NewzIntel.com

Category: Europe

  • MIL-OSI Canada: Tariff-rate quotas on imports of steel mill products

    Source: Government of Canada News

    Backgrounder

    The Government of Canada announced the implementation of tariff rate quotas (TRQs) on imports of steel mill products from non-free trade agreement partners, effective June 27, 2025. This measure will help stabilize the Canadian market and prevent harmful diversion of foreign steel from third countries into Canada while minimizing impacts on Canadian importers and downstream users.

    The TRQs will be administered on the basis of five steel product categories: flat, long, pipe and tube, semi-finished, and stainless steel (see Annex A for list of tariff classifications applicable to each category). A 50 per cent surtax will be applied on imports of covered products that exceed the specified quantity threshold from non-FTA partners.

    The quotas will be reviewed in 30 days to ensure their appropriateness and effectiveness in light of evolving market circumstances, and periodically thereafter. The reviews will be supported by the newly established industry-government steel task force.

    Administration of the Tariff-Rate Quotas

    Global Affairs Canada will be responsible for administering the quota of products that may be imported without this additional surtax through the issuance of shipment-specific import permits. To facilitate the administration of the TRQs, the subject products are being added to the Import Control List. Importations made without the applicable shipment-specific import permit will be assessed the 50 per cent surtax by the CBSA. This surtax would be additive to any existing surtaxes or anti-dumping and countervailing duty measures, as well as forthcoming tariff measures based on the country of “melt and pour” for steel or “smelt and cast” for aluminum.

    Key elements of the tariff-rate quota include:

    • Total quota volume: For each of the five steel product categories, a limit is imposed on the quantity of goods that may be imported without a surtax. The one-year limit corresponds to  all of 2024 imports from non-FTA countries. 
    • Quota periods: The annual quota will be administered on the basis of three-month quarterly periods. Once the quota for a category in a quarter has been filled, imports under that category will be subject to a surtax for the remainder of that period. Any quota remaining at the end of a quarter will be rolled over into the following one.
    • Country share limit: For each category, there is a limit on the share of the total quarterly quota that imports from a single country of origin can fill. The limits are based on historical trade patterns. If imports from a country reaches the specified limit in a category, all subsequent imports from that country in that category will be subject to the surtax, until the end of the quarter.

    See Annex B for additional details on the tariff-rate quota volume and limits.

    The TRQs will apply to imports originating in any country that does not have a free trade agreement in force with Canada. The list of countries excluded from the tariff-rate quotas are set out in Annex C.

    Global Affairs Canada and the Canada Border Services Agency will be responsible for administering the tariff-rate quota for each steel product category. Additional information on the administration of these measures can be found at the links below:

    • GAC Notice to Importers (will follow)
    • CBSA Customs Notice (will follow)

    Annex A – Steel Products Subject to Provisional Safeguards

    Steel Products Subject to Provisional Safeguards
    Product Category

    Applicable Tariff Classifications

    Flat

    7208.10.00; 7208.25.00; 7208.26.00; 7208.27.00; 7208.36.00; 7208.37.00; 7208.38.00; 7208.39.00; 7208.40.00; 7208.51.00; 7208.52.00; 7208.53.00; 7208.54.00; 7208.90.00; 7209.15.00; 7209.16.00; 7209.17.00; 7209.18.00; 7209.25.00; 7209.26.00; 7209.27.00; 7209.28.00; 7209.90.00; 7210.11.00; 7210.12.00; 7210.49.00; 7210.50.00; 7210.61.00; 7210.69.00; 7210.70.00; 7210.90.00; 7211.14.00; 7211.19.00; 7211.23.00; 7211.29.00; 7211.90.00; 7212.10.00; 7212.30.00; 7212.40.00; 7212.50.00; 7225.19.00; 7225.30.00; 7225.40.00; 7225.50.00; 7225.91.00; 7225.92.00; 7225.99.00; 7226.91.00; 7226.92.00; 7226.99.00

    Long

    7213.10.00; 7213.20.00; 7213.91.00; 7213.99.00; 7214.10.00; 7214.20.00; 7214.91.00; 7214.99.00; 7216.10.00; 7216.21.00; 7216.22.00; 7216.31.00; 7216.32.00; 7216.33.00; 7216.40.00; 7216.50.00; 7216.99.00; 7217.10.00; 7217.20.00; 7217.30.00; 7217.90.00; 7224.10.00; 7227.10.00; 7227.20.00; 7227.90.00; 7228.30.00; 7228.40.00; 7228.50.00; 7228.60.00; 7228.70.00; 7228.80.00; 7229.20.00; 7229.90.00; 7301.10.00; 7301.20.00

    Pipe and Tube

    7304.19.00; 7304.22.00; 7304.23.00; 7304.24.00; 7304.29.00; 7304.39.00; 7304.59.00; 7304.90.00; 7305.11.00; 7305.12.00; 7305.19.00; 7305.20.00; 7305.31.00; 7305.39.00; 7305.90.00; 7306.19.00; 7306.29.00; 7306.30.00; 7306.50.00; 7306.61.00; 7306.69.00; 7306.90.00

    Semi-finished

    7206.10.00; 7206.90.00; 7207.11.00; 7207.12.00; 7207.19.00; 7207.20.00; 7224.90.00

    Stainless

    7218.10.00; 7218.91.00; 7218.99.00; 7222.30.00; 7222.40.00; 7304.49.00

    Annex B – Tariff-Rate Quota Volumes

    Tariff-Rate Quota Volumes
    Product Quota for each three-month quarterly period (tonnes) Maximum Share of Total Quota per Country
    Flat 186,856 36%
    Long 178,512 28%
    Pipe and Tube 117,406 47%
    Semi-finished 152,383 72%
    Stainless 5,568 91%

    Annex C – Excluded Countries of Origin

    • Australia
    • Austria
    • Belgium
    • Brunei Darussalam
    • Bulgaria
    • Canada
    • Chile
    • Colombia
    • Costa Rica
    • Croatia
    • Cyprus
    • Czechia
    • Denmark
    • Estonia
    • Finland
    • France
    • Germany
    • Greece
    • Honduras
    • Hungary
    • Iceland
    • Ireland
    • Israel
    • Italy
    • Japan
    • Jordan
    • South Korea
    • Latvia
    • Liechtenstein
    • Lithuania
    • Luxembourg
    • Malaysia
    • Malta
    • Mexico
    • Netherlands
    • New Zealand
    • Norway
    • Panama
    • Peru
    • Poland
    • Portugal
    • Romania
    • Singapore
    • Slovakia
    • Slovenia
    • Spain
    • Sweden
    • Switzerland
    • Ukraine
    • United Kingdom
    • United States
    • Vietnam

    MIL OSI Canada News –

  • MIL-OSI Russia: IMF Executive Board Concludes the 2025 Article IV Consultation and Completes the Fifth Review Under the Extended Credit Facility Arrangement, and Second Review Under the Resilience and Sustainability Facility Arrangement with Tanzania

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    June 27, 2025

    • The IMF Executive Board today concluded the 2025 Article IV Consultation and completed the fifth review under the Extended Credit Facility (ECF) arrangement and the second review under the Resilience and Sustainability Facility (RSF) arrangement with Tanzania, allowing for an immediate disbursement of about US$ 448.4 million (SDR 326.47 million) under both the ECF and the RSF.
    • Economic conditions have continued to improve, with robust growth and macro-financial stability. Real GDP growth was 5.5 percent in CY24 and is projected to reach 6.0 percent in CY25 and 6½ percent over the medium-term, contingent on decisive reform implementation.
    • Tanzania’s economic reform program supported by the ECF arrangement remained broadly on track. The authorities are committed to implementing reforms to preserve macro-financial stability, promote sustainable and inclusive growth, advance structural reforms, and address risks and challenges from climate change, supported by the ECF and RSF arrangements.

    Washington, DC: The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) concluded today the 2025 Article IV Consultation[1] with Tanzania and completed the fifth review of the Extended Credit Facility (ECF) arrangement and the second review of the Resilience and Sustainability Framework (RSF) arrangement. The authorities have consented to the publication of the Staff Report prepared for this consultation.[2] Completion of the fifth ECF review allows for the immediate disbursement of about US$ 155.7 million (28.5 percent of quota, SDR 113.37 million), bringing Tanzania’s total access under the ECF arrangement to about US$ 908.3 million. Completion of the second RSF review allows for the immediate disbursement of about US$ 292.7 million (53.5 percent of quota, SDR 213.1 million), bringing Tanzania’s total access under the RSF arrangement to about US$ 345.4 million.

    The 40-month ECF Arrangement with Tanzania for a total access of about US$ 1,046.4 million at the time of program approval (200 percent of quota, SDR 795.58 million) was initially approved in July 2022, and was extended by 6 months in June 2024. The arrangement aims to support economic recovery, preserve macro-financial stability, and promote sustainable and inclusive growth. The 23-month RSF arrangement with Tanzania, approved in June 2024 (150 percent of quota), supports the authorities’ reforms to reduce prospective balance of payments risks and enhance economic resilience to climate change.

    Tanzania’s economic reform program under the ECF arrangement remained on track. All end-December 2024 quantitative performance criteria and indicative targets were met, and two end-December 2024 structural benchmarks were completed on time. Two of the three end-March SBs were implemented with delay, but the Secured Transaction Act has not been implemented and is reset to end-February 2026. All five reform measures (RMs) for this review were implemented despite challenges in meeting indicative timelines.

    Economic activity continued to gain momentum, with real GDP growth reaching 5.5 percent in CY24. Headline inflation remained stable at 3.2 percent (year-on-year) in April 2025, below the central bank’s target, while a neutral or mildly stimulative monetary policy was maintained and exchange rate flexibility increased. The banking sector remains resilient, but pockets of vulnerability persist. The fiscal balance weakened markedly in the third quarter of FY25, prompting the authorities to delay lower priority spending in the fourth quarter. The current account deficit narrowed further to 2.6 percent of GDP in CY24, from 3.8 percent in CY23, underpinned by strong export performance.

    The medium-term outlook is favorable, contingent on sustained reform implementation, particularly to strengthen the business environment and support a more dynamic private sector. However, risks to the outlook are tilted to the downside, and challenges to meet SDG targets and reduce poverty are daunting, especially considering that the population is expected to double by 2050.

    Following the Executive Board discussion, Mr. Okamura, Deputy Managing Director and Acting Chair, issued the following statement:

    “Tanzania’s reform program supported by the Extended Credit Facility (ECF) remains broadly on track. Amid downside risks to the economic outlook and daunting challenges to reduce poverty, the authorities’ strong commitment to reform implementation, as well as continued engagement and capacity support by development partners, are critical.

    “The authorities’ plan to resume growth-friendly fiscal consolidation in FY25/26 is welcome and will require steadfast implementation of revenue measures and strict cash management and commitment controls to ensure that spending is consistent with revenue outturns. Implementing contingency measures would also be essential to compensate for any budget over-run in FY24/25. In the medium term, decisive implementation of fiscal reforms including the new medium-term revenue strategy and public financial management reforms will be important to meet development needs while maintaining debt sustainability.

    “Continued efforts are needed to fully operationalize the new interest rate-based monetary policy framework. Monetary operations could be strengthened by improving liquidity forecasting capacity and operation of standing facilities and addressing segmentation and counterparty credit risk in the interbank cash market. The recent increase in exchange rate flexibility is welcome and should continue to be a key pillar of the new monetary policy framework. Ongoing efforts to upgrade financial supervision will help enhance financial stability and deepening.

    “Amid strong demographic pressures, achieving resilient and inclusive long-term growth requires accelerated human capital development through increased and more efficient public spending on education and health. At the same time, structural reforms in the areas of public sector governance, business regulation, and access to finance, as well as climate change-related reforms, are critical to foster private sector development and job creation, enhance economic resilience and reduce prospective balance of payments risks.”

    Executive Board Assessment[3]

    Executive Directors agreed with the thrust of the staff appraisal. They welcomed Tanzania’s continued robust growth, subdued inflation, and improved external balance. While they agreed that the medium-term outlook is favorable, they noted downside risks, including from an uncertain external environment, declining aid flows, and potential delays in reform implementation. They emphasized that the authorities’ commitment to reforms under the ECF and RSF programs will be critical to safeguard macro financial stability and achieve more resilient and inclusive long-term growth. Continued engagement and capacity development support by the Fund and other international partners also remain essential.

    Directors welcomed the authorities’ commitment to resume growth friendly fiscal consolidation in FY25/26. They concurred that stepped-up efforts to enhance domestic revenue mobilization in line with the recently approved medium term revenue strategy, and to strengthen public financial and investment management, will be critical to create space for priority development needs and safeguard debt sustainability. They called for prudent budget execution in an election year and enforcement of commitment controls to control spending. They welcomed the continued progress in reducing domestic arrears.

    Directors agreed that a neutral or mildly stimulative monetary policy stance remains appropriate at this juncture but encouraged the authorities to stand ready to adjust this stance if inflation pressures emerge. They called for continued efforts to improve monetary policy effectiveness, including strengthening monetary and liquidity management operations, policy communication, and central bank independence. They underscored the importance of greater exchange rate flexibility for cushioning the economy against external shocks and encouraged the removal of legacy exchange rate restrictions and Multiple Currency Practices. They welcomed the recent adoption of Basel II & III supervisory and regulatory standards and encouraged the authorities to continue upgrading the financial supervision framework and closely monitoring risks.

    Directors called for accelerated structural reforms to promote sustainable private sector led growth and job creation. They urged the authorities to improve the efficiency of tax administration, ease the regulatory burden, promote access to finance, close gender gaps, and upgrade infrastructure. They also highlighted the pressing need to increase human capital through increased and more efficient public spending on education and health, as well as on social safety nets. Directors commended the authorities’ efforts to strengthen the AML/CFT framework and encouraged them to formalize risk-based AML/CFT supervision in the real estate sector. They welcomed the progress made in strengthening climate resilience through the RSF supported reforms.

    It is expected that the next Article IV consultation with Tanzania will be held in accordance with the Executive Board decision on consultation cycles for members with Fund arrangements.

    Tanzania: Selected Economic Indicators

    2022/23

    2023/24

    2024/25

    Act.

    Est.

    Proj.

    Output

    Real GDP growth (%) 1

    4.9

    5.3

    5.7

    Calendar year real GDP growth (%) 2

    5.1

    5.5

    6.0

    Prices

    Inflation – average (%)

    4.6

    3.1

    3.3

    Central government finances

    Revenue (% GDP) 3

    15.0

    15.5

    16.3

    Expenditure (% GDP)

    19.3

    18.6

    19.7

    Fiscal balance (% GDP)

    -4.3

    -3.2

    -3.4

    Public debt (% GDP)

    45.9

    49.2

    48.5

    Money and credit

    Broad money (% change)

    18.8

    10.9

    11.1

    Credit to private sector (% change)

    22.2

    16.1

    12.5

    3-month Treasury bill interest rate (%)

    6.5

    6.8

    …

    Balance of payments

    Current account (% GDP)

    -6.6

    -3.5

    -2.6

    FDI (% GDP)

    2.0

    2.1

    2.1

    Reserves (in months of imports)

    4.0

    3.8

    3.8

    External public debt (% GDP)

    29.7

    32.9

    32.8

    Exchange rate

    REER (% change)

    3.3

    -10.3

    …

    Sources: Tanzanian authorities and IMF staff estimates and projections.

    1 All data refer to fiscal years (July-June).

    2 Fiscal year 2022/23 corresponds to calendar year 2023.

    3 Includes grants.

    [1] Under Article IV of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, the IMF holds bilateral discussions with members, usually every year. Staff hold separate annual discussions with the regional institutions responsible for common policies in four currency unions—the Euro Area, the Eastern Caribbean Currency Union, the Central African Economic and Monetary Union, and the West African Economic and Monetary Union. For each of the currency unions, staff teams visit the regional institutions responsible for common policies in the currency union, collects economic and financial information, and discusses with officials the currency union’s economic developments and policies. On return to headquarters, the staff prepares a report, which forms the basis of discussion by the Executive Board. Both staff’s discussions with the regional institutions and the Board discussion of the annual staff report will be considered an integral part of the Article IV consultation with each member.

    [2] Under the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, publication of documents that pertain to member countries is voluntary and requires the member consent. The staff report will be shortly published on the https://www.imf.org/en/Countries/TZA page.

    [3] At the conclusion of the discussion, the Managing Director, as Chairman of the Board, summarizes the views of Executive Directors, and this summary is transmitted to the country’s authorities. An explanation of any qualifiers used in summings up can be found here: http://www.IMF.org/external/np/sec/misc/qualifiers.htm.

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Kwabena Akuamoah-Boateng

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/06/27/pr25225-tanzania-imf-concl-2025-aiv-consultation-comp-5th-rev-ecf-arr-2nd-rev-rsf-arrangement

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI Russia News –

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Tweaks around the edges won’t fix the terrible Welfare Bill

    Source: Party of Wales

    Plaid Cymru publish response to UK Government welfare consultation

    Plaid Cymru has published its response to the UK Government’s Pathways to Work consultation, condemning Labour’s proposed welfare reforms as “a direct attack on some of the most vulnerable people in our society” and “an insult to the post-industrial Welsh communities Labour claims to represent.”

    The party’s Work and Pensions spokesperson Ann Davies MP said the proposed Universal Credit and Personal Independence Payment Bill would cause “grave hardship” to disabled people, particularly young people with mental health conditions, and risks replicating the worst injustices of previous Conservative regimes.

    Plaid Cymru has criticised the concessions announced on 26 June – including exemptions for existing PIP claimants and temporary protections for some UC recipients – as “inadequate sticking plasters on a fundamentally flawed agenda.” The party warned that creating a two-tier system between existing and future claimants does not eliminate injustice, but delays and redistributes it.

    Wales, where around 30% of the population is disabled and the poverty rate among disabled adults is among the highest in the UK, stands to suffer the most. Yet the Labour UK Government has refused to publish a Wales-specific impact assessment.

    Ms Davies said that “if the Welsh Government have a backbone, they will oppose this terrible bill in its entirety.”

    Ann Davies MP said:

    “The current system already fails too many people. But instead of meaningful reform that helps the sick and disabled play the most active role possible in society, the Labour Government’s plan is to make it even harder for disabled people to access vital support. This is a direct attack on some of the most vulnerable people in our society, and an insult to the post-industrial Welsh communities Labour claims to represent.

    “The so-called concessions announced this week are no more than sticking plasters on a fundamentally flawed bill. There is no fairness in protecting existing claimants while penalising those who become disabled in the future. People do not choose when to get sick or disabled, and so arbitrary cutoff dates make no sense.

    “These proposals would cause grave hardship to disabled people and young people with mental health conditions, and they risk replicating the worst injustices of past Conservative welfare systems.

    “The economic hit to Wales will be disproportionate, and the Labour UK Government’s refusal to publish a Wales-specific impact assessment is a slap in the face to the people of Wales. If the Welsh Government have a backbone, they will oppose this terrible bill in its entirety.

    “The UK Government may have offered short-term concessions, but tweaks around the edges won’t fix a broken system. What we need is investment in inclusive employment, individualised support, and long-term savings through genuinely fair welfare – not cuts that push people further into hardship.

    “Our response to the consultation outlines why Plaid Cymru MPs will be voting against this Bill at second reading next week.”

    Ends.

    Pathways to Work: Reforming Benefits and Support to Get Britain Working – Plaid Cymru Consultation Response

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: 250 years of Jewish life in Sweden – anniversary year is underway

    Source: Government of Sweden

    This year marks the 250th anniversary of Jewish life in Sweden. The anniversary is an opportunity to highlight the Jewish minority, Jewish culture and Jewish cultural heritage that is found all over the country. The Government has therefore tasked a number of agencies with contributing to the observance of the anniversary.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Government investing in more reading time and less screen time

    Source: Government of Sweden

    Pupils’ ability to read and understand what they read is the foundation of their learning in all school subjects. The Swedish Government’s school policy aims to get back to basics and re establish a strong knowledge-based school system, with the focus in early grades on fundamental skills such as reading, writing and arithmetic. Digital learning aids should only be introduced in teaching at an age when they encourage, rather than hinder, pupils’ learning.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Business leaders from 28 countries take part in Join Sweden Summit, the Government’s investment conference

    Source: Government of Sweden

    More than 600 leading Swedish and international companies, investors and decision-makers gathered in Stockholm on 19 February for the Join Sweden Summit, the Government’s international investment conference that set a new attendance record this year. Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson hosted the conference.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Russia: For two years now, unique electric river vessels — unmatched anywhere else in the world — have been operating in Moscow.

    Since the launch of these river routes, regular passenger services have transformed the Moskva River into a fully-fledged transport artery for the city.

    Trips on these electric vessels are included in the Ediny (Unified) travel passes for 30, 90, and 365 days. Two years after the launch of regular electric river transport, residents of the capital now have the opportunity to:

    Use three year-round river routes with a total length of 29 km

    Quickly and conveniently cross to the opposite bank of the Moskva River thanks to the electric vessels

    Moreover, the launch created 350 new jobs, and the Moskva River has become much safer. Thanks to regular patrols, crews can promptly spot people who end up in the water — and they have already saved four lives.

    On June 20, Moscow Mayor Sergey Sobyanin opened the third route of the regular electric river transport, Novospasskiy — ZIL, improving transport accessibility for more than 55,000 Muscovites living in four districts. The ZIL pier is now the terminal stop for two lines at once, allowing passengers to travel from Pechatniki to Novospasskiy on the most innovative type of urban transport in the capital, — said Maksim Liksutov.

    MIL OSI Russia News –

  • MIL-OSI Russia: IMF Executive Board Concludes 2025 Article IV consultation and First Review Under the Extended Fund Facility for El Salvador

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    June 27, 2025

    • The IMF Executive Board concluded El Salvador’s 2025 Article IV consultation and completed the first review of the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) arrangement, allowing for an immediate disbursement of SDR 86.16 million (about US$118 million).
    • Program performance has been solid, with the economy continuing to expand as macroeconomic imbalances are being addressed.
    • Key fiscal and international reserve targets were met with margins and progress continues with the ambitious reform agenda in the areas of governance, transparency, and financial resilience.

    Washington, DC: The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) concluded El Salvador’s 2025 Article IV consultation[1] and completed the first review of the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) arrangement. Completion of this review allows immediate disbursement of SDR 86.16 million (about US$118 million), bringing total disbursements under this arrangement to SDR 172.32 million (about US$231 million). The authorities have consented to the publication of this Staff Report.[2]

    El Salvador’s 40-month EFF arrangement was approved by the Executive Board on February 26, 2025, with total access of SDR 1,033.92 million (about US$1.4 billion or 360 percent of quota). The program remains focused on strengthening public finances, rebuilding external and financial buffers, and enhancing governance and transparency frameworks to create the conditions for stronger and more resilient growth.

    Program performance has been solid, with the economy continuing to expand as macroeconomic imbalances are being addressed. Key fiscal and international reserve targets were met with margins and progress continues with the ambitious reform agenda in the areas of governance, transparency, and financial resilience. Specifically, in the context of the first review, (i) a new Fiscal Sustainability Law has been enacted; (ii) a presidential decree limiting exceptions to the Procurement Law has been issued; (iii) financial information on the largest state-owned enterprises has been published; and (iv) information on public contracts has been made more accessible. Steps continue to be taken to mitigate Bitcoin associated risks and unwind the public sector’s participation in Chivo.

    The 2025 Article IV consultation focused on policies to boost medium-term growth and resilience. Special attention was given to policies to support foreign direct investment, employment and exports, while considering the implications of a more challenging external backdrop.

    Following the Executive Board discussion on El Salvador, Mr. Nigel Clarke, Deputy Managing Director and Acting Chair, issued the following statement:

    “El Salvador’s economic program, supported by the Extended Fund Facility arrangement, had an auspicious start. Notably, the economy continues to expand, inflation has further moderated, and the current account deficit has narrowed amid efforts to address macroeconomic imbalances. Fiscal consolidation remains on track, external and financial buffers are being rebuilt, and governance and transparency reforms are proceeding in line with program commitments. In light of rising external risks, agile policy making and contingency planning remain essential to protect program objectives, including in the context of the dollarization regime.

    “Efforts to strengthen public finances must continue, especially through a further rationalization of the wage bill and other current spending. Beyond this year, comprehensive reforms to the civil service and pension reforms are needed to safeguard fiscal consolidation and protect priority social and infrastructure spending. Meanwhile, continued efforts to mobilize official support will help further reduce reliance on bank and pension fund financing and support private sector credit.

    “Sustained efforts are needed to rebuild financial sector buffers and enhance oversight and regulation. The steady implementation of the planned increases in banks’ reserve requirements and liquidity buffers is critical to enhancing resilience and preserving financial stability. These efforts should be complemented by enhancements in the oversight of banks as well as nonbank financial institutions.

    “Steps to strengthen governance and transparency must continue. A consistent and evenhanded application of the new Anti-Corruption Law remains critical, alongside efforts to reinforce the AML/CFT framework in line with international best practices. Boosting confidence and investment requires elevating standards of fiscal reporting and transparency about public contracts, and improved access to public information. Focused efforts should be considered to support foreign direct investment and address infrastructure gaps, including through well-designed public-private partnerships and investor protection schemes.

    “Bitcoin risks should continue to be mitigated. An early unwinding of the public sector’s participation in the government’s e-wallet (Chivo) remains critical, and efforts should continue to keep the public sector’s holdings of Bitcoin unchanged, and to improve the oversight of crypto assets to enhance consumer and investor protection.”

    Executive Board Assessment[3]

    Executive Directors agreed with the thrust of the staff appraisal. They commended the Salvadoran authorities for the strong ownership and satisfactory performance under the Fund‑supported program and welcomed the continued efforts to address macroeconomic imbalances. Directors noted, however, downside risks related to escalating global trade tensions and tighter immigration policies elsewhere, which could negatively impact remittances and growth. Against this backdrop, Directors emphasized the importance of sustaining the reform momentum to safeguard macroeconomic stability and durably address El Salvador’s longstanding structural challenges and encouraged the authorities to stand ready to activate contingency plans as needed.

    Directors underscored the need to sustain fiscal consolidation by further rationalizing the wage bill and containing current expenditures to secure space for priority social and infrastructure spending and put debt firmly on a downward trajectory. They concurred that contingency measures to broaden tax revenues and streamline tax expenditures could also be considered. Directors welcomed the new Fiscal Responsibility Law and agreed that developing and implementing civil service and pension reforms and further strengthening public financial management are essential to underpin the fiscal adjustment over the medium term. Continuing to mobilize official external support would help reduce reliance on bank and pension fund financing and support private sector credit.

    While noting that the financial system remains sound, Directors emphasized the importance of further rebuilding financial sector buffers and strengthening oversight and regulation. They agreed that implementing the new Financial Stability Law and improving the supervision and governance of nonbank financial institutions in line with best practices are also key. Directors encouraged mitigating risks from the use of Bitcoin and boosting the oversight of crypto assets. They stressed the need to unwind the public sector’s participation in the government e‑wallet (Chivo) and to not increase overall Bitcoin holdings by the public sector and underscored the importance of clear and consistent communication in this regard. Directors also emphasized the need to enhance the autonomy of the central bank and strengthen its capital position and boost international reserves.

    Directors underscored the importance of advancing structural reforms to unlock El Salvador’s growth potential. They recommended further strengthening governance and transparency and, in this regard, encouraged enhancing the AML/CFT framework in line with FATF recommendations, securing the consistent and evenhanded application of the new anti‑corruption framework, and strengthening the transparency of public information, including in the procurement process. Noting that the improvements in domestic security offer a unique opportunity to further boost growth, Directors welcomed the authorities’ Long‑term Growth Strategy and encouraged reforms to raise productivity, improve the investment climate, and enhance financial inclusion. They welcomed ongoing efforts to reduce red tape and logistics costs, as well as plans to address large infrastructure and human capital gaps, with support of the private sector. Directors also encouraged strengthening resilience to climate‑related shocks.

    It is expected that the next Article IV consultation with El Salvador will be held in accordance with the Executive Board decision on consultation cycles for members with Fund arrangements.

    Table 1. El Salvador: Selected Economic Indicators

    I. Social Indicators

    Rank in UNDP Development Index 2021 (of 189)

    125

    		  

    Population (million, 2022)

    6.3

    Per capita income (U.S. dollars, 2022)

    5,366

    Life expectancy at birth in years (2021)

    71

    Percent of pop. below poverty line (2021)

    24.6

    		  

    Gini index (2019)

    		  

    39
                   

    II. Economic Indicators (percent of GDP, unless otherwise indicated)

    2020

    2021

    2022

    2023

    2024

    (Est.)

    2025

    (Proj.)

    2026

    (Proj.)

    Income and Prices

    		              

    Real GDP growth (percent)

    -7.9

    11.9

    2.9

    3.5

    2.6

    2.5

    2.5

    Consumer price inflation (average, percent)

    -0.4

    3.5

    7.2

    4.0

    0.9

    1.0

    1.8

    GDP Deflator (percent)

    0.7

    4.1

    6.6

    2.6

    1.8

    0.8

    2.2
                   

    Money and Credit

    		              

    Credit to the private sector

    65.3

    61.1

    62.6

    61.9

    62.5

    66.1

    69.1

    Broad money

    69.4

    60.9

    58.0

    59.5

    58.8

    59.1

    58.1

    Interest rate (time deposits, percent)

    4.2

    4.1

    4.5

    5.3

    5.6

    …

    …
                   

    External Sector

    		              

    Current account balance 

    1.1

    -4.3

    -6.7

    -1.1

    -1.8

    -0.8

    -2.1

    Trade balance

    -20.2

    -27.3

    -30.0

    -26.2

    -26.9

    -27.0

    -26.0

    Transfers (net)

    24.0

    26.1

    24.5

    24.2

    23.7

    25.2

    23.0

    Foreign direct investment (net)

    0.0

    -1.3

    -0.4

    -2.0

    -1.8

    -2.1

    -2.3

    Gross international reserves (mill. of US$)

    3,083

    3,426

    2,696

    3,081

    3,706

    4,252

    4,762
                   

    Nonfinancial Public Sector

    		              

    Overall balance

    -8.2

    -5.5

    -2.7

    -4.7

    -4.5

    -3.0

    -2.1

    Primary balance

    -3.8

    -1.0

    2.0

    -0.1

    0.0

    1.9

    2.9

    Of which: tax revenue

    18.3

    19.9

    20.1

    19.8

    20.6

    21.2

    21.2

    Gross debt 1/

    95.4

    88.0

    83.7

    85.1

    87.5

    88.0

    86.6
                   

    National Savings and Investment

    		              

    Gross capital formation

    17.2

    23.4

    24.5

    20.7

    20.3

    22.0

    21.6

    Private fixed investment 2/

    14.7

    21.0

    19.3

    18.8

    19.4

    19.7

    19.7

    National savings

    18.3

    19.0

    17.7

    19.6

    18.6

    21.1

    19.5

    Private sector

    23.9

    21.4

    18.3

    20.4

    19.4

    20.9

    18.4
                   

    Net Foreign Assets of the Financial System

    		              

    Millions of U.S. dollars

    3,618

    3,022

    1,488

    1,565

    2,298

    2,442

    2,730
                   

    Memorandum Items

    		              

    Nominal GDP (billions of US$)

    24.9

    29.0

    31.9

    33.9

    35.4

    36.5

    38.3
                   

    Sources: Central Reserve Bank of El Salvador, Ministry of Finance, and IMF staff estimates.

    1/ Nonfinancial public sector, including CIP-A pension bonds.

    2/ Excludes changes in inventories.

    [1] Under Article IV of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, the IMF holds bilateral discussions with members, usually every year. A staff team visits the country, collects economic and financial information, and discusses with officials the country’s economic developments and policies. On return to headquarters, the staff prepares a report, which forms the basis for discussion by the Executive Board.

    [2] Under the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, publication of documents that pertain to member countries is voluntary and requires the member consent. The staff report will be shortly published on https://www.imf.org/en/Countries/SLV.

    [3] At the conclusion of the discussion, the Managing Director, as Chairman of the Board, summarizes the views of Executive Directors, and this summary is transmitted to the country’s authorities. An explanation of any qualifiers used in summings up can be found here: http://www.IMF.org/external/np/sec/misc/qualifiers.htm.

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Brian Walker

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/06/27/imf-concludes-2025-article-iv-consultation-and-first-review-under-the-eff-for-el-salvador

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI Russia News –

  • MIL-OSI Russia: IMF Executive Board Concludes Fifth Review Under the Policy Coordination Instrument (PCI) and the Third Review Under the Arrangement Under the Resilience and Sustainability Facility of Paraguay

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    June 27, 2025

    • On June 27, 2025, the IMF Executive Board concluded the fifth review under the Policy Coordination Instrument (PCI) and the third review under the Resilience and Sustainability Facility (RSF) arrangement.
    • The Paraguayan economy remains robust underpinned by buoyant domestic demand. Staying the course with the fiscal consolidation plan and structural reforms will be critical to preserve macroeconomic stability.
    • Program performance under the PCI and RSF remains very satisfactory, underpinned by a strong commitment to pursue prudent macroeconomic policies and structural reforms to enhance the country’s prospects for long-term sustainable and inclusive growth.

    Washington, DC: The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) today completed the fifth review under the PCI arrangement and the third review under the RSF arrangement. The completion of the reviews provides the authorities with access to approximately US$ 285 million (SDR 211.46 million) under the RSF, of which the authorities have requested disbursement of US$ 195 million (SDR 146 million).

    The Paraguayan economy remains resilient, with real GDP growing 4.2 percent in 2024. Buoyant private consumption and gross fixed capital formation outweighed a negative contribution from net exports owing mainly to lower electricity production and exports. Economic activity continued its strong momentum in early 2025 with real GDP expected to expand 3.8 percent this year. Headline inflation remains contained within the central bank’s tolerance range.

    Fiscal consolidation is progressing, with the fiscal deficit falling to 2.6 percent of GDP in 2024, down from 4.1 percent in 2023, supported by a substantial increase in tax revenue. The fiscal deficit is projected to decline further to 1.9 percent of GDP in 2025. The current account deficit widened to 3.7 percent of GDP in 2024, from 0.4 percent in 2023, primarily due to lower export revenues, driven in large part by lower soybean prices and a drop in hydroelectricity exports because of low river water levels. Foreign reserves remain comfortably above standard adequacy metrics.

    At the conclusion of the Executive Board’s discussion, Mr. Nigel Clarke, Deputy Managing Director, and Acting Chair, made the following statement:

    “The Paraguayan economy remains resilient, owing to its strong macroeconomic fundamentals and the authorities’ continued prudent macroeconomic management. The outlook is favorable, with growth expected to remain robust, but is subject to elevated global risks and to adverse weather shocks. Against this backdrop, staying the course with prudent macroeconomic management continues to serve as a cornerstone of macroeconomic stability.

    “With inflation contained within the central bank’s tolerance range, monetary policy should remain data driven. The exchange rate should continue to serve as a shock absorber. The banking sector is well capitalized, liquid, and profitable, and the authorities plan to deepen and modernize capital markets. Further strengthening AML/CFT frameworks, including by promptly finalizing the National Risk Assessment, is essential.

    “The authorities remain resolute in advancing the fiscal consolidation plan, aiming to reduce the deficit to 1.5 percent of GDP by 2026—the ceiling established by the Fiscal Responsibility Law. Efforts to bolster tax revenues and improve the efficiency of public expenditure should continue to support fiscal consolidation goals.

    “Addressing the sustainability of the public employees’ pension fund is essential to mitigate medium-term fiscal risks. The overall risk of sovereign stress is low, and ongoing efforts to gradually decrease the proportion of debt denominated in foreign currency would help further strengthen the risk profile of public debt.

    “Policy reforms under the Policy Coordination Instrument and the Resilience and Sustainability Facility are further strengthening macroeconomic stability and resilience. Sustained progress on the reform agenda—including continuing efforts to reduce informality, strengthen governance and anti-corruption frameworks, and enhance resilience to natural disasters—will further improve the business environment, boost Paraguay’s appeal as an investment destination, and reinforce macroeconomic stability.”

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Julie Ziegler

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/06/27/pr-25224-paraguay-imf-concludes-5th-rev-under-pci-and-3rd-rev-under-rsf

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI Russia News –

  • MIL-OSI Security: St. Louis County Woman Admits Aiding $1 Million Romance Fraud

    Source: US FBI

    ST. LOUIS – A woman on Thursday admitted aiding an online Nigerian fraud conspiracy that cost victims an estimated $1 million.

    Shirley Waller, 43, of St. Louis County, Missouri,  also admitted committing two other frauds. Waller pleaded guilty to one count of wire fraud and one count of conspiracy to commit mail fraud, wire fraud and use of an assumed name to commit mail fraud.

    Waller admitted aiding scammers who tricked their victims out of what the government estimates is $1,068,834. Investigators were initially alerted by a 71-year-old St. Louis County woman who mailed $35,000 to Waller’s home as part of a romance scam. The shipment of cash was tracked on its journey 164 times in less than 24 hours by several IP addresses in Nigeria. Investigators then determined that more than 70 Express Mail packages had been delivered to Waller’s home during a 60-day period ending Nov. 1, 2023. In a court-approved search of Waller’s home on Jan. 12, 2024, the U.S. Postal Inspection Service found two guns and a series of Express Mail packages sent to variations of Waller’s name. The packages of cash had been sent by older adults targeted in online fraud schemes. Waller would then forward a portion of the money to Nigeria via cryptocurrency transactions and other electronic means. Postal authorities seized parcels containing $41,650 that were being delivered to Waller’s home and packages containing $17,500 in her safe.

    Waller admitted fraudulently applying for a Paycheck Protection Program loan of $19,235 on April 10, 2021, by falsely claiming she ran a business in Michigan. She received the loan but used the money to travel to Ghana, Germany and Jamaica. Waller also submitted another fraudulent loan application for a St. Louis resale shop, concealing the existence of the first loan and falsifying her business income. She did not receive that loan.

    Waller also admitted fraudulently obtaining a $196,000 mortgage loan by lying about her marital status, income and job and by submitting counterfeit tax documents and bank statements.

    Waller is scheduled to be sentenced on September 29. Each count carries a potential penalty of up to 20 years in prison, a $250,000 fine, or both prison and a fine. In March, she was sentenced to 15 months in prison after she pleaded guilty to one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm.

    The U.S. Postal Inspection Service, the Town and Country Police Department and the FBI investigated the case. Assistant U.S. Attorney Tracy Berry is prosecuting the case.

    MIL Security OSI –

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Mongolia: Staff Concluding Statement of the 2025 Article IV Mission

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    June 27, 2025

    A Concluding Statement describes the preliminary findings of IMF staff at the end of an official staff visit (or ‘mission’), in most cases to a member country. Missions are undertaken as part of regular (usually annual) consultations under Article IV of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, in the context of a request to use IMF resources (borrow from the IMF), as part of discussions of staff monitored programs, or as part of other staff monitoring of economic developments.

    The authorities have consented to the publication of this statement. The views expressed in this statement are those of the IMF staff and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF’s Executive Board. Based on the preliminary findings of this mission, staff will prepare a report that, subject to management approval, will be presented to the IMF Executive Board for discussion and decision.

    Washington, DC: An International Monetary Fund (IMF) staff mission, led by Mr. Tahsin Saadi Sedik, conducted discussions as part of the 2025 Article IV consultation with the Mongolian authorities in Ulaanbaatar during June 4–18, 2025. At the end of the visit, the mission issued the following statement, summarizing its key findings and recommendations.

    • During 2023‒24, record-high coal exports and increased government spending led to buoyant economic activity, which, along with fiscal surpluses and successful debt rollovers, also helped reduce vulnerabilities.
    • The resource boom is weakening amid rising risks. With coal exports declining in recent months, mainly due to falling prices, and increased global uncertainty, the near-term outlook has become less favorable, and downside risks have increased amid limited policy buffers.
    • The policy priority is to increase resilience of the Mongolian economy to downside risks by restoring both internal and external balances, and by preserving buffers. This requires greater fiscal prudence and adherence to fiscal rules, tight monetary and macroprudential policies, and increased exchange rate flexibility.
    • Should downside risks materialize, significant and timely policy adjustments—particularly fiscal tightening—will be required to safeguard macroeconomic and financial stability.

    Recent economic developments, outlook, and risks

    Since the 2023 Article IV consultation, Mongolia’s macroeconomic conditions have improved. A resource-driven boom during 2023‒24 led to buoyant economic activity, despite a sharp contraction in the agriculture sector. Budget revenues from the mining sector more than doubled, enabling fiscal surpluses and contributing to the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves and savings in the sovereign wealth fund despite a significant increase in public spending, which together with debt repayments helped reduce debt-to-GDP ratio from 64.5 percent in 2022 to 44.5 percent in 2024 (IMF staff definition). Rating agencies have upgraded Mongolia’s sovereign credit rating to B+/B2, and its sovereign spread narrowed to historically low levels before the volatility spiked amid global trade tensions. The IMF staff’s Sovereign Risk and Debt Sustainability Framework (SRDSF) indicates a moderate risk rating compared to the high-risk rating in the 2023 SRDSF. However, the sharp increase in public spending in 2023-24, including wages and capital expenditures, resulted in a highly expansionary fiscal policy stance, which together with the policy rate cuts, despite the tightening of reserve requirements, fueled rapid credit growth and inflation pressures, and led to a surge in imports and a shift in the current account from surplus to deficit in 2024.

    In early 2025, the commodity boom began to lose momentum, and the outlook has weakened amid rising downside risks. Mongolia’s coal export receipts declined sharply, mainly due to falling prices, resulting in a sizeable shortfall in budget revenues and a further widening of the current account deficit, which led to a reduction in foreign exchange reserves and increased depreciation. Credit growth and inflation remain high despite some recent moderation, with inflation standing above the Bank of Mongolia (BOM)’s target band.

    Policies to Navigate a Weaker Outlook and Increased Risks 

    Fiscal policy

    Greater fiscal prudence and adherence to the fiscal rules are critical to restoring external and internal balances and preserving fiscal buffers. Despite the decline in revenues, the authorities plan to meet the structural fiscal balance target envisaged in the 2025 Budget and the recently approved medium-term fiscal framework through expenditure restraint. To achieve this objective, the government needs to articulate detailed and credible measures. It is critical that these measures safeguard social spending to protect the most vulnerable. Should downside risks materialize, an ambitious consolidation strategy would be needed to preserve macroeconomic stability. To ensure the credibility of fiscal rules as a policy anchor, compliance with the rules will be critical. In particular, large investment projects should be implemented within the fiscal deficit and debt rules, as defined in the Fiscal Stability Law.

    As a priority, the tax package currently under discussion should be reconsidered. While the package includes several positive elements, such as modernizing the tax administration, broadening VAT base, introducing digital service tax and strengthening progressive tax structure, it would result in a substantial and permanent reduction in non-mining tax revenues. This would increase the overall deficit, reduce the government’s fiscal space to implement critically needed development projects, and hinder compliance with fiscal rules, while also increasing the budget’s vulnerability to volatile mining revenues. In addition, some elements of the tax package need to be further refined to align with international best practices. The package also includes some measures, such as a progressive VAT, for which Mongolia’s tax administration is not yet prepared. Instead, reform efforts should focus on strengthening non-mining revenue mobilization by streamlining tax incentives, collecting tax arrears, and implementing tax and customs administration reforms.

    Further reforms are needed to mitigate fiscal risks. Efforts should focus on improving the targeting of social assistance, which would help address the perceived inequitable distribution of mining wealth. Implementation of mega projects should be prioritized according to the availability of external financing and the economy’s absorptive capacity. Coordination with subnational entities needs to be strengthened to ensure fiscal discipline of the general government. Legal frameworks governing state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and public-private partnerships should be enhanced. Building on recent efforts, the Ministry of Finance’s capacity to monitor and mitigate related fiscal risks should be further strengthened. The Development Bank of Mongolia’s long-standing balance-sheet and governance issues need to be addressed promptly. Expanding domestic debt issuance is critical to establishing a benchmark yield curve to help develop domestic markets and to reduce Mongolia’s reliance on external borrowing.

    Monetary and Exchange Rate Policies

    Domestic financial conditions should remain tight to contain credit growth and inflation. Despite the policy rate hike in early 2025 and some moderation in recent months, inflation is expected to stay above the BOM’s target band over 2025–26. A further rate increase may be warranted if the recent decline in inflation reverses, including through exchange rate depreciation. At the same time, there is scope to recalibrate reserve requirements. Excessive reliance on reserve requirements may incentivize banks to seek external funds with more than one year maturity, which are excluded from these requirements, thus increasing the BOM’s exposure to exchange rate risks through its foreign exchange swaps with banks.

    Greater exchange rate flexibility would strengthen Mongolia’s resilience to external shocks. The BOM should pursue opportunistic accumulation of reserves when market conditions allow. The BOM should support a more effective exchange rate price-discovery mechanism by gradually reducing its role as an intermediary and structural provider of FX to the market. In addition, the BOM should support the development of domestic FX derivatives markets and phase out its role as the dominant provider of FX hedging instruments to banks.

    Reforms to strengthen the BOM’s effectiveness should be accelerated. As a priority, the BOM should fully withdraw from subsidized mortgage program, which undermines the transmission of monetary policy and jeopardizes the independence of the central bank. The government should expedite the transfer of the BOM’s subsidized mortgage program and relieve the BOM of its obligation to channel the newly established Savings Fund toward the expansion of the mortgage program. Moreover, the proposed amendments to the central bank law, aimed at strengthening the BOM’s mandate, as well as the operational autonomy, and governance, should be finalized and submitted to Parliament. Furthermore, the Ministry of Finance and the BOM need to agree on a memorandum of understanding that outlines a gradual recapitalization strategy for the BOM that is consistent with fiscal sustainability.

    Macroprudential and Financial Sector Policies

    Macroprudential frameworks and financial oversight should be strengthened to mitigate financial stability risks, including rapid credit growth. The recent tightening of macroprudential measures, including the reduction of Debt-Service-To-Income (DSTI) limits, for banks and non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs) is a welcome development. Further efforts are needed, including aligning the DSTI limit for NBFIs with that of banks and expanding the BOM’s macroprudential toolkit to include countercyclical capital buffers, liquidity coverage ratios, and net stable funding ratios. Macroprudential and monetary policies should be separated in terms of formulation and implementation. The ongoing transition toward a risk-based, forward‑looking supervisory approach is welcome. The interconnections between banks and NBFIs should be closely monitored. Amendments to the BOM and Banking Laws are critical to ensure greater legal protection for supervisors and more effective inter-agency information sharing and coordination. The strengthening of crisis management arrangements and clarifying the resources available for resolutions would also help reduce financial stability risks.  

    Reforms are also needed to enhance the financial sector’s ability to lend to creditworthy entities. The objective is to reduce the cost of lending, especially to small and medium-sized enterprises. This could be done by amending the Credit Information and Insolvency Laws to enable more effective and timely credit assessment and collateral evaluation, and to streamline foreclosure and insolvency processes. In addition, efforts to diversify bank ownership structures should continue, which may require increasing ownership limits, and allowing investment in multiple banks. This should be complemented with effective supervision of complex ownership structures to mitigate the risks associated with connected and related-party lending.  

    Structural Policies

    Further improvements to the business climate and governance that build on recent progress would boost Mongolia’s long-term growth prospects. The substantial state footprint in the economy and frequent regulatory changes dampen private sector initiatives and discourage FDI. Reform efforts should focus on reducing red tape, streamlining licensing procedures, improving tax compliance and land use processes, and ensuring consistent and transparent judicial and regulatory enforcement. Governance in the public sector also requires strengthening. This includes addressing corruption vulnerabilities in revenue institutions, strengthening the transparency and accountability of public procurement and SOEs, and implementing legislative reforms, including the SOE Law and Whistleblower Protection Law. Mongolia has made satisfactory progress in strengthening its anti‑money laundering and counter-financing of terrorism legal framework, though challenges related to effective implementation remain.

    Climate adaptation, mitigation, and green transition will require significant investments and policy reforms. Adaptation actions are needed given increase in the frequency and intensity of natural hazards, such as harsh winters and floods, while mitigation actions are needed to address Mongolia’s high carbon intensity and to reduce air pollution. In addition, preparations are needed to address the expected decline in China’s coal demand as it advances its energy transition and decarbonization agenda. So far, implementation of Mongolia’s climate agenda remains limited. Climate adaptation measures have yet to be fully integrated into sectoral policies and budget processes. Moreover, there is no dedicated climate change law to mandate cross-sectoral coordination. Advancing Mongolia’s climate objectives will require significant financial contributions from both the public and private sectors, underscoring the importance of creating fiscal space.

    The staff team expresses its sincere gratitude to the authorities and to a broad range of public and private sector counterparts for their warm hospitality and for the candid, constructive discussions.

     

    Table 1. Mongolia: Selected Economic and Financial Indicators, 2022-30

     

     

    2022

    		  

    2023

    2024

    		  

    2025

    		  

    2026

    2027

    2028

    2029

    2030

     Actual

    		      

                      Projections

         (In percent of GDP, unless otherwise indicated)

    National Accounts

    		                      

    Real GDP growth (percent change)

    5.0

    7.4

    4.9

    5.5

    5.5

    5.5

    5.3

    5.0

    5.0

    Nominal GDP (in USD million)

    17,146

    20,315

    23,586

    …

    …

    …

    …

    …

    …

    Contributions to Real GDP (ppts)

    Domestic Demand

    11.4

    5.6

    21.2

    6.6

    4.4

    7.1

    7.2

    6.5

    6.2

    Exports of G&S

    13.9

    17.9

    0.5

    4.2

    5.4

    2.8

    2.3

    1.7

    1.8

    Imports of G&S

    -20.3

    -16.2

    -16.8

    -5.3

    -4.2

    -4.4

    -4.2

    -3.3

    -3.0

    Consumption

    65.8

    57.5

    66.1

    		  

    72.1

    72.0

    72.5

    72.5

    73.0

    73.0

      Private

    51.9

    44.5

    49.8

    		  

    55.6

    55.9

    56.6

    56.6

    57.2

    57.3

             Public

    13.9

    13.0

    16.3

    16.5

    16.1

    16.0

    15.9

    15.8

    15.7

    Gross Capital Formation

    42.3

    33.9

    34.6

    32.3

    30.7

    30.7

    30.9

    30.7

    30.4

    Gross Fixed Capital Formation

    29.8

    25.3

    26.8

    24.3

    23.7

    23.7

    23.9

    23.7

    23.4

    Public

    7.1

    7.4

    9.9

    8.3

    8.0

    7.9

    7.8

    7.8

    7.9

    FDI

    14.2

    10.7

    11.6

    9.5

    9.0

    8.8

    8.6

    7.8

    7.7

    Domestic Private (including SOEs)

    8.6

    7.3

    5.3

    6.5

    6.7

    7.0

    7.5

    8.0

    7.8

    Gross national saving

    28.9

    34.5

    24.1

    17.5

    17.6

    17.4

    17.9

    17.8

    17.7

     

    Prices

    Consumer Prices (Avg; percent change)

    15.1

    10.4

    6.2

    8.7

    8.6

    7.9

    7.2

    6.7

    6.4

    Consumer Prices (EoP; percent change)

    13.3

    7.7

    8.3

    9.0

    8.2

    7.5

    6.8

    6.5

    6.2

        Copper prices (US$ per ton)

    8,829

    8,491

    9,142

    8,981

    8,897

    8,983

    9,056

    9,122

    9,167

      Coal prices (US$ per ton)

    123

    131

    107

    68

    73

    72

    72

    72

    72

        GDP deflator (percent change)

    17.7

    21.8

    8.2

    6.1

    8.0

    7.5

    7.3

    6.5

    6.5
                       

    General government accounts 1/

    		                    

    Primary balance (IMF definition)

    2.2

    		  

    4.3

    		  

    2.8

    		  

    1.0

    		  

    0.5

    -1.0

    -0.8

    -0.8

    -0.7

    Total revenue and grants

    34.4

    		  

    34.6

    		  

    39.2

    		  

    35.1

    		  

    33.6

    31.5

    31.2

    31.1

    30.9

    Primary expenditure and net lending

    32.2

    		  

    30.3

    36.5

    34.1

    		  

    33.0

    32.5

    32.1

    31.8

    31.6

    Interest

    1.5

    1.6

    1.5

    1.7

    1.9

    2.1

    2.2

    2.4

    2.5

    Overall balance (IMF definition)

    0.7

    2.7

    1.3

    -0.7

    -1.4

    -3.1

    -3.1

    -3.1

    -3.2

    Non-mineral primary balance (in percent of GDP)

    -6.3

    -5.7

    -8.9

    -7.4

    -8.3

    -9.4

    -9.0

    -8.6

    -8.2

    Gross financing needs

    3.8

    9.0

    4.7

    5.4

    5.6

    7.5

    7.8

    8.6

    11.9

       General government debt 2/

    64.5

    45.9

    44.5

    44.7

    46.8

    49.5

    51.5

    53.0

    53.7

    Domestic

    4.4

    2.6

    3.2

    3.0

    3.0

    3.2

    3.2

    3.4

    3.6

               External

    60.1

    43.3

    41.3

    41.7

    43.8

    46.4

    48.3

    49.6

    50.1

     

    Monetary sector

    Broad money growth (percent change)

    6.5

    26.8

    15.2

    13.4

    12.7

    11.7

    11.8

    14.1

    11.8

    Reserve money growth (percent change)

    39.9

    7.4

    51.9

    0.7

    12.7

    11.7

    11.8

    14.1

    12.7

    Credit growth (percent change)

    8.6

    22.0

    30.9

    25.0

    21.2

    19.5

    17.5

    15.5

    15.5

     

     

    Balance of payments

    		                          

    Current account balance

    -13.4

    0.6

    -10.5

    		  

    -14.8

    -13.1

    -13.3

    -13.0

    -12.9

    -12.7

    Exports of goods

    57.5

    68.5

    62.5

    53.6

    53.5

    51.4

    49.8

    47.9

    46.1

    Imports of goods

    50.3

    46.1

    49.5

    		  

    46.2

    45.1

    44.2

    43.7

    42.9

    41.5

    Gross official reserves (in USD million)

    3,400

    4,922

    5,510

    		  

    4,566

    4,627

    4,669

    4,864

    5,045

    5,212

    (In months of imports)

    3.0

    3.6

    4.0

    		  

    3.2

    3.1

    3.0

    3.0

    3.0

    3.0

    (net of bank’s FX deposits held at the BOM)

    1,949

    3,491

    4,233

    		  

    …

    …

    …

    …

    …

    …

    Net international reserves (NIR) 3/

    -788

    1,152

    1,768

    		  

    …

    …

    …

    …

    …

    …

     

    Exchange rate

    		                    

    Togrog per U.S. dollar (eop)

    3,445

    3,411

    3,420

    …

    …

    …

    …

    …

    …

    Sources: Mongolian authorities; and IMF staff projections.      

    		                        

    1/ These projections were prepared ahead of the supplementary budget for 2025 currently under discussion. They include the tax package approved by the previous

    Cabinet.    
                                                                                                                     

    2/ Includes DBM’s total debt, explicit government’s guarantees to SOE as well as government’s liabilities to BOM related to the TDB settlement regarding Erdenet. Excludes BOM liabilities to PBOC.

    3/ NIR is defined as GIR excl. commercial banks’ and government’s US$ deposits held at the BOM, the PBOC swap line, and liabilities to the IMF.
    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Pemba Sherpa

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/06/27/mongolia-staff-concluding-statement-of-the-2025-article-iv-mission

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI Russia News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: The Tiffany Telegram: June 27, 2025

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Representative Tom Tiffany (WI-07)

    Dear Friend,

    A lot has been happening in Washington these past few weeks, and I will update you on all of it in this edition of the Tiffany Telegram.

    But first, I ask you to join me in praying for the two Milwaukee police officers who were shot in the line of duty last night. We need the power of prayer to uplift them and their families as they recover from their injuries. You can read more about the incident here. 

    Since our last Telegram, President Trump authorized a successful airstrike in Iran, eliminating key components of their nuclear weapons capability. Iran’s rulers have been vowing “Death to America” for decades, and peace cannot coexist with a nuclear-armed Iran.

    These types of actions fall squarely under the President’s powers as commander-in-chief. But in typical D.C. fashion, Democrats immediately filed articles of impeachment against President Trump. These are the same people who stayed silent when Presidents Biden, Obama, and Clinton used military force in similar situations.

    We saw this same double standard during President Trump’s first term. When they couldn’t defeat him at the ballot box, and their bogus lawfare campaign failed, they turned to political stunts. Thankfully, a bipartisan majority – including 128 House Democrats – joined Republicans in rejecting the latest impeachment proposal.

    President Trump has made it clear that he is not seeking a “regime change” in Iran, and I agree. No reasonable person wants to see American servicemen and women pulled into another endless ground war in the Middle East. What we need is peace through strength. If there is one president who can achieve that, it’s Donald Trump, just as he proved through the Abraham Accords in his first term.

    We also have problems here at home that require urgent attention. A report this week revealed that over the past four years, the Biden administration released more than 700 illegal Iranian nationals into our country.

    And those are just the ones we know about.

    Many more may have entered undetected across our wide-open southern border. Thankfully, the Trump administration took action this week by arresting over 100 of them this week. One of them even had ties to Iran-backed Hezbollah and was living less than 30 minutes from the Seventh District, in St. Paul. You can read more about that here. 

    We must put America first, and that means removing people who never should be here to begin with. The House-passed reconciliation bill takes major steps toward securing our border, and I will keep you updated as the Senate works through it this weekend. 

    As we approach Independence Day, I hope you enjoy time with your family and loved ones but also take a moment to honor the heroes who have made this freedom possible. Thanks again for starting off your weekend with us! We will be back in two weeks with more.

    Sincerely,
    Tom Tiffany
    Member of Congress

    Click here or on the video above to watch me discuss Democrats cheapening impeachment on Meg Ellefson’s Show.

     WHO’s in charge of U.S. pandemic policy?

    That’s a question many Americans were asking during the last administration, when former President Biden bent over backwards to funnel hundreds of millions of dollars to the scandal-plagued World Health Organization (WHO) while quietly working behind the scenes to negotiate a controversial “pandemic accord.” Telegram readers will recall that I responded by drafting a bill to put the brakes on this dangerous effort by classifying it as a treaty, and requiring any such “agreement” to be presented to the Senate for ratification, where it would require a two-thirds supermajority vote. While I wasn’t able to get my legislation enacted into law last Congress, it did clear the House. The good news is that President Trump is back in the Oval Office, and has moved quickly to withdraw the U.S. from the WHO. The bad news, however, is that a future president more friendly to shady organizations like the United Nations and WHO may try to pick up where the Biden administration left off. That’s why this week I reintroduced the No WHO Pandemic Preparedness Treat Without Senate Approval Act. I’m hopeful that in the coming weeks and months, I can work with the Senate sponsor, Sen. Ron Johnson, and President Trump to get this bill across the finish line to protect American sovereignty today – and well into the future. You can read more about the effort here.

    Protect our streets, deport criminal illegal aliens

    After being trapped for four years with a president who allowed and encouraged millions of illegal aliens to flood the United States with little to no vetting, American citizens were forced to pay the price of an open border – sometimes even with their lives. In 2023, Jorge Sanchez, who was in the U.S. illegally, was convicted of a DUI. But instead of being deported, he was released back onto the streets. Then, just a year later, Sanchez was driving drunk again when he struck and killed Wisconsin father Steven Nasholm. This tragedy didn’t have to happen. That’s why yesterday, House Republicans passed the Protect Our Communities from DUIs Act. This bill will deport any illegal alien convicted of driving under the influence, and prevents any future president from skirting their deportation, as we saw with the Biden-Harris administration. Sadly, 160 Democrats opposed the measure. You can see how lawmakers voted on the bill here.

     

    Putting American veterans first

    Our veterans have made the ultimate sacrifice to this great nation, and honoring those men and women is crucial. That is why this week, the House passed legislation to protect our service members and veterans. This legislation ensures that veterans’ healthcare and benefits are fully funded, including critical support for mental health and President Trump’s Bridging Rental Assistance for Veteran Empowerment (BRAVE) program to combat homelessness. It defends constitutional rights by preventing the VA from sharing veteran information without a judge’s consent and blocks federal funding for DEI, gender procedures, and illegal alien services at VA facilities. You can read more about the package here, and see how lawmakers voted on it here. 

    Join me and Congressman Scott Fitzgerald in celebrating 50 years of a Wisconsin favorite – happy anniversary, Miller Lite!

    Committee Update

    Judiciary

    The devastation caused by illegal migration 

    On Thursday, during a Judiciary Immigration Subcommittee hearing, I questioned witnesses on the effects of mass illegal migration on the American people. As we know, the impacts have been widespread and often tragic. During the Biden administration, we saw stories ranging from Laken Riley in Georgia, Jocelyn Nungaray in Texas, and two children in our very own Seventh District where destructive open borders policies shattered American families, terrorized American communities, and killed innocent Americans. And it doesn’t stop there. The tidal wave of illegal immigration flooding American neighborhoods has also reduced job opportunities and lowered wages, especially for blue-collar workers. We’ve also seen more than 250,000 Americans killed by fentanyl almost solely sourced from Communist China and smuggled in through the open southern border by Mexican cartels. That’s why it was deeply troubling to hear one witness blame victims who are unintentionally poisoned, rather than targeting those pumping this deadly drug into our communities. Strengthening border security and interior enforcement is a critical step to turning the tide, and I let the witness know that. You can watch our exchange here.

    Natural Resources

    Fixing our forests with modern tech 

    Yesterday, we had an exciting hearing in the Federal Lands Subcommittee on advancing innovative technologies to improve forest management and prevent wildfires. The private sector has developed some compelling technology in this space, and now we just need federal agencies to use it. Despite spending an average of $2.5 billion per year on wildfires, this crisis is only getting worse. That’s because instead of investing in proactive prevention, we’re spending all that money on reactive suppression. A lot of fires can be prevented with stronger federal integration with the private sector, proactive forest management, and faster responses enabled by modern technology. Whether it’s drones that fly through thick smoke and high winds, AI models that predict fire behavior in real-time, or remote sensors and camera networks that detect ignitions before they become infernos, each of these technologies plays a complementary role in confronting the wildfire crisis. With all the technology we have at our disposal, there is no excuse for the situation to remain the same. It is also timely that this week, the USDA repealed the Clinton-era roadless rule that has prevented the proper management of nearly 59 million acres of Forest Service land. This Congress and this administration will continue to enact commonsense reforms for how we manage our public lands, so that we have safer communities and a healthier environment. You can watch my questions from the hearing here.

    District Update 

    Photo of the week

    I might be biased, but Wisconsin has some of the best wildlife. This week’s photo of the week features a white-tailed deer beneath a tree in full bloom. If you have a favorite photo of Wisconsin that you’d like to share, email it to comms.tiffany@gmail.com with your name and location. You could be featured in the next Telegram.

    “Nature’s duo” – Submitted by Wayne near Park Falls

    Resources  

    Vacation is meant to be relaxing, so don’t let renewing or applying for your passport stress you out. The current processing time is 4 to 6 weeks, so we recommend getting this done as soon as possible. For more information, click here.

    FEMA is accepting applications for the Staffing for Adequate Fire and Emergency Response (SAFER) grant program. For more information on the program, click here. Additionally, the Small Business Administration (SBA) announced that Economic Injury Disaster Loans (EIDLs) are available in Wisconsin due to economic losses caused by excessive moisture. Click here to see if you are eligible to apply. 

    If a friend forwarded you this newsletter, and you would like to receive it in the future, you can subscribe here for weekly updates and connect with me on X, Facebook, and Instagram. 

    As always, you are welcome to visit my website or to contact my offices in Washington, DC or Wisconsin, which remain open for service, if you have any questions or need assistance. 

    Good News from Wisconsin’s 7th District and Congress

    State Champs

    Congratulations to all the athletes in the Seventh District who took home state championship titles this spring sports season. Keep up the hard work! 

     ACSA Young Snowmobiler of The Year

    Derek Andres of Conrath was named the 2025 American Council of Snowmobile Association Young Snowmobiler of the Year. Congratulations!  

    100th Birthday

    Plymouth resident and World War II veteran Walter Gorlewski is turning 100 years old this weekend. Happy birthday and thank you for your service! 

    Condemning the LA riots

    This week, the House passed bipartisan legislation condemning the violent riots in LA and expressing gratitude to law enforcement officers.

    Ending Birthright Citizenship

    Today, the Supreme Court ruled that rogue district courts cannot block President Trump’s order to end birthright citizenship and restore the 14th Amendment to its original intent.

     

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Chairman Mast Exposes Boston University’s Phony USAID Stats

    Source: US House Committee on Foreign Affairs

    Media Contact 202-226-8467

    WASHINGTON, D.C. – This Week, House Foreign Affairs Chairman Brian Mast wrote a letter to Boston University President Melissa Gilliam raising concerns over the “Impact Counter,” a dashboard promoted by the university that makes false and misleading claims about the impacts of restructuring at the U.S. Agency for International Development.  

    In his letter, Chairman Mast exposes a series of falsehoods conveyed by the dashboard and used to spread dangerous hysteria about deaths caused by the USAID restructuring.  

    “I am deeply concerned that Boston University is serving as a platform for the weaponization of academia, where federally funded professors are spreading disinformation about the ongoing reorganization of USAID and its consequences,” Chairman Mast wrote. “Brooke Nichols, an Associate Professor at BU, is at the heart of this dangerous hysteria through her creation of the ‘Impact Counter,’ a dashboard of numbers that claim the restructuring of USAID has killed hundreds of thousands of people.” 

    As Chairman Mast notes, the dashboard has been used as ammunition to attack President Trump as his administration carries out a foreign policy agenda that puts America first and promotes U.S. interests abroad. 

    “Unfortunately, hidden behind Dr. Nichols’ claim is an erroneous set of assumptions based on inaccurate information,” Chairman Mast wrote. “This platform has become no better than a Russian bot farm or CCP propaganda. Boston University is creating a breeding ground for far-left activists to exploit academia for political gain which undermines the legitimacy of these institutions.” 

    Read the full letter here. 

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Chairman Mast Exposes Boston University’s Phony USAID Stats

    Source: US House Committee on Foreign Affairs

    Media Contact 202-226-8467

    WASHINGTON, D.C. – This Week, House Foreign Affairs Chairman Brian Mast wrote a letter to Boston University President Melissa Gilliam raising concerns over the “Impact Counter,” a dashboard promoted by the university that makes false and misleading claims about the impacts of restructuring at the U.S. Agency for International Development.  

    In his letter, Chairman Mast exposes a series of falsehoods conveyed by the dashboard and used to spread dangerous hysteria about deaths caused by the USAID restructuring.  

    “I am deeply concerned that Boston University is serving as a platform for the weaponization of academia, where federally funded professors are spreading disinformation about the ongoing reorganization of USAID and its consequences,” Chairman Mast wrote. “Brooke Nichols, an Associate Professor at BU, is at the heart of this dangerous hysteria through her creation of the ‘Impact Counter,’ a dashboard of numbers that claim the restructuring of USAID has killed hundreds of thousands of people.” 

    As Chairman Mast notes, the dashboard has been used as ammunition to attack President Trump as his administration carries out a foreign policy agenda that puts America first and promotes U.S. interests abroad. 

    “Unfortunately, hidden behind Dr. Nichols’ claim is an erroneous set of assumptions based on inaccurate information,” Chairman Mast wrote. “This platform has become no better than a Russian bot farm or CCP propaganda. Boston University is creating a breeding ground for far-left activists to exploit academia for political gain which undermines the legitimacy of these institutions.” 

    Read the full letter here. 

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Chairman Mast Exposes Boston University’s Phony USAID Stats

    Source: US House Committee on Foreign Affairs

    Media Contact 202-226-8467

    WASHINGTON, D.C. – This Week, House Foreign Affairs Chairman Brian Mast wrote a letter to Boston University President Melissa Gilliam raising concerns over the “Impact Counter,” a dashboard promoted by the university that makes false and misleading claims about the impacts of restructuring at the U.S. Agency for International Development.  

    In his letter, Chairman Mast exposes a series of falsehoods conveyed by the dashboard and used to spread dangerous hysteria about deaths caused by the USAID restructuring.  

    “I am deeply concerned that Boston University is serving as a platform for the weaponization of academia, where federally funded professors are spreading disinformation about the ongoing reorganization of USAID and its consequences,” Chairman Mast wrote. “Brooke Nichols, an Associate Professor at BU, is at the heart of this dangerous hysteria through her creation of the ‘Impact Counter,’ a dashboard of numbers that claim the restructuring of USAID has killed hundreds of thousands of people.” 

    As Chairman Mast notes, the dashboard has been used as ammunition to attack President Trump as his administration carries out a foreign policy agenda that puts America first and promotes U.S. interests abroad. 

    “Unfortunately, hidden behind Dr. Nichols’ claim is an erroneous set of assumptions based on inaccurate information,” Chairman Mast wrote. “This platform has become no better than a Russian bot farm or CCP propaganda. Boston University is creating a breeding ground for far-left activists to exploit academia for political gain which undermines the legitimacy of these institutions.” 

    Read the full letter here. 

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI: United Community Banks, Inc. Announces Date for Second Quarter 2025 Earnings Release and Conference Call

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    GREENVILLE, S.C., June 27, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — United Community Banks, Inc. (NYSE: UCB) announces it will release its second quarter 2025 financial results on Wednesday, July 23, 2025, before the stock market opens. The company also will hold a conference call at 9:00 a.m. EST on Wednesday, July 23, 2025, to discuss its financial results, business highlights, and outlook.

    Participants can pre-register for the conference call by navigating to https://dpregister.com/sreg/10200766/ff6c2759d0. Those without internet access or unable to pre-register may dial in by calling 1-844-676-1337. Participants are encouraged to dial in 15 minutes prior to the call start time. The conference call also will be webcast and can be accessed by selecting “Events and Presentations” under “News and Events” within the Investor Relations section of the company’s website, ucbi.com.

    About United Community Banks, Inc.

    United Community Banks, Inc. (NYSE: UCB) is the financial holding company for United Community, a top 100 U.S. financial institution committed to building stronger communities and improving the financial health and well-being of its customers. United Community offers a full range of banking, mortgage and wealth management services. As of March 31, 2025, United Community Banks, Inc. had $27.9 billion in assets and operated 200 offices across Alabama, Florida, Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina and Tennessee. The company also manages a nationally recognized SBA lending franchise and a national equipment finance subsidiary, extending its reach to businesses across the country. United is an 11-time winner of J.D. Power’s award for highest customer satisfaction among consumer banks in the Southeast and was named the most trusted bank in the region in 2025. The company has also been recognized eight consecutive years by American Banker as one of the “Best Banks to Work For.” In commercial banking, United earned five 2025 Greenwich Best Brand awards, including national honors for middle market satisfaction. Forbes has consistently named United among the World’s Best and America’s Best Banks. Learn more at ucbi.com.

    For more information:        

    Elizabeth Boggess
    Head of Investor Relations
    (864) 241-8705
    Investor_Relations@ucbi.com

    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Cybersecurity of solar energy infrastructure – E-001383/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The objective of the risk assessment is to assess to what extent intentional widespread attacks on solar infrastructure can affect the stability of the European electricity grid.

    The scope of this risk assessment is solar energy infrastructure and related infrastructure, with a focus on smart infrastructure that can affect the electricity grid.

    The Commission will carefully review the outcomes of the risk assessment and, if relevant, reflect on potential follow-up proposals.

    On cybersecurity, the EU has a comprehensive framework in force with the directive for measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union (NIS2)[1] and the Cyber Resilience Act[2], which focuses on cybersecurity requirements for products with digital elements.

    Moreover, the EU also has a specific technical binding rules for cybersecurity in the cross-border electricity flows in the EU and neighbouring countries.

    Within the scope of the Net-Zero Industry Act (NZIA)[3], the Commission has introduced pre-qualification and award criteria for cybersecurity in procurement procedures and auctions.

    • [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32022L2555.
    • [2] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32024R2847.
    • [3] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L_202401735.
    Last updated: 27 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Implementation of the Migration Pact in the context of the Polish Government’s position – temporary protection and financial contributions – P-001105/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The Council Implementing Decision 2022 /382[1], establishing the existence of a mass influx of displaced persons from Ukraine and having the effect of introducing temporary protection, specifies in Article 2(1) and (2) the categories of persons who receive temporary protection and their rights.

    Member States must ensure that beneficiaries of temporary protection on their territory enjoy these rights. For further information on the obligations of Member States, the Commission refers the Honourable Member to the guidance documents and operational guidelines[2].

    According to Article 64(1) of the Asylum and Migration Management Regulation (AMMR)[3], financial contributions consist of transfers from the contributing Member States to the EU budget.

    Pursuant to Article 64(2) of the AMMR, the benefitting Member States shall identify actions eligible for funding, and the Commission shall collaborate closely with them to ensure that those actions correspond to the objectives of the Annual Solidarity Pool (Articles 56(2)(b) and 56(3)) of the AMMR.

    The Commission is working on the assessment of migratory pressure, risk of migratory pressure and significant migratory situation. The assessments of these situations will be based on both quantitative and qualitative data, in accordance with Articles 9 and 10 of the AMMR.

    • [1] Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/382 of 4 March 2022 establishing the existence of a mass influx of displaced persons from Ukraine within the meaning of Article 5 of Directive 2001/55/EC, and having the effect of introducing temporary protection, OJ L 71, 4.3.2022, p. 1-6 (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec_impl/2022/382/oj/eng).
    • [2] https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/migration-and-asylum/asylum-eu/temporary-protection-0_en?prefLang=da#obligations-of-eu-countries-towards-persons-enjoying-temporary-protection .
    • [3] Regulation (EU) 2024/1351 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on asylum and migration management, amending Regulations (EU) 2021/1147 and (EU) 2021/1060 and repealing Regulation (EU) No 604/2013, OJ L, 2024/1351, 22.5.2024 (http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1351/oj).
    Last updated: 27 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Authoritarian restructuring of the Turkish state without consequences for EU candidate status – E-001451/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The April 2024 European Council conclusions[1] highlighted the EU’s strategic interest in a stable and secure environment in the Eastern Mediterranean and in the development of a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship with Türkiye. This aligns with the November 2023 Joint Communication[2], advocating for a progressive, proportionate, and reversible approach.

    As an EU candidate country and long-standing member of the Council of Europe, Türkiye is expected to apply the highest democratic standards and practices.

    Full respect for fundamental rights and the rule of law will continue to be an integral part of EU-Türkiye relations. The Commission’s position on the arrest of the Mayor of Istanbul on 19 March 2025 was spelled out in the joint statement[3] of the High Representative/Vice-President and Commissioner for Enlargement and Eastern Neighbourhood, issued on the day of the mayor’s detention.

    The statement stressed that the events gave rise to questions regarding Türkiye’s adherence to its long-established democratic tradition. The EU urged the Turkish authorities to provide full transparency and follow due process.

    Accession negotiations with Türkiye remain at a standstill since June 2018, following the decisions of the Council[4]. This position was re-confirmed by the Council in December 2024[5].

    Consequently, the Commission has reduced financial support to Türkiye, with funding reoriented towards support for civil society organisations and EU key priorities.

    • [1] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/m5jlwe0p/euco-conclusions-20240417-18-en.pdf.
    • [2] https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/joint-communication-european-council-state-play-eu-turkiye-political-economic-and-trade-relations-0_en.
    • [3] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_25_836.
    • [4] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/35863/st10555-en18.pdf.
    • [5] https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-16983-2024-INIT/en/pdf.
    Last updated: 27 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Changes to cohesion policy and their impact on regional disparity – E-001656/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The Commission’s proposal of 1 April 2025[1] for a regulation amending the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), the Cohesion Fund, and the Just Transition Fund as regards specific measures to address specific challenges in the context of the mid-term review does not propose a change to the distribution of the resources across the different categories of regions, nor to the provisions governing possible transfers between categories of regions or to the methodology on the allocation per Member State[2].

    Therefore, required resources for less developed regions cannot be used for transition or more developed regions. Furthermore, the possibilities provided for in the proposal are of a voluntary nature and amendments of individual programmes require prior approval by the relevant monitoring committee before they are submitted to the Commission.

    The implementation data submitted by the Member States indicates that some of the 2021-2027 resources remain unallocated. At a time of mounting challenges and limited fiscal space, it is necessary to maximise the utilisation of the available allocations, and the managing authorities will have the opportunity to direct them towards strategic investments that address urgent challenges which risk weakening the economic, social and territorial cohesion of the EU.

    • [1] COM(2025) 123 final.
    • [2] Articles 110, 111 and Annex XXVI of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 (the Common Provisions Regulation).
    Last updated: 27 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Need for broader deregulation and simplification to reduce administrative burdens – E-001664/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The target for reducing reporting obligations’ burden has been set at 25% in March 2023, in the ‘Long term competitiveness’ Communication[1].

    As indicated in the communication ‘A Simpler and Faster Europe’[2], this target has been expanded to cover all administrative burden, and up to 35% for small and medium enterprises (SMEs). This represents a target of EUR 37.5 billion of savings over the mandate.

    The President of the Commission has made the reduction of red tape a priority for the new mandate of the Commission as explained in answer to E-1084/2025.

    The roadmap has been set in the ‘Competitiveness compass’ and the communication ‘A Simpler and Faster Europe’ and simplification omnibuses have been adopted on 26 February, 14 May, 21 May and 17 June 2025. However, while aiming at achieving significant simplification, the Commission proposals nevertheless preserve the EU policy goals.

    The Better Regulation tools have been reinforced (e.g. through the SME and Competitiveness checks, and the scrutiny of delegated and implementing acts) to ensure that EU legislation is designed with implementation and simplification in mind right from the outset.

    The communication also underscores the important role of the co-legislators for this process:

    ‘The European Parliament and the Council have a central role to play in creating simple and effective rules at the lowest administrative cost for people and companies. In 2016, both institutions committed to the principle of assessing the impacts of their substantial amendments when appropriate’.

    • [1] https://commission.europa.eu/system/files/2023-03/Communication_Long-term-competitiveness.pdf.
    • [2] https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/8556fc33-48a3-4a96-94e8-8ecacef1ea18_en?filename=250201_Simplification_Communication_en.pdf.
    Last updated: 27 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Commission’s assesment of EIOPA findings regarding NOVIS case – E-001855/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    Under Article 30 of the Solvency II Directive[1], the financial supervision of insurance undertakings with their head office located in the territory of a Member State is the sole responsibility of the supervisory authority of that Member State.

    The Commission’s opinion issued according to Article 17(4) of the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) Regulation[2] concerns the way and the extent to which the national supervisor exercised its supervisory powers under the Solvency II Directive following the detection of non-compliance by a Slovakian insurance undertaking with Solvency II requirements.

    Article 17(4) of the EIOPA Regulation does not confer on the Commission any powers to open an autonomous investigation upon any individual undertaking that is the object of the national competent authority’s supervision. This provision provides that the Commission’s formal opinion shall take into account the EIOPA’s recommendation.

    The factual background and assessment of the situation of the Slovak insurance undertaking referred to in the Commission’s opinion are based on the evidence and assessment provided by the national supervisory authority, which is the sole authority empowered to exercise direct supervisory competence towards insurance undertakings under its jurisdiction, and by EIOPA, including in the context of inspections of a collaboration platform.

    The Commission and EIOPA discussed the findings referred to in the EIOPA Recommendation and concurred that supervisory action was necessary.

    • [1] OJ L 335, 17.12.2009, p. 1-155.
    • [2] OJ L 331, 15.12.2010, p. 48-83.
    Last updated: 27 June 2025

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Transparency in the allocation of European funds intended for persons with disabilities in France – E-001925/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Social Fund Plus (ESF+) is implemented under shared management. It is up to Member States to decide which measures they want to invest in, in line with the specific objectives of the ESF+ Regulation[1].

    All Managing Authorities (MA) must have a website with information on programmes under its responsibility, covering the programme’s objectives, activities, available funding opportunities, achievements, and a list of operations selected for support (Article 49 of the Common Provisions Regulation (CPR)[2]).

    For the selection of operations, the MA shall establish and apply criteria and procedures which are non-discriminatory, transparent, ensure accessibility to persons with disabilities, ensure gender equality, and take account of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’), the principle of sustainable development and the EU policy on environment (Article 73(1) of the CPR).

    Article 69(7) of the CPR stipulates that it is the Member States’ responsibility to ensure the effective examination of complaints concerning the Funds.

    The scope, rules and procedures concerning those arrangements are the responsibility of Member States in accordance with their institutional and legal framework. This is without prejudice to the general possibility of citizens and stakeholders to address complaints to the Commission.

    The Horizontal Enabling Conditions on the effective application and implementation of the Charter and on the implementation and application of the United Nations Convention on the rights of persons with disabilities (UNCRPD) reiterate that Member States need to have reporting arrangements to the monitoring committee regarding cases of non-compliance of operations in place.

    • [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32021R1057 .
    • [2] Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 laying down common provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund Plus, the Cohesion Fund, the Just Transition Fund and the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund and financial rules for those and for the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, the Internal Security Fund and the Instrument for Financial Support for Border Management and Visa Policy.
    Last updated: 27 June 2025

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Briefing – Belgium’s National Recovery and Resilience Plan: Latest state of play – 27-06-2025

    Source: European Parliament

    The EU’s Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) is the core component of Next Generation EU (NGEU). By promoting the sustainable and inclusive recovery after the COVID-19 pandemic that ensures the green and digital transitions make progress, the RRF is consistent with the European Commission’s priorities. Belgium’s initial maximum contribution to finance its national recovery and resilience plan (NRRP) was set to €5 924 million in grants. The amount was updated in June 2022 and reduced to €4 523 million. In addition, the non-repayable allocation for the REPowerEU chapter to reinforce the NRRP’s energy dimension is set at €281 million. Belgium also submitted a reasoned request to transfer part of its allocation from the resources of the Brexit Adjustment Reserve to the RRF (€228 million). Finally, Belgium requested a loan support of €264 million. The overall EU financial contribution to the amended Belgian NRRP stands thus at €5 298 million; it represents 0.7 % of the entire RRF, and 1.1 % of Belgium’s gross domestic product (GDP) in 2019. The Council approved Belgium’s amended NRRP in December 2023. Other targeted revisions took place in 2024 and 2025. In total, Belgium has received €2.46 billion so far: €915.1 million in pre-financing – 13 % of the initial NRRP (€770 million, all grants) in 2021, and 20 % of the REPowerEU chapter (€102.1 million in grants, €43 million in loans) in 2024; and two result-based instalments – one of €631.6 million (all grants) in September 2024, and another of €909 million (of which €40 million in loans) in May 2025. The European Parliament, which was a major advocate of creating a common EU recovery instrument, participates in interinstitutional forums for cooperation and discussion on RRF implementation and scrutinises the European Commission’s work. This briefing is one in a series covering all EU Member States. Third edition. The ‘NGEU delivery’ briefings are updated at key stages throughout the lifecycle of the plans.

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Arbitrary detention of peaceful protesters and their detention conditions in Türkiye – E-001704/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The EU reacted swiftly to the detention of mayor İmamoğlu and the arrests and charges brought against elected officials, political activists, civil society and businesses representatives, journalists, and others with the Statement of the High Representative/Vice-President and Commissioner for Enlargement of 19 March 2025[1].

    On 24 March 2025,[2] the Commission urged the Turkish authorities to uphold democratic values and to fully respect the rights of elected officials as well as right of peaceful demonstration.

    It reminded that as a Council of Europe member and EU candidate, Türkiye must uphold democratic values. The Commission, as well as the Delegation of the EU to Türkiye, expressed both in public and in private meetings with the Turkish authorities the need for Türkiye to uphold the EU standards in relation to freedom of expression and of assembly, including in relation to recent detentions of peaceful protesters in recent weeks.

    The Commission has regularly raised its concerns on the detention conditions in Turkish prisons and detention centres in its enlargement reports on Türkiye[3] and in particular on the need to improve access to healthcare, rehabilitation and resocialisation programmes.

    • [1] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_25_836.
    • [2] https://audiovisual.ec.europa.eu/en/video/I-269761.
    • [3] https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/turkiye-report-2024_en.
    Last updated: 27 June 2025

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Global Gateway initiative – E-002457/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002457/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Engin Eroglu (Renew), Joachim Streit (Renew)

    The Global Gateway initiative aims to offer a strategic alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Funded by European taxpayers, it seeks to promote European values and interests worldwide.

    However, media reports indicate that Chinese state-owned enterprises have won major contracts under EU-funded projects abroad. In some years, they reportedly secured more contract value financed by the European Investment Bank (EIB) than European firms.

    This raises serious concerns about the responsible use of EU funds, the competitiveness of European industry, and the EU’s strategic autonomy.

    • 1.Can the Commission confirm the accuracy of recent media reports regarding Chinese companies being awarded contracts under Global Gateway and in EIB-funded projects, and clarify the extent of their involvement?
    • 2.What measures is the Commission taking – both independently and in cooperation with the EIB – to ensure that EU-funded infrastructure projects do not benefit strategic competitors or undermine Europe’s geopolitical and economic interests, and that European companies and workers benefit fairly from these initiatives?
    • 3.What reforms to the EIB’s procurement rules for non-EU projects could help block tenders based on unfair competition, such as incorporating principles from the Foreign Subsidies Regulation[1]?

    Submitted: 18.6.2025

    • [1] Regulation (EU) 2022/2560 of 14 December 2022 on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2560/oj.
    Last updated: 27 June 2025

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Statements by the President of Azerbaijan on achieving international recognition of the pseudo-state through the Organization of Turkic States – E-001683/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The EU has consistently opposed any actions or statements that seek to upgrade the international status of the so-called ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’, a territory not recognised by the international community.

    Such moves undermine the United Nations (UN) efforts to create a conducive environment for settlement talks. The EU only recognises the Republic of Cyprus as a subject of international law, in line with relevant UN Security Council resolutions.

    The EU has been closely monitoring developments since the Organisation of Turkic States (OTS) Summit in Samarkand in November 2022, when the Turkish Cypriot secessionist entity became an observer to the organisation.

    The EU has expressed its concerns through public statements, including one from the European External Action Service (EEAS) Spokesperson[1], and has actively engaged with all OTS Member States, including Azerbaijan, at all levels on this worrying development. The High Representative/Vice-President has reiterated these concerns in statements made in July[2] and November 2024[3].

    The EU expects its partners to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states and to avoid taking any steps that contradict this principle.

    This expectation has been clearly communicated to Azerbaijan during the visit of the High Representative/Vice-President of the Commission on 25 April 2025, and the EU will continue to convey this message at all levels of political dialogue.

    The EU remains committed to upholding relevant UN Security Council resolutions and fundamental principles of international law, particularly regarding state sovereignty, independence, and integrity. It will continue to work towards ensuring that these principles are fully respected.

    • [1] https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/cyprus-statement-spokesperson-observer-status-turkish-cypriot-secessionist-entity-organisation_en?s=230.
    • [2] https://www.eeas.europa.eu/node/443430_fr.
    • [3] https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/ots-statement-hrvp-josep-borrell-attempts-legitimise-turkish-cypriot-secessionist-entity_en.
    Last updated: 27 June 2025

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Imprisoned EU citizens – E-001441/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    Protecting EU citizens abroad, including those who may be imprisoned in non-EU countries, as well as the collection and provision of detailed information regarding the imprisonment of EU citizens in non-EU countries, falls within the exclusive competency of Member States.

    At their request, the European External Action Service can support Member States in coordinating efforts to ensure the consular protection of unrepresented EU citizens, and may facilitate information sharing where possible, but it does not have the mandate to directly collect or disseminate such data.

    Last updated: 27 June 2025

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Skin sensitisation tests involving the use of guinea pigs – E-001720/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    In 2022, 33 029 skin sensitisation tests were conducted on animals constituting a reduction of 12.2% compared to 2018 and 12.5% compared to 2021.

    Based on ALURES[1] data, most guinea pig sensitisation assays occur in the medical devices (MD) sector. Testing requirements for these are governed by the International Organisation for Standardisation standards, and the relevant standard 10993-10:2021[2] still lists guinea pig assays next to the local lymph node assay (LLNA) and non-animal methods.

    Member States are expected to urge manufacturers to validate the LLNA or other alternatives for specific needs such as MD. Manufacturers should prioritise application of Defined Approaches for skin sensitisation.

    These consist of a combination of non-animal methods and a defined algorithm to interpret results and are described in the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development Guideline 497[3]. These approaches have superior performance compared to the LLNA in predicting human responses.

    Member States require regular reporting on progress made with alternatives, or to limit the project authorisation period for animal tests.

    If validation of the alternative fails, use of animals should continue to be allowed. The Commission collaborates closely with Member States to remind them of the obligations[4] under Directive 2010/63[5] to ask product-specific qualification of recognised alternatives.

    The European Partnership for Alternative Approaches to Animal Testing[6] has invited the MD industry to join initiatives such as the skin sensitisation project to share knowledge and accelerate qualification of non-animal methods also by MD manufacturers.

    The Commission will publish a Roadmap on phasing out animal testing which covers MD legislation.

    • [1] https://environment.ec.europa.eu/topics/chemicals/animals-science/statistics-and-non-technical-project-summaries_en.
    • [2] Biological evaluation of medical devices — Part 10: Tests for skin sensitisation.
    • [3] https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/guideline-no-497-defined-approaches-on-skin-sensitisation_b92879a4-en.html.
    • [4] E.g., during bi-annual meetings.
    • [5] Directive 2010/63/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 September 2010 on the protection of animals used for scientific purposes, OJ L 276, 20.10.2010, p. 33-79.
    • [6] https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/sectors/chemicals/european-partnership-alternative-approaches-animal-testing_en.
    Last updated: 27 June 2025

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Further sanctions against Nord Stream – P-002107/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The EU has imposed unprecedented restrictive measures (sanctions) in response to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, including far-reaching trade restrictions in several economic sectors, and specific financial measures against Russian individuals and entities.

    As the Honourable Member is aware, these sanctions are adopted under the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy and are aimed to maximise their impact on Russia’s ability to conduct and finance its war of aggression.

    On 10 June 2025, the Commission President and the High Representative/Vice-President[1] stated that the joint proposal for the 18th sanctions package includes, among other measures, sanctions on the Nord Stream pipelines.

    This measure should prevent Russia from generating any revenue in the future by using those pipelines to transport natural gas. Those future measures are currently discussed in the Council and require a unanimous adoption.

    The proposals and the negotiations in the Council are not public. Hence, the Commission is not able to comment further on measures prior to their adoption in the Council.

    The Commission will continue to cooperate and coordinate closely with Member States and operators on the implementation and enforcement of sanctions once they are adopted.

    • [1] https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/ukrainerussia-press-remarks-high-representativevice-president-kaja-kallas-joint-press-conference_en.
    Last updated: 27 June 2025

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