Category: Energy

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Yannis Stournaras: Central banks – opportunities and implications posed by artificial intelligence

    Source: Bank for International Settlements

    Introduction

    Many thanks to the conference organisers for inviting me to be here today. It’s a privilege to be part of this dialogue that is helping to shape the digital era.

    Central banks may seem far removed from your world-but we share an important feature: all of us are engaged in understanding complexity, managing uncertainty, and preparing for the future.

    Today, I would like to discuss how central banks can harness the transformative potential of artificial intelligence (AI) in their mission to safeguard monetary and financial stability. My remarks will unfold along three dimensions, focusing on several important issues, but without being exhaustive.

    • First, on the ways that AI intersects with our monetary policy strategy at the European Central Bank (ECB).
    • Second, on the opportunities AI offers to central banks for efficiency gains in areas such as communication and economic analysis.
    • Third, on the implications posed by AI for price stability, monetary policy transmission and financial stability.

    Intersections of monetary policy strategy with AI

    So, let me briefly discuss the ways that AI intersects with our monetary policy strategy.

    When the ECB Governing Council embarked on its strategy review last year, we made it clear that price stability remains our objective. We also decided to keep the symmetric, 2% inflation target unchanged.

    The clarity which that objective provides, and our success in achieving that objective, have provided the ECB with credibility, which was essential in keeping inflation expectations anchored around the 2 per cent level during the recent inflation surge.

    Although our updated strategy is only expected to be concluded and announced later this year, the following is important.

    When the review was initiated, no one could have possibly foreseen the tectonic eruptions to the geopolitical landscape that ensued.

    These developments have only reinforced the importance of the review and the need to ensure that our policies will remain fit for a rapidly evolving world — a world that is now being shaped by geopolitical tensions, trade disruptions, ongoing climate change, and rapid advances in artificial intelligence.

    In such a world, central banks need to be able to respond with agility, which is undoubtedly a guiding virtue for everyone in this room.

    We have to deliver a strategy that is not only robust but also flexible: one that allows adjustments to the monetary policy stance and our toolkit in response to shocks and provides a foundation that can guide the Governing Council in navigating through challenges in the years to come.

    In today’s fast-moving environment-where inflation dynamics can shift rapidly, financial conditions are increasingly volatile and uncertainty is ever-present-we need to improve our ability to communicate, assess economic developments in real time and make more accurate projections of the outlook to guide our monetary policy making.

    This is where AI begins to play a potentially transformative role. In the following, I will focus on the opportunities provided by AI in core central banking fields, namely communication and economic analysis.

    Opportunity to enhance communication

    I start with communication.

    Central banks have come a long way in their communication strategies. As you may know, it was not always the case that the words “central bank” and “communication” could even stand together in the same sentence.

    In the 1960s and 1970s, the conventional wisdom among central bankers was: “the less said, the better.” The aim was often to surprise markets with the announcement of their policy decisions. Significant policy decisions were sometimes made without immediate public disclosure, and the rationale behind them was not always transparently communicated. The language used would often make the oracles of Delphi seem crystal clear.

    Alan Greenspan once captured this perfectly when he said, “if I seem unduly clear to you, you must have misunderstood what I said.”

    Things began to change in the 1980s and 1990s. Two factors, in particular, helped bring about this change.

    The first factor was credibility. As more and more central banks adopted inflation targeting frameworks, they realized that to achieve their targets, they needed to control inflation expectations. In other words, they needed to be credible.

    The second factor was independence. As central banks achieved independence from politicians, they also had to communicate in a transparent way with the public to help build trust, and safeguard accountability.

    An important corollary of the improved communication is that it has increased the effectiveness of monetary policy transmission.

    The previous ECB strategy review in 2021 consolidated this finding, while also calling for central banks in the euro area to use simpler and engaging language to directly access a broader audience.

    More recently, efforts are being made to exploit AI for the benefit of our communication processes, to enhance transparency, foster trust, and ensure that our monetary policy reaction function is clearly understood, thereby supporting the anchoring of inflation expectations.

    An important application involves the sentiment analysis of official publications, such as monetary policy statements, speeches, and press releases. For example, using Large Language Models (LLMs) the impact of ECB statements on financial markets1 can be explored. This kind of work helps understand how the language in communications shapes market expectations for inflation and interest rates.

    AI models can be trained on financial and policy-specific issues to detect subtle shifts in tone – such as whether a message appears more hawkish (in favour of tighter monetary policy) or dovish (in favour of looser monetary policy) – before publication. This allows communications teams to adjust language in order to ensure it aligns with the intended policy signal, minimising the risk of misinterpretation by the markets that could trigger undue volatility.

    AI can also play a growing role in the crafting and refining of speeches by policy makers. LLMs can support a consistent voice in communication, while also tailoring the tone and content to specific audiences – be it financial market analysts, other expert audiences, or the wider public.

    Moreover, AI supports a wide range of multilingual and accessibility needs. Machine translation models – fine-tuned for economic and legal language – help ensure timely publication of central bank materials across multiple official languages, a feature very useful to the European System of Central Banks which speaks all 24 official languages of the EU.

    Recourse to AI for communication purposes, however, necessitates caution. Over-reliance on AI in crafting and interpreting central bank communications could create an “echo chamber.” This would occur when AI tools respond to, and amplify, each other’s outputs, leading to overly uniform narratives and repetitive signals, that may distort the policymakers’ message. This is a clear case that illustrates the need for human oversight in overviewing processes to ensure that communication stays varied, accurate, and relevant.

    Opportunity to improve central bank economic analysis and decision making

    Another area that AI is poised to enhance is economic analysis. Following the AI revolution, we have started to build expertise in incorporating AI and non-traditional data in our analytical tools. These tools are rapidly being applied in the economic analyses that inform our monetary policy decisions.

    A question however arises: Is the use of AI in this context a hype? Or could it mark a methodological revolution that will help us better pursue our mandate? I believe that there are unique opportunities but also several challenges.

    First, central banks rely heavily on economic data to make informed decisions on monetary policy. Traditional statistical methods may not be sufficient to apprehend the complexity of the current uncertain environment. The use of LLMs can deliver enhanced data processing and analysis of unstructured data sets of textual data (like news articles or social media). This enables us to access new and non-traditional data sources, that could provide useful insights into our policies.

    Furthermore, machine learning (ML) models can quickly detect patterns, trends, and potential risks that might not be visible using traditional methods. Thus, we could identify structural breaks and patterns that would otherwise be difficult to detect.

    These tools can also help identify non-linear relationships. This is particularly important in a complex environment, since capturing non-linearities in the data is essential to understanding how the economy will evolve under stress and how seemingly small disturbances could lead to large-scale economic disruptions.

    In addition, by processing real-time data, AI can provide timely insights and rigorous analysis, allowing central banks more flexibility in decision making. This is valuable in a world prone to shocks and in times of pervasive uncertainty.

    There is also a possibility that these tools will be useful in the prediction of turning points in the business cycle and of tail events, such as fiscal crises.

    Finally, AI could improve forecasting and nowcasting inflation and economic activity. The Eurosystem already uses AI to improve its forecasting processes. For example, ML techniques are applied in inflation forecasting2 or in nowcasting global trade3. Moreover, short-term forecasts of economic activity are informed by sentiment indicators derived from the textual analysis of news, using LLMs4. Research5 at the Bank of Greece has produced forecasting models of inflation based on textual indicators of supply and demand disturbances in commodity markets. With the help of AI tools, these indicators can be updated on a daily basis and thus help predict inflation more accurately. This research has found that out-of-sample inflation forecast errors are reduced by up to 30 per cent.

    Still, there are several challenges.

    First, AI models are often complex and opaque, lacking transparency. Being like a “black box”, they are – at least for the time being – difficult to reconcile with the principles of transparency and accountability of central banks.

    Second, AI models (usually LLMs) could occasionally provide inaccurate or misleading information, raising practical, reputational and legal concerns. Therefore, human supervision is of the essence, especially in processes that require rational reasoning.

    Third, the quality of non-traditional data is often poor and the process of reconciling these data with our existing data sources is demanding. In a similar vein, the use of AI should not create an over-reliance on machine-driven outcomes.

    Overall, I believe that AI is a potent technology which has already brought about tectonic shifts in economic analysis. Its potential is still unfolding, and the benefits it offers are only beginning to be realised. The cutting-edge research promoted at this conference marks a point of methodological revolution. I believe that such research will fundamentally transform the way we understand economic dynamics and will ultimately enable us to make better-informed decisions.

    While AI opens unique opportunities for central banks in the pursuit of their mandate, it also brings a number of emerging implications that we must carefully consider. I’d like to share what I see as some of the most significant.

    Implications on productivity, employment, inflation

    Let me start with the effects on the macroeconomic outlook.

    AI has strong potential to raise productivity, both through its direct impact on total factor productivity, but also through improvements of efficiency on individual firm level. However, the aggregate effects remain uncertain and vary widely across studies6.

    One reason is that a disproportionate share of the benefits generated by AI may be concentrated in a small number of highly advanced firms, particularly large technology companies with the resources and infrastructure to develop and deploy cutting-edge AI tools.

    This concentration poses a risk: while AI can deliver substantial productivity benefits at the enterprise level, these gains may not necessarily translate into broad-based growth in aggregate productivity, unless mechanisms are in place to ensure that the diffusion of AI is wide across sectors, firms and countries.

    In a similar vein, the potential impact of AI on employment is difficult to estimate. On the one hand, it can automate routine, lower-skilled tasks – potentially displacing workers. On the other hand, AI can create new opportunities by increasing labour demand for non-automated tasks, as well as giving rise to new types of jobs. To maximise the favourable effects of AI on employment and to mitigate risks such as labour market inequality, reskilling the workforce with AI-complementary skills will be essential.

    Turning to prices, the impact of AI on inflation could go in both directions. Increased global demand for energy – driven by the computational intensity of AI technologies – could raise energy prices. According to the IMF7, electricity used by data centres alone, is already as much as that of Germany or France, and by 2030 would be comparable to that of India which is the world’s third largest electricity user. At the same time, AI can also contribute to more efficient energy use and improved grid management, potentially lowering costs.

    Moreover, AI-induced productivity improvements might help offset labour shortages, especially in times of low unemployment and ageing population. This could lead to a decline in unit labour costs, exerting thus downward price pressures. However, the overall impact of AI on employment and wage growth is difficult to predict.

    Expectations also play a central role in the price formation process. If consumers fully anticipate future benefits from AI (such as better products, lower costs, or higher wages), they may bring forward consumption in the short term, creating inflationary pressures. However, if expectations are only regressively formed, disinflationary forces may dominate in the near term due to delayed consumption and investment.

    Implications for monetary policy transmission

    The transmission of monetary policy to the economy, and thus monetary policy making are significantly impacted by AI.

    As I already noted, AI is expected to bring about distributional shifts in income and wealth. These shifts matter for monetary policy, since they influence households’ marginal propensity to consume and their access to credit.

    Should AI disproportionally raise the income share of lower-income households – with a higher marginal propensity to consume and greater credit constraints – the transmission of monetary policy could be strengthened. In contrast, if the gains accrue mainly to higher-income, more skilled households – who have lower marginal propensity to consume and are less responsive to interest rate changes — then monetary policy transmission may weaken.

    AI is also affecting how firms set prices. Companies that are more digitalised and employ algorithmic pricing tools can adjust prices more frequently and with greater precision in response to economic shocks. Higher price flexibility could induce – all else equal, a more efficient real economy.

    At the same time, ML tools enable firms to personalise prices and introduce heterogeneity, which is likely to weaken the link between monetary policy measures and prices, although AI could provide tools that enhance price transparency and improve consumers’ ability to compare prices. There is also the risk that algorithmic pricing could lead to tacit collusion among firms and greater market power, undermining the effectiveness of monetary policy in controlling inflation.

    Finally, AI may influence wage-setting dynamics. If the presence of automation erodes workers’ bargaining power, wage responsiveness to changes in unemployment could be reduced. This would weaken the sensitivity of inflation to shifts in monetary policy and complicate central banks’ ability to steer inflation effectively.

    Implications for financial stability

    Turning now to financial stability, the implications of AI technologies are complex and multifaceted.

    On the one hand, AI offers powerful tools to enhance financial institutions’ capabilities in risk assessment, liquidity management and strategic decision making. On the other hand, AI can exacerbate existing vulnerabilities and create new ones.

    For example, generative AI could be deliberately misused – such as through the creation of deepfakes or fabricated statements – potentially aimed at manipulating sentiment or triggering market stress.

    There is also the risk of herding behavior. As more institutions adopt similar AI models, the likelihood of systemic stress increases. What may initially appear as isolated, micro-level risk could rapidly escalate via AI and pose serious threats to financial stability.

    If financial institutions, market participants or the public at large base their key decisions on such inputs, without adequate human verification, we may witness situations of disorderly market volatility. Overreliance to a limited number of AI providers could further raise operational risks and adversely affect the resilience of the financial sector.

    Therefore, it is critical that these tools are deployed with caution. Sound governance, robust regulatory oversight, and adequate safeguards will be essential to ensuring that AI acts as a tool for strength, rather than a source of systemic risk.

    Conclusion

    To conclude, the core task of central banks remains safeguarding price and financial stability, and AI poses unprecedented opportunities but also considerable challenges.

    From enhancing communication and improving economic analysis, to reshaping the channels through which monetary policy and the financial system operate, AI is already redefining the way we pursue our tasks.

    As I have outlined today, AI can make central banks more agile, more transparent, and more effective. But its use also demands flexibility – not only in the tools we use, but in the way we think, plan and make decisions. In a world of growing complexity and rapid technological change, we must ensure that innovation goes hand in hand with responsibility, transparency, and trust.

    This calls for thoughtful integration, not blind adoption. As we integrate AI into our policymaking, we must ensure that human judgment and critical thinking remain central to our decisions. AI should serve as a tool to enhance – not replace – our responsibility to make sound, efficient policy choices in the interest of our citizens.

    The euro area faces a dual challenge: harnessing the opportunities that artificial intelligence presents while actively addressing its broader implications.

    To rise to this challenge, it is vital that we craft a comprehensive European AI strategy. To improve the environment for AI innovation and diffusion of new technologies, our strategy has to rest on three pillars: funding, regulation and energy.

    Developing and scaling AI requires substantial investment, particularly in digital infrastructure. There is broad consensus on the importance of building a savings and investment union to jump-start European projects on innovation, including AI.

    Complementary efforts to equip people with the skills they need to thrive in an AI-driven economy and to mitigate the risk of widening inequality are also of high importance.

    In addition, regulatory burdens and weak institutional quality can significantly hold back the expansion of high-tech sectors. That’s why we need simple but efficient regulation, while ensuring protection of personal data and strong institutions to defend AI-generated innovation.

    Energy, too, is a critical piece of the puzzle. AI diffusion across the economy will place greater demands on Europe’s energy infrastructure. Addressing supply constraints now is essential to ensuring that AI adoption is sustainable in the long run.

    All these considerations need to be taken into account when assessing challenges and opportunities arising from this very innovative technology. The successful adoption of AI requires a flexible adjustment in a constantly evolving environment. Therefore, we need to commence our journey on that potentially wonderful vessel with urgency but also with careful consideration, towards a new shore.

    I am confident that the insights shared at this conference, and the research being pursued by many of you in this room, will be instrumental in guiding us forward.

    Thank you.

    MIL OSI Economics

  • Key targets and capabilities: a look at Iran’s nuclear facilities amid Israeli strikes

    Source: Government of India

    Source: Government of India (4)

    Israel said early on Friday it had struck Iranian nuclear targets to block Tehran from developing atomic weapons, and Iranian media and witnesses reported explosions including at the country’s main uranium enrichment facility. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said the strikes are aimed at hurting Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, ballistic missile factories and military capabilities.

    Below are some of Iran’s main nuclear facilities.

    WHERE ARE IRAN’S NUCLEAR FACILITIES?

    Iran’s nuclear programme is spread over many locations. While the threat of Israeli airstrikes has loomed for decades, only some of the sites have been built underground.

    DOES IRAN HAVE A NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAMME?

    The United States and the U.N. nuclear watchdog believe Iran had a coordinated, secret nuclear weapons programme that it halted in 2003. The Islamic Republic denies ever having had one or planning to have one.

    Iran agreed to restrictions on its nuclear activities in exchange for relief from international sanctions under a 2015 deal with world powers. That pact fell apart after Trump – then serving his first term as president – pulled the United States out of it in 2018 and Iran started abandoning the restrictions in the following year.

    IS IRAN INCREASING ITS URANIUM ENRICHMENT?

    Yes. Iran has been expanding its uranium enrichment programme ever since the pact broke down, reducing the so-called “breakout time” it would need to produce enough weapons-grade uranium for a nuclear bomb to days or little more than a week from at least a year under the 2015 deal.

    Actually making a bomb with that material would take longer. How long is less clear and is the subject of debate.

    Iran is now enriching uranium to up to 60% fissile purity, close to the 90% of weapons-grade, at two sites, and in theory it has enough material enriched to that level, if enriched further, for six bombs, according to a yardstick of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the U.N. watchdog.

    NATANZ

    Netanyahu said on Friday that Israel had targetted Natanz as part of its attack.

    A complex at the heart of Iran’s enrichment programme on a plain abutting mountains outside the Shi’ite Muslim holy city of Qom, south of Tehran. Natanz houses facilities including two enrichment plants: the vast, underground Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) and the above-ground Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP).

    An exiled Iranian opposition group revealed in 2002 that Iran was secretly building Natanz, igniting a diplomatic standoff between the West and Iran over its nuclear intentions that continues today.

    The FEP was built for enrichment on a commercial scale, able to house 50,000 centrifuges. Around 16,000 centrifuges are currently installed there, roughly 13,000 of which are in operation, refining uranium to up to 5% purity.

    Diplomats with knowledge of Natanz describe the FEP as being about three floors below ground. There has long been debate about how much damage Israeli airstrikes could do to it.

    Damage has been done to centrifuges at the FEP by other means, including an explosion and power cut in April 2021 that Iran said was an attack by Israel.

    The above-ground PFEP houses only hundreds of centrifuges but Iran is enriching to up to 60% purity there.

    FORDOW

    On the opposite side of Qom, Fordow is an enrichment site dug into a mountain and therefore probably better protected from potential bombardment than the FEP.

    The 2015 deal with major powers did not allow Iran to enrich at Fordow at all. It now has around 2,000 centrifuges operating there, most of them advanced IR-6 machines, of which up to 350 are enriching to up to 60%.

    The United States, Britain and France announced in 2009 that Iran had been secretly building Fordow for years and had failed to inform the IAEA. U.S. President Barack Obama said then: “The size and configuration of this facility is inconsistent with a peaceful programme.”

    ISFAHAN

    Iran has a large nuclear technology centre on the outskirts of Isfahan, its second largest city.

    It includes the Fuel Plate Fabrication Plant (FPFP) and the uranium conversion facility (UCF) that can process uranium into the uranium hexafluoride that is fed into centrifuges.

    Iran also stores enriched uranium at Isfahan, diplomats say.

    There is equipment at Isfahan to make uranium metal, a process that is particularly proliferation-sensitive since it can be used to devise the core of a nuclear bomb.

    The IAEA has said there are machines for making centrifuge parts at Isfahan, describing it in 2022 as a “new location”.

    KHONDAB

    Iran has a partially built heavy-water research reactor originally called Arak and now Khondab. Heavy-water reactors pose a nuclear proliferation risk because they can easily produce plutonium which, like enriched uranium, can be used to make the core of an atom bomb.

    Under the 2015 deal, construction was halted, the reactor’s core was removed and filled with concrete to make it unusable. The reactor was to be redesigned “to minimise the production of plutonium and not to produce weapon-grade plutonium in normal operation”. Iran has informed the IAEA that it plans to start operating the reactor in 2026.

    TEHRAN RESEARCH CENTRE

    Iran’s nuclear research facilities in Tehran include a research reactor.

    BUSHEHR

    Iran’s only operating nuclear power plant, on the Gulf coast, uses Russian fuel that Russia then takes back when it is spent, reducing the proliferation risk.

    (Reuters)

  • MIL-OSI Africa: Uganda: Govt Unveils Shs72.3 Trillion Budget to Drive Full Monetisation of Economy


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    The Ministry of Finance Planning and Economic Development has unveiled a Shs72.136 trillion national budget for the 2025/2026 financial year, setting its sights on transforming every corner of the country into a hub of commercial activity.

    Presented by Finance Minister Matia Kasaija at the Kololo Ceremonial Grounds on Thursday, 12 June, 2025, the budget signals a strong shift towards full monetisation of Uganda’s economy, underpinned by commercial agriculture, industrialisation, digital transformation, and expanded access to markets.

    Speaking against the backdrop of a rapidly growing economy, Kasaija painted a picture of a Uganda ready to transition from resilience to acceleration.

    “The budget for next financial year, and over the medium term, is focused on people and wealth creation,” he said.

    Consequently, the theme of the financial year 2025/26 is: “Full Monetisation of Uganda’s Economy through Commercial Agriculture, Industrialisation, Expanding and Broadening Services, Digital Transformation and Market Access.’”

    The Shs72.3 trillion resource envelope represents one of the largest in Uganda’s history, with domestic revenue expected to contribute Shs37.2 trillion, roughly 60 percent of the total. The rest will be financed through borrowing and grants. The budget deficit is estimated at 7.6 percent of GDP.

    But Kasaija reassured Ugandans, stating that the government had a clear strategy to enhance domestic revenue mobilisation, widen the tax base, and strengthen tax administration.

    “Government plans to collect Shs37.2 trillion in domestic revenue next financial year,” he said, adding that focus would be placed on tackling smuggling, corruption at Uganda Revenue Authority (URA), and leveraging digital tools like the Electronic Fiscal Receipting and Invoicing System to plug leakages.

    Priority sectors such as health, education, agriculture, infrastructure, and tourism received large shares of the allocation.

    Healthcare emerged as a major beneficiary, with Shs5.87 trillion earmarked for next year. Kasaija detailed plans to functionalise Health Centre IVs, scale up e-health systems, and expand emergency medical services. He said the government had already delivered 20 digital X-ray machines and installed CT scanners in 14 out of 16 regional referral hospitals.

    “We are strengthening the National Ambulance and Emergency Care System,” he added.

    In education, the Minister allocated Shs5.04 trillion to support Universal Primary and Secondary Education, student loans, the construction of new seed schools, and improvements in teacher recruitment and digital inspections.

    Kasaija also confirmed the upcoming operationalisation of Bunyoro and Busoga universities, as well as continued investment in sports infrastructure ahead of African Champions Cup (CHAN) and African Cup of Nation (AFCON 2027).

    “In order to improve compliance with quality standards, Government digitised school inspections in all public schools and TVET institutions,” he said.

    Wealth creation programmes, a lifeline for millions of Ugandans received renewed commitment, with Shs2.43 trillion directed towards the Parish Development Model (PDM), Emyooga, the Uganda Development Bank (UDB), and other grassroots economic empowerment initiatives.

    Kasaija said the PDM alone would receive Shs .059 trillion in FY2025/2026, ensuring every parish continues to receive Shs100 million annually.

    “These investments are changing the lives of Ugandans by boosting household incomes, enhancing food security and creating employment opportunities,” he noted.

    He revealed that over 2.6 million Ugandans have already benefited from PDM funds, with investments spanning food crops, livestock, poultry, and microenterprises. To enhance efficiency and eliminate corruption, PDM operations have been fully digitised, using systems such as the WENDI and ZAIDI apps.

    On the industrial and agricultural front, the government committed Shs1.86 trillion to agro-industrialisation. This includes funding for agricultural research, irrigation schemes, fertilisers, extension services, and value addition. Kasaija highlighted the completion of 145 solar-powered irrigation schemes and the ongoing construction of 157 more.

    He singled out the Agricultural Credit Facility, now worth over Shs1 trillion in disbursements, as a key driver of agricultural transformation.

    “I have provided additional capital of Shs50 billion to the Agricultural Credit Facility next financial year, in addition to insurance that benefits all farmers including PDM beneficiaries.”

    Uganda’s industrial and energy ambitions were also prominently featured, with Kasaija announcing an allocation of Shs875.8 billion for mineral-based industrial development and oil and gas. The East African Crude Oil Pipeline is now 58 percent complete, and an agreement has been signed for the construction of a 60,000-barrel-per-day oil refinery. Once oil production starts in 2026, government expects annual revenues of US$1 to 2.5 billion.

    “Uganda currently saves up to US$72.8 million annually on fuel imports,” Kasaija said, citing the impact of the Uganda National Oil Company’s direct importation of petroleum products, which eliminated middlemen and reduced speculative pricing.

    Tourism, another pillar of the economy, was allocated Shs430 billion, with an additional Shs2.2 trillion indirectly supporting tourism infrastructure such as roads, ICT, and security.

    The government aims to position Uganda as a competitive MICE (Meetings, Incentives, Conferences, and Exhibitions) destination in Africa, following recent successes. “Uganda now ranks 7th in Africa in MICE tourism,” Kasaija stated.

    Even as he celebrated Uganda’s achievements, such as coffee exports surging past US$1.83 billion and tourism earnings reaching US$1.52 billion, Kasaija called on Ugandans to embrace value addition and export diversification.

    “While it took the country more than a century to reach US$1 billion in annual coffee export earnings, it has taken just one year to double these earnings,” he said. “I therefore implore Ugandans to grow more coffee and, most importantly, add value to our coffee before we export it.”

    AUDIO: Minister Kasaija

    Kasaija expressed confidence in the direction the country is taking. With projected economic growth of 7 percent in FY2025/2026 and a GDP per capita increase to US$1,324, Uganda is moving steadily towards middle-income status.

    “The necessary foundation has already been established, the speed of economic transformation is destined to be faster in the medium term.” Kasaija concluded.

    Distributed by APO Group on behalf of Parliament of the Republic of Uganda.

    MIL OSI Africa

  • Israel Launches Unprecedented Strikes on Iran’s Nuclear Program as Middle East Braces for Escalation

    Source: Government of India

    Source: Government of India (4)

    Israel launched widescale strikes against Iran on Friday, targeting nuclear facilities, ballistic missile factories and military commanders in what officials described as the start of a prolonged operation to prevent Tehran from building an atomic weapon. The attacks represent a dramatic escalation in tensions between the two adversaries and have thrown the Middle East into chaos.

    The Israel Defense Forces said the operation, titled ‘Rising Lion’, involved strikes against dozens of military targets, including the country’s nuclear program. Israeli military officials indicated that more than 200 fighter jets participated in the operation, which targeted locations across Iran in the early hours of Friday morning.

    The attacks killed Major General Hossein Salami, the head of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Israeli forces also claimed to have eliminated other senior Iranian military commanders, dealing a significant blow to Iran’s military leadership structure. As head of the Revolutionary Guard Corps, Salami was one of Iran’s most powerful military figures, overseeing the country’s most potent military arm and reporting directly to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

    The strikes targeted Iran’s main uranium enrichment facility at Natanz, though the International Atomic Energy Agency reported no increase in radiation levels at the site following the attacks. The agency confirmed that the Bushehr nuclear power plant was not targeted during the operation.

    Iran’s armed forces spokesperson Brigadier General Abolfazl Shekarchi warned that Israel and the United States would pay a ‘heavy price’ for the strikes. Iranian state media reported that residential areas in Tehran were hit and that civilians, including children, were among the casualties.

    Israel’s Defense Minister Israel Katz declared a special state of emergency across the country, warning citizens to expect missile and drone retaliation. Sirens sounded across Israel in the hours before dawn as the country braced for potential Iranian counter-attacks. The strikes come at a particularly sensitive time, as the Trump administration has been pursuing diplomatic negotiations with Tehran over Iran’s nuclear program.

    Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has repeatedly characterized Iran’s nuclear program as an existential threat to Israel’s survival. The White House has reportedly sought to distance itself from the Israeli operation, with Trump administration officials stating that the United States provided no military support for the strikes.

  • IAEA says no increase in radiation levels at Iran’s Natanz nuclear site

    Source: Government of India

    Source: Government of India (4)

    The International Atomic Energy Agency on Friday said there was no increase in radiation levels at the Natanz nuclear site that was targeted during an Israeli attack, citing information given to them by Iranian authorities.

    The international atomic energy watchdog also added that the Bushehr nuclear power plant was not targeted during the attack.

    More to follow.

    (Reuters)

  • Indian stock market opens in red as Israel-Iran tensions rise

    Source: Government of India

    Source: Government of India (4)

    Indian benchmark indices opened sharply lower on Friday as escalating tensions between Israel and Iran rattled investor sentiment. Heavy selling pressure was witnessed in auto, IT, financial services, and PSU bank stocks during early trade.

    At around 9:33 a.m., the Sensex was trading 896.50 points, or 1.10 per cent, lower at 80,795.44, while the Nifty fell 278.50 points, or 1.12 per cent, to 24,609.70.

    The Nifty Bank index dropped 633.80 points, or 1.13 per cent, to 55,448.75. The Nifty Midcap 100 declined by 603.90 points, or 1.03 per cent, to trade at 57,836.95, while the Nifty Smallcap 100 was down 192.75 points, or 1.04 per cent, at 18,272.30.

    Analysts warned that the economic fallout from Israel’s military action could be severe if hostilities with Iran persist. Israel has already declared that its operation could last several days.

    “The market impact will depend on the duration of the conflict. In the near term, investors are likely to adopt a risk-off approach. Sectors dependent on oil derivatives—such as aviation, paints, adhesives, and tyres—may face pressure. In contrast, oil producers like ONGC and Oil India could prove more resilient,” said Dr. V.K. Vijayakumar, Chief Investment Strategist at Geojit Financial Services.

    The Nifty had already closed over one per cent lower in the previous session amid signs of rising geopolitical tension in the Middle East. As of this morning, Israel has launched pre-emptive strikes on Iran, prompting a broad-based risk-off sentiment across global markets.

    “Technically, Wednesday’s ‘buyer rejection’ candle, which followed the bearish ‘upside gap two crows’ pattern earlier in the week, was a clear warning of caution building in the market,” noted Akshay Chinchalkar, Head of Research at Axis Securities.

    Among the top laggards in the Sensex pack were Tata Motors, L&T, PowerGrid, Kotak Mahindra Bank, SBI, Titan, and Infosys.

    Across Asian markets, indices in Hong Kong, Bangkok, Jakarta, Japan, Seoul, and China were all trading in the red.

    In the previous U.S. trading session, the Dow Jones closed at 42,967.62, up 101.85 points or 0.24 per cent. The S&P 500 gained 23.02 points or 0.38 per cent to end at 6,045.26, while the Nasdaq rose by 46.61 points or 0.24 per cent to close at 19,662.49.

    On the institutional front, Foreign Institutional Investors (FIIs) extended their selling for the second consecutive day, offloading equities worth ₹3,831.42 crore on June 12. Meanwhile, Domestic Institutional Investors (DIIs) bought equities worth ₹9,393.85 crore on the same day.

    — IANS

  • Oil soars more than 9% after Israel strikes Iran, rattling investors

    Source: Government of India

    Source: Government of India (4)

    Oil prices surged more than 9% on Friday, hitting their highest in almost five months after Israel struck Iran, dramatically escalating tensions in the Middle East and raising worries about disrupted oil supplies.

    Brent crude futures LCOc1 jumped $6.29, or 9.07%, to $75.65 a barrel by 0315 GMT after hitting an intraday high of $78.50, the highest since January 27. U.S. West Texas Intermediate crude CLc1 was up $6.43, or 9.45%, at $74.47 a barrel after hitting a high of $77.62, the loftiest since January 21.

    Friday’s gains were the largest intraday moves for both contracts since 2022 after Russia invaded Ukraine, causing energy prices to spike.

    Israel said it targeted Iran’s nuclear facilities, ballistic missile factories and military commanders on Friday at the start of what it warned would be a prolonged operation to prevent Tehran from building an atomic weapon.

    “This has elevated geopolitical uncertainty significantly and requires the oil market to price in a larger risk premium for any potential supply disruptions,” ING analysts led by Warren Patterson said in a note.

    Several oil traders in Singapore said it was still too early to say if the strike will affect Middle East oil shipments as it will depend on how Iran retaliates and if the U.S. will intervene.

    “It’s too early to tell but I think the market is worried about shutting off of the Strait of Hormuz,” one of the traders said.

    MST Marquee senior energy analyst Saul Kavonic said the conflict would need to escalate to the point of Iranian retaliation on oil infrastructure in the region before oil supply is materially impacted.

    He added that Iran could hinder up to 20 million barrels per day of oil supply via attacks on infrastructure or limiting passage through the Strait of Hormuz, in an extreme scenario.

    Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said Israel will receive “harsh punishment” following Friday’s attack that he said killed several military commanders.

    U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio on Thursday called Israel’s strikes against Iran a “unilateral action” and said Washington was not involved while also urging Tehran not to target U.S. interests or personnel in the region.

    “Iran has announced an emergency and is preparing to retaliate, which raises the risk of not just disruptions but of contagion in other neighbouring oil producing nations too,” said Priyanka Sachdeva, senior market analyst at Phillip Nova.

    “Although Trump has shown reluctance to participate, U.S. involvement could further raise concerns.”

    In other markets, stocks dived in early Asian trade, led by a selloff in U.S. futures, while investors scurried to safe havens such as gold and the Swiss franc.

    (Reuters)

  • MIL-OSI New Zealand: Joint Statement: By the Foreign Ministers of the Republic of Indonesia and New Zealand at the 12th Joint Ministerial Commission

    Source: New Zealand Government

    His Excellency Sugiono, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, and Rt Hon Winston Peters, Minister of Foreign Affairs of New Zealand, convened the 12th meeting of the Joint Ministerial Commission (JMC) on 13th June 2025 in Jakarta, Indonesia. 
    The Ministers welcomed meeting in person, underscoring the importance of regular consultations between themselves, Leaders and other Cabinet colleagues to strengthen the relationship in ways that deliver real benefits and advance shared values.
    The Ministers celebrated the cooperation between Indonesia and New Zealand under the Comprehensive Partnership agreed by Leaders in 2018, and the achievements under the 2025-2029 Plan of Action. 
    The Ministers committed to intensify cooperation across the seven pillars of the Comprehensive Partnership to strengthen bilateral ties and achieve the ambitious goals set out in the 2025-2029 Plan of Action.
     
    Reviewing the implementation of the first year of the Plan of Action 2025-2029, and way forward 

    “Friends for Good” Ties

    The Ministers acknowledged intensive recent engagement between the two countries, including Minister Peters’ attendance at President Prabowo’s inauguration in October 2024, and meetings between our Prime Minister and President, and Foreign Ministers at APEC in November 2024, as well as increased engagements by senior officials. 
    Both Ministers agreed to further increase two-way dialogue and acknowledged the importance of face-to-face engagement, and regular hosting of key relationship architecture meetings, in maintaining our “Friends for Good” ties.
    The Ministers agreed to encourage relevant stakeholders to bolster bilateral relations and cooperation, including through bilateral defence talks and the annual Senior Officials Meeting on Trade and Investment Framework.
    Both Ministers also noted the significant potential for promoting Parliamentary and civil society exchanges to further strengthen bilateral and people-to-people ties.
    Enhancing Trade and Economic Partnerships to Advance Growth of Both Economies
    The Ministers highlighted the importance of enhancing mutual prosperity and strengthening trade and economic connections. Ministers recalled the goal in the Plan of Action to grow two-way trade to NZ$6 billion by the end of 2029.  They highlighted the need for New Zealand and Indonesia to increase mutual cooperation in the face of global economic uncertainty.
    Both Ministers highlighted the importance of resolving non-tariff trade barriers to ensure trade continuity and growth. Ministers welcomed agreement of the Cooperation Arrangement on Halal Standards.  The Arrangement will facilitate the convenience, security, safety and certainty of halal food traded between our countries. Ministers noted the intent for New Zealand and Indonesia to work together to further support the Indonesian national program of food resilience and the Nutritious Meal programme.

    The Ministers noted the positive trend of New Zealand’s investment in Indonesia, and agreed to continue efforts to encourage investment flows.
    Ministers welcomed the year-round direct flights between Auckland and Bali and committed to continue to work towards unlocking the full potential of enhanced air connectivity to facilitate increased people-to-people, business and trade flows.
    Both Ministers reconfirmed the importance of a rules-based, free and open trade environment, with the World Trade Organisation at its core, as critical for the regional and global economy. The Ministers welcomed the implementation of the upgraded ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Area (AANZFTA), which entered into force in April 2025, and ongoing cooperation under the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).
    The Ministers acknowledged the process of Indonesia’s accession to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) as an important step to foster economic integration, accelerate economic reform, and support mutual prosperity. 
    Both Ministers reaffirmed their nations’ commitment to preventing illegal money laundering and other illegal financing activities to enhance financial integrity and transparency and to further promote economic growth and development.
     
    Renewable Energy and Environment Cooperation 
    The Ministers highlighted the importance of renewable energy, including geothermal cooperation, which has been a significant part of the relationship since the 1970s and welcomed the renewed Partnership Arrangement in renewable energy and energy conservation signed in September 2024. 
    Ministers announced a further NZ$15 million investment in Phase 2 of the New Zealand-Maluku Access to Renewable Energy Support (NZMATES 2.0) programme to continue to improve access to reliable, renewable electricity for remote and small islands while building local industry service capacity.
    The Ministers acknowledged strong collaboration between the Indonesia and New Zealand geothermal industries, including under the Pūngao Ngawha (Panas Bumi) Indonesia-New Zealand Partnership Programme (PINZ), that provides access to New Zealand’s world-renowned technical and training capabilities, with the aim of assisting Indonesia to further accelerate the development of its geothermal energy sector and broader energy transition.
    The Ministers emphasised their shared commitment to adapting to and mitigating the impacts of climate change under the Paris Agreement and expressed willingness to expand climate related and environmental cooperation through comprehensive climate change dialogue that includes both mitigation and adaptation strategies.
     

    Education, Tourism, Science, Technology and Innovation, and People-to-People Cooperation

    Ministers welcomed the significant increase in the annual allocation of tertiary scholarships under the Manaaki New Zealand Scholarship Programme (MNZSP), from 45 to 70, for Indonesia for this year and the next two years, reflecting their mutual dedication to deepening people-to-people connections, strengthening capacity in renewable energy and public governance, and developing disadvantaged regions. 
    The Ministers welcomed the Arrangement on Education Cooperation to refresh areas of cooperation, including increased education and higher education policy dialogues to enhance education system development and resilience.
    The Ministers underscored the importance of enhancing people-to-people connections, particularly in education and tourism, as a bedrock of strong bilateral ties. Both Ministers welcomed the exchange of cultural missions and promotions to serve this purpose.
    Ministers welcomed further exchanges of officials’ level visits to New Zealand focused on good governance, public sector performance and integrity and other sectors to advance bilateral relations.
    The Ministers encouraged closer cooperation between Indonesia and New Zealand in supporting research collaboration as highlighted in the Arrangement on Education Cooperation.
     
    Development Cooperation 
    Both Ministers welcomed the past year’s implementation progress under the Statement of Partnership (SoP) 2025-2029 signed in July 2024 and reviewed in May 2025. The SoP has strengthened and elevated both the development relationship and mutual commitment to focus on development cooperation and other strategic issues and is strongly aligned with Indonesia’s national priorities in two areas: climate and economic resilience; and inclusive human development.
     
    Defence, Security, Cyber and Maritime Cooperation

    Ministers acknowledged New Zealand and Indonesia’s long-standing defence relationship and committed to continuing to strengthen these ties, including through regular Defence Ministers’ meetings. They welcomed the upcoming visit to Jakarta by New Zealand Navy ship HMNZS Te Kaha and the recent visit by the Chief of the Royal New Zealand Navy.
    The Ministers announced new funding towards ongoing cooperation on security issues through continued support for the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation (JCLEC). The funding provided by New Zealand will enable the continued delivery of high-quality capacity building initiatives and collaboration between law enforcement agencies to combat transnational organised crime in the region. 
    The Ministers also reaffirmed their commitment to the Bali Process and welcomed progress against the Adelaide Strategy for Cooperation, which sets out the priority areas of cooperation for the Bali Process Working Groups. This includes an upcoming Joint Tabletop Exercise co-hosted by New Zealand, Indonesia, Australia and Viet Nam, through the Working Group on Disruption of Criminal Networks Involved in People Smuggling and Trafficking in Persons from 23 to 26 June 2025. 
    The Ministers agreed to continue to implement the refreshed cooperation arrangement on counter-terrorism, and identify opportunities for dialogue on preventing violent extremism. 
    Ministers highlighted the importance of active participation by our militaries in training activities, annual defence talks and joint exercises, including Exercise Super Garuda Shield.
     

    Regional and Multilateral Agenda

    The Ministers emphasised ASEAN’s central role in the dynamic regional architecture and their shared commitment to ongoing dialogue and cooperation through ASEAN-led mechanisms and processes, particularly the East Asia Summit (EAS), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus).
    The Ministers welcomed the ASEAN-New Zealand Joint Statement on the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific in 2023 to maintain regional stability and to serve as a framework to strengthen bilateral relations to advance economic relations and maritime governance under international law.
    The Ministers welcomed the implementation of the ASEAN-New Zealand Plan of Action (POA) (2021-2025) and its substantial progress achieved across the four themes outlined in the POA – Peace, Prosperity, People, and Planet. They further welcomed activity throughout 2025 to commemorate 50 years of dialogue relations between New Zealand and ASEAN, including preparations under way for a Commemorative Summit in Malaysia in October. Minister Sugiono confirmed Indonesia’s support for New Zealand’s proposal to elevate the relationship to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, and noted the development of a new ASEAN-New Zealand Plan of Action (2026-2030) to guide future cooperation. 
    Ministers reaffirmed their shared commitment to maintaining and promoting security and stability in the South China Sea. Ministers underscored their strong support for freedom of navigation and overflight and unimpeded trade, and their unwavering support for the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Ministers emphasised the need for the peaceful resolution of disputes in accordance with international law, particularly UNCLOS. In this regard, Ministers recalled the 2016 ruling of the South China Sea Arbitral Tribunal, constituted under UNCLOS. They underscored the importance of further progress towards an effective and substantive Code of Conduct that is consistent with international law, including the 1982 UNCLOS.
    Ministers expressed concern about the conflict and humanitarian crisis in Myanmar.  Ministers called on stakeholders and parties in Myanmar, in particular the armed forces and security forces concerned, to immediately cease violence, including the targeting of civilians, and to engage in inclusive dialogue. Ministers emphasised the importance of a peaceful, stable and unified Myanmar, affirmed their strong support for ASEAN-led efforts in line with the ASEAN Five-Point Consensus and encouraged the international community to work together in a pragmatic and constructive way to support peace and stability in Myanmar.
    The Ministers expressed concern about the dire humanitarian situation in Gaza and reiterated their calls for all parties to cease all hostilities; release all remaining hostages; facilitate the rapid, safe, unimpeded, and sustained delivery of humanitarian aid; adhere to international humanitarian law; and protect aid workers to enable their lifesaving work. Ministers reaffirmed their support for the implementation of a two-state solution consistent with international law and relevant United Nations resolutions.
    Ministers exchanged views on the war against Ukraine and reiterated support for efforts to achieve a comprehensive, just and lasting peace.  In that context, Ministers continued to reaffirm their respect for sovereignty, political independence and territorial integrity, and reiterated their call for compliance with the United Nations Charter and international law.
    The Ministers acknowledged the challenges to the multilateral system from shifting geopolitical dynamics, a tightly constrained financial environment and increasingly complex global risks. They reaffirmed their strong support for multilateralism and the international rules-based system, and acknowledged its important role in underpinning global stability, resilience and prosperity. The Ministers committed to collaborating on efforts to strengthen the multilateral system, increase inclusivity and transparency, and to safeguard and advance human rights, in order to support a system that is more responsive to today’s challenges. 

    Conclusion

    Ministers reviewed the implementation of the Plan of Action for 2025-2029 and discussed their common interest in advancing bilateral cooperation and delivering tangible outcomes.
    Both Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to utilise and advance the implementation of existing cooperation frameworks to deliver our shared interests. 
    Both Ministers were ready to explore more cooperation in the future to support both nations’ interests, as confirmation of their strong stance as Friends for Good.
    Minister Peters expressed his sincere gratitude to Minister Sugiono and the Indonesian Government for the warm welcome and hospitality accorded to him during the visit, and looked forward to hosting Minister Sugiono at the 13th JMC in New Zealand in 2026.

    MIL OSI New Zealand News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Congressman Brad Sherman Statement on Israel’s Justified Attack on Iranian Nuclear Capabilities

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Congressman Brad Sherman (D-CA)

    WASHINGTON, D.C. – Today, Congressman Brad Sherman (CA-32), a Senior Member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee for 29 years, released the following statement on Israel’s attack on Iranian nuclear capabilities:

    “Under the circumstances, what Israel has done is understandable and justified. 

    Earlier today, for the first time in 20 years, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) board declared that Iran was in breach of its non-proliferation obligations under the Safeguards Agreement that Iran itself signed. Iran was extremely close to several nuclear bomb. Israel could not wait while Iran pretended to negotiate in good faith while racing towards a bomb.

    The second wave has already begun and we expect many days and perhaps weeks of additional action. Substantial damage has been done to Iran’s nuclear program. However, the status of Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile is yet to be known.

    It’s regrettable that Iran’s decades of violation of the non proliferation treaty which it signed has led us to a point where this is necessary. While the U.S. pulled out of the 2014 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) agreement, Iran has been bound by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Safeguards Agreement it signed decades ago and which the IAEA determined it violated.

    Israel did not take this step lightly. There will be retaliation from Iran, and likely also from the Houthis and Hezbollah. Many Israeli civilians will be killed.  Israel took this action because it believed it had no other choice. 

    Israel could not wait until Iran had a stockpile of nuclear weapons ready to be launched.”

    ###

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Kaine, Van Hollen, Padilla Introduce Legislation to Sanction Salvadoran Officials for Human Rights Abuses, Collusion with Trump Administration in Violation of Constitutional Rights

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Virginia Tim Kaine

    WASHINGTON, D.C. – Today, U.S. Senators Tim Kaine (D-VA), a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Chris Van Hollen (D-MD), and Alex Padilla (D-CA) are introducing new legislation in a continuation of their efforts to hold El Salvador accountable for its human rights abuses and its collusion with the Trump Administration to imprison people from the United States without due process. The senators’ legislation would apply sanctions on Salvadoran officials and others who have engaged in international human rights violations or worked to deprive individuals residing in the United States of their rights under the U.S. Constitution. The legislation would additionally explicitly sanction President Bukele and Vice President Ulloa, as well as El Salvador’s Ministers of Foreign Relations, Defense, and Justice and Public Security, among others. In addition to its actions alongside the Trump Administration to imprison people from the United States, Bukele and his government have continued to jail and persecute innocent Salvadoran citizens, including journalists and human rights advocates such as Ruth López.

    The text of the legislation is available here.

    “Under President Bukele, tens of thousands of Salvadorans and even U.S. residents remain jammed in megaprisons without due process. President Bukele may think he has a friend in President Trump, but he should know that Americans will not tolerate his efforts to undermine the rule of law and democratic institutions—whether in El Salvador or here in the United States,” said Kaine. “That’s why I’m introducing this legislation with my colleagues to sanction foreign nationals complicit in Bukele’s behavior and the Trump Administration’s illegal actions to deny due process to people living in the United States.”

    “President Bukele and the Government of El Salvador are colluding with the Trump Administration, taking American taxpayer dollars to imprison people as part of a scheme to violate their constitutional rights. We must hold Bukele and his cronies accountable for these wrongful actions as well as for the gross violations of human rights they are committing in El Salvador. This legislation would do just that by placing sanctions on Bukele and those in his government who are responsible for these abuses. We must send a clear signal that these injustices are unacceptable and must end,” said Van Hollen.

    “President Bukele and his regime are continuing to commit abhorrent human rights atrocities and eradicate due process,” said Padilla. “We must hold Bukele and all responsible parties accountable for the suspension of constitutional rights and continued collusion with the Trump Administration to imprison people from the United States without due process. Imposing economic sanctions and visa restrictions on Bukele and his corrupt government is a necessary step to push El Salvador to finally uphold international human rights law and respect fundamental civil liberties.”

    The senators’ legislation is supported by the Latin America Working Group, the Washington Office on Latin America, Human Rights Watch, and Immigration Hub.

     “Senators Van Hollen, Kaine, and Padilla’s bill to impose sanctions on the regime of President Nayib Bukele is timely and importantly puts a spotlight on the gross violation of human rights that have occurred under President Bukele’s state of exception. Since March 2022, 85,000 people have been detained, constitutional guarantees have been suspended, and over 350 people have died while under state custody. Systemic torture and persecution are state policies. Significantly, the bill also addresses the pervasive corruption that has occurred since President Bukele took office and prevents the IMF and other international financial institutions not to lend support. Not one penny of our tax dollars should support this regime until there is an end to the human rights violations, and the rule of law, judicial independence, and government transparency are restored.  All Members of Congress should get behind this bill,” said Vicki Gass, Executive Director, Latin America Working Group.  

    “Targeted individual sanctions for gross human rights violations are a critical diplomatic tool the U.S. can use to push for change and hold authoritarian actors accountable; as El Salvador’s political and human rights crisis deepens, strong international action like this becomes essential,” said Ana María Méndez-Dardón, Director for Central America at the Washington Office on Latin America.

    “We are heartened to see Senators confronting the human rights abuses of government officials in El Salvador. This bill an important reminder that uncritical US government support to President Bukele will not last forever and a recognition that nobody should be deported to Salvadoran prisons,” said Juan Pappier, Deputy Director of the Americas division, Human Rights Watch.

    Additional Background:

    • Sanctions: Imposes property-blocking and visa sanctions on President Bukele, key members of his cabinet, and other foreign persons working on behalf of the Salvadoran government that have:
      • engaged in gross violations of internationally recognized human rights, including in connection with the ongoing “state of exception” in El Salvador;
      • engaged in the scheme, including by accepting U.S. taxpayer dollars, to deprive individuals residing in the United States of their Constitutional rights; or
      • provided material support to any person that has engaged in the above activities.
    • Termination/Snapback of Sanctions: Sanctions cannot be terminated until at least four years after the bill is enacted and unless the President certifies to Congress that the Government of El Salvador is no longer engaged in gross violations of internationally recognized human rights and no longer engaged in the scheme, including by accepting U.S. taxpayer dollars, to deprive individuals residing in the United States of their Constitutional rights. If the President determines that either of those conditions resume, then sanctions shall be reimposed.
    • Reporting Requirements: Requires reports to Congress that provide transparency on Salvadoran officials subject to a variety of sanctions authorities, U.S. government assistance to El Salvador, bilateral written agreements between the United States and El Salvador, and compliance with U.S. laws including the Leahy Laws and the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act. Also requires a report on the actions of Salvadoran officials, including President Bukele, to use cryptocurrency as a mechanism for gross corruption, graft, and sanctions evasion.
    • Blocking International Financial Assistance: Instructs the United States to use its voice and vote in international financial institutions to oppose financial assistance to the Government of El Salvador until the appropriate Presidential certification is transmitted to Congress.
    • Prohibiting U.S. Funds for El Salvador: Prohibits any U.S. funding for the Government of El Salvador until the appropriate Presidential certification is transmitted to Congress.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: June 12th, 2025 Heinrich Presses Forest Service Chief on Visiting the Pecos Watershed, DOGE Causing Trash to Pile Up on Public Lands, Trump’s Budget Eliminating Funding for the New Mexico Forest and Watershed Restoration Institute

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for New Mexico Martin Heinrich

    VIDEO: U.S. Senator Martin Heinrich (D-N.M.) questions U.S. Forest Chief Tom Schultz at an Appropriations Subcommittee hearing on June 11, 2025.

    WASHINGTON — At an Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies Appropriations Subcommittee hearing on President Trump’s Fiscal Year 2026 (FY26) budget request, U.S. Senator Martin Heinrich (D-N.M.) pressed U.S. Forest Chief Tom Schultz on visiting the Pecos Watershed in Northern New Mexico, DOGE procedures causing trash to pile up on public lands, and Trump’s budget eliminating funding for the New Mexico Forest and Watershed Restoration Institute at New Mexico Highlands University.

    Heinrich’s questioning follows a letter he sent yesterday, in his capacity as the Ranking Member of the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee, to U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) Secretary Brooke Rollins on the harmful impacts of the “Department of Government Efficiency’s” (DOGE) actions on the United States Forest Service (USFS). Heinrich’s letter stressed that operational failures that are now occurring at the USFS, such as accumulating garbage at recreational sites and a lack of firefighting equipment ahead of fire season, are due to new layers of red tape required by DOGE.

    On Forest Chief Schultz visiting the Pecos Watershed in Northern New Mexico:

    Heinrich began, “The Santa Fe National Forest manages the vast majority of the headwaters of the Pecos watershed, which is one of the most important watersheds in the state of New Mexico. And for decades, this is a community that has really worked very hard with very few resources to try to recover from historic pollution and protect that resource from future pollution. This is a river that supports traditional farming, recreation, fishing, fisheries and many other uses that are economically critical to that that community. But we still have legacy pollution from a pretty disastrous mines spill some 30 years ago.”

    Heinrich continued, asking, “I know I communicated with you recently, I sent you a letter, inviting you to visit this community and meet with my constituents. Is that something that you can commit to doing?”

    Schultz responded, “Senator, thank you for the question. So, my staff is looking at that request, and we’re trying to figure out if we can make that work. So that’s something we’re actively working on right now.”

    Heinrich underscored the importance of visiting the Pecos Watershed, “I hope you can make that a priority. I think it’s really helpful to get that community perspective. . . And so, I would very much welcome you to join us in New Mexico for that and I will make any logistics that you need help with a priority.”

    On the DOGE contract approvals process causing trash to pile up on public lands:

    Heinrich stated, “I’m all for making government more efficient, but one of the things I’m concerned about is that there are some things that DOGE seems to be making less efficient. And one of those has been contract approvals and that seems to be having real consequences in the [Forest] Service: trash piling up at recreation sites, bathroom challenges, equipment not getting replaced in a timely way.”

    Heinrich highlighted his efforts to keep our public lands safe and accessible, asking, “I sent you and Secretary Rollins a letter on this yesterday. But can you give me a sense, why is it taking so long to get simple things like a contract extension for custodial services authorized?”

    Schultz responded, “So what I will tell you is initially, when we first started looking at some of the existing contracts that we had for prior obligations, there was a process we had to get in place — and I think we’ve worked through all of the existing obligations. There should not be anything that’s hung up there. When it comes to new obligations, we, as the Forest Service, instituted our own policies and procedures in addition to review from the Department and from the Efficiency folks. So, we have put a process in place to make sure that it’s thorough and responsive when it comes to certain things like toilets and cleaning up toilets, which has been a huge issue that I’ve weighed in on in numerous cases.”

    “We have figured out that process and some of that is on the Forest Service, for the process that we put in place it is going to slow somethings down, but it’s something that we have addressed. And there should not be toilets that are not being cleaned at this point in time. So, if you’re hearing about that, please let me know, because we’ve really jumped on this issue,” Schultz continued.

    Schultz then turned to contracting in general, stating, “I think there is a review in place for contracts, grants, and agreements. It’s not just contracts; it’s all three of those. And that’s something we are looking at, how we make that process more efficient, but there is a very thorough review. You’re absolutely right, and is it different than it has been historically? Yes, it is, because there’s more attention to detail in those contracts, but we’re looking to make that process more effective and more timely than it has been over the last month. But it is something that — we have a new process we just instituted about a month ago, and we’re working on making that better.”

    Heinrich responded, “I understand the need for analysis and review. I just want to make sure that we’re not, you know, adding layers of bureaucracy in the name of efficiency.”

    On Trump’s FY26 budget eliminating funding for the Southwest Ecological Restoration Institutes (SWERI) and the Forest Service decreasing FY25 funding, which includes the New Mexico Forest and Watershed Restoration Institute at New Mexico Highlands University:

    Heinrich highlighted that, “The Southwest Ecological Restoration Institutes — in New Mexico, Colorado and Arizona — these are institutes that offer unique opportunities for dedicated research in forest science and watershed health. They represent the future of science for our forest management. Yet, this plan cuts the institutes’ budget by more than 50% and that’s just not a number that they could swallow in a single year.”

    “Why did you decide to reduce the funding for the institutes this year, and what is your plan for them in FY26?” Heinrich asked.

    Schultz responded, “Okay, so I think first of all, the FY25 budget is what your question is. I think on the first one, so we did cut $3 million in FY25. So, for this budget, they currently have $23 million on hand in prior appropriation dollars. So, that was part of the consideration. So, we’re trying to align the FY25 budget as we move toward the FY26 president’s budget. So, we’re moving in that direction. So, the ‘why’ is: We’re trying to align this year’s FY25 budget with where we’re going in FY26. In FY26, it does not include resources to provide funding for SWERI. So, there are resources this year, they are reduced, but next year — in the FY26 budget — there are none. That’s correct. And that’s tied to R&D’s overall look. And the reason that R&D is treated differently in the FY26 budget: There’s going to be a greater reliance on the states and the universities. So, a lot of the land grant universities — and I’m a — was a member of the advisory board.”

    Heinrich asked, “That institute is at Highlands University?”

    Schultz responded, “Yes, sir, I understand. Yes, sir. My point is, though, that the funding in the future is going to have to come more from those universities themselves and other grant opportunities. The Forest Service is going to be shifting its funding away from R&D in general in the budget.”

    Heinrich pressed Schultz on the Forest Service eliminating funding for the Southwest Ecological Restoration Institutes by emphasizing, “I think that’s a mistake. And I think these institutes have really provided the Forest Service an enormous amount of science at a time when management has needed to change because conditions have been changing. And so, I hope that as we approach the appropriations process that we consider this President’s budget as it should be considered: Advisory.”

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI China: China, Africa unlock development potential at key expo

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    The 4th China-Africa Economic and Trade Expo (CAETE) opened Thursday in Changsha, capital of central China’s Hunan Province, drawing a record-breaking of over 30,000 participants from 53 African countries, 11 international organizations and 27 Chinese provincial-level regions, highlighting the dynamic two-way economic ties.

    Under the theme “China and Africa: Together Toward Modernization,” the biennial event, running through June 15, aims to further harness the shared development potential as a concrete follow-up to the 10 partnership actions announced at the 2024 Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation.

    From African flavors to tourism offerings, from digital payment solutions to agricultural machinery and clean energy technologies, the expo is expected to further advance the China-Africa partnership in their shared pursuit of modernization.

    People visit the fourth China-Africa Economic and Trade Expo at Changsha International Convention and Exhibition Center in Changsha, central China’s Hunan Province, June 12, 2025. (Xinhua/Liu Qiong)

    BEYOND TRADITIONAL TRADE

    At this year’s expo, more than 800 African products, ranging from Kenyan black tea to Congolese framed artwork, are scheduled to either debut or expand their presence in the Chinese market, a stable and promising destination supported by favorable policies and platforms.

    The strength of the partnership is reflected in trade data. In 2024, two-way trade reached a record of 295.6 billion U.S. dollars, marking a 4.8 percent year-on-year increase. This solidified China’s position as Africa’s largest trading partner for the 16th consecutive year. Meanwhile, imports from Africa reached 116.8 billion dollars, up 6.9 percent year-on-year.

    Beyond traditional trade, the expo also showcases progress in value-added production between China and African countries. One example is Rwanda’s chili sauce, which has become a symbol of integrated value chain development.

    Seeking larger-scale and sustainable cooperation, Rwanda’s Gashora Farm partnered in 2024 with Hunan Modern Agriculture International Development Co. Ltd to launch the Rwanda-Hunan Chili Pepper Industry Demonstration Project, which covers 100 hectares (1 square km). The initiative spans the full value chain, from seedling cultivation to export.

    In the first season after signing of the agreement, 200 tonnes of dried chili were shipped to China. “The Chinese market offers more than just orders. It brings stability and investment,” said Dieudonne Twahirwa, managing director of Gashora Farm. “It gives us partners. This partnership is transforming our business and the lives of farmers.”

    From Kenyan dried anchovies and Madagascan lamb products to rubber from Cote d’Ivoire, cooperation of various forms is expanding across Africa, supporting African countries’ industrialization efforts. This trend has already yielded notable success, including Ethiopia’s Eastern Industrial Zone and the China-Egypt TEDA Suez Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone.

    This photo taken on June 12, 2025 shows guests talking prior to the opening ceremony of the fourth China-Africa Economic and Trade Expo in Changsha, central China’s Hunan Province. (Xinhua/Jin Liangkuai)

    “The continent’s development priorities are shifting from raw material exports to value-added production,” said Humphrey Moshi, a professor of economics and director of the Center for Chinese Studies at the University of Dar es Salaam in Tanzania. “The China-Africa relationship is evolving beyond traditional trade, toward deeper industrial collaboration and shared value creation.”

    “It is no longer just about importing, but co-building industrialization,” said Senegalese Minister of Agriculture, Food Sovereignty and Livestock Mabouba Diagne. “China is a strategic partner that can drive the structural transformation of our agriculture … CAETE serves as a matchmaking platform, enabling such win-win collaborations.”

    EMPOWERING AFRICAN PRIORITIES

    This year’s expo features exhibition zones dedicated to clean energy, modern agricultural machinery, along with 30 events to be held in such areas as industrial collaboration and youth entrepreneurship. The expanded agenda underscores a dynamic partnership aligned with Africa’s priorities, including agricultural modernization, industrialization, and sustainable growth.

    “This expo is even more innovative,” said Okonkwo Chinweuba Innocent, Belt and Road Africa Economic Promotion Initiative Center in Nigeria. “It better connects supply and demand between China and Africa … cooperation is expanding into new areas like digital economy, green development and finance,” he told Xinhua.

    As cooperation deepens in these fast-growing sectors, Chinese solutions are empowering Africa’s industrialization and modernization, key priorities for the continent.

    An exhibitor introduces a sightseeing vehicle to a visitor at Changsha International Convention and Exhibition Center in Changsha, central China’s Hunan Province, June 12, 2025. (Xinhua/Xue Yuge)

    For instance, in e-commerce, Chinese expertise contributes to local transformation. To tackle persistent logistical challenges, Kilimall, an e-commerce platform founded by Chinese entrepreneurs in Africa, has introduced the “African overseas warehouse” model to reduce delivery time and facilitate cross-border trade. During the expo, the company is showcasing services designed to help entrepreneurs gain access to both Chinese and African markets.

    Private-sector participation is also gaining momentum. “I would like to see more Chinese companies set up in Kenya to manufacture solar products,” said Arnold Dodo Kageha, a 28-year-old Kenyan entrepreneur who has profited from distributing Chinese clean energy products such as portable power stations.

    “CAETE has become more than just a trade fair,” said Moshi. “It is now a venue through which Africa and China can align their aspirations and work together. It fits squarely within the broader goals of South-South cooperation.”

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Congressional Delegation Introduces Chugach Alaska Land Exchange and Oil Spill Recovery Act

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Alaska Dan Sullivan

    06.12.25

    WASHINGTON — U.S. Senators Lisa Murkowski and Dan Sullivan and U.S. Representative Nick Begich (all R-Alaska), introduced the Chugach Alaska Land Exchange and Oil Spill Recovery Act to direct a land exchange between the federal government and Chugach Alaska Corporation (Chugach). This exchange would resolve conflicts that exist between the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill (EVOS) Trustee Council’s Habitat Protection Program (the “Program”) goals for federal habitat conservation of surface lands impacted by EVOS and Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA) promises to Chugach for economic development of subsurface rights under these same lands. 

    The land exchange directed by this legislation would require Chugach to trade 231,000 acres of subsurface estate (under surface fee and conservation easements on surface land owned by the federal government) for 65,403 acres of fee simple land owned by the federal government. Most of the lands that would be exchanged were identified in the Chugach Region Land Study and Report to Congress from December 2022.  Congress directed the study in Section 1113 of the John D. Dingell, Jr. Conservation, Management and Recreation Act (Public Law 116-9; 133 Stat. 614) which Murkowski authored.

    “The effects of the Exxon Valdez oil spill on Native people in the Chugach region are still felt –environmentally, socially and economically. We must continue to take steps to move forward with recovery and that includes fulfilling the promises of ANCSA to Chugach, the Alaska Native Regional Corporation,” Senator Murkowski said. “I am proud to reintroduce this legislation, which is a “win-win” for Chugach and the federal government’s EVOS program goals.”

    “In the aftermath of the Exxon Valdez spill, Chugach Alaska Corporation not only had to deal with the devastating environmental consequences for the region, but also misguided federal restrictions on their ability to develop resources on their lands,” said Senator Sullivan.“Senator Murkowski, Congressman Begich and I are reintroducing legislation to amend ANCSA—as has been done many times throughout history—and facilitate a commonsense land exchange already studied extensively by BLM and the Forest Service. Our legislation will help address the evolving needs of Prince William Sound communities and create economic opportunities and cultural benefits for thousands of Alaska Native shareholders in the Chugach region, as intended under ANCSA.”

    “This land exchange corrects a decades-old misstep that has kept Chugach shareholders from fully benefiting from their own land and resources. With this legislation, we’re protecting our resources while restoring the rights of Alaska Native landowners,” said Congressman Begich. “I am proud to lead this legislation in the House and look forward to working with the delegation to continue restoring Alaska’s right to self-determination and ensuring responsible stewardship of our state’s resources.”

    “We are deeply grateful to Senator Lisa Murkowski, Senator Dan Sullivan, and Representative Nick Begich for their unwavering leadership and advocacy on behalf of Chugach and our people and communities,” said Sheri Buretta, Chairman of the Chugach Board. “Their decision to reintroduce this legislation underscores the significance of this exchange resolving long-standing split-estate conflicts in the region — not only for our corporation, but for the broader public interest, the State of Alaska, and the federal government. Chugach stands ready to work in close partnership with Congress, federal agencies, and all stakeholders to help advance this process. Our commitment to cooperation is rooted in a shared vision of responsible stewardship, economic opportunity, and enduring respect for our connection to these lands that have sustained our people for millennia.”?

    BACKGROUND:

    On March 24, 1989, the Exxon Valdez oil spill discharged approximately 11 million gallons of crude oil (enough to fill 17 Olympic-sized swimming pools) into Prince William Sound and adjoining waters in Alaska. It was one of the most environmentally damaging disasters in world history.

    The Chugach Region experienced great social and economic harm from the oil spill. Government recovery efforts, though well-intentioned, also had negative impacts and did not always include the voices of the Alaska Native people who have stewarded these lands for millennia. Thirty-five years later, the people and the environment are still recovering.

    Through Section 1113 of the John D. Dingell, Jr. Conservation, Management and Recreation Act of 2019 (sponsored by Murkowski; Public Law 116-9), Congress directed the Secretary of the Interior, in coordination with the Secretary of Agriculture and in consultation with Chugach Alaska Corporation, to conduct a study and provide a report to Congress assessing the social and economic impacts of the EVOS Trustee Council’s Program on Chugach, Chugach lands, and on the Chugach Region. The study was also required to identify sufficient acres of accessible and economically viable federal land that could be exchanged with Chugach.

    Under the Program, the Trustee Council used funds acquired from the companies responsible for EVOS to purchase fee title to 134,121 acres of surface estate lands, and purchased conservation easements on an additional 66,073 acres of surface estate lands, from four of the five Village Corporations in the Chugach Region that had been conveyed to them under ANCSA. Chugach was not a party to any of these acquisitions but owns the subsurface, or mineral estate, for all of the lands in which interests were acquired by the federal government from the Village Corporations under the Program.

    Some surface lands and conservation easements on surface lands acquired by the federal government under the Program went into the state and federal park systems, but most went into the Chugach National Forest, managed by the U.S. Forest Service.

    The EVOS Program lands (fee surface estate lands and conservation easement lands) are subject to restrictions on any surface development that is inconsistent with maintaining their wilderness characteristics. Therefore, Chugach is effectively prohibited from taking any steps to develop its subsurface interests and needs alternative lands to realize the meaningful economic benefits promised in ANCSA.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: MATSUI, MCCLAIN DELANEY, LANDSMAN, CARTER URGE SENATE LEADERSHIP TO STRIKE PROVISION CONDITIONING BEAD FUNDING ON AI MORATORIUM

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Congresswoman Doris Matsui (D-CA)

    WASHINGTON, D.C. – Today, Congresswoman Doris Matsui (CA-07), Ranking Member of the House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Communications and Technology, Congresswoman April McClain Delaney (MD-06), Congressman Greg Landsman (OH-01), and Congressman Troy Carter (LA-02) led 27 lawmakers in a letter to Senate leadership. The letter urges the Senate to strike a provision in the Senate Commerce Committee’s budget reconciliation text that would condition Broadband Equity, Access, and Deployment (BEAD) funding on states acquiescing to a ten-year moratorium on enforcing their own artificial intelligence (AI) laws and regulations.  

    “The BEAD program is a once-in-a-generation investment to close the digital divide in areas across our nation that have long been overlooked. Congress created BEAD as the product of thoughtful, bipartisan deliberations to expand affordable broadband access to every American,” wrote the lawmakers. “In contrast, the reconciliation text’s AI moratorium provision represents a reckless and dangerous attempt to force states to forfeit their ability to protect the public from the rapidly escalating risks of unregulated AI and automated decision systems. It is textbook federal overreach.”

    In the absence of a federal AI regulatory framework, California and other states across the nation are embracing common-sense safeguards that ensure innovation and competition can continue to thrive while protecting the public. As AI tools grow more sophisticated and more widely deployed, these state measures are crucial to building consumer trust and ensuring safety. Yet the moratorium, spearheaded by Republicans, would strip states of their authority to respond to new and evolving AI risks—freezing vital consumer protections for a full decade.

    The BEAD program, included as part of the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law, provides $42.45 billion to expand high-speed internet access nationwide. It funds planning, infrastructure, and adoption programs in all 50 states and is key to closing the digital divide and getting rural and underserved Americans reliable, high-speed internet coverage. Just last week, the Trump Administration released new guidelines that would substantially delay BEAD investments, forcing states to redo their plans. Conditioning this transformative funding on the surrender of state policymaking authority is deeply troubling—and sets a dangerous precedent.  

    “Rather than hold the administration accountable for betraying BEAD’s commitment to connectivity, the AI moratorium provision would destabilize BEAD further by allowing the administration to claw back long awarded funding from states unwilling to relinquish their role in ensuring safe and responsible AI innovation,” the lawmakers continued. 

    Full text of the letter can be found below or HERE.

    Dear Majority Leader Thune, Minority Leader Schumer, Chairman Cruz, and Ranking Member Cantwell:

    We write to urge you to strike a deeply dangerous provision in the Senate Commerce Committee’s budget reconciliation text that would condition Broadband Equity, Access, and Deployment (BEAD) funding on states acquiescing to a ten-year moratorium on state and local enforcement of their own artificial intelligence (AI) laws and regulations.

    The BEAD program is a once-in-a-generation investment to close the digital divide in areas across our nation that have long been overlooked. Congress created BEAD as the product of thoughtful, bipartisan deliberations to expand affordable broadband access to every American. And a core tenet of BEAD is empowering our states and local communities to use their on-the-ground knowledge to ensure federal broadband dollars go where they are most needed. In contrast, the reconciliation text’s AI moratorium provision represents a reckless and dangerous attempt to force states to forfeit their ability to protect the public from the rapidly escalating risks of unregulated AI and automated decision systems. It is textbook federal overreach.

    Linking critical broadband funding—intended to close the digital divide, support rural communities, and provide lifesaving services to our constituents—to the suppression of state-level AI oversight is both coercive and irresponsible. It forces states to choose between expanding internet access and safeguarding their residents from potentially harmful and untested technologies. The notion that states should be barred—even temporarily—from enacting necessary safeguards or responding to emerging harms undermines democratic governance and public trust. A federally imposed moratorium on state AI regulation, especially as a condition for infrastructure funds, strips state and local governments of their ability to respond to the specific, pressing needs and values of their communities.

    What’s more, this sets a deeply troubling precedent: allowing essential public investments to be weaponized to block legitimate state policymaking on complex and consequential technologies. The consequences of such a trade-off are unacceptable.

    The BEAD Program has obligated all the $42.45 billion allocated to states and territories to advance significant capital for broadband expansion. States are at the one-yard line, ready to reach the end zone and get shovels in the ground. But this success is under threat. After nearly six months of freezing BEAD progress, the administration doubled down on sabotaging BEAD with rule changes that would undo the states’ hard work,

    further delay broadband buildout, drive up costs for consumers, and hamstring states’ flexibility to choose the right mix of technologies to provide the most reliable, scalable, and future-proof internet service available to a location. Rather than hold the administration accountable for betraying BEAD’s commitment to connectivity, the AI moratorium provision would destabilize BEAD further by allowing the administration to claw back long-awarded funding from states unwilling to relinquish their role in ensuring safe and responsible AI innovation.

    We have already seen an outpouring of opposition against the House Republicans’ AI moratorium provision, including bipartisan opposition from state attorneys general state legislators, voters, and over 140 consumer advocacy, online safety, and civil rights groups These, and other growing voices, have highlighted how a ten-year hold on state enforcement and regulation exposes Americans to a growing list of harms as AI technologies rapidly evolve and expand across sectors, from healthcare to employment, education, and housing. The resulting regulatory gap from the AI moratorium provision would decimate the good work that states, led by both Democrats and Republicans, have accomplished to set commonsense AI guardrails, including in transparency and online safety.

    The Senate Commerce reconciliation text fails to address these bipartisan concerns. Instead, it would further harm Americans by depriving a state of critical broadband funding simply because that state wants to exercise its right to protect its residents from AI-specific harms.

    As you are aware, the “Byrd Rule” under the Congressional Budget Act prohibits the inclusion of non-budgetary provisions in reconciliation legislation. The effort to make BEAD funding contingent on a state’s decision to suspend any new AI regulations is not only a dangerous and sweeping policy change—it also plainly violates the Byrd rule.

    For all these reasons, we strongly urge the Senate to reject the AI moratorium provision and preserve both the intent of the BEAD program and the states’ right to regulate emerging technologies in the public interest.

    Thank you for your attention to this urgent matter.

    # # #

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Press Briefing Transcript: Julie Kozack, Director, Communications Department, June 12, 2025

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    June 12, 2025

    SPEAKER:  Ms. Julie Kozack, Director of the Communications Department, IMF

    MS. KOZACK: Good morning, everyone, and welcome to this IMF Press Briefing. My name is Julie Kozak. I’m the Director of Communications at the IMF.  As usual, this press briefing will be embargoed until 11:00 a.m. Eastern Time in the United States.  And as usual, I will start with a few announcements, and then I’ll take your questions in person on WebEx and via the Press Center.  And I have quite a few announcements today, so please do bear with me. 

    On June 18th, the Managing Director will travel to Brussels, where she will hold bilateral meetings with officials.  On June 19th, she will travel to Luxembourg to present the Euro Area Annual Consultation at the Eurogroup meeting.  On June 20th, the Managing Director will be in Rome to speak at the Mattei Plan for Africa and the Global Gateway event, a joint effort with the African Continent.  This event is co-chaired by Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen.  And from there, the Managing Director will travel to Japan from June 22nd to 24th.  During her visit, she will hold meetings with Japanese officials, members of the private sector, and other stakeholders. 

    Turning to other management travel.  First Deputy Managing Director Gita Gopinath will travel to Sri Lanka, Singapore, and Indonesia.  On June 16th, she will participate in the Sri Lanka Road to Recovery Conference, where she will deliver opening remarks.  And in all three countries, our FDMD will meet with officials and various stakeholders during this trip. 

    From June 24th through 26th, our Deputy Managing Director Bo Li will attend the World Economic Forum Annual Meeting of the New Champions in Tianjin, China.  DMD Li will participate in sessions on safeguarding growth engines and the role of digital assets in Global payment systems. 

    On June 30th, Deputy Managing Director Nigel Clarke will participate in the Finance for Development Conference and in Sevilla, Spain. 

    And with that, I will now open the floor to your questions.  For those of you who are connecting virtually, please do turn on both your camera and microphone when speaking.  All right, let’s open the floor.   

    QUESTIONER: I have two questions on Ukraine.  After meetings in Kyiv last month, the IMF mission emphasized the importance of Ukraine’s upcoming budget declaration for 2026-2028, which will determine the course of the fiscal framework and policies.  What are the Fund’s expectations, and does the IMF have any specific requirements or policy guidelines for this document?  And secondly, if I may, do you have data of the IMF Board — IMF support meetings to approve the aides review for Ukraine?     

    MS. KOZACK: Any other questions on Ukraine?                                          

    QUESTIONER: So, Ukraine has recently defaulted on its GDP-linked securities and, before that, failed to reach an agreement with creditors to restructure its part of its sovereign debt.  How concerned is IMF with these developments, and do you see any risks for the EFF repayments from Ukraine?  Thank you. 

    QUESTIONER: Some follow-up to your question.  IMF sources indicate that Ukraine transferred $171 million repayment to the Fund on June 9th, the first repayment on loans received post-February 2022.  Can you confirm this payment was received?  And how does the IMF view Ukraine’s emerging shift towards repayment on wartime financing?  Thank you. 

    MS. KOZACK: Let me take these questions for a moment, and I’ll remind you where we are on Ukraine.

    On May 28th, IMF staff and the Ukrainian authorities reached Staff–Level Agreement.  And this was for the Eighth Review of the EFF program.  Subject to approval by our Executive Board, Ukraine will have access to about U.S. $500 million, and that would bring total disbursements under the program to U.S. $10.6 billion.  The Board is scheduled to take place in the coming weeks, and we’ll provide more details as they become available.  I can also add that Ukraine’s economy has remained resilient.  Performance under the EFF has continued to be strong despite very challenging circumstances.  The authorities met all of their quantitative performance criteria and indicative targets, and progress does continue on the structural agenda in Ukraine.

    Now, with respect to the specific questions on the budget declaration, what I can provide there is that our view is that the 2026-2028 budget declaration will provide a strategic framework for fiscal policy for the remainder of the program over that period of time.  It will help focus the debate on key expenditure priorities, including recovery, reconstruction, defense, and social spending.  And it will also form the basis for discussion of the 2026 budget, which, of course, will also be an important milestone for Ukraine. 

    On the question regarding the debt, what I can say there is that we encourage the Ukrainian authorities and their creditors to continue to make progress toward reaching an agreement in line with the debt sustainability targets under the IMF’s program and the authority’s announced strategy.  So that’s sort of our broad view on the debt.  On the implications for completion of the review, as in all cases where a member country may have arrears to private creditors, staff will assess whether the requirements under the Fund’s lending into arrears policy are met.  In light of this, again, we encourage the authorities to continue to make good-faith efforts toward reaching an agreement in light of the debt sustainability targets. 

    And on your question about Ukraine’s payment to the Fund, what I can say is that, in general, we don’t comment on specific transactions of individual members.  What I can guide you to is that we do provide on our website detailed information on members’ repayments.  And this is made available on a monthly basis.  So, at the end of each month, if you look at the Ukraine page, you can see the transactions that were made.  And on a daily basis, we provide detail on member countries outstanding obligations to the IMF.  So that can give you a sense of how the overall obligations of Ukraine have evolved on a daily basis. 

    QUESTIONER: Can you give us an update on the relationship between the IMF and Senegal?  Where do things currently stand with misreporting and a new program?  This is my first question.  And the second one I have is the Fifth Review under the Policy Coordination concerning Rwanda.  The IMF stated that “Rwanda continues to demonstrate leadership in integrating climate consideration into macroeconomic policy and leveraging institutional reforms to mobilize climate finance.”  Now my question is, can you please tell us concretely what kind of institutional reforms have been implemented by Rwanda? 

    MS. KOZACK: So, before I answer this, are there any other questions on Senegal or Rwanda? I see none in the room. Anyone online want to come in on Senegal?  Okay, I don’t see anyone coming in, so let’s start with Senegal, and then we’ll move to Rwanda. 

    What I can say on Senegal is that we, the IMF and our team in particular, remained actively engaged with the Senegalese authorities, including during a visit to Dakar over March and April and further discussions during the Spring Meetings, which were held here in Washington in April.  We do continue to work with the authorities to address the complex misreporting case that is ongoing.  And addressing this complex case does require a rigorous and time-intensive process.

    I also want to take the opportunity to add that the IMF supports our member countries in a variety of ways, and it goes beyond just providing financing.  So, for example, in the case of Senegal, we are continuing to provide the authorities with technical assistance, including, for example, on our debt sustainability analysis that is tailored to low-income countries.  We’re working closely with the authorities on compiling government financial statistics.  This is being led by our Statistics Department.  We’re providing technical assistance on energy sector reform, public investment management, and revenue mobilization, and that, of course, is with support from our fiscal experts. 

    With respect to a new program.  We don’t have currently a fixed timeline for a new program, and we are awaiting the final audit outcome. 

    Now, turning to your question on Rwanda here.  What I can say, and maybe just to step back and remind everyone of where we are in Rwanda.  On June 4th, so just a few days ago, our Executive Board concluded the Fifth Review of Rwanda’s policy Coordination Instrument.  Rwanda’s economic growth remains among the strongest in Sub-Saharan Africa, and that’s despite rising pressures both on the fiscal side and the external side.  Rwanda, of course, we’re encouraging Rwanda to continue with a credible fiscal consolidation, strong domestic revenue mobilization, and a strong monetary policy. 

    With respect to your specific question, Rwanda successfully completed its Resilience and Sustainability Fund program, the RSF program, in December of 2024, six months ahead of the initial timetable.  And under this RSF, Rwanda did carry out a number of institutional reforms that were focused on green public financial management, climate public investment management, climate-related risk management for financial institutions, and disaster risk reduction.  So, these are some of the institutional reforms that Rwanda completed, which led us to make that statement about their leadership in this area. 

    I can also add that these reforms, along with some of the other reforms they’re having, they’re undertaking, such as a green taxonomy and the adoption of best practices in climate risk reporting by financial institutions.  The idea is that this together will help to close information gaps, improve transparency, and that hopefully will allow for a boost to private sector engagement in advancing Rwanda’s ambitious climate goals and its broader goals toward economic development and strong and sustainable growth. 

    QUESTIONER: Two questions on Syria.  The Fund said this week that Syria needs substantial international assistance for its recovery efforts.  Firstly, can you give us an estimation of how much economic assistance Syria will need?  And secondly, could you just let us know if there were any discussions around if a potential Article IV was discussed? 

    MS. KOZACK: Thank you. Any other questions on Syria?                   

    QUESTIONER: Just to know if there was any demand from the Syrian government for any kind of technical assistance from the IMF to help them recover, economically speaking?

    MS. KOZACK: Does anyone online want to come in on Syria? I don’t see anyone coming in. So let me step back again and give a sense of where we are on Syria.

    I think, as many of you know, an IMF staff team visited Syria from June 1st through 5th.  This was the first IMF visit to Syria since 2009.  The goal of the visit was to assess the economic and financial conditions in Syria, as well as to discuss with the authorities their economic policy, and also to ascertain the authorities ‘ capacity-building priorities, ultimately to support the recovery of the Syrian economy.  I think, as we’ve discussed here before, Syria faces enormous challenges following years of conflict that have caused immense human suffering, and it’s reduced the Syrian economy to a fraction of its former size. 

    At the IMF, we’re committed to supporting Syria in its efforts.  Based on the findings of the mission, IMF staff, in coordination with other partners, are developing a detailed roadmap for policy and capacity development priorities for key economic institutions.  And within the IMF’s mandate, this covers the Finance Ministry, the Central Bank, and the Statistics Agency.  So those would be the areas where we will be focusing in terms of the detailed roadmap on priorities, economic and capacity building priorities. 

    Syria, as noted, will need substantial international assistance.  We don’t yet have a precise estimate of that assistance.  But what I can say is this will also — it will not only require concessional financial support, but also substantial capacity development support for the country.  And that’s basically where we have left it with the Syrian authorities.  And, of course, we will continue to engage closely with them, and we are committed to helping them, supporting them on their recovery journey. 

    QUESTIONER: Is the date of the IMF mission to Argentina already said?  And based on that definition, when would the First Review of the agreement could take place?  And another one, in the last few days, the Argentina government has launched different mechanisms to try to increase the level of foreign exchange reserves.  Is the IMF worried that Argentina will not reach the target set in the agreement?  And could the IMF give Argentina a waiver on this?  Thank you very much. 

    MS. KOZACK: Okay, any other questions in the room on Argentina? I know we have several online.

    QUESTIONER: Thanks for taking my questions.  I would like to know how does the IMF evaluate the listed economy measures, particularly the issue of the measure to use undeclared dollars.  Thank you.

    QUESTIONER: My first question is about the reserve target for the new program with Argentina.  Central Bank is about $4 billion below the target set for June.  Also, some operations are expected that could increase their reserve stock.  Officials said on Monday evening that local currency bonds can now be purchased with U.S. dollar and that the minimum time requirement for foreign investors to hold onto some Argentina bonds will be eliminated.  The IMF is concerned that the Central Bank is not accumulating reserves touch foreign trade and is only receiving income touch debt.  Is the consensus with the authorities to postpone the Frist Review and allow time for Argentina to activate credit operation in order to close — to get closer to the target set for June, or Argentina should resort to a waiver?  And what is your view on the recent measures? 

    And that second question is about the possibility of an IMF mission arriving in Argentina in the coming weeks.  Is that possible?  Would it be a technical staff mission, or could the Managing Director or Deputy Executive Director also come?  Thank you very much. 

    QUESTIONER: So, the question is the same as (connection issue) First Review of the agreement signed in April (connection issue)

    QUESTIONER: -Is the IMF considering granting a waiver and also if they build up. 

    MS. KOZACK: You’ve broken up quite a bit, and now we’re not able to hear you, so we’ll try to get you back, or I think what I understood from your question is it’s broadly along the same lines as some of the other questions. What we can do is if you want to connect via the Press Center, I can read the question out loud. But what I’m going to do is move on.                      

    QUESTIONER:  Basically, echoing my colleague’s questions on the timing of the mission and whether an extension was granted to meet the reserve’s target, well, for the First Review generally.  And separately, Argentina has July 9th dollar debt payments, which will obviously affect reserves.  How will that payment and timing affect your calculus of the reserves target within the First Review?  Thank you.

    QUESTIONER: Well, yes, also echoing my colleague’s question regarding whether the timeline for the First Review, the end date remains this Friday, which was what it said on the Staff Report.  And also, there was a ruling lately, these past few days, against former President Cristina Kirchner.  I was wondering if that raises any concerns in the IMF regarding any political conflict or any subsequent economic impact. 

    MS. KOZACK: I think we’ve covered all the questions on Argentina. Anyone else on Argentina? Okay, very good.  So, let me try to give a response that tries to cover as many of these questions as I can.  So again, I’m just going to step back and provide where we are with Argentina. 

    So, on April 11th, the IMF’s Executive Board approved a new four-year EFF arrangement worth $20 billion for Argentina.  The initial disbursement was $12 billion, and the goal of the program was to support is to support Argentina’s transition to the next phase of state stabilization and reform.  The Milei administration’s policies continue to evolve and to deliver impressive results, as we have previously noted. 

    In this regard, we welcome the recent measures announced this week by the Central Bank and the Ministry of Finance as they represent another important step in efforts to consolidate disinflation, support the government’s financing strategy and to rebuild reserves and, more specifically, steps to strengthen the monetary framework and to improve liquidity management.  These are important to further reduce inflation and inflation expectations.  The Treasury’s successful reentry into capital markets and other actions to mobilize financing for Argentina are also expected to boost reserves, and stability overall for the country continues to be supported by the implementation of strong fiscal anchor in the country. 

    Our team continues to engage frequently and constructively with the Argentine authorities as part of the program’s First Review.  I can add that a technical mission will visit Buenos Aires in late June to assess progress on program targets and objectives and to also discuss the authority’s forward-looking reform agenda.  More broadly and despite the more challenging environment, the authorities, as I said, have continued to make very notable and impressive progress.  So, I will leave it at that. 

    Let’s go online for a bit, and then we’ll come — no, let’s go right here in the back.  You haven’t had a question, and you’re in the room.                             

    QUESTIONER: Given the recent escalation in global trade tensions and the effect of the tariffs, what is the IMF’s assessment of how these developments are affecting emerging economies?  And what policy recommendation does the IMF have for countries facing increased external pressures? 

    MS. KOZACK: Okay, let me answer — let me turn to this question on emerging markets, a very important constituency and part of our membership here at the IMF. So, let me start with where we were and what our assessment was as of April.

    In April, when we launched our World Economic Outlook, we projected growth in emerging and developing countries to slow from 4.3 percent in 2024 to 3.7 percent in 2025 and then to come back a little bit to 3.9 percent in 2026.  We did have at that time also significant downgrades for countries most affected by the trade measures, and that includes China, for example.  We have seen since then that there have been some positive surprises to growth in the first quarter for this group of countries, including China.  We have also seen recent reductions in some tariffs, and that represents kind of an upside risk to our forecast.  And, of course, we will be updating our forecast, including for this group of emerging and developing countries, as part of our July WEO update, and that will be released toward the end of July. 

    In terms of our recommendations, we recommend what we would call a multi-pronged policy response.  So first, to carefully calibrate monetary policy and also macroprudential or prudential policies to maintain stability in countries.  We also recommend for this group of countries, but for all of our members, to rebuild fiscal buffers to restore policy space to respond to, of course, future shocks that may occur.  For countries that may face particular disruptive pressures in the foreign currency, foreign exchange market, we would say that they could pursue targeted interventions if those instances are disruptive.  We also are encouraging again all of our countries to undertake the necessary reforms to no longer delay reforms associated with boosting productivity and longer-term growth. 

    I think maybe stepping back, we’ve been talking for quite some time in the IMF about a low growth, high debt environment.  And this, of course, applies to this group of countries as well.  So, dealing with the debt side, of course, is important through fiscal consolidation, but also, very importantly, boosting growth and productivity growth.  So, countries can also have a more prosperous society and also deal with some of their debt issues through stronger growth is also very important. 

    All right, let me go online, and then I’ll come back to the room.  Let’s see.  Online, I see a few hands up.                             

    QUESTIONER: My question is on Japanese tour conducted by Managing Director.  Could you give more details on how Japanese tour played this month?  For example, is there any chance for giving speeches or press conference and so on? 

    MS. KOZACK: So, as I said, the Managing Director will visit Japan later this month. Her visit will mostly entail meetings with government officials and also the business community as well as other stakeholders. She will have an opportunity to also do some outreach, and we can provide further details to you as her agenda becomes more concrete.  But she is very much looking forward to the visit.  Japan, as I think we’ve said before, is an important partner for the IMF.  And the Managing Director is very much looking forward to meeting with Japanese officials and talking more broadly to other stakeholders in Japan about the important partnership that the IMF has with Japan. 

    I see some other hands up online.  Unfortunately, I can’t see.  So, I think if you’re online and you have your hand up, just jump in. 

    QUESTIONER: You already referred to your own economic outlooks when you talked about emerging markets.  But I was — I wanted to ask you, does the IMF anticipate a similar growth downgrade as we’ve just seen for the World Bank this week and its economic assessment?  Because, of course, back in April, the cutoff point for your last report was just as Donald Trump was announcing the Liberation Day tariffs. 

    MS. KOZACK: Okay, so thank you for that. Any other questions on the global outlook? Okay, so let me take this one, and then we’ll come back to some other questions. 

    So, what I can say in terms of the forward-looking, I mean, first, I want to start by reiterating that we will release a revised set of projections in July as part of our regular WEO update.  What I can add is that since we released our World Economic Outlook, what we call the WEO, in April, we have seen some, you know, some data come in and some other developments.  So first, we have seen some trade deals that have lowered tariffs, notably between the U.S. and China, but also the U.S. and the UK, and at the same time, the U.S. has raised further tariffs on steel and aluminum imports.  So taken together, such announcements, combined with the April 9th pause on the high level of tariffs, these could support activity relative to the forecast that we had in April.  But nonetheless, we do have an outlook for the global economy that remains subject to heightened uncertainty, especially as trade negotiations continue. 

    I can also add that recent activity indicators reflect a complex economic landscape.  So, this is recent high-frequency data.  We have some outturns in the first quarter, which indicated a front-loading of activity ahead of the tariff announcements that took place in April.  And some high-frequency indicators also show some trade diversion and unwinding of that earlier front loading.  So, this is kind of the more recent indicators.  So, all of this creates kind of a complicated picture for us with some upside risk, some other developments, and we’ll take all of these developments together into account as we update our forecast toward the end of July in our WEO. 

    QUESTIONER: When you say support activity, do you mean there’s a chance it could be an improved outlook? 

    MS. KOZACK: So yes, by support activity, what we mean is that it’s kind of positive, it’s a little bit of a positive sign for economic activity. So that’s related, though, I would say, to the specific announcements. So, so just going back to say, the announcements of the trade deals that have lowered tariffs, particularly the ones between the U.S. and China and the U.S. and the UK, those could be supportive or a bit more positive for economic activity going forward.  But the overall picture is both complicated for the reasons that I mentioned. 

    We have some front loading in the first quarter.  Some of that seems perhaps to be unwinding in more recent indicators.  And we also, of course, have to remember that we are in an environment of very high uncertainty, and uncertainty, in general, tends to dampen economic activity. 

    So, the overall picture is quite complex.  And so, we will take all of these factors into account as we move forward with our forecast in July.  And, of course, between now and when we release our forecast later in July, we would expect that there will be further data releases.  And also, there is the possibility that there can be further announcements that we would have to take into account or further developments that we would have to take into account as well. 

    Let me just stay online for another minute.  I think I have one more hand up online or two hands online. 

    QUESTIONER: My question is about Egypt.  I was hoping to ask you if the Egyptian authorities have requested a waiver from the Fund for any of the requirements related to the Fifth Review of the country’s ongoing loan program and specifically if a waiver has been requested related to targets for divestment from state-owned assets.  And if you have any update on the timing of the Fifth Review, that would also be very helpful.  I know there were some suggestions that the Fifth Review could be combined with the Sixth Review, in which case we wouldn’t see it until September rather than the June date that had previously been talked about.  Thank you.

    MS. KOZACK: Anyone else on Egypt?

    QUESTIONER: My question is related to the previous one by my colleague.  She asked about the state-owned companies to be listed for IPOs or for private sectors to be having a bigger stake in the economy.  How the IMF evaluate the progress achieved by the Egyptian authorities during that?  And also, when the Fifth Review to be finished after the physical meetings happened in past May?  And what are the most recent progress achieved until now during this?  And also, I’d like to ask about how IMF evaluated the latest step by Egyptian government to give the Minister of Finance the right to issue sukuk in the guarantee of place in Red Sea as published in the last two days. 

    MS. KOZACK: Okay, thank you. Anyone else have questions on Egypt? So, on Egypt, as I think many of you know, an IMF team visited Cairo.  From May 6th to May 18th, the team held productive discussions with the Egyptian authorities on their economic and financial policies.  Discussions are continuing virtually to finalize agreement on remaining policies and reforms that could support the completion of the Fifth Review under the EFF. So again, discussions around the Fifth Review are continuing virtually. 

    As we have said here before, Egypt has made clear progress on its macroeconomic reform program with notable improvements in inflation and in the level of international reserves.  As Egypt’s macroeconomic stabilization is taking hold, it’s now the time for efforts to focus on accelerating and deepening reforms, including reducing the footprint of the state, leveling the playing field, and improving the business environment in Egypt. 

    What I can add is that in order to deliver on these objectives, particularly with respect to reducing the footprint of the state, leveling the playing field, et cetera, it’s important to decisively reduce the role of the public sector in the economy.  The implementation of the state ownership policy, as well as the asset divestment program in sectors where the state has committed to reduce its footprint, will be playing a critical role in strengthening the ability of Egypt’s private sector to contribute to growth and activity in the Egyptian economy, which will ultimately support improvements in livelihoods of the Egyptian people.  We remain committed to supporting Egypt in building economic resilience and fostering stronger private sector-led growth. 

    On some of the more specific questions related to Sukuk, I don’t have a response here, but we’ll come back to you bilaterally. 

    QUESTIONER: It’s a quick overall question.  Could you remind us the condition for a country to come under IMF supervision?  Does it require specifically a program, or can it come from the IMF itself?  Thank you very much. 

    MS. KOZACK: Can you clarify what you mean by IMF supervision? Just so I understand.

    QUESTIONER: To be perfectly honest, in the past few days, we had comments from the French government about the fact that it could become under IMF supervision.  I’m not very interested in specifically about France, but just in general overall how IMF comes to work with governments.  What are the conditions for the IMF to step in and come to help the government?  Thank you very much. 

    MS. KOZACK: Very good. So, let me maybe take this opportunity to step back and explain kind of the three big pillars of the work of the IMF.

    So, the first is policy advice, and this is done mainly through the Article IV consultation process.  The reason it’s called Article IV is because it’s in Article IV of our Articles of Agreement, and every member country of the IMF — so, we have 191 member countries — every member country commits when they join the IMF to participate in the Article IV consultation process.  So that applies to every member.  And that is a process that I know you here are very familiar with, where the IMF sends a team, and we conduct an assessment of the economy, and we provide policy advice to the country.  That’s done for all members. 

    Another leg or another pillar of what we do at the IMF is capacity development.  And for capacity development, this is at the request of the member.  So, this could be, you know, very specific advice on a specific area where our technical expert would go and do sort of a deep dive analysis and provide detailed policy recommendations.  But it’s really meant at building state capacity.  So often, this is done in areas such as revenue mobilization or public financial management, statistics, monetary policy frameworks, and debt management.  These are some of the areas where we would provide technical assistance to countries.  That’s at the request of the member. 

    And the same is true for our financial support.  So, for financial support, this is done again at the request of the member country.  The member would request financial support from the Fund, and then the Fund would then send a team and ultimately develop a program that reflects the commitments of the authorities.  But that program would need to be aimed at getting the country back on its feet.  In our technical language, it’s restoring medium-term viability for the country.  And that financing program has a balance between financial resources that the Fund provides and also policy measures taken by the part of the authorities.  But that, again, is at the request of the member country. 

    QUESTIONER: So, my question is about cryptocurrency and digital assets.  What is the IMF’s view right now on the daily use transactions by people, by governments, in paying and accumulating Bitcoin and other digital currencies?  What risks and opportunities do you see on behalf of the IMF and what shall be done on the governmental level to implement any additional safeguards requirements to make this like a daily routine operations?  Thank you. 

    MS. KOZACK: Okay, so I think on the broad topic of kind of crypto assets, what we can say is that they have gained popularity as an asset class. And also, what we see is that the underlying technology, which is a digital ledger that is shared, trusted, and programmable, is broadly viewed as highly valuable. And that technology may have broader societal benefits.  So, we do see crypto assets as a speculative asset as an asset class.  At the IMF, we generally don’t recommend crypto assets as legal or cryptocurrencies as legal tender.  We also do see that there are some potential risks that could arise from crypto assets.  These include risks to financial stability, to consumer and investor protection, and also to market integrity. 

    So, in order to balance, in a sense, the opportunities based on the technology and a new asset class with some of these risks, what we advise countries to do is to establish a robust policy framework to effectively mitigate some of the risks while allowing society to take advantage of the benefits or the opportunities that arise from this new technology. 

    QUESTIONER:  The Bank of Russia recently cut its key interest rate from 21 percent to 20 percent, marking its first easing move since September 2022.  From the IMF perspective, what are the implications of this monetary policy shift?  Thank you. 

    MS. KOZACK: So, on Russia, let me just step back a minute, and I’ll provide our overall assessment of the economy, and then I’ll get to your specific question.

    So, what we see in Russia is that last year, we saw the economy overheating, and now what we observe in Russia is a, is sharp slowdown of the economy, with growth slowing but inflation still relatively elevated.  Growth in 2025 is expected to slow to 1.5 percent based on our forecast from April, and this was compared to 4.3 percent in 2024.  And this reflects policy tightening, cyclical factors, and also lower oil prices. 

    Now, with respect to the action by the Central Bank, as you noted, the Central Bank indeed reduced the key policy rate from 21 percent to 20 percent for the first time.  This was the first reduction since September of 2022.  And the action taken by the Central Bank was in response to slowing growth, which I just mentioned, and also some easing of inflation pressures. 

    So, as I noted, inflation still remains high.  It was just under 10 percent in May.  But our forecast has inflation declining going forward.  So, we expect inflation to ease to 8.2 percent by the end of this year.  And we anticipate that inflation will turn to the target of 4 percent in the first half of 2027.  So that’s the IMF forecast.  So, the inflation challenge for Russia remains, and it’s appropriate.  Therefore, that monetary policy remains tight, and even with this cut, monetary policy is still tight. 

    I am going to now take the opportunity to read one question or some questions on Ghana and some questions on Sri Lanka, and then we’ll bring the Press Briefing to a close.  So, on Ghana, I have three questions.  The first one is about an update on when Ghana’s program will be presented to the Board following Staff–Level Agreement. 

    The second question is about the amended Energy Sector Levy Act to add GH₵1 per liter on petroleum products to defray the cost of fuel purchases for thermal plants.  Has the IMF taken note of this, and what’s its position on using taxes versus passing these costs through tariffs? 

    The third question on Ghana is whether the IMF is looking at the possibility of revising Ghana’s IMF program targets as the cedi’s sharp appreciation against the dollar has affected many variables that influence these targets set by the Fund? 

    So let me take a moment to just respond on Ghana.  So again, stepping back to where we are on Ghana.  On April 15th, the IMF staff and the Ghanaian authorities reached Staff–Level Agreement on the Fourth Review of Ghana’s Extended Credit Facility.  Upon approval by our Executive Board, Ghana would be scheduled to receive about U.S. $370 million, bringing total support under the ECF to $2.4 billion since May of 2023.  We anticipate bringing the review to our Board in early July, so in just a few weeks. 

    What I can add about the question about the cedi’s sharp appreciation is that you know, of course, as we look at a program, we look at all of these developments, including, of course, developments in the exchange rate.  And so, future program reviews will provide an opportunity for the team to carefully assess all of the evolving macroeconomic and financial conditions, including exchange rate movements, and to ensure that the program’s targets and objectives remain appropriate and achievable. 

    And on the fuel levy, what I can say is that this is a new measure that will help generate additional resources to tackle the challenges in Ghana’s energy sector, and it’s also going to bolster Ghana’s ability to deliver on the fiscal objectives under the program. 

    And I’m going to read one last set of questions on Sri Lanka, and then we will bring the Press briefing to a close.  So, we have a number of journalists asking about Sri Lanka.  So there’s — we’re consolidating the questions here.  So, these journalists are asking for updates on the IMF’s view on Sri Lanka’s progress in implementing cost recovery, electricity prices, and the automatic price adjustment system.  They’re asking about the date for the Executive Board’s consideration of the Fourth Review under the program. 

    And another question, has the government raised the issue of recent global shocks and possible further pressure on the economy and its ability to meet its reform program targets?  How do we rate the new government’s approach to corruption? 

    QUESTIONER: My question is, recently Sri Lankan president announced that the existing IMF program is likely (inaudible) that it will be the final program for the country as it tries to achieve financial independence.  What is the IMF’s view on this?  Is it achievable given the current situation in Sri Lanka?  And what is the progress on the IMF Board approval for the next review?  Thank you. 

    MS. KOZACK: All right, so again, just stepping back and reminding where we are on Sri Lanka.

    So, on April 25th, IMF staff and the Sri Lankan authorities reached Staff–Level Agreement on their fourth review of Sri Lanka’s economic reform program.  The program and Sri Lanka’s ambitious reform agenda continue to deliver commendable outcomes.  Performance under the program remains strong overall, and the government remains committed to program objectives.  Completion of the review is pending approval of the IMF’s Executive Board, and it is contingent on the completion of prior actions. 

    What I can add is that our IMF team, of course, is closely engaged with the authorities to assess the measures that were recently announced by the regulator on June 11th.  And these include a 15 percent increase in in electricity tariffs and the publication of a revised bulk supply transaction account guidelines for this.  So, these were two prior actions.  Once the review is completed by our Executive Board, Sri Lanka would have access to about $344 million in financing, and we will announce the Board date for Sri Lanka in due course. 

    With respect to some of the more specific questions on governance, what I can add is that in end-February, the government published an updated government action plan on governance reforms.  And this action plan included important commitments such as enacting a public procurement law, an asset recovery law, and other actions that are aligned with the recommendations that were included in the IMF’s Governance Diagnostic Report. 

    On the question about kind of the global situation and the impact on Sri Lanka, what I can say there is that, like for all countries in an environment of high uncertainty around policy and in general, high global uncertainty, this poses, of course, risks to an economy like Sri Lanka’s, as it does to many others.  If some of the risks associated with high global uncertainty were to materialize, the way we will approach this will be to work very closely with the authorities first to assess the impact of any downside risk that materializes, and then we will also work with the authorities to consider what are the appropriate policy responses within the contours of the program. And more broadly, for all countries, including Sri Lanka, it’s really critical for each country to sustain its own reform momentum.  Sustaining reform momentum, both with macroeconomic policy reforms and, importantly, some of the growth-enhancing reforms that we were talking about earlier, is critical for all countries in our membership, including Sri Lanka. 

    And on the question regarding the president’s remarks, I think there, what I can simply say is to repeat that, you know, Sri Lanka has made commendable progress, you know, in implementing some very difficult but much-needed reforms.  The effects — these efforts are really starting to bear fruit.  We see a remarkable rebound in growth following Sri Lanka’s crisis.  Inflation is low, international reserves are continuing to grow, revenue collection on the fiscal side is improving, and the debt restructuring process is nearly complete.  So, I think it’s really important to recognize, you know, the significant efforts that Sri Lanka has taken and also the tremendous progress that has been made.  Right now, of course, we are very much focused on the current EFF, and therefore, as I mentioned, it’s going to be critical for Sri Lanka to sustain the reform momentum through the remainder of this EFF program. 

    And with that, I am going to bring this Press Briefing to a close.  Let me thank you all for your participation today.  As a reminder, as usual, this briefing is embargoed until 11:00 A.M. Eastern Time in the United States.  A transcript will be made available later on IMF.org, and should you have any clarifications or additional queries, please reach out to my colleagues media@imf.org. This concludes our Press Briefing for today.  I wish everyone a wonderful day, and I do look forward to seeing you all next time.  Thank you very much. 

    *  *  *  *  *

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Brian Walker

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/06/12/tr-061225-com-regular-press-briefing-june-12-2025

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI China: Trump revokes California’s nation-leading electric vehicle mandate

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    U.S. President Donald Trump speaks during a signing ceremony at the White House in Washington, D.C., the United States, on June 12, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]

    U.S. President Donald Trump moved on Thursday at a White House signing ceremony to eliminate California’s nation-leading vehicle emissions standards, upending the strict rules that had become a template for states across the nation to realize their greenhouse gas ambitions.

    “We officially rescue the U.S. auto industry from destruction by terminating California’s electric vehicle mandate, once and for all,” Trump said at the Oval Office alongside House Speaker Mike Johnson, Transportation Secretary Sean Duffy, Energy Secretary Chris Wright and Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Administrator Lee Zeldin.

    During the ceremony, Trump signed a congressional resolution that overturns a California state rule that would have phased out the sale of new gas-powered cars by 2035. The state makes up about 12 percent of the U.S. population. Its rule has also been adopted by 11 other states and Washington, D.C. The resolution was approved by Congress last month and aims to quash the country’s most aggressive attempt to phase out gas-powered cars.

    Trump also signed measures to overturn state policies curbing tailpipe emissions in certain vehicles and smog-forming nitrogen oxide pollution from trucks.

    This was “a long-sought victory for some carmakers and oil companies that attacked the rules as unachievable,” said Bloomberg News in its report about the signing, adding that the resolutions Trump signed repeal waivers granted under former President Joe Biden allowing California to set automobile pollution standards that are more stringent than federal requirements.

    Environmentalists have decried Trump’s vows to unwind rules to spur electric vehicle sales — a fixture of his reelection campaign — as an assault on essential protections to help avert the worst effects of climate change, added the report.

    California quickly announced it will challenge the move in court, with California’s attorney general holding a news conference to discuss the planned lawsuit before Trump’s signing ceremony ended at the White House.

    “The move takes place against the backdrop of worsening relations between Trump and Gov, Gavin Newsom, with the president ordering the military to quell unrest in Los Angeles over immigration raids,” noted Politico about the development. “It also comes as Tesla CEO and former White House adviser Elon Musk clashed with Trump last week over electric vehicle policies.”

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Press Briefing Transcript: Julie Kozack, Director, Communications Department, June 12, 2025

    Source: International Monetary Fund

    June 12, 2025

    SPEAKER:  Ms. Julie Kozack, Director of the Communications Department, IMF

    MS. KOZACK: Good morning, everyone, and welcome to this IMF Press Briefing. My name is Julie Kozak. I’m the Director of Communications at the IMF.  As usual, this press briefing will be embargoed until 11:00 a.m. Eastern Time in the United States.  And as usual, I will start with a few announcements, and then I’ll take your questions in person on WebEx and via the Press Center.  And I have quite a few announcements today, so please do bear with me. 

    On June 18th, the Managing Director will travel to Brussels, where she will hold bilateral meetings with officials.  On June 19th, she will travel to Luxembourg to present the Euro Area Annual Consultation at the Eurogroup meeting.  On June 20th, the Managing Director will be in Rome to speak at the Mattei Plan for Africa and the Global Gateway event, a joint effort with the African Continent.  This event is co-chaired by Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen.  And from there, the Managing Director will travel to Japan from June 22nd to 24th.  During her visit, she will hold meetings with Japanese officials, members of the private sector, and other stakeholders. 

    Turning to other management travel.  First Deputy Managing Director Gita Gopinath will travel to Sri Lanka, Singapore, and Indonesia.  On June 16th, she will participate in the Sri Lanka Road to Recovery Conference, where she will deliver opening remarks.  And in all three countries, our FDMD will meet with officials and various stakeholders during this trip. 

    From June 24th through 26th, our Deputy Managing Director Bo Li will attend the World Economic Forum Annual Meeting of the New Champions in Tianjin, China.  DMD Li will participate in sessions on safeguarding growth engines and the role of digital assets in Global payment systems. 

    On June 30th, Deputy Managing Director Nigel Clarke will participate in the Finance for Development Conference and in Sevilla, Spain. 

    And with that, I will now open the floor to your questions.  For those of you who are connecting virtually, please do turn on both your camera and microphone when speaking.  All right, let’s open the floor.   

    QUESTIONER: I have two questions on Ukraine.  After meetings in Kyiv last month, the IMF mission emphasized the importance of Ukraine’s upcoming budget declaration for 2026-2028, which will determine the course of the fiscal framework and policies.  What are the Fund’s expectations, and does the IMF have any specific requirements or policy guidelines for this document?  And secondly, if I may, do you have data of the IMF Board — IMF support meetings to approve the aides review for Ukraine?     

    MS. KOZACK: Any other questions on Ukraine?                                          

    QUESTIONER: So, Ukraine has recently defaulted on its GDP-linked securities and, before that, failed to reach an agreement with creditors to restructure its part of its sovereign debt.  How concerned is IMF with these developments, and do you see any risks for the EFF repayments from Ukraine?  Thank you. 

    QUESTIONER: Some follow-up to your question.  IMF sources indicate that Ukraine transferred $171 million repayment to the Fund on June 9th, the first repayment on loans received post-February 2022.  Can you confirm this payment was received?  And how does the IMF view Ukraine’s emerging shift towards repayment on wartime financing?  Thank you. 

    MS. KOZACK: Let me take these questions for a moment, and I’ll remind you where we are on Ukraine.

    On May 28th, IMF staff and the Ukrainian authorities reached Staff–Level Agreement.  And this was for the Eighth Review of the EFF program.  Subject to approval by our Executive Board, Ukraine will have access to about U.S. $500 million, and that would bring total disbursements under the program to U.S. $10.6 billion.  The Board is scheduled to take place in the coming weeks, and we’ll provide more details as they become available.  I can also add that Ukraine’s economy has remained resilient.  Performance under the EFF has continued to be strong despite very challenging circumstances.  The authorities met all of their quantitative performance criteria and indicative targets, and progress does continue on the structural agenda in Ukraine.

    Now, with respect to the specific questions on the budget declaration, what I can provide there is that our view is that the 2026-2028 budget declaration will provide a strategic framework for fiscal policy for the remainder of the program over that period of time.  It will help focus the debate on key expenditure priorities, including recovery, reconstruction, defense, and social spending.  And it will also form the basis for discussion of the 2026 budget, which, of course, will also be an important milestone for Ukraine. 

    On the question regarding the debt, what I can say there is that we encourage the Ukrainian authorities and their creditors to continue to make progress toward reaching an agreement in line with the debt sustainability targets under the IMF’s program and the authority’s announced strategy.  So that’s sort of our broad view on the debt.  On the implications for completion of the review, as in all cases where a member country may have arrears to private creditors, staff will assess whether the requirements under the Fund’s lending into arrears policy are met.  In light of this, again, we encourage the authorities to continue to make good-faith efforts toward reaching an agreement in light of the debt sustainability targets. 

    And on your question about Ukraine’s payment to the Fund, what I can say is that, in general, we don’t comment on specific transactions of individual members.  What I can guide you to is that we do provide on our website detailed information on members’ repayments.  And this is made available on a monthly basis.  So, at the end of each month, if you look at the Ukraine page, you can see the transactions that were made.  And on a daily basis, we provide detail on member countries outstanding obligations to the IMF.  So that can give you a sense of how the overall obligations of Ukraine have evolved on a daily basis. 

    QUESTIONER: Can you give us an update on the relationship between the IMF and Senegal?  Where do things currently stand with misreporting and a new program?  This is my first question.  And the second one I have is the Fifth Review under the Policy Coordination concerning Rwanda.  The IMF stated that “Rwanda continues to demonstrate leadership in integrating climate consideration into macroeconomic policy and leveraging institutional reforms to mobilize climate finance.”  Now my question is, can you please tell us concretely what kind of institutional reforms have been implemented by Rwanda? 

    MS. KOZACK: So, before I answer this, are there any other questions on Senegal or Rwanda? I see none in the room. Anyone online want to come in on Senegal?  Okay, I don’t see anyone coming in, so let’s start with Senegal, and then we’ll move to Rwanda. 

    What I can say on Senegal is that we, the IMF and our team in particular, remained actively engaged with the Senegalese authorities, including during a visit to Dakar over March and April and further discussions during the Spring Meetings, which were held here in Washington in April.  We do continue to work with the authorities to address the complex misreporting case that is ongoing.  And addressing this complex case does require a rigorous and time-intensive process.

    I also want to take the opportunity to add that the IMF supports our member countries in a variety of ways, and it goes beyond just providing financing.  So, for example, in the case of Senegal, we are continuing to provide the authorities with technical assistance, including, for example, on our debt sustainability analysis that is tailored to low-income countries.  We’re working closely with the authorities on compiling government financial statistics.  This is being led by our Statistics Department.  We’re providing technical assistance on energy sector reform, public investment management, and revenue mobilization, and that, of course, is with support from our fiscal experts. 

    With respect to a new program.  We don’t have currently a fixed timeline for a new program, and we are awaiting the final audit outcome. 

    Now, turning to your question on Rwanda here.  What I can say, and maybe just to step back and remind everyone of where we are in Rwanda.  On June 4th, so just a few days ago, our Executive Board concluded the Fifth Review of Rwanda’s policy Coordination Instrument.  Rwanda’s economic growth remains among the strongest in Sub-Saharan Africa, and that’s despite rising pressures both on the fiscal side and the external side.  Rwanda, of course, we’re encouraging Rwanda to continue with a credible fiscal consolidation, strong domestic revenue mobilization, and a strong monetary policy. 

    With respect to your specific question, Rwanda successfully completed its Resilience and Sustainability Fund program, the RSF program, in December of 2024, six months ahead of the initial timetable.  And under this RSF, Rwanda did carry out a number of institutional reforms that were focused on green public financial management, climate public investment management, climate-related risk management for financial institutions, and disaster risk reduction.  So, these are some of the institutional reforms that Rwanda completed, which led us to make that statement about their leadership in this area. 

    I can also add that these reforms, along with some of the other reforms they’re having, they’re undertaking, such as a green taxonomy and the adoption of best practices in climate risk reporting by financial institutions.  The idea is that this together will help to close information gaps, improve transparency, and that hopefully will allow for a boost to private sector engagement in advancing Rwanda’s ambitious climate goals and its broader goals toward economic development and strong and sustainable growth. 

    QUESTIONER: Two questions on Syria.  The Fund said this week that Syria needs substantial international assistance for its recovery efforts.  Firstly, can you give us an estimation of how much economic assistance Syria will need?  And secondly, could you just let us know if there were any discussions around if a potential Article IV was discussed? 

    MS. KOZACK: Thank you. Any other questions on Syria?                   

    QUESTIONER: Just to know if there was any demand from the Syrian government for any kind of technical assistance from the IMF to help them recover, economically speaking?

    MS. KOZACK: Does anyone online want to come in on Syria? I don’t see anyone coming in. So let me step back again and give a sense of where we are on Syria.

    I think, as many of you know, an IMF staff team visited Syria from June 1st through 5th.  This was the first IMF visit to Syria since 2009.  The goal of the visit was to assess the economic and financial conditions in Syria, as well as to discuss with the authorities their economic policy, and also to ascertain the authorities ‘ capacity-building priorities, ultimately to support the recovery of the Syrian economy.  I think, as we’ve discussed here before, Syria faces enormous challenges following years of conflict that have caused immense human suffering, and it’s reduced the Syrian economy to a fraction of its former size. 

    At the IMF, we’re committed to supporting Syria in its efforts.  Based on the findings of the mission, IMF staff, in coordination with other partners, are developing a detailed roadmap for policy and capacity development priorities for key economic institutions.  And within the IMF’s mandate, this covers the Finance Ministry, the Central Bank, and the Statistics Agency.  So those would be the areas where we will be focusing in terms of the detailed roadmap on priorities, economic and capacity building priorities. 

    Syria, as noted, will need substantial international assistance.  We don’t yet have a precise estimate of that assistance.  But what I can say is this will also — it will not only require concessional financial support, but also substantial capacity development support for the country.  And that’s basically where we have left it with the Syrian authorities.  And, of course, we will continue to engage closely with them, and we are committed to helping them, supporting them on their recovery journey. 

    QUESTIONER: Is the date of the IMF mission to Argentina already said?  And based on that definition, when would the First Review of the agreement could take place?  And another one, in the last few days, the Argentina government has launched different mechanisms to try to increase the level of foreign exchange reserves.  Is the IMF worried that Argentina will not reach the target set in the agreement?  And could the IMF give Argentina a waiver on this?  Thank you very much. 

    MS. KOZACK: Okay, any other questions in the room on Argentina? I know we have several online.

    QUESTIONER: Thanks for taking my questions.  I would like to know how does the IMF evaluate the listed economy measures, particularly the issue of the measure to use undeclared dollars.  Thank you.

    QUESTIONER: My first question is about the reserve target for the new program with Argentina.  Central Bank is about $4 billion below the target set for June.  Also, some operations are expected that could increase their reserve stock.  Officials said on Monday evening that local currency bonds can now be purchased with U.S. dollar and that the minimum time requirement for foreign investors to hold onto some Argentina bonds will be eliminated.  The IMF is concerned that the Central Bank is not accumulating reserves touch foreign trade and is only receiving income touch debt.  Is the consensus with the authorities to postpone the Frist Review and allow time for Argentina to activate credit operation in order to close — to get closer to the target set for June, or Argentina should resort to a waiver?  And what is your view on the recent measures? 

    And that second question is about the possibility of an IMF mission arriving in Argentina in the coming weeks.  Is that possible?  Would it be a technical staff mission, or could the Managing Director or Deputy Executive Director also come?  Thank you very much. 

    QUESTIONER: So, the question is the same as (connection issue) First Review of the agreement signed in April (connection issue)

    QUESTIONER: -Is the IMF considering granting a waiver and also if they build up. 

    MS. KOZACK: You’ve broken up quite a bit, and now we’re not able to hear you, so we’ll try to get you back, or I think what I understood from your question is it’s broadly along the same lines as some of the other questions. What we can do is if you want to connect via the Press Center, I can read the question out loud. But what I’m going to do is move on.                      

    QUESTIONER:  Basically, echoing my colleague’s questions on the timing of the mission and whether an extension was granted to meet the reserve’s target, well, for the First Review generally.  And separately, Argentina has July 9th dollar debt payments, which will obviously affect reserves.  How will that payment and timing affect your calculus of the reserves target within the First Review?  Thank you.

    QUESTIONER: Well, yes, also echoing my colleague’s question regarding whether the timeline for the First Review, the end date remains this Friday, which was what it said on the Staff Report.  And also, there was a ruling lately, these past few days, against former President Cristina Kirchner.  I was wondering if that raises any concerns in the IMF regarding any political conflict or any subsequent economic impact. 

    MS. KOZACK: I think we’ve covered all the questions on Argentina. Anyone else on Argentina? Okay, very good.  So, let me try to give a response that tries to cover as many of these questions as I can.  So again, I’m just going to step back and provide where we are with Argentina. 

    So, on April 11th, the IMF’s Executive Board approved a new four-year EFF arrangement worth $20 billion for Argentina.  The initial disbursement was $12 billion, and the goal of the program was to support is to support Argentina’s transition to the next phase of state stabilization and reform.  The Milei administration’s policies continue to evolve and to deliver impressive results, as we have previously noted. 

    In this regard, we welcome the recent measures announced this week by the Central Bank and the Ministry of Finance as they represent another important step in efforts to consolidate disinflation, support the government’s financing strategy and to rebuild reserves and, more specifically, steps to strengthen the monetary framework and to improve liquidity management.  These are important to further reduce inflation and inflation expectations.  The Treasury’s successful reentry into capital markets and other actions to mobilize financing for Argentina are also expected to boost reserves, and stability overall for the country continues to be supported by the implementation of strong fiscal anchor in the country. 

    Our team continues to engage frequently and constructively with the Argentine authorities as part of the program’s First Review.  I can add that a technical mission will visit Buenos Aires in late June to assess progress on program targets and objectives and to also discuss the authority’s forward-looking reform agenda.  More broadly and despite the more challenging environment, the authorities, as I said, have continued to make very notable and impressive progress.  So, I will leave it at that. 

    Let’s go online for a bit, and then we’ll come — no, let’s go right here in the back.  You haven’t had a question, and you’re in the room.                             

    QUESTIONER: Given the recent escalation in global trade tensions and the effect of the tariffs, what is the IMF’s assessment of how these developments are affecting emerging economies?  And what policy recommendation does the IMF have for countries facing increased external pressures? 

    MS. KOZACK: Okay, let me answer — let me turn to this question on emerging markets, a very important constituency and part of our membership here at the IMF. So, let me start with where we were and what our assessment was as of April.

    In April, when we launched our World Economic Outlook, we projected growth in emerging and developing countries to slow from 4.3 percent in 2024 to 3.7 percent in 2025 and then to come back a little bit to 3.9 percent in 2026.  We did have at that time also significant downgrades for countries most affected by the trade measures, and that includes China, for example.  We have seen since then that there have been some positive surprises to growth in the first quarter for this group of countries, including China.  We have also seen recent reductions in some tariffs, and that represents kind of an upside risk to our forecast.  And, of course, we will be updating our forecast, including for this group of emerging and developing countries, as part of our July WEO update, and that will be released toward the end of July. 

    In terms of our recommendations, we recommend what we would call a multi-pronged policy response.  So first, to carefully calibrate monetary policy and also macroprudential or prudential policies to maintain stability in countries.  We also recommend for this group of countries, but for all of our members, to rebuild fiscal buffers to restore policy space to respond to, of course, future shocks that may occur.  For countries that may face particular disruptive pressures in the foreign currency, foreign exchange market, we would say that they could pursue targeted interventions if those instances are disruptive.  We also are encouraging again all of our countries to undertake the necessary reforms to no longer delay reforms associated with boosting productivity and longer-term growth. 

    I think maybe stepping back, we’ve been talking for quite some time in the IMF about a low growth, high debt environment.  And this, of course, applies to this group of countries as well.  So, dealing with the debt side, of course, is important through fiscal consolidation, but also, very importantly, boosting growth and productivity growth.  So, countries can also have a more prosperous society and also deal with some of their debt issues through stronger growth is also very important. 

    All right, let me go online, and then I’ll come back to the room.  Let’s see.  Online, I see a few hands up.                             

    QUESTIONER: My question is on Japanese tour conducted by Managing Director.  Could you give more details on how Japanese tour played this month?  For example, is there any chance for giving speeches or press conference and so on? 

    MS. KOZACK: So, as I said, the Managing Director will visit Japan later this month. Her visit will mostly entail meetings with government officials and also the business community as well as other stakeholders. She will have an opportunity to also do some outreach, and we can provide further details to you as her agenda becomes more concrete.  But she is very much looking forward to the visit.  Japan, as I think we’ve said before, is an important partner for the IMF.  And the Managing Director is very much looking forward to meeting with Japanese officials and talking more broadly to other stakeholders in Japan about the important partnership that the IMF has with Japan. 

    I see some other hands up online.  Unfortunately, I can’t see.  So, I think if you’re online and you have your hand up, just jump in. 

    QUESTIONER: You already referred to your own economic outlooks when you talked about emerging markets.  But I was — I wanted to ask you, does the IMF anticipate a similar growth downgrade as we’ve just seen for the World Bank this week and its economic assessment?  Because, of course, back in April, the cutoff point for your last report was just as Donald Trump was announcing the Liberation Day tariffs. 

    MS. KOZACK: Okay, so thank you for that. Any other questions on the global outlook? Okay, so let me take this one, and then we’ll come back to some other questions. 

    So, what I can say in terms of the forward-looking, I mean, first, I want to start by reiterating that we will release a revised set of projections in July as part of our regular WEO update.  What I can add is that since we released our World Economic Outlook, what we call the WEO, in April, we have seen some, you know, some data come in and some other developments.  So first, we have seen some trade deals that have lowered tariffs, notably between the U.S. and China, but also the U.S. and the UK, and at the same time, the U.S. has raised further tariffs on steel and aluminum imports.  So taken together, such announcements, combined with the April 9th pause on the high level of tariffs, these could support activity relative to the forecast that we had in April.  But nonetheless, we do have an outlook for the global economy that remains subject to heightened uncertainty, especially as trade negotiations continue. 

    I can also add that recent activity indicators reflect a complex economic landscape.  So, this is recent high-frequency data.  We have some outturns in the first quarter, which indicated a front-loading of activity ahead of the tariff announcements that took place in April.  And some high-frequency indicators also show some trade diversion and unwinding of that earlier front loading.  So, this is kind of the more recent indicators.  So, all of this creates kind of a complicated picture for us with some upside risk, some other developments, and we’ll take all of these developments together into account as we update our forecast toward the end of July in our WEO. 

    QUESTIONER: When you say support activity, do you mean there’s a chance it could be an improved outlook? 

    MS. KOZACK: So yes, by support activity, what we mean is that it’s kind of positive, it’s a little bit of a positive sign for economic activity. So that’s related, though, I would say, to the specific announcements. So, so just going back to say, the announcements of the trade deals that have lowered tariffs, particularly the ones between the U.S. and China and the U.S. and the UK, those could be supportive or a bit more positive for economic activity going forward.  But the overall picture is both complicated for the reasons that I mentioned. 

    We have some front loading in the first quarter.  Some of that seems perhaps to be unwinding in more recent indicators.  And we also, of course, have to remember that we are in an environment of very high uncertainty, and uncertainty, in general, tends to dampen economic activity. 

    So, the overall picture is quite complex.  And so, we will take all of these factors into account as we move forward with our forecast in July.  And, of course, between now and when we release our forecast later in July, we would expect that there will be further data releases.  And also, there is the possibility that there can be further announcements that we would have to take into account or further developments that we would have to take into account as well. 

    Let me just stay online for another minute.  I think I have one more hand up online or two hands online. 

    QUESTIONER: My question is about Egypt.  I was hoping to ask you if the Egyptian authorities have requested a waiver from the Fund for any of the requirements related to the Fifth Review of the country’s ongoing loan program and specifically if a waiver has been requested related to targets for divestment from state-owned assets.  And if you have any update on the timing of the Fifth Review, that would also be very helpful.  I know there were some suggestions that the Fifth Review could be combined with the Sixth Review, in which case we wouldn’t see it until September rather than the June date that had previously been talked about.  Thank you.

    MS. KOZACK: Anyone else on Egypt?

    QUESTIONER: My question is related to the previous one by my colleague.  She asked about the state-owned companies to be listed for IPOs or for private sectors to be having a bigger stake in the economy.  How the IMF evaluate the progress achieved by the Egyptian authorities during that?  And also, when the Fifth Review to be finished after the physical meetings happened in past May?  And what are the most recent progress achieved until now during this?  And also, I’d like to ask about how IMF evaluated the latest step by Egyptian government to give the Minister of Finance the right to issue sukuk in the guarantee of place in Red Sea as published in the last two days. 

    MS. KOZACK: Okay, thank you. Anyone else have questions on Egypt? So, on Egypt, as I think many of you know, an IMF team visited Cairo.  From May 6th to May 18th, the team held productive discussions with the Egyptian authorities on their economic and financial policies.  Discussions are continuing virtually to finalize agreement on remaining policies and reforms that could support the completion of the Fifth Review under the EFF. So again, discussions around the Fifth Review are continuing virtually. 

    As we have said here before, Egypt has made clear progress on its macroeconomic reform program with notable improvements in inflation and in the level of international reserves.  As Egypt’s macroeconomic stabilization is taking hold, it’s now the time for efforts to focus on accelerating and deepening reforms, including reducing the footprint of the state, leveling the playing field, and improving the business environment in Egypt. 

    What I can add is that in order to deliver on these objectives, particularly with respect to reducing the footprint of the state, leveling the playing field, et cetera, it’s important to decisively reduce the role of the public sector in the economy.  The implementation of the state ownership policy, as well as the asset divestment program in sectors where the state has committed to reduce its footprint, will be playing a critical role in strengthening the ability of Egypt’s private sector to contribute to growth and activity in the Egyptian economy, which will ultimately support improvements in livelihoods of the Egyptian people.  We remain committed to supporting Egypt in building economic resilience and fostering stronger private sector-led growth. 

    On some of the more specific questions related to Sukuk, I don’t have a response here, but we’ll come back to you bilaterally. 

    QUESTIONER: It’s a quick overall question.  Could you remind us the condition for a country to come under IMF supervision?  Does it require specifically a program, or can it come from the IMF itself?  Thank you very much. 

    MS. KOZACK: Can you clarify what you mean by IMF supervision? Just so I understand.

    QUESTIONER: To be perfectly honest, in the past few days, we had comments from the French government about the fact that it could become under IMF supervision.  I’m not very interested in specifically about France, but just in general overall how IMF comes to work with governments.  What are the conditions for the IMF to step in and come to help the government?  Thank you very much. 

    MS. KOZACK: Very good. So, let me maybe take this opportunity to step back and explain kind of the three big pillars of the work of the IMF.

    So, the first is policy advice, and this is done mainly through the Article IV consultation process.  The reason it’s called Article IV is because it’s in Article IV of our Articles of Agreement, and every member country of the IMF — so, we have 191 member countries — every member country commits when they join the IMF to participate in the Article IV consultation process.  So that applies to every member.  And that is a process that I know you here are very familiar with, where the IMF sends a team, and we conduct an assessment of the economy, and we provide policy advice to the country.  That’s done for all members. 

    Another leg or another pillar of what we do at the IMF is capacity development.  And for capacity development, this is at the request of the member.  So, this could be, you know, very specific advice on a specific area where our technical expert would go and do sort of a deep dive analysis and provide detailed policy recommendations.  But it’s really meant at building state capacity.  So often, this is done in areas such as revenue mobilization or public financial management, statistics, monetary policy frameworks, and debt management.  These are some of the areas where we would provide technical assistance to countries.  That’s at the request of the member. 

    And the same is true for our financial support.  So, for financial support, this is done again at the request of the member country.  The member would request financial support from the Fund, and then the Fund would then send a team and ultimately develop a program that reflects the commitments of the authorities.  But that program would need to be aimed at getting the country back on its feet.  In our technical language, it’s restoring medium-term viability for the country.  And that financing program has a balance between financial resources that the Fund provides and also policy measures taken by the part of the authorities.  But that, again, is at the request of the member country. 

    QUESTIONER: So, my question is about cryptocurrency and digital assets.  What is the IMF’s view right now on the daily use transactions by people, by governments, in paying and accumulating Bitcoin and other digital currencies?  What risks and opportunities do you see on behalf of the IMF and what shall be done on the governmental level to implement any additional safeguards requirements to make this like a daily routine operations?  Thank you. 

    MS. KOZACK: Okay, so I think on the broad topic of kind of crypto assets, what we can say is that they have gained popularity as an asset class. And also, what we see is that the underlying technology, which is a digital ledger that is shared, trusted, and programmable, is broadly viewed as highly valuable. And that technology may have broader societal benefits.  So, we do see crypto assets as a speculative asset as an asset class.  At the IMF, we generally don’t recommend crypto assets as legal or cryptocurrencies as legal tender.  We also do see that there are some potential risks that could arise from crypto assets.  These include risks to financial stability, to consumer and investor protection, and also to market integrity. 

    So, in order to balance, in a sense, the opportunities based on the technology and a new asset class with some of these risks, what we advise countries to do is to establish a robust policy framework to effectively mitigate some of the risks while allowing society to take advantage of the benefits or the opportunities that arise from this new technology. 

    QUESTIONER:  The Bank of Russia recently cut its key interest rate from 21 percent to 20 percent, marking its first easing move since September 2022.  From the IMF perspective, what are the implications of this monetary policy shift?  Thank you. 

    MS. KOZACK: So, on Russia, let me just step back a minute, and I’ll provide our overall assessment of the economy, and then I’ll get to your specific question.

    So, what we see in Russia is that last year, we saw the economy overheating, and now what we observe in Russia is a, is sharp slowdown of the economy, with growth slowing but inflation still relatively elevated.  Growth in 2025 is expected to slow to 1.5 percent based on our forecast from April, and this was compared to 4.3 percent in 2024.  And this reflects policy tightening, cyclical factors, and also lower oil prices. 

    Now, with respect to the action by the Central Bank, as you noted, the Central Bank indeed reduced the key policy rate from 21 percent to 20 percent for the first time.  This was the first reduction since September of 2022.  And the action taken by the Central Bank was in response to slowing growth, which I just mentioned, and also some easing of inflation pressures. 

    So, as I noted, inflation still remains high.  It was just under 10 percent in May.  But our forecast has inflation declining going forward.  So, we expect inflation to ease to 8.2 percent by the end of this year.  And we anticipate that inflation will turn to the target of 4 percent in the first half of 2027.  So that’s the IMF forecast.  So, the inflation challenge for Russia remains, and it’s appropriate.  Therefore, that monetary policy remains tight, and even with this cut, monetary policy is still tight. 

    I am going to now take the opportunity to read one question or some questions on Ghana and some questions on Sri Lanka, and then we’ll bring the Press Briefing to a close.  So, on Ghana, I have three questions.  The first one is about an update on when Ghana’s program will be presented to the Board following Staff–Level Agreement. 

    The second question is about the amended Energy Sector Levy Act to add GH₵1 per liter on petroleum products to defray the cost of fuel purchases for thermal plants.  Has the IMF taken note of this, and what’s its position on using taxes versus passing these costs through tariffs? 

    The third question on Ghana is whether the IMF is looking at the possibility of revising Ghana’s IMF program targets as the cedi’s sharp appreciation against the dollar has affected many variables that influence these targets set by the Fund? 

    So let me take a moment to just respond on Ghana.  So again, stepping back to where we are on Ghana.  On April 15th, the IMF staff and the Ghanaian authorities reached Staff–Level Agreement on the Fourth Review of Ghana’s Extended Credit Facility.  Upon approval by our Executive Board, Ghana would be scheduled to receive about U.S. $370 million, bringing total support under the ECF to $2.4 billion since May of 2023.  We anticipate bringing the review to our Board in early July, so in just a few weeks. 

    What I can add about the question about the cedi’s sharp appreciation is that you know, of course, as we look at a program, we look at all of these developments, including, of course, developments in the exchange rate.  And so, future program reviews will provide an opportunity for the team to carefully assess all of the evolving macroeconomic and financial conditions, including exchange rate movements, and to ensure that the program’s targets and objectives remain appropriate and achievable. 

    And on the fuel levy, what I can say is that this is a new measure that will help generate additional resources to tackle the challenges in Ghana’s energy sector, and it’s also going to bolster Ghana’s ability to deliver on the fiscal objectives under the program. 

    And I’m going to read one last set of questions on Sri Lanka, and then we will bring the Press briefing to a close.  So, we have a number of journalists asking about Sri Lanka.  So there’s — we’re consolidating the questions here.  So, these journalists are asking for updates on the IMF’s view on Sri Lanka’s progress in implementing cost recovery, electricity prices, and the automatic price adjustment system.  They’re asking about the date for the Executive Board’s consideration of the Fourth Review under the program. 

    And another question, has the government raised the issue of recent global shocks and possible further pressure on the economy and its ability to meet its reform program targets?  How do we rate the new government’s approach to corruption? 

    QUESTIONER: My question is, recently Sri Lankan president announced that the existing IMF program is likely (inaudible) that it will be the final program for the country as it tries to achieve financial independence.  What is the IMF’s view on this?  Is it achievable given the current situation in Sri Lanka?  And what is the progress on the IMF Board approval for the next review?  Thank you. 

    MS. KOZACK: All right, so again, just stepping back and reminding where we are on Sri Lanka.

    So, on April 25th, IMF staff and the Sri Lankan authorities reached Staff–Level Agreement on their fourth review of Sri Lanka’s economic reform program.  The program and Sri Lanka’s ambitious reform agenda continue to deliver commendable outcomes.  Performance under the program remains strong overall, and the government remains committed to program objectives.  Completion of the review is pending approval of the IMF’s Executive Board, and it is contingent on the completion of prior actions. 

    What I can add is that our IMF team, of course, is closely engaged with the authorities to assess the measures that were recently announced by the regulator on June 11th.  And these include a 15 percent increase in in electricity tariffs and the publication of a revised bulk supply transaction account guidelines for this.  So, these were two prior actions.  Once the review is completed by our Executive Board, Sri Lanka would have access to about $344 million in financing, and we will announce the Board date for Sri Lanka in due course. 

    With respect to some of the more specific questions on governance, what I can add is that in end-February, the government published an updated government action plan on governance reforms.  And this action plan included important commitments such as enacting a public procurement law, an asset recovery law, and other actions that are aligned with the recommendations that were included in the IMF’s Governance Diagnostic Report. 

    On the question about kind of the global situation and the impact on Sri Lanka, what I can say there is that, like for all countries in an environment of high uncertainty around policy and in general, high global uncertainty, this poses, of course, risks to an economy like Sri Lanka’s, as it does to many others.  If some of the risks associated with high global uncertainty were to materialize, the way we will approach this will be to work very closely with the authorities first to assess the impact of any downside risk that materializes, and then we will also work with the authorities to consider what are the appropriate policy responses within the contours of the program. And more broadly, for all countries, including Sri Lanka, it’s really critical for each country to sustain its own reform momentum.  Sustaining reform momentum, both with macroeconomic policy reforms and, importantly, some of the growth-enhancing reforms that we were talking about earlier, is critical for all countries in our membership, including Sri Lanka. 

    And on the question regarding the president’s remarks, I think there, what I can simply say is to repeat that, you know, Sri Lanka has made commendable progress, you know, in implementing some very difficult but much-needed reforms.  The effects — these efforts are really starting to bear fruit.  We see a remarkable rebound in growth following Sri Lanka’s crisis.  Inflation is low, international reserves are continuing to grow, revenue collection on the fiscal side is improving, and the debt restructuring process is nearly complete.  So, I think it’s really important to recognize, you know, the significant efforts that Sri Lanka has taken and also the tremendous progress that has been made.  Right now, of course, we are very much focused on the current EFF, and therefore, as I mentioned, it’s going to be critical for Sri Lanka to sustain the reform momentum through the remainder of this EFF program. 

    And with that, I am going to bring this Press Briefing to a close.  Let me thank you all for your participation today.  As a reminder, as usual, this briefing is embargoed until 11:00 A.M. Eastern Time in the United States.  A transcript will be made available later on IMF.org, and should you have any clarifications or additional queries, please reach out to my colleagues media@imf.org. This concludes our Press Briefing for today.  I wish everyone a wonderful day, and I do look forward to seeing you all next time.  Thank you very much. 

    *  *  *  *  *

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Brian Walker

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    MIL OSI Economics

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Philippines’ annual renewable power generation to reach 69.4TWh in 2035, forecasts GlobalData

    Source: GlobalData

    Philippines’ annual renewable power generation to reach 69.4TWh in 2035, forecasts GlobalData

    Posted in Power

    The Department of Energy in the Philippines has established an ambitious objective of attaining 35% renewable energy generation by 2030. Furthermore, the country is on a path to install 15GW of clean energy by the same year. It has also set a target of achieving 50% renewable energy generation by 2040. Against this backdrop, annual electricity generation from renewables in the country is forecast to reach 69.4TWh in 2035, registering a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 13.1% during 2024-35, according to GlobalData, a leading data and analytics company.

    GlobalData’s latest report, “Philippines Power Market Outlook to 2035, Update 2025 – Market Trends, Regulations, and Competitive Landscape,” reveals that in 2024, thermal power dominated the generation mix with 78%, followed by renewable power accounting for 15.6%. Large hydro and pumped storage accounted for the remaining 6.4% share. In 2035, thermal power is expected to continue to account for a 62.7% share followed by renewables and large hydro and pumped storage accounting for 33% and 4.3%, respectively.

    To realize its renewable capacities goals, the Philippines is focusing on a 75% increase in geothermal capacity, a 160% rise in hydropower capacity, an expansion of wind power to 2.3GW, and an increment of biomass power by 0.3GW, all by 2040, using 2020 as the baseline year.

    Attaurrahman Ojindaram Saibasan, Senior Power Analyst at GlobalData, comments: “The Philippine government’s dedication to renewable energy is underscored by its strategic policies and collaborations designed to augment the proportion of renewables within the nation’s energy portfolio. In line with its renewable energy objectives, there have been several noteworthy developments. For example, a $15 billion agreement with UAE-based Masdar is concentrating on the advancement of solar and wind projects, as well as battery storage initiatives, with the aim of achieving 1GW of clean energy by 2030.”

    Between 2025 and 2030, a total of $26.2 billion is expected to be invested in the country’s power sector, of which solar PV is expected to account for a share of 38.8%, followed by onshore wind accounting for 19.4% share. Offshore wind power is expected to account for 17% share.

    Saibasan concludes: “The Philippines is witnessing a consistent rise in electricity demand, attributable to economic expansion, urban development, industrial growth, and the broadening of digital infrastructure. In response to this escalating need, the nation is executing a range of strategies, which include the development of infrastructure, diversification of energy sources, and the enactment of policy reforms.”

    MIL OSI Economics

  • MIL-OSI Banking: China to drive global propylene capacity additions through 2030, says GlobalData

    Source: GlobalData

    China to drive global propylene capacity additions through 2030, says GlobalData

    Posted in Oil & Gas

    China is poised to significantly expand its propylene production capacity by 2030, backed by strong demand for propylene derivatives such as polypropylene and propylene oxide in the building, packaging, and construction industries. Accounting for over 40% of the expected capacity additions worldwide by 2030, China is positioning itself as the dominant player in the global propylene market, according to GlobalData, a leading data and analytics company.

    GlobalData’s latest report, “Propylene Industry Capacity and Capital Expenditure Forecasts with Details of All Active and Planned Plants to 2030,” reveals that China is likely to witness total propylene capacity additions of 22.27 million tonnes per annum (mtpa) during 2025-30 from 23 planned and eight announced projects.

    Nivedita Roy, Oil and Gas Analyst at GlobalData, comments: “Propylene is a highly versatile petrochemical with a wide range of industrial and commercial uses. It is also a building block for several important chemicals, such as acrylonitrile and propylene oxide, and polypropylene – a widely used plastic for packaging, automotive parts, and consumer goods. Driven by the growth of these industries that heavily rely on propylene-derived products, the Chinese market is experiencing a substantial increase in propylene capacity additions.”

    In China, the highest capacity addition is expected from the “Shandong Yulong Petrochemical Longkou Propylene Plant 2”, which has a nameplate capacity of 2.0 mtpa. The plant is still in the feasibility stage and is anticipated to commence production of propylene in 2030. Shandong Yulong Petrochemical Ltd is the designated operator of this plant.

    “Fujian Yongrong New Materials Company Putian Propylene Plant 2” follows next in terms of the capacity additions in the country, with 1.10 mtpa likely to be added by 2029. It is also in the feasibility stage, with Fujian Eversun New Material Co Ltd being the proposed operator.

    The third-highest propylene capacity addition in the country is expected from the “SABIC Fujian Petrochemical Zhangzhou Propylene Plant” with a capacity of 1.02 mtpa. SABIC Fujian Petrochemical Co Ltd is the designated operator of this plant, which is currently under construction and is likely to start operations in 2026.

    MIL OSI Global Banks

  • MIL-OSI New Zealand: Supercharging residential solar power generation

    Source: New Zealand Government

    • The Government is expanding the permitted voltage range for electricity networks, so Kiwis with solar panels can send more power back to the grid.
    • Changes are being made to clarify that a building consent is not needed to install rooftop solar panels on existing buildings. 
    • Councils will be required to process building consents for new homes with solar panels within 10 working days, down from the standard 20 working days.  

    Common sense changes in the energy and building consent systems will drive greater residential solar uptake in New Zealand, Energy Minister Simon Watts and Building and Construction Minister Chris Penk say. 

    “New Zealand’s residential uptake of rooftop solar is lower than many other countries. This Government wants to change that so more Kiwis can generate, store, and send their own electricity back to the market. This will allow them to save on their power bills and contribute to a more secure electricity system,” Mr Watts says. 

    “Rooftop solar will play a crucial role in supporting energy security and reducing emissions. But our networks need to be able to better support the growing flow of electricity from consumers, while also dealing with growing demand for more electric vehicle charging. 

    “That’s why we are expanding the voltage range from +/- 6 percent to +/- 10 percent to manage the changing flow of electricity from rooftop solar and EV charging. This will future proof our electricity system and help electrify the economy.  

    “Modelling suggests this change could boost solar investment and overall generation by a whopping 507 GWh through increased solar connections. This is great for the security of our energy supply.” 

    Mr Penk says the building consent system can help accelerate the shift towards renewable energy.   

    “We need the right incentives in place to make rooftop solar a realistic option for Kiwis. 

    “The Government is focused on getting people into safe, affordable homes faster – and we want those homes to be sustainable and future-ready. 
     
    “With the energy system preparing for a surge in residential solar, the consenting process needs to play its part to support the transition.  
     
    “We are proposing changes to the Building Act, that will make it clear that a building consent is not needed to install rooftop solar panels on existing buildings.  

    “Right now, decision-making is inconsistent between councils – creating unnecessary barriers for homeowners who want to take responsibility for their environmental impact and make sustainable choices. 
     
    “As a further incentive, we are also proposing that Kiwis who choose to include solar panels in the design of new homes will have their entire building consent fast-tracked and processed in 10 working days instead of the standard 20 working days, saving Kiwis around $400 a day in time and consenting costs.” 
     
    “Delivering the best outcomes for New Zealanders is incredibly important to Minister Penk and me. Expanding the voltage range could help avoid hundreds of millions of dollars in infrastructure upgrade costs to accommodate rooftop solar and EV charging being passed on to Kiwi households,” Mr Watts says.

    “Combined, these common-sense and cost-effective changes will boost the resilience of New Zealand’s electricity supply, make it easier and cheaper for Kiwis to build sustainable homes, and spur New Zealand’s residential solar market into the future.” 

    Notes to editors:

    • New Zealand appliance standards have aligned with international +/-10% voltage requirements since the 1980s, meaning compliant appliances should already operate safely within the new voltage range.
    • Consumers using older devices that don’t meet New Zealand or international appliance standards may use a surge protector, but consistent high-end voltage delivery is unlikely.
    • The expert modelling referred to in this release was prepared by grid connection specialists, ASNA. 

    MIL OSI New Zealand News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Newhouse Commends Trump Action on Lower Snake River Dams

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Congressman Dan Newhouse (4th District of Washington)

    Headline: Newhouse Commends Trump Action on Lower Snake River Dams

    WASHINGTON, D.C. – Today, Rep. Dan Newhouse (WA-04) released the following statement on President Donald Trump’s memorandum revoking the Biden administration’s executive actions targeting the Lower Snake River dams.

    “Throughout my time in Congress, I have stood firm in my support for the Lower Snake River Dams and the critical role they play in our region’s economy,” said Rep. Newhouse.  

    “Today’s action by President Trump reverses the efforts by the Biden administration and extreme environmental activists to remove the dams, which would have threatened the reliability of our power grid, raised energy prices, and decimated our ability to export grain to foreign markets. I want to thank the President for his decisive action to protect our dams, and I look forward to continuing to work with the administration for the benefit of the Fourth District.” 

    The Memorandum signed today revokes the Biden Administration’s “Restoring Healthy and Abundant Salmon, Steelhead, and Other Native Fish Populations in the Columbia River Basin” Memorandum. 

    This Memorandum directs the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of the Interior, the Secretary of Commerce, and the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works to withdraw from agreements stemming from Biden’s misguided executive action, including the December 14, 2023, Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) filed in connection with related litigation. 

    The specified agencies will coordinate with the Council on Environmental Quality to review and revise environmental review processes related to the matters in the MOU, save federal funds, and withdraw from the MOU. 

    See the full announcement here. 

    Background 

    During his tenure in Congress, Newhouse has led the charge in combating efforts to breach the four Lower Snake River dams.

    In March of this year, Newhouse led a coalition of lawmakers from the Pacific Northwest, backed by regional stakeholders, in introducing a package of legislation to protect the Lower Snake River dams and strengthen hydropower as a reliable, affordable source of base load energy.

    In January of this year, Newhouse and Senator Jim Risch of Idaho introduced the Northwest Energy Security Act to require the Bureau of Reclamation, the Bonneville Power Administration, and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to ensure the Lower Snake River dams remain operational and continue to support the region’s energy needs. 

    In October 2024, Newhouse criticized the Biden administration for wasting taxpayer dollars on more studies to find ways to replace the energy produced by the dams. 

    In June 2024, Newhouse opposed the Biden administration’s creation of a politically motivated Columbia River Taskforce, made up only of administration officials, to find ways to breach the dams.  

    In March 2024, Newhouse called out Secretary Jennifer Granholm in a hearing for refusing to acknowledge the long-term implications of the Columbia River Systems Operation Agreement are a de-facto breach of the Snake River Dams. 

    In December 2023, Newhouse slammed the Biden administration’s announcement of a package of actions and commitments in the Columbia River System Operations (CRSO) mediation. 

    In September 2023, Newhouse led a letter to then-Council on Environmental Quality Chair Brenda Mallary addressing the lack of public and stakeholder input throughout the mediation process of the four Lower Snake River dams. 

    In June 2023, Newhouse hosted the House Natural Resources Committee for a field hearing in Pasco, Washington on the importance of protecting the dams on the Snake River. 

    In August 2022, Newhouse held a rally with over 100 community members from the Tri-Cities in Howard Amon Park to show support for the Lower Snake River Dams. 

    ### 

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Banking: STATEMENT: Ontario’s Integrated Energy Plan emphasizes DERs and procurements

    Source: – Press Release/Statement:

    Headline: STATEMENT: Ontario’s Integrated Energy Plan emphasizes DERs and procurements

    Ontario recognizes that onsite solar and storage, plus predictable procurements including wind and solar energy, are key to delivering reliable, affordable power to communities, farmers and businesses.  

    Toronto, June 12, 2025—The Canadian Renewable Energy Association (CanREA) is encouraged to see Distributed Energy Resources (DERs) and predictable procurement windows emphasized in Ontario’s Integrated Energy Plan (IEP), which was announced in a press conference today by Stephen Lecce, Minister of Energy and Mines, and Sam Oosterhoff, Associate Minister of Energy Intensive Industries.

    According to the Ministry, the IEP, entitled “Energy for Generations,” aims to provide a coordinated, long-term approach to ensure Ontario has the energy it needs to power homes, businesses, and industry with abundant, reliable, clean, and affordable energy supply.

    CanREA worked with the government and its agencies to inform aspects of this plan, contributing our expertise to help shape the DER approach and procurement strategy.

    “The government’s continued commitment to competitive, transparent procurements—reaffirmed in the Integrated Energy Plan (IEP)—will drive low-cost clean energy investments that benefit Ontario ratepayers,” said Vittoria Bellissimo, CanREA’s President and CEO.

    CanREA has long advocated for consistent procurements, with open processes, as the most effective way for investors and developers to successfully build out the new wind, solar and energy storage projects needed to help meet growing demand in Ontario.

    “We are also encouraged that the IEP identifies the critical actions needed to fully leverage the significant potential of distributed energy resources (DERs) that bring energy and resilience to all regions in the province,” said Bellissimo.

    Specifically, the IEP indicates the intention to create a DER stream in the IESO’s Enabling Resources Program and to enable broader opportunities for DERs in IESO procurements and programs. The government also plans to review Ontario’s net metering framework and launch a Local Generation Program to create new pathways for DER providers.

    As a whole, the DER strategy clearly recognizes CanREA’s position that rooftop solar and batteries are ready to play a growing role in delivering reliable, affordable power to Ontario’s communities, farmers and businesses.

    “Going forward, CanREA is ready to help the government and its agencies execute key initiatives from the Integrated Energy Plan, and CanREA members will continue to invest in clean energy projects in this province through Ontario’s upcoming procurements and programs,” said Eric Muller, CanREA’s Ontario Director.

    PHOTO (from left to right): Minister Stephen Lecce (Ontario Minister of Energy and Mines), Leonard Kula (CanREA Vice President of Policy—Eastern Canada and Utility Affairs), Minister Sam Oosterhoff (Associate Minister of Energy Intensive Industries), at the announcement of Ontario’s new Integrated Energy Plan (IEP), “Energy for Generations,” in Toronto on June 12, 2025.

    Quotes

    “The government’s continued commitment to competitive, transparent procurements—reaffirmed in the Integrated Energy Plan (IEP)—will drive low-cost clean energy investments that benefit Ontario ratepayers. We are encouraged that the IEP identifies the critical actions needed to fully leverage the significant potential of distributed energy resources that bring energy and resilience to all regions in the province.”
    —Vittoria Bellissimo, President and CEO, Canadian Renewable Energy Association (CanREA)

    “Going forward, CanREA is ready to help the government and its agencies execute key initiatives from the Integrated Energy Plan, and CanREA members will continue to invest in clean energy projects in this province through Ontario’s upcoming procurements and programs.”
    —Eric Muller, Ontario Director, Canadian Renewable Energy Association (CanREA)

    For media inquiries or interview opportunities, please contact: 

    Communications Canadian Renewable Energy Association communications@renewablesassociation.ca 

    About CanREA 

    The Canadian Renewable Energy Association (CanREA) is the voice for wind energy, solar energy and energy storage solutions that will power Canada’s energy future. We work to create the conditions for a modern energy system through stakeholder advocacy and public engagement. Our diverse members are uniquely positioned to deliver clean, low-cost, reliable, flexible and scalable solutions for Canada’s energy needs. For more information on how Canada can use wind energy, solar energy and energy storage to help achieve its net-zero commitments, consult “Powering Canada’s Journey to Net-Zero: CanREA’s 2050 Vision.” Follow us on Bluesky and LinkedIn here. Learn more at renewablesassociation.ca. 

    The post STATEMENT: Ontario’s Integrated Energy Plan emphasizes DERs and procurements appeared first on Canadian Renewable Energy Association.

    MIL OSI Global Banks

  • MIL-OSI Security: East Granby Woman Admits $1.1 Million Pandemic Relief Program Scheme

    Source: United States Department of Justice (National Center for Disaster Fraud)

    David X. Sullivan, United States Attorney for the District of Connecticut, and Harry Chavis, Special Agent in Charge of IRS Criminal Investigation in New England, announced that KAREN GASTON, 44, of East Granby, waived her right to be indicted and pleaded guilty today before U.S. District Judge Sarah F. Russell in New Haven to offenses stemming from a scheme to defraud COVID-19 pandemic relief programs of more than $1.1 million.

    In March 2020, the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (“CARES”) Act provided emergency financial assistance to Americans suffering the economic effects caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.  One source of relief provided by the CARES Act was the authorization of forgivable loans to small businesses for job retention and certain other expenses through the Paycheck Protection Program (“PPP”).  The PPP was overseen by the U.S. Small Business Administration (“SBA”), and individual PPP loans were issued by private lenders, which received and processed PPP applications and supporting documentation, and then made loans using the lenders’ own funds, which were guaranteed by the SBA.  The CARES Act also authorized SBA to distribute Economic Injury Disaster Loans (“EIDLs”), which provided working capital to eligible small businesses, including sole proprietors, to meet operating expenses.

    According to court documents and statements made in court, in 2020, Gaston controlled certain entities including LNK, Elegant Clinical, Ruby Red LLC, and Diamond Shine LLC.  LNK and Diamond Shine LLC were operational, but shared resources and employees.  Ruby Red LLC had only one client and Gaston was its sole employee.   Elegant Clinical was no longer operational.  Beginning in approximately April 2020, Gaston submitted loan applications to the PPP and EIDL programs that falsely represented the status of the operations, resources, and employees of these entities.  She also filed loan applications at separate financial institutions in order to disguise the true nature of her criminal activity.

    Specifically, Gaston’s loan applications falsely represented that her businesses were all active and operating concerns; falsely represented the number of employees and the amount of wages purportedly paid by the businesses; included copies of fraudulent tax returns and tax related documents; and falsely represented that a family member, used as an applicant on an application, was a part owner of one of her entities.

    Gaston received $1,163,910 in PPP and EIDL loan funds through this scheme.  Instead of using the funds for payroll or other operating expenses, she spent the money on personal expenditures, including travel, food, luxury home goods, expensive jewelry, cars, and paying off her home mortgage.

    Gaston pleaded guilty to wire fraud, which carries a maximum term of imprisonment of 20 years, and making illegal monetary transactions, which carries a maximum term of imprisonment of 10 years.

    Gaston has agreed to make full restitution.  She also has agreed to the forfeiture of a ring she purchased in July 2020 from the jeweler Harry Winston for $39,521.63.

    Gaston is released on a $100,000 bond pending sentencing, which is not scheduled.

    This investigation has been conducted by the Internal Revenue Service, Criminal Investigation Division.  The case is being prosecuted by Assistant U.S. Attorney Michael S. McGarry.

    Individuals with information about allegations of fraud involving COVID-19 are encouraged to report it by calling the Department of Justice’s National Center for Disaster Fraud Hotline at 866-720-5721, or via the NCDF Web Complaint Form at: https://www.justice.gov/disaster-fraud/ncdf-disaster-complaint-form.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI USA News: Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Stops the Green Agenda in the Columbia River Basin

    Source: US Whitehouse

    STOPPING RADICAL ENVIRONMENTALISM: Today, President Donald J. Trump signed a Presidential Memorandum revoking an executive action issued by the prior administration that called for “equitable treatment for fish.”

    • Today’s Memorandum revokes the Biden Administration’s “Restoring Healthy and Abundant Salmon, Steelhead, and Other Native Fish Populations in the Columbia River Basin” Memorandum, which placed concerns about climate change above the Nation’s interests in reliable energy resources.
    • This Memorandum directs the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of the Interior, the Secretary of Commerce, and the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works to withdraw from agreements stemming from Biden’s misguided executive action, including the December 14, 2023 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) filed in connection with related litigation.
    • The specified agencies will coordinate with the Council on Environmental Quality to review and revise environmental review processes related to the matters in the MOU, save Federal funds, and withdraw from the MOU.

    RESTORING AMERICAN ENERGY DOMINANCE AND SECURING AMERICAN PROSPERITY: President Trump continues to prioritize our Nation’s energy infrastructure and use of natural resources to lower the cost of living for all Americans over speculative climate change concerns.

    • President Trump recognizes the importance of ensuring the future of wildlife populations in the Columbia River Basin, while also advancing the country’s energy creation to benefit the American public.
    • The MOU required the Federal government to spend millions of dollars and comply with 36 pages of onerous commitments to dam operations on the Lower Snake River. 
    • Dam breaching would have resulted in reduced water supply to farmers, eliminated several shipping channels, had devastating impacts to agriculture, increased energy costs, and eliminated recreational opportunities throughout the region.  
    • The dam breaches would have eliminated over 3,000 megawatts of secure and reliable hydroelectric generating capacity—which is enough generation to power 2.5 million American homes.

    PUTTING AMERICA FIRST: President Trump continues to deliver on his promise to end the previous administration’s misplaced priorities and protect the livelihoods of the American people. Unlike the previous administration, the Trump Administration understands that policies that promote environmental quality and economic growth are not mutually exclusive.

    • President Trump champions the needs of the American people and prioritizes U.S. interests in reliable, affordable energy resources.
      • President Trump signed an Executive Order reinvigorating America’s beautiful clean coal industry to support grid stability and hundreds of thousands of U.S.  jobs.
    • President Trump is committed to unleashing American energy dominance, reversing all executive actions that impose undue burdens on energy production and use.
      • On Day One, President Trump declared a National Energy Emergency to unlock domestic energy production and bring down costs for everyday Americans.
    • President Trump’s commonsense approach to environmental conservation empowers the American people to take full advantage of our nation’s vast and great natural resources.
      • President Trump reversed the burdensome regulations that impeded Alaska’s ability to develop its vast natural resources, unleashing the state’s potential to create a safe and prosperous future for the entire Nation.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA News: Empowering Commonsense Wildfire Prevention and Response

    Source: US Whitehouse

    class=”has-text-align-left”>By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered:
    Section 1. Purpose. The devastation of the January 2025 Los Angeles wildfires shocked the American people and highlighted the catastrophic consequences when State and local governments are unable to quickly respond to such disasters.  In too many cases, including in California, a slow and inadequate response to wildfires is a direct result of reckless mismanagement and lack of preparedness. Wildfires threaten every region, yet many local government entities continue to disregard commonsense preventative measures. Firefighters across the country are forced to rely on outdated technology and face challenges in quickly responding to wildfires because of unnecessary regulation and bureaucracy. 
    The Federal Government can empower State and local leaders by streamlining Federal wildfire capabilities to improve their effectiveness and promoting commonsense, technology-enabled local strategies for land management and wildfire response and mitigation.  

    Sec. 2.  Streamlining Federal Wildland Fire Governance.  Within 90 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of Agriculture shall, to the maximum degree practicable and consistent with applicable law, consolidate their wildland fire programs to achieve the most efficient and effective use of wildland fire offices, coordinating bodies, programs, budgets, procurement processes, and research and, as necessary, recommend additional measures to advance this objective.

    Sec. 3.  Encouraging Local Wildfire Preparedness and Response.  (a)  Within 90 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of Agriculture, in consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall:
            (i)   expand and strengthen the use of partnerships, agreements, compacts, and mutual aid capabilities that empower Federal, State, local, tribal, and community-driven land management that reduces wildfire risk and improves wildfire response, including on public lands; and
            (ii)  develop and expand the use of other measures to incentivize responsible land management and wildfire prevention, mitigation, and response measures at the State and local levels.
    (b)  Within 180 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of Agriculture, in consultation with the Secretary of Commerce and the heads of executive departments and agencies (agencies) represented at the National Interagency Fire Center, shall:
            (i)   develop a comprehensive technology roadmap, in consultation with the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), to increase wildfire firefighting capabilities at the State and local levels, including through artificial intelligence, data sharing, innovative modeling and mapping capabilities, and technology to identify wildland fire ignitions and weather forecasts to inform response and evacuation; and
            (ii)  promote the use of a risk-informed approach, as consistent with Executive Order 14239 of March 18, 2025 (Achieving Efficiency Through State and Local Preparedness), to develop new policies that remove barriers to preventing and responding to wildfires, including through year-round response readiness, better forest health, and activities outlined in Executive Order 14225 of March 1, 2025 (Immediate Expansion of American Timber Production).

    Sec. 4.  Strengthening Wildfire Mitigation.  Within 90 days of the date of this order:
    (a)  The Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency shall consider modifying or rescinding, as consistent with applicable law, Federal rules or policies that impede the use of appropriate, preventative prescribed fires.
    (b)  The Secretary of Agriculture and the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, in consultation with the Secretary of the Interior, shall consider modifying or rescinding, as consistent with applicable law, Federal rules or policies hindering the appropriate use of fire retardant to fight wildfires.
    (c)  The Secretary of Agriculture, in consultation with the Secretary of the Interior, shall consider promoting, assisting, and facilitating, as consistent with applicable law, innovative uses of woody biomass and forest products to reduce fuel loads in areas at risk of wildfires.
    (d)  The Secretary of the Interior, the Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary of Energy, and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission shall consider initiating rulemaking proceedings to establish, as consistent with applicable law, best practices to reduce the risk of wildfire ignition from the bulk-power system without increasing costs for electric-power end users, including through methods such as vegetation management, the removal of forest-hazardous fuels along transmission lines, improved engineering approaches, and safer operational practices.  
    (e)  The Attorney General, in consultation with the Secretary of Agriculture and the Secretary of the Interior, shall review pending and proposed wildfire-related litigation involving electrical utility companies to ensure the Department’s positions and proposed resolutions in such matters advance the wildfire prevention and mitigation efforts identified in this order.

    Sec. 5.  Modernizing Wildfire Prevention and Response
    (a)  Within 120 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Director of OSTP, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and the heads of relevant agencies, shall, as appropriate, identify, declassify, and make publicly available historical satellite datasets that will advance wildfire prevention and response and improve wildfire prediction and evaluation models.
    (b)  Within 180 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of Agriculture, in consultation with the Secretary of Commerce and the heads of agencies represented at the National Interagency Fire Center, shall:
            (i)   Identify rules that impede wildfire prevention, detection, or response and consider eliminating or revising those rules, as consistent with applicable law.  This consideration and any resulting rulemaking proceedings shall be reflected in the Fall 2025 Unified Regulatory Agenda. 
            (ii)  Develop performance metrics for wildfire response, including metrics related to average response times, annual fuels treatments, safety and cost effectiveness, and other subjects, as appropriate for inclusion in strategic and annual performance plans.
    (c)  Within 210 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of Defense shall evaluate and, as appropriate and consistent with applicable law, prioritize the sale of excess aircraft and aircraft parts to support wildfire mitigation and response.

    Sec. 6.  General Provisions.  (a)  Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:
            (i)   the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or
            (ii)  the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.
    (b)  This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.
    (c)  This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.
    (d)  The costs for publication of this order shall be borne by the Department of Agriculture and the Department of the Interior in equal shares.

                                  DONALD J. TRUMP

    THE WHITE HOUSE,
        June 12, 2025.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: VIDEO: Senator Peters Secures Army Corps Commitment to Prioritize Timely Completion of Soo Locks Construction

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Michigan Gary Peters

    WASHINGTON, DC – During a hearing in the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development, U.S. Senator Gary Peters (MI) secured a commitment from key U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) officials to prioritize the timely completion of the ongoing Soo Locks construction project. In his questioning, Peters emphasized the importance of this critical project for U.S. economic and national security.  

    “To put things into perspective, just a six-month unscheduled outage at the Soo would result in an estimated 11 million jobs lost and a $1.1 trillion hit to the economy. I think that’s a classic definition of critical infrastructure,” said Senator Peters during the hearing. “The bottom line is, we need a second Poe-sized lock to alleviate this risk, and I’ve been leading the charge with a lot of my colleagues for quite some time.” 

    In response, Mr. D. Lee Forsgren, Acting Assistant Secretary of the U.S. Army (Civil Works) said, “As you so articulately laid out, it is the backbone of the economy of this country, and we cannot afford as a nation to let that happen. I commit we will be looking at ways forward to enhance that system.” 

    To watch the full video of Senator Peters’ questioning, click here.

    Peters also applauded the $264 million included in the 2025 Army Corps Work Plan and Budget Request, which he recently led the bipartisan Michigan delegation in advocating for. This funding would allow the USACE to award the final remaining contracts needed to finish the project at their current cost.  

    “It was great to see the funding in the work plan allowing us to hit those final three options,” said Lt. Gen. William H. Graham, Jr., Chief of Engineers and Commanding General of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. “We’re never going to get better prices than what we had locked in to finish those last three options up at the Soo. I’m heading up there in a few weeks to make sure that there are no surprises up there and that the team on the ground has everything they need to continue to deliver, and I think we’re on track for 2030, which is exciting.” 

    Peters has prioritized securing the funding necessary to build a new Poe-sized Lock at the Soo Locks. In 2024, he toured the ongoing construction project after helping to secure $257.4 million for the project in government funding legislation. In January 2022, Peters helped to secure $479 million for modernizing the Soo Locks through the bipartisan infrastructure law. In December 2022, he helped pass the bipartisan Water Resources and Development Act as part of the annual national defense bill, including needed funding flexibility for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to keep the New Lock at the Soo project on schedule. 

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Trahan Delivers Opening Statement at Legislative Hearing on GOP College Sports Bill

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Congresswoman Lori Trahan (D-MA-03)

    WASHINGTON, DC – Today, Congresswoman Lori Trahan (MA-03), a former Division I volleyball player, delivered the following opening statement at the House Energy and Commerce Committee’s hearing on partisan legislation that would roll back the rights of college athletes and hand massive giveaways to the NCAA and powerful conferences.
    “The SCORE Act uses the approval of the House settlement as justification to slam the door on future progress for college athletes. Proponents claim the system is broken, but the fact that three separate antitrust cases are being settled proves otherwise. We have a system where the NCAA, conferences, and their member institutions set rules. Athletes can challenge them. And if the rules are unfair, courts can intervene, or a deal can be struck. This bill rewrites that process to guarantee the people in power always win, and the athletes who fuel this multibillion-dollar industry always lose,” Congresswoman Trahan said.
    CLICK HERE or the image below to watch Trahan’s opening statement. A transcript is embedded below.

    —————————————-
    Congresswoman Lori Trahan
    Remarks as Delivered
    House Energy and Commerce Hearing on “Winning Off the Field: Legislative Proposal to Stabilize NIL and College Athletics”
    June 12, 2025
    I’m deeply disappointed for the second year in a row, Republicans on this Committee are advancing a partisan college sports bill that protects the power brokers of college athletics at the expense of the athletes themselves. This legislation was crafted behind closed doors, with no input from Democratic members of the Energy and Commerce Committee, the Judiciary Committee, or the Education and Workforce Committee.
    In fact, we didn’t see a draft of the bill until late last week – not because our Republican colleagues shared it with us, but because lobbyists and members of the media got it first. I’m a former D1 athlete, and I’m deeply, I care deeply about the future of college sports. So that when I asked the Chairman about the rumored hearing today, he said he’d be happy to discuss the proposal with me beforehand. Sadly, that meeting never happened.
    What makes this all the more frustrating is that there is bipartisan agreement on serious problems in college sports that deserve congressional action. International athletes are being denied the same NIL rights as their teammates. Women are being left out of roster spots due to Title IX loopholes.
    We could be working together on solutions. Instead, the SCORE Act uses the approval of the House settlement as justification to slam the door on future progress for college athletes.
    Proponents claim the system is broken, but the fact that three separate antitrust cases are being settled proves otherwise. We have a system where the NCAA, conferences, and their member institutions set rules. Athletes can challenge them. And if the rules are unfair, courts can intervene, or a deal can be struck.
    This bill rewrites that process to guarantee the people in power always win, and the athletes who fuel this multibillion-dollar industry always lose.
    I oppose the legislation as written, and I look forward to hearing from our witnesses, and I yield to Congresswoman Clark.
    ###

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  • MIL-OSI Canada: Using science and technology to reduce tailings ponds

    Under the leadership of former premier Peter Lougheed, Alberta harnessed advances in technology to drive development and innovation in the oil sands. That work was critical in allowing Canada and the world to benefit from some of our province’s greatest natural resources. Fifty years later, Alberta is again looking to innovators and knowledge-keepers to help develop long-term solutions to the mine water challenge.

    Over the last year, the Oil Sands Mine Water Steering Committee has met with industry operators, technology providers, Indigenous community members, scientists and others to review evidence and explore viable options to improve mine water management and tailings pond reclamation in Alberta’s oil sands region.

    The committee has submitted its first recommendations to begin addressing this challenge while protecting the environment and downstream communities. Alberta’s government accepts these recommendations and will immediately begin exploring them further to help create an accelerated plan to reclaim the water and eventually return the land for use by future generations.

    “We need to start finding a path to more effectively manage oil sands mine water and tailing ponds. Doing nothing while mine water continues accumulating is not a sustainable approach. I want to thank the committee for their thoughtful work. We will immediately start to carefully evaluate these recommendations and determine how they can safely be put into action.”

    Rebecca Schulz, Minister of Environment and Protected Areas

    “These effective and evidence-based recommendations help provide a roadmap to accelerate action to address tailings ponds and oil sands mine water. This will help Alberta better manage and reduce mine water while still delivering the most responsible energy in the world.”

    Tany Yao, steering committee chair and MLA for Fort McMurray-Wood Buffalo

    “This committee’s recommendations are an important step forward. We cannot keep ignoring this challenge but need to find practical and effective solutions forward.”

    Chief Jim Boucher, steering committee member, president, Saa Dene Group of Companies, and former chief of Fort McKay First Nation

    The committee’s initial recommendations focus largely on improving water use efficiency, developing new measurement standards, and better managing or even reducing water accumulation at mine sites. The following recommendations reflect a year of rigorous, thoughtful analysis and engagement:

    • Recommendation 1 calls for changes to help keep more water out of tailings ponds. Currently, much of the water collected has not actually been used in the oil sands extraction or separation processes. The recommendation calls for measures to more easily keep melting snow, runoff and other water separate, and for government to create clearer standards for this water’s safe release.
    • Recommendation 2 advises government to promote more water-sharing between mine sites to minimize new withdrawals from the Athabasca River.
    • Recommendation 3 advises government to focus on managing oil sands mine water within the watershed, not moving water across watersheds.
    • Recommendation 4 advises government that deep well disposal be considered to manage low volumes of otherwise untreatable oil sands mine water and some legacy mine water, once all other options have been fully explored. Deep well disposal involves injecting oil sands mine water deep unground beneath many layers of impermeable rock, providing permanent storage that also protects the drinking water and land above.
    • Recommendation 5 calls for government to develop a standardized method for measuring naphthenic acids, naturally occurring organics that are sourced from oil sands bitumen. Though no jurisdiction is known to have ever implemented such a method for regulatory purposes, being able to measure them is considered essential in assessing the effectiveness of mine water treatment options.

    Read the recommendations in detail on Alberta.ca, along with a letter from Committee Chair Tany Yao. The committee’s work continues, and more recommendations will be shared in the near future.

    Over the next six months, Alberta Environment and Protected Areas will work with the Alberta Energy Regulator and others to evaluate and explore these recommendations to put a plan in place that is realistic, safe and backed by research and evidence.

    Government is committed to continue listening to Albertans and the people who brought forward solutions. The ongoing leadership and participation of Indigenous communities are vital to shaping how we manage tailings and protect the land and water for future generations.

    Quick facts

    • In Alberta and around the world, mining operations produce tailings. Tailings – a mixture of water, sand, clay and residual bitumen – are the byproduct of the extraction process.
    • The committee assessed and evaluated options against feasibility criteria, including regulatory and policy alignment, environmental impact, economic viability, technical feasibility, and Indigenous community impacts.
    • The province’s oil sands tailings ponds now contain more than 1.4 billion cubic metres. This includes non-process affected water, such as rainwater, surface runoff, muskeg dewatering, non-saline groundwater depressurization, and other water that has not been directly utilized in oil sands extraction or separation processes.
    • Oil sands operators are responsible for reclamation, but research and evidence on how best to reclaim these sites is still being refined.
    • Oil sands mine operations in Alberta have reduced the amount of fresh water used per barrel by 23 per cent since 2017.

    Related information

    • Oil Sands Mine Water Steering Committee

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