Category: Fisheries

  • MIL-OSI Africa: Government welcomes decrease in consumer price inflation

    Source: South Africa News Agency

    Thursday, April 24, 2025

    Government has welcomed the decrease in headline consumer price inflation to 2.7% in March from 3.2% in February.

    According to Statistics South Africa (Stats SA), the headline consumer inflation decreased for the first time in five months due to lower fuel prices and softer tuition inflation.

    “The moderation in inflation offers welcome relief to consumers and aligns with ongoing efforts to support economic recovery and keep prices stable. Government remains committed to fostering economic stability and building conditions that support growth and improved living standards,” Government Communication and Information System (GCIS) Acting Director-General Terry Vandayar said.

    Stats SA reported that the fuel index softened by 0.4% from February, taking the annual rate from -3.6% to -8.8%. 

    A litre of 95-octane petrol (inland) was R22.34 in March, down from R24.45 a year before. The average price for diesel declined to R22.80 from R24.85 over the same period.

    “Education fees are surveyed once a year in March. The price index for education increased by 4.5%, lower than the 6.4% rise in 2024. School fees increased by 5.0% (from 6.6% in 2024). Tertiary education institutions charged 3.7% more in 2025, compared with the 5.9% rise recorded the year before,” Stats SA said.

    The annual rate for food and non-alcoholic beverages (NAB) edged lower to 2.7% in March from 2.8% in February. 

    Vegetables, fruits and nuts, cereal products, meat and fish registered higher annual rates. 

    Lower rates were recorded for oils and fats; hot beverages; milk, other dairy products and eggs; cold beverages; and sugar, confectionery and desserts. –SAnews.gov.za

    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi launches development works worth over Rs 13,480 crore in Madhubani, Bihar marking National Panchayati Raj Day

    Source: Government of India

    Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi launches development works worth over Rs 13,480 crore in Madhubani, Bihar marking National Panchayati Raj Day

    In the last decade, several measures have been taken to empower Panchayats, Panchayats have been strengthened through technology: PM

    The rural economy has gained new momentum in the last decade: PM

    The past decade has been the decade of India’s infrastructure: PM

    Makhana is a superfood for the country and the world today, but in Mithila it is a part of the culture,source for prosperity here: PM

    The willpower of 140 crore Indians will now break the back of the perpetrators of terror: PM

    Terrorism will not go unpunished, Every effort will be made to ensure that justice is done, The entire nation is firm in this resolve: PM

    Posted On: 24 APR 2025 2:11PM by PIB Delhi

    The Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi inaugurated, laid the foundation stone and dedicated to the nation multiple development projects worth over Rs 13,480 crore in Madhubani, Bihar today on the occasion of National Panchayati Raj Day. The Prime Minister appealed to everyone at the event to observe silence and pray for the departed souls in the Pahalgam attacks on 22 April 2025. Addressing the gathering on the occasion, he said that on the occasion of Panchayati Raj Day, the entire nation is connected with Mithila and Bihar. He remarked that projects worth thousands of crores of rupees, aimed at Bihar’s development, have been inaugurated and foundations laid for, emphasising that these initiatives in electricity, railways, and infrastructure will create new employment opportunities in Bihar. He paid tributes to the great poet and national icon, Ramdhari Singh Dinkar Ji, on his death anniversary. 

    Remarking that Bihar is the land where Mahatma Gandhi expanded the mantra of Satyagraha, Shri Modi highlighted Mahatma Gandhi’s firm belief that India’s rapid development is only possible when its villages are strong. He emphasized that the concept of Panchayati Raj was rooted in this sentiment. “Over the past decade, continuous steps have been taken to empower Panchayats. Technology has played a significant role in strengthening Panchayats, with over 2 lakh Gram Panchayats connected to the internet in the last decade”, he added. Shri Modi pointed out that more than 5.5 lakh Common Service Centers have been established in villages, underlining that the digitalization of Panchayats has brought additional benefits, such as easy access to documents like birth and death certificates, and landholding certificates. He remarked that while the nation received a new Parliament building after decades of independence, 30,000 new Panchayat Bhawans have also been constructed across the country. He also highlighted that ensuring adequate funds for Panchayats has been a priority for the government. “Over the past decade, Panchayats have received more than ₹2 lakh crore, all of which has been utilized for the development of villages”, he said.

    Highlighting that one of the major issues faced by Gram Panchayats has been related to land disputes, the Prime Minister mentioned the frequent disagreements over which land is residential, agricultural, Panchayat-owned, or government-owned. He emphasized that to address this issue, the digitization of land records is being undertaken, which has helped resolve unnecessary disputes effectively.

    Shri Modi underscored that Panchayats have strengthened social participation, remarking that Bihar was the first state in the country to provide 50% reservation for women in Panchayats. He emphasized that today, a significant number of women from economically weaker sections, Dalits, Mahadalits, backward, and extremely backward communities are serving as public representatives in Bihar, describing it as true social justice and genuine social participation. He underlined that democracy thrives and becomes stronger with greater participation. Reflecting this vision, Shri Modi noted that a law providing 33% reservation for women in the Lok Sabha and State Assemblies has also been enacted. He remarked that this will benefit women across all states, giving our sisters and daughters greater representation.

    Emphasising that the government is working in mission mode to increase women’s income and create new opportunities for employment and self-employment, Shri Modi highlighted the transformative impact of the ‘Jeevika Didi’ program in Bihar, which has changed the lives of many women. He remarked that today, self-help groups of women in Bihar have been provided financial assistance of approximately ₹1,000 crore, noting that this will further strengthen the economic empowerment of women and contribute to the goal of creating 3 crore Lakhpati Didis across the country. He highlighted that the rural economy has gained new momentum over the past decade. He pointed out that villages have seen the construction of houses for the poor, roads, gas connections, water connections, and toilets, bringing lakhs of crores of rupees to rural areas. The Prime Minister remarked that new employment opportunities have been created, benefiting laborers, farmers, vehicle operators, and shopkeepers, providing them with new avenues for income. He emphasized that this has particularly benefited communities that have been deprived for generations. He cited the example of the PM Awas Yojana, which aims to ensure that no family in the country remains homeless and that everyone has a permanent roof over their heads. He noted that over the past decade, more than 4 crore permanent houses have been constructed under this scheme. He highlighted that in Bihar alone, 57 lakh poor families have received permanent houses. He remarked that these houses have been provided to families from economically weaker sections, Dalits, and backward and extremely backward communities like Pasmanda families. Shri Modi announced that in the coming years, 3 crore more permanent houses will be provided to the poor. He noted that today, approximately 1.5 lakh families in Bihar are moving into their new permanent homes. He said that across the country, 15 lakh poor families have been issued approval letters for the construction of new houses, including 3.5 lakh beneficiaries from Bihar. He highlighted that today, financial assistance has been sent to approximately 10 lakh poor families for their permanent houses, including 80,000 rural families and 1 lakh urban families from Bihar.

    “The past decade has been a decade of infrastructure development for India”, said the Prime Minister, highlighting that this modern infrastructure is strengthening the foundation of a developed India. He noted that for the first time, over 12 crore rural families have received tap water connections in their homes, underlining that more than 2.5 crore households have been electrified, and those who never imagined cooking on gas stoves have now received gas cylinders. “Even in challenging regions like Ladakh and Siachen, where providing basic facilities is difficult, 4G and 5G mobile connections have now been established, reflecting the nation’s current priorities”, he pointed out. The Prime Minister highlighted advancements in healthcare, noting that institutions like AIIMS were once limited to major cities like Delhi. He announced that AIIMS is now being established in Darbhanga, and the number of medical colleges in the country has nearly doubled in the past decade and mentioned the construction of a new medical college in Jhanjharpur. He emphasized that to ensure quality healthcare in villages, over 1.5 lakh Ayushman Arogya Mandirs have been established across the country, including more than 10,000 in Bihar. He remarked that Jan Aushadhi Kendras have become a significant relief for the poor and middle class, offering medicines at an 80% discount. He noted that Bihar now has over 800 Jan Aushadhi Kendras, saving its people ₹2,000 crore in medical expenses. The Prime Minister highlighted that under the Ayushman Bharat scheme, lakhs of families in Bihar have received free treatment, resulting in savings of thousands of crores of rupees for these families.

    “India is rapidly advancing its connectivity through infrastructure like railways, roads, and airports”, highlighted Shri Modi, noting that metro projects are underway in Patna, and over two dozen cities across the country are now connected with metro facilities. He announced the launch of the ‘Namo Bharat Rapid Rail’ service between Patna and Jaynagar, which will significantly reduce travel time between the two locations, and emphasized that this development will benefit lakhs of people from Samastipur, Darbhanga, Madhubani, and Begusarai.

    The Prime Minister also mentioned the inauguration and launch of multiple new railway lines in Bihar, highlighting the commencement of the modern Amrit Bharat train service between Saharsa and Mumbai, which will greatly benefit the labor families. He remarked that the government is modernizing several railway stations in Bihar, including Madhubani and Jhanjharpur. He emphasized that air connectivity in Mithila and Bihar has improved significantly with Darbhanga Airport, and the expansion of Patna Airport is underway. “These development projects are creating new employment opportunities in Bihar”, he added.

    “Farmers are the backbone of the rural economy, the stronger this backbone, the stronger the villages, and consequently, the nation”, said Shri Modi. He highlighted the persistent challenges of floods in the Mithila and Kosi regions, noting that the government is set to invest ₹11,000 crore to mitigate the impact of floods in Bihar. He said that this investment will facilitate the construction of dams on rivers such as Bagmati, Dhar, Budhi Gandak, and Kosi, adding that canals will be developed, ensuring irrigation arrangements through river water. “This initiative will not only reduce flood-related issues but will also ensure adequate water supply reaches every farmer’s field”, he added.

    “Makhana, a cultural staple of Mithila, has now gained global recognition as a superfood”, highlighted Shri Modi, mentioning that makhana has been granted a GI tag, officially certifying it as a product of this region. He added that the Makhana Research Centre has been accorded national status. He also highlighted the Budget announcement of the Makhana Board, which is expected to transform the fortunes of makhana farmers, emphasising that Bihar’s makhana will now reach international markets as a superfood. He noted that the National Institute of Food Technology and Management is being established in Bihar, which will support the youth in setting up small enterprises related to food processing. He further emphasized that Bihar is making consistent progress in fisheries along with agriculture, highlighting that fishermen now have access to the benefits of the Kisan Credit Card, providing advantages to numerous families involved in fisheries. He remarked that under the PM Matsya Sampada Yojana, projects worth hundreds of crores have been executed in Bihar.

    Expressing deep sorrow over the brutal killing of innocent civilians by terrorists in Pahalgam, Jammu and Kashmir, on April 22, Shri Modi remarked that the entire nation is distressed and stands in solidarity with the grieving families. He assured that every effort is being made by the government to ensure the speedy recovery of those undergoing treatment. He highlighted the profound loss suffered by families, where some lost their sons, brothers, or life partners, noting that the victims came from diverse linguistic and regional backgrounds—some spoke Bengali, Kannada, Marathi, Odia, Gujarati, and some were from Bihar. Underlining that from Kargil to Kanyakumari, the grief and outrage over this attack are shared equally across the nation, Shri Modi remarked that this attack was not just on unarmed tourists but was a brazen assault on the soul of India. “The terrorists responsible for this attack, along with those who conspired it, will face punishment beyond their imagination”, he declared in unequivocal terms, asserting that the time has come to eliminate the remaining strongholds of terrorism. “The willpower of 140 crore Indians will now break the backbone of the perpetrators of terror”, he stressed.

    The Prime Minister declared from the soil of Bihar that India will identify, track, and punish every terrorist, their handlers, and their backers, emphasising that India will pursue them to the ends of the earth. “India’s spirit will never be broken by terrorism and terrorism will not go unpunished. Every effort will be made to ensure justice is served and the entire nation is firm in this resolve against terrorism”, he stressed. He further stated that everyone who believes in humanity stands with India during these times. He expressed his gratitude to the people and leaders of various countries who have supported India in these moments.

    “Peace and security are the most critical prerequisites for rapid development”, said Shri Modi, remarking that a developed Bihar is essential for a developed India. He concluded by highlighting that efforts are being made to ensure development in Bihar and to extend the benefits of progress to every section and every region of the state. He expressed gratitude to everyone for joining the program on the occasion of Panchayati Raj Day.

    The Governor of Bihar, Shri Arif Mohammed Khan, Chief Minister of Bihar, Shri Nitish Kumar, Union Ministers Shri Rajiv Ranjan Singh, Shri Jitan Ram Manji, Shri Giriraj Singh, Shri Chirag Paswan, Shri Nityanand Rai, Shri Ram Nath Thakur, Dr. Raj Bhushan Choudhary were present among other dignitaries at the event.

    Background 

    Prime Minister participated in the National Panchayati Raj Day programme in Madhubani, Bihar. He also presented National Panchayat Awards, recognizing and incentivizing best-performing Panchayats on the occasion. 

    Prime Minister laid the foundation stone of an LPG bottling plant with rail unloading facility at Hathua in Gopalganj District of Bihar worth around Rs 340 crore. This will help in streamlining the supply chain and improving efficiency of bulk LPG transportation.

    Boosting power infrastructure in the region, Prime Minister laid the foundation stone for projects worth over Rs 1,170 crore and also inaugurated multiple projects worth over Rs 5,030 crore in the power sector in Bihar under the Revamped Distribution Sector Scheme. 

    In line with his commitment to boost rail connectivity across the nation, Prime Minister flagged off Amrit Bharat express between Saharsa and Mumbai, Namo Bharat Rapid rail between Jaynagar and Patna and trains between Pipra and Saharsa and Saharsa and Samastipur. He also inaugurated the Supaul Pipra rail line, Hasanpur Bithan Rail line and two 2-lane Rail over bridges at Chapra and Bagaha. He dedicated to the nation the Khagaria-Alauli Rail line. These projects will improve connectivity and lead to overall socio-economic development of the region.

    Prime Minister distributed benefits of around Rs 930 crore under Community Investment Fund to over 2 lakh SHGs from Bihar under Deendayal Antyodaya Yojana – National Rural Livelihoods Mission (DAY- NRLM).

    Prime Minister handed over sanction letters to 15 lakh new beneficiaries of PMAY-Gramin and released instalments to 10 lakh PMAY-G beneficiaries from across the country. He also handed over keys to some beneficiaries marking the Grih Pravesh of 1 lakh PMAY-G and 54,000 PMAY-U houses in Bihar.

     

     

    ***

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    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI Africa: African Mining Week (AMW) to Spotlight Investor Strategies Driving Africa’s Mineral Industrialization

    Source: Africa Press Organisation – English (2) – Report:

    CAPE TOWN, South Africa, April 24, 2025/APO Group/ —

    African Mining Week (AMW) – taking place from October 1–3, 2025, in Cape Town – will connect global investors with high-impact opportunities across Africa’s mining sector, spotlighting the strategies fueling the continent’s mineral industrialization.

    A key highlight of the event will be a high-level panel, The Investor Perspective: Financing Africa’s Mineral Industrialization. The session will explore the evolving investment landscape and examine diverse financing mechanisms – including bank loans, private equity, venture capital and impact investing – that are mobilizing capital into African mining.

    DFIs Drive Infrastructure Investments

    Attracted by strong returns and Africa’s long-term growth potential, development finance institutions (DFIs) are ramping up investments into the continent’s mining infrastructure. In March 2025, the African Development Bank approved a $150 million loan to Mauritania’s state-owned mining company SNIM and committed $500 million to the Lobito Corridor – a strategic railway project linking Angola, the DRC and Zambia to international markets. Meanwhile, the Africa Finance Corporation (AFC) is backing several critical mineral projects, including Nyanza Light Metals’ $780 million PGMs facility in South Africa, Gecamines’ expansion in the DRC, Giyani Metals’ manganese development in Botswana and FG Gold’s project in Sierra Leone. Between 2014 and 2024, AFC invested over $1 billion into Africa’s mining sector. The U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) is also deepening its commitment, providing more than $750 million toward the Lobito Corridor, $34 million for Pensana’s Longonjo rare earths project in Angola and $3.2 million to Chillerton’s green copper development in Zambia.

    Geopolitics and African Prospects

    Geopolitical shifts are intensifying the global race for Africa’s critical minerals, vital for the energy transition and digital economy. From 2019 to 2023, companies from the United Arab Emirates committed over $110 billion to African projects. In early 2025, UAE-based Ambrosia Investment Holding acquired a 50% stake in Allied Gold’s projects in Ethiopia and Mali, investing $375 million to scale up gold production. Canadian mining investment on the continent has now surpassed $37 billion, with companies like Ivanhoe Mines, Fortuna Silver, Pioneer Lithium and Trigon Metals leading expansion efforts. Similarly, Australia’s mining footprint in Africa reached $60 billion in asset value in 2024, supported by firms such as Sovereign Metals, Cazaly Resources and Atlantic Lithium.

    Private Placements

    Private placements are emerging as a preferred capital-raising vehicle for mining ventures across Africa. Companies including Zanaga Iron Ore, Moab Minerals, Global Atomic Corporation, Premier African Minerals and Trigon Metals are leveraging this mechanism to fast-track project development and attract investor interest. As ESG criteria take center stage in investment decision-making, AMW will serve as a platform for financiers and project developers to engage on sustainability metrics, transparency and responsible investing.

    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI Global: What we’ve learnt about lone-actor terrorism over the years could help us prevent future attacks

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Diego Muro, Senior Lecturer in International Relations, University of St Andrews

    Politically motivated attacks, carried out by lone individuals lacking direct affiliation with any terrorist group, have become more common in Europe during the last few decades.

    One of the most common and devastating forms of lone-actor violence involves driving into crowds. In 2016, Mohamed Lahouaiej-Bouhlel used this method to kill 86 people in Nice. In 2011, Anders Breivik detonated a bomb in central Oslo before carrying out a mass shooting on the island of Utøya, leaving 77 dead. Not all lone-actor attacks are as deadly or indiscriminate as these. Some target specific people, as seen in the assassinations of German politician Walter Lübcke in 2019 and British MP David Amess in 2021.

    Lone-actor terrorism – also known as lone-wolf terrorism – poses a unique challenge for European states. Traditional counterterrorism tools designed for organised groups like al-Qaeda, Islamic State, or Eta are far less effective against people acting alone. While lone-actor plots are typically less complex, they can still cause significant harm.

    We’ve also seen that lone-actor attacks can trigger far-reaching ripple effects. The resulting public outrage can intensify debates on contentious issues like immigration, and ultimately boost support for extremist parties.

    Copycat or reactionary attacks are another consequence of lone-actor terrorism. A striking example is the mass shootings carried out by Brenton Tarrant in New Zealand in 2019. He cited the actions of Breivik and others as direct inspiration. According to Tarrant’s own manifesto, a key trigger for his radicalisation was the 2017 Islamist attack in Stockholm, where Rakhmat Akilov, an asylum seeker from Uzbekistan, drove a truck into a crowd, killing five people, including an 11-year-old child.

    Why lone-actor attacks are so difficult to prevent

    Because lone actors operate independently and rarely communicate their intentions, their identities often remain unknown until after an attack. Their goals and ideologies are frequently ambiguous, making it hard to predict behaviour or select likely targets. Even correctly identifying an incident as lone-actor terrorism can be challenging.

    The case of Axel Rudakubana illustrates this difficulty. Rudakubana killed three young girls in Southport, northern England, in 2024 after breaking into their Taylor Swift-themed dance workshop. Despite the discovery of an Al-Qaeda training manual in his possession, prosecutors found no substantial evidence of political motivation and labelled the incident a “mass killing” rather than terrorism.

    It is very difficult – if not impossible – to determine the exact number of lone-actor terrorist attacks that have taken place in Europe with certainty. The absence of a universally accepted definition of terrorism is part of the problem. It’s also possible that acts of mass violence are being classified as terrorism when they are actually ideologically neutral. Equally, it can be difficult to determine whether an actor truly acted alone, especially in an age of internet radicalisation.

    What is clear is that independent terrorist attacks became more frequent in the early 2010s. By 2013, such incidents spiked, with Europe seeing six to seven Islamist and far-right attacks per year (up from fewer than one annually before 2010). These figures refer strictly to cases where perpetrators acted independently, excluding those with evidence of external support. For example, Anis Amri’s 2016 truck attack in Berlin and Taimour al-Abdaly’s 2010 suicide attempt in Stockholm were initially seen as lone-actor events, but later investigations revealed ties to Islamist cells.

    Lone-actor terrorism appears less common among far-left and ethno-nationalist groups, though exceptions do exist.

    Lone-actor terrorist attacks in Europe

    Lone-actor attacks in the 2010s.
    D muro, O Craciunas, CC BY-ND

    This shift towards lone-actor attacks is likely a result of evolving counterterrorism strategies implemented after major attacks like the 2004 Madrid train bombings and the 2005 London bombings. It became harder to carry out large-scale plots so groups like Al-Qaeda and later Islamic State switched to encouraging or organising attacks by loosely affiliated individuals acting independently but on their behalf.

    The struggle between terrorist groups and governments is one of constant adaptation. By 2018, Europol data indicated that all the Islamist attacks that had been seen through to completion in Europe during that year had been carried out by lone actors.

    Lone-actor attacks have an even longer history within far-right terrorism. The term “lone-wolf terrorist” was first popularised in American white supremacist propaganda in the early 1990s – well before the more neutral term “lone-actor terrorist” was adopted by researchers. As counterterrorism efforts increasingly targeted white supremacist groups, many within the movement came to see independent action as the most effective way to evade detection and maintain operational secrecy.

    Addressing the threat

    Fortunately, we now understand more about lone-actor crimes. We’ve come to understand that these attacks stem from complex psychological and environmental factors.

    While perpetrators shouldn’t be dismissed as simply “crazy,” mental health can play a role in radicalisation, especially when combined with personal grievances, failed aspirations, and perceived injustices. Influences from family, peers and online spaces also shape this process. While no two radicalisation pathways are identical, certain patterns can be observed – and recognising them early may help reduce the threat.

    The idea of “self-radicalisation” also merits caution. Lone actors rarely radicalise in isolation; their manifestos often echo broader ideological themes, shaped by conspiracy theories or charismatic figures. These actors often assign symbolic meaning to their actions. Raising awareness of the impact of violent public discourse is key – though this must be done without infringing on free speech. History shows that providing “pressure valves” for controversial ideas is more constructive than censorship.

    Lone-actor attacks are, in part, difficult to prevent precisely because they are not a systemic threat in the way that coordinated, group-based terrorism can be. Its danger lies in isolated bursts of violence rather than in sustained campaigns. But there are patterns worth following that could help prevent future incidents.

    The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. What we’ve learnt about lone-actor terrorism over the years could help us prevent future attacks – https://theconversation.com/what-weve-learnt-about-lone-actor-terrorism-over-the-years-could-help-us-prevent-future-attacks-254137

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-Evening Report: Preference deals can decide the outcome of a seat in an election – but not always

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Adrian Beaumont, Election Analyst (Psephologist) at The Conversation; and Honorary Associate, School of Mathematics and Statistics, The University of Melbourne

    Every election cycle the media becomes infatuated, even if temporarily, with preference deals between parties. The 2025 election is no exception, with many media reports about preference “deals” being made.

    However, it is important to remember that voters are not required to follow the how to vote cards of the parties they vote for, and only major party voters have a significant percentage who follow the cards.

    Other than the Greens and One Nation, minor parties lack resources to put people at every polling place who will give voters how to vote cards. As a result, how to vote follow rates for most minor parties are low.

    At the 2022 Victorian state election, for example, seven seats had preferences for all voters data entered into a computer system. The Poll Bludger said Sunday that in these seven seats, about 30% of Labor voters exactly followed their party’s how to vote card.

    In seats where the Liberals were making an effort by staffing polling places, over 50% of their voters followed the card. But in Preston, a Labor vs Greens contest, only 29% of Liberals followed the card.

    The major parties will usually be the final two candidates in a seat, so their preferences are not distributed.

    Despite all this, there may be political consequences of preference recommendations.

    At this election, Labor is recommending preferences to the Greens ahead of the Coalition in all seats except in the Victorian Labor-held seat of Macnamara (an “open” ticket without a recommendation between the Greens and Liberals owing to concerns about the Jewish vote in that seat).

    The Coalition is recommending preferences to One Nation ahead of anyone else in 139 of the 147 seats One Nation is contesting.

    Recommending preferences to the Greens may make Labor seem too left-wing to some voters, and recommending preferences to One Nation may make the Coalition seem too right-wing and pro-Trump. One Nation will recommend preferences to the Coalition ahead of Labor in all seats it contests, the same recommendation they used in 2022.

    The Poll Bludger said the Greens will be recommending preferences to Labor in all seats at this election. Occasionally, the Greens issue open tickets. The difference is worth about 5% of the Greens vote, so if the Greens had 10% in a seat, Labor’s two-party vote would be 0.5 points higher with a Greens recommendation to preference Labor than otherwise.

    Trumpet of Patriots will put the incumbent party last in seats they contest. The Poll Bludger said Clive Palmer’s previous United Australia Party did this in 2022. But in 2022, Labor had a higher share of UAP preferences in seats it held than in Coalition-held seats, the opposite of what would be expected if these recommendations had made a difference.

    Trumpet of Patriots is only getting 1% or 2% in current national polls, so their how to vote preference recommendations are not worth worrying about.

    In 2022, Greens preferences (that is, voters who put the Greens as 1 on their House of Representatives ballot) went to Labor over the Coalition by 86–14. One Nation preferences went to the Coalition over Labor by 64–36. These figures are national, and use the Labor vs Coalition two-party count in seats where one major party missed the final two.

    Both the Greens and One Nation are using the same preference recommendations between Labor and the Coalition as in 2022, so their voters’ preferences won’t change because of recommendations.

    Seat-specific recommendations

    The Liberals are recommending preferences to teal independent Kate Hullett in the Western Australian Labor-held seat of Fremantle, after they put her behind Labor in the WA state seat of Fremantle at the March 8 state election. This will increase Hullett’s chance of defeating Labor.

    If the final two in Macnamara are the Greens and the Liberals, The Poll Bludger said Labor’s decision to issue an open ticket will give the Liberals about 2% of the 10% swing they would need to gain Macnamara.

    The Liberals will recommend preferences to Labor in the Tasmanian Labor-held seat of Franklin ahead of an anti-salmon farming independent. They will also recommend preferences to Labor ahead of Muslim Vote-backed independents in the NSW Labor-held seats of Watson and Blaxland. These recommendations will make it difficult for any of these three independents.

    Adrian Beaumont does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Preference deals can decide the outcome of a seat in an election – but not always – https://theconversation.com/preference-deals-can-decide-the-outcome-of-a-seat-in-an-election-but-not-always-255005

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-OSI Russia: A beach recreation area has been created at Pionersky Pond in Gorky Park

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: Moscow Government – Government of Moscow –

    A beach recreation area has been created on the bank of the Pionersky Pond in the Maxim Gorky Central Park of Culture and Leisure. This season, you can swim and sunbathe here.

    “This summer season, you can swim and sunbathe on Pionersky Pond. Despite its relatively small area, you can swim here, splash around in the water with your children, and sunbathe on comfortable loungers and deck chairs,” said the deputy head of the capital’s Department of Capital Repairs

    Sergey Dunaev.

    Gorky Park is one of the most popular in the capital. It is located in the very center of the city, combining natural areas, historical heritage and modern public spaces. Over time, Muscovites’ ideas about quality recreation have changed, so there was a need to create new infrastructure and expand the existing functionality of the park.

    One of the objects of improvement and rehabilitation was the Pioneer Pond. It appeared in the 19th century during the arrangement of the garden of the bourgeois school, which owned this territory. At that time, the pond was called Small. Actor Mikhail Chekhov fished here and singer Fyodor Shalyapin skated here.

    During the Soviet era, the pond was called Pionersky. In this picturesque place, you could go boating or feed the ducks. However, the pond was unsuitable for swimming. It was decided to change this and create a new beach recreation area literally two steps from the Garden Ring.

    The specialists cleared the bottom of silt and debris in the amount of 3.7 thousand cubic meters, and then arranged a sandy pond bed and a beach area with gentle slopes to the water. They restored more than 620 meters of the coastline. To make swimming not only pleasant but also safe, they equipped a mobile point for complex water purification with a bottom outlet.

    Along the shore, decking was installed. For this purpose, a metal frame with a decking covering of almost 4.6 thousand square meters was mounted on piles. Various chairs, chaise lounges and sun loungers for relaxation and sunbathing were placed on the decking. Benches and urns were also installed around the pond. In total, 356 small architectural forms appeared.

    Four pavilions were erected near the pond, which will house changing rooms, showers, toilets, a beach equipment rental point, administration offices and a cozy café with a terrace.

    In the sunbathing areas, wooden pergolas in pastel green were placed. Their contours resemble the arch of the main entrance with a central part and semicircular wings extending from it – circumferences.

    You can walk around the pond in cool weather, when the swimming season has not yet opened or has already ended. For this purpose, sidewalks made of concrete tiles with an area of 3.4 thousand square meters were made. The space is illuminated by 55 lanterns, made in a modern design, with energy-saving lamps.

    For the safety of vacationers, lifeguard towers were installed, an alert system and 25 CCTV cameras were mounted. The area around the pond was landscaped: almost 6.5 thousand square meters of lawn were laid out, more than 30 linden trees, maples and about 500 bushes were planted.

    About a thousand safety signs will be replaced on Moscow reservoirs

    A playground with a slide, a climbing frame, swings and an obstacle course was set up near the pond. A small recreation area with a pergola, comfortable chairs and tables was placed nearby. Parents will be able to sit there and watch their children play.

    Get the latest news quicklyofficial telegram channel the city of Moscow.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    Please Note; This Information is Raw Content Directly from the Information Source. It is access to What the Source Is Stating and Does Not Reflect

    https: //vv.mos.ru/nevs/ite/153103073/

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-Evening Report: Why AUKUS remains the right strategy for the future defence of Australia

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Jennifer Parker, Adjunct Fellow, Naval Studies at UNSW Canberra, and Expert Associate, National Security College, Australian National University

    Australian strategic thinking has long struggled to move beyond a narrow view of defence that focuses solely on protecting our shores. However, in today’s world, our economy could be crippled without an enemy boot stepping foot on Australian soil.

    Australia’s acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines through AUKUS marks a shift in this mindset.

    It is not a strategy in itself, but a structural pivot: a recognition that our vital interests lie far beyond the coastline, and that defending them requires Australia to project its maritime power.

    Protecting our vital sea lanes

    Over a century ago, US naval officer Alfred Thayer Mahan observed that “wars are won by the economic strangulation of the enemy from the sea”.

    While not universally true, this maxim is directly relevant to an island nation like Australia – 99% of our international trade moves by sea.

    But not just any trade – our critical supplies of fuel, fertiliser and ammunition all come by sea. Australia’s economy and defences would be crippled if these things were stopped at sea.

    These vulnerabilities are compounded by our growing dependence on undersea cables for communications.

    Strategic concepts that rely on making Australia’s territory a hard target, such as the “strategic defensive”, fail to grapple with this reality, perpetuating a flawed understanding of how to defend Australia.

    Viewing Australia’s interests solely through the lens of avoiding or defeating a territorial attack overlooks the reality that an adversary could cripple the nation far more easily through the maritime, space or cyber domains.

    The ability to project power in the seas and oceans far from Australia’s shores is critical to protecting these seaborne supply lines and sustaining the national economy. This is where AUKUS comes in – the endurance and range of nuclear-powered submarines are a key element.

    Developing a future maritime strategy

    Australia’s future nuclear-powered submarines would make adversary naval task groups vulnerable if they threatened our maritime trade routes.

    Much more is needed, however, to deliver a coherent maritime strategy. This includes:

    • expanding our surface combatant fleet

    • addressing the vulnerability of Australia’s limited number of resupply, mine warfare and hydrographic vessels

    • and resolving longstanding issues around our strategic fleet (commercial ships that could be requisitioned in a time of crisis).

    We must also expand our flagged merchant shipping fleet by reforming the Australian International Shipping Register. And we must strengthen our domestic maritime security through the establishment of a national coastguard.

    But AUKUS, as the centrepiece of our future undersea capability, is a good start.

    AUKUS’ critics

    AUKUS has attracted plenty of criticism — particularly following the new Trump administration’s moves away from the US’ traditional allies in Europe.

    Yet, despite claims the three-phase AUKUS submarine plan is failing, it remains remarkably on track.

    Like any complex defence acquisition, it carries risks. These risks include the continued political will to keep the deal on track, as well as the workforce, delivery schedule and cost pressures that come with building the submarines.

    But the relevant question is not whether risks exist — if that were the test, most defence programs wouldn’t proceed. The question is whether the risks around AUKUS are being effectively mitigated.

    And as the three phases of the AUKUS deal progress, these risks will continue to evolve. Australia must remain focussed on addressing them.

    Political will is firm

    The political risk has been most salient recently, given the Trump administration’s actions on Europe, Ukraine, foreign aid and tariffs. But while these disruptions are significant, they were largely foreshadowed.

    By contrast, the political signals coming out of Washington around AUKUS have been overwhelmingly positive. This is because AUKUS is in the US’ strategic interests as much as it is in Australia’s interests.

    Importantly, the political commitment to AUKUS in Canberra, Washington and London has already been demonstrated.

    The “optimal pathway” to guide the agreement into the 2030s was signed within 18 months of AUKUS’ launch in September 2021. And the AUKUS treaty that enables the US and UK to transfer nuclear submarine technology and equipment to Australia has since been signed and entered into force among all three partners.

    In Australia, bipartisan support has held for over three years, with no sign of weakening.

    Australia’s importance to the US

    Many critics have also focused on the risks posed by the US submarine industrial base and its ability to build nuclear-powered submarines quickly enough.

    The US would need to increase its production rate to two Virginia-class submarines per year by 2028 – and subsequently to 2.33 submarines per year – in order to reach the target US fleet of 66 submarines by 2054.

    But this does not preclude the sale of three Virginia-class submarines to Australia in the early 2030s. Australia is not just a recipient of submarines from the US — it will help enable the US’ undersea operations in the region.

    Our role as a rotational hub for US submarines and the longstanding support we can offer the US fleet through facilities such as the Harold E. Holt submarine communications station makes our contribution far more valuable than the notional loss of three submarines on paper.

    Could this change in the future? Like all international arrangements, of course it could. But there is no indication at present that it will.

    The defence of Australia is not simply about protecting our continent from attack — it is about safeguarding vital national interests. For an island nation, that means securing maritime trade routes and undersea infrastructure.

    Even for those concerned about the extremely unlikely prospect of invasion, a robust maritime strategy also enables threats to be defeated well before they reach our shores.

    Through its emphasis on maritime power projection, AUKUS reflects a fundamental shift in how we think about defending Australia in the decades ahead.


    This is the final part of a series on the future of defence in Australia. Read the other stories here.

    Jennifer Parker is a 20-year veteran of the Royal Australian Navy.

    ref. Why AUKUS remains the right strategy for the future defence of Australia – https://theconversation.com/why-aukus-remains-the-right-strategy-for-the-future-defence-of-australia-254985

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-OSI Australia: Police road safety presence remains over ANZAC Day long weekend

    Source: New South Wales – News

    South Australia Police will continue road safety action into the ANZAC Day long weekend following hundreds of road safety offences over the Easter long weekend.

    Officer in Charge of Traffic Services Branch, Superintendent Shane Johnson said unfortunately one life was lost on Thursday, 10 people were seriously injured and whilst overall detections were slightly lower, many drivers still made unsafe choices.

    “Overall, it is pleasing to see fewer detections across the Fatal Five categories this year, however speeding remains an issue, with 925 detections,” Superintendent Johnson said.

    “When you’re driving this long weekend, keep an eye on your speed, it’s easy to creep over the speed limit if you get complacent.”

    Operation Safe Long Weekend was conducted state-wide from Thursday 17 to Monday 21 April, returning road safety offences including:

    • 78 Drink driving
    • 81 Drug driving
    • 925 Speeding
    • 28 Distraction
    • 303 Dangerous driving
    • 24 Seatbelt

    An incident of note involved a 31-year-old Two Wells man who was detected drug driving, travelling at 156km/h in a 110km/h speed zone and driving unlicenced on Thursday 17 April. He was issued with a six-month Immediate Loss of Licence and expiations for driving whilst unlicensed and at excessive speed. Depending on forensic analysis of the drug test, he may be summonsed to court.

    “Police will continue to deliver a strong presence throughout the ANZAC Day long weekend with two operations running to ensure the safety of all road users,” Superintendent Johnson added.

    Operation Safe Long Weekend will target the Fatal Five road safety offences categories while Operation Stop Drink Drug Drive will see RBTs and drug testing stations active state-wide from Thursday 25 to Sunday 27 April.

    “Although there will be stationary random breath testing sites around the state, remember every police car has this equipment so stop yourself before we stop you.”

    MIL OSI News

  • MIL-OSI New Zealand: Ill-prepared trip leads to Mount Taranaki rescue

    Source: New Zealand Police (National News)

    Attributable to Detective Gerhard Jacobs, SAR Incident Controller:

    A family walking on Mt Taranaki who were underprepared for the conditions is prompting a reminder from Police to those heading out this long weekend.

    Police received a call about 6:30pm last night reporting that a man and two children were overdue returning from the Pouakai Range.

    Police Search and Rescue were engaged, as were Land Search and Rescue volunteers, and a Department of Conservation volunteer.

    The family were unfamiliar with the area, and underprepared for the cold conditions.

    LandSAR volunteers walked four hours through near-freezing temperatures and 50km/h winds, to then escort the family out and to safety.

    The trio were all eventually out by around midnight.

    Police would like to remind people walking in the outdoors – particularly on the unforgiving Mt Taranaki – that preparation is key, and to know your limits.

    In this instance last night, the family had changed their plans without informing anyone, and the man had just 5 per cent battery on his phone as emergency services were attempting to gain their location by it via GPS.

    Fortunately, the group made it out safely, however the outcome could have been very different.

    This is a reminder to please always take two forms of communication with you when in and around Mt Taranaki, and be prepared to stay out overnight should you be caught out.

    If you get into trouble, please call 111 as soon as possible, as this will enable an emergency response at the earliest opportunity.

    Police would like to thank Taranaki LandSAR, and the Department of Conservation, for their dedication and response last night in tough conditions.

    ENDS

    Issued by the Police Media Team

    MIL OSI New Zealand News

  • MIL-Evening Report: The ocean can look deceptively calm – until it isn’t. Here’s what ‘hazardous surf’ really means

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Samuel Cornell, PhD Candidate, Beach Safety Research Group, School of Population Health, UNSW Sydney

    Over the Easter weekend, seven people drowned along the Australian coast. Most were swept off rock platforms – extremely dangerous locations that are increasingly prevalent in Australia’s coastal fatality data.

    The weather was unseasonably warm, the surf at times looking calm and at others foreboding. And yet, despite warnings from Surf Life Saving, emergency services and meteorologists, many still entered the water – often unaware of how deceptively dangerous the conditions could be.

    It was a tragic reminder that many people don’t understand ocean conditions and how waves and swells work. Current water safety warnings aren’t doing enough to change behaviour – but with simple improvements and better education around long-period swells, we could save lives.

    The difference between waves and swells

    Waves on the ocean are caused by wind. Some, called sea waves, are generated by nearby winds. Others, known as swell waves, are created by distant weather systems, such as storms far away, and travel long distances.

    Swells can travel thousands of kilometres and may still be present even if the local wind is calm. It’s estimated that up to 75% of wave action across the globe is caused by distant storms, not local winds. This makes the predicting of swells and waves a complex science.

    A long-period swell refers to waves that arrive at longer intervals, typically 12 to 20 seconds apart. These swells carry more energy than short-period ones, travel greater distances, and tend to produce sets of larger waves when they hit the coast.

    Long-period swells can result in sudden large waves that crash into the beach with more energy.
    Sneaky Buddy/Shutterstock

    What makes long-period swells so dangerous?

    Over Easter, hazardous long-period swells generated by an ex-cyclone offshore were hitting much of the east coast. The Bureau of Meteorology issued warnings, and Surf Life Saving reinforced these messages with media alerts and beach closures.

    But the surf didn’t always look threatening – at least not all of the time.

    The misleading nature of long-period swells is part of the problem. They create deceptively calm periods, and lulls between these wave sets can last ten or 15 minutes. During that time, people feel safe entering the water, wading out, going onto a rock platform or relaxing near the shoreline.

    When the next set arrives, it can be unexpected and forceful – knocking people over, pulling them into the water or creating unexpected currents.

    Unlike short-period waves, long-period swells carry momentum that enables them to surge much further up beaches and rock platforms, increasing the chances of sweeping people into the water. When these waves break, they do so with considerable force, and the powerful backwash can drag people into deep water.

    The sudden arrival of these waves, without a gradual buildup, makes them especially dangerous in exposed areas like rock shelves or platforms.

    Rock platforms are dangerous because of a combination of environmental exposure and low visibility in our approach to coastal safety. They’re often exposed to powerful waves, have uneven, slippery surfaces, and lack easy exit points.

    If someone is knocked into the water, there’s usually nothing to hold onto, and climbing back up is almost impossible – especially in heavy clothing or fishing gear.

    Why current warnings don’t cut through

    Australians may be familiar with fire danger ratings, cyclone warnings and the UV index.

    But the way we communicate surf risk – particularly around swell behaviour – is vague and technical. Phrases like “hazardous surf” or “long-period swell” are accurate, but fail to convey what people will actually experience at the shoreline.

    Most members of the public don’t know what a 16-second swell interval means, or how it affects where and how waves break. As a result, warnings go unnoticed, or people believe they can assess the risk themselves by looking at the water – which, during a lull, can seem completely harmless.

    Social media compounds this problem. Over Easter, videos of huge waves circulated widely, but so did footage of people playing or standing near the water with no apparent concern. The public sees mixed signals – and the science and warnings don’t always cut through.

    How to improve coastal hazard communication

    If we want to reduce coastal deaths during swell events, we need to bridge the gap between forecasts and real-world understanding.

    1. Translate forecasts into direct, behavioural warnings

    Instead of just saying “hazardous surf”, add language that explains what that means: “Conditions may appear calm, but large sets of waves will arrive every 10–15 minutes. Stay well back from the waterline”.

    2. Use visual risk systems

    Just like fire danger ratings, a colour-coded coastal risk index could be introduced for days when swell conditions are particularly hazardous. Simple signage at beaches could indicate the risk level and explain the reason for it.

    3. Integrate live updates at key sites

    SMS alerts or digital signage at car parks and entry points could provide real-time hazard updates. These should be visual and multilingual to reach a broader audience.

    4. Make ocean science public knowledge

    Government campaigns, surf clubs and schools should all help explain the basics of swell behaviour – including what long-period swell is, why wave sets arrive and why calm periods aren’t always safe. Just like “swim between the flags” became a known rule, so, too, should basic awareness of wave cycles. Surfers could be champions of this education.

    The conditions that contributed to the Easter drownings were forecast, monitored and forewarned. But most people don’t make decisions based on marine forecasts – they make them based on what they see in front of them.

    Long-period swell is a classic hidden hazard. It tricks even experienced beach goers, not because the science is unclear, but because the risk isn’t made clear to the public.

    Samuel Cornell receives funding from Meta Platforms, Inc. His research is supported by a University of New South Wales Sydney, University Postgraduate Award. His research is supported by Royal Life Saving Society – Australia to aid in the prevention of drowning. Research at Royal Life Saving Society – Australia is supported by the Australian government. He has been affiliated with Surf Life Saving Australia and Surf Life Saving NSW in a paid and voluntary capacity.

    ref. The ocean can look deceptively calm – until it isn’t. Here’s what ‘hazardous surf’ really means – https://theconversation.com/the-ocean-can-look-deceptively-calm-until-it-isnt-heres-what-hazardous-surf-really-means-255011

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-OSI China: Agricultural trade between China and ASEAN countries strengthened

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    Agricultural trade between China and ASEAN countries strengthened

    Updated: April 24, 2025 09:12 Xinhua
    A staff member checks imported seafood at Dongxing port in Dongxing, south China’s Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, March 18, 2025. Over the years, along with the deepening of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the development of the New International Land-Sea Trade Corridor, the export and import of agricultural products between China and Southeast Asia countries have been continuously strengthened. Agricultural products from both sides won great popularity among buyers. [Photo/Xinhua]
    An aerial drone photo taken on March 18, 2025 shows trucks loaded with agricultural products from China and ASEAN countries waiting for customs clearance at Dongxing port in Dongxing, south China’s Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region. [Photo/Xinhua]
    Villagers pack tangerines for export in Baohe Village of Changshou District, southwest China’s Chongqing Municipality, March 24, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]
    Staff members process imported shrimp at a food company in southwest China’s Chongqing Municipality, April 19, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]
    An aerial drone photo taken on March 21, 2025 shows trucks loaded with agricultural products from China and ASEAN countries at the port of the Friendship Pass in Pingxiang, south China’s Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region. [Photo/Xinhua]
    Customs officers inspect imported fruits at the port of the Friendship Pass in Pingxiang, south China’s Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, March 21, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]
    A customer purchases imported fruits at a market near the Dongxing port in Dongxing, south China’s Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, April 17, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]
    Staff members check fresh young coconuts imported from Thailand at a fruit company at Chongqing International Logistics Hub Park in southwest China’s Chongqing Municipality, April 19, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]
    A villager carries newly-picked tangerines for export in Heyan Village of Changshou District, southwest China’s Chongqing Municipality, March 24, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]
    A staff member labels selected lemons for export to Vietnam at a fruit company in southwest China’s Chongqing Municipality, April 14, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]
    Staff members process imported shrimp at a food company in southwest China’s Chongqing Municipality, April 19, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]
    A staff member loads packed lemons for export onto a truck at a fruit company in southwest China’s Chongqing Municipality, April 14, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]
    An aerial drone photo taken on March 21, 2025 shows trucks loaded with fruits from ASEAN countries waiting for customs clearance at the port of the Friendship Pass in Pingxiang, south China’s Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region. [Photo/Xinhua]

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-OSI Australia: Motorcycle seized after learner rider caught at 166km/h

    Source: New South Wales Community and Justice

    Motorcycle seized after learner rider caught at 166km/h

    Thursday, 24 April 2025 – 9:44 am.

    A learner motorcycle rider will appear in court for dangerous driving and other offences, after being caught speeding on the Bass Highway yesterday.
    The 23-year-old Devonport man was detected travelling at 166km/h near Paramatta Creek about 5pm.
    Inspector Adam Spencer said as a learner license holder, the man is legally limited to 80km/h.
    “To ride at more than double the learner speed limit is reckless and unacceptable,” he said.
    “Western road police have confiscated the man’s motorcycle, and he will appear in court at a later date.”
    “This kind of behaviour puts the lives of not only the rider but also other road users at extreme risk.”
    “The decision to travel at such a dangerous speed could have led to devastating consequences, fortunately, our officers were proactively on the lookout for this type of behaviour.”
    “While the Easter holiday period is over, Tasmania Police will remain proactive in keeping our roads safe.”
    “We will not tolerate the minority or road users who disregard road rules and jeopardise the safety of others.”
    “Our focus is firmly on protecting all road users and preventing tragedies on Tasmanian roads.”
    Anyone with dash-cam footage or relevant information about a black Yamaha YZF motorcycle travelling westbound on the Bass Highway from Launceston to Sassafras between 4pm and 5pm on Wednesday, 23 April is asked to contact police on 131 444.
    Information can also be provided to Crime Stoppers Tasmania at crimestopperstas.com.au

    MIL OSI News

  • MIL-OSI USA: I-5 fish passage project construction begins Wednesday, April 30, south of Bellingham

    Source: Washington State News 2

    Project will remove 17 barriers along Friday, Lake and Chuckanut creeks 

    BELLINGHAM – A three-year project to remove 17 barriers to fish migration along a 6-mile stretch of Interstate 5 in Skagit and Whatcom Counties will begin construction Wednesday, April 30. 

    Contractor crews working on behalf of the Washington State Department of Transportation will begin overnight work on I-5 south of Bellingham at 8 p.m. Wednesday, April 30.

    Construction is expected to last until 2027, as crews will remove 17 barriers and replace them with 10 new structures that will allow fish to swim freely beneath I-5 and adjacent Whatcom and Skagit county roads near Lake Samish. This work will improve stream connectivity along Lake Creek, Chuckanut Creek and unnamed tributaries to Friday Creek and Lake Creek.

    What to expect

    From April through October 2025, construction will occur at Lake Creek near the north end of Lake Samish. During this time, travelers should expect to see:

    • Nighttime single-lane closures on I-5 from 8 p.m. to 5 a.m., starting Wednesday, April 30, through early June.
    • Temporary two-lane bypass roads used for northbound and southbound I-5 traffic during the summer.
    • Occasional nighttime rolling slowdowns, where traffic is briefly held or slowed to create a safe work zone ahead.

    Later in 2025, construction may occur at the unnamed tributaries to Friday Creek near Alger. More information will be shared once the schedule is finalized.

    Temporary bypass roads

    In 2025, bypass roads will be built to divert northbound and southbound I-5 traffic around the Lake Creek work zone (milepost 245). An advisory speed reduction will be set once traffic is shifted to the bypass roads. 

    Restoring fish habitat

    This project is part of WSDOT’s efforts to improve fish passage under state highways. 2013 federal court injunction requires the state to significantly increase its efforts to remove state-owned culverts that block salmon, bull trout and steelhead habitats.

    People can find real-time updates by visiting the Friday, Lake and Chuckanut Creeks Online Open House and the WSDOT Travel Map.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Rep. Mike Levin Reintroduces Legislation to Ban Drilling Off of Southern California

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Representative Mike Levin (CA-49)

    April 22, 2025

    Washington, D.C. – Today, Rep. Mike Levin (CA-49) reintroduced the Southern California Coast and Ocean Protection Act, which would prohibit offshore drilling along the Southern California coast, as a part of a larger initiative to ban offshore drilling in sensitive areas and protect our vibrant coastal communities.

    Rep. Levin’s bill, The Southern California Coast and Ocean Protection Act, would prevent new leasing for the exploration, development, or production of oil or natural gas along the Southern California coast, from San Diego to the northern border of San Luis Obispo County.

    Rep. Levin introduced this bill along with:

    • Rep. Huffman’s (D-CA) West Coast Ocean Protection Act
    • Rep. Pallone’s (D-NJ) Clean Ocean and Safe Tourism (COAST) Anti-Drilling Act
    • Rep. Castor’s (D-FL) Florida Coast Protection Act
    • Rep. Carbajal’s (D-CA) California Clean Coast Act
    • Rep. Panetta’s (D-CA) Central Coast of California Conservation Act of 2025
    • Rep. Magaziner’s (D-RI) New England Coastal Protection Act of 2025
    • Rep. Ross’ (D-NC) Defend our Coast Act

    These bills would prohibit the Secretary of the Interior from issuing any oil and gas lease leases or any other authorizations along the entire coast of California and in other coastal areas across the country. Together, these bills will protect valuable ecosystems and the economic viability of communities concerned about oil spills.

    “I’m joining my colleagues to permanently protect our beautiful coasts and put a stop to offshore drilling in sensitive areas,” said Rep. Mike Levin. “These bills take a vitally important step in protecting our communities from the consequences of offshore drilling, especially as the Trump Administration attempts to unleash drilling on our coastline in San Diego and Orange County. The Administration wants to risk disastrous environmental impacts on our beaches, threatening our coastal economy and way of life to line the pockets of oil executives. I’m proud to join my colleagues in the California Delegation and across the country in taking a stand against offshore drilling nationwide.”

    Rep. Levin has advocated extensively for a ban on offshore drilling. In November 2024, Rep. Levin sent a letter to the Biden Administration that resulted in the withdrawal of future oil and natural gas leasing in sensitive coastal areas across the country, including in Southern California. In January 2025, the Trump Administration once again opened these areas to drilling and has taken measures to expand offshore drilling and roll back environmental regulations
                              

    “The Southern California Coast and Ocean Protection Act will protect our environment, economy, climate, and way of life from the harmful effects of offshore oil and gas development. The 2021 Amplify Energy Oil Spill off Orange County showed the damage that offshore drilling can inflict on coastal ecosystems and marine wildlife and triggered beach and fishery closures that disrupted southern California’s tourism-based economy. The Surfrider Foundation urges members of Congress to support these and other bills to permanently prohibit new offshore drilling in U.S. waters,” said Pete Stauffer, Ocean Protection Manager, Surfrider Foundation.

    “Southern California’s coastal communities depend on thriving oceans and wildlife, and they know all too well the devastating costs of offshore spills, busted pipelines, and oil-covered beaches,” said Joseph Gordon, Oceana Campaign Director. “Oceana commends Congressman Levin for reintroducing this important legislation that would permanently protect the Golden State’s beloved southern coast from the dangers of oil and gas drilling and spilling. This bill is part of a state and national movement to safeguard our multi-billion-dollar coastal economies from dirty and dangerous offshore drilling.” 

    “The Surf Industry Members Association is proud to support the Southern California Coast and Ocean Protection Act. Our coastline is not just a vital economic engine—it’s the heart of our culture and way of life for millions across the region. Prohibiting new offshore oil and gas leasing in Southern California is a critical step to protect our waves, our marine ecosystems, and the communities that depend on them. We urge Congress to pass it to ensure a clean, thriving ocean for generations to come,” said Vipe Desai, Executive Director, Surf Industry Members Association

    “This administration is determined to sell off our oceans to pad Big Oil pockets. Permanently protecting the waters off southern California puts coastal communities and wildlife above polluters and brings us closer to a world where our waters are free from oil spills, endangered whale populations are free from seismic blasting, and ecosystems have a chance to thrive,” said Taryn Kiekow Heimer, Director of Ocean Energy at NRDC (Natural Resources Defense Council).  “Now more than ever, we need leadership from Congress to set us back on track to tackle climate change and protect our ocean from an industry that only cares about its bottom line.”

    This legislation is endorsed by organizations including: Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), Earthjustice, Oceana, Sierra Club, Surfrider Foundation, League of Conservation Voters, Futureswell, Ocean Conservancy, Environment America, WILDCOAST, Surf Industry Members Association, Food & Water Watch, Peace Boat US, Defenders of Wildlife, Ocean Defense Initiative, Center for Biological Diversity, The Ocean Project, Business Alliance to Protect the Pacific Coast, Animal Welfare Institute, U.S. Climate Action Network, American Bird Conservancy, Hispanic Access Foundation

    ###

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Wyden, Merkley Co-Sponsor Bills to Permanently Protect the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans from Offshore Drilling

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator Ron Wyden (D-Ore)

    April 23, 2025

    Wyden co-sponsors additional Merkley-led bill to protect the Arctic Ocean

    Washington, D.C. —U.S. Senators Ron Wyden and Jeff Merkley today announced they are co-sponsoring two bills that would permanently protect the Pacific and Atlantic oceans from the environmental and economic costs of fossil fuel drilling off our coastal shores. Merkley also led a bill to prohibit drilling in the Arctic, which Wyden also co-sponsored.  

    “The U.S. simply does not need to drill in the coastal waters of the Pacific. We have more than enough clean energy resources without putting Oregon’s outdoor recreation and seafood industries at risk,” Wyden said. “These bills are all about looking out for small businesses that depend on tourism and the fishing industry, rather than capitulating to the ‘oiligarchs’ whose only goal is to fatten their wallets, no matter the environmental and economic toil it could bring to our shores.”    

    “Offshore drilling guarantees future oil spills with devastating consequences: from oiled beaches to catastrophic damage to tourism, commercial sport fishing, and ocean ecosystems,” Merkley said. “Trump’s Dirty Energy First strategy would see his administration expand offshore drilling—all to enrich billionaire corporate polluters—but Senator Wyden and I are leading the charge to protect the Oregon Coast and beyond from dangerous offshore oil and gas drilling.”

    The West Coast Protection Act would permanently prohibit new oil and gas leases for drilling off the coast of California, Oregon, and Washington. 

    The Clean Ocean and Safe Tourism (COAST) Anti-Drilling Act would permanently prohibit the U.S. Department of the Interior from issuing leases for the exploration, development, or production of oil and gas in the North Atlantic, Mid-Atlantic, South Atlantic, and Straits of Florida Planning Areas of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf.

    The Stop Arctic Ocean Drilling Act, led by Merkley, would permanently ban new or renewed leases for oil, gas, or mineral extraction in the Arctic Ocean Planning Areas of the Outer Continental Shelf, protecting one of the planet’s most fragile ecosystems. 

    This legislation comes following the 15th anniversary of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, which resulted in the deaths of 11 workers, 134 million gallons spilled into the Gulf of Mexico over 87 days, the demise of thousands of marine mammals and sea turtles, and billions of dollars in economic losses from the fishing, outdoor recreation, and tourism industries.

    “The Pacific west coast economy provides over $80 Billion in GDP via industries like tourism, outdoor recreation, fishing, retail, and real estate, supporting more than 825,000 jobs. And BAPPC’s 8,100 business members rely on a clean ocean to drive their revenues and provide for their customers, employees and families. We strongly support the West Coast Protection Act and other legislation to prohibit new offshore drilling and protect our businesses by prioritizing a healthy coastal ecosystem,” said Grant Bixby, Founding Member, The Business Alliance for Protecting the Pacific Coast.

    In addition to Wyden and Merkley, the West Coast Protection Act is cosponsored by Senators Cory Booker (D-N.J.), Maria Cantwell (D-Wash.), Edward J. Markey (D-Mass.), Patty Murray (D-Wash.), Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.), Adam Schiff (D-Calif.), and Sheldon Whitehouse (D-R.I.) and led by Senator Alex Padilla (D-Calif.). 

    The COAST Anti-Drilling Act, led by Senators Cory Booker (D-NJ) and Jack Reed (D-R.I.), is co-sponsored by Wyden and Merkley, along with Senators Richard Blumenthal (D-Conn.), Chris Coons (D-Del.), Angus King (I-Maine), Markey, Sanders, Jeanne Shaheen (D-N.H.), Chris Van Hollen (D-Md.), Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.), and Whitehouse.

    Merkley’s Stop Arctic Ocean Drilling Act was co-sponsored by Markey, Blumenthal, Sanders, and Warren, in addition to Wyden. 

    Full text of the West Coast Protection Act is here. 

    Full text of the COAST Anti-Drilling Act is here. 

    Full text of the Stop Arctic Drilling Act is here. 

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-Evening Report: Tremors, seizures and paralysis: this brain disorder is more common than multiple sclerosis – but often goes undiagnosed

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Benjamin Scrivener, PhD Candidate, Faculty of Medical and Health Sciences, University of Auckland, Waipapa Taumata Rau

    Kateryna Kon/Shutterstock

    Imagine suddenly losing the ability to move a limb, walk or speak. You would probably recognise this as a medical emergency and get to hospital.

    Now imagine the doctors at the hospital run some tests and then say, “Good news! All your tests were normal, clear scans, and nothing is wrong. You can go home!” Yet, you are still experiencing very real and disabling symptoms.

    Unfortunately, this is the experience of many people with functional neurological disorder. Even worse, some are blamed and reprimanded for exaggerating or faking their symptoms.

    So, what is this disorder, and why is it so challenging to recognise and treat?

    What is functional neurological disorder?

    Neurological disorders are conditions that affect how the nervous system works. The nervous system sends and receives messages between the brain and other parts of your body to regulate a wide range of functions, such as movement, speaking, vision, thinking and digestion.

    To the untrained eye, functional neurological disorder can resemble other conditions such as stroke, multiple sclerosis or epilepsy.

    But, unlike these conditions, functional neurological symptoms aren’t due to damage or a disease process affecting the nervous system. This means the disorder doesn’t appear on routine brain imaging and other tests.

    Functional symptoms are, instead, due to dysfunction in the processing of information between several brain networks. Simply put, it’s a problem of the brain’s software, not the hardware.

    What are the symptoms?

    Functional neurological disorder can produce a kaleidoscope of diverse and changing symptoms. This often adds to confusion for patients and make diagnosis more challenging.

    Symptoms may include paralysis or abnormal movements such as tremors, jerks and tics. This often leads to difficulty walking or coordinating movements.

    Sensory symptoms may involve numbness, tingling or loss of vision.

    Dissociative symptoms, such as functional seizures and blackouts, are also common.

    Some people experience cognitive symptoms including brain fog or problems finding the right words. Fatigue and chronic pain frequently coexist with these symptoms.

    These symptoms can be severe and distressing and, without treatment, can persist for years. For example, some people with functional neurological disorder cannot walk and must use a wheelchair for decades.

    Diagnosis involves identifying established diagnostic signs and ensuring no other diagnoses are missed. This process is best carried out by an experienced neurologist or neuropsychiatrist.

    Functional neurological disorder can affect movement and some people may be unable to walk.
    Fit Ztudio/Shutterstock

    How common is it?

    Functional neurological disorder is one of the most common medical conditions seen in emergency care and in outpatient neurology clinics.

    It affects around 10–22 people per 100,000 per year. This makes it more common than multiple sclerosis.

    Despite this, it is often under-recognised and misunderstood by health-care professionals. This leads to delays in diagnosis and treatment.

    This lack of awareness also contributes to the perception that it’s rare, when it’s actually common among neurological disorders.

    Who does functional neurological disorder affect?

    This condition can affect anyone, although it is more common in women and younger people. Around two thirds of patients are female, but this gender disparity reduces with age.

    Understanding of the disorder has developed significantly over the past few decades, but there’s still more to learn. Several biological, psychological, and social factors can predispose people.

    Genetics, traumatic life experiences, anxiety and depression can increase the risk. Stressful life events, illness, or physical injuries can trigger or worsen existing symptoms.

    But not everyone with the disorder has experienced significant trauma or stress.

    How is it treated?

    If left untreated, about half the people with this condition will remain the same or their symptoms will worsen. However, with the help of experienced clinicians, many people can make rapid recoveries when treatment starts early.

    There are no specific medications for functional neurological disorder but personalised rehabilitation guided by experienced clinicians is recommended.

    Some people may need a team of multidisciplinary clinicians that may include physiotherapists, occupational therapists, speech therapists, psychologists and doctors.

    People also need accurate information about their condition, because understanding and beliefs about the disorder play an important role in recovery. Accurate information helps patients to develop more realistic expectations, reduces anxiety and can empower people to be more active in their recovery.

    Treating common co-existing conditions, such as anxiety or depression, can also be helpful.

    Symptoms can include headaches and brain fog.
    PeopleImages.com – Yuri A/Shutterstock

    A dark history

    The origins of the disorder are deeply rooted in the sexist history of its pre-scientific ancestor – hysteria. The legacy of hysteria has cast a long shadow, contributing to a misogynistic bias in perception and treatment. This historical context has led to ongoing stigma, where symptoms were often labelled as psychological and not warranting treatment.

    Women with functional symptoms often face scepticism and dismissal. In some cases, significant harm occurs through stigmatisation, inadequate care and poor management. Modern medicine has attempted to address these biases by recognising functional neurological disorder as a legitimate condition.

    A lack of education for medical professionals likely contributes to stigma. Many clinicians report low confidence and knowledge about their ability to manage the disorder.

    A bright future?

    Fortunately, awareness, research and interest has grown over the past decade. Many treatment approaches are being trialled, including specialist physiotherapy, psychological therapies and non-invasive brain stimulation.

    Patient-led organisations and support networks are making headway advocating for improvements in health systems, research and education. The goal is to unite patients, their families, clinicians, and researchers to advance a new standard of care across the world.

    Benjamin Scrivener receives funding from the Health Research Council of New Zealand and is a supporting member of Functional Neurological Disorder Aotearoa.

    ref. Tremors, seizures and paralysis: this brain disorder is more common than multiple sclerosis – but often goes undiagnosed – https://theconversation.com/tremors-seizures-and-paralysis-this-brain-disorder-is-more-common-than-multiple-sclerosis-but-often-goes-undiagnosed-250501

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-OSI: Northrim BanCorp Earns $13.3 Million, or $2.38 Per Diluted Share, in First Quarter 2025

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    ANCHORAGE, Alaska, April 23, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Northrim BanCorp, Inc. (NASDAQ:NRIM) (“Northrim” or the “Company”) today reported net income of $13.3 million, or $2.38 per diluted share, in the first quarter of 2025, compared to $10.9 million, or $1.95 per diluted share, in the fourth quarter of 2024, and $8.2 million, or $1.48 per diluted share, in the first quarter a year ago. The increase in first quarter 2025 profitability as compared to the first quarter a year ago was primarily the result of an increase in purchased receivable income, higher net interest income, increased mortgage banking income, and a benefit for the provision for credit losses, which were only partially offset by higher other operating expenses. Purchased receivable income increased primarily due to the Company’s acquisition of Sallyport Commercial Finance, LLC (“Sallyport or SCF”), which was completed on October 31, 2024. Sallyport and its direct and indirect subsidiaries provide services and products related to purchased receivable factoring and asset-based lending in the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom.

    Dividends per share in the first quarter of 2025 increased to $0.64 per share as compared to $0.62 per share in the fourth quarter of 2024 and $0.61 per share in the first quarter of 2024.

    “Our record first quarter earnings are the result of Northrim’s focus on profitable, market share driven growth,” said Mike Huston, Northrim’s President and Chief Executive Officer. “Our strong financial performance is due to our history of investing in our people and banking infrastructure to consistently deliver ‘Superior Customer First Service’. We remain confident that our dedication to serving our customers and communities will support future growth.”

    First Quarter 2025 Highlights:

    • Net interest income in the first quarter of 2025 increased 1% to $31.3 million compared to $30.8 million in the fourth quarter of 2024 and increased 18% compared to $26.4 million in the first quarter of 2024.
    • Net interest margin on a tax equivalent basis (“NIMTE”)* was 4.61% for the first quarter of 2025, up 14-basis points from the fourth quarter of 2024 and up 39-basis points from the first quarter a year ago.
    • Return on average assets (“ROAA”) was 1.76% and return on average equity (“ROAE”) was 19.70% for the first quarter of 2025. ROAA was 1.19% and ROAE was 13.84% for the first quarter of 2024.
    • Portfolio loans were $2.12 billion at March 31, 2025, down slightly from the preceding quarter and up 17% from a year ago. Portfolio loans in the first quarter of 2025 decreased from the preceding quarter primarily due to the reclassification of $100 million of consumer mortgages previously held as residential real estate loans to loans held for sale. The consumer mortgages are expected to be sold in the second quarter of 2025 to reduce the concentration of residential real estate loans and provide additional liquidity for future commercial and construction loan growth.
    • Total deposits were $2.78 billion at March 31, 2025, up 4% from the preceding quarter, and up 14% from $2.43 billion a year ago. Non-interest bearing demand deposits increased 5% from the preceding quarter and increased 4% year-over-year to $742.6 million at March 31, 2025 and represent 27% of total deposits.
    • The average cost of interest-bearing deposits was 2.01% at March 31, 2025, down from 2.15% at December 31, 2024 and 2.13% at March 31, 2024.
    • Mortgage loan originations were $121.6 million in the first quarter of 2025, down from $185.9 million in the fourth quarter of 2024 and up from $101.7 million in the first quarter a year ago. Mortgage loans funded for sale were $108.5 million in the first quarter of 2025, compared to $162.5 million in the fourth quarter of 2024 and $84.3 million in the first quarter of 2024.
    Financial Highlights Three Months Ended
    (Dollars in thousands, except per share data) March 31, 2025 December 31, 2024 September 30, 2024 June 30, 2024 March 31, 2024
    Total assets $ 3,140,960   $ 3,041,869   $ 2,963,392   $ 2,821,668   $ 2,759,560  
    Total portfolio loans $ 2,124,330   $ 2,129,263   $ 2,007,565   $ 1,875,907   $ 1,811,135  
    Total deposits $ 2,777,977   $ 2,680,189   $ 2,625,567   $ 2,463,806   $ 2,434,083  
    Total shareholders’ equity $ 279,756   $ 267,116   $ 260,050   $ 247,200   $ 239,327  
    Net income $ 13,324   $ 10,927   $ 8,825   $ 9,020   $ 8,199  
    Diluted earnings per share $ 2.38   $ 1.95   $ 1.57   $ 1.62   $ 1.48  
    Return on average assets   1.76 %   1.43 %   1.22 %   1.31 %   1.19 %
    Return on average shareholders’ equity   19.70 %   16.32 %   13.69 %   14.84 %   13.84 %
    NIM   4.55 %   4.41 %   4.29 %   4.24 %   4.16 %
    NIMTE*   4.61 %   4.47 %   4.35 %   4.30 %   4.22 %
    Efficiency ratio   64.47 %   66.96 %   66.11 %   68.78 %   68.93 %
    Total shareholders’ equity/total assets   8.91 %   8.78 %   8.78 %   8.76 %   8.67 %
    Tangible common equity/tangible assets*   7.41 %   7.23 %   8.28 %   8.24 %   8.14 %
    Book value per share $ 50.67   $ 48.41   $ 47.27   $ 44.93   $ 43.52  
    Tangible book value per share* $ 41.47   $ 39.17   $ 44.36   $ 42.03   $ 40.61  
    Dividends per share $ 0.64   $ 0.62   $ 0.62   $ 0.61   $ 0.61  
    Common stock outstanding   5,520,892     5,518,210     5,501,943     5,501,562     5,499,578  
                                   

    * References to NIMTE, tangible book value per share, and tangible common equity to tangible common assets, (both of which exclude intangible assets) represent non-GAAP financial measures. Management has presented these non-GAAP measurements in this earnings release, because it believes these measures are useful to investors. See the end of this release for reconciliations of these non-GAAP financial measures to GAAP financial measures.

    Alaska Economic Update
    (Note: sources for information included in this section are included on page 13.)

    The Alaska Department of Labor (“DOL”) has reported Alaska’s seasonally adjusted unemployment rate in February of 2025 was 4.7% compared to the U.S. rate of 4.1%. The total number of payroll jobs in Alaska, not including uniformed military, increased 1.6% or 5,200 jobs between February of 2024 and February of 2025.

    According to the DOL, the Oil and Gas sector had the largest growth rate in new jobs of 7.5% through February 2025 compared to the prior year, up 600 direct jobs. The Construction sector added 1,000 positions for a year-over-year growth rate of 6.1% in February of 2025. The larger Health Care sector grew by 1,400 jobs for an annual growth rate of 3.4%. Transportation, Warehousing and Utilities added 1,100 jobs for a 5% growth rate. Leisure and Hospitality increased 500 jobs year-over-year through February of 2025, up 1.6%.

    The Government sector grew by 600 jobs for 0.7% growth, adding 100 Federal jobs, and 500 State positions in Alaska over the same period. Declining sectors between February 2024 and February 2025 were Manufacturing (primarily seafood processing) shrinking 500 positions (-4.4%), Financial Activities, down 100 jobs (-0.9%), and Retail lost 100 jobs (-0.3%).

    Alaska’s seasonally adjusted personal income was $56.5 billion in the fourth quarter of 2024 according to the Federal Bureau of Economic Analysis (“BEA”). This was an annualized improvement in the fourth quarter of 4.7% for Alaska, compared to the national average of 4.6%. Alaska enjoyed an annual personal income improvement of 6% in 2024 compared to the U.S. increase of 5.4%, ranking Alaska 6th best in the nation. The $650 million increase in personal income in the fourth quarter in Alaska came from a $446 million increase in net earnings from wages, $154 million growth in government transfer receipts, and a $49 million increase in investment income.

    Alaska’s Gross State Product (“GSP”) in 2024, reached $70 billion for the first time according to the BEA. Alaska’s inflation adjusted “real” GSP increased 1.5% in 2024 and 4% annualized in the fourth quarter of 2024, placing Alaska third best of all 50 states for the quarter. The average U.S. GDP growth rate was 2.8% for the year and 2.4% in the fourth quarter of 2024. Alaska’s real GSP improvement in the fourth quarter of 2024 was primarily caused by growth in the Mining, Oil & Gas; Transportation & Warehousing; and to a lesser extent the Health Care sector. Construction played a larger role in the annual state GSP performance.

    Based on data from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Alaska exported $5.2 billion in goods to foreign countries in 2023. China is the largest importer of Alaska’s products at $1.2 billion, followed by Japan at $710 million and Korea at $702 million in 2023. Fish and related maritime products accounted for the largest volume at $2.1 billion, followed by minerals and ores $1.5 billion, and primary metals at $780 million in 2023. Chief Credit Officer and Bank Economist Mark Edwards stated, “President Trump’s significant changes to international tariffs has created uncertainty in trade markets. At this time, it is unknown how each country will respond. Alaska’s natural resources are highly valued commodities throughout the world. If issues arise with one country, such as China, it is most likely that Alaska’s products will be redirected to other markets like Japan and South Korea or sold domestically in the United States. Canada is the largest long-term investor in Alaska’s mining industry. This involves significant fixed capital investments made over decades that are unlikely to shift dramatically in the short-run.”

    According to the US Bureau of Labor Statistics, the Consumer Price Index, or CPI, for the U.S. increased 2.8% between February of 2024 and February of 2025. In Alaska, the rate of increase was 2.9% for the same time period. Food and beverage; housing rents and mortgage rates; transportation; and medical care costs are the largest causes for inflation. Declining motor fuel prices, new and used car prices, and household furnishing costs have helped moderate inflationary pressures in Alaska.

    The monthly average price of Alaska North Slope (“ANS”) crude oil was $76.39 in January, $74.03 in February and $73.39 in March of 2025. The Alaska Department of Revenue (“DOR”) calculated ANS crude oil production was 461 thousand barrels per day (“bpd”) in Alaska’s fiscal year ending June 30, 2024. Through nine months of the fiscal year 2025, production has averaged slightly above the State of Alaska forecast of 467 thousand bpd. In the Spring 2025 Revenue Forecast published March 12, 2025, the DOR expects production to continue to grow to 663 thousand bpd by fiscal year 2034. This is primarily a result of new production coming on-line in and around the NPR-A region west of Prudhoe Bay. A partnership between Santos and Repsol is constructing the new Pikka oil field and ConocoPhillips is developing the new Willow oil field. There are also a number of smaller new oil fields in Alaska’s North Slope that are contributing to the State of Alaska’s production growth estimates.

    The Alaska Permanent Fund is seeded annually by the oil wealth the State continues to save each year and has grown significantly over 40 years of successful investment. As of February 28, 2025 the funds value was $81.35 billion. According to the DOR it is scheduled to contribute $3.7 billion to the Alaska General Fund in fiscal year 2025 for general government spending and to pay the annual dividend to Alaskan residents.

    According to the Alaska Multiple Listing Services, the average sales price of a single family home in Anchorage rose 6.2% in 2024 to $510,109, following a 5.2% increase in 2023. This was the seventh consecutive year of price increases.

    The average sales price for single family homes in the Matanuska Susitna Borough rose 3.8% in 2024 to $412,859, after increasing 4% in 2023. This continues a trend of average price increases for more than a decade in the region. These two markets represent where the vast majority of the residential lending activity for Northrim Bank (the”Bank”) occurs.

    The Alaska Multiple Listing Services reported a 3.4% increase in the number of units sold in Anchorage when comparing 2024 to 2023. There was virtually no change in the number of homes sold in the Matanuska Susitna Borough, with only four fewer homes sold in 2024 than in 2023 or -0.2%.

    Northrim Bank sponsors the Alaskanomics blog to provide news, analysis, and commentary on Alaska’s economy. Join the conversation at Alaskanomics.com, or for more information on the Alaska economy, visit: www.northrim.com and click on the “Business Banking” link and then click “Learn.” Information from our website is not incorporated into, and does not form, a part of this earnings release.

    Review of Income Statement

    Consolidated Income Statement

    In the first quarter of 2025, Northrim generated a ROAA of 1.76% and a ROAE of 19.70%, compared to 1.43% and 16.32%, respectively, in the fourth quarter of 2024 and 1.19% and 13.84%, respectively, in the first quarter a year ago.

    Net Interest Income/Net Interest Margin

    Net interest income increased 1% to $31.3 million in the first quarter of 2025 compared to $30.8 million in the fourth quarter of 2024 and increased 18% compared to $26.4 million in the first quarter of 2024. Interest expense on deposits decreased to $9.9 million in the first quarter of 2025 compared to $10.6 million in the fourth quarter of 2024 and increased compared to $9.2 million in the first quarter of 2024.

    NIMTE* was 4.61% in the first quarter of 2025 up from 4.47% in the preceding quarter and 4.22% in the first quarter a year ago. NIMTE* increased 39 basis points in the first quarter of 2025 compared to the first quarter of 2024 primarily due to a favorable change in the mix of earning-assets towards higher loan balances as a percentage of total earning-assets, slightly higher yields on those assets, and a decrease in costs on interest-bearing liabilities. The weighted average interest rate for new loans booked in the first quarter of 2025 was 7.30% compared to 7.23% in the fourth quarter of 2024 and 7.84% in the first quarter a year ago. The yield on the investment portfolio in the first quarter of 2025 increased to 2.97% from 2.84% in the fourth quarter of 2024 and 2.82% in the first quarter of 2024. “We are starting to see some benefit from lower deposit costs that benefit our net interest margin and outweigh the impact of the recent Fed rate cuts on our loan portfolio, which we could continue to see for the next couple of quarters,” said Jed Ballard, Chief Financial Officer. Northrim’s NIMTE* continues to remain above the peer average of 3.23% posted by the S&P U.S. Small Cap Bank Index with total market capitalization between $250 million and $1 billion as of December 31, 2024.

    Provision for Credit Losses

    Northrim recorded a benefit to the provision for credit losses of $1.4 million in the first quarter of 2025, which was comprised of a benefit to the provision for credit losses on loans of $1.1 million, a $322,000 benefit to the provision for credit losses on unfunded commitments, and a provision for credit losses on purchased receivables of $46,000. This compares to a provision for credit losses of $1.2 million in the fourth quarter of 2024, and provision for credit losses of $149,000 in the first quarter a year ago.

    The benefit to the provision for unfunded commitments in the first quarter of 2025 was primarily due to a decrease in estimated loss rates due to changes in mix that was only partially offset by management’s assessment of economic conditions and estimated funding rates. The decrease to the provision for credit losses on loans in the first quarter of 2025 as compared to the prior quarter and the same quarter a year ago was primarily a result of the reclassification of $100 million in mortgage loans to loans held for sale, which provided a benefit to the provision of $2.2 million in the Home Mortgage Lending segment for the first quarter of 2025. This benefit was only partially offset by a $1.5 million provision for credit losses in the Home Mortgage Lending segment due to changes in the Company’s loss rate regression models for home mortgage loans. Additionally, the Company recorded $1.7 million net benefit for credit losses in the Community Banking segment related to changes in the Company’s loss rate regression models for commercial, commercial real estate, and construction loans. These decreases in the provision were only partially offset by increases in estimated loss rates for management’s assessment of economic conditions, an increase for higher loan balances in other loan segments, and specific provisions for credit losses in the Specialty Finance segment. These items reduced the overall benefit by $1.3 million. The provision for credit losses related to the Specialty Finance segment of $666,000 in the first quarter of 2025 consisted of a $621,000 provision for credit losses on loans and a $46,000 provision for credit losses on purchased receivables and represents management’s estimate of collateral shortfalls for four loans.

    Nonperforming loans, net of government guarantees, increased during the quarter to $8.0 million at March 31, 2025, compared to $7.5 million at December 31, 2024, and $5.3 million at March 31, 2024.

    The allowance for credit losses on loans was 262% of nonperforming loans, net of government guarantees, at the end of the first quarter of 2025, compared to 292% three months earlier and 333% a year ago.

    Other Operating Income

    In addition to home mortgage lending, Northrim has interests in other businesses that complement its core community banking activities, including purchased receivables financing and wealth management. Other operating income contributed $14.2 million, or 31% of total first quarter 2025 revenues, as compared to $13.0 million, or 30% of revenues in the fourth quarter of 2024, and $7.8 million, or 23% of revenues in the first quarter of 2024. The increase in other operating income in the first quarter of 2025 as compared to the preceding quarter and the first quarter of 2024 was primarily the result of increased purchased receivable income due to the Company’s acquisition of Sallyport on October 31, 2024. The fair market value of marketable equity securities decreased $50,000 in the first quarter of 2025 compared to a decrease of $364,000 in the prior quarter and an increase of $314,000 in the first quarter of 2024. Additionally, the increase in other operating income in the first quarter of 2025 as compared to the fourth quarter of 2024 was partially offset by a decrease in mortgage banking income due to a lower volume of mortgage activity. See further discussion regarding mortgage activity contained under “Home Mortgage Lending” below.

    Other Operating Expenses

    Operating expenses were $29.3 million in the first quarter of 2025, compared to $29.4 million in the fourth quarter of 2024, and $23.6 million in the first quarter of 2024. The decrease in other operating expenses in the first quarter of 2025 compared to the fourth quarter of 2024 was primarily due to a decrease in salaries and other personnel expense, including $623,000 in lower mortgage commissions expense due to lower mortgage volume and a decrease in profit share expense. Professional fees decreased in the first quarter of 2025 compared to the fourth quarter of 2024 primarily due to one-time deal costs associated with the acquisition of Sallyport of $1.1 million recorded in the fourth quarter of 2024. These decreases were only partially offset by $600,000 in compensation expense for Sallyport acquisition payments and an increase in other operating expense for a decrease in fair value of loans held for sale of $1.2 million as a result of reclassifying the consumer mortgages discussed above. The increase in other operating expenses in the first quarter of 2025 compared to the first quarter a year ago was primarily due to an increase in salaries and other personnel expense, the increase in compensation expense for Sallyport acquisition payments, the increase in other operating expense for the decrease in fair value of loans held for sale, as well as an increase in other real estate owned, or OREO, expense due to a gain on sale recorded in the first quarter of 2024 for proceeds received related to a government guarantee on an OREO property in prior years. Total other operating expense increased $2.7 million in the Specialty Finance segment in the first quarter of 2025 compared to the first quarter of 2024 from the addition of Sallyport on October 31, 2024.

    Income Tax Provision

    In the first quarter of 2025, Northrim recorded $4.3 million in state and federal income tax expense for an effective tax rate of 24.2%, compared to $2.4 million, or 17.8% in the fourth quarter of 2024 and $2.3 million, or 21.9% in the first quarter a year ago. The increase in the tax rate in the first quarter of 2025 as compared to the fourth and first quarters of 2024 is primarily the result of a decrease in tax credits and tax exempt interest income as a percentage of pre-tax income in 2025 as compared to 2024.

    Community Banking

    Northrim is committed to meeting the needs of the diverse communities in which it operates. As a testament to that support, the Bank has branches in four regions of Alaska identified by the Federal Reserve as ‘distressed or underserved non-metropolitan middle-income geographies’.

    Net interest income in the Community Banking segment totaled $28.2 million in the first quarter of 2025, compared to $27.6 million in the fourth quarter of 2024 and $24.2 million in the first quarter of 2024. Net interest income increased slightly in the first quarter of 2025 as compared to the fourth quarter of 2024 mostly due to lower interest expense on deposits and borrowings and higher interest income on loans. These increases were only partially offset by lower interest income on investments.

    Other operating expenses in the Community Banking segment totaled $18.6 million in the first quarter of 2025, down $535,000 or 3% from $19.1 million in the fourth quarter of 2024, and up $1.4 million or 8% from $17.2 million in the first quarter a year ago. The decrease in the first quarter of 2025 as compared to the prior quarter was mostly due to decreases in salaries and other personnel expense, marketing expense, and professional and outside services expense. The increase in the first quarter of 2025 as compared to the first quarter a year ago was primarily due to an increase in OREO expense due to a gain on sale recorded in the first quarter of 2024 for proceeds received related to a government guarantee on an OREO property sold in prior years, as well as increases in data processing expense, insurance expense, salaries and other personnel expense, and marketing expense.

    The following table provides highlights of the Community Banking segment of Northrim:

      Three Months Ended
    (Dollars in thousands, except per share data) March 31, 2025 December 31, 2024 September 30, 2024 June 30, 2024 March 31, 2024
    Net interest income $ 28,151   $ 27,643   $ 25,928   $ 24,318   $ 24,215  
    (Benefit) provision for credit losses   (1,768 )   771     1,492     (184 )   197  
    Other operating income   2,703     2,535     3,507     2,450     2,468  
    Other operating expense   18,581     19,116     18,723     18,068     17,178  
    Income before provision for income taxes   14,041     10,291     9,220     8,884     9,308  
    Provision for income taxes   3,253     1,474     2,133     1,786     1,966  
    Net income $ 10,788   $ 8,817   $ 7,087   $ 7,098   $ 7,342  
    Weighted average shares outstanding, diluted   5,608,102     5,597,889     5,583,055     5,558,580     5,554,930  
    Diluted earnings per share attributable to Community Banking $ 1.93   $ 1.58   $ 1.26   $ 1.27   $ 1.32  
                                   

    Home Mortgage Lending

    During the first quarter of 2025, mortgage loans funded for sale were $108.5 million, compared to $162.5 million in the fourth quarter of 2024, and $84.3 million in the first quarter of 2024.

    During the first quarter of 2025, the Bank purchased loans of $13.1 million from its subsidiary, Residential Mortgage. of which approximately half were jumbos, one-quarter were mortgages for second homes, and one-quarter were adjustable rate mortgages, with a weighted average interest rate of 6.39%, as compared to $23.4 million and 6.30% in the fourth quarter of 2024, and $17.4 million and 6.65% in the first quarter of 2024. Net interest income contributed $3.0 million to total Home Mortgage Lending revenue in the first quarter of 2025, down from $3.3 million in the prior quarter, and up from $2.2 million in the first quarter a year ago.

    The income statement impact from the reclassification of the consumer mortgages was a decrease in provision for credit losses of $2.2 million and a $1.2 million decrease in the fair value of mortgages.

    The Arizona, Colorado, and Pacific Northwest mortgage expansion markets were responsible for 20% of Residential Mortgage’s $122 million total production in the first quarter of 2025, 19% of $186 million total production in the fourth quarter of 2024, and 19% of $102 million total production in the first quarter of 2024.

    The net change in fair value of mortgage servicing rights decreased mortgage banking income by $855,000 during the first quarter of 2025 compared to an increase of $873,000 for the fourth quarter of 2024 and a decrease of $25,000 for the first quarter of 2024. Mortgage servicing revenue decreased to $2.7 million in the first quarter of 2025 from $2.8 million in the prior quarter and increased from $1.6 million in the first quarter of 2024 due to an increase in production of Alaska Housing Finance Corporation (AHFC) mortgages, which contribute to servicing revenues at origination. In the first quarter of 2025, the Company’s servicing portfolio increased $24.0 million compared to a $294.1 million increase in the fourth quarter of 2024, which included the purchase of the AHFC servicing portfolio of $235.6 million, and an increase of $15.5 million in the first quarter of 2024.

    As of March 31, 2025, Northrim serviced 6,391 loans in its $1.48 billion home-mortgage-servicing portfolio, a 2% increase compared to the $1.46 billion serviced as of the end of the fourth quarter of 2024, and a 40% increase from the $1.06 billion serviced a year ago.

    The following table provides highlights of the Home Mortgage Lending segment of Northrim:

      Three Months Ended
    (Dollars in thousands, except per share data) March 31, 2025 December 31, 2024 September 30, 2024 June 30, 2024 March 31, 2024
    Mortgage commitments $ 68,258   $ 32,299   $ 77,591   $ 88,006   $ 56,208  
               
    Mortgage loans funded for sale $ 108,499   $ 162,530   $ 209,960   $ 152,339   $ 84,324  
    Mortgage loans funded for investment   13,061     23,380     38,087     29,175     17,403  
    Total mortgage loans funded $ 121,560   $ 185,910   $ 248,047   $ 181,514   $ 101,727  
    Mortgage loan refinances to total fundings   11 %   11 %   6 %   6 %   4 %
    Mortgage loans serviced for others $ 1,484,714   $ 1,460,720   $ 1,166,585   $ 1,101,800   $ 1,060,007  
               
    Net realized gains on mortgage loans sold $ 2,740   $ 3,747   $ 5,079   $ 3,188   $ 1,980  
    Change in fair value of mortgage loan commitments, net   660     (665 )   60     391     386  
    Total production revenue   3,400     3,082     5,139     3,579     2,366  
    Mortgage servicing revenue   2,696     2,847     2,583     2,164     1,561  
    Change in fair value of mortgage servicing rights:          
    Due to changes in model inputs of assumptions1   (322 )   1,372     (566 )   239     289  
    Other2   (533 )   (499 )   (402 )   (320 )   (314 )
    Total mortgage servicing revenue, net   1,841     3,720     1,615     2,083     1,536  
    Other mortgage banking revenue   170     238     293     222     129  
    Total mortgage banking income $ 5,411   $ 7,040   $ 7,047   $ 5,884   $ 4,031  
               
    Net interest income $ 3,046   $ 3,280   $ 2,941   $ 2,775   $ 2,232  
    Provision (benefit) for credit losses   (307 )   305     571     64     (48 )
    Mortgage banking income   5,411     7,040     7,047     5,884     4,031  
    Other operating expense   7,650     7,198     7,643     6,697     6,086  
    Income (loss) before provision for income taxes   1,114     2,817     1,774     1,898     225  
    Provision (benefit) for income taxes   310     842     497     532     63  
    Net income (loss) $ 804   $ 1,975   $ 1,277   $ 1,366   $ 162  
               
    Weighted average shares outstanding, diluted   5,608,102     5,597,889     5,583,055     5,558,580     5,554,930  
    Diluted earnings per share attributable to Home Mortgage Lending $ 0.14   $ 0.35   $ 0.23   $ 0.25   $ 0.03  

    1Principally reflects changes in discount rates and prepayment speed assumptions, which are primarily affected by changes in interest rates.
    2Represents changes due to collection/realization of expected cash flows over time.

    Specialty Finance

    The Company’s Specialty Finance segment includes Northrim Funding Services and Sallyport Commercial Finance. Northrim Funding Services is a division of the Bank and has offered factoring solutions to small businesses since 2004. Sallyport is a leading provider of factoring, asset-based lending and alternative working capital solutions to small and medium sized enterprises in the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom that the Company acquired on October 31, 2024 in an all cash transaction valued at approximately $53.9 million. The composition of revenues for the Specialty Finance segment are primarily purchased receivable income, but also includes interest income and other fee income.

    The acquisition of Sallyport included $1.1 million in one-time deal related costs which are reflected in other operating expenses for the fourth quarter of 2024 in the tables below. Total pre-tax income for Sallyport for the first quarter of 2025 was $1.3 million compared to $945,000 for the two months of operations in the fourth quarter of 2024, excluding transaction costs.

    Average purchased receivables and loan balances at Sallyport were $59.9 million for the first quarter of 2025, and yielded 35.8%. This included the recognition of $899,000 in fee income collected during the quarter related to two nonperforming receivables that was previously deferred and the collection of a $350,000 line termination fee. The yield excluding these items for the first quarter of 2025 was 27.4%.

    The following table provides highlights of the Specialty Finance segment of Northrim:

      Three Months Ended
    (Dollars in thousands, except per share data) March 31, 2025 December 31, 2024 September 30, 2024 June 30, 2024 March 31, 2024
    Purchased receivable income $ 6,150   $ 3,526   $ 1,033   $ 1,243   $ 1,345  
    Other operating income   (64 )   (68 )            
    Interest income   596     407     158     170     212  
    Total revenue   6,682     3,865     1,191     1,413     1,557  
    Provision for credit losses   666     125              
    Compensation expense – SCF acquisition payments   600                  
    Other operating expense   2,500     3,063     362     429     374  
    Interest expense   496     489     185     210     212  
    Total expense   4,262     3,677     547     639     586  
    Income before provision for income taxes   2,420     188     644     774     971  
    Provision for income taxes   688     53     183     218     276  
    Net income Specialty Finance segment $ 1,732   $ 135   $ 461   $ 556   $ 695  
    Weighted average shares outstanding, diluted   5,608,102     5,597,889     5,583,055     5,558,580     5,554,930  
    Diluted earnings per share attributable to Specialty Finance $ 0.31   $ 0.02   $ 0.08   $ 0.10   $ 0.13  
                                   

    Balance Sheet Review

    Northrim’s total assets were $3.14 billion at March 31, 2025, up 3% from the preceding quarter and up 14% from a year ago. Northrim’s loan-to-deposit ratio was 76% at March 31, 2025, down from 79% at December 31, 2024, and up from 74% at March 31, 2024.

    At March 31, 2025, our liquid assets, investments, and loans maturing within one year were $1.11 billion and our funds available for borrowing under our existing lines of credit were $571.7 million. Given these sources of liquidity and our expectations for customer demands for cash and for our operating cash needs, we believe our sources of liquidity to be sufficient for the foreseeable future.

    Average interest-earning assets were $2.78 billion in the first quarter of 2025, down slightly from $2.79 billion in the fourth quarter of 2024 and up 9% from $2.56 billion in the first quarter a year ago. The average yield on interest-earning assets was 6.10% in the first quarter of 2025, up slightly from 6.02% in the preceding quarter and up from 5.69% in the first quarter a year ago.

    Average investment securities decreased to $523.8 million in the first quarter of 2025, compared to $565.8 million in the fourth quarter of 2024 and $670.9 million in the first quarter a year ago. The average net tax equivalent yield on the securities portfolio was 2.97% for the first quarter of 2025, up from 2.84% in the preceding quarter and up from 2.82% in the year ago quarter. The average estimated duration of the investment portfolio at March 31, 2025, was approximately 2.4 years compared to approximately 2.7 years at March 31, 2024. As of March 31, 2025, $70.0 million of available for sale securities with a weighted average yield of 2.25% are scheduled to mature in the next six months, $80.7 million with a weighted average yield of 1.16% are scheduled to mature in six months to one year, and $168.6 million with a weighted average yield of 1.67% are scheduled to mature in the following year, representing a total of $319.4 million or 11% of earning assets that are scheduled to mature in the next 24 months.

    Total unrealized losses, net of tax, on available for sale securities decreased by $2.8 million in the first quarter of 2025 resulting in total unrealized loss, net of tax, of $5.5 million compared to $8.3 million at December 31, 2024, and $17.2 million a year ago. The average maturity of the available for sale securities with the majority of the unrealized loss is 1.3 years. Total unrealized losses on held to maturity securities were $1.1 million at March 31, 2025, compared to $1.0 million at December 31, 2024, and $3.4 million a year ago.

    Average interest bearing deposits in other banks decreased to $38.0 million in the first quarter of 2025 from $72.2 million in the fourth quarter of 2024 and decreased from $61.6 million in the first quarter of 2024, as cash was used to fund the loan growth and provide liquidity.

    Loans held for sale increased to $159.6 million at March 31, 2025, compared to $60.0 million at December 31, 2024, and $43.8 million a year ago, largely due to the reclassification of $100 million consumer mortgage loans from portfolio loans in the first quarter of 2025. Management expects to sell these loans with servicing retained which will result in an increase to mortgage servicing rights when the sale closes in the second quarter of 2025.

    Portfolio loans were $2.12 billion at March 31, 2025, consistent with the preceding quarter and up 17% from a year ago. Portfolio loans, excluding consumer mortgage loans, were $1.94 billion at March 31, 2025, up $77.4 million or 4% from the preceding quarter and up 22% from a year ago. This increase in the first quarter of 2025 was diversified throughout the loan portfolio including nonowner-occupied commercial real estate and multi-family loans increasing by $70.8 million, commercial loans increasing by $55.4 million, and commercial real estate owner-occupied loans increasing $10.4 million from the preceding quarter. These increases were partially offset by a $57.9 million decrease in construction loans. Average portfolio loans in the first quarter of 2025 were $2.17 billion, which was up 5% from the preceding quarter and up 21% from a year ago. Yields on average portfolio loans in the first quarter of 2025 decreased to 6.89% from 6.93% in the fourth quarter and increased from 6.75% in the first quarter of 2024. The decrease in the yield on portfolio loans in the first quarter of 2025 compared to the fourth quarter of 2024 is primarily due to a change in the mix of loans as construction loans decreased and commercial real estate loans increased as a percentage of the overall portfolio. The yield on new portfolio loans, excluding consumer mortgage loans, was 7.43% in the first quarter of 2025 as compared to 7.40% in the fourth quarter of 2024 and 8.39% in the first quarter of 2024.

    Northrim’s loans and credit lines are subject to approval procedures and amount limitations. These limitations apply to the borrower’s total outstanding indebtedness and commitments to us, including the indebtedness of any guarantor. Generally, Northrim is permitted to make loans to one borrower of up to 15% of the unimpaired capital and surplus of the Bank. The legal lending limit was $37.6 million at March 31, 2025. At March 31, 2025, Northrim had 23 relationships totaling $520.2 million in portfolio loans whose total direct and indirect commitments were greater than 50% of the legal lending limit.

    Alaskans continue to account for substantially all of Northrim’s deposit base. Total deposits were $2.78 billion at March 31, 2025, up 4% from $2.68 billion at December 31, 2024, and up 14% from $2.43 billion a year ago. “The increase in deposits in the first quarter of 2025 was not consistent with our customers’ normal business cycles as we normally see decreases in balances during the first quarter, however deposits from new relationships in the quarter were more than able to offset our normal seasonal deposit movement,” said Ballard. At March 31, 2025, 74% of total deposits were held in business accounts and 26% of deposit balances were held in consumer accounts. Northrim had approximately 34,000 deposit customers with an average balance of $61,000 as of March 31, 2025. Northrim had 27 customers with balances over $10 million as of March 31, 2025, which accounted for $694.7 million, or 26%, of total deposits. Demand deposits increased by 5% from the prior quarter and increased 4% from the prior year to $742.6 million at March 31, 2025. Demand deposits remained consistent at 27% of total deposits at both March 31, 2025 and December 31, 2024 and were down from 29% of total deposits at March 31, 2024. Average interest-bearing deposits were up 2% to $2.00 billion with an average cost of 2.01% in the first quarter of 2025, compared to $1.95 billion and an average cost of 2.15% in the fourth quarter of 2024, and up 16% compared to $1.73 billion and an average cost of 2.13% in the first quarter of 2024. Uninsured deposits totaled $1.04 billion or 37% of total deposits as of March 31, 2025 compared to $1.08 billion or 40% of total deposits as of December 31, 2024.

    Shareholders’ equity was $279.8 million, or $50.67 book value per share, at March 31, 2025, compared to $267.1 million, or $48.41 book value per share, at December 31, 2024 and $239.3 million, or $43.52 book value per share, a year ago. Tangible book value per share* was $41.47 at March 31, 2025, compared to $39.17 at December 31, 2024, and $40.61 per share a year ago. The increase in shareholders’ equity in the first quarter of 2025 as compared to the fourth quarter of 2024 was largely the result of earnings of $13.3 million and an increase in the fair value of the available for sale securities portfolio, which increased $5.5 million, net of tax, which were only partially offset by dividends paid of $3.6 million. The Company did not repurchase any shares of common stock in the first quarter of 2025 and currently has no plans to continue to repurchase shares. Tangible common equity to tangible assets* was 7.41% as of March 31, 2025, compared to 7.23% as of December 31, 2024 and 8.14% as of March 31, 2024. Northrim continues to maintain capital levels in excess of the requirements to be categorized as “well-capitalized” with Tier 1 Capital to Risk Adjusted Assets of 9.76% at March 31, 2025, compared to 9.76% at December 31, 2024, and 11.55% at March 31, 2024.

    Asset Quality

    Northrim believes it has a consistent lending approach throughout economic cycles, which emphasizes appropriate loan-to-value ratios, adequate debt coverage ratios, and competent management.

    Nonperforming assets (“NPAs”) net of government guarantees were $12.3 million at March 31, 2025, up from $11.6 million at December 31, 2024 and $5.4 million a year ago. Of the NPAs at March 31, 2025, $4.5 million are attributable to the Community Banking segment and $7.6 million are attributable to the Specialty Finance segment.

    Net adversely classified loans were $20.4 million at March 31, 2025, as compared to $9.6 million at December 31, 2024, and $7.2 million a year ago. Adversely classified loans are loans that Northrim has classified as substandard, doubtful, and loss, net of government guarantees. The increase in adversely classified loans, net of government guarantees, at March 31, 2025 as compared to the prior quarter and prior year is mostly attributable to two commercial relationships totaling $9.4 million. Net loan recoveries were $34,000 in the first quarter of 2025, compared to net loan recoveries of $51,000 in the fourth quarter of 2024, and net loan recoveries of $42,000 in the first quarter of 2024. Additionally, Northrim had three new loan modifications to borrowers experiencing financial difficulty totaling $813,000, for a total of 14 totaling $3.8 million, net of government guarantees in the first quarter of 2025.

    Northrim had $140.7 million, or 7% of portfolio loans, in the Healthcare sector, $122.5 million, or 6% of portfolio loans, in the Tourism sector, $110.9 million, or 5% of portfolio loans, in the Accommodations sector, $91.2 million, or 4% of portfolio loans, in the Retail sector, $85.7 million, or 4% of portfolio loans, in the Aviation (non-tourism) sector, $75.5 million, or 4% of portfolio loans, in the Fishing sector, and $60.2 million, or 3% in the Restaurants and Breweries sector as of March 31, 2025.

    Northrim estimates that $106.3 million, or approximately 5% of portfolio loans, had direct exposure to the oil and gas industry in Alaska, as of March 31, 2025, and $1.5 million of these loans are adversely classified. As of March 31, 2025, Northrim has an additional $32.6 million in unfunded commitments to companies with direct exposure to the oil and gas industry in Alaska, and no unfunded commitments on adversely classified loans. Northrim defines direct exposure to the oil and gas sector as loans to borrowers that provide oilfield services and other companies that have been identified as significantly reliant upon activity in Alaska related to the oil and gas industry, such as lodging, equipment rental, transportation and other logistics services specific to this industry.

    About Northrim BanCorp

    Northrim BanCorp, Inc. is the parent company of Northrim Bank, an Alaska-based community bank with 20 branches throughout the state and differentiates itself with its detailed knowledge of Alaska’s economy and its “Customer First Service” philosophy. The Bank has two wholly-owned subsidiaries, Sallyport Commercial Finance, LLC, a specialty finance company and Residential Mortgage Holding Company, LLC, a regional home mortgage company. Pacific Wealth Advisors, LLC is an affiliated company.

    www.northrim.com

    Forward-Looking Statement
    This release may contain “forward-looking statements” as that term is defined for purposes of Section 21E of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended. These statements are, in effect, management’s attempt to predict future events, and thus are subject to various risks and uncertainties. Readers should not place undue reliance on forward-looking statements, which reflect management’s views only as of the date hereof. All statements, other than statements of historical fact, regarding our financial position, business strategy, management’s plans and objectives for future operations are forward-looking statements. When used in this report, the words “anticipate,” “believe,” “estimate,” “expect,” and “intend” and words or phrases of similar meaning, as they relate to Northrim and its management are intended to help identify forward-looking statements. Although we believe that management’s expectations as reflected in forward-looking statements are reasonable, we cannot assure readers that those expectations will prove to be correct. Forward-looking statements, are subject to various risks and uncertainties that may cause our actual results to differ materially and adversely from our expectations as indicated in the forward-looking statements. These risks and uncertainties include: descriptions of Northrim’s and Sallyport’s financial condition, results of operations, asset based lending volumes, asset and credit quality trends and profitability and statements about the expected financial benefits and other effects of the acquisition of Sallyport by Northrim Bank; expected cost savings, synergies and other financial benefits from the acquisition of Sallyport by Northrim Bank might not be realized within the expected time frames and costs or difficulties relating to integration matters might be greater than expected; the ability of Northrim and Sallyport to execute their respective business plans; potential further increases in interest rates; the value of securities held in our investment portfolio; the impact of the results of government initiatives, including tariffs, on the regulatory landscape, natural resource extraction industries, and capital markets; the impact of declines in the value of commercial and residential real estate markets, high unemployment rates, inflationary pressures and slowdowns in economic growth; changes in banking regulation or actions by bank regulators; potential further increases in inflation, supply-chain constraints, and potential geopolitical instability, including the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East; financial stress on borrowers (consumers and businesses) as a result of higher rates or an uncertain economic environment; the general condition of, and changes in, the Alaska economy; our ability to maintain or expand our market share or net interest margin; the sufficiency of our allowance for credit losses and the accuracy of the assumptions or estimates used in preparing our financial statements, including those related to current expected credit losses accounting guidance; our ability to maintain asset quality; our ability to implement our marketing and growth strategies; our ability to identify and address cyber-security risks, including security breaches, “denial of service attacks,” “hacking,” and identity theft; disease outbreaks; and our ability to execute our business plan. Further, actual results may be affected by competition on price and other factors with other financial institutions; customer acceptance of new products and services; the regulatory environment in which we operate; and general trends in the local, regional and national banking industry and economy. In addition, there are risks inherent in the banking industry relating to collectability of loans and changes in interest rates. Many of these risks, as well as other risks that may have a material adverse impact on our operations and business, are identified in the “Risk Factors” section of our Annual Report on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2024, and from time to time are disclosed in our other filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission. However, you should be aware that these factors are not an exhaustive list, and you should not assume these are the only factors that may cause our actual results to differ from our expectations. These forward-looking statements are made only as of the date of this release, and Northrim does not undertake any obligation to release revisions to these forward-looking statements to reflect events or conditions after the date of this release.

    References:

    https://www.bea.gov/

    http://almis.labor.state.ak.us/

    http://www.tax.alaska.gov/programs/oil/prevailing/ans.aspx

    http://www.tax.state.ak.us/

    www.mba.org

    https://www.alaskarealestate.com/MLSMember/RealEstateStatistics.aspx

    https://www.akleg.gov/basis/Bill/Text/34?Hsid=HJR011C

    https://www.uschamber.com/assets/static/maps/international-trade/AK_Chamber_2024.pdf

    https://tax.alaska.gov/programs/programs/reports/RSB.aspx?Year=2025&Type=Spring

    https://www.capitaliq.spglobal.com/web/client?auth=inherit&overridecdc=1&#markets/indexFinancials

    Income Statement      
    (Dollars in thousands, except per share data) Three Months Ended
    (Unaudited) March 31, December 31, March 31,
        2025     2024     2024  
    Interest Income:      
    Interest and fees on loans $ 37,470   $ 37,059   $ 30,450  
    Interest on portfolio investments   3,675     3,844     4,520  
    Interest on deposits in banks   416     883     838  
    Total interest income   41,561     41,786     35,808  
    Interest Expense:      
    Interest expense on deposits   9,935     10,568     9,180  
    Interest expense on borrowings   329     377     181  
    Total interest expense   10,264     10,945     9,361  
    Net interest income   31,297     30,841     26,447  
           
    (Benefit) provision for credit losses   (1,409 )   1,201     149  
    Net interest income after provision for credit losses   32,706     29,640     26,298  
           
    Other Operating Income:      
    Purchased receivable income   6,150     3,526     1,345  
    Mortgage banking income   5,411     7,040     4,031  
    Bankcard fees   1,074     1,148     917  
    Service charges on deposit accounts   677     622     549  
    Unrealized gain (loss) on marketable equity securities   (50 )   (364 )   314  
    Other income   938     949     688  
    Total other operating income   14,200     13,033     7,844  
           
    Other Operating Expense:      
    Salaries and other personnel expense   17,223     18,254     15,417  
    Data processing expense   3,104     3,108     2,659  
    Occupancy expense   1,889     1,893     1,962  
    Professional and outside services   1,115     1,967     755  
    Insurance expense   1,017     894     779  
    Marketing expense   672     965     513  
    Compensation expense – SCF acquisition payments   600          
    OREO expense, net rental income and gains on sale   3     2     (391 )
    Other operating expense   3,708     2,294     1,944  
    Total other operating expense   29,331     29,377     23,638  
           
    Income before provision for income taxes   17,575     13,296     10,504  
    Provision for income taxes   4,251     2,369     2,305  
    Net income $ 13,324   $ 10,927   $ 8,199  
           
    Basic EPS $ 2.41   $ 1.99   $ 1.49  
    Diluted EPS $ 2.38   $ 1.95   $ 1.48  
    Weighted average shares outstanding, basic   5,519,998     5,509,078     5,499,578  
    Weighted average shares outstanding, diluted   5,608,102     5,597,889     5,554,930  
                       
    Balance Sheet      
    (Dollars in thousands)      
    (Unaudited) March 31, December 31, March 31,
        2025     2024     2024  
           
    Assets:      
    Cash and due from banks $ 29,671   $ 42,101   $ 30,159  
    Interest bearing deposits in other banks   35,852     20,635     50,205  
    Investment securities available for sale, at fair value   463,096     478,617     592,479  
    Investment securities held to maturity   36,750     36,750     36,750  
    Marketable equity securities, at fair value   8,669     8,719     13,467  
    Investment in Federal Home Loan Bank stock   5,342     5,331     3,236  
    Loans held for sale   159,603     59,957     43,818  
           
    Portfolio loans   2,124,330     2,129,263     1,811,135  
    Allowance for credit losses, loans   (20,922 )   (22,020 )   (17,533 )
    Net portfolio loans   2,103,408     2,107,243     1,793,602  
    Purchased receivables, net   95,489     74,078     37,698  
    Mortgage servicing rights, at fair value   26,814     26,439     20,055  
    Other real estate owned, net            
    Premises and equipment, net   37,070     37,757     40,836  
    Lease right of use asset   7,632     7,455     8,867  
    Goodwill and intangible assets   50,824     50,968     15,967  
    Other assets   80,740     85,819     72,421  
    Total assets $ 3,140,960   $ 3,041,869   $ 2,759,560  
           
    Liabilities:      
    Demand deposits $ 742,560   $ 706,225   $ 714,244  
    Interest-bearing demand   1,187,465     1,108,404     889,581  
    Savings deposits   256,650     250,900     246,902  
    Money market deposits   193,842     196,290     209,785  
    Time deposits   397,460     418,370     373,571  
    Total deposits   2,777,977     2,680,189     2,434,083  
    Other borrowings   13,136     23,045     13,569  
    Junior subordinated debentures   10,310     10,310     10,310  
    Lease liability   7,682     7,487     8,884  
    Other liabilities   52,099     53,722     53,387  
    Total liabilities   2,861,204     2,774,753     2,520,233  
           
    Shareholders’ Equity:      
    Total shareholders’ equity   279,756     267,116     239,327  
    Total liabilities and shareholders’ equity $ 3,140,960   $ 3,041,869   $ 2,759,560  
           

    Additional Financial Information
    (Dollars in thousands)
    (Unaudited)

    Composition of Portfolio Loans                        
      March 31, 2025   December 31, 2024   September 30, 2024   June 30, 2024   March 31, 2024
      Balance % of total   Balance % of total   Balance % of total   Balance % of total   Balance % of total
    Commercial loans $ 573,593   27 %   $ 518,148   24 %   $ 492,414   24 %   $ 495,781   26 %   $ 475,220   26 %
    Commercial real estate:                            
    Owner occupied properties   430,442   20 %     420,060   20 %     412,827   20 %     383,832   20 %     372,507   20 %
    Nonowner occupied and multifamily properties   690,277   32 %     619,431   29 %     584,302   31 %     551,130   30 %     529,904   30 %
    Residential real estate:                            
    1-4 family properties secured by first liens   188,219   9 %     270,535   13 %     248,514   12 %     222,026   12 %     218,552   12 %
    1-4 family properties secured by junior liens & revolving secured by first liens   53,836   3 %     48,857   2 %     45,262   2 %     41,258   2 %     35,460   2 %
    1-4 family construction   34,017   2 %     39,789   2 %     39,794   2 %     29,510   2 %     27,751   2 %
    Construction loans   156,211   7 %     214,068   10 %     185,362   9 %     154,009   8 %     153,537   8 %
    Consumer loans   7,424   %     7,562   %     7,836   %     6,679   %     6,444   %
    Subtotal   2,134,019         2,138,450         2,016,311         1,884,225         1,819,375    
    Unearned loan fees, net   (9,689 )       (9,187 )       (8,746 )       (8,318 )       (8,240 )  
    Total portfolio loans $ 2,124,330       $ 2,129,263       $ 2,007,565       $ 1,875,907       $ 1,811,135    
                                 
    Composition of Deposits                        
      March 31, 2025   December 31, 2024   September 30, 2024   June 30, 2024   March 31, 2024
      Balance % of total   Balance % of total   Balance % of total   Balance % of total   Balance % of total
    Demand deposits $ 742,560   27 %   $ 706,225   27 %   $ 763,595   29 %   $ 704,471   29 %   $ 714,244   29 %
    Interest-bearing demand   1,187,465   43 %     1,108,404   41 %     979,238   37 %     906,010   36 %     889,581   37 %
    Savings deposits   256,650   9 %     250,900   9 %     245,043   9 %     238,156   10 %     246,902   10 %
    Money market deposits   193,842   7 %     196,290   7 %     204,821   8 %     195,159   8 %     209,785   9 %
    Time deposits   397,460   14 %     418,370   16 %     435,870   17 %     420,010   17 %     373,571   15 %
    Total deposits $ 2,777,977       $ 2,680,189       $ 2,628,567       $ 2,463,806       $ 2,434,083    
                                                     

    Additional Financial Information
    (Dollars in thousands)
    (Unaudited)

    Asset Quality March 31,   December 31,   March 31,
        2025       2024       2024  
    Nonaccrual loans – Community Banking $ 4,274     $ 4,337     $ 4,472  
    Nonaccrual loans – Home Mortgage Lending   221       233       263  
    Nonaccrual loans – Specialty Finance   3,573       2,946       525  
    Nonaccrual loans – Total   8,068       7,516       5,260  
    Loans 90 days past due and accruing – Community Banking         17        
    Loans 90 days past due and accruing – Total         17        
    Total nonperforming loans – Community Banking   4,274       4,354       4,472  
    Total nonperforming loans – Home Mortgage Lending   221       233       263  
    Total nonperforming loans – Specialty Finance   3,573       2,946       525  
    Total nonperforming loans – Total   8,068       7,533       5,260  
    Nonperforming loans guaranteed by gov’t – Community Banking   80              
    Nonperforming loans guaranteed by gov’t – Total   80              
    Net nonperforming loans – Community Banking   4,194       4,354       4,472  
    Net nonperforming loans – Home Mortgage Lending   221       233       263  
    Net nonperforming loans – Specialty Finance   3,573       2,946       525  
    Net nonperforming loans – Total   7,988       7,533       5,260  
                 
    Repossessed assets – Community Banking   297       297        
    Repossessed assets – Total   297       297        
                 
    Nonperforming purchased receivables – Specialty Finance   4,007       3,768       183  
                 
    Net nonperforming assets – Community Banking   4,491       4,651       4,472  
    Net nonperforming assets – Home Mortgage Lending   221       233       263  
    Net nonperforming assets – Specialty Finance   7,580       6,714       708  
    Net nonperforming assets – Total $ 12,292     $ 11,598     $ 5,443  
                 
    Adversely classified loans, net of gov’t guarantees – Community Banking $ 16,592     $ 6,332     $ 6,374  
    Adversely classified loans, net of gov’t guarantees – Home Mortgage Lending   252       358       307  
    Adversely classified loans, net of gov’t guarantees – Specialty Finance   3,573       2,946       525  
    Adversely classified loans, net of gov’t guarantees – Total $ 20,417     $ 9,636     $ 7,206  
                 
    Special mention loans, net of gov’t guarantees – Community Banking $ 14,496     $ 19,769     $ 9,976  
    Special mention loans, net of gov’t guarantees – Home Mortgage Lending   637              
    Special mention loans, net of gov’t guarantees – Total $ 15,133     $ 19,769     $ 9,976  
                           
    Asset Quality, Continued March 31, December 31, March 31,
        2025     2024     2024  
    Nonperforming loans, net of government guarantees / portfolio loans   0.38 %   0.35 %   0.29 %
    Nonperforming loans, net of government guarantees / portfolio loans, net of government guarantees   0.40 %   0.38 %   0.31 %
    Nonperforming assets, net of government guarantees / total assets   0.39 %   0.38 %   0.20 %
    Nonperforming assets, net of government guarantees / total assets net of government guarantees   0.41 %   0.40 %   0.20 %
                 
    Loans 30-89 days past due and accruing, net of government guarantees / portfolio loans   0.04 %   0.11 %   0.03 %
    Loans 30-89 days past due and accruing, net of government guarantees / portfolio loans, net of government guarantees   0.04 %   0.11 %   0.04 %
                 
    Allowance for credit losses for loans / portfolio loans   0.98 %   1.03 %   0.97 %
    Allowance for credit losses for loans / portfolio loans, net of gov’t guarantees   1.06 %   1.10 %   1.03 %
    Allowance for credit losses for loans / nonperforming loans, net of government guarantees   262 %   292 %   333 %
                 
    Gross loan charge-offs for the quarter – Community Banking $ 50   $ 44   $ 25  
    Gross loan charge-offs for the quarter – Specialty Finance       105      
    Gross loan charge-offs for the quarter – Total   50     149     25  
                 
    Gross loan recoveries for the quarter – Community Banking   (84 )   (200 )   (67 )
    Gross loan recoveries for the quarter – Home Mortgage Lending            
    Gross loan recoveries for the quarter – Specialty Finance            
    Gross loan recoveries for the quarter – Total $ (84 ) $ (200 ) $ (67 )
                 
    Net loan (recoveries) charge-offs for the quarter – Community Banking $ (34 ) $ (156 ) $ (42 )
    Net loan (recoveries) charge-offs for the quarter – Specialty Finance       (105 )    
    Net loan (recoveries) charge-offs for the quarter – Total $ (34 ) $ (51 ) $ (42 )
                 
    Net loan charge-offs (recoveries) for the quarter / average loans, for the quarter   %   %   %
                 
    Allowance for credit losses for purchased receivables / purchased receivables   3.72 %   4.69 %   %
                 
    Net purchased receivable charge-offs (recoveries) for the quarter $   $   $  
                 

    Additional Financial Information
    (Dollars in thousands)
    (Unaudited)

    Average Balances, Yields, and Rates                
      Three Months Ended
      March 31, 2025   December 31, 2024   March 31, 2024
        Average     Average     Average
      Average Tax Equivalent   Average Tax Equivalent   Average Tax Equivalent
      Balance Yield/Rate   Balance Yield/Rate   Balance Yield/Rate
    Assets                
    Interest bearing deposits in other banks $ 37,969   4.44 %   $ 72,212   4.72 %   $ 61,561   5.38 %
    Portfolio investments   523,753   2.97 %     565,785   2.84 %     670,937   2.82 %
    Loans held for sale   46,223   5.86 %     83,304   5.97 %     32,635   6.13 %
    Portfolio loans   2,173,425   6.89 %     2,066,216   6.93 %     1,793,425   6.75 %
    Total interest-earning assets   2,781,370   6.10 %     2,787,517   6.02 %     2,558,558   5.69 %
    Nonearning assets   293,415         251,364         201,137    
    Total assets $ 3,074,785       $ 3,038,881       $ 2,759,695    
                     
    Liabilities and Shareholders’ Equity                
    Interest-bearing deposits $ 2,002,594   2.01 %   $ 1,954,495   2.15 %   $ 1,731,923   2.13 %
    Borrowings   37,081   3.55 %     29,251   3.95 %     23,944   2.95 %
    Total interest-bearing liabilities   2,039,675   2.04 %     1,983,746   2.18 %     1,755,867   2.14 %
                     
    Noninterest-bearing demand deposits   697,534         738,911         705,134    
    Other liabilities   63,348         49,815         60,407    
    Shareholders’ equity   274,228         266,409         238,287    
    Total liabilities and shareholders’ equity $ 3,074,785       $ 3,038,881       $ 2,759,695    
    Net spread   4.06 %     3.84 %     3.55 %
    NIM   4.55 %     4.41 %     4.16 %
    NIMTE*   4.61 %     4.47 %     4.22 %
    Cost of funds   1.52 %     1.59 %     1.53 %
    Average portfolio loans to average interest-earning assets   78.14 %       74.12 %       70.10 %  
    Average portfolio loans to average total deposits   80.49 %       76.71 %       73.59 %  
    Average non-interest deposits to average total deposits   25.83 %       27.43 %       28.93 %  
    Average interest-earning assets to average interest-bearing liabilities   136.36 %       140.52 %       145.71 %  
                                 

    Additional Financial Information
    (Dollars in thousands, except per share data)
    (Unaudited)

    Capital Data (At quarter end)          
      March 31, 2025   December 31, 2024   March 31, 2024
    Book value per share $ 50.67     $ 48.41     $ 43.52  
    Tangible book value per share* $ 41.47     $ 39.17     $ 40.61  
    Total shareholders’ equity/total assets   8.91 %     8.78 %     8.67 %
    Tangible Common Equity/Tangible Assets*   7.41 %     7.23 %     8.14 %
    Tier 1 Capital / Risk Adjusted Assets   9.76 %     9.76 %     11.55 %
    Total Capital / Risk Adjusted Assets   10.62 %     10.94 %     12.47 %
    Tier 1 Capital / Average Assets   8.02 %     7.68 %     9.01 %
    Shares outstanding   5,520,892       5,518,210       5,499,578  
    Total unrealized loss on AFS debt securities, net of income taxes $ (5,452 )   $ (8,295 )   $ (17,205 )
    Total unrealized gain on derivatives and hedging activities, net of income taxes $ 1,097     $ 1,272     $ 1,172  
                           
    Profitability Ratios                            
      March 31, 2025   December 31, 2024   September 30, 2024   June 30, 2024   March 31, 2024
    For the quarter:                            
    NIM 4.55 %   4.41 %   4.29 %   4.24 %   4.16 %
    NIMTE* 4.61 %   4.47 %   4.35 %   4.30 %   4.22 %
    Efficiency ratio 64.47 %   66.96 %   66.11 %   68.78 %   68.93 %
    Return on average assets 1.76 %   1.43 %   1.22 %   1.31 %   1.19 %
    Return on average equity 19.70 %   16.32 %   13.69 %   14.84 %   13.84 %

    *Non-GAAP Financial Measures
    (Dollars and shares in thousands, except per share data)
    (Unaudited)

    Non-GAAP financial measures have inherent limitations, are not required to be uniformly applied, and are not audited. Although we believe these non-GAAP financial measures are frequently used by stakeholders in the evaluation of the Company, they have limitations as analytical tools and should not be considered in isolation or as a substitute for analysis of results as reported under GAAP.

    Net interest margin on a tax equivalent basis

    Net interest margin on a tax equivalent basis (“NIMTE”) is a non-GAAP performance measurement in which interest income on non-taxable investments and loans is presented on a tax equivalent basis using a combined federal and state statutory rate of 28.43% in both 2025 and 2024. The most comparable GAAP measure is net interest margin and the following table sets forth the reconciliation of NIMTE to net interest margin for the periods indicated.

      Three Months Ended
      March 31, 2025   December 31, 2024   September 30, 2024   June 30, 2024   March 31, 2024
    Net interest income $ 31,297     $ 30,841     $ 28,842     $ 27,053     $ 26,447  
    Divided by average interest-bearing assets   2,781,370       2,787,517       2,674,291       2,568,266       2,558,558  
    Net interest margin (“NIM”)2   4.55 %     4.41 %     4.29 %     4.24 %     4.16 %
                       
    Net interest income $ 31,297     $ 30,841     $ 28,842     $ 27,053     $ 26,447  
    Plus: reduction in tax expense related to tax-exempt interest income   379       379       385       378       379  
      $ 31,676     $ 31,220     $ 29,227     $ 27,431     $ 26,826  
    Divided by average interest-bearing assets   2,781,370       2,787,517       2,674,291       2,568,266       2,558,558  
    NIMTE2   4.61 %     4.47 %     4.35 %     4.30 %     4.22 %
                                           

    2Calculated using actual days in the quarter divided by 365 for the quarters ended in 2025 and 366 for the quarters ended in 2024, respectively.

    *Non-GAAP Financial Measures
    (Dollars and shares in thousands, except per share data)
    (Unaudited)

    Tangible Book Value Per Share

    Tangible book value per share is a non-GAAP measure defined as shareholders’ equity, less intangible assets, divided by shares outstanding. The most comparable GAAP measure is book value per share and the following table sets forth the reconciliation of tangible book value per share and book value per share for the periods indicated.

      March 31, 2025   December 31, 2024   September 30, 2024   June 30, 2024   March 31, 2024
                       
    Total shareholders’ equity $ 279,756     $ 267,116     $ 260,050     $ 247,200     $ 239,327  
    Divided by shares outstanding   5,521       5,518       5,502       5,502       5,500  
    Book value per share $ 50.68     $ 48.41     $ 47.26     $ 44.93     $ 43.52  
                                           
      March 31, 2025   December 31, 2024   September 30, 2024   June 30, 2024   March 31, 2024
                       
    Total shareholders’ equity $ 279,756     $ 267,116     $ 260,050     $ 247,200     $ 239,327  
    Less: goodwill and intangible assets   50,824       50,968       15,967       15,967       15,967  
      $ 228,932     $ 216,148     $ 244,083     $ 231,233     $ 223,360  
    Divided by shares outstanding   5,521       5,518       5,502       5,502       5,500  
    Tangible book value per share $ 41.47     $ 39.17     $ 44.36     $ 42.03     $ 40.61  
                                           

    Tangible Common Equity to Tangible Assets

    Tangible common equity to tangible assets is a non-GAAP ratio that represents total equity less goodwill and intangible assets divided by total assets less goodwill and intangible assets. The most comparable GAAP measure of shareholders’ equity to total assets is calculated by dividing total shareholders’ equity by total assets and the following table sets forth the reconciliation of tangible common equity to tangible assets and shareholders’ equity to total assets for the periods indicated.

    Northrim BanCorp, Inc. March 31, 2025   December 31, 2024   September 30, 2024   June 30, 2024   March 31, 2024
                       
    Total shareholders’ equity $ 279,756     $ 267,116     $ 260,050     $ 247,200     $ 239,327  
    Total assets   3,140,960       3,041,869       2,963,392       2,821,668       2,759,560  
    Total shareholders’ equity to total assets   8.91 %     8.78 %     8.78 %     8.76 %     8.67 %
    Northrim BanCorp, Inc. March 31, 2025   December 31, 2024   September 30, 2024   June 30, 2024   March 31, 2024
    Total shareholders’ equity $ 279,756     $ 267,116     $ 260,050     $ 247,200     $ 239,327  
    Less: goodwill and other intangible assets, net   50,824       50,968       15,967       15,967       15,967  
    Tangible common shareholders’ equity $ 228,932     $ 216,148     $ 244,083     $ 231,233     $ 223,360  
                       
    Total assets $ 3,140,960     $ 3,041,869     $ 2,963,392     $ 2,821,668     $ 2,759,560  
    Less: goodwill and other intangible assets, net   50,824       50,968       15,967       15,967       15,967  
    Tangible assets $ 3,090,136     $ 2,990,901     $ 2,947,425     $ 2,805,701     $ 2,743,593  
    Tangible common equity ratio   7.41 %     7.23 %     8.28 %     8.24 %     8.14 %
                                           
    Contact:     Mike Huston, President, CEO, and COO
    (907) 261-8750
    Jed Ballard, Chief Financial Officer
    (907) 261-3539
         

    Note Transmitted on GlobeNewswire on April 23, 2025, at 12:15 pm Alaska Standard Time.

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Security: Coast Guard detains 12 Mexican fishermen, seizes 1,400 pounds of illegally caught fish off Texas coast

    Source: United States Coast Guard

     News Release  

    U.S. Coast Guard 8th District Public Affairs Detachment Texas
    Contact: 8th District Public Affairs Detachment Texas
    Office: 281-464-4810
    After Hours: 832-293-1293
    PA Detachment Texas online newsroom

     

    04/23/2025 02:50 PM EDT

    CORPUS CHRISTI, Texas — The Coast Guard interdicted and detained 12 Mexican fishermen engaged in illegal fishing and seized approximately 1,400 pounds of fish in federal waters off southern Texas, Monday.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI NGOs: Peru: Enacted law hinders freedom of expression and association and jeopardizes access to justice for victims

    Source: Amnesty International –

    Lima, 15 April 2025

    Amnesty International rejects the recent enactment of the law that modifies the creation of the Peruvian Agency for International Cooperation (APCI), a norm that violates freedom of expression, freedom of association and access to justice for hundreds of victims in Peru.

    On the grounds of seeking to strengthen the work of the APCI, this law proposes undue control over the work of civil society organizations, which leaves the door open to arbitrary decisions, discretionality and the censoring of voices that are critical of and inconvenient for those in power, and can undermine the accountability of the state.

    During the act marking the enactment of this law, President Dina Boluarte declared that it would “place under comprehensive review a minority of NGOs that act against the interests of our country, sowing hatred and attacking our system”.

    “We are concerned that the president of Peru is enacting a norm that is contrary to human rights, as well as the language used in the announcement. The highest authority in the country is sending a message that it will not accept criticism or dissenting voices, in a discourse that is contrary to freedom of expression and any voice considered critical of state policies and decisions. It is unfortunate that the president should publicly stigmatize civil society organizations,” said Marina Navarro, director of Amnesty International Peru.

    We are concerned that the president of Peru is enacting a norm that is contrary to human rights, as well as the language used in the announcement. The highest authority in the country is sending a message that it will not accept criticism or dissenting voices, in a discourse that is contrary to freedom of expression and any voice considered critical of state policies and decisions. It is unfortunate that the president should publicly stigmatize civil society organizations

    Marina Navarro, director of Amnesty International Peru

    Civil society organizations are already subject to permanent monitoring and oversight procedures, which is essential for transparency in their work. However, the excessive control proposed under the approved amendment, given the discretionality that public officials will be able to exert over the work of human rights organizations, can promote self-censorship and unduly limit the issues and strategies these organizations work on.

    Amnesty International also expresses its concern about the access to justice of hundreds of victims of human rights violations, since the law establishes as a “very serious” offence the use of development funds to advise, finance or assist administrative or judicial actions in national or international instances against the Peruvian state. This measure, in addition to undermining the right of access to justice for those who cannot afford the costs associated with lengthy and onerous legal proceedings, may result in the imposition of sanctions that lead to the closure of organizations and undermine the right to defend human rights.

    “We would like to point out once again that the reduction of civic space puts many advances made in human rights at risk. Civil society organizations can serve as a counterbalance when the state violates human rights, as they make injustices visible, defend and assist people in need, and propose concrete solutions with expert knowledge based on experience,” said Ana Piquer, Americas director at Amnesty International.

    We would like to point out once again that the reduction of civic space puts many advances made in human rights at risk. Civil society organizations can serve as a counterbalance when the state violates human rights, as they make injustices visible, defend and assist people in need, and propose concrete solutions with expert knowledge based on experience

    Ana Piquer, Americas director at Amnesty International

    The organization urges the authorities to repeal this norm and respect the international human rights treaties to which Peru is a party.

    MIL OSI NGO

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2023, Section VI – European Economic and Social Committee – A10-0054/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    2. MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    with observations forming an integral part of the decision on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2023, Section VI – European Economic and Social Committee

    (2024/2025(DEC))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to its decision on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2023, Section VI – European Economic and Social Committee,

     having regard to Rule 102 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0054/2025),

    A. whereas in the context of the discharge procedure, the discharge authority wishes to stress the particular importance of further strengthening the democratic legitimacy of the Union institutions by improving transparency and accountability, and by implementing the concept of performance-based budgeting and good governance of human resources;

    B. whereas the European Economic and Social Committee (the ‘Committee’) is an advisory body of the Union providing a forum for consultation, dialogue and consensus among representatives of the various economic, social and civil components of organised civil society from the Member States;

    C. whereas the Committee contributes to the Union decision-making process and, by ensuring links between Union policies and economic, social and civic circumstances, it pursues its missions of better law making, participatory democracy from the bottom up and the promotion of European values;

    D. whereas the consultation of the Committee by the Commission or the Council is mandatory in certain cases, and the Committee may also adopt opinions on its own initiative while enjoying a wide area for referral as defined by the Single European Act, the Maastricht Treaty and the Amsterdam Treaty, allowing it to be consulted by Parliament;

    E. whereas the Committee’s commission for financial and budgetary affairs (CAF) is the Committee’s supervisory body for all budgetary procedures and, in particular, the establishment of the budget estimates, the budget implementation, the annual activity report, the discharge and the follow up to the annual report of the Court of Auditors (the ‘Court’);

    F. whereas in the last years the Committee has taken initiatives to attract and retain skilled staff, optimise its organisational structure and working methods and promote a respectful working environment, in the context of a limited budget;

    1. Notes that the budget of the Committee falls under MFF heading 7 ’European public administration’, which amounted to a total of EUR 12,3 billion, i.e. 6,4 % of Union budget spending, in 2023; notes that, in 2023, the budget of the Committee represented 1,29 % of MFF heading 7 appropriations;

    2. Notes that the Court o, in its Annual Report  for the financial year 2023 (the ‘Court’s report’), examined a sample of 70 transactions under Heading 7, of which 21 (30 %) contained errors; further notes that for five of those errors, which were quantified by the Court, the Court estimated a level of error below the materiality threshold;

    3. Notes from the Court’s report that administrative expenditure includes expenditure on human resources including pensions, which in 2023 accounted for about 70 % of the total administrative expenditure, and on buildings, equipment, energy, communications and information technology; welcomes the fact that the Court concluded, as it did in previous years, that, overall, administrative spending is low risk; notes that the Court did not identify any specific issue concerning the Committee in 2023;

    Budgetary and financial management

    4. Notes that the final adopted budget for the Committee was EUR 158 767 970 in 2023, representing an overall increase of 4,1 % compared to 2022; notes from the Committee’s replies to the questionnaire submitted by the Committee on Budgetary Control for the 2023 budgetary discharge (the ‘Questionnaire’) and the Committee’s annual activity report for 2023 (the ‘Annual report’) that the remuneration and allowances budget line (expenses with Committee’s staff and Members) increased by 8,4 % between 2022 and 2023 due to the inflation; notes from the Questionnaire that the budget for outside assistance for the operation, development and maintenance of software systems increased by 33,70 % from 2022 to 2023 due to the Committee having made the implementation of its digital strategy for 2024-2026 a priority in 2023; notes that, otherwise, the distribution of appropriations across other budget lines in the Committee’s 2023 budget remained comparable to previous years’ distribution;

    5. Notes with satisfaction that the rate of the Committee’s budget implementation of current year commitment appropriations increased further from 96,12 % in 2022 to 98,70 % in 2023, leaving behind the lower budgetary implementation in previous years due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the related travel restrictions; notes further that the current year payment appropriations execution rate increased from 88,12 % in 2022 to 90,67 % in 2023; notes that the average payment time in 2023 was 20,14 days, higher than in 2022 (i.e. 18,34 days);

    6. Notes that the carry-over of appropriations from 2023 to 2024 amounted to EUR 13 827 713 (i.e. approx. 8,70 % of the Committee’s budget for 2023), which represents a decrease from the previous year’s level of EUR 20 162 518 (i.e. approx. 13 % of the Committee’s budget for 2022); notes further with appreciation that the rate of implementation of the appropriations carried over from 2022 to 2023 was 86,76 % in 2023, compared to 76,91 % in 2022; encourages the Committee to continue the efficient use of the provided funds;

    7. Notes that the Committee’s own services launched 12 negotiated procedures below EUR 60 000 in 2022, mainly for case studies, studies and logistical support; notes that the Committee also launched six procurement procedures with the joint services shared with the European Committee of the Regions (the ‘CoR’) mainly in the field of logistics and maintenance;

    8. Notes that, in 2023, the Committee continued to improve the cost-effectiveness of its activities, including through hybrid work, increased teleworking, full dematerialisation of financial circuits and reduced energy consumption; notes from the Questionnaire that the Committee achieved financial savings of EUR 65 000 in 2023 due to a reduction in energy consumption; commends the Committee for having signed a new framework contract for medical checks that provides for lower prices, increased flexibility and better service overall than the previous contract; acknowledges the significant budgetary and administrative savings achieved by the Committee through interinstitutional cooperation, notably the joint services with the CoR and the outsourcing (Service level agreements) of specific services to the Commission in the handling of HR and the use of financial and HR management IT tools, as well as the participation in interinstitutional procurement procedures led by other institutions; notes from the Questionnaire that the total cost incurred by the Committee for the outsourcing of specific services to the Commission increased from EUR 743 600 in 2022 to EUR 793 000 in 2023;

    9. Recalls that the Council decision of 25 May 2023 set the allowance for remote attendance of members of the Committee at non-statutory meetings at EUR 145 per remote meeting per day, which represents 50 % of the daily allowance for physical participation in 2023; considers that despite remote attendance being an important instrument for modern institutions given that, inter alia, it reduces the costs of meetings and allows broader participation, the allocation of an allowance for remote attendance of meetings, even if reduced and intended only for some types of events, is difficult to understand for the public, even more so when taking into consideration the difference paid to the members of the Committee and members of the CoR for remote attendance; notes with satisfaction from the Committee’s follow-up report to Parliament’s resolution on the implementation of the Committee’s budget for 2022 (the ‘Follow-up report’) that the application of that decision has already produced budgetary savings of EUR 1 677 000 due to lower travel costs and allowances paid, as well as environmental savings of some 553,66 tons of CO2, due to less travel in 2023; notes from the Annual report that the number of reimbursed meetings days attended remotely was 2006 (6 259 in 2022), with an average duration of 3 hours per meeting for a total cost of EUR 294 930 in 2023 (EUR 922 925 in 2022); welcomes multiple checks carried out by the Committee to prove the remote attendance of members prior to the payment of the allowance;

    10. Notes that the impact of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine continued to put pressure on the Committee’s budget in 2023, through rising inflation and salary adjustments, challenges in building projects due to delays and higher raw material prices, the indexation of rental contracts (+10,3 % in 2023 compared to 2022), as well as indexation of maintenance and security service contracts (+13,50 % in 2023 compared to 2021); notes in particular that the energy costs increased from EUR 726 000 to EUR 3 125 000 between 2021 and 2022, before decreasing to EUR 1 923 391 in 2023; acknowledges the 2 % cap for non-salary-related expenses; commends in this context the Committee for its initiative in addressing challenges at budgetary level by e.g. implementing energy-saving strategies through short-term, as well as medium- and long-term measures, thus not needing an amending budget in 2023;

    11. Notes a decrease in the current year appropriations for budget line 1004 (expenditure for Member’s travel, including subsistence and meetings allowances) from EUR 19,790 million in 2022 (of which EU 15,895 million were paid) to EUR 19,761 million in 2023 (of which EU 18,344 million were paid); notes with satisfaction an improvement in the implementation rate of those appropriations from 80,31 % in 2022 to 92,83 % in 2023; notes that the Committee President participated in 35 missions totalling EUR 71 926 in 2023 against 26 missions totalling EUR 38 042 in 2022;

    12. Notes from the Questionnaire that the Joint Directorate for Innovation and Information Technology of the Committee and the CoR allocates some 3 % of its IT budget to cybersecurity which is far from the 10 % target provided for in the relevant legislation; calls on the co-legislators and the Commission to take this into account in the framework of the annual budgetary procedure;

    Internal management, performance and internal control

    13. Notes from the Annual report that, as part of its annual work programme for 2023, the Committee had a total of 31 objectives designed for all entities of its administration and, as part of the general secretariat’s strategy for 2021-2025, the Committee has five core values and five key strategic objectives; notes from the Questionnaire that the number of opinions produced and participations in high-level meetings are key indicators for measures the Committee’s performance; takes note from the Questionnaire that the Committee has performance indicators in various areas, such as IT, HR, translation and communication; asks the Committee to include in its future reporting a list of all key performance indicators and objectives, per activity, as well as the target ( %) set for achieving them and the level ( %) of their achievement;

    14. Notes that the Committee pursues its mission through opinions, which refer to legislative proposals made by the Commission (referrals), own-initiative opinions, which call on the Union institutions to take action, and exploratory opinions, which feed into the Commission’s work on its planned initiatives, and that the Committee’s positions can be highlighted in resolutions or included in evaluation and information reports; commends the Committee for its performance in assisting Parliament, the Council and the Commission in the legislative cycle in 2023; notes in that context that, in 2023, the Committee adopted 213 opinions and reports, an increase from 202 in 2022 and organised 146 hearings and 23 conferences, compared to 116 and 29 in 2022, respectively; notes that Committee’s members participated in 429 high-level meetings, summits and conferences in 2023 compared to 345 in 2022;

    15. Appreciates that the Committee has taken action in 2023 to improve the visibility and impact of its work in connection with the format of its opinions, the methodology for follow-up opinions, cooperation with Parliament and the Commission and other projects of transversal nature, as well as innovative initiatives such as the EU Youth test, the enlargement candidate member initiative and the European Circular Economy Stakeholder Platform, among other;

    16. Commends the initiatives undertaken by the Committee aimed at fostering the active engagement of youth in the policy-making process;

    17. Welcomes the pilot project implemented between September 2022 and April 2023 with the aim of strengthening the follow-up of selected opinions in respect of all institutions, whereas 19 opinions were selected for reinforced follow-up under that project; notes from the Questionnaire the overall positive results of that pilot project, such as improving the Committee’s capacity to undertake follow-up actions, improved prioritisation of Committee’s work and increased outreach and impact of the opinions selected;

    18. Highlights that the efficient management of limited resources remained a key challenge throughout 2023 due to staffing constraints, compounded by increased activities under a continuous stable staffing policy; notes the Committee’s plan to introduce a new approach to strategic workforce planning and staff allocation, leveraging data collection on staff skills, active listening across the organisation, and reflections on strategic priorities by the Committee’s political bodies; invites the Committee to keep the Parliament informed of the outcome of this new plan, as this it could inspire other institutions who face similar, recurrent challenges resources wise;

    19. Notes with regard to internal control standards (ICS), that the 2023 compliance exercise showed improvements compared to 2022; notes in that context that compliance, namely the extent to which the requirements of the 16 ICS are implemented, increased from 80,30 % in 2022 to 87,40 % in 2023, while effectiveness, namely the extent to which the implementation of those requirements works as intended, increased from 74 % in 2022 to 78,10 % in 2023; notes further that the 2023 annual risk assessment exercise showed that the application of internal controls decreased inherent risks (in category ‘critical’ and ‘very important’) by 53 %, from 40 to 19, in 2023;

    20. Notes that a restructuration of the Internal Audit Service (IAS) took place in 2023, strengthening its compliance with international audit standards and streamlining and documenting all its process;

    21 Notes that, in the area of financial transactions, the Committee’s internal audit service (IAS) adopted a new decision on the assessment of risks for the implementation of a simplified procedure in the beginning of 2023; notes further that the Committee’s Bureau adopted a new internal audit charter and an audit committee charter including procedural rules in 2023;

    22. Notes from the Annual report and the Questionnaire that in 2023, the IAS launched four audits, namely on meeting authorisations, selecting the consultative commission on Industrial change, strategic cycle and duration and distance allowances for Committee’s members; calls on the Committee to keep the discharge authority informed on the outcome of those audits and implement all open recommendations resulted from previous audits (on institutional deadlines, interpreting, verification, ethics and integrity, statutory rights and payment times);

    Human resources, equality and staff well-being

    23. Notes that, at the end of 2023, the Committee was employing 707 staff members, compared to 706 in 2022; notes further that 49 contract agents and 130 temporary agents (of which 52 recruited in 2023) were employed in 2023 (compared to 50 contract agents and 128 temporary agents in 2022); notes, in addition, that the Committee was employing 12 interim agents and 10 external staff working intra muros, excluding external services providers in the fields of logistics and IT; takes note that the occupation rate was 95,50 % in 2023 compared to 95,10 % in 2022 and the staff turnover rate was 7 % in 2023;

    24. Welcomes the ongoing efforts of the Committee to improve its HR framework with a view to becoming an attractive employer and a workplace, where every individual is valued and can fully develop their potential; notes that as part of implementing its HR strategy for 2023-2025, the Committee delivered on several key milestones in 2023, with new decisions being adopted on working conditions (hybrid working, overtime, special leave), diversity and inclusion strategy and action plan for 2023-2027, staff mobility and the methodology on sensitive posts, as well as on staff appraisal and promotions system, among other; notes with satisfaction the positive results of the staff satisfaction survey published in May 2023, whereby both staff and managers expressed high levels of satisfaction with various HR related, matters in particular on working arrangements, a topic on which it appears the Committee has found the perfect balance;

    25. Notes that the Committee became a net importer of talent (from other institutions) for the second consecutive year as a result of implementing a targeted attractiveness and retention plan; acknowledges nevertheless persistent challenges due to reliance on temporary agents amid a shortfall of EPSO reserve lists, posing risks to expertise retention; underlines the importance of permanent staff in maintaining skills, continuity and productive working environment; recommends the Committee to implement initiatives to respond to those challenges by, for example, organising internal competitions;

    26. Notes that with a view to better distributing its scarce resources, an external HR mapping audit, commissioned by the Committee, was finalised in 2023; notes with concern that the results of that audit confirmed the heavy workload in many different services across the Committee, thus putting at risk the fulfilment of the Committee’s mission and obligations; calls on the Committee to implement that audit’s recommendations, including revising the appraisal and performance system by 2025, adopting the new working conditions decision, and conducting regular staff engagement monitoring; stresses the importance of strategic workforce planning to optimize resource allocation, ensure alignment with the high-level priorities set by political authorities and continue its cost-efficiency efforts;

    27. Notes that in 2023 the positive trends initiated in 2022 in relation to recruitment of staff continued; commends the Committee for the actions taken in this area such as the alignment of publication of vacancy posts with the publication of new EPSO reserve lists or the publication of job opportunities on the Committee’s website and Linkedin, among other; asks the Committee to keep Parliament informed of the outcome of its pilot project on employer branding activities; underlines that the on-boarding of newcomers constitutes an important factor of strategic alignment by ensuring that staff are informed of the rules and strategies in place in an institution; commends the Committee for having strengthened the on-boarding of new staff members in 2023 through an updated welcome booklet and on-boarding letter, a welcome pack with eco-friendly goodies, a feedback loop on the on-boarding experience, improved welcome session timing, a revamped Newcomers’ Corner, and on-boarding tips for managers;

    28. Recalls that the Committee adopted Decision 282/23A, effective 1 January 2024, establishing a flexible, trust-based hybrid working policy while offering staff an improved work-life balance and enhancing adaptability and efficiency; asks the Committee to inform the discharge authority about the developments in this regard in timely manner;

    29. Welcomes the appointment of a female Secretary-General in January 2024 as a positive development towards achieving gender balance; regrets however that the percentage of women in senior management remained low in 2023, with  only two out of seven senior management positions currently being held by women; welcomes nevertheless that the Committee considers the gender balance of its staff and in particular in the senior management as an important factor and invites the Committee to swiftly improve the situation at the highest levels of the Committee, by ensuring a balanced representation in line with the Committee’s commitments to diversity and inclusion;

    30. Regrets that the Committee was unable to provide data on cases of burnout in 2023 and rejects the Committee’s position expressed in its follow-up report whereby burnout as such is not a recognised medical diagnosis and the reasons for burnout may be manifold; recalls the importance of statistical data on burnout with the aim ofhelping to take decisions on staff well-being, which should be also based on lessons learned from past very unfortunate experiences, and on external evaluations of the current framework; acknowledges data protection constraints but stresses the value of anonymised statistical data to support informed managerial decisions; notes with concern the findings highlighting heavy workloads in several services due to limited human resources; welcomes the adoption of new working arrangements as a positive step, but encourages the Committee to take further steps to ensure the publication of anonymised data on burnout cases;

    31. Notes that, in 2023, the Committee was employing staff members from all Member States, with some of them being overrepresented (e.g. Belgium, Italy.); notes that in 2023 24 % of managers employed by the Committee were from the 13 Member States that joined the Union after 2004, which represents a slight increase compared to 21 % in 2022 and 19 % in 2021; reiterates its encouragement to the Committee to continue to take action to reach a proper geographical distribution within its staff, with a particular focus on management level;

    32. Welcomes the Committee’s efforts to create a healthy work environment for its staff members; commends particularly the emphasis placed by the Committee on mental and physical health of staff, and the efforts made with regard to awareness-raising about health-related issues; notes the Committee’s measures on the management of sick leave, such as medical part-time and extended remote working, to ensure that staff on long-term sickness related absence return to work in a timely fashion, as well as an increase in the percentage of staff with no absences from 27 % in 2022 to 30 % in 2023; observes with satisfaction that the Committee arranged a free of charge skin cancer screening campaign on the Committee’s premises where 104 staff members over four days were consulted by external dermatologists in 2023;

    Ethical framework and transparency

    33. Welcomes the adoption of the new diversity and inclusion strategy, effective until 2027; commends the specific awareness-raising actions on disability undertaken in early 2024; notes with satisfaction that diversity and inclusion training remains mandatory for managers and recommended for staff; acknowledges the Committee’s strong commitment to fostering a fully inclusive workplace; encourages the Committee to take further steps to monitor the representation of employees with disabilities and ensure the publication of anonymised data in this regard;

    34. Notes that the Committee continued its internal reform process with the adoption of a decision on the general implementing provisions on administrative investigations and implementing rules for disciplinary proceedings in 2023; commends the Committee for having taken this last step necessary to fully implement the measures for a reinforced ethical framework of the Committee; notes from the Follow-up report that the Committee and the internal auditor have agreed on an action plan relating to the audit of the Committee’s ethics and integrity, with eight recommendations implemented and closed and two recommendations still open to be implemented by March 2025; asks the Committee to keep the discharge authority informed on the progress made in this matter;

    35. Notes that the Committee continued to train staff and raise awareness about topics related to whistleblowing, conflicts of interest and other ethical issues in 2023: notes in this context with satisfaction the results of the staff engagement survey carried out in 2023 showing a high awareness rate among staff, with regard to the Committee’s ethical framework, in particular on the networks of confidential counsellors (93 %) and ethics counsellors (83 %); observes that the Committee organised 12 training sessions on those topics with a total participation of 79 staff members in 2023; commends the Committee for organising compulsory training on respect and dignity at work for all staff, including managers;

    36. Notes that one harassment complaint was reported in 2023 and closed the same year, as a result of investigation and mediation by the Committee, without sanctions being imposed; recalls that the Committee is a civil party in the ongoing legal proceedings initiated by Belgian national authorities against a former member accused of misconduct that is currently before the Belgian courts; asks the Committee to inform Parliament about developments in that case; believes that fostering a culture of respect and dignity, supported by a zero-tolerance policy on harassment, is crucial to prevent future allegations and to ensure a safe and inclusive working environment within the Committee;

    37. Reiterates that a zero-tolerance policy against harassment is needed to protect the wellbeing of staff and is a duty of any employer; reminds that in addressing harassment claims a lesson learned approach should be put in place in order to avoid any possible wrongdoing; still considers that an external and independent investigation into the case currently under legal proceeding would be beneficial to improve the Committee’s reaction to similar cases;

    38. Appreciates the Committee’s readiness to cooperate with the Union’s investigative bodies, namely the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) and the Ombudsman; notes that two OLAF cases were opened in 2023, both of which were dismissed in the same year: one for lack of sufficient evidence and the other referred to the Committee for follow-up; asks the Committee to keep the discharge authority informed of the progress made in the second case; notes further that the Ombudsman opened an enquiry in 2023 in relation to the management of a case involving allegations of harassment; asks the Committee to inform the discharge authority of the outcome of that enquiry;

    39. Notes with satisfaction the Committee’s work towards more transparency in its activities in 2023; notes in that context the adoption of a decision broadening the range of documents available online via the Transparency Register, such as the Committee’s meeting minutes and attendance lists, as well as a decision requesting the Committee’s members to meet only registered stakeholders, publish their list of meetings and attach their “legislative footprint” to their opinions; appreciates that the Committee publishes online information on its annual budget, performance indicators, expenditure or public procurement; calls for the publication of all meetings held by EESC members with third parties;

    40. Noes with satisfaction that the Committee has put solid rules and procedures in place to prevent conflicts of interests and avoid revolving doors with regard to staff who engage in outside activities or members who take on jobs after no longer being a Committee member; notes in this context that the Committee has introduced a new “Declaration of financial interests form” in 2023; notes that the form is to be declared by members, delegates, alternates and advisors for both their remunerated and non-remunerated posts or activities outside the Committee; commends further the Committee for its involvement in 2023 in the political negotiations to create the Inter-institutional Ethics Body tasked with setting ethical standards to strengthen transparency and integrity;

    41. Notes that the Committee Bureau, on 21 March 2023, adopted several transparency measures in accordance with the principles laid down with respect to the EU Transparency Register, such as a recommendation for office-holding members to only meet with registered stakeholders, the obligation for office holding members to publish their lists of meetings and a voluntary ‘legislative footprint’ for rapporteurs; notes that several actions were taken to implement the Bureau decision, including the issuing of a service note laying down practical modalities for the implementation of the decision, an awareness training campaign, and the provisions of template messages to be included in correspondence between Committee members and external stakeholders encouraging to join the EU Transparency Register (if applicable);

    42. Urges the EESC to implement real-time tracking of declared conflicts of interest, requiring all members and senior staff to publicly disclose financial interests, assets, and external affiliations annually, to prevent undue influence on decision-making;

    43. Notes an absence of cases in areas of fraud, conflicts of interest and whistleblowing in 2023; notes that the effectiveness of the Committee’s anti-fraud measures was reviewed in order to develop an anti-fraud strategy which is still missing despite several requests from Parliament in its discharge resolutions to take action to improve the overall anti-fraud system; recalls the importance of a comprehensive anti-fraud strategy and calls on the Committee to keep the discharge authority informed of the outcome of that exercise that should have culminated with the adoption of an anti-fraud strategy in 2024;

    Digitalisation, cybersecurity and data protection

    44. Notes that the combined IT budget of both the Committee and the CoR was EUR 12 700 000 in 2023, compared to EUR 11 712 000 in 2022, i.e. an increase of 8,4 %, whereas EUR 350 000 of that budget (or 3 % thereof) was paid for cybersecurity in 2023; notes further that 6,24 % of the Committee’s total budget for 2023 represented expenditure for actions implementing the new ‘Digital Strategy 2024-2026’ (DS2026) prepared by the Joint Directorate for Innovation and Information Technology (DIIT) in 2023;

    45. Notes that DS2026 envisions a future where technology integrates with the Committee’s core mission, focusing on efficiency, speed, and continuous digital evolution, putting both administration and members at the centre of digital transformation and aiming to improve service delivery, empowerment, and adaptability; notes that DS2026 is structured around eight objectives, eight key principles and four major projects such as the adoption of Ares and EdiT which are expected to be rolled out in 2026 and 2025, respectively; notes with satisfaction from the Questionnaire the progress made by DIIT in implementing DS2026 in 2023, with actions taken such as the adoption of staff guidelines on artificial intelligence, integration of amendment flows with translation tools and establishment of a project management office, among many other;

    46. Notes from the Annual report the Committee’s actions in the area of protection of personal data and its processing; notes that in 2023 the Committee created a new online version of its register of records and a new joint register of records with the CoR, whereas the former had 121 records and the latter had 25 records at the end of 2023; notes further that the Committee adopted a new procedure for handling data breaches, published a data protection guide and implemented several awareness-raising initiatives for its staff and members in 2023; notes lastly that the EDPS launched one enquiry in 2023 related to the management of an external audit, and continued an older enquiry on the use of cloud services under the Cloud II contracts by Union institutions, whereas for both enquiries the conclusions are still pending; asks the Committee to keep the discharge authority informed on the follow-up on these matters;

    47. Notes that the Committee finalised in 2023 its project for the equipment of all its meetings rooms, whereas an additional 14 such rooms were equipped with technologies that make them fully operational in hybrid mode; appreciates that the Committee conducted all procurement procedures for high value contracts in a fully digitalised way, used the Qualified electronic signature for any type of contractual agreements and provided trainings to staff on the transition to the Public Procurement Management Tool system and the Funding and Tenders Portal in 2023;

    48. Commends the Committee for its concrete actions to ensure its staff acquire the necessary digital skills in an increasingly digitalised workplace in 2023; notes in this context the activities, such as “mini-hackatons”, organised in the framework of a peer-to-peer network established with the CoR to foster better use and understanding of collaborative digital tools, as well as peer-to-peer coaching and experience exchanges; notes that the outcome of those activities was integrated into the Committee’s training offer;

    49. Notes that in October 2023 guidelines for staff members on the use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) were adopted, that an information session was provided for all staff members, highlighting opportunities and challenges, and that further communication to staff members was provided through knowledge-based articles on the Committee’s intranet to raise awareness; 

    50. Notes that the work continued adopting and applying the NIST Cybersecurity Framework within both the Committee and the CoR in 2023, whereas the actions taken that year focused on some of that framework’s principles, i.e. protect and detect principles; notes that mitigation strategies are implemented using the “Essential Eight” Cybersecurity Framework; notes further that the Committee did not encounter any cyber-attacks in 2023, but it did encounter brief Denial of Service (DoS) attacks against the Committee’s externally hosted corporate websites at the end of 2022 and the start of 2024;

    51. Urges the EESC to increase its cybersecurity budget to at least 10% of its total IT expenditures in line with EU cybersecurity directives, ensuring enhanced protection against cyber threats, especially for sensitive data related to policy and budgetary matters;

    Buildings

    52. Acknowledges receipt of the Committee’s report of 3 June 2024 informing the discharge authority about the Committee’s building policy, in compliance with Article 266(1) of the Union’s Financial Regulation; notes with satisfaction from that report that the Committee, with the CoR, achieved one of the major priorities of their 2017 Building Strategy, i.e. “geographical concentration of the buildings”; notes further that this achievement already brought savings due to the lower cost of renting the entire VMA compared to the three buildings previously rented; understands that those savings are approx. EUR 1,8 million, which,- according to that report, is equivalent to the rent paid for the B100 building; notes that the Committee is currently working on the update of its 2017 long-term building strategy, and that this work should be finished by the end of 2025; calls on the Committee to keep the discharge authority informed on the outcome of this exercise;

    53. Welcomes the finalisation of renovations (i.e. fitting-out works) of the newly acquired VMA building, which included the installation of smart energy saving technologies; supports the Committee’s plan to carry out technical and environmental audits of all its buildings, whereas the outcome of those audits should allow for the identification of all technical installations and building components that need to be fully or partially renovated or kept as they are, thereby aligning with the European Green Deal objectives; invites the Committee to update the discharge authority on the outcome of those audits and their follow-up;

    54. Notes that the task force on “new ways of working”, established in 2022, issued a first prospective report in 2023, focusing on the available office spaces and possible optimisation options; notes the Committee’s plan to continue that exercise with a participatory process with staff members to co-design the future workspaces; invites the Committee to keep the discharge authority informed on the progress made on this matter;

    55. Welcomes the commitment of the Committee and the CoR to systematically apply the “design for all” principle to their infrastructure, ensuring accessibility of their building by design; notes that the two committees took a range of different measures to ensure accessibility of their buildings to people with various kinds of disabilities in 2023, including upon modernisation of its elevators in the JDE building;

    Environment and sustainability

    56. Welcomes the Committee’s green practices and commends the further reduction of gas, electricity and water consumption and carbon emissions and an increase in the recycling rate in connection with the Committee’s activities in 2023 compared to 2019; notes a slight deterioration, compared to 2019 levels, of the rate of waste volume, from -66 % in 2022 to -56 % in 2023 due to higher office presence;

    57. Notes that the energy efficiencies and emissions reductions have been achieved through investments in innovative energy-efficient building installations, including through smart energy saving technologies installed in the VMA building, the purchase of 100 % green electricity, the introduction of (customised) environmental criteria in all tender procedures with value of EUR 60 000 or more, the use of paperless workflows and other measures such as reducing the operating hours for lighting, reducing the winter reference temperature in all buildings to 19 degrees or closing buildings in periods of low staff presence, among many other measures; notes that the reduction in the Committee’s energy consumption corresponds to a 3,4 % rate and a financial gain of EUR 65 395;

    58. Notes from the Follow-up report that the smart energy saving technologies installed in the recently renovated VMA building contributed to a reduction in the Committee’s energy consumption (gas and electricity) of 20 % to 30 % in 2023; reiterates however its call on the Committee to provide the Parliament with an update on the return on investments of those technological installations;

    59. Welcomes that the Committee adopted an energy-saving strategy, with short-, medium- and long-term measures; notes in this context that the Committee started an environmental audit of all its buildings in order to identify, among other, the level of the energy performance of the current structures and pieces of equipment, as well as estimate the environmental return of the necessary investments compared to the overall costs (maintenance, consumption etc.) over a 30-year period; notes further that studies on energy efficiency measures are planned for 2024 and 2025; calls on the Committee to keep the discharge authority informed on the progress made on those matters;

    60. Recalls that in 2022, the electricity produced by Committee’s solar panels was 15,5 MWH or 0,25 % of the Committee’s yearly consumption, whereas in 2023 the same figure decreased to 5,75 MWh; notes with satisfaction from the Questionnaire that the Committee is leading by example with regard to measures and actions taken in favour of sustainable mobility;

    Interinstitutional cooperation

    61. Commends the close cooperation established by the Committee with the CoR at administrative level, through the new cooperation agreement signed in 2022, whereby the two committees share premises and joint services in the areas of translation, infrastructure, logistics, security, procurement, financial management and IT, while maintaining full institutional autonomy; welcomes the positive development in 2023 when the two committee further agreed on the development and funding of a shared communication area with joint-audio visual facilities in the JDE building; asks the Committee to identify and inform the Parliament on the budgetary savings made during the first year of implementing that agreement in the audio-visual area; reiterates its call on the Committee to pursue and expand that cooperation in other areas with a view to avoiding duplication and further rationalising the operating costs of services available in the premises shared by the Committee and the CoR; invites the Committee and the CoR to explore the possibility of setting up a single administration for their joint services, keeping separate directorates or units for the services dealing with matters related to their specific and independent mandates; encourages the Committee and the CoR to continue their efforts to develop further cooperation and synergies;

    62. Observes that budgetary savings and efficiency gains continued to be realised through active cooperation between the Committee and other Union institutions in 2023, including by organising the Committee’s plenary sessions on Commission and Parliament premises, where the venues and associated services are provided either free of charge or at rates below external market prices;

    63. Notes with satisfaction that the Committee and Parliament re-negotiated in 2023 and signed in 2024 their inter-institutional agreement, whereas the agreement aims to provide more relevant and timely contributions throughout the legislative cycle and to reinforce bilateral cooperation; welcomes that the new Protocol of Cooperation of the Committee with the Commission, signed in 2022, already brought improvements to the Committee’s impact for example at pre-legislation phase through exploratory opinions; encourages the further reinforcement of political, legislative, and communication synergies between the Committee and Parliament, particularly in the context of the European Citizens’ Initiative and the European Semester;

    64. Reiterates its appreciation for the outsourcing (Service level agreements) of specific services to the Commission in the handling of HR and the use of financial and HR management IT tools, as well as for the Committee’s participation in inter-institutional procurement procedures led by other institutions, whereby the Committee continued to benefit from synergies in the area of IT, corporate travel, insurance, transportation, translation and audio-visual equipment in 2023;

    65. Notes the Committee’s role in reinforcing the links with and between the national economic and social councils (NESCs) of the Member  States; notes from the Questionnaire the measures that the Committee has taken to reinforce the network of and the online community with the NESCs, such as the establishment of joint working groups and exchange programmes, working on collaborative IT platform, and participation in common events, among others; calls for continued cooperation on topics of common interest and the exchange of good practices, emphasisiziing the vital role of civil society in addressing the Union’s current challenges;

    Communication

    66. Notes that the Committee’s overall budget for communication in 2023 was EUR 2,15 million, an increase compared to EUR 1,5 million in 2022; notes that this budget was primarily allocated to the four flagship events organised in 2023 (European Citizens’ initiative, Your Europe, Your Say! The organic food awards and the 14th Civil Society Prize), the improvement and/or revamping of the Committee’s social media, external website and audio-visual production, as well as for media and press publications; commends the Committee for its communication activities delivering on this communication priorities for 2023, such as the Blue Deal initiative, COP28, the resolution on democracy, and the Committee’s 65th anniversary, among others;

    67. Commends the Committee for its efforts in connection with its strategic communication in 2023; notes that the Committee adopted a new communication strategy aimed at strengthening its image and outreach; notes that, as part of that strategy, the Committee web-streamed its main events, mostly in all Union languages, introduced new communication tools such as the ‘Reporting from the plenary’ video series focused its communication resources on the Committee’s flagship events for 2023 and deployed special efforts to increase its outreach on social media;

    68. Calls on the EESC to strengthen its monitoring and reporting on labour rights, social inclusion, and human rights violations within EU-funded programs, ensuring greater accountability in its advisory functions and policy recommendations;

    69. Notes that the number of the social media followers on the Committee’s corporate platforms increased substantially by 25,000 in 2023; notes that by the end of 2023, the Committee reached 61 416 followers on X, which is an increase of 5 % compared to 2022, 61 761 followers on LinkedIn, which is an increase of 30 % compared to 2022, 46 868 followers on Facebook, which is an increase of 5.3 % compared to 2022 and 17 428 followers on Instagram, which is an increase of 45 % compared to 2022;

    70. Welcomes the Committee’s positive approach towards the use of open-source solutions for its online communication; notes that in July 2023, the Committee opened its first account on the EU Voice Mastodon platform, a decentralised, free and open-source social media network that connects users in a privacy-oriented and advertising-free environment; observes throughout the second half of 2023, that the Committee actively communicated on the Mastodon account, feeding it every working day with posts on its activities and priorities and raising awareness about the Union; takes note of the Committee’s decision to discontinue its presence on that platform as of 2024.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the European Water Resilience Strategy – A10-0073/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on the European Water Resilience Strategy

    (2024/2104(INI))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), in particular Article 191 thereof,

     having regard to the Agreement adopted at the 21st Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP21) in Paris on 12 December 2015 (the Paris Agreement),

     having regard to the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), with particular emphasis on the SDG 6 onclean water and sanitation,

     having regard to the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework, adopted in December 2022,

     having regard to the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants of 22 May 2021,

     having regard to the precautionary principle and the principles that preventive action should be taken, that environmental damage should, as a priority, be rectified at source and that the polluter should pay, as enshrined in Article 191(2) TFEU,

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1119 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 June 2021 establishing the framework for achieving climate neutrality and amending Regulations (EC) No 401/2009 and (EU) 2018/1999 (European Climate Law)[1],

     having regard to Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2000 establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy[2] (Water Framework Directive),

     having regard to Directive 2006/118/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on the protection of groundwater against pollution and deterioration[3] (Groundwater Directive),

     having regard to Directive 2008/105/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on environmental quality standards in the field of water policy, amending and subsequently repealing Council Directives 82/176/EEC, 83/513/EEC, 84/156/EEC, 84/491/EEC, 86/280/EEC and amending Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council[4] (Environmental Quality Standards Directive),

     having regard to Directive 2007/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2007 on the assessment and management of flood risks[5],

     having regard to Directive (EU) 2020/2184 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on the quality of water intended for human consumption[6] (Drinking Water Directive),

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2020/741 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 May 2020 on minimum requirements for water reuse[7] (Water Reuse Regulation),

     having regard to Directive 2008/56/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 establishing a framework for community action in the field of marine environmental policy (Marine Strategy Framework Directive)[8],

     having regard to Directive (EU) 2024/3019 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 November 2024 concerning urban wastewater treatment[9] (revised Urban Wastewater Treatment Directive),

     having regard to Directive (EU) 2024/1785 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 April 2024 amending Directive 2010/75/EU on industrial emissions (integrated pollution prevention and control) and Council Directive 1999/31/EC on the landfill of waste[10],

     having regard to Council Directive 91/676/EEC of 12 December 1991 concerning the protection of waters against pollution caused by nitrates from agricultural sources[11],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1991 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2024 on nature restoration and amending Regulation (EU) 2022/869[12],

     having regard to Directive (EU) 2022/2557 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on the resilience of critical entities and repealing Council Directive 2008/114/EC[13] (Critical Entities Resilience Directive),

     having regard to Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of the European Parliament and of the Council on 14 December 2022 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union, amending Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 and Directive (EU) 2018/1972, and repealing Directive (EU) 2016/1148 (NIS 2 Directive)[14],

     having regard to Directive 2009/128/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 October 2009 establishing a framework for Community action to achieve the sustainable use of pesticides[15],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/2115 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 2 December 2021 establishing rules on support for strategic plans to be drawn up by Member States under the common agricultural policy (CAP Strategic Plans) and financed by the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) and by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1305/2013 and (EU) No 1307/2013[16],

     having regard to Commission Regulation (EU) 2024/3190 of 19 December 2024 on the use of bisphenol A (BPA) and other bisphenols and bisphenol derivatives with harmonised classification for specific hazardous properties in certain materials and articles intended to come into contact with food, amending Regulation (EU) No 10/2011 and repealing Regulation (EU) 2018/213[17],

     having regard to the Commission communication of 19 February 2021 entitled ‘A Vision for Agriculture and Food’ (COM(2025)0075),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 11 December 2019 on the European Green Deal (COM(2019)0640),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 29 January 2025 entitled ‘A Competitiveness Compass for the EU’ (COM(2025)0030),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 12 May 2021 entitled ‘Pathway to a Healthy Planet for All – EU Action Plan: ‘Towards Zero Pollution for Air, Water and Soil’’ (COM(2021)0400),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 24 February 2021 entitled ‘Forging a climate-resilient Europe – the new EU Strategy on Adaptation to Climate Change’ (COM(2021)0082),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 18 July 2007 on addressing the challenge of water scarcity and droughts in the European Union (COM(2007)0414),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 11 March 2020 entitled ‘A new Circular Economy Action Plan: For a cleaner and more competitive Europe’ (COM(2020)0098),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 14 November 2012 entitled ‘A Blueprint to Safeguard Europe’s Water Resources’ (COM(2012)0673),

     having regard to the EU biodiversity strategy for 2030,

     having regard to the COP29 Declaration on Water for Climate Action, endorsed by the European Union,

     having regard to the European Oceans Pact announced by Commission President von der Leyen in her political guidelines for the next European Commission (2024-2029) on 18 July 2024,

     having regard to the European climate adaptation plan and the European water resilience strategy announced by Commission President von der Leyen in her political guidelines for the next European Commission (2024-2029) on 18 July 2024,

     having regard to the EU’s 8th environment action programme,

     having regards to its resolution of 5 October 2022 entitled ‘Access to water as a human right – the external dimension’[18],

     having regard to its resolution of 19 September 2024 on the devastating floods in central and eastern Europe, the loss of lives and the EU’s preparedness to act on such disasters exacerbated by climate change[19],

     having regard to its resolution of 6 October 2022 on momentum for the ocean: strengthening ocean governance and biodiversity[20],

     having regard to its resolution of 28 November 2019 on the climate and environment emergency[21],

     having regard to its resolution of 14 November 2024 on the UN climate change conference in Baku, Azerbaijan (COP29)[22],

     having regard to the Commission report  of 4February 2025 on the implementation of the Water Framework Directive (2000/60/EC) and the Floods Directive (2007/60/EC) entitled ‘Third river basin management plans – Second flood risk management plans’ (COM(2025)0002),

     having regard to the European Court of Auditors special report 15/2024 of 16 October 2024 entitled ‘Climate adaptation in the EU – action not keeping up with ambition’,

     having regard to former Finnish President Sauli Niinistö’s report of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘Safer Together – Strengthening Europe’s civil and military preparedness and readiness’,

     having regard to Enrico Letta’s report of April 2024 entitled ‘Much more than a market’,

     having regard to its resolution of 17 December 2020 on the implementation of the EU water legislation[23],

     having regard to the European Court of Auditors special report 33/2018 of 18 December 2018 entitled ‘Combating desertification in the EU: a growing threat in need of more action,

     having regard to the European citizens’ initiative (ECI) on the right to water,

     having regard to its resolution of 8 September 2015 on the follow-up to the European Citizens’ Initiative Right2Water[24],

     having regard to UN General Assembly Resolution 64/292 of 28 July 2010, which recognises the human right to water and sanitation,

     having regard to the Strategic Dialogue on the future of EU agriculture,

     having regard to the European Court of Auditors special report 20/2024 of 30 September 2024 entitled ‘Common Agricultural Policy Plans – Greener, but not matching the EU’s ambitions for the climate and the environment’,

     having regard to European Environment Agency report 07/2024 of 15 October 2024 entitled ‘Europe’s state of water 2024: the need for improved water resilience’ (EEA Report 07/2024),

     having regard to the Environment Council conclusions of 17 June 2024 on the 8th environment action programme,

     having regard to European Court of Auditors special report 20/2021 of 28 September 2021 entitled ‘Sustainable water use in agriculture: CAP funds more likely to promote greater rather than more efficient water use’,

     having regard to the European Economic and Social Committee declaration of 26 October 2023 for an EU Blue Deal,

     having regard to the Commission proposal of 5 July 2023 for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Soil Monitoring and Resilience (Soil Monitoring Law) (COM(2023)0416),

     having regard to its position  at first reading of 24 April 2024 on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2000/60/EC establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy, Directive 2006/118/EC on the protection of groundwater against pollution and deterioration and Directive 2008/105/EC on environmental quality standards in the field of water policy[25],

     having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development,

     having regard to the report of the Committee on the Environment, Climate and Food Safety (A10-0073/2025),

    A. whereas water is essential for life and humanity; whereas the EU has to manage current and future water resources efficiently and respond effectively to the current water challenges, as they directly affect human health, the environment and its ecosystems, strategic socio-economic activities such as energy production, agriculture and food security, and the EU’s competitiveness;

    B. whereas water is a scarce and limited resource and, while 70 % of the earth’s surface is water-covered, available and usable fresh water accounts for only 0.5 % of water on earth[26]; whereas mountains are real water towers and important freshwater reservoirs in Europe, the Alps alone providing 40 % of Europe’s fresh water[27];

    C. whereas groundwater supplies two thirds of the EU’s drinking water and supports many ecosystems[28]; whereas the services provided by freshwater ecosystems are worth over EUR 11 trillion in Europe, and provide considerable health and recreational benefits, such as from angling[29];

    D. whereas water stress is already occurring in Europe, affecting approximately 20 % of Europe’s territory and 30 % of the population on average every year, figures that are likely to increase in the future on account of climate change[30], despite the fact that total water abstraction at the EU-27 level appeared to decrease by 15 % between 2000 and 2019; whereas the increase in the number and recurrence of extreme weather events such as droughts and floods, and the fact that they are expected to become yet more frequent in the near future, poses a risk to human life and the EU’s food sovereignty and could lead to regions in Europe becoming uninhabitable;

    E. whereas 78 % of Europeans consider that the EU should propose additional measures to address water-related issues in Europe and 21 % of Europeans consider pollution to be the main threat linked to water in their country[31];

    F. whereas the human right to water and sanitation was recognised as a human right in a resolution adopted by the UN General Assembly on 28 July 2010;

    G. whereas the European Citizens’ Initiative Right2Water was the first ever to gather the required number of signatories, calling for the EU to ensure the right to water for all;

    H. whereas the provisions of Article 14 TFEU and Protocol No 26 thereto on Services of General Interest are key elements to be prominently taken into account in all aspects of the design and implementation of the European water resilience strategy (EWRS), thus safeguarding the status of Europe’s water services as essential public services, and ensuring accessibility, equity, affordability and the maintenance of high quality standards;

    I. whereas the Member States should follow up on the recommendations of the Commission report of November 2023[32] in order to improve water balances as the knowledge basis for making decisions about water allocation;

    J. whereas substantive corporate value may be at risk owing to worsening water insecurity, with a decrease in the capacity of production or its complete halt as a consequence; whereas assets in water-stressed regions could become stranded, temporarily or permanently, if assumptions made about water availability and access prove inaccurate, if regulatory responses are unanticipated or if risk mitigation and stewardship plans are not put in place[33];

    K. whereas the deadline set by the Water Framework Directive (WFD) for European rivers, lakes, transitional waters, coastal waters and groundwaters to achieve ‘good’ status was 2015, with a possible postponement to 2027 under certain conditions; whereas the objective of achieving good chemical status for all EU water bodies by 2027 remains far from being achieved, primarily due to substances such as mercury, brominated flame retardants and polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons[34];

    L. whereas the 2025 report on the implementation of the WFD shows that delays in meeting the WFD’s targets are not due to a deficiency in the legislation but to a lack of funding, slow implementation and insufficient integration of environmental objectives into sectoral policies; whereas analysis has shown that the Member States are not meeting the annual investment needs, which are estimated to be EUR 77 billion, with a financing gap currently estimated at around EUR 25 billion a year; whereas the report also shows the clear need for the Member States to increase their level of ambition and accelerate action to reduce the compliance gap as much as possible before 2027, to increase investment and ensure adequate financing, including via EU funds, to achieve the objectives of their programmes of measures, as well as to put in place additional measures to reduce current persistent environmental challenges to and improve transboundary cooperation;

    M. whereas the water legislation has been evaluated as fit for purpose; whereas it establishes a framework for the protection of inland surface waters, transitional waters, coastal waters and groundwater; whereas, at the same time, it allows for less stringent environmental objectives to be achieved if socio-economic needs served by such human activity cannot be achieved by other means and it allows for a failure to achieve the objectives for water bodies if the reason for the failure is overriding public interest; whereas the legislation is proportionate and mandates the authorities of the Member States, in line with the principle of subsidiarity, to decide on the overriding public interest; whereas in some cases this may be the protection of the environment and in others a socio-economic activity;

    N. whereas industry accounts for approximately 40 % of total water abstraction in Europe; whereas the largest categories of the annual water abstraction in the EU-27, according to the statistical classification of economic activities in the European Community (NACE), are abstraction for cooling in electricity generation (34 %), followed by abstraction for agriculture (29 %), public water supply (21 %) and manufacturing (15 %)[35]; whereas data on water abstraction and use in the EU is historical and poor[36];

    O. whereas electricity production is the largest water-abstracting sector, but most of the water is returned to the environment after cooling or turbine propulsion; whereas overall, agriculture is the highest net water-consuming sector at the EU level, as most of the water is consumed by the crop or evaporates; whereas other uses, such as industry and water utilities, abstract and consume comparatively less water, but they can represent significant pressures at a local level, especially on groundwater[37];

    P. whereas all industrial activity requires water to produce its end products or to support production activities; whereas businesses depend on water for their daily operations, and as water scarcity increases, it can disrupt operations, raise costs and create regulatory and reputational risks;

    Q. whereas the energy sector relies heavily on water resources; whereas this dependency poses a serious risk as water scarcity can impact energy production processes and supply security, especially where water is used as feedstock or for cooling; whereas the transition to renewable energy, particularly wind and solar energy, offers sustainable and water-efficient decarbonisation pathways and the opportunity to halt or reverse the trend of increasing water consumption;

    R. whereas water is an essential resource for agriculture in the production of high-quality food, feed and renewable raw materials; whereas agriculture depends on water availability and irrigation helps to shield farmers from irregular rainfall and to increase the viability, yield and quality of the crops, but is a significant drain on water resources; whereas in view of climate change, changing weather patterns and increased frequency of floods and droughts, the importance of water as a resource for the production of high-quality agricultural products and of the need for water to be used efficiently will therefore be fundamental to the security of food supply and to the solutions to address water scarcity; whereas reducing pressure on surface water and groundwater from agriculture must go hand in hand with investment aimed at the use of reclaimed water and innovative desalination technologies, thereby achieving a better water balance as well as promoting clean alternative energies such as green hydrogen;

    S. whereas reliable data on water accounting, that is, the systematic study of the current status and trends in water supply, demand, accessibility and use in domains that have been specified[38], is crucial for an assessment of the current situation in the EU and for European competitiveness;

    T. whereas the potential of wastewater as an alternative water supply is underestimated, given that 60-70 % of the potential value of wastewater across the EU is currently unexploited[39] and less than 3 % of treated wastewater is reused in the EU[40]; whereas there is significant potential for circular approaches to water in households, as only a small amount of the water in households is used for drinking and eating and therefore requires the highest quality standards;

    U. whereas a very large quantity of water is lost due to obsolete or ageing water networks and the lack of necessary maintenance; whereas investment in the maintenance, improvement and development of resilient innovative irrigation infrastructures is essential for reducing and improving the efficiency of water consumption in agriculture; whereas such improvements in efficiency enable the water saved to be used for other purposes or enable the natural flow rates of watercourses to be maintained;

    V. whereas clean and sufficient water is an essential element in implementing and achieving a real sustainable circular economy in the EU;

    W. whereas water leakage is an underestimated global issue, which significantly exacerbates water scarcity, with an average of 23 % of treated water lost during distribution in the EU due to leaky pipes, outdated treatment facilities and insufficient reservoirs[41]; whereas the revised Drinking Water Directive included measures to reduce water leakages, as well as risk assessment and management of the catchment areas for drinking water abstraction;

    X. whereas in 2021, 91 % of Europe’s groundwater bodies were reported as having achieved ‘good quantitative status’, while 77 % were reported as having ‘good chemical status’[42];

    Y. whereas in 2021, only 37 % of Europe’s surface water bodies were reported as being in ‘good’ or ‘high’ ecological status, while 29 % achieved ‘good chemical status’[43];

    Z. whereas the European Environment Agency emphasises that the proportion of surface waters failing to achieve good ecological status is uneven across Europe, and that these are more prevalent in parts of central and western Europe, and stresses that differences in water status between the Member States may be caused by different pressures, but that those differences may also result from varying approaches to monitoring and assessment[44];

    AA. whereas the quality of surface waters across the continent reflects continuing and combined pressures, in particular diffuse pollution and the degradation of their natural flow and physical features; whereas pollution by nutrients and persistent priority substances, as well as by substances newly emerging as pollutants, continues; whereas groundwaters are affected by diffuse pollution and also suffer from intensive abstraction[45];

    AB. whereas groundwater supplies 65 % of water for drinking and 25 % of water for agricultural irrigation in the EU[46]; whereas it is a finite resource that needs to be protected from pollution and over-exploitation[47];

    AC. whereas monitoring data from the European Environment Agency indicates widespread pollution by per- and polyfluoralkyl substances (PFAS), commonly referred to as ‘forever chemicals’, in European waters, posing significant risks to aquatic ecosystems and human health; whereas short-chain PFAS trifluoroacetic acid (TFA) has been detected in drinking water all over Europe; whereas PFAS persist in the environment, bioaccumulate in living organisms and cause adverse (eco)toxicological effects; whereas from a group of 6 000 to 10 000 individual substances, only a few have been extensively studied and their impact on human health and environment is known; whereas 99 % of PFAS remain undetected in the environment as a result of limits in monitoring;

    AD. whereas the lack of EU-wide quality standards for PFAS in groundwater and insufficient monitoring of less-studied PFAS compounds exacerbate the challenge of achieving good chemical status for EU waters in line with the WFD and pose a substantial technical and financial burden on health systems and on water service providers while jeopardising applications of water and sewage sludge reuse;

    AE. whereas hazardous chemicals, including heavy metals and other pollutants, released into water bodies by industrial activities, significantly impact water quality and aquatic ecosystems[48];

    AF. whereas pharmaceutical substances are increasingly identified in surface water and groundwater; whereas pollution caused by pharmaceutical residues necessitates advanced water treatment technologies, including membrane filtration, activated carbon treatment, advanced oxidation processes and other innovative purification techniques;

    AG. whereas Directive 2010/75/EU[49] mandates that the potential aggravation of the impact of industrial discharges on the state of water bodies due to variations of water flow dynamics should be explicitly taken into account in the granting and reviewing of permits; whereas the best available techniques will newly incorporate notions of environmental performance levels related to water and permits, which translate the use of these techniques into environmental performance limit values; whereas this is a welcome change with a potential improvement to the industry’s resilience, as EU installations may already face a lower production capacity seasonally due to water scarcity;

    AH. whereas urban wastewater is one of the main sources of water pollution, if not properly collected and treated; whereas the objectives of the Urban Wastewater Treatment Directive should not be lowered, and its scope should be extended to other sectors and substances that contribute to water pollution;

    AI. whereas nutrient pollution in EU water bodies leads to eutrophication, loss of biodiversity, and degradation of aquatic ecosystems[50]; whereas pesticide run-off contaminates surface water and groundwater, threatening water quality and human health;

    AJ. whereas research indicates that exposure in Europe to the synthetic chemical bisphenol A (BPA), which is used in products ranging from plastic and metal food containers to reusable water bottles, is well above acceptable health safety levels[51];

    AK. whereas soil and nutrient management lies at the basis of improving water quality and availability; whereas the EWRS should focus on improving nutrient management, with the aim of closing nutrient loops to reduce nutrient emissions to waterways; whereas the safe use of sewage sludge in agriculture will also reduce the EU’s very high dependency on the import of phosphorus mineral fertiliser, for example, from Russia; whereas the safe use of sludge should therefore also be considered as contributing to European resilience and strategic autonomy;

    AL. whereas climate change represents a major threat to water resources and aquatic ecosystems; whereas many impacts of climate change are felt through water, such as more intense and frequent droughts, more extreme flooding and more erratic seasonal rainfall; whereas floods and water scarcity compromise food and water security, and the health of the general population, ultimately affecting social cohesion, economic prosperity and stability, as well as jeopardising the long-term availability of this valuable resource;

    AM. whereas the European climate risk assessment recognised that Europe’s policies and adaptation actions are not keeping pace with the rapidly growing risks that threaten ecosystems, infrastructure, food and water supply and people’s health, as well as the economy and finance[52];

    AN. whereas assessments by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change show that the sea level rise due to climate change is leading to an increase in the salinity of soils and freshwaters, compromising ecosystem health and water quality, as well as affecting 80 million Europeans living in low elevation coastal zones and flood plains; whereas freshwater and marine ecosystems are interconnected as riverine pollution, disruption to sediment flows and water shortages all have a very strong impact on the health of marine ecosystems, particularly the coastal ones, as well as on the viability of social and economic activities that depend on them, such as transport, fisheries, agriculture, aquaculture and tourism;

    AO. whereas prolonged drought, extreme heat and large-scale flooding events, caused by changing weather patterns, will intensify and become more frequent throughout the continent, damaging ecosystems and human health and leading to major disruption to economic activities and decreasing the overall quantity and quality of available water; whereas preserving water resources and the natural functions of rivers, while supplying sufficient water of good quality, is becoming a major challenge that will require increased climate change mitigation and adaptation efforts, effective management and innovative measures to increase water availability; whereas managing water scarcity and flood risks affordably and sustainably will increasingly become important across the EU;

    AP. whereas in 2022, Europe experienced its hottest summer and the second warmest year on record, leading to drought impacting over 15 % of EU territory; whereas the average annual economic loss caused by droughts in the EU between1981 and 2010 was estimated at around EUR 9 billion per year; whereas with no adaptation measures, it is estimated that annual drought losses in Europe and the UK could increase to EUR 45 billion per year up to 2100 with warming of 3°C[53]; whereas in the period of 1998-2020, floods comprised 43 % of all disaster events in Europe; whereas climate change impacts and socio-economic developments are leading to more frequent flooding, affecting an increasing number of people and causing increasing damage; whereas 12 % of Europe’s population lives in floodplains[54];

    AQ. whereas the cost of inaction in addressing water-related challenges is extremely high, given that 90 % of disasters are related to water[55]; whereas without policy action, the cost of economic losses from coastal floods alone could exceed EUR 1 trillion per year by the end of the century in the EU[56] and the economic cost of droughts in Europe could exceed EUR 65 billion a year by 2100[57];

    AR. whereas significant differences exist between the Member States in water availability, management strategies and usage patterns, and vulnerability to climate change impacts can vary considerably; whereas a tailored approach is required to enhance water resilience and ensure sustainable water management;

    AS. whereas droughts constitute one of the chief catastrophic consequences of climate change; whereas around 23 % of the EU’s territory is moderately susceptible to desertification and 8 % is highly susceptible to it; whereas Hungary, Bulgaria, Spain and Italy are among the countries most affected, and 74 % of Spain’s surface area is at risk of desertification; whereas the EWRS should look beyond prolonged droughts, but rather address the reality that the semi-arid line is moving north, resulting in increasing areas in the EU that will face chronic long-term unavailability of sufficient freshwater resources;

    AT. whereas policies related to desertification, water consumption and climate change are closely interconnected; whereas as part of the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification, the EU reaffirmed in 2015 and later re-confirmed in 2024[58] its commitment to achieving land degradation neutrality by 2030, which, according to the European Court of Auditors special report on desertification, is unlikely to be achieved;

    AU. whereas water infrastructure can help maintain a constant and predictable flow and supply of water; whereas in 2022, the annual average river discharge across Europe was the second lowest since records began in 1991[59];

    AV. whereas downstream areas are particularly dependent on upstream water management and abstraction; whereas the Member States should refrain from implementing measures that significantly increase flood risks upstream or downstream of other countries in the same river basin, in accordance with the WFD;

    AW. whereas nature-based solutions are pertinent interventions that, when tailored to specific ecosystems and needs, can increase resilience in the water cycle and provide multiple benefits in terms of biodiversity protection, carbon sequestration, improved water quality, nutrient retention, supply of drinking water, wildfire prevention and flood risk mitigation; whereas nature-based solutions can enhance the effectiveness and the operable life of water infrastructure, therefore ensuring, in many cases, complementarity of both solutions;

    AX. whereas natural water retention measures are nature-based solutions that aim to store water in natural, agricultural, forested and urban landscapes;

    AY. whereas water is not a commercial product like any other but, rather, a heritage which must be protected, defended and treated as such; whereas, under Directive (EU) 2024/1203 on the protection of the environment through criminal law[60], abstraction of surface water or groundwater within the meaning of the WFD constitutes a criminal offence where such conduct is unlawful and intentional, and causes, or is likely to cause, substantial damage to the ecological status or the ecological potential of surface water bodies or to the quantitative status of groundwater bodies;

    AZ. whereas soil biodiversity and soil organic carbon affect water retention capacity; whereas soil erosion, compaction and certain soil management practices that cause soil degradation lead to a steady decrease in the water retention capacity of soil, which as a consequence exacerbates drought and flood events with a direct negative impact on farming; whereas healthy soil is therefore one of the drivers of water resilience, which itself should be approached and managed at river basin level; whereas better land management is key to preventing disasters;

    BA. whereas the current multiannual financial framework (MFF) includes an ambitious but non-binding target of dedicating at least 7.5 % of annual EU spending to the biodiversity objectives in 2024 and 10 % in both 2026 and 2027; whereas the new financial framework should incorporate a water perspective with a view to allocating sufficient resources to the future EWRS in order to ensure resilient water ecosystems and infrastructure, and security of water supply, and to facilitate investments in innovative solutions;

    BB. whereas cohesion funding has played a crucial role in improving water and sanitation services across the Member States; whereas continued support is required to ensure their long-term resilience and compliance with increasingly stringent quality standards;

    BC. whereas pricing policies can improve the efficiency of water use; whereas such policies are a national competence and account for the regional differences in water availability and the source of water supply; whereas pricing can play a significant role in prompting households and other economic sectors to optimise consumption, as well as in ensuring that water users effectively participate in recovering the costs of water services; whereas pricing policies should also consider affordability for households and small businesses;

    BD. whereas digitalisation and innovation can effectively assist the Member States, regional bodies and the Commission in collecting data on and monitoring water management; whereas the EU is at the forefront of new technological developments in the water sector, accounting for 40 % of all international patent families in this sector between 1992 and 2021[61], a position that needs to be fostered and nurtured, and the potential of the internal market fully exploited; whereas hurdles for the introduction and scaling-up of new water technologies need to be examined and a just European level playing field guaranteed; whereas continued support for research in water technology innovation is needed to secure and to create jobs and boost European competitiveness;

    BE. whereas innovation is a crucial tool to help the water sector meet the challenges of the United Nation’s SDGs, adapt to climate change and become more water-efficient;

    BF. whereas deployment of monitoring and modelling technologies is still lagging behind in many Member States, and the digitalisation of the sector is too slow; whereas provisions on the river basin management plans in the WFD do not explicitly include concrete measures to digitise the water sector; whereas common shortcomings for the current policies harnessing the potential digital solutions are related to the lack of technology guidance, monitoring standards, policy integration, standardisation and public involvement;

    BG. whereas the water sector is vulnerable to various threats, including physical attacks, cyberattacks and contamination with harmful agents; whereas such incidents could result in widespread illness, casualties and service disruptions, significantly impacting public health, the environment and economic stability; whereas the digitalisation of  water management might introduce further security risks in a context of increasing hostile attacks on critical infrastructure; whereas the implementation of the NIS2 Directive and Critical Entities Resilience Directive can contribute to mitigating security risks to vital (drinking) water systems and (drinking) water infrastructure, arising from geopolitical tensions;

    BH. whereas advances in sensor technology, computing, artificial intelligence (AI) and big data management can help monitor water quantity and quality and inform the operational decisions of the policymakers and water management companies; whereas innovations in nature-based systems to manage water are available and can contribute to resilient water management;

    BI. whereas water is a vital component in the life cycle of AI, both in the operation of data centres and the manufacture of hardware; whereas the rapid expansion of AI could result in an exponential increase in water demand; whereas that dependency on an increasingly scarce resource poses significant challenges in terms of sustainability; whereas strategic technologies, such as semiconductors, hydrogen, electric vehicle batteries and data centres, play a key role in achieving a competitive and autonomous EU;

    BJ. whereas chiller and cooling tower systems, based on innovative cooling technologies such as evaporative and closed-loop cooling, are already available and can contribute to reducing water consumption in industrial, heating, ventilation and air conditioning systems applications;

    BK. whereas research must be promoted with a view to producing alternative active ingredients to combat pests, to ensure greater plant health and reduce the use of inputs and phytosanitary products;

    BL. whereas water resilience is crucial in education and teaching, and in raising awareness and giving information about the functioning of the water cycle;

    BM. whereas limited access to water and related infrastructure has a negative impact, especially on women, as it undermines the realisation of other human rights, such as self-determination, economic independence and education;

    BN. whereas 60 % of European river basin districts are transnational, which makes effective transboundary cooperation crucial; whereas 20 European countries depend on other countries for more than 10 % of their water resources, with five countries relying on more than 75 % of their resources coming from abroad via rivers[62]; whereas this cooperation should be strengthened to account for current and future climate challenges such as droughts and floods;

    BO. whereas United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres appointed a Special Envoy on Water, aiming to enhance international cooperation and synergies among international water processes;

    BP. whereas clean water access and sustainable and resilient sanitation infrastructure are key components of the One Health approach, recognising the interconnection between the health of humans and water pollution;

    BQ. whereas water cooperation across borders and sectors generates many benefits, including enhancing food security, sustaining healthy livelihoods and ecosystems, helping address resilience to climate change, contributing to disaster risk reduction, providing renewable energy, supporting cities and industry, and fostering regional integration and peace;

    BR. whereas geopolitical developments demonstrate that the EU should be ready to withstand the challenges that go beyond the environmental sphere; whereas non-environmental threats, such as recent accidents related to the damaged cable in the Baltic Sea, send the EU a strong message that strengthening transboundary cooperation is key in addressing both the environmental and security-related objectives;

    BS. whereas about 41 000 kilometres of inland waterways flow through 25 of the Member States; whereas inland waterways, which rely on the availability of water resources, perform a crucial role in optimising water supply and mitigating the impact of droughts and floods, as well as supporting the economic activities and the development of regions;

    BT. whereas the increasing water scarcity, inequalities in access to water, and external shocks to the water sector have heightened interdependencies, increasing competition for water and leading to complex economic repercussions;

    General remarks

    1. Welcomes and supports President von der Leyen’s announcement in the political guidelines for the next European Commission (2024-2029) on putting forward a European Water Resilience Strategy (EWRS) addressing water efficiency, scarcity, pollution and water-related risks, as well as the recognition that water is an indispensable resource that is increasingly under stress from climate change and increasing demands;

    2. Believes that while implementing legislation, economic competitiveness should be taken into account in line with the Competitiveness Compass; calls for the implementation of EU environmental legislation in order to build a resilient and competitive Europe, mitigate and adapt to climate change, halt biodiversity loss, prevent pollution, ensure food security, limit resource use and waste, and strive towards efficient use of resources, including water, while taking into account the precautionary principle, the control-at-source principle and the polluter-pays principle; highlights the fact that water availability impacts the quantity, quality, variety and seasonal availability of foods that can be produced;

    3. Calls for the EU to integrate its commitments to the COP29 Baku Dialogue on Water for Climate Action and the UN 2023 Water Conference into the international dimension of the strategy;

    4. Stresses the urgent need to enhance water resilience and management to ensure sustainable freshwater supplies for people, the economy and the environment; emphasises that the EWRS should be developed in coordination with the European Oceans Pact, ensuring a cohesive and integrated approach to managing freshwater and ocean resources, addressing interconnected challenges, enhancing competitiveness and promoting sustainable water management across inland and marine environments, while ensuring a holistic ‘source-to-sea’ approach;

    5. Insists on the need for a comprehensive and holistic EWRS that integrates water quality, quantity, security, infrastructure, technology and management aspects and includes the restoration of the water cycle as a key element, as it underpins economic activities, ensures resource availability and contributes to climate regulation;

    6. Stresses the importance of water supply, in particular drinking water, as well as water security of supply; points out that all environmental restoration projects should take into account the water security aspects, prioritising solutions that not only provide environmental benefits, but also guarantee the supply and efficient management of water; emphasises, furthermore, that ecological restoration measures should be carried out in synergy with the development of the EU’s renewable energy potential and not impact the overall energy resilience;

    7. Recommends that lakes and other freshwater-dependent habitats be included in the strategy, alongside rivers, transitional waters and groundwater, as essential components of the EU’s water resilience efforts;

    8. Stresses the urgent need to improve crisis-warning systems with regard to heavy water incidents, as well as to improve preventive measures;

    9. Calls on the Commission to present a European climate adaptation plan, including concrete legislative proposals and actions, particularly regarding infrastructure resilience, water management and nature-based solutions, while prioritising the protection of vulnerable communities, to make the EU more resilient and to lead by example;

    10. Reiterates that access to clean and safe drinking water and sanitation is a human right; emphasises that this right must be unequivocally ensured, with everyone having access to affordable and good quality water services, including the inhabitants of islands and outermost regions;

    11. Notes that industrial activities and agricultural production require water to produce their end products or to support production activities, with the amount of water used varying depending on the type of activity; highlights the fact that ensuring Europe’s competitiveness and strategic autonomy requires a water-smart society where technology and data enhance a circular economy, fostering sustainable and water-efficient practices; calls on all relevant actors to accelerate the transition towards water-efficient, circular industry and agriculture by promoting and investing in innovative solutions, including digital tools and technologies, resource recovery, water reuse, renewable energy production, infrastructure, nature-based solutions and inclusive governance mechanisms;

    12. Urges the Commission to integrate and mainstream the water dimension into internal and external EU policies through a cross-sectoral approach in order to ensure that water resilience, sustainability and security is woven into the fabric of European policies; calls on the Commission, in particular, to carry out a water-related assessment of any regulatory measure, including related to energy, as part of the socio-economic and environmental impact assessment; emphasises that assessing how each EU policy, and EU-funded projects and infrastructure, can impact water resources in terms of quantity, quality and accessibility would ensure that water resilience is a cornerstone of policy formulation and implementation, thus shifting the paradigm from treating water as an infinite resource to recognising its intrinsic value for humanity and for the EU’s ecological and socio-economic landscape and its competitiveness;

    Water efficiency

    13. Stresses that efficient water use is essential for preserving the EU’s water resources and that water efficiency should be a key objective of the EU; calls, in this regard, for a consequential reduction in water demand, including by addressing excessive leakage levels, investing in research and innovative solutions, modernising industrial and production processes, upgrading water infrastructure, managing water resources and peak demands sustainably, prioritising uses and ensuring that higher water efficiency results in a reduction in overall freshwater consumption as well as in an increase in water availability in water-stressed areas at the local and regional levels; believes that areas affected by prolonged drought and desertification should be given priority;

    14. Calls for a legislative framework setting sectoral water efficiency and water abstraction targets at basin level, based on up-to-date assessments of water availability and climate risks, including a water valuation approach that accounts for ecosystem services and long-term sustainability, and covering all water uses, including industry, energy, agriculture, public institutions and households; underlines the fact that these targets should be ambitious yet adaptable, taking into account the specific circumstances and progress already achieved by each Member State to ensure continued efforts towards efficiency gains across all regions; stresses the importance of efficient and uniform data collection practices across the Member States and all sectors, including through the use of innovative technologies, as well as real-time data collection points for more transparency on water consumption; emphasises the need to carry out an appropriate assessment of the environmental and socio-economic impacts of water use;

    15. Reiterates the need to develop a common EU methodology for setting water efficiency and water abstraction targets to ensure the sustainable use of available renewable water resources within an integrated water resources management framework which gives due consideration to linkages beyond the water sector through the water-energy-food-ecosystems nexus, thus enabling decision-makers and economic actors to plan the necessary investment to ensure water supply security in an increasingly sustainable manner, while giving due consideration to the characteristics of the water bodies concerned;

    16. Calls for close collaboration on integrated energy and water resource planning and related technologies across all sectors at national, regional and local levels, including between all stakeholders, in order to establish mechanisms for ensuring coherence across water and energy policies;

    17. Calls on the Commission to put forward a comprehensive policy on sustainable water management for industry based on reducing, recovering, reusing and recycling, including a focus on the use of water-efficient and circular technologies, water recycling, pollutant reduction strategies and the promotion of closed-loop systems;

    18. Recalls that the growing threat of water scarcity is jeopardising industries and projects that are key to Europe’s competitiveness drive, including semiconductors, data centres, renewable hydrogen and electric vehicle battery production; notes that these industries will increasingly face pressure to reduce their environmental impact and improve water resource efficiency, including both direct and indirect water usage; calls on the Member States to support water-intensive industries in setting up water-efficiency plans aimed at saving, reusing and recycling water, preventing water pollution and implementing water-efficient technologies; calls on the Commission to incorporate comprehensive water management strategies into relevant EU industrial policies and sector-specific transition pathways, with a particular focus on strategic water-intensive sectors;

    19. Stresses that knowledge, data, research and technology are key for efficient water use; calls for adequate financial and technical support to be given to the Member States to implement efficient water management measures, including by means of innovative and modern technologies;

    20. Welcomes the recommendations of the final report of the Strategic Dialogue on the future of EU agriculture underlining that sustainable farming practices and new business models need to be scaled up to promote more efficient use of natural resources, especially water;

    21. Calls for the transition to a more sustainable and competitive farming model, assisted by the implementation of sustainable practices and innovative solutions that promote biodiversity, reduce chemical inputs and enable water resources to be managed efficiently, including nature-based solutions, regenerative management, smart precision irrigation technologies, digital monitoring systems, advanced treatment methods and smart water distribution networks, optimising consumption and preventing water resource depletion, and that help ensure continued productivity while enabling agriculture to reduce pollution, use pesticides and fertilisers efficiently, improve the hydrological cycle, enhance groundwater recharge and adapt to lower water use; considers that technological solutions can also include measures that can increase water absorption, infiltration and retention in agricultural systems, which are important amid increasing occurrences of both drought and heavy rains;

    22. Points out that innovative irrigation solutions and practices can enhance water efficiency in agriculture, gaining an economic advantage while also reducing environmental burdens; notes that farmers generally lack sufficient means and incentives to know about water use by crops, actual irrigation applications, the yield responses of crops to different water management practices, and thus current on-farm water-efficiency levels; calls on the Commission and the Member States to incentivise the uptake and support the maintenance of innovative irrigation solutions such as drip irrigation to allow for an active management of water levels and efficient use of water resources, as well as to promote continuous knowledge exchange, so that all relevant stakeholders can share greater responsibility across the entire water supply chain;

    23. Recommends better consideration of the nutrient cycle in agricultural production and the exploitation of the value in urban wastewater; calls for more research into the effective use of nutrients and the development of nutrient recovery technologies, in order to decrease the Union’s dependence on imported raw materials; recognises the high potential for nutrient recovery from water and calls on the Member States to support the agricultural sector to optimise their nutrient consumption including by using resources (nitrate and phosphorus) recovered from wastewater treatment plants; calls on the Commission to propose an integrated nutrient management action plan to effectively address loss of valuable agricultural inputs, recycling of nutrients, nutrient pollution and inefficiencies in the nutrient cycle;

    24. Emphasises, in line with the final report of the Strategic Dialogue on the future of EU agriculture, the need to support the transition to regionally adapted crop and seed varieties and the switch to different crops, with reduced water requirements and greater drought resistance, as well as the need to support the adoption of appropriate soil management practices; considers the need for stronger support for scientific research and technological development related to the breeding of new species, to enable the production and supply of foodstuffs to be diversified and their quality enhanced, while raising the level of protection for human health and the environment; notes the potential of plant varieties that are more resistant to water stress and pests and could play a role in reducing water use and could reduce the environmental footprint of crops;

    25. Calls for financial and technical support for farmers and rural communities, particularly in water-stressed areas, to help them adopt sustainable land management practices that improve soil and water quality, contribute to biodiversity and mitigate climate change; emphasises the need for special attention to be given to regions that are particularly vulnerable to soil degradation and water scarcity;

    26. Points to the success of the agricultural  European Innovation Partnership EIP‑AGRI and calls for the continuation of knowledge exchange, expertise and peer-to-peer learning via the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) Network;

    27. Notes the links between carbon sinking and water availability, and calls for coherence between the water resilience strategy and carbon farming schemes;

    28. Reiterates that the Water Reuse Regulation aims at reducing the pressure on water bodies by setting out provisions on reusing water after appropriate treatment extends its life cycle, thereby preserving water resources; emphasises, however, that regulatory, financial and technological barriers, including the economic competitiveness of reclaimed wastewater, risk management planning and the sharing of responsibilities, contribute to the slow uptake of reuse of reclaimed water for agriculture; calls, therefore, on the Commission and the Member States to adopt supportive policies, at both the EU and the local level, that incentivise water reuse practices, taking into account the importance of adapting wastewater treatment and quality requirements to the intended water use; notes that treated wastewater also finds valuable applications in various industrial processes and urban contexts, contributing to reducing the pressure on freshwater resources and the conservation of drinking water; calls therefore on the Commission to assess a possible extension of the scope of the Water Reuse Regulation in order to establish, at EU level, minimum water quality standards for safe water reuse for industrial and urban purposes;

    29. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to specify systems of regulatory and financial incentives for the reuse of treated wastewater in water-intensive sectors and to provide specific funding for the construction of infrastructure connecting wastewater treatment plants and refined water distribution networks; urges a streamlined approach in EU legislation to remove administrative barriers and promote safe and efficient water recycling across the Member States; calls on the Member States to set up national water reuse and saving plans to incentivise cross-sectoral cooperation in water management;

    30. Reiterates that reused water could alleviate abstraction from rivers, lakes and groundwater for irrigated agriculture; underlines the fact that reused water can contribute to maintaining base flows and minimum water levels during dry periods;

    31. Highlights the potential of the building sector to save water, for example, with the help of smart sub-metering systems, efficient greywater systems, reuse of domestic wastewater or rainwater harvesting; stresses that the energy performance of buildings can be enhanced by water efficiency, reducing greenhouse gas emissions; calls on the Member States and local authorities to incentivise water-saving features in new buildings; stresses, in this regard, that water-efficient practices should be factored into urban planning; highlights the fact that harvesting rain water as well as using and reusing water efficiently can improve climate adaptation in cities;

    32. Calls for the transition, in industry and in the energy and digital sectors, to optimised cooling efficiency and alternative cooling methods that are less water-dependent, in order to ensure significant water savings in these sectors;

    33. Points out that, while households represent 10 % of the overall water consumption in the EU, action on improving domestic water efficiency is also necessary; notes that water-saving technological solutions are readily available and can reduce water consumption in households without compromising comfort or requiring high investment; calls on the Member States to support consumers in transitioning towards such technologies and to strengthen consumer awareness of water consumption and potential efficiency gains by anchoring domestic water efficiency in water, building and consumer policies across the EU;

    34. Notes that the leakage rates from pipes are high in some Member States, which increases the total share of domestic water consumption; welcomes the provisions of the new Drinking Water Directive on leakage rates and the ongoing work of the Commission to evaluate those rates and set threshold values that will trigger action in the Member States concerned; calls on the Member States to urgently tackle leakage in water supply networks and to fully implement the monitoring and reporting requirements of the Drinking Water Directive, so that the Commission can set a threshold value for leakage by January 2028; emphasises the need for sustainable urban irrigation networks to be modernised, to curb leakages and reduce their water footprint; calls on the Member States to regularly inform the public about the efficiency and effectiveness of their water supplies;

    35. Points out that public sector organisations provide significant untapped potential for saving water by virtue of their size or their nature as public organisations; believes that the public sector should act as a role model for other sectors;

    36. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to promote easily accessible and free information, training, advisory programmes and information campaigns aimed at raising public awareness of sustainable water resource management;

    37. Recommends that water-efficiency aspects, such as reductions in water loss and reuse of water, be integrated in the upcoming revision of the public procurement framework;

    Water pollution

    38. Underlines the fact that the existing EU water policy framework is designed to address the effective management of water resources and the protection and restoration of freshwater and marine ecosystems, but that its poor implementation and enforcement, insufficient funding and lack of proper cost-benefit analyses of the implementation measures undermine its effectiveness;

    39. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to implement and enforce the current legislation, in particular the WFD and its ‘daughter’ directives (the Groundwater Directive and the Environmental Quality Standards Directive), with a particular focus on strengthening the monitoring and reporting mechanisms to ensure that all Member States consistently implement the required water protection measures; recalls the need for sufficient funding to implement these acts;

    40. Stresses that the chemical pollution of surface water and groundwater poses a threat to the aquatic environment, with effects such as acute and chronic toxicity in aquatic organisms, accumulation of pollutants in the ecosystem and loss of habitats and biodiversity, as well as to human health;

    41. Calls for the establishment of a comprehensive EU-wide quality standard for PFAS totals in groundwater and surface water; stresses that respective updates of the relevant directives are essential for safeguarding water quality and achieving good chemical status for water bodies as mandated under the WFD;

    42. Insists that essential uses of PFAS, for example for medical devices, pharmaceuticals and products necessary for the transition to climate neutrality, are not endangered; calls on the Commission to propose to phase out forever chemicals (PFAS) in consumer goods with proven concerns for human health and the environment, and only where there are safe alternatives;

    43. Calls on the Commission to propose updated limits on PFAS in drinking water, taking into account the latest scientific knowledge;

    44. Emphasises the urgency of addressing, primarily at the source, and effectively monitoring pollution from pharmaceuticals, bisphenols, antimicrobial resistance genes, persistent organic pollutants and other existing and emerging pollutants, to align with the EU’s zero pollution ambition and the goal of achieving good chemical status for all water bodies;

    45. Calls on the Commission to close the gaps with enhanced funding and the enforcement of current laws, and the integration of circular economy principles to mitigate pollution at its source and safeguard water ecosystems for future generations; underscores the fact that antibiotic-resistant bacteria and certain emerging pollutants remain insufficiently addressed, necessitating further innovation and investment; emphasises the need for all sectors to apply sustainable production processes and circular practices, proactively preventing pollutants from entering water systems;

    46. Recalls that microplastics may enter drinking water sources in a number of ways: from surface run-off (for example, after a rain event) to wastewater effluent (both treated and untreated), combined sewer overflows, industrial effluent, degraded plastic waste and atmospheric deposition; calls on the Commission to put forward, in line with the requirements of the Drinking Water Directive, a full risk assessment of microplastics in drinking water, while continuously working on reliable and robust sampling and analytical methods in order to appropriately address the potential threat of this emerging pollutant to sources of water intended for human consumption;

    47. Emphasises the need to improve the monitoring and regulation of plastic pollution in freshwater and marine environments, with particular attention to microplastics and single-use plastics; encourages the Commission to assess current enforcement mechanisms and consider further measures to protect water quality;

    48. Calls on the stakeholders to develop safe water contact materials, to substitute BPA and other bisphenols and ensure compliance with Regulation (EU) 1935/2004 on materials and articles intended to come into contact with food[63] and the recently adopted provisions as regards the use of BPA and other bisphenols and bisphenol derivatives (Commission Regulation (EU) 2024/3190);

    49. Recalls that the revised Urban Wastewater Treatment Directive, in effect since 1 January 2025, imposes new obligations regarding water purification, requiring pharmaceutical and cosmetic producers to cover at least 80 % of the costs of removing micropollutants from wastewater, with the aim of reducing harmful substances in the environment;

    50. Calls for increased EU support for local authorities for the modernisation of wastewater treatment plants and the promotion of water reuse, to align with the EU’s zero pollution ambition, ensuring that municipal wastewater management contributes effectively to good chemical and ecological water status;

    51. Calls for increased monitoring of pesticide residues in water bodies and enforcement of pesticide application regulations to mitigate their impact on water quality; stresses the need for increased funding to support farmers in the adoption of low-input and organic farming practices that reduce reliance on chemical pesticides and fertilisers, as well as to provide appropriate training and independent advisory services to farmers and other operators on the use, effectiveness and toxicity of pesticides, as well as best practice;

    52. Insists on the integration of circular economy principles to reduce hazardous chemical use in industrial processes; stresses the need for additional funding to support industries in transitioning to clean technologies that minimise water pollution[64];

    53. Recognises the role of treated sludge as a local and circular source of fertiliser, contributing to soil health, nutrient recycling and reduced dependency on synthetic fertilisers; emphasises the importance of preventing PFAS, heavy metals, microplastics and other harmful substances from entering sewer networks in order to enable the safe and sustainable use of high-quality sewage sludge in agriculture;

    54. Calls on the Commission to include an overview of measures in an annex to the EWRS, with a timeline for achieving the objectives in question;

    Adaptation to climate change: floods, droughts, stress areas, disaster preparedness

    55. Calls for the climate adaptation proofing of all new EU legislative and non-legislative acts in order to ensure the integration of climate adaptation into sectoral plans and policy measures affecting water and land use; highlights, in this regard, the need for increased climate ambition as part of the fight against climate change, while urging the Member States to ensure that all climate adaptation measures affecting water use contribute to long-term, improved water resilience; calls on the Commission to take fully into account the geographical and environmental conditions in the Member States, as well as the specific situation of islands, outermost regions and other areas of high vulnerability, such as areas affected by desertification, when adopting new legislative and non-legislative proposals; asks the Commission to present a roadmap for current and ongoing legislative and non-legislative policy measures, including targets and monitoring requirements affecting water and land use;

    56. Emphasises the need for tailored climate adaptation measures for the Mediterranean region, which faces unique challenges such as prolonged droughts and saline intrusion into freshwater resources;

    57. Stresses the specific challenges faced by island areas due to the scarcity of drinking water and calls for targeted measures to protect island water resources, including improving rainwater collection and storage infrastructure, and implementing alternative water sources, while enhancing water resource monitoring and management systems; calls, further, on the Member States to take better account of mountainous regions in national adaptation plans in order to meet the specific challenges of water management in mountainous areas;

    58. Reiterates that climate change mitigation and adaptation solutions should not come at the cost of ecosystem degradation, and should avoid increasing the demand for water- and energy-intensive activities, and should instead prioritise energy- and water-efficient innovation and technologies as part of moving towards a more resource-efficient economy, without undermining its productivity, while ensuring equitable access to water for all; points out that, in order to be effective, climate change mitigation and adaptation solutions should be tailored to national circumstances, while enhancing competitiveness and productivity in the short and long term; points out the possibilities of synergies, in this regard, with innovative energy production such as photovoltaics and biogas, as it can also contribute to an increase in agricultural income;

    59. Recognises the importance of reserving water for nature and the need to maintain healthy freshwater ecosystems, for the good functioning of the water cycle, for human activities and for mitigating the impacts of droughts and water scarcity; underlines, in the context of restoring freshwater ecosystems and the natural functions of rivers, the importance of removing ‘obsolete barriers’, namely artificial barriers that no longer fulfil their original purpose or are no longer needed, wherever such opportunities exist, on the basis of current knowledge and experience; calls for the establishment of specific programmes for the cleaning and conservation of river channels, ensuring minimum flow and reducing the accumulation of debris and sediment that can affect water storage and distribution capacity;

    60. Insists that, with climate change impact becoming more persistent, flood and drought management must fully integrate the arising risks, including changing weather patterns, such as increased rain patterns leading to excess of water; is convinced that a combination of monitoring and data collection, preparedness, emergency and recovery responses taking into account the principle of ‘building back better’[65]on the one hand, and adapting societal and economic activities on the other, is essential to reduce vulnerability and increase resilience, especially in the light of the quantitative aspect of water becoming more prominent; stresses, in this regard, the need for climate-resilient nature-based solutions and infrastructure that take into account the impact of extreme climate events in their development to ensure their viability in the face of extreme climate events;

    61. Recalls that in 2007, the WFD was supplemented by Directive 2007/60/EC on the assessment and management of flood risks, which aims to establish a framework to reduce the adverse consequences of flooding on human health, the environment, cultural heritage and economic activity; notes that making the two directives mutually compatible is achieved through risk management plans and river basin flood management plans as the components of an integrated water management system in which coordination is crucial; recalls that flood prevention is closely connected to urban green spaces, soil protection strategies and investment in drainage networks;

    62. Stresses that preparedness for water scarcity and drought can be significantly improved in the EU, considering that no drought management plans are in place in several Member States[66]; calls on the Member States and, where applicable, competent regional and local authorities, to develop drought management plans, particularly with a view to ensuring the provision of drinking water, ensuring food production and integrating digitalised monitoring, control and early warning systems in order to support effective and data-based decisions on protection, response and communication measures with clearly defined areas of responsibility; points out the need to introduce EU-level provisions as regards drought management plans, similar to the ones on flood management plans;

    63. Insists, in view of the numerous climatic events, such as floods, droughts and cyclones, which have affected Europe, on the importance of the EU having a robust mechanism for responding to such crises, including systems for warning and providing assistance to the civilian population; points out that digital monitoring, adequate public display of relevant data and early warning systems are key to developing effective drought and flood management plans at the level of the Member States; emphasises, further, the importance of fully using the available EU tools, such as the flood forecasts of the European Flood Awareness System and the Global Flood Awareness System, and the Global Flood Monitoring tool, as part of the Copernicus Emergency Management Service;

    64. Stresses the importance of the Union Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM) in helping countries hit by water-related disasters such as flood and droughts; calls for increased funding to provide the UCPM with sufficient and upgraded resources in order to increase preparedness and improve capacity building;

    65. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to enhance citizen preparedness in the event of water-related disasters or crisis; stresses the importance of information campaigns and demonstration exercises in education facilities, public administration and businesses in order to build a ‘preparedness culture’ for citizens;

    66. Calls on the Member States to systematically renew and upgrade their water infrastructure, including drinking water and sanitation infrastructure, as well as infrastructure regulating river flows, and to invest in innovative solutions based on good practice, making water systems more resilient to climate change, ensuring stable drinking water supply, enabling the early detection of losses and reducing water leakages and waste, while optimising water transport and storage systems; highlights the fact that funding for innovative water infrastructure is insufficient compared to the investment needs across the EU; calls, in this regard, for dedicated funding, on national, regional or EU level, to ensure adequate financing for the development, maintenance and modernisation of water-resilient infrastructure, to foster innovative solutions and technologies and ensure long-term sustainability of that water infrastructure;

    67. Regrets that, despite the threat that desertification poses to water quality and availability, soil fertility and food production, and despite the fact that 13 Member States have declared themselves to be affected by desertification in the context of the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification, the Commission is not addressing desertification effectively and efficiently; urges the Commission, therefore, in line with the Council conclusions of 14 October 2024 on desertification, land degradation and drought, to present an integrated EU-wide action plan to combat desertification, land degradation and drought, aiming at building resilience to drought and achieving land degradation neutrality in the EU by 2030, based on a full impact assessment;

    68. Calls on the Member States to create natural water reserves based on up-to-date assessments of climate risks to protect critical water supplies and their catchments, and taking into consideration the environmental and socio-economic impact of developing such reserves; points out that such natural water reserves would complement the WFD’s requirement for Member States to identify water bodies used for drinking water abstraction, making sure they meet the objectives set out in Article 4 WFD and in the Drinking Water Directive, and would ensure their necessary protection; notes that such natural water reserves already exist under different forms in various Member States; stresses that assistance should be given to Member States or local and regional governments to help them develop natural water reserves;

    69. Notes the potential of retention infrastructure as an example of water generation systems created using the best available, cost-effective techniques that have the lowest environmental impact, including by means of wastewater reuse or rainwater collection, in order to reduce the risks of droughts and floods, increase water security and foster circularity, water reclamation and reuse; believes that water retention facilities may be useful tools provided that they are authorised by local or national authorities under clear conditions, including the capacity of local groundwater to sustain such activities and the need for farmers accessing the water resource to adapt their practices to more sustainable practices, in particular in terms of water needs and water quality; calls on the Commission to use its available tools, including financial support, to streamline this approach among the Member States;

    70. Deplores the unlawful or intentional abstraction of water, which is likely to cause substantial damage to water bodies; calls for strong dissuasive measures to be applied, including through the criminal law, to protect the ecological status or the ecological potential of surface water bodies or of the quantitative status of groundwater bodies; notes that additional support for training and knowledge transfer for national enforcement capacities is needed;

    71. Notes the important cross-cutting role of nature-based solutions in addressing the challenges of the triple planetary crisis and restoring the natural water cycle; calls on the Commission and the Member States to prioritise, taking into account the environmental and socio-economic impacts, the deployment of nature-based solutions for water resilience in their policy actions and recommendations, such as the re-wetting of wetlands and peatlands to increase ground water availability and surrounding soil moisture, the restoration and protection of floodplains, natural water retention measures, revegetation as a barrier against floods, and rainwater conservation, in order to strengthen water availability, mitigate climate change risks and support long-term resilience for communities, businesses and food production; underlines that, in addition to nature-based solutions, complementary investment in engineering solutions remains necessary to ensure successful climate adaptation and water resilience in the long term;

    Funding and pricing

    72. Notes that nature-based solutions and natural water retention measures have the potential to restore groundwater levels and support ecological flows while reducing water-related risks from water scarcity, floods and droughts; notes that in flood management, nature-based solutions cannot usually replace existing solutions and may not be effective for the most extreme events; points out, however, that nature-based solutions can enhance the effectiveness and operable life of grey infrastructure by increasing water absorption capacity, reducing water velocity and regulating peak flows; reiterates, in this regard, that the effectiveness of nature-based solutions is context-specific and must be adapted to the local situation; emphasises in this regard that a ‘one solution that fits all’ does not exist;

    73. Stresses the need to provide financial support for sustainable innovative methods and solutions, while having due regard to public-private partnerships;

    74. Stresses, in the context of climate adaptation, the importance of healthy soils in ensuring water security and circularity; emphasises that the natural water retention of soils must be improved through measures to enhance soil health, minimising carbon losses, as well as actions at the level of the water body, such as the stabilisation of riverbanks, including through re-naturalisation, and the restoration of the retention capacities of aquifers;

    75. Notes that thoroughly designed forest management measures can improve watershed health, regulate water flow and reduce drought and flood stress, given the essential role of trees and forests in water cycle regulation, through their ability to purify water, increase the availability of water resources and improve soil moisture retention; proposes that this be duly considered when the Commission, in cooperation with the Member States, develops Union disaster resilience goals and that it be considered in the development and refinement of disaster risk management and contingency planning; highlights the need, in this regard, for more research, data collection, innovation and funding to support land managers in preventing the impact of environmental stressors such as drought floods and diminishing watershed function;

    76. Recognises that urban areas are increasingly vulnerable to water-related climate risks such as flooding, water shortages and heat stress; calls for the integration of urban water resilience planning into climate adaptation strategies, including investment in green roofs, permeable infrastructure, rainwater harvesting and storm water retention systems, as well as measures aimed at increasing green and blue spaces in urban areas, in order to mitigate extreme weather impacts and to reduce the risks to human life and property; calls further for the maintenance of, and regained access to, urban waterways in cities;

    77. Emphasises that the EWRS should ensure adequate funding from public and private sources in order to support the modernisation, upgrading, adaptation and maintenance of resilient water infrastructure, sustainable water management, data collection, research, effective monitoring, digitalisation, upskilling, nature-based solutions, the development and the uptake of innovative water-efficient technologies, as well as to ensure environmental and socio-economic sustainability in line with the goals set by the new European Competitiveness Compass;

    78. Calls on the Commission to create a separate and dedicated fund for water resilience within the upcoming MFF; believes that specific financial mechanisms should also be established within the European Regional Development Fund and the Cohesion Fund to support water-smart technologies and water investment; strongly believes that, in the interim, water should be prioritised in existing funding frameworks, including the Cohesion Fund; stresses that EU funding mechanisms must incorporate considerations of social equity and affordability, in particular in the context of providing water services to the population, ensuring support for Member States and citizens with greater financial constraints and specific realities, while meeting water management obligations; highlights the importance of adjusting existing funding, subsidies and financing streams related to water management and other related land uses, moving away from outdated engineering solutions to innovative ones, as well as nature-based solutions or a combination thereof;

    79. Calls for targeted funding, via Horizon Europe and the EIP-AGRI, for field trials on the water relations of different cropping systems; calls for the recognition of the role of women in water policies and for specific funding to be identified to promote their access to agriculture;

    80. Recalls that the lack of dedicated funding for water or binding funding targets within the current MFF limits the EU’s capacity to direct targeted investment towards essential water resilience measures, including infrastructure modernisation, innovation, climate adaptation measures and the implementation of nature-based solutions, and thus its competitive capacity, as the absence of a water balance creates an additional burden for the economy of the regions; notes that outermost and mountainous regions and islands in the EU are particularly struggling to access funding or public-private partnerships to support local and regional investment in water management and infrastructure;

    81. Stresses the important role of the European Investment Bank (EIB) in water financing; highlights the fact that the EIB is actively investing in and supporting the water sector; stresses that the EU should collaborate with the EIB to share best practice and calls, further, on the EIB and other financial institutions to strengthen their role in the funding of innovative and resilient water infrastructure, improved sanitation and drinking water infrastructure, digitalisation, as well as to support projects aimed at flood risk reduction, erosion prevention and the revitalization of watercourses, by facilitating favourable conditions for water investment;

    82. Urges the Commission to explore and promote innovative financing mechanisms, including payments for ecosystem services and green bonds, while ensuring regulatory clarity and safeguards to prevent market distortions; calls on the EIB and other financial institutions to prioritise low-interest loans and credits for Member States and regional and local authorities undertaking large-scale restoration projects, with specific provisions to support economically disadvantaged regions;

    83. Highlights the importance of public-private partnerships as a source of funding for water investment; calls on the Commission to incentivise private investment in the water sector by creating a supportive regulatory framework that may include co-financing opportunities and public-private partnerships in order to drive innovation, improve infrastructure and ensure sustainable water management solutions across the Member States; underlines, nevertheless, that the involvement of private investment in the EU water sector must not undermine the status of water as a public good and a public service, and that the long-term resilience of the sector, as well as the principles of accessibility, affordability and sustainability must be ensured;

    84. Calls on the Member States to adopt governance frameworks that clearly define the roles and responsibilities of stakeholders in planning, financing and implementing nature-based solutions; believes that these frameworks should integrate funding from diverse sources, including philanthropic contributions and private-sector partnerships, while ensuring equitable access to resources for small-scale projects, particularly managed at local or regional levels;

    85. Urges the Commission and the Member States to address water aspects in their budgets and to improve governance within the regions in the use of EU funds;

    86. Underlines the need to provide targeted financial and technical assistance to municipalities to facilitate compliance with water-related legislation;

    87. Encourages the Member States to accelerate the granting of authorisations for sustainable and innovative resilient water infrastructure projects to enable their rapid implementation in the face of the urgent challenges;

    88. Notes that the application of the cost recovery principle on water services, which provides that all water users effectively and proportionately participate financially in the recovery of the costs of water services, remains low to non-existent in several Member States; calls on the Member States and their regional authorities to implement adequate water pricing policies and apply the cost recovery principle for both environmental and resource costs in line with the WFD; calls on the Member States to take into account the long investment cycles when implementing the cost recovery principle and to ensure sufficient funding is available for needed (re)investment;

    89. Stresses the importance of ensuring that water pricing supports long-term water security by reflecting the economic, environmental and resource costs of water use; encourages the Member States and competent regional and local authorities to ensure that water pricing is economically sustainable, socially fair and promotes efficient water use, and that it reflects the availability of water across different Member States and regions, particularly in water-stressed regions, while safeguarding affordability for households and small businesses; calls on the Member States and competent regional and local authorities to insure transparent water prices and to raise awareness of the value of water services;

    90. Points out that competent national water authorities will play a central role in implementing new water management and conservation plans at the level of the Member States; calls, therefore, on the Members States to financially and technically increase the capacity of those competent authorities to play a more significant enabling and advisory role in sustainable and future-proof water management and storage infrastructure; believes that EU funds, such as the Just Transition Fund, should be used to further assist Member States and water agencies in implementation;

    Digitalisation, security and technological innovation

    91. Stresses the potential and the necessity for digitalisation and AI in improving the management and monitoring of bodies of water and water infrastructure, as well as in reporting and ensuring the comparability of data reflecting different geographical flow conditions;

    92. Calls on the Commission, the Member States and water providers to mainstream transparency and digitalisation as fundamental principles in water management and to enhance the use of management and metering data, with the aim of strengthening  monitoring, assessment, accountability and decision-making, while optimising and simplifying reporting obligations; calls for digitally enabled water technologies to facilitate real-time, sample-based and distance monitoring and reporting on water quality, leakages, usage and resources; calls for improved efficiency in the use of public funds and public spending in this area; recognises that widespread deployment of innovative digital technologies needs to be accompanied by digital skills training;

    93. Emphasises the need to promote digitalisation and data-centric solutions in building a water-smart society; stresses the need to develop digital solutions for monitoring water consumption and optimising the use of water resources across all sectors; calls on the Commission, in cooperation with the Member States, to provide financial support for the implementation of smart water management systems, focusing on the needs of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs);

    94. Points out that water systems, including water treatment and distribution systems, are considered one of the nation’s critical infrastructures and security pillars, and hence key for the EU’s strategic autonomy, and require increased protection and the ability of utilities to detect, respond to, and recover from physical and cyberthreats and cyberattacks; notes that a higher level of digitalisation comes with new vulnerabilities; points out that, in the event of a threat or an attack, water system operators can lose their ability to control the flow and quality of the water or lose the ability to track the true status of the water system; insists that vulnerability assessments and an emergency response plan should be an integral part of the water management system in every Member State; encourages the promotion of information sharing about threats to cybersecurity and procedures to exchange best practice among operators, as well as to establish a cybersecurity culture through technical security measures, competence building and awareness creation and communication; draws attention to the measures and provisions in the NIS2 Directive and the Critical Entities Resilience Directive which could help mitigate the arising security risks; calls on the Commission to take the lead in reinforcing the EU-level coordination formats and to propose effective tools in the upcoming Preparedness Union Strategy with the aim of ensuring timely preparedness to tackle environmental and non-environmental risks to the water bodies that are threatening the EU’s overall security;

    95. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to increase the involvement of women in decisions regarding water resilience; calls for the adoption of a methodological approach that effectively considers gender-related needs in the implementation of water supply projects, by implementing monitoring, reporting and tracking that use tools and indicators disaggregated by gender;

    96. Notes that better data and data analysis are key to evidence-based decision-making and the swift identification of small changes in water quality that could present a threat to bodies of water, together with the evaluation of best practice and identification of the most cost-effective and impactful measures;

    97. Stresses that improved, reliable and interoperable data on water supply, demand, distribution, accessibility and use are needed and that data points need to be established; urges the Commission and the Member States to enhance data collection and improve data interoperability across all levels to support the implementation of current water legislation, as well as to facilitate circular economy and water-smart industrial symbiosis strategies; highlights the fact that data and AI could be used in modelling water and energy consumption as well as reuse and recycling capacities;

    98. Calls on the Commission to better recognise the fundamental role of the water sector in bolstering EU competiveness by fostering research and innovation and promoting entrepreneurship and talent; emphasises, in this regard, the importance of ramping up innovation in the water sector; points out that the European Innovation Centre for Industrial Transformation and Emissions, created as part of Directive 2010/75/EU, could play a role in this regard, as it evaluates the environmental performance of industrial technologies and gathers information on innovative industrial environmental techniques; points, further, to existing partnerships like the Water4All Partnership, a funding programme for scientific research;

    99. Believes that there is a need to build and nurture multi-stakeholder platforms to promote innovation uptake at all levels, local and national; recommends that these platforms involve a wide range of participants – the public and private sectors, and civil society associations – to build a coalition of partners to bring about change; supports the promotion of knowledge sharing on how digital water technologies can support the implementation of existing EU water legislation, as well as capacity building at local, regional and national levels; calls on the Commission and the Members States to expand digital skills, and research and development (R&D) programmes targeting water, including through collaboration with universities, research centres and SMEs;

    100. Acknowledges the critical role of data centres in the digital economy; notes with concern that the rapid expansion of the technology could lead to a substantial increase in AI’s demand for water resources associated with their operations, which could undermine the environmental benefits that AI promises to deliver, such as resource optimisation and carbon emission reductions, and stresses the need to integrate water efficiency measures in their design and operation; urges the Commission to address the use of water resources by information and communications technologies (ICT) and, in particular, by AI and data centres in its EWRS, in particular by encouraging data centres to reuse treated water and to promote the design of more efficient chips and components to reduce the need for cooling; recommends that the Member States prioritise water resilience strategies that address the specific challenges posed by data centres to ensure the sustainability of both the digital and the environmental agendas;

    101. Recalls that seawater desalination is the process of removing salt from sea or brackish water to make it useable for a range of ‘fit for use’ purposes, including drinking, and that it is thus an important technological solution for people’s livelihoods; notes that, at the same time, desalination is an energy-intensive process and should ideally be done using renewable energy, whenever possible, in order to minimise environmental impacts; reiterates that desalination produces a by-product, brine (a concentrated salt solution), that must be properly disposed of to avoid adverse impacts on the marine environment; considers, therefore, that desalination based on reverse osmosis or thermal technologies should be applied, if other more environmentally sustainable options are not available or cannot be implemented, particularly in remote areas and islands; highlights, in this regard, the ongoing work on new technological solutions, such as microbial desalination cells, offering an environmentally sustainable and innovative alternative to traditional desalination methods, particularly to provide clean water and wastewater treatment to small, isolated locations without electricity;

    102. Stresses the need for increased funding and R&D into technologies such as innovative desalination techniques in order to increase the efficiency, sustainability and the scaling up of such technologies; calls for research into the possibilities of using such technologies in agriculture to diversify the water supply points and therefore decrease the vulnerability of the sector to water stress;

    103. Notes that in the last decade, there have been many scientific breakthroughs for making water treatment smarter and more circular, with these solutions offering opportunities for using digital solutions, AI and remote sensing to use water more efficiently and by reusing treated wastewater for irrigation and recovering energy and nutrients from wastewater;

    104. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to address the regulatory obstacles within the single market to facilitate the development, scaling-up, and placing on the market of innovative biotechnology and biomanufacturing solutions and the promotion of cleaner manufacturing and circularity;

    105. Calls for the funding, development and authorisation of innovative solutions for crop protection and fertilisation, including biological control agents and active substances with lower impact on the environment, which are needed for a just transition to more sustainable agricultural systems;

    106. Calls for specific programmes to be established for the cleaning and conservation of river channels, ensuring adequate flow and reducing the accumulation of debris and sediment that can affect water storage and distribution capacity;

    Cross-border and international cooperation

    107. Stresses the need for a comprehensive EWRS that fosters cross-border cooperation, more uniform data collection and reporting, sharing best practice between local, regional and national actors, ensuring sustainable water management and equitable resource distribution among the Member States, preventing water challenges such as scarcity and flood risk from being passed on to other Member States;

    108. Emphasises that climate change represents a major threat to water resources and aquatic ecosystems; notes that floods and water scarcity compromise food and water security and the health of the general population, ultimately affecting social cohesion and stability; recognises that water resilience is crucial for preventing and addressing current and future health, food, energy and security crises; emphasises that water resilience promotes transboundary water cooperation, serving as a catalyst for peace and security, as countries are interconnected through shared rivers and groundwater resources;

    109. Calls for increased cross-border cooperation between the Member States in the management of shared river basins and groundwater aquifers and in the effective collection and sharing of data on water quality, pollution levels and water levels; recommends the establishment of regional cooperation centres to coordinate the implementation of joint water resilience strategies, taking into account the climate, social and economic challenges of each territory;

    110. Calls for enhanced international cooperation, including at the level of river basins, to address the growing water crisis, ensure clean and high-quality water, promote sustainable water management and implement various innovative water technologies, including nature-based solutions; calls for the anchoring of cooperation across borders at operational, tactical and strategic levels;

    111. Calls for the establishment of cross-border projects under Interreg and other EU funds to improve regional cooperation in the management of water resources, with a particular focus on ensuring the fair distribution of water between sectors and Member States;

    112. Stresses the need to strengthen EU monitoring capacities through digitalisation and modern technologies, including satellite surveillance and real-time pollution tracking, which are essential for preventing and combating cross-border pollution;

    113. Urges the Commission to implement a specific diplomatic role dedicated to resolving water-related conflicts, promoting water cooperation and protecting water sources and systems, particularly during armed conflicts and in transboundary contexts;

    114. Urges the EU to lead international efforts to protect and restore water ecosystems in line with the SDG 6 on clean water and sanitation;

    °

    ° °

    115. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Management and Regulation Ensure Effective Spectrum Sharing 

    Source: NASA

    Spectrum is a shared resource. Since the discovery of radio waves and the invention of the telegraph, humanity has exponentially increased its use of the radio frequency (RF) spectrum.  Consider how many wireless devices are around you right now.  You’re probably reading this on a smartphone or laptop connected to the internet through Wi-Fi or 5G. You might be listening to music on Bluetooth headphones. If you are in a car or bus, the driver may be using signals from GPS satellites. To meet this increasing need, RF engineers and regulators continue to develop ways to enable users to share the same frequencies at the same time in the same place — think of modern cell phone technology. Avoiding or lessening interference between users requires regulators and users alike to maintain and enforce the ‘rules of the road’ that describe who can use which frequencies where, when, and how. NASA, like all other users, must comply with these regulations and collaborate with other users to ensure our use of the RF spectrum can continue and evolve. 

    NASA’s spectrum professionals work with users early in the project planning phase to understand the type, location, and duration of their data, and in turn determine what kind of antennas, transmitters, and receivers will be required. With that information, a spectrum manager helps to define the spectrum requirements, such as bandwidths, modulation, and other technical characteristics of the radio signals to be used.  Understanding a project’s objectives helps define the appropriate service allocation and  potential frequency ranges.   
    Once these spectrum requirements are determined, NASA’s spectrum professionals work with other relevant spectrum users within and beyond NASA to coordinate the use of the spectrum.   In the unfortunate event of harmful RF interference, working to identify, resolve, and report the interference is another critical function of NASA’s spectrum professionals. For example as Jeff Hayes — NASA’s current SCaN (Space Communications and Navigation) Program liaison to the Science Mission Directorate and the former program executive for operating missions in the Heliophysics and Astrophysics Divisions — recounts, “The NICER (Neutron Star Interior Composition Explorer) observatory did actually experience bouts of RF interference over certain parts of the world. As NICER uses GPS to understand where it is pointing to in the sky, interference can make the location information of the source imprecise, and that impacts the quality of the data collected. That data could potentially be attributed to the wrong star.” 
    When NASA identifies interference to a mission like NICER or to a device at an agency center or facility, NASA center and facility spectrum managers work to identify, resolve, and report the interference.  
    Identifying and reporting sources of interference helps to raise awareness of the impacts and causes of interference. When the sources of interference are international, which is especially common for space systems like NICER, SCaN’s spectrum management team works with U.S. regulators to report the incident to international regulators. These interference reports can be used to advocate for regulatory protections that help ensure the integrity of valuable science data and the safety of human spaceflight activities.  

    NASA’s spectrum analysts and engineers perform analyses and simulations to support spectrum planning and management activities. For example, passive remote sensing instruments like the radiometer on the Soil Moisture Active Passive mission detect natural energy (radiation) emitted or reflected by an object or scene being observed. This energy is much fainter than human-generated radio signals and require highly sensitive radiometers that are susceptible to interference from more powerful signals. The spectrum management team works to ensure regulatory protections are in place and followed to ensure the integrity of NASA’s scientific missions. 
    Sometimes NASA’s future missions envision new ways and places to use radio waves. For example, when NASA’s Artemis campaign began taking steps to return humans to the Moon, SCaN’s spectrum professionals began working with other stakeholders to develop a RF architecture that enables the use of radio waves for science data, communications, positioning, navigation, and timing while also limiting the risk of interference with systems on or orbiting Earth. NASA’s spectrum professionals further the agency’s spectrum management goals and objectives by analyzing potential changes in international or domestic regulations and proposing technical solutions that promote collaborative spectrum use with both foreign and domestic partners.   
    NASA’s technical expertise is critical to ensuring domestic and international regulators are well informed as they develop new or revised regulations that effectively enable the exciting innovation and exploration central to NASA’s mission.  

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Text of the Vice-President’s address at the inauguration ceremony of ‘KARTAVYAM’ at Delhi University, Delhi (Excerpts)

    Source: Government of India

    Very good morning all of you. 

    I was Governor of the state of West Bengal and had the good fortune to be at a place where Britishers ruled for long so an Indian mind had the great occasion to occupy that place. I had the good fortune at the invitation of the Hon’ble President, the first tribal woman to hold that position to be at Rashtrapati Bhavan. I had the good fortune in 1990 to be sworn in as a Union Minister at Rashtrapati Bhavan but something was missing. What happened for 20 years, two decades, it was from this place. 

    Boys and girls and those in the last bench, you are not backbenchers. You happen to be sitting at the end but you are more significant for everyone. I am always not superstitious, but careful about the seating arrangement. I keep on my right as I do in Rajya Sabha, the Government. So Yogesh Singh and Prakash but on my left, we always have the Opposition Professor Balaram Pani. जिस नाम ने भगवान श्री कृष्ण को ताकत दी वह आपकी लेफ्ट साइड में है, कुछ गलत नहीं हो सकता।  It will be the right check on the right side. The left is very powerful and that is why in our body heart is on the left side.

    Distinguished members of the faculty and everyone associated with the management and dear friends, but let me start with one observation imparted by your Vice-Chancellor. He reflected rightly that a distinguished judge, a jurist, H.R. Khanna was your alumnus. That reminds me and should remind us always, why in this country we are celebrating two days and those two days are :-

    One is ‘Constitution Day’ and; 

    The second is ‘Samvidhaan Hatya Diwas’. 

    Why do we do that? We do it with a purpose because on 26th November 1949, the Constitution was adopted. Young boys and girls need to be reminded because that Constitution was tested, strained, mauled, ravaged on 25th June 1975. That was the darkest period in human history of democratic world. I say darkest because the highest court of the land held ignoring verdict of nine High Courts. Nine High Courts were uniform that in democracy fundamental rights can never be put on hold. Access to judiciary cannot be moderated, much less denied being a Fundamental Right under Article 32 of the Constitution but that was done. I would not go more on that but what was held by the Supreme Court? Executive of the day is sole arbiter of Fundamental Rights. It can suspend them for as much time as it likes. There was one dissent voice and that emanated from an alumnus of this place. 

    Boys and girls, remember what was written at that point of time in the New York Times editorial. I quote from the editorial “If India ever finds its way back to the freedom and democracy that were proud hallmarks of its first eighteen years as an independent nation, someone will surely erect a monument to Justice H.R. Khanna”

    So boys and girls, I am at the right place and reminding you that each one of you must always bear in mind why for the last 10 years we are celebrating Constitution Day and why we have started remembering ‘Samvidhaan Hatya Diwas’. Because by virtue of your age, you may not have seen what went through. 

    Imagine in a democracy, lakhs of people are put behind the bars, tortured, traumatised, with no hope. The tunnel for them was dark, there was no light. Therefore it is befitting, particularly at this place, to start this series and look at the nomenclature of it ‘KARTAVYAM’ a Sanskrit word that defines all. And I am sure it will be game-changing for the nation to be enlightened on these aspects. 

    In our country, iconization is taking place frequently. We iconize people without testing them. We accord them elevated status on parameters that are baffling. Sometimes it is managed, event managed, and suddenly you will find in a particular field one becomes a leader. Time for us to challenge such things, we must be discerning. We cannot allow these people who have no claim justifiably to influence our minds. Before believing them, we must test them. 

    Therefore, I am saying unhesitatingly that Campus Law Centre is iconic. It has been tested all throughout. The reputation is well-earned, well-recognised. And why? Because it has been, as indicated by the Vice Chancellor, a great place of ideation. I am so glad you are starting this ideation now in a different mode. By all standards, Campus Law Centre and its alumni have shaped the destiny of the nation. Let me recall my good friend who is no more, Arun Jaitley, and the contributions he has made, and many more.

    Therefore, I can say it is a crucible of change and as was reflected in pre-Socrates era by a philosopher, Heraclitus, the only constant in life is the change. This change will emanate now from here on what is our constitution, what are our obligations, and our belief, supreme belief, unrestricted, unregulated, in nothing but truth, absolute truth, because truth is sanctified by our civilisational ethos, our Vedic culture, and is a demand of our constitutional core values. 

    Therefore, boys and girls, for me it is an absolute honour and privilege to be in this great enormous talent with huge potential, human laboratory of ideation that can catalyse big change and innovation and so my greetings to all of you. ‘KARTAVYAM’ duty in Sanskrit perfectly embodies the gazing that is before me. It is a word rooted in action, obligation, and the moral force that sustains civilisations. 

    Our father of the constitution, people of great eminence, gave us a constitution thoughtfully, working painstakingly, engaging in dialogue, discourse, debate, deliberation, avoided confrontation, always went for consensus. They had boys and girls divisive issues before them, highly contentious issues, but they gave us a constitution that represents our identity, values, and nation’s aspirations but according to our constitution, our civilisational values, and for any democracy, every citizen has a pivotal role. 

    I find it inconceivably intriguing that some have recently reflected that constitutional offices can be ceremonial ornamental. Nothing can be far distanced from a wrong understanding of role of everyone in this country, constitutional functionary or a citizen.  

    According to me, a citizen is supreme because a nation and democracy are built by citizens, every one of them has a role. The soul of democracy resides and pulsates in every citizen. Democracy will blossom, its values will get heightened when citizen is alert, citizen contributes. And what a citizen contributes, there is no substitution of that but boys and girls, if a citizen is the soul of democracy, this soul gets practical dimensions. It becomes fully meaningful. There is ground realisation when a citizen performs duties. 

    Individual obligations in society are fundamental to sustaining a society and for upkeep of its values and that is reflected in our constitution’s preamble. Before that, those who are law students, let me tell you, in one case, Golaknath, Supreme Court said the preamble is not part of the constitution. Later on, in another bench, Kesavananda Bharati, it is part of the constitution. 

    Let me tell you, notwithstanding all this, the constitution is encapsulated its essence, its worth, its nectar in preamble of the constitution. And what does it say! ‘We the People of India’, the supreme power is with them. No one is above the people of India and ‘We the People of India’, under the constitution have chosen to reflect their aspirations, their desire, their will through their public representatives. And they hold these representatives accountable, severely accountable on occasions, through elections. 

    A prime minister who imposed emergency was held accountable in 1977. Therefore, let there be no doubt about it.  Constitution is for the people, and its repository of safeguarding it is that of elected representatives. They are the ultimate masters as to what constitutional content will be. There is no visualisation in the constitution of any authority above parliament, Parliament is supreme. And that being the situation, let me tell you, it is as supreme as every individual in the country. Part of ‘We the People’, is an atom in democracy and that atom has atomic power. That atomic power is reflected during elections and that is why we are a democratic nation. 

    Democracy is not only for the government to govern, it is participatory democracy. Just not laws, but also culture and ethos. Citizenship demands action, not merely status. Already Dr. Ambedkar has been quoted, but I will reiterate. Dr. Ambedkar recognised freedom requires responsibility and that is why we have in our constitution Fundamental Rights and Fundamental Duties. To the students of law, and everyone in general, let me tell you, Fundamental Duties were not there originally in the constitution but constitution is a dynamic document. It has to reflect the aspirations of the people. Take note of contemporary situations, so we had by the 42nd Constitution Amendment Act, a new part added to the Indian constitution, Part IV-A. And that introduced an article 51A, that initially gave Ten Fundamental Duties but then it was felt one more duty needs to be added. And that, if I’m not wrong, was brought about by the 86th Constitution Amendment Act. 

    Early in this century, to give great impetus on education, we must always give precedence to our duties above our rights because this nation is ours. Nationalism requires commitment that is unadulterated. A commitment that is emanating voluntarily and that this will not be superseded by any other consideration, partisan, personal or otherwise. 

    Now our constitution, as a matter of fact, boys and girls, reflects our civilisational ethos of thousands of years. We are so unique in the world, unparalleled. The world is recognising our might now. The world is understanding India, Bharat, as it was 1300th centuries ago. 

    Therefore, we can cull out from Vedic dharm, our constitutional vision and that vision is, democracy is shaped not by governments, democracy is shaped by individuals. Because individuals bear the responsibility to uphold our symbols, preserve our heritage, defend sovereignty, foster brotherhood. This has happened during the emergency. People gave their supreme sacrifice, but did not bargain for the fundamentals of our civilisation, reflected in our constitution. But then boys and girls, what is democracy? We have to understand. Democracy thrives through expression and dialogue. अभिव्यक्ति और संवाद, यह प्रजातंत्र के मूल मंत्र हैं।

    If your right of expression is thwarted or regulated, as was done during the emergency, democracy nosedives but if your right of expression, and that right of expression is reflecting arrogance, ego that my expression is ultimate, I will not look at any different point of view. I will not look at the other point of view that again is also not expression, as per our civilisation. Because every expression demands respect for dialogue, respect for the other point of view. You must ever be prepared to be challenged because to challenge is not a physical challenge, it is a challenge of an idea, a thought, that I disagree with you. That does not mean I am disagreeable. There must always be room and therefore expression and dialogue, both are complementary and define democracy. 

    If we go into our civilisational wealth, इसको वैदिक काल में अनंतवाद कहा जाता था, वाद-विवाद की परंपरा थी। वाद-विवाद का मतलब अहं और अहंकार से दूर था। वाद-विवाद अहं और अहंकार को खत्म करता है, क्योंकि यदि अगर मैं ही सही हूं, मेरे अलावा कोई सही नहीं है यह अहं और अहंकार व्यक्ति को ही नहीं, संस्था को भी धीरे-धीरे खत्म कर देता है। इसलिए प्रजातंत्र के लिए जरूरी है अभिव्यक्ति और संवाद।

    Democracy, boys and girls, lives in conversation and everyone is equal when it comes to conversation. I cannot claim a higher pedestal by virtue of my position, that what a boy and girl will say, different than what I say, cannot be right. I cannot be a judge in my own course, to the students of law. Read any book on administrative law, Indian or foreign…  you will find this will be repugnant to the fundamentals of natural justice. That being the situation, expressing thoughts fulfils a democratic duty, not just exercising rights. Every young mind, boys and girls, must be activated. Fortunately, on account of technological advancement and our Bharat the technological penetration has stunned the entire world. It has reached the last person, everyone is benefiting. 

    Boys and girls, the power is in you. You have to project your own ideas, you have to protect the idea which you believe is correct and you have to neutralise the pernicious idea, which you think is wrong because democracy’s health reflects. If you want to know the health of democracy, like the health of an individual, if you want to analyse how healthy is our democracy, then you will have to find out discourse quality, the kind of discourse we have.

    Is our discourse moderated? Is our discourse manipulated? Is our discourse controlled by moneybags, by muscle power, by foreign interests, by people working against the interests of this nation? You will have to discern. The quality of discourse defines our democracy and in this, I have no doubt, our youth must elevate beyond partisanship to thoughtful deliberation. 

    Our youth cannot afford this critical juncture when Bharat is rising. The rise is unstoppable. We are destined to be a global power. We will be a developed nation, you cannot be tied down to partisan interests. You have to believe only in national interests. In India, if we examine our background, there was a time when individuals had profound moral and social standing. Respect was only for those who had high moral and ethical standing, who had everything to give back to society. If I quote Upanishad, “Yatha Pinde Tatha Brahmande” As is the individual, so is the universe. That is why people have narrowly construed the great inclusivity of Bharat, Dharm of Bharat. 

    Our silenced boys and girls may be very dangerous as thinking minds, as privileged minds getting education in such a great university. You have to be contributors for preserving our national legacy, our thought process and ensure sustainability of it. We cannot afford this to be thwarted by forces inimical to Bharat that have structured sinister designs, pernicious motivations to run down institutions, be that of the presidency, tarnishing individuals. Every word that is spoken by a constitutional functionary is guided by the supreme sublime interest of the nation but the expectation is that our youth, our young minds, and when I say our youth, our youth demographic dividend is envy of the world. 

    Our youth has catalysed big change. Rise of our economy to that level will be third largest very shortly. It is on account of everyone working in togetherness. Government has a role that it does not become a handicap. Government has a role that it must have affirmative policies. Government is like giving you a good stadium, a good football ground. Goals have to be scored by individuals. You are the people who have to deal. 

    The ancient wisdom, if you carefully go through our constitutional prescriptions, I’m particularly addressing law students, you will find powerful resonance of our constitutional values. As a matter of fact, high ethical standards, welfare of all, ‘Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam’ these are deeply, indelibly embedded in our DNA. We as a nation are different than any other nation on the planet. 

    We must legitimately take pride. हम भारतीय हैं। भारतीयता हमारी पहचान है, राष्ट्रीयता हमारा धर्म है, राष्ट्र के प्रति समर्पण करना हमारा सर्वोपरि कर्तव्य है और हमें इसको आगे बढ़ाना चाहिए, सृजन करना चाहिए, इसका संकल्प लेना चाहिए। 

    Boys and girls, our national transformation stands on five Pillars. 

    One – Social harmony. समरसता, भाईचारा हो, एक-दूसरे की बात को समझे, यह हमारी सांस्कृतिक धरोहर है। हमें इसको उपजाना है, इसका संरक्षण करना है। 
    Unifying Diversity, We have always believed in inclusivity. Family nurtured patriotism. बच्चों को शुरू से ही संस्कार सीखना, इसके बहुत दूरगामी परिणाम हैं। यह हमारी संस्कृति का एक अभिन्न अंग है। स्वदेशी, Self-Reliance महात्मा गांधी ने कहा था – ‘स्वदेशी’। Prime Minister ने कहा, ‘Vocal for Local’, पर अब ईसका फायदा देखिए। 

    Economic nationalism, boys and girls, is a fundamental aspect of economy. When we get in this country items that can be made here, not only are we draining out our foreign exchange, we are depriving our people of work. We are blunting entrepreneurship. We can make भारत आत्मनिर्भर by each individual consciously contributing for it. Be it natural resources. Reckless consumption is not in our traditions because we are trustees. Our fiscal power, our money power cannot entitle us to make a demand on our natural resources which belong to one and all. Beyond human beings to all living beings, civic duties is the Fifth Pillar of it. 

    Every individual, if he or she decides, we can inculcate a new fervour of nationalistic spirit. By integrating individual responsibility, traditional values, environmental consciousness, in our journey of cultural pride and self-reliance. 

    लोकसंग्रह हमारे वैदिक कल्चर में है। इसको कह सकते हो कि हर किसी की भागीदारी, हर किसी का योगदान। अपने भारतीय संस्कृति में यदि आप देखोगे और जाओगे पुराने कल्चर में, कन्या दान क्या होता था? व्यक्ति अपनी बेटी की शादी करता था, पर कन्यादान हर कोई देता था। दुनिया के अंदर आज तक इससे बड़ा अजूबा उदाहरण नहीं है की यह क्यों है। यह क्या सीखता है। 

    Public order stems not from force, not from coercion, from voluntary discipline. National growth depends on citizens’ pervasive attitude. Public order thrives when every individual acts as guardian of law and justice. Just imagine the scene we have faced. Youth must infuse mindsets, How can our democracy can tolerate disruption, property destruction, constitutional challenges, and assault on civilization ethos. Public property, our property are being burnt. Public order being disrupted even when rule of law is taking its own course. We must neutralise these forces. First by counselling, and if counselling does not work, then sometimes a bitter pill has to be given, even to the body to keep it in shape. 

    Boys and girls, no one has greater stakes than you have. Your stakes are the highest because you are the future of this country. If Viksit Bharat will be attained, which it will be, it will be with your mindset contributing 100%. As they say, the engine must fire on all cylinders in full throttle. We have to understand what is meant by nationalism. It is not jingoistic aggression, but profound love for the nation. Profound belief in our culture and heritage. We have to celebrate our great achievements, take them to greater heights, at the same time being fully cognisant of our shortcomings. Everyone will have shortcomings and failures, these are natural. 

    A failure is not a failure. It is another stepping stone for success and in that perspective, we have to believe that true nationalism manifests through several elements. 

    One, give your very best to the nation. Excellence, integrity, conservation, compassion, and not sloganeering. We must keep away from it. 

    Keeping the nation first, keeping national interest uppermost. We can never have national interest subservient to partisan interest. That is not an option, it is the only way out because we are proud Indians and already quoted by Dr. Ambedkar, forget about everything else. I quote him the relevant part. Ambedkar’s wisdom is, ‘Be Indians first, Indians last, Nothing but Indians.’ And his second one, I quote, ‘Educate, Organise, and Agitate’ was meant for you boys and girls. 

    Students and the cream is before me and I’m sure students all over the country will be listening to me. Be a responsibility to national unity. Progress, it is your obligation to neutralise divisive voices through active engagement in social media. You have to focus on governance. Improve its quality because you are the foot soldiers for our journey to reach Bharat in 2047, if not before. Nations are built not by governments. Nations are not built by industrialists. Nations are built by individuals. 

    The power of the individual, as I said, an atom. The power is atomic. You have that power, you only have to realise it but the greatest impact comes, boys and girls, when you excel in integrity. In ethical standards in your field and always aim to serve a public purpose, a public cause. New India would emerge and is emerging only through citizens performing duties with dedication. 

    Let me warn you on certain things, choosing integrity over expediency. Many people take shortcuts, believe me a shortcut is the longest distance between two points. When you are in trouble, when you are in difficulty. If you take a shortcut with the rule of law. If you take a shortcut with financial discipline. There may be momentary success but when you get into the rut of it, you are never out of it. Therefore, never choose expediency over integrity. Our national character should be that we are honest people because a nation can be honest with honest people only. 

    Democracy’s quality depends on participation. Voting informed opinions, civil society engagement. Constructive different point of view. Democracy has to be vibrant in our procedure. Educated youth must evaluate politics beyond partisanship. You must learn to demand accountability from everyone including the one speaking to you. You must be highly critical and judgemental. If you think what I say is wrong, I am subject to correction but if you think I am right and still you observe silence, trust me. You will be silenced forever.

    सही बात, सही समय, सही समूह को और  सही व्यक्ति को कहने में हिचकिचाहट करोगे, तो खुद को तो दुर्बल करोगे ही, उन सकारात्मक शक्तियों को भी आप गहरी चोट पहुँचाओगे। इसलिए, अभिव्यक्ति और संवाद सर्वोपरि है।

    Thank you so much.

    ****

    JK/RC/SM

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Urgent need to fight the organised crime of smugglers – P-001576/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Priority question for written answer  P-001576/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Fredis Beleris (PPE)

    On 12 April 2025, a Greek patrol vessel was informed that irregular migrants were being disembarked from a Turkish fishing boat near Agios Fokas, in the south of the island of Lesvos. Upon approaching the boat, the patrol vessel was shot at by one of the four smugglers on board. We are once again witnessing the aggression of the trafficking networks in the Aegean Sea. New EU actions are based on data from the EU Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment (EU-SOCTA). It is therefore all the more evident that there is an urgent need, as reflected in the new European Internal Security Strategy, to strengthen the resources at the EU’s disposal to guard European borders and combat organised crime.

    In view of the above, can the Commission answer the following:

    • 1.Does it intend to further strengthen the relevant European agencies, especially Frontex and Europol, in the fight against organised crime of traffickers?
    • 2.Does it intend to increase funding for protection and deterrence instruments at the external borders in the revision of the current MFF and the new (post-2027) MFF?

    Submitted: 17.4.2025

    Last updated: 23 April 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the control of the financial activities of the European Investment Bank – annual report 2023 – A10-0068/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on the control of the financial activities of the European Investment Bank – annual report 2023

    (2024/2052(INI))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to the European Investment Bank Group (‘EIB Group’) 2023 activity report of 1 February 2024 entitled ‘A Blueprint for Sustainable Living’, and to the EIB Group document of 2 February 2023 entitled ‘EIB Group Operational Plan 2023-2025’,–  having regard to the European Investment Bank (‘EIB’, ‘the Bank’) Investment Report 2023/2024 entitled ‘Transforming for competitiveness’, published on 7 February 2024,

     having regard to the EIB document of 8 May 2023 entitled ‘Mid-term review of the EIB Energy Lending Policy’,

     having regard to the EIB Group report on the implementation of the EIB Group Transparency Policy in 2023, published on 1 July 2024,

     having regard to the EIB Group document of 27 November 2023 entitled ‘The EIB Group PATH Framework – Version 1.2 of November 2023 – Supporting counterparties on their pathways to align with the Paris Agreement’,

     having regard to the EIB Group and EIB documents of 21 June 2024 entitled ‘EIB Group 2024-2027 Strategic Roadmap’ and of 29 November 2023 entitled ‘EIB Global Strategic Roadmap’,

     having regard to the EIB Group Sustainability Report 2023, published on 25 July 2024,

     having regard to the EIB information note of 6 February 2023 entitled ‘The European Investment Bank’s approach to human rights’,

     having regard to the EIB Group Complaints Mechanism Report 2023, published on 10 June 2024,

     having regard to the EIB Group document of 14 October 2024 entitled ‘Diversity, Equity and Inclusion at the EIB Group’,

     having regard to the EIB publication of 23 September 2024 entitled ‘EIB Audit Committee Annual Reports for the year 2023’,

     having regard to the EIB Group report of 15 July 2024 entitled ‘EIB Group activities in EU cohesion regions 2023’,–  having regard to the EIB report of 19 October 2023 entitled ‘EIB Investment Survey 2023 – European Union overview’,

      having regard to the EIB Group report of 26 June 2024 entitled ‘EIB Group support for EU businesses: Evidence of impact in addressing market failures’,

     having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 5 March 2024 entitled ‘A new European Defence Industrial Strategy: Achieving EU readiness through a responsive and resilient European Defence Industry’ (JOIN(2024)0010),

     having regard to European Court of Auditors Special Report 22/2024 entitled ‘Double funding from the EU budget’,

     having regard to the EIB Group report of 29 December 2023 entitled ‘European Investment Bank Group Risk Management Disclosure Report – June 2023’,

     having regard to the joint communication of 19 March 2025 from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy entitled ‘Joint White Paper for European Defence Readiness 2030’ (JOIN(2025)0120),

     having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0068/2025),

    A. whereas the EIB Group includes the EIB and the European Investment Fund (EIF); whereas the EIB stands as the world’s largest multilateral development bank; whereas the EIB is treaty-bound to contribute to EU integration; whereas the EIB’s key priorities include providing funding for projects to foster European integration and social cohesion; whereas the EIF acts as a dedicated body for supporting the European Union’s policy objectives in the areas of entrepreneurship, job creation and economic cohesion;

    B. whereas, as a bank owned by the EU Member States, the EIB is governed by a Board of Governors, a Board of Directors and a Management Committee, and it maintains robust internal mechanisms for accountability, governance and audit; whereas the EIF is owned by the EIB (60 %), the EU (30 %) and financial institutions (10 %) from the Member States, the UK and Türkiye, and is managed by the General Meeting of EIF shareholders, the Board of Directors and the Chief Executive, with independent internal mechanisms for accountability, governance and audit, some of which are shared at the Group level;

    C. whereas both the EIB and the EIF operate within a competitive market but are held to high standards of transparency and stakeholder engagement as EU bodies;

    D. whereas the EIB Group promotes EU policies both within and outside the EU and collaborates closely with other EU and national institutions, aligning its financing with the EU’s political priorities; whereas the EIB Group outlined eight strategic priorities in its Strategic Roadmap for 2024-2027: climate action, digital transformation, defence, cohesion, agriculture, social infrastructure, external financing and promoting the Capital Markets Union;

    E. whereas the EIB is also tasked with securing resources through borrowing activities, which are crucial for implementing the EU’s policies;

    F. whereas the European Council’s strategic agenda for 2024-2029 envisages an enhanced role for the EIB Group as a driver of EU defence and security, and emphasises the need to boost EU competitiveness and improve citizens’ economic and social well-being through significant collective investment efforts, leveraging both public and private funding;

    G. whereas the Draghi report on the future of European competitiveness[1] proposed numerous ways to expand the EIB’s role in financing EU policies and to enable the EIB to assume more risk;

    H. whereas the EIB Group’s core mission is to bolster Europe’s potential for job creation and economic growth; whereas its investments should tackle inequalities by improving access to jobs, training opportunities, housing and education in order to address poverty and unemployment; whereas it is crucial to overcome barriers to financing for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and mid-caps; whereas public lending and guarantee schemes serve as vital countercyclical policy tools, especially during economic downturns, and help mitigate structural market failures;

    I. whereas the EIB is a cornerstone of the European financial architecture for development and the largest multilateral lender in the EU’s neighbouring regions, including the Eastern Neighbourhood countries, the Western Balkans, the Middle East, and North Africa; whereas the EIB is expected to help close the gap in productive investment between Europe and its main competitors by increasing investment in innovation, communication technology and intellectual property;

    J. whereas the success of the EU’s policy objectives and their effective implementation increasingly depend on the EIB Group; whereas the depth and quality of Parliament’s oversight of the EIB’s financial operations should therefore be in line with the intensity of EIB-Commission cooperation, which has become very significant;

    K. whereas the EIB’s business model requires the highest standards of integrity, accountability and transparency, and robust measures must be implemented and regularly updated to combat financial fraud, corruption, money laundering, terrorism, organised crime and both tax evasion and avoidance; whereas the EIB Group has a control framework aimed at preventing and mitigating sanctions risks;

    L. whereas the EIB Group adheres to the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s definition of compliance risk, with the aim of preventing the risk of legal or regulatory sanctions, material financial loss, or damage to reputation; whereas the Bank takes appropriate measures to mitigate such risks by ensuring strict compliance with legal and regulatory frameworks, both at EU and international level;

    Financial operations and performance

    1. Acknowledges that the EIB has operated effectively and efficiently in a landscape marked by significant global challenges, including geopolitical tensions, climate change impacts and other factors influencing the global economy; suggests exploring both the EIB’s effectiveness and efficiency through thoughtful analysis, particularly focusing on the impact on competitiveness and growth;

    2. Recognises that EIB financing is becoming increasingly crucial in the context of high interest rates and constrained public finances; expects the EIB, in the context of a challenging economic outlook and increased global competition, to address constraints to EU competitiveness, such as volatile energy prices, skills shortages in key sectors and insufficient investments in innovation and new technologies;

    3. Notes that the EIB Group achieved strong consolidated results amounting to EUR 2.272 billion in 2023 under the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), compared to EUR 2.327 billion in 2022, reflecting a year-on-year decrease of 2.4 %; calls for a detailed analysis of the factors contributing to this decrease, especially since the period was marked by steady economic growth; observes that EIB reserves reached over EUR 56 billion in 2023, up from EUR 53.9 billion in 2022 and EUR 36 billion in 2014;

    4. Notes that the EIB’s total liquidity ratio remained well within internal limits to the end of 2023 and that the EIB’s Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) ratio stood at 33.1 % in 2023, significantly higher than the average ratio of significant institutions supervised by the European Central Bank (ECB) at that time; emphasises that maintaining the EIB’s AAA rating with a ‘stable’ outlook is crucial for securing favourable market financing at preferential rates and should be preserved; underlines that the EIB’s high credit standing is key to its successful business model;

    5. Calls on the EIB to maintain its strong capital position and consistently high profits, but notes that the Bank has potential to absorb potential fluctuations in returns without compromising shareholder capital or its credit rating, has the capacity to take on more risk in strategic investments and is well-equipped to invest more in higher-risk innovative projects where private capital remains hesitant;

    6. Highlights that the EIB’s total disbursements reached EUR 54.4 billion in 2023, with EUR 53.4 billion from its own resources, compared to EUR 54.3 billion (EUR 53.3 billion from its own resources) in 2022; observes that the EIF’s disbursements on private equity investments amounted to EUR 139.7 million in 2023, compared to EUR 113.7 million in 2022; notes that, according to an economic model developed jointly by the EIB’s Economics Department and the Commission’s Joint Research Centre, the EIB Group’s overall investment within the EU in 2023 is expected to create around 1 460 000 new jobs in the EU-27 by 2027 and boost the EU’s GDP by 1.03 percentage points; calls on the EIB Group to ensure a more balanced geographical distribution of investments to maximise their impact across all EU regions, promoting cohesive and inclusive growth throughout the Union, with particular attention to under-represented and less developed areas;

    7. Recalls that the EIB’s Statute mandates geographical balance among its staff and that the selection of staff members must be based on merit, while also considering fair representation of nationals from all Member States; encourages the Bank to continuously monitor geographical balance among its staff and to adjust the recruitment process accordingly, if needed;

    8. Welcomes the fact that the EIB Group upholds a rigorous policy against tax fraud, tax evasion, tax avoidance, money laundering and terrorism financing;

    InvestEU, the simplification of the multiannual financial framework, and the Recovery and Resilience Facility

    9. Welcomes the adoption, on 13 December 2023, of the EIB Group Operational Plan 2024-2026, which outlines the priorities and activities for implementing the EIB Group’s strategy over the next three years; calls for adjustments to new market conditions, including simplification and a reduction of bureaucracy to remove barriers to financing for SMEs, which must be significantly increased; acknowledges that increasing higher-risk activities and mandates is crucial for providing effective support to high value-added and innovative sectors;

    10. Recalls that the EIB Group has been allocated 75 % (EUR 19.6 billion) of the EU budgetary guarantee under the InvestEU Regulation[2]; highlights that, in 2023 alone, the EIB approved 30 operations under InvestEU totalling EUR 9.1 billion; believes that in order to stay competitive, significant investments are needed, primarily from the private sector; believes that focusing on innovative projects, start-ups and scale-ups would enhance European competitiveness and growth; notes that this requires mobilising private investments; calls, therefore, on the EIB to play a more significant role in strategic de-risking through guarantees, thereby encouraging private capital investment;

    11. Stresses that, within the current 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework, the EIB manages 87 mandates from the Commission, increasing to about 130 if those relating to shared management and assigned by local governments and the Member States are included, and notes that the EIB produces no fewer than 457 reports a year for these; points out that de-bureaucratisation and simplification are deemed necessary to enable better use of resources;

    12. Emphasises that the EIB is managing six Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) mandates in four Member States, signed in 2021 (Greece and Italy), 2022 (Romania) and 2024 (Spain), totalling EUR 8.7 billion; acknowledges that the adoption of ‘financing not linked to costs’ instruments, which have significantly expanded with the RRF, inherently raises the risk of errors and double funding; expresses its concern about the transparency, auditing and monitoring of the implementation of the RRF; calls on the EIB to cooperate with Member States to address government capacity constraints and the lack of technical skills so as to ensure that RRF resources are managed as effectively as possible, in alignment with national structures and complying with all RRF reporting requirements, especially in the implementation of investment projects and reforms; urges the Commission and the EIB, in its advisory role, to refrain from proposing new financing mechanisms based on the RRF model without taking corrective measures, including in the upcoming post-2027 multiannual financial framework; stresses that, while the EIB seeks simplification, it must not compromise the soundness of EU resource management or the ability to maintain oversight and accountability, as mandated by the Treaties;

    Energy security

    13. Notes the EIB’s continued support for security of supply, which mainly takes the form of reinforcing electricity grids and cross-border infrastructure, of reducing energy demand through energy efficiency projects and of fostering low-carbon power generation; commends the fact that the EIB has supported new dimensions of energy security, such as demand response and energy storage, and has promoted the development of a sustainable supply of critical raw materials (CRM) needed for the energy transition; calls for an urgent analysis of the real impact of these projects implemented to date, especially of their impact on the availability and cost of energy and thus on the general competitiveness of European companies;

    14. Reiterates the need to address energy poverty and emphasises the need for a fair and inclusive energy transition; recalls that the energy crisis is exacerbating inflation, increasing food insecurity and straining household budgets; encourages the EIB to leverage the Just Transition Mechanism and the Modernisation Fund to support regions and populations most affected by the energy transition; stresses the importance of using the Just Transition Mechanism to support workers and regions affected by the phase out of fossil fuels, ensuring access to retraining and quality jobs; recognises that numerous sectors are grappling with challenges stemming from the combined effects of adaption to European Green Deal objectives and the repercussions of the energy crisis and inflation; stresses that accelerating the deployment of innovative low-carbon technologies requires bringing their costs to a level that is competitive with fossil fuels and adjusting to the ongoing reform of the green policies;

    15. Acknowledges that the REPowerEU plan is a crucial new element in the EU policy response to the energy crisis; notes that, in July 2023, the EIB Group increased the financing targets of the October 2022 commitment from EUR 30.0 billion until 2027 to EUR 45.0 billion (REPowerEU+), in order to scale up its efforts to support the EU’s energy security; calls for a clear overview of potential double funding of energy projects;

    16. Underlines that in 2023, the EIB provided approximately EUR 21.4 billion in financing for energy-related projects, of which around EUR 19.8 billion in the EU and EUR 1.6 billion outside the EU; considers it necessary to increase not only the volume of financing for energy-related projects, but also the efficiency of the investments; underlines, in this regard, the importance of the EIB’s combined offer of competent technical assistance and innovative financial support, and encourages the Bank to expand the range of innovative financing products offered to economic operators, going beyond the standard market offer;

    17. Believes that hydrogen and its derivatives, particularly when sourced from renewable energy, can significantly contribute to the EU’s decarbonisation goals and reduce dependence on fossil fuels; urges the EIB to take a leading role in mobilising private investments, which are essential for scaling up hydrogen production across the EU, while ensuring technological neutrality and supporting a diverse range of innovative solutions for decarbonisation, including further scientific research aimed at enhancing and stabilising the efficiency of hydrogen technology; encourages the Bank to consider the cost-effectiveness of such projects from the perspective of their total life cycle;

    Defence and security policy

    18. Welcomes the significant role that the EIB Group plays in supporting the EU’s defence and security policy by providing funding and leveraging private investment to enhance the Union’s strategic autonomy and resilience; stresses the importance of the EIB’s investment capabilities, supporting initiatives that contribute to strengthening the EU’s defence industry, advancing cybersecurity infrastructure and promoting innovation in critical defence technologies;

    19. Appreciates that security and defence is set as one of the Bank’s core priorities in its Strategic Roadmap for 2024-2027; highlights that in May 2024, the EIB’s Board of Directors approved the EIB Group Security and Defence Industry Action Plan, which follows the EIB Group 2022 Strategic European Security Initiative aimed at supporting innovation in dual-use technology, in order to enhance support for the EU’s security and defence industry; notes, with satisfaction, that EIB Group support is provided to SMEs and innovative start-ups within the security and defence sector under the ‘dual-use’ principle, upholding the ‘credible civil use’ criterion, but waiving the revenue test; welcomes the decision of the EIB Board of Directors of 21 March 2025 to expand the Bank’s eligibilities for financing Europe’s security and defence industry and infrastructure, by ensuring that excluded activities are as limited as possible in scope;

    20. Welcomes the EIB’s targeted investments in both defence and civilian infrastructure and emphasises the need for strategic investment in technologies that serve both civilian and defence purposes, in line with the EU’s broader goals of promoting innovation and enhancing the Union’s security; calls on the EIB Group to conduct a review of the impact of the extension of its new dual-use goods policy;

    21. Stresses the importance of SMEs, start-ups and mid-caps in the security and defence industry and in developing a common European market for defence; believes that smaller actors play a crucial role in strengthening the Union’s capacity and autonomy to develop innovative defence products; encourages the EIB to further support cross-border research and development (R&D) cooperation, particularly by paving the way for smaller actors to take part in the defence supply chains; stresses that greater EIB investment in the defence sector can encourage investment by commercial banks in the same area and considers it necessary to increase the flexibility of lending to SMEs in this regard;

    22. Notes that the resources allocated to support the defence and security sector mainly come from the European Defence Fund (EDF) (EUR 8 billion), the EIB Strategic European Security Initiative (SESI) (EUR 8 billion) and the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP) (EUR 1.5 billion); calls for a dedicated capital allocation on defence and the further adjustment of the scope of eligible investments in order to meet the ambitious role of contributing to Europe’s peace and security set by the White Paper on European Defence Readiness 2030 for the EIB Group; welcomes the integration of the EIB’s existing EUR 8 billion SESI into a cross-cutting and permanent public policy goal and the removal of a predefined ceiling for financing in this area; believes that these measures will allow the Bank to respond to the investment needs in security and defence, while safeguarding its operations and strong financial position; believes that the decision by the Board of Governors in June 2024 to increase the gearing ratio of the Bank will enable increased investments in areas of strategic importance, including in security and defence;

    23. Underlines the added value of the innovative measures that the EIB has adopted to accelerate investments in security and defence, and of the ‘one-stop shop’ that acts as the single point of entry for clients and external stakeholders, to whom it offers expert assistance to streamline access and speed up deployment of financing available under the SESI; encourages the EIB to continue developing and implementing agreed upon measures that simplify client procedures and further accelerate investment processes, while ensuring that the AAA rating is preserved;

    24. Notes, with appreciation, that in June 2023, the EIB approved an increase in SESI for security investments in the EU from EUR 6.0 billion to EUR 8.0 billion for the period from 2022 to 2027, also including the space and cybersecurity sectors; encourages the EIB to strengthen institutional partnerships with the EU Agency for the Space Programme and other potentially relevant partners, in accordance with EU competition rules;

    25. Commends the EIB’s cooperation with all relevant stakeholders, including Member State governments, the European Defence Agency (EDA) and the NATO Innovation Fund; appreciates, in particular, the EIB Group’s cooperation with the EDA and welcomes the signing of an update to the memorandum of understanding between the two bodies on 3 October 2024, which will allow them to strengthen strategic partnerships and jointly identify financing needs to better support research, development and innovation (RDI) in the area of security and defence in the Union;

    26. Invites the EIB to further strengthen such collaboration with key stakeholders with a view to increasing impact, synergies and complementarity with EU defence programmes, ensuring that its investments complement broader EU defence policy goals and contribute to achieving economies of scale in European defence capabilities; asks the EIB to enhance regional security and resilience, particularly in Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean through the creation of infrastructure that supports regional security and fosters greater cooperation between EU Member States on defence matters; stresses, furthermore, the importance of exploring cooperation with the NATO Innovation Fund in order to improve access to financing for technology start-ups, in parallel to the deployment of the EIF Defence Equity Facility;

    Social infrastructure and housing

    27. Asks the EIB to increase risk-taking for projects providing essential services with long-term clear and measurable benefits; welcomes, in this vein, the EIB Group’s actions and measures in the area of housing and social infrastructure that contribute to affordable housing, social inclusion and regional development, while also supporting sustainability and innovation; calls on the EIB to prioritise its investments towards these goals in order to achieve better economic growth, social inclusion and regional cohesion, while also supporting the EU’s sustainability objectives; invites the Bank to focus on sustainable urban development and inclusive growth by ensuring that the EU’s housing and infrastructure needs are met for a stronger, more cohesive and prosperous Europe;

    28. Emphasises that housing purchase and rental costs have surged significantly in recent years, reducing the affordability of many metropolitan areas in the EU and limiting access to housing; stresses that the EIB must play a stronger role in addressing the housing crisis; welcomes the inclusion of support for social infrastructure in the EIB Group’s eight strategic priorities for 2024-2027 and agrees that investments in energy-efficient, sustainable and accessible housing, and education within easy reach are crucial for boosting productivity and fostering strong and resilient societies; encourages the EIB to prioritise investments in housing cooperatives, energy-efficient social housing and renovation projects targeting low-income households; believes that addressing the EU’s major housing investment gaps requires overcoming both financial and non-financial investment barriers and the large-scale mobilisation of resources and capacities;

    29. Welcomes that the EIB, in collaboration with the Commission, has initiated a pan-European investment platform aimed at promoting affordable and sustainable housing, combining advisory services and financing, and encourages the participants to continue this initiative;

    30. Welcomes the EIB’s commitment to easing the pressure on housing markets in Europe; stresses that housing purchase and rental prices have increased significantly in recent years, reducing the affordability of many metropolitan areas in the EU and compromising access to these; emphasises that EIB analysis shows that the EU needs about 1.5 million new housing units per year to cope with demand, and that about 75 % of the EU’s building stock needs to be renovated, representing an additional 5 million units per year; welcomes the fact that the EIB supports the reconstruction of existing housing and the construction of new social and affordable accommodation; encourages the EIB to mobilise more funding for affordable housing projects among the Member States;

    31. Calls for the strengthening of technical assistance and financial expertise in support of local and regional authorities, especially in areas with low investment capacity, in order to improve access to EIB funding; believes that cooperation with local authorities, local governments and civil society representatives should foster the development of social housing suitable for all, and especially for the most vulnerable citizens of the concerned Member State; is aware that the effectiveness of the EIB’s action in the housing and social infrastructure sector also depends on the removal of policy and regulatory hurdles;

    32. Notes that, in 2023, the EIB signed EUR 8.3 billion in financial support for energy efficiency operations, of which 65 % was for energy efficiency in buildings; invites the EIB to prioritise long-term affordable and accessible solutions, and sustainable investments, such as energy-efficient renovations and the reuse of vacant buildings;

    33. Believes that the related investments should ensure sufficient durability before any change of destination or use is authorised;

    34. Invites the EIB to build on its long-standing experience as an accelerator of European investments and to also deploy its potential in the education and training and healthcare sectors, including through advisory services; calls on the Bank to strengthen support for healthcare capacities, both within and outside the EU, thus  ensuring a stronger role for Europe in the world;

    Support for SMEs, mid-caps, start-ups, scale-ups and businesses in rural and remote areas, the Capital Markets Union and the role of the EIF

    35. Highlights that SMEs, start-ups and scale-ups are vital for the EU’s economy; notes that these businesses encounter significant hurdles in accessing financing, markets and talent, which constrains their growth; asserts that business growth, dynamism and public investment are essential for fostering innovation, competitiveness and productivity; encourages the EIB Group to continue addressing these challenges, notably in the current geopolitical context, through customised financial programmes, risk-sharing mechanisms and targeted financial instruments, while ensuring the additionality of public resources for these purposes and avoiding the crowding out of private capital; notes that different instruments to support lending to businesses can be combined depending on the context, and that different EIB Group instruments target different market failures and firm types; stresses the need to provide technical assistance to SMEs before project approval, in order to improve access to EIB funding;

    36. Notes that the development of a well-functioning securitisation market can be a key first step towards establishing a strong Capital Markets Union (CMU); believes that the CMU will benefit consumers and SMEs by offering high-yield investment opportunities in the real economy and will eventually boost the venture capital market by improving access to diversified funding sources; believes that financing European scale-ups with European capital should be a priority, as exemplified by the European Tech Champions Initiative, which was launched in February 2023 to finance promising European tech companies and prevent the sale of businesses to foreign investors because of the lack of European investment; encourages the EIF to explore establishing the second generation of this initiative; observes that the European Tech Champions Initiative is complemented by the European Scale-up Initiative, which aims to provide crucial financing for Europe’s high-tech companies in their late-stage development; notes that these investments should be in line with policy actions at EU and national level; is aware of the comparative weaknesses of the European venture capital market in respect of other competitors’ markets, and that European start-ups and scale-ups are often obliged to relocate or search for foreign buyers or rely on sources of financing other than venture capital, hence less suited to high-growth;

    37. Acknowledges the mission of the EIF to support access to financing for European micro, small and medium-sized enterprises; believes that the EIF should significantly step up its activities for the development of the European venture capital ecosystem, while maintaining a geographical balance; calls for the EIF’s activities to be strengthened, enabling increased investment in high-growth sectors, enhancing risk-sharing between public and private investors, and promoting innovation throughout Europe; considers it necessary to monitor the rate of increase in support for micro, small and medium-sized enterprises;

    38. Encourages the EIF to further develop its monitoring tools to better track the long-term performance of venture capital funds and SME financing operations, especially in terms of job creation, innovation diffusion and regional impact; stresses also the critical role of large European companies in Europe’s economic structure, particularly those operating in essential sectors such as energy, defence and infrastructure; calls for a balanced approach that ensures the EIB continues to support large European companies in securing investment capital for major projects and research and development initiatives, thereby enhancing Europe’s global competitiveness;

    39. Praises the support provided by the EIB Group to about 400 000 SMEs and mid-caps in 2023 alone, with EUR 31.1 billion in financing, including loans and guarantees for businesses (of which EUR 14.9 billion was deployed by the EIF), resulting in the mobilisation of over EUR 134 billion, and notes that it teamed up with almost 300 partner institutions across Europe to this end; encourages the EIB to continue its role in improving access to financing for SMEs, which often face barriers to funding from traditional financial institutions, providing targeted financing to ensure sufficient resources to grow and thrive; welcomes and calls for the constant expansion of the number of partner institutions to reach a wide geographical and sectoral coverage;

    40. Recalls that the deployment of the European Guarantee Fund ended in 2023 and that its disbursements to help SMEs to recover from the adverse impact of the pandemic reached approximately 200 000 SMEs across the EU; recalls the concerns expressed in previous resolutions about the transparency of the decision-making processes and information about final recipients;

    41. Welcomes that EIF measures on anti-money-laundering, countering the financing of terrorism and tax avoidance encompass risk assessments for products and transactions, thorough due diligence on counterparties and screening the ownership structures and key individuals against sanctions and adverse media; welcomes the introduction of mandatory staff training and the conclusion of an agreement with the Financial Intelligence Unit of Luxembourg on the reporting of and follow-up on any suspicious transactions detected;

    Key policy areas of cohesion, climate action and environmental sustainability, and digitalisation

    42. Appreciates that in its 2021-2027 Cohesion Orientation, the EIB committed to dedicating at least 40 % of its total financing in the EU between 2022 and 2024 to projects in cohesion regions; notes that, in 2023, such financing amounted to EUR 29.8 billion, equivalent to 45 % of the Bank’s total signatures in the EU; underlines that the share of EIB financing allocated to less developed regions increased from 24 % in 2022 to 26 % in 2023, totalling EUR 17.2 billion, well above the 21 % target set in the EIB Cohesion Orientation for 2023; reiterates the call for the EIB to continue monitoring, analysing and addressing the shortcomings that prevent certain regions or countries from fully benefiting from the EIB’s financial support and assistance;

    43. Acknowledges the role played by the EIF in contributing to economic and social cohesion in the Union through a wide range of financial instruments; notes that EIF commitments to credit guarantees, venture capital and private equity investments for cohesion regions in 2023 stood at EUR 6.8 billion, representing 48 % of total EIF commitments in the EU; notes that in 2023, the EIF was especially active in Central and Eastern Europe;

    44. Notes that the EIB Environmental and Social Sustainability Framework includes revised environmental and social policy and standards promoting an integrated approach to impact and risk assessment and management;

    45. Acknowledges that over the past 15 years, EIB Advisory has supported over 1 000 projects in cohesion regions; calls on the Bank to actively promote financing opportunities in less developed and transition regions, including by boosting the presence of advisory services in EIB local offices; considers it necessary to also take into account the geographical distribution of EIB support for increasing social cohesion;

    46. Highlights the EIB’s initiatives in cohesion regions to support the healthcare sector, including the HERA Invest programme, a EUR 100 million guarantee established with the Commission to support research and development in addressing pressing cross-border health threats; encourages the EIB to promote targeted investments in key systemic enablers such as healthcare, education, social housing, digital connectivity and local financing for cities and regions, ensuring a better geographical balance, either through direct lending or financial instruments, and to leverage synergies between EU grants and EIB loans to enhance cross-border rail connectivity, which is crucial for better integration within the EU single market;

    47. Acknowledges the EIB’s strategic orientation since 2019 to be the EU Climate Bank; emphasises that in 2023 alone, the EIB signed EUR 41.8 billion in financing for climate action and EUR 25.1 billion for environmental sustainability (EUR 35.1 billion and EUR 15.9 billion respectively in 2022); notes that EIB financing for climate change adaptation totalled EUR 2.7 billion in 2023, corresponding to 6.4 % of its total climate action (compared to EUR 1.9 billion, or 5.4 %, in 2022); welcomes that climate action and environmental sustainability financing, as a whole, accounted for 60 % of EIB financing in 2023; calls for maintaining technological neutrality in its investment strategy in climate and sustainable financing;

    48. Recalls that the EIB Energy Lending Policy (ELP), adopted in 2019, established a ‘phase out support to energy projects reliant on unabated fossil fuels’ and introduced a transition period during which the Bank could continue to approve projects already under appraisal, but the Board of Directors did not approve any such project after the end of 2021; remarks that, in 2022, the EIB Group introduced a temporary and exceptional extension of the exemptions to the Paris Alignment for Counterparties Framework (so-called PATH) in support of REPowerEU, to cover projects with high innovative content and renewable energy projects and electric vehicle charging infrastructure in the EU; observes that, in 2023, the EIB Group decided to apply the same temporary and exceptional extension also for projects in the spirit of REPowerEU outside the EU; notes that such temporary and exceptional extensions are expected to run until 2027, subject to a Climate Bank roadmap review expected in 2025; recalls its previous resolution[3] and maintains that PATH offers the appropriate framework for supporting counterparties on their pathways to align with the Paris Agreement objectives; emphasises that the EIB is expected to intensify its engagement with all of its clients to foster the development of their decarbonisation plans;

    49. Notes the EIB Group Climate Bank Roadmap mid-term review, approved in 2023, which includes a simplified Paris Alignment framework for microenterprises, the revision of the PATH framework’s disclosure requirements for financial intermediaries and a temporary extension of the list of countries in which the EIB can act as a sole financier of climate adaptation projects due to their particular vulnerability to climate change;

    50. Welcomes the EIB Group’s inclusion of agriculture and bioeconomy among its key priorities, but notes that agriculture, fisheries and forestry received only 1.1 % of the EIB’s lending stock in 2023; considers it important for the EIB to programme significant amounts for financing the agricultural sector and through simplified procedures;

    51. Underlines that agriculture is a key driver of growth and development in rural areas; acknowledges the increasing challenges faced by the agricultural sector and the need for EU farmers to adapt to the European Green Deal objectives, cope with the energy crisis and manage rising inflation; calls on the EIB Group to enhance support and foster innovation for this vital sector, which plays a significant role in ensuring food security, leveraging the EU’s One Health approach by integrating human, animal, plant and environmental health to create sustainable, resilient and productive agri-food systems; highlights the financial challenges faced by farmers, particularly young and small operators, noting that farmers and the enterprises in this sector experience lower success rates when applying for financing;

    52. Stresses that EIB support should have a just transition approach in order to achieve sustainable agriculture that protects the environment, human health and animal welfare, while improving farmers’ livelihoods, in particular for small and medium-sized farms; maintains that supporting rural areas is essential for promoting balanced and inclusive development, generational renewal and equal access to financial opportunities for women and men; reiterates its call on the EIB Group to increase its involvement in the agricultural sector by improving access to funding;

    53. Appreciates that the EIB Group is one of the key supporters of digitalisation in the EU, particularly in financing digital infrastructure and supporting innovative digital start-ups; encourages the EIB to enhance its support for digital networks strengthening the EU’s technological autonomy and innovation in key technologies;

    54. Believes that reducing digital inequality and preventing social exclusion requires significant public investment in telecommunications infrastructure, particularly in rural areas; encourages the EIB to support European citizens in acquiring adequate digital literacy to fully participate in society, with a special focus on the elderly and those with disabilities;

    55. Recognises the critical role of the cybersecurity sector in protecting businesses and governments from advanced digital threats and foreign influence; welcomes the increase in security investments from EUR 6 billion to EUR 8 billion, financed through the SESI to address security challenges, including those in the New Space industry;

    56. Welcomes the EIB’s focus on gender equality and women’s economic empowerment, resulting in a total of EUR 5.8 billion in investment in this field in 2023 (compared to EUR 5.1 billion in 2022); believes that the EIB could further increase microfinance loans to women-led businesses, which still face discrimination in access to financing;

    57. Highlights that the security of supply of critical raw materials is crucial for both the green and digital transitions, as well as for the defence sector and the EU industrial base in general; calls on the EIB to increase investments in the CRM sector to help diversify the supply of both primary and secondary raw materials and to develop circular economy solutions, in particular R&D for alternative materials, such as bio-based materials; welcomes, in this regard, the adoption on 21 March 2025 of a new CRM strategic initiative, with an expected EUR 2 billion in financing for CRM investment in 2025, a new CRM Task Force and a dedicated one-stop shop to build and manage a pipeline of CRM operations and advisory activities and increased technical expertise and partnerships;

    The EIB’s activities outside the EU

    58. Underlines that in EIB Global’s second year of existence, it provided financing amounting to EUR 8.4 billion (compared to EUR 9.1 billion in 2022); notes that, as EIB Global financing is limited to 50 % of the total cost of a project, investment co-financing with development finance institutions and multilateral development banks is recurring; calls on the EIB and the Commission to invest in internal audit and independent control functions to guarantee the integrity and soundness of all operations;

    59. Recalls that EIB Global is among the key implementing actors of the European Global Gateway and, as such, is expected to apply the highest standards of transparency and accountability;

    60. Notes the adoption by the EIB Board of Directors of the EIB Global Strategic Roadmap and its commitment to respect and promote human rights and the rule of law in the projects it supports;

    61. Highlights the importance of ensuring that the EIB Group’s interventions in Ukraine are guided by the priorities for the country’s reconstruction agreed with the EU, and are consistent with the methods and frameworks laid out in the Ukraine Plan and with the provisions of the EU Treaties; notes that the EIB is further enhancing its efforts to address fraud and corruption in relation to the EIB Group projects implemented in Ukraine; calls for the continued application of appropriate conditionality on the financial assistance provided to Ukraine, with a focus on ensuring effective oversight mechanisms, such as access to information and premises, and the monitoring of visits, and calls for conditionality to be extended to all non-EU countries for which it provides financing;

    62. Urges the strengthening of the administrative and audit capacity of Ukrainian authorities responsible for implementing, monitoring, controlling and supervising funded actions, in particular for the prevention of fraud, corruption, conflicts of interest and irregularities; reiterates that the EIB should have clear and unrestricted oversight at all times;

    63. Believes that a greater role for the EIB will bring added value for both the reconstruction of Ukraine and the enlargement process and for prospective partnerships under the EU’s Global Gateway agenda and neighbourhood policy and in support of the Sustainable Development Goals; encourages the Commission to maximise cooperation with the EIB to leverage the EU’s strategic autonomy, particularly on energy and raw materials;

    64. Welcomes the adoption, in 2024, of the Ukraine Facility, which follows the EIB’s EU for Ukraine (EU4U) initiative and establishes a support mechanism based on EU budget resources; encourages the Member States to ensure that solid support continues to be provided to the country, in line with its needs;

    65. Stresses that, in order to support Ukraine, the EIB has built up a loan portfolio of over EUR 7 billion since the beginning of the conflict with Russia in 2014; underlines that, as of 31 December 2023, the EIB’s exposure (disbursed and not yet disbursed) amounted to EUR 5.750 billion, predominantly covered by EU guarantees under the External Lending Mandate; notes that, in addition, the Bank also granted financial guarantees on exposures to counterparties located in Ukraine, fully covered by EU Comprehensive Guarantees, for a signed amount of EUR 388.7 million at the end of 2023 (compared to EUR 478.8 million at the end of 2022);

    66. Notes the growing financial engagement of the EIB in Ukraine; calls on the Bank to provide regular, detailed updates to the budgetary authority and relevant audit bodies regarding the disbursement and implementation of funds covered by EU guarantees;

    67. Underlines the disproportionate impact of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine on eastern EU regions bordering Russia and Belarus; draws attention to the costs borne by these regions and Member States as a result of their shared border with hostile neighbouring countries, notably their need to increasingly redirect public funds towards security, defence and preparedness, while dealing with severely reduced resources due to a disruption in economic activities, cross-border trade and other exchanges, and in cohesion programmes; calls on the EIB to take this into account in its financing decisions;

    68. Welcomes the significant investments made in Moldova to support economic resilience, improving energy security, enhancing infrastructure and aiding the country’s progress towards EU integration; acknowledges that in the Western Balkans, EIB Global invested EUR 1.2 billion in 2023, plus an additional EUR 700 million to enhance road safety and improve railway networks; welcomes the adoption of the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans in 2024 and the Reform and Growth Facility for Moldova approved by the European Parliament;

    69. Recognises the role played by the EIB in supporting the Western Balkans on their path to Union membership, in line with the EU’s enlargement policy; observes that EIB Global invested EUR 1.2 billion in the Western Balkans in 2023, mobilising a total of over EUR 6 billion in investments; notes that the majority of the financing was allocated to sustainable connectivity, followed by credit lines for SMEs, infrastructure projects in the healthcare, education and skills sectors, and water supply and sanitation;

    70. Asks the EIB to collaborate with other bilateral and multilateral institutions to develop and apply common methodologies for development impact analysis, with a view to ensuring added value and long-term, positive impacts;

    EIB accountability architecture

    71. Recalls that internal oversight at the EIB is headed by the Inspectorate General (IG), which comprises three accountability-related divisions – operations evaluation, the complaints mechanism and fraud investigation – that hold complementary roles, contributing to the consistent handling of allegations and complaints;

    72. Observes that the EIB Complaints Mechanism (EIB-CM) handled a total of 104 cases in 2023 (97 in 2022); notes that 60 new complaints were received in 2023 (54 in 2022), of which 44 were considered admissible and 29 were related to EIB-financed projects, of which 27 were located outside Europe;

    73. Notes that the EIB Procurement Complaints Committee is the independent EIB committee handling complaints about project procurement procedures relating to EIB-financed projects outside the EU;

    74. Welcomes the efforts of the Investigative Division (IG/IN) to cooperate and coordinate efforts with the other components of the EU’s anti-fraud architecture, in particular the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO), which received 37 % of the referrals made for investigations in 2023 (27 cases out of 74); encourages the IG/IN to strengthen its cooperation with all components of the EU’s anti-fraud architecture;

    75. Notes that the IG/IN carries out proactive fraud detection activities using the Fraud and Integrity Risk Scoring Tool and the Corruption Risk In Procurement robot and that, in 2023, 24 reviews identified targets for three full and in-depth proactive integrity reviews; invites the Bank to assess how these digital tools could be further enhanced to support transparency and financial accountability;

    76. Regrets the fact that, despite repeated calls by Parliament, the IG/IN annual report does not provide adequate information about the financial magnitude of the cases it handles, the funds or mandates affected, the kinds of projects concerned, the mitigating measures adopted, the role of the EIB services and of the intermediaries or partners in the cases, or even the Member States concerned; invites the representatives of the IG/IN to increase the level of engagement, interactions and transparency with Parliament, especially regarding the control of the financial activities; reiterates its call to the IG/IN to go beyond providing a mere narrative description of a few case studies, and to periodically report valuable insights into the extent to which financial interests are safeguarded; suggests that the IG/IN adopt a reporting model similar to those used by other investigative bodies, such as EPPO and OLAF, where a proper balance between transparency and duty of confidentiality or of professional secrecy is pursued;

    77. Is aware that the EIB Exclusion Policy provides for an autonomous exclusion process that is not fully equivalent to the Commission’s Early Detection and Exclusion System in terms of decision-making standards, results and remedies; reiterates its call on the EIB Group and the Commission to cooperate in identifying the potential gaps and proposing remedies, including an expedited procedure to enforce EIB exclusion decisions via the Early Detection and Exclusion System; observes that in 2023, exclusion proceedings based on IG/IN findings excluded five companies from participating in any EIB-financed activity for a period of five years;

    78. Welcomes the approval, in 2023, of the EIB Group’s Internal Control Framework Policy; acknowledges the results of the group alignment process between the EIB and the EIF insofar as they reflect the different business models and governance structures of the two entities; refers, in particular, to the Audit Committee’s remarks that both internal audit and the internal control framework should evolve to become group functions;

    79. Notes that the EIB’s independent external auditor is the third line of defence; points out that the regular rotation of auditors and assignments allows fresh perspectives, and therefore observes that the EIB external auditor should be rotated periodically, yet its mandate was extended until 2027 and it has been the auditor of the EIB Group since 2009;

    80. Appreciates that the EIB Group Risk Management Framework and EIB Group’s semi-annual Risk Management Disclosure Reports are effective and are aligned with the requirements and technical standards of the European Banking Authority;

    81. Stresses that, in 2023, despite difficult market conditions, the EIB’s portfolio continued to exhibit very low levels of non-performing exposures (NPEs); takes the view that even if a significant portion of the Bank’s loan portfolio benefits from credit enhancements or from EU Member State guarantees, the high quality of the EIB’s portfolio results from the diligent implementation of very effective EIB lending policies;

    82. Highlights that the EIB does not fall within the scope of application of the EU’s legislation applicable to credit institutions, in particular the Capital Requirements Regulation[4] and Directive[5] (CRR, CRD), thus the Bank is entitled to determine its capital and liquidity requirements in a manner that is adequate and appropriate to its activities, its mission and the market conditions; points out that the EIB Group is committed to conform to the best banking and market practices and can determine their applicability in line with the proportionality principle; stresses that the implementation of these norms should not create unwarranted burden; welcomes the fact that the EIB Group voluntarily performed the Review and Evaluation Process; points out that this should be in line with the EIB’s governance structure and mission;

    83. Understands that, in line with the EU’s evolving needs, the EU institutions approved, in 2024, the change in statute proposed by the EIB Board of Governors by amending the statutory limit on its gearing ratio[6] and raising it from 250 % to 290 %, to enable the EIB to invest more without increasing its equity base;

    84. Notes that the amended gearing ratio paves the way for increased risk-taking; acknowledges that investments in renewable energy, sustainable infrastructure and innovative technologies are crucial for the EU’s competitiveness, but often carry greater risk because of the uncertainty of returns; points out that increased risk-taking may increase the volatility of the EIB’s returns, but observes that the EIB maintains capital buffers that would support expanded risk activities;

    85. Is alarmed by the situation of Northvolt AB, a battery manufacturer considered pivotal in the green transition; stresses that Northvolt has benefited from a substantial EIB lending package of slightly over EUR 942.6 million as part of the debt financing to expand a gigafactory site; notes that Northvolt filed for bankruptcy in March 2025; calls on the EIB to provide details about the evaluation and decision-making process to fund Northvolt AB and the causes that led to the failure of the project;

    86. Stresses that the expansion of the gigafactory site was expected to increase the annual output capacity for battery production and was of strategic importance for global competitiveness and was consistent with the EU’s strategies in the sector;

    87. Calls on the Commission and the EIB Board of Directors to launch an in-depth internal review without undue delay to verify the financial damage, the reasons for and the background to the failure of this flagship project and to learn from this experience in order to prevent the recurrence of a similar situation or enable the early detection thereof;

    88. Maintains that the greatest added value of EU support lies in fostering higher-risk investments in innovative projects, scaling up EU strategic goals and enabling long-term transition projects that cannot get funding from the private sector; believes that to effectively pursue its targets in innovation and competitiveness, the InvestEU programme should focus on financing higher-risk and more scale-up investment and that the EIB Group should take on more and larger high-risk projects, which should involve primarily and preferentially European investors, combining a more risk-absorption-oriented deployment of InvestEU resources with an equivalent orientation in the use of the EIB Group’s own financial resources; urges the EIB to introduce stricter conditions to prevent EU public financing from being used to subsidise companies relocating production outside Europe, ensuring that all EIB-funded projects contribute to long-term European industrial resilience;

    89. Is aware that members of the EIB’s Management Committee are often civil servants in their countries of origin before beginning their terms at the EIB, which typically last for two to six years, and that they are therefore entitled to pursue professional development opportunities subject to certain conditions during the cooling-off period (which has been extended to a period of 24 months after the end of their term at the EIB); notes that Management Committee members are asked to inform the Ethics and Compliance Committee and seek approval as soon as possible for any negotiations regarding prospective employment;

    90. Strongly echoes Parliament’s repeated calls to strengthen the mechanism to prevent conflicts of interest within the EIB and to improve the handling of such cases, and to better define the terms under which EIB vice-presidents can participate in decisions about operations in their countries of origin, and insists that these matters be addressed in a future revision of the Management Committee code of conduct;

    91. Highlights that on 31 October 2023, the European Ombudsman ruled in Case 611/2022/KR that a former vice-president had participated in approving financing agreements between the EIB and a national promotional bank[7] in his country of origin just weeks before becoming the Chief Executive Officer of that national promotional bank, despite the EIB’s Chief Compliance Officer advising against such actions during the appointment process; understands that this case predates the entry into force of the current Management Committee code of conduct, which now includes specific provisions regarding the prospective employment of its members; notes that, in the future review of the rules applicable to its Ethics and Compliance Committee, the EIB has committed to consider the European Ombudsman recommendation to make public the Committee’s decisions;

    92. Observes that mitigating measures, such as ring-fencing and cooling-off periods, are the most common precautionary clauses to be used when handling a revolving-doors case and understands that such measures are implemented and are complied with by the members of the Management Committee, including those recently reported on in the media;

    93. Shares the view of the European Ombudsman that the role of the EIB Ethics and Compliance Committee should be strengthened when it comes to overseeing the intended new jobs of Management Committee members and that it should be able to impose and enforce risk-mitigating measures; understands that the role of the Ethics and Compliance Committee has become more prominent in recent years and that internal discussions are ongoing on how to enhance its efficiency;

    94. Invites the Bank to boost the participation of European companies in procurement processes launched for projects financed by the EIB; encourages the Bank to advise borrowers to prioritise eligibility for European companies in order to strengthen European competitiveness;

    95. Reiterates its call on the EIB to ensure proper geographical representation, including at middle and senior management levels, and calls on it to publish an annual breakdown of the gender and nationality for middle and senior management positions;

    Scrutiny, transparency and oversight

    96.  Strongly regrets the fact that the European Court of Auditors (ECA) still lacks full access to all data relating to EIB operations; acknowledges that not all the activities of the EIB are directly financed by the EU and, therefore, not all activities are automatically accessible to the ECA; insists that the ECA should have access to the necessary information to comprehensively and exhaustively assess all EIB operations involving EU funds, including those conducted through financial intermediaries, designed to implement EU policies; calls on the ECA to fully scrutinise, to the best of its abilities, all operations involving the EU budget to any degree;

    97. Observes that the main relevant audit tasks are entrusted to the EIB Audit Committee, which is a fully independent body; believes that the participation of qualified external representatives in specific Audit Committee tasks could enhance the objectivity of the Audit Committee’s analyses;

    98. Notes that the EIB’s Transparency Policy strikes a compromise between the principle of openness and the need to safeguard sensitive information; observes that the policy indicates what information should be published proactively and when – stipulating, for instance, that project summaries should be published at least three weeks before the project’s financing is considered for approval by the EIB Board of Directors – and sets out the relevant derogations; calls for these summaries to provide meaningful information to stakeholders;

    99. Notes that in 2023, 449 projects were approved by the EIB Board of Directors and that almost all (94 %) of the project summaries were published, in the majority (57 %) of cases before approval; observes that all EIB operations conducted through financial intermediaries are published on the EIB’s website and that the EIB provides details on request;

    100. Recalls that all EIB documents are accessible to the public in line with the presumption in favour of disclosure; emphasises that all applicants should be informed in advance about public access to documents, and any refusals should be based solely on specified exceptions; stresses that the EIB should consider publishing, in a timely manner, information regarding the rationale and context for projects and the explanation of their alignment with and contribution to EU policy goals; calls on the EIB to systematically publish audit results of its largest financial operations, ensuring independent scrutiny of its risk management and impact assessments; expects the EIB to limit non-disclosure to the applicable exceptions listed in Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001[8] and Regulation (EC) No 1367/2006[9]; calls for the full implementation of the Ombudsman’s recommendations issued following its inquiries into EIB disclosure policy and related requests for access to documents;

    101. Recalls that all recipients of EU funding have a general obligation to acknowledge its origin and ensure the visibility of any EU funding received; calls on the EIB Group to ensure that final recipients comply with the visibility criteria of the EU’s financial support;

    102. Highlights that the Bank is working to reduce the time needed to bring a product from conception to market availability (time to market) by fully digitising its project cycles; calls for the Bank to intensify its efforts in the digitalisation of its operations;

    103 Reiterates its call on the EIB to strengthen and fully implement its policy on tax fraud, evasion and avoidance, including by refraining from funding beneficiaries or financial intermediaries which have been found to be, or are at high risk of being, involved in such practices;

    104. Reiterates that more structured dialogue between Parliament and the EIB would be enhanced by the adoption of a memorandum of cooperation; praises, in this connection, the EIB’s unprecedented cooperation with Parliament for the preparation of this resolution, noting that it is a tangible expression of openness and transparency;

    Follow-up on Parliament’s recommendations

    105. Urges the EIB to continue reporting on the status of previous recommendations issued by Parliament, particularly regarding the outcomes achieved and the impact of the actions taken to implement its priorities and the EU’s policies, especially as regards:

    (a) impact (economic, environmental and social) of its investment strategy and results achieved in contributing to the balanced and steady development of the internal market in the interests of the Union;

    (b) actions adopted to enhance the prevention and countering of conflicts of interest, fraud, corruption and other potential forms of misconduct;

    (c) new measures to strengthen transparency;

    (d) measures to strengthen support for SMEs and eligible economic operators during the implementation of EU policies;

    (e) follow-up on the calls and requests adopted via the present resolution;

    °

    ° °

    106. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission, and asks that the Council and the EIB Board of Directors hold a debate on Parliament’s positions presented herein.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Türkiye – A10-0067/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Türkiye

    (2025/2023(INI))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to the European Council conclusions of 17 and 18 April 2024, 30 June 2023, 23 June 2022, 24 June 2021 and 12 December 2019, and to all relevant previous Council and European Council conclusions,

     having regard to Türkiye’s membership of the Council of Europe and NATO,

     having regard to the Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Turkey on the readmission of persons residing without authorisation[1] (EU-Turkey Readmission Agreement),

     having regard to the statement of the members of the European Council of 25 March 2021 on Türkiye,

     having regard to the ‘EU-Turkey statements’ of 18 March 2016 and 29 November 2015,

     having regard to the ‘Turkey Negotiating Framework’ of 3 October 2005,

     having regard to the declaration issued by the European Community and its Member States on 21 September 2005 following the declaration made by Turkey upon its signature of the Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement on 29 July 2005,

     having regard to the Council conclusions of December 2006 and March 2020, and to the Presidency Conclusions of the European Council in Copenhagen of 21-22 June 1993, also known as the Copenhagen Criteria,

     having regard to the Council conclusions on Enlargement of 17 December 2024 and of 12 December 2023,

     having regard to the International Law of the Sea and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 on EU enlargement policy (COM(2024)0690) and to the accompanying Türkiye 2024 Report (SWD(2024)0696),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 on EU enlargement policy (COM(2023)0690) and to the accompanying Türkiye 2023 Report (SWD(2023)0696),

     

     having regard to Special report 06/2024 of the European Court of Auditors of 24 April 2024 entitled ‘The Facility for Refugees in Turkey – Beneficial for refugees and host communities, but impact and sustainability not yet ensured’,

     having regard to the joint communications from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to the European Council of 29 November 2023 (JOIN(2023)0050) and of 22 March 2021 (JOIN(2021)0008) on the state of play of EU-Türkiye political, economic and trade relations,

     having regard to the Commission communication of 19 December 2024 entitled ‘Eighth Annual Report of the Facility for Refugees in Turkey’ (COM(2024)0593),

     having regard to the fundamental principles of international law and to the Charter of the United Nations, the 1977 and the 1979 High-Level Agreements between the leaders of the two communities, and the relevant resolutions of the UN Security Council on Cyprus, including Resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964, which reaffirms the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus, Resolution 550 (1984) of 11 May 1984 on secessionist actions in Cyprus, Resolution 789 (1992) of 25 November 1992, and Resolution 2537 (2020) on the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP),

     having regard to Article 46 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which states that the contracting parties undertake to abide by the final judgment of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in any case to which they are parties, and to the ensuing obligation of Türkiye to implement all judgments of the ECtHR,

     having regard to the relevant resolutions of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe,

     having regard to the 2025 Freedom in the World report published by Freedom House,

     having regard to the 2024 World Press Freedom Index published by Reporters Without Borders,

     having regard to the January 2025 prison statistics report published by the Civil Society in the Penal System Association (CISST) and to the 2024 country profile for Türkiye published by Prison Insider,

     having regard to the Global Gender Gap Report 2024 published by the World Economic Forum,

     having regard to recent reports of the We Will Stop Femicide Platform (Kadın Cinayetlerini Durduracağız Platformu),

     having regard to the UNESCO statement on Hagia Sophia of 10 July 2020, and to the relevant UNESCO World Heritage Committee decisions 44 COM 7B.58 (2021) and 45 COM 7B.58 (2023), adopted in its 44th and 45th sessions respectively,

     having regard to its previous resolutions on Türkiye, in particular those of 13 September 2023 on the 2022 Commission Report on Türkiye[2], of 7 June 2022 on the 2021 Commission Report on Turkey[3], and of 26 November 2020 on escalating tensions in Varosha following the illegal actions by Türkiye and the urgent need for the resumption of talks[4],

     having regard to its resolution of 29 February 2024 on deepening EU integration in view of future enlargement[5],

     having regard to its resolution of 15 April 2015 on the centenary of the Armenian Genocide[6],

     having regard to its resolutions of 5 May 2022 on the case of Osman Kavala in Turkey[7], of 10 October 2024 on the case of Bülent Mumay in Türkiye[8] and of 13 February 2025 on recent dismissals and arrests of mayors in Türkiye[9],

     having regard to European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s visit to Ankara in December 2024,

     having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0067/2025),

    A. whereas Türkiye remains a candidate for EU accession, and EU membership remains the repeatedly declared political goal of the Turkish Government, although the gap with the values and interests of the EU is growing; whereas EU accession negotiations have effectively been at a standstill since 2018, owing to the deterioration of the rule of law and democracy in Türkiye;

    B. whereas any accession country is expected to respect democratic values, the rule of law and human rights, and to abide by EU law; whereas Türkiye needs to credibly demonstrate its commitment to closer relations and alignment with the European Union in order to reinvigorate its European perspective; whereas being a candidate country presumes a willingness to progressively approach and align with the EU in all aspects, including values, interests, standards and policies, inter alia with its common foreign and security policy, to respect and uphold the Copenhagen criteria, and to pursue and maintain good neighbourly relations with the EU and all of its Member States without discrimination; whereas the tensions between the EU and Türkiye in relation to the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean have de-escalated but not ceased; whereas Türkiye has repeatedly been asked to refrain from all actions which violate the sovereignty and sovereign rights of all EU Member States and are in breach of international and EU law;

    C. whereas the 2023 Commission progress report on Türkiye painted a picture of continued backsliding, while its latest progress report of 2024 appears to present a slightly more positive overall picture of progress on enlargement-related reforms in Türkiye, such as in the area of economic and monetary policies; whereas this cannot, however, be applied to the core matters related to democracy and fundamental rights, which have deteriorated even further since the release of the Commission’s latest report; whereas the gap between Türkiye and the EU’s values and normative framework has therefore remained unaddressed during the recent period with the persistent use of laws and measures aimed at curtailing the rule of law and human rights, fundamental freedoms and civil liberties;

    D. whereas the joint communication on the state of play of EU-Türkiye relations of 29 November 2023 struck a more positive note, putting forward a set of recommendations on cooperating in areas of joint interest in a phased, proportionate and reversible manner and based on the established conditionalities; whereas only a few concrete steps in line with the commitments therein have been taken so far; whereas the April 2024 European Council mandated Coreper to advance in the implementation of this joint communication; whereas nevertheless this joint communication has not yet received a clear political endorsement by the Council;

    E. whereas Türkiye is a member of the Council of Europe and is therefore bound by the judgments of the ECtHR; whereas owing to its failure to apply landmark ECtHR rulings, Türkiye is currently facing historical infringement proceedings; whereas Türkiye consistently ranks among the countries most frequently found in violation of the human rights and fundamental freedoms protected by the European Convention on Human Rights; whereas as of late November 2024, Türkiye had the highest number of pending cases before the ECtHR, with 22 450 applications, representing 36.7 % of the Court’s total caseload of 61 250 applications;

    F. whereas Türkiye is classified as ‘not free’ by Freedom House and has experienced one of the worst declines in the level of freedom in the world in the past 10 years; whereas Türkiye ranks 158th out of 180 countries in the 2024 World Press Freedom Index; whereas the Turkish Government has closed dozens of media outlets, routinely blocks online articles, is reported to control 85 % of national media and uses its state agency Anadolu as an organ of propaganda;

    G. whereas the Turkish constitution provides for sufficient protection of fundamental rights, but the practice of the institutions and the critical state of the judiciary, including the lack of respect for Constitutional Court rulings, are the main reasons for the dire situation of the rule of law and human rights in the country, issues repeatedly described in the reports of the EU, the Council of Europe and international organisations;

    H. whereas Türkiye has the highest incarceration rate and the largest prison population of all Council of Europe Member States, with an overcrowded prison population that has grown by 439 % between 2005 and 2023 and currently represents more than a third of all inmates of Council of Europe countries;

    I. whereas Türkiye is ranked 127th out of 146 countries in the 2024 Global Gender Gap Index, underscoring severe gender inequality and systemic failures in protecting women’s rights; whereas according to the 2024 report of the We Will Stop Femicide Platform (Kadın Cinayetlerini Durduracağız Platformu), 394 women were murdered by men and 259 women were found dead in suspicious circumstances in Türkiye in 2024, the highest number recorded since the civil society group started collecting data in 2010; whereas in its 2023 report, the platform noted that 315 women were killed by men, and 248 women were found dead in suspicious circumstances;

    J. whereas in recent months, Türkiye has taken steps towards the resumption of a process for a peaceful resolution of the Kurdish question; whereas on 27 February 2025 jailed militant leader Abdullah Öcalan called on his Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) to disarm and disband, providing a historic opportunity to end the Turkish-Kurdish conflict; whereas these efforts have been accompanied by increasing repression and the curtailment of the powers of democratic local governments, including the dismissal of elected Kurdish and other opposition mayors;

    K. whereas, alongside being a candidate for EU accession, Türkiye is a NATO ally and a key partner in the areas of trade, economic relations, security, the fight against terrorism, and migration; whereas Türkiye continues to play a key role in the region, acts as a bridge between Europe and Asia, and remains a key partner for the stability of the wider East Mediterranean region; whereas Türkiye continues to play a significant role in the Syrian conflict and maintains a military presence in northern Syria;

    L. whereas Türkiye has not aligned with EU sanctions against Russia; whereas trade between Türkiye and Russia has nearly doubled since the EU’s imposition of sanctions against Russia; whereas despite some steps taken, Türkiye has not prevented its territory from being used to circumvent EU sanctions against Russia;

    M. whereas the 2024 Commission progress report on Türkiye states that, as at 30 September 2024, the country maintained a very low alignment rate of 5 % with relevant statements of the High Representative on behalf of the EU and with relevant Council decisions, compared to 9 % in 2023;

    N. whereas Türkiye is the EU’s fifth largest trade partner, and the EU is Türkiye’s largest trading partner by far, as well as its primary source of foreign direct investment;

    O. whereas in the past year, the level of engagement between the EU and Türkiye has increased in terms of both technical and high-level meetings in sectoral areas;

    P. whereas Türkiye has applied for membership of BRICS+ and shown interest in joining the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO);

    Q. whereas following a period of unorthodox economic policy, Türkiye has implemented a tighter monetary policy over the past year leading to a reduction in external imbalances and a moderation of inflationary pressures;

    R. whereas Türkiye hosts the largest refugee population in the world, with around 3.1 million registered refugees, mainly from Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan; whereas since 2011 the EU has directed more than EUR 10  billion to assisting refugees and host communities in Türkiye; whereas according to a credible investigative report by Lighthouse Reports and eight media partners, the EU is funding removal centres in Türkiye implicated in the detention, abuse and forced deportations of refugees under the guise of voluntary return;

    S. whereas in addition to the emergency assistance coordinated via the EU Civil Protection Mechanism, with an estimated financial value of EUR 38 million, the EU provided EUR 78.2 million in humanitarian aid for the earthquake response in 2023, and EUR 26 million in humanitarian aid in 2024; whereas the EU signed an additional EUR 400 million in assistance under the EU Solidarity Fund to finance recovery operations following the devastating earthquake;

    T. whereas Türkiye has systematically misused counterterrorism laws to target elected officials, opposition politicians and human rights defenders, among others;

    Commitment to EU accession

    1. Recognises the long-standing aspirations of Turkish civil society regarding accession to the European Union; welcomes the Turkish Government’s recent statements reiterating its commitment to EU membership as a strategic goal amid an effort to revitalise EU-Türkiye relations in line with relevant European Council conclusions in a phased, proportionate and reversible manner; recognises the EU’s commitment to fostering this engagement through enhanced dialogue and cooperation;

    2. Stresses that EU membership is contingent on fulfilling the accession (Copenhagen) criteria, which require stable institutions that guarantee democracy, the rule of law, human rights, respect for and the protection of minorities, good neighbourly relations, respect for international law and alignment with the EU CFSP; further notes that these are absolute criteria, not issues subject to transactional strategic considerations and negotiations; stresses that recognition of all Member States is a necessary component of the accession process;

    3. Regrets, in this regard, that the aforementioned positive statements have not been accompanied by any concrete actions by the Turkish authorities to close the persistent and vast gap between Türkiye and the EU on values and standards, particularly with regard to the fundamentals of the accession process; reiterates its previously adopted conclusion that the Turkish Government continues to show, as it has done for the past few years, a clear lack of political will to carry out the necessary reforms to reactivate the accession process and continues to pursue a deeply entrenched authoritarian understanding of the presidential system;

    4. Acknowledges the strategic and geopolitical importance of Türkiye, and its increasing presence and influence in areas critical to international security, such as the Black Sea region, including Ukraine, and the Middle East; reiterates that Türkiye is a strategic partner and NATO ally, and a country with which the EU has close relations in the areas of security, trade, economy and migration; welcomes closer cooperation between Türkiye and the EU, to which the Turkish Government has made frequent reference, but stresses that this cannot in any way be a substitute for the necessary real progress which Türkiye, as a candidate country, needs to make with regard to meeting the fundamental requirements for accession; highlights, in this regard, that there are no shortcuts in the accession process and that no argument can be put forward to avoid discussing the democratic principles which are at the core of the accession process;

    5. Notes that the Commission’s Türkiye report 2024 paints a more positive picture of reform implementation in the context of Türkiye’s accession process than the Türkiye report 2023, shifting from further deterioration to ‘no progress’ with regard to the rule of law and human rights issues; is of the opinion, however, that at least in key areas such as democracy, rule of law and fundamental rights, this is due to the fact that a very low point had already been reached and this situation has remained unchanged;

    6. Further takes note of a nuanced shift in focus of the Türkiye report 2024, by contrast with the 2023 report, away from the accession process towards a strategic partnership between the European Union und Türkiye; is of the opinion that the critical state of the accession process is driving the Commission and the Council to focus merely on the partnership dimension of the EU’s relations with Türkiye, as is also reflected in the joint communication on the state of play of EU-Türkiye relations of 29 November 2023, and of 22 March 2021; highlights the increasing shift towards a different framework for the relationship, which might come at the expense of the accession process;

    The core of the accession process: democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights

    7. Considers that, in terms of human rights and the rule of law, Parliament’s recent resolutions on the matter remain valid in light of the continued dire human rights situation and democratic backsliding in Türkiye over the last year; fully endorses the latest resolutions of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the related report by its Monitoring Committee, as well as the resolutions adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, which depict in detail the wide range of serious shortfalls in human rights constantly reported by locally and internationally renowned human rights organisations;

    8. Notes the Turkish Government’s stated commitment to judicial reform and the introduction of measures of an organisational nature; highlights, however, the need to introduce structural measures ensuring judicial independence; deeply regrets that, despite a reform strategy with nine judicial reform packages, the state of independence of the judiciary in Türkiye remains desolate following systematic government interference in and political instrumentalisation of the judicial system; deplores, in this regard, the weakening of remaining constitutional review mechanisms, particularly individual applications, and the frequent violations of due process;

    9. Is dismayed by the persecution of legal professionals, including most recently the lawsuit filed by the Istanbul Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office that resulted in the removal of the leadership of the Istanbul Bar Association on charges of ‘making propaganda for a terrorist organization’ and ‘publicly disseminating misleading information’ for having asked for an investigation into the murders of two Kurdish journalists in Syria, and in the imprisonment of one of the members of the Istanbul Bar Association’s executive board following his trip to Strasbourg to hold meetings with Council of Europe institutions;

    10. Is alarmed by the blatant lack of implementation of decisions by the Constitutional Court, including in the case of MP Can Atalay, which has turned into a serious judicial crisis, with the Court of Cassation filing a criminal complaint against nine judges of the Constitutional Court; is worried by the recent decision of the Court of Cassation to overturn the sentences of and release the terrorists involved in the ISIS attack at Istanbul’s Atatürk Airport, which claimed 45 lives in 2016;

    11. Calls on Türkiye to strengthen its commitment to democratic governance, especially through reforms that ensure an independent judiciary; takes notes of the recent announcement of the Fourth Judicial Reform Strategy, spanning 2025-2029; calls on the Turkish Government to move from the superficial changes made so far through the recurrent reform packages and action plans to a profound and long overdue reform that will address, through real political will, the serious and structural shortcomings of Türkiye’s judiciary; stresses that putting an end to political interference in the judiciary requires no strategy or reform package but merely the political will to do so;

    12. Remains deeply concerned by the continued deterioration of democratic standards and relentless crackdown by the Turkish authorities on any critical voices by means of a growing battery of repressive laws, the regular misuse of counterterrorism laws, including their application in relation to minors (as in the ‘Kız Çocukları Davası’ trial), the disproportionate use of the crime of insulting a public official, the extensive use of secret witnesses and dormant cases in flawed judicial proceedings, and the recurrent practice of exaggerated night arrests and home raids to portray targeted persons as extremely dangerous;

    13. Welcomes the withdrawal in November 2024 of the draft amendment to Türkiye’s espionage laws, known as the ‘agent of influence’ law; urges the Turkish authorities to refrain from reintroducing a similar overly broad and vague law in the future, given the serious risk that it would be used as a tool to further criminalise the legitimate activities of civil society organisations within the country; calls on the Turkish authorities to ensure that the recently approved cybersecurity bill will serve its legitimate purpose of protecting data privacy and national security without giving way to potential infringements of fundamental rights or becoming another tool for further repression; stresses that the judicial apparatus remains heavily restrictive, with a complex web of legislation serving as a tool to systematically control and silence any critical voice, such as the 2020 social media law, the 2021 anti-money laundering law and the 2022 disinformation law;

    14. Is concerned by the recent approval of legal provisions granting extraordinary powers to the State Supervisory Council (DDK) and the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (TMSF), including the possibility for the former to dismiss public officials of all types and levels and appoint trustees, which could be used in an arbitrary manner;

    15. Urges the Turkish authorities to put an end to the current serious restrictions on fundamental freedoms, in particular of expression, of assembly and of association, and to the constant attacks on the fundamental rights of members of the opposition, human rights defenders, lawyers, trade unionists, members of minorities, journalists, academics, artists and civil society activists, among others; strongly condemns the recent waves of mass arrest and imprisonment on politically motivated charges, and on the grounds of suspected terror links, affecting political figures, academics and journalists, including the arrests of Elif Akgül, independent journalist, Yıldız Tar, editor in chief of LGBT+ news site Kaos GL, and Ender İmrek, columnist of Evrensel daily, all well known for their work on human rights issues;

    16. Deplores the continued prosecution, censorship and harassment of journalists and independent media, denying them the freedom to carry out their professional duties and inform the public, which is essential to a functioning democratic society; calls on the Turkish authorities to refrain from further attacks on independent media and to uphold fundamental rights and civil liberties such as freedom of speech and of the press; remains deeply concerned by the existing legislation that prevents an open and free internet, with lengthy prison sentences imposed for social media posts, scores of access blocks and content removal orders, and by the continued use of the Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTÜK) to crack down on media criticism and even on outlets deemed to spread ‘pessimism’ instead of positive news;

    17. Acknowledges the positive developments in relation to the partial lifting by the minister of the interior of restrictions on the weekly vigils of the Saturday Mothers, Cumartesi Anneleri, in Istanbul’s Galatasaray Square, and the recent acquittal of all 46 people prosecuted for more than 6 years in the case surrounding the organisation’s 700th gathering in August 2018; calls for the complete removal of all restrictions on their peaceful protest, in full compliance with the relevant Constitutional Court ruling, and for an end to the ongoing judicial case against several of its members and sympathisers; is concerned by the ongoing trial against prominent human rights defender Nimet Tanrıkulu, who was released on 4 March 2025 after spending 94 days in pre-trial detention; urges the Turkish authorities to ensure the immediate release of all individuals detained for exercising their fundamental freedoms;

    18. Continues to be appalled by the Turkish authorities’, in particular the Turkish judiciary’s, continuous disregard for and failure to apply landmark ECtHR rulings; reiterates its condemnation of Türkiye’s blatant misuse of the judicial system and the refusal to release from detention human rights defender Osman Kavala and opposition politicians Selahattin Demirtaş and Figen Yüksekdağ,for which Türkiye is facing historical infringement proceedings in the Council of Europe, with long-awaited consequences yet to be determined; calls on Türkiye to fully comply with the ECtHR judgements related to missing persons and properties (inter alia in the Fokas case) in Cyprus; deplores the politically motivated nature of these prosecutions, which form part of a broader pattern of judicial harassment; calls on Türkiye to fully implement all judgments of the ECtHR in line with Article 46 of the ECHR and in line with the unconditional obligations derived from Article 90 of the Turkish constitution; calls on the European Commission and Member States to use all diplomatic channels to urge Türkiye to implement relevant ECtHR rulings and consider implementing relevant funding conditionality in relation to compliance with ECtHR rulings;

    19. Expresses its deep concern about the dire situation in Turkish prisons owing to severe overcrowding and poor living conditions, with reports, including by the Council of Europe, of torture and ill-treatment being widespread, and access to basic needs such as hygiene and information being severely limited; is particularly worried by the conditions of imprisonment of elderly and seriously ill prisoners; is concerned by the continued use of humiliating strip searches in prisons and other places of detention and by the persisting harassment of MP Ömer Faruk Gergerlioğlu, who is currently facing six proceedings for the removal of his parliamentary seat and immunity, among other reasons for his having denounced this very practice;

    20. Strongly condemns the Turkish Government’s decision to dismiss, following the March 2024 local elections, the democratically elected mayors of at least 13 municipalities and districts (Hakkari, Mardin, Batman, Halfeti, Tunceli, Bahçesaray, Akdeniz, Siirt, Van and Kağızman, won by the DEM Party; and Esenyurt Ovacık and Şişli, won by CHP Party) and to replace them with government trustees appointed by the interior ministry; regards this long-standing practice of appointing trustees as a blatant attack on the most basic principles of local democracy; urges the Turkish authorities to immediately cease and reverse repression of political opposition and to respect the rights of voters to elect their chosen representatives in line with the recommendations of the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe and the Venice Commission; reiterates its call on the VP/HR to consider restrictive measures under the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime against Turkish officials assuming the role of trustee and those appointing them; denounces the severe repression of protests against the removal of elected mayors, including the arbitrary arrest of hundreds of protesters, some of whom were minors; regards the decision of the Turkish Government to return to this practice after the last local elections of March 2024 as a clear sign of its lack of commitment to addressing the democratic shortcomings within the country and in clear contradiction to the declared willingness to revitalise the accession process, as such actions undermine the prospects for a stronger, more comprehensive partnership with the EU and are detrimental to long-term progress towards closer cooperation;

    21. Deplores the permanent targeting of political parties and members of the opposition, who continue to suffer increasing pressure; is extremely concerned by the recent arrest and removal from office of the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality CHP Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu, along with the mayors of Şişli and Beylikdüzü, in the framework of two separate investigations on alleged corruption and terrorist-related charges involving a total of 106 suspects; highlights that theses last cases, which are part of a long list of 42 administrative and 51 judicial investigations since İmamoğlu’s election in 2019, were launched just a few days before the internal party election to nominate him presidential candidate and the day after the controverted decision by Istanbul University to revoke his diploma, a requisite for his eligibility to be President; is appalled by the decision to temporarily ban all demonstrations in Istanbul and other provinces across the country, the slowdown on social media, the detention of journalists and the crackdown on peaceful protesters; considers that this is a politically motivated move aimed at preventing a legitimate challenger from standing in the upcoming elections and that with these actions the current Turkish authorities are further pushing the country towards a fully authoritarian model;

    22. Further expresses its concern about the recent separate cases against Istanbul’s Beşiktaş district CHP Mayor Rıza Akpolat, Istanbul’s Beykoz district CHP Mayor Alaattin Köseler, CHP Youth Branch Chair Cem Aydın, and Zafer Party Chair Ümit Özdag; is appalled by the brutal and relentless crackdown on any kind of criticism to which all sectors of Turkish society have recently been subjected by the Turkish authorities, as illustrated, among others, by the case of Ayşe Barım, a well-known talent manager imprisoned since 27 January 2025 for alleged involvement in the Gezi Park protest 12 years ago, the investigation launched against Orhan Turan and Ömer Aras, the president and an executive of TÜSIAD, the country’s main business group, and the indictment, with the aim of imposing hefty prison sentences, of Halk TV Editor-in-Chief Suat Toktaş and journalists Seda Selek, Barış Pehlivan, Serhan Asker and Kürşad Oğuz, who have been provisionally acquitted; is concerned by the involvement in these and other cases of recently appointed Istanbul Chief Public Prosecutor Akın Gürlek, who has a long record of involvement, in different positions, in high-profile cases against political figures, and which may give grounds for considering the application of restrictive measures under the EU Human Rights sanction regime; is also concerned by the growing financial pressure on opposition municipalities and controversial announcements, such as that made in relation to day-care centres run by opposition municipalities;

    23. Expresses its deep concern at the deterioration in women’s rights, at gender-based violence and at the increase in the incidence of femicide in Türkiye in 2024, which has been the highest since 2010, the year before the signing of the Istanbul Convention; reiterates its strong condemnation of Türkiye’s withdrawal, by presidential decree, from this international agreement and reiterates its call to reverse this decision; urges the Turkish authorities to improve the legislative framework and its implementation, including by fully applying Protection Law no. 6284, in order to effectively tackle all forms of violence against women and the practice of so called ‘honour killings’, end the persistent policy of impunity by holding abusers to account, and advance towards gender equality, particularly with regard to the participation of women in decision-making and policymaking processes;

    24. Strongly condemns the ongoing violations and lack of protection of the fundamental rights of LGBTI+ persons in Türkiye, including the increased incidence of hate speech, hate crimes and discriminatory rhetoric, as well as continued media stereotyping based on sexual orientation and gender identity; deplores the fact that this continued discrimination is often sanctioned by the authorities, as evidenced by the mass arrests made during the Pride March in 2023 and the banning of the march in 2024, while anti-LGBTI+ marches were permitted; urges the Turkish authorities to stop banning activities against homophobia, including Pride marches, with immediate effect;

    25. Welcomes the increased dialogue with Christian minorities, but stresses that no significant progress has been registered with regard to the protection of the rights of ethnic and religious minorities, in particular as regards their legal personality, including those of the Greek Orthodox population of the islands of Gökçeada (Imvros) and Bozcaada (Tenedos); calls for Türkiye to implement the Venice Commission recommendations and all relevant ECtHR rulings in this regard; notes with concern that representatives of different confessions, including non-Muslim and Alevi communities, continue to face bureaucratic obstacles when attempting to register places of worship; highlights that this is a violation of the right to freedom of religion and belief; calls on Türkiye to adopt the long-awaited regulation on the election of board members in non-Muslim minority foundations controlling community hospitals; reiterates its call on Türkiye to respect the role of the Ecumenical Patriarchate for Orthodox Christians all over the world and to recognise its legal personality and the public use of the ecclesiastical title of Ecumenical Patriarch; calls on Türkiye to fully respect and protect the outstanding universal value of Hagia Sophia and the Chora museum, which are inscribed on UNESCO’s World Heritage List; notes with concern that Türkiye has still not implemented two decisions of the UNESCO World Heritage Committee of 2021 and 2023 regarding its obligations to undertake special measures to protect these monuments; deplores the lack of protection of Panagia Soumela Monastery, which has been put forward for inclusion in the UNESCO World Heritage Monuments list; stresses the need to eliminate restrictions on the training, appointment and succession of clergy; welcomes the envisaged reopening of the Halki Seminary and calls for the lifting of all obstacles to its proper functioning; calls on the Turkish authorities to effectively investigate and prosecute people responsible for any hate crimes, including hate speech, committed against minorities; condemns the antisemitic statements made in the media and by high-level officials following the Hamas terrorist attacks against Israel on 7 October 2023; notes that all of these practices against any religious minority are incompatible with EU values;

    26. Welcomes Abdullah Öcalan’s recent call on the PKK to lay down arms and dissolve, and to engage in a peace process, as a historic and long-awaited step that could help end a period of 40 years of violence that has caused more than 40 000 deaths; praises the efforts made by all stakeholders involved to facilitate these developments, including the constructive approach of different political leaders that was started by MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli, the visits to Imrali prison granted to a delegation of the DEM Party, and the broad consultations that this party has led with other political parties; underlines that this represents a significant opportunity and must be followed by an inclusive political process, with a prominent role for the Turkish Parliament, aimed at the peaceful and sustainable resolution of the Kurdish issue in its political, social, democratic and security-related aspects; stresses the need to uphold human rights, political pluralism, and civil rights for all citizens, including Kurds; regrets the continued political repression, judicial harassment and restrictions on cultural and linguistic rights faced by Kurdish citizens, which undermine democratic principles and social cohesion;

    Regional cooperation and good neighbourly relations

    27. Continues to commend Türkiye for hosting around 3.1 million refugees, including 2.9 million Syrians under temporary protection in 2024, down from 3.2 million in 2023; reiterates the importance of Türkiye’s collaboration for the effective and orderly management of migration flows; further welcomes the fact that since 2011 the EU has contributed close to EUR 10 billion to assist Türkiye in hosting refugees; notes that some EU funding has been allocated to strengthening Turkish border control and containment capabilities; welcomes the EU’s decision to allocate an additional EUR 1 billion in December 2024 to further support the healthcare, education, and integration of refugees in Türkiye since the fall of the Assad regime; at the same time, notes that these funds had already been pledged in May 2024, and therefore do not constitute new funds; calls on the Commission to ensure utmost transparency and accuracy in the allocation of funds and that EU-funded projects, particularly those related to removal centres and border control, comply with all relevant human rights standards; is alarmed by credible reports uncovering grave human rights violations at EU-funded removal centres in Türkiye and calls on the Commission to launch a transparent and independent review into the matter; notes with concern that a continuing increase in asylum applications has been registered in the Republic of Cyprus over recent years; recalls Türkiye’s obligation to take all necessary measures to halt the existing illegal migration routes and prevent the creation of new sea or land routes for illegal migration from Türkiye to the EU, particularly to Greece and the Republic of Cyprus; points out the risks related to any possible instrumentalisation of migrants by the Turkish Government; underlines the need to ensure the protection of all refugees’ and migrants’ rights and freedoms; calls on Türkiye to ensure the full and non-discriminatory implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement of 2016 and the EU-Türkiye Readmission Agreement vis-à-vis all Member States, including the Republic of Cyprus; expresses cautious hope that developments in Syria will gradually allow an increasing number of refugees to return home; reiterates that returns should only be carried out on a voluntary basis and under conditions of safety and dignity; condemns repeated violent attacks against refugees and migrants fuelled by xenophobic rhetoric among politicians and host communities; calls on the European Commission and the EU Member States to increase their efforts to preserve humanitarian and protection space for Syrian refugees in Türkiye and to uphold the principle of non-refoulement as a cornerstone of EU policies;

    28. Reiterates its strong interest in stability and security in the Eastern Mediterranean; welcomes the continued de-escalation and positive momentum in the region and the recent climate of re-engagement between Türkiye and Greece, albeit that unresolved issues continue to affect bilateral relations; deplores the fact that Türkiye continues to violate the sovereignty and sovereign rights of EU Member States, such as Greece and the Republic of Cyprus, including through the promotion of the Blue Homeland doctrine; underlines that, although Turkish violations of Greek airspace have drastically decreased, violations of Greek territorial waters have risen compared to 2023, and systematic illegal fishing activities have been conducted by Turkish vessels within Greek territorial waters; deeply regrets that Türkiye also continues to uphold a formal threat of war against Greece (casus belli) at 12 nautical miles; calls on Türkiye to fully respect the sovereignty of all EU Member States over their territorial sea and airspace, and their other sovereign rights, including the right to explore and exploit natural resources in accordance with EU and international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which is part of the EU acquis; reiterates its view that the memorandum of understanding between Türkiye and Libya on delimitation of the maritime jurisdiction areas in the Mediterranen infringes upon the sovereign rights of third States, does not comply with the Law of the Sea and cannot produce any legal consequences for third States;

    29. Regrets the fact that the Cyprus problem remains unresolved, and calls for serious reengagement and the political will of all parties involved to bring about peaceful UN-led negotiations, with a view to achieving real progress in the Cyprus settlement talks; welcomes the resumption of informal talks under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General on 18 and 19 March 2025, which were held in a constructive atmosphere in which both sides showed a clear commitment to making progress and continuing dialogue; welcomes the agreement between both sides on opening four crossing points, demining, establishing a youth affairs committee and launching environmental and solar energy projects, as part of a new set of confidence-building measures; encourages all sides to use this momentum to move towards the resumption of negotiations;

    30. Strongly reaffirms its view that the only solution to the Cyprus problem is a fair, comprehensive, viable and democratic settlement, including of its external aspects, within the agreed UN framework, on the basis of a bi-communal, bi-zonal federation with a single international legal personality, single sovereignty, single citizenship and political equality, as set out in the relevant UN Security Council resolutions, the agreed areas of convergence and the Framework of the UN Secretary General, as well as in accordance with international law and the principles and values on which the Union is founded; calls, as a matter of urgency, for the resumption of negotiations on the reunification of Cyprus under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General as soon as possible, from the point at which they were interrupted in Crans-Montana in 2017; calls on Türkiye to abandon the unacceptable proposal for a two-state solution in Cyprus and to return to the agreed basis for a solution and the UN framework; further calls on Türkiye to withdraw its troops from Cyprus and refrain from any unilateral action which would entrench the permanent division of the island and from action altering the demographic balance;

    31. Calls on Türkiye to respect the status of the buffer zone and the mandate of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP); reiterates its call for cooperation among the Republic of Cyprus, Türkiye, the United Kingdom and the UN to implement concrete measures for a demilitarisation of the buffer zone, and to improve security on the island; urges Türkiye and the Turkish Cypriot leadership to reverse all unilateral actions and violations within and in the vicinity of the buffer zone and refrain from any further such actions and provocations; condemns the ongoing ‘opening’ of Varosha by Türkiye, as this negatively alters the situation on the ground, undermines mutual trust and negatively impacts the prospects for the resumption of direct talks on the comprehensive solution of the Cyprus problem; calls on Türkiye to reverse its illegal actions in violation of UN Security Council resolutions 550(1984) and 789(1992) on Varosha, which call on Türkiye to transfer the area of Varosha to its lawful inhabitants under the temporary administration of the UN, and to withdraw from Strovilia and facilitate the full implementation of the Pyla Understanding;

    32. Reiterates its call on Türkiye to give the Turkish Cypriot community the necessary space to act in accordance with its role as a legitimate community of the island, which is a right guaranteed by the constitution of the Republic of Cyprus; reiterates its call on the Commission to step up its efforts to engage with the Turkish Cypriot community, with a view to facilitating the resolution of the Cyprus problem and recalling that its place is in the European Union; calls for all parties involved to demonstrate a more courageous approach to bringing the communities together; stresses the need for the EU body of law to be implemented across the entire island following a comprehensive resolution of the Cyprus problem;

    33. Takes note of the significant work of the Committee on Missing Persons in Cyprus (CMP) and calls for improved access to military zones by the Turkish army, access to its military archives and information as to the relocation of remains from former to subsequent burial sites; remains deeply concerned about the education and religious restrictions and impediments faced by the enclaved Greek Cypriots; calls on Türkiye to step up its cooperation with the Council of Europe and its relevant bodies and institutions, to address their key recommendations, to fully implement the European Convention of Human Rights with regard to respecting the freedom of religion and the freedom of opinion and expression, and the right to access and enjoy cultural heritage, and to stop the deliberate destruction of cultural and religious heritage; condemns the repeated attempts by Türkiye to intimidate and silence Turkish Cypriot journalists, trade unionists, human rights defenders and progressive citizens in the Turkish Cypriot community, thus violating their right to freedom of opinion and expression; calls on Türkiye to halt its proclaimed aggressive policy of the sale and exploitation of Greek Cypriot properties, a policy designed to create irreversible effects on the ground and which completely disregards the European Code of Human Rights ruling on this issue;

    34. Regrets Türkiye’s continuing refusal to comply with aviation law and establish a channel of communication between air traffic control centres in Türkiye and the Republic of Cyprus, the absence of which entails real safety risks and dangers as identified by the European Union Aviation Safety Agency and the International Federation of Air Line Pilots’ Associations; regrets, too, its denial of access to vessels under the flag of one Member State to the Straits of Bosporus and the Dardanelles; takes the view that these could be areas where Türkiye can prove its commitment to confidence building measures and calls on Türkiye to collaborate by fully implementing EU aviation law; regrets that Türkiye has continued its attempts to impede the implementation of the Great Sea Interconnector, an EU project of common interest, and has persisted in its plans for an illegal electricity interconnector with the occupied area of Cyprus;

    35. Regrets that for 20 years Türkiye has refused to implement the obligations assumed towards the EU, including those in relation to Cyprus, as per the Negotiating Framework of October 2005; stresses that recognition of all Member States is a necessary component of the accession process; reiterates its call on Türkiye to fulfil its obligation of full, non-discriminatory implementation of the Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement in relation to all Member States, including the Republic of Cyprus; further calls on Türkiye  to ensure that the human and political rights of all Cypriots are fully respected and that compliance with the fundamental principles of the European Union and the European acquis is guaranteed;

    36. Affirms its support for a free, secure and stable future for Syria and its citizens and highlights the need for an inclusive and peaceful political transition process that is Syrian-led and Syrian- owned, including the protection and inclusion of religious and ethnic communities; expresses its commitment to constructive cooperation between the EU and Türkiye to that end, on humanitarian aid, promoting a sustainable political solution in Syria, and the fight against DAESH, given that Türkiye has a key role in promoting stability in the region; recalls that Syria’s sovereignty must be restored; acknowledges the importance of rebuilding Syria’s economy as a pillar of long-term stability and prosperity for the region; calls on Türkiye to respect Syria’s territorial integrity and sovereignty and immediately cease all attacks and incursions on and occupation of Syrian territory in full compliance with international law; condemns the attacks carried out in recent weeks, taking advantage of the collapse of the Assad regime, by Turkish-backed militias against Syrian Kurdish forces in the north of Syria; expresses deep concern, as these attacks increase the number of internally displaced persons but also threaten the efficiency and continuity of the fight against Daesh; notes that its ongoing presence risks further destabilising and undermining efforts towards a sustainable political resolution in Syria; further notes that, citing security concerns, Türkiye also illegally occupies areas in Iraq; reiterates that civilian populations should never be the victim of military self-defence; calls for the necessary investigation into the cases in which there have been civilian casualties and to stop the crackdown on journalists working in the area; calls on Türkiye to support the process of implementing the agreement between the Syrian transitional government and the Kurdish-led SDF and refrain from any interference in Syria’s internal processes;

    37. Supports the normalisation of relations between Armenia and Türkiye in the interests of reconciliation, good neighbourly relations, regional stability and security and socio-economic development, and welcomes the progress achieved so far; welcomes the continued efforts to restore links between the two countries; urges Türkiye to ensure the speedy implementation of agreements reached by the Turkish and Armenian Governments’ special representatives, such as the opening of the airspace and the border between the two countries for the third country nationals, and, subsequently, for holders of diplomatic passports; welcomes the temporary opening of the Margara-Alican border crossing between Armenia and Türkiye to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid to Syria; expresses the hope that these developments may give impetus to the normalisation of relations in the South Caucasus region, also in terms of security and socio-economic development, and stresses the EU’s interest in supporting this process; encourages Türkiye to play a constructive role in promoting regional stability by facilitating the swift conclusion of the peace process between Armenia and Azerbaijan, inter alia by exerting its influence on Azerbaijan and by deterring Azerbaijan from any further military action against Armenian sovereignty; encourages Türkiye once again to acknowledge the Armenian genocide in order to pave the way for genuine reconciliation between the Turkish and Armenian peoples and to fully respect its obligations to protect Armenian cultural heritage;

    38. Notes that Türkiye’s stance in relation to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine continues to affect EU-Türkiye relations, as Türkiye attempts to maintain ties with both the West and Russia simultaneously; notes Türkiye’s diplomatic attempts to mediate between Russia and Ukraine, particularly regarding the Black Sea Grain Initiative, as well as its continued support for  the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine, including its vote in favour of UN General Assembly resolutions condemning the Russian aggression against Ukraine; regrets that, on the other hand, trade between Türkiye and Russia has risen sharply since the start of the war in Ukraine, making Türkiye Russia’s second largest trading partner despite EU sanctions against Russia, and that Türkiye is the only NATO member state not having imposed any sanctions on Russia; further notes that the European Union’s anti-fraud office, OLAF, has initiated an investigation into a loophole that enables countries like Türkiye to rebrand sanctioned Russian oil and export it to the EU; welcomes, however, positive steps such as Türkiye’s blocking of exports to Russia for certain dual use goods, as well as products originating in the United States and the United Kingdom that are of benefit to Russian military action; reiterates its call on the Turkish Government to halt its plans for the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant, which will be built, operated and owned by Russia’s state atomic energy corporation, Rosatom; expresses concern at Türkiye’s ongoing discussions with Russia to establish a gas-trading hub in Istanbul, scheduled to begin operations in 2025;

    39. Welcomes Türkiye’s participation in various crisis management missions and operations (within the framework of the common security and defence policy); regrets, however, the further deterioration in the level of alignment on common foreign and security policy positions, including on sanctions and countering the circumvention of sanctions, which has fallen to a historically low rate of 5 %, the lowest rate for any accession country; recalls that EU candidate countries are required to progressively align with the common foreign and security policy of the European Union and comply with international law; regrets that Türkiye has not undertaken any steps in this regard, notably by failing to align with EU sanctions against Russia, and that in many areas of mutual interest the foreign policies of the EU and Türkiye are worryingly divergent; urges Türkiye to align with and fully implement the EU sanctions against Russia, including on anti-circumvention measures and to cooperate closely with the EU’s Sanctions Envoy;

    40. Stresses the importance of reinforcing EU-Türkiye cooperation in global security matters, particularly in light of the changing geopolitical landscape and potential shifts in US foreign policy; expresses cautious hope that recent informal engagement, such as the participation of the Turkish Foreign Minister in the informal meeting of EU foreign affairs ministers in 2024, may provide an impetus towards better relations; acknowledges Türkiye’s key role as an ally in NATO and welcomes the Turkish Parliament’s decision to ratify Sweden’s NATO accession in January 2024; recalls, in this regard, that Türkiye has a key responsibility to foster stability at both regional and global levels and is expected to act in line with its NATO obligations, especially given the current geopolitical upheavals; encourages constructive engagement in a more structured and frequent political dialogue on foreign, security and defence policy to seek collaboration on convergent interests while working to reduce divergences, particularly with regard to removing persistent obstacles to the enhancement of a genuine relationship between the EU and NATO, including the acquisition from Russia of the S-400 air defence system; remains duly concerned that Türkiye continues to exclude a Member State from cooperation with NATO;

    41. Welcomes Türkiye’s long-standing position in favour of a two-state solution for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, its calls for a ceasefire in the Israel-Hamas war, and its ongoing efforts to supply humanitarian aid to Gaza throughout the conflict; deeply regrets, at the same time, the Turkish authorities’, including the President’s, active support for the EU-listed terror group Hamas and their stance on the attack against Israel on 7 October 2023, which the Turkish Government failed to condemn; points out that Türkiye’s open support for Hamas and its refusal to designate it a terrorist organisation is not compatible with the EU’s foreign and security policy; calls, therefore, for a revision of this position;

    42. Notes with concern that Türkiye has asked to be a member of BRICS+ and been offered ‘partner country’ status, and is considering the same for the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), where it holds the status of a dialogue partner; expresses serious concern over Türkiye’s increasing interest in an alternative partnership framework, which is fundamentally incompatible with the EU accession process; insists that Türkiye’s new status as a BRICS partner country must not affect Türkiye’s responsibilities within NATO; notes that Türkiye has been cultivating cooperation formats, partnerships and regional alliances beyond the EU; is concerned by Türkiye’s tendency to use this multi-vector approach to advance its interests without committing to a full-fledged cooperation with any of these alliances;

    43. Remains concerned by the Turkish Government’s use of the Turkish diaspora as an instrument for occasional meddling in EU Member States’ domestic policies;

    Socio-economic and sustainability reforms

    44. Welcomes Türkiye’s return to a more conventional economic and monetary policy, while maintaining robust growth and a moderate budget deficit; regrets, however, that the cost of this is yet again being borne by citizens in the form of higher interest rates; highlights that social vulnerabilities have increased, particularly among children and older people, primarily due to the absence of a comprehensive poverty reduction strategy and income inequalities; underlines the necessity for the Turkish authorities to implement comprehensive social protection measures, strengthen collective bargaining rights and ensure that economic reforms prioritise reducing inequality and creating decent work opportunities;

    45. Regrets the fact that despite the progress observed in economic and monetary policies, other actions by the Turkish Government affecting the rule of law continue to undermine basic principles such as legal certainty, which impacts negatively on Türkiye’s potential capacity to receive investments; welcomes the removal of Türkiye from the grey list of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in June 2024, following significant progress in improving its anti-money laundering regime and combating the financing of terrorism;

    46. Welcomes Türkiye’s increased investment activity in the green energy sector and calls on Türkiye to continue improving the compatibility of its energy policy with the EU acquis, exploiting Türkiye’s enormous potential in renewable energy; expresses concern about the lack of any significant progress on climate action, in particular owing to the absence of a comprehensive climate law, a domestic emissions trading system, and a long-term low-emission development strategy, which undermines its 2053 climate neutrality target; highlights the need for a robust legal framework and stricter enforcement mechanisms to safeguard environmental and natural resources; urges Türkiye to align its environmental policies with the EU acquis, including respecting natural habitats when conducting mining projects, and underlines the importance of Türkiye’s adherence to the Aarhus Convention; commends the work of environmental rights defenders in Türkiye and warns against the dire environmental impact of extensive government projects, such as the expansion of its copper mining activities in Mount Ida (Kaz Daglari);

    47. Highlights the fact that Türkiye has taken steps to diversify energy supplies and increase its renewable energy share; notes that the country is the seventh largest LNG market and highlights its potential as a regional energy hub; takes note that Türkiye has subscribed to the global goals on energy efficiency and renewable energy capacity by 2030; calls on the Commission to take into account Türkiye’s potential as a regional energy hub in initiatives to increase the installed renewable capacity in the Mediterranean region and in the development of the New Pact for the Mediterranean, and calls for energy cooperation to be part of the common agenda;

    48. Observes some improvements in labour market conditions and points out a number of pending critical challenges, such as informal employment, the gender gap, and income inequality; is worried about the low coverage of collective bargaining and the lack of recognition of trade union rights for certain public sector employees; believes that more efforts are needed to enhance social dialogue mechanisms and address emerging occupational safety challenges; recalls that trade union freedom and social dialogue are crucial to the development and prosperity of a pluralistic society; deplores, in this regard, the recent detentions of trade unionists including Remzi Çalişkan, vice-president of the DISK confederation, and president of Genel-Iş, who was released after a month in prison, Kemal Göksoy, President of the Mersin Branch of Genel-İş, who remains in prison, and Mehmet Türkmen, chair of the textile sector union BİRTEK SEN, who was detained on 14 February 2025;

    Wider EU-Türkiye relations

    49. Reiterates its firm conviction that, beyond the currently frozen accession process, Türkiye is a country of strategic relevance, a key partner for the stability of the wider region and plays an important role in addressing security challenges, migration management, counterterrorism, and energy security; stresses the importance of maintaining constructive dialogue and deepening cooperation in areas of mutual strategic interest; points to a number of policy areas for future engagement, whether it be the green transition, trade, energy, a modernised customs union and visa liberalisation, among others; reaffirms that the EU is committed to pursuing the best possible relations with Türkiye, based on dialogue, respect and mutual trust, in line with international law and good neighbourly relations;

    50. Stresses the importance of encouraging deeper partnership in all economic sectors, to the benefit of the EU and all of its Member States and Türkiye; notes in particular the importance of cooperation in the fields of energy, innovation, artificial intelligence, health, security and migration management, among others; in this regard, welcomes various high-level dialogues (HLDs) held recently, including the HLD on trade, and the plans for an HLD on economy, as positive steps towards pragmatic forms of cooperation in areas of mutual importance; calls again for the resumption of all relevant HLDs and for the establishment of structured HLDs on sectoral cooperation, to address common challenges and explore opportunities for joint initiatives in fields such as security, climate change, research and innovation; stresses that trade between the EU and Türkiye hit a record high last year and that the EU remains Türkiye’s largest trade and investment partner; calls for the removal of all existing trade barriers and irritants;

    51. Stands ready to support an upgraded customs union with a broader, mutually beneficial scope, which could encompass a wide range of areas of common interest, including digitalisation, Green Deal alignment for green energy policies, public procurement, sustainable development commitments, and due diligence, contributing to the economic security of both sides; supports accompanying this upgraded customs union with an efficient and effective dispute settlement mechanism; underlines the fact that for Parliament to give its consent at the end of the process, such a modernisation would need to be based on strong conditionality related to human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for international law and good neighbourly relations, including Türkiye’s full implementation of the Additional Protocol on extending the Ankara Agreement to all Member States without exception and in a non-discriminatory fashion;

    52. Notes with deep regret that no progress has been made by Türkiye towards meeting the required benchmarks for visa liberalisation; reiterates its willingness to start the visa liberalisation process as soon as the Turkish authorities fully fulfil the six clearly outstanding benchmarks in a non-discriminatory manner vis-à-vis all EU Member states while aligning with EU visa policy; regrets that Turkish citizens are facing problems with visa requests/applications to EU Member States owing to a marked increase in demand and fears of abuse of the system; recognises, however, the political commitment to improving access to visas and calls for intensified efforts on both sides to address the remaining technical and administrative barriers; calls on the EU Member states to increase the resources allocated to this matter; supports measures on visa facilitation, particularly with regard to business activities and Erasmus students; deeply regrets the constant attempts by the Turkish authorities to blame the EU for not making progress on this dossier, while not taking any necessary steps to comply with the remaining benchmarks; reminds Türkiye that the lack of tangible and cumulative progress on the pending conditions has a direct impact on business activities and Erasmus students; appreciates the invaluable contribution of Erasmus+ exchanges in providing rich cross-cultural educational opportunities;

    The way forward for EU-Türkiye relations

    53. Considers, in view of the above, that the Turkish Government has failed to take the necessary steps to address the existing fundamental democratic shortcomings within the country and therefore reiterates its view that Türkiye’s EU accession process cannot be resumed in the current circumstances, despite the democratic and pro-European aspirations of a large part of Turkish society; recalls that, as in the case of any other candidate, the accession process is contingent on full compliance with the Copenhagen criteria and on the normalisation of relations with all EU Member States;

    54. Urges the Turkish Government and the EU institutions and Member States to continue working, beyond the currently frozen accession process, on the basis of the relevant Council and European Council conclusions and the established conditionality, towards a closer, more dynamic and strategic partnership with particular emphasis on climate action, energy security, counter-terrorism cooperation and regional stability; insists on the need to begin a process of reflection on how this new constructive and progressive framework for EU-Türkiye relations can encompass the interests of all parties involved, for example by modernising and enhancing the current Association Agreement;

    55. Considers the joint communication of 29 November 2023 on the state of play of EU-Türkiye relations a good basis on which to move forward in the overall relations between the EU and Türkiye; regrets the lack of a clear political endorsement of this joint communication so far by the Council; reiterates that recognition of all EU Member States is a necessary component of any agreement between the EU and Türkiye; stresses that Türkiye’s constructive engagement, including in relation to the Cyprus problem, remains key to advancing closer cooperation between the EU and Türkiye;

    56. Warns, nevertheless, that a further drift towards authoritarianism by the Turkish authorities, such as we have been witnessing recently, will ultimately have a severe impact on all dimensions of EU-Türkiye relations, including trade and security cooperation, as it prevents the trust and reliability needed between partners and antagonises both sides in the current geopolitical scene;

    57. Continues to acknowledge and commend the democratic and pro-European aspirations of the majority of Turkish society (particularly among Turkish youth), whom the EU will not forsake; regards these aspirations as a major reason for keeping Türkiye’s accession process alive; calls therefore on the Commission to uphold and increase its political and financial support to the vibrant and pro-democratic civil society in Türkiye, whose efforts can contribute to generating the political will necessary for deepening EU-Türkiye relations; highlights, nevertheless, that the resumption of the accession process depends on the unwavering political will of Türkiye’s authorities and society to become a full-fledged democracy, which cannot be forced upon it by the EU;

    58. Reiterates its call to strengthen and deepen mutual knowledge and understanding between our societies, promoting cultural growth, socio-cultural exchanges and combating all manifestations of social, religious, ethnic or cultural prejudice; encourages Türkiye and the EU to promote shared values, particularly by supporting young people; reiterates its utmost commitment to sustaining and increasing support for Türkiye’s independent civil society;

    °

    ° °

    59. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the President of the European Council, the Council and the Commission; asks that this resolution be translated into Turkish and forwarded to the President, Government and Parliament of the Republic of Türkiye.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Press release – Border security: MEPs endorse gradual roll-out of Entry-Exit System

    Source: European Parliament

    On Wednesday, the Civil Liberties Committee endorsed plans to gradually roll out the Entry-Exit System (EES) at the EU’s external borders.

    Civil Liberties Committee MEPs adopted a draft position on the proposed gradual launch of the Entry-Exit System (EES) at EU external borders by 54 votes in favour, 2 against and with 10 abstentions. Once operational the system will register data of third‑country nationals, including biometric data such as facial images and fingerprints, as they enter and leave the Schengen area on short-stay visas. This is intended to improve security, speed up the process, and reduce queues.

    By launching the system gradually, and allowing member states to start operating it in stages, it should be possible to prevent a simultaneous launch everywhere from compromising the system’s resilience. During the roll-out period, the launch could be temporarily suspended if waiting times become too long or there are technical issues, says the Committee report.


    Roll-out over 180 days

    According to the proposed legislation, the Commission will decide when to commence a 180-day period during which EU countries will begin the incremental implementation of the EES at their borders. On day one of this period, at least 10% of border crossings would have to be registered in the new system, followed by up to 50% by day 90, and 100% by the end of the 180 days.

    In their amendments to the Commission’s proposal, Committee MEPs underline that member states should be free to decide whether to roll the system out gradually or all at once. They propose that if EU countries do opt to implement the EES in stages, then they should enjoy more flexibility in reaching certain milestones – namely, 10% of border crossings registered in the system to be achieved by day 30 (instead of day one), and 35% (instead of 50%) by day 90.

    MEPs also want to include contingency procedures for the central EES system, and recommend that neither the start nor the end of the gradual roll-out period should coincide with peak travel seasons, i.e. June-August and December-February.


    Quote

    After the vote, rapporteur Assita Kanko (ECR, Belgium) said: “The purpose of the Entry-Exit System is to make EU citizens safer. In the eight years since the EES legislation was adopted, security threats have only increased, meaning that the system is now more important than ever. Unfortunately, the system is still not operational, as not all member states are as yet ready for its full launch. With this gradual roll-out, we aim to get the system up and running as soon as realistically possible, and I’m glad about the broad support in Parliament for my position.“


    Next steps

     

    Negotiations with the Council on the final shape of the legislation were authorised with 60 in favour, 3 against, and 3 abstentions. The EP draft negotiating position will be announced at a future plenary session. If no objection is raised, negotiations can begin with the Council (which adopted its position in March 2025).


    Background

    The Entry-Exit System (EES) is one of the EU’s interoperable databases for border management and security. Once it is fully operational, physical stamping of passports will be replaced by entries in the EES, to be accessible for real-time consultation by other Schengen area member states, in line with their security needs. The EES has been developed by the European Union Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (eu-LISA).

    The system will mark the first time that biometric data, including fingerprints and facial images, are collected systematically at EU external borders. It is expected to reduce violations of entry rules.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Baldwin, Moore Urge Trump Admin to Reinstate Childhood Lead Poisoning Experts at CDC, Push for Approval of Milwaukee’s Request for Federal Assistance

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Wisconsin Tammy Baldwin
    WASHINGTON, D.C. – U.S. Senator Tammy Baldwin (D-WI) and Congresswoman Gwen Moore (D-WI-04) demanded the Trump administration reinstate the fired Center for Disease Control (CDC) lead poisoning experts and approve Milwaukee’s plea for federal assistance to help keep children safe from lead exposure in Milwaukee Public Schools (MPS). Moore and Baldwin’s call comes after the City of Milwaukee’s request for emergency help addressing lead poisoning in MPS schools was denied by the Trump Administration, in part because of staffing shortages after Elon Musk’s DOGE and the Trump Administration fired the CDC’s Childhood Lead Poisoning Prevention and Surveillance Branch. Milwaukee requested assistance after four students tested positive for lead poisoning connected to deteriorating lead paint chips at MPS buildings, leading to the temporary closure of four MPS schools while active and ongoing efforts to remediate lead exposures occur in those schools. 
    “We urge you to reinstate childhood lead poisoning experts at CDC and approve the City of Milwaukee’s request for assistance to ensure that childhood lead poisoning prevention technical assistance is provided to help ensure that students are protected from lead exposure at school,” wrote Moore and Baldwin in a letter to Health and Human Services (HHS) Secretary Robert F. Kennedy. “This haphazard approach to gutting the federal workforce is misguided and has resulted in unacceptable mistakes at the agency charged with safeguarding the public’s health. You have the ability to immediately rectify this issue, and we urge you to do so.”
    “Children who are poisoned with lead or at risk for lead poisoning should not bear the burden of a haphazard “restructuring plan.” Federal technical assistance can make a significant impact in our response to this crisis, and the longer local officials are forced to work with strained resources, the longer children and families will suffer. Our communities cannot afford to wait,” Moore and Baldwin continued.
    The full letter can be found here and below:
    Dear Secretary Kennedy,
    We were alarmed to learn that the City of Milwaukee’s Health Department’s request to receive Epi-Aid from the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) was denied. This critical assistance is needed to help local officials respond to a public health crisis involving a childhood lead poisoning case that was tied to a Milwaukee Public School (MPS) facility. The requested assistance would have supported improved data collection, public awareness outreach, and a comprehensive strategy to help protect public school students from further exposure. It is especially concerning to learn that this denial was reportedly due to a lack of staffing capacity resulting from the recent HHS reduction in force, where over 2,000 CDC employees with critical skills and expertise, including the entire Childhood Lead Poisoning Prevention and Surveillance Branch, were fired. We urge you to reinstate childhood lead poisoning experts at CDC and approve the City of Milwaukee’s request for assistance to ensure that childhood lead poisoning prevention technical assistance is provided to help ensure that students are protected from lead exposure at school.
    According to the CDC, its Epidemiologic Assistance program (Epi-Aid) enables rapid and short-term response by federal public health experts to investigate urgent public health problems, such as infectious and noninfectious disease outbreaks, unexplained illnesses, or natural or manmade disasters. The focus of an EpiAid investigation is to assist partners in making rapid, practical decisions for actions to control and prevent the public health problem from growing, thus benefiting both the federal government and those assisted. This assistance is needed in Milwaukee now.
    The recently denied Epi-Aid request would support ongoing efforts by the City of Milwaukee and MPS to address a serious public health threat that poses the greatest threat to our youngest residents. But it cannot do so without federal help. As you know, there is no safe level of lead exposure for children. When children are exposed to this neurotoxin, it harms brain development and the nervous system, contributing to learning delays and can lead to severe illness. This toxin endangers our children and prevents them from reaching their full potential. HHS has a responsibility to lend its technical expertise and make available the resources necessary to rid our communities of this poison.
    In November, a young MPS student tested positive for lead poisoning, and after careful public health investigation, it was determined that case was connected to deteriorating lead paint chips at Golda Meir Elementary School, a MPS building. Since then, three other children tested positive for lead poisoning, leading to the temporary closure of four MPS Schools while active and ongoing efforts to remediate lead exposures occur in those schools. This issue is likely widespread, as there are 125 MPS buildings built before the federal ban on lead-based paint.
    From news reports, it appears that the decision to shutter the CDC’s Childhood Lead Poisoning Prevention and Surveillance Branch contributed to the decision to reject the recent request for EPI-Aid, a request that we understand is usually granted. You recently mentioned that, “there are some programs that were cut that are being reinstated, and I think that’s one of them,” referring to the CDC’s Childhood Lead Poisoning Prevention and Surveillance Branch. You also said, “we talked about this from the beginning. We’re going to do 80 percent cuts, but 20 percent of those are going to have to be reinstalled because we’ll make mistakes.” This haphazard approach to gutting the federal workforce is misguided and has resulted in unacceptable mistakes at the agency charged with safeguarding the public’s health. You have the ability to immediately rectify this issue, and we urge you to do so.
    As Members of Congress, we have worked over the last decade on a bipartisan basis to help secure federal funding to address lead in paint and water infrastructure, including for strong investments that support critical surveillance, environmental investigation, and case management activities to help identify and treat children with elevated blood lead levels in the U.S. In fiscal year 2025, Childhood Lead Poisoning was funded at $51 million—the same level as fiscal year 2024. HHS has contended that the reduction in force and the efforts to reorganize the department will not affect programs. Unfortunately, the denial of Epi-Aid in this instance is indeed a programmatic consequence of HHS’ abrupt firings that will have lasting consequences for young children in Milwaukee.
    Children who are poisoned with lead or at risk for lead poisoning should not bear the burden of a haphazard “restructuring plan.” Federal technical assistance can make a significant impact in our response to this crisis, and the longer local officials are forced to work with strained resources, the longer children and families will suffer. Our communities cannot afford to wait. We urge you to swiftly reconstitute CDC’s Office of Childhood Lead Poisoning Prevention and approve the request for EPI-Aid from the City of Milwaukee’s Health Department. Every moment of delay results in harm to our children.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Huffman, Bergman Announced as Co-Chairs of Congressional National Marine Sanctuary Caucus

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Congressman Jared Huffman Representing the 2nd District of California

    April 22, 2025

    Silver Spring, MD Today, the National Marine Sanctuary Foundation announced that Rep. Jared Huffman (CA-02) and Rep. Jack Bergman (MI-01) will co-chair the bipartisan Congressional National Marine Sanctuary Caucus in the 119th Congress. 

    Members of the bipartisan National Marine Sanctuary Caucus are champions of a network of underwater parks in the ocean and Great Lakes, and the coastal communities that steward and rely on them. The caucus serves as a strong voice among their peers in Congress –working to raise awareness and strengthen commitment to the National Marine Sanctuary System. The caucus will highlight the National Marine Sanctuary System’s importance to local economies and jobs, and public private partnerships in conservation, maritime heritage, outdoor tourism and recreation, and education across the country.

    The caucus supports and promotes public policy that conserves our nation’s most iconic natural and cultural marine resources for all Americans; raises awareness and understanding of national marine sanctuaries and shares their successes as models for marine conservation worldwide; supports continued and robust funding for marine sanctuaries; and builds a coalition of champions for our national marine sanctuaries and our coastal communities.

    “National Marine Sanctuaries are not only treasured areas that protect natural, historical, and cultural places across our oceans and lakes, but they also are essential to our coastal economies,” said Rep. Huffman. “Sanctuaries can take on any number of breathtaking natural features, from kelp forests to rocky and coral reefs and so much more – and I am honored to have not one, but two national marine sanctuaries in my district. Our spectacular underwater parks, Greater Farallones and Cordell Bank, protect critical ocean ecosystems and conserve wildlife. So I am proud to welcome my colleague, Congressman Bergman, to join me in relaunching this bipartisan caucus to raise awareness of sanctuaries and prioritize sanctuary issues on behalf of coastal communities and our nation.”

    “From the freshwater shores of the Great Lakes to our Nation’s saltwater coastlines, productive maritime economies rely on fishing, tourism, recreation, and scientific research,” said Rep. Bergman. “In Michigan’s First District, the Thunder Bay National Marine Sanctuary stands as a strong example of how conservation and education can go hand-in-hand to support these industries. This caucus builds on that foundation—promoting opportunities to experience and appreciate our unique marine environments. By engaging both lawmakers and constituents in the importance of protecting these habitats, we’re helping to ensure that future generations can continue to enjoy and benefit from the natural resources that define our way of life.”

    “We welcome Rep. Jack Bergman and returning co-chair Rep. Jared Huffman to their leadership of the House National Marine Sanctuary Caucus, and we thank the entire caucus for their commitment to these special waters valued by all Americans. We look forward to working with the caucus leaders to protect and restore our most treasured habitat and heritage in our ocean and Great Lakes and catalyzing more opportunities for the coastal communities who rely on national marine sanctuaries,” said Joel Johnson, president and CEO of the National Marine Sanctuary Foundation.

    Alongside the co-chairs, the current membership of the Congressional National Marine Sanctuary Caucus includes Representatives Nanette Barragan (D-CA);  Don Beyer (D-VA); Suzanne Bonamici (D-OR); Julia Brownley (D-CA); Salud Carbajal (D-CA); Buddy Carter (R-GA); Ed Case (D-HI); Danny K. Davis (D-IL); Suzan DelBene (D-WA); Debbie Dingell (D-MI); Jimmy Gomez (D-CA); James A. Himes (D-CT); Sara Jacobs (D-CA); Pramila Jayapal (D-WA); Nick LaLota (R-NY); John B. Larson (D-CT); Nancy Mace (R-SC); Nicole Malliotakis (R-NY); Doris O. Matsui (D-CA); Joseph Morelle (D-NY); Jerrold Nadler (D-NY); Eleanor Holmes Norton (D-DC); Jimmy Panetta (D-CA); Chris Pappas (D-NH); John Rutherford (R-FL); Maria Salazar (R-FL); Linda Sanchez (D-CA); Adam Smith (D-WA); Darren Soto (D-FL); Debbie Wasserman Schultz (D-FL); Jill Tokuda (D-HI);  and Robert J. Wittman (R-VA).

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    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Global: Paying fishers to release sharks accidentally caught in their nets can incentivise conservation action – but there’s a catch

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Hollie Booth, Research Associate, Conservation Science, University of Oxford

    An Indonesian fisher safely releases a critically endangered wedgefish. Francesca Page. Francesca Page, CC BY-NC-ND

    Sharks and rays are among the world’s most threatened species, mainly due to overfishing. They are sometimes targeted for their fins and meat, but more often caught as bycatch in nets aiming to catch other fish. Declines in these ocean predators can disrupt food webs, harm tourism income and worsen climate change by undermining the resilience of ocean ecosystems.

    However, halting overfishing of sharks and rays is difficult because the social dynamics around it are complex. Many threatened species are caught in small-scale, mixed-species fisheries in tropical coastal areas, where households depend on the fish they catch – including endangered sharks and rays – for food and income.

    For the past five years, I have been investigating how to support both marine life and the people who rely on catching fish. I’m part of a global team of interdisciplinary researchers focusing on shark and ray conservation in small-scale fisheries in Indonesia.

    Our new study, just published in Science Advances, suggests that paying fishers to release endangered species can incentivise conservation behaviours and promote fisher welfare. However, such payments can also have unintended consequences, which may undermine conservation goals, so it’s really important to design incentives carefully and rigorously evaluate initiatives as they progress.

    Though sharks and rays are not necessarily targeted by small-scale fishers, threatened species such as wedgefish and hammerhead sharks are frequently captured. In our 2020 study, fishers often told us that wedgefish and hammerheads are “just bycatch”. However, further investigation revealed that fishers remain reluctant to reduce catches of these species because they would lose food and income.

    “It brings more money even though it’s not the target” one fisher told us. “It is rezeki” (a gift from God). “If I return it to the ocean, it is mubazir” (wasteful and God will be displeased).

    Knowing this, we explored the different positive and negative incentives that might motivate fishers to change their behaviour. We found that conditional cash payments, which compensate fishers for safely releasing wedgefish and hammerheads back into the sea, could be a cost-effective way to conserve these species without damaging fisher livelihoods.

    Inspired by our results, I worked with students and collaborators to establish a small local charitable organisation to put our findings into practice – Kebersamaan Untuk Lautan (an Indonesian phrase meaning “togetherness for the ocean”). We agreed to compensates fishers with cash payments – typically US$2-7 (£1.50-5) per fish – if they submit videos of wedgefish and hammerhead being safely released.

    Testing the incentive

    However, incentives can change fishing behaviour in unforeseen ways. For example, fishers may increase their catches to receive more payments at the expense of conservation goals. Payments may also end up going to people who would reduce catches anyway, or could release budget constraints allowing fishers to purchase more nets.

    To see if and how the conservation payments worked in practice, we carried out a controlled experiment, randomly splitting 87 vessels from Aceh and West Nusa Tenggara into two groups. One group was offered compensation for live releases while the other was not. We collected data on reported live releases and retained catches of wedgefish and hammerheads, and on fishers’ levels of satisfaction with the programme and life in general. Then we compared the two groups.

    Since we launched the pay-to-release programme in May 2022, more than 1,200 wedgefish and hammerheads have been safely released. All participating fishers and their families felt satisfied.

    “We use the compensation money to cover our daily needs. We hope that the programme continues in the future,” said the wife of one participating fisher.

    Hollie Booth has been collaborating with fishers in Indonesia to reduce bycatch of sharks. Film by Liam Webb.

    However, our experimental data from the first 16 months of the programme (May 2022 – July 2023) revealed a plot twist. Even though the compensation incentivised live releases, results suggested that some fishers had purposefully increased their catches to gain more payments.

    My team and I were initially distressed by the result. However, without the rigorous controlled experiment we would never have detected these unintended consequences. Based on our results, we revised the compensation pricing and limited how many compensated releases each vessel can claim per week. We are also piloting a new gear swap scheme, where fishers trade their nets for fish traps, which have much lower bycatch rates. Preliminary data suggest these changes have boosted the programme’s effectiveness.

    Our team at Oxford works closely with other local researchers and conservation organisations to help them design and assess their own locally appropriate incentive programmes. Another recent study from conservation charity Thresher Shark Indonesia shows that their alternative livelihood programme reduced catches of endangered thresher sharks by over 90%.

    Positive incentives are an important instrument for solving the biodiversity crisis in an equitable way. It is unfair and unjust to expect small-scale resources users in developing countries to bear most of the costs of conservation. Especially when wealthier and more powerful ocean users – such as commercial seafood companies – cause major negative impacts through overfishing while extracting huge profits. However, conservation incentives must be well designed and robustly evaluated to ensure they incentivise the right actions and deliver intended results.


    Don’t have time to read about climate change as much as you’d like?

    Get a weekly roundup in your inbox instead. Every Wednesday, The Conversation’s environment editor writes Imagine, a short email that goes a little deeper into just one climate issue. Join the 45,000+ readers who’ve subscribed so far.


    Hollie Booth is the founder and Chair of Kebersamaan Untuk Lautan. The program and this research was funded by Save Our Seas Foundation and the UK Darwin Initiative.

    ref. Paying fishers to release sharks accidentally caught in their nets can incentivise conservation action – but there’s a catch – https://theconversation.com/paying-fishers-to-release-sharks-accidentally-caught-in-their-nets-can-incentivise-conservation-action-but-theres-a-catch-253797

    MIL OSI – Global Reports