Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Linggong Kong, Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science, Auburn University

Chinese authorities in the northeastern city of Shenyang reportedly arrested a North Korean IT specialist in late April 2025, accusing him of stealing drone technology secrets.

The suspect, apparently linked to North Korea’s main missile development agency, was part of a wider network operating in China, according to the story, which first appeared in South Korea’s Yonhap News Agency. In response, Pyongyang was said to have recalled IT personnel in China.

The story was later circulated by several Chinese online outlets. Given the tight censorship in China, this implies a degree of tacit editorial approval from Beijing – although some sites later deleted the story. In a response to Yonhap over the alleged incident, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson noted that North Korea and China were “friendly neighbors” that maintained “normal” personnel exchanges, without denying the details.

The incident suggests a rare semipublic spat between the two neighboring communist countries, contradicting the image of China and North Korea as “brothers in arms.”

As a scholar of Northeast Asian security, I see the arrest – which has gotten little attention in English-language media – as representative of a wider, more nuanced picture of the two countries’ current relations. There are signs that Beijing is growing frustrated with Pyongyang – not least over North Korea’s increasing closeness with Moscow. Such a development challenges China’s traditional role as North Korea’s primary patron.

In short, the arrest could be a symptom of worsening ties between the two countries.

Beijing’s dilemma over North Korea

North Korea has long been seen by Beijing as both a strategic security buffer and within its natural sphere of influence.

From China’s perspective, allowing a hostile force to gain control of the peninsula – and especially the north – could open the door to future military threats. This fear partly explained why China intervened during the Korean War of 1950-1953.

Beyond security, North Korea also serves as an ideological ally. Both countries are run by communist parties — the Chinese Communist Party and the Workers’ Party of Korea — although the former operates as a Leninist party-state system with a partial embrace of market capitalism, while the latter remains a rigid socialist state characterized by a strong personality cult.

Even today, Chinese state media continues to highlight the bonds of “comradeship” with Pyongyang.

However, Pyongyang’s nuclear ambitions have long troubled Beijing. North Korea has conducted multiple nuclear tests since 2006 and is now believed to possess nuclear weapons capable of targeting South Korea, Japan and U.S. bases in the region.

China supports a denuclearized and stable Korean peninsula – both for regional peace and economic growth. Like the U.S., Japan and South Korea, China opposes nuclear proliferation, fearing North Korea’s periodic tests could provoke U.S. military action or trigger an arms race in the region.

Meanwhile, Washington and its allies continue to pressure Beijing to do more to rein in a neighbor it often views as a vassal state of China.

Given China’s economic ties with the U.S. and Washington’s East Asian allies – mainly South Korea and Japan – it has every reason to avoid further instability from Pyongyang.

Yet to North Korea’s isolationist rulers, nuclear weapons are vital for the regime’s survival and independence. What’s more, nuclear weapons can also limit Beijing’s influence.

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un worries that without nuclear leverage, China could try to interfere in the internal affairs of his country. After the death if Kim’s father, Kim Jong Il, in 2011, Beijing was thought to favor Kim Jong Un’s elder half-brother Kim Jong Nam as successor — possibly prompting Kim Jong Un to have him assassinated in 2017.

But despite ongoing tensions over the nuclear issue, China has continued to support the North Korean regime for strategic reasons.

For decades, China has been Pyongyang’s top trading partner, providing crucial economic aid. In 2023, China accounted for about 98% of North Korea’s official trade and continued to supply food and fuel to keep the regime afloat.

Pyongyang pals up with Putin

Yet over the past few years, more of North Korea’s imports, notably oil, have come from another source: Russia.

North Korea and Russia had been close allies during the Cold War, but ties cooled after the Soviet Union collapsed in the early 1990s.

More recently, a shared hostility toward the U.S. and the West in general has brought the two nations closer.

Moscow’s international isolation following the 2022 invasion of Ukraine and its deteriorating ties with South Korea in particular have pushed it toward Pyongyang. North Korea has reportedly supplied large quantities of ammunition to Russia, becoming a critical munitions supplier in the Ukraine war.

Though both governments deny the arms trade – banned under United Nations sanctions – North Korea is thought to have received fuel, food and access to Russian military and space technology in return. On March 8, 2025, North Korea unveiled a nuclear-powered submarine that experts believe may involve Russian technological assistance.

By 2024, Russian forces were using around 10,000 shells per day in Ukraine, with half sourced from North Korea. Some front-line units were reportedly using North Korean ammunition for up to 60% of their firepower.

High-level visits have also increased. In July 2023, Russia’s defense minister, Andrey Belousov, visited Pyongyang for the 70th anniversary of the Korean War armistice, followed by Kim Jong Un’s visit to Russia in September for a summit with President Vladimir Putin.

In June 2024, Putin visited Pyongyang, where the two countries signed a comprehensive strategic cooperation agreement, including a pledge that each would come to the other’s aid if attacked.

Soon after, North Korea began sending troops to support Russia. Intelligence from the U.S., South Korea and Ukraine indicates that Pyongyang deployed 10,000 to 12,000 soldiers in late 2023, marking its first involvement in a major conflict since the Korean War. North Korean soldiers reportedly receive at least US$2,000 per month plus a bonus. For Pyongyang, this move not only provides financial gain but also combat experience should war ever reignite on the Korean Peninsula.

Why China is worried

China, too, has remained on friendly terms with Russia since the war in Ukraine began. So why would it feel uneasy about the growing closeness between Pyongyang and Moscow?

For starters, China views Pyongyang’s outreach to Moscow as a challenge to its traditional role as North Korea’s main patron. While still dependent on Chinese aid, North Korea appears to be seeking greater autonomy.

The strengthening of Russia–North Korea ties also fuels Western fears of an “axis of upheaval” involving all three countries.

Unlike North Korea’s confrontational stance toward the West and its neighbor to the south, Beijing has offered limited support to Moscow during the Ukraine war and is cautious not to appear part of a trilateral alliance.

Behind this strategy is a desire on behalf of China to maintain stable relations with the U.S., Europe and key Asian neighbors like Japan and South Korea. Doing so may be the best way for Beijing to protect its economic and diplomatic interests.

China is also concerned that with Russian support in nuclear and missile technologies, Pyongyang may act more provocatively — through renewed nuclear tests or military clashes with South Korea. And this would only destabilize the region and strain China’s ties with the West.

A defiant and provocative Pyongyang

The timing of the alleged spy drama may offer further clues regarding the state of relations.

It came [just a day after] North Korea officially confirmed it had deployed troops to aid the Russian war effort. It also announced plans to erect a monument in Pyongyang honoring its soldiers who died in the Ukraine war.

The last spy case like this was in June 2016 when Chinese authorities arrested a North Korean citizen in the border city of Dandong. It reportedly followed Pyongyang informing China that it would permanently pursue its nuclear weapons program.

The China-North Korea relationship deteriorated further when North Korea successfully tested a hydrogen bomb in September 2016, prompting Beijing to back U.N. Security Council sanctions against Pyongyang.

Again, this time North Korea shows little sign of bending to China’s will.
On April 30, Kim oversaw missile launches from North Korea’s first 5,000-ton destroyer, touted as its most heavily armed warship.

None of which will help ease Beijing’s concerns. While China still sees Pyongyang as a critical buffer against U.S. influence in Northeast Asia, an increasingly provocative North Korea, fueled by a growing relationship with Russia, is starting to look less like a strategic asset — and more like a liability.

Linggong Kong does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. North Korean spy drama in China may signal Beijing’s unease over growing Pyongyang-Moscow ties – https://theconversation.com/north-korean-spy-drama-in-china-may-signal-beijings-unease-over-growing-pyongyang-moscow-ties-255698