Category: Europe

  • India positioned to become world’s third-largest economy, says PM Modi in Cyprus

    Source: Government of India

    Source: Government of India (4)

    Prime Minister Narendra Modi and the President of Cyprus, Nikos Christodoulides, held a high-level roundtable interaction with business leaders from both India and Cyprus in Limassol on Sunday. The engagement brought together stakeholders from a wide range of sectors including banking, financial institutions, manufacturing, defence, logistics, maritime, shipping, technology, digital innovation, artificial intelligence, IT services, tourism and mobility.

    During the interaction, Prime Minister Modi highlighted India’s robust economic transformation over the last eleven years, noting the country’s consistent growth driven by major reforms, policy stability, and improvements in the Ease of Doing Business.

    “India’s focus on innovation, digital revolution, start-up culture and future-ready infrastructure is positioning it firmly on the path to becoming the world’s third-largest economy,” the Prime Minister said. He noted that sectors such as civil aviation, port and shipbuilding, digital payments, and green development offer promising avenues for cooperation with Cyprus-based enterprises.

    The Prime Minister further pointed to the expansion of sectors such as civil aviation, shipbuilding, digital payments, and green development as avenues of cooperation for Cypriot businesses. He also underlined India’s growing capabilities in new-age industries like AI, Quantum technology, Semiconductors, and Critical Minerals.

    Describing Cyprus as an “important economic partner,” Prime Minister Modi welcomed the island nation’s interest in increasing investments into India, particularly in the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) domain.

    The interaction also witnessed the announcement of several collaborative initiatives. A Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed between the NSE International Exchange at GIFT City, Gujarat, and the Cyprus Stock Exchange to deepen cooperation in financial markets. In a key development for digital payments, NIPL (NPCI International Payments Limited) and Eurobank Cyprus reached an understanding to introduce Unified Payments Interface (UPI) for cross-border transactions. The move is expected to benefit both tourists and businesses by simplifying payments.

    Prime Minister Modi also welcomed the launch of the India–Greece–Cyprus (IGC) Business and Investment Council. The council is expected to strengthen trilateral cooperation in key sectors such as shipping, logistics, renewable energy, civil aviation and digital services.

    “Indian companies increasingly view Cyprus as a gateway to Europe and a hub for IT services, financial management, and tourism,” said the Prime Minister.

    As Cyprus prepares to assume the Presidency of the European Union Council next year, both leaders reaffirmed their commitment to strengthening the India-EU Strategic Partnership. They expressed optimism about concluding the long-pending India-EU Free Trade Agreement by the end of the year, which would provide a fresh impetus to trade and investment.

    Reflecting on the outcomes of the roundtable, Prime Minister Modi said, “The practical suggestions emerging from today’s discussion will help chart a structured roadmap for deepening cooperation in trade, innovation, and strategic sectors.”

  • Iran and Israel Exchange Fresh Strikes as Global Leaders Push for Ceasefire

    Source: Government of India

    Source: Government of India (4)

    The war between Iran and Israel is in its fourth day of direct hostilities as international diplomatic activity is in full swing to prevent the conflict from engulfing broader West Asia. While ongoing military operations have killed dozens of people and caused widespread destruction, a complex matrix of behind-the-scenes negotiations is underway among world powers and regional actors desperately trying to contain the crisis.

    Iran launched missile strikes on Israeli cities , with rockets striking Haifa and injuring at least 15 in Israel’s National Emergency Service. The attacks were launched as residents in Tehran reported shaking explosions throughout the capital city, with Iranian officials confirming missile strikes in the Niavaran and Tajrish neighborhoods in the northern part of the city, as well as in and around central Valiasr and Hafte Tir squares.

    Israeli forces have expanded their campaign beyond Tehran to cities including Shiraz and Isfahan, where a Defense Ministry military base was hit. The Israeli military announced it had conducted its longest-range strike since the fighting began, striking an aerial refueling aircraft at Mashhad Airport in eastern Iran. Well over 250 Iranian targets have been hit in the expanding military campaign, including what Israel identifies as nuclear command and control centers and key energy targets. The situation is still complex and fraught with difficulties. Now, Iranian officials refer to negotiations with USA as unjustifiable amid current Israeli aggression, and Iran has stopped attending nuclear negotiations that were supposed to be carried out in Oman.

    Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Aragchi has indicated readiness for nuclear agreements that ensure Iran does not pursue weapons development, but insists the country will not accept any deal that deprives it of nuclear rights.

    Behind closed doors, Iran has approached Qatar and Oman requesting them to act as intermediaries with the United States to facilitate ceasefire negotiations, while Saudi Arabia is reportedly involved in diplomatic efforts to de-escalate the situation. US President Donald Trump has expressed optimism about peace prospects, stating he anticipates a deal soon through ongoing calls and meetings to broker an agreement. International diplomatic efforts have accelerated as global leaders warn of the urgent need to prevent the conflict from spilling over to the rest of the Middle East, with multiple regional powers working frantically to halt what they describe as a spiral of violence causing irreparable economic and civil damage to both sides.

    The United Nations Security Council convened an emergency session where both nations presented diametrically opposing positions. Iran labeled Israel’s strike a declaration of war, while Israel justified its attack as legitimate self-defense after failed diplomacy. The session failed to produce a binding resolution, which was indicative of the failure of the international community to agree on anything.

    European leaders have called for diplomatic solutions but appear to have limited influence in the conflict, with analysts saying Europe is on the sidelines. Cyprus has played a minor role, with its president reportedly having carried messages between Israel and Iran through indirect intermediaries.

    Israel remains extremely skeptical of Iranian intentions and has continued its military push despite diplomatic progress. Israeli leaders have warned Iran to vacate nuclear facilities while calling for the United States to assist efforts at abandoning Iran’s nuclear program entirely. The Israeli government has shown little desire to stop activities without concrete Iranian concessions.

    Stakes have also increased as Iran threatened that Western assistance to Israel in downing missiles can result in targeting US, UK, and French military assets throughout the region. The threat has complicated diplomacy as Washington has already provided defensive assistance to Israel while publicly urging restraint.

    In spite of active diplomatic contacts with various regional mediators and ongoing US engagement, prospects for an immediate ceasefire are uncertain.

  • Iran and Israel Exchange Fresh Strikes as Global Leaders Push for Ceasefire

    Source: Government of India

    Source: Government of India (4)

    The war between Iran and Israel is in its fourth day of direct hostilities as international diplomatic activity is in full swing to prevent the conflict from engulfing broader West Asia. While ongoing military operations have killed dozens of people and caused widespread destruction, a complex matrix of behind-the-scenes negotiations is underway among world powers and regional actors desperately trying to contain the crisis.

    Iran launched missile strikes on Israeli cities , with rockets striking Haifa and injuring at least 15 in Israel’s National Emergency Service. The attacks were launched as residents in Tehran reported shaking explosions throughout the capital city, with Iranian officials confirming missile strikes in the Niavaran and Tajrish neighborhoods in the northern part of the city, as well as in and around central Valiasr and Hafte Tir squares.

    Israeli forces have expanded their campaign beyond Tehran to cities including Shiraz and Isfahan, where a Defense Ministry military base was hit. The Israeli military announced it had conducted its longest-range strike since the fighting began, striking an aerial refueling aircraft at Mashhad Airport in eastern Iran. Well over 250 Iranian targets have been hit in the expanding military campaign, including what Israel identifies as nuclear command and control centers and key energy targets. The situation is still complex and fraught with difficulties. Now, Iranian officials refer to negotiations with USA as unjustifiable amid current Israeli aggression, and Iran has stopped attending nuclear negotiations that were supposed to be carried out in Oman.

    Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Aragchi has indicated readiness for nuclear agreements that ensure Iran does not pursue weapons development, but insists the country will not accept any deal that deprives it of nuclear rights.

    Behind closed doors, Iran has approached Qatar and Oman requesting them to act as intermediaries with the United States to facilitate ceasefire negotiations, while Saudi Arabia is reportedly involved in diplomatic efforts to de-escalate the situation. US President Donald Trump has expressed optimism about peace prospects, stating he anticipates a deal soon through ongoing calls and meetings to broker an agreement. International diplomatic efforts have accelerated as global leaders warn of the urgent need to prevent the conflict from spilling over to the rest of the Middle East, with multiple regional powers working frantically to halt what they describe as a spiral of violence causing irreparable economic and civil damage to both sides.

    The United Nations Security Council convened an emergency session where both nations presented diametrically opposing positions. Iran labeled Israel’s strike a declaration of war, while Israel justified its attack as legitimate self-defense after failed diplomacy. The session failed to produce a binding resolution, which was indicative of the failure of the international community to agree on anything.

    European leaders have called for diplomatic solutions but appear to have limited influence in the conflict, with analysts saying Europe is on the sidelines. Cyprus has played a minor role, with its president reportedly having carried messages between Israel and Iran through indirect intermediaries.

    Israel remains extremely skeptical of Iranian intentions and has continued its military push despite diplomatic progress. Israeli leaders have warned Iran to vacate nuclear facilities while calling for the United States to assist efforts at abandoning Iran’s nuclear program entirely. The Israeli government has shown little desire to stop activities without concrete Iranian concessions.

    Stakes have also increased as Iran threatened that Western assistance to Israel in downing missiles can result in targeting US, UK, and French military assets throughout the region. The threat has complicated diplomacy as Washington has already provided defensive assistance to Israel while publicly urging restraint.

    In spite of active diplomatic contacts with various regional mediators and ongoing US engagement, prospects for an immediate ceasefire are uncertain.

  • PM Modi’s Visit to Strengthen India-EU Ties, says EAM Jaishankar on meeting Cyprus counterpart

    Source: Government of India

    Source: Government of India (4)

    External Affairs Minister (EAM) S. Jaishankar met the Cyprus Foreign Minister Constantinos Kombos on Sunday (local time) on his arrival at the Larnaca International Airport in Limassol and said that he was confident that that “Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to the Mediterranean nation will deepen our longstanding bilateral ties and the partnership between India and the European Union.

    Taking to his official X account, EAM Jaishankar said: “Delighted to meet FM @ckombos of Cyprus on my arrival at Larnaca. Confident that PM @narendramodi’s visit to Cyprus will deepen our longstanding bilateral ties and the India-EU partnership.”

    Earlier on Sunday, Prime Minister Narendra Modi reached Cyprus, heralding the start of his three-nation tour, including Canada and Croatia. The pictures of his arrival in Cyprus were shared by Prime Minister Narendra Modi on his X account.

    PM Modi was received and given a warm welcome at the airport by the Cyprus President Nikos Christodoulides as well as Finance Minister Constantinos Kombos, reflecting the deep-rooted historic ties between the two nations.

    The Cyprus President also took to X to welcome PM Modi, as he wrote: “Welcome to Cyprus Prime Minister Narendra Modi! Here, at the EU’s southeastern frontier and gateway of the Mediteranean A historic visit A new chapter in a strategic partnership that knows no limits We make a promise to advance, transform, prosper more. Together.”

    PM Modi also note of the special gesture of Cyprus President and reciprocated on his social media handle, “Landed in Cyprus. My gratitude to the President of Cyprus, Mr. Nikos Christodoulides for the special gesture of welcoming me at the airport. This visit will add significant momentum to India-Cyprus relations, especially in areas like trade, investment and more.”

    Notably, this is the first visit by an Indian Prime Minister to Cyprus in over two decades. During the visit, the two leaders are set to take part in extensive discussions for deepening bilateral ties and also explore ways to strengthen cooperation in trade, investment, security, and technology.

    Prior to his departure for three-nation tour, PM Modi described Cyprus as “a close friend and an important partner in the Mediterranean region and the EU”.

    He added that the visit was an opportunity to build on the historical friendship between the two nations and promote people-to-people exchanges.

    Cyprus, a member of the European Union is set to assume the ‘rotating presidency’ of the EU, early next year. PM Modi’s visit is seen as part of India’s consistent diplomatic outreach to Europe.

    After Cyprus visit, PM Modi will head to Canada to attend the G7 Summit and will then travel to Croatia for meetings with President Zoran Milanovic and Prime Minister Andrej Plenkovic. (IANS)

  • PM Modi’s Visit to Strengthen India-EU Ties, says EAM Jaishankar on meeting Cyprus counterpart

    Source: Government of India

    Source: Government of India (4)

    External Affairs Minister (EAM) S. Jaishankar met the Cyprus Foreign Minister Constantinos Kombos on Sunday (local time) on his arrival at the Larnaca International Airport in Limassol and said that he was confident that that “Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to the Mediterranean nation will deepen our longstanding bilateral ties and the partnership between India and the European Union.

    Taking to his official X account, EAM Jaishankar said: “Delighted to meet FM @ckombos of Cyprus on my arrival at Larnaca. Confident that PM @narendramodi’s visit to Cyprus will deepen our longstanding bilateral ties and the India-EU partnership.”

    Earlier on Sunday, Prime Minister Narendra Modi reached Cyprus, heralding the start of his three-nation tour, including Canada and Croatia. The pictures of his arrival in Cyprus were shared by Prime Minister Narendra Modi on his X account.

    PM Modi was received and given a warm welcome at the airport by the Cyprus President Nikos Christodoulides as well as Finance Minister Constantinos Kombos, reflecting the deep-rooted historic ties between the two nations.

    The Cyprus President also took to X to welcome PM Modi, as he wrote: “Welcome to Cyprus Prime Minister Narendra Modi! Here, at the EU’s southeastern frontier and gateway of the Mediteranean A historic visit A new chapter in a strategic partnership that knows no limits We make a promise to advance, transform, prosper more. Together.”

    PM Modi also note of the special gesture of Cyprus President and reciprocated on his social media handle, “Landed in Cyprus. My gratitude to the President of Cyprus, Mr. Nikos Christodoulides for the special gesture of welcoming me at the airport. This visit will add significant momentum to India-Cyprus relations, especially in areas like trade, investment and more.”

    Notably, this is the first visit by an Indian Prime Minister to Cyprus in over two decades. During the visit, the two leaders are set to take part in extensive discussions for deepening bilateral ties and also explore ways to strengthen cooperation in trade, investment, security, and technology.

    Prior to his departure for three-nation tour, PM Modi described Cyprus as “a close friend and an important partner in the Mediterranean region and the EU”.

    He added that the visit was an opportunity to build on the historical friendship between the two nations and promote people-to-people exchanges.

    Cyprus, a member of the European Union is set to assume the ‘rotating presidency’ of the EU, early next year. PM Modi’s visit is seen as part of India’s consistent diplomatic outreach to Europe.

    After Cyprus visit, PM Modi will head to Canada to attend the G7 Summit and will then travel to Croatia for meetings with President Zoran Milanovic and Prime Minister Andrej Plenkovic. (IANS)

  • MIL-OSI Banking: [Interview] Samsung Onyx Meets Golden Globes® Winner Matīss Kaža, Producer of Flow

    Source: Samsung

    “Is the cat black or is it dark gray? There is this debate online.
    If you watch it on Onyx, you get the answer.”
    — Matīss Kaža, co-writer and co-producer of Flow (2024)
     
    Visual and immersive storytelling is central to how a film is experienced on the big screen by moviegoers. As more people seek premier theater experiences, filmmakers are increasingly embracing cinema LED screens over projectors to deliver their creations in a way audiences haven’t experienced before, fully immersing the viewer in the worlds they create.
     
    Following the launch of the latest Samsung Onyx (ICD), Matīss Kaža, Golden Globes® winner, Academy Award® winner and producer of the film Flow, shared his insights on how Onyx is pushing the boundaries in cinema.
     

    Matīss Kaža is a Latvian director, writer and producer, renowned for co-writing and co-producing the animated film Flow (2024), which won a Golden Globe® Award for Best Motion Picture — Animated, an Academy Award® for Best Animated Feature, a Toronto International Film Festival — Best Animated Film, a European Film Awards for European Animated Feature Film, and more. His projects have a strong sense of authorship and cinematic vision that resonates beyond national borders.

     

     
     
    Q: Could you tell us a bit about what the film Flow is about?
     
    Flow is an animated film, without any dialogue, telling the story of a solitary, individualist cat who likes to be by himself. Then suddenly comes this huge flood, destroying the cat’s home and forcing it upon a boat with other animals. On this boat, the cat learns to collaborate and become friends with these animals to survive this new, beautiful and humanless world.
     
    ▲ Matīss Kaža shares his experience of watching his work on Samsung Onyx. (Poster: Courtesy of Sideshow and Janus Films)
     
     
    Q: As a dialogue-free film, how does a Cinema LED screen enhance the viewing experience for the audience?
     
    One of the goals of Flow as a dialogue-free film is to essentially have the audience come as close to the cat’s experience as possible, since the film is built around the contrast between the main protagonist and the world around it. Cinema is all about detailing in the visual storytelling, and this comes through on Onyx very well. The world is vividly colorful with the yellows, greens and blues — and then the cat is dark gray. There’s a huge contrast that shines through when watching on the Onyx screen, with its vivid colors and deep blacks.
     
    ▲ Flow, played on Samsung Onyx
     
     
    Q: How did the team work through the movements of each of the animals?
     
    We studied the movements of these real animals, down to the most meticulous detail, to make sure our approach to the film was naturalistic for the audience. For example, when something attracts the cat’s attention, rather than twisting its head to look, it would just twist the ear.
     
    Each animal moves in different ways and has different silhouettes, weights and verticality. It was important for us to nail this process when making the film for the audience to feel fully immersed in this world.
     

     
    ▲ Courtesy of Sideshow and Janus Films
     
     
    Q: How did it feel to watch Flow on the Samsung Onyx Cinema LED screen?
     
    Many scenes in the film feature foreground and background interactions, and the audience can fully enjoy and experience exactly how we wanted the film to look. The movements are also very clear, and you can see how all the different characters have their particularities, down to the most subtle interactions. From the smallest twitching in the ear and the smallest gaze of the eye, or any little interaction, the level of detail on Onyx makes these perfectly visible for the audience.
     
    “I would have to say that Flow on the Onyx screen really flows.”
     
     
    Q: Did you notice anything new or different about Flow after seeing it on Samsung Onyx?
     
    How vivid the color was in the beginning — where the cat is still in its home, which is a lovely sculpture garden — really stood out to me. The finer details, like the little butterflies and critters flying around, give this emotion of calmness that might not be noticeable on other screens. The Onyx truly shows the film for what it is — there is very crisp detail and clarity — and it displays things that would go unnoticed in other situations.
     
    “On the Onyx, these little details were perfectly visible —
    details which give a lot to the atmosphere, to the peaceful tone of the scene.”
     

     
    ▲ Flow, played on Samsung Onyx
     
     
    Q: Water is a core element of the film. Can you tell us more about its purpose and how the team uses it to add to the story?
     
    The most difficult part of making this movie is the water effect. The dynamics of the water in the storytelling is really important because it’s one of the central metaphors of the film.
     
    On an Onyx screen, you can explicitly see the difference between the little waves in the puddle at the beginning and end of the film. These details are so important to the storytelling, and it really comes through here on the Onyx.
     
    ▲ Courtesy of Sideshow and Janus Films
     
     
    Q: How do the color, image details and storytelling jump out more on a screen like Onyx compared to other traditional methods?
     
    Because there is no dialogue in this film, we relied solely on visual storytelling. In terms of visual storytelling, color is essential — setting the right levels of contrast and the exact color palette — for the scene. It’s what creates the mood and the atmosphere.
     
    These aspects are fundamental to the film and are captured precisely, just as we intended. Every detail and color really shines on the Onyx screen.
     
    ▲ “Cinema is all about detailing in the storytelling, it always comes through detail. And that comes through on the Onyx,” says Matīss Kaža, co-writer and co-producer of animated film Flow (2024).
     
     
    Q: As a filmmaker, do the capabilities of Onyx help inspire your creative direction for upcoming projects?
     
    I love it when the theatrical experience has me in the middle of the experience, trying to decode what is going on. Filmmakers can do a lot of interesting things using environments, visuals and powerful storytelling to put audience members in an active relationship with the film. The crispness and range of colors offered on the Onyx bring us back to why we love seeing motion pictures on the big screen. It’s super immersive, and the level of detailing is just incredible.
     
     
    Q: Anything else you would like us to know?
     
    “I do filmmaking for the cinema-going experience;
    that’s where the film really shines.”
     
    Cinemas are where you see the picture as you’re supposed to see it. Every cinematographer and director, I think, has had to come to terms with different cinemas showing different images when using traditional projection. With the uniform approach that the Onyx has, I think that problem might be solved.
     

    “Every detail and color really shines on the Onyx screen,” says Matīss Kaža, co-writer and co-producer of animated film Flow (2024).

    MIL OSI Global Banks

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Financial news: Information on securities accepted as collateral for Bank of Russia loans as of 16.06.2025

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: Central Bank of Russia (2) –

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    Categories24-7, Central Bank of Russia, Mil-SOSI, Russian Banks, Russian Economy, Russian Finance, Russian Language, Russian economy, Russian banks

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    State registration number of the issue Issuer Price (as a percentage of the par value) of one security The cost of one security, determined in the manner established by the Bank of Russia (rubles) Correction coefficient established by the Bank of Russia Isin Maturity date* Mechanism **
    Bonds issued on behalf of the Russian Federation
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    12978116V MINISTRY OF FINANCE 66,2923 5 966 ​​757.78764 0.98 RU000A10A893 05/22/2036 OM
    25085RMFS MINISTRY OF FINANCE 94.5000 945 1 for VDK/OVN; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days (rollover); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day; 0.98 for Loans (SME OFZ); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day (rollover); 1 for Irrevocable credit line; RU000A103BQ2 09/23/2025 OM
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    26226RMFS MINISTRY OF FINANCE 90.8170 908.17 1 for VDK/OVN; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days (rollover); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day; 0.98 for Loans (SME OFZ); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day (rollover); 1 for Irrevocable credit line; RU000A0zzyw2 06.10.2026 OM
    26228RMFS MINISTRY OF FINANCE 76.9920 769.92 1 for VDK/OVN; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days (rollover); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day; 0.98 for Loans (SME OFZ); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day (rollover); 1 for Irrevocable credit line; RU000A100A82 09.04.2030 OM
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    26230RMFS MINISTRY OF FINANCE 60,1760 601.76 1 for VDK/OVN; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days (rollover); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day; 0.98 for Loans (SME OFZ); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day (rollover); 1 for Irrevocable credit line; RU000A100EF5 03/15/2039 OM
    26232RMFS MINISTRY OF FINANCE 82,7960 827.96 1 for VDK/OVN; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days (rollover); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day; 0.98 for Loans (SME OFZ); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day (rollover); 1 for Irrevocable credit line; RU000A1014N4 05.10.2027 OM
    26233RMFS MINISTRY OF FINANCE 55.8450 558.45 1 for VDK/OVN; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days (rollover); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day; 0.98 for Loans (SME OFZ); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day (rollover); 1 for Irrevocable credit line; RU000A101F94 07/17/2035 OM
    26234RMFS MINISTRY OF FINANCE 98,7730 987.73 1 for VDK/OVN; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days (rollover); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day; 0.98 for Loans (SME OFZ); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day (rollover); 1 for Irrevocable credit line; RU000A101QE0 07/15/2025 OM
    26235RMFS MINISTRY OF FINANCE 67,4740 674.74 1 for VDK/OVN; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days (rollover); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day; 0.98 for Loans (SME OFZ); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day (rollover); 1 for Irrevocable credit line; RU000A1028E3 03/11/2031 OM
    26236RMFS MINISTRY OF FINANCE 79,7720 797.72 1 for VDK/OVN; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days (rollover); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day; 0.98 for Loans (SME OFZ); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day (rollover); 1 for Irrevocable credit line; RU000A102BT8 05/16/2028 OM
    26237RMFS MINISTRY OF FINANCE 78,1930 781.93 1 for VDK/OVN; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days (rollover); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day; 0.98 for Loans (SME OFZ); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day (rollover); 1 for Irrevocable credit line; RU000A1038Z7 03/13/2029 OM
    26238RMFS MINISTRY OF FINANCE 55.5510 555.51 1 for VDK/OVN; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days (rollover); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day; 0.98 for Loans (SME OFZ); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day (rollover); 1 for Irrevocable credit line; RU000A1038V6 05/14/2041 OM
    26239RMFS MINISTRY OF FINANCE 70.1930 701.93 1 for VDK/OVN; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days (rollover); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day; 0.98 for Loans (SME OFZ); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day (rollover); 1 for Irrevocable credit line; RU000A103901 07/22/2031 OM
    26240RMFS MINISTRY OF FINANCE 59.7060 597.06 1 for VDK/OVN; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days (rollover); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day; 0.98 for Loans (SME OFZ); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day (rollover); 1 for Irrevocable credit line; RU000A103BR0 07/29/2036 OM
    26241RMFS MINISTRY OF FINANCE 77.7060 777.06 1 for VDK/OVN; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days (rollover); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day; 0.98 for Loans (SME OFZ); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day (rollover); 1 for Irrevocable credit line; RU000A105FZ9 11/16/2032 OM
    26242RMFS MINISTRY OF FINANCE 83,2250 832.25 1 for VDK/OVN; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days (rollover); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day; 0.98 for Loans (SME OFZ); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day (rollover); 1 for Irrevocable credit line; RU000A105RV3 08/28/2029 OM
    26243RMFS MINISTRY OF FINANCE 71.8960 718.96 1 for VDK/OVN; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days (rollover); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day; 0.98 for Loans (SME OFZ); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day (rollover); 1 for Irrevocable credit line; RU000A106E90 05/18/2038 OM
    26244RMFS MINISTRY OF FINANCE 83,8740 838.74 1 for VDK/OVN; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days (rollover); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day; 0.98 for Loans (SME OFZ); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day (rollover); 1 for Irrevocable credit line; RU000A1074G2 03/14/2034 OM
    26245RMFS MINISTRY OF FINANCE 84,9730 849.73 1 for VDK/OVN; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days (rollover); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day; 0.98 for Loans (SME OFZ); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day (rollover); 1 for Irrevocable credit line; RU000A108EG6 09.25.2035 OM
    26246RMFS MINISTRY OF FINANCE 85.0330 850.33 1 for VDK/OVN; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days (rollover); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day; 0.98 for Loans (SME OFZ); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day (rollover); 1 for Irrevocable credit line; RU000A108EE1 03/11/2036 OM
    26247RMFS MINISTRY OF FINANCE 85.0230 850.23 1 for VDK/OVN; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days (rollover); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day; 0.98 for Loans (SME OFZ); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day (rollover); 1 for Irrevocable credit line; RU000A108EF8 05/10/2039 OM
    26248RMFS MINISTRY OF FINANCE 84,9430 849.43 1 for VDK/OVN; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days (rollover); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day; 0.98 for Loans (SME OFZ); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day (rollover); 1 for Irrevocable credit line; RU000A108EH4 05/15/2040 OM
    29007RMFS MINISTRY OF FINANCE 102.6380 1,026.38 1 for VDK/OVN; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days (rollover); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day; 0.98 for Loans (SME OFZ); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day (rollover); 1 for Irrevocable credit line; RU000A0JV4M0 02.03.2027 OM
    29008RMFS MINISTRY OF FINANCE 104.6950 1,046.95 1 for VDK/OVN; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days (rollover); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day; 0.98 for Loans (SME OFZ); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day (rollover); 1 for Irrevocable credit line; RU000A0JV4P3 02.10.2029 OM
    29009RMFS MINISTRY OF FINANCE 107,3380 1,073.38 1 for VDK/OVN; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days (rollover); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day; 0.98 for Loans (SME OFZ); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day (rollover); 1 for Irrevocable credit line; RU000A0JV4N8 04/04/2032 OM
    29010RMFS MINISTRY OF FINANCE 106.6730 1,066.73 1 for VDK/OVN; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days (rollover); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day; 0.98 for Loans (SME OFZ); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day (rollover); 1 for Irrevocable credit line; RU000A0JV4Q1 05.12.2034 OM
    29013RMFS MINISTRY OF FINANCE 96.5260 965.26 1 for VDK/OVN; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days (rollover); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day; 0.98 for Loans (SME OFZ); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day (rollover); 1 for Irrevocable credit line; RU000A101KT1 09/17/2030 OM
    29014RMFS MINISTRY OF FINANCE 99,6220 996.22 1 for VDK/OVN; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days (rollover); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day; 0.98 for Loans (SME OFZ); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day (rollover); 1 for Irrevocable credit line; RU000A101N52 03/24/2026 OM
    29015RMFS MINISTRY OF FINANCE 97.9010 979.01 1 for VDK/OVN; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days (rollover); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day; 0.98 for Loans (SME OFZ); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day (rollover); 1 for Irrevocable credit line; RU000A1025A7 10/17/2028 OM
    29016RMFS MINISTRY OF FINANCE 98,990 989.99 1 for VDK/OVN; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days (rollover); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day; 0.98 for Loans (SME OFZ); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day (rollover); 1 for Irrevocable credit line; RU000A1025B5 12/22/2026 OM
    29017RMFS MINISTRY OF FINANCE 96,7530 967.53 1 for VDK/OVN; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days (rollover); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day; 0.98 for Loans (SME OFZ); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day (rollover); 1 for Irrevocable credit line; RU000A1028D5 08.24.2032 OM
    29018RMFS MINISTRY OF FINANCE 97.0320 970.32 1 for VDK/OVN; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days (rollover); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day; 0.98 for Loans (SME OFZ); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day (rollover); 1 for Irrevocable credit line; RU000A102A31 11/25/2031 OM
    29019RMFS MINISTRY OF FINANCE 97,6400 976.4 1 for VDK/OVN; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days (rollover); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day; 0.98 for Loans (SME OFZ); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day (rollover); 1 for Irrevocable credit line; RU000A102A49 07/17/2029 OM
    29020RMFS MINISTRY OF FINANCE 98,1760 981.76 1 for VDK/OVN; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days (rollover); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day; 0.98 for Loans (SME OFZ); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day (rollover); 1 for Irrevocable credit line; RU000A102BV4 09/21/2027 OM
    29021RMFS MINISTRY OF FINANCE 96.9180 969.18 1 for VDK/OVN; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days (rollover); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day; 0.98 for Loans (SME OFZ); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day (rollover); 1 for Irrevocable credit line; RU000A105B11 11/26/2030 OM
    29022RMFS MINISTRY OF FINANCE 97,1680 971.68 1 for VDK/OVN; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days (rollover); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day; 0.98 for Loans (SME OFZ); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day (rollover); 1 for Irrevocable credit line; RU000A105G16 07/19/2033 OM
    29023RMFS MINISTRY OF FINANCE 97,1150 971.15 1 for VDK/OVN; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days (rollover); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day; 0.98 for Loans (SME OFZ); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day (rollover); 1 for Irrevocable credit line; RU000A105L19 08/22/2034 OM
    29024RMFS MINISTRY OF FINANCE 94,5320 945.32 1 for VDK/OVN; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days (rollover); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day; 0.98 for Loans (SME OFZ); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day (rollover); 1 for Irrevocable credit line; RU000A1066D5 04/17/2035 OM
    29025RMFS MINISTRY OF FINANCE 94,1990 941.99 1 for VDK/OVN; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days (rollover); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day; 0.98 for Loans (SME OFZ); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day (rollover); 1 for Irrevocable credit line; RU000A106Z61 08/11/2037 OM
    29026RMFS MINISTRY OF FINANCE 96,9970 969.97 1 for VDK/OVN; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days (rollover); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day; 0.98 for Loans (SME OFZ); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day (rollover); 1 for Irrevocable credit line; RU000A10A7D2 03/03/2038 OM
    29027RMFS MINISTRY OF FINANCE 95,4860 954.86 1 for VDK/OVN; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days (rollover); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day; 0.98 for Loans (SME OFZ); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day (rollover); 1 for Irrevocable credit line; RU000A10AA93 09/10/2036 OM
    46011RMFS MINISTRY OF FINANCE 491,7170 1,475,151 1 for VDK/OVN; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days (rollover); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day; 0.98 for Loans (SME OFZ); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day (rollover); 1 for Irrevocable credit line; RU0002867854 08/19/2025 OM
    46012RMFS MINISTRY OF FINANCE 99,3760 944.072 1 for VDK/OVN; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days (rollover); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day; 0.98 for Loans (SME OFZ); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day (rollover); 1 for Irrevocable credit line; RU0002868001 09/08/2026 OM
    46020RMFS MINISTRY OF FINANCE 60.9150 609.15 1 for VDK/OVN; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days (rollover); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day; 0.98 for Loans (SME OFZ); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day (rollover); 1 for Irrevocable credit line; RU000A0GN9A7 08.08.2034 OM
    46023RMFS MINISTRY OF FINANCE 93,1810 93,181 1 for VDK/OVN; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days (rollover); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day; 0.98 for Loans (SME OFZ); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day (rollover); 1 for Irrevocable credit line; RU000A0JRTL6 07/22/2026 OM
    52002RMFS MINISTRY OF FINANCE 81,1080 1 337,1383772 1 for VDK/OVN; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days (rollover); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day; 0.98 for Loans (SME OFZ); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day (rollover); 1 for Irrevocable credit line; RU000A0ZYZ26 01.02.2028 OM
    52003RMFS MINISTRY OF FINANCE 71,9120 1,077.8673944 1 for VDK/OVN; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days (rollover); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day; 0.98 for Loans (SME OFZ); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day (rollover); 1 for Irrevocable credit line; RU000A102069 07/16/2030 OM
    52004RMFS MINISTRY OF FINANCE 68,1900 960.885747 1 for VDK/OVN; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days (rollover); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day; 0.98 for Loans (SME OFZ); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day (rollover); 1 for Irrevocable credit line; RU000A103MX5 03/16/2032 OM
    52005RMFS MINISTRY OF FINANCE 66,4120 802.8347444 1 for VDK/OVN; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days (rollover); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day; 0.98 for Loans (SME OFZ); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day (rollover); 1 for Irrevocable credit line; RU000A105XV1 05/10/2033 OM
    MK -0-CM-119 MINISTRY OF FINANCE 119,5185 94 422,961518 0.98 XS0088543193 06.06.2028 OM
    SK -0-CM-128 MINISTRY OF FINANCE 105.6721 4,17419589094 0.98 XS0114288789 09/25/2025 OM
    Bonds of subjects of the Russian Federation and municipalities
    RU34016BEL0 BELGOROD REGION 96,6700 58.002 0.93 RU000A1025F6 09/17/2025 DM
    Ru34003kra1 CITY OF KRASNODAR 94,7400 189.48 0.9 RU000A102KT9 12/22/2025 DM
    RU34013KRN1 CITY OF KRASNOYARSK 96.0000 240 0.9 RU000A1029G6 10.10.2025 DM
    RU35002GSP0 CITY OF SAINT PETERSBURG 91,7300 458.65 0.96 RU000A0ZYKJ1 04.12.2025 OM
    RU35003GSP0 CITY OF SAINT PETERSBURG 88,6700 620.69 0.96 RU000A102A15 10/13/2025 OM
    RU35003KND0 KRASNODAR REGION 90.0300 630.21 0.93 RU000A1011B5 05.11.2025 OM
    RU35016KNA0 KRASNOYARSK REGION 97.8600 97,86 0.93 RU000A0ZZM87 09/11/2025 DM
    RU35001kur0 KURSK REGION 96,5900 144,885 0.9 RU000A0ZYCD1 10.10.2025 DM
    RU34012LIP0 LIPETSK REGION 96,6400 193.28 0.93 RU000A102598 09/15/2025 DM
    RU35010LIP0 LIPETSK REGION 96,3700 144,555 0.93 RU000A0ZZR33 10/20/2025 DM
    RU34014MOO0 MOSCOW REGION 99,1900 396.76 0.96 RU000A101WL3 07.07.2025 DM
    RU35015MOO0 MOSCOW REGION 86,9600 260.88 0.96 RU000A102CR0 09.11.2026 DM
    RU35016MOO0 MOSCOW REGION 89,3400 268.02 0.96 RU000A102G35 01.06.2026 DM
    RU35015NJG0 NIZHNY NOVGOROD REGION 93,0800 651.56 0.9 RU000A102DS6 08/18/2025 DM
    RU35016NJG0 NIZHNY NOVGOROD REGION 92,0200 920.2 0.9 RU000A1043K9 11/17/2025 DM
    Ru34021ano0 NOVOSIBIRSK REGION 96,1800 288.54 0.93 RU000A102895 10/13/2025 DM
    RU34024ANO0 NOVOSIBIRSK REGION 101,8700 1,018.7 0.93 RU000A1099S4 10.10.2026 DM
    RU34026ano0 NOVOSIBIRSK REGION 104,4600 1,044.6 0.93 RU000A10ABC2 06/06/2026 DM
    RU35023ANO0 NOVOSIBIRSK REGION 92,3600 923.6 0.93 RU000A107B19 04/16/2027 DM
    RU35003AOR0 ORENBURG REGION 99,6700 199.34 0.93 RU000A0JVM81 02.07.2025 DM
    RU35004AOR0 ORENBURG REGION 90,4500 904.5 0.93 RU000A0ZYKH5 03/03/2025 DM
    RU25073MOS0 GOVERNMENT OF MOSCOW 92,5400 925.4 0.96 RU000A1030T7 04/20/2026 OM
    RU26074MOS0 GOVERNMENT OF MOSCOW 81.4000 814 0.96 RU000A1033Z8 05/17/2028 OM
    RU34011BAS0 REPUBLIC OF BASHKORTOSTAN 96.8000 387.2 0.93 RU000A1026B3 09/23/2025 DM
    RU34012BAS0 REPUBLIC OF BASHKORTOSTAN 94,2200 659.54 0.93 RU000A103DN5 07.07.2025 DM
    RU34013BAS0 REPUBLIC OF BASHKORTOSTAN 93,5500 935.5 0.93 RU000A106FT0 12/29/2025 DM
    RU34014BAS0 REPUBLIC OF BASHKORTOSTAN 111,7100 1 117.1 0.93 RU000A10AC91 11.12.2025 DM
    RU35011RSY0 REPUBLIC OF SAKHA (YAKUTIA) 97,3700 146,055 0.9 RU000A0ZZNJ2 09/23/2025 DM
    RU35012RSY0 REPUBLIC OF SAKHA (YAKUTIA) 94,7200 378.88 0.9 RU000A100CN3 08/12/2025 DM
    RU35013RSY0 REPUBLIC OF SAKHA (YAKUTIA) 91,8700 459.35 0.9 RU000A1010D3 01.08.2025 DM
    RU35014RSY0 REPUBLIC OF SAKHA (YAKUTIA) 87,2700 436.35 0.9 RU000A101P27 09/11/2025 DM
    RU35015RSY0 REPUBLIC OF SAKHA (YAKUTIA) 86.1000 688.8 0.9 RU000A1033B9 08.08.2025 DM
    RU35016RSY0 REPUBLIC OF SAKHA (YAKUTIA) 99,2200 992.2 0.9 RU000A109L72 05.06.2026 DM
    RU35014SAM0 SAMARA REGION 91,0600 136.59 0.93 RU000A0ZZ9P8 06.06.2026 DM
    RU35015SAM0 SAMARA REGION 91,7600 367.04 0.93 RU000A1020L5 03.11.2025 DM
    RU34007SVS0 SVERDLOVSK REGION 99.5000 248.75 0.93 RU000A101UG7 06/27/2025 OM
    RU35004SVS0 SVERDLOVSK REGION 96,5400 193.08 0.93 RU000A0ZYDU3 10/21/2025 OM
    RU35005SVS0 SVERDLOVSK REGION 91.9700 91,97 0.93 RU000A0ZZQH9 12.12.2025 OM
    RU35006SVS0 SVERDLOVSK REGION 89,3300 446.65 0.93 RU000A1016N9 08.12.2025 OM
    RU35008SVS0 SVERDLOVSK REGION 90.5500 905.5 0.93 RU000A101Z17 07/23/2025 OM
    RU35009SVS0 SVERDLOVSK REGION 86,9200 521.52 0.93 RU000A102CT6 11.11.2025 OM
    RU35004STV0 STAVROPOL REGION 89,5700 447.85 0.9 RU000A102H34 08.09.2025 DM
    RU35001CLB0 CHELYABINSK REGION 87.0100 522.06 0.93 RU000A102FV5 01.09.2025 DM
    RU35015YRS0 YAROSLAVL REGION 92,2200 576,375 0.9 RU000A0JXS83 07/21/2025 DM
    Mortgage-backed bonds
    4-01-00307-R-001p LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 94,8963 53,26529319 0.9 RU000A0JX3M0 06/27/2025 DM
    4-01-00307-R-002p LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 87.6582 121,46796774 0.9 RU000A0JXRM6 06/27/2025 DM
    4-02-00307-R-002p LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 98,1600 48,206376 0.9 RU000A0ZYJT2 07/25/2025 DM
    4-03-00307-R-001p LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 90.6327 62,85377745 0.9 RU000A0ZYLX0 07/25/2025 DM
    4-03-00307-R-002p LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 96,9918 49,55311062 0.9 RU000A0ZYL89 07/25/2025 DM
    4-04-00307-R-001p LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 78.3070 156,4965395 0.9 RU000A1019A0 08/27/2025 DM
    4-04-00307-R-002p LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 83,0340 93,0562038 0.9 RU000A0ZZNW5 06/27/2025 DM
    4-05-00307-R-001p LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 75,7300 190,241333 0.9 RU000A101JD7 07/25/2025 DM
    4-05-00307-R-002p LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 79,2447 116,4500865 0.9 RU000A0ZZCH9 07/25/2025 DM
    4-06-00307-R-002p LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 86.5800 98,017218 0.9 RU000A0ZZV86 08/27/2025 DM
    4-07-00307-R-002p LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 80.0570 171,2018945 0.9 RU000A0ZZZ58 06/27/2025 DM
    4-08-00307-R-002p LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 85,0987 114.61943903 0.9 RU000A0ZZZ09 06/27/2025 DM
    4-09-00307-R-002p LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 82,7500 126,2765 0.9 RU000A100DQ4 04.07.2025 DM
    4-10-00307-R-002p LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 82,4200 160.96626 0.9 RU000A100ZB9 06/27/2025 DM
    4-11-00307-R-002p LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 79,7483 175.61373143 0.9 RU000A100Y4 07/25/2025 DM
    4-12-00307-R-002p LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 81,9254 200,13555966 0.9 RU000A1016B4 07/25/2025 DM
    4-13-00307-R-002p LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 80,1900 162,072009 0.9 RU000A1018T2 04.07.2025 DM
    4-14-00307-R-002p LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 76.6866 205,0983117 0.9 RU000A101U95 08/27/2025 DM
    4-15-00307-R-002p LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 75,8700 170,229519 0.9 RU000A101TD6 08/27/2025 DM
    4-17-00307-R-002p LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 72,9163 233,43424282 0.9 RU000A102AP8 08/27/2025 DM
    4-18-00307-R-002p LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 72,9100 239,88482 0.9 RU000A102D46 08/27/2025 DM
    4B02-01-00307-R-001P LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 72,3656 283,8178832 0.9 RU000A102GV3 07/25/2025 DM
    4B02-02-00307-R-001P LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 73,6600 256.660904 0.9 RU000A102JB9 08/27/2025 DM
    4B02-03-00307-R-001P LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 75,3770 217,9752086 0.9 RU000A102GD1 06/27/2025 DM
    4B02-04-00307-R-001P LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 78,8800 249,978608 0.9 RU000A102K13 06/27/2025 DM
    4b02-05-00307-R-001p LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 74,4803 258.72966614 0.9 RU000A102L87 06/27/2025 DM
    4B02-06-00307-R-001P LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 79,0870 284,2070432 0.9 RU000A102L53 08/27/2025 DM
    4B02-07-00307-R-001P LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 78,2113 278,01770811 0.9 RU000A103125 06/27/2025 DM
    4B02-08-00307-R-001P LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 82.6426 362,31342266 0.9 RU000A1031K4 07/25/2025 DM
    4b02-09-00307-R-001p LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 77,3500 373,376185 0.9 RU000A103N43 08/27/2025 DM
    4b02-10-00307-r-001p LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 74,5474 416,4590501 0.9 RU000A103W42 07/25/2025 DM
    4b02-11-00307-r-001p LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 72,8980 403.8622098 0.9 RU000A103YG5 07/25/2025 DM
    4b02-12-00307-r-001p LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 71,8300 356,039761 0.9 RU000A103YK7 08/27/2025 DM
    4B02-13-00307-R-001P LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 96,8800 531,251168 0.9 RU000A1041Q0 06/27/2025 DM
    4B02-14-00307-R-001P LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 78,9275 399,72832375 0.9 RU000A104511 08/27/2025 DM
    4b02-15-00307-R-001p LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 79.1000 421,42107 0.9 RU000A104B79 06/27/2025 DM
    4B02-16-00307-R-001P LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 74.7110 406.2261203 0.9 RU000A104AM1 06/27/2025 DM
    4B02-17-00307-R-001P LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 77,2819 469.30979413 0.9 RU000A104C45 06/27/2025 DM
    4b02-18-00307-r-001p LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 95,8500 640.843515 0.9 RU000A104UV0 06/27/2025 DM
    4b02-19-00307-r-001p LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 98,4800 662,218912 0.9 RU000a104x32 06/27/2025 DM
    4b02-20-00307-R-001p LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 78,1335 471,3168987 0.9 RU000A105344 06/27/2025 DM
    4b02-21-00307-R-001p LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 69,8600 485,058938 0.9 RU000A105898 07/25/2025 DM
    4b02-22-00307-R-001p LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 95,8900 703.027124 0.9 RU000A1058R2 06/27/2025 DM
    4b02-23-00307-R-001p LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 80.0655 567.8885784 0.9 RU000A105AV9 06/27/2025 DM
    4b02-24-00307-R-001p LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 77,3133 549,04813128 0.9 RU000A105CB7 06/27/2025 DM
    4b02-25-00307-R-001p LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 73,4500 419,67861 0.9 RU000A105H23 06/27/2025 DM
    4B02-26-00307-R-001P LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 96,7935 746.3166024 0.9 RU000A105JF3 06/27/2025 DM
    4b02-27-00307-R-001p LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 78,2448 512.35477488 0.9 RU000A105LN3 06/27/2025 DM
    4b02-28-00307-R-001p LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 100.9900 686.63101 0.9 RU000A105NN9 06/27/2025 DM
    4b02-29-00307-R-001p LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 79,5938 487,09017786 0.9 RU000A105NY6 06/27/2025 DM
    4b02-30-00307-R-001p LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 87.5735 578,27409255 0.9 RU000A105NP4 07/25/2025 DM
    4B02-31-00307-R-001P LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 96,7300 728.638071 0.9 RU000A105NZ3 06/27/2025 DM
    4b02-32-00307-R-001p LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 72,9700 475,757103 0.9 RU000A105P72 06/27/2025 DM
    4b02-33-00307-R-001p LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 80.7492 568.52281752 0.9 RU000A1065R7 06/27/2025 DM
    4B02-34-00307-R-001P LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 98,4500 823,08138 0.9 RU000A106FM5 06/27/2025 DM
    4B02-35-00307-R-001P LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 79,8800 549,127072 0.9 RU000A106HE8 06/27/2025 DM
    4b02-37-00307-R-001p LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 74,3754 600.75241842 0.9 RU000A1074A5 06/27/2025 DM
    4b02-38-00307-R-001p LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 100.8700 836.797346 0.9 RU000A107G55 06/27/2025 DM
    4B02-39-00307-R-001P LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 83,9500 658,982315 0.9 RU000A107GL3 06/27/2025 DM
    4b02-40-00307-R-001p LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 80.6063 632,87230382 0.9 RU000A107EQ7 06/27/2025 DM
    4b02-41-00307-R-001p LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 74,3800 605.914356 0.9 RU000A107GM1 06/27/2025 DM
    4b02-42-00307-R-001p LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 87,5800 720.336742 0.9 RU000A107SY1 08/27/2025 DM
    4b02-44-00307-R-001p LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 83.8070 657,8765693 0.9 RU000A1093G2 08/27/2025 DM
    4b02-46-00307-R-001p LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 100.8100 933.772787 0.9 RU000A109NH3 06/27/2025 DM
    4b02-49-00307-R-001p LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 79,8400 717.64184 0.9 RU000A109NJ9 06/27/2025 DM
    Bonds of legal entities – residents of the Russian Federation
    4-24-40046-n JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “ALROSA” (PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY) 93,7748 74 084.7176944 0.91 RU000A108TV3 06.24.2027 OM
    4b02-01-40046-n-001p JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “ALROSA” (PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY) 98,9400 989.4 0.96 RU000A109L49 09/01/2028 OM
    4b02-02-40046-n-001p JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “ALROSA” (PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY) 100.0000 1,000 0.96 RU000A109SH2 06.04.2026 OM
    4B02-01-55319-E-001P JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “NUCLEAR POWER INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX” 91,6200 916.2 0.96 RU000a103at8 06/18/2026 OM
    4B02-02-55319-E-001P JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “NUCLEAR POWER INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX” 95.6000 956 0.96 RU000A105K85 01.12.2025 OM
    4b02-03-55319-E-001p JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “NUCLEAR POWER INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX” 99.0000 990 0.96 RU000A109UD7 07.10.2027 OM
    4B02-04-55319-E-001P JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “NUCLEAR POWER INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX” 101,5400 1,015.4 0.96 RU000A10B3A6 05.03.2027 OM
    4B02-01-62024-H-001P JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “MEDSI GROUP OF COMPANIES” 105,1600 1,051.6 0.93 RU000a105ya3 02.24.2038 OM
    4B02-02-62024-H-001P JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “MEDSI GROUP OF COMPANIES” 94,5300 945.3 0.93 RU000A105YB1 02.24.2038 OM
    4B02-03-62024-H-001P JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “MEDSI GROUP OF COMPANIES” 96,8100 968.1 0.93 RU000A106K27 06/25/2038 OM
    4-15-00739-a JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “DOM.RF” 100.0900 1,000.9 0.96 RU000A0JQAM6 06.09.2028 OM
    4-31-00739-a JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “DOM.RF” 100.9900 1,009.9 0.96 RU000A0JV4R9 31.01.2034 OM
    4b02-01-00739-a-001p JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “DOM.RF” 101.8000 1 018 0.96 RU000A0ZYLU6 10.12.2027 OM
    4b02-01-00739-a-002p JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “DOM.RF” 97,2900 972.9 0.96 RU000A105MN1 09/21/2027 OM
    4b02-02-00739-a-001p JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “DOM.RF” 100.4100 1,004.1 0.96 RU000a0zyqu5 01/20/2028 OM
    4b02-02-00739-a-002p JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “DOM.RF” 98,8200 988.2 0.96 RU000A107GB4 12/18/2025 OM
    4b02-03-00739-a-001p JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “DOM.RF” 100.0600 1,000.6 0.96 RU000A0ZZ1N0 03/23/2028 OM
    4b02-03-00739-a-002p JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “DOM.RF” 100,1800 1,001.8 0.96 RU000A107GC2 12/16/2027 OM
    4b02-04-00739-a-001p JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “DOM.RF” 99,7300 997.3 0.96 RU000A0ZZ7C0 08.05.2028 OM
    4b02-04-00739-a-002p JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “DOM.RF” 98,6600 986.6 0.96 RU000A108FC2 05/18/2028 OM
    4b02-05-00739-a JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “DOM.RF” 100,1700 1,001.7 0.96 RU000A0JX2R1 12/21/2049 OM
    4b02-05-00739-a-001p JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “DOM.RF” 100.4500 1,004.5 0.96 RU000A1004W6 02/15/2029 OM
    4b02-05-00739-a-002p JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “DOM.RF” 99,9100 999.1 0.96 RU000A109U97 10.10.2026 OM
    4b02-06-00739-a JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “DOM.RF” 100.7100 1,007.1 0.96 RU000A0ZYF20 03.11.2050 OM
    4b02-06-00739-a-001p JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “DOM.RF” 99,9900 999.9 0.96 RU000A100et6 05/11/2039 OM
    4b02-07-00739-a JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “DOM.RF” 102,0500 1,020.5 0.96 RU000A0ZYF38 03.11.2050 OM
    4b02-07-00739-a-001p JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “DOM.RF” 99,0900 990.9 0.96 RU000A101590 10.11.2039 OM
    4b02-08-00739-a JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “DOM.RF” 100.8500 1,008.5 0.96 RU000A0ZYFM5 11.11.2050 OM
    4b02-10-00739-a JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “DOM.RF” 98,8333 988.333 0.96 RU000A0ZYFN3 11.11.2050 OM
    4b02-12-00739-a-001p JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “DOM.RF” 97,9400 979.4 0.96 RU000A1055Q0 08/29/2025 OM
    4-03-00350-D JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “WESTERN HIGH-SPEED DIAMETER” 94.7611 947.611 0.96 RU000A0JS4J1 01/28/2032 DM
    4-04-00350-D JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “WESTERN HIGH-SPEED DIAMETER” 99,8034 998,034 0.96 RU000A0JS4K9 01/28/2032 DM
    4b02-01-11394-a-001p JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “MOSCOW REGIONAL ENERGY GRID COMPANY” 97,7800 977.8 0.93 RU000A1099E4 07.24.2029 DM
    4B02-01-55470-E-001P JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “PRODUCTION ASSOCIATION “URAL OPTICAL-MECHANICAL PLANT” NAMED AFTER E.S. YALAMOV” 84,3600 843.6 0.9 RU000A100EV2 05/23/2029 DM
    4-02-0586-a-001p JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “ROSAGROLEASING” 92,0200 920.2 0.93 RU000A102TA0 02.24.2026 OM
    4-03-0586-a-001p JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “ROSAGROLEASING” 90.5800 905.8 0.93 RU000A103QL1 09/15/2026 OM
    4-04-05886-a-001p JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “ROSAGROLEASING” 97,3200 973.2 0.93 RU000A107DM8 06.12.2028 OM
    4-05-0586-a-001p JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “ROSAGROLEASING” 93,5400 935.4 0.93 RU000A108447 04/30/2029 OM
    4b02-01-0586-a-001p JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “ROSAGROLEASING” 94,5500 945.5 0.93 RU000A108KT6 01/15/2027 OM
    4-08-55477-E JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “RUSNANO” 80.4800 804.8 0.8 RU000A1008V9 03/24/2028 DM
    4B02-06-3592-H-001P JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “TRANSMASHHOLDING” 91,1600 911.6 0.93 RU000A1038D4 06.06.2026 DM
    4B02-07-3592-H-001P JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “TRANSMASHHOLDING” 92,1100 921.1 0.93 RU000A106CU5 06.06.2026 DM
    4b02-01-55163-E-001p JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “URAL STEEL” 94,5500 945.5 0.9 RU000A105Q63 24.12.2025 DM
    4B02-02-55163-E-001P JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “URAL STEEL” 89.9000 899 0.9 RU000A1066A1 04/23/2026 DM
    4b02-03-55163-E-001p JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “URAL STEEL” 98,3467 10,750.9662039 0.85 RU000A107U81 02/18/2026 DM
    4B02-05-55465-E-001P JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “FEDERAL PASSENGER COMPANY” 95,6900 956.9 0.93 RU000A0ZZTL5 01.11.2028 DM
    4B02-07-55465-E-001P JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “FEDERAL PASSENGER COMPANY” 94,9100 949.1 0.93 RU000A1012B3 02.11.2029 DM
    4-08-25642-h JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “HOLDING COMPANY “METALLOINVEST” 90.7754 71 715,1077112 0.88 RU000A105A04 10/20/2028 OM
    4B02-02-25642-H-001P JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “HOLDING COMPANY “METALLOINVEST” 96,6958 10,570.4947686 0.88 RU000A1057D4 09.09.2027 OM
    4B02-03-25642-H-001P JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “HOLDING COMPANY “METALLOINVEST” 99,3685 10 862.6663145 0.88 RU000A105M75 10.12.2025 OM
    4B02-04-25642-H JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “HOLDING COMPANY “METALLOINVEST” 91,9900 919.9 0.93 RU000A101EF3 01/29/2030 OM
    4B02-04-25642-H-001P JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “HOLDING COMPANY “METALLOINVEST” 97,0600 970.6 0.93 RU000A105W08 02/16/2027 OM
    4B02-05-25642-H-001P JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “HOLDING COMPANY “METALLOINVEST” 99,9868 10 930,2570156 0.88 RU000A1071S3 04/13/2026 OM
    4B02-06-25642-H-001P JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “HOLDING COMPANY “METALLOINVEST” 97,2600 972.6 0.93 RU000A1079S6 11/22/2027 OM
    4B02-08-25642-H-001P JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “HOLDING COMPANY “METALLOINVEST” 98,1300 981.3 0.93 RU000A108WY1 12.12.2026 OM
    4B02-09-25642-H-001P JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “HOLDING COMPANY “METALLOINVEST” 101,1500 1,011.5 0.93 RU000A10AFX9 06/16/2026 OM
    4b02-10-25642-H-001p JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “HOLDING COMPANY “METALLOINVEST” 102,7900 1,027.9 0.93 RU000A10AU99 04.02.2026 OM
    4B02-11-25642-H-001P JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “HOLDING COMPANY “METALLOINVEST” 103,8402 11,351.4991434 0.88 RU000A10YY8 02/19/2026 OM
    4B02-12-25642-H-001P JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “HOLDING COMPANY “METALLOINVEST” 105.6327 11,547.4498659 0.88 RU000A10B0C8 02/22/2027 OM
    4B02-13-25642-H-001P JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “HOLDING COMPANY “METALLOINVEST” 100.0900 1,000.9 0.93 RU000A10B4D8 09.03.2027 OM
    4b02-02-12414-F-001p JOINT-STOCK COMPANY HOLDING COMPANY “NOVOTRANS” 95,8300 479.15 0.93 RU000A103133 07/16/2025 OM
    4B02-03-12414-F-001P JOINT-STOCK COMPANY HOLDING COMPANY “NOVOTRANS” 92,2900 922.9 0.93 RU000A105CM4 01/26/2026 OM
    4B02-04-12414-F-001P JOINT-STOCK COMPANY HOLDING COMPANY “NOVOTRANS” 93,9100 939.1 0.93 RU000A106SP1 05/25/2026 OM
    4b02-05-12414-F-001p JOINT-STOCK COMPANY HOLDING COMPANY “NOVOTRANS” 94,8900 948.9 0.93 RU000A107W06 02.12.2026 OM
    4B02-01-32432-H-002P JSC “GTLK” 94,5600 945.6 0.93 RU000A102VR0 02.29.2036 OM
    4B02-03-32432-H-001P JSC “GTLK” 94,2500 942.5 0.93 RU000A0JXE06 01/21/2032 OM
    4B02-04-32432-H-001P JSC “GTLK” 93,4100 934.1 0.93 RU000A0JXPG2 05.04.2032 OM
    4b02-05-32432-h JSC “GTLK” 97,9600 979.6 0.93 RU000A0JVWD9 10.10.2025 OM
    4b02-06-32432-h JSC “GTLK” 97.3000 973 0.93 RU000A0JVWJ6 10/17/2025 OM
    4b02-07-32432-h JSC “GTLK” 96,2600 962.6 0.93 RU000A0JW1P8 12/15/2025 OM
    4B02-07-32432-H-001P JSC “GTLK” 88,4300 884.3 0.93 RU000A0ZYNY4 12/30/2032 OM
    4b02-08-32432-h JSC “GTLK” 95,3900 953.9 0.93 RU000A0JWST1 31.08.2026 OM
    4B02-08-32432-H-001P JSC “GTLK” 87,0200 870.2 0.93 RU000A0ZYR91 01/17/2033 OM
    4B02-09-32432-H-001P JSC “GTLK” 94,7200 947.2 0.93 RU000A0ZZ1J8 03/17/2033 OM
    4B02-10-32432-H-001P JSC “GTLK” 95,2400 952.4 0.93 RU000A0ZZ984 05/19/2033 OM
    4b02-12-32432-H-001P JSC “GTLK” 87,8600 878.6 0.93 RU000A0ZZV11 03.11.2033 OM
    4B02-13-32432-H-001P JSC “GTLK” 86,3500 863.5 0.93 RU000A1003A4 01/19/2034 OM
    4b02-14-32432-H-001P JSC “GTLK” 90,1900 901.9 0.93 RU000A100FE5 05.24.2034 OM
    4b02-15-32432-H-001P JSC “GTLK” 95,7400 191.48 0.93 RU000A100Z91 10/20/2025 OM
    4B02-17-32432-H-001P JSC “GTLK” 89,4600 894.6 0.93 RU000A101QL5 05/11/2035 OM
    4B02-18-32432-H-001P JSC “GTLK” 81,9200 819.2 0.93 RU000A101SC0 05/22/2035 OM
    4B02-19-32432-H-001P JSC “GTLK” 78,3800 783.8 0.93 RU000A101SD8 05/22/2035 OM
    4b02-20-32432-H-001P JSC “GTLK” 93,9400 939.4 0.93 RU000A1038M5 05/27/2036 OM
    4-01-14045-a JSC “UEC” 91,4100 914.1 0.9 RU000A0JWK74 06.06.2026 DM
    4-01-03924-j JSC “PKT” 93,0800 930.8 0.93 RU000A0JW0S4 08.12.2025 OM
    4-02-03924-j JSC “PKT” 88,0900 880.9 0.93 RU000A0JW5E3 05.02.2026 OM
    4-03-03924-j JSC “PKT” 90.6400 906.4 0.93 RU000A0JWBP5 03/17/2026 OM
    4b02-01-16643-a-002p JSC “RUSSIAN POST” 89,1500 891.5 0.93 RU000A104V75 05/25/2032 DM
    4b02-02-00005-T JSC “RUSSIAN POST” 102,8100 1,028.1 0.93 RU000A0JWGV2 06/06/2026 DM
    4b02-02-00005-T-001p JSC “RUSSIAN POST” 96,9200 969.2 0.93 RU000A0JXRD5 07.05.2027 DM
    4b02-02-16643-a-002p JSC “RUSSIAN POST” 93,6900 936.9 0.93 RU000A104W17 07.06.2032 DM
    4b02-03-00005-T JSC “RUSSIAN POST” 102,6900 1,026.9 0.93 RU000A0JWTL6 09.09.2026 DM
    4b02-03-00005-T-001p JSC “RUSSIAN POST” 92,2900 922.9 0.93 RU000A0JXS59 05/18/2027 DM
    4b02-03-16643-a-002p JSC “RUSSIAN POST” 85,5100 855.1 0.93 RU000A104W33 07.06.2032 DM
    4b02-04-00005-T JSC “RUSSIAN POST” 103,1300 1,031.3 0.93 RU000A0JXMP0 03/19/2027 DM
    4b02-04-00005-T-001p JSC “RUSSIAN POST” 93,4400 934.4 0.93 RU000A0ZZ5H3 04/21/2028 DM
    4b02-04-16643-a-002p JSC “RUSSIAN POST” 84,6500 846.5 0.93 RU000A1055Y4 08.24.2032 DM
    4b02-05-00005-T-001p JSC “RUSSIAN POST” 93,8900 938.9 0.93 RU000A0ZZ5J9 04/21/2028 DM
    4b02-06-00005-T-001p JSC “RUSSIAN POST” 97,3700 973.7 0.93 RU000A100SZ3 08/22/2029 DM
    4b02-07-00005-T-001p JSC “RUSSIAN POST” 102.5000 1,025 0.93 RU000A1008Y3 03/26/2029 DM
    4b02-08-00005-T-001p JSC “RUSSIAN POST” 101,5100 1,015.1 0.93 RU000A100UT2 09/10/2029 DM
    4b02-10-16643-a-001p JSC “RUSSIAN POST” 103,1400 1,031.4 0.93 RU000A101ZH4 07/22/2030 DM
    4B02-02-55323-E-001P JSC “STM” 88,9500 889.5 0.9 RU000A103G00 07/21/2026 DM
    4B02-03-55323-E-001P JSC “STM” 95,6200 956.2 0.9 RU000A105M91 09.12.2027 DM
    4b02-04-00182-a-001p JSC ChTPZ 90.8800 908.8 0.9 RU000A0JXTT7 06/07/2027 DM
    4b02-01-00011-T-002p STATE COMPANY “RUSSIAN HIGHWAYS” 97,3200 652,044 0.93 RU000A100030 12/17/2025 OM
    4B02-01-00011-T-003P STATE COMPANY “RUSSIAN HIGHWAYS” 94,3100 811.066 0.93 RU000A102H91 08.12.2025 OM
    4b02-01-00011-T-004P STATE COMPANY “RUSSIAN HIGHWAYS” 90.0000 900 0.93 RU000A103NU9 09/07/2026 OM
    4B02-01-00011-T-005P STATE COMPANY “RUSSIAN HIGHWAYS” 92,6200 740.96 0.93 RU000A106FR4 06.24.2026 OM
    4B02-02-00011-T-003P STATE COMPANY “RUSSIAN HIGHWAYS” 89.3000 893 0.93 RU000A104XR2 06/30/2027 OM
    4B02-03-00011-T-003P STATE COMPANY “RUSSIAN HIGHWAYS” 94,2400 942.4 0.93 RU000A105V82 02/11/2026 OM
    4B02-03-00011-T-005P STATE COMPANY “RUSSIAN HIGHWAYS” 95,0800 950.8 0.93 RU000A106R53 08/11/2026 OM
    4b02-04-00011-T-004P STATE COMPANY “RUSSIAN HIGHWAYS” 92,3800 923.8 0.93 RU000A106C92 05/29/2028 OM
    4-23-00004-T STATE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION “VEB.RF” 100.0000 1,000 0.96 RU000A0JT403 09/17/2032 DM
    4-24-00004-T STATE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION “VEB.RF” 96.1000 961 0.96 RU000A0JT6B2 09/23/2032 DM
    4-26-00004-T STATE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION “VEB.RF” 103,1100 1,031.1 0.96 RU000A0JS4Z7 02/17/2032 DM
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    4b02-23-01669-a-001p PJSC AFK SISTEMA 91,1200 911.2 0.93 RU000A104693 11/20/2031 OM
    4b02-24-01669-a-001p PJSC AFK SISTEMA 94,1500 941.5 0.93 RU000A105L27 11/23/2032 OM
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    4b02-28-01669-a-001p PJSC AFK SISTEMA 84.4000 844 0.93 RU000A107SM6 09.02.2028 OM
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    4b02-01-65105-D-002p PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “SECOND GENERATING COMPANY OF THE WHOLESALE ELECTRICITY MARKET” 92,2100 922.1 0.96 RU000A101WR0 07.07.2026 OM
    4b02-01-00027-a-001p PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “VIMPEL-COMMUNICATIONS” 83,3700 833.7 0.93 RU000A105XE7 09/13/2028 OM
    4b02-02-00027-a-001p PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “VIMPEL-COMMUNICATIONS” 94,5800 945.8 0.93 RU000A105WC3 01/16/2026 OM
    4b02-03-00027-a-001p PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “VIMPEL-COMMUNICATIONS” 83,1600 831.6 0.93 RU000A105YK2 04/16/2027 OM
    4b02-04-00027-a-001p PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “VIMPEL-COMMUNICATIONS” 82,8700 828.7 0.93 RU000A105WK6 04/14/2028 OM
    4b02-05-00027-a-001p PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “VIMPEL-COMMUNICATIONS” 86,5500 865.5 0.93 RU000A105W81 02/12/2027 OM
    4b02-06-00027-a-001p PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “VIMPEL-COMMUNICATIONS” 87,1600 871.6 0.93 RU000A105TY3 02/11/2028 OM
    4b02-07-00027-a-001p PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “VIMPEL-COMMUNICATIONS” 83,8400 838.4 0.93 RU000A105WP5 09.02.2029 OM
    4b02-08-00027-a-001p PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “VIMPEL-COMMUNICATIONS” 77,8800 778.8 0.93 RU000A105x80 03.03.2029 OM
    4B02-06-55234-E-001P PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “LSR GROUP” 90,7500 363 0.9 RU000A102T63 02.20.2026 DM
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    4B02-08-55234-E-001P PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “LSR GROUP” 93,3400 933.4 0.9 RU000A106888 05/12/2026 DM
    4B02-09-55234-E-001P PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “LSR GROUP” 93,5800 935.8 0.9 RU000A1082x0 05.03.2027 DM
    4b02-01-10797-a-002p PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “CHERKIZOVO GROUP” 106,3577 11 626.7046909 0.88 RU000A10B4V0 03/12/2027 OM
    4b02-04-10797-a-001p PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “CHERKIZOVO GROUP” 90.9100 909.1 0.93 RU000A102LD1 12/18/2025 OM
    4b02-05-10797-a-001p PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “CHERKIZOVO GROUP” 97.1000 971 0.93 RU000A105C28 10/22/2025 OM
    4b02-07-10797-a-001p PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “CHERKIZOVO GROUP” 97,5500 975.5 0.93 RU000A1094F2 07/14/2027 OM
    4b02-08-10797-a-001p PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “CHERKIZOVO GROUP” 100.9100 1,009.1 0.93 RU000A10B420 09.09.2026 OM
    4-09-55010-D PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “KAMAZ” 81,3300 813.3 0.93 RU000A0ZZ885 06/06/2033 DM
    4-10-55010-D PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “KAMAZ” 81,6700 816.7 0.93 RU000A0ZZ877 06/06/2033 DM
    4-11-55010-D PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “KAMAZ” 87,4800 874.8 0.93 RU000A0ZZ893 06/06/2033 DM
    4B02-10-55010-D-001P PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “KAMAZ” 100.2100 1,002.1 0.93 RU000A104ZC9 07/17/2025 OM
    4B02-11-55010-D-001P PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “KAMAZ” 97,0900 970.9 0.93 RU000A107MM9 01/20/2026 OM
    4b02-12-55010-D-001P PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “KAMAZ” 94,8200 948.2 0.93 RU000A109JW0 09/13/2027 OM
    4B02-13-55010-D-001P PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “KAMAZ” 99,5900 995.9 0.93 RU000A109VM6 10/14/2026 OM
    4b02-03-16419-a-001p PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “LEASING COMPANY “EUROPLAN” 103,1100 1,031.1 0.93 RU000A103KJ8 07.08.2031 OM
    4B02-03-56453-P PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “LEASING COMPANY “EUROPLAN” 103,7200 1,037.2 0.93 RU000A100W60 09/19/2029 OM
    4b02-05-16419-a-001p PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “LEASING COMPANY “EUROPLAN” 98,6600 246.65 0.93 RU000A105518 08/26/2025 OM
    4B02-05-56453-P PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “LEASING COMPANY “EUROPLAN” 100.8300 1,008.3 0.93 RU000A1004K1 02/13/2029 OM
    4B02-06-56453-P PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “LEASING COMPANY “EUROPLAN” 105,7700 423.08 0.93 RU000A100DG5 05/17/2027 OM
    4B02-07-56453-P PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “LEASING COMPANY “EUROPLAN” 103,6600 1,036.6 0.93 RU000A0JWVL2 09/28/2026 OM
    4B02-08-56453-P PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “LEASING COMPANY “EUROPLAN” 99,7100 997.1 0.93 RU000A0ZZBC2 06/19/2028 OM
    4b02-01-04715-a-002p PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “MOBILE TELESYSTEMS” 94,8700 948.7 0.96 RU000A1075E4 10/25/2027 OM
    4B02-02-04715-A PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “MOBILE TELESYSTEMS” 91,4200 914.2 0.96 RU000A0JWRV9 08/14/2031 OM
    4b02-02-04715-a-002p PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “MOBILE TELESYSTEMS” 95,2100 952.1 0.96 RU000A1078S8 11/14/2028 OM
    4b02-04-04715-a-002p PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “MOBILE TELESYSTEMS” 95,3200 953.2 0.96 RU000A1083U4 09/22/2027 OM
    4b02-05-04715-a-002p PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “MOBILE TELESYSTEMS” 95,6700 956.7 0.96 RU000A1083W0 09/22/2027 OM
    4b02-06-04715-a-002p PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “MOBILE TELESYSTEMS” 94,4300 944.3 0.96 RU000a109312 07/19/2028 OM
    4b02-14-04715-a-001p PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “MOBILE TELESYSTEMS” 86,4500 864.5 0.96 RU000A101FH6 02/10/2027 OM
    4b02-15-04715-a-001p PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “MOBILE TELESYSTEMS” 87,0800 870.8 0.96 RU000A101NG2 03.11.2026 OM
    4b02-20-04715-a-001p PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “MOBILE TELESYSTEMS” 95,2200 952.2 0.96 RU000A104SU6 04/30/2026 OM
    4b02-21-04715-a-001p PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “MOBILE TELESYSTEMS” 93,1700 931.7 0.96 RU000A104WJ1 06/19/2026 OM
    4b02-27-04715-a-001p PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “MOBILE TELESYSTEMS” 101,2500 1,012.5 0.96 RU000A109SK6 04/10/2026 OM
    4b02-01-00221-a-001p PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “OIL AND GAS COMPANY “SLAVNEFT” 101,5300 1,015.3 0.93 RU000A101T64 03/03/2030 OM
    4b02-02-00221-a-001p PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “OIL AND GAS COMPANY “SLAVNEFT” 91,7500 917.5 0.93 RU000A1007H0 03/14/2029 OM
    4b02-04-00221-a-002p PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “OIL AND GAS COMPANY “SLAVNEFT” 100.4300 1,004.3 0.93 RU000A104WF9 06/10/2032 OM
    4b02-05-00221-a-002p PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “OIL AND GAS COMPANY “SLAVNEFT” 96,5300 965.3 0.93 RU000A108ZH9 12.05.2034 OM
    4-17-00077-a PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “OIL COMPANY “LUKOIL” 99,2735 78 428,844658 0.91 RU000A1059N9 10/30/2026 OM
    4-18-00077-a PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “OIL COMPANY “LUKOIL” 95,2498 75 250.0089944 0.91 RU000A1059P4 04/23/2027 OM
    4-19-00077-a PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “OIL COMPANY “LUKOIL” 87.6755 69 266.099914 0.91 RU000A1059Q2 03/03/2030 OM
    4-20-00077-a PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “OIL COMPANY “LUKOIL” 86.4063 68 263,3963764 0.91 RU000A1059R0 10.24.2031 OM
    4b02-01-00268-E-001p PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “NOVATEK” 93,3400 933.4 0.96 RU000A106938 05/18/2026 OM
    4b02-02-00268-E-001p PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “NOVATEK” 100.6702 7 953,22767656 0.91 RU000A108G70 05/15/2029 OM
    4b02-03-00268-E-001p PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “NOVATEK” 108,2880 8 555,0552064 0.91 RU000A10AUX8 02/25/2028 OM
    4b02-04-0156-a-001p PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “PIK-SPECIALIZED DEVELOPER” 104,3700 1,043.7 0.93 RU000A0ZZ1M2 03/23/2028 DM
    4b02-05-65116-D-001p PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “ROSSETI MOSCOW REGION” 99,7700 997.7 0.96 RU000A107DP1 11/27/2026 OM
    4b02-06-65116-D-001p PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “ROSSETI MOSCOW REGION” 98,9900 989.9 0.96 RU000A108P61 05/28/2027 OM
    4b02-07-65116-D-001p PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “ROSSETI MOSCOW REGION” 99,5700 995.7 0.96 RU000A109S91 09/30/2026 OM
    4b02-08-65116-D-001p PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “ROSSETI MOSCOW REGION” 102,3100 1,023.1 0.96 RU000A10AFW1 11.12.2026 OM
    4b02-01-00124-a-001p PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “ROSTELECOM” 102,0300 1,020.3 0.93 RU000A0JWTN2 09.09.2026 OM
    4b02-01-00124-a-002p PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “ROSTELECOM” 94,9400 949.4 0.93 RU000A101541 11/26/2025 OM
    4b02-02-00124-a-001p PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “ROSTELECOM” 104,2100 1,042.1 0.93 RU000A0JXPN8 04/13/2027 OM
    4b02-03-00124-a-001p PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “ROSTELECOM” 96,2900 962.9 0.93 RU000A0ZYG52 08.11.2027 OM
    4b02-03-00124-a-002p PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “ROSTELECOM” 85,8200 858.2 0.93 RU000A101FG8 02.02.2027 OM
    4b02-04-00124-a-001p PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “ROSTELECOM” 101,9300 1,019.3 0.93 RU000a0zye3 02.03.2028 OM
    4b02-05-00124-a-001p PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “ROSTELECOM” 96,7900 967.9 0.93 RU000A100881 03/20/2029 OM
    4b02-06-00124-a-001p PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “ROSTELECOM” 97.9000 979 0.93 RU000A105LC6 04/04/2025 OM
    4b02-06-00124-a-002p PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “ROSTELECOM” 90.0500 900.5 0.93 RU000A103EZ7 07/16/2026 OM
    4b02-07-00124-a-001p PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “ROSTELECOM” 98,3800 983.8 0.93 RU000A108GR8 05/19/2027 OM
    4b02-07-00124-a-002p PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “ROSTELECOM” 95,4200 954.2 0.93 RU000A104TD0 05.05.2026 OM
    4b02-08-00124-a-001p PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “ROSTELECOM” 97,7800 977.8 0.93 RU000A108LF3 09/01/2027 OM
    4b02-09-00124-a-001p PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “ROSTELECOM” 98,2200 982.2 0.93 RU000A1095W4 03/03/2027 OM
    4b02-09-00124-a-002p PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “ROSTELECOM” 94,1500 941.5 0.93 RU000A1051E5 01/28/2026 OM
    4b02-10-00124-a-001p PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “ROSTELECOM” 102,5300 1,025.3 0.93 RU000a109916 08/13/2026 OM
    4b02-10-00124-a-002p PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “ROSTELECOM” 94.4000 944 0.93 RU000A105UU9 02/10/2026 OM
    4b02-11-00124-a-001p PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “ROSTELECOM” 98,9900 989.9 0.93 RU000A109JS8 09/10/2027 OM
    4b02-12-00124-a-001p PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “ROSTELECOM” 99,8700 998.7 0.93 RU000A109X29 04/20/2026 OM
    4b02-13-00124-a-001p PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “ROSTELECOM” 102,6600 1,026.6 0.93 RU000A10A3R1 11/13/2025 OM
    4b02-13-00124-a-002p PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “ROSTELECOM” 96,8800 968.8 0.93 RU000a107910 02/19/2026 OM
    4b02-14-00124-a-001p PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “ROSTELECOM” 103,9600 1,039.6 0.93 RU000A10ASS2 05/28/2026 OM
    4b02-14-00124-a-002p PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “ROSTELECOM” 97,6700 976.7 0.93 RU000A1085D5 31.03.2026 OM
    4b02-15-00124-a-001p PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “ROSTELECOM” 103,9900 1,039.9 0.93 RU000A10B214 01.03.2027 OM
    4b02-06-00143-a PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “SEVERSTAL” 94,0200 940.2 0.96 RU000A1008W7 03/26/2029 OM
    4-02-10613-a PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “MODERN COMMERCIAL FLEET” 92,6521 73 197.7532588 0.91 RU000A105A87 04/25/2028 DM
    4b02-01-10613-a-001p PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “MODERN COMMERCIAL FLEET” 99,6369 10 892,0069973 0.91 RU000A1060Q0 03/23/2026 DM
    4-02-06556-a PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “PHOSAGRO” 90,1122 71 191,1611416 0.91 RU000A106G56 09/15/2028 OM
    4b02-01-0656-a-001p PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “PHOSAGRO” 93,6700 936.7 0.96 RU000A106516 04/16/2026 OM
    4b02-01-0656-a-002p PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “PHOSAGRO” 100.5800 1,005.8 0.96 RU000A10A4S7 26.10.2029 OM
    4b02-02-0656-a-001p PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “PHOSAGRO” 99,9851 10 930.0711767 0.91 RU000A1063Z5 08.04.2026 OM
    4b02-03-0656-a-001p PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “PHOSAGRO” 100.8713 7,969.11513964 0.91 RU000A108LP2 05/30/2029 OM
    4b02-04-0656-a-001p PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “PHOSAGRO” 99,9500 999.5 0.96 RU000A109K40 09/07/2026 OM
    4b02-01-00122-a-001p PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “OIL COMPANY “ROSNEFT” 102.9000 1 029 0.96 RU000A0JX132 11/24/2026 OM
    4b02-01-00122-a-002p PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “OIL COMPANY “ROSNEFT” 101.1000 1 011 0.96 RU000A0ZYJH7 11/23/2027 OM
    4B02-01-00122-A-003P PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “OIL COMPANY “ROSNEFT” 101.4000 1 014 0.96 RU000A102EF1 11/13/2030 OM
    4B02-01-00122-A-004P PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “OIL COMPANY “ROSNEFT” 99.667 10 895,2646439 0.91 RU000A1083N9 03/14/2034 OM
    4b02-02-00122-a-001p PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “OIL COMPANY “ROSNEFT” 100,1600 1,001.6 0.96 RU000A0JX355 10.12.2026 OM
    4b02-02-00122-a-002p PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “OIL COMPANY “ROSNEFT” 101.1000 1 011 0.96 RU000a0zyjj3 11/23/2027 OM
    4B02-02-00122-A-003P PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “OIL COMPANY “ROSNEFT” 101.4000 1 014 0.96 RU000A102EE4 11/13/2030 OM
    4B02-02-00122-A-004P PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “OIL COMPANY “ROSNEFT” 99,5167 10 878,8670939 0.91 RU000A109DY9 08/21/2034 OM
    4b02-03-00122-a-002p PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “OIL COMPANY “ROSNEFT” 96.2000 962 0.96 RU000A0ZYLG5 08.12.2027 OM
    4B02-03-00122-A-004P PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “OIL COMPANY “ROSNEFT” 96.4000 964 0.96 RU000A10A125 10/27/2034 OM
    4b02-04-00122-a-001p PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “OIL COMPANY “ROSNEFT” 89,3700 893.7 0.96 RU000A0JXQK2 04/21/2027 OM
    4b02-04-00122-a-002p PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “OIL COMPANY “ROSNEFT” 97,7200 977.2 0.96 RU000A0ZyT40 02.02.2028 OM
    4b02-05-00122-a-002p PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “OIL COMPANY “ROSNEFT” 85,3500 853.5 0.96 RU000A0ZYVU5 02/17/2028 OM
    4b02-06-00122-a-001p PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “OIL COMPANY “ROSNEFT” 100.1000 1 001 0.96 RU000A0JXSD3 07/13/2027 OM
    4b02-06-00122-a-002p PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “OIL COMPANY “ROSNEFT” 85.1000 851 0.96 RU000A1008P1 03/22/2029 OM
    4b02-07-00122-a-001p PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “OIL COMPANY “ROSNEFT” 99.9000 999 0.96 RU000A0JXXE1 07/13/2027 OM
    4b02-08-00122-a-001p PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “OIL COMPANY “ROSNEFT” 100.0000 1,000 0.96 RU000A0ZYCP5 09/29/2027 OM
    4b02-08-00122-a-002p PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “OIL COMPANY “ROSNEFT” 86.1000 861 0.96 RU000A100KY3 06/29/2029 OM
    4b02-09-00122-a-002p PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “OIL COMPANY “ROSNEFT” 86,3100 863.1 0.96 RU000A100YQ0 10.10.2029 OM
    4b02-10-00122-a-002p PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “OIL COMPANY “ROSNEFT” 98,3700 983.7 0.96 RU000A101SF3 05/28/2030 OM
    4b02-11-00122-a-002p PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “OIL COMPANY “ROSNEFT” 98,5874 77 886.8064472 0.91 RU000A103FC3 07/10/2031 OM
    4b02-12-00122-a-002p PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “OIL COMPANY “ROSNEFT” 102,0592 11 156.8055664 0.91 RU000A1057S2 06.09.2032 OM
    4b02-13-00122-a-002p PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “OIL COMPANY “ROSNEFT” 101,9650 11 146.507905 0.91 RU000A105ZC6 04.03.2033 OM
    4b02-01-00008-T-001p FSUE “ROSMORPORT” 94,5100 236,275 0.96 RU000A1029A9 10/14/2025 DM

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Khorgos checkpoint witnesses revival of cooperation between China and Kazakhstan

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    URUMQI, June 16 (Xinhua) — Located in northwest China’s Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region and close to the border with Kazakhstan, Horgos Port is the country’s first-class land port with the longest history and the largest total shipping volume in the western region.

    In recent years, it has become an important window for exchanges and cooperation between the two countries.

    According to data as of June 13, since the beginning of 2025, the total volume of passenger traffic through the Khorgos checkpoint and the number of vehicles that have passed customs and border checks in both directions at this border crossing amounted to 620 thousand person-times and 223 thousand units, respectively, which is 35.3 percent and 40.6 percent more in annual terms for both indicators.

    As of June 12 this year, a total of 4,476 China-Europe/China-Central Asia freight trains have passed through the Khorgos checkpoint since the beginning of 2025, up 26.7 percent year-on-year, according to data from the checkpoint administration.

    Let us recall that, as of now, more than 80 international railway freight routes pass through Khorgos, connecting 18 countries.

    On June 7, the first international China-Central Asia tourist train returned to Xi’an. The train with more than 200 passengers departed from Xi’an to Almaty, Kazakhstan on May 29. It left China through the Khorgos railway checkpoint.

    Let us recall that in May 2023, China and Kazakhstan signed an intergovernmental agreement on mutual exemption from visa requirements, which officially entered into force in November of the same year. 2024 was the Year of Kazakhstan Tourism in China, and 2025 has been declared the Year of China Tourism in Kazakhstan.

    According to Li Jiang, deputy head of Horgos Customs, the launch of the above-mentioned international tourist train has laid a new foundation for deepening connectivity and promoting people-to-people exchanges between China and Central Asian countries.

    In addition, according to the results of the first five months of 2025, the flow of visitors to the China-Kazakhstan International Center for Boundary Cooperation (ICBC) “Khorgos” increased by 87.2 percent year-on-year to 3.893 million person-times.

    At present, there are 3 companies engaged in cross-border e-commerce and more than 20 streaming studios operating in Khorgos ICBC. To date, the total turnover through streaming in Khorgos ICBC has exceeded 100 million yuan.

    Khorgos checkpoint continues to upgrade infrastructure, optimize inspection procedures, and improve clearance efficiency to better serve the cross-border trade and humanitarian exchanges between China and Kazakhstan. -0-

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Xi Jinping Deepens China’s Fruitful Partnership with Central Asia

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    BEIJING, June 15 (Xinhua) — In the summer sun-drenched Xi’an, China’s ancient capital, six pomegranate trees stand gracefully near the site of the first China-Central Asia Summit in May 2023, their branches hanging low and laden with fruit.

    Planted two years ago by Chinese President Xi Jinping and the leaders of five Central Asian countries, this living avenue serves as a vivid testimony to the increasingly close and dynamic ties between China and Central Asia.

    Building on past achievements, Xi and his Central Asian counterparts will gather in the Kazakh city of Astana later this month for a second summit to ensure even closer cooperation on trade, security and connectivity in the heart of Eurasia.

    The Xi’an summit in 2023 was the first ever meeting of heads of state under the China-Central Asia cooperation mechanism. In the embrace of the ancient city, they agreed to hold the summit every two years, alternately in China and Central Asia.

    Last year, the mechanism was further institutionalized with the establishment of a secretariat in Xi’an, the capital of Xi’s home province of Shaanxi.

    The Chinese leader attaches great importance to China’s relations with the region. In his opinion, Central Asia is at a strategic crossroads, linking East and West, North and South.

    “Developing friendly and cooperative relations with Central Asian countries is a priority of China’s foreign policy,” Xi Jinping said during his first visit to Central Asia since being elected as China’s president in 2013.

    Since then, he has visited the region eight times, deepening partnerships bilaterally and through platforms such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia.

    Today, Central Asia is the only region in the world where every country is a strategic partner of China. According to Xi Jinping, these partnerships have paved a new path of good-neighborliness and mutually beneficial cooperation, creating a new paradigm of international relations.

    The main event of the Xi’an summit was the signing of the Xi’an Declaration, in which the Chinese president and the leaders of the five Central Asian countries promised to work together to build a closer China-Central Asia community with a shared future.

    This promise is in line with the core idea of Xiplomacy’s diplomatic strategy: creating a community with a shared destiny for humanity. Notably, this idea has already been fully realized at the bilateral level in Central Asia.

    Sheradil Baktygulov, Director of the Institute of World Politics of Kyrgyzstan, noted that the common political will of Xi Jinping and the leaders of Central Asian countries is the key to the sustainable development of Chinese-Central Asian cooperation.

    “This cooperation not only strengthens bilateral ties, but also lays the foundation for a new model of multilateral cooperation in the Eurasian region,” he added.

    The Chinese leader’s strong personal rapport with Central Asian leaders is helping to strengthen these ties. At the Xi’an summit, Xi Jinping hailed Tajik President Emomali Rahmon as an “old friend.” During talks with Xi, Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev called him his “dear brother.”

    Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, also an experienced sinologist, arrived in Xi’an on his 70th birthday. Xi told him: “Your visit on such a special occasion speaks volumes about the strength of our bilateral relations and confirms your unique bond with China.”

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Xi Jinping Deepens China’s Fruitful Partnership with Central Asia

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    BEIJING, June 15 (Xinhua) — In the summer sun-drenched Xi’an, China’s ancient capital, six pomegranate trees stand gracefully near the site of the first China-Central Asia Summit in May 2023, their branches hanging low and laden with fruit.

    Planted two years ago by Chinese President Xi Jinping and the leaders of five Central Asian countries, this living avenue serves as a vivid testimony to the increasingly close and dynamic ties between China and Central Asia.

    Building on past achievements, Xi and his Central Asian counterparts will gather in the Kazakh city of Astana later this month for a second summit to ensure even closer cooperation on trade, security and connectivity in the heart of Eurasia.

    The Xi’an summit in 2023 was the first ever meeting of heads of state under the China-Central Asia cooperation mechanism. In the embrace of the ancient city, they agreed to hold the summit every two years, alternately in China and Central Asia.

    Last year, the mechanism was further institutionalized with the establishment of a secretariat in Xi’an, the capital of Xi’s home province of Shaanxi.

    The Chinese leader attaches great importance to China’s relations with the region. In his opinion, Central Asia is at a strategic crossroads, linking East and West, North and South.

    “Developing friendly and cooperative relations with Central Asian countries is a priority of China’s foreign policy,” Xi Jinping said during his first visit to Central Asia since being elected as China’s president in 2013.

    Since then, he has visited the region eight times, deepening partnerships bilaterally and through platforms such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia.

    Today, Central Asia is the only region in the world where every country is a strategic partner of China. According to Xi Jinping, these partnerships have paved a new path of good-neighborliness and mutually beneficial cooperation, creating a new paradigm of international relations.

    The main event of the Xi’an summit was the signing of the Xi’an Declaration, in which the Chinese president and the leaders of the five Central Asian countries promised to work together to build a closer China-Central Asia community with a shared future.

    This promise is in line with the core idea of Xiplomacy’s diplomatic strategy: creating a community with a shared destiny for humanity. Notably, this idea has already been fully realized at the bilateral level in Central Asia.

    Sheradil Baktygulov, Director of the Institute of World Politics of Kyrgyzstan, noted that the common political will of Xi Jinping and the leaders of Central Asian countries is the key to the sustainable development of Chinese-Central Asian cooperation.

    “This cooperation not only strengthens bilateral ties, but also lays the foundation for a new model of multilateral cooperation in the Eurasian region,” he added.

    The Chinese leader’s strong personal rapport with Central Asian leaders is helping to strengthen these ties. At the Xi’an summit, Xi Jinping hailed Tajik President Emomali Rahmon as an “old friend.” During talks with Xi, Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev called him his “dear brother.”

    Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, also an experienced sinologist, arrived in Xi’an on his 70th birthday. Xi told him: “Your visit on such a special occasion speaks volumes about the strength of our bilateral relations and confirms your unique bond with China.”

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Xi Jinping on China’s diplomatic relations with neighboring countries (1)

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    Russians. Ori.org.KN | 16. 06. 2025

    Keywords:

    Source: russian.china.org.cn

    Xi Jinping on China’s diplomatic relations with neighboring countries (1) Adhering to the concept of “goodwill, sincerity, mutual benefit and inclusiveness” and the foreign policy of building good-neighborly relations with neighboring countries, we continuously deepen friendship, mutual trust and integration of interests with our neighbors.

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Xi Jinping on China’s diplomatic relations with neighboring countries (1)

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    Russians. Ori.org.KN | 16. 06. 2025

    Keywords:

    Source: russian.china.org.cn

    Xi Jinping on China’s diplomatic relations with neighboring countries (1) Adhering to the concept of “goodwill, sincerity, mutual benefit and inclusiveness” and the foreign policy of building good-neighborly relations with neighboring countries, we continuously deepen friendship, mutual trust and integration of interests with our neighbors.

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Moscow Seasons in Beijing

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    Following the successful holding of the “Chinese New Year Celebration in Moscow” in February this year, a return cultural festival, “Moscow Seasons in Beijing”, was held in Beijing from June 12 to 15. This comprehensive event, organized by the Moscow Government with the active support of the People’s Government of Beijing, became one of the key projects implemented within the framework of the cross-cultural Years of China and Russia, and also dedicated to the 30th anniversary of the establishment of sister city relations between Beijing and Moscow.

    This festival demonstrated the deepening of cultural and diplomatic relations between China and Russia and contributed to further strengthening mutual understanding and friendship.

    “Moscow Seasons in Beijing” opened with great fanfare on June 12, the official date of Russia Day. Following the traditions of the famous Moscow fairs, Moscow proudly presented its rich culture and charm in the sister city, and every day, multi-format events revealed different facets of the Russian capital.

    On June 13, a plenary session on the theme “Cities of the Future. Synergy of the Strategic Partnership between Moscow and Beijing” was held at the Grand Hyatt Hotel in Beijing as part of the business part of the festival program. The session was dedicated to issues of tourism, culture, transport, innovation and industrial development.

    The twinning relationship between Beijing and Moscow has been going on for 30 years. In 2024, Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin and Beijing Mayor Yin Yong signed the Cooperation Program between the Moscow Government and the Beijing People’s Government for 2024-2026. China is currently one of the most promising tourist markets for Moscow. In 2024, tourists from China took first place in the number of visits to Moscow among representatives of non-CIS countries, exceeding the mark of 420 thousand people. A quarter of them made business trips. About 40% of tourists plan to visit Moscow again with their families.

    The festival format, first tested in Moscow and now “transferred” to Beijing, has become a bridge for cultural exchanges between residents of the two capitals, effectively strengthening mutual understanding and awakening enthusiasm and aspiration for the development of mutual tourism and cultural ties.

    Text and photos: Tao Lijiao

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Scientists from NSU and VolGTU have created a digital assistant for the developer of elastomers

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: Novosibirsk State University – Novosibirsk State University –

    A group of scientists from the Volgograd State Technical University (VolGTU) headed by Doctor of Engineering Sciences, Professor Viktor Kablov, as part of the implementation of the program of the Competence Center “Technologies for Modeling and Development of New Functional Materials with Specified Properties” (CNFM) based at the Novosibirsk State University, carried out with the financial support of the NTI Foundation, created a database with artificial intelligence modules, which presents more than 5,000 elastomer formulations. At the moment, this is the largest materials science database of elastomeric materials in Russia. A program has also been developed for calculating the thermophysical properties of polymer composite materials and simulating the behavior of fire- and heat-protective materials. All three tools will become a digital assistant for the developer of elastomers, and will significantly speed up the process of creating new materials for many industries. The work is part of the project “Computer materials science of multicomponent nanostructured elastomeric materials with specified properties for extreme operating conditions” and is included in the above-mentioned NSU Center for Scientific and Materials Science Development Program.

    Digital (computer) materials science is a modern field of science and technology that deals with the development and optimization of new materials from the atomic level to the level of the finished product, using digital technologies, modeling methods and virtual testing throughout the entire life cycle. Computer materials science methods allow accelerating the process of creating materials with specified properties several times, while it is possible to predict the structure of materials, regulate their properties, optimize technological processes, design new, unique, not yet existing materials and composites.

    The project “Computer Materials Science of Multicomponent Nanostructured Elastomeric Materials with Specified Properties for Extreme Operating Conditions” includes two stages: development of new-generation software and information support using AI methods to solve problems of computer materials science of elastomeric materials; and development of new elastomeric materials using the created software, manufacturing technology, creation of technical documentation and release of pilot batches of materials. Work on the first stage, which began in 2024, has now been completed – a software and hardware complex has been created, consisting of three tools – a database, a program for calculating the thermophysical properties of polymeric materials and a module for simulating the behavior of materials under extreme loads.

    The work on the project is being carried out by a large group of specialists – specialists from other universities and industrial enterprises are also involved in the work. The work is being coordinated by the NTI Center for New Functional Materials, headed by the Director of the Center, Alexander Kvashnin.

    Elastomers (rubber) are polymeric materials with high elasticity. Currently, they are used in almost any technology – aviation, automobile, shipbuilding, oil and other industries. At the same time, the range of use is constantly expanding, as evidenced by an example from the automobile industry: if in the 50s there were 28 rubber parts in a car, now there are more than 500. Along with the expansion of the range of application of elastomers, the requirements for them are constantly increasing and the conditions of their operation are becoming more stringent, when the materials work near the limits of performance or in the mode of thermal and chemical destruction, severe mechanical, frictional loads, under dynamic loading, etc.

    — Elastomers are complex multicomponent materials in structure, each of them includes up to 20 components that are in a complex physical and chemical interaction. It takes at least 6 months and about 1 million rubles to develop one recipe for a new material. There are about 10,000 different recipes in the field of rubber products alone, and hundreds of new materials are constantly being developed, new ingredients appear. At the same time, the efficiency of many materials is often far from the necessary requirements due to low elaboration. Currently, materials are created mainly by empirical methods, the number of experiments conducted during the development of some materials can exceed 10 thousand. In the context of the rapid development of many industries, this approach is ineffective — conducting experiments has become tens of times more expensive, and the development time with an empirical approach is unacceptably long. Thus, we are faced with two problems that need to be solved. The first is informational, when we need to quickly find the right material. The second is technological, when we need to speed up the process of creating new materials, predict their properties with greater accuracy and model their behavior under the influence of various external factors. Our project is aimed at solving these two problems, – comments Viktor Kablov, Doctor of Technical Sciences, Professor of the Volgograd State Technical University.

    The creation of a data bank is the core of the development of Volgograd State Technical University and NSU. At the moment, it already contains more than 5,000 elastomer recipes, and the database continues to expand. When including a recipe in the database, specialists carry out verification – check, clarify the recipes and evaluate their quality. The database reflects both the ingredients (composition) and the properties of elastomers, technological modes. Based on this data, a reference book is formed in which materials are grouped and classified, which facilitates searching and working with the database.

    The data bank is equipped with machine learning and fuzzy search modules (based on artificial intelligence technologies), which allow finding patterns in compositions, provide the dependence “composition-property” and support the automated design block of the material. Such intelligent data analysis makes it possible to predict the properties of a new material with high accuracy (more than 90%) based on information about its composition.

    — Our task is to ensure that the bank answers not only the question of what material, but also the question of how to make it. As a result, such banks become digital machines in the hands of technologists. In my practice, there were cases when consortiums of experienced technologists could not solve the problem of developing a new material. We “pulled” existing solutions from the data bank and found a way out of the situation. Thus, the data bank becomes one of the important elements of computer materials science, — says Viktor Kablov.

    In the absence of a recipe with specified properties, the process of creating (“designing”) a new recipe is supposed to be carried out using an interactive program for creating recipes for elastomer materials, which uses a database of the properties of the components included in the composition. Since a large number of components are used in the formulation of elastomer materials, the program must select the best combination of components in the composition (search through a large number of options (more than one hundred thousand) and select the optimal one, which significantly simplifies and speeds up the process of creating a new composition.

    The next important component of computer materials science is a program for calculating the thermophysical properties of polymer composite materials by chemical formula (up to 16 properties are calculated). It is used to evaluate the properties of the components used. The program contains a fairly large database of thermophysical characteristics of the components included in the material. In the absence of reference data, these characteristics can be calculated using a program for predicting characteristics by chemical formula.

    — Such properties as heat capacity, thermal conductivity, temperature, density can be calculated experimentally. That is, take a certain material and conduct tests, but this requires expensive equipment and significant time resources. In modern conditions, it would be more effective if, knowing the composition, we could automate the process of calculating thermal physical properties. In my opinion, we have solved this problem quite successfully: we enter the composition into the program, and within a few seconds it calculates four main parameters — heat capacity, thermal conductivity, temperature and density, — explains Viktor Koblov.

    Another tool that scientists are currently working on is a multifactor simulation modeling based on mathematical models that describe the heating of a material with physical and chemical transformations throughout the entire volume of the material. This program uses complex multifactor models that allow for a fairly reliable calculation of the required thickness of the heat-protective coating without resorting to very expensive experiments using installations with full-scale jet engines.

    — Studying the behavior of a material, for example, fire- or heat-protective, which operates in very difficult, extreme conditions, is an extremely expensive undertaking, and the equipment — stands for conducting such tests — are not always available. We have developed a program that allows us to calculate and predict the behavior of a material in certain conditions. By entering 18 parameters that reflect the properties of the material and various factors of influence (temperature, time), we calculate the required thickness of the heat-protective coating. Moreover, it should be taken into account that this is a polymer material that swells, decomposes and absorbs heat during heating. These are the so-called “smart” materials that adapt to external influences and, as a result of a chain of chemical transformations under conditions of, for example, high temperatures, these influences are leveled. Thus, heat is spent on chemical reactions that absorb heat, and as a result, the temperature on the unheated side does not increase. This mechanism is similar to how living organisms work, — says Viktor Kablov.

    NSU plans to commercialize this development, offering partners two options for cooperation: either purchase a license for access to the database and software product, or use the service as part of a subscription service – technical support for the partner’s developments. The technology for designing new elastomers has already attracted interest from companies representing the oil refining, tire manufacturing and rubber industries.

    VolGTU and NSU are also working in parallel on the second stage, that is, the creation of elastomers, polymeric materials that work in extreme operating conditions – at high temperatures, pressure, in complex environments. Such materials are used in various fields, including oil production, petrochemistry, engine building, space technology, etc.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI China: Xi’s upcoming visit to advance China-Central Asia community with shared future

    Source: China State Council Information Office

    For centuries, China and Central Asian nations have shared close bonds through mutual learning and exchanges underpinned by deep historical ties, solid public support and strong practical needs.

    Two years ago, the inaugural China-Central Asia Summit was held in Xi’an, capital of northwest China’s Shaanxi Province. Since then, cooperation between China and Central Asian countries has yielded even more tangible and fruitful outcomes.

    At the invitation of Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, Chinese President Xi Jinping will attend the second China-Central Asia Summit in Astana, capital of Kazakhstan, from June 16 to 18. The summit is expected to take the six countries on a new journey toward building a closer China-Central Asia community with a shared future.

    A drone photo taken on April 20, 2025 shows a China-Central Asia freight train waiting for departure at the Tuanjiecun Station in southwest China’s Chongqing. (Xinhua/Tang Yi)

    GROWING PARTNERSHIP

    More than 2,100 years ago, Han Dynasty envoy Zhang Qian’s journey to western regions ushered in China-Central Asia friendly exchanges. The legacy of the ancient Silk Road has evolved and acquired more profound significance nowadays.

    Xi first proposed in Kazakhstan in 2013 the initiative to jointly build the Silk Road Economic Belt, an essential component of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

    With the launch of the China-Central Asia mechanism and the regular China-Central Asia Foreign Ministers’ Meeting mechanism in 2020, collaboration has deepened across sectors.

    In January 2022, Xi chaired a virtual summit to commemorate the 30th anniversary of diplomatic relations between China and Central Asian countries. During the summit, the parties proposed upgrading the China-Central Asia mechanism to the level of heads of state.

    Moreover, the decision to establish a mechanism for meetings among the heads of state of China and Central Asian countries was announced at the first China-Central Asia Summit held in May 2023.

    Deepening China-Central Asia cooperation is in line with the prevailing trend of the world and the expectations of the people, said Xi when addressing a welcome banquet for Central Asian leaders attending the first summit held in Xi’an, capital of Shaanxi province.

    With the upgrading of the all-around and multifaceted framework, efficient ministerial mechanisms now support cooperation in trade, investment, agriculture, customs, public security and more.

    Today, China has established comprehensive strategic partnerships, signed Belt and Road cooperation documents and implemented the vision of building a community with a shared future at the bilateral level with all five Central Asian countries.

    Ismail Dairov, director of Kyrgyzstan’s think tank the Regional Mountain Center of Central Asia, noted that Central Asia and China share a thousand-year history of exchanges. Today, within the framework of the BRI, both sides are strengthening ties and cooperation at an unprecedented pace, he said.

    The Sixth China-Central Asia Foreign Ministers’ Meeting is held in Almaty, Kazakhstan, April 26, 2025. (Xinhua/Li Renzi)

    TOWARD MODERNIZATION

    On April 29, the work to build three key control tunnels in Kyrgyzstan’s section of the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway commenced. The railway is an iconic BRI project backed by the three nations’ leaders, symbolizing shared efforts to boost connectivity and prosperity in the region.

    Kyrgyz political scientist Kubanychbek Taabaldiev called the move “a great achievement of bilateral relations between China and Central Asia” that would take the ongoing projects into a new phase and “bring benefits from both economic and political points of view.”

    “The world needs an interconnected Central Asia,” said Xi in his keynote speech at the first China-Central Asia Summit. Since then, the two sides have explored further cooperation to enhance infrastructure development for seamless and efficient connectivity.

    Much progress has been achieved: Central Asia freight trains are running regularly as official railway data showed 4,725 trips were made in the first four months of 2025, up 21 percent year on year; the Kazakhstan-Xi’an Terminal officially began operations in February 2024 and is currently operating at a high level of quality; and the construction of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Corridor has made steady progress.

    New logistics routes, including rail, road and air, now transport Chinese appliances, consumer goods and electric vehicles to Central Asia, while high-quality Central Asian products such as fertilizers, cotton, beef and mutton are reaching China faster than ever.

    Beyond transport and logistics networks, cooperation is expanding into agriculture, IT, clean energy and cross-border e-commerce, supporting industrial upgrades and better livelihoods.

    According to China’s General Administration of Customs, China-Central Asia trade reached 94.8 billion U.S. dollars in 2024, a record increase of 5.4 billion dollars from the previous year.

    Strengthening regional connectivity cannot only promote economic integration, but also deepen exchanges and understanding between civilizations, laying a solid foundation for regional stability and development, said Zaynidin Kurmanov, vice president of the Diplomatic Academy of Kyrgyzstan and former Kyrgyz Parliament speaker.

    Students learn skills at the Luban Workshop in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, May 31, 2025. (Xinhua/Li Renzi)

    CLOSER HEARTS

    From tourism to vocational education cooperation, from cultural exchanges to archaeological cooperation, Chinese and Central Asian people are being brought closer through in-depth and lasting dialogues at all levels, as well as mutual learning among civilizations.

    Recently, a tourist train accomplished the first cultural trip between Xi’an, China and Almaty, Kazakhstan. Special train services for cultural tourism in Central Asia are among a series of programs to strengthen dialogue between civilizations as promoted by Xi at the first China-Central Asia Summit.

    This year marks the China tourism year in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan’s year of tourism in China. More and more Chinese tourists enjoy the convenience provided by visa-free travel agreements between China and Central Asian countries, including Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. China’s seaside cities have also become common destinations for Central Asian visitors.

    China and Central Asian countries have also actively promoted vocational education cooperation programs. The Luban Workshop, which has been operating in Tajikistan for more than two years, has also been launched in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan to cultivate future technical talents and provide opportunities for Central Asian youths.

    “We are training engineers under the Luban Workshop project. It’s not just about education, but also cultural exchange,” said Mirlan Chynybaev, rector of Kyrgyz State Technical University that manages the workshop.

    With the establishment of Chinese Cultural Centers and Confucius Institutes, Chinese language fever and “China fever” are heating up in Central Asian countries, bringing more and more young people to study in China.

    According to Yagshy Ayjanov, a startupper from Turkmenistan who operates a company with his Chinese friends in Xi’an, their company in 2024 has provided various kinds of study services for over 800 people who want to come to China, and most of them were from Central Asia.

    “After the first China-Central Asia summit, we can clearly feel that Central Asian students have shown a stronger willingness to study in China as China means more opportunities and better employment prospects,” Ayjanov said.

    Ruslan Kenzhaev, deputy editor-in-chief of the leading Uzbek newspaper Narodnoe Slovo, pointed out that through deepening economic cooperation, promoting infrastructure development, advancing technology and people-to-people exchanges, Central Asian countries and China have developed a model of sustainable cooperation based on mutual respect and shared visions.

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-OSI China: Chinese climber Pan makes history with victory in Bern

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    Pan Yufei became the first Chinese climber to win the men’s Boulder event at the International Federation of Sport Climbing World Cup, edging out France’s Mejdi Schalck by 0.1 points on Sunday.

    Pan, whose previous best finish was fifth in Prague, the Czech Republic, last weekend, overtook Schalck in the final run on M4, topping out on his second attempt to score 84.2 points.

    Schalck had been in control for most of the final, topping M1, M2 and M3, but failed on M4 and finished with 84.1 points.

    “It feels unreal. My mind was so empty,” Pan said. “The last few years have been really tough for myself, I struggled so much and I thought I was not good enough. At the beginning of the season it was not so good, but this time I just wanted to enjoy myself.”

    Pan finished 12th at the 2024 Paris Olympic Games but did not qualify for the final of the men’s combined event, which includes both Boulder and Lead climbing.

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-Evening Report: Seabed mining is becoming an environmental flashpoint – NZ will have to pick a side soon

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Myra Williamson, Senior Lecturer in Law, Auckland University of Technology

    Getty Images

    Seabed mining could become one of the defining environmental battles of 2025. Around the world, governments are weighing up whether to allow mining of the ocean floor for metal ores and minerals. New Zealand is among them.

    The stakes are high. Deep-sea mining is highly controversial, with evidence showing mining activity can cause lasting damage to fragile marine ecosystems. One area off the east coast of the United States, mined as an experiment 50 years ago, still bears scars and shows little sign of recovery.

    With the world facing competing pressures – climate action and conservation versus demand for resources – New Zealand must now decide whether to fast-track mining, regulate it tightly, or pause it entirely.

    Who controls international seabed mining?

    A major flashpoint is governance in international waters. Under international law, seabed mining beyond national jurisdiction is managed by the International Seabed Authority (ISA), created by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

    But the US has never ratified UNCLOS. In April this year, President Donald Trump issued an executive order to bypass the ISA and allow companies to begin mining in international waters.

    The ISA has pushed back, warning unilateral action breaches international law. However, the declaration from the recently concluded UN Ocean Conference in France does not urge countries to adopt a precautionary approach, nor does it ban deep seabed mining.

    The declaration does “reiterate the need to increase scientific knowledge on deep sea ecosystems” and recognises the role of the ISA in setting “robust rules, regulations and procedures for exploitation of resources” in international waters.

    So, while the international community supports multilateralism and international law, deep-sea mining in the near future remains a real possibility.

    Fast-track approvals

    In the Pacific, some countries have already made up their minds about which way they will go. Nauru recently updated its agreement with Canadian-based The Metals Company to begin mining in the nearby Clarion Clipperton Zone. The deal favours the US’s go-it-alone approach over the ISA model.

    By contrast, in 2022, New Zealand’s Labour government backed the ISA’s moratorium and committed to a holistic ocean management strategy. Whether that position still holds is unclear, given the current government’s policies.

    The list of applications under the Fast-track Approvals Act 2024described by Regional Development Minister Shane Jones as “arguably the most permissive regime” in Australasia – includes two controversial seabed mining proposals in Bream Bay and off the Taranaki coast:

    • Trans-Tasman Resources’ proposal to extract up to 50 million tonnes of Taranaki seabed material annually to recover heavy mineral sands that contain iron ore as well as rare metal elements titanium and vanadium.

    • McCallum Brothers Ltd’s Bream Bay proposal to dredge up to 150,000 cubic metres of sand yearly for three years, and up to 250,000 cubic metres after that.

    Legal landscape changing

    Māori and environmental groups have opposed the fast-track policy, and the Treaty of Waitangi has so far been a powerful safeguard in seabed mining cases.

    Provisions referencing Treaty principles appear in key laws, including the Crown Minerals Act and the Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf (Environmental Effects) Act.

    In 2021, the Supreme Court cited these obligations when it rejected a 2016 marine discharge application by Trans-Tasman Resources to mine the seabed in the Taranaki Bight. The court ruled Treaty clauses must be interpreted in a “broad and generous” way, recognising tikanga Māori and customary marine rights.

    But that legal landscape could soon change. The Regulatory Standards Bill, now before parliament, would give priority to property rights over environmental or Indigenous protections in the formulation of new laws and regulations.

    The bill also allows for the review of existing legislation. In theory, if the Regulatory Standards Bill becomes law, it could result in the removal of Treaty principles clauses from legislation.

    This in turn could deny courts the tools they’ve previously used to uphold environmental and Treaty-based protections to block seabed mining applications. That would make it easier to approve fast-tracked projects such as the Bream Bay and Taranaki projects.

    Setting a precedent

    Meanwhile, Hawai’i has gone in a different direction. In 2024, the US state passed a law banning seabed mining in state waters – joining California (2022), Washington (2021) and Oregon (1991).

    Under the Hawai’i Seabed Mining Prevention Act, mining is banned except in rare cases such as beach restoration. The law cites the public’s right to a clean and healthy environment.

    As global conflict brews over seabed governance, New Zealand’s eventual position could set a precedent.

    Choosing to prohibit seabed mining in New Zealand waters, as Hawai’i has done, would send a strong message that environmental stewardship and Indigenous rights matter more than short-term resource extraction interests.

    If New Zealand does decide to go ahead with seabed mining, however, it could trigger a cascade of mining efforts across New Zealand and the Pacific. A crucial decision is fast approaching.

    Myra Williamson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Seabed mining is becoming an environmental flashpoint – NZ will have to pick a side soon – https://theconversation.com/seabed-mining-is-becoming-an-environmental-flashpoint-nz-will-have-to-pick-a-side-soon-258908

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Meeting with the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, Friedrich Merz

    Source: Government of Italy (English)

    15 Giugno 2025

    The President of the Council of Ministers, Giorgia Meloni, met with the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, Friedrich Merz, today, on the eve of the G7 Summit in Kananaskis.

    Coming shortly after their recent talks at Palazzo Chigi, today’s meeting provided an opportunity to confirm the shared will to hold a new edition of the Italy-Germany intergovernmental summit in Rome at the beginning of 2026 and to maintain close coordination on the main issues on the EU agenda, such as the fight against irregular migration and competitiveness.

    Lastly, the meeting also allowed for an exchange of views on the most recent developments in the Middle East and on the war in Ukraine, in the context of transatlantic relations and in view of the upcoming NATO Summit in The Hague.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Meeting with the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Keir Starmer

    Source: Government of Italy (English)

    The President of the Council of Ministers, Giorgia Meloni, met with the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Keir Starmer, today, on the eve of the G7 Summit in Kananaskis.

    The meeting provided an opportunity for an in-depth discussion on the most pressing issues on the international agenda, starting with the situation in the Middle East and the conflict in Ukraine.
    During the meeting, close coordination also continued regarding both the G7 agenda and in view of the NATO Summit in The Hague, with a full convergence of views being noted.

    Lastly, the two leaders reviewed the main areas of bilateral collaboration, especially in the fields of energy, investment promotion, and security and defence, with particular reference to the strategic Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP), as well as the increasingly fruitful cooperation in combating irregular migration and fighting human trafficking.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Huawei’s FDD Tri-Band Massive MIMO Wins Red Dot Design Award 2025

    Source: Huawei

    Headline: Huawei’s FDD Tri-Band Massive MIMO Wins Red Dot Design Award 2025

    [Shenzhen, China, June 16, 2025] At Germany’s prestigious Red Dot Award Design Competition, Huawei’s FDD tri-band Massive MIMO earned the Red Dot Design Award for its exceptional performance and lean, energy-efficient design.

    The award-winning FDD tri-band Massive MIMO

    Since its commercial debut in Nigeria with MTN—Africa’s largest mobile operator—this February, Huawei’s FDD tri-band Massive MIMO has been tested and deployed on over 20 networks across the globe. The solution delivers significant value to operators’ customers by relieving traffic demand on 4G networks, providing deep and wide 5G coverage, and enabling enhanced 5G-A uplink. The solution simultaneously delivers five leading technological advantages:

    Simplified ultra-wideband: The solution supports industry-leading, high-power 720 W output, while employing cutting-edge Real Wide Bandwidth and Compact Dipole technologies. This realizes unified operations across three bands (such as 1.8 GHz, 2.1 GHz, and 2.6 GHz, or AWS, PCS, and 2.6 GHz) within a single form factor whose size is equivalent to a conventional two-band Massive MIMO device. This enables the solution to boost both frequency bands and power capabilities without increasing size or wind load.
    Ultimate capacity: This solution is an effective enabler for 4G, 5G, and 5G-A. It can deliver 3-fold to 4-fold downlink capacity gains on 4G networks, which can increase to 7-fold in NR over LTE 4T4R, thereby effectively alleviating network congestion.
    Enhanced uplink: By leveraging M-Receiver technology, the solution realizes 5-fold uplink capacity and 10 dB uplink coverage gains compared to LTE 4T4R, fulfilling new demands of the mobile AI era that are typified by HD streaming and security, multimodal AI interactions, and autonomous driving.
    Native beamforming: Tri-band Massive MIMO traditionally increases interference due to the addition of extra beams. However, supported by enhanced intelligent beam scheduling and intelligent beamforming, Huawei’s tri-band Massive MIMO enables dynamic beam movement with users and intelligent interference avoidance, boosting user experience by 20% to 30%.
    Energy saving: The innovative GigaGreen architecture supports “0 bit 0 watt”, enabling ultra-deep dormancy during low-traffic periods and instant wake-up when traffic increases, meaning substantial reductions in overall network power consumption.

    “We have prioritized innovation in order to provide customers with wireless products that deliver unparalleled performance in terms of user experience, network capacity, energy efficiency, and simplified deployment. It is our mission to help operators build premium networks that offer improved efficiency and cost-performance. This award for tri-band Massive MIMO represents the industry’s recognition of our innovative design. Moving forward, we will continue down the path of innovation and escort our operator partners as they strive towards greater business success,” said Fang Xiang, Vice President of Huawei Wireless Network Product Line.

    MIL OSI Economics

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Huawei’s FDD Tri-Band Massive MIMO Wins Red Dot Design Award 2025

    Source: Huawei

    Headline: Huawei’s FDD Tri-Band Massive MIMO Wins Red Dot Design Award 2025

    [Shenzhen, China, June 16, 2025] At Germany’s prestigious Red Dot Award Design Competition, Huawei’s FDD tri-band Massive MIMO earned the Red Dot Design Award for its exceptional performance and lean, energy-efficient design.

    The award-winning FDD tri-band Massive MIMO

    Since its commercial debut in Nigeria with MTN—Africa’s largest mobile operator—this February, Huawei’s FDD tri-band Massive MIMO has been tested and deployed on over 20 networks across the globe. The solution delivers significant value to operators’ customers by relieving traffic demand on 4G networks, providing deep and wide 5G coverage, and enabling enhanced 5G-A uplink. The solution simultaneously delivers five leading technological advantages:

    Simplified ultra-wideband: The solution supports industry-leading, high-power 720 W output, while employing cutting-edge Real Wide Bandwidth and Compact Dipole technologies. This realizes unified operations across three bands (such as 1.8 GHz, 2.1 GHz, and 2.6 GHz, or AWS, PCS, and 2.6 GHz) within a single form factor whose size is equivalent to a conventional two-band Massive MIMO device. This enables the solution to boost both frequency bands and power capabilities without increasing size or wind load.
    Ultimate capacity: This solution is an effective enabler for 4G, 5G, and 5G-A. It can deliver 3-fold to 4-fold downlink capacity gains on 4G networks, which can increase to 7-fold in NR over LTE 4T4R, thereby effectively alleviating network congestion.
    Enhanced uplink: By leveraging M-Receiver technology, the solution realizes 5-fold uplink capacity and 10 dB uplink coverage gains compared to LTE 4T4R, fulfilling new demands of the mobile AI era that are typified by HD streaming and security, multimodal AI interactions, and autonomous driving.
    Native beamforming: Tri-band Massive MIMO traditionally increases interference due to the addition of extra beams. However, supported by enhanced intelligent beam scheduling and intelligent beamforming, Huawei’s tri-band Massive MIMO enables dynamic beam movement with users and intelligent interference avoidance, boosting user experience by 20% to 30%.
    Energy saving: The innovative GigaGreen architecture supports “0 bit 0 watt”, enabling ultra-deep dormancy during low-traffic periods and instant wake-up when traffic increases, meaning substantial reductions in overall network power consumption.

    “We have prioritized innovation in order to provide customers with wireless products that deliver unparalleled performance in terms of user experience, network capacity, energy efficiency, and simplified deployment. It is our mission to help operators build premium networks that offer improved efficiency and cost-performance. This award for tri-band Massive MIMO represents the industry’s recognition of our innovative design. Moving forward, we will continue down the path of innovation and escort our operator partners as they strive towards greater business success,” said Fang Xiang, Vice President of Huawei Wireless Network Product Line.

    MIL OSI Economics

  • MIL-OSI China: China lose to Turkey to wrap up VNL Xi’an leg

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    Host China lost to Turkey 3-0 at the 2025 FIVB Men’s Volleyball Nations League Xi’an leg on Sunday, wrapping up the opening leg with two wins and two defeats.

    After conceding its opener to Japan, China bounced back with back-to-back victories over Serbia and the Netherlands. Turkey, meanwhile, had suffered three consecutive losses before the encounter with China.

    Ramazan Efe Mandiraci (L) of Türkiye vies with Jiang Chuan of China during the Pool 3 match between China and Türkiye at the Men’s Volleyball Nations League (VNL) 2025 in Xi’an, northwest China’s Shaanxi Province, June 15, 2025. (Xinhua/Zhang Bowen)

    Turkey came out strong in the first set, taking advantage of powerful attacking to win 25-22. China raced to a 5-2 lead in the second set, but Turkey’s superior blocking shut down China’s attack to win the second set 25-21.

    China once again started fast in the third set, surging into a 5-2 lead, but Turkey countered with a four-point run to flip the score. In the final stages, Turkey pulled away with a decisive 6-2 run to close out the match 25-20, registering its first win of the season.

    China captain Jiang Chuan admitted frustration after the defeat, pointing to execution and endurance issues as key factors. “After the first three matches, we were quite fatigued physically in the fourth match, but that’s not an excuse. We need to learn how to handle such situations,” he said.

    Despite the loss, China head coach Vital Heynen expressed satisfaction with his team’s performance, especially with key players like Zhang Jingyin and Wang Jingyi sidelined with injury. “We have to be realistic that we came here without two core players. We made one good step already, winning two matches in the tournament,” he said.

    According to the schedule, China will next compete in the Chicago leg in late June, followed by the Gdansk leg in mid-July.

    Heynen emphasized that his team will not fear strong opponents, whether at home or abroad. “This year in VNL, a lot of teams are at the same level, so there will be a chance in other matches also. It will be about us. When we get better, we will get more matches,” he added.

    In other matches on Sunday, Poland beat Serbia 3-0 (25-21, 25-20, 25-23) to stay undefeated, while Japan swept the Netherlands 3-0 (25-18, 25-23, 25-18).

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-OSI China: Italy name World Cup winner Gattuso as manager

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    Former AC Milan midfielder Gennaro Gattuso has been appointed head coach of Italy’s national football team, the Italian Football Federation (FIGC) confirmed Sunday, just days after Luciano Spalletti’s departure.

    Spalletti had taken charge of the Azzurri in August 2023 on a reported three-year deal, but resigned following a disappointing Euro 2024 campaign and a 3-0 loss to Norway in Italy’s opening 2026 World Cup qualifier earlier this month.

    Gennaro Gattuso, then head coach of Valencia, instructs players during the Orange Trophy match between Valencia CF of Spain and Atalanta of Italy in Valencia, Spain, on Aug. 6, 2022. (Photo by Pablo Morano/Xinhua)

    At a press conference prior to Italy’s second qualifier against Moldova, Spalletti announced he would step down after the match, despite Italy bouncing back with a 2-0 win.

    Gattuso, 47, spent the majority of his playing career with AC Milan, where he helped the Rossoneri to two Serie A titles and two UEFA Champions League crowns. He was also part of Italy’s 2006 World Cup-winning squad.

    Since hanging up his boots in 2013, Gattuso has coached the likes of AC Milan, Napoli, Valencia and Marseille, and most recently spent the 2024/25 at the helm of Croatian side Hajduk Split.

    Italy currently sits third in World Cup Qualifying Group I with three points from two matches, while Norway leads the group with four straight wins.

    Only group winners from UEFA’s qualifiers will book direct spots to the 2026 tournament. Second-place teams will enter a playoff round – a scenario that has haunted Italy in recent years, with the Azzurri missing the last two World Cups after playoff defeats. 

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-Evening Report: ‘No kings!’: like the LA protesters, the early Romans hated kings, too

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Peter Edwell, Associate Professor in Ancient History, Macquarie University

    Protesters across the United States have brandished placards declaring “no kings!” in recent days, keen to send a message one-man rule is not acceptable.

    The defeat of the forces of King George III in the United States’ revolutionary war of 1775–83 saw the end of royal rule in the US. Touting itself as the world’s leading democracy, kings have not been welcome in America for 250 years. But for many, Donald Trump is increasingly behaving as one and now is the time to stop him.

    Having studied ancient Roman politics for years, America’s rejection of kingship reminds me vividly of the strong aversion to it in the Roman republic.

    Early Romans too, sought a society with “no kings!” – up until, that is, the period following the assassination of Julius Caesar, when everything changed.

    The seven kings of Rome

    Seven kings ruled Rome, one after the other, after the city was founded in 753 BCE. The first was Romulus who, according to some legends, gave the city its name.

    When the last of the kings of Rome was driven from the city in 509 BCE, his key opponent, Lucius Junius Brutus, vowed:

    I will pursue Lucius Tarquinius Superbus and his wicked wife and all his children, with sword, with fire, with whatever violence I may; and I will suffer neither him nor anyone else to be king in Rome!

    Tarquinius Superbus (meaning “the proud”) had ruled Rome for 25 years. He began his reign by executing uncooperative Senators.

    When Tarquinius’ son raped a noblewoman named Lucretia, the Roman population rebelled against the king’s long-running tyranny. The hubris of the king and his family was finally too much. They were driven from Rome and never allowed to return.

    A new system of government was ushered in: the republic.

    The rise of the Roman republic

    In the new system, power was shared among elected officials – including two consuls, who were elected annually.

    The consuls were the most powerful officials in the republic and were given power to wage war.

    The Senate, which represented the wealthiest sections of society (initially the patrician class), held power in some key areas, including foreign policy.

    Less affluent citizens elected tribunes of the plebs who had various powers, including the right to veto laws.

    In the republican system, the term king (rex in Latin) quickly became anathema.

    “No kings” would effectively remain the watchword through the Roman republic’s entire history. “Rex” was a word the Romans hated. It was short-hand for “tyranny”.

    The rise and fall of Julius Caesar

    Over time, powerful figures emerged who threatened the republic’s tight power-sharing rules.

    Figures such as the general Pompey (106–48 BCE) broke all the rules and behaved in suspiciously kingly ways. With military success and vast wealth, he was a populist who broke the mould. Pompey even staged a three-day military parade, known as a triumph, to coincide with his birthday in 61 BCE.

    But the ultimate populist was Julius Caesar.

    Born to a noble family claiming lineage from the goddess Venus, Caesar became fabulously wealthy.

    He also scored major military victories, including subduing the Gauls (across modern France and Belgium) from 58–50 BCE.

    In the 40s BCE, Caesar began taking offices over extended time frames – much longer periods than the rules technically allowed.

    Early in 44 BCE he gave himself the formal title “dictator for life” (Dictator Perpetuo), having been appointed dictator two years earlier. The dictatorship was only meant to be held in times of emergency for a period of six months.

    When Caesar was preparing a war against Parthia (in modern day Iran), some tried to hail him as king.

    Soon after, an angry group of 23 senators stabbed him to death in a vain attempt to save the republic. They were led by Marcus Junius Brutus, a descendant of the Brutus who killed the last Roman king, Tarquinius Superbus.

    The Roman republic was beyond saving despite Caesar’s death.
    duncan1890/Getty Images

    However, the Roman republic was beyond saving despite Caesar’s death. His great nephew Octavian eventually emerged as leader and became known as Augustus (27 BCE – 14 CE). With Augustus, an age of emperors was born.

    Emperors were kings in all but name. The strong aversion to kingship in Rome ensured their complete avoidance of the term rex.

    ‘No kings!’

    American protesters waving placards shouting “no kings!” are expressing clear concerns that their beloved democracy is under threat.

    Donald Trump has already declared eight national emergencies and issued 161 executive orders in his second term.

    When asked if he needs to uphold the Constitution, Trump declares “I don’t know.” He has joked about running for a third term as president, in breach of the longstanding limit of two terms.

    Like Caesar, is Donald Trump becoming a king in all but name? Is he setting a precedent for his successors to behave increasingly like emperors?

    The American aversion to “king” likely ensures the term will never return. But when protesters and others shout “no kings!”, they know the very meaning of the term “president” is changing before their eyes.

    Peter Edwell receives funding from the Australian Research Council.

    ref. ‘No kings!’: like the LA protesters, the early Romans hated kings, too – https://theconversation.com/no-kings-like-the-la-protesters-the-early-romans-hated-kings-too-259011

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-OSI Banking: Samsung and Art Basel Unveil Largest Art Basel Collection to Date on Samsung Art Store

    Source: Samsung

    ▲ Hedi Mertens’s Gruppo di quadrati sulla base di un quadrato (1966) shown on Neo QLED by Samsung.
     
    Samsung Electronics, the Official Art TV of Art Basel, today announced the launch of the Art Basel in Basel (ABB) Collection, an exclusive curation of digital art available across Samsung TVs with Samsung Art Store.1 Representing the most extensive Art Basel collection to date, the ABB Collection introduces 38 curated works from globally renowned artists and galleries — marking a new milestone in Samsung and Art Basel’s mission to bring world-class art to a wider audience.
     
    The ABB Collection stands apart for its emphasis on diversity, with works that span continents, mediums and voices. For the first time, the collection features representation from an Africa-based gallery, deepening the global reach and cultural richness of the Samsung x Art Basel initiative. Some of this collection will be displayed at the Art Basel, from June 19-22, at Messe Basel in Switzerland.2
     
     
    A Curated Vision of Global Expression
    Handpicked from over 100 submissions, the 38 pieces in the ABB Collection were carefully curated with a focus on artist diversity, medium variety and geographic representation. The collection celebrates both emerging talent and established visionaries, aligning with Art Basel’s dedication to championing contemporary art from all corners of the world.
     
    Highlights include:
     

    Roméo Mivekannin, “Young woman with peonies after Frédéric Bazille” (2023): A compelling reimagining of classical portraiture from a postcolonial perspective.
    Basim Magdy, “An Intergalactic Messenger Teleported us to a Cave Settlement Ruled by Shared Compassion and Humility” (2022): A vibrant exploration of utopian futurism.
    Zandile Tshabalala, “Pink Blossoms” (2024): A powerful portrait celebrating Black femininity and nature.
    Antonia Kuo, “Willo” (diptych) (2024): A striking dual-panel composition that fuses digital manipulation with analog techniques.

     
    The collection also includes works by iconic names such as Jo Baer, Kibong Rhee and Lynn Hershman Leeson, further enriching the visual and thematic depth of this year’s selection.
     
     
    ArtCube: An Interactive Hands-on Experience at Art Basel
    ▲ Jo Baer’s Untitled (1961-1962) shown on Neo QLED by Samsung.
     
    To further highlight the intersection of art and technology, Samsung will present an interactive lounge titled ArtCube3 at Art Basel. This immersive showcase will demonstrate how The Frame, MICRO LED and Neo QLED 8K redefine digital art experiences by displaying artwork — including selections from the Art Basel Collection — with breathtaking detail and depth.
     
    ArtCube invites visitors to engage with the Samsung Art Store’s exclusive collections and freely experience the premium picture quality. Visitors can also make customized portraits of moving art pieces only available through ArtCube’s tailored curation. In addition to the ArtCube lounge experience, Samsung will host a series of panel discussions featuring influential voices from the contemporary art scene, sparking conversations around technology’s expanding role in artistic expression and accessibility.
     
     
    Strengthening a Cultural Partnership
    Samsung and Art Basel have partnered to introduce curated digital collections that began with the 2024 Art Basel Miami Beach, 2025 Art Basel Hong Kong, and now includes the 2025 Art Basel in Basel. Artworks from Art Basel Hong Kong, launched in March, have gained global popularity among Art Store users, ranking them in top 10 most-viewed art pieces.4 This ongoing collaboration highlights the shared vision of expanding the role of displays as vibrant platforms for storytelling and artistic dialogue.

     
    “With the launch of a new collection in the Samsung Art Store for Art Basel in Basel 2025, we’re thrilled to offer our global audiences new ways to engage with our show,” said Maike Cruse, Director of Art Basel in Basel. Our global partnership with Samsung extends the visitor experience beyond the Messe and into people’s homes — creating new entry points to discover the exceptional artists and galleries that define our flagship fair in Basel.”
     
     
    Completing a Unique Art Experience on Samsung Art TVs
    ▲ Lynn Hershman Leeson’s Seduction (1985) shown on Neo QLED 8K by Samsung.
     
    Samsung Art Store offers the best way to transform your TV and elevate your home decor with the perfect piece of art for every season, holiday and mood. You can choose from 3,500+ works of art spanning over 800 artists, including the ABB Collection.
     
    Spanning the Neo QLED 8K, Neo QLED, QLED, The Frame and The Frame Pro, which are powered by Samsung Vision AI for AI-enhanced picture and sound, Samsung Art Store is newly available across the Samsung 2025 TV lineup. These TV models also come with new personalized features that bring users closer to all the shows, movies and sports they love. Across the lineup, Samsung offers more ways than ever to transform TV screens into personalized art galleries.
     
    The Art Basel in Basel Collection is now available exclusively on the Samsung Art Store to all Samsung Art TV users.
     
    For more information, visit www.samsung.com.
     
     
    About Art Basel
    Founded in 1970 by gallerists from Basel, Art Basel today stages the world’s premier art shows for Modern and contemporary art, sited in Basel, Miami Beach, Hong Kong and Paris. Defined by its host city and region, each show is unique, which is reflected in its participating galleries, artworks presented, and the content of parallel programming produced in collaboration with local institutions for each edition. Art Basel’s engagement has expanded beyond art fairs through new digital platforms including the Art Basel App and initiatives such as the Art Basel and UBS Global Art Market Report and the Art Basel Awards. Art Basel’s Global Lead Partner is UBS. For further information, please visit artbasel.com.
     
     
    1 Samsung Art TV includes MICRO LED, The Frame, The Frame Pro, Neo QLED 8K, Neo QLED and QLED models starting from Q7F and above.
    2 Event is open to the public from June 19-22, after VIP opening from June 16-18.
    3 Samsung Lounge ‘ArtCube’ is in Halle 1, the main exhibition floor inside Messe Basel.
    4 The information provided is based on the results collected during April 2025.

    MIL OSI Global Banks

  • MIL-OSI Russia: To the staff of JSC Mineralnye Vody International Airport

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: Government of the Russian Federation – An important disclaimer is at the bottom of this article.

    On June 15, the airport celebrates its 100th anniversary.

    Dear friends!

    I congratulate you on the anniversary of Mineralnye Vody International Airport – the 100th anniversary of its foundation.

    Over the course of a century, the airport has been developing dynamically and today is the largest in the south of Russia, has an important strategic and socio-economic significance. Thanks to air connections with the regions of the country, foreign countries, transport accessibility is improving, trade relations and business ties are strengthening, promising opportunities for business are emerging, and the tourism potential of the North Caucasus is growing. Every year, the geography of flights is expanding, new destinations are opening, and the infrastructure is being modernized.

    All these achievements are the result of the coordinated and professional work of the company’s team. You ensure the safety and comfort of passengers, implement modern technologies, improve the quality and level of services provided.

    I wish the employees and veterans of the Mineralnye Vody International Airport further success. Health and well-being to you and your loved ones.

    M. Mishustin

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Government meeting (2025, No. 20)

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: Government of the Russian Federation – An important disclaimer is at the bottom of this article.

    1. On the execution of the federal budget for the first quarter of 2025

    2. On amendments to the Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation of December 1, 2004 No. 703 (in terms of amendments to the Regulation on the Federal Treasury)

    The draft act is aimed at bringing the terms and concepts defining the functions and powers of the Federal Treasury in the financial and budgetary sphere into line with the terms and concepts contained in Article 24213–1 of the Budget Code of the Russian Federation.

    3. On the draft federal law “On Amendments to the Federal Law “On State Registration of Real Estate”

    The bill is aimed at establishing the possibility of entering into the Unified State Register of Real Estate information on the boundaries of agricultural lands within agricultural lands.

    4. On the draft amendments of the Government of the Russian Federation to the draft federal law No. 776683-8 “On Amendments to the Federal Law “On State Cadastral Valuation” and Article 6 of the Federal Law “On Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation”

    The draft amendments are aimed at clarifying the provisions of the Federal Law of July 3, 2016 No. 237-FZ “On State Cadastral Valuation” and Article 6 of the Federal Law “On Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation”.

    5. On approval of the technical regulations on the safety of inland water transport facilities

    The draft act is aimed at ensuring the safety of inland water transport facilities.

    Moscow, June 15, 2025

    The content of the press releases of the Department of Press Service and References is a presentation of materials submitted by federal executive bodies for discussion at a meeting of the Government of the Russian Federation.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Global: Netanyahu has two war aims: destroying Iran’s nuclear program and regime change. Are either achievable?

    Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Ian Parmeter, Research Scholar, Middle East Studies, Australian National University

    Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has said Israel’s attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities could last for at least two weeks.

    His timing seems precise for a reason. The Israel Defence Forces and the country’s intelligence agencies have clearly devised a methodical, step-by-step campaign.

    Israeli forces initially focused on decapitating the Iranian military and scientific leadership and, just as importantly, destroying virtually all of Iran’s air defences.

    Israeli aircraft can not only operate freely over Iranian air space now, they can refuel and deposit more special forces at key sites to enable precision bombing of targets and attacks on hidden or well-protected nuclear facilities.

    In public statements since the start of the campaign, Netanyahu has highlighted two key aims: to destroy Iran’s nuclear program, and to encourage the Iranian people to overthrow the clerical regime.

    With those two objectives in mind, how might the conflict end? Several broad scenarios are possible.

    A return to negotiations

    US President Donald Trump’s special envoy for the Middle East, Steve Witkoff, was to have attended a sixth round of talks with his Iranian counterparts on Sunday aimed at a deal to replace the Iran nuclear agreement negotiated under the Obama administration in 2015. Trump withdrew from that agreement during his first term in 2018, despite Iran’s apparent compliance to that point.

    Netanyahu was opposed to the 2015 agreement and has indicated he does not believe Iran is serious about a replacement.

    So, accepting negotiations as an outcome of the Israeli bombing campaign would be a massive climbdown by Netanyahu. He wants to use the defanging of Iran to reestablish his security credentials after the Hamas attacks of October 2023.

    Even though Trump continues to press Iran to accept a deal, negotiations are off the table for now. Trump won’t be able to persuade Netanyahu to stop the bombing campaign to restart negotiations.

    Complete destruction of Iran’s nuclear program

    Destruction of Iran’s nuclear program would involve destroying all known sites, including the Fordow uranium enrichment facility, about 100 kilometres south of Tehran.

    According to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Grossi, the facility is located about half a mile underground, beneath a mountain. It is probably beyond the reach of even the US’ 2,000-pound deep penetration bombs.

    The entrances and ventilation shafts of the facility could be closed by causing landslides. But that would be a temporary solution.

    Taking out Fordow entirely would require an Israeli special forces attack. This is certainly possible, given Israel’s success in getting operatives into Iran to date. But questions would remain about how extensively the facility could be damaged and then how quickly it could be rebuilt.

    And destruction of Iran’s nuclear centrifuges – used to enrich uranium to create a bomb – would be only one step in dismantling its program.

    Israel would also have to secure or eliminate Iran’s stock of uranium already enriched to 60% purity. This is sufficient for up to ten nuclear bombs if enriched to the weapons-grade 90% purity.

    But does Israeli intelligence know where that stock is?

    Collapse of the Iranian regime

    Collapse of the Iranian regime is certainly possible, particularly given Israel’s removal of Iran’s most senior military leaders since its attacks began on Friday, including the heads of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Iranian armed forces.

    And anti-regime demonstrations over the years, most recently the “Women, Life, Freedom” protests after the death in police custody of a young Iranian woman, Mahsa Amini, in 2022, have shown how unpopular the regime is.

    That said, the regime has survived many challenges since coming to power in 1979, including war with Iraq in the 1980s and massive sanctions. It has developed remarkably efficient security systems that have enabled it to remain in place.

    Another uncertainty at this stage is whether Israeli attacks on civilian targets might engender a “rally round the flag” movement among Iranians.

    Netanyahu said in recent days that Israel had indications the remaining senior regime figures were packing their bags in preparation for fleeing the country. But he gave no evidence.

    A major party joins the fight

    Could the US become involved in the fighting?

    This can’t be ruled out. Iran’s UN ambassador directly accused the US of assisting Israel with its strikes.

    That is almost certainly true, given the close intelligence sharing between the US and Israel. Moreover, senior Republicans, such as Senator Lindsey Graham, have called on Trump to order US forces to help Israel “finish the job”.

    Trump would probably be loath to do this, particularly given his criticism of the “forever wars” of previous US administrations. But if Iran or pro-Iranian forces were to strike a US base or military asset in the region, pressure would mount on Trump to retaliate.

    Another factor is that Trump probably wants the war to end as quickly as possible. His administration will be aware the longer a conflict drags on, the more likely unforeseen factors will arise.

    Could Russia become involved on Iran’s side? At this stage that’s probably unlikely. Russia did not intervene in Syria late last year to try to protect the collapsing Assad regime. And Russia has plenty on its plate with the war in Ukraine.

    Russia criticised the Israeli attack when it started, but appears not to have taken any action to help Iran defend itself.

    And could regional powers such as Saudi Arabia or the United Arab Emirates become involved?

    Though they have a substantial arsenal of US military equipment, the two countries have no interest in becoming caught up in the conflict. The Gulf Arab monarchies have engaged in a rapprochement with Iran in recent years after decades of outright hostility. Nobody would want to put this at risk.

    Uncertainties predominate

    We don’t know the extent of Iran’s arsenal of missiles and rockets. In its initial retaliation to Israel’s strikes, Iran has been able to partially overwhelm Israel’s Iron Dome air defence system, causing civilian casualties.

    If it can continue to do this, causing more civilian casualties, Israelis already unhappy with Netanyahu over the Gaza war might start to question his wisdom in starting another conflict.

    But we are nowhere near that point. Though it’s too early for reliable opinion polling, most Israelis almost certainly applaud Netanyahu’s action so far to cripple Iran’s nuclear program. In addition, Netanyahu has threatened to make Tehran “burn” if Iran deliberately targets Israeli civilians.

    We can be confident that Iran does not have any surprises in store. Israel has severely weakened its proxies, Hezbollah and Hamas. They are clearly in no position to assist Iran through diversionary attacks.

    The big question will be what comes after the war. Iran will almost certainly withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and forbid more inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

    Israel will probably be able to destroy Iran’s existing nuclear facilities, but it’s only a question of when – not if – Iran will reconstitute them.

    This means the likelihood of Iran trying to secure a nuclear bomb in order to deter future Israeli attacks will be much higher. And the region will remain in a precarious place.

    Ian Parmeter does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Netanyahu has two war aims: destroying Iran’s nuclear program and regime change. Are either achievable? – https://theconversation.com/netanyahu-has-two-war-aims-destroying-irans-nuclear-program-and-regime-change-are-either-achievable-259014

    MIL OSI – Global Reports