Category: Europe

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Protective equipment for motorcyclists and road safety – E-001776/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The Commission shares the concern for the safety of riders of powered two-wheelers (PTW). This is a very vulnerable road user group, and the Commission, in cooperation with Member States, is promoting a range of initiatives to support PTW rider safety.

    In response to the questions:

    1. The Commission has no current plans for an EU proposal for the adoption of specific advanced protective equipment for PTWs, such as airbags.

    2. There are no EU-level funding streams to give specific financial support to the purchase of this equipment.

    3. The Commission promotes the safety of vulnerable road users through all available mechanisms, including the exchange of best practices through the High-Level Group on Road Safety[1] and the biannual EU Road Safety Conferences; a specific focus on vulnerable road users, and PTW safety in particular, for Member States participating in the EU Road Safety Exchange[2]; and highlighting successful initiatives to support PTW safety through the EU Road Safety Charter[3] and in the annual Excellence in Road Safety Awards[4].

    One recent winner of an Excellence in Road Safety Award, an initiative on the use of road markings to promote safe PTW driving in bends, has resulted in a 60% reduction in road trauma, and has been implemented in other Member States.

    The Commission would also emphasise that it recently adopted a proposal[5] to amend Directive 2014/45/EU[6] on periodic roadworthiness tests , where it proposed more stringent requirements by introducing mandatory inspections for motorcycles above 125 cm3.

    The Commission regularly collects the most recent research on topics related to the protection of vulnerable road users, PTW safety in particular, and makes it available to the public through the EU Road Safety Observatory[7].

    • [1] https://road-safety.transport.ec.europa.eu/what-we-do/high-level-group-road-safety_en.
    • [2] https://etsc.eu/projects/eu-road-safety-exchange/.
    • [3] https://road-safety-charter.ec.europa.eu/.
    • [4] https://road-safety-charter.ec.europa.eu/content/excellence-road-safety-awards?page=0.
    • [5] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM%3A2025%3A180%3AFIN.
    • [6] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2014/45/oj/eng.
    • [7] https://road-safety.transport.ec.europa.eu/european-road-safety-observatory/data-and-analysis/thematic-reports_en.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Transparency with regard to the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority – E-001373/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    Under the current EU supervisory framework for the insurance sector[1], national competent authorities hold primary responsibility for the supervision of insurance undertakings and intermediaries operating within their jurisdictions. This includes ensuring compliance with applicable rules, safeguarding consumer protection, and taking corrective measures when necessary.

    Within this framework, the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) promotes supervisory convergence across Member States.

    EIOPA is accountable to the European Parliament and the Council and is subject to the transparency obligations laid down in the EIOPA Regulation[2].

    The Commission is committed to strengthening the supervisory system at EU level, as set out in the communication on the Savings and Investments Union[3].

    • [1] In particular, Directive 2009/138/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009 on the taking-up and pursuit of the business of Insurance and Reinsurance, OJ L 335, 17.12.2009, p. 1-155, and Directive (EU) 2016/97 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 January 2016 on insurance distribution, OJ L 26, 2.2.2016, p. 19-59.
    • [2] Namely Articles 3, 43a and 72 of Regulation (EU) No 1094/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/79/EC.
    • [3] COM(2025) 124.
    Last updated: 25 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – EU Trust Fund for Africa – 2023 discharge – E-001426/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    Addressing migration is a joint responsibility and commitment between the EU, its Member States and EU’s partners based on the principles of solidarity and partnership.

    Fluctuations in irregular border crossings underscore the complex challenges of managing migration, which depends on variety of dynamic factors that require comprehensive and continuous efforts over the long-term.

    The EU Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF)[1] has played a crucial role by addressing the root causes of irregular migration, which is now continuing under the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation — Global Europe Instrument (NDICI-Global Europe).

    Recent data indicate a significant reduction of irregular border crossings via the Central Mediterranean route, with a 59% decrease in 2024 compared to 2023, and similar levels so far in 2025[2].

    The Commission remains committed to the continuous evaluation and adaptation of its programmes to ensure their effectiveness in the ever-changing migration landscape.

    The data provided concerns the voluntary returns and reintegration supported by the EUTF in 2023 and is not related to the North of Africa region.

    In 2023, voluntary returns were funded under NDICI-Global Europe, through the Migrant Protection, Return and Reintegration programme[3], and reached the number of 27 212 both from North and Sub-Saharan Africa while 23 823 were assisted for their reintegration in Sub-Saharan Africa.

    When considering the EUTF projects which created new jobs, most of them were in the private sector. The types of jobs[4] vary according to the region, and include mainly: agriculture, fishery, livestock production or processing sector, construction and infrastructure sector, education, healthcare and social services sectors.

    • [1]  https://trust-fund-for-africa.europa.eu/index_en, established on 12 November 2015.
    • [2]  European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex).
    • [3]  https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/policies/programming/projects/migrant-protection-return-and-reintegration-programme-sub-saharan-africa-mprr-ssa_en#:~:text=The%20Migrant%20Protection%2C%20Return%2C%20and%20Reintegration%20Programme%20for,Africa%2C%20as%20well%20as%20within%20the%20African%20continent.
    • [4]  Source is the Monitoring and Learning System reports available on the EUTF website: https://trust-fund-for-africa.europa.eu/library_en.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Promise of gender equality: another case of possible misuse of EU funding in Gaza – E-002605/2024(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The EU has a robust policy in place to monitor and evaluate projects and programmes implemented under its financial support. Independent final evaluations provide information on the results and impact reached and help to inform EU’s programming. They notably systematically include cross-cutting themes of human rights and gender.

    The specific support to the Palestinian Authority (PA) channelled through PEGASE mechanism[1] directly benefits thousands of civil servants and vulnerable families by contributing to the payment of salaries, pensions and social allowances. Selection of beneficiaries follows a strict safeguard mechanism through ex-ante and ex-post screening.

    Within the framework of the EU’s cooperation with Palestine[2] for the period 2014-2021, for a total amount of EUR 2.4 billion, the EU’s strategy has been aligned with the needs of the most vulnerable Palestinian populations and has played a key role in support to the PA to provide basic services to end beneficiaries.

    Gender equality is a cross-cutting issue within the five pillars of the European Joint Strategy in support to Palestine 2021-2024[3]. The Joint Strategy implementation report for 2022-2023[4] showed progress in improving gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls through the PA gender transformative agenda, the fight against gender-based violence and the promotion of economic, labour and social rights.

    It noted challenges in achieving comprehensive gender equality, aggravated by the current conflict. The EU Gender Action Plan III for the period 2021-2025 is under implementation in Palestine[5].

    • [1] ‘Mécanisme Palestino-Européen de Gestion et d’Aide Socio-économique’ launched in 2008.
    • [2] * This designation shall not be construed as recognition of a State of Palestine and is without prejudice to the individual positions of the Member States on this issue.
    • [3] https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/palestine-occupied-palestinian-territory-west-bank-and-gaza-strip/european-joint-strategy-support-palestine-2021-2024_en?s=206.
    • [4] https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/2024/EJS%20Implementation%20Report_2022%202023.pdf.
    • [5] https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/palestine-occupied-palestinian-territory-west-bank-and-gaza-strip/eu-gender-action-plan-iii-country-level-implementation-plan-west-bank-and-gaza-2021-2025_en?s=206.
    Last updated: 25 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on the mobilisation of the European Union Solidarity Fund to provide assistance to Austria, Poland, Czechia, Slovakia and Moldova relating to floods occurred in September 2024 and Bosnia and Herzegovina relating to floods occurred in October 2024 – A10-0114/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on the proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on the mobilisation of the European Union Solidarity Fund to provide assistance to Austria, Poland, Czechia, Slovakia and Moldova relating to floods occurred in September 2024 and Bosnia and Herzegovina relating to floods occurred in October 2024

    (COM(2025)0250 – C10‑0102/2025 – 2025/0138(BUD))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to the Commission proposal to the European Parliament and the Council (COM(2025)0250 – C10‑0102/2025),

     having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 2012/2002 of 11 November 2002 establishing the European Union Solidarity Fund[1],

     having regard to Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 of 17 December 2020 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027[2], and in particular Article 9 thereof,

     having regard to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 16 December 2020 between the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on budgetary discipline, on cooperation in budgetary matters and on sound financial management, as well as on new own resources, including a roadmap towards the introduction of new own resources[3], and in particular point 10 thereof,

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1058 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 on the European Regional Development Fund and on the Cohesion Fund[4],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1057 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 establishing the European Social Fund Plus (ESF+)[5],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/2115 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 2 December 2021 establishing rules on support for strategic plans to be drawn up by Member States under the common agricultural policy (CAP Strategic Plans) and financed by the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) and by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1305/2013 and (EU) No 1307/2013[6],

     having regard to its resolution of 27 February 2024 on the draft Council regulation amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027[7],

     having regard to its resolution of 17 December 2024 on RESTORE – Regional Emergency Support to Reconstruction amending Regulation (EU) 2021/1058 and Regulation (EU) 2021/1057[8], and in particular the budgetary assessment attached to it,

     having regard to the EEA Report No 1/2024 – European Climate Risk Assessment (EUCRA)[9],

     having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgets (A10-0114/2025),

    A. whereas in September 2024, exceptionally high levels of rainfall occurred in Austria causing severe flooding resulting in total direct damages estimated by the Austrian authorities at EUR 1 711,6 million;

    B. whereas in September 2024, heavy rain occurred in south-western Poland which led to the flooding of several rivers resulting in total direct damages estimated by the Polish authorities at EUR 3,04 billion;

    C. whereas in September 2024, very strong winds and heavy rain struck entire Czechia which led to flooding resulting in total direct damages estimated by the Czech authorities at EUR 2,82 billion;

    D. whereas as of 15 September 2024, Slovakia experienced substantial flooding, particularly in Bratislava and the surrounding regions which led to the levels of the Danube and Morava rivers significantly rising resulting in total direct damages estimated by the Slovakian authorities at EUR 84,3 million;

    E. whereas in September 2024, torrential rain and the resulting floods hit several districts of Moldova resulting in total direct damages estimated by the Moldovan authorities at EUR 7,8 million;

    F. whereas in October 2024, Bosnia and Herzegovina was hit by heavy rainfall which caused catastrophic flash floods, landslides and flooding in several parts of the country resulting in total direct damages estimated by the authorities at EUR 841,85 million;

    G. whereas above mentioned occurrences caused by severe natural disasters are a result of global climate change; whereas the European State of the Climate 2024 confirms that 2024 was the warmest year ever recorded in Europe and that 30 % of the continent’s river network exceeded the “high” flood threshold while 12 % exceeded the “severe” threshold, resulting in the most widespread flooding since 2013;

    1. Expresses its deepest solidarity with all the victims, their families and all the individuals affected by the destructive floods in Austria, Poland, Czechia, Slovakia, Moldova and Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as with the national, regional and local authorities involved in the relief efforts;

    2. Welcomes the decision as a tangible and visible form of the Union’s solidarity with its citizens and the regions in the affected areas, including with those in partner countries;

    3. Reiterates the importance of communicating to the public the tangible benefits brought about by the European Union Solidarity Fund (EUSF), also to further increase citizens’ awareness of Union tools and programmes in the Member States and countries involved in accession negotiations with the Union;

    4. Highlights the increasing number of severe, destructive and deadly natural disasters in Europe and calls on Member States and the Commission to invest in climate mitigation and adaptation measures to avoid human and economic losses; underlines that in 2024 storms and flooding affected an estimated 413 000 people, resulting in the loss of at least 335 lives and that the damage from storms and flooding across Europe during the year is estimated to have cost at least EUR 18 billion[10]; considers that the budget of the EUSF or its equivalent should be substantially expanded in view of the upcoming Commission proposal on the new Multiannual Financial Framework and subsequent inter-institutional negotiations and that the EUSF or its equivalent must provide assistance commensurate to the magnitude of such disasters to citizens; notes that substantially increasing the EUSF would allow Member States to respond more effectively and quickly to disasters while other instruments, particularly cohesion funds whose primary purpose is not disaster response, could be preserved; urges also the Commission to explore all possible avenues for accelerating the mobilisation of the EUSF, in particular by amending current rules and granting higher advance payments to applicant countries;

    5. Calls on the Commission to develop dedicated crisis-response instruments for the post-2027 period, recognising that the increasing frequency and severity of natural disasters, health emergencies, geopolitical instability, and economic shocks require more agile and tailored financial mechanisms at the Union level; underlines the need for enhanced coordination with national civil protection systems and early-warning mechanisms, ensuring a more integrated and data-driven Union-wide disaster response; emphasises the importance of dedicated support for cross-border and regional cooperation in preparedness, mitigation, and recovery efforts, particularly in vulnerable or high-risk areas;

    6. Stresses that the EUSF is only a curative instrument and that the Union should also continue to address climate change adaptation and mitigation by supporting European and national policies to prevent natural disasters; underlines that EEA Report No 1/2024 ‘European Climate Risk Assessment’ warned that the Union is unprepared for the effects of climate change even if the world manages to keep global temperature rise to 1,5 degrees Celsius, as set out in the Paris Agreement, and stresses the need for action to avoid the climate risks identified reaching critical levels; recalls the need for effective synergies with other Union policies and programmes and underlines that Member States should make best use of funding opportunities in particular, of the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund+ and the rural development programmes; calls on the Commission to assess with due urgency any reasoned requests by Member States to reallocate funds within the National Recovery and Resilience plans to natural disaster assistance, in accordance with the rules laid down in Regulation (EU) 2021/241 of the European Parliament and of the Council[11]; stresses also the need for preventive measures, not only to mitigate future damage but also to prevent the exacerbation of risk conditions following catastrophic events, such as floods, wildfires, landslides or the drying up of lakes and rivers; emphasises that all reconstruction financed by the EUSF must be climate-resilient; underlines the importance of adequate flexibility between the different programmes; underscores that assistance provided under the EUSF should not be to the detriment of Union funding received by Member States under other Union policies or programmes; recalls that Member States can grant State aid, in accordance with the applicable Union rules, notably for agricultural businesses that have suffered damages due to natural disasters;

    7. Recalls that RESTORE[12] and the specific measures under the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD)[13] provide additional assistance to Member States affected by natural disasters through further flexibilities in the use of the funds; stresses that Member States should make use of the new opportunities; underlines also that RESTORE provided limited flexibility for some Member States as the implementation of the current Multiannual Financial Framework is very advanced;

    8. Recalls the importance of rapid and solid damage assessment that takes due account of the economic repercussions and calls for increased operational efforts to be made in order to reduce the average time for the release of advanced payments to offer timely assistance to regions affected by natural disasters and extreme weather events, while ensuring the Union budget is protected; stresses that Member States should, in the context of disaster response and recovery measures, give due priority to the needs of the affected population, with particular attention to vulnerable groups;

    9. Stresses the urgent need to release immediate financial assistance through the EUSF to ensure that support can reach the affected regions in a timely manner;

    10. Approves the decision annexed to this resolution;

    11. Instructs its President to sign the decision with the President of the Council and arrange for its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union;

    12. Instructs its President to forward this resolution, including its annex, to the Council and the Commission.

     

     

    ANNEX: DECISION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL

    on the mobilisation of the European Union Solidarity Fund to provide assistance to Austria, Poland, Czechia, Slovakia and Moldova relating to floods occurred in September 2024 and Bosnia and Herzegovina relating to floods occurred in October 2024

    THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

    Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 2012/2002 of 11 November 2002 establishing the European Union Solidarity Fund[14], and in particular Article 4(3) thereof,

    Having regard to Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 of 17 December 2020 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027[15], and in particular Article 9 thereof,

    Having regard to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 16 December 2020 between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on budgetary discipline, on cooperation in budgetary matters and on sound financial management, as well as on new own resources, including a roadmap towards the introduction of new own resources[16], and in particular point 10 thereof,

    Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,

    Whereas:

    (1) The European Union Solidarity Fund (‘the Fund’) aims to enable the Union to respond in a rapid, efficient and flexible manner to emergency situations in order to show solidarity with the population of regions struck by major or regional natural disasters or major public health emergency.

    (2) The Fund is not to exceed the ceilings laid down in Article 9 of Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 2020/2093, as amended by Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/765[17].

    (3) On 29 November 2024, Austria submitted an application to mobilise the Fund following the floods in September 2024.

    (4) On 29 November 2024, Poland submitted an application to mobilise the Fund following the floods in September 2024.

    (5) On 4 December 2024, Czechia submitted an application to mobilise the Fund following the floods in September 2024.

    (6) On 7 December 2024, Slovakia submitted an application to mobilise the Fund following the floods in September 2024.

    (7) On 5 December 2024, Moldova submitted an application to mobilise the Fund following the floods in September 2024.

    (8) On 27 December 2024, Bosnia and Herzegovina submitted an application to mobilise the Fund following the floods in October 2024.

    (9) Those applications meet the conditions for providing a financial contribution from the Fund, as laid down in Article 4 of Regulation (EC) No 2012/2002.

    (10) The Fund should therefore be mobilised to provide a financial contribution to Austria, Poland,  Czechia, Slovakia, Moldova and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

    (11) In order to minimise the time taken to mobilise the Fund, this Decision should apply from the date of its adoption,

    HAVE ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

    Article 1

    For the general budget of the Union for the financial year 2025, the European Union Solidarity Fund shall be mobilised as follows in commitment and payment appropriations in relation to natural disasters:

    (a) the amount of EUR  42 789 075 shall be provided to Austria in relation to floods in September 2024;

    (b) the amount of EUR 75 998 939 shall be provided to Poland in relation to floods in September 2024;

    (c) the amount of EUR 113 979 781 shall be provided to Czechia in relation to floods in September 2024;

    (d) the amount of EUR 2 108 187 shall be provided to  Slovakia in relation to floods in September 2024;

    (e) the amount of EUR 195 196 shall be provided to Moldova in relation to floods in September 2024;

    (f) the amount of EUR 45 669 725 shall be provided to Bosnia and Herzegovina in relation to floods in October 2024.

    Article 2

    This Decision shall enter into force on the day of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

    It shall apply from [the date of its adoption][*].

     

    Done at Brussels,

    For the European Parliament For the Council

    The President  The President

     

    EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

    The Commission proposes to mobilise the European Union Solidarity Fund (EUSF) in accordance with Council Regulation (EC) No 2012/2002 (EUSF regulation) for an amount of EUR 280 740 903 to provide assistance to Austria, Poland, Czechia, Slovakia, Moldova and Bosnia and Herzegovina in relation to the natural disaster (floods) that took place in 2024.

     

    Austria – neighbouring country natural disaster: floods in September 2024

     

    Between 12 and 16 September 2024, exceptionally high levels of rainfall occurred in Austria causing severe flooding. Lower Austria, Upper Austria and Vienna were particularly affected. In some parts of Lower Austria, 300-420 mm of rain fell in five days. The entire province of Lower Austria was declared a disaster area. Protective measures had to be put in place along the Danube River. In Lower Austria, nearly 2 000 houses had to be evacuated, thousands of households were without electricity, drinking water and sewerage for days. The floods led to five fatalities and 24 people were injured in Lower Austria.

     

    Austria estimates the total direct damage caused by the disaster at EUR 1 711.6 million. This amount represents 0.38% of Austria’s Gross National Income (GNI) in 2022. As the same natural disaster qualifies a “major natural disaster” in Czechia, the application from Austria is eligible for a contribution from the EUSF without a specific threshold under the neighbouring country natural disaster criterion as laid down in Article 2(4) of the EUSF Regulation.

     

    Poland – regional natural disaster: floods in September 2024

     

    Between 11 and 16 September 2024, heavy rain occurred in south-western Poland which led to the flooding of several rivers. The most impacted provinces were the Dolnośląskie, Opolskie, Śląskie and Lubuskie provinces. Subsequently, nearly 10 600 residential and more than 2 000 farm buildings were flooded. Over 200 000 people were directly affected by the disaster. Numerous businesses were forced to temporarily suspend or significantly reduce their operations which led to significant financial losses.

     

    The Polish authorities estimate the total direct damage caused by the disaster at EUR 3.04 billion. According the EUSF regulation, where the natural disaster concerns several regions at NUTS level 2, the threshold shall be applied to the average GDP of those regions weighted according to the share of total damage in each region. The direct damage expressed as a percentage of total weighted regional GDP of Dolnośląskie, Opolskie, Śląskie and Lubuskie provinces is 8.46%. This amount exceeds 1.5% of the weighted average regional GDP of Dolnośląskie, Opolskie, Śląskie and Lubuskie provinces.

     

    Czechia – major natural disaster: floods in September 2024

     

    Between 12 and 17 September 2024, very strong winds and heavy rain struck the entire country which led to flooding. The most affected regions were the Moravian-Silesian and the Olomouc Region. Dozens of houses and approximately 1 000 road and railway bridges and 2 000 km of roads and railway lines were destroyed, or damaged. More than 350 schools were flooded. Over 250 000 households were left without electricity, heat and drinking water. As a result, over 13 000 people, as well as several hospitals had to be evacuated. The floods also led to eight fatalities.

     

    The Czech authorities estimate the total direct damage caused by the disaster at EUR 2.82 billion. This amount exceeds the ‘major natural disaster’ threshold for Czechia of 0.6% of its Gross National Income, which was EUR 1.58 billion in 2024. Therefore, the disaster qualifies as a ‘major natural disaster’ according to Article 2(2) of the EUSF Regulation.

     

    Slovakia – neighbouring country natural disaster: floods in September 2024

     

    As of 15 September 2024, Slovakia experienced substantial flooding, particularly in Bratislava and the surrounding regions. Both the Danube and Morava rivers saw significant water level rises, with return periods exceeding 100 years in some locations. Cumulative rainfall reached up to 400 mm in the Záhorie region, exacerbating the impact. The most significant damage was attributed to smaller rivers, where levee breaches were reported, amplifying the flooding and leading to destruction in both rural and urban areas. Roads, bridges, and other critical infrastructure were severely affected, straining emergency response efforts.

     

    Slovakia estimates the total direct damage caused by the disaster at EUR 84.3 million. This amount represents 0.07% of Slovakia’s Gross National Income (GNI) in 2022. As the same natural disaster qualifies a “major natural disaster” in Czechia, the application from Slovakia is eligible for a contribution from the EUSF without a specific threshold under the neighbouring country natural disaster criterion as laid down in Article 2(4) of the EUSF Regulation.

     

    Moldova – regional natural disaster: floods in September 2024

     

    Between 14 and 16 September 2024, torrential rain and the resulting floods hit the Cantemir, Hincesti, Leova, Straseni, Floresti and Telenesti districts of Moldova. Over 200 000 people were affected by the disaster. The floods destroyed or damaged 20 bridges, 8 educational institutions and several public buildings. Dozens of houses and cellars were flooded and over 60 people needed to be rescued.

     

    The Moldovan authorities estimate the total direct damage caused by the disaster at EUR 7.8 million. The Moldovan authorities submitted the application under the “regional natural disaster” criterion as laid down in Article 2(3) of the EUSF Regulation, which is any natural disaster in a region at NUTS level 2 of an eligible State resulting in direct damage exceeding 1.5% of that region’s gross domestic product (GDP).

     

    Bosnia and Herzegovina – major natural disaster: floods in October 2024

     

    Between 3 and 17 October 2024, Bosnia and Herzegovina was hit by heavy rainfall, which caused catastrophic flash floods, landslides and flooding in the central, southern and western parts of the country. Herzegovina-Neretva, Central Bosnia, Zenica-Doboj and Canton 10 were the most affected cantons. In addition to power outages lasting several days and disruptions to landline and mobile phone services, there was also a complete disruption to road and rail transport. This caused severe physical and financial damage to residential and commercial buildings, as well as to the transport, water and sewage system. The floods led to 27 fatalities and 22 people were injured. Many families were forced to leave their homes and were accommodated in temporary shelters.

     

    The authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina estimate the total direct damage caused by the disaster at EUR 841.85 million. This amount exceeds the ‘major natural disaster’ threshold for Bosnia and Herzegovina of 0.6% of its Gross National Income, which was EUR 138.33 million in 2024. Therefore, the disaster qualifies as a ‘major natural disaster’ according to Article 2(2) of the EUSF Regulation.

     

    Conclusion

     

    The methodology for calculating the aid was set out in the 2002-2003 Annual Report on the EUSF and accepted by the Council and the European Parliament. The Commision therefore proposes to the budget authority to mobilise the following amounts for the applications submitted by Austria, Poland, Czechia, Slovakia, Moldova and Bosnia and Herzegovina:

     

    Disaster

    Total direct damage (EUR)

    Applied disaster threshold

    (EUR)

    2,5% of total direct damage (up to the threshold for major diasters) (EUR)

    6% of direct damage above the major disaster threshold (EUR)

    2.5% of total direct damage

    Total amount of aid proposed (EUR)

    Advance paid

    (EUR)

    Balance to be paid

    (EUR)

    Austria-floods

    (neighbouring disaster)

    1 711 563 002

    N/A

    N/A

    N/A

    42 789 075

    42 789 075

    10 663 587

     

    32 125 488

    Poland-floods

    (regional disaster)

    3 039 957 574

    538 909 893

    N/A

    N/A

    75 998 939

    75 998 939

    N/A

     

    75 998 939

    Czechia

    (major disaster)

    2 821 143 019

    1 579 680 000

    39 492 000

    74 487 781

    N/A

    113 979 781

    N/A

     

    113 979 781

    Slovakia-floods

    (neighbouring disaster)

    84 327 482

    N/A

    N/A

    N/A

    2 108 187

    2 108 187

    N/A

     

    2 108 187

    Moldova-floods

    (regional disaster)

    7 807 840

    226 331

    N/A

    N/A

    195 196

    195 196

    N/A

     

    195 196

    Bosnia and Herzegovia-floods

    (major disaster)

    841 851 670

    138 325 000

    3 458 125

    42 211 600

    N/A

    45 669 725

    N/A

     

    45 669 725

    TOTAL

    280 740 903

    10 663 587

    270 077 316

     

     

    Council Regulation 2024/765[18] of 29 February 2024 amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021-2027 split the Solidarity and Emergency Aid Reserve (SEAR) in two separate instruments: the European Solidarity Reserve and the Emergency Aid Reserve. The European Solidarity Reserve with an annual amount of EUR 1 016 million (in 2018 prices, corresponding to EUR 1 167.1 million in 2025 prices) will be used for assistance to respond to emergency situations covered by the EUSF.

    In order to avoid an early depletion of the annual allocation, Article 3(7) of the EUSF Regulation and Article 9(2), second subparagraph, of the amended MFF Regulation stipulate  that 25% of the annual EUSF allocation (i.e. EUR 291.8 million for 2025) shall remain available on 1 October of each year.

    Finally, according to the Article 4a(4) of the EUSF Regulation, the amount of EUR 50 000 000 has been already inscribed in the EU general budget 2025 (in commitments and payments appropriations) for the payment of possible advances.

    Therefore, the maximum amount that can be used by the EUSF at this stage is EUR 908,95 million (excluding the reserve for advances and the amound that will become available on 1 October). After this mobilisation EUR 980,64 million will remain available for upcoing mobilisastions.

     

    Amount available under the EUSF in 2025 (EUR):

     

    Total annual 2025 EUSF allocation (incl. 1 October tranche)

    1 167 064 638

    Amount carried over from 2024 (incl. unused advances) (+)

    194 316 161

    Credits reserved for advance payments (-)

    50 000 000

    Amount already used for advances to Spain and Austria (-)

    110 663 587

    Amount available only after 1 October (-)

    291 766 160

    Total amount currenty available (excl. reserve for advances and 1 October tranche)

    908 951 052

    Amount proposed for mobilisation under current  Mobilisation Decision (only balance to be paid)

    270 077 316

    Remaining amount for future applications (inc. for advances and 1 October tranche)

    980 639 896

     

     

    The Rapporteur recommends the swift approval of the Commission proposal for a decision annexed to this report, leading to the rapid mobilisation of the aforementioned amounts, as a sign of European solidarity with Austria, Poland, Czechia, Slovakia, Moldova and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The rapporteur calls on the Commission that this financial contribution should be delivered with particular urgency.

     

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Draghi Report: cost, contract award and transparency – E-000544/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    1. The Commission appointed Mr Draghi as unpaid Special Adviser to President of the Commission from 3 October 2023 to 30 September 2024 to draft a report on the future of European competitiveness.

    2. M. Draghi was not awarded a contract but appointed to the position of unpaid Special Adviser. This is therefore not a process that involves competitive bidding. The President of the Commission appointed him to draft the report based on his very deep and wide-ranging experience.

    3. The Commission, at this stage, cannot provide with further information on possible future contracts for reports or analyses to experts that will be commissioned during this mandate.

    Last updated: 25 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Frontloading elements of the EU asylum and migration package on the basis of a completely inadequate EU list of safe countries of origin – E-001852/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    On 16 April 2025, the Commission proposed[1] to frontload two key elements of the Asylum Procedure Regulation 2024/1348[2]: (i) the 20% or lower recognition rate threshold as an acceleration ground and (ii) the possibility to designate safe third countries and safe countries of origin with exceptions.

    The aim of anticipating the application of these measures is to provide Member States with the possibility to use some of the key provisions of the Pact on Migration and Asylum[3] sooner than their originally expected date of application, providing them with more tools to manage the asylum caseload in an effective manner.

    The same proposal also puts forward a first EU list of safe countries of origin to support a uniform application of the concept, while helping Member States to process asylum applications faster and more efficiently.

    The countries proposed for designation were selected using a range of criteria, including the fact that they create a significant asylum caseload in the EU.

    The assessment of whether a third country is a safe country of origin in accordance with the Asylum Procedure Regulation is based on a range of sources, including information from Member States, the EU Asylum Agency, the European External Action Service, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and other relevant international organisations.

    Third-country nationals without a right to stay are subject to Directive 2008/115/EC (the Return Directive)[4]. On 11 March 2025 the Commission tabled a proposal for a regulation[5] establishing a common system for returns, which aims at establishing swifter, simpler and more effective return procedures across the EU.

    • [1] Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2024/1348 as regards the establishment of a list of safe countries of origin at Union level, COM(2025) 186 final.
    • [2] Regulation (EU) 2024/1348 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 establishing a common procedure for international protection in the Union and repealing Directive 2013/32/EU; OJ L, 2024/1348, 22.5.2024.
    • [3] https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/migration-and-asylum/pact-migration-and-asylum_en.
    • [4] Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals, OJ L 348, 24.12.2008, p. 98-107.
    • [5] Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of The Council establishing a common system for the return of third-country nationals staying illegally in the Union, and repealing Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and the Council, Council Directive 2001/40/EC and Council Decision 2004/191/EC, COM(2025) 101 final.
    Last updated: 25 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Chinese Foreign Minister Meets with Diplomatic Representatives of EU and Its Member States

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    BEIJING, June 25 (Xinhua) — Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi held a collective meeting with diplomatic representatives of the European Union and its member states in Beijing on Wednesday.

    As Wang Yi, also a member of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee, reminded, this year marks the 50th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the EU. As two major constructive forces in the modern world, China and the EU should enhance mutual trust, properly resolve differences, and join forces to elevate the China-EU comprehensive strategic partnership to a new height.

    Wang Yi put forward a three-point proposal for the future development of China-EU relations.

    Firstly, the head of the Chinese Foreign Ministry pointed out, the parties must adhere to mutual respect, in particular, respect each other’s fundamental interests and important concerns in practice.

    China hopes that the EU will continue to strictly adhere to the one-China principle and oppose any form of separatist activity aimed at achieving “Taiwan independence,” the Chinese diplomat stressed.

    Secondly, the parties should adhere to the established positioning of the bilateral partnership. According to Wang Yi, China and the EU are partners, not rivals, and certainly not enemies.

    Third, the two sides should adhere to multilateralism. China firmly upholds the international system with the UN at its core, the international order based on international law, and the fundamental norms of international relations based on the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, Wang said, adding that China consistently advocates peaceful negotiations and rejects the use of force.

    According to the Chinese diplomat, the three global initiatives put forward by Chinese President Xi Jinping, the Belt and Road Initiative and the concept of building a community with a shared future for mankind are the contributions of Chinese wisdom and Chinese solutions to the international community.

    “China and the EU should follow the trend of the times, strengthen mutual understanding, build mutual trust, promote mutual success and brighten the world,” Wang added.

    The head of the EU diplomatic mission and diplomatic representatives of EU member states said that China has always been an important partner for the European Union.

    According to them, the EU is ready to move forward with China, develop constructive and stable relations, jointly confront global challenges, defend multilateralism, and promote peace and security throughout the world. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Chinese Defense Minister Meets with Participants of SCO Defense Ministers’ Meeting

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    QINGDAO, June 25 (Xinhua) — Chinese Defense Minister Dong Jun held separate meetings with his counterparts from Belarus, Iran, Pakistan, Kyrgyzstan and Russia in Qingdao, east China’s Shandong Province, on Wednesday.

    From June 25 to 26, the above-mentioned officials are taking part in a meeting of defense ministers of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) member states.

    Dong Jun stated that the world is currently witnessing a strengthening of the regressive tendencies of unilateralism and protectionism, while manifestations of hegemonism, despotism and bullying are seriously undermining the international order, becoming the biggest sources of chaos and troubles.

    The Chinese minister called for strengthening coordination within multilateral structures such as the UN and the SCO, upholding international fairness and justice, and protecting global strategic stability.

    Dong Jun’s interlocutors highly appreciated China’s active efforts and important contribution as the rotating chair of the SCO aimed at strengthening institutional mechanisms and deepening cooperation in all areas, expressing their firm intention to strengthen and develop cooperation in the military sphere. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: US to hold talks with Iran next week – D. Trump

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    THE HAGUE, June 25 (Xinhua) — U.S. President Donald Trump announced in The Hague, the Netherlands, on Wednesday that the United States will hold talks with Iran next week.

    “We are going to talk to them – to Iran – next week. We can sign an agreement,” D. Trump said at a press conference following the NATO summit.

    Earlier on Wednesday, Trump noted that the ceasefire between Iran and Israel was being observed “very well.” –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Iran says military commander killed in Israeli airstrike

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    TEHRAN, June 25 (Xinhua) — Ali Shadmani, chief of the central staff of Iran’s Khatam al-Anbia Armed Forces, has died from wounds sustained in an Israeli air strike, the headquarters said on Wednesday.

    According to the semi-official Tasnim news agency, A. Shadmani, who recently replaced Gholam Ali Rashid as chief of staff, was seriously wounded during Israeli strikes on Iran last week.

    The Jewish state’s army then announced that it had killed A. Shadmani in a nighttime airstrike on a command center located in central Tehran. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: JOINT MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the case of Dr Ahmadreza Djalali in Iran – RC-B10-0284/2025/REV1

    Source: European Parliament

    pursuant to Rules 150(5) and 136(4) of the Rules of Procedure
    replacing the following motions:
    B10‑0284/2025 (Verts/ALE)
    B10‑0285/2025 (Renew)
    B10‑0296/2025 (S&D)
    B10‑0299/2025 (PPE)
    B10‑0300/2025 (ECR)

    Sebastião Bugalho, Michał Wawrykiewicz, David McAllister, Željana Zovko, Loucas Fourlas, Isabel Wiseler‑Lima, Tomas Tobé, Miriam Lexmann, Andrey Kovatchev, Ingeborg Ter Laak, Dariusz Joński, Loránt Vincze, Danuše Nerudová, Mirosława Nykiel, Antonio López‑Istúriz White, Davor Ivo Stier, Luděk Niedermayer, Liudas Mažylis, Inese Vaidere
    on behalf of the PPE Group
    Yannis Maniatis, Francisco Assis, Evin Incir, Daniel Attard, Chloé Ridel
    on behalf of the S&D Group
    Adam Bielan, Małgorzata Gosiewska, Rihards Kols, Aurelijus Veryga, Diego Solier, Nora Junco García, Mariusz Kamiński, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Charlie Weimers, Ondřej Krutílek, Veronika Vrecionová, Alexandr Vondra, Arkadiusz Mularczyk, Bogdan Rzońca, Assita Kanko, Marlena Maląg, Marion Maréchal, Waldemar Tomaszewski, Kris Van Dijck
    on behalf of the ECR Group
    Abir Al‑Sahlani, Petras Auštrevičius, Malik Azmani, Dan Barna, Benoit Cassart, Olivier Chastel, Veronika Cifrová Ostrihoňová, Engin Eroglu, Bart Groothuis, Svenja Hahn, Karin Karlsbro, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, Nathalie Loiseau, Jan‑Christoph Oetjen, Urmas Paet, Marie‑Agnes Strack‑Zimmermann, Hilde Vautmans, Lucia Yar
    on behalf of the Renew Group
    Alice Kuhnke
    on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group
    Jonas Sjöstedt

    Document selected :  

    RC-B10-0284/2025

    Texts tabled :

    RC-B10-0284/2025

    Texts adopted :

    European Parliament resolution on the case of Dr Ahmadreza Djalali in Iran

    (2025/2753(RSP))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to its previous resolutions on the Islamic Republic of Iran,

     having regard to Rules 150(5) and 136(4) of its Rules of Procedure,

    A. whereas Swedish-Iranian national Dr Ahmad Reza Djalali, a specialist in emergency medicine and a scholar at Belgium’s Vrije Universiteit Brussel and Italy’s Università del Piemonte Orientale, was arrested on 24 April 2016 by the Iranian security forces;

    B. whereas Djalali was sentenced to death on spurious espionage charges in October 2017 following a grossly unfair trial based on a confession extracted under torture; whereas the sentence was upheld by Iran’s Supreme Court on 17 June 2018;

    C. whereas Djalali has been denied adequate medical care despite the severe deterioration in his physical health and the risk to his life, including a recent heart attack at Evin prison; whereas Iran has continued to threaten to implement his death sentence;

    D. whereas hundreds of individuals have already been executed in 2025 and at least 972 were executed in 2024, a 14 % increase on 2023;

    E. whereas the Iranian Government refuses to recognise Djalali’s Swedish citizenship;

    F. whereas this case is part of a systematic pattern of unlawful detentions and hostage diplomacy by the Iranian regime;

    1. Calls on Iran to immediately release Dr Djalali along with all political prisoners currently being detained; calls on Iran to put a moratorium on executions and to abolish the death penalty;

    2. Strongly condemns Djalali’s sham trial and the Iranian authorities’ brutal treatment of him, amounting to torture and ill treatment, as he was subjected to months of interrogation in solitary confinement, and then sentenced to death;

    3. Urges Iran to provide Djalali, whose health is deteriorating, with immediate and unrestricted access to necessary specialised medical care at an external hospital; urges Iran, furthermore, to provide Djalali with legal representation and legal defence, and allow him regular contact with his family;

    4. Calls on the relevant Member States and the European External Action Service to intensify diplomatic efforts and adopt targeted measures in response to Iran’s continued detention of EU nationals, including Cécile Kohler, Jacques Paris and others, as part of its hostage diplomacy and in violation of international law;

    5. Reiterates its call on the Council to designate the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps a terrorist organisation and extend EU sanctions to all those responsible for taking EU nationals hostage and for mass executions of opposition voices and other human rights violations;

    6. Demands that Iran grant full access to UN human rights mechanisms, including the Special Rapporteur, and the EU’s full support and increase support for civil society organisations;

    7. Emphasises that EU-Iran engagements must be founded on tangible progress on democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the release of all political prisoners;

    8. Asks the VP/HR to raise Djalali’s case publicly and in all engagements with her Iranian counterparts;

    9. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Government of Iran, the VP/HR, the Commission, the Member States and the United Nations.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Funding of Animal Rebellion – E-001574/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The Commission is not aware of any EU funding to the Animal rebellion group under its current name PLANT BASED CAMPAIGNS LTD[1].

    A person or entity may be excluded from participating in award procedures or from implementing Union funds if they meet any of the situations outlined in Article 138 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (recast)[2].

    This regulation provides grounds for exclusion including grave professional misconduct by inciting discrimination, hatred or violence against individuals or groups that are engaging in activities that are contrary to the values enshrined in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union[3].

    • [1] https://find-and-update.company-information.service.gov.uk/company/12064173.
    • [2] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L_202402509.
    • [3] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:12012M002.
    Last updated: 25 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – European main battle tank – E-001662/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Defence Fund (EDF) aims to support collaborative research and development (R&D) projects based on common priorities agreed by the Member States.

    The development of a next-generation main battle tank (MBT) is one of these priorities, as set out in the EU Capability Development Plan[1] and the Strategic Compass[2].

    In line with this, the EDF launched a call for proposals in 2023 to initiate such development, complementing the multinational Main Ground Combat System programme led by France and Germany.

    Through this call, Member States agreed on the requirements for key technologies necessary for the next-generation European MBT, and industry was invited to establish a consortium to conduct the necessary R&D.

    As a result, two projects (i.e. Main ARmoured Tank of Europe[3] and Technologies for existing and Future MBTs[4]) were selected for funding to conduct the initial R&D stages.

    A follow-up R&D action for these projects is high on the agenda for discussions with Member States, thus demonstrating a convergence of national plans.

    While Member States are free to decide which defence capabilities to develop and procure, the EU could further incentivise Member States to engage in joint procurement, which would reduce the number of systems used in the different defence capability areas.

    The Security Action for Europe Regulation[5] is a case in point, as it encourages Member States to buy together by offering them access to loans and simplified procurement rules, including in land combat capabilities.

    • [1] https://eda.europa.eu/publications-and-data/thematic-policy-reports/the-2023-eu-capability-development-priorities.
    • [2] https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/strategic-compass-security-and-defence-1_en.
    • [3] https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/document/download/b816bef0-0a9f-439d-9f30-2dfc97373b55_en?filename=EDF-2023-DA-GROUND-MBT%20MARTE.pdf.
    • [4] https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/document/download/37439eaf-8092-4e5b-ba7d-216ec4fa891b_en?filename=EDF-2023-DA-GROUND-MBT%20FMBTech.pdf.
    • [5] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/1106/oj/eng.
    Last updated: 25 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Free movement in the EU – E-001781/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The Commission would like to recall that legislation applicable to prostitution is a matter that remains within the competence of Member States, which have different approaches and legislations in this area.

    1. Restrictions on the right to move and reside freely on grounds of public policy and public security are set in Chapter VI of Directive 2004/38/EC[1], Articles 27 to 33. Member States retain the freedom to determine the requirements of public policy and public security in accordance with their needs, but they must interpret those requirements strictly. Restrictive measures, including a detention measure or ending a right to reside in or enter a Member State, may be taken only on a case-by-case basis where the personal conduct of an individual represents a genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat affecting one of the fundamental interests of the society of the host Member State[2].

    2. The Anti-Trafficking Directive (Directive 2011/36/EU)[3] provides for minimum common rules for Member States to address the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation as a purpose of trafficking in human beings, in so far as the other elements of the offence (i.e. the intentional act and the means) are met. It is for Member States to assess if, in individual cases, these elements are fulfilled. The directive is without prejudice to the way in which Member States deal with prostitution in their national law.

    • [1]  Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, OJ L 158, 30.4.2004.
    • [2] C-331/16 and C-366/16, K and H.
    • [3] Directive 2011/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2011 on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA, OJ L 101, 15.4.2011.
    Last updated: 25 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Making the French solidarity grocery store model more sustainable and widespread under the ESF+, and possibilities for European harmonisation – E-001892/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    With an allocated amount of EUR 5.3 billion for material support, the European Social Fund Plus (ESF+) is, in continuation to the Fund for European Aid to the Most Deprived (FEAD), the only instrument to target exclusively the most disadvantaged in the EU.

    According to Article 21 of the ESF+ Regulation[1], the food and/or basic material assistance shall be distributed free of charge to the most deprived persons. In case that paid-for products are distributed in the same place as the ESF+ support, those will have to be financed through different resources.

    In practice, the organisations delivering food support combine ESF+ support with national and private financing, including food donations, in order to ensure a wider coverage for the most deprived.

    The ESF+ Community of Practice for Material Support[2] explores and promotes innovative practices in delivering material support, in line with the regulatory framework for addressing material deprivation with ESF+ programmes.

    • [1] Regulation (EU) 2021/1057 of the European Parliament and of the Council
      of 24 June 2021establishing the European Social Fund Plus (ESF+) and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1296/2013 — https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1057/oj/eng.
    • [2] https://www.socialinnovationplus.eu/cop/material-support/.
    Last updated: 25 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Anti-white racism and Christianophobia: the forgotten victims of the EU’s strategy against racism – E-001643/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    In line with President of the Commission’s Political Guidelines for 2024-2029[1], the Commission initiated the preparatory works for a new anti-racism strategy that follows upon the EU anti-racism action plan 2020-2025. Building on the action plan, the Commission is determined to develop a strategy that addresses all forms of racism.

    The call for evidence to which the Honourable Members refer was launched on 15 April 2025 alongside an open public consultation on the new strategy. Both are still ongoing and will close on 8 July 2025.

    Any interested stakeholder can participate in the public consultation process. The Commission does not disburse any funding in the consultation process to stakeholders that provide a contribution and the strategy itself does not involve any costs.

    • [1] https://commission.europa.eu/document/e6cd4328-673c-4e7a-8683-f63ffb2cf648_en.
    Last updated: 25 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Funding for trauma-informed support structures – E-002384/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002384/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Kathleen Funchion (The Left)

    Are there any EU-funded or -supported programmes operating in Ireland or elsewhere that fund trauma-informed support structures for students in schools? If operating in Ireland, what is their managing authority? If there are no such programmes in Ireland or elsewhere, will the Commission, in the context of future cohesion policy, look at funding such support structures?

    Submitted: 12.6.2025

    Last updated: 25 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – The Methane Regulation, energy security and competitiveness Does the Commission intend to respond to the Member States’ concerns? – E-002452/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002452/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Piotr Müller (ECR)

    According to media reports, some Member States are calling for a reduction in the methane monitoring and reporting obligations provided for under the already adopted Methane Regulation.

    These proposals are to be considered as part of the announced Omnibus Simplification Package.

    EU climate policy, when pursued without taking into account economic and technological realities, increasingly leads to a decline in competitiveness, destabilisation of the energy market and higher costs for producers. Unreasonable administrative burdens are not conducive to innovation or investment. In this context, there are also worrying signs of possible barriers being imposed on imports of American LNG, which should be unequivocally supported as a strategic alternative to Russian raw materials.

    I would therefore ask the Commission to answer the following questions:

    • 1.How does the Commission intend to respond to the calls from Member States to reduce obligations under the Methane Regulation?
    • 2.Does the Commission plan to adapt the legislation to market realities and technological possibilities?

    Submitted: 18.6.2025

    Last updated: 25 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Commission spending on buildings – E-000410/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    When the Commission President decided to use the existing room for resting in the Berlaymont to reside when she is in Brussels, she decided as well to have a monthly deduction of her allowance to cover for all expenses related to her accommodation and more.

    The sale of 23 buildings reduces overall building expenditure whilst simultaneously improving and greening the Commission’s real estate portfolio (in line with its climate neutrality objective) and ensuring good and modern working conditions for its staff.

    Starting from a total office space of 780 000 m2 in 2021, the Commission aims to reach 580 000 m2 by 2030. This net reduction of 200 000 m2 is obtained by abandoning around 500 000 m2 in buildings with low environmental performance and taking up around 300 000 m2 of office space in new high-performance buildings to improve and green the Commission’s real estate. Of the 23 buildings sold, the Commission continues to occupy 17 until 2026-2027 and 3 until 2029.

    The Commission is actively seeking new surfaces on the market to replace sold buildings. The Commission considers leasing new buildings to be more cost-effective than retaining ownership of the buildings sold as the latter would have involved costs for renovation (with related project and legal uncertainty) and for leasing additional surfaces during renovation.

    Last updated: 25 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Memorandum of Understanding between the EU and Rwanda – E-000898/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The EU-Rwanda memorandum of understanding (MoU)[1] is a tool to help the EU address illicit trafficking and to promote a sustainable and responsible sourcing and processing of raw materials.

    The MoU was negotiated by the Commission on the basis of a mandate by the Council of the EU and is in line with the EU’s renewed Great Lakes Strategy[2].

    The MoU has provided a platform to encourage Rwandan authorities to adhere to the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative[3]. Its cancelation would remove the basis for this engagement with Rwanda on improving transparency and traceability. The MoU and the Conflict Minerals Regulation[4] are coherent and have the potential to reinforce each other.

    The main objective of the regulation is to ensure that EU importers of tin, tantalum, tungsten buy from responsible sources only, in line with the standards set by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development[5].

    The EU has been financing the European Partnership for Responsible Minerals[6], an accompanying measure to the Conflict Minerals Regulation, while also aiming at improving mineral resources management.

    The programme ‘Peace and Security for Stability in the Great Lakes region’[7], which supports the implementation of a regional certification mechanism, also aims at reducing mineral resources impact on conflict.

    The Commission takes note of the call expressed by the European Parliament in its plenary resolution of 13 February 2025[8].

    Following the Foreign Affairs Council meetings of 24 February and 17 March 2025, several measures have been taken, including the adoption of additional restrictive measures, the suspension of the EU security and defence consultations with Rwanda. The MoU regarding critical raw materials was put under review[9].

    In line with the calls from African partners, the EU fully supports the mediation efforts aiming at ending the atrocities and finding a peaceful resolution to the conflict.

    • [1] https://ec.europa.eu/docsroom/documents/58035.
    • [2] https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6631-2023-INIT/en/pdf.
    • [3] https://eiti.org/.
    • [4]  Regulation (EU) 2017/821, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32017R0821.
    • [5] https://mneguidelines.oecd.org/an-international-standard-oecd-due-diligence-guidance-for-responsible-mineral-supply-chains.htm, https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/oecd-guidelines-for-multinational-enterprises-on-responsible-business-conduct_81f92357-en.html.
    • [6] https://europeanpartnership-responsibleminerals.eu/.
    • [7] Details of this programme are available at this link: https://mirego.bi/applications/views/UE.php.
    • [8] https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-10-2025-0020_EN.html.
    • [9] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/fac/2025/02/24/.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Commission proposes EU Space Act to boost market access and strengthen space safety

    Source: European Commission

    European Commission Press release Brussels, 25 Jun 2025 Today, the European Commission has proposed the EU Space Act, a new set of ambitious measures to make Europe’s space sector cleaner, safer and more competitive in Europe and its export markets.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: JOINT MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on media freedom in Georgia, particularly the case of Mzia Amaglobeli – RC-B10-0282/2025/REV1

    Source: European Parliament

    pursuant to Rules 150(5) and 136(4) of the Rules of Procedure
    replacing the following motions:
    B10‑0282/2025 (Verts/ALE)
    B10‑0287/2025 (Renew)
    B10‑0289/2025 (S&D)
    B10‑0290/2025 (PPE)
    B10‑0295/2025 (ECR)

    Sebastião Bugalho, Rasa Juknevičienė, David McAllister, Željana Zovko, Isabel Wiseler‑Lima, Tomas Tobé, Miriam Lexmann, Andrey Kovatchev, Ingeborg Ter Laak, Michał Wawrykiewicz, Dariusz Joński, Loránt Vincze, Danuše Nerudová, Mirosława Nykiel, Antonio López‑Istúriz White, Davor Ivo Stier, Luděk Niedermayer, Liudas Mažylis, Inese Vaidere, Loucas Fourlas, Krzysztof Brejza
    on behalf of the PPE Group
    Yannis Maniatis, Francisco Assis, Tobias Cremer
    on behalf of the S&D Group
    Adam Bielan, Małgorzata Gosiewska, Rihards Kols, Mariusz Kamiński, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Alexandr Vondra, Ondřej Krutílek, Veronika Vrecionová, Joachim Stanisław Brudziński, Bogdan Rzońca, Arkadiusz Mularczyk, Assita Kanko, Marlena Maląg, Waldemar Tomaszewski
    on behalf of the ECR Group
    Urmas Paet, Petras Auštrevičius, Malik Azmani, Dan Barna, Benoit Cassart, Olivier Chastel, Veronika Cifrová Ostrihoňová, Engin Eroglu, Svenja Hahn, Karin Karlsbro, Ľubica Karvašová, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, Nathalie Loiseau, Jan‑Christoph Oetjen, Marie‑Agnes Strack‑Zimmermann, Eugen Tomac, Hilde Vautmans, Lucia Yar, Dainius Žalimas
    on behalf of the Renew Group
    Lena Schilling, Markéta Gregorová
    on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group
    Hanna Gedin, Jonas Sjöstedt, Per Clausen

    Document selected :  

    RC-B10-0282/2025

    Texts tabled :

    RC-B10-0282/2025

    Texts adopted :

    European Parliament resolution on media freedom in Georgia, particularly the case of Mzia Amaglobeli

    (2025/2752(RSP))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to its previous resolutions on Georgia,

     having regard to Rules 150(5) and 136(4) of its Rules of Procedure,

    A. whereas Mzia Amaglobeli, a journalist and co-founder of Batumelebi and Netgazeti outlets, was arrested during pro-European protests on 12 January 2025 and faces four to seven years in prison for a provoked incident involving a police officer;

    B. whereas the adoption of draconian legislation – such as the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) and amendments to the Law on Broadcasting, Code of Administrative Offences and Law on Grants – constitutes a dangerous acceleration of democratic backsliding and deliberate authoritarian strategy by Georgian Dream to silence critical voices in civil society and independent media and persecute the political opposition;

    C. whereas the authorities have virtually annihilated remaining independent media outlets in the country; whereas the public information space is fully dominated by pro-government media, spreading Russian-style propaganda and anti-European disinformation;

    D. whereas in Mzia Amaglobeli’s case, the authorities ignored procedural safeguards, imposed pre-trial detention without a clear legal basis, contested by the Public Defender, and assigned a presiding judge lacking qualifications in criminal law; whereas she is being punished for exposing corruption and reporting on election fraud during the 2024 elections;

    E. whereas she reportedly suffered inhumane treatment and undertook a 38-day hunger strike;

    F. whereas Estonia and Lithuania have imposed personal sanctions on Georgian judges and police officers linked to Mzia Amaglobeli’s case;

    1. Demands Mzia Amaglobeli’s immediate and unconditional release and the withdrawal of all charges against her, and denounces her politically motivated arrest and prosecution;

    2. Strongly condemns the Georgian Dream regime’s systemic assault on democratic institutions, political opposition, independent media, civil society and judicial independence;

    3. Expresses deep concern over arbitrary detentions and the harassment of, and violence against, journalists in Georgia, including smear campaigns, legal persecution, abuse and gender-based violence in detention; calls for independent investigations and urges the authorities to immediately end intimidation and ensure journalists’ safety and freedom;

    4. Urges the Georgian authorities to release all political prisoners and other illegally detained persons without delay, including activist Mate Devidze, opposition leaders Zurab Japaridze, Nika Melia and Nika Gvaramia, and former President Mikheil Saakashvili, and denounces the violent abduction of UNM Chair Tina Bokuchava’s husband and the reported threats to her children’s safety;

    5. Calls for the immediate repeal of all repressive legislation, the restoration of democracy, and full protection of media freedom and civil liberties;

    6. Calls for the EU to step up support for Georgia’s independent media and civil society following the entry into force of the FARA, and monitor ongoing trials;

    7. Regrets the persistent inaction of the Council, Member States and Commission and reiterates its repeated call on Member States to impose bilateral sanctions against Georgian Dream leaders and officials responsible for democratic backsliding;

    8. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Council of Europe, the OSCE, President Zourabichvili, and the self-appointed authorities of Georgia.

     

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: New State aid framework enables support for clean industry

    Source: European Commission

    European Commission Press release Brussels, 25 Jun 2025 The European Commission has today adopted a new State aid framework supporting the Clean Industrial Deal (CISAF), to enable Member States to push forward the development of clean energy, industrial decarbonisation and clean technology.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Briefing – Outlook for the European Council meeting on 26-27 June 2025 – 25-06-2025

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Council meeting on 26-27 June has a full agenda. One year into the new institutional cycle, global affairs have grown tense and unpredictable. Although a discussion on the Middle East was not originally envisaged for the June European Council meeting, the rapidly developing situation in the region will require the EU leaders’ attention. EU leaders are also expected to discuss Ukraine, European defence and security, the EU in the world, competitiveness, migration, Moldova, the Western Balkans, internal security and EU preparedness. Some further items, such as the rules-based international order, may also feature on the agenda. The discussion on internal reforms in the context of enlargement, envisaged in the Leaders’ Agenda for June, seems to have been postponed to a later date. Despite a full agenda, in his invitation letter European Council President António Costa stressed his intention to keep the meeting to one day.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Protection of Hungarian citizens’ fundamental rights in the context of biometric identification and surveillance at public gatherings – E-002415/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002415/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Kim Van Sparrentak (Verts/ALE), Brando Benifei (S&D), Svenja Hahn (Renew), Birgit Sippel (S&D), Leila Chaibi (The Left), Maria Walsh (PPE), Markéta Gregorová (Verts/ALE), Pernando Barrena Arza (The Left), Tineke Strik (Verts/ALE), Sophie Wilmès (Renew), Sebastian Everding (The Left), Jan-Christoph Oetjen (Renew), Klára Dobrev (S&D), Kai Tegethoff (Verts/ALE), Fabienne Keller (Renew), Alessandro Zan (S&D), Nela Riehl (Verts/ALE), Saskia Bricmont (Verts/ALE), Raquel García Hermida-Van Der Walle (Renew), Damian Boeselager (Verts/ALE), Evin Incir (S&D), Anna Strolenberg (Verts/ALE), Olivier Chastel (Renew), Reinier Van Lanschot (Verts/ALE), Dainius Žalimas (Renew), Thomas Waitz (Verts/ALE), Daniel Freund (Verts/ALE), Kira Marie Peter-Hansen (Verts/ALE), Marc Angel (S&D), Rasmus Nordqvist (Verts/ALE), Villy Søvndal (Verts/ALE), Hanna Gedin (The Left), Rasmus Andresen (Verts/ALE), Özlem Demirel (The Left), Jaume Asens Llodrà (Verts/ALE), Catarina Vieira (Verts/ALE), Alexandra Geese (Verts/ALE), Maria Ohisalo (Verts/ALE), Rudi Kennes (The Left), Lena Schilling (Verts/ALE), Mounir Satouri (Verts/ALE), Benoit Cassart (Renew), Mélissa Camara (Verts/ALE), Alice Kuhnke (Verts/ALE), Elio Di Rupo (S&D), Sara Matthieu (Verts/ALE), Joanna Scheuring-Wielgus (S&D), Gordan Bosanac (Verts/ALE), Petras Auštrevičius (Renew), Katrin Langensiepen (Verts/ALE), Anja Hazekamp (The Left), David Cormand (Verts/ALE), Per Clausen (The Left), Murielle Laurent (S&D), Benedetta Scuderi (Verts/ALE), Lucia Yar (Renew), Marco Tarquinio (S&D), Majdouline Sbai (Verts/ALE), Diana Riba i Giner (Verts/ALE), Elisabeth Grossmann (S&D)

    Recent reports suggest that a new Hungarian law may allow the use of facial recognition technology to identify individuals participating in public demonstrations banned by the government[1].

    • 1.Can the Commission assess whether such use complies with the Artificial Intelligence Act’s prohibition on real-time biometric identification[2], applying all legal safeguards and criteria, and confirm that post-remote identification cannot be used to bypass Article 5, which has already entered into force[3]?
    • 2.Does the use of remote biometric identification in this situation bring additional risks to the fundamental rights and freedoms in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, such as freedom of assembly and association, as enshrined in Article 12 of the Charter?
    • 3.If the national authorities responsible for oversight are unable or unwilling to act ‘independently, impartially and without bias’, as required by the Artificial Intelligence Act[4], will the Commission commit to taking action – including infringement proceedings if needed – to ensure that Hungarian citizens are effectively protected under the Artificial Intelligence Act and the Charter of Fundamental Rights?

    Submitted: 16.6.2025

    • [1] Spike, J., ‘Hungary’s new anti-LGBTQ+ law bans Pride events and sparks protests’, Associated Press, 19 March 2025, https://apnews.com/article/hungary-pride-ban-orban-lgbtq-rights-e7a0318b09b902abfc306e3e975b52df.
    • [2] Article 5(1), point (c) and Article 5(2) of Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence and amending Regulations (EC) No 300/2008, (EU) No 167/2013, (EU) No 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, (EU) 2018/1139 and (EU) 2019/2144 and Directives 2014/90/EU, (EU) 2016/797 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Artificial Intelligence Act) (OJ L, 2024/1689, 12.7.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1689/oj).
    • [3] Article 26(10) of the Artificial Intelligence Act.
    • [4] As required by Article 70 of the Artificial Intelligence Act.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Digital sovereignty or digital blockade? Effects of the planned regulation of data centres – E-002451/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002451/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Piotr Müller (ECR)

    The Commission has announced a legislative package on data centre energy efficiency to be published in 2026, along with a roadmap for digitalisation and artificial intelligence.

    Meanwhile, the European data centre sector is already facing an extremely difficult environment – rising energy costs, severe limits on the availability of connection capacity and increasing administrative requirements that are slowing down the development of new infrastructure.

    Instead of supporting a sector which underpins Europe’s digital and technological sovereignty, the Commission is signalling another regulatory wave – with no details, no clear impact assessment and no indication how the EU wants to remain competitive with the United States or Asia.

    In light of the above:

    • 1.Is the Commission not concerned that imposing additional burdens will lead to investment flight outside the EU and a weakening of this strategic sector?
    • 2.How does the Commission justify a policy that could permanently limit the development of AI and cloud services in Europe?
    • 3.Given that the policy being pushed through could lead to the digital deindustrialisation of Europe, what economic model is the Commission relying on?

    Submitted: 18.6.2025

    Last updated: 25 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Stress tests potentially run on the Spanish grid with no prior notification during the blackout of 28 April 2025 – E-002456/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002456/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Pilar del Castillo Vera (PPE)

    In the light of the blackout that affected the Iberian Peninsula and parts of France on 28 April 2025, a number of technical sources have suggested that one of the scenarios is that the incident could have been linked to deliberate tests on the Spanish electricity system to assess its resilience when faced with unmanageable peaks in renewable energy generation.

    With this in mind:

    • 1.Was the Commission made formally aware of, or did it receive any official communication from the Spanish Government about, the possibility of the incident being linked to a stress test on the national grid?
    • 2.If so, does the Commission consider Spain to have complied with the obligation of prior notification and cooperation laid down in Article 15 of Regulation (EU) 2019/941 on risk-preparedness in the electricity sector?

    Submitted: 18.6.2025

    Last updated: 25 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Transfer of biometric data to the Trump administration – E-002416/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002416/2025
    to the Council
    Rule 144
    Özlem Demirel (The Left)

    The Enhanced Border Security Partnership (EBSP) is a security agreement that the US Government obliges countries to sign if they wish to participate in the Visa Waiver Programme (VWP). This gives US authorities direct access to police-maintained biometric databases for such personal data as fingerprints and facial images. However, the initiative has raised legal and political concerns as it runs counter to the common EU legal framework. Critics also warn of an imbalance because it is unclear whether the data exchange is to be on a reciprocal basis. Such an agreement is open to abuse, particularly under the current US administration.

    • 1.Does the Council know whether the Trump administration, like its predecessor, is requiring countries participating in the VWP to sign up to the EBSP, and whether and how it differs from previous demands?
    • 2.In what formats has the EBSP or a comparable programme been discussed between the EU and the Trump administration to date?
    • 3.To what end, and with what outcome, was the issue discussed at the EU-US Justice and Home Affairs ministerial meeting in early June 2025?

    Submitted: 16.6.2025

    Last updated: 25 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Intensive agriculture and nutrient management – E-002420/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002420/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    César Luena (S&D)

    Under the European water resilience strategy, limiting nutrient pollution in aquatic ecosystems has to a key element of efforts to restore water quality. Nutrients from agriculture, urban centres and other sources are harmful for human health, cause algae to proliferate and reduce oxygen in watercourses, thus killing aquatic ecosystems. This challenge causes estimated socio-economic losses of between EUR 75 billion and EUR 485 billion per year for nitrogen alone. Accelerated action is therefore needed from source to sea, including improved implementation of the Nitrates Directive in Member States.

    Given that nitrate pollution is one of the main reasons for of the poor chemical and ecological status of Europe’s water bodies, can the Commission say:

    • 1.Why it has not announced a review of the Nitrates Directive as part of the aforementioned strategy, with a view to updating it to address new climate, scientific and technological challenges, as it has done with other environmental directives?
    • 2.Will the Commission review this directive to bring it into line with the integrated nutrient management plan?

    Submitted: 16.6.2025

    Last updated: 25 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News