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Category: France

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: New Permanent Representative of France Presents Credentials

    Source: United Nations 4

    (Based on information provided by the Protocol and Liaison Service)

    The new Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations, Jérôme Bonnafont, presented his credentials to UN Deputy Secretary-General Amina Mohammed today.

    Prior to his appointment, Mr. Bonnafont served as Ambassador at his country’s Permanent Mission in Geneva since September 2021. Concurrently, he was rapporteur-general of the “Etats généraux de la diplomatie” (National Roundtable on Diplomacy) — launched by President Emmanuel Macron and then Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs Catherine Colonna — which led to the March 2023 plan to transform and strengthen France’s diplomatic apparatus.

    He was also an adviser to Prime Minister Edouard Philippe in 2020, Director of the North Africa and Middle East Department (2015-2019), Ambassador to Madrid (2012-2015), Chief of Staff to Minister for Foreign Affairs Alain Juppé (2011-2012) and Ambassador to New Delhi (2007-2011).

    Mr. Bonnafont served as adviser for global affairs and then spokesman for the Presidency from 1997 to 2007 under President Jacques Chirac.

    Prior to this, he served in the Ministry of the Environment (1996-1997), in the Department of Legal Affairs (1995-1996), at the Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations in New York (1993-1995), in Kuwait (1991-1993), in the Department of Economic Affairs (1989-1991) and in New Delhi (1986-1989).

    He is a graduate of the Ecole Nationale d’Administration, France.

    Mr. Bonnafont is married and has one child.

    MIL OSI United Nations News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Treasurer Stacy Garrity Returns Lost WWI Medal to Veteran’s Family

    Source: US State of Pennsylvania

    April 02, 2025 – Orwigsburg, PA

    Treasurer Stacy Garrity Returns Lost WWI Medal to Veteran’s Family

    At the Orwigsburg Free Public Library, Treasurer Stacy Garrity returned a WWI medal to the family of Joseph William Morrison, who was a Private First Class in the Army from Auburn, Schuylkill County, and was killed in action. The medal was reported to Treasury as unclaimed property.

    The WWI Gold Star Mothers and Widows Pilgrimage Medal was stored in a safe deposit box owned by the late Agnes Morrison, the granddaughter of Joseph’s mother, the late Agnes Kissick Morrison, who the medal was awarded to. Christine Morrison of Brooklyn, New York, traveled to Schuylkill County for today’s ceremony that was attended by numerous family members. Christine is the cousin of Agnes Morrison.

    “I’m so honored to be returning this medal to Joseph Morrison’s family on behalf of a grateful Commonwealth,” Treasurer Garrity said. “It is so important we remember the sacrifices of those who gave their lives serving our country, as PFC Morrison did when he died representing the Allies in France. As a fellow Veteran, there is no higher honor for me than to return these medals to our military families and shine a light on the heroism of our men and women in uniform.”

    Speakers Include:
    Claudia Gross – Library Director, Orwigsburg Free Public Library
    Stacy Garrity – State Treasurer
    Christine Morrison – Great Niece of Medal Recipient, Joseph William Morrison
    Pastor Jeff Stonesifer – Congregational Free Church of Christ
    Dave Moore – Commander, VFW Post 2198

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Kugler, Inflation Expectations and Monetary Policymaking

    Source: US State of New York Federal Reserve

    Thank you, Alan, and thank you to the Griswold and Julis-Rabinowitz Centers for the opportunity to speak to you today.1 As someone who has worked in both the public sector and academia, I applaud the common purpose of both centers in connecting researchers, policymakers, and the private sector to pursue policy ideas that serve the public good.

    To that end, I can think of few individuals who have done more—as a teacher, researcher, government official, and public figure—than Alan Blinder. That includes educating the public about economic policymaking. In the spring of 2022, as many wondered whether Russia’s war on Ukraine would add to the factors then driving up inflation, Professor Blinder wrote in the Wall Street Journal that a more important factor would probably be the public’s expectations of future inflation.2
    As I will relate in these remarks, he was, of course, absolutely correct. As in the past, inflation expectations have played a crucial role in the course of inflation since the spring of 2022, and I expect they will be important in the Federal Reserve’s ongoing effort to achieve sustained inflation of 2 percent. For that reason, I would like to focus on inflation expectations today, before discussing my outlook for the U.S. economy and the implications for appropriate monetary policy. First, I will describe inflation expectations within the conceptual framework that many economists use to connect inflation to broader economic activity, known as the Phillips curve. Second, I will discuss the central importance of the stability of these expectations, which we have come to call the “anchoring” of inflation expectations. Third, I will explain how firms and households form their inflation expectations and how these expectations affect their economic decisionmaking. Throughout, I will make some references to historical experiences with inflation but focus on the period since the pandemic.
    Economists have long recognized the connection between inflation and overall macroeconomic conditions, but it was in trying to explain this empirical relationship and measure it with some precision that the importance of inflation expectations was revealed.
    The foundation of this work was laid by New Zealand economist A.W. Phillips, a fascinating figure who was, among other things, a mechanical genius who built an early economic model operated by hydraulics rather than electronics. In contemplating the mechanics of the economy, in 1958 Phillips set about to explain why nominal wage growth was slower when unemployment was high and faster when unemployment was low. His and other subsequent research showed that a crucial factor was the utilization of resources, such as labor and capital.3 Generally, when firms use labor and capital very intensively, production costs tend to rise, and firms have more scope to pass those cost increases along in the form of higher prices for their products and services, which, in turn, may push up inflation across the economy. In contrast, when that level of utilization is low, costs tend to rise more slowly (or even fall), and firms have less scope for raising prices, thus pushing down inflation. This tradeoff has been called the Phillips curve.
    In this simple form, this tradeoff implies that governments can achieve and maintain very low unemployment only if they allow inflation to rise to a certain level. In the latter 1960s, Milton Friedman and Edmund Phelps asserted that this orderly tradeoff was only temporary and would ultimately break down because of the role of expectations and, in particular, inflation expectations.4 To use an example, while current production costs are important to a factory owner setting prices, that owner will also consider future production costs, future levels of demand, and expectations for inflation throughout the economy. Likewise, workers will factor expectations of future economic conditions into their pay demands, and banks will consider future inflation in deciding loan rates. Consumers, whose purchases constitute some two-thirds of economic activity, make decisions about whether to purchase something today with an idea of what it will cost in the future. All these decisions are influenced by expectations, and this is the way in which expectations may shape inflation now. In turn, when we think about the Phillips curve and its tradeoff nowadays, we account for the important role of expectations of different individuals throughout the economy.
    There are different measures of inflation expectations, some from surveys polling business owners, others asking consumers, and yet others estimating expectations among bond investors based on the differences in yields between nominal and inflation-indexed securities. While most of my points apply broadly to all measures of expectations, my examples come mostly from surveys of consumers and businesses. While there are questions, which I will address, about how well these surveys measure inflation expectations, I closely monitor them because they complement market-based indicators of future inflation that are affected by dynamics intrinsic to financial markets, such as changes in risk premiums.
    Let me note that, in addition to the way expectations of future inflation influence prices in the near term, there are economic mechanisms that link current inflation with past inflation, such as those that set wages and the terms of rental contracts. In these cases, adjustments in these terms are often benchmarked on past inflation, as, for instance, when workers and landlords aim to recoup losses from increases in general prices. To cite one example, as the economy reopened after the pandemic, workers sought higher wages to compensate for the early wave of inflation in food and core goods, thus further pushing up inflation, especially in the services sector, where labor accounts for the largest share of this sector’s costs.5 And, because rental agreements typically last for 12 months or more, landlords faced a lag in adjusting rents to reflect the escalation of inflation after the pandemic and sought to recoup those losses when renewing leases.
    By looking at price changes this way, in a rearview mirror, some decisionmakers in the economy end up making inflation more persistent. That is important to me as an economic policymaker who must pay attention to both expectations of future inflation and the persistence of current inflation.
    When we speak of expectations of future inflation, it is crucial to define the time horizon, and different surveys conducted by the Federal Reserve and others ask about inflation from 1 year to as many as 10 years in the future. Surveys with a shorter horizon, such as the University of Michigan Surveys of Consumers’ question on inflation 1 year ahead, shown in figure 1, are heavily influenced by current inflation. Near-term inflation expectations tend to be more volatile, moving up when, for example, energy prices increase, or down when energy or some other volatile set of prices decreases. These expectations are important because many economic decisions, such as major consumer purchases and hiring and investment for firms, focus on horizons of only a few years ahead.
    By contrast, inflation expectations over longer horizons, such as the Michigan survey’s question on inflation during the next 5 to 10 years (the red line in figure 1), say less about current conditions than about the trend for inflation for some time in the future. You can think about these longer-term expectations as much less affected by the forces that push inflation up or down in the short term, what economists call “shocks.” Longer-term inflation expectations tend to be less volatile, affected less, for example, by what oil or food prices have done lately than by the stability of inflation over years or decades.
    I mention these different time horizons because they matter in my job as a central banker. Expectations a year from now reflect short-term shocks to the economy, as well as ongoing efforts from monetary policymakers to bring the economy back to its longer-run state. Thus, while short-term expectations may indicate whether inflation is expected to move toward its target, they are not the best gauge of monetary policy credibility. Longer-term inflation expectations, however, should be much less influenced by short-term shocks to the economy, and a change in those expectations has implications for the Federal Reserve’s prospects for meeting its price-stability goal.
    When these longer-term expectations are reasonably low and unresponsive to shorter-term developments, we say they are “anchored.” It is not clear who first defined the term, but Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke in 2007 gave a speech on inflation expectations in which he described “anchored” expectations as “relatively insensitive to incoming data.”6
    So how should we think about the process of anchoring and de-anchoring of inflation expectations? The dynamics of short- and long-term inflation expectations shed light on this issue. If the public experiences a spell of inflation higher than their shorter-run expectations, they will revise up these shorter-term expectations to ensure that their near-term plans account for the change in the economic environment. That’s what happened after the pandemic, when inflation based on personal consumption expenditures (PCE) rose to a peak of 7.2 percent and one-year expectations rose to more than 5 percent. But longer-term inflation expectations remained anchored, with values within the range seen since 1995. I would contrast this experience with the United States’ previous bout of high inflation from the 1970s to the early 1980s. Among other issues, such as high energy prices and accommodative monetary policy, rising inflation and inflation expectations fed a cycle of escalating inflationary pressures.7 Inflation was high and very volatile over this period, and that is reflected in shorter and longer-term inflation expectations that were high and volatile, too.
    Another important difference between these two episodes has to do with the performance of the Federal Reserve. As opposed to the late 1960s and most of the 1970s, most recently the Fed acted aggressively to tighten monetary policy, raising the federal funds rate more rapidly than in previous tightenings and lowering inflation more quickly than ever before. This came after 30 years of success in keeping inflation in check, and the credibility earned by the Fed’s inflation discipline surely helped keep longer-term expectations stable. This shows that an important role of the central bank is to convince the public, through actions and communications, about its intention to shape economic conditions and to use its policy tools to bring inflation to its target.8 By committing to keep inflation low in the future, central banks seek to influence expectations of future inflation, which, in turn, influence conditions now and over time. The Fed’s credibility in keeping inflation low and stable, won over decades, kept longer-term inflation expectations stable, and that contributed significantly to the Fed’s success in reducing inflation while keeping the labor market strong.
    Those are some of the basics about inflation expectations and how they influence the economy and the conduct of monetary policy. Next, I want to note some of the patterns we see in survey measures of inflation expectations, what influences expectations, and how inflation expectations are used by the public in their decisionmaking. Fortunately, there is a rich body of economic research that has shed light on these questions, and I will focus on the evidence for households and firms.9 We can then take some lessons from these empirical patterns for monetary policymaking.
    One important observation is that both short- and long-term inflation expectations are often notably higher than actual inflation, even after a period of very low inflation. There is evidence that survey respondents often believe the inflation they have experienced is higher than it is. Another pattern is that there is a wide dispersion of views about both shorter and longer-term inflation expectations, reflecting, at least in part, the dispersion of inflation in the consumer baskets of goods and services purchased by different people. Research also finds that some groups, such as women and lower-income households, tend to have systematically higher inflation expectations. In addition to this variation in expectations, there is high uncertainty in forecasts of future inflation. When people are asked to assign probabilities to different forecasts for inflation, surveys report wide distributions in the likelihood of one outcome or another. Finally, short-term inflation expectations tend to be correlated with both recently realized inflation and perceptions about recent inflation.10
    These patterns tell policymakers that inflation expectations of households and firms are diffuse and likely harder to influence through monetary policy relative to financial market participants and professional forecasters who follow the news more closely. Still, expectations from business owners and workers ultimately inform firms’ pricing decisions and costs and, thus, may even be more relevant for inflation outcomes; therefore, it is important for policymakers to communicate clearly with the public our intentions to bring inflation back to our target.11
    So, because inflation expectations are diffuse and heavily influenced by recent experience, let’s consider the reasons for the dispersion in these expectations. Unsurprisingly, it starts with the considerable variation in the sources that the public uses to collect information about inflation. Households report that their main source of information is their own shopping experiences, making regular purchases such as groceries and gasoline, and the price changes in those goods and services are what affect inflation expectations the most.12 Also, it seems that inflation expectations of homeowners tend to respond to changes in mortgage rates because homeowners have more of an incentive to track changes in rates that might affect, for example, their prospects for loan refinancing.13 Another important source of information is energy bills, with evidence also pointing to households’ inflation expectations being more sensitive to energy prices when inflation is higher.14 More generally, consumers and firms seem to pay more attention to news related to inflation when inflation is high, and this has been found for many countries.15
    While the unique experiences of survey respondents matter, this evidence points to inflation expectations being dependent on the state of the economy. Thus, we policymakers should account for different economic conditions when assessing the risks of a de-anchoring of inflation expectations. For instance, with fresh memories of the post-pandemic inflation and with recent surges in prices of some food items regularly purchased, inflation expectations of workers and firms may now be more sensitive to anticipated future price increases relative to the pre-pandemic period.
    Let me now turn to how households and businesses employ their inflation expectations in their economic decisionmaking, with much of the evidence consistent with what one would expect based on long-standing economic theory. Starting with households, in addition to any influence on wages from past inflation, expectations of future inflation help shape demands for pay raises. Workers care about their inflation-adjusted wages, rather than nominal wages, and (as shown in figure 2) we see a positive correlation between inflation expectations from consumers and wage growth, with a close co-movement during the recent inflationary bout. A complementary decision for the worker is to look for a new job that pays more, especially if the person envisions a low probability of getting a raise in the current job or if the raise will likely not fully cover losses in real incomes from inflation. Indeed, measures of general wage growth are more sluggish relative to those of job switchers. Moreover, researchers also find evidence of higher job-to-job transitions for workers who have higher inflation expectations.16 So inflation expectations of workers are an important influence on nominal wage growth and an important indicator of inflationary pressures for us policymakers.
    Now let’s consider how these expectations influence firms’ decisions. As I discussed in the context of the Phillips curve, firms with higher inflation expectations would be expected to increase prices more, and, indeed, researchers find causal evidence for this.17 During the recent period of high inflation, the fact that business owners’ short-term expectations about costs or input prices rose only modestly and soon returned to levels close to 2 percent just suggests that firms’ inflation expectations were not a strong source of inflationary pressures (as seen in figure 3). Still, researchers at the Richmond Fed also found that during this period, business leaders incorporated more information about aggregate inflation measures in their own pricing decisions compared with times before the pandemic inflation surge.18 While researchers also find that business leaders paid less attention to inflation as it came down, this evidence points to the inflation expectations of businesses being sensitive to underlying inflationary dynamics, and monetary policymakers should remain attentive to this.
    Now let me turn to the recent developments in inflation expectations, the current U.S. economic outlook, and the implications for monetary policy.
    In recent months, we have seen several measures of inflation expectations increase, with both consumers and businesses reporting new and proposed tariffs as an important reason. Among surveys looking one year ahead, there have been notable increases for surveys by the University of Michigan, the Conference Board survey of consumers, the Atlanta Fed’s survey of businesses, the Philadelphia Fed’s Survey of Professional Forecasters, and the New York Fed’s consumer survey. For instance, last Friday’s release of longer-term inflation expectations from the Michigan survey was the highest since February 1993. Additionally, the recent spike in short-term inflation expectations appears to be mostly “anticipatory,” as one can infer from the divergence between falling inflation perceptions—what consumers think price increases have been in the past year—and climbing short-run inflation expectations, both data from the Michigan survey. This anticipatory nature of the recent increase in short-run expectations may allow for price pressures through a second channel: Businesses may feel a greater ability to pass along higher costs to consumers when they come from external factors out of the control of these businesses. Indeed, firms are already reporting not only higher costs, but also expectations of higher costs, according to some surveys, such as the one conducted by the Atlanta Fed, along with other manufacturing surveys. For now, I take some comfort from the much smaller increases in longer-term expectations as measured by the Philadelphia Fed’s Survey of Professional Forecasters, as well as the stability of longer-term measures of what we call inflation compensation, which is based on yields from nominal and inflation-indexed Treasury securities.
    As in past episodes when inflation expectations increased, uncertainty about future inflation seems to have also gone up, as measured by the disagreement between the 75th and 25th percentiles of the distribution of individual respondents to the Michigan survey. Simultaneously, in recent months, we have also seen measures of economic policy uncertainty increase (seen in figure 4), and there is evidence that policy uncertainty and inflation uncertainty correlate over time.19 One possibility is that policy uncertainty may be contributing to a rise in inflation expectations as well as to uncertainty about future inflation. Still, it is hard to say at this point, and I will keep monitoring these developments.
    Let me turn from developments on expected inflation to realized inflation. After the substantial decline in inflation from its peak in 2022, recent disinflation has been slower, and the latest data indicate that progress toward the Federal Open Market Committee’s (FOMC) 2 percent goal may have stalled. Core PCE inflation was 2.8 percent in the 12 months ended in February, which puts us back at the same level seen in the last quarter of 2024. The best news for February comes from housing services inflation, which has come down steadily for at least a year to a 12‑month rate of 4.3 percent, even if it is still above the pre-pandemic level of 2.5 percent. For the rest of the inflation categories, the news was less positive. Core goods inflation, which had been negative for a large share of 2024, increased to 0.4 percent relative to a year before. February likely also marked an upward shift in market-based services inflation. While I do not discount price pressures in nonmarket services, which remain elevated, the acceleration in market-based services in February from an estimated 3.1 percent to 3.5 percent is also not welcome, given that this category often provides a better signal of inflationary pressures across all services.
    On the other side of the FOMC’s dual mandate, employment continues to grow at a moderate pace, and the overall labor market has remained resilient through February. The net 151,000 jobs added last month was not too far from the 177,000 average of the previous six months. The unemployment rate ticked up to 4.1 percent, and labor force participation moved down to 62.4 percent. Other labor market indicators suggest continued moderation in the labor market but not significant weakening.
    Given the recent lack of progress on inflation, recent increases in inflation expectations, and upside risks associated with announced and prospective policy changes, I strongly supported the FOMC’s decision at our March meeting to maintain the target range for the federal funds rate at 4-1/4 to 4-1/2 percent. I will support maintaining the current policy rate for as long as these upside risks to inflation continue, while economic activity and employment remain stable. Going forward, I will carefully assess incoming data, the evolving outlook, and changes in the balance of risks.
    Thank you.

    1. The views expressed here are my own and are not necessarily those of my colleagues on the Federal Reserve Board or the Federal Open Market Committee. Return to text
    2. See Alan S. Blinder (2022), “Wish the Fed Luck as It Seeks a Soft Landing on Inflation,” Wall Street Journal, April 6. Return to text
    3. For a literature review on the relationship between inflation and resource utilization, also called the slope of the Phillips curve, see Francesco Furlanetto and Antoine Lepetit (2024), “The Slope of the Phillips Curve (PDF),” Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2024-043 (Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, May). Return to text
    4. See Milton Friedman (1968), “The Role of Monetary Policy,” American Economic Review, vol. 58 (March), pp. 1–17; and Edmund S. Phelps (1967), “Phillips Curves, Expectations of Inflation and Optimal Unemployment over Time,” Economica, vol. 34 (135), pp. 254–81. Return to text
    5. For a discussion about the timing of the inflation waves of different categories, see Adriana D. Kugler (2025), “Navigating Inflation Waves: A Phillips Curve Perspective,” speech delivered at the Whittington Lecture, McCourt School of Public Policy, Georgetown University, Washington, February 20. Return to text
    6. See Ben S. Bernanke (2007), “Inflation Expectations and Inflation Forecasting,” speech delivered at the Monetary Economics Workshop of the National Bureau of Economic Research Summer Institute, Cambridge, Mass., July 10, quoted text in paragraph 7. Return to text
    7. For evidence on how longer-run inflation expectations may be driven by short-run inflation surprises, see Carlos Carvalho, Stefano Eusepi, Emanuel Moench, and Bruce Preston (2023), “Anchored Inflation Expectations,” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, vol. 15 (January), pp. 1–47. Return to text
    8. For a survey on how central banks communicate with the general public and the effectiveness of such communications, see Alan S. Blinder, Michael Ehrmann, Jakob de Haan, and David-Jan Jansen (2024), “Central Bank Communication with the General Public: Promise or False Hope?” Journal of Economic Literature, vol. 62 (June), pp. 425–57. Return to text
    9. For a literature review on this topic, see Michael Weber, Francesco D’Acunto, Yuriy Gorodnichenko, and Olivier Coibion (2022), “The Subjective Inflation Expectations of Households and Firms: Measurement, Determinants, and Implications,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 36 (Summer), pp. 157–84. Return to text
    10. See David Lebow and Ekaterina Peneva (2024), “Inflation Perceptions during the Covid Pandemic and Recovery,” FEDS Notes (Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, January 19). Return to text
    11. See Ricardo Reis (2023), “Four Mistakes in the Use of Measures of Expected Inflation,” AEA Papers and Proceedings, vol. 113 (May), pp. 47–51. Return to text
    12. See Francesco D’Acunto, Ulrike Malmendier, Juan Ospina, and Michael Weber (2021), “Exposure to Grocery Prices and Inflation Expectations,” Journal of Political Economy, vol. 129 (May), pp. 1615–39. Return to text
    13. See Hie Joo Ahn, Shihan Xie, and Choongryul Yang (2024). “Effects of Monetary Policy on Household Expectations: The Role of Homeownership,” Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 147 (October), 103599. Return to text
    14. See Francesco D’Acunto and Michael Weber (2024), “Why Survey-Based Subjective Expectations Are Meaningful and Important,” Annual Review of Economics, vol. 16 (August), pp. 329–57. For evidence on the higher sensitivity of inflation expectations when inflation is higher, see Paula Patzelt and Ricardo Reis (2024), “Estimating the Rise in Expected Inflation from Higher Energy Prices,” CEPR Discussion Paper 18907 (Paris: Centre for Economic Policy Research, March). Return to text
    15. See, for instance, Anat Bracha and Jenny Tang (2024), “Inflation Levels and (In)Attention,” Review of Economic Studies; and Michael Weber, Bernardo Candia, Hassan Afrouzi, Tiziano Ropele, Rodrigo Lluberas, Serafin Frache, Brent Meyer, Saten Kumar, Yuriy Gorodnichenko, Dimitris Georgarakos, Olivier Coibion, Geoff Kenny, and Jorge Ponce (2025), “Tell Me Something I Don’t Already Know: Learning in Low‐ and High‐Inflation Settings,” Econometrica, vol. 93 (January), pp. 229–64. Return to text
    16. See Ina Hajdini, Edward S. Knotek II, John Leer, Mathieu Pedemonte, Robert W. Rich, and Raphael S. Schoenle (2022), “Low Passthrough from Inflation Expectations to Income Growth Expectations: Why People Dislike Inflation,” Working Paper Series 22-21 (Cleveland: Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, June); and Laura Pilossoph and Jane M. Ryngaert (2024), “Job Search, Wages, and Inflation,” NBER Working Paper Series 33042 (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, October). Return to text
    17. For the relationship between inflation expectations and pricing decisions, see Olivier Coibion, Yuriy Gorodnichenko, and Tiziano Ropele (2020), “Inflation Expectations and Firm Decisions: New Causal Evidence,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 135 (February), pp. 165–219. Return to text
    18. For evidence on the recent inflationary episode, see Felipe F. Schwartzman and Sonya Ravindranath Waddell (2024), “Inflation Expectations and Price Setting among Fifth District Firms,” Economic Brief 24‑03 (Richmond: Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, January). Return to text
    19. For evidence on how policy uncertainty and inflation uncertainty correlate over time, see Carola C. Binder (2017), “Measuring Uncertainty Based on Rounding: New Method and Application to Inflation Expectations,” Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 90 (October), pp. 1–12. The measure of economic policy uncertainty is from Scott R. Baker, Nicholas Bloom, and Steven J. Davis (2016), “Measuring Economic Policy Uncertainty,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 131 (November), pp. 1593–1636. The measure of trade policy uncertainty is from Dario Caldara, Matteo Iacoviello, Patrick Molligo, Andrea Prestipino, and Andrea Raffo (2020), “The Economic Effects of Trade Policy Uncertainty,” Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 109 (January), pp. 38–59. Return to text

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI Global: Chinese barges and Taiwan Strait drills are about global power projection − not just a potential invasion

    Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Colin Flint, Distinguished Professor of Political Science, Utah State University

    A Mulberry Harbour for the 21st century. Image from video posted on Weibo via Chinese state media.

    Is China intent on a D-Day style invasion of Taiwan?

    Certainly that has been the tone of some of the reporting following the emergence of photos and videos depicting massive new Chinese barges designed for land-to-sea military operations. The fact that China launched a two-day military drill in the Taiwan Strait on April 1, 2025, has only intensified such fears.

    To me, the curious thing regarding these musings about a potential war involving China, which has one of the world’s most advanced militaries, is that it is supported by reference to technology first used some 80 years ago – specifically, the Mulberry Harbours, floating piers that allowed Allies to deploy land vehicles onto the beaches at Normandy on June 6, 1944.

    As an expert on the history and geopolitics of the Mulberry Harbours, I believe using the World War II example obscures far more than it clarifies with regard to the geopolitical situation today. Indeed, while the new Chinese ships may be operationally similar to their historical forebears, the strategic situation in China and Taiwan is far different.

    Disquiet on the Pacific front?

    The possibility of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, an island the Chinese Communist Party sees as part of its territory, is perhaps the most pressing security issue for countries in the Asia-Pacific region.

    Beijing has increasingly ratcheted up the aggressive rhetoric toward the government in Taipei during the premiership of President Xi Jinping. While one reading of Xi is that his rhetoric is in part a strategic move to burnish Chinese power globally, labeling Taiwan as a renegade or breakaway province is, for many, a clear indication of an intention to invade and bring the island within the geography of Chinese sovereignty.

    From the U.S. perspective, the Trump administration gave early signals that it saw China as the main threat to its national security, though Washington’s commitments to the defense of Taiwan remain uncertain, much like the president’s ultimate policy views toward Beijing.

    Aside from the geopolitics, any China decision to invade Taiwan would mean attempting an extremely challenging military operation that is, historically speaking, a risky proposition. Seaborne invasions have often led to high casualties or even outright failure.

    The Gallipoli landings on the coast of Turkey during World War I, for example, led to the withdrawal of mainly Australian and New Zealand forces after high casualties and barely any territorial gains. In World War II, island-hopping by U.S. forces to push back Japan’s advance achieved strategic goals – but at a high human cost.

    The difficulty posed by sea-to-land invasion is not just the battles on Day 1, it is the logistical challenge of continuing to funnel troops and materiel to sustain a push out from the beachhead. That’s where the barges come into play.

    About those WWII barges …

    British Prime Minister Winston Churchill was skeptical of opening a front against Nazi Germany by a landing on the French coast – a position that frustrated the United States. The main concern of Churchill and his generals was the logistical puzzle. They reasoned that Germany would either retain control of French ports or sabotage them, and that tanks, guns, food, soldiers and other necessities were not going to be brought up from reserve via ports.

    The Mulberry Harbours fixed that problem by creating a set of floating piers that would rise up and down with the tide by being fixed to sophisticated anchors. Ships could moor to these piers and unload needed material. The piers were protected by an inner ring of concrete caissons, dragged across the channel and sunk into position, and an outer breakwater of scuttled ships. The Mulberry Harbours were a combination of cutting-edge pier technology and improvisation.

    Construction of a Mulberry Harbour, and the unloading of supplies for the Allies at Colleville, France, in 1944.
    Three Lions/Getty Images

    The images of Chinese invasion barges today show that the technology has advanced, but the principle of an operational need for logistical support of a beachhead breakout is the same.

    Yet the geography of any invasion is very different. In World War II, the Mulberry Harbours were part of an invasion from an island to conquer a continent. But a Chinese invasion of Taiwan would be the inverse – from a continent to an island.

    Great power politics, Chinese characteristics

    The use of Mulberry Harbours, as innovative as it was, was only a moment in a longer geopolitical process.

    The D-Day invasion was the culmination of the transfer of U.S. military might across the Atlantic through Operation Bolero. Simply, the United Kingdom became a giant warehouse – mainly for U.S. soldiers and equipment.

    The Mulberry Harbours made the crossing of the English Channel possible for these men and weapons. It was the last step in the projection of U.S. power across the Atlantic Ocean and on to the European continent. I describe this as a process of a seapower moving from its near or coastal waters to far waters in another part of the globe.

    The calculation for China is very different. Certainly, barges would help an invasion across the Taiwan Strait. But China sees Taiwan as part of its near waters, and it wants to secure those waters from global competition.

    Beijing views the U.S. as having established a military presence just off its coastline from World War II to the present day, making the western Pacific another set of U.S. far waters across the globe accompanying its European presence. From its perspective, China is surrounded by a U.S. military based in Okinawa, Guam and the Philippines. This chain of bases could restrict China’s ambition through blockade, and controlling Taiwan would help China create a gap in this chain.

    Of course, China does not just have an eye on its near waters. It has also created a far water presence of its own in its building of an ocean-going military navy, established a military base in Djibouti, and through its Belt and Road Initiative become an economic and political presence across the Indian, Pacific, Arctic and Atlantic oceans.

    Chinese invasion barges could be deployed quite early in China’s process of moving from near to far waters. The Mulberry Harbours, conversely, were deployed once the U.S. had already secured its Caribbean, Atlantic and Pacific near waters.

    Part of a process

    Technical matters and historical comparisons with the Mulberry Harbours are an interesting way to look at the new Chinese invasion barges and consider the operational scale of geopolitics. But as with the World War II case, China-Taiwan tensions are simply a modern example of a local theater – this time, the Taiwanese Strait – being part of a greater global process of power projection. The comparisons to Mulberry Harbours, therefore, are not with the technology itself but its role in a mechanism of historical geopolitical change.

    The reemergence of the technology of invasion barges may be a sign that a new conflict is on the horizon. If that were the case, the irony is that China would be using Mulberry Harbour-type technology to secure its position in the western Pacific at the same time the Trump administration is questioning the strategic value of the U.S. presence in Europe – a presence established through World War II and, at least in part, the use of the Mulberry Harbours.

    Colin Flint does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Chinese barges and Taiwan Strait drills are about global power projection − not just a potential invasion – https://theconversation.com/chinese-barges-and-taiwan-strait-drills-are-about-global-power-projection-not-just-a-potential-invasion-253408

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Members discuss decarbonization, traceability, packaging, medical devices; address notifications

    Source: WTO

    Headline: Members discuss decarbonization, traceability, packaging, medical devices; address notifications

    Thematic session: Traceability requirements for bulk agricultural commodities
    The session recognized that traceability systems are becoming an important tool to demonstrate that agricultural products meet sustainability standards and regulations. Speakers discussed how such schemes could restrict market access and reviewed the challenges businesses face in complying with such requirements, especially in developing economies. They emphasized the role of public-private collaboration, national strategies, and the availability of traceability-related data to facilitate compliance with these schemes. The TBT Agreement disciplines, particularly transparency and the need to avoid unnecessary trade restrictions, were underscored as crucial for designing balanced and effective traceability schemes.
    Thematic session: Regulatory cooperation between members on food contact packaging
    Balancing multiple objectives when designing and implementing measures for reducing food contact packaging is a challenge, the session stressed. The discussion noted that food packaging serves a unique and essential role in preserving the shelf-life and safety of food we consume. Speakers identified various considerations to address these challenges, including avoiding one-size-fits-all approaches, leveraging international standards, ensuring transparency, using the best available scientific information and avoiding unnecessary costs for businesses.
    Thematic session: Decarbonization standards
    Speakers recognized that standards and regulations are vital in supporting decarbonization objectives, with international standards playing an important role in ensuring interoperability in international markets. The importance of developing economies’ participation in developing international standards was acknowledged, alongside the necessity of coherence and periodic updates to standards.
    Thematic session: Regulatory cooperation between members on medical devices regulation
    Speakers emphasized the essential role of regulatory cooperation and convergence for ensuring timely access to safe and effective medical devices, particularly in times of public health emergencies. International standards were highlighted as a foundation for facilitating trade in safe medical devices, and the importance of avoiding duplication of regulatory efforts was underscored. Speakers stressed the TBT Agreement as a key tool to guide regulatory cooperation and reduce unnecessary trade barriers for medical devices.
    TBT cross-cutting information session on trade and environment
    The TBT Committee held a cross-cutting information session on trade and environment with the participation of delegates from the WTO Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE) in an effort by members to find synergies across the work of relevant WTO bodies.  Members shared their views on possible ways in which the TBT Committee can continue enhancing members’ understanding of TBT matters at the intersection of trade and environment.
    As the TBT Committee’s agenda will continue to include issues related to environmental protection and TBT measures, members expressed support for closer cooperation between the TBT Committee and the CTE, noting the benefits of fostering synergies and cross-committee learning, while avoiding duplication.
    Adoption of improved TBT notification formats 
    Following action taken by the Transparency Working Group, and in particular by Australia, Namibia, Paraguay, the United Kingdom and the United States, significant changes to TBT notification formats were adopted to streamline and modernize information contained in these documents.
    Notifications resulting from actions of Transparency Working Group
    Guyana, for the first time, submitted a notification on measures it has put into place to ensure the implementation of the TBT Agreement (Article 15.2). This follows last year’s adoption of a template and accompanying guidelines to help members prepare these notifications. The new notification facilitates access to information on government agencies involved in standards and regulations and the publications and websites they use to disseminate information about their work. Canada and Colombia also shared information on their recently submitted notifications.
    ePing translations
    The WTO Secretariat announced the launch of a new ePing feature that allows users to request unofficial translations of the full text of notified draft regulations into English, Spanish or French. This function is now available to all WTO members and ePing users. Additionally, the Secretariat encouraged members to update their enquiry point information on ePing, emphasizing the importance of keeping contact details up to date.
    International Standards Organization (ISO)/ International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) terms and definitions
    In conformity with a decision members took at the 10th Triennial Review of the TBT Agreement in November 2024 and following the Secretariat’s consultations with the ISO and IEC, access to their Guide containing standardization terms and definitions is now available on the WTO website. The Guide is expressly referred to in Annex 1 of the TBT Agreement.
    Specific trade concerns
    Members raised eight new trade concerns and 53 previous ones.
    The new trade concerns addressed proposed measures related to eco-design requirements for electrical products such as chargers and sustainable products. They also covered regulatory issues on self-driving vehicles, restrictions on use of hazardous substances in certain electrical products, and recycling and recovery of materials from waste batteries. Concerns also addressed measures related to food and liquor labelling.
    Members also shared progress in their discussion of trade concerns. The United States announced progress with respect to its concerns on Mexico’s measures affecting yoghurt and cheese. Mexico and the United States reported the resolution of their trade concern regarding Saudi Arabia’s technical regulation for electric vehicles.
    Annual review
    Every year, the TBT Committee  carries out an annual review of activities relating to the implementation and operation of the TBT Agreement, including notifications, specific trade concerns, technical assistance activities and TBT related disputes. A brochure highlighting the Committee’s key results in 2024 is available here. These results include the MC13 Declaration on Regulatory Cooperation and the adoption of the 2025-2027 workplan.

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    MIL OSI Economics –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – French wine and spirits sector under threat: can the EU afford to pursue a risky trade strategy? – E-001227/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-001227/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Jordan Bardella (PfE)

    The prospect of a hike in US tariffs on French wine, which could be as high as 200%, has understandably raised concerns among our winemakers. Such a measure would have disastrous consequences for the sector, given that nearly 25% of French wine and spirit exports go to the United States.

    While the EU must hit back at the Trump administration, it is essential that we adopt a trade strategy that protects the interests of our Member States.

    It would be a political and economic misstep to include bourbon and Californian wines on the list of products subject to European tariffs. By targeting strongholds of opposition to Trump, the Commission risks not only bolstering the President’s position, but also providing a perfect pretext for Washington to hit our wine-making industry harder. That approach risks sacrificing a sector of excellence in the name of an ill-conceived trade retaliation.

    • 1.Will the Commission reconsider its tariff strategy to protect our winemakers, instead of exposing them to commercial blackmail?
    • 2.Will the Commission use negotiation leverage, such as the digital services sector, to force the US Government to reconsider its position?

    Submitted: 24.3.2025

    Last updated: 2 April 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Construction work on the A69 motorway in France halted – E-001231/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-001231/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Julien Leonardelli (PfE), Sarah Knafo (ESN), Christophe Gomart (PPE), André Rougé (PfE), Valérie Deloge (PfE), Mélanie Disdier (PfE), Céline Imart (PPE), Angéline Furet (PfE), Philippe Olivier (PfE), Gilles Pennelle (PfE)

    The Toulouse Administrative Court has halted construction work on the A69 motorway in France, connecting Toulouse and Castres, which had been keenly awaited by the vast majority of locals[1].

    The court’s judgment has dashed the hopes of residents in remote areas of Occitania. While ultra-liberalism continues its headlong rush towards Mercosur countries, Canada and Oceania, residents in rural areas in Europe continue to lack access to all infrastructure.

    Despite the fact that EUR 300 million has already been allocated to the project and that construction is well under way[2], it appears that a European country has given in to pressure from far-left associations that, besides taking legal action, have also resorted to violence[3].

    The project would enhance connectivity between the Mediterranean and Atlantic corridors of the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T).

    • 1.Does the Commission agree that access for people in rural regions far from cities needs to be improved?
    • 2.Will the Commission condemn the far-left associations, radical ecologists and Antifa groups for using violence to oppose the implementation of European projects that form part of the TEN-T comprehensive network?

    Supporter[4]

    Submitted: 24.3.2025

    • [1] https://www.lemonde.fr/planete/article/2025/03/08/pres-de-castres-les-partisans-de-l-a69-manifestent-pour-demander-la-poursuite-du-chantier_6577377_3244.html
    • [2] According to Atosca, 65% of the budget for the A69, or EUR 300 million of the EUR 480 million budgeted, has already been used.
    • [3] https://www.ladepeche.fr/2024/06/08/autoroute-a69-gendarmes-et-manifestants-blesses-extreme-violence-le-prefet-du-tarn-dresse-le-bilan-de-la-journee-12003426.php
    • [4] This question is supported by a Member other than the authors: Julie Rechagneux (PfE)
    Last updated: 2 April 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Industry Support Grows Ahead of Vote on Kaine, Klobuchar & Warner’s Bill to Undo Trump’s Canada Tariffs

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Virginia Tim Kaine

    WASHINGTON, D.C. – Following an endorsement from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, U.S. Senators Tim Kaine (D-VA), Amy Klobuchar (D-MN), and Mark R. Warner (D-VA) issued the following statement welcoming broad support for their bipartisan legislation to undo President Trump’s tariffs on Canadian goods, which amount to a 25 percent tax on goods imported from one of America’s top trading partners and closest allies. The legislation will be voted on today.

    “We welcome the strong support we continue to receive from both organized labor and businesses, including from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, for our legislation to undo Trump’s new sales tax on Canadian goods,” said the senators. “The outpouring of endorsements for our effort highlights that these new taxes are bad for America’s businesses that need stability to thrive and for hardworking families who want prices to go down, not up. We are giving every Senator an opportunity today to put their constituents’ pocketbooks first by challenging a nonsensical trade war with one of America’s closest trading partners and allies.”

    “Tariffs are taxes—paid by Americans—and they will quickly increase prices at a time when many are struggling with the cost of living. These import taxes are also harming U.S. manufactures and drawing retaliatory duties, worsening their impact on our economy… It is appropriate for Congress to exercise its authority under IEEPA and pass SJ Res 37, which would terminate the national emergency and the imposition of tariffs under Executive Order 14193,” wrote Neil L. Bradley, U.S. Chamber of Commerce Executive Vice President, Chief Policy Officer, and Head of Strategic Advocacy, in the Chamber’s endorsement letter, which is available here.

    In addition to the Chamber, the senators’ bill is supported by the AFL-CIO, the United Steelworkers (USW), the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (IAM), International Federation of Professional and Technical Engineers (IFPTE), National Retail Federation (NRF), the North America’s Building Trades Unions, the Sheet Metal and Air Conditioning Contractors’ National Association (SMACNA), the U.S. Conference of Mayors, Foreign Policy for America (FP4A), the National Taxpayers Union, the Taxpayers Protection Alliance, and Advancing American Freedom. Here’s what they’re saying:

    North America’s Building Trades Unions President Sean McGarvey: “The United States and Canada share far more than just a border—we share a deep, enduring economic and workforce partnership that has strengthened both our nations for generations… That partnership is enshrined in the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), a comprehensive trade agreement that President Trump himself negotiated and enacted that already governs our economic relations in this hemisphere… By circumventing this agreement and imposing unilateral tariffs on Canada, the Administration is harmfully undermining a key foreign ally while also carelessly shooting holes in the credibility of its own signature economic policy.”

    The Sheet Metal and Air Conditioning Contractors’ National Association (SMACNA) Executive Director for Legislative and Political Affairs Stanley E. Kolbe, Jr.: “On behalf of our membership, SMACNA would like to voice its strong support for S.J. Res. 37… Tariff penalties aimed at Canada for non-trade objectives have already caused harsh and unnecessary economic pain for US workers and harm to our nation’s construction and related metal fabricating as well as HVAC equipment manufacturing businesses. In fact, it will punish businesses, labor and economies on both sides of the border, and in direct contravention of the provisions featured in the existing USMCA.”

    The National Retail Federation (NRF) Executive Vice President for Government Relations David French: “While we strongly agree with the need to secure our borders, we do not believe using trade tools such as tariffs for non-trade purposes is the right approach to achieve this goal, especially without closest trading partner… U.S. retailers depend on Canada for a wide range of consumer goods under the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), which Congress overwhelmingly approved. Canada represents a significant market for U.S. retailers that not only have operations in Canada but also rely on a robust cross-border consumer market, with Canadian consumers hopping in U.S. retail stores on a daily basis. These operations are all now being significantly disrupted because of the tariffs applied to Canada under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act and Canada’s retaliation against those tariffs.”

    The U.S. Conference of Mayors CEO and Executive Director Tom Cochran: “…We write to express our strong support for S.J. Res. 37, the joint resolution to terminate the national emergency declared on February 1, 2025, that launched a trade war with Canada and thus to terminate the tariffs on Canadian imports implemented as part of that unfounded emergency… This declaration has triggered a damaging and unnecessary trade conflict with Canada—our closest ally, largest trading partner, and critical collaborator in addressing economic and public safety challenges across North America… These actions are raising prices for consumers, disrupting key industries such as construction and manufacturing, and threatening jobs in communities large and small. They also risk increasing already high housing costs, as tariffs on Canadian lumber, steel, aluminum, and other critical building materials will make housing construction and infrastructure development significantly more expensive.”

    AFL-CIO Director of Government Affairs Jody Calemine: “On behalf of the AFL-CIO, I urge you to support S.J. Res. 37, a resolution introduced by Senator Tim Kaine to terminate the national emergency that was declared to justify tariffs on imports from Canada under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA)… However, imposing large, across the board tariffs on Canada aimed at non-trade objectives will only cause unnecessary economic pain for workers and businesses on both sides of the border.”

    International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (IAM) International President Brian Bryant: “On behalf of the 600,000 active and retired members of the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (IAM), I write today in strong support of S.J. Res. 37… These new tariffs on Canada, one of our closest allies and largest trading partners, are unjust and will have lasting negative impacts on American and Canadian workers… The Trump administration’s erratic approach to tariffs is wreaking havoc on workers and businesses in the United States and Canada. Punishing one of our nation’s closest trading partners based on a false pretense is wrong and the action needs to be reversed.”

    International Federation of Professional and Technical Engineers (IFPTE) President Matthew S. Biggs and Secretary-Treasurer Gay Henson: “As the Executive Officers of the International Federation of Professional and Technical Engineers (IFPTE), representing 90,000 workers in the private, public, and federal sectors across North America, we are writing in support of S.J. Res. 37… Canada is America’s closest ally and number one trading partner. Our trading relationship uplifts American and Canadian working families alike. Imposing reckless tariffs on Canadian imports will harm both the U.S. and Canadian economies and do even greater harm to working families on both sides of the border. Congress must step in now to block this reckless and destructive policy.”

    National Taxpayers Union: “Canada is an important supplier of goods that strengthen U.S. security, including crude oil, natural gas, steel, and aluminum. Tariffs that restrict our access to these supplies and increase their cost will weaken our industrial base and undermine our ability to sustain our defense in the event of a national emergency.”

    Taxpayers Protection Alliance President David Williams: “TPA enthusiastically supports Sens. Tim Kaine and Rand Paul’s CRA to overturn President Trump’s February 1, 2025, national emergency declaration. This use of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) is fraught with issues. The ensuing trade war will inevitably raise costs for consumers. Placing a 25 percent tariff on goods from Canada and Mexico will harm consumers and the vast majority of American businesses.”

    United Steelworkers (USW) International President David McCall: “On behalf of the 850,000 active members of the United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial and Service Workers International Union (USW), I urge you to support S.J. Res. 37, a resolution introduced by Senator Tim Kaine to terminate the national emergency that was declared to impose duties on imports from Canada, under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA)… These new tariffs are misdirected, unsubstantiated by facts, and harmful to the very workers we represent.”

    Advancing American Freedom (AAF) President Tim Chapman: “Tariffs are a tax on American families and businesses. The first Trump administration cut an excellent deal with Canada with USMCA. The president should not abandon this agreement and lacks the authority to unilaterally do so.”

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: France holds the presidency of the UN Security Council during the month of April 2025

    Source: France-Diplomatie – Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development

    Today, April 1, 2025, France takes over the presidency of the United Nations Security Council for a period of one month.

    The Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and, as a permanent member, France is committed to working with its partners to enable it to respond to current challenges and conflicts.

    France succeeds Denmark, which effectively assumed the presidency of the UNSC last month, and precedes Greece, which will take up this function in May, and the French presidency of the Council is therefore at the heart of a “European quarter” of the presidency of the Security Council, through which we mark, together, our commitment to effective multilateralism and respect for the Charter of the United Nations and international law.

    In the face of current challenges, the guiding principle of our presidency will be to make multilateral dialogue prevail over power relations.

    The war of aggression waged by Russia against Ukraine since February 2022, in defiance of the most fundamental principles of international law, will be at the heart of our mobilization, and France will continue its efforts in favour of a just and lasting peace for Ukraine, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

    The situation in the Middle East will be the subject of a ministerial meeting at the end of the month, chaired by the Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs, to which international and regional partners will be invited, which will illustrate France’s commitment to peace in that region, and will be part of the preparations for the international conference on the two-state solution co-organised in New York by France and Saudi Arabia.

    Given the seriousness of the ongoing conflicts, France will pay particular attention to the situation in the Great Lakes, those in Sudan and South Sudan, as well as in Haiti.

    The French presidency will also be at the initiative with meetings devoted to peacekeeping operations and the protection of humanitarian workers, two strong commitments to support those who, on the ground, provide assistance to vulnerable populations, and to ensure effective multilateralism, France will continue to demonstrate its commitment to the reform of the Security Council in order to improve its representativeness.

    Throughout its presidency, France will have as its sole compass its commitment to multilateralism, the United Nations system and respect for international law for the maintenance of international peace and security.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Global: Flies are masters of migration – it’s about time they got some credit

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Will Hawkes, Insect Migration Researcher, College of Life and Environmental Science, University of Exeter

    As I sprinted across the flower-rich meadow on the eastern coast of Cyprus, I could barely see my car. The air was full of tiny black dots, pelting like bullets past me. I hauled open the car door and breathed a sigh of relief once inside. I was surrounded by millions of flies, amid the most incredible migration event I have ever seen.

    The migration cameras my team and I use to monitor these insects counted nearly 6,000 flies per metre per minute. Being hit by a fly travelling over 25mph (helped by the wind) hurts enough to make you want shelter quickly.

    All of these flies had just travelled at least 60 miles (100km) across open sea from the Middle East to Cyprus. This journey forms part of their springtime migration towards northern Europe.

    Butterflies and dragonflies are well-known insect migrants, but not because they’re the most numerous. That title is given to the flies. I have studied all of the insects migrating through Cyprus and the Pyrenees on the France-Spain border. Flies make up nearly 90% of all migrants. Yet they have been consistently overlooked by scientists and their ecological contribution has been hugely underappreciated.

    My colleagues and I set out to change this. We have spent months collecting written sources that mentioned fly migration from anywhere in the world. Our findings, now published in Biological Reviews, could change our perception of flies forever. Previously, nobody really knew the extent to which flies migrated, yet they are the most numerous and most ecologically important of all terrestrial migrants.

    Fly migration has been part of written human history for millennia. In the book of Exodus, when the pharoah of Egypt didn’t let Moses’s people go, God sent a plague of flies to change his mind. Then God removed flies from the land until “not a fly remained”. This last biblical quote is key.

    If these flies had been misidentified mayflies coming out of the river Nile, which are known to amass in huge numbers, their exhausted bodies would have remained for days. Because they all disappeared without a trace, this suggests a huge migration of flies. Egypt is on an important fly migration route. So perhaps fly migration was significant enough to be the subject of divine intervention.

    Flies migrate to reproduce, moving to exploit seasonal food resources. All over the world, it’s mostly females that migrate. They have been recorded migrating through mountain passes high in the Himalayas, on ships hundreds of miles out to sea in the Gulf of Mexico and in their millions migrating through western Europe. Amazingly, while on fieldwork in the Maldives, I saw Forcipomyia midges use their soft foot hairs to stick to dragonfly wings to hitch a lift over the Indian Ocean.

    Vital roles

    Flies are so important to the planet and to us. No other group of terrestrial migrants (including vertebrates such as mammals) are as ecologically diverse as flies. More than half (62%) of all migrating flies, including hoverflies, are pollinators. Without them, food crop production would decline.

    As they migrate, flies transport and disperse pollen between flowers. This could help plants adapt to climate change by maintaining genetic diversity.

    Many migratory fly species (34%) are decomposers, ensuring the planet isn’t covered in rotting carcasses and animal dung. One study showed that the larvae of just 50 houseflies (Musca domestica), – the very ecologically similar and equally abundant autumn housefly Musca autumnalis migrate south through the Pyrenees in their millions – can decompose up to 444kg of pig manure.

    The ecological roles of flies are not all positive, though. My latest study shows that monoculture crops provide lots of food for some migratory fly species (18%) that have subsequently become crop pests. Some (16%) carry diseases, such as mosquitoes that migrate huge distances and bring diseases such as malaria.

    But migratory flies have an overwhelmingly positive impact on the planet. Hoverfly larvae eat trillions of aphids each year in southern England. Insect migration is already known to be the most important way that the nutrients plants need to grow are moved across the land and flies make up the majority of the insects that transport the nutrients.

    The movement and subsequent death of trillions of migrating flies, whose bodies contain elements, such as phosphorous and nitrogen which plants need to grow, could be vital to soil health of the soils too. Migratory birds have been noted feeding on and moving at the same time as migratory flies, perhaps using them as fuel for their journeys.

    We’re only just waking up to the significance of flies. Hopefully, it’s not too late to protect them. One German study found that the number of aphid-eating migratory hoverflies declined by 97% over the last 50 years. Fewer aphid-eating hoverflies means more crop-eating aphids and also fewer pollinators. So that’s a terrifying statistic that could have drastic consequences.

    A sunrise of hope exists, however. These brilliant migratory flies have so many young that if we improve landscape connectivity, reduce pesticide usage and provide suitable habitat, they can bounce back really quickly. We need these flies as much as we need the air we breathe. So next time you see a fly up against your window, open it and let it out. It has a long way to go and such important work to do.

    Don’t have time to read about climate change as much as you’d like?

    Get a weekly roundup in your inbox instead. Every Wednesday, The Conversation’s environment editor writes Imagine, a short email that goes a little deeper into just one climate issue. Join the 40,000+ readers who’ve subscribed so far.

    Will Hawkes receives funding from The Royal Society.

    – ref. Flies are masters of migration – it’s about time they got some credit – https://theconversation.com/flies-are-masters-of-migration-its-about-time-they-got-some-credit-253254

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

  • MIL-OSI Security: Teenager convicted of multiple terrorism offences

    Source: United Kingdom London Metropolitan Police

    A man has pleaded guilty to a number of terrorism offences linked to sharing terrorist material online following an investigation by the Met’s Counter Terrorism Command.

    Leo Walby, 19 (08.08.2005) of Swanley, Kent, pleaded guilty at the Old Bailey on 2 April to six counts of dissemination of terrorist material, contrary to section 2 of the Terrorism Act (TACT), 2006. He also pleaded guilty to one count of failing to disclose a password, after being served notice, contrary to section 53, Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA), 2000.

    Walby was arrested on 4 October, 2024, as part of a proactive investigation by officers from the Counter Terrorism Command. He was arrested at an address in Swanley, Kent and officers also carried out a search at the address and seized various digital devices.

    As the investigation progressed, officers found evidence that Walby had been sharing various posts sharing extreme Islamist-related terrorist material, including Daesh propaganda through various social media accounts he was controlling.

    Walby was charged on 5 October 2024, with six counts of disseminating terrorist material. As the investigation continued, officers also applied to the court for a ‘section 49 notice’ to compel Walby to provide them with a password to a cloud-based storage account he held.

    However, even after the notice was obtained from the court, Walby still refused to provide officers with the password, so he was subsequently charged with failing to provide the password, contrary to section 53, Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA), 2000.

    Commander Dominic Murphy, head of the Met’s Counter Terrorism Command said: “Our investigation found that Walby was sharing various pieces of terrorist material across a number of social media accounts he was controlling. This kind of content can be extremely harmful, so where we identify people like Walby who are responsible for this, then we will take action and he is now facing the very serious consequences of doing this.

    “I’d encourage anyone who comes across extremist or terrorist material online to report it to our specialist team who will review to determine whether further police action is necessary and appropriate.”

    Anyone who sees what they believe to be extremist or terrorist-related material can report it via www.gov.uk/ACT.

    After pleading guilty to the above offences, Walby was remanded in custody and is due to appear for sentencing at the Old Bailey on 9 May.

    MIL Security OSI –

  • MIL-OSI Global: Tech startup culture is not as innovative as founders may think

    Source: The Conversation – France – By Yeonsin Ahn, Professeur assistant, stratégie et politique d’entreprise, HEC Paris Business School

    Eric Yuan was not happy at Cisco Systems even though he was making a salary in the high six figures, working as vice president of engineering on the videoconferencing software Cisco WebEx.

    “I even did not want to go to the office to work,” Yuan told CNBC Make It in 2019.

    Yuan was unhappy with the culture at Cisco, where new ideas were often shut down and change was slow. When he suggested building a new, mobile-friendly video platform from scratch, the idea was rejected by Cisco’s leadership. Frustrated by the resistance to innovation, Yuan left the company in 2011 and founded Zoom, whose value increased astronomically during the Covid pandemic years as it became the go-to app for remote work.

    One might think that founders who, like Yuan, expressed unhappiness with their previous employers’ culture would establish new companies with very different values. However, we found that, on average, whether they want to or not, founders are likely to replicate the culture of their previous employer in their new venture.

    Founders come from somewhere

    Yuan’s story includes the idea that many people have of the lumbering tech giant versus the agile startup. Yet our research found that this distinction is actually not so clear.

    More than 50 percent of US tech startup founders have previous experience in other companies, often in giants like Google or Meta. The work culture of these huge organizations is not always so easy to shake off when entrepreneurs go on to start their own companies.

    In our research, we identified 30 different cultural elements of companies. These include cultures of work-life balance, teamwork, authority, innovation, and compensation-oriented vs customer-oriented culture, to name a few.

    Previous research has shown that startup founders transfer knowledge and technology from former jobs. We found empirical evidence that they also transfer work culture.

    Comparing organizational cultures of “parents”, “spawns” and “twins”

    In our research, we identified startup founders and used their LinkedIn profiles to find companies where they had previously worked. Our team applied natural language processing, namely Latent Dirichlet allocation topic modelling, to text on Glassdoor, a site that allows current and former employees to anonymously review companies. We used the processed reviews to characterize the cultures of “parent” companies and startup companies, or “spawns”. We also identified a match or “twin” for the spawn organization that had a similar size, product and number of years in business.

    Then, we compared the culture of each spawn startup to the culture of its parent organization, and the culture of each spawn’s “twin” to the culture of the same parent, in a given year. If a spawn was more similar to its parent than the twin was to the parent, this supported our hypothesis that founders tend to transfer their previous work cultures to their new ventures.

    And we found that there are three conditions that favour such a transfer.

    • Length of employment

    First, the longer years founders have been at an organization, the more likely they are to transfer its culture to their new startup, because they have become very familiar with that culture.

    • Congruency of culture

    The second condition is the congruency of culture, i.e., the degree to which culture is composed of elements that are consistent in their meanings, and hence, have internal compatibility.

    For example, in our data, there a cloud-based location services platform that has high congruency in its culture. The company has three highly salient cultural elements: it is adaptive, customer-oriented and demanding. These elements consistently point to a culture of customer responsiveness. Our data also includes an e-commerce clothing platform with two cultural elements – growth orientation and work-life balance – that are poorly aligned in their meanings, reducing the congruency of its culture.

    We found that the more internally congruent a parent organization’s culture is – and thus, the easier it is to understand and learn – the more likely it is that founders will transfer its elements to their new companies.

    • Typicality of culture

    Third, the more atypical an organization is – the more it stands out from others in its field – the more likely it is that its culture will be transferred to the startup.

    In an atypical culture, it is easy for employees to identify cultural elements, and to remember and incorporate them once they found a startup. Because an atypical culture draws a stronger boundary that distinguishes an organization from others, employees become more aware that the organization has chosen them and that they have chosen to work in it. This creates a cognitive attachment in the employee toward the organization, and also increases how well they learn its culture.

    In our study, each startup’s cultural atypicality was measured by calculating the cultural distances between all organizations within the same product category for a given year.

    It’s common for founders to describe their culture as distinctive or one-of-a-kind. However, we found that’s not necessarily the case. Founders tend to replicate the culture of their previous employers because they’re accustomed to that way of working.

    False perceptions?

    Many students tell me they’re drawn to more creative and innovative work environments – something they often associate with startups rather than traditional, established companies.

    But our research suggests this perception might not be entirely accurate.

    Job seekers looking for unique or forward-thinking cultures may be surprised to find that startup environments resemble those of larger tech companies more often than expected.

    And for founders – especially those who left previous roles because of frustrating workplace cultures – it can be a wake-up call to realize how easy it is to unintentionally recreate the very environments they may have hoped to avoid.

    Yeonsin Ahn ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d’une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n’a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.

    – ref. Tech startup culture is not as innovative as founders may think – https://theconversation.com/tech-startup-culture-is-not-as-innovative-as-founders-may-think-243216

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

  • MIL-OSI: Convening of the Annual General Meeting of Euronext N.V.

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Convening of the Annual General Meeting of Euronext N.V.

    Amsterdam, Brussels, Dublin, Lisbon, Milan, Oslo and Paris – 2 April 2025 – Euronext today announced that the Annual General Meeting (“AGM”) will take place on Thursday 15 May 2025 at 10.30 CEST at Beursplein 5, 1012 JW Amsterdam, The Netherlands.

    The agenda for the meeting is as follows:

    1.   Opening
    2.   Presentation by the Chief Executive Officer (discussion item)
    3.   Annual Report 2024
    a)   Explanation of the policy on additions to reserves and dividends (discussion item)
    b)   Proposal to adopt the 2024 remuneration report (voting item 1)
    c)   Proposal to adopt the 2024 financial statements (voting item 2)
    d)   Proposal to adopt a dividend of € 2.90 per ordinary share (voting item 3)
    e)   Proposal to discharge the members of the Managing Board in respect of their duties performed during the year 2024 (voting item 4)
    f)   Proposal to discharge the members of the Supervisory Board in respect of their duties performed during the year 2024 (voting item 5)
    4.   Composition of the Supervisory Board
    a)   Re-appointment of Piero Novelli as a member of the Supervisory Board (voting item 6)
    b)   Re-appointment of Olivier Sichel as a member of the Supervisory Board (voting item 7)
    c)   Appointment of Francesca Scaglia as a member of the Supervisory Board (voting item 8)
    5.   Composition of the Managing Board
    a)   Re-appointment of Delphine d’Amarzit as a member of the Managing Board (voting item 9)
    b)   Appointment of René van Vlerken as a member of the Managing Board (voting item 10)
    6.   Proposal to amend the remuneration policy with regard to the Managing Board (voting item 11)
    7.   Proposal to amend the remuneration policy with regard to the Supervisory Board (voting item 12)
    8.   Proposal to appoint the external auditor (voting item 13)
    9.   Proposal regarding cancellation of the company’s own shares purchased by the company under the share repurchase program (voting item 14)
    10.   Proposal to designate the Managing Board as the competent body:
    a)   to issue ordinary shares (voting item 15); and
    b)   to restrict or exclude the pre-emptive rights of shareholders (voting item 16)
    11.   Proposal to authorise the Managing Board to acquire ordinary shares in the share capital of the company on behalf of the company (voting item 17)
    12.   Proposal to authorise the Supervisory Board or Managing Board (subject to approval of the Supervisory Board) to grant rights to French beneficiaries to receive shares in accordance with Articles L225-197-1 and seq. of the French Code of commerce (voting item 18)
    13.   Any other business
    14.   Close

    The AGM will be conducted in English.

    Registration date AGM

    Pursuant to Dutch law and Euronext N.V.’s Articles of Association, the persons who will be considered as entitled to attend and vote at the AGM are those persons who are registered as such in the administrations held by their financial intermediaries (the “Shareholders”) on 17 April 2025, after processing of all settlements on that date (the “Registration Date”).

    Registration and voting instructions

    Shareholders holding their shares through Euronext Securities Milan (i.e. the public) who wish to attend the AGM, provide instructions or grant a power of attorney to vote on their behalf, must complete the form (voting form / attendance card request) provided for this purpose by their financial intermediary or by Euronext Securities Department – Uptevia. The Shareholders should be aware that these documents must be received, no later than on Thursday 8 May 2025 by their financial intermediary for receipt no later than on Friday 9 May 2025 by Uptevia, Assemblées Générales, 90-110 Esplanade du Général de Gaulle 92931 Paris La Défense Cedex, France. The financial intermediary should deliver to the Shareholder a certificate of holding containing: name and city of residence of the Shareholder; number of shares; name and city of residence of the attendee (if different from the Shareholder) and declaration that the shares were in custody with the Euroclear France-admitted institution on the Registration Date. This certificate will serve as the admission certificate for the AGM for the Shareholder.

    Shareholders holding their shares through Euronext Securities Porto in Portugal who wish to attend the AGM, provide instructions or grant a power of attorney to vote on their behalf, must complete the form (voting form / attendance card request) provided for this purpose by Euronext Securities Department – Uptevia Corporate Trust. The Shareholders should be aware that these documents must be received, no later than on Thursday 8 May 2025 by their financial intermediary for receipt no later than on Friday 9 May 2025 by BNP Paribas Securities Services, PT Local Team, Edificio ART’S – Av. D. Joao II – Lote 1.18.01, Bloco B, 1998-028 Lisboa, Portugal. The financial intermediary should deliver to the Shareholder a certificate of holding containing: name and city of residence of the Shareholder; number of shares on the Registration Date; name and city of residence of the attendee (if different from the Shareholder). This certificate will serve as admission certificate for the AGM for the Shareholder.

    Persons without a valid admission certificate will not be given access to the meeting. Attendants may be asked for identification prior to being admitted.

    At the time of the publication of this convening notice, Euronext’s total issued share capital in number of issued shares and in voting rights is published on Euronext’s website:
    https://www.euronext.com/en/investor-relations/capital-and-shareholding

    Webcast

    There will be a live broadcast of the AGM via
    https://channel.royalcast.com/landingpage/euronextwebcast/20250515_1/

    AGM Documentation

    The AGM Documentation (i.e. this convening notice, the agenda and the explanatory notes thereto including the information on the persons to be appointed to the Supervisory Board and the Managing Board, as well as the 2024 Annual Report) is available:

    • at the registered office of Euronext N.V.: Beursplein 5, 1012 JW Amsterdam, The Netherlands
    • by email request to EuronextCorporateSecretary@euronext.com
    • on Euronext’s website https://www.euronext.com/en/investor-relations/shareholder-meetings
    • at Uptevia – Assemblées Générales – 90-110 Esplanade du Général de Gaulle 92931 Paris La Défense Cedex, France – + 33 1 57 43 02 30

    Managing Board and Supervisory Board of Euronext N.V.
    Beursplein 5, 1012 JW Amsterdam, The Netherlands

    Registered at the Dutch Chamber of Commerce, under number 60234520

    CONTACTS  

    ANALYSTS & INVESTORS – ir@euronext.com

    Investor Relations        Aurélie Cohen                 

            Judith Stein        +33 6 15 23 91 97          

    MEDIA – mediateam@euronext.com 

    Europe        Aurélie Cohen         +33 1 70 48 24 45   

            Andrea Monzani         +39 02 72 42 62 13 

    Belgium        Marianne Aalders         +32 26 20 15 01                 

    France, Corporate        Flavio Bornancin-Tomasella        +33 1 70 48 24 45                 

    Ireland        Andrea Monzani         +39 02 72 42 62 13                 

    Italy         Ester Russom         +39 02 72 42 67 56                 

    The Netherlands        Marianne Aalders         +31 20 721 41 33                 

    Norway         Cathrine Lorvik Segerlund        +47 41 69 59 10                 

    Portugal         Sandra Machado        +351 91 777 68 97                

    About Euronext  

    Euronext is the leading European capital market infrastructure, covering the entire capital markets value chain, from listing, trading, clearing, settlement and custody, to solutions for issuers and investors. Euronext runs MTS, one of Europe’s leading electronic fixed income trading markets, and Nord Pool, the European power market. Euronext also provides clearing and settlement services through Euronext Clearing and its Euronext Securities CSDs in Denmark, Italy, Norway and Portugal.

    As of December 2024, Euronext’s regulated exchanges in Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway and Portugal host over 1,800 listed issuers with around €6 trillion in market capitalisation, a strong blue-chip franchise and the largest global centre for debt and fund listings. With a diverse domestic and international client base, Euronext handles 25% of European lit equity trading. Its products include equities, FX, ETFs, bonds, derivatives, commodities and indices.

    For the latest news, go to euronext.com or follow us on X and LinkedIn.

    Disclaimer

    This press release is for information purposes only: it is not a recommendation to engage in investment activities and is provided “as is”, without representation or warranty of any kind. While all reasonable care has been taken to ensure the accuracy of the content, Euronext does not guarantee its accuracy or completeness. Euronext will not be held liable for any loss or damages of any nature ensuing from using, trusting or acting on information provided. No information set out or referred to in this publication may be regarded as creating any right or obligation. The creation of rights and obligations in respect of financial products that are traded on the exchanges operated by Euronext’s subsidiaries shall depend solely on the applicable rules of the market operator. All proprietary rights and interest in or connected with this publication shall vest in Euronext. This press release speaks only as of this date. Euronext refers to Euronext N.V. and its affiliates. Information regarding trademarks and intellectual property rights of Euronext is available at www.euronext.com/terms-use.

    © 2025, Euronext N.V. – All rights reserved. 

    The Euronext Group processes your personal data in order to provide you with information about Euronext (the “Purpose”). With regard to the processing of this personal data, Euronext will comply with its obligations under Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and Council of 27 April 2016 (General Data Protection Regulation, “GDPR”), and any applicable national laws, rules and regulations implementing the GDPR, as provided in its privacy statement available at: www.euronext.com/privacy-policy. In accordance with the applicable legislation you have rights with regard to the processing of your personal data: for more information on your rights, please refer to: www.euronext.com/data_subjects_rights_request_information. To make a request regarding the processing of your data or to unsubscribe from this press release service, please use our data subject request form at connect2.euronext.com/form/data-subjects-rights-request or email our Data Protection Officer at dpo@euronext.com.

    Attachment

    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-OSI: Euronext publishes its detailed dividend payment schedule for 2025

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Euronext publishes its detailed dividend payment schedule for 2025        

    Amsterdam, Brussels, Dublin, Lisbon, Milan, Oslo and Paris – 2 April 2025 – In line with the dividend distribution policy of Euronext, it is proposed to distribute 50% of 2024 reported net profit. As a consequence and subject to approval of shareholders at the Company’s Annual General Meeting to be held on 15 May 2025, the annual gross dividend on the 2024 results to be paid in 2025 amounts to €292.8 million, corresponding to a dividend per share of €2.90 (based on the total number of eligible shares).

    Payment of the annual dividend will occur as follows:

    Ex-dividend date: 26 May 2025

    Record date: 27 May 2025

    Payment date: 28 May 2025

    CONTACTS 

    ANALYSTS & INVESTORS – ir@euronext.com

    Investor Relations        Aurélie Cohen                 

            Judith Stein        +33 6 15 23 91 97          

    MEDIA – mediateam@euronext.com 

    Europe        Aurélie Cohen         +33 1 70 48 24 45   

            Andrea Monzani         +39 02 72 42 62 13 

    Belgium        Marianne Aalders         +32 26 20 15 01                 

    France, Corporate        Flavio Bornancin-Tomasella        +33 1 70 48 24 45                 

    Ireland        Andrea Monzani         +39 02 72 42 62 13                 

    Italy         Ester Russom         +39 02 72 42 67 56                 

    The Netherlands        Marianne Aalders         +31 20 721 41 33                 

    Norway         Cathrine Lorvik Segerlund        +47 41 69 59 10                 

    Portugal         Sandra Machado        +351 91 777 68 97                                 

    About Euronext  

    Euronext is the leading European capital market infrastructure, covering the entire capital markets value chain, from listing, trading, clearing, settlement and custody, to solutions for issuers and investors. Euronext runs MTS, one of Europe’s leading electronic fixed income trading markets, and Nord Pool, the European power market. Euronext also provides clearing and settlement services through Euronext Clearing and its Euronext Securities CSDs in Denmark, Italy, Norway and Portugal.

    As of December 2024, Euronext’s regulated exchanges in Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway and Portugal host over 1,800 listed issuers with around €6 trillion in market capitalisation, a strong blue-chip franchise and the largest global centre for debt and fund listings. With a diverse domestic and international client base, Euronext handles 25% of European lit equity trading. Its products include equities, FX, ETFs, bonds, derivatives, commodities and indices.

    For the latest news, go to euronext.com or follow us on X and LinkedIn.

    Disclaimer

    This press release is for information purposes only: it is not a recommendation to engage in investment activities and is provided “as is”, without representation or warranty of any kind. While all reasonable care has been taken to ensure the accuracy of the content, Euronext does not guarantee its accuracy or completeness. Euronext will not be held liable for any loss or damages of any nature ensuing from using, trusting or acting on information provided. No information set out or referred to in this publication may be regarded as creating any right or obligation. The creation of rights and obligations in respect of financial products that are traded on the exchanges operated by Euronext’s subsidiaries shall depend solely on the applicable rules of the market operator. All proprietary rights and interest in or connected with this publication shall vest in Euronext. This press release speaks only as of this date. Euronext refers to Euronext N.V. and its affiliates. Information regarding trademarks and intellectual property rights of Euronext is available at www.euronext.com/terms-use.

    © 2025, Euronext N.V. – All rights reserved. 

    The Euronext Group processes your personal data in order to provide you with information about Euronext (the “Purpose”). With regard to the processing of this personal data, Euronext will comply with its obligations under Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and Council of 27 April 2016 (General Data Protection Regulation, “GDPR”), and any applicable national laws, rules and regulations implementing the GDPR, as provided in its privacy statement available at: www.euronext.com/privacy-policy. In accordance with the applicable legislation you have rights with regard to the processing of your personal data: for more information on your rights, please refer to: www.euronext.com/data_subjects_rights_request_information. To make a request regarding the processing of your data or to unsubscribe from this press release service, please use our data subject request form at connect2.euronext.com/form/data-subjects-rights-request or email our Data Protection Officer at dpo@euronext.com.

    Attachment

    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-OSI: WENDEL: Shareholders’ Meeting set for May 15, 2025

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Shareholders’ Meeting set for May 15, 2025

    Wendel informs its shareholders that the Shareholders’ Meeting will be held on Thursday May 15, 2025, at 3 p.m. (Paris time) at the Auditorium Cézanne Saint-Honoré, located at 2-4, rue Paul-Cézanne, 75008 Paris.

    The notice of meeting, being worth convening notice, is published today in French in the Bulletin des Annonces Légales et Obligatoires (www.journal-officiel.gouv.fr/balo/). It includes notably the agenda, the draft resolutions which will be presented to the Meeting and the conditions to take part in the Meeting. It is also available on the Wendel website.

    Other documents and information concerning this Meeting will be available to shareholders and published as from April 24, 2025, under legal and regulatory conditions, on the dedicated page of the Wendel website www.wendelgroup.com/en/annual-general-meetings.

    The Meeting will be available by webcast in its entirety, live and replay. All information about the Meeting is available on the dedicated page of Wendel website: www.wendelgroup.com/en/annual-general-meetings.

    Agenda

    Thursday, April 24, 2025

    Q1 2025 Trading update – Publication of NAV as of March 31, 2025 (post-market release)

    Thursday, May 15, 2025

    Annual General Meeting

    Wednesday, July 30, 2025

    H1 2025 results – Publication of NAV as of June 30, 2025, and condensed Half-Year consolidated financial statements (post-market release)

    Thursday, October 23, 2025

    Q3 2025 Trading update – Publication of NAV as of September 30, 2025 (post-market release)

    Friday, December 12, 2025,

    2025 Investor Day

    About Wendel

    Wendel is one of Europe’s leading listed investment firms. Regarding its principal investment strategy, the Group invests in companies which are leaders in their field, such as ACAMS, Bureau Veritas, Crisis Prevention Institute, Globeducate, IHS Towers, Scalian, Stahl and Tarkett. In 2023, Wendel initiated a strategic shift into third-party asset management of private assets, alongside its historical principal investment activities. In May 2024, Wendel completed the acquisition of a 51% stake in IK Partners, a major step in the deployment of its strategic expansion in third-party private asset management and also announced in October 2024 the acquisition of 75% of Monroe Capital. Pro forma of Monroe Capital, Wendel manages more than 33 billion euros on behalf of third-party investors, and c.7.4 billion euros invested in its principal investments activity.

    Wendel is listed on Eurolist by Euronext Paris.

    Standard & Poor’s ratings: Long-term: BBB, stable outlook – Short-term: A-2 

    Wendel is the Founding Sponsor of Centre Pompidou-Metz. In recognition of its long-term patronage of the arts, Wendel received the distinction of “Grand Mécène de la Culture” in 2012.For more information: wendelgroup.com

    Follow us on LinkedIn @Wendel 

    Attachment

    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: New Permanent Representative of Guinea Presents Credentials

    Source: United Nations General Assembly and Security Council

    (Based on information provided by the Protocol and Liaison Service)

    The new Permanent Representative of Guinea to the United Nations, Mohamed Dabo, presented his credentials to UN Secretary-General António Guterres today.

    Prior to his appointment, Mr. Dabo served in his country’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, African Integration and Guineans Living Abroad as Coordinator of Economic Diplomacy, Strategic Intelligence and International Cooperation, from January 2022 to December 2024.

    Before that, from April 2019 to January 2022, he served in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Cooperation, African Integration and Guineans Abroad, as Adviser responsible for diaspora and international careers.

    From October 2017 to April 2019, he served as a member of the Minister’s cabinet and Special Assistant to the Minister in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Guineans Abroad.  Before that, from August 2013 to October 2017, he served in the Permanent Mission of Guinea to the United Nations as First Secretary and Special Assistant to the Permanent Representative.

    Mr. Dabo holds a master’s degree in political science, policies and strategies of international public action and a bachelor’s degree in political science, international relations and security defence, both from the University Jean Moulin Lyon 3, France.  He also holds a degree in law and political science from the University Lumière Lyon 2 and a degree in law from the University of Lille 2, both in France.

    MIL OSI United Nations News –

  • MIL-OSI Security: NATO Defence College Field Studies Visit to NATO HQ on 19 March

    Source: NATO

    On 19 March, the NATO Defense College (NDC) conducted a Field Studies visit to NATO HQ, International Military Staff, providing a unique learning opportunity for the Senior Course (SC) and NATO Regional Cooperation Course (NRCC) participants. This visit, which is an integral part of the NDC curriculum, allows course members to engage with national, regional, and global decision-makers while gaining firsthand insights into security policies, armed forces, and cultural values.

    The visit was attended by 121 participants, with 75 from “SC-146”, 36 from “NRCC-36”, and the remaining attendees from NDC staff. The program included a diverse and comprehensive schedule. The opening session featured a welcome address, keynote, and Q&A with Lt Gen Janusz Adamczak, Director General of the International Military Staff (IMS).

    This was followed by a panel discussion on the theme “NATO’s Deterrence and Defence: Strategic Imperatives for the Alliance”, with contributions from Mr. Angus Lapsley (Assistant Secretary General, Defence Planning Policy), Major General Ulf Haeussler (Director, Operations and Planning Division, IMS), Mr. Thijs van der Plas (Dutch Permanent Representative to NATO), and Lieutenant General Jérôme Goisque (French Military Representative to NATO).

    The group was briefed on NATO’s approach to defence and industry’s role in building capabilities from senior experts across the NATO structure. Further sessions also included “NATO Cooperation Security and Military Cooperation” and “NATO’s Assessment of the Terrorist Threat”.

    This visit was a valuable opportunity for NDC participants to gain a deeper understanding of NATO’s strategic direction and key areas of defense and security cooperation.

    MIL Security OSI –

  • MIL-OSI Global: Fake online shops rely on tech skills: what drives Cameroon’s web developers to assist online fraudsters

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Suleman Lazarus, Visiting Fellow, Mannheim Centre for Criminology, London School of Economics and Political Science

    When people discuss online fraud, the focus is often on those who directly deceive victims. Little attention is given to those who enable these crimes by providing the digital infrastructure necessary for deception.

    This digital infrastructure includes reliable access to electricity and the internet, as well as digital tools such as proxy servers, spoofing software, phishing kits and virtual private networks. Those involved must possess technical competencies in areas like web development, social engineering and systems maintenance, skills that are critical for sustaining fraudulent operations behind the scenes.

    Research on cybercrime is expanding in west Africa, particularly studies of Nigeria and Ghana. But Cameroon is understudied. This gap in research has obscured a pervasive problem in Cameroon: website developers who create digital storefronts for fraudsters.

    Pet scams are a particularly common type of online fraud perpetrated by Cameroonian fraudsters. This is a form of non-delivery fraud in which victims are tricked into paying for animals that do not exist. Typically, these fake pet websites target prospective pet buyers in countries like the US, Canada and Australia by advertising nonexistent pedigree puppies and kittens as well as exotic animals such as parrots, macaws and tortoises.

    Rather than focusing on the fraudsters themselves, our study examined the infrastructure that enables this fraud to happen and the hidden networks of actors who make deception possible. Our research sheds light on a little-known group of enablers: website developers in anglophone Cameroon who knowingly build fake shopping websites.

    Through interviews with 14 website developers engaged in this illicit trade, we explored the socio-economic and political forces that drive their participation.

    Our findings showed that a mix of economic hardship, social norms and cultural beliefs drive fraud enablement in Cameroon. Our study highlights the need for a more nuanced understanding of cybercrime. The website developers in Cameroon do not fit the typical profile of a fraudster. They see themselves as skilled workers navigating a complex socio-political landscape where survival often comes before morality, given that Cameroon, under Paul Biya’s presidency of more than 40 years, has experienced widespread poverty, instability and an uncertain succession struggle.

    To address fraud effectively, interventions must go beyond simply punishing offenders. Instead, efforts should focus on dismantling the structures that allow fraud to thrive, starting with those who enable it.

    Why fraudsters choose this activity

    A central theme emerging from our interviews was the impact of the Ambazonian Crisis, an ongoing separatist conflict in Cameroon’s anglophone regions. The crisis began as peaceful demonstrations in 2016 when trade unionists and lawyers protested against the mandatory use of the French language in schools and law courts. By 2017, these protests had turned violent as armed separatist groups emerged within the anglophone regions, engaging in sporadic conflict with government forces. The separatists called for the secession of the two anglophone regions, referring to them as Ambazonia. The conflict has since escalated. Reports estimate that the violence has led to approximately 6,000 civilian deaths, the displacement of 600,000 people within Cameroon, and the forced migration of over 77,000 people into Nigeria as refugees.

    The website developers we interviewed described how daily gunfire, displacement and political instability had made it difficult to secure stable employment and find clients.

    Interviewees cited frequent power outages and internet blackouts as barriers to working with legitimate clients.

    As one developer put it:

    There are times when we go without electricity or network for days. I might have a legitimate client, but if the power goes out, I lose the job. Fraudsters, on the other hand, don’t care about delays. They are always there with another request.

    Ghost-town protests, where separatists enforce economic shutdowns and force people to stay in their homes, further limit opportunities for legitimate business. In this unstable environment, undertaking website development for fraudsters became one of the few steady income streams.

    A second theme was spiritual beliefs. We found that spiritual beliefs had an impact on decision-making. Developers rationalised their work by distinguishing between fraud and fraud enablement. Directly perpetrating fraud against victims, they believed, carried spiritual consequences, while simply building websites for fraudsters did not. Some fraudsters in west Africa visit a so-called “juju priest”, who may demand animal sacrifice and even murder in return for their blessing. The website developers we spoke to did not want to get involved in this.

    One of the developers shared his fears about spiritual repercussions:

    Scammers who do rituals for money, they don’t last. Most of the time, you see them dying at the age of 20 or 30. I don’t want to be involved in that. But making websites? That’s different. I’m not the one taking the money.

    A third theme in our findings was the Big Boy culture, a subculture that glorifies online fraud as a symbol of success. In some west African communities, fraudsters who display their wealth through expensive cars, clothes and lifestyles are seen as role models rather than criminals.

    Vanesa, a developer, explained:

    Everybody wants to chill with the Big Boys. Fraudsters want to be seen as superstars, and that means spending money like celebrities.

    The normalisation of internet fraud in some circles has created a perception that financial success justifies the means by which it is achieved. While some developers disapproved of fraudsters’ extravagant lifestyles, others saw it as a model of economic survival to aspire to.

    Rethinking fraud prevention

    These findings challenge the simplistic notion that the internet inherently enables fraud. Instead, fraud thrives within a complex ecosystem that includes not just the perpetrators but also the enablers who facilitate deception for economic, political, and cultural reasons.

    A more effective fraud prevention strategy should address the enablers of cybercrime, not just the scammers.

    This means:

    The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Fake online shops rely on tech skills: what drives Cameroon’s web developers to assist online fraudsters – https://theconversation.com/fake-online-shops-rely-on-tech-skills-what-drives-cameroons-web-developers-to-assist-online-fraudsters-252429

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

  • MIL-OSI Africa: Fake online shops rely on tech skills: what drives Cameroon’s web developers to assist online fraudsters

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Suleman Lazarus, Visiting Fellow, Mannheim Centre for Criminology, London School of Economics and Political Science

    When people discuss online fraud, the focus is often on those who directly deceive victims. Little attention is given to those who enable these crimes by providing the digital infrastructure necessary for deception.

    This digital infrastructure includes reliable access to electricity and the internet, as well as digital tools such as proxy servers, spoofing software, phishing kits and virtual private networks. Those involved must possess technical competencies in areas like web development, social engineering and systems maintenance, skills that are critical for sustaining fraudulent operations behind the scenes.

    Research on cybercrime is expanding in west Africa, particularly studies of Nigeria and Ghana. But Cameroon is understudied. This gap in research has obscured a pervasive problem in Cameroon: website developers who create digital storefronts for fraudsters.

    Pet scams are a particularly common type of online fraud perpetrated by Cameroonian fraudsters. This is a form of non-delivery fraud in which victims are tricked into paying for animals that do not exist. Typically, these fake pet websites target prospective pet buyers in countries like the US, Canada and Australia by advertising nonexistent pedigree puppies and kittens as well as exotic animals such as parrots, macaws and tortoises.

    Rather than focusing on the fraudsters themselves, our study examined the infrastructure that enables this fraud to happen and the hidden networks of actors who make deception possible. Our research sheds light on a little-known group of enablers: website developers in anglophone Cameroon who knowingly build fake shopping websites.

    Through interviews with 14 website developers engaged in this illicit trade, we explored the socio-economic and political forces that drive their participation.

    Our findings showed that a mix of economic hardship, social norms and cultural beliefs drive fraud enablement in Cameroon. Our study highlights the need for a more nuanced understanding of cybercrime. The website developers in Cameroon do not fit the typical profile of a fraudster. They see themselves as skilled workers navigating a complex socio-political landscape where survival often comes before morality, given that Cameroon, under Paul Biya’s presidency of more than 40 years, has experienced widespread poverty, instability and an uncertain succession struggle.

    To address fraud effectively, interventions must go beyond simply punishing offenders. Instead, efforts should focus on dismantling the structures that allow fraud to thrive, starting with those who enable it.

    Why fraudsters choose this activity

    A central theme emerging from our interviews was the impact of the Ambazonian Crisis, an ongoing separatist conflict in Cameroon’s anglophone regions. The crisis began as peaceful demonstrations in 2016 when trade unionists and lawyers protested against the mandatory use of the French language in schools and law courts. By 2017, these protests had turned violent as armed separatist groups emerged within the anglophone regions, engaging in sporadic conflict with government forces. The separatists called for the secession of the two anglophone regions, referring to them as Ambazonia. The conflict has since escalated. Reports estimate that the violence has led to approximately 6,000 civilian deaths, the displacement of 600,000 people within Cameroon, and the forced migration of over 77,000 people into Nigeria as refugees.

    The website developers we interviewed described how daily gunfire, displacement and political instability had made it difficult to secure stable employment and find clients.

    Interviewees cited frequent power outages and internet blackouts as barriers to working with legitimate clients.

    As one developer put it:

    There are times when we go without electricity or network for days. I might have a legitimate client, but if the power goes out, I lose the job. Fraudsters, on the other hand, don’t care about delays. They are always there with another request.

    Ghost-town protests, where separatists enforce economic shutdowns and force people to stay in their homes, further limit opportunities for legitimate business. In this unstable environment, undertaking website development for fraudsters became one of the few steady income streams.

    A second theme was spiritual beliefs. We found that spiritual beliefs had an impact on decision-making. Developers rationalised their work by distinguishing between fraud and fraud enablement. Directly perpetrating fraud against victims, they believed, carried spiritual consequences, while simply building websites for fraudsters did not. Some fraudsters in west Africa visit a so-called “juju priest”, who may demand animal sacrifice and even murder in return for their blessing. The website developers we spoke to did not want to get involved in this.

    One of the developers shared his fears about spiritual repercussions:

    Scammers who do rituals for money, they don’t last. Most of the time, you see them dying at the age of 20 or 30. I don’t want to be involved in that. But making websites? That’s different. I’m not the one taking the money.

    A third theme in our findings was the Big Boy culture, a subculture that glorifies online fraud as a symbol of success. In some west African communities, fraudsters who display their wealth through expensive cars, clothes and lifestyles are seen as role models rather than criminals.

    Vanesa, a developer, explained:

    Everybody wants to chill with the Big Boys. Fraudsters want to be seen as superstars, and that means spending money like celebrities.

    The normalisation of internet fraud in some circles has created a perception that financial success justifies the means by which it is achieved. While some developers disapproved of fraudsters’ extravagant lifestyles, others saw it as a model of economic survival to aspire to.

    Rethinking fraud prevention

    These findings challenge the simplistic notion that the internet inherently enables fraud. Instead, fraud thrives within a complex ecosystem that includes not just the perpetrators but also the enablers who facilitate deception for economic, political, and cultural reasons.

    A more effective fraud prevention strategy should address the enablers of cybercrime, not just the scammers.

    This means:

    – Fake online shops rely on tech skills: what drives Cameroon’s web developers to assist online fraudsters
    – https://theconversation.com/fake-online-shops-rely-on-tech-skills-what-drives-cameroons-web-developers-to-assist-online-fraudsters-252429

    MIL OSI Africa –

  • MIL-OSI: Notice of the Annual General Meeting of Orrön Energy AB

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    The shareholders of Orrön Energy AB (publ), 556610-8055 (“Orrön Energy” or the “Company”), are hereby given notice of the Annual General Meeting to be held on 5 May 2025 at 11.00 (CEST). The meeting will be held digitally.

    Shareholders may choose to exercise their voting rights at the Annual General Meeting by attending the digital meeting in person, through a proxy or by postal voting.

    Vote at the Annual General Meeting

    Those who wish to exercise their voting rights at the Annual General Meeting must:

    • be entered as a shareholder in the share register kept by Euroclear Sweden AB on 24 April 2025 or, if the shares are registered in the name of a nominee, request that the nominee registers the shares in their own name for voting purposes in such time that the registration is completed by 28 April 2025; and
    • give notice of attendance at the Annual General Meeting to the Company in accordance with the instructions set out in the section “Online participation and voting at the Annual General Meeting” or submit a postal vote in accordance with the instructions set out in the section “Voting by post in advance of the Annual General Meeting” no later than 28 April 2025.

    Important information regarding participation and voting

    The Board of Directors has decided to hold the Annual General Meeting as a digital meeting combined with an option to vote by post in advance of the Annual General Meeting in accordance with the Company’s Articles of Association.

    For terms and instructions for online participation and voting at the Annual General Meeting, please refer to the section “Online participation and voting at the Annual General Meeting” below.

    For terms and instructions for voting by post in advance of the Annual General Meeting, please refer to the section “Voting by post in advance of the Annual General Meeting” below.

    Please note that despite thorough preparations, it cannot be ruled out that online participation or voting at the Annual General Meeting do not work as intended due to technical complications attributable to shareholders. The Annual General Meeting will be held regardless of any such complications and there is a risk that votes submitted online at the Annual General Meeting are not registered. Consequently, those who want to be certain of being able to exercise their voting rights should vote by post in advance of the Annual General Meeting.

    Please also note that it will not be possible to vote both by post in advance of the Annual General Meeting and online at the Annual General Meeting. If a postal vote has been submitted in accordance with the terms and instructions for voting by post and such postal vote has not been withdrawn by the shareholder no later than 28 April 2025, the Company will consider the postal vote at the Annual General Meeting.

    It is possible to vote by post in advance of the Annual General Meeting and still follow the Annual General Meeting without exercising any voting rights online, please see the section “Voting by post in advance of the Annual General Meeting” below for more information.

    Online participation and voting at the Annual General Meeting
    Those who wish to participate at the digital Annual General Meeting in person or through proxy shall give notice of attendance to the Company no later than 28 April 2025 either:

    • electronically through the Company’s website, www.orron.com (only applicable to individuals);
    • by post to Computershare AB, Box 5267, SE-102 46 Stockholm (Att. “Orrön Energy’s AGM”);
    • by telephone to +46 (0)8 518 01 554 on weekdays between 09.00 and 16.00 (CEST); or
    • by email to info@computershare.se.

    The notice of attendance shall state name, personal identification number or corporate registration number, address, telephone number and, where relevant, the number of accompanying advisors (not more than two).

    To participate and vote online, a stable network connection must be maintained throughout the Annual General Meeting. Online participation is possible via a computer, a smartphone or a tablet, provided the device is equipped with an up-to-date operating system and the latest software version. Access to the meeting will be facilitated via a web browser, ensuring a seamless and secure connection to the digital platform.

    Those who give notice of attendance at the Annual General Meeting will receive login instructions on the admission card which will be sent to the address stated in the notice of attendance. On the day of the Annual General Meeting, the digital platform will open for login from 10.00 (CEST), and participants must log in no later than 11.00 (CEST) to attend.

    In connection with each voting item, shareholders will be able to choose between the alternatives “Yes”, “No” and “Abstain”. Engagement and questions during the meeting will be facilitated through a dedicated written Q&A function.

    Those who do not wish to participate or vote online in person may exercise their voting rights at the Annual General Meeting through a proxy in possession of a written, signed and dated proxy form. In order for the proxy to obtain login instructions to the digital platform, the proxy’s name, personal identification number or corporate registration number and address must be included in the notice of attendance. A proxy form issued by a legal entity must be accompanied by a copy of a certificate of registration or a corresponding document of authority for the legal entity. Template proxy forms in Swedish and English are available on the Company’s website, www.orron.com. Proxy forms, certificates of registration and other documents of authority shall be appended to the notice of attendance. Please note that notice of attendance must be given even if a shareholder wishes to exercise its rights at the meeting through a proxy. A submitted proxy form does not count as a notice of attendance.

    Voting by post in advance of the Annual General Meeting
    Those who wish to exercise their voting rights by post in advance of the Annual General Meeting shall use the voting form and follow the instructions available on the Company’s website, www.orron.com. The postal vote must be received by the Company no later than 28 April 2025. The postal vote shall be sent either:

    • electronically in accordance with the instructions available on the Company’s website, www.orron.com;
    • by email to info@computershare.se; or
    • by post to Computershare AB, Box 5267, SE-102 46 Stockholm (Att. “Orrön Energy AGM”).

    If a shareholder’s voting rights are exercised by proxy, a power of attorney and other authorisation documents must be enclosed with the voting form. A proxy form is available on the Company’s website, www.orron.com, and will be sent to shareholders upon request.

    Shareholders who wish to exercise their voting rights by post in advance of the Annual General Meeting may still follow the Annual General Meeting online (without also exercising voting rights online). In order to receive login instructions, please elect for this option in the voting form.

    Proposed agenda
    1.   Opening of the Annual General Meeting.
    2.   Election of Chair of the Annual General Meeting.
    3.   Preparation and approval of the voting register.
    4.   Approval of the agenda.
    5.   Election of one or two persons to approve the minutes.
    6.   Determination as to whether the Annual General Meeting has been duly convened.
    7.   Presentation by the Chief Executive Officer.
    8.   Presentation of the annual and sustainability report and the auditor’s report, the consolidated financial statements and the auditor’s Group report as well as the remuneration report prepared by the Board of Directors and the auditor’s statement on compliance with the policy on remuneration.
    9.   Resolution in respect of adoption of the income statement and the balance sheet and the consolidated income statement and consolidated balance sheet.
    10.   Resolution in respect of disposition of the Company’s result according to the adopted balance sheet.
    11.   Resolution in respect of discharge from liability of members of the Board of Directors and the Chief Executive Officer.
    12.   Resolution in respect of the remuneration report prepared by the Board of Directors.
    13.   Nomination Committee proposals:

    • Proposal for the number of members of the Board of Directors.
    • Proposal for remuneration of the Chair of the Board of Directors and other members of the Board of Directors.
    • Proposal for election of Chair and other members of the Board of Directors.
    • Proposal for remuneration of the auditor.
    • Proposal for election of auditor.

    14.   Resolution in respect of the number of members of the Board of Directors.
    15.   Resolution in respect of remuneration of the Chair of the Board of Directors and other members of the Board of Directors.
    16.   Resolutions in respect of Board members:
    a)   re-election of Grace Reksten Skaugen as a Board member;
    b)   re-election of Jakob Thomasen as a Board member;
    c)   re-election of Peggy Bruzelius as a Board member;
    d)   re-election of William Lundin as a Board member;
    e)   re-election of Mike Nicholson as a Board member;
    f)   election of Richard Ollerhead as a Board member; and
    g)   re-election of Grace Reksten Skaugen as the Chair of the Board of Directors.
    17.   Resolution in respect of remuneration of the auditor.
    18.   Election of auditor.
    19.   Resolution for the 2025 Long-term, Performance-based Incentive Plan (LTIP 2025).
    20.   Resolution in respect of delivery of shares under the LTIP 2025 through:
    a)   an issue and transfer of warrants of series 2025:1; or
    b)   an equity swap arrangement with a third party.
    21.   Resolution in respect of authorisation for the Board of Directors to resolve on new issue of shares and convertible debentures.
    22.   Resolution in respect of authorisation for the Board of Directors to resolve on repurchase and sale of shares.
    23.   Closing of the Annual General Meeting.

    Proposals for resolutions to be presented at the Annual General Meeting of Orrön Energy on 5 May 2025

    Items 2 and 14–18: Resolutions in respect of Chair of the Annual General Meeting, number of members of the Board of Directors, remuneration of the Chair of the Board of Directors and other members of the Board of Directors, election of Chair of the Board of Directors and of other members of the Board of Directors, and remuneration of the auditor and election of the auditor
    Orrön Energy’s Nomination Committee for the 2025 Annual General Meeting consists of Aksel Azrac (Chair, Nemesia S.à.r.l.), Sussi Kvart (Handelsbanken Fonder) and Richard Ollerhead (JNE Partners LLP). The Nomination Committee for the 2025 Annual General Meeting, appointed by shareholders jointly holding approximately 46 per cent of the shares and voting rights in Orrön Energy as per 1 August 2024, proposes the following:

    • Advokat Klaes Edhall to be appointed as Chair of the Annual General Meeting or, if he is absent, any other person appointed by the Nomination Committee.
    • Six members of the Board of Directors to be appointed without deputy members.
    • Remuneration of the members of the Board of Directors and the Chair of the Board of Directors, including in respect of Committee membership, to be as follows: (i) annual fees for the members of the Board of Directors of EUR 60,000 (excluding the Chair of the Board of Directors); (ii) annual fees for the Chair of the Board of Directors of EUR 120,000; (iii) annual fees for Committee members of EUR 5,000 per Committee assignment (other than Committee Chairs); and (iv) annual fees for Committee Chairs of EUR 10,000; with the total fees for Committee work (including fees for Chairs of Committees) not to exceed EUR 50,000.
    • Re-election of Grace Reksten Skaugen, Jakob Thomasen, Peggy Bruzelius, Mike Nicholson and William Lundin as members of the Board of Directors and election of Richard Ollerhead as a member of the Board of Directors for a period until the end of the 2026 Annual General Meeting. Mr. Ollerhead is a British national born in 1986. Mr. Ollerhead graduated from Balliol College at the University of Oxford, where he obtained a degree in Physics and Philosophy. Mr. Ollerhead worked between 2008 and 2014 at Taconic Capital Advisors in London. From 2015 to 2018 he was part of the European investment team at MSD Partners, which spun out at the end of 2018 as JNE Partners LLP. Mr Ollerhead is a partner at JNE Partners LLP, responsible for a range of equity investments. JNE Partners LLP is the Investment Manager of JNE Master Fund LP, a subsidiary of which (JNE Partners Luxembourg S.à r.l.) is a major shareholder in the Company. Mr. Ollerhead currently holds no Board memberships.
    • Re-election of Grace Reksten Skaugen as Chair of the Board of Directors for a period until the end of the 2026 Annual General Meeting.
    • The auditor’s fees shall be payable upon approval of their invoice.
    • Re-election of the registered accounting firm Ernst & Young AB as the auditor of the Company, which intends to appoint authorised public accountant Anders Kriström as the auditor in charge, for a period until the end of the 2026 Annual General Meeting.

    Item 3: Preparation and approval of the voting register
    The Board of Directors proposes that the register prepared by Computershare AB (on behalf of the Company) based on the Company’s share register, shareholders attending in person or through proxy and postal votes received by the Company is approved as voting register for the Annual General Meeting.

    Item 10: Resolution in respect of disposition of the Company’s result according to the adopted balance sheet
    The Board of Directors proposes that no dividend is distributed and that all distributable funds are brought forward.

    Item 19: Resolution for the 2025 Long-term, Performance-based Incentive Plan (LTIP 2025)
    The Board of Directors proposes that the Annual General Meeting resolves to establish a long-term, performance-based incentive plan in respect of Group Management and a number of key employees of Orrön Energy on the terms and conditions set out below (“LTIP 2025”).

    Background and purpose
    The reason for establishing LTIP 2025 is to align the interests of Group Management and other key employees with the interests of the shareholders, and to provide market appropriate reward reflecting continuity, performance and commitment. The Board of Directors believes that the proposed LTIP 2025 will provide Orrön Energy with a crucial component to a competitive total compensation package to attract and retain executives who are critical to Orrön Energy’s future success.

    The performance-based LTIP 2025 has been designed by the Compensation Committee based on market practice and through engagement with the Company’s shareholders, other stakeholders and a remuneration consultant. The plan introduces performance conditions related to total shareholder return and strategic targets which determine the final award for the long-term incentive plan.

    It is considered that the LTIP 2025, as the share option plans in the past, is best financed through delivery of shares allowing the Company to continue to allocate all available capital towards growth.

    The Board of Directors intends to propose to future Annual General Meetings to establish long-term incentive (“LTI”) plans based on principles corresponding to the currently proposed LTIP 2025. In order to be eligible to participate in such future LTI plans, each participant needs to build towards a meaningful shareholding in Orrön Energy, meaning that a certain portion of any allotted shares pursuant to LTIP 2025 (and any future LTI plans) shall be retained until the required level of shareholding has been met.

    Implementation of LTIP 2025
    The Board of Directors proposes that the Annual General Meeting 2025 resolves on the implementation of the LTIP 2025 in accordance with the terms and conditions set out below.

    Terms and conditions

    (a)   Awards under LTIP 2025 are proposed to be made to approximately 9 permanent employees of the Orrön Energy Group (the “Participants”), comprising the CEO and other members of Group Management, as well as certain other key employees. The Board of Directors may, within the total number of shares available under LTIP 2025, invite a limited number of additional Participants in LTIP 2025 following recruitment to the Orrön Energy Group.

    (b)   LTIP 2025 gives the Participants the possibility to receive shares in Orrön Energy subject to uninterrupted employment and the fulfilment of performance conditions over a three-year performance period commencing on 1 June 2025 and expiring on 31 May 2028 (the “Performance Period”). The performance condition is two-fold, where the two conditions have a 75 per cent and 25 per cent weighting in determining the vesting of awards under LTIP 2025 (the “Performance Conditions”). The first Performance Condition is based on the share price growth and dividends (“Total Shareholder Return”) of the Orrön Energy share compared to the Total Shareholder Return of a peer group of companies (the “Peer Group”) (the “Total Shareholder Return Performance Condition”), with a 75 per cent weighting. The second Performance Condition is based on the achievement of strategic performance targets (the “Strategic Performance Condition”), with a 25 per cent weighting. At the beginning of the Performance Period, the Participants will, free of charge, be granted awards (“LTIP Awards”) which, to the extent that i.a. one or both Performance Conditions are partially or fully met, entitle the Participant to be allotted, also free of charge, shares in Orrön Energy (“Performance Shares”) as soon as reasonably practicable following the end of the Performance Period.

    (c)   The LTIP Awards (i.e. the number of Performance Shares that a Participant may be allotted following the expiration of the Performance Period, provided that i.a. one or both of the Performance Conditions are partially or fully met) to be awarded to each Participant shall be calculated as follows:

                     LTIP Award = A multiplied by B divided by C multiplied by D, where

                     A = the Participant’s monthly gross base salary applicable as at the date of grant of the LTIP Award;

                     B = a number of months as determined by the Board of Directors in respect of each Participant, taking into account such factors as industry benchmarking and the Participant’s position within the Orrön Energy Group (but in any case, subject to a maximum    cap of 36 months);

                     C = the volume weighted average price of the Orrön Energy share on Nasdaq Stockholm for the period between 1 January 2025 and 31 March 2025; and

                     D = the product of the factors representing the proportional increases in the number of Performance Shares under award for each dividend (if any) until allotment, calculated by dividing the value of the Orrön Energy share at closing on the ex-dividend date plus the declared dividend by the value of the share at closing on the ex-dividend date.

            Fractions of allotted Performance Shares shall be rounded-off to the immediate lower whole number.

            Considering the volume weighted average share price of the Orrön Energy share between 1 January 2025 and 31 March 2025 of SEK 5.9, the total number of Performance Shares that may be allotted under LTIP 2025 as at the date of award of the LTIP Awards (assuming 100 per cent vesting) is 4,450,000, corresponding to approximately 1.6 per cent of the current total number of shares and votes in Orrön Energy. In addition, considering additional Participants (if any) following recruitment and increased awards due to dividends (if any), and the expected social charges linked to award, it is proposed that the total number of Performance Shares under LTIP 2025 shall not exceed 5,450,000.

    (d)   Allotment of Performance Shares will be determined by the Board of Directors after the expiration of the Performance Period on the basis of LTIP Awards made and is conditional on (i) the Participant retaining his or her uninterrupted employment in the Orrön Energy Group until the expiry of the Performance Period and (ii) the extent to which (if any) one or both of the Performance Conditions have been met. The LTIP Award will compensate for dividends distributed (if any), and to ensure further alignment with shareholders’ interests, LTIP 2025 will do so by increasing the number of Performance Shares under award proportionally during the award period through the formula described in (c) above, entailing also a reinvestment of dividends received during the award period. The Board of Directors may reduce (including reduce to zero) allotment of Performance Shares at its discretion, should it consider the underlying performance not to be reflected in the outcome of the Performance Conditions.

    (e)   Minimum and a maximum levels for the Performance Conditions to be fulfilled have been established by the Board of Directors. In order for the LTIP Awards to give Participants entitlement to the maximum number of Performance Shares, the maximum level for both Performance Conditions must have been fulfilled.

    1. In respect of the Total Shareholder Return Performance Condition, the fulfilment of which shall result in an entitlement of a maximum of 75 per cent of the maximum number of Performance Shares, the Performance Condition calculation will be made based on a comparison of Total Shareholder Return of the Orrön Energy share to the Peer Group, comparing the three month period of January to March 2025 prior to the commencement of the Performance Period, with the three month period of January to March 2028 prior to the end of the Performance Period. The LTIP Awards will vest based on the comparative Total Shareholder Return of the Orrön Energy share from no vesting below the 38th percentile performance and with vesting at or above the 38th percentile performance on a straight line basis to 100 per cent vesting of this performance condition at the 75th percentile performance or above. The Performance Condition calculation will be performed by the Board of Directors.
    2. In respect of the Strategic Performance Condition, the fulfilment of which shall result in an entitlement of a maximum of 25 per cent of the maximum number of Performance Shares, the measurement of the Performance Condition will be based on an assessment at the end of the Performance Period, relative to the commencement of the Performance Period, of the fulfilment of strategic performance criteria set by the Board of Directors, reflecting key performance targets such as power generation, investments, financial, sustainability and growth through brownfield and greenfield projects, M&A transactions, geographical or technological expansions and other value accretive events. The Performance Condition fulfilment assessment will be performed by the Board of Directors.
    3. The Performance Conditions described in point 1 and 2 above may each individually lead to a 75 and 25 per cent vesting of the LTIP Awards, respectively, and may also vest partially, leading to a partial vesting of the LTIP Awards. Should both Performance Conditions be fully met, 100 per cent of the LTIP Awards will vest. Orrön Energy intends to present the level of fulfilment of the LTIP 2025 Performance Conditions in the 2028 Annual Report.

    (f)   The Participants will not be entitled to transfer, pledge or dispose of the LTIP Award or any rights or obligations under LTIP 2025, or exercise any shareholders’ rights regarding the LTIP Awards during the Performance Period.

    (g)   Shares allotted under LTIP 2025 (or any future LTI plans) shall be subject to certain disposition restrictions, meaning that the Participants shall be building towards a meaningful shareholding in Orrön Energy. The required level of shareholding will be either 50 per cent or 100 per cent (200 per cent for the CEO) of the Participant’s annual gross base salary based on the Participant’s position within the Orrön Energy Group. Notwithstanding this requirement, the Company may pay part or whole of the allotment of Performance Shares in cash in order to facilitate the payment of the Participant’s tax liabilities, or as otherwise may be determined by the Board of Directors. However, a minimum of 50 per cent of the allotted Performance Shares (after taxes and social security charges) under LTIP 2025 will be required to be retained until the required level of shareholding has been met.

    (h)   Recalculation of the Performance Conditions and the LTIP Awards, including the number of Performance Shares allotted, shall take place in the event of an intervening dividend in kind, bonus issue, split, preferential rights issue and/or other similar corporate events.

    Structure and administration

    The Board of Directors of Orrön Energy will be responsible for the structure and administration of LTIP 2025, as well as for the detailed terms and conditions applicable between Orrön Energy and the Participants. The detailed terms and conditions will be adopted within the scope of the terms and conditions and guidelines stated herein. In connection therewith, the Board of Directors will be entitled to adopt different terms and conditions for LTIP 2025 regarding, among other things, the Performance Period and allotment of Performance Shares in the event of commencement or termination of employment during the Performance Period, e.g. due to new recruitments, illness, disability, death, redundancy, contractual retirement and other exceptional circumstances determined by the Board of Directors.

    The Board of Directors will be entitled to make adjustments in order to comply with special rules or market conditions abroad. In the event that delivery of Performance Shares to Participants cannot take place under applicable law or at a reasonable cost and employing reasonable administrative measures, the Board of Directors will be entitled to decide that Participants may, instead, be offered a cash settlement. In the event of a change of control, all LTIP Awards under LTIP 2025 will vest in full.

    Peer Group

    The Board of Directors has reviewed the Peer Group and determined that it shall consist of the following companies for LTIP 2025: ABO Energy, Arise, Cloudberry, Energiekontor, Eolus Vind, Fortum, Magnora, Ørsted, PNE, Scatec, Solaria and TRIG. The Board of Directors shall have the power to amend the Peer Group in order to maintain a representative and relevant group of companies during the Performance Period.

    Delivery of shares, costs etc.

    In order to secure the delivery of shares to the Participants and cover potential costs (including taxes and social security charges) under the LTIP 2025, the Board of Directors proposes that the Annual General Meeting resolves to issue up to 5,450,000 warrants of series 2025:1 (see item 20 a) of the proposed agenda)

    In the event the nine-tenth (9/10) majority requirement applicable to the Board of Directors’ proposal to issue and transfer warrants of series 2025:1 under item 20 a) of the proposed agenda is not satisfied, the Board of Directors proposes that the Annual General Meeting resolves to approve that the Company may hedge its obligations under the LTIP 2025 by entering into (or maintaining) an equity swap arrangement with a third party, whereby the third party in its own name shall be entitled to acquire and transfer shares (including to the Participants) in accordance with the terms and conditions of the LTIP 2025 (see item 20 b) of the proposed agenda).

    The LTIP 2025 will be accounted for in accordance with the accounting standard IFRS 2 and the costs will be charged to the income statement over the Performance Period. The maximum cost for granting LTIP Awards under LTIP 2025, excluding costs related to delivery of the Performance Shares, is approximately 0.25 MEUR, assuming 100 per cent vesting.

    Effects on key figures
    Under the assumptions set out in item (c) above and upon full allotment of Performance Shares, the number of shares under LTIP 2025 amounts to 4,450,000 shares in Orrön Energy (subject to recruitments and adjustments for dividends), corresponding to approximately 1.6 per cent of the current total number of shares and votes in the Company. If the total number of Performance Shares under LTIP 2025 reaches the cap of 5,450,000 shares in Orrön Energy, it will correspond to approximately 1.9 per cent of the current total number of shares and votes in the Company.

    Preparation of the proposal
    The proposal for LTIP 2025 has been prepared by the Compensation Committee and resolved on by the Board of Directors.

    Other incentive schemes in Orrön Energy
    For a description of the Company’s other LTIP’s, reference is made to the Company’s Annual and Sustainability Report for 2024, note 21, and the Company’s website, www.orron.com.

    Majority requirement
    The proposal to implement LTIP 2025 requires support from shareholders representing more than half (1/2) of the votes cast at the Annual General Meeting.

    A resolution in accordance with the Board of Directors’ proposal regarding the issue and transfer of warrants of series 2025:1 under item 20 a) of the proposed agenda requires support from shareholders representing not less than nine-tenth (9/10) of both the votes cast and the shares represented at the Annual General Meeting. A resolution in accordance with the Board of Directors’ proposal regarding the equity swap arrangement under item 20 b) of the proposed agenda requires support from shareholders representing more than half (1/2) of the votes cast at the Annual General Meeting.

    Item 20: Resolution in respect of delivery of shares under the LTIP 2025 through (a) an issue and transfer of warrants of series 2025:1 or (b) an equity swap arrangement with a third party

    Background
    Under the LTIP 2025 proposed by the Board of Directors under item 19 of the proposed agenda, the Company has an obligation, subject to certain conditions, to deliver shares in the Company to the Participants in the LTIP 2025.

    In order to secure the Company’s obligation to deliver shares and to cover a portion of the costs (including taxes and social security charges), the Board of Directors proposes that the Annual General Meeting resolves to issue and transfer up to 5,450,000 warrants of series 2025:1 on the terms and conditions set out in item 20 a) below. In the event the nine-tenth (9/10) majority requirement applicable to the proposed warrant settlement method is not satisfied, the Board of Directors proposes that the Annual General Meeting resolves to approve that the Company hedges its obligations under the LTIP 2025 by entering into an equity swap arrangement with a third party, whereby the third party in its own name shall be entitled to acquire and transfer shares (including to the participants) on the terms and conditions set out in item 20 b) below.

    The Board of Directors considers the warrant settlement method to be the preferred alternative since the costs for an equity swap arrangement are significantly higher than the costs for issuing and transferring warrants. If the Annual General Meeting resolves to approve the proposed warrant settlement method under item 20 a) below with the requisite majority, the Board of Directors intends to withdraw its equity swap arrangement proposal under item 20 b) below.

    Item 20 a): Resolution in respect of delivery of shares under the LTIP 2025 through an issue and transfer of warrants of series 2025:1
    In order to secure the Company’s obligation to deliver shares under the LTIP 2025, the Board of Directors proposes that the Annual General Meetings resolves to issue and transfer warrants of series 2025:1 in the Company on the following terms and conditions:

    1. A maximum of 5,450,000 warrants shall be issued.
    2. The right to subscribe for warrants shall, with deviation of the shareholders’ preferential rights, rest with the Company itself.
    3. The reason for deviating from the shareholders’ preferential rights is to secure the Company’s obligations to deliver shares and to cover any costs (including taxes and social security charges) under the LTIP 2025.
    4. Subscription for the warrants shall take place on a separate subscription list not later than 1 November 2025.
    5. The warrants shall be issued free of charge.
    6. Each warrant shall entitle the holder to subscribe for one new share in the Company. The subscription price for each new share shall be equal to the quotient value of the Company’s share.
    7. The warrants may be exercised during the period from and including 1 June 2025 up to and including 1 June 2029.
    8. The new shares shall carry rights to dividends for the first time on the record date for dividends that occurs after subscription has been effected.
    9. The subscription price and the number of shares for which each warrant entitles subscription may be re-calculated under certain circumstances as set forth in the complete terms and conditions for the warrants.
    10. Upon exercise of all 5,450,000 warrants, the Company’s share capital will increase by SEK 66,312.15 (based on a quotient value of approximately SEK 0.01). If the subscription price exceeds the quotient value of the shares, the excess amount shall be allotted to the non-restricted statutory reserve (Sw. den fria överkursfonden).
    11. The Company may transfer up to 5,450,000 warrants (a) free of charge to Participants (and/or a designated third party) for the purpose of enabling the delivery of shares in the Company under the LTIP 2025 and (b) at a price equal to the fair market value of the warrants as determined using a customary valuation method to a designated third party for the purpose of covering any costs (including taxes and social security charges) under the LTIP 2025.

    The complete terms and conditions for the warrants of series 2025:1 will be available at the Company and on the Company’ website, www.orron.com, not later than three weeks prior to the Annual General Meeting.

    The resolution shall be conditional upon that the Annual General Meeting resolves to establish the LTIP 2025 in accordance with the Board of Directors’ proposal under item 19 of the proposed agenda.

    A resolution in accordance with the Board of Directors’ proposal requires support from shareholders representing not less than nine-tenth (9/10) of both the votes cast and the shares represented at the Annual General Meeting.

    Item 20 b): Resolution in respect of delivery of shares under the LTIP 2025 through an equity swap arrangement with a third party
    The Board of Directors proposes that the Annual General Meeting resolves to approve that the Company may hedge its obligations under the LTIP 2025 by entering into (or maintaining) an equity swap arrangement with a third party, whereby the third party in its own name shall be entitled to acquire and transfer shares (including to the participants) in accordance with the terms and conditions of the LTIP 2025.

    The resolution shall be conditional upon that the Annual General Meeting resolves to establish the LTIP 2025 in accordance with the Board of Directors’ proposal under item 19 of the proposed agenda.

    A resolution in accordance with the Board of Directors’ proposal requires support from shareholders representing more than half (1/2) of the votes cast at the Annual General Meeting.

    Item 21: Resolution in respect of authorisation for the Board of Directors to resolve on new issue of shares and convertible debentures
    The Board of Directors proposes that the Annual General Meeting resolves to authorise the Board of Directors to decide, at one or more occasions until the next Annual General Meeting:

    (i)    to issue no more than 28,500,000 new shares with consideration in cash or in kind or by set-off; and

    (ii)    to issue convertible debentures with consideration in cash or in kind or by set-off, where the number of shares that may be issued after conversion shall not exceed 28,500,000.

    The Board of Directors may resolve to deviate from the shareholders’ preferential rights. If the Board of Directors resolves to deviate from the shareholders’ preferential rights, the reason shall be to enable or facilitate acquisitions of companies or businesses or other major investments.

    The total number of shares that can be issued based on the proposed authorisations under (i) and (ii) may not together exceed 28,500,000. If the authorisation is exercised in full for issues with deviation from the shareholders’ preferential rights, the dilution effect is approximately ten per cent.

    A resolution in accordance with the Board of Directors’ proposal requires the support of shareholders representing at least two thirds (2/3) of the votes cast and of the shares represented at the Annual General Meeting.

    Item 22: Resolution in respect of authorisation for the Board of Directors to resolve on repurchase and sale of shares

    The Board of Directors proposes that the Board of Directors is authorised, during the period until the next Annual General Meeting, to decide on repurchases and sales of the Company’s shares on the following terms and conditions:

    1. The maximum number of shares repurchased shall be such that shares held in treasury from time to time do not exceed ten per cent of all shares of the Company.
    2. The maximum number of shares that may be sold is the number of shares that the Company at such time holds in treasury.
    3. Repurchase of shares may be made (a) on Nasdaq Stockholm or (b) in accordance with an offer directed to all shareholders.
    4. Repurchase and sale of shares on Nasdaq Stockholm may take place only at a price within the spread between the highest bid price and lowest ask price prevailing and disseminated by Nasdaq Stockholm from time to time. Repurchases of shares in accordance with an offer directed to all shareholders may also take place at a market premium in relation to the price prevailing and disseminated by Nasdaq Stockholm from time to time.
    5. The repurchases and sales shall be made in accordance with the provisions concerning the purchase and sale of a company’s own shares under applicable stock exchange rules and other applicable rules and regulations.

    The purpose of the authorisation is to provide the Board of Directors with an instrument to optimise the Company’s capital structure and to enable the use of own shares as consideration for or as financing of acquisitions of companies or businesses, to secure obligations under incentive plans and to cover costs, including social security charges, that may arise as a result of incentive plans.

    The Board of Directors’ reasoned statement pursuant to pursuant to Chapter 19, Section 22 of the Swedish Companies Act will be available at the Company and on the Company’s website, www.orron.com, not later than three weeks prior to the Annual General Meeting.

    A resolution in accordance with the Board of Directors’ proposal requires the support of shareholders representing at least two thirds (2/3) of the votes cast and of the shares represented at the Annual General Meeting.

    Number of shares and votes in the Company
    Orrön Energy’s share capital amounts to SEK 3,478,713.38, represented by 285,905,187 shares. Each share carries one vote. Orrön Energy holds, as of the date of this notice, no treasury shares.

    Shareholders’ right to request information

    The Board of Directors and the Chief Executive Officer shall, if a shareholder so requests and the Board of Directors considers that it may do so without significant damage to the Company, give information at the Annual General Meeting regarding circumstances that could affect the assessment of an item on the agenda and circumstances that could affect the assessment of the Company’s or a subsidiary’s financial situation. The duty to give information also applies to the Company’s relationship with another Group company and the consolidated financial statements.

    Additional documentation
    Complete proposals and other documents that shall be made available prior to the Annual General Meeting pursuant to the Swedish Companies Act and the Swedish Corporate Governance Code are available at Orrön Energy’s office (Hovslagargatan 5 in Stockholm) and on www.orron.com. The documents will be sent to shareholders free of charge upon request if their postal address is provided.

    Handling of personal data and external participants
    For information on how personal data is processed in connection with the Annual General Meeting, see the privacy notices of Euroclear Sweden AB and Computershare AB available at their respective websites, www.euroclear.com/dam/ESw/Legal/Privacy-notice-bolagsstammor-engelska.pdf. and
    www.computershare.com/se/gm-gdpr.

    It will not be possible for the Company to verify if any external persons are following the Annual General Meeting online. Consequently, the Board of Directors has resolved to allow persons who are not shareholders to follow the Annual General Meeting online.

    Stockholm in April 2025
    ORRÖN ENERGY AB (PUBL)
    The Board of Directors

    For further information, please contact:

    Robert Eriksson
    Corporate Affairs and Investor Relations
    Tel: +46 701 11 26 15
    robert.eriksson@orron.com

    Jenny Sandström
    Communications Lead
    Tel: +41 79 431 63 68
    jenny.sandstrom@orron.com

    Orrön Energy is an independent, publicly listed (Nasdaq Stockholm: “ORRON”) renewable energy company within the Lundin Group of Companies. Orrön Energy’s core portfolio consists of high quality, cash flow generating assets in the Nordics, coupled with greenfield growth opportunities in the Nordics, the UK, Germany and France. With significant financial capacity to fund further growth and acquisitions, and backed by a major shareholder, management and Board with a proven track record of investing into, leading and growing highly successful businesses, Orrön Energy is in a unique position to create shareholder value through the energy transition.

    Forward-looking statements
    Statements in this press release relating to any future status or circumstances, including statements regarding future performance, growth and other trend projections, are forward-looking statements. These statements may generally, but not always, be identified by the use of words such as “anticipate”, “believe”, “expect”, “intend”, “plan”, “seek”, “will”, “would” or similar expressions. By their nature, forward-looking statements involve risk and uncertainty because they relate to events and depend on circumstances that could occur in the future. There can be no assurance that actual results will not differ materially from those expressed or implied by these forward-looking statements due to several factors, many of which are outside the company’s control. Any forward-looking statements in this press release speak only as of the date on which the statements are made and the company has no obligation (and undertakes no obligation) to update or revise any of them, whether as a result of new information, future events or otherwise.

    Attachment

    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-OSI Global: From IBM to OpenAI: 50 years of winning (and failed) strategies at Microsoft

    Source: The Conversation – France – By Frédéric Fréry, Professeur de stratégie, CentraleSupélec, ESCP Business School

    Paul Allen (L) and Bill Gates in 1970 at Lakeside School in Seattle, Washington state, US. Microsoft was created five years later. Author unknown/Wikimedia

    Microsoft celebrates its 50th anniversary. This article was written using Microsoft Word on a computer running Microsoft Windows. It is likely to be published on platforms hosted by Microsoft Azure, including LinkedIn, a Microsoft subsidiary with over one billion users. In 2024, the company generated a net profit of $88 billion from sales worth $245 billion. Its stock market value is close to $3,000 billion, making it the world’s second-most valuable company behind Apple and almost on a par with NVidia. Cumulative profits since 2002 are approaching $640 billion.

    And yet, 50 years ago, Microsoft was just a tiny computer company founded in Albuquerque, New Mexico by two former Harvard students, Bill Gates and Paul Allen, aged 19 and 22. The twists and turns that enabled it to become one of the most powerful companies in the world are manifold, and can be divided into four distinct eras.

    First era: Bill Gates rides on IBM’s shoulders

    At the end of the 1970s, IBM was the computer industry’s undisputed leader. It soon realized that microcomputers developed by young Silicon Valley entrepreneurs, such as the Apple II, would eventually eclipse IBM’s mainframes, and so the IBM PC project was launched. However, it soon became clear that the company’s hefty internal processes would prevent it from delivering a microcomputer on schedule. It was therefore decided that various components of the machine could be outsourced using external suppliers.


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    Several specialized companies were approached to provide the operating system. They all refused, seeing IBM as the enemy to be destroyed, a symbol of centralized, bureaucratic computing. Mary Maxwell Gates, who sat on the board of an NGO next to the IBM chairman, suggested the name of her son William, nicknamed Bill, who had just founded Microsoft, and the first contact was established in 1980.

    The problem was that Microsoft was focused on a programming language called BASIC and certainly not specialized in operating systems. Not that this was ever going to be a problem for Bill Gates, who, with considerable nerve, agreed to sign a deal with IBM to deliver an operating system he didn’t have. Gates then purchased the QDOS system from Seattle Computer Products, from which he developed MS-DOS (where MS stands for Microsoft).

    Gates, whose father was a founding partner of a major Seattle law firm, then made his next move. He offered IBM a non-exclusive contract for the use of MS-DOS, which gave him the right to sell it to other computer companies. IBM, which was not used to subcontracting, was not suspicious enough: the contract brought fortunes to Microsoft and misery to IBM when Compaq, Olivetti and Hewlett-Packard rushed to develop IBM PC clones, giving birth to a whole new industry.

    Success followed for Microsoft. It not only benefited from IBM’s serious image, which appealed to businesses, but also received royalties on every PC sold on the market. In 1986, the company was introduced on the stock market. Bill Gates, Paul Allen and two of their early employees became billionaires, while 12,000 additional Microsoft employees went on to become millionaires.

    Second era: Windows, the golden goose (courtesy of Xerox)

    In the mid-1980s, microcomputers were not very functional: their operating systems, including Microsoft’s MS-DOS, ran with forbidding command lines, like the infamous C:/. This all changed in 1984 with the Apple Macintosh, which was equipped with a graphic interface (icons, drop-down menus, fonts, a mouse, etc.). This revolutionary technology was developed in Xerox’s research laboratory, even though the photocopy giant failed to understand its potential. On the other hand, Steve Jobs, Apple’s CEO, was largely inspired by it: to ensure the success of the Macintosh computer, Jobs asked Microsoft to develop a customized version of its office suite, in particular its Excel spreadsheet. Microsoft embraced the graphic interface principle and launched Windows 1 in 1985, which was soon followed by the Office suite (Word, Excel and PowerPoint).

    Over the following years, Windows was further improved, culminating in Windows 95, launched in 1995, with an advertising campaign costing over $200 million, for which Bill Gates bought the rights of The Rolling Stones’ “Start Me Up”. At the time, Microsoft’s world market share in operating systems exceeded 70%. This has hardly changed since.

    In 1997, Microsoft even went so far as to save Apple from bankruptcy by investing $150 million in its capital in the form of non-voting shares, which were sold back three years later. During one of his famous keynote speeches, Steve Jobs thanked Bill Gates by saying: “Bill, thank you. The world’s a better place.” This bailout also put an end to the lawsuit Apple had filed against Microsoft, accusing it of copying its graphic interface when designing the Windows operating system.

    Third era: bureaucratization, internal conflicts and a failed diversification strategy

    In the mid-1990s, computing underwent a new transformation with the explosion of the World Wide Web. Microsoft was a specialist in stand-alone PCs, with a business model based on selling boxed software, and it was ill-prepared for the new global networks. Its first response was to develop Internet Explorer, a browser developed from the takeover of the Mosaic browser designed by the Spyglass company, a bit like MS-DOS in its day. Internet Explorer was eventually integrated into Windows, prompting a lawsuit against Microsoft for abuse of its dominant position, which could have led to the company’s break-up. New competitors, such as Google with its Chrome browser, took advantage of these developments to attract users.

    In 2000, Bill Gates handed over his position as Microsoft CEO to Steve Ballmer, one of his former Harvard classmates, whose aim was to turn the company into an electronics and services company. Over the next fifteen years, Ballmer embarked on a series of initiatives to diversify the company by including video games (Flight Simulator), CD encyclopedias (Encarta), hardware (mice, keyboards), MP3 players (Zune), online web hosting (Azure), game consoles (Xbox), phones (Windows Phone), tablets and computers (Surface).

    While some of these products were successful (notably Azure and Xbox), others were bitter failures. Encarta was quickly swamped by Wikipedia and Zune was no match for Apple’s iPod. Windows Phone remains one of the greatest strategic blunders in the company’s history. In order to secure the company’s success in mobile telephony and compete with the iPhone, Microsoft bought the cell phone division of Finland’s Nokia for $5.4 billion in September 2013. The resulting integration was a disaster: Steve Ballmer wanted Microsoft’s phones to use a version of Windows 10, making them slow and impractical. Less than two years later, Microsoft put an end to its mobile phone operations, with losses amounting to $7.6 billion. Nokia was sold for just $350 million.

    One of the outcomes of Microsoft’s multiple business initiatives has been an explosion in the number of its employees, from 61,000 in 2005 to 228,000 in 2024. Numerous internal disputes broke out between different business units, which sometimes refused to work together.

    These turf wars, coupled with pervasive bureaucratization and effortless profitability (for each Windows installation, PC manufacturers pay around $50, while the marginal cost of the license is virtually zero), have hindered Microsoft’s capacity for innovation. Its software, including Internet Explorer 6 and Windows Vista, was soon mocked by users for its imperfections, which were continually plugged by frequent updates. As some people noted, Windows is equipped with a “safe” mode, suggesting that its normal mode is “failure”.

    Fourth era: is Microsoft the new cool (thanks to the Cloud and OpenAI)?

    In 2014, Satya Nadella replaced Steve Ballmer as head of Microsoft. Coming from the online services division, Nadella’s objective was to redirect Microsoft’s strategy online, notably by developing the Azure online web hosting business. In 2024, Azure became the world’s second-largest cloud service behind Amazon Web Services, and more than 56% of Microsoft’s turnover came from its online services. Nadella changed the company’s business model: software is no longer sold but available on a subscription basis, in the shape of products such as Office 365 and Xbox Live.

    Along the way, Microsoft acquired the online game Minecraft, followed by the professional social network LinkedIn, in 2016, for $26.2 billion (its largest acquisition to date), and the online development platform GitHub in 2018 for $7.5 billion.

    Between 2023 and 2025, Microsoft invested more than $14 billion in OpenAI, the company behind ChatGPT, giving it a particularly enviable position in the artificial intelligence revolution. ChatGPT’s models also contribute to Microsoft’s in-house AI, Copilot.

    Over the past 50 years, thanks to a series of bold moves, timely acquisitions and failed strategies to diversify, Microsoft has evolved significantly in its scope, competitive advantage and business model. Once stifled by opulence and internal conflicts, the company seems to have become attractive again, most notably to young graduates. Who can predict whether Microsoft will still exist in 50 years? Bill Gates himself says the opposite, but he may be bluffing.

    Frédéric Fréry ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d’une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n’a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.

    – ref. From IBM to OpenAI: 50 years of winning (and failed) strategies at Microsoft – https://theconversation.com/from-ibm-to-openai-50-years-of-winning-and-failed-strategies-at-microsoft-253576

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: AFRICA/SENEGAL – Appointment of bishop of Saint-Louis du Sénégal

    Source: Agenzia Fides – MIL OSI

    Wednesday, 2 April 2025

    Vatican City (Agenzia Fides) – The Holy Father has appointed the Reverend Augustin Simmel Ndiaye, of the clergy of Dakar, until now rector of the Catholic University of West Africa (UCAO) in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, as bishop of the diocese of Saint-Louis du Sénégal, Senegal.Msgr. Augustin Simmel Ndiaye was born on 2 January 1959 in Fadiouth. He studied philosophy and theology at the François Libermann Interdiocesan Major Seminary of Sébikhotane, Dakar.He was ordained a priest on 9 April 1983.After ordination, he first held the role of vicar of the Cathedral of Notre Dames des Victoires in Dakar (1983-1988). He was awarded a doctorate in canon law from the Pontifical Urbaniana University of Rome (1988-1922), and went on to serve as vicar of Sainte Thérèse in Grand-Dakar (1992-1993), professor of canon law, methodology and introduction to sacramental liturgical practice in the François Libermann Interdiocesan Major Seminary of Sébikhotane (1992-1998), president of the Union of Senegalese Clergy (1996-1999), rector (1998-2005) and professor of canon law (1998-2014) at the François Libermann Interdiocesan Major Seminary of Sébikhotane, president of the interdiocesan tribunal of Thiès, member of the Council for Economic Affairs of the metropolitan archdiocese of Dakar, parish priest of the Cathedral of Notre Dames des Victoires (2005-2014), fidei donum in the diocese of Angers, France, internship at the ecclesiastical tribunal of Angers (2014-2018), and parish priest of Sainte Marthe in Mbour (2018-2020). Since 2020 he has served as rector of the Catholic University of West Africa (UCAO) in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso. (E.G.) (Agenzia Fides, 2/4/2025)
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    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Import of Rare Earth Metals

    Source: Government of India

    Posted On: 02 APR 2025 2:19PM by PIB Delhi

    The details on the quantum of rare earth metals imported and the countries from which it has been imported during the last five years is given at Annexure-I.

    Government is aware of the occurrence of neodymium in the country. The Geological Survey of India (GSI), under the Ministry of Mines, is actively engaged in carrying out mineral exploration across the country following guidelines of United Nations Framework Classification [UNFC stage viz. reconnaissance surveys (G4), preliminary exploration (G3) and general exploration (G2)] and the Minerals (Evidence of Mineral Contents) (MEMC) Rules, 2015 with an aim to augment resource for various mineral commodities including critical minerals specified in Part D of the First Schedule of the Mines & Minerals (Development & Regulation) (MMDR) Amendment Act, 2023. During Field Season (FS) 2021-22 and 2022-23, GSI had taken up three reconnaissance stage projects for Rare Earth Elements including neodymium in Sirohi and Bhilwara districts of Rajasthan as per the approved field season programme. The details are given at Annexure-II.

    The Department of Atomic Energy has explored 1,11,845 tonne in-situ Rare Earth Elements Oxide (REO) in hard rock terrains in parts of Balotra (erstwhile Barmer) district, Rajasthan. As policy framework for utilizing critical minerals, including rare earth metals, the National Critical Mineral Mission has been launched, which is India’s strategic initiative to secure critical mineral supply chain by increasing domestic critical minerals production and foreign supply sources.

    Under the Mission, GSI has prioritized and intensified its exploration activities for critical and strategic minerals across the country including Rajasthan, with an aim to find out potential mineralized locales as well as to establish more resources for these minerals. During the current FS 2024-25, GSI has taken up 195 exploration projects including 35 projects in Rajasthan, to assess the mineral potential of strategic and critical minerals. The detailed list of mineral exploration projects taken up by GSI in Rajasthan exclusively for REE/RM and associated minerals from FS 2021-22 to 2024-25 is given at Annexure-III. Since MMDR Amendment Act, 2015, GSI has established resource of REE in Barmer and Sikar districts of Rajasthan. GSI has handed over one resource bearing geological report (GR) on REE, one Geological Memorandums (GM) on REE and one GM on tungsten for auctioning.

    ANNEXURE-I

    Annexure-I referred to in reply to part (a) of Lok Sabha Unstarred Question No. 5253 answered on 02.04.2025 regarding ‘Import of Rare Earth Metals’

    Table: Country wise quantum of rare earth metals imported by India during last 5 years

     Quantity in Tonnes

    #

    HS Code- Description

    2019-20

    2020-21

    2021-22

    2022-23

    2023-24

    Country

    Qty

    Country

    Qty

    Country

    Qty

    Country

    Qty

    Country

    Qty

    1.

    28053000– Alkali or alkaline earth metals: Rare-earth metals, scandium and yttrium, whether or not intermixed or inter alloyed

    China

    437

    China

    445

    China

    714.5

    China

    709

    China

    699

    Hong Kong

    34

    Japan

    11

    Japan

    34

    Japan

    42

    Hong Kong

    234

    Japan

    2

    Sweden

    10

    USA

    6.6

    Singapore

    20

    Japan

    192

    USA

    0.57

    USA

    4.69

    Hong Kong

    5

    Hong Kong

    20

    Mongolia

    60

    UK

    0.08

    Hong Kong

    0.05

    Russia

    1

    USA

    1.09

    UK

    0.11

    Others

    0.00

    Others

    0.07

    Others

    0.06

    Others

    0.18

    Others

    0.02

    Total

    473.65

    Total

    470.61

    Total

    761

    Total

    792

    Total

    1,185

    2.

    2846- Compounds, inorganic or organic, of rare earth metals

    Russia

    452

    China

    695

    China

    745

    China

    796

    China

    780

    China

    434

    Russia

    156

    Japan

    196

    Korea

    150

    Japan

    148

    Japan

    255

    Japan

    133

    Korea

    93

    Japan

    148

    Korea

    90

    Germany

    59

    Korea

    91

    Austria

    41

    USA

    20

    USA

    24

    Austria

    31

    Austria

    46

    Russia

    40

    France

    14

    France

    19

    Others

    144

    Others

    129

    Others

    69

    Others

    24

    Others

    24

    Total

    1,375

    Total

    1,250

    Total

    1,183

    Total

    1,153

    Total

    1,086

     

    REE Total

     

    1,848

     

    1,721

     

    1,944

     

    1,945

     

    2,270

    Note:REE has 17 elements. HS codes 280530 and 2846 pertain to REE as a whole and not to a particular element.

     

    ANNEXURE-II

    Annexure-II referred to in reply to part (b) of Lok Sabha Unstarred Question No. 5253 answered on 02.04.2025 regarding ‘Import of Rare Earth Metals’

    Table: G4 stage projects taken up for Rare Earth Elements including neodymium in Rajasthan during FS 2021-22 and FS 2022-23

    Sl. No

    State

    District

    Name of Mineral Block / Area/ Belt

    UNFC Stage

    Mineral Commodity

    FS: 2021-22

    1

    Rajasthan

    Sirohi

    Jirawal-Sanpur

    G4

    Neodymium and Dysprosium

    2

    Rajasthan

    Bhilwara

    Mahendragarh-Gundli-Bawri

    G4

    Neodymium and associated REE

    FS: 2022-23

    3

    Rajasthan

    Bhilwara

    Kodukota-Raser-Lulas-Kallyakhera

    G4

    REE and associated Neodymium

     

    ANNEXURE-III

     

    Annexure-III referred to in reply to part (c) of Lok Sabha Unstarred Question No. 5253 answered on 02.04.2025 regarding ‘Import of Rare Earth Metals’

    Table: List of projects taken up by GSI on REE/RM and associated minerals from FS 2021-22 to FS 2024-25

     

    Sl. No.

    State

    District

    Name of Mineral Block / Area / Belt

    UNFC Stage

    Mineral Commodity

    FS: 2021-22

    1

    Rajasthan

    Jaipur

    Asalpur, Boraj, Bichun

    G4

    REE & RM, basemetal

    2

    Rajasthan

    Sikar

    South East of Nanagwas

    G3

    REE & RM, basemetal

    3

    Rajasthan

    Sirohi

    Jirawal-Sanpur

    G4

    Neodymium, Dysprosium (REE)

    4

    Rajasthan

    Bhilwara

    Mahendragarh-Gundli-Bawri

    G4

    Neodymium, REE

    5

    Rajasthan

    Barmer

    Sainji Ki Beri-Meli

    G4

    REE

    6

    Rajasthan

    Barmer

    Indrana-Siwana

    G4

    REE

    7

    Rajasthan

    Barmer

    WNW of Sukleswar Ka Mandir

    G3

    REE & RM

    8

    Rajasthan

    Barmer

    Nimale Ki Pahari-Dantala

    G4

    REE & RM

    9

    Rajasthan

    Barmer

    Kundal-Dhiran

    G4

    REE & RM

    10

    Rajasthan

    Jaisalmer

    Jaisalmer-Pokran

    G4

    REE, RM

    FS: 2022-23

    1

    Rajasthan

    Barmer

    SE of Mawri

    G3

    REE

    2

    Rajasthan

    Barmer

    north of Kalaur Ka Danta

    G3

    REE, RM

    3

    Rajasthan

    Barmer

    Kalaur Ka Danta

    G3

    REE, RM

    4

    Rajasthan

    Barmer

    Kaluri-Tapra-Buriwara

    G4

    REE

    5

    Rajasthan

    Bhilwara

    Kodukota-Raser-Lulas-Kallyakhera

    G4

    Neodymium and associated REE

    6

    Rajasthan

    Barmer

    Bachharau-Dhorimana

    G4

    REE

    7

    Rajasthan

    Barmer

    south of Gura Nal

    G3

    REE

    8

    Rajasthan

    Sikar

    Ladi Ka Was

    G3

    REE, RM, Basemetal

    9

    Rajasthan

    Sikar

    Kalakhera

    G3

    REE, RM, Basemetal

    10

    Rajasthan

    Barmer

    SE of Gugrot

    G3

    REE

    11

    Rajasthan

    Jalore

    Ahor-Beria-Ajitpura

    G4

    REE, RM

    12

    Rajasthan

    Barmer

    WNW of Sukleswar Ka Mandir

    G3

    REE, RM

    13

    Rajasthan

    Barmer

    Relon Ki Dhani – Telwara

    G4

    REE

    FS: 2023-24

    1

    Rajasthan

    Alwar

    Dadikar, Harsora and Khairthal

    G4

    REE, RM, Tungsten, Tin, Niobium, Beryllium, Tantalum, Hafnium

    2

    Rajasthan

    Udaipur

    Semari

    G4

    REE, Gold, Basemetal

    3

    Rajasthan

    Udaipur

    Seriya

    G4

    REE, Gold, Basemetal

    4

    Rajasthan

    Sirohi

    Wan-Mochhal-Bhev

    G4

    REE, RM

    5

    Rajasthan

    Udaipur

    Padrara-Sayra

    G4

    REE

    6

    Rajasthan

    Ajmer

    Piloda Nagola

    G4

    REE

    7

    Rajasthan

    Banswara

    Bhongra-Bargun

    G4

    Graphite, RM

    8

    Rajasthan

    Barmer

    East of Gugrot

    G3

    REE

    9

    Rajasthan

    Jalore&Sirohi

    Jastwantpura

    G4

    REE

    10

    Rajasthan

    Sirohi

    Punawa-Ranela-Kooma

    G4

    REE

    11

    Rajasthan

    Dungarpur

    Barwasa -Lodowal

    G4

    REE, RM

    12

    Rajasthan

    Barmer

    Nakoda

    G4

    REE, RM

    FS: 2024-25

    1

    Rajasthan

    Sikar

    Ladi ka Bas

    G2

    REE, RM

    2

    Rajasthan

    Dungarpur

    Gara Sialia

    G4

    REE, RM

    3

    Rajasthan

    Jalore

    Dorda-Ambatri

    G4

    REE, RM

    4

    Rajasthan

    Tonk

    Kalyanpura-Kakor

    G4

    REE

    5

    Rajasthan

    Ajmer and Pali

    Ratangarh-Jetgarh

    G4

    RM

    6

    Rajasthan

    Sirohi

    Malawa-Nagani

    G4

    REE, RM

    7

    Rajasthan

    Pali and Sirohi

    Chhotila-Badla-Raghunathpura

    G4

    REE, RM

    8

    Rajasthan

    Alwar

    Sibagaon North

    G3

    Tin, Lithium, RM

    9

    Rajasthan

    Nagaur and Ajmer

    Chinwali-Bhutas

    G4

    REE, Basemetal

    10

    Rajasthan

    Barmer

    Jhak and Khimpar

    G4

    REE

    11

    Rajasthan

    Barmer

    Kitpala-Sinli

    G4

    REE

    12

    Rajasthan

    Pali

    Thandi Beri

    G4

    RM

    13

    Rajasthan

    Barmer and Jodhpur

    Patodi-Thob

    G4

    REE

    14

    Rajasthan

    Sirohi

    Rewakakri-Moras-UparlaSavela

    G4

    RM

    15

    Rajasthan

    Sirohi and Pali

    Malnu-Velar-Chotila ki Bhagli

    G4

    RM

    16

    Rajasthan

    Sirohi

    Isra Darbar Khera Chhota-Dhanta

    G4

    RM

     

    This information was given by Union Minister of Coal and Mines Shri G. Kishan Reddy in a written reply in Lok Sabha today.

    ****

    Sunil Kumar Tiwari

    (Release ID: 2117701) Visitor Counter : 65

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Thales Alenia Space wins €51 million contract to extend EGNOS service life

    Source: Thales Group

    Headline: Thales Alenia Space wins €51 million contract to extend EGNOS service life

    Strengthening Europe’s critical navigation infrastructure thanks to EGNOS satellite-based augmentation system

    Cannes, April 2, 2025 – Thales Alenia Space, a joint venture between Thales (67%) and Leonardo (33%), has signed a new contract worth €51 million with the European Union Agency for the Space Programme (EUSPA) to extend the operational life of the European Satellite-Based Augmentation System (EGNOS). Named LIFEX 1 (Life Extension Phase 1), this contract will ensure that EGNOS V2 continues to provide reliable, secure, and high-performance navigation services for Europe’s aviation, maritime, land transport, mapping and agricultural sectors beyond 2028. 

    EGNOS © Thales Alenia Space 

    EGNOS system enhances the accuracy, reliability and integrity of positioning signals by improving the performance of Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS), such as GPS and, in the future, Galileo. As part of this contract, Thales Alenia Space will address EGNOS V2 critical system upgrades and infrastructure improvements, reinforcing the system’s resilience and operational durability. These updates will focus on enhancing security measures, modernizing components, and ensuring the ongoing reliability of EGNOS’s “Safety of Life” service, which plays a key role in aviation, enabling accurate approaches at European airports without requiring ground guidance systems. Operational since 2011, this service has significantly improved operational safety and efficiency for the greater benefit of European operators.

    ”EGNOS is a key asset for Europe, ensuring safer and more efficient transport across multiple sectors. This contract will secure the extension of the system in operations, making the service more robust to support a growing number of users and strengthening the European Union’s satellite navigation capabilities,” said Rodrigo da Costa, Executive Director of EUSPA.

    “We are very proud to support our client EUSPA in extending the lifetime of an operational system that plays a key role in European navigation every day. With this latest contract, Thales Alenia Space demonstrates its European and export leadership in satellite navigation and contributes to the success of the EGNOS system in Europe” said David Philipona, Vice-President Navigation for Thales Alenia Space in France. “This is in line with Thales Alenia Space’s commitment to provide reliable and innovative navigation solutions to ensure safer and more efficient transport across the continent and across the world.”

    About EGNOS

    EGNOS is one of the European Union’s flagship space programs, designed to improve the performance of Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS), such as GPS and, in the future, Galileo. It enhances the accuracy, reliability, and integrity of satellite positioning signals, ensuring more precise and dependable navigation data for a wide range of industries. EGNOS’s “Safety of Life” service is essential for aviation, enabling precision approaches to airports without requiring traditional ground-based guidance systems. 
    First deployed in 2005 and providing operational “open” service since 2009, the current EGNOS system was developed by Thales Alenia Space as prime contractor and is managed by the European Union Agency for the Space Programme (EUSPA).

    Global Impact: EGNOS leading the way

    The EGNOS system’s success has influenced the development of similar systems worldwide. For example, the Korean Space Agency chose Thales Alenia Space in 2019 to supply the Korean Augmentation Satellite System (KASS) which is based on EGNOS principles. The system is already being used to enhance aviation safety, after the first signals were successfully transmitted in December 2022.

    In sub-Saharan Africa, ASECNA (Agency for Aerial Navigation Safety in Africa and Madagascar) chose Thales Alenia Space in 2019 to carry out a Phase B project for a Satellite-Based Augmentation System (SBAS) in the region including delivery of a pre-operational service in 2020, to provide enhanced satellite-based navigation for aviation, particularly for flights into and out of areas with limited ground infrastructure. Nigerian operator NIGCOMSAT and Thales Alenia Space performed successful demonstration flights in Lomé and Douala in 2021, using the SBAS signal they have transmitted in the Africa and Indian Ocean region since September 2020 – the first SBAS service provided in this region, via the NIGCOMSAT-1R satellite. They also carried out a series of demonstrations of additional services provided by the A-SBAS system in Brazzaville, Congo.

    Thales Alenia Space: a long-standing leader in satellite navigation

    Thales Alenia Space brings over 40 years of expertise in satellite design, development, and operations to the EGNOS project. The company has been instrumental in the creation, maintenance, and evolution of EGNOS since its inception, ensuring its effectiveness as a critical tool for European navigation systems.
    EGNOS V2, which has been delivering the Safety of Life service since 2011, will continue to operate under Thales Alenia Space’s guidance, with a focus on infrastructure modernization and obsolescence management. 

    About EUSPA

    The European Union Agency for the Space Programme (EUSPA) provides safe and secure European satellite navigation services, promotes the commercialization of Galileo, EGNOS, and Copernicus data and services and coordinates the EU’s forthcoming governmental satellite communications programme GOVSATCOM and the EU SST Front Desk. EUSPA is   responsible for the security accreditation of all the EU Space Programme components. By fostering the development of an innovative and competitive space sector and engaging with the  entire  EU  Space  community,  EUSPA  contributes  to  the  European green  and  digital transition,  the  safety  and  security  of  the  Union  and  its  citizens,  while  reinforcing  its  autonomy  and resilience. 

    About THALES ALENIA SPACE

    Drawing on over 40 years of experience and a unique combination of skills, expertise and cultures, Thales Alenia Space delivers cost-effective solutions for telecommunications, navigation, Earth observation, environmental management, exploration, science and orbital infrastructures. Governments and private industry alike count on Thales Alenia Space to design satellite-based systems that provide anytime, anywhere connections and positioning, monitor our planet, enhance management of its resources, and explore our Solar System and beyond. Thales Alenia Space sees space as a new horizon, helping to build a better, more sustainable life on Earth. A joint venture between Thales (67%) and Leonardo (33%), Thales Alenia Space also teams up with Telespazio to form the parent companies’ Space Alliance, which offers a complete range of services. Thales Alenia Space posted consolidated revenues of approximately 2.2 billion euros in 2023 and has around 8,600 employees in 16 sites in 8 countries across Europe.
     

    MIL OSI Economics –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Press release – Parliament endorses new fisheries protocol with Guinea-Bissau

    Source: European Parliament

    MEPs gave their consent on Wednesday to the updated fisheries agreement with Guinea Bissau, granting 41 EU vessels access to the country’s waters for the next five years.

    Under the new protocol, a total of 28 freezer tuna seiners and surface longliners and 13 pole-and-line tuna vessels, from Spain, France, Italy, Greece and Portugal, are allowed to fish in Guinea-Bissau’s waters. Altogether, European fishers are authorised to catch up to 3,500 gross registered tonnage (GRT) of cephalopods and 3,700 GRT of shrimp annually until 2029. Small pelagic species are off limits owing to the state of the stocks and low uptake.

    In exchange, the EU will provide €85 million in funding over the five years. This consists of €17 million per year, with €4.5 million set aside annually to promote Guinea-Bissau’s sustainable fisheries management and to support local fishing communities. This is an increase of €1.4 million per year, compared with the previous agreement.

    In addition to the EU’s contribution, ship-owners will pay licence and capture fees to the country’s administration. The global EU contribution to Guinea-Bissau will therefore surpass €100 million for the five-year period.

    Provisionally applied since 18 September 2024, the new protocol was approved in plenary by 518 votes in favour, 104 against and 61 abstentions.

    Better support for local fisheries

    With 605 votes in favour, 68 against and 10 abstentions, MEPs also approved a set of recommendations for the Commission and Guinea-Bissau’s authorities to consider during future negotiations and when applying the current protocol.

    Parliament wants to ensure that the deal really does support the development of local fisheries. Guinea-Bissau’s infrastructure must be improved to secure market access for local fish. Cooperation is meanwhile needed to enable Guinea-Bissau to export its fishery products.

    MEPs are concerned that “Guinea-Bissau is fast emerging as a flag-of-convenience country”. They note that the fight against illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU fishing) is being held back by a lack of transparency regarding vessel ownership. Parliamentarians therefore call on the EU to mobilise technical and financial assistance to strengthen, monitor, and control fishing activities, prevent IUU fishing and combat reflagging strategies.

    Quote

    Rapporteur Eric Sargiacomo (S&D, FR) said: “the Commission should improve monitoring and ensure that sectoral cooperation is geared more towards local food security needs, social conditions on board vessels, and recognition of the participation of women in coastal communities”.

    Background

    In terms of the funds involved, the agreement with Guinea-Bissau is the EU’s second most important fisheries partnership deal with a third country , second only to the agreement with Mauritania.

    Although fishing represents 15% of Guinea-Bissau’s government revenue, the country cannot export seafood to the EU because it does not meet EU health and sanitary requirements. It is estimated that only 3% of catches made by foreign vessels in Guinea Bissau’s fishing zone are landed in the country.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Revision of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 – E-001232/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-001232/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Christophe Clergeau (S&D)

    Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 establishes common rules to protect the social security rights of people moving within the European Union, as well as in Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland. It recognises that EU Member States decide aspects such as the beneficiaries of social security systems, the level of allowances and eligibility.

    • 1.Are there any plans for this regulation to be revised?
    • 2.Does the regulation still apply to cross-border workers in the Moselle department of France who worked in Germany and receive unemployment benefits in France?

    Submitted: 25.3.2025

    Last updated: 2 April 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Minutes – Tuesday, 1 April 2025 – Strasbourg – Final edition

    Source: European Parliament

    PV-10-2025-04-01

    EN

    EN

    iPlPv_Sit

    Minutes
    Tuesday, 1 April 2025 – Strasbourg

     Abbreviations and symbols

    + adopted
    – rejected
    ↓ lapsed
    W withdrawn
    RCV roll-call votes
    EV electronic vote
    SEC secret ballot
    split split vote
    sep separate vote
    am amendment
    CA compromise amendment
    CP corresponding part
    D deleting amendment
    = identical amendments
    § paragraph

    IN THE CHAIR: Roberta METSOLA
    President

    1. Opening of the sitting

    The sitting opened at 09:01.


    2. Conclusions of the European Council meeting of 20 March 2025 (debate)

    European Council and Commission statements: Conclusions of the European Council meeting of 20 March 2025 (2024/2980(RSP))

    António Costa (President of the European Council) and Ursula von der Leyen (President of the Commission) made the statements.

    The following spoke: Manfred Weber, on behalf of the PPE Group, Iratxe García Pérez, on behalf of the S&D Group, Kinga Gál, on behalf of the PfE Group, Nicola Procaccini, on behalf of the ECR Group, Valérie Hayer, on behalf of the Renew Group, Terry Reintke, on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group, Manon Aubry, on behalf of The Left Group, Alexander Sell, on behalf of the ESN Group, Dolors Montserrat, Raphaël Glucksmann, Jean-Paul Garraud, Patryk Jaki, Billy Kelleher, Virginijus Sinkevičius, Pasquale Tridico, Zsuzsanna Borvendég, Ruth Firmenich, Siegfried Mureşan, Paolo Borchia, Nicolas Bay, Gerben-Jan Gerbrandy, Hannah Neumann, Li Andersson, Katarína Roth Neveďalová, Željana Zovko, Alex Agius Saliba, Anna Bryłka, Charlie Weimers, Hilde Vautmans, Reinier Van Lanschot, Paulo Cunha, who also answered a blue-card question from João Oliveira, Christel Schaldemose, Gilles Pennelle, Carlo Fidanza, Svenja Hahn, Tom Berendsen (the President spoke about Siegbert Frank Droese’s behaviour following Hannah Neumann’s speech), Javier Moreno Sánchez, Harald Vilimsky, Johan Van Overtveldt, Marie-Pierre Vedrenne, Reinhold Lopatka, Dan Nica, Emmanouil Fragkos, Ľubica Karvašová, Danuše Nerudová, Marta Temido, Anna Zalewska, Karlo Ressler, Elio Di Rupo, François-Xavier Bellamy, Aodhán Ó Ríordáin and Brando Benifei.

    The following spoke under the catch-the-eye procedure: Dariusz Joński, Vytenis Povilas Andriukaitis, Anna Maria Cisint, Sebastian Tynkkynen, João Oliveira, Siegbert Frank Droese, Lukas Sieper, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Bruno Gonçalves and Seán Kelly.

    The following spoke: Maroš Šefčovič (Member of the Commission) and António Costa.

    The debate closed.


    3. Russia’s war crimes in Ukraine: standing with Ukraine and upholding justice (debate)

    Statement by the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy: Russia’s war crimes in Ukraine: standing with Ukraine and upholding justice (2025/2635(RSP))

    The President said that there would be only one round of political group speakers and no catch-the-eye procedure or blue-card questions.

    Kaja Kallas (Vice President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy) made the statement.

    The following spoke: Sandra Kalniete, on behalf of the PPE Group, Thijs Reuten, on behalf of the S&D Group, Anders Vistisen, on behalf of the PfE Group, Michał Dworczyk, on behalf of the ECR Group, Petras Auštrevičius, on behalf of the Renew Group, Villy Søvndal, on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group, Martin Schirdewan, on behalf of The Left Group, and René Aust, on behalf of the ESN Group.

    The following spoke: Kaja Kallas.

    The debate closed.


    4. Amendment of the agenda

    In accordance with Rule 164(2), the President proposed the following amendment of the agenda, with the agreement of the political groups:

    Wednesday/Thursday

    The vote on ‘Energy-intensive industries’ (item 24 on the agenda) would be held over until voting time on Thursday.

    Parliament agreed to the proposal.

    The agenda was amended accordingly.

    (The sitting was suspended at 11:54.)


    IN THE CHAIR: Esteban GONZÁLEZ PONS
    Vice-President

    5. Resumption of the sitting

    The sitting resumed at 12:01.


    6. Voting time

    For detailed results of the votes, see also ‘Results of votes’ and ‘Results of roll-call votes’.


    6.1. Amending Directives (EU) 2022/2464 and (EU) 2024/1760 as regards the dates from which Member States are to apply certain corporate sustainability reporting and due diligence requirements ***I (vote)

    Amending Directives (EU) 2022/2464 and (EU) 2024/1760 as regards the dates from which Member States are to apply certain corporate sustainability reporting and due diligence requirements (COM(2025)0080 – C10-0038/2025 – 2025/0044(COD)) – JURI Committee

    REQUEST FOR AN URGENT DECISION by the PPE Group (Rule 170(6))

    Approved

    The following tabling deadlines had been set:

    – amendments: Wednesday 2 April 2025 at 13:00
    – requests for separate votes and split votes: Wednesday 2 April 2025 at 19:00.

    Vote: 3 April 2025.

    The following had spoken:

    Tomas Tobé, on behalf of the PPE Group (the author of the request), and Manon Aubry against.

    Detailed voting results


    6.2. Request for waiver of the immunity of Jana Nagyová (vote)

    Report on the request for the waiver of the immunity of Jana Nagyová [2024/2035(IMM)] – Committee on Legal Affairs. Rapporteur: Krzysztof Śmiszek (A10-0029/2025)

    (Majority of the votes cast)

    PROPOSAL FOR A DECISION

    Adopted (P10_TA(2025)0040)

    Detailed voting results


    6.3. Request for waiver of the immunity of Petr Bystron (vote)

    Report on the request for waiver of the immunity of Petr Bystron [2024/2048(IMM)] – Committee on Legal Affairs. Rapporteur: Dominik Tarczyński (A10-0030/2025)

    (Majority of the votes cast)

    PROPOSAL FOR A DECISION

    Adopted (P10_TA(2025)0041)

    Detailed voting results


    6.4. Request for waiver of the immunity of Maciej Wąsik (vote)

    Report on the request for the waiver of the immunity of Maciej Wąsik [2024/2043(IMM)] – Committee on Legal Affairs. Rapporteur: Mario Furore (A10-0031/2025)

    (Majority of the votes cast)

    PROPOSAL FOR A DECISION

    Adopted (P10_TA(2025)0042)

    Detailed voting results


    6.5. Request for waiver of the immunity of Mariusz Kamiński (vote)

    Report on the request for the waiver of the immunity of Mariusz Kamiński [2024/2046(IMM)] – Committee on Legal Affairs. Rapporteur: Mario Furore (A10-0032/2025)

    (Majority of the votes cast)

    PROPOSAL FOR A DECISION

    Adopted (P10_TA(2025)0043)

    Detailed voting results


    6.6. Partial renewal of a member of the Court of Auditors – Lucian Romașcanu (vote)

    Report on the nomination of Lucian Romașcanu as a Member of the Court of Auditors [05958/2025 – C10-0010/2025 – 2025/0801(NLE)] – Committee on Budgetary Control. Rapporteur: Tomáš Zdechovský (A10-0039/2025)

    (Majority of the votes cast)
    (Secret ballot (Rule 133(3)))

    APPOINTMENT OF LUCIAN ROMAȘCANU

    Approved (P10_TA(2025)0044)

    The list of Members voting is annexed to these minutes (minutes of 1.4.2025 Annex 1)

    Detailed voting results


    6.7. Common data platform on chemicals, establishing a monitoring and outlook framework for chemicals ***I (vote)

    Report on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a common data platform on chemicals, laying down rules to ensure that the data contained in it are findable, accessible, interoperable and reusable and establishing a monitoring and outlook framework for chemicals [COM(2023)0779 – C9-0449/2023 – 2023/0453(COD)] – Committee on the Environment, Climate and Food Safety. Rapporteur: Dimitris Tsiodras (A10-0018/2025)

    (Majority of the votes cast)

    COMMISSION PROPOSAL and AMENDMENTS

    Approved by single vote (P10_TA(2025)0045)

    REQUEST FOR REFERRAL BACK TO COMMITTEE

    Approved

    The following had spoken:

    Dimitris Tsiodras (rapporteur), after the vote on the Commission’s proposal, to request that the matter be referred back to the committee responsible, for interinstitutional negotiations, in accordance with Rule 60(4).

    Detailed voting results


    6.8. Re-attribution of scientific and technical tasks to the European Chemicals Agency ***I (vote)

    Report on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2011/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the re-attribution of scientific and technical tasks to the European Chemicals Agency [COM(2023)0781 – C9-0448/2023 – 2023/0454(COD)] – Committee on the Environment, Climate and Food Safety. Rapporteur: Dimitris Tsiodras (A10-0019/2025)

    (Majority of the votes cast)

    COMMISSION PROPOSAL and AMENDMENTS

    Approved by single vote (P10_TA(2025)0046)

    REQUEST FOR REFERRAL BACK TO COMMITTEE

    Approved

    The following had spoken:

    Dimitris Tsiodras (rapporteur), after the vote on the Commission’s proposal, to request that the matter be referred back to the committee responsible, for interinstitutional negotiations, in accordance with Rule 60(4).

    Detailed voting results


    6.9. Re-attribution of scientific and technical tasks and improving cooperation among Union agencies in the area of chemicals ***I (vote)

    Report on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulations (EC) No 178/2002, (EC) No 401/2009, (EU) 2017/745 and (EU) 2019/1021 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the re-attribution of scientific and technical tasks and improving cooperation among Union agencies in the area of chemicals [COM(2023)0783 – C9-0447/2023 – 2023/0455(COD)] – Committee on the Environment, Climate and Food Safety. Rapporteur: Dimitris Tsiodras (A10-0020/2025)

    (Majority of the votes cast)

    COMMISSION PROPOSAL and AMENDMENTS

    Approved by single vote (P10_TA(2025)0047)

    REQUEST FOR REFERRAL BACK TO COMMITTEE

    Approved

    The following had spoken:

    Dimitris Tsiodras (rapporteur), after the vote on the Commission’s proposal, to request that the matter be referred back to the committee responsible, for interinstitutional negotiations, in accordance with Rule 60(4).

    Detailed voting results


    6.10. Macro-financial assistance to Jordan ***I (vote)

    Report on the proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on providing macro-financial assistance to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan [COM(2024)0159 – C9-0146/2024 – 2024/0086(COD)] – Committee on International Trade. Rapporteur: Céline Imart (A10-0038/2025)

    (Majority of the votes cast)

    COMMISSION PROPOSAL

    Approved (P10_TA(2025)0048)

    Parliament’s first reading thus closed.

    Detailed voting results

    10

    The following had spoken:

    Michael McGrath (Member of the Commission), before the vote, to make a statement.


    6.11. Macro-financial assistance to Egypt ***I (vote)

    Report on the proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on providing macro-financial assistance to the Arab Republic of Egypt [COM(2024)0461 – C10-0009/2024 – 2024/0071(COD)] – Committee on International Trade. Rapporteur: Céline Imart (A10-0037/2025)

    (Majority of the votes cast)

    COMMISSION PROPOSAL and AMENDMENTS

    Approved (P10_TA(2025)0049)

    REQUEST FOR REFERRAL BACK TO COMMITTEE

    Approved

    Detailed voting results

    11

    Procedural motions:

    – Michael McGrath (Member of the Commission), before the vote, to make a statement.

    – Céline Imart (rapporteur), after the vote on the Commission’s proposal, to request that the matter be referred back to the committee responsible, for interinstitutional negotiations, in accordance with Rule 60(4).


    6.12. Customs duties on imports of certain products originating in the USA ***I (vote)

    Report on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2018/196 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 February 2018 on additional customs duties on imports of certain products originating in the United States of America [COM(2025)0027 – C10-0007/2025 – 2025/0012(COD)] – Committee on International Trade. Rapporteur: Bernd Lange (A10-0034/2025)

    (Majority of the votes cast)

    PROVISIONAL AGREEMENT

    Adopted (P10_TA(2025)0050)

    Parliament’s first reading thus closed.

    Detailed voting results

    12

    (The sitting was suspended at 12:27.)


    IN THE CHAIR: Sabine VERHEYEN
    Vice-President

    7. Resumption of the sitting

    The sitting resumed at 12:31.


    8. Approval of the minutes of the previous sitting

    The minutes of the previous sitting were approved.


    9. CFSP and CSDP (Article 36 TUE) (joint debate)

    Report on the implementation of the common foreign and security policy – 2024 annual report [2024/2080(INI)] – Committee on Foreign Affairs. Rapporteur: David McAllister (A10-0010/2025)
    Report on the implementation of the common security and defence policy – annual report 2024 [2024/2082(INI)] – Committee on Foreign Affairs. Rapporteur: Nicolás Pascual de la Parte (A10-0011/2025)

    David McAllister and Nicolás Pascual de la Parte introduced the reports.

    The following spoke: Kaja Kallas (Vice President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy).

    The following spoke: Michael Gahler, on behalf of the PPE Group, Sven Mikser, on behalf of the S&D Group, Kinga Gál, on behalf of the PfE Group, Adam Bielan, on behalf of the ECR Group, Urmas Paet, on behalf of the Renew Group, Marc Botenga, on behalf of The Left Group, Stanislav Stoyanov, on behalf of the ESN Group, Rasa Juknevičienė, Tobias Cremer, António Tânger Corrêa, Alberico Gambino, Bart Groothuis, Hannah Neumann, Özlem Demirel, Marcin Sypniewski, Monika Beňová, Łukasz Kohut, Yannis Maniatis, Pierre-Romain Thionnet, Rihards Kols, Hilde Vautmans, Jaume Asens Llodrà, Lynn Boylan, Hans Neuhoff, Francisco José Millán Mon, Nacho Sánchez Amor, Afroditi Latinopoulou, Nathalie Loiseau, Hanna Gedin, Salvatore De Meo, Hana Jalloul Muro, Claudiu-Richard Târziu, Petras Auštrevičius, Davor Ivo Stier, who also answered a blue-card question from Diana Iovanovici Şoşoacă, Tonino Picula, Lucia Yar, Vangelis Meimarakis, who also answered a blue-card question from Petras Gražulis, Thijs Reuten, Marta Wcisło, Riho Terras, Antonio López-Istúriz White, Mārtiņš Staķis, on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group, and Sebastian Tynkkynen.

    The following spoke under the catch-the-eye procedure: Tomislav Sokol, João Oliveira, Željana Zovko, Lukas Sieper and Michał Szczerba.

    The following spoke: Kaja Kallas, David McAllister and Nicolás Pascual de la Parte.

    The debate closed.

    Vote: 2 April 2025.


    10. Human rights and democracy in the world and the European Union’s policy on the matter – annual report 2024 (debate)

    Report on human rights and democracy in the world and the European Union’s policy on the matter – annual report 2024 [2024/2081(INI)] – Committee on Foreign Affairs. Rapporteur: Isabel Wiseler-Lima (A10-0012/2025)

    Isabel Wiseler-Lima introduced the report.

    The following spoke: Kaja Kallas (Vice President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy).

    The following spoke: Abir Al-Sahlani (rapporteur for the opinion of the FEMM Committee), Antonio López-Istúriz White, on behalf of the PPE Group, Francisco Assis, on behalf of the S&D Group, Christophe Bay, on behalf of the PfE Group, Arkadiusz Mularczyk, on behalf of the ECR Group, Barry Andrews, on behalf of the Renew Group, Catarina Vieira, on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group, Kathleen Funchion, on behalf of The Left Group, Petr Bystron, on behalf of the ESN Group, Reinhold Lopatka, Elisabeth Grossmann, Silvia Sardone, Sophie Wilmès, Mounir Satouri, Alvise Pérez, Liudas Mažylis, Marco Tarquinio, András László, who also answered a blue-card question from Catarina Vieira, Loucas Fourlas, Chloé Ridel, who also answered a blue-card question from João Oliveira, Hermann Tertsch, Emmanouil Kefalogiannis, Evin Incir and Alice Teodorescu Måwe.

    The following spoke under the catch-the-eye procedure: Sunčana Glavak, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Lukas Sieper and Michał Wawrykiewicz.

    The following spoke: Kaja Kallas.

    IN THE CHAIR: Roberts ZĪLE
    Vice-President

    The following spoke: Isabel Wiseler-Lima.

    The debate closed.

    Vote: 2 April 2025.


    11. Presentation of the new European Internal Security Strategy(debate)

    Commission statement: Presentation of the new European Internal Security Strategy (2025/2608(RSP))

    Magnus Brunner (Member of the Commission) made the statement.

    The following spoke: Tomas Tobé, on behalf of the PPE Group, Birgit Sippel, on behalf of the S&D Group, Fabrice Leggeri, on behalf of the PfE Group, Assita Kanko, on behalf of the ECR Group, Malik Azmani, on behalf of the Renew Group, Saskia Bricmont, on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group, Giuseppe Antoci, on behalf of The Left Group, Mary Khan, on behalf of the ESN Group, Jeroen Lenaers, Thijs Reuten, Jorge Buxadé Villalba, Alessandro Ciriani, Moritz Körner, who also answered a blue-card question from Lukas Sieper, Lena Düpont, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Petra Steger, Mariusz Kamiński, François-Xavier Bellamy, Marieke Ehlers, Charlie Weimers, Javier Zarzalejos, Joachim Stanisław Brudziński, who also declined to take a blue-card question from Dariusz Joński, Paulo Cunha, who also answered a blue-card question from João Oliveira, Elena Donazzan, Maciej Wąsik and Gheorghe Piperea.

    The following spoke under the catch-the-eye procedure: Dariusz Joński, José Cepeda, João Oliveira, Sunčana Glavak, Diana Iovanovici Şoşoacă, Ana Miguel Pedro and Lukas Sieper.

    The following spoke: Henna Virkkunen (Executive Vice-President of the Commission).

    The debate closed.


    12. EU Preparedness Union Strategy (debate)

    Commission statement: EU Preparedness Union Strategy (2025/2641(RSP))

    Hadja Lahbib (Member of the Commission) made the statement.

    The following spoke: Lena Düpont, on behalf of the PPE Group.

    IN THE CHAIR: Pina PICIERNO
    Vice-President

    The following spoke: Yannis Maniatis, on behalf of the S&D Group, Roberto Vannacci, on behalf of the PfE Group, Beata Szydło, on behalf of the ECR Group, Grégory Allione, on behalf of the Renew Group, Diana Riba i Giner, on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group, Ana Miranda Paz, on the language used by a Member during this debate (the President agreed), Merja Kyllönen, on behalf of The Left Group, Christine Anderson, on behalf of the ESN Group (the President reminded the House of the rules on conduct), Lukas Mandl, Christophe Clergeau, Christophe Bay, Elena Donazzan, Anna-Maja Henriksson, Ville Niinistö, Catarina Martins, Cecilia Strada, who referred to the speech of Roberto Vannacci (the President reiterated the need to respect the rules on conduct), Kostas Papadakis, who also answered a blue-card question from João Oliveira, Tomislav Sokol, Heléne Fritzon, Barbara Bonte, Adrian-George Axinia, who also declined to take a blue-card question from Alvise Pérez, Nathalie Loiseau, Lena Schilling, Luke Ming Flanagan, Massimiliano Salini, Annalisa Corrado, Juan Carlos Girauta Vidal, who also declined to take a blue-card question from Grégory Allione, Michał Dworczyk, Nicolás Pascual de la Parte, Leire Pajín, Matej Tonin, Tobias Cremer, Victor Negrescu and Vytenis Povilas Andriukaitis.

    The following spoke under the catch-the-eye procedure: Hélder Sousa Silva, Laura Ballarín Cereza, Ana Miranda Paz, Cecilia Strada, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, João Oliveira and Maria Zacharia.

    The following spoke: Hadja Lahbib.

    The debate closed.


    13. Improving the implementation of cohesion policy through the mid-term review to achieve a robust cohesion policy post 2027 (debate)

    Council and Commission statements: Improving the implementation of cohesion policy through the mid-term review to achieve a robust cohesion policy post 2027 (2025/2648(RSP))

    Adam Szłapka (President-in-Office of the Council) and Raffaele Fitto (Executive Vice-President of the Commission) made the statements.

    The following spoke: Andrey Novakov, on behalf of the PPE Group, Mohammed Chahim, on behalf of the S&D Group, Rody Tolassy, on behalf of the PfE Group, Denis Nesci, on behalf of the ECR Group, Ľubica Karvašová, on behalf of the Renew Group, Cristina Guarda, on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group, Elena Kountoura, on behalf of the The Left Group, Gabriella Gerzsenyi, Marcos Ros Sempere, Şerban Dimitrie Sturdza, Ciaran Mullooly, Gordan Bosanac, who also answered a blue-card question from Lukas Sieper.

    IN THE CHAIR: Esteban GONZÁLEZ PONS
    Vice-President

    The following spoke: Dan-Ştefan Motreanu, Victor Negrescu, Antonella Sberna, Raquel García Hermida-Van Der Walle, Christian Doleschal, Carla Tavares, who also answered a blue-card question from Ana Miranda Paz, Elsi Katainen, Elena Nevado del Campo, who also answered a blue-card question from Raquel García Hermida-Van Der Walle, Estelle Ceulemans, Joachim Streit, Jacek Protas and Hannes Heide.

    The following spoke under the catch-the-eye procedure: Nikolina Brnjac, Rosa Serrano Sierra, Ana Miranda Paz, Diana Iovanovici Şoşoacă, Francisco José Millán Mon, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Paulo Do Nascimento Cabral and Maria Grapini.

    The following spoke: Raffaele Fitto and Adam Szłapka.

    The debate closed.


    14. Safeguarding the access to democratic media, such as Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (debate)

    Statement by the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy: Safeguarding the access to democratic media, such as Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (2025/2630(RSP))

    Marta Kos (Member of the Commission) made the statement on behalf of the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.

    The following spoke: Sebastião Bugalho, on behalf of the PPE Group, Nils Ušakovs, on behalf of the S&D Group, António Tânger Corrêa, on behalf of the PfE Group, Małgorzata Gosiewska, on behalf of the ECR Group, Irena Joveva, on behalf of the Renew Group, Virginijus Sinkevičius, on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group, Milan Uhrík, on behalf of the ESN Group, Andrey Kovatchev, Francisco Assis, Hermann Tertsch, Alexandr Vondra, Dan Barna, Mary Khan, who also answered a blue-card question from Tomáš Zdechovský, Erik Kaliňák, who also answered a blue-card question from Veronika Cifrová Ostrihoňová, Ondřej Kolář, Robert Biedroń, Virginie Joron, Rihards Kols, Veronika Cifrová Ostrihoňová, Petar Volgin, Fidias Panayiotou, Rasa Juknevičienė, Hannes Heide, Csaba Dömötör, who also answered a blue-card question from Gabriella Gerzsenyi, Claudiu-Richard Târziu, Laurence Farreng, Elena Yoncheva, Isabel Wiseler-Lima, Evin Incir, who also answered a blue-card question from Fidias Panayiotou, and Julien Sanchez.

    IN THE CHAIR: Antonella SBERNA
    Vice-President

    The following spoke: Helmut Brandstätter, Mika Aaltola, Michał Kobosko, Alice Teodorescu Måwe and Tomáš Zdechovský.

    The following spoke under the catch-the-eye procedure: Radan Kanev, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Diana Iovanovici Şoşoacă and Gabriella Gerzsenyi.

    The following spoke: Marta Kos.

    The debate closed.


    15. Crackdown on democracy in Türkiye and the arrest of Ekrem İmamoğlu (debate)

    Statement by the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy: Crackdown on democracy in Türkiye and the arrest of Ekrem İmamoğlu (2025/2642(RSP))

    Marta Kos (Member of the Commission) made the statement on behalf of the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.

    The following spoke: Emmanouil Kefalogiannis, on behalf of the PPE Group, Nacho Sánchez Amor, on behalf of the S&D Group, Susanna Ceccardi, on behalf of the PfE Group, Assita Kanko, on behalf of the ECR Group, Malik Azmani, on behalf of the Renew Group, Vladimir Prebilič, on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group, Giorgos Georgiou, on behalf of The Left Group, Michalis Hadjipantela, Kathleen Van Brempt, Mathilde Androuët, Bernard Guetta, Mélissa Camara, Özlem Demirel, Reinhold Lopatka, Joanna Scheuring-Wielgus, Željana Zovko, Nikos Papandreou, Elissavet Vozemberg-Vrionidi and Dario Nardella.

    The following spoke under the catch-the-eye procedure: Sebastian Tynkkynen, Ana Miranda Paz, Hanna Gedin, Maria Zacharia, Lefteris Nikolaou-Alavanos, Lukas Sieper and Fidias Panayiotou.

    The following spoke: Marta Kos.

    The debate closed.


    16. Dramatic situation in Gaza and the need for an immediate return to the full implementation of the ceasefire and hostage release agreement (debate)

    Statement by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy: Dramatic situation in Gaza and the need for an immediate return to the full implementation of the ceasefire and hostage release agreement (2025/2644(RSP))

    Kaja Kallas (Vice President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy) made the statement.

    The following spoke: Hildegard Bentele, on behalf of the PPE Group, Evin Incir, on behalf of the S&D Group, Fabrice Leggeri, on behalf of the PfE Group, Bert-Jan Ruissen, on behalf of the ECR Group, Hilde Vautmans, on behalf of the Renew Group, Villy Søvndal, on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group, Irene Montero, on behalf of The Left Group, Alice Teodorescu Måwe, Sebastiaan Stöteler, Hana Jalloul Muro, Barry Andrews, Ana Miranda Paz, Giorgos Georgiou, Ondřej Kolář, who also answered a blue-card question from Rima Hassan, and Matjaž Nemec.

    IN THE CHAIR: Ewa KOPACZ
    Vice-President

    The following spoke: Tomáš Kubín, Leoluca Orlando, Danilo Della Valle, Céline Imart, who also answered a blue-card question from Benedetta Scuderi, Marta Temido, Saskia Bricmont, Estrella Galán, Aodhán Ó Ríordáin, Mimmo Lucano, and Marit Maij and Benedetta Scuderi, on the language sometimes used during this debate (the President took note).

    The following spoke under the catch-the-eye procedure: Davor Ivo Stier, Daniel Attard, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Vladimir Prebilič and Marc Botenga.

    The following spoke: Kaja Kallas.

    The debate closed.


    17. Targeted attacks against Christians in the Democratic Republic of the Congo – defending religious freedom and security (debate)

    Council and Commission statements: Targeted attacks against Christians in the Democratic Republic of the Congo – defending religious freedom and security (2025/2612(RSP))

    Kaja Kallas (Vice President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy) made the statement.

    The following spoke: Lukas Mandl, on behalf of the PPE Group, Marit Maij, on behalf of the S&D Group, Thierry Mariani, on behalf of the PfE Group, Patryk Jaki, on behalf of the ECR Group, Hilde Vautmans, on behalf of the Renew Group, Mounir Satouri, on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group, Marc Botenga, on behalf of The Left Group, Tomasz Froelich, on behalf of the ESN Group, Wouter Beke, Francisco Assis, György Hölvényi, Alexander Sell, Nikolaos Anadiotis, Reinhold Lopatka, Anja Arndt, Ingeborg Ter Laak and Davor Ivo Stier.

    The following spoke under the catch-the-eye procedure: Margarita de la Pisa Carrión, Joachim Stanisław Brudziński, Saskia Bricmont, Bert-Jan Ruissen and Sebastian Tynkkynen.

    The following spoke: Kaja Kallas.

    Motions for resolutions tabled under Rule 136(2) to wind up the debate: minutes of 3.4.2025, item I.

    The debate closed.

    Vote: 3 April 2025.


    18. Explanations of vote


    18.1. Written explanations of vote

    Explanations of vote submitted in writing under Rule 201 appear on the Members’ pages on Parliament’s website.


    19. Agenda of the next sitting

    The next sitting would be held the following day, 2 April 2025, starting at 09:00. The agenda was available on Parliament’s website.


    20. Approval of the minutes of the sitting

    In accordance with Rule 208(3), the minutes of the sitting would be put to the House for approval at the beginning of the afternoon of the next sitting.


    21. Closure of the sitting

    The sitting closed at 22:07.


    LIST OF DOCUMENTS SERVING AS A BASIS FOR THE DEBATES AND DECISIONS OF PARLIAMENT


    I. Documents received

    The following documents had been received from committees:

    – Report on Parliament’s estimates of revenue and expenditure for the financial year 2026 (2024/2111(BUI)) – BUDG Committee – Rapporteur: Matjaž Nemec (A10-0048/2025)


    ATTENDANCE REGISTER

    Present:

    Aaltola Mika, Abadía Jover Maravillas, Adamowicz Magdalena, Aftias Georgios, Agirregoitia Martínez Oihane, Agius Peter, Agius Saliba Alex, Alexandraki Galato, Allione Grégory, Al-Sahlani Abir, Anadiotis Nikolaos, Anderson Christine, Andersson Li, Andresen Rasmus, Andrews Barry, Andriukaitis Vytenis Povilas, Androuët Mathilde, Angel Marc, Annemans Gerolf, Annunziata Lucia, Antoci Giuseppe, Arias Echeverría Pablo, Arimont Pascal, Arłukowicz Bartosz, Arnaoutoglou Sakis, Arndt Anja, Arvanitis Konstantinos, Asens Llodrà Jaume, Assis Francisco, Attard Daniel, Aubry Manon, Auštrevičius Petras, Axinia Adrian-George, Azmani Malik, Bajada Thomas, Baljeu Jeannette, Ballarín Cereza Laura, Barley Katarina, Barna Dan, Barrena Arza Pernando, Bartulica Stephen Nikola, Bartůšek Nikola, Bausemer Arno, Bay Nicolas, Bay Christophe, Beke Wouter, Beleris Fredis, Bellamy François-Xavier, Benifei Brando, Benjumea Benjumea Isabel, Beňová Monika, Bentele Hildegard, Berendsen Tom, Berger Stefan, Berlato Sergio, Bernhuber Alexander, Biedroń Robert, Bielan Adam, Bischoff Gabriele, Blaha Ľuboš, Blinkevičiūtė Vilija, Blom Rachel, Bloss Michael, Bocheński Tobiasz, Boeselager Damian, Bogdan Ioan-Rareş, Bonaccini Stefano, Bonte Barbara, Borchia Paolo, Borrás Pabón Mireia, Borvendég Zsuzsanna, Borzan Biljana, Bosanac Gordan, Boßdorf Irmhild, Bosse Stine, Botenga Marc, Boyer Gilles, Boylan Lynn, Brandstätter Helmut, Brasier-Clain Marie-Luce, Braun Grzegorz, Brejza Krzysztof, Bricmont Saskia, Brnjac Nikolina, Brudziński Joachim Stanisław, Bryłka Anna, Buchheit Markus, Buczek Tomasz, Buda Daniel, Buda Waldemar, Budka Borys, Bugalho Sebastião, Buła Andrzej, Bullmann Udo, Burkhardt Delara, Buxadé Villalba Jorge, Bystron Petr, Bžoch Jaroslav, Camara Mélissa, Canfin Pascal, Carberry Nina, Cârciu Gheorghe, Carême Damien, Casa David, Caspary Daniel, Castillo Laurent, del Castillo Vera Pilar, Cavazzini Anna, Cavedagna Stefano, Ceccardi Susanna, Cepeda José, Ceulemans Estelle, Chahim Mohammed, Chaibi Leila, Chastel Olivier, Chinnici Caterina, Christensen Asger, Ciccioli Carlo, Cifrová Ostrihoňová Veronika, Ciriani Alessandro, Cisint Anna Maria, Clausen Per, Clergeau Christophe, Cormand David, Corrado Annalisa, Costanzo Vivien, Cotrim De Figueiredo João, Cowen Barry, Cremer Tobias, Crespo Díaz Carmen, Cristea Andi, Crosetto Giovanni, Cunha Paulo, Dahl Henrik, Danielsson Johan, Dauchy Marie, Dávid Dóra, David Ivan, Decaro Antonio, de la Hoz Quintano Raúl, Della Valle Danilo, Deloge Valérie, De Masi Fabio, De Meo Salvatore, Demirel Özlem, Deutsch Tamás, Devaux Valérie, Dibrani Adnan, Diepeveen Ton, Dieringer Elisabeth, Dîncu Vasile, Di Rupo Elio, Disdier Mélanie, Dobrev Klára, Doherty Regina, Doleschal Christian, Dömötör Csaba, Do Nascimento Cabral Paulo, Dorfmann Herbert, Dostalova Klara, Dostál Ondřej, Droese Siegbert Frank, Düpont Lena, Dworczyk Michał, Ecke Matthias, Ehler Christian, Ehlers Marieke, Eriksson Sofie, Erixon Dick, Eroglu Engin, Estaràs Ferragut Rosa, Everding Sebastian, Ezcurra Almansa Alma, Falcă Gheorghe, Falcone Marco, Farantouris Nikolas, Farreng Laurence, Farský Jan, Ferber Markus, Ferenc Viktória, Fernández Jonás, Fidanza Carlo, Fiocchi Pietro, Firea Gabriela, Firmenich Ruth, Fita Claire, Flanagan Luke Ming, Fourlas Loucas, Fourreau Emma, Fragkos Emmanouil, Freund Daniel, Frigout Anne-Sophie, Friis Sigrid, Fritzon Heléne, Froelich Tomasz, Fuglsang Niels, Funchion Kathleen, Furet Angéline, Furore Mario, Gahler Michael, Gál Kinga, Galán Estrella, Gálvez Lina, Gambino Alberico, García Hermida-Van Der Walle Raquel, Garraud Jean-Paul, Gasiuk-Pihowicz Kamila, Geadi Geadis, Gedin Hanna, Geese Alexandra, Geier Jens, Geisel Thomas, Gemma Chiara, Georgiou Giorgos, Gerbrandy Gerben-Jan, Germain Jean-Marc, Gerzsenyi Gabriella, Geuking Niels, Gieseke Jens, Giménez Larraz Borja, Girauta Vidal Juan Carlos, Glavak Sunčana, Glück Andreas, Glucksmann Raphaël, Goerens Charles, Gomes Isilda, Gómez López Sandra, Gonçalves Bruno, Gonçalves Sérgio, González Casares Nicolás, González Pons Esteban, Gori Giorgio, Gosiewska Małgorzata, Gotink Dirk, Gozi Sandro, Grapini Maria, Gražulis Petras, Gregorová Markéta, Griset Catherine, Gronkiewicz-Waltz Hanna, Groothuis Bart, Grossmann Elisabeth, Grudler Christophe, Gualmini Elisabetta, Guarda Cristina, Guetta Bernard, Guzenina Maria, Győri Enikő, Gyürk András, Hadjipantela Michalis, Hahn Svenja, Haider Roman, Halicki Andrzej, Hansen Niels Flemming, Hassan Rima, Hauser Gerald, Häusling Martin, Hava Mircea-Gheorghe, Heide Hannes, Heinäluoma Eero, Henriksson Anna-Maja, Herbst Niclas, Herranz García Esther, Hetman Krzysztof, Hohlmeier Monika, Hojsík Martin, Holmgren Pär, Hölvényi György, Homs Ginel Alicia, Humberto Sérgio, Ijabs Ivars, Imart Céline, Incir Evin, Inselvini Paolo, Iovanovici Şoşoacă Diana, Jalloul Muro Hana, Jamet France, Jarubas Adam, Jerković Romana, Jongen Marc, Joński Dariusz, Joron Virginie, Jouvet Pierre, Joveva Irena, Juknevičienė Rasa, Junco García Nora, Jungbluth Alexander, Kalfon François, Kaliňák Erik, Kaljurand Marina, Kalniete Sandra, Kamiński Mariusz, Kanev Radan, Kanko Assita, Karlsbro Karin, Kartheiser Fernand, Karvašová Ľubica, Katainen Elsi, Kefalogiannis Emmanouil, Kelleher Billy, Keller Fabienne, Kelly Seán, Kemp Martine, Kennes Rudi, Khan Mary, Kircher Sophia, Knafo Sarah, Knotek Ondřej, Kobosko Michał, Kohut Łukasz, Kolář Ondřej, Kollár Kinga, Kols Rihards, Konečná Kateřina, Kopacz Ewa, Körner Moritz, Kountoura Elena, Kovařík Ondřej, Kovatchev Andrey, Krištopans Vilis, Kruis Sebastian, Krutílek Ondřej, Kubín Tomáš, Kuhnke Alice, Kulja András Tivadar, Kulmuni Katri, Kyllönen Merja, Kyuchyuk Ilhan, Lakos Eszter, Lalucq Aurore, Lange Bernd, Langensiepen Katrin, Laššáková Judita, László András, Latinopoulou Afroditi, Laurent Murielle, Laureti Camilla, Laykova Rada, Lazarov Ilia, Lazarus Luis-Vicențiu, Leggeri Fabrice, Lenaers Jeroen, Leonardelli Julien, Lewandowski Janusz, Lexmann Miriam, Liese Peter, Lins Norbert, Loiseau Nathalie, Løkkegaard Morten, Lopatka Reinhold, López Javi, López Aguilar Juan Fernando, López-Istúriz White Antonio, Lövin Isabella, Lucano Mimmo, Luena César, Łukacijewska Elżbieta Katarzyna, Lupo Giuseppe, McAllister David, Madison Jaak, Maestre Cristina, Magoni Lara, Maij Marit, Maląg Marlena, Manda Claudiu, Mandl Lukas, Maniatis Yannis, Mantovani Mario, Maran Pierfrancesco, Marczułajtis-Walczak Jagna, Maréchal Marion, Mariani Thierry, Marino Ignazio Roberto, Martins Catarina, Marzà Ibáñez Vicent, Mato Gabriel, Matthieu Sara, Mavrides Costas, Maydell Eva, Mayer Georg, Mazurek Milan, Mažylis Liudas, McNamara Michael, Mebarek Nora, Mehnert Alexandra, Meimarakis Vangelis, Mendes Ana Catarina, Mendia Idoia, Mertens Verena, Mesure Marina, Metsola Roberta, Metz Tilly, Mikser Sven, Milazzo Giuseppe, Minchev Nikola, Miranda Paz Ana, Molnár Csaba, Montero Irene, Montserrat Dolors, Morace Carolina, Morano Nadine, Moreira de Sá Tiago, Moreno Sánchez Javier, Moretti Alessandra, Motreanu Dan-Ştefan, Mularczyk Arkadiusz, Müller Piotr, Mullooly Ciaran, Mureşan Siegfried, Muşoiu Ştefan, Nagyová Jana, Nardella Dario, Navarrete Rojas Fernando, Negrescu Victor, Nemec Matjaž, Nerudová Danuše, Nesci Denis, Neuhoff Hans, Neumann Hannah, Nevado del Campo Elena, Nica Dan, Niebler Angelika, Niedermayer Luděk, Niinistö Ville, Nikolaou-Alavanos Lefteris, Ní Mhurchú Cynthia, Noichl Maria, Nordqvist Rasmus, Novakov Andrey, Nykiel Mirosława, Obajtek Daniel, Ódor Ľudovít, Oetjen Jan-Christoph, Ohisalo Maria, Oliveira João, Omarjee Younous, Ó Ríordáin Aodhán, Orlando Leoluca, Ozdoba Jacek, Paet Urmas, Pajín Leire, Palmisano Valentina, Panayiotou Fidias, Papadakis Kostas, Papandreou Nikos, Pappas Nikos, Pascual de la Parte Nicolás, Paulus Jutta, Pedro Ana Miguel, Pedulla’ Gaetano, Pellerin-Carlin Thomas, Peltier Guillaume, Penkova Tsvetelina, Pennelle Gilles, Pérez Alvise, Peter-Hansen Kira Marie, Petrov Hristo, Picaro Michele, Picierno Pina, Picula Tonino, Piera Pascale, Pietikäinen Sirpa, Pimpie Pierre, Piperea Gheorghe, de la Pisa Carrión Margarita, Pokorná Jermanová Jaroslava, Polato Daniele, Polfjärd Jessica, Popescu Virgil-Daniel, Pozņaks Reinis, Prebilič Vladimir, Princi Giusi, Protas Jacek, Pürner Friedrich, Rackete Carola, Radev Emil, Radtke Dennis, Rafowicz Emma, Ratas Jüri, Razza Ruggero, Rechagneux Julie, Regner Evelyn, Repasi René, Repp Sabrina, Ressler Karlo, Reuten Thijs, Riba i Giner Diana, Ricci Matteo, Ridel Chloé, Riehl Nela, Ripa Manuela, Rodrigues André, Ros Sempere Marcos, Roth Neveďalová Katarína, Rougé André, Ruissen Bert-Jan, Ruotolo Sandro, Rzońca Bogdan, Saeidi Arash, Salini Massimiliano, Salis Ilaria, Salla Aura, Sánchez Amor Nacho, Sanchez Julien, Sancho Murillo Elena, Saramo Jussi, Sardone Silvia, Šarec Marjan, Sargiacomo Eric, Satouri Mounir, Saudargas Paulius, Sbai Majdouline, Sberna Antonella, Schaldemose Christel, Schaller-Baross Ernő, Schenk Oliver, Scheuring-Wielgus Joanna, Schieder Andreas, Schilling Lena, Schneider Christine, Schwab Andreas, Scuderi Benedetta, Seekatz Ralf, Sell Alexander, Serrano Sierra Rosa, Serra Sánchez Isabel, Sidl Günther, Sienkiewicz Bartłomiej, Sieper Lukas, Simon Sven, Singer Christine, Sinkevičius Virginijus, Sippel Birgit, Sjöstedt Jonas, Śmiszek Krzysztof, Smith Anthony, Smit Sander, Sokol Tomislav, Solier Diego, Solís Pérez Susana, Sommen Liesbet, Sonneborn Martin, Sorel Malika, Sousa Silva Hélder, Søvndal Villy, Squarta Marco, Staķis Mārtiņš, Stancanelli Raffaele, Ştefănuță Nicolae, Steger Petra, Stier Davor Ivo, Storm Kristoffer, Stöteler Sebastiaan, Stoyanov Stanislav, Strack-Zimmermann Marie-Agnes, Strada Cecilia, Streit Joachim, Strik Tineke, Strolenberg Anna, Sturdza Şerban Dimitrie, Stürgkh Anna, Sypniewski Marcin, Szczerba Michał, Szekeres Pál, Szydło Beata, Tamburrano Dario, Tânger Corrêa António, Tarczyński Dominik, Tarquinio Marco, Tarr Zoltán, Târziu Claudiu-Richard, Tavares Carla, Tegethoff Kai, Temido Marta, Teodorescu Georgiana, Teodorescu Måwe Alice, Terheş Cristian, Ter Laak Ingeborg, Terras Riho, Tertsch Hermann, Thionnet Pierre-Romain, Timgren Beatrice, Tinagli Irene, Tobback Bruno, Tobé Tomas, Tolassy Rody, Tomac Eugen, Tomašič Zala, Tomaszewski Waldemar, Tomc Romana, Tonin Matej, Toom Jana, Topo Raffaele, Torselli Francesco, Tosi Flavio, Toussaint Marie, Tovaglieri Isabella, Toveri Pekka, Tridico Pasquale, Trochu Laurence, Tsiodras Dimitris, Turek Filip, Tynkkynen Sebastian, Uhrík Milan, Ušakovs Nils, Vaidere Inese, Valchev Ivaylo, Vălean Adina, Valet Matthieu, Van Brempt Kathleen, Van Brug Anouk, van den Berg Brigitte, Vandendriessche Tom, Van Dijck Kris, Van Lanschot Reinier, Van Leeuwen Jessika, Vannacci Roberto, Van Overtveldt Johan, Van Sparrentak Kim, Varaut Alexandre, Vasconcelos Ana, Vasile-Voiculescu Vlad, Vautmans Hilde, Vedrenne Marie-Pierre, Verheyen Sabine, Verougstraete Yvan, Veryga Aurelijus, Vešligaj Marko, Vicsek Annamária, Vieira Catarina, Vigenin Kristian, Vilimsky Harald, Vincze Loránt, Vind Marianne, Vistisen Anders, Vivaldini Mariateresa, Volgin Petar, von der Schulenburg Michael, Vondra Alexandr, Voss Axel, Vozemberg-Vrionidi Elissavet, Vrecionová Veronika, Vázquez Lázara Adrián, Waitz Thomas, Walsh Maria, Walsmann Marion, Warborn Jörgen, Warnke Jan-Peter, Wąsik Maciej, Wawrykiewicz Michał, Wcisło Marta, Wechsler Andrea, Weimers Charlie, Werbrouck Séverine, Wiesner Emma, Wiezik Michal, Wilmès Sophie, Winkler Iuliu, Winzig Angelika, Wiseler-Lima Isabel, Wiśniewska Jadwiga, Wölken Tiemo, Wolters Lara, Yar Lucia, Yon-Courtin Stéphanie, Yoncheva Elena, Zacharia Maria, Zalewska Anna, Žalimas Dainius, Zarzalejos Javier, Zdechovský Tomáš, Zdrojewski Bogdan Andrzej, Zijlstra Auke, Zīle Roberts, Zingaretti Nicola, Złotowski Kosma, Zoido Álvarez Juan Ignacio, Zovko Željana, Zver Milan


    ANNEX 1 – Partial renewal of a member of the Court of Auditors – Lucian Romașcanu

    MEMBERS VOTING IN THE SECRET BALLOT

    ECR:
    Alexandraki, Axinia, Bartulica, Bay Nicolas, Berlato, Bielan, Bocheński, Brudziński, Buda Waldemar, Cavedagna, Ciccioli, Ciriani, Crosetto, Donazzan, Dworczyk, Erixon, Fidanza, Fiocchi, Fragkos, Gambino, Geadi, Gemma, Gosiewska, Inselvini, Jaki, Junco García, Kamiński, Kartheiser, Kols, Krutílek, Madison, Magoni, Maląg, Mantovani, Maréchal, Milazzo, Mularczyk, Müller, Nesci, Ozdoba, Peltier, Picaro, Piperea, Polato, Pozņaks, Procaccini, Razza, Ruissen, Rzońca, Sberna, Solier, Squarta, Storm, Sturdza, Szydło, Tarczyński, Târziu, Teodorescu, Terheş, Timgren, Tomaszewski, Torselli, Trochu, Tynkkynen, Valchev, Van Dijck, Van Overtveldt, Veryga, Vivaldini, Vondra, Vrecionová, Wąsik, Weimers, Wiśniewska, Zalewska, Zīle, Złotowski

    ESN:
    Anderson, Arndt, Aust, Bausemer, Borvendég, Boßdorf, Buchheit, David, Droese, Froelich, Gražulis, Jongen, Jungbluth, Khan, Knafo, Laykova, Mazurek, Neuhoff, Sell, Stoyanov, Sypniewski, Tyszka, Uhrík, Volgin

    NI:
    Anadiotis, Beňová, Blaha, Braun, De Masi, Dostál, Firmenich, Geisel, Iovanovici Şoşoacă, Kaliňák, Konečná, Laššáková, Lazarus, Nikolaou-Alavanos, Panayiotou, Papadakis, Pérez, Pürner, Roth Neveďalová, Sonneborn, von der Schulenburg, Warnke, Yoncheva, Zacharia

    PPE:
    Aaltola, Abadía Jover, Adamowicz, Aftias, Agius, Arias Echeverría, Arimont, Arłukowicz, Beke, Beleris, Bellamy, Benjumea Benjumea, Bentele, Berendsen, Berger, Bernhuber, Bogdan, Brejza, Brnjac, Buda Daniel, Budka, Bugalho, Buła, Carberry, Casa, Caspary, Castillo, Chinnici, Crespo Díaz, Cunha, Dahl, Dávid, de la Hoz Quintano, De Meo, Doherty, Doleschal, Do Nascimento Cabral, Düpont, Ehler, Estaràs Ferragut, Ezcurra Almansa, Falcă, Falcone, Farský, Ferber, Fourlas, Gahler, Gasiuk-Pihowicz, Gerzsenyi, Geuking, Gieseke, Giménez Larraz, Glavak, González Pons, Gotink, Gronkiewicz-Waltz, Hadjipantela, Halicki, Hansen, Hava, Herbst, Herranz García, Hetman, Hohlmeier, Humberto, Imart, Jarubas, Joński, Juknevičienė, Kanev, Kemp, Kircher, Kohut, Kolář, Kollár, Kopacz, Kovatchev, Kulja, Lakos, Lazarov, Lenaers, Lexmann, Liese, Lins, Lopatka, López-Istúriz White, Łukacijewska, McAllister, Mandl, Marczułajtis-Walczak, Mato, Maydell, Mažylis, Mehnert, Meimarakis, Mertens, Millán Mon, Montserrat, Morano, Motreanu, Mureşan, Navarrete Rojas, Nerudová, Nevado del Campo, Niedermayer, Novakov, Nykiel, Pascual de la Parte, Pedro, Pereira, Pietikäinen, Polfjärd, Popescu, Princi, Protas, Radev, Radtke, Ratas, Ressler, Ripa, Salini, Salla, Saudargas, Schenk, Schwab, Seekatz, Sienkiewicz, Simon, Smit, Solís Pérez, Sommen, Sousa Silva, Stier, Szczerba, Tarr, Teodorescu Måwe, Ter Laak, Terras, Tobé, Tomašič, Tomc, Tonin, Tosi, Tsiodras, Vaidere, Van Leeuwen, Verheyen, Voss, Vozemberg-Vrionidi, Vázquez Lázara, Walsh, Walsmann, Warborn, Wawrykiewicz, Wcisło, Weber, Wechsler, Winkler, Winzig, Wiseler-Lima, Zarzalejos, Zdechovský, Zdrojewski, Zoido Álvarez, Zovko, Zver

    PfE:
    Androuët, Annemans, Bartůšek, Bay Christophe, Blom, Bonte, Borchia, Borrás Pabón, Brasier-Clain, Bryłka, Buczek, Buxadé Villalba, Bžoch, Ceccardi, Cisint, Dauchy, Deloge, Deutsch, Diepeveen, Dieringer, Disdier, Dömötör, Dostalova, Ehlers, Ferenc, Frigout, Furet, Gál, Garraud, Girauta Vidal, Griset, Győri, Gyürk, Haider, Hauser, Hölvényi, Jamet, Joron, Knotek, Kovařík, Krištopans, Kruis, Kubín, László, Latinopoulou, Leggeri, Leonardelli, Mariani, Mayer, Moreira de Sá, Nagyová, Pennelle, Piera, Pimpie, de la Pisa Carrión, Pokorná Jermanová, Rougé, Sanchez, Sardone, Schaller-Baross, Sorel, Stancanelli, Steger, Stöteler, Szekeres, Tânger Corrêa, Tertsch, Thionnet, Tolassy, Tovaglieri, Turek, Vandendriessche, Vannacci, Varaut, Vicsek, Vilimsky, Vistisen, Werbrouck, Zijlstra

    Renew:
    Agirregoitia Martínez, Allione, Al-Sahlani, Auštrevičius, Azmani, Baljeu, Barna, Bosse, Boyer, Brandstätter, Canfin, Chastel, Christensen, Cotrim De Figueiredo, Cowen, Devaux, Eroglu, Farreng, Friis, García Hermida-Van Der Walle, Gerbrandy, Glück, Goerens, Gozi, Groothuis, Grudler, Guetta, Hahn, Henriksson, Ijabs, Joveva, Karlsbro, Karvašová, Katainen, Kelleher, Keller, Kobosko, Körner, Kulmuni, Kyuchyuk, Loiseau, McNamara, Minchev, Mullooly, Ní Mhurchú, Ódor, Oetjen, Paet, Petrov, Šarec, Singer, Strack-Zimmermann, Streit, Stürgkh, Tomac, Toom, Van Brug, van den Berg, Vasconcelos, Vasile-Voiculescu, Vautmans, Vedrenne, Verougstraete, Wiesner, Wiezik, Wilmès, Yar, Žalimas

    S&D:
    Agius Saliba, Andriukaitis, Angel, Annunziata, Arnaoutoglou, Assis, Attard, Bajada, Ballarín Cereza, Barley, Benifei, Biedroń, Bischoff, Blinkevičiūtė, Bonaccini, Borzan, Bullmann, Burkhardt, Cârciu, Cepeda, Ceulemans, Chahim, Clergeau, Corrado, Costanzo, Cremer, Cristea, Danielsson, Decaro, Dibrani, Dîncu, Di Rupo, Dobrev, Ecke, Eriksson, Fernández, Firea, Fita, Fuglsang, Gálvez, García Pérez, Geier, Germain, Glucksmann, Gomes, Gómez López, Gonçalves Bruno, Gonçalves Sérgio, Gori, Grapini, Grossmann, Gualmini, Guzenina, Heide, Heinäluoma, Homs Ginel, Incir, Jalloul Muro, Jerković, Jouvet, Kalfon, Kaljurand, Lalucq, Lange, Laurent, Laureti, López, López Aguilar, Luena, Lupo, Maestre, Maij, Maniatis, Maran, Mebarek, Mendes, Mikser, Molnár, Moreno Sánchez, Moretti, Muşoiu, Nardella, Negrescu, Nemec, Nica, Noichl, Ó Ríordáin, Pajín, Papandreou, Pellerin-Carlin, Penkova, Picula, Rafowicz, Regner, Repasi, Repp, Reuten, Ricci, Ridel, Rodrigues, Ros Sempere, Sánchez Amor, Sancho Murillo, Sargiacomo, Schaldemose, Scheuring-Wielgus, Schieder, Serrano Sierra, Sidl, Sippel, Śmiszek, Strada, Tarquinio, Temido, Tinagli, Tobback, Topo, Ušakovs, Van Brempt, Vešligaj, Vigenin, Vind, Wölken, Wolters, Zingaretti

    The Left:
    Andersson, Antoci, Arvanitis, Aubry, Barrena Arza, Botenga, Boylan, Carême, Chaibi, Clausen, Della Valle, Demirel, Everding, Farantouris, Flanagan, Fourreau, Funchion, Furore, Galán, Georgiou, Hassan, Kennes, Kountoura, Kyllönen, Lucano, Martins, Mesure, Montero, Morace, Oliveira, Omarjee, Palmisano, Pappas, Pedulla’, Rackete, Salis, Saramo, Schirdewan, Sjöstedt, Smith, Tamburrano, Tridico

    Verts/ALE:
    Andresen, Asens Llodrà, Bloss, Boeselager, Bosanac, Bricmont, Camara, Cavazzini, Cormand, Eickhout, Freund, Geese, Gregorová, Guarda, Häusling, Holmgren, Kuhnke, Langensiepen, Lövin, Marino, Marquardt, Marzà Ibáñez, Matthieu, Metz, Miranda Paz, Neumann, Niinistö, Nordqvist, Ohisalo, Orlando, Paulus, Peter-Hansen, Prebilič, Reintke, Riba i Giner, Riehl, Satouri, Sbai, Schilling, Scuderi, Sinkevičius, Søvndal, Staķis, Ştefănuță, Strik, Strolenberg, Tegethoff, Toussaint, Van Lanschot, Van Sparrentak, Vieira, Waitz

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Recognition of organic sugar produced in Guadeloupe – E-000732/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    Imports of organic sugar from Brazil must be certified by control bodies recognised by the Commission in accordance with Article 46(1) of Regulation (EU) 2018/848[1] as competent to carry out controls and to issue organic certificates in compliance with the EU’s organic legislation.

    The list of food additives authorised in organics is established in Regulation (EU) 2021/1165[2]. The food additives authorised are the same for producers in the EU including Guadeloupe and for organic producers in Brazil who wish to export to the EU.

    In accordance with Article 45(2) of Regulation (EU) 2018/848 the Commission may grant specific authorisations for the use of products and substances in third countries and in the outermost regions of the EU. The procedure to request an authorisation is established in Article 10 of Regulation (EU) 2021/1165.

    A consultation[3] has recently been carried out on a proposed amendment of that regulation to provide, inter alia, a dedicated procedure for the outermost regions of the EU to make such requests.

    On financing, the Common Agricultural Policy’s POSEI scheme (Programme d’Options Spécifiques à l’Eloignement et l’Insularité), with its high level of support and degree of subsidiarity, efficiently helps to strengthen local production.

    In 2024, the French POSEI allocated EUR 74.86 million to the cane-sugar-rum measure. Finally, in line with Article 349 of the Treaty[4] and with its 2022 Communication[5] on the strategy for the outermost regions, the Commission continues to take into account the outermost regions’ sensitive products in negotiating free trade agreements (FTA), assessing their effect and taking measures in the event of potential negative impacts, including safeguard clauses.

    • [1] Regulation (EU) 2018/848 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2018 on organic production and labelling of organic products and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 834/2007 (http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2018/848/oj).
    • [2] Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/1165 of 15 July 2021 authorising certain products and substances for use in organic production and establishing their lists (http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2021/1165/oj).
    • [3] https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/14024-Organic-production-amended-list-of-authorised-products-and-substances_en
    • [4] Article 349 of the Treaty on the functioning of the EU (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/treaty/tfeu_2012/art_349/oj/eng).
    • [5] Communication (COM(2022)198 final: Putting people first, securing sustainable and inclusive growth, unlocking the potential of the EU’s outermost regions (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52022DC0198).
    Last updated: 2 April 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI: CoinShares Resolves on Dividend Distribution for the financial year 2024

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    2 April 2025 | SAINT HELIER, Jersey | As announced on 18 February 2025, CoinShares International Limited (“CoinShares” or the “Company”) (Nasdaq Stockholm: CS; US OTCQX: CNSRF),  the leading European investment company specialising in digital assets, indicated a distribution to shareholders would be considered within the parameters of the dividend policy, subject to the finalisation of the Group audit for the year ended 31 December 2024

    Under the policy, the Company aims to return to shareholders by way of annual dividend of between 20% and 40% of the Group’s profit after tax, adjusted for any special dividend payments made during the period.

    Consistent with the policy, and following publication of the Group’s audited financial statements for the year ended 31 December 2024, the Board of the Company resolved to declare and pay in four equal instalments an annual dividend in relation to the financial year ending 31 December 2024 of approximately GBP 0.30 per ordinary share, amounting to GBP 20,000,000, to be paid from the Group’s reserves.

    The dividend to holders of ordinary shares will be made in sterling (GBP) and subsequently, before distribution to shareholders who hold ordinary shares via Euroclear Sweden, converted to SEK at prevailing rates at the time of distribution.

    The total number of shares in the Company as at 31 December 2024 was 2024 66,678,210.

    The key dates for the annual dividend are as follows:

      Ex-dividend date Record date Payment date Total Dividend
    Tranche 1 29 April 2025 30 April 2025 6 May 2025 GBP 5,000,000
    Tranche 2 27 June 2025 30 June 2025 3 July 2025 GBP 5,000,000
    Tranche 3 29 September 2025 30 September 2025 3 October 2025 GBP 5,000,000
    Tranche 4 29 December 2025 30 December 2025 7 January 2026 GBP 5,000,000

    In accordance with Article 115(4) of the Companies (Jersey) Law 1991, each payment will be subject to an assessment of the financial health of the Group by its Board.

    About CoinShares

    CoinShares is the leading European alternative asset manager specialising in digital assets, that delivers a broad range of financial services across investment management, trading and securities to a wide array of clients that includes corporations, financial institutions and individuals. Founded in 2013, the firm is headquartered in Jersey, with offices in France, Stockholm, the UK and the US. CoinShares is regulated in Jersey by the Jersey Financial Services Commission, in France by the Autorité des marchés financiers, in the US by the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority. CoinShares is publicly listed on the Nasdaq Stockholm under the ticker CS and the OTCQX under the ticker CNSRF.

    For more information on CoinShares, please visit: https://coinshares.com
    Company | +44 (0)1534 513 100 | enquiries@coinshares.com
    Investor Relations | +44 (0)1534 513 100 | enquiries@coinshares.com

    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-OSI Global: Europeans have more flexible views on how to respond to irregular migrants than policymakers think – new research

    Source: The Conversation – France – By Martin Ruhs, Professor of Migration Studies, European University Institute

    With an estimated minimum of 2.6 to 3.2 million irregular migrants in Europe and fierce public debates about them, policymakers face the difficult question of how to ensure migrants’ basic rights of protection from exploitation, destitution and ill health while also establishing effective migration controls. However, we know surprisingly little about how Europeans think about this policy dilemma.

    In our study, the first of its kind in Europe, we surveyed 20,000 people across Austria, Italy, Poland, Sweden, and the UK to understand their preferences on policies regarding access to healthcare, social welfare and labour protections, as well as the obtainment of regular legal status or “regularisation” for irregular migrants.

    The results challenge the idea that public attitudes toward irregular migrants’ rights are simply “for” or “against”. Instead, we find that variations in policy design matter – and when policies include both migration controls and protections for migrants, public support often increases.

    Our method

    To study public preferences for policies relating to irregular migrants, we conducted a conjoint survey experiment. In it, respondents were presented with different multidimensional “policy packages” that randomly varied in how they regulated opportunities for regularisation, as well as legal rights to access primary health care, financial support in low-income situations, and back pay of withheld wages.

    Respondents were shown two policy packages at a time, and then asked to rate and indicate which of the two they preferred. For each respondent, this process was repeated five times. This method allowed us to study how a change in a particular policy feature – e.g., a change in how access to primary healthcare is regulated – affects individuals’ support for the overall policy package.

    So, what do Europeans think? Here are some of our key results.

    • People favour selective regularisation

    Our results suggest that the public prefers targeted pathways for regularisation for irregular migrants. Across all five countries we analysed, respondents consistently preferred policies that allow irregular migrants to acquire legal status based on certain conditions, including a clean criminal record and a minimum length of stay in the host country. Somewhat surprisingly, there was no consistent preference between a five-year or ten-year minimum residence period.

    • Healthcare gets more support than financial assistance

    We found that giving irregular migrants access to healthcare is far less controversial than giving access to financial support for those living on low incomes. This aligns with findings from the US, where such support has remained politically divisive.

    • Some migration controls boost support for access to rights – but not all rights

    We also found greater support for irregular migrants receiving health care and back pay for withheld wages when these rights were linked to a migration control measure: obligations for public sector employees to report irregular migrants to authorities.

    This suggests, as existing literature highlights, that many people experience an internal conflict between humanitarian concerns and a desire for stricter migration controls.

    However, the pattern in our data does not hold for all rights: even when combined with reporting obligations, the provision of cash assistance for irregular migrants still does not generate public support.

    • A preference for essential workers

    Not all irregular migrants are viewed equally: our findings show that people are more supportive of rights and regularisation opportunities for migrants who previously worked legally in the host country – especially in essential roles like elder care. This reflects broader research on attitudes toward welfare deservingness, which found that public perception of migrants’ past contributions to society shape views on whether they should get access to rights.

    How do attitudes differ across countries?

    While there are many similarities in public views on regularisation opportunities and access to rights for irregular migrants across the countries we studied, there are also some notable differences. For example, support for providing primary healthcare varied: respondents in the UK were the least supportive, and respondents in Italy were the most. Similarly, while respondents in most countries opposed the provision of low-income support, Italian respondents were more ambivalent, showing no strong preference for or against this right for irregular migrants.

    Overall, respondents in Italy showed the greatest preferences for inclusive policies, including the strongest support for allowing irregular migrants to apply for legal status. While our analysis does not investigate the reasons for this, it may reflect Italy’s history of regularisation programmes in recent decades, which may have made Italian respondents more open to and supportive of such programmes.

    Rethinking public attitudes about irregular migrants

    Public attitudes matter – they influence which policies are feasible and sustainable over time. Our research shows that EU and UK residents don’t default to blunt and one-sided policies such as blanket opposition to irregular migrants ever gaining legal status. Instead, people are selective, and prefer policies that distinguish between giving irregular migrants different types of rights. People also have specific views about when and why irregular migrants should have access to healthcare, social welfare, labour protections and legal status.

    This does not mean that survey respondents wanted to offer unconditional legal status and access to rights to all irregular migrants. Instead, respondents often preferred an approach that combines selective access to rights with enforcement of migration rules. What our study indicates is that the public has more nuanced views on how migration should be managed than policymakers generally give them credit for. This suggests there may be more room for selective and inclusive policymaking than often assumed.

    This article is based on a research paper co-authored by Lutz Gschwind (Uppsala University, UU), Martin Ruhs (EUI), Anton Ahlén (UU) and Joakim Palme (UU). The paper is part of the international “PRIME” project that analyses the conditions of irregular migrants in Europe. PRIME is funded by the European Union Horizon Europe programme. Views and opinions expressed, however, are those of the authors only and do not necessarily reflect those of the EU or the European Research Executive Agency. Neither the EU nor the granting authority can be held responsible for them.

    The author has received support from the European Union Horizon Europe funding programme for research and innovation (project number 101095113).

    – ref. Europeans have more flexible views on how to respond to irregular migrants than policymakers think – new research – https://theconversation.com/europeans-have-more-flexible-views-on-how-to-respond-to-irregular-migrants-than-policymakers-think-new-research-253473

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –