Category: Europe

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Alexander Novak: Russia remains the largest investor for Kazakhstan, investment growth in 2024 amounted to 25%

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: Government of the Russian Federation – An important disclaimer is at the bottom of this article.

    Deputy Prime Minister of Russia Alexander Novak met with First Deputy Prime Minister of Kazakhstan Roman Sklyar at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum.

    “We consider Kazakhstan as our closest ally and strategic partner,” emphasized Alexander Novak. “Cooperation in the trade, economic and investment spheres is developing successfully, large-scale joint projects are being implemented in industry, energy, transport infrastructure, agriculture and the digital economy. Russia remains the largest investor in the Kazakh economy, with investment growth in 2024 amounting to 25% compared to 2023.”

    He highly praised the interaction between Russia and Kazakhstan in the format of the OPEC deal, which makes a decisive contribution to ensuring stability and predictability of the global oil market. The Deputy Prime Minister called for continued coordination of collective actions within OPEC, as they meet long-term national interests and contribute to strengthening the economies of the countries participating in the deal.

    The parties discussed the expansion of Russian-Kazakh cooperation in the electric power and oil and gas sectors, as well as the terms of Russian oil and gas supplies to Kazakhstan and in transit through its territory.

    Alexander Novak invited Roman Sklyar and the delegation of Kazakhstan to take part in the annual international forum “Russian Energy Week”, which will be held from October 15 to 17 in Moscow.

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  • MIL-OSI Russia: Dmitry Chernyshenko: Russian science is not faceless – it has faces.

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: Government of the Russian Federation – An important disclaimer is at the bottom of this article.

    Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Chernyshenko greeted those gathered at the opening of the exhibition of portraits of leading Russian scientists “Science in Faces” as part of the XXVIII St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF-2025).

    The event was also attended by the Minister of Science and Higher Education Valery Falkov, the head of the Talent and Success Foundation Elena Shmeleva, and the Chairman of the Board and General Director of Sibur LLC Mikhail Karisalov.

    The Deputy Prime Minister noted that the exhibition traditionally starts on the sidelines of the SPIEF, takes place in the regions of Russia and ends at the Congress of Young Scientists.

    “Russian science is not faceless – it is in faces. It is extremely important that such projects popularize our science through remarkable people – physicists, biologists, geneticists, mathematicians, who through their discoveries contribute to achieving technological leadership. This is a national goal set by President Vladimir Putin. We have excellent positions in the world, we see them,” said Dmitry Chernyshenko.

    The head of state instructed that Russia be among the top ten countries in terms of volume of scientific research, the Deputy Prime Minister added. Another task set by the President is to increase investments in science to 2% of GDP. The role of technology customers and enterprises is significant in this.

    In the fourth season of the exhibition “Science in Faces” the exposition included 23 portraits of laureates of key scientific awards. The heroes of the project represent 14 regions of the country: Moscow and the Moscow region, St. Petersburg, Belgorod, Voronezh, Murmansk, Nizhny Novgorod, Sverdlovsk, Tomsk, Tyumen regions, the Republic of Dagestan, the Republic of Tatarstan, Krasnodar Krai, the federal territory “Sirius”. The exhibition “Science in Faces” is held with the grant support of the Ministry of Education and Science as part of the Decade of Science and Technology announced by President Vladimir Putin, and is part of the “Science Nearby” initiative.

    “Behind every scientific victory there is a specific person who is in love with a particular discipline, a scientific field. It is important to have an idea of what attracted him to this work, to get acquainted with his biography. It is also important to talk about our contemporaries who are currently engaged in an amazing type of human activity – research and development,” said the head of the Ministry of Education and Science Valery Falkov.

    Dmitry Chernyshenko also assessed the stands of the Ministry of Education and Science, the Ministry of Sports, the Federal Agency for Youth Affairs, St. Petersburg and the regions of the Volga Federal District.

    The Ministry of Education and Science’s stand demonstrates the ministry’s priority areas of activity. Interactive panels provide details about the national project “Youth and Children”, the Decade of Science and Technology, the development of human resources, and much more. Three agreements on cooperation in science and higher education were signed in the presence of Dmitry Chernyshenko. On the sidelines of the SPIEF, the head of the Ministry of Education and Science, Valery Falkov, concluded strategic partnerships with businesses and the government of the Altai Republic.

    The Ministry of Sports stand features the GTO and Sports Museum zones, a 3D avatar of the famous hockey player Alexander Ovechkin. The exhibits include awards, cups and sports uniforms. At the stand, Dmitry Chernyshenko, Sports Minister Mikhail Degtyarev and President of the Russian National Badminton Federation Andrey Antropov discussed cooperation in the field of sports with the Chairman of the Indonesian Badminton Association Mohammad Fadil Imran. As a reminder, on the eve, June 19, Russian President Vladimir Putin held a meeting with the President of the Republic of Indonesia Prabowo Subianto.

    In addition, Dmitry Chernyshenko, together with the head of Rosmolodezh Grigory Gurov, assessed the stand “Rosmolodezh. Entrepreneurship”. The space is divided into three thematic zones: “Past” (clothing and accessories with historical motifs), “Present” (products reflecting modern trends) and “Future” (developments in the field of robotics and medical technologies). The stand presents products of more than 45 participants of the “Youth Market” project from 18 regions of the country. One of the brands of the “Youth Market” was the Center for Prosthetics and Rehabilitation “Dinamika”, it specializes in the creation of modern prostheses of hands and feet.

    Deputy Prime Minister and Plenipotentiary Representative of the President of Russia in the Volga Federal District (VFD) Igor Komarov inspected the stands of five regions of the VFD: Bashkortostan, Tatarstan, Kirov, Penza and Samara regions.

    At the St. Petersburg stand, Dmitry Chernyshenko was presented with information about the products of the company “Bionika 2.0” and the tourist cluster “Gorskaya”.

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  • MIL-OSI Russia: Tatyana Golikova moderated the session “Healthy Longevity Without Compromises” at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: Government of the Russian Federation – An important disclaimer is at the bottom of this article.

    As Tatyana Golikova noted, the discussion is devoted to a question that worries all of humanity: how to prolong an active and healthy life. This is a task not only for scientists and doctors, but also for society as a whole.

    Ensuring healthy longevity is a priority task set for the country by the President of Russia.

    These issues were discussed at the first forum “Russia and the World: Healthy Longevity Trends” held on May 27-28. The forum was organized by the Russian Government with the assistance of the Roscongress Foundation, the Moscow Region Government, and the Ministry of Education and Science. It was attended by over 1,500 specialists and experts from various fields: politicians and public figures, scientists, healthcare and cultural specialists, media representatives, bloggers, healthy food manufacturers, dietary supplements, medical products, and others. Following the discussion, the first resolution was approved and posted on the Roscongress website.

    “Everyone has different potential. A person’s biological clock can run faster or slower. A systematic approach to increasing healthy life expectancy requires coordinated efforts at the state and expert levels,” the Deputy Prime Minister noted.

    Tatyana Golikova spoke about some health-saving technologies used in Russia.

    The first is healthy longevity medicine – a comprehensive health-preserving strategy that combines innovative scientific research and its practical application.

    “The national project “New Health Preservation Technologies” has been implemented since 2025. It includes five federal projects. Currently, the main focus is on treating diseases and conditions that have already developed in humans. However, in recent years, preventive medicine has begun to actively develop, identifying risk factors for disease development. Healthy longevity medicine is aimed at identifying pre-risks for disease development and influencing them. And here we have a lot to do. At the moment, our system works to treat diseases. Such a reboot will help increase the quality of life of people and life expectancy,” the Deputy Prime Minister said.

    The main areas of scientific medical research on the topic of healthy longevity, which are currently being conducted in Russia:

    — a combination of regenerative biomedicine, research on which began in 2023 as part of the federal project “Medical Science for Humans”;

    — development of biomarkers and panels that allow determining biological age, as well as drugs that allow preventing the aging process of cells;

    — genetic research: predictive genetics, pharmacogenetics and nutrigenetics.

    The national project also includes research aimed at combating age-associated diseases and their complications, including neurodegenerative diseases, cardiovascular diseases and diabetes.

    “We are creating an accessible medical infrastructure for healthy longevity based on health centers and medical prevention offices. Last year alone, more than 38 million people applied to them. We are changing the functions of health centers and reorienting them to work on identifying pre-risks for the development of diseases and eliminating them,” emphasized Tatyana Golikova.

    The second block of tasks in the area of healthy longevity is the social involvement of a person.

    “Numerous international studies have shown that strong social connections are directly related to increased life expectancy. An American study of 300,000 people showed that social isolation is a health risk and is comparable to smoking 15 cigarettes a day. Another study by British scientists, who observed 7,300 people for over 50 years, showed that 73% of people with good health met with friends at least once a week, visited public places, museums and theaters. It is important for healthy longevity to develop various types of relationships – family, friendship, professional, neighborly, as well as to participate in public organizations, volunteer activities, various communities,” the Deputy Prime Minister said.

    In addition, Tatyana Golikova emphasized that a healthy living environment plays an important role in prolonging longevity, a combination of ecology, eating habits, physical activity, lifestyle and strong social connections. All of these are the main factors in the formation of the so-called blue zones – regions with the highest concentration of long-livers. The experience of studying the inhabitants of these zones at one time gave impetus to the development of genetic research in the field of aging biology. In Russia, such research was also launched within the framework of the national project “New Health Preservation Technologies”.

    The session was attended by Vladimir Dadali, professor at the North-West State Medical University named after I.I. Mechnikov of the Ministry of Health of the Russian Federation, certified consultant in nutrition at the University of Natural Medicine (California, USA); Mikhail Kovalchuk, president of the National Research Center “Kurchatov Institute”; Konstantin Kotenko, director of the Russian Scientific Center of Surgery named after Academician B.V. Petrovsky; Olga Krivonos, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Government of the Russian Federation; Elena Chichkanova, managing partner, communications director at Mayrveda.

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  • MIL-OSI USA: Warren Demands Answers on Trump’s Potential Contract with Shadowy Humanitarian Group, Urges More Aid to Gaza Through Responsible Partners

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Massachusetts – Elizabeth Warren

    June 20, 2025

    Letter follows reports that Secretary of State Marco Rubio is considering giving GHF $500 million despite concerns about its funding sources, neutrality, basic competence in providing aid, and more

    “It is critical that the United States stop the humanitarian disaster in Gaza. But that must be done through funding professional humanitarian organizations.”

    Text of Letter (PDF)

    Washington, D.C. — In a new letter to the Secretary of State and the United States Agency for International Aid (USAID), U.S. Senator Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.) raised her concerns about the Department of State’s reported plan to give $500 million to the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF). 

    “Reports of deadly violence against starving Palestinians connected with the GHF’s aid network are deeply troubling, as are reports of the organization’s ties to the Israeli government, and the lack of financial transparency regarding its donors, and its new connections – via its executive director – to the Trump administration and campaign,” said Senator Warren

    In May 2025, the World Health Organization and its partners determined that “Nineteen months into the conflict, the Gaza Strip is still confronted with a critical risk of Famine,” with over 2 million people facing high levels of acute food insecurity. This includes 71,000 cases of acute malnutrition among children and 17,000 pregnant women who will “need treatment for acute malnutrition.”

    Before the blockade in March 2025, food aid was distributed in Gaza at 400 locations through experienced humanitarian organizations, many of whom worked in the region for decades. After the blockade was partially lifted in May, the Israeli government only allowed aid to resume under a distribution network managed by the newly-created GHF. 

    From the beginning, GHF limited distribution of aid to four hubs in southern Gaza, under the watch of private security contractors. Additionally, it agreed to let the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to take position up to 1000 feet of GHF distribution sites, where it attacks Gazans who step out of the zone designated for waiting for aid collection. In its first three weeks of operation, more than 200 people seeking aid were killed and thousands wounded near GHF distribution sites. 

    Senator Warren also raised concerns about the GHF’s funding and ownership. Humanitarian groups typically report clear expenditure reports and disclosure requirements surrounding all aid distribution. GHF has, to date, refused to disclose its funding sources or its total budget. Israeli media recently reported that around $200 million was quietly reapportioned from the Israeli government’s budget towards the aid effort in Gaza and another $100 million came from an anonymous “Western European nation”.

    “This raises questions around the lack of impartiality, and neutrality, of GHF’s operations in Gaza,” said Senator Warren

    GHF’s leadership has also been marked by turmoil. The founder and first executive director of the GHF, Jake Wood, quit hours before the organization was supposed to start distributing aid on May 26th, claiming “it is not possible to implement this plan while also strictly adhering to the humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality, and independence.” He was replaced by Reverend Johnnie Moore, who served as co-chair for President Trump’s presidential campaign’s evangelical advisory board. 

    Just three months after the launch of the organization, the GHF’s Swiss affiliate was shut down by Switzerland’s government for “not fulfilling various legal obligations.” 

    “It is critical that the United States stop the humanitarian disaster in Gaza. But that must be done through funding professional humanitarian organizations,” wrote Senator Warren

    “The questions surrounding GHF – its funding sources and connection to the Trump Administration, its use of private contractors, its ability to serve and be seen as a neutral entity, its abandonment by its founders, and its basic competence in providing aid – must be answered before the State Department commits any funding to the organization,” concluded Senator Warren

    Senator Warren asked the State Department and USAID to provide clarity on its potential plans to use GHF, how the agencies plan to measure success for the distribution of aid, and their plans to ensure contractors follow U.S. law when distributing aid by July 2, 2025. 

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Alexander Novak: For sustainable economic growth it is important to create a favorable investment climate

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: Government of the Russian Federation – An important disclaimer is at the bottom of this article.

    Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak took part in the session “Business Climate of Russia. National Model and Regional Opportunities” at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum. The session was also attended by Minister of Economic Development Maxim Reshetnikov, General Director of JSC “Barkli” Leonid Kazinets, Chairman of the public organization “Business Russia”, founder of the R-Pharm group of companies Alexey Repik.

    Alexander Novak recalled that one of the key tasks for economic development set by the President is to increase investment by 60% by 2030 and ensure sustainable economic growth in the long term.

    “To achieve ambitious goals to attract investment to the economy, it is important to create a favorable investment climate. Much work has been done in this direction in recent years. The National Entrepreneurial Initiative, the National Investment Climate Rating, and “Business Climate Transformation” were launched. In 2020, as a result of this work, our country moved up in the Doing Business rating from 123rd to 28th place. In certain areas, the breakthrough was even more significant. We worked on simplifying procedures and reducing the time it takes for organizations to connect to networks in the electric power industry. Thanks to the successful joint work of businesses with the Government and the regions, we moved up from 168th to 8th place in the rating for this indicator,” said Alexander Novak.

    Among other important steps to improve the investment climate, he named the implementation of a project to reengineer industrial construction rules, the reform of regulatory authorities, the improvement of corporate regulation, and the introduction of regional and municipal investment standards. All of this has had a positive impact on investment activity in the regions and throughout the country, but today this work needs to be restarted in order to enter the top twenty countries among 180 participants in the World Bank’s Be Ready investment climate business rating by 2030.

    To this end, on the instructions of the President, a national model of target conditions for doing business is being developed jointly with the Agency for Strategic Initiatives. With the participation of businesses, representatives of federal and regional authorities, 11 working groups have been created for the entire life cycle of business: from registering a company to deploying work within the country and selling its products abroad. Business conditions will be improved according to 40 criteria and 150 indicators at the federal level and 27 indicators at the regional level.

    The national model of target conditions for doing business will be launched next year, which will help to achieve one of the national goals of attracting investment into the Russian economy.

    At the end of the session, Alexander Novak announced the results of the National Investment Climate Rating for 2025. The Deputy Prime Minister presented an honorary diploma for first place to Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin – the capital became the leader of the rating. Two regions at once took second place in the rating: Nizhny Novgorod and the Republic of Tatarstan. Third place was taken by the Moscow Region and the Republic of Bashkortostan.

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  • MIL-OSI Russia: Russia and the United Arab Emirates are discussing the details of the creation of a BRICS grain exchange.

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: Government of the Russian Federation – An important disclaimer is at the bottom of this article.

    Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation Dmitry Patrushev held a working meeting with the Minister of Economy of the United Arab Emirates Abdullah Bin Touq Al-Marri. The event took place on the sidelines of the XXVIII St. Petersburg International Economic Forum. The parties discussed cooperation between the two countries, in particular within the framework of the creation of a grain exchange of the BRICS countries.

    “The relations between the Russian Federation and the United Arab Emirates are of a strategic nature. The United Arab Emirates are one of Russia’s most important economic partners in the Middle East. The agro-industrial sector makes a major contribution to the development of trade. Last year, the turnover of agricultural products between our countries grew by almost a third. Russia is one of the world’s leading grain exporters. These products form the basis of Russian deliveries to the United Arab Emirates. We count on further cooperation. At the same time, we believe it is important to develop dialogue within the BRICS association. It accounts for almost half of the world’s consumption of grain and oilseeds,” said Dmitry Patrushev.

    The Deputy Prime Minister recalled that Russia had put forward an initiative to create a grain exchange of BRICS countries, which should simplify grain trade within the organization. Dmitry Patrushev noted that the creation of a BRICS grain exchange will strengthen global food security. The participating countries will be able to form independent price indicators within the association, which will contribute to a more objective assessment of the cost of agricultural products on the world market.

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  • MIL-OSI Russia: IMF Executive Board Concludes the Fifth Reviews Under the Extended Fund Facility and the Resilience and Sustainability Facility with Barbados

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    June 20, 2025

    • The IMF Executive Board concluded the fifth and final reviews under the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) and the Resilience and Sustainability Facility (RSF) arrangements with Barbados, allowing an immediate disbursement of about US$19 million under the EFF arrangement and about US$39 million under the RSF arrangement.
    • Implementation of the home-grown Barbados Economic Recovery and Transformation (BERT 2022) plan has remained strong and the broad objectives of the EFF and RSF arrangements have been achieved. Macroeconomic stability has been reinforced, and reforms have been implemented to boost fiscal sustainability, enhance growth, and build resilience.
    • Barbados’ economy has continued to perform well. Growth has been robust, inflation has moderated, the fiscal and external positions have improved, and the public debt-to-GDP ratio has continued to decline. The outlook is stable but subject to downside risks, given heightened global uncertainty and vulnerabilities to external shocks and natural disasters.

    Washington, DC: The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) today concluded the fifth and final reviews of the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) and the Resilience and Sustainability Facility (RSF) arrangements with Barbados. The completion of the reviews allows the authorities to draw the equivalent of SDR 14.175 million (about US$19 million) under the EFF arrangement and SDR 28.35 million (about US$39 million) under the RSF arrangement, bringing total disbursements under the EFF arrangement to SDR 85.05 million (about US$116 million) and SDR 141.75 million (about US$193 million) under the RSF arrangement. The authorities have consented to the publication of the staff report prepared for these reviews.[1]

    Economic activity in 2024 remained robust, with growth estimated at 4 percent, driven by tourism, construction, and business services. Inflation moderated to an average of 1.4 percent due to easing global commodity prices and prices of domestic goods and services. The external position strengthened further, with the current account deficit narrowing to 4.5 percent of GDP, supported by tourism receipts, declining import prices, and one-off current transfers. Gross international reserves reached US$1.6 billion at end-2024, equivalent to over 7 months of import cover, providing continued strong support to the exchange rate peg.

    The near-term outlook is stable. Growth is expected to reach 2.7 percent in 2025, supported by construction of tourism-related projects and government investment. Inflation is expected to pick up in 2025 due to the rising cost of non-fuel imports and some domestic agricultural products. Nevertheless, risks to the outlook are tilted to the downside, amidst the highly uncertain external economic environment and Barbados’ continued vulnerability to global shocks and natural disasters.

    Program performance has remained strong. All quantitative performance criteria and indicative targets were met. The authorities exceeded the primary fiscal surplus target for FY2024/25 and are targeting 4.4 percent of GDP for FY2025/26. Public debt has fallen below 105 percent of GDP, and the authorities remain committed to bringing it down to 60 percent of GDP by FY2035/36. The authorities met the EFF structural benchmarks for the review, including completing the assessment of human resource needs at the Barbados Customs and Excise Department, preparing a public-private partnership (PPP) framework, and developing a daily liquidity forecasting framework. Both reform measures for the RSF fifth review were also implemented. Key elements to strengthen the integration of climate concerns into public financial management have been completed, including the development of project appraisal guidelines, the deepening of fiscal risk analysis, and the preparation of the PPP framework. The Central Bank of Barbados has also included physical climate risk analysis in its bank stress testing.

    Following the Executive Board discussion on Barbados, Mr. Bo Li, Deputy Managing Director and Acting Chair, issued the following statement:

    “The implementation of Barbados’ homegrown Economic Recovery and Transformation program has remained strong, supported by the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) and the Resilience and Sustainability Facility (RSF) arrangements. The completion of the fifth and final reviews marks the successful conclusion of the Fund arrangements.

    “While the outlook is stable, risks remain tilted to the downside, given the highly uncertain external economic environment and Barbados’ vulnerability to shocks and natural disasters. The authorities remain strongly committed to ensuring macroeconomic stability and implementing structural reforms to boost potential growth and build resilience.

    “Maintaining strong fiscal surpluses will be necessary to achieve the public debt target of 60 percent of GDP by FY2035/36. The authorities’ focus on strengthening revenue mobilization and improving public financial management is appropriate. These measures will be key to preserving fiscal sustainability and creating space for public investment. Finalizing ambitious reforms of state-owned enterprises is a priority. The authorities are taking the necessary steps to mobilize external financing.

    “The exchange rate peg remains a critical anchor for macroeconomic stability, supported by ample international reserves. Measures have been taken to strengthen the monetary policy framework and financial safety nets. Efforts to enhance the local payments market and infrastructure are advancing, with the goal of moving to a digital payments system in 2026.

    “Reforms to improve the business environment and boost growth potential are key. Important measures include advancing the digitalization of government services and investing in skills and education. The authorities focus on boosting macroeconomic resilience to natural disasters and facilitating the transition to renewable energy is welcome.”

    [1] Under the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, publication of documents that pertain to member countries is voluntary and requires member consent. The staff report will be published shortly on the www.imf.org/Barbados page.

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Meera Louis

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/06/20/pr-25210-barbados-imf-concludes-5th-reviews-under-the-eff-and-resil-and-sustainability-facility

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  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Experts of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women Praise Ireland for Increasing Women’s Representation in Decision-Making, Raise Issues Concerning Historic Rights Violations and Sexual Violence

    Source: United Nations – Geneva

    The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women today concluded its consideration of the eighth periodic report of Ireland, with Committee Experts praising the State’s efforts to increase women’s representation in decision-making and raising questions concerning redress for historic rights violations and measures to address sexual and gender-based violence.

    In the dialogue, several Committee Experts commended Ireland’s achievements in promoting women’s representation in decision-making, including its 40 per cent quota for female candidates in national elections.  Jelena Pia-Comella, Committee Expert and Rapporteur for Ireland, said statistics on Irish women’s participation in diplomacy were outstanding.

    Ms. Pia-Comella said the Committee was deeply concerned that there had yet to be recognition that women and girls of the Magdalene Laundries had experienced degrading treatment and gender-based discrimination; that arbitrary barriers to redress persisted within the Mother and Baby Institutions payment scheme; and that the State had failed to adequately implement the 2014 O’Keeffe judgment.  How would these issues be addressed?

    Another Committee Expert said one in five women in Ireland reportedly experienced non-consensual sex in their lifetimes.  There was insufficient funding for measures to address sexual offences.  What measures would the State party take to increase protection for women victims of sexual violence?

    Introducing the report, Colm Brophy, Minister of State for Migration of Ireland and head of the delegation, said the national strategy for women and girls 2017-2021 put a spotlight on promoting greater gender balance in decision-making.  Ireland’s largest listed companies had now reached the key milestone of 40 per cent female directors overall.  Legislation was also introduced in 2012 requiring political parties to meet gender quotas for candidates in parliamentary elections or face financial penalties.  The quota for the most recent elections in 2024 was 40 per cent.

    The delegation added that women made up 49 per cent of senior management of Ireland’s Foreign Service, and 54 per cent of heads of foreign missions.

    In the context of Mother and Baby and County Home Institutions, Mr. Brophy said the State repeatedly failed to protect vulnerable citizens, and to uphold their most fundamental rights.  The delegation added that the redress scheme established in 2013 regarding Magdalene Laundries was accessible for women living abroad.  The payment scheme was one of a large suite of actions implemented to redress the harms caused.  It was expected that legislation to implement the European Court of Human Rights decision on the O’Keeffe case would be implemented in coming weeks.

    Mr. Brophy also said the national strategy for women and girls prioritised action to combat domestic and gender-based violence.  Launched in 2022, the third national strategy on domestic, sexual and gender-based violence instituted fundamental structural reforms to Ireland’s approach to tackling the issue.  A new agency, Cuan, was established in 2024 to deliver services to victims.

    In closing remarks, Mr. Brophy said the Committee had invested significant time in understanding the issues facing women and girls in Ireland.  The State would develop measures in response to the Committee’s concluding observations.  Ireland was committed to its obligations under the Convention and to the United Nations.

    Nahla Haidar, Committee Chair, in concluding remarks, thanked the State party for its support to the treaty bodies, international law and the rule of law.  The dialogue had provided the Committee with further insight into the efforts made by Ireland to implement the Convention for the benefit of women and girls in the State.

    The delegation of Ireland consisted of representatives from the Department of Children, Disability and Equality; Department of Education and Youth; Department of Health; Department of Justice, Home Affairs and Migration; Office of the Attorney General; Department of Social Protection; Cuan, the Domestic, Sexual and Gender-Based Violence Agency; Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade; Department of Enterprise, Tourism and Employment; and the Permanent Mission of Ireland to the United Nations Office at Geneva.

    The Committee will issue the concluding observations on the report of Ireland at the end of its ninety-first session on 4 July. All documents relating to the Committee’s work, including reports submitted by States parties, can be found on the session’s webpage.  Meeting summary releases can be found here.  The webcast of the Committee’s public meetings can be accessed via the UN Web TV webpage.

    The Committee will next meet at 3 p.m. on Monday, 23 June to meet with representatives from non-governmental organizations and national human rights institutions who will brief the Committee on the situation of women in Afghanistan, San Marino, Chad and Botswana, the reports of which the Committee will review next week.

    Report

    The Committee has before it the eighth periodic report of Ireland (CEDAW/C/IRL/8).

    Presentation of Report

    COLM BROPHY, Minister of State for Migration of Ireland and head of the delegation, said Ireland had worked actively over the period since 2017 to promote equality for women and to address issues facing them.  A national strategy for women and girls was launched in 2017 as the whole of Government framework for action on gender equality.  Women’s organizations participated in the strategy committee, chaired at Ministerial level, which monitored implementation.  A successor strategy was currently being finalised, in consultation with women across Ireland.

    Travellers were recognised as an ethnic minority in a landmark decision of Ireland’s Parliament in March 2017, a decision supported by all political parties at the time. The Government was working on identifying and eliminating barriers to access to public services for Travellers. The Irish health system partnered with Traveller organizations to train Travellers to become community health peer workers.  The success of these projects was reflected in higher rates of uptake of screening amongst Traveller women relative to the general population for breast and cervical cancers.  In education, the Traveller and Roma education strategy 2024–2030 committed to supporting Traveller and Roma women on their educational journey.

    The needs of migrant women were addressed through a combination of mainstream public services and a wide range of targeted supports, funded by grants from various national and European integration funds.  These supports played a crucial role in improving outcomes for migrant women in areas of particular concern, including labour market access and housing. A national migration and integration strategy, due to be published next year, would provide a cohesive policy framework for recognising and addressing the integration challenges facing migrant women. 

    The national strategy for women and girls 2017-2021 put a spotlight on promoting greater gender balance in decision-making.  The Government launched a business-led initiative entitled Balance for Better Business in 2018 which spearheaded a series of initiatives contributing to a significant improvement in the percentage of women on corporate boards, particularly of publicly listed companies. Ireland’s largest listed companies had now reached the key milestone of 40 per cent female directors overall, compared to 18 per cent in 2018.  Ireland now ranked sixth in the European Union for female board representation and fifth for leadership teams.

    Legislation was introduced in 2012 requiring political parties to meet gender quotas for candidates in parliamentary elections or face financial penalties.  The quota for the most recent elections in 2024 was 40 per cent and this would apply for future national elections.  Maternity leave entitlements were introduced for elected members of local authorities in 2022, and for members of both chambers of Ireland’s parliament in 2024.  A funding scheme had also been in place since 2019 to incentivise political parties to increase the number of women candidates for local elections.  The Government also provided funding for civil society organizations providing support for women candidates, and the new national Traveller and Roma inclusion strategy 2024-2028 included a commitment to promote greater participation by Traveller and Roma women in political and public life, including in leadership positions.

    During the period under review, the Government introduced major initiatives to enable parents to access childcare and had increased public funding of early learning and childcare to unprecedented levels.  Government expenditure now exceeded 1.37 billion euros in 2025, a 200 per cent increase on investment since 2017.  The early childhood care and education programme provided two years of pre-school without charge and enjoyed participation rates of 96 per cent each year. The national childcare scheme, introduced in 2019, provided targeted and universal subsidies to reduce the costs for parents.  In addition, the equal start scheme introduced in 2024 was specifically targeted at enabling children from disadvantaged households to access early learning and childcare.

    Mr. Brophy introduced Government measures to increase family leave entitlements, including extending parental leave to 26 weeks under the parental leave (amendment) act 2019; establishing a statutory right to flexible work arrangements; establishing the right to five days of paid sick leave through the sick leave act 2022; increasing the national minimum wage by 46 per cent, from 9.25 euros per hour in 2017 to 13.50 euros in 2025; and requiring relevant organizations to report on their gender pay gaps and transpose the European Union pay transparency directive. The Government had focused on promoting greater participation by women and girls in science, technology, engineering and maths subjects.  Thanks to Government action, the number of female apprentices doubled between 2021 and 2025. 

    The national strategy for women and girls prioritised action to combat domestic violence and gender-based violence.  This was reflected in Ireland’s decision to ratify the Council of Europe’s Istanbul Convention on Preventing and Combatting Violence against Women and Domestic Violence in 2019.  Ireland enacted the domestic violence act in 2018, which strengthened the protections available to those experiencing domestic violence and made coercive control a criminal offence. 

    Launched in 2022, the third national strategy on domestic, sexual and gender-based violence instituted fundamental structural reforms to Ireland’s approach to tackling the issue.  A new agency, Cuan, was established in 2024 to deliver services to victims and implement awareness raising campaigns on such violence.  Ireland also became one of the first countries to enable persons experiencing domestic violence to have five days of paid leave.  The Government had also introduced significant measures to combat trafficking.  The third national action plan to prevent and combat trafficking, launched in 2023, was working to implement a more victim-centred approach, while raising awareness among service providers of trafficking and providing appropriate training.

    Mr. Brophy also presented measures to address women’s health needs, including the establishment of the Women’s Health Taskforce in 2019; the women’s health action plans for 2022-2023 and 2024-2025, which ensured a continued focus and delivery of key women’s health actions; the allocation of over 180 million euros since 2020 in additional funding, including funding for free contraception for women from 17 to 35 years, in vitro fertilisation treatment, and public menopause clinics. 

    Ireland was the first county in the world to decide by referendum in 2015 that same-sex couples should be able to marry.  A referendum on removing the reference in article 41.2 of the Constitution to women’s place in the home was also held in March 2024, but this was defeated.  The people of Ireland voted in a referendum in May 2018 to amend the Irish Constitution to permit Ireland’s parliament to legislate for abortion.  All 19 maternity hospitals were now providing termination services, in accordance with legislation.  There had also been a sustained increase in community providers, which now stood at 455.

    In the context of Mother and Baby and County Home Institutions, the State repeatedly failed to protect vulnerable citizens, and to uphold their most fundamental rights. The Government was conscious of the terrible hurt and pain caused, and the impact that this had had, and continued to have on many individuals and their families.  The Commission of Inquiry’s report, and the official State apology which followed, were a starting point for the further restorative measures now being progressed.  Six of the seven major commitments made by the Government to survivors were in place, while the seventh, a National Centre for Research and Remembrance, was in progress. 

    Ireland enacted the landmark birth information and tracing act 2022, which had provided clear rights of access to birth and early life information, and a Mother and Baby Institutions payment scheme opened to applications in March 2024 and provided payments and health benefits to survivors.  To date, more than 4,500 payments had been made totalling over 66 million euros.  Last Monday, work began to excavate at the site of the former Tuam Mother and Baby Home so as to ensure the dignified burial of any babies found to have been buried there.  In addition, many women who spent time in Magdalen Laundries had now benefited from the Government’s redress scheme, which remained open for any further applications.

    The Government aimed to make equality a lived reality for women and girls in all of their diversity. There were areas where further progress or change was needed, but the Government was committed to creating a better society for women and girls.

    Statement by the National Human Rights Institution of Ireland

    DEIRDRE MALONE, Director, Ireland’s Human Rights and Equality Commission, said Ireland played a leadership role in the global struggle for gender equality.  However, its international ambition for gender equality was not always matched with domestic action on gender equality.  There had been procrastination in ratifying key treaties and removing reservations; delay in incorporating international standards into national law; continuing failure to implement the recommendations of treaty bodies, including those of the Committee; and in the case of O’Keeffe, a continuing refusal to follow the judgement of the European Court of Human Rights regarding redress.

    In areas such as the needs of Traveller and Roma women and access to abortion, Ireland had clear and comprehensive policies and strategies which were not being implemented.  In those areas where there was progress, it was often frustratingly slow.  While domestic, sexual and gender-based violence policy had seen several positive reforms in recent years, it was necessary to bridge the gap between the progressive policies and legislation that Ireland had enacted and the reality on the ground. 

    Women suffered disproportionately from an inadequate, arbitrary, and overly bureaucratic social welfare system, which was not benchmarked against the cost of living or indexed against national wages.  Some 4.8 per cent of women lived in consistent poverty with lone parent households headed by women, and low-income families being more susceptible to poverty. The Gender Pay Gap and the Gender Pension Gap remained stark.

    In areas including the treatment of women in prison and women’s participation in politics, there had been regression.  Prison overcrowding worsened daily.  Given the impact of prison on women and family life, Irish penal policy needed to be reformed in line with the Bangkok Rules.

    More than 75 per cent of seats in parliament were held by men; only three out of 15 newly appointed cabinet Ministers were women.  Ireland had made a commitment to the principles of the Convention but was not matching that commitment with action that transformed the lived realities of its women and girls.  By investing in an equal future, the Irish State – one that prided itself on its adherence to human rights and rule of law – could show leadership to other nations, at a time when such leadership was so badly needed.

    Questions by a Committee Expert 

    JELENA PIA-COMELLA, Committee Expert and Rapporteur for Ireland, congratulated Ireland on placing gender equality at the forefront of its agenda during its 2021-2022 tenure at the United Nations Security Council.

    The Committee regretted that, despite its previous recommendation, the State party did not intend to remove its reservations to the Convention and remained concerned that the Irish Constitution’s outdated language on women’s duties at home continued to discriminate against women’s rights in the economic and social spheres. Did the State party intend to devise a plan to implement the relevant recommendations of the gender equality bodies of the Citizen’s Assembly and Parliamentary Committee?  What was the status of review of the equality (miscellaneous provisions) bill of 2024?

    The Committee welcomed that State apologies had been issued for past human rights violations. However, it was deeply concerned that there had yet to be recognition that women and girls of the Magdalene Laundries had experienced degrading treatment and gender-based discrimination; that arbitrary barriers to redress persisted within the Mother and Baby Institutions payment scheme; and that the State had failed to adequately implement the 2014 O’Keeffe judgment. 

    What steps was the State party taking to provide up-front payment to women residing abroad; and to comprehensively address concerns raised regarding the operation of commissions of investigation?  Would the State overhaul the current model of investigations to embed human rights and equality principles in their operation?  Would the proposed commission of investigation into sexual abuse in day and boarding schools include non-religious schools, including the school Louise O’Keeffe attended?  What was the status of the National Centre for Research and Remembrance and how would it address the needs and views of affected persons?

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said significant progress had been made in implementing the recommendations of the Citizen’s Assembly on Gender Equality.  Of 205 actions, 190 had been completed or were in progress.  The recommendations addressed sexual and gender-based violence, education in challenging gender stereotypes, and actions to improve the share of women in politics.

    The redress scheme established in 2013 regarding the Magdalene Laundries was accessible for women living abroad.  The State had worked actively to keep conditions under review.  Persons under 66 were entitled to a symbolic payment, which had been increased to 120 euros per week.  Women continued to receive payments under the scheme.  The payment scheme was one of a large suite of actions made to redress the harms caused in Mother and Baby County Home Institutions, including measures to support access to information.  Some 16,000 applications had been processed thus far.  The National Remembrance Centre would be in Dublin. A steering committee for the Centre was established in 2022 and development permission was received in 2025.

    To address shortcomings, a revised version of the O’Keeffe payment scheme was put in place in 2021, after which 128 applications were received.  It was expected that legislation to implement the decision of the European Court of Human Rights on this case would be implemented in coming weeks. A report into incidents of sexual abuse in residential institutions was published in 2024, and the Government was preparing measures to implement the recommendations of the report.

    A voluntary redress scheme had provided compensation to more than 375 women who had undergone symphysiotomy procedures.  The Government had fulfilled its obligations to women who had suffered due to these procedures.

    Equality legislation was currently being drafted and would be reviewed by a parliamentary committee over the summer.

    Questions by a Committee Expert 

    A Committee Expert asked about the timeline for the adoption of the new national strategy on women and girls?  How would it incorporate lessons from the previous cycle and align with Convention standards?  Would Traveller women’s needs be addressed in the strategy?  What measures were in place to monitor equality policies of Government bodies?  What training on gender equality was provided to Government officials?

    Ireland’s national human rights institution had “A” status under the Paris Principles and the appointment process for its commissioners was transparent.  Did the institution promote international and regional human rights frameworks?  Was the State party considering implementing the recommendation of the Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions to establish a fixed term for members?

    The Committee welcomed that political parties would have their funding reduced by 50 per cent if they failed to present at least 40 per cent female candidates.  It called for a quota of 50 per cent female representation to be established.  Efforts to implement gender quotas had not produced meaningful representation of Traveller women.  It was welcome that women represented 40 per cent of board members in the largest publicly listed companies.  However, the share of female executive directors remained low, at 11 per cent. None of these companies had a female chief executive officer.  How would this be addressed, and how would the State party increase the representation of Traveller women in Government?

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said representatives from Government and civil society monitored the implementation of actions on gender equality.  The forthcoming national strategy for women and girls was close to finalisation.  Work was underway to embed a focus on Traveller women in the new strategy.  It also included measures to strengthen training on gender equality for Government officials.  Some 6,900 civil servants had enrolled in online training on gender equality. A professional diploma on human rights was offered for public officials, which covered gender equality.

    The national human rights institution had its own dedicated budget, provided on an annual basis. Its funding allocations had been increased substantially in recent years – its allocation in 2025 was 3.5 million euros higher than in 2015.  The Government did not play a role in the appointment of its commissioners.

    The Balance for Better Business programme monitored gender representation on the boards of Irish companies.  The average level of female representation on the boards of all publicly listed companies was now at 37 per cent.  A new five-year strategy had been developed which set targets for more than 40 per cent female representation on the boards of all companies by 2028.  It included measures to improve the recruitment of women and promote women’s career pathways.

    Amendments were made to the electoral act of 1997 that improved the gender balance in political parties, with the introduction of 40 per cent quotas for women candidates in national elections.  There were no plans to extend these quotas to local elections.  Policies had been developed to promote the representation of Traveller women in politics, and the Women for Election organization, which was funded by the Government, was working toward this goal.

    Questions by Committee Experts 

    A Committee Expert said that Ireland’s work towards gender equality on the boards of companies was very impressive.

    One Committee Expert recognised progress in addressing gender-based violence, including the adoption of the Istanbul Protocol and the national strategy to combat domestic, sexual and gender-based violence.  What further measures would be adopted to address gender stereotypes with an intersectional approach?  Forced sterilisation of women with disabilities was still practiced and hate crimes against women had risen by four per cent over the reporting period. When would the State party develop a national action plan to address hate crimes and adopt measures to ban forced sterilisation?  What measures were in place to ensure that victims of female genital mutilation had access to health services?  Would it increase the number of specialised female genital mutilation clinics?

    One in five women in Ireland reportedly experienced non-consensual sex in their lifetimes. There were delays in access to justice and insufficient funding for measures to address sexual offences. What measures would the State party take to increase access to legal aid and protection for women victims of sexual violence?  What resources would be provided to strengthen support structures?  Would the State party consolidate legislation on sexual violence into one law?

    A Committee Expert said Ireland had made considerable efforts to combat trafficking, including by developing a national action plan to combat trafficking and establishing an independent monitoring mechanism.  However, there were shortcomings in identifying victims, particularly girls.  Only five children were identified as victims of trafficking in 2023, and the training of officials reportedly did not lead to effective prosecutions.  How would the State party train the judiciary and increase the prosecution of trafficking offences?  What steps had been taken to improve the identification of victims and ensure that no victims were excluded from support?  The Committee welcomed that a trafficking specific shelter had been established in 2023, but it was not large enough; were there plans to extend it?  There had only been 15 convictions of consumers of sex services in 2023; were there plans to increase prosecutions? 

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said the national strategy for women and girls included measures to address gender stereotypes and to collect data on such stereotypes.  Ireland had taken measures to address gender stereotypes in the media, including through a media forum held in 2025, and measures to promote gender balance in the media.  A campaign on reporting harmful online content had also been developed.

    Women’s health services were trained on responding to victims of female genital mutilation, and management guidelines had been developed on caring for victims, who had access to free counselling services.  A project was underway to reduce waiting times for healthcare for victims of female genital mutilation.  Ireland had ratified the Council of Europe Convention that prohibited forced sterilisation.

    Work was ongoing to update legislation on hate crimes and to introduce a prohibition of the incitement of hatred online.  The Government had also drafted legislation on removing the guardianship rights of parents who killed their partners.  Ireland had comprehensive laws on sexual offences.  There had been a three-fold increase in funding for support for victims of domestic, sexual and gender-based violence, and a body had been established to promote the collection and accessibility of data on sexual violence.

    Competent authorities, as well as non-governmental organizations, were now able to refer suspected victims of human trafficking.  The Government was looking at expanding the shelter for victims of trafficking.  It funded several non-governmental organizations to provide trauma-informed support to victims.  The Irish police forces had worked to increase prosecutions of organised crime cases, which had proven effective in preventing trafficking.  Ireland had recently decriminalised the sale of sex; there was no plan to change this legislation.  The Government was planning to introduce on-the-spot fines and mobile phone searches to increase prosecutions for the consumption of sex services.

    Questions by Committee Experts 

    JELENA PIA-COMELLA, Committee Expert and Rapporteur for Ireland, welcomed the State party’s proactive efforts to address coercive practices.  Could it provide more information on the special measures it had developed to address rape?

    Another Committee Expert asked if legislation was planned to address drink spiking?  What services were provided to victims of gender-based violence in prisons?

    A Committee Expert asked how the State party was promoting the meaningful participation of women, including marginalised women, in the Foreign Service?  The Committee was concerned about online threats against women involved in politics and public life.  What monitoring mechanisms were in place?  There was no clear gender-responsive climate strategy.  How did the State party ensure that women and girls were included in decision-making processes on climate action?

    Another Committee Expert said there was no formal procedure for the determination of statelessness in Ireland.  How would the State party amend this deficiency?  What did the State party plan to do in response to the recent court decision on the right to guardianship for babies born through surrogacy?

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said the Government was prioritising the drafting of legislation on coercive practices.  The prison service provided support to persons who had experienced domestic, sexual and gender-based violence.  An intervention model was also in place to prevent revictimisation upon release. Drink spiking was a criminal offence.

    Last year, of the 67 persons identified as victims of human trafficking, 10 were children.  The third national action plan on trafficking included measures to tackle trafficking in children.  A series of training programmes had been developed for prosecutors on sexual offences.

    Women made up 49 per cent of senior management in Ireland’s Foreign Service, and 54 per cent of heads of foreign missions.  A code of conduct on countering online hate speech had been developed, as had guidance for candidates who faced online harassment on lodging complaints.

    The Government was working to provide pathways to the parents of babies born through surrogacy to have their parental rights recognised.

    Questions by Committee Experts 

    JELENA PIA-COMELLA, Committee Expert and Rapporteur for Ireland, said that the statics of female participation in diplomacy were outstanding.  The Committee welcomed the State party’s higher education authority act. The primary curriculum did not address gender equality; would it do so in future?  What measures were in place to promote equal access to education? How did the State party ensure that its sexual and reproductive health education addressed same-sex relationships, gender identity and abortion?

    Another Committee Expert said the Committee welcomed the reduction of the gender pay gap to 9.6 per cent in 2022. What enforcement mechanisms were in place to ensure private sector compliance with equal pay mechanisms? Women constituted 60 per cent of low paid workers.  How did the State party address the barriers faced by women in accessing decent work? Roma women had an estimated unemployment rate of 80 per cent; how was the State party addressing this issue? Were there plans to introduce a universal State pension to address the gender pension gap, which was currently at 36 per cent?

    The Committee was concerned about the unequal distribution of unpaid care work.  What measures were in place to ensure access to affordable childcare for all children and to encourage greater uptake of parental leave by men? How did the State party ensure effective redress in cases of workplace harassment?

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said the sexual and reproductive health education curriculum was being reviewed, and the updated curriculum would be introduced from 2027.  It focused on promoting healthy relationships, gender equality and safety online, preventing harmful gender narratives, addressing the root causes of domestic and sexual violence, assessing responses to unplanned pregnancies and rape, and the harms of pornography.

    The accessibility and affordability of early learning and childcare had been improved since 2017.  Up to two years of preschool education was now offered at no cost.  Universal subsidies were provided to families.  More than two million children were covered by the national childcare scheme, which had a budget of 529 million euros in 2025.  The equal start scheme provided targeted support in disadvantaged areas for Traveller, Roma and refugee children.

    Reporting on the gender pay gap required employers to consider the reasons for the gap.  Guidelines were being developed for different sectors on addressing gender pay gaps.  Employees could lodge complaints when their employer did not report on gender pay gaps. Paid parental leave created individual, non-transferrable entitlements for each parent.  The Government planned to increase awareness of parents’ entitlements. 

    One of the actions in the national Roma and Traveller strategy promoted their employment and participation in internships.  The Government was reaching out to marginalised groups to encourage participation in voluntary employment services.

    Questions by a Committee Expert

    A Committee Expert said Ireland had made significant progress in terms of women’s health.  How did the State ensure free access to healthcare for marginalised women?  How did the roadmap for digital health to 2030 address the needs of women and girls, including persons who had difficulties accessing digital services? Could the delegation provide data on women who had accessed legal abortions in 2023 and 2024?  How many women had had to travel abroad to obtain abortions?  How was the State party combatting stigma related to abortions and conscientious objections?  Was the State party considering abolishing the mandatory three-day waiting period for abortions?

    How was free, prior and informed consent guaranteed for medical interventions on institutionalised women and transgender persons?  There were reported cases of forced sterilisations and forced abortions; how did the State sanction such harmful practices, and how many cases of such practices had been brought before the courts?  How was the State party ensuring that mental health services were community-based and gender sensitive?  What steps had been taken to ensure that victims of gender-based violence could benefit from free mental health services?  Would the State prohibit the use of confidential health data of victims in court cases?

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said the parental leave scheme encouraged fathers to use it.  In 2024, over 66,000 parents had received parental benefits, of which 32 per cent were men.  Ireland’s State pension system recognised periods spent outside the workforce for caring requirements.  The long-term carers’ contribution supported the pensions of women who provided full-time care for long periods of time; over 7,000 women had been added to this scheme last year.  The difference in average pay to men and women was negligible in terms of the State pension.  The proposal of a universal pension could undermine progress made in recognising time spent by women providing care and would not resolve the pension issue. Ireland was in the process of adopting an auto-enrolment process for pensions which would particularly benefit women.

    The Government was considering ratifying International Labour Organization Conventions 156 and 183. The Workplace Relations Commission was responsible for deciding on workplace discrimination claims.  Some 63 claims had been received in 2024.  The Commission did not collect reasons for withdrawals of complaints.  It assisted all parties to reach a suitable outcome for a claim.

    The State party promoted collective bargaining to promote access to decent working conditions and wages. There was no legal impediment to collective bargaining.  The Government supported the rights of all workers to join and form trade unions. 

    Ireland was committed to gender transformative climate action.  Its delegation at the most recent Conference of the Parties in Baku was 50 per cent female. The Just Transition Commission had published a report that called for assessment of the gender implications of climate measures.

    Free hormone replacement therapy was provided to women experiencing the symptoms of menopause.  The Government was committed to ensuring safe and equitable access to pregnancy termination services for marginalised groups of society. In 2023, 10,033 women used termination services, while in 2022, 214 women went abroad to access such services. The free contraception scheme provided for the cost of contraception and related health consultations.  More than 200,000 women benefited from the scheme last year.  Since 2016, several million euros had been invested in maternity services, funding a large increase in maternity health staff.

    Women’s mental health remained a key priority in the national mental health strategy.  The State was providing mental health services to victims of violence that considered their gender and experience of trauma.  The State party was not aware of cases of forced sterilisation and forced abortion.

    Children could remain in the care of their mother in prison until 12 months of age.  High quality antenatal care was provided to women in prisons and there were mother and baby units in the State’s two women’s prisons.  Draft legislation had been developed that would limit the use of counselling records in court proceedings.  Banning disclosure of such records entirely could affect the right to a fair trial.  Measures were being developed to reduce revictimisation of survivors through disclosure hearings.

    The State was rolling out campaigns to encourage victims of sexual and gender-based violence to come forward and access support services, and was working with partners to ensure that frontline staff were delivering trauma-informed and culturally sensitive care to victims of violence.  The State was working to map the mental health needs of adolescent girls, which would inform the development of the national mental health strategy.

    Questions by Committee Experts

    A Committee Expert said Ireland had developed initiatives to promote the empowerment of women.  Some 32 per cent of start-ups were headed by women in 2022. There was a risk of poverty and exclusion for single, women-headed families – there had been a 171 per cent increase in the number of women who were unable to access housing in 2023. How was the State party addressing this? What progress had been made in developing a second action plan on business and human rights?  How did the State party ensure obligatory due diligence in human rights?

    One Committee Expert said Traveller women were disproportionately represented in prisons.  How were prison services aligned with the Bangkok Rules? The Traveller and Roma women national strategy did not address access to justice.  Would this be rectified?  How many women of colour were represented in decision-making bodies?  How was Ireland promoting unimpeded access to humanitarian assistance to women and girls on the frontlines of conflict, and how did the State party encourage consideration of intersectionality globally?

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said single parents were a target of social benefit schemes, including school meals programmes and the child benefit scheme, which had been extended to children up to age 18 in full-time education.  Ireland had piloted equality budgeting measures, including for gender budgeting. It was designing a tagging framework that would ensure the recording of expenditure on equality issues.

    Ireland was working to increase female participation in entrepreneurial activity through a six-year action plan, which included schemes for financial support for high potential start-ups led by women.  Mentorship, training and networking programmes were offered to women entrepreneurs. There was double the number of women accessing such training compared to men.

    Ireland’s first national action plan on business and human rights had concluded in 2023, and a consultation process for developing the second plan was currently underway.  A working outline of the plan was presented in June 2024. The next plan was likely to finish in 2028 or 2029.  The Government planned to include gender responsive due diligence in the plan.

    The Government was committed to providing affordable social homes at scale.  There were more than 20,000 social housing solutions delivered in 2024. Several million euros would be invested in programmes to address homelessness in 2025.  Around 15,500 persons accessed emergency accommodation in April 2025, including 4,700 children.  A national homelessness action committee was established in 2021 to address the issue; it had developed a national support framework. 

    The zero-tolerance strategy sought to increase the number of refuge units and safe homes for victims of violence. There were 141 refuge units at the outset of the strategy; the current number was 159.  By the end of 2025, more than 200 would be established.  There had been investments of over 100 million euros in Traveller-specific accommodation.

    There was disproportionate representation of Travellers within the justice system.  The family support model for Traveller women in prison provided intensive support at all judicial stages.  Services were being extended to pre-sentencing and post-release stages. There were plans for the establishment of an open women’s prison.

    Ireland was consistent in its participation in multilateral fora addressing lethal autonomous weapons.  It was presenting a value-based message that addressed gender issues.

    Questions by a Committee Expert 

    A Committee Expert asked why the findings of the independent review of the legal aid scheme of 2021 were not published.  How could women who could not afford legal representation have access to justice? How was the right of access to justice of women with disabilities respected?

    The Committee welcomed efforts to support women’s access to child maintenance payments.  Could the State party provide statistics on fathers who did not pay child maintenance?  Why had the State party decided not to establish a child maintenance agency? How did it respond to non-payment of maintenance?  Would it publish the results of a study into the economic consequences of divorce on both parents?  Women with disabilities were reportedly discriminated against in child custody decisions.  Would the State party investigate this issue?

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said the child maintenance review group was established in 2020 to assess whether to establish a State child maintenance agency; it had decided that such an agency should not be established.  Instead, it had called for a review of the enforcement of child maintenance orders to be undertaken and had issued 26 recommendations to ensure compliance with such orders.  Guidelines on the implementation of the recommendations were being developed. There had been significant increases in child support and working family payments recently.

    New legislation passed last year included provisions to make the family court process more accessible and less costly. The best interests of the child were a primary consideration in all family court proceedings.

    Frontline professionals across the justice sector were trained on identifying risks of sexual and gender-based violence and responding to such violence effectively.  Staff of the probation service were also trained on risk assessment and recognising cases of sexual and gender-based violence.

    The civil legal aid review was completed in May 2025 and the Government was now considering its results.  The judicial appointments act included provisions promoting equal numbers of men and women as members of the judiciary. The gender pay gap platform would allow for assessment of the pay gap in the legal sector.

    Concluding Remarks 

    COLM BROPHY, Minister of State for Migration of Ireland and head of the delegation, thanked the Committee for the constructive dialogue.  The Committee had invested significant time in understanding the issues facing women and girls in Ireland.  Ireland was committed to its obligations under the Convention and to the United Nations more broadly.  The State would develop measures in response to the Committee’s concluding observations, and brief civil society on them.  Mr. Brophy closed by thanking all those who had contributed to the dialogue. 

    NAHLA HAIDAR, Committee Chair, thanked the State party for its responses and its support to the treaty bodies, international law and the rule of law.  The dialogue had provided the Committee with further insight into the efforts made by Ireland to implement the Convention for the benefit of women and girls in the State.  The Committee would develop concluding observations to strengthen the implementation of the Convention in Ireland, including recommendations for immediate follow-up.  It looked forward to its next dialogue with the State party.

    ___________

    Produced by the United Nations Information Service in Geneva for use of the media; 
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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – EU/Euratom Agreement on the interpretation and application of the Energy Charter Treaty: adoption by Euratom – P10_TA(2025)0127 – Wednesday, 18 June 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    (Consultation)

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to the Commission proposal to the Council (COM(2024)0256),

    –  having regard to Article 203 of the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, pursuant to which the Council consulted Parliament (C10‑0092/2024),

    –  having regard to Rule 84 of its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the opinion of the Committee on International Trade,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (A10-0008/2025),

    1.  Approves the Commission proposal;

    2.  Calls on the Council to notify Parliament if it intends to depart from the text approved by Parliament;

    3.  Asks the Council to consult Parliament again if it intends to substantially amend the text approved by Parliament;

    4.  Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council and the Commission.

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – Non-objection to a delegated act: The time period to submit requests for amendments of CAP Strategic Plans – P10_TA(2025)0124 – Wednesday, 18 June 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to the Commission delegated regulation (C(2025)03151),

    –  having regard to the Commission’s letter of 21 May 2025 asking Parliament to declare that it will raise no objections to the delegated regulation,

    –  having regard to the letter from the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development to the Chair of the Conference of Committee Chairs of 4 June 2025,

    –  having regard to Article 290 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/2115 of the European Parliament and of the Council(1), and in particular Article 122, point (a), thereof,

    –  having regard to Rule 114(6) of its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the recommendation for a decision of the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development,

    –  having regard to the fact that no objections have been raised within the period laid down in the third and fourth indents of Rule 114(6) of its Rules of Procedure, which expired on 17 June 2025,

    A.  whereas, in the current context of ongoing instability in the agricultural sector across the Union several Member States are already encountering difficulties in deciding in the early months of 2025 on the need to review their transfer decisions taken in 2022 pursuant to Article 17(5), Article 88(7) and Article 103 of Regulation (EU) 2021/2115, and it is therefore considered necessary to provide Member States with additional time to plan those transfers;

    B.  whereas the time limit laid down in Article 3(4) of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2023/370(2) expired on 31 May 2025, it is therefore of utmost importance to establish a new time limit of 31 August 2025 for the submission of requests for amendment as soon as possible, in order to allow for appropriate planning and consideration by Member States;

    C.  whereas Delegated Regulation (EU) 2023/370 should therefore be amended accordingly;

    1.  Declares that it has no objections to the delegated regulation;

    2.  Instructs its President to forward this decision to the Council and the Commission.

    (1) Regulation (EU) 2021/2115 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 2 December 2021 establishing rules on support for strategic plans to be drawn up by Member States under the common agricultural policy (CAP Strategic Plans) and financed by the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) and by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1305/2013 and (EU) No 1307/2013 (OJ L 435, 6.12.2021, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/2115/oj).
    (2) Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2023/370 of 13 December 2022 supplementing Regulation (EU) 2021/2115 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to procedures, time limits for submission by Member States of requests for amendments of CAP Strategic Plans, and further cases for which the maximum number of amendments of CAP Strategic Plans does not apply (OJ L 51, 20.2.2023, p. 25, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_del/2023/370/oj).

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – Macro-financial assistance to Egypt – P10_TA(2025)0125 – Wednesday, 18 June 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

    Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 212(2) thereof,

    Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,

    After transmission of the draft legislative act to the national parliaments,

    Acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure(1),

    Whereas:

    (1)  Relations between the Union and the Arab Republic of Egypt (‘Egypt’) are developed within the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an Association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Arab Republic of Egypt, of the other part(2) (the ‘Association Agreement’), in force since 2004. The Union and Egypt adopted the latest EU-Egypt Partnership Priorities (2021-2027) at the ninth EU-Egypt Association Council, established by the Association Agreement, on 19 June 2022 (the ‘Partnership Priorities’). The Partnership Priorities reconfirm the joint aim of addressing common challenges facing the Union and Egypt, promoting joint interests and guaranteeing long-term stability and sustainable development on both sides of the Mediterranean. The shared commitment to the universal values of democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights continues to underpin the Partnership Priorities, as is also reflected in the EU-Egypt Multi-Annual Indicative Programme for the period of 2021-2027 (the ‘EU-Egypt MIP’).

    (2)  The Partnership Priorities reflect the shared commitment of the Union and Egypt to reinforce cooperation in support of Egypt’s ‘Sustainable Development Strategy Vision 2030’ and the Union’s determination to act on a renewed impetus to strengthen the partnership with its Southern Neighbourhood. In particular, in the conclusions of the European Council of 10-11 December 2020, the Union identified a democratic, more stable, greener and more prosperous Southern Neighbourhood as a strategic priority. The EU Agenda for the Mediterranean, and the Economic and Investment Plan for the Southern Neighbours set out in the Joint Communication of the Commission and of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 9 February 2021 entitled ‘Renewed partnership with the Southern Neighbourhood: A new Agenda for the Mediterranean’ present the Union’s objectives of achieving long-term, sustainable socioeconomic recovery and resilience and of advancing the twin green and digital transitions in the region.

    (3)   On 17 March 2024, Egypt and the Union jointly decided to upgrade their relations to a strategic and comprehensive partnership, based on the values of equity and mutual respect and trust in order to strengthen their common stability, peace and prosperity.

    (4)  In line with the Partnership Priorities, the Union and Egypt are committed to ensuring accountability, the rule of law, full respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as promoting democracy, gender equality and equal opportunities as constitutional rights of all their citizens. Those commitments contribute to the advancement of the partnership and to Egypt’s sustainable social and economic development, good governance and socio-economic stability. The increased and constructive engagement between the Union and Egypt in the last period has opened the path to more meaningful dialogue on human rights-related issues. In the framework of the Association Agreement, the subcommittee on Political Matters, Human Rights and Democracy – International and Regional issues ▌ and the Association Committee provide the institutional platforms to exchange views on an array of human rights issues, which the Union would like to continue and build upon. The steady future improvement of the human rights situation in Egypt in key areas related to civil, political, economic, social rights and fundamental freedoms regularly addressed by both partners in bilateral and international fora will have a positive impact on relations between the Union and Egypt.

    (5)  Assistance to Egypt is funded mainly through the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe (NDICI-GE), established by Regulation (EU) 2021/947 of the European Parliament and of the Council(3). The Union’s indicative allocation for Egypt under the NDICI-GE for the first period (2021-2024) of the EU-Egypt MIP was EUR 240 million. This is in addition to the ongoing cooperation portfolio of EUR 1,3 billion and other budget support and emergency measures in response to the COVID-19 pandemic and to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine amounting to EUR 307 million. The Partnership Priorities for 2021-2027 are reflected in the EU-Egypt MIP, which has been prepared in close consultation with all relevant stakeholders, and cover three broad areas: (i) Sustainable Modern Economy and Social Development; (ii) Partnering in Foreign Policy, and (iii) Enhancing Stability. The NDICI-GE replaces the European Neighbourhood Instrument under which the Union’s bilateral assistance to Egypt for the period 2014-2020 amounted to EUR 756 million.

    (6)  The Union recognises Egypt’s key role for regional security and stability, and has a strong interest in preventing short-term economic instability in Egypt that could have broader consequences and a negative impact on the geopolitical landscape. Terrorism, organised crime, such as human trafficking, irregular migration, disinformation and conflicts, are common threats against common security and the social fabric of nations across both sides of the Mediterranean. The Union acknowledges Egypt’s contribution to addressing such issues. Furthermore, energy security is one of the most pressing challenges facing countries on both sides of the Mediterranean. Energy cooperation between the Union and Egypt could not only offer a source of economic prosperity for the region, but also strengthen energy security by diversifying energy supplies and encouraging regional collaboration. Therefore, the Union and Egypt have a common interest in strengthening cooperation highlighted in the Partnership Priorities, in full compliance with international law, including human rights and international humanitarian law, as well as in promoting joint interests and addressing common challenges.

    (7)  Recalling the global and regional geopolitical challenges, such as the humanitarian crisis in Gaza, resulting from the aftermath of the Hamas terrorist attacks across Israel on 7 October 2023, the escalating tensions in the Horn of Africa and the safety of navigation in the Red Sea, as well as migratory pressure from the conflict in Sudan, uncertainties in Syria, the instability in Libya, Egypt’s role as a host to large numbers of refugees and migrants, and the strategic importance of Egypt as the largest country in the region and a pillar of stability for the whole Middle East, the Union has embarked on a strategic and comprehensive partnership with Egypt as outlined in the Joint Declaration of the Union and Egypt, signed in Cairo on 17 March 2024 (the ‘Joint Declaration’).

    (8)  The objective of the strategic and comprehensive partnership with Egypt is to elevate the political relations of the Union and Egypt to a strategic partnership and to enable Egypt to fulfil its key role of providing stability in the region, the Middle East and North Africa. That partnership aims to contribute to supporting Egypt’s macroeconomic resilience and enabling the implementation of ambitious socio-economic reforms in a manner that complements and reinforces the reform process provided for under the International Monetary Fund (IMF) programme for Egypt. As outlined in the Joint Declaration, the strategic and comprehensive partnership will address a wide set of policy measures clustered across six pillars of intervention, namely political relations, economic stability, investment and trade, migration, security and law enforcement cooperation, demography and human capital. The strategic and comprehensive partnership should be developed in line with initiatives at Union and Member State level.

    (9)  Underpinning the strategic and comprehensive partnership is a financial package of EUR 7,4 billion consisting of short- and longer-term support for the macro-fiscal and socio-economic reform agenda, as well as increased amounts available to support investments in Egypt and targeted support for the implementation of the different strategic priorities, which include renewable energy and migration, amongst others. Part of the support package is the Union’s macro-financial assistance package of up to EUR 5 billion in loans, composed of two macro-financial assistance operations, a short-term operation of a maximum amount of EUR 1 billion and a medium-term operation of a maximum amount of EUR 4 billion. That financial package also includes financial instruments, such as guarantees and blending instruments, aimed to mobilise public and private investments with the objective of generating substantial new investments with positive economic impacts which can benefit all Egyptians. This will be complemented by programmes to support specific priorities under the strategic and comprehensive partnership through individual projects and technical assistance implemented under the NDICI-GE.

    (10)  Egypt’s macro-fiscal situation has faced significant challenges and has deteriorated substantially over recent months, as external pressures have intensified and public debt has increased further, with substantial downside risks to the economic outlook persisting. The repercussions of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and the geopolitical tensions and conflicts in the Middle East have led to protracted capital outflows and lower foreign currency receipts, in particular due to sharply easing income from tourism, Suez Canal proceeds, and gas production amid volatility of confidence among foreign investors. This is particularly challenging in Egypt’s difficult fiscal situation, which is characterised by constant fiscal deficits and high and growing debt-to-GDP ratios. Despite that difficult external context, in 2024 Egypt was able to implement reforms, such as the unification of exchange rates and making progress in tightening monetary policy, to help preserve its macroeconomic stability.

    (11)  Egypt’s economic and financial situation has been supported by several disbursing IMF programmes since 2016. Those are a three-year Extended Fund Facility of USD 12 billion adopted in 2016, emergency financial assistance under the Rapid Financing Instrument of USD 2,8 billion adopted in 2020, a one-year Stand-By Arrangement of USD 5,2 billion adopted in 2020, and a four-year Extended Fund Facility of USD 3 billion adopted in 2022 and augmented to USD 8 billion in 2024. Egypt made considerable reform efforts during the first part of its engagement with the IMF in 2016-2021. Reforms included a significant currency devaluation, accompanied by monetary policy reforms focused on an inflation target corridor. Fuel subsidy reform was coupled with a significant strengthening of a targeted social transfer system. Public finance management was strengthened by developing medium-term revenue and debt management strategies. The Egyptian authorities also began improving the governance of state-owned enterprises.

    (12)  After the adoption of a follow-up IMF programme in December 2022, reform progress was less noticeable, although Egypt has implemented steps to level the playing field between public and private companies through a law to abolish the tax privileges of state-owned enterprises, albeit with exemptions on the basis of national security, and through the adoption of a state ownership policy, aimed to reduce the presence of the State in the economy, which remains large and distorting despite recent limited progress, and clarifying the rationale of continued State involvement in certain strategic sectors. However, Egypt did not implement its commitment to make the currency durably flexible in 2023, leading to a largely stable official exchange rate and a substantial parallel currency market with a significantly depreciated and highly volatile exchange rate. That fragmentation weighed heavily on foreign investment and domestic business activity.

    (13)  Egypt re-engaged with the IMF in early 2024, and reached a staff-level agreement on 6 March 2024 on a revamped extended fund facility programme scaled up to USD 8 billion. The new programme was adopted by a Decision of the IMF Executive Board on 29 March 2024, and it aims to address the areas of: (i) credible exchange rate flexibility; (ii) sustainable tightening of monetary policy; (iii) fiscal consolidation to preserve debt sustainability; (iv) a new framework to rein in infrastructure spending; (v) provision of adequate levels of social spending to protect vulnerable groups, including from rises in the cost of living and energy price; and (vi) implementation of the state ownership policy and reforms to level the playing field with a view to promoting the development of the private sector in the economy. Together with the signature of the staff-level agreement, Egypt also enacted a flexibilisation of the exchange rate, and raised the central bank’s key policy rate by a sizeable 600 basis points, in line with the priorities of the IMF programme. Staff-level agreement on the fourth review of Egypt’s economic reform programme was reached in December 2024, and the IMF Executive Board completed the review in March 2025.

    (14)  In view of a worsening economic situation and outlook clouded by substantial downside risks in relation to ongoing external shocks, Egypt requested complementary macro-financial assistance from the Union on 12 March 2024.

    (15)  Given that Egypt is a country covered by the European Neighbourhood Policy, it should be considered to be eligible to receive macro-financial assistance from the Union.

    (16)  The Union’s macro-financial assistance should be an exceptional instrument of untied and undesignated balance-of-payments support, which aims to address Egypt’s immediate external financing needs, and it should underpin the implementation of a policy programme containing strong immediate adjustment and structural reform measures designed to improve Egypt’s balance-of-payments position.

    (17)  Given that there is still a significant residual external financing gap in Egypt’s balance of payments over and above the resources provided by the IMF and other multilateral institutions and regional partners, the Union’s macro-financial assistance to be provided to Egypt is, under the current exceptional circumstances, considered to be an appropriate response to Egypt’s request to the Union to support Egypt’s economic stabilisation, in conjunction with the IMF programme. The Union’s EUR 5 billion macro-financial assistance package, including the macro-financial assistance of up to EUR 4 billion under this Decision, seeks to support the economic stabilisation and the structural reform agenda of Egypt, supplementing resources made available under the IMF programme. The first part of the package, a macro-financial assistance loan of EUR 1 billion, was disbursed in December 2024 after a positive assessment by the Commission.

    (18)  The Union’s macro-financial assistance should aim to support the restoration of a sustainable external financing situation for Egypt, thereby supporting its economic and social development. By fostering stability and prosperity in its Neighbourhood, the provision of the Union’s macro-financial assistance to Egypt could also contribute to the Union’s growth and economic resilience.

    (19)  The determination of the amount of the Union’s macro-financial assistance should be based on a complete quantitative assessment of Egypt’s residual external financing needs and should take into account Egypt’s capacity to finance itself with its own resources, in particular the international reserves at its disposal. The Union’s macro-financial assistance is part of an international joint effort, effectively complementing the programmes and resources provided by the IMF and the World Bank. The determination of the amount of the assistance should also take into account expected financial contributions from multilateral donors and the need to ensure fair burden sharing between the Union and other donors, as well as the pre-existing deployment of the Union’s other external financing instruments in Egypt and the added value of the Union’s overall involvement in Egypt.

    (20)  The Commission should ensure that the Union’s macro-financial assistance is legally and substantially in accordance with the key principles and objectives of the different areas of external action, with measures taken in respect of those areas, and with other relevant Union policies and Union values, such as democracy, human rights and the rule of law.

    (21)  The Union’s macro-financial assistance should support the Union’s external policy towards Egypt. The Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) should work closely together throughout the macro-financial assistance operation in order to coordinate, and ensure the consistency of, the Union’s external policy.

    (22)  The Union’s macro-financial assistance should support Egypt’s commitment to foster values shared with the Union, including democracy, the rule of law, good governance, respect for human rights, sustainable development and poverty reduction, as well as its commitment to the principles of open, rule-based and fair trade.

    (23)  A precondition for granting the Union’s macro-financial assistance to Egypt should be that Egypt continue to make concrete, credible and tangible steps towards respecting effective democratic mechanisms, including a multi-party parliamentary system, and the rule of law, and guaranteeing respect for human rights. In addition, the specific objectives of the Union’s macro-financial assistance should strengthen the efficiency, transparency and accountability of the public finance management systems, the governance and supervision of the financial sector in Egypt, and should promote structural reforms that aim to support sustainable and inclusive growth, decent employment creation and fiscal consolidation. The Commission and the EEAS should regularly monitor the fulfilment of that precondition and the achievement of those specific objectives.

    (24)  The link of the Union’s macro-financial assistance to an on-track disbursing IMF programme, with its strong macro-fiscal framework and rigorous debt sustainability analysis, provides reassurances in relation to Egypt’s repayment capacity. In addition, in order to ensure that the Union’s financial interests linked to the Union’s macro-financial assistance are protected efficiently, Egypt should take appropriate measures relating to the prevention of, and fight against, fraud, corruption and any other irregularities linked to that assistance. The transparent management of funds allocated under the Union’s macro-financial assistance is essential. In addition, a loan agreement to be concluded between the Commission and the Egyptian authorities should contain provisions authorising the European Anti-Fraud Office to carry out investigations, including on-the-spot checks and inspections, in accordance with the provisions and procedures laid down in Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council(4) and Council Regulation (Euratom, EC) No 2185/96(5), the Commission and the Court of Auditors to carry out audits and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office to exercise its competences with regard to the provision of the Union’s macro-financial assistance during and after the availability period of that assistance.

    (25)  The release of the Union’s macro-financial assistance is without prejudice to the powers of the European Parliament and the Council as budgetary authority.

    (26)  The amounts of the provision required for macro-financial assistance in the form of loans should be consistent with the budgetary appropriations provided for in the multiannual financial framework.

    (27)  The Union’s macro-financial assistance should be managed by the Commission. In order to ensure that the European Parliament and the Council are able to follow the implementation of this Decision, the Commission should regularly inform them of developments relating to that assistance and provide them with relevant documents.

    (28)  The annual report on the implementation of this Decision should include information on concrete, tangible and credible steps taken by Egypt towards respecting effective democratic mechanisms, including a multi-party parliamentary system, and the rule of law, and guaranteeing respect for human rights.

    (29)  In order to ensure uniform conditions for the implementation of this Decision, implementing powers should be conferred on the Commission. Those powers should be exercised in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council(6).

    (30)  The Union’s macro-financial assistance should be subject to economic policy conditions, to be set out in a memorandum of understanding (MoU). In order to ensure uniform conditions of implementation and for reasons of efficiency, the Commission should be empowered to negotiate such conditions with the Egyptian authorities under the supervision of the committee of representatives of the Member States in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011. Under Regulation (EU) No 182/2011, the advisory procedure should, as a general rule, apply in all cases other than as provided for in that Regulation. Considering the potentially significant impact of assistance of more than EUR 90 million, it is appropriate that the examination procedure as specified in Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 be used for operations above that threshold. Considering the amount of the Union’s macro-financial assistance to Egypt, that examination procedure should apply to the adoption of the MoU, and to any reduction, suspension or cancellation of that assistance.

    (31)  Since the objective of this Decision, namely to address Egypt’s external financing needs cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States but can rather be better achieved at Union level, the Union may adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union. In accordance with the principle of proportionality, as set out in that Article, this Decision does not go beyond what is necessary to achieve that objective.

    (32)  In order to enable the prompt provision of macro-financial assistance to Egypt, this Decision should enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union,

    HAVE ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

    Article 1

    1.  The Union shall make macro-financial assistance in the form of loans of a maximum amount of up to EUR 4 billion available to Egypt (the ‘Union’s macro-financial assistance’), with a view to supporting Egypt’s economic stabilisation and a substantive reform agenda. The release of the Union’s macro-financial assistance is subject to the adoption of the Union budget for the relevant year by the European Parliament and the Council. The Union’s macro-financial assistance shall contribute to covering Egypt’s balance-of-payments needs as identified in the IMF programme.

    2.  In order to finance the Union’s macro-financial assistance, the Commission shall be empowered, on behalf of the Union, to borrow the necessary funds on the capital markets or from financial institutions and to on-lend them to Egypt.

    3.  The release of the Union’s macro-financial assistance shall be managed by the Commission in a manner consistent with the agreements or understandings reached between the IMF and Egypt, and with the key principles and objectives of economic reforms set out in the Association Agreement.

    The Commission shall regularly inform the European Parliament and the Council of developments regarding the Union’s macro-financial assistance, including disbursements thereof, and shall provide those institutions with the relevant documents in due time.

    4.  The Union’s macro-financial assistance shall be made available for a period of two and a half years, starting from the first day after the date of entry into force of the MoU referred to in Article 3(1).

    5.  Where the financing needs of Egypt decrease fundamentally during the period of the disbursement of the Union’s macro-financial assistance compared to the initial projections, the Commission, acting in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 7(2), shall reduce the amount of the assistance, suspend or cancel it.

    Article 2

    1.  A precondition for granting the Union’s macro-financial assistance shall be that Egypt continue to make concrete and credible steps towards respecting effective democratic mechanisms, including a multi-party parliamentary system, and the rule of law, and guaranteeing respect for human rights.

    2.  The Commission and the EEAS shall monitor the fulfilment of the precondition set out in paragraph 1 throughout the life-cycle of the Union’s macro-financial assistance.

    3.  Paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article shall apply in accordance with Council Decision 2010/427/EU(7).

    Article 3

    1.  The Commission, in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 7(2), shall agree with the Egyptian authorities on clearly defined economic policy and financial conditions, focusing on structural reforms and sound public finances, to which the Union’s macro-financial assistance is to be subject. Those economic policy and financial conditions shall be set out in a memorandum of understanding (MoU) which shall include a timeframe for their fulfilment. Those economic policy and financial conditions shall be consistent with the agreements or understandings referred to in Article 1(3), including the macroeconomic adjustment and structural reform programmes implemented by Egypt with the support of the IMF.

    2.  The economic policy and financial conditions referred to in paragraph 1 shall aim, in particular, to enhance the efficiency, transparency and accountability of the public finance management systems in Egypt, including for the use of the Union’s macro-financial assistance. Progress in mutual market opening, including for small and medium-sized enterprises, the development of rule-based and fair trade, sustainable development, good governance and other priorities in the context of the Union’s external policy shall also be duly taken into account when designing the policy measures. The Commission shall regularly monitor Egypt’s progress in attaining those objectives.

    3.  The detailed financial terms of the Union’s macro-financial assistance shall be laid down in a loan agreement to be concluded between the Commission and the Egyptian authorities in accordance with Article 223 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council(8) (the ‘Financial Regulation’) (the ‘loan agreement’).

    4.  The Commission shall verify, at regular intervals, that the conditions referred to in Article 4(3), first subparagraph, continue to be met, including whether the economic policies of Egypt are in accordance with the objectives of the Union’s macro-financial assistance. For the purposes of that verification, the Commission shall coordinate closely with the IMF and the World Bank, and, where necessary, with the European Parliament and with the Council.

    Article 4

    1.  Subject to the conditions referred to in paragraph 3, first subparagraph, the Union’s macro-financial assistance shall be made available by the Commission in instalments. The size of each of those instalments shall be set out in the MoU. An instalment may be disbursed in one or more tranches.

    2.  The amounts of the Union’s macro-financial assistance provided in the form of loans shall be provisioned, where required, in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2021/947.

    3.  The Commission shall decide on the release of the instalments subject to the fulfilment of the following conditions:

    (a)  the precondition set out in Article 2(1);

    (b)  a continuous satisfactory track record of implementing a policy programme that contains strong adjustment and structural reform measures supported by a non-precautionary IMF credit arrangement; and

    (c)  the satisfactory implementation of the economic policy and financial conditions agreed in the MoU.

    The release of the second instalment shall not, in principle, take place earlier than three months after the release of the first instalment. The release of the third instalment shall not, in principle, take place earlier than three months after the release of the second instalment.

    4.  Where the conditions set out in paragraph 3, first subparagraph, are not met, the Commission shall temporarily suspend or cancel the disbursement of the Union’s macro-financial assistance. In such cases, it shall inform the European Parliament and the Council without delay of the reasons for that suspension or cancellation.

    5.  The Union’s macro-financial assistance shall be disbursed to the Central Bank of Egypt. Subject to the agreed provisions set out in the MoU, including a confirmation of residual budgetary financing needs, the Union funds may be transferred by the Central Bank of Egypt to the Egyptian Ministry of Finance as the final beneficiary.

    Article 5

    1.  In order to finance the Union’s macro-financial assistance in the form of loans, the Commission shall be empowered, on behalf of the Union, to borrow the necessary funds on the capital markets or from financial institutions in accordance with Article 224 of the Financial Regulation.

    2.  The Commission shall enter into a loan agreement referred to in Article 3(3) in respect of the amount referred to in Article 1. The loan agreement shall lay down the availability period and the detailed terms of the Union’s macro-financial assistance, including in relation to the internal control systems. Egypt shall repay the loan, which shall be granted on terms that allow its repayment over a long period, including a possible grace period. The maximum duration of the loan shall be 35 years. ▌

    3.   The Commission shall inform the European Parliament and the Council of developments in the operations referred to in paragraph 2.

    Article 6

    1.  The Unions macro-financial assistance shall be implemented in accordance with the Financial Regulation.

    2.  The Union’s macro-financial assistance shall be implemented under direct management.

    3.  Before the implementation of the Union’s macro-financial assistance, the Commission shall assess, by means of an operational assessment, the soundness of Egypt’s financial arrangements, administrative procedures, and internal and external control mechanisms which are relevant to the assistance.

    Article 7

    1.  The Commission shall be assisted by a committee. That committee shall be a committee within the meaning of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011.

    2.  Where reference is made to this paragraph, Article 5 of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 shall apply.

    Article 8

    1.  By 30 June of each year, the Commission shall submit to the European Parliament and to the Council a report on the implementation of this Decision in the preceding year, including an evaluation of that implementation. That report shall:

    (a)  examine the progress made in implementing the Union’s macro-financial assistance;

    (b)  assess the economic situation and prospects of Egypt, as well as progress made in implementing the policy measures referred to in Article 3(1);

    (c)  indicate the connection between the economic policy and financial conditions set out in the MoU, Egypt’s on-going economic and fiscal performance and the Commission’s decisions to release the instalments of the Union’s macro-financial assistance, while outlining concrete and credible steps taken towards respecting democratic mechanisms and the rule of law and guaranteeing human rights.

    2.  Not later than two years after the expiry of the availability period referred to in Article 1(4), the Commission shall submit to the European Parliament and to the Council an ex post evaluation report, assessing the results and efficiency of the completed Union’s macro-financial assistance and the extent to which it has contributed to the aims of the assistance.

    Article 9

    This Decision shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

    Done at …,

    For the European Parliament For the Council

    The President The President

    (1) Position of the European Parliament of 18 June 2025.
    (2) OJ L 304, 30.9.2004, p. 39.
    (3) Regulation (EU) 2021/947 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 June 2021 establishing the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe, amending and repealing Decision No 466/2014/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Regulation (EU) 2017/1601 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 480/2009 (OJ L 209, 14.6.2021, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/947/oj).
    (4) Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 September 2013 concerning investigations conducted by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation (Euratom) No 1074/1999 (OJ L 248, 18.9.2013, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2013/883/oj).
    (5) Council Regulation (Euratom, EC) No 2185/96 of 11 November 1996 concerning on-the-spot checks and inspections carried out by the Commission in order to protect the European Communities’ financial interests against fraud and other irregularities (OJ L 292, 15.11.1996, p. 2, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/1996/2185/oj).
    (6) Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 laying down the rules and general principles concerning mechanisms for control by Member States of the Commission’s exercise of implementing powers (OJ L 55, 28.2.2011, p. 13, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2011/182/oj).
    (7) Council Decision 2010/427/EU of 26 July 2010 establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service (OJ L 201, 3.8.2010, p. 30, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2010/427/oj).
    (8) Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (OJ L, 2024/2509, 26.9.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj).

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Latest news – Meeting on the current situation with Ms Yahav Erez, from Yesh Din. – Delegation for relations with Palestine

    Source: European Parliament

    Next meeting of the Delegation will take place on Monday, 23 June 2025,at 12.00 – 13.00in Room SPINELLI 5G3 (Brussels)

    The main topic of discussion will be an exchange of views on the current situation in Palestine with a local NGO representative currently in Brussels, Ms Yahav Erez, International Advocacy Coordinator at Yesh Din.

    Meeting documents will be published on the EP Delegations webpage via eMeeting (intranet and internet) once available.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Missions – 26 June: INTA mission to Ghent – 26-06-2025 – Committee on International Trade

    Source: European Parliament

    A delegation of 6 Members of the Committee on International Trade (INTA) will travel to Ghent on 26 June to visit a steel and automotive company.

    The one day mission will provide an opportunity to INTA Members to visit the ArcelorMittal and Volvo Cars plant in the port of Ghent. This will allow more insight into the trade-related challenges the steel and automotive sectors are facing, in particular with regard to the US tariffs, unfair trade practices and geopolitical tensions.

    The delegation will be led by the INTA Chair, Bernd Lange (S&D, DE).

    The composition of the delegation:

    LANGE Bernd (S&D)

    VAN DIJCK Kris (ECR)

    SBAI Majdouline (Greens/EFA)

    BRICMONT Saskia (Greens/EFA)

    KENNES Rudi (The Left)

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: EIB backs new military base in Lithuania with €540 million loan

    Source: European Investment Bank

    • EIB approves €540 million loan for Lithuanian military base in Rūdninkai to strengthen NATO defence capabilities.
    • Base near border with Belarus to host German military brigade, feature training, medical and housing facilities.
    • EIB financing reflects commitment to European security and defence.

    The European Investment Bank (EIB) plans to lend €540 million for Lithuania to build a military base south of the capital Vilnius, highlighting Europe’s collective commitment to bolster its defence infrastructure and deterrence capacity. The new base in Rūdninkai will host a German brigade, strengthening the rapid-response capabilities of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the region.

    Construction of the Rūdninkai military site, which will be located 35 kilometres from the border with Belarus, is due to begin in 2026. The project will span 170 hectares, lay out 11 kilometres of roads and feature around 150 buildings including medical centres, residential units, training facilities, warehouses, hangars and helipads.

    “This is a landmark step in how we support Europe’s security,” EIB Group President Nadia Calviño said in Luxembourg where she met Lithuanian Finance Minister Rimantas Šadžius. “By financing large-scale military infrastructure, we’re demonstrating our readiness to meet the region’s evolving defence needs. It reflects the EIB’s growing role in safeguarding stability across the European Union.”

    The initiative is strategically important for NATO’s eastern defence. Rūdninkai is near a narrow corridor that represents the only land route between the Baltic states and the rest of NATO as well as of the EU. The corridor, known as the Suwałki Gap, is bordered by Belarus to the southeast and Russia’s Kaliningrad exclave to the northwest.

    The financing from the EIB is part of its recently expanded scope of activities in the areas of security and defence to include military investments that align with the EU’s goals of bolstering preparedness and crisis management. The approved EIB loan will be to private partners to be selected by the Lithuanian Ministry of Defence to carry out the project.

    “I greatly appreciate the invaluable expertise and financial support from the EIB in implementing the Rūdninkai project that will strengthen Lithuania’s defense capabilities,” said Lithuanian Finance Minister Šadžius. “We are already seeing the results of financial diplomacy and we can confidently state that the EIB’s involvement will contribute not only to Lithuania’s debt sustainability and stronger fiscal stance but also to the security of our country.”

    The EIB Board of Directors approved the €540 million loan at a meeting on 19 June in Luxembourg. The endorsement paves the way for legal and financial negotiations over the loan that are expected to be completed in the coming months. 

    “This investment marks a historic milestone for Lithuania’s national security and NATO’s collective defence,” said Lithuanian Minister of National Defence Dovilė Šakalienė. “The Rūdninkai military base will not only strengthen our defence posture but also serve as a permanent home for the German brigade – a cornerstone of NATO’s deterrence in the region. The EIB’s support is a clear sign that European resilience begins with shared responsibility.”

    The EIB backing for the Rūdninkai military site will help spread the costs of the project, easing the burden on Lithuanian finances and on companies involved in an initiative that takes the form of a public-private partnership (PPP). The EIB is also providing advisory services to ensure that the PPP agreements meet market standards and follow best practices.

    The Rūdninkai base will accommodate around 4,000 German troops and 750 civilian personnel.

    In April 2025 Germany activated the 45th Panzer Brigade of the German Armed Forces (Bundeswehr), also known as the Lithuania Brigade. For Germany, it`s the first brigade-sized unit to be based abroad permanently since World War II.

    Background information   

    EIB Group

    The European Investment Bank (ElB) is the long-term lending institution of the European Union, owned by its Member States. Built around eight core priorities, the EIB finances investments that contribute to EU policy objectives by bolstering climate action and the environment, digitalisation and technological innovation, security and defence, cohesion, agriculture and the bioeconomy, social infrastructure, the capital markets union and a stronger Europe in a more peaceful and prosperous world.  

    The EIB Group, which also includes the European Investment Fund (EIF), signed nearly €89 billion in new financing for over 900 high-impact projects in 2024, boosting Europe’s competitiveness and security.    

    The EIB Group stepped up its support to Europe’s security and defence industry by expanding the scope of projects eligible for financing and setting up a one-stop shop to streamline processes, doubling investment to €1 billion in 2024. The EIB Group expects to multiply this amount in 2025 to new record.

    The Board of Directors in March approved a series of additional measures to further contribute to European peace and included peace and security as a cross-cutting Public Policy Goal to finance large-scale strategic projects in areas such as land-border protection, military mobility, critical infrastructure, military transport, space, cybersecurity, anti-jamming technologies, radar systems, military equipment and facilities, drones, bio-hazard and seabed infrastructure protection, critical raw materials and research. 

    High-quality, up-to-date photos of the EIB Group’s headquarters for media use are available here

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Banking: Members agree on way forward for SPS transparency working group, launch mentoring system

    Source: WTO

    Headline: Members agree on way forward for SPS transparency working group, launch mentoring system

    New working group on transparency
    In adopting the Report of the Sixth Review of the SPS Agreement at its last meeting in March, members endorsed a recommendation to establish a Transparency Working Group for a two-year period.  The Committee followed up by agreeing to initiate working group discussions in November to focus on how to improve SPS notifications, track how comments are taken into account, and examine possible enhancements to the ePing SPS&TBT Platform.  The working group will also consider revisions of key SPS transparency documents.
    The Chair of the Committee, Ms Maria Cosme (France), noted that New Zealand and Chile volunteered to be stewards of the working group, which will be guided by the agreed operational guidelines.  The Transparency Working Group will hold its first meeting back-to-back with the November Committee meeting. 
    Launch of mentoring system
    In line with another recommendation in the Sixth Review, the Committee launched a new SPS mentoring system to assist developing and LDC members with transparency and timely engagement on SPS matters. The system will start with a pilot phase between June 2025 and June 2026 in which informal, ad hoc supportive relationships will be established between individual mentors and mentees for knowledge-sharing, peer learning and engagement on SPS-related issues.
    With the Committee’s agreement, the WTO Secretariat has set up a dedicated mentoring webpage, which includes an online form for interested government officials seeking mentoring during the pilot phase. After this, the Secretariat will select a limited number of requests for the pilot and will launch a call for mentors who could support the selected mentees to achieve their objectives.
    Thematic session
    On 17 June, the Committee held a thematic session on addressing relevant risks associated with antimicrobial resistance (AMR) through SPS measures in international trade.  The recordings of the session are available on the dedicated webpage. The session was based on a proposal submitted by the European Union.
    The event focused on steps being taken by members to address relevant risks related to AMR in the context of the SPS Agreement and international trade. It also explored the relationship between AMR and the SPS Agreement, and provided members, international organizations, academia and other stakeholders with an opportunity to share experiences and best practices in addressing relevant AMR-related risks while facilitating safe trade.
    Specific trade concerns
    Members raised 56 specific trade concerns (STCs) — four for the first time — at the meeting. The new STCs raised by members related to uncertainty regarding coffee beans imports into China; Thailand’s regulation to mitigate aflatoxins in peanut kernels; a ban on imports of aquaculture shrimp in Thailand; and Viet Nam’s procedure for the listing of exporting establishments.
    A list of the STCs discussed is available here.
    As of early 2025, close to 60% of all STCs raised in the SPS Committee had been reported as resolved or partially resolved.
    STDF annual report and updates
    The Standards and Trade Development Facility (STDF) shared updates on its work, including the launch of its 2024 Annual Report, which highlights project results, lessons learned and reflections on its 20th anniversary. The report also covers monitoring, evaluation, learning and Trust Fund financing, aligning with the STDF 2025–2030 Strategy.
    Next meeting
    The next regular meeting of the Committee is scheduled for 5-7 November 2025.

    Share

    MIL OSI Global Banks

  • MIL-OSI Banking: Verizon announces expiration date results of its private exchange offers for 10 series of notes and expiration of related tender offers

    Source: Verizon

    Headline: Verizon announces expiration date results of its private exchange offers for 10 series of notes and expiration of related tender offers

    NEW YORK, N.Y. –  Verizon Communications Inc. (“Verizon”) (NYSE, Nasdaq: VZ) today announced the expiration and preliminary expiration date results of its Exchange Offers (as defined below) and the expiration of its Cash Offers (as defined below).

    Exchange Offers

    The first transaction consists of 10 separate private offers to exchange (the “Exchange Offers”) any and all of the outstanding series of notes listed in the table below (as used in the context of the Exchange Offers and the Cash Offers (as defined below), collectively the “Old Notes”) in exchange for newly issued 5.401% Notes due 2037 of Verizon (the “New Notes”), on the terms and subject to the conditions set forth in the Offering Memorandum dated June 12, 2025 (the “Offering Memorandum”), the eligibility letter (the “Eligibility Letter”) and the accompanying exchange offer notice of guaranteed delivery (the “Exchange Offer Notice of Guaranteed Delivery” which, together with the Offering Memorandum and the Eligibility Letter, constitute the “Exchange Offer Documents”).

    The Exchange Offers expired at 5:00 p.m. (Eastern time) on June 18, 2025 (the “Exchange Offer Expiration Date”). The “Exchange Offer Settlement Date” with respect to the Exchange Offers will be promptly following the Exchange Offer Expiration Date and is expected to be June 25, 2025. In addition to the applicable Total Exchange Price (as defined in the Offering Memorandum and set forth in the table below), Exchange Offer Eligible Holders (as defined below) whose Old Notes are accepted for exchange will receive a cash payment equal to the accrued and unpaid interest on such Old Notes from and including the immediately preceding interest payment date for such Old Notes to, but excluding, the Exchange Offer Settlement Date. Interest will cease to accrue on the Exchange Offer Settlement Date for all Old Notes accepted, including those tendered through the Guaranteed Delivery Procedures (as defined in the Offering Memorandum).

    Unless otherwise defined herein, capitalized terms used under the heading Exchange Offers have the respective meanings assigned thereto in the Exchange Offer Documents.

    The table below indicates, among other things, the aggregate principal amount of each series of Old Notes validly tendered for exchange and not validly withdrawn at or prior to the Exchange Offer Expiration Date in connection with Verizon’s offer to exchange any and all of its outstanding notes listed below for New Notes:

    Acceptance Priority Level(1)

    Title of Security

    CUSIP
    Number(s)

    Principal Amount Outstanding

    Principal Amount Tendered for Exchange by the Expiration Date(2)

    1

    1.450% Notes due 2026

    92343VGG3

    $838,579,000

    $1,689,000

    2

    Floating Rate Notes due 2026

    92343VGE8

    $212,932,000

    $4,987,000

    3

    4.125% Notes due 2027

    92343VDY7

    $2,903,541,000

    $316,360,000

    4

    3.000% Notes due 2027

    92343VFF6

    $569,992,000

    $64,673,000

    5

    4.329% Notes due 2028

    92343VER1/

    92343VEQ3/

    U9221ABK3

    $3,640,515,000

    $722,436,000

    6

    2.100% Notes due 2028

    92343VGH1

    $2,139,693,000

    $196,532,000

    7

    4.016% Notes due 2029

    92343VEU4/

    92343VET7/

    U9221ABL1

    $4,000,000,000

    $523,460,000

    8

    3.150% Notes due 2030

    92343VFE9

    $1,464,080,000

    $266,808,000

    9

    1.680% Notes due 2030

    92343VFX7/

    92343VFN9/

    U9221ABS6

    $1,098,195,000

    $270,138,000

    10

    7.750% Notes due 2030

    92344GAM8/

    92344GAC0

    $562,561,000

    $30,303,000

    (1) Subject to the satisfaction or waiver of the conditions of the Exchange Offers described in the Offering Memorandum, if the New Notes Capacity Condition (as defined if the Offering Memorandum) and/or the corresponding Cash Offer Completion Condition (as defined if the Offering Memorandum) is not satisfied with respect to every series of Old Notes, Verizon will accept Old Notes for exchange in the order of their respective Acceptance Priority Level specified in the table above (as used in the context of the Exchange Offers and the Cash Offers, each an “Acceptance Priority Level,” with 1 being the highest Acceptance Priority Level and 10 being the lowest Acceptance Priority Level). It is possible that a series of Old Notes with a particular Acceptance Priority Level will not be accepted for exchange even if one or more series with a higher or lower Acceptance Priority Level are accepted for purchase.

    (2) The principal amounts tendered as reflected in the table above, does not include the aggregate principal amounts of Old Notes that may be validly tendered pursuant to Guaranteed Delivery Procedures and not validly withdrawn prior to the guaranteed delivery date and accepted for exchange.

    Verizon is offering to accept for exchange validly tendered Old Notes using a “waterfall” methodology under which such Old Notes of different series will be accepted in the order of their respective Acceptance Priority Levels as listed in the table above, subject to a $2.5 billion cap on the maximum aggregate principal amount of New Notes that Verizon will issue in all of the Exchange Offers (the “New Notes Maximum Amount”). However, subject to applicable law, Verizon, in its sole discretion, has the option to waive or increase the New Notes Maximum Amount at any time.

    Based on the principal amount of Old Notes validly tendered for exchange and not validly withdrawn at or prior to the Exchange Offer Expiration Date and the Total Exchange Prices set forth in the table above, Verizon expects that the Minimum Issue Requirement (as defined in the Offering Memorandum) will be satisfied.  Verizon will not receive any cash proceeds from the Exchange Offers. The actual aggregate principal amount of New Notes that will be issued on the Exchange Offer Settlement Date is subject to change, based on the amount of Old Notes delivered pursuant to the Guaranteed Delivery Procedures and satisfaction or waiver of the conditions set forth in the Offering Memorandum, including the Cash Offer Completion Condition.

    If and when issued, the New Notes will not be registered under the Securities Act or any state securities laws. Therefore, the New Notes may not be offered or sold in the United States absent registration or an applicable exemption from the registration requirements of the Securities Act and any applicable state securities laws. Verizon will enter into a registration rights agreement with respect to the New Notes.

    Only a holder who had duly completed and returned an Eligibility Letter certifying that it was either (1) a “qualified institutional buyer” (as defined in Rule 144A under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended (the “Securities Act”)); or (2) a person located outside the United States who is (i) not a “U.S. person” (as defined in Rule 902 under the Securities Act), (ii) not acting for the account or benefit of a U.S. person and (iii) a “Non-U.S. qualified offeree” (as defined below), was authorized to receive the Offering Memorandum and to participate in the Exchange Offers (such holders, “Exchange Offer Eligible Holders”).

    Global Bondholder Services Corporation is acting as the Information Agent and the Exchange Agent for the Exchange Offers. Questions or requests for assistance related to the Exchange Offers or for additional copies of the Exchange Offer Documents may be directed to Global Bondholder Services Corporation at (212) 430-3774.You may also contact your broker, dealer, commercial bank, trust company or other nominee for assistance concerning the Exchange Offers. The Exchange Offer Documents can be accessed at the following link: https://gbsc-usa.com/eligibility/verizon.

    Cash Offers

    The second transaction consists of 10 separate offers to purchase for cash (the “Cash Offers”) any and all of each series of Old Notes, on the terms and subject to the conditions set forth in the Offer to Purchase dated June 12, 2025 (the “Offer to Purchase”), the certification instructions letter (the “Certification Instructions Letter”) and the accompanying cash offer notice of guaranteed delivery (the “Cash Offer Notice of Guaranteed Delivery” which, together with the Offer to Purchase and the Certification Instructions Letter, constitute the “Tender Offer Documents”).

    The Cash Offers expired at 5:00 p.m. (Eastern time) on June 18, 2025 (the “Cash Offer Expiration Date”). The “Cash Offer Settlement Date” with respect to the Cash Offers will be promptly following the Cash Offer Expiration Date and is expected to be June 25, 2025.

    Unless otherwise defined herein, capitalized terms used under the heading Cash Offers have the respective meanings assigned thereto in the Tender Offer Documents.

    The table below indicates, among other things, the aggregate principal amount of each series of Old Notes tendered and not validly withdrawn at or prior to the Cash Offer Expiration Date in connection with Verizon’s offer to purchase any and all of its outstanding notes listed below:

    Acceptance Priority Level(1)

    Title of Security

    CUSIP
    Number(s)

    Principal Amount Outstanding

    Principal Amount Tendered for Purchase by the Expiration Date(2)

    1

    1.450% Notes due 2026

    92343VGG3

    $838,579,000

    $14,136,000

    2

    Floating Rate Notes due 2026

    92343VGE8

    $212,932,000

    $2,287,000

    3

    4.125% Notes due 2027

    92343VDY7

    $2,903,541,000

    $174,419,000

    4

    3.000% Notes due 2027

    92343VFF6

    $569,992,000

    $25,913,000

    5

    4.329% Notes due 2028

    92343VER1/

    92343VEQ3/

    U9221ABK3

    $3,640,515,000

    $158,375,000

    6

    2.100% Notes due 2028

    92343VGH1

    $2,139,693,000

    $255,691,000

    7

    4.016% Notes due 2029

    92343VEU4/

    92343VET7/

    U9221ABL1

    $4,000,000,000

    $109,039,000

    8

    3.150% Notes due 2030

    92343VFE9

    $1,464,080,000

    $43,536,000

    9

    1.680% Notes due 2030

    92343VFX7/

    92343VFN9/

    U9221ABS6

    $1,098,195,000

    $39,519,000

    10

    7.750% Notes due 2030

    92344GAM8/

    92344GAC0

    $562,561,000

    $2,818,000

    (1) Subject to the satisfaction or waiver of the conditions of the Cash Offers described in the Offer to Purchase, including if the Maximum Total Consideration Condition (as defined in the Offer to Purchase) is not satisfied with respect to every series of Old Notes, Verizon will accept Notes for purchase in the order of their respective Acceptance Priority Level specified in the table above. It is possible that a series of Old Notes with a particular Acceptance Priority Level will not be accepted for purchase even if one or more series with a higher or lower Acceptance Priority Level are accepted for purchase.

    (2) The principal amounts tendered reflect the preliminary results of the Cash Offer and are subject to change following review of the documentation submitted by holders of Old Notes to determine the validity of the tenders received pursuant to the Tender Offer Documents. The principal amounts tendered does not include the aggregate principal amounts of Old Notes that may be validly tendered pursuant to Guaranteed Delivery Procedures and not validly withdrawn prior to the guaranteed delivery date and accepted for exchange.

    Verizon is offering to purchase validly tendered Old Notes using a “waterfall” methodology under which such Old Notes of different series will be accepted in the order of their respective Acceptance Priority Levels as listed in the table above, subject to the Maximum Total Consideration Condition and the Exchange Offer Completion Condition (each as defined in the Offer to Purchase). However, subject to applicable law, Verizon, in its sole discretion, has the option to waive or increase the Maximum Total Consideration Condition at any time.

    In addition to the applicable Total Consideration, Cash Offer Eligible Holders (as defined below) whose Old Notes are accepted for purchase will be paid accrued and unpaid interest on such Old Notes from and including the immediately preceding interest payment date for such Old Notes to, but excluding, the Cash Offer Settlement Date. Interest will cease to accrue on the Cash Offer Settlement Date for all Old Notes accepted in the Cash Offers, including those Old Notes tendered through the Guaranteed Delivery Procedures.

    Only holders who were not Exchange Offer Eligible Holders (“Cash Offer Eligible Holders”) were eligible to participate in the Cash Offers. Holders of Old Notes participating in the Cash Offers were required to complete the Certification Instructions Letter and certify that they are Cash Offer Eligible Holders.

    Verizon is in the process of reviewing the documentation submitted by holders of Old Notes pursuant to the Cash Offers to determine the validity of the tenders received in the Cash Offers pursuant to the Tender Offer Documents. Verizon will announce the final principal amount of each series of Old Notes validly tendered and accepted for exchange and for purchase as soon as practicable, but no later than 9:00 a.m. (Eastern time) on June 23, 2025.

    Global Bondholder Services Corporation is acting as the Information Agent and the Tender Agent for the Cash Offers. Questions or requests for assistance related to the Cash Offers or for additional copies of the Tender Offer Documents may be directed to Global Bondholder Services Corporation at (212) 430-3774. You may also contact your broker, dealer, commercial bank, trust company or other nominee for assistance concerning the Cash Offers. The Tender Offer Documents can be accessed at the following link: https://www.gbsc-usa.com/verizon.

    Verizon refers to the Exchange Offers and the Cash Offers, collectively, as the “Offers.”

    Verizon retained Barclays Capital Inc, Goldman Sachs & Co. LLC, J.P. Morgan Securities LLC, RBC Capital Markets, LLC to act as lead dealer managers for the Offers and Scotia Capital (USA) Inc., Truist Securities, Inc. and U.S. Bancorp Investments, Inc. to act as co-dealer managers for the Offers.

    This announcement is for informational purposes only. This announcement is not an offer to purchase or a solicitation of an offer to purchase any Old Notes. The Exchange Offers are being made solely pursuant to the Offering Memorandum and related documents and the Cash Offers are being made solely pursuant to the Offer to Purchase and related documents. The Offers are not being made to holders of Old Notes in any jurisdiction in which the making or acceptance thereof would not be in compliance with the securities, blue sky or other laws of such jurisdiction. In any jurisdiction in which the securities laws or blue sky laws require the Offers to be made by a licensed broker or dealer, the Offers will be deemed to be made on behalf of Verizon by the dealer managers or one or more registered brokers or dealers that are licensed under the laws of such jurisdiction.

    This communication and any other documents or materials relating to the Exchange Offers have not been approved by an authorized person for the purposes of Section 21 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, as amended (the “FSMA”). Accordingly, this announcement is not being distributed to, and must not be passed on to, persons within the United Kingdom save in circumstances where section 21(1) of the FSMA does not apply. Accordingly, this communication is only addressed to and directed at persons who are outside the United Kingdom and (i) persons falling within the definition of investment professionals (as defined in Article 19(5) of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Financial Promotion) Order 2005 (the “Financial Promotion Order”)), or (ii) within Article 43 of the Financial Promotion Order, or (iii) high net worth companies and other persons to whom it may lawfully be communicated falling within Article 49(2)(a) to (d) of the Financial Promotion Order, or (iv) to whom an invitation or inducement to engage in investment activity (within the meaning of Section 21 of the FSMA) in connection with the issue or sale of any securities may otherwise lawfully be communicated or caused to be communicated (such persons together being “relevant persons”). The New Notes are only available to, and any invitation, offer or agreement to subscribe, purchase or otherwise acquire such New Notes will be engaged in only with, relevant persons. Any person who is not a relevant person should not act or rely on any document relating to the Exchange Offers or any of their contents.

    This communication and any other documents or materials relating to the Exchange Offer are only addressed to and directed at persons in member states of the European Economic Area (the “EEA”), who are “Qualified Investors” within the meaning of Article 2(e) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1129. The New Notes are only available to, and any invitation, offer or agreement to subscribe, purchase or otherwise acquire such New Notes, will be engaged in only with, Qualified Investors. The Exchange Offer is only available to Qualified Investors. None of the information in the Offering Memorandum and any other documents and materials relating to the Exchange Offer should be acted upon or relied upon in any member state of the EEA by persons who are not Qualified Investors.

    “Non-U.S. qualified offeree” means:

    (i)       in relation to any investor in the European Economic Area (the “EEA”), a qualified investor as defined in Regulation (EU) 2017/1129 (as amended or superseded) that is not a retail investor.  For these purposes, a retail investor means a person who is one (or more) of: (a) a retail client as defined in point (11) of Article 4(1) of Directive 2014/65/EU (as amended, “MiFID II”); or (b) a customer within the meaning of Directive (EU) 2016/97, where that customer would not qualify as a professional client as defined in point (10) of Article 4(1) of MiFID II;

    (ii)      in relation to any investor in the United Kingdom, a qualified investor as defined in Article 2 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1129 as it forms part of domestic law by virtue of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 that is not a retail investor and that (a) has professional experience in matters relating to investments and qualifies as an investment professional within the meaning of Article 19(5) of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Financial Promotion) Order 2005 (as amended, the “Financial Promotion Order”), (b) is a person falling within Article 49(2)(a) to (d) (“high net worth companies, unincorporated associations etc.”) of the Financial Promotion Order, or (c) is a person to whom an invitation or inducement to engage in investment activity (within the meaning of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, as amended (the “FSMA”)) in connection with the issue or sale of any notes may otherwise lawfully be communicated or caused to be communicated (all such persons together being referred to as “relevant persons”). For these purposes, a retail investor means a person who is one (or more) of: (x) a retail client, as defined in point (8) of Article 2 of Regulation (EU) No 2017/565 as it forms part of domestic law by virtue of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 (“EUWA”); or (y) a customer within the meaning of the provisions of the FSMA and any rules or regulations made under the FSMA to implement Directive (EU) 2016/97, where that customer would not qualify as a professional client, as defined in point (8) of Article 2(1) of Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 as it forms part of domestic law by virtue of the EUWA; or

    (iii)      any entity outside the U.S., the EEA and the United Kingdom to whom the Exchange Offer may be made in compliance with all applicable laws and regulations of any applicable jurisdiction without registration of the Exchange Offer or any related filing or approval.

    Cautionary Statement Regarding Forward-Looking Statements

    In this communication Verizon has made forward-looking statements, including regarding the conduct and completion of the Offers. These forward-looking statements are not historical facts, but only predictions and generally can be identified by use of statements that include phrases such as “will,” “may,” “should,” “continue,” “anticipate,” “assume,” “believe,” “expect,” “plan,” “appear,” “project,” “estimate,” “hope,” “intend,” “target,” “forecast,” or other words or phrases of similar import. Similarly, statements that describe our objectives, plans or goals also are forward-looking statements. These forward-looking statements are subject to risks and uncertainties that could cause actual results to differ materially from those currently anticipated, including those discussed in the Offering Memorandum and Offer to Purchase under the heading “Risk Factors” and under similar headings in other documents that are incorporated by reference in the Offering Memorandum and Offer to Purchase. Holders are urged to consider these risks and uncertainties carefully in evaluating the forward-looking statements and are cautioned not to place undue reliance on these forward-looking statements. The forward-looking statements included in this press release are made only as of the date of this press release, and Verizon undertakes no obligation to update publicly these forward-looking statements to reflect new information, future events or otherwise. In light of these risks, uncertainties and assumptions, the forward-looking events might or might not occur. Verizon cannot assure you that projected results or events will be achieved.

    MIL OSI Global Banks

  • MIL-OSI Banking: Members advance Bosnia and Herzegovina’s WTO accession negotiations closer to conclusion

    Source: WTO

    Headline: Members advance Bosnia and Herzegovina’s WTO accession negotiations closer to conclusion

    The Chair of the Working Party, Ambassador Anita Pipan of Slovenia, said the meeting was an opportunity to “inject fresh momentum into Bosnia and Herzegovina’s accession process, which is now in its 26th year and is technically advanced.”
    Ambassador Pipan asked delegations to clearly pinpoint the last outstanding issues of this accession process. She underlined that Bosnia and Herzegovina was identified by the WTO Director-General Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala as one of three accessions with a strategic focus for this year and the 14th Ministerial Conference (MC14) next year in Cameroon, alongside Ethiopia and Uzbekistan.
    “Today’s meeting offers an opportunity to take stock of where we are, identify remaining concerns, and consider possible next steps toward the conclusion of the accession process,” she added.
    Mr. Hamdo Tinjak, Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Relations and Head of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s WTO Accession Team, led the delegation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Geneva.
    He said that through the WTO accession process, alongside other integration efforts, the country has succeeded in establishing an open and liberal foreign trade regime grounded in the principles of free movement of people, goods, services and capital, and the removal of trade barriers.
    “We view this as one of the most significant achievements of the accession process. Full WTO membership would serve as formal recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a country with harmonized and transparent trade legislation — a reliable partner for international trade and a favourable destination for foreign investment. This, in turn, is expected to contribute to the expansion of our foreign trade and, ultimately, to the broader economic development of the country,” said Mr Tinjak. See his full statement here.
    On the bilateral track, Bosnia and Herzegovina reported significant progress in the last remaining bilateral market access negotiations, following the resolution of a key outstanding issue relating to the regulation of petroleum fuels. On the multilateral track, Bosnia and Herzegovina stressed that the draft Working Party Report (the formal document that outlines the specific commitments an acceding government will undertake upon joining the WTO) is nearly complete, reflecting Bosnia and Herzegovina’s alignment with WTO rules and principles.
    Deputy Director-General Zhang Xiangchen said that the reactivation of this accession process after seven years “stands as a testament to the recent constructive developments in this technically advanced accession file, which have provided a clear basis for the Working Party to take its work towards finalization.”
    DDG Zhang, who accompanied the Working Party Chair on a visit to Sarajevo in November 2024, stressed that the WTO Secretariat remains fully committed to supporting efforts “to cross the finishing line in the very near future”.
    Delegations commended Bosnia and Herzegovina’s technical engagement, and the substantive progress made in the accession process.
    Next steps
    Recognizing the value of securing a potential deliverable for the WTO before or at MC14, Ambassador Pipan urged the conclusion of the remaining bilateral market access negotiations, which would enable the WTO Secretariat to consolidate the draft schedules of commitments on goods and services. On the multilateral front, she requested members to submit additional questions and comments by 17 July that will be circulated to the Working Party.
    Subsequently, the Secretariat will update the draft Working Party Report. “I very much hope that this next version will be final,” Ambassador Pipan said.
    Keeping in mind Bosnia and Herzegovina’s aspiration to finalize its accession process as soon as possible, the Chair added that the next Working Party meeting will depend on consultations with delegations and the Secretariat, particularly on the conclusion of the last outstanding bilateral market negotiations and the finalization of the draft Working Party Report.

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    MIL OSI Global Banks

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Ward 10 Eilean a’ Cheò By-Election Result

    Source: Scotland – Highland Council

    Issued on behalf of the Returning Officer

    The by-election to elect a councillor to represent Ward 10 Eilean a’ Cheò on The Highland Council has been won by Christine Gillies – Independent – who was one of eight candidates contesting the vacancy.

    Voters in the ward went to the poll yesterday (Thursday 19 June ) and the by-election count was held this morning at Kyleakin Community Hall and webcasted live.

    Voting was by the single transferable vote and Christine emerged as the winner at stage 8 of the electronic count.

    The turnout was 40.1%.

    She will join Councillors John Finlayson (Highland Independent), Drew Millar (Scottish National Party) and Ruraidh Stewart (Scottish Conservative and Unionist) in representing Ward 10 on The Highland Council.

    20 Jun 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – 2023 and 2024 reports on Montenegro – P10_TA(2025)0130 – Wednesday, 18 June 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Montenegro, of the other part(1), which entered into force on 1 May 2010,

    –  having regard to Montenegro’s application for membership of the European Union of 15 December 2008,

    –  having regard to the Commission opinion of 9 November 2010 on Montenegro’s application for membership of the European Union (COM(2010)0670), the European Council’s decision of 16-17 December 2010 to grant Montenegro candidate status and the European Council’s decision of 29 June 2012 to open EU accession negotiations with Montenegro,

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1529 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 September 2021 establishing the Instrument for Pre-Accession assistance (IPA III)(2),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1449 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans(3),

    –  having regard to the Presidency conclusions of the Thessaloniki European Council meeting of 19-20 June 2003,

    –  having regard to the Sofia Declaration of the EU-Western Balkans summit of 17 May 2018 and the Sofia Priority Agenda annexed thereto,

    –  having regard to the declarations of the EU-Western Balkans summits of 13 December 2023 in Brussels, and of 18 December 2024 in Brussels,

    –  having regard to the Berlin Process launched on 28 August 2014,

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 6 October 2020 entitled ‘An Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2020)0641),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘2023 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy’ (COM(2023)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Montenegro 2023 Report’ (SWD(2023)0694),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘New growth plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2023)0691),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 20 March 2024 on pre-enlargement reforms and policy reviews (COM(2024)0146),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 24 July 2024 entitled ‘2024 Rule of Law Report’ (COM(2024)0800), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘2024 Rule of Law Report – The rule of law situation in the European Union: Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Montenegro’ (SWD(2024)0829),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘2024 Communication on EU enlargement policy’ (COM(2024)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Montenegro 2024 Report’ (SWD(2024)0694),

    –  having regard to the Commission’s overview and country assessments of 31 May 2023 and of 13 June 2024 of the economic reform programme of Montenegro, and to the joint conclusions of the Economic and Financial Dialogue between the EU and the Western Balkans and Türkiye adopted by the Council on 16 May 2023 and to the joint conclusions of the Economic and Financial Dialogue between the EU and the Western Balkans Partners, Türkiye, Georgia, Republic of Moldova and Ukraine adopted by the Council on 14 May 2024,

    –  having regard to the EU-Montenegro Intergovernmental Accession Conferences of 22 June 2021, 13 December 2021, 29 January 2024, 26 June 2024 and 16 December 2024,

    –  having regard to the 11th EU-Montenegro Stabilisation and Association Council on 14 July 2022,

    –  having regard to the declaration and recommendations adopted at the 22nd meeting of the EU-Montenegro Stabilisation and Association Parliamentary Committee, held on 31 October and 1 November 2024,

    –  having regard to Montenegro’s accession to NATO on 5 June 2017,

    –  having regard to Special Report 01/2022 of the European Court of Auditors of 10 January 2022 entitled ‘EU support for the rule of law in the Western Balkans: despite efforts, fundamental problems persist’,

    –  having regard to the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (the Istanbul Convention), ratified by Montenegro in 2013, and to the recommendations of the Commission on gender equality and combating gender-based violence,

    –  having regard to the World Press Freedom Index report published annually by Reporters Without Borders,

    –  having regard to the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) data on the Ukraine Refugee Situation as of April 2025,

    –  having regard to its recommendation of 23 November 2022 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy concerning the new EU strategy for enlargement(4),

    –  having regard to its previous resolutions on Montenegro,

    –  having regard to its resolution of 29 February 2024 on deepening EU integration in view of future enlargement(5),

    –  having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0093/2025),

    A.  whereas enlargement is a key EU foreign policy tool and a strategic geopolitical investment in peace, stability, security and prosperity;

    B.  whereas the new enlargement momentum, sparked by the changing geopolitical reality and the EU membership applications by several Eastern Partnership countries, has prompted the EU to accelerate its efforts towards delivering on its long-overdue commitments to the Western Balkans; whereas the future of the Western Balkan countries lies within the EU;

    C.  whereas each country is judged on its own merits in fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria, including full respect for democracy, the rule of law, good governance, fundamental EU values and alignment with EU foreign and security policy; whereas the implementation of necessary reforms in the area of ‘fundamentals’ determines the timetable and progress in the accession process;

    D.  whereas Montenegro has gone furthest in the accession process, with all 33 chapters of the EU acquis open and six provisionally closed, and has significant public support therefor;

    E.  whereas the EU is Montenegro’s largest trading partner, investor and provider of financial assistance;

    F.  whereas Montenegro is exposed to malign foreign influence, disinformation campaigns and other forms of influence, including election meddling, hybrid warfare strategies and unfavourable investments from non-EU actors, particularly Russia and China, which are trying to influence Montenegro’s political, economic and strategic trajectory and threaten democratic processes and media integrity, jeopardising the country’s prospects for EU accession;

    G.  whereas on 8 June 2024, an ‘All-Serb Assembly’ took place in Belgrade with the participation of high-ranking parliamentarians under the slogan ‘One people, one Assembly’;

    Commitment to EU accession

    1.  Recognises Montenegro’s firm commitment to EU accession and reaffirms its full support for the country’s future EU membership; welcomes Montenegro’s leading regional position in the EU accession process as well as the overwhelming support of Montenegro’s citizens and the majority of political actors for joining the EU in 2028;

    2.  Welcomes Montenegro’s positive progress in enacting EU-related reforms and measures, underpinned by an ambitious timeline and calls for collective efforts of political actors, civil society and citizens; commends Montenegro for meeting the interim benchmarks for Chapters 23 and 24, which continue to determine the overall pace of negotiations, and for receiving a positive Interim Benchmark Assessment Report; welcomes the closure of three more negotiating chapters, bringing the total to six;

    3.  Encourages all political actors to stay focused on EU integration and the required reforms; stresses the need for political stability, commitment and constructive engagement in consensus building across party lines in order to move swiftly and more effectively towards closing additional chapters in 2025, so as to achieve the country’s ambitious timeline; stresses that the reforms adopted must be implemented effectively and consistently to ensure genuine progress and full alignment with EU legislation; calls for a strengthening of the functioning of, and coordination between, state institutions in order to achieve political stability and advance the country’s substantial progress in implementing key EU-related reforms, in particular electoral and judicial reforms and the fight against organised crime and corruption;

    4.  Underlines that the credibility of the EU, including its enlargement policy as a whole, would be affected if tangible progress achieved by certain Western Balkan countries does not translate into clear advancements on the EU accession path;

    5.  Welcomes Montenegro’s sustained full alignment with the EU’s common foreign and security policy (CFSP), including EU restrictive measures, inter alia, those related to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and those targeted against cyberattacks, as well as its support for the international rules-based order at UN level; encourages Montenegro to strengthen the enforcement of restrictive measures and avoid their circumvention and to seize the assets of those sanctioned; calls on all government representatives to respect and promote CFSP alignment and EU values and refrain from any activities that may threaten Montenegro’s strategic path towards EU membership and its sovereignty; is highly concerned, in this context, by public high officials’ statements in support of the President of the Republika Srpska entity, Milorad Dodik, who is undermining the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina; regrets the participation of high-ranking parliamentarians from Montenegro in the ‘All-Serbian Assembly’ in Belgrade as well as their support for the declaration adopted on that occasion undermining the sovereignty of Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo;

    6.  Underlines the strategic importance of Montenegro’s NATO membership and welcomes its active involvement in EU common security and defence policy missions and operations, such as EU Naval Force Operation Atalanta, and in NATO and other international and multilateral missions; welcomes the decision of Montenegro’s Council for Defence and Security to approve the participation of its armed forces in the EU Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine and NATO’s Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine and calls on the Montenegrin Parliament to adopt these decisions, thereby reinforcing the country’s commitment to collective security;

    7.  Commends Montenegro for its humanitarian and material support to Ukraine and for extending the temporary protection mechanism that grants persons fleeing Ukraine the right to stay in Montenegro for one year; recalls that Montenegro is among the Western Balkan countries hosting the largest number of Ukrainian refugees, with over 18 800 refugees from Ukraine registered in Montenegro as of 31 January 2025, according to UNHCR statistics;

    8.  Remains seriously concerned by malign foreign interference, destabilisation efforts, cyberattacks, hybrid threats and disinformation campaigns, including attempts to influence political processes and public opinion, by third-country actors, which discredit the EU and undermine Montenegro’s progress on its accession path; urges Montenegro to adopt countermeasures in stronger cooperation with the EU and NATO and through increased regional cooperation among the Western Balkan countries; notes that religious institutions can be used as a tool for external influence and condemns any undue interference by the Serbian Orthodox Church in this regard; reiterates the importance of building resilience capacity against foreign information manipulation and interference, including through greater oversight of the media landscape, public awareness campaigns and media literacy programmes; recommends that Montenegro establish a dedicated hybrid threat task force;

    9.  Urges the Commission, the European External Action Service (EEAS), the Delegation of the EU to Montenegro and the Montenegrin authorities to boost strategic communication to Montenegrin citizens on the benefits of the enlargement process and EU membership, as well as on the concrete accession criteria that Montenegro still needs to fulfil to align with EU requirements; urges them, furthermore, to improve the EU’s visibility in the country, including as regards EU-funded projects; calls for StratCom monitoring to be expanded in order to concentrate on cross-border disinformation threats in the Western Balkan countries and their neighbours; calls on the Commission to further support the efforts of the EEAS and the Western Balkans Task Force so as to expand outreach activities by increasing visibility in local media, fact-checking reports and partnering with civil society organisations to counter false narratives more effectively;

    10.  Welcomes the Montenegrin Parliament’s renewed engagement in the Stabilisation and Association Parliamentary Committee;

    Democracy and the rule of law

    11.  Recognises the Montenegrin Parliament’s key role in the accession process, notably as regards passing accession-related legislation, and underlines the importance of parliamentary cooperation in this regard; reiterates the European Parliament’s readiness to use its political and technical resources to advance the EU-related reform agenda, including through democracy support activities; notes, with concern, the re-emerging tensions and ethnic polarisation, which are slowing the reform process; calls for constructive dialogue and consensus building across the political spectrum, prioritising legislative quality, and strongly urges that solutions be found through parliamentary dialogue; calls for preventing identity politics from diverting attention from the EU agenda or straining relations with its neighbours, ensuring that Montenegro remains firmly on the EU path; welcomes the agreement between the Montenegrin Prime Minister and opposition leaders to request an opinion from the Venice Commission regarding the termination of the mandate of Constitutional Court judge Dragana Đuranović and for the opposition to return to the parliament;

    12.  Expresses its concern about attempts to amend the law on Montenegrin citizenship in the Montenegrin Parliament, which could have serious and long-term implications for the country’s decision-making processes and identity, while emphasising that any discussions on identity politics must be handled with the utmost sensitivity to avoid further polarisation and should aim for broad societal consensus; encourages the Montenegrin authorities to consult and coordinate with the EU on any possible changes to the law on citizenship and stresses the importance of achieving consensus on any matters relating to this subject of crucial importance for the identity and independence of Montenegro;

    13.  Strongly encourages the Montenegrin Parliament to hold inclusive and transparent public consultations and regular and meaningful engagement with civil society in decision-making from an early stage in the legislative process, notably for key legislation in the EU reform process; encourages a more active role for the Montenegrin Parliamentary Women’s Club;

    14.  Calls on Montenegro to fully align its electoral legal framework with EU standards, notably as regards harmonising electoral legislation, voting and candidacy rights restrictions, transparency, dispute resolution mechanisms, campaign and media oversight, and political party and election campaign financing, and to implement the recommendations of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights(6); urges Montenegro to increase transparency and control of political party spending and prevent the abuse of state resources by bringing the relevant legislation into line with EU standards, as well as enhancing the enforcement of third-party financing rules and strengthening sanctions for violations; highlights the role of the Agency for Prevention of Corruption (APC) in this regard, and calls for increased cooperation between the APC and financial intelligence authorities to detect and prevent foreign influence in political campaigns; calls, furthermore, on Montenegro to implement the recommendations of the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) on gender parity on electoral lists;

    15.  Reiterates its call on the Montenegrin authorities to establish a single nationwide municipal election day, as provided for in the Law on Local Self-Government, in order to enhance governance efficiency, reduce political tensions and strengthen the stability and effectiveness of municipal and state institutions; recalls that future disbursement of funds under the Reform and Growth Facility is contingent on the fulfilment of this reform, in line with Montenegro’s commitments in its reform agenda, and should be pursued as a matter of priority; welcomes the fact that, in 2022, elections in 14 municipalities were held on the same day; calls for a robust legislative framework in this regard; is concerned by the misconduct of the electoral process in the municipality of Šavnik;

    16.  Calls on the Montenegrin authorities to adopt the Law on Government that should enable an improved governance framework and the optimisation of public administration;

    17.  Underlines the importance of a professional, merit-based, transparent and depoliticised civil service; calls on Montenegro to amend and implement the relevant legislation to provide a framework for the professionalisation, optimisation and rationalisation of state administration, including procedural safeguards against politically motivated decisions on appointments and dismissals, as well as high standards for managerial positions; regrets the lack of significant progress in adopting and effectively implementing such legislation and highlights that this allows for public service recruitment to remain subject to political influence;

    18.  Welcomes Montenegro’s inclusion in the Commission’s 2024 Rule of Law Report; notes, with concern, the identified deficiencies, including judicial appointments and the independence of the prosecutor’s office;

    19.  Welcomes the progress made in implementing key judicial reforms, adopting a new strategic framework and completing long-outstanding judicial appointments; calls on Montenegro to fill the remaining high-level judicial positions;

    20.  Urges Montenegro to further align its legal framework, including the constitution, in particular on the composition and decision-making process of the Judicial Council, with EU laws and standards on the independence, accountability, impartiality, integrity and professionalism of the judiciary, and to further depoliticise appointments to bolster independence, implement outstanding international recommendations, and determine criteria for the retirement of judges and prosecutors in line with European standards and in full compliance with the Constitution; regrets the pending case backlog and calls on Montenegro to take measures to reduce the duration of legal proceedings, particularly for serious and organised crime cases, notably on money laundering; recommends that Montenegro adopt the amendments to the Constitution in the final stage of the country’s EU accession negotiations;

    21.  Notes the steps taken in the fight against corruption, including new laws and provisions on the protection of whistleblowers, the creation of a new National Council for the fight against corruption and a new anti-corruption strategy for 2024-2028; encourages Montenegro to further align with the EU acquis and EU standards and address recommendations by the Commission, the Venice Commission and the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO); encourages the Montenegrin authorities to continue addressing existing deficiencies in the handling of organised crime cases and the seizure and confiscation of criminal assets;

    22.  Urges Montenegro to step up its criminal justice response to high-level corruption, including by strengthening the effective enforcement of existing criminal legislation and imposing effective and deterrent penalties, and to create conditions for judicial institutions and independent bodies dealing with corruption to function effectively, free from political influence;

    23.  Notes the work of the Agency for Prevention of Corruption and calls for it to be provided with sufficient funding and for it to be depoliticised; expects the Agency to deliver tangible results and act non-selectively to strengthen its integrity and enhance its authority in carrying out its competences effectively; calls for a stronger corruption prevention framework;

    24.  Urges Montenegro to align its weapons legislation with EU law and international standards, particularly as regards technical standards for firearm markings, deactivation procedures and regulations for alarm and signal weapons, as well as to establish a standardised and effective data collection and reporting system for firearms; is appalled by the tragic mass shooting in Cetinje and expresses its condolences to the victims’ families; expresses its concern over the exploitation of this tragedy for disinformation and ethnic polarisation; urges Montenegro to strengthen its crisis communication to counter disinformation and ensure responsible media reporting in the aftermath of violent incidents; calls for systematic actions in the areas of security, mental well-being and institutional transparency, as well as in civic education and public awareness, outreach and educational initiatives, on the dangers and risks of firearms, in line with citizens’ expectations and societal needs;

    25.  Calls on Montenegro to urgently fully align its visa policy with that of the EU, especially as regards countries posing irregular migration or security risks to the EU; expresses its concern that, contrary to expectations, two additional countries have been added to the visa-free regime and that Russian and Belarusian passport holders continue to benefit from a visa-free regime; notes that the harmonisation of the visa policy is also provided for in Montenegro’s reform agenda under the Reform and Growth Facility;

    26.  Welcomes the ongoing cooperation between Montenegro and the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex), Europol, Eurojust and the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training (CEPOL), and notes the importance of this cooperation in tackling cross-border crime, including the trafficking of weapons, drugs and human beings, and in combating terrorism and extremism; welcomes the entry into force of the upgraded agreement on operational cooperation in border management with Frontex on 1 July 2023 and encourages further cooperation between Montenegro and Frontex to strengthen border management, support asylum procedures, fight smuggling and enhance readmission;

    Fundamental freedoms and human rights

    27.  Regrets that the most vulnerable groups in society still face discrimination; calls on Montenegro to adopt a new anti-discrimination law and relevant strategies, through an inclusive, transparent and meaningful process that actively involves those most affected, to improve vulnerable groups’ access to rights; underlines that respect for the rights of all national minorities is an integral part of the EU acquis; calls for stronger implementation to ensure equal treatment of all ethnic, religious, national and social groups so that they are guaranteed equal rights and opportunities and can fully participate in social, political and economic life;

    28.  Welcomes Montenegro’s multi-ethnic identity and calls for the further promotion of and respect for the languages, cultural heritage and traditions of local communities and national minorities, as this is closely intertwined with Montenegro’s European perspective;

    29.  Underlines the multi-ethnic identity of the Bay of Kotor; stresses that Montenegro’s European perspective is closely intertwined with the protection of minorities and their cultural heritage; calls on the Montenegrin authorities to nurture the multi-ethnic nature of the state, including the traditions and cultural heritage of the Croatian community in the Bay of Kotor;

    30.  Expresses its grave concern over the endangered heritage sites in Montenegro such as the Bay of Kotor and Sveti Stefan; stresses that Sveti Stefan, along with Miločer Park, was listed among the ‘7 Most Endangered heritage sites in Europe’ for 2023;

    31.  Calls on the Montenegrin authorities to address the difficult living conditions of Roma people in Montenegro and the discrimination they face, and calls for more measures to promote intercultural understanding in schools; calls on the Montenegrin authorities to also take measures to improve the climate of societal inclusion for LGBTI persons;

    32.  Welcomes that Montenegro has aligned its legislative and institutional framework with the EU acquis and international human rights standards regarding compliance with the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and its optional protocols; urges the authorities to address shortcomings in implementation, namely related to accountability and monitoring;

    33.  Calls for the effective implementation of strategies to uphold the rights of persons with disabilities across all sectors and policies;

    34.  Condemns all hate speech, including online and gender-based hate speech, and hate crimes; welcomes the criminalisation of racism and hate speech;

    35.  Emphasises the need to strengthen institutional mechanisms for gender quality and calls on the Montenegrin authorities to address the gender pay gap, to improve women’s participation in decision-making – in both the public domain, particularly public administration, and judicial and security sectors, and in business – to ensure the increased political participation of women, to introduce gender responsive budgeting, and to combat gender stereotypes and strengthen efforts to combat discrimination against women, particularly in rural areas; welcomes recent efforts aimed at boosting women’s representation in science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) and encourages further efforts in technology sectors;

    36.  Is deeply concerned by the high rates of gender-based violence, including domestic violence and femicide; calls on Montenegro to fully align its definitions of gender-based violence and domestic violence with the Istanbul Convention, and with recommendations of international bodies, and to set up effective protection and prevention mechanisms and support centres, and ensure effective judicial follow-up for victims of domestic and sexual violence as well as a more robust penal policy towards perpetrators; calls for the collection of disaggregated data on gender-based violence and gender disparities to improve policy responses;

    37.  Regrets that the draft law on legal gender recognition was not adopted in 2024, despite it being a measure under Montenegro’s EU accession programme; urges Montenegro to adopt the law without delay;

    38.  Welcomes Montenegro’s new media laws and its strategy for media policy aimed at strengthening the legal framework to effectively protect journalists and other media workers; insists on a zero-tolerance policy with regard to pressure on, harassment of, or violence against journalists, particularly by public figures; underlines the need for effective investigations, the prosecution of all instances of hate speech, smear campaigns and strategic lawsuits against journalists, and follow-up of past cases; stresses the need to ensure journalists’ rights to access information and maintain a critical stance; notes a significant improvement in Montenegro’s press freedom, demonstrated by its progress on the World Press Freedom Index;

    39.  Expresses its concern over cases where journalists, academics and civil society organisations have faced pressure for exercising free speech, including instances where the police have initiated misdemeanour proceedings against them; is concerned by the use of strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs) to target journalists;

    40.  Regrets the prevailing high level of polarisation in the media and its vulnerability to political interests and foreign influence as well as foreign and domestic disinformation campaigns that spread narratives that negatively impact democratic processes in the country and endanger Montenegro’s European perspective; calls on Montenegro to further develop improved media literacy programmes and include them as a core subject in education; calls on the Montenegrin authorities to ensure the editorial, institutional and financial independence of the public service broadcaster RTCG, as well as the legality of the appointment of its management and full respect for court rulings concerning RTCG; recalls that it needs to comply with the law and the highest standards of accountability and integrity; regrets that the independence of public media is being weakened and undermined; calls on all media entities to comply with legal requirements on public funding transparency;

    41.  Welcomes the publication of the 2023 population census results; calls on the authorities to avoid any politicisation of the process; encourages stakeholders to use these results in a non-discriminatory manner;

    42.  Welcomes Montenegro’s vibrant and constructive civil society and underlines its importance in fostering democracy and pluralism and in promoting good governance and social progress; expresses its concern over the shrinking space for civil society organisations with a critical stance, and condemns all smear campaigns, intimidation and attacks against civil society organisations, notably by political figures in the context of proposals for a ‘foreign agent law’; notes that such laws have the potential to undermine fundamental freedoms and the functioning of civil society and are inconsistent with EU values and standards; calls for a supportive legal framework and clear and fair selection criteria in relation to public funding; calls for the Council for Cooperation between the Government and non-governmental organisations to resume work; underlines the importance of building collaborative relationships and genuinely consulting civil society on draft legislation from an early stage onwards;

    Reconciliation, good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation

    43.  Recalls that good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation are essential elements of the enlargement process; commends Montenegro’s active involvement in regional cooperation initiatives; recalls that good neighbourly relations are key for advancing in the accession process;

    44.  Regrets that Chapter 31 could not be closed in December 2024; calls on all engaged parties to find solutions to outstanding bilateral issues in a constructive and neighbourly manner and prioritise the future interests of citizens in the Western Balkans; recalls that using unresolved bilateral and regional disputes to block candidate countries’ accession processes should be avoided; welcomes bilateral consultations between the Republic of Croatia and Montenegro on the status of unresolved bilateral issues; encourages the authorities to continue pursuing confidence-building measures;

    45.  Notes Montenegro’s amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code to address legal and practical obstacles to the effective investigation, prosecution, trial and punishment of war crimes in line with relevant recommendations; calls on Montenegro to apply a proactive approach to handling war crimes cases, in line with international law and standards, to identify, prosecute and punish the perpetrators and the glorification of war crimes and ensure access to, and delivery of justice, redress and reparations for victims, and clarify the fate of missing persons; calls on Montenegro to allocate sufficient resources to specialised prosecutors and courts and proactively investigate all war crime allegations and raise issues of command responsibility, as well as to review past cases that were not prosecuted in line with international or domestic law; calls for regional cooperation in the investigation and prosecution of individuals indicted for war crimes; recognises that addressing these issues and safeguarding court-based facts are an important foundation for trust, democratic values, reconciliation and strengthening bilateral relations with neighbouring countries, and encourages Montenegro to step up these efforts;

    46.  Warns against the dangers of political revisionism, which distorts historical facts for political purposes, undermines accountability and deepens societal divisions; strongly condemns the glorification of war criminals and widespread public denial of international verdicts for war crimes, including by the Montenegrin authorities; considers that President Jakov Milatović’s statement expressing regret over the participation of Montenegrin forces in the bombardment of the city of Dubrovnik was a valuable contribution to regional peace and reconciliation;

    47.  Reiterates its support for the initiative to establish the Regional Commission for the establishment of facts about war crimes and other gross human rights violations on the territory of the former Yugoslavia (RECOM);

    48.  Reiterates its call for the archives that concern the former republics of Yugoslavia to be opened and for access to be granted to the files of the former Yugoslav Secret Service and the Yugoslav People’s Army Secret Service in order to thoroughly research and address communist-era crimes;

    Socio-economic reforms

    49.  Welcomes Montenegro’s inclusion in SEPA payment schemes, lowering costs for citizens and businesses; underlines that this opens up opportunities for business expansion, increased competitiveness, innovation and improved access to foreign direct investments;

    50.  Welcomes the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans, which aims to integrate the region into the EU’s single market, promote regional economic cooperation and deepen EU-related reforms, and which includes the EUR 6 billion Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans; welcomes Montenegro’s adoption of a reform agenda and encourages its full implementation; notes that the implementation of the defined reform measures under Montenegro’s reform agenda for the Growth Plan would provide access to over EUR 380 million in grants and favourable loans, subject to successful implementation; stresses the importance of inclusive stakeholder consultations, including local and regional authorities, social partners and civil society, in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation phases;

    51.  Encourages Montenegro to make best use of all EU funding available under the Pre-accession Assistance Instrument (IPA III), the Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans, the IPARD programme and the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans, to accelerate socio-economic convergence with the EU and further align its legislation with the EU on fraud prevention; recalls the conditionality of EU funding, which may be modulated or suspended in the event of significant regression or persistent lack of progress on fundamentals;

    52.  Calls for the EU and the Western Balkan countries to establish a framework for effective cooperation between the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) and the accession countries in order to facilitate close cooperation and the prosecution of the misuse of EU funds, including through the secondment of national liaison officers to the EPPO; encourages Montenegro to fully implement working arrangements with the EPPO; calls for the EU to make the necessary legal and political arrangements to extend the jurisdiction of the EPPO to EU funds devoted to Montenegro as a candidate country;

    53.  Positively notes Montenegro’s economic growth; calls for more steps to reduce the budget deficit and public debt, and to further remove indirect tax exemptions that do not align with the EU acquis; welcomes the efforts to reduce these fiscal vulnerabilities; reiterates the need for increased public investment in the education system for sustainable social and economic development;

    54.  Notes Montenegro’s public debt to foreign financial institutions and companies that can be used as a tool to influence its policy decisions, in particular those related to China and Russia; welcomes the efforts to reduce these vulnerabilities and calls on the authorities to further reduce economic dependence on China and to continue making use of the Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans, the EU Global Gateway initiative and the Reform and Growth Facility, with a view to finding greener and more transparent alternatives for financing infrastructure projects; calls on Montenegro to increase transparency in future infrastructure projects, ensure competitive bidding and avoid excessive debt dependence on foreign creditors;

    55.  Calls on the Montenegrin authorities to take measures to counter depopulation and emigration, in particular through investments in education and healthcare, especially in the north of the country, as well as through decentralisation by investing in medium-sized cities;

    56.  Encourages the Montenegrin authorities to boost the digital transformation and pursue evidence-based labour market policies to address the persistently high unemployment rate, in particular among women and young people, while bolstering institutional capacity and enhancing the underlying digital policy framework, and to effectively implement the Youth Guarantee and the new Youth Strategy; urges the authorities to address brain drain as a matter of urgency; encourages the development of targeted preventive measures and incentives to legalise informal businesses and employees, as a large informal sector continues to hinder economic and social development in Montenegro;

    57.  Welcomes the calls for the prompt integration of all Western Balkan countries into the EU’s digital single market before actual EU membership, which would crucially enable the creation of a digitally safe environment;

    58.  Calls for more transparency in public procurement, notably for procedures via intergovernmental agreements, and for full compliance with EU rules and principles; calls on Montenegro to reduce the number of public procurement procedures without notices; expresses its concern over the financial burden and lack of transparency surrounding the construction of the Bar-Boljare motorway financed by a Chinese loan; stresses that the secrecy surrounding loan agreements and construction contracts raises accountability concerns;

    59.  Expresses its concern over any agreements or projects that circumvent public procurement rules, transparency obligations and public consultation requirements, as set out in national legislation and EU standards; calls on the Government of Montenegro to ensure full respect for the principles of transparency, accountability, inclusive decision-making and the rule of law in all public infrastructure and development initiatives;

    Energy, the environment, biodiversity and connectivity

    60.  Urges Montenegro to advance the green transition, with the support of EU funding, improve its institutional and regulatory framework and enhance energy resilience by finally adopting and implementing the long-overdue National Energy and Climate Plan, adopting energy efficiency laws and integrating further with EU energy markets; calls for all new green transition projects to be implemented in line with EU standards on the environment, State aid and concessions;

    61.  Regrets the lack of progress on key sector reforms in the area of transport policy; calls on the Montenegrin authorities to align the country’s transport development with the Sustainable and Smart Mobility Strategy for the Western Balkans, focusing on railways, multimodality and reducing CO2 emissions and other environmental impacts, and to further implement its Transport Development Strategy and strengthen administrative capacities for the implementation of trans-European transport networks;

    62.  Welcomes the reduction of data roaming charges between the EU and the Western Balkan countries and calls on the authorities, private actors and all stakeholders to take all necessary steps towards the goal of bringing data roaming prices close to domestic prices by 2028; welcomes the entry into force of the first phase of the implementation of the roadmap for roaming between the Western Balkans and the EU;

    63.  Encourages the adoption of sectoral strategies for waste management, air and water quality, nature protection and climate change, ensuring strategic planning for investments; notes the lack of progress and associated rising costs in building essential waste water treatment plants to prevent sewage pollution in rivers and the sea in seven municipalities;

    o
    o   o

    64.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Commissioner for Enlargement, the Commissioner for the Mediterranean, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, and to the President, Government and Parliament of Montenegro, and to have it translated and published in Montenegrin.

    (1) OJ L 108, 29.4.2010, p. 3, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_internation/2010/224/oj.
    (2) OJ L 330, 20.9.2021, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1529/oj.
    (3) OJ L, 2024/1449, 24.5.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1449/oj.
    (4) OJ C 167, 11.5.2023, p. 105.
    (5) OJ C, C/2024/6746, 26.11.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6746/oj.
    (6) https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/montenegro.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – The Commission’s 2024 Rule of Law report – P10_TA(2025)0129 – Wednesday, 18 June 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to the Treaty on European Union (TEU), in particular Articles 2, 3(1), 3(3), second subparagraph, 4(3), 5, 6, 7, 11, 19 and 49 thereof,

    –  having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), in particular to the articles thereof relating to respect for and the protection and promotion of democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights in the Union, including Articles 70, 258, 259, 260, 263, 265 and 267,

    –  having regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the Charter),

    –  having regard to the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 24 July 2024 entitled ‘2024 Rule of Law Report – The rule of law situation in the European Union’ (COM(2024)0800), and the annex thereto containing recommendations for the Member States,

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 on EU enlargement policy (COM(2024)0690) and its accompanying staff working documents (the Enlargement Package),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget(1) (the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 laying down common provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund Plus, the Cohesion Fund, the Just Transition Fund and the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund and financial rules for those and for the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, the Internal Security Fund and the Instrument for Financial Support for Border Management and Visa Policy(2) (the Common Provisions Regulation),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union(3) (the Financial Regulation), in particular Article 6(3) thereof,

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/692 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 April 2021 establishing the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values programme and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1381/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation (EU) No 390/2014(4),

    –  having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

    –  having regard to the UN instruments on the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRDP), the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities and the Recommendations of the UN Forum on Minority Issues, and to the recommendations and reports of the UN Universal Periodic Review, as well as the case-law of the UN treaty bodies and the special procedures of the Human Rights Council,

    –  having regard to the European Convention on Human Rights, the European Social Charter, the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the European Committee of Social Rights, and the conventions, recommendations, resolutions, opinions and reports of the Parliamentary Assembly, the Committee of Ministers, the Commissioner for Human Rights, the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, the Steering Committee on Anti-Discrimination, Diversity and Inclusion, the Venice Commission and other bodies of the Council of Europe,

    –  having regard to the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence,

    –  having regard to the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages and to the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities of the Council of Europe,

    –  having regard to the memorandum of understanding between the Council of Europe and the European Union of 23 May 2007 and the Council conclusions of 17 December 2024 on EU priorities for cooperation with the Council of Europe 2025-2026,

    –  having regard to the Commission’s reasoned proposal of 20 December 2017 for a Council decision on the determination of a clear risk of a serious breach by the Republic of Poland of the rule of law (COM(2017)0835), issued in accordance with Article 7(1) TEU,

    –  having regard to its resolution of 25 October 2016 with recommendations to the Commission on the establishment of an EU mechanism on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights(5),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 7 February 2018 on protection and non-discrimination with regard to minorities in the EU Member States(6);

    –  having regard to its resolution of 1 March 2018 on the Commission’s decision to activate Article 7(1) TEU as regards the situation in Poland(7),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 19 April 2018 on the need to establish a European Values Instrument to support civil society organisations which promote fundamental values within the European Union at local and national level(8),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 12 September 2018 on a proposal calling on the Council to determine, pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union, the existence of a clear risk of a serious breach by Hungary of the values on which the Union is founded(9),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 13 November 2018 on minimum standards for minorities in the EU(10),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 14 November 2018 on the need for a comprehensive EU mechanism for the protection of democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights(11),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 7 October 2020 on the establishment of an EU Mechanism on Democracy, the Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights(12),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 13 November 2020 on the impact of COVID-19 measures on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights(13),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 17 December 2020 on the European Citizens’ Initiative ‘Minority SafePack – one million signatures for diversity in Europe’(14),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 10 June 2021 on the rule of law situation in the European Union and the application of the Conditionality Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092(15),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 24 June 2021 on the Commission’s 2020 Rule of Law Report(16),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 8 July 2021 on the creation of guidelines for the application of the general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget(17),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 16 September 2021 with recommendations to the Commission on identifying gender-based violence as a new area of crime listed in Article 83(1) TFEU(18),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 11 November 2021 on strengthening democracy and media freedom and pluralism in the EU: the undue use of actions under civil and criminal law to silence journalists, NGOs and civil society(19),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 15 December 2021 on the evaluation of preventive measures for avoiding corruption, irregular spending and misuse of EU and national funds in case of emergency funds and crisis-related spending areas(20),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 8 March 2022 on the shrinking space for civil society in Europe(21),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 10 March 2022 on the rule of law and the consequences of the ECJ ruling(22),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 19 May 2022 on the Commission’s 2021 Rule of Law Report(23),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 9 June 2022 on the rule of law and the potential approval of the Polish national recovery plan (RRF)(24),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 15 September 2022 on the situation of fundamental rights in the European Union in 2020 and 2021(25),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 15 September 2022 on the proposal for a Council decision determining, pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union, the existence of a clear risk of a serious breach by Hungary of the values on which the Union is founded(26),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 20 October 2022 on the rule of law in Malta, five years after the assassination of Daphne Caruana Galizia(27),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 20 October 2022 on growing hate crimes against LGBTIQ+ people across Europe in light of the recent homophobic murder in Slovakia(28),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 10 November 2022 on racial justice, non-discrimination and anti-racism in the EU(29),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 24 November 2022 on the assessment of Hungary’s compliance with the rule of law conditions under the Conditionality Regulation and state of play of the Hungarian RRP(30),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 30 March 2023 on the 2022 Rule of Law Report – the rule of law situation in the European Union(31),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 18 April 2023 on the institutional relations between the EU and the Council of Europe(32),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 28 February 2024 ‘Report on the Commission’s 2023 Rule of Law report’(33),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 29 February 2024 on deepening EU integration in view of future enlargement(34),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 1 June 2023 on the breaches of the Rule of Law and fundamental rights in Hungary and frozen EU funds(35),

    –  having regard to the report of its Committee of Inquiry to investigate the use of Pegasus and equivalent surveillance spyware (PEGA) and to its recommendation of 15 June 2023 to the Council and the Commission following the investigation of alleged contraventions and maladministration in the application of Union law in relation to the use of Pegasus and equivalent surveillance spyware(36),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 11 July 2023 on the electoral law, the investigative committee and the rule of law in Poland(37),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 19 October 2023 on the rule of law in Malta: six years after the assassination of Daphne Caruana Galizia, and the need to protect journalists(38),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 6 December 2023 entitled ‘No place for hate: a Europe united against hatred’ (JOIN(2023)0051),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 18 January 2024 on the situation of fundamental rights in the European Union – annual report 2022 and 2023(39),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 18 January 2024 on extending the list of EU crimes to hate speech and hate crime(40),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 24 April 2024 on ongoing hearings under Article 7(1) TEU regarding Hungary to strengthen the rule of law and its budgetary implications(41),

    –  having regard to the conclusion of the Article 7 TEU procedure in relation to Poland, as announced by the Commission on 29 May 2024, following steps taken by Poland to restore compliance with EU rule of law standards;

    –  having regard to Resolution 2262 (2019) of 24 January 2019 of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on promoting the rights of persons belonging to national minorities,

    –  having regard to the recommendations and reports of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, the High Commissioner on National Minorities, the Representative on Freedom of the Media and other bodies of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), to the cooperation between the EU and the OSCE on democratisation, institution-building and human rights and to the annual OSCE hate crime report, in which participating states have committed themselves to passing legislation that provides for penalties that take into account the gravity of hate crime, to taking action to address under-reporting and to introducing or further developing capacity-building activities for law enforcement, prosecution and judicial officials to prevent, investigate and prosecute hate crimes,

    –  having regard to the special reports of the European Court of Auditors of 17 December 2024 on Enforcing EU Law (28/2024), of 22 February 2024 on the Rule of Law in the EU (03/2024), and of 10 January 2022 on EU support for the rule of law in the Western Balkans (01/2022), and to its review of 28 February 2024 on the Commission’s rule of law reporting (02/2024), and to their respective recommendations,

    –  having regard to the Political Guidelines for the next European Commission 2024-2029, presented to Parliament on 18 July 2024 by Ursula von der Leyen, candidate for President of the Commission,

    –  having regard to the 2024 Eurobarometer surveys on corruption, which show that corruption remains a serious concern for citizens and businesses in the EU,

    –  having regard to the feedback reports, mission reports, written questions and answers of its Democracy, Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights Monitoring Group (DRFMG)(42),

    –  having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Foreign Affairs,

    –  having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Legal Affairs,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (A10-0100/2025),

    A.  whereas the Union is founded on the common values enshrined in Article 2 TEU of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities – values that are common to the EU Member States and are reflected in the Charter and embedded in international human rights treaties; whereas the Charter is part of EU primary law; whereas democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights are mutually reinforcing values which, when undermined, pose a systemic threat to the rights and freedoms of the people living in the EU;

    B.  whereas it is apparent from Article 49 TEU, which provides the possibility for any European state to apply to become a member of the European Union, that the Union is composed of states which have freely and voluntarily committed themselves to the common values referred to in Article 2 TEU, which respect those values and which undertake to promote them; whereas EU law is thus based on the fundamental premise that each Member State shares with all the other Member States, and recognises that those Member States share with it, those same values; whereas that premise implies and justifies the existence of mutual trust between the Member States that those values will be recognised and, therefore, that the law of the EU that implements them will be respected(43),(44); whereas the Member State are required to ensure that any regression in the protection of the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU is prevented;

    C.  whereas civil society organisations (CSOs), the legal community, associations, independent media and grassroots movements remain a cornerstone of the rule of law by promoting transparency, accountability and citizen participation in democratic processes; whereas these actors have been instrumental in safeguarding judicial independence, freedom of expression and other constitutional values, often operating under increasing political and legal constraints;

    D.  whereas the principle of sincere cooperation in Article 4(3) TEU places an obligation on the Union and the Member States to assist each other in carrying out obligations that arise from the Treaties in full mutual respect, and on Member States to take any appropriate measure, general or particular, to ensure the fulfilment of the obligations arising from the Treaties or resulting from the acts of the institutions of the Union; whereas Member States should refrain from any measures which could jeopardise the attainment of the Union’s objectives;

    E.  whereas in a recent Eurobarometer survey, 74 % of respondents thought that the EU plays an important role in upholding the rule of law and 89 % believed that it is important for all Member States to respect the EU’s core values; whereas, in the current global economic and political context, bolstering citizens’ trust in the rule of law and the resilience of democracies at EU level is a crucial factor;

    F.  whereas accession to the EU must always be a merit-based procedure in which there is an assessment of whether an applicant fulfils the Copenhagen criteria, in particular those guaranteeing full respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law, in order to ensure that EU enlargement strengthens rather than weakens the EU and its single market; whereas the fundamental role of the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance as a Union instrument is to support the rule of law, democracy and human rights in candidate and potential candidate countries, including the strengthening of democratic institutions and CSOs, as well as progress on good governance and the fight against corruption, the promotion and protection of non-discrimination and gender equality and the strengthening of capacities for conflict prevention and resolution;

    Independence of the judiciary

    1.  Underlines that fair and accessible justice is a basic rule of law principle that requires an independent judiciary; reiterates that access to justice is essential for citizens to exercise rights, challenge discrimination and hold decision makers accountable;

    2.  Recalls that robust national legal systems are indispensable in Member States, candidate and potential candidate countries, given that the Commission relies on national judicial authorities to enforce EU law, and that they are fundamental to judicial cooperation across the EU and to fostering mutual trust; notes with concern that while some judicial systems may appear robust on paper, this does not always align with reality;

    3.  Stresses the need for the impartiality of judges; recalls that the appointment and promotion of judges must be determined solely by their qualifications and not be influenced by political or personal considerations, as the judges essential for safeguarding judicial independence; recalls that the criteria for nominations and appointments to high-level judicial positions must be fully transparent;

    4.  Underlines the important role of the national councils of the judiciary in safeguarding judicial independence; considers it necessary to evaluate the reforms that are in the process of being adopted in different Member States and encourages the adaptation of the composition and functioning of these bodies to the standards established by the Commission and the Council of Europe, and which have been endorsed by the CJEU; calls on the Commission in its future rule of law reports to place a particular focus on the roles, structures and functioning of Member States’ national judicial councils as part of its assessment of judicial independence;

    5.  Points out that the prosecution service is a key element in the capacity of a Member State to fight crime and corruption; regrets any governmental or political interference in corruption investigations and recalls that no one is above the law; condemns the misuse of the judicial system for political purposes, including the persecution of political opponents and interference in corruption investigations; stresses that both politically motivated prosecutions and amnesty laws and pardon procedures driven by political interests undermine public trust in constitutional principles and EU standards; highlights the importance of guaranteeing the autonomy and independence of the prosecution service, thereby preventing any political interference in its work, especially from the government; highlights the role of transparent appointment processes for prosecutors as a key factor in maintaining public confidence in criminal justice; highlights its concern about repeated attacks on judges and prosecutors who are conducting high-profile political investigations linked to cases of corruption and abuse of power perpetrated against political opponents;

    6.  Calls for disciplinary procedures for judges and prosecutors to be handled by independent bodies free from political influence and, where necessary, for the system of disciplinary procedures to be reformed to preclude their use by political authorities to control the judiciary;

    7.  Calls on the Commission to maintain constant oversight, ensuring that judges and prosecutors remain independent of the authorities responsible for appointing or reappointing them; calls on the Commission to proactively monitor and swiftly react to risks of rule of law backsliding in areas of judicial independence and access to justice, in line with the principle of non-regression as clarified in recent CJEU case-law;

    8.  Notes that the Commission has found that there are structural challenges with regard to improving the efficiency, accessibility and quality of the judiciary of some Member States(45) and of candidate and potential candidate countries; notes that the Commission has found that several Member States have allocated additional resources to strengthening the resilience of justice systems to ensure the timely resolution of cases and reduce backlogs, while in other Member States levels of remuneration continue to pose challenges, often leading to shortages and vacancies; notes that underfunding and understaffing can undermine the accessibility and effectiveness of judicial systems, thus eroding trust in the rule of law; emphasises that adequate remuneration is essential to attract and retain qualified judicial personnel; strongly believes that training is a key element that guarantees the independence of judges, as well as the quality and efficiency of the judicial system; states that an important element of the state of the rule of law and fair proceedings are judicial procedures conducted in a reasonable time frame; notes, in that context, that the justice scoreboard indicates significant discrepancies across the EU legal area;

    9.  Encourages the Member States to ensure training opportunities for judges; strongly believes that training should be multidisciplinary, with a particular focus on gender equality; reiterates that adequate resources, including funding, infrastructure and qualified personnel, are crucial for the efficiency and accessibility of the justice system; recognises the role of court staff, including notaries, in numerous Member States; calls on all Member States to follow up on corruption cases within a reasonable time limit so as to not foster a feeling of impunity among their citizens; invites Member States to take advantage of the opportunities offered by digitalisation to simplify procedures and processes, improve efficiency and accessibility, save time and reduce storage costs;

    10.  Stresses the importance of independent judicial systems and access to free legal aid in ensuring equal access to justice; reiterates that adequate resources, including infrastructure and personnel, are crucial to improving justice systems; recommends that Member States take concrete steps to improve access to justice for marginalised and vulnerable groups, including adequately funded, enhanced legal aid systems and measures to address language barriers and digital divides;

    11.  Recalls that the Commission’s 2024 Rule of Law Report states that serious concerns persist regarding judicial independence in Hungary and that political influence on the prosecution service remains, with the risk of undue interference in individual cases, and that the freedom of expression of judges remains under pressure and smear campaigns against judges continue in the media;

    12.  Welcomes the pivotal role of the CJEU in upholding the rule of law across the EU; endorses further initiatives to enhance the resources and the capabilities of the CJEU to effectively address further challenges to the rule of law; reiterates that, in accordance with Article 19 TEU and Article 267 TFEU, national courts cannot be hindered from using the possibility of a referral for preliminary ruling to the CJEU; calls on the Commission to carry out a systematic check in this regard as part of its annual rule of law report, and to start infringement proceedings in cases where national judges face obstacles in this regard;

    13.  Regrets the trend whereby some Member States are selectively applying, delaying or failing to implement CJEU and ECtHR judgments and calls for their timely and effective implementation; emphasises that Member States and EU institutions must systematically integrate and implement the latest CJEU case-law to uphold the rule of law and ensure the uniform application of EU law; calls for the swift adaptation of national legislation and institutional frameworks to comply with court rulings;

    14.  Reiterates its strong support for the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court (ICC) as essential, independent and impartial jurisdictional institutions at a particularly challenging time for international justice; recalls the need to fully implement the orders of the International Court of Justice, which are legally binding; calls for the Union, its Member States and candidate and potential candidate countries to continue to support the ICC;

    15.  Urges the Commission, as the guardian of the Treaties, to meet its responsibility for the enforcement of the Union’s basic values, including those laid down in Article 2 TEU and in the EU’s primary law, and not to rely only on citizens going to court themselves to ensure the application of EU law; stresses that the non-implementation of domestic and international judgments is violating the rule of law and risks leaving people without remedy and can create a perception among the public that judgments can be disregarded, undermining general trust in fair adjudication; underlines the fundamental role of the CJEU and the ECtHR in ensuring respect for the law and guaranteeing uniformity in its application; proposes establishing clear deadlines for the implementation of court rulings, as well as a detailed monitoring plan for the implementation of pending judgments; urges the Commission to launch infringement procedures if needed, together with motions for interim measures; calls on the Member States to implement pending judgments of the CJEU and the ECtHR promptly and suggests the establishment of a monitoring unit to monitor the implementation of CJEU and ECtHR rulings relating to democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights in EU countries, and to fully integrate the monitoring unit’s findings into the annual rule of law report; recommends that the Commission, in particular, take action regarding failures to implement CJEU judgments under Article 260(2) TFEU and apply the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation in cases of non-compliance with CJEU and ECtHR judgments where the breach identified affects or seriously risks affecting the Union budget or financial interests; stresses that systematic non-compliance with EU law must entail tangible financial penalties to ensure genuine deterrence; calls on the Commission to assess whether delays or non-compliance with such rulings warrant proceedings for failure to act under Article 258 TFEU; calls on the Commission to systematically analyse data on non-compliance with country-specific views of UN Treaty Bodies;

    16.  Welcomes the revision of the Victims’ Rights Directive(46) to close legal gaps, ensuring that victims can access justice and receive support; calls on the Council to include as much as possible from Parliament’s mandate, including provisions ensuring victims’ right to review decisions in criminal proceedings, on access to legal remedies and fair compensation, and on comprehensive support services, particularly for those in vulnerable situations; stresses the importance of effective data collection, of enhancing resource allocation for victim assistance and of safeguarding victims’ privacy and personal data to prevent secondary victimisation and ensure that victims, including undocumented migrants and asylum seekers, can safely report crimes; expects co-legislators to adopt solutions that are victim-centred;

    17.  Recognises the essential role of law enforcement in upholding the rule of law and protecting fundamental rights; calls on the Member States to ensure adequate funding, training and resources for the police and law enforcement agencies; calls on the Member States to take into account the Council of Europe’s Code of Police Ethics in this regard; emphasises that any use of force must be strictly necessary, proportionate and subject to clear safeguards; calls on the Member States to introduce guidelines for the transparent, independent and consistent selection, testing and trialling of weapons used by law enforcement agents, based on UN standards, recommendations and guiding principles; notes that this assessment should determine that such weapons are compliant with international human rights law and standards prior to their selection and deployment; calls on the Member States to thoroughly investigate any cases of excessive use of force and discriminatory treatment by law enforcement agencies;

    18.  Calls on the Commission to include, as a rule of law concern, the conditions in prisons in future rule of law reports, given the serious and growing concerns across Europe regarding overcrowding, inadequate living conditions and the alarming rates of suicide within prisons;

    19.  Calls on the Commission to pay special attention to analysing procedural justice with a view to identifying strengths, gaps, discrepancies and best practice in ensuring transparency, efficiency and fair treatment in strengthening administrative justice across the EU, as a means of ensuring the accountability of public authorities;

    Anti-corruption framework

    20.  Stresses that the rule of law requires that persons holding public office cannot act arbitrarily or abuse their power for personal gain; underlines that governments should adopt laws in the interest of the general public and not in the interest of specific individuals;

    21.  Reiterates that corruption is a serious threat to democracy, fundamental rights and the rule of law in Member States, candidate countries and potential candidate countries; underlines that corruption erodes citizens’ trust in public institutions; deplores the fact that the 2024 Eurobarometer on corruption shows that corruption remains a serious concern for EU citizens and businesses, with 68 % of Europeans considering corruption to be widespread in their country, 65 % believing that high-level corruption cases are not pursued sufficiently and 41 % believing that the level of corruption has increased; considers this a call for the EU to step up its efforts to combat corruption;

    22.  Reiterates its call on the Commission to immediately finalise negotiations on the EU’s membership of the Council of Europe’s Group of States against Corruption (GRECO); notes that such membership will ensure greater transparency, accountability and efficiency in the management of EU funds, the legislative process and the work of the EU institutions, and demands that the annual rule of law report cover EU institutions;

    23.  Reiterates its call on all Member States to adopt a code of conduct for judges following the GRECO recommendations, and taking into account the codes applicable at the ECtHR and the CJEU; calls on Member States to create independent mechanisms to investigate alleged violations of the code of conduct and other laws, to improve disclosure and transparency with regard to conflicts of interest and gifts received by the judiciary, and to address the issue of revolving doors;

    24.  Calls on the Member States, candidate countries and potential candidate countries, and the EU institutions to enhance transparency and accountability in public institutions by strengthening anti-corruption and conflict of competence legal frameworks and reporting processes to ensure the effective investigation and prosecution of corruption cases, including high-level corruption cases (inter alia those linked to public procurement procedures and those relating to high-risk areas such as ports or land borders), reinforcing oversight mechanisms and bodies and the independence and proper functioning of existing agencies, fostering protection for whistle-blowers, improving integrity frameworks and lobbying for legislation; regrets the lack of relevant progress made and stresses that final convictions and deterrent penalties are necessary to demonstrate genuine commitment to tackling corruption; calls on Member States to ensure the transparency and accountability of lobbying activities, including the establishment or improvement of mandatory lobbying registers and ‘legislative footprint’ mechanisms for tracking the influence of lobbying activities on lawmaking processes;

    25.  Acknowledges the important role of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) in safeguarding the rule of law and combating corruption within the EU; encourages the Commission to closely monitor Member States’ level of cooperation with the EPPO; endorses the reinforcement of the monitoring and coordinative powers of the EPPO with a view to strengthening its ability to combat corruption in Member States; calls on the Commission to propose, under Article 86(4) TFEU, an expansion of the mandate of the EPPO to avoid circumvention of EU restrictive measures and cross-border environmental crimes, and to accelerate the revision of the EPPO Regulation(47) and the Directive on the fight against fraud to the EU’s financial interests by means of criminal law(48) in order to safeguard and clarify the primary competence of the EPPO with regard to corruption offences affecting the EU’s financial interests or committed by EU officials;

    26.  Urges all Member States that have not yet done so to join the EPPO in order to enhance the effectiveness of the fight against corruption, particularly in relation to the protection of EU funds; calls on all candidate and potential candidate countries to establish a framework for effective cooperation with the EPPO;

    27.  Calls on European bodies such as Europol, Eurojust, the European Court of Auditors, the EPPO and the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) to improve their cooperation in the fight against corruption and fraud affecting EU finances;

    28.  Calls on the Commission to enhance transparency and accountability in all of its communications, visits and meetings, especially with high-level national actors;

    29.  Welcomes the Commission’s proposal for a directive on combating corruption which harmonises the definition of corruption offences in the public and private sector and the corresponding penalties; welcomes the inclusion of preventive measures, including on illicit political financing and training, in the directive on combating corruption, such as effective rules for the disclosure and management of conflicts of interest, open access to information and effective rules regulating the interaction between the private and the public sector; calls on the Member States to also put in place effective rules to address revolving doors, establish codes of conduct for public officials, establish a public legislative footprint, and ensure transparency in the funding of candidatures for elected public officials and political parties; appreciates that almost all Member States now have anti-corruption strategies in place; regrets, at the same time, that implementation and effectiveness vary; calls on the Member States that have not yet done so to develop and implement robust and effective anti-corruption strategies with the involvement of civil society; underlines the importance of the identification, notification, representation and coordination of victims of corruption; calls on the Member States to protect victims of corruption and enable them to have their views and concerns presented and considered at appropriate stages during criminal proceedings; calls on the Member States to ensure that victims of corruption have the right to adequate and proportionate compensation;

    30.  Calls on all the EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies to strengthen their anti-corruption measures with regard to the disclosure and management of conflicts of interest, open access to information, rules regulating the interaction of EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies with the private sector, revolving doors and the code of conduct for public officials; considers that during their term of office, Members of the European Parliament should not engage in paid side activities with for-profit organisations or businesses seeking to influence EU policymaking

    31.  Recognises the crucial role that whistle-blowers play in exposing corruption and promoting transparency across both the public and private sectors; stresses the need to protect whistle-blowers from retaliation and harassment; calls for independent and autonomous whistle-blower protection authorities to be further strengthened and further integrated into broader national anti-corruption frameworks, ensuring a unified and robust approach to combating corruption throughout all Member States;

    Media pluralism and freedom

    32.  Welcomes initiatives to promote free, independent and pluralistic media and a safe and enabling environment for journalists such as the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA)(49) and calls for its swift implementation; calls on the Member States and candidate and potential candidate countries to improve transparency in the allocation of state advertising online and offline and to follow the recommendations contained in Commission Recommendation (EU) 2021/1534 of 16 September 2021 on ensuring the protection, safety and empowerment of journalists and other media professionals in the European Union; calls on the Commission to provide the Member States with the necessary assistance in transposing the EMFA into national law, and to monitor its implementation, especially in certain Member States that rank poorly in freedom indices; underlines that the EMFA is a crucial milestone in safeguarding the independence, pluralism and integrity of the media landscape across the Union;

    33.  Expresses deep concern over the increasing attacks on journalists and publishers, with a disproportionate impact on women; calls on the Commission and the Member States and on candidate and potential candidate countries to ensure the safety and protection of journalists, including investigative journalists and fact checkers who are particularly exposed; highlights the fact that the most common forms of threat include verbal attacks, online harassment, intimidation through social media and email, and legal threats, including cases covered by the Anti-SLAPP (‘Strategic lawsuits against public participation’) Directive(50), as well as instances of stalking and personal harassment;

    34.  Calls on the Member States to fully implement the Anti-SLAPP Directive and Commission Recommendation (EU) 2022/758 of 27 April 2022 on protecting journalists and human rights defenders who engage in public participation from manifestly unfounded or abusive court proceedings(51), and to adopt comprehensive domestic anti-SLAPP measures to protect journalists and provide support for those facing intimidation, defamation and limitations on the ability to exercise their profession; recommends that, when transposing the directive, Member States extend its application to also include national cases, since the majority of SLAPP cases occur at the national level; calls on the Commission to put forward proposals to address SLAPP cases not covered under the current Directive;

    35.  Calls for the introduction of specific aggravating circumstances in criminal law for offences committed against journalists when such acts are motivated by or connected to their professional activities;

    36.  Urges the Member States and candidate and potential candidate countries to protect and promote media freedom and pluralism, ensure transparent allocation of public funds, prevent the concentration of media ownership, protect editorial independence and combat disinformation, particularly through robust laws, including specific provisions on media ownership transparency, and independent regulators; underlines the important role of public service media; welcomes initiatives at national level to create a media registry containing public information about ownership and advertising investment in order to ensure transparency, impartiality and verifiability; further calls on Member States to ensure adequate, sustainable and predictable funding and budgetary stability based on transparent and objective criteria for public service media; recommends the creation of a dedicated EU media freedom fund supporting independent journalism and local media outlets;

    37.  Condemns the spread of hate speech, including in mainstream and social media, as it poses a serious threat to democracy and the rule of law; calls for stronger enforcement of media regulations to combat hate speech and safeguard a diverse and inclusive media landscape, in accordance with its resolution of 18 January 2024 on the situation of fundamental rights in the European Union; underlines the fact that prominent public figures and politicians have to lead by example and need to ensure a respectful debate; recalls that freedom of expression is a fundamental value of democratic societies and should not be unjustifiably restricted; further recalls that any legislation on hate speech and hate crime should be grounded in the principles of necessity and proportionality; underlines that freedom of expression must be exercised within the law and in line with Article 11 of the Charter and should not be exploited as a shield for hate speech and hate crimes;

    38.  Acknowledges that citizens perceive signs of an erosion of democracy fuelled by misinformation and disinformation, and that the spread of false information through social media could lead to the erosion of general respect for the rule of law; calls on digital platforms to take immediate action by ensuring compliance with their own community standards and European laws, including the Digital Services Act(52) (DSA) and competition rules; calls on the Commission to assess such compliance regularly and take measures where necessary; recommends that Member States, candidate and potential candidate countries develop comprehensive strategies to combat disinformation and foreign interference in democratic processes, while safeguarding freedom of expression and media pluralism;

    39.  Strongly condemns state control and political interference in media operations; highlights the fact that media regulators must be adequately protected by legal safeguards to ensure their independence and freedom from political pressure, with sufficient budgetary resources at their disposal; underlines the democratic importance of independent media regulators;

    40.  Expresses deep concern over the abuse of spyware and the lack of sufficient safeguards against illegal surveillance of journalists; calls on the Commission to implement the recommendations of Parliament’s PEGA Inquiry Committee on banning politically motivated surveillance;

    41.  Urges Member States to ensure that the transposition of Directive (EU) 2016/343(53) on the presumption of innocence does not introduce restrictions on the right to report on and inform the public of matters of public interest, including judicial investigations, that are not provided for by the Directive; calls on Member States to review and, if necessary, modify existing national provisions that could limit journalistic freedoms;

    42.  Calls on the Member States to ensure that the national coordinators established under the DSA are fully empowered to perform their role in facilitating information exchange and cooperation at the European level;

    Civil society organisations (CSOs)

    43.  Agrees with the Commission’s assessment that CSOs, including those advocating for the rule of law and democracy, the protection of marginalised groups, environmental protection and social justice, and human rights defenders (HRDs) are essential for the checks and balances and for the protection of fundamental values and Union law that are a cornerstone of the EU; appreciates that CSOs and professional associations representing groups such as judges, prosecutors or journalists support the rule of law; underlines, in particular, the importance of local, vibrant civil societies in candidate and potential candidate countries, which play a constructive role in the EU accession processes; recognises their role as watchdogs against rule of law violations and their contribution to promoting and safeguarding democratic principles; recalls the need for a safe, supportive and enabling environment for their work;

    44.  Highlights the role of civil society and independent oversight bodies in monitoring, verifying and supporting the implementation of the recommendations of the 2024 Rule of Law Report; calls for a structured civil dialogue framework to integrate civil society contributions into the annual rule of law cycle, as recommended by the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC)(54) and civil society networks(55); reiterates the importance of broad consultation when drafting the report; supports the Commission’s plan to draft a strategy on space for and the protection of civil society and HRDs; recommends that the EU Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders be fully implemented; calls on the Commission to conduct visits to Member States on-site whenever possible, rather than virtually, as on-site visits could paint a fuller and more contextual picture of the local situation;

    45.  Is concerned by the growing trend of CSOs and HRDs facing further legal restrictions, a lack of funding, and attacks, which undermine freedom of association, freedom of assembly and freedom of expression; notes with concern that several Member States and candidate and potential candidate countries have imposed disproportionate measures, including the excessive use of force and the detention of protesters to prevent people from participating in protests in some Member States, as well as pre-emptive bans on public gatherings on the vague grounds of security; stresses that courts have overturned such bans in multiple cases; strongly condemns the use of ‘foreign agent laws’, which stifle dissent, harass CSOs and restrict their operations, creating a chilling effect on civil society and HRDs; regrets the fact that restrictions on freedom of assembly, expression and association and the use of excessive force often disproportionately affect specific causes or groups(56);

    46.  Stresses that peaceful assembly, freedom of association and expression, and freedom of the arts and sciences are fundamental rights protected by international law and are essential for democracy; condemns the increased pressure on these rights, where proven, and notes the trend of restricting them; condemns also, in this context, episodes of violence against police forces; calls on the Commission to reflect these freedoms in the annual report;

    47.  Expresses deep concern about the shrinking civic space and increasing persecution of CSOs and HRDs in the EU, particularly those working on anti-racism, climate justice, LGBTIQ rights, women’s rights and migrant supports; notes that these groups face a range of threats including legal and financial restrictions, funding suspensions, smear campaigns, intimidation and criminalisation; condemns, in particular, the growing repression of climate activism in several Member States, including the misuse of anti-terrorism and organised crime laws and the classification of peaceful climate activists as members of ‘criminal organisations’; calls on the Member States to refrain from disproportionate legal action against such activists; urges the Commission to systematically monitor the situation of these organisations in its rule of law reports and to expand dedicated EU funding for civil society actors combating racism and working on other fundamental rights;

    48.  Calls on the Commission to address such breaches in a dedicated pillar of the annual rule of law reports; calls on the Commission to strengthen the protection of CSOs and HRDs, by establishing early warning mechanisms, increasing the transparency of funding for all actors in the scope of the EU Transparency Register and expanding funding to support CSOs to enable them to operate freely and independently;

    49.  Urges the Member States to create an enabling environment for CSOs and HRDs, adopt the Anti-SLAPP Directive, and implement Commission Recommendation (EU) 2022/758 to protect CSOs from legal harassment; calls for strengthened independence of national oversight bodies, with adequate resources and safeguards against political interference; encourages support for CSOs in developing and disseminating educational initiatives to ensure broad outreach and accessibility;

    50.  Considers that the Commission and the Member States should improve funding mechanisms for CSOs and initiatives that strengthen the judiciary and uphold court independence, namely through the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values programme and the Justice programme; welcomes the fact that the Commission plans to draft a strategy for protecting civil society, recalls, at the same time, that there should be a special focus on HRDs; calls on the Commission to include a rapid response mechanism to support threatened CSOs and HRDs within the Union, drawing on the model of the EU-funded ‘Protect Defenders’ mechanism, which currently has a non-EU focus only; emphasises that this mechanism could provide resources for advocacy, legal aid and awareness campaigns, while ensuring that these organisations can operate without undue restrictions or harassment; calls for the full and consistent application of the Union guidelines on HRDs in candidate and potential candidate countries; is concerned, however, by the growing trend in some Member States of CSOs and HRDs facing challenges, with new legal restrictions, a lack of funding, and physical or verbal attacks, and by the deplorable acceptance of such practices and the chilling effect thereof, including on their freedom of speech within the Member States(57) and the EU institutions; considers that CSOs and HRDs play an essential supportive role in monitoring Member States’ compliance with the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU;

    Equality and non-discrimination before the law

    51.  Recalls that Member States’ legal frameworks must enshrine equal legal treatment and promote equality and the right of individuals not to be discriminated against in judicial proceedings; stresses that the rule of law and fundamental rights are interlinked and that violations of the rule of law have an immediate impact on fundamental rights and disproportionately affect women, minorities and vulnerable groups; calls on the Commission to monitor the effect of any violations of the rule of law on fundamental rights and to ensure that equality and non-discrimination before the law for all people are protected through the use of all relevant instruments, including infringement procedures, where appropriate;

    52.  Stresses the need to fight against all types of discrimination before the law; expresses its concern over the lack of progress in and implementation of equality and anti-discrimination laws in some Member States; regrets the fact that, despite existing EU legislation such as Directive 2000/78/EC(58) on equal treatment, gaps in the legal framework and in implementation persist, leaving victims without adequate legal recourse; recalls that Member States’ legal frameworks must enshrine equal legal treatment and promote equality and the right of individuals not to be discriminated against in legal remedy; calls on the Commission to act in cases of non-compliance with these principles; deplores the intention of the Commission to withdraw the proposal for a horizontal equal treatment directive(59) and urges the Council to adopt the directive without further delay;

    53.  Is concerned that the Commission’s 2024 Rule of Law Report noted that some Member States fail to effectively prosecute hate crimes or provide sufficient support to victims of hate crimes, undermining trust in judicial systems and perpetuating inequality before the law; calls on the Council to extend the current list of ‘EU crimes’ in Article 83(1) TFEU to include hate crimes and hate speech and calls on the Commission to put forward a legislative proposal on hate crime and hate speech; asks the Commission to focus on hate crimes in its rule of law reports and, in this regard, to closely monitor and record hate crimes;

    54.  Underlines that gender-based violence, online and offline, is a major and pervasive offence, as well as a radical violation of fundamental rights, and it violates the principle of equality before the law; calls on the Commission and the Member States to take action against gender-based violence, both online and offline, including violence committed through the use of digital platforms; calls for gender-based violence to be added to the list of EU crimes and for an EU legislative proposal on combating rape based on the lack of consent, also in candidate and potential candidate countries;

    55.  Recalls the need for access to sexual and reproductive rights and health and calls for access to safe, legal abortion to be enshrined in the Charter;

    56.  Calls on all Member States to protect LGBTIQ rights in compliance with Union law, the Charter, and CJEU and ECtHR case-law, recalls that legal barriers to recognising same-sex partnerships or parenthood across borders persist in several Member States; warns that such practices not only hinder the free movement of LGBTIQ families within the EU, but also violate the rule of law principle of non-discrimination before the law, highlighting the lack of uniform protection for LGBTIQ individuals across Member States; calls on the Member States who have not yet done so to introduce legal recognition of same-sex partnerships; calls on the Commission to recast Directive 2004/38/EC(60) in order to include an explicit cross-border recognition of private and family life rights, including parenthood for same-sex parents, in the light of the latest rulings(61) of the CJEU; stresses that all children are equal before the law and that Member States must act in the best interests of the child, increase legal certainty and reduce discrimination against the children of same-sex parents; recalls Parliament’s position supporting the recognition of parenthood across the EU, irrespective of how a child is conceived or born, or the type of family they have; urges the Commission to present a renewed LGBTIQ strategy that fully addresses the challenges throughout Europe; calls on the Commission and the Council to make LGBTIQ rights a cross-cutting priority across all policy fields; calls on the Commission to put forward appropriate legislative measures to ensure respect for these principles, as well as to rely on infringement procedures against Member States; urges the Commission to present legislative proposals to combat hate crimes and hate speech on grounds of gender identity, sex characteristics and sexual orientation;

    57.  Is deeply concerned about the discriminatory measures introduced in some Member States under the pretext of fighting ‘LGBTIQ propaganda’ and ‘gender ideology’ which are contributing to an alarming increase in hate crimes and hate speech targeting LGBTIQ individuals in several Member States and have a negative impact on children, families and workers; welcomes the CJEU’s opinion of 5 June 2025 stating that it considers Hungary to be in violation of EU law in prohibiting or restricting access to LGBTIQ+ content; highlights the negative impact of such measures on the freedom of expression and assembly for LGBTIQ groups and beyond; emphasises that these actions encourage discrimination against LGBTIQ individuals and contravene EU law; urges the Commission to present a proposal for a binding EU ban on conversion practices in all Member States; notes that in 2024, both the Commission and the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) noted an alarming increase in hate crimes and hate speech targeting LGBTIQ individuals and other minorities in several Member States, stresses the importance of the right to self-determination of LGBTIQ persons and reminds Member States that, in accordance with case-law, the right to self-determination is a fundamental right; therefore urges all Member States who have not done so yet to make sure that LGBTIQ individuals have access to legal gender recognition;

    58.  Is deeply concerned by and strongly condemns the rising levels of anti-Semitism across the EU; is also deeply concerned and strongly condemns the rising levels of Islamophobia and all other forms of discrimination across the EU, including acts of violence, intimidation, hate speech and the display of hate symbols in public spaces; calls on the Member States and candidate and potential candidate countries to make sure that members of all minorities are equal before the law; calls on the Member States to review laws and policies to ensure that they do not discriminate against minorities, directly or indirectly, and to review any discriminatory legal provisions and regulations; calls for sustained efforts at both EU and national levels to monitor, prevent and prosecute related hate crimes and to protect Jewish and Muslim communities from harassment and violence;

    59.  Emphasises that a lack of accountability disproportionately affects minorities’ communities, fair political representation, and economic opportunities; calls for increased transparency in public decision-making processes to ensure inclusive and equitable governance;

    60.  Calls on the Member States to fully implement Directive 2024/1500(62) and Directive 2024/1499(63), which establish minimum standards for equality bodies; calls for concrete measures to guarantee their independence and ensure their effectiveness in promoting equality;

    61.  Underlines that third-country nationals legally residing in the EU, regardless of their nationality or place of birth, must be treated in a non-discriminatory manner and enjoy fair and equal treatment in the areas specified by existing legislation; points out that third-country nationals, regardless of their nationality, place of birth or residence status, have the right to apply for international protection in compliance with international and EU law, of which the non-refoulement principle is an integral part; calls on the Commission to support the Member States in upholding the rule of law and fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter and in implementing the legislation adopted by the co-legislators; stresses the binding nature of the judgments of the CJEU and the ECtHR;

    62.  Urges the Commission to ensure that the free movement of persons within the EU, the right to reside freely, and family reunification are fully respected in the EU territory and that every citizen can enjoy equal rights and fully exercise their rights;

    63.  Urges the Commission to strengthen the focus in the annual rule of law report on strengthening the fight against all forms of discrimination in access to justice; calls on the Commission and the Member States to combat discrimination on grounds of racial and ethnic origin, religion or belief, nationality, political opinion, language, disability, age, gender, including gender identity and gender expression, and sexual orientation; urges the Council to reach an agreement on Directive 2008/0140(CNS)(64); urges the Commission to introduce new pillars in the annual rule of law report focusing on combating all forms of hatred and discrimination as enshrined in Article 21 of the Charter, namely regarding crimes that target minority groups and members of national, ethnic, linguistic and religious minorities, as well as the conditions of civil society in Member States; calls on the Commission to require Member States to collect comparable and robust disaggregated equality data to fully assess the impact of structural discrimination on the rule of law; calls on the Commission to reconsider its position on the Minority SafePack Initiative and to put forward legislative initiatives to safeguard the promotion of minority rights and language rights; reiterates its call for the EU to accede to the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages; calls for closer ties between the EU and the Council of Europe on minority rights, including in view of the enlargement process;

    64.  Emphasises the need for Member States to address the gender gap in the judiciary and other key democratic institutions; recommends implementing targeted measures to increase women’s representation in senior judicial and public administration positions;

    65.  Calls on the Member States to establish national human rights institutions, in accordance with the UN Paris Principles, to guarantee their independence and to ensure that they have the capacity to carry out their tasks effectively;

    Single market and the rule of law

    66.  Highlights the importance of the rule of law in ensuring the smooth and efficient functioning of the single market and reaffirms that well-functioning, independent judicial systems, effective anti-corruption frameworks and strong protection of media freedom are crucial for maintaining fair competition, upholding legal certainty and fostering trust among economic operators; underlines that non-compliance and circumvention of European regulations lead to enormous distortions of competition in the internal market; emphasises that reliable and stable rule of law structures are key pillars for investment and trade, which are essential for competitiveness and, therefore, for the capacity of the welfare system and the labour market in the EU;

    67.  Stresses that the proper functioning of the single market depends on the effective application of the principle of mutual trust and recognition in both judicial and administrative cooperation; recalls that such trust can only be sustained where the rule of law – as also recommended by the Venice Commission in its rule of law checklist – is fully upheld; indicates that the principle of mutual recognition should be suspended in cases of systemic breaches;

    68.  Underlines the negative economic impact that corruption and weak judiciary systems have on investor confidence and cross-border cooperation; is concerned that national governments and institutions which fail to uphold the rule of law may allow anti-competitive behaviour to flourish, or may even actively encourage it for political or economic gain, thereby potentially damaging the EU’s economy and undermining the fairness of its internal market;

    69.  Recalls that, within the scope of application of the Treaties, any discrimination on the grounds of nationality is prohibited in accordance with the Charter, and that freedom of establishment, service provision and movement of capital are fundamental to the single market; underlines that the rules regarding equality of treatment forbid overt and covert discrimination by reason of nationality or, in the case of a company, its seat; recalls its condemnation of the reported systemic discriminatory, non-transparent and unfair practices against companies in some Member States;

    70.  Condemns systemic discriminatory practices in Hungary, including the misuse of EU funds to benefit political allies, violations of EU competition rules, and the concentration of businesses in the hands of oligarchs with ties to the government; deplores the release of EU funds to the Hungarian Government despite ongoing deficiencies in judicial independence and anti-corruption frameworks; recommends suspending disbursements until all rule of law benchmarks are met; urges the Commission to ensure that EU funds reach the Hungarian population, including through direct and indirect funding mechanisms for beneficiaries independent of the Hungarian Government;

    71.  Highlights the importance of addressing economic inequality and social exclusion as threats to democratic participation and the rule of law;

    72.  Calls on the Commission to integrate the single market dimension of the rule of law more explicitly into its monitoring mechanisms, with a stronger focus on the uniform and rapid application, implementation and enforcement of existing legislation, ensuring that Member States’ adherence to rule of law principles is assessed not only from a democratic and judicial standpoint but also in terms of its economic impact on the single market and financial stability; requests that the Commission include in its 2025 rule of law report a dedicated chapter on the single market dimension; urges the Commission to use all available legal tools to address rule of law deficiencies, including launching infringement procedures and competition law enforcement powers when necessary, to preserve the functioning of the internal market;

    Rule of law toolbox

    73.  Stresses the importance of embedding rule of law milestones in funding instruments such as the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF); deplores the release of EU funds to the Hungarian Government despite ongoing deficiencies in judicial independence and anti-corruption frameworks; recommends suspending disbursements until all rule of law benchmarks are met; urges the Commission to ensure that EU funds reach the Hungarian population, including through direct and indirect funding mechanisms for beneficiaries independent of the Hungarian Government, while maintaining the full impact of the measures taken;

    74.  Criticises the Council’s inaction in advancing ongoing Article 7 TEU proceedings, which weakens the EU’s credibility in upholding the rule of law; urges the Council to unblock the next steps in the Article 7 TEU procedure in relation to Hungary, given persistent violations on judicial independence, media freedom and civil society, which necessitate immediate and decisive action; recommends that the Council ensure that hearings take place at least once per presidency during ongoing Article 7 procedures and also that new developments affecting the rule of law, democracy and fundamental rights are addressed; emphasises that there is no need for unanimity in the Council in order to identify a clear risk of a serious breach of Union values under Article 7(1) TEU, or to address concrete recommendations to the Member States in question and provide deadlines for the implementation of those recommendations; reiterates its call on the Council to do so, underlining that any further delaying of such action would amount to a breach of the rule of law principle by the Council itself; insists that Parliament should have a more active role in Article 7 TEU proceedings, including the ability to present reasoned proposals to the Council, attend Council hearings and be fully informed at every stage of the procedure;

    75.  Welcomes the preventive tools in the rule of law toolbox, such as the annual rule of law cycle, the EU justice scoreboard, the European Semester, EU funds to support civil society, judicial networks and media freedom and the rule of law milestones in the RRF; insists that a closer link between the findings of the 2024 Rule of Law Report and the allocation of financial support under the Union budget is introduced, in terms of milestones, ensuring that EU funds are tied to the achievement of necessary reforms; calls on the Commission to further develop a direct link between preventive and reactive instruments and hence, on the basis of the findings in the annual rule of law reports, to promptly and in a coordinated manner launch infringement procedures, set further steps in applying the Article 7 TEU procedure, and apply the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation and the horizontal enabling conditions related to the Charter, as well as provisions from the Financial Regulation and Common Provisions Regulation; calls on the Commission to assess and report on the potential risks to the Union budget posed by weaknesses in rule of law regimes in the annual rule of law reports starting with the 2025 report; underlines that both the triggering of the reactive instruments and the closure of relevant procedures must be based on the objective criterion of compliance with the rule of law and with EU and international law as interpreted by international courts;

    76.  Calls on the Commission to systemically resort to expedited procedures and applications for interim measures before the CJEU in infringement cases; calls on the Commission to revise its policy, outlined in its 2022 communication on enforcing EU law(65), not to use infringement actions for ‘individual’ redress, as this policy has led to serious deprivation of rights for citizens across the EU, especially where their own governments are refusing to comply with EU law or CJEU judgments, also because most of these cases are not merely individual but address strategic and fundamental issues; asks the Commission to report annually on the application and effectiveness of the tools used against breaches of the principles of the rule of law in Member States;

    77.  Underlines the need for an ever more comprehensive toolbox ensuring compliance, beyond its budgetary dimension, with EU values across all Union law, including financial instruments, to prevent backsliding; urges the Commission to identify the gaps and present relevant proposals broadening the scope of this toolbox; supports stronger application of the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation, with cross-cutting conditionality in EU funding programmes; maintains its position that frozen EU funds should only be released once meaningful reforms have been fully implemented and rule of law compliance has been verifiably achieved in practice; emphasises the need for consistency and transparency in applying the toolbox to protect Union values, without political considerations and using objective criteria to trigger reactive instruments; highlights the fact that conditionality should equally apply to candidate and potential candidate countries; insists on the importance of Parliament’s role in overseeing the use of those tools; urges the Commission to conduct systematic audits of the distribution of EU funds to prevent conflicts of interest, political instrumentalisation or opacity in fund allocation at the national level;

    78.  Insists on the introduction of a performance-based instrument in the multiannual financial framework (MFF) to strengthen the alignment between EU funds and the respect for Union values enshrined in Article 2 TEU such as democracy, fundamental rights and the rule of law; requests that the future MFF include robust rule of law safeguards applicable to all EU funds;

    79.  Expresses concern that the suspension of EU funds could be misused as a political weapon against civil society and local authorities; recalls that the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation ensures that final recipients should not lose access to EU funds if sanctions are applied to their government; calls for ‘smart conditionality’ that would enable national governments undermining the rule of law to be bypassed by allocating decommitted EU funds directly to local and regional authorities and to non-governmental organisations and businesses that comply with EU law, as well as by simplifying the reallocation of funds intended for the benefit of the Member State in question to other EU programmes; proposes the establishment of a transparent system for local authorities to request EU funds when national governments block or misuse EU funds; stresses the importance of strictly applying the conditionality mechanisms as enshrined in the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance and in the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans in a transparent manner;

    Checks and balances

    80.  Underlines the importance of safeguarding the separation of powers and a stable institutional framework in every Member State; calls on the Member States to ensure that any constitutional or legislative reforms affecting the separation of powers fully comply with EU fundamental values and legal principles;

    81.  Calls on the Member States to refrain from excessively using accelerated procedures that bypass stakeholder and civil society consultation, including parliamentary scrutiny or emergency powers, as these negatively impact the stability and the quality of lawmaking and democracy; calls on the Member States to set up transparent lawmaking processes following systematic and public consultation with various stakeholders and advisory bodies;

    82.  Encourages national governments and parliaments to publish publicly accessible impact assessments and consultation findings for every major legislative proposal;

    83.  Underlines the recommendation of the Venice Commission that complaints and appeals in the case of electoral irregularities, in particular with regard to vote buying, ballot-box stuffing and incorrect vote counting, be followed up effectively; recalls the importance of the EU legislation adopted in this regard, namely the DSA, the Digital Markets Act(66), the AI Act(67), Regulation (EU) 2024/900 on the transparency and targeting of political advertising(68) and the EMFA; calls on the Commission and the Member States to fully implement these acts and provide adequate public resources for the measures under them;

    84.  Calls on the Member States to strengthen the independence of national oversight bodies in order to ensure resources and freedom from political interference; stresses the importance of civil society and HRDs in promoting accountability and protecting fundamental rights;

    85.  Expresses deep concern about the rise of extremism and its corrosive effect on democratic norms and the rule of law in several Member States; notes with concern that extremist groups actively target minorities and contribute to a climate of fear, discrimination and polarisation; calls on the Commission to explicitly identify such groups as a threat to democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms, including academic and media independence, in its annual rule of law report; urges the Member States to take decisive action to counter their influence through robust legal frameworks, education promoting democratic values, and support for CSOs countering extremism; calls for coordinated EU action to counter this threat, including through education, social inclusion programmes and, where necessary, legal measures;

    86.  Expresses concern about the reported cases of the use of surveillance technologies by Member State governments against journalists, activists, opposition figures and staff of the EU institutions; recalls that the use of spyware must be strictly proportionate and necessary and urges the Commission to present a plan of measures to prevent its abuse without undue delay, making full use of all available legislative means provided by the Treaties, as recommended by the PEGA Committee;

    87.  Notes with concern the increasing use of artificial intelligence for national security and law enforcement purposes across the EU, stressing the risks to fundamental rights and freedoms(69); recalls the need to ensure robust data protection safeguards when Member States or national authorities employ surveillance software; calls for strengthened EU legislation to prevent mass surveillance and discrimination;

    88.  Is concerned about foreign interference in the Member States and in candidate and potential candidate countries, including social media manipulation and disinformation by forces both inside and outside the Union to manipulate public opinion and distort democratic debate; stresses the importance of transparency in platform algorithms, independent audits and robust fact-checking mechanisms to combat disinformation and safeguard democracy; calls on major digital platforms to cooperate with national law enforcement authorities to support investigations into illegal online activities; calls on the Commission and the Member States to monitor this and to apply the DSA and the Digital Markets Act swiftly, particularly regarding very large online platforms; calls on the Commission to include greater scrutiny of online platform disinformation in Pillar 3 (Pluralism and Media Freedom) of its rule of law report;

    89.  Stresses the importance of academic freedom as an integral aspect of the rule of law and urges the Member States to protect universities from political interference and ensure institutional autonomy; encourages the Member States to foster a culture of the rule of law through awareness campaigns, outreach initiatives and action promoting democratic values and principles;

    90.  Invites the Commission and the Member States to consider engaging in a process focused on improving administrative procedures and practices that have an impact on the functioning of key democratic processes and the exercise of checks and balances in line with the EU’s established, shared principles;

    Horizontal recommendations

    91.  Recognises the Commission’s rule of law report as a key preventive tool for monitoring the state of the rule of law across the EU, facilitating dialogue between Member States, and guiding reforms in areas such as judicial independence, anti-corruption, media freedom and other checks and balances;

    92.  Acknowledges that the Commission’s rule of law report has become more comprehensive since its inception in 2020; deplores, however, the fact that essential elements from Parliament’s 2016 resolution have not yet been implemented and that the Commission has not fully addressed the recommendations made by Parliament in its previous resolutions; considers that these recommendations remain valid and reiterates them; calls for the inclusion in the annual report of important missing elements of the Venice Commission’s rule of law checklist, such as prevention of the abuse of powers, equality before the law and non-discrimination; reiterates its position that the report should cover the full scope of the values of Article 2 TEU, as these cannot be seen in isolation; asks the Commission to explore the potential release, at around the same time, of all reports related to the rule of law or fundamental rights, such as the annual reports on compliance with the Charter or the report by the FRA, in order to enable a simultaneous global debate on these issues; regrets, however, that despite the growing threats of disinformation, propaganda and information manipulation targeting European democracy, a similar peer review practice among the Member States, in support of the efforts of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, has not yet been considered;

    93.  Calls on the Commission to expand the scope of the report next year; insists that the Commission’s 2025 rule of law report cover the entire scope of Article 2 TEU and include broader indicators, such as media independence, the role of civil society, fundamental rights, academic and artistic freedom, gender equality, the protection of minorities and vulnerable groups, respect for international law, free and fair elections and the functioning of democratic institutions, in order to provide a fuller picture of rule of law standards across the EU, and in candidate and potential candidate countries;

    94.  Calls on the Commission to publish the criteria it uses to select information from civil society, international bodies, national authorities and other stakeholders in the process of their rule of law reporting; repeats its call on the Commission to invite the FRA to provide methodological advice and conduct comparative research in order to add detail in key areas of the annual report, given the intrinsic links between fundamental rights and the rule of law;

    95.  Encourages the Commission to use clearer language and transparent assessment rules to evaluate compliance with the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU; reiterates its call to the Commission to differentiate clearly between systemic and isolated breaches of the rule of law in Member States, to avoid the risk of trivialising the most serious breaches of the rule of law, and to make clear that when the values of Article 2 TEU are systematically, deliberately and gravely violated over a period of time, Member States could fail to meet all criteria that define a democracy; indicates that the recommendations should better reflect negative findings in the report and be more detailed; believes that the assessment of the fulfilment of previous recommendations should be more precise and qualitative, not relying only on legislative changes but also on real and independent evidence of their implementation in practice; invites the Commission to conduct field visits and provide assessments based on concrete and independent evidence of implementation in practice;

    96.  Warns that failing to link monitoring to real consequences risks diminishing the report’s relevance in the Member States; calls for a greater focus on implementing country-specific recommendations, with timelines and measurable benchmarks, including, where relevant, reference to existing opinions of international bodies (e.g. the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission, UN Special Rapporteurs) or relevant court rulings (including from the ECtHR); calls on the Commission to detail the possible consequences in the event of non-compliance, including by referring to specific instruments from the toolbox, which includes budgetary tools and funding conditionality; believes that certain breaches of the values deserve immediate enforcement action and other breaches require recommendations to be implemented urgently; urges the Member States to implement the recommendations outlined in previous reports and commends those Member States that have not only implemented the recommendations but have also exceeded the established standards;

    97.  Notes that the release date of the annual rule of law report in July is not conducive to generating sufficient visibility and is contrary to the report’s intended purpose of generating a genuine public debate about its findings; urges the Commission to reconsider the publication date and undertake additional efforts to make its findings widely known in all Member States;

    98.  Recalls that decisions taken or not taken by the EU institutions often influence the rule of law situation in the Member States; criticises the fact that the rule of law status at the EU institutions remains outside the scope of the Commission’s 2024 Rule of Law Report; requests that a chapter on the EU’s adherence to rule of law standards, based on an independent review mechanism, be included in the Commission’s 2025 rule of law report;

    99.  Proposes a comprehensive interinstitutional mechanism on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights covering all the values set out in Article 2 TEU and involving all EU institutions, Member States and candidate countries in order to foster uniformity; emphasises the need to ensure full independence and objectivity in the composition and functioning of this body, while adapting its mandate specifically to address rule of law challenges;

    100.  Believes that EU-level interinstitutional dialogue and cooperation on the rule of law should be strengthened; regrets the fact that the Commission and the Council have so far rejected its offer to enter into an interinstitutional agreement on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights; reaffirms its willingness to resume talks on this agreement; calls on the other institutions, in the meantime, to at least explore further cooperation in the context of the proposed interinstitutional pilot on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights, which would help build trust between the institutions in a practical way, in particular by sharing monitoring, dialogue and meeting practices; calls on the Council to make its rule of law dialogue more inclusive by inviting other institutions, such as the Venice Commission, the Human Rights Commissioner and representatives of Parliament, to its sessions; believes that the Council’s rule of law dialogue should become more interactive, with systematic provision of feedback; calls on the Member States to invest in proper preparation for this dialogue; emphasises that increased transparency would enhance the rule of law dialogue within the Union and therefore invites the Council to provide detailed public conclusions; urges the Council to engage with national parliaments to enhance democratic oversight of Member States’ compliance with EU rule of law standards; stresses that the rule of law report should be evidence-based and objective, addressing the Member States and EU institutions, and should include preventive and corrective measures;

    101.  Calls on the Member States to ensure that emergency measures adopted in response to crises (such as pandemics or security threats) are subject to regular parliamentary scrutiny and judicial review, and are strictly time-limited and proportionate;

    102.  Considers that cooperation between the EU and international organisations such as the Council of Europe, the OSCE and the UN in promoting and defending democracy, the rule of law, fundamental freedoms and human rights, including the rights of minorities, should be further strengthened;

    103.  Encourages the Member States to develop and implement comprehensive civic education programmes that foster understanding of democratic institutions, the rule of law and fundamental rights among citizens of all ages;

    104.  Deplores the fact that the Commission has not incorporated many of Parliament’s repeated requests regarding the Commission’s rule of law reports; demands that the Commission issue a communication by 31 December 2025 detailing which of the requests adopted by Parliament in relation to the Commission’s rule of law reports since 2021 the Commission will implement, which it will not, and why;

    105.  Welcomes the extension of the Commission’s rule of law report to cover candidate countries, namely Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia, reinforcing the fact that the EU’s fundamental values must be respected not only by current Member States but also by future members during the accession processes; encourages a close evaluation of the rule of law in all countries in an accession process; encourages the Commission to provide concrete recommendations to accession countries on the state of the rule of law, and to ensure alignment with the enlargement report; expects the Commission to include all candidate countries in its 2025 rule of law report;

    o
    o   o

    106.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, the Council of Europe and the governments and parliaments of the Member States.

    (1) OJ L 433, 22.12.2020, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/2092/oj.
    (2) OJ L 231, 30.6.2021, p. 159, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1060/oj.
    (3) OJ L, 2024/2509, 26.9.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj.
    (4) OJ L 156, 5.5.2021, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/692/oj.
    (5) OJ C 215, 19.6.2018, p. 162.
    (6) OJ C 463, 21.12.2018, p. 21.
    (7) OJ C 129, 5.4.2019, p. 13.
    (8) OJ C 390, 18.11.2019, p. 117.
    (9) OJ C 433, 23.12.2019, p. 66.
    (10) OJ C 363, 28.10.2020, p. 13.
    (11) OJ C 363, 28.10.2020, p. 45.
    (12) OJ C 395, 29.9.2021, p. 2.
    (13) OJ C 415, 13.10.2021, p. 36.
    (14) OJ C 445, 29.10.2021, p. 70.
    (15) OJ C 67, 8.2.2022, p. 86.
    (16) OJ C 81, 18.2.2022, p. 27.
    (17) OJ C 99, 1.3.2022, p. 146.
    (18) OJ C 117, 11.3.2022, p. 88.
    (19) OJ C 205, 20.5.2022, p. 2.
    (20) OJ C 251, 30.6.2022, p. 48.
    (21) OJ C 347, 9.9.2022, p. 2.
    (22) OJ C 347, 9.9.2022, p. 168.
    (23) OJ C 479, 16.12.2022, p. 18.
    (24) OJ C 493, 27.12.2022, p. 108.
    (25) OJ C 125, 5.4.2023, p. 80.
    (26) OJ C 125, 5.4.2023, p. 463.
    (27) OJ C 149, 28.4.2023, p. 15.
    (28) OJ C 149, 28.4.2023, p. 22.
    (29) OJ C 161, 5.5.2023, p. 10.
    (30) OJ C 167, 11.5.2023, p. 74.
    (31) OJ C 341, 27.9.2023, p. 2.
    (32) OJ C, C/2023/442, 1.12.2023, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2023/442/oj.
    (33) OJ C, C/2024/6743, 26.11.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6743/oj.
    (34) OJ C, C/2024/6746, 26.11.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6746/oj.
    (35) OJ C, C/2023/1223, 21.12.2023, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2023/1223/oj.
    (36) OJ C, C/2024/494, 23.1.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/494/oj.
    (37) OJ C, C/2024/3995, 17.7.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/3995/oj.
    (38) OJ C, C/2024/2656, 29.4.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/2656/oj.
    (39) OJ C, C/2024/5739, 17.10.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/5739/oj.
    (40) OJ C, C/2024/5733, 17.10.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/5733/oj.
    (41) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2024)0367.
    (42) For all DRFMG monitoring activities, see: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/libe-democracy-rule-of-law-and-fundament/product-details/20190103CDT02662.
    (43) Opinion 2/13 of the Court of Justice of 18 December 2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454, paragraph 168.
    (44) Judgment of the Court of Justice of 24 June 2019, European Commission v Republic of Poland, C-619/18, ECLI:EU:C:2019:531, paragraph 42.
    (45) COM(2024)0800, Annex with recommendations, pp. 1, 9, 11, 19 and 24.
    (46) Directive 2012/29/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA (OJ L 315, 14.11.2012, p. 57, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2012/29/oj).
    (47) Council Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 of 12 October 2017 implementing enhanced cooperation on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (‘the EPPO’) (OJ L 283, 31.10.2017, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2017/1939/oj).
    (48) Directive (EU) 2017/1371 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2017 on the fight against fraud to the Union’s financial interests by means of criminal law (OJ L 198, 28.7.2017, p. 29, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2017/1371/oj).
    (49) Regulation (EU) 2024/1083 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 establishing a common framework for media services in the internal market and amending Directive 2010/13/EU (European Media Freedom Act) (OJ L, 2024/1083, 17.4.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1083/oj).
    (50) Directive (EU) 2024/1069 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 on protecting persons who engage in public participation from manifestly unfounded claims or abusive court proceedings (‘Strategic lawsuits against public participation’) (OJ L, 2024/1069, 16.4.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1069/oj).
    (51) OJ L 138, 17.5.2022, p. 30, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reco/2022/758/oj.
    (52) Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act) (OJ L 277, 27.10.2022, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj).
    (53) Directive (EU) 2016/343 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on the strengthening of certain aspects of the presumption of innocence and of the right to be present at the trial in criminal proceedings (OJ L 65, 11.3.2016, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2016/343/oj).
    (54) EESC opinion of 14 February 2024 entitled ‘Strengthening civil dialogue and participatory democracy in the EU: a path forward’.
    (55) Civil Society Europe, ‘Joint Civil Society Contribution on Civic Space to the 2024 Annual Rule of Law Report’, June 2024.
    (56) European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Addressing racism in policing, Publications Office of the European Union, 2024.
    (57) Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, Drozd v. Poland, 15158/19 of 6 April 2023, and Mándli and Others v Hungary, 63164/16 of 26 May 2020.
    (58) Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation (OJ L 303, 2.12.2000, p. 16, http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2000/78/oj).
    (59) Proposal for a Council Directive on implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation (COM(2008)0426).
    (60) Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC (OJ L 158, 30.4.2004, p. 77, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2004/38/oj).
    (61) Judgment of the Court of Justice of 5 June 2018, Relu Adrian Coman and Others v Inspectoratul General pentru Imigrări and Ministerul Afacerilor Interne, C‑673/16, ECLI:EU:C:2018:385.
    (62) Directive (EU) 2024/1500 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on standards for equality bodies in the field of equal treatment and equal opportunities between women and men in matters of employment and occupation, and amending Directives 2006/54/EC and 2010/41/EU (OJ L, 2024/1500, 29.5.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1500/oj).
    (63) Council Directive (EU) 2024/1499 of 7 May 2024 on standards for equality bodies in the field of equal treatment between persons irrespective of their racial or ethnic origin, equal treatment in matters of employment and occupation between persons irrespective of their religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation, equal treatment between women and men in matters of social security and in the access to and supply of goods and services, and amending Directives 2000/43/EC and 2004/113/EC (OJ L, 2024/1499, 29.5.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1499/oj).
    (64) Proposal for a Council Directive on implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation (COM(2008)0426).
    (65) Commission communication of 13 October 2022 entitled ‘Enforcing EU law for a Europe that delivers’ (COM(2022)0518).
    (66) Regulation (EU) 2022/1925 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2022 on contestable and fair markets in the digital sector and amending Directives (EU) 2019/1937 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Digital Markets Act) (OJ L 265, 12.10.2022, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/1925/oj).
    (67) Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence and amending Regulations (EC) No 300/2008, (EU) No 167/2013, (EU) No 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, (EU) 2018/1139 and (EU) 2019/2144 and Directives 2014/90/EU, (EU) 2016/797 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Artificial Intelligence Act) (OJ L, 2024/1689, 12.7.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1689/oj).
    (68) Regulation (EU) 2024/900 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 March 2024 on the transparency and targeting of political advertising (OJ L, 2024/900, 20.3.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/900/oj).
    (69) Europol, ‘AI and policing – The benefits and challenges of artificial intelligence for law enforcement’, Publications Office of the European Union, 2024.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – Implementation report on the Recovery and Resilience Facility – P10_TA(2025)0128 – Wednesday, 18 June 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to Article 175 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/241 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 February 2021 establishing the Recovery and Resilience Facility(1) (RRF Regulation),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2023/435 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 February 2023 amending Regulation (EU) 2021/241 as regards REPowerEU chapters in recovery and resilience plans and amending Regulations (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) 2021/1060 and (EU) 2021/1755, and Directive 2003/87/EC(2) (REPowerEU Regulation),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget(3) (Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation),

    –  having regard to Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/765 of 29 February 2024 amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027(4) (MFF Regulation),

    –  having regard to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 16 December 2020 between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on budgetary discipline, on cooperation in budgetary matters and on sound financial management, as well as on new own resources, including a roadmap towards the introduction of new own resources(5) (the IIA),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union(6) (Financial Regulation),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/795 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 February 2024 establishing the Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform (STEP), and amending Directive 2003/87/EC and Regulations (EU) 2021/1058, (EU) 2021/1056, (EU) 2021/1057, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) 2021/1060, (EU) 2021/523, (EU) 2021/695, (EU) 2021/697 and (EU) 2021/241(7),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1263 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2024 on the effective coordination of economic policies and on multilateral budgetary surveillance and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97(8),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 23 June 2022 on the implementation of the Recovery and Resilience Facility(9),

    –  having regard to the Commission notice of 22 July 2024 entitled ‘Guidance on recovery and resilience plans’(10),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 21 February 2024 on strengthening the EU through ambitious reforms and investments (COM(2024)0082),

    –  having regard to the Commission’s third annual report of 10 October 2024 on the implementation of the Recovery and Resilience Facility (COM(2024)0474),

    –  having regard to the Court of Auditors’ (ECA) annual report of 10 October 2024 on the implementation of the budget for the 2023 financial year, together with the institutions’ replies,

    –  having regard to special report 13/2024 of the ECA of 2 September 2024 entitled ‘Absorption of funds from the Recovery and Resilience Facility – Progressing with delays and risks remain regarding the completion of measures and therefore the achievement of RRF objectives’, special report 14/2024 of the ECA of 11 September 2024 entitled ‘Green transition – Unclear contribution from the Recovery and Resilience Facility’, and special report 22/2024 of the ECA of 21 October 2024 entitled ‘Double funding from the EU budget – Control systems lack essential elements to mitigate the increased risk resulting from the RRF model of financing not linked to costs’,

    –  having regard to the study of December 2023 supporting the mid-term Evaluation of the Recovery and Resilience Facility,

    –  having regard to the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) 2024 annual report published on 3 March 2025,

    –  having regard to the report of September 2024 by Mario Draghi entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness’ (Draghi report),

    –  having regard to the opinion of the Committee of the Regions of 8 October 2024 entitled ‘Mid-term review of the post-COVID European recovery plan (Recovery and Resilience Facility)’(11),

    –  having regard to the information published on the Recovery and Resilience Scoreboard (RRF Scoreboard),

    –  having regard to the Commission staff working document of 20 November 2024 entitled ‘NGEU Green Bonds Allocation and Impact report 2024’ (SWD(2024)0275),

    –  having regard to its in-house research, in-depth analysis and briefings related to the implementation of the RRF(12),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 18 January 2024 on the situation in Hungary and frozen EU funds(13),

    –  having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure, as well as Article 1(1)(e) of, and Annex 3 to, the decision of the Conference of Presidents of 12 December 2002 on the procedure for granting authorisation to draw up own-initiative reports,

    –  having regard to the opinions of the Committee on Budgetary Control, the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs, the Committee on the Environment, Climate and Food Safety and the Committee on Transport and Tourism,

    –  having regard to the joint deliberations of the Committee on Budgets and the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs under Rule 59 of the Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgets and the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (A10-0098/2025),

    A.  whereas the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) was created to make European economies and societies more sustainable, resilient and better prepared in the light of unprecedented crises in 2019 and 2022, by supporting Member States in financing strategic investments and in implementing reforms;

    B.  whereas reforms and investments under the RRF help to make the EU more resilient and less dependent by diversifying key supply chains and thereby strengthening the strategic autonomy of the EU; whereas reforms and investments under the RRF also generate European added value;

    C.  whereas the RRF, as well as other EU funds, such as the European instrument for temporary support to mitigate unemployment risks in an emergency, has helped to protect labour markets from the risk of long-term damage caused by the double economic shock of the pandemic and the energy crisis;

    D.  whereas RRF expenditure falls outside the ceilings of the multiannual financial framework (MFF) and borrowing proceeds constitute external assigned revenue; whereas Parliament regrets that they do not form part of the budgetary procedure; whereas based on the Financial Regulation’s principle of transparency, citizens should know how and for what purpose funds are spent by the EU;

    E.  whereas, due to the lack of progress in introducing new own resources in the EU and the need to ensure the sustainability of the EU’s repayment plan, a clear and reliable long-term funding strategy is essential to meet repayment obligations without forcing difficult trade-offs in the EU budget that could undermine future investments and policy priorities; whereas further discussions and concrete financial solutions will be necessary to secure the long-term viability of the EU’s debt repayment plan;

    F.  whereas the borrowing costs for NextGenerationEU (NGEU) have to be borne by the EU budget and the actual costs exceed the 2020 projections by far as a result of the high interest rates; whereas the total costs for NGEU capital and interest repayments are projected to be around EUR 25 to 30 billion per year from 2028, equivalent to 15-20 % of the 2025 annual budget; whereas Parliament has insisted that the refinancing costs be placed over and above the MFF ceilings; whereas a three-step ‘cascade mechanism’ including a new special EURI instrument was introduced during the 2024 MFF revision to cover the significant cost overruns resulting from NGEU borrowing linked to major changes in the market conditions; whereas an agreement was reached during the 2025 budgetary procedure to follow an annual 50/50 benchmark, namely to finance the overrun costs in equal shares by the special EURI instrument de-commitment compartment and the Flexibility Instrument;

    G.  whereas the bonds issued to finance the RRF are to be repaid in a manner that ensures the steady and predictable reduction of liabilities, by 2058 at the latest; whereas the Council has yet to adopt the adjusted basket of new own resources proposed by the Commission, which raises concerns about the viability of the repayment of the debt undertaken under NGEU;

    H.  whereas the social dimension is a key aspect of the RRF, contributing to upward economic and social convergence, restoring and promoting sustainable growth and fostering the creation of high-quality employment;

    I.  whereas the RRF should contribute to financing measures to strengthen the Member States’ resilience to climate disasters, among other things, and enhance climate adaptation; whereas the Member States should conduct proper impact assessments for measures and should share best practice on the implementation of the ‘do no significant harm’ (DNSH) principle;

    J.  whereas the RRF plays an important role in supporting investments and reforms in sustainable mobility, smart transport infrastructure, alternative fuels and digital mobility solutions, thus enhancing connectivity and efficiency across the EU; whereas it is regrettable that only a few Member States chose to use the RRF to support investments, particularly in high-speed railway and waterway infrastructure, aimed at developing European corridors, despite the encouragement of cross-border and multi-country projects; whereas it is crucial to increase investments in transport infrastructure, particularly in underserved regions, to improve connectivity, support regional cohesion and contribute to the green transition;

    K.  whereas by 31 December 2024, Member States had submitted 95 payment requests and the level of RRF disbursements including pre-financing stood at EUR 197,46 billion in grants (55 % of the total grants envelope) and EUR 108,68 billion in loans (37 % of the total loans envelope); whereas three Member States have already received their fifth payment, while one Member State has not received any RRF funding; whereas all Member States have revised their national recovery and resilience plans (NRRP) at least once; whereas 28 % of milestones and targets have been satisfactorily fulfilled and the Commission has made use of the possibility to partially suspend payments where some milestones and targets linked to a payment request were not found to be satisfactorily fulfilled; whereas delays in the execution of planned reforms and investments, particularly in social infrastructure and public services, could lead to the underutilisation of available resources, thereby reducing the expected impact on economic growth, employment and social cohesion;

    L.  whereas the ECA has revealed various shortcomings of the RRF, in particular in relation to its design, its transparency and reporting, the risk of double funding and the implementation of twin transition measures;

    M.  whereas according to the ECA, performance is a measure of the extent to which an EU-funded action, project or programme has met its objectives and provides value for money; whereas moreover, financing not linked to costs does not, in itself, make an instrument performance-based;

    N.  whereas robust audit and control systems are crucial to protect the financial interests of the EU throughout the life cycle of the RRF; whereas the milestones commonly known as ‘super milestones’, in particular related to the rule of law, had to be fulfilled prior to any RRF disbursements;

    O.  whereas the RRF Regulation refers to the RRF’s ‘performance-based nature’ but does not define ‘performance’; whereas RRF performance should be linked to sound financial management principles and should measure how well an EU-funded action, project or programme has met its objectives and provided value for money;

    P.  whereas effective democratic control and parliamentary scrutiny over the implementation of the RRF require the full involvement of Parliament and the consideration of all its recommendations at all stages;

    Q.  whereas the Commission has to provide an independent ex post evaluation report on the implementation of the RRF by 31 December 2028, consisting of an assessment of the extent to which the objectives have been achieved, of the efficiency of the use of resources and of the European added value, as well as a global assessment of the RRF, and containing information on its impact in the long term;

    R.  whereas the purpose of this report is to monitor the implementation of the RRF, in accordance with Parliament’s role as laid down in the RRF Regulation, by pointing to the benefits and shortcomings of the RRF, while drawing on the lessons learnt during its implementation;

    Strengthening Europe’s social and economic resilience

    1.  Highlights the fact that the RRF is an unprecedented instrument of solidarity in the light of two unprecedented crises and a cornerstone of the NGEU instrument, ending in 2026; emphasises the importance of drawing lessons from its implementation for the upcoming MFF, including as regards transparency, reporting and coherent measurement of deliverables; highlights the stabilising effect of the RRF for Member States at a time of great economic uncertainty, as it mitigates negative economic and social consequences and supports governments by contributing to the implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights, by promoting economic recovery and competitiveness, boosting resilience and innovation, and by supporting the green and digital transitions;

    2.  Highlights the important role of the RRF in preventing the fragmentation of the internal market and the further deepening of macroeconomic divergence, in fostering social and territorial cohesion by providing macroeconomic stabilisation, and in offering assurance to the financial markets by improving investor confidence in turbulent times, thereby lowering yield spreads;

    3.  Welcomes the fact that the RRF is a one-off instrument providing additional fiscal space that has contributed to the prevention of considerable economic and social divergences between Member States with diverse fiscal space; highlights the Commission finding that the RRF has led to a sustained increase in investments across the EU and that the Commission expects the RRF to have a lasting impact across the EU beyond 2026, given its synergies with other EU funds; is, however, concerned that the RRF expiration in 2026 poses a significant risk of a substantial decline in public investment in common European priorities;

    4.  Recalls that the MFF and RRF combined amount to almost EUR 2 trillion for the 2021-2027 programming period, but points to the fact that the high inflation rates and the associated increases in the cost of goods and services have decreased the current value of European spending agreed in nominal terms;

    5.  Takes note of the Commission’s projection in 2024 concerning the potential of NGEU’s impact on the EU’s real gross domestic product (GDP) by 2026, which is significantly lower than its simulation in 2020 (1,4 % compared with 2,3 %), due in part to adverse economic and geopolitical conditions, and of the estimation that NGEU could lead to a sizeable, short-run increase in EU employment by up to 0,8 %; notes that the long-term benefits of the RRF on GDP will likely exceed the budgetary commitments undertaken by up to three to six times , depending on the productivity effects of RRF investment and the diligent implementation of reforms and investments;

    6.  Highlights the difficulty of quantifying the precise social and economic impact of the RRF, as it takes time for the impact of reforms and investments to become clear; stresses the need for further independent evaluations to assess the effective impact of reforms and investments and for further improvements of the underlying methodology; notes the Commission’s finding that approximately half of the expected increase in public investment between 2019 and 2025 is related to investment financed by the EU budget, particularly by the RRF, but notes that some investments have not yet delivered measurable impact;

    7.  Notes that the RRF has incentivised the implementation of some reforms included in the country-specific recommendations made in the context of the European Semester through the inclusion of such reforms in the NRRPs; underlines that there has been a qualitative leap forward in terms of monitoring RRF implementation; recalls that the RRF Scoreboard is used to monitor the progress made towards achieving milestones and targets, as well as compliance with horizontal principles, and in particular the six pillars, namely the green transition, the digital transformation, smart, sustainable and inclusive growth (including economic cohesion, jobs, productivity, competitiveness, research, development and innovation, and a well-functioning internal market with strong small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)), social and territorial cohesion, health, economic, social and institutional resilience with the aim of, inter alia, increasing crisis preparedness and crisis response capacity, and policies for the next generation, children and young people, such as education and skills; highlights that the overall uptake of country-specific recommendations made in the context of the European Semester remains low and has even dropped;

    8.  Highlights that in the context of the new economic governance framework, the set of reforms and investments underpinning an extension of the adjustment period should be consistent with the commitments included in the approved NRRPs during the period of operation of the RRF and the Partnership Agreement under the Common Provisions Regulation(14); observes that the five Member States that requested an extension of the adjustment period by 31 December 2024 relied partly on the reforms and investments already approved under the RRF to justify the extension; takes note of the fact that most Member States have included information on whether the reforms and investments listed in the medium-term fiscal-structural plans are linked to the RRF;

    9.  Welcomes the fact that the RRF provides support for both reforms and investments in the Member States, but notes with concern that the short timeframe for the remaining RRF implementation poses challenges to the completion of key reforms and large-scale investments that are to be finalised towards the end of the RRF and to the timely fulfilment of the 70 % of milestones and targets that are still pending;

    10.  Recalls that RRF expenditure should not substitute recurring national budgetary expenditure, unless duly justified, and should respect the principle of additionality of EU funding; insists that the firm, sustainable and verifiable implementation of non-recurrence, together with the targeting of clearly defined European objectives of reforms and investments, is key to ensure additionality and the long-lasting effect of additional European funds; recalls the need to uphold this principle and appeals against the crowding out or replacement of cohesion policy by the RRF or other temporary instruments, as cohesion policy remains essential for long-term sustainable territorial cohesion and convergence;

    11.  Highlights that prioritising RRF implementation, the lack of administrative capacity in many Member States and challenges posed by global supply chains have contributed to the delayed implementation of cohesion policy; calls on the Commission, in this context, to provide a comprehensive assessment of the RRF’s impact on other financial instruments and public investments, technical support, and the administrative and absorption capacities of the Member States;

    12.  Recalls that, in reaction to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, the REPowerEU revision contributes to Europe’s energy security by reducing its dependence on fossil fuels, diversifying its energy supplies, investing in European resources and infrastructure, tackling energy poverty and investing in energy savings and efficiency in all sectors, including transport; emphasises that through REPowerEU, an additional EUR 20 billion in grants was made available in 2023, including EUR 8 billion generated from the front-loading of Emissions Trading System allowances and EUR 12 billion from the Innovation Fund; highlights Parliament’s successes in negotiations, in particular on the provisions on replenishing the Innovation Fund, the 30 % funding target for cross-border projects, the focus of investments on tackling energy poverty for vulnerable households, SMEs and micro-enterprises, and the flexible use of unspent cohesion funds from the 2014-2020 MFF and of up to 7,5 % of national allocations under the 2021-2027 MFF;

    13.  Recalls its call to focus RRF interventions on measures with European added value and therefore regrets the shortage of viable cross-border or multi-country measures, including high-speed railway and sustainable mobility infrastructure projects for dual use that are essential for completing the TEN-T network, and the related risk of re-nationalising funding; notes that the broad scope of the RRF objectives has contributed to this by allowing a wide variety of nationally focused projects to fall within its remit;

    14.  Highlights the modification of Article 27 of the RRF Regulation through REPowerEU, which significantly strengthened the cross-border and multi-country dimensions of the RRF by encouraging the Member States to amend their NRRPs to add RepowerEU chapters, including a spending target of at least 30 % for such measures in order to guarantee the EU’s energy autonomy; is concerned by the broad interpretation adopted by the Commission, which allows any reduction in (national) energy demand to make a case for a cross-border and multi-country dimension;

    15.  Welcomes the possibility of using RRF funding to contribute to the objectives of the Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform (STEP) by supporting investments in critical technologies in the EU in order to boost its industrial competitiveness; notes that no Member State has made use of the possibility to include in its NRRP an additional cash contribution to STEP objectives via the Member State compartment of InvestEU; recalls that Member States can still amend their national plans in that regard; expects the revision processes to be efficient, streamlined and simple, especially considering the final deadline of 2026, the current geopolitical context and the need to invest in European defence capabilities;

    16.  Recalls the application of the DNSH principle for all reforms and investments supported by the RRF, with a targeted derogation under REPowerEU for energy infrastructure and facilities needed to meet immediate security of supply needs; encourages the Commission to assess the feasibility of a more uniform interpretation of the DNSH principle between the RRF and the EU taxonomy for sustainable activities, while taking into account the specificities of the RRF as a public expenditure programme;

    Financial aspects of the RRF

    17.  Stresses that the RRF is the first major performance-based instrument at EU level which is exclusively based on financing not linked to costs (FNLC); recalls that Article 8 of the RRF Regulation stipulates that the RRF must be implemented by the Commission in direct management in accordance with the relevant rules adopted pursuant to Article 322 TFEU, in particular the Financial Regulation and the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation; regrets that the Council did not agree to insert specific rules in the Financial Regulation to address the risks of this delivery model, such as double funding; considers that the rules of the Financial Regulation should be fully applicable to future instruments based on FNLC, including as regards fines, penalties and sanctions;

    18.  Notes that only 13 Member States have requested loans and that EUR 92 billion of the EUR 385,8 billion available will remain unused since this amount was not committed by the deadline of 31 December 2023; takes note of the fact that loans were attractive for Member States that faced higher borrowing costs on the financial markets or that sought to compensate for a reduction in RRF grants; points out that some Member States have made limited use of RRF loans, either due to strong fiscal positions or administrative considerations; calls on the Commission to analyse the reasons for the low uptake in some Member States and to consider these findings when designing future EU financial instruments; notes with concern that national financial instruments to implement the NRRPs have not been sufficiently publicised, leading to limited awareness and uptake by potential beneficiaries; considers that a political discussion is needed on the use of unspent funds in the light of tight public budgets and urgent EU strategic priorities; calls for an assessment of how and under which conditions unused RRF funds could be redirected to boost Europe’s competitiveness, resilience, defence, and social, economic and territorial cohesion, particularly through investments in digital and green technologies aligned with the RRF’s original purpose;

    19.  Recalls the legal obligation to ensure full repayment of NGEU expenditure by 31 December 2058 at the latest; reminds the Council and the Commission of their legal commitment under the interinstitutional agreement concluded in 2020 to ensure a viable path to refinancing NGEU debt, including through sufficient proceeds from new own resources introduced after 2021 without any undue reduction in programme expenditure or investment instruments under the MFF; deplores the lack of progress made in this regard, which raises concerns regarding the viability of the repayment of the debt undertaken under NGEU, and urges the Council to adopt new own resources without delay and as a matter of urgency; urges the Commission, furthermore, to continue efforts to identify additional genuine new own resources beyond the IIA and linked to EU policies, in order to cover the high spending needs associated with the funding of new priorities and the repayment of NGEU debt;

    20.  Notes with concern the Commission’s estimation that the total cost for NGEU capital and interest repayments are projected to be around EUR 25 to 30 billion per year from 2028, equivalent to 15-20 % of the 2025 annual budget ; recalls that recourse to special instruments had to be made in the last three budgetary procedures to cover EURI instrument costs; highlights that the significant increase in financing costs puts pressure on the future EU budget and limits the capacity to respond to future challenges;

    21.  Takes note of the Commission’s target to fund up to 30 % of NGEU costs by issuing greens bonds; notes that by 31 December 2024 the Commission had issued European green bonds amounting to EUR 68.2 billion;

    Design and implementation of NRRPs

    22.  Notes that 47 % of the available RRF funds had been disbursed by 31 December 2024, with grants reaching 55 % and loans 37 %, which has resulted in a high proportion of measures still to be completed in 2025 and 2026; is concerned, however, about the ECA’s finding that only 50 % of disbursed funds had reached final beneficiaries in 15 out of 22 Member States by October 2023; calls on the Commission to take the recommendations of the ECA duly into account in order to improve the functioning of any future performance-based instruments similar to the RRF, in particular in the context of a more targeted MFF;

    23.  Welcomes the fact that all Member States have surpassed the targets for the green (37 %) and the digital transitions (20 %), with average expenditure towards climate and digital objectives of the RRF as a whole standing at 42 % and 26 % respectively; notes that the ECA has cast doubt on how the implementation of RRF measures has contributed to the green transition and has recommended improvements to the methodologies used to estimate the impact of climate-related measures; highlights the fact that the same methodological deficiencies exist across all pillars of the RRF;

    24.  Notes the tangible impact that the RRF could have on social objectives, with Member States planning to spend around EUR 163 billion; underlines that such spending must be result-oriented, ensuring measurable economic and/or social benefits; stresses the need to accelerate investments in the development of rural, peripheral and outermost, isolated and remote areas, and in the fields of affordable housing, social protection and the integration of vulnerable groups, and youth employment, where expenditure is lagging behind; calls for an in-depth evaluation by the Commission, under the RRF Scoreboard, of the projects and reforms related to education and young people implemented by Member States under the RRF; regrets the delayed implementation of health objectives observed in certain Member States, given that the instrument should also improve the accessibility and capacity of health systems, and of key social infrastructure investments, including early childhood education and care facilities; stresses that these delays, in some cases linked to shifting budgetary priorities and revised national implementation timelines, risk undermining the achievement of the RRF’s social cohesion objectives;

    25.  Reiterates its negotiating position to include targets for education (10 %) and for cultural activities (2 %); encourages the Commission’s effort to evaluate these targets as a benchmark in its assessment of education policy in NRRPs, through the RRF Scoreboard;

    26.  Observes that a large majority of NRRPs include a specific section explaining how the plan addresses gender-related concerns and challenges; is concerned, however, that some NRRPs do not include an explanation of how the measures in the NRRP are expected to contribute to gender equality and equal opportunities for all and calls on the Member States concerned to add such explanations without delay;

    27.  Stresses the importance of reforms focusing on labour market fragmentation, fostering quality working conditions, addressing wage level inequalities, ensuring decent living conditions, and strengthening social dialogue, social protection and the social economy;

    28.  Notes the tangible impact that the RRF could have on the digital transformation objective, with EUR 166 billion allocated to corresponding plans; welcomes the contributions made under the smart, sustainable and inclusive growth pillar, in particular to competitiveness and support for SMEs; notes the need for an acceleration of investments in transnational cooperation, support for competitive enterprises leading innovation projects, and regulatory changes for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, which are lagging behind;

    29.  Stresses that the success of EU investments depends on well-functioning capital markets; calls on the Member States to ensure a more effective and timely disbursement of funds, particularly for SMEs and young entrepreneurs, to streamline application procedures with a view to enhancing accessibility and to implement specific measures to provide targeted support to help them play a more prominent role in the process of smart and inclusive growth;

    30.  Is concerned that the achievement of milestones and targets lags behind the indicative timetable provided in the NRRPs, and that the pace of progress is uneven across Member States; regrets the time lag between the fulfilment of milestones and targets and the implementation of projects; highlights that the RRF will only achieve its long-term and short-term potential if the reform and investment components, respectively, are properly implemented; welcomes the fact that, following a slow start, RRF implementation has picked up since the second half of 2023 but significant delays affecting key reforms and investments still persist and have been attributed to various factors, including the revisions linked to the inclusion of REPowerEU, mounting inflation, the insufficient administrative capacity of Member States, in particular the smaller Member States, uncertainties regarding specific RRF implementation rules, high energy costs, supply shortages and an underestimation of the time needed to implement measures; notes that the postponement of key implementation deadlines by some governments to 2026 raises concerns about the capacity of some Member States to fully absorb the allocated funds within the set timeframe of the RRF; stresses the importance of maintaining a realistic and effective implementation schedule to prevent the risk of incomplete projects and missed opportunities for structural improvements; calls on the Commission to ensure that administrative bottlenecks are urgently addressed;

    31.  Recalls the modification of the RRF Regulation through the inclusion of the REPowerEU chapter; stresses the importance of the REPowerEU chapters in NRRPs and calls on the Member States to prioritise mature projects and implement their NRRPs more quickly, both in terms of reforms and investments, and, where necessary, to adjust NRRPs in line with the RRF’s objectives, without undermining the overall balance and level of ambition of the NRRPs, in order to respond to challenges stemming from geopolitical events and to tackle current realities on the ground;

    32.  Highlights the fact that the RRF could have helped to mitigate the effects of the current EU-wide housing crisis; regrets that some Member States did not make use of this opportunity and stresses the importance for the Member States to accelerate investments in availability and affordability of housing;

    33.  Highlights the role of ‘super milestones’ in protecting the EU’s financial interests against rule of law deficiencies and in ensuring the full implementation of the requirements under Article 22 of the RRF Regulation; welcomes the fact that all but one Member State have satisfactorily fulfilled their ‘super milestones’; recalls that the Commission must recover any pre-financing that has not been netted against regular payment requests by the end of the RRF;

    34.  Notes the high administrative burden and complexity brought by the RRF; stresses the considerable efforts required at national level to implement the RRF in parallel with structural funds; notes that between 2021 and 2024 the demand-driven Technical Support Instrument supported more than 500 RRF-related reforms in the Member States, directly or indirectly related to the preparation, amendment, revision and implementation of the NRRPs; takes note of the Commission guidance of July 2024 with simplifications and clarifications to streamline RRF implementation but expects the Commission to act swiftly on its promise to cut the administrative burden by 25 %; urges the Commission to give clear and targeted technical support to the Member States, allowing them to develop efficient administrative capacity to implement the milestones and targets; calls on the Commission to decrease the level of complexity of EU public procurement rules which apply to higher-value contracts;

    35.  Expresses concern over the complexity of application procedures for RRF funding, particularly for SMEs and non-governmental organisations, which require external consultancy services even for small grants; emphasises that such bureaucratic obstacles contradict the original objectives of the RRF, which aimed to provide rapid and direct financial support; calls for an urgent simplification of application and reporting requirements, particularly for smaller beneficiaries, to maximise the absorption and impact of funds and to assist with their contribution to the green and digital transitions;

    36.  Believes that implementation delays underscore the risk that measures for which RRF funding has been paid will not be completed by the 2026 payment deadline; welcomes the Commission’s statement at the Recovery and Resilience Dialogue (RRD) of 16 September 2024 that it will not reimburse non-implemented projects; considers it a shortcoming that RRF funds paid for milestones and targets assessed as fulfilled cannot be recovered if related measures are not eventually completed; encourages the Commission to take into account the ECA’s recommendations related to this and to assess, in cooperation with the Member States, the measures most at risk of not being completed by 31 August 2026; stresses the importance of monitoring these measures, facilitating timely follow-up and working towards solutions to overcome delays;

    37.  Notes with concern that the remaining implementation timeframe of the RRF is too short for the implementation of many innovative projects; further notes that innovative projects, by definition, are more difficult to plan and more likely to encounter obstacles during implementation, making them unsuited to the RRF’s strict deadlines; urges the Commission to create future programmes that are flexible enough to give proper answers in changing circumstances and that at the same time guarantee a certain degree of predictability;

    38.  Notes that some milestones and targets may be no longer achievable because of objective circumstances; stresses that any NRRP revisions should be made in accordance with the RRF Regulation, including the applicable deadlines, and should not entail backtracking on reforms, commitments or lower quality projects but should maintain the overall ambition and the efficiency of public spending;

    39.  Is concerned about the Commission’s uneven assessment of NRRPs, which has led to double standards in the application of the Regulation; is further concerned about the uneven and different definition of milestones and targets from one NRRP to the other, as consistently reported by the ECA;

    40.  Highlights that the duration of the Commission’s assessment of payment requests by Member States differs considerably among the Member States and stresses the need for more transparency from the Commission; urges the Commission to accelerate its assessments and to ensure the equal treatment of the Member States; highlights the need to ensure a level playing field across the EU for measures and indicators that are used to assess all RRF projects;

    41.  Urges the Member States to increase their efforts to address administrative bottlenecks and provide sufficient administrative capacity to accelerate RRF implementation in view of the 2026 deadline and to avoid concentrating RRF projects in more developed regions and capitals by enabling RRF funds to flow into projects in the most vulnerable regions, thereby serving the RRF’s objective to enhance the EU’s social, territorial and economic cohesion; emphasises the importance of fair regional distribution within the NRRPs while ensuring that RRF funds are allocated based on economic and social impact, feasibility and long-term benefits;

    42.   Calls for an 18-month extension of mature RRF projects through an amendment of the RRF Regulation by co-decision, if needed; emphasises that the envisaged extension of projects will be conducted by the Commission based on objective, clear and fair benchmarks; welcomes the possibility of establishing a targeted and performance-based prioritisation and transfer system after the 2026 deadline in order to allow for the finalisation of ongoing projects through other funding schemes, including the European Investment Fund and a possible new European competitiveness fund; urges the Commission to present a strategy to address the huge demand for public investment beyond 2026 without compromising budgetary resources in other critical areas;

    43.  Calls for an evaluation of how this framework could enable targeted investments in EU defence supply chains, strategic stockpiles and defence innovation, ensuring alignment with broader European security objectives;

    44.  Is concerned that some Member States might choose to forego parts of the amounts or entire amounts associated with their last payment request, thus avoiding the fulfilment of the last milestones and targets;

    Transparency, monitoring and control

    45.  Takes note of the fact that the Commission had planned to conduct 112 RRF audits in all Member States in 2024; reminds the Commission of its obligation, in accordance with Article 24(9) of the RRF Regulation, to recover funding in case of incorrect disbursements or reversals of measures;

    46.  Notes that the Commission relies on its own methodologies when calculating partial payments and suspensions of funds; regrets that these methodologies were only developed two years after the start of the RRF implementation and without the consultation of Parliament;

    47.  Welcomes the extensive work of the ECA in relation to the RRF and deems it important to thoroughly assess its findings, in particular its findings that milestones and targets are often rather vague and output-oriented and are therefore not fit to measure results and impacts, and its findings regarding the risks of double funding resulting from overlaps with other policies; notes that the Commission has accepted many but not all of the ECA’s recommendations; stresses that weaknesses in financial controls, as highlighted by the ECA, must be urgently addressed to prevent double funding, cost inefficiencies, and mismanagement of EU funds; calls for enhanced transparency and for the full consideration of the ECA’s recommendations without adding unnecessary administrative burden;

    48.  Notes that the ECA considers that the RRF focuses on progress on implementation rather than performance, particularly because RRF-funded measures focus on outputs rather than results, vary in ambition, sometimes lack clarity and do not always cover a measure’s key implementation stages, including completion;

    49.  Notes that the ECA’s audits revealed several cases in which funding had been disbursed but the requirements related to the fulfilment of corresponding milestones and targets had not been adequately met; further notes that the Commission framework for assessing the ‘satisfactory fulfilment’ of the relevant milestones and targets contains discretionary elements, such as ‘minimal deviation from a requirement’ or ‘proportional delays’, and that the methodology for the determination of partial payments does not provide an explanation for the values chosen as coefficients, thereby leaving room for interpretation; asks the Commission to provide Parliament with further clarification;

    50.  Insists that, as a rule, measures already included in other national plans benefiting from EU funding (e.g. cohesion, agriculture, etc.) should not be included in NRRPs, even if they do not incur any costs; urges the Commission to remain vigilant and proactive in identifying any potential situation of double funding in particular in regard to the different implementation models of the RRF and other EU funding instruments;

    51.  Regrets the lack of a proper RRF audit trail and the persistent lack of transparency despite the bi-annual reporting requirement for Member States on the 100 largest final recipients, which was introduced into REPowerEU upon Parliament’s request; regrets the delays in reporting by some Member States and the limited informative value of the information provided, which ultimately prevents compliance checks by the Commission or the ECA; reiterates its call for the lists of the largest final recipients for each Member State to be regularly updated and published on the RRF Scoreboard and to include information on the economic operators involved, including contractors and sub-contractors, and their beneficial owners, and not simply ministries or other government bodies or state companies; further regrets that the current definition of ‘final recipient’ leaves room for interpretation, resulting in different final beneficiaries for similar measures among Member States; calls on the Commission, in this context, to ensure a common understanding of what constitutes a ‘final recipient’ so that this can be applied consistently;

    52.  Is concerned about persistent weaknesses in national reporting and control mechanisms, due in part to absorption pressure affecting the capacity to detect ineligible expenditure and due to the complexity of the audit and control procedures, which created uncertainty in the Member States and an overload of administrative procedures; calls on the Commission to provide assurance on whether Member States’ control systems function adequately and to check the compliance of RRF-funded investment projects with EU and national rules; calls for payments to be reduced and, where appropriate, amounts to be recovered in accordance with Article 22 of the RRF Regulation, should weaknesses persist in the national control systems; regrets the reliance on manual cross-checks and self-declarations by recipients of EU funds in the absence of interoperable IT tools and harmonised standards, despite the existence of tools such as the Early Detection and Exclusion System and ARACHNE, whose use is currently not mandatory, thereby risking that expenditure is declared twice; recalls, in this regard, the reluctance of the Member States to make progress in developing the relevant IT tools in a timely manner;

    53.  Shares the view of the ECA that the FNLC model does not preclude reporting on actual costs; notes that having clear insights on costs also facilitates the work of control and oversight bodies, as well as the EPPO and the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), and enables enhanced public scrutiny;

    54.  Reiterates the role of the RRF Scoreboard in providing information for citizens on the overall progress in the implementation of NRRPs; underlines the importance of the Scoreboard in strengthening transparency and calls on the Commission to increase the level of transparency and data visualisation in the Scoreboard;

    55.  Recalls that the reporting on the progress of implementation in the RRF Scoreboard is based on information provided by the Member States on a bi-annual basis;

    56.  Highlights the important role of the EPPO and OLAF in protecting the EU’s financial interests; welcomes the fact that EPPO investigations into RRF-related fraud and corruption cases have led to several arrests, indictments and seizures of RRF funds; recalls that the EPPO was handling 307 active cases related to the RRF in 2024, corresponding to about 17 % of all expenditure fraud investigations and causing an estimated damage to the EU’s financial interests of EUR 2,8 billion; expects the number of investigations to grow as RRF implementation advances; calls on the Commission to look into the management declarations of the Member States in terms of their reporting of detected fraud and the remedial measures taken;

    Role of the European Parliament

    57.  Reiterates the importance of Parliament’s role in scrutinising and monitoring the implementation of the RRF and in holding the Commission accountable; highlights Parliament’s input provided through various channels, in particular through various plenary debates, parliamentary resolutions, bi-monthly RRD meetings with the responsible Commissioners, over 30 meetings of the standing working group on the scrutiny of the RRF, numerous parliamentary questions, the annual discharge procedure of the Commission and the regular flow of information and ad hoc requests for information from the Commission; regrets that the model of using milestones and targets to trigger disbursement was not accompanied by adequate budgetary control mechanisms, resulting in a diminished role for Parliament compared to its scrutiny of MFF spending;

    58.  Recalls Parliament’s rights as laid down in Article 25 of the RRF Regulation, in particular the right to simultaneously receive from the Commission information that it transmits to the Council or any of its preparatory bodies in the context of the RRF Regulation or its implementation, as well as an overview of its preliminary findings concerning the satisfactory fulfilment of the relevant milestones and targets included in the NRRPs; encourages the sharing of relevant outcomes of discussions held in Council preparatory bodies with the competent parliamentary committees;

    59.  Recalls further the right of Parliament’s competent committees to invite the Commission to provide information on the state of play of the assessment of the NRRPs in the context of the RRD meetings;

    60.  Regrets the fact that Parliament has no role in the design of NRRPs and is not consulted on payment requests; criticises furthermore the fact that Parliament has not been provided with a clear and traceable overview of the implementation status of projects and payments; expects to be informed about the context of NRRP revisions in order to make its own assessment of the revisions and to have an enhanced role in possible future instruments based on the RRF experience;

    Stakeholder involvement

    61.  Regrets the insufficient involvement of local and regional authorities (LRAs), civil society organisations, social partners, national parliaments and other relevant stakeholders in the design, revision or implementation of NRRPs leading to worse policy outcomes, as well as limited ownership; regrets that in the design and implementation of the NRRPs, some Member States have clearly favoured some LRAs or stakeholders to the detriment of others; recalls that the participation of LRAs, national authorities and those responsible for developing these policies is crucial for the success of the RRF, as stated in Article 28 of the RRF Regulation; recalls that Parliament supported a binding provision in the RRF to establish a multilevel dialogue to engage relevant stakeholders and discuss the preparation and implementation of NRRPs with them, with a clear consultation period; calls, therefore, for the maximum possible stakeholder involvement in the implementation of NRRPs, in accordance with the national legal framework and based on clear and transparent principles;

    62.  Reiterates the need for regular interaction between national coordinating authorities and national stakeholders involved in the monitoring of the implementation of the NRRPs, in line with the principle of transparency and accountability; stresses that more regular and public communication from the national coordinating authorities is needed to ensure that updated information about the progress of the implementation of NRRPs is made available;

    63.  Stresses that decisions should be made at the level that is most appropriate; is convinced that the application of the partnership principle and a stronger involvement of LRAs could make project implementation more efficient, reduce disparities within Member States and result in more and better quality measures with a cross-border and multi-country dimension;

    64.  Believes that valuable lessons can be drawn from the RRF to be reflected in the design of performance-based instruments in the next MFF, in particular in the light of the EU’s competitiveness and simplification agendas;

    Lessons for the future

    65.  Believes that the combination of reforms and investments has proved successful but that a clearer link is needed between the two; highlights the importance of aligning any funding with the objectives of the instrument and disbursing it in line with the progress made towards them; insists that the level of ambition of NRRPs should not be lowered but should be commensurate with the RRF timeline to ensure their successful implementation;

    66.  Is convinced, as highlighted by the Draghi report, that boosting EU competitiveness, decarbonising the EU’s economy and making it more circular and resource-efficient, as well as closing the skills gap, creating quality jobs and enhancing the EU’s innovation capacity, will be central priorities beyond 2026; is concerned that a sizeable funding gap will arise after the RRF ceases to operate at the end of 2026, notably for public investment in common European priorities, since financial resources from national budgets vary significantly among Member States; highlights the need to use the lessons learned from the RRF to better leverage public and private investments with a view to addressing the financing gap in European objectives and transitions, which the Draghi report estimates at over EUR 800 billion annually, while ensuring seamless continuity of investments in common European goods;

    67.  Welcomes the enhanced use of financial instruments made possible by the option to channel RRF funds towards the Member States’ compartment of InvestEU;

    68.  Urges the Commission to apply the lessons learned and the ECA’s observations, and to ensure that future performance-based instruments are well-targeted, aligned with the aim of financing European public goods and prioritising the addressing of clearly defined strategic challenges, economic sustainability and competitiveness; calls for it to be ensured that all future instruments are designed to measure not only inputs or short-term outputs and progress but also results in terms of long-term impacts backed by outcomes;

    69.  Notes that, according to the ECA, it is essential that future performance-based instruments are not designed and implemented in a way that is detrimental to accountability and, in particular, that appropriate control systems are in place in the Member States and are checked by the Commission before implementation starts; notes that this would involve setting minimum requirements for the Member States’ controls and the Commission’s checks;

    70.  Calls on the Commission to conduct an independent evaluation and to report on the RRF impact on private investments at aggregate EU level, in particular on its potential crowding-out effect on private investments and its determinants; calls further for objective and clear analyses from the Commission on how the implementation of reforms and investments within the NRRPs affects the economies of the individual Member States, with special regard to smart, sustainable and inclusive growth; urges the Commission to take the lessons learned from these analyses and from the ECA’s observations on the RRF implementation into account when drawing up its proposals for the next programming period;

    71.  Underlines that all EU-funded investments and reforms should be coordinated and coherent with strategic planning at national level and should focus on projects with a clear European added value; underlines the need for a spending target for cross-border and multi-country investments; calls on the Commission to develop a credible methodology to assess the cross-border and multi-country dimensions of EU funded projects;

    72.  Highlights that meaningful social and territorial dialogues with a high level of involvement of LRAs, social partners, civil society organisations and national parliaments within the national legal framework are essential for national ownership, successful implementation and democratic accountability; expresses concern over the insufficient involvement of all relevant stakeholders in the implementation and oversight of RRF-funded initiatives; stresses in particular that regions and city councils cannot be mere recipients of decisions, without being given the opportunity to have a say on reforms and investments that truly transform their territories;

    73.  Believes that it is essential to adopt differentiated strategies that recognise the cultural diversity of the various regions and enhance their economic and social cohesion instead of applying a homogeneous or one-size-fits-all approach that could be to the detriment of the less developed regions; calls, therefore, for dialogues with stakeholders to be strengthened and more diligently employed as they could inspire future initiatives and mechanisms in the EU and its Member States;

    74.  Underlines the requirement of the RRF Regulation to publicly display information about the origin of funding for projects funded by the EU to ensure buy-in from European citizens;

    75.  Highlights that the RRD meetings have been an important tool in enhancing transparency and accountability, which are crucial for the optimal implementation of the RRF;

    76.  Reiterates that further efforts are required to improve the transparency and traceability of the use of EU funds; stresses the need to ensure that data that is relevant for performance measurement is available and that information on performance is presented in a better and more transparent manner; stresses that the feedback mechanism between performance information and programme design or adjustment should be enhanced;

    77.  Considers that better training and capacity-building across all regions and authorities involved, in particular at national level, could have accelerated the RRF’s implementation and enabled the implementing authorities to better adapt to the performance-based nature of the RRF; considers that the Commission could have assisted Member States more at the planning stage and provided earlier implementation guidance, in particular with a view to strengthening their audit and control systems and the cross-border dimension of the RRF;

    78.  Highlights the importance of mitigating the risk of double funding; suggests the deployment of an integrated and interoperable IT and data mining system and the development of clear standards for datasets to be applied across Member States, with a view to allowing comprehensive and automated expenditure tracking; calls for improved coordination mechanisms that define clear responsibilities among the bodies involved in the implementation of the various EU and national programmes, while avoiding unnecessary bureaucratic complexity and ensuring an efficient allocation of funds; encourages the integration of advanced data analytics and AI tools to enhance performance tracking, evaluation and reporting to alleviate manual workload and to streamline reporting processes; underlines that such progress can only happen if there is also operational support to digitalise administrations;

    79.  Strongly urges the Commission and the Member States to ensure that any type of EU FNLC or EU funding that is performance based complies with EU and national rules, ultimately protecting the financial interests of the EU; reiterates the accountability and responsibility of the Commission and the Member States to ensure the legality and the regularity of EU funding, as well as the respect of sound financial management principles;

    80.  Considers that the role of Parliament in the monitoring of the RRF should be further enhanced;

    81.  Calls for future performance-based instruments to have a single audit trail to trace budget contributions to the projects funded; underlines the need for project-level auditing to mitigate reputational risks in the eyes of the general public and to facilitate the recovery of funds in case measures are reversed; underlines the need to reduce administrative bottlenecks and burden;

    82.  Demands that any possible future performance-based programmes make clearer links between the milestones and targets and the actual projects being implemented; stresses that there should be less of a delay between the fulfilment of milestones and the implementation of projects;

    83.  Reiterates its call for an open platform which contains data on all projects, final recipients and the regional distribution of funding, thereby facilitating auditing and democratic oversight;

    84.  Stresses that any possible future budgetary decisions on EU borrowing should respect the unity of the budget and Parliament’s role as part of the budgetary authority; highlights the risks of cost overruns for the repayment of debt, resulting inter alia from volatile interest rates; deems it important to ensure from the outset that sufficient funding is available to cover these costs without presenting a detriment to other programmes or political priorities;

    85.  Invites the Commission and the Member States to closely assess and learn from instruments and tools such as the RRF, in order to maximise the efficiency and impact of EU funding, investments and reforms, streamline policy objectives, improve the collaboration of the institutions and stakeholders at national and European level, and increase national ownership;

    86.  Notes the declared intention of the Commission to draw on the RRF experience when designing its proposals for the post-2027 EU funding programmes, due later this year; acknowledges that the independent ex post evaluation will come too late to feed into the process leading up to the next programming period, but expects the Commission and the co-legislators to take due account of the lessons learned from the RRF and of the recommendations of relevant stakeholders, in particular LRA, civil society organisations and social partners; believes that, as the EU plans for future economic resilience, there is also a need to further mobilise private investment, strengthen capital markets and ensure that public spending remains fiscally responsible and strategically targeted to make the EU more resilient and sovereign in an ever more conflictual geopolitical context;

    o
    o   o

    87.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, and to the governments and parliaments of the Member States.

    (1) OJ L 57, 18.2.2021, p. 17, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/241/oj.
    (2) OJ L 63, 28.2.2023, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/435/oj.
    (3) OJ L 433I, 22.12.2020, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/2092/oj.
    (4) OJ L, 2024/765, 29.2.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/765/oj.
    (5) OJ L 433 I, 22.12.2020, p. 28.
    (6) OJ L, 2024/2509, 26.9.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj.
    (7) OJ L, 2024/795, 29.2.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/795/oj.
    (8) OJ L, 2024/1263, 30.4.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1263/oj.
    (9) OJ C 32, 27.1.2023, p. 42.
    (10) OJ C, C/2024/4618, 22.7.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/4618/oj.
    (11) OJ C, C/2024/7057, 4.12.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/7057/oj.
    (12) European Parliament, Think Tank https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/research/advanced-search?textualSearch=RRF&startDate=01%2F07%2F2019&endDate=&sort=RELEVANCE.
    (13) OJ C, C/2024/5742, 17.10.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/5742/oj.
    (14) Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 laying down common provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund Plus, the Cohesion Fund, the Just Transition Fund and the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund and financial rules for those and for the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, the Internal Security Fund and the Instrument for Financial Support for Border Management and Visa Policy (OJ L 231, 30.6.2021, p. 159, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1060/oj).

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Censorship attempts by France in the run-up to the Romanian presidential elections – E-002390/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002390/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Petra Steger (PfE), Mary Khan (ESN)

    According to Telegram founder Pawel Durow, France made deliberate attempts to silence conservative voices in Romania on his platform ahead of the second round of the Romanian presidential elections[1]. It is striking that, just two days before the elections, the head of the French foreign intelligence service, Nicolas Lerner – who had allegedly asked Durow to implement this censorship – travelled to Romania especially to meet the leaders of the Romanian secret service[2]. Even more seriously, Macron’s bosom buddy and Renew Group leader Valérie Hayer issued an open statement to France Info saying that every effort would be made on the ground to ensure that the next Romanian President is pro-European[3]. These rampantly proliferating fantasies of control and censorship are nothing more than an attack on democracy. After all, any attempt to influence national elections through digital platforms such as Telegram constitutes a violation of fundamental European values. What is more, in statements made by ex-Commissioner Thierry Breton – who openly contemplated nullifying undesirable election results – the Commission has itself revealed a dangerous readiness to undermine democratic processes.

    • 1.What information does the Commission have on the censorship allegations made by Telegram founder Pawel Durow?
    • 2.Is the Commission planning to open an investigation to look into these serious allegations?
    • 3.What specific measures is the Commission taking to prevent such interference by Member States in national elections?

    Submitted: 13.6.2025

    • [1] https://www.spiegel.de/netzwelt/web/pawel-durow-telegram-gruender-kritisiert-franzoesische-einmischung-in-rumaenien-wahl-a-1eddfa73-f872-4ece-bf7c-64459e217159
    • [2] https://www.berliner-zeitung.de/news/vorwurf-der-einmischung-frankreichs-geheimdienstchef-soll-rumaenien-kurz-vor-der-wahl-besucht-haben-li.2327797
    • [3] https://www.lejdd.fr/International/presidentielle-en-roumanie-valerie-hayer-accusee-dingerence-au-profit-du-candidat-centriste-pro-ue-157948
    Last updated: 20 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Briefing – Violence against women in the EU: State of play in 2025 – 20-06-2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Violence against women is a violation of human rights and a serious form of discrimination against women. It takes many forms and, according to survey data, affects one third of women in the EU. Such violence has a major impact on victims and imposes a significant cost burden on society. International documents adopted by the United Nations and Council of Europe, including the latter’s ‘Istanbul Convention’, to which the EU acceded in 2023, set the normative framework for combating violence against women. The EU has embodied these international norms in its legislation and policies. The EU has deployed all the tools at its disposal to combat this phenomenon. It has adopted specific legislation focused on violence against women and has used legislation on other related subjects to address this type of violence. It has funded multiple programmes at EU and international level and has organised exchanges of good practice among its Member States. Although there are similarities between national policies to combat violence against women, the Member States have adopted different approaches. Parliament has been a strong supporter of EU action in the area. It has repeatedly called on the Commission and Member States to adopt legislative and non-legislative measures to combat violence against women, and has debated the multiple forms of this violence in its resolutions. This is a further update in a series of EPRS briefings on the matter dating back to February 2014. The most recent previous edition was from 2022.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – 2023 and 2024 reports on Moldova – P10_TA(2025)0131 – Wednesday, 18 June 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘2024 Communication on EU enlargement policy’ (COM(2024)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Republic of Moldova 2024 Report’ (SWD(2024)0698),

    –  having regard to the Commission opinion of 17 June 2022 on the application by the Republic of Moldova (hereinafter ‘Moldova’) for membership of the European Union (COM(2022)0406) and the joint staff working document of 6 February 2023 entitled ‘Association Implementation Report on the Republic of Moldova’ (SWD(2023)0041),

    –   having regard to Regulation (EU) 2025/535 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 March 2025 on establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Republic of Moldova(1),

    –  having regard to its previous resolutions on Moldova,

    –  having regard to the Commission analytical report of 1 February 2023 on Moldova’s alignment with the EU acquis (SWD(2023)0032),

    –  having regard to the proposal of 9 October 2024 for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Republic of Moldova (COM/2024/0469),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 9 October 2024 on the Moldova Growth Plan (COM/2024/0470),

    –  having regard to the Council conclusions of 17 December 2024 on enlargement,

    –  having regard to the visit of the delegation of the Committee on Foreign Affairs to Moldova on 25-27 February 2025,

    –  having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0096/2025),

    A.  whereas, following Moldova’s application for EU membership of 3 March 2022, the European Council granted it candidate status on 23 June 2022 and subsequently decided to open accession negotiations on 14 December 2023;

    B.  whereas in June 2024 negotiations on Moldova’s EU accession started;

    C.  whereas Moldova held a referendum on 20 October 2024, the outcome of which confirmed the embedding of EU accession into its Constitution, despite various forms of manipulative interference to destabilise the country, illicit financing of political actors, disinformation campaigns and cyberattacks;

    D.  whereas the Association Agreement(2), which includes a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (AA/DCFTA), remains the basis for political association and economic integration between the EU and Moldova, and a regular political and economic dialogue is ongoing between the two sides;

    Progress with EU accession-related reforms, in particular on the rule of law and governance

    1.  Commends Moldova’s exemplary commitment and steady progress with EU accession-related reforms despite significant internal and external challenges – such as Russia’s full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine – which made it possible for accession negotiations to start in June 2024, half a year after the relevant decision by the European Council on 14 December 2023 and less than two years after the country’s application for EU membership on 3 March 2022;

    2.  Recognises that EU-Moldova relations have entered into a new phase, with intensifying cooperation, gradual alignment across all policy areas of the EU acquis and advancement on the EU integration path; welcomes the progress achieved in the bilateral screening process since it started in July 2024 and the recent closing of screening for cluster 1 (fundamentals) and cluster 2 (internal market); commends and supports the ambition of the Moldovan Government to open negotiations on cluster 1 (fundamentals), cluster 2 (internal market) and cluster 6 (external relations) in the coming months, as well as completing the screening process for all clusters by the end of 2025; calls on the Commission to enhance its support to the Moldovan Government in order to ensure the successful achievement of these key objectives; encourages the Council to take a merit-based approach in its decisions on Moldova’s negotiation process; deplores the bilateralisation and instrumentalisation of the EU accession process, such as the opposition of the Hungarian Government to opening negotiations on clusters 1, 2 and 6, which has led to a delay and serves Russia’s objective of obstructing the European integration of the region;

    3.  Believes that Moldova’s capacity to consolidate its current progress with EU accession-related reforms and sustain the ambitious pace towards EU membership will require the strong and genuine support of a parliamentary majority after the elections in autumn 2025;

    4.  Notes that the outcomes of both the constitutional referendum on EU accession, held on 20 October 2024, and the presidential election, held on 20 October 2024 and 3 November 2024, confirmed the support of a majority of the people of Moldova for the country’s goal of EU membership and the required pro-EU reforms; underlines that this referendum and election were held professionally and with an extraordinary sense of duty and dedication, despite a massive hybrid campaign by Russia and its proxies which used various tools, such as the strategic exploitation of social media, AI-generated content, ‘leaks’ of fake documents, intimidation, which entailed various forms of manipulative interference to destabilise the country, illicit financing of political actors, vote-buying, including by Russia’s instrumentalisation of parts of the clergy from the Metropolis of Chisinau and All Moldova, disinformation campaigns and cyberattacks; recalls that these attacks had four key strategies: divide society, delegitimise institutions, discredit democratic actors and promote Russian influence; welcomes the outcome of the 2024 constitutional referendum which enshrined the commitment to joining the EU in the country’s constitution; strongly condemns the increasing attempts by Russia, pro-Russian oligarchs and Russian-sponsored local proxies to destabilise Moldova, sow divisions within Moldovan society and derail the country’s pro-EU direction through hybrid attacks, the instrumentalisation of energy supplies, disinformation, manipulation and intimidation campaigns targeting civil society organisations and independent media;

    5.  Notes that the upcoming parliamentary elections on 28 September 2025 will be of crucial importance for the continuation of Moldova’s pro-EU trajectory; is concerned about the likely intensification of foreign, in particular Russian, malign interference and hybrid attacks ahead of the elections; calls for the EU to increase its support, including financial and technical support, for the Moldovan Government’s efforts to counter such interference in the country’s democratic process, including through additional sanctions listings, an extension and consolidation of the mandate and resources of the EU Partnership Mission (EUPM) in Moldova and the granting of additional support thereto, and the sharing of expertise in foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), countering hybrid threats and strengthening resilience; calls similarly for an increase in efforts by the Moldovan authorities and the EU in support of independent media and pro-democracy civil society, in order to enable journalists at national and regional level to counter FIMI and to strengthen digital literacy;

    6.  Stresses the importance of strategic communication, debunking and combating false, Russia-promoted narratives about the EU and its policies and of highlighting the concrete short- and long-term benefits of EU accession for the people of all of Moldova, with a special focus on regions such as Gagauzia as well as socio-economically disadvantaged communities in rural areas; calls for the EU to step up its support for Moldova in this regard;

    Socio-economic reforms

    7.  Welcomes the Commission’s Moldova Growth Plan, which is aimed at supporting Moldova’s socio-economic and fundamental reforms and enhancing access to the EU’s single market; welcomes the Reform and Growth Facility for Moldova, which underpins the Growth Plan and is worth EUR 2,02 billion, making it the largest EU financial support package for Moldova since its independence; underlines that this facility provides Moldova with EUR 520 million in non-repayable support and a maximum amount of EUR 1,5 billion in loans, with an 18 % pre-financing rate, demonstrating the EU’s recognition of the urgency of supporting Moldova’s reforms and resilience; calls on the Commission to support the Moldovan authorities in implementing the necessary Reform Agenda for the effective absorption of funds from this facility, ensuring that the benefits of this support are promptly felt by Moldova’s citizens; looks forward to the announced impact assessment of the Reform and Growth Facility for Moldova in the form of a Commission staff working document within three months of the adoption of the corresponding regulation;

    8.  Calls on the Commission to include adequate dedicated pre-accession funds for Moldova in the EU’s next multiannual financial framework, and to begin preparing Moldova for the efficient use of future pre-accession funds as a newly designated EU candidate country;

    9.  Reiterates that the support of the people of Moldova for European integration can be strengthened with a tangible improvement in their livelihoods, by strengthening state institutions and public administration in order to use project funding effectively and to implement and enforce the EU acquis, ensuring a robust welfare system and fighting corruption and oligarchic influence and ensuring accountability; calls on the Moldovan authorities to continue to ensure the meaningful involvement of civil society organisations, diaspora, vulnerable groups and social partners, including trade unions, in order to strengthen trust in democratic institutions and processes and boost public support for EU accession-related reforms;

    10.  Stresses the importance of civil society organisations in monitoring governance and progress with EU-related reforms, promoting transparency, defending human rights and countering disinformation and external malign influence by anti-reform political actors and Russian proxies;

    11.  Calls for comprehensive social policy reforms to address poverty and persistent large-scale emigration, increase healthcare coverage, strengthen public education, improve working conditions and develop adequate social protection systems; emphasises that economic development must be inclusive and sustainable, with opportunities for small and medium-sized enterprises; stresses the need for targeted social investment in Moldova’s young people and rural areas to reduce regional disparities and safeguard social cohesion;

    12.  Calls for special emphasis on Moldova’s participation in EU social, educational, and cultural programmes in order to promote social convergence, innovation and technological advancement;

    13.  Calls on Moldova to implement the Reform Agenda, which outlines the key socio-economic and fundamental reforms to accelerate the growth and competitiveness of Moldova’s economy and its convergence with the EU on the basis of enhanced implementation of the AA/DCFTA;

    14.  Strongly calls for the acceleration of Moldova’s gradual integration into the EU and the single market by continuing to align its legal and regulatory framework with the EU acquis and associating the country to more EU programmes and initiatives, including through the granting of observer status to Moldovan officials and experts in relevant EU bodies, which would deliver tangible socio-economic benefits even before the country formally joins the EU; congratulates Moldova on its inclusion in the geographical scope of the Single Euro Payments Area payment schemes, facilitating transfers in euro and reducing costs for Moldova’s citizens and businesses; commends the inclusion of roaming liberalisation in the updated EU–Moldova Association Agreement; welcomes Moldova’s recent progress in the transposition of the EU’s roaming and telecommunications acquis and expresses support for a swift decision on the inclusion of Moldova into the EU ‘roam like at home’ area; calls on the service providers to cooperate in good faith with the Moldovan authorities on implementing ‘roam like at home’;

    15.  Welcomes the renewal of the EU’s temporary trade liberalisation measures in July 2024 in order to support Moldova’s economy, substituting the loss of trade caused by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and its unfriendly policies towards Moldova; calls for the EU to take swift and significant steps towards the permanent liberalisation of its tariff-rate quotas, in order to ensure predictability and increase the country’s attractiveness to investors;

    16.  Notes that the recent decision of the US administration to suspend support for civil society, independent media, key reforms and infrastructure projects has created additional urgent needs in Moldova, regarding which the EU should step in; calls on the Commission, in this regard, to increase its funding for EU instruments supporting democracy, such as the European Endowment for Democracy, and for other key projects that had until recently been funded by the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and other US agencies;

    Human rights

    17.  Notes Moldova’s progress towards achieving gender equality, including its adoption of the Programme for Promoting and Ensuring Equality between Women and Men for the 2023-2027 period, and calls for its continued efforts in this regard, particularly to reduce the gender pay gap, fight against stereotypes, discrimination and gender-based violence, and to increase the representation of women in politics and business;

    18.  Welcomes the efforts by the Moldovan authorities to combat violence against women and improve protection for survivors, in particular the adoption of the National Programme on Preventing and Combatting Violence against Women and Domestic Violence for the 2023-2027 period; notes that the impact of this, however, is still lacking and therefore calls for the establishment of more shelters for survivors of domestic violence, for adequate attention by the justice system to violence against women and for policy changes and increased awareness-raising among men regarding gender-based violence;

    19.  Calls on the Moldovan Government to strengthen its efforts, including the effective implementation of its legislative framework, to combat racial discrimination, marginalisation, racist hate speech and hate crimes targeting members of ethnic minority groups, including the Roma;

    20.  Commends Moldova’s efforts to improve the rights of the LGBTIQ+ community in recent years;

    21.  Calls on the Moldovan Government to fully align its legislation on the rights of persons with disabilities with the EU acquis and to tackle the systemic problem of children with intellectual disabilities being placed in psychiatric institutions;

    Energy, environment and connectivity

    22.  Condemns Russia’s instrumentalisation of energy against Moldova, most recently by halting gas supplies to the Transnistrian region on 1 January 2025, in violation of contractual obligations, and thereby provoking a serious crisis in the region; applauds the Commission’s swift proposal of a Comprehensive Strategy for Energy Independence and Resilience and its support package worth EUR 250 million, which will reduce the energy bills of Moldovan consumers, including in the Transnistrian region, support Moldova’s decoupling from Russia’s energy supplies and integrate Moldova into the EU energy market; emphasises the need for the EU and the Moldovan authorities to effectively communicate about the substantial EU support package aimed at addressing Moldova’s energy crisis;

    23.  Commends the alignment of the Moldovan energy sector with the EU acquis; calls on the Moldovan Government to continue its efforts, with EU support that includes the tools available from the Reform and Growth Facility for Moldova, to diversify gas and electricity supply routes, develop connectivity, increase energy efficiency and its internal production and storage capacity, as well as advance its full integration into the EU energy market in order to ensure Moldova’s energy security and resilience; stresses the importance of the completion of the Vulcanesti-Chisinau 400 kV overhead power line by the end of 2025 in order to reduce Moldova’s reliance on energy infrastructure in the Transnistrian region; calls on the EU to mobilise the necessary resources to help compensate for the withdrawal of USAID support for Moldova’s energy sector;

    24.  Commends the Moldovan Government for its progress on decarbonisation, energy efficiency and transitioning to a green economy, including doubling the share of renewable energy to 30 % by 2030; encourages the EU and its Member States to continue to provide financial support and expertise to Moldovan counterparts in this area; welcomes the adoption in 2023 of Moldova’s National Climate Change Adaptation Programme until 2030 and its Action Plan for this purpose; calls on the Moldovan Government to adopt and begin implementing its National Energy and Climate Plan for the 2025-2030 period; notes the importance of implementing the commitments of the Energy Community’s Decarbonisation Roadmap, and implementing the Monitoring, Reporting, Verification and Accreditation package with a view to introducing carbon pricing and aligning with the EU emissions trading system;

    25.  Believes that an extension of the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T) corridor Baltic Sea-Black Sea-Aegean Sea (Corridor IX) to include the route of Chisinau-Constanta-Varna-Bourgas would be a strategic investment in the region’s transport infrastructure, enhancing connectivity and promoting economic growth, in view of the enlargement of the EU to the east and the potential positive impact of this extension on the region’s security and stability, serving as a key logistics route for NATO and enhancing the EU’s geostrategic autonomy;

    Rule of law and good governance

    26.  Underlines that comprehensive justice reform remains key for the success of Moldova’s democratic and EU accession-related reforms; recognises Moldova’s sustained efforts to build an independent, impartial, accountable and professional judicial system and conclude the vetting process by the end of 2026; calls, therefore, for the EU to continue actively supporting the justice reform and the process of vetting both judges and prosecutors, including the attraction, training and recruitment of qualified judicial personnel and increase in judicial capacity;

    27.  Notes that Moldova has achieved progress in the fight against and prevention of corruption, but stresses the need to continue the fight against money laundering; welcomes the entry into force in February 2024 of Moldova’s National Integrity and Anti-Corruption Programme for 2024-2028; highlights the need to ensure enhanced coordination among all key anti-corruption and justice institutions in order to implement comprehensive reforms and to ensure that they have adequate resources and capacities; stresses that results in terms of prosecution and conviction in corruption cases need to be delivered in order to ensure public trust in the ongoing reforms;

    28.  Recalls the importance of continuing the investigation and bringing to justice those responsible for the 2014 bank fraud; welcomes the fact that, after long efforts by the Moldovan authorities, Interpol has finally added one of the alleged perpetrators, Vladimir Plahotniuc, to its list of internationally wanted persons;

    29.  Welcomes the adoption by Moldova in 2023 of a new national strategy for preventing and combating human trafficking, aligned with the EU acquis, and the cooperation of Moldova with Europol in combating drug trafficking;

    30.  Expresses its readiness to continue supporting the Parliament of Moldova through mutually agreed democracy support activities that respond to the needs of the institution, its elected members and staff; underlines the importance of the Parliament of Moldova in fostering public debate about the country’s European future and achieving a broad consensus over, and democratic legitimacy of, EU accession-related reforms across political parties and among broader society; highlights the decision of 10 March 2025 to open a European Parliament office in Chisinau to further strengthen Parliament’s engagement with the Eastern Partnership region;

    Cooperation in the field of common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and progress on resolving the Transnistrian conflict

    31.  Welcomes Moldova’s consistent cooperation on foreign policy issues and the significantly increased rate, notably from 54 % in 2022 to 86 % in 2024, of its alignment with the EU’s CFSP positions and restrictive measures; invites it to continue to improve this alignment, including on restrictive measures against Russia, and to continue cooperation on preventing the circumvention of sanctions against Russia and Belarus related to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine;

    32.  Underlines that Moldova is a key contributor to the regional and European security, including through its unwavering support to Ukraine since the start of Russia’s war of aggression, for example by welcoming Ukrainian war refugees, and through its contributions to the EU Civil Protection Mechanism, for example by deploying firefighting teams to tackle severe wildfires in Greece;

    33.  Expresses its support for the EUPM in Moldova and calls on the Member States to contribute the necessary experts and financial resources, in anticipation of a potential intensification of hybrid threats; welcomes the recent extension of the EUPM’s mandate until April 2026; encourages the Moldovan authorities to make full use of the EUPM’s expertise to enhance its preparedness, particularly in view of repeated electoral interference ahead of the parliamentary elections on 28 September 2025; calls for the EU to draw from the experience gained in Moldova in protecting the electoral process and democratic institutions in the EU itself; encourages the European External Action Service and the Commission to use all available EU instruments in the area of countering hybrid threats, in order to continue to support Moldova, including by swiftly deploying a Hybrid Rapid Response Team; welcomes the establishment of Moldova’s Centre for Strategic Communications and Countering Disinformation, as a means of coordinating the fight against foreign interference among the various Moldovan institutions, and of the National Agency for Cyber Security and the National Institute for Cyber Security Innovations; notes that Moldova’s National Security Strategy, adopted in December 2023, highlights EU accession as a key objective and for the first time identifies Russia as the source of major threats to Moldova’s security; stresses the importance of improving information sharing and intelligence cooperation between Moldova and the EU and its Member States on security threats;

    34.  Reiterates its full commitment to Moldova’s territorial integrity and to the peaceful resolution of the conflict, based on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Moldova in its internationally recognised borders;

    35.  Welcomes the Commission’s initiatives to include proactive support for the Transnistrian region in its energy emergency support packages, and exchange of information and practical cooperation between the Moldovan Government and the de facto authorities of the Transnistrian region throughout the energy crisis caused by Russia; welcomes the progress regarding the conditionalities for Tiraspol in light of the recent gas transit agreement and calls for the full implementation of these conditionalities, including the release of all political prisoners by Tiraspol and the dismantling of the remaining illegal checkpoints;

    36.  Welcomes Moldova’s keen interest in contributing to the EU’s common security and defence policy (CSDP) and the fact that Moldova is the first country to sign a security and defence partnership with the EU; welcomes Moldova’s continued active participation in EU missions and operations under the CSDP, namely the EU Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Operation Althea) and the EU Training Mission in Somalia, its interest in participation in PESCO projects and the ongoing negotiations on a framework agreement with the European Defence Agency; calls on the EU to include Moldova in the EU security and defence programmes and related budget allocations, including the European Defence Industry Programme and Readiness 2030, allowing the country to participate in joint procurement alongside the Member States;

    37.  Welcomes the allocation of EUR 50 million to modernise the defence capacities of the Moldovan Armed Forces in the context of the current security challenges through the European Peace Facility (EPF) for 2024; notes that Moldova is the second-largest EPF beneficiary after Ukraine, with a total of EUR 137 million allocated since 2021; welcomes the announced support of EUR 60 million to be provided to Moldova from the EPF budget in 2025; calls on the Member States to progressively increase the EPF funding for Moldova to further enhance the country’s defence capabilities;

    o
    o   o

    38.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and to the President, Government and Parliament of the Republic of Moldova.

    (1) OJ L, 2025/535, 21.3.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/535/oj.
    (2) Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Moldova, of the other part (OJ L 260, 30.8.2014, p. 4, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_internation/2014/492/oj).

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Pet breeding mills in the EU – E-001711/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    In 2021 an obligation for all establishments keeping animals, including dogs, to be registered was introduced in the Animal Health Law[1].

    Operators of these establishments must keep and maintain records on the health status of these animals. Furthermore, for disease prevention, such establishments must receive regular animal health visits from a veterinarian.

    This legislation also strengthened traceability rules for dogs by making the individual identification of these animals mandatory in the case of cross-border movements.

    Official controls in these establishments are the responsibility of Member States’ competent authorities, which must also ensure its effectiveness.

    The Commission proposed in 2023 the first EU Regulation on the welfare of dogs and cats and their traceability[2]. The proposal requires that breeding establishments producing above a threshold notify their activity to Member States’ competent authorities and that these establishments are approved before starting their activities.

    The approval must be granted with a certificate, following an on-site inspection by the competent authority that confirms that the establishment meets the animal welfare requirements of the regulation.

    This proposal requires that the competent authorities maintain a list of breeding establishments of dogs and cats, made publicly available. Penalties to operators breaching the proposed Regulation are set by Member States.

    The Commission proposal sets requirements that aim to prevent illegal breeders from reaching the EU market, thus promoting responsible adoption from legitimate breeders. For reasons of subsidiarity, awareness campaigns for the public are to be launched by Member States and are commonplace.

    • [1] http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/429/oj.
    • [2] Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on the welfare of dogs and cats and their traceability, COM/2023/769 final.
    Last updated: 20 June 2025

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Position on initiatives to restructure the external debt of developing countries and reform special drawing rights (SDRs) – E-001569/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The Commission supports the G20 Common Framework (CF) for Debt Treatments, which is a mechanism to provide poorer countries with orderly and coordinated debt restructurings.

    The Commission supports making the CF timelier and more predictable for debtor countries and extending it to middle-income countries that need it.

    The CF has started to deliver and restructuring timelines are now shorter. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) Global Sovereign Debt Roundtable Playbook on sovereign debt restructuring, which includes indicative guidance on timelines, is an important step in the right direction.

    The Commission is an observer at the IMF and is not a prescribed holder of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), therefore it does not hold SDRs. The EU at the IMF Board supported the USD 650 billion SDR allocation and the Commission supports EU Member States’ SDRs rechannelling efforts towards vulnerable countries.

    EU Member States so far pledged around USD 37 billion of SDRs (or equivalent contributions) to the IMF trust funds and lead the way in transferring the resources to these funds with around USD 35 billion delivered.

    Decisions to allocate SDRs are based on long-term global liquidity needs and require approval by an 85% majority of the total voting power.

    The Commission supports the proposals to channel SDRs through multilateral development banks for countries in a position to do so, whilst respecting national legal frameworks and their reserve asset status.

    For EU Member States it is not legally possible to channel SDRs to multilateral development banks because of Article 123 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

    Last updated: 20 June 2025

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Violation of children’s rights in Italy: failure to hear a child, despite the Cartabia reform, and forced meetings with her father – E-001466/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    Children’s rights are protected under Article 24 of the EU Charter[1], which guarantees their right to be heard in matters affecting them.

    The Commission is committed to ensuring the respect of the Charter within the remit of its competences[2]. The Brussels IIb Regulation[3] provides uniform rules obliging the courts of the Member States to hear a child when exercising jurisdiction in parental responsibility matters.

    Family law remains under national jurisdiction, according to the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity, and aligned with national and international law.

    When child victims are heard in criminal proceedings, pursuant to the Victims’ Rights Directive[4], the procedural rules are determined by national law.

    Directive (EU) 2024/1385[5] further recognises child victims, as witnesses to domestic violence, requiring child-friendly procedures, trained professionals, and safe contact arrangements between a child and a holder of parental responsibility who is an offender or suspect of violence against women or domestic violence. Member States must transpose it into their national legislation (by June 2027).

    During this period, the Commission will hold implementation workshops to steer the timely and complete transposition.

    In its role as guardian of the Treaties, the Commission will continue monitoring the application of the relevant legal provisions and may decide to take appropriate action.

    • [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/treaty/char_2012/oj/eng.
    • [2] According to its Article 51(1), the Charter applies to Member States only when they are implementing EU law.
    • [3] Council Regulation (EU) 2019/1111 of 25 June 2019 on jurisdiction, the recognition and enforcement of decisions in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, and on international child abduction (recast) OJ L 178, 2.7.2019, p. 1-115.
    • [4] Directive 2012/29/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA, OJ L 315, 14.11.2012, p. 57.
    • [5] Directive (EU) 2024/1385 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on combating violence against women and domestic violence, OJ L, 2024/1385, 24.5.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1385/oj.
    Last updated: 20 June 2025

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Application of the 2020 Drinking Water Directive to football stadiums – E-001762/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    Article 16(2) of the Drinking Water Directive[1] states that ‘in order to promote the use of tap water intended for human consumption, Member States shall ensure that outdoor and indoor equipment is set up in public spaces, where technically feasible, […]’.

    The directive does not legally define the concept of ‘public spaces’ for the purpose of Article 16(2).

    Therefore, the definition of ‘public spaces’ must be determined at national level by the Member States.

    However, the directive does provide examples of possible measures and public spaces in its recitals (33) to be considered by Member States when implementing the directive, and which could be relevant for the question on football stadiums: ‘for example by encouraging the free provision of water intended for human consumption in public administrations and public buildings or, for free or for a low service fee, for customers in restaurants, canteens and catering services’.

    • [1] Directive (EU) 2020/2184 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on the quality of water intended for human consumption (recast) (Text with EEA relevance), OJ L 435, 23.12.2020, p. 1-62.
    Last updated: 20 June 2025

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – The risk of polycrisis in the immediate future – E-001298/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The Commission and the High Representative/Vice-President are well aware of the announcement made by Secretary Rubio that 83% of all United States Agency for International Development (USAID) programs funded by USAID will be terminated.

    It is clear that the impact of the termination of United States (US) foreign aid programmes by the US are important and are being felt globally — with wide ranging consequences on the lives of people and on global stability and security.

    Pending the availability of reliable and confirmed information, the Commission together with the European External Action Service, with the input of EU Delegations, have made preliminary assessments and continue to monitor the impact of the termination of USAID’s programmes as well as the US wider international support.

    There is a particular focus on identifying the most acute risks and key priorities where action and mitigating measures may be required across partner regions, including in the areas of security, health, migration and democracy (especially countering disinformation).

    The EU will continue to be a reliable, predictable and responsible partner. As the main provider of development cooperation and humanitarian assistance, the EU has long been at the forefront of supporting global efforts to promote sustainable development and tackle crises worldwide.

    Clearly, the EU cannot fill the gap left by the US, given the amounts at stake. The EU is committed to living up to its responsibilities, working together with its Member States in a Team Europe approach[1], within the limits of its means, to the most pressing situations, based on the EU values and interests, together with its partners.

    The scale and complexity of the current global crises requires a collective response, including with non-EU countries where dialogue is already engaged. This was also on the agenda of the recent Foreign Affairs Council gathering EU Development Ministers on 26 May 2025[2].

    • [1] https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/policies/team-europe-initiatives_en#a-groundbreaking-approach .
    • [2] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/fac/2025/05/26/.

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Collapse of the ruined Armenian Monastery in the occupied part of Cyprus – E-001179/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The Commission attributes great importance to the preservation of cultural heritage in Cyprus and regularly raises the importance of safeguarding sites of cultural and religious significance.

    Under the Aid Programme for the Turkish Cypriot community, the Commission supports the bi-communal Technical Committee on Cultural Heritage (TCCH).

    Since 2012, the Commission has provided EUR 32.5 million to support the work of the Committee, which has restored, conserved or protected more than 180 cultural sites across Cyprus. The United Nations Development Programme implements the EU funding.

    EU funding for the TCCH is regularly mentioned in the annual reports on the implementation of the Aid Programme for the Turkish Cypriot community[1].

    Concerning the Sourp Magar monastery, a Rehabilitation Plan and Conservation Design was included in the TCCH works programme.in 2018, but not completed due to Covid-19.

    The Commission understands that the TCCH still intends to proceed with the conservation works. The TCCH is currently undertaking efforts to secure the funding needed, which would come from the EU and from other sources, including from the local communities concerned.

    The Commission welcomes the continuing efforts of the TCCH.

    • [1] https://commission.europa.eu/publications/annual-reports-implementation-aid-regulation-turkish-cypriot-community_en.
    Last updated: 20 June 2025

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