NewzIntel.com

Category: Energy

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Iranian FM condemns Israeli strikes at UNHRC meeting

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    GENEVA, June 20 (Xinhua) — Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi condemned Israel’s strikes on his country in Geneva on Friday.

    Speaking at the 59th session of the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC), A. Araghchi said that the Jewish state had launched “unprovoked aggression” against Iran.

    A. Araghchi arrived in Geneva for a meeting with the Foreign Ministers of Great Britain, France and Germany, which was also attended by the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.

    In his speech at the UN Human Rights Council meeting, A. Araghchi noted that Israel is committing “a terrible genocide in Palestine,” and is now carrying out aggression against Iran.

    The Jewish state is committing war crimes and crimes against humanity, the head of the Iranian Foreign Ministry said.

    He recalled that Iran’s nuclear facilities were also attacked, despite the fact that they are under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

    Such strikes not only violate international law, but could also trigger serious radioactive leaks with catastrophic consequences for the environment and public health, he added.

    A. Araghchi also recalled that on June 15, Iran was supposed to hold a meeting with the United States dedicated to a peaceful solution to the Iranian nuclear problem. The Israeli shelling, according to him, is a betrayal of diplomacy and a blow to the UN system. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News –

  • MIL-OSI NGOs: IAEA Director General Grossi’s Statement to UNSC on Situation in Iran

    Source: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) –

    (As prepared for delivery)

    Attacks on nuclear sites in the Islamic Republic of Iran have caused a sharp degradation in nuclear safety and security in Iran. Though they have not so far led to a radiological release affecting the public, there is a danger this could occur.

    The International Atomic Energy Agency has been monitoring closely the situation at Iran’s nuclear sites since Israel began its attacks a week ago. As part of its mission, the IAEA is the global nerve centre for information on nuclear and radiological safety, and we can respond to any nuclear or radiological emergency.

    Based on information available to the IAEA, the following is the current situation at Iran’s nuclear sites. Which I offer as a follow up to my most recent report to this Security Council.

    The Natanz enrichment site contains two facilities. The first is the main Fuel Enrichment Plant. Initial attacks on the 13th of June targeted and destroyed electricity infrastructure at the facility, including an electrical sub-station, the main electric power supply building, and emergency power supply and back-up generators. On the same day, the main cascade hall appears to have been attacked using ground-penetrating munitions.

    The second facility at Natanz is the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant. It consists of aboveground and underground cascade halls. On the 13th of June the above-ground part was functionally destroyed and the strikes on the underground cascade halls were seriously damaging.

    The level of radioactivity outside the Natanz site has remained unchanged and at normal levels, indicating no external radiological impact on the population or the environment.

    However, within the Natanz facility there is both radiological and chemical contamination. It is possible that Uranium isotopes contained in Uranium Hexafluoride, Uranyl Fluoride and Hydrogen Fluoride are dispersed inside the facility. The radiation, primarily consisting of alpha particles, poses a significant danger if inhaled or ingested. This risk can be effectively managed with appropriate protective measures, such as using respiratory devices. The main concern inside the facility is chemical toxicity.

    Fordow is Iran’s main enrichment location for enriching uranium to 60%. The Agency is not aware of any damage at Fordow at this time.

    At the Esfahan nuclear site, four buildings were damaged in last Friday’s attack: the central chemical laboratory, a uranium conversion plant, the Tehran reactor-fuel manufacturing plant, and the enriched uranium metal processing facility, which was under construction.

    No increase of off-site radiation levels was reported. As in Natanz, the main concern is chemical toxicity.  

    The Khondab Heavy Water Research Reactor under construction in Arak, was hit on the 19th of June. As the reactor was not operational and did not contain any nuclear material, no radiological consequence is expected. The nearby Heavy Water Production Plant is also assessed to have been hit, and similarly no radiological consequence is expected.

    As stated in the IAEA’s update of the 18th of June, at the Tehran Research Center, one building, where advanced centrifuge rotors were manufactured and tested, was hit. At the Karaj workshop, two buildings, where different centrifuge components were manufactured, were destroyed. There was no radiological impact, internally or externally.

    Let me now refer to the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant. This is the nuclear site in Iran where the consequences of an attack could be most serious. It is an operating nuclear power plant and as such it hosts thousands of kilograms of nuclear material. Countries of the region have reached out directly to me over the past few hours to express their concerns, and I want to make it absolutely and completely clear: In case of an attack on the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant a direct hit could result in a very high release of radioactivity to the environment.

    Similarly, a hit that disabled the only two lines supplying electrical power to the plant could cause its reactor’s core to melt, which could result in a high release of radioactivity to the environment. In their worst-case, both scenarios would necessitate protective actions, such as evacuations and sheltering of the population or the need to take stable iodine, with the reach extending to distances from a few to several hundred kilometres. Radiation monitoring would need to cover distances of several hundred kilometres and food restrictions may need to be implemented.

    Any action against the Tehran Nuclear Research Reactor could also have severe consequences, potentially for large areas of the city of Tehran and its inhabitants. In such a case, protective actions would need to be taken.

    I will continue to provide public updates about the developments at all these sites and their possible health and environmental consequences.

    The Agency is, as madame Undersecretary kindly reminded, and will remain present in Iran and inspections there will resume, as required by Iran’s safeguards obligations under its NPT Safeguards Agreement, as soon as safety and security conditions allow.

    In this context, let me restate that the safety of our inspectors is of utmost importance. The host country has a responsibility in this regard, and we expect every effort to be made to ensure that their security and their communication lines with the IAEA headquarters will be maintained.

    As stated in my most recent report to the Agency’s Board of Governors and based on inspections conducted at the relevant facilities since then, Iran’s uranium stockpiles remain under safeguards in accordance with Iran’s comprehensive safeguards agreement. You may recall that more than 400kg of this stockpile is uranium enriched up to 60% U-235. It is essential that the Agency resumes inspections as soon as possible to provide credible assurances that none of it has been diverted.

    Importantly, any special measures by Iran to protect its nuclear materials and equipment must be done in accordance with Iran’s safeguards obligations and the Agency.  

    Therefore, it is of paramount importance that the Agency’s inspectors are allowed to verify that all relevant materials, especially those enriched to 60%, are accounted for. Beyond the potential radiological risks, attacks on such materials would make this effort of course more difficult.

    Madame President,

    The IAEA has consistently underlined, as stated in its General Conference resolution, that armed attacks on nuclear facilities should never take place, and could result in radioactive releases with grave consequences within and beyond the boundaries of the State which has been attacked.

    I therefore again call on maximum restraint. Military escalation threatens lives and delays indispensable work towards a diplomatic solution for the long-term assurance that Iran does not acquire a nuclear weapon.

    Madame President,

    The presence, support, analysis and inspections of technical experts are crucial to mitigating risks to nuclear safety and security – that is true during peacetime and even more so during military conflict.

    For the second time in three years, we are witnessing a dramatic conflict between two UN and IAEA Member States in which nuclear installations are coming under fire and nuclear safety is being compromised. The IAEA, just as has been the case with the military conflict between the Russian Federation and Ukraine, will not stand idle during this conflict.

    As I stated in this chamber just a few days ago, I am ready to travel immediately and to engage with all relevant parties to help ensure the protection of nuclear facilities and the continued peaceful use of nuclear technology in accordance with the Agency mandate, including by deploying Agency nuclear safety and security experts, in addition to our safeguards inspectors in Iran, wherever necessary.

    For the IAEA to act, a constructive, professional dialogue is needed. I urge the Members of this Council to support us in making it happen sooner rather than later.

    The IAEA must receive timely and regular technical information about affected nuclear facilities and their respective sites. I urge in this regard the Iranian regulatory authorities to continue a constructive dialogue with the IAEA Incident and Emergency Centre, which has been operating 24/7 since the beginning of this conflict.

    Nuclear facilities and material must not be shrouded by the fog of war.

    Yesterday there was an incorrect statement to the media by an Israeli military official that Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant had been attacked. Though the mistake was quickly identified and the statement retracted, the situation underscored the vital need for clear and accurate communication, and the Agency’s unique role in providing it in a technically accurate and politically impartial way is obvious.

    Let me conclude by assuring the international community of the IAEA’s continued support at this very grave time.

    A diplomatic solution is within reach if the necessary political will is there. Elements for an agreement have been discussed. The IAEA can guarantee, through a watertight inspections system, that nuclear weapons will not be developed in Iran.  They can form the basis of a long-standing agreement that brings peace and avoids a nuclear crisis in the Middle East. This opportunity should not be missed. The alternative would be a protracted conflict and a looming threat of nuclear proliferation that, while emanating from the Middle East, would effectively erode the NPT and the non-proliferation regime as a whole.

    MIL OSI NGO –

  • MIL-OSI Security: IAEA Director General Grossi’s Statement to UNSC on Situation in Iran

    Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

    (As prepared for delivery)

    Attacks on nuclear sites in the Islamic Republic of Iran have caused a sharp degradation in nuclear safety and security in Iran. Though they have not so far led to a radiological release affecting the public, there is a danger this could occur.

    The International Atomic Energy Agency has been monitoring closely the situation at Iran’s nuclear sites since Israel began its attacks a week ago. As part of its mission, the IAEA is the global nerve centre for information on nuclear and radiological safety, and we can respond to any nuclear or radiological emergency.

    Based on information available to the IAEA, the following is the current situation at Iran’s nuclear sites. Which I offer as a follow up to my most recent report to this Security Council.

    The Natanz enrichment site contains two facilities. The first is the main Fuel Enrichment Plant. Initial attacks on the 13th of June targeted and destroyed electricity infrastructure at the facility, including an electrical sub-station, the main electric power supply building, and emergency power supply and back-up generators. On the same day, the main cascade hall appears to have been attacked using ground-penetrating munitions.

    The second facility at Natanz is the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant. It consists of aboveground and underground cascade halls. On the 13th of June the above-ground part was functionally destroyed and the strikes on the underground cascade halls were seriously damaging.

    The level of radioactivity outside the Natanz site has remained unchanged and at normal levels, indicating no external radiological impact on the population or the environment.

    However, within the Natanz facility there is both radiological and chemical contamination. It is possible that Uranium isotopes contained in Uranium Hexafluoride, Uranyl Fluoride and Hydrogen Fluoride are dispersed inside the facility. The radiation, primarily consisting of alpha particles, poses a significant danger if inhaled or ingested. This risk can be effectively managed with appropriate protective measures, such as using respiratory devices. The main concern inside the facility is chemical toxicity.

    Fordow is Iran’s main enrichment location for enriching uranium to 60%. The Agency is not aware of any damage at Fordow at this time.

    At the Esfahan nuclear site, four buildings were damaged in last Friday’s attack: the central chemical laboratory, a uranium conversion plant, the Tehran reactor-fuel manufacturing plant, and the enriched uranium metal processing facility, which was under construction.

    No increase of off-site radiation levels was reported. As in Natanz, the main concern is chemical toxicity.  

    The Khondab Heavy Water Research Reactor under construction in Arak, was hit on the 19th of June. As the reactor was not operational and did not contain any nuclear material, no radiological consequence is expected. The nearby Heavy Water Production Plant is also assessed to have been hit, and similarly no radiological consequence is expected.

    As stated in the IAEA’s update of the 18th of June, at the Tehran Research Center, one building, where advanced centrifuge rotors were manufactured and tested, was hit. At the Karaj workshop, two buildings, where different centrifuge components were manufactured, were destroyed. There was no radiological impact, internally or externally.

    Let me now refer to the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant. This is the nuclear site in Iran where the consequences of an attack could be most serious. It is an operating nuclear power plant and as such it hosts thousands of kilograms of nuclear material. Countries of the region have reached out directly to me over the past few hours to express their concerns, and I want to make it absolutely and completely clear: In case of an attack on the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant a direct hit could result in a very high release of radioactivity to the environment.

    Similarly, a hit that disabled the only two lines supplying electrical power to the plant could cause its reactor’s core to melt, which could result in a high release of radioactivity to the environment. In their worst-case, both scenarios would necessitate protective actions, such as evacuations and sheltering of the population or the need to take stable iodine, with the reach extending to distances from a few to several hundred kilometres. Radiation monitoring would need to cover distances of several hundred kilometres and food restrictions may need to be implemented.

    Any action against the Tehran Nuclear Research Reactor could also have severe consequences, potentially for large areas of the city of Tehran and its inhabitants. In such a case, protective actions would need to be taken.

    I will continue to provide public updates about the developments at all these sites and their possible health and environmental consequences.

    The Agency is, as madame Undersecretary kindly reminded, and will remain present in Iran and inspections there will resume, as required by Iran’s safeguards obligations under its NPT Safeguards Agreement, as soon as safety and security conditions allow.

    In this context, let me restate that the safety of our inspectors is of utmost importance. The host country has a responsibility in this regard, and we expect every effort to be made to ensure that their security and their communication lines with the IAEA headquarters will be maintained.

    As stated in my most recent report to the Agency’s Board of Governors and based on inspections conducted at the relevant facilities since then, Iran’s uranium stockpiles remain under safeguards in accordance with Iran’s comprehensive safeguards agreement. You may recall that more than 400kg of this stockpile is uranium enriched up to 60% U-235. It is essential that the Agency resumes inspections as soon as possible to provide credible assurances that none of it has been diverted.

    Importantly, any special measures by Iran to protect its nuclear materials and equipment must be done in accordance with Iran’s safeguards obligations and the Agency.  

    Therefore, it is of paramount importance that the Agency’s inspectors are allowed to verify that all relevant materials, especially those enriched to 60%, are accounted for. Beyond the potential radiological risks, attacks on such materials would make this effort of course more difficult.

    Madame President,

    The IAEA has consistently underlined, as stated in its General Conference resolution, that armed attacks on nuclear facilities should never take place, and could result in radioactive releases with grave consequences within and beyond the boundaries of the State which has been attacked.

    I therefore again call on maximum restraint. Military escalation threatens lives and delays indispensable work towards a diplomatic solution for the long-term assurance that Iran does not acquire a nuclear weapon.

    Madame President,

    The presence, support, analysis and inspections of technical experts are crucial to mitigating risks to nuclear safety and security – that is true during peacetime and even more so during military conflict.

    For the second time in three years, we are witnessing a dramatic conflict between two UN and IAEA Member States in which nuclear installations are coming under fire and nuclear safety is being compromised. The IAEA, just as has been the case with the military conflict between the Russian Federation and Ukraine, will not stand idle during this conflict.

    As I stated in this chamber just a few days ago, I am ready to travel immediately and to engage with all relevant parties to help ensure the protection of nuclear facilities and the continued peaceful use of nuclear technology in accordance with the Agency mandate, including by deploying Agency nuclear safety and security experts, in addition to our safeguards inspectors in Iran, wherever necessary.

    For the IAEA to act, a constructive, professional dialogue is needed. I urge the Members of this Council to support us in making it happen sooner rather than later.

    The IAEA must receive timely and regular technical information about affected nuclear facilities and their respective sites. I urge in this regard the Iranian regulatory authorities to continue a constructive dialogue with the IAEA Incident and Emergency Centre, which has been operating 24/7 since the beginning of this conflict.

    Nuclear facilities and material must not be shrouded by the fog of war.

    Yesterday there was an incorrect statement to the media by an Israeli military official that Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant had been attacked. Though the mistake was quickly identified and the statement retracted, the situation underscored the vital need for clear and accurate communication, and the Agency’s unique role in providing it in a technically accurate and politically impartial way is obvious.

    Let me conclude by assuring the international community of the IAEA’s continued support at this very grave time.

    A diplomatic solution is within reach if the necessary political will is there. Elements for an agreement have been discussed. The IAEA can guarantee, through a watertight inspections system, that nuclear weapons will not be developed in Iran.  They can form the basis of a long-standing agreement that brings peace and avoids a nuclear crisis in the Middle East. This opportunity should not be missed. The alternative would be a protracted conflict and a looming threat of nuclear proliferation that, while emanating from the Middle East, would effectively erode the NPT and the non-proliferation regime as a whole.

    MIL Security OSI –

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Dmitry Chernyshenko: Implementation of AI will give BRICS economies about 2-3 trillion dollars by 2030

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: Government of the Russian Federation – An important disclaimer is at the bottom of this article.

    At the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation Dmitry Chernyshenko held a plenary session entitled “AI Science: A New Path to Leadership.” Leading Russian and foreign scientists discussed how AI science and innovation are shaping Russia’s new technological path to global leadership.

    At the session, the Deputy Prime Minister emphasized that the expected effect of introducing AI into the economies of the BRICS countries by 2030 will be around 2–3 trillion dollars:

    “According to various estimates, the expected effect of using AI technologies in the BRICS countries is between 2 and 3 trillion dollars. There is something to fight for – the share of advanced generative AI systems in this market is currently about 20%. Those who are the first to see the “golden” directions in the development of AI will discover a new Klondike, and if we conduct exploratory research in all areas, we will increase our chances of getting there.”

    The Deputy Prime Minister recalled that in December 2024, at the AI Journey conference, President Vladimir Putin proposed holding an international foresight in Russia – a strategic session on the future of artificial intelligence – in order to determine the directions of technology development together with scientists from around the world.

    The foresight is being implemented by the International AI Alliance Network, an organization that unites industry associations from 14 countries. The Russian part of the foresight is supervised by the Ministry of Economic Development of Russia and the Strategic Agency for Support and Formation of AI Developments (SAPFIR), a project office created on the basis of the Skolkovo Foundation, on behalf of the President of Russia.

    “In Russia, the President has set a national goal – ‘Technological Leadership’. One of the tasks is to form a new AI market for Russia. We are building a complete system – a foundation for Russia’s long-term leadership in AI science. At the same time, we understand that scientific leadership in AI is impossible without international cooperation and coordination of efforts. The future of AI should be built in cooperation, taking into account various scientific schools, cultures and approaches. For this reason, the results of the foresight are published openly, and every scientist in the world can make a contribution. The alliance plans to present the results to the UN and to Russian President Vladimir Putin at the annual AI Journey conference before November this year. This is our manifesto of openness, accessibility and trust for every member of the global AI community,” the Deputy Prime Minister said.

    Last year, Russian experts identified 10 key areas of fundamental scientific research in the field of AI. They formed the basis for discussion at this year’s international foresight. Several sessions of the scientific dialogue on the global prospects of AI have already been held in Morocco, the UAE, Serbia and China. One of the foresight iterations took place at the Sber tech hub in St. Petersburg.

    Dmitry Chernyshenko emphasized that the state’s task is to ensure the completeness of research and competencies in the field of AI. To this end, within the framework of the federal project “Artificial Intelligence”, the Ministry of Economic Development of Russia is holding a grant competition among research centers, according to the results of which 13 teams were selected.

    “Investments in research centers have already demonstrated their success and effectiveness: 13 centers provide half of Russia’s entire scientific reserve in AI,” the Deputy Prime Minister noted.

    Dmitry Chernyshenko noted that the issue of personnel with knowledge of AI is also being addressed systematically.

    “Studying the effects of AI on humans, including dependence on AI decisions, is a meaningful scientific task, where major research is ahead. We are faced with a challenge: to provide not just education, but to cultivate a new type of thinking. To this end, a strategy for the development of education is being developed in Russia, which provides for the creation of a digital environment, individual educational, upbringing, career trajectories and assistants,” the Deputy Prime Minister said.

    An important topic of the session was international foresight – a joint initiative aimed at identifying priority areas of research and development of AI at the global level. Participants also discussed current issues of artificial intelligence development, consolidation of efforts at the international level, tools for accelerating scientific progress and new forms of financing.

    The discussion was attended by Professor Ajit Abraham from India, who created a unique network of machine intelligence laboratories, uniting more than 1,000 researchers from 100 countries.

    Another participant was the CEO of the AIRI Institute of Artificial Intelligence, Ivan Oseledets, one of the leading experts in the field of machine learning, the second most cited Russian mathematician, professor at the Russian Academy of Sciences, and laureate of the Russian Presidential Prize.

    The speakers also included First Deputy Chairman of the Board of Sberbank PJSC Alexander Vedyakhin, Vice-Rector for Research at Serbia’s Singidunum University Nebojsa Bakanin, Professor at China’s Anhui University Ye Tian, Rector of Innopolis University Alexander Gasnikov, and Skoltech Professor Anhui Fan from Vietnam.

    Speakers focused on the role of fundamental science and support for research initiatives, including issues of task-oriented machine learning algorithms (narrow AI), as well as computation and data for AI, fundamental and generative models, human-machine interactions, optimization and mathematics.

    The results of the discussions at the session will form the basis of a foresight study to identify fundamental scientific problems in the field of AI.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    MIL OSI Russia News –

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Alexander Novak: Russia remains the largest investor for Kazakhstan, investment growth in 2024 amounted to 25%

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: Government of the Russian Federation – An important disclaimer is at the bottom of this article.

    Deputy Prime Minister of Russia Alexander Novak met with First Deputy Prime Minister of Kazakhstan Roman Sklyar at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum.

    “We consider Kazakhstan as our closest ally and strategic partner,” emphasized Alexander Novak. “Cooperation in the trade, economic and investment spheres is developing successfully, large-scale joint projects are being implemented in industry, energy, transport infrastructure, agriculture and the digital economy. Russia remains the largest investor in the Kazakh economy, with investment growth in 2024 amounting to 25% compared to 2023.”

    He highly praised the interaction between Russia and Kazakhstan in the format of the OPEC deal, which makes a decisive contribution to ensuring stability and predictability of the global oil market. The Deputy Prime Minister called for continued coordination of collective actions within OPEC, as they meet long-term national interests and contribute to strengthening the economies of the countries participating in the deal.

    The parties discussed the expansion of Russian-Kazakh cooperation in the electric power and oil and gas sectors, as well as the terms of Russian oil and gas supplies to Kazakhstan and in transit through its territory.

    Alexander Novak invited Roman Sklyar and the delegation of Kazakhstan to take part in the annual international forum “Russian Energy Week”, which will be held from October 15 to 17 in Moscow.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    MIL OSI Russia News –

  • MIL-OSI Canada: B.C. strengthens response to repeat violent offending

    Source: Government of Canada regional news

    Abbotsford Police Department:

    A total of $643,000 in SITE funding was allocated to support the Abbotsford Police Department’s Project Spotlight, an eight-month initiative targeting repeat violent offenders involved in violent property crimes.

    Combining uniformed and undercover resources, officers employed a variety of tactics including surveillance and patrols by vehicle, foot, bike and ATV. The project involved collaboration with loss prevention officers, business owners and criminal-justice partners to remove repeat violent offenders from the community and streamline justice processes.

    The project resulted in 272 individuals investigated, 108 people charged with 271 offences, and 122 warrant arrests. Officers also seized weapons, drugs, cash and stolen property, issued 106 violation tickets, prohibited eight impaired drivers and impounded several vehicles.

    Cranbrook RCMP:

    Two projects with more than $148,000 in funding were used to engage with a prolific repeat violent offender who had committed armed robbery. The investigation and subsequent arrest disrupted the individual’s ongoing criminal activities, resulting in seized firearms and yielding evidence that resulted in Criminal Code charges.

    Kelowna RCMP:

    Three projects with more than $216,000 in funding were used to support a joint Lake Country and Kelowna RCMP operation targeting a violent offender’s property.

    Surveillance led to investigations into various property crime offenders and drug traffickers, resulting in recovered stolen vehicles and the seizure of drugs (meth, cocaine, fentanyl) and weapons, including 20 firearms, ammunition and a live grenade.

    Twenty-two individuals were investigated during this time, of whom five individuals were charged with 16 offences. Since the search warrant was enforced, there was a notable decrease in activity at the residence and the surrounding area.

    Prince George RCMP:

    To address rising violent crime and street disorder linked to the opioid crisis, homelessness and public disruptions in downtown Prince George, the RCMP secured more than $93,000 in SITE funding to support overtime patrols from November 2023 to April 2024.

    Overtime members conducted high-visibility patrols in violent crime hot spots, assisted with the removal of illegal encampments and disrupted ongoing criminal activity. The initiative resulted in more than 380 individuals investigated, including 12 ReVOII-prioritized individuals, 50 arrests on outstanding warrants, five breach-related arrests and 32 individuals charged with a total of 86 charges. Officers also seized numerous weapons and illicit substances. Throughout the initiative, officers engaged directly with business owners and civilians, who expressed strong appreciation for the increased police presence and its impact on community safety.

    Surrey police service (SPS):

    The SPS has received more than $181,000 for two projects focused on dealing with repeat violent offenders in the community.

    In December 2024, the SPS was notified of the imminent release of a high-priority ReVOII individual from provincial custody.

    In response, the SPS swiftly implemented an operational plan to conduct surveillance of the individual over a weekend period. This proactive approach allowed officers to gather updated intelligence on the offender. Within two weeks, the individual breached probation conditions and was arrested by SPS officers. During the arrest, a knife and a conducted energy weapon were seized. At the conclusion of the SITE-funded initiative, the ReVOII offender remained in custody.

    Surrey RCMP:

    When police of jurisdiction, the Surrey RCMP received almost $314,000 in SITE funding for six projects focused on dealing with repeat violent offenders in the community.

    Projects involved visible, proactive police work in specific areas of the city to prevent crime. Some were also done in conjunction with the Metro Vancouver Transit Police and involved uniformed foot patrols around Surrey’s transit hubs. These patrols aimed to make people feel safer and deter violence.

    Projects also focused on taking quick action to deal with a violent repeat offender living in the community.

    Vancouver Police Department (VPD):

    In Vancouver, more than $2 million has been allocated to the VPD to support 16 police operations to address repeat offending in the downtown core, particularly street disorder and associated forms of violent crime, including projects focused in the Downtown Eastside.

    In September 2024, the Province committed up to $1 million in SITE funding to the VPD for Project Brighthaven (part of Task Force Barrage) to address public safety concerns related to violence and street disorder in the Gastown and Hastings area.

    On Feb. 20, 2025, the VPD reported that in Hastings Crossing, violent crime decreased 27% between Oct. 1, 2024, and Jan. 31, 2025, compared to the preceding four months and was down 18% compared to the same period one year previously.

    In Gastown, assaults involving weapons and assaults causing bodily harm decreased by 45% compared to the preceding four months and were down 59% compared to the same period one year previously.

    Thanks to the SITE initiative, January 2025 saw the fewest number of violent crimes and property crimes in Hastings Crossing in more than two years.

    Victoria Police Department (VicPD):

    VicPD secured more than $150,000 in SITE funding to implement three iterations of Project Lifter, an initiative targeting organized retail theft involving violence.

    Through overtime patrols, officers worked in partnership with 13 retailers and more than 30 loss-prevention officers over 11 days. The initiative focused on individuals engaged in violent thefts and incorporated outreach efforts to connect repeat offenders with housing, substance-use and other community supports.

    The projects led to 141 individuals being investigated, 113 individuals charged and 155 charges recommended to Crown. Police also made 31 arrests for warrants or breaches, including 13 individuals arrested multiple times and two identified as ReVOII-prioritized. Officers seized a range of weapons, and recovered more than $65,000 in stolen merchandise.

    MIL OSI Canada News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – EU/Euratom Agreement on the interpretation and application of the Energy Charter Treaty: adoption by Euratom – P10_TA(2025)0127 – Wednesday, 18 June 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    (Consultation)

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to the Commission proposal to the Council (COM(2024)0256),

    –  having regard to Article 203 of the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, pursuant to which the Council consulted Parliament (C10‑0092/2024),

    –  having regard to Rule 84 of its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the opinion of the Committee on International Trade,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (A10-0008/2025),

    1.  Approves the Commission proposal;

    2.  Calls on the Council to notify Parliament if it intends to depart from the text approved by Parliament;

    3.  Asks the Council to consult Parliament again if it intends to substantially amend the text approved by Parliament;

    4.  Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council and the Commission.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – Macro-financial assistance to Egypt – P10_TA(2025)0125 – Wednesday, 18 June 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

    Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 212(2) thereof,

    Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,

    After transmission of the draft legislative act to the national parliaments,

    Acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure(1),

    Whereas:

    (1)  Relations between the Union and the Arab Republic of Egypt (‘Egypt’) are developed within the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an Association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Arab Republic of Egypt, of the other part(2) (the ‘Association Agreement’), in force since 2004. The Union and Egypt adopted the latest EU-Egypt Partnership Priorities (2021-2027) at the ninth EU-Egypt Association Council, established by the Association Agreement, on 19 June 2022 (the ‘Partnership Priorities’). The Partnership Priorities reconfirm the joint aim of addressing common challenges facing the Union and Egypt, promoting joint interests and guaranteeing long-term stability and sustainable development on both sides of the Mediterranean. The shared commitment to the universal values of democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights continues to underpin the Partnership Priorities, as is also reflected in the EU-Egypt Multi-Annual Indicative Programme for the period of 2021-2027 (the ‘EU-Egypt MIP’).

    (2)  The Partnership Priorities reflect the shared commitment of the Union and Egypt to reinforce cooperation in support of Egypt’s ‘Sustainable Development Strategy Vision 2030’ and the Union’s determination to act on a renewed impetus to strengthen the partnership with its Southern Neighbourhood. In particular, in the conclusions of the European Council of 10-11 December 2020, the Union identified a democratic, more stable, greener and more prosperous Southern Neighbourhood as a strategic priority. The EU Agenda for the Mediterranean, and the Economic and Investment Plan for the Southern Neighbours set out in the Joint Communication of the Commission and of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 9 February 2021 entitled ‘Renewed partnership with the Southern Neighbourhood: A new Agenda for the Mediterranean’ present the Union’s objectives of achieving long-term, sustainable socioeconomic recovery and resilience and of advancing the twin green and digital transitions in the region.

    (3)   On 17 March 2024, Egypt and the Union jointly decided to upgrade their relations to a strategic and comprehensive partnership, based on the values of equity and mutual respect and trust in order to strengthen their common stability, peace and prosperity.

    (4)  In line with the Partnership Priorities, the Union and Egypt are committed to ensuring accountability, the rule of law, full respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as promoting democracy, gender equality and equal opportunities as constitutional rights of all their citizens. Those commitments contribute to the advancement of the partnership and to Egypt’s sustainable social and economic development, good governance and socio-economic stability. The increased and constructive engagement between the Union and Egypt in the last period has opened the path to more meaningful dialogue on human rights-related issues. In the framework of the Association Agreement, the subcommittee on Political Matters, Human Rights and Democracy – International and Regional issues ▌ and the Association Committee provide the institutional platforms to exchange views on an array of human rights issues, which the Union would like to continue and build upon. The steady future improvement of the human rights situation in Egypt in key areas related to civil, political, economic, social rights and fundamental freedoms regularly addressed by both partners in bilateral and international fora will have a positive impact on relations between the Union and Egypt.

    (5)  Assistance to Egypt is funded mainly through the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe (NDICI-GE), established by Regulation (EU) 2021/947 of the European Parliament and of the Council(3). The Union’s indicative allocation for Egypt under the NDICI-GE for the first period (2021-2024) of the EU-Egypt MIP was EUR 240 million. This is in addition to the ongoing cooperation portfolio of EUR 1,3 billion and other budget support and emergency measures in response to the COVID-19 pandemic and to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine amounting to EUR 307 million. The Partnership Priorities for 2021-2027 are reflected in the EU-Egypt MIP, which has been prepared in close consultation with all relevant stakeholders, and cover three broad areas: (i) Sustainable Modern Economy and Social Development; (ii) Partnering in Foreign Policy, and (iii) Enhancing Stability. The NDICI-GE replaces the European Neighbourhood Instrument under which the Union’s bilateral assistance to Egypt for the period 2014-2020 amounted to EUR 756 million.

    (6)  The Union recognises Egypt’s key role for regional security and stability, and has a strong interest in preventing short-term economic instability in Egypt that could have broader consequences and a negative impact on the geopolitical landscape. Terrorism, organised crime, such as human trafficking, irregular migration, disinformation and conflicts, are common threats against common security and the social fabric of nations across both sides of the Mediterranean. The Union acknowledges Egypt’s contribution to addressing such issues. Furthermore, energy security is one of the most pressing challenges facing countries on both sides of the Mediterranean. Energy cooperation between the Union and Egypt could not only offer a source of economic prosperity for the region, but also strengthen energy security by diversifying energy supplies and encouraging regional collaboration. Therefore, the Union and Egypt have a common interest in strengthening cooperation highlighted in the Partnership Priorities, in full compliance with international law, including human rights and international humanitarian law, as well as in promoting joint interests and addressing common challenges.

    (7)  Recalling the global and regional geopolitical challenges, such as the humanitarian crisis in Gaza, resulting from the aftermath of the Hamas terrorist attacks across Israel on 7 October 2023, the escalating tensions in the Horn of Africa and the safety of navigation in the Red Sea, as well as migratory pressure from the conflict in Sudan, uncertainties in Syria, the instability in Libya, Egypt’s role as a host to large numbers of refugees and migrants, and the strategic importance of Egypt as the largest country in the region and a pillar of stability for the whole Middle East, the Union has embarked on a strategic and comprehensive partnership with Egypt as outlined in the Joint Declaration of the Union and Egypt, signed in Cairo on 17 March 2024 (the ‘Joint Declaration’).

    (8)  The objective of the strategic and comprehensive partnership with Egypt is to elevate the political relations of the Union and Egypt to a strategic partnership and to enable Egypt to fulfil its key role of providing stability in the region, the Middle East and North Africa. That partnership aims to contribute to supporting Egypt’s macroeconomic resilience and enabling the implementation of ambitious socio-economic reforms in a manner that complements and reinforces the reform process provided for under the International Monetary Fund (IMF) programme for Egypt. As outlined in the Joint Declaration, the strategic and comprehensive partnership will address a wide set of policy measures clustered across six pillars of intervention, namely political relations, economic stability, investment and trade, migration, security and law enforcement cooperation, demography and human capital. The strategic and comprehensive partnership should be developed in line with initiatives at Union and Member State level.

    (9)  Underpinning the strategic and comprehensive partnership is a financial package of EUR 7,4 billion consisting of short- and longer-term support for the macro-fiscal and socio-economic reform agenda, as well as increased amounts available to support investments in Egypt and targeted support for the implementation of the different strategic priorities, which include renewable energy and migration, amongst others. Part of the support package is the Union’s macro-financial assistance package of up to EUR 5 billion in loans, composed of two macro-financial assistance operations, a short-term operation of a maximum amount of EUR 1 billion and a medium-term operation of a maximum amount of EUR 4 billion. That financial package also includes financial instruments, such as guarantees and blending instruments, aimed to mobilise public and private investments with the objective of generating substantial new investments with positive economic impacts which can benefit all Egyptians. This will be complemented by programmes to support specific priorities under the strategic and comprehensive partnership through individual projects and technical assistance implemented under the NDICI-GE.

    (10)  Egypt’s macro-fiscal situation has faced significant challenges and has deteriorated substantially over recent months, as external pressures have intensified and public debt has increased further, with substantial downside risks to the economic outlook persisting. The repercussions of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and the geopolitical tensions and conflicts in the Middle East have led to protracted capital outflows and lower foreign currency receipts, in particular due to sharply easing income from tourism, Suez Canal proceeds, and gas production amid volatility of confidence among foreign investors. This is particularly challenging in Egypt’s difficult fiscal situation, which is characterised by constant fiscal deficits and high and growing debt-to-GDP ratios. Despite that difficult external context, in 2024 Egypt was able to implement reforms, such as the unification of exchange rates and making progress in tightening monetary policy, to help preserve its macroeconomic stability.

    (11)  Egypt’s economic and financial situation has been supported by several disbursing IMF programmes since 2016. Those are a three-year Extended Fund Facility of USD 12 billion adopted in 2016, emergency financial assistance under the Rapid Financing Instrument of USD 2,8 billion adopted in 2020, a one-year Stand-By Arrangement of USD 5,2 billion adopted in 2020, and a four-year Extended Fund Facility of USD 3 billion adopted in 2022 and augmented to USD 8 billion in 2024. Egypt made considerable reform efforts during the first part of its engagement with the IMF in 2016-2021. Reforms included a significant currency devaluation, accompanied by monetary policy reforms focused on an inflation target corridor. Fuel subsidy reform was coupled with a significant strengthening of a targeted social transfer system. Public finance management was strengthened by developing medium-term revenue and debt management strategies. The Egyptian authorities also began improving the governance of state-owned enterprises.

    (12)  After the adoption of a follow-up IMF programme in December 2022, reform progress was less noticeable, although Egypt has implemented steps to level the playing field between public and private companies through a law to abolish the tax privileges of state-owned enterprises, albeit with exemptions on the basis of national security, and through the adoption of a state ownership policy, aimed to reduce the presence of the State in the economy, which remains large and distorting despite recent limited progress, and clarifying the rationale of continued State involvement in certain strategic sectors. However, Egypt did not implement its commitment to make the currency durably flexible in 2023, leading to a largely stable official exchange rate and a substantial parallel currency market with a significantly depreciated and highly volatile exchange rate. That fragmentation weighed heavily on foreign investment and domestic business activity.

    (13)  Egypt re-engaged with the IMF in early 2024, and reached a staff-level agreement on 6 March 2024 on a revamped extended fund facility programme scaled up to USD 8 billion. The new programme was adopted by a Decision of the IMF Executive Board on 29 March 2024, and it aims to address the areas of: (i) credible exchange rate flexibility; (ii) sustainable tightening of monetary policy; (iii) fiscal consolidation to preserve debt sustainability; (iv) a new framework to rein in infrastructure spending; (v) provision of adequate levels of social spending to protect vulnerable groups, including from rises in the cost of living and energy price; and (vi) implementation of the state ownership policy and reforms to level the playing field with a view to promoting the development of the private sector in the economy. Together with the signature of the staff-level agreement, Egypt also enacted a flexibilisation of the exchange rate, and raised the central bank’s key policy rate by a sizeable 600 basis points, in line with the priorities of the IMF programme. Staff-level agreement on the fourth review of Egypt’s economic reform programme was reached in December 2024, and the IMF Executive Board completed the review in March 2025.

    (14)  In view of a worsening economic situation and outlook clouded by substantial downside risks in relation to ongoing external shocks, Egypt requested complementary macro-financial assistance from the Union on 12 March 2024.

    (15)  Given that Egypt is a country covered by the European Neighbourhood Policy, it should be considered to be eligible to receive macro-financial assistance from the Union.

    (16)  The Union’s macro-financial assistance should be an exceptional instrument of untied and undesignated balance-of-payments support, which aims to address Egypt’s immediate external financing needs, and it should underpin the implementation of a policy programme containing strong immediate adjustment and structural reform measures designed to improve Egypt’s balance-of-payments position.

    (17)  Given that there is still a significant residual external financing gap in Egypt’s balance of payments over and above the resources provided by the IMF and other multilateral institutions and regional partners, the Union’s macro-financial assistance to be provided to Egypt is, under the current exceptional circumstances, considered to be an appropriate response to Egypt’s request to the Union to support Egypt’s economic stabilisation, in conjunction with the IMF programme. The Union’s EUR 5 billion macro-financial assistance package, including the macro-financial assistance of up to EUR 4 billion under this Decision, seeks to support the economic stabilisation and the structural reform agenda of Egypt, supplementing resources made available under the IMF programme. The first part of the package, a macro-financial assistance loan of EUR 1 billion, was disbursed in December 2024 after a positive assessment by the Commission.

    (18)  The Union’s macro-financial assistance should aim to support the restoration of a sustainable external financing situation for Egypt, thereby supporting its economic and social development. By fostering stability and prosperity in its Neighbourhood, the provision of the Union’s macro-financial assistance to Egypt could also contribute to the Union’s growth and economic resilience.

    (19)  The determination of the amount of the Union’s macro-financial assistance should be based on a complete quantitative assessment of Egypt’s residual external financing needs and should take into account Egypt’s capacity to finance itself with its own resources, in particular the international reserves at its disposal. The Union’s macro-financial assistance is part of an international joint effort, effectively complementing the programmes and resources provided by the IMF and the World Bank. The determination of the amount of the assistance should also take into account expected financial contributions from multilateral donors and the need to ensure fair burden sharing between the Union and other donors, as well as the pre-existing deployment of the Union’s other external financing instruments in Egypt and the added value of the Union’s overall involvement in Egypt.

    (20)  The Commission should ensure that the Union’s macro-financial assistance is legally and substantially in accordance with the key principles and objectives of the different areas of external action, with measures taken in respect of those areas, and with other relevant Union policies and Union values, such as democracy, human rights and the rule of law.

    (21)  The Union’s macro-financial assistance should support the Union’s external policy towards Egypt. The Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) should work closely together throughout the macro-financial assistance operation in order to coordinate, and ensure the consistency of, the Union’s external policy.

    (22)  The Union’s macro-financial assistance should support Egypt’s commitment to foster values shared with the Union, including democracy, the rule of law, good governance, respect for human rights, sustainable development and poverty reduction, as well as its commitment to the principles of open, rule-based and fair trade.

    (23)  A precondition for granting the Union’s macro-financial assistance to Egypt should be that Egypt continue to make concrete, credible and tangible steps towards respecting effective democratic mechanisms, including a multi-party parliamentary system, and the rule of law, and guaranteeing respect for human rights. In addition, the specific objectives of the Union’s macro-financial assistance should strengthen the efficiency, transparency and accountability of the public finance management systems, the governance and supervision of the financial sector in Egypt, and should promote structural reforms that aim to support sustainable and inclusive growth, decent employment creation and fiscal consolidation. The Commission and the EEAS should regularly monitor the fulfilment of that precondition and the achievement of those specific objectives.

    (24)  The link of the Union’s macro-financial assistance to an on-track disbursing IMF programme, with its strong macro-fiscal framework and rigorous debt sustainability analysis, provides reassurances in relation to Egypt’s repayment capacity. In addition, in order to ensure that the Union’s financial interests linked to the Union’s macro-financial assistance are protected efficiently, Egypt should take appropriate measures relating to the prevention of, and fight against, fraud, corruption and any other irregularities linked to that assistance. The transparent management of funds allocated under the Union’s macro-financial assistance is essential. In addition, a loan agreement to be concluded between the Commission and the Egyptian authorities should contain provisions authorising the European Anti-Fraud Office to carry out investigations, including on-the-spot checks and inspections, in accordance with the provisions and procedures laid down in Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council(4) and Council Regulation (Euratom, EC) No 2185/96(5), the Commission and the Court of Auditors to carry out audits and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office to exercise its competences with regard to the provision of the Union’s macro-financial assistance during and after the availability period of that assistance.

    (25)  The release of the Union’s macro-financial assistance is without prejudice to the powers of the European Parliament and the Council as budgetary authority.

    (26)  The amounts of the provision required for macro-financial assistance in the form of loans should be consistent with the budgetary appropriations provided for in the multiannual financial framework.

    (27)  The Union’s macro-financial assistance should be managed by the Commission. In order to ensure that the European Parliament and the Council are able to follow the implementation of this Decision, the Commission should regularly inform them of developments relating to that assistance and provide them with relevant documents.

    (28)  The annual report on the implementation of this Decision should include information on concrete, tangible and credible steps taken by Egypt towards respecting effective democratic mechanisms, including a multi-party parliamentary system, and the rule of law, and guaranteeing respect for human rights.

    (29)  In order to ensure uniform conditions for the implementation of this Decision, implementing powers should be conferred on the Commission. Those powers should be exercised in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council(6).

    (30)  The Union’s macro-financial assistance should be subject to economic policy conditions, to be set out in a memorandum of understanding (MoU). In order to ensure uniform conditions of implementation and for reasons of efficiency, the Commission should be empowered to negotiate such conditions with the Egyptian authorities under the supervision of the committee of representatives of the Member States in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011. Under Regulation (EU) No 182/2011, the advisory procedure should, as a general rule, apply in all cases other than as provided for in that Regulation. Considering the potentially significant impact of assistance of more than EUR 90 million, it is appropriate that the examination procedure as specified in Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 be used for operations above that threshold. Considering the amount of the Union’s macro-financial assistance to Egypt, that examination procedure should apply to the adoption of the MoU, and to any reduction, suspension or cancellation of that assistance.

    (31)  Since the objective of this Decision, namely to address Egypt’s external financing needs cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States but can rather be better achieved at Union level, the Union may adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union. In accordance with the principle of proportionality, as set out in that Article, this Decision does not go beyond what is necessary to achieve that objective.

    (32)  In order to enable the prompt provision of macro-financial assistance to Egypt, this Decision should enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union,

    HAVE ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

    Article 1

    1.  The Union shall make macro-financial assistance in the form of loans of a maximum amount of up to EUR 4 billion available to Egypt (the ‘Union’s macro-financial assistance’), with a view to supporting Egypt’s economic stabilisation and a substantive reform agenda. The release of the Union’s macro-financial assistance is subject to the adoption of the Union budget for the relevant year by the European Parliament and the Council. The Union’s macro-financial assistance shall contribute to covering Egypt’s balance-of-payments needs as identified in the IMF programme.

    2.  In order to finance the Union’s macro-financial assistance, the Commission shall be empowered, on behalf of the Union, to borrow the necessary funds on the capital markets or from financial institutions and to on-lend them to Egypt.

    3.  The release of the Union’s macro-financial assistance shall be managed by the Commission in a manner consistent with the agreements or understandings reached between the IMF and Egypt, and with the key principles and objectives of economic reforms set out in the Association Agreement.

    The Commission shall regularly inform the European Parliament and the Council of developments regarding the Union’s macro-financial assistance, including disbursements thereof, and shall provide those institutions with the relevant documents in due time.

    4.  The Union’s macro-financial assistance shall be made available for a period of two and a half years, starting from the first day after the date of entry into force of the MoU referred to in Article 3(1).

    5.  Where the financing needs of Egypt decrease fundamentally during the period of the disbursement of the Union’s macro-financial assistance compared to the initial projections, the Commission, acting in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 7(2), shall reduce the amount of the assistance, suspend or cancel it.

    Article 2

    1.  A precondition for granting the Union’s macro-financial assistance shall be that Egypt continue to make concrete and credible steps towards respecting effective democratic mechanisms, including a multi-party parliamentary system, and the rule of law, and guaranteeing respect for human rights.

    2.  The Commission and the EEAS shall monitor the fulfilment of the precondition set out in paragraph 1 throughout the life-cycle of the Union’s macro-financial assistance.

    3.  Paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article shall apply in accordance with Council Decision 2010/427/EU(7).

    Article 3

    1.  The Commission, in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 7(2), shall agree with the Egyptian authorities on clearly defined economic policy and financial conditions, focusing on structural reforms and sound public finances, to which the Union’s macro-financial assistance is to be subject. Those economic policy and financial conditions shall be set out in a memorandum of understanding (MoU) which shall include a timeframe for their fulfilment. Those economic policy and financial conditions shall be consistent with the agreements or understandings referred to in Article 1(3), including the macroeconomic adjustment and structural reform programmes implemented by Egypt with the support of the IMF.

    2.  The economic policy and financial conditions referred to in paragraph 1 shall aim, in particular, to enhance the efficiency, transparency and accountability of the public finance management systems in Egypt, including for the use of the Union’s macro-financial assistance. Progress in mutual market opening, including for small and medium-sized enterprises, the development of rule-based and fair trade, sustainable development, good governance and other priorities in the context of the Union’s external policy shall also be duly taken into account when designing the policy measures. The Commission shall regularly monitor Egypt’s progress in attaining those objectives.

    3.  The detailed financial terms of the Union’s macro-financial assistance shall be laid down in a loan agreement to be concluded between the Commission and the Egyptian authorities in accordance with Article 223 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council(8) (the ‘Financial Regulation’) (the ‘loan agreement’).

    4.  The Commission shall verify, at regular intervals, that the conditions referred to in Article 4(3), first subparagraph, continue to be met, including whether the economic policies of Egypt are in accordance with the objectives of the Union’s macro-financial assistance. For the purposes of that verification, the Commission shall coordinate closely with the IMF and the World Bank, and, where necessary, with the European Parliament and with the Council.

    Article 4

    1.  Subject to the conditions referred to in paragraph 3, first subparagraph, the Union’s macro-financial assistance shall be made available by the Commission in instalments. The size of each of those instalments shall be set out in the MoU. An instalment may be disbursed in one or more tranches.

    2.  The amounts of the Union’s macro-financial assistance provided in the form of loans shall be provisioned, where required, in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2021/947.

    3.  The Commission shall decide on the release of the instalments subject to the fulfilment of the following conditions:

    (a)  the precondition set out in Article 2(1);

    (b)  a continuous satisfactory track record of implementing a policy programme that contains strong adjustment and structural reform measures supported by a non-precautionary IMF credit arrangement; and

    (c)  the satisfactory implementation of the economic policy and financial conditions agreed in the MoU.

    The release of the second instalment shall not, in principle, take place earlier than three months after the release of the first instalment. The release of the third instalment shall not, in principle, take place earlier than three months after the release of the second instalment.

    4.  Where the conditions set out in paragraph 3, first subparagraph, are not met, the Commission shall temporarily suspend or cancel the disbursement of the Union’s macro-financial assistance. In such cases, it shall inform the European Parliament and the Council without delay of the reasons for that suspension or cancellation.

    5.  The Union’s macro-financial assistance shall be disbursed to the Central Bank of Egypt. Subject to the agreed provisions set out in the MoU, including a confirmation of residual budgetary financing needs, the Union funds may be transferred by the Central Bank of Egypt to the Egyptian Ministry of Finance as the final beneficiary.

    Article 5

    1.  In order to finance the Union’s macro-financial assistance in the form of loans, the Commission shall be empowered, on behalf of the Union, to borrow the necessary funds on the capital markets or from financial institutions in accordance with Article 224 of the Financial Regulation.

    2.  The Commission shall enter into a loan agreement referred to in Article 3(3) in respect of the amount referred to in Article 1. The loan agreement shall lay down the availability period and the detailed terms of the Union’s macro-financial assistance, including in relation to the internal control systems. Egypt shall repay the loan, which shall be granted on terms that allow its repayment over a long period, including a possible grace period. The maximum duration of the loan shall be 35 years. ▌

    3.   The Commission shall inform the European Parliament and the Council of developments in the operations referred to in paragraph 2.

    Article 6

    1.  The Union’s macro-financial assistance shall be implemented in accordance with the Financial Regulation.

    2.  The Union’s macro-financial assistance shall be implemented under direct management.

    3.  Before the implementation of the Union’s macro-financial assistance, the Commission shall assess, by means of an operational assessment, the soundness of Egypt’s financial arrangements, administrative procedures, and internal and external control mechanisms which are relevant to the assistance.

    Article 7

    1.  The Commission shall be assisted by a committee. That committee shall be a committee within the meaning of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011.

    2.  Where reference is made to this paragraph, Article 5 of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 shall apply.

    Article 8

    1.  By 30 June of each year, the Commission shall submit to the European Parliament and to the Council a report on the implementation of this Decision in the preceding year, including an evaluation of that implementation. That report shall:

    (a)  examine the progress made in implementing the Union’s macro-financial assistance;

    (b)  assess the economic situation and prospects of Egypt, as well as progress made in implementing the policy measures referred to in Article 3(1);

    (c)  indicate the connection between the economic policy and financial conditions set out in the MoU, Egypt’s on-going economic and fiscal performance and the Commission’s decisions to release the instalments of the Union’s macro-financial assistance, while outlining concrete and credible steps taken towards respecting democratic mechanisms and the rule of law and guaranteeing human rights.

    2.  Not later than two years after the expiry of the availability period referred to in Article 1(4), the Commission shall submit to the European Parliament and to the Council an ex post evaluation report, assessing the results and efficiency of the completed Union’s macro-financial assistance and the extent to which it has contributed to the aims of the assistance.

    Article 9

    This Decision shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

    Done at …,

    For the European Parliament For the Council

    The President The President

    (1) Position of the European Parliament of 18 June 2025.
    (2) OJ L 304, 30.9.2004, p. 39.
    (3) Regulation (EU) 2021/947 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 June 2021 establishing the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe, amending and repealing Decision No 466/2014/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Regulation (EU) 2017/1601 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 480/2009 (OJ L 209, 14.6.2021, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/947/oj).
    (4) Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 September 2013 concerning investigations conducted by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation (Euratom) No 1074/1999 (OJ L 248, 18.9.2013, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2013/883/oj).
    (5) Council Regulation (Euratom, EC) No 2185/96 of 11 November 1996 concerning on-the-spot checks and inspections carried out by the Commission in order to protect the European Communities’ financial interests against fraud and other irregularities (OJ L 292, 15.11.1996, p. 2, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/1996/2185/oj).
    (6) Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 laying down the rules and general principles concerning mechanisms for control by Member States of the Commission’s exercise of implementing powers (OJ L 55, 28.2.2011, p. 13, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2011/182/oj).
    (7) Council Decision 2010/427/EU of 26 July 2010 establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service (OJ L 201, 3.8.2010, p. 30, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2010/427/oj).
    (8) Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (OJ L, 2024/2509, 26.9.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj).

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI NGOs: Azerbaijan: Seven journalists sentenced in latest shocking crackdown on free speech

    Source: Amnesty International –

    Reacting to the sentencing to lengthy prison terms of seven media workers in the “Abzas Media case” in Azerbaijan, Marie Struthers, Amnesty International’s Eastern Europe and Central Asia Director, said:

    “The case against Abzas Media is an example of how Azerbaijan’s judicial system is being weaponized to muzzle independent journalism and calls for a strong international response. By pressing fabricated economic charges against journalists who exposed high-level corruption, the Azerbaijani authorities are sending a chilling message to anyone in the country who dares to challenge them. A strong international reaction should make clear that this is unacceptable.

    “The political repression in Azerbaijan today is staggering, yet we lack a united, principled stand against it from the international community, in defence of human rights. In stark contrast, major actors like the European Union persist in actively courting President Ilham Aliyev in search of lucrative gas deals.

    The political repression in Azerbaijan today is staggering, yet we lack a united, principled stand against it from the international community

    Marie Struthers, Amnesty International’s Eastern Europe and Central Asia Director

    “The international community must exert real pressure on the Azerbaijani authorities to immediately release the Abzas Media journalists, imprisoned media workers from Toplum TV, Meydan TV and Kanal 13, and all other government critics imprisoned solely for exercising their right to freedom of expression, and to put an end to the Azerbaijani government’s systemic campaign against dissent.”

    Background

    On 20 June, the Baku Court of Serious Crimes sentenced seven media workers affiliated with the independent investigative outlet Abzas Media – including director Ulvi Hasanli, editor-in-chief Sevinc Vagifgizi, investigative journalist Hafiz Babaly, reporters Nargiz Absalamova and Elnara Gasymova, translator Muhammad Kekalov, and economist and Radio Free Europe correspondent Farid Mehralizade – to prison terms ranging from seven and a half to nine years. The charges included “currency smuggling,” “money laundering,” “tax evasion” and forgery of documents.

    Their prosecution and imprisonment are widely believed to be in retaliation for the media organization’s investigations into corruption among President Ilham Aliyev’s family and inner circle. These include reports on post-war reconstruction in Nagorno-Karabakh and illicit financial networks tied to state-linked companies. During the hearings, the defence highlighted numerous procedural irregularities, pressure on the defendants and witnesses, and a lack of credible evidence. Witnesses have withdrawn or denied previous statements, and defendants have reported ill-treatment in custody.

    At least 25 journalists are currently imprisoned in the country. Azerbaijan has the highest number of imprisoned media workers held on politically motivated charges since it joined the Council of Europe in 2001. Just on 7 May, independent journalist Ulviyya Ali, a contributor to Voice of America, was arrested.

    MIL OSI NGO –

  • MIL-OSI Banking: First “Manitoba Wind Energy Indigenous Equity Summit” a success

    Source: – Press Release/Statement:

    Headline: First “Manitoba Wind Energy Indigenous Equity Summit” a success

    A unique conference, presented by Canadian Renewable Energy Association (CanREA) in collaboration with Indigenous Clean Energy (ICE), recognizes the critical role of Indigenous engagement in Manitoba’s energy transition.

    Winnipeg, Manitoba, June 20, 2025—More than 120 people attended the Manitoba Wind Energy Indigenous Equity Summit, held at the Winnipeg Art Gallery on June 18, 2025, presented by Canadian Renewable Energy Association (CanREA) in collaboration with Indigenous Clean Energy (ICE).

    This unique, invitation-only event brought together key representatives from Manitoba’s Indigenous and renewable energy communities to discuss Manitoba Hydro’s recently launched wind energy procurement, entitled “Call for Power: Indigenous Majority Owned Wind,” part of the Manitoba Affordable Energy Plan. This is the province’s first significant wind-energy procurement in many years. An RFP for 600 MWs of wind energy is expected to be issued in August of this year, with a majority Indigenous-ownership criteria.

    “In order for Manitoba’s new wind energy procurement to succeed, the renewable energy industry must commit to ensuring that development plans align with the priorities of Indigenous communities,” said Evan Wilson, CanREA’s Vice President of Policy—Western Canada and National Affairs.

    The Summit kicked off with opening remarks by the Hon. Mike Moyes, Manitoba’s Minister of Environment and Climate Change, as well as the Hon. Adrien Sala, Minister of Finance and Minister responsible for Manitoba Hydro, who spoke about the importance of collaboration and the value that such an event can bring to the process.

    In “Wind Energy 101 – Developer Spotlight Panel,” Wilson moderated a panel of wind energy developers with successful projects elsewhere in Canada, including Ina Gjoka (Innergex), Brian Hodder (Renewable Energy Systems / RES Group), Galvin Clancey (Nordex) and Jennifer Tuck (Potentia Renewables), who shared lessons learned and ideas for how best to work together for Manitoba’s energy transition.

    Following this discussion, ICE’s Founding Executive Director, Chris Henderson, moderated a panel on “Indigenous Nation: Wind Pathways Success,” featuring panelists Kory Wood (Kikinaw Energy Services), Troy Jerome (Sentii Energy, Kiruguj First Nation), and Drew Bernard (Lennox Island First Nation).

    “Indigenous 51% equity is essential to Manitoba’s wind call for power. The Government of Manitoba’s Indigenous inclusion goal was supported by CanREA members and Indigenous communities at the Indigenous Equity Summit in Winnipeg. Indigenous Clean Energy’s collaboration with CanREA was positive, reflecting this vision,” said Henderson.

    Later that morning, CanREA’s Director for Saskatchewan and Indigenous Engagement, Kelly Hall, emceed a session on “Indigenous Loan Guarantees & Financing Options,” in which the Canada Infrastructure Bank’s Justin Lok presented on Financing Indigenous Equity, the Manitoba Finance Treasury Division’s Nicoleta Oprea presented on the Government of Manitoba Treasury, and the Canada Indigenous Loan Guarantee Corporation’s Pearl Yuzicappi presented on the Canada Development Investment Corporation.

    The afternoon was split into two simultaneous tracks: The CanREA track consisted of a session on “Wind Energy Procurement Guidance,” in which CanREA’s Director for Manitoba & Saskatchewan and for Indigenous Engagement, Kelly Hall, hosted Bryce Wood and team from Manitoba Environment and Climate Change’s Environmental Approvals Branch, as well as Adrienne McGarrigle of Solas Energy, who offered guidance to help navigate the upcoming Wind Energy Procurement Process.

    The Indigenous Clean Energy track consisted of several sessions. It began with an “Indigenous Nation-Nation Experience Sharing Session,” with opening remarks by Kisik Energy Manitoba’s Darrell Brown, a Founding Chair at ICE. Next, the “Indigenous Renewables Turtle Island Landscape” session was facilitated by ICE’s Henderson and ICE Board Member Mihskakwan James Harper of NRStor.

    The “Indigenous Wind Project Development Discussion,” also facilitated by Henderson, featured Kory Wood (Kikinaw Energy Services), Troy Jerome (Sentii Energy, Kiruguj First Nation) and Drew Bernard (Lennox Island First Nation).

    The Summit closed with an open Q&A discussion with the audience, facilitated by CanREA & ICE, with special guest Isabelle Deguise of Renewable Energy Systems (RES) Canada Inc., who is also a CanREA Board member.

    “The first-ever Manitoba Wind Energy Indigenous Equity Summit was a great success.  Indigenous engagement is a priority for the clean energy industry, as it is critical to the success of the energy transition in Manitoba, and across Canada. As Manitoba’s current Indigenous wind energy procurement progresses, CanREA will continue to advocate for Indigenous engagement, share our industry knowledge and be a voice for the industry in Manitoba,” said Hall.

    CanREA thanks all attendees and speakers for participating in the Summit, with a special thanks to ICE for their collaboration in organizing, supporting and executing the Summit, and to our generous sponsors, Northland Power (the Wellness and Networking Break Sponsor), and MLT Aikins (the Networking Lunch Sponsor). Doing double duty, Drew Lafond and Kevin Mehi of MLT Aikins also presented at the Summit, focusing on “Legal Considerations for Indigenous Equity Ownership.”

    Photos

    Photo: In “Wind Energy 101 – Developer Spotlight Panel,” CanREA’s Evan Wilson (far right) moderated a panel of wind energy developers with successful projects elsewhere in Canada, including (from L to R) Brian Hodder (Renewable Energy Systems / RES Group), Ina Gjoka (Innergex), Jennifer Tuck (Potentia Renewables) and Galvin Clancey (Nordex).

    Photo: The panel on “Indigenous Nation: Wind Pathways Success” featured, from left to right: moderator Mihskakwan James Harper (NRStor & ICE board member), and speakers Kory Wood (Kikinaw Energy Services), Drew Bernard (Lennox Island First Nation), and Chris Henderson (Indigenous Clean Energy). 

    Photo: The Manitoba Wind Energy Indigenous Equity Summit kicked off with opening remarks by the Hon. Mike Moyes, Manitoba’s Minister of Environment and Climate Change (left), as well as the Hon. Adrien Sala, Minister of Finance and Minister responsible for Manitoba Hydro (right), who spoke about the importance of collaboration and the value that such an event can bring to the process. Centre: Kelly Hall, CanREA’s Director for Manitoba & Saskatchewan and for Indigenous Engagement.

    Quotes

    “In order for Manitoba’s new wind energy procurement to succeed, the renewable energy industry must commit to ensuring that development plans align with the priorities of Indigenous communities.”
    —Evan Wilson, Vice President of Policy—Western Canada and National Affairs, Canadian Renewable Energy Association (CanREA)

    “Indigenous 51% equity is essential to Manitoba’s wind call for power. The Government of Manitoba’s Indigenous inclusion goal was supported by CanREA members and Indigenous communities at the Indigenous Equity Summit in Winnipeg. Indigenous Clean Energy’s collaboration with CanREA was positive, reflecting this vision.” 
    —Chris Henderson, Founding Executive Director, Indigenous Clean Energy (ICE)

    “The first-ever Manitoba Wind Energy Indigenous Equity Summit was a great success. Indigenous engagement is a priority for the clean energy industry, as it is critical to the success of the energy transition in Manitoba, and across Canada. As Manitoba’s current Indigenous wind energy procurement progresses, CanREA will continue to advocate for Indigenous engagement, share our industry knowledge and be a voice for the industry in Manitoba.”
    —Kelly Hall, Director for Manitoba & Saskatchewan, and for Indigenous Engagement, Canadian Renewable Energy Association (CanREA)

    For media inquiries or interview opportunities, please contact: 

    Communications Canadian Renewable Energy Association communications@renewablesassociation.ca 

    About CanREA 

    The Canadian Renewable Energy Association (CanREA) is the voice for wind energy, solar energy and energy storage solutions that will power Canada’s energy future. We work to create the conditions for a modern energy system through stakeholder advocacy and public engagement. Our diverse members are uniquely positioned to deliver clean, low-cost, reliable, flexible and scalable solutions for Canada’s energy needs. For more information on how Canada can use wind energy, solar energy and energy storage to help achieve its net-zero commitments, consult “Powering Canada’s Journey to Net-Zero: CanREA’s 2050 Vision.” Follow us on Bluesky and LinkedIn here. Learn more at renewablesassociation.ca. 

    The post First “Manitoba Wind Energy Indigenous Equity Summit” a success appeared first on Canadian Renewable Energy Association.

    MIL OSI Global Banks –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – 2023 and 2024 reports on Montenegro – P10_TA(2025)0130 – Wednesday, 18 June 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Montenegro, of the other part(1), which entered into force on 1 May 2010,

    –  having regard to Montenegro’s application for membership of the European Union of 15 December 2008,

    –  having regard to the Commission opinion of 9 November 2010 on Montenegro’s application for membership of the European Union (COM(2010)0670), the European Council’s decision of 16-17 December 2010 to grant Montenegro candidate status and the European Council’s decision of 29 June 2012 to open EU accession negotiations with Montenegro,

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1529 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 September 2021 establishing the Instrument for Pre-Accession assistance (IPA III)(2),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1449 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans(3),

    –  having regard to the Presidency conclusions of the Thessaloniki European Council meeting of 19-20 June 2003,

    –  having regard to the Sofia Declaration of the EU-Western Balkans summit of 17 May 2018 and the Sofia Priority Agenda annexed thereto,

    –  having regard to the declarations of the EU-Western Balkans summits of 13 December 2023 in Brussels, and of 18 December 2024 in Brussels,

    –  having regard to the Berlin Process launched on 28 August 2014,

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 6 October 2020 entitled ‘An Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2020)0641),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘2023 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy’ (COM(2023)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Montenegro 2023 Report’ (SWD(2023)0694),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘New growth plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2023)0691),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 20 March 2024 on pre-enlargement reforms and policy reviews (COM(2024)0146),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 24 July 2024 entitled ‘2024 Rule of Law Report’ (COM(2024)0800), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘2024 Rule of Law Report – The rule of law situation in the European Union: Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Montenegro’ (SWD(2024)0829),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘2024 Communication on EU enlargement policy’ (COM(2024)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Montenegro 2024 Report’ (SWD(2024)0694),

    –  having regard to the Commission’s overview and country assessments of 31 May 2023 and of 13 June 2024 of the economic reform programme of Montenegro, and to the joint conclusions of the Economic and Financial Dialogue between the EU and the Western Balkans and Türkiye adopted by the Council on 16 May 2023 and to the joint conclusions of the Economic and Financial Dialogue between the EU and the Western Balkans Partners, Türkiye, Georgia, Republic of Moldova and Ukraine adopted by the Council on 14 May 2024,

    –  having regard to the EU-Montenegro Intergovernmental Accession Conferences of 22 June 2021, 13 December 2021, 29 January 2024, 26 June 2024 and 16 December 2024,

    –  having regard to the 11th EU-Montenegro Stabilisation and Association Council on 14 July 2022,

    –  having regard to the declaration and recommendations adopted at the 22nd meeting of the EU-Montenegro Stabilisation and Association Parliamentary Committee, held on 31 October and 1 November 2024,

    –  having regard to Montenegro’s accession to NATO on 5 June 2017,

    –  having regard to Special Report 01/2022 of the European Court of Auditors of 10 January 2022 entitled ‘EU support for the rule of law in the Western Balkans: despite efforts, fundamental problems persist’,

    –  having regard to the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (the Istanbul Convention), ratified by Montenegro in 2013, and to the recommendations of the Commission on gender equality and combating gender-based violence,

    –  having regard to the World Press Freedom Index report published annually by Reporters Without Borders,

    –  having regard to the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) data on the Ukraine Refugee Situation as of April 2025,

    –  having regard to its recommendation of 23 November 2022 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy concerning the new EU strategy for enlargement(4),

    –  having regard to its previous resolutions on Montenegro,

    –  having regard to its resolution of 29 February 2024 on deepening EU integration in view of future enlargement(5),

    –  having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0093/2025),

    A.  whereas enlargement is a key EU foreign policy tool and a strategic geopolitical investment in peace, stability, security and prosperity;

    B.  whereas the new enlargement momentum, sparked by the changing geopolitical reality and the EU membership applications by several Eastern Partnership countries, has prompted the EU to accelerate its efforts towards delivering on its long-overdue commitments to the Western Balkans; whereas the future of the Western Balkan countries lies within the EU;

    C.  whereas each country is judged on its own merits in fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria, including full respect for democracy, the rule of law, good governance, fundamental EU values and alignment with EU foreign and security policy; whereas the implementation of necessary reforms in the area of ‘fundamentals’ determines the timetable and progress in the accession process;

    D.  whereas Montenegro has gone furthest in the accession process, with all 33 chapters of the EU acquis open and six provisionally closed, and has significant public support therefor;

    E.  whereas the EU is Montenegro’s largest trading partner, investor and provider of financial assistance;

    F.  whereas Montenegro is exposed to malign foreign influence, disinformation campaigns and other forms of influence, including election meddling, hybrid warfare strategies and unfavourable investments from non-EU actors, particularly Russia and China, which are trying to influence Montenegro’s political, economic and strategic trajectory and threaten democratic processes and media integrity, jeopardising the country’s prospects for EU accession;

    G.  whereas on 8 June 2024, an ‘All-Serb Assembly’ took place in Belgrade with the participation of high-ranking parliamentarians under the slogan ‘One people, one Assembly’;

    Commitment to EU accession

    1.  Recognises Montenegro’s firm commitment to EU accession and reaffirms its full support for the country’s future EU membership; welcomes Montenegro’s leading regional position in the EU accession process as well as the overwhelming support of Montenegro’s citizens and the majority of political actors for joining the EU in 2028;

    2.  Welcomes Montenegro’s positive progress in enacting EU-related reforms and measures, underpinned by an ambitious timeline and calls for collective efforts of political actors, civil society and citizens; commends Montenegro for meeting the interim benchmarks for Chapters 23 and 24, which continue to determine the overall pace of negotiations, and for receiving a positive Interim Benchmark Assessment Report; welcomes the closure of three more negotiating chapters, bringing the total to six;

    3.  Encourages all political actors to stay focused on EU integration and the required reforms; stresses the need for political stability, commitment and constructive engagement in consensus building across party lines in order to move swiftly and more effectively towards closing additional chapters in 2025, so as to achieve the country’s ambitious timeline; stresses that the reforms adopted must be implemented effectively and consistently to ensure genuine progress and full alignment with EU legislation; calls for a strengthening of the functioning of, and coordination between, state institutions in order to achieve political stability and advance the country’s substantial progress in implementing key EU-related reforms, in particular electoral and judicial reforms and the fight against organised crime and corruption;

    4.  Underlines that the credibility of the EU, including its enlargement policy as a whole, would be affected if tangible progress achieved by certain Western Balkan countries does not translate into clear advancements on the EU accession path;

    5.  Welcomes Montenegro’s sustained full alignment with the EU’s common foreign and security policy (CFSP), including EU restrictive measures, inter alia, those related to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and those targeted against cyberattacks, as well as its support for the international rules-based order at UN level; encourages Montenegro to strengthen the enforcement of restrictive measures and avoid their circumvention and to seize the assets of those sanctioned; calls on all government representatives to respect and promote CFSP alignment and EU values and refrain from any activities that may threaten Montenegro’s strategic path towards EU membership and its sovereignty; is highly concerned, in this context, by public high officials’ statements in support of the President of the Republika Srpska entity, Milorad Dodik, who is undermining the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina; regrets the participation of high-ranking parliamentarians from Montenegro in the ‘All-Serbian Assembly’ in Belgrade as well as their support for the declaration adopted on that occasion undermining the sovereignty of Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo;

    6.  Underlines the strategic importance of Montenegro’s NATO membership and welcomes its active involvement in EU common security and defence policy missions and operations, such as EU Naval Force Operation Atalanta, and in NATO and other international and multilateral missions; welcomes the decision of Montenegro’s Council for Defence and Security to approve the participation of its armed forces in the EU Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine and NATO’s Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine and calls on the Montenegrin Parliament to adopt these decisions, thereby reinforcing the country’s commitment to collective security;

    7.  Commends Montenegro for its humanitarian and material support to Ukraine and for extending the temporary protection mechanism that grants persons fleeing Ukraine the right to stay in Montenegro for one year; recalls that Montenegro is among the Western Balkan countries hosting the largest number of Ukrainian refugees, with over 18 800 refugees from Ukraine registered in Montenegro as of 31 January 2025, according to UNHCR statistics;

    8.  Remains seriously concerned by malign foreign interference, destabilisation efforts, cyberattacks, hybrid threats and disinformation campaigns, including attempts to influence political processes and public opinion, by third-country actors, which discredit the EU and undermine Montenegro’s progress on its accession path; urges Montenegro to adopt countermeasures in stronger cooperation with the EU and NATO and through increased regional cooperation among the Western Balkan countries; notes that religious institutions can be used as a tool for external influence and condemns any undue interference by the Serbian Orthodox Church in this regard; reiterates the importance of building resilience capacity against foreign information manipulation and interference, including through greater oversight of the media landscape, public awareness campaigns and media literacy programmes; recommends that Montenegro establish a dedicated hybrid threat task force;

    9.  Urges the Commission, the European External Action Service (EEAS), the Delegation of the EU to Montenegro and the Montenegrin authorities to boost strategic communication to Montenegrin citizens on the benefits of the enlargement process and EU membership, as well as on the concrete accession criteria that Montenegro still needs to fulfil to align with EU requirements; urges them, furthermore, to improve the EU’s visibility in the country, including as regards EU-funded projects; calls for StratCom monitoring to be expanded in order to concentrate on cross-border disinformation threats in the Western Balkan countries and their neighbours; calls on the Commission to further support the efforts of the EEAS and the Western Balkans Task Force so as to expand outreach activities by increasing visibility in local media, fact-checking reports and partnering with civil society organisations to counter false narratives more effectively;

    10.  Welcomes the Montenegrin Parliament’s renewed engagement in the Stabilisation and Association Parliamentary Committee;

    Democracy and the rule of law

    11.  Recognises the Montenegrin Parliament’s key role in the accession process, notably as regards passing accession-related legislation, and underlines the importance of parliamentary cooperation in this regard; reiterates the European Parliament’s readiness to use its political and technical resources to advance the EU-related reform agenda, including through democracy support activities; notes, with concern, the re-emerging tensions and ethnic polarisation, which are slowing the reform process; calls for constructive dialogue and consensus building across the political spectrum, prioritising legislative quality, and strongly urges that solutions be found through parliamentary dialogue; calls for preventing identity politics from diverting attention from the EU agenda or straining relations with its neighbours, ensuring that Montenegro remains firmly on the EU path; welcomes the agreement between the Montenegrin Prime Minister and opposition leaders to request an opinion from the Venice Commission regarding the termination of the mandate of Constitutional Court judge Dragana Đuranović and for the opposition to return to the parliament;

    12.  Expresses its concern about attempts to amend the law on Montenegrin citizenship in the Montenegrin Parliament, which could have serious and long-term implications for the country’s decision-making processes and identity, while emphasising that any discussions on identity politics must be handled with the utmost sensitivity to avoid further polarisation and should aim for broad societal consensus; encourages the Montenegrin authorities to consult and coordinate with the EU on any possible changes to the law on citizenship and stresses the importance of achieving consensus on any matters relating to this subject of crucial importance for the identity and independence of Montenegro;

    13.  Strongly encourages the Montenegrin Parliament to hold inclusive and transparent public consultations and regular and meaningful engagement with civil society in decision-making from an early stage in the legislative process, notably for key legislation in the EU reform process; encourages a more active role for the Montenegrin Parliamentary Women’s Club;

    14.  Calls on Montenegro to fully align its electoral legal framework with EU standards, notably as regards harmonising electoral legislation, voting and candidacy rights restrictions, transparency, dispute resolution mechanisms, campaign and media oversight, and political party and election campaign financing, and to implement the recommendations of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights(6); urges Montenegro to increase transparency and control of political party spending and prevent the abuse of state resources by bringing the relevant legislation into line with EU standards, as well as enhancing the enforcement of third-party financing rules and strengthening sanctions for violations; highlights the role of the Agency for Prevention of Corruption (APC) in this regard, and calls for increased cooperation between the APC and financial intelligence authorities to detect and prevent foreign influence in political campaigns; calls, furthermore, on Montenegro to implement the recommendations of the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) on gender parity on electoral lists;

    15.  Reiterates its call on the Montenegrin authorities to establish a single nationwide municipal election day, as provided for in the Law on Local Self-Government, in order to enhance governance efficiency, reduce political tensions and strengthen the stability and effectiveness of municipal and state institutions; recalls that future disbursement of funds under the Reform and Growth Facility is contingent on the fulfilment of this reform, in line with Montenegro’s commitments in its reform agenda, and should be pursued as a matter of priority; welcomes the fact that, in 2022, elections in 14 municipalities were held on the same day; calls for a robust legislative framework in this regard; is concerned by the misconduct of the electoral process in the municipality of Šavnik;

    16.  Calls on the Montenegrin authorities to adopt the Law on Government that should enable an improved governance framework and the optimisation of public administration;

    17.  Underlines the importance of a professional, merit-based, transparent and depoliticised civil service; calls on Montenegro to amend and implement the relevant legislation to provide a framework for the professionalisation, optimisation and rationalisation of state administration, including procedural safeguards against politically motivated decisions on appointments and dismissals, as well as high standards for managerial positions; regrets the lack of significant progress in adopting and effectively implementing such legislation and highlights that this allows for public service recruitment to remain subject to political influence;

    18.  Welcomes Montenegro’s inclusion in the Commission’s 2024 Rule of Law Report; notes, with concern, the identified deficiencies, including judicial appointments and the independence of the prosecutor’s office;

    19.  Welcomes the progress made in implementing key judicial reforms, adopting a new strategic framework and completing long-outstanding judicial appointments; calls on Montenegro to fill the remaining high-level judicial positions;

    20.  Urges Montenegro to further align its legal framework, including the constitution, in particular on the composition and decision-making process of the Judicial Council, with EU laws and standards on the independence, accountability, impartiality, integrity and professionalism of the judiciary, and to further depoliticise appointments to bolster independence, implement outstanding international recommendations, and determine criteria for the retirement of judges and prosecutors in line with European standards and in full compliance with the Constitution; regrets the pending case backlog and calls on Montenegro to take measures to reduce the duration of legal proceedings, particularly for serious and organised crime cases, notably on money laundering; recommends that Montenegro adopt the amendments to the Constitution in the final stage of the country’s EU accession negotiations;

    21.  Notes the steps taken in the fight against corruption, including new laws and provisions on the protection of whistleblowers, the creation of a new National Council for the fight against corruption and a new anti-corruption strategy for 2024-2028; encourages Montenegro to further align with the EU acquis and EU standards and address recommendations by the Commission, the Venice Commission and the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO); encourages the Montenegrin authorities to continue addressing existing deficiencies in the handling of organised crime cases and the seizure and confiscation of criminal assets;

    22.  Urges Montenegro to step up its criminal justice response to high-level corruption, including by strengthening the effective enforcement of existing criminal legislation and imposing effective and deterrent penalties, and to create conditions for judicial institutions and independent bodies dealing with corruption to function effectively, free from political influence;

    23.  Notes the work of the Agency for Prevention of Corruption and calls for it to be provided with sufficient funding and for it to be depoliticised; expects the Agency to deliver tangible results and act non-selectively to strengthen its integrity and enhance its authority in carrying out its competences effectively; calls for a stronger corruption prevention framework;

    24.  Urges Montenegro to align its weapons legislation with EU law and international standards, particularly as regards technical standards for firearm markings, deactivation procedures and regulations for alarm and signal weapons, as well as to establish a standardised and effective data collection and reporting system for firearms; is appalled by the tragic mass shooting in Cetinje and expresses its condolences to the victims’ families; expresses its concern over the exploitation of this tragedy for disinformation and ethnic polarisation; urges Montenegro to strengthen its crisis communication to counter disinformation and ensure responsible media reporting in the aftermath of violent incidents; calls for systematic actions in the areas of security, mental well-being and institutional transparency, as well as in civic education and public awareness, outreach and educational initiatives, on the dangers and risks of firearms, in line with citizens’ expectations and societal needs;

    25.  Calls on Montenegro to urgently fully align its visa policy with that of the EU, especially as regards countries posing irregular migration or security risks to the EU; expresses its concern that, contrary to expectations, two additional countries have been added to the visa-free regime and that Russian and Belarusian passport holders continue to benefit from a visa-free regime; notes that the harmonisation of the visa policy is also provided for in Montenegro’s reform agenda under the Reform and Growth Facility;

    26.  Welcomes the ongoing cooperation between Montenegro and the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex), Europol, Eurojust and the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training (CEPOL), and notes the importance of this cooperation in tackling cross-border crime, including the trafficking of weapons, drugs and human beings, and in combating terrorism and extremism; welcomes the entry into force of the upgraded agreement on operational cooperation in border management with Frontex on 1 July 2023 and encourages further cooperation between Montenegro and Frontex to strengthen border management, support asylum procedures, fight smuggling and enhance readmission;

    Fundamental freedoms and human rights

    27.  Regrets that the most vulnerable groups in society still face discrimination; calls on Montenegro to adopt a new anti-discrimination law and relevant strategies, through an inclusive, transparent and meaningful process that actively involves those most affected, to improve vulnerable groups’ access to rights; underlines that respect for the rights of all national minorities is an integral part of the EU acquis; calls for stronger implementation to ensure equal treatment of all ethnic, religious, national and social groups so that they are guaranteed equal rights and opportunities and can fully participate in social, political and economic life;

    28.  Welcomes Montenegro’s multi-ethnic identity and calls for the further promotion of and respect for the languages, cultural heritage and traditions of local communities and national minorities, as this is closely intertwined with Montenegro’s European perspective;

    29.  Underlines the multi-ethnic identity of the Bay of Kotor; stresses that Montenegro’s European perspective is closely intertwined with the protection of minorities and their cultural heritage; calls on the Montenegrin authorities to nurture the multi-ethnic nature of the state, including the traditions and cultural heritage of the Croatian community in the Bay of Kotor;

    30.  Expresses its grave concern over the endangered heritage sites in Montenegro such as the Bay of Kotor and Sveti Stefan; stresses that Sveti Stefan, along with Miločer Park, was listed among the ‘7 Most Endangered heritage sites in Europe’ for 2023;

    31.  Calls on the Montenegrin authorities to address the difficult living conditions of Roma people in Montenegro and the discrimination they face, and calls for more measures to promote intercultural understanding in schools; calls on the Montenegrin authorities to also take measures to improve the climate of societal inclusion for LGBTI persons;

    32.  Welcomes that Montenegro has aligned its legislative and institutional framework with the EU acquis and international human rights standards regarding compliance with the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and its optional protocols; urges the authorities to address shortcomings in implementation, namely related to accountability and monitoring;

    33.  Calls for the effective implementation of strategies to uphold the rights of persons with disabilities across all sectors and policies;

    34.  Condemns all hate speech, including online and gender-based hate speech, and hate crimes; welcomes the criminalisation of racism and hate speech;

    35.  Emphasises the need to strengthen institutional mechanisms for gender quality and calls on the Montenegrin authorities to address the gender pay gap, to improve women’s participation in decision-making – in both the public domain, particularly public administration, and judicial and security sectors, and in business – to ensure the increased political participation of women, to introduce gender responsive budgeting, and to combat gender stereotypes and strengthen efforts to combat discrimination against women, particularly in rural areas; welcomes recent efforts aimed at boosting women’s representation in science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) and encourages further efforts in technology sectors;

    36.  Is deeply concerned by the high rates of gender-based violence, including domestic violence and femicide; calls on Montenegro to fully align its definitions of gender-based violence and domestic violence with the Istanbul Convention, and with recommendations of international bodies, and to set up effective protection and prevention mechanisms and support centres, and ensure effective judicial follow-up for victims of domestic and sexual violence as well as a more robust penal policy towards perpetrators; calls for the collection of disaggregated data on gender-based violence and gender disparities to improve policy responses;

    37.  Regrets that the draft law on legal gender recognition was not adopted in 2024, despite it being a measure under Montenegro’s EU accession programme; urges Montenegro to adopt the law without delay;

    38.  Welcomes Montenegro’s new media laws and its strategy for media policy aimed at strengthening the legal framework to effectively protect journalists and other media workers; insists on a zero-tolerance policy with regard to pressure on, harassment of, or violence against journalists, particularly by public figures; underlines the need for effective investigations, the prosecution of all instances of hate speech, smear campaigns and strategic lawsuits against journalists, and follow-up of past cases; stresses the need to ensure journalists’ rights to access information and maintain a critical stance; notes a significant improvement in Montenegro’s press freedom, demonstrated by its progress on the World Press Freedom Index;

    39.  Expresses its concern over cases where journalists, academics and civil society organisations have faced pressure for exercising free speech, including instances where the police have initiated misdemeanour proceedings against them; is concerned by the use of strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs) to target journalists;

    40.  Regrets the prevailing high level of polarisation in the media and its vulnerability to political interests and foreign influence as well as foreign and domestic disinformation campaigns that spread narratives that negatively impact democratic processes in the country and endanger Montenegro’s European perspective; calls on Montenegro to further develop improved media literacy programmes and include them as a core subject in education; calls on the Montenegrin authorities to ensure the editorial, institutional and financial independence of the public service broadcaster RTCG, as well as the legality of the appointment of its management and full respect for court rulings concerning RTCG; recalls that it needs to comply with the law and the highest standards of accountability and integrity; regrets that the independence of public media is being weakened and undermined; calls on all media entities to comply with legal requirements on public funding transparency;

    41.  Welcomes the publication of the 2023 population census results; calls on the authorities to avoid any politicisation of the process; encourages stakeholders to use these results in a non-discriminatory manner;

    42.  Welcomes Montenegro’s vibrant and constructive civil society and underlines its importance in fostering democracy and pluralism and in promoting good governance and social progress; expresses its concern over the shrinking space for civil society organisations with a critical stance, and condemns all smear campaigns, intimidation and attacks against civil society organisations, notably by political figures in the context of proposals for a ‘foreign agent law’; notes that such laws have the potential to undermine fundamental freedoms and the functioning of civil society and are inconsistent with EU values and standards; calls for a supportive legal framework and clear and fair selection criteria in relation to public funding; calls for the Council for Cooperation between the Government and non-governmental organisations to resume work; underlines the importance of building collaborative relationships and genuinely consulting civil society on draft legislation from an early stage onwards;

    Reconciliation, good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation

    43.  Recalls that good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation are essential elements of the enlargement process; commends Montenegro’s active involvement in regional cooperation initiatives; recalls that good neighbourly relations are key for advancing in the accession process;

    44.  Regrets that Chapter 31 could not be closed in December 2024; calls on all engaged parties to find solutions to outstanding bilateral issues in a constructive and neighbourly manner and prioritise the future interests of citizens in the Western Balkans; recalls that using unresolved bilateral and regional disputes to block candidate countries’ accession processes should be avoided; welcomes bilateral consultations between the Republic of Croatia and Montenegro on the status of unresolved bilateral issues; encourages the authorities to continue pursuing confidence-building measures;

    45.  Notes Montenegro’s amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code to address legal and practical obstacles to the effective investigation, prosecution, trial and punishment of war crimes in line with relevant recommendations; calls on Montenegro to apply a proactive approach to handling war crimes cases, in line with international law and standards, to identify, prosecute and punish the perpetrators and the glorification of war crimes and ensure access to, and delivery of justice, redress and reparations for victims, and clarify the fate of missing persons; calls on Montenegro to allocate sufficient resources to specialised prosecutors and courts and proactively investigate all war crime allegations and raise issues of command responsibility, as well as to review past cases that were not prosecuted in line with international or domestic law; calls for regional cooperation in the investigation and prosecution of individuals indicted for war crimes; recognises that addressing these issues and safeguarding court-based facts are an important foundation for trust, democratic values, reconciliation and strengthening bilateral relations with neighbouring countries, and encourages Montenegro to step up these efforts;

    46.  Warns against the dangers of political revisionism, which distorts historical facts for political purposes, undermines accountability and deepens societal divisions; strongly condemns the glorification of war criminals and widespread public denial of international verdicts for war crimes, including by the Montenegrin authorities; considers that President Jakov Milatović’s statement expressing regret over the participation of Montenegrin forces in the bombardment of the city of Dubrovnik was a valuable contribution to regional peace and reconciliation;

    47.  Reiterates its support for the initiative to establish the Regional Commission for the establishment of facts about war crimes and other gross human rights violations on the territory of the former Yugoslavia (RECOM);

    48.  Reiterates its call for the archives that concern the former republics of Yugoslavia to be opened and for access to be granted to the files of the former Yugoslav Secret Service and the Yugoslav People’s Army Secret Service in order to thoroughly research and address communist-era crimes;

    Socio-economic reforms

    49.  Welcomes Montenegro’s inclusion in SEPA payment schemes, lowering costs for citizens and businesses; underlines that this opens up opportunities for business expansion, increased competitiveness, innovation and improved access to foreign direct investments;

    50.  Welcomes the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans, which aims to integrate the region into the EU’s single market, promote regional economic cooperation and deepen EU-related reforms, and which includes the EUR 6 billion Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans; welcomes Montenegro’s adoption of a reform agenda and encourages its full implementation; notes that the implementation of the defined reform measures under Montenegro’s reform agenda for the Growth Plan would provide access to over EUR 380 million in grants and favourable loans, subject to successful implementation; stresses the importance of inclusive stakeholder consultations, including local and regional authorities, social partners and civil society, in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation phases;

    51.  Encourages Montenegro to make best use of all EU funding available under the Pre-accession Assistance Instrument (IPA III), the Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans, the IPARD programme and the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans, to accelerate socio-economic convergence with the EU and further align its legislation with the EU on fraud prevention; recalls the conditionality of EU funding, which may be modulated or suspended in the event of significant regression or persistent lack of progress on fundamentals;

    52.  Calls for the EU and the Western Balkan countries to establish a framework for effective cooperation between the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) and the accession countries in order to facilitate close cooperation and the prosecution of the misuse of EU funds, including through the secondment of national liaison officers to the EPPO; encourages Montenegro to fully implement working arrangements with the EPPO; calls for the EU to make the necessary legal and political arrangements to extend the jurisdiction of the EPPO to EU funds devoted to Montenegro as a candidate country;

    53.  Positively notes Montenegro’s economic growth; calls for more steps to reduce the budget deficit and public debt, and to further remove indirect tax exemptions that do not align with the EU acquis; welcomes the efforts to reduce these fiscal vulnerabilities; reiterates the need for increased public investment in the education system for sustainable social and economic development;

    54.  Notes Montenegro’s public debt to foreign financial institutions and companies that can be used as a tool to influence its policy decisions, in particular those related to China and Russia; welcomes the efforts to reduce these vulnerabilities and calls on the authorities to further reduce economic dependence on China and to continue making use of the Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans, the EU Global Gateway initiative and the Reform and Growth Facility, with a view to finding greener and more transparent alternatives for financing infrastructure projects; calls on Montenegro to increase transparency in future infrastructure projects, ensure competitive bidding and avoid excessive debt dependence on foreign creditors;

    55.  Calls on the Montenegrin authorities to take measures to counter depopulation and emigration, in particular through investments in education and healthcare, especially in the north of the country, as well as through decentralisation by investing in medium-sized cities;

    56.  Encourages the Montenegrin authorities to boost the digital transformation and pursue evidence-based labour market policies to address the persistently high unemployment rate, in particular among women and young people, while bolstering institutional capacity and enhancing the underlying digital policy framework, and to effectively implement the Youth Guarantee and the new Youth Strategy; urges the authorities to address brain drain as a matter of urgency; encourages the development of targeted preventive measures and incentives to legalise informal businesses and employees, as a large informal sector continues to hinder economic and social development in Montenegro;

    57.  Welcomes the calls for the prompt integration of all Western Balkan countries into the EU’s digital single market before actual EU membership, which would crucially enable the creation of a digitally safe environment;

    58.  Calls for more transparency in public procurement, notably for procedures via intergovernmental agreements, and for full compliance with EU rules and principles; calls on Montenegro to reduce the number of public procurement procedures without notices; expresses its concern over the financial burden and lack of transparency surrounding the construction of the Bar-Boljare motorway financed by a Chinese loan; stresses that the secrecy surrounding loan agreements and construction contracts raises accountability concerns;

    59.  Expresses its concern over any agreements or projects that circumvent public procurement rules, transparency obligations and public consultation requirements, as set out in national legislation and EU standards; calls on the Government of Montenegro to ensure full respect for the principles of transparency, accountability, inclusive decision-making and the rule of law in all public infrastructure and development initiatives;

    Energy, the environment, biodiversity and connectivity

    60.  Urges Montenegro to advance the green transition, with the support of EU funding, improve its institutional and regulatory framework and enhance energy resilience by finally adopting and implementing the long-overdue National Energy and Climate Plan, adopting energy efficiency laws and integrating further with EU energy markets; calls for all new green transition projects to be implemented in line with EU standards on the environment, State aid and concessions;

    61.  Regrets the lack of progress on key sector reforms in the area of transport policy; calls on the Montenegrin authorities to align the country’s transport development with the Sustainable and Smart Mobility Strategy for the Western Balkans, focusing on railways, multimodality and reducing CO2 emissions and other environmental impacts, and to further implement its Transport Development Strategy and strengthen administrative capacities for the implementation of trans-European transport networks;

    62.  Welcomes the reduction of data roaming charges between the EU and the Western Balkan countries and calls on the authorities, private actors and all stakeholders to take all necessary steps towards the goal of bringing data roaming prices close to domestic prices by 2028; welcomes the entry into force of the first phase of the implementation of the roadmap for roaming between the Western Balkans and the EU;

    63.  Encourages the adoption of sectoral strategies for waste management, air and water quality, nature protection and climate change, ensuring strategic planning for investments; notes the lack of progress and associated rising costs in building essential waste water treatment plants to prevent sewage pollution in rivers and the sea in seven municipalities;

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    64.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Commissioner for Enlargement, the Commissioner for the Mediterranean, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, and to the President, Government and Parliament of Montenegro, and to have it translated and published in Montenegrin.

    (1) OJ L 108, 29.4.2010, p. 3, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_internation/2010/224/oj.
    (2) OJ L 330, 20.9.2021, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1529/oj.
    (3) OJ L, 2024/1449, 24.5.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1449/oj.
    (4) OJ C 167, 11.5.2023, p. 105.
    (5) OJ C, C/2024/6746, 26.11.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6746/oj.
    (6) https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/montenegro.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – 2023 and 2024 reports on Moldova – P10_TA(2025)0131 – Wednesday, 18 June 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘2024 Communication on EU enlargement policy’ (COM(2024)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Republic of Moldova 2024 Report’ (SWD(2024)0698),

    –  having regard to the Commission opinion of 17 June 2022 on the application by the Republic of Moldova (hereinafter ‘Moldova’) for membership of the European Union (COM(2022)0406) and the joint staff working document of 6 February 2023 entitled ‘Association Implementation Report on the Republic of Moldova’ (SWD(2023)0041),

    –   having regard to Regulation (EU) 2025/535 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 March 2025 on establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Republic of Moldova(1),

    –  having regard to its previous resolutions on Moldova,

    –  having regard to the Commission analytical report of 1 February 2023 on Moldova’s alignment with the EU acquis (SWD(2023)0032),

    –  having regard to the proposal of 9 October 2024 for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Republic of Moldova (COM/2024/0469),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 9 October 2024 on the Moldova Growth Plan (COM/2024/0470),

    –  having regard to the Council conclusions of 17 December 2024 on enlargement,

    –  having regard to the visit of the delegation of the Committee on Foreign Affairs to Moldova on 25-27 February 2025,

    –  having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0096/2025),

    A.  whereas, following Moldova’s application for EU membership of 3 March 2022, the European Council granted it candidate status on 23 June 2022 and subsequently decided to open accession negotiations on 14 December 2023;

    B.  whereas in June 2024 negotiations on Moldova’s EU accession started;

    C.  whereas Moldova held a referendum on 20 October 2024, the outcome of which confirmed the embedding of EU accession into its Constitution, despite various forms of manipulative interference to destabilise the country, illicit financing of political actors, disinformation campaigns and cyberattacks;

    D.  whereas the Association Agreement(2), which includes a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (AA/DCFTA), remains the basis for political association and economic integration between the EU and Moldova, and a regular political and economic dialogue is ongoing between the two sides;

    Progress with EU accession-related reforms, in particular on the rule of law and governance

    1.  Commends Moldova’s exemplary commitment and steady progress with EU accession-related reforms despite significant internal and external challenges – such as Russia’s full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine – which made it possible for accession negotiations to start in June 2024, half a year after the relevant decision by the European Council on 14 December 2023 and less than two years after the country’s application for EU membership on 3 March 2022;

    2.  Recognises that EU-Moldova relations have entered into a new phase, with intensifying cooperation, gradual alignment across all policy areas of the EU acquis and advancement on the EU integration path; welcomes the progress achieved in the bilateral screening process since it started in July 2024 and the recent closing of screening for cluster 1 (fundamentals) and cluster 2 (internal market); commends and supports the ambition of the Moldovan Government to open negotiations on cluster 1 (fundamentals), cluster 2 (internal market) and cluster 6 (external relations) in the coming months, as well as completing the screening process for all clusters by the end of 2025; calls on the Commission to enhance its support to the Moldovan Government in order to ensure the successful achievement of these key objectives; encourages the Council to take a merit-based approach in its decisions on Moldova’s negotiation process; deplores the bilateralisation and instrumentalisation of the EU accession process, such as the opposition of the Hungarian Government to opening negotiations on clusters 1, 2 and 6, which has led to a delay and serves Russia’s objective of obstructing the European integration of the region;

    3.  Believes that Moldova’s capacity to consolidate its current progress with EU accession-related reforms and sustain the ambitious pace towards EU membership will require the strong and genuine support of a parliamentary majority after the elections in autumn 2025;

    4.  Notes that the outcomes of both the constitutional referendum on EU accession, held on 20 October 2024, and the presidential election, held on 20 October 2024 and 3 November 2024, confirmed the support of a majority of the people of Moldova for the country’s goal of EU membership and the required pro-EU reforms; underlines that this referendum and election were held professionally and with an extraordinary sense of duty and dedication, despite a massive hybrid campaign by Russia and its proxies which used various tools, such as the strategic exploitation of social media, AI-generated content, ‘leaks’ of fake documents, intimidation, which entailed various forms of manipulative interference to destabilise the country, illicit financing of political actors, vote-buying, including by Russia’s instrumentalisation of parts of the clergy from the Metropolis of Chisinau and All Moldova, disinformation campaigns and cyberattacks; recalls that these attacks had four key strategies: divide society, delegitimise institutions, discredit democratic actors and promote Russian influence; welcomes the outcome of the 2024 constitutional referendum which enshrined the commitment to joining the EU in the country’s constitution; strongly condemns the increasing attempts by Russia, pro-Russian oligarchs and Russian-sponsored local proxies to destabilise Moldova, sow divisions within Moldovan society and derail the country’s pro-EU direction through hybrid attacks, the instrumentalisation of energy supplies, disinformation, manipulation and intimidation campaigns targeting civil society organisations and independent media;

    5.  Notes that the upcoming parliamentary elections on 28 September 2025 will be of crucial importance for the continuation of Moldova’s pro-EU trajectory; is concerned about the likely intensification of foreign, in particular Russian, malign interference and hybrid attacks ahead of the elections; calls for the EU to increase its support, including financial and technical support, for the Moldovan Government’s efforts to counter such interference in the country’s democratic process, including through additional sanctions listings, an extension and consolidation of the mandate and resources of the EU Partnership Mission (EUPM) in Moldova and the granting of additional support thereto, and the sharing of expertise in foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), countering hybrid threats and strengthening resilience; calls similarly for an increase in efforts by the Moldovan authorities and the EU in support of independent media and pro-democracy civil society, in order to enable journalists at national and regional level to counter FIMI and to strengthen digital literacy;

    6.  Stresses the importance of strategic communication, debunking and combating false, Russia-promoted narratives about the EU and its policies and of highlighting the concrete short- and long-term benefits of EU accession for the people of all of Moldova, with a special focus on regions such as Gagauzia as well as socio-economically disadvantaged communities in rural areas; calls for the EU to step up its support for Moldova in this regard;

    Socio-economic reforms

    7.  Welcomes the Commission’s Moldova Growth Plan, which is aimed at supporting Moldova’s socio-economic and fundamental reforms and enhancing access to the EU’s single market; welcomes the Reform and Growth Facility for Moldova, which underpins the Growth Plan and is worth EUR 2,02 billion, making it the largest EU financial support package for Moldova since its independence; underlines that this facility provides Moldova with EUR 520 million in non-repayable support and a maximum amount of EUR 1,5 billion in loans, with an 18 % pre-financing rate, demonstrating the EU’s recognition of the urgency of supporting Moldova’s reforms and resilience; calls on the Commission to support the Moldovan authorities in implementing the necessary Reform Agenda for the effective absorption of funds from this facility, ensuring that the benefits of this support are promptly felt by Moldova’s citizens; looks forward to the announced impact assessment of the Reform and Growth Facility for Moldova in the form of a Commission staff working document within three months of the adoption of the corresponding regulation;

    8.  Calls on the Commission to include adequate dedicated pre-accession funds for Moldova in the EU’s next multiannual financial framework, and to begin preparing Moldova for the efficient use of future pre-accession funds as a newly designated EU candidate country;

    9.  Reiterates that the support of the people of Moldova for European integration can be strengthened with a tangible improvement in their livelihoods, by strengthening state institutions and public administration in order to use project funding effectively and to implement and enforce the EU acquis, ensuring a robust welfare system and fighting corruption and oligarchic influence and ensuring accountability; calls on the Moldovan authorities to continue to ensure the meaningful involvement of civil society organisations, diaspora, vulnerable groups and social partners, including trade unions, in order to strengthen trust in democratic institutions and processes and boost public support for EU accession-related reforms;

    10.  Stresses the importance of civil society organisations in monitoring governance and progress with EU-related reforms, promoting transparency, defending human rights and countering disinformation and external malign influence by anti-reform political actors and Russian proxies;

    11.  Calls for comprehensive social policy reforms to address poverty and persistent large-scale emigration, increase healthcare coverage, strengthen public education, improve working conditions and develop adequate social protection systems; emphasises that economic development must be inclusive and sustainable, with opportunities for small and medium-sized enterprises; stresses the need for targeted social investment in Moldova’s young people and rural areas to reduce regional disparities and safeguard social cohesion;

    12.  Calls for special emphasis on Moldova’s participation in EU social, educational, and cultural programmes in order to promote social convergence, innovation and technological advancement;

    13.  Calls on Moldova to implement the Reform Agenda, which outlines the key socio-economic and fundamental reforms to accelerate the growth and competitiveness of Moldova’s economy and its convergence with the EU on the basis of enhanced implementation of the AA/DCFTA;

    14.  Strongly calls for the acceleration of Moldova’s gradual integration into the EU and the single market by continuing to align its legal and regulatory framework with the EU acquis and associating the country to more EU programmes and initiatives, including through the granting of observer status to Moldovan officials and experts in relevant EU bodies, which would deliver tangible socio-economic benefits even before the country formally joins the EU; congratulates Moldova on its inclusion in the geographical scope of the Single Euro Payments Area payment schemes, facilitating transfers in euro and reducing costs for Moldova’s citizens and businesses; commends the inclusion of roaming liberalisation in the updated EU–Moldova Association Agreement; welcomes Moldova’s recent progress in the transposition of the EU’s roaming and telecommunications acquis and expresses support for a swift decision on the inclusion of Moldova into the EU ‘roam like at home’ area; calls on the service providers to cooperate in good faith with the Moldovan authorities on implementing ‘roam like at home’;

    15.  Welcomes the renewal of the EU’s temporary trade liberalisation measures in July 2024 in order to support Moldova’s economy, substituting the loss of trade caused by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and its unfriendly policies towards Moldova; calls for the EU to take swift and significant steps towards the permanent liberalisation of its tariff-rate quotas, in order to ensure predictability and increase the country’s attractiveness to investors;

    16.  Notes that the recent decision of the US administration to suspend support for civil society, independent media, key reforms and infrastructure projects has created additional urgent needs in Moldova, regarding which the EU should step in; calls on the Commission, in this regard, to increase its funding for EU instruments supporting democracy, such as the European Endowment for Democracy, and for other key projects that had until recently been funded by the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and other US agencies;

    Human rights

    17.  Notes Moldova’s progress towards achieving gender equality, including its adoption of the Programme for Promoting and Ensuring Equality between Women and Men for the 2023-2027 period, and calls for its continued efforts in this regard, particularly to reduce the gender pay gap, fight against stereotypes, discrimination and gender-based violence, and to increase the representation of women in politics and business;

    18.  Welcomes the efforts by the Moldovan authorities to combat violence against women and improve protection for survivors, in particular the adoption of the National Programme on Preventing and Combatting Violence against Women and Domestic Violence for the 2023-2027 period; notes that the impact of this, however, is still lacking and therefore calls for the establishment of more shelters for survivors of domestic violence, for adequate attention by the justice system to violence against women and for policy changes and increased awareness-raising among men regarding gender-based violence;

    19.  Calls on the Moldovan Government to strengthen its efforts, including the effective implementation of its legislative framework, to combat racial discrimination, marginalisation, racist hate speech and hate crimes targeting members of ethnic minority groups, including the Roma;

    20.  Commends Moldova’s efforts to improve the rights of the LGBTIQ+ community in recent years;

    21.  Calls on the Moldovan Government to fully align its legislation on the rights of persons with disabilities with the EU acquis and to tackle the systemic problem of children with intellectual disabilities being placed in psychiatric institutions;

    Energy, environment and connectivity

    22.  Condemns Russia’s instrumentalisation of energy against Moldova, most recently by halting gas supplies to the Transnistrian region on 1 January 2025, in violation of contractual obligations, and thereby provoking a serious crisis in the region; applauds the Commission’s swift proposal of a Comprehensive Strategy for Energy Independence and Resilience and its support package worth EUR 250 million, which will reduce the energy bills of Moldovan consumers, including in the Transnistrian region, support Moldova’s decoupling from Russia’s energy supplies and integrate Moldova into the EU energy market; emphasises the need for the EU and the Moldovan authorities to effectively communicate about the substantial EU support package aimed at addressing Moldova’s energy crisis;

    23.  Commends the alignment of the Moldovan energy sector with the EU acquis; calls on the Moldovan Government to continue its efforts, with EU support that includes the tools available from the Reform and Growth Facility for Moldova, to diversify gas and electricity supply routes, develop connectivity, increase energy efficiency and its internal production and storage capacity, as well as advance its full integration into the EU energy market in order to ensure Moldova’s energy security and resilience; stresses the importance of the completion of the Vulcanesti-Chisinau 400 kV overhead power line by the end of 2025 in order to reduce Moldova’s reliance on energy infrastructure in the Transnistrian region; calls on the EU to mobilise the necessary resources to help compensate for the withdrawal of USAID support for Moldova’s energy sector;

    24.  Commends the Moldovan Government for its progress on decarbonisation, energy efficiency and transitioning to a green economy, including doubling the share of renewable energy to 30 % by 2030; encourages the EU and its Member States to continue to provide financial support and expertise to Moldovan counterparts in this area; welcomes the adoption in 2023 of Moldova’s National Climate Change Adaptation Programme until 2030 and its Action Plan for this purpose; calls on the Moldovan Government to adopt and begin implementing its National Energy and Climate Plan for the 2025-2030 period; notes the importance of implementing the commitments of the Energy Community’s Decarbonisation Roadmap, and implementing the Monitoring, Reporting, Verification and Accreditation package with a view to introducing carbon pricing and aligning with the EU emissions trading system;

    25.  Believes that an extension of the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T) corridor Baltic Sea-Black Sea-Aegean Sea (Corridor IX) to include the route of Chisinau-Constanta-Varna-Bourgas would be a strategic investment in the region’s transport infrastructure, enhancing connectivity and promoting economic growth, in view of the enlargement of the EU to the east and the potential positive impact of this extension on the region’s security and stability, serving as a key logistics route for NATO and enhancing the EU’s geostrategic autonomy;

    Rule of law and good governance

    26.  Underlines that comprehensive justice reform remains key for the success of Moldova’s democratic and EU accession-related reforms; recognises Moldova’s sustained efforts to build an independent, impartial, accountable and professional judicial system and conclude the vetting process by the end of 2026; calls, therefore, for the EU to continue actively supporting the justice reform and the process of vetting both judges and prosecutors, including the attraction, training and recruitment of qualified judicial personnel and increase in judicial capacity;

    27.  Notes that Moldova has achieved progress in the fight against and prevention of corruption, but stresses the need to continue the fight against money laundering; welcomes the entry into force in February 2024 of Moldova’s National Integrity and Anti-Corruption Programme for 2024-2028; highlights the need to ensure enhanced coordination among all key anti-corruption and justice institutions in order to implement comprehensive reforms and to ensure that they have adequate resources and capacities; stresses that results in terms of prosecution and conviction in corruption cases need to be delivered in order to ensure public trust in the ongoing reforms;

    28.  Recalls the importance of continuing the investigation and bringing to justice those responsible for the 2014 bank fraud; welcomes the fact that, after long efforts by the Moldovan authorities, Interpol has finally added one of the alleged perpetrators, Vladimir Plahotniuc, to its list of internationally wanted persons;

    29.  Welcomes the adoption by Moldova in 2023 of a new national strategy for preventing and combating human trafficking, aligned with the EU acquis, and the cooperation of Moldova with Europol in combating drug trafficking;

    30.  Expresses its readiness to continue supporting the Parliament of Moldova through mutually agreed democracy support activities that respond to the needs of the institution, its elected members and staff; underlines the importance of the Parliament of Moldova in fostering public debate about the country’s European future and achieving a broad consensus over, and democratic legitimacy of, EU accession-related reforms across political parties and among broader society; highlights the decision of 10 March 2025 to open a European Parliament office in Chisinau to further strengthen Parliament’s engagement with the Eastern Partnership region;

    Cooperation in the field of common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and progress on resolving the Transnistrian conflict

    31.  Welcomes Moldova’s consistent cooperation on foreign policy issues and the significantly increased rate, notably from 54 % in 2022 to 86 % in 2024, of its alignment with the EU’s CFSP positions and restrictive measures; invites it to continue to improve this alignment, including on restrictive measures against Russia, and to continue cooperation on preventing the circumvention of sanctions against Russia and Belarus related to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine;

    32.  Underlines that Moldova is a key contributor to the regional and European security, including through its unwavering support to Ukraine since the start of Russia’s war of aggression, for example by welcoming Ukrainian war refugees, and through its contributions to the EU Civil Protection Mechanism, for example by deploying firefighting teams to tackle severe wildfires in Greece;

    33.  Expresses its support for the EUPM in Moldova and calls on the Member States to contribute the necessary experts and financial resources, in anticipation of a potential intensification of hybrid threats; welcomes the recent extension of the EUPM’s mandate until April 2026; encourages the Moldovan authorities to make full use of the EUPM’s expertise to enhance its preparedness, particularly in view of repeated electoral interference ahead of the parliamentary elections on 28 September 2025; calls for the EU to draw from the experience gained in Moldova in protecting the electoral process and democratic institutions in the EU itself; encourages the European External Action Service and the Commission to use all available EU instruments in the area of countering hybrid threats, in order to continue to support Moldova, including by swiftly deploying a Hybrid Rapid Response Team; welcomes the establishment of Moldova’s Centre for Strategic Communications and Countering Disinformation, as a means of coordinating the fight against foreign interference among the various Moldovan institutions, and of the National Agency for Cyber Security and the National Institute for Cyber Security Innovations; notes that Moldova’s National Security Strategy, adopted in December 2023, highlights EU accession as a key objective and for the first time identifies Russia as the source of major threats to Moldova’s security; stresses the importance of improving information sharing and intelligence cooperation between Moldova and the EU and its Member States on security threats;

    34.  Reiterates its full commitment to Moldova’s territorial integrity and to the peaceful resolution of the conflict, based on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Moldova in its internationally recognised borders;

    35.  Welcomes the Commission’s initiatives to include proactive support for the Transnistrian region in its energy emergency support packages, and exchange of information and practical cooperation between the Moldovan Government and the de facto authorities of the Transnistrian region throughout the energy crisis caused by Russia; welcomes the progress regarding the conditionalities for Tiraspol in light of the recent gas transit agreement and calls for the full implementation of these conditionalities, including the release of all political prisoners by Tiraspol and the dismantling of the remaining illegal checkpoints;

    36.  Welcomes Moldova’s keen interest in contributing to the EU’s common security and defence policy (CSDP) and the fact that Moldova is the first country to sign a security and defence partnership with the EU; welcomes Moldova’s continued active participation in EU missions and operations under the CSDP, namely the EU Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Operation Althea) and the EU Training Mission in Somalia, its interest in participation in PESCO projects and the ongoing negotiations on a framework agreement with the European Defence Agency; calls on the EU to include Moldova in the EU security and defence programmes and related budget allocations, including the European Defence Industry Programme and Readiness 2030, allowing the country to participate in joint procurement alongside the Member States;

    37.  Welcomes the allocation of EUR 50 million to modernise the defence capacities of the Moldovan Armed Forces in the context of the current security challenges through the European Peace Facility (EPF) for 2024; notes that Moldova is the second-largest EPF beneficiary after Ukraine, with a total of EUR 137 million allocated since 2021; welcomes the announced support of EUR 60 million to be provided to Moldova from the EPF budget in 2025; calls on the Member States to progressively increase the EPF funding for Moldova to further enhance the country’s defence capabilities;

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    o   o

    38.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and to the President, Government and Parliament of the Republic of Moldova.

    (1) OJ L, 2025/535, 21.3.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/535/oj.
    (2) Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Moldova, of the other part (OJ L 260, 30.8.2014, p. 4, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_internation/2014/492/oj).

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Cantwell Questions Energy Secretary Why DOE is Spiking Clean Energy Projects, Increasing Electricity Costs

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Washington Maria Cantwell
    06.20.25
    Cantwell Questions Energy Secretary Why DOE is Spiking Clean Energy Projects, Increasing Electricity Costs
    Cantwell presses Secretary Wright on whether DOE will renege on $1B promised for PNW green hydrogen hub On hydropower, Secretary acknowledges to Cantwell that “hydro has been a great resource for this country” that is “quite beneficial to our electricity grid”
    WASHINGTON, D.C. – Today, U.S. Senator Maria Cantwell (D-WA), a senior member of the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee, pressed U.S. Department of Energy Secretary Chris Wright on whether the Trump Administration is attempting to roll back hydrogen production investments secured and awarded under the Biden Administration — including a $1 billion grant awarded to the Pacific Northwest Hydrogen Association in 2023 to become a one of seven Regional Clean Hydrogen Hubs, as well as a 2022 tax credit aimed at spurring more investment in clean hydrogen production called 45V.  The budget reconciliation bill passed last month by the House of Representatives eliminates the hydrogen credit, as would the proposal released earlier this week by Senate Finance Committee Chairman Mike Crapo (R-ID).
    Sen. Cantwell: “I actually think getting rid of the tax credits that we have, some of the other ones, broadly, are going to lead to electricity increased cost. And so, can I get you to tell me about the hydrogen hubs, whether you believe you support the hydrogen hubs and moving forward on this?”
    Wright: “So, we put together, as I’m sure you’ve heard, and we’ve published it on the website, this project review process. We have a cross-functional team that evaluates every project. We’re going through 500 projects.”
    Sen. Cantwell: “But is that data call a way to kill the projects? Or no, you really believe in funding some?”
    Wright: “Oh, absolutely. No, we are funding plenty of projects right now, and we don’t stop funding any project. We’re funding all of the existing projects right now, and when we evaluate them – no, plenty of projects will pass. Plenty of projects will pass. Other projects we’ll say, “Hey, can you modify it this way to make it much more beneficial?” Some projects will be modified, and some projects will be ended. “
    Video of their Q&A is HERE; a transcript is HERE.
    Hydrogen is a clean fuel that, when consumed in a fuel cell, produces no dirty emissions — only water. Hydrogen can be produced from existing power resources, such as solar and hydropower.
    Sen. Cantwell helped secure the Regional Clean Hydrogen Hubs (H2Hubs) program and other key hydrogen investments in the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law (BIL) during consideration in the Energy and Natural Resources Committee in July 2021, where she is a senior member, and push for its successful passage through the Senate. The H2Hubs program designated up to $7 billion in competitive grants to establish between six and 10 regional clean hydrogen hubs across the United States. These networks of hydrogen producers, consumers, and local connective infrastructure were meant to help accelerate the use of hydrogen as clean energy and work toward achieving former President Biden’s goal of a 100 percent clean electrical grid by 2035 and net-zero carbon emissions by 2050.
    In October 2023, with support from the region’s Congressional delegation led by Sen. Cantwell, the Pacific Northwest Hydrogen Association received a $1 billion grant through the H2Hubs program. With continued federal support, the Pacific Northwest Hydrogen Association will be able to build out a robust network of hydrogen suppliers and off-takers in both the western and eastern parts of Washington and Oregon, as well as parts of Montana. Clean hydrogen can support decarbonization efforts already being made in the transportation, industrial, and agricultural sectors, as well as the rapidly expanding zero-carbon aviation sector being pioneered in the Pacific Northwest.
    In 2022, President Biden signed the Inflation Reduction Act into law, which included the 45V hydrogen production tax credit to incentivize projects that produce clean hydrogen power. In July 2024, Sen. Cantwell joined a group of colleagues in sending a letter urging then-Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen to issue guidance on 45V eligibility that capitalizes on the “opportunity to reduce greenhouse gas emissions faster and enhance our energy security, while strengthening our economy, creating thousands of jobs, and combating the climate crisis.” The budget bill currently being negotiated in the House and the Senate would drastically shorten the timeline for projects to qualify for the 45V credits – requiring them to begin construction by Jan. 1, 2026 rather than the previous deadline of Jan. 1, 2033 – and cut funding for the H2Hubs program. The Trump Administration is also currently reviewing the remaining H2Hubs financing.

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI Africa: From Discovery to Delivery: Building a Legal Framework for Namibia’s Midstream Infrastructure (by Rachel Mushabati)

    By Rachel Mushabati, Senior Associate Attorney & Country Head – CLG Namibia (www.CLGGlobal.com)

    Namibia’s recent offshore oil discoveries mark a pivotal moment in the country’s energy sector. With major players such as Shell, TotalEnergies, QatarEnergy, and Galp uncovering significant reserves, Namibia is poised to become a key oil producer. However, while exploration and production activities have gained momentum, the midstream sector; involving transportation, storage, and refining of petroleum, remains underdeveloped.

    A strong legal framework for midstream infrastructure is essential to ensure that Namibia maximizes economic benefits, attracts investment, and builds a sustainable energy industry. CLG Legal and Business Advisory, with its extensive advisory experience across Africa, is uniquely positioned to support this transition. CLG has advised on midstream regulatory frameworks, infrastructure structuring, and investment promotion strategies in various jurisdictions, and brings this expertise to the Namibian context.

    Understanding Midstream Infrastructure and Its Importance

    Midstream infrastructure serves as the critical link between oil extraction and the end consumer. This includes pipelines, refineries, storage facilities, and specialized port infrastructure that facilitate the transportation of crude oil and natural gas. Without adequate midstream infrastructure, Namibia risks becoming an exporter of raw crude without capturing additional value through processing and distribution. A robust midstream sector can boost job creation, industrial development, and energy security, making it a strategic national priority.

    Market studies from other African producers have shown that well-developed midstream infrastructure can contribute up to 30% more in local value addition compared to direct crude exports.[1] In Ghana, for instance, domestic refining and pipeline infrastructure contributed significantly to its GDP growth in the petroleum sector between 2016–2022. Namibia has the opportunity to tap into similar economic potential.[2]

    Existing Legal Framework and Gaps

    Namibia’s petroleum sector is primarily governed by the Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act 2 of 1991 and the Petroleum Products and Energy Act 13 of 1990. These laws focus largely on upstream activities and the regulation of downstream petroleum products. However, there is no dedicated midstream regulatory framework. The absence of clear midstream regulations means there is little guidance on ownership structures, investment incentives, and operational guidelines for pipelines, storage, and refining facilities.

    For example, Nigeria’s midstream sector prior to the Petroleum Industry Act (2021) faced significant bottlenecks due to the absence of a clear regulatory framework, particularly regarding third-party access and tariff setting for pipeline infrastructure. These issues led to investor reluctance and underinvestment, which were only addressed after the establishment of the Nigerian Midstream and Downstream Petroleum Regulatory Authority (Nigeria Petroleum Industry Act, 2021).

    Lessons from Other Oil-Producing Countries

    Namibia can draw inspiration from countries that have successfully developed midstream infrastructure through effective regulation. Norway, for example, has established a robust midstream legal framework that ensures state participation in pipelines and refineries while promoting private investment.[3] Ghana has a dedicated Petroleum Midstream Regulatory Authority that oversees infrastructure development and ensures compliance with environmental and safety standards. Similarly, Nigeria’s Petroleum Industry Act (2021) introduced the Nigerian Midstream and Downstream Petroleum Regulatory Authority, which provides clear guidelines on pipeline ownership and operations.

    The Role of Key Stakeholders in Strengthening Namibia’s Legal Framework

    To unlock the full potential of the midstream sector, coordinated action is required among various stakeholders:

    1. Government Ministries and Regulators: Responsible for drafting legislation, setting environmental and safety standards, and issuing licenses.
    2. Private Sector and Investors: Bring in capital and technical expertise, while also needing legal certainty to invest confidently.
    3. State-Owned Entities: Can serve as infrastructure operators and strategic partners in public-private partnerships.
    4. Civil Society and Communities: Essential for ensuring environmental accountability and social license to operate.
    5. Legal Advisory Firms: Provide technical assistance in drafting laws, structuring transactions, and navigating policy reform.

    Strengthening Namibia’s Midstream Legal Framework

    To address the existing gaps, Namibia must develop a comprehensive legal framework that clearly defines the governance of midstream activities. A dedicated Midstream Act would be a crucial first step, providing legal certainty on pipeline infrastructure, refineries, storage, and transportation. Encouraging public-private partnerships can drive midstream development while ensuring local participation. Establishing an independent regulatory authority will help enhance transparency, streamline approvals, and enforce compliance.

    Additionally, Namibia should implement policies that prioritize local employment and skills transfer, ensuring that midstream investors contribute to national workforce development. Environmental and safety standards must also be strengthened to mitigate risks associated with pipeline integrity, spill prevention, and emergency response. To further attract investors, tax breaks, duty exemptions, and streamlined licensing processes should be introduced to make Namibia a more competitive destination for midstream infrastructure development.

    Conclusion

    For Namibia to fully capitalize on its oil discoveries, it must establish a strong midstream legal framework that facilitates the efficient transportation, storage, and processing of petroleum resources. Without this, the country risks losing significant economic value and remaining dependent on crude exports.

    By adopting best practices from other oil-producing nations and implementing strategic legal reforms, Namibia can create a thriving midstream sector that benefits both investors and citizens alike. CLG stands ready to support this transformation, leveraging its pan-African expertise in midstream regulation, infrastructure development, and legal advisory. Our team has been instrumental in shaping midstream legal regimes across West and Central Africa, and we are committed to helping Namibia build a regulatory foundation that supports sustainable growth and long-term prosperity.

    [1] Ruben, R., Kuijpers, R., & Dijkxhoorn, Y. (2022). Mobilizing the Midstream for Supporting Smallholder Intensification. Land, 11(12), 2319. https://apo-opa.co/4ngI2bu

    [2] Oxford Business Group. “Ghana’s energy production targets and exploration attract investment”. Retrieved from https://apo-opa.co/4kUZQHu.

    [3] Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (2021). ‘Midstream Regulatory Framework and Investment Guidelines’.

    Distributed by APO Group on behalf of CLG.

    Contact:
    Email: info@clgglobal.com
    Phone: +27 11 245 5900

    MIL OSI Africa –

  • MIL-OSI USA: USGS Releases Report on Oil and Gas Potential Beneath U.S. Public Lands

    Source: US Geological Survey

    If produced, that would be enough oil to supply all of the nation’s needs for 4 years at the current rate of consumption, and enough natural gas to meet the nation’s needs for nearly 12 years.  

    The onshore public lands of the U.S. included in the report are those administered by the Departments of Agriculture, Defense, Energy and Interior and the Tennessee Valley Authority. 

    The undiscovered oil and gas resource estimates are both significant increases from the most recent USGS estimates in 1998.These increases are due not to any change in the subsurface but to the revolution in energy production since the previous USGS estimates of undiscovered oil and gas resources on public lands in 1998, when the USGS estimated 7.86 billion barrels of oil and 201.1 trillion cubic feet of gas.  Those estimates focused on conventional oil and gas accumulations and did not include all unconventional resources such as shale oil, tight oil and tight gas (oil and gas trapped in impermeable rock), and coal-bed gas, which are routinely produced using fracking and are now part of USGS oil and gas assessments. 

    “The USGS assesses the potential for energy resources where science tells us there may be a resource that hasn’t been discovered yet,” said Sarah Ryker, acting director of the USGS. “In this report, we leveraged our extensive existing data to estimate oil and gas resources on federally managed public lands.  We expect these estimates to be useful for state and national land management, energy futures analysis, and economic development planning.”  

    The estimates were produced by compiling previously published reports that included 579 assessment units, subdivisions of the nation’s 69 geologic provinces that the USGS assesses for undiscovered, technically recoverable oil and gas. Resources were then allocated to public lands proportionally based on the percentage of public land in each defined assessment unit. 

    ###

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI Russia: HSE at SPIEF: Investments in Electric Power, the Role of Women in the Economy, and the “Russian Engineer”

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: State University Higher School of Economics – State University Higher School of Economics –

    © Roman Kitashov / Roscongress Foundation

    Should we increase electricity generation and what should be the role of the state here? What economic effect does involving women in the economy provide? How can we train personnel to ensure technological leadership? HSE representatives, together with other experts, sought answers to these and other questions at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum. In addition, HSE signed a number of cooperation agreements.

    Blood for the economy

    Investments in the electric power industry have a significant multiplier effect on the economy, they contribute to the development of regions and related industries, believes Ilya Dolmatov, Director Institute of Economics and Regulation of Infrastructure Industries HSE. However, against the backdrop of increased availability of electricity, the volume of investment in this area has decreased, he noted, speaking at the session “Investments in the Electric Power Industry on the Horizon up to 2050.”

    Meanwhile, today the economy is transforming, many industries are digitalizing and, in fact, deeper electrification is taking place. “In this sense, we can definitely say that if we do not provide investments for the growth of new capacities, we will face the fact that the economy will not grow. We already see that we have to introduce certain restrictions on electricity consumption, connecting new consumers,” says Ilya Dolmatov. At the same time, in the current macroeconomic realities, the expert believes, it is impossible to do without state support, especially in infrastructure. “The state must determine priority projects and, accordingly, measures to support them,” he believes.

    “Russia is currently one of the top four countries in terms of electricity consumption,” said Deputy Minister of Energy of the Russian Federation Petr Konyushenko. The department expects electricity consumption to grow by about a third of the current level by 2050. To cover the projected growth, it is planned to increase generating capacity, and a number of large construction projects in the electric grid economy will be launched in the near future. These are global federal projects to connect the East with Siberia, to build a direct current line that will connect the Novovoronezh nuclear power plant with Moscow, and a power transmission line from Krasnoyarsk Krai to Buryatia.

    The tasks of industry, in turn, are to help power engineers solve their problems, noted Deputy Minister of Industry and Trade Mikhail Ivanov. Over the course of 10 years, demand for power engineering has grown threefold, and the capabilities of our production have grown fourfold, he shared the figures. But it is still necessary to correctly “balance the capabilities of engineering with the modernization of electric power facilities.”

    The head of Yakutia, Aisen Nikolaev, noted that “everyone needs energy, it is like lifeblood for the economy.” But, according to him, companies all unanimously say that without state support, it is simply impossible to implement energy investment projects as desired. “We also need support from development institutions, which are much talked about. This is preferential lending first and foremost, especially in our conditions. These are direct government investments, these are tax breaks, which have already been discussed today. Well, and balanced tariff regulation,” the speaker noted.

    The session was also attended by Pavel Snikkars, CEO of PJSC T Plus, Alexandra Panina, member of the board of PJSC Inter RAO, Kirill Komarov, First Deputy CEO, Director of the Development and International Business Block of Rosatom, Alexey Molsky, member of the board, Deputy CEO for Investments and Capital Construction of PJSC Rosseti, Eldar Muslimov, First Deputy CEO of MKOOO EN HOLDING, and bank representatives.

    Ilya Dolmatov signed an agreement between the HSE and Rosvodokanal at the SPIEF. The parties agreed to develop cooperation in the field of training and retraining of personnel, research and development, and technology implementation activities. On behalf of Rosvodokanal, the signature was made by the company’s CEO Sergey Krzhanovsky.

    International Women’s Cooperation

    Victoria Panova, Vice-Rector of the National Research University Higher School of Economics, Head of BRICS Expert Council – Russia, Russia’s Sherpa in the Women’s Twenty, took part in the session of the Eurasian Women’s Forum “International Cooperation of Women in the Interests of Economic Development” within the framework of the SPIEF.

    According to Victoria Panova, scientific research has shown that more active involvement of women in employment can add about 7 trillion dollars to the global GDP in the coming decades. More active participation of women in the economy and development of female education will also contribute to the growth of labor productivity by 35%. “Women are more likely to reinvest income from entrepreneurial activity in health care, food security and education, which increases the sustainability of the country’s development and ensures stability and overall prosperity,” said Victoria Panova.

    The Vice-Rector also stressed the importance of strengthening expert and scientific interaction among women researchers. She proposed creating a regularly updated depository of measures to expand the legal and economic opportunities of women in the association countries in BRICS.

    Priority is technological leadership

    HSE Vice-Rector Dmitry Zemtsov moderated the session “Training Personnel to Ensure Russia’s Technological Sovereignty” at the Ministry of Education and Science stand.

    Deputy Minister of Science and Higher Education of the Russian Federation, graduate of the Master’s program “Management in Higher Education» Olga Petrova of the Higher School of Economics spoke about synchronizing personnel training with business demands and solving the problem of achieving technological leadership. One of the key projects was the Advanced Engineering Schools project. “The project has become a powerful tool for synchronizing efforts so that the very “Russian engineer” in the broad sense emerges from the walls of the university,” said Olga Petrova. According to her, another flagship program for personnel training, Priority 2030, of which the HSE is a participant, has been reconfigured for technological leadership.

    The session featured the following speakers: Rector of Peter the Great St. Petersburg Polytechnic University Andrey Rudskoy, Rector of MEPhI Vladimir Shevchenko and other speakers.

    The topic of what specialists will be in demand on the global market was also discussed at the session “Preparing Personnel for the International Market of the Future.” Its moderator was Irina Karelina, Vice President of the National Research University Higher School of Economics.

    The Russian Ministry of Education and Science stand also hosted a session entitled “The Rights of Young Scientists to Their Developments: How Not to Drown in Bureaucracy?” The director of the Institute for Enterprise and Market Analysis HSE University Anton Kazun. In particular, he spoke about the experience of transforming the results of fundamental research into applied projects (using the example of the recommendation system for selecting lawyers “Zastupnik”) and the possibilities of developing a model of technology transfer centers in various universities of the Russian Federation (based on the experience of HSE University), including regular exchange of experience between universities (for example, within the framework of the “Priority-2030” program). Anton Kazun also took part in the discussion of the proposal to legislatively enshrine the exemption from VAT when implementing the rights to use all types of RIAs, exclusive rights to which are held by universities.

    Dmitry Zemtsov also signed a number of agreements concluded by the HSE within the framework of the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum.

    An agreement was reached with the Russian State University for the Humanities on joint scientific research related to historical and cultural identity, traditional values, preservation of cultural heritage, as well as on holding scientific events and student expeditions within the framework of the project “Rediscovering Russia”. In addition, the plans include formulating proposals for socio-economic development that will be included in youth policy programs in Russia. The documents were signed by Rector of the Russian State University for the Humanities Andrey Loginov and Dmitry Zemtsov.

    Cooperation agreements were also signed between the ANO “University of Entrepreneurs” and universities participating in the program, including the National Research University Higher School of Economics. The parties agreed to create and develop entrepreneurial workshops, where more than 350 senior students will begin developing at least 50 business projects as early as 2025.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    MIL OSI Russia News –

  • MIL-OSI Africa: Petralon Energy Set to Shape Conversations on Nigeria’s Oil Future at African Energy Week (AEW) 2025

    African Energy Week (AEW) 2025: Invest in African Energies is honored to welcome Ahonsi Unuigbe, Founder and CEO of Petralon Energy, as a distinguished speaker at this year’s edition in Cape Town. A driving force behind one of Nigeria’s leading indigenous upstream oil and gas companies, Unuigbe will offer valuable perspectives on the role of independent operators in Africa’s energy future, as well as the opportunities arising from sector reforms, new fiscal incentives and major IOC divestments.

    Since its founding, Petralon Energy has positioned itself at the forefront of Nigeria’s upstream sector, with a mission to create value through indigenous ownership and technical excellence. In 2025, the company continues to make significant strides at the Dawes Island Field, where drilling and completion of a new well added 2,500 barrels of oil per day to Nigeria’s daily production, directly supporting national energy security and economic growth. Petralon is also pursuing strategic offshore investments through its non-operated interests in OML 127 and OML 130, part of a broader plan to strengthen its asset portfolio amid the shifting dynamics of Nigeria’s upstream sector.

    Beyond its operational achievements, Petralon Energy is focused on long-term capacity building. The company launched its Future Leaders Program in 2024, aimed at equipping young Nigerian engineers with the technical, leadership and problem-solving skills necessary to drive the sector forward. Petralon’s strategic partnership and joint investment agreement with engineering firm Julius Berger Nigeria, announced earlier this year, further reflects its commitment to delivering infrastructure solutions that support sustainable field development and enhance project delivery.

    At AEW 2025, Unuigbe will join key discussions on how African independents can leverage new fiscal frameworks, attract investment and form partnerships that maximize the potential of both mature and frontier assets. His participation will contribute to high-level dialogue around indigenous firms’ expanding role in shaping the continent’s energy landscape.

    “Companies like Petralon Energy represent the future of Nigeria’s oil and gas sector — a future where African companies take the lead in driving production, creating jobs and delivering energy security. We are proud to welcome them at AEW 2025, where we will celebrate and support the success of local firms like Petralon that are building Africa’s energy industry from the ground up,” states NJ Ayuk, Executive Chairman of the African Energy Chamber.

    Petralon Energy’s participation in AEW 2025 embodies the conference’s core theme of African solutions for African energy challenges, and reflects the growing leadership of indigenous companies in delivering the continent’s energy future.

    Distributed by APO Group on behalf of African Energy Chamber.

    About African Energy Week (AEW):
    AEW: Invest in African Energies is the platform of choice for project operators, financiers, technology providers and government, and has emerged as the official place to sign deals in African energy. Visit www.AECWeek.com for more information about this exciting event.

    MIL OSI Africa –

  • MIL-OSI Analysis: Trump’s first term lies at the heart of escalation between Iran and Israel

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Christian Emery, Associate Professor in International Politics, UCL School of Slavonic and East European Studies, UCL

    The US president, Donald Trump, is weighing up whether to join Israel in attacking Iran. The fact he is even contemplating such a move is, in my opinion, a direct consequence of his 2018 decision to tear up the agreement negotiated during Barack Obama’s presidency that limited Iran’s nuclear capabilities in return for sanctions relief.

    Trump not only squandered the opportunity to constrain Iran’s nuclear ambitions severely. He also shut the door on showing Iran that diplomacy and economic development could offer a more promising path than proxy warfare.

    The Obama administration’s core strategic rationale behind the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, or joint comprehensive plan of action (JCPOA), was that amid several devastating regional wars and an American public weary of costly military interventions, a war with Iran would be disastrous. This was especially true given the growing US desire to pivot toward containing China.

    Get your news from actual experts, straight to your inbox. Sign up to our daily newsletter to receive all The Conversation UK’s latest coverage of news and research, from politics and business to the arts and sciences.

    Obama challenged opponents of the deal to propose a credible alternative. And Israel’s prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, addressed US Congress to make the case against the JCPOA. He argued that it would not prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons.

    But Obama ultimately succeeded in persuading the American public that the only real alternative to a negotiated agreement with Iran was yet another war in the Middle East.

    Trump believed that exiting the JCPOA and crushing the Iranian economy would either force the regime to accept major restrictions on its nuclear programme and moderate its regional behaviour, or cause the entire theocratic system to collapse.

    What followed instead was a sharp escalation of tensions in the Persian Gulf. Iran exercised greater reliance on its regional proxy network, with attacks on US personnel increasing. It simultaneously increased its stockpile of highly enriched uranium.

    When Trump took office in 2017, the JCPOA had already eliminated 98% of Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile. It also capped enrichment at 3.7%, well below the level required for a nuclear bomb.

    The situation has changed since Trump’s withdrawal. Israel’s central justification for launching its attack against Iran on June 15 was the International Atomic Energy Agency’s determination that Iran had now amassed over 408kg of uranium enriched up to 60%. Netanyahu claimed that Iran could be “within a few months” of producing a nuclear weapon.

    However, even with these serious violations, US intelligence has consistently stated that Iran is not actively pursuing such a weapon. It recently assessed that, even if Iran decided to do so, it was up to three years away from being able to produce a nuclear weapon that it could deliver to a target of its choosing.

    Netanyahu may have wanted to attack Iran anyway. He has repeatedly claimed over the past 15 years that immediate military action was needed to stop Iran from obtaining a nuclear bomb.

    But it would have been harder to justify an attack on Iran if it possessed no highly enriched uranium and was verifiably complying with the JCPOA. Iran had stuck to the JCPOA for four years, including one year after the US withdrew, and there is no evidence to suggest it wouldn’t have kept to a deal that Iran clearly saw as being in its interests.

    Maximum pressure campaign

    Iran’s developing nuclear programme may be the immediate pretext for the current escalation. But Iran’s proxy warfare strategy, using regional militant groups to fight Israel and serve as pressure points it can activate when threatened, forms the other essential backdrop.

    This strategy pre-dates the Trump administration. But Trump’s so-called “maximum pressure” campaign clearly escalated tensions in the Middle East, making direct confrontation between Israel and Iran more likely.

    When Trump enacted sanctions aiming to eliminate Iran’s oil and gas exports, Tehran retaliated by using its strategic position in the Strait of Hormuz to harass Gulf shipping. In September 2019, an Iranian drone attack on a Saudi oil processing facility temporarily took out 50% of Saudi oil production.

    Iran would normally have zero interest in disrupting Gulf shipping. This is because its own gas and oil must travel through the Strait of Hormuz. But its strategy was to deter Trump’s economic warfare by showing that it would not be the only one to suffer.

    Tehran unsurprisingly viewed Trump’s policy as an attempt to deliver regime change and responded by doubling down on its “forward defence” strategy. Iran increased its military, financial and political backing of proxy groups in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and Yemen. And it also continued development of its ballistic missile programme.

    Before 2018, the US estimated that Iran was sending about US$200 million (£148 million) annually to the Lebanese armed group, Hezbollah. By 2020, it was sending US$700 million.

    Trump’s repudiation of the JCPOA also critically damaged more moderate voices in Iran. In 2017, the success of the JCPOA helped propel reformist president Hassan Rouhani to a second term in office. However, in 2021, the regime prevented key moderate figures from standing.

    Ebrahim Raisi, a hardliner who had lost against Rouhani in 2017 and was already under US sanctions, was elected as Iran’s president. Raisi and his faction demanded tougher terms for any future nuclear deal – more sanctions relief upfront and binding guarantees against another US withdrawal.

    This frustrated attempts to revive the agreement under Joe Biden’s presidency, as only Congress could offer such guarantees. This was an improbable prospect amid escalating tensions with a more hostile, nuclear-advanced Iran that was increasingly aligning with Russia.

    None of this absolves Iran of its own intransigence, support for terrorism or brutalisation of its own citizens. Nor does it free the Islamic Republic of criticism over its decision to abandon the nuclear limits agreed under the JCPOA – even if it was the US that first broke the deal.

    Ultimately, though, the conditions that led to this war would almost certainly not have arisen without Trump’s mishandling of Iran policy in his first administration. It was a precursor to the abysmal leadership he’s demonstrating in this war.

    Christian Emery does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Trump’s first term lies at the heart of escalation between Iran and Israel – https://theconversation.com/trumps-first-term-lies-at-the-heart-of-escalation-between-iran-and-israel-259199

    MIL OSI Analysis –

  • MIL-OSI Global: What ancient ice sheets can tell us about future sea level rise

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Ed Gasson, Royal Society University Research Fellow and Senior Lecturer, Department of Earth and Environmental Sciences, University of Exeter

    When visiting Godrevy beach on the north Cornish coast, most people look out to sea at the lighthouse, surfers and seals rather than the cliffs behind. But these cliffs hold a history of past climate and sea level that is incredibly valuable to scientists like me who are trying to determine how quickly sea level is going to rise in the future.

    Scramble up the slate rocks a few metres and you’ll reach a flat platform cut by waves breaking over 100,000 years ago. On top, there’s a cliff of sand and pebbles, an incredibly clear indicator of where the shoreline used to be, several metres higher than it is today.

    Beaches like this exist all around the Cornish coastline, near Falmouth at Bream Cove and at the furthest western point near Lands End at Porth Nanven.

    Searching for the source of these higher sea levels takes us to the poles. In a climate similar to today, the Antarctic and Greenland ice sheets retreated, raising global sea level. Although exactly where this ice was lost from remains a mystery that continues to frustrate scientists.

    Godrevy lighthouse, Cornwall, UK.
    Vivi_784/Shutterstock

    Local science, global stories.

    This article is part of a series, Secrets of the Sea, exploring how marine scientists are developing climate solutions.

    In collaboration with the BBC, Anna Turns travels around the West Country coastline to meet ocean experts making exciting discoveries beneath the waves.

    When ice gets trapped on land as giant ice sheets, it causes the sea level to change, but it doesn’t change by the same amount all around the planet. Like the moon, the gravity of the ice sheets pulls the ocean towards them, causing sea levels to rise near to the ice sheets.

    The opposite happens when they melt. As the ice on Greenland retreats today, it’s causing the sea level nearby to fall, rather than rise. Only as far as Scotland, some 1,500 miles from Greenland, does this sea level fall switch to a sea level rise.

    The cliffs at Godrevy reveal historic sea level rise.
    Ed Gasson, CC BY-NC-ND

    This gravity effect leaves behind a distinctive fingerprint in past sea level markers, such as raised beaches and fossil coral reefs. By piecing together data from around the world we can work out the source of past high sea levels.

    The raised beaches such as those in north Cornwall are likely caused by the retreat of ice from Antarctica, rather than the ice from Greenland. But direct evidence for ice loss from Antarctica has proven very hard to come by.

    I’m involved with an international drilling project that aims to solve this mystery. Following two challenging seasons of drilling, our team of scientists and engineers will return to Antarctica in late 2025 and attempt to recover sediments from deep underneath the ice, to analyse for signals of past ice retreat.

    If we’re lucky, we’ll recover records from warm climates millions of years ago. This will help us understand how the west Antarctic ice sheet may change in the future as our climate continues to warm.

    Drilling down

    Next winter, this international team is travelling to Scott Base, a New Zealand research station at the edge of the Ross ice shelf in west Antarctica. From there, the journey continues over 500 miles to the other end of the ice shelf, an extremely remote corner of an already remote continent.

    Everything we need is taken across the ice in a convoy of tracked snow vehicles. A hot water drill is used to make a small hole through the 500m ice shelf, providing access to the sediment below. Up to 200m of valuable sediment core will be retrieved with a custom-designed drilling system.

    The geological data contained in these sediments will help us to improve models and refine our predictions of how sea level will rise in the future. As the amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere increases, it is as if we are rapidly moving backwards through geological time.

    Today, there is as much CO₂ in the atmosphere as during a geological epoch known as the mid-Pliocene, more than 3 million years ago. The average estimate for the mid-Pliocene is a concentration of around 400 parts per million (ppm), a value we reached only 12 years ago.

    We’ll exceed the highest concentrations of the Pliocene this year. The next warmest interval is probably the mid-Miocene, 12 million years earlier.

    Back in Cornwall, some communities are already planning for the effects of sea level rise. In Bude, local people have come together to form a “climate jury”, a panel chosen to give local people a voice as to how to best manage and reduce the impacts of a rising sea.

    This approach could be adopted by other communities at risk from sea level rise, alongside other adaptations. Hopefully, the world can avoid a return to the very high sea levels that formed the raised beaches at Godrevy.

    Don’t have time to read about climate change as much as you’d like?

    Get a weekly roundup in your inbox instead. Every Wednesday, The Conversation’s environment editor writes Imagine, a short email that goes a little deeper into just one climate issue. Join the 45,000+ readers who’ve subscribed so far.

    Ed Gasson receives funding from The Royal Society and the Natural Environment Research Council.

    – ref. What ancient ice sheets can tell us about future sea level rise – https://theconversation.com/what-ancient-ice-sheets-can-tell-us-about-future-sea-level-rise-251185

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

  • MIL-OSI Security: How Nuclear and Isotopic Techniques Help Countries Combat Soil Salinization

    Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

    The IAEA has a long history of helping countries adjust to salinized soils. In 1978, the IAEA helped develop climate smart agricultural practices to reclaim salt-affected soil that transformed saline soils in Pakistan into productive farmlands.

    IAEA support to the country has continued as the changing climate has caused even further soil salinization. In Pakistan, erratic rainfall patterns have pushed farmers to irrigate using groundwater with high levels of salt. With IAEA support, Pakistan’s Nuclear Institute for Agriculture and Biology (NIAB) has developed and planted salt-tolerant crops and implemented soil nutrient and water management techniques. Today, NIAB is sharing its expertise by training scientists from other countries affected by soil salinization.

    The IAEA is also supporting countries such as Jordan, Lebanon and Syria, where scientists are using nuclear techniques to develop salt-tolerant crops, helping farmers grow food in degraded soils.

    Following IAEA regional projects, in which 60 researchers from 10 countries were trained in soil, nutrient and water management to combat soil salinity, the IAEA published an open-access book enabling experts in several countries to successfully grow crops under saline conditions such as millet in Lebanon, barley and safflower in Jordan and Kuwait, okra in Syria and quinoa in the United Arab Emirates. “Thanks to the joint work with the IAEA, our scientists applied the recommended climate-smart agricultural practices to successfully grow crops under saline conditions,” says Nabeel Bani Hani, Director of the National Agricultural Research Center in Jordan.

    “As the world faces increasing pressure to feed a growing population, restoring degraded land is more urgent than ever. The IAEA’s work shows that with the right tools—science, collaboration, and innovation—we can turn salty, barren soils into fertile ground for the future” said Mohammad Zaman, Head of the Soil and Water Management and Crop Nutrition Section of the Joint FAO/IAEA Centre.

    MIL Security OSI –

  • MIL-OSI Security: How Nuclear and Isotopic Techniques Help Countries Combat Soil Salinization

    Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

    The IAEA has a long history of helping countries adjust to salinized soils. In 1978, the IAEA helped develop climate smart agricultural practices to reclaim salt-affected soil that transformed saline soils in Pakistan into productive farmlands.

    IAEA support to the country has continued as the changing climate has caused even further soil salinization. In Pakistan, erratic rainfall patterns have pushed farmers to irrigate using groundwater with high levels of salt. With IAEA support, Pakistan’s Nuclear Institute for Agriculture and Biology (NIAB) has developed and planted salt-tolerant crops and implemented soil nutrient and water management techniques. Today, NIAB is sharing its expertise by training scientists from other countries affected by soil salinization.

    The IAEA is also supporting countries such as Jordan, Lebanon and Syria, where scientists are using nuclear techniques to develop salt-tolerant crops, helping farmers grow food in degraded soils.

    Following IAEA regional projects, in which 60 researchers from 10 countries were trained in soil, nutrient and water management to combat soil salinity, the IAEA published an open-access book enabling experts in several countries to successfully grow crops under saline conditions such as millet in Lebanon, barley and safflower in Jordan and Kuwait, okra in Syria and quinoa in the United Arab Emirates. “Thanks to the joint work with the IAEA, our scientists applied the recommended climate-smart agricultural practices to successfully grow crops under saline conditions,” says Nabeel Bani Hani, Director of the National Agricultural Research Center in Jordan.

    “As the world faces increasing pressure to feed a growing population, restoring degraded land is more urgent than ever. The IAEA’s work shows that with the right tools—science, collaboration, and innovation—we can turn salty, barren soils into fertile ground for the future” said Mohammad Zaman, Head of the Soil and Water Management and Crop Nutrition Section of the Joint FAO/IAEA Centre.

    MIL Security OSI –

  • MIL-OSI Security: IAEA Mission Observes Commitment to Safety at Research Reactor in Malaysia, Recommends Further Improvement

    Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

    An IAEA team of experts visited Malaysia’s nuclear research reactor, the Reaktor TRIGA PUSPATI, during an Integrated Safety Assessment for Research Reactors mission. (Photo: Nuklear Malaysia)

    An International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) team of experts said Malaysia is committed to the safe operation of its sole nuclear research reactor, the Reaktor TRIGA PUSPATI (RTP). The team also identified the need to further enhance the effectiveness of the reactor’s safety committee, the management of refurbishment and modernization of the reactor’s safety systems and components, and operating procedures.

    The five-day Integrated Safety Assessment for Research Reactors (INSARR) mission to the RTP facility, which concluded on 20 June, was conducted at the request of Malaysian Nuclear Agency (Nuklear Malaysia). The mission team comprised three experts from Slovenia, South Africa, and Thailand, and two IAEA staff.

    RTP is located in Bangi, Selangor, about 30 kilometres south of Kuala Lumpur. Two INSARR missions were conducted at RTP in 1997 and 2014. Since then, the reactor has undergone modifications, including replacement of the rotary rack, refurbishment of the supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems and the upgrading of the stack monitoring system.

    RTP was constructed in 1979 and began operation in 1982. RTP was designed for various fields of nuclear research, education and training, and it incorporates facilities for neutron and gamma radiation studies, as well as isotope production and sample activation.

    The INSARR team visited the reactor and its associated facilities and met with the research reactor staff and management. “Nuklear Malaysia has shown a commitment to safety by requesting an IAEA INSARR mission,” said Kaichao Sun, team leader and Nuclear Safety Officer at the IAEA. “Ageing management of reactor systems and components that are important to safety can be challenging. Effective application of the IAEA safety standards, including the establishment of effective leadership and management for safety and the utilization of operating experience feedback, helps address this challenge.”

    The mission team made recommendations and suggestions to Nuklear Malaysia for further improvements, including the need for:

    • Improving the reactor safety committee’s oversight of all activities important to safety, including reactor modifications and operational safety programmes such as refurbishment and modernization of the reactor’s safety systems and components;   
    • Strengthening procedures to respond to abnormal situations and events, such as loss of electrical power, fire and earthquakes;      
    • Establishing procedures for learning from operating experience; and     
    • Strengthening radiological protection practices by improving the classification of different areas of the workplace.  

    “The INSARR mission is a valuable opportunity for us to engage in a peer-review process,” said Julia Abdul Karim, Director of Technical Support Division at Nuklear Malaysia. “It enables us to benchmark our programmes and activities against the IAEA safety standards and the international best practices and to strengthen our operational safety of our research reactor.”

    Background

    INSARR missions are an IAEA peer review service, conducted at the request of a Member State, to assess and evaluate the safety of research reactors based on IAEA safety standards. Follow-up missions are standard components of the INSARR programme and are typically conducted within two years of the initial mission. General information about INSARR missions can be found on the IAEA website.

    The IAEA Safety Standards provide a robust framework of fundamental principles, requirements, and guidance to ensure safety. They reflect an international consensus and serve as a global reference for protecting people and the environment from the harmful effects of ionizing radiation.

    MIL Security OSI –

  • MIL-OSI Security: IAEA Mission Observes Commitment to Safety at Research Reactor in Malaysia, Recommends Further Improvement

    Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

    An IAEA team of experts visited Malaysia’s nuclear research reactor, the Reaktor TRIGA PUSPATI, during an Integrated Safety Assessment for Research Reactors mission. (Photo: Nuklear Malaysia)

    An International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) team of experts said Malaysia is committed to the safe operation of its sole nuclear research reactor, the Reaktor TRIGA PUSPATI (RTP). The team also identified the need to further enhance the effectiveness of the reactor’s safety committee, the management of refurbishment and modernization of the reactor’s safety systems and components, and operating procedures.

    The five-day Integrated Safety Assessment for Research Reactors (INSARR) mission to the RTP facility, which concluded on 20 June, was conducted at the request of Malaysian Nuclear Agency (Nuklear Malaysia). The mission team comprised three experts from Slovenia, South Africa, and Thailand, and two IAEA staff.

    RTP is located in Bangi, Selangor, about 30 kilometres south of Kuala Lumpur. Two INSARR missions were conducted at RTP in 1997 and 2014. Since then, the reactor has undergone modifications, including replacement of the rotary rack, refurbishment of the supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems and the upgrading of the stack monitoring system.

    RTP was constructed in 1979 and began operation in 1982. RTP was designed for various fields of nuclear research, education and training, and it incorporates facilities for neutron and gamma radiation studies, as well as isotope production and sample activation.

    The INSARR team visited the reactor and its associated facilities and met with the research reactor staff and management. “Nuklear Malaysia has shown a commitment to safety by requesting an IAEA INSARR mission,” said Kaichao Sun, team leader and Nuclear Safety Officer at the IAEA. “Ageing management of reactor systems and components that are important to safety can be challenging. Effective application of the IAEA safety standards, including the establishment of effective leadership and management for safety and the utilization of operating experience feedback, helps address this challenge.”

    The mission team made recommendations and suggestions to Nuklear Malaysia for further improvements, including the need for:

    • Improving the reactor safety committee’s oversight of all activities important to safety, including reactor modifications and operational safety programmes such as refurbishment and modernization of the reactor’s safety systems and components;   
    • Strengthening procedures to respond to abnormal situations and events, such as loss of electrical power, fire and earthquakes;      
    • Establishing procedures for learning from operating experience; and     
    • Strengthening radiological protection practices by improving the classification of different areas of the workplace.  

    “The INSARR mission is a valuable opportunity for us to engage in a peer-review process,” said Julia Abdul Karim, Director of Technical Support Division at Nuklear Malaysia. “It enables us to benchmark our programmes and activities against the IAEA safety standards and the international best practices and to strengthen our operational safety of our research reactor.”

    Background

    INSARR missions are an IAEA peer review service, conducted at the request of a Member State, to assess and evaluate the safety of research reactors based on IAEA safety standards. Follow-up missions are standard components of the INSARR programme and are typically conducted within two years of the initial mission. General information about INSARR missions can be found on the IAEA website.

    The IAEA Safety Standards provide a robust framework of fundamental principles, requirements, and guidance to ensure safety. They reflect an international consensus and serve as a global reference for protecting people and the environment from the harmful effects of ionizing radiation.

    MIL Security OSI –

  • MIL-OSI NGOs: How Nuclear and Isotopic Techniques Help Countries Combat Soil Salinization

    Source: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) –

    The IAEA has a long history of helping countries adjust to salinized soils. In 1978, the IAEA helped develop climate smart agricultural practices to reclaim salt-affected soil that transformed saline soils in Pakistan into productive farmlands.

    IAEA support to the country has continued as the changing climate has caused even further soil salinization. In Pakistan, erratic rainfall patterns have pushed farmers to irrigate using groundwater with high levels of salt. With IAEA support, Pakistan’s Nuclear Institute for Agriculture and Biology (NIAB) has developed and planted salt-tolerant crops and implemented soil nutrient and water management techniques. Today, NIAB is sharing its expertise by training scientists from other countries affected by soil salinization.

    The IAEA is also supporting countries such as Jordan, Lebanon and Syria, where scientists are using nuclear techniques to develop salt-tolerant crops, helping farmers grow food in degraded soils.

    Following IAEA regional projects, in which 60 researchers from 10 countries were trained in soil, nutrient and water management to combat soil salinity, the IAEA published an open-access book enabling experts in several countries to successfully grow crops under saline conditions such as millet in Lebanon, barley and safflower in Jordan and Kuwait, okra in Syria and quinoa in the United Arab Emirates. “Thanks to the joint work with the IAEA, our scientists applied the recommended climate-smart agricultural practices to successfully grow crops under saline conditions,” says Nabeel Bani Hani, Director of the National Agricultural Research Center in Jordan.

    “As the world faces increasing pressure to feed a growing population, restoring degraded land is more urgent than ever. The IAEA’s work shows that with the right tools—science, collaboration, and innovation—we can turn salty, barren soils into fertile ground for the future” said Mohammad Zaman, Head of the Soil and Water Management and Crop Nutrition Section of the Joint FAO/IAEA Centre.

    MIL OSI NGO –

  • MIL-OSI NGOs: IAEA Mission Observes Commitment to Safety at Research Reactor in Malaysia, Recommends Further Improvement

    Source: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) –

    An IAEA team of experts visited Malaysia’s nuclear research reactor, the Reaktor TRIGA PUSPATI, during an Integrated Safety Assessment for Research Reactors mission. (Photo: Nuklear Malaysia)

    An International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) team of experts said Malaysia is committed to the safe operation of its sole nuclear research reactor, the Reaktor TRIGA PUSPATI (RTP). The team also identified the need to further enhance the effectiveness of the reactor’s safety committee, the management of refurbishment and modernization of the reactor’s safety systems and components, and operating procedures.

    The five-day Integrated Safety Assessment for Research Reactors (INSARR) mission to the RTP facility, which concluded on 20 June, was conducted at the request of Malaysian Nuclear Agency (Nuklear Malaysia). The mission team comprised three experts from Slovenia, South Africa, and Thailand, and two IAEA staff.

    RTP is located in Bangi, Selangor, about 30 kilometres south of Kuala Lumpur. Two INSARR missions were conducted at RTP in 1997 and 2014. Since then, the reactor has undergone modifications, including replacement of the rotary rack, refurbishment of the supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems and the upgrading of the stack monitoring system.

    RTP was constructed in 1979 and began operation in 1982. RTP was designed for various fields of nuclear research, education and training, and it incorporates facilities for neutron and gamma radiation studies, as well as isotope production and sample activation.

    The INSARR team visited the reactor and its associated facilities and met with the research reactor staff and management. “Nuklear Malaysia has shown a commitment to safety by requesting an IAEA INSARR mission,” said Kaichao Sun, team leader and Nuclear Safety Officer at the IAEA. “Ageing management of reactor systems and components that are important to safety can be challenging. Effective application of the IAEA safety standards, including the establishment of effective leadership and management for safety and the utilization of operating experience feedback, helps address this challenge.”

    The mission team made recommendations and suggestions to Nuklear Malaysia for further improvements, including the need for:

    • Improving the reactor safety committee’s oversight of all activities important to safety, including reactor modifications and operational safety programmes such as refurbishment and modernization of the reactor’s safety systems and components;   
    • Strengthening procedures to respond to abnormal situations and events, such as loss of electrical power, fire and earthquakes;      
    • Establishing procedures for learning from operating experience; and     
    • Strengthening radiological protection practices by improving the classification of different areas of the workplace.  

    “The INSARR mission is a valuable opportunity for us to engage in a peer-review process,” said Julia Abdul Karim, Director of Technical Support Division at Nuklear Malaysia. “It enables us to benchmark our programmes and activities against the IAEA safety standards and the international best practices and to strengthen our operational safety of our research reactor.”

    Background

    INSARR missions are an IAEA peer review service, conducted at the request of a Member State, to assess and evaluate the safety of research reactors based on IAEA safety standards. Follow-up missions are standard components of the INSARR programme and are typically conducted within two years of the initial mission. General information about INSARR missions can be found on the IAEA website.

    The IAEA Safety Standards provide a robust framework of fundamental principles, requirements, and guidance to ensure safety. They reflect an international consensus and serve as a global reference for protecting people and the environment from the harmful effects of ionizing radiation.

    MIL OSI NGO –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Congressman Nick Langworthy Holds Press Conference on Energy Choice Act, Vows to End Blue-State Wars on American Energy

    Source: US Congressman Nick Langworthy (NY-23)

    ELMIRA, N.Y. – Today, Congressman Nick Langworthy (NY-23) held a press conference in Elmira, NY, on the Energy Choice Act to prohibit states or local governments from banning an energy service’s connection, reconnection, modification, installation, or expansion based on the type or source of energy to be delivered.

    “Governor Kathy Hochul and Democrats in Albany are hurting New Yorkers with their relentless war on American energy,” said Congressman Langworthy. “Her effort to ban the use of gas in buildings across the state will not only increase energy costs for families, but it will also eliminate a reliable and necessary source of energy that keeps homes heated and people safe. As this is becoming a dangerous trend in blue states across the country, the Energy Choice Act would end these costly bans and secure our nation’s energy future.”

    Watch the livestream here.

    “The Independent Oil and Gas Association of New York (IOGANY) fully supports the passage of the proposed Energy Choice Act. IOGANY is an association of oil and gas producers, pipeline companies, and associated support industries that provide safe, reliable, cost-effective energy in New York State. We are also New York State business owners and homeowners that are experiencing the same inflationary costs as NY citizens. 

    “During the past decade, New York has implemented policies to improve New York’s air quality through the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) and Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (CLCPA). Both of these policies are focused on reaching emission reduction goals by reducing the use of fossil fuels and increasing the use of green energy (wind and solar). These efforts have resulted in increased electric and natural gas utility bills as costs of these green energy programs are passed through to the business community and homeowners. Everyone knows the sun does not shine and the wind does not blow all the time, so this transition is impacting energy reliability.  

    “In addition to increased utility bills, these policies will force home and business owners to pay to convert buildings and homes to use primarily electric energy (new electric appliances and heating systems), as well as, purchase electric vehicles and pay for charging stations installation. This is increasing the cost of living in New York State at a time when we already have a high tax burden and people are leaving the state.

    “IOGANY members, as citizens and business owners in New York, want clean air but question what this effort will cost citizens and will reliable energy be available to support our current standard of living. We also question if the current established emission goals can be reached while still providing safe, reliable, cost-effective energy. Cleaner air is a wonderful objective but at what cost and impact on our standard of living. This is why as individuals and members of the oil and gas industry, we support the Clean Energy Choice Bill passage,” said the Independent Oil and Gas Association of New York.

     

    “This Energy Choice legislation is of key importance to all New Yorkers. This bill gives the ability to adequately power and heat our homes, businesses, and institutions that make New York the Empire State. The plumbing and heating contractors of the NYS PHCC have members throughout the entire state, employing thousands of technicians, many union plumbers, who see firsthand how ill-conceived but well-intentioned local and state restrictive energy laws are jeopardizing our energy usage and supply in our great state.  Everyone wants to have efficient, environmentally friendly and reliable energy.  This law would allow for the use of not only renewable gas and hydrogen but also other fuels like bio biodiesel, all made in New York. The NYS PHCC fully supports Congress member Langworthy’s Energy Choice Act,” said Terence O’Brien Co-Executive Director; NYS PHCC.

    ###

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Energy Panel at the XXVIII St. Petersburg International Economic Forum

    Source: Rosneft

    Headline: Energy Panel at the XXVIII St. Petersburg International Economic Forum

    Start: June 21, 10 a.m.

    The broadcast of the Energy Panel will be organized on internal television (channel F3) and the Roscongress news channel.

    Energy consumption and progress have always been interconnected. The higher mankind climbed up the ladder of development, the more energy was required for new achievements – from the campfires of primitive times to the nuclear power plants of today.

    Our civilization is at a critical stage now – the global energy industry is facing a large-scale transformation, the energy consumption model is changing. Against this background, every country faces the issue of the need to ensure energy security.

    What will the energy industry of the future look like and what factors will determine its development? What role will new technologies play in this process? Which country will be the first to ensure the transition to a new energy sector? And what is in store for the oil industry against the backdrop of these changes?

    The answers to these and other questions will be revealed during the broadcast of the Energy Panel.  

    Keynote Speech:
    ● Igor Ivanovich Sechin, Chief Executive Officer, Rosneft Oil Company  

    Moderator:
    ● Rick Sanchez, RT anchor

    Department of Information and Advertising
    Rosneft Oil Company
    June 20, 2025

    MIL OSI Economics –

  • MIL-OSI USA: NIST Names Shyam Sunder Associate Director for Laboratory Programs

    Source: US Government research organizations

    Dr. Shyam Sunder

    GAITHERSBURG, Md. — The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) announced that S. Shyam Sunder has been selected as its new Associate Director for Laboratory Programs (ADLP), effective June 1, 2025.

    In this role, Sunder will provide leadership and oversight to NIST’s laboratories, which provide vital measurement and research services that underpin technology innovation in the United States. NIST’s non-regulatory science mission is executed in close partnership with industry through its laboratory programs by supporting new technologies, services and markets, and industry-led, consensus-based standards that help American companies compete around the world. 

    “Shyam’s expertise and practical background, as well as his more than 30 years in leadership roles at NIST, make him an invaluable asset as we continue to push boundaries in critical and emerging technologies,” said Deputy Under Secretary of Commerce for Standards and Technology and Acting NIST Director Craig Burkhardt. “Shyam will play a crucial role in helping NIST accelerate advances at the forefront of measurement science, which is the foundation for unleashing technological innovation and U.S. economic competitiveness.”

    Sunder previously served as director of NIST’s Special Programs Office and Acting Director of the Standards Coordination Office. In these roles, he established and managed the NIST Safety Commission, which issued a comprehensive set of findings and recommendations to improve NIST’s safety culture and the effectiveness of its safety protocols. In response to the CHIPS for America Act, he led NIST’s cross-laboratory team, engaging more than 800 stakeholders to assess and publish seven “grand challenges” to advance the U.S. semiconductor industry. He further led NIST’s efforts to establish a competitively selected Standardization Center of Excellence to accelerate U.S. engagement in international standardization for critical and emerging technologies through a cooperative agreement with the private sector-led U.S. standards system.

    Sunder’s prior positions include founding director of NIST’s Engineering Laboratory, director of its Building and Fire Research Laboratory (BFRL), and chief of BFRL’s Structures and Materials Division. He co-chaired White House National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) panels that set the federal R&D agenda for Net-Zero Energy High-Performance Buildings and Cyber-Physical Systems.

    Before joining NIST in 1994, he served on the Massachusetts Institute of Technology faculty. He received master and doctor of science degrees from MIT, and a bachelor of technology with distinction from the Indian Institute of Technology Delhi.

    Sunder is a recipient of the Presidential Rank Award of Distinguished Executive, and the U.S. Department of Commerce Gold Medal Award, its highest honor, for distinguished leadership of the federal building and fire safety investigation of the World Trade Center disaster after the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. He was elected to the National Academy of Construction in 2012.

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Energy panel within the framework of the XXVIII St. Petersburg International Economic Forum

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: Rosneft – Rosneft – An important disclaimer is at the bottom of this article.

    Start: June 21 at 10:00

    The Energy Panel will be broadcast on the SPIEF internal television and the Roscongress information channel.

    Energy consumption and progress have always been interconnected. The higher humanity rose in the developmental stages, the more energy was required for new achievements – from the fires of primitive times to the nuclear power plants of modern times.

    Today, our civilization is at a turning point – the world energy industry is facing a large-scale transformation, and the energy consumption model is changing. Against this background, each country is acutely faced with the need to ensure energy security.

    What will the energy of tomorrow look like and what factors will determine its development? What role will new technologies play in this process? Which country will be the first to ensure the transition to a new type of energy? And what awaits the oil industry against the backdrop of ongoing changes?

    Answers to these and other questions can be heard during the Energy Panel broadcast.

    Keynote speech: ● Igor Ivanovich Sechin, Chief Executive Officer of PJSC NK Rosneft

    Moderator: ● Rick Sanchez, RT anchor

    Department of Information and Advertising of PJSC NK Rosneft June 20, 2025

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    MIL OSI Russia News –

  • India’s Eight Core Industries Index registers marginal 0.7% growth in May 2025

    Source: Government of India

    Source: Government of India (4)

    The Index of Eight Core Industries (ICI), a crucial gauge of the performance of key infrastructure sectors in the Indian economy, rose marginally by 0.7% year-on-year in May 2025, according to provisional data released by the Ministry of Commerce & Industry. This modest uptick highlights continuing challenges in several critical sectors despite gains in a few industries.

    The eight industries that comprise the index — Coal, Crude Oil, Natural Gas, Petroleum Refinery Products, Fertilizers, Steel, Cement, and Electricity — collectively account for 40.27% of the overall Index of Industrial Production (IIP). In May, positive growth was reported in Cement, Steel, Coal, and Refinery Products, while the remaining sectors recorded year-on-year contractions.

    Coal production, which holds a weight of 10.33% in the index, increased by 2.8% compared to the same month last year. On a cumulative basis, production during April–May 2025-26 rose by 3.1%. However, the crude oil sector, with a weight of 8.98%, contracted by 1.8% in May and by 2.2% over the two-month period.

    Natural gas output witnessed a sharper year-on-year fall of 3.6% in May, contributing to a cumulative decline of 2.3%. Meanwhile, petroleum refinery products — the largest component of the index with a weight of 28.04% — posted a modest 1.1% increase in May. Despite this, cumulative output during the April–May period dropped by 1.7%.

    The fertilizer sector reported the steepest decline, shrinking by 5.9% in May and registering a cumulative decrease of 5.1%. In contrast, the steel industry, which holds significant weight at 17.92%, saw a healthy 6.7% rise in output in May and a 5.5% increase over the two-month period.

    Cement production delivered the strongest performance among all eight industries, recording a robust 9.2% growth in May. Its cumulative output also showed significant momentum, rising by 7.8%. However, electricity generation, a major sector with a 19.85% weight, fell sharply by 5.8% in May and declined by 2.2% cumulatively — contributing to an overall drag on the index.