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Category: European Union

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Patients get care closer to home as GP scheme expanded

    Source: United Kingdom – Government Statements

    Press release

    Patients get care closer to home as GP scheme expanded

    Government confirms expansion of Advice and Guidance scheme, with more patients now receiving their care closer to home

    • More patients to get care in the community thanks to roll out of expanded scheme to keep patients off waiting lists
    • £80m available to support GPs in getting patients care in the right place, rather than being sent to hospitals
    • Expanded scheme marks latest step to deliver government’s Plan for Change to cut waiting lists after data shows 3 million extra appointments created since July

    Tens of thousands of patients are receiving care closer to home, so they don’t have to be added to lengthy NHS waiting lists, as the government confirms the expansion of a GP scheme to shift care from hospital to community.

    The scheme named “Advice and Guidance” sees GPs working more closely with hospital specialists to access expert advice quickly and speed their patients through the system, so they get care in the right place as soon as possible.

    That means patients are being directed to more appropriate care – such as being prescribed medication, accessing blood tests or scans via their GP, or receiving care in a local women’s health hub or community physio service, rather than being put on long NHS waiting lists.

    And new data shows that, between July and December 2024, around 660,000 treatments were diverted from hospitals and into the community thanks to the scheme – a 60,000 increase on the same period the previous year.

    The government has pledged to expand the use of the system, with an ambition to increase diversions from the elective waiting list to up to 2 million by the end of 2025/26 – meaning that more patients will benefit from faster and more convenient care. The NHS is now rolling out payments to GPs across the country, replacing the previous approach which led to patchy provision and meant a postcode lottery for patients.

    As a result of tough but necessary decisions made at the Budget, the government has been able to put £26 billion of investment into the NHS, which is funding the £80 million expansion of this efficient and effective “Advice and Guidance” service – alongside driving forward work to cut waiting lists and improve care for patients through the Plan for Change.

    Thanks to the scheme, patients suffering from something as common as irritable bowel syndrome – which is estimated to affect up to 1 in 5 people – can avoid being added to already long waiting lists, which stand at almost 400,000 for digestive conditions. Instead, after an initial consultation with their family doctor, the GP can seek expert advice and refer the patient directly to dieticians to provide quicker care, closer to home – all without the patient having to set foot inside a hospital.

    Health Minister Karin Smyth said:

    By caring for patients closer to home, we save time and stop masses of people having to head to hospital for unnecessary appointments in the first place.

    We are rewiring the NHS so that we are doing things differently, more efficiently and delivering better outcomes for patients. This scheme is a perfect example of how we are saving patients time and reducing pressure on key NHS services in the process.

    It will take time to reverse the damaging neglect the NHS has suffered in recent years, but our Plan for Change is starting to deliver benefits for patients, with waiting lists cut by 219,000 since July, and 1,500 new GPs in post.

    Dr Amanda Doyle, NHS national director for primary care and community services, said:

    GPs have been working closely with specialist hospital teams to make sure patients get the right care and treatment.

    Expanding this service with this new funding will help even more patients access the right support, closer to their home while reducing unnecessary waits for hospital care.

    “Advice and Guidance” opens a channel between GPs and hospital specialists before patients are referred onto waiting lists for hospital care. It enables patients to get the right tests and treatment via their GP or local services within their community.

    From April, GP practices can now claim for every request raised via the scheme in recognition of their vital role in helping to deliver the shift from hospital to community. The expansion of the scheme aims to standardise its use across the country and ensure it is being deployed consistently to get patients treated in the right place.

    Many patients suffering from certain conditions, can and should be safely and effectively managed in an out-of-hospital setting. This means people can take more power over decision making, which can help to improve overall wellbeing and potentially even reduce healthcare costs.   

    Other examples of patients who stand to benefit from the expansion include:

    • Women seeking gynaecological care, including treatment for menopause symptoms where GPs may need specialist advice on which types of hormone replacement therapy (HRT) to prescribe. Providing this treatment in the community saves patients being added to the waiting list for gynaecological care, which stands at more than 580,000.
    • Patients with ear, nose and throat (ENT) issues – 30 per cent of referrals to secondary care currently include many conditions which can and should be managed in an out-of-hospital setting, including tinnitus, ear wax removal, and simple ear infections. As of February 2025, the waiting list for ENT services is 634,000.

    Professor Sir Sam Everington OBE, GP in Tower Hamlets since 1989, said:

    Advice and guidance enables patients and GPs to get advice direct from a specialist, typically within a week for routine cases. This means that patients get their health problems sorted rapidly, preventing health deterioration and avoiding long waits to be seen. In my experience, over two-thirds of patients with kidney disease can be managed in this way with advice from a consultant and treatment by the GP, removing the enormous stress and uncertainty of waiting a long time.

    Ruth Rankine, director of primary care at the NHS Confederation, said:

    Advice and Guidance, if implemented effectively, can support improved patient care, streamlined referrals processes, and efficient use of resources. It can give the patient and their GP more control over their treatment options and support care closer to home.

    For many conditions, we know that hospital treatment isn’t the best option so this measure will support a greater drive to provision of out of hospital services in line with the government’s priorities, and deliver more investment in primary and community services to provide more cost-effective support to patients.

    Sharon Brennan, Director of Policy and External Affairs, National Voices, said: 

    If genuine shared decision-making sits at the centre of the advice and guidance service it has the potential to ensure, where appropriate, patients receive the most suitable care closer to home without having to anxiously sit on consultant waiting lists. To make sure patient develop trust in this new service, we must see real choice offered to patients about what best treatment routes are, and strong communication about what the service is and what it means in practical terms for patient care.

     The government has set out its plan to reform and rebuild the NHS, with the ambition that 92% of patients will be waiting less than 18 weeks by the end of this Parliament.

    The Plan for Change is already delivering tangible impacts for patients – with industrial action ended, NHS waiting lists falling, and over 3 million additional appointments delivered since July 2024.

    We have also begun fixing the front door of the NHS, hiring an extra 1,500 GPs since October and changing the GP contract to help bring an end to the 8am scramble for appointments.

    Updates to this page

    Published 17 April 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

  • MIL-OSI: Bigstack Opportunities I Inc. Enters Into Definitive Agreement For Qualifying Transaction

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    TORONTO, April 16, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Bigstack Opportunities I Inc. (“Bigstack”) (TSXV: STAK.P), a capital pool company as defined under the policies of the TSX Venture Exchange (the “TSXV” or the “Exchange”), is pleased to announce that, further to the non-binding letter of intent dated November 3, 2024 between Bigstack and Reeflex Coil Solutions Inc. (“Reeflex”) and its press releases dated November 4, 2024 and January 17, 2025, it has entered into a business combination agreement dated April 14, 2025 (the “Business Combination Agreement”) with Reeflex and 2704122 Alberta Ltd., a wholly-owned subsidiary of Bigstack (“Subco”). Reeflex and all of the shareholders (the “Coil Shareholders”) of Coil Solutions Inc. (“Coil”) have entered into a share purchase agreement dated April 14, 2025 (the “Share Purchase Agreement”).

    Terms of the Transaction

    The Business Combination Agreement provides for a three-cornered amalgamation (the “Business Combination”), whereby (i) Reeflex will amalgamate with Subco under the Business Corporations Act (Alberta), (ii) all of the issued and outstanding common shares in the capital of Reeflex (the “Reeflex Shares”) immediately prior to the Business Combination will be cancelled and, in consideration therefor, the holders thereof (the “Reeflex Shareholders”) will receive one common share in the capital of Bigstack (“Bigstack Share”) on the basis of one Reeflex Share for one Bigstack Share at a deemed price of $0.10 per Bigstack Share and (iii) the amalgamated corporation (the “Amalco”) will be a wholly-owned subsidiary of Bigstack, all on the terms and conditions of the Business Combination Agreement.

    Prior to the completion of the Business Combination, pursuant to the Share Purchase Agreement, it is intended that Reeflex will purchase all of the issued and outstanding shares in the capital of Coil (the “Acquisition” and, together with the Business Combination, the “Transaction”) from the Coil Shareholders for aggregate consideration of $5.8 million, subject to a post-closing working capital adjustment, which is expected to be paid and satisfied by way of (i) Reeflex issuing secured non-interest bearing promissory notes to each Coil Shareholder with an aggregate principal amount equal to $1,700,000 that are to be fully paid within 5 business days of the closing of the Acquisition, (ii) Reeflex issuing secured promissory notes to each Coil Shareholder with an aggregate principal amount equal to $2,300,000 that bear interest at the prime rate published by the Bank of Canada from time to time and are paid down monthly and to be fully paid on the fifth anniversary of the closing of the Acquisition and (iii) Reeflex issuing an aggregate of 18,000,000 Reeflex Shares to the Coil Shareholders at a deemed price of $0.10 per Reeflex Share, all upon the terms and conditions of the Share Purchase Agreement.

    After giving effect to the Transaction, the Reeflex Shareholders will collectively exercise control over Bigstack, Bigstack will wholly-own Amalco and Amalco will wholly-own Coil. Bigstack, as it exists upon completion of the Transaction (the “Resulting Issuer”), is expected to continue the business of Coil.

    It is anticipated that all convertible securities of Bigstack will be exercised prior to completion of the Transaction; however, if any warrants to purchase common shares of Bigstack remain outstanding following the completion of the Transaction, they shall continue to be exercisable for common shares of the Resulting Issuer in accordance with their terms. It is anticipated that Bigstack will change its name to “Reeflex Solutions Inc.” on or immediately prior to the completion of the Transaction.

    Immediately prior to the closing of the Transaction, it is anticipated that (i) assuming completion of the anticipated exercise of all convertible securities of Bigstack, there will be 10,662,000 Bigstack Shares issued and outstanding and (ii) holders of Reeflex Shares will hold 36,239,500 Reeflex Shares. Therefore, immediately following the closing of the Transaction, it is anticipated that there will be 46,901,500 common shares of the Resulting Issuer issued and outstanding.

    Bigstack anticipates that the Transaction will constitute its Qualifying Transaction pursuant to Policy 2.4 – Capital Pool Companies of the Exchange (the “CPC Policy”), as such term is defined in the policies of the Exchange, and it is expected that Bigstack will be a Tier 2 Industrial Issuer on the Exchange upon completion of the Transaction.

    The proposed Transaction is not a “Non-Arm’s Length Qualifying Transaction” as such term is defined in the CPC Policy. No Non-Arm’s Length Party to Bigstack (as such term is defined in the CPC Policy) (a) has any direct or indirect beneficial interest in Reeflex or Coil, or (b) is an insider of Reeflex or Coil. There is no relationship between or among a Non-Arm’s Length Party to Bigstack and a Non-Arm’s Length Party to the Qualifying Transaction (as such terms are defined in the CPC Policy). It is not expected that the Transaction will be subject to approval by the shareholders of Bigstack.

    Completion of the Transaction is subject to a number of conditions, including but not limited to, the satisfaction of all conditions provided for in the Business Combination Agreement, which will include representations, warranties, covenants and conditions customary for a transaction of this nature, and the receipt of all necessary regulatory, corporate and third party approvals, including TSXV acceptance and, if applicable pursuant to TSXV requirements, majority of the minority shareholder approval. Where applicable, the Transaction cannot close until the required shareholder approval is obtained. There can be no assurance that the Transaction will be completed as proposed or at all. Investors are cautioned that, except as disclosed in the management information circular or filing statement to be prepared in connection with the Transaction, any information released or received with respect to the Transaction may not be accurate or complete and should not be relied upon. Trading in the securities of a capital pool company should be considered highly speculative. The TSXV has in no way passed upon the merits of the proposed transaction and has neither approved nor disapproved the contents of this press release.

    Business and History of Reeflex

    Reeflex is a privately-held corporation incorporated under the Business Corporations Act (Alberta) on June 14, 2024. Its head and registered offices are located in Calgary. Reeflex currently has no business operations or assets other than cash and a management team that has been working on the Transaction and the proposed going public structure for the past year.

    Business and History of Coil

    Founded in 2007 in Redcliff, Alberta, Coil specializes in innovative drilling products and services for the global oil and gas industry. In 2010, Coil expanded its operations, opening a second facility in Calgary, Alberta, introducing a line of downhole fracking tools and venturing into custom tool design. In 2012, Coil launched its coil tubing injector line. In 2013, Coil opened a third facility in Red Deer, Alberta. In 2014, Coil developed two distinct models of, and manufactured, its first full coil tubing units. In 2016, Coil expanded sales to Asia, Africa, Australia, North America, South America and Europe. In 2017, Coil designed and built the largest free-standing mast unit in the world. In 2022, Coil established a dedicated manufacturing division in Calgary, Alberta, operating under its tradename, Ranglar, for injectors and mobile equipment. In 2024, Coil completed a reorganization with its shareholders, which resulted in the conversion of preferred shares and debt into common shares. Today, Coil continues to focus on coiled tubing solutions and downhole tools, offering a comprehensive range of services including rentals, sales, training, testing and consulting. With 41 employees, Coil has developed patented products that are distributed worldwide, including a key distributor in Germany and more than 60 active clients.

    The following tables set out selected financial information of Coil for the periods indicated therein:

      Financial Year ended
    2024
    (audited)
    ($)    		 Financial Year ended
    2023
    (audited)
    ($)
    Total revenues 14,265,524 14,069,331
    Income from continuing operations 1,750,495 2,193,603
    Net income or loss, in total 1,089,024 1,554,716
    Total assets 9,969,946 11,752,788
    Total long term financial liabilities 735,009 1,006,362
    Cash dividends NIL 111,736

    Concurrent Financing

    In advance of the Transaction, Reeflex completed a non-brokered private placement of 4,139,500 subscription receipts (each, a “Subscription Receipt”) at a price of $0.20 per Subscription Receipt, for aggregate gross proceeds of $827,900 (the “Concurrent Financing”).

    The gross proceeds resulting from the Concurrent Financing are (and will continue to be) held by Marrelli Trust Company Limited as subscription receipt and escrow agent until certain escrow release conditions are satisfied, including the completion of the Acquisition and the receipt of written confirmation from the TSX Venture Exchange that all conditions precedent to the Transaction have been satisfied (collectively, the “Escrow Release Conditions”). Upon satisfaction of the Escrow Release Conditions, and prior to the completion of the Transaction, the gross proceeds from the Concurrent Financing will be released from escrow and each Subscription Receipt will automatically convert into one Reeflex Share. In connection with the Concurrent Financing, Reeflex has paid to registered dealers and such other persons permitted under applicable securities laws who act as finders for the Concurrent Offering a finder’s fee an aggregate of $21,336, representing 7% of the gross proceeds resulting from subscriptions that were introduced to Reeflex by the finder. Except for the foregoing, it is not expected that any finder’s fee or commission will be payable in connection with the Transaction.

    Reeflex intends to use the proceeds of the Concurrent Financing for general corporate and working capital purposes.

    Resulting Issuer

    The Parties expect that the Resulting Issuer following from the Transaction will carry on the existing business of Coil and be an industrial issuer focused on providing coiled tubing and downhole tool solutions to the oil and gas industry. See “Terms of the Transaction” above for details concerning the expected corporate structure of the Resulting Issuer upon completion of the Transaction.

    Upon completion of the Transaction, the Parties expect that the board of directors of the Resulting Issuer will consist of the following four (4) directors, of whom three (3) will be independent. John Babic will not be independent as he will be the President and Chief Executive Officer of the Resulting Issuer.

    John Babic – Proposed President, Chief Executive Officer and Director of Resulting Issuer

    John Babic is an accomplished executive with nearly 40 years of experience in the oil and gas sector, covering upstream, downstream, and manufacturing operations. He currently serves as the President and CEO of 1175317 Alberta Ltd., an investment and real estate holding company.

    Throughout his career, Mr. Babic has held several senior executive positions, including CEO of Reeflex Coil Solutions Inc. and CEO and Director of various public companies such as Dalmac Energy Inc., an oilfield transportation and services company; Raydan Manufacturing Inc., a manufacturer specializing in heavy-duty transportation suspension systems; Hyduke Energy Services Inc., a manufacturer of oilfield equipment, including drilling and service rigs; and Sawtooth Resources Inc., an oil and gas exploration and production company.

    In addition, Mr. Babic has served for 7 years as a Director of Edmonton Economic Development Corporation, contributing to the city’s economic growth and development initiatives.

    Mr. Babic holds both a Bachelor of Arts and Bachelor of Commerce degree from the University of Alberta.

    Shawn Szydlowski – Proposed Director of Resulting Issuer

    Shawn Szydlowski is a seasoned business leader with over 30 years of experience in corporate management, entrepreneurship, and financial oversight. As the founder of Care For A Ride, established in 2009, Mr. Szydlowski built a successful business focused on providing safe, reliable transportation for seniors, enabling them to maintain independence and quality of life.

    His career also includes 15 years with Dalmac Energy, where he held key roles such as Interim CFO and Chairman of the Audit Committee. Mr. Szydlowski played a crucial role in navigating the company through complex financial challenges, ensuring regulatory compliance, and fostering sustainable growth. Additionally, he brings 20 years of experience in corporate sales and account management, where he consistently drove strategic results, earning the President’s Club Award for three consecutive years.

    Eric Szustak – Proposed Director of Resulting Issuer

    Mr. Szustak is currently the President, Chief Executive Officer, Chief Financial Officer, Corporate Secretary and a director of Bigstack. He is a Chartered Professional Accountant and Chartered Accountant with over 35 years’ experience in financial services, business development, marketing, accounting, and as Chief Financial Officer of various reporting issuers. Mr. Szustak is currently Chairman and Corporate Secretary of Quinsam Capital Corporation, which is a public merchant bank listed on the CSE, a director of Copper Road Resources Inc., a mining company listed on the TSXV, and a director of Nevada Organic Phosphate Inc., a fertilizer company listed on the CSE. Mr. Szustak’s previous experience also includes 14 years with three national brokerage firms: Midland Walwyn, Merril Lynch and BMO Nesbitt Burns, in various positions, including private client wealth groups, management and securities compliance. Mr. Szustak will be Chair of the Audit Committee of the Resulting Issuer in addition to his general duties as a director of the Resulting Issuer. Mr. Szustak will devote such percentage of his working time to the affairs of the Resulting Issuer as is required to fulfill his duties to the same.

    Derrek Dobko – Proposed Director of Resulting Issuer

    Derrek Dobko is a seasoned financial officer with over 20 years of experience in the oilfield service, manufacturing, and transportation industries. He has held senior finance positions in both public and private companies, showcasing his expertise in financial management and reporting.

    As controller of Raydan Manufacturing, Mr. Dobko was responsible for the company’s financial reporting in accordance with IFRS and the preparation of all financial information required under TSXV reporting standards. His career also includes senior accounting roles at Peak Energy Services, Alta-Fab Structures, and his current position with NTS Amega Canada.

    Additionally, Mr. Dobko has gained valuable operational experience in the transportation sector, particularly in managing financial operations for Liquids in Motion, a mid-sized trucking company. He holds a Bachelor of Commerce from the University of Alberta and is a Certified Professional Accountant (CPA), with a designation from CPA Alberta.

    Upon completion of the Transaction, the following persons are also expected to constitute insiders of the Resulting Issuer:

    Trevor Conway – Proposed Chief Financial Officer and Secretary of Resulting Issuer

    Trevor Conway is an accomplished mid-market investment banking professional with extensive transaction experience across various industry sectors, including energy. He previously served as CFO of Reconciliation Energy Transition Inc., a Calgary-based energy transition project development company and as Special Advisor to BluMaple Capital Partners, a Calgary-based private equity firm focused on low-carbon energy innovators.

    Prior to these roles, Mr. Conway was the Managing Director and Head of Energy Investment Banking at iA Capital Markets, a division of iA Private Wealth and part of iA Financial Group, a leading Canadian financial institution.

    Mr. Conway holds an MBA from the Ivey Business School at Western University, a BA (Special) in Economics from the University of Alberta, and a Sustainable Investment Professional Certificate (SIPC) from the John Molson Executive Centre at Concordia University. He is also a former Fellow of the Canadian Securities Institute (FCSI).

    In addition to his professional work, Mr. Conway has contributed to several industry and community initiatives. He has served on the National & Local Advisory Committee of the TSX Venture Exchange and was Past Director and Governor of the Canadian Energy Executive Association.

    George Wu – Proposed Director of Amalco

    George Wu is a distinguished financial executive with a proven track record in leading complex financial strategies and driving portfolio success. With extensive expertise in bank debt, structured finance, fixed income, and equity analysis, he excels in portfolio management and strategic financial planning. His leadership has successfully optimized portfolios, resulting in a 20% increase in returns over the past three years.

    Known for his exceptional relationship-building skills, Mr. Wu has effectively engaged as a financial strategist with c-suite executives and diverse stakeholders. He holds a CFA, MBA, and B.Sc. (Honours Program) and currently serves as Portfolio Manager and Chief Compliance Officer at a leading independent portfolio management firm in Edmonton, ensuring top-tier financial stewardship and compliance.

    In addition to his professional accomplishments, Mr. Wu mentors commerce undergraduates through the University of Alberta’s PRIME Program, contributing to the development of future leaders in investment management. Mr. Wu and his family have called Edmonton home since 2000, where they enjoy a multilingual household speaking English, French, and Mandarin Chinese.

    Cecil Hassard – Proposed Director of Amalco

    Mr. Cecil Hassard is an accomplished entrepreneur and business leader with a proven track record of driving innovation and operational excellence in the oil and gas industry. In 2007, he co-founded Coil which has grown to become a global provider of high-quality products and innovative solutions for the energy sector. He further diversified the company’s offerings by introducing the “Ranglar” division, based in Calgary, Alberta, which manufactures custom mobile equipment for industries such as oil and gas, mining, and more.

    Under his leadership, Coil has established a strong presence in Canada and the United States, and in serving clients worldwide. He broadened Coil’s capabilities with the “Ranglar” division, enabling tailored solutions to a broader range of industries with specialized equipment. He has driven advancements in operational efficiency and provided cutting-edge solutions for the energy sector. Mr. Cecil Hassard’s entrepreneurial vision has established Coil as a dynamic and influential leader in the global oil and gas industry.

    Bryan Hassard – Proposed Chief Operating Officer of Coil

    Mr. Bryan Hassard is an accomplished business leader and co-founder of Coil, established in 2007. He serves as the Vice President of Manufacturing and a director of Coil, playing a critical role in the company’s operations and strategic direction.

    Mr. Bryan Hassard’s leadership has been instrumental in expanding Coil’s sales from Canada to the United States and globally, enhancing the company’s ability to serve the oil and gas industry on a broader scale utilizing distributors in different areas. As Vice President of Manufacturing, he oversees production processes, ensuring high-quality standards and operational efficiency. Mr. Bryan Hassard’s dedication to innovation and excellence has significantly contributed to the growth and success of Coil.

    Sponsorship

    Sponsorship of a qualifying transaction of a capital pool company is required by the TSXV unless an exemption from the sponsorship requirement is available. Bigstack has applied for a waiver from the sponsorship requirements. There is no assurance that the Bigstack will be able to obtain such a waiver.

    Trading Halt

    Trading in the Bigstack Shares was halted, as previously disclosed in Bigstack’s press release dated November 4, 2024, and is not expected to resume until the Transaction is completed or until the Exchange receives the requisite documentation to resume trading.

    Further updates with respect to the Transaction may be provided as the Transaction proceeds.

    Overview of Bigstack

    Bigstack is a “capital pool company” under the policies of the Exchange and it is intended that the Transaction will constitute the “Qualifying Transaction” of Bigstack, as such term is defined in CPC Policy. The Bigstack Shares are currently listed on the Exchange and Bigstack is a reporting issuer in the provinces of Alberta, British Columbia and Ontario. Bigstack was incorporated under the Business Corporations Act (Ontario) on November 25, 2020.

    Additional Information

    All information contained in this press release with respect to Reeflex and Coil was provided by Reeflex and Coil, respectively, to Bigstack for inclusion herein. Bigstack and its directors and officers have not independently verified such information and have relied exclusively on Reeflex and Coil for any information concerning Reeflex and Coil.

    Forward Looking Information

    This press release contains statements that constitute “forward-looking information” (“forward-looking information”) within the meaning of the applicable Canadian securities legislation. All statements, other than statements of historical fact, are forward-looking information and are based on expectations, estimates and projections as at the date of this press release. Any statement that discusses predictions, expectations, beliefs, plans, projections, objectives, assumptions, future events or performance (often but not always using phrases such as “anticipate”, “believe”, “estimate”, “expect”, “intend” or variations of such words and phrases or stating that certain actions, events or results “may”, “could”, “would”, “might” or “will” be taken to occur or be achieved) are not statements of historical fact and may be forward-looking information.

    More particularly and without limitation, this press release contains forward-looking statements concerning the Transaction and its constituents steps, including the Acquisition and the Business Combination (including the completion, structure, terms and timing thereof), the binding definitive agreements relating to the Transaction, including in respect of the Acquisition, the expected capital structure and expected shareholders of, and the expected size of their shareholdings in, the Resulting Issuer, the expected corporate structure of the Resulting Issuer and its subsidiaries, if any, the future financial performance of the Resulting Issuer or any of the parties, the Concurrent Financing, including the amount expected to be raised thereunder, any finder’s fees or commissions payable in relation to the same, and expected use of proceeds therefrom, the Subscription Receipts and Escrow Release Conditions, the expected composition of the board of directors and management of the Resulting Issuer and its subsidiaries, if any, TSXV sponsorship requirements and any exemptions therefrom, the issuance of additional press releases describing the Transaction, the trading of the Bigstack Shares on the TSXV and the holding of shareholder meetings in connection with the Transaction. Although Bigstack believes that the expectations reflected in such forward-looking information are reasonable, it can give no assurance that the expectations of any forward-looking information will prove to be correct. Known and unknown risks, uncertainties and other factors may cause the actual results and future events to differ materially from those expressed or implied by such forward-looking information. Such factors include, but are not limited to: delay or failure to receive board, shareholder or regulatory approvals; inability to complete the Concurrent Financing on the terms described herein or at all; and general business, economic, competitive, political and social uncertainties. There can be no certainty that the Transaction and related transactions will be completed on the terms set out in the Letter of Intent and other agreements among the Parties or at all. Accordingly, readers should not place undue reliance on the forward-looking information contained in this press release. Except as required by law, Bigstack disclaims any intention and assumes no obligation to update or revise any forward-looking information to reflect actual results, whether as a result of new information, future events, changes in assumptions, changes in factors affecting such forward-looking information or otherwise.

    Investors are cautioned that, except as disclosed in the management information circular or filing statement to be prepared in connection with the Transaction, any information released or received with respect to the Transaction may not be accurate or complete and should not be relied upon. Trading in the securities of a capital pool company should be considered highly speculative.

    The TSX Venture Exchange Inc. has in no way passed upon the merits of the proposed Transaction and has neither approved nor disapproved the contents of this press release.

    Bigstack Opportunities I Inc.

    For further information, please contact Eric Szustak, the President, Chief Executive Officer, Chief Financial Officer, Corporate Secretary and a director of Bigstack.

    Eric Szustak
    President, CEO, CFO, Corporate Secretary and Director
    Email: eszustak@jbrlimited.com
    Telephone: (905) 330-7948

    Neither TSX Venture Exchange nor its Regulation Services Provider (as that term is defined in the policies of the TSX Venture Exchange) accepts responsibility for the adequacy or accuracy of this release.

    The securities have not been and will not be registered under the United States Securities Act of 1933, as amended and may not be offered or sold in the United States absent registration or an applicable exemption from the registration requirement. This press release shall not constitute an offer to sell or the solicitation of an offer to buy nor shall there be any sale of the securities in any jurisdiction in which such offer, solicitation or sale would be unlawful.

    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: expert reaction to study of nitrogen fertilised grassland and pollen allergies

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    A study published in The Lancet Planetary Health looks at the impact of nitrogen fertiliser on pollen allergies.

    Dr Roy Neilson, Soil Ecologist, The James Hutton Institute, said:

    “Daelemans et al. take a novel approach of pollen assessment in considering the impact of nitrogen fertiliser application on pollen burden. Using a paired design at 25 grassland sites within a region of Belgium, and based on two sampling periods during May, the authors report that nitrogen-enriched grasslands had a 6·2-fold increase in pollen compared with their unfertilised paired grassland.

    “The results of the study arguably support the importance of species-specific grass pollen monitoring given that a subset of grass species may have disproportionate influence on respiratory health responses during peak grass pollen concentrations1. However, it is unclear how nitrogen driven increase in pollen will contribute to the predicted increase in pollen season severity by up to 60% due to a changing climate2.

    “Peaks in abundance of pollen occur at different times during the summer across the UK3 thus, it is unclear whether sampling in a single month as the study of Daelemans et al. would have the same outcome across the entire pollen season. Moreover, unlike tree pollen, a recent study reported that grass (Poaceae) pollen seasons are neither becoming more severe nor longer in the UK4.

    “Adoption of Regenerative Agricultural principles5 such as reducing synthetic inputs (e.g., inorganic nitrogen-based fertiliser) has potential to contribute to the mitigation of the outcomes reported by Daelemans et al.”

    References:

    1 Rowney, et al. (2021). Environmental DNA analysis reveals links between abundance and composition of airborne grass pollen and respiratory health. Current Biology, 31, 1-9.

    2 Kurganskiy, et al. (2021). Predicting the severity of the grass pollen season and the effect of climate change in Northwest Europe. Science Advances, 7, eabd7658.

    3 Brennan, et al. (2019). Grass allergy season defined by spatio-temporal shifts in airborne pollen biodiversity. Nature Ecology and Evolution, 3, 750-754.

    4 Adams-Groom, B., Selby, K., Derrett, S., Frisk, C.A., Pashley, C.H., Satchwell, J., King, D., McKenzie, G., and Neilson, R. (2022). Pollen season trends as markers of climate change impact: Betula, Quercus and Poaceae. Science of the Total Environment, 831, 154882.

    5 British Ecological Society (2025). Regenerative Agriculture in the UK: An Ecological Perspective. London, UK.

    Dr Roberto Picetti, Assistant Professor, London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine (LSHTM) said:

    “This study highlights the impact of nitrogen pollution on allergies, which is an under-recognised pathway affecting human health.

    “These findings are relevant to the UK, where nitrogen pollution remains a concern both in agricultural areas and in cities, and is already linked to other environmental and health problems, including respiratory illness, biodiversity loss, and air and water quality degradation.

    “It builds on well-established research which continues to find a link between high levels of nitrogen and changes in plant communities and pollen abundance, and to increased immune responses in individuals who are allergic to grass pollen.

    “This is a high-quality study that adds valuable evidence to an important and emerging area of public health. The conclusions are well grounded in the data, do not overstate the implications, and make a compelling case for further research and policy attention. Although observational studies are not able to account for every possible variable, this research uses a range of scientific approaches, such as ecology, molecular analysis and immunological testing, to strengthen its conclusions.

    “This study is a valuable step towards understanding and addressing the growing problem of pollen allergies and supports the case for more comprehensive environmental policies that consider both the health and ecological impacts of nitrogen pollution.

    “By reducing nitrogen pollution, we could help protect biodiversity and lessen the severity of pollen allergies.”

    (from our friends at SMC Spain) Dr José Gómez Rial, Head of the Immunology Department at the Complejo Hospitalario Universitario de Santiago de Compostela (CHUS), Servicio Gallego de Salud (SERGAS) (Spain), said:

    “The study shows that nitrogen-enriched meadows produce up to six times more pollen than their unfertilised equivalents, and that this pollen has a greater capacity to activate immune cells in allergy sufferers, with a 5.1-fold increase in sensitivity in basophil activation tests and a 1.3-fold increase in specific immunoglobulin E (IgE) levels. Although the exact mechanism is not detailed in the article, it is plausible that excess nitrogen modifies the biochemical composition of pollen, increasing the quantity or proportion of allergenic proteins synthesised by the plant, which would enhance its capacity to activate the immune system.

    “These findings have important implications for both ecology and health. On the one hand, they reveal that nitrogen pollution not only affects plant biodiversity but can also directly aggravate highly prevalent allergic diseases such as rhinitis or seasonal asthma. On the other hand, they emphasise the need to integrate public health into environmental policies: reducing nitrogen emissions and limiting the use of fertilisers would not only contribute to preserving ecosystems but could also reduce the burden of disease associated with respiratory allergies. The concept of One Health applies not only to human and animal health, but also to plant health and the environment”.

    (from our friends at SMC Spain) Prof África González-Fernández, Researcher at CINBIO, Professor of Immunology at the University of Vigo (Spain), said:

    “The experiment is well-reasoned, but they analyse few cases (25 people in rich areas and 25 in areas not enriched with fertilisers). It has not been done in other areas, and the in vitro trials were carried out with 20 subjects. There is a lack of healthy controls.

    “There are studies from years ago on the increase in allergy and nitrogen fertilisers, as well as on NO2 levels and allergy. There is a lot of literature on the subject. Other studies have been carried out measuring IgE levels and they have included a basophil release test, which is currently used routinely in immunology laboratories in hospitals. They conclude that allergic patients recognise more proteins in the pollen of fertilised plants (enriched in nitrogen) than in those that are not fertilised, with more production of specific IgE and more release of mediators by basophils when exposed to fertilised pollen.

    “The same authors wrote a review in 2023: Impact of environmental nitrogen pollution on pollen allergy: A scoping review. In Table 4 they describe the mechanisms by which NO2 would affect pollen and the allergic response.

    “I see several limitations:

    1. The low number of allergic patients.
    2. They do not include control cases.
    3. At high pollen concentrations, there are no in vitro differences in the basophil release study. They do not correlate these data with the actual pollen count that could be in the environment.
    4. They have only taken into account serum levels of IgE antibodies against pollen, basophil release and immunoblot studies [a technique for the identification of proteins]. They have not studied cellular responses (T lymphocytes, NK cells) which they do carry out in other studies. As an example of immunological studies, a study was also carried out in Madrid years ago on the ability of pollen to activate lymphocytes and NK cells, and it has been seen (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1398-9995.2007.01438.x) that pollen-allergic asthmatic patients, when they live in more polluted areas, present more and more severe symptoms.
    5. There is already previous data on pollen: Cuinica et al. (https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/24361564/), Zhao et al. (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pce.12601), Chassard et al.(https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/25463703/) ”

    ‘The impact of ecosystem nitrogen enrichment on pollen allergy: a cross-sectional paired comparison study’ by Robin Daelemans et al. was published in The Lancet Planetary Health at 23:30 UK time on Wednesday 16th April 2025. 

    Declared interests

    Dr Roberto Picetti: No conflicts of interest to declare.

    For all other experts, no reply to our request for DOIs was received.

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

  • MIL-OSI Australia: Denmark

    Source:

    We’ve reviewed our travel advice for Denmark and advise exercise normal safety precautions.

    Denmark’s domestic terror threat level is set to ‘significant’ (level 4 of 5). Terrorist attacks could occur anywhere and at any time. Terrorists may target tourist areas and attractions or other places frequented by foreigners. Take official warnings seriously and follow the advice of local authorities (see ‘Safety’).

    MIL OSI News –

  • MIL-OSI Economics: AI-powered deception: Emerging fraud threats and countermeasures

    Source: Microsoft

    Headline: AI-powered deception: Emerging fraud threats and countermeasures

    Introduction | Security snapshot | Threat briefing
    Defending against attacks | Expert profile 

    Microsoft maintains a continuous effort to protect its platforms and customers from fraud and abuse. From blocking imposters on Microsoft Azure and adding anti-scam features to Microsoft Edge, to fighting tech support fraud with new features in Windows Quick Assist, this edition of Cyber Signals takes you inside the work underway and important milestones achieved that protect customers.

    We are all defenders. 

    Between April 2024 and April 2025, Microsoft:

    • Thwarted $4 billion in fraud attempts.
    • Rejected 49,000 fraudulent partnership enrollments.
    • Blocked about 1.6 million bot signup attempts per hour.

    The evolution of AI-enhanced cyber scams

    AI has started to lower the technical bar for fraud and cybercrime actors looking for their own productivity tools, making it easier and cheaper to generate believable content for cyberattacks at an increasingly rapid rate. AI software used in fraud attempts runs the gamut, from legitimate apps misused for malicious purposes to more fraud-oriented tools used by bad actors in the cybercrime underground.

    AI tools can scan and scrape the web for company information, helping cyberattackers build detailed profiles of employees or other targets to create highly convincing social engineering lures. In some cases, bad actors are luring victims into increasingly complex fraud schemes using fake AI-enhanced product reviews and AI-generated storefronts, where scammers create entire websites and e-commerce brands, complete with fake business histories and customer testimonials. By using deepfakes, voice cloning, phishing emails, and authentic-looking fake websites, threat actors seek to appear legitimate at wider scale.

    According to the Microsoft Anti-Fraud Team, AI-powered fraud attacks are happening globally, with much of the activity coming from China and Europe, specifically Germany due in part to Germany’s status as one of the largest e-commerce and online services markets in the European Union (EU). The larger a digital marketplace in any region, the more likely a proportional degree of attempted fraud will take place.

    E-commerce fraud

    Fraudulent e-commerce websites can be set up in minutes using AI and other tools requiring minimal technical knowledge. Previously, it would take threat actors days or weeks to stand up convincing websites. These fraudulent websites often mimic legitimate sites, making it challenging for consumers to identify them as fake. 

    Using AI-generated product descriptions, images, and customer reviews, customers are duped into believing they are interacting with a genuine merchant, exploiting consumer trust in familiar brands.

    AI-powered customer service chatbots add another layer of deception by convincingly interacting with customers. These bots can delay chargebacks by stalling customers with scripted excuses and manipulating complaints with AI-generated responses that make scam sites appear professional.

    In a multipronged approach, Microsoft has implemented robust defenses across our products and services to protect customers from AI-powered fraud. Microsoft Defender for Cloud provides comprehensive threat protection for Azure resources, including vulnerability assessments and threat detection for virtual machines, container images, and endpoints.

    Microsoft Edge features website typo protection and domain impersonation protection using deep learning technology to help users avoid fraudulent websites. Edge has also implemented a machine learning-based Scareware Blocker to identify and block potential scam pages and deceptive pop-up screens with alarming warnings claiming a computer has been compromised. These attacks try to frighten users into calling fraudulent support numbers or downloading harmful software.

    Job and employment fraud

    The rapid advancement of generative AI has made it easier for scammers to create fake listings on various job platforms. They generate fake profiles with stolen credentials, fake job postings with auto-generated descriptions, and AI-powered email campaigns to phish job seekers. AI-powered interviews and automated emails enhance the credibility of job scams, making it harder for job seekers to identify fraudulent offers.

    To prevent this, job platforms should introduce multifactor authentication for employer accounts to make it harder for bad actors to take over legitimate hirers’ listings and use available fraud-detection technologies to catch suspicious content.

    Fraudsters often ask for personal information, such as resumes or even bank account details, under the guise of verifying the applicant’s information. Unsolicited text and email messages offering employment opportunities that promise high pay for minimal qualifications are typically an indicator of fraud.

    Employment offers that include requests for payment, offers that seem too good to be true, unsolicited offers or interview requests over text message, and a lack of formal communication platforms can all be indicators of fraud.

    Tech support scams

    Tech support scams are a type of fraud where scammers trick victims into unnecessary technical support services to fix a device or software problems that don’t exist. The scammers may then gain remote access to a computer—which lets them access all information stored on it, and on any network connected to it or install malware that gives them access to the computer and sensitive data.

    Tech support scams are a case where elevated fraud risks exist, even if AI does not play a role. For example, in mid-April 2024, Microsoft Threat Intelligence observed the financially motivated and ransomware-focused cybercriminal group Storm-1811 abusing Windows Quick Assist software by posing as IT support. Microsoft did not observe AI used in these attacks; Storm-1811 instead impersonated legitimate organizations through voice phishing (vishing) as a form of social engineering, convincing victims to grant them device access through Quick Assist. 

    Quick Assist is a tool that enables users to share their Windows or macOS device with another person over a remote connection. Tech support scammers often pretend to be legitimate IT support from well-known companies and use social engineering tactics to gain the trust of their targets. They then attempt to employ tools like Quick Assist to connect to the target’s device. 

    Quick Assist and Microsoft are not compromised in these cyberattack scenarios; however, the abuse of legitimate software presents risk Microsoft is focused on mitigating. Informed by Microsoft’s understanding of evolving cyberattack techniques, the company’s anti-fraud and product teams work closely together to improve transparency for users and enhance fraud detection techniques. 

    The Storm-1811 cyberattacks highlight the capability of social engineering to circumvent security defenses. Social engineering involves collecting relevant information about targeted victims and arranging it into credible lures delivered through phone, email, text, or other mediums. Various AI tools can quickly find, organize, and generate information, thus acting as productivity tools for cyberattackers. Although AI is a new development, enduring measures to counter social engineering attacks remain highly effective. These include increasing employee awareness of legitimate helpdesk contact and support procedures, and applying Zero Trust principles to enforce least privilege across employee accounts and devices, thereby limiting the impact of any compromised assets while they are being addressed. 

    Microsoft has taken action to mitigate attacks by Storm-1811 and other groups by suspending identified accounts and tenants associated with inauthentic behavior. If you receive an unsolicited tech support offer, it is likely a scam. Always reach out to trusted sources for tech support. If scammers claim to be from Microsoft, we encourage you to report it directly to us at https://www.microsoft.com/reportascam. 

    Building on the Secure Future Initiative (SFI), Microsoft is taking a proactive approach to ensuring our products and services are “Fraud-resistant by Design.” In January 2025, a new fraud prevention policy was introduced: Microsoft product teams must now perform fraud prevention assessments and implement fraud controls as part of their design process. 

    Recommendations

    • Strengthen employer authentication: Fraudsters often hijack legitimate company profiles or create fake recruiters to deceive job seekers. To prevent this, job platforms should introduce multifactor authentication and Verified ID as part of Microsoft Entra ID for employer accounts, making it harder for unauthorized users to gain control.
    • Monitor for AI-based recruitment scams: Companies should deploy deepfake detection algorithms to identify AI-generated interviews where facial expressions and speech patterns may not align naturally.
    • Be cautious of websites and job listings that seem too good to be true: Verify the legitimacy of websites by checking for secure connections (https) and using tools like Microsoft Edge’s typo protection.
    • Avoid providing personal information or payment details to unverified sources: Look for red flags in job listings, such as requests for payment or communication through informal platforms like text messages, WhatsApp, nonbusiness Gmail accounts, or requests to contact someone on a personal device for more information.

    Using Microsoft’s security signal to combat fraud

    Microsoft is actively working to stop fraud attempts using AI and other technologies by evolving large-scale detection models based on AI, such as machine learning, to play defense by learning from and mitigating fraud attempts. Machine learning is the process that helps a computer learn without direct instruction using algorithms to discover patterns in large datasets. Those patterns are then used to create a comprehensive AI model, allowing for predictions with high accuracy.

    We have developed in-product safety controls that warn users about potential malicious activity and integrate rapid detection and prevention of new types of attacks.

    Our fraud team has developed domain impersonation protection using deep-learning technology at the domain creation stage, to help protect against fraudulent e-commerce websites and fake job listings. Microsoft Edge has incorporated website typo protection, and we have developed AI-powered fake job detection systems for LinkedIn.

    Microsoft Defender Smartscreen is a cloud-based security feature that aims to prevent unsafe browsing habits by analyzing websites, files, and applications based on their reputation and behavior. It is integrated into Windows and the Edge browser to help protect users from phishing attacks, malicious websites, and potentially harmful downloads.

    Furthermore, Microsoft’s Digital Crimes Unit (DCU) partners with others in the private and public sector to disrupt the malicious infrastructure used by criminals perpetuating cyber-enabled fraud. The team’s longstanding collaboration with law enforcement around the world to respond to tech support fraud has resulted in hundreds of arrests and increasingly severe prison sentences worldwide. The DCU is applying key learnings from past actions to disrupt those who seek to abuse generative AI technology for malicious or fraudulent purposes. 

    Quick Assist features and remote help combat tech support fraud

    To help combat tech support fraud, we have incorporated warning messages to alert users about possible tech support scams in Quick Assist before they grant access to someone approaching them purporting to be an authorized IT department or other support resource.

    Windows users must read and click the box to acknowledge the security risk of granting remote access to the device.

    Microsoft has significantly enhanced Quick Assist protection for Windows users by leveraging its security signal. In response to tech support scams and other threats, Microsoft now blocks an average of 4,415 suspicious Quick Assist connection attempts daily, accounting for approximately 5.46% of global connection attempts. These blocks target connections exhibiting suspicious attributes, such as associations with malicious actors or unverified connections.

    Microsoft’s continual focus on advancing Quick Assist safeguards seeks to counter adaptive cybercriminals, who previously targeted individuals opportunistically with fraudulent connection attempts, but more recently have sought to target enterprises with more organized cybercrime campaigns that Microsoft’s actions have helped disrupt.

    Our Digital Fingerprinting capability, which leverages AI and machine learning, drives these safeguards by providing fraud and risk signals to detect fraudulent activity. If our risk signals detect a possible scam, the Quick Assist session is automatically ended. Digital Fingerprinting works by collecting various signals to detect and prevent fraud.

    For enterprises combating tech support fraud, Remote Help is another valuable resource for employees. Remote Help is designed for internal use within an organization and includes features that make it ideal for enterprises.

    By reducing scams and fraud, Microsoft aims to enhance the overall security of its products and protect its users from malicious activities.

    Consumer protection tips

    Fraudsters exploit psychological triggers such as urgency, scarcity, and trust in social proof. Consumers should be cautious of:

    • Impulse buying—Scammers create a sense of urgency with “limited-time” deals and countdown timers.
    • Trusting fake social proof—AI generates fake reviews, influencer endorsements, and testimonials to appear legitimate.
    • Clicking on ads without verification—Many scam sites spread through AI-optimized social media ads. Consumers should cross-check domain names and reviews before purchasing.
    • Ignoring payment security—Avoid direct bank transfers or cryptocurrency payments, which lack fraud protections.

    Job seekers should verify employer legitimacy, be on the lookout for common job scam red flags, and avoid sharing personal or financial information with unverified employers.

    • Verify employer legitimacy—Cross-check company details on LinkedIn, Glassdoor, and official websites to verify legitimacy.
    • Notice common job scam red flags—If a job requires upfront payments for training materials, certifications, or background checks, it is likely a scam. Unrealistic salaries or no-experience-required remote positions should be approached with skepticism. Emails from free domains (such as johndoehr@gmail.com instead of hr@company.com) are also typically indicators of fraudulent activity.
    • Be cautious of AI-generated interviews and communications—If a video interview seems unnatural, with lip-syncing delays, robotic speech, or odd facial expressions, it could be deepfake technology at work. Job seekers should always verify recruiter credentials through the company’s official website before engaging in any further discussions.
    • Avoid sharing personal or financial information—Under no circumstances should you provide a Social Security number, banking details, or passwords to an unverified employer.

    Microsoft is also a member of the Global Anti-Scam Alliance (GASA), which aims to bring governments, law enforcement, consumer protection organizations, financial authorities and providers, brand protection agencies, social media, internet service providers, and cybersecurity companies together to share knowledge and protect consumers from getting scammed.

    Recommendations

    • Remote Help: Microsoft recommends using Remote Help instead of Quick Assist for internal tech support. Remote Help is designed for internal use within an organization and incorporates several features designed to enhance security and minimize the risk of tech support hacks. It is engineered to be used only within an organization’s tenant, providing a safer alternative to Quick Assist.
    • Digital Fingerprinting: This identifies malicious behaviors and ties them back to specific individuals. This helps in monitoring and preventing unauthorized access.
    • Blocking full control requests: Quick Assist now includes warnings and requires users to check a box acknowledging the security implications of sharing their screen. This adds a layer of helpful “security friction” by prompting users who may be multitasking or preoccupied to pause to complete an authorization step.

    Kelly Bissell: A cybersecurity pioneer combating fraud in the new era of AI

    Kelly Bissell’s journey into cybersecurity began unexpectedly in 1990. Initially working in computer science, Kelly was involved in building software for healthcare patient accounting and operating systems at Medaphis and Bellsouth, now AT&T.

    His interest in cybersecurity was sparked when he noticed someone logged into a phone switch attempting to get free long-distance calls and traced the intruder back to Romania. This incident marked the beginning of Kelly’s career in cybersecurity.

    “I stayed in cybersecurity hunting for bad actors, integrating security controls for hundreds of companies, and helping shape the NIST security frameworks and regulations such as FFIEC, PCI, NERC-CIP,” he explains.

    Currently, Kelly is Corporate Vice President of Anti-Fraud and Product Abuse within Microsoft Security. Microsoft’s fraud team employs machine learning and AI to build better detection code and understand fraud operations. They use AI-powered solutions to detect and prevent cyberthreats, leveraging advanced fraud detection frameworks that continuously learn and evolve.

    “Cybercrime is a trillion-dollar problem, and it’s been going up every year for the past 30 years. I think we have an opportunity today to adopt AI faster so we can detect and close the gap of exposure quickly. Now we have AI that can make a difference at scale and help us build security and fraud protections into our products much faster.”

    Previously Kelly managed the Microsoft Detection and Response Team (DART) and created the Global Hunting, Oversight, and Strategic Triage (GHOST) team that detected and responded to attackers such as Storm-0558 and Midnight Blizzard.

    Prior to Microsoft, during his time at Accenture and Deloitte, Kelly collaborated with companies and worked extensively with government agencies like the Department of Homeland Security’s Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, where he helped build security systems inside their operations.

    His time as Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) at a bank exposed him to addressing both cybersecurity and fraud, leading to his involvement in shaping regulatory guidelines to protect banks and eventually Microsoft.

    Kelly has also played a significant role in shaping regulations around the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and Payment Card Industry (PCI) compliance, which helps ensure the security of businesses’ credit card transactions, among others.

    Internationally, Kelly played a crucial role in helping establish agencies and improve cybersecurity measures. As a consultant in London, he helped stand up the United Kingdom’s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC), which is part of the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), the equivalent of CISA. Kelly’s efforts in content moderation with several social media companies, including YouTube, were instrumental in removing harmful content.

    That’s why he’s excited about Microsoft’s partnership with GASA. GASA brings together governments, law enforcement, consumer protection organizations, financial authorities, internet service providers, cybersecurity companies, and others to share knowledge and define joint actions to protect consumers from getting scammed.

    “If I protect Microsoft, that’s good, but it’s not sufficient. In the same way, if Apple does their thing, and Google does their thing, but if we’re not working together, we’ve all missed the bigger opportunity. We must share cybercrime information with each other and educate the public. If we can have a three-pronged approach of tech companies building security and fraud protection into their products, public awareness, and sharing cybercrime and fraudster information with law enforcement, I think we can make a big difference,” he says.

    Next steps with Microsoft Security

    To learn more about Microsoft Security solutions, visit our website. Bookmark the Security blog to keep up with our expert coverage on security matters. Also, follow us on LinkedIn (Microsoft Security) and X (@MSFTSecurity) for the latest news and updates on cybersecurity.

    Methodology: Microsoft platforms and services, including Azure, Microsoft Defender for Office, Microsoft Threat Intelligence, and Microsoft Digital Crimes Unit (DCU), provided anonymized data on threat actor activity and trends. Additionally, Microsoft Entra ID provided anonymized data on threat activity, such as malicious email accounts, phishing emails, and attacker movement within networks. Additional insights are from the daily security signals gained across Microsoft, including the cloud, endpoints, the intelligent edge, and telemetry from Microsoft platforms and services. The $4 billion figure represents an aggregated total of fraud and scam attempts against Microsoft and our customers in consumer and enterprise segments (in 12 months).

    MIL OSI Economics –

  • MIL-OSI: CBL International Limited Reports 2024 Full-Year Results: Revenue Soars 35.9% to $592.5 Million Amid Global Expansion

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    KUALA LUMPUR, Malaysia, April 16, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — CBL International Limited (NASDAQ: BANL) (the “Company” or “CBL”), the listing vehicle of Banle Group (“Banle” or “the Group”), a leading marine fuel logistic company in the Asia-Pacific region, today announced its annual financial results for the year ended December 31, 2024.

    Financial Performance Overview

    The company reported consolidated revenue of $592.52 million for the year ended December 31, 2024, marking a 35.9% increase from $435.90 million in 2023. This growth was primarily driven by a 38.1% increase in sales volume, supported by the addition of new customers during the year, expansion of our supply network to cover more ports, and a broader customer base that now includes bulk carriers and oil and gas tankers in addition to container liner operators.

    Due to challenging market conditions, the Company reported a net loss of $3.87 million in 2024, compared to a net income of $1.13 million in 2023, mainly attributed to a 25.5% decrease in gross profit to $5.37 million in 2024 from $7.21 million in 2023 and a 56.8% rise in operating expenses to $8.70 million in 2024 from $5.55 million in 2023. The Company adopted a volume-driven growth strategy that involved offering more competitive pricing in a market characterized by intensified competition and pricing pressure. While this approach supported increased sales volume and market share, it also contributed to narrower profit margins.

    In addition to reduced gross margins, the net loss was impacted by increased expenses for business expansion, biofuel operation, additional expenses to enhance ESG, and a rise in interest expenses. These were partially offset by a reduction in income tax expenses. The financial outcome reflects both the dynamic nature of the bunkering industry and the Company’s ongoing investment in client base development and geographic growth, which are expected to enhance long-term positioning as market conditions normalize.

    Earnings per share (EPS) reflected this, decreasing to $(0.136) in 2024 from $0.045 in 2023. Cash and cash equivalents increased by 8.3% to $8.02 million as of December 31, 2024 from $7.40 million as of December 31, 2023.

    Business Expansion in Challenging Times

    CBL International’s operational expansion was a key focus in 2024, particularly in a challenging industry environment marked by geopolitical tensions, such as the Red Sea crisis and broader Middle East tensions. The company grew its service network from 36 ports at the time of its IPO in March 2023 to over 60 ports by year-end 2024, covering Asia Pacific, Europe, Africa, and Central America. Revenue growth year-on-year was notable across China, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, and South Korea.

    Key new ports included Mauritius, Panama, and India, enhancing its global reach. This expansion was supported by servicing nine of the world’s top 12 container shipping lines, representing nearly 60% of global container fleet capacity. The Company’s European expansion focused on strengthening cross-regional service offerings for Euro–Asia trade routes. Growth was supported by a stronger presence in the Amsterdam-Rotterdam-Antwerp (ARA) region and a new Ireland office established in late 2023, enhancing local sourcing capabilities.

    Customer diversification was another priority, with the share of non-container liners in total revenue increased, and sales concentration among the top five customers declined in fiscal year 2024.

    A significant highlight was the company’s push towards sustainability, with biofuel sales surging by 628.8% and volume by 603.0%. The introduction of B24 biofuel (76% fossil fuel, 24% used cooking oil methyl ester) in Hong Kong, China, and Malaysia reduced greenhouse gas emissions by 20%, supported by ISCC EU and ISCC Plus certifications secured in 2023. This aligns with global trends towards greener shipping solutions and positions CBL as a leader in sustainable fuel logistics.

    Strategically, CBL enhanced its IT systems, implementing real-time order tracking, data analytics, and workflow automation to improve efficiency. Credit risk management was strengthened, and working capital management improved with increased factoring facilities and a cash balance rise, navigating macroeconomic challenges through pricing strategies and port network adjustments. Additionally, CBL expanded its funding sources by accessing capital markets, such as private placement, increasing financial flexibility to support growth initiatives.

    Bullish Outlook and Customer Loyalty Strategy

    Despite the net loss, CBL’s management remains optimistic about the future, viewing current industry challenges as an opportunity to build resilience and enhance customer loyalty. While prudently evaluating the impact of the latest U.S. tariff policy, among other macro incidents such as geopolitical tensions, regulatory changes, and shifting global trade dynamics, on the economy and the bunkering sector, CBL believes its broad global network, primarily focused on intra-Asia and Euro-Asia trade routes, helps mitigate potential adverse effects. Since the Company has no operation on U.S. ports, the impact of such policies may be limited in the near future.

    The Company’s strategic expansion of ports, diversification of its client base, and commitment to sustainable initiatives are designed to position it for growth when market conditions improve. By investing in new ports and expanding relationships with key industry players, CBL aims to secure long-term partnerships that will strengthen its market position as global trade stabilizes and profitability improves.

    Management Commentary and Future Outlook

    Dr. Teck Lim Chia, Chairman and CEO of CBL International Limited, stated, “We are confident in our strategy to expand our service network, maximize sales volume and explore sustainable offerings, even in these challenging times. Our investments in new ports, diversified clients, and sustainable fuels are building a foundation for future growth. We believe that by demonstrating our capabilities at present, we will earn customer loyalty that will yield substantial benefits as the market recovers, positioning CBL International for significant success in the years ahead.”

    Looking ahead, CBL remains focused on expanding its market presence, particularly in biofuels, and enhancing its global supply network. The company is committed to driving operational efficiency and delivering sustainable growth.

    Webcast Details

    CBL International Limited (Nasdaq: BANL) cordially invites you to participate in a webcast to discuss its financial results for the year ended December 31, 2024.

    About the Banle Group

    CBL International Limited (Nasdaq: BANL) is the listing vehicle of Banle Group, a reputable marine fuel logistic company based in the Asia Pacific region that was established in 2015. We are committed to providing customers with one-stop solution for vessel refueling, which is referred to as bunkering facilitator in the bunkering industry. We facilitate vessel refueling mainly through local physical suppliers in over 60 major ports covering Belgium, China, Hong Kong, India, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Mauritius, Panama, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey and Vietnam, as of 16 April, 2025. The Group actively promotes the use of sustainable fuels and is awarded with the ISCC EU and ISCC Plus certifications.

    For more information about our company, please visit our website at: https://www.banle-intl.com.

    Forward-Looking Statements

    Certain statements in this announcement are not historical facts but are forward-looking statements. Forward-looking statements generally are accompanied by words such as “believe,” “may,” “could,” “will,” “estimate,” “continue,” “anticipate,” “intend,” “expect,” “plan,” “should,” “would,” “plan,” “future,” “outlook,” “potential,” “project” and similar expressions that predict or indicate future events or trends or that are not statements of historical matters, but the absence of these words does not mean that a statement is not forward-looking. These forward-looking statements include, but are not limited to, statements regarding estimates and forecasts of other performance metrics and projections of market opportunity. They involve known and unknown risks and uncertainties and are based on various assumptions, whether or not identified in this press release and on current expectations of BANL’s management and are not predictions of actual performance. These forward-looking statements are provided for illustrative purposes only and are not intended to serve as and must not be relied on by any investor as, a guarantee, an assurance, a prediction or a definitive statement of fact or probability. Actual events and circumstances are difficult or impossible to predict and will differ from assumptions. Many actual events and circumstances are beyond the control of BANL. Some important factors that could cause actual results to differ materially from those in any forward-looking statements could include changes in domestic and foreign business, fuel prices and tariffs, market, financial, political and legal conditions. The Company undertakes no obligation to update or revise publicly any forward-looking statements to reflect subsequent occurring events or circumstances, or changes in its expectations, except as may be required by law. Although the Company believes that the expectations expressed in these forward-looking statements are reasonable, it cannot assure you that such expectations will turn out to be correct, and the Company cautions investors that actual results may differ materially from the anticipated results and encourages investors to review other factors that may affect its future results in the Company’s registration statement and other filings with the SEC.

    CBL INTERNATIONAL LIMITED
    (Incorporated in Cayman Islands with limited liabilities)

    For more information, please contact:
    CBL International Limited
    Email: investors@banle-intl.com

    Strategic Financial Relations Limited
    Shelly Cheng
    Iris Au Yeung
    Email:    		 Tel: (852) 2864 4857
    Tel: (852) 2114 4913
    sprg_cbl@sprg.com.hk 

    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-OSI Global: Growing threats faced by women candidates undermine our democracy

    Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Inessa De Angelis, PhD Student, Faculty of Information, University of Toronto

    As Liberal MP Pam Damoff prepares to leave politics, she joins other Canadian women MPs in warning that growing threats and harassment are driving them out of politics.

    Their call adds to the voices of other politicians in Australia and the United Kingdom who caution that misogyny and threats of violence, especially on social media, have caused them to refrain from seeking re-election.

    With the Canadian federal election approaching, campaigns expose politicians to increased online incivility and abuse. Nearly 19 per cent of tweets analyzed by the Samara Centre for Democracy during the 2021 campaign contained harassment.

    Harassment undermines democracy and threatens the equal participation of women in politics. When women politicians don’t seek re-election, we lose key voices advocating for a more equitable future.

    Despite threats to our democracy being a key theme of the ongoing federal election campaign, barely anyone is talking about the threat harassment poses.

    Harassment is a threat to representation

    Women remain underrepresented in Canadian Parliament. Canada currently ranks 70th out of 190 countries for representation of women in politics. Following the federal election in 2021, women held only 30.9 per cent of the seats in the House of Commons.

    While research shows women who run for office are just as likely to win as their male counterparts, women require more convincing to step up and put their name on the ballot.

    Once women politicians are elected, they face more barriers in Parliament. Some of these barriers include family obligations and fewer promotions to high-profile roles.

    However, gender-based heckling, violence and harassment are additional barriers.

    Shaping voter behaviour

    Violence against women politicians aims to silence and exclude women from participating in politics simply because they are women.

    And while men and women politicians receive similar amounts of online harassment, online attacks against women politicians tend to be more personal and sexist in tone.

    Online harassment isn’t just driving women out of politics; it’s also shaping voter behaviour.

    In fact, research shows that women voters are less likely to participate in political discussions on social media because they fear getting harassed as women politicians are.

    These findings align with outgoing Liberal MP Jennifer O’Connell’s letter to her constituents that cites online threats of sexual violence fuelled by misinformation and disinformation as rationale for not seeking re-election.

    Increasing security

    The rising threats of harassment against all politicians led the Privy Council Office to offer private-sector security services for candidates who feel intimidated and threatened during the 2025 campaign.

    The goal of private security is to offer an extra level of protection when the threshold for police protection is not met. Through the program, candidates can get an unarmed guard to watch their surroundings and manage risks.

    Which metrics are used to determine if the threshold is met? Private security services should protect all candidates equally. However, the lived experiences and concerns of women politicians are often discounted and not taken seriously.

    A new way to measure harassment

    Defining and quantifying types of harassment is hard. Hate speech is recognized as explicit harassment, but this raises questions about who gets to decide which less explicit incidents count as harassment.

    There are more subtle forms of harassment like sexist microaggressions that threaten women candidates just as much as blatant hate speech. But these subtle microaggressions are often brushed off as not being harassment.

    With no single definition or agreed-upon way to measure harassment, I developed a seven-point scale to categorize nuanced forms of online harassment. This scale takes into account more subtle forms of harassment, including social media comments that question the authority of women politicians to explicit hate speech.

    I found that 86 per cent of replies to tweets sent to women MPs contained some form of harassment.

    We cannot view each incident of harassment such as threatening social media comments, volunteers being screamed at or signs being vandalized as isolated events. Understanding all of these incidents, regardless of their severity, as being connected allows us to track the growing forms and impacts of violence.

    Legislation needed

    Steps have already been taken at Parliament to fight harassment through Bill C-65, which strengthens federal workplace protections against violence and sexual harassment. But more should be done on the campaign trail.

    The Privy Council Office’s new private-sector security service is a start. However, candidates should not be expected to quantify how threats make them feel to receive help. Political parties and the Privy Council Office should proactively offer more support to all candidates.

    Social media platforms must take greater responsibility for applying their terms of service to minimize harmful content.

    New legislation should be drafted to address threats faced by politicians. Regardless of who forms the next government, all parties need to work together to pass online harms legislation.

    Harassment is used as a barrier to stop women from running for office. This is fundamentally about making sure their voices are heard in our democracy.

    Inessa De Angelis receives funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada and the Province of Ontario.

    – ref. Growing threats faced by women candidates undermine our democracy – https://theconversation.com/growing-threats-faced-by-women-candidates-undermine-our-democracy-254371

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

  • MIL-OSI: Stifel Financial Schedules First Quarter 2025 Financial Results Conference Call

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    ST. LOUIS, April 16, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Stifel Financial Corp. (NYSE: SF) will release its first quarter financial results before the market opens on Wednesday, April 23, 2025. The company will host a conference call to review the results at 9:30 a.m. Eastern time that same day. The conference call may include forward-looking statements.

    All interested parties are invited to listen to Stifel Chairman and CEO Ronald J. Kruszewski by dialing (866) 409-1555 and referencing participant ID 2769458. A live audio webcast of the call, as well as a presentation highlighting the company’s results, will be available through Stifel’s website, www.stifel.com. For those who cannot listen to the live broadcast, a replay of the broadcast will be available through the above-referenced website beginning approximately one hour following the completion of the call.

    Stifel Company Information
    Stifel Financial Corp. (NYSE: SF) is a financial services holding company headquartered in St. Louis, Missouri, that conducts its banking, securities, and financial services business through several wholly owned subsidiaries. Stifel’s broker-dealer clients are served in the United States through Stifel, Nicolaus & Company, Incorporated, including its Eaton Partners and Miller Buckfire business divisions; Keefe, Bruyette & Woods, Inc.; and Stifel Independent Advisors, LLC; in Canada through Stifel Nicolaus Canada Inc.; and in the United Kingdom and Europe through Stifel Nicolaus Europe Limited. The Company’s broker-dealer affiliates provide securities brokerage, investment banking, trading, investment advisory, and related financial services to individual investors, professional money managers, businesses, and municipalities. Stifel Bank and Stifel Bank & Trust offer a full range of consumer and commercial lending solutions. Stifel Trust Company, N.A. and Stifel Trust Company Delaware, N.A. offer trust and related services. To learn more about Stifel, please visit the Company’s website at www.stifel.com. For global disclosures, please visit https://www.stifel.com/investor-relations/press-releases.

    Stifel Investor Relations Contact
    Joel Jeffrey, Senior Vice President
    (212) 271-3610 direct
    investorrelations@stifel.com

    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: The UK calls on all parties to agree an immediate and unconditional ceasefire in DRC: UK statement at the UN Security Council

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    Speech

    The UK calls on all parties to agree an immediate and unconditional ceasefire in DRC: UK statement at the UN Security Council

    Statement by Ambassador James Kariuki, UK Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN, at the UN Security Council meeting on the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

    President, this month we commemorate 31 years since the genocide against the Tutsi. 

    During this time, we honour the memory of those who lost their lives, and recognise the remarkable resilience shown by the people of Rwanda.

    I will make three points.

    First, the United Kingdom remains deeply concerned at the situation in eastern DRC. 

    We regret that despite the unanimous adoption by this Council of resolution 2773 almost two months ago, it remains far from being implemented. 

    While the withdrawal of M23 and Rwandan Defence Forces from Walikale is a positive step, much more needs to be done.

    We reiterate this Council’s call for the M23 to cease hostilities and withdraw from all controlled areas, and for the Rwandan Defence Forces to cease support for the M23 and withdraw from Congolese territory. 

    We call on the parties, in line with resolution 2773, to agree an immediate and unconditional ceasefire, and to seriously engage with regional peace processes.

    Second, the United Kingdom welcomes regional leadership towards a durable resolution of the conflict. 

    We welcome the nomination of President Gnassingbé of Togo as the African Union’s mediator for the peace process for eastern DRC. 

    We hope this will support coordination between regional and international efforts to deliver peace. 

    And we urge the parties to engage with his efforts and urgently implement the EAC-SADC roadmap to attain sustainable peace and security.

    Third, the United Kingdom is deeply concerned by the scale of human suffering from the conflict in eastern DRC, as set out by our briefers, and its impact on the region. 

    More than one million people have been displaced since the start of the year.

    We repeat our calls for all parties to respect international humanitarian and human rights law and to allow safe and unimpeded passage of humanitarian assistance by lake, road and through the reopening of key airports including Goma and Kavumu. 

    We also support greater UN and donor co-ordination to ensure assistance reaches those most in need.

    Updates to this page

    Published 16 April 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

  • MIL-Evening Report: State of the states: six experts on how the campaign is playing out around Australia

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By David Clune, Honorary Associate, Government and International Relations, University of Sydney

    The federal election campaign has passed the halfway mark, with politicians zig-zagging across the country to spruik their policies and achievements.

    Where politicians choose to visit (and not visit) give us some insight into their electoral priorities and strategy.

    Here, six experts analyse how the campaign has looked so far in New South Wales, Queensland, South Australia, Tasmania, Victoria and Western Australia.

    New South Wales

    David Clune, honorary associate, government and international relations, University of Sydney

    Opposition Leader Peter Dutton’s strategy in NSW seems to include a tacit concession Liberal heartland seats won by the Teals in 2022 are unlikely to come back.

    Instead, the Liberals are hoping to make inroads into Western Sydney electorates held by Labor. It’s a fast-growing, diverse area where families are struggling to pay the mortgage and household bills, and young people have difficulty renting or buying homes. Dutton and Prime Minister Anthony Albanese have concentrated their campaigning in this area, both claiming to be the best choice for cost-of-living relief and housing affordability.

    Many of these seats are among Labor’s safest. Most would require a two-party preferred swing of 6% or more to be lost. Historically speaking, swings of this size are unlikely, although nevertheless possible.

    Labor is putting much effort into “sandbagging” marginal coastal seats. A major issue is Labor’s emphasis on renewables versus the Coalition’s policy of building nuclear power plants, including one in the Hunter Valley.

    Dutton’s messaging in the early part of the campaign was confusing, combining pragmatic politics, such as cutting the excise on petrol, with right-wing ideology, such as slashing the public service. The former resonated in the marginals, the latter did not. Albanese, by contrast, stayed on message, releasing a stream of expensive handouts to win the votes of battling Sydneysiders.

    A wildcard is the emergence of Muslim lobby groups, The Muslim Vote and Muslim Votes Matter. These were formed to support pro-Palestine candidates in safe Labor seats in Western Sydney where there is a large Muslim population, such as Blaxland and Watson.

    One factor that won’t be influential is the state government. Premier Chris Minns leads a Labor administration whose performance has generally been lacklustre, but which is not notably unpopular. Unlike in Victoria, NSW voters seem to have their baseball bats in the closet.

    The opinion polls continue to show the trend developing since February of a swing back to Labor in NSW, mirroring the national trend. According to an aggregate of polling data, as at April 15 the Labor two-party preferred vote in NSW was 51.9%, an increase of 1.7% since the March federal budget.

    Queensland

    Paul Williams, associate professor of politics and journalism, Griffith University

    The fact neither Albanese nor Dutton has spent a disproportionate amount of time campaigning in Queensland underscores the view the Sunshine State is not a pathway to The Lodge.

    But the fact both leaders have made several visits – Albanese campaigned here four times in 12 days – also indicates neither leader is taking any seat for granted.

    Indeed, Albanese has visited normally tough-to-win seats, such as Leichhardt in far north Queensland (held by the Coalition for 26 of the past 29 years), which reveals an emboldened Labor Party. With the retirement of popular Coalition MP Warren Entsch, and held by just 3.44%, Labor thinks Leichhardt is “winnable”, especially after reports the LNP candidate Jeremy Neal had posted questionable comments regarding China and Donald Trump on social media.

    If so – and given the growing lead Labor boasts in national polls – the LNP would be also at least a little concerned in Longman (3.1%), Bonner (3.4%), Flynn (3.8%), Forde (4.2%) and Petrie (4.4%).

    At least the opposition can placate itself with this week’s Resolve Strategic poll, which indicates it still leads Labor in Queensland by six points after preferences, 53% to 47%. That’s just a one-point swing to Labor since 2022. However, it would be concerned that the LNP’s lead has been slashed ten points from the previous YouGov poll.

    But most concerning must surely be a uComms poll in Dutton’s own seat of Dickson, held by a slender 1.7%, which forecast the opposition leader losing to high-profile Labor candidate Ali France, 51.7 to 48.3%. The entry of the Climate 200-backed independent candidate Ellie Smith appears to have disrupted preference flows.

    Labor’s own polling indicated a closer contest at 50% each, while the LNP’s polling indicates an easy win for Dutton, 57% to 43%, despite Labor spending A$130,000 on France’s campaign.

    An alleged terror plot against Dutton in Brisbane doesn’t appear to have shifted the dial. But voters’ potential to conflate Dutton with Trump may well have, especially given Trump’s tariffs now threaten Queensland beef producers’ $1.4 billion trade with the United States. In the closing weeks, watch as Dutton draws on the new and popular Premier David Crisafulli for electoral succour.

    South Australia

    Rob Manwaring, associate professor of politics and public policy, Flinders University

    Is there a federal election campaign taking place? In South Australia, there is a something of an elusive air about the current festival of democracy, with many voters disengaged. The lack of excitement reflects the fact that only two seats in the state are marginal: Sturt (0.5%) and Boothby (3.3%).

    The party campaigns have sparkled and flickered, but not really caught alight. The signature move was Albanese’s early announcement of the $150 million new healthcare centre at Flinders, in the seat of Boothby. For the ALP, this neatly coalesced around Labor’s campaign on Medicare.

    Federal Labor also sees its strongest asset in the state in Premier Peter Malinauskas, who was prominent during the recent AFL gather round – the round played entirely in Adelaide and its surrounds.

    In a welcome development for the state, Labor’s announcement Adelaide would be put forward to host the next Climate COP conference in 2026 was an interesting flashpoint. Locally, many businesses welcomed the announcement, as it potentially will generate significant footfall and economic activity.

    Yet, the Coalition quickly announced they would not support the bid, trying to shift the attention away from climate to cost-of-living issues.

    More generally, there is a perception the Coalition has been struggling to build campaign momentum. Notably, in a recent visit by members of the shadow cabinet, energies appear to be focused more on sandbagging the seat of Sturt than on winning Boothy, which Labor holds with a nominal 3.3%.

    Other factors also might explain a sense of indifference in South Australia. There have been key developments in state politics, for example, notably the ongoing criminal case against former Liberal leader David Speirs, and independent MP, and former Liberal, Nick McBride, who faces assault charges related to family and domestic violence (to which he’s yet to enter a plea).

    Tasmania

    Robert Hortle, deputy director of the Tasmanian Policy Exchange, University of Tasmania

    The Labor and Liberal campaign strategies started quite differently across Tasmania’s five electorates.

    Labor is desperate to defend Lyons and Franklin and hopeful of picking up Braddon (though perhaps overly ambitious, given the 8% margin).

    Its candidates have focused on promoting Labor’s big, national-level policies. In the first couple of weeks of the campaign, this meant pushing its flagship healthcare and childcare policies. Following the campaign launches on the weekend, housing is the new flavour.

    The Liberal Party – there is no Coalition in Tassie – is focused on winning super marginal Lyons (0.9%) and holding Braddon and Bass. In contrast to Labor, the Liberal campaign was initially defined by lots of community-level funding announcements and Tasmania-specific infrastructure support.

    Since the Coalition’s plan to halve the fuel excise was announced, the approach has changed somewhat. Tasmanian Liberal candidates are now swinging in behind this and other national policy pronouncements about – you guessed it – housing.

    Both major party candidates have been pretty quiet on the controversial issue of salmon farming. This is surprising given the national spotlight on Braddon’s Macquarie Harbour and the waterways of Franklin. The only exception is Braddon Labor candidate Anne Urquhart’s very vocal support for the salmon industry.

    For the Greens, the goal is to build on their 2022 vote share and turn one Senate seat into two, although this is a long shot. They have campaigned hard on issues – mainly salmon farming and native forest logging – where agreement between the Labor and Liberal parties has left space for a dissenting voice.

    Although the Greens’ chances of winning any of the lower house seats are slim, they will be hoping these issues help them make further inroads into the declining primary vote share of the major parties.

    Victoria

    Zareh Ghazarian, senior lecturer in politics, school of social sciences, Monash University

    Victoria has several seats that can potentially change hands at this election. As ABC election analyst Antony Green reminds us, the state is home to at least a dozen seats the major parties hold by a margin of 6% or less. Additionally, the independents in Kooyong and Goldstein are also on thin margins (2.2% and 3.3% respectively).

    Within this context, the campaign in Victoria has been marked by several visits by the major party leaders. The challenge, however, has been how they have worked with their state counterparts.

    State Liberal Leader Brad Battin has fallen short of explicitly supporting the Coalition’s focus on nuclear energy. Instead, he says he’s ready to have an “adult conversation” about the prospect. Coal currently provides more than 60% of electricity in Victoria.

    Dutton was, however, happy to campaign alongside Battin and also visited a petrol station with the state leader while in Melbourne.

    The Labor Party in Victoria, on the other hand, has been grappling with a drop in support in the polls, with Premier Jacinta Allan’s popularity falling. As a result, there’s been much speculation among political commentators about whether Albanese would want to be campaigning with a leader seemingly struggling to attract support.

    In one of the first visits to the state, Albanese did not campaign with Allan. This was even though he had been happy to be with the premiers of South Australia and Western Australia while campaigning there.

    According to Albanese, it was the fact that parliament was sitting that made it impossible for Allan to join him on the campaign trail. Both leaders were together at a subsequent visit, but this elicited questions about the impact of Allan’s leadership on Labor’s standing in Victoria.

    Western Australia

    Narelle Miragliotta, associate professor in politics, Murdoch University

    Reports the state’s 16 seats will decide which party grouping will form government has resulted in WA voters being treated to regular visits by the major party leaders, including Labor’s campaign launch.

    The campaign context in WA is shaped by its mining economy. Perth is the fastest growing capital in the country, which has led to strong growth in the median housing price and an expensive rental market.

    While the state’s economic prosperity is one of the drivers of cost-of-living pressures, some of this has been offset by relief measures from the state Labor government, relatively low unemployment and some of the highest average weekly incomes in the country.

    On top of this two potentially divisive issues – the nature positive laws and North West shelf gas expansion – have been defused by federal Labor. The party has backtracked in the case of the former. In the case of the latter, it has merely delayed (not without criticism, however) what is likely to be an eventual approval.

    Clearer differences have emerged on future of the WA live sheep trade. But while important to communities directly affected by the phasing out of the practice, the issue does not appear to be capturing the attention of most metropolitan voters.

    What might we expect? Labor’s two-party-preferred margin is comfortable in eight of the nine seats it holds. The five Liberal-held seats are on much slimmer margins. Polling suggests little improvement in their state-wide share of the two party preferred vote since 2022.

    To the extent the polls portend the outcome, the Liberals’ lack of electoral momentum in WA suggests it will be a struggle to regain the target seats of Curtin and Tangney. Only the outcome in WA’s newest seat, Bullwinkel, remains uncertain.

    Paul Williams is a research associate with the TJ Ryan Foundation.

    David Clune, Narelle Miragliotta, Rob Manwaring, Robert Hortle, and Zareh Ghazarian do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. State of the states: six experts on how the campaign is playing out around Australia – https://theconversation.com/state-of-the-states-six-experts-on-how-the-campaign-is-playing-out-around-australia-253124

    MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Experts of the Committee against Torture Commend Armenia on Proactively Addressing Issues in Prisons, Raise Questions on Ensuring Police Accountability for Excessive Use of Force and Tackling the Criminal Subculture in Prisons

    Source: United Nations – Geneva

    The Committee against Torture today concluded its consideration of the fifth periodic report of Armenia.  Committee Experts commended the State on proactively addressing issues in its main prisons, while raising questions on ensuring the accountability of police officers for excessive use of force and tackling the criminal subculture within prisons. 

    Anna Racu, Committee Expert and Country Rapporteur, said the Committee welcomed the swift and constructive response by the Armenian authorities regarding the “quarantine” and disciplinary blocks at Artik Prison, which were promptly closed for refurbishment, ensuring that these areas no longer remained in a state of severe disrepair.  This proactive approach to addressing immediate concerns was commendable.

    Peter Kessing, Committee Expert and Country Rapporteur, said it had been reported that there were still cases where the police used excessive force in conflict with the Convention.  Were audio or video recordings of police interrogation mandatory?  Were taped interrogations routinely reviewed to identify potential instances and acts of torture?  What initiatives had Armenia taken to prevent excessive use of force, including lethal force, by the police in future demonstrations and protests? 

    Ms. Racu said in Armenia, the influence of the criminal subculture significantly undermined the reputation of the prison administration.  What measures had been taken by the Government to break down the informal hierarchies and criminal gangs and networks that had an informal power in many of Armenia’s penitentiary institutions?  What steps were being taken to ensure that all prisoners, regardless of their social status or affiliations, had equal protection under the law and were not subject to discrimination or abuse, including sexual abuse by other inmates or informal leaders?  What measures were being taken to address corruption among prison staff?

    The delegation said in 2023, the Ministry of Internal Affairs was established as a civilian oversight body over the police.  It was responsible for areas of public safety, security and disaster risk management, and was driven by the objective of introducing human rights-based approaches in policing and public services.  The large-scale use of video surveillance in police operations ensured accountability of the police.  Patrol police wore body cameras all the time, acknowledged by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture as an important tool for the prevention of torture.

    The delegation said Armenia had produced a draft bill which criminalised receiving or leading groups promoting the criminal subculture.  Since 2024, significant structural reforms had been undertaken and a new operational department now functioned within the central penitentiary service, containing an intelligence unit which was equipped with tools used by criminal police.  From 2022 to 2024, 60 criminal cases were initiated and nine came from penitentiary institutions.  Addressing the criminal subculture was a top priority for Armenia’s Ministry of Justice, the police and penitentiary units.

    Introducing the report, Anna Karapetyan, Deputy Minister of Justice of Armenia and head of the delegation, said based on its Constitution and ratified international treaties, Armenia had taken strong steps to establish legal provisions and capacities to combat torture and hold violators accountable. In 2021, the new Criminal and Criminal Procedure Codes were adopted, followed by the adoption of the new Penitentiary Code in 2022.  The new Criminal Code prescribed three levels of penalty according to the aggravating circumstances of torture and brought substantive changes to the procedure of initiating criminal investigations.  While Armenia continued to uphold its human rights commitments domestically, the continued imprisonment, ill-treatment and torture of Armenian prisoners of war and other detainees held by Azerbaijan remained a concern.

    In concluding remarks, Claude Heller, Committee Chairperson, thanked the delegation for the excellent and informative dialogue.  The multilateral system was in deep crisis, at the political level and financially.  However, despite all these restrictions, the Committee worked arduously, objectively and constructively to produce a positive impact on the lives of people in the States parties.

    In her closing remarks, Ms. Karapetyan expressed sincere appreciation to the Committee for the excellent dialogue. The Committee’s comments and recommendations reinforced the shared responsibility held together for the prohibition of torture everywhere, under all circumstances.

    The delegation of Armenia consisted of representatives from the Ministry of Justice; the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs; the Ministry of Internal Affairs; the Ministry of Health; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; the Prosecutor General; the Investigative Committee; and the Permanent Mission of Armenia to the United Nations Office at Geneva.

    The Committee will issue concluding observations on the report of Armenia at the end of its eighty-second session on 2 May.  Those and other documents relating to the Committee’s work, including reports submitted by States parties, will be available on the session’s webpage.  Summaries of the public meetings of the Committee can be found here, and webcasts of the public meetings can be found here.

    The Committee will next meet in public on Thursday, 17 April at 3 p.m. to conclude its consideration of the eighth periodic report of France (CAT/C/FRA/8).

    Report

    The Committee has before it the fifth periodic report of Armenia (CAT/C/ARM/5).

    Presentation of Report

    ANNA KARAPETYAN, Deputy Minister of Justice of Armenia and head of the delegation, said based on its Constitution and ratified international treaties, Armenia had taken strong steps to establish legal provisions and capacities to combat torture and hold violators accountable.  Armenia had made notable progress in preventing torture and ill-treatment through several strategic reforms.  The 2020–2022 Human Rights Action Plan envisaged 15 actions, including installing audio-video recording in interrogation rooms, developing the relevant guidelines on the investigation of cases of torture, and wide-scale training for professionals in law enforcement, healthcare, and justice, among others. 

    The ongoing 2023–2025 Human Rights Action Plan reinforced the absolute right to be free from torture, including through strengthening the reporting mechanism, enhancing the capabilities of the relevant Department in the Investigative Committee, and improving the conditions of the detention facilities in penitentiary institutions and courts.  The 2020–2022 Police Reform Strategy led to a significant achievement in strengthening civilian oversight of the police, through the establishment of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in 2023.  The 2019–2023 and 2023-2026 Penitentiary and Probation Strategies, along with a dedicated 2021–2022 plan on suicide prevention, contributed to better detention conditions and medical documentation practices. 

    In 2021, the new Criminal and Criminal Procedure Codes were adopted, followed by the adoption of the new Penitentiary Code in 2022.  The new Criminal Code prescribed three levels of penalty according to the aggravating circumstances of torture and brought substantive changes to the procedure of initiating criminal investigations.  The new Criminal Procedure Code guaranteed the minimum rights of arrested persons, as outlined in article 110, which were aligned with international standards. 

    In 2021, the Government adopted a decree furthering the procedure of filling in and monitoring the medical examination protocol, which was extended to police detention facilities.  In 2022, amendments were adopted to the Internal Regulations of Police Detention Facilities, making it mandatory to conduct medical examination of arrestees by ambulance in each case of admitting a new arrestee, regardless of the presence of bodily injuries or health complaints. 

    The adoption of the law on police guard in 2024 envisaged the establishment of the new police guard instead of the current police troops, shifting from a militarised service to the modern policing approach with a specialisation on crowd management.  The law on advocacy ensured attorneys could communicate privately with clients, and detainees had the right to inform the third party of their detention.  The new Penitentiary Code established the right of lawyers to freely meet their clients in prisons or detention facilities without requiring special permission for access.  It was noteworthy that the Criminal Procedure Code required almost all types of investigative actions, including interrogations, to be audio and video recorded. 

    Following the dissolution of the Special Investigative Service in 2021, the mandate for investigating acts of torture was transferred to the Investigative Committee of the Republic of Armenia, where a dedicated division consisting of eight investigators was responsible for handling such cases.  Allegations of torture or ill-treatment committed by investigators of the Investigative Committee were reviewed by the Anti-Corruption Committee. By 2024, 386 criminal proceedings were investigated, with 133 terminated and one case involving four individuals referred to court.  In recent years two torture verdicts had been rendered, although neither had entered into force yet. 

    Alleged police violence was investigated under other articles of the Criminal Code; three police officers had been convicted for obstructing lawful professional activities of journalists during 2018 protests and were dismissed from the police service as a result of disciplinary proceedings.  Similarly, three police officers were dismissed from service for obstructing lawful professional activities of journalists during mass protests of 2015.

    The new Criminal Code also introduced new types of preventive measures that acted as non-custodial alternatives to detention, such as house arrest and administrative supervision. In 2024, these alternative preventive measures were applied to 1,587 defendants.  Similarly, the new Criminal Code provided the limitation of liberty as an alternative to incarceration.  The Civil Code now included provisions for redress for torture victims.  Victims also had the right to rehabilitation, including compensation for medical care, and access to free psychological and legal services.  This year within the implementation of the Human Rights Strategy and deriving Action Plan, a study was developed regarding the possible directions of the establishment of the rehabilitation centre.  The new Codes were currently undergoing a monitoring phase; necessary steps would be taken to address any potential shortcomings which may arise. 

    Armenia had made significant progress in countering domestic violence, in particular through the new Criminal Code which defined “close relative,” which included spouses and former spouses, as well as individuals in or formerly in marital relations. 

    While Armenia continued to uphold its human rights commitments domestically, the continued imprisonment, ill-treatment and torture of Armenian prisoners of war and other detainees held by Azerbaijan remained a concern.  The Committee, in its most recent concluding observations on Azerbaijan, had expressed deep concern regarding Azerbaijan’s conduct and the ongoing detention of the 23 Armenian individuals, which remainedMs. Karapetyan concluded by stating that Armenia was fully committed to the full and effective implementation of the Convention.

    Questions by Committee Experts

    PETER KESSING, Committee Expert and Country Rapporteur, said since Armenia’s last review by the Committee in 2017, progress had been made in prohibiting and preventing torture and ill-treatment.  In particular, the Committee noted and commended the State party for the enactment of a fundamentally new Criminal Code, a new Criminal Procedure Code, and a new Penitentiary Code, which were very positive signs.  Additionally, Armenia had joined the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and had undertaken significant reforms in the police, penitentiary, and justice sectors in recent years. 

    Could the delegation elaborate on specific cases and court decisions where Armenian courts had applied the principle in article 5 (3) of the Constitution and found that international law, including the Convention, took precedence over national law? Mr. Kessing commended Armenia and the Armenian Constitution for article 81, and the obligation to take the views of United Nations Committees into account when interpreting the Constitution, which illustrated a strong commitment to international law.  Could cases be provided where the practice of the Committee had been taken into account when interpreting the Armenian Constitution?

    It was reported that the definition of ‘State officials’ in Armenian law was narrow, and did not include staff working in psychiatric institutions or medical workers. Was this correct?  Did this mean that those people working in psychiatric institutions or medical workers could not be investigated or prosecuted for torture? If this was the case, was Armenia considering amending and broadening the definition of ‘State officials’ in line with the obligation in the Convention against Torture?  Pursuant to the new Criminal Code, no limitation periods were applicable to the offence of torture and the offence of abusing and exceeding public authority.  Did this apply retroactively to past cases of torture?  Was there still a statute of limitations in relation to civilian court cases concerning redress and compensation for torture? 

    Regarding the Virabyan case from 2012, could the delegation explain what decision the Armenian Court of Cassation had taken, after the court received the advisory opinion from the European Court of Human Rights in April 2022?   Had the Armenian Court of Cassation handed down a decision? Had the police officer responsible for torturing Mr. Virabyan been held accountable?  Could the delegation confirm that evidence and material extracted by use of torture or ill-treatment would always be excluded from court proceedings in Armenia?  Were there concrete cases where Armenian courts had excluded torture-material? 

      

    According to the Council of Europe, Armenia had the second highest proportion of pre-trial detainees in Europe, with 53 per cent of the people in Armenian prisons being held in pre-trial detention; this was a very high rate.  It was expected that the new Criminal Codes that entered into force during the second half of 2022 would help further reduce the number of remand prisoners.  Had the necessary implementing laws and by-laws been adopted to ensure the full implementation of the new Criminal Codes?  Had the new Criminal Codes reduced the number of remand prisoners? Could up to date information about the use of electric monitoring and other alternatives to detention be provided? 

    It had been reported that there were still cases where the police used excessive force in conflict with the Convention.  What was the status of police reform?  What concrete initiatives had been taken to date to reform the police?  Were all individuals who were arrested informed about the reason for their arrest?  Were audio or video recordings of police interrogation mandatory?  Were taped interrogations routinely reviewed to identify potential instances and acts of torture?

    What initiatives had Armenia taken to prevent excessive use of force, including lethal force, by the police in future demonstrations and protests? 

    Despite progress made by Armenia since the last review, it was reported that the quality of the investigations of police conduct remained a significant issue. 

    It was a positive sign that criminal cases concerning alleged police torture were initiated and investigated, but it was reported that torture cases often remained unsolved for many years and rarely led to criminal charges.  Could updated information about the number of investigations into torture and ill-treatment over the last three years be provided? 

    The Committee had been informed that after the adoption of the new Criminal Codes, it was more difficult for lawyers to assist alleged victims of torture in court proceedings, due to the 30 per cent tax applied; was this correct?  Could information about the legal and practical independence of the Investigative Committee of Armenia established in 2022 be provided?  Was the Committee fully independent from the Police?  Would Armenia take steps to ensure a more prompt and effective investigation of police complaints?  Were alleged perpetrators of torture immediately suspended from their duties for the duration of the investigation?

    During the last two examinations of Armenia by the Committee, the police’s excessive use of force in connection with a protest in March 2008 following the February elections, leading to the death of 10 people, was discussed.  The Committee expressed its concern over the slow and ineffective investigation of the situation.  What was the status of the investigation into the 2008 demonstration and later demonstrations?  How many police officers had been identified and held accountable in disciplinary, civilian or criminal proceedings?  What kind of sentences had they received?   Had the victims been provided redress and compensation as required under the Convention? 

    The Committee was aware of reports alleging that Armenian forces had violated international humanitarian law and human rights law during the conflict.  Had Armenia taken steps to ensure that alleged war crimes committed by Armenian forces during the conflict were promptly and impartially investigated by an independent body? 

    As part of a new expedited asylum procedure, there was a 15-day deadline for applying for asylum for asylum seekers arriving illegally to Armenia.  Was this correct?  If so, how many asylum requests had been rejected over the last three years due to the 15-day deadline?  Was it correct that asylum seekers were being prosecuted for illegal entry in Armenia in conflict with domestic law and article 31 in the Refugee Convention that was ratified by Armenia?  Would the State party take further measures to ensure that this practice was ended? What steps were taken to ensure that asylum seekers in detention had access to fair and efficient refugee status determination procedures, as well as appeals procedures with suspensive effect on the deportation order?

    The Human Rights Defender of Armenia was established by law in October 2003, and since 2006 had been accredited “A” status by the Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institution.  In October 2024, the institution reiterated its recommendation that a clear, transparent and participatory selection and appointment process for membership of the Human Rights Defender’s decision-making body must be included in relevant legislation.  Had Armenia taken steps to implement this recommendation? 

    Was it true that the salaries of staff working in the Human Rights Defender’s office were lower than comparable positions in the public sector?  What was the State party doing to remedy the situation?  How many complaints of torture or ill-treatment had the Human Rights Defender received over the last three years?  Could the Human Rights Defender recommend redress to a victim of torture or ill-treatment and criminal proceedings against alleged perpetrators of torture and ill-treatment?  How did the State party follow-up on the recommendations of the national preventive mechanism? 

    The Committee hoped that Armenia would consider making a declaration under article 22 of the Convention and recognise the Committee’s competence to receive and consider individual complaints.  This would provide redress to victims and assist Armenia in implementing the Convention and developing a justice system in line with international human rights law.

    ANNA RACU, Committee Expert and Country Rapporteur, said since Armenia’s last review by this Committee in 2016, there had been notable advancements in the country’s human rights framework.  Significant reforms had been made, including amendments to national legislation and the adoption of policies aimed at improving detention conditions and aligning with international standards.  These positive steps were a testimony of Armenia’s commitment to enhance its legal and institutional frameworks to combat torture and ill-treatment and different forms of violence. 

    The Committee welcomed the fact that periodic professional trainings on the Convention and European Committee for the Prevention of Torture were carried out for the police and prison staff.  The Committee commended the positive initiative that jurisprudence of the European Court for Human Rights was included in the common core curricula for judges, prosecutors, prison staff and civil servants.  The National Strategy for Human Rights Protection (2020–2022) and its action plan emphasised the importance of capacity building for law enforcement and prison staff, including training on human rights and torture prevention.  Had there been any other specific strategic documents that envisaged capacity building activities for law enforcement, judges and prosecutors and other groups with specific competencies under the Convention?   

    It was positive that the Armenian Government had managed to establish a good cooperation with international partners.  The Police Academy and Penitentiary Service Training Centre had incorporated elements of human rights education into their curricula, while the introduction of specialised training modules on the absolute prohibition of torture had been a step forward.  However, some sources indicated that there were some issues that continued to affect the overall effectiveness of the training programmes.  

    What oversight mechanisms were in place to ensure police officers were adequately trained and disciplined for misconduct related to the use of force or mistreatment during arrest or detention?  What measures were in place to ensure that training on the Istanbul Protocol and the prohibition of torture was effectively applied in practice?  Were the training programmes based on practical aspects, which emerged from specific cases or recorded human rights violations? With respect to the courses held for medical personnel, were there plans to provide mandatory training on the Istanbul Protocol, given its importance for proper documentation of torture?

    Had the State party implemented any training programmes focused on the prevention of torture and the appropriate use of force for military personnel, intelligence officers, and security guards, particularly in the context of ongoing tensions related to the military conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh?  How many officers had undergone this training and was it mandatory?

    Could information on recent developments or reforms aimed at improving the living conditions and the treatment of inmates be provided?  Had measures been taken to enhance oversight and accountability within the prison system?  It was encouraging to note the significant progress made, particularly the comprehensive refurbishment of Abovyan Prison, including the reconstruction of the wing for mothers with children and the installation of ventilation and heating systems in the main accommodation areas of Armavir Prison.  These initiatives were important steps forward in enhancing the material conditions for inmates and improving their overall living environment. Furthermore, the Committee welcomed the swift and constructive response by the Armenian authorities regarding the “quarantine” and disciplinary blocks at Artik Prison, which were promptly closed for refurbishment, ensuring that these areas no longer remained in a state of severe disrepair. 

    This proactive approach to addressing immediate concerns was commendable.  These efforts reflected a commitment to addressing longstanding issues in Armenia’s prison system, and the Committee looked forward to seeing the continued actions for the refurbishment of Artik and Armavir Prisons. 

    Despite these positive developments, there were some concerns.  The activities of the “Kosh” and “Hrazdan” penitentiary institutions were suspended on 1 January 2022.  Despite the ongoing discussions on the need to suspend the activities of the “Nubarashen” penitentiary institution, it continued to operate.  Could the delegation’s views regarding these institutions be provided?  Could detailed information regarding the number of inmates in Armenian prisons over the past four years be provided?  What steps had been taken to address overcrowding, including the use of non-custodial measures and alternatives to detention?

    Current legislation in Armenia allowed for the restriction of family communication for up to one month for any violation, which contradicted the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (Nelson Mandela Rules) and European Prison Rules.  What specific rehabilitation programmes were available for prisoners in Armenia? Could an update be provided on recidivism rates and the successful reintegration of former prisoners, as well as the approach of the Government on cooperation with civil society organizations for the benefits of inmates?

    By transferring the competence of medical services to the Ministry of Justice and subsequently to the Ministry of Health, Armenia had taken important steps towards the independence of medical staff in detention.  However, there were still some problematic areas.  After the reform of medical prison services, how independent were the prison doctors from the prison administration?  What systems ensured they could prioritise inmate health without external pressures?  How was access to specialised medical treatment managed for inmates requiring complex care? What oversight mechanisms monitored the quality of healthcare services in prisons?  What measures were implemented to prevent the spread of communicable diseases among inmates? 

    Could an update on harm reduction programmes for drug users, those with HIV and treatment for prisoners with disabilities be provided?  What was the current level of medical equipment and medicines available in prisons?  What specialised medical equipment and healthcare provisions were available for women in detention?  What protocols were in place for documenting injuries from torture or violence, and could inmates and lawyers access these reports?

    What rules and formal protocols existed for medical professionals to document injuries or signs of torture and ill-treatment?  What training did medical professionals receive on identifying and reporting signs of torture and ill-treatment? 

    How were reports of torture and ill-treatment by medical professionals submitted to the competent authorities? 

    In 2023, there were 29 suicide attempts by 22 individuals, primarily concentrated in the “Nubarashen” and “Armavir” institutions. Submissions received from human rights non-governmental organizations indicated that many deaths were attributed to pre-existing health conditions and inadequate medical care.  What were the delegation’s views on the effectiveness of the procedure for checking and assessing the risk of suicide and self-harm? What specific assessments were in place to identify individuals at risk?  Were there cells with safe conditions with no easy access to means of killing oneself? What specific training programmes were provided to penitentiary staff regarding prevention and managing suicidal tendencies, self-harm behaviours, and instances of violence among inmates?

    In Armenia, the influence of the criminal subculture significantly undermined the reputation of the prison administration.  Despite the implementation of legislative amendments by the State to reduce the influence of the criminal subculture in penitentiary institutions and measures aimed at their practical application, the influence of the criminal subculture in places of deprivation of liberty still continued to exist.  What measures had been taken by the Government to break down the informal hierarchies and criminal gangs and networks that had an informal power in many of Armenia’s penitentiary institutions?  What steps were being taken to ensure that all prisoners, regardless of their social status or affiliations, had equal protection under the law and were not subject to discrimination or abuse, including sexual abuse by other inmates or informal leaders?  What measures were being taken to address corruption among prison staff?

    What specific measures had the Armenian Government implemented over the past few years to increase the number of prison staff?  How had the Government addressed the issue of staff retention, including any changes to salaries, working conditions, or benefits aimed at reducing turnover among prison personnel?

    What efforts were being made to ensure that staffing levels in penitentiaries met international standards, particularly concerning the ratio of staff to prisoners?

    A Committee Expert said the Committee had received information that seven out of 10 children aged one to 14 years old were subject to psychological or corporal punishment. What was the State party doing to prevent violence against children?  The Committee had also received reports which revealed concerning cases of violence against children with disabilities, including at a psychological care home in 2023, where a resident was restrained with chains. What measures had Armenia adopted to eliminate unauthorised physical restraints and other inhumane practices in care institutions? 

    Another Committee Expert asked if there were any Azerbaijanis who remained in Armenia’s custody? What procedures had been implemented to ensure any abuse of prisoners of war was fully investigated?  Had there been any kind of arrangements aimed at ensuring the returning prisoner would be promptly investigated for torture cases by the receiving side?  What measures had been taken to prevent discrimination and hate speech against those of Azerbaijani origin? 

    An Expert asked what training members of special teams received, and what were rules on the use of force?  Was equipment deployed by special units certified?  Was it imported or manufactured locally? 

    Responses by the Delegation 

    The delegation said the monitoring of the Criminal Procedure Code had already led to 13 amendments.  International law prevailed in Armenia.  Evidence and materials obtained through torture were totally excluded from criminal cases.  Currently, more than 52 per cent of inmates in penitentiary institutions were in pretrial detention.  Audio and video recording in police stations were mandatory for every case. 

    Armenia had advanced legislation regarding asylum seekers and victims of trafficking. International law had almost been copied into the criminal legislation, particularly article 31 of the Geneva Convention on the status of refugees.  A small limitation had been imposed in consultation with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, which related to the 15 days of applying for asylum for three groups of cases: unlawful entry to the country, if the person was being criminally prosecuted, and for those who had been apprehended. Under this rule, 14 cases of asylum had been rejected, five approved and five suspended.

    The Human Rights Defender was ensured access to all penitentiary records.  Most of the recommendations from the Human Rights Defender’s Office were taken into account when completing renovations and works in the penitentiary institutions.  Currently, the Human Rights Defender could not initiate court cases but could provide briefs to the Constitutional Court.  New legislation on discrimination was being developed which stipulated that the Human Rights Defender could recommend cases to court when it came to discrimination.  Currently, Armenia was not discussing the possibility of implementing article 22. 

    The National Human Rights Action Plan provided for the relevant chapters for each individual who should receive training on torture prevention.  Currently the Ministry of Justice was in the process of developing a single human rights training programme for staff at the penitentiary institutions.  There were two key educational complexes which provided training to judges, the judiciary and police officers.  Last year the Human Rights Defender’s Office provided training to all police detention facilities. 

    In 2024, a mother and childcare penitentiary institution was constructed.  Currently, the sanitation facilities were adapted to meet the needs of pregnant women and children up to three years old.   Food preparation for penitentiary institutions had been outsourced to a private company, which ensured dietary diversity. More than 95 per cent of the inmates were satisfied with the food provided. 

    From 2019, persons deprived of their liberty under the age of 19 were included in the general education programme to ensure the continuity of education.  Surveys had been conducted among inmates to identify those without secondary education, and efforts had been made to provide them with secondary education or vocational training.  Last year, an innovative workshop was opened for inmates, allowing them to make furnishings for other institutions, providing them with the necessary equipment and materials.

    Responses by the Delegation 

    The delegation said under Armenian law, amnesty did not apply to individuals who had committed the crime of torture.  The term public official had been broadened to include any person who had the authority to act on behalf of the State.  As such, all individuals operating in this capacity could be held criminally liable. All institutions which could be engaged in cases of torture were covered within the criminal legislation for criminal liability.  Armenia had ratified the Rome Statute and remained fully committed to aligning its national legislation with the requirements of the International Criminal Court.  Trainings for public officials, judges and members of the Investigative Committee were planned with international officials in this regard. 

    There had been a notable increase in detention motions of around 20 per cent in 2024, compared to previous years.  The percentage of granted motions of detention had generally decreased. Legislative amendments and relevant trainings had been organised for the probation service, and they were being monitored.  A thematic report on the practical challenges of alternative measures was developed in 2022 to see where the law could be improved.  Work was being done to ensure that pro bono lawyers would be exempt from taxes.

    Armenia had produced a draft bill which criminalised receiving or leading groups promoting the criminal subculture.  Since 2024, significant structural reforms had been undertaken and a new operational department now functioned within the central penitentiary service, containing an intelligence unit which was equipped with tools used by criminal police. From 2022 to 2024, 60 criminal cases were initiated and nine came from penitentiary institutions.  Addressing the criminal subculture was a top priority for Armenia’s Ministry of Justice, the police and penitentiary units.

    The fight against corruption remained a top priority for the Armenian Government, and a strategy had been underway for the past three years.  Individuals could submit anonymous reports via an online platform, directly accessible to the Ministry of Justice, under the whistleblowers law. 

    The penitentiary service guaranteed equal treatment, and the Criminal Code ensured equality for all convicted individuals.  Any case of attempted suicide or self-harm was reported to investigative authorities. Mental health and suicide risk monitoring tools had been implemented in all penitentiary institutions since 2022. In every case of suicide, attempted suicide, or self-harm, a comprehensive analysis of the situation was undertaken. Since July 2024, a risk and needs assessment tool was introduced which supported the rehabilitation services.   

    In 2023, the Ministry of Internal Affairs was established as a civilian oversight body over the police.  It was responsible for areas of public safety, security and disaster risk management, and was driven by the objective of introducing human rights-based approaches in policing and public services.  The large-scale use of video surveillance in police operations ensured the accountability of the police.  Under the new Criminal Procedure Code, the police were no longer authorised to conduct interrogations of persons accused of committing a crime.  This responsibility had been transferred to the independent Investigative Committee.  Patrol police wore body cameras all the time, acknowledged by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture as an important tool for the prevention of torture.  Work was underway to provide the same equipment to community police.

    In 2024, operations of nine out of 33 police facilities were discontinued, with an additional two terminated in 2025.  Modernization and renovation works were planned for the remaining facilities to ensure compliance with international standards.  In 2024, joint trainings on documenting and reporting torture were organised for police officers and medical professionals, with the support of the Council of Europe.  Trainings based on the provisions of the Convention and the Istanbul Protocol were being developed and were expected to be scheduled this year. 

    Over the past 10 years, there had been several police officers dismissed due to exhibiting excessive use of force against journalists during demonstrations.  To ensure the independence of medical professionals from the police, since 2022, medical examinations in police facilities were conducted exclusively by the doctors of ambulance services. 

    In 2024, the law on the police guard was adopted, which provided for the establishment of a new specialised police service with clear criteria for proportional use of force. This law and the relevant bylaws aimed to create the correct modus operandi for Armenian police officers, particularly in the context of mass demonstrations. 

    In 2024, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, in cooperation with the migration and citizenship service, had conducted trainings for penitentiary officials on cases of asylum.  The Bar Association of Armenia provided the penitentiary service with leaflets and posters related to granting asylum, available in eight languages.  They contained information about the grounds for granting asylum and rights of asylum seekers. 

    The criminal case of March 2008 remained ongoing, and the Committee had already been provided with information pertaining to this case.  Taking into account the volume and complexity of the case, investigative teams had been set up to ensure the comprehensive investigation.  Around 7,000 victims had been questioned over the course of the investigation.  As part of the ongoing forensic examination being conducted, firearms were being submitted for study.  More information would be provided in writing. 

    Concerning the case of Mr. Virabyan, the advisory opinion of the European Court of Human Rights was applied in the decision of the court of cassation.  The Convention took precedence over domestic legislation, and this was applied in the case of Mr. Virabyan.  In 2024, two convictions were rendered under the Criminal Code for police officials found guilty of the crime of torture, with the individuals sentenced to four years in prison. 

    Targeted interventions had been adopted in care home settings to prevent cases of abuse.  A draft order addressing the submission of anonymous reports in care institutions was now in process.  This would allow standardised information to be provided to beneficiaries about the clearly defined mechanism for submitting complaints. 

    In April 2024, a procedure was adopted for referring child victims of violence, and where necessary placing the child within a family, institution or support centre. Corporal punishment was prohibited in all settings, including the family setting.  Children who had experienced violence were entitled to State support, and entities responsible for childcare were required to promptly report any instances of violence.  In recent years, Armenia had made progress in expanding the welfare and rights of the child. 

    To strengthen the independence of medical personnel in penitentiary institutions, the penitentiary centre was founded independently in 2018.  Medical examinations were carried out by a doctor, totally excluding the employees of penitentiary institutions and out of earshot of penitentiary staff. A preliminary examination of mental health and suicide risks was ensured.  In cases of suspected torture and ill-treatment, all injuries were noted and documented. 

    The medical examinations of persons deprived of their liberty were organised in a timely manner, without undue delay.  Upon entering the penitentiary institution, persons deprived of their liberty underwent a mental health screening within 24 hours, and psychologists and mental health staff were stationed at the centres.  The law on reproductive health applied to everyone, including those in prisons. Tests were performed for all sexually transmitted diseases, including HIV.  If a positive result was received, medical staff would begin medical treatment. 

    The Ministry of Justice had implemented a wide range of awareness raising activities in all penitentiary institutions, including posters on combatting torture.  Video material regarding the prohibition of torture was also disseminated publicly.  Armenia was actively working to combat hate speech and had classified hate speech through technology as a distinct type of cybercrime.  A comprehensive range of awareness raising activities to address the manifestations of hate speech had been implemented, including a month-long campaign in high traffic areas, such as the metro, highlighting the negative impacts of hate speech.  Armenia was currently drafting a new strategy on combatting discrimination and hate speech, to address the possible issues which may arise during the investigation processes.  This had stemmed from the human rights agenda of the Government. 

    Questions by Committee Experts

    PETER KESSING, Committee Expert and Country Rapporteur, commended Armenia for the efforts made to comply with the Convention.  What happened if a person was not able to comply with the 15 days of deadline in relation to asylum applications?  Had any of the cases against police officers led to criminal proceedings?  Regarding the March 2008 investigation, 17 years was a long time, and the Committee looked forward to receiving the written information from the delegation. Was it true that cases by the Investigative Committee were slow?  Would the State take measures to make investigations more prompt?  Was the committee fully independent from the police? Had Armenia undertaken any investigations into allegations of mistreatment of Azerbaijani soldiers and civilians on Armenian soil?  The national mechanism to follow up on concluding observations was a positive step.  Could more information on this mechanism be provided? 

    ANNA RACU, Committee Expert and Country Rapporteur, said the Committee was concerned about the lack of community services for psychiatric patients, and the lack of a mechanism for the deinstitutionalisation of children in social care homes.  Could more information about the reform of social care homes in Armenia be provided? Which institution had oversight on psychiatric facilities?  Did civil society organizations have access to monitoring visits?  Did any complaints mechanisms exist in these institutions? How many complaints had been received and what had been the results?  Could updated statistics be provided in cases where victims had been offered redress and compensation?  How did the Government plan to ensure that compensation was accessible to victims, even in cases where perpetrators remained unidentified? 

    There were ongoing efforts by the Government to monitor violent incidents and deaths within the armed forces, but there was a significant lack of public oversight over the military units.  The practice of non-statutory relationships among servicemen, which often resulted in bullying, violence and sexual abuse, persisted.  What specific measures were being taken by the Armenian military management to address and prevent violence in the army?  What steps was the Government taking to increase public oversight of the military?  How did the Government plan to ensure that the military was held accountable for offences such as injuries and murders?  What actions were being taken to provide psychological support for soldiers to prevent suicide and address mental health issues? 

    Armenia had made notable progress in addressing gender-based and domestic violence.  The adoption of the 2017 law on violence in the family was a significant step forward.  However, there were concerns about the high number of incidents of gender-based violence, particularly during the pandemic.  It was important to ensure access to free health care services to victims and survivors, and shelters must be accessible to victims with disabilities.  What measures were in place to address the gaps in the reporting system, particularly in rural and remote areas?  What shelters were available for victims and survivors?  How did Armenia intend to integrate the provisions of the Istanbul Convention into its domestic legislation?  When would it be ratified? 

    Responses by the Delegation 

    The delegation said the independence and impartiality of the Investigative Committee was ensured through a special unit, tasked with investigating torture and abuse by officials. Regarding allegations of torture of Azerbaijanis soldiers, comprehensive investigations had been undertaken relating to videos received.  However, the investigations remained ongoing.  There were currently no prisoners of Azerbaijani origins in Armenia’s custody; all individuals had been returned.  In stark contrast, Azerbaijan continued to hold Armenian nationals in its custody, in contrast to its national obligations.  The closure of the Red Cross office in Azerbaijan had created a protection gap.  International human rights organizations had reported grave human rights violations by Azerbaijani forces. 

    Armenia was establishing a mechanism for reporting and follow-up on human rights recommendations. The national mechanism would be a permanent structure which involved members of judicial and legislative branches of the Government. 

    If the applicant for asylum missed the 15-day deadline, the person was treated not as an asylum seeker, but as a foreigner.  The law had been developed with assistance from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and non-governmental organization colleagues. 

    There were 67 disciplinary proceedings launched against police officers last year, with 27 resulting in finding no violations.  As a result of one of the proceedings, three police officers were found guilty and dismissed from service. 

    The fight against gender-based violence was an ongoing process carried out with State and non-State parties and civil society actors.  State financed shelter services were available which provided victims with safe accommodation and psychosocial and legal support.  Over the past five years, the number of individuals receiving these services had increased, due to the increase in social workers.  The law on the protection of domestic violence had undergone many changes, with almost 11 provisions amended.  The provision concerning the reconciliation procedure had been annulled, and now stipulated for medical services to be provided to victims of violence based on the type of violence they had experienced. 

    Armenia had conducted awareness raising campaigns which focused on educating stakeholders on the importance of the Istanbul Convention as it pertained to gender-based violence.  Recent legal reforms strengthened protections for victims, improved measures for reporting violence, and improved training for police and those dealing with victims.  A new vulnerability assessment system was being launched, which would help families overcome extreme poverty. 

    Since 2014, the number of children in institutional care had been reduced five-fold from more than 2,000 to less than 400.  There were now three crisis centres providing round the clock care to children.  There had been a sharp increase in foster care placements over the last five years. 

    Regarding the armed groups, there were several main actors within the human rights action plan, including suicide and self-harm prevention groups, which operated within military units.  Legal and human rights education efforts had also been strengthened, with training courses provided on torture and ill-treatment, targeting military personnel. 

    Closing Remarks

    CLAUDE HELLER, Committee Chairperson, thanked the delegation for the excellent and informative dialogue.  The multilateral system was in deep crisis at the political level and financially. However, despite all these restrictions, the Committee worked arduously, objectively and constructively to produce a positive impact on the lives of people in the States parties. 

    ANNA KARAPETYAN, Deputy Minister of Justice of Armenia and head of the delegation, expressed sincere appreciation to the Committee for the excellent dialogue. The Committee’s comments and recommendations reinforced the shared responsibility held together for the prohibition of torture everywhere, under all circumstances.  Armenia was proud of the progress made but recognised that the journey for a torture-free society was ongoing.  Armenia remained committed to working towards this goal. 

    ___________

    Produced by the United Nations Information Service in Geneva for use of the media; 
    not an official record. English and French versions of our releases are different as they are the product of two separate coverage teams that work independently.

     

    CAT25.005E

    MIL OSI United Nations News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: NASA’s Chandra Releases New 3D Models of Cosmic Objects

    Source: NASA

    [embedded content]

    New three-dimensional (3D) models of objects in space have been released by NASA’s Chandra X-ray Observatory. These 3D models allow people to explore — and print — examples of stars in the early and end stages of their lives. They also provide scientists with new avenues to investigate scientific questions and find insights about the objects they represent.
    These 3D models are based on state-of-the-art theoretical models, computational algorithms, and observations from space-based telescopes like Chandra that give us accurate pictures of these cosmic objects and how they evolve over time.
    However, looking at images and animations is not the only way to experience this data. The four new 3D printable models of Cassiopeia A (Cas A), G292.0+1.8 (G292), Cygnus Loop supernova remnants, and the star known as BP Tau let us experience the celestial objects in the form of physical structures that will allow anyone to hold replicas of these stars and their surroundings and examine them from all angles.

    Using NASA’s James Webb Space Telescope, astronomers uncovered a mysterious feature within the remnant, nicknamed the “Green Monster,” alongside a puzzling network of ejecta filaments forming a web of oxygen-rich material. When combined with X-rays from Chandra, the data helped astronomers shed light on the origin of the Green Monster and revealed new insights into the explosion that created Cas A about 340 years ago, from Earth’s perspective.

    This 3D model shows a star less than 10 million years old that is surrounded by a disk of material. This class of objects is known as T Tauri stars, named after a young star in the Taurus star-forming region. The model describes the effects of multiple flares, or outbursts that are detected in X-rays by Chandra from one T Tauri star known as BP Tau. These flares interact with the disk of material and lead to the formation of an extended outer atmosphere composed by hot loops, connecting the disk to the developing star.

    The Cygnus Loop (also known as the Veil Nebula) is a supernova remnant, the remains of the explosive death of a massive star. This 3D model is the result of a simulation describing the interaction of a blast wave from the explosion with an isolated cloud of the interstellar medium (that is, dust and gas in between the stars). Chandra sees the blast wave and other material that has been heated to millions of degrees. The Cygnus Loop is a highly extended, but faint, structure on the sky: At three degrees across, it has the diameter of six full moons.

    This is a rare type of supernova remnant observed to contain large amounts of oxygen. The X-ray image of G292.0+1.8 from Chandra shows a rapidly expanding, intricately structured field left behind by the shattered star. By creating a 3D model of the system, astronomers have been able to examine the asymmetrical shape of the remnant that can be explained by a “reverse” shock wave moving back toward the original explosion.

    The 3D models here are the subject of several scholarly papers by Salvatore Orlando of INAF in Palermo, Italy, and colleagues published in The Astrophysical Journal, Astronomy & Astrophysics, and Monthly Notices of the Royal Astronomical Society. Much of this work is also publicly available work on SketchFab.
    NASA’s Marshall Space Flight Center manages the Chandra program. The Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory’s Chandra X-ray Center controls science operations from Cambridge, Massachusetts, and flight operations from Burlington, Massachusetts.
    Read more from NASA’s Chandra X-ray Observatory.
    Learn more about the Chandra X-ray Observatory and its mission here:

    chandra

    https://chandra.si.edu

    This release features visualizations of three supernova remnants and one star. Each is rendered as a composite image, and as a digital 3-dimensional model, presented in separate short video clips. The composite images are two dimensional and static, but the digital models rotate, showcasing their three-dimensionality.
    The first featured supernova is Cassiopeia A. In the X-ray, optical, and infrared composite image, the debris from an exploded star resembles a round purple gas cloud, marbled with streaks of golden light. In the rotating, 3D model, the purple gas cloud is depicted as a flat disk, like a record or CD. Bursting out the front and back of the disk is an orange and white shape similar to a ball of coral, or a head of cauliflower lined with stubby tendrils. Most of the ball, and the majority of the tendrils, appear on one side of the disk. On the opposite side, the shape resembles dollops of thick whipped cream.
    Next in the release is a star known as BP Tau. BP Tau is a developing star, less than 10 million years old, and prone to outbursts or flares. These flares interact with a disk of material that surrounds the young star, forming hot loops of extended atmosphere. In the composite image, BP Tau resembles a distant, glowing white dot surrounded by a band of pink light. The rotating, 3D model is far more dynamic and intriguing! Here, the disk of material resembles a large blue puck with round, ringed, concave surfaces. At the heart of the puck is a small, glowing red orb: the developing star. Shooting out of the orb are long, thin, green strands: the flares. Also emerging from the orb are orange and pink petal-shaped blobs: the loops of extended atmosphere. Together, the orb, strands, and petals resemble an exotic flowering orchid.
    The third celestial object in this release is the supernova remnant called Cygnus Loop. In the composite image, the remnant resembles a wispy cloud in oranges, blues, purples, and whites, shaped like a backwards letter C. The 3D model examines this cloud of interstellar material interacting with the superheated, supernova blast wave. In the 3D model, the Cygnus Loop resembles a bowl with a thick base, and a wedge cut from the side like a slice of pie. The sides of the bowl are rendered in swirled blues and greens. However, inside the thick base, revealed by the wedge-shaped cut, are streaks of red and orange. Surrounding the shape are roughly parallel thin red strands, which extend beyond the top and bottom of the digital model.
    The final supernova featured in this release is G292.0+1.8. The composite image depicts the remnant as a bright and intricate ball of red, blue, and white X-ray gas and debris set against a backdrop of gleaming stars. In the 3D model, the remnant is rendered in translucent icy blue and shades of orange. Here, the rotating shape is revealed to be somewhat like a bulbous arrowhead, or perhaps an iceberg on its side.

    Megan WatzkeChandra X-ray CenterCambridge, Mass.617-496-7998mwatzke@cfa.harvard.edu
    Lane FigueroaMarshall Space Flight Center, Huntsville, Alabama256-544-0034lane.e.figueroa@nasa.gov

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI Security: Update 286 – IAEA Director General Statement on Situation in Ukraine

    Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

    Frequent air raid alarms, the regular sound of explosions nearby and the presence of drones are continuing to highlight the dangers facing Ukraine’s main nuclear sites during the military conflict, Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) said today.

    “The nuclear safety and security situation in Ukraine remains precarious. This is very clear from the daily reports of our teams on the ground. Military activities are still taking place in the vicinity of nuclear sites, putting their safety at constant risk. Our work to help prevent a nuclear accident is far from over,” Director General Grossi said.

    The IAEA continues to monitor and assess nuclear safety and security at Ukraine’s five main nuclear facilities and deliver essential equipment and other technical assistance, including medical support.

    At the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) over the past week, the IAEA team based at the site has heard explosions at varying distances almost every day, as well as occasional bursts of gunfire.

    As part of regular walkdowns across the site, the team visited the turbine halls of two reactor units, where they were again denied access to the western parts of the halls. The team also visited the site’s water treatment facility where they confirmed the arrangements for the treatment of wastewater and observed the testing of an emergency diesel generator.

    At the South Ukraine NPP, the IAEA team was informed that five drones were detected 2 km west of the site during the night of 11-12 April. From their residence, the team observed the drones and heard gunfire apparently aimed at repelling them.

    At the Chornobyl site, the IAEA team visited the New Safe Confinement and received an update on its status following the mid-February drone attack that punched a hole in the structure. Radiation levels remained normal for the area and there had been no release of radioactive substances beyond the established limits.

    Air raid alarms were heard on most days over the past week at these two sites, the IAEA teams reported.

    Over the past week, the IAEA has organised five additional deliveries of equipment as part of its efforts to help ensure nuclear safety and security, bringing the total to 130 since the start of the conflict.

    The Rivne NPP received two static test benches that had been refurbished and modernized in Germany, with funding from Norway. Plant staff also received training on the newly automated system. The benches are used to test the plant’s hydraulic shock absorbers, which reduce vibrations in coolant pumps, steam generators and other equipment essential for nuclear safety.

    Other types of equipment were delivered to Chornobyl, the Centralized Dry Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage Facility and State Specialized Enterprise “Radon Association”, which manages radioactive waste. These deliveries were funded by the European Union, Denmark and Sweden. The Khmelnytskyy NPP received medical equipment supported with funding from Norway.

    MIL Security OSI –

  • MIL-OSI NGOs: Human Rights Violations During Mozambique’s Post-2024 Election Crackdown

    Source: Amnesty International –

    Footnotes

    [1] Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI), “User Guide: OONI Probe Desktop App”, 25 October 2022, https://ooni.org/support/ooni-probe-desktop/

    [2] Amnesty International, Mozambique: turn the page! A human rights manifesto for political parties and candidates, October 2019 election (Index: AFR 41/1019/2019), 17 September 2019, https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr41/1019/2019/en/; Amnesty International, “Mozambique: Civil society calls for the unconditional and immediate release of the Gaza-18 election party delegates”(Index: AFR 41/1427/2019), 25 November 2019, https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr41/1427/2019/en/; Amnesty International, “Mozambique police must only use live ammunition to protect life during demonstrations”(Index: PRE 01/301/2010 ), 1 September 2010, https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/pre01/301/2010/en/; Amnesty International,“Mozambique: authorities must launch a full and impartial investigation into the killing of journalist” (Index: AFR 41/2361/2015), 31 August 2015, https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr41/2361/2015/en/; Amnesty International, Mozambique: media freedom in ashes (Index: AFR 41/2947/2020), 31 August 2020, https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr41/2947/2020/en/; Amnesty International,“Mozambique: civil society groups call for the unconditional and immediate release of radio journalist” (Index: AFR 41/0205/2019 ), 11 April 2019, https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr41/0205/2019/en/; Amnesty International, “What I saw is death”: war crimes in Mozambique’s forgotten cape (Index: AFR 41/3545/2021), 2 March 2021, https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr41/3545/2021/en/; Amnesty International, “Mozambique: Torture by security forces in gruesome videos must be investigated”, 9 September 2020, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/press-release/2020/09/mozambique-torture-by-security-forces-in-gruesome-videos-must-be-investigated/

    [3] Amnesty International, “What I saw is death” (previously cited); Amnesty International, “Mozambique: Authorities must promptly investigate arrest of journalist while covering demonstration”, 7 June 2024, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2024/06/mozambique-authorities-must-promptly-investigate-arrest-of-journalist-while-covering-demonstration/; Amnesty International, “Mozambique: Authorities must investigate killing of newspaper editor João Fernando Chamusse”, 15 December 2023, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/12/mozambique-authorities-must-investigate-killing-of-newspaper-editor-joao-fernando-chamusse/; Amnesty International, “Mozambique: Fears grow for election monitors secretly transferred to new prison”, 18 November 2019, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/11/mozambique-fears-grow-for-election-monitors-secretly-transferred-to-new-prison-2/; Caitlin Sturridge and others, Copping with the risk of conflict, climate and internal displacement in northern Mozambique: ‘We can’t just sit here with our arms crossed’, November 2022, https://media.odi.org/documents/USAID_CCD_Mozambique_final.pdf; Republic of Mozambique, Estratégia Nacional de Desenvolvimento (2015-2035), [National Development Strategy (2015-2035)], July 2024, https://www.mef.gov.mz/index.php/publicacoes/estrategias/397-estrategia-nacional-de-desenvolvimento/file; Human Rights Watch (HRW), Mozambique: abuses against media, activists before elections, 11 September 2024, https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/09/11/mozambique-abuses-against-media-activists-elections 

    [4] Africa News, “Frelimo’s candidate wins in Maputo amid ongoing vote count”, 14 October 2024, https://www.africanews.com/2024/10/14/frelimos-candidate-wins-in-maputo-amid-ongoing-vote-count/

    [5] Times Live, “Africa: Frelimo extends 50-year rule in Mozambique as it retains power in disputed general elections”, 24 October 2024, https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/africa/2024-10-24-frelimo-extends-50-year-rule-in-mozambique-as-it-retains-power-in-disputed-general-election/

    [6] Associated Press (AP), “Long-ruling party leads in Mozambique’s election as opposition candidate calls for strikes”, 16 October 2024, https://apnews.com/article/mozambique-election-frelimo-vote-6987692541d92a9c6a287be4af89a524

    [7] The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), “Mozambique opposition lawyer shot dead”, 19 October 2024,  https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cy4d3j1mm2yo 

    [8] Centre for Public Integrity (CIP), “Elvino Dias was killed preparing a draft of the PODEMOS appeal to the Constitutional Council: Mozambique elections 316- 20 October 2024”, 20 October 2024, https://www5.open.ac.uk/technology/mozambique/sites/www.open.ac.uk.technology.mozambique/files/files/Election-Bulletin-316_20Out24_Murders_Will-CNE-change-results.pdf

    [9] Deutsche Welle (DW), “Mozambique: Police fire tear gas at opposition leader”, 21 October 2024, https://www.dw.com/en/mozambique-police-fire-tear-gas-at-opposition-leader/a-70561138; Venâncio Mondlane, “REVOLUÇÃO: Venâncio Mondlane anuncia nova manifestação [“REVOLUTION: Venâncio Mondlane announces new demonstration”], 22 October 2024, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mG5g-SbnNy8    

    [10] Interview by voice call with lawyer, 12 February 2025; HRW, “Mozambique: Abuses against media, activists before elections”, 11 September 2024, https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/09/11/mozambique-abuses-against-media-activists-elections

    [11] Integrity Magazine, “CNE confirma Daniel Chapo e Frelimo como vencedores das eleições de 9 de Outubro”, [“The National Electoral Commission confirms the victory of Daniel Chapo and Frelimo the winners of the 9 October elections”], 25 October 2024, https://integritymagazine.co.mz/arquivos/33773

    [12] DW, “Mondlane: “Está-se a cometer crimes contra a humanidade”, [“Mondlane: “Crimes against humanity are being committed”], 26 October 2024, https://www.dw.com/pt-002/ven%C3%A2ncio-mondlane-est%C3%A1-se-a-cometer-crimes-contra-a-humanidade/a-70608646

    [13] DW, Venâncio Mondlane anuncia “manifestação four by four”, [“Venâncio Mondlane announces “demonstrations four by four””], 2 December 2024, https://www.dw.com/pt-002/ven%C3%A2ncio-mondlane-anuncia-manifesta%C3%A7%C3%A3o-four-by-four/a-70938463; Al Jazeera, “Clanging pans: why Mozambique’s election protesters refuse to go away, 15 November 2024, https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2024/11/15/clanging-pans-why-mozambiques-election-protesters-refuse-to-go-away

    [14] Al Jazeera, “Clanging pans: why Mozambique’s election protesters refuse to go away, 15 November 2024, https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2024/11/15/clanging-pans-why-mozambiques-election-protesters-refuse-to-go-away

    [15] Al Jazeera, “Mozambique’s controversial election result upheld: What to know”, 23 December 2024, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/12/23/mozambiques-controversial-election-result-upheld

    [16] Al Jazeera, “Chapo sworn in following Mozambique’s disputed presidential elections”, 15 January 2025, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/1/15/chapo-sworn-in-following-mozambiques-disputed-presidential-election 

    [17] BBC, “Injuries as Mozambique police fire on opposition protest”, 6 March 2025, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cjd3y2eyxy3o

    [18]  Televisão de Moçambique (TVM)’s video of President Chapo’s address, 24 February 2025, on file with Amnesty International; Radio France Internationale – International French Radio (RFI), “Daniel Chapo vows to fight “terrorism and demonstrations”, 25 February 2025, https://www.rfi.fr/pt/%C3%A1frica-lus%C3%B3fona/20250225-daniel-chapo-promete-combater-terrorismo-e-manifesta%C3%A7%C3%B5es

    [19] Amnesty International identified these units based on the uniforms apparent in visual evidence and description of uniforms provided in interviews with eyewitnesses and victims.

    [20] Amnesty International, Kinetic Impact Projectiles in Law Enforcement – an Amnesty International Position Paper, March 2023, pg. 18; https://www.amnesty.nl/content/uploads/2023/03/Amnesty-position-paper-kinetic-impact-projectiles.pdf?x55122

    [21] Interview by voice call with doctor, 17 February 2025; Interview by voice call with doctor, 22 February 2025.

    [22] Interview by voice call with doctor, 17 February 2025; Interview by voice call with doctor, 22 February 2025.

    [23] Interview by voice call with doctor, 17 February 2025; Interview by voice call with doctor, 22 February 2025.

    [24] TV Mirramar, “Ordem dos medicos preocupada com aumento de feridos por armas de fogo” [“Order of Doctors concerned about increase in firearm injuries”], 29 October 2024, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d0YqkTsYGaI&t=52s; Interview by voice call with doctor, 17 February 2025.

    [25] Interview by voice call with doctor, 17 February 2025; Interview by voice call with doctor, 22 February 2025.

    [26] For instance, interview by voice call with victim’s relative, 21 and 27 February 2025; Interview by voice call with victim’s relative, 18 and 21 February 2025

    [27] Interview by voice call with victim, 17 February 2025.

    [28] Interview by voice call with victim’s relative, 17 February 2025.

    [29] Plataforma DECIDE, “Preliminary report on the post-electoral context in Mozambique: 21 October 2024- 21 January 2025”, Undated, https://pdecide.org/blog/preliminary-report-on-the-post-electoral-context-in-mozambique-3-months

    [30] TVM, “Police records” Bernardino Rafael reports 956 acts of violence and records 96 deaths”, 23 January 2025, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rTS1gRRNJmY  

    [31] BBC Africa, “President Chapo on Mondlane’s ‘parallel government”, 22 January 2025, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MqSIetyQHyQ

    [32] Attorney General of Mozambique, Speech at the opening of the judicial year, 4 February 2025, on file with Amnesty International; Club of Mozambique, “Mozambique: 651 cases opened during post-elections protests- Attorney General”, 4 February 2025, https://clubofmozambique.com/news/mozambique-651-cases-opened-during-post-election-protests-attorney-general-275268/

    [33] Venâncio Mondlane, Facebook post, “O que se falou no encontro? [What was said at the meeting?]”, 24 March 2025, https://www.facebook.com/venamondlane/videos/998522575570322/  

    [34] Amnesty International, Guidelines on the right to freedom of peaceful assembly (Index: ACT 30/8426/2024), November 2024, ACT3084262024ENGLISH.pdf

    [35] HRC, General Comment 36: Article 6 (The Right to life), 30 October 2018, UN Doc. CCPR/C/GC/36, para. 7. The right to life is protected by article 6.1 of the ICCPR and article 4 of the ACHPR. Article 4.2 of the ICCPR also protects the right to life in exceptional circumstances, such as internal political instability or any other public emergency. See, also, Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), Resolution 1989/65: The Principles on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions, adopted on 24 May 1989.  

    [36] Amnesty International, Guidelines on the right to freedom of peaceful assembly (Index: ACT 30/8426/2024), November 2024, ACT3084262024ENGLISH.pdf

    [37] UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials (Basic Principles), 7 September 1990.

    [38] Amnesty International, Use of Force – Guidelines for Implementation of the UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by law enforcement officials, August 2015, https://www.amnesty.org.uk/files/use_of_force.pdf; UN Basic Principles.

    [39] HRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, A/HRC/26/36, para 63.

    [40] Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), 10 December 1984. Mozambique ratified the CAT on 14 September 1999. United Nations Human Rights Treaty Body Database – Mozambique, https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/TreatyBodyExternal/Treaty.aspx

    [41] Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment on extra-custodial use of force and the prohibition of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, A/72/178, para. 46. 

    [42] HRC, General Comment No. 37, (previously cited), para. 78. 

    [43] UN Guidance on less-lethal weapons in law enforcement, 2020, https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/HRBodies/CCPR/LLW_Guidance.pdf, guideline 6.3; HRC, General Comment No. 37 (previously cited).

    [44] UN Guidance on less-lethal weapons in law enforcement (previously cited), HRC, General Comment No. 37 (previously cited), para. 88; https://www.amnesty.nl/content/uploads/2017/07/guidelines_use_of_force_eng.pdf?x90620

    [45] Amnesty International Guidelines on the use of force (previously cited), guideline 5b and p. 114

    [46] African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Commission), African Commission Guidelines for the Policing of Assemblies by Law Enforcement Officials in Africa, para. 21.3.1 https://achpr.au.int/en/soft-law/guidelines-policing-assemblies-law-enforcement-officials-africa

    [47] UN Guidance on less-lethal weapons in law enforcement (previously cited), guideline 6.3; Amnesty International, Guidelines on the Rights to Freedom of Peaceful Assembly (previously cited), guideline 14.1.

    [48] UN Guidance on less-lethal weapons in law enforcement (previously cited), guideline 7.5; Amnesty International, “Kinetic impact projectiles in law enforcement”, March 2023, https://www.amnesty.nl/content/uploads/2023/03/Amnesty-position-paper-kinetic-impact-projectiles.pdf?x36065

    [49] UN Guidance on less-lethal weapons in law enforcement (previously cited), guideline 7.5; HRC, General Comment No. 37 (previously cited), para. 87; Amnesty International, “Kinetic impact projectiles in law enforcement”, March 2023, https://www.amnesty.nl/content/uploads/2023/03/Amnesty-position-paper-kinetic-impact-projectiles.pdf?x36065

    [50] Amnesty International, “Chemical irritants in law enforcement”, June 2021, https://www.amnesty.nl/content/uploads/2021/07/Amnesty-position-paper-chemical-irritants.pdf

    [51]  Video published on the platform X on 27 November 2024, on file with Amnesty International. https://x.com/Cidiachissungo/status/1861915616598167924

    [52] Video sent to researchers via messaging app, on file with Amnesty International.

    [53] Amnesty International, Guidelines on the right to freedom of peaceful assembly (Index: ACT 30/8426/2024), November 2024, ACT3084262024ENGLISH.pdf

    [54] In addition to the PP and TP, one eyewitness identified the presence of the Rapid Intervention Police that day. Interview by voice call, 14 February 2025.

    [55] In addition to the PP and TP, one eyewitness identified the presence of the Rapid Intervention Police that day. Interview by voice call, 14 February 2025.

    [56] RFI, “Moçambique: Polícia confirma morte de um manifestante pró-Mondlane no Niassa” [“Mozambique: Police confirm death of pro-Mondlane protester in Niassa”], 28 October 2024, https://www.rfi.fr/pt/%C3%A1frica-lus%C3%B3fona/20241028-mo%C3%A7ambique-pol%C3%ADcia-confirma-morte-de-um-manifestante-pr%C3%B3-mondlane-no-niassa

    [57] Interview by voice call with eyewitness, 11 February 2025; Interview by voice call with eyewitness, 14 February 2025; Interview by voice call with eyewitness, 17 February 2025.

    [58] Interview by voice call with eyewitness, 11 February 2025; Interview by voice call with eyewitness, 14 February 2025.

    [59] Video provided by eyewitness; on file with Amnesty International

    [60] Interview by voice call with eyewitness, 11 February 2025.

    [61] Videos provided by eyewitness, on file with Amnesty International

    [62] Interview by voice call with eyewitness, 14 February 2025; Interview by voice call with eyewitness, 17 February 2025.

    [63] Inerview by voice call with eyewitness, 27 February 2025.

    [64] Video provided by eyewitness; on file with Amnesty International

    [65] Video published on Facebook and YouTube, respectively, on 26 October 2024, on file with Amnesty International. https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1173170507612261, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Lj_AfHK_JcI

    [66] Video provided by eyewitness, on file with Amnesty International.

    [67] Interview by voice call, 11 February 2025; Interview by voice call, 14 February 2025; Interview by voice call, 17 February 2025.

    [68] Video published on Facebook and YouTube, respectively, 26 October 2024, on file with Amnesty International. https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1173170507612261, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Lj_AfHK_JcI

    [69] RFI, “Moçambique: Polícia confirma morte de um manifestante pró-Mondlane no Niassa” [“Mozambique: Police confirm death of pro-Mondlane protester in Niassa”], 28 October 2024, https://www.rfi.fr/pt/%C3%A1frica-lus%C3%B3fona/20241028-mo%C3%A7ambique-pol%C3%ADcia-confirma-morte-de-um-manifestante-pr%C3%B3-mondlane-no-niassa

    [70] Facebook profiles managed by Albino José Síbia. https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100084198734038 https://www.facebook.com/ShottasOficial, https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100069938172987

     

    [72] Videos published on the platform X on 12 December 2024, on file with Amnesty International. https://x.com/mozinforma/status/1867313710223831438

    [73] 360 Mozambique, “General Protests: Ressano Garcia Border Returns to Normal”, 16 December 2024, https://360mozambique.com/business/general-protests-ressano-garcia-border-returns-to-normal/

    [74] A section of the video posted on the platform X on 12 December 2024, on file with Amnesty International. https://x.com/Cidiachissungo/status/1867262509016920434

    [75] Video posted on the platform X on 12 December 2024, on file with Amnesty International. https://x.com/justicefrontil/status/1867281218351640723

    [76] Video posted on Facebook on 12 December 2024, on file with Amnesty International. https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1526742851326323

    [77] Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), “Albino Sibia (Mano Shottas)”, https://cpj.org/data/people/albino-sibia-mano-shottas/

    [78] Mozambique ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) on 21 July 1993 and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) on 22 February 1989. See United Nations Human Rights Treaty Body Database – Mozambique, https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/TreatyBodyExternal/Treaty.aspx and ACHPR, https://achpr.au.int/en/charter/african-charter-human-and-peoples-rights/

    [79] Interview by voice call with someone with intimate knowledge of the situation, 10 February 2025; Adriano Nuvunga, Facebook post: “CDD entra com uma acção contra o Estado mocambicano pelo assassinato Bárbaro do jovem blogueiro “Shottas”” [“CDD files a lawsuit against the Mozambican state for the barbaric murder of the young blogger “Shottas””], 30 December 2024, https://www.facebook.com/Prof.adrianonuvunga/videos/cdd-entra-com-uma-ac%C3%A7%C3%A3o-contra-o-estado-mocambicano-pelo-assassinato-b%C3%A1rbaro-do-/1029506992507642/

    [80] Interview by voice call with eyewitness, 10 February 2025; Interview by voice call with eyewitness, 27 February 2025; Miramar, “UIR invade cemitério e dispara no momento de luto” [“UIR invades cemetery and shoots during mourning”], 14 December 2024, https://miramar.co.mz/noticias/mocambique/uir-invade-cemiterio-e-dispara-no-momento-de-luto-14-12-2024-49489 

    [81] Videos published on the platform X on 14 December 2024, on file with Amnesty International 
    https://x.com/mozinforma/status/1867929771835076734/video/1 https://x.com/Cidiachissungo/status/1867936730910703888
    https://x.com/mozinforma/status/1867929771835076734/video/1

    [82] Inerview by voice call with eyewitness, 27 February 2025.

    [83] Interview by voice call with eyewitness, 27 February 2025.

    [84] Video published on Facebook on 14 December 2024, on file with Amnesty International. https://www.facebook.com/watch/live/?ref=watch_permalink&v=595714569533356

    [85] Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA), “COMUNICADO- MISA condena baleamento de repórter pela UIR” [“-STATEMENT- MISA condemns the shooting of a reporter by the UIR”], 20 December 2024, https://www.misa.org.mz/index.php/destaques/noticias/327-comunicado-misa-condena-baleamento-de-reporter-pela-uir

    [86] Interview by voice call with person known to the victim, 19 February 2025.

    [87] DW, “Vários mortos no regresso de Mondlane a Moçambique” [“Several dead on Mondlane’s return to Mozambique”]; 9 January 2025, https://www.dw.com/pt-002/v%C3%A1rios-mortos-no-regresso-de-mondlane-a-mo%C3%A7ambique/a-71257510; Observador, “Chegada de Mondlane a Maputo. Número de mortos em Moçambique sobe para três – como aconteceu” [“Mondlane arrives in Maputo. Death toll in Mozambique rises to three – as it happened”], 9 January 2025, https://observador.pt/liveblogs/mondlane-chegou-a-maputo-estou-aqui-presente-de-carne-e-osso/

    [88] Video published on YouTube on 9 January 2025, on file with Amnesty International. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SnA0Ur-Eb8I

    [89] Video published on YouTube on 9 January 2025, on file with Amnesty International. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KCVLf30Ajfs

    [90] Video published on Facebook on 9 January 2025, on file with Amnesty International. https://www.facebook.com/watch/live/?ref=watch_permalink&v=1194732825606271

    [91] Interview by voice call with eyewitness, 13 February 2025.

    [92] Interview by voice call with “Pedro”, 1 March 2025.

    [93] Interview by voice call with “Pedro”, 1 March 2025.

    [94] Interview by voice call with “Pedro”, 1 March 2025.

    [95] Interview by voice call with “Pedro”, 1 March 2025.

    [96] Videos published on the platform X on 9 January 2025, on file with Amnesty International. https://x.com/AllexandreMZ/status/1877368651554124233
    https://x.com/Cidiachissungo/status/1877308762274329016
    https://x.com/AllexandreMZ/status/1877304210435330388/video/1

    [97] Videos received via messaging app; on file with Amnesty International; Video published on Facebook on 21 October 2024, on file with Amnesty International.
    https://www.facebook.com/tvsucessoofficial/videos/1049942656916240/

    [98] Interview by voice call with an eyewitness, 12 February 2025.

    [99] Video published on Facebook on 21 October 2024, on file with Amnesty International. https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1049942656916240

    [100] Interview by voice call with an eyewitness, 12 February 2025; Interview by voice call with eyewitness, 21 February 2025.

    [101] Interview by voice call with an eyewitness, 12 February 2025.

    [102] Video published on Facebook on 21 October 2024, on file with Amnesty International. https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1049942656916240

    [103] Amnesty International reviewed videos and X-rays. The videos indicate the injury was caused by a tear gas canister. The X-rays clearly show a fracture in the tibia.

    [104] Interview by voice call with eyewitness, 21 February 2025.

    [105] Videos sent via messaging app, on file with Amnesty International.

    [106] Interview by voice call with eyewitness, 21 February 2025.

    [107] VOA, “Jornalistas moçambicanos feridos em manifestação em Maputo” [“Mozambican journalists injured in protest in Maputo”], 21 October 2025, https://www.voaportugues.com/a/jornalistas-mo%C3%A7ambicanos-feridos-em-manifesta%C3%A7%C3%A3o-em-maputo/7830621.html 

    [108] Publico, “Pelo menos 30 pessoas foram detidas nos confrontos em Maputo” [“At least 30 people were arrested in the clashes in Maputo”], 22 October 2024, https://www.publico.pt/2024/10/22/mundo/noticia/menos-30-pessoas-detidas-confrontos-maputo-2108971

    [109] Video published on Facebook on 21 October 2024, on file with Amnesty International. https://www.facebook.com/tvsucessoofficial/videos/8571222766325965/

    [110] Video published on Facebook on 21 October 2024, on file with Amnesty International. https://www.facebook.com/tvsucessoofficial/videos/8571222766325965/

    [111] Video published on Facebook on 21 October 2024, on file with Amnesty International. https://www.facebook.com/tvsucessoofficial/videos/8571222766325965/

    [112] Videos sent via messaging app, on file with Amnesty International.

    [113] Principle 5(c) of the UN Basic Principles (previously cited).

    [114] RFI, “Moçambique: Três mortos e dezenas de feridos nas manifestações” [“Mozambique: Three dead and dozens injured in protests”], 8 November 2024, https://www.rfi.fr/pt/%C3%A1frica-lus%C3%B3fona/20241108-mo%C3%A7ambique-tr%C3%AAs-mortos-e-dezenas-de-feridos-nas-manifesta%C3%A7%C3%B5es; Radio Renascença (RR), “Protestos em Maputo deixam 57 pessoas feridas por arma de fogo“ [“Protests in Maputo leave 57 people injured by firearms”], 8 November 2024, https://rr.pt/noticia/mundo/2024/11/08/protestos-em-maputo-deixam-57-pessoas-feridas-por-arma-de-fogo/400690/

    [115] Videos published on the platform X on 7 November 2024, on file with Amnesty International. https://x.com/Cidiachissungo/status/1854544977507856444 https://x.com/wilkerDias13/status/1854464732637327870 https://x.com/wilkerDias13/status/1854464732637327870

    [116] Videos published on the platform X on 7 November 2024, on file with Amnesty International.  https://x.com/wilkerDias13/status/1854461552214114747/video/1
    https://x.com/wilkerDias13/status/1854485342604104076

    [117] Video published on the platform X on 7 November 2024, on file with Amnesty International. https://x.com/wilkerDias13/status/1854461552214114747/video/2

    [118] Interview by voice call with eyewitness, 19 and 20 February 2025.

    [119] HRC, General Comment No. 37 (previously cited), para 80; ACHPR Guidelines on the Policing of Assemblies in Africa (previously cited), para. 3.2; Amnesty International, Guidelines on the right to freedom of peaceful assembly (previously cited), guideline 7.5.

    [120] Videos published on the platform X on 27 and 28 November 2024, on file with Amnesty International. https://x.com/Cidiachissungo/status/1861684733605806131 https://x.com/Cidiachissungo/status/1862014546333856026 https://x.com/Cidiachissungo/status/1861685433677013386

    [121] Video published on the platform X on 27 November 2024, on file with Amnesty International. https://x.com/Cidiachissungo/status/1861931525492617413

    [122] Video published on the platform X on 27 November 2024, on file with Amnesty International. https://x.com/Cidiachissungo/status/1861919381283827798

    [123] Videos published on the platform X on 27 November 2024, on file with Amnesty International. https://x.com/Cidiachissungo/status/1861919381283827798

    [124] Pictures published on the platform X on 30 November 2024, on file with Amnesty International. https://x.com/AllexandreMZ/status/1862832887285854247

    [125] VOA, “Ministry of National Defence admits to having run over young man [sic] in protest in Maputo”, 27 November 2024, https://www.voaportugues.com/a/ministério-da-defesa-nacional-reconhece-ter-atropelado-jovem-em-protesto-em-maputo/7879042.html

    [126] VOA, “Ministry of National Defence admits to having run over young man [sic] in protest in Maputo”, 27 November 2024, https://www.voaportugues.com/a/ministério-da-defesa-nacional-reconhece-ter-atropelado-jovem-em-protesto-em-maputo/7879042.html

    [127] Interview by voice call with individual with intimate knowledge of the situation, 11 February 2025.

    [128] Interview by voice call with individual with intimate knowledge of the situation, 11 February 2025.

    [129] Plataforma DECIDE, “Preliminary report on the post-electoral context in Mozambique: 21 October 2024- 21 January 2025” (previously cited), pg. 2.

    [130] Plataforma DECIDE, “Preliminary report on the post-electoral context in Mozambique: 21 October 2024- 21 January 2025” (previously cited), pg. 2.

    [131] Interview by voice call with a lawyer, 12 February 2025; Interview by voice call with a lawyer, 19 February 2025.

    [132] Interview by voice call with a lawyer, 12 February 2025; Interview by voice call with a lawyer, 19 February 2025.

    [133] Interview by voice call with a lawyer, 12 February 2025; Interview by voice call with a lawyer, 19 February 2025.

    [134] Plataforma DECIDE, “Preliminary report on the post-electoral context in Mozambique: 21 October 2024- 21 January 2025” (previously cited), pg. 2.

    [135] Plataforma DECIDE, “Preliminary report on the post-electoral context in Mozambique: 21 October 2024- 21 January 2025” (previously cited), pg. 2.

    [136] Interview by voice call with a lawyer, 12 February 2025; Interview by voice call with a lawyer, 19 February 2025.

    [137] Interview by voice call with a lawyer, 12 February 2025; Interview by voice call with a lawyer, 19 February 2025.

    [138] Interview by voice call with a lawyer, 12 February 2025; Interview by voice call with a lawyer, 19 February 2025.

    [139] Interview by voice call with a lawyer, 12 February 2025; Interview by voice call with a lawyer, 19 February 2025.

    [140] Interview by voice call with a victim of arbitrary detention, 12 February 2025.

    [141] Interview by voice call with a victim of arbitrary detention, 12 February 2025.

    [142] Interview by voice call with a lawyer, 12 February 2025; Interview by voice call with a lawyer, 19 February 2025; Interview by voice call with victim, 18 and 19 February 2025.

    [143] Interview by voice call with a lawyer, 12 February 2025; Interview by voice call with a lawyer, 19 February 2025; Interview by voice call with a victim of arbitrary detention, 12 February 2025; Interview by voice call with a relative of a detainee, 18 and 21 February 2025.

    [144] Interview by voice call with son of victim of detainee, 18 and 21 February 2025.

    [145] Interview by voice call with son of victim of detainee, 18 and 21 February 2025.

    [146] Interview by voice call with a victim of arbitrary detention, 12 February 2025.

    [147] Interview by voice call with a victim of arbitrary detention, 12 February 2025.

    [148] Interview by voice call with a lawyer, 12 February 2025.

    [149] Interview by voice call with victim, 18 and 19 February 2025.

    [150] Interview by voice call with victim, 18 and 19 February 2025.

    [151] Photos of victim taken on 6 and 7 December 2024, on file with Amnesty International.

    [152] Interview by voice call with victim, 18 and 19 February 2025.

    [153] Interview by voice call with victim, 18 and 19 February 2025.

    [154] ICCPR, Article 9.1; ACHPR, Article 6.

    [155] ICCPR, Article 14; ACHPR, Article 7. See also the African Commission, Principles and Guidelines on the Rights to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa.

    [156] African Commission Principles and Guidelines on the Rights to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa; article 1(e) and (g).

    [157] For instance, ICCPR, Articles 7 and 10. Conditions of detention which violate article 10 of the ICCPR may also violate Article 7 of the ICCPR (prohibition of torture or other ill-treatment). See also, UN Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, Interim report, 3 August 2009, UN Doc. A/64/215 paras 48, 55.

    [158] The 1955 UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Nelson Mandela Rules); Rules 15; 16; 19; 20; and 19. See also the ACHPR Guidelines on the Conditions of Arrest, Police Custody and Pre-Trial Detention in Africa (the Luanda Guidelines), March 2015; and The UN Basic Principles for the Treatment of Prisoners, 1990.

    [159] Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), Article 37(b).

    [160] African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACRWC), Article 17.2(b). See also, ICCPR, Article 10.2(b).

    [161] ICCPR, Article 9.1; ACHPR, Article 6; Constitution of the Republic of Mozambique, 16 November 2004, Article 59.1.

    [162] ICCPR, Article 17.

    [163] ICCPR, Article 2.3. See also, HRC, General Comment 31: The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, 26 May 2004, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. 13.

    [164] ICCPR, Article 9.5.

    [165] CAT, Article 14. See also, Committee Against Torture, General Comment 3: Implementation of article 14 by States parties (Article 14), 13 December 2012, UN Doc. CAT/C/GC/3; UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC), Resolution 22/21: Torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment: rehabilitation of torture victims, adopted on 12 April 2013.

    [166] Photo of police complaint, on file with Amnesty International.

    [167] Interview by voice call with victim, 18 and 19 February 2025 and correspondence on 1 April 2025.

    [168] Integrity Magazine, “Moçambique enfrenta 18 horas de corte de internet em meio `a tensão pós-eleitoral [“Mozambique faces internet shutdown amid post-electoral tension”], 26 October 2024, https://integritymagazine.co.mz/arquivos/33806; Sahara Reporters, “Social media platforms down in Mozambique ahead of protests against disputed election results”, 31 October 2024, https://saharareporters.com/2024/10/31/social-media-platforms-down-mozambique-ahead-protests-against-disputed-election-results

    [169] Internet Outage Detection & Analysis (IODA) and Cloudflare, “Mozambique’s post-election fallout: fatal protests and widespread internet shutdowns”, 26 February 2025, https://ioda-dev.inetintel.cc.gatech.edu/reports/mozambiques-post-election-fallout-fatal-protests-and-widespread-internet-shutdowns/

    [170] Club of Mozambique, “Mozambique elections: Mondlane calls for week-long strike and a national march to Maputo”, 29 October 2024, https://clubofmozambique.com/news/mozambique-elections-mondlane-calls-for-week-long-strike-and-a-national-march-to-maputo-269757/

    [171] IODA and Cloudflare, “Mozambique’s post-election fallout: fatal protests and widespread internet shutdowns”, 26 February 2025, https://ioda-dev.inetintel.cc.gatech.edu/reports/mozambiques-post-election-fallout-fatal-protests-and-widespread-internet-shutdowns/

    [172] Netblocks, X post, 25 October 2024, https://x.com/netblocks/status/1849839619291988399

    [173] IODA and Cloudflare, “Mozambique’s post-election fallout: fatal protests and widespread internet shutdowns”, 26 February 2025, https://ioda-dev.inetintel.cc.gatech.edu/reports/mozambiques-post-election-fallout-fatal-protests-and-widespread-internet-shutdowns/

    [174] Netblocks, X post, 8 November 2024, https://x.com/netblocks/status/1854830014555914571

    [175] IODA and Cloudflare, “Mozambique’s post-election fallout: fatal protests and widespread internet shutdowns”, 26 February 2025, https://ioda-dev.inetintel.cc.gatech.edu/reports/mozambiques-post-election-fallout-fatal-protests-and-widespread-internet-shutdowns/

    [176] IODA and Cloudflare, “Mozambique’s post-election fallout: fatal protests and widespread internet shutdowns”, 26 February 2025, https://ioda-dev.inetintel.cc.gatech.edu/reports/mozambiques-post-election-fallout-fatal-protests-and-widespread-internet-shutdowns/

    [177] Tmcel is a state mobile company that resulted from the merging of telecommunication company Telecomunicações de Moçambique (AS30619) and Mcel (mobile company).

    [178] Netblocks, X post, 31 October 2024, https://x.com/netblocks/status/1851892913292071349

    [179] OONI Probe testing of ‘www.facebook.com’, ‘www.instagram.com’ and WhatsApp services in Mozambique between 15 October and 18 November 2024.

    [180] Club of Mozambique, “Mozambique Elections: Second internet shutdown – AIM”, 1 November 2024, https://clubofmozambique.com/news/mozambique-elections-second-internet-shutdown-aim-269982/

    [181] Club of Mozambique, “Mozambique Elections: Second internet shutdown – AIM”, 1 November 2024, https://clubofmozambique.com/news/mozambique-elections-second-internet-shutdown-aim-269982/

    [182] RFI, “Moçambique: Ministro justificou restrições na internet para impedir ’destruição’ do país” [“Mozambique: Minister justified internet restrictions to prevent “destruction” of the country”], 11 November 2024, https://www.rfi.fr/pt/%C3%A1frica-lus%C3%B3fona/20241111-mo%C3%A7ambique-ministro-justificou-restri%C3%A7%C3%B5es-na-internet-para-impedir-destrui%C3%A7%C3%A3o-do-pa%C3%ADs

    [183] Text messages shared with researchers by Vodacom, Movitel and Tmcel clients, on file with Amnesty International. See also, HRW, “Mozambique: post-election internet restrictions hinder rights”, 6 November 2024, https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/11/06/mozambique-post-election-internet-restrictions-hinder-rights

    [184] Ngani, “Manifestações pós-eleitoral: mais um apagão dos serviços de internet em Moçambique” [“Post-election demonstrations: another blackout of internet services in Mozambique”], 1 November 2024, https://ngani.co.mz/tech/01/11/2024/manifestacoes-pos-eleitoral-mais-um-apagao-dos-servicos-de-internet-em-mocambique/

    [185] Centre for Democracy and Human Rights (Centro para Democracia e Direitos Humanos – CDD), “Depois da proibição do bloqueio pelo tribunal: submetida acção principal contra as operadoras de telefonia móvel por bloqueio de internet” [“After a blockage from court has been denied: a complaint against internet shutdown by mobile companies submitted down”], 18 December 2024, https://cddmoz.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/Submetida-accao-principal-contra-as-operadoras-de-telefonia-movel-por-bloqueio-de-internet.pdf

    [186] Video sent by eyewitness, on file with Amnesty International.

    [187] Interview by voice call with eyewitness, 11 February 2025; Interview by voice call with eyewitness, 14 February 2025.

    [188] Interview by voice call with eyewitness, 11 February 2025.

    [189] Interview by voice call with media professional, 12 February 2025.

    [190] ICCPR, Article 19.2.

    [191] ICCPR, Article 19.3(a)(b). See also the African Commission, Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression and Access to Information in Africa, November 2019; the Johannesburg Principles on National Security, Freedom of Expression and Access to Information, 1 October 1995.

    [192] ACHPR, Article 9.

    MIL OSI NGO –

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: More acts announced for Radio 1 Big Weekend

    Source: City of Liverpool

    BBC Radio 1 has revealed an exciting first for Big Weekend 2025, which will take place in Sefton Park, Liverpool from Friday 23 May – Sunday 25 May. The festival will feature a performance from Radio 1 Anthems acts – celebrating iconic tracks and unforgettable moments from the past two decades of music.

    The headline Radio 1 Anthems acts are:

    • Natasha Bedingfield – performing Friday 23 May
    • Sugababes – performing Saturday 24 May

    Natasha Bedingfield says: “It’s a big deal to be part of Radio 1’s Big Weekend. I can’t wait to jump up on stage and sing my heart out with everyone. Let’s hope some inhibitions get released!”

    Sugababes say: “We’re buzzing to be playing Radio 1’s Big Weekend! We’ve heard amazing things about the energy and the crowds, so we’re excited to be part of it this year. Expect a lot of love, big tunes, and a show to remember!”

    Aled Haydn Jones, Head of Radio 1, says: “Radio 1’s Big Weekend is about bringing people together through the music they love, and our Radio 1 Anthems artists are a perfect example of that. These acts have soundtracked unforgettable moments for our audience and continue to resonate with listeners today – whether they’re rediscovering the songs or discovering them for the first-time.

    “I’m really excited about this brand-new addition to Big Weekend and can’t wait to see the impact these iconic acts will have on the crowd in Liverpool.”

    This exciting new addition to Big Weekend is in keeping with the Radio 1 Anthems extension which launched on BBC Sounds last November (2024) and was provisionally approved by Ofcom last week to launch on DAB+. Radio 1 Anthems helps the station’s young listeners to discover and re-discover a wide range of music and artists championed by Radio 1 throughout the 2000s and 2010s.

    With over 100,000 music fans expected to attend across the weekend, audiences can look forward to nostalgia-packed, feel-good sets full of timeless hits and throwback moments from these two iconic acts. They join a stellar line-up including Sam Fender, Tate McRae, Mumford & Sons, HAIM, Tom Grennan, JADE, Lola Young, AJ Tracey plus many more.

    More information on the line-up and tickets can be found on the Radio 1 Big Weekend website.

    BBC Radio 1 will broadcast live from the festival site across the weekend, with performances and tracks available live and on demand across Radio 1’s iPlayer channel and BBC Sounds.

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi receives a telephone call from the President of the Republic of Finland H.E. Mr. Alexander Stubb

    Source: Government of India

    Posted On: 16 APR 2025 5:45PM by PIB Delhi

    The leaders review ongoing bilateral collaboration and reiterated commitment to  to further deepen the partnership.

    They exchanged view on regional and global issues

    Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi had a telephonic conversation with the President of the Republic of Finland H.E. Mr. Alexander Stubb today.

    The leaders reviewed the ongoing collaboration between the two countries including in the areas of digitalization, sustainability and mobility. They reiterated their commitment to further strengthen and deepen the partnership including  in the areas of quantum, 5G-6G, AI and cyber-security. 

    The leaders also exchanged the views on regional and global issues of mutual interest, including the situation in Ukraine.  President Stubb expressed Finland’s support for closer  
    India- EU relations and conclusion of a mutually beneficial FTA at the earliest.  

    The two leaders agreed to remain in touch. 

    ******

    MJPS/SR/SKS

    (Release ID: 2122157) Visitor Counter : 53

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Management of infectious diseases in livestock and breeding animals – E-001444/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-001444/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Kristian Vigenin (S&D)

    The management of infectious diseases in livestock and breeding animals remains a major challenge for animal health, farmers’ well-being and sustainable agriculture. Current protocols often involve the culling of entire herds or flocks, even in situations where more targeted, science-based responses might be possible. This approach can be unnecessarily distressing for farmers, financially damaging, and ethically troubling – especially when less drastic alternatives may exist through advances in veterinary science.

    The outbreaks of small ruminant plague (PPR) in Bulgaria in 2018 and 2024 further underscore the urgent need for more effective, nuanced, and evidence-based disease response strategies.

    • 1.Is the Commission planning any new initiatives focused on improving the management of infectious diseases in livestock, particularly through financing research into alternative solutions such as vaccines, treatments and disease monitoring systems?
    • 2.Is there any intention to review and potentially revise the existing EU protocols for handling diseased animals, in order to allow for more flexible and evidence-based approaches that could reduce the reliance on mass culling?
    • 3.Why was the issue of infectious disease management not more prominently addressed in the recently published Vision for Agriculture and Food[1], and will the Commission consider integrating this dimension more explicitly in future strategic planning?

    Submitted: 9.4.2025

    • [1] COM(2025)0075.
    Last updated: 16 April 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Financing civil defence in Poland – E-001481/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-001481/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Marcin Sypniewski (ESN)

    Poland, as a border state of the European Union and the target of hybrid actions from Russia, is particularly vulnerable to attacks that could have an impact on the civilian population. In addition, last year’s flooding also revealed serious infrastructural deficiencies. Owing to the neglect of the civil defence infrastructure and the limited resources of local authorities, it is extremely difficult to establish an effective civil defence system.

    In the light of the foregoing:

    • 1.Does the Commission plan to allocate funds for the construction of civil defence facilities, such as shelters? If so, under what mechanism and in what amount?
    • 2.Can funds under the energy transition programmes be used to adapt mine facilities to serve as shelters?

    Submitted: 9.4.2025

    Last updated: 16 April 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Just Transition Fund – E-001480/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-001480/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Marcin Sypniewski (ESN)

    In light of the start of work on the MFF for the next programming period, I would like to inquire about the fate of the Just Transition Fund. Decarbonisation affects many regions in Europe, including Poland, and especially Silesia.

    In this connection:

    • 1.At the current stage of work, is the continued existence of the Just Transition Fund in the new MFF being questioned, and will it retain its current character, i.e. as a separate fund under cohesion policy?
    • 2.At the current stage of work, is the Fund intended as a measure exclusively for regions with a coal-based economy, or is an expansion of its scope envisaged?
    • 3.Please present the current assumptions for the Fund and a timetable for further work.

    Submitted: 9.4.2025

    Last updated: 16 April 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Violation of Directive 1999/70/EC on the grounds of discrimination against substitute teachers in Greece in cases of serious illness – E-001474/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-001474/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Elena Kountoura (The Left)

    In Greece, there are situations where substitute teachers who have been diagnosed with serious and hard-to-treat illnesses are discriminated against in terms of labour and other rights in comparison with their permanent colleagues. The competent authorities of the Ministry of Education reject requests for online work or additional days of sick leave during treatment and recovery periods, on the grounds that they are not provided for by the current institutional framework[1]. The only solution is to return to work immediately following the end of the treatment or recovery period – during which they are not paid a salary[2].

    Having regard to Article 54(1) and (3) of Greek Law 3528/2007 (the Civil Servants’ Code), the infringement of EU law due to the incorrect transposition into Greek law of Council Directive 1999/70/EC, which prohibits discrimination against workers on fixed-term contracts, and the infringement procedure initiated by the Commission against Greece (INFR(2024)4013)[3], as well as the inhuman dilemma faced by substitute teachers in Greece, whereby they have to choose between earning a salary or getting treatment in the event of a serious illness, can the Commission say:

    • 1.Is it aware of these cases of discrimination in Greece between workers with different types of contracts as regards sick leave and other employment rights?
    • 2.What steps does it intend to take to ensure equal rights for severely ill workers in Greece, regardless of their contract type?

    Submitted: 9.4.2025

    • [1] In fact, Article 657 of the Civil Code expressly states that an employee’s claim to a salary may be retained even when the employee is not working, provided that the impediment to work is due to an important reason, such as the illness of the employee, as is apparent from the provisions of Articles 660 and 661 of the Civil Code, Article 5(3) of Law 2112/1920 (Government Gazette A, No 67), Article 8 of Royal Decree 16/18-7-1920 and Article 3 of Law 4558/1930 (Government Gazette A, No 124), and as also sustained by the case-law of the courts (Decision 826/2011 of the Court of First Instance in Athens, Decision 542/2010 of the Supreme Court, Decision 4214/2010 of the Court of Appeal of Athens, and others).
    • [2] See for example: https://www.alfavita.gr/ekpaideysi/473918_eipan-se-anaplirotria-na-dialexei-i-tin-therapeia-toy-karkinoy-tis-i-merokamato.
    • [3] Greek law contains less favourable employment conditions for fixed-term teachers working in public schools compared to permanent teachers, for instance as regards sick leave.
    Last updated: 16 April 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Overcoming challenges to Cyprus’s accession to the Schengen area – E-000502/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    Already since its accession to the EU, Cyprus has been bound by the Schengen rules. Its gradual integration into the Schengen area without internal frontiers, culminating in a Council decision on lifting checks at the internal borders, is subject to a positive Schengen evaluation[1] and a unanimous decision of the Council .

    Cyprus’ first-time evaluation is ongoing, and the Commission is closely monitoring the progress made by Cyprus in fulfilling the technical Schengen requirements.

    The Commission is aware that Cyprus’ integration into the Schengen area requires due respect to its special situation and the framework applicable in line with Protocol 10[2]. The Commission stands ready to engage in a dialogue with Cyprus on how this can be achieved, including with regard to the Green Line.

    The Commission already provides substantial financial support to Cyprus for border and migration management as well as police cooperation. During the 2021-2027 programming period, more than EUR 292 million[3] have been allocated to Cyprus under the Home Affairs Funds[4].

    This includes measures sustaining the implementation of the Schengen requirements, such as EUR 9.9 million to support digital systems (e.g. the Schengen Information System), EUR 67.7 million for the construction of the new reception and pre-departure centres in Limnes, and EUR 30 million to enhance Cyprus’ surveillance systems at the external sea border.

    • [1] In accordance with Regulation (EU) 2022/922 on the establishment and operation of an evaluation and monitoring mechanism to verify the application of the Schengen acquis, OJ L 160, 15.6.2022, p. 1-27.
    • [2] Act concerning the conditions of accession of the Czech Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Malta, the Republic of Poland, the Republic of Slovenia and the Slovak Republic and the adjustments to the Treaties on which the European Union is founded — Protocol No 10 on Cyprus; OJ L 236, 23.9.2003, p. 955-955.
    • [3] Under the 2021-2027 programming period, so far more than EUR 90 million have been allocated under the Asylum Migration and Integration Fund programme of Cyprus, EUR 80 million under the Border Management and Visa Policy Instrument programme and EUR 25.6 under the Internal Security Fund. On top of this support EUR 96.4 million have been provided under the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund directly from the Commission (emergency assistance, union actions for Member States under pressure).
    • [4] This includes the Border Management and Visa Instrument, the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund and the Internal Security Fund.
    Last updated: 16 April 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Support measures for Greek table olives – E-001483/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-001483/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Yannis Maniatis (S&D)

    The recent announcement by the Trump administration imposing 20 % tariffs on all European products signals a clear change in US policy, leading to increased protectionism. The consequences of this trade war, which has just begun with this tariff policy, are expected to be negative for all parties involved. Many sectors, including the agri-food sector, are following developments with great concern and uncertainty. They include the Greek table olive sector, which is in imminent danger.

    Table olives are Greece’s leading agricultural export product to the US, with exports reaching EUR 241 million annually, making the US market the main destination for Greek exports, especially for premium quality products of high value. Any disruption to this flow creates problems for the countryside, growers, their organisations and businesses.

    Given that the Commission is expected to react to the US announcements soon:

    • 1.What measures does the Commission intend to adopt to protect susceptible agri-food products, such as table olives, given that the competitiveness of the sector is under threat from non-EU countries with lower tariffs (10 % in Egypt, Türkiye, Morocco, etc.)?
    • 2.How does the Commission intend to proceed at the World Trade Organization (WTO) level with regard to Greek table olives, given that the EU has already successfully challenged the US regarding Spanish ripe olives, justifying the demands of Spanish producers and exporters?

    Submitted: 10.4.2025

    Last updated: 16 April 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Possible deportation of EU nationals from Germany owing to their participation in public demonstrations – E-001457/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-001457/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Billy Kelleher (Renew), Barry Andrews (Renew), Cynthia Ní Mhurchú (Renew), Barry Cowen (Renew), Maria Walsh (PPE), Lynn Boylan (The Left), Aodhán Ó Ríordáin (S&D)

    Three EU nationals – two Irish and one Polish – have been ordered to leave Germany over their participation in pro-Palestinian protests.

    The authorities have claimed that the three individuals involved constitute a threat to public safety and should therefore leave Germany as soon as possible.

    They have been told to leave Germany by 21 April 2025 or face deportation. All three participated in a pro-Palestinian protest at Berlin’s Free University in October 2024.

    None of these three EU nationals has been convicted of any crime and any charges against them are demonstration-related and of ‘no serious character’.

    Freedom of expression and freedom of assembly are both guaranteed in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and in the European Convention on Human Rights.

    Can the Commission therefore answer the following:

    • 1.Does it believe that the actions of the Berlin authorities violate Articles 6 and 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and Article 45 of the TFEU?
    • 2.What actions will the Commission undertake to ensure that all EU citizens have their rights protected?

    Submitted: 9.4.2025

    Last updated: 16 April 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Border management with regard to Lebanon and Syria – E-001464/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-001464/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Lukas Mandl (PPE)

    Due to the increased security challenges in the Middle East arising from the fall of the Assad regime, the region faces high risks of weapons proliferation, drug smuggling and illegal migration. The current figures show that the Central Mediterranean route remains the most active migratory pathway into the EU. Compared to 2023, there has been a 10 % increase in irregular border crossings on this route.

    • 1.Does the Commission intend to address the issue of human trafficking and illegal migration at its roots in the Middle East region?
    • 2.What means and measures will the Commission take to support people in Syria to stay in order to reconstruct their country, and prevent them from illegally crossing the borders to Lebanon, in order to continue to Cyprus and elsewhere in the EU?
    • 3.What means and measures will the Commission adopt to support effective border management mechanisms operationally implemented by trustworthy international organisations, such as the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, in order to prevent illegal weapons smuggling and illegal border crossings, especially from Syria to Lebanon, and in order to support the Lebanese Armed Forces in fully implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1701?

    Submitted: 9.4.2025

    Last updated: 16 April 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Possible merger of coal companies receiving state aid – E-001479/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-001479/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Marcin Sypniewski (ESN)

    Three major coal companies receiving state aid and subject to the EU notification procedure are currently carrying out mining activities in Poland: Polska Grupa Górnicza (PGG), Południowy Koncern Węglowy (PKW) and Węglokoks Kraj (WK). Each of them operates separately, even though they produce coal almost exclusively for commercial power and heating, competing with each other in the same market and often for the same customers.

    This leads to overlapping organisational structures, complexities in the settlement of state aid and difficulties in the implementation of protective packages for employees – relocations are only possible within a single company.

    Taking the above into consideration:

    • 1.Would it be acceptable to merge PGG, PKW and WK into a single economic entity that would continue the transformation process and be covered by a single state aid mechanism?
    • 2.Would such an organisational change require an update or a renotification of state aid?
    • 3.Does the Commission acknowledge that there are reasons to simplify the organisational structure of coal mining in Poland, in line with practices used in other Member States?

    Submitted: 9.4.2025

    Last updated: 16 April 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – EU Trust Fund for Africa – 2023 discharge – E-001426/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-001426/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Auke Zijlstra (PfE), Marieke Ehlers (PfE)

    In the framework of the 2023 discharge procedure, the Commission recently published its ‘Communication to the European Parliament, the Council and the Court of Auditors; annual accounts of the European Development Fund for the financial year 2023’[1]. We should like to pose the following questions in this connection:

    • 1.According to the Commission, the objectives of the mission are to: ‘contribute to better migration management’ as well as ‘addressing the root causes of… irregular migration’ (p. 62). At the same time, the Commission states that ‘irregular border crossings’ from Tunisia and Libya increased by 50 % in 2023 compared to 2022 and that ‘pressure on the Western Mediterranean and Atlantic routes substantially increased… + 95 % compared to 2022’ (p. 65). Can the Commission please explain how this fits in with ‘better migration management’?
    • 2.According to the Commission ‘420 voluntary returns’ and the ‘reintegration of 509 returning migrants’ took place in 2023 (p. 64). Does the Commission not consider this a meagre result, given that a total of 157 951 ‘irregular migrants’ reached Italy and Malta (page 65)?
    • 3.The Commission states that the EU Trust Fund for Africa has created 11 087 new jobs (p. 64). Can it explain – in broad terms – what type of jobs are concerned and whether they are in the public or private sector?

    Submitted: 8.4.2025

    • [1] COM(2024) 273 final
    Last updated: 16 April 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – The situation of truck drivers in Europe who come from countries outside the EU – E-001423/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-001423/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Marit Maij (S&D), Gabriele Bischoff (S&D), Marc Angel (S&D), Estelle Ceulemans (S&D), Marianne Vind (S&D), Johan Danielsson (S&D)

    Truck drivers from countries outside the EU are still exploited on a large scale in the EU. In the Netherlands, several truck drivers are now on strike because they have the courage to stand up for their rights that are not respected: healthy working conditions, a fair salary and decent working hours and days. In the EU, there are around three million truck drivers, of whom 10 % come from outside the EU.

    Such illegal and exploitative practices shed a particularly bad light on the conditions of the EU labour market for non-EU nationals.

    In light of this:

    • 1.How is the Commission planning to ensure that compliance with existing legislation, such as Regulation (EC) No 561/2006[1] on road transport and Regulation (EU) No 165/2014[2] on recording equipment in road transport is better enforced?
    • 2.Will the Commission propose an extension of the mandate of the European Labour Authority to include non-EU nationals?
    • 3.What is the Commission planning to do in order to stop the exploitation of non-EU nationals, in particular, in the EU labour market, and will the Commission propose legislation to prevent this, such as limiting the opportunities for temporary work and subcontracting?

    Submitted: 8.4.2025

    • [1] OJ L 102, 11.4.2006, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2006/561/oj.
    • [2] OJ L 60, 28.2.2014, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2014/165/oj.
    Last updated: 16 April 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Financing of secure parking areas for hauliers in Romania – E-002819/2024(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    Regulation (EU) 2024/1679[1] introduced the obligation for Member States to ensure the development of safe and secure parking areas (SSPAs) certified in accordance with EU standards along the roads of the core network and the extended core network, with an average maximum distance of 150 kilometres between two SSPAs, by 31 December 2040.

    However, it falls under the responsibility of Member States to organise themselves in achieving this objective, by planning the projects and their progress in accordance with national priorities and circumstances, as well as public procurement and permitting processes, thus ensuring that the infrastructure development occurs in compliance with the required EU standards.

    In this context, the Commission supports the Member States in their efforts to build more SSPAs, notably by providing funding under the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) .

    For the realisation of projects across the EU, CEF Transport made available EUR 250 million each in 2022 and 2023, and EUR 320 million for the call for proposals of 2024. These fundings support both the creation of new SSPAs and the upgrade of existing parking areas in accordance with EU safety and security standards . So far, the EU has already co-funded 138 SSPAs and around 16,113 parking spots. In Romania, three SSPAs have been certified in accordance with the EU standards adopted in 2022[2].

    Furthermore, the Commission has launched a study on the availability and development of SSPAs and rest facilities for professional drivers in the EU, with a view to presenting a report to the European Parliament and the Council.

    The development of SSPAs and the support of Member States to fulfil the trans-European transport network (TEN-T) requirements, remain a priority for the Commission.

    • [1] Regulation (EU) 2024/1679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 on Union guidelines for the development of the trans-European transport network, amending Regulations (EU) 2021/1153 and (EU) No 913/2010 and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1315/2013 (OJ L 2024/1679, 28.6.2024).
    • [2] Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2022/1012 of 7 April 2022 supplementing Regulation (EC) No 561/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to the establishment of standards detailing the level of service and security of safe and secure parking areas and to the procedures for their certification (OJ L 170, 28.6.2022, p. 27).

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: expert reaction to study of vegan protein consumption and amino acid intake

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    A study published in PLOS One looks at protein consumption and amino acid intake in vegan.

    Prof Tom Sanders, Professor emeritus of Nutrition and Dietetics, King’s College London, said:

    “Protein consists of mixtures of 20 amino acids and 8 of these are regarded as dietary essential because they cannot be synthesised from other amino acids in adults. This cross-sectional study has calculated the intakes of essential amino acids in adult vegans from food tables and compared them with reference intakes. The authors report that intakes of lysine and leucine are lower than reference amounts in vegans. 

    “Limitations include:

    1) There is no omnivore control group for comparison. 

    2) The amino acid compositional data on foods were limited particularly on the amounts that may be digestible. 

    3) No account was made of contribution by gut microbiota to dietary intake of lysine. 

    4) Was the comparator reference intake appropriate? While vegans probably do have lower intakes of lysine and leucine it does not been the intakes suggest deficiency especially as the reference intakes are based mainly on American studies where intakes of protein were high and based mainly on animal products. 

    “Interpretation of the results: 

    “Human leucine deficiency has not been described. However, higher intakes have been promoted for body building in the form of whey protein. On the other hand, there is growing evidence that the growth promoting effects of high intakes of leucine and other branch chain amino acids may be linked to increased risk of cancer (especially prostate cancer). 

    “In practice, protein requirements are estimated for the amounts required to maintain nitrogen balance and support growth. Although plant proteins when tested alone have a lower biological value than milk, eggs, meat and fish (measured by how they support growth in rats) when mixtures of plant proteins (e.g. cereals and pulses) are tested they have high biological value. In most human diets lysine is regarded as the amino acids most likely to limit protein quality. Physiological adaptations do occur on low protein intakes and lysine may be salvaged from lysine synthesised by gut microbiota in the large bowel.  This concept was supported by a recent study comparing vegans and omnivores (https://doi.org/10.1007/s00394-021-02790-y). That study measured plasma lysine concentrations did find levels to be 25% lower in vegans compared with omnivores but concluded the difference was unlikely to be of any significance.”

    ‘Evaluation of protein intake and protein quality in New Zealand vegans’ by Bi Xue Patricia Soh et al. was published in PLOS One at 19:00 UK time on Wednesday 16th April.

    DOI: https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0314889

    Declared interests

    Prof Tom Sanders: I have received grant funding for research on vegans in the past. I have been retired for 10 years but during my career at King’s College London, I formerly acted as consultant for companies that made artificial sweeteners and sugar substitutes.

    I am a member of the Programme Advisory Committee of the Malaysia Palm Oil Board which involves the review of research projects proposed by the Malaysia government.

    I also used to be a member of the Scientific Advisory Committee of the Global Dairy Platform up until 2015.

    I did do some consultancy work on GRAS affirmation of high oleic palm oil for Archer Daniel Midland more than ten years ago.

    My research group received oils and fats free of charge from Unilever and Archer Daniel Midland for our Food Standards Agency Research.

    Tom was a member of the FAO/WHO Joint Expert Committee that recommended that trans fatty acids be removed from the human food chain.

    Member of the Science Committee British Nutrition Foundation.  Honorary Nutritional Director HEART UK.

    Before my retirement from King’s College London in 2014, I acted as a consultant to many companies and organisations involved in the manufacture of what are now designated ultraprocessed foods.

    I used to be a consultant to the Breakfast Cereals Advisory Board of the Food and Drink Federation.

    I used to be a consultant for aspartame more than a decade ago.

    When I was doing research at King’ College London, the following applied: Tom does not hold any grants or have any consultancies with companies involved in the production or marketing of sugar-sweetened drinks.  In reference to previous funding to Tom’s institution: £4.5 million was donated to King’s College London by Tate & Lyle in 2006; this funding finished in 2011. This money was given to the College and was in recognition of the discovery of the artificial sweetener sucralose by Prof Hough at the Queen Elizabeth College (QEC), which merged with King’s College London. The Tate & Lyle grant paid for the Clinical Research Centre at St Thomas’ that is run by the Guy’s & St Thomas’ Trust, it was not used to fund research on sugar. Tate & Lyle sold their sugar interests to American Sugar so the brand Tate & Lyle still exists but it is no longer linked to the company Tate & Lyle PLC, which gave the money to King’s College London in 2006.”

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Plymouth to go to the polls

    Source: City of Plymouth

    Plymouth voters will be asked to choose how they think the city should be governed in the future, following the verification of valid signatures submitted as part of a petition.

    The Council received a petition requesting a directly elected mayor for Plymouth City Council. As per the legislation, the Council has validated each signature to ensure that they are registered electors in the Plymouth City Council area.  

    Following this process, 10,856 signatures were verified as being eligible, meaning the threshold of obtaining support from at least five per cent of registered electors in the city has been reached to trigger a referendum.  

    In papers published today, for the Full Council meeting on Monday 28 April, proposals set out that the referendum will be held on Thursday 17 July. This will be formally confirmed when the Notice of Poll is published, following the Council meeting. 

    At the referendum, those on the electoral register will be asked to have their say on whether Plymouth City Council’s governance model should be changed from a leader model to a directly elected mayor.  

    This process is separate from – and not related to – the ongoing discussions about Plymouth potentially joining a combined regional authority that could be led by an elected strategic mayor.  

    There are a number of ways to cast your vote. You can vote in person at a polling station, by post, or by appointing someone you trust to vote on your behalf, which is known as a proxy vote.  

    Registering to vote is quick and easy, it only takes five minutes and can be done online. Once registered you will be placed onto the electoral register. However, you will need to register again if you’ve changed your name, address or nationality.  

    Once registered, you can request for a postal vote application online. Having a postal vote means that a postal ballot pack containing your ballot paper will be sent to your home, so you can vote via post, avoiding the need to go to a polling station. If you’re unable to vote in person you can apply for a proxy vote and ask someone to vote on your behalf.  

    All registered voters in Plymouth will also need to show an eligible photographic ID to vote in person at a polling station. 

    Accepted forms of ID include a UK, European Economic Area (EEA) or Commonwealth passport; a full or provisional UK, EEA or Commonwealth driver’s licence; some concessionary travel passes, such as an older person’s bus pass or a blue badge. 

    Anyone who does not have one of the accepted forms of ID can apply for free Voter Authority Certificate online or by completing a paper form, which is available from the Council.  

    It is anticipated that the deadlines will be:  

    •           Deadline to register to vote: 1 July 2025 

    •           Deadline to apply or change a postal vote: 5pm on 2 July 2025 

    •           Deadline to apply for Voter Authority Certificate: 5pm on 9 July 2025 

    •           Deadline to apply for a proxy vote: 5pm on 9 July 2025.

    For more information about registering to vote or applying for a postal vote or voter ID see our register to vote page.

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –