were processed, on average, in 16 working days and confirmatory applications in 32 working days;

    58. Welcomes that, according to the publicly available annual reports, no cases of fraud or irregularity were brought to the attention of the responsible authorising officers by delegation during 2023, nor were such cases subject to the competence of the panel (Article 143 of the Financial Regulation) or OLAF;

    Digitalisation

    59. Notes that, in 2023, the Secretariat continued to pursue its goal of digital transformation, in line with its Digital Strategy priorities for 2022-2025; notes, that out of 113 digitalisation projects in the annual work plan, concerning, in particular, the areas of shared services, policy, legal  and IT, 37 % were completed at the end of the year while 8 % were cancelled or merged and 38% were still ongoing; notes that more diversified training courses were organised, including specific courses for the electronic signature of contracts and to promote FIORI, the new user experience of SAP;

    60. Urges the Council to accelerate the implementation of secure digital voting and document-sharing systems to enhance efficiency, accountability, and reduce unnecessary paper-based processes;

    61. Welcomes that, in 2023, 97 % of invoices were submitted electronically, the same as in 2022; acknowledges that, with between 30 and 40 % of purchase orders and contracts being signed electronically each month in 2023, significant progress was made towards the full digitalisation of the financial workflow, from launching procurement procedures to paying invoices electronically;

    62. Notes that, in 2023, the Council took steps in favour of greater digital accessibility, in particular through the publication of a Digital Accessibility Guide;

    Cybersecurity and data protection

    63. Notes that, in 2023, the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) issued a Supervisory Opinion in accordance with Article 57(1)(g) of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 relating to the need to conduct a data protection impact assessment concerning the project of the Secretariat regarding the use of centralised human resource analytics and reporting services and the establishment a data warehouse; notes that the EDPS did not report any investigation or complaint concerning the Council in 2023;

    64. Expresses concern over the lack of robust safeguards against surveillance and data collection by third parties; calls for enhanced security measures, including mandatory data encryption and regular security audits of all digital communication systems used by the Council;

    65. Notes that, in order to improve the cybersecurity awareness and preparedness of its staff, the Secretariat designed and launched several new training courses related to information security, counterespionage, and cybersecurity in 2023; notes further that awareness-raising events about cybersecurity and information security were organised during Cybersecurity Month in October 2023;

    Buildings

    66. Notes that budget line 2011 for “Water, gas, electricity and heating” was reinforced by 33 % through a budgetary transfer in 2023; notes that the Secretariat continued to reduce its energy consumption, through methods such as reducing the building heating and replacing the boilers in the Justus Lipsius building;

    67. Notes that key building projects were executed in 2023, such as the renovation of some meeting rooms in the LEX and Justus Lipsius buildings, the continuous renovation of office corridors in the Justus Lipsius building, improvements of facilities and infrastructure for bikes in the Council’s premises and the modernisation of the Justus Lipsius reception desks;

    68. Regrets that the Council has still not implemented a simplified accreditation procedure to facilitate the access of the other Union institutions’ staff to Council’s premises; calls on the Council to implement this measure;

    Environment and sustainability

    69. Notes that, further to an external audit performed in 2023, the EcoManagement and Audit Scheme was maintained and that Energy Performance of Buildings certificates were renewed;

    70. Notes that, as part of the continuing priority efforts for sustainable mobility, facilities and infrastructures for bikes in the Secretariat premises were improved and tailored and videoconferencing facilities in the form of “meet anywhere rooms” were renovated or put in place; notes further that efforts to on-board staff and managers in the green transformation were deployed through training and awareness-raising actions;

    Interinstitutional cooperation

    71. Stresses the need for Article 319 TFEU to be revised in order to explicitly stipulate that Parliament, besides granting discharge to the Commission, also grants discharge to other Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies in respect of the implementation of their sections of the budget or of their budgets; invites the Council to overcome the inter-institutional conflict and to resume talks with the European Parliament in order to reach a common agreement for a smooth resumption of the discharge procedure;

    Communication

    72. Notes that, in 2023, the overall budget for communication implemented in the course of the year, taking transfers into account, was EUR 11 871 300, i.e. 3,54 % higher than the 2022 budget;

    73. Notes that the Secretariat provides communication services to the President of the European Council, whose web presence was fundamentally revamped in 2022, the President of the Eurogroup, the rotating presidency, the High Representative-Vice President, Member States and the Secretariat; notes that 2023 saw a marked increase in collaboration between the Secretariat’s digital team and the presidencies, in particular, close editorial coordination led to increased synergies in terms of content reuse and better complementarity, which maximised the overall communication impact;

    74. Notes that, according to an online survey conducted in the last quarter of 2023, 67 % of users were satisfied with their overall experience with the Council’s website, which had over 23 million visits in 2023, a 1 % increase compared to 2022, and 57 900 subscribers, compared to 51 600 in 2022.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Serbia – A10-0072/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Serbia

    (2025/2022(INI))

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States of the one part, and the Republic of Serbia, of the other part[1], which entered into force on 1 September 2013,

    – having regard to Serbia’s application for membership of the EU of 19 December 2009,

    – having regard to the Commission opinion of 12 October 2011 on Serbia’s application for membership of the European Union (COM(2011)0668), the European Council’s decision of 1 March 2012 to grant Serbia candidate status and the European Council’s decision of 28 June 2013 to open EU accession negotiations with Serbia,

    – having regard to the Brussels Agreement of 27 February 2023 and the Ohrid Agreement of 18 March 2023 and the Implementation Annex thereto,

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1529 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 September 2021 establishing the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA III)[2],

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1449 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans[3],

    – having regard to the presidency conclusions of the Thessaloniki European Council meeting of 19 and 20 June 2003,

    – having regard to the declarations of the EU-Western Balkans summits of 17 May 2018 in Sofia and of 6 May 2020 in Zagreb,

    – having regard to its resolutions on foreign interference in all democratic processes in the European Union, including disinformation,

    – having regard to the Berlin Process, launched on 28 August 2014,

    – having regard to the first agreement on principles governing the normalisation of relations between the governments of Serbia and Kosovo of 19 April 2013, to the agreements of 25 August 2015, and to the ongoing EU-facilitated dialogue for the normalisation of relations,

    – having regard to the agreement on free movement between the governments of Serbia and Kosovo of 27 August 2022, to the agreement on licence plates of 23 November 2022, and to the Energy Agreements’ Implementation Roadmap in the EU-facilitated Dialogue of 21 June 2022,

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 5 February 2020 entitled ‘Enhancing the accession process – A credible EU perspective for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2020)0057),

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 6 October 2020 entitled ‘An Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2020)0641),

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘2023 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy’ (COM(2023)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Serbia 2023 Report’ (SWD(2023)0695),

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘New growth plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2023)0691),

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 20 March 2024 on pre-enlargement reforms and policy reviews (COM(2024)0146),

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘2024 Communication on EU enlargement policy’ (COM(2024)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Serbia 2024 Report’ (SWD(2024)0695),

    – having regard to the European Council conclusions of 9 February 2023 on the EU-facilitated dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina,

    – having regard to Article 14 of the Serbian Constitution on the protection of national minorities,

    – having regard to the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, ratified by Serbia in 2001 and the Council of Europe’s European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, ratified by Serbia in 2006,

     

    – having regard to the European Council conclusions of 26 and 27 October 2023 on Kosovo and Serbia,

    – having regard to the Council conclusions of 17 December 2024 on enlargement,

    – having regard to the final report of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR) election observation mission on the early parliamentary and presidential elections of 3 April 2022 in Serbia, published on 19 August 2022,

    – having regard to the European Council conclusions of December 2006, to the Council conclusions of March 2020 and to the Conclusions of the Presidency of the European Council in Copenhagen of 21-22 June 1993, also known as the Copenhagen criteria,

    – having regard to the final report of the OSCE/ODIHR election observation mission on the early parliamentary elections of 17 December 2023 in Serbia, published on 28 February 2024,

    – having regard to the memorandum of understanding between the European Union and the Republic of Serbia on a strategic partnership on sustainable raw materials, battery value chains and electric vehicles, signed on 19 July 2024,

    – having regard to its resolution of 29 February 2024 on deepening EU integration in view of future enlargement[4],

    – having regard to its previous resolutions on Serbia, in particular that of 19 October 2023 on the recent developments in the Serbia-Kosovo dialogue, including the situation in the northern municipalities in Kosovo[5], and that of 8 February 2024 on the situation in Serbia following the elections[6],

    – having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

    – having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0072/2025),

    A. whereas enlargement is one of the most successful EU foreign policy instruments and a strategic geopolitical investment in long-term peace, stability and security throughout the continent;

    B. whereas according to the Copenhagen criteria, candidate countries must adhere to the values of the Union in order to be able to join it;

    C. whereas democracy and the rule of law are the fundamental values on which the EU is founded;

    D. whereas in recent years, political rights and civil liberties have been steadily eroded, putting pressure on independent media, the political opposition and civil society organisations;

    E. whereas the Fourth Opinion on Serbia of the Council of Europe Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention on National Minorities, adopted on 26 June 2019, criticised Serbia’s delays in fully implementing education rights for minorities;

    F. whereas freedom of religion is a core European value and a fundamental human right and Serbia is therefore obliged to respect and guarantee this freedom for all individuals residing within its territory, in accordance with its international commitments and human rights obligations;

    G. whereas in line with Chapter 23 of the acquis, Serbia must demonstrate real improvements in the effective exercise of the rights of persons belonging to national minorities;

    H. whereas each candidate country for enlargement is judged on its own merits, including their respect for and unwavering commitment to shared European rights and values and alignment with the EU’s foreign and security policy;

    I. whereas Serbia has not imposed sanctions against Russia following the Russian aggression in Ukraine; whereas Serbia’s rate of alignment with the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) has been steadily declining since 2021; whereas Serbia supports the territorial integrity and political independence of Ukraine, and has clearly condemned the Russian Federation’s aggression against Ukraine and voted alongside the EU in the UN, even though it has not imposed sanctions against Russia; whereas Serbia’s rate of alignment with the CFSP dropped from 54 % in 2023 to 51 % in 2024 while other candidate countries in the region – Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and North Macedonia – achieved 100 % alignment;

    J. whereas Serbia remains a critical battleground for foreign disinformation campaigns, notably by Russia and China, which seek to create an anti-Western rhetoric; whereas the final report of the OSCE/ODHIR on the early parliamentary elections held on 17 December 2023 pointed out several procedural deficiencies, as well as the use of harsh rhetoric and the presence of consistent bias in the media that gave an unbalanced advantage to the ruling party; whereas the issues identified in that report need to be assessed thoroughly and promptly; whereas as part of the accession negotiations, Serbia adopted the Strategy for Combating Cybercrime 2019-2023 and the relevant action plans in September 2018; whereas the strategy and the relevant action plans were not renewed after December 2023; whereas Serbia did not align with the EU’s restrictive measures in reaction to cyberattacks in 2023 and 2024;

    K. whereas the normalisation of relations between Kosovo and Serbia is a precondition for the progression of both countries towards EU membership;

    L. whereas accession to the EU inevitably requires full alignment with the foreign policy objectives of the Union;

    M. whereas Serbia recognises the territorial integrity of Ukraine, including the Crimean peninsula and the Donbas region;

    N. whereas the EU is Serbia’s main trading partner, accounting for 59.7 % of Serbia’s total trade;

    O. whereas Russia is using its influence in Serbia to try to destabilise, interfere in and threaten neighbouring sovereign states and undermine Serbia’s European future; whereas Russian propaganda outlets such as RT (formerly Russia Today) and Sputnik operate freely in Serbia and exert significant influence in shaping anti-EU and anti-democratic narratives; whereas disinformation often originates from a false or misleading statement by a political figure, which is then reported by state-owned media and subsequently amplified on social media, often with an intention to undermine political opponents and democratic principles;

    P. whereas on 8 June 2024, an ‘All-Serb Assembly’ took place in Belgrade with the participation of political leaders from Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Kosovo under the slogan ‘One people, one assembly’;

    Commitment to EU accession

    1. Notes Serbia’s stated commitment to EU membership as its strategic goal and its ambition to align fully with the EU acquis by the end of 2026; urges Serbia to deliver quickly and decisively on essential reforms, especially in cluster 1, for this very ambitious commitment to be perceived as realistic, genuine and meaningful; stresses the need for Serbia to seriously and categorically demonstrate that it is strategically oriented towards the EU, by showing strong political will and consistency in the implementation of EU-related reforms and by communicating objectively and unambiguously with its citizens about the EU, Serbia’s European path and the required reforms;

    2. Reiterates the strategic importance of the Western Balkans in the current geopolitical context and for the security and stability of the EU as a whole; outlines that, owing to its geopolitical position, the country has a direct impact on the overall stability of the region; condemns, therefore, Serbia’s attempts to establish a sphere of influence undermining the sovereignty of neighbouring countries;

    3. Acknowledges Serbia’s good level of preparation with regard to macroeconomic stability and fiscal discipline and the Commission’s assessment that cluster 3 is technically ready for opening but notes with concern that there has been limited or no overall progress in meeting the benchmarks for EU membership across negotiating chapters, with particular shortcomings in critical areas such as the rule of law, media freedom, public administration reform, and alignment with EU policies, particularly the EU’s foreign policy;

    4. Regrets the fact that no substantial progress has been made on Chapter 31, as Serbia’s pattern of alignment with EU foreign policy positions has remained largely unchanged, mainly due to Serbia’s close relations with Russia; recalls that Serbia remains a notable exception in the Western Balkans regarding CFSP alignment; calls on Serbia to reverse this trend and to demonstrate positive steps towards full alignment; notes that Serbia’s rate of compliance with EU statements and declarations is increasing but remains at only 61 %; welcomes Serbia’s continued active participation in and positive contribution to EU military crisis management missions and operations;

    5. Welcomes Serbia’s humanitarian support for Ukraine and takes note of the sale of ammunition to the value of EUR 800 million for use by Ukraine in a mutually beneficial agreement; notes that Serbia has aligned with some of the EU’s positions regarding Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; regrets, however, that Serbia still does not align with the EU’s restrictive measures against Russia; calls on the EU to reconsider the extent of the financial assistance provided by the EU to Serbia in the event of continued support for anti-democratic ideologies and non-alignment with the EU’s restrictive measures and the CFSP; calls on Serbia to swiftly align with the EU’s restrictive measures and general policy towards Russia and Belarus, systematically and without delay;

    6. Stresses the importance of implementing sanctions against Russia for the security of Europe as a whole; deplores Serbia’s continued close relations with Russia, raising concerns about its strategic orientation; reiterates its calls on the Serbian authorities to enhance transparency regarding the role and activities of the so-called Russian-Serbian Humanitarian Center in Nis and to immediately terminate all military cooperation with Russia; notes Serbia’s decision to support the UN resolution condemning Russia’s aggression against Ukraine three years after the full-scale invasion; regrets President Vučić’s immediate verbal retraction of Serbia’s UN vote, calling it a ‘mistake’; considers that maintaining privileged relations with the Kremlin regime undermines not only Serbia’s credibility as a candidate country but also the trust of its European partners and the future of EU-Serbia relations;

    7. Regrets the continued decline in public support for EU membership in Serbia and the growing support for the Putin regime, which is the result of a long-standing anti-EU and pro-Russian rhetoric from the government-controlled media as well as some government officials; calls on the Serbian authorities to foster a fact-based and open discussion on accession to the EU;

    8. Deplores the continued spread of disinformation, including about Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; condemns the spillover effects of these actions in other countries in the region; calls on the Serbian authorities to combat disinformation and calls for the EU to enhance cooperation with Serbia to strengthen democratic resilience and counter hybrid threats;

    9. Notes Serbia’s progress on aligning with EU visa policy and calls for full alignment, in particular with regard to those non-EU countries presenting a security threat to the EU, including the threat of cyberattacks; welcomes the agreement signed on 25 June 2024 between the EU and Serbia on operational cooperation on border management with Frontex, highlighting the need to act in line with fundamental rights and international standards;

    10. Reiterates that the overall pace of the accession negotiations should depend on tangible progress on the fundamentals, the rule of law and a commitment to the shared European rights and values as well as to the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue, which is to be conducted in good faith so that it results in a legally binding agreement based on mutual recognition, as well as alignment with the EU’s CFSP; reiterates its position that accession negotiations with Serbia should only advance if the country aligns with EU sanctions against Russia and makes significant progress on its EU-related reforms, in particular in the area of the fundamentals;

    11. Repeats its concern regarding the appeasing approach of the Commission towards Serbia against the backdrop of the country’s year-long rollback on the rule of law, democracy and fundamental rights, as well as its destabilising influence on the whole region; urges the Commission to use clearer language, including on the highest level, towards Serbia, consistently addressing significant shortcomings, lack of progress and even backsliding, thus upholding the EU’s fundamental values;

    12.  Calls on the Serbian Government to promote the role and benefits of EU accession and EU-funded projects and reforms among the Serbian population;

    Democracy and the rule of law

    13. Notes the ongoing challenges in ensuring judicial independence, including undue influence and political pressure on the judiciary; expresses concern about the failure to implement safeguards preventing political interference in judicial appointments and disciplinary actions against judges and prosecutors; calls on Serbia to ensure that the High Judicial Council, the High Prosecutorial Council and the Government and Parliament of Serbia effectively and proactively defend judicial independence and prosecutorial autonomy;

    14. Stresses the importance of adopting the Law on the Judicial Academy and the Venice Commission opinion and making necessary judicial appointments to reduce existing vacancies and improve the overall effectiveness of the judicial system; notes that the delay in adopting this law has stalled key judicial reforms necessary for alignment with EU standards; calls for the draft law to be amended following transparent consultation with all relevant stakeholders, with a view to ensuring the independence and control mechanisms of the institution in order to contribute to overall judicial independence;

    15. Notes that limited progress has been made in the fight against corruption despite the adoption of a new anti-corruption strategy for 2024-2028; calls on Serbia to adopt and begin implementing the accompanying anti-corruption action plan and to establish an effective monitoring and coordination mechanism to track progress, in line with international standards; expresses concern that corruption is still prevalent in many areas, particularly related to ‘projects of interests for the Republic of Serbia’, and that strong political will is required to effectively address corruption as well as to mount a robust criminal justice response to high-level corruption; notes that Serbia ranks 105th in the Corruption Perceptions Index 2024, well below the EU average; considers that the level of corruption in Serbia is a significant obstacle to its EU accession process; notes with concern that results have still not been delivered in cases of high public interest, after several years, such as in the long-standing cases of Krušik, Jovanjica, Savamala and Belivuk; calls on Serbia to strengthen the independence of its anti-corruption institutions by ensuring that they are adequately resourced and protected from political interference; calls on the Government of Serbia to sign the Anti-Bribery Convention of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and to fully align its legal framework on police cooperation and organised crime with that of the EU;

    16. Welcomes the more pluralistic composition of the new parliament, with a broader representation of political parties, including parties of national minorities; notes that the early election and the corresponding break in the functioning of the government and parliament have impeded progress on reforms; notes the frequent pattern of early elections, a permanent campaign mode and long delays in forming governments, as well as the disrupted work of the national parliament, including the absence of government question-time sessions, the lack of discussion on the reports of independent institutions, and the more frequent use of urgent procedures, which lead to a lack of parliamentary legislative oversight and legitimacy and do not contribute to the effective democratic governance of the country;

    17. Takes note of the resignation of Prime Minister Miloš Vučević on 28 January 2025, which was confirmed by the National Assembly on 19 March 2025; takes note of the resumption of the work of the National Assembly on 4 March 2025, after a pause of three months, and condemns all the acts of violence that occurred on this occasion;

    18. Reiterates its readiness to support the National Assembly and the members thereof in the democratic processes related to Serbia’s European path, including the proper functioning of the parliament in accordance with its rules of procedure, by using the European Parliament’s existing democracy support tools and initiatives and by supporting increased parliamentary oversight of the EU accession process and reforms;

    19. Takes note, with deep concern, of the final report of the OSCE/ODIHR election observation mission on the December 2023 elections; notes that in April 2024, the National Assembly formed a working group for the improvement of the election process but that, by the end of the year, it had not agreed on any legal measures to improve the election process; notes that two out of three representatives of civil society left the working group in February 2025; notes that steps were taken in the first months of 2025 on amending the Law on Unified Voter Registry but that there is no consensus among political and civil society actors on the content; calls on all parliamentary groups in the National Assembly to decide on the implementation of ODIHR recommendations, with the agreement of all groups; calls for equal treatment of all members of parliament in the work of the National Assembly, consistent and effective implementation of the parliamentary Code of Conduct and the impartial sanctioning of breaches of parliamentary integrity;

    20. Is concerned about the increasing role of foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) and foreign cyber operations and interference in Serbia’s democratic election processes;

    21. Stresses the critical importance of ensuring the independence of key institutions, including media regulators such as the Regulatory Authority for Electronic Media (REM); regrets the delay in the election of the new members; regrets the irregularities in the nomination process; notes the withdrawal of several candidates from the selection in February 2025, who justified their decision on the basis of these irregularities; deeply regrets the fact that the REM neglected its legal obligations to scrutinise the conduct of the 2023 election campaign in the media in a timely manner, to report on its findings and to sanction media outlets that breached the law, spread hate speech or violated journalistic standards; notes, with concern, the absence of pluralistic political views in the nationwide media; notes that the REM should actively promote media pluralism and transparency regarding the ownership structures of media outlets and independence from foreign actors;

    22. Notes that the REM awarded four national frequencies to channels that have a history of violating journalistic standards, including using hate speech and misleading the public, not complying with warnings issued by the REM, spreading disinformation and supporting the Kremlin’s narrative on Russia’s war in Ukraine; deeply regrets the fact that REM has not issued the fifth national licence and calls for it to be awarded through a transparent and impartial process without unnecessary delay and in compliance with international media freedom standards as soon as a new REM council is elected; calls for the Serbian Government to scrap and re-start the process of electing new members, in line with Serbian law and international media freedom standards;

    Fundamental freedoms and human rights

    23. Expresses its sincere condolences to the families of the 15 victims who lost their lives and to those who were injured following the collapse of the canopy of Novi Sad train station on 1 November 2024; calls for full and transparent legal proceedings following the investigation by the authorities, to bring those responsible to justice; underlines the need to examine more broadly to what extent corruption led to the lowering of safety standards and contributed to this tragedy;

    24. Regrets the delayed response and accountability of the Serbian authorities, the slow investigation process and the lack of transparency in the aftermath of the tragedy, which were partially addressed in the face of escalating public pressure;

    25. Expresses deep concern about the systemic issues highlighted by the student protests and various other protests in Serbia, such as issues relating to civil liberties, separation of powers, corruption, environmental protection, institutional and financial transparency, especially in relation to infrastructure projects, and accountability; regrets the fact that the government missed the opportunity to meet the demands of the students and of the citizens who support the students in good faith; affirms that the students’ demands align with reforms that Serbia is expected to implement on its European path;

    26. Underlines the importance of freedom of speech and assembly; calls on the authorities of Serbia to ensure the protection of those participating in the peaceful protests; takes note of the mass protests on 15 March 2025, the largest in the modern history of Serbia; calls for an impartial investigation of the claims that unlawful technology of crowd control was used against the protesters, causing injuries to a number of them;

    27. Condemns, in the strongest terms, the misuse of personal data from public registries to retaliate against peaceful protesters; calls on the prosecution office in Serbia to file charges against all persons who physically attacked and incited violence against the participants of the demonstrations; is deeply concerned about any act of violence; is carefully following developments as regards arrests of protesters and legal proceedings that have been opened against them; is concerned about the reports that the security services were involved in intimidation and surveillance of the protesters; condemns the language used by the Serbian authorities inciting violence against students and other protesters; notes that student activists have faced legal harassment, intimidation and excessive use of force by the authorities; calls for a thorough, impartial and speedy investigation into allegations of violence used against demonstrators and police misconduct during protests; urges the diplomatic missions of the EU and the Member States to continue to monitor closely the ongoing legal cases relating to the protests;

    28.  Is deeply alarmed that the Serbian authorities have engaged in widespread illegal surveillance practices using spyware against activists, journalists and members of civil society, as indicated in the recent reports by Amnesty International and the SHARE Foundation; urges the Government of Serbia to immediately cease the use of advanced surveillance technology against activists, journalists and human rights defenders, and calls on the competent state authorities to conduct a thorough investigation into all existing cases of unlawful surveillance and use of spyware and to initiate appropriate proceedings against those responsible; calls on the European Commission, in the light of this, to follow up on these incidents, address these issues with the Serbian authorities and insist on a thorough investigation into these matters;

    29. Rejects allegations that the EU and some of its Member States were involved in organising the student protests with a view to triggering a ‘colour revolution’; strongly condemns, in that context, the unlawful arrests and expulsions of EU citizens and the public disclosure, by convicted war criminals, of the personal data of EU citizens, as well as hate speech against national minorities; expresses concern about the rising number of detention cases involving EU citizens at Serbia’s border; notes that anti-EU narratives are being manifested in decreasing support for EU integration in Serbian society and in a strengthening of the presence of foreign autocratic actors in the country;

    30. Calls on the Serbian authorities to restore citizens’ confidence in state institutions by granting transparency and accountability; encourages all political and social actors to engage in an inclusive, substantive dialogue aimed at fulfilling EU-related reforms;

    31. Notes that media freedom in Serbia has deteriorated further, as evidenced by Serbia’s drop to 98th place in the 2024 Reporter Without Borders World Press Freedom Index; urges Serbia to improve and protect media professionalism, diversity and media pluralism, and to promote quality investigative journalism, the highest ethical journalistic standards, through respecting journalistic codes of conduct, and media literacy; recalls the importance of the plurality and transparency of the media, including on aspects related to ownership and state financing, most notably through better involvement of the REM; recalls that the concentration of media ownership can have adverse effects on the freedom of the media and the professionalism of reporting; reaffirms that, as part of the accession negotiations, Serbia needs to align with the EU in matters of strategic importance, such as countering FIMI; calls on Serbia to align with EU policies in countering foreign interference and disinformation campaigns by implementing concrete regulatory measures in line with EU standards, such as the provisions included in the Digital Services Act[7] and Regulation (EU) 2024/900 on the transparency and targeting of political advertising[8]; encourages cooperation between Serbia, the European External Action Service and the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats in tackling disinformation; expects the authorities to investigate and prosecute all instances of hate speech, smear campaigns and strategic lawsuits against journalists;

    32. Expresses its deep concerns about reported cases of abusive attacks, digital surveillance and harassment against journalists, human rights activists and civil society organisations, most recently a police raid on 25 February 2025 on four leading civil society organisations, ostensibly regarding their misuse of US Agency for International Development funds; strongly condemns persistent smear campaigns and intimidation against civil society in Serbia, including false allegations about plots to overthrow the government with foreign support;

    33. Expresses concern that civil society organisations in Serbia face increasing challenges, including restrictive conditions, funding constraints, police raids and other forms of intimidation from state authorities; underlines the importance of a framework that enables local, vibrant civil society organisations to operate freely and participate in policymaking, including EU integration processes, in inclusive and meaningful ways; regrets that Serbia currently does not provide a framework that enables its lively and pluralistic civil society organisations, particularly those engaged in democracy support and electoral observation, to operate freely and participate in policymaking in inclusive and meaningful ways; expresses concern about recent raids of the offices of civil society organisations; calls for investigations into all attacks and smear campaigns against civil society organisations and for the improved transparency of public funding;

    34. Urges the Serbian authorities to expand the availability of public broadcasting services in all minority languages across the country, ensuring equal access to media for all communities, while drawing on the best practice of the region of Vojvodina;

    35. Expresses its deep concern about the draft law submitted to the Serbian Parliament on 29 November 2024, which proposes the establishment of a Russian-style foreign agents law; reminds Serbian legislators that civil society organisations and journalists play a key role in a healthy democratic society; reiterates that such legislation is incompatible with the values of the EU; notes that multiple civil society organisations suspended their cooperation with the legislative and executive branches of the government in February 2025;

    36. Expresses grave concern about the increasing political interference in heritage protection in Serbia, including the removal of protected status from cultural monuments and the disregard for legal procedures governing their preservation, as in the case of the Generalštab Modernist Complex;

    37. Calls on Serbia to fight disinformation, including manipulative anti-EU narratives and, in particular, to end its own state-sponsored disinformation campaigns; condemns the opening of an RT office in Belgrade, the launch of RT’s online news service in Serbian and the continued operation of the Russian online news service Sputnik Srbija, which is used to propagate pro-Russian narratives and misinformation across the Western Balkans region; urges the Serbian authorities to counter hybrid threats and fully align with the Council’s decision on the suspension of the broadcasting activities of Sputnik and RT; is deeply concerned about the spread of disinformation about the Russian aggression against Ukraine; calls on Serbia and the Commission to bolster infrastructure to fight disinformation and other hybrid threats; condemns the increasing influence of Russian and Chinese state-sponsored disinformation in Serbia, including the dissemination of anti-EU and anti-democratic narratives;

    38. Takes note of the adoption of the national strategy for equality and the strategy for prevention of and protection against discrimination, and calls for their full implementation and for further alignment with European standards; urges the Serbian authorities to address the recommendations of the Group of Experts on Action against Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (GREVIO), with a view to improving compliance with the Istanbul Convention ratified by Serbia; notes with concern the temporary suspension of the implementation of the Law on Gender Equality by the Constitutional Court; expresses concern about the persistent lack of adequate support for organisations promoting women’s rights and gender equality;

    39.  Stresses that the Serbian authorities must take concrete measures to uphold and strengthen the respect for the rights of the child in the country, including by ratifying the third Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopting a national action plan for the rights of the child, adopting a new strategy on violence against children, given the expiry of the previous framework, and establishing a national framework to protect children from abuse and neglect;

    40. Welcomes the fact that Belgrade Pride 2024 parade, the biggest in Serbia so far, passed off peacefully, though being protected by a high-profile police presence;

    41. Highlights the need for strong commitment to safeguarding the rights of national minorities, ensuring their full representation at all levels of government, preserving their cultural identity through the use of their respective languages and by meeting their educational needs, freedom of expression and access to information, and to actively pursuing investigations into hate-motivated crimes as an irreplaceable part of common European values; regrets the fact that almost all national minorities are protected only formally; expresses concerns about the practice of pro forma representation of national minorities who are under government control; calls on Serbia to protect and promote the cultural heritage and traditions of its national minorities, in particular to create a positive atmosphere for education in minority languages, including by providing sufficient numbers of teachers, textbooks and additional materials, and deplores the violation of minority rights in this area; calls on Serbia to refrain from exploiting the national identities of national minorities that create division within these communities, and strongly condemns recorded cases of hate speech against some of them; notes the considerable delay in drafting a new action plan for the realisation of national minority rights and stresses the urgent need for Serbia to finalise and implement it promptly; highlights the need for the new action plan to fully incorporate the findings and recommendations of the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities;

    42. Expresses concerns about the significant decline in the population of certain minority groups, including the Bulgarian minority; calls on Serbia to ensure the right to use names and language specific to minority groups, including women within the Bulgarian community; notes with concern that not all school textbooks have been translated into Bulgarian; calls on the Serbian Government to ensure reciprocal equal rights for the Croatian minority in Serbia as the Serbian minority enjoys in Croatia, in particular with regard to ensuring their reciprocal representation at all levels of government, including regional and local levels; reiterates its concern regarding the restrictive and arbitrary enforcement of the Law on Permanent and Temporary Residence related to the passivation of address of thousands of Albanians in the south of Serbia; emphasises the situation of the Romanian Orthodox Church in Serbia, which is not officially recognised by the state as a traditional church;

    43. Regrets the attempts by the Serbian authorities to undermine the national identity of communities within the country; expresses concern, in this context, about the promotion of narratives such as that of the ‘Shopi nation’, which seek to erase the existence of the Bulgarian community and deny its historical roots and cultural heritage; regrets the searches carried out by the Serbian authorities at the Bosilegrad Cultural Centre and the initiation of pre-trial proceedings for ‘ethnic hatred’ against activists from non-governmental organisations;

    44. Calls on Serbia to refrain from distorting historical events, such as the narrative surrounding the so-called Surdulica massacre, which only serve to spread division and hatred against minorities and neighbouring countries, which is incompatible with EU membership;

    Reconciliation and good neighbourly relations

    45. Reiterates that good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation remain essential elements of the enlargement process; calls on Serbia to stop restrictions on entry for regional civil society activists and artists as such practices undermine regional dialogue and cooperation; reaffirms, furthermore, the importance of the stability of south-eastern European countries and their resilience against foreign interference in internal democratic processes; stresses the importance of Serbia developing good neighbourly relations, implementing bilateral agreements and resolving outstanding bilateral issues with its neighbours; notes Serbia’s participation in regional initiatives and its active involvement in the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans and the Common Regional Market; underlines the fact that respect for national minority rights is an essential condition of Serbia’s advancement along its European path;

    46. Calls for historical reconciliation and the overcoming of discrimination and prejudices from the past; deplores the recent inflammatory rhetoric by the government, targeting neighbouring states that did not support the opening of cluster 3 for Serbia;

    47. Reiterates that Serbia must refrain from influencing the domestic politics of its neighbouring Western Balkan countries, including regarding the unconstitutional celebration of Republika Srpska Day in Bosnia and Herzegovina and questioning Bosnia and Herzegovina’s court decisions;

    48. Urges Serbia to step up its reconciliation efforts and seek solutions to past disputes, in particular when it comes to missing persons, who account for 1 782 people in Croatia, 7 608 people in Bosnia and Herzegovina and 1 595 people in Kosovo; calls on the Serbian authorities to achieve justice for victims by recognising and respecting court verdicts on war crimes, fighting against impunity for wartime crimes, investigating cases of missing persons, investigating grave sites, and supporting domestic prosecutors in bringing perpetrators to justice, which requires the cooperation of other parties too; strongly condemns the widespread public denials of international verdicts for war crimes, including the denial of the Srebrenica genocide;

    49. Calls on the judicial authorities in Serbia to ensure compliance with the standards of fair trial and satisfaction of justice for victims in all war crime cases; calls for the denial of war crimes and the glorification of war criminals to be included in the Criminal Code, with a view to prosecuting any form of denial of war crimes determined by the verdicts of the International Criminal Tribunal of the former Yugoslavia and the International Court of Justice;

    50. Reiterates its position on the importance of opening and publishing wartime archives, and reiterates its call for the former Yugoslav archives to be opened and, in particular, for access to be granted to the files of the former Yugoslav secret service (UDBA) and the Yugoslav People’s Army Counterintelligence Service (KOS), and for the files to be returned to the respective governments if they so request;

    51. Reiterates its full support for the EU-facilitated dialogue and welcomes the appointment of Peter Sørensen as the EU Special Representative for the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue;

    52. Reiterates the importance of constructive engagement on the part of the authorities of both Serbia and Kosovo in order to achieve a comprehensive, legally binding normalisation agreement, based on mutual recognition and in accordance with international law; calls on both Kosovo and Serbia to implement the Brussels and Ohrid Agreements, including the establishment of the Association/Community of Serb-majority municipalities, and the lifting of Serbia’s opposition of Kosovo’s membership in regional and international organisations, and to avoid unilateral actions that could undermine the dialogue process;

    53. Expects Kosovo and Serbia to fully cooperate and take all the necessary measures to apprehend and swiftly bring to justice the perpetrators of the 2023 terrorist attack in Banjska; deplores the fact that Serbia still has not prosecuted the culprits, most notably Milan Radoičić, the Vice-President of Srpska Lista; reiterates that the perpetrators of the terrorist attack in Zubin Potok must also be held accountable and must face justice without delay;

    54. Calls on the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and on the Commission to take a more proactive role in leading the dialogue process; calls for an enhanced role for the European Parliament in facilitating the dialogue through regular joint parliamentary assembly meetings;

    Socio-economic reforms

    55. Welcomes Serbia’s steady progress towards developing a functioning market economy with positive GDP growth and increased foreign investment in some sectors; takes note of that fact that Serbia received its first-ever investment-grade credit rating; underlines the fact that the EU is Serbia’s main trading partner, the largest source of foreign direct investment and by far the largest donor; reiterates that the financial assistance, which is of great benefit to Serbia, is conditional on the strengthening of democratic principles and alignment with the CFSP and other EU policies; reiterates the need for more substantial reforms in the labour market, education and public administration, including to address social inequalities; expresses concern about the scale and scope of intergovernmental contracts awarded that are exempt from the current legislative framework on public procurement; regrets, however, the fact that public debt as a percentage of GDP remains well above the eastern European average;

    56. Is concerned about the investment in Serbia by Russia and China and their growing influence on the political and economic processes in the region;

    57. Calls on Serbia to intensify efforts and increase investment in the socio-economic development of its border regions to address depopulation and ensure that the residents have access to essential services, including professional opportunities, healthcare and education; underlines the potential of the IPA III cross-border cooperation programmes as a key tool to promote long-term sustainable regional growth;

    58. Welcomes Serbia’s active engagement in the implementation of the new Growth Plan for the Western Balkans; takes note of the fact that Serbia adopted its Reform Agenda on 3 October 2024; believes that embracing the opportunities of the growth plan would further enhance the Serbian economy, which over the past three years benefited from more than EUR 586 million in financial and technical assistance under IPA III; believes that the EU funding should better support the democratic reforms of the country; calls, in that context, for the relevant EU funding, including from the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans, to be reprogrammed to redirect more funds towards supporting judiciary reforms and anti-corruption measures, as well as towards independent media and civil society organisations, in order to support their critical work, in particular in the vacuum created by the withdrawal of US donors; calls, furthermore, for the EU and the Western Balkan countries to establish a framework for fruitful cooperation between the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) and its Western Balkan counterparts in order to ensure that the EPPO can effectively exercise its power on IPA III and Western Balkan Facility funds in the recipient countries; urges the Serbian authorities to step up efforts to communicate clearly to citizens the benefits of the EU funds and to improve their visibility;

    59. Regrets the lack of public consultation during the adoption of the Serbian Reform Agenda; calls for more effective oversight of the EU funding programmes and projects;

    60. Advocates increased regional cooperation among Western Balkan countries to share best practice and develop joint strategies in combating disinformation and foreign interference; emphasises the role of the EU in facilitating such collaborative efforts; calls for the continuation and further reinforcement of the IPA regional cybersecurity programme;

    61. Recognises the important role of Serbia’s business community in advancing economic convergence with the EU, including through the opportunities offered by and in the implementation of the growth plan as a sustainable alternative to Russian and Chinese investment in the country; welcomes the business community’s contribution to advancing socio-economic relations in the Western Balkans;

    62. Takes note of Serbia’s business community’s efforts in advocating for the accession of the Western Balkans to the EU’s single market as a concrete step towards full EU membership; calls for clear, measurable actions and well-defined roles and responsibilities for the implementation of the Common Regional Market action plan, as a key driver for the region’s successful accession to the EU’s single market;

    Energy, the environment, sustainable development and connectivity

    63. Calls on Serbia to increase its efforts towards the transposition of relevant environmental and climate acquis and to ensure the proper application of environmental protection standards, including by significantly enhancing its administrative and technical capacities at all levels of government, notably on waste management legislation and the adoption of the Climate Change Adaptation Programme and the National Energy and Climate Plan; urges the Serbian authorities to improve the transparency and environmental impact assessment of all investment, including from China and Russia;

    64. Reiterates its regret regarding the lack of action on the pollution of the Dragovishtitsa river by mines operating in the region and the detrimental effect on the health of the local people and the environment;

    65. Calls on Serbia to increase its efforts towards the decarbonisation of its energy system and to enable effective enforcement of pollution reduction regulations related to thermal power plants;

    66. Emphasises the need for further progress in transboundary cooperation with neighbouring countries, especially with regard to transboundary road infrastructure; urges Serbia to begin implementing the activities outlined in the memorandum of understanding on environmental protection cooperation with Bulgaria;

    67. Takes note of the EU-Serbia memorandum of understanding launching a strategic partnership on sustainable raw materials, battery value chains and electric vehicles, in view of the European energy transition and in line with the highest environmental standards; recalls that dialogue with the affected populations, the scientific community and civil society should be at the centre of any such strategic partnership;

    68. Welcomes the agreement reached at the EU-Western Balkans summit in Tirana on reduced roaming costs; calls, in this respect, on the authorities, private actors and all stakeholders to facilitate reaching the agreed targets to achieve a substantial reduction of roaming charges for data and further reductions leading to prices close to the domestic prices between the Western Balkans and the EU by 2027; welcomes the entering into force of the first phase of implementation of the roadmap for roaming between the Western Balkans and the EU;

    69. Reiterates that it is important for Serbia to continue diversifying its energy supply, to be able to break away from its dependency on Russia; takes note of the sanctions announced by the United States against Naftna Industrija Srbije (NIS), a subsidiary of the Russian Gazprom; welcomes the completion of the gas interconnector between Serbia and Bulgaria (IBS) in December 2023; regrets the postponement of the launching of the IBS’s commercial operation; calls for the swift finalisation of the permitting process to ensure its full operability in compliance with the energy community acquis; notes that Serbia is taking steps to introduce a carbon tax by 2027 as a step towards aligning with the EU emissions trading system;

    70. Notes that all chapters in cluster 4 on the green agenda and sustainable connectivity have been opened; notes the adoption of the Law on Environmental Impact Assessment as a positive step towards environmental protection in Serbia, while expressing its regret that the new law fails to align fully with the relevant EU Directive 2014/52/EU[9], since it still leaves the opportunity for significant projects to advance without comprehensive environmental scrutiny; reiterates the need to designate and rigorously manage protected areas, particularly those identified as Important Bird and Biodiversity Areas (IBAs); calls for special attention to be given to critical sites where enforcement against poaching needs to be improved;

    °

    ° °

    71. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the President of the European Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States and the President, Government and National Assembly of Serbia.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on competition policy – annual report 2024 – A10-0071/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on competition policy – annual report 2024

    (2024/2079(INI))

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), in particular to Articles 101 to 109 thereof,

    – having regard to the publication of 18 July 2024 by Ursula von der Leyen entitled ‘Europe’s choice – political guidelines for the next European Commission 2024–2029’,

    – having regard to the report of 9 September 2024 by Mario Draghi entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness’,

    – having regard to the report of 18 April 2024 by Enrico Letta entitled ‘Much more than a market’,

    – having regard to the European Court of Auditors Special Report21/2024 of 23 October 2024 entitled ‘State aid in times of crisis – Swift reaction but shortcomings in the Commission’s monitoring and inconsistencies in the framework to support the EU’s industrial policy objectives’,

    – having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation)[1],

    – having regard to Article 11 TFEU, which mandates the integration of environmental protection requirements into the definition and implementation of all EU policies and activities, with a view to promoting sustainable development,

    – having regard to Article 3 of Decision (EU) 2022/591 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 April 2022 on a General Union Environment Action Programme to 2030[2], which provides that environmentally harmful subsidies, in particular fossil fuel subsidies, should be phased out without delay,

    – having regard to the judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union of 3 September 2024 in Case C‑611/22 P, Illumina v Commission[3], of 10 September 2024 in Case C‑465/20 P, European Commission v Ireland and Others[4], and of 10 September 2024 in Case C‑48/22 P (Google and Alphabet v Commission)[5],

    – having regard to the Commission’s report of June 2024 entitled ‘Protecting competition in a changing world – Evidence on the evolution of competition in the EU during the past 25 years’,

    – having regard to the study entitled ‘The role of commodity traders in shaping agricultural markets’, published by its Policy Department for Structural and Cohesion Policies in November 2024,

    – having regard to the report of 20 December 2023 by the European Securities and Markets Authority entitled ‘CRA Market Share Report: 2023 edition’,

    – having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

    – having regard to the report of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (A10-0071/2025),

    A. whereas the current challenging economic, climate and geopolitical contexts, marked by uncertainty and unpredictability, require a renewed approach to European competitiveness and concrete strategies to boost economic growth;

    B. whereas the proper enforcement of the EU competition policy framework leads to lower prices, higher quality, greater choice for consumers, faster innovation and a fairer and more resilient economy, and protects entry conditions for operators in the internal market, tackling abuses of dominant position, monopolies and practices distortive to the internal market;

    C. whereas the Draghi report underlines that the EU has a broad and diversified industrial innovation base, with a strong comparative advantage in green technologies, but that sustained efforts are needed in order to retain that advantage; whereas the integration of climate and environmental considerations into competition policy is essential, in that regard; whereas the Letta report maintains that the lack of EU integration in the financial, energy and electronic communications sectors is a primary reason for Europe’s declining competitiveness;

    D. whereas the EU’s competition policy could contribute to bolstering the resilience of the internal market, as well as achieving the goals of the European Green Deal, the 2030 Digital Compass and the Competitiveness Compass, for which international exchange and cooperation are essential;

    E. whereas the Commission and the national competition authorities need to act in an impartial and objective way in order to preserve the credibility of the EU’s competition policy; whereas the political independence of national competition authorities is of utmost importance to ensure the impartiality and credibility of competition policy;

    General considerations

    1. Considers that EU competition law seeks to shield against excessive levels of concentration and accumulation of market power, and reaffirms the role of competition policy in encouraging efficiency, innovation and growth, creating a level playing field and protecting consumers, by assuring that markets remain competitive, efficient, dynamic and innovative, delivering high-quality products and services at fair prices and with a wider range of choice;

    2. Reiterates that competition policy should contribute to all of the EU’s policies, notably in the fields of sustainability, energy, defence and digitalisation; welcomes the Commission’s commitment to a new State aid framework to accompany the Clean Industrial Deal, so as to ensure competitiveness through mobilising the necessary public support for the energy transition to decarbonise EU industry, while ensuring that this does not hinder innovation, increase prices or reduce competition in the internal market; reiterates that State aid should not distort fair and effective competition;

    3. Emphasises that the global strength and importance of the EU single market derives not only from its internal and external competitiveness but also from its ability to set common standards and guarantee territorial cohesion; notes that at the same time, policymakers should take due account of international regulatory and market developments and calls on the Commission to strive for continued dialogue and cooperation at international level, including via second-generation cooperation agreements that allow for more effective information exchange between competition authorities, and the development of influence on competition policy, globally; highlights the importance of the European Competition Network (ECN) and calls on the Commission to prioritise sustained constructive dialogue and cooperation, in this regard, at international level; calls for the coordination between national competition authorities to ensure the uniform application of competition rules and underlines the necessity of increasing collaboration between antitrust and other sectoral regulators;

    A competitive Union

    4. Supports the Commission’s commitment to investing in sustainable competitiveness; welcomes the Draghi report’s emphasis on innovation, investments, market integration, decarbonisation and resilience, and the Letta report’s focus on integration, autonomy and solidarity; encourages policies that promote innovation, competitiveness and sustainable and inclusive growth;

    5. Underlines the need for coordinated, targeted and truly European industrial policy to boost competitiveness; notes that this must not result in market dominance or abuse thereof, price distortion or economic inefficiencies, and points to the need for effective merger control procedures;

    6. Considers that any State aid granted should be consistent with EU policy objectives; notes the Commission’s intention to provide guidance on the compatibility of State aid with innovation, climate and economic security considerations, as well as its actions to scale down and phase out fossil fuel subsidies under the Clean Industrial Deal, and encourages the Member States to consider the introduction of further conditions for the receipt of State aid; calls for companies structured through non-EU tax havens to be barred from receiving State aid; invites the Commission to investigate the lack of harmonisation of clawback mechanisms;

    7. Takes note of the Commission’s report asserting that market concentration, markups and profits have increased over the past 25 years, while industry dynamism has decreased, despite the active enforcement of competition law; also takes note that this increase in markups was found to be driven by market share reallocation towards the largest firms; further notes that weak levels of competition have had significant negative impacts on consumers, purchasing power, and on the competitiveness of EU firms and overall economic growth; recalls that the application of competition law should focus on ensuring open, competitive markets free from anti-competitive practices;

    8. Points out that State aid is increasingly used to support industrial policy objectives; recalls that such aid, as permitted under Article 107(3)(c) TFEU, must not adversely affect trading conditions or the common interest; notes the divergent fiscal capabilities of the Member States and warns that fragmented State aid creates an uneven playing field; calls on the Commission to monitor these effects and to ensure the integrity of the single market, which can be done through a common financing instrument for a European industrial policy, such as a European Competitiveness Fund, as proposed by Commission President von der Leyen in her political guidelines; calls on the Commission and the Member States not to engage in subsidy competition, which only exacerbates market distortions, notably when financing undertakings that are not efficient; concludes that temporary State aid frameworks have failed to prevent further market fragmentation and notes that only two of the Member States accounted for 77 % of State aid notified; calls for stricter State aid notification monitoring and enhanced State aid reporting and transparency, in line with the recommendations of the European Court of Auditors;

    9. Underlines the importance of the important projects of common European interest (IPCEIs) for financing projects within the EU with a cross-border dimension; stresses that IPCEIs should have genuine EU added value, which means that they should have a positive impact on more than one Member State; calls on the Commission and the Member States to ensure that any such State aid notification is completed within six months at the latest;

    10. Takes note of the Draghi report’s estimate that, in order to protect our EU competitiveness, an additional EUR 800 billion per year is needed; acknowledges the importance of public and private investment in this context; underlines that the EU budget needs to be properly equipped to that end; regards the completion of the Savings and Investments Union as important for mobilising private investment, addressing the fragmentation of the internal market and supporting the EU’s industrial strategy; acknowledges the urgent need for reforms alongside the effective implementation of the three action areas outlined in the Draghi report: (i) closing the innovation gap with the US and China; (ii) a common plan for decarbonisation and competitiveness to accelerate the energy transition and reduce energy costs; and (iii) enhancing security and reducing dependencies;

    11. Welcomes the protection of the level playing field of European markets and European companies and their workers granted by anti-dumping measures that correct for distortive foreign State aid; calls on the Commission to make swift use of available trade instruments on procurement and foreign subsidies to prevent unfair competition in the internal market;

    Enforcement priorities

    12. Observes changes in business practices, highlighting a decline in cartel cases; cautions, however, against new forms of harmful conduct like tacit collusion and algorithmic collusion, and emphasises the need to align enforcement priorities with this evolving landscape;

    13. Notes the Draghi report’s proposal for a ‘new competition tool’ as a flexible market investigation tool designed to address structural competition problems that do not result from anti-competitive agreements or abuse of dominance, and to impose market-wide, forward-looking structural or behavioural remedies, including by lowering entry barriers for competitors, with the aim of increasing competitiveness, incentivising innovation and protecting vulnerable consumers; invites the Commission to analyse how this tool would complement the existing framework for sector investigations;

    14. Recalls that under the Treaty, the Commission is empowered to address exploitative abuses;

    15. Acknowledges the existence of a legal base for structural remedies against the abuse of market dominance; is aware that EU competition rules stipulate that structural remedies should only be used as a last resort if behavioural remedies have proven ineffective, but nonetheless regrets the reluctance of the Commission to address market dominance through structural remedies; reiterates its invitation to make better use of structural remedies and end the primacy given to behavioural remedies, and encourages further efforts to strengthen their application when necessary; calls on the Commission to make better use of the interim measures instrument to stop any practice that would seriously harm competition, particularly in relation to dynamic and rapidly developing markets such as digital markets;

    16. Welcomes the priority given to housing by the 2024-2029 Commission; calls on the Commission to assess how EU competition principles affect the supply of services of general economic interest (SGEI); calls on the Commission to assess the position of social services of general interest and an SGEI exemption for affordable housing;

    17.  Stresses the importance of State aid as a tool for closing the economic gap between more developed EU regions and island areas, inland areas, outermost regions and economically depressed areas; recalls that allowing State aid in the context of SGEIs remains essential for the survival of these areas, especially in the context of State support dedicated to connectivity and other basic provisions of services for communities residing in isolated, remote or peripheral regions of the EU; calls on the Commission to investigate possibilities of further flexibility in providing funding to these regions;

    18. Takes note of the recent Court of Justice of the European Union ruling which found that one of the Member States has failed to transpose the ECN+ Directive into national legislation; underlines the importance of transposing the ECN+ Directive fully; calls on all of the Member States to ensure a proper implementation of this Directive;

    Merger and antitrust

    19. Notes with concern the Court of Justice of the European Union’s interpretation of Article 22 of the EC Merger Regulation in Case C-611/22 P (Illumina v Commission), rescinding the Commission’s approach of accepting referrals of non-notifiable deals; acknowledges that the EC Merger Regulation does not provide the Commission with sufficient tools for dealing with killer acquisitions; strongly believes that the impact of merger decisions on the internal market justifies the inclusion of an internal market legal base in the EC Merger Regulation, so as to fully involve co-legislators, in a manner similar to that of the Digital Markets Act (DMA); calls on the Commission to require Member States that have or can claim the relevant competence to examine potential killer acquisitions in the light of their national merger control laws, and to continue to refer those deals in accordance with Article 22 of the EC Merger Regulation; calls on the Commission to explore the possibility of reviewing the EC Merger Regulation to be able to examine mergers that fall below EU or national thresholds, regardless of the sectors involved;

    20. Notes that since the 2004 entry into force of the EC Merger Regulation, 0.7 % of notified mergers have been either blocked by the Commission or withdrawn following an investigation;

    21. Notes that the turnover thresholds in the EC Merger Regulation alone might not be suitable for detecting all cases that should be reviewed by the competition authorities; highlights practices used by dominant firms to avoid formal investigations, such as the growing use of ‘partnerships’ in the AI sector, which further suggests that a review of the EU Merger Regulation is necessary;

    22. Welcomes the Draghi report’s proposal for an ‘innovation defence’ in cases where a merger increases the ability and incentive to innovate, and invites the Commission to analyse and further develop this concept; furthermore calls for matters of public interest, such as the impact on workers, to be taken into account;

    23. Asks the Commission to identify the national barriers that may prevent it from considering the EU market as the relevant one in its analyses of mergers; calls on the Commission to present a legislative proposal to remove these impediments; notes that the international environment needs to be carefully analysed when deciding on the definition of the relevant market in competition and merger control cases; calls on the Commission to adopt a forward-looking approach to consolidation in the EU where appropriate, as also proposed by the Draghi and Letta reports, taking into account the strategic importance and pro-competitive impact of scale and favourable investment conditions in certain sectors for driving innovation and long-term competition;

    24. Calls for merger assessment frameworks to be updated to reflect the realities of the digital economy, where market power can be manifested in ways beyond traditional market share in clearly delineated markets; supports the development of advanced methodologies for analysing data-driven dominance and network effects, emphasising the critical role of consumer choice in selecting digital services and devices; encourages the Commission to enhance mechanisms enabling interoperability across services and devices, fostering innovation and competition in the digital ecosystem; urges the Commission to progress swiftly on the implementation of the existing interoperability obligations for messaging services under the DMA, the existing interoperability obligations for cloud providers under the Data Act and to start work on the review of the DMA for May 2026; urges the Commission to implement existing interoperability obligations under the DMA and look into extending interoperability obligations to online social networking services; supports the Commission in taking more account of the potential harm to competition when assessing mergers where expansion into adjacent markets would have the effect of further strengthening market dominance in the acquiring company’s core market;

    25. Calls on the Commission to address excessively long antitrust investigations during which companies continue to benefit from their anticompetitive practices; calls on the Commission to set appropriate time limits for antitrust cases and ensure an effective follow-through of decisions taken; calls on the Commission to adopt further interim measures to stop any practice which would seriously harm competition, particularly in relation to dynamic and rapidly developing markets such as digital markets;

    Sectoral policies

    26. Welcomes the two September 2024 landmark judgments by the Court of Justice confirming the Commission’s assertion that the Irish tax deal with Apple constitutes illegal State aid and that Google abused its dominant position in contravention of the Treaties; acknowledges that the legal framework in Ireland has since changed; encourages the Commission to continue the clamp down on State aid abuses involving the selective granting of tax breaks to companies;

    27. Notes the detrimental effect of international tax competition; recalls its support for the implementation of Pillar Two of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD); deeply regrets the US presidential Executive Order of 20 January 2025 which asserts that the OECD global tax agreement has ‘no force or effect within the United States’; stresses the importance of multilateralism in ensuring that multinationals pay their fair share of taxation where value is created; takes the view that the EU should fully stand by the OECD’s Pillar Two Directive;

    28. Emphasises the worrying market concentrations in various digital markets, such as social media, search engines, AI, cloud services, e-commerce, microchips and online advertising; underlines the actual and potential negative impact on EU competitiveness, the resilience of supply chains, media freedom, privacy and data protection, society and democracy; urges the Commission to address issues that are specific to the tech market, including infrastructural power in hardware and cloud computing layers, vertical concentration, algorithmic manipulation of the digital public sphere and market leveraging in digital markets, as demonstrated by the progress made under the DMA; additionally calls for the opening of new investigations into the cloud services sector to further ensure fair competition and innovation, taking into account the degree of market concentration in this sector and anticompetitive practices related to complex and non-transparent licensing terms or forced bundling; furthermore, urges the Commission to address the increasing vertical concentration of dominant players across the advertising value chain, which puts the EU online advertising sector at risk;

    29. Notes the rapid development of AI services, which has the potential to result in market concentration; calls on the Commission to take an ecosystemic approach towards this sector, including by developing and applying new theories of harm to address the further entrenchment of the dominant players in this sector; highlights that the DMA contains several provisions that must be used to prevent gatekeepers from restricting emerging AI developers, and asks the Commission to act swiftly to address the risk of consumers being forced into using pre-determined AI services on their mobile devices, ensuring that AI systems remain user-selectable and transparent, thereby safeguarding competition and consumer choice; calls on the Commission to explore the possibility of adding generative AI as a new core platform service under the DMA;

    30. Notes that large digital players use their market power, power over consumers, financial resources and data concentration in one market to leverage their position in another; stresses that small players cannot compete with the aforementioned factors, which makes EU citizens even more dependent on the same small number of non-EU companies and endangers strategic autonomy; calls for increased scrutiny of the leveraging of position by dominant digital sector players into other sectors and the EU’s strategic autonomy, through a revision of the merger guidelines to ensure that market leveraging can be scrutinised more effectively;

    31. Notes the importance of data and data analytics tools as one of the deterring factors for digital market concentrations and acquisitions in the digital sector; calls for an opinion of the European Data Protection Board in cases of concentrations involving one or more operators in digital sectors on the relevance of datasets for the intended concentration, the personal data the target acquisition processes and the potential impact on the rights to privacy and data protection the intended concentration has;

    32. Expresses concern regarding the growing use of dynamic pricing mechanisms across the EU; calls on the Commission to explore regulatory measures against highly adaptive and opaque pricing methods;

    33. Calls on the Commission to vigorously enforce all competition rules, including the Foreign Subsidies Regulation and the DMA, in order to address gatekeeper practices and foster contestable markets and fair competition; stresses that the Commission must have sufficient staff for enforcement, while noting that new tools, as well as scientists and economists stemming from divergent disciplines, can work to improve competition law enforcement; underlines in particular that the DMA should be applied rigorously and independently, without any undermining by external pressures; stresses that the DMA and potential fines must not be used as a bargaining chip in relation to discussions on tariffs, but as a cornerstone of the EU’s efforts to ensure fair and competitive digital markets; notes the six non-compliance procedures launched against some designated gatekeepers; is deeply concerned about potential delays in critical investigations and the capacity of the Commission to respect their ‘best effort’ obligations and to make a decision on non-compliance procedures without undue delay;

    34. Notes with concern the fragmentation in numerous consumer markets, including financial services, telecoms and household energy, and calls for faster and greater market integration where there are benefits for consumers, and for recognition that this market integration can drive investment and innovation;

    35. Expresses alarm at the high concentration in the retail, agricultural and automotive sectors in overseas territories whereby excessive prices set by dominant undertakings on essential products and services amplify inequalities, precariousness and territorial disparities; calls on the Commission to launch an investigation into potential abuses of dominant position under Article 102 TFEU;

    36. Notes with concern the high degree of market concentration in the European financial sector, as well as its sustained over-reliance on a limited number of non-EU service providers; notes that the three largest credit rating agencies still hold a market share of over 90 %; expresses concern about the continued high concentration in the public interest entities (PIE) audit market, with four firms mainly holding the vast majority of EU revenues for PIE audits, limiting choice and risking supervisory capture; invites the Commission to present an impact assessmenton options to address these concerns; urges the Commission to carefully assess public tenders for expertise from audit market participants so that potential conflicts of interest are avoided;

    37. Expresses concern about the food price crisis and notes, in this regard, the high levels of market concentration in food supply chains; reiterates its call for the Commission to urgently conduct a thorough analysis of the extent and effect of buying alliances, thereby devoting special attention to guaranteeing fair competition and greater transparency in supermarket and hypermarket chains’ commercial practices, particularly where such practices affect brand value and product choice or limit innovation or price comparability; recalls, in this light, the market concentration in agri-commodity trading wherein four companies account for the vast majority of the global crop trade; regrets that the Commission nonetheless conditionally approved the 2024 Bunge-Viterra merger (M.11204) despite competition concerns; asks the Commission to address excessive power accumulation in the hands of a few large players in this market, in order to strengthen the bargaining position of farmers and consumers alike; highlights the implementation of the New Competition Tool in this context;

    38. Notes the high-net profits of EU banks during this inflationary period, mostly driven by the delayed pass-through of the rapid monetary policy tightening to deposit rates;

    39.  Notes with particular concern the dominant position of two international card schemes in the EU payments market, and their engagement in practices that reinforce and extend their dominance of this market, potentially further increasing barriers to entry and hampering long-term innovation[6], as well as leading to higher costs for EU businesses and ultimately consumers; calls on the Commission to take decisive actions, emphasising the need for a review of the Interchange Fee Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2015/751) to tackle the significant increase in card scheme fees charged by international card schemes and to ensure a fair, competitive and transparent market environment;

    Parliamentary involvement

    40. Stresses that Parliament should be sufficiently involved in shaping competition policy; cautions against the over-reliance on soft-law instruments, such as guidance and temporary frameworks, in which Parliament’s involvement is limited; calls on the Commission to enter into negotiation for an interinstitutional agreement on competition policy to formalise its enforcement priorities to Parliament; calls on the European Council to adopt a decision under Article 48(7) TEU allowing for the adoption of legislative acts in the area of competition policy in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure; stresses that Parliament should be more involved in the activity of working parties and expert groups in the International Competition Network and the OECD as an observer, and also in the High-Level Group on the DMA;

    41. Calls on the responsible Executive Vice-President, also Commissioner in charge of competition policy to maintain close contact with Parliament’s competent committee and its working group on competition issues;

    °

    ° °

    42. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Türkiye – A10-0067/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Türkiye

    (2025/2023(INI))

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to the European Council conclusions of 17 and 18 April 2024, 30 June 2023, 23 June 2022, 24 June 2021 and 12 December 2019, and to all relevant previous Council and European Council conclusions,

    – having regard to Türkiye’s membership of the Council of Europe and NATO,

    – having regard to the Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Turkey on the readmission of persons residing without authorisation[1] (EU-Turkey Readmission Agreement),

    – having regard to the statement of the members of the European Council of 25 March 2021 on Türkiye,

    – having regard to the ‘EU-Turkey statements’ of 18 March 2016 and 29 November 2015,

    – having regard to the ‘Turkey Negotiating Framework’ of 3 October 2005,

    – having regard to the declaration issued by the European Community and its Member States on 21 September 2005 following the declaration made by Turkey upon its signature of the Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement on 29 July 2005,

    – having regard to the Council conclusions of December 2006 and March 2020, and to the Presidency Conclusions of the European Council in Copenhagen of 21-22 June 1993, also known as the Copenhagen Criteria,

    – having regard to the Council conclusions on Enlargement of 17 December 2024 and of 12 December 2023,

    – having regard to the International Law of the Sea and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 on EU enlargement policy (COM(2024)0690) and to the accompanying Türkiye 2024 Report (SWD(2024)0696),

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 on EU enlargement policy (COM(2023)0690) and to the accompanying Türkiye 2023 Report (SWD(2023)0696),

     

    – having regard to Special report 06/2024 of the European Court of Auditors of 24 April 2024 entitled ‘The Facility for Refugees in Turkey – Beneficial for refugees and host communities, but impact and sustainability not yet ensured’,

    – having regard to the joint communications from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to the European Council of 29 November 2023 (JOIN(2023)0050) and of 22 March 2021 (JOIN(2021)0008) on the state of play of EU-Türkiye political, economic and trade relations,

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 19 December 2024 entitled ‘Eighth Annual Report of the Facility for Refugees in Turkey’ (COM(2024)0593),

    – having regard to the fundamental principles of international law and to the Charter of the United Nations, the 1977 and the 1979 High-Level Agreements between the leaders of the two communities, and the relevant resolutions of the UN Security Council on Cyprus, including Resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964, which reaffirms the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus, Resolution 550 (1984) of 11 May 1984 on secessionist actions in Cyprus, Resolution 789 (1992) of 25 November 1992, and Resolution 2537 (2020) on the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP),

    – having regard to Article 46 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which states that the contracting parties undertake to abide by the final judgment of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in any case to which they are parties, and to the ensuing obligation of Türkiye to implement all judgments of the ECtHR,

    – having regard to the relevant resolutions of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe,

    – having regard to the 2025 Freedom in the World report published by Freedom House,

    – having regard to the 2024 World Press Freedom Index published by Reporters Without Borders,

    – having regard to the January 2025 prison statistics report published by the Civil Society in the Penal System Association (CISST) and to the 2024 country profile for Türkiye published by Prison Insider,

    – having regard to the Global Gender Gap Report 2024 published by the World Economic Forum,

    – having regard to recent reports of the We Will Stop Femicide Platform (Kadın Cinayetlerini Durduracağız Platformu),

    – having regard to the UNESCO statement on Hagia Sophia of 10 July 2020, and to the relevant UNESCO World Heritage Committee decisions 44 COM 7B.58 (2021) and 45 COM 7B.58 (2023), adopted in its 44th and 45th sessions respectively,

    – having regard to its previous resolutions on Türkiye, in particular those of 13 September 2023 on the 2022 Commission Report on Türkiye[2], of 7 June 2022 on the 2021 Commission Report on Turkey[3], and of 26 November 2020 on escalating tensions in Varosha following the illegal actions by Türkiye and the urgent need for the resumption of talks[4],

    – having regard to its resolution of 29 February 2024 on deepening EU integration in view of future enlargement[5],

    – having regard to its resolution of 15 April 2015 on the centenary of the Armenian Genocide[6],

    – having regard to its resolutions of 5 May 2022 on the case of Osman Kavala in Turkey[7], of 10 October 2024 on the case of Bülent Mumay in Türkiye[8] and of 13 February 2025 on recent dismissals and arrests of mayors in Türkiye[9],

    – having regard to European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s visit to Ankara in December 2024,

    – having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

    – having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0067/2025),

    A. whereas Türkiye remains a candidate for EU accession, and EU membership remains the repeatedly declared political goal of the Turkish Government, although the gap with the values and interests of the EU is growing; whereas EU accession negotiations have effectively been at a standstill since 2018, owing to the deterioration of the rule of law and democracy in Türkiye;

    B. whereas any accession country is expected to respect democratic values, the rule of law and human rights, and to abide by EU law; whereas Türkiye needs to credibly demonstrate its commitment to closer relations and alignment with the European Union in order to reinvigorate its European perspective; whereas being a candidate country presumes a willingness to progressively approach and align with the EU in all aspects, including values, interests, standards and policies, inter alia with its common foreign and security policy, to respect and uphold the Copenhagen criteria, and to pursue and maintain good neighbourly relations with the EU and all of its Member States without discrimination; whereas the tensions between the EU and Türkiye in relation to the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean have de-escalated but not ceased; whereas Türkiye has repeatedly been asked to refrain from all actions which violate the sovereignty and sovereign rights of all EU Member States and are in breach of international and EU law;

    C. whereas the 2023 Commission progress report on Türkiye painted a picture of continued backsliding, while its latest progress report of 2024 appears to present a slightly more positive overall picture of progress on enlargement-related reforms in Türkiye, such as in the area of economic and monetary policies; whereas this cannot, however, be applied to the core matters related to democracy and fundamental rights, which have deteriorated even further since the release of the Commission’s latest report; whereas the gap between Türkiye and the EU’s values and normative framework has therefore remained unaddressed during the recent period with the persistent use of laws and measures aimed at curtailing the rule of law and human rights, fundamental freedoms and civil liberties;

    D. whereas the joint communication on the state of play of EU-Türkiye relations of 29 November 2023 struck a more positive note, putting forward a set of recommendations on cooperating in areas of joint interest in a phased, proportionate and reversible manner and based on the established conditionalities; whereas only a few concrete steps in line with the commitments therein have been taken so far; whereas the April 2024 European Council mandated Coreper to advance in the implementation of this joint communication; whereas nevertheless this joint communication has not yet received a clear political endorsement by the Council;

    E. whereas Türkiye is a member of the Council of Europe and is therefore bound by the judgments of the ECtHR; whereas owing to its failure to apply landmark ECtHR rulings, Türkiye is currently facing historical infringement proceedings; whereas Türkiye consistently ranks among the countries most frequently found in violation of the human rights and fundamental freedoms protected by the European Convention on Human Rights; whereas as of late November 2024, Türkiye had the highest number of pending cases before the ECtHR, with 22 450 applications, representing 36.7 % of the Court’s total caseload of 61 250 applications;

    F. whereas Türkiye is classified as ‘not free’ by Freedom House and has experienced one of the worst declines in the level of freedom in the world in the past 10 years; whereas Türkiye ranks 158th out of 180 countries in the 2024 World Press Freedom Index; whereas the Turkish Government has closed dozens of media outlets, routinely blocks online articles, is reported to control 85 % of national media and uses its state agency Anadolu as an organ of propaganda;

    G. whereas the Turkish constitution provides for sufficient protection of fundamental rights, but the practice of the institutions and the critical state of the judiciary, including the lack of respect for Constitutional Court rulings, are the main reasons for the dire situation of the rule of law and human rights in the country, issues repeatedly described in the reports of the EU, the Council of Europe and international organisations;

    H. whereas Türkiye has the highest incarceration rate and the largest prison population of all Council of Europe Member States, with an overcrowded prison population that has grown by 439 % between 2005 and 2023 and currently represents more than a third of all inmates of Council of Europe countries;

    I. whereas Türkiye is ranked 127th out of 146 countries in the 2024 Global Gender Gap Index, underscoring severe gender inequality and systemic failures in protecting women’s rights; whereas according to the 2024 report of the We Will Stop Femicide Platform (Kadın Cinayetlerini Durduracağız Platformu), 394 women were murdered by men and 259 women were found dead in suspicious circumstances in Türkiye in 2024, the highest number recorded since the civil society group started collecting data in 2010; whereas in its 2023 report, the platform noted that 315 women were killed by men, and 248 women were found dead in suspicious circumstances;

    J. whereas in recent months, Türkiye has taken steps towards the resumption of a process for a peaceful resolution of the Kurdish question; whereas on 27 February 2025 jailed militant leader Abdullah Öcalan called on his Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) to disarm and disband, providing a historic opportunity to end the Turkish-Kurdish conflict; whereas these efforts have been accompanied by increasing repression and the curtailment of the powers of democratic local governments, including the dismissal of elected Kurdish and other opposition mayors;

    K. whereas, alongside being a candidate for EU accession, Türkiye is a NATO ally and a key partner in the areas of trade, economic relations, security, the fight against terrorism, and migration; whereas Türkiye continues to play a key role in the region, acts as a bridge between Europe and Asia, and remains a key partner for the stability of the wider East Mediterranean region; whereas Türkiye continues to play a significant role in the Syrian conflict and maintains a military presence in northern Syria;

    L. whereas Türkiye has not aligned with EU sanctions against Russia; whereas trade between Türkiye and Russia has nearly doubled since the EU’s imposition of sanctions against Russia; whereas despite some steps taken, Türkiye has not prevented its territory from being used to circumvent EU sanctions against Russia;

    M. whereas the 2024 Commission progress report on Türkiye states that, as at 30 September 2024, the country maintained a very low alignment rate of 5 % with relevant statements of the High Representative on behalf of the EU and with relevant Council decisions, compared to 9 % in 2023;

    N. whereas Türkiye is the EU’s fifth largest trade partner, and the EU is Türkiye’s largest trading partner by far, as well as its primary source of foreign direct investment;

    O. whereas in the past year, the level of engagement between the EU and Türkiye has increased in terms of both technical and high-level meetings in sectoral areas;

    P. whereas Türkiye has applied for membership of BRICS+ and shown interest in joining the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO);

    Q. whereas following a period of unorthodox economic policy, Türkiye has implemented a tighter monetary policy over the past year leading to a reduction in external imbalances and a moderation of inflationary pressures;

    R. whereas Türkiye hosts the largest refugee population in the world, with around 3.1 million registered refugees, mainly from Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan; whereas since 2011 the EU has directed more than EUR 10  billion to assisting refugees and host communities in Türkiye; whereas according to a credible investigative report by Lighthouse Reports and eight media partners, the EU is funding removal centres in Türkiye implicated in the detention, abuse and forced deportations of refugees under the guise of voluntary return;

    S. whereas in addition to the emergency assistance coordinated via the EU Civil Protection Mechanism, with an estimated financial value of EUR 38 million, the EU provided EUR 78.2 million in humanitarian aid for the earthquake response in 2023, and EUR 26 million in humanitarian aid in 2024; whereas the EU signed an additional EUR 400 million in assistance under the EU Solidarity Fund to finance recovery operations following the devastating earthquake;

    T. whereas Türkiye has systematically misused counterterrorism laws to target elected officials, opposition politicians and human rights defenders, among others;

    Commitment to EU accession

    1. Recognises the long-standing aspirations of Turkish civil society regarding accession to the European Union; welcomes the Turkish Government’s recent statements reiterating its commitment to EU membership as a strategic goal amid an effort to revitalise EU-Türkiye relations in line with relevant European Council conclusions in a phased, proportionate and reversible manner; recognises the EU’s commitment to fostering this engagement through enhanced dialogue and cooperation;

    2. Stresses that EU membership is contingent on fulfilling the accession (Copenhagen) criteria, which require stable institutions that guarantee democracy, the rule of law, human rights, respect for and the protection of minorities, good neighbourly relations, respect for international law and alignment with the EU CFSP; further notes that these are absolute criteria, not issues subject to transactional strategic considerations and negotiations; stresses that recognition of all Member States is a necessary component of the accession process;

    3. Regrets, in this regard, that the aforementioned positive statements have not been accompanied by any concrete actions by the Turkish authorities to close the persistent and vast gap between Türkiye and the EU on values and standards, particularly with regard to the fundamentals of the accession process; reiterates its previously adopted conclusion that the Turkish Government continues to show, as it has done for the past few years, a clear lack of political will to carry out the necessary reforms to reactivate the accession process and continues to pursue a deeply entrenched authoritarian understanding of the presidential system;

    4. Acknowledges the strategic and geopolitical importance of Türkiye, and its increasing presence and influence in areas critical to international security, such as the Black Sea region, including Ukraine, and the Middle East; reiterates that Türkiye is a strategic partner and NATO ally, and a country with which the EU has close relations in the areas of security, trade, economy and migration; welcomes closer cooperation between Türkiye and the EU, to which the Turkish Government has made frequent reference, but stresses that this cannot in any way be a substitute for the necessary real progress which Türkiye, as a candidate country, needs to make with regard to meeting the fundamental requirements for accession; highlights, in this regard, that there are no shortcuts in the accession process and that no argument can be put forward to avoid discussing the democratic principles which are at the core of the accession process;

    5. Notes that the Commission’s Türkiye report 2024 paints a more positive picture of reform implementation in the context of Türkiye’s accession process than the Türkiye report 2023, shifting from further deterioration to ‘no progress’ with regard to the rule of law and human rights issues; is of the opinion, however, that at least in key areas such as democracy, rule of law and fundamental rights, this is due to the fact that a very low point had already been reached and this situation has remained unchanged;

    6. Further takes note of a nuanced shift in focus of the Türkiye report 2024, by contrast with the 2023 report, away from the accession process towards a strategic partnership between the European Union und Türkiye; is of the opinion that the critical state of the accession process is driving the Commission and the Council to focus merely on the partnership dimension of the EU’s relations with Türkiye, as is also reflected in the joint communication on the state of play of EU-Türkiye relations of 29 November 2023, and of 22 March 2021; highlights the increasing shift towards a different framework for the relationship, which might come at the expense of the accession process;

    The core of the accession process: democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights

    7. Considers that, in terms of human rights and the rule of law, Parliament’s recent resolutions on the matter remain valid in light of the continued dire human rights situation and democratic backsliding in Türkiye over the last year; fully endorses the latest resolutions of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the related report by its Monitoring Committee, as well as the resolutions adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, which depict in detail the wide range of serious shortfalls in human rights constantly reported by locally and internationally renowned human rights organisations;

    8. Notes the Turkish Government’s stated commitment to judicial reform and the introduction of measures of an organisational nature; highlights, however, the need to introduce structural measures ensuring judicial independence; deeply regrets that, despite a reform strategy with nine judicial reform packages, the state of independence of the judiciary in Türkiye remains desolate following systematic government interference in and political instrumentalisation of the judicial system; deplores, in this regard, the weakening of remaining constitutional review mechanisms, particularly individual applications, and the frequent violations of due process;

    9. Is dismayed by the persecution of legal professionals, including most recently the lawsuit filed by the Istanbul Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office that resulted in the removal of the leadership of the Istanbul Bar Association on charges of ‘making propaganda for a terrorist organization’ and ‘publicly disseminating misleading information’ for having asked for an investigation into the murders of two Kurdish journalists in Syria, and in the imprisonment of one of the members of the Istanbul Bar Association’s executive board following his trip to Strasbourg to hold meetings with Council of Europe institutions;

    10. Is alarmed by the blatant lack of implementation of decisions by the Constitutional Court, including in the case of MP Can Atalay, which has turned into a serious judicial crisis, with the Court of Cassation filing a criminal complaint against nine judges of the Constitutional Court; is worried by the recent decision of the Court of Cassation to overturn the sentences of and release the terrorists involved in the ISIS attack at Istanbul’s Atatürk Airport, which claimed 45 lives in 2016;

    11. Calls on Türkiye to strengthen its commitment to democratic governance, especially through reforms that ensure an independent judiciary; takes notes of the recent announcement of the Fourth Judicial Reform Strategy, spanning 2025-2029; calls on the Turkish Government to move from the superficial changes made so far through the recurrent reform packages and action plans to a profound and long overdue reform that will address, through real political will, the serious and structural shortcomings of Türkiye’s judiciary; stresses that putting an end to political interference in the judiciary requires no strategy or reform package but merely the political will to do so;

    12. Remains deeply concerned by the continued deterioration of democratic standards and relentless crackdown by the Turkish authorities on any critical voices by means of a growing battery of repressive laws, the regular misuse of counterterrorism laws, including their application in relation to minors (as in the ‘Kız Çocukları Davası’ trial), the disproportionate use of the crime of insulting a public official, the extensive use of secret witnesses and dormant cases in flawed judicial proceedings, and the recurrent practice of exaggerated night arrests and home raids to portray targeted persons as extremely dangerous;

    13. Welcomes the withdrawal in November 2024 of the draft amendment to Türkiye’s espionage laws, known as the ‘agent of influence’ law; urges the Turkish authorities to refrain from reintroducing a similar overly broad and vague law in the future, given the serious risk that it would be used as a tool to further criminalise the legitimate activities of civil society organisations within the country; calls on the Turkish authorities to ensure that the recently approved cybersecurity bill will serve its legitimate purpose of protecting data privacy and national security without giving way to potential infringements of fundamental rights or becoming another tool for further repression; stresses that the judicial apparatus remains heavily restrictive, with a complex web of legislation serving as a tool to systematically control and silence any critical voice, such as the 2020 social media law, the 2021 anti-money laundering law and the 2022 disinformation law;

    14. Is concerned by the recent approval of legal provisions granting extraordinary powers to the State Supervisory Council (DDK) and the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (TMSF), including the possibility for the former to dismiss public officials of all types and levels and appoint trustees, which could be used in an arbitrary manner;

    15. Urges the Turkish authorities to put an end to the current serious restrictions on fundamental freedoms, in particular of expression, of assembly and of association, and to the constant attacks on the fundamental rights of members of the opposition, human rights defenders, lawyers, trade unionists, members of minorities, journalists, academics, artists and civil society activists, among others; strongly condemns the recent waves of mass arrest and imprisonment on politically motivated charges, and on the grounds of suspected terror links, affecting political figures, academics and journalists, including the arrests of Elif Akgül, independent journalist, Yıldız Tar, editor in chief of LGBT+ news site Kaos GL, and Ender İmrek, columnist of Evrensel daily, all well known for their work on human rights issues;

    16. Deplores the continued prosecution, censorship and harassment of journalists and independent media, denying them the freedom to carry out their professional duties and inform the public, which is essential to a functioning democratic society; calls on the Turkish authorities to refrain from further attacks on independent media and to uphold fundamental rights and civil liberties such as freedom of speech and of the press; remains deeply concerned by the existing legislation that prevents an open and free internet, with lengthy prison sentences imposed for social media posts, scores of access blocks and content removal orders, and by the continued use of the Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTÜK) to crack down on media criticism and even on outlets deemed to spread ‘pessimism’ instead of positive news;

    17. Acknowledges the positive developments in relation to the partial lifting by the minister of the interior of restrictions on the weekly vigils of the Saturday Mothers, Cumartesi Anneleri, in Istanbul’s Galatasaray Square, and the recent acquittal of all 46 people prosecuted for more than 6 years in the case surrounding the organisation’s 700th gathering in August 2018; calls for the complete removal of all restrictions on their peaceful protest, in full compliance with the relevant Constitutional Court ruling, and for an end to the ongoing judicial case against several of its members and sympathisers; is concerned by the ongoing trial against prominent human rights defender Nimet Tanrıkulu, who was released on 4 March 2025 after spending 94 days in pre-trial detention; urges the Turkish authorities to ensure the immediate release of all individuals detained for exercising their fundamental freedoms;

    18. Continues to be appalled by the Turkish authorities’, in particular the Turkish judiciary’s, continuous disregard for and failure to apply landmark ECtHR rulings; reiterates its condemnation of Türkiye’s blatant misuse of the judicial system and the refusal to release from detention human rights defender Osman Kavala and opposition politicians Selahattin Demirtaş and Figen Yüksekdağ,for which Türkiye is facing historical infringement proceedings in the Council of Europe, with long-awaited consequences yet to be determined; calls on Türkiye to fully comply with the ECtHR judgements related to missing persons and properties (inter alia in the Fokas case) in Cyprus; deplores the politically motivated nature of these prosecutions, which form part of a broader pattern of judicial harassment; calls on Türkiye to fully implement all judgments of the ECtHR in line with Article 46 of the ECHR and in line with the unconditional obligations derived from Article 90 of the Turkish constitution; calls on the European Commission and Member States to use all diplomatic channels to urge Türkiye to implement relevant ECtHR rulings and consider implementing relevant funding conditionality in relation to compliance with ECtHR rulings;

    19. Expresses its deep concern about the dire situation in Turkish prisons owing to severe overcrowding and poor living conditions, with reports, including by the Council of Europe, of torture and ill-treatment being widespread, and access to basic needs such as hygiene and information being severely limited; is particularly worried by the conditions of imprisonment of elderly and seriously ill prisoners; is concerned by the continued use of humiliating strip searches in prisons and other places of detention and by the persisting harassment of MP Ömer Faruk Gergerlioğlu, who is currently facing six proceedings for the removal of his parliamentary seat and immunity, among other reasons for his having denounced this very practice;

    20. Strongly condemns the Turkish Government’s decision to dismiss, following the March 2024 local elections, the democratically elected mayors of at least 13 municipalities and districts (Hakkari, Mardin, Batman, Halfeti, Tunceli, Bahçesaray, Akdeniz, Siirt, Van and Kağızman, won by the DEM Party; and Esenyurt Ovacık and Şişli, won by CHP Party) and to replace them with government trustees appointed by the interior ministry; regards this long-standing practice of appointing trustees as a blatant attack on the most basic principles of local democracy; urges the Turkish authorities to immediately cease and reverse repression of political opposition and to respect the rights of voters to elect their chosen representatives in line with the recommendations of the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe and the Venice Commission; reiterates its call on the VP/HR to consider restrictive measures under the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime against Turkish officials assuming the role of trustee and those appointing them; denounces the severe repression of protests against the removal of elected mayors, including the arbitrary arrest of hundreds of protesters, some of whom were minors; regards the decision of the Turkish Government to return to this practice after the last local elections of March 2024 as a clear sign of its lack of commitment to addressing the democratic shortcomings within the country and in clear contradiction to the declared willingness to revitalise the accession process, as such actions undermine the prospects for a stronger, more comprehensive partnership with the EU and are detrimental to long-term progress towards closer cooperation;

    21. Deplores the permanent targeting of political parties and members of the opposition, who continue to suffer increasing pressure; is extremely concerned by the recent arrest and removal from office of the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality CHP Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu, along with the mayors of Şişli and Beylikdüzü, in the framework of two separate investigations on alleged corruption and terrorist-related charges involving a total of 106 suspects; highlights that theses last cases, which are part of a long list of 42 administrative and 51 judicial investigations since İmamoğlu’s election in 2019, were launched just a few days before the internal party election to nominate him presidential candidate and the day after the controverted decision by Istanbul University to revoke his diploma, a requisite for his eligibility to be President; is appalled by the decision to temporarily ban all demonstrations in Istanbul and other provinces across the country, the slowdown on social media, the detention of journalists and the crackdown on peaceful protesters; considers that this is a politically motivated move aimed at preventing a legitimate challenger from standing in the upcoming elections and that with these actions the current Turkish authorities are further pushing the country towards a fully authoritarian model;

    22. Further expresses its concern about the recent separate cases against Istanbul’s Beşiktaş district CHP Mayor Rıza Akpolat, Istanbul’s Beykoz district CHP Mayor Alaattin Köseler, CHP Youth Branch Chair Cem Aydın, and Zafer Party Chair Ümit Özdag; is appalled by the brutal and relentless crackdown on any kind of criticism to which all sectors of Turkish society have recently been subjected by the Turkish authorities, as illustrated, among others, by the case of Ayşe Barım, a well-known talent manager imprisoned since 27 January 2025 for alleged involvement in the Gezi Park protest 12 years ago, the investigation launched against Orhan Turan and Ömer Aras, the president and an executive of TÜSIAD, the country’s main business group, and the indictment, with the aim of imposing hefty prison sentences, of Halk TV Editor-in-Chief Suat Toktaş and journalists Seda Selek, Barış Pehlivan, Serhan Asker and Kürşad Oğuz, who have been provisionally acquitted; is concerned by the involvement in these and other cases of recently appointed Istanbul Chief Public Prosecutor Akın Gürlek, who has a long record of involvement, in different positions, in high-profile cases against political figures, and which may give grounds for considering the application of restrictive measures under the EU Human Rights sanction regime; is also concerned by the growing financial pressure on opposition municipalities and controversial announcements, such as that made in relation to day-care centres run by opposition municipalities;

    23. Expresses its deep concern at the deterioration in women’s rights, at gender-based violence and at the increase in the incidence of femicide in Türkiye in 2024, which has been the highest since 2010, the year before the signing of the Istanbul Convention; reiterates its strong condemnation of Türkiye’s withdrawal, by presidential decree, from this international agreement and reiterates its call to reverse this decision; urges the Turkish authorities to improve the legislative framework and its implementation, including by fully applying Protection Law no. 6284, in order to effectively tackle all forms of violence against women and the practice of so called ‘honour killings’, end the persistent policy of impunity by holding abusers to account, and advance towards gender equality, particularly with regard to the participation of women in decision-making and policymaking processes;

    24. Strongly condemns the ongoing violations and lack of protection of the fundamental rights of LGBTI+ persons in Türkiye, including the increased incidence of hate speech, hate crimes and discriminatory rhetoric, as well as continued media stereotyping based on sexual orientation and gender identity; deplores the fact that this continued discrimination is often sanctioned by the authorities, as evidenced by the mass arrests made during the Pride March in 2023 and the banning of the march in 2024, while anti-LGBTI+ marches were permitted; urges the Turkish authorities to stop banning activities against homophobia, including Pride marches, with immediate effect;

    25. Welcomes the increased dialogue with Christian minorities, but stresses that no significant progress has been registered with regard to the protection of the rights of ethnic and religious minorities, in particular as regards their legal personality, including those of the Greek Orthodox population of the islands of Gökçeada (Imvros) and Bozcaada (Tenedos); calls for Türkiye to implement the Venice Commission recommendations and all relevant ECtHR rulings in this regard; notes with concern that representatives of different confessions, including non-Muslim and Alevi communities, continue to face bureaucratic obstacles when attempting to register places of worship; highlights that this is a violation of the right to freedom of religion and belief; calls on Türkiye to adopt the long-awaited regulation on the election of board members in non-Muslim minority foundations controlling community hospitals; reiterates its call on Türkiye to respect the role of the Ecumenical Patriarchate for Orthodox Christians all over the world and to recognise its legal personality and the public use of the ecclesiastical title of Ecumenical Patriarch; calls on Türkiye to fully respect and protect the outstanding universal value of Hagia Sophia and the Chora museum, which are inscribed on UNESCO’s World Heritage List; notes with concern that Türkiye has still not implemented two decisions of the UNESCO World Heritage Committee of 2021 and 2023 regarding its obligations to undertake special measures to protect these monuments; deplores the lack of protection of Panagia Soumela Monastery, which has been put forward for inclusion in the UNESCO World Heritage Monuments list; stresses the need to eliminate restrictions on the training, appointment and succession of clergy; welcomes the envisaged reopening of the Halki Seminary and calls for the lifting of all obstacles to its proper functioning; calls on the Turkish authorities to effectively investigate and prosecute people responsible for any hate crimes, including hate speech, committed against minorities; condemns the antisemitic statements made in the media and by high-level officials following the Hamas terrorist attacks against Israel on 7 October 2023; notes that all of these practices against any religious minority are incompatible with EU values;

    26. Welcomes Abdullah Öcalan’s recent call on the PKK to lay down arms and dissolve, and to engage in a peace process, as a historic and long-awaited step that could help end a period of 40 years of violence that has caused more than 40 000 deaths; praises the efforts made by all stakeholders involved to facilitate these developments, including the constructive approach of different political leaders that was started by MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli, the visits to Imrali prison granted to a delegation of the DEM Party, and the broad consultations that this party has led with other political parties; underlines that this represents a significant opportunity and must be followed by an inclusive political process, with a prominent role for the Turkish Parliament, aimed at the peaceful and sustainable resolution of the Kurdish issue in its political, social, democratic and security-related aspects; stresses the need to uphold human rights, political pluralism, and civil rights for all citizens, including Kurds; regrets the continued political repression, judicial harassment and restrictions on cultural and linguistic rights faced by Kurdish citizens, which undermine democratic principles and social cohesion;

    Regional cooperation and good neighbourly relations

    27. Continues to commend Türkiye for hosting around 3.1 million refugees, including 2.9 million Syrians under temporary protection in 2024, down from 3.2 million in 2023; reiterates the importance of Türkiye’s collaboration for the effective and orderly management of migration flows; further welcomes the fact that since 2011 the EU has contributed close to EUR 10 billion to assist Türkiye in hosting refugees; notes that some EU funding has been allocated to strengthening Turkish border control and containment capabilities; welcomes the EU’s decision to allocate an additional EUR 1 billion in December 2024 to further support the healthcare, education, and integration of refugees in Türkiye since the fall of the Assad regime; at the same time, notes that these funds had already been pledged in May 2024, and therefore do not constitute new funds; calls on the Commission to ensure utmost transparency and accuracy in the allocation of funds and that EU-funded projects, particularly those related to removal centres and border control, comply with all relevant human rights standards; is alarmed by credible reports uncovering grave human rights violations at EU-funded removal centres in Türkiye and calls on the Commission to launch a transparent and independent review into the matter; notes with concern that a continuing increase in asylum applications has been registered in the Republic of Cyprus over recent years; recalls Türkiye’s obligation to take all necessary measures to halt the existing illegal migration routes and prevent the creation of new sea or land routes for illegal migration from Türkiye to the EU, particularly to Greece and the Republic of Cyprus; points out the risks related to any possible instrumentalisation of migrants by the Turkish Government; underlines the need to ensure the protection of all refugees’ and migrants’ rights and freedoms; calls on Türkiye to ensure the full and non-discriminatory implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement of 2016 and the EU-Türkiye Readmission Agreement vis-à-vis all Member States, including the Republic of Cyprus; expresses cautious hope that developments in Syria will gradually allow an increasing number of refugees to return home; reiterates that returns should only be carried out on a voluntary basis and under conditions of safety and dignity; condemns repeated violent attacks against refugees and migrants fuelled by xenophobic rhetoric among politicians and host communities; calls on the European Commission and the EU Member States to increase their efforts to preserve humanitarian and protection space for Syrian refugees in Türkiye and to uphold the principle of non-refoulement as a cornerstone of EU policies;

    28. Reiterates its strong interest in stability and security in the Eastern Mediterranean; welcomes the continued de-escalation and positive momentum in the region and the recent climate of re-engagement between Türkiye and Greece, albeit that unresolved issues continue to affect bilateral relations; deplores the fact that Türkiye continues to violate the sovereignty and sovereign rights of EU Member States, such as Greece and the Republic of Cyprus, including through the promotion of the Blue Homeland doctrine; underlines that, although Turkish violations of Greek airspace have drastically decreased, violations of Greek territorial waters have risen compared to 2023, and systematic illegal fishing activities have been conducted by Turkish vessels within Greek territorial waters; deeply regrets that Türkiye also continues to uphold a formal threat of war against Greece (casus belli) at 12 nautical miles; calls on Türkiye to fully respect the sovereignty of all EU Member States over their territorial sea and airspace, and their other sovereign rights, including the right to explore and exploit natural resources in accordance with EU and international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which is part of the EU acquis; reiterates its view that the memorandum of understanding between Türkiye and Libya on delimitation of the maritime jurisdiction areas in the Mediterranen infringes upon the sovereign rights of third States, does not comply with the Law of the Sea and cannot produce any legal consequences for third States;

    29. Regrets the fact that the Cyprus problem remains unresolved, and calls for serious reengagement and the political will of all parties involved to bring about peaceful UN-led negotiations, with a view to achieving real progress in the Cyprus settlement talks; welcomes the resumption of informal talks under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General on 18 and 19 March 2025, which were held in a constructive atmosphere in which both sides showed a clear commitment to making progress and continuing dialogue; welcomes the agreement between both sides on opening four crossing points, demining, establishing a youth affairs committee and launching environmental and solar energy projects, as part of a new set of confidence-building measures; encourages all sides to use this momentum to move towards the resumption of negotiations;

    30. Strongly reaffirms its view that the only solution to the Cyprus problem is a fair, comprehensive, viable and democratic settlement, including of its external aspects, within the agreed UN framework, on the basis of a bi-communal, bi-zonal federation with a single international legal personality, single sovereignty, single citizenship and political equality, as set out in the relevant UN Security Council resolutions, the agreed areas of convergence and the Framework of the UN Secretary General, as well as in accordance with international law and the principles and values on which the Union is founded; calls, as a matter of urgency, for the resumption of negotiations on the reunification of Cyprus under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General as soon as possible, from the point at which they were interrupted in Crans-Montana in 2017; calls on Türkiye to abandon the unacceptable proposal for a two-state solution in Cyprus and to return to the agreed basis for a solution and the UN framework; further calls on Türkiye to withdraw its troops from Cyprus and refrain from any unilateral action which would entrench the permanent division of the island and from action altering the demographic balance;

    31. Calls on Türkiye to respect the status of the buffer zone and the mandate of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP); reiterates its call for cooperation among the Republic of Cyprus, Türkiye, the United Kingdom and the UN to implement concrete measures for a demilitarisation of the buffer zone, and to improve security on the island; urges Türkiye and the Turkish Cypriot leadership to reverse all unilateral actions and violations within and in the vicinity of the buffer zone and refrain from any further such actions and provocations; condemns the ongoing ‘opening’ of Varosha by Türkiye, as this negatively alters the situation on the ground, undermines mutual trust and negatively impacts the prospects for the resumption of direct talks on the comprehensive solution of the Cyprus problem; calls on Türkiye to reverse its illegal actions in violation of UN Security Council resolutions 550(1984) and 789(1992) on Varosha, which call on Türkiye to transfer the area of Varosha to its lawful inhabitants under the temporary administration of the UN, and to withdraw from Strovilia and facilitate the full implementation of the Pyla Understanding;

    32. Reiterates its call on Türkiye to give the Turkish Cypriot community the necessary space to act in accordance with its role as a legitimate community of the island, which is a right guaranteed by the constitution of the Republic of Cyprus; reiterates its call on the Commission to step up its efforts to engage with the Turkish Cypriot community, with a view to facilitating the resolution of the Cyprus problem and recalling that its place is in the European Union; calls for all parties involved to demonstrate a more courageous approach to bringing the communities together; stresses the need for the EU body of law to be implemented across the entire island following a comprehensive resolution of the Cyprus problem;

    33. Takes note of the significant work of the Committee on Missing Persons in Cyprus (CMP) and calls for improved access to military zones by the Turkish army, access to its military archives and information as to the relocation of remains from former to subsequent burial sites; remains deeply concerned about the education and religious restrictions and impediments faced by the enclaved Greek Cypriots; calls on Türkiye to step up its cooperation with the Council of Europe and its relevant bodies and institutions, to address their key recommendations, to fully implement the European Convention of Human Rights with regard to respecting the freedom of religion and the freedom of opinion and expression, and the right to access and enjoy cultural heritage, and to stop the deliberate destruction of cultural and religious heritage; condemns the repeated attempts by Türkiye to intimidate and silence Turkish Cypriot journalists, trade unionists, human rights defenders and progressive citizens in the Turkish Cypriot community, thus violating their right to freedom of opinion and expression; calls on Türkiye to halt its proclaimed aggressive policy of the sale and exploitation of Greek Cypriot properties, a policy designed to create irreversible effects on the ground and which completely disregards the European Code of Human Rights ruling on this issue;

    34. Regrets Türkiye’s continuing refusal to comply with aviation law and establish a channel of communication between air traffic control centres in Türkiye and the Republic of Cyprus, the absence of which entails real safety risks and dangers as identified by the European Union Aviation Safety Agency and the International Federation of Air Line Pilots’ Associations; regrets, too, its denial of access to vessels under the flag of one Member State to the Straits of Bosporus and the Dardanelles; takes the view that these could be areas where Türkiye can prove its commitment to confidence building measures and calls on Türkiye to collaborate by fully implementing EU aviation law; regrets that Türkiye has continued its attempts to impede the implementation of the Great Sea Interconnector, an EU project of common interest, and has persisted in its plans for an illegal electricity interconnector with the occupied area of Cyprus;

    35. Regrets that for 20 years Türkiye has refused to implement the obligations assumed towards the EU, including those in relation to Cyprus, as per the Negotiating Framework of October 2005; stresses that recognition of all Member States is a necessary component of the accession process; reiterates its call on Türkiye to fulfil its obligation of full, non-discriminatory implementation of the Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement in relation to all Member States, including the Republic of Cyprus; further calls on Türkiye  to ensure that the human and political rights of all Cypriots are fully respected and that compliance with the fundamental principles of the European Union and the European acquis is guaranteed;

    36. Affirms its support for a free, secure and stable future for Syria and its citizens and highlights the need for an inclusive and peaceful political transition process that is Syrian-led and Syrian- owned, including the protection and inclusion of religious and ethnic communities; expresses its commitment to constructive cooperation between the EU and Türkiye to that end, on humanitarian aid, promoting a sustainable political solution in Syria, and the fight against DAESH, given that Türkiye has a key role in promoting stability in the region; recalls that Syria’s sovereignty must be restored; acknowledges the importance of rebuilding Syria’s economy as a pillar of long-term stability and prosperity for the region; calls on Türkiye to respect Syria’s territorial integrity and sovereignty and immediately cease all attacks and incursions on and occupation of Syrian territory in full compliance with international law; condemns the attacks carried out in recent weeks, taking advantage of the collapse of the Assad regime, by Turkish-backed militias against Syrian Kurdish forces in the north of Syria; expresses deep concern, as these attacks increase the number of internally displaced persons but also threaten the efficiency and continuity of the fight against Daesh; notes that its ongoing presence risks further destabilising and undermining efforts towards a sustainable political resolution in Syria; further notes that, citing security concerns, Türkiye also illegally occupies areas in Iraq; reiterates that civilian populations should never be the victim of military self-defence; calls for the necessary investigation into the cases in which there have been civilian casualties and to stop the crackdown on journalists working in the area; calls on Türkiye to support the process of implementing the agreement between the Syrian transitional government and the Kurdish-led SDF and refrain from any interference in Syria’s internal processes;

    37. Supports the normalisation of relations between Armenia and Türkiye in the interests of reconciliation, good neighbourly relations, regional stability and security and socio-economic development, and welcomes the progress achieved so far; welcomes the continued efforts to restore links between the two countries; urges Türkiye to ensure the speedy implementation of agreements reached by the Turkish and Armenian Governments’ special representatives, such as the opening of the airspace and the border between the two countries for the third country nationals, and, subsequently, for holders of diplomatic passports; welcomes the temporary opening of the Margara-Alican border crossing between Armenia and Türkiye to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid to Syria; expresses the hope that these developments may give impetus to the normalisation of relations in the South Caucasus region, also in terms of security and socio-economic development, and stresses the EU’s interest in supporting this process; encourages Türkiye to play a constructive role in promoting regional stability by facilitating the swift conclusion of the peace process between Armenia and Azerbaijan, inter alia by exerting its influence on Azerbaijan and by deterring Azerbaijan from any further military action against Armenian sovereignty; encourages Türkiye once again to acknowledge the Armenian genocide in order to pave the way for genuine reconciliation between the Turkish and Armenian peoples and to fully respect its obligations to protect Armenian cultural heritage;

    38. Notes that Türkiye’s stance in relation to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine continues to affect EU-Türkiye relations, as Türkiye attempts to maintain ties with both the West and Russia simultaneously; notes Türkiye’s diplomatic attempts to mediate between Russia and Ukraine, particularly regarding the Black Sea Grain Initiative, as well as its continued support for  the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine, including its vote in favour of UN General Assembly resolutions condemning the Russian aggression against Ukraine; regrets that, on the other hand, trade between Türkiye and Russia has risen sharply since the start of the war in Ukraine, making Türkiye Russia’s second largest trading partner despite EU sanctions against Russia, and that Türkiye is the only NATO member state not having imposed any sanctions on Russia; further notes that the European Union’s anti-fraud office, OLAF, has initiated an investigation into a loophole that enables countries like Türkiye to rebrand sanctioned Russian oil and export it to the EU; welcomes, however, positive steps such as Türkiye’s blocking of exports to Russia for certain dual use goods, as well as products originating in the United States and the United Kingdom that are of benefit to Russian military action; reiterates its call on the Turkish Government to halt its plans for the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant, which will be built, operated and owned by Russia’s state atomic energy corporation, Rosatom; expresses concern at Türkiye’s ongoing discussions with Russia to establish a gas-trading hub in Istanbul, scheduled to begin operations in 2025;

    39. Welcomes Türkiye’s participation in various crisis management missions and operations (within the framework of the common security and defence policy); regrets, however, the further deterioration in the level of alignment on common foreign and security policy positions, including on sanctions and countering the circumvention of sanctions, which has fallen to a historically low rate of 5 %, the lowest rate for any accession country; recalls that EU candidate countries are required to progressively align with the common foreign and security policy of the European Union and comply with international law; regrets that Türkiye has not undertaken any steps in this regard, notably by failing to align with EU sanctions against Russia, and that in many areas of mutual interest the foreign policies of the EU and Türkiye are worryingly divergent; urges Türkiye to align with and fully implement the EU sanctions against Russia, including on anti-circumvention measures and to cooperate closely with the EU’s Sanctions Envoy;

    40. Stresses the importance of reinforcing EU-Türkiye cooperation in global security matters, particularly in light of the changing geopolitical landscape and potential shifts in US foreign policy; expresses cautious hope that recent informal engagement, such as the participation of the Turkish Foreign Minister in the informal meeting of EU foreign affairs ministers in 2024, may provide an impetus towards better relations; acknowledges Türkiye’s key role as an ally in NATO and welcomes the Turkish Parliament’s decision to ratify Sweden’s NATO accession in January 2024; recalls, in this regard, that Türkiye has a key responsibility to foster stability at both regional and global levels and is expected to act in line with its NATO obligations, especially given the current geopolitical upheavals; encourages constructive engagement in a more structured and frequent political dialogue on foreign, security and defence policy to seek collaboration on convergent interests while working to reduce divergences, particularly with regard to removing persistent obstacles to the enhancement of a genuine relationship between the EU and NATO, including the acquisition from Russia of the S-400 air defence system; remains duly concerned that Türkiye continues to exclude a Member State from cooperation with NATO;

    41. Welcomes Türkiye’s long-standing position in favour of a two-state solution for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, its calls for a ceasefire in the Israel-Hamas war, and its ongoing efforts to supply humanitarian aid to Gaza throughout the conflict; deeply regrets, at the same time, the Turkish authorities’, including the President’s, active support for the EU-listed terror group Hamas and their stance on the attack against Israel on 7 October 2023, which the Turkish Government failed to condemn; points out that Türkiye’s open support for Hamas and its refusal to designate it a terrorist organisation is not compatible with the EU’s foreign and security policy; calls, therefore, for a revision of this position;

    42. Notes with concern that Türkiye has asked to be a member of BRICS+ and been offered ‘partner country’ status, and is considering the same for the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), where it holds the status of a dialogue partner; expresses serious concern over Türkiye’s increasing interest in an alternative partnership framework, which is fundamentally incompatible with the EU accession process; insists that Türkiye’s new status as a BRICS partner country must not affect Türkiye’s responsibilities within NATO; notes that Türkiye has been cultivating cooperation formats, partnerships and regional alliances beyond the EU; is concerned by Türkiye’s tendency to use this multi-vector approach to advance its interests without committing to a full-fledged cooperation with any of these alliances;

    43. Remains concerned by the Turkish Government’s use of the Turkish diaspora as an instrument for occasional meddling in EU Member States’ domestic policies;

    Socio-economic and sustainability reforms

    44. Welcomes Türkiye’s return to a more conventional economic and monetary policy, while maintaining robust growth and a moderate budget deficit; regrets, however, that the cost of this is yet again being borne by citizens in the form of higher interest rates; highlights that social vulnerabilities have increased, particularly among children and older people, primarily due to the absence of a comprehensive poverty reduction strategy and income inequalities; underlines the necessity for the Turkish authorities to implement comprehensive social protection measures, strengthen collective bargaining rights and ensure that economic reforms prioritise reducing inequality and creating decent work opportunities;

    45. Regrets the fact that despite the progress observed in economic and monetary policies, other actions by the Turkish Government affecting the rule of law continue to undermine basic principles such as legal certainty, which impacts negatively on Türkiye’s potential capacity to receive investments; welcomes the removal of Türkiye from the grey list of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in June 2024, following significant progress in improving its anti-money laundering regime and combating the financing of terrorism;

    46. Welcomes Türkiye’s increased investment activity in the green energy sector and calls on Türkiye to continue improving the compatibility of its energy policy with the EU acquis, exploiting Türkiye’s enormous potential in renewable energy; expresses concern about the lack of any significant progress on climate action, in particular owing to the absence of a comprehensive climate law, a domestic emissions trading system, and a long-term low-emission development strategy, which undermines its 2053 climate neutrality target; highlights the need for a robust legal framework and stricter enforcement mechanisms to safeguard environmental and natural resources; urges Türkiye to align its environmental policies with the EU acquis, including respecting natural habitats when conducting mining projects, and underlines the importance of Türkiye’s adherence to the Aarhus Convention; commends the work of environmental rights defenders in Türkiye and warns against the dire environmental impact of extensive government projects, such as the expansion of its copper mining activities in Mount Ida (Kaz Daglari);

    47. Highlights the fact that Türkiye has taken steps to diversify energy supplies and increase its renewable energy share; notes that the country is the seventh largest LNG market and highlights its potential as a regional energy hub; takes note that Türkiye has subscribed to the global goals on energy efficiency and renewable energy capacity by 2030; calls on the Commission to take into account Türkiye’s potential as a regional energy hub in initiatives to increase the installed renewable capacity in the Mediterranean region and in the development of the New Pact for the Mediterranean, and calls for energy cooperation to be part of the common agenda;

    48. Observes some improvements in labour market conditions and points out a number of pending critical challenges, such as informal employment, the gender gap, and income inequality; is worried about the low coverage of collective bargaining and the lack of recognition of trade union rights for certain public sector employees; believes that more efforts are needed to enhance social dialogue mechanisms and address emerging occupational safety challenges; recalls that trade union freedom and social dialogue are crucial to the development and prosperity of a pluralistic society; deplores, in this regard, the recent detentions of trade unionists including Remzi Çalişkan, vice-president of the DISK confederation, and president of Genel-Iş, who was released after a month in prison, Kemal Göksoy, President of the Mersin Branch of Genel-İş, who remains in prison, and Mehmet Türkmen, chair of the textile sector union BİRTEK SEN, who was detained on 14 February 2025;

    Wider EU-Türkiye relations

    49. Reiterates its firm conviction that, beyond the currently frozen accession process, Türkiye is a country of strategic relevance, a key partner for the stability of the wider region and plays an important role in addressing security challenges, migration management, counterterrorism, and energy security; stresses the importance of maintaining constructive dialogue and deepening cooperation in areas of mutual strategic interest; points to a number of policy areas for future engagement, whether it be the green transition, trade, energy, a modernised customs union and visa liberalisation, among others; reaffirms that the EU is committed to pursuing the best possible relations with Türkiye, based on dialogue, respect and mutual trust, in line with international law and good neighbourly relations;

    50. Stresses the importance of encouraging deeper partnership in all economic sectors, to the benefit of the EU and all of its Member States and Türkiye; notes in particular the importance of cooperation in the fields of energy, innovation, artificial intelligence, health, security and migration management, among others; in this regard, welcomes various high-level dialogues (HLDs) held recently, including the HLD on trade, and the plans for an HLD on economy, as positive steps towards pragmatic forms of cooperation in areas of mutual importance; calls again for the resumption of all relevant HLDs and for the establishment of structured HLDs on sectoral cooperation, to address common challenges and explore opportunities for joint initiatives in fields such as security, climate change, research and innovation; stresses that trade between the EU and Türkiye hit a record high last year and that the EU remains Türkiye’s largest trade and investment partner; calls for the removal of all existing trade barriers and irritants;

    51. Stands ready to support an upgraded customs union with a broader, mutually beneficial scope, which could encompass a wide range of areas of common interest, including digitalisation, Green Deal alignment for green energy policies, public procurement, sustainable development commitments, and due diligence, contributing to the economic security of both sides; supports accompanying this upgraded customs union with an efficient and effective dispute settlement mechanism; underlines the fact that for Parliament to give its consent at the end of the process, such a modernisation would need to be based on strong conditionality related to human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for international law and good neighbourly relations, including Türkiye’s full implementation of the Additional Protocol on extending the Ankara Agreement to all Member States without exception and in a non-discriminatory fashion;

    52. Notes with deep regret that no progress has been made by Türkiye towards meeting the required benchmarks for visa liberalisation; reiterates its willingness to start the visa liberalisation process as soon as the Turkish authorities fully fulfil the six clearly outstanding benchmarks in a non-discriminatory manner vis-à-vis all EU Member states while aligning with EU visa policy; regrets that Turkish citizens are facing problems with visa requests/applications to EU Member States owing to a marked increase in demand and fears of abuse of the system; recognises, however, the political commitment to improving access to visas and calls for intensified efforts on both sides to address the remaining technical and administrative barriers; calls on the EU Member states to increase the resources allocated to this matter; supports measures on visa facilitation, particularly with regard to business activities and Erasmus students; deeply regrets the constant attempts by the Turkish authorities to blame the EU for not making progress on this dossier, while not taking any necessary steps to comply with the remaining benchmarks; reminds Türkiye that the lack of tangible and cumulative progress on the pending conditions has a direct impact on business activities and Erasmus students; appreciates the invaluable contribution of Erasmus+ exchanges in providing rich cross-cultural educational opportunities;

    The way forward for EU-Türkiye relations

    53. Considers, in view of the above, that the Turkish Government has failed to take the necessary steps to address the existing fundamental democratic shortcomings within the country and therefore reiterates its view that Türkiye’s EU accession process cannot be resumed in the current circumstances, despite the democratic and pro-European aspirations of a large part of Turkish society; recalls that, as in the case of any other candidate, the accession process is contingent on full compliance with the Copenhagen criteria and on the normalisation of relations with all EU Member States;

    54. Urges the Turkish Government and the EU institutions and Member States to continue working, beyond the currently frozen accession process, on the basis of the relevant Council and European Council conclusions and the established conditionality, towards a closer, more dynamic and strategic partnership with particular emphasis on climate action, energy security, counter-terrorism cooperation and regional stability; insists on the need to begin a process of reflection on how this new constructive and progressive framework for EU-Türkiye relations can encompass the interests of all parties involved, for example by modernising and enhancing the current Association Agreement;

    55. Considers the joint communication of 29 November 2023 on the state of play of EU-Türkiye relations a good basis on which to move forward in the overall relations between the EU and Türkiye; regrets the lack of a clear political endorsement of this joint communication so far by the Council; reiterates that recognition of all EU Member States is a necessary component of any agreement between the EU and Türkiye; stresses that Türkiye’s constructive engagement, including in relation to the Cyprus problem, remains key to advancing closer cooperation between the EU and Türkiye;

    56. Warns, nevertheless, that a further drift towards authoritarianism by the Turkish authorities, such as we have been witnessing recently, will ultimately have a severe impact on all dimensions of EU-Türkiye relations, including trade and security cooperation, as it prevents the trust and reliability needed between partners and antagonises both sides in the current geopolitical scene;

    57. Continues to acknowledge and commend the democratic and pro-European aspirations of the majority of Turkish society (particularly among Turkish youth), whom the EU will not forsake; regards these aspirations as a major reason for keeping Türkiye’s accession process alive; calls therefore on the Commission to uphold and increase its political and financial support to the vibrant and pro-democratic civil society in Türkiye, whose efforts can contribute to generating the political will necessary for deepening EU-Türkiye relations; highlights, nevertheless, that the resumption of the accession process depends on the unwavering political will of Türkiye’s authorities and society to become a full-fledged democracy, which cannot be forced upon it by the EU;

    58. Reiterates its call to strengthen and deepen mutual knowledge and understanding between our societies, promoting cultural growth, socio-cultural exchanges and combating all manifestations of social, religious, ethnic or cultural prejudice; encourages Türkiye and the EU to promote shared values, particularly by supporting young people; reiterates its utmost commitment to sustaining and increasing support for Türkiye’s independent civil society;

    °

    ° °

    59. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the President of the European Council, the Council and the Commission; asks that this resolution be translated into Turkish and forwarded to the President, Government and Parliament of the Republic of Türkiye.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the protection of the European Union’s financial interests – combating fraud – annual report 2023 – A10-0049/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on the protection of the European Union’s financial interests – combating fraud – annual report 2023

    (2024/2083(INI))

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to Articles 310(6) and 325(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

    – having regard to the Commission report of 25 July 2024 entitled ‘35th Annual Report on the protection of the European Union’s financial interests and the fight against fraud – 2023’ (COM(2024)0318) (2023 PIF Report),

    – having regard to the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) 2023 annual report[1] and the Activity report of the Supervisory Committee of OLAF – 2023[2],

    – having regard to the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) 2023 Annual Report published on 1 March 2024,

    – having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget[3] (the Conditionality Regulation),

    – having regard to Directive (EU) 2019/1937 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2019 on the protection of persons who report breaches of Union law [4] (the Whistleblower Directive) and to the Commission report of 3 July 2024 on its implementation and application (COM(2024)0269),

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 5 July 2023 entitled ‘2023 Rule of Law Report – The rule of law situation in the European Union’ (COM(2023)0800), and to the European Parliament resolution of 28 February2024 entitled ‘Report on the Commission’s 2023 Rule of Law report’[5],

    – having regard to the Commission’s decision of 16 December 2024 not to lift the measure imposed in application of Article 2(2) of Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/2506 of 15 December 2022 on measures for the protection of the Union budget against breaches of the principles of the rule of law in Hungary,

    – having regard to the judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) of 16 February 2022 in Cases C-156/21[6] and C-157/21[7] and to Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/2506 of 15 December 2022 on measures for the protection of the Union budget against breaches of the principles of the rule of law in Hungary, all of which refer to the Conditionality Regulation,

    – having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union[8] (the Financial Regulation),

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1624[9], Regulation (EU) 2024/1620[10] and Directive (EU) 2024/1640[11], all of the European Parliament and of the Council, all adopted on 31 May 2024 and all concerning the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, including through the establishment of the Authority for Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism,

    – having regard to Directive (EU) 2017/1371 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2017 on the fight against fraud to the Union’s financial interests by means of criminal law[12] (the PIF Directive),

    – having regard to the Commission report of 16 September 2022 entitled ‘Second report on the implementation of Directive (EU) 2017/1371 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2017 on the fight against fraud to the Union’s financial interests by means of criminal law’ (COM(2022)0466),

    – having regard to the Commission report of 3 July 2024 on the implementation and application of Directive (EU) 2019/1937 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2019 on the protection of persons who report breaches of Union law (COM(2024)0269),

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 laying down common provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund Plus, the Cohesion Fund, the Just Transition Fund and the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund and financial rules for those and for the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, the Internal Security Fund and the Instrument for Financial Support for Border Management and Visa Policy[13] (the Common Provisions Regulation),

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 24 July 2024 entitled ‘2024 Rule of Law Report – The rule of law situation in the European Union’ (COM(2024)0800),

    – having regard to the study entitled ‘Strengthening the fight against organised crime: Assessing the legislative framework’, published in December 2022[14],

    – having regard to the study entitled ‘Strengthening the fight against corruption: assessing the legislative and policy framework’, published in January 2023[15],

    – having regard to the study entitled ‘Compliance assessment of measures adopted by the Member States to adapt their systems to Council Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 of 12 October 2017 implementing enhanced cooperation on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (‘the EPPO’)’ and its extension, both published in December 2023[16],

    – having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 3 May 2023 on the fight against corruption (JOIN(2023)0012) and to the Commission proposal of 3 May 2023 for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on combating corruption, replacing Council Framework Decision 2003/568/JHA and the Convention on the fight against corruption involving officials of the European Communities or officials of Member States of the European Union and amending Directive (EU) 2017/1371 of the European Parliament and of the Council (COM(2023)0234),

    – having regard to the joint Europol-OLAF report of 6 June 2023 entitled ‘Assessing the Threats to the NextGenerationEU (NGEU) Fund’,

    – having regard to the European Ombudsman’s closing note of 12 September 2023 on the Strategic Initiative concerning the transparency and accountability of the Recovery and Resilience Facility in relation to Case SI/6/2021/PVV, opened on 24 February 2022,

    – having regard to the European Court of Auditors (ECA) report entitled ‘Our activities in 2023’, published on 9 October 2024,

    – having regard to ECA Review 04/2023 of 6 July 2023 entitled ‘Digitalising the management of EU funds’,

    – having regard to Special Eurobarometer 534 entitled ‘Citizens’ attitudes towards corruption in the EU in 2023’[17],

    – having regard to ECA special report 06/2023 of 13 March 2023 entitled ‘Conflict of interest in EU cohesion and agricultural spending – Framework in place but gaps in transparency and detection measures’,

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/785 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2021 establishing the Union Anti-Fraud Programme and repealing Regulation (EU) No 250/2014[18],

    – having regard to its resolution of 18 January 2024 on the protection of the European Union’s financial interests – combating fraud – annual report 2022[19],

    – having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

    – having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0049/2025),

    A. whereas, in line with the obligation laid down in Article 325(5) TFEU, each year, the Commission submits to the European Parliament and to the Council a report drafted in cooperation with the Member States on the measures taken for the implementation of this article (known as PIF reports);

    B. whereas PIF reports are based mainly on information provided by the Member States, including data on irregularities and fraud detected, via the Irregularity Management System (IMS), and on data extracted from the Commission’s accounting system (ABAC);

    C. whereas effective measures to protect the EU’s financial interests at EU level have to be implemented on the basis of data-based knowledge of the specific situation in each Member State, particularly in cases involving complex criminal activity;

    D. whereas the number of irregularities detected and reported demonstrates the results of Member States’ efforts to counter illegal activities in this area and is not to be interpreted, by itself, as an indication of the level of mismanagement or fraud in the Member States;

    E. whereas the links between irregularities’ occurrence, their detection and the reporting level require a wider overall assessment;

    F. whereas sound management of public resources and protecting the EU’s financial interests across all EU policies should be key to increasing citizens’ confidence by ensuring the proper and effective use of taxpayers’ money;

    G. whereas protecting the EU budget involves multiple actors at various levels who can only achieve their mandate through a structured network of relationships and coordination within the anti-fraud architecture (AFA)[20];

    H. whereas the diversity of legal and administrative systems in the Member States and their varying levels of digitalisation need to be adequately addressed with the creation of more unified, interoperable and comparable administrative and reporting systems in the EU in order to effectively prevent and counter fraud, corruption, irregularities and other infringements;

    I. whereas solid cooperation between authorities conducting administrative investigations and those conducting criminal investigations at both EU and Member State levels should be encouraged;

    J. whereas the Early Detection and Exclusion System (EDES) and ARACHNE are effective tools to protect the EU budget from risks of insolvency, negligence, fraud or irregularity committed by private actors, in the case of the EDES, and via a data-mining and risk-scoring approach, in the case of ARACHNE;

    K. whereas criminal networks operating in the EU are fully embracing the entire range of cutting-edge information technology, including artificial intelligence (AI), to facilitate their criminal activities, posing an even more complex threat to the EU budget and a new challenge for law enforcement and requiring the AFA to fast-track its exploration of AI use in the fight against fraud;

    L. whereas respect for the values on which the EU is founded and for fundamental rights, as well as compliance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, are prerequisites for accessing EU funding;

    M. whereas the rule of law conditionality mechanism applies across the entire EU budget as a prerequisite for accessing all EU funds and allows measures to be taken in cases of breaches of the rule of law principles that affect or seriously risk affecting the sound financial management of the EU budget or the EU’s financial interests;

    N. whereas Article 22 of Regulation (EU) 2021/241 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 February 2021 establishing the Recovery and Resilience Facility[21] (the RRF Regulation) contains provisions concerning the protection of the EU’s financial interests;

    General remarks on PIF reporting and on major threats

    1. Welcomes the 2023 PIF Report and its analyses on the relevant findings, and endorses its recommendations;

    2. Shares the view that effective protection of the Union’s financial interests requires the acceleration of the digitalisation that facilitates knowledge sharing, data accessibility and data processing and that would enhance the governance of the overall AFA; maintains that both the EU and national authorities should intensify the use of digital tools with a view to facilitating cooperation;

    3. Reiterates that a more measurable and results-oriented governance of the activities of the AFA’s many components is key both to effectively protecting the Union’s financial interests and to assessing the AFA’s efficiency;

    4. Recalls that solid cooperation between the administrative and judicial authorities conducting investigations at both EU and Member State levels is essential; reiterates its concerns over the still suboptimal situation, in particular as regards the detection and reporting of suspected fraud and irregularities and their follow-up, in which there are marked differences between Member States; encourages the Member States, therefore, to take a proactive approach to protecting the Union’s financial interests and to enhance the exchange of information between their national authorities and with EU bodies and agencies, including in order to identify and address emerging risks and fraud trends in a timely manner; underlines the fact that the fight against fraud requires a holistic and comprehensive approach, covering all stages of the anti-fraud cycle and reflecting the multiple, interconnected and interdependent actors and processes in place for the protection of the financial interests of the Union;

    5. Notes that the overall number of cases of fraud and irregularities reported by the competent EU and national authorities increased significantly, by 9 %, in 2023 (13 563) compared to 2022 (12 455); regrets the fact that this is an all-time high and is the continuation of a growing trend over the last five years; observes, further, that the overall financing concerned in relation to these cases in 2023 (EUR 1.90 billion) was markedly higher than in 2022 (EUR 1.77 billion), having increased by 7.3 %; acknowledges that the multiannual cycle of implementation of numerous programmes makes comparisons based on a five-year average more appropriate than year-to-year comparisons for identifying real-time situations and obtaining reliable analysis of trends and patterns; appreciates, accordingly, that the 2023 PIF Report refers to the results of the 2019-2023 period; observes that the rise in the number of irregularities and in funding that achieves no positive results highlights the need to correlate budgets with the performance indicators of the competent institutions;

    6. Is concerned by the overall scenario depicted by the multiannual analysis in the 2023 PIF Report; emphasises that the current situation justifies the efforts made to ensure more effective deployment of adequate resources and their more efficient use, which requires better governance and cooperation; underlines that fraud, corruption and violations of democracy, justice and the rule of law are deeply interconnected and cannot be tackled in isolation; calls on the Commissioners on budget, fraud and public administration and on democracy, justice and the rule of law to work closely and immediately on launching initiatives to make the actions and the results of the AFA measurable and more tangible and to present them to Parliament, in line with the commitment made at the confirmation hearings; suggests that stronger synergies be created between the Commission’s Directorate-General for Budget and other Commission directorates-general working on the rule of law and the protection of other EU values, particularly the Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers, the Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion and the Directorate-General for Regional and Urban Policy, to ensure that all the departments work together, rather than in silos, to address these systemic challenges more effectively;

    7. Reiterates the call for a holistic approach in PIF reports, which are also considered an AFA governance tool, in order to provide a comprehensive overview of the synergies between all the relevant actors, identify best practices and address shortcomings; is aware that, as emphasised in the 2023 PIF Report, the operational protection of the Union’s financial interests from fraud, irregularities and other illicit activities is entrusted to national authorities, OLAF and the EPPO, and welcomes the integration of OLAF and EPPO findings in the 2023 PIF Report; asks for a deeper analysis of the interaction between the AFA components, and for the introduction of measures to increase the efficiency of the competent institutions with a view to reducing fraud and irregularities; calls for the further improvement of this holistic approach to provide a clearer, more complete and more concrete picture of the overall state of play of the protection of the Union’s financial interests, encompassing the entirety of anti-fraud action at both national and EU levels;

    8. Welcomes OLAF’s investigative performance, in particular the increased number of recommendations issued (309 compared to 275 in 2022) and the overall amount recommended for financial recovery (EUR 1 043.8 million compared to EUR 426.8 million in 2022) against a stable number of cases opened (190 in 2023 and 192 in 2022) and concluded (265 in 2023 and 256 in 2022); points out, in particular, that over the 2019-2023 period, more than 88 % of the irregularities identified as potentially fraudulent and related to expenditure disbursed under direct management were detected following OLAF investigations; regrets that the long duration of the investigations can have a negative impact regarding the consequential late launching of remedial measures; reiterates its request to receive comprehensive and adequately detailed figures on the amounts effectively recovered by the Commission on the grounds of the financial recommendations issued by OLAF; calls on the Commission also to integrate in the next PIF reports ad hoc sections on OLAF in order to develop a more granular analysis and reporting of its activities and of the financial recoveries carried out;

    9. Welcomes the way in which the EPPO, operationally active since June 2021, has developed and increased its activities, which is well-reflected in the numbers of opened investigations (1 371 compared to 865 in 2022), of overall currently active investigations (1 927 compared to 1 117 in 2022) and of indictments (139 compared to 87 in 2022); appreciates the level of detail in EPPO reporting, which offers relevant information on many trends and on the situation in the participating Member States; calls for greater EPPO efficiency, with this being reflected in the amounts recovered and not just in the number of investigations;

    10. Stresses the added value that EU bodies bring to the protection of the financial interests of the Union and the fight against fraud, especially when it comes to cross-border crime, as shown by the operational results of the EPPO and OLAF in 2023 too; reiterates its call for all relevant EU actors involved in the fight against fraud to be guaranteed adequate resources and, in this regard, reminds the Commission and the Council that every euro spent on investigation and anti-fraud action returns to the EU budget;

    11. Is concerned that the substantial financial loss of value added tax (VAT) fraud reported by the EPPO is having a detrimental effect on the national budgets of the Member States while simultaneously threatening fair taxation and fair competition between businesses in the single market; underlines the fact that VAT is an important resource for the Union’s budget too; deems it appropriate to take into account the complexity of the underlying provisions on the system of own resources of the Union when quantifying the financial impact of the EPPO’s activities[22]; points out the concerning number of investigations into the recovery and resilience programmes (233) and the estimated financial loss (EUR 1.86 billion); calls, therefore, for adequate measures to be taken at both national and EU levels;

    12. Calls on the Commission to develop and implement solutions allowing a follow-up to OLAF recommendations and EPPO prosecutions, their analysis and the measurability of the actual impact of their actions on the protection of the Union’s budget in terms of recovery of both mismanaged funds and of uncollected resources, with a view to providing additional justification for results-oriented policymaking; calls on the Commission to notify Parliament of the outcomes of EPPO prosecutions;

    13. States that communication and transparency are essential to address fraud and corruption; emphasises the importance of engaging civil society, the media and investigative journalism to enhance awareness; underlines the central role played by the media and investigative journalism in the fight against fraud, corruption, conflicts of interest and other misuse of public funds; considers that it is essential to safeguard the media from political pressure and influence to protect its independence and its role as a watchdog of democracy and the sound management of public funds;

    14. Underlines that transparency plays an important role in the management of public funds; encourages the Commission and the Member States to maximise transparency in the use of funds, including with regard to information about final beneficiaries;

    15. Underlines the importance of the role played by public authorities in fostering a zero-tolerance culture with regard to fraud and states that communication and transparency are essential to address fraud and corruption; emphasises the importance of engaging civil society, the private sector, the media and investigative journalism to enhance awareness; encourages the Commission to provide support to these relevant actors in the form of training programmes, funding and any other measures required to ensure their independence from external influence and from unlawful state surveillance, intimidation and attempts to undermine their legitimacy, in line with EU fundamental rights and the rule of law; invites the Commission to launch an EU-wide public awareness campaign on the risks of fake news, misinformation and deepfake content in fraud cases affecting EU-funded projects;

    16. Is concerned about the EPPO’s and Europol’s clear warning on the increasing presence of groups of organised criminals behind the most relevant cases of cross-border fraud; notes that the EPPO’s annual report indicates 209 investigated offences concerning PIF-focused criminal organisations in its active investigations up to the end of 2023; understands that organised crime affects Union resources substantially and that the scale of fraud affecting the financial interests of the Union, in particular on the revenue side of the budget, can only be explained by the heavy involvement of serious organised criminal groups; is aware that the current analysis and reporting tools do not allow its quantification in a way that is satisfactory for evaluating the effectiveness or the shortcomings of the measures and policies in place; calls on the Commission to swiftly launch all necessary actions to address the analysis and reporting issue;

    17. Maintains that the fact that the relevant EU legislation has not been transposed efficiently into the national legislation of many Member States and the fact that the Member States’ national laws are not harmonised give organised criminal groups opportunities to conduct a number of illegal cross-border activities in areas affecting the Union’s financial interests; reiterates, therefore, its previous calls for the revision of Council Framework Decision 2008/841/JHA on the fight against organised crime[23] and for the introduction of a new common definition of organised crime, taking into account, in particular, the use of corruption, violence, threat or intimidation to obtain control of economic activities or procurement;

    18. Points out the results of the 2023 Eurobarometer survey on ‘Citizens’ attitudes towards corruption in the EU in 2023’, showing that corruption is a serious concern for EU citizens and businesses in the EU; maintains that high-level corruption, including in EU institutions, not only affects the Union’s financial interests and the EU economy as a whole, but also undermines citizens’ trust in democratic institutions, both in the EU and in the Member States; underlines that organised criminal groups are increasingly using corruption to infiltrate public administrations and gain economic advantages;

    19. Points out that, in relation to corruption cases, the EPPO reported 131 investigated offences up to the end of 2023 (there were 87 cases in 2022) and that, over the years 2019-2023, 65 cases were reported to the Commission via IMS[24] by 11 countries, and that the reported irregular amounts linked to such cases come to about EUR 50.5 million; calls on the Commission to request that the EPPO inform Parliament of how much of that EUR 50.5 million has been recovered;

    20. Acknowledges that anti-corruption strategies are in place in the Member States; calls for an evaluation and a periodical revision of these strategies; emphasises the importance of taking into account and fully addressing country-specific recommendations relating to the fight against corruption;

    21. Acknowledges the Commission’s efforts to prevent and address cases of conflict of interest in the management of the Union’s financial resources; observes that, in the 2019-2023 period, 419 cases were reported via the IMS related to conflict of interest (there were 375 in 2018-2022), involving in total about EUR 112 million; stresses that the ECA has indicated in its audit work[25] that the main source of information on conflict of interest is the IMS and that the quantity and quality of the data recorded in the IMS varies between Member States; underlines that where Member States consider a conflict of interest to be a minor component in a wider fraud case, they do not report such cases as relating to conflicts of interest; calls on the Commission to adopt initiatives necessary to ensure consistent and adequately detailed reporting in the IMS of the above situations; calls for the provisions on conflicts of interest to be applied in a way that ensures legal certainty, be based on a clear and proportionate assessment of the risks and allow practical application by the competent authorities;

    Revenue

    22. Observes that, in 2023, the overall number of fraudulent and non-fraudulent irregularities related to traditional own resources (TOR) (5 118 compared to 4 661 in 2022) was 10 % higher than the five-year average (2019-2023), but that the amount involved decreased by 12 % to EUR 478 million (compared to EUR 783 million bat the end of2022); regrets that while the data show improved recovery for non-fraudulent cases (82 %), the recovery rate for fraudulent cases remains unchanged at 25 %, which is still low and is distributed unevenly across the Member States;

    23. Points out that, in 2023, the Commission considered that in only five of the new write-off reports submitted to it by the Member States had it been satisfactorily demonstrated that TOR had been lost for reasons not imputable to the Member States in question and that the latter were not financially responsible for the loss; notes, by contrast, that in 81 cases, amounting to almost EUR 69 million, the Commission considered that the Member States had not satisfactorily demonstrated that TOR had been lost for reasons not imputable to them and that they were therefore financially responsible for the loss; concludes, therefore, that there is actionable room for improvement in the collection of TOR by the Member States;

    24  Underlines that it is essential for Member States to live up to their responsibility to collect TOR in order to ensure that the burden of financing EU expenditure is shared fairly among the Member States and maintain a level playing field for economic actors in the single market; calls on the Member States to step up their efforts to improve the effectiveness of their national administrations’ activity in the field of recovery, following the detection of irregularities and fraud relating to VAT, in order to increase the amount of TOR made available to the EU budget; acknowledges that the VAT compliance gap relates to more than just fraud and evasion, but also covers VAT lost as a result of insolvencies, bankruptcies, administrative errors and legal tax optimisation; believes, however, that VAT fraud, such as missing trader intra-Community fraud, contributes meaningfully to VAT non-compliance and reiterates its call for the issue to be addressed through digital means, the fraud-proofing of VAT rules and stronger cooperation between national tax authorities and the competent EU investigative bodies;

    25. Acknowledges the current legal framework relating to cooperation with OLAF, the EPPO and Eurofisc; calls on the Commission to speed up the process of revising the current legal framework to provide a clear legal basis for direct cooperation between Eurofisc and the EPPO; encourages OLAF to maximise the possibilities offered by mutual administrative assistance practices to detect and identify customs fraud and related VAT fraud, as well as to report such cases to the EPPO without delay; stresses that, in 2023, the EPPO identified VAT fraud in about 20 % of its active cases (873 cases), making this the second most frequent type of crime after non-procurement expenditure fraud (1 586 cases); is concerned by the increasing participation of groups of organised criminals in VAT fraud operations and by the identified connections between this kind of fraud and other kinds of very serious crimes, such as money laundering;

    26. Reiterates its call on the Commission to reconsider the threshold of EUR 10 million set in the PIF Directive, which has a major impact on the EPPO’s activities in VAT fraud cases; maintains that different interpretations of the methodologies for calculating this threshold make the situation unclear; emphasises that the current threshold limits deterrence and allows perpetrators to seek out the weakest jurisdiction to elude the EPPO’s intervention; believes that the revision of the PIF Directive should either remove the threshold or substantially lower it; calls on the Commission, in the meantime, to provide adequate guidance on the calculation method for cases prior to the amendment of the PIF Directive;

    27. Stresses the importance of effective and efficient cooperation between OLAF and the EPPO in this specific revenue sector and maintains that adequate detection and data transmission by OLAF to the EPPO could increase the collection of VAT and customs revenue for the EU budget, and would help avoid any overlap between the activities of the two offices;

    Expenditure

    28. Is concerned by the high levels of fraud and irregularities detected, both in 2023 and in 2022, under the common agricultural policy, both in rural development and in support for agriculture; remarks that the data confirm patterns and risks identified in previous years; observes that, during the 2019-2023 period, fraudulent irregularities reported for rural development increased, mainly owing to a rising number of irregularities detected for the 2014-2020 programming period; notes that during the 2019-2023 period, the number of non-fraudulent rural development irregularities continuously increased in line with the implementation of the programmes;

    29. Observes that in cohesion policy the number and financial amounts of non-fraudulent irregularities reported for the 2014-2020 programming period are much lower than those reported during the first 10 years of implementation of the 2007-2013 programming period; points out that the fraud detection rate[26] (0.53 %) for the 2014-2020 programming period is similar to the rate for the 2007-2013 programming period, while the irregularity detection rate (0.67 %) is much lower than the rate recorded for the 2007-2013 programming period (2.5 %); notes that individual irregularities involving large financial amounts have a substantial impact on the fraud detection rate; calls for further clarification of the correlation between the fraud detection rate and the occurrence of fraud;

    30. Welcomes OLAF’s analytical report entitled ‘Fraud and irregularities by areas of the cohesion policy – comparing risks’, which refers to information from Member States for the 2014-2020 programming period up until December 2023 and identifies areas particularly exposed to fraud risk (such as investments for the environment, climate change and the transition to a low carbon economy, research, development and innovation); remarks that the largest financial amounts in fraud cases were in environmental protection and research, technology development and innovation;

    31. Reiterates its concern over the lengthy administrative procedures for dealing with the fraudulent cases reported; points out that, on average, during the 2019-2023 period, under the common agricultural policy, nearly four years were required from the start of an irregularity to arrive at a suspicion of fraudulent activity, and nearly three more years to close the case after its being reported to the Commission; highlights that, for cohesion, on average and during the 2014-2020 period, it took about a year and a half to arrive at a suspicion that a fraudulent irregularity had been committed and more than two years to close the case after its being reported to the Commission; asks the Commission to intensify dialogue with, and provide advice to, the Member State authorities to reduce the length of administrative procedures;

    32. Observes that, for direct management between 2019 and 2023, OLAF was mentioned as the source of detection of fraudulent irregularities for 88.4 % of recovery items, corresponding to 92.1 % of total recovery amounts; asks the Commission to provide clear information on the data and on the actions taken to enhance swift recovery, including data on overall recovery levels for fraudulent and non-fraudulent irregularities;

    33. Emphasises that when, despite preventive measures, fraudulent or non-fraudulent irregularities are detected, recovery is the measure that protects the Union’s financial interests, allowing for the correct implementation of EU policies and for the refunding of disbursed expenditure that is non-compliant with the funding requirements; stresses the findings of ECA special report 7/2024[27] when referring to the 2014-2020 period, for which the reported irregular expenditure was EUR 14 billion, which is to be refunded via recovery; stresses the need to speed up the recovery process by establishing clear deadlines and imposing penalties for delays, so that funds are returned to the EU budget as quickly as possible; calls on the Commission to propose adequate measures to provide complete information on irregular expenditure and the associated corrective measures taken;

    34. Stresses the importance of follow-up measures after the necessary corrective actions have been taken, with a view to learning from cases of fraud and improving procedures to prevent similar cases from occurring in the future; considers it important, in this regard, that the Member States thoroughly follow up on cases by analysing the enabling factors behind fraud and assessing the need to revise their management and control systems accordingly;

    35. Understands that, following a lack of support in the Council for its initiatives in 2004 and 2014, the Commission is not willing to put forward another legislative proposal for mutual administrative assistance in the areas of EU spending that do not currently provide for this practice; encourages the Commission to take advantage of the revision of the OLAF Regulation[28], which already provides OLAF with an enhanced mandate for the coordination of Member States’ actions in order to further develop the current provisions with a view to filling this gap;

    36. Notes that civil society organisations are an essential component of a vibrant democratic society, ensuring the broad coverage of diverse views in public debates; recognises that these organisations may receive Union funds to support their work in contributing to democratic dialogue and public engagement; emphasises that transparency in stakeholder meetings is fundamental to democratic integrity and should apply equally to all entities engaging with EU institutions; stresses that clear documentation and disclosure of such interactions strengthens public trust and democratic accountability; stresses that lobbying should be transparent, with full disclosure of all parties involved; takes notes of the allegations that the Commission subsidises NGOs to influence Members of the European Parliament; stresses that, if their existence is confirmed, such practices could distort policy discussions and contravene the principle of separation of powers and should therefore be ended; calls on the ECA to audit the programmes concerned and give its recommendations; expects the future ECA report to bring clarity on these issues; recalls that the ECA asked, in special report 05/2024[29], for more efforts to be made to improve checks on the ground; notes with concern the ECA’s observation that lobbyists can choose to which category they belong, regardless of their legal form, to avoid disclosing financial information; notes that the EU is one of the largest global funders of civil society organisations; underlines the need for the EU Transparency Register Secretariat to enhance its systematic checks of the self-declarations of entities declaring themselves to be ‘NGOs, platforms, networks and similar’; observes that such systematic checks could be based on a set of criteria, including non-profit status, objectives relating to public benefit, and independence, to strengthen the trust in all entities registered in the EU Transparency Register, and should be supported by robust requirements for accountability and transparency;

    37. Considers that when assessing delivery models for EU expenditure, the susceptibility of the various options to fraud and other misuse should be taken into account; calls on the Commission to ensure that the lessons learnt from the design and implementation of the RRF, including the recommendations addressed to it by the ECA and Parliament, are taken into account in future EU funding instruments, notably the post-2027 multiannual financial framework (MFF); underlines that the shortcomings identified in the implementation of the RRF, including risks of fraud, double funding, and lack of transparency, must serve as a lesson for future EU financial frameworks; opposes any replication of the RRF model in its current form and stresses that any future performance-based funding must be accompanied by significantly stronger safeguards, transparency requirements and fraud prevention mechanisms to ensure the sound management of EU funds;

    NextGenerationEU (NGEU) and the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF)

    38. Appreciates the efforts made by the Commission in the revision of the 27 recovery and resilience plans (RRPs) to adjust to the energy market disruptions following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine; notes that the integration into the RRPs of REPowerEU is expected to contribute to reducing dependence on Russian fossil fuels and increasing European self-sufficiency;

    39. Recalls, nevertheless, that delays can be observed in the implementation of the RRF and calls on the Commission to remain vigilant, in particular towards the end of the RRF life cycle, in order to ensure that Member States adequately protect the financial interests of the EU and that EU taxpayers’ money is spent appropriately;

    40. Underlines the importance of robust management and control systems in preventing fraud as they have the effect of deterring criminals from attempting to defraud public authorities; expresses concerns about the ECA’s repeated observations pointing to persistent weaknesses in the implementation of Member State control systems, as this poses risks to the availability of complete and accurate data underlying payment requests, access to those requests for control purposes, and the effective functioning of Member State control systems to protect the EU’s financial interests; regrets that in several Member States, the control systems were not fully functional when the national RRPs started to be implemented, and underlines that such issues pose risks to the regularity of RRF payments and to the protection of the EU’s financial interests; calls on the Commission to ensure that the Member States remedy the inadequacies identified in their control frameworks without delay, including by implementing the recommendations addressed to it by the ECA;

    41. Observes that the Commission’s control framework for the RRF relies primarily on the responsibility of the Member States to protect the EU’s financial interests; calls on the Commission to maintain a high level of attention to the fulfilment by the Member States of the specific audit and control milestones added to those RRPs which had lacked robustness and to continue efforts to close accountability gaps; takes notes of the actions launched by the Commission following the ECA’s recommendations on the identifiable weaknesses of some Member States’ control and reporting systems; urges the Commission to take decisive and swift action whenever necessary and to make full use of the provisions of the RRF Regulation if deficiencies persist in the control systems of Member States;

    42. Notes with grave concern that ECA special report 14/2024 found that the climate impact of green spending under the RRF could have been overestimated by up to EUR 34.5 billion, with some projects having minimal impact on the energy transition or even causing environmental harm while also increasing the risk of fraud;

    43. Calls for the establishment of clear, measurable criteria for green investments under the EU budget and the RRF to ensure that only projects with significant and proven environmental and economic benefits receive funding, thereby enhancing accountability and long-term sustainability while reducing the risk of fraud;

    44. Observes that, for the RRF in 2023, the 2023 PIF Report indicates the number of cases of suspected fraud reported by the Commission (15) and the number of audits (13, compared with 16 carried out in 2022), but it does not include the concerningly high number of EPPO investigations (233 investigations referred to recovery and resilience programmes, with an estimated financial loss of EUR 1.86 billion); is concerned by a possible increase in the number of cases of fraud, corruption, double funding and conflicts of interest in the coming years and urges the Commission and the Member States to act swiftly in order to ensure the sound management and fair distribution of RRF funds;

    45. Calls on the Commission to introduce mandatory fraud reporting via the IMS for all RRF-related cases, ensuring that irregularities and fraud affecting RRF funds are systematically recorded and monitored; notes with concern the lack of transparency in reporting fraud linked to RRF funds and insists that all Member States comply with standardised reporting obligations;

    46. Asks OLAF to continue its risk analysis, which, in 2023, was made available to Member States along with an updated version of the ‘RRF risk framework’, and with the training and seminars for Member State authorities; endorses the use of the IMS for reporting RRF irregularities; reiterates its call on the Commission, on the specialised EU agencies and bodies, as well as on Member States, to actively cooperate and interact to ensure the protection of the EU’s financial interests when implementing the NGEU;

    47. Observes that, as part of the Guidance on RRPs, the Commission has adopted[30] Annex IV on the framework for reduction and recoveries under the RRF; understands that the reduction of a payment is feasible when there are still payments to be effected; recalls that the RRF ends in 2026; points out that recovery is only to be launched whenever no further instalments remain; is concerned by the fact that this recovery procedure, borrowed from the model for implementing cohesion funds, has proved to be extremely ineffective and was abandoned in the current MFF; strongly regrets the fact that by the end of 2023 there were no recovery orders in ABAC concerning the RRF, and that there is still no obligation for Member States to report irregularities related to the RRF via the IMS;

    48. Reiterates that transparency plays a vital role in exposing fraudulent schemes and discouraging fraudsters; reiterates its dissatisfaction with the interpretation endorsed by the Commission of the concept of ‘final recipient’ under the RRF; rejects the Commission’s incomplete and misleading interpretation[31]; remarks that, even according to the Commission guidelines[32], the ‘final recipient’ is the ‘last entity’ that receives funds for an RRF measure, and that any initial or intermediary recipient of funding, such as ministries or agencies operating merely as distributors of the funds, should not be considered to be the ‘last entity’; asks the Commission again to request that the Member States provide information on the ‘final recipient’ or ‘last entity’ and not to accept from Member States any information on ‘second-level recipients’ that is not in line with the agreement between the co-legislators; calls on the Commission to review its guidance by providing cases and examples that can clarify the provision and be a solid term of reference for the national authorities, in such a way as to endorse an adequate transparency level and a homogeneous interpretation across all the Member States; stresses that, should the Commission continue to refuse to ensure full transparency, Parliament must consider all available measures to enforce compliance;

    49. Is concerned by the ECA’s opinion[33] on the increasing risk of EU funds being spent twice on the same measure and handed out twice for the same action; understands that corresponding measures in similar areas, such as transport and energy infrastructure, are financed from both the EU budget and the RRF, because the EU’s pandemic recovery fund finances actions similar to those covered by standard EU programmes; acknowledges that complementarity between the RRF and other EU instruments is allowed, but observes that this could result in delivering milestones that are fully financed by funds other than the RRF, because the RRF is not linked to the reimbursement of costs effectively incurred, but rather rewards the fulfilment of milestones and targets; emphasises that the several layers of governance, the fragmented IT landscape and the limited exchanges of data or use of data-mining tools such as ARACHNE, prevent the detection of double funding, and therefore the control mechanisms in place may be insufficient to properly mitigate this increased risk; maintains that the absence of direct access to the full list of RRF final recipients limits the Commission’s capacity to detect potential cases of double funding; believes that the precaution adopted by some Member States of avoiding combining the RRF with other EU instruments contributes to mitigating the risk of double funding; calls on the Commission to increase its controls in this regard;

    50. Observes that Member States may include measures in their RRPs with no estimated costs or estimated costs of zero[34]; points out also that these ‘cost-free’ milestones are the main term of reference for assessing the correct use of RRF resources for their intended purposes; understands that the payments for these ‘cost-free’ or ‘zero-cost’ milestones are released following the milestones’ achievement, irrespective of the cost sustained, in line with the ‘financing not linked to cost’ approach under the RRF; observes, however, that such milestones make it impossible to verify the sound management of paid RRF resources, because such resources are disbursed in connection with a milestone for which they have not been deployed; calls on the Commission to reconsider its assumption that a ‘zero-cost’ measure cannot induce double funding, irrespective of whether other EU funds are used to implement it; strongly calls on the Commission to strengthen controls on ‘zero-cost’ measures and to give guidance to the Member States on how to address the financial design of the measures concerned in order to prevent such risk;

    51. Reiterates its calls on the Commission to maintain adequate ex post audit procedures and to pay close attention to the risk of reversal after payment for the achievement of targets previously audited and assessed as satisfactorily fulfilled;

    52. Follows up on the Ombudsman’s strategic initiative, launched in February 2022 and closed in September 2023, conducted on the transparency and accountability of the RRF, whose results it fully endorses; welcomes the ongoing dialogue between the Commission and the Ombudsman to address the suboptimal situations detected, in particular concerning the scoreboard and the proactive publication of documents related to the RRF;

    Digitalisation and transparency to enhance the fight against fraud

    53. Welcomes the political agreement reached on the proposed recast text of the Financial Regulation; believes that extending the scope of EDES to include shared management, and the adoption of a legal basis to use ARACHNE as a model for an EU-wide data-mining and risk-scoring tool, will strengthen the protection of the EU’s financial interests; recalls the calls made in previous reports to ensure that all Member States make use of data-mining tools, especially ARACHNE, to ensure timely and diligent reporting standards;

    54. Shares the view that the IMS, the system through which Member States report to the Commission on irregularities and fraud affecting the EU budget, has potential for greater interoperability with other corporate tools of the Commission, such as ARACHNE and EDES, and with digital tools in Member States; asks to be informed, following the recast of the Financial Regulation, on the progress of the EDES-IMS interface and about the possible use of IMS data within the data-mining and risk-scoring tool (ARACHNE);

    55. Reiterates its call for increased interoperability between data systems and for the harmonisation of reporting, monitoring and auditing in the Union; is aware of the crosscutting nature of interoperability and appreciates the adoption of the Interoperable Europe Act[35];

    56. Underlines the findings of ECA Review 4/2023 of 6 July 2023 on digitalising the management of EU funds; recalls the positive effects of digitalisation on prevention and detection of fraud and irregularities, as well as on the management, control and auditing of EU funds, by allowing easier and quicker access to data and remote cross-checks, thereby limiting costs by reducing the need for controls and on-the-spot checks;

    57. Recognises that taking advantage of a real-time and data-driven economy has significant benefits for the protection of the Union’s financial interests, while reducing the administrative burden on public authorities and businesses operating and trading across borders within the EU; calls for the EU and the Member States to improve the effectiveness of data sharing by creating a digital ecosystem allowing for the seamless, real-time and secure movement of standardised, structured and machine-readable data between businesses and public authorities, in particular national tax administrations, with a view to limiting possibilities for committing fraud and tax evasion;

    58. Shares the view that digitalisation should be at the core of every anti-fraud strategy, and in particular that it should be integrated into national anti-fraud strategies to allow coordination between its constituent parts and for the threats posed by new technologies to be factored in;

    59. Believes that digitalisation offers opportunities for tangible improvements to the governance of the anti-fraud network and that by facilitating communication and accessibility it helps to improve reporting, thereby allowing for a better understanding of the obstacles that persist and a more timely and comprehensive response by decision-makers and co-legislators; welcomes the fact that over half of the Member States have taken steps to identify and address skills gaps in digitalisation, in particular a lack of information and access to data on digitalisation; encourages the Member States and actors in the AFA to continue addressing skills gaps through measures involving, inter alia, knowledge sharing, training and the broadening of know-how and skills in the field of digitalisation;

    60. Welcomes the efforts of many components of the AFA in assessing and further developing the options offered by AI and machine learning in identifying and detecting irregularities and pursuing efficiency gains in both analysis and classic administrative tasks; reiterates that human assessment must remain the pivotal characteristic of every process; adds that AI has the potential to be a game changer in the fight against fraud, allowing the rapid analysis of large data sets, as well as enhancing fraud detection and identification of fraud patterns; recalls that the successful use of AI relies on effective collaboration between all stakeholders and on the availability of high quality data, underpinned by the effective use of ARACHNE; urges the Commission to work towards developing AI in Europe so as to uphold data sovereignty and ensure robust data protection, aligning with the principles outlined in the AI Act[36] and the General Data Protection Regulation[37] (GDPR); calls on all anti-fraud actors to strengthen their cooperation to leverage the use of AI effectively and responsibly in the fight against fraud;

    61. Recognises the growing risk of AI-generated content being used to manipulate procurement processes, financial transactions and evidence in fraud investigations; calls on the Commission to prioritise research and policy measures to combat fraudulent activities enabled by artificial intelligence, including deepfake technology and AI-driven disinformation campaigns that could compromise financial and anti-fraud mechanisms; calls on the Commission to propose stricter legal provisions and penalties for entities found to be using AI to commit or facilitate financial fraud, including AI-driven money laundering schemes, falsification of contracts, and digital identity theft in procurement processes;

    62.  Acknowledges the importance of the use of AI to make improvements in the quality and completeness of data exchanged with Member States; welcomes, in this regard, OLAF’s actions, including recommendations in the annual PIF reports, structured bilateral dialogues with Member States, the revision of the Commission Anti-Fraud Strategy action plan, and interinstitutional exchanges focusing on these matters;

    63. Further calls for a dedicated EU-wide initiative to develop AI-driven fraud detection mechanisms within OLAF, the EPPO, and Europol, to increase efficiency in tracking and preventing financial crimes against the EU budget; recommends the establishment of an EU-wide task force composed of representatives from OLAF, the EPPO, Europol and national anti-fraud units, with a dedicated focus on digital fraud threats, including deepfake technology, AI-generated fake documents and synthetic identity fraud; underlines that this task force should develop and share best practices with the Member States;

    64. Stresses the need for increased cross-border cooperation and data-sharing mechanisms between Member States to combat AI-enabled fraud, particularly in high-risk areas such as VAT, customs and financial aid distribution; encourages the creation of a joint EU intelligence hub to track fraudulent AI activity in real time; calls on the Commission and the Member States to integrate AI and data analytics into fraud detection systems, ensuring interoperability between national and EU-level databases while maintaining strong data protection safeguards;

    65. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to implement strict transparency and audit measures in AI-based fraud detection tools to prevent bias, algorithmic manipulation and misuse in financial oversight systems; urges the development of AI ethics guidelines for anti-fraud institutions to ensure accountability;

    66. Calls for a mandatory forensic verification process for all digital evidence submitted in financial fraud cases, ensuring the authenticity of documents and audio and video material used in investigations;

    The internal layer of the EU’s AFA – 2023 key measures at EU level

    67. Underlines the fact that the EU’s AFA is a composite institutional architecture designed to detect, prevent and combat fraud and other forms of misconduct affecting the EU’s financial interests, built on a multi-layered network of cooperation in which the first layer (OLAF, the EPPO, Europol, Eurojust, AMLA, the Commission, the ECA and the European Investment Bank (EIB)) is grounded on horizontal cooperation between the EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, while the other layers are based on vertical relationships between EU and national authorities, and between EU authorities and international organisations; points out that the AFA has evolved over the years through a series of separate decisions that have led to an innovative network of entities; underlines that their coordinated activities in recent years have generated valuable experience that should be considered in the future revision of the relevant regulations; stresses that with the creation of the EPPO, the first European prosecutorial authority was established, enabling prompt and direct criminal law investigations and prosecutions, and that the lessons learnt in the first years of its operational activity need to be adequately integrated in the legislative framework to be able to take full advantage of the available tools and resources; stresses the importance of clear mandates between the various EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies in order to minimise the risk of overlaps and duplication and thereby ensure the efficiency of the functioning of the AFA;

    68. Appreciates the integration in the 2023 PIF Report of the main administrative and judicial results achieved by OLAF and the EPPO, respectively, which follows the many calls from Parliament for more comprehensive reporting of the actions carried out by the components of the AFA; considers, however, that the differences in nature, scope and granularity between the two reports should be addressed and that the areas of cooperation should be indicated clearly; deems the differences in the figures provided by OLAF, the EPPO and the 2023 PIF Report to be justified in the current circumstances; highlights that reporting bodies in the Member States may report on criminal investigations only when the relevant judicial authorities grant the authorisation for them to do so, and this implies that while the EPPO and OLAF report data on active investigations, the reporting bodies are often unable to enter these details in the IMS database because of the need to protect confidentiality and ensure the proper conduct of investigations; understands that these cases result in a divergence in the data (‘delta’) that can only be eliminated when the investigations are completed and the relevant data are included in the reporting to the Commission so they can be included in a future PIF Report;

    69. Welcomes the adoption by the Commission, in May 2023, of a package of anti-corruption measures which encompasses a proposal for a directive on combating corruption; believes that prevention and prosecution of corruption need to be stepped up and calls on the Commission to intensify the monitoring of the enforcement of measures in the Member States;

    70. Welcomes the establishment of a network against corruption, which met for the first time on 20 September 2023, believes that the mapping of areas at a high-risk of corruption could contribute effectively to the further development of the EU anti-corruption strategy;

    71. Underlines the importance of the rule of law as one of the fundamental values of the Union and stresses that the rule of law conditionality mechanism is crucial in order to ensure that Member States continue to respect rule of law principles; reiterates its deep concern regarding the situation concerning the rule of law in certain Member States, which is deeply worrying in its own right and can lead to serious losses for the Union budget; calls on the Commission to ensure the strict and fast implementation of all elements of the mechanism when Member States breach rule of law principles and when this affects, or risks affecting, EU financial interests; further insists on the need for coherence across various instruments when assessing the rule of law situation in Member States;

    72. Notes that the fourth Commission Report 2023 on the rule of law, adopted in February 2024, provides a follow-up to the recommendations issued in the previous year’s Rule of Law Report; acknowledges that, in the fight against corruption, various Member States have updated or launched a revision of their national strategies and/or action plans, while others have reformed criminal law to strengthen the fight against corruption; observes that for many Member States the main obstacle to the fight against corruption is the limited resources of prosecution services; calls on the Commission to continue encouraging and supporting the efforts of Member States to reform and improve the efficacy of criminal proceedings and addressing the other challenges identified in the report; reminds the Commission of the effective tools at its disposal to safeguard the rule of law, such as infringement procedures, funding conditionality and the Article 7 TEU procedures, and expects it to make full use of them all; highlights, in this regard, that the new Financial Regulation introduces conditionality linked to the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU and calls on the Commission to start applying it, particularly in cases where infringement procedures have already been launched against a Member State for violations of the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU, as this constitutes a clear recognition of an ongoing breach that could also impact the sound financial management of the Union budget;

    73. Takes note of the Commission’s decision not to lift the measure under Article 2(2) of Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/2506 of 15 December 2022 on measures for the protection of the Union budget against breaches of the principles of the rule of law in Hungary[38]; expects the Commission and the Council to lift the adopted measures only where evidence is collected that the remedial measures adopted by the Hungarian Government have proven effective in practice and, in particular, that no regression has been detected on already adopted measures; condemns the threats, such as espionage, to which EU institution staff are exposed, such as OLAF staff during their investigative missions in Hungary; stresses that such actions gravely undermine the rule of law and the integrity of the EU institutions; calls for the swift establishment of robust protection measures to safeguard EU institution staff on missions; calls on the Hungarian authorities to take immediate and concrete steps to safeguard judicial independence, uphold media freedom and fully implement the recommendations of the Commission’s Rule of Law Report to restore democratic checks and balances; urges the Council to continue the Article 7 TEU procedure against the Hungarian Government;

    74. Emphasises that respect for the rule of law, including the fight against corruption, is a key determinant of the single market environment that fosters investment, growth, jobs and innovation, and protects small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and economic operators operating across borders; stresses that the Commission is accountable for rigorous verification, as a condition for disbursing funding, of the fulfilment of the rule of law-related milestones integrated in the various Member State RRPs; recalls that the Commissioner for democracy, justice and rule of law, working in close coordination with the recently appointed Commissioner on budget, anti-fraud and public administration, holds primary responsibility for the full application of the general regime of conditionality; calls on the Commission not to use ‘dialogue’ with Member States or the ‘pilot’ procedure as an open-ended means to avoid launching actual infringement procedures; calls, furthermore, on the Commission to prioritise horizontally infringements affecting the EU’s financial interests, in particular regarding the PIF Directive and the EPPO Regulation[39]; welcomes the statement in the Commission Political Guidelines on the importance of the rule of law for EU funds and the commitment by the Commissioner for budget, anti-fraud and public administration to introduce strong safeguards on the rule of law in the next MFF;

    75. Considers that the protection of the common EU values enshrined in Article 2 TEU currently included in the Common Provisions Regulation needs to be further strengthened; calls on the Commission to explore how a mechanism equivalent to the horizontal enabling conditions could be developed as a general feature in all areas of the EU budget, with a view to linking a wider range of policies to all the values set out in Article 2 TEU; calls on the Commission to explore means of linking funding to rule of law conditions and the completion of necessary reforms in order to ensure a comprehensive approach, applied horizontally to all EU funds; calls on the Commission to pursue a comprehensive approach and to put forward proposals for further strengthening the Union’s rule of law toolbox as a priority, including strengthened rule of law conditionality for funds deployed in the current programming period;

    76. Maintains that corruption is intrinsically linked to money laundering, and that money laundering is one of the most important enablers of illegal activities by organised criminals, as it allows them to transfer the proceeds of their crime into the legal economy; recognises that the heterogeneous national legal systems and fragmented application of the Union’s anti-money laundering framework have made it difficult to prevent, detect and counter money laundering; welcomes, in this regard, the adoption of the ambitious legislative package on anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism, which will unify national rules and thus enhance the collective fight against money laundering across the Union; welcomes the establishment of the new Authority for Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism (AMLA); considers that the new agency will play a central role in the new anti-money laundering framework through its coordinating and supervisory responsibilities; recalls that money laundering and terrorist financing are intrinsically linked and calls for the EPPO, OLAF and the ECA to have a stronger role in countering these phenomena;

    77. Shares the view that the protection of the EU’s financial interests has been strengthened by the recast Financial Regulation; points out that the scope of EDES has been extended to encompass shared and direct management and provide new grounds for exclusion; welcomes the introduction of a legal basis for a risk-scoring and data-mining tool to be used by all Member States and in all management modes; regrets that both these measures will enter into force only in 2028 and only from the next MFF, resulting in several more years without comprehensive transparency regarding the final recipients of EU funds and missing a crucial opportunity to use these data to strengthen safeguards against corruption and fraud;

    78. Appreciates the adoption of an updated action plan[40] for the 2019 Commission Anti-Fraud Strategy; notes that it includes 44 actions distributed over seven themes covering, in particular, digitalisation, cooperation, the RRF, customs fraud, and awareness-raising in ethical and anti-fraud culture matters;

    79. Points out that the EU’s anti-fraud programme (UAFP) is the only spending programme specifically dedicated to fighting fraud affecting the EU’s financial interests and that it provides relevant support to all Member States’ authorities as components of the external layer of the AFA, in order to strengthen the fight against fraud; observes that the UAFP has the flexibility needed to adapt to the constantly changing anti-fraud landscape and is aligned with the seven-year period (2021-2027) of the current MFF; notes that, so far, 55 % of the total implementation of the UAFP has contributed to the digital transition;

    80. Calls on the Commission to build on the success of the UAFP and encourages the Commissioner on budget and anti-fraud to consider the UAFP as a model to be extended in the next MFF, in line with the task, indicated in the mission letter, of securing support for Member States’ efforts to protect the Union’s financial interests;

    81. Welcomes the first UAFP association request received in 2023 from a non-EU country, namely Ukraine, with which an association agreement covering its participation in the programme has been negotiated and was adopted in March 2024;

    82. Expresses concern that the Commission’s latest interim evaluation of Hercule III found aspects that may have hampered the programme’s effectiveness, notably that certain Member States’ administrations lacked the resources to enable them to cope with the programme’s administrative requirements;

    83. Takes note of the reiterated calls from the EPPO to bolster the detection capacity of the relevant components of the AFA, and recalls that, in line with the Commission Anti-Fraud Strategy, emphasis is to be given to data analysis as a tool for detecting fraud; highlights, in this regard, the importance of harmonising definitions in order to obtain comparable data across the EU; encourages the Commission to strengthen the use of the IMS as a tool to support auditors’ risk analysis when preparing audit activities; invites OLAF to increase its training offer to Commission staff, including auditors and relevant actors in the financial flow circuit;

    84. Is aware that the decentralised structure of the EPPO entails an interplay between national law and EU law and between national authorities and the EPPO; understands that the EPPO operates based on the directly applicable EU regulations but that it also requires adequate implementing measures to be adopted via national legislation transposing the PIF Directive and other relevant Union acts; calls on the Commission to ensure that national legislation is fully in line with the EPPO Regulation and the PIF Directive, launch infringement proceedings and propose the revision of these legal acts in order to make the EPPO more effective in the exercise of its mandate;

    85. Notes the results of the Compliance assessment of measures adopted by the Member States to adapt their systems to the EPPO Regulation[41], which was presented in September 2023; regrets that many situations are still suboptimal and need to be addressed because they weaken the effectiveness of the protection of the Union’s financial interests by means of criminal investigations; refers, in particular, to the attribution of competence between national prosecution services and the EPPO; stresses also that the EPPO Regulation stipulates the reporting of possible EPPO cases directly and without undue delay; calls on the Commission to verify and monitor Member States’ full compliance with the EPPO Regulation and their prompt reporting of suspicions of fraud in areas within the EPPO’s competence directly to it;

    86. Is concerned that in many Member States the designated national authority deciding on disagreements between the EPPO and national authorities on the competence for prosecuting a case is not a ‘court’ or a ‘tribunal’; calls on the Commission to verify and monitor whether Member States are fully complying with Article 25(6) and Article 42(2)(c) of the EPPO Regulation, which requires the possibility of an appeal to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) against a decision by a national authority on the attribution of competence;

    87. Stresses that the current control by national authorities over the ‘necessary’ resources and equipment of the European Delegated Prosecutors (EDPs) and the need to refer to the national authorities’ provisions for ‘adequate arrangements’ on social security, pensions and insurance coverage could constrain the autonomy and independence of the EPPO’s actions; calls on the Commission to propose adequate solutions in the forthcoming revision of the EPPO Regulation;

    88. Points out that the transposition of the PIF Directive differs between Member States, which, in some cases, affects the cross-border exercise of EPPO competences; calls on the Commission to ensure proper implementation of the PIF Directive and to propose its revision, based on the experience gathered;

    89. Underlines that Article 25(3) of the EPPO Regulation, which elaborates on the exercise of the EPPO’s competence in the event of non-PIF offences inextricably linked to PIF offences, raises legal and practical questions and requires further streamlining in order to make effective use of the EPPO’s legal framework; calls on the Commission to propose suitable solutions in the forthcoming revision of the EPPO Regulation in order to reinforce the EPPO’s ability to investigate cross-border organised crime;

    90. Reiterates[42] that the EPPO has an important role in safeguarding the rule of law and in combating corruption in the Union, and encourages the Commission to closely monitor Member States’ level of cooperation with the EPPO in the rule of law reports; welcomes the accession of Poland and Sweden to the EPPO; notes with approval Ireland’s recent announcement of its intention to participate; calls on the Government of Hungary, the sole remaining Member State that has not yet joined the EPPO, despite the absence of any legal or constitutional impediment, to join the EPPO without further delay; recalls that broad public support for Hungary’s accession has been demonstrated by the collection of 680 000 signatures in favour of joining the EPPO, underscoring a strong societal demand for enhanced legal safeguards against fraud and corruption affecting the Union’s financial interests;

    91. Reiterates its call for the launch of an exchange of views on the possible clarification of the competence of the EPPO within its mandate, as defined in the Treaty, as regards protecting the financial interests of the Union;

    92. Notes that in 2023, cooperation between the relevant actors increased, with the EPPO and Eurojust cooperating on 26 ongoing cases at the end of 2023; observes that also in 2023 the EPPO and Europol cooperated efficiently on various operational matters, and understands that this cooperation almost doubled in 2023, with Europol providing support on 47 cases upon the EPPO’s request; calls on the Commission to request that the EPPO and Eurojust specify the efficiency criteria on the basis of which they conduct their activities;

    93. Welcomes the efforts by OLAF and the EPPO to strengthen their cooperation; understands that information is being exchanged between the two offices in order to avoid parallel investigations into the same matters, and that, in 2023, 22 complementary investigations were opened by OLAF and four supporting investigations were requested by the EPPO; is aware that the synergies resulting from the use of complementary investigations (ex Article 12(f) of the OLAF Regulation) and investigations in support (ex Article 12(e) of the OLAF Regulation) are suboptimal; calls on the Commission to address the legal and operational causes of this when reviewing its regulations;

    94. Is concerned about the lack of analysis and accurate information on the recoveries to the benefit of the Union’s budget that should follow both OLAF and EPPO investigations; is aware that the impact of the AFA on the security of citizens and on the enforcement of the rule of law in the Union goes beyond the quantification of financial recoveries alone; stresses, however, that the results of the efforts made to create the AFA should tend towards measurability and be tangible at least as regards the budgetary aspects; emphasises that the impact of the activities implemented for the protection of the Union’s financial interests should be assessed and taken into consideration in the allocation of resources and definition of mandates;

    95. Understands that the Commission has yet to provide data on the recoveries to the benefit of the Union budget following the EPPO activities reported to the Commission, as provided by Article 103(2) of the EPPO Regulation, and that this matter is included in the mission letter of the Commissioner for budget, anti-fraud and public administration; observes that the freezing of assets is essential to combat crime affecting the EU budget and that a certain amount of time is needed for freezing to be converted into actual confiscations and recoveries; highlights that the amount confiscated is not expected to return by default to the Union’s budget; notes that, in line with Article 38 of the EPPO Regulation, the potential revenue resulting from seizure and confiscation measures taken by EDPs in Member States should flow back into the EU budget and could be accounted for in the EU budget as non-assigned revenue; calls on the Commission to make the necessary arrangements with the relevant national authorities to allow these sums to enter the EU budget;

    96. Points out that data on effective recoveries following OLAF financial recommendations are not published in the OLAF Annual Report or in any other official report from the Commission; regrets that only aggregated data are made available and they refer to 2 299 financial recommendations issued by OLAF between 2012 and 2023 for an overall amount of about EUR 9 billion; remarks that the analysis of the available figures suggests considerable room for improvement; observes that a large gap exists between the amounts recommended for recovery by OLAF, the amount established as recoverable by the Commission’s services and the amount eventually effectively recovered; is concerned by the low recovery rates for undue expenditure (for activities implemented under shared and indirect management modes the rate is 34 % and 11 %, respectively, and for recovery under direct management only 22 %); calls on the Commission to provide data with adequate granularity on recovery and to assess the reasons behind the recovery gap; stresses the need for OLAF and the Commission to agree upon, and apply consistently, common evaluation criteria that ensure greater convergence and clarity, thereby improving the efficiency and effectiveness of financial recovery assessment; emphasises that recovery following an OLAF recommendation and the EPPO’s investigations is an important measurement of the efficiency of the AFA and calls for more transparency in this regard;

    The external layer of the EU’s AFA – key measures at national level in 2023

    97. Understands that the overall level of implementation by the Member States of the Commission’s recommendations issued in the 2022 PIF Report is considered satisfactory; highlights, however, that significant differences between Member States persist; is concerned, in particular, by the cases of inadequate reporting of irregularities by some Member States via the IMS; recalls that reporting is mandatory under the current regulations and encourages OLAF to strengthen its oversight and monitoring actions with a view to achieving uniform reporting across the Union;

    98. Calls on the Commission to monitor the comprehensiveness of the reporting in IMS by countries benefiting from pre-accession assistance and welcomes the initiatives of the Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations to enforce candidate countries’ obligations to report irregularities in the IMS on a regular basis;

    99. Encourages the Member States to report in the IMS the irregularities related to the RRF, in line with the ECA recommendations; calls on the Commission to facilitate such use of the IMS by the Member States by providing support in the form of training, seminars and exchange of best practices;

    100. Welcomes the participation of Sweden and Poland in the EPPO, decided on in 2024, as well as the objective of the new Irish Government to join the EPPO; insists that Member States that are not yet participating must do so without delay and calls on the Commission to incentivise participation in the EPPO through positive measures;

    101. Reiterates that Member States’ ineffective, untimely or lack of cooperation with the EPPO and OLAF constitute grounds for action under the Conditionality Regulation; calls on the Commission to take into due consideration all information from the EPPO and OLAF on situations where Member States fail to comply with their obligations;

    102. Maintains that National Anti-Fraud Strategies (NAFS) are the most effective tool for coordination between the various national, regional and sectoral authorities and the many local entities entrusted with the tasks into which the anti-fraud cycle is organised; notes that, in 2023, 21 out of 27 Member States reported having an anti-fraud strategy; observes that out of 21, only 10 Member States had a full national anti-fraud strategy[43] while 11 Member States had only sectoral rather than national anti-fraud strategies in place; recognises that the approach taken by Member States in their anti-fraud strategies today varies widely; regrets that six Member States do not have any anti-fraud strategy at all; strongly regrets this highly unsatisfactory situation, which compromises the integrity of EU spending and undermines citizens’ trust in EU institutions;

    103. Maintains that Member States would benefit from a periodic evaluation of their anti-fraud frameworks; calls on the Commission to encourage Member States to run independent or peer reviews of their anti-fraud frameworks to enhance consistency and pursue high standards;

    104. Encourages the Commission to propose enforceable initiatives to clarify the relationship and consider establishing a link between the adoption of NAFS by the Member States and the level of financial support they receive;

    105. Asks the Commission to launch, in preparation for the revision of the OLAF Regulation, a monitoring exercise on the state of play of the Anti-Fraud Coordination Services (AFCOS) established in the Member States; encourages the Commission to plan for the update and redesign of their structure, role, responsibilities and mandate; regrets the suboptimal staffing level across the majority of the AFCOS in the Member States; underlines the need to ensure sufficient levels of expertise among staff in national anti-fraud coordinating structures; calls on the Commission to encourage and support Member States in addressing these issues as a matter of priority, including in the context of the European Semester cycle;

    106. Underlines the role played by public authorities in fostering a zero-tolerance culture against fraud and stresses, in particular, the importance of fraud prevention to ensure that fraud, corruption, conflicts of interest and other misuse of funds do not occur in the first place; recalls that the correct transposition of the PIF Directive, adopted on 5 July 2017, is crucial for the protection of the Union budget, for the implementation of all the EU policies for which EU money is used, including in the context of RRF deployment, and for establishing the scope of investigations and prosecutions by the EPPO, whose competence is established by reference to the PIF Directive, as implemented by national law; expects national authorities, including governments, in all Member States unequivocally to condemn fraud, corruption, conflicts of interest and any other misuse of public funds, taking a proactive approach in protecting the financial interests of the Union through effective measures in areas including risk assessment, communication and information sharing, and training of staff; calls on the Commission to intervene in a timely manner through infringement procedures to ensure the consistent transposition of the PIF Directive and the effective liability of – and sanctions for – legal and natural persons;

    107. Reiterates that whistleblowers play a key role in boosting fraud detection, investigation and prosecution; understands that, by the end of 2023, 24 Member States had adopted national legislation to transpose the Whistleblower Directive and declared their transposition complete; regrets, however, that in March 2023, after analysis of the national measures adopted, the Commission was obliged to refer six Member States to the CJEU for their failure to transpose the Directive and failure to notify transposition measures, asking the Court to impose financial sanctions; is concerned by the further infringement proceedings[44] ongoing against six other Member States; calls on the Commission to intensify the monitoring of national transposition measures and report to Parliament accordingly; stresses that Parliament itself must also urgently ensure the proper transposition of the Directive, as confirmed by the CJEU ruling of 11 September 2024, which found that Parliament’s current framework fails to provide balanced and effective protection against retaliation; calls for Parliament to immediately adopt robust rules in line with the Directive to safeguard its own whistleblowers;

    108. Notes that the Investigative Division of the European Investment Bank (EIB IG/IN) had made 10 referrals to the EPPO and 17 to OLAF by the end of 2023; is aware that entities which have been found by EIB IG/IN to engage in prohibited practices may be excluded, in other words declared ineligible, for a stated period, from being awarded any contracts or entering into any relationship with the EIB; observes that, in 2023, these exclusion proceedings resulted in the exclusion of five economic operators for a minimum duration of three years, while five other companies reached settlement agreements applying conditionality to their eligibility;

    External dimension of the protection of the EU’s financial interests

    109. Welcomes the Commission’s reaction to its call to increase the monitoring of, and control over, the funds under the Global Europe, Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument for assistance to non-EU countries, as well as via the joint communication with the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy[45]; appreciates the Commission’s continuous efforts to ensure that anti-corruption measures are mainstreamed into EU external action instruments; reiterates its recommendation to suspend budgetary support and de-commit funds to non-EU countries, including candidate countries, where the authorities clearly fail to take genuine action against widespread corruption, without compromising support for the civil population; emphasises that respect for and commitment to promoting EU values is an essential precondition for all partners aspiring to join the Union; reiterates that accession to the EU is a merit-based process whereby each applicant is assessed on its own merits and its fulfilment of the Copenhagen criteria; considers that when applying the revised enlargement methodology there should be a particular focus on fundamental reforms, and that fair and rigorous conditionality should be applied as well as reversibility where setbacks occur; considers that appropriate tools must be used to ensure that candidate countries show concrete and sustainable compliance with the rule of law, democratic principles and fundamental rights, both before and after joining the Union;

    110. Observes that in the context of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, Ukraine will continue to require substantial support in the current and next MFF and, in the perspective of a fair and sustainable peace agreement, Ukraine will need support for post-war reconstruction, including for central government services and reforms;

    111. Considers that the three pillars of the Ukraine Facility could be reshaped accordingly and that reconstruction should align with pre-accession requirements; emphasises the importance of close coordination and cooperation with the Ukraine coordination mechanism established by the G7; calls for the EU and all Member States to increase their support for Ukraine, while putting appropriate measures in place to protect the financial interests of the EU through the prevention, detection and correction of fraud, corruption, conflicts of interest and irregularities in the use of Union funds, including by performing more thorough checks, in order to ensure that EU funds sent to Ukraine and to its neighbouring countries are adequately monitored and controlled and end up benefiting those most in need;

    112. Stresses that the unprecedented volume of financial support received by Ukraine from the EU in recent years, and deployed in the extremely adverse conditions imposed by the ongoing war, imply the adoption of appropriate measures to ensure that such resources are employed as intended, in particular where they are aimed at benefiting infrastructure and people in need;

    113. Appreciates the work carried out by OLAF and the EPPO in protecting the financial interests of the Union by providing training to increase administrative capacity and autonomy, carrying out investigations in Ukraine and agreeing on the working arrangement with the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine to facilitate cooperation in the investigation of corruption; invites the competent EU offices to continue their cooperation with and support for the Ukrainian authorities;

    114. Acknowledges, in this regard, the progress made by Ukraine in advancing reforms related to judicial independence, accountability, anti-corruption and anti-money laundering, despite the difficult conditions caused by Russia’s ongoing war of aggression; encourages Ukraine to continue on the path of reform, including with regard to the influence of oligarchs in politics;

    115. Welcomes the enhanced sanctions adopted by the EU against Russia so far, encompassing the banning of Russian nationals and entities from participating in public procurement contracts in the EU and restrictions on EU funding for Russian publicly owned or controlled entities; recognises, however, that despite the current measures, individuals and entities subject to the sanctions against Russia can still find ways to circumvent the sanctions and calls, therefore, for the EU and the Member States to maintain, reinforce and extend the scope and effectiveness of the sanctions policy against Russia and Belarus;

    116. Recognises that the Member States and their relevant competent authorities are responsible for the effective implementation and enforcement of EU sanctions, as well as for identifying breaches and imposing appropriate penalties; underlines the role played by customs authorities and the importance of their close cooperation in strengthening the uniform enforcement of sanctions; welcomes, in this regard, the Baltic Customs Initiative;

    117. Underlines that the EU is the biggest provider of external assistance to Palestinian refugees; stresses that the Union budget must continue to provide support to build peace and stability in the Middle East region, combat terrorism, hate, fundamentalism and disinformation, as well as promote human rights, fight impunity and strengthen adherence to the rule of law; emphasises, accordingly, that EU budgets must not support, under any circumstances, activities that go against these objectives; notes that, following the heinous terror attacks of 7 October 2023 by Hamas and allegations of misuse of EU funds for terrorism, a funding review has been conducted by the Commission, which, although concluding that no evidence has been found, to date, that money had been diverted for unintended purposes (including for support for incarcerated terrorists) and reporting that the safeguards in place worked well, still called for certain additional measures that were deemed necessary; recalls that all hostages taken by Hamas have to be released; emphasises the importance of ensuring that EU funds are effectively allocated and managed in order to achieve their intended goals, even via scrutiny by the EPPO, OLAF and the ECA where appropriate; recalls the ongoing issue of the destruction of EU-funded projects in Gaza and the West Bank and calls for greater accountability and safeguards in this context;

    118. Stresses that suspension of budgetary support in non-EU countries, including candidate countries, is an appropriate measure in the event of failure to take genuine action against widespread corruption; expects priority to be given to the fight against corruption in pre-accession negotiations, with capacity building via the establishment of specialised anti-corruption bodies; asks the Commission to ensure, also in cases where funding is suspended, assistance for civil populations, where possible through alternative channels;

    119. Underlines the importance of cooperation with international organisations in combating fraud; regrets the lack of cooperation by some international organisations in providing the ECA with complete, unlimited and timely access to the documents necessary to carry out its tasks; notes that the Commission has stepped up communication with international organisations and calls on it to further intensify efforts to ensure access to all requested documentation;

     

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    120. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.

     

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the ninth report on economic and social cohesion – A10-0066/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on the ninth report on economic and social cohesion

    (2024/2107(INI))

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to Articles 2 and 3 of the Treaty on European Union,

    – having regard to Articles 4, 162, 174 to 178, and 349 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 laying down common provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund Plus, the Cohesion Fund, the Just Transition Fund and the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund and financial rules for those and for the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, the Internal Security Fund and the Instrument for Financial Support for Border Management and Visa Policy[1] (Common Provisions Regulation),

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1058 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 on the European Regional Development Fund and on the Cohesion Fund[2],

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1059 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 on specific provisions for the European territorial cooperation goal (Interreg) supported by the European Regional Development Fund and external financing instruments[3],

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1057 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 establishing the European Social Fund Plus (ESF+) and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1296/2013[4],

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1056 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 establishing the Just Transition Fund[5],

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/2115 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 2 December 2021 establishing rules on support for strategic plans to be drawn up by Member States under the common agricultural policy (CAP Strategic Plans) and financed by the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) and by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1305/2013 and (EU) No 1307/2013[6],

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2020/460 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 March 2020 amending Regulations (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013 and (EU) No 508/2014 as regards specific measures to mobilise investments in the healthcare systems of Member States and in other sectors of their economies in response to the COVID-19 outbreak (Coronavirus Response Investment Initiative)[7],

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2020/558 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2020 amending Regulations (EU) No 1301/2013 and (EU) No 1303/2013 as regards specific measures to provide exceptional flexibility for the use of the European Structural and Investments Funds in response to the COVID-19 outbreak[8],

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2020/461 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 March 2020 amending Council Regulation (EC) No 2012/2002 in order to provide financial assistance to Member States and to countries negotiating their accession to the Union that are seriously affected by a major public health emergency[9],

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2020/2221 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 December 2020 amending Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013 as regards additional resources and implementing arrangements to provide assistance for fostering crisis repair in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic and its social consequences and for preparing a green, digital and resilient recovery of the economy (REACT-EU)[10],

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2022/562 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 April 2022 amending Regulations (EU) No 1303/2013 and (EU) No 223/2014 as regards Cohesion’s Action for Refugees in Europe (CARE)[11],

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2022/2039 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 amending Regulations (EU) No 1303/2013 and (EU) 2021/1060 as regards additional flexibility to address the consequences of the military aggression of the Russian Federation FAST (Flexible Assistance for Territories) – CARE[12],

    – having regard to the URBACT programme for sustainable urban cooperation, established in 2002,

    – having regard to the Urban Agenda for the EU of 30 May 2016,

    – having regard to the Territorial Agenda 2030 of 1 December 2020,

    – having regard to the 9th Cohesion Report, published by the Commission on 27 March 2024[13], and the Commission communication of 27 March 2024 on the 9th Cohesion Report (COM(2024)0149),

    – having regard to the study entitled ‘The future of EU cohesion: Scenarios and their impacts on regional inequalities’, published by the European Parliamentary Research Service in December 2024,

    – having regard to the Commission report of February 2024 entitled ‘Forging a sustainable future together – Cohesion for a competitive and inclusive Europe’[14],

    – having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 31 May 2024 on the 9th Cohesion Report[15],

    – having regard to the opinion of the Committee of the Regions of 21 November 2024 entitled ‘A renewed Cohesion Policy post 2027 that leaves no one behind – CoR responses to the 9th Cohesion Report and the Report of the Group of High-Level Specialists on the Future of Cohesion Policy’,

    – having regard to the report entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness – A competitiveness strategy for Europe’, published by the Commission on 9 September 2024,

    – having regard to the agreement adopted at the 21st Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP21) in Paris on 12 December 2015 (the Paris Agreement),

    – having regard to the study entitled ‘Streamlining EU Cohesion Funds: addressing administrative burdens and redundancy’, published by its Directorate-General for Internal Policies of the Union in November 2024[16],

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2025/XXXX of the European Parliament and of the Council of [INSERT DATE] on the Border Regions’ Instrument for Development and Growth in the EU (BRIDGEforEU) [INSERT FOOTNOTE ONCE PUBLISHED IN OJ],

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 3 May 2022 entitled ‘Putting people first, securing sustainable and inclusive growth, unlocking the potential of the EU’s outermost regions’ (COM(2022)0198),

    – having regard to the opinion in the form of a letter from the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development (XXX),

    – having regard to its resolution of 25 March 2021 on cohesion policy and regional environment strategies in the fight against climate change[17],

    – having regard to its resolution of 20 May 2021 on reversing demographic trends in EU regions using cohesion policy instruments[18],

    – having regard to its resolution of 14 September 2021 entitled ‘Towards a stronger partnership with the EU outermost regions[19],

    – having regard to its resolution of 15 September 2022 on economic, social and territorial cohesion in the EU: the 8th Cohesion Report[20],

    – having regard to its resolution of 20 October 2023 on possibilities to increase the reliability of audits and controls by national authorities in shared management[21],

    – having regard to its resolution of 23 November 2023 on harnessing talent in Europe’s regions[22],

    – having regard to its resolution of 14 March 2024 entitled ‘Cohesion policy 2014-2020 – implementation and outcomes in the Member States[23],

    – having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

    – having regard to the report of the Committee on Regional Development (A10-0066/2025),

    A. whereas cohesion policy is at the heart of EU policies and is the EU’s main tool for investments in sustainable economic, social and territorial development, and contributing to the Green Deal objectives, across the EU under its multiannual financial frameworks for the periods of 2014-2020 and 2021-2027; whereas cohesion policy, as mandated by the Treaties, is fundamental for a well-functioning and thriving internal market by promoting the development of all regions in the EU, and especially the less developed ones;

    B. whereas cohesion policy has fostered economic, social and territorial convergence in the EU, notably by increasing the gross domestic products, for example, of central and eastern EU Member States, which went from 43 % of the EU average in 1995 to around 80 % in 2023; whereas the 9th Cohesion Report highlights that, by the end of 2022, cohesion policy supported over 4.4 million businesses, creating more than 370 000 jobs in these companies; whereas it also underlines that cohesion policy generates a significant return on investment, and that each euro invested in the 2014–2020 and 2021–2027 programmes will have generated 1.3 euros of additional GDP in the Union by 2030; whereas cohesion policy constituted, on average, around 13 % of total public investment in the EU[24];

    C. whereas the Commission report entitled ‘The long-term vision for the EU’s rural areas: key achievements and ways forward’, presented alongside the ninth Cohesion Report, underlines that EUR 24.6 billion, or 8 % of the rural development pillar of the common agricultural policy, is directed towards investments in rural areas beyond farming investments, setting the scene for a debate on the future of rural areas;

    D. whereas between 2021 and 2027, cohesion policy will have invested over EUR 140 billion in the green and digital transitions[25], to help improve networks and infrastructure, support nature conservation, improve green and digital skills and foster job creation and services for the public;

    E. whereas despite the widely acknowledged and proven positive impact of cohesion policy on social, economic and territorial convergence, significant challenges remain, marked notably by development disparities at sub-national level, within regions and in regions caught in a development trap, and by the impact of climate change, in terms of demography, the digital and green transitions, and connectivity, but also in terms of sustainable economic development, in particular in least developed regions and rural and remote areas;

    F. whereas cohesion policy and sectoral programmes of the EU have repeatedly and efficiently helped regions to respond effectively to emergencies and asymmetric shocks such as the COVID-19 crisis, Brexit, the energy crisis and the refugee crisis caused by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, as well as natural disasters, even though it is a long-term, structural policy and not a crisis management instrument or the ‘go-to’ emergency response funding mechanism; whereas such crises have delayed the implementation of the European Structural and Investment Funds and whereas a considerable number of projects financed with Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) funds have been taken for the most part from projects that had been slated for investment under cohesion policy;

    G. whereas despite measures already taken for the 2014-2020 and 2021-2027 periods, the regulatory framework governing the use and administration of cohesion policy instruments and funds should be further simplified and interoperable digital tools better used and developed, including the establishment of one-stop digitalised service centres, with the objective of streamlining procedures, enhancing stakeholder trust, reducing the administrative burden, increasing flexibility in fund management and speeding up payments, not only for the relevant authorities but also for the final beneficiaries; whereas it is necessary to increase the scope for using funds more flexibly, including the possibility of financing the development of dual-use products; whereas it is of utmost importance to formulate any future cohesion policy with a strategic impetus throughout the funding period, which could, however, be reassessed at midterm;

    H. whereas the low absorption rate of the 2021-2027 cohesion policy funds, currently at just 6 %, is not because of a lack of need from Member States or regions, but rather stems from delays in the approval of operational programmes, the transition period between financial frameworks, the prioritisation of NextGenerationEU by national managing authorities, limited administrative capacity and complex bureaucratic procedures; whereas Member States and regions may not rush to absorb all available funds as they anticipate a possible extension under the N+2 or N+3 rules;

    I. whereas radical modifications to the cohesion regulatory framework, from one programming period to the next, contribute to generating insecurity among the authorities responsible and beneficiaries, gold-plating legislation, increasing error rates (and the accompanying negative reputational and financial consequences), delays in implementation and, ultimately, disaffection among beneficiaries and the general population;

    J. whereas there is sometimes competition between cohesion funds, emergency funds and sectoral policies;

    K. whereas demographic changes vary significantly across EU regions, with the populations of some Member States facing a projected decline in the coming years and others projected to grow; whereas demographic changes also take place between regions, including movement away from outermost regions, but are generally observed as movement from rural to urban areas within Member States, wherein women are leaving rural areas in greater numbers than men, but also to metropolitan areas, where villages around big cities encounter difficulties in investing in basic infrastructure; whereas the provision of essential services such as healthcare, education and transportation must be reinforced in all regions, with a particular focus on rural and remote areas; whereas a stronger focus is needed on areas suffering from depopulation and inadequate services, requiring targeted measures to encourage young people to remain through entrepreneurship projects, high-quality agriculture and sustainable tourism;

    L. whereas taking account of the ageing population is crucial in order to ensure justice among the generations and thereby to strengthen participation, especially among young people;

    M. whereas urban areas are burdened by new challenges resulting from the population influx to cities, as well as rising housing and energy prices, requiring the necessary housing development, new environmental protection and energy-saving measures, such as accelerated deep renovation to combat energy poverty and promote energy efficiency; whereas the EU cohesion policy should help to contribute to an affordable and accessible housing market for all people in the EU, especially for low- and middle-income households, urban residents, families with children, women and young people;

    N. whereas effective implementation of the Urban Agenda for the EU can enhance the capacity of cities to contribute to cohesion objectives, thereby improving the quality of life of citizens and guaranteeing a more efficient use of the EU’s financial resources;

    O. whereas particular attention needs to be paid to rural areas, as well as areas affected by industrial transition and EU regions that suffer from severe and permanent natural or demographic handicaps, brain drain, climate-related risks and water scarcity, such as the outermost regions, and in particular islands located at their peripheries or at the periphery of the EU, sparsely populated regions, islands, mountainous areas and cross-border regions, as well as coastal and maritime regions;

    P. whereas Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has created a new geopolitical reality that has had a strong impact on the employment, economic development and opportunities, and general well-being of the population living in regions bordering Ukraine, Belarus and Russia, as well as candidate countries such as Ukraine and Moldova, which therefore require special attention and support, including by accordingly adapting cohesion policy; whereas this war has led to an unprecedented number of people seeking shelter in the EU, placing an additional burden on local communities and services; whereas the collective security of the EU is strongly dependent on the vitality and well-being of regions situated at the EU’s external borders;

    Q. whereas the unique situation of Northern Ireland requires a bespoke approach building on the benefits of PEACE programmes examining how wider cohesion policy can benefit the process of reconciliation;

    R. whereas 79 % of citizens who are aware of EU-funded projects under cohesion policy believe that EU-funded projects have a positive impact on the regions[26], which contributes to a pro-EU attitude;

    S. whereas overall awareness of EU-funded projects under cohesion policy has decreased by 2 percentage points since 2021[27], meaning that greater decentralisation should be pursued to bring cohesion policy even closer to the citizen;

    1. Insists that the regional and local focus, place-based approach and strategic planning of cohesion policy, as well as its decentralised programming and implementation model based on the partnership principle with strengthened implementation of the European code of conduct, the involvement of economic and civil society actors, and multi-level governance, are key and positive elements of the policy, and determine its effectiveness; is firmly convinced that this model of cohesion policy should be continued in all regions and deepened where possible as the EU’s main long-term investment instrument for reducing disparities, ensuring economic, social and territorial cohesion, and stimulating regional and local sustainable growth in line with EU strategies, protecting the environment, and as a key contributor to EU competitiveness and just transition, as well as helping to cope with new challenges ahead;

    2. Calls for a clear demarcation between cohesion policy and other instruments, in order to avoid overlaps and competition between EU instruments, ensure complementarity of the various interventions and increase visibility and readability of EU support; in this context, notes that the RRF funds are committed to economic development and growth, without specifically focusing on economic, social and territorial cohesion between regions; is concerned about the Commission’s plans to apply a performance-based approach to the European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF); acknowledges that performance-based mechanisms can be instrumental in making the policy more efficient and results-orientated, but cautions against a one-size-fits-all imposition of the model and expresses serious doubt about ideas to link the disbursement of ESIF to the fulfilment of centrally defined reform goals, even more so if the reform goals do not fall within the scope of competence of the regional level;

    3. Is opposed to any form of top-down centralisation reform of EU funding programmes, including those under shared management, such as the cohesion policy and the common agricultural policy, and advocates for greater decentralisation of decision-making to the local and regional levels; calls for enhanced involvement of local and regional authorities and economic and civil society actors at every stage of EU shared management programmes, from preparation and programming to implementation, delivery and evaluation, keeping in mind that the economic and social development of, and territorial cohesion between, regions can only be accomplished on the basis of good cooperation between all actors;

    4. Emphasises that the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) plays a key role, alongside cohesion policy funds, in supporting rural areas; stresses that the EAFRD’s design must align with the rules of cohesion policy funds to boost synergies and facilitate multi-funded rural development projects;

    5. Is convinced that cohesion policy can only continue to play its role if it has solid funding; underlines that this implies that future cohesion policy must be provided with robust funding for the post-2027 financial period; stresses that it is necessary to provide funding that is ambitious enough and easily accessible to allow cohesion policy to continue to fulfil its role as the EU’s main investment policy, while retaining the flexibility to meet potential new challenges, including the possibility of financing the development of dual-use products, and to enable local authorities, stakeholders and beneficiaries to effectively foster local development; is of the firm opinion that the capacity to offer flexible responses to unpredictable challenges should not come at the expense of the clear long-term strategic focus and objectives of cohesion policy;

    6. Underlines the importance of the next EU multiannual financial framework (MFF) and the mid-term review of cohesion policy programmes 2021-2027 in shaping the future of cohesion policy; reiterates the need for a more ambitious post-2027 cohesion policy in the next MFF 2028-2034; calls, therefore, for the upcoming MFF to ensure that cohesion policy continues to receive at least the same level of funding as in the current period in real terms; furthermore calls for cohesion policy to remain a separate heading in the new MFF; stresses that cohesion policy should be protected from statistical effects that may alter the eligibility of regions by changing the average EU GDP; reiterates the need for new EU own resources;

    7. Proposes, therefore, that next MFF be more responsive to unforeseen needs, including with sufficient margins and flexibilities from the outset; emphasises in this regard, however, that cohesion policy is not a crisis instrument and that it should not deviate from its main objectives, namely from its long-term investment nature; calls for the European Union Solidarity Fund to be strengthened, including in its pre-financing, making it less bureaucratic and more easily accessible, in order to develop an appropriate instrument capable of responding adequately to the economic, social and territorial consequences of future natural disasters or health emergencies; emphasises the need for Parliament to have adequate control over any emergency funds and instruments;

    8. Recognises the need to also use nomenclature of territorial units for statistics (NUTS) 3 classification for specific cases, in a manner that recognises that inequalities in development exist within all NUTS 2 regions; is of the opinion that regional GDP per capita must remain the main criterion for determining Member States’ allocations under cohesion policy; welcomes the fact that, following Parliament’s persistent calls, the Commission has begun considering additional criteria[28] such as greenhouse gas emissions, population density, education levels and unemployment rates, in order to provide a better socio-economic overview of the regions;

    9. Stresses that the rule of law conditionality is an overarching conditionality, recognising and enforcing respect for the rule of law, also as an enabling condition for cohesion policy funding, to ensure that Union resources are used in a transparent, fair and responsible manner with sound financial management; considers it necessary to reinforce respect for the rule of law and fundamental rights, and to ensure that all actions are consistent with supporting democratic principles, gender equality and human rights, including workers’ rights, the rights of disabled people and children’s rights, in the implementation of cohesion policy; highlights the important role of the European Anti-Fraud Office and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office in protecting the financial interests of the Union;

    10. Calls for further efforts to simplify, make more flexible, strengthen synergies and streamline the rules and administrative procedures governing cohesion policy funds at EU, national and regional level, taking full advantage of the technologies available to increase accessibility and efficiency, building on the existing and well-established shared management framework, in order to strengthen confidence among users, thus encouraging the participation of a broader range of economic and civil society actors in projects supported and maximising the funds’ impact; calls for further initiatives enabling better absorption of cohesion funds, including increased co-financing levels, higher pre-financing and faster investment reimbursements; calls for local administration, in particular representing smaller communities, to be technically trained for better administrative management of the funds; stresses, therefore, the importance of strengthening the single audit principle, further expanding simplified cost options and reducing duplicating controls and audits that overlap with national and regional oversight for the same project and beneficiary, with a view to eliminating the possibility of repeating errors in subsequent years of implementation;

    11. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to give regions greater flexibility already at the programming stage, in order to cater for their particular needs and specificities, emphasising the need to involve the economic and civil society actors; underlines that thematic concentration was a key element in aligning cohesion policy with Europe 2020 objectives; asks the Commission, therefore, to present all findings related to the implementation of thematic concentration and to draw lessons for future legislative proposals;

    12. Acknowledges that the green, digital and demographic transitions present significant challenges but, at the same time, opportunities to achieve the objective of economic, social and territorial cohesion; recognises that, statistically, high-income areas can hide the economic problems within a region; is aware of the risk of a widening of regional disparities, a deepening of social inequalities and a rising ‘geography of discontent’ related to the transition process; underlines the need to reach the EU’s sustainability and climate objectives, and to maintain shared economic growth by strengthening the Union’s competitiveness; calls, therefore, for a European strategy that guarantees harmonious growth within the Union, meeting the respective regions’ specific needs; reaffirms its commitment to pursuing the green and digital transitions, as this will create opportunities to improve the EU’s competitiveness; underlines the need to invest in infrastructure projects that enhance connectivity, particularly in sustainable, intelligent transport, and in energy and digital networks, ensuring that all regions, including remote and less-developed ones, are fully integrated into the single market and benefit equitably from the opportunities it provides; emphasises, in this context, the need to support the development of green industries, fostering local specificities and traditions to increase the resilience of the economic environment and civil society to future challenges;

    13. Urges that the cohesion policy remain consistent with a push towards increasing innovation and completing the EU single market, in line with the conclusions of the Draghi report on European competitiveness; underlines, in the context of regional disparities, the problem of the persisting innovation divide and advocates for a tailored, place-based approach to fostering innovation and economic convergence across regions and reducing the innovation gap; calls for a stronger role for local and regional innovation in building competitive research and innovation ecosystems and promoting territorial cohesion; points to new EU initiatives, such as regional innovation valleys and partnerships for regional innovation, that aim to connect territories with different levels of innovation performance and tackle the innovation gap; considers that this approach will reinforce regional autonomy, allowing local and regional authorities to shape EU policies and objectives in line with their specific needs, characteristics and capacities, while safeguarding the partnership principle;

    14. Is convinced that cohesion policy needs to continue to foster the principle of just transition, addressing the specific needs of regions, while leaving no territory and no one behind; calls for continued financing of the just transition process, with the Just Transition Fund being fully integrated into the Common Provisions Regulation and endowed with reinforced financial means for the post-2027 programming period; emphasises, nonetheless, the need to assess the impact of the Just Transition Fund on the transformation of eligible regions and, while ensuring it remains part of cohesion policy, refine its approach in the new MFF on the basis of the findings and concrete measures to ensure the economic and social well-being of affected communities;

    15. Underlines the need to improve the relationship between cohesion policy and EU economic governance, while avoiding a punitive approach; stresses that the European Semester should comply with cohesion policy objectives under Articles 174 and 175 TFEU; calls for the participation of the regions in the fulfilment of these objectives and for a stronger territorial approach; calls for a process of reflection on the concept of macroeconomic conditionality and for the possibility to be explored of replacing this concept with new forms of conditionality to better reflect the new challenges ahead;

    16. Is concerned about the growing number of regions in a development trap, which are stagnating economically and are suffering from sharp demographic decline and limited access to essential services; calls, therefore, for an upward adjustment in co-financing for projects aimed at strengthening essential services; stresses the role of cohesion policy instruments in supporting different regions and local areas that are coping with demographic evolution affecting people’s effective right to stay, including, among others, challenges related to depopulation, ageing, gender imbalances, brain drain, skills shortages and workforce imbalances across regions; recognises the need for targeted economic incentives and structural interventions to counteract these phenomena; in this context, calls for the implementation of targeted programmes to attract, develop and retain talent, particularly in regions experiencing significant outflows of skilled workers, by fostering education, culture, entrepreneurship and innovation ecosystems that align with local and regional economic needs and opportunities;

    17. Recognises the importance of supporting and financing specific solutions for regions with long-standing and serious economic difficulties or severe permanent natural and demographic handicaps; reiterates the need for maintaining and improving the provision of quality essential services (such as education and healthcare), transport and digital connectivity of these regions, fostering their economic diversification and job creation, and helping them respond to challenges such as rural desertification, population ageing, poverty, depopulation, loneliness and isolation, as well as the lack of opportunities for vulnerable people such as persons with disabilities; underlines the need to prioritise the development and adequate funding of strategic sectors, such as renewable energy, sustainable tourism, digital innovation and infrastructure, in a manner that is tailored to the economic potential and resources of each region, in order to create broader conditions for endogenous growth and balanced development across all regions, especially rural, remote and less-developed areas, border regions, islands and outermost regions; recalls the importance of strong rural-urban linkages and particular support for women in rural areas;

    18. Emphasises the need for a tailored approach for the outermost regions, as defined under Article 349 TFEU, which face unique and cumulative structural challenges due to their remoteness, small market size, vulnerability to climate change and economic dependencies; underlines that these permanent constraints, including the small size of the domestic economy, great distance from the European continent, location near third countries, double insularity for most of them, and limited diversification of the productive sector, result in additional costs and reduced competitiveness, making their adaptation to the green and digital transition particularly complex and costly; underlines their great potential to further develop, inter alia through improved regional connectivity, key sectors such as blue economy, sustainable agriculture, renewable energies, space activities, research or eco-tourism; reiterates its long-standing call on the Commission to duly consider the impact of all newly proposed legislation on the outermost regions, with a view to avoiding disproportionate regulatory burdens and adverse effects on these regions’ economies;

    19. Underlines the fact that towns, cities and metropolitan areas have challenges of their own, such as considerable pockets of poverty, housing problems, traffic congestion and poor air quality, generating challenges for social and economic cohesion created by inharmonious territorial development; emphasises the need for a specific agenda for cities and calls for deepening their links with functional urban areas, encompassing smaller cities and towns, to ensure that economic and social benefits are spread more evenly across the entire territory; highlights the need to strengthen coordination between the initiatives of the Urban Agenda for the EU and the instruments of cohesion policy, favouring an integrated approach that takes into account territorial specificities and emerging challenges; calls, furthermore, for more direct access to EU funding for regional and local authorities, as well as cities and urban authorities, by inter alia widening the use of integrated territorial investments (ITI);

    20. Stresses the need to continue and strengthen investments in affordable housing within the cohesion policy framework, recognising its significance for both regions and cities; highlights the need to foster its changes relevant to investing in housing beyond the two current possibilities (energy efficiency and social housing); emphasises the important role that cohesion policy plays in the roll-out and coordination of these initiatives; believes, furthermore, that it is important to include housing affordability in the URBACT initiative;

    21. Stresses the strategic importance of strong external border regions for the security and resilience of the EU; calls on the Commission to support the Member States and regions affected by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, in particular the regions on the EU’s eastern border, by revising the Guidelines on regional State aid[29], through tailor-made tools and investments under the cohesion policy, as well as supporting them to make the most of the possibilities offered by the cohesion policy funds, including Interreg, in a flexible way, to help cope with the detrimental socio-economic impact of the war on their populations and territories; calls, furthermore, for support to be given to regions bordering candidate countries such as Ukraine and Moldova to strengthen connections and promote their EU integration;

    22. Highlights the added value of territorial cooperation in general and cross-border cooperation in particular; underlines the importance of Interreg for cross-border regions, including outermost regions; emphasises its important role in contributing to their development and overcoming cross-border obstacles, including building trust across borders, developing transport links, identifying and reducing legal and administrative obstacles and increasing the provision and use of cross-border public services, among others; considers Interreg as the main EU instrument for tackling the persistent cross-border obstacles faced by emergency services, and proposes that there be a more prominent focus on these services; underlines the fact that cross-border areas, including areas at the EU’s external borders, bordering aggressor countries often face specific challenges; believes that EU border regions, facing multiple challenges, must be supported and is of the opinion that they must be provided with increased means; welcomes the new regulation on BRIDGEforEU; emphasises the importance of small-scale and cross-border projects and stresses the need for effective implementation on the ground; calls on the Commission to encourage Member States to actively support awareness-raising campaigns in bordering regions to maximise the impact of cross-border cooperation;

    23. Recalls the need to ‘support cohesion’, rather than just rely on the ‘do no harm to cohesion’ principle, which means that no action should hamper the convergence process or contribute to regional disparities; calls for a stronger integration of these principles as cross-cutting in all EU policies, to ensure that they support the objectives of social, economic and territorial cohesion, as set out in Articles 3 and 174 TFEU; calls, furthermore, on the Commission to issue specific guidelines on how to implement and enforce these principles across EU policies, paying particular attention to the impact of EU laws on the competitiveness of less developed regions; reiterates that new legislative proposals need to take due account of local and regional realities; suggests that the Commission draw on innovative tools such as RegHUB (the network of regional hubs) to collect data on the impact of EU policies on the regions; to this end, underlines the need to strengthen the territorial impact assessment of EU legislation, with a simultaneous strengthening of the territorial aspects of other relevant policies; insists that promoting cohesion should also be seen as a way of fostering solidarity and mutual support among Member States and their regions; calls on the Commission and the Member States to continue their efforts regarding communication and visibility of the benefits of cohesion policy, demonstrating to citizens the EU’s tangible impact and serving as a key tool in addressing Euroscepticism; welcomes the launch of the multilingual version of the Kohesio platform;

    24. Notes with concern the severe decline in recent years of adequate levels of national funding by Member States towards their poorer regions; recalls the importance of respecting the EU rule on additionality; calls on the Commission to ensure that national authorities take due account of internal cohesion in drafting and implementing structural and investment fund projects;

    25. Insists that, in addition to adjusting to regional needs, cohesion policy must be adapted to the smallest scale, i.e. funds must be accessible to the smallest projects and project bearers; points out that their initiatives are often the most innovative and have a significant impact on rural development; reiterates that these funds should be accessible to all, regardless of their size or scope; approves of the Cohesion Alliance’s call for ‘a post-2027 Cohesion Policy that leaves no one behind’;

    26. Stresses that delays in the MFF negotiations, together with the fact that Member States have placed a greater focus on the programming of the RRF funds, led to considerable delays in the programming period 2021-2027; stresses the importance of a timely agreement in the next framework, and therefore calls for the Common Provisions Regulation (CPR) and the budget negotiations to be finalised at least one year before the start of the new funding period so that Member States can develop their national and regional funding strategies in good time to ensure a successful transition to the next funding period and the continuation of existing ESIF projects;

    27. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the European Economic and Social Committee, the European Committee of the Regions and the national and regional parliaments of the Member States.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Global: Forgotten futures? Canada urgently needs a national discussion about young people’s futures

    Source: The Conversation – Canada – By J-C Couture, Adjunct faculty and Associate Lecturer, Department of Secondary Education, University of Alberta

    This federal election cycle has seen laudable efforts to raise awareness around neglected issues.

    We’ve heard more about the need for greater co-operation between provincial and territorial governments to respond to chaos triggered by United States President Donald Trump’s policies. In the same time frame, municipal politicans have been calling for climate change action through co-ordinated sustainable infrastructure development.

    For policy experts and pundits alike, a growing consensus is emerging that Canada has for too long ignored deeper economic and political structural problems.

    Some political analysts, (like pundit Andrew Coyne), have framed these issues as being part of Canada’s growth crisis, underscoring problems like a lack of a coherent industrial policy, flat or declining productivity and weak competitiveness.

    Others, including provincial, municipal and First Nations leaders, note Canada also lacks a coherent approach to infrastructure that addresses decades of neglect in cities, towns and Indigenouscommunities alike.

    As researchers committed to advancing more intentional conversations concerning the future of public education, we also see a huge gap in terms of co-ordinated, pan-Canadian federal efforts to support young people’s futures through education.

    Need to knit vision together

    For example, we have a national early learning and child-care strategy, (which could be imperilled, depending on who wins the election). It’s often shorthanded as being about “child care,” which diminishes the long-term significance of paying attention to how we invest in young people and families, and the quality of early education.

    A recent open letter by the chair of the Toronto District School Board called on the leaders of Canada’s federal party leaders to address the growing diversity and complexity of the city’s student population.



    Read more:
    ‘Child care’ or education? Words matter in how we envision living well with children

    We don’t have a federal department for education. While the Council of Ministers of Education Canada (CMEC) serves as a forum to discuss policy issues, as education scholar Jennifer Wallner notes, “effective creativity and co-ordination” is needed.

    In the early 2000s, the Canadian Council on Learning was making ground-breaking contributions towards helping Canada develop comprehensive and coherent approaches to lifelong learning. But the council’s work was hobbled in 2011 when it was defunded by Stephen Harper’s Conservative government.

    Sen. Rosemary Moodie’s introducton of Bill S-282, a “National Strategy for Children and Youth Act,” in November 2023 is one example of a positive effort to develop a pan-Canadian youth development framework.

    There are solid pieces of a puzzle that can contribute to nurturing hopeful young people and a socially healthy and empowered society. But these sorely need to be knit together, as they have in places like like Iceland and Finland
    to name a few.

    Refraining from taking democracy for granted

    The question of what public education actually means is much more than a semantic exercise; it’s a practical and foundational exercise in building a civil society and nation.

    Three decades ago, American cultural and media critic Neil Postman invoked the truism that “public education creates a public” — a reminder that the vibrancy of our communities and democracy can’t be taken for granted. As we look at the U.S. and the rise of neo-liberalism and authoritarian populism, Canadians need to remember Postman.

    Our colleague, David King, former minister of education in Alberta from 1979 to 1986, observes that of all institutions citizens have created, “public school education is the only such institution that remains where we can share common stories, and conventions and imagination.”

    What we should value about public education

    Yet the role of public education in contributing to Canada’s democratic traditions is often taken for granted. A shared sense of what we should value about public education remains elusive — and is played out amid debate about structural and political reforms, around matters like who controls schools.

    Meanwhile, researchers highlight how families continue moving to private schooling. Consider Australians, who see public education as a universal right, yet 35 per cent of students attend private schools..

    In Canada, a network of university researchers and advocacy groups — the Public Education Exchange (PEX) research network —has documented growing privatization and commercialization of public education. Sue Winton, PEX project director and education professor, describes how the privatization of public education in Canada continues to undermine equality and democracy.

    Sue Winton discusses her book ‘Unequal Benefits: Privatization and Public Education in Canada.’

    Across Canada, processes towards privatization involve policies and practices that shift responsibilities from governments to private bodies, with corresponding shifts in lower investment in per-student public school learning.

    Shifts towards privatization go beyond funding private and charter schools. They include underfunding school facilities and movements that promote sloganeering around “parent rights” and “parental choice.”



    Read more:
    ‘School choice’ policies are associated with increased separation of students by social class

    Post-secondary investment declines

    In higher education, privatization has also accelerated. Students, particularly international students, have provided an increasing portion of funding. In Ontario, according to Higher Education Strategy Associates, international students contributed approximately 76 per cent of all tuition fee revenue in the college sector in 2023-24. In the university sector, it’s more than 50 per cent. Other provinces saw similar shifts.

    A decline in per capita public investment has encouraged the growth of the private college and university sector and investments in AI-enabled learning through corporate learning systems. Technology-related fields have developed corporate partnerships that shape what is taught and how.

    The precarity of public higher education in Canada threatens our social and economic future.

    Making futures possible for young people

    Whether it’s through local community schools, a university or college campus or larger community initiatives, we can’t drop the promise of universal access to an inclusive and broad education.

    Keeping this promise is even more pressing given generational inequity. As discusssed by Paul Kershaw, policy professor and founder of “Gen Squeeze” think tank, and Kareem Kudus, research analyst, “generationally unfair policies … have contributed to today’s housing, affordability, medical care and climate crises.”



    Read more:
    Wildfires in Alberta spark urgent school discussions about terrors of global climate futures

    Initiatives established in the 1970s focused on building connections between different regions: Open House Canada was a high-school student exchange program, and Katimavik, a youth service program founded by the visionary author Jacques Hébert, who would later become a senator and champion for intercutural and global travel experiences for our young people.

    Programs like these have presented significant and rich opportunities for building relationships across difference, and an equitable and inclusive sense of social cohesion. But governments at all levels have failed to sustain and expand such programs, or connect them with school learning.

    Broader discussions on what we care about

    The current existential threat to Canada fuelled by Trump’s presidency should mobilize not just an “elbows up” approach, but also “heads up” when it comes to the need for a pan-Canadian a youth policy framework that bolsters public education. As many Americans are also realizing, we need public education to help address current challenges, but it’s under attack.

    As American organizational behaviour expert and writer Margaret J. Wheatley reminds us: “There is nothing more powerful than a community discovering what it cares about.”

    In the aftermath of the federal election, we’d love to see much more dialogue surrounding the “publicness” of public education — to go further in at least deciding on what we really care about as a country.

    The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Forgotten futures? Canada urgently needs a national discussion about young people’s futures – https://theconversation.com/forgotten-futures-canada-urgently-needs-a-national-discussion-about-young-peoples-futures-254883

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Hamas sympathisers – E-001443/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-001443/2025
    to the Council
    Rule 144
    Moritz Körner (Renew)

    • 1.Does the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator have an estimate of how many Hamas sympathisers are currently residing in the EU? If so, how many are there, and if not, why not?
    • 2.Since Hamas’ attack on Israel on 7 October 2023, there have been pro-Palestinian demonstrations in many EU Member States. Does the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator know where the financial support for these demonstrations stems from? If not, why not?

    Submitted: 9.4.2025

    Last updated: 23 April 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Security: FBI’s 2024 Internet Crime Complaint Center Report Released

    Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation FBI Crime News (b)

    EXINGTON, SC—The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) has released its latest annual report. The 2024 Internet Crime Report combines information from 859,532 complaints of suspected Internet crime and details reported losses exceeding $16 billion—a 33% increase in losses from 2023.

    According to the 2024 report, South Carolina ranked 22 out of all states in the number of complaints received by the public. South Carolinians reported $146 million in losses, a $27 million increase from the prior year. As a group, people 60 and older submitted the greatest number of complaints and suffered the most severe financial losses at $58.5 million.

    The top three cyber crimes in South Carolina, by number of complaints, reported by victims in 2024 were: Extortion (1,384), phishing/spoofing (1,259), and personal data breaches (924).

    The top three cyber crimes in South Carolina reported by financial losses were: Business e-mail compromises ($40.8 million), up from $30.6 million in 2023; investment fraud ($38.4 million), down from $42.5 million the previous year; and confidence/romance scams ($15.1 million), up from $11.3 million in 2023.

    “Cyber crime remains a serious and growing threat to South Carolinians, with victims losing millions of dollars annually,” said Reid Davis, Acting Special Agent in Charge of the FBI Columbia field office. “The FBI is fully committed to identifying and bringing cybercriminals to justice and empowering the public with the critical tools and awareness. One effort is our outreach to South Carolina seniors where we engage with groups about current online threats and provide them with security measures they can take to stay ahead of the evolving cyber landscape.”

    To promote public awareness, the IC3 produces an annual report to aggregate and highlight the data provided by the public. The quality of the data is a direct reflection of the information the public provides through the IC3 website. The IC3 standardizes the data by categorizing each complaint and analyzes the data to identify and forecast trends in Internet crime. The annual report helps the FBI develop effective relationships with industry partners and share information for investigative and intelligence purposes for law enforcement and public awareness.

    The IC3, which was established in May 2000, houses nine million complaints from the public in its database and continues to encourage anyone who thinks they’ve been the victim of a cyber-enabled crime, regardless of dollar loss, to file a complaint through the IC3 website. The more comprehensive complaints the FBI receives, the more effective it will be in helping law enforcement gain a more accurate picture of the extent and nature of Internet-facilitated crimes.

    The FBI recommends that everyone frequently review consumer and industry alerts published by the IC3. If you or your business are a victim of an Internet crime, immediately notify all financial institutions involved in the relevant transactions, submit a complaint to www.ic3.gov, contact your nearest FBI field office, and contact local law enforcement.

    Learn more about the history of IC3 by listening to this previously released podcast: FBI podcast episode “Inside the FBI: IC3 Turns 20.”

    The full 2024 Internet Crime Report can be found here

    MIL Security OSI –

  • MIL-OSI USA: 04.23.2025 Texas Chosen for Groundbreaking Aviation Center After Cruz Push

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Texas Ted Cruz
    DALLAS, TX – U.S. Senate Commerce Committee Chairman Ted Cruz (R-Texas) today applauded Secretary of Transportation Sean Duffy’s announcement that the Texas A&M System will lead a new Center for Advanced Aviation Technologies (CAAT) with laboratory and testing locations in the Dallas-Fort Worth Metroplex and across the Lone Star State.
    Sen. Cruz authored and championed a provision in the bipartisan FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024 authorizing the creation of a new federal research and testing center for emerging aviation technologies like drones, air taxis, and supersonic and hypersonic aircraft. With its thriving aviation sector, strong business environment, and robust state university system, Texas was the logical home for such a center. Under the Texas A&M System’s leadership, a consortium of Texas universities, private organizations, and the FAA will advance the research, development, and integration of innovative aviation technologies.
    Upon the announcement, Sen. Cruz said, “When I authored the bipartisan FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024, I wrote the language creating the Center for Advanced Aviation Technologies with the express intention of bringing that Center to the Dallas-Fort Worth area because of the groundbreaking innovation occurring there. I’m confident this new research and testing center will help the private sector create thousands of high-paying jobs and grow the Texas economy through billions in new investments. I am thankful to Secretary Duffy for recognizing the value of placing the new center in Texas, and I’m grateful to see the Texas A&M System leading this initiative and cultivating the next generation of aviation leaders. This is a significant win for Texas that will impact communities across our state, and I will continue to pursue policies that create new jobs and ensure the Lone Star State continues to lead the way in innovation and the manufacturing of emerging aviation technologies.”
    Secretary Duffy said, “Texas is the perfect place for our new Center for Advanced Aviation Technologies. Under Senator Cruz’s leadership, the state has already established itself as a leader in commercial drone safety testing. From drones delivering your packages to powered lift technologies like air taxis, we are at the cusp of an aviation revolution. The CAAT will ensure we make that dream a reality and unleash American innovation safely.” 
    Texas A&M University System Chancellor John Sharp said, “We’re thrilled the Department of Transportation has selected The Texas A&M University System to lead the Center for Advanced Aviation Technologies in Fort Worth. The Texas A&M System will support DOT and the Federal Aviation Administration to facilitate the integration of advanced air mobility and drive innovation of cutting-edge aviation technologies. And we will do it by harnessing the power and expertise of A&M System members — such as Texas A&M-Corpus Christi’s Autonomy Research Institute, the Texas A&M Engineering Experiment Station and George H.W. Bush Combat Development Complex — and leveraging partnerships throughout the country. We thank Chairman Cruz for his vision in establishing this Center.”
    BACKGROUND
    The CAAT Laboratory will be located at Texas A&M Fort Worth and led by Texas A&M Corpus Christi utilizing their Autonomy Research Institute (ARI), which was designated by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) as an unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) test site.
     As an FAA-designated UAS test site, ARI is allowed to test UAS technologies, better known as drones, in a controlled environment, including those not permitted for general use. ARI also benefits from expedited access to Certificates of Waiver or Authorization (COAs) for experimental and developmental purposes. These COAs, along with proposed Demonstration Zones at the University of North Texas (UNT), will increase available airspace for testing the integration of new technologies, particularly autonomous aircraft, into the nation’s airspace.
     The program will bring together all 19 members and institutions of the Texas A&M System, as well as University of North Texas (UNT), Southern Methodist University (SMU), University of Texas at Dallas (UTD), University of Texas Arlington (UTA), Virginia Tech’s Mid-Atlantic Aviation Partnership (MAAP), Louisiana State University (LSU), and a consortium of private organizations and government entities.
    Last year, Sen. Cruz hosted a roundtable discussion featuring leaders from the ARI at Texas A&M University-Corpus Christi and various representatives from across the aviation industry to advocate for Texas to be chosen as the center’s location.  
    To learn more about the project from the Department of Transportation’s announcement, click HERE.

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Cortez Masto Demands Trump Administration Undo Funding Termination for National Endowment for the Humanities

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Nevada Cortez Masto

    Reno, Nev. – U.S. Senator Cortez Masto joined her colleagues in sending a letter demanding the Trump administration undo its termination of congressionally-appropriated funding for grants administered by the National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH). The cuts include funding for Nevada Humanities, which supports museums, cultural centers, and libraries across the state.

    “Overnight, on April 2, 2025, the NEH terminated all current five-year General Operating Support grants awarded to state and jurisdictional humanities councils. […] The administration is also targeting NEH with the aim of terminating more than 1,400 other grant awards, substantially reducing its staff, and eliminating many of the agency’s previously announced grant programs,” the lawmakers began. “Such reckless actions will have a devastating impact on museums, historic sites, universities, educators, libraries, public television and radio stations, research institutions, and local humanities programming throughout our nation.” 

    “NEH funds, allocated to state humanities councils, are for local use and allow councils to leverage $2 in private investment for every federal dollar spent. The loss of NEH funding to humanities councils will decimate the ability of these nonprofits to serve localities in their states, eliminating programs that are essential to each state’s cultural infrastructure,” the lawmakers wrote. “This will lead to significant job loss in communities that are the most vulnerable to the lack of federal support.”

    “Libraries, museums, historic sites, and community centers in rural communities and small towns face particularly dire financial futures without grant funding from state humanities councils and the NEH. Additionally, small and midsize organizations benefit from the guidance and expertise of the agency,” the lawmakers continued. “These organizations are the backbone of our communities’ unique cultures, reinforcing civic participation, community engagement, historic preservation, tourism infrastructure, and economic development.”

    The NEH funding provides the majority of operating support for state humanities councils. The Trump administration is also threatening to terminate more than 1,400 other grant awards at the NEH, substantially reducing its staff, and eliminating many of the agency’s previously announced grant programs. 

    The full text of the letter can be found here.

    Senator Cortez Masto has pushed multiple Departments under the Trump Administration for detailed, public information regarding the impacts of President Trump’s federal funding freeze, hiring freeze, and terminations on Nevada – including to the Department of the Interior, the U.S. Forest Service, the National Nuclear Security Administration, the Department of Veterans Affairs, Department of Agriculture, General Services Administration, and Department of Health and Human Services.

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Senator Hassan Helps Introduce Bipartisan Resolution to Protect Independence of USPS

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for New Hampshire Maggie Hassan

    WASHINGTON – U.S. Senators Maggie Hassan (D-NH), Dan Sullivan (R-AK), and Gary Peters (D-MI) introduced a bipartisan resolution to protect the independence and services of the United States Postal Service, emphasizing the essential role the Postal Service has played in connecting and serving Americans, especially in rural communities.

    “Privatizing the United States Postal Service would completely destroy the reliable and timely delivery that Granite Staters count on for medication and other essential goods,” said Senator Hassan. “The Postal Service serves all Americans, no matter where they live. Privatization would completely abandon that, potentially slowing down or even eliminating mail service to the rural communities that need it most. This bipartisan resolution is a clear statement of the bipartisan opposition against any attempts to privatize the Postal Service.” 

    The resolution notes that the Postal Service delivers mail to more than 168 million residential and business addresses six days a week and is one of the most trusted government agencies. The Postal Service is a self-sustaining entity that is not funded by taxpayer dollars and relies on revenues derived from its products and services. The resolution also highlights the Postal Service’s critical role in the $1.9 trillion mailing industry, which employs 7.9 million Americans. The Postal Service provides affordable and universal service to rural, suburban, and urban communities alike, and employs more than 73,000 military veterans. Finally, the resolution underscores that Congress should ensure the Postal Service remains an independent establishment and not subject to privatization. 

    The full text of the resolution can be found here.

    This resolution is part of Senator Hassan’s ongoing efforts to protect and strengthen the USPS. In 2022, Senator Hassan and colleagues’ bipartisan legislation to strengthen the USPS and improve the agency’s long-term financial stability was signed into law. 

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI Security: Hawaii Man Convicted of Sex Trafficking Three Adult Women and One Minor

    Source: United States Attorneys General 12

    Isaiah McCoy, 38, of Honolulu, Hawaii, was convicted yesterday of multiple counts of sex trafficking by a federal jury in the District of Hawaii. Specifically, the jury convicted McCoy of four counts of sex trafficking three adults and one minor, two counts of obstructing a sex trafficking investigation, seven counts of interstate and foreign travel or transportation in aid of racketeering enterprises, and one count of interstate travel for prostitution purposes.

    “This successful conviction represents this Justice Department’s commitment to putting those who prey on the innocent behind bars,” said Attorney General Pamela Bondi. “Human trafficking — which flourished under the prior administration — is a scourge on our country that the Trump Administration will eradicate.”

    “Today’s conviction vindicates the rights of multiple women and girls who the defendant terrorized over several years within the District of Hawaii,” said Assistant Attorney General Harmeet K. Dhillon of the Justice Department’s Civil Rights Division. “The defendant specifically targeted each victim’s unique vulnerabilities and used false promises, brute physical force, and psychological manipulation to compel the victims to engage in commercial sex for his own profit. There is no place in a civilized society for the defendant’s atrocious conduct, and the Justice Department is committed to standing up for vulnerable human trafficking victims and holding their traffickers accountable.”

    “The conviction of Mr. McCoy is a testament to HSI’s zero tolerance for those who engage in sex trafficking in Hawaii,” said Special Agent in Charge Lucy Cabral-DeArmas of Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) Hawaii. “McCoy is a predator who left countless victims in his path while he sought to enrich himself at their expense. HSI will aggressively pursue those, like McCoy, who seek to exploit vulnerable women and girls and mute their voices while believing they will not be held accountable.”

    The evidence presented at the 12-day trial demonstrated that McCoy compelled victims to commit hundreds of commercial sex acts between 2019 and 2021. McCoy made promises of a romantic relationship, a luxurious lifestyle, and financial security to women and girls struggling with low self-esteem, a difficult upbringing, or financial trouble. McCoy’s promises ended up hollow and false, designed to provide him with the opportunity to learn about a victim’s vulnerabilities while misrepresenting himself as caring and empathetic. McCoy’s feigned romantic interest and claimed wealth led him to emotionally manipulate his victims.

    After luring the victims into his orbit with his false promises, McCoy turned violent and abusive if the victims did not provide him with enough money or otherwise violated one of his many rules. The evidence presented at trial demonstrated that some of McCoy’s rules included requiring the victims to call him “Daddy” or “Zeus,” requiring the victims to share their cell phone location, and requiring the victims to provide him an update on the amount of money earned through commercial sex work. McCoy required his victims to work all hours of the day and night even when they were sick, hungry, or did not want to engage in commercial sex acts. If not, McCoy would physically assault his victims and leave them battered and bruised.

    Evidence presented in court detailed the extensive violence to which McCoy subjected his victims. For example, McCoy repeatedly burned one of the victims with cigar butts when she did not provide him with enough money. On other occasions, McCoy threw victims to the ground before repeatedly stomping on their head, stomach, or hands with his feet. McCoy even smashed a victim’s head against a car door before carrying her unconscious body through a hotel lobby and into an elevator. McCoy inflicted violence against multiple victims that caused them to seek treatment at local hospitals. All of McCoy’s actions contributed to the creation of a climate of fear where the victims felt they had no way out because McCoy promised them that he had eyes and ears everywhere monitoring the victims’ every move.

    McCoy required the victims to turn over all the proceeds from his commercial sex business to himself because he felt that the money belonged to him. McCoy then spent the money on high-end designer shoes, belts, clothing, and other accessories. In contrast, although McCoy would intermittently buy designer items for the victims as “rewards,” the victims were ultimately left with nothing.

    A sentencing hearing is scheduled for Aug. 18. McCoy faces a minimum penalty of 15 years in prison and a maximum penalty of life in prison as well as mandatory restitution. A federal district court judge will determine any sentence after considering the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors.

    HSI investigated the case, with assistance from the Honolulu Police Department.

    Trial Attorneys Maryam Zhuravitsky and Elizabeth Hutson of the Civil Rights Division’s Human Trafficking Prosecution Unit are prosecuting the case.

    Anyone who has information about human trafficking should report that information to the National Human Trafficking Hotline toll-free at 1-888-373-7888, which is available 24 hours a day, seven days a week. For more information about human trafficking, please visit www.humantraffickinghotline.org. Information on the Justice Department’s efforts to combat human trafficking can be found at www.justice.gov/humantrafficking.

    MIL Security OSI –