Category: Europe

  • MIL-OSI Europe: MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION the immediate risk of further repression by Lukashenka’s regime in Belarus: threats from the investigative Committee – B10-0229/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    with request for inclusion in the agenda for a debate on cases of breaches of human rights, democracy and the rule of law
    pursuant to Rule 150 of the Rules of Procedure

    Sebastião Bugalho, Miriam Lexmann, Michael Gahler, Isabel Wiseler‑Lima, Michał Wawrykiewicz, Tomas Tobé, Dariusz Joński, Luděk Niedermayer, Seán Kelly, Vangelis Meimarakis, Andrey Kovatchev, Wouter Beke, Danuše Nerudová, Loránt Vincze, Jessica Polfjärd, Sandra Kalniete, Łukasz Kohut, Antonio López‑Istúriz White, Tomáš Zdechovský, Inese Vaidere
    on behalf of the PPE Group

    NB: This motion for a resolution is available in the original language only.

    B10‑0229/2025

    Motion for a European Parliament resolution on the immediate risk of further repression by Lukashenka’s regime in Belarus: threats from the investigative Committee

    (2025/2629(RSP))

    The European Parliament,

      having regard to its previous resolutions on Belarus,

      having regard to Rule 150(5) of its Rules of Procedure,

    1. whereas, the EU does not recognize the fraudulent Belarusian presidential election of January 26, 2025, and deems the detention of political prisoners unacceptable; whereas Belarus’s complicity in the war in Ukraine further undermines its commitment to international peace and human rights;
    2. whereas the Lukashenka regime expands its repression beyond Belarus, targeting Belarusians abroad with surveillance, threats, and prosecutions; whereas official statements by the Investigative Committee of Belarus in January and March 2025 confirm escalating transnational repression, particularly against Freedom Day participants; whereas the regime monitors Belarusians abroad, identifying over 100 individuals linked to the Coordination Council as suspects; whereas since August 2020, the Investigative Committee labelled nearly 19,000 acts as “extremist-related crimes” while denying police violence in 2020, reflecting a systematic effort to silence dissent and dismantle opposition through intimidation and legal persecution;
    1. Strongly condemns the continued expansion of repression by the Lukashenka regime, which now targets Belarusians abroad with criminal prosecution, asset seizures, and other measures designed to silence dissent;
    2. Denounces the deployment of judicial instruments as tools of repression by the Belarusian Investigative Committee, which seeks to criminalize peaceful participation in pro-democracy demonstrations and intimidate both the participants and their families through pervasive surveillance and legal threats;
    3. Condemns the systematic violation of international human rights norms ­  including the rights to freedom of assembly, expression, and political participation ­  as guaranteed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and reinforced by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;
    4. Demands an immediate cessation of repression against Belarusians within Belarus and abroad, including politically motivated charges, asset seizures, and surveillance of exiles and demonstrators, and calls for the release of all political prisoners;
    5. Stresses the need for the EU and its member states to maintain public scrutiny over Belarus’ imprisonment of individuals for politically motivated charges and the targeting of their relatives, by using all public channels at their disposal to increase the visibility and names of individuals imprisoned or detained for political reasons; calls to expand and enforce targeted sanctions against Belarusian officials responsible for transnational repression;
    6. Calls on the EU and its member states to strengthen legal protections and visa access for Belarusian exiles, pro-democracy activists, and those fleeing persecution;  urges to ensure a coordinated EU response to support Belarusian citizens with expired passports who face the risk of human rights violations upon return;
    7. Calls on the EU and its member states to maintain and expand their financial, technical, and political support for independent civil society activists, journalists, lawyers, and human rights defenders operating both within Belarus and in exile; urges to continue monitoring and documenting their trials;
    8. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the VP/HR, the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the representatives of the Belarusian democratic forces and the de facto Belarusian authorities.  

     

     

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION the immediate risk of further repression by Lukashenka’s regime in Belarus: threats from the investigative Committee – B10-0227/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    with request for inclusion in the agenda for a debate on cases of breaches of human rights, democracy and the rule of law

    Michał Kobosko, Oihane Agirregoitia Martínez, Petras Auštrevičius, Malik Azmani, Dan Barna, Helmut Brandstätter, Olivier Chastel, Veronika Cifrová Ostrihoňová, Engin Eroglu, Svenja Hahn, Karin Karlsbro, Ľubica Karvašová, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, Jan‑Christoph Oetjen, Urmas Paet, Hilde Vautmans, Lucia Yar, Dainius Žalimas
    on behalf of the Renew Group

    NB: This motion for a resolution is available in the original language only.

    B10‑0227/2025

    Motion for a European Parliament resolution on the immediate risk of further repression by Lukashenka’s regime in Belarus – threats from the Investigative Committee

    (2025/2629(RSP))

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to its previous resolutions on Belarus,

      having regard to Rule 150 of its Rules of Procedure,

     

    A. whereas Belarusians celebrate the Freedom Day on 25 March to commemorate the independence declaration by the democratic Belarusian People’s Republic of 1918;

    B. whereas the Lukashenka regime has been escalating its repression beyond Belarusian borders to dismantle alternative democratic political structures;

    C. whereas Belarus’ Investigative Committee announced to monitor citizens’ participation in actions abroad, to prosecute all participants, including residents abroad and their conviction in absentia;

    D. whereas Belarusian diaspora’s families were threatened with imprisonment and asset confiscation if participating in Freedom Day protests;

    E. whereas hundreds participants in Freedom Day rallies have been identified as suspects by the Investigative Committee of Belarus;

    F.  whereas Lukashenka’s regime is taking advantage of many Belarusian passports expiring, forcing the diaspora to return to Belarus, facing possible imprisonment; whereas 2023, EU Member States issued around 300 000 first residence permits to Belarusians;

    G. whereas Belarusian civil society and free media are severely affected by cuts in the U.S. budget;

     

    1. Calls for the EU, its Member States and the international community to apply immediate protective measures for Belarusian citizens in EU Member States and abroad facing criminal persecution by Lukashenka’s regime, including enhanced asylum procedures, security cooperation, and legal protection against extraterritorial persecution.

    2. Encourages EU Member States to extend for those Belarusian citizens whose passports are expiring the right for a legal stay by providing alternative travel documents.

    3. Regrets that Belarus Freedom Day was used by the regime to “inaugurate” Lukashenka, and reiterates its non-recognition of Lukashenka.

    4. Urges EU Member States not to comply with Interpol arrest warrants requesting extradition of Lukashenka’s political opponents to Belarus.

    5. Welcomes the Council’s sanctions on stakeholders undermining democracy and rule of law, contributing to repression and to military cooperation with Russia, such as the Central Election Commission, which issued politically motivated judgments and the President Property Management Directorate of the Belarusian Federation of Trade Unions; warns that Belarus functions as transit hub for Russia to circumvent existing sanctions; calls for stronger investigations of sanction evasion.

    6. Urges the Member States to impose further sanctions equally to those imposed on Russia, particularly on the Belarusian banking system.

    7. Regrets the recent U.S. negotiations with Lukashenka, which risk legitimizing his regime.

    8. Urges the EU and its member states to increase financial support for independent media, human rights organizations, civil society initiatives, and institutions of Belarusian democratic forces.

    9. Calls on the HRVP to use INTCEN and EDMO to counteract Belarusian intelligence operations and disinformation.

     

    10. Emphasizes the Belarusian democratic actors’ role and unwavering support for a free, democratic, sovereign and independent Belarus as part of a peaceful Europe.

    11. Calls on Lukashenka’s regime for the immediate release of all political prisoners and their rehabilitation.

    12. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the HR/VP, the Council, the representatives of the Belarusian democratic forces and the Belarusian de facto authorities.

     

     

     

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION Immediate risk of further repression by Lukashenka’s regime in Belarus: threats from the Investigative Committee – B10-0221/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    with request for inclusion in the agenda for a debate on cases of breaches of human rights, democracy and the rule of law

    NB: This motion for a resolution is available in the original language only.

    B10‑0221/2025

    Motion for a European Parliament resolution on Immediate risk of further repression by Lukashenka’s regime in Belarus: threats from the Investigative Committee

    (2025/2629(RSP))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to its previous resolutions on Belarus,

     having regard to Rule 150(5) of its Rules of Procedure,

     

    A. whereas ever since peaceful protests broke out against the massively falsified presidential election of 9 August 2020, the Lukashenka regime, with Russian support, has been continuing its severe repression against the Belarusian people, with many citizens being harassed, arrested, tortured and convicted for expressing opposition to the regime or for protesting against the falsification of the election or the systematic human rights violations;

    B. whereas, since 2020, tens of thousands of people have been arbitrarily detained and, as of March 2025, there remain 1 200 political prisoners in Belarus, many of whom suffer under life-threatening conditions; whereas the actual number of political prisoners might be substantially higher;

    C. whereas recent statements by the Investigative Committee of Belarus point to increased repression, in particular through broadened surveillance and threats against Belarusian citizens abroad;

    D. whereas the recent suspension of the right to asylum by the Polish government might negatively affect Belarusians fleeing persecution;

    1. Calls for an immediate end to the repression of the people of Belarus and reiterates its firm solidarity with all those who continue to fight the Lukashenka regime’s massive and systematic repression in Belarus and against Belarusian citizens abroad;

    2. Urges to immediately and unconditionally release all political prisoners;

    3. Reiterates its concern about the situation regarding human rights and fundamental freedoms in Belarus, including the unabated systematic repression, the continued crackdown on the democratic opposition, civil society, independent media, trade unions, religious organisations and political parties, persistent impunity, and the structural lack of respect for due process and fair trials;

    4. Expresses concern about intensified persecution committed in exile, such as the abuse of Interpol arrest warrants by the Lukashenka regime to bring about the extradition of political opponents from non-EU countries as well as the intensified surveillance of and threats against Belarusian citizens abroad;

    5. Calls on the countries concerned not to extradite Belarusian citizens who have fled the Lukashenka regime and may face persecution on their return to Belarus; calls for the EU and its Member States to raise the abuse of international arrest warrants with Interpol;

    6. Notes the increased targeting of individuals linked to the representative structures established by the democratic forces of Belarus in exile; urges the Commission and the Member States to continue assisting Belarusian democratic forces, civil society and independent media and encourages the representatives of the democratic forces to maintain and promote unity, based on the objective of a free, democratic and independent Belarus, among all Belarusian democratic forces and civil society;

    7. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the representatives of the Belarusian democratic forces and the de facto authorities of the Republic of Belarus.

     

     

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on Prosecution of journalists in Cameroon, notably the cases of Amadou Vamoulké, Kingsley Fomunyuy Njoka, Mancho Bibixy, Thomas Awah Junior and Tsi Conrad – B10-0230/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    with request for inclusion in the agenda for a debate on cases of breaches of human rights, democracy and the rule of law
    pursuant to Rule 150 of the Rules of Procedure

    Rima Hassan
    on behalf of The Left Group

    NB: This motion for a resolution is available in the original language only.

    Document selected :  

    B10-0230/2025

    Texts tabled :

    B10-0230/2025

    Texts adopted :

    B10‑0230/2025

    Motion for a European Parliament resolution on  Prosecution of journalists in Cameroon, notably the cases of Amadou Vamoulké, Kingsley Fomunyuy Njoka, Mancho Bibixy, Thomas Awah Junior and Tsi Conrad

    (2025/2627(RSP))

    The European Parliament,

      having regard to its previous resolutions on Cameroon,

      having regard to Rules 150(5) of its Rules of Procedure,

     

    1. Whereas Cameroon’s counter-terrorism law is broad and open to abuse and often used to arrest, intimidate and sentence journalists in military courts notably for covering protests in English-speaking regions of the North-West and South-West (NW/SW regions) ;
    2. Whereas both security forces and separatist groups have committed serious abuses against civilians; whereas security forces bear particular responsibility for excessive use of force and voluntarily delaying accountability, notably in the village of Ngarbuh;
    3. Whereas the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention declared that the detention of English-speaking journalist Thomas Awah Junior was a violation of international law;
    4. Whereas UN High Commissioner for Human Rights urged Cameroon to ensure an independent, effective, and impartial investigation into the murder of journalist Jean-Jacques Ola Bébé, who was killed while investigating the torture and murder of his former colleague, Martinez Zogo;
    5. Whereas in the case of journalist Samuel Wazizi, the Cameroonian authorities had to admit his sudden death in the Yaoundé military hospital following revelations in the national press;

     

     

    1. Calls for the immediate and unconditionally release of all arbitrarily detained individuals, including journalists, opposition members, and activists; urges Cameroon to ensure fair trials in line with international standards;
    2. Reiterates its serious concerns over the arbitrary arrest and harassment of journalists ;

     

    1. Recalls that military tribunals cannot try civilians under international law;

     

    1. Calls on Cameroonian authorities to guarantee the rights to freedom of expression, association and assembly for all;

     

    1. Strongly recommends a comprehensive reform of the deeply flawed anti-terrorism law ;
    2. Calls on Cameroon to ratify the Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance and the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, which Cameroon committed to do during the previous Universal Periodic Review;
    3. Reiterates its call to Member States to support a UN Human Rights Council fact-finding mission to Cameroon to determine the extent to which international human rights law and international humanitarian law have been violated and by whom since the last decade, in particular in light of the conflict in the NW/SW regions;

     

    1. Further stresses that the culture of impunity has severe consequences, fuels systemic corruption, undermines Human Rights as well as encourages violence and social unrest;
    2. Reaffirms its strong and unequivocal opposition to the use of the death penalty under all circumstances; calls on Cameroon to ratify the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;
    3. Calls on the international community to question the characterisation of the conflict in the NW/SW regions as a full-blown “non-international armed conflict” (NIAC); underlines international humanitarian law applies only if a situation is recognised as a NIAC;

     

    1. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the VP/HR, Member States and authorities of Cameroon.

     

     

    Last updated: 1 April 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Hearings – Enhancing media literacy in the digital age – 08-04-2025 – Committee on Culture and Education

    Source: European Parliament

    On April 8th, 2025, the Committee on Culture and Education will host a public hearing on ‘’Enhancing media literacy in the digital age’,’ exploring the impact of digital technologies and media literacy.

    Speakers include Francesca Pasquali, discussing digital media’s role in daily life; Alessandro Orlowski, addressing online disinformation; Fernanda Bonacho, on journalism’s role in media literacy; and Will Kingston-Cox, focusing on empowering youth to combat disinformation.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on Prosecution of journalists in Cameroon, notably the cases of Amadou Vamoulké, Kingsley Fomunyuy Njoka, Mancho Bibixy, Thomas Awah Junior and Tsi Conrad – B10-0237/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    with request for inclusion in the agenda for a debate on cases of breaches of human rights, democracy and the rule of law
    pursuant to Rule 150 of the Rules of Procedure

    Adam Bielan, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Ondřej Krutílek, Veronika Vrecionová, Małgorzata Gosiewska, Alexandr Vondra, Waldemar Tomaszewski, Assita Kanko, Ivaylo Valchev, Joachim Stanisław Brudziński
    on behalf of the ECR Group

    NB: This motion for a resolution is available in the original language only.

    B10‑0237/2025

    Motion for a European Parliament resolution on Prosecution of journalists in Cameroon, notably the cases of Amadou Vamoulké, Kingsley Fomunyuy Njoka, Mancho Bibixy, Thomas Awah Junior and Tsi Conrad

    (2025/2627(RSP))

    The European Parliament,

      having regard to its previous resolutions on Cameroon

     

      having regard to Rule 150 of its Rules of Procedure,

     

     

    1. whereas several NGOs submitted a report to the UN on freedom of expression and press in 2023; whereas this report concluded that Cameroonian journalists face lethal threats and false legal charges while reporting on the Anglophone conflict; whereas there is virtually no press freedom in Cameroon; whereas journalists and media outlets have to use self-censorship in order to avoid harassment and prosecution; whereas the largest media outlets are owned by the state and being used to distribute propaganda of President Biya, who has been in power since 1982; whereas privately owned media outlets are strictly supervised; whereas Freedom House stated in 2022 that Cameroon is not a free state;

     

    1. whereas Cameroon is one of Africa’s most dangerous countries for journalists who have to work in a hostile and precarious environment; whereas several journalists have been murdered; whereas it is impossible for media outlets to adopt critical and independent editorial policy without facing a significant risk of harassment, legal issues or lethal threats if its reporting endangers the interests of the government and its representatives; whereas Cameroon’s laws, including the 1990 press freedom law, are often circumvented in order to repress journalists; whereas anti-terrorism laws and military tribunals have been abused by the authorities to detain, prosecute and imprison representatives of the media;

     

    1. whereas Cameroon has detained, prosecuted and imprisoned several journalists and other representatives of media, most notably Amadou Vamoulké, Kingsley Fomunyuy Njoka, Mancho Bibixy, Thomas Awah Junior and Tsi Conrad; whereas these individuals have been detained, prosecuted, or imprisoned on baseless charges;

    ***

     

    1. Strongly condemns the unjust imprisonment of Amadou Vamoulké, Kingsley Fomunyuy Njoka, Mancho Bibixy, Thomas Awah Junior, Tsi Conrad and all other media representatives;

     

    1. Demands that the Cameroonian authorities release all media representatives immediately and unconditionally, as well as all others detained or imprisoned for exercising their freedoms, democratic rights, while doing their job and to drop all charges against them;

     

    1. Denounces the degradation of the rule of law, human rights and press freedom in Cameroon and urges the authorities to repeal all repressive legislation and ensure the judiciary’s independence;

     

    1. Demands that Cameroonian authorities stop all ongoing human rights violations related to freedom of press, expression, and speech; demands that the right to press freedom be fully restored;

     

    1. Highlights the need to protect civil society organizations and preserve press freedom;

     

    1. Calls on Member States to exert diplomatic and economic pressure towards Cameroon until all unduly imprisoned journalists and other media representatives are released;  

     

    1. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the VP/HR, the Cameroonian authorities, the African Union, the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Pan-African Parliament.

     

     

    Last updated: 1 April 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Difficulties in implementing the law on livestock housing – E-001064/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-001064/2025/rev.1
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Galato Alexandraki (ECR)

    Law 4056/2012 on licensing and operating livestock housing has proven to be unworkable and ineffective and is posing serious problems for Greek livestock farming. Despite occasional amendments to the law for specific categories, such as poultry and equine housing, farmers continue to face excessive demands that put a financial strain on them and create uncertainty about the viability of the sector.

    The continued stringency of the legislation in contrast to the exceptions that have already been granted for other sectors, raises questions about the fair treatment of livestock farmers and about whether the applicable conditions really support growth in the agricultural sector or whether they actually make it easier for animal products to be imported from non-EU countries.

    In view of the above:

    • 1.How could the Commission assist so that the legislative requirements imposed on Greek farmers are realistic and practicable, bearing in mind the need for equal treatment in relation to other sectors not covered by Law 4056/2012?
    • 2.What measures could the Commission put in place to ensure that all Greek livestock farmers have access to the necessary economic and technical support to adapt to the new requirements without taking a financial hit?

    Submitted: 12.3.2025

    Last updated: 1 April 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Commission unveils ProtectEU – a new European Internal Security Strategy

    Source: European Commission

    European Commission Press release Strasbourg, 01 Apr 2025 Today, the European Commission is presenting ProtectEU – a European Internal Security Strategy to support Member States and bolster the EU’s ability to guarantee security for its citizens. The strategy sets out an ambitious vision and workplan for the years to come, with a sharper legal toolbox, increased information sharing and deeper cooperation.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Earthquake in Myanmar: FDFA releases CHF 2.5 million and steps up its support

    Source: Switzerland – Federal Administration in English

    The number of dead and injured continues to rise following the earthquake in Myanmar. The disaster has worsened an already precarious humanitarian situation, exacerbated by an armed conflict that has lasted several years. To meet these new needs, Switzerland is releasing CHF 2.5 million and is making specialists from the Swiss Humanitarian Aid Unit (SHA) available to UN agencies.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Commission proposes flexibility to help manufacturers comply with 2025 CO2 emission targets for new cars and vans

    Source: European Commission

    European Commission Press release Brussels, 01 Apr 2025 Today, the European Commission proposed a targeted amendment to the Regulation setting CO2 emission performance standards for new cars and vans. The amendment introduces a flexibility measure with their CO2 targets between 2025 and 2027.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Urgent call for sanctions in the face of increasing imports of fertilisers from Russia and Belarus – P-002660/2024(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The Commission has been closely monitoring the situation regarding EU’s import of nitrogen fertilisers from Russia and Belarus. For nitrogen fertilisers of heading 3102[1], imports in the first half of 2024 reached 1.3 million tonnes, i.e., 27% more than in the first 6 months of 2023.

    An increase has also been observed in fertilisers mixtures containing nitrogen of heading 3105[2], with Russia exporting in the first half of 2024close to 700 000 tonnes, almost double than one year before.

    It is worth mentioning that some fertiliser types, albeit not urea or nitrogen fertilisers, are also subject to restrictions under EU sanctions, i.e. a quota on imports of potash fertilisers from Russia[3] and a ban on Belarus[4].

    The surge in imports clearly indicates a growing risk of further dependency on Russian supplies. The EU cannot afford to deepen its reliance on Russia in such strategic sectors linked to food security.

    Therefore, the Commission has proposed on 28 January 2025 a regulation[5] to the Council and the European Parliament with the aim to increase gradually duties on nitrogen-based fertilisers imported from Russia and Belarus.

    The measure should contribute to preserving a competitive EU fertiliser industry, reduce dependencies while also ensuring that EU farmers have access to ample and diverse sources of fertilisers.

    Where there is unfair competition stemming from imports, the EU uses trade defence instruments to restore fair competition. There are anti-dumping measures in place on imports of mixture of urea and ammonium nitrate from, inter alia, Russia[6] which are currently subject to an expiry review.

    There are also measures in place on ammonium nitrate[7] from Russia. Where measures are no longer effective, they may be reviewed.

    • [1] Heading 3102 as defined in the EU Combined nomenclature: Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2522 of 23 September 2024 amending Annex I to Council Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87 on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and on the Common Customs Tariff, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L_202402522
    • [2] Heading 3105 as defined in the EU Combined nomenclature, see footnote 1.
    • [3] Article 3(i) of Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02014R0833-20250225
    • [4] Council Regulation (EC) No 765/2006, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02006R0765-20180224
    • [5] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52025PC0034&qid=1742811387528
    • [6] Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/1688, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32019R1688
    • [7] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32020R2100

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Highlights – BUDG-CONT – Lessons learnt from the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation – 7.4.25 – Committee on Budgets

    Source: European Parliament

    Image generated by AI © Image used under license from Adobe Stock

    On 7 April 2025, the Committee on Budgets and the Committee on Budgetary Control will hold a joint public hearing on the “Lessons learnt from the Rule of Law Conditionality Mechanism and ways to make it more effective for the future”.

    Four years after the entry into force of the Rule of law conditionality Regulation, Members will hear from different stakeholders how they assess the functioning of the legislation, including its impact on the ground, and discuss how the functioning of the mechanism could be improved going forward.
    The hearing, which complements the recent exchange of views with Commissioner Serafin on the implementation of the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation, should feed into the forthcoming BUDG-CONT implementation report on the Conditionality Regulation.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Hearings – Public Hearing on the Rule of Law Conditionality Mechanism – 07-04-2025 – Committee on Budgetary Control – Committee on Budgets

    Source: European Parliament

    As part of the scrutiny exercised by the European Parliament on the implementation of the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation, the Committees on Budgets (BUDG) and on Budgetary Control (CONT) will hold a public hearing on the lessons learnt from this mechanism and ways to make it more effective.

    The objective of this hearing is to feed into the implementation report that BUDG and CONT Members will prepare over the coming months, led by Jean-Marc Germain (S&D, Standing Rapporteur for BUDG) and Monika Hohlmeier (EPP, Standing Rapporteur for CONT).

    The first panel will look at the effectiveness of the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation in protecting the Union budget against rule of law breaches and ways to strengthen the rule of law via budget conditionality. The second one will look at the impact of the regulation on the ground, from the perspective of civil society and local authorities.

    The invited speakers are:

    – Ms Delphine Freymann (Venice Commission);

    – Ms Thu Nguyen (Jacques Delors Center);

    – Mr Benedek Jávor (Representation of Budapest to the EU, Energy Cities Association);

    – Mr András Léderer (Hungarian Helsinki Committee);

    – Ms Katarína Batková (VIA IURIS).

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – The apparent disconnect between the Commission’s actions and Parliament’s resolutions on Nagorno-Karabakh – E-001588/2024(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The EU has repeatedly called on Azerbaijan to release those who have been detained for exercising their fundamental rights, including journalists, human rights defenders, and political activists.

    The EU continues to engage and raise these issues with Azerbaijan as part of the human rights dialogue and bilaterally, including at the highest level. Any decision relating to sanctions is for the Council to make by unanimity.

    In parallel, the EU continues to call upon Azerbaijan to ensure the rights of Karabakh Armenians, including their right to return to their homes without intimidation and discrimination.

    The EU remains fully committed to facilitating dialogue between Armenia and Azerbaijan to achieve lasting and sustainable peace, including through political and financial support.

    EU engagement with Azerbaijan remains instrumental in order to promote peace, stability and prosperity in the South Caucasus through regional cooperation, including in the context of the normalisation process between Azerbaijan and Armenia.

    Last updated: 1 April 2025

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Italian court ruling on Libyan Coast Guard rescue operations and its implications for the legal compliance of EU funding – E-002089/2024(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    In line with the President of the Commission’s political guidelines presented in July 2024[1] there is a need to strengthen the coordination of search and rescue (SAR) operations to prevent loss of life at sea, including in cooperation with neighbouring third countries .

    The Commission confirms that providing EU financial support to the training and capacity building of the Libyan coastguard for operations in its own SAR zone contributes to the efforts of saving lives of people who disembark on dangerous journeys, often resorting to smugglers and traffickers, and risking their lives.

    Notably, in the framework of the EU-funded ‘Support to integrated border and migration management in Libya’ programme, the Commission aims at improving Libyan authorities’ capacity to carry out SAR operations and thus saving lives both at sea and in the desert, in respect of international rules and human rights obligations.

    The Commission takes note of the June 2024 Croton Civil Court ruling. It is committed to continue to engage, alongside the international partners, with the Libyan authorities to ensure that SAR operations are carried out in line with international standards .

    A regular dialogue at technical level has been established with Libyan authorities to address all issues in the context of migration and protection, including respect of human rights.

    Five technical missions of the Commission took place between 2024 and 2025 and observed notable improvements on both engagement from the Libyan authorities and practical results in terms of access to disembarkation points and detention centres, release of vulnerable migrants, and the doubling of voluntary humanitarian returns, compared to the figures of 2023.

    • [1] https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/e6cd4328-673c-4e7a-8683-f63ffb2cf648_en?filename=Political%20Guidelines%202024-2029_EN.pdf
    Last updated: 1 April 2025

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Azerbaijani political prisoners and Armenian hostages still being held in Baku – E-000185/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The rule of law and human rights in Azerbaijan remain a priority for the EU and are at the core of the EU-Azerbaijan bilateral relations.

    The EU has repeatedly voiced concerns regarding the unsettling rise of arrests of independent journalists, human rights defenders, and political activists on politically motivated charges in Azerbaijan.

    The EU has called on the Azerbaijani authorities to ensure that their actions adhere to the relevant obligations under domestic and international law.

    In this context, the EU has consistently called for the release of all persons imprisoned for exercising their fundamental rights. These messages have been conveyed publicly and bilaterally at all levels, including at the level of the High Representative/Vice-President[1].

    The EU has closely followed the issue of Karabakh Armenian detainees held in Azerbaijan and continues to call on Azerbaijan to respect due process and the rights of detainees and to ensure transparency. The EU has also advocated to address these issues as part of confidence-building measures between the parties.

    Any Common Foreign Security Policy decision relating to sanctions is for the Council to make by unanimity.

    • [1] https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/azerbaijan-statement-spokesperson-human-rights-situation_en; https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/CRE-10-2024-10-22-ITM-020_EN.html; https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/CRE-10-2024-12-18-ITM-019-03_EN.html;
      https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/council-europe/1506th-meeting-committee-ministers-11-september-2024-eu-statement-exchange-views-european-committee_en?s=51
    Last updated: 1 April 2025

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Türkiye’s alleged ties with radical Islamist groups in Syria – E-002865/2024(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The fall of Assad’s criminal regime marks a historic moment for the Syrian people. The European Council Conclusions of 19 December 2024[1] stressed the historic opportunity to reunite and rebuild the country and underlined the importance of an inclusive and Syrian-led political process that meets the legitimate aspirations of the Syrian people. The EU stands ready to support the new phase in Syria in coordination with regional partners, including Türkiye.

    Türkiye has an important role to play in the stability of Syria and the region, which is in the common interest of the EU and Türkiye. It is important that the good cooperation between the EU and Türkiye, which is also a member of the Global Coalition to Defeat Daesh[2], continues in the fight against terrorism.

    Türkiye has legitimate security concerns and a legitimate right and responsibility to fight against terrorism, ensuring that this is done in accordance with the rule of law, respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms, and in full respect of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of neighbouring states and international law.

    In line with the Council Conclusions of June 2018[3], which were repeated regularly since then, Türkiye’s accession negotiations have effectively come to a standstill. No progress has been achieved in the areas of democracy, rule of law, fundamental rights and the independence of the judiciary.

    As a result, the Commission has substantially reduced the EU financial support to Türkiye under the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance[4] since 2018, and reoriented this funding towards the civil society, people-to-people contacts and the Green Deal-related common priorities.

    A large part of the current financial assistance goes towards supporting Syrian refugees (about 3 million) present in the country.

    • [1] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/jhlenhaj/euco-conclusions-19122024-en.pdf
    • [2]  https://theglobalcoalition.org/en/
    • [3]  https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/35863/st10555-en18.pdf
    • [4]  https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32021R1529

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Adoption of the proposal for a Directive on European cross-border associations – E-003060/2024(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The Commission’s proposal for a directive on European cross-border associations (2023/0315(COD)) (ECBA Directive[1]) aims at improving the functioning of the internal market by removing legal and administrative barriers for non-profit associations that operate or wish to operate in more than one Member State, thus promoting the role non-profit associations play in generating economic and societal values in the EU and allowing a level playing field between them.

    The Commission’s proposal introduces an additional legal form of a European cross-border association (ECBA) in Member States’ national legal systems, which is specifically designed for cross-border purposes and will reduce legal and administrative burden when it comes to the recognition and establishment of non-profit associations engaging in activities in another Member State.

    Once established in one Member State, an ECBA will be recognised automatically and will be able to operate in all Member States as well as transfer its registered office in another Member State, thereby allowing non-profit associations to drive prosperity and unleash their full societal and economic potential in the EU.

    In March 2024, the Council started examining the proposal. The Commission urges the Council to adopt its position and stands ready to assist the Council for this purpose and support the co-legislators through the negotiation process.

    • [1] The proposal for a directive is accompanied by Regulation of technical nature amending the internal market Information System (IMI) and the Single Digital Gateway (SDG) Regulations, to allow cooperation and exchange of information among competent authorities through the IMI system and to conduct digital operations through the SDG allowing access to information about ECBAs available online; https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52023PC0516
    Last updated: 1 April 2025

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Reducing excessive budget deficits in EU Member States – P-001609/2024(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    Decisions on the role of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) is of exclusive competence of the signatories of the ESM Treaty. The ESM is an intergovernmental organisation established by euro area Member States with the objective of enabling these countries to avoid and overcome financial crisis and to maintain long-term financial stability and prosperity.

    Article 126 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union establishes that Member States shall avoid excessive government deficits, and that the Commission monitors the developments of the fiscal situation and, in particular, compliance with the criteria established in the Treaty itself.

    Romania has been subject to an excessive deficit procedure since 2020[1]. On 3 April 2020, the Council, acting upon a recommendation by the Commission, recommended that Romania correct its excessive deficit by 2022 at the latest.

    Considering the crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, on 18 June 2021, the deadline for correction was extended to 2024. On 26 July 2024, based on a Commission recommendation, the Council established that no effective action had been taken by Romania to correct its excessive deficit.

    On 14 January 2025, acting upon a recommendation by the Commission, the Council recommended that Romania should correct its excessive deficit situation by 2030.

    The Council also recommended to other seven Member States to correct their excessive deficit (Belgium, France, Hungary, Italy, Malta, Poland and Slovakia)[2].

    The Commission will assess the action taken by Romania and the other seven Member States in response to the recommendations in spring 2025.

    • [1] All documents related to the Excessive Deficit Procedure for Romania can be found at: https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/economic-and-fiscal-governance/stability-and-growth-pact/corrective-arm-excessive-deficit-procedure/excessive-deficit-procedures-overview/romania_en
    • [2] https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/economic-and-fiscal-governance/stability-and-growth-pact/corrective-arm-excessive-deficit-procedure/excessive-deficit-procedures-overview_en

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Implementation of safe and secure parking areas – E-001308/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-001308/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Tomas Tobé (PPE)

    In 2022, the Transported Asset Protection Association estimated that 26 000 cases of attacks against trucks occur every year in Germany alone. This equates to one attack every 20 minutes. Not only does this cost businesses more than EUR 2 billion annually, but it also creates an unsafe work environment for truck drivers across Europe.[1] Moreover, there is no indication that the situation has improved since 2022 – quite the opposite.

    The Trans-European Transport Network Regulation demands safe and secure parking areas for trucks every 150 km along the network, with an implementation deadline of 2040.[2] In the confirmation hearing, Commissioner Tzitzikostas stated that these parking areas would be delivered even earlier than the 2040 deadline.

    In the light of this:

    • 1.How does the Commission plan to ensure sufficient safe and secure parking areas before the 2040 deadline?
    • 2.What advantages does the Commission see in public-private partnerships to speed up the implementation of these parking areas?
    • 3.Since taking office, what measures has the Commission taken to increase the number of safe and secure parking areas?

    Submitted: 28.3.2025

    • [1] https://tapaemea.org/intelligence/germany-spotlight/.
    • [2] Article 31(4) of Regulation (EU) 2024/1679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 Jun 2024 on Union guidelines for the development of the trans-European transport network, amending Regulations (EU) 2021/1153 and (EU) No 913/2010 and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1315/2013, OJ L, 2024/1679, 28.6.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1679/oj.
    Last updated: 1 April 2025

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Non-recognition of academic qualifications awarded to students of the Italian subsidiary (Enna) of Romania’s ‘Dunărea de Jos’ University of Galaţi – E-001153/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-001153/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Giuseppe Lupo (S&D)

    The Italian Ministry for Universities and Research (MUR) has sent a letter to the ‘Dunărea de Jos’ University of Galaţi in Romania, stating that the qualifications awarded by this university through the subsidiary of the Faculty of Medicine and Pharmacy in Enna, Italy, cannot be recognised by the Italian education system because they are not accredited. This is because, according to the MUR, Italy has made the recognition of academic qualifications issued by foreign universities operating within its territory subject to specific accreditation procedures.

    Considering that this subsidiary is an entity without a legal personality, operating on the basis of an accreditation issued by the Romanian Agency for Quality Assurance in Higher Education, which ensures that the study programmes offered by Romanian universities comply with European standards, can the Commission answer the following:

    • 1.Can it clarify whether, even without accreditation, academic qualifications awarded to students through the subsidiary of the Medical Faculty in Enna and obtained in accordance with the educational standards laid down in Directive 2005/36/EC, must be automatically recognised everywhere in Europe, including Italy?
    • 2.Can it clarify whether the refusal to recognise these academic qualifications is contrary to Article III of the Lisbon Recognition Convention, which requires Member States to take all necessary measures to facilitate the mutual recognition of academic qualifications?

    Submitted: 19.3.2025

    Last updated: 1 April 2025

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: EIB Global announces digitalisation grant for Montenegrin schools

    Source: European Investment Bank

    • Provided under the EIB’s Economic Resilience Initiative Fund, the grant will enable the purchase of digital equipment for schools, supporting the Montenegro Education Programme.
    • The project will promote digital education and skills development to enhance youth employability and digital transformation, leading to higher productivity.
    • To date, EIB Global has invested €29 million in the Montenegrin education sector.

    At a ceremony held today at the European Investment Bank (EIB Global) headquarters in Luxemburg, EIB Vice-President Robert de Groot and Montenegro’s Minister of Education, Science and Innovation Anđela Jakšić Stojanović have signed a grant agreement for €2 million. The funding is earmarked for the purchase of digital equipment for Montenegrin schools, to improve learning conditions and digital literacy among students and teachers.

    Provided under the EIB’s donor-funded Economic Resilience Initiative Fund, the grant builds on previous investments by EIB Global in the Montenegro Education Programme to upgrade education infrastructure and services across the country. These include an €18 million EIB loan, an €11 million EU grant channelled through the Western Balkans Investment Framework, as well as a €2.5 million technical assistance grant under the Economic Resilience Initiative. The new digital equipment, coupled with teacher training and upskilling, is expected to promote the integration of digital tools in education and equitable access to digital learning resources for all pupils.

    EIB Vice-President Robert de Groot, who is responsible for operations in Montenegro, said: “As a long-standing partner of the Montenegrin Ministry of Education, we are pleased to be part of this latest initiative and to further support digitalization in schools. The new ICT equipment funded by this grant will increase digital usage and skills, broaden access to learning, and improve the overall learning environment. It will enhance access to quality education, contribute to youth employability, and lead to a future-ready workforce that meets market demands.”

    Minister of Education, Science, and Innovation of Montenegro Anđela Jakšić-Stojanović underlined that the acquisition of additional computer equipment creates a strong foundation for the digitalization of the educational process and enables young people to acquire the digital skills and competencies for the 21st century.

    “This agreement marks a significant milestone in enhancing the Montenegrin education system, greatly contributing to better learning conditions and the advancement of our students. Education is one of the pillars of every society, and the continuous improvement of its quality should be a priority at all levels.”, Minister Jakšić-Stojanović said.

    The grant will be used to purchase additional digital equipment for Montenegrin schools, including tablets, laptops, desktop computers, projectors and interactive whiteboards, as well as printers, scanners and servers. To date, EIB Global has invested €29 million in Montenegro’s education sector.

    Background information

    About EIB Global

    The European Investment Bank (ElB) is the long-term lending institution of the European Union, owned by its Member States. It finances investments that contribute to EU policy objectives.

    EIB Global is the EIB Group’s specialised arm devoted to increasing the impact of international partnerships and development finance, and a key partner of Global Gateway. We aim to support €100 billion of investment by the end of 2027 — around one-third of the overall target of this EU initiative. Within Team Europe, EIB Global fosters strong, focused partnerships alongside fellow development finance institutions and civil society. EIB Global brings the EIB Group closer to people, companies and institutions through our offices across the world. High-quality, up-to-date photos of our headquarters for media use are available here.

    About the Economic Resilience Initiative Fund

    The Economic Resilience Initiative Fund, which backs this grant, was established by the EIB in 2017 to channel donors’ resources to impactful projects in the Southern Neighbourhood and Western Balkans to help meet the challenges posed by forced displacement and migration. The fund donors are Bulgaria, Croatia, Italy, Luxembourg, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Poland and the United Kingdom.

    About the EIB in Montenegro

    The EU bank has been an active partner of Montenegro, providing almost €1.1 billion in loans to the country, mostly in support of SMEs, education and transport infrastructure. For more information on EIB projects in Montenegro, visit https://www.eib.org/en/projects/regions/enlargement/the-western-balkans/montenegro/index.htm.

    About the EIB in the Western Balkans

    The EIB is one of the leading international financiers in the Western Balkans. For detailed information on the EIB’s activities in this region, visit www.eib.org/en/publications/the-eib-in-the-western-balkans.

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Extending the duration of the concession for the A35 Brescia-Bergamo-Milan (Brebemi) motorway – E-001215/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-001215/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Massimiliano Salini (PPE)

    One of the few Italian concessions awarded following a public tender procedure, the BreBeMi Brescia-Milan motorway is a strategic project of major national interest.

    In 2003, the concession agreement for the project was signed by ATI Brebemi S.p.A. and ANAS, which was replaced as the contracting authority by Concessioni Autostradali Lombarde S.p.A. in 2007.

    In the documents pertaining to the tender (namely the 2001 invitation to tender and the draft agreement), it is clearly stated that the contract’s duration could be extended were the need to change the economic balance of the concession ever arise.

    In the light of the above, could the Commission confirm that such an extension can indeed be used to change the economic balance of the concession in the updated business plan?

    This interpretation is consistent with:

    • 1.Directive 2014/23/EU, inasmuch as possible extensions of the duration of the concession were provided for in the tender documentation, had to be included in the tenders and were communicated to the bidders;
    • 2.EU state aid regulations, seeing as the above extension does not confer any economic advantage on the concessionaire because it is meant to restore and maintain the economic balance of the contract.

    Submitted: 21.3.2025

    Last updated: 1 April 2025

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL Convention) – E-001184/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-001184/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Nicolás González Casares (S&D)

    During a recent clean-up organised by environmental associations in Galicia, more than half of the waste collected at Doniños beach – a Natura 2000-protected site – was sanitary waste. Having confirmed that no incident had occurred at the Ferrol water purification station, this waste most likely came from a discharge of blackwater from a cruise ship or similar vessel.

    The MARPOL Convention (Annex IV) allows untreated blackwater to be discharged into the sea as long as this is done at least 12 nautical miles away from the coast. Resolution 28, adopted at the IUCN World Conservation Congress in Marseille in 2021 calls for legislation to be updated to stop the pollution of oceans caused by the discharging of wastewater by ships.

    In view of the above:

    • 1.What actions has the Commission taken to reinforce international legislation on this issue?
    • 2.Is the Commission pushing for an update to Annex IV to introduce provisions on the keeping of records and measures aimed at confirming the proper functioning of wastewater treatment plants across their entire life cycle, as called for by resolution WCC-2020-Res-028?

    Submitted: 20.3.2025

    Last updated: 1 April 2025

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Interference from Qatar and conflicts of interest in the Commission – E-001147/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-001147/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Thierry Mariani (PfE)

    The former Director-General of DG MOVE has been entangled in accusations of conflict of interest in connection with Qatar.

    Yet, despite this, he is still working for the Commission, where, at his request, he has been transferred to the post of ‘hors classe adviser’ to DG INTPA[1].

    The thing is, that directorate is specifically responsible for relations between the European Union and foreign powers, which raises questions as to whether it is appropriate to assign a senior official with a tarnished reputation to the position.

    Furthermore, no clear information has been provided on whether the Commission has imposed any sanctions or measures against him.

    • 1.Can the Commission clarify the former Director-General of DG MOVE’s exact status, role and functions in DG INTPA? Why, when he is accused of having a conflict of interest, does this former senior DG MOVE official continue to be employed in a directorate responsible for the EU’s external relations?
    • 2.Has the Commission made him face internal sanctions or any other measure designed to prevent further risks of undermining the integrity of the EU institutions?

    Submitted: 18.3.2025

    • [1] https://op.europa.eu/en/web/who-is-who/organization/-/organization/INTPA/COM_CRF_252008
    Last updated: 1 April 2025

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Public procurement irregularities in Spain and favourable treatment – E-001206/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-001206/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Dolors Montserrat (PPE)

    The judge investigating David Sánchez Pérez-Castejón, the brother of the Spanish Prime Minister, is looking into the possible creation of an ad hoc post for him by the public administration.

    Articles 9 and 10 of the EU Treaty and Article 61 of the EU Financial Regulation lay down the principles of equality, impartiality and prevention of conflicts of interest. What is more, Article 298 TFEU governs the principle of good administration in the civil service.

    In view of the above:

    • 1.Does the Commission take the view that directly benefiting the Prime Minister’s brother is a violation of the principle of administrative impartiality?
    • 2.What steps will the Commission take to ensure that the Spanish Government upholds the principle of equal access to public employment, in compliance with Article 45 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and Article 4 of Directive 2000/78/EC, which prohibits favourable treatment in public procurement?
    • 3.Will the Commission ask the government for information so that it can determine whether Spanish legislation complies with European standards of impartiality in access to public employment or whether there has been a breach of the principle of transparency in the management of human resources in the administration?

    Submitted: 20.3.2025

    Last updated: 1 April 2025

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Exempting Poland from the migrant relocation mechanism – E-001204/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-001204/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Jadwiga Wiśniewska (ECR)

    At a meeting with Ursula von der Leyen on 7 February 2025, Prime Minister Donald Tusk said ‘Poland will not implement the Migration Pact in a way that would introduce additional quotas of immigrants in Poland,’ and his argumentation was met with understanding from the Commission.

    However, on 10 March 2025, Commission spokesperson Markus Lammert said that the Pact on Migration and Asylum was binding on all EU countries and that if a Member State risks delaying the implementation of legislation or even undermining the Pact the Commission would have to take the ‘necessary measures’.

    In light of the above:

    • 1.Is Prime Minister Tusk correct in stating that the Commission accepted the Polish Government’s argumentation and that Poland will be exempt from the migrant relocation mechanism set out in Article 56(2) of Regulation (EU) 2024/1351 on asylum and migration management?
    • 2.What ‘necessary measures’ is the Commission planning to take against countries which do not fully comply with the provisions of the Pact on Migration and Asylum?

    Submitted: 20.3.2025

    Last updated: 1 April 2025

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – A cloud to call our own! – E-001198/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-001198/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Catherine Griset (PfE), Christophe Bay (PfE), Mathilde Androuët (PfE), Virginie Joron (PfE), Julie Rechagneux (PfE), Valérie Deloge (PfE), Pierre Pimpie (PfE), André Rougé (PfE), Pascale Piera (PfE), Julien Leonardelli (PfE), Fabrice Leggeri (PfE), Aleksandar Nikolic (PfE)

    Under the US’ Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, American companies have to hand over the personal and professional data of their European clients to American intelligence agencies.

    Yet, the EU has concluded an agreement with the US for the transfer of our data called the Data Privacy Framework.

    Recently, Democratic members of the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, tasked with monitoring that framework in the US, have been dismissed.

    Their dismissal is to be welcomed, given the American left’s scant regard for civil liberties. However, the new US administration could also order that particular European data be seized.

    We must, therefore, be able to store our own personal data, along with that of our administrations and of businesses in the EU, on European cloud hosts.

    • 1.What action is the Commission taking to ease the way for the development of European cloud hosts?
    • 2.Could their development be sped up to replace US solutions if the Court of Justice of the European Union were to annul the Data Privacy Framework?

    Supporter[1]

    Submitted: 20.3.2025

    • [1] This question is supported by a Member other than the authors: Jean-Paul Garraud (PfE)

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – PEF and natural fibres – E-001299/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-001299/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Yannis Maniatis (S&D)

    The proposed EU Green Claims directive, currently undergoing interinstitutional negotiation, would require environmental claims made for products to be substantiated by harmonised methods for measuring the products’ environmental footprint. The aim is to make the claims reliable, comparable and verifiable across the EU, thus reducing ‘greenwashing’.

    However, one methodology being considered for this purpose, the product environmental footprint (PEF), would favour ‘fast fashion’ models, which rely on the rapid and low-cost production of synthetic, petroleum-based fibres. At the same time, the production of natural fibres such as cotton, linen and wool would be penalised by the same methodology. This is mainly because criteria such as product biodegradability or the release of micro-plastics are only partially considered or missing.

    Given that a new recommendation on the use of PEF methods is expected in 2025, according to the current timetable[1], we would like to ask:

    • 1.How does the Commission intend to ensure that PEF rules for apparel and footwear are based on environmental circularity and do not instead favour the interests of multinational ‘fast fashion’ companies, while undermining both the agricultural sector and consumers?
    • 2.Is the Commission considering the inclusion of additional criteria to the PEF methodology for apparel and footwear, such as the release of micro-plastics and biodegradability?

    Submitted: 27.3.2025

    • [1] European Commission, ‘About the Environmental Footprint Methods’, https://green-business.ec.europa.eu/environmental-footprint-methods/about-environmental-footprint-methods_en.
    Last updated: 1 April 2025

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – EU billions for Ahmed al-Sharaa, a.k.a. Abu Mohammad al-Julani – E-001182/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-001182/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Barbara Bonte (PfE)

    On 17 March 2025, at the ninth conference on Syria in Brussels, the Commission announced that it would be allocating almost EUR 2.5 billion in 2025 and 2026 for the transition in Syria, which is to be led by the new Syrian regime under the terrorist jihadist Ahmed al-Sharaa, better known as Abu Mohammad al-Julani.

    While the Commission still seems to be in a state of euphoria, Abu Mohammad al-Julani has proven himself to be Syria’s new butcher. He glossed over the murder of more than a thousand Alawites and Christians, referring to it ‘as an expected challenge’.

    • 1.What specific conditions with regard to the protection of religious minorities, and in particular Alawites and Christians, has the Commission imposed on the new Syrian regime in relation to the billions in aid?
    • 2.Does the Commission not consider it necessary to suspend the payment of the billions pledged on 17 March 2025 as long as the violence continues in Syria?
    • 3.What specific monitoring mechanisms is the Commission using to oversee the expenditure of considerable EU funds in Syria?

    Submitted: 19.3.2025

    Last updated: 1 April 2025

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