Thank you, Chair.

On behalf of France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States, we express our sincere gratitude to Director General Grossi and to his team for their patient and exhaustive efforts to verify Iran’s implementation of its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement required under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and to clarify the critical safeguards issues that have been outstanding for more than six years. Unfortunately, as a result of Iran’s long-time failure to cooperate in resolving these issues, the Agency is not able to provide assurance that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively peaceful.

Since 2019, Iran has had every opportunity to provide the required, technically credible explanations in response to the IAEA’s questions, which relate to Iran’s core legal obligations under its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. Regrettably, though, Iran has again refused to engage constructively with the IAEA to provide such explanations, despite multiple requests by the Board to do so since 2020.

Now, at this Board’s request, Director General Grossi has produced a comprehensive and updated assessment of the possible presence or use of undeclared nuclear material in connection with past and present outstanding issues regarding Iran’s nuclear program, addressing the Agency’s ability to verify Iran’s implementation of its safeguards obligations.

The Director General’s report speaks for itself in describing the full extent of the outstanding safeguards issues in Iran, their connection with Iran’s past nuclear activities, and Iran’s extensive record of obstruction, concealment, deception, and obfuscation in its approach to the work of the IAEA and the implementation of its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement.

The report makes clear that:

Iran has refused to declare nuclear material and nuclear-related activities at three undeclared locations in Iran.

Until the early 2000s, those locations and possibly others formed part of Iran’s undeclared structured nuclear program.

Iran retained, at Turquzabad, up until 2018, unknown nuclear material and/or heavily contaminated equipment and other assets arising from various locations, the whereabouts of which remain unknown to the Agency.

These locations, as well as several others, were sanitized through various means, including the wholesale demolition of buildings, at key times in the IAEA’s investigation and despite direct requests by the Agency to preserve them.

In addition, the Director General’s report underscores that:

Iran is the only country that is not meeting its obligations related to the implementation of the modified Code 3.1, which it accepted in 2003, even as Iran talks openly about constructing new nuclear facilities. As the Agency has recalled multiple times, the modified Code 3.1 is a legal obligation for Iran under the Subsidiary Arrangements to its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. Iran cannot unilaterally modify or suspend implementation of these Subsidiary Arrangements.

Iran is the only State in the world without nuclear weapons that is producing and accumulating uranium enriched to 60%, which has potential proliferation implications.

There have been repeated statements by former high-level officials in Iran related to Iran having the capability to manufacture nuclear weapons, which continue to provide concerns.

The report’s overall assessment is alarming: as a result of Iran’s failure to cooperate with the IAEA, the Director General cannot rule out that nuclear material remains unaccounted for and outside of safeguards in Iran today and he cannot provide assurance that Iran’s nuclear program is exclusively peaceful. These serious findings should give all of us pause.

Chair,

Given the issues reported by the Director General and Iran’s ongoing failure to cooperate with the IAEA, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and United States are bringing forward a resolution for the Board’s consideration finding Iran in noncompliance with its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. Our resolution contains the following main points:

First, it expresses continued, strong support for the Agency’s professional and impartial efforts in carrying out its mandate to verify the implementation of Iran’s safeguards obligations.

Second, it deeply regrets that Iran has failed to co-operate fully with the Agency, as required by its safeguards agreement.

Third, it finds Iran in non-compliance with its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with the Agency in the context of Article XII.C of the Agency’s Statute.

Fourth, it also finds that the Director General’s inability to provide assurance that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively peaceful gives rise to questions that are within the competence of the United Nations Security Council, as the organ bearing the main responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, consistent with Article III.B.4 of the Agency’s Statute.

Fifth, it calls upon Iran to urgently remedy its non-compliance with its Safeguards Agreement by taking all steps deemed necessary by the Agency and the Board, and reaffirms its decision that Iran must urgently act to ensure verification of the non-diversion of nuclear material and abide by its legal obligation to implement modified Code 3.1.

Chair,

The resolution defers the timing and content of the report that the Board is required to take pursuant to the IAEA Statute. We hope that Iran takes this final opportunity to provide full and immediate cooperation with the IAEA so that the Director General can report that these matters have been clarified and resolved, and so that the Board can swiftly consider action to find that Iran’s non-compliance has been remedied.

We do not take this step lightly. The Board of Governors has given Iran every opportunity over the past six years to resolve questions related to undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran. We firmly believe that all IAEA Member States must work together to uphold the integrity of the IAEA safeguards system and the broader nuclear nonproliferation regime, and this shared responsibility includes holding states accountable to their obligations under their NPT-required safeguards agreements. Simply put: the facts are clear, the legal basis is ironclad, and the action is long overdue. That is why we strongly urge all Board members to support this important resolution.

We understand there are questions about how this resolution may impact separate, ongoing diplomatic efforts with Iran. The IAEA Statute is clear on the Board’s authority to act and find non-compliance when a state is not complying with its obligations under its safeguards agreement. Iran’s legally binding obligation to implement its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement cannot be subject to separate political considerations. This resolution will not undermine diplomatic efforts with Iran – it will only strengthen them. It underscores the importance of Iran’s full cooperation with the IAEA, and its full implementation of its legal safeguards obligations, as the necessary foundation for any enduring agreement that addresses international concerns related to Iran’s nuclear activities. The Director General’s comprehensive report echoes this essential point.

We also regret that Iran, instead of providing the full cooperation required by its safeguards agreement, has continued to threaten escalation and confrontation. However, let us be clear: this resolution is not an act of escalation by the Board; it is an acknowledgement of the legal and factual reality of Iran’s noncompliance with its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement after many years of concerted effort by the Director General and the Secretariat to resolve fundamental questions related to undeclared nuclear materials and activities in Iran. It is not the Board that is forcing this step on Iran, but Iran who is forcing this step on the Board.

Chair,

The Board cannot be intimidated into inaction by Iran’s threats. A failure to act would only embolden Iran’s continued non-cooperation and escalation. Iran has an opportunity it can and should seize – an opportunity to cooperate meaningfully with the IAEA to finally answer the serious and longstanding questions raised by the Director General.

With these thoughts, we encourage all members of this Board to join us today in upholding the nonproliferation regime.

Thank you, Chair.