Category: Education

  • MIL-OSI: Practice AI Accelerates Strategic Outreach and Legal Tech Partnerships Following a Dynamic PILMMA 2025 Super Summit

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    DENVER, May 13, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Practice AI, in collaboration with its esteemed partner Legal Soft, is proud to announce a series of new initiatives and partnerships for May 2025. Fresh off the success of the PILMMA 2025 Super Summit, which took place from April 29 to May 2 at the Hilton Denver City Center. Practice AI is set to expand its outreach efforts, further integrating artificial intelligence (AI) in the legal domain in ways that are both innovative and ethically grounded.

    A New Era Unfolds: Recapping the PILMMA 2025 Super Summit

    The PILMMA Super Summit has long been recognized as the premier legal marketing and management conference designed for “serious lawyers” who are determined to create the practices they truly want rather than settling for the status quo. This year’s edition, held in Denver, Colorado, attracted top legal professionals, legal tech innovators, and forward-thinking industry leaders from across the country. The summit offered an immersive three-day experience focused on elite networking, mastermind sessions, and breakthrough strategies to redefine legal practices.

    Key Highlights from the Summit Include:

    • Elite Networking: Attendees had the opportunity to connect with some of the most successful lawyers, legal marketers, and firm owners in the country. The event’s robust networking sessions provided fertile ground for forging relationships that promise to drive future collaborations and strategic partnerships.
    • Masterminding for Growth: With a dedicated focus on the “Mastermind Effect,” the summit featured interactive sessions led by seasoned professionals who shared insights on how to scale a law firm exponentially by systematically breaking through common operational barriers.
    • Expert-Led Workshops: The agenda was packed with sessions on optimizing legal practice management, leveraging AI to boost marketing performance, and deploying cutting-edge legal tech to increase efficiency. These discussions helped attendees pinpoint exactly where their practices stood and how incremental improvements could lead to significant breakthroughs.
    • Strategic Focus on AI: A recurring theme at the summit was the transformative potential of AI in law. Participants explored topics such as enhancing legal research accuracy, automating routine tasks, and integrating AI-driven analytics to better serve clients.

    For more details on the PILMMA 2025 Super Summit agenda and its mission to empower legal professionals, visit the official summit page at pilmma.org/summit pilmma.org.

    The Ideal Backdrop for Innovation and Collaboration

    Held at the Hilton Denver City Center, located at 1701 California Street, Denver, CO 80202, the summit provided an inspiring setting for the convergence of industry leaders and forward-thinking professionals. The city’s vibrant atmosphere and modern facilities contributed significantly to the event’s success, offering attendees both a conducive environment for learning and ample opportunities for networking.

    During the summit, participants experienced a dynamic mix of keynote sessions, hands-on workshops, and interactive networking events, all aimed at fostering a collaborative spirit among legal professionals. This environment reinforced the idea that strategic partnerships, like the one between Practice AI and Legal Soft, are key to unlocking new possibilities in legal tech innovation.

    Forging the Future: Initiatives and Partnership Highlights

    In the coming months, Practice AI is set to launch several initiatives that build on the momentum generated by the PILMMA 2025 Super Summit. These initiatives are designed to foster continuous innovation and deeper collaboration across the legal tech community:

    • Educational Workshops and Seminars: Practice AI and Legal Soft will jointly host a series of workshops aimed at demystifying AI for legal professionals. These sessions will provide practical guidance on integrating AI into everyday legal practice, focusing on both technological and ethical considerations.
    • Collaborative Research and Development Projects: By leveraging the combined expertise of both partners, new R&D projects will explore innovative AI applications: From predictive analytics in litigation to advanced legal document automation. These projects will serve as testbeds for pioneering solutions that can be scaled across the industry.
    • Industry Roundtables and Peer-to-Peer Learning: Recognizing the value of shared experiences, the partners plan to organize roundtable discussions with thought leaders from both the legal and tech sectors. These sessions will address the challenges of AI adoption and offer strategies for sustainable growth in legal practice.
    • Customized AI Solutions for Law Firms: Practice AI is working on tailoring its AI tools to meet the unique needs of individual law firms. By offering customizable solutions, the company aims to ensure that every legal practice, regardless of size or specialty, can benefit from the advantages of AI.

    A Call for Collaborative Transformation

    At the core of Practice AI’s mission is a clear vision: technology, when implemented with responsibility and foresight, can transform legal practice for the better. Hamid Kohan’s words at the summit resonate with this vision. “Practice AI is now intensifying its outreach efforts to forge strategic partnerships with leading legal professionals, ensuring that AI is implemented responsibly and efficiently,” he reiterated. This commitment to ethical AI adoption serves as the guiding principle for all future initiatives.

    Kohan’s second remark further underscores the company’s commitment to education and collaboration. “We are committed to raising awareness on using AI the smart way. By collaborating with legal tech leaders and seasoned legal professionals, we are paving the way for a future where technology and law work in harmony to deliver better outcomes for all stakeholders.” These statements not only reflect the current momentum at Practice AI but also set the tone for a future where continuous dialogue and shared innovation drive industry progress.

    Industry Impact and Looking Ahead

    The transformative impact of AI in the legal field is already evident. From automating mundane tasks to providing deep insights through data analytics, AI is reshaping the way legal services are delivered. Practice AI’s initiatives for May 2025 are designed to help legal professionals adapt to these changes and harness the full potential of AI. With strategic outreach and robust partnerships, the company is leading the charge toward a smarter, more efficient legal industry.

    Key anticipated impacts include:

    • A Shift in Legal Practice Paradigms: As more law firms begin to adopt AI-driven tools, the traditional models of legal practice are evolving. This shift is expected to lead to more agile, client-focused, and cost-effective legal services.
    • Enhanced Professional Development: By providing targeted educational programs, Practice AI is helping legal professionals develop the skills needed to thrive in an increasingly digital and data-driven environment.
    • A Robust Ecosystem of Innovation: The collaborative efforts between Practice AI and its strategic partners such as Legal Soft are set to foster a thriving ecosystem of innovation, where new ideas and solutions are continuously tested and refined.
    • Greater Transparency and Ethical Standards: Emphasizing responsible AI use ensures that ethical considerations remain at the forefront, building trust among clients and reinforcing the integrity of legal practices.

    A Bold Step Forward for Legal Technology

    The PILMMA 2025 Super Summit has laid the foundation for an exciting new chapter in legal technology. As Practice AI and Legal Soft build on the success of the event, the focus now turns to a future defined by strategic partnerships, innovative AI solutions, and a commitment to ethical, client-centric practices. The initiatives launched this May are not just steps toward technological advancement; they are a comprehensive strategy to empower legal professionals, drive efficiency, and transform legal services.

    Practice AI’s renewed outreach and collaboration efforts reaffirm its position as a leader in legal tech innovation. By bridging the gap between cutting-edge AI and traditional legal practices, the company is not only redefining the future of law but also ensuring that every legal professional has the tools and support needed to excel in a rapidly evolving landscape.

    As Practice AI embarks on this bold new phase, the focus remains on collaboration, continuous learning, and ethical technology adoption. The successful PILMMA 2025 Super Summit has not only provided valuable insights into the future of legal practice but also set the stage for transformative partnerships that will drive innovation for years to come. By forging strong alliances and engaging directly with the legal community, Practice AI is ensuring that the integration of AI in law is both progressive and responsible, ushering in an era of enhanced efficiency, improved client service, and sustained industry growth.

    For more information on the PILMMA 2025 Super Summit and to view the detailed agenda and event highlights, please visit PILMMA Summit pilmma.org.

    For media inquiries, please contact:
    Practice AI
    Address: 21731 Ventura Blvd. #175, Woodland Hills, CA 91364
    Phone: (424) 476-5858
    Email: sales@lawpractice.ai

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    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Dmitry Chernyshenko: The main stage of the Unified State Exam will begin on May 23 in all 89 regions of Russia and 55 foreign countries

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: Government of the Russian Federation – An important disclaimer is at the bottom of this article.

    A meeting was held under the chairmanship of Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Chernyshenko on the issue of readiness to conduct the state final certification (SFC) for basic general and secondary general education programs in 2025.

    Its participants discussed the readiness of the subjects of the Russian Federation, including border territories and reunited regions, to conduct the Unified State Exam, Basic State Exam, and State Final Exam.

    Dmitry Chernyshenko noted that, on the instructions of President Vladimir Putin, changes were made to the federal basic general education programs. They will come into force on September 1, 2025. The main and unified state exams are synchronized with the programs.

    “Based on many years of accumulated experience, we see that competent organization of the exam at the local level is an important condition for good results. Over the past two years, according to the results of monitoring, Novosibirsk, Belgorod, Tambov and Leningrad regions, the Altai Republic, the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug, the Republic of Tatarstan, the federal cities of Sevastopol and Moscow have demonstrated a stable exemplary level of conducting the examination campaign. The heads of the regions must take personal control of key issues related to the conduct of the state final certification,” the Deputy Prime Minister said.

    At the request of the Belgorod Region, in connection with the current situation, two additional days for exams were added to the Unified State Exam schedule: in mathematics – May 26, in Russian language – May 29. Graduates from the DPR, LPR, Kherson and Zaporizhia regions, individual schools in border regions, as well as children who moved from these regions, can take the final assessment in the form of an interim assessment.

    “We believe that the early period of the Unified State Exam was held in the normal mode. On May 23, the main stage of the Unified State Exam will begin in all 89 regions of Russia and 55 foreign countries. Traditionally, the exam procedure itself requires special control. For this purpose, over 300 thousand specialized specialists, more than 6 thousand medical workers and about 40 thousand public observers will be involved in the examination centers. Since 2024, on the instructions of President Vladimir Putin, graduates have the right to retake the Unified State Exam in one subject. This year, such retakes will take place on July 3 and 4,” said Dmitry Chernyshenko.

    All results of the State Final Attestation are necessarily entered into the federal information system.

    In conclusion, the Deputy Prime Minister paid special attention to the need to establish prompt interdepartmental cooperation with education authorities, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Energy, the Russian National Guard and the media for the smooth conduct of examination and admissions campaigns.

    “Our system is generally ready to conduct both the Unified State Exam and the Main State Exam. The main period of the OGE starts on May 21, and the main period of the USE starts on May 23. It is important that the order of the President of Russia on synchronizing programs and exam assignments has been fulfilled, they do not go beyond the educational program, and calendar-thematic planning has been included in the programs,” said Minister of Education Sergey Kravtsov.

    The head of the Ministry of Education noted that in 2025, an experiment to expand the availability of secondary vocational education will be conducted in Moscow, St. Petersburg and the Lipetsk region. By the end of May, the ministry will develop regulations for taking into account the results of control procedures (USE, OGE, VPR, diagnostic work) in the educational process. In June, the document will be sent to the subjects.

    The Minister of Education added that the share of those choosing the Unified State Exam in mathematical and natural science subjects will be 35% by 2030, with the planned figure for 2025 being 32%.

    Head of Rosobrnadzor Anzor Muzaev said that this year over 712 thousand people have registered to participate in the Unified State Exam, of which over 637 thousand are this year’s graduates. He focused the special attention of regional executive authorities on monitoring the technical readiness of all examination points, the readiness of the organizers, as well as ensuring the safety of all exam participants and those involved in their conduct.

    The head of Rosobrnadzor separately focused on this year’s changes. “This year, work was carried out to synchronize control measurement materials with federal state educational standards and federal educational programs. This is the President’s order, and it has been fulfilled,” said Anzor Muzaev.

    Rosobrnadzor also took into account a number of comments from members of the public and the deputy corps regarding the procedure for conducting the Unified State Exam. “We held a broad discussion and implemented these proposals in 2025. Rosobrnadzor’s methodological recommendations include detailed instructions for persons involved in admitting exam participants to exam points, as well as instructions for setting up stationary and portable metal detectors. We proposed actively involving parents of students, including representatives of parent committees, to monitor compliance with the rights of graduates during their admission and presence at exam points,” said Anzor Muzaev.

    Another innovation of the 2025 examination campaign is the ability to promptly report information about any violations in the Unified State Exam directly to Rosobrnadzor via the feedback platform on the public services portal. Each examination point has posters with a QR code, which can be used to send this information directly to a Rosobrnadzor employee so that any problems that arise are resolved as quickly as possible.

    Representatives of the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Emergency Situations, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Russian National Guard and all regions of Russia also took part in the meeting. Representatives of border regions separately reported on their readiness to conduct the state final certification: Deputy Governor of the Belgorod Region – Minister of Education of the Belgorod Region Andrey Milekhin, Acting Deputy Chairman of the Government of the Kursk Region Oksana Krutko, Acting Deputy Governor of the Bryansk Region Denis Amelichev.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-Evening Report: Using a blue inhaler alone is not enough to manage your asthma

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Stephen Hughes, Lecturer in Pharmacy Practice, University of Sydney

    New Africa/Shutterstock

    Inhalers have been key to asthma management since the 1950s. The most common, salbutamol, comes in a familiar blue-coloured inhaler (or “puffer”).

    This kind of “rescue inhaler” brings quick relief from asthma symptoms. You may know these inhalers by their brand names such as Ventolin, Asmol or Zempreon.

    But there is growing evidence that using this kind of inhaler without treating the underlying condition may not only be ineffective – it could actually increase the risk of an asthma attack.

    Next month, the National Asthma Council is releasing updated guidelines that reflect this shift. Here’s what’s changing and what you need to know.

    What is a bronchodilator?

    Bronchodilators such as salbutamol act by relaxing smooth muscle in the airways. While they don’t address inflammation, which is the key cause of asthma, bronchodilators are effective at quickly opening up constricted airways.

    This means for people experiencing typical asthma symptoms – such as tightness of the chest and shortness of breath – a puff of salbutamol brings relief within ten minutes. The effect can last up to six hours.

    Salbutamol relaxes the airway muscles that tighten due to asthma.
    BlueRingMedia/Shutterstock

    Salbutamol is used by people with asthma and other respiratory conditions, such as chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (which includes chronic bronchitis and/or emphysema). As part of a management plan made with a doctor, salbutamol is used to relieve shortness of breath when it occurs.

    In Australia, more than 60% of salbutamol is purchased over the counter (without a prescription) in pharmacies. Many of these purchases may be for people with infrequent asthma symptoms, meaning less than twice a month.

    However, we now know there are safer and more effective ways for people with infrequent asthma to manage it in the long term.

    So, what’s wrong with using salbutamol?

    Treating symptoms is only one part of asthma management. Salbutamol doesn’t address the root cause – why the airways of people who get asthma become constricted in the first place.

    It’s a bit like taking pain relief for a swollen elbow without treating the tendonitis causing the pain.

    In asthma, chronic inflammation is usually a result of genes and environment interacting.

    Some people have airways that overreact to triggers in the environment. These triggers include pollens, moulds and dust mites, or air that is cold or humid.

    Over the long term, chronic inflammation can lead to changes in the airways. The airway walls become thicker and produce more mucus, allowing less space for air to flow through them.

    Using short-acting treatments such as salbutamol without addressing chronic inflammation in the airways poses risks.

    Salbutamol can become less effective with regular use. This means people with shortness of breath don’t gain the relief they expect and need, and paradoxically, their airways may become more “twitchy” (sensitive to environmental triggers) and inflamed. One response to this is people use more salbutamol and the problem is compounded.

    Strong data links increased use of short-term inhalers such as salbutamol to higher risk of asthma flare-ups, hospital admissions and even death.

    Purchasing three or more salbutamol inhalers per year is considered overuse.

    According to asthma guidelines in Australia and globally, needing salbutamol for symptom relief on more than two days a week is an indicator of poorly controlled asthma, requiring review and possibly anti-inflammatory treatment.

    Using your blue inhaler more than two days a week may indicate poorly controlled asthma.
    Kotcha K/Shutterstock

    What do the new guidelines recommend?

    In 2019, the Global Initiative for Asthma, an independent not-for-profit organisation, radically changed its recommendations for salbutamol use. This is based on its committee of asthma experts reviewing the evidence.

    Australian asthma guidelines from the National Asthma Council are set to follow suit.

    The council’s 2025 Australian Asthma Handbook now states that salbutamol alone is inadequate treatment for asthma in adults or adolescents.

    Previously, the guidelines recommended people with infrequent symptoms to use salbutamol when needed and “alone” – that is, without an anti-inflammatory preventer.

    The new recommendations specifically warn against anyone with asthma using a short-acting bronchodilator such as salbutamol by itself, due to the increased health risks mentioned above.

    People with asthma who use salbutamol, for example, should also use an anti-inflammatory treatment that provides preventive cover, such as an inhaled corticosteroid.

    The 2025 Australian Asthma Handbook now recommends anti-inflammatory relievers from day one when it comes to asthma treatment in adults and adolescents.

    These inhalers contain, in a single dose (one puff), both a bronchodilator (to relieve symptoms) and a low-dose anti-inflammatory corticosteroid (to treat underlying inflammation).

    They are recommended instead of salbutamol-only inhalers for symptom relief, even for those whose symptoms are infrequent.

    When used in place of salbutamol-only inhalers, anti-inflammatory relievers have demonstrated improvements in quality of life for people with asthma, as well as lower risks of hospitalisations and death.

    In the case of children with asthma, global guidelines emphasise the use of anti-inflammatory inhalers and discourage over-reliance on bronchodilators.

    Will I need to change my inhaler?

    Currently, combination anti-inflammatory relievers are only available with a prescription from a doctor. These prescriptions with repeats can allow people with asthma up to 12 months of treatment.

    In Australia you can still buy salbutamol in a pharmacy without a prescription, after consultation with a pharmacist.

    However, if you have asthma and you’re concerned about the new guidance, you should speak to your pharmacist or doctor for advice.

    Stephen Hughes receives research grant funding from the Australian Government Department of Health and Aged Care Medical Research Future Fund, The Australian Research Council and Asthma Australia. He is a past Board Member of the National Asthma Council of Australia and current member of its Finance and Risk Management Committee.

    Bandana Saini has received funding from 1) Australian Government Department of Health Initiatives (via MRFFs or Community Pharmacy Agreement based investigator initiated grants, 2) National Health and Medical Research Council or from 3) organisations such as Asthma Australia.

    ref. Using a blue inhaler alone is not enough to manage your asthma – https://theconversation.com/using-a-blue-inhaler-alone-is-not-enough-to-manage-your-asthma-250133

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-OSI USA: 05.13.2025 Sen. Cruz Announces Key Senior Staff Hires and Promotions

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Texas Ted Cruz
    WASHINGTON, D.C. – U.S. Sen. Ted Cruz (R-TX) announced key senior staff hires and promotions in his Washington, D.C. office.
    OMRI CEREN promoted to Senior Advisor for Policy and Communications. Omri previously served as National Security Advisor and then Legislative Director for Senator Cruz. Before joining Sen. Cruz’s staff, he was programmatic director at The Israel Project, a nonprofit focused on working with journalists and the public on Middle East issues, and before that was a political blogger and writer. He received his doctorate from the University of Southern California’s Annenberg School for Communication.
    PRESTON HOWEY promoted to Legislative Director. A proud native of the Permian Basin, Preston began his Capitol Hill career with Chairman Kevin Brady (TX-08) and later served as Legislative Director for Representative August Pfluger (TX-11). He went on to work with the natural gas markets team at the American Petroleum Institute before joining Senator Cruz’s office as Domestic Policy Advisor. Preston is a graduate of Texas A&M University.
    MIKE BERRY hired as Chief Counsel. Mike joins Sen. Cruz’s office after 7 years on active duty as a U.S. Marine, and more than a decade of litigation experience in the non-profit sector. During his time in the Marines, Mike deployed to Afghanistan and taught law at the U.S. Naval Academy. Mike also served in senior litigation roles at First Liberty Institute and America First Policy Institute, during which he successfully led the litigation efforts on some of the nation’s most high-profile religious liberty and election integrity cases. Mike received his undergraduate degree from Texas A&M University, and his law degree from The Ohio State University.
    BRANDON GINDT hired as National Security Advisor. A Texas native, Brandon joins Sen. Cruz’s office from the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) where he served in the Directorate for Operations since 2018, predominantly working on Middle East and strategic competition issues. During his tenure at DIA, he deployed to Afghanistan and managed crisis operations on the Joint Staff and served as the Israel and Lebanon Country Director in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. He received his undergraduate and graduate degrees from Texas A&M University. 
    MACARENA MARTINEZ promoted to Communications Director. A native of Houston, Macarena has served as Senator Cruz’s communications advisor since 2023. Before her work with Senator Cruz, Macarena served as the Texas Communications Director for the Republican National Committee. Prior to that, she was a War Room Analyst on President Donald Trump’s 2020 campaign. Macarena holds a double bachelor’s degree from the University of Texas at Austin.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Global: ‘The pope is Peruvian!’ How 2 decades in South America shaped the vision of Pope Leo XIV

    Source: The Conversation – USA – By Matthew Casey-Pariseault, Associate Clinical Professor of History, Arizona State University

    Faithful hold a photo of Robert Prevost, who was elected Pope Leo XIV, in front of the Cathedral of Chiclayo, Peru, where he served as bishop for several years. AP Photo/Manuel Medina

    In his first appearance as Pope Leo XIV on the balcony of St. Peter’s Basilica, the man born Robert Francis Prevost spoke for 10 minutes in Italian. Then he transitioned to Spanish and, with a big grin, gave a greeting to his “beloved diocese of Chiclayo in Peru.”

    Many Peruvians were overjoyed with the election of Leo, whom they are proud to claim as a fellow citizen. “The Pope is Peruvian!” reported the live coverage on Latina Noticias, one of the main national networks. Other news outlets around Lima, where I live, shared similar headlines. Within minutes, all of Peru knew that the new pope, who was born and raised in Chicago, had served in Peru for over two decades and was nationalized as a citizen in 2015.

    During his time in the South American nation, he lived alongside his parishioners through a bloody civil war, a decade-long dictatorship and an unstable post-dictatorship period that has so far led to three former presidents being handed prison sentences. Amid these challenges, Prevost became part of Peruvian society – and, eventually, a leader within it.

    Prevost’s leadership roles in Chicago and Rome were essential in his formation. But as a scholar of religion in Latin America, I believe that it is his time in Peru that has best prepared him to take on the challenges of directing the global Catholic Church. In Peru, where Catholicism permeates public life, Prevost encountered deep social and political challenges in ways that bishops in many other countries may never face so directly.

    Missionary during war and dictatorship

    Prevost first arrived in Peru in 1985. A member of the Order of St. Augustine, the young man had been sent to its mission in Chulucanas, in the northern province of Piura. Chulucanas is about 30 miles east of the regional capital, where the desert coast begins to rise up into the Andes.

    After a year, Prevost left to finish his doctoral degree and serve briefly in Illinois. But he soon returned to Peru, serving as a missionary in the northern city of Trujillo. He stayed there through the remainder of the 1980s and 1990s, amid civil war between the government and various militant groups – primarily the Maoist guerrillas of Sendero Luminoso, or “Shining Path,” who aimed to install a communist state.

    The violence hit other regions more severely, but Trujillo and the surrounding area were home to car bombs, sabotaged electrical grids and brutal military dragnet operations. Prevost accompanied Peruvians through some of the darkest days of the country’s history.

    During these years, Prevost trained future clergy and served as a parish priest. One fellow Augustinian recalled that Prevost played a key role in recruiting and training Peruvian candidates to the priesthood. Prevost also founded the Trujillo parish of Nuestra Señora de Montserrat, where his parishioners knew him as “Padre Roberto.”

    As the country transitioned away from the civil war period, which ultimately left nearly 70,000 dead, Prevost remained in Peru. During the 1990s, President Alberto Fujimori’s government built a polarizing legacy by undermining democracy and citizenship rights while capturing the two most powerful guerrilla leaders.

    Peruvian families carry remains of recently identified relatives who were killed years ago, during the insurgency, to the cemetery for burial in 2022.
    AP Photo/Martin Mejia

    As I show in my research, religion and politics are deeply intertwined in Peru. By the 1990s, the Peruvian Catholic Church was divided between members who spoke out in defense of human rights and those who defended the often brutal tactics of the government. Juan Luis Cipriani Thorne, who was then the archbishop of Ayacucho – the Andean stronghold of Sendero Luminoso – became a spokesperson for the pro-state faction, framing defenders of human rights as apologists for terrorism.

    Prevost was among those who maintained a critical view of any party, including the government, that committed human rights abuses. Diego Garcia-Sayan, the country’s former minister of justice and foreign affairs, recently wrote an op-ed praising Prevost’s willingness to speak out against attempts to legalize the death penalty and to defend embattled human rights organizations.

    From Chiclayo to the Vatican

    After returning to the United States in 1999, Prevost rose through the leadership ranks of the Augustinian order. He was sent back to Peru in 2014, when Pope Francis named him the apostolic administrator, and later bishop, of the northern diocese of Chiclayo.

    As bishop, Prevost emerged as a voice for democracy and justice. In a 2017 public statement to national media, he urged former President Fujimori to “personally ask forgiveness for the great injustices that were committed and for which he was prosecuted.”

    During his tenure as bishop, Prevost helped guide his community through the COVID-19 pandemic. He also played a key role ministering to Chiclayo’s growing population of Venezuelan migrants.

    Venezuelan Betania Rodriguez on May 10, 2025, shows a photo taken with Pope Leo XIV at a migrant shelter in Chiclayo, Peru.
    AP Photo/Guadalupe Pardo

    Meanwhile, he was gaining the confidence of his peers, as well as Pope Francis. Prevost was given a leadership role in the Peruvian Conference of Bishops and played a central role during Francis’ 2018 visit to Peru. In 2023, Francis named Prevost prefect of the Dicastery of Bishops, the oversight body for naming new bishops across the world.

    Prevost took the position in Rome but was sad to leave Peru again. “This time, again, it will be hard for me to leave here,” Prevost told Peruvian media.

    In recent years, Prevost has taken on causes central to Francis’ papacy. He was a key actor in the Vatican investigations of a Peruvian organization, Sodalicio de Vida Cristiana, which was found to have committed dozens of sexual and psychological abuses dating back to the 1970s. Francis dissolved the organization in 2025. Prevost has also developed an increased focus on Indigenous and environmental rights, in line with Francis’ 2015 encyclical Laudato Si and 2019 conference for bishops in the Amazon.

    Local celebrations

    Photographs and memes celebrating the Peruvian pope have flown around social media and WhatsApp groups in Peru. The photos of Prevost eating traditional dishes from the north coast are especially popular. AI-generated memes of the pope wearing the Peruvian national soccer jersey or eating ceviche with an Inca Kola soda are making the rounds.

    In Chicalayo and Trujillo, in addition to official church celebrations, thousands have taken to the streets to express their joy with placards and chants.

    Leo XIV has clearly brought the memory of his years in Peru with him to the Vatican. He has chosen Edgard Rimaycuna, a Peruvian priest whom the pope knew from his time in Chiclayo, as his personal secretary.

    I believe the challenges that Leo guided his parishioners through in two decades in Peru should offer valuable lessons for the new pope to build on the legacy of Francis, the first Latin American pope.

    Matthew Casey-Pariseault does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. ‘The pope is Peruvian!’ How 2 decades in South America shaped the vision of Pope Leo XIV – https://theconversation.com/the-pope-is-peruvian-how-2-decades-in-south-america-shaped-the-vision-of-pope-leo-xiv-256415

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI USA: InCHIP Supports Principal Investigators Amid Uncertainty in Federal Research Funding

    Source: US State of Connecticut

    On Friday, May 30, UConn’s Institute for Collaboration on Health, Intervention, and Policy (InCHIP) will hold a virtual coffee break for faculty to receive updates on the evolving federal research funding landscape and guidance for writing competitive grant applications in the current climate.

    The event will feature a panel of InCHIP principal investigators (PIs) who have submitted a federal funding proposal this year. In addition, leaders from InCHIP and the Office of the Vice President for Research will share advice from program officers at the National Institutes of Health and answer questions about the impact of federal funding on the university.

    Information for the upcoming coffee hour can be found on InCHIP’s website, chip.uconn.edu.

    This event is part of InCHIP’s recurring coffee hours, which provide faculty a space to informally discuss their experiences with federal funding changes and create a network of support.

    Caitlin Caspi, Director of Food Security Initiatives at the UConn Rudd Center for Food Policy and Health, and Associate Professor of Allied Health Sciences

    “These events are important for us to get an idea of how changes in federal funding are affecting faculty and how InCHIP can support PIs and their research,” says Caitlin Caspi, associate director of InCHIP and director of Food Security Initiatives at the UConn Rudd Center for Food Policy and Health.

    Faculty from UConn Storrs, UConn Health, regional campuses, and various schools and colleges have participated, highlighting strong interest and demand for these events.

    Caspi spearheaded the coffee hours in response to unprecedented funding cuts at the National Institutes of Health (NIH). According to the Association of American Medical Colleges (AAMC), about $1.9 billion in research and career development funding to U.S. institutions has been terminated. AAMC data shows that Connecticut has lost more than $12 million in NIH funding.

    Scientific research is a core component in the economic engine of Connecticut and the United States. Government-funded research also fuels cures for debilitating diseases and innovation.

    A 2019 study published in Science by researchers at the University of California, Berkely, the University of Connecticut, Boston University, and Harvard University quantified the impact of federal research dollars on patents. The authors found that nearly one-third of U.S. patents rely on federal research dollars and established that corporations have become more reliant on government investment.

    In addition to the impacts on innovation, the cuts have socioeconomic implications. As the largest public funder of biomedical research, the NIH provided key support for research that improves public health and well-being, especially for historically understudied populations and fields.

    Grant terminations have most heavily impacted research areas like HIV/AIDS, sexual and gender minorities, COVID-19, and climate science – many of which are InCHIP priorities. In response, leadership is working to expand support for investigators beyond the coffee hours.

    First, InCHIP continues to offer seed grant funding to support innovative pilot research that will serve as the foundation for future external funding proposals.

    Tricia Leahey of the Department of Allied Health Sciences (AHS) in the College of Agriculture, Health and Natural Resources (CAHNR), and director of the UConn Institute for Collaboration on Health, Intervention, and Policy (InCHIP)

    “InCHIP seed grants support innovative pilot research in emerging areas and PI career growth. In unstable financial times, these internal funding opportunities can act as lifelines to keep research moving forward,” says Tricia Leahey, director of InCHIP.

    For the Spring 2025 semester, InCHIP offered internal funds for projects that aim to address health challenges and concerns affecting understudied populations in Connecticut and the United States.

    Specifically, InCHIP has partnered with the UConn Gladstein Family Human Rights Institute to fund projects that explore the areas of health equity, human rights, and social justice. InCHIP expects to fund 2 projects under this opportunity.

    InCHIP also offered seed grants in environment and health, community-engaged research, and women’s health, along with core funding for career development, and team formation, bridge funding, and project completion.

    The spring application cycle has closed, but investigators are encouraged to check InCHIP’s website during the fall semester.

    InCHIP is also supporting PIs who received award termination from the NIH, from navigating logistics to providing financial support. In addition, InCHIP is helping PIs navigate the changing funding landscape through grant writing workshops and identifying non-federal funding sources.

    Next semester, InCHIP will offer a grant writing workshop focused on foundation opportunities. The goal of the workshop is to help PIs learn best practices for crafting competitive proposals. Modeled after InCHIP’s Spring 2025 NIH grant writing bootcamp, the workshop builds on this semester’s successful bootcamp and follow-up seminar, which is providing researchers hands-on experience and in-depth feedback on their grant proposals.

    Details about the foundation grants workshop will be announced on InCHIP’s website.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Experts of the Committee on the Rights of the Child Commend Norway on Child Welfare Act, Raise Questions on Proposed Increased Use of Force in Schools and Data on Children with Disabilities

    Source: United Nations – Geneva

    The Committee on the Rights of the Child today concluded its review of the seventh periodic report of Norway, with Committee Experts commending the State on the new child welfare act, while raising questions about the proposed increased use of force in schools and the lack of data on children with disabilities. 

    Bragi Gudbrandsson, Committee Expert and Taskforce Member, commended Norway for the child welfare act which was a wonderful piece of legislation. 

     

    Mr. Gudbrandsson said the Committee was concerned that Norway planned to use stronger force and constraints.  How had the country reached this situation?

    Faith Marshall Harris, Committee Expert and Taskforce Member, also emphasised her concern, stating that instead of teachers being trained to de-escalate violence, they were given the power to use more force than police officers.  It seemed that the Government had responded in a knee-jerk reaction to media pressure; however, the situation was more about training teachers to deal with these situations in a non-violent way.  Norway was encouraged to rethink this approach. 

    Thuwayba Al Barwani, Committee Expert and Taskforce Member, said Norway had excellent data but when it came to disability, there was no disaggregated data to better understand the situation of children with disabilities in the country.  How many of these children lived with their families? How many lived in residential care? How many were receiving support services?  What awareness raising campaigns were in place to remove stigma and educate about disability? 

    What measures were in place to provide quality psychological care for children with mental health disabilities in all municipalities?   

    The delegation said the new education act introduced a broader scope for exercising force and restraint.  Employees could now intervene against pupils when necessary.  Norway shared the Committee’s concerns and had tried to state explicitly in the provision that this was a last resort, with strict measures for physical restriction to take place.  The Government and municipalities focused on the competence of the staff to put pre-emptive measures in place so that physical interventions were a last resort and only used when necessary. 

    The delegation said the Norwegian strategy for equality for all ran until 2030, with an important competence to increase the visibility of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in all municipalities.  In 2025, the Government allocated 280 million kroner for grants for people with disabilities.  Norway could not definitively say how many people with disabilities were living in the country.  A recent report by Statistic Norway, focused on the different definitions of disability, which would hopefully assist the State in future.

    Introducing the report, Lene Vågslid, Minister of Children and Families of Norway and head of the delegation, said since the last dialogue with the Committee in 2018, Norway had taken significant steps to further strengthen children’s rights. 

    Last month, the Government presented a proposal for a new children’s act to Parliament, which included a new provision on the child’s right to privacy, and the parents’ responsibility in this regard.  Norway had introduced a range of measures in recent years to develop and improve the child welfare sector, including the new child welfare act, which entered into force in 2023, placing greater emphasis on prevention and helping children and parents as early as possible.  For the first time, a white paper on “Safe digital upbringing” would soon be presented to Parliament to develop policies that empowered and protected children in their digital lives. 

    In closing remarks, Mr. Gudbrandsson said it was clear Norway was on an exciting journey in revisiting the fundamental principles of the Convention, which was reflected in the new legislation, guidelines and action plans; the Committee was very impressed and appreciated these efforts. 

    In her closing remarks, Ms. Vågslid thanked the Committee for the important questions and the dialogue.  Norway aimed to highlight that all sectors were working towards the best possible outcomes for children. 

    The delegation of Norway was comprised of representatives from the Ministry of Children and Families; the Ministry of Culture and Equality; the Ministry of Education and Research; the Ministry of Justice and Public Security; the Ministry of Health Services; the Ministry of Labour and Social Inclusion; and the Permanent Mission of Norway to the United Nations Office at Geneva. 

    Summaries of the public meetings of the Committee can be found here, while webcasts of the public meetings can be found here. The programme of work of the Committee’s ninety-ninth session and other documents related to the session can be found here.

    The Committee will next meet in public at 3. pm on Wednesday, 14 May to begin its consideration of the combined fifth and sixth periodic reports of Indonesia (CRC/C/IDN/5-6).

    Report

    The Committee has before it the seventh periodic report of Norway (CRC/C/NOR/7).

    Presentation of Report

    LENE VÅGSLID, Minister of Children and Families of Norway and head of the delegation, said since the last dialogue with the Committee in 2018, Norway had taken significant steps to further strengthen children’s rights.  Fundamental children’s rights were included in the Norwegian Constitution, including that the best interests of the child must be a key consideration, and that children had a right to be heard regarding issues affecting them.  Moreover, the Convention was implemented through the human rights act, meaning it was applied as Norwegian law and prevailed if in conflict with other legislation. 

    Last month, the Government presented a proposal for a new children’s act to Parliament, which included a new provision on the child’s right to privacy, and the parents’ responsibility in this regard.  There were also several amendments to strengthen children’s rights when parents separated, including mandatory mediation for the parents and children. Additionally, the new education act of 2023 applied to all public primary and secondary education and contained general provisions stating that the best interests of pupils should be a fundamental consideration in actions and decisions concerning them. 

    Norway had introduced a range of measures in recent years to develop and improve the child welfare sector, including the new child welfare act, which entered into force in 2023, placing greater emphasis on prevention and helping children and parents as early as possible.  Last month, the Government launched the Quality Improvement Initiative, to give children relying on child welfare services greater predictability and stability. 

    It was only in exceptional cases, and as a matter of last resort, that the best interest of the child could lead to children being separated from their parents.  From 2023, children in health institutions had the right to be accompanied by a parent or guardian throughout their stay.  Families who had a child with a serious illness, injury or disability now had a right to a coordinator.  The Government also recently decided to incorporate the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities into the human rights act. 

    Since 2022, Norway had offered collective protection to around 90,000 refugees from Ukraine, many of them children.  The State had also increased the earmarked budget line for strengthened child expertise in asylum reception centres, and the County Governor’s supervision of unaccompanied minors was increased.  A national strategy for children in low-income families (2020-2023) was put forward in 2020 and renewed in 2024, aiming to strengthen the economy of low-income families and reduce economic barriers to kindergartens and after-school programmes. 

    In 2023, the Government introduced a “youth guarantee” which ensured young people close follow-up and individual support.  Since 2022, a cross-sector initiative called the Core Group for Vulnerable Children and Youth coordinated efforts across eight ministries and 14 agencies to address the needs of at-risk children.  Two weeks ago, Norway launched a national mission on the inclusion of children in education, work and societal life, with the key goal of reducing exclusion among children by 2035. 

    For the first time, a white paper on “Safe digital upbringing” would soon be presented to Parliament to develop policies that empowered and protected children in their digital lives.  Norway had also, for the first time, established a Ministry of Digitalisation, working closely together on children’s behalf.  Norway had high ambitions for all its children and was committed to advancing their well-being.  Ms. Vågslid concluded by commending the important role played by the United Nations treaty bodies in improving States’ implementation of human rights. 

    TORMOD C. ENDRESEN, Permanent Representative of Norway to the United Nations Office at Geneva, said Norway was looking forward to doing a deep dive with the Committee on the Rights of the Child in the country.  He then introduced the Norwegian delegation. 

    Questions by Committee Experts

    BRAGI GUDBRANDSSON, Committee Expert and Taskforce Member, said the Committee was aware of Norway’s exemplary record in children’s rights, being the first country to incorporate the Convention into domestic legislation, and the first in the world to establish the position of Ombudsman for children.  For this reason, the Committee would do its best to give Norway a critical appraisal. 

    The Government of Norway had been criticised in the law-making process, including the lack of a child rights assessment impact, and that children’s views were not included in the process of lawmaking.  It was understood that steps had been taken to address this; could the delegation share these with the Committee?  Could some examples be provided?  How was it ensured that the public administration act contributed to strong policies for children?  It was interesting that Norway had not yet formulated a comprehensive implementation plan for the Convention on a national, regional or sectoral basis. Could the delegation comment on this? 

    Norway was commended for collaboration between the Ministries and the Core Group for Vulnerable People.  Had it addressed the discrepancies in resources between the different municipalities? Had a strategy been devised in this regard?  Were children regularly consulted by the Core Group?  Norway currently did not collect disaggregated data which was of concern to the Committee.  Could the State use a safeguard strategy, rather than simply not collecting the statistics?  How did the State address the concerns of unaccompanied minors in reception centres? What was the status of amendments to the legal aid act?  To what extent were local politicians aware of the Committee’s observations since 2018? What was being done to improve this situation?  How were the concluding observations applied in the Government? 

    Mr. Gudbrandsson commended Norway for the child welfare act which was a wonderful piece of legislation.  The lack of participation of children in Norway was of concern, with many pieces of legislation being implemented without children having a chance to provide their views.  Were steps being taken to follow-up the child welfare act to ensure children were heard? Was there a possibility to accommodate the views of the children during child abuse cases through the Barnahus model? Would the State consider the age limit for accessing Barnahus services to 18?  It was important to provide young offenders with inappropriate sexual behaviour with good therapy, and Norway was commended for thinking about this.  The Committee welcomed the State’s action plan to address violence against children.  Had an evaluation of the previous plans been conducted?  How had this impacted the new plan? 

    The Committee was concerned that Norway planned to use stronger force and constraints.  How had the country reached this situation? Would Norway ban child marriages completely without any exceptions?  There was a lack of specific prohibition of the sale and sexual exploitation of children; could this be explained? 

    MARY BELOFF, Committee Vice-Chair and Taskforce Member, said Norway’s high-level delegation present before the Committee highlighted the country’s commitment to human rights.  Norway was an exemplary country in so many ways.  Why did discrimination still persist in such an egalitarian community, particularly when it came to Sami, migrant, asylum and refugee children? Where did the root causes lie? Were there any plans to diminish the levels of discrimination seen against children? 

    All State practices in Norway kept the best interests of the child in mind.  However, there were certain cases where questions arose. Was there an instrument for local and national authorities for this purpose?  How could the best interest of the child be reconciled with chemical restraints or practices of confinement?  How was it assessed whether the best interests of the children involved were satisfied? 

    If a child needed to be removed from their family, was there a protocol in place to ensure that the best interests of the child were still respected?  How was the situation of brothers and sisters assessed and the impact on children’s mental health?  Was there sufficient information to provide a solution to deportation or family reunification as it pertained to refugees?  How did “extended detention” reconcile with the best interests of the child?

    Responses by the Delegation 

    The delegation said the proposed children’s act strengthened the rights of all children in Norway and put their safety first, with the best interests of the child always considered most important.  The act aimed to facilitate the child’s contact with both parents and reduce conflict in situations of separation of parents.  The new act also included special provisions for cases of abuse of children.

    Norway placed a great emphasis on human rights and had implemented human rights conventions in the national law; in case of conflict, the conventions would prevail.  Norway’s Parliament had considered the ratification of the third Optional Protocol on several occasions, most recently in 2022, but given several reservations expressed, had voted not to implement it by an 80 per cent majority.  Given that recent decision, the Government was currently not considering ratifying the third Optional Protocol.  The Government remained adamant to develop a national complaints procedure and had taken steps in this regard.  A child-friendly website had been designed, allowing children to access the complaints procedure more easily. 

    The participation of children was becoming an increasingly valued part of Norway’s decision-making process.  The right to be heard was enshrined in the Constitution, and there were now established youth councils and mandated conversations with the Government and youth-oriented non-governmental organizations.  In March this year, the Government developed and clarified the role of the Norwegian Directorate for Children, Youth and Family which would now oversee all aspects pertaining to children and participation, and provide guidance to the public sector in this regard. 

    There were many national complaints bodies in Norway which had the competence to handle complaints concerning children.  Several measures had been taken to strengthen children’s right to complain. Politicians at all levels were responsible for following Norwegian law in all their decisions, and the Convention was part of Norwegian law.  Politicians received a copy of the Convention on the first day of work and an informative poster.  All general comments made by the Committee were published on the Government’s website in Norwegian and English. 

    The Norwegian Human Rights Institution had created a guide on children’s rights which was available online.  Since 2018, it was forbidden to enter a marriage with someone under 18 in Norway, and from this year, foreign marriages of a person under the age of 18 were not recognised. 

    In April, a bill was submitted to parliament for a new administrative procedural act.  The legal aid act stipulated the right to free legal aid for natural citizens, including minors.  The Norwegian Barnahus model was evaluated in 2021, with the system seeming to work well and in accordance with international conventions.  The Government aimed to strengthen the legal protection of child suspects, including around interrogation of minors. The evaluation of the Barnahus model did not delve further into the proposal to raise the age for access to services to 18. 

    Residents in asylum reception centres took part in an information programme about the Norwegian society and its fundamental values.  The objective was to help residents take care of their own living situations and also inform them of their rights.  In cases of expulsion, an extended right to free legal aid was granted. 

    In recent years, Norway had taken significant steps to strengthen the child welfare services through policies, research, and financial commitments.  The child welfare services aimed to do everything within their power to allow children to live at home.  The municipalities were vital in this regard.  In Norway, around 54,000 children and adolescents received help from child welfare services annually.  The new child welfare act entered into force in 2023, and children were provided with additional rights, including speaking to child welfare authorities without parental consent.  The new participation regulation came into force in 2024 and clarified the duty of the child welfare services to provide child participation in cases.  Norway was working to improve the system, including through evaluating the new rules, developing more child friendly processes, and ensuring access to qualified legal representation to children, among other measures.   

    Norway had been working hard on foster homes; nine out of 10 children living in alternative care lived in foster homes.  Several measures had been launched to improve the situation of foster parents, including for them to be given clearer decision-making authority.  Children who had lived in a foster home for at least two years could be proposed a permanent residence in the home, if the aim of reunification had been abandoned.  The State was currently investing in models for foster homes for siblings. 

    The responsibility of the treatment and follow-up of intersex children was assigned to two hospitals, and necessary medical treatment was initiated when relevant. Treatment practices in Norway were aligned with the rest of the Nordic countries.    Norway did not collect any data or statistics based on the ethnicity of the population.  The Government was strengthening and renewing its efforts to combat hate and discrimination based on ethnicity and religion, and had delivered four action plans, including against anti-Semitism and anti-Muslim racism and hate speech, as well as discrimination against the Sami.  A study showed that a high number of children with ethnic backgrounds had experienced racism. 

    The kindergarten act and education act stated that children had the right to an education free from discrimination.  The new education act introduced a broader scope for exercising force and restraint. Employees could now intervene against pupils when necessary.  Norway shared the Committee’s concerns and had tried to state explicitly in the provision that this was a last resort, with strict measures for physical restriction to take place.   

    Several guidelines had been produced by the immigration service and the appeals board on how to hear children in the case-handling process.   

    Questions by Committee Experts

    THUWAYBA AL BARWANI, Committee Vice-Chair and Taskforce Member, acknowledged the hard work Norway had put into the strategy of equality for persons with disabilities 2020 to 2030.  How had the strategy helped mitigate the discrimination of vulnerable children? What interventions were envisaged to address access to services for children with disabilities to ensure their rights were upheld?  The Committee had heard reports of abuse of children with psychosocial disabilities, particularly girls.  What measures had been taken to address this problem?  To what extent did these children know their rights?  Was the State party making efforts to give them opportunities to be heard and their views taken into account? 

    There had been violations found in 76 per cent of respite homes; how was the Government planning to regulate these homes?  Were there efforts to reduce and phase out these institutions and replace them with more community-based care? 

    Norway had excellent data but when it came to disability, there was no disaggregated data to better understand the situation of children with disabilities in the country. How many of these children lived with their families?  How many lived in residential care?  How many were receiving support services?  What awareness raising campaigns were in place to remove stigma and educate about disability? 

    What measures were in place to provide quality psychological care for children with mental health disabilities in all municipalities?   

    The Committee had received reports that children without resident permits could not be seen by a general practitioner, and could only receive emergency health care, which was of concern.  Was the Government planning to change this practice?  The Committee welcomed Norway’s commitment to protect intersex children from violence; however, it was concerned that unnecessary irreversible surgeries had been performed on intersex children without their informed consent.  Was this the case?  Had data been collected on these practices?  Had there been redress for these children?  How was the Government planning to protect children from these practices?  What measures did the Government have to combat family poverty?  What additional measures were in place to improve the living conditions of children in municipal housing? 

    FAITH MARSHALL HARRIS, Committee Expert and Taskforce Member, said Norway had been the envy of the world in terms of the environment and had an incredible record. Why was the State now granting more licenses for gas and extraction and exports?  The Committee was concerned about this change of direction.  Why was the State turning its back on the commitments made in the Paris Agreement?  Why was Norway undermining its incredible heritage in this direction?  Given the fact that this was so important to the lives of children, was there a mechanism in place for consulting them on these major decisions?

    Children with disabilities in Svalbard could not receive special education and had to move with their parents to the mainland; could more information be provided on this? The use of force by teachers in the classroom against disruptive pupils was concerning and seemed to escalate violence. Instead of teachers being trained to de-escalate violence, they were given the power to use more force than police officers.  It seemed that the Government had responded in a knee-jerk reaction to media pressure; however, the situation was more about training teachers to deal with these situations in a non-violent way.  Norway was encouraged to rethink this approach. 

    Could Norway provide more information about programmes and strategies for the Sami people?  Had Norway developed a national referral mechanism for trafficking?  Was legal representation available to children from the very start of an investigation?  How were children who had come out of warzones being rehabilitated? 

    BRAGI GUDBRANDSSON, Committee Expert and Taskforce Member, asked what services children with challenging behaviours were entitled to by law? 

    MARY BELOFF, Committee Vice-Chair and Taskforce Member, asked how children were heard in cases where the State legally granted a sex change?  Had a legal definition of statelessness been adopted? What mechanisms existed to protect children who had been exposed on the internet?  Did children deprived of liberty receive information on their rights?

    A Committee Expert said Norway did not participate in the ministerial conference on ending violence against children; was there a specific reason for this? 

    Another Expert asked about the Norwegian children’s act.  When would this be finished?  How much were children involved in that act? 

    An Expert asked what was being done to prevent violence against children, including risks in the digital environment?  How was the birth declaration of refugee or stateless individuals conducted?  What was being done to support those parents?

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said children’s rights would always be work in progress; it was important to evolve and improve.  Children in Norway were among the highest users of screens, social media and digital technology globally.  How could the State protect them in their everyday life?  This was a difficult problem to solve. 

    The work with the Core Group for Vulnerable Children and Youth started in 2021.  There was a need for a better cross-sectoral collaboration to ensure children, youth and their families received the necessary support and follow-up.  The Core Group was comprised of representatives from seven ministries. Last year, the Core Group was evaluated, with conclusions finding that it was well established.  The Core Group did not consult children directly in its work. 

    To combat complex forms of discrimination, it was important to apply a cross-sectional approach when developing legislation.  The action plan to combat hate speech and discrimination against the Sami was launched in January this year, and included 32 measures under headings such as dialogue, democracy, safety and security, among others.  Many valuable inputs from those concerned had been received, including from young people, as well as the Sami Parliament, which was actively involved in the development of the plan.

    The Norwegian strategy for equality for all ran until 2030, with an important competence to increase the visibility of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in all municipalities.  In 2025, the Government allocated 280 million kroner for grants for persons with disabilities.  Norway could not definitively say how many persons with disabilities were living in the country.  A recent report by Statistic Norway focused on the different definitions of disability, which would hopefully assist the State in the future.

    Every year, the Government submitted a forward-looking white paper to the Sami Parliament.  The Government aimed to get more qualified teachers in Sami schools and kindergartens.  The lack of Sami language competence was the biggest challenge to provide good services to the Sami population.  The Government had financed a school programme to assist students with a Roma background to complete primary and secondary education.  The unique framework of the Svalbard community determined what services could be provided.  It was not possible to ensure all needs could be met in the archipelago as on the mainland, including the educational offering, particularly special education, which required a tailored, individual approach.  Any additional needs needed to be met on the mainland. 

    The education act and the private school act that clarified employees to use physical interventions, included an obligation to prevent physical intervention from occurring. The Government and municipalities focused on the competence of the staff to put pre-emptive measures in place so that physical interventions were a last resort and only used when necessary. Schools should have an environment where all students thrived and benefited from education, including those who exhibited disruptive behaviours.  The solutions for these students needed to be adapted to each individual pupil.  This year, the Norwegian Government had allocated money to municipalities to address these issues.   

    Minors who came to Norway alone were a particularly vulnerable group and given high priority. In 2022, an independent evaluation of minors in asylum reception centres was conducted to ensure they received the necessary care, and violations were detected in several centres.  In 2025, the Government increased the funding of independent supervision and funding in several reception centres.  Norway worked systematically to improve the care provided to children in reception centres.  It was mandatory for reception centres to have routines in place to handle violence against children, with staff required to report any violent behaviour to relevant authorities.  The Norwegian Directorate of Immigration had instructed follow-up procedures for minor asylum seekers who may be victims of human trafficking, violence or child marriage. The Directorate of Immigration had developed specific action cards for the reception centres, for each of these specific issues.

    The Directorate of Immigration required that cooperation resident councils were established within asylum centres to ensure residents could express their views on the operation of the centre.  When applying for protection, all unaccompanied asylum-seeking minors were offered an asylum interview, either in person or online.  Clear child-friendly guidelines had been prepared on interviewing children which needed to be followed by police units.  The Immigration Appeal Board heard children orally if deemed necessary.  It was rare for children to be involved in the Board meetings.  Child hearings were conducted orally by the local police in Norway. The police had received guidance on how to hear children in a child-friendly manner. 

    A person charged with a criminal offence who was under the age of 18 at the time of the offense would only be sentenced to preventive detention in extraordinary circumstances. Unfortunately, there were cases where the court had found there were no alternative ways to safeguard public security. In light of the recommendation from the Committee, the Norwegian Government was monitoring this situation. 

    Human trafficking was a grave violation of human rights and a crime with serious consequences. The level of trafficking was low in Norway.  The Government had decided to release a strategy on trafficking in human beings which would be presented in 2025.  Training to detect victims of torture and trafficking was of utmost importance; a national guideline was published in this regard in 2023.  There were several provisions in the criminal procedure act which granted the right to a publicly appointed defence council, which was an unconditional right if the individual was a minor at the time of the offence. 

    More than 89 per cent of children in Norway participated in kindergartens.  The Government’s strategy to 2030 aimed to ensure all children could participate in high quality kindergartens, regardless of where they lived and their financial situation.  The Government had taken steps in 2024 to reduce the price of kindergarten places, significantly lowering barriers for families to enrol their children in kindergartens.  Children of minority backgrounds had lower levels of enrolment.  Children in asylum reception centres were not entitled to a place in kindergarten, but grants were provided to assist them in this regard. 

    Municipalities were strengthening formal competence in education.  School absenteeism could have many different courses and the severity of cases varied.  Absenteeism early in the school year could have significant consequences for pupils. The Government was strengthening efforts to prevent students from developing school absenteeism.

    The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities’ project was an important measure to ensure the Convention was implemented throughout the whole country. A guide had been created to help the municipalities understand and implement the Convention, and films and other materials had been made to increase the understanding of using the Convention in practice. 

    Children and young people would have to live with the climate, and the decisions made today would affect their future.  It was crucial to limit the global temperature increase to 1.5 degrees Celsius. Norway was contributing to this effort by striving to complete its own climate goals and it collaborated with the European Union in this regard.  The Government involved children and young people in the development of the climate policy.  An agreement had been reached which safeguarded the rights of reindeer herders. The State had taken a responsibility to ensure that reindeer herders could utilise additional land for winter grazing.  Following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the supply of gas from Norway to Europe had helped free Europe from Russian gas.

    Questions by Committee Experts

    FAITH MARSHALL HARRIS, Committee Expert and Taskforce Member, congratulated Norway on the outcome for the reindeer herders.  The issues of violence and bullying in schools was an increasing worldwide phenomenon which had reached even Norway.  Did Norway consider that the socialisation in schools needed to increase?  What would be done about this?  Was the issue of displacement among indigenous peoples being addressed?  Was their free, prior and informed consent being obtained for development activities? 

    A Committee Expert asked if the Immigration Appeals Board had an administrative and judicial competency?  What kind of appeals did it hear?  Were there age assessment appeals before this Board?  How was the right of children to be heard guaranteed if the Board did not hear children directly?  Did the Board hear appeals from detention conditions?  Was there mandatory reporting with regards to the best interest of the child?  Did permanency only apply to children in residential care or those in all care settings?

    Another Expert said developing countries were most vulnerable to the impact of greenhouse gases. What was Norway doing for those countries? 

    A Committee Expert asked if children in Norway had been consulted regarding the ratification of the third Optional Protocol?  Norway should be commended regarding its commitment to the landmine treaty, as landmines were some of the worst arms affecting children.  Did the State plan to take a stronger stance?

    Another Committee Expert asked if there were positive parenting programmes in place in Norway? How was artificial intelligence used in Norway and how did the State protect children from its threats? 

    MARY BELOFF, Committee Vice-Chair and Taskforce Member, asked why Norway did not feel the need to have a differentiated response between the ages of 15 to 18? 

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said three quarters of the country’s child and adolescent mental health services had implemented cognitive behaviour therapies to address trauma.  The Norwegian Board of Health Supervision conducted nationwide inspections of children in respite homes between 2022 and 2023, and had provided several recommendations, with follow-up measures now initiated.  Since 1991, Norway had implemented a reform for the care of people with developmental disabilities, with the goal to phase out institutional care.  Data showed that almost 20,000 children had received one or more municipal care services. 

    Children with disabilities should be treated equally and protected against discrimination. The Ombudsman for Children played an important role in raising awareness about children’s rights.  Illegal substance use among children and young people in Norway was relatively low.  However, there had been a concerning increase in cocaine use among young men and boys.  The Government was particularly focused on preventing substance use among children and young people.  Most children and young people in Norway reported a good quality of life and satisfaction; however, there had been an increase of poor self-mental health diagnosis among young people in Norway, particularly after the COVID-19 pandemic. The Government aimed to ensure that everyone had access to good quality, low-threshold mental health services, and municipal capacities had been developed in this regard.

    Combatting violence against children was a high priority for the Norwegian Government and a national action plan had been developed.  A whitepaper on safe digital upbringing would soon be submitted to Parliament.  The development of social media was being debated, and Norway was assessing an age limit for social media services.  Most social media services were not developed with children’s wellbeing in mind. Children of any age could refuse a parent sharing videos or photos of them on social media.

    In cases of separation, parents should have shared daily authority as a general rule, to safeguard the child’s right to family life and reduce conflict.  Norway had a free and low threshold counselling service for families to prevent disputes.  The Norwegian Directorate of Children and Youth offered a wealth of online resources for parents to help them navigate different aspects of parenting. 

    The Government had proposed legislative amendments to ensure foster parents could be given direct authority to make decisions on behalf of the child.  Foster parents were given the right to appeal the decision to move a child.  The child welfare act regulated follow-up between parents and monitored the child’s development. 

    Children could be placed in child welfare institutions if they had serious behavioural problems; this was the case for approximately 20 per cent of children residing in these institutions.  The State had a duty to ensure these children received the necessary care and help required. 

    Norway’s housing allowance had been strengthened in 2024 and 2025 to help those struggling in the housing market.  The Government had strengthened the grants scheme for the inclusion of children and youth. Policies targeted newly arrived refugees and immigrants who had lived in Norway for years, to increase their access to the labour market.   

    The Government had initiated a series of measures to improve the school environment and was further strengthening this effort.  Studies showed that pupils who did not use their phones in school hours experienced less bullying, and for this reason there was a directive for schools to keep school-hours mobile free.  Schools and kindergartens had an obligation to act if a child was experiencing bullying.

    An age assessment was considered during the asylum decision.  It was not the case that the Immigration Appeal Board never heard the child. When it was assessed that the case was sufficiently informed, the Board could decide on the case without a hearing. Usually, it was assessed that the case was sufficiently informed, as the child had previously been heard through an asylum-seeking interview.  The detention of children was only used to carry out an immediate pending return. Minors above 16 years old could be granted a resident permit if they reached the age of 18.  This was important to reduce the number of asylum-seeking minors embarking on dangerous journeys to Norway and Europe.  There were special penal sentences in place for juvenile offenders.

    Norway regretted the decision of some countries to withdraw from the mine ban treaty and had no plans to withdraw. 

    Gender affirming treatment was not provided to intersex children based on this diagnosis alone; it was only after a diagnosis of gender dysmorphia where treatment could be received, following years of monitoring.  Surgeries were not performed on the psychosocial indications of intersex children.  The last time this occurred was several decades ago. 

    When giving birth in Norway, most births took place in a hospital, where the birth was then registered.  If the birth took place at home without a doctor or midwife present, it was up to the mother to report the birth within one month. 

    Closing Remarks

    BRAGI GUDBRANDSSON, Committee Expert and Taskforce Member, appreciated the rich, comprehensive information shared by the delegation.  It was clear Norway was on an exciting journey in revisiting the fundamental principles of the Convention, which was reflected in the new legislation, guidelines and action plans; the Committee was very impressed and appreciated these efforts.  The proposal to expand the use of force in schools and residential care was of concern to the Committee and it was hoped this would be carefully considered before being enacted. 

    LENE VÅGSLID, Minister of Children and Families of Norway and head of the delegation, thanked the Committee for the important questions and the dialogue.  Norway had seen a rise in the exclusion of children which it wished to turn around.  The proposed children’s act aimed to secure the child’s right to family life, provided it was in their best interest.  Norway aimed to highlight that all sectors were working towards the best possible outcomes for children.  Norway looked forward to receiving the Committee’s concluding observations.

    SOPIO KILADZE, Committee Chair, thanked Norway for the dialogue and for acknowledging the challenges faced by the country.  The concluding observations would contain recommendations to make Norway a better place for children.  Ms. Kiladze extended warm regards on behalf of the Committee to the children of Norway.

    ___________

    Produced by the United Nations Information Service in Geneva for use of the media; 
    not an official record. English and French versions of our releases are different as they are the product of two separate coverage teams that work independently.

    CRC25.010E

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI Security: Elementary Teacher Indicted in Austin for Alleged Possession of Child Sexual Abuse Material

    Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) State Crime Alerts (c)

    AUSTIN, Texas – A federal grand jury in Austin returned an indictment today charging an Austin man, who was employed as a fifth grade teacher in the city, with two counts related to his alleged receipt and possession of child pornography.

    According to an affidavit filed in the court documents, Carl David Innmon, 50, allegedly downloaded multiple batches of downloads via BitTorrent between Dec. 29, 2024 and Jan. 15, 2025. The alleged downloads contained a total of 126 files that depict an image of a child engaging in sexual conduct or sexual performance. The children in three of the downloaded files, the affidavit alleges, include an infant and two girls between the ages of four and seven.

    Based on the investigation, a search warrant was conducted on Innmon’s residence, leading to the seizure of a smartphone, a laptop and a portable hard drive. A forensic analysis of these items cumulatively revealed 365,797 files of Child Sexual Abuse Material.

    Innmon is charged with one count of possession of child pornography and one count of receipt of child pornography. If convicted, he faces up to 20 years in federal prison. A federal district court judge will determine any sentence after considering the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors.

    The affidavit also alleges that Innmon was in possession of artificial intelligence generated child pornography, and that his devices contained a large quantity of real images depicting students in a classroom. Some of those images were allegedly placed in an AI generator, de-clothing the students. With assistance from the Austin Independent School District and AISD Police, a Texas Department of Public Safety (TX DPS) Criminal Investigations Division (CID) Special Agent was able to positively identify the students depicted in the images and their ages. The children were allegedly identified as students of Innmon’s.

    Acting U.S. Attorney Margaret Leachman for the Western District of Texas made the announcement.

    The FBI and TX DPS CID are investigating the case.

    Assistant U.S. Attorney Grant Sparks is prosecuting the case.

    This case was brought as part of Project Safe Childhood, a nationwide initiative to combat the growing epidemic of child sexual exploitation and abuse launched in May 2006 by the Department of Justice. Led by U.S. Attorneys’ Offices and CEOS, Project Safe Childhood marshals federal, state and local resources to better locate, apprehend and prosecute individuals who exploit children via the Internet, as well as to identify and rescue victims. For more information about Project Safe Childhood, please visit www.justice.gov/psc.

    An indictment is merely an allegation and all defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law.

    ###

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-Evening Report: The pay equity puzzle: can we compare effort, skill and risk between different industries?

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Gemma Piercy, Lecturer, Sociology, Social Policy and Criminology, University of Waikato

    Getty Images

    Last week’s move by the government to amend pay equity laws, using parliamentary urgency to rush the reforms through, caught opposition parties and New Zealanders off guard.

    Protests against the Equal Pay Amendment Bill have continued into this week, driven to some extent by disappointment that an apparent political consensus on the issue has broken down.

    In 2017, the National-led government passed a forerunner to the current legislation for the health sector only, the Care and Support Workers (Pay Equity) Settlement Act. Later, in opposition, National also supported the Labour government’s Equal Pay Act in 2018, as well as the Equal Pay Amendment Act in 2020.

    That legislation was designed to extend a pay equity process to all occupations and create a clearer pathway for making pay equity claims. With both major parties seemingly aligned, some 33 pay equity claims were under way.

    Those claims – all halted now – involve the education, health and social services sectors. As such, the government would have to meet the costs of successful claims.

    This explains why one rationale for the law change has been that the claims were potentially too expensive. The other rationale (preferred by Finance Minister Nicola Willis and Workplace Relations Minister Brooke van Velden) is that the existing policy wasn’t sufficiently rigorous in determining the validity of some claims.

    In reality, both the cost and the policy framework allowing equity claims to proceed are interrelated: the more permissive the framework, the higher the potential cost to the government and employers.

    But while equal pay for equal work is the goal, it’s important to understand that equal pay and pay equity are not the same thing.

    Equal pay is about making sure men and women are paid at the same rate in a specific occupation.

    Pay equity, on the other hand, involves a more complex process. It aims to establish pay relativities between famale-dominated industries and other sectors using specific criteria. And herein lies the core of the argument.

    Comparing different work sectors

    According to van Velden, the framework for comparing different kinds of work was too loose, or simply not realistic:

    You have librarians who’ve been comparing themselves to transport engineers. We have admin and clerical staff […] comparing themselves to mechanical engineers. We don’t believe we have that setting right.

    On the surface, this may seem logical. And previous policy advice provided to the government suggests the recent law change will move New Zealand’s framework into line with other countries.

    But using a proxy method of comparison between types of work in different industries or sectors remains central to any pay equity claim.

    That’s because pay equity seeks to make visible and fix the deep, structural inequalities that have historically seen women’s work undervalued compared to men’s work. It’s about ensuring jobs that are different but of equal value are paid similarly, as a way to achieve gender equality.

    Women’s employment is still concentrated in lower-paying industries and occupations, so comparisons have to be made with other sectors.

    The factors used to measure that relativity are known as “comparators”. Rather than using tools developed and tested under the previous legislation, the new system will introduce “a hierarchy of comparators”, with a preference for comparators to be chosen within the same industry or occupation making the pay equity claim.

    Comparators are selected to help compare the nature of different kinds of work in male-dominated and female-dominated industries. This is based on an assessment of skills, experience and qualifications, level of responsibilities, types of working conditions and degree of effort.

    The assessment is completed through in-depth interviews with workers in comparison occupations. It uses resources such as Employment New Zealand’s skills recognition tool to evaluate the validity of those comparators.

    Different kinds of cost

    The subjective nature of valuing different kinds of work is part of the problem, of course. But New Zealand research shows only part of the gender pay gap can be attributed to objectively measurable pay differences within specific industries. Pay equity is about addressing both the objective and subjective elements contributing to that gap.

    We’ll need to carefully monitor the new system to see whether its narrower comparator requirements affect its capacity to close the gender pay gap.

    Treasury’s concerns also need to be considered. The former budget allocation of NZ$17 billion over four years suggests the costs of settling pay equity claims may be considerable.

    On the other hand, they may be bearable. Last year in the United Kingdom, for example, Birmingham City Council was effectively bankrupt and feared pay equity claims might be a final straw. In the end, the costs were not as high as initially anticipated.

    Finally, focusing exclusively on reducing fiscal cost risks other costs rising instead. Women who are paid less than they should be will struggle to put food on the table, pay back student loans, get onto the property ladder, contribute to Kiwisaver and afford their retirement.

    Without pay equity, in other words, there is less economic activity in general.

    Gemma Piercy received funding from the Pay Equity Unit (2004-2009), part of the former Department of Labour, now Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment.

    Bill Cochrane and Suzette Dyer do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. The pay equity puzzle: can we compare effort, skill and risk between different industries? – https://theconversation.com/the-pay-equity-puzzle-can-we-compare-effort-skill-and-risk-between-different-industries-256464

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-OSI USA: Rep. Aguilar Announces $300,000 to Strengthen CSUSB Artificial Intelligence Cybersecurity Research

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Representative Pete Aguilar (31 CD Ca)

    Today, Rep. Pete Aguilar announced a $300,000 grant for California State University, San Bernardino (CSUSB) to enhance its research into the effects of artificial intelligence (AI) on the cybersecurity workforce. Continuing Rep. Aguilar’s focus on strengthening the cybersecurity program at CSUSB, this grant will enable educators at the university to adapt their curriculum as AI technology rapidly evolves.
    “As artificial intelligence technology develops, it is crucial that the cybersecurity workforce in the Inland Empire is equipped with the skills and knowledge necessary to ensure we can keep up,” said Rep. Pete Aguilar. “This grant funding is an investment in the future success of the CSUSB students entering the cyber workforce and ensuring that the Inland Empire stays at the forefront of cybersecurity.”
    “The grant supports our effort to forecast all the ways AI will impact the cyber workforce and to provide guidance for educators to adjust in real time to the changes with an information website, a series of workshops throughout the next two years,” said Vincent Nestler, Associate Professor, CSUSB School of Cyber and Decision Sciences.
    The funding comes as part of the U.S. National Science Foundation’s (NSF) Office of Advanced Cyberinfrastructure’s (OAC) National Artificial Intelligence Research Resource (NAIRR) pilot award program. The project, entitled “EAGER: NAIRR Pilot Expansion: FA1: AI Horizon: Forecasting Cybersecurity Workforce Evolution and Adaptive Skill Development,” will support efforts to integrate AI technology into cybersecurity by supporting research and educational needs at universities across the country. The grant funding will support the training of approximately 1,000 faculty members and 1,000 students across 470 higher education institutions across the country.
    Rep. Aguilar has made strengthening the cybersecurity program at California State University, San Bernardino, a top priority. During his time in Congress, Rep. Aguilar has secured more than $130 million in federal resources for CSUSB’s cybersecurity program as part of his commitment to help connect students to national security jobs and strengthen the Inland Empire’s cybersecurity.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: NASA Enables Construction Technology for Moon and Mars Exploration

    Source: NASA

    One of the keys to a sustainable human presence on distant worlds is using local, or in-situ, resources which includes building materials for infrastructure such as habitats, radiation shielding, roads, and rocket launch and landing pads. NASA’s Space Technology Mission Directorate is leveraging its portfolio of programs and industry opportunities to develop in-situ, resource capabilities to help future Moon and Mars explorers build what they need. These technologies have made exciting progress for space applications as well as some impacts right here on Earth. 
    The Moon to Mars Planetary Autonomous Construction Technology (MMPACT) project, funded by NASA’s Game Changing Development program and managed at the agency’s Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntsville, Alabama, is exploring applications of large-scale, robotic 3D printing technology for construction on other planets. It sounds like the stuff of science fiction, but demonstrations using simulated lunar and Martian surface material, known as regolith, show the concept could become reality. 

    With its partners in industry and academic institutions, MMPACT is developing processing technologies for lunar and Martian construction materials. The binders for these materials, including water, could be extracted from the local regolith to reduce launch mass. The regolith itself is used as the aggregate, or granular material, for these concretes. NASA has evaluated these materials for decades, initially working with large-scale 3D printing pioneer, Dr. Behrokh Khoshnevis, a professor of civil, environmental and astronautical engineering at the University of Southern California in Los Angeles.  
    Khoshnevis developed techniques for large-scale extraterrestrial 3D printing under the NASA Innovative Advanced Concepts (NIAC) program. One of these processes is Contour Crafting, in which molten regolith and a binding agent are extruded from a nozzle to create infrastructure layer by layer. The process can be used to autonomously build monolithic structures like radiation shielding and rocket landing pads. 
    Continuing to work with the NIAC program, Khoshnevis also developed a 3D printing method called selective separation sintering, in which heat and pressure are applied to layers of powder to produce metallic, ceramic, or composite objects which could produce small-scale, more-precise hardware. This energy-efficient technique can be used on planetary surfaces as well as in microgravity environments like space stations to produce items including interlocking tiles and replacement parts. 
    While NASA’s efforts are ultimately aimed at developing technologies capable of building a sustainable human presence on other worlds, Khoshnevis is also setting his sights closer to home. He has created a company called Contour Crafting Corporation that will use 3D printing techniques advanced with NIAC funding to fabricate housing and other infrastructure here on Earth.  
    Another one of NASA’s partners in additive manufacturing, ICON of Austin, Texas, is doing the same, using 3D printing techniques for home construction on Earth, with robotics, software, and advanced material.  

    [embedded content]
    Construction is complete on a 3D-printed, 1,700-square-foot habitat that will simulate the challenges of a mission to Mars at NASA’s Johnson Space Center in Houston, Texas. The habitat will be home to four intrepid crew members for a one-year Crew Health and Performance Analog, or CHAPEA, mission. The first of three missions begins in the summer of 2023.

    The ICON company was among the participants in NASA’s 3D-Printed Habitat Challenge, which aimed to advance the technology needed to build housing in extraterrestrial environments. In 2021, ICON used its large-scale 3D printing system to build a 1,700 square-foot simulated Martian habitat that includes crew quarters, workstations and common lounge and food preparation areas. This habitat prototype, called Mars Dune Alpha, is part of NASA’s ongoing Crew Health and Performance Exploration Analog, a series of Mars surface mission simulations scheduled through 2026 at NASA’s Johnson Space Center in Houston.  
    With support from NASA’s Small Business Innovation Research program, ICON is also developing an Olympus construction system, which is designed to use local resources on the Moon and Mars as building materials. 
    The ICON company uses a robotic 3D printing technique called Laser Vitreous Multi-material Transformation, in which high-powered lasers melt local surface materials, or regolith, that then solidify to form strong, ceramic-like structures. Regolith can similarly be transformed to create infrastructure capable of withstanding environmental hazards like corrosive lunar dust, as well as radiation and temperature extremes.  
    The company is also characterizing the gravity-dependent properties of simulated lunar regolith in an experiment called Duneflow, which flew aboard a Blue Origin reusable suborbital rocket system through NASA’s Flight Opportunities program in February 2025. During that flight test, the vehicle simulated lunar gravity for approximately two minutes, enabling ICON and researchers from NASA to compare the behavior of simulant against real regolith obtained from the Moon during an Apollo mission.    
    Learn more: https://www.nasa.gov/space-technology-mission-directorate/  

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Global: Trump moves to gut low-income energy assistance as summer heat descends and electricity prices rise

    Source: The Conversation – USA – By Conor Harrison, Associate Professor of Economic Geography, University of South Carolina

    Cities like Houston get high humidity in addition to the heat, making summer almost unbearable without cooling. Brandon Bell/Getty Images

    The U.S. is headed into what forecasters expect to be one of the hottest summers on record, and millions of people across the country will struggle to pay their power bills as temperatures and energy costs rise.

    A 2023 national survey found that nearly 1 in 4 Americans were unable to pay their full energy bill for at least one month, and nearly 1 in 4 reported that they kept their homes at unsafe temperatures to save money. By 2025, updated polling indicated nearly 3 in 4 Americans are worried about rising energy costs.

    Conservative estimates suggest that utilities shut off power to over 3 million U.S. households each year because the residents cannot pay their bills.

    This problem of high energy prices isn’t lost on the Trump administration.

    On the first day of his second term in 2025, President Donald Trump declared a national energy emergency by executive order, saying that “high energy prices … devastate Americans, particularly those living on low- and fixed incomes.”

    Secretary of Energy Christopher Wright raised concerns about utility disconnections and outlined a mission to “shrink that number, with the target of zero.”

    Yet, the administration’s 2026 budget proposal zeros out funding for the Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program, or LIHEAP, the federal program that administers funding to help low-income households pay their utility bills. And on April 1, 2025, the administration laid off the entire staff of the LIHEAP office.

    During the hottest periods, even nighttime temperatures might not drop below 90 in Phoenix. Without air conditioning, homes can become dangerously hot.
    Patrick T. Fallon/AFP via Getty Images

    Many people already struggle to cobble together enough help from various sources to pay their power bills. As researchers who study energy insecurity, we believe gutting the federal office responsible for administering energy bill assistance will make it even harder for Americans to make ends meet.

    The high stakes of energy affordability

    We work with communities in South Carolina and Tennessee where many residents struggle to heat and cool their homes.

    We see how high energy prices force people to make dangerous trade-offs. Low-income households often find themselves choosing whether to buy necessities, pay for child care or pay their utility bills.

    One elderly person we spoke with for our research, Sarah, explained that she routinely forgoes buying medications in order to pay her utility bill. Another research participant who connects low-income families to energy bill assistance in Tennessee said: “I’ve gone into these homes, and it’s so hot. Your eyes roll in the back of your head. It’s like you can’t breathe. How do you sit in here? It’s just unreal.”

    Unfortunately, these stories are increasingly common, especially in low-income communities and communities of color.

    Electricity prices are predicted to rise with worsening climate change: More frequent heat waves and extreme weather events drive up demand and put pressure on the grid. Furthermore, rising energy demand from data centers – supercharged by the increasing energy use by artificial intelligence – is accelerating price increases.

    Shrinking resources for assistance

    LIHEAP, created in 1981, provides funding to states as block grants to help low-income families pay their utility bills. In fiscal year 2023, the program distributed US$6.1 billion in energy assistance, helping some 5.9 million households avoid losing power connections.

    The program’s small staff played critical roles in disbursing this money, providing implementation guidelines, monitoring state-level fund management and tracking and evaluating program effectiveness.

    A long line of utility customers wait to apply for help from the Low-Income Energy Assistance Program in Trenton, N.J., in 2011. In 2023, around 6 million households benefited from LIHEAP.
    AP Photo/Mel Evans

    LIHEAP has historically prioritized heating assistance in cold-weather states over cooling assistance in warmer states. However, recent research shows a need to revisit the allocation formula to address the increasing need for air conditioning. The layoffs removed staff who could direct this work.

    It is unlikely that other sources of funding can fill in the gaps if states do not receive LIHEAP funds from the federal government. The program’s funding has never been high enough to meet the need. In 2020, LIHEAP provided assistance to just 16% of eligible households.

    Our research has found that, in practice, many households rely on a range of local nonprofits, faith-based organizations and informal networks of family and friends to help them pay their bills and keep the power on.

    For example, a research participant named Deborah reported that when faced with a utility shut-off, she “drove from church to church to church” in search of assistance. United Way in South Carolina received over 16,000 calls from people seeking help to pay their utility bills in 2023.

    These charitable services are an important lifeline for many, especially in the communities we study in the South. However, research has shown that faith-based programs do not have the reach of public programs.

    Without LIHEAP, the limited funds provided by nonprofits and the personal connections that people patch together will be stretched even thinner, especially as other charitable services, such as food banks, also face funding cuts.

    What’s ahead

    The $4.1 billion that Congress allocated to LIHEAP for the 2025 fiscal year, which ends Sept. 30, has already been disbursed. Going forward, however, cuts to LIHEAP staff affect its ability to respond to growing need. Congress now has to decide if it will kill the program’s future funding as well.

    Maricopa County in Arizona, home to Phoenix, illustrates what’s at stake. Annual heat-related deaths have risen 1,000% there in the past decade, from 61 to 602. Hundreds of these deaths occurred indoors.

    Cooling becomes essential during Arizona’s extreme summers. Maricopa County, home to Phoenix, reported more than 600 heat-related deaths in 2024.
    AP Photo/Ross D. Franklin

    We believe gutting LIHEAP puts the goal of energy affordability for all Americans – and Americans’ lives – in jeopardy. Until more affordable energy sources, such as solar and wind power, can be scaled up, an expansion of federal assistance programs is needed, not a contraction.

    Increasing the reach and funding of LIHEAP is one option. Making home weatherization programs more effective is another.

    Governments could also require utilities to forgive past-due bills and end utility shut-offs during the hottest and coldest months. About two dozen states currently have rules to prevent shut-offs during the worst summer heat.

    For now, the cuts mean more pressure on nonprofits, faith-based organizations and informal networks. Looking ahead to another exceptionally hot summer, we can only hope that cuts to LIHEAP staff don’t foreshadow a growing yet preventable death toll.

    Etienne Toussaint, a law professor at the University of South Carolina, and Ann Eisenberg, a law professor at West Virginia University, contributed to this article.

    Conor Harrison receives funding from the National Science Foundation and the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation.

    Elena Louder receives funding from the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation.

    Nikki Luke receives funding from the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation. She previously worked at the U.S. Department of Energy.

    Shelley Welton receives funding from the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation.

    ref. Trump moves to gut low-income energy assistance as summer heat descends and electricity prices rise – https://theconversation.com/trump-moves-to-gut-low-income-energy-assistance-as-summer-heat-descends-and-electricity-prices-rise-256194

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Global: How redefining just one word could strip the Endangered Species Act’s ability to protect vital habitat

    Source: The Conversation – USA – By Mariah Meek, Associate Professor of Integrative Biology, Michigan State University

    Green sea turtles, like this hatchling in Florida, are endangered due in part to habitat destruction and fishing nets. Keenan Adams/USFWS

    It wouldn’t make much sense to prohibit people from shooting a threatened woodpecker while allowing its forest to be cut down, or to bar killing endangered salmon while allowing a dam to dry out their habitat.

    But that’s exactly what the Trump administration is proposing to do by changing how one word in the Endangered Species Act is interpreted.

    For 50 years, the U.S. government has interpreted the Endangered Species Act as protecting threatened and endangered species from actions that either directly kill them or eliminate their habitat.

    Most species on the brink of extinction are on the list because there is almost no place left for them to live. Their habitats have been paved over, burned or transformed. Habitat protection is essential for their survival.

    The golden-cheeked warbler breeds only in Texas, primarily in Texas Hill Country. It has been losing habitat as development expands in the region.
    Steve Maslowski/USFWS, CC BY

    As an ecologist and a law professor, we have spent our entire careers working to understand the law and science of helping imperiled species thrive. We recognize that the rule change the Trump administration quietly proposed could green-light the destruction of protected species’ habitats, making it nearly impossible to protect those endangered species.

    The public, which has long supported the Endangered Species Act, has until May 19, 2025, to comment on the proposal.

    The legal gambit

    The Endangered Species Act, passed in 1973, bans the “take” of “any endangered species of fish or wildlife,” which includes harming protected species.

    Since 1975, regulations have defined “harm” to include habitat destruction that kills or injures wildlife. Developers and logging interests challenged that definition in 1995 in a Supreme Court case, Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon. However, the court ruled that the definition was reasonable and allowed federal agencies to continue using it.

    In short, the law says “take” includes harm, and under the existing regulatory definition, harm includes indirect harm through habitat destruction.

    Critical habitat throughout the U.S., including many coastlines and mountain areas. Note: Alaska is not to scale.
    U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service

    The Trump administration is seeking to change that definition of “harm” in a way that leaves out habitat modification.

    This narrowed definition would undo the most significant protections granted by the Endangered Species Act.

    Why habitat protection matters

    Habitat protection is the single most important factor in the recovery of endangered species in the United States – far more consequential than curbing direct killing alone.

    A 2019 study examining the reasons species were listed as endangered between 1975 and 2017 found that only 17% were primarily threatened by direct killing, such as hunting or poaching. That 17% includes iconic species such as the red wolf, American crocodile, Florida panther and grizzly bear.

    In contrast, a staggering 81% were listed because of habitat loss and degradation. The Chinook salmon, island fox, southwestern willow flycatcher, desert tortoise and likely extinct ivory-billed woodpecker are just a few examples. Globally, a 2022 study found that habitat loss threatened more species than all other causes combined.

    As natural landscapes are converted to agriculture or taken over by urban sprawl, logging operations and oil and gas exploration, ecosystems become fragmented and the space that species need to survive and reproduce disappears. Currently, more than 107 million acres of land in the U.S. are designated as critical habitat for Endangered Species Act-listed species. Industries and developers have called for changes to the rules for years, arguing it has been weaponized to stop development. However, research shows species worldwide are facing an unprecedented threat from human activities that destroy natural habitat.

    Under the proposed change, development could be accelerated in endangered species’ habitats.

    Gutting the Endangered Species Act

    The definition change is a quiet way to gut the Endangered Species Act.

    It is also fundamentally incompatible with the purpose Congress wrote into the act: “to provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened species depend may be conserved [and] to provide a program for the conservation of such endangered species and threatened species.” It contradicts the Supreme Court precedent, and it would destroy the act’s habitat protections.

    Northern spotted owls, like these fledglings, living in old growth forests in the Pacific Northwest are listed as threatened species because of habitat loss.
    Tom Kogut/USFS, CC BY

    Secretary of the Interior Doug Burgum has argued that the recent “de-extinction” of dire wolves by changing 14 genes in the gray wolf genome means that America need not worry about species protection because technology “can help forge a future where populations are never at risk.”

    But altering an existing species to look like an extinct one is both wildly expensive and a paltry substitute for protecting existing species.

    The Catalina Island fox is endemic to Catalina Island. Habitat loss, diseases introduced by domestic dogs, and predators have diminished the population of these small foxes to threatened status.
    Catalina Island Conservancy/Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-SA

    The administration has also refused to conduct the required analysis of the environmental impact that changing the definition could have. That means the American people won’t even know the significance of this change to threatened and endangered species until it’s too late, though if approved it will certainly end up in court.

    The ESA is saving species

    Surveys have found the Endangered Species Act is popular with the public, including Republicans. The Center for Biological Diversity estimates that the Endangered Species Act has saved 99% of protected species from extinction since it was created, not just from bullets but also from bulldozers. This regulatory rollback seeks to undermine the law’s greatest strength: protecting the habitats species need to survive.

    Congress knew the importance of habitat when it passed the law, and it wrote a definition of “take” that allows the agencies to protect it.

    Mariah Meek has received funding from the National Science Foundation, the US Fish and Wildlife Service, and several state agencies. In addition to being a professor, she is also the Director of Research for The Wilderness Society.

    Karrigan Börk receives grant funding from the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation and several California state agencies. He is on the Advisory Board of Water Audit California, an organization that works to protect California’s public trust resources.

    ref. How redefining just one word could strip the Endangered Species Act’s ability to protect vital habitat – https://theconversation.com/how-redefining-just-one-word-could-strip-the-endangered-species-acts-ability-to-protect-vital-habitat-256424

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI USA: Preparing science educators to use and teach AI in the classroom

    Source: US Government research organizations

    Researchers use fossil shark teeth to excite middle school teachers and students about artificial intelligence

    An interdisciplinary team of researchers funded by the U.S. National Science Foundation has created a teacher-driven curriculum called Shark AI. This optional online program introduces Florida middle school teachers and students to artificial intelligence through the science of paleontology. With Shark AI, science teachers learn how to incorporate AI and machine learning concepts into their classrooms to help their students build essential skills and prepare for 21st-century STEM careers.

    “Most K-12 AI learning occurs with computer science standards and learning goals,” said Bruce MacFadden, University of Florida (UF) distinguished professor and principal investigator (PI) on the project. Shark AI takes a novel approach by using AI to teach concepts that are connected to biology, paleontology and the nature of science, while at the same time connecting to computer science education goals as well,” he said.

    Image showing the Google Teachable Machine model built to identify fossils. Students use this free, online machine learning tool to create their own models to classify fossil shark teeth.

    Developed with and for teachers, Shark AI is a free, optional online curriculum with five flexible modules — all aligned with middle school science standards — that teachers can choose to integrate into their instruction plans. The lessons aim to demystify AI by teaching students about data collection and object classification using fossil shark teeth, showing students how to train and evaluate machine learning models while recognizing a model’s limitations, and supporting students as they create unique AI models.

    But to best prepare students to use AI, teachers must also know how to use the technology. One critical component to using Shark AI is having access to real fossils.

    Credit: Christine Wusylko, University of Florida

    Students measuring real shark teeth fossils.

    “With Shark AI, students have access to high-quality, real fossils that they can touch and feel,” MacFadden said. “The kids love having that, and so do the teachers.”

    The other key piece is the support provided through professional development for Florida middle school educators who are voluntarily implementing Shark AI in their classrooms.

    “If teachers aren’t given opportunities to learn, they can never bring that knowledge back to their schools,” said Seema Naik, an engineer-turned-sixth and eighth grade educator, and this year’s Career Technical Education Rookie Teacher of the Year for her school in Broward County. “I never imagined that you could actually make a connection between fossils and AI, that you can train a model and do this. That was quite fascinating,” she said.

    The Shark AI team hosts a weeklong summer workshop to support teacher cohorts. The educators learn from various experts, including other middle school ‘teacher leaders,’ who use the curriculum.

    Credit: Erika Nortemann/Florida Museum

    Shark AI teacher professional development session showing educators looking at fossil shark teeth.

    “One thing the teacher cohorts enjoy most about the professional development is working with other teachers — their peers — who facilitate a lot of these AI learning experiences,” said Pavlo “Pasha” Antonenko, UF professor of educational technology and co-PI on the project. “From this project, we have learned that teachers can use AI. Teachers are using AI. We just need to help them do it more effectively,” Antonenko said.

    Importantly, this peer-to-peer engagement helped teachers like Naik unpack some of the common misconceptions she and others held about AI.

    “I had several questions and concerns about the technology before I went through the training, but now I am comfortable using AI in my class,” she said. “Learning how AI could be used positively, that was pretty powerful.”

    Credit: UF College of Education, University of Florida

    Shark AI teacher professional development session, where teachers are learning how to use Google Teachable Machine.

    The community teachers develop while participating in the Shark AI training is also key as they navigate the new curriculum. For example, Naik mentioned that some Florida schools use Microsoft applications while others use Google. This caused a few technical hurdles for some of the Shark AI teachers, but they worked together to troubleshoot and ultimately share their best practices.

    And to help teachers make clear connections for their students between the science classroom and the STEM workforce, the project offers “role model visits,” where a research team member visits science classes to engage directly with the students using Shark AI.

    “Going to a class and saying: ‘I am a real scientist, and if you want, you can be too. You are classifying fossils using machine learning tools, and that is exactly what I do as a scientist.’ That is very powerful for teachers, not only for the content support, but also for the science identity that the students might come away with,” MacFadden said.

    Shark AI role model visits, seen here, allow students to learn directly from Shark AI research team members. Starting with 180 students in 2022, Shark AI’s reach has grown exponentially to engage 1,350 total students over three years. And that number is a testament to the research team and the participating teachers.

    For Naik, Shark AI has not only given her a better understanding and confidence to use AI in her science classes, but she recognizes how the curriculum is giving her students “ownership of their learning,” something she says is key as they move into high school and become more self-sufficient.

    “This project really champions teachers,” emphasized Christine Wusylko, UF postdoctoral researcher on the team. “Shark AI teachers feel special, and they feel part of a club. The curriculum is flexible, and it’s led by teachers. And as a former science teacher myself, that is invaluable.”

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Briefing – Addressing menstrual poverty in the EU – 13-05-2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Menstrual poverty, defined as insufficient access to menstrual hygiene products and facilities, affects an estimated 10 % of the half of the EU population who menstruate, with a higher prevalence among people with a low income, refugees, young people, and people with disabilities. Studies from Belgium, France, Germany, and Spain highlight the economic burden menstruation imposes, particularly on vulnerable persons. The COVID 19 pandemic exacerbated this issue by disrupting supply chains and intensifying financial strains. To address menstrual poverty, the European Union has facilitated access to menstrual hygiene products primarily through fiscal reform. The revision of the EU VAT Directive introduced greater flexibility for Member States to apply reduced or zero VAT rates to female sanitary products, shifting their classification from luxury to essential goods. Practices remain quite divergent, with some Member States, such as Ireland, Cyprus and Malta, adopting a zero rate, while others, such as Hungary, Sweden and Denmark, maintain standard rates. EU funding programmes such as Erasmus+ and ESF+ have indirectly supported menstrual health initiatives through education, social inclusion, and material assistance projects. Partnerships with non-governmental organisations, such as the Red Cross, have helped distribute products to marginalised groups. Likewise, numerous local initiatives in Member States increasingly provide free menstrual products in schools, universities, and public spaces. The European Parliament recognises menstrual poverty as a gender equality issue and calls for greater access to free menstrual products. Members continue to urge Member States and the European Commission to introduce concrete initiatives to combat period poverty.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Links between mass immigration and violent crime – E-000536/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    1. The Commission provides statistics through Eurostat, including on migration[1] and crime[2], in accordance with the applicable Regulations and does not collect data as referred to in the Honourable Member’s question. Eurostat focuses on criminal offences as set out in the International Classification of Crime for Statistical Purposes.

    2. Research[3] has revealed different aspects that do not allow for the assumption of a causal link between migration and crime[4]. Taking only a single factor into account creates a biased image[5] and would be misleading.

    3. The Pact on Migration and Asylum was adopted by the European Parliament and the Council in May 2024[6]. It provides for new tools to monitor the implementation of the Common European Asylum System, including a dedicated monitoring by the European Union Asylum Agency.

    • [1] https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/migration-asylum.
    • [2] https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/crime.
    • [3] Research for example from the public research institute ‘Institut Convergences Migrations (IC Migrations)’ https://www.icmigrations.cnrs.fr/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/4_Fiche-insecurite_V3.pdf and http://www.cepii.fr/BLOG/bi/post.asp?IDcommunique=982. Several media shared that research in the past years, for instance: https://www.tf1info.fr/politique/presidentielle-2022-peut-on-dresser-un-lien-direct-entre-immigration-et-delinquance-comme-le-fait-valerie-pecresse-2201402.html; https://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2023/04/21/immigration-les-etrangers-pas-plus-delinquants-que-les-autres-selon-une-etude_6170487_3224.html; https://factuel.afp.com/doc.afp.com.34QB9EL.
    • [4] For example, many condemnations are for misdemeanours and some misdemeanours are specific to foreigners when it is about the policing of regular stay in the EU and cannot therefore be representative of a comparison between nationals and foreigners.
    • [5] Recent analysis by the ifo Institute has shown that ‘More foreigners do not increase Germany’s crime rate’ (press release of 18 February 2025 at https://www.ifo.de/en/press-release/2025-02-18/more-foreigners-do-not-increase-germanys-crime-rate). Media coverage includes the article ‘Study: Immigration has not raised German crime rate’ published by DW on 20 February 2025 at https://www.dw.com/en/study-finds-immigration-has-not-raised-german-crime-rate/a-71691228.
    • [6] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1351/oj/eng.
    Last updated: 12 May 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Highlights – Workshop on Consent-based rape legislation in the EU – Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality

    Source: European Parliament

    On Monday, 19 May 2025, the Policy Department for Citizens, Equality and Culture, at the request of the FEMM Committee, will organise a workshop entitled ‘Consent-based rape legislation in the EU’.

    The workshop will examine key aspects of consent, the state of play of consent-based rape legislation throughout the EU, as well as awareness raising and capacity building in this regard. The workshop proceedings will feed into the joint LIBE-FEMM own-initiative report on the ‘Importance of consent-based rape legislation in the EU’. Members will debate with Sara Uhnoo (University of Gothenburg), Kristien Michielsen (KU Leuven) and Donna von Allemann (Women against Violence Europe Network (WAVE)).

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Replacement of Ukraine with Türkiye as Russian gas transit hub – E-000818/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    One of the Commission’s primary energy policy objective is to successfully implement the RepowerEU plan[1], which entails phasing out Russian energy imports to the EU. The expiry of the gas transit agreement between Russia and Ukraine end of 2024 resulted in the reduction of Russian gas imports to the EU by approximately 15 billion cubic meters per year. To ensure security of supply, the Commission has prepared for months, together with Member States, in anticipation of the end of transit via Ukraine, focusing on securing alternative routes and supplies. Notably, the Commission identified and incentivised Member States to utilise four diversification routes[2] with sufficient capacity, via Germany, Italy, Poland, and Greece. By doing so, the Commission effectively facilitated the EU’s transition towards a more diversified and resilient energy landscape, acting first and foremost in the interest of Member States with fewer supply alternatives.

    The Commission did not intervene in Ukraine’s sovereign decision not to renew its transit agreement with Russia, neither did it intervene in the redirection of volumes via the Turkstream. The end of transit has caused Russia to lose approximatively USD 6.5 billion[3] per year, when the loss of revenues from the transit is estimated at USD 450 million for Ukraine per year.

    • [1] https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal/repowereu-affordable-secure-and-sustainable-energy-europe_en.
    • [2]  https://energy.ec.europa.eu/document/download/e8a46964-f29b-44f8-9410-689f9e34463b_en.
    • [3] ‘Breaking the link: The cost of shutting down Europe’s last Russian gas pipeline’, 13 January 2025, Stockholm School of Economics.
    Last updated: 12 May 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – Discharge 2023: EU general budget – Commission, executive agencies and European Development Funds – P10_TA(2025)0077 – Wednesday, 7 May 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to its decision on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2023, Section III – Commission,

    –  having regard to its decisions on discharge in respect of the implementation of the budgets of the executive agencies for the financial year 2023,

    –  having regard to Rule 101 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the opinions of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Development, the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs, the Committee on the Environment, the Committee on Transport and Tourism, the Committee on Regional Development, the Committee on Culture and Education, the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, the Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality,

    –  having regard to the letter from the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0074/2025),

    A.  whereas the eleventh EDF has reached its final stage as its sunset clause came into effect on 31 December 2020; whereas, however, specific contracts for existing financing agreements were signed until 31 December 2023, and the implementation of the ongoing projects funded by the EDF will continue until their final completion;

    B.  whereas the ninth, tenth and eleventh(1) EDFs were not incorporated into the Union general budget and continue to be implemented and reported on separately until their closure;

    C.  whereas, for the 2021-2027 MFF, development cooperation aid to ACP countries is integrated in the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe (‘NDICI-Global Europe’) as part of the EU general budget, and development cooperation aid to OCTs, including Greenland, has been incorporated into the Decision on the Overseas Association;

    D.  whereas the EDFs are managed almost entirely by the Commission’s DG INTPA with a small proportion (7 %) of the 2023 EDF expenditure being managed by DG NEAR;

    Political priorities

    1.  Underlines its strong commitment to the Union’s fundamental values and principles which are enshrined in the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU); in the framework of the discharge process, stresses especially the principles of sound financial management as set out in Article 317 TFEU and the combatting of fraud and protection of the financial interests of the Union as set out in Article 325 TFEU;

    2.  Underlines the importance of the principle of separation of powers in the Union and recalls that according to the Treaty, the institutions shall practice mutual sincere cooperation; believes that under no circumstances the actions of one Union institution should affect the independence of another institution; urges all other institutions to respect the role of the Parliament as the sole Union institution directly elected by the citizens and to refrain from any undue, direct or indirect interference in its legislative processes, thereby ensuring that Parliament’s decision making-process remains free and independent from other Union institutions or any other entities;

    3.  Highlights the importance of the Union budget for achieving the Union’s political priorities, as well as its role in assisting Member States in unforeseen situations such as international conflicts or crises and their consequences; points out in this regard the continuing relevance of investments and support from the Union budget for reducing disparities between Member States and regions, for promoting economic growth and employment, for combating poverty and social exclusion, and thus for improving the daily life of European citizens;

    4.  Notes that the Court of Auditors (the Court) for the financial year 2023 has issued a clean opinion concerning the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of revenue; at the same time, regrets that the Court has had to issue for the 5th consecutive year an adverse opinion on the legality and regularity of Union budget expenditure and a qualified opinion on the legality and regularity of expenditure under the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF);

    5.  Expresses its deep concerns that the overall error rate estimated by the Court has been on a rising trend since the financial year 2020 and has reached 5,6 % for the financial year 2023; notes that there are significant differences in the error rates between headings which range from spending areas with error rates below the materiality threshold of 2 % up to an error rate of 9,3 % in the case of cohesion policy; further notes that discharge is a political process where all issues related to a specific financial year may be taken into consideration and that the decision on whether to grant or refuse discharge should remain factual and anchored in the Union acquis, and that it is taken for the budget as a whole; urges the Commission, finally, to take into account the Court’s recommendations and to reduce the overall error rate over the coming years; further asks the Commission to present an Action Plan within the four months on reducing the error rate;

    6.  Is concerned that the Commission and the Court have different interpretations of what the “error rate” represents, thus generating confusion; expresses its support for a common audit approach and methodology and strongly calls on both institutions to find a solution to the divergent approaches before the 2024 discharge; is concerned that the Commission is systematically underestimating the existing error level and that this could lead to an ineffective protection of the financial interests of the Union;

    7.  Expresses again its deep its concern that the accumulated outstanding commitments (RAL – reste à liquider) have reached a record level of EUR 543 billion, equivalent to 3,2 % of the total GDP of the Union at the end of 2023 and representing more than double the Union annual budget for 2023; underlines that such a record high level of outstanding commitments risks creating challenges for the future smooth implementation of extraordinary high levels of payments and/or leading to significant decommitments to the detriment of the implementation of Union policy objectives;

    8.  Further expresses its concern that the outstanding debt from borrowing has reached EUR 458,5 billion, equivalent to 2,7 % of the total GDP of the Union at the end of 2023; notes that the increase in outstanding debt during 2023, equivalent to EUR 110,5 billion, has made the Union one of the largest debt issuers in Europe; further notes that the amount of outstanding debt is projected to increase further during the coming years, especially due to increased borrowing linked to the RRF and financial assistance to a number of countries including Ukraine which is the victim of a war of aggression by Russia; reiterates its deep concerns that the increase in debt makes the Union budget more vulnerable to increases in interest rates since a part of the debt will have to be serviced and repaid by the Union budget;

    9.  Recalls the importance of a strict application of the financial rules of the Union in all programmes and on all beneficiaries, in order to avoid all forms of fraud, conflicts of interest, corruption, double funding and money laundering;

    10.  Underlines the importance of the rule of law as one of the fundamental values of the Union and stresses that the Rule of Law Conditionality Mechanism is crucial in order to ensure that Member States continue to respect the principles of the rule of law; reiterates its deep concerns about the deteriorating rule of law situation in certain Member States including attacks or restrictions to the activities of civil society organisations, which not only poses a significant threat to democratic values but also leads to an increased risk of financial losses for the Union budget; calls for the provision of adequate support to civil society organisations active in the field; acknowledges the emergence of new forms of rule of law violations by national governments and calls on the Commission to address these evolving challenges; calls on the Commission to ensure strict and fast implementation of all elements of the mechanism when Member States breach the principles of the rule of law where such breaches affect, or risk affecting, the financial interests of the Union; at the same time, underlines the need for complete and timely information on decisions related to the implementation of the Rule of Law Conditionality Mechanism; encourages the Commission to explicitly assess when shortcomings in the rule of law are of a systemic nature; calls for a stronger emphasis on the implementation of country-specific recommendations, coupled with effective follow-up mechanisms and measurable benchmarks; proposes the establishment of a comprehensive rule of law monitoring framework involving all Union institutions, Member States, and candidate countries, aimed at ensuring coherence and uniformity across the Union, while at the same time ensuring a fair and impartial application; calls on the Commission to propose measures to ensure the protection of final beneficiaries in cases of breaches of the rule of law by national governments without undermining the application and effectiveness of the regulation;

    11.  Takes note of the innovative nature of the RRF and its contribution to supporting Member States in recovering from the economic and social consequences of the pandemic and creating a more resilient European economy; is of the opinion that any shift to a performance-based approach based on the RRF as a model requires addressing the many issues identified in its implementation, as well as assessing data on its full impact, before using such a model; recalls the many problems identified in the implementation of the RRF which would need to be addressed, including, but not limited to: the lack of adequate consultation of the regional and local authorities and other relevant stakeholders, such as social partners and civil society organisations and the lack of their involvement in the implementation; the weak cross border dimension, which may hint to a reduced EU added value in that respect; the lack of a clear definition of the milestones and targets and their satisfactorily fulfilment; the insufficient flexibility; the common debt with long-term debt payment as a consequence; the serious transparency, audit and control problems of the program which make it impossible for the citizens to be informed about the final beneficiaries of actions funded by the Union and pushes Member States to use RRF funds to cover projects very similar to those financed by Cohesion funds but with a much more limited capacity of control; reiterates the concern about the interpretation of the Commission and Member States on what a “final recipient” of RRF funding represents, which is not in line with the agreement of the REPowerEU negotiations and maintains that ministries, public authorities or other contracting authorities cannot be listed as final recipients of RRF funding; further expresses concern about the findings of the Court in relation to the risk of double funding and financing of recurring budgetary expenditure which are not in line with the RRF legal basis;

    12.  Notes that the set-up of the NGEU mechanism implies that the repayment of NGEU loans must start before the end of 2027 and be completed by 2058 at the latest; is concerned that the increase in interest rates over the last years has increased the borrowing costs under the NGEU significantly compared with original estimates; reiterates the need to fully respect the timeline of the legally binding roadmap for the introduction of new own resources and underlines that swift progress on new own resources is essential to repay NGEU and safeguard the current and future MFFs;

    13.  Stresses the urgent need for significant de-bureaucratisation, streamlining and simplification of all Union policies and their funding in line with the recommendations in the Draghi report(2) in order to ease the burdens for European businesses and increase European competitiveness, while ensuring the protection of the financial interests of the Union; underlines that simplification will also have a positive effect on error rates in the implementation of policies because many errors happen because of overcomplicated rules which are difficult to navigate, especially for small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs), new applicants, spin-offs and start-ups;

    14.  Reiterates the need to balance the further simplification of rules and procedures with much more systematic use of digitalised reporting, better and more robust controls and adequate ex post checks on the most repeated areas of irregular spending that do not add excessive bureaucratic complexity for beneficiaries, develop training sessions and practical information for applicants, in particular new applicants, and improve the assistance and guidelines for SMEs, spin-offs, start-ups, administration and payment agencies and all other relevant stakeholders; reminds that a robust control system under the responsibility of the Commission is particularly needed for the RRF;

    15.  Stresses the need and highlights the importance of the NDICI programme for the support to global challenges, the promotion of human rights, freedoms and democracy; underlines the importance of reinforcing the Eastern Neighbourhood line in order to support political, economic and social reforms in this challenged region;

    16.  Underlines that it is imperative for the credibility of the Union that the Commission ensures that no Union funds are allocated to individuals or organisations linked to any kind of terrorist movements or any other movement expressing extremist views, inciting violence and/or hatred, that are directly in opposition to the European Union’s fundamental values, including Islamist anti-Semitic, anti-Christian and anti-Islamic movements; in this context, recalls that there have been allegations that 19 of 13 000 UNRWA employees in Gaza were involved in the despicable terrorist attacks by Hamas against Israel on 7 October; recalls that in 9 cases their employment was formally terminated in the interests of UNRWA; takes note of the results of the investigation launched by the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS); underlines that the Commission should also establish better controls ensuring that no such funding happens indirectly through third parties and organise better traceability of Union funds to final beneficiaries;

    17.  Reiterates deep concerns about the increase in the exploitation of Union funds against Union principles and values, especially when the use of funds and transfers to other organisations are not entirely traceable; warns of the danger of Union funds ultimately being used within corrupt circles and being subject to fraud and irregularities, foreign interference or entrism; emphasises the importance of ‘final beneficiary transparency’ for Union funds;

    18.  Emphasises the importance of maintaining institutional integrity and preventing potential foreign interference; condemns any improper attempt to influence the legislative activities of the European Parliament; insists on the responsibility of OLAF to conduct all necessary in-depth investigations; stresses the importance of the work carried out by the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) in protecting the European Union’s financial interests; insists to provide to the EPPO adequate financial and human resources; recalls the Agreement establishing an interinstitutional body for ethical standards for members of institutions and advisory bodies referred to in Article 13 of the Treaty on European Union, and insist on its swift implementation in all EU institutions;

    19.  Recalls the crucial role of civil society organisations (CSOs), including NGOs, in upholding democratic values to support a vibrant and lively democratic society, ensuring a sound basis for broad coverage of all relevant views in different debates and highlights that CSOs may receive support from Union funds to exercise these functions, as provided in Article 11 of the Treaty on European Union;

    20.  Notes that there have been allegations from some Members of the Budgetary Control committee that grant agreements, concluded by the Commission included detailed lobbying activities which could be interpreted as potentially interfering with internal decision making in the Union Institutions; notes that the Commission took a series of measures to address the allegations by adopting guidance on funding for activities related to the development, implementation, monitoring and enforcement of Union legislation and policy, stating that while such grant agreements did not breach the EU legal framework, they could potentially entail a reputational risk for the Union; notes that all grant agreements include a disclaimer stating that ‘views of the beneficiary do not in any way represent views of the EU and that granting authority cannot be held responsible for them’; notes that such a disclaimer was further added in the 2024 call for proposals for operation grants;

    21.  Notes that a screening of grant agreements in all portfolios to verify their alignment with the new guidance is ongoing and that, so far, the Commission has not communicated to the Parliament the full results of the screening nor other measures that the Commission might take, if necessary; calls the Commission to keep the discharge authority informed at all times; emphasises that transparency in stakeholder meetings is fundamental to democratic integrity and should apply equally to all entities engaging with Union institutions; stresses that clear documentation and disclosure of such interactions strengthens public trust and democratic accountability;

    22.  Recalls that EU funding requires stringent accountability and transparency standards; in line with the ECA recommendations in the Special Report 05/2024(3) and the recent special Report 11/2025(4), urges the Commission to ensure that the information disclosed in the Financial Transparency System is frequently updated, reliable, comparable and useful; stresses the need to allocate additional resources to the EUTR Secretariat to enable a systematic and thorough monitoring of the Transparency Register; this should include allocating resources towards AI implementation to develop an AI based search mechanism; recalls the need to proactively check that all entities beneficiaries of EU funds respect EU values;

    23.  Welcomes the reply of Commissioner Serafin to the written question(5), once again confirming EU funding was granted and used by NGOs in full respect of EU Treaties and LIFE Regulation(6); takes further note of the recent ECA Special Report on transparency of EU funding granted to NGOs(7), which, while stating that the use of EU funding for NGO advocacy is legal, also confirms it is in line with EU’s legal transparency requirements as laid down in the EU Financial Regulation; at the same time ECA SR 11/2025 points to the fact that more should be done to improve transparency of EU funding received by all beneficiaries; calls in this regard on the Commission to implement ECA recommendations regarding screening of self-declarations in the EU’s Financial Transparency System, as well as proactive monitoring of the respect to EU fundamental values and principles by the beneficiaries;

    24.  Welcomes the entry into force of the recast of the Financial Regulation; welcomes, in particular, the enhancements related to tracking Union funds through digital tools and interoperability that will bolster the protection of the Union Financial Interests, the targeted extension of the Early Detection and Exclusion System (EDES) to shared management following MFF 2027, the reference to the Rule of Law conditionality mechanism and the introduction of a conditionality based on Union values as enshrined in Article 2 TEU, as well as the opportunity to streamline SMEs and individual applicants with the introduction of very low-value grants;

    CHAPTER 1 – Multi-annual Financial Framework (MFF)

    The European Court of Auditors’ statement of assurance and budgetary and financial management

    Reliability of the accounts

    25.  Welcomes the Court’s conclusion in its annual report on the implementation of the budget for the financial year 2023(8), that the consolidated accounts of the European Union for that year are reliable; notes that the Court has issued a clean opinion on the reliability of the accounts every year since 2007;

    26.  Notes that on 31 December 2023, total liabilities amounted to EUR 679,9 billion, and total assets amounted to EUR 467,7 billion; notes that the difference of EUR 212,2 billion represents the negative net assets, comprising debt and the portion of expenses already incurred by the Union up to 31 December 2023 that must be funded by future budgets;

    27.  Notes that at the end of 2023, the estimated value of incurred but not yet claimed eligible expenses due to beneficiaries, recorded as accrued expenses, was EUR 155,2 billion (2021: EUR 148,7 billion), of which EUR 7,4 billion is related to accrued RRF expenditure;

    28.  Welcomes the Court’s conclusion that the assets, liabilities, revenue and expenses, including those related to NextGenerationEU (NGEU), the estimate related to the UK’s withdrawal process, and the impact of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, are presented fairly in the consolidated annual accounts;

    Legality and regularity of Union revenue

    29.  Notes the Court’s conclusion that the Union’s revenue is free from material error and that the managing systems examined by the Court were generally effective;

    Legality and regularity of Union expenditure

    30.  Strongly regrets the adverse opinion on the legality and regularity of the Union budget expenditure issued by the Court for the fifth year in a row; considers this increasingly problematic, as the Commission seems unable, or unwilling, to identify the cause and address the underlying issues; regrets the Commission is not accepting some recommendations of the Court of Auditors; notes in particular the importance of reinforcement of financial management of the Commission and Member States, that is considered as not reliable by the Court and therefore compromises the reliability of the Annual Management and Performance Report; calls on the Commission to present a clear action plan on reducing the error rate within the following four months; stresses that Parliament shall duly scrutinise such an action plan;

    31.  Is seriously concerned by the Court’s estimation of the error level of 5,6 % in 2023 expenditure; notes that this is an accelerated deterioration compared to the previous two years (4,2 % in 2022 and 3.0 % in 2021); notes with concern that the Court continues to detect substantial issues in reimbursement-based expenditure where the estimated level of error is 7,9 %; notes that the effect of the errors found by the Court is estimated to be both material and pervasive; calls for the Commission’s financial management to be tightened up, in accordance with the recommendations made by the Court in its Annual Reports and Special Reports, in order to resolutely tackle the high error rate over the next few years; underlines the Court’s warning that the increasing European debt is placing growing pressure on the Union budget;

    32.  Notes that the Commission in its Annual Management and Performance Report categorises the expenditure into higher, medium and lower risk categories, in order to focus action on high-risk areas; while the Court uses only two risk categories in order to produce an opinion on the legality and regularity of the expenditures; is worried that the Court’s work revealed limitations in the Commission’s ex-post work, which, taken together, affect the robustness of the Commission’s risk assessment; notes with concern that one of the areas most impacted was ‘Cohesion, resilience and values’, where the Court assessed the majority of the spending to be high risk, while the Commission classified only a minority in this way;

    33.  Reiterates the concerns about the Court observation that the Commission’s risk assessment is likely to underestimate the level of risk in several areas; is also worried by recurrent weaknesses identified by the Court in Member States’ management and control systems, which are still not still preventing or detecting irregularities in heading 2, thus limiting the reliance that can be placed on their work, while the Commission’s error rates do still rely on these national systems, which do not work effectively;

    34.  Notes that the increase is primarily caused by the estimated level of error under MFF heading 2 – cohesion, resilience and values, where the Court found 9,3 % of expenditure to be in breach of Union rules and regulations; recalls the underlying issues that are reported by the Court and that have been known for several years;

    35.  Underlines that the estimated level of error in the Union’s expenditure, as presented in the Court’s statement of assurance, is an estimate of the money that should not have been paid out because it was not used in accordance with the applicable rules and regulations; considers that, though not an indicator of fraud or corruption, the estimated level of error represents expenditure where corrective actions are necessary, and thus shows a wasteful use of resources; regrets that, while being a problem in itself, this will also give a negative impression to citizens, and may even call into question the Commission’s ability to effectively protect the Union’s financial interests;

    36.  Notes with concern that the Commission´s own estimate of the risk at payment is only 1,9 % for 2023 and has been at that level since 2020; notes that the Commission estimates its capacity to correct and recover irregular expenditure during implementation of the associated programmes at 1,0 %, resulting in a risk at closure of 0,9 %; is concerned that again for this year the Commission’s risk at payment is not only below the Court estimated level of error of 5,6 % but also below the Court range, which is between 4,4 % and 6,8 %; highlights that the divergence between the Court’s overall error rate and the Commission’s risk at payment is also evident in some of the specific spending areas, in particular in heading 2, even more than in the past; welcomes the Court’s estimate of the level of error as an important indicator for the existing risks;

    37.  Notes the multi-annual perspective of the Commission’s risk at closure, as corrections and recoveries after year-end are not reflected in the Court’s estimate of the level of error; regrets, however, the confusion caused by the Commission’s presentation of the risk at payment;

    38.  Recalls the positions expressed in the 2022 discharge resolution and the exchanges of views in the discharge hearings for the financial year 2023 on the diverging methodologies and estimates between the Court and the Commission of errors made in Union expenditure; notes in particular that the Court’s error rate is based on a statistical sample, whereas the Commission’s risk at payment is to a large extent compiled from the error rates reported by national auditing authorities in Member States and calculated only after corrections and repayments; reminds that the Court’s error rate includes the errors that remained undetected by the Member States and the Commission, which demonstrates that the Commission’s error rates are an underestimation; notes with concern an even wider gap between the Court’s and Commission’s estimates; further notes that the Commission and the Court are organising joint workshops on this issue; notes that the Court recently aligned its methodology on procurement in the decentralised agencies with the methodology of the Commission; reiterates its support for the independent audit approach and methodology of the Court and invites the Commission to cooperate with the Court with a view to increasing harmonisation and providing for more comparable estimates of the level of error;

    39.  Recalls that the discharge authority needs a statement of assurance, provided by the Court, on the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions at year-end for its decision on discharge for that year; notes that Union spending programmes are multiannual and that their management and control systems cover multiple years, allowing for corrections and recoveries after year-end;

    40.  Recalls that the Commission is responsible for preventing and detecting fraud; notes that the Court, in the exercise of its mandate, is obliged to report any cases of irregularity; notes that the Court forwards to the EPPO suspicions of criminal offences falling under its competences and to OLAF suspicions of fraud, corruption or other illegal activity affecting the Union’s financial interests; notes that, in 2023, the Court reported 20 cases of suspected fraud to OLAF, and in parallel reported 12 of these cases to the EPPO, resulting so far in four OLAF investigations and nine EPPO investigations; commends the Court for its reporting of cases of irregularity to OLAF and the EPPO, as information resulting from audit engagements usually has a high degree of reliability; reminds in this framework of the key role played by the whole Union’s anti-fraud architecture and expresses some concerns about the refusal of some Member States to cooperate with one of its elements, the EPPO;

    Budgetary and financial management

    41.  Notes that in 2023, 98,9 % of the available commitment appropriations were used (EUR 184,4 billion out of EUR 186,5 billion); notes that the available appropriations were higher than the MFF ceiling of EUR 182,7 billion due to the use of special instruments for new or unforeseen events; notes that 90,0 % of payment appropriations were used (EUR 162,0 billion of EUR 165,2 billion available);

    42.  Notes with concern that the total outstanding commitments, which represent future debts if not decommitted, reached an all-time high of EUR 543 billion (2022: EUR 450 billion); notes that the Commission foresees a decrease from 2025 to 2029 when committed amounts for both NGEU and the 2021-2027 programming period should be paid out; notes however that the actual amounts for 2023 (EUR 543 billion) are much higher than the forecasted amount (EUR 490 billion), calling the Commission’s estimates into question;

    43.  Recalls that the time available for implementing shared management funds under the 2021-2027 MFF is shorter than under previous MFFs because of the n+2 for the last year, which, coupled with the high RAL, will raise the risk of decommitments; notes the Court’s observation that the Commission has increased its forecasted amount of decommitments from EUR 7,6 billion for 2023-2027, to EUR 8,1 billion for 2024-2027 to EUR 8,8 billion for 2025-2027, a 15 % increase in 2 years; underlines with concern that the Commission has underestimated its projections for the RAL in the last two years, and that the Commission therefore likely underestimates the amount of decommitments that will be made until 2027; notes the introduction of the “cascade mechanism” following the mid-term review of the MFF 2021-2027 and the incentive to use decommitted amounts to cover increased interest costs for amounts borrowed by the Commission for NGEU;

    44.   Notes that the latest long-term payment forecast produced by the Commission foresees substantial decommitments as of 2027 unless Member States undertake additional efforts and implement at a much faster pace than in the period 2014-2020; notes that for the CF, ERDF, and ESF+ cohesion policy funds, the Commission forecast total decommitments for 2024-2027 at EUR 2,2 billion, more than five times its 2022 forecast of EUR 0,4 billion; warns that for the Just Transition Fund (JTF), the low implementation in 2023 puts important amounts at risk from 2025 onwards; calls on the Commission and on the Member States to use all of the available possibilities to avoid decommitments;

    45.  Notes with concern that Union debt increased from EUR 344,3 billion in 2022 to EUR 458,5 billion in 2023, 60 % of which is related to NGEU; notes that only for the debt issued for NGEU, associated interest costs need to be paid directly from the Union Budget and that, due to increased interest rates, these costs for the current MFF (until the end of 2027) are estimated to be between EUR 17 billion and EUR 27 billion higher than the initially forecasted EUR 14,9 billion;

    46.  Notes with concern that the total exposure of the Union budget because of guarantees and contingent liabilities for loans rose to EUR 298,0 billion; notes that assumptions on capital-market interest should be made conservatively, both for existing debt and new debt and that for both categories a viable plan for its repayment is necessary; notes that the Court received information from the Commission that indicates that the exposure will steadily increase in the coming years, putting additional pressure on the headroom of the budget and further reducing the flexibility of the Union budget; supports the Court recommendations to the Commission to act more proactively to ensure that its mitigating tools (such as the Common Provisioning Fund) have sufficient capacity as well as to provide more transparent reporting on total annual budget exposure, making its estimate public;

    47.  Notes with concern that the Court in its Special Report 07/2024(9) observed that a significant share of recovery orders issued between 2014 and 2022 were still outstanding at the time of their audit; further notes that the Commission, in its replies to the Parliament’s Committee on Budgetary Control’s (CONT Committee) written questions for the 2023 discharge, mentioned that there are 1 357 overdue recovery orders for a total outstanding amount of approximately EUR 335 million for the period 2014-2023; calls on the Commission to prioritise collecting monies under overdue recovery orders and to keep the Committee on Budgetary Control informed about progress made;

    48.  Highlights that equality is a founding value of the Union and is enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union; recalls the commitment of the Union to gender mainstreaming in its policy-making and implementation of Union funds, including gender budgeting; encourages the Commission to continue the efforts made in gender budgeting and in tracking the impact of the Union budget to foster gender equality; recalls the obligation of the Commission to accompany all legislative proposals with an impact assessment when they are projected to have a significant economic, social, and environmental impact in order to guarantee, among other things, fair distribution of funds;

    49.  Notes that the review of the Interinstitutional Agreement on the Transparency Register is due by July 2025; calls on the Commission to ensure that the process is as open as possible, to align financial reporting requirements across all categories of registrants (including funding sources and lobbying budgets), addressing also the risk identified in the Court’s Special Report on the EU Transparency Register (SR 05/2024) regarding self-declarations on the category of interest representation; believes that, in order to address the recommendations of the Court, the resources of the secretariat of the Transparency Register should be increased;

    50.  Recalls the following findings of the Court of Auditors’ Special Report 11/2025: (i) that the identification and registration of entities as NGOs are not always consistent and reliable; (ii) that despite a more streamlined granting process, issues with the completeness and accuracy of data remain; (iii) that the lack of a reliable overview of Union spending on NGOs hampers useful analysis; (iv) that the calls for proposals in the Court’s sample were transparent; (v) that respect for Union values is not pro-actively verified; and (vi) that transparency practices vary widely in the Court’s sample, with larger NGOs performing better. calls on the Commission to fully implement the recommendations in the Court’s Special Report;

    Recommendations

    51.  Strongly supports the recommendations of the Court in its annual report on the implementation of the budget for the financial year 2023 (annual report for the 2023 financial year)(10) as well as in related special reports; calls on the Commission to implement them without delay and to keep the discharge authority informed on the progress of the implementation;

    52.  Calls on the Court to look for ways, together with the Commission, to align their methodologies for the general budget, as in the case of procurement for the decentralised agencies, while respecting the different roles;

    53.  Calls on the Commission, in particular, to:

       (i) continue to engage with the Court in order to increase understanding, convergence and comparability of the two approaches to the diverging estimates of errors in Union expenditure;
       (ii) qualify the impact of corrective measures on the overall level of error;
       (iii) look for ways, together with the Court, to align their methodologies as regards the evaluation of procurement errors, and the estimation of the level of error for the general budget, as in the case of procurement for the decentralised agencies, while respecting the different roles;
       (iv) present the discharge authority with a strategy to strengthen the use of funds for their intended purpose, increase absorption and prevent decommitments in order to maximise the EU-added value of the Union Budget;
       (v) increase the reliability of the forecast of the outstanding commitments with a more realistic estimate of the absorption of Union funds to give the discharge authority a better forecast of the development of the RAL over the years and better protect the Union budget;
       (vi) report on, and provide sufficient measures to, protecting the Union budget from the different risks identified beyond the RAL, such as decommitments in cohesion policy, the increasing debt, increased budget exposure and the impact of increasing inflation;
       (vii) provide more transparent reporting on total annual budget exposure by presenting, in the Annual Management and Performance Report, a multi-annual outlook on the exposure of the Union Budget to budgetary guarantees;
       (viii) substantially simplify rules and procedures and improve the assistance to, and ensure consistent and user-friendly guidelines for SMEs, new applicants, spin-offs, start-ups, administration and payment agencies, CSOs and all other relevant stakeholders, without compromising the quality of the controls;
       (ix) make sure that the mitigation tools in place have sufficient capacity to effectively face the exposure risks of the Union budget;
       (x) boost efforts to improve transparency in the use of funds, including as regards information on final beneficiaries, including on the funds that are allocated for the preparation of policy and legislative proposals;
       (xi) put in place all necessary means for ensuring that all interest representatives that approach Union institutions are registered in the Transparency Register; further asks the Commission to set up an effective mechanism to ensure that entities funded by the Union in the Transparency Register are aligned with Union values and demand full transparency on their financing, providing a deeper insight into the financing of all entities registered and which should be the condition to approach all Union institutions, bodies and agencies;
       (xii) together with Parliament and Council, guarantee adequate resources for the secretariat of the Transparency Register in order to ensure that the entries on the lobbying activities of all interest representatives can be checked for accuracy and that lobbying become more transparent as requested in the Court in Special Report 05/2024 on the EU Transparency Register; calls on the Commission to allocate adequate resources to identify irregularities to guarantee a wide range of search capabilities;
       (xiii) require interest representatives in the Transparency Register to list their financial supporters by self-declaring that they are only representing their interests or the collective interests of their members and to propose an amendment to Annex II to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 20 May 2021 to require them to list their financial supporters in the EU Transparency Register, even if they state in that register that they are only representing the interests of their own members; urges entities already registered that have not listed their financial resources by self-declaration to declare them voluntarily before the interinstitutional agreement is amended;
       (xiv) continue to support Member States in improving both the quality and the quantity of checks and to share best practices in the fight against fraud and corruption;
       (xv) address the situation regarding late recovery orders and to take all necessary measures to recover the majority of the amount outstanding for the period 2014-2023, including implementation of corporate escalation mechanisms, and keep the discharge authority informed on the progress made in recovering the sums;
       (xvi) reinforce the capacity of the Anti-fraud Architecture of the Union, including the provision of sufficient financial and human resources, and facilitate the cooperation between them;

    Revenue

    54.  Welcomes that for 2023, the Court is also able to issue a clean opinion on the legality and regularity of revenue; at the same time, stresses that the problems with customs duties not being declared or being incorrectly declared (a customs gap) leading to a shortfall in collected import duties has been a persistent problem for many years and could potentially entail a loss of traditional own resources for the Union and for the Member States;

    55.  Notes with serious concern that the Court has examined the implementation of the Commission’s Customs Action Plan, which has the potential to lead to a significant reduction of the customs gap, and has again identified insufficient progress in the implementation of some actions from this plan; notes that the Commission, as part of this plan, proposed a customs reform in May 2023(11), including the establishment of the EU Customs Authority and EU Customs Data Hub;

    56.  Recalls that the Court has highlighted the risks to the EU’s financial interests from inadequate or ineffective customs controls of imported goods; commends the efforts made by OLAF on the fight against Fraud linked to customs duties and VAT; underlines the rise of the ecommerce and the online platforms risks due to potential security and safety threats and risk of non-compliance with EU taxation and customs rules, product standards, intellectual property rights, prohibitions and restrictions;

    57.  Notes with concern that the Court revealed that the Commission did not charge late interest payments for six cases related to late corrections to GNI data by Member States where the Commission has expressed reservations; agrees with the Court that the Commission, as a matter of principle, ought to charge late interest payments in such cases in order to create an incentive for Member States to address the reservations within the deadlines;

    58.  Notes with satisfaction that the new own resource based on non-recycled plastic packaging waste generated by Member States in 2023 amounted to EUR 7,2 billion, equivalent to 4,0 % of the EU’s total revenue; further notes that the Court identified(12) some problems related to the reliability and comparability of data; stresses that it provides an excellent example of a new own resource, as it creates positive incentives for Member States to reduce the volume of non-recycled plastic packaging while at the same time generating a new revenue stream for the Union;

    59.  Stresses that the Commission’s proposals concerning new own resources from 2021 comprising three elements, the first based on revenues from emissions trading (ETS), the second drawing on the resources generated by the Union’s carbon border adjustment mechanism, and the third based on the share of residual profits from multinationals that will be re-allocated to Member States under the OECD/G20 agreement on a re-allocation of taxing rights (“Pillar One”) are obvious candidates for such new resources; at the same time, points out that other sources might also be considered if they should prove to be easier for Member States to approve; welcomes other initiatives that may lead to new own resources for the Union budget;

    60.  Calls on the Commission, in particular, to:

       (i) increase focus and pressure on the implementation of the Customs Action Plan and not least the proposal for a significant customs reform from May 2023, including the establishment of the EU Customs Authority and EU Customs Data Hub; ensure that Member States implement effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties for non-compliance with reporting obligations; initiate infringement proceedings in those cases where there is sufficient evidence that Member States are implementing a manifestly inadequate penalty system for breaches of the Directive on Administrative Cooperation 6(13) (DAC 6);
       (ii) insist on the importance of intensifying and diversifying the International customs cooperation with trade partners and stresses the need to strengthen the fight against cross-border tax and customs fraud in the context of the expansion of e-commerce;
       (iii) create incentives for Member States to address reservations related to corrections of GNI data by Member States within the deadlines by charging late interest payments;
       (iv) continue work towards the introduction of additional new own resources;

    Single market, Innovation and Digital

    61.  Notes that the budget for the programmes under MFF heading 1 ‘Single Market, Innovation and Digital’ was EUR 25,3 billion (13,2 % of the Union budget) distributed as follows: EUR 15,3 billion (60,5 %) for Research, EUR 4,1 billion (16,1 %) for Transport, Energy and Digital, EUR 2,3 billion (9,1 %) for the InvestEU Programme, EUR 2,2 billion (8,7 %) for Space, and EUR 1,4 billion (5,6 %) for other areas;

    62.  Notes that the Court has examined 127 transactions covering the full range of spending under this MFF heading, notably the Horizon 2020 programme (90 transactions), Horizon Europe (7 transactions), the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF), space programmes and financial instruments, and also that it has reviewed the European Climate, Infrastructure and Environment Executive Agency’s (CINEA) ex ante control system for CEF grants in the transport and energy sectors and the regularity information given in the annual activity reports of the Directorate-General for Research and Innovation (DG RTD) and the European Health and Digital Executive Agency (HaDEA);

    63.  Notes that the Court estimates that the level of error in spending on ‘Single Market, Innovation and Digital’ in 2023 was material at 3,3 %; notes the Court’s observation that research and innovation expenditure is most affected by error, particularly in the area of personnel costs; further notes that the Commission estimates the risk at payment as 1,4 % for this heading, which is in the lower half of the range of the Court’s estimate; is concerned by the Court’s conclusion that the Commission’s risk at payment for this heading remains an underestimate, because of weaknesses identified by the Court in the Commission’s ex post audits in this area since the financial year 2019(14);

    64.  Notes with concern that 39 (31 %) of the 127 transactions that the Court examined contained errors; is deeply concerned that for seven cases of quantifiable errors made by beneficiaries, the Commission (or the auditors contracted by the beneficiaries) had sufficient information to prevent, or to detect and correct the error before accepting the expenditure, and thus, had the Commission made proper use of all the information at their disposal, the estimated level of error for this chapter would have been 1,4 percentage points lower; highlights that this points to weaknesses in the Commission’s controls;

    Research and innovation

    65.  Highlights the importance of Union research and innovation (R&I) funding programmes for the scientific, societal, economic and technological development of the Union, reducing inequalities, achieving the green and digital transitions and decreasing the Union’s energy dependency on Russia; recalls that Horizon Europe is the most significant research and innovation programme in Europe, with a total budget of EUR 95,5 billion for 2021-2027, including EUR 5,4 billion from the NGEU instrument; notes that the RRF has allocated around EUR 48 billion in investments to R&I; underlines that in order to enhance the Union’s competitiveness and close the innovation gap, additional funding for R&I is needed, taking into account the Draghi report’s pertinent recommendations; highlights, in particular, the need to increase defence-related R&I spending due to the current geopolitical conditions, which could serve as an important component of the innovation policy strategy;

    66.  Notes that its predecessor, Horizon 2020, with a budget of EUR 75,6 billion funded more than 35 000 projects between 2014 and 2020 and its calls attracted over a million individual applications from 177 countries; further notes that in her hearing for the 2023 discharge, Commissioner Ivanova underlined the EU added value of EU R&I funding programmes, explaining that the final evaluation of Horizon 2020 estimated that, for each euro of costs linked to the programme five euros worth of benefits would be generated for society by 2040; deeply regrets that 74 % of proposals assessed as high quality by independent experts could not be funded due to budget constraints; notes that an additional EUR 159 billion would have been needed to fund all high-quality proposals; stresses the importance of ensuring sufficient funding for Union research and innovation, not the least to increase the Union’s competitiveness and prosperity, in line with the Union’s strategic agenda for 2024-2029;

    67.  Notes the late adoption of the Horizon Europe legal bases in 2021 and welcomes that the Commission managed to reach close to 100 % budget implementation in 2023; notes that the number of grant agreements signed by the end of 2023 was 10 674 and a further two framework agreements were signed;

    68.  Notes with concern that the Court found errors relating to ineligible costs in 30 of the 97 research and innovation transactions in its sample, and that these errors represent 71 % of the Court’s estimated level of error for this heading in 2023; reiterates its concern that after 9 years of implementation of the Horizon 2020 programme, the calculation of personnel costs remains a major source of errors, as 22 of the 30 research transactions with quantifiable errors in the Court’s sample (around 73 %) are affected by the incorrect application of the methodology for calculating personnel costs; acknowledges both the Commission’s and the Court’s continued efforts to remedy this situation; welcomes that the Commission has accepted the Court’s recommendations to enhance beneficiaries’ compliance with the daily-rate rules and to ensure clarity concerning daily-rate rules in Horizon Europe documents;

    69.  Underlines the importance of simplifying the rules and procedures governing Union R&I funding; notes that in 2023 the Commission has continued the roll out of simplified cost options such as lump sums and unit costs in Horizon Europe; further notes the remarks made by the Director-General for Research and Innovation in the exchange of views with the CONT Committee that the Commission intends to increase the disbursement of Horizon Europe funds through lump sums to 50 % by 2027; welcomes that the Commission, taking the Court’s recommendations issued in its annual reports for 2022 into account, will further specify the requirements defining the proper implementation of lump sum grants, including the elements of each work package triggering payment, and will also provide detailed guidance to those involved in assessing the implementation of projects; further notes that, as described in the Commission’s assessment of Lump Sum Funding in Horizon 2020 and Horizon Europe 2018-2024, beneficiaries would welcome more clarity on how lump sum grants would be audited; is concerned that the ex post audit strategy for Horizon Europe is not yet developed;

    70.  Stresses the crucial role of the private sector in addressing the innovation gap in the Union and improving the Union’s competitiveness and prosperity; believes, in particular, that it is imperative to continue to promote and facilitate as much as possible the participation of SMEs in Union R&I funding programmes; notes the Court’s conclusion that SMEs and newcomers are more prone to making errors than other beneficiaries since they lack the experience and resources to administer the funds; welcomes the efforts made by the Commission to support SMEs specifically, for example through information campaigns, contacts with the system of National Contact Points and the dedicated helpdesk of the Research Enquiry Service; considers that the simplification of rules and procedures is the major driver for increased participation of SMEs;

    Energy, Transport and Digital

    71.  Highlights the importance of Union investments in the development of high performing, sustainable and efficiently interconnected trans-European networks in the fields of transport, energy and digital services and notes that the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF), with EUR 4,1 billion of expenditure in 2023, is a key Union instrument in delivering these objectives;

    72.  Draws attention to the need to simplify the application procedures under the Connecting Europe Facility for Transport (CEF-T) in order to enable greater participation of smaller entities and local initiatives in the development of European transport infrastructure; regrets that the CEF-T budget does not cover all the needs for sustainable transport investments and that most of the CEF-T budget has already been allocated, leaving a funding gap until 2027;

    73.  Recalls that the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and the resulting sanctions imposed on Russia continued to adversely impact the Union’s transport sector in 2023, leading to traffic shortages, supply chain bottlenecks, and the necessity to bypass traditional routes, thereby extending journey times and increasing costs; points out that the Eastern border regions, especially in the Baltic states, Finland, Poland, and Romania, have been particularly affected by economic losses and a halt of cross-border mobility as a consequence of the Russian aggression; calls on the Commission to introduce targeted measures, including in the next MFF, to facilitate recovery of the affected regions;

    74.  Calls on the Commission to conduct a comprehensive review of the funding allocated to the cross-border and multi-country infrastructure projects, facing significant implementation challenges, financial difficulties, or delays, such as Rail Baltica; points out that this review should address inefficiencies in planning and management as well as escalating construction costs that threaten project timelines and objectives; reiterates that greater transparency in the management of public funds increases citizens’ trust in the Union institutions;

    75.  Notes with concern that the Court found two errors in CEF projects in its 2023 sample, and that one of these relates to a serious breach of the Union’s public procurement rules, and has led to the contract being awarded to a consortium that did not fulfil the selection criteria and that this error contributed 28 % to the estimated error rate for heading 1;

    76.  Is deeply concerned by the Court’s findings in relation to the European Climate, Infrastructure and Environment Executive Agency’s (CINEA)ex ante control system for CEF grants in the transport and energy sectors, in particular the Court’s conclusion that while the strategies for both CEF1 (2014-2020) and CEF2 (2021-2027) are based on a sound analysis of risks and past irregularities, the guidelines for ex-ante checks on procurement were not detailed enough; fully supports the Court’s recommendation that the Commission should further develop these guidelines;

    Recommendations

    77.  Calls on the Commission to:

       (i) secure the provision of adequate resources to support high-quality research and innovation project proposals with an EU added value in the short-term through the 2026 draft budget and in the medium-term through the Commission’s proposal for the next Multiannual Financial Framework;
       (ii) continue to simplify rules and procedures in line with the new financial regulation, to support training sessions and user-friendly, consistent and practical information for applicants in Member States, in particular for SMEs, new applicants, spin-offs, start-ups, CSOs or local action groups and to encourage applications from beneficiaries in Member States with more limited participation, as well as from smaller entities;
       (iii) continue to apply simplified rules and procedures, digitalisation measures and simplified cost options (SCOs) while addressing, in particular, the risk of irregularities and fraud and the costs of controls, and finalising the ex post audit strategy for Horizon Europe as soon as possible;
       (iv) further specify the requirements for defining proper implementation of lump sum grants, taking into account the Court’s pertinent recommendations from its 2022 Annual Report, and verify the actual implementation of projects using lump sums;
       (v) undertake a thorough analysis of procurement errors found and further develop the guidelines describing the extent of the checks to be performed for ex ante controls on procurement for CEF projects, as recommended by the Court;

    Cohesion, Resilience and Values

    78.  Stresses the importance of Union cohesion policy for economic and territorial convergence and development in the regions of the Union, as well as for supporting the implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights; notes that the budget for the programmes under MFF heading 2 ‘Cohesion, resilience and values’ was EUR 73,3 billion (38,4 % of the Union budget) distributed as follows: 47,8 % for the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and other regional operations, 18,9 % for the European Social Fund (ESF), 9,8 % for the Cohesion Fund (CF), 3,8 % for Erasmus+, 2,1 % for CEF Transport, and 3,8 % for other areas;

    79.  Notes that the Court has examined a sample of 238 transactions covering the full range of spending under MFF Heading 2; notes with concern that the Court’s estimated overall level of error in expenditure under this heading in 2023 increased to 9,3 %, which is significantly above the materiality threshold; draws attention to the marked increase in the overall level of error estimated by the Court in 2023 compared to previous years (6,4 % in 2022, 3,6 % in 2021);

    80.  Is concerned about the Court’s observation that the significant additional resources made available under the Recovery Assistance for Cohesion and the Territories of Europe (REACT-EU), the approaching end of the eligibility period for 2014-2020 programmes (31 December 2023), and parallel implementation of the NGEU programme have put additional pressure on Member State’s administrations, increasing the risk of errors; is in particular concerned by the practice of reducing Member States’ co-funding, as is the case under REACT-EU, the Coronavirus Investment Initiative (CRII) and CRII+, which reduces the ownership and associated incentives for properly overseeing expenditure; notes from the Commission replies the acknowledgement that some authorities may have carried out less effective controls and verifications due to the heavy overload and increasing pressure of parallel implementation of 2014-2020 programmes and of additional funding under NGEU;

    81.  Notes the Court’s analysis of transactions with additional funding through REACT-EU and flexibility through CRII+ and Cohesion’s Action for Refugees (CARE) and their contribution to the estimated levels of error; notes in particular the conclusion that errors found in 100 % EU-funded priorities contributed 5,0 % to the total estimated level of error of 9,3 %; is concerned that increasing flexibilities, without either decreasing requirements or increasing preventive checks and controls at the same time, contributed to the high error rate;

    82.  Notes the Court’s Review 03/2024 “An overview of the assurance framework and the key factors contributing to errors in 2014-2020 cohesion spending” that provides a multi-annual overview covering six years of audit results, including an assessment of management and control issues, aiming to strengthen the assurance model; is concerned by the Court’s conclusion that, although the assurance framework for cohesion policy has helped to reduce the level of error, it has not been effective in bringing the overall level of error below the materiality threshold of 2 %; is worried that the Commission can rely only to a limited degree on the work of the national audit authorities, because of the systematic weaknesses; supports the Court’s recommendation to the Commission to strengthen the implementation of the assurance framework for the 2021-2027 cohesion spending; reminds the Commission of the discharge authority’s call to work closely with the Member States to improve the management and control system for Union expenditure to reduce the high error rate to below the 2 % materiality threshold;

    83.  Notes the Court’s observation in its review on the reliability of the work of key actors in the control system for cohesion policy; is concerned by the Court’s finding that during a 6-year period managing authorities, the first line of defence for detection and prevention of errors, are not sufficiently effective in mitigating the inherent high risk of error in cohesion policy; considers it even more worrying that the Court found that the second line of defence, the Member States’ audit authorities, are not able to determine the correct error rate for the packages of expenditure they audit and provide assurance on, since the Court detected additional errors in at least 39 % of these packages; notes that these errors have been detected and reported by the Court annually for more than 6 years and that there is therefore a systemic issue;

    84.  Notes the Court’s categorisation of errors found in cohesion expenditure, with ineligible projects accounting for 29 %, ineligible costs for 26 % and serious non-compliance in public procurement procedures accounting for 21 % of errors and ERDF and CF related expenditure accounting for the largest share of errors (80 %); notes that expenditure under the ESF+, YEI and FEAD are proportionally less affected by error, as they together account for 16 % of errors, while they together account for around 20 % of the budget under this heading;

    85.  Notes the study commissioned by the Committee on Budgetary Control on ‘Lessons learned from the implementation of crisis response tools’ that shows that absorption of uncommitted cohesion resources was supported by the flexibilities introduced under CRII and CRII+; is concerned by the finding of the researchers that quality of fast-tracked projects might not have reached the same level as investments before the pandemic; is further concerned by the researchers’ observation that the risk of low-quality projects is entirely borne by the Union Budget, because of 100 % EU-funding in CRII, CRII+ and REACT-EU; considers that 100 % EU-funding might help absorption, but that absorption is not a goal in itself;

    86.  Stresses that, in its most recent discharge opinions, the Committee on Regional Development called for additional advisory support from the Commission to national, local and regional authorities to avoid a situation of administrative overload; recognises the Commission’s efforts but, observes that, regrettably, these have not been sufficient to mitigate the risk of error; warns that a similar administrative overload might occur at the end of the RRF eligibility period and the final years of the MFF; underlines the need to address the insufficient administrative capacity of national, local and regional authorities as a matter of urgency; calls on the Commission, in this regard, to provide them with clear guidance, and to increase its support for administrative capacity building, including through staff training, best practice sharing, peer-to-peer reviews and technical assistance to ensure effective fund management;

    87.  Notes the public discussions on the post-2027 multiannual financial framework that may indicate a shift towards a performance-based model, coupling investments and reforms, and a desire to simplify rules and procedures; calls on the Commission to prioritise the financial responses to the current threats resulting from the geopolitical situation; warns that any decision on the future design of spending programmes must not be to the detriment of oversight and control of Union expenditure in terms of transparency and information at Union level about non-compliance with rules and regulations; considers that the errors identified by the Court and the way the Commission handles those errors are also an indication of a properly functioning management and control system and notes that both institutions stated their commitment to improve the system and bring down the error rate;

    88.  Notes, as in previous years, the Court’s observation that the Commission’s desk reviews, to review and assess the work of audit authorities, are aimed at checking only consistency of regularity information, and that they are therefore too limited to confirm the residual error rate reported by the national authorities in their assurance packages; notes the Commission’s reply that it complements its desk review with on-the-spot audit work covering the programmes and assurance packages, which enables it to establish a reasonable and fair estimate of the error rates for each programme; considers that the Court’s observation is about the scope of the desk reviews and the fact that they are only aimed at consistency and therefore too limited to provide the Commission with information that is sufficiently reliable;

    89.  Is concerned about the persistent shortcomings observed by the Court in the work of national audit authorities as visible in the weaknesses identified in the assurance packages, with a residual error rate above the materiality threshold for more than 60 % of the value of assurance packages audited in 2023; stresses with concern that managing authorities consistently do not effectively succeed in preventing or detecting irregularities in expenditure declared by beneficiaries and that this reduces the extent to which the Commission can rely on their work;

    90.  Reminds that in shared management, it is the Commission’s responsibility to make sure that Member States set up management and control systems that function effectively during the implementation of programmes; is worried that both the Commission and the Court have identified that not all Member States’ management and control systems function effectively, thus negatively effecting the reliability of the Commission error rates, as they rely on these national systems, which do not work effectively; calls into question the possibility for the Commission to continue to rely on national systems;

    91.  Considers that for the single audit approach to work well, and in order to achieve reduced administrative burden for beneficiaries and managing authorities, adherence to audit standards at all levels of control and audit is of essential importance; is therefore worried by the Court’s finding in its annual report that essential supporting documents about compliance with eligibility conditions were not presented by programme authorities and beneficiaries, and also by the finding by the Court presented in its review that insufficient documentation of audit work from audit authorities limits the reliance that can be placed on audit work of national audit authorities;

    92.  Recalls that following Article 15 of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 of the European Parliament and of the Council(15) (CPR) for the programming period 2021-2027, Member States need to comply with horizontal and thematic enabling conditions, which need to remain fulfilled and respected throughout the implementation period of the funds; recalls that when enabling conditions are not fulfilled at the time of submission of a payment application to the Commission for the specific objective concerned, the related expenditure will not be reimbursed from the Union budget until the Commission is satisfied that the enabling condition has been fulfilled; recalls the strong regrets of the discharge authority in relation to the Commission decision of 13 December 2023(16) considering that Hungary fulfilled the horizontal enabling condition related to judicial independence that enabled the Hungarian authorities to submit reimbursement claims of up to EUR 10,2 billion; notes with concern that since the release of these funds, the Hungarian government has not taken steps to reinstate the independence of the judiciary but on the contrary; reiterates its worries about the lack of adequate control mechanisms or unreliable public procurement procedures to guarantee sound financial management and the protection of the Union budget; believes that this decision politically contradicts the prolongation of the measures adopted under Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092(17) (the ‘Conditionality Regulation’);

    93.  Expresses deep concern over the findings in the 2023 Rule of Law Report regarding the rule of law situation in Hungary, particularly the persistent and systemic challenges in the judiciary and the media sectors; notes with alarm the increasing pressure on judicial independence, including concerns over the selection and promotion of judges, and recent reports of intimidation and interference in judicial decisions, as exemplified by the resignations of judges in protest against political influence; notes with concern in the same vein that the head of the Hungarian Integrity Authority, a key institution established as a condition set by the Commission for the release of Union funds under the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation, is facing increasing pressure from the Hungarian government; calls on the Commission to ensure a coordinated and holistic approach across all relevant Union funds and legislative tools, emphasizing that Union funds must not be allocated to activities undermining democracy or reinforcing authoritarianism;

    94.  Recalls that the Conditionality Regulation establishes a mechanism and measures to protect the Union Budget from breaches of the rule of law when other procedures set out in Union legislation would not protect the budget more efficiently; recalls that this mechanism was activated on 15 December 2022 in the case of Hungary over concerns related to its system of public procurement, resulting in a temporary suspension of 55 % of budgetary commitments for three cohesion policy programmes; recalls that the same regulation, in line with Article 6 of Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093(18) (the ‘MFF Regulation’), stipulates that suspended commitments of 2022 (year n), may not be re-entered into the budget beyond 2024 (year n+2) and that therefore 55 % of commitments from 2022, around EUR 1 billion, were decommitted in December 2024; notes that no other procedures under the Conditionality Regulation are ongoing;

    95.  Notes that the Commission allocated an equivalent of five full-time staff members to the implementation of the Conditionality Regulation and reiterates the European Court of Auditor’s concerns raised in its Special Report 03/2024 that current staff numbers appear to be insufficient to ensure a strict and coherent application of the Regulation;

    96.  Reiterates the need to treat as a single, integral package all the measures required for the release of Union funding under the Conditionality Regulation, the CPR and Regulation (EU) 2021/241 of the European Parliament and of the Council(19) (the ‘RRF Regulation’); stresses the importance of the protection of the Union financial interests also for disbursement of pre-financing;

    97.  Notes that some investments which would have been eligible for financing under cohesion are included in the National Recovery and Resilience Plans; recalls that the general objective of the RRF enshrined in Article 4 of the RRF Regulation is to promote the Union’s economic, social and territorial cohesion, and that one of its six pillars is specifically dedicated to this purpose; acknowledges that the wide scope of the RRF results in limited overlap with other Union funding programmes, as intended by the co-legislators when establishing the Article 9 of the RRF Regulation, which establishes additionality and complementarity funding as key principles; draws attention, however, to the risks of double funding emerging from such situations;

    98.  Expresses its preoccupation about the visible delays in implementation of cohesion policy in Member States and the lack of capacity of national administrations to deal in parallel with different spending programmes (e.g. cohesion programmes and RRF programmes) covering complementary or even similar objectives; calls on the Commission to ensure that sufficient technical assistance is provided to Member States facing difficulties in order to address existing delays in the implementation of cohesion programmes;

    99.  Recognises the disproportionate impact of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine on eastern regions of the Union bordering Russia and Belarus; draws attention to the costs borne by these regions and Member States as a result of their shared border with hostile neighbouring countries, notably their need to increasingly direct public funding into security, defence and preparedness, while facing dramatically reduced resources due to a disruption in economic activities, cross-border trade and other exchanges, and in cohesion programmes, particularly Interreg programmes; notes the measures taken by the European Commission to support these regions, notably through flexibilities provided under cohesion policy; welcomes that providing support to eastern border regions most affected by Russia’s aggression is included in the mission letter of the Executive Vice President for Cohesion and Reforms; calls on the Commission to ensure the provision of adequate support for eastern regions of the Union bordering Russia and Belarus to cope with the disproportionate consequences of the Russian war of aggression, both in the short-term through the 2026 draft budget and in the medium-term through the Commission’s proposal for the next MFF;

    100.  Stresses the importance of ESF+ which aims to achieve high employment, fair social protection, a skilled and resilient workforce, and inclusive/cohesive societies as key in eradicating poverty; expresses the need to provide it with the continued financial and political support of the Union, national and regional institutions in the delivery of its objectives and targets in the years to come; underlines the importance of closely involving regional actors, in particular civil society organisations and social partners working on the ground in the implementation of ESF+ funded activities;

    101.  Welcomes the frontloading of EUR 100 million from the 2027 budget of Erasmus+ to the 2023 budget of Erasmus+, which enabled continued support to pupils, students, teachers and qualified staff fleeing from Ukraine, and the extra EUR 20 million awarded to Erasmus+ in 2023 as a result of Parliament’s insistence; stresses that frontloading must remain an exception to rapid response to unforeseen acute crisis situations; underlines that any frontloading of Erasmus+ cannot result in cuts for the programme at the end of current MFF; emphasises that every effort must be made to respond to such situations preferentially with additional funding;

    102.  Emphasises the need for strict oversight of the allocation of funds to prevent misuse within the Erasmus programme; asks the Commission to gather evidence to investigate any case of fraudulent or suspicious recipients, in accordance with its duties outlined in the Financial Regulation and Erasmus+ grant agreements; calls for adequate safeguarding of the programme from abuse by organizations whose activities are not aligned with the fundamental values of the Union (human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, rule of law, human rights); recalls that the Commission is legally bound to ensure that programme beneficiaries commit to and ensure the respect of these values and do not commit professional misconduct;

    103.  Notes that in 2023, the budget of the EU4Health programme, the main financial instrument to support Union health initiatives, was EUR 735 million, mainly managed by Directorate-General for Health and Food Safety and the Health Emergency Preparedness and Response Authority (HERA) and implemented through the European Health and Digital Executive Agency; acknowledges the progress of initiatives funded under this programme, notably in the areas of health emergency preparedness, the Beating Cancer Plan, the Pharmaceutical Strategy for Europe and in the implementation of Union health legislation;

    Recommendations

    104.  Calls on the Commission to:

       (i) re-consider the practice of 100 % Union funding in Union crisis response instruments, where increasing pre-financing might provide faster availability of funds, while maintaining a shared financial budgetary control responsibility in implementation of the funds by maintaining financial involvement from both national and Union level;
       (ii) ensure selection of qualitatively good projects with cohesion policy funds by favouring long-term investments, and duly justifying 100 % Union funding while limiting its application;
       (iii) address the systemic issue of non-detection of errors at Member State level in cohesion policy spending with an action plan, aimed at reporting an accurate error rate in assurance packages, and detection of errors at the first lines of defence by making available more, and/or better targeting existing resources and increase detection capacity at Member State and Commission level;
       (iv) calculate and report to the discharge authority the cost of control for all expenditure handled by national authorities concerning cohesion policy funds, and NGEU, and compare these figures with the cost of control when only Cohesion policy funds were handled by the same authorities;
       (v) address the recurrent issue of insufficient documentation at beneficiary, programme authority and audit authority level, not only through checks, awareness raising and information on requirements, but also through increased digitalisation and where possible, through financial incentives to penalise non-respect of the requirements for sound financial management;
       (vi) expand the scope of its desk review of assurance packages to review more quality criteria in addition to consistency to make a reliable estimate of the residual error rate for the assurance package under review, as well as of the risk at payment as a whole;
       (vii) step up its monitoring of the horizontal and thematic enabling conditions in all Member States to identify potential threats for the protection of the Union Budget and ensure enhanced transparency and stakeholder participation in the application of this tool;
       (viii) closely align the rule of law report with the Conditionality Regulation and report in more detail on the breaches of the principles of the rule of law that can be used as input to trigger the Conditionality Regulation;
       (ix) continuously monitor the implementation by the Hungarian Government of measures foreseen in Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/2506 of 15 December 2022; assess to what extent the situation has improved or worsened, including in relation to the challenges faced by the Hungarian Integrity Authority, and take all necessary actions in accordance with the Conditionality Regulation;
       (x) provide Member States with increased technical assistance in order to address delays in the implementation of national programmes in order to increase the absorption rate;
       (xi) closely monitor and mitigate the increasing risk of double funding between Cohesion programmes and RRF funding and address any such occurrences without delay;
       (xii) further enhance simplification in the implementation of cohesion programmes and work closely with Member States to identify best practices regarding the digitalisation of practices and procedures;
       (xiii) take all necessary measures to bring down the error rate in close cooperation with the Court of Auditors;
       (xiv) ensure the provision of adequate support for eastern regions of the Union bordering Russia and Belarus to cope with the disproportionate consequences of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, both in the short-term and in the medium-term;

    Natural resources

    105.  Notes that the budget for the programmes under MFF heading 3 ‘Natural resources’ was EUR 59,5 billion (31,1 % of the Union budget) distributed as follows: 65,0 % for direct payments under the European Agricultural Guarantee fund (EAGF), 27,6 % for the Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD), 4,2 % for market-related expenditure under the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF), 1,9 % for Maritime and Fisheries, 0,9 % for Environment and Climate (LIFE), and 0,4 % for other areas;

    106.  Notes that the Court has examined a sample of 218 transactions covering the full range of spending under this MFF heading; notes that the Court also examined the regularity information given in the annual activity reports of the Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural Development (DG AGRI) and the Directorate-General for Climate Action (DG CLIMA), as well as selected systems in 20 Member States and the United Kingdom; notes that the Court estimates the level of error for ‘Natural Resources’ to be 2,2 % (2,2 % in 2022) and that the majority of the errors found affected rural development transactions;

    107.  Points out, however, that this is partly due to the complexity of environmental schemes in rural development programmes and the recognized negative issue of “gold plating” at national level;

    108.  Notes, in this context, the lower-than-expected implementation rate of EAFRD funding for the period 2023-2027, with an absorption rate of only 1 % at the end of 2023, with payments amounting to EUR 0,7 billion, and expects the absorption rate to increase significantly in the course of the next reporting period;

    109.  Notes that the Court found 16 quantifiable errors in rural development, 15 in direct payments, three in expenditure related to market measures, and three in non-CAP expenditure; is reassured by the Commission’s assessment that most errors concern clerical mistakes and by the actions taken by the Commission to prevent errors in the future;

    110.  Notes the categorisation of errors by the Court, with ineligible claims accounting for 35 % of the errors, and administrative errors and inaccurate information on areas or animals for 21 % and 20 % respectively; notes with concern, that as in previous years, that the Court found in several cases that the Member State authorities and the Commission had sufficient information to prevent, or to detect and correct the error before accepting the expenditure and that, had the Member State authorities and the Commission made proper use of all the information at their disposal, the estimated level of error for this chapter would have been 1.0 percentage point lower;

    111.  Notes that 2023 was the first year of the CAP 2023-2027 new delivery model, which integrates performance elements, agreed with the Member States in Strategic Plans, as basis for payments; notes that 2023 was a modest start of the new delivery model, EUR 63,65 million declared on the basis of generated outputs and therefore subject to a ‘performance clearance’ by DG AGRI out of EUR 215,52 million declared under the CAP Strategic plans under sectoral interventions and rural development; notes that in 2024 payments under the new delivery model will have increased substantially; notes the Court’s observations as regards processing performance data for the Annual Performance Reports where Member States are in the process of setting-up systems and procedures and at times manually aggregate data, with associated risks for the reliability of data;

    112.  Recalls the farmers’ protests across Europe towards the end of 2023 and early 2024 and the Commission’s response aimed at simplification, in particular for small farmers, and increasing discretionary powers for Member States; stresses that simplification should go hand in hand with sound financial management and take into account the Union’s climate commitments; welcomes the Commission’s targeted approach, especially concerning the distinction between farm size in terms of agricultural land and number of farms; cautions that discretion given to Member States should also be accompanied by thorough oversight by the Commission;

    113.  Recalls that both the Commission and Member States are responsible for addressing fraud in CAP spending; welcomes in that regard the work done in terms of anti-fraud risk assessments and the update of its anti-fraud strategy by DG AGRI;

    114.  Notes the Court’s Special Report 07/2024 on the Commission’s systems for recovering irregular expenditure, and the Commission’s reply; notes the Court’s observation that recoveries concerning agricultural expenditure have been relatively successful, attributed in part to the so-called 50-50 rule that incentivised Member States to recover funds; notes that this rule has not been retained in the 2023-2027 CAP and the Court’s warning that this might lead to a deterioration of the rate of recovery for agricultural expenditure;

    115.  Notes the Court’s Special Report 20/2024 on Common Agriculture Policy Plans and the Commission’s reply; stresses the importance of ensuring that all key elements for assessing performance are provided; considers that plans need to account for specific situations in specific Member States and that therefore a certain level of divergence is even desirable, is however worried that divergence in ambitions may mean that there is no level playing field for farmers across Member States; is further disappointed by the Court’s finding that although the new monitoring framework has been simplified, the CAP objectives lack clarity and indicators focus on outputs rather than results, and that important result indicators are missing; notes that the Court recommends the Commission to promote exchange of best practices in the plans and strengthening the future CAP monitoring framework;

    116.  Notes the Court’s Special Report 19/2024 on Organic farming in the EU, and the Commission’s reply; is once more worried by the Court’s finding that a weak strategic framework and data constraints prevent the measurement of the impact of the policy; considers that the increased focus on performance and definition of targets and indicators, and the related monitoring of results across Union policies needs to be supported by an equal increase of the Commission’s capacity to define performance frameworks and monitor performance;

    117.  Welcomes the increased competitiveness achieved through market measures in the wine sector and encourages the Commission and Member States to persevere in their efforts to replicate this success in other sectors;

    118.  Recalls that democracy and pluralism are fundamental values of the Union enshrined in Article 2 TEU; further recalls that, in line with Article 11 TEU, Union institutions shall give citizens and representative associations the opportunity to make known and publicly exchange their views in all areas of Union action in order to maintain an open, transparent and regular dialogue; underlines that separation of powers between the institutions as laid down in Article 13 TEU must always be respected and that Union institutions shall practice mutual sincere cooperation;

    119.  Recognises the importance of the LIFE programme; recalls the provisions of the LIFE+ Regulation, including those related to operating grants, the eligibility conditions, the award criteria, the overall allocation for 2021-2027 and the distribution of funds within the programme;

    120.  Notes that some members of the Budgetary Control committee requested access to a series of grant agreements under the LIFE programme, as well as other Union funding programmes, and after scrutinising them expressed concerns on the content of several of the programmes in February 2024; notes that the Commission, including the Internal Audit Service (IAS), was initially not aware of any issue, but adopted a series of measures with the aim of addressing the concerns; recalls the discharge written questions and hearings with the Secretary-General of the Commission on 5 November 2024, the responsible Commissioners for MFF Heading 3 on 12 November, and the Commissioner responsible for Budget and administration on 9 December 2024 where the concerns and the Commission’s response were discussed;

    121.  Notes the concerns expressed by some members of the Budgetary Control Committee that certain grant agreements between the European Union Climate, Infrastructure and Environment Executive Agency (CINEA) and beneficiaries, such as CSOs and private companies, under the LIFE Programme include ‘work plans’ containing detailed advocacy actions towards Union institutions or their representatives, as well as other actions directed towards certain trade agreements which the Union was negotiating, or litigation measures to be pursued by the respective entities; acknowledges that this could be potentially interpreted as interfering with internal decision making in Union institutions; notes that the Commission has performed a legal analysis of the grant agreements that raised concerns of some Members of the CONT Committee, which concluded that there was no evidence that the entities concerned had breached their contractual or code of conduct obligations, yet the Commission asked some beneficiaries to make amendments to the grant agreements that contained the specific provisions that potentially entailed a reputational risk; further notes that all grant agreements include a disclaimer stating that ‘views of the beneficiary do not in any way represent views of the EU and that granting authority cannot be held responsible for them’;

    122.  Underlines that Union financing should not contribute to undermining the rule of law, nor the values on which the Union is founded; recalls the provisions of Article 163 of the Financial Regulation; considers it crucial that there should be no funding without traceability of funds;

    123.  Notes the actions taken by the Commission to address the allegations which included the issuance of guidance for Commission services on funding activities related to the development, implementation, monitoring and enforcement of Union legislation and policy and screening of their contract portfolios to determine which agreements were not in line with the guidance; takes note of the measures adopted so far by the Commission while awaiting the results of the screening of the grant agreements with all the beneficiaries, which was requested by the Commission’s Corporate Management Board;

    124.  Notes the decision-making structure, including the evaluation board within CINEA, for deciding on contracts between the Commission and beneficiaries; urges the Commission to ensure that the decision-making structure of CINEA for deciding on contracts to be awarded features clear accountability, clear responsibilities and a practical structure;

    125.  Notes that the executive agency conducts annual bottom-up risk management exercises and that these bottom-up risk management exercises did not identify any critical risks; notes that irrespective of the financing programme, evaluation procedures should be constantly reviewed and adapted if needed;

    126.  Notes reports in the media that the President of the Commission hired a paid special adviser to deliver a report on the “Strategic Dialogue on the Future of EU Agriculture” who received a salary equal to a Director-General in the Commission; is concerned by the remuneration of all the special advisers and the discretion the Commission has in deciding their remuneration, which creates arbitrary inequalities;

    Recommendations

    127.  Calls on the Commission to:

       (i) closely monitor the Member States’ progress as regards the processing of performance data and the aggregation of data for the annual performance report and keep the discharge authority informed about issues with reliability of performance data, in particular where it concerns manually aggregated data;
       (ii) inform the discharge authority why the Court concludes that for several years several errors could have been prevented, had the Commission and Member States used all information at their disposal and why the Commission and Member States do not manage to address this issue appropriately;
       (iii) apply the lessons learned as regards the reduction of the administrative burden from its response to the farmers’ protests in future policy initiatives, while taking due account of the risk of abuse of funds where control measures are reduced, or risk of too much divergence between Member States when discretionary powers are used without proper oversight;
       (iv) keep the discharge authority informed about the recovery rates of agricultural expenditure, in particular if the rate deteriorates in comparison to the recovery rate under the previous CAP and swiftly mitigate the causes for the deterioration, including considering the introduction of new incentives for Member State authorities to recover funds;
       (v) assess the differences in ambition of strategic plans and inform the discharge authority whether there is divergence between Member States, threatening the level-playing field for farmers, and assess how the Commission addresses those differences;
       (vi) make better use of its capacity for setting-up performance frameworks, for defining objectives and indicators and holding those contributing to the achievements, be they Member States or beneficiaries, accountable for their contributions;
       (vii) update the Commission’s anti-fraud strategy to devote attention to advocating for and upholding a clear separation of executive and legislative power in the Union;
       (viii) have a clear and comprehensive strategy at Commission level as to how to better protect the financial interests of the Union and ensure that Union funds are spent for their intended purposes and diligently apply the Financial Regulation provisions, including by ensuring that grant agreements can be suspended or terminated when beneficiaries violate the Union’s legislation;
       (ix) ensure a fair distribution of Union funds to CSOs to contribute to a pluralistic and vibrant society;
       (x) ensure that the Commission’s guidance adopted in 2024 is applied by all authorising officers and, if necessary, further develop guidance to fully align grant agreements with Treaty provisions and existing legislation;
       (xi) make the results of the screening of grant agreements available to the discharge authority in order to allow an assessment of the extent to which the Commission may be exposed to a reputational risk;
       (xii) adequately address issues such as revolving doors, transparency in financing and donations, the fight against money laundering, limiting foreign interference, independence from political and economic influence, whistleblowing and transparent governance structures, in respect of all entities receiving Union funds;
       (xiii) review the template for MoUs between the Commission and executive agencies to ensure clearer division of responsibilities;
       (xiv) instruct the audit structure to review contracts with beneficiaries and to flag in case they identify contracts that are not in line with applicable financial rules;
       (xv) have the IAS review contracts between the Commission and grantees, specifically to search for content that is not in line with applicable financial rules within work packages;
       (xvi) evaluate the decision-making structure in the areas of the awarding of contracts and instruct Commission services and executive agencies to perform better checks on the content of contracts at all stages, including by ensuring that work packages and key performance indicators as listed by applicants align with the objectives of respective funding programmes;
       (xvii) adopt more precise categorisation of entities listed in the Financial Transparency System;
       (xviii) review its rules for special advisers to remove the arbitrary selection and remuneration;
       (xix) further enhance simplification in the implementation of programmes and work closely with Member States to identify best practices regarding the digitalisation of practices and procedures;
       (xx) improve the quality of dialogue with farmers from all Member States;
       (xxi) react more quickly when serious concerns of the discharge authority are flagged to the Commission;
       (xxii) perform adequate checks of entities listed in the Transparency Register, in order to ensure that they comprehensively list their activities in the Register;
       (xxiii) draw clearer lines of responsibility when implementing collaborative platforms;
       (xxiv) instruct the Corporate Management Board to submit consolidated information on the list of critical risks to the internal audit service and ensure executive agencies address potential risks and ensure a transparent selection of independent evaluators to prevent conflict of interest and guarantee their independence;
       (xxv) instruct all DGs and executive agencies to review the distribution of funds dedicated to auditing in order to ensure sufficient resources;
       (xxvi) ensure that proposals for Multiannual Work Programmes of any Union funding instrument have clear guidelines on the activities eligible for funding, clearer rules on screening of applications and on admissible content as well as clearer requirements for transparency and traceability of the use of Union funds, including in relation to the disclosure requirements under the EU Transparency Register;
       (xxvii) ensure that all grant agreements respect the necessary requirements related to transparency, traceability and visibility of funds;

    Migration and Border management

    128.  Notes that in 2023 the budget for the programmes under MFF heading 4 ‘Migration and Border Management’ was EUR 2,7 billion (1,4 % of the Union budget spending) distributed as follows: 1,2 billion (46,5 %) for three decentralised agencies, the European Boarder Coast Agency (FRONTEX), the European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA) and the European Union Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (EU- LISA); 1 billion (38,6 %) for the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF), and 0,4 billion (14,9 %) for the Integrated Border Management Fund (IBMF);

    129.  Notes that in 2023 a significant portion of the spending under MFF heading 4 still concerned the completion of projects remaining from the 2014-2020 MFF; notes that 18 % of AMIF national programmes for 2014-2020 remained undeclared at the end of 2023 and that the last annual accounts and the request for payment of the final balance for these funds will be provided by the Member States as part of the closure package by 31 December 2024 at the latest;

    130.  Notes that the Court examined a sample of 23 transactions, which is not large enough to be representative of the spending under MFF headings 4 and 5 and, thus, it cannot provide a separate estimate of the error rate for these headings; further notes that the Court’s audit results show that the expenditure under MFF headings 4 and 5 is affected by eligibility and procurement issues and that it is a high-risk area (7 out of 23 transactions audited, i.e. 30,4 %, were affected by errors); is concerned that the Court detected four quantifiable errors which had a financial impact on the amounts charged to the Union budget and that it also found further ten cases of non-compliance with legal and financial provisions (which had no direct financial impact on the Union budget); therefore, invites the Court to provide a clear estimate of the error rate for heading 4; notes that the Commission concludes that the risk at payment in 2023 is 1,1 % for the expenditure on migration and border management;

    131.  Notes that the Commission has accepted the Court’s recommendation made in its annual report for 2023 to provide further guidance on applicable rules to the Member State authorities responsible for implementing DG HOME funding via shared management; regrets that the Commission has not yet fully implemented the Court’s previous recommendations that were due to be addressed by the end of 2023; notes that DG HOME is undertaking a reassessment of its ex-ante methodology to ensure the respect of the rules applicable to post-2021 generation of grants, and that this reassessment will also address the Court’s relevant recommendations and those of the IAS audit on the preparedness for closing actions and programmes funded under the Internal Security Fund (ISF) and the AMIF 2014-2020 through direct and shared management;

    132.  Notes with concern that two reservations on the declaration of assurance were issued in DG HOME’s Annual Activity Report for 2023 and that one reservation concerns the implementation of AMIF and ISF 2014-2020 in several Member States and the other reservation concerns the implementation of Border Management and Visa Instrument (BMVI) 2021-2027 in one Member State; welcomes the Commission’s commitment to take remedial measures for the underlying issues that necessitated the reservations;

    133.  Welcomes the progress identified by the Court in its review of the preparatory work done by five member state audit authorities in managing the transition of the AMIF, BMVI and ISF funds to the CPR of the 2021-2027 MFF; observes that these audit authorities reported to the Court that the support and guidance DG HOME provided to them was satisfactory; notes with concern that at the time of the Court’s audit four out of five Member State audit authorities had not finalised their audit strategies;

    134.  Takes note of the adoption of the New Pact on Migration and Asylum; welcomes that the mid-term revision of the MFF 2021-2027 allocated an additional EUR 2 billion to migration and border management for 2024-2027 to address the growing challenges in migration and border management resulting from the current geopolitical context; notes, however, that additional funds might be needed with a view to ensuring the full implementation of the Pact; calls for the quick implementation of the Pact in the Member States;

    135.  Stresses that securing the Union’s external borders is a pillar of the New Pact on Migration and Asylum; notes with concern that the Commission reported that the number of irregular border crossings in the Union increased in 2023 to 380 000, compared to 330 000 in 2022; observes that the BMVI can support frontline Member States to ensure they have the resources for infrastructure, facilities and installations necessary to secure the external borders of the Union, including electronic border security enhancements and other tools for border surveillance as provided for in annex III of the BMVI regulation; notes the European Council conclusions of 9 February 2023 that the Union will step up its action to prevent irregular departures and loss of life, to reduce pressure on the borders of the Union and on reception capacities, to fight against smugglers and to increase returns; underlines the need to better protect vulnerable people from smuggling and trafficking networks and address the negative effects of the instrumentalisation of migrants as part of hybrid attacks, notably by pro-Russian forces, as well as by the Belarusian regime;

    136.  Recalls that, according to Regulation (EU) 2021/1060, Member States and the Commission must ensure respect for fundamental rights and compliance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union in the implementation of Union funds;

    137.  Notes the Court’s conclusion that the AMIF 2014-2020 was performing below expectations in terms of facilitating returns of migrants: also takes note of the fact that the Court and the Commission agree that progress in this area was particularly affected by COVID-19-related travel restrictions; further notes that in 2023 return measures were supported with EUR 29,8 million from the AMIF; considers that the Commission must provide stronger efforts to assist Member States in addressing irregular border crossing and in successfully implementing returns of third-country nationals, as well as the integration of legal migrants; looks forward to receiving consolidated information in 2025 on progress in this regard through the ex-post evaluation AMIF 2014-2020; highlights that the Commission should continue to take action on migration and asylum within the framework of external action, including the ‘Team Europe’ approach while also increasing the transparency of the programming and implementation of the Union home affairs funds in third countries and safeguarding the role of the Parliament;

    Recommendations

    138.  Calls on the Commission to:

       (i) address the Court’s recommendations in a thorough and timely manner and share DG HOME’s revised ex-ante methodology, once completed, with the discharge authority;
       (ii) continue to support the Member State managing and audit authorities in the timely finalisation of their audit strategies for MFF 2021-2027 funds, paying particular attention to eligibility and procurement issues, as well as all other recurrent findings of the Court;
       (iii) take action to improve the performance of actions funded by the Union in terms of effective returns and combatting irregular migration, while ensuring the full respect of Union legislation and the fundamental values of the Union;
       (iv) take action to increase the efficiency of Union spending on the protection and management of the European Union’s external borders;
       (v) monitor, assist in and scrutinise the timely progress of the administrative, operational and legal steps required by Member States and Union agencies for the full implementation of the New Pact on Migration and Asylum by 2026;
       (vi) increase the transparency of the programming and implementation of the Union home affairs funds in third countries, while safeguarding the role of Parliament in ensuring the democratic scrutiny of Union spending;
       (vii) continuously assess, in the implementation of the Union Budget, compliance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Union values enshrined in Article 2 TEU, in accordance with Article 6 of the Financial Regulation;

    Security and Defence

    139.  Notes that in 2023 the budget for the programmes under MFF heading 5 ‘Security and Defence’ was EUR 1,4 billion (0,7 % of the Union budget spending) distributed as follows: 500 million (38,4 %) for the European Defence Fund (EDF), 300 million (19 %) for military mobility, 200 million (17,1 %) for decentralised agencies, namely the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA), Europol and European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training (CEPOL), 200 million (13,1 %) for the ISF, and 200 million (12,4 %) for nuclear safety, decommissioning and other areas;

    140.  Notes that in 2023 a significant portion of the spending under MFF heading 5 still concerned the completion of projects remaining from the 2014-2020 MFF; notes that 25 % of ISF national programmes for 2014-2020 remained undeclared at the end of 2023 and that the last annual accounts and the request for payment of the final balance for these funds will be provided by the Member States as part of the closure package by 31 December 2024 at the latest;

    141.  Notes with concern that, for the reasons explained in the section on migration and border management, the Court cannot provide a separate estimate of the error rate for MFF heading 5 ‘Security and Defence’ and that, based on its audit results, the Court considers expenditure from this heading to be high-risk; therefore, invites the Court to provide an estimate of the error rate for this heading as well; notes that the Commission concludes that in 2023 the risk at payment was 0,5 % for the expenditure on security and defence;

    142.  Observes that the Commission has not accepted the Court’s recommendation to carefully check and document the technical aspects of military mobility grant applications to the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) during the grant award procedure and that the Commission considers that its current processes already ensure a check on whether dual-use infrastructure projects meet the eligibility conditions;

    143.  Recalls the highly unstable geopolitical situation in the Union’s neighbourhood giving rise to greater security and defence challenges, including hybrid threats, and thereby to greater investment needs in security, defence and preparedness, since the beginning of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; draws attention to the fact that MFF heading 5, dedicated to security and defence, is the smallest of all MFF headings and regrets that the Union’s current budget for ensuring the security and defence of its citizens is not equal to the challenges to be met either in the short or the long term; notes that in 2023 Union funding in support of the defence industry came exclusively from the EDF; recalls the role played by the EDF in supporting European technological expertise in emerging and disruptive technologies; welcomes that submissions to the 2023 EDF calls increased by 72 % compared to the previous year, demonstrating the strong and constantly growing interest of European defence industry actors and research organisations in the EDF and the high demand for funding in this sector; notes that under the 2023 calls, the Union committed EUR 1,15 billion for 61 defence R&D projects, benefiting 581 legal entities from 26 Member States and Norway; notes that on average 17 entities from eight different Member States and Norway participate in each project; underlines the importance of a level playing field in supporting cross-border defence R&D cooperation;

    144.  Welcomes the Commission’s actions to enhance support for SMEs in the defence sector, in particular appreciates that the EU Defence Innovation Scheme (EUDIS), which provides a diverse range of instruments tailored to support SMEs within the defence ecosystem, became fully operational in 2023, with EUR 224 million allocated to it from the EDF budget; appreciates, further, the role of the SME bonus under the EDF in facilitating the access of smaller actors and innovators in defence supply chains; notes that in the 2023 EDF calls, 42 % of the entities selected for funding were SMEs, an increased share compared to 2022 (38,2 %), and that 18 % of the total funding available through the EDF calls is allocated to SMEs;

    145.  Recalls that the Preparatory Action on Defence Research (PADR) was a precursor programme of the EDF with a budget of EUR 90 million that funded 18 research projects selected following calls for proposals in the years 2017 to 2019; further recalls that the Court, in its Special Report 10/2023 ‘The Preparatory action on defence research’, has observed that the Union still lacked a long-term strategy for the projects under the EDF, particularly in terms of impact, additional research, development, manufacturing and procurement; welcomes that the Commission has accepted all of the Court’s recommendations and has confirmed that their implementation is ongoing; welcomes, in this regard, the Commission’s adoption of a European Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS) and legislative proposal establishing the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP) as well as its commitment to build up the EDF; nevertheless, in view of the geopolitical realities the Union faces, is concerned that the full implementation of the Court’s recommendations is expected only in 2026;

    146.  Recalls the Court’s observations in its Special Report 10/2023 regarding the limited availability of human resources at the Commission and the subsequent risk for the EDF; notes that the growing number of proposals to evaluate and projects to manage puts considerable pressure on human resources; further notes the large share of seconded national experts (17 %) among DG DEFIS staff in 2023 and DG DEFIS’s intention to reinforce staff by the selection of officials through specialised EPSO competitions in the field of space and defence, for which the reserve lists were finalised in November 2023;

    147.  Notes that the implementation of ‘Action Plan on Military Mobility 2.0’ is ongoing, with EUR 1,74 billion allocated for dual-use transport infrastructure projects under the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) between 2021-2027; notes that so far the Union has co-funded 95 military mobility projects in 21 Member States and that 94 of these projects are still ongoing and most of them are expected to be finalised between 2026 and 2027; notes with concern that following three calls for proposals organised in 2021, 2022 and 2023, the entirety of the military mobility envelope under the CEF for the current programming period has thereby already been exhausted; considers that although making the budget quickly available by frontloading amounts into the 2022 and 2023 calls responded to the need to take into account the evolution of the security situation in Europe following Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, it simultaneously led to Union funding being unstable and unpredictable by leaving a gap of more than four years with no more Union funds available for military mobility calls to finance dual-use infrastructure projects until the post-2027 MFF; recalls the Court’s conclusions in its Special Report 04/2025 that the Action Plan was not built on sufficiently solid foundations and that progress towards its objective, namely ensuring swift and seamless movement of personnel, materiel and assets at short notice and on a large scale, has been variable due to design weaknesses and remaining obstacles to implementation; notes that the Commission considers that more action is needed to strengthen dual-use transport infrastructure corridors, including on regulatory issues such as cross-border movement permission procedures; notes the Court’s observation that the Commission had not carried out a robust assessment of the overall funding required to make its objectives and targets achievable; regrets that only EUR 300 million was spent on military mobility in 2023 and is concerned that calls for proposals under the military mobility envelope faced a four-time oversubscription rate, demonstrating the increased interest among Member States and project beneficiaries;

    148.  Expresses deep concern over the Commission’s decision to proceed with the adoption of the “Rearm EU” initiative without prior consultation of the European Parliament; regrets that such a decision bypasses the principle of institutional balance and undermines Parliament’s role as co-legislator in shaping strategic and budgetary priorities; urges the Commission to refrain from initiating substantial policy instruments that impact the Union’s financial and strategic architecture without ensuring full respect for the prerogatives of the Parliament;

    149.  Notes that the European Parliament has called on the Union and its Member States to put in place a legal framework enabling Russia to be classified as a State sponsor of terrorism;

    Recommendations

    150.  Calls on the Commission to:

       (i) develop a longer-term strategy for the EDF, building on the experience with Preparatory Action on Defence Research (PADR) and the Court’s recommendations, as soon as possible;
       (ii) secure the provision of adequate resources to enhance Union defence cooperation, in the short-term through the 2026 draft budget and the timely recruitment of expert staff, and in the medium-term through the Commission’s proposal for the next MFF;
       (iii) further strengthen military mobility in the Union by substantially increasing the funding available to improve dual-use transport infrastructure corridors and by taking action to eliminate administrative, procedural and regulatory barriers to cross-border military movements, while prioritising Union funding to projects that best respond to the current European threat landscape; taking into account the Court’s findings and recommendations in special report 04/2025;
       (iv) take action to ensure due diligence in relation to project criteria for dual-use military mobility infrastructure projects, in line with the Court’s recommendation;

    Neighbourhood and the world

    151.  Notes that the budget for the programmes under MFF heading 6 ‘Neighbourhood and the world’ was EUR 15,2 billion (7,4 % of the Union budget) distributed as follows: 63,4 % for the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe (NDICI-Global Europe), 16,4 % for Humanitarian Aid (HUMA), 16 % for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA III) and 4.2 % for other actions and programmes; notes that in total, payments for ‘Neighbourhood and the world’ reached 15,2 billion in 2023, representing approximatively 8 % of the overall Union expenditure excluding RRF;

    152.  Notes that the Court examined a sample of 72 transactions, which is not adequately representative of the spending under this MFF heading and, therefore, cannot provide an estimate of the error rate; considering that the Court’s audit results show that this is a high-risk area (of 37 out of 72 transactions audited, i.e. 51.4 %, were affected by errors), invites the Court to provide a clear estimate of the error rate for this chapter; notes that the Court found 31 errors that had a financial impact on the Union budget, relating to ineligible beneficiaries, ineligible costs, expenditure not incurred, and breaches of public procurement rules, areas that could point to risks of unreliable functioning of control mechanisms;

    153.  Notes, additionally, that the Court detected 19 cases of non-compliance with legal and financial provisions, none of which had direct financial impact on the Union budget, and which included issues such as ambiguous cost allocations, non-compliance with visibility rules, and inadequate documentation;

    154.  Is concerned that the Court found a significant non-compliance with visibility rules in an EU-funded project under indirect management by DG NEAR, which concerned a contribution agreement worth EUR 21,2 million signed with an international organisation in a project where the aim was to support Eastern partnership countries in tackling COVID-19; notes that the Court found that most donation certificates it checked did not contain any acknowledgment that the medical equipment donated was funded by the Union; recalls that beneficiaries of Union funds are required to clearly publicise the fact that the Union has financed or co-financed the action they are implementing; notes the Commission’s replies that it is discussing new communication and visibility guidelines with the United Nations to reduce the risks of errors on compliance with visibility rules;

    155.  Expresses concern that the Court, in its IT audit on the information system OPSYS’ component for managing user access and rights, found three shortcomings including (i) that the Directorate-General for International Partnerships (DG INTPA) had not formalised a procedure for granting and removing access rights for system administrators and to standard users; (ii) four cases in which standard users had more access rights than they needed for their jobs, which is not in line with the Commission’s IT standards; and that (iii) DG INTPA did not manage all administrator accounts belonging to staff of other directorates-general; is concerned that these weaknesses increase the risks of both inappropriate access to the system and non-compliance with the rules and procedures for implementing external action projects, and also undermine the integrity of system processes and data;

    156.  Notes that the Commission intensified communication with international organisations in order to raise awareness of the need to ensure that the Court’s auditors obtain full access to documents when auditing projects funded by the Union, and that the Commission has supported initiatives to find permanent solutions to the issues of access to and retention of documents; notes, however, the Commission’s acknowledgment that despite efforts, some constraints regarding access to documents persist due to the existing legal frameworks of the implementing partners, which are not expected to change in the near future;

    157.  Urges the Commission to enhance the rule of law conditionality-based approach of the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) III funding in order for the instrument to serve its purpose of effectively preparing accession countries to fulfil the conditions of becoming Member States of the Union; reiterates its calls on the Commission to implement the recommendations of the Court’s Special Report 01/2022 in order to ensure an effective impact of Union financial assistance in support for the rule of law in the Western Balkans, in particular by developing guidelines on the application of the provisions on modulation and conditionality under IPA III;

    158.  Stresses that Union aid should under no circumstances – directly or indirectly – be financing terrorism, hence it should not support any entity connected to Hamas or any other terrorist or extremist organisation; notes to this end, it is legitimate and necessary to be able to clearly know and identify all the final beneficiaries of European aid in third countries; emphasises the need for strict control over the distribution and use of aid to ensure no misuse of funds;

    159.  Notes with regret that the European Commission financed the Gaziantep Islamic Science and Technology University, which has proven ties to terrorist organisation of Hamas; calls on the Commission to cancel all ties to this university and other universities with ties to terrorist organisations;

    160.  Urges the Commission, in the context of delivering enhanced support and humanitarian aid to the Palestinian population, to also make full use of trusted partners, such as the WHO, WFP UNICEF or different Red Crescent organisations; recalls the importance for the Commission to guarantee independent controls of UNRWA by external experts, the Court and experienced international partners;

    161.  Notes that the Commission has been working in the last months with UNRWA, to enhance the neutrality processes and control systems in the Agency, in line with findings of the investigations by the UN OIOS on the allegations of involvement of 19 of its staff in the 7th October 2023 attack, and to monitor the application of the action plan presented by UNRWA on the implementation of the recommendations of the Independent Review Group led by former French Minister of Foreign Affairs Colonna to strengthen control and oversight; notes that the Commission has reassessed the Union’s 2024 funding decision for UNRWA and that, through an exchange of letters between Commissioner Várhelyi and UNRWA Commissioner General Lazzarini in April 2024, the Union reached an agreement about the Union’s conditional assistance for UNRWA, linked to a number of milestones in relation to three work streams, including the screening of UNRWA staff, an audit by the Union, as well as the reinforcement of the Department of Internal Investigations and Ethics office; notes that Union assistance was resumed;

    162.  Recalls the necessity for the Palestinian Authority to remove all educational materials and content that fail to adhere to UNESCO standards by the next school year, in particular those that contain antisemitism as defined by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance classification endorsed by the Union, incitement to violence, hate speech, and glorification of terrorism; recalls the provisions of previous discharge resolutions; stresses that financial support from the Union for the Palestinian Authority in the area of education should be provided on the condition that textbook content is aligned with UNESCO standards, that all anti-Semitic references are deleted, and that examples which incite to hatred and violence are removed, as repeatedly requested in the resolutions accompanying the discharge decisions; recalls the findings of the Georg Eckert Institute’s report funded by the Union, which revealed a complex picture on the textbooks; notes that the Union does not fund the Palestinian textbooks, and that neither are they the responsibility of UNRWA, which nevertheless reviews all issued textbooks to address any problematic content;); notes that the Commission will carry out close scrutiny to ensure that no Union funds are allocated, directly or indirectly, to the drafting, teaching, or exposure of such educational materials to Palestinian children, including those provided by UN organisations;

    163.  Notes DG NEAR’s acknowledgement in its AAR 2023 that projects in Kyiv received regular visits but security constraints limited on-site monitoring and project visits in other Ukrainian regions; further notes that the constraints on adequately monitoring projects in Ukraine led to a renewed reservation in the 2023 AAR of DG NEAR and that corrective actions are being implemented, such as monitoring progress on project implementation through desk reviews, remote solutions and using a service provider;

    164.  Welcomes that OLAF provides targeted anti-fraud assistance to authorities and supports the accession of Ukraine to the Union Anti-Fraud Programme; notes that the Framework Agreement for the Ukraine Facility, which entered into force in June 2024, provides for legally binding arrangements for the management, control, supervision, monitoring, evaluation, reporting and audit of funds under the Facility, as well as measures to prevent, investigate and correct irregularities, fraud, corruption and conflicts of interest, and provisions on the roles of OLAF and EPPO; welcomes, in addition, that, pursuant to article 36 of the Ukraine Facility Regulation, the Commission established in June 2024 an Audit Board, with the mission of assisting the Commission in assessing the effectiveness of Ukraine’s management and control systems regarding the funds provided under the Facility and in fighting mismanagement of Union funding under the Ukraine Facility; calls on the Commission to keep the European Parliament regularly informed about the activities and findings of the Audit Board in order to ensure proper parliamentary oversight;

    165.  Notes with concern the recent reports on the findings of a draft audit report paid for by the Commission on the Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States (OACPS) Secretariat which allege to suspected fraud, unpaid salaries and further liabilities; notes that as reported the Commission has contributed EUR 3,7 million to the Secretariat in 2023 and is trying to recover EUR 3,6 million as of March 2024; asks the Commission to ensure full transparency and accountability, grant access to the audit report and inform the members of Parliament on the concrete steps taken;

    166.  Calls on the Commission in line with the Court’s recommendations in its opinion 03/2024 to integrate into the new MFF legislative proposal the recommendations of the External Action Guarantee complementing the Commission’s evaluation, including increased use of blending (grants) in LDCs, fragile or conflict-affected countries and engaged coordination with stakeholders such as civil society;

    167.  Is concerned about the allocation of EFSD+ under the new flexible ‘Support to Investments’ envelope in favour of benefiting countries where the Global Gateway investments are easier to implement at the expense of prioritising LDCs, and fragile and conflict-affected countries; calls for reporting on the volume of EFSD+ amounts allocated and contractualised in these countries and for transparency on how the quota of allocations to LDCs within country MIPs is respected within allocations of the regional MIPs;

    168.  While recognising the Global Gateway strategy as a concerted Union response to global challenges, reiterates that actions bringing together public and private investment must always be guided by the legal framework as provided by the NDICI Regulation, the Agenda 2030, and the needs of partner countries, as communicated by way of an honest dialogue at eye level; is concerned about inconsistencies surrounding Global Gateway programmes; calls, therefore, for improved transparency, democratic accountability, robust monitoring and evaluation mechanisms in Global Gateway and Team Europe initiatives; calls for a centralised, publicly accessible platform, regularly updated, to detail Global Gateway projects, including their objectives, funding sources, implementing partners, and expected outcomes;

    European Development Fund (EDF)

    169.  Notes that to audit the regularity of transactions, the Court examined a sample of 140 transactions, representing the full range of spending from the EDFs; notes, furthermore, that this comprised 31 transactions related to the European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, 87 transactions authorised by 14 EU delegations(20) and 19 payments approved by Commission headquarters;

    170.  Notes with concern that, out of the 140 transactions examined, 62 (44,3 %) contained errors, compared to 57 (40,7 %) in 2022 for the same number of transactions; stresses, moreover, that the Court quantified 52 errors (48 in 2022), on the basis of which it estimated the level of error for the financial year 2023 to be 8,9 % (7,1 % in 2022);

    171.  Highlights with concern that the three most common types of errors in the financial year 2023 related to expenditure not incurred at 45 % (51 % in 2022), to absence of essential supporting documents at 31 % (7 % in 2022) and to ineligible expenditure at 23 % (24 % in 2022);

    172.  Notes the Commission’s replies to written questions to Commissioners Jutta Urpilainen and Oliver Varhelyi that in 2023 approximately 45 % of the total errors are due to excess clearing, a practice where expenditure not incurred is included in the accounts as expenditure incurred, and that therefore such errors are temporary, since they will no longer exist after the final clearings; notes furthermore that, to reduce these temporary errors, the Commission has requested its partners to review their reporting templates to allow for easier identification of incurred expenditure, and that DG INTPA launched a special working group to screen the compliance of relevant organisations through a risk management framework; also notes that DG INTPA is currently reviewing its control strategy, which aims also to identify how ex-ante controls can be strengthened and to improve the reporting of the pillar-assessed organisations to the Commission; calls on the Commission to report to the discharge authority on the effects of these actions;

    173.  Notes that the expected outcomes of DG INTPA’s ongoing review of its control strategy include the reinforcement of guidance on financial reporting and also on enhanced ex-ante controls so as to prevent errors including on excess clearing; calls on the Commission to report to the discharge authority on the remedial measures taken upon finalisation of this review;

    174.  Is concerned that, as in previous years, some international organisations provided only limited access to documents (e.g., in read-only format), which hindered the planning, execution and quality control of the Court’s audit and led to delays; notes that audit and control issues were discussed with UN entities on several occasions, including in the context of joint technical reference group meetings and the relevant EU-UN Financial and Administrative Framework Agreement (FAFA) working group; notes furthermore that the Commission is working with the International Organisations concerned and has intensified communication with them on the Court’s access to documents; encourages, as in previous years, the Commission to increase these efforts;

    175.  Stresses that, according to Court’s assessment, the Residual Error Rate (RER) study does not constitute an assurance engagement or an audit and is based on the RER methodology and manual provided by DG INTPA; notes that DG INTPA clarifies that the RER study is meant to be a key indicator for the estimated financial impact of residual errors, i.e., it measures the proper functioning of the internal control system and thus, demonstrates the Commission’s corrective capacity; stresses that, as in previous years, the Court has found limitations in the study; notes, furthermore, the Court’s opinion, as in previous years, that the RER methodology allows the contractor to rely entirely on the results of DG INTPA´s controls, and that relying on the work of other auditors is contrary to the purpose of an RER study; highlights the Court’s finding that in cases where these previous checks were carried out under the FAFA between the European Commission and the United Nations, the contractor is not always able to carry out additional substantive testing as the FAFA limits the Commission’s verification rights; highlights the Commission’s reply which recognised the limitations in terms of controls set in the FAFA; urges the Commission to look for workable solutions to resolve this issue;

    176.  Recalls that two EUTFs were created under the EDFs; recalls that EUTF for Africa has mobilised over EUR 5 billion, with 88 % of contributions (EUR 4,4 billion) coming from the EDF and the Union budget; deplores that, despite several requests from Parliament, the process of managing and allocating these funds still lacks transparency; is concerned by the Court’s findings in its Special report 17/2024 “The EU trust fund for Africa Despite new approaches, support remained unfocused; notes that, despite an innovative approach to identifying human rights risks in a difficult environment, these risks were not comprehensively addressed and that the Court found that the assessment of potential risks to human rights was not comprehensive; recalls that the Commission is unable to identify and report on the most efficient and effective approaches to reducing irregular migration and forced displacements in Africa according to the Court; regrets that the new monitoring system aggregates information from all EUTF projects, but suffers from issues of data accuracy; notes that the Union’s Africa trust fund is set to be phased out in 2025;

    Recommendations

    177.  Calls on the Commission to act on the Court’s recommendations:

       (i) as regards the OPSYS application system, formalise and enhance the procedure for granting and removing access rights for system administrators and to standard users, enhance the quality of the new software, and allocate resources needed to enhance its maturity and robustness;
       (ii) strengthen guidance and controls to ensure that organisations implementing contracts under indirect management, including international organisations, international financial institutions and state agencies, comply with visibility rules;
       (iii) continue to intensify its communication with international organisations in order to provide the Court with complete, unlimited and timely access to documents necessary to carry out its task in accordance with the TFEU, and not just in read-only format;
       (iv) put in place adequate ex ante and ex post control measures in unstable or conflict zones to ensure the proper control of spending of Union funds and ways to recover the Union funds;
       (v) take measures to improve controls systems for the clearing of pre-financing paid to international organisations;
       (vi) strengthen ex ante controls before accepting expenditure;

    178.  Furthermore, calls on the Commission to:

       (i) strictly monitor through all available mechanisms and work with UNRWA to ensure the implementation of all agreed actions to guarantee that UNRWA works in full compliance with humanitarian principles and neutrality, including in the forthcoming EU-UNRWA joint declaration and the upcoming financing decisions for conditional Union assistance;
       (ii) ensure that all contracts involving Union funds fully respect applicable Union legislation, including accountability, transparency, and sound financial management, and that this includes verifying that there are no subcontractors, natural persons, participants in workshops and/or trainings or recipients of financial support made to third parties subject to Union restrictive measures or involved in the financing of terrorism or acts of terrorism as well as other acts of hatred and incitement to hatred;
       (iii) increase evidence-based targeting of geographical areas and beneficiaries, and improve the accuracy of reported achievements of future development action, including through the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe;

    European public Administration

    179.  Notes that the Commission is directly responsible for the implementation of 59,1 % of the overall administrative budget of the Union, equivalent to EUR 7,2 billion; further notes that 70 % of the administrative expenditure relates to human resources including pensions while the remaining primarily covers expenditure related to buildings, equipment, energy, communications and IT; notes with satisfaction that also for 2023 the Court concludes that the spending area is low risk;

    180.  Notes that during 2023, 2152 civil servants left the Commission primarily due to retirement, resignation or the end of their contracts; notes that this represents a relatively high turnover, which should give the Commission ample possibilities to address persistent imbalances in geographical representation throughout the services;

    181.  Encourages the Commission together with EPSO to ensure that necessary technical systems are put in place as quickly as possible and that processes are accelerated in order for the Commission and other Union institutions to be able to rely on EPSO for the selection of highly qualified and motivated candidates for all types of jobs in the institutions;

    182.  Appreciates that female representation in management positions increased from 46,1 % in December 2022 to 47,8 % in December 2023; encourages the Commission to continue to focus on ensuring and maintaining gender balance on all levels of management;

    183.  Notes with satisfaction that the Commission has implemented policies to enhance work-life balance and staff well-being, including the right to disconnect; at the same time commends that a new decision on the prevention and fight against harassment was adopted which establishes the position of a Chief Confidential Counsellor as key figure in the fight against harassment; stresses the need to provide this position with the appropriate resources to effectively carry out multiple challenging tasks;

    184.  Acknowledges the progress of the Commission with regard to the internalisation of crèche staff;

    185.  Notes with satisfaction that the Commission issued updated versions of the guidelines on ethical standards for participation of the Members of the European Commission in the election campaign to the European Parliament and guidelines for the participation of Members of the Commission in election campaigns at Member State level; further commends that in March 2023, the Commission adopted much needed strengthened rules on missions and costs paid by third parties;

    186.  Stresses the need to ensure that all the Union Institutions in Luxembourg can attract staff to all types of jobs and careers; notes that especially for servants in lower pay grades Luxembourg can be a less attractive option due to the costs of living; notes that with the agreement on the budget for 2025 the first step has been taken by establishing a special housing allowance for staff in lower grades working in Union institutions in Luxembourg;

    187.  Notes that the Commission has an ambitious goal of reducing the overall office space of the Commission by 25 % and the number of buildings by 50 % by 2030 compared to 2020; notes that the total reduction in overall space reached a little over 83 000 m2 in 2023, equal to a reduction of 11 %; welcomes that this goal is an important element in the Commission achieving carbon neutrality and reducing administrative costs; stresses that it is important that the reduction in the number of building and office space and the resulting roll-out of collaborative work spaces and other significant administrative changes happens in close cooperation with staff;

    188.  Is concerned about the severe delays, including delays of up to 6 months, faced by civil servants across the institutions when receiving the reimbursements of healthcare costs under the institutions’ sickness insurance scheme; is also concerned about the inadequate treatment of civil servants and MEPs with autoimmune diseases, neurological disorders, COPD (obstructive pulmonary disease), long COVID, undiagnosed and rare diseases by the sickness insurance scheme of the institutions; notes that patients with these symptoms are often not reimbursed for their diagnostic tests;

    189.  Notes that, in 2023, the Ombudsman launched 398 inquiries concerning the Commission; further notes that during 2023 the Commission received 187 closing decisions without remarks and 17 decisions of maladministration; notes with concern that the Ombudsman receives many citizens’ complaints about extreme delays in gaining access to requested documents from the Commission and encourages the Commission to strive to speed up the processing of such requests and further reduce the number of decisions of maladministration and establish clear rules concerning access to all types of written texts whether on paper, email, text messages or any other form of communication, which is part of an administrative process related to Commission policies or decisions; notes that out of the nine investigations related to the Commission concluded by OLAF in 2023, seven were closed with recommendations; calls on the Commission to ensure transparency and accountability in the follow-up to these cases;

    190.  Expresses deep concern that there has been allegations of corruption linked to the Commission; at the same time deplores that there has been allegations about officials from the Commission that allegedly accepted gifts from a country that the Union was negotiating an agreement with; stresses the need for a clear and systematic approach to ensure that all OLAF cases involving relevant potential criminal offences are promptly referred to the EPPO and the competent national authorities; calls on the Commission to reinforce relevant rules and procedures in order to ensure that all cases are handled in a strict, correct and efficient way;

    191.  Notes that only very few cases of psychological and sexual harassment have been recognised as such in the past years and expresses concern that this may point to institutional blind spots in the Commission, given the significant number of employees of the institution;

    192.  Expresses deep concern regarding reports of an ongoing investigation involving the former Commissioner for Justice, who is alleged to have been engaged, during his time in office, in money laundering activities involving funds of unknown origin; calls on the Commission to fully cooperate with the Belgian authorities and to urgently clarify whether these activities were in any way connected to his official duties within the Commission;

    193.  Calls on the Commission to prioritise permanent staff over external consultants and contractual staff, in order to guarantee high quality working conditions and to prevent knowledge and experience from being lost; calls for flexibility for DGs with a high proportion of seconded national experts (SNE) in the establishment plan to convert SNE posts into temporary agent posts with the aim of ensuring better expertise retention, operational functionality and business continuity; further insists on avoiding the externalisation of tasks to consultancies when available know-how can be found in-house;

    194.  Notes that, in recent years, the Commission has increasingly outsourced impact assessments to external companies, raising concerns about potential conflicts of interest; calls on the Commission to strengthen provisions to prevent possible conflicts of interest and to provide better guidance to staff handling public procurement procedures for policy-related service contracts;

    195.  Regrets the alleged espionage organised by the Hungarian Government against OLAF staff during an investigative mission; calls for the swift establishment of robust protection measures to safeguard Union institutional staff on mission in Member States and to prevent any violations;

    196.  Welcomes the entry into force of Regulation (EU) 2023/2841(21); takes note of cybersecurity investments, including EUR 30 million allocated to enhancing digital security in the Commission; calls on the Commission to spare no effort in further developing a cybersecurity culture, promoting training and awareness within the Union institution; stresses the importance of continued adequate investments in cybersecurity towards the longer term indicative target in the order of at least 10 % of total IT spending;

    197.  Reiterates its concern that the significant risks to the security and protection of the registry and operating mechanism of the Union system for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading against cyberattacks have still not been adequately addressed; points out that this issue has been highlighted in the Annual Activity Reports (AARs) since 2010, with reservations raised in each report; notes that this concern is once again emphasised in the Directorate-General for Climate Action’s 2023 AAR, further underscoring the persistent failure to prioritise the security of the system;

    European Schools

    198.  Notes that the European Schools’ overall budget for 2023 was EUR 417,5 million primarily funded by the Commission, other Union institutions, Member States and fees from parents; further notes that almost 80 % of the budget was spent on staff costs;

    199.  Notes with satisfaction that the Court is able to conclude that nothing has come to their attention that causes them to believe that the consolidated accounts for 2023 are not prepared, in all material respects, in accordance with the International Public Sector Accounting Standards;

    200.  Observes that the Court found some systematic or recurrent weaknesses in payments and related human resources (HR) and procurement procedures including insufficient verification of supporting evidence affecting the regularity of some HR procedures and payments;

    201.  Calls on the Commission, in particular, to:

       (i) ensure that Union Institutions can rely on EPSO to efficiently organise and complete selection procedures and other staff related procedures in order to provide Union Institutions with sufficient highly qualified and motivated candidates for open positions;
       (ii) explore all possibilities to correct significant geographical and gender imbalances in different categories of the staff;
       (iii) continue work on measures that will ensure that Union Institutions based in Luxembourg can continue to attract highly qualified staff for all types of job profiles;
       (iv) ensure that the roll-out of collaborative work spaces and other significant administrative changes happens in close cooperation with staff;
       (v) make more staff available for processing of reimbursement requests for the sickness insurance scheme, to improve staff training and to have better IT software available to process requests more quickly;
       (vi) act as a role model, particularly for diseases that do not fall into classical fields and rare diseases; urges the Commission to expand their technical knowledge and handling of these cases; urges the Commission to expand the catalogue of tests eligible for reimbursement to include a wider bandwidth for laboratory tests and other diagnostic procedures and exams as well as treatments; urges the Commission to do this promptly;
       (vii) ensure the rapid introduction of strong protective mechanisms for Union institutional staff on mission in Member States and third countries, safeguarding their rights;
       (viii) support the European Schools in their implementation, as soon as possible, of recommendations by the Court from previous years and the recommendation from the report concerning the financial year 2023 which asks the schools to perform systematic checks of supporting evidence on allowances paid to seconded staff;
       (ix) prepare a report analysing the reasons why the vast majority of harassment complaints (requests for assistance) in the Commission are dismissed, most of them without even opening an administrative inquiry, and recommending how such dysfunctionality of the formal procedure can be addressed;
       (x) ensure that as of 2025, requests for assistance in harassment cases are followed up with a proper administrative inquiry by the Investigation and Disciplinary Office (IDOC) or OLAF so as to ensure that harassers are held accountable and sanctioned proportionately to their wrongdoing;

    CHAPTER II – Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF)

    General remarks

    202.  Notes that in 2023, 27 recovery and resilience plans (RRPs) were revised, and that these revisions had an impact on the pace of implementation of the existing plans, causing delays; notes at the same time that the political priorities in Member States can change; notes that increased energy prices, high inflation and supply chain disruptions caused by Russia’s unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine, and, in some cases, natural disasters, contributed to the revision of the RRPs; underlines that the delays caused by the revisions of the RRPs came in addition to existing ones, as shown by the significant differences between the foreseen calendar of payments requests and the actual transmission of these requests by the Member States to the Commission; remains concerned by the risk of under-implementation and of failure to reach the milestones and targets (M&Ts) as agreed in the RRPs; emphasises the need for enhanced monitoring mechanisms to ensure that delays do not disproportionately impact key projects;

    203.  Notes that there should be a clear thematic link between reforms and investments and that there may be, in certain cases, a long delay between the creation of the national recovery plans and the completion of milestones and targets; regrets that the RRF design does not allow for sufficient flexibility to respond to emerging crises in a prompt manner;

    204.  Draws attention with utmost concern to the statement of the President of the Court, arguing that approximately half of the RRF disbursements had not reached the real economy, and questions if the other half may have been used either to substitute recurring budgetary expenditure or generate profit to Member States from the increased interest rates;

    205.  Recalls that the RRF is a temporary recovery instrument based on performance, i.e. that payments are linked to the satisfactory fulfilment of M&Ts related to reforms and investments included in the national RRPs; stresses that the effectiveness of the RRF must be assessed, not only in terms of disbursement, but also in terms of its ability to generate tangible, long-term improvements of the consequences of the pandemic; recalls that there is no definition in the RRF Regulation of the “satisfactory fulfilment of M&Ts”; recalls that each national plan should effectively address all or a significant subset of challenges identified in the European Semester, particularly the country- specific recommendations (CSRs) adopted by the Council; notes the fact that, thanks to the RRF, the percentage of CSRs with progress has increased by 17 % between 2021 and 2023;

    206.  Notes that in 2023, the Commission disbursed a total of EUR 75 billion, and additional pre-financing payments of EUR 7,1 billion, which brought the total disbursements by the end of 2023 to EUR 220,8 billion, divided into EUR 141,6 billion in grants (40 % of the total EUR 357 billion for grants under the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) envelope) and EUR 79,2 billion in loans (27 % of the total EUR 291 billion for loans under the RRF envelope); mandates detailed reporting requirements on how Member States allocate funds, preventing substitution of recurring budgetary expenditures, and ensuring funds reach intended beneficiaries;

    Court’s observations

    207.  Notes that the Court issued a qualified opinion on the legality and regularity of the RRF expenditure in 2023; is concerned that the Court concluded that seven out of 23 RRF payments made in 2023 were affected by quantitative findings and that six of these payments were affected by material error; notes that in the Court’s opinion, except for those matters, the RRF expenditure accepted in the accounts for the year 2023 is legal and regular in all material respects; notes that the nature of the RRF spending model relies on the assessments of milestones and targets (M&Ts) to be made by the Commission; notes that in 2023, the Court checked 452 M&Ts included in 23 grant payments and that it does not provide an error rate due to the nature of the RRF’s spending model but estimates the minimum financial impact of its findings to be above the materiality threshold; is convinced that Member States should also bear responsibility for errors detected in post-disbursement;

    208.  Expresses deep concern that the Court was unable to verify the actual financial impact of erroneous or ineligible RRF payments due to the inherent limitations of the milestone and target-based assessment model; calls on the Commission to develop a more transparent error-tracking methodology to prevent misallocation and inefficiency;

    209.  Notes that the Court audited 325 out of 542 milestones and 127 out of 135 targets included in 2023 payment requests for grants; regrets that the Court considers that 16 of them were affected by regularity issues (2.4 % of the total); is concerned by the fact that the Court considers that the requirements had not been satisfactorily fulfilled for seven M&Ts in six payments and that the Commission had still made the corresponding payments; notes that the Court’s conclusions are based on extensive audit work and regrets that the Commission contests some of the Court’s conclusions; notes that all of the RRF payments must be assessed against the framework communicated and applied by the Commission, which must take into consideration for each payment the opinion of the Economic and Financial Committee and the scrutiny by Member State experts under the comitology procedure; requests the Commission to ensure that all disputed payments related to unsatisfactorily fulfilled M&Ts undergo independent external review to strengthen public trust in the process; recommends an introduction of real-time tracking systems for disbursements and expenditures to prevent misallocations under the RRF and the MFF;

    210.  Notes with particular concern that the Court has identified nine potential cases of ineligible M&Ts linked to the continuation of a pre-existing project that either started before the eligibility period, or that were a substitution of recurring national budgetary expenditure; regrets the lack of clarity in the RRF Regulation, and does not share the Commission’s interpretation that the eligibility period concerns only the date of start of works on a specific project rather than the beginning of the preparatory or projection phase; regrets that such a view led to measures which were planned before the RRF eligibility period being included in the RRPs, and acknowledges that any measure must respect the scope, objectives and eligibility conditions set by the RRF Regulation; calls on the Commission to implement stricter verification mechanisms to prevent the inclusion of pre-existing projects that do not provide added value under the RRF framework;

    211.  Recalls that RRF funds shall not be used to replace recurring budgetary expenditure, unless in duly justified case; and is preoccupied by the Court’s findings that some M&Ts that were a substitution of recurring national budgetary expenditure were not adequately justified in the RRPs;

    212.  Notes with concern the Court’s finding that NGEU borrowing may more than double by 2026 while the bulk of repayment is deferred to future MFFs; recalls that the repayment of NGEU borrowing must start before the end of 2027, if unused appropriations remain available in the budget line to cover NGEU financing costs, and be completed by 2058 at the latest; notes that the Union budget exposure at the end of 2023 is expected to rise in 2024 and 2025, mainly due to RRF loans; is concerned that potential changes in market conditions might result in higher borrowing costs which, for the NGEU debt relating to grants, will have to be borne by the Union budget; is concerned that there is to date still no repayment plan for the NGEU common debt, and that the Union’s debt continues to rise, with a large share of this increase attributed to the temporary recovery instrument, NGEU; is concerned that the increased debt and the associated higher interest costs will have long-term consequences for the Union’s fiscal stability, potentially leading to greater financial strain and a reduced capacity to respond to future challenges or invest in key strategic areas;

    213.  Notes the Court’s finding that payments from RRF were lower than expected in 2023; emphasises that the Court has criticised the slow disbursement and absorption of RRF funds; is concerned by the Court’s findings in Special Report 13/2024 that absorption of RRF funds has progressed with some delays, that Member States may not be able to complete all measures at the end of the RRF’s implementation period for which a significant proportion of funds have already been paid out, and that the second half of the RRF’s implementation period is more challenging with an increase in number of M&Ts, a shift from reforms to investments and more advanced stage of implementation, and a high proportion of measures to be completed in the last year;

    214.  Notes, conversely, that according to the Commission the achievement of M&Ts is broadly on track, as by 31 August 2024, over 40 % of the available RRF funds had been disbursed to Member States, with the disbursement of grants reaching 48 % and loans slightly exceeding 30 %; notes that the pace of payment requests has also accelerated since the second half of 2023 with the revision of the RRPs linked to the introduction of the REPowerEU chapters was finalised in 2023;

    215.  Notes the Court’s findings in Special Report 13/2024 that additional reasons for slow absorption included measures not being suited to the RRF’s timeframe and underestimation of the time needed to implement them (due to public procurement and state aid rules); as well as uncertainties on implementing rules and how they should be applied including lacking guidance on the ‘do no significant harm’ principle (DNSH) and how to ascribe to it;

    216.  Expresses strong concerns about the Court’s observation that point to persistent weaknesses in the implementation of Member States control systems as this poses a risk to the availability of complete and accurate data underlying payment requests, access to those requests for control purposes, and the effective functioning of Member State control systems to protect the Union’s financial interests; recalls that, according to the RRF Regulation, Member State control systems have a key role to play in ensuring that the financial interests of the Union are protected effectively; urges the Commission to take decisive and swift action whenever necessary, including imposing financial corrections, and to make full use of the provisions of the RRF Regulation if deficiencies persist in the control systems of Member States;

    217.  Expresses concern about the Court’s findings in Special Report N°22/2024 on ‘Double funding from the EU budget: Control systems lack essential elements to mitigate the increased risk resulting from the RRF model of financing not linked to cost’; highlights that Member States can propose so-called ‘zero cost measures’, i.e. measures estimated to have no costs to be financed by the RRF, and for which there is no check at all for double-funding, as the Commission considers that measures which receive no RRF funds are free of risk from that perspective; also notes with concern the Court’s findings that from Member States’ perspective, the many layers of governance involved including national, regional or municipality level, make coordination and oversight very challenging; is concerned that when checks are performed, (i) they suffer from a very complicated environment with different IT tools used often not interoperable and data recorded in an often non-standardised way, leaving manual cross-checks across databases as the only possible tool to check for double funding, and (ii) Member States’ control systems rely to a large extent on self-declarations by recipients of Union funds; notes, however, that the Court did not find any case of double funding;

    218.  Notes the Commission’s observation that, according to the RRF Regulation, double funding is explicitly linked to budgetary costs and thus, there can be no double funding if the Member State has not submitted any cost estimate linked to a specific measure as part of its national plan; notes that the Commission underlines that no-cost reforms do not increase the financial envelope but are nevertheless essential criteria for the Commission’s positive assessment of RRPs, as well as their full implementation for the relevant payments; points out that the Commission, shortly after the Court audit field work, acknowledged it had identified the first two potential cases of double funding;

    219.  Recalls that Article 9 of the RRF Regulation establishes additionality and complementarity between Union programmes and instruments funding as key principles; believes that, to respect these principles but avoid the risk of double financing, the same measures already included in other national plans benefiting from Union funding (e.g. cohesion, agriculture, etc.) should either not be included in RRPs or more thoroughly described, even if they do not incur any costs, in order to avoid double funding; underlines that due to the different model of implementation, double funding between RRF and other Union financing instruments might be more difficult to identify, and urges the Commission to remain vigilant and pro-active in identifying any potential situation of double funding;

    220.  Regrets the lack of adequate safeguards to prevent double funding of projects under both the RRF and other Union financial instruments; calls for an automated cross-checking system between RRF and cohesion Funds, the Common Agricultural Policy, and other Union funding programmes to detect and eliminate duplicate claims;

    221.  Expresses concern about the Court’s finding in its Review 01/2023: ‘EU financing through cohesion policy and the RRF: A comparative analysis’ that reporting of fraud involving RRF expenditure still lacks a standardised approach with strong coordination and cooperation between Member States, which are obliged to report on cases of suspected fraud not in an integrated IT system, but in the management declaration accompanying every payment request, although Member States have also reported cases outside of the management declarations; regrets that there are no clear guidelines about exactly when a case of suspected fraud should be reported, whether there is a reporting threshold, and what standard information should be reported for each case and about the remedial measures taken; furthermore supports the request made by the Court to the Commission in the same review 01/2023 to obtain sufficient assurance from the Member States on the effectiveness of national systems to prevent, detect and correct fraud, corruption and conflicts of interest;

    222.  Expresses concerns that in 2023 the Commission had to introduce 10 additional control milestones for seven Members States to address the weaknesses identified in their control systems; reminds and supports the Court’s evaluation that the fact control milestones were introduced, which means that Member states systems were not fully functional when the plans started to be implemented, posing a serious risk to the regularity of the of the RRF expenditure and to the protection of financial interests;

    223.  Regrets the findings of the Court’s Special Report No 26/2023 that several policy areas in the RRF’s pillar containing health policies lack a corresponding common indicator to measure progress; is concerned that this impedes the proper monitoring and understanding of progress made towards achieving milestones and targets linked to health policies;

    224.  Welcomes that, in 2023, the Commission made progress in eliminating any possibility of misinterpretation of figures of the Recovery and Resilience Scoreboard and that the Scoreboard further addressed the related recommendation of the Court to improve the presentation of data displayed on the Scoreboard and to improve explanations with regard to its limitations, in particular by better explaining the underlying methodologies and explicitly stating, where applicable, that the data is estimated;

    Audit and control

    225.  Welcomes that, based on the Court’s recommendations and the experience gained, the Commission, in 2023, published three methodological notes to clarify the application of the RRF Regulation, including its framework for (i) assessing the satisfactory fulfilment of M&Ts, upon conducting an assessment, and (ii) the application of the provisions related to the reversal of M&Ts, as well as a methodology to determine the amount to be suspended if a milestone or target is not satisfactorily fulfilled; takes note of the updated Guidance on RRPs, adopted on 19 July 2024, which provides additional guidance to ensure the continued adequacy of controls to identify and avoid any risk of double funding as well as the methodology for reductions and recoveries under the RRF in accordance with Article 24(8) of the RRF Regulation;

    226.  Calls on the Commission to increase the number of ex-post audits and on-the-ground inspections for RRF-funded projects, particularly in high-risk sectors such as digital infrastructure, energy where previous Union funding programmes have identified significant irregularities;

    227.  Warns that the inclusion of pre-existing projects and the substitution of recurring budgetary expenditures within the RRF framework undermines the additionality principle, effectively converting the instrument into a backdoor financing mechanism for Member States’ regular budgets, rather than fostering genuine post-crisis recovery and resilience; calls for an urgent review to prevent further dilution of the RRF’s purpose;

    228.  Advocates more decisiveness on the part of both the Commission and Member States in order to detect irregularities in the spending of RRF funds and to recover undue payments;

    229.  Is concerned with the Court’s counter-reply to the Commission’s replies on the existence of an assurance gap at Union level regarding compliance with Union and national rules on public procurement and State aid; notes that the Commission argues that the assurance provided by DG ECFIN covers the effectiveness of Member States’ controls on compliance with public procurement and state aid rules. however, stresses that while DG ECFIN’s AAR refers to Commission assessments of the existence and effectiveness of Member States’ controls, there is no conclusion regarding their effectiveness; expresses concern that, according to the Court, this represents an important limitation of the scope of the Commission’s declaration of assurance, meaning that the Commission still does not provide full assurance as to whether RRF expenditure – which the Commission manages directly – complies with the rules;

    230.  Stresses that delays in disbursement and absorption of RRF funds not only slow down economic recovery but also create substantial risks of last-minute, low-quality spending towards the end of the RRF period; calls on the Commission to introduce stricter interim evaluations to prevent a ‘use-it-or-lose-it’ rush that could lead to waste and misallocation;

    231.  Notes with serious concern that Member States may strategically forego their final payment requests to avoid fulfilling politically sensitive milestones and targets, thereby evading necessary but unpopular reforms; calls on the Commission to introduce financial penalties for incomplete RRF implementation to prevent manipulation of the payment structure;

    232.  Notes that the Commission’s replies that it extended the scope of its audit work beyond that required by the RRF Regulation to verify that the control procedures put in place in the Member States give the necessary assurance that Member States regularly and effectively verify compliance with public procurement and State aid rules and eligibility for RRF measures, but disagrees with the Commission’s opinion that the conclusions of DG ECFIN’s Annual activity report cover this;

    233.  Notes with concern that, as stated by the Commission in its mid-term evaluation of the RRF of 21 February 2024, a majority of Member States consider that the payment suspension methodology remains unclear when it comes to reforms because of the discretion given to the Commission in applying the methodology; urges the Commission to revise this methodology in order to avoid any double standards in its application;

    234.  Notes that the Commission’s IAS, in its audit on ex-ante controls of the RRF payment requests carried out in 2023, identified a very important issue according to which DG ECFIN, in cooperation with the Recovery and Resilience Task Force, should further develop and formalise the existing guidance for the cases where DG ECFIN requests that Member States make additional commitments concerning action stemming from audit and control milestones, in particular that the guidance should define (i) how DG ECFIN should follow up the fulfilment of the formal confirmation on the Member State’s commitment, (ii) the criteria for determining the deadlines for the Member States to fulfil the commitments, and (iii) the relations between the ‘commitment framework’, the ‘framework for assessing M&Ts under the RRF Regulation’ and the ‘Reversal of M&Ts under the Facility’;

    235.  Notes that the Commission checks during its “Protection of the Financial Interest of the Union” audits that Member States have a clear and codified process for transmitting cases of fraud, corruption, conflict of interest and double funding to all competent authorities, including the EPPO where relevant;

    236.  Is concerned by the Court reporting in its annual reports that by the end of 2023, the EPPO had 206 active investigations related to funds used to implement RRF measures and estimated potential damages of over EUR 1,8 billion (concerning both national and Union funding); notes that the 206 open investigations concern ten Member States, with around 75 % of these cases coming from one country; is worried that at the end of 2023 the Member States’ management declarations had not reported a single case of detected suspected fraud, meaning that none of the EPPO open cases were reported by Member States themselves, casting doubts on Member States’ ability to detect and fight frauds; stresses that, while no investigation has yet been completed, the figures presented by the EPPO confirm that the risk of fraud is present in the RRF, and that they call into question the reliability of Member State management declarations in terms of reporting detected fraud and the remedial measures taken; calls for urgent reinforcement of fraud detection mechanisms, including a mandatory fraud risk assessment for all large-scale RRF projects; calls on the Commission to ensure that the EPPO has adequate resources to investigate cases of fraud related to RRF expenditure, given the increasing number of investigations and high estimated damages;

    237.  Warns that Member States’ self-reported fraud cases under RRF remain significantly underreported, creating a misleading picture of financial integrity;

    238.  Strongly regrets the lack of transparency in reporting fraud linked to RRF funds and insists that all Member States comply with standardised reporting obligations and use the Irregularity Management System (IMS);

    239.  Recalls that the Financial Regulation recast in force since 30 September 2024 (‘FR recast’) provides for the extension of its scope of the Early Detection and Exclusion System (EDES) to shared management and direct management in cases where the budget is implemented with Member States, for programmes adopted or financed as from 1 January 2028; calls on the Commission to act on the most serious grounds for exclusion in order to better protect the financial interests of the Union;

    240.  Notes that, with a view to reducing the margin between the Commission and the Court, for different interpretations of M&Ts, the Commission has published its approach to the concepts of the start date of a measure and the concept of ‘substitution of recurring national budgetary expenditure’ as Annex II and Annex III of its 2024 Annual Report on the implementation of the RRF; re-iterate its calls on the Commission to keep working with the Court in order to bring the interpretation of M&Ts as close together as possible;

    Implementation and impact

    241.  Urges the Commission to minimise risks that Member States might chose not to receive parts or the entire amounts of the last payment request, thus avoiding the fulfilment of the last M&Ts and jeopardising the overall implementation of the RRPs; is extremely concerned about the additional risks of measures being reversed after the RRF lifetime, and urges the Commission, when making the final payments, to ensure that such situations will not occur;

    242.  Emphasises that, according to the Commission’s mid-term evaluation of the RRF of 21 February 2024, Member States highlighted the need to mobilise more resources than initially planned to revise the RRPs, and that the efficiency of the performance-based approach is reduced by the ‘excessively complex procedures’ for the plan modifications, which do not distinguish between major or minor amendments and require Council approval for any modification;

    243.  Stresses that for control and audits in the RRF, Member States should put in place arrangements to prevent, detect and correct corruption, fraud and conflicts of interests, and that the Commission performs ex-post and system audits on M&Ts; stresses that some confusion persists with respect to the role of the Court, which has developed a strategy (2021-2025 Strategy) for carrying out its responsibilities for the NGEU programme and the RRF, which some Member States perceive as an unnecessary overlap and administrative burden; is concerned that the Commission, both in its mid-term evaluation of the RRF of 21 February 2024 and its RRF Annual Report of 10 October 2024, acknowledged that Member States’ authorities at all levels found the audit and control procedures to be too complex, and that Member States complained about overlapping audits by national authorities, the Commission and the Court; fully supports the Court work on the RRF; welcomes that the Commission has admitted and accepted that the Court has a full audit mandate on RRF, which is one of the foundation for the Parliament discharge on the RRF funds; recommends to the Member States to cooperate with the European Court of Auditors;

    244.  Is concerned that the Commission Annual Report of 10 October 2024 on the RRF implementation highlighted the entry costs for Member States’ administrations, with room for further simplification; notes, according to this Commission’s Annual Report, that concerning the design of the instrument, in the mid-term evaluation Member States referred to the combined obligations linked to (i) the evidence needed to prove fulfilment of M&Ts, (ii) demanding reporting requirements, for example the common indicators and the bi-annual data; and (iii) the audit and control framework; recalls that Member States see room for simplifying control and audit procedures, ensuring better coordination among the actors involved and avoiding multiple checks; also notes, again according to the Commission RRF Annual Report 2024, that some national authorities also pointed to inflexibility in the Commission’s assessment of milestones and targets and the rigid and resource-intensive procedures to revise RRPs;

    245.  Notes that one of the objectives of the RRF is to help Member States to implement ambitious reforms and investments that make their economies and societies more sustainable, resilient and prepared for the green and digital transitions; highlights with concerns the finding of the Court in its Special Report 15/2024 underlining the lack of relevance, quality and comparability of data submitted by the Member States, with data insufficient to evaluate progress on climate adaptation in the Member States, and thus paving the way for possible greenwashing; expresses concern that the RRF could become a financial vehicle for superficial rebranding of conventional expenditures as ‘green’; encourages the Commission to introduce a mechanism within the RRF framework to track the environmental impact of investments and ensure alignment with the Union’s climate objectives;

    246.  Highlights the RRF impact on the Union business and SMEs; notes that RRF has provided EUR 78 billion in direct support to SMEs, representing 12 % of total RRF expenditure, and that broader measures benefiting businesses amount to EUR 152 billion (23 % of total RRF spending); notes that EUR 2,75 million SMEs, approximately 11 % of all active SMEs in the Union, have received support through the RRF; underlines that nearly 600 000 businesses have benefited from digitalisation initiatives, while EUR 5,2 billion have been allocated to green transition projects, including renewable energy and hydrogen;

    247.  Highlights with concern that the facilitation of cross-border projects has not worked out; deplores that, despite the inclusion in the RRPs of several measures linked to Important Projects of Common Interest (‘IPCEIs’) and cross-border measures in the REPowerEU chapters, the national governance of the Facility has not sufficiently promoted cross-border cooperation; strongly insists that Union financing should be better linked with the achievement of common Union objectives and should generate EU added value;

    248.  Emphasises that the Commission Annual Report of 10 October 2024 on the RRF implementation acknowledged the insufficient involvement of Member States of regional and local authorities, civil society organisations, social partners, and other relevant stakeholders in the preparation and the implementation of the national RRPs; calls for their close involvement in the implementation of the national RRPs on the ground;

    249.  Urges the Commission not to approve any revision of RRPs, which may lead to a re-packaging of planned reforms or investments into the RRPs if they don’t respect the conditions of the RRF Regulation; notes that any revision should always aim to create added value and increase synergies;

    Transparency

    250.  Recalls that, while Member States are not required to publish all data on final recipients, Regulation (EU) 2023/435 of the European Parliament and of the Council(22) amending the RRF Regulation requires Member States to publish information on the 100 final recipients receiving the highest amount of funding under the RRF; welcomes that on 10 October 2024, the Commission published, as part of the RRF Annual Report 2024, a dedicated Annex to provide further clarity on the concept of final recipients under the RRF Regulation and the scope of the publication of data on the largest 100 final recipients; expresses deep concern over the interpretation of the Commission of the concept of “final recipient” under the RRF, as often they are listed only at the ministry level, and that the descriptions are vague, with many examples available in almost all lists provided by Member States; reiterates its demand that the list of 100 largest final recipients provides the factual natural person or entity that is the last in a chain of money transfers to be made available in a publicly accessible database to enhance accountability and enable independent oversight, while respecting the legal framework of Union data protection; is concerned that otherwise it will be problematic to measure the impact and guarantee visibility of the RRF funds to the citizens, although also takes into account the RRF Scoreboard and the project map; stresses that, should the Commission continue to refuse to ensure full transparency, Parliament must consider all available measures to enforce compliance, to prevent a similar interpretation from being applied to the transparency provisions in other financial regulations;

    251.  Reminds the Commission that the letter and spirit of the RRF Regulation must be strictly followed, and that the adoption of guidelines or other internal documents must be fully in line with the results of the negotiations between the co-legislators; is convinced that this has not been the case when the Commission adopted the provisions related to the interpretation of what a “final recipient” is in its Guidance on RRPs in the context of REPowerEU;

    252.  Notes that not being able to ascertain final recipients of RRF funding poses a severe risk to the transparency and traceability of Union funds and thus to the protection of the financial interests of the Union;

    253.  Recalls that a robust IT infrastructure is essential for data collection, programme monitoring and evaluation, and that managing authorities and beneficiaries are critical of the level of information required and duplication with other domestic systems; notes that, in contrast to the Cohesion Policy, the Court under the RRF pointed to the different structures and approaches used by national monitoring authorities, which could be perceived as less reliable by providing non-homogeneous information and leaving room for a potentially high number of errors; stresses that, in this respect, centralised interoperable systems facilitate efficient data collection and reporting, while fragmented systems underscore the need for streamlined approaches;

    254.  Welcomes that the ‘FR recast’ establishes horizontal measures for a centralised website (Financial Transparency System) at Union level, covering all recipients of Union funding, and notes that this website is due to overcome the current fragmentation, enhance transparency, and facilitate public scrutiny of recipients; notes that the Commission, as from the next MFF (i.e. post 2027) will be required to use the relevant data stored in the data mining and risk-scoring tool, Arachne, to feed the centralised website for transparency purposes, and that, in line with data protection rules, the website will include only public data, e.g. relevant data on recipients, contractors, subcontractors, and beneficiaries; further stresses that all Member States will have an obligation to provide the Commission with access to this data, to be fed into Arachne by automated means; regrets that the use of Arachne by Member States is not compulsory;

    255.  Notes that the final M&T of the national RRPs must be completed by 31 August 2026 according to Articles 18(4) and 20(5) of the Regulation; recalls the need for the Commission to work closely with every Member State to speed up implementation on the ground including through providing regular guidance and, upon request, technical assistance to help the implementation of the plans; re-iterates its concerns about the possibility of the reversal of M&Ts after the lifetime of the RRF, and urges the Commission to prevent such situations;

    256.  Calls on the Commission to reject any request of revision of RRPs which would lower the overall ambition of the plan or would eliminate important structural reforms from the RRPs, and to prioritise the completion of measures related to CSRs in RRPs; further calls on the Commission to step up its technical assistance to Member States lagging behind in the RRF implementation;

    Recommendations

    257.  Calls on the Commission to act on the Court’s recommendations from its Annual Report as well as those of its related special reports, and welcomes that the Commission accepts the vast majority of them; calls on the Commission to implement them and to keep the discharge authority informed on the progress of the implementation;

    258.  Calls on the Commission to grant full access to the Court to the new reporting tool on the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), FENIX as soon as possible;

    259.  Furthermore, calls on the Commission to:

       (i) carefully balance auditing and control requirements with the administrative burden imposed on Member States and beneficiaries of future performance-based instruments, while maintaining a sufficient level of control and audit that would grant a solid protection of the Union financial interests;
       (ii) closely monitor the continued fulfilment of M&Ts, in particular those related to audit, monitoring and control and ensure an adequate monitoring of any potential reversal of previously completed M&Ts;
       (iii) use the results of its checks on Member States control systems to express a clear conclusion on their effectiveness and take all appropriate measures;
       (iv) establish one single contact point for Member States on the Statement of Assurance at the Commission to which the Court can have access without further burdening Member States with requests for additional proofs;
       (v) record and monitor systematically all irregularities and all frauds affecting RRF funds;
       (vi) consistently and accurately apply the provisions related to the “final recipients”, of the RRF Regulation, by revising its Guidance on RRPs in the context of REPowerEU, and to communicate with Member States on the correct application of the definition of “final recipients”; calls on the Commission to come forward with proposals requiring Member States to publish details of all final recipients;
       (vii) streamline its control on the M&Ts through the implementation of a Single Audit approach, which would allow reduction of the administrative burden, the consolidation of audit responsibilities between the Commission and the Court, the coordination of audit timelines and requirements to avoid duplication and overlapping controls and audits, but at the same time ensuring the full protection of the Union financial interests;
       (viii) support Member States in making IT systems truly interoperable, so as to facilitate efficient data collection, reporting and exchange between various government departments and agencies to allow the minimisation of the risks of double funding, actively cross-check between relevant databases, and communicate with Member States about their administrative capacities to ensure double funding does not occur; notes in this regard, the positive examples provided at the Court Conference on Transparency and Traceability of EU Recovery and Resilience Funding in October 2024;
       (ix) work closely with Member States to ensure that M&Ts, in particular those of a structural nature or linked with CSRs, are fully and diligently implemented, and that no revision of RRPs will be approved in cases where ambition has been lowered or important measures have been weakened; avoid, to the extent possible, the revision of plans that would represent a “re-packaging” of planned measures into the RRPs if they don’t respect the conditions of the RRF Regulation;
       (x) strictly apply the provisions of the RRF Regulation, including those regarding suspension of payments or recoveries of amounts, in particular if the protection of the financial interests of the Union is not ensured;
       (xi) apply very strictly the methodology on partial payments, including as regards structural measures and measures linked to the implementation of CSRs;
       (xii) develop a methodology based on quality and comparability of data to evaluate progress on green and digital transitions, as well as the tangible benefits, in the Member States;
       (xiii) ensure that Member States diligently apply the visibility provisions of the RRF, making sure that measures implemented through the Facility are adequately flagged as funded by the Union;
       (xiv) provide technical assistance, administrative support and advice to Member States to strengthen their administrative capacity, including through the organisation of regular meetings of the Informal Expert Group on the implementation of the RRF to discuss technical aspects and encourage the exchange of good practices amongst national authorities;
       (xv) perform, whenever a revision of the RRPs is proposed, a comprehensive analysis of new and existing measures and whether they would substitute recurring budgetary expenditure or would be in breach of other eligibility conditions of the RRPs;
       (xvi) provide training and support to Member States to increase administrative capacities including training on specialised skills, knowledge and providing examples of best practices;
       (xvii) keep working with the Court in order to bring the interpretation of M&Ts as close together as possible;
       (xviii) use the recommendations of the Court from its work on the RRF and the experience gained in the implementation for the design of the next multiannual financial framework architecture including the implementation of future Union performance-based instruments;
       (xix) strengthen the design of future performance-based instruments by ensuring a closer link between disbursements and progress in implementation;
       (xx) ensure that any future revision, as well as the overall implementation, of RRPs is done in close cooperation with and consultation of local and regional authorities, and other relevant stakeholders in order to maximise the RRP’s impact;
       (xxi) analyse the weaknesses present in performance-based instruments, and address these weaknesses when designing new programmes in the future;
       (xxii) build, in the next MFF, on a high-level of interoperability and data exchange between various government departments and agencies to facilitate efficient data sharing and real-time updates across multiple platforms in order to allow to track overlapping projects, minimising the risks of double counting and double funding.
    (1) The 11th EDF covers the 2021-2027 MFF.
    (2) ‘The future of European competitiveness’, 9 September 2024.
    (3) Special report 05/2024: EU Transparency Register – provides useful but limited information on lobbying activities.
    (4) Special Report 11/2025 Transparency of EU funding granted to NGOs – despite progress, the overview is still not reliable.
    (5) https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/P-10-2025-000595-ASW_EN.pdf.
    (6) https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32021R0783.
    (7) https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/P-10-2025-000595-ASW_EN.pdf.
    (8) OJ C, C/2024/5882, 9.10.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/5882/oj.
    (9) ECA Special Report 07/2024: The Commission’s systems for recovering irregular EU expenditure – Potential to recover more and faster.
    (10) OJ C, C/2024/5882, 9.10.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/5882/oj.
    (11) COM(2023) 258.
    (12) ECA Special Report 16/2024: EU revenue based on non‑recycled plastic packaging waste – A challenging start hindered by data that is not sufficiently comparable or reliable.
    (13) Council Directive (EU) 2018/822 of 25 May 2018 amending Directive 2011/16/EU as regards mandatory automatic exchange of information in the field of taxation in relation to reportable cross-border arrangements (OJ L 139, 5.6.2018, p. 1; ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2018/822/oj).
    (14) ECA 2023 Annual Report para 1.35.
    (15) Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 laying down common provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund Plus, the Cohesion Fund, the Just Transition Fund and the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund and financial rules for those and for the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, the Internal Security Fund and the Instrument for Financial Support for Border Management and Visa Policy (OJ L 231, 30.6.2021, p. 159; ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1060/oj).
    (16) Commission Decision of 13.12.2023 on the reassessment, on the Commission’s initiative, of the fulfilment of the conditions under Article 4 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 following Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/2506 of 15 December 2022 regarding Hungary, C(2023)8999.
    (17) Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget (OJ L 433I, 22.12.2020, p. 1; ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/2092/oj).
    (18) Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 of 17 December 2020 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027 (OJ L 433I, 22.12.2020, p. 11; ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/2093/oj).
    (19) Regulation (EU) 2021/241 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 February 2021 establishing the Recovery and Resilience Facility (OJ L 57, 18.2.2021, p. 17; ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/241/oj).
    (20) Angola, Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Fiji, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, The Gambia, Togo and Uganda.
    (21) Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2023/2841 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2023 laying down measures for a high common level of cybersecurity at the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union (OJ L, 2023/2841, 18.12.2023, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/2841/oj).
    (22) Regulation (EU) 2023/435 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 February 2023 amending Regulation (EU) 2021/241 as regards REPowerEU chapters in recovery and resilience plans and amending Regulations (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) 2021/1060 and (EU) 2021/1755, and Directive 2003/87/EC (OJ L 63, 28.2.2023, p. 1; ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/435/oj).

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Highlights – Consent-based rape legislation in the EU – Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality

    Source: European Parliament

    On Monday, 19 May 2025, the Policy Department for Citizens, Equality and Culture, at the request of the FEMM Committee, will organise a workshop entitled ‘Consent-based rape legislation in the EU’.

    The workshop will examine key aspects of consent, the state of play of consent-based rape legislation throughout the EU, as well as awareness raising and capacity building in this regard. The workshop proceedings will feed into the joint LIBE-FEMM own-initiative report on the ‘Importance of consent-based rape legislation in the EU’. Members will debate with Sara Uhnoo (University of Gothenburg), Kristien Michielsen (KU Leuven) and Donna von Allemann (Women against Violence Europe Network (WAVE)).

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: SCMA visits Hungary and Egypt to promote development opportunities in GBA

    Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

    SCMA visits Hungary and Egypt to promote development opportunities in GBA 
         While in Beijing, Mr Tsang led the HKSAR Government delegation to meet with Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Ms Hua Chunying and leaders of various bureaus to deepen their understanding of the country’s foreign policies and the latest developments of the international situation. He expressed his gratitude to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for its staunch and continuous support for the HKSAR and hoped it would continue to provide support and guidance the HKSAR Government in handling external affairs of Hong Kong, to support Hong Kong in intensifying international interaction and co-operation, and to showcase the successful implementation of “one country, two systems” to the world.
     
         In addition to the visit to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mr Tsang also met with the Hong Kong Basic Law Committee of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress and the Committee on Liaison with Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan and Overseas Chinese of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, and toured the China Foreign Affairs University. Before leaving Beijing tomorrow, he will visit the Museum of Early Revolutionary Activities of the Communist Party of China in Beijing (the Red Building of Peking University), one of the main venues of the May Fourth Movement, meet with Hong Kong students in Beijing, and visit the Office of the Government of the HKSAR in Beijing to receive briefings on its work.
     
         Mr Tsang will depart Beijing for Budapest, Hungary, in the early hours of May 15. He will attend the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area – Europe (Hungary) Economic and Trade Cooperation Exchange Conference co-organised by Guangdong, Hong Kong and Macao on May 16. The conference aims to promote the enormous business opportunities brought about by the GBA to the Hungarian business community and how Hong Kong can play its important function as a “super connector” and “super value-adder” between the two places.
     
         During his stay in Hungary, Mr Tsang will meet with local political and business representatives to learn about the latest developments in the region and explore ways to further strengthen co-operation between Hungary and Hong Kong, with a view to opening up new opportunities for enterprises of both places.
     
         After completing his visit to Hungary, Mr Tsang will depart for Cairo, Egypt, on May 17 and attend the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area – Africa (Egypt) Economic and Trade Cooperation Exchange Conference on May 19 to promote the latest developments and the development potential of the GBA, as well as Hong Kong’s unique advantages under “one country, two systems”. During his stay, he will exchange views with representatives of the local political and business circles to understand the local development trends and promote interface between the industries of Hong Kong and Egypt.
     
         The Commissioner for the Development of the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area, Ms Maisie Chan, and the Director-General of Investment Promotion, Ms Alpha Lau, will join the visit.
     
         Mr Tsang will depart from Egypt on the evening of May 19 and return to Hong Kong on May 20. During his absence, the Under Secretary for Constitutional and Mainland Affairs, Mr Clement Woo, will be the Acting Secretary for Constitutional and Mainland Affairs.
    Issued at HKT 19:24

    NNNN

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Farr Primary School goes gold

    Source: Scotland – Highland Council

    Farr Primary School has recently received several important accreditations including the UNICEF Gold Rights Respecting School award, sportscotland Gold School Sport Award 2025-2027 and Reading Schools Core and Silver accreditation.

    Education Committee Chair, Cllr John Finlayson said: “Farr Primary School has recently received three wonderful accreditations, a real testament to their hard work and dedication. I’d like to congratulate the pupils, staff and the wider community for their commitment to reach the highest UNICEF Gold Rights Respecting School award, sportscotland Gold School Sport Award 2025-2027 and Reading Schools Core and Silver accreditation.

    “By putting children at the heart of everything we do, we can create a positive and inclusive learning environment where every child feels valued, respected and with the life tools to flourish in many areas.”

    Head Teacher at Farr Primary School, Kirsty Guthrie said: “Pupils across the school have leadership roles and as part of this they work with parents and carers and the wider school community to enable positive changes. Pupil voice is valued highly and is at the heart of decision making here at Farr Ps. Rights are embedded across the curriculum and underpin our ethos and vision going forward.”

    The Rights Respecting Schools Gold Award issued by the UK Committee for UNICEF is the highest accolade and celebrates schools that have successfully embedded children’s rights into their daily practice.

    The Rights Respecting Schools Award encourages schools to create safe and inspiring learning environments where children are respected, their talents are nurtured, and they can thrive. By using the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) as a guiding framework, schools in Highland have demonstrated a deep commitment to promoting and realising children’s rights.

    The sportscotland School Sport Award is a national initiative designed to encourage schools to put young people at the heart of decision making, planning and implementation of extra-curricular school sport. It also encourages schools to self-reflect and continuously improve and recognise and celebrate successful school sport models. The award also encourages sporting links between schools and the communities around them, providing opportunities for young people to progress. 

    Reading School Award – As well as sustaining the foundational work of Core level, Reading Schools: Silver is based around schools providing additional opportunities to broaden their learners’ experiences, such as engaging with authors, visiting libraries, and bringing in other outside expertise.

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI USA: Ciscomani Reiterates His Commitment to Protecting Head Start Programs

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Congressman Juan Ciscomani (Arizona)

    The two-term Congressman toured and delivered remarks at an Arizona Head Start program in Eloy, AZ

    Eloy, AZ — U.S. Congressman Juan Ciscomani, a longtime advocate for Head Start, visited the Pinal Gila Community Child Services Inc. (PGCCS) in Eloy to reiterate his support of this critical program and opposition to funding reductions that would jeopardize access to early childhood education for families in need.  

    Ciscomani delivered remarks at the Arizona Head Start Association Seminar, toured the Eloy facility, and discussed his efforts in Congress to strengthen the childcare workforce and expand access to Head Start.  

    “Education is a pillar of the American Dream. With 22 Head Start programs across 500 locations in Arizona, these programs are critical to the well-being of our families and students,” Ciscomani told workers and educators in attendance. As a dad of six, I see firsthand the critical role early learning and development programs, like Head Start, play for children. I want to ensure that more children have the opportunity to attend these programs to build a strong foundation for their lives. Rather than reducing funding, I support investing more and expanding access to Head Start. As the only appropriator for the state of Arizona I plan to continue supporting full funding for these vital programs.” 

    As Arizona’s sole appropriator, Ciscomani secured a $25 million increase in funding for Head Start in the FY25 Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education Appropriations Bill and will continue to champion that effort as the Committee crafts its FY26 budget. 

    In January 2025, Ciscomani reintroduced the Head Start Education and Development Workforce Advancement and Yield (HEADWAY) Act (H.R. 336) to address the childcare workforce shortage by allowing teachers in Early Head Start to teach while simultaneously earning their Child Development Associate (CDA) credentials. This would offer greater hiring flexibility for Head Start while at the same time supporting educators and expanding access to these much-needed programs. 
    This is the third Head Start facility Ciscomani has visited in his time in Congress. In December 2023, Ciscomani visited the Head Start program in Tucson and in August 2024, Ciscomani visited the Head Start program in Casa Grande. In September 2024, Ciscomani attended the Head Start on the Hill Rally to hear from educators and senior Head Start officials about the importance of early childhood development programs.  

    Background: 

    • In March 2025, Ciscomani co-led the Child Care Availability and Affordability Act (H.R. 1827) and the Child Care Workforce Act (H.R. 1826), a bicameral, bipartisan effort to make childcare more affordable and accessible by strengthening existing child tax credits and increasing the supply of childcare providers. 

    ### 

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Security: Woodbridge, Connecticut, Man Admits $2.3 Million Pandemic Relief Program Scheme

    Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) State Crime Alerts (b)

    Marc H. Silverman, Acting United States Attorney for the District of Connecticut, today announced that on May 9, 2025, YASIR G. HAMED, 60, of Woodbridge, waived his right to be indicted and pleaded guilty before U.S. District Judge Stefan R. Underhill in Bridgeport to offenses stemming from a scheme to defraud a COVID-19 pandemic relief program of more than $2.3 million.

    In March 2020, the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (“CARES”) Act provided emergency financial assistance to Americans suffering the economic effects caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.  One source of relief provided by the CARES Act was the authorization of forgivable loans to small businesses for job retention and certain other expenses through the Paycheck Protection Program (“PPP”).  The PPP was overseen by the U.S. Small Business Administration (“SBA”), and individual PPP loans were issued by private lenders, which received and processed PPP applications and supporting documentation, and then made loans using the lenders’ own funds, which were guaranteed by the SBA.

    According to court documents and statements made in court, Hamed, an accountant, had an ownership interest or representative relationship with several New Haven-based businesses, including Access Consulting and Professional Services Inc.; Connecticut Medical Transportation Inc.; Arabic Language Learning Program Inc.; Institute for Global Educational Exchange Inc.; Access Medical Transport Inc.; Ikea Car & Limo Inc.; Center of the World Tours, North America LLC.; and Sudanese American Friendship Association Inc.  Between June 2020 and September 2021, Hamed submitted fraudulent PPP loan applications on behalf of these companies, overstating employee numbers and average monthly payroll, and making other fraudulent representations.  As part of the applications, he submitted false tax filings that had never been filed with the IRS.

    Hamed also submitted PPP loan applications on behalf of companies owned by his clients.  In at least one instance, Hamed convinced the owner of a business, which he knew was not active and had no employees, to seek PPP funding.  Hamed prepared the paperwork for the PPP application and then took a significant portion of the loan proceeds.

    Through this scheme, Hamed obtained than $2.3 million in PPP loans for his businesses and for his clients, receiving more than $1 million in loan proceeds for himself and his family, and significant kickbacks from his clients.  Hamed used the funds for personal expenses, including education expenses for a family member, and for a downpayment on a $880,000 house in Woodbridge that he purchased in October 2020.

    Hamed has agreed to pay $2,384,772 in restitution.

    Hamed pleaded guilty to bank fraud, which carries a maximum term of imprisonment of 30 years, and engaging in illegal monetary transactions, which carries a maximum term of imprisonment of 10 years.  Judge Underhill scheduled sentencing for August 8.

    Hamed was arrested on November 13, 2024.  He is released on a $500,000 bond pending sentencing.

    This investigation has been conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Internal Revenue Service – Criminal Investigation Division.  The case is being prosecuted by Assistant U.S. Attorney Christopher W. Schmeisser.

    Individuals with information about allegations of fraud involving COVID-19 are encouraged to report it by calling the Department of Justice’s National Center for Disaster Fraud Hotline at 866-720-5721, or via the NCDF Web Complaint Form at: https://www.justice.gov/disaster-fraud/ncdf-disaster-complaint-form.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Change of British High Commissioner to Fiji: Kanbar Hossein-Bor

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    Press release

    Change of British High Commissioner to Fiji: Kanbar Hossein-Bor

    Mr Kanbar Hossein-Bor has been appointed British High Commissioner to the Republic of Fiji.

    Mr Kanbar Hossein-Bor has been appointed British High Commissioner to the Republic of Fiji, non-resident British High Commissioner to the Republic of Kiribati and His Majesty’s non-resident Ambassador to the Federated States of Micronesia and the Republic of the Marshall Islands, in succession to Dr Brian Jones who will be transferring to another Diplomatic Service appointment.  Mr Hossein-Bor will take up his appointment during July 2025.

    Curriculum Vitae

    Full name: Kanbar Hossein-Bor

    Year Role
    2021 to 2025 FCDO, Deputy Director Democratic Governance and Media Freedom Co-ordinator
    2018 to 2020 Dhaka, Deputy High Commissioner
    2015 to 2015 Monrovia, Chargé d’Affaires
    2012 to 2015 FCO, Head, Libya Team
    2009 to 2012 The Hague, Head of International Tribunals and UK Agent to the International Court of Justice
    2006 to 2007 Baghdad, Legal Adviser and Head of Justice and Human Rights Section
    2006 to 2009 FCO, Legal Directorate
    2002 to 2005 Barrister, Private Practice

    Media enquiries

    Email newsdesk@fcdo.gov.uk

    Telephone 020 7008 3100

    Contact the FCDO Communication Team via email (monitored 24 hours a day) in the first instance, and we will respond as soon as possible.

    Updates to this page

    Published 13 May 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Local mental health group enhances city’s green spaces

    Source: City of Portsmouth

    BH Live runs Portsmouth Interaction, a health and wellbeing service that refers local people across the city to low-cost fitness and wellbeing activities to support better mental health.

    Created with the community in mind, Portsmouth Interaction’s Conservation Group has been running in partnership with Portsmouth City Council since 2017, with countryside officer Peter Roberts playing a lead role.

    The free sessions help people with long-term health conditions improve their fitness, self-esteem, and mental health. They also support participants in returning to work, staying physically active, and rejoining everyday life. By spending time outdoors and caring for local green spaces, participants give back to the community and the city’s environment.

    Between April 2024 and March 2025 Portsmouth Interaction’s Conservation Group welcomed nearly 400 attendances, with volunteers delivering an average of 11.5 hours of conservation work every week clearing litter, unwanted saplings and weeds in green spaces across Hilsea. Since the group’s inception, more than 450 trees have been planted in the area.

    Recent studies from Mind, a mental health charity, found that connecting with nature can improve mood, help with symptoms of mental health conditions, improve physical health, and build confidence and self-esteem*.

    Discussing the success of the group, Cllr Matthew Winnington, Cabinet Member for Health, Wellbeing and Social Care at Portsmouth City Council said:

    “Supporting the mental health of our residents is one of our key priorities, and we are committed to making sure they can get support where they need it. The importance of volunteer groups in this area cannot be understated.

    “Portsmouth Interaction’s volunteers play an integral role. They help to maintain and improve this much-loved green oasis in the north of the city, alongside being involved in the creation and development of the area that the Forest School uses. Special thanks go to our countryside officer, Peter Roberts, for all his efforts to make this project happen.”

    Feedback from the sessions has been extremely positive, with participants sharing;

    “I am much more connected to nature and the environment; I have learnt the history of this site which I previously had no knowledge of”.

    “Since becoming unwell 6 years ago this project has been essential to my well-being – mental and physical.”

    “I feel happier in myself.”

    Following its success, BH Live has also partnered with local charity, Enable Ability, to deliver joint Portsmouth Interaction Conservation Group sessions to young adults with additional needs to help build confidence, support personal development, and socialise.

    On behalf of BH Live, Kerry Morgan, Portsmouth Interaction’s Manager, shared;

    “It’s fantastic to see these sessions have been so well received by participants, as well as residents and Portsmouth City Council. It’s brilliant that we can extend our reach to work with other local groups too and encourage more people of all ages to get active, give back to the community, and spend time with others in some of Portsmouth’s beautiful green spaces.”

    Residents interested in getting involved can find out more about Portsmouth Interaction at bhliveactive.org.uk/health-and-wellbeing-activities.

    More information about BH Live can be found at bhlive.org.uk.

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Marshall Medal awarded to Dr John Jumper

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    News story

    Marshall Medal awarded to Dr John Jumper

    Prestigious Marshall Medal awarded to Dr John Jumper by the Marshall Aid Commemoration Commission

    Minister of State for Europe, North America and Overseas Territories, Stephen Doughty MP (left), Dr John Jumper (centre), and MACC Chair John Raine CMG OBE (right)

    The Marshall Aid Commemoration Commission has announced 12 May that it has awarded a prestigious Marshall Medal to Dr John Jumper – a 2007 Marshall Scholar, distinguished scientist at Google DeepMind and co-recipient of the 2024 Nobel Prize for Chemistry – on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the Marshall Scholarship programme.

    The Marshall Medal is awarded on significant anniversaries of the Marshall Scholarship programme and the Marshall Plan to people whose outstanding achievements and contributions to British-American understanding, distinguished role in public life, or creative energy, reflect the legacy of former US Army General and Secretary of State George C. Marshall – the architect of the Marshall Plan. The Marshall Scholarship programme was established by the British Government in enduring gratitude for the post-war economic aid provided by the United States under his leadership. Marshall Scholarships are awarded each year to distinguished young Americans who show exceptional promise as future scholars, leaders and ambassadors for UK-US understanding, to undertake postgraduate study at any UK university.

    Upon making this award the Marshall Commission released its citation:

    As a trailblazing scientist whose research has advanced the frontiers of human understanding in medicine, biotechnology and Artificial Intelligence, and whose transatlantic career and commitments exemplify the aims and values of the Marshall Scholarship programme in developing connections between the United Kingdom and the United States across all fields of endeavour; supporting our mutual values, security and economic vitality; and strengthening the special relationship between our two nations, the Marshall Aid Commemoration Commission is delighted to award a Marshall Medal to Dr John Jumper.

     “John Jumper’s journey from Marshall Scholar at Cambridge to distinguished scientist at Google DeepMind – returning to the UK to undertake Nobel prize-winning research – demonstrates the enduring transatlantic connections and collaboration the Marshall Scholarship programme helps to forge,” said John Raine CMG OBE, Chair of the Marshall Commission. “It is with immense pleasure that we recognise his achievements with the Marshall Medal.”

    The Medal was presented at an event celebrating departing Marshall Scholars who have completed their degrees. The Commissioners were also delighted to host the Minister of State for Europe, North America and Overseas Territories, Stephen Doughty MP, who congratulated Dr Jumper and the departing Scholars.

    In his remarks, Dr Jumper thanked the Commission and encouraged the students to maximise their impact by focusing on the problems of tomorrow rather than replicating the approaches of the past, but also to recognise that progress is not always linear.

    Only 23 Marshall Medals have been awarded in the programme’s 70-year history. Past awardees include US Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer, former US Secretaries of State Madeleine Albright and Colin Powell, former CIA Director Bill Burns, and most recently, Dr Lisa Cook – Governor of the US Federal Reserve, among others. A full list of recipients is available on the Commission’s website: https://www.marshallscholarship.org/about/the-marshall-medal

    About the Marshall Scholarship 

    Named for US Army General and Secretary of State George C. Marshall, the Marshall Scholarship programme began in 1953 as a gesture of gratitude to the people of the United States for the post-World War II economic assistance the UK received under the Marshall Plan. Since that time, it has remained uniquely positioned among international scholarships for its prestige and scope: offering talented young Americans the chance to study any academic subject at UK universities of their choice for up to three years. This has given rise to an unprecedented breadth of expertise in almost every academic field, producing numerous university presidents, six Pulitzer Prize winners, two Nobel Laureates, fourteen MacArthur Fellows, two-academy-Award nominees, two US Supreme Court Justices and a NASA Astronaut.  

    With over 2,200 scholarships awarded to date, Marshall Scholars are leading the conversation and direction of some of the most critical issues of our time.

    Notable winners of the Marshall Scholarship include:  

    • Supreme Court Associate Justices Stephen Breyer (ret.) and Neil Gorsuch 

    • William Burns, former Director of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency 

    • Pulitzer Prize Winners Anne Applebaum, Tom Friedman, Jeffrey Gettleman, Sarah Stillman and Dan Yergin  

    • Nobel Prize Winners in Chemistry Dr. John Jumper (2024) and Prof. Roger Tsien (2008). 

    • Dr. Dan Barouch, Leading COVID-19 vaccine researcher and William Bosworth Castle Professor of Medicine at Harvard Medical School 

    • Kurt Campbell, former Deputy Secretary of State, United States Department of State. 

    • Reid Hoffman, Philanthropist and founder of social networking platform LinkedIn 

    • Lisa Cook, Economist and currently the first African-American woman and first person of colour to sit on the Federal Reserve Board of Governors 

    • Rep. Gabe Amo, Congressman representing Rhode Island’s 1st Congressional District 

    • Kris Kobach, Attorney General of the State of Kansas 

    • Jocelyn Benson, Secretary of State for the State of Michigan 

    • Col. Anne McClain, NASA Astronaut and U.S. Army Colonel who recently commanded NASA’s SpaceX Crew-10 mission to the International Space Station. 

    • Dr. Ray Dolby, Founder of Dolby Laboratories and 1997 winner of the National Medal of Technology and Innovation 

    • Rebecca F. Kuang, #1 New York Times bestselling author of Babel and The Poppy War book trilogy 

    For media inquiries, interview requests or further quotes about the Marshall Medal award or Marshall Scholarship programme, please contact Stephanie Berke at stephanie.berke@marshallscholarship.org

    Updates to this page

    Published 13 May 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI Global: Russia-China ties on full display on Victory Day – but all is not as well as Putin is making out

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, University of Birmingham

    Chinese troops participating in Russia’s Victory Day parade in Red Square, Moscow, on May 9 is a clear indication that President Xi Jinping is fully committed to his “no-limits” partnership with his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin.

    Xi’s own attendance of the parade, which came as part of a state visit to Russia, underlines that China is not only supporting Russia. It signified that Beijing wants this support to be understood clearly in Kyiv, Washington and European capitals.

    Travelling to Moscow and having his troops goose-step down Red Square was not a last-minute decision by Xi. Nor was the multitude of agreements signed by the two leaders and their joint declaration anything but part of a well established pattern of deepening relations between Russia and China.

    This trend has accelerated since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. But the breadth and depth of China’s commitment to Russia at this particular moment is undoubtedly related to the broader upheaval in the international order that has been worsened since Donald Trump’s return to the White House.


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    The Trump administration, possibly spooked by market wobbles, has taken steps to restore stability. China and the US have agreed a deal to slash the import tariffs they have imposed on each other. But uncertainty remains – above all about how the complex relationships in the triangle of Washington, Beijing and Moscow will work out and where this will leave the rest of the world.




    Read more:
    Trump, Xi and Putin: a dysfunctional love triangle with stakes of global significance


    On May 8, in the wake of Xi and Putin’s meetings in Moscow, Russia and China released a joint statement. It stressed the intention of the two leaders to “enhance the coordination of their approaches and to deepen the practical cooperation on maintaining and strengthening global strategic stability, as well as to jointly address common challenges and threats in this sphere”.

    They reiterated this determination in their press statements afterwards. Putin emphasised that he and Xi “personally control all aspects of [the] Russia-China partnership and do all we can to expand the cooperation on bilateral issues and the international agenda alike”.

    A Chinese read-out from the talks was similarly clear on the alignment between the countries. Xi reportedly said that “in the face of unilateralist countercurrents, bullying and acts of power politics, China is working with Russia to shoulder the special responsibilities of major countries and permanent members of the UN Security Council”.

    This unequivocal display of how close Moscow and Beijing are – as well as Putin and Xi personally – is important for both nations. For Russia, it remains important to demonstrate that western attempts at international isolation have not succeeded.

    For China, the very public consolidation of ties with Russia is above all a signal to the US. China is keen to stress that Trump’s efforts to engineer a split between Moscow and Beijing, which the American president described as necessary to “un-unite” the two nations during an interview with US talk show host Tucker Carlson in November 2024, have largely failed.

    However, beyond the glossy surface of the celebrations in Moscow, all is not as well for Russia as Putin is trying to make out. For all the public displays of friendship between Xi and Putin, the relationship between the two countries remains highly asymmetrical.

    Russia would not be able to continue to wage its war against Ukraine without Chinese support. Trade between Russia and China is critical to propping up the Russian war economy, reaching a record high of nearly US$250 billion (£190 billion) in 2024. Their trade has increased by more than 60% since 2021, yet it is only marginally up since 2023.

    China’s diplomatic clout is also helpful for Russia. If Beijing had taken an unequivocal stance opposing Moscow’s aggression, fewer leaders in the developing world would have sided with Putin.

    In this case, Russia would probably have lost organisations like the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and the Brics group of emerging economies as platforms to further its broader agenda of restoring its erstwhile status as a great power.

    In that agenda, Putin has been moderately successful. But with South Africa and India’s leaders absent from Russia’s Victory Day commemorations, the list of attendees was shorter than at the Brics summit in Kazan, Russia, in October 2024.

    A doubled-edged sword

    Notably absent from the celebrations in Moscow was high-level representation from North Korea and Iran. These are two key allies of Russia with whom Moscow signed strategic partnership agreements in June 2024 and January 2025, respectively.

    Tehran simply sent its ambassador to Moscow to attend. However, it may have compensated Putin in a different and materially more significant way.

    According to reports, Iran is readying a delivery of launchers to enable Russia to use the short-range ballistic missiles already delivered last year. This would further add to Russia’s reliance on Iranian hardware in Ukraine, which has so far been most visible in the use of Iranian-made Shahed drones.

    North Korea dispatched a military delegation led by three-star general Kim Yong-bok. Kim is widely considered the commander of North Korean forces fighting alongside Russian troops in the Kursk region of western Russia, where Ukrainian forces seized territory in August 2024 as a possible bargaining chip in future negotiations with Russia.

    Putin officially acknowledged the participation of North Korean troops in this operation in a statement on April 28. This acknowledgment came two days after he had announced the defeat of Ukrainian forces there in a highly choreographed and televised meeting with his chief of general staff, Valery Gerasimov.

    The demonstration of Russia’s close relationships with its three core allies – China, Iran and North Korea – is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it clearly indicates that Putin is far from isolated on the international stage.

    But it also signals that Russia has become a lot more dependent on these relationships than would befit Putin’s dreams of restoring Russia’s great-power status. Neither can be much comfort to Ukraine and its allies, unfortunately.

    Stefan Wolff is a past recipient of grant funding from the Natural Environment Research Council of the UK, the United States Institute of Peace, the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK, the British Academy, the NATO Science for Peace Programme, the EU Framework Programmes 6 and 7 and Horizon 2020, as well as the EU’s Jean Monnet Programme. He is a Trustee and Honorary Treasurer of the Political Studies Association of the UK and a Senior Research Fellow at the Foreign Policy Centre in London.

    ref. Russia-China ties on full display on Victory Day – but all is not as well as Putin is making out – https://theconversation.com/russia-china-ties-on-full-display-on-victory-day-but-all-is-not-as-well-as-putin-is-making-out-256385

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Global: Arctic ice is vanishing – our bold experiment is trying to protect it

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Shaun Fitzgerald, Director, Centre for Climate Repair, University of Cambridge

    The author and colleagues exploring in the Canadian Arctic. Real Ice

    Like ice in a drink, Arctic sea ice keeps things cold – until it melts. Using the same principle, some scientists are investigating whether they can make sea ice thicker and better able to cool the planet. I recently returned from Cambridge Bay in the far north of Canada, where I saw some early experiments in practice.

    Over the winter months, the build-up of sea ice around Cambridge Bay and across the Arctic helps keep the sea water underneath close to the freezing temperature, which for saltwater is around -1.8°C.

    These conditions are broadly maintained even through the early summer until the ice begins to melt and break up. The white ice cover, which reflects a large portion of the sun’s energy, is then replaced by dark blue water, which has the opposite effect. Now absorbing more sunlight, the water warms up.

    Such has been the balanced perennial cycle of sea ice in the Arctic, but recent decades of global warming might be putting it in jeopardy.


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    Over the past 30 years, sea ice in the Arctic has decreased. Rising air temperatures coupled with warmer water flowing in from further south have meant the ice starts to form later in the year and melt earlier.

    With less sea ice, there are longer periods in summer where more of the sun’s energy is absorbed rather than reflected into space. This creates a feedback loop – the warmer the water, the less sea ice is formed; the less sea ice there is, the warmer it gets.

    The author (in blue) and colleagues on the ice near Cambridge Bay in March 2025.
    Real Ice

    My trip to Cambridge Bay was as part of a team of scientists and engineers who have gathered together with local communities in the Arctic and two umbrella projects: Real Ice and Arctic Reflections. These groups want to research whether anything can be done to temporarily slow down or even reverse the loss of sea ice.

    The ultimate solution is, undoubtedly, deep and rapid reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. But with slow progress over the past few decades, additional measures may buy us time.

    Buying time

    Several big ideas are currently being explored. The first involves pumping seawater on top of existing ice to try and promote ice growth on top of the sea ice.

    Usually, any new sea ice that forms naturally does so on the underside of the ice. The process of freezing gives off some energy, which must escape through the ice above – a good insulator.

    The idea of pumping on top of the ice is that by bypassing the insulating effect, more sea ice might form – and the heat it gives off can be transferred to the cold winter Arctic air or directly radiated out to space.

    The author, pumping water onto ice.
    Real Ice

    The second idea stems from the realisation that snow is an even better insulator than ice. The proposal is therefore to pump just enough water onto the snow to flood it.

    As it freezes and turns into solid ice, it becomes much more conductive than snow. In turn, this will enable more sea ice to form naturally on the underside of sea ice.

    A third idea is derived from the observation that as sea ice melts in the early summer, melt ponds form on the surface. These melt ponds are much darker and absorb more heat than the original ice.

    So the idea is to explore whether it might be possible to drill small holes in the ice to drain them, exposing reflective ice and slowing the melt.

    These ideas might sound fanciful, but the dramatic changes in the Arctic warrant investigation into interventions that could have an impact sooner than cutting emissions or removing greenhouse gases.

    Can we really save sea ice?

    Crucially, the research is focused on developing our understanding of these potential ideas. The research could show that they are impractical, unfeasible or would potentially make things worse.

    For example, if pumping sea water onto sea ice leads to thicker ice at the end of the winter, that may not be much use if the ice is so much saltier that it melts more quickly.

    Therefore, researchers are using a combination of mathematical modelling, laboratory experiments, and limited-scale field experiments to address fundamental questions. A research project funded by the UK government has just been launched which includes modelling of thickening of sea ice.

    A further one including additional outdoor experiments will be starting soon funded by the UK’s Advanced Research and Invention Agency (Aria) as part of its Exploring Climate Cooling programme.

    These experiments will be conducted in close collaboration with local communities and under Aria’s stringent governance framework, prioritising safety and environmental monitoring. The goal is to gather essential real-world data to rigorously assess if this intervention warrants further consideration.

    The initial results and observations from preliminary field experiments are inconclusive but encouraging. For example, the ice formed by pumping sea water onto sea ice appears to become less salty (and therefore less prone to melting) over a few weeks.

    The brine which forms as seawater freezes on the surface is more dense than the ice and appears to migrate downwards through the ice. This seems theoretically plausible, but it is too early in the experiments to be confident in the results.

    If this research suggests that thickening sea ice works, then the next step will be to engage with more Arctic locals and various policymakers, and determine whether scaled-up testing of some of these approaches would be appropriate.


    Don’t have time to read about climate change as much as you’d like?

    Get a weekly roundup in your inbox instead. Every Wednesday, The Conversation’s environment editor writes Imagine, a short email that goes a little deeper into just one climate issue. Join the 45,000+ readers who’ve subscribed so far.


    Shaun Fitzgerald currently receives funding from NERC on a project which includes modelling of Rethickening of Arctic Sea Ice. Shaun will also shortly be receiving funding from ARIA on a further project on Rethickening of Arctic Sea Ice.

    ref. Arctic ice is vanishing – our bold experiment is trying to protect it – https://theconversation.com/arctic-ice-is-vanishing-our-bold-experiment-is-trying-to-protect-it-254534

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Global: Amazon’s new robot has a sense of touch, but it’s not here to replace humans

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Kartikeya Walia, Lecturer, Department of Engineering, Nottingham Trent University

    Amazon has just unveiled its newest warehouse robot called Vulcan, which has a “sense of touch”. Designed to gently stow items using pressure-sensitive gripping and artificial intelligence (AI), Vulcan is now being tested in two Amazon facilities, in Spokane, Washington state, US, and Hamburg, Germany.

    The robot is part of Amazon’s long-term investment in warehouse automation. The inevitable question that always comes up is: will robots like this replace human workers? In short: not yet, and probably not completely. In fact, Vulcan is a good example of how robotics are being designed to work with people, not against them.

    Vulcan is designed to assist warehouse workers in stowing – the process of placing items into storage bins (called pods) before they’re picked, packed and shipped. Human pickers often work at different height levels when they’re stowing, with repetitive bending, reaching or climbing of steps.

    Amazon has divided the workspace into zones: the “kneel and lunge” zone (low height), the “power” zone (mid height), and the “ladder” zone (high height). Vulcan is designed to operate in the lowest and highest zones – the most physically demanding areas for humans – to reduce the risk of injury and improve efficiency.

    Amazon’s new Vulcan robot.

    The “sense of touch” comes from Vulcan’s force-sensitive gripper. This adjusts how firmly it should hold each item. Using AI, Vulcan can predict the right amount of force to use, squeezing gently for soft, squishy items, and more firmly for flat or rigid ones.

    It also uses a clever flat prong to make space inside the bins, packing things more
    efficiently, almost like playing a game of Tetris.

    Right now, Vulcan can match the speed of a human worker and operate for around 20 hours a day. The movements are fast, hence it still works behind a protective safety fence. However, it’s not flawless – it can only handle objects up to about 8lbs (3.6kg) and struggles with round items.


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    The human factor

    So, does this mean fewer jobs for humans? New technologies often raise concerns about job losses – and in some cases, with good reason. Some roles will inevitably disappear as robots become more commonplace, especially those that are dull, dirty, or dangerous. But that’s only part of the picture.

    From what I’ve seen in my own research and experience with robotics, automation
    doesn’t usually eliminate jobs entirely – it changes them. Amazon insists that
    Vulcan is being introduced not to replace staff, but to reduce the physical strain of repetitive tasks and support faster, safer warehouse operations.

    Importantly, Amazon also runs a Mechatronics and Robotics Apprenticeship Program – a free course for workers to upskill and move into more technical roles,
    often with a pay increase of up to 40%. The company also runs other upskilling programmes.

    Though it’s also worth repeating here that Amazon has been the subject of criticism and complaints from employees about its intensive working conditions (Amazon says its employees’ safety and health is its top priority and that some inaccurate information has gone around), these kinds of upskilling initiatives are key to the future of work in environments that use robots. As machines take over the repetitive tasks, humans will move into roles involving assembly, commissioning, maintenance, quick repair, and eventually, system reconfiguration.


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    In theory, a fully automated, 24/7 “lights-out” warehouse sounds like a dream for
    business – no breaks, no injuries, no wages. But in practice, completely removing
    humans from the shop floor is incredibly risky. Robots and automation systems,
    especially those that are used in an environment as complex as Amazon’s logistics and warehouse management chain, can break down.

    If even one component in the workflow fails – a sensor, a motor, or a software module – and there are no humans around to spot it or fix it quickly, the entire operation could grind to a halt. In high-volume environments like Amazon warehouses, even an hour of downtime could cost a fortune.

    Keeping humans in the loop provides the flexibility and quick thinking that complex
    systems still depend on. It’s a safety net no algorithm can yet replace. It’s also a way to adapt to changes quickly, something that rigid automation often can’t do.

    Vulcan isn’t Amazon’s first robot, and it won’t be the last. Earlier systems like Sparrow could handle about 60% of the company’s inventory. With Vulcan, that number jumps to 75%. That’s certainly progress, but it also shows the limits of automation.

    There’s still a long way to go before a robot can match the flexibility, judgement and care of a human worker. The future of robotics in warehouses won’t be about replacing people, it will be about working alongside them, easing physical strain, increasing efficiency, and creating new types of jobs.

    We’re already seeing shifts in the industry. Modular robots are built using a core set of hardware “modules” that can be combined and recombined to form a customised machine. These are making it easier to tailor automation.

    An example of a reconfigurable modular robot.

    At the same time, vendor lock-in – where companies rely on proprietary hardware and software from a single supplier – is becoming less common. Instead, firms like Amazon are increasingly developing their own bespoke components to better suit their operational needs. A shift towards in-house, self-deployable robotics would mean that companies will need more technically skilled workers who can assemble, modify, and maintain these systems.

    For now, Vulcan is a glimpse of what’s coming: smarter robots, safer work and
    hopefully, a future where technology supports people, not the other way around.

    Kartikeya Walia receives funding from the EPSRC and UKRI.

    ref. Amazon’s new robot has a sense of touch, but it’s not here to replace humans – https://theconversation.com/amazons-new-robot-has-a-sense-of-touch-but-its-not-here-to-replace-humans-256273

    MIL OSI – Global Reports