Category: Europe

  • MIL-OSI Europe: At a Glance – Transitioning out of temporary protection for displaced people from Ukraine – 24-06-2025

    Source: European Parliament

    The EU’s temporary protection regime has provided predictability and legal certainty to both displaced people from Ukraine and the EU Member States. The situation in Ukraine, as a result of Russia’s ongoing war of aggression, still requires a common European response. The EU has therefore decided to extend temporary protection for a fifth year, until 4 March 2027. Moreover, the European Commission has proposed a coordinated approach to a smooth transition out of temporary protection, when the circumstances allow.

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Digital censorship and content removal by Meta in the EU – E-002118/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002118/2025/rev.1
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Tom Vandendriessche (PfE)

    Over the last few years, a number of citizens and movements in the EU have reported that social media pages have been unilaterally removed or blocked by large tech concerns, including Meta (Facebook/Instagram). In many instances, that is done with no clear statement of reasons, in an untransparent process and with no scope for redress.

    Recently, a Flemish activist publicly shared that Meta removed not only the main communication page of his group (which has more than 40 000 followers), but also a separate page given over to recreational nature walks in Flanders.

    In view of this:

    ​​​​​​​What does the Commission think about the increasing reports of content removal and page blocking by Meta in the EU, especially when such action appears to be targeted at particular ideological or political opinions?

    Submitted: 27.5.2025

    Last updated: 24 June 2025

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Falling birth rates in the EU and the Commission’s strategic response – E-002332/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002332/2025/rev.1
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Nadine Morano (PPE)

    According to Eurostat data, the fertility rate in the EU reached a historically low level in 2023, with an average of 1.38 children per woman, well below the estimated population replacement threshold of 2.1. The number of births has also been falling, dropping to 3.67 million in 2023, compared to almost 7 million in the 1960s.

    This change is being accompanied by a significant ageing of the population: the median age in the EU was 44.7 in 2024, which poses major challenges for the sustainability of pension and healthcare systems and for economic growth.

    Does the Commission plan to launch a coordinated European strategy to address the demographic challenge, including specific measures to promote birth rates and ensure the sustainability of social systems?

    Submitted: 11.6.2025

    Last updated: 24 June 2025

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Highlights – ECON – LIBE: Scrutiny of delegated acts and implementing measures – NEW – Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs

    Source: European Parliament

    © Image used under license from Adobe Stock

    On 30 June 2025 from 18:30-20:00, ECON and LIBE Members will exchange views with Maria Luís Albuquerque, Commissioner for Financial Services and the Savings and Investments Union, on the amendment to the delegated regulation in relation to third countries which have strategic deficiencies in their AML/CTF regimes (High-Risk Third Countries).

    Under Article 9 of Directive (EU) 2015/849 (AMLD4), the Commission is mandated to adopt a list of high-risk third countries presenting strategic deficiencies in their anti-money laundering/countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) regimes. The purpose is to protect the EU internal market from risks posed by third countries, by requiring financial institutions and other gatekeepers to apply enhanced vigilance with regard to transactions involving high-risk third countries. This is done through the adoption of the Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/1675 which is regularly amended. In the context of their scrutiny powers, the co-legislators can object to such delegated acts adopted by the Commission during a one-month scrutiny period (extendable by another one-month period). The European Parliament rejected the last amending to the list of high-risk third countries by its resolution of 23 April 2024. The EU list of high-risk third countries was not amended since then.

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Germany: EIB provides €30 million financing to OLEDWorks for automotive lighting

    Source: European Investment Bank

    EIB

    • EIB financing supports OLEDWorks in ramping up the manufacturing and R&D of their lighting technology.
    • The company’s products combine high brightness, longevity, energy-efficiency, and reduced waste. 
    • The loan is backed by the European Commission’s InvestEU programme, which aims to promote sustainable investment, innovation, and job creation in Europe.

    Luxembourg/Aachen, 26 June 2025. – The European Investment Bank (EIB) has granted financing of €30 million to OLEDWorks, a provider of innovative lighting solutions for the automotive industry, microdisplays, and other specialty lighting applications. The loan aims to support the company’s expansion and product development within the European Union, with a primary focus on automotive clients. Most of the investment will be used at the borrower’s existing site in Aachen, Germany.

    OLEDWorks specialises in designing and developing lighting solutions based on organic light-emitting diodes (OLEDs). Its technology offers a combination of high brightness, energy efficiency, and durability. Notably, the company has developed an innovative application for OLED panels in the automotive sector, which represents a first-of-its-kind use case at scale.

    The financing provided by the EIB will enable OLEDWorks to strengthen its position as a world leader in multi-stack OLED technology, and to expand its portfolio of automotive customers. It will also allow OLEDWorks to capitalise on the nascent trend of using OLED technologies in the automotive sector, which is expected to gain momentum in the coming years. Furthermore, the financing will help to keep key manufacturing sectors and innovation in Europe, as the lighting industry has largely been delocalised to Asia in recent decades.

    “OLEDWorks provides the type of cutting-edge technology that will secure a bright future for Europe and its people,” said EIB Vice President Nicola Beer, who oversees the Bank’s operations in Germany. “The financing provided by the EIB reflects our commitment to supporting innovative companies in strategic sectors. OLEDWorks’ lighting solutions align with our objective of fostering technological advancements on the continent—progress we need if we want Europe to be competitive and green.”

    David DeJoy, CEO of OLEDWorks, emphasizes the pivotal role this investment plays in meeting customer needs: “The financing provided by the EIB will allow for expedited technology development and will enable advancements of OLED lighting technology with higher segmentation and display-like capabilities, higher brightness for automotive stop and turn applications, and bendable OLED panels.”

    Wolfgang Görgen, Managing Director of OLEDWorks GmbH, adds: ”The technology advancements along with enhanced capacity at our Aachen facility will empower us to respond swiftly to our customers’ demands.”

    The EIB support is expected to facilitate OLEDWorks’ growth plans and enable the hiring of some 45 new employees over the next three to four years. The project falls under the InvestEU-supported Future Tech programme loan, which addresses funding gaps and provides adequate risk capital to venture-backed companies in the EU. European small and mid-sized companies often face challenges in accessing non-dilutive financing options for growth investments. Since its establishment in 2016, the EIB’s innovation financing team has addressed the unique funding needs of over 300 fast-growing companies, investing €7 billion in the process.

    Background information

    About the European Investment Bank

    The European Investment Bank (ElB) is the long-term lending institution of the European Union, owned by its Member States. Built around eight core priorities, we finance investments that contribute to EU policy objectives by bolstering climate action and the environment, digitalisation and technological innovation, security and defence, cohesion, agriculture and bioeconomy, social infrastructure, the capital markets union, and a stronger Europe in a more peaceful and prosperous world. 

    The EIB Group, which also includes the European Investment Fund (EIF), signed nearly €89 billion in new financing for over 900 high-impact projects in 2024, boosting Europe’s competitiveness and security.   

    About OLEDworks

    OLEDWorks is a global leader in the development and production of innovative organic light-emitting diode (OLED) technology. By producing the world’s best-performing OLED panels and combining rapid product innovation, OLEDWorks enriches lighting solutions in automotive, specialty, and microdisplay applications.

    The OLEDWorks manufacturing facility is IATF 16949 and ISO 9001, 14001, 45001 certified with full traceability via a factory MES system.

    About the InvestEU Programme

    The InvestEU programme supports the sustainable recovery of the European Union by leveraging significant private and public funds. It aims to crowd in private investment for strategic priorities such as the European Green Deal and the digital transition. The programme simplifies and enhances funding opportunities for investment projects within the European Union. It consists of the InvestEU Fund, the InvestEU Advisory Hub, and the InvestEU Portal. The InvestEU Fund is implemented through financial partners utilising the EU budget guarantee of €26.2 billion to mobilise at least €372 billion in additional investment.

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Agricultural Policy – E-001469/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) payments made to Member States during the current Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), i.e. in financial years 2021-2024, are listed in the attached table[1].

    While the Commission bears overall responsibility for the financial management of the CAP, most of the CAP budget (around 99.5%) is implemented under ‘shared management’ between the Commission and Member States. In the financial year 2024, 5.7 million farmers received CAP support directly, not counting all other beneficiaries.

    On the second and third questions, Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/1475[2] sets out detailed rules for the monitoring and evaluation of the CAP Strategic Plans, including the provision of information from Member States.

    Under this regulation, Member States have to submit data to the Commission on CAP interventions and beneficiaries. The first deadline for data submission was 30 April 2025.

    The Commission is currently conducting quality checks to ensure the accuracy and completeness of data collected. Given the volume of data the Commission estimates that the dataset will be ready for analysis by the fourth quarter of 2025.

    Under the transparency rules for the CAP, Member States publish details of the beneficiaries of CAP payments[3].

    • [1] For more details the Commission refers the Honourable Member to the annual financial reports on the European agricultural guarantee fund (EAGF) and the European agricultural fund for rural development (EAFRD): https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/common-agricultural-policy/financing-cap/cap-funds/financial-report-eagf-and-eafrd_en.
    • [2] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2022/1475/oj.
    • [3] https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/common-agricultural-policy/financing-cap/beneficiaries_en.
    Last updated: 24 June 2025

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Clarification of whether the principle of reciprocity is consistent with EU law – E-002400/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002400/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Emma Rafowicz (S&D), Hannes Heide (S&D), Bogdan Andrzej Zdrojewski (PPE), Laurence Farreng (Renew), Marcos Ros Sempere (S&D), Milan Zver (PPE), Aurore Lalucq (S&D), Nikos Papandreou (S&D), Sandro Ruotolo (S&D)

    Following the 2020 judgment in the Recorded Artists Actors Performers Ltd case, the European music sector, supported by Parliament, requested clarification of Directive 2006/115/EC. It seeks confirmation of the principle of reciprocity that derives from international treaties, so that Member States may apply a different system, should they wish to do so. The Court of Justice of the European Union highlighted that it was the responsibility of the EU legislator to clarify whether this principle is consistent with EU law.

    Without EU intervention, performing artists, along with very small, small and medium enterprises that produce music in Europe risk having EUR 125 million of their annual revenue transferred to the United States. This is despite the fact that such performers and entities are a catalyst for diversity and European creative talent.

    The EU’s capacity to exert trade pressure on third countries who do not follow EU legal norms is also at stake.

    Clearly, it is even more important for the EU to maintain trade pressure, given the aggressive trade policy pursued by the Trump Administration. Confirming the principle of reciprocity is perfectly in line with the EU’s goal of contributing a fair and balanced response.

    In this context, can the Commission specify its planned schedule for the implementation of this work?

    Submitted: 13.6.2025

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Deregulation of ESG reporting obligations and protecting small and medium-sized enterprises from excessive administrative burdens – E-002396/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002396/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Piotr Müller (ECR)

    The most recent draft Council position of 29 May 2025 proposes that ESG reporting obligations be significantly limited by, among other things, excluding companies that have fewer than 1 000 employees or an annual turnover of under EUR 450 million and also by banning bigger corporations from requesting ESG data from these entities.

    In this context, we would like to put the following questions to the Commission:

    • 1.Does the Commission agree that the current ESG reporting system – in particular that established by the Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive – creates disproportionate administrative burdens and requires real deregulation as opposed to simply superficial changes?
    • 2.Can the Commission clearly indicate which ESG reporting obligations will actually be removed rather than simply delayed or relaxed in a way that would not reduce the actual burden on companies? In particular, are there specific changes planned to the obligations laid down in the European Sustainability Reporting Standards and to the obligation to collect data across the whole value chain, which, in practice, includes smaller companies?
    • 3.Is the Commission considering consolidating ESG reporting regulations into a single coherent legal act in order to limit regulatory fragmentation and the resulting costs for entrepreneurs?

    Submitted: 13.6.2025

    Last updated: 24 June 2025

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Detailed breakdown of EU funding for nature conservation in Tanzania from 2014 to the present – E-001130/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The EU continues to follow closely the developments concerning the Maasai communities living in the Ngorongoro Conservation Area and in the Loliondo Game Controlled Area.

    As regards the protection of nature and biodiversity, the EU has provided a significant amount of funding for these sectors in Tanzania from 2014 to the present.

    The Commission is sending directly to the Honourable Member a table which includes the currently available information on bilateral programmes relating to nature conservation in Tanzania.

    The table indicates the information relating to each project including titles, adoption year, recipients, objectives, amount of EU contribution, and duration.

    The total amount of EU bilateral funding for nature conservation in Tanzania from 2014 to the present amounts to EUR 95.38 million.

    As regards projects adopted under the 2021-2027 multiannual-indicative programme for Tanzania, detailed documents can be found on the Commission website[1].

    See annex : Annex

    • [1] https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/countries/tanzania_en.
    Last updated: 24 June 2025

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Press release – Transport MEPs seek to reinforce passenger rights

    Source: European Parliament

    MEPs push for a common reimbursement form, no charge for selecting a child seat, free on-board personal item and small hand luggage and better protection for multimodal journeys.

    On Tuesday, Transport and Tourism Committee proposed changes to EU passenger rights rules by 38 votes to two and two abstentions to close enforcement gaps and make sure passengers are better aware of their rights in the case of travel disruptions.

    Intermediaries

    The draft rules clarify the role of intermediaries (ticket vendors or retailers) in reimbursing air passengers for cancelations, long delays or denied boarding. MEPs want these companies to inform passenger at the time of booking about the full cost of an air ticket, intermediation or service fees, and the reimbursement process, which should not take longer than 14 days. Should an intermediary fail to respect this deadline, it would be up to the air carrier to process the reimbursement within seven days.

    Common form

    MEPs support the proposal to introduce a common form for compensation and reimbursement requests. They also want to add a provision tasking air carriers with sending passengers the pre-filled form, or activate alternative automatic communication channels, within 48 hours following a disruption.

    Extraordinary circumstances

    To reduce the margin for interpretation as to what constitutes extraordinary circumstances that would allow airlines to deny compensation, the Transport and Tourism Committee followed Parliament existing position, adopted in 2014 to have a defined list of exceptions, such as natural disasters, war, weather conditions or unforeseen labour disputes (excluding strikes by airline staff).

    Hand luggage and more rights for vulnerable travellers

    MEPs want to facilitate air travel by introducing common dimensions for hand luggage. Passengers should have a right to carry on board one personal item, such as a handbag, backpack or laptop (maximum dimensions of 40x30x15 cm), and one small hand luggage (maximum dimensions of 100 cm and 7 kg) without an additional fee.

    MEPs also want to ensure kids under 12 years old are seated next to their accompanying passenger free of charge. They also want more protections for persons with reduced mobility by making sure an accompanying person can travel with them free of charge, and adding a compensation right in case of loss/damage to mobility equipment or injury to an assistance animal.

    Multimodal journey

    In a separate vote, Transport MEPs backed new draft EU rules on passenger rights in multimodal journeys comprising at least two modes of transport (plane-bus, train-bus-plane, etc.) by 32 votes to one and nine abstentions. If a passenger has bought a single multimodal contract from one operator, switching between transport modes should not mean losing protection against missed connections and assistance, MEPs say. Should a missed connection result in a travel delay of 60 minutes or more, the passenger should be offered meals, refreshment and a hotel stay free of charge, as needed.

    Since only a single multimodal contract would offer full protection, the Transport and Tourism Committee inserted an obligation for carriers and intermediaries to inform travellers, before purchase, what kind of ticket they are buying (single, combined or separate multimodal). Failing to do so would make sellers liable for reimbursement of the ticket and for 75% compensation if the passenger misses a connection.

    Quotes

    Rapporteur on enforcement of passenger rights Matteo Ricci (S&D, IT) said: “Today’s vote marks an important step toward fairer and more transparent travel. The agreed compromises protect all passengers, with special attention to persons with disabilities and reduced mobility, and introduce concrete measures such as the clear definition of free hand luggage up to a maximum size of 100cm, a fundamental right to avoid unjustified extra costs. Increased transparency for intermediaries and strengthened enforcement bodies will ensure a fairer and more efficient system. Parliament is taking a strong position that defends citizens’ rights.”

    Rapporteur on air passenger rights Andrey Novakov (EPP, DE) added: “Every delay, cancellation or confusion at the gate reminds us why passengers need stronger rights. Better protection for passengers also means clear and fair rules for industry. The European Parliament has made real progress, but our work is far from over.”

    Rapporteur on passenger rights in the multimodal journey Jens Gieseke (EPP, DE) said: ““For the first time, we are creating clear and enforceable rights for combined journeys by train, plane, bus or ferry. We are enshrining in law key guarantees – including the right to timely and reliable information, fair reimbursements for missed connections, more accessibility for people with reduced mobility, and clear liability rules for intermediaries and carriers. Our proposals are intended to strengthen passenger confidence and encourage companies to develop more attractive multimodal offers. They set out clear, reasonable obligations for carriers – and at the same time ensure passengers are not abandoned.”

    Next steps

    Transport Committee MEPs also decided to start talks with EU countries on the final shape of legislation, if plenary gives its green light in July 2025: unanimously by 42 votes on passenger rights in the multimodal journey; and by 40 votes to one on enforcement of passenger rights.

    Background information

    In 2014, Parliament reacted to a Commission proposal to update air passenger rights, proposing that delayed or stranded air passengers receive better access to compensation, while providing airlines clearer rules on how to deal with passenger complaints. Progress on reaching an interinstitutional agreement was stalled for 11 years, until in June 2025 EU ministers reached a political agreement among themselves on the file, opening the way for negotiations with Parliament.

    In 2023, Commission suggested more amendments to ensure the effective protection of passenger rights in the Union when travelling by air, rail, sea and inland waterways and bus and coach transport. Commission also suggested complementing these existing rules by ensuring passengers enjoy a similar level of protection when they switch between these transport modes during a journey.

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Status of permanent seasonal workers in Spain – E-001493/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The Commission publishes unemployment statistics based on the EU Labour Force Survey (EU LFS)[1]. The EU-LFS serves as the primary source of labour market information in the EU.

    However, it does not provide specific data on permanent seasonal workers (PSW), as a distinct category. During their active work season, PSW are classified as employed, but in the off-season they are categorised as unemployed if actively seeking work, or as outside the labour force otherwise.

    1. PSW figures at the national level would offer country-specific insights for this specific group. For detailed information on PSW, dedicated national data could be the most suitable source. For country-specific analyses, the Commission often relies on figures published by national providers to complement the findings.

    2. In European official statistics released by Eurostat, the employment status of individuals is determined according to internationally recognised methodologies and in compliance with EU regulations. The EU-LFS is conducted consistently across countries and over time, guided by Commission Implementing Regulation 2019/2240 on the organisation of a sample survey in the labour force domain[2], and adheres to the International Labour Organisation definitions. Eurostat validates the quality of survey data and metadata to ensure they comply with EU regulations and provide harmonised information.

    3. The Commission considers that out-of-work PSW who are not actively seeking employment cannot be classified as unemployed under existing statistical definitions. No revision of the data collection methodology is planned.

    • [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2019/2240/oj/eng.
    • [2] Idem.
    Last updated: 24 June 2025

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Transparency of EU financing of NGOs and civil society organisations in Hungary – E-001011/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The Commission would kindly refer the Honourable Member to the publicly available Financial Transparency System (FTS)[1] and the attached Annex I.

    On the FTS, the Commission makes available information on recipients of funds financed from the EU budget, where it is implemented in direct management .

    Operating grants are awarded competitively. Applicants submit proposals with the description of their work programmes, annexed to the grant agreement , which may mention, among other activities, advocacy activities.

    The Commission does not prescribe the specific activities in the applicants’ work programmes . Nonetheless, agreements involving activities directed at EU institutions, even if they do not breach the legal framework, may entail reputational risks for the EU.

    To mitigate these risks, the Commission has issued guidance[2] to all Commission services, clarifying which activities should not be mandated as a condition for EU financing. As part of a grant agreement, beneficiaries must commit to respecting EU values.

    The Commission does not have a general responsibility for monitoring the Member States’ funding from the national budgets to civil society organisations.

    For EU funding under shared management, based on the requirement of Article 49(3) of the Common Provisions Regulation[3] (CPR), a complete list of projects is publicly available on the responsible Hungarian authority’s website[4].

    T he implementation of EU funds governed by the CPR requires compliance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights[5] throughout the programming period, horizontal enabling condition (HEC)[6]. When the HEC is not fulfilled, the related expenditure under the CPR is not reimbursed from the EU budget.

    The Commission monitors through its annual Rule of Law Report[7] the situation of civil society in all Member States. In that context, it has noted that concerns related to the Hungarian State’s role in financing civil society persist[8] and has made recommendations in that respect[9].

    Hungary is subject to measures under the Conditionality Regulation[10] to protect the EU budget from breaches of the principles of the Rule of Law, which include the suspension of funds.

    Per Article 5(2) of the regulation, the imposition of measures does not affect a Member States’ obligations toward beneficiaries and final recipients.

    See annex : Annex

    • [1] https://ec.europa.eu/budget/financial-transparency-system/index.html ( The annual publications are based on Article 38 of the Financial Regulation (OJ L 2024/2509, 26.9.2024, p. 1-239), and in accordance with the third paragraph of the article, information on recipients is not disclosed in specific cases outlined therein . Information regarding financial year 2024 will be published on the portal in June 2025).
    • [2] https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/opportunities/docs/2021-2027/common/guidance/guidance-funding-dev-impl-monit-enforce-of-eu-law_en.pdf.
    • [3] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32021R1060.
    • [4] https://www.palyazat.gov.hu.
    • [5] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12012P/TXT.
    • [6] Article 6 of the Common Provisions Regulation (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32021R1060).
    • [7] https://commission.europa.eu/publications/2024-rule-law-report-communication-and-country-chapters_en.
    • [8] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=SWD:2024:0817:FIN:EN:PDF.
    • [9] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=SWD:2024:0817:FIN:EN:PDF.
    • [10] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32020R2092.

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Alchemy with the actual unemployment figure and exclusion from benefits and support – E-001688/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The Eurostat definition of unemployed is based on guidelines and global standards provided by the International Labour Organisation (ILO).

    In line with Article 148 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), the guidelines for the employment policies of the Member States (the ‘Employment Guidelines’) are to guide policy implementation in the Member States and in the EU, including in matters related to unemployment benefits[1].

    Member States retain their autonomy to determine the details of their social security systems (Article 153(4) TFEU), including which benefits are provided, their eligibility conditions and their calculation methods. Consequently, Greece retains its competence to determine the amounts of unemployment benefits to be provided.

    The reform of the unemployment benefit system, tested on a pilot basis under the EU Recovery and Resilience Facility, is part of the Greek government’s effort to streamline unemployment benefits, to improve public spending efficiency and facilitate transitions to employment.

    The ongoing pilot considers prior work experience and applies an indexation of the benefit to the latest daily net wage level, which is decreasing over time to motivate return to work thereby having a positive impact on the coverage of the unemployment insurance system.

    The pilot is based on a study funded by the Commission and complements the employment incentive introduced by Law 4921/2022[2], whereby unemployed persons who find a job during the duration of the unemployment benefit are entitled to 50% of the remaining benefit as an incentive in addition to their salary.

    • [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L_202403134.
    • [2] https://www.kodiko.gr/nomologia/download_fek?f=fek/2022/a/fek_a_75_2022.pdf&t=098149c7b54fc11d14f3b0da58d67f17.
    Last updated: 24 June 2025

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT containing a motion for a non-legislative resolution on the proposal for a Council decision on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Union, of the Implementing Protocol (2025-2030) to the Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Union and the Government of Greenland and the Government of Denmark – A10-0103/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT NON-LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTION

    on the proposal for a Council decision on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Union, of the Implementing Protocol (2025-2030) to the Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Union and the Government of Greenland and the Government of Denmark

    (COM(2024)0479 – C10‑0227/2024 – 2024/0263M(NLE))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to the draft Council decision on the conclusion, on behalf of the Union, of the Protocol on the implementation of the Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Union, on the one hand, and the Government of Greenland and the Government of Denmark, on the other (2025-2030) (14652/2024),

     having regard to the Protocol on the implementation of the Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Union, on the one hand, and the Government of Greenland and the Government of Denmark, on the other (2025-2030) (14781/2024),

     having regard to the request for consent submitted by the Council in accordance with Article 43(2) and Article 218(6), second subparagraph, point (a)(v) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (C10‑0227/2024),

     having regard to the Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement (SFPA) between the European Union on the one hand, and the Government of Greenland and the Government of Denmark on the other hand, and the Implementing Protocol thereto,

     having regard to Article 62 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,

     having regard to the Convention of the North-East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC),

     having regard to the Convention of the North-West Atlantic Fisheries Organisation (NAFO),

     having regard to the Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic (OSPAR),

     having regard to the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework,

     having regard to the Agreement to prevent unregulated high seas fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean,

     having regard to Protocol No 34 to the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union on special arrangements for Greenland,

     having regard to the Voluntary Guidelines for Securing Sustainable Small-Scale Fisheries of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations,

     having regard to the EU Competitiveness Compass,

     having regard to Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2013 on the Common Fisheries Policy, and in particular Articles 29 and 31 thereof[1],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2017/2403 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2017 on the sustainable management of external fishing fleets, and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1006/2008[2],

     having regard to Council Decision (EU) No 2021/1764 of 5 October 2021 on the association of the Overseas Countries and Territories with the European Union including relations between the European Union on the one hand, and Greenland and the Kingdom of Denmark on the other (Decision on the Overseas Association, including Greenland)[3],

     having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 13 October 2021 entitled ‘A stronger EU engagement for a peaceful, sustainable and prosperous Arctic’ (JOIN(2021)0027),

     having regard to the ex ante and ex post evaluation study of the 2021-2024 protocol and of a possible new implementing protocol to the SFPA between the European Union and Greenland,

     having regard to EU’s biodiversity strategy for 2030,

     having regard to the Commission communication of 19 February 2025 entitled ‘A Vision for Agriculture and Food – Shaping together an attractive farming and agri-food sector for future generations’ (COM(2025)0075),

     having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 24 June 2022 entitled ‘Setting the course for a sustainable blue planet – Joint Communication on the EU’s International Ocean Governance agenda’ (JOIN(2022)0028),

     having regard to its non-legislative resolution of 5 October 2021 on the draft Council decision on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Union, of a Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Union, on the one hand, and the Government of Greenland and the Government of Denmark, on the other hand, and the Implementing Protocol thereto[4],

     having regard to the reports of the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) entitled ‘Greenland Sea Ecosystem Overview’ of 2023, and ‘Greenland Sea Ecoregion – Fisheries Overview’ of 2024,

     having regard to its legislative resolution of …[5] on the draft decision,

     having regard to Rule 107(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the report of the Committee on Fisheries (A10-0103/2025),

    A. whereas Greenland, as an autonomous territory, is responsible for managing its fisheries resources and regulating commercial fishing in Greenland and its exclusive economic zone, and for regulating who is allowed to fish in its waters;

    B. whereas Greenland’s fisheries comprise coastal fisheries and deep-sea fisheries;

    C. whereas 88 % of Greenland’s population identifies as Greenlandic Inuit;

    D. whereas small-scale coastal fisheries and subsistence fisheries form an integral part of the traditional culture, economy and social structure of Greenland’s coastal communities and of the Greenlandic Inuit people, providing both livelihoods, in particular for isolated settlements, and cultural heritage;

    E. whereas inshore fisheries are key to ensuring food security in Greenland and contribute to addressing social challenges;

    F. whereas the SFPA between the EU and Greenland is the second most significant fisheries agreement for the EU in financial terms; whereas, according to the findings and conclusions of the ex post evaluation, the SFPA and the Protocol thereto have significantly contributed to Greenland’s fisheries policy, in particular by enhancing cooperation and collaboration and supporting sustainable fisheries management, thus creating a mutually beneficial arrangement between the EU and Greenland;

    G. whereas the EU-Greenland SFPA and the EU-Norway agreement are closely interlinked, with the EU exchanging fishing opportunities in Greenland for access to Norwegian waters; whereas in recent years, following the exchange of quotas with Norway, fishing opportunities have been granted to around 10 Community vessels under the Protocol;

    H. whereas the EU maintains a close relationship with Greenland, including through the fisheries partnership agreement that has been in place since 1984; whereas Greenland is the overseas country and territory (OCT) that receives the most EU funding by far; whereas EU support to Greenland for the period from 2021 to 2027 comes to EUR 225 million, which is equivalent to the total amount received by the other 12 OCTs combined;

    I. whereas, according to scientists, the Arctic region is warming up almost four times faster than the rest of the world, with rapid increases in ice melt and implications for fish populations, marine ecosystems and coastal communities, as well as for the fishing industry and the livelihoods of fishers, which depend on Arctic waters;

    J. whereas healthy fish populations and marine ecosystems are crucial for resilience to the growing effects of climate change and for guaranteeing the future of coastal fishing communities;

    K. whereas the accelerating pace of global warming in the region underscores the urgent need for coordinated global action, including in fisheries;

    L. whereas Greenland efficiently manages fishing activities within its EEZ, with the Greenland Fisheries and Hunting Control Authority (GFJK) responsible for registering and monitoring both domestic and foreign catches and landings and for ensuring compliance with international control and enforcement agreements, while also facilitating daily data exchanges with the countries that have fisheries agreements with Greenland;

    M. whereas the evaluation of the previous protocol reveals that overfishing can be ruled out with certainty for only five of the fifteen stocks exploited under the Protocol, but that there is a lack of scientific data for some of the stocks, and four of them are regarded as still overexploited;

    N. whereas fishing opportunities are established by a joint committee on the basis of the best available scientific advice and the recommendations made by NAFO, NEAFC and ICES;

    O. whereas fisheries are a crucial economic sector for Greenland, providing a livelihood for many; whereas it is essential to ensure that fishing practices do not harm marine ecosystems, particularly given that according to ICES, the greatest physical disturbance of the seabed and benthic habitats in the Greenland Sea ecoregion is caused by mobile bottom-contacting fishing gear and there is a considerable overlap between the distribution of corals, sponges and sea pens and the areas trawled[6]; whereas to safeguard both the marine environment and the future of fisheries, it is vital that all forms of trawling are conducted in a manner that minimises damage to the seabed; whereas according to the ex post and ex ante evaluation study, the management measures applicable to EU vessels operating in Greenland, and the risk levels of EU vessels having negative impacts on ecosystems, mean that bycatch levels and impacts on ecosystems are minimal;

     

    P. whereas ICES also points out that other activities causing marine pollution, marine litter or underwater noise, as well as climate change, are having an impact on the marine ecosystems and upsetting the balance of the ecoregion;

    Q. whereas the European Union and Greenland, on behalf of Denmark, hold seats on NEAFC and NAFO;

    Context and general principles of the SFPA

    1. Notes the importance of the fisheries sector for Greenland, given that seafood exports account for over 90 % of the autonomous territory’s total exports, and that fishing and the fishing industry together account for 15 % of all jobs; highlights the great professionalism of Greenlandic people in the fishing sector and their extensive knowledge, skills and experience in fisheries management and maritime operations; notes that their deep-rooted expertise reflects a strong commitment to maintaining the economic and cultural significance of fisheries in Greenland; stresses that the share of Greenlandic total allowable catches (TACs) allocated to the EU under the Protocol is relatively small;

    2. Recalls Greenland’s geostrategic position within the Arctic region; underlines the importance of the SFPA for relations between the European Union and Greenland in the current geopolitical context, particularly in the light of the recent diplomatic and geopolitical tensions caused by the new US Government, but also given the reality of the climate crisis and its impact on the region;

    3. Highlights the importance of using the SFPA as a key framework for addressing common challenges such as the climate crisis and geopolitical, security and preparedness concerns, for promoting sustainable fisheries policy, scientific cooperation and environmental resilience in Arctic waters, and for fostering economic cooperation; points out the need to strengthen the EU’s Arctic policy and its cooperation with the Government of Greenland;

    4. Underlines that, while guaranteeing fishing opportunities for the EU fleet, the SFPA should contribute to the exploitation of fisheries resources within sustainable limits and the preservation of marine biodiversity in Greenland’s waters, in line with the standards laid down by the European Union and international forums such as regional fisheries management organisations, in order to achieve economic, social and environmental benefits; recalls that EU vessels are to fish only the available surplus, as established in Article 3 of the SFPA;

    5. Highlights that the agreement has provided benefits to both parties, including EU and Greenlandic stakeholders, particularly in terms of sustainability, transparency, equity, scientific research, capacity-building and national development;

    6. Points out that the sectoral support available under the Protocol will help the Government of Greenland to implement its national fisheries and maritime economy strategy, including in the fight against illegal, unreported and undeclared (IUU) fishing, while promoting decent working conditions for fishing activity;

    7. Notes that the new Protocol has been concluded for a term of six years, which means improved visibility for stakeholders, in particular the fisheries sector;

    8. Notes the increase in the total financial contribution paid by the European Union and the fees paid by fishing operators, which ensure that Greenland receives economic benefits from access rights to its waters and that EU vessels operate under regulated and monitored conditions, reducing risks of overfishing or environmental damage;

    9. Underlines the high value of the SFPA and that every EUR 1 invested from the EU budget in the compensation payment for access supports the creation of EUR 6.88 of added value, with EUR 4.32 for the EU and EUR 2.12 for Greenland;

    Sustainability of fisheries under the SFPA

    10. Welcomes the robust monitoring system, the comprehensive framework for managing bycatch and the ban on discards that apply in Greenland waters; considers positively the effort made in terms of controls of fishing operations and the presence of observers in these activities, to which the sectoral support provided under the SFPA has contributed; highlights that all catches, including bycatches and discards, must be recorded and reported by species according to the applicable Greenlandic legislation; acknowledges the fundamental role of observers in ensuring compliance with the applicable rules, contributing to transparency and supporting sustainable fisheries management in the region;

    11. Reaffirms its concerns regarding the lack of precise scientific data about the state of fish stocks, which are assessed with limited data or using a precautionary approach; regrets, in particular, the situation of the Northern prawn, targeted by both Greenland vessels and Community vessels (which account for a more marginal share); notes, in this respect, the positive step taken by reducing indicative annual fishing opportunities for several fish stocks on the basis of the available scientific data;

    12. Remains concerned by the exploitation of the Northern prawn, particularly in certain areas of West Greenland, where stocks have shown signs of decline as a result of fishing pressure, global warming and increased predation by cod; emphasises the importance of strengthening sustainable management measures, including adjusting catch quotas on the basis of scientific recommendations from ICES and NAFO, and of improving fishing practices to reduce bycatch and preserve the marine ecosystem; calls on the Commission to enhance cooperation with the Greenlandic authorities to ensure a sustainable and balanced exploitation of this resource, which is essential to the local economy;

    13. Reiterates that, on the basis of the SFPA, the Commission and Greenland should continue to apply a precautionary approach and use the best available scientific advice, including the scientific recommendations issued by the relevant regional fisheries management organisations, as a basis for setting annual fishing opportunities, while also taking into consideration the socio-economic aspects;

    14. Notes that a considerable share of the fishing opportunities granted to the European Union by Greenland go to Norwegian vessels in connection with the exchange of quotas; recalls that the same sustainability standards and fisheries control rules followed by EU vessels must apply to Norwegian vessels in order to ensure that they are treated equally;

    Improvement of scientific advice and data collection

    15. Recalls that reliable and robust data is required to calculate the available surplus; reiterates its concerns regarding the existing gaps for some stocks; recommends, in this regard, that particular attention be given to calculating available surpluses; welcomes the efforts of the fisheries sector to cooperate with scientific monitoring and data collection and invites the Commission to step up scientific and financial cooperation with Greenland, including, for instance, by continuing to support the Greenland Institute of Natural Resources;

    16. Underlines the limited availability of data about benthic habitats in the Greenland Sea ecoregion, such as habitats that could potentially be considered vulnerable marine ecosystems; stresses the need to obtain more comprehensive scientific data in order to map these habitats, to adopt appropriate measures, particularly technical and spatial measures aimed at mitigating the impact of fisheries on these ecosystems, and to encourage the reporting of encounters with vulnerable marine ecosystem species (VMEs) by vessels; invites the Greenlandic authorities to consider dedicating a share of sectoral support to consolidating the mapping and detection of VMEs;

    17. Recalls that use of vessel monitoring systems is crucial for monitoring fishing activities, as it allows the real-time tracking of fishing vessels, thus making it possible to monitor compliance with the applicable rules, including in sensitive marine areas;

    18. Calls on the Commission and on Greenland to provide a further assessment of the impacts on fish stocks of other activities affecting the ecosystems, such as maritime transport, seismological research, pollution and climate change;

    Support for fisheries policy in Greenland

    19. Notes that the SFPA has generated employment opportunities for Greenlandic nationals and that sectoral support is being implemented effectively, providing significant environmental, social and economic benefits to Greenland; underlines, nevertheless, the small share of landings carried out by the EU fleet in Greenland and the limited number of seafarers from Greenland signed on with EU vessels (five, according to the evaluation of the previous agreement, accounting for 2.5 % of total jobs);

    20. Recalls, in this regard, the limited number of EU vessels fishing in Greenland under the Protocol (8-10 vessels), and notes that the majority do not land in or visit Greenlandic ports; encourages operators to maintain good cooperation and further enhance employment opportunities; highlights that according to the ex ante and ex post evaluation study, there has been no reciprocal interest in establishing joint enterprises/ventures given the priorities of the private sector in Greenland and in EU Member States;

    21. Considers that the indirect added value delivered to Greenland’s economy by the Protocol has the potential to be higher than with previous protocols; believes that the goal is to ensure a mutually beneficial agreement for the EU and Greenland, and for Greenland to derive an overall benefit from such agreements through the sustainable development of fisheries and auxiliary sectors in Greenland, which will have a lasting positive impact on the local economy;

    22. Points out that resources for sectoral support under the previous protocol helped to strengthen Greenland’s scientific research and administrative capacity and contributed to better ocean governance in Greenland;

    23. Stresses the importance, for both sides, of respecting all the relevant international commitments when implementing the Protocol, including the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples;

    24. Welcomes, too, the fact that a significant share of the sectoral support paid under the previous protocol was used to step up the monitoring of fisheries, scientific research and data collection, administration and support for small-scale coastal fisheries;

    25. Encourages the Commission and Greenland, within the framework of the SFPA, to provide further support to Greenland’s small-scale coastal fisheries, in line with the FAO’s Voluntary Guidelines for Securing Sustainable Small-Scale Fisheries and the priorities and needs of the Greenlandic authorities;

    26. Considers that sectoral support can contribute to securing the livelihoods of coastal fishing communities through such measures as, but not limited to, access to training, support for co-management in coastal areas or measures to adapt fishing activities to climate change and improve data, including data about their fishing effort;

    27. Supports the appropriate inclusion of Greenland’s fishing communities and civil society throughout the process leading to the adoption of the protocols, and stresses the importance of helping to ensure their participation in the implementation of the SFPA;

    28. Highlights that EU vessels fish beyond 12 nautical miles from the baseline of Greenland, which prevents competition with small-scale coastal fisheries;

    29. Encourages both parties to facilitate the exchange of best practices in arrangements for access to and preservation of fisheries resources;

    30. Notes Greenland’s willingness to develop its fisheries sector further; takes note of the recent reform of its fisheries legislation; highlights that the SFPA can support the continued development of Greenland’s fisheries policy; notes that this policy includes elements such as ensuring the long-term health and productivity of Greenland’s marine ecosystems and the distribution of fishing resources, including for coastal fisheries communities; recalls that Greenlandic lawmakers have exclusive competence for such developments;

    Regional governance of fisheries and challenges for the Arctic

    31. Underscores the importance of repositioning the fisheries agreement in the broader context of post-Brexit fisheries governance and regional fisheries management, relations between the European Union and Norway, and other coastal states, in the area of fisheries and the European Union’s policy on the Arctic; stresses the critical need to maintain a strong and productive partnership with Greenland and its Nordic neighbours;

    32. Encourages Greenland to continue strengthening its already strong transparency and cooperation within the framework of regional fisheries management organisations and agreements between coastal states for the management of certain stocks;

    33. Calls on the Commission to further utilise the opportunities that the Commission office in Nuuk provides, especially in terms of strengthening cooperation with the Greenlandic Government;

    34. Recalls the joint communication of 13 October 2021 entitled ‘A stronger EU engagement for a peaceful, sustainable and prosperous Arctic’;

    °

    ° °

    35. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the governments and parliaments of the Member States and of Greenland.

    EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

    At the end of 2024, Greenland and the European Union signed a new Protocol implementing the Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement (SFPA) (2025-2030). This is a mixed agreement that allows the European Union’s vessels to fish species such as cod, Greenland halibut, redfish and Northern prawn. In return, the European Union pays a financial contribution of EUR 17,296,857 per annum, comprising EUR 14,096,857 for access rights and EUR 3,200,000 for support and implementation of Greenland’s fisheries policy, plus the fees paid by vessel owners. In recent years, the fisheries agreement has allowed around 10 of the European Union’s vessels to operate in the autonomous territory’s waters. The new Protocol provides details of the rules and provisions governing this access.

     

    Fisheries in Greenland

     

    The fisheries sector is of central importance for Greenland in socio-economic and cultural terms. It accounts for 15% of the territory’s jobs and over 90% of its exports. Coastal fisheries mainly involve small vessels (dinghies), and sustain an economy and local jobs. Many remote Inuit communities rely on subsistence fishing. The territory also has a highly developed deep-sea fishing fleet, and has concluded fisheries agreements that allow foreign vessels to fish in the deep-sea fishing area. Greenland’s fisheries are suffering the effects of climate change on a vulnerable Arctic marine environment, with particular impacts on the species caught. Greenland has put measures in place to limit the impact of fisheries on the marine environment; these include a ban on discards, a plan for the management of bycatch etc.

     

    New Protocol implementing the SFPA

     

    The new Protocol that has been signed has a term of six years, providing stability and visibility for stakeholders. It contains provisions aimed at providing a framework for access to waters by European vessels and cooperation with Greenland: fishing opportunities, bycatch, scientific cooperation, monitoring, controls, surveillance, fishing areas, observers etc.

     

    A specific characteristic of the agreement is that catches are regulated on the basis of fishing opportunities that are set annually. Your rapporteur is concerned about the fact that, according to the ex-post evaluation, the TACs for several of the targeted species exceed the limits set on the basis of scientific advice. These proven cases of overfishing, or of uncertainty owing to a lack of data, pose a threat to fish populations and the sustainability of fisheries, as in the case of the Northern prawn. Several indicative fishing opportunities have been reduced. The second noteworthy point is linked to the need for additional data regarding the targeted species and marine ecosystems.

     

    The programming of sectoral support will be adopted in the three months following the application of the Protocol. The sectoral support allocated in recent years has made it possible to support research and scientific assessments, the administration of Greenland’s fisheries, controls and also small-scale coastal fisheries. This is assessed positively in the evaluation of the last Protocol.

     

    Findings and recommendations 

     

    In the context of current diplomatic tensions with the United States and the climate crisis in the Arctic, your rapporteur recalls the importance of the SFPA and relations between Greenland and the European Union in the area of fisheries. Through its sectoral support, the fisheries agreement offers assistance that is welcomed by the authorities and a number of civil society actors in Greenland. Positive developments include the increase in the financial contribution paid by the European Union, in the amount of sectoral support and in the fees paid by vessel owners.

     

    Your rapporteur invites the European Union to provide increased support to coastal fishing communities, with respect for the rights of the indigenous peoples and the FAO’s Guidelines for Securing Sustainable Small-Scale Fisheries. It is advisable to ensure that these peoples, as well as NGOs, are involved in the agreement. Another positive development is the European Union’s support in areas such as controls, the fight against IUU fishing, the collection of data and scientific research.

    Your rapporteur underlines the environmental challenges associated with the agreement. As already requested by Parliament in 2021, it is essential to continue efforts in relation to data collection and the fight against overfishing, by following the scientific advice for setting TACs in Greenland and allocating annual fishing opportunities to the European Union. Even though it fishes smaller quantities, the European Union must follow the precautionary principle. The definition of the surplus is controversial in certain cases. The fishing carried out by the European Union’s vessels furthermore has an impact on seabed ecosystems and the emphasis must be on identifying and protecting vulnerable marine ecosystems, with the sector’s help.

     

    Finally, your rapporteur asks for this fisheries agreement to be repositioned in the context of regional fisheries governance. Quota exchanges mean that post-Brexit relations with coastal countries, including Norway, are closely linked to the agreement. The European Union and Greenland must strengthen cooperation and transparency within the RFMOs and the agreements between coastal states. More broadly, the European Union must do more to protect species and the marine environment in the Arctic.

     

     

     

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Recruitment of children and adolescents by armed groups in Colombia – E-001758/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    Fighting the recruitment of minors in armed conflicts remains among key EU’s priorities, in line with the 2003 Guidelines on Children and Armed Conflict, as updated in 2024[1],[2]. The EU regularly raises the issue of child and forced recruitment in Colombia in its bilateral dialogues as well as in multilateral fora[3].

    As part of the Group of Friends of United Nations Resolution 1612, the EU supports numerous projects on children and armed conflict in Colombia.

    An example is ‘Entornos protectores’, a project focused on providing guarantees and opportunities for children and adolescents at risk of recruitment/use by armed actors.

    This includes culturally sensitive education programmes, psychosocial support, and community-based early warning systems developed in collaboration with local leaders to prevent recruitment, particularly for indigenous communities and girls.

    The EU also supports disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration programmes to rehabilitate former child recruits, providing vocational training and reintegration support in a conflict sensitive way.

    The EU continues to support human rights defenders in Colombia — including those focused on the rights of the child and on child recruitment — through different means such as the EU Protect Defenders Mechanism[4].

    The EU Delegation in Colombia is currently implementing human rights and civil society projects for a total budget of EUR 9 239 032. It is also expanding its partnerships with local actors to strengthen community-led conflict and recruitment prevention efforts.

    • [1] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/06/24/children-and-armed-conflicts-council-updates-eu-guidelines-and-approves-conclusions/.
    • [2] https://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/2025/02/joint-statement-by-eeas-secretary-general-srsg-for-children-and-armed-conflict-on-the-international-day-against-the-use-of-child-soldiers/.
    • [3] https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/un-new-york/eu-statement-%E2%80%93-un-peacebuilding-commission-ambassadorial-meeting-colombia_en.
    • [4] https://protectdefenders.eu/.
    Last updated: 24 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Murder of indigenous guards and ancestral wise men in Colombia – E-001750/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The rights of indigenous peoples are an integral part of the EU external human rights policy, as per the Council Conclusions on Indigenous Peoples of May 2017[1].

    The EU is committed to supporting indigenous peoples and their ancestral authorities as part of its human rights and peacebuilding strategy in Colombia, including in its dialogues with national authorities and through concrete action.

    Several EU-financed projects — including those within the framework of the #DefendamosLaVida campaign — are focused on the protection and empowerment of human rights defenders and social leaders in Colombia.

    Special attention is always placed on indigenous community territories, working closely with their organisations to strengthen their collective protection mechanisms.

    The EU Delegation in Colombia is currently implementing human rights and civil society projects for a total budget of EUR 9 239 032.

    The EU has made numerous public declarations[2] supporting the work of indigenous communities and demanding measures to protect them.

    These declarations also increase public awareness and contribute to reducing security risks. During the 15th EU-Colombia Human Rights Dialogue, the EU stressed the importance of recognising and respecting indigenous peoples’ self-governance and territorial autonomy as a key contribution to peacebuilding.

    • [1] https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-8814-2017-INIT/en/pdf.
    • [2] https://x.com/GBertrand_UE/status/1897359034065559625, https://x.com/UEenColombia/status/1864416363164450838.
    Last updated: 24 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Case number SA.104638 – E-001536/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    As a matter of policy, the Commission does not comment on bilateral exchanges between the Commission and Member States or complainants at the stage of the preliminary investigation. Should the Commission decide to open a formal investigation procedure, communication on the proceedings will follow at that time.

    Last updated: 24 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Quarrying in Pentadaktylos destroying the natural environment and amending the regulation on trade across the Green Line – E-002402/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002402/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Costas Mavrides (S&D)

    The Pentadaktylos mountain range in the occupied part of Cyprus has suffered incalculable damage and irreparable alteration of the natural landscape due to uncontrolled and illegal quarrying, in gross violation of all principles of environmental management and protection. Rare local species of flora and fauna are at risk of total extinction. What is more, many products produced in the Occupied Territories, as well as illegally extracted aggregates, are not subject to environmental or other certifications and checks (relating to health, safety or working conditions), creating unequal and unfair competition, as similar undertakings in the free areas operate under strict control and face higher production costs in order to comply with legislation.

    In view of this, can the Commission say:

    • 1.Is Republic of Cyprus able to prohibit the entry of such products into free areas in order to protect legitimate businesses and ensure that environmental and other laws are upheld?
    • 2.Will it revise the Green Line Regulation to explicitly prohibit the transport of aggregates from the Occupied Territories, taking into account the serious impact thereof on the environment and on healthy competition in the market, and adapt the regulation’s provisions to safeguard the rights of natural and legal persons, including property rights, as in the EU’s other regulation on financial assistance to the Turkish Cypriot community in the Occupied Territories?

    Submitted: 14.6.2025

    Last updated: 24 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Questionable European intelligence service reports on an impending Russian attack on the EU as a pretext for debt-financed arms build-up programmes – E-001291/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The intelligence threats assessments of the Member States remain outside the remit of the Commission. Therefore, the Commission is not in a position to evaluate or assess them.

    The Commission officials, in their public statements, have been referring to open-source information in which Member States’ intelligence services assessed the probability of Russian aggressive actions against the EU as likely in a five-year perspective.

    Commission defence industry programmes and instruments aimed at boosting European defence are proposed in the context of growing threats to European security which are proliferating in a way that poses an acute challenge to the EU way of life. This was the case even before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

    However, the Russian full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine has forced the EU and its partners to confront the reality of high-intensity war returning on the European continent on a scale never seen since 1945. Consequently, in the Commission assessment the only way the EU can ensure peace is to gain the ability to deter those who could harm the EU.

    Therefore, in March 2025, the Commission and the High Representative/Vice-President presented jointly the White Paper for European Readiness 2030[1] and the President of the Commission previously proposed the ReArm Europe Plan that lays down sound funding foundations to support a surge in defence.

    This long-term endeavour will enable the Member States to build up their armed forces to face any scenario, including the most extreme military contingencies.

    • [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025JC0120.
    Last updated: 24 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Measures to support people with Down syndrome and initiatives for the self-representation of people with disabilities – E-001954/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    1. The initiatives planned under the strategy for the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 2021-2030[1] address the rights and needs of persons with disabilities in all their diversity, including people with Down syndrome. Promoting independent living and inclusion in the community are among the key objectives of the strategy, as well as inclusive and accessible education of all children with disabilities, including Down syndrome . While specific standards for social, educational or support services for persons with Down syndrome have not been issued, the Commission has provided guidance in various areas of life concerning them, such as independent living or employment, highlighting the importance of considering the diversity of disabilities[2].

    2. The Commission supports the participation in decision-making processes of persons with disabilities, including people with intellectual disabilities such as people with Down syndrome. For instance, the Guide of good electoral practices for citizens with disabilities[3], adopted as part of the Commission’s EU Citizenship Package, presents an overview of practices aiming to further improve participation of citizens with disabilities in the electoral process. The Commission involves organisations representing persons with intellectual disabilities such as people with Down syndrome through the Disability Platform[4], as well as on the occasion of the European Day of Persons with Disabilities[5]. In addition, to enhance the involvement of people with intellectual disabilities such as people with Down syndrome, the Commission is upscaling the use of easy-to-read formats across its information and consultation documents.

    • [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A52021DC0101.
    • [2] Commission Notice — Guidance on independent living and inclusion in the community of persons with disabilities in the context of EU funding, C/2024/7897 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/7188/oj/eng.
    • [3] Guide of good electoral practices in Member States addressing the participation of citizens with disabilities in the electoral process https://commission.europa.eu/publications/guide-good-electoral-practices-member-states-addressing-participation-citizens-disabilities_en.
    • [4] Register of Commission expert groups and other similar entities https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/expert-groups-register/screen/expert-groups/consult?lang=en&groupId=3820&newsTypeId=2.
    • [5] European Day of Persons with Disabilities 2024 — https://employment-social-affairs.ec.europa.eu/european-day-persons-disabilities-2024-2024-11-28_en.
    Last updated: 24 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Commission President’s participation at the WEF – E-000243/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    1. On 20, 21 and 23 January 2025, the President of the Commission participated in the World Economic Forum (WEF) in Davos, Switzerland. At the WEF 2025, the President of the Commission met with Her Excellency Karin Keller-Sutter, President of the Helvetic Confederation, and the President of the United States National Academy of Medicine.

    The President participated in the following events:

    — Opening remarks and question and answer (Q&A) session at ‘Deutsche Meets Davos’ Event;

    — Opening remarks and Q&A session ‘Europe‘s Competitiveness Compass: A Conversation with Ursula von der Leyen and International Business Council’;

    — Opening remarks at the launch of the Energy Transition Forum ‘All Hands on Deck for the Energy Transition’, together with the President of Peru;

    — Opening remarks and Q&A session at Financial Times lunch;

    — Remarks at the ‘Scaling Up Renewables in Africa’ high-level event, organised by Global Citizen as a follow up to the campaign launched with South Africa in November 2024.

    3. The President’s mission costs will be published on a dedicated website[1].

    2. At the WEF 2025, the President of the Commission delivered a keynote speech, where she addressed topics like competitiveness, simplification, decarbonization, energy supplies and the relations with China and the United States[2]. Following her address, she provided more details by replying to questions by Klaus Schwab, Founder and Chairman of the World Economic Forum. The keynote address and the exchange can be watched online[3].

    • [1] https://ec.europa.eu/transparencyinitiative/meetings/mission.do?host=a2c7c963-a9ad-4c47-aa73-4bb46b06dd5d.
    • [2] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_25_285.
    • [3] https://audiovisual.ec.europa.eu/en/video/I-265956.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – General Court judgment in Case T-36/23 (Stevi and The New York Times v Commission) – P-001943/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The Commission is still analysing the judgment of the General Court and will comply with its duty to take the necessary measures to comply with the judgment in due course.

    In particular, since the General Court has found that the Commission should have provided a more precise explanation of its statement according to which it does not hold the requested documents, the Commission will review the situation in light of this finding and will adopt a new decision.

    The General Court has ordered the Commission to pay the costs of the case. Since they have not yet been liquidated, it is not possible to quantify them at this stage.

    The General Court does not put into question the Commission’s documents registration policy. These rules aim to ensure the integrity and validity of the Commission’s records and that important documents drafted or received by the Commission can be retrieved and eventually made accessible to interested EU citizens.

    The Commission will continue to strictly abide by the solid legal framework in place for access to documents. The Commission remains fully committed to maintaining openness, accountability and clear communication with all stakeholders, including EU institutions, civil society, and interest representatives.

    Last updated: 24 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – ‘Safe third country’ concept – E-002241/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002241/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Marco Tarquinio (S&D), Leoluca Orlando (Verts/ALE), Rudi Kennes (The Left), Mélissa Camara (Verts/ALE), Jaume Asens Llodrà (Verts/ALE), Ilaria Salis (The Left), Brando Benifei (S&D), Alessandro Zan (S&D), Pasquale Tridico (The Left), Mounir Satouri (Verts/ALE), Saskia Bricmont (Verts/ALE), Murielle Laurent (S&D), Estrella Galán (The Left), Giorgio Gori (S&D), Emma Rafowicz (S&D), Evin Incir (S&D), Sandro Ruotolo (S&D), Anna Strolenberg (Verts/ALE), Matjaž Nemec (S&D), Pernando Barrena Arza (The Left), Chloé Ridel (S&D), Alessandra Moretti (S&D), Nicola Zingaretti (S&D), Annalisa Corrado (S&D), Marta Temido (S&D), Erik Marquardt (Verts/ALE), Özlem Demirel (The Left), Fabienne Keller (Renew), Damien Carême (The Left), Per Clausen (The Left), Maria Walsh (PPE), Krzysztof Śmiszek (S&D), Gaetano Pedulla’ (The Left), Udo Bullmann (S&D), Cecilia Strada (S&D), Rima Hassan (The Left)

    The Commission has proposed a review of the ‘safe third country’ (STC) concept[1] that:

    – eliminates the mandatory connection between the applicant and the STC;

    – considers transit through an STC a sufficient link to apply the concept;

    – in the absence of a connection or transit, applies the concept if there is an agreement or arrangement with a third country that examines the asylum application;

    – eliminates the automatic suspensive effect of appeals against inadmissibility decisions that are based on the concept.

    However, the European Court of Human Rights’ case-law has repeatedly clarified that a transfer to a third country respects the ECHR only if the applicant has a significant connection with the country and if effective and accessible procedural safeguards are guaranteed.

    Therefore, how will the Commission:

    • 1.ensure that the application of the STC concept in the absence of a concrete link, and the abolition of the automatic suspensive effect of appeals, are compatible with international law, including Article 13 ECHR and Article 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, which enshrine the right to an effective remedy?
    • 2.guarantee that such a broad interpretation of the STC concept will not lead to a systemic externalisation of asylum responsibilities, contrary to the spirit of the Common European Asylum System and the EU’s international obligations?

    Supporters[2]

    Submitted: 4.6.2025

    • [1] Proposal of 20 May 2025 for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2024/1348 as regards the application of the ‘safe third country’ concept (COM(2025)0259).
    • [2] This question is supported by Members other than the authors: Cristina Guarda (Verts/ALE), Benedetta Scuderi (Verts/ALE)

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Philip R. Lane: Monetary policy: new challenges

    Source: European Central Bank

    Speech by Philip R. Lane, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, at the Barclays-CEPR Monetary Policy Forum 2025

    London, 24 June 2025

    Since the extraordinary inflation surges in 2021-2022, the primary challenge facing monetary policy has been to return inflation to target in a timely manner.[1] In terms of interest rate policy, this required a rapid hiking cycle from July 2022 to September 2023, followed by a “hold at peak” phase and then a gradual reversal of the restrictive stance starting in June 2024.[2] The gradualism in the easing phase reflected ongoing uncertainty about the speed of the disinflation process.

    While headline inflation is currently around the target, services inflation still has some distance to travel to make sure that inflation stabilises at the target on a sustainable basis. Still, there has been sufficient progress in returning inflation to target to consider that this monetary policy challenge is largely completed. This assessment is reinforced by the accumulating evidence that the remaining services disinflation is well on track: first, the projection errors for inflation, including for the services subcomponent, have been relatively small during the disinflation process; second, both the wage tracker data and survey indicators suggest that further deceleration in wage growth can be expected in both 2025 and 2026, facilitating further declines in services inflation.

    However, this disinflation challenge has been superseded by a new set of challenges and monetary policymakers have to make sure that the medium-term inflation target is protected in a volatile environment in which, amongst other factors, there is high uncertainty about the future of long-standing international trade system.[3] This uncertainty extends beyond the calibration of new tariff regimes and includes the possibility of a broader set of non-tariff barriers, a deeper intertwining of economic policies and security policies and possible revisions to the treatment of foreign portfolio investors and foreign direct investors. In addition to policy uncertainty, geopolitical tensions, such as Russia’s unjustified war against Ukraine and the tragic conflict in the Middle East, remain a major source of uncertainty. Reflecting these developments, we have seen high volatility in energy prices this year and substantial currency repricing. There has also been considerable financial market volatility.

    At the same time (and largely as an endogenous reaction to the changed security landscape), the fiscal outlook for the euro area has materially changed for the coming years, with the overall fiscal deficit looking set to remain above three per cent over the projection horizon. The near-term and medium-term implications for output and inflation of the structural changes associated with the green transition, the increasing business adoption of artificial intelligence applications and global shifts in comparative advantage are also highly uncertain, operating both on demand and supply with potentially different timelines.

    Especially under current conditions of high uncertainty, it is essential to remain data dependent and take a meeting-by-meeting approach in making monetary policy decisions, with no pre-commitment to any particular future rate path. In addition to observing how activity and inflation are actually behaving, data dependence also extends to the incoming data on policy settings outside the monetary domain, since shifts in international and domestic policy regimes are highly relevant for future inflation dynamics. In this environment, the primary task for monetary policy makers is to make sure that any temporary deviations from target do not turn into longer-term deviations.

    This orientation explains our June decision to cut rates by 25 basis points. The June projections were conditioned on a rate path that included a quarter-point reduction of the deposit facility rate (DFR) in June: model-based optimal policy simulations and an array of monetary policy feedback rules indicated a cut was appropriate under the baseline and also constituted a robust decision, remaining appropriate across a range of alternative future paths for inflation and the economy. By supporting the pricing pressure needed to generate target-consistent inflation in the medium-term, this cut helps ensure that the projected negative inflation deviation over the next eighteen months remains temporary and does not convert into a longer-term deviation of inflation from the target. This cut also guards against any uncertainty about our reaction function by demonstrating that we are determined to make sure that inflation returns to target in the medium term. This helps to underpin inflation expectations and avoid an unwarranted tightening in financial conditions.

    It is worth noting, in particular, that the robustness of the decision was also supported by a set of model-based optimal policy simulations conducted on various combinations of the trade scenarios discussed in the Eurosystem staff projections report, even when also factoring in upside scenarios for fiscal expenditure. By contrast, leaving the DFR on hold at 2.25 per cent could have triggered an adverse repricing of the forward curve and a revision in inflation expectations that would risk generating a more pronounced and longer-lasting undershoot of the inflation target. In turn, if this risk materialised, a stronger monetary reaction would ultimately be required.

    Looking ahead, our monetary policy will have to take into account not only the most likely path (the baseline) but also the risks to activity and inflation. To this end, it will be important to explore how alternative rate paths hold up in various plausible sensitivity and scenario analyses, in order to make sure we minimise the risk of extended deviations from our medium-term target.

    MIL OSI Economics

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Experts of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women Commend the Voices of Afghan Women and Girls Demanding Justice, Ask about Discriminatory Laws and Edicts and the Ban on Education

    Source: United Nations – Geneva

    The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women today concluded its consideration of the fourth periodic report of Afghanistan, with Committee Experts extending profound appreciation to the women and girls of Afghanistan demanding justice, while raising concerns about the discriminatory laws and edicts imposed since the military takeover by the Taliban in 2021, and the ban on education. 

    Bandana Rana, Committee Expert and Country Rapporteur, extended profound appreciation to the women and girls of Afghanistan, whose voices continued to resonate across the world, demanding justice.  Another Expert urged all States parties to amplify the voices of Afghan women. 

    A Committee Expert said the dismantling of the Ministry of Women’s Affairs and replacing it with the Ministry of Vice and Virtue was a violation of article 3.  The law on vice and virtue silenced women’s voices in public and muffled their voices in private.  A March 2024 announcement enforced public flogging, and there had been numerous women publicly flogged for crimes ranging from adultery to dress code violations.  The reinstation of the stoning edict constituted torture and violated the rights to women’s liberty. 

    Another Committee Expert said education was one of the most important conditions for securing women and girls’ rights to equality.  Hence, it was deeply concerning that all eight sub-articles under article 10 were being violated by the State party.  Following the de facto authorities order to close secondary schools in 2021, schools today remained closed.  A shocking 30 per cent of girls in the State party did not even receive primary education.  All Afghan women and girls were entitled to receive full education.  Another concern was that young boys and girls were sent to religious madrasas where the curriculum was aligned with the most extreme versions of Islam. 

    In response to these comments and questions, the delegation said the edicts imposed by the de facto authorities amounted to gender apartheid.  The discrimination that women in Afghanistan faced was unparalleled globally.  There were no laws ensuring human rights in the country.  Women had been left to view these values as unattainable.  The Taliban de facto authorities had stated that Sharia law was the applicable legal framework in Afghanistan.  The Taliban had abolished mechanisms promoting gender equality, and projects promoting gender equality had ceased operations. 

    The delegation said the issue of education had been at the forefront of all of Afghanistan’s struggles and the international community’s demands.  The international community had continually emphasised the need for schools to open, and now there was no hope this would occur. There were currently efforts to implement small-scale education programmes on the ground.  This was better than nothing but could not address a systematic ban and an increasing number of jihadi madrasas.  There needed to be a mechanism to push the education project into Afghanistan, going over the Taliban’s restrictions, using technology. 

    Introducing the report, Nasir Ahmad Andisha, Permanent Representative of Afghanistan to the United Nations Office at Geneva, said that during the last review before the Committee in 2020, the delegation had been led by a woman from the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, which had since been abolished from the Government and replaced by the Ministry of Virtue and Vice.  Since August 2021, there had been over four years of systematic, widespread assault on every aspect of life of women and girls, a complete and total erasure and dehumanisation of women and girls in Afghanistan.

    The laws, policies and institutions that were once enacted to promote and protect women’s rights had been replaced with an intentionally designed edifice of oppression, including discriminatory edicts, decrees, declarations, orders, culminating in a so-called law on the promotion of virtue and the prevention of vice, Mr. Andisha said. 

    In closing remarks, Nahla Haidar, Committee Chair, said every member of the Committee was concerned and stood in solidarity with Afghanistan. This had been one of the most important considerations of a country report.  Ms. Haidar thanked all those from Afghanistan who came to share their views. 

    In his closing remarks, Mr. Andisha appreciated the opportunity to engage with the Committee. The Committee had created a vital pathway to ensure the voices of Afghan women and girls were heard.  Since August 2021, the situation for Afghan women and girls had deteriorated into a system of gender apartheid, which went against every article of the Convention.  It was time to listen, support and stand in solidarity with the women and girls of Afghanistan. They must be at the centre of every solution. 

    The delegation of Afghanistan was comprised of representatives of the National Human Rights Commission of Afghanistan; the Afghanistan Parliament; the Afghanistan Senate; the Ambassador of Afghanistan in Canada; the Ambassador of Afghanistan in Australia; the Ambassador of Afghanistan in Austria; the Administrative Reform Commission; Afghan diplomats; human rights activists; and the Permanent Mission of Afghanistan to the United Nations Office at Geneva.

    The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women’s ninety-first session is being held from 16 June to 4 July.  All documents relating to the Committee’s work, including reports submitted by States parties, can be found on the session’s webpage.  Meeting summary releases can be found here.  The webcast of the Committee’s public meetings can be accessed via the UN Web TV webpage.

    The Committee will next meet at 10 a.m. on Wednesday, 25 June to begin its consideration of the combined initial to fifth periodic reports of San Marino (CEDAW/C/SMR/1-5).

    Report

    The Committee has before it the fourth periodic report of Afghanistan (CEDAW/C/AFG/4).

    Presentation of Report

    NASIR AHMAD ANDISHA, Permanent Representative of Afghanistan to the United Nations Office at Geneva, thanked the Committee for undertaking this exceptional process despite the extraordinary situation in Afghanistan, where dark clouds overshadowed the lives of women and girls.  Afghanistan had ratified the Convention in 2003, without reservation, marking a landmark step forward for women’s rights in the country. 

    During the last review before the Committee in 2020, the delegation had been led by a woman from the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, which had since been abolished from the Government and replaced by the Ministry of Virtue and Vice.  Since August 2021, there had been over four years of systematic, widespread assault on every aspect of life of women and girls, a complete and total erasure and dehumanisation of women and girls in Afghanistan.  The laws, policies and institutions that were once enacted to promote and protect women’s rights had been replaced with an intentionally designed edifice of oppression, including discriminatory edicts, decrees, declarations, orders, culminating in a so-called law on the promotion of virtue and the prevention of vice. 

    Despite challenges in the preparation of the report, it aimed to provide a comprehensive and accurate account of the situation on the ground since 15 August 2021, reflecting an inclusive and participatory approach.  The report strove to ensure the international community took effective action based on verified information by proposing concrete recommendations for the path forward.  These recommendations aimed to offer hope, a vision, and a path forward towards the transformation of Afghanistan’s society through practical pathways for change in the lives of women and girls at a time when the Taliban de facto authorities had called the situation of women and girls an ‘internal’ matter”.   

    The Committee would hear how girls who still could attend school felt they needed to make the desperate choice to end their lives or were forced into marriage.  The dialogue today aimed to fulfil Afghanistan’s commitment to the international system.  Regardless of the Taliban’s approach, Afghanistan was taking its commitments to the international system seriously. 

    SIMA SAMAR, Former President of the National Human Rights Commission, said the dialogue today was exceptional.  The staff of the Afghanistan embassy did not have to defend themselves regarding the implementation of the Convention in the country.  The Committee and the Ambassador were on the same page.  The situation in Afghanistan was exceptional. After the removal of the Taliban in 2001, use of the word gender apartheid had stopped, and everyone thought they would never have to deal with this regime again.  Unfortunately, there was no other definition for what was happening in Afghanistan today. 

    Afghanistan had a unique situation.  The de facto authority aimed to erase women from public life and put restrictions on women without accountability and justice; this was a key core of their policies. All protection mechanisms established over the past 20 years had been abolished by the Taliban.  Afghanistan was the only Islamic country which had ratified the Convention without reservation.  The normalisation of the present violations of the human rights situation in Afghanistan was a scary concept.  The way Afghanistan now treated women led to a continuation of conflict. 

    FAWZIA KOOFI, Former member of the Afghanistan Parliament, thanked the Committee for listening to the women and girls of Afghanistan.  The women before the Committee were in a unique and tragic position; they were here to represent a State but they did not have a State.  It was emotional and heart wrenching.  Since the Taliban returned to power, women had been systemically excluded from every sphere of political and public life.  All mechanisms enabling women to participate in governance had been dismantled.  The Ministry of Women’s Affairs had been abolished and replaced by the Ministry of Vice and Virtue, which used the police to supress women’s autonomy. Women had been entirely excluded from the civil justice system.  Female prosecutors had been dismissed and faced security threats, particularly from former Taliban prisoners released on 15 August. 

    No female leaders were engaged in any decision-making processes at any level in Afghanistan. Women and girls were deliberately excluded from diplomatic negotiations and from international forums and engagements. Just one month after the Doha meeting, where no women were included, the law on vice and virtue was instigated, which effectively rendered women as second class citizens.  Girls could not attend school after a certain age but could attend madrasa schools which promoted radicalisation.  The Taliban needed to be held accountable for violations of the Convention. 

    SHUKRIA BARAKZAI, Former member of the Afghanistan Parliament, said today, Afghanistan was facing the worst system of gender apartheid. The de facto authorities had erased the legal identity of women and removed their presence from work and public life.  These were clear violations of international law and the Convention.  Yet despite this situation, Afghan women were showing resilience; their bravery must not go unnoticed.  The Committee was urged to recognise gender apartheid as a grave violation of the Convention; hold the de facto authorities accountable for systematic discrimination; and to support Afghan women inside and outside of the country. 

    In Iran, Afghan women could not buy food or use their credit cards.  Embassies had been shut down and were not providing simple documents. Recently, a new order was announced by the Taliban that female doctors and nurses could not go to their work without a male member of their family accompanying them (mahram).  The Convention should not just be a Convention, but an obligation. 

    Questions by a Committee Expert

    BANDANA RANA, Committee Expert and Country Rapporteur, extended profound appreciation to the women and girls of Afghanistan, whose voices continued to resonate across the world demanding justice.  The dialogue transcended mere procedure; it unfolded against the stark reality of one of the gravest human rights catastrophes confronting women and girls.  It was hoped that today’s exchange would prove constructive, anchored in mutual respect, steadfast commitment to strengthening accountability for the rights of Afghan women and girls.

    Since the de facto authorities assumed control, Afghan women and girls had suffered an unprecedented and systematic obliteration of their rights.  The prohibition of girls’ education beyond primary school, limitation to access to justice and healthcare, the wholesale exclusion of women from public and civic participation, and the systematic dismantling of constitutional protections constituted flagrant violations of the Convention’s fundamental principles.

    The Committee bore a solemn obligation, a legal, international and moral imperative, to examine these developments with unflinching clarity and uncompromising resolve. The Committee remained steadfast in its openness to future engagement.  To the de facto authorities, to States wielding influence, and to the international community at large: silence was complicity, not neutrality. It was hoped that today’s dialogue would serve to deepen the accountability of all stakeholders, and galvanise a renewed and unified commitment to restore the inalienable human rights of Afghan women and girls. 

    Since the takeover in August 2021, the de facto authorities had issued a sweeping series of edicts and decrees that institutionalised gender-based discrimination, directly violating article 1 of the Convention.  This discrimination was systemic and far-reaching, affecting every aspect of public, political, social, economic and cultural life.  Women and girls were barred from secondary and tertiary education, excluded from most forms of employment, severely restricted in their freedom of movement, and denied participation in political and public life. The Committee expressed its profound concern regarding these deep and entrenched violations.  The abolition of Afghanistan’s 2004 Constitution, and the dismantling of key legislative protection, including the law on the elimination of violence against women, were grave violations of article 2.  The inconsistent and opaque application of religious and customary law reinforced patriarchal norms, especially in areas such as family law, inheritance, and protection from violence, further entrenching gender inequality.

    The Committee was deeply alarmed by the erosion of legal institutions and access to justice. The dissolution of the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, closure of family courts, termination of women’s protection centres, and the cessation of legal aid services, dismantled essential accountability mechanisms for survivors of gender-based violence. Since August 2021, many non-governmental organizations had been forced to cease operations, suspend activities, or function underground.  Women human rights defenders were subjected to arbitrary detention, harassment and threats. 

    Prior to the 2021 takeover, Afghanistan had adopted a national action plan on United Nations Security Council resolution 1325, establishing a foundational framework for women’s participation in peacebuilding, conflict prevention, and reconstruction.  This framework had now been dismantled.  Afghanistan currently ranked last on the global women, peace and security index, reflecting the acute deterioration in women’s inclusion, access to justice, and personal safety.  The Committee remained gravely concerned about the systematic and institutionalised discrimination endured by women and girls in Afghanistan, and urgently called upon the de facto authorities and the international community to intensify its efforts, and to uphold the rights of Afghan women and girls in compliance with the Convention.

    Responses by the Delegation 

    The delegation said that the Organization of Islamic Cooperation had categorically rejected the Taliban’s assertion that its actions were based on Sharia law.  The 2004 Constitution had been dismantled by the Taliban.  Since August 2021, the Taliban had issued over 100 decrees which had the effect of segregating women and girls.  Every new decree aimed to further oppress women.  The Taliban had contravened every article in the Convention.  In its recommendations to the international community, the Committee was urged to refrain from normalising the Taliban’s activities; ensure any engagement with the Taliban de facto authorities was contingent on respect for the human rights of all, and promoted an equitable gender government; recognise and codify gender apartheid as an international crime; and adopt a new legitimate Constitution through a consultative process, among other measures. 

    Questions by Committee Experts

    A Committee Expert said the dismantling of the Ministry of Women’s Affairs and replacing it with the Ministry of Vice and Virtue was a violation of article 3.  The law on vice and virtue silenced women’s voices in public and muffled their voices in private.  A March 2024 announcement enforced public flogging, and there had been numerous women publicly flogged for crimes ranging from adultery to dress code violations.  The reinstation of the stoning edict constituted torture and violated the rights to women’s liberty.  Impunity in the criminal justice system eroded international law.  There were numerous punishments of women being beaten with whips, for cases such as making eye contact with men who were not family members. 

    The application by the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court for arrest warrants broke new grounds, marking the first time gender persecution had been charged as a standalone charge.  Rape and other forms of sexual violence and forced marriage were violations of the Rome Statute.  These crimes may rise to the level of what was increasingly being recognised as a form of gender apartheid, which must be codified in the draft Convention on crimes against humanity.  All States parties were asked to amplify the voices of Afghan women. 

    Another Expert said the Committee expressed its deep concerns regarding the abolished efforts in the State party to increase women’s participation in public life through temporary special measures.  Between 2001 and 2021, several special measures were introduced by the previous government with the goal of achieving greater equality for women.  Among other policies, the election law reserved at least 25 per cent of the seats in each Provincial, District, and Village Council for female candidates.  Such laws and policies managed to increase the representation of women in Community Development Councils to almost 50 per cent in 2019 and in civil service from almost zero per cent during the previous regime (1996–2001) to 28 per cent in 2020. Yet, since taking power in 2021, the de facto authorities had dismantled all measures and programmes aimed at eliminating gender-based prejudices and promoting equality.

    The Committee called for all countries to employ whatever tools at their disposal to aid Afghan women and girls, including by putting in place special measures to deliver funding to local and international aid organizations, increasing quotas for resettlement of Afghani female refugees, and cooperating with neighbouring countries to ensure the safety of Afghani women in their territories.

    Responses by the Delegation

    The edicts imposed by the de facto authorities amounted to gender apartheid, the delegation said.  The discrimination that women in Afghanistan faced was unparalleled globally.  There were no laws ensuring human rights in the country.  Women had been left to view these values as unattainable.  The Taliban de facto authorities had stated that Sharia law was the applicable legal framework in Afghanistan.  The Taliban had abolished mechanisms promoting gender equality, and projects promoting gender equality had ceased operations.  All gender offices had been eliminated.  Women were left with no legal recourse.  Women faced considerable challenges to legal representation. 

    Questions by Committee Experts

    A Committee Expert said Afghan women underwent the worst forms of violence.  The Committee was alarmed by information provided by United Nations Women, including that instances of gender-based violence against women and girls had increased substantially.  The decrees published by the de facto authorities had remained dead letters due to the culture of impunity surrounding these acts.  These harmful practices did not respect the implementation of article 5 of the Convention and were flagrant violations of international law. 

    Another Expert said Afghanistan continued to serve as a transit and destination country for forced labour and sexual exploitation.  Many women had been coerced into prostitution and forced marriage. There were now not merely inadequate trafficking efforts, but the creation of conditions which made trafficking inevitable.  The December 2024 ban on women attending medical institutions had eliminated their last pathway to higher education.  This systematic exclusion violated several articles of the Convention and created a desperate situation which drove women towards trafficking. 

    The criminalisation of trafficking victims was highly alarming.  Women and girls could be charged for “zina” (sex outside of marriage) after being forced into trafficking.  It was acknowledged that the de facto authorities issued a decree around trafficking, however, this decree was inadequate compared to previous legislative frameworks.  The previous government’s efforts to coordinate trafficking efforts had been dismantled and there were no forms of victim identification.  There could be no effective trafficking response without full restoration of women’s rights. 

    Responses by the Delegation 

     

    The delegation said Islam and Sharia recognised and supported the rights of women and girls. The Taliban de facto authorities had weaponised their interpretation of culture and religion and systematically restricted every part of women’s lives.  These interpretations undermined the agency of women and girls.  Space for women was being limited under the pretence of “culture”.  The term “gender apartheid” should be codified. 

    Women and girls made up the majority of trafficking victims inside and outside Afghanistan. The de facto authorities made no effort to stop these crimes; shelters had been shut down and systems to prosecute traffickers had been dismantled.  Girls faced a higher risk due to being denied their rights to education. Many women were especially vulnerable, including those who were internally displaced.  The recent statement by some countries in support of women in Afghanistan was welcomed.  The Committee was urged to recommend that the international community took strong actions to protect women at risk.  The right to live free from violence, exploitation and trafficking was not optional.   

    Digital abuse had not received proper attention, and this was something which needed to be addressed. 

    Questions by Committee Experts

    A Committee Expert said previously, Afghan women had been active participants in politics, and by 2020 women comprised around one fifth of civil servants.  However, even during this period of progress, women had faced numerous threats in political life.  Women’s voices in peace processes remained largely ceremonial.  Since August 2021, the erasure of Afghan women from public and political life was deeply concerning.  The Expert condemned the dismantling of the Constitutional guarantee for 27 per cent of female political participation.  Not a single women served in the de facto administration. This stance starkly contravened the Convention.  The complete exclusion of women from the judiciary was extremely concerning. 

    Another Expert said the Committee was deeply concerned at the ongoing violations of Afghan women regarding their right to identity, including their inability to have access to identity documents.  Women in Afghanistan could not register the birth of their children and had to rely on a man to do it for them.  They were denied the possibility of transmitting their nationality to their children.  This situation was complicated when it came to women in situations of heightened risk. The lack of civil documentation affected a high percentage of women, putting them at a major risk of ending up as a victim of human trafficking.  There was a pressing need for States, multilateral organizations and those with a presence on the ground to work on a coordinated basis to support documents relating to civil documentation with a gender perspective. It was essential to roll out awareness raising campaigns targeting community and religious leaders. 

    BANDANA RANA, Committee Expert and Country Rapporteur, said the Committee expressed concern regarding the exclusion of Afghan women from international discussions, including the Doha talks.  Refugee and asylum-seeking women must have access to gender sensitive asylum procedures. All host and transit States were urged to uphold their obligations under the Convention. 

    Responses by the Delegation 

    The delegation said female representation across Afghanistan had previously been comprised of 35 per cent of women and was now at zero per cent.  Now that public space was completely closed to women, this space was only provided by the United Nations.  Recently, there had been reports that United Nations female staff were detained by the Taliban. 

    It was currently much more difficult for women in Afghanistan to receive a passport.  If they were single, then they needed a man to go with them to apply.  This had stripped women from fully enjoying their rights as country nationals.  It was difficult to see the de facto authorities appointing females to represent Afghanistan on an international level. 

    Questions by Committee Experts

    A Committee Expert said education was one of the most important conditions for securing women and girls’ rights to equality.  Hence, it was deeply concerning that all eight sub-articles under article 10 were being violated by the State party.  In 2017, more than one third of the student population were girls.  The Constitution and national law provided the right to education without discrimination, and women regularly entered higher education. Following the de facto authorities order to close secondary schools in 2021, schools today remained closed.  A shocking 30 per cent of girls in the State party did not even receive primary education.  All Afghan women and girls were entitled to receive full education. 

    Another concern was that young boys and girls were sent to religious madrasas where the curriculum was aligned with the most extreme versions of Islam.  The exclusion of half the population from education aimed to erase women and girls from public and intellectual life.  These restrictions had led to a rise in early marriage and child labour, and deepened poverty in an already poor country.  The de-facto authorities must reverse all education bans and allow girls to receive an education; there must be pressure from the international community to ensure this occurred. 

    BANDANA RANA, Committee Expert and Country Rapporteur, said host countries were obliged under the Convention to ensure equal education opportunities for Afghan girls who were refugees. 

    Responses by the Delegation 

    The delegation said the issue of education had been at the forefront of all of Afghanistan’s struggles and the international community’s demands.  The international community had continually emphasised the need for schools to open, and now there was no hope this would occur. There were currently efforts to implement small-scale education programmes on the ground.  This was better than nothing, but could not address a systematic ban and an increasing number of jihadi madrasas.  In a few years, there would be female Taliban supporters leaving these institutions.  There needed to be a mechanism to push the education project into Afghanistan, going over the Taliban’s restrictions, using technology. 

    Questions by a Committee Expert

    A Committee Expert said the Committee expressed deep concern at the erosion of Afghan’s women’s right to work.  Most female civil servants had been barred from returning to their jobs since the de facto authorities assumed power in 2021.  In 2022, Afghan women were banned from working for non-governmental organizations, as well as United Nations organizations.  The requirement for a male guardian had resulted in women being stopped from commuting to work all together.  Women in formal labour dropped from around 14 per cent in 2021 to just five per cent in 2023.  Women headed households had been disproportionately impacted by poverty. This was a national development crisis requiring urgent international action.  The right to work was a core human right, fundamental to human dignity and social stability. 

    Responses by the Delegation 

     

    The delegation said the Taliban de facto authorities had banned women from working in non-governmental organizations.  The loss of this infrastructure had most severely affected the country’s most vulnerable.  Today the majority of Afghan women were excluded from income-generating activities. Unleashing women’s economic potential would unlock the future of the country.  Excluding women had cost the Afghan economy almost a billion dollars. Previously, women had been very active in the private sector and in the civil service.  It had been almost two years that women who had retired were not receiving their pensions, which made the situation even more difficult. 

    Questions by a Committee Expert

    A Committee Expert said the Committee was concerned about the health situation of women in Afghanistan and their access to basic health services.  The systematic restrictive measures taken by the de facto authorities had seriously impacted women’s access to health care.  They faced greater barriers to accessing health care owing to scarce resources and cultural norms, which only allowed women to be treated by women.  Afghanistan had one of the highest child mortality rates in the world, with around 625 deaths per 100,000 births.  This rate was higher in rural and remote areas.  Women had reported high rates of bad mental health and accounted for the majority of suicide attempts.  The Taliban’s disregard of the health of women was a violation of the Convention. The de facto authorities must lift relevant restrictions to create a social and cultural environment conducive to women’s physical and mental health.  It was also hoped that the international community would call on Afghanistan to rebuild its healthcare system and reintroduce the training of female health care professionals. 

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said access to health, and the reduction in maternal and child mortality had been areas where Afghanistan had made phenomenal progress before 2021. Unfortunately, the past four years of reversal had almost washed away all these achievements. 

    Reports of desperation, anxiety and suicide were widespread and worsening.  No mental health support was available to women. The ability of women to access medical treatment had been severely constricted, as they were denied healthcare without a male guardian.  Many women in rural areas died during childbirth due to a lack of resources. The number of female doctors and midwives had already been insufficient before the ban.  The closing of midwife schools could mean that in 10 years, there would be no trained midwives.  The Committee was urged to consider increasing offers to support medical and consulting services and create a safe space, shelter and support centre for those in exile.     

    Access to education was the strongest tool for empowerment; the Taliban was denying this access to restrict the empowerment of women and control them.  The connection between health and education was undeniable, as education gave women and girls the opportunity to choose their profession and their lives.  The radicalisation of girls in the family was also a frightening concept for the country. 

    Questions by a Committee Expert

    An Expert said following the Taliban takeover, sanitation and water infrastructure in Afghanistan had collapsed, drastically impacting women and girls.  The restriction of hammams had also restricted women’s hygiene.   

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said the policies of the Taliban directly attacked the mental health of women in Afghanistan.  Young girls also did not receive iron tablets from the schools under Taliban rule, and periods were considered taboo.  Vaccinations had now been banned and Afghanistan was the only country with cases of polio. 

    Questions by a Committee Expert

    An Expert said it was alarming that over 90 per cent of the population had been plunged into poverty.  Women were banished from economic activity and struggled to meet basic needs.  The economy had sharply declined.  It was perturbing that only 6.8 per cent of women had a personal or joint bank account, compared to 21 per cent of men. There was grave concern that the lockout of women and girls from businesses had stifled the economy.  The international community and private sector trading partners were urged to increase pressure to uphold women and girls as critical contributors to the economy. 

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said since the Taliban’s military takeover, all economic activity by women had ceased after it had been driven underground or was conducted by male intermediaries.  Women-led households were confronting impossible choices, including forced marriage or the sale of children.  Families were trading household belongings or their daughters for survival.  There was no functioning social safety net; pensions had been stripped away.  Women were increasingly barred from inheriting or owning land, homes or other assets.  Over 40 public libraries and community art centres had been shut down since April. Female artists had fled to exile and those who remained lived in fear.  Women’s access to financial resources needed to be enhanced, as did women’s access to cultural opportunities.  These were essential to rebuilding Afghanistan. 

    Questions by a Committee Expert

    An Expert said rural women no longer had access to land or credit and had been nearly totally erased from public spaces.  The Committee was alarmed about the near collapse of maternal and reproductive healthcare in rural areas.  Women with disabilities faced systemic neglect and heightened exposure to abuse. The Committee was also concerned about the forced and mass return of Afghan nationals from Iran and Pakistan since 2023.  The plight of child widows and orphaned girls in rural regions was also alarming.  This violation represented a widespread denial of the rights recognised under the Convention.  Women and girls were also being excluded from technology, including artificial intelligence. 

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said the discrimination faced by women in Afghanistan was even worse for rural women, and those from diverse ethnic groups.  Women human rights defenders were especially at risk.  Rural women were also hit harder by climate change and disasters, with no system to help them recover.  The Committee was urged to ensure that women and civil society inside Afghanistan were able to participate in the development of strategies conducive to the Convention.  Even a cell phone in Afghanistan was not considered personal property; all communications were checked.  All Afghan women were facing the same type of discrimination, whatever their ethnicity, religion or where they lived.  The Olympic Committee in Afghanistan was under the control of the Taliban; the Committee was called on to show support for Afghan athletes, who were largely based outside of Afghanistan. 

    Questions by a Committee Expert

    A Committee Expert said the access of women to inheritance was an area where there had been modest progress.  Courts were currently led by male religious leaders.  Forced marriage and child marriage were other concerning areas. Divorce for women had become almost impossible in practice.  Gender-based violence in Afghanistan had increased significantly in a context of impunity.  The authorities were recommended to establish basic guarantees for women and girls in line with international human rights standards.  The explicit prohibition needed to be outlined, and 18 needed to be laid out as the minimum age for marriage. 

    Responses by the Delegation

     

    The delegation said the arbitrary arrests of women human rights defenders and activists further undermined the Convention.  Nearly 80 per cent of young women were now excluded from education and employment opportunities.  As such, forced and child marriage increased significantly.  Forced marriage denied women autonomy and led to gender-based violence and risk of death.  The international community was urged to support grassroots organizations working for women’s equality, especially women-led organizations. 

    The decline of gender equality was a global trend.  It was hard for Afghan women and girls to find their way; sometimes they were banned by their own international allies.  How could the women make themselves relevant?  The Committee had a huge responsibility in this regard.  Due urgency had not been given while Afghanistan was losing generations of women.  There needed to be space for the people of Afghanistan to create their own narrative for their country.  Women should be put in the driving seat; they knew how to fix their country. 

    The Taliban had engaged in acts of polygamy with underage girls.  They had cancelled all court orders for women seeking divorce. There was no longer a body to make law in Afghanistan and there was no Constitution.  The Committee must be more than a monitoring body; it needed to be a defender of justice.  Afghan women needed more than a statement; they needed action. 

    Closing Remarks

    NAHLA HAIDAR, Committee Chair, said every member of the Committee was concerned and stood in solidarity with Afghanistan.  The Committee Experts did not represent Governments, but they could speak to all States parties.  Within their limited authority and mandate, they were doing all they possibly could to carry the voices of the women in Afghanistan to those who could take action. It was frustrating when the Committee’s concluding observations did not translate into action.  The action was not necessarily in the hands of the Committee, but they would pave the way for it.  This had been one of the most important considerations of a country report. Ms. Haidar thanked all those from Afghanistan who came to share their views. 

    BANDANA RANA, Committee Expert and Country Rapporteur, said the Committee would do everything within its mandate to improve the rights of women and girls in Afghanistan.  The Committee called on the de facto authorities to restore women’s rights as a matter of urgency, and for the international community’s support.  Ms. Rana thanked all those from Afghanistan who had shared their experiences with the Committee. 

    SIMA SAMAR, Former President of the National Human Rights Commission, thanked the Committee for protecting women’s rights around the world.  Having a lack of female representation was a threat to peace and security.  Ms. Samar thanked the Committee Experts for their solidarity with the women of Afghanistan. 

    NASIR AHMAD ANDISHA, Permanent Representative of Afghanistan to the United Nations Office at Geneva, said he appreciated the opportunity to engage with the Committee. The Committee had created a vital pathway to ensure the voices of Afghan women and girls were heard.  Since August 2021, the situation for Afghan women and girls had deteriorated into a system of gender apartheid, which went against every article of the Convention.  Afghanistan’s women and girls may be denied their dignity, but they were the strongest advocates of human rights. 

    The Committee was urged to expand its procedures in response to the situation in Afghanistan, including to cooperate with the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, which allowed for individual complaints.  States were urged to establish a gender response and accountability mechanism.  The human rights system should improve coordination across the United Nations system, with a view to promoting and protecting human rights.  It was time to listen, support and stand in solidarity with the women and girls of Afghanistan.  They must be at the centre of every solution. 

    ___________

    Produced by the United Nations Information Service in Geneva for use of the media; 
    not an official record. English and French versions of our releases are different as they are the product of two separate coverage teams that work independently.

    CEDAW25.017E

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: UN OCEAN CONFERENCE IN NICE (FRANCE) – PARTICIPATION OF PM FIAME NAOMI MATA’AFA

    Source:

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    [PRESS RELEASE] – Since Monday 9th June and until Friday 13th , more than sixty heads of state and government, including many leaders from the Pacific and Latin America, are meeting in Nice, on the French Riviera, for the 3rd United Nation Ocean Conference (UNOC3) aimed at better protecting an overheated, polluted and overfished ocean. This UNOC3 is co-chaired by France and Costa Rica.

    The Samoan delegation is led by Prime Minister Fiame Naomi Mata’afa. Minister for Natural Resources and Environment Toeolesulusulu Cedric Pose Salesa Schuster is accompanying the Prime Minister.

    Independently, the Apia-based Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme (SPREP) has sent an important delegation to Nice.

    This conference will lead to the adoption of the Nice Ocean Action Plan that will consist of a political declaration and a list of voluntary commitments from all stakeholders.

    The priorities of this Conference were set out by the President of the French Republic at the “SOS Ocean” event in Paris on March 31 and include the entry into force of the International Agreement for the Protection of the High Seas and Marine Biodiversity (the so-called “BBNJ” Agreement), the decision to at least 30% of the ocean by 2030 (Global Biodiversity Framework target 30×30), a declaration to fight against plastic pollution and the promotion of sustainable fisheries respectful of ecosystems, for our global food sovereignty.

    Decarbonisation of maritime transport and supporting science and research to better understand the ocean are additional goals of this conference.

    In his opening address, French President Emmanuel Macron stated that” While the Earth is warming, the ocean is boiling” He called for “mobilization”;, explaining that “The first response is therefore multilateralism,”.

    “The climate, like biodiversity, is not a matter of opinion, it is a matter of scientifically established facts,” he also insisted. Later on, Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva also took this view, denouncing “the threat of unilateralism” hanging over the oceans: “We cannot allow what happened to international trade to happen to the sea,” declared President Lula, calling for “clear action” from the International Seabed Authority, while Donald Trump plans to unilaterally authorize the industrial exploitation of minerals at the bottom of the Pacific.

    President Macron also insisted that Greenland, which he is due to visit at the end of the week but is coveted by Donald Trump’s United States, was “not for sale.”

    “The abyss is not for sale, and no more than Greenland is for sale, nor is Antarctica or the high seas for sale,” the French president declared.

    Shortly after, UN Secretary General, who visited Samoa in 2024, declared that the deep seabed must not become a “Far West.” “I hope we can turn this around. That we can replace plunder with protection,” Mr Gutteres added.

    Mr. Macron also assured that the High Seas and Marine Biodiversity (the so-called “BBNJ” Agreement) would be ratified by enough countries to enter into force. “In addition to the fifty ratifications already submitted here in the last few hours, fifteen countries have formally committed to joining them,” Emmanuel Macron declared.

    Samoa is one of them. “This means that the political agreement has been reached, which allows us to say that this High Seas Treaty will be properly implemented. So it’s a done deal,” he added, without specifying a timeline. The treaty, signed in 2023, will enter into force 120 days after the sixtieth ratification. France initially hoped to obtain these sixty ratifications by the Nice conference.

    Finally, several countries could also use the Nice summit to announce the creation of new marine protected areas or the banning of certain fishing practices, such as bottom trawling, in some of them.

    France announced on Saturday, through Emmanuel Macron, a limitation of bottom trawling in its marine protected areas (MPAs) to preserve the seabed, but failed to convince NGOs, who criticized the “lack of ambition” of these announcements.

    Many side events are also taking place during this week during this largest conference ever organized for the protection of the oceans.

    Prime Minister Fiame addressed the audience in her capacity of a leader of an island country that is a victim of climate change, in particular the sea rise. Samoa has taken very strong decision recently in favour of the protection of the environment. And sent a good signal before the UN Conference of Nice, in adopting on 6 June its Marine Spatial Plan, a milestone step to fully protect 30 per cent (%) and ensure sustainable management of 100 per cent (%) of its vast ocean 120,000-square-kilometer ocean territory.

    Doing such, Samoa became one of the first Pacific Island nations to adopt a legally binding plan.

    END.

    Photo credits: SPREP / French Embassy in Samoa).

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    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Hong Kong Customs seizes suspected ketamine and suspected MDMA worth about $4.9 million at airport (with photo)

    Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

    Hong Kong Customs seizes suspected ketamine and suspected MDMA worth about $4.9 million at airport (with photo)

    Hong Kong Customs today (June 24) detected a drug trafficking case involving baggage concealment at Hong Kong International Airport. About 10.4 kilograms of suspected ketamine and 2.1kg of suspected MDMA, with a total estimated market value of about $4.9 million, were seized.

    A 27-year-old male passenger arrived in Hong Kong from Amsterdam, Netherlands, today. During Customs clearance, the batches of suspected ketamine and suspected MDMA were found in his rucksack, carry-on travel bag and carry-on suitcase. The man was subsequently arrested.

    The arrested person has been charged with one count of trafficking in a dangerous drug. The case will be brought up at the West Kowloon Magistrates’ Court tomorrow (June 25).

    Customs will continue to step up enforcement against drug trafficking activities through intelligence analysis. The department also reminds members of the public to stay alert and not participate in drug trafficking activities for monetary return. They must not accept hiring or delegation from another party to carry controlled items into and out of Hong Kong. They are also reminded not to carry unknown items for other people.

    Customs will continue to apply a risk assessment approach and focus on selecting passengers from high-risk regions for clearance to combat transnational drug trafficking activities.

    Under the Dangerous Drugs Ordinance, trafficking in a dangerous drug is a serious offence. The maximum penalty upon conviction is a fine of $5 million and life imprisonment.

    Members of the public may report any suspected drug trafficking activities to Customs’ 24-hour hotline 182 8080 or its dedicated crime-reporting email account (crimereport@customs.gov.hk) or online form (eform.cefs.gov.hk/form/ced002).

    Ends/Tuesday, June 24, 2025
    Issued at HKT 20:00

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Press release – Gas storage: deal with Council on refill flexibility to bring down prices

    Source: European Parliament

    The draft legislation aims to address speculation on the gas market and bring down prices, by introducing greater flexibility in rules on gas storage refilling.

    MEPs and the Polish Presidency of the Council reached an informal agreement on Tuesday to extend the EU’s 2022 gas storage scheme until 31 December 2027, as it would otherwise have expired at the end of 2025. The provision is designed to ensure gas supply security ahead of the winter season.

    MEPs and Council also introduced several amendments to ease tensions in the gas market, as speculation surrounding the existing mandatory 90% fill rate target by 1 November each year was driving the cost of refilling during the summer.

    Refilling flexibilities

    The agreed text will allow Member States to achieve the 90% filling target at any point in time between 1 October and 1 December, taking into account the start of the Member States withdrawal period. Once the 90% target is met, it should not be required to maintain that level until 1 December.

    Member States should have the possibility to deviate by up to ten percentage points from the filling target in case of difficult market conditions, such as indications of speculation hindering cost-effective storage filling.

    The Commission may further increase this deviation by delegated act, for one filling season, if these market conditions persist.

    Towards full independence from Russian imports

    The competent authority monitoring gas refilling shall also include information on the share of gas originating in the Russian federation being stored in that Member State, in line with the 17 June proposals from the European Commission, which will help in monitoring whether Russian gas is stored in the EU.

    Quote

    “The 2022 legislation showed that Europe was able to protect its citizens in a situation where Russia was using gas as a weapon of blackmail”, said rapporteur Borys Budka (EPP, Poland). “This revision will provide for more flexibility and less bureaucracy but above all to bring Europe’s gas prices down, while we continue towards energy independence from unreliable suppliers” he said.

    Next steps

    The informal agreement will be put to a vote in the Industry, Research and Energy committee on the 26th of June.

    Background

    Gas-storage facilities provide for 30% of the Union’s gas consumption during winter months. The EU’s energy security has been a critical concern in recent years, not least in light of its dependence on non-EU countries for primary energy supplies. The 2022 energy crisis, exacerbated by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the subsequent weaponisation of gas supplies, highlighted the urgent need for additional measures to ensure stable and affordable energy supplies.

    In response, the EU introduced new gas storage rules. However, the global gas market remains tight, with increased competition for liquefied natural gas (LNG) supplies and persistent price volatility.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Highlights – 26 June: INTA mission to Ghent – Committee on International Trade

    Source: European Parliament

    A delegation of 6 Members of the Committee on International Trade (INTA) will travel to Ghent on 26 June to visit a steel and automotive company.

    The one day mission will provide an opportunity to INTA Members to visit the ArcelorMittal and Volvo Cars plant in the port of Ghent. This will allow more insight into the trade-related challenges the steel and automotive sectors are facing, in particular with regard to the US tariffs, unfair trade practices and geopolitical tensions.

    The delegation will be led by the INTA Chair, Bernd Lange (S&D, DE).

    The composition of the delegation:

    LANGE Bernd (S&D)

    JOŃSKI Dariusz (EPP)

    VAN DIJCK Kris (ECR)

    SBAI Majdouline (Greens/EFA)

    BRICMONT Saskia (Greens/EFA)

    KENNES Rudi (The Left)

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Hearings – Public hearing on the human rights dimension of the EU Memoranda of Understanding – 25-06-2025 – Subcommittee on Human Rights

    Source: European Parliament

    On 25 June 2025, DROI Subcommittee is organising a public hearing on “The Human Rights dimension of the EU memoranda of Understanding in its Southern Neighbourhood (Mauritania, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, with a focus on the use of EU funds)”. It will allow to reflect upon the EU cooperation policy in the region from a human rights perspective and discuss solutions for the monitoring of the informal agreements and related funding and improving the human rights conditionality in the EU policy tools.

    Civil society voices will share testimonies and analysis of situations on the ground after the conclusion of those informal agreements, which include but are not limited to migration and asylum-related measures. Representatives of the EU Commission, the European External Action Service and the European Court of Accounts will explain EU action in the field, also against the background of the upcoming EU Pact for the Mediterranean. Each panel will be followed by a Q&A session with MEPs.

    MIL OSI Europe News