to wind up the debate on the statement by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
Joachim Stanisław Brudziński, Adam Bielan, Mariusz Kamiński, Cristian Terheş, Małgorzata Gosiewska, Jaak Madison, Rihards Kols, Jadwiga Wiśniewska, Carlo Fidanza, Michał Dworczyk, Roberts Zīle, Alberico Gambino, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Ivaylo Valchev, Veronika Vrecionová, Ondřej Krutílek, Tobiasz Bocheński, Assita Kanko, Alexandr Vondra
on behalf of the ECR Group
B10‑0073/2024
European Parliament resolution on strengthening Moldova’s resilience against Russian interference ahead of the upcoming presidential elections
(2024/2821(RSP))
The European Parliament,
– having regard to its previous resolutions on the Republic of Moldova and on Eastern Partnership countries,
– having regard to the Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Moldova, of the other part[1], which includes a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area and which fully entered into force on 1 July 2016,
– having regard to Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union,
– having regard to the Republic of Moldova’s application for European Union (EU) membership, submitted on 3 March 2022,
– having regard to the Versailles Declaration of 10 and 11 March 2022,
– having regard to the EU statement of 21 March 2024 at the OSCE Permanent Council No 1466 in Vienna on the recent security incidents in the Transnistrian region,
– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,
A. whereas a presidential election is scheduled to be held in Moldova on 20 October 2024; whereas a referendum on Moldova’s accession to the EU is set to take place on the same day as the presidential election;
B. whereas Russia has persistently sought to influence, subvert and undermine free, fair and independent elections in Moldova, as well as in various EU countries, by using disinformation, covert activities, corruption and many other hybrid warfare tactics aimed at destabilising the West; whereas, despite recent legislative improvements, concerns regarding campaign financing and the use of illicit Russian funds to influence electoral outcomes remain among the most sensitive issues within Moldova’s electoral landscape; whereas Russia’s efforts to exert influence are expected to increase in the run-up to Moldova’s presidential election;
C. whereas there has been a noticeable shift in Russian interference tactics, with Russia expanding its support beyond traditional hard-line pro-Russian parties to a broader spectrum of political actors; whereas this spectrum now includes not only moderately pro-Russian and pro-Moldovan groups but also groups presenting themselves as ‘pro-European’; whereas this strategy appears, deceptively, to offer disillusioned voters a range of alternatives to the Party of Action and Solidarity, seeking to fragment the political landscape and dilute genuine support for the current government; whereas this shift reflects the Kremlin’s evolving approach to influence operations, prioritising the creation of multiple fronts to undermine democratic processes and foment internal discord;
D. whereas Moldova’s local elections on 5 November 2023 reportedly saw unprecedented levels of Russian interference, including disinformation campaigns, voter bribery and financial support for pro-Russian parties, which pose a serious threat to Moldova’s democratic process ahead of the presidential election in October 2024; whereas recent reports by Moldovan investigators unveil the possibility that more than USD 15 million of Russian funds have allegedly been transferred to bribe voters in the upcoming elections;
E. whereas Moldova has taken steps to combat Russian interference, including by banning pro-Russian parties, sanctioning oligarchs, suspending media outlets that spread disinformation, and increasing customs controls; whereas these efforts require further support from the international community and the EU in particular;
F. whereas on 3 March 2022 the Republic of Moldova applied for EU membership and, on 17 June 2022, the European Commission presented its opinions on the applications submitted by Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova; whereas Moldova was granted the status of candidate country on 23 June 2022 by unanimous agreement of the 27 Member States; whereas the Commission outlined nine steps for Moldova to address in its 2023 Enlargement Package report, which was presented on 8 November 2023, recommending the opening of accession negotiations, provided that remaining reforms in justice, anti-corruption and deoligarchisation were accomplished; whereas the Council decided to open accession negotiations on 14 December 2023, and the first intergovernmental conference formally launching these negotiations was held on 25 June 2024;
G. whereas the EU has imposed sanctions on key Moldovan oligarchs and pro-Russian actors, and the United States (US) has repeatedly warned Moldova of Russian plans to destabilise and overthrow its government;
H. whereas Russian actors, including sanctioned individuals like fugitive Moldovan oligarch Ilan Shor, have been directly involved in those destabilisation efforts, using state-funded Russian media outlets located in Russian territory and criminal networks to influence Moldovan politics;
I. whereas Russian interference, combined with Moldova’s vulnerable economic situation, political divisions and geostrategic importance, risks undermining Moldova’s future in the EU, despite its significant progress towards EU accession; whereas oligarch-backed media and corrupt financial networks continue to destabilise Moldova’s political landscape, posing a threat to its sovereignty and democratic institutions;
J. whereas Russia Today (RT) and its employees, including editor-in-chief Margarita Simonyan, have directly coordinated with the Kremlin to support Russian Government efforts to influence the October 2024 Moldovan election; whereas Simonyan leverages the state-funded platforms in which she holds leadership positions – namely RT, Sputnik, and their parent company, the international information agency Rossiya Segodnya, a federal state unitary enterprise – to attempt to foment unrest in Moldova, likely with the specific aim of causing protests to turn violent;
K. whereas Russia is escalating its years of ‘grey zone’ assaults on Moldova through disinformation, cyberattacks, bomb threats and other manipulations; whereas this campaign is part of what experts and government officials discuss as Russia’s steadily evolving hybrid war from the Baltic to the Black Sea: its invasion of Ukraine and destabilisation efforts against Georgia, Estonia and other neighbours; whereas Putin’s primary instruments for destabilising Moldova are propaganda and the corruption exercised by billionaire allies such as Ilan Shor and former ruling party leader Vladimir Plahotniuc, as well as Russia’s influence over two regions: Gagauzia, a stronghold of Ilan Shor in the south, and Transnistria, located on Moldova’s eastern border and controlled by Russian troops;
L. whereas in 2023, the Russian government expanded the operational scope of RT by embedding within it a cyber-unit with direct ties to the Russian state; whereas this unit has been involved in intelligence and influence operations globally, including in Moldova; whereas the information gathered by this entity, operating under RT’s cover, is reportedly funnelled to Russian intelligence agencies, state-controlled media, mercenary groups and other actors aligned with the Russian Government; whereas RT is also engaged in disinformation campaigns, covert influence operations and military procurement efforts in support of Russia’s war in Ukraine;
M. whereas the Intelligence and Security Service of the Republic of Moldova published a report in 2023 highlighting the unprecedented intensity of the actions carried out by the Russian Federation aimed at anchoring the Republic of Moldova within its sphere of influence; whereas the mechanism used to carry out this threat is of a hybrid nature, aiming operationally at attacking democratic processes and undermining Moldova’s path towards European integration by amplifying radical, separatist tendencies in the southern region of Moldova, particularly in Gagauzia, spreading propaganda and altering the information space, interfering in Moldova’s electoral process and conducting subversive operations;
N. whereas on 18 September 2024 two close allies of Ilan Shor – Marina Tauber, member of the Parliament of Moldova, and Governor (Bashkan) of Gagauzia Evghenia Guțul – met the spokesperson of the Russian Foreign Ministry, Maria Zakharova, and subsequently released false information about the EU and Moldova’s future in it, thus manipulating Moldovan citizens and trying to influence the upcoming election;
O. whereas Moldova faces growing economic and security challenges, including the risk of political backsliding if Russia-backed candidates succeed in the upcoming presidential election;
P. whereas Ukraine’s decision to close its border with Transnistria, which hosts 1 500 Russian troops, significantly curtailed trade between Kyiv and Tiraspol, cutting off critical revenue streams and reducing Transnistria’s trade volumes with Russia by 22 % in 2022; whereas Moldova now controls most of Transnistria’s access to external trade, representing an unprecedented opportunity to influence the separatist region; whereas Moldova has implemented a pressure strategy that includes criminalising separatism, tightening customs checks and stripping Transnistrian businesses of customs privileges, thus creating significant economic strain; whereas, despite receiving free Russian gas, Transnistria remains vulnerable to the potential cutting off of the Russian gas transit through Ukraine by December 2024, which could leave the region without energy;
Q. whereas Russia has a substantial military presence in the Black Sea, including through undisclosed numbers and capabilities of its submarines, and considerable potential to dominate adjacent maritime transport routes; whereas the volatile situation in Transnistria poses a strategic risk, as Russia could seize control of the region and escalate the conflict, owing to Ukraine’s likely military response;
R. whereas, according to journalistic investigations, dozens of priests from the Metropolis of Moldova travel to Russia, where they receive cards through which they later withdraw funds; whereas these trips are reportedly organised by Ilan Shor in close collaboration with the Russian Orthodox Church, which is closely aligned with the Kremlin regime, with the intention of using the clergy for electoral purposes;
S. whereas in response to Russia’s continued efforts to undermine Moldovan democracy and interfere in Moldova’s electoral processes, the US State Department is imposing additional sanctions on a critical aspect of Russia’s malign influence in Moldova;
1. Stands in solidarity with the people of the Republic of Moldova and reiterates its unwavering support for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova within its internationally recognised borders; in particular, commends Moldova for its 2022 electoral code reforms, which addressed long-standing recommendations and set a stronger framework for the upcoming election and for an increase in the number of polling stations abroad and a new partial postal voting initiative; stresses also the important role being played by the Republic of Moldova in the safety and stability of the EU’s eastern border in the context of the humanitarian crisis caused by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine;
2. Strongly condemns Russia’s repeated attempts to destabilise the Republic of Moldova, its institutions and society; calls on the Russian authorities to respect the Republic of Moldova’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, to cease its provocations and attempts to destabilise the country, and to immediately and unconditionally withdraw its military forces from the occupied territories of Moldova (Transnistria), Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia) and Ukraine;
3. Reaffirms its full commitment to the Republic of Moldova’s membership of the EU; welcomes the Moldovan authorities’ considerable efforts to advance the reform agenda and their determination to fulfil the nine steps identified in the Commission’s opinion of 17 June 2022 in order to progress towards EU membership, despite Russia’s pressure on Moldova and the crises triggered by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine;
4. Stresses that, based on the experience of the 2023 local elections, the Russian Federation is likely to employ the tactic of using ‘filler’ parties in the upcoming parliamentary elections in 2025, creating a smokescreen to facilitate the entry of at least one Ilan Shor-controlled party into Parliament;
5. Congratulates Moldova for the first intergovernmental conference on the opening of accession negotiations, which occurred in June 2024, only two years after the granting of candidate status, and thus serves as evidence of Moldova’s determination to fulfil the EU’s reform agenda; acknowledges the significant progress made by Moldova in the EU accession process and calls for the intergovernmental conference to conclude cluster 1 of the negotiations in the coming year;
6. Calls on NATO and its members to consider enhancing NATO’s naval presence and readiness in the Black Sea region;
7. Calls for the EU to support Moldova’s efforts toward the peaceful reintegration of Transnistria by providing financial and technical assistance for economic stabilisation, social cohesion measures and the diversification of Transnistria’s energy through neighbouring Member States, ensuring that Moldova’s progress toward EU accession is not undermined by the unresolved status of Transnistria;
8. Encourages the Government of Moldova, as the country advances on its path to EU accession, to repair the injustices done by the oppressive Soviet occupation to all religious denominations;
9. Recognises the Orthodox Metropolis of Bessarabia as a victim of Soviet oppression; notes in this regard that the Orthodox Metropolis of Bessarabia, after it was abusively abolished by the Soviet authorities, was not officially recognised until 2002, after a decision of the European Court of Human Rights;
10. Calls on the Commission, the European External Action Service and the Member States to urgently provide funding and expertise to support the training of short-term election observers in Moldova for the October 2024 elections, in collaboration with the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and its dedicated services and offices;
11. Calls on the Commission to consider enhanced cooperation to provide Moldova with specific counter-interference technical assistance and to improve Moldova’s election infrastructure, including assisting with the implementation of secure voting technologies and measures to ensure the integrity of the transmission of vote count results;
12. Urges the Commission to develop and present a comprehensive growth plan for Moldova that would aim to facilitate foreign investment and foster economic development within the country; calls for the continued provision of robust financial support to Moldova to ensure its sustainable growth and stability; further calls for the permanent abolition of import duties and quotas on Moldovan exports to the EU;
13. Welcomes the assistance provided under the European Peace Facility in support of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Moldova, aimed at modernising the country’s air defence capabilities, and calls for the continued provision of such support; notes that every sovereign state has the inherent right to invest in its defence capabilities, and affirms that such actions are fully consistent with the Republic of Moldova’s status of neutrality;
14. Commends the launch of the EU Partnership Mission in the Republic of Moldova under the common security and defence policy, aimed at strengthening the resilience of Moldova’s security sector; strongly supports the mission’s activities and its role in providing crucial assistance and expertise to enhance the country’s security and stability;
15. Commends the signing of the security and defence partnership, which will strengthen Moldova’s resilience and enable the EU and Moldova to jointly address common security challenges; emphasises that Moldova is the first country to sign such a partnership with the EU, demonstrating the strong commitment of both parties to enhanced cooperation in the field of security and defence;
16. Calls for the EU, the US, Canada and the United Kingdom to continue to apply and expand sanctions against individuals, media outlets and entities involved in Kremlin-sponsored activities to subvert the democratic processes and electoral integrity of Moldova and all EU countries and partners;
17. Urges the Moldovan Government to increase vigilance over potential electoral irregularities, enhance public communication on election security, and prepare to address Russian attempts to incite protests following the election results;
18. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Government and Parliament of the Republic of Moldova, the Russian Federation, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the United Nations and the Council of Europe.