Category: Europe

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Protecting EU consumers against the backdrop of FWU Life Insurance Lux S.A.’s liquidation – E-000794/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    Effective supervision is essential for protecting EU consumers and fostering trust in the single market.

    Under the Solvency II Directive[1], the authority of the Member State where an insurer has established its head office has primary responsibility for its supervision and the competence to take necessary measures if its financial condition is not sufficiently sound.

    The Insurance Recovery and Resolution Directive (IRRD)[2] and the Solvency II Amending Directive[3] reinforce the regulatory framework, aiming to better protect policyholders and enhance coordination among national authorities.

    The IRRD introduces harmonised recovery and resolution measures to protect policyholders, beneficiaries and claimants, and ensure effective crisis management[4].

    It also mandates the Commission to issue by January 2027 a report on the potential for minimum common standards for Insurance Guarantee Schemes and, if appropriate, a legislative proposal.

    The Solvency II review introduces stronger cooperation and wider information exchange between the home and host Member State supervisors in case of significant cross-border activities[5]. It also enhances the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority’s powers to intervene in complex cross-border cases[6].

    Effective and harmonised supervision is also a key objective of the Savings and Investments Union[7]. In this context, the Commission calls on the European Supervisory Authorities and National Competent Authorities to make full use of existing supervisory convergence tools.

    Furthermore, it announced its intention to propose measures to strengthen these tools and enhance their effectiveness[8], thereby supporting greater consistency in supervisory practices across the EU.

    • [1] Directive 2009/138/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009 on the taking-up and pursuit of the business of Insurance and Reinsurance, OJ L 335, 17.12.2009, p. 1-155.
    • [2] Directive (EU) 2025/1 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 November 2024 establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of insurance and reinsurance undertakings and amending Directives 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2007/36/EC, 2014/59/EU and (EU) 2017/1132 and Regulations (EU) No 1094/2010, (EU) No 648/2012, (EU) No 806/2014 and (EU) 2017/1129, OJ L, 2025/1, 8.1.2025.
    • [3] Directive (EU) 2025/2 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 November 2024 amending Directive 2009/138/EC as regards proportionality, quality of supervision, reporting, long-term guarantee measures, macro-prudential tools, sustainability risks and group and cross-border supervision, and amending Directives 2002/87/EC and 2013/34/EU, OJ L, 2025/2, 8.1.2025.
    • [4] In particular, it equips national supervisory authorities and national resolution authority with harmonised mandates and tools to intervene when insurers face financial distress.
    • [5] In particular, the home supervisory authority must promptly inform the host authority if it detects deteriorating financial conditions in an insurance undertaking under its jurisdiction. Under certain conditions, the host authority may also request a joint on-site inspection with the home authority and, if the latter accepts the request, EIOPA is invited to participate. See new Articles 152aa, 152ab, 152b of the Solvency II Directive.
    • [6] Including by means of binding mediation and, under specific conditions, the disclosure of the names of concerned undertakings
    • [7] https://finance.ec.europa.eu/publications/commission-unveils-savings-and-investments-union-strategy-enhance-financial-opportunities-eu_en
    • [8] The proposal is scheduled for the fourth quarter of 2025.
    Last updated: 24 April 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Commission opinion on the amendment of Law 5/2018 on the Horta of Valencia in the Valencian Country – E-000780/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    There is no EU legislation on the conservation of traditional landscapes or requiring climate resilience in vulnerable areas. However, the ‘Horta de Valencia’ is partially included in the Natura 2000 network[1], protected under the Habitats[2] and the Birds[3] Directives.

    Natura 2000 sites or parts of them can only be de-designated under very strict conditions[4], and are protected under the regime set out in Article 6 of the Habitats Directive. The Commission has issued guidance documents to support Member States in the management of Natura 2000 sites[5].

    Furthermore, the Nature Restoration Regulation[6] sets out a number of country-wide binding restoration targets for specific habitats and species including in urban and agricultural ecosystems. Member States must submit National Restoration Plans to the Commission by mid-2026, showing how they deliver on the targets.

    In addition to the above-mentioned provisions of EU law on nature protection and restoration, any project, plan or programme likely to have significant effects on the environment will have to comply with the relevant requirements of the Environmental Impact Assessment[7] or the Strategic Environmental Assessment[8] Directives.

    In any case, it should be borne in mind that Member States are primarily responsible for ensuring compliance with EU law. In line with its strategic approach on enforcement action[9], which focuses on cases of systemic non-compliance, the Commission considers that the means of redress available under national legislation would be the most appropriate mechanism to address individual cases of possible non-compliance.

    However, in its role as guardian of the Treaties, the Commission will continue monitoring the situation and may decide to take appropriate action.

    • [1]  L’Albufera (SiteCode: ES0000023), l’Albufera (ZEPA) (SiteCode: ES0000471).
    • [2] Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora, OJ L 206, 22.7.1992, p. 7-50.
    • [3] Directive 2009/147/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 November 2009 on the conservation of wild birds (Codified version), OJ L 20, 26.1.2010, p. 7-25.
    • [4] https://circabc.europa.eu/ui/group/fcb355ee-7434-4448-a53d-5dc5d1dac678/library/8555aa28-9fb6-411f-8228-f8c99b296564/details
    • [5] https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/9a406f60-be3c-11e9-9d01-01aa75ed71a1
    • [6] Regulation (EU) 2024/1991 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2024 on nature restoration and amending Regulation (EU) 2022/869 (Text with EEA relevance) — OJ L, 2024/1991, 29.7.2024.
    • [7] Directive 2011/92/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment, OJ L 26, 28.1.2012, p. 1-21, as amended by Directive 2014/52/EU of 16 April 2014 — OJ L 124, 25.4.2014, p. 1-18.
    • [8] Directive 2001/42/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 June 2001 on the assessment of the effects of certain plans and programmes on the environment, OJ L 197, 21.7.2001, p. 30-37.
    • [9] As set out in the communication of 19 January 2017 (EU law: Better results through better application — C/2016/8600, OJ C 18, 19.1.2017, p. 10-20) and in the communication of 13 October 2022 COM(2022) 518 final — Enforcing EU law for a Europe that delivers.
    Last updated: 24 April 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – EU competences in forest matters – E-000936/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The EU has a variety of competences shared with Member States that have an impact on forest protection and forestry, including climate, environment, energy and agriculture, which the Union has exercised respecting the principle of subsidiarity[1].

    The EU has exercised these competences through the adoption of legislation using the appropriate legal basis. As forests are natural resources and an integral part of the environment, the Habitats[2] and Wild Birds Directive[3], the Land Use, Land Use Change, and Forestry (LULUCF) Regulation[4], the Deforestation Regulation[5], the Nature Restoration Law[6], the Carbon Removal Certification Framework[7] are based on Article 192(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), and so is the proposal for a regulation on a Forest Monitoring Framework[8], currently in the co-decision procedure.

    The Renewable Energy Directive[9] has multiple legal bases under TFEU (Article 114 — internal market, Article 192(1) — environment and Article 194(2) — energy), while the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development[10] is based on Articles 42 and 43(2).

    EU action on climate, biodiversity and circular economy as well as their benefits inherently relate to natural ecosystems, including forests.

    The mentioned Commission proposal for a Forest Monitoring Framework aims at having accurate, timely and comparable data on forests across the EU, in view of increasing pressures and stressors, and their cross-border impacts.

    • [1] Court of Justice of the European Union judgment of 25 February 1999 in Joined Cases C-164/97 and C-165/97, EU:C:1999:99.
    • [2] Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora, OJ L 206, 22.7.1992, p. 7-50.
    • [3] Directive 2009/147/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 November 2009 on the conservation of wild birds, OJ L 20, 26.1.2010, p. 7-25.
    • [4] Regulation (EU) 2018/841 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2018 on the inclusion of greenhouse gas emissions and removals from land use, land use change and forestry in the 2030 climate and energy framework and amending Regulation (EU) No 525/2013 and Decision No 529/2013/EU, OJ L 156, 19.6.2018, p. 1-25.
    • [5] Regulation (EU) 2023/1115 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 May 2023 on the making available on the Union market and the export from the Union of certain commodities and products associated with deforestation and forest degradation and repealing Regulation (EU) No 995/2010, OJ L 150, 9.6.2023, p. 206-247.
    • [6] Regulation (EU) 2024/1991 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2024 on nature restoration and amending Regulation (EU) 2022/869, OJ L, 2024/1991, 29.7.2024.
    • [7] Regulation (EU) 2024/3012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 November 2024 establishing a Union certification framework for permanent carbon removals, carbon farming and carbon storage in products, OJ L, 2024/3012, 6.12.2024.
    • [8] https://environment.ec.europa.eu/publications/proposal-regulation-forest-monitoring-framework_en
    • [9] Directive (EU) 2018/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources, as amended, OJ L 328, 21.12.2018, p. 82-209.
    • [10] https://commission.europa.eu/funding-tenders/find-funding/eu-funding-programmes/european-agricultural-fund-rural-development-eafrd_en

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Security: Three Members of an International Money Laundering Organization Charged with Laundering Millions of Dollars in Drug Proceeds

    Source: Office of United States Attorneys

    WASHINGTON – A federal grand jury in Florence, South Carolina returned an indictment on Tuesday, April 22, charging Nasir Ullah, 28, and Naim Ullah, 32, both of Sumter, South Carolina, and Puquan Huang, 49, of Buford, Georgia, with conspiring to launder millions of dollars of proceeds derived from drug trafficking.

    “As alleged in the indictment, the defendants laundered tens of millions of dollars in drug proceeds from the United States through China and the Middle East, enabling a continuous flow of fentanyl and other dangerous drugs into our country from Mexico,” said Matthew R. Galeotti, Head of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division. “Dismantling transnational criminal organizations and Chinese Money Laundering Organizations that support them is a critical priority for the Department. Alongside DEA and our local law enforcement partners, we will continue to prosecute the financial networks that fuel illegal drug trade and profit from the sale of deadly substances.”

    “We are committed to dismantling criminal organizations that seek to profit through the distribution of dangerous drugs like cocaine and fentanyl across South Carolina and beyond,” said Acting U.S. Attorney Brook B. Andrews for the District of South Carolina. “This $30 million money laundering operation, which has international ties, was conducted in multiple communities in our state. We will continue to work tirelessly with our law enforcement partners to trace these illicit funds, disrupt these networks, and hold those involved accountable for the harm they present.”

    “Cases like this exemplify the value of partnerships,” said Jae W. Chung, Acting Special Agent in Charge of the DEA Atlanta Division. “The volume of dangerous drugs, including deadly fentanyl, impacts our communities beyond comprehension. This investigation and subsequent arrests demonstrate DEA’s commitment to protecting our community by destroying these drug trafficking and money laundering organizations.”

    According to court documents, unsealed today, Ullah, Ullah, and Huang allegedly worked for a money laundering organization that laundered at least $30 million in proceeds related to the distribution of illegal drugs, including cocaine and fentanyl, which were unlawfully imported into the United States, typically through Mexico. Ullah, Ullah, Huang, and their co-conspirators allegedly traveled throughout the United States to collect drug proceeds. They communicated with co-conspirators in China to arrange for the laundering of these proceeds through transactions designed to conceal the illegal source of the proceeds, including disguising the source of the drug proceeds by moving money through the shipment of electronic goods to China and the Middle East.

    Ullah, Ullah, and Huang are charged with conspiracy to commit money laundering. If convicted, they each face a maximum penalty of 20 years in prison.

    The DEA’s Charleston, South Carolina Resident Office is investigating the case, with assistance from the DEA’s Special Operations Division, Bilateral Investigations Unit; DEA’s Office of Special Intelligence, Document and Media Exploitation Unit; DEA’s offices in Columbia, South Carolina and Atlanta, Georgia; the FBI’s offices in Charleston and Columbia, South Carolina; the U.S. Air Force, Office of Special Investigations; the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division; the Sumter County Sheriff’s Office; the South Carolina Highway Patrol; the Fort Mill Police Department; the York County Sheriff’s Office; the North Charleston Police Department; the Mount Pleasant Police Department; and the Richland County Sheriff’s Department.

    Trial Attorneys Mary K. Daly and Jasmin Salehi Fashami of the Criminal Division’s Money Laundering and Asset Recovery Section and Assistant U.S. Attorney Everett E. McMillian for the District of South Carolina are prosecuting the case.

    The Third and Fifth Judicial Circuit Solicitor’s Offices of South Carolina provided assistance in this case.

    An indictment is merely an allegation. All defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law.

    ###

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Former ILVA plant and JTF financing – E-000927/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    According to available information, the EUR 400 million in question are distinct from the so-called bridge loan and are part of the EUR 1.1 billion seized from the former owners of ILVA to remedy the environmental impact of the plant.

    In Decision (EU) 2018/1498[1], the Commission concluded that the latter amount[2] was not state aid[3]. The destination of these funds was not an element retained by the Commission in its assessment (as non-aid) and, therefore, without prejudice to the application of Italian law, a change in such destination does not constitute a breach of the decision.

    A new permit in line with the Industrial Emissions Directive (IED)[4] is due to be issued to the Acciaierie d’Italia plant by June 2025. The Commission receives updates on the progress made to bring the plant into compliance with the IED and is in contact with the Italian authorities to address the issues raised in the infringement procedure[5].

    The European Regional Development Fund (ERDF)[6] can only support small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) or investments related to the production, processing, transport, distribution, storage, or combustion of fossil fuels, with some exceptions[7]. Regulation (EU) 2021/1056[8] excludes support to those activities under the Just Transition Fund (JTF)[9].

    Further exceptions for the support of such investments are introduced in the proposal for a regulation amending Regulation (EU) 2021/1058 and (EU) 2021/1056[10].

    In addition, while support to enterprises others than SMEs is allowed by Regulation (EU) 2021/1056, it is not under the Italian JTF National Programme[11].

    Thus, investments involving large enterprises and related to blue hydrogen cannot be financed under the above-mentioned programmes, unless exceptions apply.

    • [1] Commission Decision (EU) 2018/1498 of 21 December 2017 on the state aid and the measures SA.38613 (2016/C) (ex 2015/NN) implemented by Italy for Ilva SpA in Amministrazione Straordinaria (notified under document C(2017) 8391), OJ L 253, 9.10.2018, p. 45-75.
    • [2] ‘Measure 1: the transfer of the assets seized during criminal proceedings against Ilva’s previous owners’.
    • [3] Section 2.2.1, Section 5.2.1 and Article 1(a) of Decision (EU) 2018/1498.
    • [4] Directive (EU) 2024/1785 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 April 2024 amending Directive 2010/75/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on industrial emissions (integrated pollution prevention and control) and Council Directive 1999/31/EC on the landfill of waste, OJ L, 2024/1785, 15.7.2024.
    • [5]  INFR(2013)2177: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_13_866
    • [6] Regulation (EU) 2021/1058 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 on the European Regional Development Fund and on the Cohesion Fund, OJ L 231, 30.6.2021.
    • [7] Article 7(1)(h) of Regulation (EU) 2021/1058.
    • [8] Regulation (EU) 2021/1056 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 establishing the Just Transition Fund, OJ L 231, 30.6.2021.
    • [9] Article 9(d) of Regulation (EU) 2021/1056.
    • [10] Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2021/1058 and (EU) 2021/1056 as regards specific measures to address strategic challenges in the context of the mid-term review .
    • [11] https://www.jtf.gov.it/the-program/

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Wholesale natural gas prices and increasing costs of storage refill – E-000111/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The Commission is committed to bring down energy prices for households and businesses to support the energy transition and EU’s competitiveness.

    As part of the Clean Industrial Deal[1], the Commission adopted an Action Plan for affordable Energy[2] outlining key actions to lower energy costs for European consumers, including by ensuring well-functioning and transparent gas markets.

    Mandatory filling targets in the Gas Storage Regulation (EU) 2022/1032[3] have increased transparency and predictability of market participants’ behaviour, contributing to market stability, especially during the 2022-2023 energy crisis[4].

    Although the situation has improved, the gas market remains tight and competition for global liquified natural gas has increased. This is why the Commission has proposed to extend this regulation by 2 years[5].

    At the same time, understanding the need for greater flexibility, the Commission issued a recommendation[6] to support Member States on how to identify and apply flexibility existing within the existing legislative framework to better coordinate and smartly design their storage filling policies ahead of winter 2025/2026.

    The Commission on the other hand will consider actual market conditions when deciding on enforcement of the storage filling targets.

    The Commission is carefully monitoring the internal energy market and has a good overview of the situation in individual Member States, including the effects the war against Ukraine may have on their security of supply.

    Analysis shows that the impact of the end of Russian gas transit via Ukraine on gas prices has been limited. To address specific challenges, the Commission has established a High-Level Working Group with Slovakia, and is going to launch one with Hungary.

    • [1] The Clean Industrial Deal: A Joint roadmap for competitiveness and decarbonisation COM(2025) 85 final.
    • [2] Action Plan for Affordable Energy: Unlocking the true value of our Energy Union to secure affordable, efficient and clean energy for all Europeans COM(2025) 79 final.
    • [3] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/1032/oj/eng
    • [4] Report from the Commission on solidarity and certain aspects concerning gas storage based on Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 of the European Parliament and of the Council COM(2025) 98 final.
    • [5] Proposal for Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 as regards the role of gas storage for securing gas supplies ahead of the winter season.
    • [6] Commission Recommendation on the implementation of the gas storage filling targets in 2025 COM(2025) 1481 final.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Ongoing discrimination in online sales against remote and outermost regions of the EU – E-000630/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    Under the Geo-blocking Regulation[1], deciding whether to offer delivery services in specific locations within Member States remains the business choice of the trader.

    Charging higher prices for delivery depending on the area served may also be justified in light of increased costs . However, customers from other Member States are entitled to delivery in areas served by the trader according to its general conditions of access on the same terms as local customers without discrimination.

    The Commission cooperates with national authorities and the Consumer Protection Cooperation Network[2] to enforce the regulation and tackle unjustified geo-blocking.

    The Commission has established, on the basis of Regulation (EU) 2018/644[3] on cross-border parcel delivery services, a public database with information on more than 44 000 domestic and cross border tariffs[4].

    E-commerce providers may thus rely on a diverse and substantial offer to ensure delivery throughout the EU. However, only universal service providers are under the obligation imposed by Directive 97/67/EC[5] to provide affordable, cost-oriented, and non-discriminatory tariffs.

    The Commission has just launched an evaluation of the Geo-blocking Regulation[6] to assess if any further measures are needed to address remaining barriers and strengthen cross-border trade in the EU.

    The Commission remains committed to supporting a stronger integration of the outermost regions in the single market, in line with the 2022 EU Outermost Regions Strategy[7].

    • [1] Regulation (EU) 2018/302 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 February 2018 on addressing unjustified geo-blocking and other forms of discrimination based on customers’ nationality, place of residence or place of establishment within the internal market and amending Regulations (EC) No 2006/2004 and (EU) 2017/2394 and Directive 2009/22/EC, OJ L 60I, 2.3.2018, p. 1-15.
    • [2] https://commission.europa.eu/live-work-travel-eu/consumer-rights-and-complaints/enforcement-consumer-protection/consumer-protection-cooperation-network_en
    • [3] Regulation (EU) 2018/644 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 April 2018 on cross-border parcel delivery services, OJ L 112, 2.5.2018, p. 19-28.
    • [4] https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/sectors/postal-services/parcel-delivery-eu/find-best-price-your-eu-parcel-delivery_en
    • [5] Directive 97/67/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 December 1997 on common rules for the development of the internal market of Community postal services and the improvement of quality of service, OJ L 15, 21.1.1998, p. 14-25, amended by Directive 2002/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 June 2002 amending Directive 97/67/EC with regard to the further opening to competition of Community postal services, OJ L 176, 5.7.2002, p. 21-25, and amended by Directive 2008/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 February 2008 amending Directive 97/67/EC with regard to the full accomplishment of the internal market of Community postal services, OJ L 52, 27.2.2008, p. 3-20.
    • [6] See the call for evidence published on the Have Your Say portal: https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/14416-Geo-blocking-Regulation-evaluation_en
    • [7] Communication ‘Putting people first, securing sustainable and inclusive growth, unlocking the potential of the EU’s outermost regions’ (COM/2022/198 final).
    Last updated: 24 April 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Customs duties in the EU – E-000788/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    Anti-dumping duties on fertilisers are only applicable to imports of urea ammonium nitrate mixtures from Trinidad and Tobago and the United States of America.

    The Commission is currently conducting an expiry review investigation on the anti-dumping measures applicable to these imports.

    The expiry review was initiated on 8 October 2024, at the request of the EU industry, and the Commission is currently investigating whether expiry of these measures would be likely to result in continuation and/or recurrence of dumping and continuation or recurrence of injury to the EU industry.

    The review investigation will be normally concluded within 12 months of the date of initiation of the review, but not later than 15 months from initiation.

    The Commission is not carrying out at this stage legislative work as regards suspending conventional duties on imports of the products referred to by the Honourable Member (codes 3102 10, 3102 80, 3105 30, 3105 40 and 3105 20 from the tariff nomenclature).

    The Commission is monitoring prices applicable in the EU for these and other nitrogen-based fertilisers and retains its prerogative of proposing to the Council the suspension of Common Customs Tariffs should the price levels of these goods increase.

    On 19 April 2024, the Commission published for public feedback a draft Commission directive amending Annex III of the Nitrates Directive[1] as regards the use of certain fertilising materials from livestock manure (RENURE). Discussions on the draft text are underway in the Nitrates Committee with the competent Member State authorities.

    • [1] Nitrates — updated rules on the use of certain fertilising materials from livestock manure (RENURE); https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/14242-Nitrates-updated-rules-on-the-use-of-certain-fertilising-materials-from-livestock-manure-RENURE-_en
    Last updated: 24 April 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Video: Syria, Haiti & other topics – Daily Press Briefing (24 April 2025) | United Nations

    Source: United Nations (Video News)

    Noon Briefing by Stéphane Dujarric, Spokesperson for the Secretary-General.

    Highlights:

    – Syria
    – Briefings Tomorrow
    – Secretary-General
    – Deputy Secretary-General
    – Occupied Palestinian Territory
    – U.N.I.F.I.L.
    – Yemen
    – Democratic Republic of the Congo
    – Haitian Migrants
    – Haiti
    – Ukraine
    – Myanmar
    – Immunization Week
    – International Days

    SYRIA
    Tomorrow at 8 a.m., the new three-starred Syrian flag will be raised, next to the flags of the other 193 Member States and the two permanent observers. If you have any questions about media coverage, please ask the Media Accreditation and Liaison Unit (MALU). They will facilitate that. And just to stay on Syria, Geir Pedersen will be here to brief the Council tomorrow and he will be speaking to you at the stakeout afterwards.

    BRIEFINGS TOMORROW
    Tomorrow at 11:00 a.m., there will be a hybrid press briefing by Ambassador Jürg Lauber, the President of the Human Rights Council.
    And our Noon Briefing guest will be Ulrika Richardson, the Humanitarian Coordinator for Haiti, who also serves as the Deputy Special Representative and Resident Coordinator for Haiti. She will brief us virtually on Haiti.

    SECRETARY-GENERAL
    This evening, the Secretary-General will be traveling this evening to Rome, where on Saturday he will attend the funeral of Pope Francis at St. Peter’s Basilica.
    This afternoon, the Secretary-General will sign the Book of Condolences for the Pope at the Observer Mission of the Holy See.
    On Tuesday, the UN flag will fly at half-mast to honour the passing of the late Pontiff.

    DEPUTY SECRETARY-GENERAL
    Our Deputy Secretary-General, Amina Mohammed, continues her visit to Washington, D.C., for the World Bank/IMF Annual Spring Meetings.
    This morning, she took part in a Women Lead Breakfast with over 50 female leaders, which was hosted by the World Bank Managing Directors. Amina Mohammed highlighted women’s labour and economic participation as one of the most powerful forces driving inclusive and sustainable development, and she called for women’s leadership to be placed at the centre of decision-making.
    Later, she participated in the G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors Meeting, where she underscored the importance of advancing reforms to the international financial architecture to make it more inclusive and responsive.
    This afternoon, she will deliver remarks at the 111th meeting of the World Bank/IMF Development Committee and continue her engagements with senior government officials and other key stakeholders. She will be on her way back later today.

    Full Highlights: https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/noon-briefing-highlight?date%5Bvalue%5D%5Bdate%5D=24%20April%202025

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6VIPt0O88YQ

    MIL OSI Video

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Briefing – EU-UK trade flows: Continuities, changes and trends – 24-04-2025

    Source: European Parliament

    The Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) between the European Union (EU) and the United Kingdom (UK), which entered into force in May 2021, governs the EU’s relationship with the UK, following its withdrawal from the EU. In addition to the European Commission evaluating the implementation of the TCA on an annual basis, Article 776 of the TCA provides for a joint review of the deal’s implementation five years after its entry into force, in 2026. On 20 November 2024, the European Parliament’s Conference of Presidents approved a joint request from the Committees on Foreign Affairs (AFET) and on International Trade (INTA) to draw up an implementation report in response to the European Commission’s 21 March 2024 report on the implementation and application of the EU-UK TCA. This briefing seeks to inform the drafting of the joint AFET–INTA implementation report. The briefing provides an analysis of the data on trade flows between the EU and the UK in the last two years (2023 and 2024), in the context of the implementation of the TCA. It should be read in tandem with the European Implementation Assessment on the EU-UK TCA, published by the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) in December 2023, which analyses EU-UK trade flows in the first two years of the TCA’s implementation. That EPRS study was requested by AFET and INTA to inform their 2023 joint implementation report on the same subject. Similar to the 2023 EPRS study, this briefing concludes that the TCA continues to have a stronger impact on the UK than on the EU in the trade relationship. Trade between the EU and the UK continues to be more complex and challenging compared to when the UK was an EU Member State, even if the implementation of the TCA in the last four years has been generally smooth, with some exceptions. The UK has managed to bounce back from COVID and Brexit less successfully than the EU and has, like the EU-27, been affected by Russia’s war in Ukraine and inflation. EU-UK trade in goods decreased slightly in 2023 and 2024, and it is still below pre-Brexit levels. EU-UK trade in services (the TCA does not cover financial services), continues to be less disrupted, and surpassed pre-COVID 19 levels as of 2023. At a time of uncertainty on the future direction of trade policy, geopolitical upheaval, and the United States administration’s (potential) new tariffs on imports from its trading partners (including the UK and the EU), the TCA offers an opportunity to deepen EU-UK trade relations.

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Addressing barriers in the EU single market for services – E-000302/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The Commission will present at the end of May 2025 an ambitious horizontal Single Market Strategy. The strategy will build on the Commission’s extensive dialogue with stakeholders and the input received through a call for evidence.

    The strategy will provide an overarching vision for the Single Market and announce concrete actions on the Single Market for services and goods as well as the horizontal functioning of the Single Market.

    The Single Market for services will be one of the main focus areas of the strategy. Services withing the Single Market account for 70% of EU Gross Domestic Product and employment.

    Yet, the Single Market for services performs below its full potential. Intra-EU trade in services is less than one third of that in goods, and not higher than with third countries.

    Despite an initial reduction of regulatory barriers following the transposition of the Services Directive[1], around 60% of the barriers experienced by companies 20 years ago are still of the same type today.

    Member States restrict access to more than 5700 regulated services, equivalent to one fifth of the labour force. Stakeholders call for a new impulse to reduce regulatory and administrative barriers to the free movement of services in the Single Market, such as sector-specific initiatives to complement horizontal services policies, lighter authorisation regimes and less or simplified declaration obligations as well as improved online information and less burdensome administrative procedures.

    Especially given the current context of trade tensions, the growth potential of the Single Market needs to be unleashed. The European Single Market is a joint endeavour, unlocking its full potential requires action at both, EU and Member States level.

    • [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32006L0123
    Last updated: 24 April 2025

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Territorial supply restrictions and artificial price increases for basic food products – E-000393/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    Territorial supply constraints can impede the good functioning of the Single Market to the detriment of consumers. They facilitate the maintenance of unjustified price differences between geographical markets in the EU for many products, including daily consumer goods.

    Competition law is an effective tool to fight territorial supply constraints if these are imposed unilaterally by companies that are in a dominant position or if they result from anti-competitive agreements between companies.

    This was demonstrated in the AB InBev and in Mondelez cases[1] where the Commission fined these companies for hindering the cross-border trade of certain products. However, territorial supply constraints may also occur outside these conditions.

    For those territorial supply constraints which are not captured by competition law, the Commission has launched a fact-finding exercise with the Member States to map their occurrence across the EU.

    In addition, as announced in the Retail Transition Pathway[2], the Commission will organise on 7 April 2025, a stakeholder dialogue with retailers, manufacturers and consumers to hear their views.

    Against this background, the Commission will identify in the Single Market Strategy to be adopted at the end of May 2025 a way forward so that European consumers can enjoy the benefits of the Single Market, no matter where they reside.

    • [1] https://competition-cases.ec.europa.eu/cases/AT.40632. (regarding Mondelez), and https://competition-cases.ec.europa.eu/cases/AT.40134 (regarding AB InBev).
    • [2] https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/industry/transition-pathways_en
    Last updated: 24 April 2025

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Future trade agreement with Ukraine – E-000792/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    As the autonomous trade measures for imports from Ukraine will expire on 5 June 2025, the Commission is committed to pursuing the review of the current trade conditions under Article 29 of the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA)[1] with Ukraine.

    The Commission is confident that this review will be the best way to provide stability and predictability for producers and other stakeholders in the EU as well as in Ukraine.

    The review of the DCFTA should take into account as much as possible the concerns of the EU producers and other stakeholders . It will be crucial to find the right balance between the necessity to continue facilitating the movement of Ukrainian agricultural goods, thereby supporting the Ukrainian economy in its efforts in sustaining its fight against the Russian aggressor, and at the same time address the concerns of EU stakeholders about the increased agri-food imports from Ukraine.

    Furthermore, the Commission is considering including a strong safeguard clause as well as a link to compliance with relevant EU production standards. The Commission is currently working on the details of its position.

    • [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:22014A0529(01)
    Last updated: 24 April 2025

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Safeguarding the security interests of all Member States in the context of Türkiye’s possible inclusion in the EU defence programme SAFE – E-001528/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-001528/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Afroditi Latinopoulou (PfE)

    The EU is considering various forms of possible military cooperation with Türkiye, including the deployment of European multinational forces in Ukraine to secure peace or a ceasefire with the active participation of Türkiye. At the same time, it is considering launching a new dialogue on Türkiye’s accession path.

    It should be noted that the White Paper on the Future of European Defence included provisions according to which the EU would act ‘in a way that is without prejudice to the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States, and takes into account the security and defence interests of all Member States’.

    Can the Commission therefore answer the following:

    • 1.How will it be ensured that the strategic cooperation between the EU and Türkiye is commensurate with Türkiye’s progress in its accession process as well as the country’s bilateral relations with Greece and Cyprus?
    • 2.On the basis of the provisions of the White Paper, what specific measures are envisaged to protect Greece’s security interests in the event that Türkiye is included in the defence programme SAFE?
    • 3.What mechanisms does it have at its disposal to deal with any deterioration in the relations between Türkiye and Greece or Cyprus or efforts by Türkiye to utilise its defence cooperation with the EU in a way that would jeopardise the security of Member States?

    Submitted: 14.4.2025

    Last updated: 24 April 2025

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Highlights – European Central Bank – annual report 2025 – Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs

    Source: European Parliament

    On Monday 28 April, from 15.00 to 16.00, Luis de Guindos, Vice-President of the European Central Bank (ECB), will as usual present to the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) the ECB’s Annual Report followed by an exchange of views.

    The ECB will publish its Annual Report 2024 in 22 EU official languages on the ECB’s website on Monday 28 April at 15:00. It covers the ECB’s monetary policy and economic and financial developments in 2024 and presents the activities of the Eurosystem in its various areas of competence. At the same time, the ECB will also publish its response to comments and suggestions raised by the European Parliament in its Resolution on the ECB, as voted on 11 February 2025.

    The presentation of the ECB’s Annual Report and the exchange of view with ECON Members will also be an opportunity to discuss the latest developments, challenges and outlook in economic and monetary affairs and is expected to feed into the preparation of the European Parliament’s ECB annual report 2025.

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Thierry Breton’s statements to the media – E-000278/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The Commission does not comment about statements that former Commissioners make in their private capacity.

    Elections are at the core of democracy, which is a founding value of the EU.

    The conduct and the organisation of elections are the competence and responsibility of the Member States, in accordance with their national constitutional and legislative rules, as well as with their international obligations and EU law. National competent authorities and courts have the primary responsibility of ensuring compliance with these rules.

    The Commission supports Member States on electoral matters, notably through the framework of the European cooperation network on elections[1], which brings together national authorities with competences in electoral matters and facilitates the exchanges of information and best practices.

    The Commission is also working with Member States to support the application of EU law provisions which are relevant in national electoral contexts within the EU, such as under the Digital Service Act[2], the regulation on the transparency and targeting of political advertising[3] (which will become fully applicable in October 2025), the General Data Protection Regulation[4] and the Artificial Intelligence Act[5].

    In 2023, the Commission also published a recommendation on inclusive and resilient electoral processes in the Union[6].

    • [1] https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/democracy-eu-citizenship-anti-corruption/democracy-and-electoral-rights/european-cooperation-network-elections_en
    • [2] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32022R2065. In 2024, the Commission issued Guidelines for providers of Very Large Online Platforms and Very Large Online Search Engines on the mitigation of systemic risks for electoral processes, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52024XC03014&qid=1714466886277
    • [3] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/900/oj/eng
    • [4] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj/eng
    • [5] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1689/oj/eng
    • [6] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reco/2023/2829/oj/eng
    Last updated: 24 April 2025

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – The EU’s position on Hamas – E-000797/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    Hamas has been listed on the EU terror list since 2001 and continues to be so. Following the brutal and indiscriminate terrorist attack against Israel on 7 October 2023, a new dedicated sanctions regime against Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad was set up in January 2024[1]. Since then, two packages of listings have been adopted.

    The EU has also made use of the CP931[2]/EU Terrorist List to designate leading figures of Hamas as terrorists[3]. The EU also adopted sanctions under the Global Human Rights sanctions regime in response to sexual violence committed by Hamas[4].

    The EU has been clear that there must be no future role for Hamas in the future governance of Gaza, and that Hamas should no longer be a threat to Israel.

    The EU will continue its political and financial support to the Palestinian Authority and its reform programme to help it prepare for its return to govern Gaza[5].

    • [1] Sanctions against terrorism: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions-against-terrorism/
    • [2] Common Position 931′ (CP931) is the Council Common Position of 27 December 2001 on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism and designating entities as terrorist organisations. CP931 mandates EU Member States to enforce specific measures against groups involved in terrorism.
    • [3] See footnote 1.
    • [4] Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad: Council extends restrictive measures by one year: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/01/13/hamas-and-palestinian-islamic-jihad-council-extends-restrictive-measures-by-one-year/
    • [5] Statement by the High Representative on the Arab Plan for Gaza: https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/statement-high-representative-arab-plan-gaza_en
    Last updated: 24 April 2025

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Impact of the Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD) and the attendant administrative costs on Germany and the EU – E-002991/2024(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The first set of calculations made by the Commission on the costs of the Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD)[1] were explained under the impact assessment document accompanying the CSRD proposal[2].

    In this document, the total incremental recurring costs of reporting against sustainability reporting standards in all 27 Member States were estimated at EUR 2.1 billion per year, plus additional recurrent costs for audit and assurance and the one-off implementation costs.

    Subsequently, when adopting the European Sustainability Reporting Standards (ESRS) Delegated Act, the Commission estimated EUR 1.7 billion in annual recurring costs across the EU for reporting against ESRS[3]. This recurring costs estimate shows a reduction compared to the estimate in the 2021 CSRD impact assessment as a result of various simplifications made.

    On 26 February the Commission adopted legislative proposals to modify the CSRD, as part of the ‘Omnibus’ initiative to reduce administrative burden on companies.

    The Commission estimates that the proposed modifications would exempt about 80% of companies from reporting under the CSRD and lead to CSRD/ESRS reporting cost savings of EUR 1.2 billion per year, plus savings on the related audit and assurance costs.

    Beyond this, companies would also benefit from being exempted from taxonomy reporting and future simplifications of the ESRS.

    As set out in more detail in the assessment accompanying the omnibus proposal,[4] the combined cost savings resulting from the proposed changes to the CSRD scope (including the exemptions this would bring for Taxonomy reporting), plus the modifications of the future ESRS, have been estimated to amount to EUR 4.4 billion per year.

    • [1] OJ L 322, 16.12.2022, p. 15-80.
    • [2] Impact assessment, SWD/2021/150 final: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52021SC0150
      Summary of the impact assessment, SWD/2021/151 final: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52021SC0151
    • [3] EUR-Lex — Ares(2023)4009405 — EN — EUR-Lex and https://www.ceps.eu/ceps-publications/cost-benefit-analysis-of-the-first-set-of-draft-european-sustainability-reporting-standards/
    • [4] SWD(2025) 80 final.
    Last updated: 24 April 2025

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Managing the influx of migration to the Canary Islands – E-000288/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    In 2025, the EU’s contribution to Frontex’s budget amounts to approximately EUR 1 billion. This provides Frontex with sufficient resources to fulfil its role in combatting cross-border crime, in line with its mandate.

    Return and readmission are important components of cooperation of the EU and its Member States with partner countries. Under international customary law, all States are obliged to readmit their own nationals.

    To implement this obligation, the Commission continually engages with partner countries of origin and transit both to improve returns and to prevent irregular arrivals.

    This cooperation can take the form of readmission agreements or arrangements, or dedicated provisions in broader agreements such as the Samoa Agreement[1]; Anti-Smuggling Operational Partnerships, like the one concluded with Morocco[2]; EU support for the voluntary return of sub-Saharan migrants from several transit countries; or comprehensive migration partnerships, like the one concluded with Mauritania in March 2024[3].

    These initiatives complement the ones caried out on a bilateral basis by Member States.

    • [1] Partnership Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Members of the Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States, of the other part. OJ L 2023/2862, 28.12.2023, p. 1-172.
    • [2] https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/news/european-commission-and-morocco-launch-renewed-partnership-migration-and-tackling-human-smuggling-2022-07-08_en
    • [3] https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/eu-mauritania-joint-declaration_en
    Last updated: 24 April 2025

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Ban on sailors entering certain countries – E-000896/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The Commission is not in a position to reply on substance, as the matter is not subject to EU legislation: border control comes under national legislation as far as Ireland is concerned, given that Ireland is not bound by the Schengen Borders Code, and under third country legislation as far as the United Kingdom is concerned.

    Last updated: 24 April 2025

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Injection of EU funding for Moldova – legitimate support or election meddling? – E-002252/2024(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    On 20 October 2024, the people of the Republic of Moldova voted in a referendum on Moldova’s EU path. Despite massive interference and hybrid campaigns by Russia, including blatant vote-buying, they expressed majority support for anchoring their future within the EU.

    The Commission took note of the results reflecting diverse opinions among Moldova’s citizens and will keep working closely with the country to build consensus on its path towards EU membership.

    Moldova has continued to make progress as recognised by the EU leaders during the European Council in March 2024. However, since the start of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, Moldova has been tackling challenges related to slow economic growth, supporting a large number of Ukrainian refugees, inflation, disruption to its energy supplies and cyber-attacks.

    For this reason, in October 2024, the President of the Commission announced the Commission’s proposal for a Growth Plan for the Republic of Moldova[1]. Its aim is to support the Moldovan economy with EUR 1.8 billion between 2025 and 2027.

    It also provides Moldova with similar financial support to that offered to Western Balkan countries and to Ukraine, reflecting their aspirations to join the EU.

    The co-legislators adopted Regulation (EU) 2025/535 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 March 2025 establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Republic of Moldova[2].

    The EU condemns the unprecedented malign interference by Russia into Moldova’s elections and will continue supporting Moldova’s resilience and progress on its EU accession path.

    • [1] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_5124
    • [2] https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/regulation-eu-2025535-european-parliament-and-council-18-march-2025-establishing-reform-and-growth_en
    Last updated: 24 April 2025

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – EIB criticises green reporting rules under Taxonomy Regulation – E-000151/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    It is a key priority for the Commission to simplify rules and reduce the reporting burdens for undertakings, including financial institutions financial institutions.

    On 26 February 2025, the Commission presented an omnibus package[1] aiming at simplification in relation to sustainability reporting.

    The omnibus proposals delay by two years the reporting for companies that should have done so in 2026 or later and introduce a reduction in the scope of reporting under the Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD)[2] to large companies[3] with more than 1000 employees.

    This entails a change of scope of reporting under Taxonomy regulation[4], which is aligned with the CSRD. In addition, the proposal will make Taxonomy reporting voluntary for companies in scope with a turnover below EUR 450 million.

    In parallel, the Commission also published for public feedback proposed changes to the Taxonomy Disclosures Delegated Act[5] significantly simplifying reporting requirements and introducing materiality thresholds, and changes to Climate and Environmental Delegated Acts[6].

    As regards the green asset ratio, it is proposed to allow financial institutions to exclude from the indicators’ denominators the exposures that relate to undertakings with less than 1000 employees, which will not be obliged to report on EU Taxonomy information as per the Omnibus proposal.

    In addition, the Omnibus package will protect companies out of the scope of the requirements, including SMEs, from excessive sustainability information requests that they receive when they are included in the value chains of larger companies or from financial institutions ( trickle-down effect ).

    • [1] https://commission.europa.eu/publications/omnibus-i_en
    • [2] Directive (EU) 2022/2464 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 amending Regulation (EU) No 537/2014, Directive 2004/109/EC, Directive 2006/43/EC and Directive 2013/34/EU, as regards corporate sustainability reporting, OJ L 322, 16.12.2022, p. 15.
    • [3] Large companies are defined in the Accounting Directive as companies that exceed at least two of the three following criteria: balance sheet of EUR 25 million, turnover of EUR 50 million and 250 employees.
    • [4] Regulation (EU) 2020/852 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 June 2020 on the establishment of a framework to facilitate sustainable investment, and amending Regulation (EU) .2019/2088, OJ L 198, 22.6.2020, p. 13.
    • [5] Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2021/2178 of 6 July 2021 supplementing Regulation (EU) 2020/852 of the European Parliament and of the Council by specifying the content and presentation of information to be disclosed by undertakings subject to Articles 19a or 29a of Directive 2013/34/EU concerning environmentally sustainable economic activities, and specifying the methodology to comply with that disclosure obligation, OJ L 443 10.12.2021, p. 9.
    • [6] Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2021/2139 of 4 June 2021 supplementing Regulation (EU) 2020/852 of the European Parliament and of the Council by establishing the technical screening criteria for determining the conditions under which an economic activity qualifies as contributing substantially to climate change mitigation or climate change adaptation and for determining whether that economic activity causes no significant harm to any of the other environmental objectives (OJ L 442, 9.12.2021, p. 1) and 2020/852 of the European Parliament and of the Council by establishing the technical screening criteria for determining the conditions under which an economic activity qualifies as contributing substantially to the sustainable use and protection of water and marine resources, to the transition to a circular economy, to pollution prevention and control, or to the protection and restoration of biodiversity and ecosystems and for determining whether that economic activity causes no significant harm to any of the other environmental objectives and amending Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2021/2178 as regards specific public disclosures for those economic activities (OJ L 2023/2486, 21.11.2023).
    Last updated: 24 April 2025

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Highlights – EMPL-CULT exchange of views with Commission EVP Roxana Mînzatu on ‘Union of Skills’ – Committee on Culture and Education

    Source: European Parliament

    On 5 May 2025, the Committees on Employment and Social Affairs and on Culture and Education will jointly invite the Commission’s Executive Vice-President, Roxana Mînzatu to present the Union of Skills. In early March, the Commission published its strategy to boost high quality education and skills development in order to tackle the labour shortages in Europe and increase the EU’s competitiveness.

    This strategy aims to focus on investment, adult and lifelong learning, skills retention, and the recognition of diverse training types to equip European citizens with the skills necessary to thrive in a rapidly changing job market, furthering their personal development and their awareness of democratic citizenship.

    The debate will contribute to preparing the EMPL/CULT response to the communication and feed into the committees’ work on a number of related files such as a CULT own-initiative report on the European Universities Initiative.

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – EU multilingualism in light of the principle of equality and non-discrimination – E-000499/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    In its answers to written questions E-001876/2019[1], E-003446/2019[2], E-005238/2020/rev.1[3], and P-003875/2022[4], the Commission outlined that the legal status of languages in each national legal order is a matter falling under national competence.

    Apart from the implementation of EU law, it is for Member States to ensure compliance with fundamental rights in accordance with their constitutional order and their obligations under international law.

    As parties to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, they are bound by the provisions on sign language contained therein.

    Regulation 1/58[5] lists all the official languages and the working languages of the institutions of the Union; sign languages are not included.

    That regulation is adopted by the Council, acting unanimously and without a Commission proposal, on the basis of Article 342 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union[6].

    The Commission is taking steps to reinforce the availability of international sign interpreters for EU conferences and meetings. In the strategy for the rights of persons with disabilities 2021-2030[7], it committed to increase the accessibility of audiovisual communications and publications as well as interpretation in international sign language.

    Each institution is competent for the provision of sign language interpretation. The interpretation service of the Commission provides sign language interpretation into and from international sign in meetings and conferences where this service is requested by the meeting organiser and according to the needs of the participants.

    To the best of its ability, the interpretation service also provides interpretation into and from national sign languages if specific requests are made in this sense.

    • [1] https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-8-2019-001876-ASW_EN.html
    • [2] https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-9-2019-003446-ASW_EN.html
    • [3] https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-9-2020-005238-ASW_EN.html
    • [4] https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/P-9-2022-003875-ASW_EN.html
    • [5] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:01958R0001-20130701
    • [6] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/treaty/tfeu_2016/art_342/oj/eng
    • [7] For more information, please see: https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/disability/union-equality-strategy-rights-persons-disabilities-2021-2030_en
    Last updated: 24 April 2025

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – EU support for investigations of the crime at Tempi – P-001585/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Priority question for written answer  P-001585/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Emmanouil Fragkos (ECR)

    With regard to the crime that took place at Tempi (on 28 February 2023), the government’s narrative refers to the fatalities as a result of the crash. Investigations have shown that the hydrocarbons benzene, toluene and xylene, weighing 3.8-5.4 tonnes, were to blame for the fatal fireball. It was found that passengers who survived the crash were burnt to death, with the fire starting 1.5-3 minutes after the crash. It is estimated that 8.9-12.6 tonnes of aromatic hydrocarbons spilled onto the soil, with their evaporation creating dangerous conditions for those who later ventured onto the site. The fact that the smuggled cargo is to blame for the fireball, and thus for most of the deaths, is being covered up by the government – presumably at the request of the smugglers.

    The government’s manipulation of justice clearly results in the failure to investigate the identity of the smuggler and his connection to the government. Since 2014, the EU has provided almost EUR 700 million in funding towards 16 transport projects in Greece, and the crime at Tempi presents an – indirect – insult to it.

    In light of the above, can the Commission answer the following:

    • 1.Could it request that a European agency, such as the European Railway Agency (ERA), carry out an independent investigation of the accident?
    • 2.Is there a possibility for EU action to ensure that the Greek Government takes all the necessary measures to hold those responsible to account?
    • 3.Has the decision been taken to monitor Greece more closely with regard to the investigation of the case and the implementation of security measures following the crime at Tempi?

    Submitted: 21.4.2025

    Last updated: 24 April 2025

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – The development of the EU’s common foreign and security policy towards Iran – E-000836/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The EU policy vis-à-vis Iran is outlined in the Council conclusions of December 2022[1] and is complemented by the European Council conclusions of March 2024[2], April 2024[3] and October 2024[4].

    EU Foreign Ministers discussed Iran in the Council most recently in March 2025 under the chairmanship of the High Representative/Vice-President.

    The EU will use all tools at its disposal to react to issues of concern with Iran, including the adoption of new restrictive measures (‘sanctions’), which are decided by the Council of the European Union.

    The EU has listed more than 500 Iran-related individuals and entities under different sanctions regimes[5]. Those sanctioned are subject to a travel ban (individuals) and an asset freeze (both individuals and entities).

    Moreover, EU individuals and entities are prohibited from making funds or economic resources available to those listed. Finally, a number of sectoral restrictions apply, which prevent Iranian individuals and entities from procuring certain sensitive items[6].

    At the same time, the EU is committed to avoiding and mitigating any potential unintended impacts of EU sanctions on humanitarian action. Food, medicine and other emergency supplies do not fall under EU sanctions.

    • [1] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/12/12/iran-council-approves-conclusions/
    • [2] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/70880/euco-conclusions-2122032024.pdf
    • [3] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/04/18/european-council-conclusions-on-ukraine-and-turkiye/
    • [4] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/2pebccz2/20241017-euco-conclusions-en.pdf
    • [5] E.g. Restrictive measures in view of Iran’s military support to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and to armed groups and entities in the Middle East and the Red Sea region; restrictive measures in relation to the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; restrictive measures in relation to serious human rights violations in Iran; restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.
    • [6] E.g. An embargo on equipment which may be used for internal repression and on equipment that may be used to monitor or intercept the Internet and telephone communications on mobile or fixed networks; the arms embargo, restrictive measures related to missile technology, restrictions on certain nuclear-related transfers and activities, and provisions concerning certain metals and software which are subject to an authorisation regime.
    Last updated: 24 April 2025

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Regulated tariffs for the sale of electricity: a force for stability and social justice in Europe – E-001358/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-001358/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Thomas Pellerin-Carlin (S&D)

    The recent energy crisis has demonstrated the importance of a tariff framework that guarantees stable and predictable prices for consumers. In France, regulated tariffs for the sale of electricity (TRVEs) play this essential role, protecting 60% of households and many very small businesses against market volatility.

    Refuting the argument that TRVEs constitute a barrier to competition, the French Energy Regulatory Commission has demonstrated that these tariffs are compatible with a balanced market and provide direct benefits to consumers. By extending the TRVEs until 2030, France is opting for the path of protection and economic stability.

    At a time when the EU is promoting the electrification of uses and the energy transition, it is time to draw inspiration from this type of mechanism to guarantee affordable electricity for all Europeans.

    • 1.Does the Commission intend to promote mechanisms inspired by the TRVEs to guarantee fair and stable prices at the European level?
    • 2.What tools does it propose to ensure effective consumer protection in the face of market volatility, based on the principles of social justice and ecological transition?

    Submitted: 2.4.2025

    Last updated: 24 April 2025

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Wolf hunting in Asturias, Cantabria and Galicia and possible non-compliance with EU law – E-001526/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-001526/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Irene Montero (The Left)

    The Spanish autonomous communities of Asturias and Cantabria have publicly announced plans to allow wolf hunting. Specifically, 53 individuals will be culled in Asturias and another 41 in Cantabria (between 15% and 20% of the estimated population). Galicia, for its part, has allowed wolf hunting since 14 April 2025.

    This action – following on from the decision to remove the wolf from the Spanish List of Wild Species in the Special Protection Scheme (LESRPE) – runs counter to the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in Case C-436/22. According to the latter, wolves cannot be declared as a huntable species at regional level if their conservation status at national level is unfavourable. Nor can it be designated as such where it is not afforded strict protection in the region concerned under the Habitats Directive, since any species management measures, including hunting, must in all cases aim to maintain those species at – or restore them to – a favourable conservation status.

    In light of the above:

    Does the European Commission consider the decision by Asturias, Galicia and Cantabria to allow the hunting of wolves to be in accordance with the law?

    Submitted: 14.4.2025

    Last updated: 24 April 2025

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Need to incorporate specific measures to better support the health coverage of islands in the EU cohesion policy framework – E-001524/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-001524/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Elena Kountoura (The Left)

    EU island regions face chronic and structural problems with regard to access to basic health services. This issue is exacerbated by geographical isolation, seasonal population pressure, the inability to attract medical and nursing staff and the inadequacy of infrastructure. Despite the fact that the TFEU recognises insularity as a permanent structural handicap, these specific problems do not appear to be dealt with sufficiently under the current cohesion policy strategy and priorities.[1]

    Taking into account the desperate shortages of doctors, nurses and basic health infrastructure on at least 15 Greek islands, as reflected in data from the Panhellenic Federation of Public Hospital Employees in view of Easter and the upcoming tourist season[2], and the resolution of the European Parliament[3] calling on the EU to draw up a dedicated strategy and agenda for islands, with clearly defined priorities for action and funding, and stressing the need to improve health infrastructure and upgrade primary healthcare provision, access to healthcare and the provision of support, in order to encourage the establishment of healthcare professionals, can the Commission say:

    • 1.Does it intend to establish a specific horizontal priority and category of funding and targeted support for basic public health services on islands within the framework of the cohesion funds?
    • 2.Does the Commission intend to establish specific rules, targeted financial support and binding criteria for strengthening healthcare services in island regions under the post-2027 cohesion policy framework, in order to take account of the specific situation of islands with regard to access to healthcare services?

    Submitted: 14.4.2025

    • [1] Despite financial support from EU cohesion policy funds, such as the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and the European Social Fund Plus (ESF+), for action in the area of health, the problem of poor and unequal health coverage on islands remains acute and, in many cases, it is getting worse. This highlights the need for more targeted, established and permanent measures.
    • [2] For more information, see https://www.efsyn.gr/ellada/ygeia/468921_kentra-aerodiakomidon-ehoyn-ginei-ta-nisia#goog_rewarded
    • [3] For further information, see European Parliament resolution of 7 June 2022 on EU islands and cohesion policy: current situation and future challenges (2021/2079 (INI)), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2022-0225_EN.html.
    Last updated: 24 April 2025

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – EU interference in Romanian political affairs – E-000256/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The organisation and conduct of elections are the competence and responsibility of the Member States, in accordance with their national constitutional rules and legislation, as well as their international obligations and applicable EU law. National authorities and courts are primarily responsible for ensuring compliance with the applicable rules.

    The Commission has no competence to intervene in the organisation and conduct of elections.

    The Commission supports Member States on electoral matters, mainly through the framework of the European cooperation network on elections[1]. This brings together national authorities with relevant competence and facilitates the exchanges of information and best practices.

    The Commission is also working with Member States to support the application of EU law provisions relevant in national electoral contexts, such as those in the Digital Services Act[2], the regulation 2024/900 on the transparency and targeting of political advertising[3] (which will apply in full from October 2025), the General Data Protection Regulation[4] and the Artificial Intelligence Act[5].

    In 2023, the Commission issued the recommendation on inclusive and resilient electoral processes in the EU[6] aiming to promote high democratic standards for elections in the EU, supporting high turnout, inclusive participation, easy and equal exercise of electoral rights and resilient electoral processes.

    • [1] https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/democracy-eu-citizenship-anti-corruption/democracy-and-electoral-rights/european-cooperation-network-elections_en
    • [2] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32022R2065. In 2024, the Commission issued Guidelines for providers of Very Large Online Platforms and Very Large Online Search Engines on the mitigation of systemic risks for electoral processes, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52024XC03014&qid=1714466886277
    • [3] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/900/oj/eng
    • [4] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj/eng
    • [5] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1689/oj/eng
    • [6] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reco/2023/2829/oj/eng
    Last updated: 24 April 2025

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