Question for written answer E-002307/2025 to the Commission Rule 144 Brando Benifei (S&D)
A few weeks ago, an EU citizen had a reservation on an EU flight cancelled because their electric wheelchair was supposedly ‘incompatible’ with the aircraft. No refund was offered: according to the airline, the passenger could have changed wheelchairs or been accompanied. In 2024, another airline refused to carry a wheelchair in the hold because of supposedly ‘excessive dimensions’, but then accepted the same wheelchair on the same route and aircraft on the following day.
Citizens with disabilities are careful to report their needs as passengers, yet detailed information on acceptance, compatibility and safety criteria is frequently missing from airlines’ websites, and contact centre operators are often not trained or have insufficient information available. This severely restricts people from planning and undertaking journeys independently.
Articles 21 and 26 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union are transposed into Regulation (EC) No 1107/2006, which protects the right of persons with disabilities to travel by air without discrimination.
Also in the light of Commission Notice C/2024/5992, can the Commission clarify whether and how it intends to promote the development and use by airlines of tools, such as digital tools, to better protect the rights of persons with disabilities when they are using air transport, at all stages of their journey?
Question for written answer E-002295/2025 to the Commission Rule 144 Brando Benifei (S&D), Sophie Wilmès (Renew), Rasmus Andresen (Verts/ALE), Francisco Assis (S&D), Dan Barna (Renew), Wouter Beke (PPE), Benoit Cassart (Renew), Olivier Chastel (Renew), Elio Di Rupo (S&D), Daniel Freund (Verts/ALE), Giorgio Gori (S&D), Sandro Gozi (Renew), Maria Grapini (S&D), Evin Incir (S&D), Merja Kyllönen (The Left), Sergey Lagodinsky (Verts/ALE), Murielle Laurent (S&D), Camilla Laureti (S&D), Nathalie Loiseau (Renew), Idoia Mendia (S&D), Ana Miranda Paz (Verts/ALE), Alessandra Moretti (S&D), Ciaran Mullooly (Renew), Ştefan Muşoiu (S&D), Dario Nardella (S&D), Leoluca Orlando (Verts/ALE), Pina Picierno (S&D), André Rodrigues (S&D), Virginijus Sinkevičius (Verts/ALE), Jonas Sjöstedt (The Left), Dario Tamburrano (The Left), Marco Tarquinio (S&D), Carla Tavares (S&D), Kathleen Van Brempt (S&D), Kim Van Sparrentak (Verts/ALE), Maria Walsh (PPE), Alessandro Zan (S&D), Elisabeth Grossmann (S&D), Michał Szczerba (PPE), Lucia Yar (Renew), Nicola Zingaretti (S&D), Giuseppe Lupo (S&D), Sandro Ruotolo (S&D), Raffaele Topo (S&D), Lucia Annunziata (S&D), Antonio Decaro (S&D)
US President Donald Trump has announced a suspension of several student visa categories for foreign nationals, including those from EU Member States. The US State Department has recently halted student visa interviews for foreign applicants while it implements new procedures to screen their social media activity, a move that raises serious concerns about privacy, fundamental rights and potential discrimination. These unilateral actions undermine academic exchange, mutual understanding and the right of young Europeans to access global education opportunities. They also set a dangerous precedent of profiling and digital surveillance, which runs counter to democratic values and the rule of law.
In light of these developments:
1.Does the Commission consider the US decision compatible with international commitments on human rights, academic freedom and data protection?
2.What steps has the Commission taken to ensure that EU students are not subject to discriminatory practices or privacy violations under these measures?
3.How does the Commission intend to respond to this unilateral and disproportionate decision, and what actions will it take to defend the rights of young Europeans seeking to study abroad?
Question for written answer E-002299/2025 to the Commission Rule 144 Loucas Fourlas (PPE)
The social reintegration of people released from prison is crucial for reducing recidivism rates and strengthening social cohesion. However, many Member States face shortcomings in support structures, vocational training and psychosocial support for former detainees, increasing the risk of their return to a life of crime.
In view of the principles of the European strategy for crime prevention and reintegration support, can the Commission say:
1.What policy is it planning or implementing in order to strengthen reintegration mechanisms for released prisoners?
2.Are there any EU programmes or funding instruments in which local authorities can participate to support former prisoners?
3.How is cooperation between prisons, social welfare services and employers ensured?
Since the signature of the EU-Tunisia Strategic and Comprehensive Partnership (SCP)[1], tangible progress has been achieved across all areas of cooperation, including migration management.
Human rights and democratic principles remain at the core of the EU’s external action, in line with Article 2 of the Association Agreement[2].
These values are regularly reaffirmed through political and technical dialogue. The EU remains committed that its financial assistance is fully consistent with human rights obligations and reserves the right to invoke specific clauses in its agreements and contracts, enabling adjustments in cases of non-compliance.
The Commission considers that increased actions by Tunisia against migrant smuggling, including the prevention of departures and the interception of vessels in its waters, as well as search and rescue operations to save lives at sea, have contributed to a consistent trend of reduction of arrivals from Tunisia since the implementation of the SCP and related support.
According to information from the European Union Asylum Agency (EUAA)[3], as of October 2024, no Member State had applied the safe third country concept vis-a-vis Tunisia.
The Commission has no information of transfers of non-Tunisian third-country nationals to Tunisia while an application for international protection in the EU was pending.
[3] See EUAA (2022): https://euaa.europa.eu/sites/default/files/publications/2022-12/2022_safe_country_concept_asylum_procedure_EN.pdf; EUAA: https://whoiswho.euaa.europa.eu/Pages/safe-country-concept.aspx — last updated on 4 October 2024.
The rights of minorities are fundamental values of the EU and are part of the Copenhagen criteria for accession to the EU.
In June 2024, the Commission confirmed that Ukraine had fulfilled the requirement to enact a law addressing the remaining Venice Commission recommendations from June and October 2023 linked to respectively the law on national minorities and to the laws on state language, media and education[1].
As part of the accession process, the Commission conducted a screening of Ukraine’s alignment with the EU acquis in the field of fundamental rights, including the rights of persons belonging to national minorities. Subsequently, the EU invited Ukraine, in the negotiating framework, to prepare an Action Plan on national minorities[2].
The Commission consistently conveys the message, in bilateral contacts with Ukrainian counterparts, that it is expected that Ukraine will continue to implement the adopted legislation adequately and effectively at national and regional level, in line with European standards and as part of a constructive mutual dialogue with the representatives of national minorities.
The Commission will continue to follow closely the Ukraine government’s ongoing dialogues with representatives of minorities, including the representatives of Ukraine’s Romanian national minority and in the field of education.
The Commission is also assisting Ukraine in its reform efforts, by supporting the project ‘Support for implementing European standards relating to anti-discrimination and rights of national minorities in Ukraine’ implemented by the Council of Europe[3].
[1] https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2023)021-e and https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-AD(2023)028-e.
Since the Russian military aggression against Ukraine in 2022, the EU has acted firmly to cut its reliance on Russian energy. For this purpose, the Commission adopted the REPowerEU Plan[1] in May 2022, aiming to fast forward the clean energy transition, diversify energy supplies, and enhance EU energy independence.
Despite a significant progress that was collectively achieved in the EU, energy imports from Russia still remain in the EU system . Dependency on Russian energy imports possess a threat to the EU’s economic security due to weaponisation of energy supplies by Russia. With the REPowerEU Roadmap, adopted on 6 May 2025[2], the Commission is fully committed to stop relying on Russian energy.
The Roadmap will enable the phase out of Russian energy imports, in a coordinated, stepwise and secure manner as we advance on the EU’s energy transition. As outlined in the Roadmap, concrete measures will be presented in legislative proposals by the Commission mid- June.
The protection of minors online is a priority for the Commission. Under the Digital Services Act (DSA),[1] providers of designated Very Large Online Platforms (VLOPs) and Very Large Online Search Engines (VLOSEs)[2] are required to conduct systemic risk assessments, considering inter alia actual or foreseeable risks to the protection of minors as well as a person’s physical and mental well-being, and to put in place effective mitigation measures to address these.
These assessments should consider whether and how the design of the recommender systems may influence such risks. In addition, the providers of online platforms accessible to minors shall put in place appropriate and proportionate measures to ensure a high level of privacy, safety and security of minors.
The Commission has taken swift action in relation to DSA enforcement and opened formal proceedings against the provider of TikTok[3] to assess whether it may have breached the DSA in relation to the protection of minors online and to the functioning of the recommender systems.
The investigations are ongoing. If the Commission establishes a breach of the DSA, a fine of up to 6% of global turnover of the provider may be imposed.
The Commission is developing guidelines on the protection of minors online under the DSA[4] as well as an Action Plan to counter cyberbullying. The Commission will also launch an EU-wide inquiry into the broader impacts of social media on well-being[5].
The European Strategy for a better Internet for kids (BIK+)[6] promotes a responsible use of technology by supporting children, their carers and teachers through the awareness and education activities organised by the Safer Internet Centres and the information and training material available in all language on the BIK platform[7].
In view of the launch of the Entry/Exit System (EES), the Commission adopted all the implementing acts for the EES as required by the applicable legislation and provided to the Member States technical and operational guidelines, recommendations and best practices.
In 2024, Member States reported to the Commission that they had equipped their border crossing points, adapted their procedures and set up specific plans as part of the measures to address circumstances that may result in disruptions at the border crossing points.
Moreover, Member States can use optional tools such as automated border control systems to gradually reduce waiting times at the external borders.
In December 2024, the Commission adopted a legislative proposal[1] enabling a progressive start of operations of the EES, introducing more flexibility for the Member States to deploy the EES, and measures that will enable them to effectively manage exceptional circumstances, such as technical problems or periods of peak travel. Co-legislators reached a provisional agreement on the proposal on 19 May 2025.
[1] Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a temporary derogation from certain provisions of Regulation (EU) 2017/2226 and Regulation (EU) 2016/399 as regards a progressive start of operations of the Entry/Exit System — COM/2024/567 final .
Under Article 56 of the Digital Services Act (DSA)[1], the Commission has powers to supervise and enforce the regulation in relation to providers of designated very large online platforms (VLOPs) and of very large online search engines.
Since the DSA does not as such regulate content nor individual content moderation decisions-which are a matter for specific laws and the competent courts to determine — but rather the processes online platforms have in place, these powers do not cover content moderation actions.
However, the DSA imposes on providers several obligations to increase the transparency and accountability of their services for all users.
For example, Article 17 of the DSA mandates the providers of hosting services, thus including LinkedIn, to provide statements of reasons to any recipients of the service affected by restrictions, such as the suspension of accounts, imposed on the basis of the information shared.
In addition, pursuant to Article 15 of the DSA, providers of intermediary services — thus again including LinkedIn — shall make publicly available, at least once a year, transparency reports on their content moderation activities.
Those reports shall contain information about the content moderation engaged in at the providers’ own initiative, including the use of automated tools and the number and type of measures taken that affect the availability, visibility and accessibility of information provided by users. LinkedIn transparency reports can be found online.[2]
As regards systemic risks, it is for the providers of VLOPs such as LinkedIn to diligently identify, analyse and assess them pursuant to Article 34 of the DSA, and to put in place mitigation measures accordingly pursuant to Article 35, under the supervision of the Commission.
Anselm Leahy sits at a table in the white, pristine kitchen of his new Dublin apartment. “When I first came into the apartment, I was astonished. I couldn’t believe it,” he says, gesturing toward a big bay window in the living room that overlooks nearby houses and green fields. “I was over the moon.”
The apartment is part of new social housing built by the Focus Ireland Association, a state-run institution that provides loans to developers building affordable homes across the country. Leahy moved in just under two years ago, ending a spell of homeless that began with the death of his father and his mother’s subsequent move into a retirement home. “My will to live was very, very low,” Leahy says. “To get this apartment has changed me in lots of different ways: mentally, physically, spiritually. I feel human again. I feel like I have a future. I have hope.”
Cities like Dublin suffer from a shortage of affordable housing that has blocked many people – the unemployed, low-income families, migrants and young workers – out of the market. Over the past 15 years, average rents in the European Union have risen by one-quarter and house prices by half, while one in ten Europeans now spend 40% or more of their disposable income on housing.
At the same time, the share of social housing in total supply has shrunk since 2010, even though the number of vulnerable people such as the homeless or new migrants has risen. Half of Europe’s housing stock was built before 1980, and much of it needs to be renovated. Many buildings are energy inefficient (a rating of D or worse). Bringing those homes and apartments up to new EU standards will be expensive and slow.
The lack of affordable housing translates into real hardship: young people put off starting families, students turn down the best universities, essential workers like teachers or nurses don’t accept jobs in in major cities – all because they are priced out of housing.
“These people and their stories provide living proof of the housing crisis and the impact it has on Europe,” said Dan Jørgensen, the EU Commissioner for Energy and Housing, at a housing event hosted by the European Investment Bank (EIB) in early March. “It threatens social justice and social cohesion … It weakens our economy and reduces our competitiveness.”
The problem is clear: Over the last decade or so, housing demand has outstripped supply and incomes haven’t kept up with prices. The solution, however, is much more complicated. The European Union needs to build almost one million new dwellings. That requires:
innovative, faster and less costly ways of building;
regulatory reform to speed up permitting and to create the investment framework for housing providers to deliver affordable new apartments and homes;
financing solutions that encourage residential development and renovation.
“We need to enhance the housing supply while also making better use of the stock we already have,” says Chiara Fratto, a European Investment Bank economist who researches housing issues.
Question for written answer E-002302/2025 to the Commission Rule 144 Lukas Mandl (PPE)
Following the announcement of the possible withdrawal of the SEP regulation proposal, concerns persist over opaque licensing costs for certain technologies. To ensure fair access, transparency and cost efficiency, I would like to ask the Commission the following questions:
1.How does the Commission intend to ensure licensing under fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory conditions if the proposal is withdrawn?
2.Does it share my belief that technologies should be licensed individually and not bundled with other technologies for maximum flexibility, transparency and competition?
3.How does it intend to ensure transparency concerning patent ownership and essentiality across relevant sectors?
“Berizka preschool in Ukrainian village of Ulaniv southwest of Kyiv reopens after major renovation supported by EU.
Renovation financed through EIB’s Ukraine Recovery Programme to restore critical social infrastructure in Ukrainian communities.
The “Berizka” preschool in the Ukrainian village of Ulaniv reopened after a major upgrade supported by the European Union lending arm – the European Investment Bank (EIB). The €420,000 renovation highlights the EU’s commitment to restoring social infrastructure in Ukraine.
Berizka, serves more than 110 children aged two to six, including many children from internally displaced families. It is one of 100 educational institutions across Ukraine being renovated with support of the EIB. The building is now equipped with full thermal insulation and energy-efficient windows and doors – upgrades that are especially important amid Russia’s full-scale military invasion of Ukraine, by reducing electricity consumption and utility costs.
The preschool also has a new metal roof, renovated porches and two ramps that ensure easier entry for people, including children and parents with limited mobility. It offers an environment, where children and their families can feel a sense of normalcy and stability despite the war.
EIB Vice-President Teresa Czerwińska,who oversees the Bank’s operations in Ukraine said: “The renovated preschool shows how the EIB supports Ukraine’s long-term recovery: we invest in resilient, energy-efficient infrastructure that strengthens local communities and ensures continuity of vital services for people.”
The renovation took place between May 2024 and June 2025 under the “Ukraine Early Recovery Programme” – a joint EU-EIB initiative implemented in cooperation with the Ukrainian Ministry for Development of Communities and Territories and Ministry of Finance as well as the Vinnytsia Oblast Military Administration and the Ulaniv Village, with technical assistance from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).
This is one of seven EIB-backed recovery projects in Vinnytsia region, with a combined investment value of €7.6 million. These projects include the reconstruction of four schools, two water and wastewater facilities and one community and administrative services center. In 2024 alone, three projects were completed, including two schools in Stryzhavka and a sewer system in Zhmerynka.
Head of Cooperation at the EU Delegation to UkraineStefan Schleuning said: “Berizka preschool in Vinnytsia Oblast is a powerful example of how EU support, channelled through the EIB’s recovery programmes, is already making a tangible difference. Together with Ukraine, we are restoring essential services, strengthening communities, and building for the future of the next generation.”
Deputy Prime Minister for Restoration of Ukraine – Minister for Development of Communities and Territories of Ukraine Oleksii Kuleba said: “Restoring access to education is a shared priority with our European partners. Together, we’re rebuilding social infrastructure and introducing modern energy-efficient solutions that make communities more resilient.”
First Deputy Head of the Vinnytsia Regional Military Administration Natalia Zabolotna said: “This preschool is the fourth EU- and EIB-supported recovery project completed in our region over the past two years. These results are possible thanks to the strength and dedication of local workers, who continue delivering essential services despite the war.”
Head of Ulaniv Village Council Oleksandr Hotsulyak said: “For our village, this preschool is essential. Thanks to support from the EU and the EIB, over 110 children, including those from displaced families — now have a modern, comfortable space to learn and grow. Investing in early childhood education lays the foundation for children’s resilience, recovery, and long-term development.”
UNDP Resident Representative in Ukraine Jaco Cilliers said: “By connecting Ukrainian communities with EIB financing mechanisms, UNDP helps ensure that recovery efforts are truly community-led, with local leaders determining how EU support can best serve their reconstruction priorities.”
Background information
The EIB in Ukraine
The EIB Group has supported Ukraine’s economy since day one of the Russian invasion, providing €3 billion in financing to date, with €2.3 billion already disbursed. The EIB continues to focus on securing Ukraine’s energy supply, restoring damaged infrastructure and maintaining essential public services across the country. Under a guarantee agreement signed with the European Commission, the EIB is set to invest at least €2 billion more in urgent recovery and reconstruction. This funding is part of the European Union’s €50 billion Ukraine Facility for 2024-2027 and is fully aligned with the priorities of the Ukrainian government.
EIB recovery programmes in Ukraine
The reconstruction of the preschool in Ulaniv village was carried out under the Ukraine Recovery Programme, one of three recovery programmes supported by the European Investment Bank (EIB). As of June 2025, the EIB has provided €740 million across these programmes to support Ukraine’s recovery. The funding helps the government to restore essential services in communities across the country – including schools, kindergartens, hospitals, housing, heating and water systems. These EIB-backed programmes are further supported by €15 million in EU grants to facilitate implementation. The Ministry for Development of Communities and Territories of Ukraine, in cooperation with the Ministry of Finance, coordinates and oversees programme implementation, while local authorities and self-governments are responsible for managing recovery sub-projects. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in Ukraine provides technical assistance to local communities, supporting project implementation and ensuring independent monitoring for transparency and accountability. More information about the programmes is available here.
Ukrainian preschool with children from displaced families reopens after EU-backed renovation
Question for written answer E-002287/2025 to the Commission Rule 144 Bas Eickhout (Verts/ALE)
In 2006, a major financial scandal came to light in the Netherlands. Millions of retail investors had put their savings into investment-linked insurance plans that came with such high hidden costs that they could only make tiny returns. These products are currently banned in the Netherlands.
Now, nearly twenty years later, the Dutch NN Group is selling similar financial products to Belgian and Greek retail investors[1]. Again, these products include many different kinds of hidden fees and management costs, sometimes amounting to as much as 7 % per year.
1.What tools are currently available to national and European supervisors to address these misleading retail financial products offering such blatantly poor value for money on the market?
2.Interinstitutional negotiations on the EU’s retail investment strategy are currently ongoing. Is the Commission confident that the outcome will effectively end the selling of these products with high hidden costs or, if not, what additional actions does the Commission propose?
3.The Commission will adopt measures to create a European blueprint for savings and investment accounts, including a recommendation on the tax treatment of these accounts. How will the Commission prevent the Member States from wasting tax incentives on retail investment products that charge high fees with low value for money?
Bonn, Germany – Worsening rates of Amazon deforestation, record temperatures exceeding 1.5°C and chronic government policy inertia around climate action and finance demand an urgent response from delegates the next two weeks at the UN climate negotiations in Bonn.
A key moment on the road to COP30 in Brazil, the annual June intersessional meetings (SB62) in Bonn take place against a backdrop of climate-fuelled disasters and increasing deforestation rates in the Amazon. The ongoing forest loss is bringing the Amazon closer to a tipping point.
An Lambrechts, Biodiversity Politics Expert, Greenpeace International said: “Now more than ever, we need an action plan to end deforestation. The world is hurtling toward a climate and biodiversity catastrophe, but as COP30 moves to the Amazon under Brazil’s presidency, there is a significant opportunity to accelerate protection and restoration of critical ecosystems.”
“At COP28 the world agreed to halt deforestation and forest degradation by 2030, but there is no coherent UNFCCC plan yet to implement that goal beyond the expectation that parties include it in their NDCs and act at the national level. A transformative COP30 forest outcome that addresses fragmentation and delivers a five-year Action Plan starting next year can make the difference.”
“Delegates in Bonn must seize the moment and work towards a radical shift in climate ambition and pave the way to address the 1.5°C ambition gap. Countries’ 2035 climate action plans, due this year, must ramp up emissions cuts and deliver on the COP28 decision to “transition away from fossil fuels”.
Tracy Carty, Climate Politics Expert, Greenpeace International said: “Climate inaction is costing lives! As emissions rise unchecked, our chances of limiting warming to the Paris goals recede and impacts escalate. We need to act faster and bolder to give ourselves the best chance possible.”
“The weak finance deal agreed at COP29 is constraining many developing countries’ ability to raise ambition and the finance gap risks undermining trust and progress in this year’s negotiations. Rich countries must urgently increase public finance support – and making big polluters, like the fossil fuel industry, pay for the damage and destruction is a vital part of the solution.”
Anna Cárcamo, Climate Politics Specialist, Greenpeace Brazil said: “Bonn will be a key moment to advance important agendas leading to COP30 and Brazil as the incoming COP Presidency has signalled that it will focus on moving forward with adaptation, just transitions and implementation of the COP28 decision, including the goals to eliminate deforestation and to transition away from fossil fuels.”
“While all countries must act together to implement these critical agendas and goals, Brazil should lead with coherence, by continuing to address deforestation and reconsidering the expansion of fossil fuel extraction, especially in the Amazon.”
Question for written answer E-002278/2025 to the Commission Rule 144 Gheorghe Falcă (PPE)
In May 2022, the Commission launched the EU-Ukraine Solidarity Lanes, a strategic initiative to ensure the swift export of agricultural goods from Ukraine via EU transport routes. As then Transport Commissioner Adina Vălean noted, the goal was to move 20 million tonnes of agricultural products within three months. By February 2025, the Solidarity Lanes had become essential, facilitating 70 % of Ukrainian imports, 40 % of non-agricultural exports and 20 % of grain-related trade – demonstrating their ongoing role as a secure alternative to Black Sea routes.
The cooperation between Romania, Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova within this framework has proven key to Ukraine’s economic resilience and future reconstruction. Given the shared European perspective of Moldova and Ukraine, it is important to explore how this cooperation might be deepened.
1.Is the Commission open to supporting the establishment of a trilateral Chamber of Commerce between Romania, Ukraine and Moldova to strengthen economic ties under the Solidarity Lanes framework?
2.Could the Commission consider targeted support – financial, logistical or technical – for structured exchanges and working visits among businesses and institutions in the EU, Ukraine and Moldova, to foster long-term cooperation and promote regional stability?
[1] This question is supported by Members other than the author: Daniel Buda (PPE), Dan Barna (Renew), Mircea-Gheorghe Hava (PPE), Ioan-Rareş Bogdan (PPE)
Priority question for written answer P-002354/2025 to the Commission Rule 144 Pál Szekeres (PfE)
In the context of the provisional agreement on a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on European statistics on population and housing, amending Regulation (EC) No 862/2007 and repealing Regulations (EC) No 763/2008 and (EU) No 1260/2013, we would like to know, as a matter of urgency, the Commission’s views on the following:
1.If the current rules remain in place and the rules in the expected amendments are adopted, will the population size of the EU Member States be calculated on the basis of the principle of ‘usual residence’ in the census? If so, could the census be affected by the scale of migration and the volume of migrants and refugees from non-EU countries?
2.Could this also affect policymaking, influencing the population size of Member States when the proposed new definitions are adopted, and ultimately providing a strategic incentive to support more immigration from a political perspective?
Question for written answer E-002282/2025 to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Rule 144 Arkadiusz Mularczyk (ECR)
Given the European Union’s robust sanctions regime against Russia in response to the country’s illegal war of aggression against Ukraine, and the reported involvement of thousands of Cuban soldiers fighting alongside Russian forces in Ukraine, how does the Commission reconcile its continued provision of significant humanitarian and development support to Cuba with its stated commitment to upholding international law and deterring actors who facilitate or participate in Russia’s war effort?
Question for written answer E-002303/2025 to the Commission Rule 144 Marc Angel (S&D), Tilly Metz (Verts/ALE), Niels Fuglsang (S&D)
Animal welfare has already been regulated in several areas at EU level, or is currently under regulatory development within the EU. Although Article 13 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union declares that animals are sentient beings and that the welfare of animals is to be considered in the formulation of Union policies, no specific EU directive or regulation has yet been adopted to generally regulate the use of animals in the film industry, or at least to develop or recommend a related framework. As a result, regulation varies across Member States, and there is currently a lack of a unified European standard or supervisory mechanism that would ensure consistent protection of animals during film shoots, including in cinema, television and advertising productions.
1.Does the Commission envisage creating Europe-wide animal welfare standards that could serve to generally regulate, or at least provide initial guidance for, the European film industry?
2.Does the Commission agree that at least in the case of film industry productions that are fully or partially EU-financed, such mandatory animal welfare standards should be required in the future?
Question for written answer E-002276/2025 to the Commission Rule 144 Gaetano Pedulla’ (The Left)
On 13 November 2024, the MEF[1] sold approximately 16% of the share capital of Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena (MPS), a stake acquired in 2017 during the public bailout, through an ABB[2] procedure taking advantage of derogations from the BRRD. The MEF appointed Banca Akros, part of the Banco Bpm Group, to handle the sale, which divided the stake up between four entities: Caltagirone (3.6%), Delfin (3.5%), Banco Bpm (5%) and Anima – Sgr, controlled by Banco Bpm – (3.5%)[3], after rejecting an offer submitted by Unicredit, according to press reports. To the buyers’ benefit, the shares were sold at below market rate, going against standard practice of selling at a premium. The government thus appears to have favoured the industrial conglomerates Caltagirone and Delfin, which were already involved in the 2023 takeover of Generali and attempted a similar coup with the MPS takeover bid for Mediobanca, Generali’s main shareholder. This would appear to be part of a strategy to circumvent EU restrictions prohibiting entities without a banking licence (Caltagirone and Delfin) from gaining a controlling interest in supervised banks.
In view of the above: does the Commission not believe Banca Akros’ ABB and the Italian Government’s overall strategy to be in breach of European rules on the neutrality of public entities with regard to financial institutions, particularly those operating in several EU Member States?
Submitted: 5.6.2025
[1] Italian Ministry for Economic Affairs and Finance
[2] Accelerated book-building, a procedure reserved for institutional investors.
Question for written answer E-002281/2025 to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Rule 144 Arkadiusz Mularczyk (ECR)
Considering the recent US executive order designating certain cartels and other organisations as Foreign Terrorist Organizations and Specially Designated Global Terrorists, what concrete legislative measures has the Commission already put in place, or what specific proposals are currently being developed, to address and mitigate the potential impact of these designated groups’ activities within the European Union, particularly concerning their financial networks, logistical support, and any direct or indirect operational presence in Europe?
On 5 June 2025, the European Commission adopted the European ocean pact. The world’s seas and oceans are under severe and increasing pressure from pollution, climate change, and over-exploitation. The deterioration of the environment, coupled with the growing demand for maritime space and marine resources, has emphasised the necessity of coherent ocean governance — a goal that the ocean pact aims to achieve. The pact is a non-legislative strategy intended to serve as a unified reference framework for all ocean-related EU policies. It was announced as one of the key deliverables within the Commission’s fisheries and oceans portfolio. Actions and initiatives in this pact are grouped under six priorities: ocean health; a sustainable blue economy; coastal communities and islands; ocean research, skills and literacy; maritime security and defence; and ocean governance. To support implementation, a high-level stakeholder-led ocean board would be established as well as an ‘ocean pact scoreboard’ to monitor achievement of the objectives. Member States will be encouraged to designate and manage marine protected areas in order to meet the 2030 target of protecting 30 % of their seas. In order to achieve the targets set out in the ocean pact, the Commission will table an ocean act by 2027. This legislative act, which has been requested by various stakeholders, will be based on a revision of the maritime spatial planning directive. It would strengthen and modernise maritime planning and bring relevant ocean-related targets together in one place.
Question for written answer E-002292/2025 to the Commission Rule 144 Rasmus Nordqvist (Verts/ALE), Dan-Ştefan Motreanu (PPE), Elena Kountoura (The Left), Stine Bosse (Renew), Anna Cavazzini (Verts/ALE), Bas Eickhout (Verts/ALE), Villy Søvndal (Verts/ALE), Kira Marie Peter-Hansen (Verts/ALE), Sara Matthieu (Verts/ALE), Majdouline Sbai (Verts/ALE), Isabella Lövin (Verts/ALE), Pär Holmgren (Verts/ALE), Krzysztof Śmiszek (S&D), David Cormand (Verts/ALE), Lucia Yar (Renew), Lena Schilling (Verts/ALE), Alice Kuhnke (Verts/ALE)
The Competitiveness Compass suggests the upcoming Circular Economy Act will help drive investment in recycling, help EU industry substitute virgin materials and reduce landfill and incineration of used raw materials. Executive Vice-President Stéphane Séjourné echoed this during a structured dialogue with Parliament’s Committee on Environment, Public Health and Food Safety on 13 May 2025, underscoring the urgency of scaling up recycling capacity across the EU.
1.How does the Commission intend to establish a new financing framework that supports the scaling up of circular solutions, notably to increase the EU’s own remanufacturing and recycling capacity?
2.What role does the Commission envisage for financial tools under the Clean Industrial Deal (CID), e.g. the proposed CID State Aid Framework, the Industrial Decarbonisation Accelerator Act and Bank, the Public Procurement Framework, the Competitiveness Fund, the Innovation Fund, or the green VAT initiative, in supporting investment in circular economy infrastructure and value chains?
3.What specific measures will the Commission take to mobilise private capital to support the circular economy?
Question for written answer E-002300/2025 to the Commission Rule 144 Loucas Fourlas (PPE)
The involvement of criminal networks in the trafficking of babies and illegal adoptions remains a hidden but real threat. Shortcomings in cross-border cooperation, poor birth registration practices in certain regions and scant checks in certain private healthcare facilities enable the existence of such networks.
In light of the above, can the Commission say:
1.What measures is it taking to strengthen cooperation between Member States in tackling such networks?
2.Is there any intention to tighten controls on private and public facilities related to childbirth and adoptions?
3.How can the traceability of births and the protection of newborns be improved?
Priority question for written answer P-002370/2025 to the Commission Rule 144 Pietro Fiocchi (ECR)
Recent events, including the Iberian Peninsula blackout, show the importance of investing in reliable, locally manufactured grid technologies. However, European grid operators face regulatory uncertainty on procurement choices for electrical switchgears due to unclear provisions under the F-gas Regulation[1].
Switchgears are essential components in electrical power systems. They play a crucial role during blackouts, by avoiding spreading. With demand set to rise by approximately 10 % yearly until 2030, prescriptive rules risk creating monopolistic scenarios, market distortions and, not least, supply shortages in Europe.
Given the above:
1.Is the Commission planning to simplify the provisions of the F-Gas Regulation on electrical switchgear, as well as on the F-Gas Portal? Will these clarifications be part of the energy omnibus package mentioned by Energy Commissioner, Dan Jørgensen?
2.The Commission has stated that switchgears will not be part of the 2025–2030 Ecodesign work plan. It added, however, that it will monitor the progress of the F-gas Regulation and market developments in the sector before considering requirements under Article 5.6 of the Ecodesign for Sustainable Products Regulation. With lead times for procurement now approaching 26 months, can the Commission clarify by when it intends to complete that assessment and activate the provision?
Submitted: 12.6.2025
[1] Regulation (EU) 2024/573 of 7 February 2024 on fluorinated greenhouse gases (OJ L, 2024/573, 20.2.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/573/oj).
Priority question for written answer P-002374/2025 to the Commission Rule 144 Anna-Maja Henriksson (Renew)
In September 2018 the Commission brought forward a legislative proposal (COM(2018)0639) to discontinue seasonal time changes in the EU by repealing Directive 2000/84/EC. The aim was to do away with the six-monthly changing of the clocks in a coordinated manner, prevent disruptions in the internal market and promote citizens’ wellbeing. The proposal was based on the strong support for the initiative expressed during the public consultation. The issue remains a priority, so further work on it should also be given high priority.
The European Parliament adopted its position on the matter in 2019. After that, discussions in the Council ground to a halt following requests for further impact assessments, and no progress has been made since then. The proposal has now been included in Annex III to the Commission’s work programme for 2025.
In view of the above:
What steps is the Commission planning to take in 2025 to pave the way for an agreement in the Council, or to take the matter forward in some other way?
Question for written answer E-002279/2025 to the Commission Rule 144 Fulvio Martusciello (PPE)
There have been several crackdowns on press freedom in Azerbaijan in recent years, with an intensification in the final months of 2024.
This unprecedented repression has essentially wiped out local independent journalism. Independent media in Azerbaijan and international human rights organisations have accused the government of arresting journalists for their work and creating a regulatory environment that makes it almost impossible for them to operate legally.
The accusation is always the same: allegedly undeclared imports of foreign currency into the country, in the form of cash or subsidies from abroad. The authorities seem to exploit the fact that independent media receive foreign funding, via legally obtained subsidies, to accuse journalists of economic crimes aggravated by high treason against the state.
Against this backdrop, the EU imports more than 7 % of its natural gas from Azerbaijan and intends to double this amount by 2027, in order to reduce imports of Russian gas.
In light of the above, how will the Commission manage to expand energy cooperation with Azerbaijan while also ensuring that the response to the recent imprisonment of journalists in Azerbaijan is heard?
Question for written answer E-002274/2025 to the Commission Rule 144 Dolors Montserrat (PPE), Pilar del Castillo Vera (PPE)
The technical investigation launched by the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-e) expert group into the blackout on 28 April 2025 includes representatives from Spain’s national grid operator Red Eléctrica de España (Redeia), which also happens to be one of the subjects under technical analysis.
In light of the above:
1.Does the Commission believe that the current composition of the ENTSO-e expert group ensures due independence, impartiality and absence of conflicts of interest – as required by the principle of good administration recognised in Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union – given it is both a judge and party in the case?
2.Does the Commission intend to request an additional external report from the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators, with the supervision of independent experts who have a proven and extensive track record in the energy market and are not under the influence of companies with an interest in the energy market?
The public hearing on “Management and Preparedness for Extreme Weather Events and Natural Disasters in the EU Budget” will examine the effects of the rising frequency and severity of natural disasters on the current EU budget, as well as on the planning and implementation of the EU’s long term budget.
The Committee on Budgets will hold a public hearing to understand which mechanisms within the EU budget are in place to respond to severe weather and climate emergencies. They will also gain insight into the appropriateness of existing instruments, the level of preparedness to face climate risks, and reflect on future requirements. The invited speakers are: – Ms. Eulalia Rubio (Institut Jacques Delors) – Mr. Marco Panigalli (Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations, European Commission) – Ms. Aleksandra Kazmierczak (expert in climate change and human health at the European Environment Agency – EEA) – Ms. Marie Evo (Co-Director at the European Center for Flood Risk Prevention and Management – CEPRI)
Members of the Committee on the Environment, Climate and Food Safety, the Committee on Regional Development, and the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development are invited to enhance the discussion with their contributions.
Question for written answer E-002289/2025 to the Commission Rule 144 Sophia Kircher (PPE)
Having the wolf’s protection status downgraded is a hard-won and important step for the future of agriculture. The mountain farming economy, especially in the Alpine region, is suffering severe losses and increasingly being pushed to the edge of its existence. It is good that the EU institutions have decided to recognise the situation and move the wolf – which has not been endangered for quite some time – to Annex V of the Habitats Directive. However, lowering the protection status will not suffice if the wolf’s favourable conservation status still has to be proven at national level before it can be withdrawn. In the spirit of an EU that stands for cross-regional cooperation, the best way to solve the issue would be to have a regionally differentiated approach, especially for wolf-stricken areas such as the Alpine region.
1.Will the Commission take account of larger contiguous spatial areas, such as the Alpine biogeographical region, when assessing the favourable conservation status, rather than the national conservation status?
2.In cases where the conservation status is favourable at the cross-border population level, why does the Member State have to provide additional evidence of this at national and local level?
3.How will it guarantee the future of mountain farming, which plays a key role in the Alpine cultural landscape, despite the wolf’s reintroduction?
Priority question for written answer P-002356/2025 to the Commission Rule 144 Niels Flemming Hansen (PPE)
An increasing number of EU companies are reporting greenhouse gas emissions as part of their climate strategies. Credible and consistent data is vital for assessing environmental performance and advancing decarbonisation.
The proposed green claims directive establishes a framework for communicating environmental claims to consumers. However, it does not provide a standardised methodology for the crucial business-to-business (B2B) exchange of emissions data. This legislative gap risks creating an uneven playing field, undermining the efforts of green frontrunners and potentially enabling greenwashing within complex value chains.
The CountEmissions EU proposal is specifically designed to fill this void by creating a common EU methodology for calculating and reporting emissions from transport services. By harmonising B2B reporting, it provides the missing link for end-to-end transparency, ensuring that data is reliable from the transport operator to the final customer.
In the light of the above:
1.What specific steps will the Commission take to facilitate the swift start of trilogue negotiations between the Council and Parliament on the CountEmissions EU file?
2.If the adoption of the CountEmissions EU regulation were to be significantly delayed, what is the Commission’s assessment of the potential negative impact on the transport and logistics sector, as well as on the EU’s overall climate objectives?