Category: Europe

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Fairness and Child Poverty Update

    Source: Scotland – City of Dundee

    Grassroots examples of how Dundee City Council and partners are tackling fairness and child poverty issues are to be showcased to councillors.

    The frontline actions are contained in a new report which highlights the scale of the task faced by local agencies during the continuing cost of living crisis.

    While Dundee is setting itself the ambitious goal of matching the Scottish Government’s overall national target of reducing child poverty to less than 10% of children living in relative poverty, latest figures show a rate of 26.1 % for the city.

    A combined Fairness and Local Child Poverty Action Plan Report for 2024/25 is to go before the City Governance committee at its next meeting on Monday June 23. The document sets out how the council and partners will continue to work together to improve the situation for families and communities across Dundee.

    It also takes on board the latest recommendations of the Dundee Fairness Leadership Panel, which is looking to prioritise efforts around mental health and isolation, fair housing and support to third sector projects offering crisis assistance to tackle poverty.

    In the report, areas of improvement over the last year are highlighted.

    These include:  

    • The number of council and registered social landlord housing completions (increased by 29.2%).
    • percentage point gap in literacy in p1-p7 between pupils living in SIMD 1 areas and SIMD 5 areas (decreased by 16.6%)
    • number of children living in temporary accommodation (decreased by 13.4%) 

    Within the report, a number of case studies are used to illustrate the efforts that are ongoing throughout the city. These are grouped under themes and some of the projects listed include:

    Social Inclusion and Stigma

    Strengthening family support through volunteering – DVVA Programme

    Promoting community-led suicide prevention – Dundee Creating Hope Awards Pilot

    Work and Wages  

    Supporting young people into employment – Employability Pathfinder (LFI Linlathen)

    Safe Housing Enabling Employment – Housing & Communities Team

    Benefits and Advice

    Preventing housing insecurity through school-based advice

    Securing backdated benefits for an older resident

    Attainment and Child Poverty

    Tackling poverty and increasing attainment in Longhaugh and St Francis’ Primary Schools

    Closing the attainment gap through the Strategic Equity Fund

    Health Inequalities

    Promoting wellbeing and resilience in schools – S2 Health & Wellbeing Group

    Supporting mental health through community-led events – Hilltown Community

    Housing and Communities

    Adapting homes for children with disabilities

    Providing coordinated housing and community support

    Committee depute convener Councillor Willie Sawers said: “The voices of communities with experience continue to be listened to as they are a vital help to us to develop responses to inequalities and poverty.

    “Statistics concerning child poverty in Dundee are stark, that is why we committed to doing as much as we can to turn this around.

    “I am heartened by the strong partnerships that exist between Dundee organisations and agencies across the public, private and third sectors and the ongoing desire to work together to transform life for people in the city.” 

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Sergei Sobyanin: An exit to the Southern Rokada will appear from Mosfilmovskaya Street

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: Moscow Government – Government of Moscow –

    In the Ramenki district, work is underway to build a street and road network. The project includes an extension of Mosfilmovskaya Street and two new bridges across the Ramenka River. Sergei Sobyanin reported this in his telegram channel.

    “We are implementing a number of important transport projects this year – we are creating connections between districts, convenient approaches to the rail frame stations, and expanding bottlenecks. In the west of Moscow, we will extend Mosfilmovskaya Street. From it, you can go to the Southern Rokada – Aminyevskoye Shosse and Lobachevsky Street,” the Moscow Mayor wrote.

    Source: Sergei Sobyanin’s Telegram channel @mos_sobyanin 

    In the future, it will be possible to go through Mosfilmovskaya Street and Gaidai Street to General Dorokhov Avenue, which connects the Third Transport Ring and the Moscow Ring Road (MKAD). This will also improve transport services for the Ramenki and Ochakovo-Matveyevskoye districts. Almost 300 thousand residents will receive additional routes for travel around the city, including to the nearest metro stations and Moscow Central Diameters.

    In addition, the implementation of the project will eliminate overruns of up to three kilometers and reduce travel time by an average of 10 minutes, reduce the congestion level of Lobachevsky Street by 24 percent, Michurinsky Prospekt by 22 percent, and Gaidai Street by 30 percent, and will help organize new routes of surface urban passenger transport that will connect residential areas with metro stations and Moscow Central Diameters (MCD).

    Construction of a new street and road network in Ramenki began in March 2023 on the territory of the cinema quarter (its 11 streets are named after outstanding Russian directors and actors). The project envisages extending Mosfilmovskaya Street from the intersection of Ramensky Boulevard with Vinnitskaya Street to Gaidai and Aleksey Batalov Streets with a straight line distance of about 1.5 kilometers. Four traffic lanes will be organized here (two in each direction) with the possibility of exiting to the Southern Rokada – Aminyevskoye Highway and Lobachevsky Street via Gaidai and Vasily Lanovoy Streets.

    Part of the future section of Mosfilmovskaya Street will pass along two new bridges across the Ramenka River with a total length of 465 meters. They will offer a picturesque view of the landscape reserve and the adjacent territory. In the evening and at night, the artificial structures will be decorated with lighting.

    Under one of the bridges near the intersection with Ranevskaya Street, a 404-meter-long U-turn with two traffic lanes in one direction will be organized.

    In addition, specialists will reconstruct sections of Gaidai Street from Aminyevskoye Highway to Aleksey Batalov Street (856 meters, two traffic lanes in each direction), Vasily Lanovoy Street from Lobachevsky Street to Aleksey Batalov Street (2.7 kilometers, two traffic lanes in each direction) and Ranevskaya Street in the area where it joins Mosfilmovskaya Street (724 meters, two traffic lanes in each direction).

    In total, the project will involve the construction and reconstruction of over seven kilometers of roads, including access roads to social and engineering infrastructure facilities. It is also planned to lay 93.4 kilometers of engineering communications and build a treatment facility.

    Today the facility is 70 percent complete. Work is scheduled to be completed this fall.

    The plans for 2026 include extending Gaidai Street to General Dorokhov Avenue (1.4 kilometers, two traffic lanes in each direction).

    Construction of road bridges across rivers

    Since 2011, 34 automobile bridges have been built in Moscow across the Moskva River, the Moscow Canal, the Yauza, Bitsa, Desna, Likhoborka, Molodtsy, Pakhra, Pekhorka, Setun, Sosenka, Skhodnya, Tsyganka, Kozhukhovsky Backwater and Novinki Backwater rivers.

    Another six projects with a total length of over 1.2 kilometers are under construction and design. These are bridges across the Moskva River in the line of Beregovoy Proezd and near Novozavodskaya Street with a length of 315 and 250 meters, two bridges across the Ramenka River in the line of the extension of Mosfilmovskaya Street with a length of 465 meters, a 190-meter bridge across the Moskva River as part of the reconstruction of Rublevskoye Highway and a 35-meter bridge across the Pakhra River.

    New roads of Moscow

    In 2011–2024, the Moscow Government built 1,460 kilometers of roads, which is about 25 percent of the existing street and road network. 454 new tunnels, overpasses, and bridges were built — the number of artificial transport structures increased by 65 percent. In addition, 328 off-street pedestrian crossings were built.

    The plans for this year include the construction of 90 kilometers of roads, 19 artificial structures and 18 pedestrian crossings.

    Among the main objects:

    — section of Ivan Franko street from Zhitomirskaya street to Gerasim Kurin street (opened in February 2025);

    — overpasses on the section of the Southern road from Kaspiyskaya Street to 1st Kotlyakovsky Lane;

    — an overpass with an exit from the Moscow High-Speed Diameter (MSD) onto Kashirskoye Shosse towards the Moscow Ring Road (as part of the MSD section from Kuryanovsky Boulevard to Kantemirovskaya Street);

    — section of the Solntsevo-Butovo-Varshavskoe Shosse highway from Edvarda Griga Street to Polyany Street (stage 1.3);

    — street and road network in the territory of the Mnevnikovskaya floodplain;

    — a bridge across the Moscow River connecting Beregovoy Proezd and Shelepikhinskoye Highway;

    — the street and road network in the Ramenka area, including the extension of Mosfilmovskaya Street and two new bridges across the Ramenka River.

    In 2026–2027, it is planned to build 175.5 kilometers of roads, 31 artificial structures and 33 pedestrian crossings.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    Please Note; This Information is Raw Content Directly from the Information Source. It is access to What the Source Is Stating and Does Not Reflect

    https: //vv.mos.ru/mayor/tkhemes/12961050/

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Algernon Yau begins visit to France

    Source: Hong Kong Information Services

    In an effort to promote Hong Kong’s unique advantages and vast opportunities for businesses in France, Secretary for Commerce & Economic Development Algernon began his visit to the country yesterday by touring a global aeronautic services company in Toulouse.

     

    Mr Yau met Elior Group SA Group Chairman and Chief Executive Officer Daniel Derichebourg to learn about the company’s latest developments.

     

    They also exchanged views on promoting closer business collaboration between Hong Kong and France.

     

    With the assistance of Invest Hong Kong, Elior Group SA has recently set up an Asian headquarters and expanded its presence in Hong Kong.

     

    Earlier this year, the company signed a memorandum of understanding with the Airport Authority to explore the possibility of providing professional services such as aircraft dismantling, parts recycling and related training in Hong Kong, thereby helping Hong Kong develop into the first aircraft parts processing and trading centre in Asia.

     

    Mr Yau pointed out that Hong Kong and France have long-standing business relations and many companies in Hong Kong with parent companies located in France are internationally renowned enterprises.

     

    He added that with the distinct advantages under “one country, two systems”, Hong Kong is the premier destination for enterprises around the globe to set up or expand their businesses.

     

    The commerce chief also highlighted that he believes the co-operation between the company and various stakeholders in Hong Kong will help unleash market potential and create new opportunities, leveraging Hong Kong’s advantages as a business and investment hub, and its role as a springboard to the Mainland, markets in Asia and beyond.

     

    Furthermore, Mr Yau toured the Derichebourg Aeronautics Training Center and the Airbus assembly lines respectively to learn about the latest advancements in related aeronautic training, aircraft manufacturing and sustainable aviation development.

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • Indian animated film Desi Oon wins Jury Prize at Annecy, shines on global stage

    Source: Government of India

    Source: Government of India (4)

    Indian animated film Desi Oon has won the prestigious Jury Award for Best Commissioned Film at the Annecy International Animation Festival 2025 in France. The festival is widely considered the world’s foremost event for animation.

    Directed by celebrated animator Suresh Eriyat, Desi Oon has garnered multiple accolades across both national and international platforms. It recently bagged the Best Film award at the WAVES Awards of Excellence 2025 and was one of the top entries in the Create in India Challenge, an initiative by the Ministry of Information & Broadcasting (I&B) under the WAVES 2025 summit.

    The Create in India Challenge attracted entries from more than 60 countries across 32 themed challenges, showcasing stories deeply rooted in Indian culture while leveraging cutting-edge animation technology. Over 750 finalists were featured at Creatosphere, a curated platform during WAVES 2025 held at the Jio World Convention Centre in Mumbai from May 1–4.

    Desi Oon has also been shortlisted in the Film Craft Lions category at Cannes Lions 2025, further cementing its global acclaim. Among its growing list of recognitions are wins at the AICP Show 2025, with the film now archived at New York’s Museum of Modern Art (MoMA), as well as two Golds at Good Ads Matter 2025, multiple trophies at the Kyoorius Creative Awards, and a coveted D&AD Wooden Pencil for design excellence.

    Calling Desi Oon a “cultural milestone,” Anubhav Singh, the Ministry official overseeing the Create in India Challenge, said: “The Government of India remains committed to nurturing the AVGC-XR sector and positioning India as a global content creation powerhouse.”

    Sanjay Khimesara, President of ASIFA India, a non-profit promoting the art of animation, VFX, and gaming, added:

    “This win is not just Suresh Eriyat’s; it is India’s. Desi Oon reflects the soul of India in a frame-by-frame journey that blends humour, emotion, and artistry. It inspires a new generation of Indian creators to think big, stay rooted, and aim global.”

    Organised by the Ministry of I&B in collaboration with ASIFA India, the WAVES Awards celebrate excellence in animation, VFX, and emerging media.

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Change of His Majesty’s Ambassador to Hungary: Justin McKenzie Smith

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    News story

    Change of His Majesty’s Ambassador to Hungary: Justin McKenzie Smith

    Mr Justin McKenzie Smith has been appointed His Majesty’s Ambassador to Hungary in succession to Mr Paul Fox, who will be retiring from the Diplomatic Service. Mr McKenzie Smith will take up his appointment during October 2025.

    Justin McKenzie Smith

    Curriculum vitae           

    Full name: Justin James McKenzie Smith

    Date Role
    2024 to present Language training (Hungarian)
    2021 to 2024 FCDO, Head, Central Asia & Eastern Neighbourhood Department
    2020 to 2021 Scottish Government (on secondment)
    2016 to 2020 Tbilisi, Her Majesty’s Ambassador
    2015 to 2016 Language training (Georgian)
    2011 to 2015 Mexico City, Director, Trade & Investment and Deputy Head of Mission
    2011 Language training (Spanish)
    2008 to 2011 FCO, Deputy Director/Director (acting), Eastern Europe & Central Asia Directorate
    2004 to 2008 New York, First Secretary, UK Mission to the United Nations
    2002 to 2004 FCO, Ministerial Press Officer
    1999 to 2002 FCO, Head, Europe Section, Human Rights Policy Department
    1996 to 1999 Moscow, Second Secretary
    1995 to 1996 Language training (Russian)
    1994 to 1995 FCO, European Union Department
    1994 Joined FCO

    Media enquiries

    Email newsdesk@fcdo.gov.uk

    Telephone 020 7008 3100

    Email the FCDO Newsdesk (monitored 24 hours a day) in the first instance, and we will respond as soon as possible.

    Updates to this page

    Published 19 June 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Coventry celebrates Armed Forces Day 2025

    Source: City of Coventry

    All are invited to the Service of Thanksgiving in Holy Trinity Church at 10.30am which is then followed by a parade leading into Broadgate where the city says thank you to those who serve and their families, veterans and cadets.

    Following the church service the parade will be led by the 13th Coventry Scout Band and commences from the side of Holy Trinity Church at 11.30am, goes into Cuckoo Lane, Pepper Lane, High Street and then into Broadgate where there will be a civic salute from the presentation stage.

    Broadgate will also play host to a number of organisations showcasing their support and raising awareness of their services in support of the city’s armed forces.

    People are invited to come along and show the armed forces the city’s support and pay tribute to all the brave service personnel and their families.

    The Lord Mayor of the City of Coventry, Cllr Rachel Lancaster said, “I am very proud to be part of Armed Forces Day and to be able to join with the residents of the city to say thank you to our service women and men.”  

    “In these times of conflict, it’s a chance to show how grateful we are to all those who have served, are serving and the families that support them, and the support we receive from the armed services in the city’s work for peace.”

    On the day, the Armed Forces Day flag will be raised on buildings and famous landmarks around the country, including Coventry’s Council House.

    David Fellows, Chair of the Coventry branch of the Royal Naval Association said, “Armed Forces Day is not only an opportunity to show support for our Forces but also show we have respect for those who are charged with the protection of our beliefs and values.” 

    “The Armed Services are on call 24/7, 365 days a year, they respond to natural disasters, take part in Air/Sea rescues, work in the NHS alongside doctors and nurses and are always there to step up when needed. “

    “Armed Forces Reserves, who work in all walks of life, are also ready to act when needed.”

    Coventry is a member of the Armed Forces Covenant which is a promise to look after current and former service personnel and their families.

    Find out more about the national day, events and how to get involved.

    Details of Coventry’s Armed Forces Day.

    Visit the RNA website.

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Open letters between HM Treasury and Bank of England, June 2025

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments 3

    Correspondence

    Open letters between HM Treasury and Bank of England, June 2025

    CPI inflation was 3.5% in April 2025, prompting an open letter from the Governor of the Bank of England to the Chancellor on 19 June 2025. The Chancellor replied to the Governor on 19 June 2025.

    Documents

    Letter from the Chancellor of the Exchequer to the Governor of the Bank of England (19/06/2025)

    Request an accessible format.
    If you use assistive technology (such as a screen reader) and need a version of this document in a more accessible format, please email digital.communications@hmtreasury.gov.uk. Please tell us what format you need. It will help us if you say what assistive technology you use.

    Letter from the Governor of the Bank of England to the Chancellor of the Exchequer (19/06/2025)

    Request an accessible format.
    If you use assistive technology (such as a screen reader) and need a version of this document in a more accessible format, please email digital.communications@hmtreasury.gov.uk. Please tell us what format you need. It will help us if you say what assistive technology you use.

    Details

    The remit for the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) requires an exchange of open letters between the Governor of the Bank of England and the Chancellor of the Exchequer if inflation moves away from the target by more than 1 percentage point in either direction.

    Updates to this page

    Published 19 June 2025

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    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI Russia: “Active Citizens” will choose the best routes of the “Show Moscow!” competition

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: Moscow Government – Government of Moscow –

    The Active Citizen project has begun vote for the best tourist route of the “Show Moscow!” competition. This was reported by Natalia Sergunina, Deputy Mayor of Moscow.

    Traditionally, residents of the capital will determine the winners in each of the 12 administrative districts, and the jury will determine the five most creative ideas.

    “Participants from six to 87 years old sent more than 800 applications to the competition. Compared to last year, their number has grown by a third. The most popular topics were history, culture, architecture and ecology. At the same time, the authors presented different formats of excursions – from walking, cycling and river to metro trips,” said Natalia Sergunina.

    Most of the presented routes pass through the Central, Eastern and North-Eastern administrative districts.

    Thus, during one of the walks, tourists are offered to ride a tram from Severnoye Medvedkovo to the Ostankinsky District, stopping at temples, parks and the Rostokinsky Aqueduct. Participants will learn why the Babushkinsky District is named this way, see zodiac signs made of metal structures and try legendary donuts.

    Another competition entry is dedicated to the architect Ivan Kondratenko, known as the creator of the famous cloud cutters.

    Another excursion invites you to immerse yourself in the world of Soviet cinema. All those who wish will get acquainted with places in the southwest of the capital, which many times became living decorations for legendary films, including “Moscow Does Not Believe in Tears” and “You Never Dreamed of It…”.

    The finalists were determined by members of the expert jury. It included representatives of the Museum of Moscow, the tourism industry, capital departments and winners of previous seasons.

    Sergei Sobyanin: Leading Moscow guides to take part in “My District” excursions“Show Moscow!”: How Muscovites Create Unique City Tours

    The “Show Moscow!” competition has been held since 2020. Over the course of its history, participants have developed more than 2,500 original routes to interesting places in the capital.

    The Active Citizen project has been running since 2014. It has already been joined by 7.2 million people. Decisions supported by city residents are implemented in the city.

    Get the latest news quickly official telegram channel the city of Moscow.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    Please Note; This Information is Raw Content Directly from the Information Source. It is access to What the Source Is Stating and Does Not Reflect

    https: //vv.mos.ru/nevs/ite/155491073/

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Interview with Alexey Overchuk for the Vedomosti newspaper.

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: Government of the Russian Federation – An important disclaimer is at the bottom of this article.

    Alexey Overchuk: “A change in the technological order is taking place”

    Deputy Prime Minister Alexei Overchuk discusses the nature of the changes taking place in international trade, the struggle of countries for access to rare earth minerals, and the establishment of new trade relations for Russia in an interview with Vedomosti.

    Interview with Alexey Overchuk for the Vedomosti newspaper

    Question: Vedomosti, together with Roscongress and economists, prepared a report for the SPIEF on the topic of “Global Development Opportunities.” The main trend that experts are currently noting is the fragmentation of the global economy. In your opinion, what balance of power may be established in the near future?

    A. Overchuk: Indeed, fragmentation of the world economy, or deglobalization, is happening. This has an economic background.

    Globalization emerged in the late 1940s and early 1950s as a response to the economic and social successes of the socialist economy. In the United States, it was seen as a threat to a way of life based on private property.

    In this global confrontation, the USSR and its allies were excluded from global supply chains, financial restrictions were imposed on them, export controls were applied, obstacles were created to obtaining export revenues, and conditions were created for the diversion of resources to unproductive expenditures, such as the arms race and peripheral military conflicts. The policy of containment put the USSR in a position where its revenue opportunities were narrowed and its expenditure obligations increased. The calculation was that at some point the country’s budget, formed on the basis of a strict planning system, would cross the break-even point and the state would not be able to fulfill its obligations to the Soviet people.

    At the same time, in exchange for participating in the containment policy, the United States created the most favorable conditions for the development of the countries that supported them. They were provided with access to cheap finance, technology, education, and security guarantees. Thus, these countries were freed up funds that could be used for development, and market conditions and freedom of capital movement made it possible to build the most effective international supply chains. Investments were placed where they gave the greatest return, which made it possible to better saturate the market with goods. An international trade system was formed that sought to ensure free access of goods to foreign markets, including the most capacious consumer market on the planet.

    The United States bore the burden of maintaining this system for decades, but also, thanks to the strength of its domestic market, it was able to turn a blind eye to tariff restrictions and barriers to American exports in the markets of friendly countries. Many of these countries took advantage of globalization, which demonstrated the advantages of a market economy. It was not emphasized that this success was financed by the largest economy in the world. The outcome of the confrontation between the two economic systems is known, and, obviously, the point of further bearing these costs has diminished. Today, countries that have enjoyed the benefits of globalization for 70 years are forced to pay their own bills, costs and their structure are changing, and this is pushing the world to find a new balance.

    Question: Why did fragmentation begin now?

    A. Overchuk: These processes are long and are now just becoming noticeable. Over the past 30 years, there has been a series of economic crises and regional conflicts that have diverted resources and influenced the growth of national debt. The United States allowed a trade imbalance and barriers to its exports. Trust in the dollar-based international financial system has been undermined. The freezing of Russian foreign assets and talk of their confiscation have called into question the security of property rights. New technologies have emerged. Internal problems have accumulated. Apparently, [US President Donald] Trump wondered: why continue to bear this global burden when solving the accumulated internal problems requires corresponding expenses? All this has a complex effect.

    In addition, the pandemic has highlighted the weaknesses of the global economy. China has gone into isolation, causing supply disruptions to global markets. The vulnerability of international commodity flows and dependence on foreign suppliers, for example, of the same chips, began to be perceived as a security threat. There has come an understanding that the global economy does not always work as we would like, it is necessary to reduce the transport shoulder, move production closer to consumers, and even better, especially when it comes to security issues, not to transfer technology and develop our own production.

    Question: How would you identify the potential fault lines of global economic fragmentation?

    A. Overchuk: The modern world is connected by complex economic threads, and if they begin to break, their recreation in other regions will require very large investments, the justification of which will often be questionable. At the same time, processes have already been launched that are throwing the global system out of balance and forcing the formation of new cooperation chains and the search for new balances. In this environment, countries will be attracted to the largest economies of their regions. Obviously, such factors as the presence of domestic consumer demand capable of ensuring the necessary level of sustainable independent development, the presence of science and a production base that supports technological sovereignty, own resources necessary to ensure food and energy security, as well as the development of a new economy will play a role here. Availability of water will be critical. The presence of a civilizational community and a common language for communication will play a role. Not many regions of the planet that, despite fragmentation, will continue to maintain ties with each other fall under this description.

    Question: The trade deficit has been the main reason for the double- and triple-digit tariffs in the US. What are the long-term consequences of the US tariffs?

    A. Overchuk: They will negotiate and look for a balance of interests. First, they announced an increase in tariffs and made it clear to their partners how everything could suddenly change and become bad, and then they rolled back and negotiations began. Tariffs are a double-edged sword. Their growth entails an increase in prices for imported consumer goods, which affects inflation, leads to a drop in real incomes, etc. It is unlikely that anyone wants to go this route completely, but some positions of American exports may improve. The main goal of these efforts is to create conditions for the relocation of production to North America. A self-sufficient macro-region with a huge consumer market and global export opportunities is being formed here. Such shifts do not happen quickly, so the coming years will be spent in a joint search for new equilibrium points, which will be very dynamic. Agreements will be reached and quickly revised.

    Question: We discussed with experts how difficult it will be for China to overcome this. They are focused on the domestic market, but the export economy still accounts for a significant part of the GDP. How will this hit China, even if they agree to reduce duties to reasonable levels?

    A. Overchuk: China is making a lot of efforts to improve people’s living standards and increase domestic consumption. Its progress in this area is obvious. On the other hand, it is, of course, an export-oriented economy that has extracted maximum benefits from globalization and has become one of the most technologically advanced on the planet. The international trade system has made the economies of the United States and China interdependent like no other. The state of relations between them determines the well-being of the entire world, and both countries understand the consequences of their abrupt rupture. At the same time, it is known that China’s growth is now perceived in the United States as a threat to its leadership. Hence the use of export control measures and the withdrawal of assets of American companies. In addition, recreating the international supply chains formed in and around China will require attracting an unbearable volume of investment. This will take time. So there will be agreements on some positions.

    At the same time, China is actively diversifying its export markets. As a country with a strategic vision, China has been working on implementing its Belt and Road Initiative for over 10 years, creating favorable conditions for promoting its goods, services, technologies, and knowledge to foreign markets. This is a global project. Geography does not allow us to talk about it as a macro-region, but rather as a global network structure with the center of economic gravity in China.

    Question: It used to be that the production process was distributed across different countries: raw materials were mined here, processing and assembly took place – design and software work took place there… If the value chains were to be broken, how would production and international trade take place?

    A. Overchuk: It will not come to a complete break. The world is very complex now. Hundreds and thousands of individual components and parts are produced in dozens of countries and cross state borders dozens of times before they are put together into a final product that is consumed on some completely different side of the world. The changes that are taking place lead to changes in the cost structure of production and delivery of goods and services to end consumers, which does not go unnoticed by investors and they react to it. In addition, the global economic system has shown its vulnerabilities. Some things will continue to be created as a product resulting from coordinated global efforts, while others will be localized within individual macro-regions and countries. Much of this is based on economic calculations, while others are dictated by the current global situation.

    Particular attention should be paid to new types of resources for the new economy. After all, countries with technologies do not always have a sufficient resource base. Therefore, international supply chains connecting different regions of the world are likely to receive new content. Countries with technologies will strive to develop their own production, and therefore the need for cross-border knowledge transfer will decrease. End consumers will have access to user devices connected to computing power located in countries that own technological solutions and intellectual property rights. The main flows of global income will also be directed there. Such technological dependence will be avoided by those who can independently develop the relevant competencies and protect their market. Potentially, there are three or four macro-regions on the planet that are already doing this or will be able to do so.

    Question: Is it economically feasible to do everything in one country?

    A. Overchuk: It is economically expedient to optimize costs, i.e. to distribute production in such a way that the best competitive conditions are achieved for each specific product on the consumer market. This is how it worked under globalization. On the other hand, there are factors of technological sovereignty, food and energy security. Some countries can afford greater dependence on external circumstances, some less. Their income level will also depend on this.

    Question: So this is a question of national security and sovereignty?

    A. Overchuk: This is at the intersection of interests, ambitions and opportunities.

    Question: If we resume trade relations with the US, is it possible to increase trade turnover? Last year it was a 30-year low – $3.5 billion. Compared to the economies these are, one could say there was simply no trade turnover.

    A. Overchuk: Our trade turnover with one of the two largest economies in the world (China. – Vedomosti) exceeds $244 billion. With Belarus we have $51 billion, with Armenia it exceeded $12 billion. Therefore, as they say, when there is practically nothing, Russian-American mutual trade has good potential. Taking into account the low base effect, trade turnover with the USA will grow rapidly if such decisions are made.

    The United States is currently attracting investors to its country and seeking to create new production facilities. Even taking into account the capacity of the North American market, the United States will be interested in increasing its exports. From this point of view, the EAEU is about 190 million consumers with good purchasing power living within the perimeter of the common customs contour. In other words, this is a promising market for the United States. As for the reverse flow of goods from the EAEU, we see interest in access to critical minerals and rare earths, which Central Asia, located between China, Afghanistan, Iran, the Caspian Sea and Russia, is rich in. Investing in the creation of modern high-tech production facilities in North America requires ensuring guaranteed supplies of raw materials, which makes the existence of secure supply chains critically necessary. The most cost-effective and secure route from Central Asia to North America lies north of Kazakhstan to the Baltic and the Barents Sea. There are other areas of mutual interest, so there is certainly potential.

    Question: This year marks the 10th anniversary of the Greater Eurasian Partnership idea. It was planned that the EAEU would be “coupled” with other associations that already exist on the continent. Which ones have more prospects?

    A. Overchuk: Various integration associations are being formed on the large Eurasian continent today. There is the EU, the EAEU, the CIS, and ASEAN. China is developing its Belt and Road project. The SCO has recently been paying increasing attention to issues of improving transport connectivity on the continent and creating common investment mechanisms for development. These are already mechanisms for linking participating economies.

    If we talk about the EAEU, work is underway to develop international transport corridors that will play a central role in the overall transport framework of Greater Eurasia, integration with the Chinese Belt and Road initiative is being carried out, industrial cooperation projects that build value chains are being supported, trade barriers are being reduced, and the free trade zone is being expanded. This is what is already being done.

    Of particular importance for the EAEU is the development of trade relations with the countries of the Global South and the formation of better conditions for promoting exports from our countries to this market, as well as saturating our common market with their products. These efforts contribute to the development of mutual trade with India, Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and further – with Southeast Asia, with Africa. These are all rapidly developing markets with good demographics, and there is prospect there.

    Question: Since you mentioned Afghanistan… The Supreme Court lifted the terrorist status of the Taliban, the de facto authorities of the country. How do you think this could change the approaches to the implementation of international projects in the country and Russia’s participation in them?

    A. Overchuk: Russia has a varied history with this country, and many people have questions about the normalization of relations with the Taliban movement. What should be understood here? For the first time in many years, a situation has developed in Afghanistan where the central government controls the entire territory of the country and seeks to ensure peaceful conditions. Representatives of Afghanistan say that they are interested in living in peace with their neighbors and developing their own economy. The results of these efforts are already noticeable. Automobile transit from Russia, from Central Asia through Afghanistan to Pakistan has begun.

    The Afghans have proposed a list of projects: from the construction of residential buildings to power plants, from road construction to the production and processing of agricultural products. Any government interested in improving life in its country will take such actions. It is in our interests for Afghanistan to be a peaceful state, and for people to be engaged in peaceful life. We want to contribute to this. Especially since the leadership of this country demonstrates a positive attitude towards Russia.

    Question: On the issue of Eurasian transport corridors. There is North-South. Iraq has spoken about its intention to build a branch from Iran. There is Turkey’s “Development Road” project – from the Persian Gulf through Iraq to Turkey and Europe. Can this also be connected somehow? Or are they competitors?

    A. Overchuk: There are many initiatives in the transport and logistics sector on the continent. Countries are striving to develop international transport corridors. As a result, a single transport framework of Greater Eurasia will be formed. The totality of these efforts, even competing with each other, will strengthen transport connectivity in the macro-region and promote the development of its economies. Everyone in Greater Eurasia will benefit from this. But peace is needed for this.

    Question: We have a free trade zone with Vietnam. Are there any similar agreements planned with India, with which our trade is growing?

    A. Overchuk: The purpose of such agreements is to simplify trade conditions, reduce costs for business by improving the accessibility of foreign markets, which leads to an increase in mutual trade, complementarity and growth of the economies of the participating countries. The EAEU member states view India as the largest and geographically closest market in Eurasia to our union, with which it is possible to conclude a free trade agreement. Together with our partners in the EAEU and the CIS, we are working to improve transport connectivity with India and create better conditions for the mutual movement of goods between our markets. Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan are also interested in developing such infrastructure. The free trade agreement with Iran entered into force in May this year. Preparations were underway with Pakistan to launch the first freight train between our countries. Our vision of Greater Eurasia, among other things, includes the formation of a continental transport framework, which, where possible, will be supported by free trade agreements. It is clear that what is now starting to happen between Iran and Israel is pushing this prospect back and slowing down the economic development of the countries in the region.

    Consultations are underway on the issue of the agreement with India. We see that India is also working in this direction, concluding agreements with other countries, for example with the UAE or, most recently, in May, with Britain, developing trade and economic ties with the USA. The totality of such efforts of many countries is forming a new network of mutually beneficial ties and relations between states and international integration associations.

    Question: What are the positions of the parties?

    A. Overchuk: The positions of the parties will be set out in the signed document.

    Question: You said that it is important to strengthen good-neighborly relations in order to counter external challenges that are growing every year. In this regard, what prospects do you see for the development of the EAEU? Is it possible to expand the number of its participants?

    A. Overchuk: The EAEU has already reached a very high level of economic integration. Five equal member states have access to a large common market, have put in place a mechanism to support industrial cooperation and are jointly expanding the free trade zone, providing better competitive conditions for their exports. In general, the EAEU has resolved the problems of food and energy security, and transport connectivity is being strengthened. Last year, the GDP growth rates of the EAEU member states exceeded the world average. All this does not go unnoticed, and an increasing number of countries are showing interest in closer cooperation with our integration association.

    As for the accession of new states to the EAEU, this is always their sovereign decision, taken based on an analysis of the pros and cons that the respective economies will receive. Countries comprehensively assess the impact of integration on individual sectors of their economy, investment attraction, the labor market, their foreign economic and foreign policy relations with other countries. For our part, we also consider these models, assess how the opening of our markets to potential member states will affect our economies, as well as how the structure of their economies will be transformed. We understand that for the economies of our closest neighbors, joining the EAEU will create new opportunities for growth and development.

    Question: We have observer countries in the EAEU. As if joining is the next step for them?

    A. Overchuk: Observer states in the EAEU are Uzbekistan, Iran, Cuba. This status gives the country the opportunity to gain access to materials, documents, have the opportunity to participate at the expert level in working meetings, can state their positions there, and also take part in regular meetings at the level of heads of government and heads of state. The EAEU is the largest economic integration association in our region, and, understanding its logic, they can make more informed decisions for interaction and development of their economies.

    The EAEU is a leading trading partner, for example, for Uzbekistan. At the same time, Uzbekistan is a member of the CIS, where there is also a free trade zone for goods and services. In addition, Uzbekistan has certain advantages in customs clearance of goods going to our markets. Russian business is actively investing in the economy of this country. Our countries have a flexible set of economic integration tools and have the choice to act as they see fit. If any country ever considers it promising to join the EAEU, it will make a corresponding request, and the EAEU member states will consider it.

    Question: There is also the issue of distribution of duties in the EAEU. Could this be a barrier for countries to join?

    A. Overchuk: The system of distribution of customs duties is designed in such a way that the accession of a new member state will require a revision of the existing shares due to each state. This is part of the accession process, during which all countries will agree on a new distribution formula, which directly affects the size of customs revenues of each participant in the integration association. However, even if we imagine that the country will incur losses, it will still ultimately benefit from access to a larger market, participation in cooperation chains, resources and the economic growth associated with all this. All this is taken into account, and the experience of the EAEU shows that agreements are always found. So there is no barrier here – there will be negotiations, and this is normal.

    Question: It seems that there is a threat of the opposite process – a reduction in the number of EAEU participants. Armenia recently adopted a law on striving to join the EU. At the end of 2024, you said that Yerevan’s trade with it was falling, while with the EAEU it was growing. The Armenian Foreign Ministry said in May that they had not submitted applications to the EU and intended to work in the EAEU. How do you assess such conflicting signals?

    A. Overchuk: In 2014, before joining the EAEU, Armenia’s per capita GDP was approximately $3,850. Thanks to barrier-free access to the EAEU market, this figure exceeded $8,500 in 2024. Mutual trade with the EAEU in 2024 reached $12.7 billion. For comparison: the volume of mutual trade between Armenia and the EU in 2024 was $2.3 billion. Providing the republic with food and energy on favorable terms also contributes to the sustainable and dynamic development of Armenia as our ally. Armenia’s economic success is a demonstration of the advantages of the interaction model within the EAEU. On the one hand, this is what shapes reality in Armenia, and on the other hand, there are people in Armenia who believe that developing relations with the EU opens up more prospects for their country than interaction with the EAEU. Ultimately, this will be the choice of the Armenian people, and we will always respect it.

    Currently, there is a discussion in Armenia and practical measures are being taken to get closer to the EU. This is already having a negative economic effect. Back in September of last year, I drew the attention of my colleagues to the fact that due to the rapprochement with the EU, Russian entrepreneurs are starting to be more cautious about doing business with Armenia. According to our estimates, our mutual trade turnover last year already lost about $2 billion. This year, we have already lost $3 billion, and the overall decline by the end of the year will obviously be $6 billion. For a country with a GDP of about $26 billion, these are very noticeable figures. And this is only the reaction of Russian business to the Armenian discussion about rapprochement with the EU.

    It is obvious that the EAEU and the EU are incompatible. It is impossible to be in two unions at the same time. Moreover, Brussels, despite the fact that many in Armenia do not want a break, will not allow Yerevan to have normal relations with Russia in the current conditions. Therefore, when the people of Armenia go to make their choice, they will need to imagine how this will affect the lives of ordinary people and what will happen next.

    For example, in 2022, Brussels closed the skies of Europe to Russian air carriers. The European perspective means that Yerevan will also have to stop air traffic with Russia, since decisions will be made elsewhere. Of course, people will adapt and start flying via Tbilisi, but this means that families will not be able to communicate with their loved ones in Russia as easily, or grandchildren from Russia cannot simply be put on a direct flight to Yerevan and sent to their relatives for the summer. Of course, the flow of tourists from Russia – and this is the main source of tourist income – will come to naught, which will affect the hotel and restaurant business, and this will also affect retail.

    Europe has closed for Russian hauliers and retaliatory measures have been introduced against European hauliers. Today, at the borders of the Union State of Russia and Belarus with the EU, cargo is being re-coupled, and then it is pulled by a vehicle with Russian or Belarusian license plates. The European perspective means that Armenian trucks will also come to Verkhniy Lars, re-coupled and return back to Armenia. There may be many such everyday examples in the future.

    This year, the dynamics of Armenia’s trade with the EU has shown growth, while Armenian exports to the EU are declining. Unfortunately, Armenia has already made a decision to simplify the procedure for processing documents on conformity assessment of food products imported to Armenia from non-EAEU member states. Because of this seemingly inconspicuous decision, in addition to the fact that foreign goods will begin to create competition within Armenia and displace Armenian producers, Russia will need to assess the threats to its market. The authors of this document expect that the EAEU will not be able to open its market to goods that do not meet its requirements, which means that Russia will need to strengthen control in Upper Lars, which will be felt by many bona fide Armenian producers selling their goods to Russia, and this will cause their dissatisfaction with the actions of Russia and the EAEU. We are being placed in such conditions, and the ultimate goal of these efforts, as the EU wants, is a complete break between Russia and Armenia. Whether the Armenians want this is a question they will have to answer. In today’s reality, given the state of relations between Russia and the EU, this is exactly how life looks, and people need to know about it.

    The law declaring the beginning of the process of joining the EU has already been adopted, and we have a tradition of taking the law seriously. It is a difficult situation: once again, it will be the choice of the people of Armenia, and we will respect it. We want to develop multifaceted ties with Armenia. Armenian employers and regions are also in favor of developing ties with Russia, they are talking about the urgent need to increase the number of checkpoints.

    Question: From the point of view of global development trends, can the EU somehow be part of the Greater Eurasian space?

    A. Overchuk: Someday, maybe. The main problem of the European Union is the lack of its own resources, and Europeans have long understood this well. Every time the world stood on the threshold of a new industrial revolution, the question of access to resources arose. If you recall the Treaty of Versailles, then significant attention was paid to coal, and if you recall the post-war agreements in the 20th century, then the discussion was about gas and oil. In the context of the transition to a new economic order, Europe is seeking to gain access to resources that it does not have, but which are necessary to maintain its position in the new world.

    The EU is the largest developed market with high purchasing power of the population. In the current conditions, the EU ceases to be a purely economic union, while it is losing its production base, in a number of important positions it depends on foreign technologies, and the most effective transport routes pass through the Union State. A more sober assessment of the situation would help Brussels peacefully fit into global trends, become part of Greater Eurasia and largely maintain its standard of living.

    Question: BRICS, which includes Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, the UAE, Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia and Indonesia, has been expanding very rapidly in recent years – up to and including 2024. What opportunities does Russia have in BRICS? Is further expansion possible?

    A. Overchuk: BRICS is a unique platform: there are no big, small, senior or junior. It appeared relatively recently and, one might say, is still feeling out possible options for interaction, comparing the positions of the parties and, due to its global nature and respectful attitude to the opinions of all partners, is careful in forming institutional mechanisms for interaction. Discussions take place on an equal footing, without mentoring, moralizing or imposing someone else’s positions. Everyone has the opportunity to convey their point of view, and if others share it, it is reflected in the final documents, which, as a rule, reflect positions on issues on the global agenda, and also define a joint vision of development.

    BRICS does not oppose itself to the existing international institutions and does not seek to replace them, most likely, it develops a joint position for work within them. At the same time, without opposing itself to the existing international structures, BRICS does not exclude the creation of alternative structures. For example, the New Development Bank has been created. There is an exchange of experience, knowledge, approaches, and certain positions are being developed at the interdepartmental level. There is in-depth interaction along the lines of finance ministries, central banks, tax authorities, transport workers and other areas. This in itself is very valuable and, in the case of joint interest, can begin to acquire specifics.

    Other important points that are probably not paid much attention to: BRICS does not include countries whose relations were burdened by a colonial past, and there is no division into developed and developing countries. All this makes it attractive for many countries of the world.

    Question: The BRICS countries are very geographically divided by regions: there are integration associations that are geographically more compact – the EAEU, the EU, NAFTA. That is, this is not an integration process and organization, but rather a club, like the G20 or an alternative to the G7?

    A. Overchuk: The advantage of BRICS is that it is not really a regional association. Its wide geographical distribution ensures the presence of various points of view on this platform, reflecting regional characteristics and vision. Countries that play a leading role in their regions participate there. Many of them are centers of economic attraction in their regions, and in this sense BRICS can become a coordinating support for the interaction of future macro-regions. And this gives BRICS additional weight, not to mention the fact that BRICS is today economically larger than the G7.

    Question: What are Russia’s prospects with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)? Is a free trade zone possible with this association?

    A. Overchuk: Interaction in the EAEU-ASEAN format is developing. EAEU and ASEAN days are held at the ASEAN and EEC venues. Last year, a session on “Economic Integration and Connectivity of ASEAN and Northern Eurasia Macroregions” was held as part of the ASEAN Business Investment Summit, where the conjugation of their economic potentials was discussed. Over the past 10 years, mutual trade between Russia and ASEAN countries has grown by more than 80%. Cooperation will develop, but, of course, the relocation of production, changes in tariff policy, and the need to create conditions for development in the EAEU member states require a careful assessment of the consequences of concluding free trade agreements, which our five countries always do.

    And then there is APEC, which includes the USA, China, Japan, Mexico, Canada, Australia and other countries of the Pacific Ocean basin, where the idea of creating a free trade zone was also previously promoted. The world is trying out interaction in various formats, in which, in principle, everyone shares common points of view regarding a set of global challenges.

    Question: You have previously predicted that there will be a struggle between countries for access to rare earth minerals. The United States and Ukraine recently signed an agreement on access to them. Why have rare earth minerals become such an important resource?

    A. Overchuk: The fall in the cost of memory storage and the data streams continuously generated by the Internet of Things, along with the ability to work with unstructured data, have pushed the corporate world to create digital services based on algorithms and predictive analytics methods that allow us to predict the behavior of both various systems and individual users. In turn, all this has paved the way for the development of large language models and artificial intelligence, which requires a lot of energy. A little earlier, global concern about the growth of the average temperature on the planet and the need to switch to clean energy sources became more acute. The synergy of these changes leads to a point beyond which, as famous classics wrote, other production forces and production relations begin to operate. All this began to move actively about 15-17 years ago. So if you follow these processes, what is happening becomes clear.

    The technological order is changing, and this always requires new resources. When we depended – still depend, however – on the internal combustion engine, oil was the main resource. Today, the world is changing – and critical minerals and rare earths are becoming priority resources. But no serious investor will start investing until they have calculated all the risks and are completely confident in the control over the uninterrupted supply of raw materials.

    In the modern world, everyone strives to breathe fresh air, have access to clean water and prevent the planet’s temperature from rising. Achieving these noble goals requires restructuring the economy, closing old and organizing new production facilities, which creates a new demand and structure for the consumption of raw materials. For example, the transition to electric vehicles entails an increase in demand for lithium, copper, nickel and other so-called critical materials. Previously, these resources were not needed in such quantities, but today the situation has changed. Therefore, an assessment is made of global reserves, in which countries they are located, to what extent they will be able to meet the expected demand.

    There are studies that suggest that maintaining someone’s usual level of consumption, for example, two cars in each family, may raise the issue of a shortage of critical materials on the planet. It is clear that the economy of shared consumption has arrived and it is becoming more convenient to order a taxi or rent a car through an app than to buy one, but nevertheless, the issue of resource shortage is present. Therefore, those who have the appropriate technologies and an understanding of the development vector are striving to gain control over critical materials and rare earths. What happened in Ukraine with the signing of the well-known agreement is one illustration of the process. This is really very critical for the development of society, ensuring leadership positions in the global economy and maintaining the usual level of consumption. Those who do not yet fully understand this – enter into contracts with foreign companies to develop their reserves.

    Question: In addition to new types of resources, the issue of world hunger is also being discussed. It is believed that consumption will change, food preferences will change. For example, there is an opinion that there will not be enough meat for everyone, there will be plant food.

    A. Overchuk: At the recent Astana Forum, the FAO Director General said that Kazakhstan could theoretically feed 1 billion people. This is a very serious figure, given that the area under grain crops in Kazakhstan is about 15 million hectares, while in the world it is about 700 million hectares. This is only about Kazakhstan. Russia has more areas, better water supply, and higher yields. In addition, if we talk about the production and export of fertilizers to global markets, Russia and Belarus have strong positions here. Our macro-region is very well positioned in terms of ensuring its own food security and has unique export potential. If we are not hindered in receiving income from the sale of grain and food, then the problems of hunger in the world will be less acute.

    And of course, it is necessary to help needy countries develop food production, overcome poverty and increase incomes. This potential has not yet been exhausted either.

    Question: Another trend that is being talked about all over the world is the demographic problem: the aging population, the declining birth rate, even in India. This also directly affects the economy through labor resources, demand. How can we solve this problem here in Northern Eurasia? Attract labor from South Asia, ASEAN, Africa?

    A. Overchuk: A decrease in the supply of labor in the labor market leads to an increase in its cost and inflation. The import of cheap labor allows us to solve current problems, but in the longer term it reduces incentives to increase labor productivity, transition to new technologies and leads to economic backwardness. Given the advantages that Northern Eurasia has, it is already attracting migrants from South Asia and Africa.

    In some places, the demographic problem is considered to be population decline, while in others, on the contrary, it is population growth. Some places experience a labor shortage, while in others, there is an oversupply and pressure on social infrastructure. In general, Northern Eurasia looks rather balanced. Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan are recording rapid growth: for example, in Uzbekistan in 2024, with a population of almost 38 million people, 962,000 children were born. So the problems are different everywhere.

    Northern Eurasia is a single civilizational space with a common language of communication and worldview. This unity is the greatest advantage of all the peoples inhabiting our region, and therefore it is very important to preserve and support it. It is these efforts, as well as technological development and increased labor productivity, that will allow us to preserve our uniqueness and provide what is necessary for the further development of our macro-region in the new world.

    Question: Now the status of the world’s factory belongs to China. There is the US, which is transferring production to itself with the help of a trade war. There is ASEAN, for example, where even China is transferring production because there is cheap labor there. There is Africa. What new future layouts for the global division of labor do you see?

    A. Overchuk: These processes are constantly happening in the world. 70 years ago, the main production facilities were located in the USA and Europe. Then they moved to Japan, then to South Korea and China. Now the ASEAN countries are growing, and Africa is starting to develop. Every time one of the countries reached a certain level of development and income, investors had a question about the advisability of moving assets to economies that require lower costs. The impetus for making such decisions, as a rule, is a change in the cost of labor and, for example, tariff measures. Access to water and energy, the environment for doing business are also important. China has now reached a point of development where it itself has begun to move its production, and not only to the ASEAN countries, but also to the North American free trade zone, and is actively working with Africa.

    This process has been repeated in one form or another in different countries at different times. Assessing the features of the current stage, it is necessary to pay attention to the reduction in the share of live labor in the cost structure, which is happening due to the widespread introduction of new technologies, including artificial intelligence. This is what makes it possible to return production to highly developed countries with traditionally high labor costs. The advantage will be with those who master the technology and access to resources, but this will also increase the income gap, which will pose very serious social issues for these countries, including the need for a wider distribution of private property and the income it creates.

    Question: What will this changing world be like in the medium and long term, and what will be Russia’s role in it?

    A. Overchuk: In terms of purchasing power parity, Russia is one of the four leading economies in the world, which makes it the center of economic gravity of Northern Eurasia. Russia and its allies in the EAEU and the CIS have everything they need for confident development in the world of the future. Together, we have a literate and relatively large population, we have technologies and all the necessary resources, including water, we do not have acute problems with food and energy security, and we are expanding the free trade zone. The CIS countries have everything they need for success, which will be possible if we complement each other, develop integration, and jointly build ties with other macro-regions of the emerging world.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Marat Khusnullin, as part of the delegation of the President of Russia, inspected the restored building of the Rimsky-Korsakov Conservatory

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: Government of the Russian Federation – An important disclaimer is at the bottom of this article.

    Deputy Prime Minister Marat Khusnullin, as part of the delegation of the President of Russia, visited the St. Petersburg State Conservatory named after N.A. Rimsky-Korsakov after a large-scale restoration.

    “In 2020, on the instructions of the President, we conducted a thorough analysis, looked at the condition of the building and what needed to be done with it. At that time, the conservatory was in a deplorable state, and our key task was to preserve the building, and then tidy it up and make it more modern. The work began with strengthening the structures, after which specialists began the painstaking restoration of 989 protected items – frescoes, sculptures, paintings, stairs and stucco. Particular attention was paid to the restoration of the unique painting in the house church. I would like to note that now the hall has modern equipment, including a mechanical stage, which allows both classical and modern events to be held. I would like to express my gratitude to the President for his support, as well as to the large team of builders and restorers, without whom we would not have had such a beautiful facility that we can be proud of,” said Marat Khusnullin.

    The Deputy Prime Minister noted that the reconstruction of the conservatory, which began in 2014, faced a number of difficulties, but thanks to the personal instruction of the President, the project was successfully completed. In 2021, the work came under the control of the Single Customer in Construction. Over the course of three years, the building was not only put in order, but also significantly modernized.

    During the restoration, the facades were returned to their historical light beige color, the paintings of the house church by Andrei Ryabushkin and Vasily Belyaev were restored, and about 1,000 unique exhibits were restored, including rare harmoniums and furniture. The usable area of the conservatory increased by more than 600 sq. m due to new glass domes.

    Now the conservatory combines an authentic appearance and cutting-edge technology: the Great Hall is equipped with a variable acoustics system, and 40 classrooms are equipped with modern equipment for recording and playing music.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-Evening Report: A war on diplomacy itself – Israel’s unprovoked attack on Iran

    ANALYSIS: By Joe Hendren

    Had Israel not launched its unprovoked attack on Iran on Friday night, in direct violation of the UN Charter, Iran would now be taking part in the sixth round of negotiations concerning the future of its nuclear programme, meeting with representatives from the United States in Muscat, the capital of Oman.

    Israel’s Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu claimed he acted to prevent Iran from building a nuclear bomb, saying Iran had the capacity to build nine nuclear weapons. Israel provided no evidence to back up its claims.

    On 25 March 2025, Trump’s own National Director of Intelligence, Tulsi Gabbard said: 

    “The IC [Intelligence Community] continues to assess that Iran is not building a nuclear weapon and Supreme Leader Khamenei has not authorised the nuclear weapons programme he suspended in 2003. The IC is monitoring if Tehran decides to reauthorise its nuclear weapons programme”

    Even if Iran had the capability to build a bomb, it is quite another thing to have the will to do so.

    Any such bomb would need to be tested first, and any such test would be quickly detected by a series of satellites on the lookout for nuclear detonations anywhere on the planet.

    It is more likely that Israel launched its attack to stop US and Iranian negotiators from meeting on Sunday.

    Only a month ago, Iran’s lead negotiator in the nuclear talks, Ali Shamkhani, told US television that Iran was ready to do a deal. NBC journalist Richard Engel reports:

    “Shamkhani said Iran is willing to commit to never having a nuclear weapon, to get rid of its stockpiles of highly enriched uranium, to only enrich to a level needed for civilian use and to allow inspectors in to oversee it all, in exchange for lifting all sanctions immediately. He said Iran would accept that deal tonight.”

    Inside Iran as Trump presses for nuclear deal.   Video: NBC News

    Shamkhani died on Saturday, following injuries he suffered during Israel’s attack on Friday night. It appears that Israel not only opposed a diplomatic solution to the Iran nuclear impasse: Israel killed it directly.

    A spokesperson for the Iranian Foreign Ministry, Esmaeil Baghaei, told a news conference in Tehran the talks would be suspended until Israel halts its attacks:

    “It is obvious that in such circumstances and until the Zionist regime’s aggression against the Iranian nation stops, it would be meaningless to participate with the party that is the biggest supporter and accomplice of the aggressor.”

    On 1 April 2024, Israel launched an airstrike on Iran’s embassy in Syria, killing 16 people, including a woman and her son. The attack violated international norms regarding the protection of diplomatic premises under the Vienna Convention.

    Yet the UK, USA and France blocked a United Nations Security Council statement condemning Israel’s actions.

    It is worth noting how the The New York Times described the occupation of the US Embassy in November 1979:

    “But it is the Ayatollah himself who is doing the devil’s work by inciting and condoning the student invasion of the American and British Embassies in Tehran. This is not just a diplomatic affront; it is a declaration of war on diplomacy itself, on usages and traditions honoured by all nations, however old and new, whatever belief.

    “The immunities given a ruler’s emissaries were respected by the kings of Persia during wars with Greece and by the Ayatollah’s spiritual ancestors during the Crusades.”

    Now it is Israel conducting a “war on diplomacy itself”, first with the attack on the embassy, followed by Friday’s surprise attack on Iran. Scuppering a diplomatic resolution to the nuclear issue appears to be the aim. To make matters worse, Israel’s recklessness could yet cause a major war.

    Trump: Inconsistent and ineffective
    In an interview with Time magazine on 22 April 2025, Trump denied he had stopped Israel from attacking Iran’s nuclear sites.

    “No, it’s not right. I didn’t stop them. But I didn’t make it comfortable for them, because I think we can make a deal without the attack. I hope we can. It’s possible we’ll have to attack because Iran will not have a nuclear weapon.

    “But I didn’t make it comfortable for them, but I didn’t say no. Ultimately I was going to leave that choice to them, but I said I would much prefer a deal than bombs being dropped.”

    — US President Donald Trump

    In the same interview Trump boasted “I think we’re going to make a deal with Iran. Nobody else could do that.” Except, someone else had already done that — only for Trump to abandon the deal in his first term as president.

    In July 2015 Iran signed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) alongside the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and the European Union. Iran pledged to curb its nuclear programme for 10-15 years in exchange for the removal of some economic sanctions. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) also gained access and verification powers.

    Iran also agreed to limit uranium enrichment to 3.67 per cent U-235, allowing it to maintain its nuclear power reactors.

    Despite clear signs the nuclear deal was working, Donald Trump withdrew from the JCPOA and reinstated sanctions on Iran in November 2018. Despite the unilateral American action, Iran kept to the deal for a time, but in January 2020 Iran declared it would no longer abide by the limitations included in JCPOA but would continue to work with the IAEA.

    By pulling out of the deal and reinstating sanctions, the US and Israel effectively created a strong incentive for Iran to resume enriching uranium to higher levels, not for the sake of making a bomb, but as the most obvious means of creating leverage to remove the sanctions.

    As a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Iran is allowed to enrich uranium for civilian fuel programmes.

    Iran’s nuclear programme began in the 1960s with US assistance. Prior to the Islamic Revolution of 1979, Iran was ruled by the brutal dictatorship of the Shah, Mohammad Reza Pahavi.

    American corporations saw Iran as a potential market for expansion. During the 1970s the US suggested to the Shah he needed not one but several nuclear reactors to meet Iran’s future electricity needs. In June 1974, the Shah declared that Iran would have nuclear weapons, “without a doubt and sooner than one would think”.

    In 2007, I wrote an article for Peace Researcher where I examined US claims that Iran does not need nuclear power because it is sitting on one of the largest gas supplies in the world. One of the most interesting things I discovered while researching the article was the relevance of air pollution, a critical public health concern in Iran.

    In 2024, health officials estimated that air pollution is responsible for 40,000 deaths a year in Iran. Deputy Health Minister Alireza Raisi said the “majority of these deaths were due to cardiovascular diseases, strokes, respiratory issues, and cancers”.

    Sahimi describes levels of air pollution in Tehran and other major Iranian cities as “catastrophic”, with elementary schools having to close on some days as a result. There was little media coverage of the air pollution issue in relation to Iran’s energy mix then, and I have seen hardly any since.

    An energy research project, Advanced Energy Technologies provides a useful summary of electricity production in Iran as it stood in 2023.

    Iranian electricity production in 2023. Source: Advanced Energy Technologies

    With around 94.6 percent of electricity generation dependent on fossil fuels, there are serious environmental reasons why Iran should not be encouraged to depend on oil and gas for its electricity needs — not to mention the prospect of climate change.

    One could also question the safety of nuclear power in one of the most seismically active countries in the world, however it would be fair to ask the same question of countries like Japan, which aims to increase its use of nuclear power to about 20 percent of the country’s total electricity generation by 2040, despite the 2011 Fukushima disaster.

    Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi stated that Iran’s uranium enrichment programme “must continue”, but the “scope and level may change”. Prior to the talks in Oman, Araghchi highlighted the “constant change” in US positions as a problem.

    Trump’s rhetoric on uranium enrichment has shifted repeatedly.

    He told Meet the Press on May 4 that “total dismantlement” of the nuclear program is “all I would accept.” He suggested that Iran does not need nuclear energy because of its oil reserves. But on May 7, when asked specifically about allowing Iran to retain a limited enrichment program, Trump said “we haven’t made that decision yet.”

    Ali Shamkhani, an adviser to Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, said in a May 14 interview with NBC that Iran is ready to sign a deal with the United States and reiterated that Iran is willing to limit uranium enrichment to low levels. He previously suggested in a May 7 post on X that any deal should include a “recognition of Iran’s right to industrial enrichment.”

    That recognition, plus the removal of U.S. and international sanctions, “can guarantee a deal,” Shamkhani said.

    So with Iran seemingly willing to accept reasonable conditions, why was a deal not reached last month? It appears the US changed its position, and demanded Iran cease all enrichment of uranium, including what Iran needs for its power stations.

    One wonders if Zionist lobby groups like AIPAC (American Israel Public Affairs Committee) influenced this decision. One could recall what happened during Benjamin Netanyahu’s first stint as Israel’s Prime Minister (1996-1999) to illustrate the point.

    In April 1995 AIPAC published a report titled ‘Comprehensive US Sanctions Against Iran: A Plan for Action’. In 1997 Mohammad Khatami was elected as President of Iran. The following year Khatami expressed regret for the takeover of the US embassy in Tehran in 1979 and denounced terrorism against Israelis, while noting that “supporting peoples who fight for their liberation of their land is not, in my opinion, supporting terrorism”.

    The threat of improved relations between Iran and the US sent the Israeli government led by Netanyahu into a panic. The Israeli newspaper Ha’aretz reported that “Israel has expressed concern to Washington of an impending change of policy by the United States towards Iran” adding that Netanyahu “asked AIPAC . . . to act vigorously in Congress to prevent such a policy shift.”

    20 years ago the Israeli lobby were claiming an Iranian nuclear bomb was imminent. It didn’t happen.

    Netanyahu’s Iran nuclear warnings.   Video: Al Jazeera

    The misguided efforts of Israel and the United States to contain Iran’s use of nuclear technology are not only counterproductive — they risk being a catastrophic failure. If one was going to design a policy to convince Iran nuclear weapons may be needed for its own defence, it is hard to imagine a policy more effective than the one Israel has pursued for the past 30 years.My 2007 Peace Researcher article asked a simple question: ‘Why does Iran want nuclear weapons?’ My introduction could have been written yesterday.


    “With all the talk about Iran and the intentions of its nuclear programme it is a shame the West continues to undermine its own position with selective morality and obvious hypocrisy. It seems amazing there can be so much written about this issue, yet so little addresses the obvious question – ‘for what reasons could Iran want nuclear weapons?’.

    “As Simon Jenkins (2006) points out, the answer is as simple as looking at a map. ‘I would sleep happier if there were no Iranian bomb but a swamp of hypocrisy separates me from overly protesting it. Iran is a proud country that sits between nuclear Pakistan and India to its east, a nuclear Russia to its north and a nuclear Israel to its west. Adjacent Afghanistan and Iraq are occupied at will by a nuclear America, which backed Saddam Hussein in his 1980 invasion of Iran. How can we say such a country has no right’ to nuclear defence?’”

    This week the German Foreign Office reached new heights in hypocrisy with this absurd tweet.

    Iran has no nuclear weapons. Israel does. Iran is a signatory to the NPT. Israel is not. Iran allows IAEA inspections. Israel does not.

    Starting another war will not make us forget, nor forgive what Israel is doing in Gaza.

    From the river to the sea, credibility requires consistency.

    I write about New Zealand and international politics, with particular interests in political economy, history, philosophy, transport, and workers’ rights. I don’t like war very much.

    Joe Hendren writes about New Zealand and international politics, with particular interests in political economy, history, philosophy, transport, and workers’ rights. Republished with his permission. Read this original article on his Substack account with full references.

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-Evening Report: A war on diplomacy itself – Israel’s unprovoked attack on Iran

    ANALYSIS: By Joe Hendren

    Had Israel not launched its unprovoked attack on Iran on Friday night, in direct violation of the UN Charter, Iran would now be taking part in the sixth round of negotiations concerning the future of its nuclear programme, meeting with representatives from the United States in Muscat, the capital of Oman.

    Israel’s Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu claimed he acted to prevent Iran from building a nuclear bomb, saying Iran had the capacity to build nine nuclear weapons. Israel provided no evidence to back up its claims.

    On 25 March 2025, Trump’s own National Director of Intelligence, Tulsi Gabbard said: 

    “The IC [Intelligence Community] continues to assess that Iran is not building a nuclear weapon and Supreme Leader Khamenei has not authorised the nuclear weapons programme he suspended in 2003. The IC is monitoring if Tehran decides to reauthorise its nuclear weapons programme”

    Even if Iran had the capability to build a bomb, it is quite another thing to have the will to do so.

    Any such bomb would need to be tested first, and any such test would be quickly detected by a series of satellites on the lookout for nuclear detonations anywhere on the planet.

    It is more likely that Israel launched its attack to stop US and Iranian negotiators from meeting on Sunday.

    Only a month ago, Iran’s lead negotiator in the nuclear talks, Ali Shamkhani, told US television that Iran was ready to do a deal. NBC journalist Richard Engel reports:

    “Shamkhani said Iran is willing to commit to never having a nuclear weapon, to get rid of its stockpiles of highly enriched uranium, to only enrich to a level needed for civilian use and to allow inspectors in to oversee it all, in exchange for lifting all sanctions immediately. He said Iran would accept that deal tonight.”

    Inside Iran as Trump presses for nuclear deal.   Video: NBC News

    Shamkhani died on Saturday, following injuries he suffered during Israel’s attack on Friday night. It appears that Israel not only opposed a diplomatic solution to the Iran nuclear impasse: Israel killed it directly.

    A spokesperson for the Iranian Foreign Ministry, Esmaeil Baghaei, told a news conference in Tehran the talks would be suspended until Israel halts its attacks:

    “It is obvious that in such circumstances and until the Zionist regime’s aggression against the Iranian nation stops, it would be meaningless to participate with the party that is the biggest supporter and accomplice of the aggressor.”

    On 1 April 2024, Israel launched an airstrike on Iran’s embassy in Syria, killing 16 people, including a woman and her son. The attack violated international norms regarding the protection of diplomatic premises under the Vienna Convention.

    Yet the UK, USA and France blocked a United Nations Security Council statement condemning Israel’s actions.

    It is worth noting how the The New York Times described the occupation of the US Embassy in November 1979:

    “But it is the Ayatollah himself who is doing the devil’s work by inciting and condoning the student invasion of the American and British Embassies in Tehran. This is not just a diplomatic affront; it is a declaration of war on diplomacy itself, on usages and traditions honoured by all nations, however old and new, whatever belief.

    “The immunities given a ruler’s emissaries were respected by the kings of Persia during wars with Greece and by the Ayatollah’s spiritual ancestors during the Crusades.”

    Now it is Israel conducting a “war on diplomacy itself”, first with the attack on the embassy, followed by Friday’s surprise attack on Iran. Scuppering a diplomatic resolution to the nuclear issue appears to be the aim. To make matters worse, Israel’s recklessness could yet cause a major war.

    Trump: Inconsistent and ineffective
    In an interview with Time magazine on 22 April 2025, Trump denied he had stopped Israel from attacking Iran’s nuclear sites.

    “No, it’s not right. I didn’t stop them. But I didn’t make it comfortable for them, because I think we can make a deal without the attack. I hope we can. It’s possible we’ll have to attack because Iran will not have a nuclear weapon.

    “But I didn’t make it comfortable for them, but I didn’t say no. Ultimately I was going to leave that choice to them, but I said I would much prefer a deal than bombs being dropped.”

    — US President Donald Trump

    In the same interview Trump boasted “I think we’re going to make a deal with Iran. Nobody else could do that.” Except, someone else had already done that — only for Trump to abandon the deal in his first term as president.

    In July 2015 Iran signed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) alongside the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and the European Union. Iran pledged to curb its nuclear programme for 10-15 years in exchange for the removal of some economic sanctions. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) also gained access and verification powers.

    Iran also agreed to limit uranium enrichment to 3.67 per cent U-235, allowing it to maintain its nuclear power reactors.

    Despite clear signs the nuclear deal was working, Donald Trump withdrew from the JCPOA and reinstated sanctions on Iran in November 2018. Despite the unilateral American action, Iran kept to the deal for a time, but in January 2020 Iran declared it would no longer abide by the limitations included in JCPOA but would continue to work with the IAEA.

    By pulling out of the deal and reinstating sanctions, the US and Israel effectively created a strong incentive for Iran to resume enriching uranium to higher levels, not for the sake of making a bomb, but as the most obvious means of creating leverage to remove the sanctions.

    As a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Iran is allowed to enrich uranium for civilian fuel programmes.

    Iran’s nuclear programme began in the 1960s with US assistance. Prior to the Islamic Revolution of 1979, Iran was ruled by the brutal dictatorship of the Shah, Mohammad Reza Pahavi.

    American corporations saw Iran as a potential market for expansion. During the 1970s the US suggested to the Shah he needed not one but several nuclear reactors to meet Iran’s future electricity needs. In June 1974, the Shah declared that Iran would have nuclear weapons, “without a doubt and sooner than one would think”.

    In 2007, I wrote an article for Peace Researcher where I examined US claims that Iran does not need nuclear power because it is sitting on one of the largest gas supplies in the world. One of the most interesting things I discovered while researching the article was the relevance of air pollution, a critical public health concern in Iran.

    In 2024, health officials estimated that air pollution is responsible for 40,000 deaths a year in Iran. Deputy Health Minister Alireza Raisi said the “majority of these deaths were due to cardiovascular diseases, strokes, respiratory issues, and cancers”.

    Sahimi describes levels of air pollution in Tehran and other major Iranian cities as “catastrophic”, with elementary schools having to close on some days as a result. There was little media coverage of the air pollution issue in relation to Iran’s energy mix then, and I have seen hardly any since.

    An energy research project, Advanced Energy Technologies provides a useful summary of electricity production in Iran as it stood in 2023.

    Iranian electricity production in 2023. Source: Advanced Energy Technologies

    With around 94.6 percent of electricity generation dependent on fossil fuels, there are serious environmental reasons why Iran should not be encouraged to depend on oil and gas for its electricity needs — not to mention the prospect of climate change.

    One could also question the safety of nuclear power in one of the most seismically active countries in the world, however it would be fair to ask the same question of countries like Japan, which aims to increase its use of nuclear power to about 20 percent of the country’s total electricity generation by 2040, despite the 2011 Fukushima disaster.

    Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi stated that Iran’s uranium enrichment programme “must continue”, but the “scope and level may change”. Prior to the talks in Oman, Araghchi highlighted the “constant change” in US positions as a problem.

    Trump’s rhetoric on uranium enrichment has shifted repeatedly.

    He told Meet the Press on May 4 that “total dismantlement” of the nuclear program is “all I would accept.” He suggested that Iran does not need nuclear energy because of its oil reserves. But on May 7, when asked specifically about allowing Iran to retain a limited enrichment program, Trump said “we haven’t made that decision yet.”

    Ali Shamkhani, an adviser to Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, said in a May 14 interview with NBC that Iran is ready to sign a deal with the United States and reiterated that Iran is willing to limit uranium enrichment to low levels. He previously suggested in a May 7 post on X that any deal should include a “recognition of Iran’s right to industrial enrichment.”

    That recognition, plus the removal of U.S. and international sanctions, “can guarantee a deal,” Shamkhani said.

    So with Iran seemingly willing to accept reasonable conditions, why was a deal not reached last month? It appears the US changed its position, and demanded Iran cease all enrichment of uranium, including what Iran needs for its power stations.

    One wonders if Zionist lobby groups like AIPAC (American Israel Public Affairs Committee) influenced this decision. One could recall what happened during Benjamin Netanyahu’s first stint as Israel’s Prime Minister (1996-1999) to illustrate the point.

    In April 1995 AIPAC published a report titled ‘Comprehensive US Sanctions Against Iran: A Plan for Action’. In 1997 Mohammad Khatami was elected as President of Iran. The following year Khatami expressed regret for the takeover of the US embassy in Tehran in 1979 and denounced terrorism against Israelis, while noting that “supporting peoples who fight for their liberation of their land is not, in my opinion, supporting terrorism”.

    The threat of improved relations between Iran and the US sent the Israeli government led by Netanyahu into a panic. The Israeli newspaper Ha’aretz reported that “Israel has expressed concern to Washington of an impending change of policy by the United States towards Iran” adding that Netanyahu “asked AIPAC . . . to act vigorously in Congress to prevent such a policy shift.”

    20 years ago the Israeli lobby were claiming an Iranian nuclear bomb was imminent. It didn’t happen.

    Netanyahu’s Iran nuclear warnings.   Video: Al Jazeera

    The misguided efforts of Israel and the United States to contain Iran’s use of nuclear technology are not only counterproductive — they risk being a catastrophic failure. If one was going to design a policy to convince Iran nuclear weapons may be needed for its own defence, it is hard to imagine a policy more effective than the one Israel has pursued for the past 30 years.My 2007 Peace Researcher article asked a simple question: ‘Why does Iran want nuclear weapons?’ My introduction could have been written yesterday.


    “With all the talk about Iran and the intentions of its nuclear programme it is a shame the West continues to undermine its own position with selective morality and obvious hypocrisy. It seems amazing there can be so much written about this issue, yet so little addresses the obvious question – ‘for what reasons could Iran want nuclear weapons?’.

    “As Simon Jenkins (2006) points out, the answer is as simple as looking at a map. ‘I would sleep happier if there were no Iranian bomb but a swamp of hypocrisy separates me from overly protesting it. Iran is a proud country that sits between nuclear Pakistan and India to its east, a nuclear Russia to its north and a nuclear Israel to its west. Adjacent Afghanistan and Iraq are occupied at will by a nuclear America, which backed Saddam Hussein in his 1980 invasion of Iran. How can we say such a country has no right’ to nuclear defence?’”

    This week the German Foreign Office reached new heights in hypocrisy with this absurd tweet.

    Iran has no nuclear weapons. Israel does. Iran is a signatory to the NPT. Israel is not. Iran allows IAEA inspections. Israel does not.

    Starting another war will not make us forget, nor forgive what Israel is doing in Gaza.

    From the river to the sea, credibility requires consistency.

    I write about New Zealand and international politics, with particular interests in political economy, history, philosophy, transport, and workers’ rights. I don’t like war very much.

    Joe Hendren writes about New Zealand and international politics, with particular interests in political economy, history, philosophy, transport, and workers’ rights. Republished with his permission. Read this original article on his Substack account with full references.

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-OSI Africa: SA sends 10 critically endangered Black rhinos to Mozambique

    Source: South Africa News Agency

    Ten additional black rhinos have been successfully translocated from South Africa to Zinave National Park in Mozambique to help secure the first founder population of black rhinos since becoming locally extinct 50 years ago.

    The rhinos, including five males and five females, were donated by South Africa’s provincial conservation entity, Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife, in collaboration with Mozambique’s National Administration for Conservation Areas (ANAC) and Peace Parks Foundation. 

    The translocation was made possible through funding from the United Kingdom’s People’s Postcode Lottery.

    By reintroducing wildlife to areas where the species once thrived, biodiversity is restored. The preservation of natural ecosystems is one of the most effective tools in mitigating climate change. Through the creation of ecosystem ‘carbon sinks’, these ecosystems can increase global carbon uptake by up to 12 times.

    With 37 rhinos already introduced and thriving, this initiative aims to enhance biodiversity and reinforce the park as Mozambique’s only ‘big five’ national park, setting a new standard for wildlife conservation and ecological restoration.

    Peace Parks Foundation approached Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife for a donation of black rhinos to boost the numbers to form a viable breeding population of black rhinos in Mozambique. 

    An agreement was reached on the ten rhinos sourced from Ithala Game Reserve and Ezemvelo’s three Black Rhino Range Expansion Project. The rhinos were initially relocated to Hluhluwe iMfolozi Park, where they were housed in specially prepared holding facilities in preparation for the 48-hour journey to Zinave.

    Minister of Forestry, Fisheries and the Environment, Dr Dion George, described this as a significant conservation success.

    Goerge commended the Government of Mozambique and its co-management partner, Peace Parks Foundation, on achieving this important milestone, noting that establishing new founder populations is one of many critical interventions to secure the future of these species.

    “South Africa’s successes in rhino conservation and the implementation of anti-poaching and anti-trafficking efforts have stabilised its rhino populations, thereby placing the country in a position as a source of rhino for range States in Africa which have either lost many or all of their rhino and wish to re-establish populations or augment current populations, as is the case with this translocation. 

    “The export and import of these valuable black rhinos have been done in compliance with the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora’s legislation of both countries,” the Minister said on Wednesday.

    To ensure successful translocation and compliance with all the required permits, the Department of Forestry, Fisheries and the Environment Management Inspectors (EMIs), together with officials from Border Management Authority (BMA), played a crucial role during the loading and endorsement of Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) permits at the ports of exit. 

    During the loading this week, the departmental EMIs ensured that all the allocated microchip numbers, as prescribed in the CITES permits, correspond with those inserted in the live rhino.

    The first rhinos were successfully translocated from South Africa to Zinave National Park in 2022, in the longest road transfer of rhinos ever undertaken. 

    This initiative, the result of a partnership between Mozambique’s National Administration for Conservation Areas (ANAC) and Peace Parks Foundation, marked the beginning of Mozambique’s efforts to rebuild founder white and black rhino populations as part of a national conservation initiative to reintroduce rhinos in the country. 

    In 2023, Peace Parks received a funding award of £800,000, raised by players of the UK People’s Postcode Lottery towards the translocation of ten more black rhinos to Zinave, which enabled this critical next phase in rhino rewilding.

    “Supporting the rewilding of critically endangered species like the black rhino is at the heart of what we believe in — creating lasting impact for people and planet. I am delighted that players of People’s Postcode Lottery have been able to support Peace Parks Foundation. 

    “This historic translocation to Zinave National Park simply wouldn’t have happened without player-raised funding. It’s a powerful example of what we can achieve when we come together across borders to restore nature and protect our shared future,” Managing Director of UK People’s Postcode Lottery Clara Govier said. – SAnews.gov.za

    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Journalismfund Europe – E-001475/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    Journalismfund Europe has been awarded EUR 5.6 million through its participation in four selected projects under the Creative Europe programme between 2021 and 2025[1].

    Through open calls for proposals in Creative Europe, the Commission selects multiple organisations every year that organise calls for proposals and redistribute funds to a wide range of smaller media projects (including local and regional media, community media, investigative journalism and other media) so as to enhance media pluralism.

    The Commission does not fund the operations of Journalismfund. Financial support under Creative Europe is awarded for the implementation of specific projects. EU-funded projects do not restrict beneficiaries from receiving funding from other sources.

    Through the selection procedures and grant agreements, the Commission ensures that all EU co-financed news media projects respect EU Treaty values, including principles of democracy, transparency and political neutrality, and respect of professional journalistic standards, including but not limited to methods to ensure accuracy, objectivity independence and professional reporting, impartiality and plural viewpoints.

    Selected projects contain safeguards for editorial independence from any donor, as set out in the grant agreement.

    • [1] https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/opportunities/portal/screen/how-to-participate/org-details/890210808.
    Last updated: 18 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Journalismfund Europe – E-001475/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    Journalismfund Europe has been awarded EUR 5.6 million through its participation in four selected projects under the Creative Europe programme between 2021 and 2025[1].

    Through open calls for proposals in Creative Europe, the Commission selects multiple organisations every year that organise calls for proposals and redistribute funds to a wide range of smaller media projects (including local and regional media, community media, investigative journalism and other media) so as to enhance media pluralism.

    The Commission does not fund the operations of Journalismfund. Financial support under Creative Europe is awarded for the implementation of specific projects. EU-funded projects do not restrict beneficiaries from receiving funding from other sources.

    Through the selection procedures and grant agreements, the Commission ensures that all EU co-financed news media projects respect EU Treaty values, including principles of democracy, transparency and political neutrality, and respect of professional journalistic standards, including but not limited to methods to ensure accuracy, objectivity independence and professional reporting, impartiality and plural viewpoints.

    Selected projects contain safeguards for editorial independence from any donor, as set out in the grant agreement.

    • [1] https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/opportunities/portal/screen/how-to-participate/org-details/890210808.
    Last updated: 18 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Controversial collaborations with Chinese universities – E-000926/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The Commission is well aware of the risks that could emerge from international collaborations in research and innovation (R&I), including at the level of Member States, national funding agencies and research performing organisations.

    In line with the Global Approach to Research and Innovation of 2021[1], several legal measures have already been implemented in Horizon Europe to enhance research security[2].

    It is to be noted that no new grants or contracts were signed under Horizon Europe with any legal entity (public and private) established in Russia, Belarus or in the non-government-controlled territories of Ukraine.

    Beyond Horizon Europe, and in full respect of the academic freedom and the institutional autonomy of the R&I sector, the Commission is working to raise awareness on research security and to encourage due diligence processes.

    As a follow-up to the European Economic Security Strategy of 2023[3], in January 2024, the Commission proposed a Council Recommendation on enhancing research security[4] (adopted in May 2024) that provides guidance to ensure international cooperation remains both open and secure.

    In line with the latter, the risk level of international cooperation activities should be assessed on the basis of four criteria[5]. It is the combination of those factors that determines the risk level of a project.

    The recommendation aims to mobilise research organisations to perform risk appraisals and, where needed, set up risk management plans before international research collaborations. It supports the notion that with academic freedom also comes academic responsibility.

    The Commission is establishing dedicated structures to support the sector perform due diligence processes.

    • [1] COM(2021) 252 final.
    • [2] These include tools such as the use of Article 22(5) of the Horizon Europe Regulation allowing to limit the participation of certain entities in specific calls, the ethics screening process, ensuring a focus on civil applications and that the highest ethical standards are abided by, and Article 40(4) relating to the right to object to transfers of ownership of results. China-specific restrictions have also been inserted using Article 22(6) to exclude entities based in China from participating in innovation actions. At the level of the Horizon Europe Work Programme additional eligibility restrictions are provided for the protection of the EU’s economic security.
    • [3] JOIN(2023)20 final.
    • [4] OJ C, C/2024/3510, 30.5.2024.
    • [5] a) the risk profile of the EU-based organisation entering into the international cooperation: consider the organisation’s strengths and vulnerabilities; b) the research and innovation domain in which the international cooperation is to take place: for example: consider whether the project focuses on research domains involving critical knowledge and technology; c) the risk profile of the third country where the international partner is based or from where it is owned or controlled; d) the risk profile of the international partner organisation.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – EU ETS for maritime transport – P-001895/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    All sectors, including maritime transport, must contribute to the EU climate neutrality goal by 2050 and the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) is key to achieve this objective.

    For reasons of administrative practicability, ships below 5 000 gross tonnage (GT) were not included within the scope of the ETS Directive[1] from the start of its extension to maritime transport, but their inclusion in the future could improve the effectiveness of the EU ETS and potentially reduce evasive behaviour with the use of ships below the size threshold[2].

    Therefore, the ETS Directive requires the Commission to examine, no later than end of 2026, the feasibility and economic, environmental and social impacts of such a possible inclusion. Other, national measures could be taken, such as opt-ins within the ETS2 for buildings, road transport and additional sectors.

    The Commission recently adopted a report[3] assessing the potential inclusion of smaller ships under the scope of the EU Regulation for the monitoring, reporting and verification of maritime greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.

    It notes that such an extension could have a positive impact on the level playing field since vessels just above or below the size threshold might be competing for similar market segments.

    In addition, it shows that it could help unlock the implementation of energy efficiency and low carbon solutions. However, the analysis also finds that the balance between administrative costs and additional monitored GHG emissions is less favourable for smaller ships.

    The Commission has committed to use 20 million EU allowances[4] until 2030 to support the decarbonisation of the maritime sector via the Innovation Fund, which can, as well as other instruments[5], support retrofitting of ships.

    • [1] Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 2003 establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community and amending Council Directive 96/61/EC (OJ L 275, 25.10.2003, p. 32).
    • [2] The report from the Commission on the m onitoring of the implementation of the ETS Directive in relation to maritime transport from 18 March 2025 shows that there is no evidence of an increased use of vessels between 4 000 GT and 5 000 GT in 2024 compared to the previous year- COM(2025) 110 final — https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025DC0110 .
    • [3]  COM(2025) 109 final — https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025DC0109.
    • [4] Worth about EUR 1.5 billion with a price of EUR 75 per EU allowance.
    • [5] An inventory of financing products supporting investments in the shipping sector is available in the Ship Financing Portal — https://transport.ec.europa.eu/transport-modes/maritime/ship-financing-portal_en.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Exclusion of the ceramics sector from cost offsets under the Emissions Trading System (ETS) and the single market distortions caused by the allocation of free allowances – E-001557/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    1. Installations producing ceramic tiles are covered by the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS). They receive free allocation on the basis of the spray-dried powder benchmark and of fall-back benchmarks for the processes not covered by the spray-dried powder benchmark. In this context, heat generated by means of combined heat and power (CHP) systems is rewarded by free allocation. In addition, operators of CHPs benefit from the ETS carbon price included in the electricity price, in particular as additional revenue for the electricity sold on the market. Therefore, the Commission does not see a need to change the current rules providing both, carbon leakage protection and incentives to invest into innovative low-carbon technologies including CHPs.

    2. The ceramics sector is energy-intensive for the production processes as well as trade-intensive. Therefore, it is considered at risk of carbon leakage and therefore eligible to receive free allowances at 100% of benchmark level in line with Commission Delegated Decision (EU) 2019/708[1] for the period 2021-2030. Member States may award state aid to electro-intensive industries to compensate for the cost of carbon emissions passed on through electricity bills (indirect cost compensation). However, the eligibility threshold set for this aid is an indirect emission intensity of at least 1 kg CO2/EUR, which was not reached for sector 23.31 (Manufacture of ceramic tiles and flags) when the eligibility was assessed as part of the 2020 adoption of the relevant Commission guidelines[2]. The sector is therefore not currently eligible for this aid.

    • [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec_del/2019/708/oj: OJ C 317, 25.9.2020, p. 5-19.
    • [2] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=oj:JOC_2020_317_R_0004.
    Last updated: 18 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – The final destination of EU development funds – E-000704/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    EU funds allocated to development assistance are implemented in accordance with the principle of transparency enshrined in the Financial Regulation applicable to the EU Budget[1].

    Detailed information on amounts funded are available in the Financial Annexes of the report on the Implementation of the EU’s External Action Instruments that the Commission publishes on a yearly basis[2]. These annexes provide a breakdown of the development assistance funding across multiple dimensions. In particular:

    — Table 3B provides a breakdown of disbursements by Instrument and responsible Directorate-General (DG International Partnerships vs. other services).

    — Table 5B provides a breakdown of disbursements made by thematic area/ sector being targeted (e.g. health, education, population policies, humanitarian aid) and the responsible Directorate-General.

    — Table 6B provides a breakdown of disbursements made by country/region and the responsible Directorate-General.

    — Table 8B provides a breakdown of disbursements made by country/region and thematic area/sector.

    — Table 13B provides a breakdown of disbursements made by type of contribution (e.g. contribution to a project, contribution to an NGO, etc…).

    Information on EU budget funding (with the exception of programmes under shared management[3]) awarded to specific recipients, such as European media outlets and think tanks, is publicly available through the centralised Financial Transparency System (FTS) web page[4].

    This tool provides information at individual project level (e.g. nature of the measure, committed amount, project start & end date, funding instrument, responsible Directorate-General) allowing to conduct searches across multiple dimension (e.g. name of the think tank, year of funding, beneficiary country).

    • [1]  Article 38 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj/eng.
    • [2]  For 2023’s activity, the Financial Annexes can be found in Section 8 of the Commission Staff Working Document (SWD(2024) 267 final) accompanying the 2024 Annual Report on the implementation of the European Union’s External Action Instruments in 2023 (COM(2024) 548 final): https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=SWD:2024:267:FIN; https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/bfc002cc-bdca-11ef-91ed-01aa75ed71a1/language-en#:~:text=This%20is%20the%20staff%20working%20document%20accompanying%20the,international%20partnerships%2C%20humanitarian%20aid%2C%20foreign%20policy%20and%20enlargement.
    • [3]  Funding implemented through shared management represents less than 2% of the total volume of development aid, and mostly relates to interregional cooperation projects in EU border regions (e.g. transport, connectivity).
    • [4]  https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/eu-budget_en.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – The Commission’s use of public money for behind-the-scenes political lobbying – E-002388/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002388/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Mariusz Kamiński (ECR)

    In recent months a number of stories have appeared in the media concerning the Commission’s use of public money to carry out behind-the-scenes political lobbying to push through controversial policies such as the Green Deal and climate policy.

    The reports show that experts advocating the Commission’s preferred views are also receiving funding in the areas of agriculture and the common security and defence policy.

    What is more, reports in the Welt am Sonntag[1] suggest that, in addition to supporting ‘green’ NGOs in their efforts to lobby Member States and independent institutions, including the European Parliament, the Commission has also allegedly provided funding to help NGOs sue European companies.

    One example is ClientEarth, which received EUR 350 000 to take legal action against coal-fired power plants, with the explicit aim of increasing the ‘financial and legal risk’ for their operators.

    In view of the above, please provide specific answers to the following questions, which will speed up the work of the expected committee of inquiry that more than 200 MEPs have already called for:

    • 1.Has the Commission funded and in any way mandated NGOs, consultancy firms or lobbying outfits to influence the decisions and policies of democratic governments and independent institutions?
    • 2.In what areas – other than the already confirmed cases of the Green Deal, security and defence policy and agriculture – has the Commission conducted similar lobbying campaigns, and were activities promoting the agreement with Mercosur also financed?
    • 3.What steps is the Commission intending to take in response to the criticism that there is no credible and transparent overview of the EU funds that are going to NGOs?

    Submitted: 13.6.2025

    • [1] https://www.welt.de/wirtschaft/plus256221718/geheime-vertraege-offengelegt-eu-kommission-bezahlte-aktivisten-fuer-klimalobbyismus.html
    Last updated: 18 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Industrial Emissions Directive – BREF for the ceramic manufacturing industry – E-002327/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002327/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Stefano Bonaccini (S&D), Elisabetta Gualmini (S&D), Sandro Gozi (Renew), Antonella Sberna (ECR), Sander Smit (PPE), Stefano Cavedagna (ECR)

    In November 2024, in the context of the application of the revised Industrial Emissions Directive, the Commission presented the draft Best Available Techniques Reference Document (BREF) for the ceramic manufacturing industry.

    The document establishes mandatory emissions and environmental performance levels, as well as the techniques to achieve them, constituting the basis for operational permits for ceramic manufacturing installations in the EU.

    Although the revised Industrial Emissions Directive introduces significant changes to permitting processes, with stricter emissions limits and ambitious decarbonisation and environmental targets, it also offers accessible and modern techniques, which would ensure viable technical and economic conditions in the ceramic sector.

    In the light of the above:

    • 1.Has the Commission properly assessed the impact on the ceramic industry of complying with the proposed targets, taking into consideration the heterogeneous nature of the sector and the investment needed to implement the required techniques?
    • 2.Can the Commission clarify the criteria for classifying the listed techniques (e.g. the electrification of continuous and intermittent kilns) as best available techniques, given their limited availability, the elevated costs of implementation and the absence of reliable data on their performance and related emissions?

    Submitted: 10.6.2025

    Last updated: 18 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: OSCE Presence delivers specialized training on sectorial analysis of financial crimes for Albanian State Police

    Source: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe – OSCE

    Headline: OSCE Presence delivers specialized training on sectorial analysis of financial crimes for Albanian State Police

    In support of Albania’s National Strategy for the Prevention of Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism, the OSCE Presence in Albania organized a three-day training programme on sectorial analysis on financial crimes, from 17 to 19 June 2025. This initiative is part of ongoing efforts to enhance the institutional capacity of the Albanian State Police, specifically of the Anti-Money Laundering Sector within the General Directorate.
    Led by two national experts, the training was designed to strengthen the police analytical and operational capabilities in the field of economic and financial crime. It provided 12 officers with the knowledge and skills necessary to conceive and draft sectoral analyses in this field. These skills will support strategic planning, intelligence-led investigations and effective interagency co-ordination in combating money laundering, corruption and related financial offenses.
    By delivering targeted capacity-building support, this training contributes directly to the implementation of the Albania’s National Strategy for the Prevention of Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism and reinforces the OSCE’s commitment to promoting effective, intelligence-driven policing in Albania.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Supply of Veterinary Medicines to Northern Ireland from 1 January 2026

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    News story

    Supply of Veterinary Medicines to Northern Ireland from 1 January 2026

    New rules governing the distribution of veterinary medicines in Northern Ireland will apply from 1 January 2026.

    On 19 June 2025, the Government published its paper ‘Protecting Animal Health: The Government’s Approach to Veterinary Medicines in Northern Ireland’.

    This paper sets out important information for Marketing Authorisation Holders, Wholesale Dealers and Retailers and reports on the progress in safeguarding the ongoing supply of veterinary medicines in Northern Ireland, and the steps that the Government will take to support this.

    The following guidance accompanies the Paper and provides further technical guidance which can be found on the VMD Information Hub – GOV.UK:

    • Supplying veterinary medicines to Northern Ireland from 2026 – Guidance for Marketing Authorisation holders
    • Supplying veterinary medicines to Northern Ireland from 2026 – Guidance for Wholesalers / Retailers
    • Supplying veterinary medicines to Northern Ireland from 2026 –  Veterinary Medicine Health Situation Scheme – Guidance
    • Supplying veterinary medicines to Northern Ireland from 2026 – Veterinary Medicines Internal Market Scheme guidance

    Please direct any queries to windsorframework@vmd.gov.uk

    Updates to this page

    Published 19 June 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: SCED begins visit to France to promote Hong Kong’s unique advantages as business and investment hub (with photos)

    Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

         The Secretary for Commerce and Economic Development, Mr Algernon Yau, began his visit to France on June 18 (France time) to promote Hong Kong’s unique advantages and vast opportunities for businesses.
     
         Mr Yau first visited Toulouse and met with the Group Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Elior Group SA, Mr Daniel Derichebourg, to learn about the company’s latest developments and exchange views on promoting closer business collaboration between Hong Kong and France. Elior Group SA is a global aeronautic services company, which is part of Derichebourg SA, a leading business in Europe.
     
         With the assistance of Invest Hong Kong, Elior Group SA has recently set up an Asian headquarters and expanded its presence in Hong Kong. The company early this year signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Airport Authority Hong Kong to explore the possibility of providing professional services such as aircraft dismantling, parts recycling and related training in Hong Kong, thereby helping Hong Kong develop into the first aircraft parts processing and trading centre in Asia.
      
         Mr Yau said that Hong Kong and France have long-standing business relations and many companies in Hong Kong with parent companies located in France are internationally renowned enterprises. With the distinct advantages under “one country, two systems”, Hong Kong is the premier destination for enterprises around the globe to set up or expand their businesses. He believes that the co-operation between the company and various stakeholders in Hong Kong will help unleash market potential and create new opportunities, leveraging Hong Kong’s advantages as a business and investment hub, and its role as a springboard to the Mainland, markets in Asia and beyond.
      
         Meanwhile, Mr Yau took the opportunity to visit the Derichebourg Aeronautics Training Center and the Airbus assembly lines respectively to learn about the latest advancements in related aeronautic training, aircraft manufacturing and sustainable aviation development.
      
         Mr Yau will proceed to Bordeaux on June 19 (France time).

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI: JLT Mobile Computers announces a generational change in marketing leadership

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Växjö, Sweden, June 24, 2025 * * * JLT Mobile Computers, a leading developer and supplier of reliable computers for demanding environments, today announced the planned generational change in its marketing leadership. This leadership transition reflects JLT’s strategic initiative to centralize and mobilize its marketing resources, reinforcing its commitment to global growth and market expansion.

    Christian Meincke, who has served as Chief Marketing Officer at JLT since 2023, is retiring. Tejal Ranjan, Vice President of Marketing, will take on global responsibility for the company’s marketing strategy, planning, and operations.

    Tejal joined JLT as VP of Marketing, USA in October 2024 and brings over 20 years of international experience in B2B technology marketing. Throughout her career, Tejal has held executive marketing positions at global technology firms, leading digital transformation efforts, building high-performing teams, and launching integrated campaigns that accelerated revenue growth and brand recognition. She is recognized for her customer-centric approach, data-driven decision-making, and her ability to closely align marketing with sales for measurable business impact.

    To learn more about JLT Mobile Computers, and the company’s products, services and solutions, visit jltmobile.com. Financial information is available on JLT’s investor page.

    About JLT Mobile Computers

    JLT Mobile Computers is a leading developer and supplier of rugged mobile computing devices and solutions for demanding environments. 30 years of development and manufacturing experience have enabled JLT to set the standard in rugged computing, combining outstanding product quality with expert service, support and solutions to ensure trouble-free business operations for customers in warehousing, transportation, manufacturing, mining, ports and agriculture. JLT operates globally from offices in Sweden, France, and the US, complemented by an extensive network of sales partners in local markets. The company was founded in 1994, and the share has been listed on the Nasdaq First North Growth Market stock exchange since 2002 under the symbol JLT. Eminova Fondkommission AB acts as Certified Adviser. Learn more at jltmobile.com.

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI: JLT Mobile Computers announces a generational change in marketing leadership

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Växjö, Sweden, June 24, 2025 * * * JLT Mobile Computers, a leading developer and supplier of reliable computers for demanding environments, today announced the planned generational change in its marketing leadership. This leadership transition reflects JLT’s strategic initiative to centralize and mobilize its marketing resources, reinforcing its commitment to global growth and market expansion.

    Christian Meincke, who has served as Chief Marketing Officer at JLT since 2023, is retiring. Tejal Ranjan, Vice President of Marketing, will take on global responsibility for the company’s marketing strategy, planning, and operations.

    Tejal joined JLT as VP of Marketing, USA in October 2024 and brings over 20 years of international experience in B2B technology marketing. Throughout her career, Tejal has held executive marketing positions at global technology firms, leading digital transformation efforts, building high-performing teams, and launching integrated campaigns that accelerated revenue growth and brand recognition. She is recognized for her customer-centric approach, data-driven decision-making, and her ability to closely align marketing with sales for measurable business impact.

    To learn more about JLT Mobile Computers, and the company’s products, services and solutions, visit jltmobile.com. Financial information is available on JLT’s investor page.

    About JLT Mobile Computers

    JLT Mobile Computers is a leading developer and supplier of rugged mobile computing devices and solutions for demanding environments. 30 years of development and manufacturing experience have enabled JLT to set the standard in rugged computing, combining outstanding product quality with expert service, support and solutions to ensure trouble-free business operations for customers in warehousing, transportation, manufacturing, mining, ports and agriculture. JLT operates globally from offices in Sweden, France, and the US, complemented by an extensive network of sales partners in local markets. The company was founded in 1994, and the share has been listed on the Nasdaq First North Growth Market stock exchange since 2002 under the symbol JLT. Eminova Fondkommission AB acts as Certified Adviser. Learn more at jltmobile.com.

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Verizon announces pricing terms of its private exchange offers for 10 series of notes and related tender offers open to certain investors

    Source: Verizon

    Headline: Verizon announces pricing terms of its private exchange offers for 10 series of notes and related tender offers open to certain investors

    NEW YORK, N.Y. –  Verizon Communications Inc. (“Verizon”) (NYSE, Nasdaq: VZ) today announced the pricing terms of its two previously announced related transactions to repurchase 10 series of its outstanding notes listed in the tables below.

    Exchange Offers

    The first transaction consists of 10 separate private offers to exchange (the “Exchange Offers”) any and all of the outstanding series of notes listed in the table below (as used in the context of the Exchange Offers and the Cash Offers (as defined below), collectively the “Old Notes”) in exchange for newly issued debt securities of Verizon (the “New Notes”), on the terms and subject to the conditions set forth in the Offering Memorandum dated June 12, 2025 (the “Offering Memorandum”), the eligibility letter (the “Eligibility Letter”) and the accompanying exchange offer notice of guaranteed delivery (the “Exchange Offer Notice of Guaranteed Delivery” which, together with the Offering Memorandum and the Eligibility Letter, constitute the “Exchange Offer Documents”). Only a holder who has duly completed and returned an Eligibility Letter certifying that it is either (1) a “qualified institutional buyer” (as defined in Rule 144A under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended (the “Securities Act”)); or (2) a person located outside the United States who is (i) not a “U.S. person” (as defined in Rule 902 under the Securities Act), (ii) not acting for the account or benefit of a U.S. person and (iii) a “Non-U.S. qualified offeree” (as defined below), are authorized to receive the Offering Memorandum and to participate in the Exchange Offers (such holders, “Exchange Offer Eligible Holders”).

    The Exchange Offers will each expire at 5:00 p.m. (Eastern time) today, June 18, 2025 (such date and time with respect to an Exchange Offer, as the same may be extended with respect to such Exchange Offer, the “Exchange Offer Expiration Date”). Old Notes tendered for exchange may be validly withdrawn at any time at or prior to 5:00 p.m. (Eastern time) today, June 18, 2025 (such date and time with respect to an Exchange Offer, as the same may be extended with respect to such Exchange Offer, the “Exchange Offer Withdrawal Date”), but not thereafter, unless extended by Verizon. The “Exchange Offer Settlement Date” with respect to an Exchange Offer will be promptly following the Exchange Offer Expiration Date and is expected to be June 25, 2025.

    Unless otherwise defined herein, capitalized terms used under the heading Exchange Offers have the respective meanings assigned thereto in the Exchange Offer Documents.

    The table below indicates, among other things, the applicable Exchange Offer Yield and Total Exchange Price (each as defined in the Offering Memorandum) for each series of Old Notes, as calculated at 11:00 a.m. (Eastern time) today, June 18, 2025 (as used in the context of the Exchange Offers and the Cash Offers (as defined below), the “Price Determination Date”).

    Acceptance Priority Level(1)

    Title of Security

    CUSIP
    Number(s)

    Reference U.S.
    Treasury Security

    Yield of Reference U.S.
    Treasury Security

    Fixed Spread
    (basis points) (2)

    Floating Rate Note Total Exchange Price(3)

    Fixed Rate Note Exchange Offer Yield

    Fixed Rate Note Total Exchange Price

    1

    1.450% Notes due 2026

    92343VGG3

    4.625% due March 15, 2026

    4.225%

    +0

    N/A

    4.225%

    $980.07

    2

    Floating Rate Notes due 2026

    92343VGE8

    N/A

    N/A

    N/A

    $1,006.00

    N/A

    N/A

    3

    4.125% Notes due 2027

    92343VDY7

    3.875% due May 31, 2027

    3.929%

    +15

    N/A

    4.079%

    $1,000.71

    4

    3.000% Notes due 2027

    92343VFF6

    3.875% due May 31, 2027

    3.929%

    +15

    N/A

    4.079%

    $982.00

    5

    4.329% Notes due 2028

    92343VER1/

    92343VEQ3/

    U9221ABK3

    3.875% due June 15, 2028

    3.869%

    +20

    N/A

    4.069%

    $1,007.76

    6

    2.100% Notes due 2028

    92343VGH1

    3.875% due June 15, 2028

    3.869%

    +15

    N/A

    4.019%

    $950.62

    7

    4.016% Notes due 2029

    92343VEU4/

    92343VET7/

    U9221ABL1

    4.000% due May 31, 2030

    3.952%

    +30

    N/A

    4.252%

    $990.52

    8

    3.150% Notes due 2030

    92343VFE9

    4.000% due May 31, 2030

    3.952%

    +35

    N/A

    4.302%

    $951.02

    9

    1.680% Notes due 2030

    92343VFX7/

    92343VFN9/

    U9221ABS6

    4.000% due May 31, 2030

    3.952%

    +55

    N/A

    4.502%

    $867.19

    10

    7.750% Notes due 2030

    92344GAM8/

    92344GAC0

    4.000% due May 31, 2030

    3.952%

    +60

    N/A

    4.552%

    $1,152.36

    (1) Subject to the satisfaction or waiver of the conditions of the Exchange Offers described in the Offering Memorandum, if the New Notes Capacity Condition (as defined below) and/or the corresponding Cash Offer Completion Condition (as defined below) is not satisfied with respect to every series of Old Notes, Verizon will accept Old Notes for exchange in the order of their respective Acceptance Priority Level specified in the table above (as used in the context of the Exchange Offers and the Cash Offers, each an “Acceptance Priority Level,” with 1 being the highest Acceptance Priority Level and 10 being the lowest Acceptance Priority Level). It is possible that a series of Old Notes with a particular Acceptance Priority Level will not be accepted for exchange even if one or more series with a higher or lower Acceptance Priority Level are accepted for purchase.

    (2) The Total Exchange Price payable per each $1,000 principal amount of a series of Old Notes validly tendered for exchange other than the Floating Rate Notes (as defined below) (the “Fixed Rate Notes”) will be payable in a specified principal amount of New Notes and will be based on the fixed spread specified in the table above (the “Fixed Spread”) for the applicable series of Fixed Rate Notes, plus the yield of the specified Reference U.S. Treasury Security for that series as of the Price Determination Date. The Total Exchange Price does not include the applicable Accrued Coupon Payment (as defined below), which will be payable in cash in addition to the applicable Total Exchange Price.

    (3) The Total Exchange Price payable per each $1,000 principal amount of floating rate notes due 2026 (the “Floating Rate Notes”) validly tendered for exchange and not validly withdrawn will be payable in a specified principal amount of New Notes. Any Floating Rate Notes validly tendered and accepted by us, will receive the Total Exchange Price listed above for the Floating Rate Notes.

    Upon the terms and subject to the conditions set forth in the Exchange Offer Documents, Exchange Offer Eligible Holders who (i) validly tender, and who do not validly withdraw, Old Notes at or prior to the Exchange Offer Expiration Date or (ii) deliver a properly completed and duly executed Exchange Offer Notice of Guaranteed Delivery and all other required documents at or prior to the Exchange Offer Expiration Date and validly tender their Old Notes at or prior to 5:00 p.m. (Eastern time) on the second business day after the applicable Exchange Offer Expiration Date pursuant to the Guaranteed Delivery Procedures, and whose Old Notes are accepted for exchange by us, will receive the applicable Total Exchange Price for each $1,000 principal amount of such Old Notes, which will be payable in principal amount of New Notes.

    Verizon is offering to accept for exchange validly tendered Old Notes using a “waterfall” methodology under which such Old Notes of different series will be accepted in the order of their respective Acceptance Priority Levels as listed in the table above, subject to a $2.5 billion cap on the maximum aggregate principal amount of New Notes that Verizon will issue in all of the Exchange Offers (the “New Notes Maximum Amount”). However, subject to applicable law, Verizon, in its sole discretion, has the option to waive or increase the New Notes Maximum Amount at any time.

    Subject to the satisfaction or waiver of the conditions of the Exchange Offers described in the Offering Memorandum, Verizon will, in accordance with the Acceptance Priority Levels, accept for exchange all Old Notes of each series validly tendered and not validly withdrawn, so long as (1) the Total Exchange Price for all validly tendered and not validly withdrawn Old Notes of such series, plus (2) the Total Exchange Price for all validly tendered and not validly withdrawn Old Notes of all series having a higher Acceptance Priority Level than such series of Old Notes is equal to, or less than, the New Notes Maximum Amount; provided, however, Verizon may: (x) waive the New Notes Capacity Condition with respect to one or more Exchange Offers and accept all Old Notes of the series sought in such Exchange Offer, and of any series of Old Notes sought in Exchange Offers with a higher Acceptance Priority Level, validly tendered and not validly withdrawn; or (y) skip any Exchange Offer for Old Notes that would have caused the New Notes Maximum Amount to be exceeded and exchange all Old Notes of a given series in an Exchange Offer having a lower Acceptance Priority Level so long as Verizon is able to exchange the full amount of validly tendered and not validly withdrawn Notes in such Exchange Offer without exceeding the New Notes Maximum Amount. Subject to applicable law, Verizon may waive or increase the New Notes Maximum Amount at any time.

    In addition to the applicable Total Exchange Price, Exchange Offer Eligible Holders whose Old Notes are accepted for exchange will receive a cash payment equal to the accrued and unpaid interest on such Old Notes from and including the immediately preceding interest payment date for such Old Notes to, but excluding, the Exchange Offer Settlement Date (the “Accrued Coupon Payment”). Interest will cease to accrue on the Exchange Offer Settlement Date for all Old Notes accepted in the Exchange Offers, including those Old Notes tendered through the Guaranteed Delivery Procedures.

    The New Notes will mature on July 2, 2037. The table below indicates the interest rate (the “New Notes Coupon”) for the series of New Notes to be issued by Verizon pursuant to the Exchange Offers (as calculated at the Price Determination Date in accordance with the Offering Memorandum).

    New Notes

    Reference U.S.
    Treasury Security

    Reference Yield of Reference U.S.
    Treasury Security

    Fixed Spread
    (basis points)

    New Notes Coupon

    New Notes due 2037

    4.250% due May 15, 2035

    4.351%

    +105

    5.401%

    Pursuant to the Minimum Issue Requirement, Verizon will not complete the Exchange Offers if the aggregate principal amount of New Notes to be issued would be less than $750 million. Verizon may not waive the Minimum Issue Requirement.

    In addition to the Minimum Issue Requirement, Verizon’s obligation to accept any series of Old Notes tendered in the Exchange Offers is subject to the satisfaction of certain conditions applicable to the Exchange Offer for such series as described in the Offering Memorandum, including, among others, the New Notes Capacity Condition and the Cash Offer Completion Condition. Verizon expressly reserves the right, subject to applicable law, to waive any and all conditions to any Exchange Offer, other than conditions described by Verizon as non-waivable.

    Notwithstanding any other provision in the Offering Memorandum to the contrary, if at the Exchange Offer Expiration Date, for a particular Exchange Offer, the Total Exchange Price payable for all validly tendered Old Notes of a particular series is greater than the New Notes Maximum Amount (after exchanging all validly tendered Old Notes of each series with a higher Acceptance Priority Level), then Verizon will not be obligated to accept for exchange, or issue any New Notes in exchange for, such series of Old Notes and may terminate the Exchange Offer with respect to such series of Old Notes (the “New Notes Capacity Condition”) in accordance with the Acceptance Priority Procedures described in the Offering Memorandum.

    Each series of Old Notes that is subject to an Exchange Offer pursuant to the Exchange Offer Documents is also subject to a corresponding Cash Offer pursuant to the Offer to Purchase (as defined below), which Cash Offer is only available to holders of the Old Notes that are not Exchange Offer Eligible Holders. The Acceptance Priority Levels set forth in the Offer to Purchase correspond to the Acceptance Priority Levels set forth in the Offering Memorandum. Verizon’s obligation to complete an Exchange Offer with respect to a particular series of Old Notes is conditioned on the timely satisfaction or waiver of all conditions precedent to the completion of the corresponding Cash Offer for such series of Old Notes (with respect to each Exchange Offer, the “Cash Offer Completion Condition”), and Verizon’s obligation to complete a Cash Offer with respect to a particular series of Old Notes is subject to various conditions, as set forth in the Offer to Purchase, including (i) that all of the conditions precedent to the completion of the corresponding Exchange Offer are timely satisfied or waived and (ii) that the aggregate amount of cash (excluding the Accrued Coupon Payment) that would have to be paid to purchase any and all of the validly tendered Old Notes of such series in such Cash Offer does not exceed the applicable maximum cash amount specified in the Offer to Purchase. Verizon will terminate an Exchange Offer for a given series of Old Notes if it terminates the Cash Offer for such series of Old Notes, and Verizon will terminate the Cash Offer for a given series of Old Notes if it terminates the Exchange Offer for such series of Old Notes. The termination of a Cash Offer for a series of Old Notes will not impact the Exchange Offers for any other series of Old Notes. The Cash Offer Completion Condition cannot be waived by Verizon. If Verizon extends any Cash Offer for a series of Old Notes for any reason, Verizon will extend the corresponding Exchange Offer for such series Old Notes.

    If and when issued, the New Notes will not be registered under the Securities Act or any state securities laws. Therefore, the New Notes may not be offered or sold in the United States absent registration or an applicable exemption from the registration requirements of the Securities Act and any applicable state securities laws. Verizon will enter into a registration rights agreement with respect to the New Notes.

    Global Bondholder Services Corporation is acting as the Information Agent and the Exchange Agent for the Exchange Offers. Questions or requests for assistance related to the Exchange Offers or for additional copies of the Exchange Offer Documents may be directed to Global Bondholder Services Corporation at (212) 430-3774.You may also contact your broker, dealer, commercial bank, trust company or other nominee for assistance concerning the Exchange Offers. The Exchange Offer Documents can be accessed at the following link: https://gbsc-usa.com/eligibility/verizon.

    Cash Offers

    The second transaction consists of 10 separate offers to purchase for cash (the “Cash Offers”) any and all of each series of Old Notes, on the terms and subject to the conditions set forth in the Offer to Purchase dated June 12, 2025 (the “Offer to Purchase”), the certification instructions letter (the “Certification Instructions Letter”) and the accompanying cash offer notice of guaranteed delivery (the “Cash Offer Notice of Guaranteed Delivery” which, together with the Offer to Purchase and the Certification Instructions Letter, constitute the “Tender Offer Documents”). Only holders who are not Exchange Offer Eligible Holders (“Cash Offer Eligible Holders”) are eligible to participate in the Cash Offers. Holders of Old Notes participating in the Cash Offers will be required to complete the Certification Instructions Letter and certify that they are Cash Offer Eligible Holders.

    The Cash Offers will each expire at 5:00 p.m. (Eastern time) today, June 18, 2025 (such date and time with respect to a Cash Offer, as the same may be extended with respect to such Cash Offer, the “Cash Offer Expiration Date”). Old Notes tendered for purchase may be validly withdrawn at any time at or prior to 5:00 p.m. (Eastern time) today, June 18, 2025 (such date and time with respect to a Cash Offer, as the same may be extended with respect to such Cash Offer, the “Cash Offer Withdrawal Date”), but not thereafter, unless extended by Verizon. The “Cash Offer Settlement Date” with respect to a Cash Offer will be promptly following the Cash Offer Expiration Date and is expected to be June 25, 2025.

    Unless otherwise defined herein, capitalized terms used under the heading Cash Offers have the respective meanings assigned thereto in the Tender Offer Documents.

    The table below indicates, among other things, the applicable Cash Offer Yield and Total Consideration (as defined in the Offer to Purchase) for each series of Old Notes, as calculated at the Price Determination Date in accordance with the Offer to Purchase.

    Acceptance Priority Level(1)

    Title of Security

    CUSIP
    Number(s)

    Reference U.S.
    Treasury Security

    Yield of Reference U.S.
    Treasury Security

    Fixed Spread
    (basis points) (2)

    Floating Rate Note Total Consideration(3)

    Cash Offer Yield

    Fixed Rate Note Total Consideration

    1

    1.450% Notes due 2026

    92343VGG3

    4.625% due March 15, 2026

    4.225%

    +0

    N/A

    4.225%

    $980.07

    2

    Floating Rate Notes due 2026

    92343VGE8

    N/A

    N/A

    N/A

    $1,006.00

    N/A

    N/A

    3

    4.125% Notes due 2027

    92343VDY7

    3.875% due May 31, 2027

    3.929%

    +15

    N/A

    4.079%

    $1,000.71

    4

    3.000% Notes due 2027

    92343VFF6

    3.875% due May 31, 2027

    3.929%

    +15

    N/A

    4.079%

    $982.00

    5

    4.329% Notes due 2028

    92343VER1/

    92343VEQ3/

    U9221ABK3

    3.875% due June 15, 2028

    3.869%

    +20

    N/A

    4.069%

    $1,007.76

    6

    2.100% Notes due 2028

    92343VGH1

    3.875% due June 15, 2028

    3.869%

    +15

    N/A

    4.019%

    $950.62

    7

    4.016% Notes due 2029

    92343VEU4/

    92343VET7/

    U9221ABL1

    4.000% due May 31, 2030

    3.952%

    +30

    N/A

    4.252%

    $990.52

    8

    3.150% Notes due 2030

    92343VFE9

    4.000% due May 31, 2030

    3.952%

    +35

    N/A

    4.302%

    $951.02

    9

    1.680% Notes due 2030

    92343VFX7/

    92343VFN9/

    U9221ABS6

    4.000% due May 31, 2030

    3.952%

    +55

    N/A

    4.502%

    $867.19

    10

    7.750% Notes due 2030

    92344GAM8/

    92344GAC0

    4.000% due May 31, 2030

    3.952%

    +60

    N/A

    4.552%

    $1,152.36

    (1) Subject to the satisfaction or waiver of the conditions of the Cash Offers described in the Offer to Purchase, including if the Maximum Total Consideration Condition (as defined below) is not satisfied with respect to every series of Old Notes, Verizon will accept Notes for purchase in the order of their respective Acceptance Priority Level specified in the table above. It is possible that a series of Old Notes with a particular Acceptance Priority Level will not be accepted for purchase even if one or more series with a higher or lower Acceptance Priority Level are accepted for purchase.

    (2) The Total Consideration for each series of Fixed Rate Notes (such consideration, the “Fixed Rate Note Total Consideration”) validly tendered will be determined in accordance with standard market practice, as described in the Offer to Purchase, to result in a Total Consideration payable per each $1,000 principal amount of each series of Fixed Rate Notes that equates to a yield to the maturity date (or Par Call Date, if applicable) in accordance with the formula set forth in Annex A to the Offer to Purchase, for the applicable series of Fixed Rate Notes, equal to the sum of (i) the yield corresponding to the bid side price of the applicable Reference U.S. Treasury Security specified in the table above for such series of Fixed Rate Notes at the Price Determination Date plus (ii) the applicable Fixed Spread specified in the table above for such series of Fixed Rate Notes. The Total Consideration does not include the applicable Accrued Coupon Payment (as defined below), which will be payable in cash in addition to the applicable Total Consideration.

    (3) Payable per each $1,000 principal amount of Floating Rate Notes validly tendered and not validly withdrawn at or prior to the Cash Offer Expiration Date or the Cash Offer Guaranteed Delivery Date (as defined below) pursuant to the Guaranteed Delivery Procedures and accepted for purchase (such amount, the “Floating Rate Note Total Consideration”).

    Upon the terms and subject to the conditions set forth in the Tender Offer Documents, Cash Offer Eligible Holders who (i) validly tender, and who do not validly withdraw, Old Notes at or prior to the Cash Offer Expiration Date or (ii) deliver a properly completed and duly executed Cash Offer Notice of Guaranteed Delivery at or prior to the Cash Offer Expiration Date and validly tender their Old Notes at or prior to 5:00 p.m. (Eastern time) on the second business day after the applicable Cash Offer Expiration Date (such date and time with respect to a Cash Offer, as the same may be extended with respect to such Cash Offer, the “Cash Offer Guaranteed Delivery Date”) pursuant to the Guaranteed Delivery Procedures, and whose Old Notes are accepted for purchase by Verizon, will receive the applicable Total Consideration for each $1,000 principal amount of Old Notes, which will be payable in cash.

    Verizon is offering to purchase validly tendered Old Notes using a “waterfall” methodology under which such Old Notes of different series will be accepted in the order of their respective Acceptance Priority Levels as listed in the table above, subject to the Maximum Total Consideration Condition (as defined below) and the Exchange Offer Completion Condition (as defined below). However, subject to applicable law, Verizon, in its sole discretion, has the option to waive or increase the Maximum Total Consideration Condition at any time.

    Subject to the satisfaction or waiver of the conditions of the Cash Offers described in the Offer to Purchase, Verizon will, in accordance with the Acceptance Priority Levels as listed in the table above, accept for purchase all Old Notes of each series validly tendered and not validly withdrawn, so long as the Total Consideration, excluding the Accrued Coupon Payment, for all validly tendered and not validly withdrawn Notes of all series having a higher Acceptance Priority Level than such series of Old Notes is equal to, or less than, the Maximum Total Consideration Amount; provided, however, Verizon may: (x) waive the Maximum Total Consideration Condition with respect to one or more Cash Offers and accept all Old Notes of the series sought in such Cash Offer, and of any series of Old Notes sought in Cash Offers with a higher Acceptance Priority Level, validly tendered and not validly withdrawn; or (y) skip any Cash Offer for Old Notes that would have caused the Maximum Total Consideration Amount to be exceeded and purchase all Old Notes of a given series in an Cash Offer having a lower Acceptance Priority Level so long as Verizon is able to purchase the full amount of validly tendered and not validly withdrawn Notes in such Cash Offer without exceeding the Maximum Total Consideration Amount. 

    In addition to the applicable Total Consideration, Cash Offer Eligible Holders whose Old Notes are accepted for purchase will be paid accrued and unpaid interest on such Old Notes from and including the immediately preceding interest payment date for such Old Notes to, but excluding, the Cash Offer Settlement Date (the “Accrued Coupon Payment”). Interest will cease to accrue on the Cash Offer Settlement Date for all Old Notes accepted in the Cash Offers, including those Old Notes tendered through the Guaranteed Delivery Procedures.

    Verizon’s obligation to accept any series of Old Notes tendered in the Cash Offers is subject to the satisfaction of certain conditions applicable to the Cash Offer for such series as described in the Offer to Purchase, including the Maximum Total Consideration Condition and the Exchange Offer Completion Condition. Verizon expressly reserves the right, subject to applicable law, to waive any and all conditions to any Cash Offer, other than conditions described by Verizon as non-waivable.

    Verizon’s obligation to complete a Cash Offer with respect to a particular series of Old Notes validly tendered is conditioned (the “Maximum Total Consideration Condition”) on aggregate Total Consideration, excluding the Accrued Coupon Payment, payable for Old Notes purchased in the Cash Offers (the “Aggregate Purchase Consideration”) not to exceed $300 million (the “Maximum Total Consideration Amount”). Verizon’s obligation to complete a Cash Offer with respect to a particular series of Old Notes validly tendered is conditioned on the Maximum Total Consideration Amount being sufficient to pay the Total Consideration, excluding the Accrued Coupon Payment, for all validly tendered Notes of such series (after accounting for all validly tendered Notes that have a higher Acceptance Priority Level).  

    Verizon reserves the right, but are under no obligation, to increase or waive the Maximum Total Consideration Amount, in our sole discretion subject to applicable law, with or without extending the Cash Offer Withdrawal Date. No assurance can be given that Verizon will increase or waive the Maximum Total Consideration Amount. If Cash Offer Eligible Holders tender more Old Notes in the Cash Offers than they expect to be accepted for purchase based on the Maximum Total Consideration Amount and Verizon subsequently accepts more than such Cash Offer Eligible Holders expected of such Old Notes tendered as a result of an increase of the Maximum Total Consideration Amount, such Cash Offer Eligible Holders may not be able to withdraw any of their previously tendered Notes. Accordingly, Cash Offer Eligible Holders should not tender any Old Notes that they do not wish to be accepted for purchase.

    If the Maximum Total Consideration Condition is not satisfied with respect to each series of Old Notes, for (i) a series of Old Notes (the “First Non-Covered Notes”) for which the Maximum Total Consideration Amount is less than the sum of (x) the Aggregate Purchase Consideration for all validly tendered First Non-Covered Notes and (y) the Aggregate Purchase Consideration for all validly tendered Notes of all series, having a higher Acceptance Priority Level as set forth on the cover of the Offer to Purchase (with 1 being the highest Acceptance Priority Level and 10 being the lowest Acceptance Priority Level) than the First Non-Covered Notes, and (ii) all series of Old Notes with an Acceptance Priority Level lower than the First Non-Covered Notes (together with the First Non-Covered Notes, the “Non-Covered Notes”), then Verizon may, at any time on or prior to the Cash Offer Expiration Date: (x) waive the Maximum Total Consideration Condition with respect to one or more Cash Offers and accept all Old Notes of the series sought in such Cash Offer, and of any series of Old Notes sought in Cash Offers with a higher Acceptance Priority Level, validly tendered and not validly withdrawn; or (y) skip any Cash Offer for Old Notes that would have caused the Maximum Total Consideration Amount to be exceeded and purchase all Old Notes of a given series in an Cash Offer having a lower Acceptance Priority Level so long as Verizon is able to purchase the full amount of validly tendered and not validly withdrawn Notes in such Cash Offer without exceeding the Maximum Total Consideration Amount.

    Verizon’s obligation to complete any Cash Offer with respect to a given series of Old Notes is conditioned on the completion of the corresponding Exchange Offer for such series of Old Notes (with respect to each Cash Offer, the “Exchange Offer Completion Condition”). Verizon will terminate the Cash Offer for a given series of Old Notes if it terminates the Exchange Offer for such series of Old Notes, and it will terminate the Exchange Offer for a given series of Old Notes if it terminates the Cash Offer for such series of Old Notes. The termination of an Exchange Offer for a series of Old Notes will not impact the Cash Offer for any other series of Old Notes. If Verizon extends the Exchange Offer for a series of Old Notes for any reason, Verizon will extend the corresponding Cash Offer for such series of Old Notes. The Exchange Offer Completion Condition cannot be waived by Verizon.

    Global Bondholder Services Corporation is acting as the Information Agent and the Tender Agent for the Cash Offers. Questions or requests for assistance related to the Cash Offers or for additional copies of the Tender Offer Documents may be directed to Global Bondholder Services Corporation at (212) 430-3774. You may also contact your broker, dealer, commercial bank, trust company or other nominee for assistance concerning the Cash Offers. The Tender Offer Documents can be accessed at the following link: https://www.gbsc-usa.com/verizon.

    Verizon refers to the Exchange Offers and the Cash Offers, collectively, as the “Offers.”

    If Verizon terminates any Offer with respect to one or more series of Old Notes, it will give prompt notice to the Tender Agent or Exchange Agent, as applicable, and all Old Notes tendered pursuant to such terminated Offer will be returned promptly to the tendering holders thereof. With effect from such termination, any Old Notes blocked in DTC will be released.

    Holders are advised to check with any bank, securities broker or other intermediary through which they hold Old Notes as to when such intermediary needs to receive instructions from a holder in order for that holder to be able to participate in, or (in the circumstances in which revocation is permitted) revoke their instruction to participate in, the Exchange Offers or Cash Offers, as applicable, before the deadlines specified herein and in the Exchange Offer Documents or the Tender Offer Documents, as applicable. The deadlines set by any such intermediary and each clearing system for the submission and withdrawal of exchange instructions will also be earlier than the relevant deadlines specified herein and in the Exchange Offer Documents or the Tender Offer Documents, as applicable.

    This announcement is for informational purposes only. This announcement is not an offer to purchase or a solicitation of an offer to purchase any Old Notes. The Exchange Offers are being made solely pursuant to the Offering Memorandum and related documents and the Cash Offers are being made solely pursuant to the Offer to Purchase and related documents. The Offers are not being made to holders of Old Notes in any jurisdiction in which the making or acceptance thereof would not be in compliance with the securities, blue sky or other laws of such jurisdiction. In any jurisdiction in which the securities laws or blue sky laws require the Offers to be made by a licensed broker or dealer, the Offers will be deemed to be made on behalf of Verizon by the dealer managers or one or more registered brokers or dealers that are licensed under the laws of such jurisdiction.

    This communication and any other documents or materials relating to the Exchange Offers have not been approved by an authorized person for the purposes of Section 21 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, as amended (the “FSMA”). Accordingly, this announcement is not being distributed to, and must not be passed on to, persons within the United Kingdom save in circumstances where section 21(1) of the FSMA does not apply. Accordingly, this communication is only addressed to and directed at persons who are outside the United Kingdom and (i) persons falling within the definition of investment professionals (as defined in Article 19(5) of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Financial Promotion) Order 2005 (the “Financial Promotion Order”)), or (ii) within Article 43 of the Financial Promotion Order, or (iii) high net worth companies and other persons to whom it may lawfully be communicated falling within Article 49(2)(a) to (d) of the Financial Promotion Order, or (iv) to whom an invitation or inducement to engage in investment activity (within the meaning of Section 21 of the FSMA) in connection with the issue or sale of any securities may otherwise lawfully be communicated or caused to be communicated (such persons together being “relevant persons”). The New Notes are only available to, and any invitation, offer or agreement to subscribe, purchase or otherwise acquire such New Notes will be engaged in only with, relevant persons. Any person who is not a relevant person should not act or rely on any document relating to the Exchange Offers or any of their contents.

    This communication and any other documents or materials relating to the Exchange Offer are only addressed to and directed at persons in member states of the European Economic Area (the “EEA”), who are “Qualified Investors” within the meaning of Article 2(e) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1129. The New Notes are only available to, and any invitation, offer or agreement to subscribe, purchase or otherwise acquire such New Notes, will be engaged in only with, Qualified Investors. The Exchange Offer is only available to Qualified Investors. None of the information in the Offering Memorandum and any other documents and materials relating to the Exchange Offer should be acted upon or relied upon in any member state of the EEA by persons who are not Qualified Investors.

    “Non-U.S. qualified offeree” means:

    (i)       in relation to any investor in the European Economic Area (the “EEA”), a qualified investor as defined in Regulation (EU) 2017/1129 (as amended or superseded) that is not a retail investor. For these purposes, a retail investor means a person who is one (or more) of: (a) a retail client as defined in point (11) of Article 4(1) of Directive 2014/65/EU (as amended, “MiFID II”); or (b) a customer within the meaning of Directive (EU) 2016/97, where that customer would not qualify as a professional client as defined in point (10) of Article 4(1) of MiFID II;

    (ii)      in relation to any investor in the United Kingdom, a qualified investor as defined in Article 2 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1129 as it forms part of domestic law by virtue of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 that is not a retail investor and that (a) has professional experience in matters relating to investments and qualifies as an investment professional within the meaning of Article 19(5) of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Financial Promotion) Order 2005 (as amended, the “Financial Promotion Order”), (b) is a person falling within Article 49(2)(a) to (d) (“high net worth companies, unincorporated associations etc.”) of the Financial Promotion Order, or (c) is a person to whom an invitation or inducement to engage in investment activity (within the meaning of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, as amended (the “FSMA”)) in connection with the issue or sale of any notes may otherwise lawfully be communicated or caused to be communicated (all such persons together being referred to as “relevant persons”). For these purposes, a retail investor means a person who is one (or more) of: (x) a retail client, as defined in point (8) of Article 2 of Regulation (EU) No 2017/565 as it forms part of domestic law by virtue of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 (“EUWA”); or (y) a customer within the meaning of the provisions of the FSMA and any rules or regulations made under the FSMA to implement Directive (EU) 2016/97, where that customer would not qualify as a professional client, as defined in point (8) of Article 2(1) of Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 as it forms part of domestic law by virtue of the EUWA; or

    (iii)      any entity outside the U.S., the EEA and the United Kingdom to whom the Exchange Offer may be made in compliance with all applicable laws and regulations of any applicable jurisdiction without registration of the Exchange Offer or any related filing or approval.

    Cautionary Statement Regarding Forward-Looking Statements

    In this communication Verizon has made forward-looking statements, including regarding the conduct and completion of the Offers. These forward-looking statements are not historical facts, but only predictions and generally can be identified by use of statements that include phrases such as “will,” “may,” “should,” “continue,” “anticipate,” “assume,” “believe,” “expect,” “plan,” “appear,” “project,” “estimate,” “hope,” “intend,” “target,” “forecast,” or other words or phrases of similar import. Similarly, statements that describe our objectives, plans or goals also are forward-looking statements. These forward-looking statements are subject to risks and uncertainties that could cause actual results to differ materially from those currently anticipated, including those discussed in the Offering Memorandum and Offer to Purchase under the heading “Risk Factors” and under similar headings in other documents that are incorporated by reference in the Offering Memorandum and Offer to Purchase. Holders are urged to consider these risks and uncertainties carefully in evaluating the forward-looking statements and are cautioned not to place undue reliance on these forward-looking statements. The forward-looking statements included in this press release are made only as of the date of this press release, and Verizon undertakes no obligation to update publicly these forward-looking statements to reflect new information, future events or otherwise. In light of these risks, uncertainties and assumptions, the forward-looking events might or might not occur. Verizon cannot assure you that projected results or events will be achieved.

    MIL OSI Economics

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Christine Lagarde: Strengthening economies in a stormy and fragmenting world

    Source: European Central Bank

    Speech by Christine Lagarde, President of the ECB, at the ninth Annual Research Conference “Economic and financial integration in a stormy and fragmenting world” organised by the National Bank of Ukraine and Narodowy Bank Polski in Kyiv, Ukraine

    Kyiv, 19 June 2025

    It is an honour to be here in Kyiv – a city that has come to symbolise resilience, dignity and the enduring spirit of freedom. Kyiv stands not only as the heart of Ukraine, but as a beacon of what it means to hold fast to democratic values in the face of immense challenge.

    As the great Ukrainian poet Taras Shevchenko once wrote, “In your own house – your own truth. Your own strength and freedom.” Ukraine’s fight today reminds all of Europe of this powerful truth: our security and prosperity rely on unity, on integration with our neighbours.

    In the face of Russia’s unjustified war of aggression, Ukrainians have demonstrated extraordinary courage and resilience in defence of their country.

    In my remarks today, and in keeping with the theme of this conference, I would like to reflect on the historical lessons we have learned about strengthening and integrating economies in an increasingly stormy and fragmented world.

    Experience shows that closer ties with the European neighbourhood can provide a strong foundation for Ukraine to rebuild and emerge stronger. And as geopolitical tensions rise and global supply chains fragment, the case for deeper regional cooperation has never been clearer.

    Europe’s own long history of integration offers valuable insights that can help guide Ukraine’s path forwards. Two key lessons stand out.

    First, while deeper integration increases the potential rewards, it also raises the risks if not managed wisely. Sound domestic policy frameworks are essential to maximise growth and safeguard stability.

    Second, the benefits of integration are neither automatic nor permanent. Maintaining them depends on continuous reform – but reforms must also deliver tangible improvements for people’s lives, and do so relatively quickly.

    The benefits of integration in a fragmenting world

    During the Cold War, the Iron Curtain fractured the European economy. Trade between East and West fell by half. This division was like imposing a 48% tariff – leading to immense welfare losses and isolating the Eastern bloc from global markets.[1]

    But the transformation since Europe’s eastern enlargement has been nothing short of remarkable. On average, countries that joined the EU in 2004 have nearly doubled their GDP per capita over the past two decades.

    Critically, this was not just about catching up from a low base. Between 2004 and 2019, the EU’s new Member States saw their GDP per capita grow 32% more than comparable non-EU countries.[2] The difference was deeper economic integration – and those that were already highly embedded in the regional economy gained the most.

    While all new members experienced gains, countries with stronger integration into regional value chains recorded nearly 10 percentage points higher GDP per capita growth compared with less integrated peers – regardless of geographic proximity.[3]

    This difference was driven mainly by technology and productivity spillovers. ECB research shows that a 10% increase in productivity among western EU firms translated into a 5% productivity gain for central and eastern European firms linked to their supply chains.[4]

    The case for regional integration is therefore clear – and in today’s increasingly fragmented geopolitical landscape, it has become even more compelling.

    First, regional integration underpins growth.

    European economies are highly open, which means a world splintering into rival trading blocs poses clear risks to prosperity. Yet Europe’s most important trading partner is Europe itself: around 65% of euro area exports go to other European countries, including the United Kingdom, Switzerland and Norway. For Ukraine too, Europe is the principal trading partner, accounting for over 50% of its goods trade in 2024.

    By deepening economic ties – more closely linking neighbouring economies – we can reduce our exposure to external shocks. Rising trade within our region can help offset losses in global markets.

    Second, regional integration strengthens resilience.

    One consequence of geopolitical fragmentation is the realignment of supply chains toward trusted partners. Nearly half of firms involved in external trade have already revised their strategies – or intend to do so – including relocating parts of their operations closer to home.[5] While this trend reduces strategic dependencies, it can also raise costs.

    Yet large integrated regions can mitigate these costs by replicating many of the benefits of globalisation at the regional level. Supply chains can be reorganised regionally, allowing each country to specialise based on its comparative advantage within regional value chains.

    Ukraine stands to benefit significantly from expanding these networks across the region – and the EU stands to benefit, too, from having Ukraine as a partner.[6]

    In the automotive sector, for example, Ukrainian firms already produce around 7% of all wire harnesses used in EU vehicles.[7] As the industry shifts towards electric vehicles, which require more complex wiring systems, Ukraine’s manufacturing base is well positioned to scale up and play a larger role in the EU value chain.

    Equally transformative is Ukraine’s drone industry, which has become one of the most advanced in the region. Drones are not only a critical component of modern warfare, but also a technology with substantial spillover effects and far-reaching dual-use applications.

    Indeed, the country’s ambitious goal of producing 4.5 million drones by 2025 has accelerated innovation in materials science, battery technology and 3D printing. These advances are already finding civilian applications in sectors such as logistics, agriculture and emergency response.

    In short, for both existing EU members and neighbouring countries like Ukraine, regional integration is both a path to prosperity and a strategic anchor in an increasingly fragmented world.

    Managing the risks of integration

    But examining the experience of countries that have used regional integration as a platform for growth and reform reveals two important lessons.

    The first is that if integration is not accompanied by appropriate reforms, it can create new vulnerabilities – especially in the financial sphere.

    Financial integration often brings volatile capital inflows, which can make it difficult to distinguish sustainable growth from unsustainable excesses in real time.

    One way this can happen is when productivity gains in tradable sectors, such as manufacturing, drive up wages in those sectors, which then spill over into higher wages in non-tradable sectors and push up overall inflation.[8]

    While this effect is a normal feature of catching-up, it can make it easy to mistake genuine convergence for economic overheating. If foreign capital is in fact driving financial imbalances – such as unsustainable real estate booms – countries may exhibit the same patterns of rising wages and inflation, masking underlying vulnerabilities.

    Another potential distortion is that capital inflows can significantly affect government fiscal positions by boosting tax revenues and creating the illusion of permanently greater fiscal space. This often leads to procyclical fiscal policies, with governments increasing spending or cutting taxes during boom periods – only to face fiscal stress when inflows reverse or growth slows.

    Both dynamics have been visible during Europe’s recent experience with regional integration.

    After the eastern enlargement, financial integration accelerated rapidly. Between 2003 and 2008, the new Member States experienced an extraordinary surge in capital inflows, averaging over 12% of GDP annually – twice the typical level for emerging markets globally.[9]

    Initially, this rapid financial integration brought clear benefits: it expanded access to credit, fuelled growth and enabled much-needed development. However, in many countries, foreign capital was disproportionately channelled into consumption and construction booms, while tax revenues rose sharply on the back of property transactions and buoyant domestic demand.[10] This led to widespread misallocation of private capital and inefficient public spending.

    Capital flows then reversed sharply when the global financial crisis struck, exposing these imbalances. Between December 2008 and May 2013, external bank liabilities in non-euro area central and eastern European countries declined by an average of 27% – with some countries experiencing drops of more than 50%.[11]

    Yet the risks associated with financial integration can be avoided. Not all countries in the region were affected equally. Those that performed better typically shared two key features.

    First, they had clear policies to channel foreign investment into productive sectors. Strong industrial strategies, a skilled workforce and integration into global supply chains helped direct capital towards manufacturing and tradable services – sectors that drive export growth and are less prone to unsustainable booms and asset bubbles.[12]

    Second, they maintained robust financial policy frameworks. Tighter capital requirements, active macroprudential measures and countercyclical buffers strengthened domestic banking sectors and curbed excessive mortgage lending. These tools enabled those countries to absorb large capital inflows without creating destabilising imbalances.[13]

    The lesson is clear: as countries integrate into the region, strong domestic policy frameworks are critical to ensuring that capital inflows support long-term growth rather than generating financial instability or inefficient allocation.

    This insight is especially relevant for Ukraine today as it charts its path towards recovery. If reconstruction proceeds as planned, the country could attract significant capital inflows over the next decade. But without the right safeguards, that capital risks being misallocated – undermining long-term productivity instead of strengthening it.

    There are encouraging signs. The EU–Ukraine Association Agreement and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area have already driven significant reforms in the financial sector. Ukraine’s banking regulation now aligns with more than 75% of EU standards, covering critical areas such as capital adequacy, governance and auditing.[14]

    The National Bank of Ukraine has adopted a risk-based supervisory model inspired by the Single Supervisory Mechanism – the system of banking supervision in Europe – markedly improving oversight. Despite extremely challenging circumstances, Ukraine is also modernising its capital markets – consolidating exchanges, upgrading settlement systems and strengthening regulatory enforcement to attract long-term investors.

    These reforms are already delivering results: in 2023, Ukraine’s banking sector remained profitable and well capitalised despite the ongoing war – an outcome that would have been unthinkable a decade ago.

    Still, further progress is essential, especially in fiscal governance. Strengthening public investment management will be critical to ensure that reconstruction funds are allocated transparently and efficiently.

    This is not just about meeting external standards. It is about ensuring that every euro, and every hryvnia, delivers real returns for the Ukrainian people.[15]

    Making integration sustainable

    However, reforms cannot be treated as a one-time effort.

    So, the second key lesson is that the benefits of regional integration are neither automatic nor permanent. Sustaining them requires continuous reform – and, just as importantly, it requires citizens to see visible, tangible improvements in their daily lives.

    In this context, there are two risks to watch out for.

    The first is that institutional reform momentum can fade if economic benefits do not follow quickly.

    Deeper regional integration typically begins with aligning framework conditions, such as legal systems, regulation and public administration. These areas often improve rapidly. But for the economic gains to materialise, domestic entrepreneurs and foreign investors must respond to the new incentives created – and this takes time.

    In the long run, evidence shows that countries with initially weaker institutions benefit the most from adopting higher standards.[16] But in the short run, if people only see the effort and not the payoff, public support for further reforms can weaken, putting long-term convergence at risk.

    The second risk is that structural shifts in the economy may weaken the link between integration and economic convergence over time.

    The integration of goods markets has traditionally driven convergence almost automatically, as foreign direct investment flows to countries with lower land and labour costs, supply chains relocate and lower-income countries benefit from technology transfers.

    As I mentioned earlier, this will remain an important mechanism even in an era of supply chain reshoring. But countries cannot rely on it as heavily as in the past. Future growth in intra-EU trade is expected to depend increasingly on services – particularly digital services.

    However, research shows that services sector activity tends to concentrate in larger, more affluent urban areas that exhibit the hallmarks of a knowledge economy: high tertiary education rates, strong technology and science sectors and robust digital infrastructure.[17]

    This means that deeper integration alone will not guarantee broad-based convergence across all regions. Over time, countries will need to invest more in education, skills and digitalisation to ensure they can build high levels of human capital.

    Maintaining the path of convergence is therefore not easy. But slowing down reform efforts is not the answer – especially in the shock-prone world we face today.

    There is a clear link between strong institutions and economic resilience. ECB research indicates that, during the pandemic, regions with lower institutional quality experienced – all else equal – an additional decline of around 4 percentage points in GDP per capita compared with the ten regions with the highest quality of government.[18]

    As our economies are increasingly buffeted by global turbulence, institutional backsliding therefore risks creating a vicious circle: repeated shocks can undermine economic convergence and further erode public confidence in the reform process.

    The best way for countries to sustain reform momentum is to recognise the importance of maintaining public support and, as far as possible, pair governance improvements with a focus on sectors where they have a clear competitive edge – and where deeper integration with the region can unlock significant and rapid growth opportunities.

    This way, the benefits of reforms will be felt more quickly and more widely.

    Ukraine is well positioned to put this into practice. Its IT sector is already relatively strong: IT services exports reached nearly USD 7 billion in 2023, making it one of the country’s leading export sectors despite the war.[19]

    Ukraine also produces around 130,000 STEM graduates each year – exceeding Germany and France[20] – and it ranks among the top five countries globally for certified IT professionals.[21] Successful IT clusters are active in several cities, and major foreign firms – including Apple, Microsoft, Boeing and Siemens – have established R&D operations in the country.

    A dynamic defence tech ecosystem is also taking shape[22], with Ukrainian start-ups attracting almost half a billion US dollars in funding in 2024 – surpassing many of their peers across central and eastern Europe.[23] Experience from countries like Israel suggests that such a foundation can enable the country to emerge as a broader technology hub in the years ahead.

    If Ukraine stays the course on institutional reform and continues to adapt its economy to new opportunities, despite the stormy environment, it can emerge as a vital engine of growth and a key contributor to the region’s future.

    Conclusion

    Let me conclude.

    Ukraine stands at a pivotal moment – facing the hardships of war, the challenge of reconstruction and the opportunity of deeper regional integration.

    In a world marked by shifting geopolitical realities, such integration offers a clear path to recovery and lasting prosperity.

    The recent history of regional integration shows not only its immense benefits, but also the importance of managing transitional risks through robust policy frameworks. It also underlines the need to sustain reform over time by ensuring that people feel its benefits.

    I am confident that Ukraine will be able to fully realise its economic potential, turning the upheaval of today into the foundation for a dynamic future.

    As Ivan Franko, one of Ukraine’s greatest poets, once wrote: “even though life is but a moment and made up of moments, we carry eternity in our souls.”

    This enduring spirit captures the resilience and potential of Ukraine’s people and its economy – a spirit that will continue to drive advancement and renewal in the years ahead.

    MIL OSI Economics

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – State of play of the EU accession negotiations with Ukraine versus the Western Balkans – E-002321/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002321/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Friedrich Pürner (NI)

    Ukraine was granted EU candidate country status in 2022 and is among the ten countries hoping to accede to the Union. The Western Balkans embarked upon their journey to EU membership in 2003. Since then, only Croatia has joined the Union (in 2013), while the other countries are still working towards the Copenhagen criteria. By contrast, although Ukraine is at war, its accession process is advancing at a much faster pace.

    • 1.What progress has Ukraine made in ticking off the Copenhagen criteria and the individual chapters of the EU acquis since being conferred candidate status in June 2022, and what specific challenges remain, particularly in the areas of the rule of law, fighting corruption, and judicial reform?
    • 2.Are there discussions within the Commission about adapting or loosening the accession requirements for Ukraine in certain areas – for example, as regards the full implementation of the EU acquis or economic convergence – in order to speed up the accession process, and if so, how is a balance being struck between expedition and compliance with the accession criteria?
    • 3.To what extent is the Commission taking the current geopolitical situation and the ongoing war in Ukraine into account when setting timelines and priorities for the accession negotiations, and are there any plans to introduce transitional arrangements or special agreements in order to facilitate the accession process in these extraordinary circumstances?

    Submitted: 10.6.2025

    Last updated: 18 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – State of play of the EU accession negotiations with Ukraine versus the Western Balkans – E-002321/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002321/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Friedrich Pürner (NI)

    Ukraine was granted EU candidate country status in 2022 and is among the ten countries hoping to accede to the Union. The Western Balkans embarked upon their journey to EU membership in 2003. Since then, only Croatia has joined the Union (in 2013), while the other countries are still working towards the Copenhagen criteria. By contrast, although Ukraine is at war, its accession process is advancing at a much faster pace.

    • 1.What progress has Ukraine made in ticking off the Copenhagen criteria and the individual chapters of the EU acquis since being conferred candidate status in June 2022, and what specific challenges remain, particularly in the areas of the rule of law, fighting corruption, and judicial reform?
    • 2.Are there discussions within the Commission about adapting or loosening the accession requirements for Ukraine in certain areas – for example, as regards the full implementation of the EU acquis or economic convergence – in order to speed up the accession process, and if so, how is a balance being struck between expedition and compliance with the accession criteria?
    • 3.To what extent is the Commission taking the current geopolitical situation and the ongoing war in Ukraine into account when setting timelines and priorities for the accession negotiations, and are there any plans to introduce transitional arrangements or special agreements in order to facilitate the accession process in these extraordinary circumstances?

    Submitted: 10.6.2025

    Last updated: 18 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News