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  • MIL-OSI USA: Fast Flux: A National Security Threat

    News In Brief – Source: US Computer Emergency Readiness Team

    Executive summary

    Many networks have a gap in their defenses for detecting and blocking a malicious technique known as “fast flux.” This technique poses a significant threat to national security, enabling malicious cyber actors to consistently evade detection. Malicious cyber actors, including cybercriminals and nation-state actors, use fast flux to obfuscate the locations of malicious servers by rapidly changing Domain Name System (DNS) records. Additionally, they can create resilient, highly available command and control (C2) infrastructure, concealing their subsequent malicious operations. This resilient and fast changing infrastructure makes tracking and blocking malicious activities that use fast flux more difficult. 

    The National Security Agency (NSA), Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Australian Signals Directorate’s Australian Cyber Security Centre (ASD’s ACSC), Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (CCCS), and New Zealand National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC-NZ) are releasing this joint cybersecurity advisory (CSA) to warn organizations, Internet service providers (ISPs), and cybersecurity service providers of the ongoing threat of fast flux enabled malicious activities as a defensive gap in many networks. This advisory is meant to encourage service providers, especially Protective DNS (PDNS) providers, to help mitigate this threat by taking proactive steps to develop accurate, reliable, and timely fast flux detection analytics and blocking capabilities for their customers. This CSA also provides guidance on detecting and mitigating elements of malicious fast flux by adopting a multi-layered approach that combines DNS analysis, network monitoring, and threat intelligence. 

    The authoring agencies recommend all stakeholders—government and providers—collaborate to develop and implement scalable solutions to close this ongoing gap in network defenses against malicious fast flux activity.

    Download the PDF version of this report: Fast Flux: A National Security Threat (PDF, 841 KB).

    Technical details

    When malicious cyber actors compromise devices and networks, the malware they use needs to “call home” to send status updates and receive further instructions. To decrease the risk of detection by network defenders, malicious cyber actors use dynamic resolution techniques, such as fast flux, so their communications are less likely to be detected as malicious and blocked. 

    Fast flux refers to a domain-based technique that is characterized by rapidly changing the DNS records (e.g., IP addresses) associated with a single domain [T1568.001]. 

    Single and double flux

    Malicious cyber actors use two common variants of fast flux to perform operations:

    1. Single flux: A single domain name is linked to numerous IP addresses, which are frequently rotated in DNS responses. This setup ensures that if one IP address is blocked or taken down, the domain remains accessible through the other IP addresses. See Figure 1 as an example to illustrate this technique.

    Figure 1: Single flux technique.

    Note: This behavior can also be used for legitimate purposes for performance reasons in dynamic hosting environments, such as in content delivery networks and load balancers.

    2. Double flux: In addition to rapidly changing the IP addresses as in single flux, the DNS name servers responsible for resolving the domain also change frequently. This provides an additional layer of redundancy and anonymity for malicious domains. Double flux techniques have been observed using both Name Server (NS) and Canonical Name (CNAME) DNS records. See Figure 2 as an example to illustrate this technique.

    Figure 2: Double flux technique. 

    Both techniques leverage a large number of compromised hosts, usually as a botnet from across the Internet that acts as proxies or relay points, making it difficult for network defenders to identify the malicious traffic and block or perform legal enforcement takedowns of the malicious infrastructure. Numerous malicious cyber actors have been reported using the fast flux technique to hide C2 channels and remain operational. Examples include:

    • Bulletproof hosting (BPH) services offer Internet hosting that disregards or evades law enforcement requests and abuse notices. These providers host malicious content and activities while providing anonymity for malicious cyber actors. Some BPH companies also provide fast flux services, which help malicious cyber actors maintain connectivity and improve the reliability of their malicious infrastructure. [1]
    • Fast flux has been used in Hive and Nefilim ransomware attacks. [3], [4]
    • Gamaredon uses fast flux to limit the effectiveness of IP blocking. [5], [6], [7]

    The key advantages of fast flux networks for malicious cyber actors include:

    • Increased resilience. As a fast flux network rapidly rotates through botnet devices, it is difficult for law enforcement or abuse notifications to process the changes quickly and disrupt their services.
    • Render IP blocking ineffective. The rapid turnover of IP addresses renders IP blocking irrelevant since each IP address is no longer in use by the time it is blocked. This allows criminals to maintain resilient operations.
    • Anonymity. Investigators face challenges in tracing malicious content back to the source through fast flux networks. This is because malicious cyber actors’ C2 botnets are constantly changing the associated IP addresses throughout the investigation.

    Additional malicious uses

    Fast flux is not only used for maintaining C2 communications, it also can play a significant role in phishing campaigns to make social engineering websites harder to block or take down. Phishing is often the first step in a larger and more complex cyber compromise. Phishing is typically used to trick victims into revealing sensitive information (such as login passwords, credit card numbers, and personal data), but can also be used to distribute malware or exploit system vulnerabilities. Similarly, fast flux is used for maintaining high availability for cybercriminal forums and marketplaces, making them resilient against law enforcement takedown efforts. 

    Some BPH providers promote fast flux as a service differentiator that increases the effectiveness of their clients’ malicious activities. For example, one BPH provider posted on a dark web forum that it protects clients from being added to Spamhaus blocklists by easily enabling the fast flux capability through the service management panel (See Figure 3). A customer just needs to add a “dummy server interface,” which redirects incoming queries to the host server automatically. By doing so, only the dummy server interfaces are reported for abuse and added to the Spamhaus blocklist, while the servers of the BPH customers remain “clean” and unblocked. 

    Figure 3: Example dark web fast flux advertisement.

    The BPH provider further explained that numerous malicious activities beyond C2, including botnet managers, fake shops, credential stealers, viruses, spam mailers, and others, could use fast flux to avoid identification and blocking. 

    As another example, a BPH provider that offers fast flux as a service advertised that it automatically updates name servers to prevent the blocking of customer domains. Additionally, this provider further promoted its use of separate pools of IP addresses for each customer, offering globally dispersed domain registrations for increased reliability.

    Detection techniques

    The authoring agencies recommend that ISPs and cybersecurity service providers, especially PDNS providers, implement a multi-layered approach, in coordination with customers, using the following techniques to aid in detecting fast flux activity [CISA CPG 3.A]. However, quickly detecting malicious fast flux activity and differentiating it from legitimate activity remains an ongoing challenge to developing accurate, reliable, and timely fast flux detection analytics. 

    1. Leverage threat intelligence feeds and reputation services to identify known fast flux domains and associated IP addresses, such as in boundary firewalls, DNS resolvers, and/or SIEM solutions.

    2. Implement anomaly detection systems for DNS query logs to identify domains exhibiting high entropy or IP diversity in DNS responses and frequent IP address rotations. Fast flux domains will frequently cycle though tens or hundreds of IP addresses per day.

    3. Analyze the time-to-live (TTL) values in DNS records. Fast flux domains often have unusually low TTL values. A typical fast flux domain may change its IP address every 3 to 5 minutes.

    4. Review DNS resolution for inconsistent geolocation. Malicious domains associated with fast flux typically generate high volumes of traffic with inconsistent IP-geolocation information.

    5. Use flow data to identify large-scale communications with numerous different IP addresses over short periods.

    6. Develop fast flux detection algorithms to identify anomalous traffic patterns that deviate from usual network DNS behavior.

    7. Monitor for signs of phishing activities, such as suspicious emails, websites, or links, and correlate these with fast flux activity. Fast flux may be used to rapidly spread phishing campaigns and to keep phishing websites online despite blocking attempts.

    8. Implement customer transparency and share information about detected fast flux activity, ensuring to alert customers promptly after confirmed presence of malicious activity.

    Mitigations

    All organizations

    To defend against fast flux, government and critical infrastructure organizations should coordinate with their Internet service providers, cybersecurity service providers, and/or their Protective DNS services to implement the following mitigations utilizing accurate, reliable, and timely fast flux detection analytics. 

    Note: Some legitimate activity, such as common content delivery network (CDN) behaviors, may look like malicious fast flux activity. Protective DNS services, service providers, and network defenders should make reasonable efforts, such as allowlisting expected CDN services, to avoid blocking or impeding legitimate content.

    1. DNS and IP blocking and sinkholing of malicious fast flux domains and IP addresses

    • Block access to domains identified as using fast flux through non-routable DNS responses or firewall rules.
    • Consider sinkholing the malicious domains, redirecting traffic from those domains to a controlled server to capture and analyze the traffic, helping to identify compromised hosts within the network.
    • Block IP addresses known to be associated with malicious fast flux networks.

    2. Reputational filtering of fast flux enabled malicious activity

    • Block traffic to and from domains or IP addresses with poor reputations, especially ones identified as participating in malicious fast flux activity.

    3. Enhanced monitoring and logging

    • Increase logging and monitoring of DNS traffic and network communications to identify new or ongoing fast flux activities.
    • Implement automated alerting mechanisms to respond swiftly to detected fast flux patterns.
    • Refer to ASD’s ACSC joint publication, Best practices for event logging and threat detection, for further logging recommendations.

    4. Collaborative defense and information sharing

    • Share detected fast flux indicators (e.g., domains, IP addresses) with trusted partners and threat intelligence communities to enhance collective defense efforts. Examples of indicator sharing initiatives include CISA’s Automated Indicator Sharing or sector-based Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs) and ASD’s Cyber Threat Intelligence Sharing Platform (CTIS) in Australia.
    • Participate in public and private information-sharing programs to stay informed about emerging fast flux tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). Regular collaboration is particularly important because most malicious activity by these domains occurs within just a few days of their initial use; therefore, early discovery and information sharing by the cybersecurity community is crucial to minimizing such malicious activity. [8]

    5. Phishing awareness and training

    • Implement employee awareness and training programs to help personnel identify and respond appropriately to phishing attempts.
    • Develop policies and procedures to manage and contain phishing incidents, particularly those facilitated by fast flux networks.
    • For more information on mitigating phishing, see joint Phishing Guidance: Stopping the Attack Cycle at Phase One.

    Network defenders

    The authoring agencies encourage organizations to use cybersecurity and PDNS services that detect and block fast flux. By leveraging providers that detect fast flux and implement capabilities for DNS and IP blocking, sinkholing, reputational filtering, enhanced monitoring, logging, and collaborative defense of malicious fast flux domains and IP addresses, organizations can mitigate many risks associated with fast flux and maintain a more secure environment. 

    However, some PDNS providers may not detect and block malicious fast flux activities. Organizations should not assume that their PDNS providers block malicious fast flux activity automatically and should contact their PDNS providers to validate coverage of this specific cyber threat. 

    For more information on PDNS services, see the 2021 joint cybersecurity information sheet from NSA and CISA about Selecting a Protective DNS Service. [9] In addition, NSA offers no-cost cybersecurity services to Defense Industrial Base (DIB) companies, including a PDNS service. For more information, see NSA’s DIB Cybersecurity Services and factsheet. CISA also offers a Protective DNS service for federal civilian executive branch (FCEB) agencies. See CISA’s Protective Domain Name System Resolver page and factsheet for more information. 

    Conclusion

    Fast flux represents a persistent threat to network security, leveraging rapidly changing infrastructure to obfuscate malicious activity. By implementing robust detection and mitigation strategies, organizations can significantly reduce their risk of compromise by fast flux-enabled threats. 

    The authoring agencies strongly recommend organizations engage their cybersecurity providers on developing a multi-layered approach to detect and mitigate malicious fast flux operations. Utilizing services that detect and block fast flux enabled malicious cyber activity can significantly bolster an organization’s cyber defenses. 

    Works cited

    [1] Intel471. Bulletproof Hosting: A Critical Cybercriminal Service. 2024. https://intel471.com/blog/bulletproof-hosting-a-critical-cybercriminal-service 

    [2] Australian Signals Directorate’s Australian Cyber Security Centre. “Bulletproof” hosting providers: Cracks in the armour of cybercriminal infrastructure. 2025. https://www.cyber.gov.au/about-us/view-all-content/publications/bulletproof-hosting-providers 

    [3] Logpoint. A Comprehensive guide to Detect Ransomware. 2023. https://www.logpoint.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/logpoint-a-comprehensive-guide-to-detect-ransomware.pdf

    [4] Trendmicro. Modern Ransomware’s Double Extortion Tactic’s and How to Protect Enterprises Against Them. 2021. https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/security/news/cybercrime-and-digital-threats/modern-ransomwares-double-extortion-tactics-and-how-to-protect-enterprises-against-them

    [5] Unit 42. Russia’s Trident Ursa (aka Gamaredon APT) Cyber Conflict Operations Unwavering Since Invasion of Ukraine. 2022. https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/trident-ursa/

    [6] Recorded Future. BlueAlpha Abuses Cloudflare Tunneling Service for GammaDrop Staging Infrastructure. 2024. https://www.recordedfuture.com/research/bluealpha-abuses-cloudflare-tunneling-service 

    [7] Silent Push. ‘From Russia with a 71’: Uncovering Gamaredon’s fast flux infrastructure. New apex domains and ASN/IP diversity patterns discovered. 2023. https://www.silentpush.com/blog/from-russia-with-a-71/

    [8] DNS Filter. Security Categories You Should be Blocking (But Probably Aren’t). 2023. https://www.dnsfilter.com/blog/security-categories-you-should-be-blocking-but-probably-arent

    [9] National Security Agency. Selecting a Protective DNS Service. 2021. https://media.defense.gov/2025/Mar/24/2003675043/-1/-1/0/CSI-SELECTING-A-PROTECTIVE-DNS-SERVICE-V1.3.PDF

    Disclaimer of endorsement

    The information and opinions contained in this document are provided “as is” and without any warranties or guarantees. Reference herein to any specific commercial product, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United States Government, and this guidance shall not be used for advertising or product endorsement purposes.

    Purpose

    This document was developed in furtherance of the authoring cybersecurity agencies’ missions, including their responsibilities to identify and disseminate threats, and develop and issue cybersecurity specifications and mitigations. This information may be shared broadly to reach all appropriate stakeholders.

    Contact

    National Security Agency (NSA):

    Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA):

    • All organizations should report incidents and anomalous activity to CISA via the agency’s Incident Reporting System, its 24/7 Operations Center at report@cisa.gov, or by calling 1-844-Say-CISA (1-844-729-2472). When available, please include the following information regarding the incident: date, time, and location of the incident; type of activity; number of people affected; type of equipment user for the activity; the name of the submitting company or organization; and a designated point of contact.

    Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI):

    • To report suspicious or criminal activity related to information found in this advisory, contact your local FBI field office or the FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3). When available, please include the following information regarding the incident: date, time, and location of the incident; type of activity; number of people affected; type of equipment used for the activity; the name of the submitting company or organization; and a designated point of contact.

    Australian Signals Directorate’s Australian Cyber Security Centre (ASD’s ACSC):

    • For inquiries, visit ASD’s website at www.cyber.gov.au or call the Australian Cyber Security Hotline at 1300 CYBER1 (1300 292 371).

    Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (CCCS):

    New Zealand National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC-NZ):

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI: Míla Holding hf. announces Consolidated Condensed Annual Financial Statements for the year ended 31 December 2024

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Míla Holding hf.
    Storhofdi 22-30,
    110 Reykjavik,
    Iceland

    Míla Holding hf. announces Consolidated Condensed Annual Financial Statements for the year ended 31 December 2024

    Consolidated condensed annual financial statements, for the year 2024, ended 31 December 2024 of Míla Holding hf. were approved at a Board of Directors meeting and Annual General Meeting on 3 April 2025.

    The financial statements are enclosed and can also be found on the Company’s website:
    https://www.mila.is/um-milu/fjarmal/

    For more information please contact:
    Inga Helga Halldórudóttir
    Compliance officer
    Míla Holding hf.
    ingah@mila.is

    Attachment

    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Trump declarations on Gaza and the Palestinian people – E-000612/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    In accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 2735 (2024)[1], the EU rejects any attempt at demographic or territorial changes in the Gaza Strip and supports unifying the Gaza Strip with the West Bank under the Palestinian Authority (PA), as the EU made clear on the occasion of the 13th EU-Israel Association Council held on 24 February 2025[2].

    This is also in line with the five key principles set by the President of the Commission in November 2023 on Gaza (Gaza to be an essential part of the future Palestinian State, and no forced displacement of Palestinians)[3].

    The EU has been constantly clear in affirming its unwavering commitment to the two-state solution; this is the only solution to the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians. The High Representative/Vice-President will continue to spare no effort to revive the political process towards the two-state solution.

    The EU is the biggest provider of external assistance to the Palestinians. The PA is the EU’s key partner and the EU will continue to provide support to encourage further reforms, also in view of the PA’s return to Gaza.

    To address the dire economic situation in the West Bank and avoid further destabilisation, the Commission announced on 19 July 2024 a two-step approach of short-term emergency financial support and a multi-year programme of support[4].

    The EU disbursed almost EUR 400 million in emergency financial assistance between July and November 2024, following the completion of a number of prior reform actions agreed with the PA.

    The EU is now working on a multi-year comprehensive programme for Palestinian recovery and resilience, which will be based on a mutually agreed ambitious reform agenda of the PA.

    • [1] https://docs.un.org/en/s/RES/2735(2024)
    • [2] https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6511-2025-INIT/en/pdf
    • [3] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_23_5646
    • [4] https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/news/european-commission-and-palestinian-authority-agree-emergency-financial-support-and-principles-2024-07-19_en
    Last updated: 3 April 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Protecting citizens from the devious practices of news networks – E-000387/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The Audiovisual Media Services Directive[1] obliges Member States to ensure that audiovisual media services do not incite to violence or hatred directed against a group of persons or a member of a group based on any of the grounds referred to in Article 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union[2].

    In its role as guardian of the Treaties, the Commission monitors the correct implementation of the Audiovisual Media Services Directive by Member States and, when needed, may decide to take appropriate action.

    It is national authorities’ primary responsibility to assess the compliance of media programmes with the relevant legal requirements. The investigation and prosecution of individual cases of alleged hate speech remains a competence of national authorities.

    • [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2018.303.01.0069.01.ENG&toc=OJ:L:2018:303:TOC
    • [2] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:12012P/TXT
    Last updated: 3 April 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Follow-up on the European Council’s call for long-term investment planning on interconnecting the EU energy market – E-001304/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-001304/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Bruno Gonçalves (S&D), Bruno Tobback (S&D), Thomas Pellerin-Carlin (S&D), Giorgio Gori (S&D), Daniel Attard (S&D), Elena Sancho Murillo (S&D), Nicolás González Casares (S&D), Yannis Maniatis (S&D)

    On 20 March 2025, the European Council called for urgent action to build a genuine energy union before 2030, including ‘cross-border and Union-wide long-term investment planning, with a view to fully integrate and interconnect the EU energy market’.

    Taking this into consideration:

    • 1.What are the main obstacles hindering the achievement of EU interconnection targets?
    • 2.What concrete steps is the Commission already taking to accelerate investment in cross-border interconnections?
    • 3.Given the urgency highlighted by the European Council, will the Commission propose a new fund for interconnection development, or will we have to wait for the new multiannual financial framework (starting in 2028)?

    Submitted: 27.3.2025

    Last updated: 3 April 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Clarification on hierarchical disparities among the coordinators on combating antisemitism and fostering Jewish life, on anti-Muslim hatred and on anti-racism – E-002848/2024(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    Racism has no place in the EU. The Political Guidelines for the Commission 2024-2029[1] make clear that action to combat racism remains a priority and commit to proposing a new EU Anti-racism Strategy as one of the main initiatives to be taken forward.

    It is for each institution to determine its own administrative organisation. Within the Commission, all services are committed to the same priorities, and work under the leadership of the President and the College of Commissioners.

    The coordinators on combatting anti-Muslim hatred and on combatting antisemitism and fostering Jewish life, together with the coordinator for inter-religious dialogue, are now part of the Secretariat-General, ensuring cross-policy coordination on inter-faith exchanges and working together to ensure that the EU is a safe place for everyone, including Jewish and Muslim communities, in line with the priorities set out in the mission letter of the Commissioner for Internal Affairs and Migration.

    At the same time, combatting racism remains firmly embedded in the Commission’s work on equality. The new EU Anti-racism Strategy will address all forms of racism under the lead of the Commissioner for Equality, and the anti-racism coordinator will continue to be based within the Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers, working in close cooperation with all relevant Commission services.

    The Commission also remains fully committed to implementing the EU strategic framework for Roma equality, inclusion and participation.

    • [1] https://commission.europa.eu/document/e6cd4328-673c-4e7a-8683-f63ffb2cf648_en
    Last updated: 3 April 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Thierry Breton, Bank of America advisor – E-000255/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    1. The precise amount of the Bank of America’s reimbursement of the former Commissioner for Internal Market participation to the two-days Bank of America’s Global Advisory Council, to be held twice per year, has no bearing on the Commission’s assessment of the compatibility of the former Commissioner’s post term of office activity with the Bank of America, which is based on Article 245 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the Code of Conduct for Members of the Commission. The former Commissioner for Internal Market has not informed the Commission about the precise amount of his reimbursement and the Commission has not asked to share this information with the Commission.

    2. The Commission’s assessment of former Commissioners’ envisaged post term of office activities is based on the compatibility of the notified activity with the principles of integrity and discretion enshrined in Article 245 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and with the Code of Conduct for the Members of the Commission, irrespective of the Commission’s use of its prerogatives in the context of the implementation of EU policies.

    Last updated: 3 April 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Greek banks profiteering from interest, fees and excessive charges – E-000352/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The Commission follows closely the developments in the banking sector across the EU. With a return on equity of 13.9%, in the third quarter of 2024, Greek banks’ profitability was ninth among 16 examined euro area countries[1].

    The Commission is aware of the recent intervention by the Hellenic Government in the Greek bank market that reduced or abolished six types of bank fees[2]. The Commission does not have any indication that bank fees in Greece would not be in line with EU legislation .

    Unless otherwise regulated by law, banks operating in the EU are free to set their fees and interest rates as they see fit. EU legislation generally does not regulate fees and charges nor prescribes their level[3].

    Exceptions to this include the Payment Account Directive[4] that requires that services for payment account with basic features are offered free of charge or for a reasonable fee only, the Instant Payments Regulation[5] that requires that fees for instant credit transfers are not higher than fees for regular credit transfers and the Consumer Credit Directive that requires Member States to introduce measures to ensure that consumers cannot be charged with excessively high borrowing rates, annual percentage rates of charge or total costs of credit[6].

    While the EU legislator has regulated fees in some cases and taken measures to ensure transparency of fees to enable consumers to take informed choices, the Commission does currently not envisage to limit bank fees more generally.

    • [1] European Central Bank Supervisory banking statistics.
    • [2] https://minfin.gov.gr/apo-simera-meionontai-i-katargountai-oi-6-vasikes-trapezikes-promitheies-gia-ekatommyria-polites/
    • [3] For information on national rules see the European Banking Authority report ‘Thematic review on the transparency and level of fees and charges for retail banking products’. https://www.eba.europa.eu/sites/default/files/document_library/Publications/Reports/2022/1045497/Report%20on%20the%20thematic%20review%20on%20fees%20and%20charges.pdf
    • [4] Directive 2014/92/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on the comparability of fees related to payment accounts, payment account switching and access to payment accounts with basic features Text with EEA relevance, OJ L 257, 28.8.2014, p. 214-246.
    • [5] Regulation (EU) 2024/886 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 March 2024 amending Regulations (EU) No 260/2012 and (EU) 2021/1230 and Directives 98/26/EC and (EU) 2015/2366 as regards instant credit transfers in euro (Text with EEA relevance), OJ L, 2024/886, 19.3.2024.
    • [6] Directive (EU) 2023/2225 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 October 2023 on credit agreements for consumers and repealing Directive 2008/48/EC, OJ L, 2023/2225, 30.10.2023.
    Last updated: 3 April 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Intellectual property rights on a cattle breeding program – P-001362/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Priority question for written answer  P-001362/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Ciaran Mullooly (Renew)

    Can the Commission clarify if intellectual property rights can be applied to the offspring of specified bulls and females in a cattle breeding programme?

    Submitted: 2.4.2025

    Last updated: 3 April 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Highlights – Structured dialogue with Commissioner Síkela on the Commission Work Programme – Committee on Development

    Source: European Parliament

    On Tuesday 8 April, the Members of the Committee on Development will meet Commissioner Síkela for his first Structured Dialogue on the Commission Work Programme, in line with the Framework Agreement between the European Parliament and the European Commission.

    This annual dialogue is the opportunity to comment on the implementation of the current Commission Work Programme and to formulate expectations the following one. It is also an occasion to follow up on the commitments made during the Commissioner’s hearing last year and to convey any other political messages related to the state of EU development policy.

    The scaling-up of the Global Gateway strategy, the preparation of the next long-term budget, the definition of an integrated EU approach to fragility, and the implementation of the Joint Vision 2030 with Africa ahead of 7th African Union-European Union Summit later this year are of particular interest to DEVE Members, in the current context of drastic reductions in cooperation aid programmes by the US administration, and a broader trend of declining ODA also from EU Member States.

    The outcome of this debate will form part of the Summary Report, which the Conference of Committee Chairs will adopt in June.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Highlights – AGRI vote on the future of agriculture, debates on wine legislation, food security – Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development

    Source: European Parliament

    Future EU agriculture © Image used under license from Adobe Stock

    The Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development will vote on the non-legislative draft report on the future of agriculture and the post-2027 common agricultural policy, on 8 April. AGRI members will also discuss the global challenges related to food security, sustainable agriculture and natural resource management with Maurizio Martina, Deputy Director-General of the FAO. The AGRI Committee will then debate on the EU wine legislation with the Commission.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Highlights – Animal welfare during transport – Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development

    Source: European Parliament

    Transport animals.jpeg © Image used under the license of Adobe Stock

    The EPRS will present to TRAN and AGRI Members the study on animal welfare during transport, up-date on the implementation of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2005 . A discussion will follow under the Joint committee procedure. This is part of the preparation of the AGRI-TRAN joint report on the matter.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Hearings – Public Hearing on the impact of markets in crypto-assets on financial stability – NEW – 08-04-2025 – Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs

    Source: European Parliament

    The Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) will hold a hearing to assess whether the growing importance of markets in crypto-assets has the potential to affect financial stability, on 8 April 2025.

    The hearing should allow Members of the European Parliament to gather from the invited experts additional information if the Union is equipped with a comprehensive policy and regulatory response to address possible risks of crypto-assets to financial stability.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Former Commissioner Thierry Breton’s new lobbying activities for Bank of America – E-000358/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    Former Commissioners are free to continue their professional careers following their term of office as Members of the Commission.

    This is a fundamental right enshrined, inter alia, in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. In line with Article 245 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and Article 11 of the Code of Conduct for the Members of the Commission, the Commission assesses former Commissioners’ envisaged post term of office activities in order to ensure the best possible balance between Former Commissioner’s individual right to work with the obligations of integrity and discretion to which they remain submitted following their term of office. There is therefore no contradiction whatsoever in the Commission’s approach.

    The decision adopted by the Commission in reply to Mr Breton’s notification[1] contains the appropriate conditions and restrictions to ensure that his activity for the Bank of America complies with the principles of integrity, discretion, confidentiality and collegiality to which he remains submitted.

    Article 12(4) of the Code of Conduct for the Members of the Commission indeed stipulates the procedure to appoint the Members of the Independent Ethical Committee and lays down the criteria under which they are chosen.

    The Committee is perfectly independent, and the Commission does not intend to review the above-mentioned provision.

    • [1] Decision C(2025) 9000 of 15 January 2020, available on the following website: https://commission.europa.eu/about/service-standards-and-principles/ethics-and-good-administration/commissioners-and-ethics/former-european-commissioners-authorised-occupations_en
    Last updated: 3 April 2025

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Delegated act and regulatory technical standards on the adjustment of own funds requirements and minimum features of stress testing – E-000315/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The draft Commission Delegated Regulation on regulatory technical standards specifying adjustment of own funds requirement and minimum features of stress testing programmes of issuers of asset-referenced tokens or of e-money tokens (‘draft RTS’)[1] is based on the empowerment laid down in Article 35(6) of Regulation on Markets in Crypto-assets[2] (MiCA).

    It further specifies Article 35(3) and (5) of MiCA and does not include any new obligations or imposes any unnecessary additional burden on market participants.

    The European Banking Authority (EBA) held an open public consultation on the draft RTS, which was open to anyone who wished to respond on the EBA’s website[3] between 8 November 2023 and 8 February 2024.

    The consultation was part of a package of several draft RTS on prudential matters under MiCA, for which the EBA held a hybrid public hearing on 30 January 2024 for all registered interested stakeholders.

    The provision stipulating that the draft RTS is to enter into force and apply 20 days after its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union[4] (OJ) is standard for such regulatory acts.

    The draft RTS as adopted by the Commission is publicly available and can be consulted by market operators since 13 December 2024.[5]

    Its publication in the OJ is preceded by a three-month scrutiny period, as laid down in Article 13 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010[6].

    The maximum timeframe for issuers to adjust to higher own fund requirements[7] was extended from three months to six months following the public consultations based on comments received from the stakeholders.

    This timeframe strikes the right balance between allowing an issuer sufficient time to adjust while addressing the higher risks posed by the issuer.

    • [1] C(2024) 6908 final.
    • [2] Regulation (EU) 2023/1114 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 May 2023 on markets in crypto-assets, and amending Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010 and (EU) No 1095/2010 and Directives 2013/36/EU and (EU) 2019/1937 (OJ L 150, 9.6.2023, p. 40, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/1114/oj).
    • [3] https://www.eba.europa.eu/publications-and-media/events/consultation-adjustment-own-funds-requirements-and-design-stress EBA received 8 responses.
    • [4] Article 11 of the draft RTS.
    • [5] Register of delegated and implementing acts, https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/regdel/#/delegatedActs/2443?lang=en
    • [6] Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/78/EC (OJ L 331, 15.12.2010, p. 12, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2010/1093/oj).
    • [7] A laid down in Article 3 of the draft RTS.
    Last updated: 3 April 2025

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Support for the digital transition for small and medium-sized enterprises (SΜΕs) in the EU – E-000097/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The Commission is deploying the InvestEU Innovation and Digitalisation Guarantee[1] — a pan-European instrument implemented by the European Investment Fund (EIF)[2] and supporting small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) for digitalisation of their business models, supply chain management, business development, cybersecurity, training and upskilling .

    Equity support for start-ups in the area of EU’s digital transformation and independence is equally available under InvestEU[3].

    Under the Pact for Skills[4], the Commission supports the development of digital skills in SMEs. A large-scale partnership is governed by the European Digital SME Alliance[5] and other organisations that are either SMEs or support skills development in SMEs.

    Activities include matchmaking events to improve access to finance, analyses of skills bottlenecks and definition of key performance indicators.

    As digital skills are important for all industrial ecosystems, regular information activities and events ensure smooth dialogue and coordination across all sectors.

    The Commission is committed to enhancing the competitiveness and fostering the adoption of breakthrough technologies by SMEs by implementing several initiatives[6] not only to reduce the cost of accessing advanced technologies, but also to ensure that European SMEs can fully participate in the EU’s digital transformation.

    The Commission will shortly present a third Omnibus, including on small mid-caps and removal of paper requirements.

    • [1] https://www.eif.org/InvestEU/guarantee_products/index.htm
    • [2] https://www.eif.org/index.htm
    • [3] https://www.eif.org/InvestEU/equity_products/index.htm
    • [4] https://pact-for-skills.ec.europa.eu/about/industrial-ecosystems-and-partnerships/digital_en
    • [5] https://www.digitalsme.eu/
    • [6] European Digital Innovation Hubs; Artificial Intelligence Innovation Package; Digital Single Market Strategy etc.
    Last updated: 3 April 2025

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Trips home by asylum seekers in the European Union – E-002235/2024(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    1. The Commission is aware that some Member States have observed movements of beneficiaries of international protection, travelling back to their country of origin and subsequently returning to the EU.

    2. The Commission will continue to monitor any developments and engage closely with the Member States and other key stakeholders to provide support by promoting information-sharing and cooperation.

    3. Beneficiaries of international protection in the EU possess either residence permits and/or special travel documents issued to such beneficiaries of international protection. Third-country nationals possessing such documents therefore do not need Schengen short-stay visas to cross the external borders of the EU.

    Regarding visas granted by third countries to beneficiaries of international protection holding special travel documents issued by Member States, the format of the visas issued by these third countries and rules to affix to travel documents depends on each third countries legislation and practices.

    Last updated: 3 April 2025

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Impact of the new sanctions on Russia – E-000807/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The EU has so far imposed 16 packages of massive and unprecedented restrictive measures in response to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine.

    EU sanctions have had a major effect on Russia’s economy, putting its supply chains under significant strain. By closing down sources of essential revenue and access to critical goods and technologies, these measures have made it costlier and more difficult for Russia to wage war.

    The package of sanctions adopted on 24 February 2025 continues targeting important sectors of the Russian economy and the Russian Government’s means of revenue generation.

    The EU has notably imposed a port access ban and a ban on the provision of a broad range of services related to maritime transport on 74 additional non-EU tankers that are part of Putin’s shadow fleet, circumventing the oil price cap and supporting Russia’s energy sector.

    A total of 153 vessels are now designated by the EU. Those measures have an important impact in curtailing the activities of the shadow fleet and reducing energy shipping capacities available to Russia. The EU will continue to work with Member States and partners to further close related networks.

    The EU has also targeted a number of systemically important sectors of Russia, including energy, trade, transport and infrastructure, such as through a transaction ban on Russian airports and ports used to support Russia’s war efforts or circumvent EU sanctions.

    In addition, to further restrict Russia’s access to revenue, the EU has added primary aluminium to the list of goods subject to a prohibition for their purchase, import or transfer, directly or indirectly into the EU, if they originate in Russia or are exported from Russia.

    The scope of this ban therefore goes beyond import to the EU.

    Last updated: 3 April 2025

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Bologna tram lines – NextGenerationEU funds – E-000585/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    1. The disbursement of the financial contribution allocated to Italy under the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) is linked to the satisfactorily fulfilment of the milestones and targets outlined in the annex to the Council Implementing Decision on the approval of the assessment of the recovery and resilience plan for Italy (CID Annex).[1]

    With reference to the investment on the Development of Rapid Mass Transport systems, targets M2C2-25bis, M2C2-25ter and M2C2-26 will be assessed in the context of the tenth payment request. The satisfactorily fulfilment of said targets will be assessed based on the requirements outlined in the CID Annex.

    When the Commission assesses that not all milestones and targets associated with an instalment are satisfactorily met, the Commission can make a partial payment; an amount of the payment of the instalment related to a non-fulfilled milestone or target will then be suspended, in line with Article 24 of Regulation (EU) 2021/241.

    2. Due to the performance-based nature of the RRF, the implementation of the measures linked to the plan (and the related coverage of costs) falls under the Member State’s responsibility. Therefore, the way in which the central administration might seek compensations from the implementing authorities in the event of a delay is a matter of national procedures, which falls outside the scope of Regulation (EU) 2021/241[2].

    • [1] https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-15114-2024-ADD-1-REV-1/en/pdf
    • [2] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/241/oj/eng
    Last updated: 3 April 2025

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Questions surrounding the real role played by Internews, a partner of the EU and the Commission – P-000796/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The Commission has a four-year Financial Framework Partnership Agreements[1] with three consortia of media-development organisations, which implement the Commission’s global programme to support independent media for the duration of this partnership.

    One of these consortia is led by Internews Europe, which is fully funded by European donors and constitutes a separate entity from Internews. The consortium includes four other organisations, none of which is either based or affiliated with the United States.

    The consortium is currently implementing the AGILE project[2], which seeks to reinforce the resilience of independent media across Global South countries, working closely with local actors.

    The objective of EU projects is to safeguard the editorial independence of media around the world by increasing their financial autonomy, consolidating their skills, and building up their resilience to censorship and other forms of pressure.

    • [1] https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/news-and-events/events/infopoint-conference-supporting-independent-media-through-global-partnerships-2024-12-05_en
    • [2] https://internews.org/internews-europe-launches-e10-5m-eu-grant-funded-independent-journalism-project/
    Last updated: 3 April 2025

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Highlights – Consideration of draft opinion on Possibilities for simplification of cohesion funds – Committee on Budgetary Control

    Source: European Parliament

    Possibilities for simplification of cohesion funds © Image used under the license of AdobeStock

    On 8 April 2025, the Members of the Committee on Budgetary Control will consider the draft CONT opinion to the own-initiative report of the REGI Committee on Possibilities for simplification of cohesion funds.

    Cohesion policy is the European Union’s main investment policy, amounting to almost 1/3 of the EU’s multiannual financial framework (MFF) for 2021-2027. Regrettably, cohesion is one of the spending areas with the highest level of errors: the European Court of Auditors’ estimated error rate for expenditure from Heading 2 in the financial year 2023 is 9.3%. In his draft opinion, the CONT Rapporteur underlines simplification should be the guiding principle in cohesion and insists that simplification should never come at the expense of sound financial management, control or transparency requirements.

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Energy Charter Treaty – E-001264/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-001264/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Lena Schilling (Verts/ALE)

    The reformed Energy Charter Treaty was adopted on 3 December 2024. The Commission notes that the unreformed Treaty is in clear conflict with the Paris Agreement, EU climate legislation and investment protection standards. In Parliament’s view[1], this also applies to the reformed Treaty, which mitigates some of the shortcomings but does not go far enough overall. Although provisional applicability is in principle provided for, this is not legally possible in some Member States.

    According to Article 42(4) of the ECT, most of the reforms of the Treaty will not enter into force until three-quarters of the Contracting Parties have ratified them. This process can take many years and requires that, in addition to the remaining Member States in the ECT, many non-EU Contracting Parties that were critical of the reform process also ratify these reforms.

    Parliament also considers that the reformed ECT cannot be reconciled with the EU’s climate targets because of the extended transition periods during the phase-out of protection for fossil investments.

    • 1.Does the Commission intend to launch infringement proceedings against Member States that remain in the unreformed ECT and, if so, when, or if not, why not?
    • 2.What approach is envisaged if its entry into force is not foreseeable?
    • 3.What can the Commission do to ensure that the ECT does not delay the achievement of climate neutrality by 2050?

    Submitted: 26.3.2025

    • [1] www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2022-0421_EN.html.
    Last updated: 3 April 2025

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Highlights – CONT-ECON: Presentation of ECA Special Report 09/2025 – Committee on Budgetary Control

    Source: European Parliament

    Ensuring compliance of RRF spending with public procurement © Image used under license from Adobe Stock

    On 7 April 2025, the ECA Special Report 09/2025 “Systems for ensuring compliance of RRF spending with public procurement and state aid rules” will be jointly presented to Members of the Committee on Budgetary Control (CONT) and the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) by reporting ECA Member Jorg Kristijan Petrovič.

    Compliance with public procurement and state aid rules is essential for ensuring the integrity and effectiveness of Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) funds. In its special report, the ECA has examined the RRF control systems at the Commission and in Member States and whether they provide sufficient assurance on compliance with public procurement and state aid rules. Overall, the ECA found that enforcement of compliance remains inconsistent across Member States, and that, despite improvements in the Commission’s audits and monitoring systems, issues with inconsistent coverage, lack of clear guidelines and delayed corrective actions remain. Against this background, the ECA has issued recommendations to improve guidance and transparency and to increase EU level assurance in these areas.

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Unfair commissions on transactions for ordinary people while banks profit – E-000485/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    With a return on equity of 13.9%, in the third quarter of 2024, Greek banks’ profitability was ninth among 16 examined euro area countries[1].

    One recent independent analysis shows that Greek banks lag behind their European peers in terms of net fee and commission income, representing approximately 17% of total operating income on average in the first half of 2024, below a typical level of around 22% in Europe[2].

    Banks operating in the EU can in principle determine their fees and interest rates. Consumers are also free to choose the provider that fits their needs.

    While EU legislation generally does not regulate the level of charges, the Payment Account Directive (PAD)[3] requires that the services for payment account with basic features (referred to in Article 17) are offered free of charge or for a reasonable fee[4].

    According to the Commission’s information, banks in Greece pay taxes[5]. Banks offset these tax obligations with eligible deferred tax assets (DTAs) or deferred tax credits (DTCs).

    Greek banks have accumulated large DTAs due to losses booked during the major restructuring of Greek Government debt in 2012[6] and severe recession which led to tens of billions of euros in provisioning and hence the creation of new DTAs.

    A significant portion of Greek banks’ deferred tax assets which benefit from a government guarantee are deferred tax credits and qualify as CET1[7] capital.

    In June 2024, DTCs amounted to EUR 12.5 billion[8] and they follow a linear annual amortisation schedule, ending in 2041. Furthermore, a financial transaction tax applies to financial institutions operating in Greece.

    Regarding the 5% withholding tax on dividends, the taxation is a competence of Member State authorities.

    • [1] ECB Supervisory banking statistics.
    • [2] Morningstar DBRS analysis February 2025.
    • [3] Directive 2014/92/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on the comparability of fees related to payment accounts, payment account switching and access to payment accounts with basic features, OJ L 257, 28.8.2014, p. 214-246.
    • [4] Article 18 clarifies that the reasonable fees are established taking into account at least national income levels and average fees charged by credit institutions in the Member State concerned for services provided on payment accounts.
    • [5] The nominal corporate tax rate in Greece for credit institutions that fall under the requirements of Article 27A of Law 4172/2013 is 29%, while it is 22% for other legal entities.
    • [6] ‘Private Sector Involvement’.
    • [7] Common Equity Tier 1.
    • [8] Or 50% of banks’ CET1 capital.
    Last updated: 3 April 2025

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – The European fertiliser industry in purgatory – E-000396/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The Commission outlined several directions of action in its 2022 Communication on ‘Ensuring availability and affordability of fertilisers’[1] and is actively pursuing them. A Fertilisers Market Observatory[2] was established for improving market transparency.

    The Commission has also adopted on 28 January 2025 a proposal to impose additional tariffs on nitrogen-based fertilisers from Russia and Belarus[3], aiming at reducing and eventually putting an end to the EU’s dependence on both sources of supply.

    The Commission’s approach has been shaped by the need to balance efforts to limit revenue flows that fund the ongoing Russian aggression with considerations related to food security.

    As regards the strategy called for, the Commission considers that such strategic approach is reflected in the 2022 Communication referred to above. The current production of the major category of nitrogen fertilisers requires vast quantities of natural gas.

    Against the background of the structurally higher EU prices of natural gas, compared to other regions, the best prospect for reviving the EU nitrogen fertiliser industry is its conversion to the use of ammonia derived from renewable hydrogen instead of natural gas.

    This will also help fulfilling the industry’s decarbonisation goals. Finally, in view of facilitating the replacement of fossil-based materials in nitrogen fertilisers, the Commission is assessing the potential of different waste streams in providing recovered nitrogen.

    A technical study[4] assesses agronomic efficiency and safety of several recovered materials rich in nitrogen, for their possible inclusion in EU fertilising products.

    • [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52022DC0590(01)
    • [2] https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/data-and-analysis/markets/overviews/market-observatories/fertilisers_en
    • [3] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025PC0034
    • [4] Technical study for the inclusion of new materials and processes under Regulation (EU) 2019/1009: https://circabc.europa.eu/ui/group/36ec94c7-575b-44dc-a6e9-4ace02907f2f/library/78f825aa-5272-44f0-9126-f1b25985f650?p=1&n=10&sort=name_ASC
    Last updated: 3 April 2025

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – The risk of polycrisis in the immediate future – E-001298/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-001298/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Sebastião Bugalho (PPE), Lídia Pereira (PPE), Paulo Do Nascimento Cabral (PPE), Sérgio Humberto (PPE), Paulo Cunha (PPE), Hélder Sousa Silva (PPE)

    A strong transatlantic alliance is crucial to address common challenges. It is in the interest of the EU and the United States that their relationship is preserved.

    However, the decision of the US administration to end the US development aid is an alarming one. In the last three months, 1.3 million displaced Ukrainians have lost financial support and shelter and 2.7 million no longer have access to medical assistance. In Africa, it is feared that the cuts to the US Agency for International Development (USAID) could lead to a migration crisis similar to that of 2015 in Syria. In Sudan, 25 million people are enduring acute food insecurity and at least 638 000 people are experiencing famine.

    We now risk facing a security crisis on the eastern front, the return of organised terrorism[1] and simultaneous health and migration crises, all converging in time and space.

    • 1.Has the Commission assessed the impact of USAID cuts? If so, how will the EU address the gap caused by this defunding?
    • 2.Are any partnerships with non-EU countries being considered to mitigate its effects?
    • 3.The debate on the US withdrawal mainly focuses on the defence aspect, but its impact is far-reaching. Is the Commission taking into account the scenario of simultaneous migration and health crises arising as a consequence?

    Submitted: 27.3.2025

    • [1] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/12/16/fight-against-terrorism-and-violent-extremism-council-approves-conclusions-on-reinforcing-external-internal-links/.
    Last updated: 3 April 2025

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Lack of transparency in the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority’s actions in relation to Euroins Insurance Group in Bulgaria – E-000507/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) issued Recommendation EIOPA-BOS-24-521[1] to the Financial Supervision Commission (FSC), the Bulgarian national supervisory authority, in accordance with Article 16(1) of the EIOPA Regulation[2].

    This recommendation was adopted by the Board of Supervisors (BoS), which, as per Article 40 of the EIOPA Regulation, includes the heads of national public authorities responsible for the supervision of financial institutions in each Member State, including the FSC and the Romanian Financial Supervisory Authority (ASF).

    The Commission is a non-voting member of the BoS and was not involved in the adoption of the recommendation.

    In addition, the recommendation does not mention any specific insurance undertaking.

    Under the current EU supervisory framework, national supervisory authorities retain primary responsibility for the prudential supervision of insurance undertakings with head offices within their jurisdiction, ensuring compliance with Solvency II[3]. These authorities operate independently in line with their mandates.

    • [1] https://www.eiopa.europa.eu/document/download/451793ef-5ec0-433a-8882-8ea03d7fc8ed_en?filename=EIOPA%20Recommendation%20to%20the%20FSC_EN.pdf
    • [2] Regulation (EU) No 1094/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/79/EC, OJ L 331, 15.12.2010, p. 48-83.
    • [3] Directive 2009/138/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009 on the taking-up and pursuit of the business of Insurance and Reinsurance, OJ L 335, 17.12.2009, p. 1-155.
    Last updated: 3 April 2025

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Hungary’s ban on Pride – E-001277/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-001277/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Diana Riba i Giner (Verts/ALE)

    The recent amendment to Hungary’s so-called ‘child protection’ law, which bans Pride marches and authorises police to use facial recognition technology to track participants, represents a serious challenge to EU law. This targeted attack on the LGBTIQ+ community is a direct and deliberate violation of fundamental EU principles. The right to peaceful assembly is enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights as a cornerstone of EU values. Additionally, the use of AI-driven surveillance to monitor individuals exercising their rights raises significant concerns regarding privacy, data protection and discrimination, directly conflicting with the EU AI Act and existing privacy regulations. This constitutes a discriminatory measure aimed at undermining the rights and dignity of LGBTIQ+ individuals.

    • 1.What immediate actions will the Commission take to address this clear breach of fundamental rights and ensure Hungary upholds its obligations under the EU Treaties?
    • 2.Given the systematic erosion of LGBTIQ+ rights in Hungary, will the Commission take legal steps to prevent further democratic backsliding and protect affected communities?

    Submitted: 26.3.2025

    Last updated: 3 April 2025

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Hungary’s ban on pride marches – E-001276/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-001276/2025
    to the Council
    Rule 144
    Diana Riba i Giner (Verts/ALE)

    The recent amendment to Hungary’s so-called ‘child protection’ law, which bans pride marches and authorises police to use facial recognition technology to track participants, represents a serious challenge to EU law. This targeted attack on the LGBTIQ+ community is a direct and deliberate violation of fundamental EU principles. The right to peaceful assembly is enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights as a cornerstone of EU values. Additionally, the use of AI-driven surveillance to monitor individuals exercising their rights raises significant concerns regarding privacy, data protection and discrimination, directly conflicting with the EU AI Act and existing privacy regulations. This constitutes a discriminatory measure aimed at undermining the rights and dignity of LGBTIQ+ individuals.

    • 1.What immediate actions will the Council take to address this clear violation of fundamental rights and ensure that Hungary complies with its obligations under EU treaties?
    • 2.Given the ongoing erosion of LGBTIQ+ rights in Hungary, how does the Council plan to respond in order to prevent further democratic backsliding and protect affected communities?

    Submitted: 26.3.2025

    Last updated: 3 April 2025

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: The Commission hosts EU–Türkiye High-Level Economic Dialogue

    Source: European Commission

    European Commission Press release Brussels, 03 Apr 2025 Today, Commissioner for Economy and Productivity, Implementation and Simplification Valdis Dombrovskis and Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos met Türkiye’s Minister of Treasury and Finance Mehmet Şimşek in Brussels for a High-Level Economic Dialogue (HLED) between the European Union and Türkiye.

    MIL OSI Europe News –