Source: European Parliament
The European Parliament,
– having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),
– having regard to Title V of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), in particular Chapter Two, Section Two thereof on provisions on the common security and defence policy (CSDP),
– having regard to the Versailles Declaration adopted at the informal meeting of heads of state or government on 11 March 2022,
– having regard to the ‘Strategic Compass for Security and Defence – For a European Union that protects its citizens, values and interests and contributes to international peace and security’, which was approved by the Council on 21 March 2022 and endorsed by the European Council on 25 March 2022,
– having regard to the national security strategies of the EU Member States,
– having regard to the Civilian CSDP Compact – Towards more effective civilian missions, approved by the Council on 22 May 2023,
– having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2315 of 11 December 2017 establishing permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) and determining the list of participating Member States(1),
– having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/1968 of 17 October 2022 on a European Union Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine (EUMAM Ukraine)(2),
– having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/1970 of 17 October 2022 amending Decision 2010/452/CFSP on the European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia, EUMM Georgia(3),
– having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/2507 of 19 December 2022 amending Decision 2010/452/CFSP on the European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia, EUMM, Georgia(4),
– having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/162 of 23 January 2023 on a European Union mission in Armenia (EUMA)(5),
– having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/890 of 18 March 2024 amending Decision (CFSP) 2021/509 establishing a European Peace Facility(6),
– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2019/452 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 March 2019 establishing a framework for the screening of foreign direct investments into the Union(7),
– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/697 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2021 establishing the European Defence Fund and repealing Regulation (EU) 2018/1092(8),
– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2023/1525 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 July 2023 on supporting ammunition production (ASAP)(9),
– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2023/2418 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 October 2023 on establishing an instrument for the reinforcement of the European defence industry through common procurement (EDIRPA)(10),
– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1252 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 establishing a framework for ensuring a secure and sustainable supply of critical raw materials and amending Regulations (EU) No 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, (EU) 2018/1724 and (EU) 2019/1020(11),
– having regard to the Commission proposal of 18 April 2023 for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down measures to strengthen solidarity and capacities in the Union to detect, prepare for and respond to cybersecurity threats and incidents (COM(2023)0209),
– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 10 March 2023 on a European Union Space Strategy for Security and Defence (JOIN(2023)0009),
– having regard to Commission Recommendation (EU) 2023/2113 of 3 October 2023 on critical technology areas for the EU’s economic security for further risk assessment with Member States(12),
– having regard to the annual financing decision, constituting the first part of the annual work programme for the implementation of the European Defence Fund for 2024, adopted by the Commission on 21 June 2023 (C(2023)4252),
– having regard to the Council conclusions of 22 January 2018 on the Integrated Approach to External Conflicts and Crises and of 24 January 2022 on the European security situation,
– having regard to the Granada Declaration adopted at the informal meeting of heads of state or government on 6 October 2023,
– having regard to the Council conclusions of 21 February 2022 extending and enhancing the implementation of the Coordinated Maritime Presences Concept in the Gulf of Guinea,
– having regard to the European Council conclusions of 21 and 22 March 2024, concerning the decision to open accession negotiations with Bosnia and Herzegovina,
– having regard to the Council conclusions of 27 May 2024 on EU security and defence,
– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 10 November 2022 entitled ‘Action plan on military mobility 2.0’ (JOIN(2022)0048),
– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 18 May 2022 on the Defence Investment Gaps Analysis and Way Forward (JOIN(2022)0024),
– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 5 March 2024 entitled ‘A new European Defence Industrial Strategy: Achieving EU readiness through a responsive and resilient European Defence Industry’ (JOIN(2024)0010),
– having regard to the report by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 20 June 2024 entitled ‘Common Foreign and Security Policy Report – Our priorities in 2024’,
– having regard to the political guidelines for the next European Commission 2024-2029, by the candidate for European Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen, of 18 July 2024, entitled ‘Europe’s choice’,
– having regard to the report by Enrico Letta entitled ‘Much more than a market’ and in particular the section on ‘Promoting peace and enhancing security: towards a Common Market for the defence industry’, published in April 2024,
– having regard to the report by Mario Draghi of 9 September 2024 on the future of European competitiveness and Chapter Four thereof on increasing security and reducing dependencies,
– having regard to the report by Sauli Niinistö of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘Safer Together: Strengthening Europe’s Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness’,
– having regard to the security and defence partnerships respectively signed on 21 May 2024 by the EU and Moldova, on 28 May 2024 by the EU and Norway, on 1 November 2024 by the EU and Japan, on 4 November 2024 by the EU and South Korea, on 19 November 2024 by the EU and North Macedonia, and on 18 December 2024 by the EU and Albania,
– having regard to the Charter of the United Nations, in particular Article 2(4) thereof on prohibiting the use of force and of Article 51 on the inherent right to individual and collective self-defence,
– having regard to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),
– having regard to UN Security Council Resolutions 1325 (2000) of 31 October 2000, 1889 (2009) of 5 October 2009, 2122 (2013) of 18 October 2013, 2242 (2015) of 13 October 2015 and 2493 (2019) of 29 October 2019 on Women, Peace and Security, and Resolutions 2250 (2015) of 9 December 2015, 2419 (2018) of 6 June 2018 and 2535 (2020) of 14 July 2020 on Youth, Peace and Security,
– having regard to UN General Assembly Resolution 70/1 of 25 September 2015 entitled ‘Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development’,
– having regard to the Pact for the Future and Chapter Two thereof on international peace and security, adopted on 23 September 2024 by the heads of state or government of the UN member states,
– having regard to the North Atlantic Treaty,
– having regard to the Madrid Summit Declaration adopted by the heads of state or government of NATO at the North Atlantic Council meeting in Madrid on 29 June 2022,
– having regard to the NATO 2022 Strategic Concept and the NATO 2023 Vilnius Summit Communiqué,
– having regard to the three joint declarations on EU-NATO cooperation signed on 8 July 2016, 10 July 2018 and 10 January 2023,
– having regard to the ninth progress report on the implementation of the common set of proposals endorsed by EU and NATO Councils on 6 December 2016 and 5 December 2017, submitted jointly by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) and the NATO Secretary General to the Council of the EU and the NATO Council on 13 June 2024,
– having regard to the Washington Summit Declaration issued by the heads of state or government of NATO participating in the North Atlantic Council meeting in Washington on 10 July 2024,
– having regard to its recommendation of 8 June 2022 on the EU’s Foreign, Security and Defence Policy after the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine(13),
– having regard to its recommendation of 23 November 2022 concerning the new EU strategy for enlargement(14),
– having regard to its resolution of 23 November 2022 on recognising the Russian Federation as a state sponsor of terrorism(15),
– having regard to its resolution of 1 June 2023 on foreign interference in all democratic processes in the European Union, including disinformation(16),
– having regard to its resolution of 28 February 2024 on the implementation of the common security and defence policy – annual report 2023(17),
– having regard to its resolution of 29 February 2024 on the need for unwavering EU support for Ukraine, after two years of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine(18),
– having regard to its resolution of 17 July 2024 on the need for the EU’s continuous support for Ukraine(19),
– having regard to its resolution of 19 September 2024 on continued financial and military support to Ukraine by EU Member States(20),
– having regard to its resolution of 17 January 2024 on the security and defence implications of China’s influence on critical infrastructure in the European Union(21),
– having regard to its position of 22 October 2024 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the Ukraine Loan Cooperation Mechanism and providing exceptional macro-financial assistance to Ukraine(22),
– having regard to its resolution of 24 October 2024 on the misinterpretation of UN resolution 2758 by the People’s Republic of China and its continuous military provocations around Taiwan(23),
– having regard to Ukraine’s victory plan presented by the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, to the European Council on 17 October 2024,
– having regard to the ReArm Europe proposal of 4 March 2025,
– having regard to the Joint White Paper for European Defence Readiness 2030, as presented on 19 March 2025 (JOIN(2025)0120),
– having regard to the Commission proposal of 19 March 2025 for a Council regulation establishing the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) through the reinforcement of European defence industry Instrument (COM(2025)0122),
– having regard to Commission communication of 19 March 2025 entitled ‘Accommodating increased defence expenditure within the Stability and Growth Path’ (C(2025)2000),
– having regard to the speeches and statements made at the Munich Security Conference of 14-16 February 2025,
– having regard to the leaders meeting of 2 March 2025 in London,
– having regard to the Commission’s plans for a European Military Sales Mechanism,
– having regard to the European Council conclusions of 20 March 2025,
– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,
– having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0011/2025),
A. whereas this past year has been marked by a decline in global peace and security, resulting, inter alia, from conflict, geopolitical rivalry, growing militarisation, terrorism and hybrid threats, as assessed by the Normandy Index 2024(24);
B. whereas Russia’s ongoing war of aggression against Ukraine, continued armament efforts and armaments cooperation with other authoritarian powers far surpassing European stocks and production capacities, and the Russian regime’s choice to undermine the rules-based international order and the security architecture of Europe and to wage war on European countries or seek to destabilise them in order to realise its imperialist vision of the world, poses the most serious and unprecedented threat to world peace, as well as to the security and territory of the EU and its Member States; whereas Russia currently produces three million artillery shells per year, while the EU’s declared ambition within its first European Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS) aims for a production capacity of 2 million shells per year by the end of 2025; whereas the Russian regime is strengthening its ties with the autocratic leadership of China, Iran and North Korea to achieve its objectives;
C. whereas recent statements by members of the US administration, accompanied by the heavy pressure exerted on Ukraine by the US leadership, reflect a shift in US foreign policy, as the Trump administration is proposing the normalisation of ties with Russia and it is becoming increasingly clear that Europe needs to strengthen its security and defence to be able to help Ukraine and to defend itself;
D. whereas the EU is also facing the most diverse and complex range of non-military threats since its creation, exacerbated by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, including, inter alia, foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), cyberattacks, economic pressure, food and energy blackmail, instrumentalisation of migration and subversive political influence;
E. whereas Russia illegally invaded and annexed Crimea and the Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia regions of Ukraine; whereas Ukraine needs to be provided with the necessary military capabilities for as long as it takes for Ukraine to achieve a decisive military victory, end Russia’s illegal war of aggression, restore its sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders and deter any future aggression; whereas Ukraine, in defending itself, is also protecting and fighting for European values and core security interests; whereas Russia is still illegally occupying the Abkhazia and South Ossetia regions of Georgia and the Transnistria region of Moldova;
F. whereas the new US administration has been actively trying to get Russia to agree to a peace deal but, despite two telephone calls between Presidents Trump and Putin, on 12 February and 18 March 2025, as well as several rounds of direct negotiations between the United States and Russia in Saudi Arabia, Russia has so far avoided responding clearly to any ceasefire proposal and has consistently set conditions on a ceasefire; whereas despite its repeated criticism, the EU has, so far, not been adequately represented at the negotiations on a ceasefire and peace in Ukraine;
G. whereas, driven by the ambition to become a global superpower, China is eroding the rules-based international order by increasingly pursuing assertive foreign and hostile economic and competition policies and exporting dual-use goods employed by Russia on the battlefield against Ukraine, thereby threatening European interests; whereas China is also heavily arming itself militarily, using its economic power to quash criticism worldwide, and is striving to assert itself as the dominant power in the Indo-Pacific region; whereas China, by intensifying its confrontational, aggressive and intimidating actions against some of its neighbours, particularly in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, poses a risk to regional and global security;
H. whereas China has, for many years, promoted an alternative narrative, challenging human rights, democratic values and open markets in multilateral and international forums; whereas China’s increasing influence in international organisations has impeded positive progress and further excluded Taiwan from rightful and meaningful participation in these organisations;
I. whereas the EU’s security environment has deteriorated not only in Eastern Europe, but also in its southern neighbourhood and beyond;
J. whereas the despicable terrorist attacks by Hamas against Israel, the ongoing war in Gaza and the military operations against the Hezbollah on Lebanese territory have significantly increased the danger of a regional military confrontation in the Middle East, and the risk of escalation in the region is at its highest in decades; whereas the ongoing attacks in the Red Sea launched from the Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen, with the support of Iran, and the hijackings of commercial vessels by Somali pirates, from the Red Sea to the northwestern Indian Ocean, pose a significant threat to freedom of navigation, maritime security and international trade; whereas additional attacks by various Iran-backed militias in Iraq and Syria are further increasing the risk of regional escalation; whereas the EU has launched its own military operation, EUNAVFOR ASPIDES, to improve the security situation in the area;
K. whereas the eastern neighbourhood and Western Balkan countries face increasingly diverse threats to their security and are being negatively affected by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, as well as the increased assertiveness of regional and global actors, such as China; whereas Kosovo and the EU-facilitated Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue face, in particular, threats of destabilisation;
L. whereas the disastrous impact of past or ongoing wars, instability, insecurity, poverty and climate change in the Sahel region, northeast Africa and Libya, poses serious risks to EU security and its economic and trade interests; whereas the instability and insecurity in the southern neighbourhood and the Sahel region are closely interlinked with and remain an ongoing challenge for EU external border management; whereas the EU Border Assistance Mission in Libya and EUNAVFOR MED Operation IRINI are contributing to sustainable peace, security and stability by implementing the arms embargo, fighting illicit weapons and human trafficking, and training the Libyan coastguard;
M. whereas a part of Cyprus, an EU Member State, still remains under illegal occupation by Türkiye;
N. whereas the Arctic region is becoming increasingly important for geopolitics, economic development and transport, while, at the same time, it is facing challenges linked to climate change, militarisation and migration;
O. whereas past underinvestment in defence by EU Member States has led to an investment gap; whereas the Member States have agreed on more, better and smarter defence spending; whereas in 2024, 16 EU Member States that are also NATO allies, compared to 9 in 2023, were expected to exceed the NATO guidelines to spend at least 2 % of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on defence; whereas an increasing number of experts consider defence investments of 3 % of GDP to be a necessary objective in the light of the direct threat that Russia poses to the EU and its Member States;
P. whereas in 2023, Parliament and the Council concluded agreements on the European defence industry reinforcement through a common procurement act (EDIRPA) and the Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP), which, as short-term and emergency measures, aim to encourage the joint procurement of defence products, ramp up the European defence industry’s production capacity, replenish depleted stocks and reduce fragmentation in the defence-procurement sector;
Q. whereas in 2024, the Commission issued proposals for establishing a European Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS) and a European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP), addressing, in particular, the upgrade of EU security and defence capabilities;
R. whereas building defence capabilities and adapting them to military needs requires a common strategic culture, shared threat perception and solutions to be developed and combined in doctrine and concepts;
S. whereas the exception to the EU budget funding principle set out in Article 41(2) TEU applies to expenditure arising from operations having military or defence implications only; whereas in all other cases, the VP/HR, together with the Commission, where necessary, should propose that CFSP- or CSDP-related expenditure be financed through the EU budget; whereas Articles 14(1) and 16(1) TEU establish a balance between Parliament and the Council as regards their budgetary functions; whereas the current practice does not reflect this balance;
T. whereas the Draghi report highlights a combination of structural weaknesses affecting the competitiveness of the EU’s Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB), and identifies fragmentation, insufficient public defence spending and limited access to financing; whereas the European Investment Bank’s (EIB) lending policy excludes the financing of ammunition and weapons, as well as equipment or infrastructure exclusively dedicated to military and police use;
U. whereas the report by Mr Niinistö underlines the fact that the EU and its Member States are not yet fully prepared for the most severe cross-sectoral or multidimensional crisis scenarios, especially given the further deteriorating external environment; whereas the report states that many threats are already taking place continuously; whereas it insists that preparedness is needed to signal to potential adversaries that they will not be able to outlast the EU; whereas it deplores the fact that the Union lacks a common plan in the event of armed aggression and underlines that the EU needs to rethink the way it defines its security; whereas it underlines the importance of the EU being ready to act in support of a Member State in the event of external armed aggression and of further unlocking the EU’s potential for enhanced civil-military cooperation and dual-use infrastructure and technologies, through optimising the use of scarce resources and strengthening coordination mechanisms for the most severe crisis situations;
V. whereas the integration of artificial intelligence into the security and defence domain, including weapon technologies, impacts military operations by enabling autonomous systems, predictive analytics and enhanced decision-making capabilities to play a significant role in battlefields; whereas this development presents both unprecedented opportunities and profound risks;
W. whereas CSDP has 13 civilian missions, 8 military operations and 1 civilian-military mission under way, with around 5 000 personnel deployed on three continents; whereas reviews by the European External Action Service (EEAS) state that these missions and operations persistently suffer from Member States not delivering on their pledges to provide sufficient military or civilian personnel; whereas they also lack rapid decision-making and suffer from a lack of flexibility and adaptation to the specific local needs on the ground; whereas such obstacles limit the overall effectiveness of CSDP missions and operations; whereas one of the objectives of the Strategic Compass is to reinforce EU civilian and military CSDP missions and operations by providing them with more robust and flexible mandates, promoting rapid and more flexible decision-making processes and ensuring greater financial solidarity; whereas EU missions and operations are often targeted by hybrid threats, including disinformation, jeopardising their effectiveness in stabilising the countries in which they are deployed and, instead, reinforcing pre-existing instability, often benefiting malicious non-state actors;
X. whereas CSDP missions and operations greatly strengthen the resilience and stability of the European neighbourhood, including in the Mediterranean, the Western Balkans, the Eastern Partnership countries, the Sahel region and the Horn of Africa, by providing services such as military, police, coastguard, border management training and capacity building;
Y. whereas the EU assistance to the Libyan coastguard is provided through the EU Border Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM Libya) and EUNAVFOR MED Operation IRINI; whereas the main goal of EUNAVFOR MED IRINI is to support the implementation of the UN Security Council’s arms embargo on Libya; whereas the Council of the EU extended the mandate of EUNAVFOR MED IRINI until 31 March 2025, including the task of training the Libyan coastguard and navy;
Z. whereas the EUFOR Althea operation sets a path towards peace, stabilisation and the European integration of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and still plays a pivotal role in ensuring the security and stability of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the region; whereas in early March 2025, an additional 400 soldiers were deployed to support EUFOR Althea amid increased uncertainty in the country following the ruling of the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the case of Milorad Dodik on 26 February 2025;
AA. whereas on 17 May 2024, the EU ended the mandate of the EU Training Mission in Mali (EUTM); whereas on 30 June 2024, it ended the mandate of the European Union military partnership mission in Niger (EUMPM) and on 30 September 2024, it ended the ground mission of personnel from the EU Capacity Building Mission in Niger (EUCAP Sahel Niger);
AB. whereas the EU will allocate EUR 1,5 billion for the 2021-2027 period to support conflict prevention, peace and security initiatives at national and regional level in sub-Saharan Africa; whereas additional support is also provided in Africa under the European Peace Facility (EPF), which enables the EU to provide all kinds of equipment and infrastructure to the armed forces of EU partners;
AC. whereas the EU and its Member States are facing increasing hybrid attacks on their soil, including FIMI, political infiltration and sabotage, aimed at undermining sound political debate and the trust of EU citizens in democratic institutions, as well as creating divisions in European societies and between nations; whereas in the years to come, hybrid threats will involve increased use of the systematic combination of information warfare, agile force manoeuvre, mass cyberwarfare and emerging and disruptive technologies, from seabed to space, with the deployment of advanced space-based surveillance and strike systems, all of which will be enabled by advanced AI, quantum computing, increasingly ‘intelligent’ drone swarm technologies, offensive cyber capabilities, hypersonic missile systems and nanotech- and bio-warfare; whereas Russia and China have demonstrated increased use of hybrid tools to undermine the security and stability of the EU;
AD. whereas the Russian Federation makes use of private military companies (PMCs), such as Africa Corps and the Wagner Group, as part of a hybrid warfare toolbox to maintain plausible deniability while exerting influence in various regions and gaining access to natural resources and critical infrastructure; whereas Africa Corps and the Wagner Group have reportedly committed atrocities in Ukraine, Mali, Libya, Syria and the Central African Republic; whereas the Russian Federation has reinforced anti-European sentiments, especially in countries with a strong European presence or hosting CSDP missions;
AE. whereas on 7 March 2024, Sweden joined NATO as a new member, following Finland which joined in 2023; whereas security and defence cooperation with partners and allies is crucial to the EU’s ambition of becoming an international security provider and constitutes an integral pillar of the CSDP; whereas cooperation with the UN, NATO, the African Union, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), as well as numerous allies and like-minded partners such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Norway, Ukraine, Moldova, the Western Balkan countries, Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand and certain Latin American countries, among others, is crucial to the successful implementation of the CSDP;
The consequences of a changing geopolitical paradigm for European security
1. Stresses the seriousness of the threats to the security of the European continent, which have reached a level unprecedented since the Second World War; expresses deep concern at the rise of geopolitical fractures, new and renewed imperialist ambitions for domination by authoritarian powers, systemic rivalry of great powers, nationalist unilateralism, the spread of terrorism, including jihadist terrorism, forced displacement of civilians and deliberate targeting of civilian persons and infrastructure, and the primary and growing use of force and violence by certain malicious actors to promote their political and economic objectives and interests or to resolve disputes;
2. Expresses, in this context, deep concern over the apparent shift in the United States’ stance on Russia’s war of aggression, which has included openly blaming Ukraine for the ongoing war, suspending US military aid and attempting to coerce Ukraine into relinquishing its legitimate right to self-defence; strongly deplores any attempts at blackmailing Ukraine’s leadership into surrendering to the Russian aggressor for the sole purpose of announcing a ‘peace deal’ and considers that the current attempt by the US administration to negotiate a ceasefire and peace agreement without the involvement of the EU, which will ultimately have to deal with the outcome, is counterproductive as it empowers the belligerent, thus showing that aggressive policy is not punished but rewarded; is cautiously optimistic about the proposal for a 30-day ceasefire agreement; recalls that a ceasefire can only be an effective tool for the suspension of hostilities if the aggressor fully adheres to it; expects Russia, therefore, to agree to it and follow it by ceasing all attacks on Ukraine, its military positions, civilian population, infrastructure and territory; concludes nevertheless, taking into account Russia’s history of violations of previous agreements, that peace can only be reached by empowering Ukraine through robust security guarantees; is of the opinion, conversely, that any settlement that undermines Ukraine’s legitimate aspirations, such as its right to choose its own security arrangements, or that lacks credible security guarantees will risk subjecting Ukraine and other European countries to renewed Russian attacks; regrets, in this regard, the votes of the US Government, aligned with the Russian Government, in the UN General Assembly and the UN Security Council on resolutions on the third anniversary of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine;
3. Believes that the geopolitical theatres in Ukraine, the Middle East and the South China Sea and the Indo-Pacific are increasingly interconnected as Russia and China, in particular, are deepening their ties, and pose significant challenges to global peace and security and the rules-based international order that must be addressed by the international community; highlights the increase in attacks and hybrid threats aimed at undermining democratic values and structures, among other things, during elections, as well as the cohesion of and citizens’ adhesion to European values-based societies and the rule of law; believes that this trend amounts to a paradigm shift, as it reverses the logic of building international security on the basis of respect for international law, a rules-based international order and multilateralism;
4. Recognises the evolving nature of global security threats and emphasises the crucial role that diplomacy, development cooperation and arms control and disarmament play alongside military efforts in ensuring long-lasting international peace and security; notes, however, the limited impact of diplomatic efforts aimed at building peace and security in recent times; underscores that sustainable global peace and stability cannot be achieved through military measures alone, but require comprehensive strategies that address the key drivers of instability, such as poverty, inequality, governance failures and climate change; stresses that the EU’s Global Gateway initiative and other development programmes should be aligned with security objectives, fostering resilient societies by promoting inclusive economic growth, good governance and human rights;
The EU’s response: a new era of European security and defence
5. Strongly welcomes the Joint White Paper for European Defence Readiness 2030(25), which puts forward a strong and ambitious road map for enhancing Europe’s security; calls on the Commission and the Member States to swiftly implement the various ambitious elements without delay, as Europe needs to have the ability to deter aggressors and defend itself on all fronts, to take leadership and act rapidly on questions of security, and to produce defence equipment for its own needs;
6. Emphasises the absolute need for the EU to recognise and meet the challenges posed by the multiple and constantly evolving threats to its security, and, for this purpose, to engage in improved and new policies and actions that enable the EU and its Member States to collectively and coherently strengthen their defence in Europe, in order to ensure the security of all EU Member States and their citizens, as well as enhancing their ability to act at the global level;
7. Believes that diplomacy should remain a cornerstone of EU foreign policy;
8. Recalls the importance of the EU achieving greater strategic autonomy and defence readiness, as outlined in the Strategic Compass, to ensure that its objectives are aligned with the collective and sovereign interests of its Member States and the broader vision of European security and defence; acknowledges, in this regard, that some Member States have long-standing policies of military neutrality, and respects the right of every Member State to determine its own security policy;
9. Emphasises the importance of continuing to operationalise Article 42(7) TEU on mutual assistance, ensuring solidarity among Member States, especially those whose geographical position leaves them directly exposed to imminent threats and challenges, and regardless of whether they are NATO members; calls for concrete steps towards developing a true EU solidarity policy, including by clarifying the practical arrangements in the event of a Member State activating Article 42(7) TEU and the coherence between Article 42(7) TEU and Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty;
10. Notes the overall limited progress and underinvestment in the development of a common European defence capability, industrial capacity and defence readiness since the CSDP’s establishment 25 years ago; notes, with regret, that despite the ambition of framing a common Union defence policy, as laid out in Article 42(2) TEU, concrete steps are still missing;
11. Underlines that, while we are strengthening our own defence, our alliance and cooperation with the United States remains extremely important, as does coordination with NATO, in both the development of capabilities and the exchange of classified information; recognises that the United States’ security priorities have changed owing to challenges in other regions, requiring Europe to take full responsibility for its own defence;
12. Insists on the need for a truly common approach, policies and joint efforts in the area of defence as well as a paradigm shift in the EU’s CSDP that enable the EU to act decisively and effectively in its neighbourhood and on the global stage, safeguard its values, interests and citizens and promote its strategic objectives; underlines the importance of presenting the EU as a strong and united international actor, capable of acting more strategically and autonomously, defending itself against potential enemy attacks and supporting its partners, and delivering peace, sustainable development and democracy; stresses the utmost importance of the EU and its Member States continuing to work on creating a common strategic culture in the area of security and defence; underlines the need for the Member States to collectively reflect on the future of their deterrence policies and doctrines, as well as their adaptation to the changing security environment in Europe; stresses, further, that in order to develop coherent foreign and defence policies, the EU must strengthen its democratic and independent structures, decision-making processes and operational autonomy;
13. Welcomes the objective of the Commission President to usher in a new era for European defence and security, by building a true European defence union; welcomes the appointment of Andrius Kubilius, the first-ever Commissioner for Defence and Space, tasked with working jointly with the VP/HR; welcomes the publication of the white paper on the future of European defence; stresses the need for the EU and its Member States, acting to define the European defence union, to take priority measures and prepare future actions in order to ensure the defence readiness of the EU, notably with regard to the threat posed by Russia, and to bolster deterrence and enhance operational capabilities as a tool of defence in wartime, while meeting civilian and humanitarian needs, and thus leveraging the concept of ‘dual-use’;
14. Welcomes the five-point ReArm Europe plan proposed by the Commission President on 4 March 2025;
15. Welcomes the outcomes of the special European Council meeting of 6 March 2025 and the conclusions of the European Council meeting of 20 March 2025;
16. Welcomes the fact that the white paper took on board Parliament’s demands regarding the need to ensure the protection of the EU’s land, air and maritime borders against military and hybrid threats; applauds the endorsement of an Eastern Border Shield and reiterates its support for the Baltic Defence Line;
17. Welcomes the publication of the EU Preparedness Union Strategy and emphasises that the EU’s actions must be holistic, addressing all dimensions of security – external, internal, social and economic; firmly believes that only such a comprehensive approach will ensure sustained public support in the long term; underlines that the measures outlined in the White Paper and the Preparedness Union Strategy must be complementary and reinforce each other;
18. Calls for the EU and its Member States to accelerate their commitments made in the Versailles Declaration and to assume greater responsibility for their defence and security, including by achieving greater strategic autonomy and bolstering defence and deterrence capabilities, in particular on its eastern borders; stresses that NATO and the transatlantic partnership with the United States remain the cornerstones of European collective defence and that the EU and NATO play complementary, coherent and mutually reinforcing roles in supporting international peace and security; recalls that a stronger and more capable EU in the field of security and defence will contribute positively to global and transatlantic security and is complementary to NATO; stresses the need for EU Member States and the EU as a whole to step up their efforts through increased and targeted joint investments, joint procurement of defence products that are, for the most part, designed and manufactured in the EU, and the development of more joint capabilities, via, inter alia, pooling and sharing, thereby strengthening their armed forces whether for national, NATO or EU operational purposes; stresses that the EU and its Member States need to ensure that a substantial and increased part of their military equipment is not subject to restrictive third-country regulations;
19. Concurs with the ambition of strengthening the European pillar within NATO and stresses that the development of a European defence union should go hand-in-hand with the deepening of EU-NATO cooperation, making full use of the unique capacities of each organisation;
20. Stresses the need for close coordination on deterrence and collaboration between the EU and NATO with regard to developing coherent, complementary and interoperable defence capabilities and reinforcing industrial production capacities; stresses that a European pillar within NATO notably consists of jointly acquiring strategic enablers or strategic weapons systems, which are often too expensive for a single member state, such as air-to-air refuelling capability, command and control capability, hypersonic weapons, layered air defence, electronic warfare capabilities and air and missile defence systems; believes that the European added value lies in jointly developing or buying these enablers and systems that individual EU Member States severely lack; points out that EU capability development strengthens the European pillar within NATO and contributes accordingly to transatlantic security; calls for the establishment of a regular conference between the EU and NATO in order to ensure close coordination and complementarity between both organisations and their member states in their efforts to strengthen capability development and armaments, while avoiding unnecessary and dysfunctional duplication; calls on the Commission and the Council to ensure that EU efforts in defence capability development are coherent with the objectives of the NATO Defence Planning Process; calls, further, for all EPF support for the provision of equipment to be carried out in coordination with NATO to increase efficiency and avoid unnecessary duplication;
Enhancing European security: supporting Ukraine by providing military capabilities in order to end Russia’s war of aggression
21. Insists that the EU must engage in security commitments towards Ukraine, as recommended in the Kyiv Security Compact, in order to deter further Russian aggression;
22. Highlights the fact that the financial support provided by the EU and its Member States to Ukraine exceeds that provided by any other country, reflecting the EU’s unparalleled commitment to Ukraine; underscores that the EU’s role in any negotiations impacting the security of Europe must be commensurate with its political and economic weight; reaffirms that there can be no negotiations touching on European security without the EU being at the table;
23. Reiterates the European Council conclusion of 20 March 2025 that endorses the principle of ‘peace through strength’ and underlines that Ukraine must be in the strongest possible position in order to eventually negotiate with Russia;
24. Stresses that a comprehensive peace agreement, which respects Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, needs to be accompanied by robust and credible security guarantees for Ukraine in order to deter future Russian aggression; welcomes the efforts that have been started in this regard with like-minded and NATO partners; welcomes the European Council conclusions of 20 March 2025 that underline that the EU and its Member States are ready to contribute to security guarantees, in particular by supporting Ukraine’s ability to defend itself effectively;
25. Reaffirms its unwavering support for the EU and its Member States to stand in solidarity with Ukraine in the face of Russia’s war of aggression and to provide Ukraine with the necessary military means and in the time it needs to defend itself, repel the Russian Armed Forces and their proxies, end the conflict, protect its sovereignty and restore its territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders; fully endorses, therefore, the ‘porcupine strategy’ for Ukraine, as laid out in the white paper; welcomes the joint security commitments between the EU and Ukraine, and the bilateral security agreements concluded by Ukraine with several Member States; underlines that such commitments and agreements are part of a wider internationally coordinated package of security guarantees for Ukraine, including the G7’s launch of a multilateral framework for the negotiation of bilateral security commitments and arrangements for Ukraine; believes that without decisive EU military support, Ukraine will not be able to achieve victory against Russia; strongly reiterates its call for EU Member States to urgently meet their commitments and deliver weapons, fighter aircrafts, drones, air defence, weapon systems and ammunition to Ukraine, including air-launched cruise missiles and surface-to-surface systems, and to significantly increase the relevant quantities; notes the successful delivery of 1 million rounds of artillery ammunition to Ukraine as agreed in March 2023 by the Council, despite the regrettable nine-month delay; acknowledges the notable advancements in the EU’s artillery ammunition production capacity, which contribute to the EU’s preparedness and ability to support Ukraine; stresses the importance of enhancing Ukraine’s anti-drone capabilities as a critical element in countering aerial threats and maintaining operational security; calls for the provision of specialised equipment and expertise to enable Ukrainian forces to swiftly identify, track and respond to hostile drone activities, ensuring robust protection for both military and civilian infrastructure; calls for the Member States to lift all restrictions hindering Ukraine from using Western weapons systems against legitimate military targets within Russia, in accordance with international law; calls on the Council to commit to transferring all confiscated military equipment or ammunition from EU operations and missions within and outside the EU to Ukraine; reiterates its position that all EU Member States and NATO allies should collectively and individually commit to supporting Ukraine militarily with no less than 0,25 % of their GDP annually;
26. Reiterates the inherent right of Ukraine to choose its own destiny and recalls its demand for the appropriate involvement of Ukraine and the EU in the ongoing negotiations between the United States and Russia;
27. Commends the Danish model of support for Ukraine, which consists of procuring defence capabilities produced directly in Ukraine; calls for the EU and its Member States to strongly support this model and to make full use of its potential, as Ukraine’s defence industrial capacity, estimated at around 50 %, is underused, and the model brings many advantages to both sides, such as cheaper equipment, speedier and safer logistics, and greater ease of training and maintenance;
28. Calls for the EU and its Member States to support Ukraine in expanding the international coalition in support of its victory plan and peace formula, presented by the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, as the only viable route to restoring Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity on the basis of international law, and thereby holding Russia, its leadership and its accomplices, in particular the Belarusian regime, to account for waging a war of aggression against Ukraine and committing war crimes and the crime of aggression, and ensuring Russian reparations and other payments for the extensive damage caused in Ukraine; emphasises that all initiatives aimed at ending the conflict must have the support of Ukraine and, ultimately, its people;
29. Calls on the VP/HR to mobilise more diplomatic support for Ukraine and the sanctions imposed on Russia, using the full spectrum of the diplomatic toolbox, and encouraging EU Member States to consider imposing secondary sanctions; deplores the fact that some components of Western origin have been found in weapons and weapon systems used by Russia against Ukraine, and calls for the EU and its Member States to implement sanctions more rigorously; calls for further action from and cooperation between the Member States to stop the Russian shadow fleet;
30. Strongly condemns the role that North Korea plays in aiding Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine through the training of North Korean troops and their deployment to Russia to directly participate in the war or support the Russian Armed Forces; also condemns, in the strongest possible terms, North Korea’s supply of military equipment and weaponry actively deployed on the battlefield, and its involvement in sanctions evasion; considers North Korea’s actions a blatant violation of international norms and warns of the dangerous and significant risk of escalation that they pose to Europe and the broader international community; underlines, with serious concern, the risk that North Korea is using the battlefield in Ukraine as a platform to study advanced combat tactics, including drone warfare, with the intention of applying these techniques in potential future conflicts; expresses its outrage at the fact that several other rogue states are actively supporting Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, including Iran, among others; condemns, in this regard, Iran’s transfer of Shahed drones, ammunition and ballistic missiles to Russia, heightening the risk of potential military intervention by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; firmly believes that the EU and the international community must firmly respond to this with a combination of diplomatic, military and economic measures, and, most importantly, by providing increased support to Ukraine to strengthen its defence against this alliance of rogue states that Russia has built up; underlines the importance of closely liaising with the 2025-2029 US Administration in this regard;
31. Stresses the importance of the EPF, which has been instrumental in supporting the provision of military capabilities and training to the Ukrainian Armed Forces, while facilitating coordination for all stakeholders through the clearing house mechanism within the EU Military Staff; welcomes the establishment of the dedicated Ukraine Assistance Fund under the EPF and calls for an increase in financial resources for military assistance to Ukraine through this instrument, while also providing a medium-term financial perspective; urges the Hungarian Government to immediately cease its efforts to hinder the EU’s actions in support of Ukraine and to lift its veto on the extension of the EU’s sanctions renewal period and the EPF military support to Ukraine, including the agreed reimbursement to EU Member States for the military aid they have delivered; expresses its deep concern that the veto by the Hungarian Government has blocked the opening of a new tranche of expenditure to support the Ukrainian Armed Forces and has prevented the release of EUR 6,6 billion in partial reimbursement to the EU Member States providing military support to Ukraine; urges the Council and the VP/HR to find innovative solutions capable of lifting these blockages and offsetting these funding cuts; encourages the Member States to develop scenario-based and predictable inventories of military capabilities that can be provided under the EPF to ensure that the short-term provision of capabilities is rapidly sourced from Member States and delivered without delay, and that the long-term provision of capabilities that assist Ukraine in restoring deterrence is provided in a foreseeable time frame, in coordination with non-EU countries, when necessary; appreciates that all military assistance and weapon deliveries under the EPF have been in full compliance with the EU Common Position on arms exports, international human rights law and humanitarian law, while ensuring adequate transparency and accountability;
32. Disagrees with the Hungarian Government’s policy towards Russia, its use of vetoes against EU sanctions and its blocking of EU financial and defence aid for Ukraine; believes that the actions of the Hungarian Government undermine unity and solidarity in Europe; recalls that, under the EPF, countries are entitled to financial compensation for equipment deliveries to Ukraine and underlines, in the light of this, that the current blocks on reimbursements to 25 Member States, from which Poland stands out with a total of EUR 450 million in unpaid compensation, need to be removed immediately;
33. Highlights the outcome of the NATO Washington Summit, which reaffirmed that Ukraine’s future is in NATO and that the alliance supports Ukraine’s right to choose its own security arrangements and decide its own future, free from outside interference; concurs that both the EU and NATO have demonstrated political unity in solidarity with and commitment to supporting Ukraine; reiterates its belief that Ukraine is on an irreversible path to NATO membership; welcomes the allies’ pledge of long-term security assistance for the provision of military equipment, assistance and training for Ukraine; recognises the crucial role of NATO, EU-NATO cooperation and NATO allies such as the US and the UK, in coordinating efforts to support Ukraine militarily not only through the supply of weapons, ammunition and equipment, but also intelligence and data;
34. Welcomes the Council’s decision of 21 May 2024, ensuring that the net profits stemming from extraordinary revenues generated by immobilised Russian Central Bank (RCB) assets in the EU, as a result of the implementation of the EU restrictive measures, are used for further military support to Ukraine, as well as its defence industry capacities and reconstruction; also welcomes the agreement reached with the Council, which led to the Council’s decision of 23 October 2024 to adopt a financial assistance package, including an exceptional macro-financial assistance loan of up to EUR 35 billion and the establishment of a Ukraine Loan Cooperation Mechanism that will use contributions raised from the profits of immobilised RCB assets and support Ukraine in repaying loans of up to EUR 45 billion from the EU and its G7 partners; recalls, however, that the mobilisation of this financial assistance will be at the expense of the sum earmarked for EU military support via the Ukraine Facility, which will now only benefit from a maximum of 15 % of the profits from the immobilised RCB assets;
35. Welcomes the achievements of the EU Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine (EUMAM), which, to date, has trained more than 70 000 Ukrainian soldiers on EU territory, thereby making the EU the biggest provider of military training to Ukraine and significantly contributing to enhancing the military capability of the Ukrainian Armed Forces; takes note of the new goal of training 75 000 Ukrainian soldiers by the end of winter 2024/2025; welcomes the Council’s decision of 8 November 2024 to extend the mandate of the mission for two years; calls for EUMAM’s financial, logistical and human resources to be expanded and adapted to the evolving military training needs of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, including in the air and maritime defence domains, as well as to the requested long-term reform efforts in line with the joint security commitments between the EU and Ukraine; welcomes the Member States’ strong participation in EUMAM, which can be described as a template for future military training missions, advancing deterrence by significantly enhancing interoperability between Member States and partners, and calls on the Member States to demonstrate similar ambition and contributions to other current and future CSDP missions and operations; emphasises that EUMAM should also act as a platform for the exchange of best practices to ensure that European forces also benefit from the lessons learnt on the battlefield by the Ukrainian Armed Forces; welcomes the launch of the NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU), announced at the NATO Washington Summit, which coordinates the provision of military training and equipment for Ukraine by NATO allies and partners and provides logistical support; stresses the importance of close coordination between EUMAM and NSATU;
36. Commends the work of the European Union Advisory Mission Ukraine (EUAM) in implementing, in difficult conditions, its newly reinforced mandate; calls for the EU to ensure that EUAM can operate with the adequate financial, logistical and expert personnel to meet Ukraine’s needs, and welcomes the participation of non-EU countries in this regard; stresses the importance of EUAM and its role as the largest EU footprint on the ground, providing strategic advice to Ukraine’s national and state security authorities; highlights EUAM’s key tasks in combating organised and cross-border crimes, restoring public services in liberated territories and supporting the investigation and prosecution of international crimes, building on EUAM’s presence and expertise;
37. Stresses the importance of cooperation with and the gradual integration of the Ukrainian defence industry into the EU’s defence technological and industrial base (EDTIB) and, to this end, calls for Ukraine’s defence to be fully taken into account in the preparation of the Commission’s new legislative initiatives aimed at strengthening the EDTIB; stresses that concrete steps should be taken towards Ukraine’s integration into EU defence policies and programmes during Ukraine’s EU accession process, including by adapting the Ukrainian Armed Forces to EU capability requirements and involving them in cross-border defence industrial and technological cooperation projects and programmes; welcomes, in this respect, the opening of the EU Defence Innovation Office in Ukraine to identify Ukrainian needs and capacities in defence innovation, facilitate joint initiatives and promote cross-border cooperation between EU and Ukrainian defence industry stakeholders, and to be a focal point for Ukrainian partners, as well as a coordination and information hub; welcomes the ongoing initiatives of several EU Member States to deepen cooperation with Ukraine in the field of defence research and industrial production, and calls for further use of Ukraine’s innovative defence potential to develop weapons and ammunition and to accelerate their production in close cooperation with the EU and other Western partners, using available support mechanisms; calls on the military industries of EU Member States to honour their commitment to establish military production on Ukrainian territory;
38. Emphasises the need to strengthen demining capabilities within Ukraine to address the widespread presence of unexploded ordnance and landmines, as well as to demine Ukraine’s seawaters in the Black Sea; advocates the allocation of dedicated resources to support comprehensive demining training, including advanced detection and disposal techniques; notes that enhanced demining capacity will not only facilitate safer military operations, but also support the recovery and safety of civilian areas affected by the war;
Joining forces to increase defence capabilities
39. Welcomes the ambition set out in the EDIS to achieve the defence readiness of the EU and its Member States and to boost the EDTIB; considers the Commission’s proposal to establish a European defence industry programme (EDIP) vital in that regard; supports the objectives of strengthening EU defence industrial preparedness, improving joint defence planning and further facilitating joint procurement by the Member States in line with the priorities set out in the capability development plan (CDP) and the areas for cooperation identified in the coordinated annual review on defence in order to launch European defence projects of common interest, in particular in strategic capability areas, such as air and missile defence, as well as to ensure security of supply and access to critical raw materials and to prevent shortages in defence production; strongly supports the idea of predominantly using EU-level cooperation in the European defence industrial sector, and supports the concrete quantified targets for cooperation presented in the EDIS, which focus in particular on joint procurement, specifically, inviting the Member States to procure at least 40 % of defence equipment in a collaborative manner by 2030, to ensure that, by 2030, the value of intra-EU defence trade represents at least 35 % of the value of the EU defence market, and to procure at least 50 % of their defence investments within the EU by 2030 and 60 % by 2035;
40. Highlights the importance of the permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) for improving and harmonising the EU’s defence capabilities; notes again, with regret, that the Member States continue not to make full use of the PESCO framework and that tangible results within the currently 66 ongoing projects remain limited; further notes with regret the lack of information provided to Parliament about the reasons for the closure of six projects and their possible results; points out that the participating Member States agreed to 20 binding commitments in order to fulfil the EU’s ambition in defence; considers it necessary to conduct a thorough review of PESCO projects with regard to results and prospects, with a view to streamlining the current set of projects to a small set of priority projects while closing projects that lack sufficient progress; suggests establishing a priority scheme within PESCO in order to effectively address the identified capability gaps and priorities;
41. Welcomes the Commission’s proposal for an EDIP; notes with concern the assessment of the European Court of Auditors that the financial envelope of the EDIP is insufficient given its objectives, and therefore reiterates its call to ensure the required funding for defence; stresses that substantial budgetary efforts will be necessary for the EDIP to have a significant effect on military support for Ukraine, the development of a genuine EU defence capability and a competitive EDTIB; welcomes the 2023 revision of the CDP; regrets the limited progress made on capability development since the adoption of the first CDP in 2008; calls on the Member States to significantly increase joint efforts to achieve timely substantial progress by making full and coherent use of EU instruments, including the European Defence Fund (EDF), PESCO and the coordinated annual review on defence, as well as the instruments put forward in the EDIP proposal;
42. Welcomes the joint efforts undertaken thus far to strengthen the EU’s defence readiness through measures reinforcing and supporting the adaptation of the EDTIB, notably through the EDIRPA and ASAP regulations, and calls for their swift implementation; regrets that the financial envelope of EDIRPA remains limited and points out that the role of ASAP in relation to the ambition of supplying Ukraine with one million pieces of ammunition was restrained by the Council’s objection to its regulatory elements;
43. Welcomes the efforts and investments made thus far by companies of the EDTIB to reinforce industrial capacity, including with the support of EU instruments; highlights that further and lasting reinforcement of the EDTIB’s capacity requires first and foremost orders by the Member States, which should be conducted jointly in order to ensure the Union’s defence readiness, improve interoperability between Member States’ armed forces and achieve economies of scale, thus making the most of EU taxpayers’ money; calls, accordingly, on the Member States to intensify joint procurement efforts in line with the capability gaps identified in the Defence Investment Gaps Analysis and the capability priorities of the CDP; underlines that effective joint procurement with regard to development projects, especially in the framework of the EDF, requires a joint definition of the military requirements of the respective systems in order to achieve adequate economies of scale; calls on the Commission, in this regard, to draw on the EU Military Committee’s expertise to produce such a joint definition in order to ensure military coherence at the industrial level; calls on the Member States to engage in joint procurement with a view to establishing pan-European value chains by distributing production throughout the Union and thereby increasing the economic attractiveness of joint procurement, while building strategic redundancies into production capacities for greater resilience in the event of an armed conflict; further calls on the Member States and the Commission to aim for a further strengthening of joint procurement mechanisms and sufficient coordination by the European Defence Agency;
44. Underlines the need to further support the transition of development projects to marketable solutions and welcomes the provision in the EDIP proposal in that regard; deplores the unnecessary and dysfunctional duplication of efforts with regard to the projects on the future main battle tank and the hypersonic interceptor; voices its concern that such duplications counteract the ambition laid out in the EDIS to procure 60 % from the EDTIB by 2035, as scattered resources will extend the time required to achieve marketable solutions, thus most likely leading to procurement from the United States; regrets, similarly, the mounting delays in essential capability projects, notably the Franco-German project on the Main Ground Combat System and the Franco-German-Spanish project on the Future Combat Air System, which also entail the risk of the future procurement of US solutions; stresses that all possible synergies with the EDF should be used, while avoiding the duplication of efforts;
45. Stresses the need to ensure the coherence of output between respective EU and NATO capability development planning processes; calls for the interoperability of military equipment from EU Member States and NATO Allies to be improved and for industrial cooperation to be fostered by ensuring that future EU legal standards for defence products components and ammunition are based on the NATO standards;
46. Welcomes the proposal for European defence projects of common interest regarding the development of common capabilities that go beyond the financial means of a single Member State; believes that these projects should be used to support the industrial and technological capacities that underpin the major common priorities of several Member States, and in fields such as external border protection and defence, particularly in the land domain, and to provide support to strategic enablers, particularly in space and European air defence, in acting on the whole spectrum of threats, to enhance military mobility, specifically strategic and tactical air transport, DeepStrikes, drone and anti-drone technologies, missiles and munitions, and artificial intelligence, in order to develop sovereign infrastructure and critical enablers; emphasises that pragmatism must prevail due to the sheer number of priorities and the need to mobilise new resources; considers, in that regard, that the EU should focus, where possible, on rapidly available and proven European technologies that gradually reduce the EU’s dependencies and improve its security; highlights the need to support the development of pan-European value chains in EU defence cooperation by incorporating companies throughout the EU and to boost competitiveness in the sector by various means, such as mergers and champions; considers, furthermore, that instead of focusing on fair return, the EU’s defence policies should encourage the growth of EU centres of excellence;
47. Highlights the vital necessity of overcoming the fragmentation of the EU’s defence industrial landscape and of finally achieving the full implementation of the EU’s internal market for defence products, as the current structure leads to unnecessary duplications and the multiplication of inefficiencies in defence investments and their use, and structurally hampers the strengthening of defence readiness; is concerned that the internal market for defence products is still undermined by insufficiently harmonised application of its rules by the Member States and by disproportionate use of the exemption provided for in Article 346 TFEU; endorses the call for the creation of a true single market for defence products and services, as also presented in Mr Niinistö’s report; emphasises the need for a newly updated and effective regulatory framework aimed at reducing barriers for market entry for defence products, enabling EU defence industrial consolidation and permitting EU companies to fully exploit business potential, encouraging innovation and more and smoother cross-border as well as civil and military cooperation, boosting production, increasing security of supply and ensuring smarter and more efficient public investments in the EDTIB; underlines, at the same time, the importance of maintaining fruitful competition between different competitors and of avoiding oligopolies in which individual providers can freely determine the prices and availability of defence goods; calls on the Commission to present proposals to complete the EU internal market for defence, based, in particular, on an assessment of EU rules for defence procurement and transfer of defence-related products, and on the identification and analysis of limitations and loopholes in the current legal framework; further calls on the Commission to make suggestions for an interpretation of Article 346 TFEU in line with the current reality of an interdependent security architecture in the EU; calls for the implementation of Directive 2009/81/EC on defence and sensitive security procurement(26) and Directive 2009/43/EC on intra-EU transfers of defence-related products(27) (the Transfers Directive) to be improved, and where needed, in the light of the EDIS, for proposals for the revision of these directives to be submitted;
48. Stresses the importance of ensuring a balanced effort between strengthening the existing armament industrial capabilities of the Member States in the short- and medium-term and supporting research and development (R&D) for new and innovative military equipment and armament tailored to the present and future needs of the armed forces of the Member States and to EU defence capabilities, such as those required by CSDP missions and operations and the EU Rapid Deployment Capacity (RDC); emphasises that priority should be given to keeping and enhancing the technological advantage through targeted strategic projects as a key element in deterrence with regard to our adversaries and competitors; underlines the importance of including all Member States in security and defence strategies, particularly with regard to the development of the defence industry;
49. Stresses the need to develop an effective EU-level armaments policy that includes the establishment of a functioning and effective external trade dimension, is aimed at supporting partners that face threats by aggressive authoritarian regimes, and prevents arms deliveries to undemocratic aggressive regimes in line with the eight existing EU criteria; stresses the need to overcome the very narrow and national interpretation of Article 346 TFEU in this regard;
50. Stresses that cooperation with international partners in the defence sector should be limited to like-minded partners and should not contravene the security and defence interests of the EU and its Member States; recalls that dependencies on high-risk suppliers of critical products with digital elements pose a strategic risk that should be addressed at EU level; calls on the Member States’ relevant authorities to reflect on how to reduce these dependencies and undertake an immediate assessment and review of existing Chinese investments in critical infrastructure, including power grids, the transport network and information and communication systems, to identify any vulnerabilities that could impact the security and defence of the Union;
51. Welcomes the revision of the EU’s Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Regulation; stresses the need to further strengthen FDI screening procedures by incorporating due diligence standards to identify cases where governments of states hold leverage over investors in EU critical infrastructure, such as European ports, and in undersea cables in the Baltic, Mediterranean and Arctic seas in ways that would contravene the security and defence interests of the Union and its Member States, as established within the framework of the CFSP pursuant to Title V of the TEU; underlines that this approach should also be applied to candidate countries; believes that additional legislation is needed to effectively protect the security of European ICT supply chain from high-risk vendors and protect against cyber-enabled intellectual property theft; calls for the creation of a European framework aimed at closely regulating and setting minimum standards and conditions for the export of intellectual property and technologies that are critical to the security and defence of the Union, including dual-use goods;
Research and development for defence technology and equipment
52. Supports a significant increase in investments in defence R&D, with a particular emphasis on collaborative initiatives, thereby strengthening the EU’s technological leadership and competitiveness in defence and ensuring a spillover effect in the civilian marketplace; notes, in this regard, that in 2022, the Member States invested approximately EUR 10,7 billion in defence R&D; underlines that technological advancement in critical domains – air, land, maritime, space and cyber – requires stable long-term investment across the Member States to keep pace with rapid global innovation;
53. Stresses the need for EU R&D instruments and funding to be used as effectively as possible in order to address capability gaps and priorities in a timely manner as laid out in the Defence Investment Gap Analysis and the CDP; calls, therefore, on the Commission and the Member States to align EDF projects and funding with the EU’s urgent capability needs and prioritise them on this basis, and to focus on the most relevant and promising research activities; further calls on the Commission to initiate a thorough review of the EDF in view of a revised follow-up financial instrument for the next multiannual financial framework (MFF); calls on the Commission and the Member States to adopt an approach that incorporates a low energy, carbon and environmental footprint by design when implementing relevant EU funds and to regularly report on progress; recalls that the R&D actions can be directed at solutions to improve efficiency, reduce the carbon footprint and achieve sustainable best practices; welcomes the relevant investment of EUR 133 million provided for in the first annual work programme, but notes that this represents only 11 % of the overall annual EDF budget; recalls the role of NextGenerationEU in climate action and calls on the Member States to use resources from their national recovery plans to invest in the sustainability of their military infrastructure;
Dual-use and emerging and disruptive technologies
54. Stresses the need to develop a more proactive role for the EU in sustaining investment in dual-use technologies, which can be applied in both civilian and military contexts, as a means to enhance the EU’s resilience against hybrid and emerging threats; underlines the need to support, in particular, the testing of prototypes of new products and to focus on new technologies in close cooperation with Ukrainian defence and technological actors; underlines the importance of ensuring the financial viability of companies, including small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), that invest in such innovation; advocates the promotion of civilian commercialisation of these technologies as a way to expand market opportunities and strengthen the European industrial base, fostering synergies between military and civilian development;
55. Highlights the important role that emerging disruptive technologies, such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing, cloud computing and robotics, play in defence; stresses that the development and harnessing of these technologies in defence require further EU-coordinated investment and research efforts so that the defence equipment suppliers in the EU remain at the forefront of innovation; notes that under the current EDF Regulation, with its long implementation cycles, the Commission fails to provide funding to research projects in a timely manner; calls, therefore, for a more flexible and faster approach for research projects on emerging disruptive technologies, reflecting the increasing pace of developments in that field building on the work of the European Defence Agency’s Hub for European Defence Innovation and drawing on the work of the US Defence Advanced Research Project Agency; further calls for the EU to play a leading role in promoting research into the military applications of artificial intelligence and in establishing governance frameworks for the responsible development and use of this technology;
56. Reiterates its call on the Commission to share with Parliament a detailed analysis of the risks linked to the misuse, by our adversaries, of technologies such as semiconductors, quantum computing, blockchains, space, artificial intelligence and biotechnologies, including genomics, as well as the list of proposed EU actions in these fields, in line with the EU’s economic security strategy; is concerned about the role of Chinese military-linked companies in gathering the genetic data of EU citizens;
57. Calls on the Commission to propose an EU drone package, which focuses on drone and anti-drone systems and auxiliary capabilities, contains plans and funds for stimulating research and development, draws on lessons learnt from the Ukrainian experience, and is open to the participation of Ukraine’s highly innovative companies, as well as an industrial programme dedicated to the joint development, production and procurement of drone and anti-drone systems, and a regulation on the use of drones in civilian and military contexts;
Defence SMEs
58. Reiterates that defence-related SMEs from across the Union are the backbone of the European defence industry and supply chains and are key to innovation in these areas, and emphasises the need to provide support to SMEs and start-ups, in particular, in the defence and dual-use sector; stresses that the EDIS and the EDIP must ensure a level playing field for all defence industry actors across the Union and promote cooperation between bigger and smaller companies from all Member States, ensuring that the industry will not be dominated by some large companies from a limited number of Member States; encourages the Member States to provide special opportunities for SMEs in the European defence sector to participate in the bidding process through such measures as creating a pre-approved list of companies to facilitate a faster engagement process, introducing private equity firms that invest in SMEs into the procurement process, assisting SME growth through incubation and capital investment, reducing the complexities of bidding for contracts, and implementing internal measures to reform the amount of time taken to process contract details;
Military mobility
59. Highlights the importance of developing, maintaining and protecting the infrastructure necessary to ensure the rapid and efficient military mobility of our armed forces across the Member States; underlines the need to ensure the resilience of critical infrastructure that allows military mobility and the provision of essential services; recognises that military logistics can contribute to deterrence by signalling the EU’s overall military preparedness; anticipates that these points will be clearly reflected in the announced June 2025 joint communication on Military Mobility;
60. Underlines the urgent need to substantially enhance and invest in military mobility, prioritising investments and removing bottlenecks and missing links; stresses, in this regard, the importance of swiftly implementing projects and regulatory measures in accordance with the EU Action Plan on Military Mobility 2.0; supports new strategic investments in civil and military infrastructure, such as ports, airports and highways, which will also allow the smooth transfer of military units and supplies, including rapid reaction forces, heavy equipment, goods and humanitarian aid; calls on the Commission to act on the recommendations from the 2025 ECA Special Report on Military Mobility and to give greater importance to the military assessment in the selection process for dual-use projects(28);
61. Calls on the Commission to develop an integrated approach to military mobility and logistics that ensures that the Council’s pledge to remove all remaining barriers by 2026 is upheld, and that coincides with much higher EU investment in key aspects of military mobility; further calls for the appropriate EU funding for ongoing and necessary military mobility projects to be secured in the next MFF; calls on the Member States to take further action to simplify and harmonise procedures for military mobility and shorten the timelines for granting permissions so that the Member States can act faster and increase their efficiency of response, in line with their defence needs and responsibilities, both in the context of CSDP missions and operations and in the context of national and multinational activities; encourages the Member States to use the third-country PESCO agreement on military mobility as a template for partner country participation, with an emphasis on tailoring PESCO projects to CSDP mission needs;
62. Appreciates the efforts of countries bordering Ukraine to provide military assistance to Ukraine securely and efficiently; notes that Poland’s military mobility experience and potential, including the planned Central Communication Port, are essential for the security of the entire eastern flank;
An updated Strategic Compass: promoting a common strategic vision and coherence, and improving EU decision-making on defence issues within the EU institutional framework
Strategic Compass
63. Stresses that geopolitical developments and threats have continued to evolve rapidly since the Strategic Compass was adopted by Member States in March 2022; calls, therefore, for a review of the comprehensive joint threat assessment enshrined in the Strategic Compass, from which priorities for EU action should derive; believes that this review exercise should serve to define common views on Europe-wide capability gaps, which should be addressed via bilateral, multinational or EU-level programmes, funds, projects and instruments, and set out the timeframe within which this should be done; calls, furthermore, for the Commission and the VP/HR to present updated measures for the Strategic Compass following this review exercise, if necessary, and for this to inform the preparation of the white paper on the future of European defence; reiterates that the Strategic Compass’s ambitious aims and milestones can only be achieved with corresponding political willingness and action on behalf of the Member States and the EU institutions; stresses the need for coherence and compatibility between the Strategic Compass and NATO’s Strategic Concept;
64. Calls on the Commission and the EEAS to ensure that the Climate Change and Defence Roadmap is fully implemented and is improved within the context of updated measures under the Strategic Compass; calls for the timeframes for reviewing the Roadmap to be reconsidered and, in particular, for the overall objectives to be reviewed much earlier than 2030; calls on the Member States to develop national structures in support of the objectives; urges the VP/HR to propose to the Member States an action programme composed of priority actions presented in the Roadmap that can be implemented in the short term;
Defence governance: consolidating the EU institutional framework and decision-making process in defence and security fields
65. Suggests that the Council review the institutional settings of its decision-making bodies competent for defence and security, and consider setting up a new permanent decision-making body made up of ministers of defence from Member States, without prejudice to the respective distribution of competences within national ministries in this regard;
66. Stresses that effective EU-level cooperation in the field of security and defence and swift, coordinated responses to security challenges require coherence between the different structures of the Council and the Commission; stresses, furthermore, the need to prevent overlaps, guarantee efficient public investments, address critical capabilities gaps and develop coherent security strategies with respect to partners, third countries and various regions of the world, both in policymaking processes and in current and future initiatives; notes the unclear division of portfolios and the potential overlap of competences among commissioners in the field of security and defence following the creation of the position of Commissioner for Defence and Space, and therefore calls on the Commission to clearly delineate the competences of the commissioners in this field; invites the Commission to carry out an internal review of its various structures, including the Directorate-General for Defence Industry and Space (DG DEFIS) and the European Defence Agency, and of their mandates in order to ensure complementarity and the efficient administration of current and future initiatives under the CSDP; calls on the Member States and the Commission to dedicate further financial and human resources to the EEAS to ensure that it can effectively perform its role as the EU’s diplomatic service in the light of the highly competitive geopolitical context and the increased demands on its limited capacities in recent years;
67. Reaffirms that, in order to become a credible geopolitical player, the EU should reform its process for decision-making on the CFSP/CSDP and underlines, in this regard, that institutional reflections on lifting the requirement for unanimity in this process should be considered; recalls that the EU Treaty framework already allows a number of different institutional forms of cooperation in the field of foreign, security and defence policy and notes with regret that the potential for fast action in this field, as provided for in the ‘passerelle clauses’ of the TEU, has been used only in a very limited manner; calls on the Council to consider all possibilities to strengthen and deepen its process for decision-making on the CFSP/CSDP with a view to realising the untapped potential within the Treaties; reiterates its call for the Council to gradually switch to qualified majority voting for decisions on the CFSP and CSDP, at least in those areas that do not have military implications; suggests, furthermore, that the Council pursue making full use of the ‘passerelle clauses’ and the scope of articles that enhance EU solidarity and mutual assistance in the event of crises;
68. Strongly reiterates its call to strengthen the EU Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) and achieve its full operational readiness, including through the provision of adequate premises, staff, enhanced command and control, and effective communication and information systems for all CSDP missions and operations; stresses the need to achieve timely results with regard to the MPCC, given the ambition of the Strategic Compass that the MPCC should function as the EU’s preferred command and control structure and be capable of planning and conducting all non-executive military missions and two small-scale or one medium-scale executive operation, as well as live exercises; stresses the need for the MPCC to facilitate synergies between civil and military instruments and calls for joint civil-military headquarters combining civil and military instruments to be set up at European level in the longer term, in order to make full use of the EU’s integrated approach in crisis management right from the strategic planning phase to the actual conduct of the mission or operation; takes the view that the EU’s Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) should consider how to protect a deployed force against multiple hybrid threats and conduct advanced operations at a far higher level of risk than in current contexts; calls on the Commission, the EEAS, the MPCC, the CPCC, the EU Military Committee and the EU Military Staff to foster a new culture of understanding between civilian and military partners, develop interagency cooperation and ensure the transfer of best practices in mission planning and the associated concepts, including by developing a model for generating and sharing best practices;
69. Reiterates its full support for the Rapid Deployment Capacity (RDC) to achieve full operational capability in the first half of 2025 at the latest, with at least 5 000 troops available for rescue and evacuation tasks, initial entry and stabilisation operations or the temporary reinforcement of missions; notes that EU Battlegroups, which have never been deployed despite being operational since 2007, will be an integral part of the wider EU RDC framework; welcomes the planning and realisation of live exercises within the framework of the RDC and encourages the continuation of such initiatives;
70. Considers the RDC to be a key element for achieving the EU’s level of ambition and believes that additional troops and force elements should gradually be assigned to it, with reference to the Helsinki Headline Goal of 1999; believes that it would make sense to use the White Paper process to launch a discussion about the creation of additional permanent multinational EU military units that could fulfil complementary tasks to the RDC; highlights the need to engage further with NATO on the establishment of the RDC, in line with the principle of the single set of forces;
71. Reiterates its call on the Member States to consider the practical aspects of implementing Article 44 TEU during the operationalisation of the RDC, as well as in other relevant CSDP missions, in order to enable a group of willing and capable Member States to plan and carry out a mission or operation within the EU framework, thereby facilitating the swift activation of the RDC; calls on the Member States to commit to substantially narrowing critical gaps in strategic enablers in a timely manner, in particular those linked to the RDC, such as strategic airlift, secure communications and information systems, medical assets, cyber-defence capabilities and intelligence and reconnaissance; calls on the Commissioner for Defence and Space to consider including, in his proposed European defence projects of common interest, initiatives aimed at providing the necessary strategic enablers that would facilitate CSDP missions and operations and the RDC;
Increasing resources dedicated to the EU common security and defence policy
72. Insists that urgent needs cannot wait for the next MFF; insists that innovative solutions for finding additional funding must be explored without delay, such as investing in the defence sector, making it easier and faster to repurpose funds from one project to another, and exploring the possibility of adjusting EU funding criteria to give new prominence to security criteria in allocating spending;
73. Welcomes the increased budgets and investment in defence by Member States and the increase, albeit modest, in the EU budget for the CSDP in 2024; strongly believes that, in the light of unprecedented security threats, all EU Member States should urgently reach a level of defence spending, as a proportion of their GDP, that is significantly higher than NATO’s current target of 2 %; acknowledges that 23 of the 32 NATO Allies, including 16 countries that are members of both the EU and NATO, were expected to meet NATO’s spending target of devoting 2 % of their GDP to defence expenditure by the end of 2024; points out that this has increased sixfold since 2014, when this target was pledged; notes that the EU’s current budget for security and defence given the current geopolitical upheaval and Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, is not equal to the challenges to be met in the short and long term; recommends, in the light of the estimated need for EUR 500 billion of defence investment by 2035 and on the basis of continuous analysis of capability needs and gaps, that the Member States further increase defence investments, in particular for the joint procurement of defence capabilities, and fully supports the targets set under the EDIS in this respect;
74. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to initiate an open discussion on the basis of among other things, the recommendations presented in the reports by Mr Draghi and Mr Niinistö, including increasing the resources allocated to security and defence in the next MFF and exploring all effective funding options to this end, and pooling parts of national defence budgets at EU level in order to generate economies of scale; further calls on the Member States to amend the EPF financing process to ensure adequate and sustainable support for partners and allies, while also aligning with CSDP missions and operations; calls for a strategy to be devised with the aim of creating centres of excellence in different regions of the EU, without duplicating NATO’s work in these fields, in order to promote innovation and the participation of all Member States, ensuring that the capabilities and specialised knowledge of each Member State contribute to a more cohesive and integrated defence industrial base;
75. Welcomes the new financial instrument Security Action for Europe (SAFE), and urges the Commission and the Member States to ensure that increased investment in Europe’s defence capabilities respect the notion of ‘buy more, buy better, buy together, buy European’; regrets the use of Article 122 and the consequent lack of involvement of Parliament in the approval of this instrument;
76. Welcomes the savings and investments union strategy, and expresses its expectation that it will make it easier to mobilise private savings towards more efficient capital markets and channel investment into the defence sector;
77. Urges the Member States to support the establishment of a defence, security and resilience bank to serve as a multilateral lending institution designed to provide low-interest, long-term loans that can support key national security priorities such as rearmament, defence modernisation, rebuilding efforts in Ukraine and the buying back of critical infrastructure currently controlled by hostile non-EU countries;
78. Recalls that the EU’s objectives of solidarity, cohesion and convergence also apply to defence; stresses that the financial means needed to rebuild and expand our defence capabilities in the decade to come will have a significant impact on the soundness and sustainability of public finances, and therefore requires cooperation and coordination at EU level through a genuine defence economic policy; underlines that increases in defence investment should not compete with other investment priorities, including social cohesion; further recalls that financing orientations should be anchored in a whole-of-society approach to resilience and therefore need to be broadly supported by European citizens, and that this support needs be sustainable in the long term; stresses that the financial burden must therefore be shared fairly, especially by profitable companies that already benefit from public participation or state aids; emphasises, furthermore, that public spending should be complemented by increased private funding; calls on the Commission to reflect upon possible fiscal avenues that would allow a fairer distribution of the financial burden and limit competition disturbances in the EDTIB induced by state aids and market-distorting tendering processes;
79. Calls for the next MFF to genuinely provide the means for a defence union; supports proposals to provide massive EU financial investment in European defence and to stimulate research and technological innovation and dual-use projects in the European defence industry, thereby strengthening its competitiveness and promoting advances that contribute both to security and to sustainable economic growth; underlines that defence investment from the EU budget should only complement, but not replace, financial efforts by the Member States, especially with regard to the ambition of countries that are members of both the EU and NATO to invest 2 % of their GDP in defence; invites the Member States to bring forward the re-assessment of the scope and definition of common costs, to enhance solidarity and stimulate participation in CSDP military missions and operations, and of exercise-related costs, in line with the Strategic Compass;
80. Calls on the Commission to raise common debt to provide the Union with the fiscal capacity to borrow in exceptional and crisis situations, present and future, taking into account the experience and lessons learnt from NextGenerationEU, as we are now experiencing a pressing need to boost security and defence for protecting EU citizens, restoring deterrence and supporting the EU’s allies, first and foremost Ukraine; emphasises that the burden of such action must be shared fairly;
81. Calls for the next MFF to provide increased financial support to ensure the timely supply of defence products through joint procurement, industrial coordination, stockpiling, support for SMEs and expansion of production capacities; emphasises that this funding should particularly prioritise Member States bordering Ukraine to enhance its protection, as well as Member States faced with a high risk of conventional military threats, such as those bordering Russia and Belarus;
82. Is concerned about the lack of much-needed private financing for the EDTIB, particularly for SMEs, which may derive from a lack of long-term government contracts or from an overly narrow interpretation of environmental, social and governance criteria; welcomes, therefore, the clarification provided by the European Securities and Market Authority on 14 May 2024 to the effect that only companies involved in weapons banned under international law are automatically excluded from accessing funds; welcomes the proposals made in Mr Niinistö’s report to avoid fragmentation in defence spending, combine relevant funding streams and trigger more private-sector investment; calls on the Commission to assess the recommendations and come up with concrete proposals; highlights the need for the defence industry to get better access to capital markets;
EIB lending policy for the defence sector
83. Stresses the importance of access for the defence sector to the loans provided by the EIB as a catalyst for private investment in the European defence industry; welcomes the further extension of the EIB’s eligibility criteria to dual-use goods and calls on the EIB to take further measures in this regard; stresses that given that the EIB’s objective of promoting the development of the EU and supporting its policies, in particular defence policy and the strengthening of the EDTIB, in line with Article 309 TFEU, the EIB should further review its lending policy and continuously adapt it; calls on the EIB to conduct a review of the impact of the extension of its dual-use goods policy and to reform its eligibility list as appropriate so that ammunition and military equipment that go beyond dual-use application are no longer excluded from EIB financing; welcomes the EIB’s 2022 Strategic European Security Initiative aimed at supporting dual-use research, development and innovation, security infrastructure and technology projects focused on cybersecurity, New Space, artificial intelligence and quantum technologies;
Contributing more effectively to global security through EU common security and defence policy and strengthening the role of the EU as a security actor
De-escalation, preventing wars and supporting conflict resolution
84. Expresses its very strong concern about and condemnation of China’s support to Russia in its war of aggression against Ukraine, in particular through cooperation with Russia’s military industrial and technological base, the exportation of dual-use goods to Russia and the ongoing involvement of China-based companies in sanctions evasion and circumvention; expresses, in this regard, serious concern about recent reports claiming that China is producing long-range attack drones for use by Russia in its war of aggression against Ukraine, and demands that if China continues to support Russia’s armament efforts, this must have serious consequences for the EU’s external policy towards China; deplores the ‘no limits’ partnership between Russia and China and expresses serious concern about the renewed commitment by China and Russia to further strengthen their ties; welcomes the Council’s decision to impose sanctions on Chinese companies for their support for Russia’s war in Ukraine;
85. Is deeply concerned about China’s increasing investments in military capabilities and the militarisation of its supply chains to bolster its industry while taking advantage of the political and economic opportunities created by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; is also deeply concerned about the effect that European dependencies on China have on the credibility of the Member States’ ability to safeguard their national security and of the ability of the EU as a whole to effectively criticise and counter China’s economic coercion, possible further escalation with Taiwan and support to Russia; calls on the Commission and the Member States to seriously implement a policy of ‘de-risking’ with the aim of managing the risks coming from economic and technological engagement with China; calls, in this regard, for the risks posed by Chinese suppliers in EU critical infrastructure to be addressed, and for no EU funds or subsidies to be directed to advancing the position of these suppliers in Europe;
86. Strongly condemns China’s unwarranted military exercises of 14 October 2024 around Taiwan; condemns, furthermore, the increasing number of hostile acts being conducted by China against Taiwan, including cyberattacks, influence campaigns, the entry of Chinese warplanes into Taiwan’s Air Defence Identification Zone and the severing of subsea cables; reaffirms its strong commitment to preserving the status quo in the Taiwan Strait and underscores that any attempt to unilaterally change it, particularly by means of force or coercion, will not be accepted and will be met with a decisive and firm reaction; lauds the restraint and disciplined reaction of the Taiwanese authorities and calls on the Chinese authorities to exercise restraint and avoid any actions that may further escalate cross-strait tensions; calls for regular exchanges between the EU and its Taiwanese counterparts on relevant security issues and for stronger cooperation on countering disinformation and foreign interference; stresses that any escalation in the Taiwan Strait would have detrimental effects on Europe’s security and economy and therefore urges the Commission to start developing contingency planning and mitigation measures on the basis of likely escalation scenarios, such as an economic blockade of Taiwan by China;
87. Expresses deep concern at China’s increasingly aggressive actions in the South China Sea and in the Indo-Pacific region, namely its use of military and economic coercion, hybrid warfare tactics, dangerous manoeuvres conducted by its navy and coast guard against its neighbours and island-building, in order to advance unlawful maritime claims and threaten maritime shipping lanes; points to reports that a Chinese-linked ship cut a Taiwanese undersea cable in early January 2025 and calls for a thorough investigation into the matter; calls, furthermore, for Taiwan and the EU to share information about such incidents; reiterates its strong interest in and support for freedom of navigation and maritime security everywhere, and notably in the South China Sea; calls on the Chinese authorities to put an end to all aggressive and provocative actions, in particular air and maritime operations in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, that endanger stability in the Indo-Pacific region and thereby undermine international peace and security, the sovereignty of countries in the region, the safety of life at sea and freedom of navigation in full compliance with UNCLOS; applauds the increase in freedom of navigation exercises conducted by several EU countries, including France, the Netherlands and Germany; notes that these activities are in line with international law and calls for more cooperation and coordination with regional partners, including through Coordinated Maritime Presences in the north-western Indian Ocean, among other areas, in order to increase freedom of navigation operations in the region;
88. Remains concerned about the political and economic pressure being exerted by China and Russia in Central Asia and stresses the need to scale up the EU’s presence in the region in response; underlines the EU’s interest in strengthening security cooperation, economic relations and political ties with the countries of Central Asia, including in order to address the circumvention of sanctions against Russia and Belarus;
89. Condemns Iran, in the strongest terms, for its destabilising activities in the Middle East region, including through its proxies, and for its continued support for terrorist groups, which pose a direct threat to regional, European and global security; condemns the growing military cooperation between Iran and Russia, in particular their intention to sign a treaty on a comprehensive strategic partnership; expresses, however, full support for and solidarity with Iran’s civil society and democratic forces and calls for increased international efforts to support these groups in their struggle for freedom and human rights; welcomes the EU’s decision to renew sanctions against Iran until July 2025, including by sanctioning Iran’s production of drones and missiles and its supply thereof to Russia and the wider Middle East region; points out that the sanction options that have not yet been exhausted include a much more restrictive approach to technology transfers through exports of products that are not categorised as dual-use;
90. Unequivocally condemns the Iranian Government for aiding and abetting internationally recognised terrorist organisations, such as Hamas and Hezbollah, and networks that have perpetrated or attempted attacks within the EU, posing a direct threat to European security, sovereignty and stability; recalls, in this respect, that the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps has been involved in planning and carrying out dozens of assassinations and terrorist attacks, including on EU soil, over the past 30 years and, more recently, in attacks against Jewish synagogues and individuals, as well as against Israeli embassies in several Member States; urges the EU and the Member States to enhance intelligence-sharing and counter-terrorism measures to prevent any future attacks; reiterates its long-standing call to add the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to the EU list of terrorist organisations and supports the initiatives taken by some Member States in this regard;
91. Considers Iran’s nuclear weapons programme to be one of the foremost threats to global security and stresses that if Iran succeeds in acquiring a nuclear breakout capability, it risks intensifying in belligerence and stepping up its state sponsorship of terrorism and proliferation of missiles and drones;
92. Reiterates its condemnation, in the strongest terms, of the despicable terrorist attacks perpetrated by the terrorist organisation Hamas against Israel on 7 October 2023, which contributed to further destabilisation in the Middle East, intensified by aggressions against Israel by Iranian proxies (such as terrorist organisations including Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen) and the Iranian regime itself; reiterates that Israel has the right to defend itself, as enshrined in and constrained by international law; calls for the immediate and unconditional release of all remaining hostages held by Hamas; calls for all parties to put an immediate end to all hostilities and fully abide by international law, including international humanitarian law; expresses severe concern over the recent collapse of the ceasefire in Gaza and calls for an immediate return to it; emphasises that this would represent a significant step in relieving the immense suffering endured by civilians on both sides over the past months; praises the commitment of mediators, including the United States, Egypt and Qatar, whose efforts were pivotal in achieving the first ceasefire; urges all European and international actors to actively contribute to the achievement of a new breakthrough, to oversee the implementation of the ceasefire and hold accountable those who fail to comply with it;
93. Welcomes the redeployment of the EU Border Assistance Mission to Rafah on 31 January 2025 to support the Palestinian Authority in facilitating safe passage for medical evacuations during Phase I of the ceasefire; stands ready to engage in discussions on future concrete contributions to supporting a ceasefire;
94. Expresses its deep concern regarding the military escalation in the Middle East, which contributes to further destabilisation in the region; deplores the unacceptable number of civilian casualties, the forced displacement caused by the escalating violence and the persistent use of military force; expresses serious concern, furthermore, about the ongoing military action by the Israeli Defence Forces in the Gaza Strip and in the West Bank; condemns the Israeli Defence Forces firing on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), which is a grave violation of international law; reaffirms the essential stabilising role played by UNIFIL, to which 16 Member States contribute, in southern Lebanon; calls for immediate ceasefires in both Gaza and Lebanon, an end to the hostilities, the full and symmetrical implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701(2006) and the protection of the civilian populations; stresses the need for the EU and other international actors to assume greater responsibility and assist governments and civil society organisations in the Middle East with reaching durable and sustainable peace, in particular by continuing to support a two-state solution between Israel and Palestine, as well as by countering terrorism and radicalisation in the region; underscores that the evolution of conflicts in the region has repercussions on neighbouring regions and on Europe and poses security challenges for the EU with regard to the future of deterrence, humanitarian law and crisis management;
95. Welcomes the Arab Recovery and Reconstruction Plan presented at the Cairo Summit on 4 March 2025, which represents a serious basis for discussions on the future of the Gaza Strip; encourages the VP/HR and the Commissioner for the Mediterranean to engage constructively with Arab partners to provide credible solutions for the reconstruction, governance and security of Gaza; rejects, on the other hand, the ‘Trump Gaza’ proposal, which disregards the volatile security conditions across the Middle East; is of the opinion that the extent of the destruction and human suffering in Gaza requires comprehensive international engagement, with the United States, the EU, the UN, Arab states and other international partners complementing each other’s efforts in order for negotiations to resume and be constructive; is committed to future normalisation efforts between Israel and Arab states in the region;
96. Urges the Council and the Member States to designate Hezbollah, in its entirety, as a terrorist organisation and to push for its full disarmament in line with UN Security Council Resolution 1701(2006); highlights recent decisions taken by several states, including the United States and Canada, to list Samidoun as a terrorist organisation acting as proxy of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine; stresses that Samidoun was banned in Germany in 2023 and calls on other EU Member States to take similar measures by banning the organisation within their territory;
97. Notes that the Jordan-Syria border is being used as a crossing point for arms and drug trafficking; emphasises the need for the EU to further support Jordan, which has been weakened by the current crisis in the Middle East, and calls for the increased use of the EPF protect the Jordan-Syria border;
98. Recognises that Türkiye is a country of strategic relevance for the EU; notes that Türkiye is increasingly present in areas where the EU has key security interests and CSDP missions and operations, and notes with regrets the role that Türkiye plays in destabilising certain areas of concern for the EU and in its neighbourhoods; points out Türkiye’s illegal activities against the EU’s interests in the eastern Mediterranean, which violate international law, including UNCLOS; reiterates its condemnation of the signature of the memoranda of understanding between Türkiye and Libya on comprehensive security and military cooperation and on the delimitation of maritime zones, which are interconnected and are clear violations of international law, the relevant UN Security Council resolutions and the sovereign rights of EU Member States; deplores the fact that Türkiye undermines the effectiveness of EU sanctions against Russia and reiterates its call on Türkiye to fully align with these; calls on Türkiye to refrain from undermining EU CSDP missions and operations; reiterates its call on Türkiye to fulfil its obligation regarding the full, non-discriminatory implementation of the Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement with respect to all Member States, including the Republic of Cyprus;
99. Deplores the fact that despite de-escalation efforts, Türkiye continues to retain the threat of casus belli against Greece and to illegally occupy the northern part of the Republic of Cyprus; strongly condemns Türkiye’s illegal activities in Cyprus, including its violation of the status of the buffer zone, its increasing militarisation of the occupied areas of the Republic of Cyprus and its efforts to upgrade the secessionist entity in the occupied area of Cyprus in violation of international law, noting that these activities that are not conducive to the resumption of the UN-led negotiations; condemns Türkiye’s continuous violations of UN Security Council resolutions 550(1984) and 789(1992), which call on Türkiye to transfer the area of Varosha to its lawful inhabitants under the temporary administration of the UN by supporting the opening of the town of Varosha to the public; strongly urges Türkiye, once more, to reverse its illegal and unilateral actions in Varosha; further calls on Türkiye to withdraw its troops from Cyprus;
100. Calls urgently for the resumption of negotiations on the reunification of Cyprus under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General and reaffirms its unconditional support for Cyprus in resolving the issue; calls on Türkiye to accept a fair, comprehensive and viable solution to this issue;
101. Welcomes the informal extended meeting convened by the UN Secretary-General on 18 March 2025 in Geneva in the aim of paving the way for the resumption of negotiations on the Cyprus problem firmly within the agreed UN framework, the only framework accepted by the EU and the international community, and in line with EU law, values and principles; recalls that the reunification of Cyprus is a priority for the EU, which stands ready to step up and assume an active role in supporting the UN-led process with all the tools at its disposal; calls on Türkiye to engage constructively in negotiations and return to the negotiating table in good faith;
102. Calls for the EU to play a significant role in the Mediterranean and to become a security actor with the ability to guarantee the stability of the region and respect for international law and UNCLOS; welcomes, in this regard, the appointment of a Commissioner for the Mediterranean, working under the guidance and political steering of the VP/HR; stresses the need for the VP/HR, in cooperation with the Commissioner for the Mediterranean where necessary and in consultation with Member States, to develop a coherent security strategy with regard to the Mediterranean region and its neighbouring countries, including in North Africa, the Levant and the Sahel; calls for enhanced cooperation with partner countries in the Mediterranean to combat extremism, terrorism, the illicit trade in weapons and human trafficking;
103. Notes with concern the violations of migrants’ fundamental rights in Libya, as highlighted in UN Security Council Resolution 2755(2024); stresses the need to examine the role of CSDP missions and operations – EUBAM Libya and EUNAVFOR IRINI – in effectively fighting against the smuggling and trafficking of human beings, and their activities in relation to the need to protect migrants’ fundamental rights;
104. Notes that the rapid collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s criminal regime in Syria, which has been supported by the Kremlin since 2015, constitutes a significant political defeat for Vladimir Putin and threatens Russia’s strategic and military presence in Syria; recalls that since 2015, the Khmeimim and Tartus military bases have served as key points for Russian power projection in the Middle East and Africa; notes further that the Khmeimim and Tartus military bases were vital for the supply and transport of heavy weaponry and equipment to Russia’s private military companies, such as the Wagner Group and its operations in Libya, Mali, the Central African Republic, and Sudan; stresses that losing military bases in Syria could weaken Russia’s operational capacity and influence in Africa; calls, therefore, for the EU and its Member States to closely monitor the situation in Syria, make ties with the new Syrian regime conditional on Russia’s full withdrawal from the country and prevent Russia from establishing new military bases elsewhere in the region; recognises, in this regard, the EU’s significant leverage with regard to Syria in terms of political recognition, the easing of sanctions, trade agreements, and financial support for reconstruction, positioning the EU as an alternative to Türkiye in shaping Syria’s future;
105. Expresses its growing concern about and condemns the continuing attempts by Russia to destabilise the countries in the EU’s eastern neighbourhood through the use of FIMI, political assassinations, threats and territorial occupations in a bid to negatively impact their European aspirations and stability; underlines the need to reinforce the EU’s capacities to defend and develop democratic and value-based societies in the countries in the EU’s eastern neighbourhood;
106. Reaffirms the EU’s commitment to support the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova within its internationally recognised borders and the efforts to reach a peaceful, lasting, comprehensive political settlement of the Transnistrian conflict; strongly condemns the constant and coordinated attempts by Russia, pro-Russian oligarchs and Russian-sponsored local proxies to destabilise the Republic of Moldova, sow divisions within Moldovan society and derail the country’s European course through hybrid attacks, the weaponisation of energy supplies, disinformation, bomb threats and staged protests, as well as the threat or use of violence; notes with concern that the Security and Intelligence Service of the Republic of Moldova has reported an unprecedented level of intensity in Russia’s actions aimed at anchoring Moldova within its sphere of influence; underlines that this hybrid threat is targeted at democratic processes and undermines European integration, including by amplifying radical separatist tendencies in the south of the country, particularly in Gagauzia, using propaganda, manipulating the information space, interfering in the electoral process and conducting subversive operations;
107. Reiterates its calls on Russia to withdraw its military forces and equipment from the territory of the Republic of Moldova, to ensure the full destruction of all ammunition and equipment in the Cobasna depot under international oversight and to support a peaceful resolution to the Transnistrian conflict, in line with the principles of international law; calls for enhanced EU support for Moldova in combating FIMI, hybrid threats and cyberattacks; urges the Member States to increase funding for the EPF to strengthen the defence capabilities of Moldova;
108. Recognises that Georgia was the first target, in 2008, of Russia’s full-scale military aggression and its attempts to forcefully redraw the borders of a sovereign state in Europe; stresses that since 2008, Russia has persisted in its illegal occupation of and effective control over the occupied regions of Georgia; underlines that Russia’s military presence and significant military build-up in the occupied regions, its unlawful activities, its continued borderisation activities along the administrative boundary lines and its human rights abuses in Georgia pose a serious risk to the country’s security and to the broader security framework of Europe; reiterates its calls on Russia to withdraw its military forces and equipment from the territory of Georgia;
109. Strongly condemns Russia’s shooting down of Azerbaijan Airlines Flight 8243 on 25 December 2024, killing 38 of the 67 passengers on board; underlines that this highlights once more the brutal and belligerent nature of the Russian regime;
110. Urges the EU to continue its active engagement and take decisive steps, through its important instruments, to ensure that Russia fulfils its obligations under the EU-mediated ceasefire agreement of 12 August 2008, in particular its obligations to withdraw all its military forces from the occupied regions of Georgia, to allow the deployment of international security mechanisms inside both Georgian regions and the EU Monitoring Mission’s unhindered access to the whole territory of Georgia, and to engage constructively in the Geneva International Discussions and the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanisms; calls on the EEAS to prepare a comprehensive report on violations of the 12 August 2008 ceasefire agreement, to identify and communicate clearly the provisions that have still not been fulfilled by Russia and to submit recommendations;
111. Welcomes the recent news of the successful conclusion of negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan on the full text of the draft Agreement on Peace and Establishment of Interstate Relations, commends Armenia for paving the way for the finalisation of the text and urges the Azerbaijani leadership to sign and implement, in good faith, the peace agreement as concluded in the negotiations;
112. Condemns Azerbaijan for its continued efforts to undermine the possibility of regional peace and its continued threats against Armenia; calls for the EU and its Member States to suspend any security, technical or financial assistance provided to Azerbaijan, including through various EU instruments, that might contribute to the increase of Azerbaijan’s offensive capabilities or endanger the security, territorial integrity and sovereignty of Armenia;
113. Recalls that a year has passed since Azerbaijan’s seizure of Nagorno-Karabakh, which resulted in the forced displacement of more than 140 000 Armenians from the region; condemns the military support and the supply of arms provided by non-EU countries to Azerbaijan; points out that Azerbaijan has been guilty of serious breaches of human rights in Nagorno-Karabakh; condemns the destruction of the Armenian cultural heritage in the region by Azerbaijan; calls for the release of all 23 Armenian hostages detained in Azerbaijan, including former de facto officials of Nagorno-Karabakh and prisoners of war from the 2020 war; calls on the Council to consider imposing targeted and individual sanctions against those responsible for ceasefire violations and human rights abuses in Nagorno-Karabakh;
114. Welcomes the decision to adopt the first assistance measure under the EPF in support of Armenian armed forces, as this would strengthen the resilience of Armenia in the context of ensuring security, independence and sovereignty; calls for the further reinforcement of the cooperation between Armenia and the EU in the field of security and defence, in particular in the area of mine clearance, including through the use of the EPF, taking into account Armenia’s reconsideration of its membership of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation; welcomes the actions undertaken by several Member States to provide defensive military support to Armenia and urges the other Member States to consider similar initiatives;
115. Emphasises that the EU should urgently review its regional strategy for the Sahel, following the various coups in the region; strongly deplores the forced departure of French troops and UN peacekeeping forces from the region and condemns the presence instead of private military companies (PMCs) and state-sponsored proxies such as the Africa Corps (formerly Wagner Group); underscores that that these PMCs have played a destabilising role in the Sahel and have supported various repressive regimes in an attempt to further Russia’s influence in Africa; points out the supply of weapons by Russia to the Sahel’s military regimes; further notes that other actors, such as Türkiye, are increasingly present in the region; urges the EU Special Representative for the Sahel and the Member States to maintain diplomatic engagement and continue supporting civil society and spending on development and humanitarian aid;
116. Expresses its concern about the lack of coherence in the EU response to the Great Lakes region’s crises and calls on the Council to reassess its renewed EU Great Lakes Strategy adopted on 20 February 2023; recognises the importance of a genuine commitment by the EU to peace in the region; notes with concern the role that Rwanda has played in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and calls on the EU to impose conditions on any military support to Rwanda; strongly condemns M23’s seizure of territories in eastern DRC, including the regional capital cities of Goma and Bukavu, directly leading to the death of an estimated 3 000 civilians; condemns the breaches of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of eastern DRC by M23 rebels; is deeply concerned about the humanitarian situation of millions of displaced persons in the area and about the use of rape as a strategic weapon of war; urges the VP/HR to engage in clear actions in line with the EU Great Lakes Strategy in order to restore stability and to cooperate with the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) to protect civilians in eastern DRC; urges the Rwandan Government to withdraw its troops from DRC territory and cease cooperation with the M23 rebels, including the supply of weapons and troops and logistical support; calls for the EU to suspend both its Memorandum of Understanding on raw materials and all military cooperation with Rwanda, including through the EPF and any other mechanisms, until Rwanda ends its illegal support for armed groups and fully respects the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the DRC; equally calls on the DRC to stop its cooperation with rebel groups in the region; supports the Luanda and Nairobi peace process to achieve a political solution to the conflict by diplomatic means and urges the VP/HR to continue diplomatic outreach to the parties to the conflict and other parties in the region and to increase pressure on the parties to reengage in peaceful negotiations, including by postponing the EU Security and Defence Consultations with Rwanda and adopting sanctions, depending on the situation on the ground and the progress made in ongoing regional mediation processes;
117. Expresses its disappointment about the suspension of the activities of the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and underlines that this significantly increases security and defence challenges, as critical investments in resilience, adaptation, conflict prevention and peacebuilding have now been curtailed, and therefore calls for the EU and its international partners to ensure that the vacuum left behind will not be used by our adversaries by strategically reflecting on how to take over certain programmes left unfunded as result of the US Government’s actions;
118. Is concerned about the limited role played by the EU in the Horn of Africa, while the involvement of other foreign actors is growing; calls for a review of the EU strategy in the region, with a view to achieving the EU’s goals of promoting peace, stability, and inclusive and sustainable economic development in the region; calls on the Council, the Commission and the EEAS to reflect on how to best use CSDP missions and operations deployed in the region to further these goals and enhance the EU’s activities;
119. Recognises that the Arctic region has significant strategic and geopolitical importance owing to its emerging maritime routes, wealth of natural resources and opportunities for economic development unlocked by global warming, while being increasingly contested; is alarmed by the intensifying militarisation and resource competition driven by Russian and Chinese activities in the region; strongly condemns the repeated statements by the US President concerning his goal of a US takeover of Greenland;
120. Underlines the importance of preserving security, stability and cooperation in the Arctic; stresses that the region must remain free from military tensions and natural resource exploitation and that the rights of indigenous peoples must be respected; reiterates the need to include the Union’s Arctic policy in the CSDP and to strengthen deterrence and defence capabilities in close coordination with NATO; emphasises that EU-NATO cooperation is essential to counterbalance the expanding influence of Russia and China in the region; calls for issues of interest to the Arctic to be addressed regularly within the Political and Security Committee and Council meetings;
Gender dimension and women’s role in peace and security
121. Emphasises the disproportionate and unique impact of armed conflicts on women and girls, especially in terms of conflict-related sexual violence; highlights the imperative need to ensure the provision and accessibility of the appropriate healthcare in armed conflicts, including sexual and reproductive health and rights; calls on the EU and Member States to ensure that armed conflicts are considered through a gender lens;
122. Recalls that mainstreaming and operationalising gender perspectives in external relations and implementing the ‘Women, Peace and Security’ agenda in accordance with the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions are long-standing priorities for the EU; recalls in this regard the importance of strengthening women’s participation in conflict prevention and resolution, peace negotiations, peacebuilding and peacekeeping, humanitarian action and post-conflict reconstruction;
123. Stresses that the integration of a gender perspective into all external and internal CSDP activities helps to improve the CSDP’s operational effectiveness and is a driver of the EU’s credibility as a proponent of gender equality worldwide; insists therefore on the importance of delivering on all the commitments made by the EU, including those in the EU’s Gender Action Plan (GAP) III (2020-2024) and in the Strategic Compass; also insists that the update of the Strategic Compass propose further measures to ensure gender equality and the full and meaningful participation of women in the CSDP, especially in military missions;
124. Welcomes the inclusion of gender and human rights perspectives and the appointment of gender advisers in all CSDP missions and operations and the establishment of a network of gender focal points; calls for the new Civilian CSDP Compact to be used to strive for the full participation of women in civilian CSDP missions;
CSDP missions and operations
125. Underlines the importance of clear and achievable goals, openness to the host country’s perspectives and ownership, as well as of equipment and the necessary financial, logistical and human resources for each of the CSDP missions and operations; also underlines the deterioration of the security environment where many CSDP missions are present; calls for improvements to the governance of evaluation and control of CSDP missions and operations; reiterates its call for comprehensive assessments of CSDP missions and operations, in particular of the realism of their mandates in relation to the resources and equipment allocated, their management, methods of recruiting their staff and of matching profiles to the skills required, transparency on calls for tender, activities and results obtained, lessons learned on good practices and difficulties encountered; stresses the particular need for all missions and operations to have sunset provisions to allow a sustainable termination if necessary; calls on the VP/HR and the Member States to continue to effectively design CSDP missions and operations, including robust, result-oriented, flexible and modular mandates, in order to adapt to the changing security context and needs of host countries, and to maintain a strong partnership with host governments, civil society and local populations, ensuring the creation of the necessary conditions for the missions and operations to achieve their goals over the long term; calls for the Member States to use the new Civilian CSDP Compact to strengthen their strategic vision of civilian crisis management by clarifying the role, effectiveness and added value of civilian CSDP, and by defining a shared level of ambition for civilian crisis management; also calls for the synergies and complementarities between the civilian and military dimensions of the CSDP to be built on; calls on the Commission and the EEAS to develop, together with the Member States, a structured and regular civilian Capability Development Process to assess the availabilities of Member States’ capability needs, develop requirements, conduct a gap analysis and periodically review progress; believes in the necessity of establishing a solid policy on the equipment and services needed by partner countries where civilian CSDP missions take place;
126. Notes that the CFSP budget for civilian CSDP missions has only marginally increased between the multiannual financial framework (MFF) 2014-2020 and the MFF 2021-2027, while at the same time the number of missions and their tasks and costs have increased; calls for a substantive increase in funding for the CFSP budget, while at the same time ensuring the efficient use of the funds allocated to CSDP civilian missions, in order to make sure that they respond effectively to crisis situations and unforeseen events; calls for the establishment of a dedicated budget line or ‘civilian support facility’, to provide partner countries with the necessary equipment and services to enhance their civilian capabilities;
127. Reiterates its call on the EEAS to take concrete action to support CSDP missions and operations defending against cyber and hybrid attacks and countering FIMI in countries where CSDP missions and operations are deployed, in particular in the Western Balkans and in the Eastern Partnership countries; calls on the Commission to take into account CSDP missions and operations when formulating its European Democracy Shield in order to pre-empt threats aiming to discredit the EU’s external actions and safeguard EU personnel deployed abroad; insists on the need to build on lessons learned across the different CSDP missions and operations, as well as cooperating with Member States’ missions and operations so as to better communicate and identify threats in order to pre-empt or respond to them in a timely manner when necessary; calls for an improved response capability, strategic communication and enhanced outreach in the areas of deployment – using the relevant local languages – in order to better inform the local population of the rationales, benefits and roles of the CSDP missions and operations in their respective regions, informing them as well of the consequences of relying on the support of other actors aiming at destabilising them, in particular Russia and China; also calls on the Commission and the EEAS to increase the visibility of CSDP missions and operations in the Eastern Partnership countries by including them in their political messaging, making documents publicly accessible and engaging with the international press; calls on the Commission and the EEAS to adjust the advisory mandates of CSDP missions and operations to include specialised training on combating hybrid warfare activities, cyber warfare and open source intelligence (OSINT) analysis; calls on the EEAS to increase its cooperation and coordination with other missions and operations by like-minded partners and organisations, including United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, in countering FIMI operations in the field;
128. Stresses that corruption in theatres of operations can adversely impact CSDP missions and operations by exposing them to reputational damage, wasting resources, and exacerbating poor governance and maladministration, as well as increasing local levels of bribery, fraud, extortion, and nepotism; calls for strategies to be implemented to prevent and combat corruption, developing anti-corruption expertise and knowledge and stepping up efforts to mitigate corruption risks in current and future CSDP missions and operations;
129. Calls on the Council and the EEAS to include a cultural heritage protection component in its CSDP missions and operations in order to provide assistance and education to local partners on addressing security challenges relating to the preservation and protection of cultural heritage; notes that the inclusion of cultural heritage protection and intercultural dialogue in mission mandates would be beneficial to the process of conflict resolution and reconciliation;
130. Highlights the need to extend the mandates of CSDP missions and operations deployed in neighbouring eastern European countries, where heightened security threats justify a reinforced EU presence; encourages all Member States to deploy personnel to those missions and operations; also encourages greater third country participation in these missions, particularly from third countries that have successfully hosted completed CSDP missions; calls on the Member States to examine how new CSDP missions and operations can be established in EU candidate countries, if necessary, and in close cooperation with their national authorities; calls on the EEAS to ensure that the CSDP missions’ support to security sector reforms includes training for ministerial officials; calls for the EEAS and the European Security and Defence College to help develop the expertise of civil and defence staff supporting and deployed in CSDP missions and operations; recognises the opportunity for third countries hosting CSDP missions and operations to help the EU achieve CSDP objectives and demonstrate their capacity to provide security to others via their participation in out-of-area CSDP missions and operations;
131. Welcomes the UN Security Council’s extension of the mandate of the European Union Force (EUFOR) Operation Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) beyond 2025, as an established and proven peacekeeping mission that has significantly contributed to the stability of both the country and the region; further welcomes the mission’s positive response to the request from the BiH Ministry of Security’s Civil Protection Agency, offering assistance to national authorities on addressing the impact of the recent flooding; takes the view that this extension reflects the shared commitment across the political spectrum in BiH to uphold peace and security in cooperation with the EU; welcomes the arrival of EUFOR Althea reserve forces in BiH in mid-March and reiterates its call on all actors in BiH to refrain from any political threats and other potentially harmful actions, respect the country’s constitution and work towards ensuring BiH’s EU integration path; welcomes the continued presence of the Kosovo Force (KFOR) and the EU Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) in Kosovo and commends the role it plays in strengthening security and stability; calls on all parties involved to adhere to the requirements of international law, restrain and prevent any disruptive actions from destabilising the northern region of Kosovo; urges them to engage in the structured dialogue mediated by the EU; condemns in the strongest possible terms the terrorist attack by Serbian paramilitaries against Kosovo’s police and the hideous terrorist attack on critical infrastructure near Zubin Potok in northern Kosovo; stresses that the perpetrators of these deplorable terrorist attacks must be held accountable and face justice without delay; calls for the strengthening of both EUFOR’s Operation Althea and KFOR with additional resources;
132. Commends the establishment and operations of the EU Partnership Mission in Moldova (EUPM Moldova), which has contributed to strengthening the country’s crisis management structures and to enhancing its resilience to cyber and hybrid threats, and countering FIMI; calls for the mission’s mandate to be extended beyond May 2025, the adequacy of its means, methods and resources in relation to the mission’s objectives to be assessed and its resources adapted in the light of the evaluation’s conclusions in order to enhance its effectiveness; recognises the important role that the European Union Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM) plays in helping to re-open rail freight through Transnistria and in thwarting multiple smuggling operations; encourages EUBAM to expand its collaboration with multiple international organisations including Europol, FRONTEX and the OSCE via its Arms Working Group, ORIO II Joint Operations and ‘EU 4 Border Security’ initiatives;
133. Welcomes the role of the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) to Georgia in monitoring the situation on the Abkhaz and South Ossetian Administrative Boundary Line; condemns the temporary detention of EUMM officers by security actors while conducting a routine patrol along the Administrative Boundary Line (ABL); expresses its profound concern about any actions that obstruct EUMM actions and seek to undermine efforts to build confidence; urges the Council and the EEAS to monitor the situation closely, promote the unimpeded access of the EUMM to Georgia’s territories occupied by Russia according to the mission’s mandate, support the extension of its mandate and strengthen its capacities in order to properly address the security and humanitarian needs of the local population in conflict-affected areas;
134. Welcomes and strongly supports the activities of the civilian European Union Mission in Armenia (EUMA) under the CSDP, which is helping to increase security in the region by substantially decreasing the number of incidents in conflict-affected and border areas, building confidence and reducing the level of risks for the population living in these areas; welcomes Armenia’s assistance to the activities of the EUMA on its territory; commends the Council for the decision to boost the mission’s capacity and increase the number of observers deployed as well as to extend its deployment timeframe, and calls for further expansion and a stronger presence in the region in order to create an environment conducive to EU-supported normalisation efforts between Armenia and Azerbaijan; urges Azerbaijan to allow EU observers on its side of the border as well; condemns Azerbaijani threats and Russia’s negative narrative against the EUMA;
135. Considers that the two EU civilian CSDP missions – European Union Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS) and the European Union Border Assistance Mission for the Rafah Crossing Point (EUBAM Rafah) can play an essential role in supporting Palestinian state-building efforts; supports a stronger role for the EUPOL COPPS and EUBAM Rafah, in line with the European Council conclusions of 21 and 22 March 2024 and based on the principle of the two-state solution and the viability of a future Palestinian state, so that they can participate in the facilitation of the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the Gaza Strip, improve the efficiency of the Palestinian authority in the West Bank, and prepare for the authority’s return to the Gaza Strip; stresses in particular the need to create the necessary conditions for the full reactivation of EUBAM Rafah to allow it act as a neutral third party at the Rafah crossing point, in coordination with the Palestinian Authority as well as the Israeli and Egyptian authorities; expects the reinforcement of the scope and mandates of EUPOL COPPS and EUBAM Rafah on the ground to be included as key priorities of the forthcoming EU-Middle East Strategy; welcomes the Council decision to extend the mandates of the two missions until 30 June 2025;
136. Takes note that the mandates of the EUTM Mali, EUMPM in Niger and of the ground mission of personnel from EUCAP Sahel Niger ended in 2024, while the EU Capacity Mission Sahel Mali (EUCAP Sahel Mali) and the EU Regional Advisory and Coordination Cell (EU RACC) for the Sahel are still ongoing; acknowledges that the various international missions have not been able to achieve their goal of stabilising the region and its fragile democracies or ensuring peace in the region; is concerned by the failure of the EU’s Sahel strategy in terms of security and defence; expresses deep concern about the worsening security situation, the continuous failure of states and the resurgence of terrorism in the Sahel; takes note of the creation of a new type of hybrid civilian-military EU Security and Defence Initiative in the Gulf of Guinea (EUSDI Gulf of Guinea), established in August 2023, aiming to empower the security and defence forces of Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Togo and Benin to improve the stability and resilience of their northern border areas; calls on the EEAS and the Member States to closely examine the mandate of all CSDP missions in Africa, with the aim of providing achievable goals and milestones for each mission given the current political context, as well as exploring whether these missions could be amended to more effectively serve a new revised multi-dimensional EU strategy for Africa and the Sahel, as part of its integrated approach; calls in this regard, for a review, as a matter of priority, of the mandate and resources of the EUCAP Sahel Mali and EU RACC for the Sahel, proposing changes to them and consider their termination if necessary;
137. Welcomes the creation in February 2024 of EUNAVFOR ASPIDES as an EU military operation in response to the Houthi attacks on international shipping in the Red Sea, in order to contribute to the protection of freedom of navigation and the safeguarding of maritime security, especially for merchant and commercial vessels in the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf; calls on the Member States to increase the capabilities of the EUNAVFOR ASPIDES operation and to consider merging it with the EU ATALANTA military operation, as originally envisaged, to improve the efficiency of both operations;
Improving the EU’s ability to address security challenges
Intelligence capacity
138. Stresses the importance of enhanced intelligence sharing and information exchange among Member States and EU institutions, including Parliament, to combat foreign interference, improve situational awareness and be able to better anticipate and counter threats to collective security and define common lines of action under the CSDP, particularly in the area of crisis management;
139. Underlines the need for the EU to make full use of the necessary first-hand information on global issues occurring outside its borders in the light of increasing geopolitical challenges and crises worldwide; commends the efforts of the EU Intelligence and Situation Centre (EU INTCEN) and the EU Military Staff Intelligence Directorate, cooperating in the framework of the Single Intelligence Analysis Capacity (SIAC), as well as the European Union Satellite Centre (SatCen), to produce all-source intelligence assessments; calls on the EU Member States to reinforce the EU INTCEN, the SIAC, the EEAS Crisis Response Centre and the EU SatCen by enhancing its staff and financial resources, as well as capabilities and information security; urges these centres, provided they have adequate information security provisions, to draw lessons from NATO’s role in facilitating public-private sharing of cyber threat intelligence, and apply this to their field, thereby offering added value to the Member States;
140. Calls on the Member States to utilise the EU INTCEN as an effective intelligence-sharing body in order to share intelligence in a secure fashion, formulate a common strategic and security culture and provide strategic information; stresses that on the basis of the intelligence gathered, the EU INTCEN should be further involved in the threat assessments carried out by the EU institutions, as well as attribution of digital operations and sanctions evasions; reiterates its call to promote the establishment of a system for the regular and continuous flow of intelligence from Member States to the EEAS and between EU Member States on foreign and security issues occurring outside the Union; underlines the importance of secure communications and a high level of information security for reliable intelligence and calls for efforts to enhance and streamline security rules and regulations to be pursued in this respect to better protect sensitive information, infrastructure and communication systems from foreign interference and attacks;
141. Calls for regular joint threat assessments with input from Member States’ intelligence services in order to inform CSDP decision-making bodies and reiterates its call for the deployment of intelligence-gathering capacities in all CSDP missions and operations, which would provide information to the EU INTCEN, EU Military Staff (EUMS), the MPCC and the CPCC;
Defence against hybrid attacks and disinformation
142. Expresses serious concern about the growing security challenges posed by cyber and hybrid attacks, as well as FIMI, all of which are aimed, inter alia, at undermining the stability of the EU’s democratic societies, in particular in EU territories far from their mainland, the alliances of EU Member States, and fostering polarisation, especially in the run-up to elections; stresses that Member States, particularly those on the EU’s eastern external border, are vulnerable to such hostile influence from Russia and Belarus; welcomes the established institutional cooperation at administrative level between the Commission, the EEAS and Parliament during the past European election campaign to prevent a massive use of FIMI by malicious third state and non-state actors; calls on the Commission, the EEAS and Parliament’s administration to strengthen their capabilities to increase resilience against hybrid attacks and FIMI; points in this regard to the recent decision by the Romanian constitutional court to annul the first round of the presidential elections following reports of massive hybrid attacks by Russia, especially via social media platforms; further calls on the administrations of the EEAS and Parliament to closely cooperate with the private sector, civil society as well as the academic and scientific community in countering malign influence campaigns and hybrid threats, including the weaponisation of new technologies;
143. Supports the pledged establishment of a ‘European Democracy Shield’ and reiterates its call on the Member States, the Commission and the EEAS to consider the creation of a well-resourced and independent structure tasked with identifying, analysing and documenting FIMI threats against the EU as a whole, to detect, track and request the removal of deceptive online content, to increase situational awareness and threat intelligence sharing, and develop attribution capabilities and countermeasures in relation to FIMI; considers that this structure would serve as a reference point and specialised knowledge hub to facilitate and foster operational exchange between Member States’ authorities and the EU institutions; stresses that the structure should clarify and enhance the role of the EEAS Strategic Communications division and its task forces as the strategic body of the EU’s diplomatic service and prevent the overlap of activities; highlights its own decision to establish a special committee on the EU Democracy Shield in the European Parliament and deems it an important way to consolidate European efforts in this field;
144. Highlights the importance of intensifying efforts to combat disinformation promoted by foreign actors aiming to undermine the credibility of the EU, particularly in EU candidate or neighbouring countries and regions where CSDP missions and operations are under way; underlines that the coordination between the EEAS and relevant EU agencies, including the EU Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) and relevant authorities at Member State level, must be significantly increased in order to develop coherent and efficient strategies against FIMI; underlines in this regard the need for strategic and preventive communication, and invites all EU institutions to work hand in hand with the EEAS, to strengthen the visibility, the positive perception and legitimacy of the EU’s external actions;
145. Considers that hybrid threats in the years ahead will see the combination of information warfare, agile force manoeuvre, mass cyberwarfare, and emerging and disruptive technologies from the seabed to space with the deployment of advanced air and space surveillance and strike systems, all of which will possibly be enabled by AI, quantum computing, ever smarter drone swarm technologies, offensive cyber capabilities, hypersonic missile systems, nanotechnologies and biological warfare; recognises in particular the increasing role of AI in hybrid warfare and its potential use in undermining democratic institutions, spreading disinformation, disrupting critical infrastructure, as well as influencing public opinion through automated and data-driven operations;
146. Calls for strategic, proactive and coordinated EU-level measures to counter hybrid threats and to strengthen the security and integrity of critical infrastructure in the EU, de-risking and promoting the EU’s technological edge in critical sectors, including measures to restrict or exclude high-risk suppliers; stresses in this regard the importance of the PESCO project that aims to support the Cyber and Information Domain Coordination Centre (CIDCC) to facilitate the planning and conduct of EU missions and operations with cyber- and information-domain capabilities as well as enhancing the general resilience of the EU in this area; calls, therefore, for its permanent integration in CSDP;
147. Condemns the continued malicious actions by Russia and Belarus aimed at destabilising the EU by pushing migrants to forcibly enter EU countries, constituting a hybrid attack; calls on the EU to review and update its policies concerning the strengthening of its external borders, including through the funding of physical barriers , in order to bolster the security of the Union as a whole;
Cybersecurity
148. Welcomes the Cyber Solidarity Act(29) and its importance to Member States’ cyber defence capabilities; supports the promotion of platforms for information sharing and analysis and calls for this to be expanded to include the provision of threat or vulnerability intelligence with cross-border security operations centres (SOCs); calls for a clearer funding plan that specifies the amount of funds that will be used to implement the act;
149. Is concerned by the delay by many Member States in implementing the Directive on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union (NIS 2 Directive)(30) and calls for swift implementation to secure European critical infrastructure; calls on the VP/HR to better synchronise the cyber, hybrid and FIMI sanction toolboxes and use them more actively while also exploring how sectoral sanctions may be implemented;
Space
150. Welcomes the findings and recommendations in Mr Draghi’s report on the future of European competitiveness, which encourages Member States to update governance and investment rules in the space domain, in particular for defence-related areas; calls on the Commission and the Member States to invest appropriately in this domain in the context of the next MFF and also by considering any other financing instrument; highlights in particular the need to further develop the European Space Programme considering the strong connections between the space and the defence and security sectors when planning the new MFF; underlines the importance of improving cooperation between the Commission and the European Space Agency to avoid duplication of efforts and ensure more efficient use of resources; calls for fostering transatlantic cooperation and synergies with NATO to ensure effective coordination in the development of space and defence capabilities;
151. Stresses that the current pillars of the EU’s space programme – the Galileo global satellite navigation programme and the Copernicus Earth observation programme – have clear dual-use potential in developing space applications and services; stresses the importance of establishing, as a third pillar of the EU’s space programme, the IRIS2 satellite constellation to provide secure communication services to the EU and its Member States as well as broadband connectivity for European citizens, private companies and governmental authorities; recommends that Taiwan and Ukraine be granted access to the IRIS2 Satellite Constellation; highlights that, beyond satellite communications, sectors such as positioning, navigation, timing, as well as earth observation, are essential in strengthening the EU’s strategic autonomy and resilience; stresses that the development of these capabilities directly contributes to an effective crisis response and the protection of critical infrastructure; calls therefore for new EU space programmes to be considered, enabling the EU to strengthen its strategic autonomy and its status as a global space power;
152. Recognises the inadequacy of launch vehicle capabilities and satellite communications within the EU; underlines the strategic importance of advancing and enhancing these capabilities to enable the EU to effectively support Member States and CSDP missions and operations, while maintaining a resilient and autonomous posture; stresses that the development of EU-led solutions in this domain is essential for the protection of critical infrastructure and to ensure a secure and competitive presence in the space sector;
153. Calls on the Member States to address the growing threat of the weaponisation of space, in particular reports of Russia’s progress on space-based nuclear weapons technology, which would constitute a blatant violation of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty;
Maritime domain
154. Stresses that, given the growing geopolitical maritime tensions, the EU must step up its activities at sea, by leading in maritime domain awareness, protecting critical infrastructure, ensuring that its external maritime borders are monitored effectively in order to fight against the criminal organisations profiting from smuggling illegal immigrants inside EU Member States, in particular in the Mediterranean sea and the Atlantic Ocean, and contributing to ensuring freedom of navigation, the safety of maritime lines of communication and of vessels and crews, and to countering illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing;
155. Underlines the commitment to strengthen the EU’s role as a guarantor of international maritime security; stresses in this regard the importance of the Coordinated Maritime Presence (CMP) concept, enhancing the role of the EU as a global maritime security provider and its visibility in key maritime regions, highlights the activities of CMPs in the Gulf of Guinea and in the northwestern Indian Ocean; calls on the Member States to engage actively with those initiatives and to build up their military naval capabilities with a view to enhancing the EU’s presence and visibility in the global maritime sector; recommends that CMPs be expanded to other key maritime areas across the globe;
156. Expresses its serious concerns about Russia’s and China’s surveillance and sabotage of critical maritime infrastructure, such as seabed communication cables and offshore energy facilities; expresses in particular its strong concern about the damage to two subsea communications cables, one linking Finland to Germany and the other connecting Sweden to Lithuania, within less than 24 hours on 17 and 18 November 2024, and about the damage by a tanker belonging to the Russian shadow fleet of EstLink2, linking Estonia and Finland, on 25 December 2024; calls on the EU to put in place effective monitoring and surveillance systems and regional coastguard cooperation to ensure the prevention and rapid detection of attacks against such infrastructure; welcomes, in that regard, the launch of the operation ‘Baltic Sentry’ by NATO, with participation of several Member States, to improve the security of critical undersea infrastructure in the Baltic Sea; calls on Member States to fully abide by the commitments of the New York declaration on the Security and Resilience of Undersea Cables, including the procuring of submarine cable equipment only from companies in allied countries; calls on the Commission to allocate adequate resources to the research and development of cutting-edge underwater assets and defence equipment to protect islands against possible landings and attacks by forces from third countries;
157. Calls for the EU and the Member States’ authorities to take urgent and decisive measures against the Russian shadow fleet in the Baltic and Black Seas, and therefore welcomes the news that, on 21 March 2025, Germany took over ownership of the ship Eventin, which had been used to circumvent EU sanctions on Russian oil exports;
Arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament
158. Deplores the weakening of non-proliferation and arms control regimes during these unstable geopolitical times and calls for the redoubling of efforts to reverse this trend; emphasises in this regard the critical and substantial need for an increase in investment in regional and global arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament, with a particular focus on multilateral strategies; stresses that those strategies should address issues relating to unexploded ordnance and chemical weapons dumped in the previous century, which pose a threat to security, the environment, health and the economy, in particular in the Baltic, Adriatic and North seas;
159. Reaffirms its unwavering support for the EU and its Member States’ commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), recognising it as the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament framework; recalls that Russia withdrew its ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in October 2023;
160. Notes that, as a result of the unprecedented threat of a Russian aggression against EU territory, Member States, especially those in geographical proximity to Russia and its ally Belarus, are faced with difficult decisions regarding their armament policy, including the revision of previous policies and participation in international treaties; reiterates its condemnation of the Russian threats that have led some Member States to consider withdrawing from the Ottawa Treaty and notes that, while this does not entail a general shift in EU policy, this reconsideration underlines the seriousness of the Russian threat and the need to adequately protect our citizens;
161. Recalls that international negotiations related to non-proliferation and arms control regimes and their outcomes have an impact on Europe, in particular on EU Member States; highlights the importance of giving renewed impetus to reviving those regimes; also stresses the importance of ensuring that the EU takes an active and constructive role in advancing and strengthening the international rules-based efforts towards non-proliferation, arms control, and disarmament architecture, in particular in the field of weapons of mass destruction and dual-use digital surveillance and manipulation tools;
162. Calls on the Member States to fully comply with Common Position 2008/944/CFSP defining common rules governing the control of exports of military technology and equipment as amended by Council Decision (CFSP)2019/1560, and to strictly implement criterion 4 on regional stability;
163. Stresses the need to prevent sensitive emerging technologies and key dual-use items, especially those that are critical for EU security, from being transferred to destinations of concern outside the EU; calls for the establishment and implementation of EU-wide electronic customs and export licensing systems, as a critical step towards making export controls by Member States of those technologies and items more effective;
Defence and society and civilian and military preparedness and readiness
164. Highlights the need for a broader understanding of security threats and risks among EU citizens to develop a shared understanding and alignment of threat perceptions across Europe and to create a comprehensive notion of European defence; stresses that securing support by democratic institutions and consequently by citizens is essential to develop a successful and coherent long-term EU defence, which requires an informed public debate; calls for the EU and its Member States to develop awareness-raising and educational programmes, especially for the young, aimed at improving knowledge and facilitating debates on security, defence and the importance of the armed forces and at strengthening the resilience and preparedness of societies to face security challenges, while allowing for greater public and democratic control and scrutiny of the defence sector; calls on the Commission and the Member States to develop those programmes within the framework of the European Democracy Shield, building on the model of national programmes, such as the Swedish Civil Contingency Initiative;
165. Welcomes the efforts to strengthen Europe’s civil and military preparedness and readiness, as also proposed in Mr Niinistö’s report; acknowledges the critical importance of citizens in crisis preparedness and response, in particular the psychological resilience of individuals and household preparedness; also recognises the importance of civil protection infrastructures and planning for emergency situations; supports a whole-of-society approach to resilience, involving the active engagement of EU institutions, Member States, civil society, and individual citizens in strengthening the EU security framework; stresses that CSDP decision-making bodies responsible for planning, resources and logistics have the potential to become the primary enablers of civilian crisis management during emergency situations; calls on the Member States and the Commission to closely examine the report’s recommendations and develop an EU risk assessment and preparedness strategy, joint exercises, a stronger EU-NATO cooperation interface in view of crisis situations; calls for the development of adequate civil protection infrastructure and thorough emergency planning and for the necessary investments for these purposes to be ensured, including through a dedicated EIB investment guarantee programme for crisis-proof civil defence infrastructure;
166. Recalls that terrorism, including jihadi terrorism, poses a persistent threat to the security of the EU and of its partners; calls on the EU to continue efforts to prevent this threat with determination and full solidarity, in particular through greater coordination to improve knowledge, develop preparedness and response capabilities, and to ensure closer interaction with partners and other international actors;
167. Points out that the EU’s defence policies should reflect the principles of gender equality and diversity, promoting inclusive military environments that reflect the values and diversity of European society while ensuring that all members of the European armed forces, regardless of gender or background, have equal opportunities and access to support; reiterates the important role of young people and youth organisations in maintaining and promoting peace and security and calls on the EEAS to commit to integrating young people into its youth, peace and security (YPS) agenda more systematically; also calls for developing train-the-trainers programmes and cooperation between defence institutions and universities of EU Member States, such as military courses, exercises and role playing training activities for civilian students;
168. Stresses that the EU and its Member States must address critical recruitment and retention challenges in the military by developing coordinated national and EU-level actions in order to ensure a sustainable military workforce; recommends, that the EU should support the Member States in developing policies that enhance career attractiveness and long-term retention strategies; stresses the need for the EU Military Committee (EUMC) to provide follow-up on its task of gathering and analysing data across the EU Member States on the issues of recruitment and retention, in order to identify possible measures addressing these issues; highlights that supporting the mental health and well-being of military personnel, with a focus on professional development and long-term care for veterans, must be adequately taken into consideration in the further development of the Defence Union;
169. Recalls the importance of organising joint training and exercises between European armed forces, thereby promoting interoperability, with a view to maximising mission preparedness and addressing a broad range of threats, both conventional and non-conventional; calls for the development and creation of exchange programmes at EU level for military personnel from the Member States, aimed at providing training opportunities and experience in different European military environments and structures and thereby fostering mutual understanding, cohesion, and interoperability, between the EU’s armed forces; reiterates in this respect its support for the European Initiative for the Exchange of Military Young Officers (Military Erasmus – EMILYO), operated by the European Security and Defence College;
Strengthening defence cooperation and partnerships
170. Underlines the importance of the partnership dimension of the Strategic Compass in reinforcing cooperation between the EU and its allies and partners around the world on the basis of common values and respect for human rights and democracy, in order to strengthen the perception of the deterrence principle and to counter foreign strategies aimed at undermining the EU and its partners, and destabilising the rules-based international order; calls on the EU to further engage in security cooperation with partners in all the priority areas identified in the Strategic Compass, notably in strengthening resilience of local security sectors in the area of crisis management, countering hybrid threats as well as upgrading capacities of cybersecurity institutions; also calls for closer cooperation between relevant organisations from partners with the EU Satellite Centre, the European Defence Agency (EDA) and the EU Agency for Cyber Security (ENISA); believes that the participation of partners and NATO Allies in PESCO projects, subject to the agreement by the EU Member States, contributes to improving compatibility between their standards in the defence sector as well as to sharing experience, intelligence and technical expertise in various fields;
171. Reaffirms that the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) must always strictly observe international law and the multilateral decisions taken deriving from international institutions; welcomes the adoption of the EU’s human rights and international humanitarian law due diligence policy on security sector support to third parties (EU HRDDP), serving as a basis for security and military cooperation with third countries in a way that is more compliant with human rights and international humanitarian law (IHL); calls for its thorough implementation; reiterates the call for closer cooperation with international organisations, such as, but not limited to, the UN, the African Union, and their peacekeeping missions in joint theatres, and the OSCE on security;
172. Welcomes the Joint Declaration of the G7 Defence Ministers of 19 October 2024 and their declaration of intent to increase cooperation in the defence sector; stresses the strong interest for the EU of developing international partnerships with like-minded partners in this area and the need to strengthen EU efforts to ensure that countries which were once strategic partners, and with which some Member States maintain strong cultural ties, are not drawn into the sphere of influence of systemic rivals; recalls that economic diplomacy plays a crucial role in this endeavour, serving as an essential tool to reinforce cooperative ties, promote mutual prosperity, and consolidate the EU’s presence and influence, contributing to the resilience of partners against external pressures;
173. Believes that every effort must be made to maintain and, if possible, foster transatlantic cooperation in every area of the military and defence sector, while recalling the need to foster European defence and develop greater sovereignty;
EU-NATO cooperation
174. Stresses the importance of the EU’s strategic partnership with NATO, in full respect of the agreed guiding principles of transparency, reciprocity and inclusiveness, as well as respect for the decision-making autonomy and procedures of each organisation; highlights that NATO and the EU play complementary, coherent and mutually reinforcing roles in supporting international peace and security and thus avoiding the duplication of defence efforts, while maintaining strong close cooperation; welcomes the accession of Sweden to NATO in 2024, and that of Finland in 2023, representing a historic step forward in strengthening security in Europe, notably in the Baltic sea region; calls on the VP/HR to operate in close coordination and unity with the NATO Secretary General;
175. Calls for further deepening of EU-NATO cooperation by building on the EU’s Strategic Compass and NATO’s new Strategic Concept, including in the fields of cybersecurity, hybrid warfare, counter terrorism, military mobility, dual-use infrastructure, conflict prevention and crisis management, military-security cooperation, countering malicious foreign interference from third countries, a coordinated approach in the Indo-Pacific, as well as increasing common action on the international stage to protect democracy; strongly supports NATO’s Open Door Policy; invites the EU and NATO to reinforce their cooperation on supporting the capacity-building of common partners;
176. Stresses the constant need for alignment among states that are both EU and NATO members and the obligation under Articles 1 and 3 of the NATO charter for cooperation, self-help and mutual aid; calls on the EU to step up its efforts on common security and defence initiatives wherever there is no NATO equivalent, to increase standardisation, improve interoperability and develop common operating procedures between Member States’ and the EU’s defence capabilities;
177. Commends the close EU-NATO cooperation in the Western Balkans, including through EUFOR Operation Althea and the KFOR military operations, which guarantee the necessary stability for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and the wider region;
178. Emphasises the vital role of the Black Sea region in the European security landscape and calls for the EU to collaborate with NATO on formulating a comprehensive strategy for this region, which should address security challenges, counter hybrid threats, enhance maritime cooperation and bolster regional partnerships;
179. Welcomes the appointment of NATO’s Special Representative for the Southern Neighbourhood and NATO’s focus on this region; considers it appropriate to strengthen coordination and consultation between EU officials in charge of policy for the Southern Neighbourhood and the Sahel and their NATO counterparts, in order to avoid duplication and fragmentation of efforts and resources;
180. Welcomes the proposal from the NATO Parliamentary Assembly (NATO PA) to enhance Parliament’s status to ‘partner’ under the ongoing reform of partnerships; invites its Delegation for relations with the NATO PA (DNAT) to make full use of Parliament’s current and future privileges; considers DNAT an important instrument of Parliament’s diplomacy in an enhanced EU-NATO partnership aimed at strengthening the European pillar of NATO and contributing to reaching the Alliance’s overall objectives; is of the view that DNAT can play a pivotal role in reinforcing EU-NATO cooperation, strengthening the democratic resilience of accession countries and key partners, as well as, overall, enhancing the parliamentary dimension of this essential partnership;
Partnership with North America
181. Considers it essential to further develop the EU’s close relationship with the United States, which is based on mutual respect, the shared values of democracy, freedom and the rule of law, as well as a broad range of common or converging interests; values the United States’ commitment to and involvement in the territorial defence of Europe, in accordance with the North Atlantic Treaty and its Article 5, especially in the light of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; encourages mutual security and defence initiatives, and cooperation in the fields of disarmament and non-proliferation, the impact of disruptive technologies, climate change, hybrid threats, cyber defence, military mobility, crisis management and the relationship with strategic competitors; calls for further strengthening of the EU-US security and defence dialogue as an important instrument in closer transatlantic cooperation;
182. Notes that the recent actions and statements by the US administration have further increased concerns about the future stance of the United States vis-à-vis Russia, NATO and the security of Europe; regrets, in this regard, the votes of the US Government, aligned with the Russian Government, in the UN General Assembly and the UN Security Council on resolutions about the third anniversary of Russia’s war of aggression; calls for the Commission to make efforts to re-strengthen the EU-US security and defence dialogue as an important instrument in closer transatlantic cooperation;
183. Notes the importance of greater collaboration in defence production and procurement, including through equal market access for both defence industries; takes note of the US National Defence Industry Strategy of January 2024 and its ambition to deepen industrial cooperation with partners; acknowledges the vast range of possible mutually beneficial areas of cooperation in defence and its positive implications for a stronger transatlantic partnership in times of increasing geopolitical competition; stresses, however, that such cooperation requires a level playing field, which is incompatible with the provisions of the US International Trade in Arms Regulation; calls, accordingly, upon the Commission to launch a dialogue with the United States to explore the possibilities of developing mutually beneficial defence industrial cooperation based on a legal framework that ensures a level transatlantic playing field;
184. Underlines that cooperation with Canada is fundamental for EU security and welcomes the active role that Canada has played in providing support to Ukraine; believes that the bilateral security and defence dialogue and the upcoming security and defence partnership provide the basis for enhanced security and defence cooperation, including on respective initiatives to boost defence industry production;
Partnership with the United Kingdom
185. Recognises the UK’s significant contributions to Europe’s security and stability, as well as its commitment to shared defence objectives, which enhance collective security across Europe; welcomes the strong cooperation between the EU, EU Member States and the United Kingdom when it comes to supporting Ukraine, as well as bilateral agreements such as the Trinity House agreement between the UK and Germany to deepen defence cooperation; welcomes the participation of the UK Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs at the EU Foreign Affairs Council meeting in October 2024; calls for the EU and the UK to swiftly upgrade defence cooperation and become closer security partners by signing a joint declaration with concrete engagements and structured dialogue to strengthen EU-UK cooperation on the full range of foreign and security challenges the EU and UK face on the European continent; underlines in this regard the importance of closer cooperation on information and intelligence sharing, counter terrorism, military mobility, security and defence initiatives, crisis management, cyber defence, hybrid threats and FIMI, and on jointly addressing shared threats, such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction;
186. Considers it essential to make progress on practical cooperation by formalising a joint declaration on a security and defence partnership with the United Kingdom as a means of strengthening European security and the European pillar of NATO, in particular in the context of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; encourages the VP/HR to regularly invite the United Kingdom to informal Council meetings of foreign affairs (and defence) ministers to exchange views on issues of common concern while fully safeguarding the EU’s decision-making autonomy;
Partnership with Western Balkan and Eastern European partners
187. Believes that the EU’s security is closely interlinked with the security of its immediate European neighbours and that the EU has an interest in giving priority to its enlargement policy and strengthening the stability of its South-Eastern and Eastern European neighbours, in particular candidate countries; calls for stronger military-security cooperation, including civilian and military as well as policy and military security, cooperation with candidate countries and partners, particularly in areas such as resilience, cybersecurity, hybrid threats, border management, counter-terrorism and countering disinformation; reiterates the need for close cooperation with NATO in this regard; welcomes the signing of Security and Defence Partnerships on 19 November and 18 December 2024 between the EU and North Macedonia and Albania, respectively;
188. Highlights that the Union should facilitate the participation of European partners with a high level of alignment with CSDP matters, most notably the Western Balkans countries, in current and future programmes linked to the defence sector; reaffirms that thorough involvement of the candidate countries would substantially facilitate their accession process by increasing their industrial and operational capacities in the defence sector, thus increasing interoperability with EU Member States’ armed forces; is of the opinion that the comprehensive inclusion of the Western Balkans candidate countries in EU defence initiatives would represent a strategic investment, as well as an integral part of the EU’s efforts to counter the growing assertiveness and foreign interference orchestrated in those countries;
189. Encourages the Member States to further utilise the European Peace Facility (EPF) for training and outfitting security services in South-Eastern and Eastern European partners hosting CSDP missions, particularly military police, medical and law enforcement infrastructure and to increase intelligence exchange capabilities via secure lines of communication;
Partnership with the African Union and African countries
190. Stresses the importance of the EU-Africa relationship for European security; considers it essential to significantly step up the EU’s partnerships with African countries;
Partnership with the Indo-Pacific region
191. Stresses the strategic significance of the Indo-Pacific region within the EU’s defence framework, recognising the necessity of addressing growing security concerns linked to China’s regional activities and their broader implications for global stability; considers it essential to strengthen the EU’s presence and partnerships in this region; is also aware of Taiwan’s leading role in high-tech development, and its extensive experience defending itself against China’s hybrid attacks, disinformation, and FIMI, which should be a foremost consideration when assessing the possibilities of strengthening multilateral exchanges and cooperation;
192. Underscores the imperative for the EU of establishing more enduring collective security through a network of regional allies and partners, forming the conventional foundation of its engagement in the region; strongly welcomes the recent signing of the Security and Defence Partnerships on 1 and 4 November 2024 between the EU and Japan and South Korea, respectively; believes that a further deepening of the strategic and defence partnerships of the EU with Japan and South Korea, and the development of regular dialogue, cooperation, and capacity building with other like-minded countries in the Indo-Pacific region, such as Australia, New Zealand and Taiwan, are fundamental to advancing common security; reiterates its call on the EU for further engagement with emerging strategic partners in the region, such as Indonesia and Viet Nam;
193. Underlines the importance of the EU-India partnership and believes that the momentous visit of the President of the Commission and the College of Commissioners to India on 27 and 28 February 2025 marked the beginning of a new chapter in the history of EU-India relations and reaffirmed the strategic link and its untapped potential; underlines the potential of deepening our partnership, including through enhanced security and defence consultations;
Greater involvement of the European Parliament in the CSDP
194. Stresses that the strengthening of the CSDP as a political priority in the tenth legislative term and the increase in spending on defence policies and programmes at EU level and by the Member States requires full parliamentary scrutiny and accountability;
195. Calls, in this regard, for Parliament’s scrutiny, legislative and budgetary role over a growing range of defence initiatives across the EU institutions and in particular the work carried out under the CSDP to be reinforced, including by strengthening regular dialogue, the exchange of information and maintaining permanent channels of communication open between the VP/HR, the Commissioner for Defence and Space and the competent Parliament bodies; recommends the inclusion of regular intelligence updates to relevant parliamentary committees;
196. Deplores that the lack of access to information means Parliament is not in a situation to properly scrutinise PESCO projects; reiterates its call to the Member States to submit an implementation report on PESCO projects to Parliament at least twice a year; further reiterates its call on the EEAS to regularly and comprehensively report on the implementation of the Strategic Compass, other security and defence initiatives and programmes and their assessment to Parliament’s Committee on Security and Defence; stresses the need to improve the scrutiny of the implementation of defence industrial regulations by the introduction of the procedure for delegated acts;
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197. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the European Council, the Council, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the President of the Commission and competent Commissioners, the UN Secretary-General, the NATO Secretary General, the President of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, the EU security and defence agencies and the governments and parliaments of the Member States and partner countries.
| (1) |
OJ L 331, 14.12.2017, p. 57, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2017/2315/oj. |
| (2) |
OJ L 270, 18.10.2022, p. 85, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2022/1968/oj. |
| (3) |
OJ L 270, 18.10.2022, p. 93, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2022/1970/oj. |
| (4) |
OJ L 325, 20.12.2022, p. 110, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2022/2507/oj. |
| (5) |
OJ L 22, 24.1.2023, p. 29, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2023/162/oj. |
| (6) |
OJ L, 2024/890, 19.3.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2024/890/oj. |
| (7) |
OJ L 79 I, 21.3.2019, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2019/452/oj. |
| (8) |
OJ L 170, 12.5.2021, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/697/oj. |
| (9) |
OJ L 185, 24.7.2023, p. 7, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/1525/oj. |
| (10) |
OJ L, 2023/2418, 26.10.2023, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/2418/oj. |
| (11) |
OJ L, 2024/1252, 3.5.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1252/oj. |
| (12) |
OJ L, 2023/2113, 11.10.2023, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reco/2023/2113/oj. |
| (13) |
OJ C 493, 27.12.2022, p. 136. |
| (14) |
OJ C 167, 11.5.2023, p. 105. |
| (15) |
OJ C 167, 11.5.2023, p. 18. |
| (16) |
OJ C, C/2023/1226, 21.12.2023, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2023/1226/oj. |
| (17) |
Texts adopted, P9_TA(2024)0105. |
| (18) |
OJ C, C/2024/6745, 26.11.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6745/oj. |
| (19) |
OJ C, C/2024/6129, 22.10.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6129/oj. |
| (20) |
OJ C, C/2024/7214, 10.12.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/7214/oj. |
| (21) |
OJ C, C/2024/5719, 17.10.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/5719/oj. |
| (22) |
OJ C, C/2025/488, 29.1.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/488/oj. |
| (23) |
OJ C, C/2025/487, 29.1.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/487/oj. |
| (24) |
Study, ‘Mapping threats to peace and democracy worldwide – Normandy Index 2024’, European Parliament, European Parliamentary Research Service, September 2024. |
| (25) |
JOIN(2025)0120. |
| (26) |
Directive 2009/81/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on the coordination of procedures for the award of certain works contracts, supply contracts and service contracts by contracting authorities or entities in the fields of defence and security, and amending Directives 2004/17/EC and 2004/18/EC (OJ L 216, 20.8.2009, p. 76, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2009/81/oj). |
| (27) |
Directive 2009/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 May 2009 simplifying terms and conditions of transfers of defence-related products within the Community (OJ L 146, 10.6.2009, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2009/43/oj). |
| (28) |
European Court of Auditors Special Report 04/2025 entitled ‘EU military mobility – Full speed not reached due to design weaknesses and obstacles en route’. |
| (29) |
Regulation (EU) 2025/38 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 December 2024 laying down measures to strengthen solidarity and capacities in the Union to detect, prepare for and respond to cyber threats and incidents and amending Regulation (EU) 2021/694 (Cyber Solidarity Act) (OJ L, 2025/38, 15.1.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/38/oj). |
| (30) |
Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union, amending Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 and Directive (EU) 2018/1972, and repealing Directive (EU) 2016/1148 (NIS 2 Directive) (OJ L 333, 27.12.2022, p. 80, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2022/2555/oj). |
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