Category: France

  • MIL-OSI Africa: Fighting fake news: how media in Kenya and Senegal check facts

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Layiré Diop, Professseur de communication, Francis Marion University

    Misinformation has accelerated in recent years, in speed and volume. Studies show that Africans are exposed to misinformation and disinformation on a regular basis.

    Disinformation refers to false information deliberately created to cause harm. Misinformation consists of false information that wasn’t created with the intention of harming individuals or groups. Either way, it’s often difficult to know whether something is true and accurate.

    Media fact-checking and media literacy have become more important than ever.

    As specialists in media and mass communication, we conducted a study of strategies to combat misinformation and disinformation. We also examined the role and impact of fact-checking practices. This research is based on 42 interviews conducted in 2021 with media professionals in Kenya and Senegal.

    The participants fell into three main categories. Some were journalists, while others specialised in fact-checking. The rest were individuals who influenced media policies, including government officials, thinktank employees and academics.

    Findings indicate that media professionals in Senegal and Kenya employ reactive fact-checking strategies such as cross-checking information from sources and verifying images and videos. They also promote media literacy as a proactive strategy to help media consumers critically engage with media content.

    The combination of the two methods is described as a shield and an antidote against the spread of misinformation and disinformation.

    Fact-checking: practices and perception

    In Kenya and Senegal, though information verification was already a daily routine for news organisations, fact-checking is gaining ground. It is emerging as an important approach to counter disinformation.

    Fact-checkers and journalists are at the forefront of verifying and determining the accuracy of information shared in public (for example, posts made by social media users) or content created by the media company. The most popular fact-checking services used by participants are PesaCheck, Piga Firimbi and AfricaCheck.

    In both countries, verification methods involve cross-checking multiple sources and analysing visual content. Findings of this study reveal that misinformation is most commonly found in political and health-related topics.

    Once verified, the information is shared in different formats. It is disseminated through news reports, social media posts, and short videos that debunk fake news.

    Cross-checking information

    This process involves consulting primary sources and seeking input from experts to clarify information and put it in context. Participants defined experts as specialists in a specific field, and individuals who regularly contribute to the subject through the media.

    In addition to asking sources and experts, media companies are setting up fact-checking services to verify information before publication. Participants from both countries revealed that media organisations trained their employees to use verification tools.

    Verifying images and videos

    Images and videos on social media often mix truths and manipulations. To debunk them, professionals use verification techniques. One common method is reverse image search: an online search for the image. This technique is made possible by geolocation and the large number of online images. Fact-checkers compare these images to verify content. Google’s reverse image search tool is the most widely used.

    Geolocation through Google Maps helps pinpoint the exact location where an image was taken, for comparison with the location claimed in the content being verified. For videos, professionals use a tool called InVID. This tool generates images from a video, which are then geolocated using reverse image search techniques.

    Perceptions of the effectiveness of fact-checking

    Media professionals in both countries saw fact-checking as an effective strategy to combat misinformation and disinformation and an essential tool for verifying content.

    However, they emphasised the importance of respecting freedom of expression. For them, it was essential to prevent the government or private sector from becoming the sole authority on the accuracy of information shared on media platforms.

    The recent decision by Meta (the technology conglomerate that owns Facebook, WhatsApp, Instagram and other services) to end its fact-checking programme and replace it with community ratings could lead to a new spread of false information.

    Media literacy: practice and perceptions

    Study participants concur that training the public in how to verify content is a proactive measure to curb misinformation. By doing this, professionals share their fact-checking processes as a form of media literacy.

    In Kenya, the press produces videos and tutorials to teach the public how to verify information online. Africa Check also produces materials on methods of verifying information.

    Fact-checking organisations and media outlets play a crucial role in verifying content. They also educate content consumers on how to verify information before sharing it on social media or messaging apps. To make these educational videos more accessible, they are translated into local languages. This helps content creators and consumers who do not understand French or English to better engage with the information.

    In Senegal, Africa Check partnered with a community radio station to provide media literacy training in a local language. The initiative involves fact-checking, translating articles into the Wolof language, and then sharing the information on WhatsApp.

    Perception of the effectiveness of media literacy

    Respondents saw media literacy as a proactive strategy that empowers the public to think critically and verify facts independently. Journalists and fact-checkers in Kenya and Senegal emphasised the importance of media education in curbing the spread of false information.

    In addition, they emphasised that media literacy is not only important for the public. Media professionals also need training to stay updated on technological changes and the strategies and techniques used by misinformation propagandists.

    Challenges to overcome

    These approaches face several obstacles. One is the reluctance of government officials to respond to information requests, often out of fear of critical fact-checking of their own statements. Cultural and linguistic diversity in Africa also presents a challenge for media professionals. Translating verified content into local languages is not easy and requires time and financial resources.

    In Senegal and Kenya, as in many other African countries, media literacy is not yet included in the school curriculum. Investing in media literacy programmes in schools would require expertise, money and time.

    In addition to the creation of fact-checking desks in newsrooms and raising public awareness of the dangers of misinformation, promoting media literacy at all levels (media, mosques, churches, businesses, schools, universities) should be a priority. Organising media weeks at school, as France does, could be a step towards that goal.

    – Fighting fake news: how media in Kenya and Senegal check facts
    – https://theconversation.com/fighting-fake-news-how-media-in-kenya-and-senegal-check-facts-251123

    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Inspection report published: An inspection of the Border Force operation to deter and detect clandestine entrants to the UK August 2024 – November 2024

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    News story

    Inspection report published: An inspection of the Border Force operation to deter and detect clandestine entrants to the UK August 2024 – November 2024

    This inspection examined the Border Force operation to deter and detect clandestine entrants at the juxtaposed controls in northern France (Calais, Coquelles, and Dunkerque), focusing on how efficiently and effectively staff resources and detection techniques are used and on Border Force’s engagement with security contractors, port and transport operators, and the French authorities.

    Over the course of the last decade, the UK government has contributed hundreds of millions of pounds towards the strengthening of security measures in northern France with the aim of preventing migrants from entering the UK illegally. Since 2020, spending has been focused on combating ‘small boat’ crossings. Prior to that, the emphasis had been on improving the physical security measures at the juxtaposed ports, including through the installation of many miles of fencing on the approach roads. This has made incursions into the ports and clandestine entry by concealment in vehicles much more difficult, which many argue is the reason why the small boat crossings began.   

    It is clear that the numbers of clandestine entrants detected at Calais, Coquelles, and Dunkerque have fallen substantially. In 2016, there were over 56,000. In 2024, there were around 5,000. However, the relationship between small boats and clandestine entry through the juxtaposed ports is not well understood. This needs more attention, not least to get ahead of any displacement effect if new measures to reduce small boat crossings begin to work.   

    Meanwhile, this inspection has shown that the threat of clandestine entry at the juxtaposed ports remains high and is unrelenting, both from organised facilitations and from opportunistic ‘jump-ups’. Border Force resources and capabilities are stretched, and its operations and those of its security contractors are closely monitored by migrants and by smuggling gangs to identify and be ready to exploit any weaknesses. It is therefore vital that Border Force continues to invest in staff, detection equipment and IT systems at the juxtaposed ports. To do so with confidence that it is investing in the right places, it needs to record and analyse what is working and where the gaps are much more systematically than is currently the case.        

    One of the measures employed to deter clandestine entry is a penalty scheme that enables Border Force to levy fines on anyone found to have a clandestine entrant in their vehicle. When I looked at this scheme in 2018, I found that no penalties had been imposed since July 2016. My report described the system as “broken” and in need of urgent attention. I recommended that the Home Office should fix the scheme so that penalties were issued wherever appropriate, and payment was pursued promptly. This recommendation was accepted. In 2019, I found that significant headway had been made with the backlog of referrals, but some cases had been waiting almost three years for a penalty notice to be imposed, calling into question the deterrent value of any eventual penalty. There was a problem with the resourcing of the team managing the scheme, and it did not have the IT it needed. At the time, Border Force indicated that it was aware of these issues and was already taking action to address them.   

    Given this history, it was all the more disappointing to find in this latest inspection that the team is still not staffed appropriately and does not have the systems required to run the scheme efficiently and effectively. This is despite the fact that the scope of the scheme was extended in 2023 to take in hauliers and lorry drivers who are found not to have secured their vehicles. At the same time, the penalties were substantially increased.     

    Even if income-generation is not its primary purpose, and the monies recovered are not wholly retained by the Home Office, it is hard to excuse the perennial under-investment in this area when the scheme has recovered over £10 million since the beginning of 2022, with another £26 million still to be recovered, albeit that some of this is uncollectible. If the Home Office is unwilling or unable to resource the scheme so that it works efficiently and effectively, ensuring that penalties are demonstrably consistent and fair, it should give serious consideration to reforming the scheme in line with the resources it is prepared to invest in it.  

    My report contains seven recommendations, covering: ‘ownership’ of clandestine entry and responsibility for ensuring that recommended improvements are implemented and embedded; an improved range of analyses, assessments and intelligence products to support decision-making about resources, investments and operational deployments; the provision of training to frontline Border Force officers to enable them to be used more flexibly; the installation of an integrated Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) system linking the juxtaposed controls at Calais, Coquelles, and Dunkerque; a ‘root and branch’ review of the working practices and processes of the civil penalties team; production and publication of an ‘engagement plan’ for industry stakeholders; and publication of an annual report on how the scheme is working.  

    In its formal response, the Home Office has accepted two recommendations and partially accepted four. While I had hoped that the department might have shown more ambition in some areas, including in its timescales for implementing improvements, it has set out its thinking and what it intends to deliver in a way that will enable the ICIBI and others to measure its progress. Meanwhile, it has rejected my recommendation regarding an integrated ANPR system on grounds of cost versus likely benefits, which I understand, but which reinforces my view that it needs to become better at analysing what is working in order to inform investment decisions.    

    My report was sent to the Home Secretary on 4 February 2025, so its publication today is well within the target of eight weeks, which is encouraging. The published report contains a number of redacted passages. These redactions were made by the Home Secretary in line with the UK Borders Act 2007 which empowers her to omit material if she thinks its publication is undesirable for reasons of national security. In my view, the redactions do not affect understanding of the key findings and recommendations. 

    My principal concern going forward is that whatever improvements Border Force makes to its processes and practices as a result of this inspection these are banked and become ‘business as usual’, so that when the ICIBI comes to look at this area again it is not having to repeat the same points.

    David Bolt, Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration

    25 March 2025

    Updates to this page

    Published 25 March 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: French string quartet Quatuor Béla set to stop off in Derry-Londonderry as part of NI tour

    Source: Northern Ireland – City of Derry

    French string quartet Quatuor Béla set to stop off in Derry-Londonderry as part of NI tour

    25 March 2025

    Walled City Music and Moving On Music (Belfast) present Quatuor Béla, one of France’s leading string quartets on a rare tour of Northern Ireland, supported by Arts Council of Northern Ireland and Queens University Belfast.

    Guided by the personality and work of Béla Bartok, the quartet play and deliver programmes with sincere conviction. Recognized for their “diabolical technique” (Télérama), Quatuor Béla have become one of the leading European quartets working with contemporary composers such as Garth Knox, Kaija Saariaho and Francesca Verunelli.

    Founded in 2006 by four musicians from the National Higher Conservatory of Music of Lyon and Paris, the Béla Quartet were brought together by a shared passion for the repertoire of the 20th century. The quartet is committed to championing new compositions and exploring the relationship between composers and performers.

    This tour of NI will feature significant works of the classical repertoire with Beethoven’s Serioso Quartet, Fauré’s only string quartet, alongside works by Queens University associated composers Piers Hellawell, and world premieres by Simon Mawhinney and Pedro Rebelo.

    The tour will begin in Christ Church Derry on Thursday 3rd April with Walled City Music, continuing to St Macartin’s Enniskillen with Music in Fermanagh, Market Place Theatre Armagh on Saturday 5th and finishing in Harty Room QUB Belfast on Sunday 6th April.

    For concert details and tickets for the Derry performance, please visit www.walledcitymusic.com.

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI: CoinShares announces issue of options under the Employee Incentive Plan

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    25 March 2025 | SAINT HELIER, Jersey | CoinShares International Limited (“CoinShares” or the “Company“) (Nasdaq Stockholm Market: CS; US OTCQX: CNSRF), a global investment firm specializing in digital assets, has granted 345,038 options (the “Options”) over ordinary shares of £0.000495 par value each (“Ordinary Shares”). The Options have been granted under the Company’s Employee Incentive Plan (“EIP”) as part of the staff remuneration for the financial year ended 31 December 2024, as approved by the Board on 24 March 2025.

    The 345,038 Options granted represent 0.52% of the issued share capital of the Company, bringing the total number of shares currently under option in issue to 3,511,303 (5.00% of the issued share capital of the Company).  

    The vesting date of the Options granted shall be 24 March 2028, being three years from the date of grant. The exercise price of the Options is SEK 72.8 per Ordinary Share.

    Options granted under the EIP to persons discharging managerial responsibilities for the Company have been included in the table below, which sets out the total shareholding and interests of each individual in the Company:

    Individual Role Number of Shares  % of issued capital New Options Total Options
    Richard Nash CFO 900 0.00% 220,038 424,461
    Benoit Pellevoizin Head of Marketing and Communications 0 0.00% 30,000 70,000
    Lewis Fellas Head of Hedge Fund Solutions 300 0.00% 30,000 30,000
        1,200 0.00% 280,038 524,461

    About CoinShares

    CoinShares is a leading global investment company specialising in digital assets, that delivers a broad range of financial services across investment management, trading and securities to a wide array of clients that includes corporations, financial institutions and individuals. Focusing on crypto since 2013, the firm is headquartered in Jersey, with offices in France, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the US. CoinShares is regulated in Jersey by the Jersey Financial Services Commission, in France by the Autorité des marchés financiers, and in the US by the Securities and Exchange Commission, National Futures Association and Financial Industry Regulatory Authority. CoinShares is publicly listed on the Nasdaq Stockholm under the ticker CS and the OTCQX under the ticker CNSRF.

    For more information on CoinShares, please visit: https://coinshares.com
    Company | +44 (0)1534 513 100 | enquiries@coinshares.com
    Investor Relations | +44 (0)1534 513 100 | enquiries@coinshares.com

    This information is information that CoinShares International Limited is obliged to make public pursuant to the EU Market Abuse Regulation (596/2014). The information in this press release has been published through the agency of the contact persons set out above, at 13:00 GMT on Tuesday, 25 March 2025.

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on general guidelines for the preparation of the 2026 budget, Section III – Commission – A10-0042/2025

    Source: European Parliament 2

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on general guidelines for the preparation of the 2026 budget, Section III – Commission

    (2024/2110(BUI))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to Article 314 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

     having regard to Article 106a of the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community,

     having regard to Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 of 17 December 2020 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021-2027[1] and to the joint declaration agreed between Parliament, the Council and the Commission in this context[2] and the related unilateral declarations[3],

     having regard to Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2022/2496 of 15 December 2022 amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027[4],

     having regard to the Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/765 amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027[5] (MFF Revision),

     having regard to its position of 16 December 2020 on the draft Council regulation laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027[6],

     having regard to its resolution of 15 December 2022 on upscaling the 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework: a resilient EU budget fit for new challenges[7],

     having regard to its resolution of 3 October 2023 on the proposal for a mid-term revision of the multiannual financial framework 2021-2027[8],

     having regard to its resolution of 27 February 2024 on the draft Council regulation amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027[9],

     having regard to Council Decision (EU, Euratom) 2020/2053 of 14 December 2020 on the system of own resources of the European Union and repealing Decision 2014/335/EU, Euratom[10],

     having regard to the Commission proposal of 22 December 2021 for a Council decision amending Decision (EU, Euratom) 2020/2053 on the system of own resources of the European Union (COM(2021)0570) and its position of 23 November 2022 on the proposal[11],

     having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (recast)[12] (the Financial Regulation),

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1119 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 June 2021 establishing the framework for achieving climate neutrality and amending Regulations (EC) No 401/2009 and (EU) 2018/1999 (‘European Climate Law’)[13],

     having regard to the EU’s obligations under the Paris Agreement and its commitments under the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework,

     having regard to the EU gender equality strategy 2020-2025,

     having regard to its resolution of 10 May 2023 on the impact on the 2024 EU budget of increasing European Union Recovery Instrument borrowing costs[14],

     having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget[15],

     having regard to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 16 December 2020 between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on budgetary discipline, on cooperation in budgetary matters and on sound financial management, as well as on new own resources, including a roadmap towards the introduction of new own resources[16],

     having regard to the Interinstitutional Proclamation on the European Pillar of Social Rights[17] of 13 December 2017,

     having regard to the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2025[18] and the joint statements agreed between Parliament, the Council and the Commission annexed hereto,

     having regard to Enrico Letta’s report entitled ‘Much more than a market’, presented in the European Parliament on 21 October 2024,

     having regard to Mario Draghi’s report entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness’, presented in the European Parliament on 17 September 2024,

     having regard to Sauli Niinistö’s report entitled ‘Safer together – Strengthening Europe’s civilian and military preparedness and readiness’, presented in the European Parliament on 14 November 2024,

     having regard to the presentation of the EU Competitiveness Compass by Commission President Ursula von der Leyen on 29 January 2025,

     having regard to the joint white paper of 19 March 2025 for European Defence Readiness providing a framework for the ReArm Europe plan (JOIN(2025)0120),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 26 February 2025 entitled ‘The Clean Industrial Deal: A joint roadmap for competitiveness and decarbonisation’ (COM(2025)0085),

     having regard to the proposal of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2025 amending Regulations (EU) 2015/1017, (EU) 2021/523, (EU) 2021/695 and (EU) 2021/1153 as regards increasing the efficiency of the EU guarantee under Regulation (EU) 2021/523 and simplifying reporting requirements (COM(2025)0084),

     having regard to the Council conclusions of 18 February 2025 on the budget guidelines for 2026,

     having regard to Rule 95 of its Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the opinions of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Transport and Tourism, the Committee on Regional Development and the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development,

     having regard to the letters from the Committee on Budgetary Control, the Committee on the Environment, Climate and Food Safety, the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy, the Committee on Culture and Education and the Committee on Constitutional Affairs,

     having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgets (A10-0042/2025),

    Budget 2026: building a resilient, sustainable and prosperous future for Europe

    1. Highlights the anticipated economic growth projected for 2025 and 2026 within the EU[19], accompanied by an easing of inflation; notes nonetheless the uncertainties stemming from Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, which directly threatens the security of the EU, and the worsening effects of climate change and the biodiversity crisis, also manifested in the increasing frequency and intensity of natural disasters, which are compounded by new significant geopolitical changes and a deteriorating international rules-based order, heightened security threats and a rise in global protectionism; emphasises that, in such an increasingly volatile landscape, it is imperative for the EU to enhance its defence and security capabilities, social, economic and territorial cohesion and political and strategic autonomy, decrease its dependence, increase its competitiveness and ensure a prosperous future for the continent and its people, who are currently facing an increasingly high cost of living;

    2. Is determined to ensure that the 2026 budget, by focusing on strategic preparedness and security, economic competitiveness and resilience, sustainability, climate, as well as strengthening the single market, provides the people in the EU with a robust ecosystem and delivers on their priorities, thus reinforcing a socially just and prosperous Europe; underlines the need for additional investment in security and defence, research, innovation, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), health, energy, migration, as well as land and maritime border protection, inclusive digital and green transitions, job creation, and the provision of opportunities for young people; insists that this be accompanied by administrative simplification, as indicated in the Competitiveness Compass; insists that the EU budget is the largest investment instrument with leverage effect, complementing national budgets and therefore enabling the EU to navigate the complexities of a rapidly changing world while ensuring prosperity, social cohesion and stability for its people; is strongly of the opinion that the EU should use this leverage effect to the maximum degree to boost the Union’s objectives and policymaking, as well as private investment;

    Investing in a solid, sustainable and resilient economy

    3. Is adamant that sound economic resilience and sustainability can be achieved in the EU by boosting public and private investment, increasing innovation and supporting competitiveness, including by addressing the skills gap and fostering more industrial production in Europe as a source for robust economic growth and quality jobs, and thereby guaranteeing the Union’s strategic autonomy, ensuring that the EU remains agile and self-reliant in the face of global challenges, disruptions and volatility; highlights the need to promote innovation, prioritise education, reduce costs and the administrative burden, and strengthen the single market, particularly as regards services;

    4. Reaffirms, in this regard, that research and innovation remain crucial for the EU’s success in cutting-edge industries and new clean and sustainable technologies; recalls the long-standing goal of increasing research and innovation investment to 3 % of gross domestic product (GDP); calls, therefore, for increased funding to be provided under Horizon Europe to fund at least 50 % of all excellent proposals in all scientific disciplines, enable researchers as well as companies, especially SMEs, to bring new developments to the market, and to scale up, ensure solid economic growth and boost the Union’s competitiveness in the global economy, thereby preventing actors from leaving for competing regions while also ensuring that Europe has the knowledge base it needs to pursue the Green Deal commitments;

    5. Highlights the importance of targeted support in encouraging public-private partnerships and accessible and increased financing to support SMEs as the backbone of the European economy and a vector for pioneering innovation, emphasising the role of the European Innovation Council, InvestEU and the SME component of the single market programme in empowering start-ups and scale-ups of innovative companies, supporting them in their growth and contributing to a greater role for the EU economy on the global stage; expresses its concern that, according to the interim evaluation of InvestEU, envelopes for many financial products may run out by the end of 2025 without budgetary reinforcements; takes note of the Commission proposal in this regard; underlines, furthermore, the importance of the single market programme to leverage the full potential of the EU’s cross-border dimension;

    6. Stresses that the modernisation of the economy will require blending public and private investment; emphasises, in this regard, the necessity of private investments to maximise the leverage effect of public spending; recalls that these efforts should lead to simplification and reduce the financial burden for the EU’s SMEs while maintaining EU standards;

    7. Underscores the urgency of further accelerating the digital and green transitions as catalysts for a future-oriented and resource-efficient economy that remains attractive for innovative businesses and that is based on market-driven investments providing quality jobs and leaving no one behind; advocates substantial investment in forward-looking digital infrastructure, underpinned by well-regulated, human-centred and trustworthy artificial intelligence and cybersecurity; stresses the need to improve citizens’ basic digital skills to match the needs of companies and to equip citizens to counter disinformation; stresses, further, the need to increase the resilience of the Union’s democracy in fighting malign foreign interference;

    8. Recognises the strategic value of the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T) and the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) for contributing to the economic, social and climate goals of the EU’s cross-border transport infrastructure; calls for network extensions, particularly towards candidate countries and the EU’s strategic partners, as regards the EU’s sustainable and smart mobility strategy and the complementarities between the TEN-T and the Trans-European Networks for Energy (TEN-E);

    A better-prepared Union, capable of effectively responding to crises

    9. Underlines the need to enhance EU security and defence capabilities to create a genuine defence union and to better prepare for and respond to unprecedented geopolitical challenges and new hybrid security threats; stresses the essential role of common investment, research, production and procurement mechanisms, including in new disruptive technologies supporting an independent EU defence industry; considers that there is an EU added value in security and defence cooperation that not only makes Europe and its people safer but also leads to greater efficiency, potential savings, quality job creation and enhanced strategic autonomy; calls therefore for immediate upscaling and much better coordination of defence spending by Member States; stresses in particular the need to provide adequate resources to innovate and enhance Member States’ military capabilities, as well as their interoperability; takes note, in line with the Commission’s ‘ReArm Europe’ plan, of its call for the European Investment Bank (EIB) and other international financial institutions and private banks in Europe to invest more actively in the European defence industry while safeguarding their operations and financing capacity; recalls the importance of investing in and developing dual-use equipment and, particularly, of strengthening EU military mobility as regards funding dual-use transport infrastructure along priority axes; calls on the Commission to assess the possibility of using calls for this purpose under the CEF transport programme, in the light of the military mobility funding gap; underlines the urgent need to strengthen the EU’s cybersecurity capabilities to fight hybrid warfare;

    10. Recalls the role of the EU’s space programme in enhancing the strategic security of the Union through a variety of civil and military applications; underlines that a strong European space sector is fundamental for European security, open strategic autonomy, secure connectivity, the protection of critical infrastructure and advancing the twin green and digital transitions, and therefore requires sufficient resources;

    11. Highlights, in the face of new challenges in internal and external security, the importance of ensuring proper implementation of the Asylum and Migration Pact, in full compliance with international human rights law, and of respecting the principles of solidarity and the fair sharing of responsibility; stresses that effective management and protection of the EU’s external borders, both land and maritime, are essential for maintaining the freedoms of the Schengen area and crucial for the security of the EU and its citizens; emphasises the need to better protect people from trafficking and enhance support to strengthen cross-border cooperation between the Member States and the Union in combating criminal networks, particularly those involved in migrant smuggling and human trafficking, so as to reinforce law enforcement and the judicial response to these criminal networks, as well as to support Member States facing hybrid threats, in particular the instrumentalisation of migrants as defined in the Crisis Regulation[20];

    12. Recalls the vital role that the Integrated Border Management Fund, the Border Management and Visa Instrument (BMVI) and the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund play in protecting external borders; calls, in addition, for appropriate funding for border protection capabilities, including physical infrastructure, buildings, equipment, systems and services required at border crossing points, as provided for in Annex III to the BMVI Regulation[21], and for the requirements to be met in terms of reception conditions, integration, return and readmission procedure; reaffirms that cooperation agreements with non-EU countries in full respect of international law can help to prevent irregular migration and strengthen border security;

    13. Acknowledges the common agricultural policy (CAP) as a key strategic European policy for food security and greater EU autonomy in affordable and high-quality food production; stresses the crucial role of the CAP in ensuring a decent income for EU farmers as well as a productive, competitive and sustainable European agriculture; regrets that direct payments have significantly decreased in real terms due to inflation, while the administrative burden on farmers has increased due to the accumulation of bureaucracy; urges the Commission to reduce the administrative burden while maintaining high production standards and the requirement to implement EU legislation; calls for adequate resources and for direct payments to be protected to help farmers cope with the impact of inflation, fuel costs, changes in the global food and trade market and adverse climate events, affecting agricultural production and threatening food security, including in the outermost regions; highlights, in this regard, the role of the agricultural reserve; emphasises the need to help small and medium-sized farms and new and young farmers by supporting generational renewal and ensuring continued support for the promotion of EU agricultural products; underlines the need for appropriate support for research and innovation to make the agricultural sector more sustainable, including water management, in particular through the Horizon Europe programme, without reducing European agricultural production and while preventing European farmers from facing unfair competition from imported products that do not meet our standards; welcomes the Commission’s preparation of a second simplification package; underscores that food security is an essential component for geopolitical stability;

    14. Stresses the strategic role of fisheries and aquaculture and the need for them to be adequately supported financially; acknowledges that the common fisheries policy ensures a stable income and long-term future for fishers by contributing to protecting sustainable marine ecosystems, which are key to the sector’s competitiveness; insists that special attention must be devoted to the EU’s fishing fleet in order to improve safety and security, including by combating illegal fishery actions and improving working conditions, energy efficiency and sustainability, as well as by renewing the fleet; reaffirms that the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund should support a human resources policy capable of addressing future challenges, in order to promote an inclusive, diversified and sustainable blue economy; expresses its concern about the effect of the end of the Brexit transition period in June 2026 on the fishing and aquaculture sectors;

    15. Stresses that enhancing energy security and independence remains fundamental for the EU; highlights the EU’s role in ensuring security of energy supply, assisting households, farmers and businesses in mitigating price volatility and managing price gaps in comparison to the rest of the world; calls, therefore, for additional investment in critical infrastructure and connectivity, including large-scale cross-border electricity grids and hydrogen infrastructure for hard-to-abate sectors, which are an essential prerequisite to the decarbonisation of European industry, in low-carbon and renewable energy sources and connectivity, in particular by properly funding the CEF, as well as in energy efficiency; highlights the need to adapt European infrastructure to meet future energy demands as part of the transition to a clean and modern economy; underlines the importance of investing in new, expanding and modernising interconnector capacity for electricity trading, in particular cross-border capacity, for a fully integrated EU energy market that enhances Europe’s diversified supply security and resilience to energy market disruptions, reducing external dependencies and ultimately ensuring affordable and sustainable energy for EU citizens and businesses; stresses, in this regard, the need to strengthen cooperation with Africa;

    16. Recalls, in this context, the current housing crisis in Europe, including the lack of decent and affordable housing; calls, therefore, for swift additional investments through a combination of funding sources, including the EIB and national promotional banks, in areas with a positive impact on reducing the cost of living for households, improving the energy efficiency of buildings and deploying renewable energy sources; calls for a coordinated approach at EU level that respects the principle of subsidiarity, encourages best practices and effectively uses all relevant funding mechanisms in addressing this pressing challenge;

    17. Is highly concerned by the strong impacts of climate change and the biodiversity crisis both in Europe and globally and by the fact that the year 2024 was assessed to be the planet’s warmest year on record; calls for sufficient funding for the LIFE programme to finance climate and environment-related projects, including in the area of climate change mitigation and adaptation, and for increased budgetary flexibility to adequately respond to natural disasters in the EU; regrets that increasing numbers of natural disasters have led to a high number of victims, as well as to long-term devastating effects on citizens, farmers and businesses based and working in the regions concerned, as well as in the ecosystems impacted; calls for increased funding for the EU Solidarity Fund, RESTORE (Regional Emergency Support to Reconstruction) and the EU Civil Protection Mechanism, including for increasing rescEU capacities, which allow for more cost-efficient capacity building, in order to support Member States quickly and effectively in overwhelming crisis situations; recognises the EU’s role as a hub for coordinating and improving Member States’ preparedness and capacities to respond immediately to large-scale, high-impact emergencies, and its added value both for Member States and citizens; stresses, in this regard, that the EU Civil Protection Mechanism is a tangible expression of European solidarity, reinforcing the EU’s role as a crisis responder; acknowledges that the European Union Solidarity Fund or any other fund alone cannot fully compensate for the extreme weather events of increased frequency and severity caused by climate change today and in the future; stresses the need to invest in and prioritise preparedness, prevention, and adaptation measures, prioritising nature-based solutions; stresses that it is crucial to ensure that Union spending contributes to climate mitigation, adaptation efforts and water resilience infrastructure; emphasises that these investments are far lower than the cost of climate inaction;

    Enhancing citizens’ opportunities in a vibrant society

    18. Insists that continued investment in EU4Health and Cluster Health in Horizon Europe are key to improving health and preparedness for future health crises, thereby improving the health status of EU citizens; stresses the need for health investments for maximum impact; highlights its support for a holistic regulatory and funding approach to Europe’s life sciences and biotech ecosystem, including the creation of cutting-edge European clusters of excellence, as a central pillar of a stronger European health union, to which a European plan for cardiovascular diseases and lifestyles should be added, focusing on primary and secondary prevention as key objectives to increase life expectancy in the EU; highlights the need to create a more supportive care system to respond to demographic challenges and the ageing population; reiterates its support for Europe’s Beating Cancer Plan, as well as the importance of European investment in tackling childhood diseases, rare diseases and antimicrobial resistance; reiterates the importance of the gender aspect of health, including sexual and reproductive health and access to services; is highly concerned by the current mental health crisis in Europe, affecting in particular the young generation, exacerbated by recent global events, which requires immediate action to be taken; underlines the need to prevent shortages of critical medicines, medical countermeasures and healthcare workers faced by some Member States; calls, in this respect, for better coordination at EU level and joint procurement of medicines in order to reduce costs;

    19. Stresses the importance of investing in young generations and their skills, as major agents of change and progress, by ensuring access to quality education; considers it essential that all students, without discrimination and in every EU Member State, should have full access to the Erasmus+ programme and underlines the essential role of Erasmus+ in facilitating cultural exchange, strengthening European identity and promoting peace through mutual understanding and cooperation, making it a cornerstone of European integration and unity; recalls the need to tackle the skills deficit, the brain drain and the correlation between market needs and skills; considers that for the EU workforce to remain competitive in the future, establishing key areas for training and reskilling is needed; stresses that further investment is required in modernising the Union’s education systems, by equipping them for the digital and green transitions, creating talent booster schemes and incentivising young entrepreneurs; points, in this respect, to the relevance of sufficient financial resources for EU programmes such as the European Social Fund Plus, Erasmus+ and the EU Solidarity Corps, which have proven highly effective in helping to achieve high employment levels and fair social protection, in broadening education and training across the Union, as well as in promoting new job opportunities and fostering skills, youth participation and equal opportunities for all; calls on the Commission to do its utmost so that all university students remain eligible to participate in the Erasmus+ programme, including in Hungary;

    20. Recalls the role of the EU budget in contributing to the objectives of the European Pillar of Social Rights; highlights the role of the EU budget in contributing to initiatives that reinforce social dialogue and facilitate labour mobility, including in the form of training, networking and capacity building;

    21. Highlights the ever-increasing threats and dangers of organised and targeted disinformation campaigns against the EU by foreign stakeholders undermining European democracy; calls for the mobilisation of all relevant Union programmes, including Creative Europe, to fund actions in 2026 that promote inclusive digital and media literacy, in particular for young people, combating disinformation, countering online hate speech and extremist content, while encouraging the active participation of citizens in democratic processes and safeguarding media freedom and pluralism for good cultural resilience, all of which are fundamental to a thriving democracy;

    22. Calls on the Commission to increase EU funding for protecting citizens, religious communities and public spaces against terrorist threats, combating radicalisation and terrorist content online, as well as countering hate speech and rising antisemitism, anti-Muslim hatred and racism;

    23. Calls on the Commission to ensure the swift, full and proper implementation and robust enforcement of the Digital Services Act[22], the Digital Market Act[23] and the Artificial Intelligence Act[24], also by allocating sufficient human resources; stresses the importance of tackling foreign interference, addressing the dangers of biased algorithms, and safeguarding transparency, accountability and the integrity of the digital public space;

    24. Underlines the added value of funding programmes in the areas of democracy, rights and values; recalls the important role that the EU budget plays in the promotion of the European values enshrined in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union and in supporting the key principles of democracy, the rule of law, solidarity, inclusiveness, justice, non-discrimination and equality, including gender equality; reaffirms, furthermore, the essential role of the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values programme in promoting European values and citizens’ rights, in particular its Union Values strand, as well as gender equality, thereby sustaining and further developing an open, rights-based, democratic, equal and inclusive society based on the rule of law; stresses the need for targeted measures to address gender disparities and promote equal opportunities through EU funding allocations; stresses that supporting investigative journalism with sufficient resources is a strategic investment in democracy, transparency and social justice; reiterates the importance of the Daphne and Equality and Rights programmes, and stresses that necessary resources should be devoted to combating discrimination in all its forms, as well as tackling forms of violence;

    25. Emphasises the valuable work carried out under the Union Values strand, which provides, among other things, direct funding to civil society organisations as key actors in vibrant democracies; stresses that citizens and civil society organisations, promoting the will and interest of citizens, represent the core of European democracy; underlines, in this regard, the importance of all EU programmes and increased funding in supporting the genuine engagement of civil society, particularly in the context of the impact of reduced funding for civil society by the EU’s international partners;

    26. Considers it essential for the Union’s stability and progress and its citizens’ trust to ensure the proper use of Union funds and to take all steps towards protecting the Union’s financial interests, in particular by applying the rule of law conditionality; underscores the undeniable connection between respect for the rule of law and efficient implementation of the Union’s budget in accordance with the principles of sound financial management under the Financial Regulation; reiterates that under the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation[25], the imposition of appropriate measures must not affect the obligations of governments to implement the programme or fund affected by the measure, and in particular the obligations they have towards final recipients; insists, therefore, that in cases of breaches of the rule of law by national governments, the Commission should explore alternative ways to implement the budget, including by assessing the possibility of diverting sources to directly and indirectly managed programmes, in order to ensure that local and regional authorities, civil society and other beneficiaries can continue to benefit from Union funding, without weakening the application of the regulation; highlights the role of the European Court of Auditors and its constant activity in defence of transparency, accountability and strict compliance with the regulations on all of the funds and programmes;

    A strong Union in a changing world

    27. Observes that the need for the EU to maintain and augment its presence on the global stage is increasingly crucial amid escalating global conflicts, geopolitical shifts and foreign influence efforts worldwide, particularly considering developments with other major global providers of aid; stresses that in order to achieve this, the Union requires sufficient funding and resources to act, including to respond to major crises in its neighbourhood and throughout the world, in particular in the light of the sudden decrease in international funding; stresses the importance of the humanitarian aid programme and regrets that resources are not increasing in line with record-high needs; underscores the need to strengthen the EU’s role as a leading humanitarian actor while effectively addressing emerging crises, particularly in regions facing protracted conflict, displacement, food insecurity and natural disasters; emphasises that the Union also requires sufficient resources for long-term investments in building global partnerships, and points out the importance of the participation of non-EU countries in Union programmes, where appropriate;

    28. Underlines that the EU’s security environment has changed dramatically following Russia’s illegal, unprovoked and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine and unpredictable changes in the policies of its main allies; recalls the importance of enhancing citizens’ safety and of achieving efficiency in the area of defence and strategic autonomy, through a comprehensive approach to security that covers military and civilian capabilities, external relations and internal security; stresses the importance of the Internal Security Fund to ensure funding to tackle increased levels of serious organised crime with a cross-border dimension and cybercrime; recognises the pressure which increased defence spending represents for Member Sates’ national budgets; stresses the importance of Member States stepping up their efforts and increasing funding for their defence capabilities, in a consistent and complementary manner in line with the NATO guideline;

    29. Stresses that, beyond the enormous sacrifices of the people of Ukraine in withstanding Russia’s war of aggression for our common European security, this war has also had substantial economic and social consequences for people throughout Europe; recalls that certain Member States, in particular those with a land border with Russia and/or Belarus in the Baltic region, and frontline Member States, as well as vulnerable sectors of the economy, remain particularly exposed to the consequences of the war and deserve support in areas such as agriculture, infrastructure and military mobility, in the spirit of EU solidarity;

    30. Firmly reiterates its unconditional and full support for Ukraine in its fight for its freedom and democracy against Russian aggression, as the war on its soil has passed the three-year mark; underlines the ongoing need for high levels of funding, including in humanitarian aid and for repairs to critical infrastructure, and for improved capacity along the EU-Ukraine Solidarity Lanes; welcomes the renewed and reinforced intention of the Commission and Member States to work in a united way to address Ukraine’s pressing defence needs and to further support the Ukrainian economy by providing regular and predictable financial support and facilitating investment opportunities; welcomes the agreement with the Council on macro-financial assistance for Ukraine of up to EUR 35 billion, making use of the proceeds of frozen Russian assets through the new Ukraine Loan Cooperation Mechanism, in order to support Ukraine’s recovery, reconstruction and modernisation, as well as to foster Ukraine’s progress on its path to EU accession; stresses the importance of ensuring accountability regarding core international crimes;

    31. Insists on the benefits of pre-accession funds, both for the enlargement countries and for the EU itself, as the funding creates more stability in the region; welcomes the implementation of the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans to further support the economic convergence of Western Balkan countries with the EU’s single market through investment and growth in the region; insists on the need to deploy the necessary funds to support Moldova’s accession process, in line with the EU’s commitment to enlargement and regional stability; underlines the role of the Reform and Growth Facility for the Republic of Moldova and highlights the necessity of securing sufficient financial resources for its full implementation; underlines the importance of sustained support for candidate countries in implementing the necessary accession-related reforms, in particular regarding the rule of law, anti-corruption and democracy and in enhancing their resilience and preventing and countering hybrid threats; calls on the Commission to allocate additional funding to support civil society, independent media organisations and journalists;

    32. Underlines, furthermore, that EU neighbourhood policy, namely its Eastern and Southern Partnerships, contributes to the overall goal of increasing the stability, prosperity and resilience of the EU’s neighbours and thereby of increasing the security of our continent; stresses, therefore, the importance of reinforcing the Southern and Eastern Neighbourhood budget lines in order to support political, economic and social reforms in the regions, facilitate peace processes and reconstruction and provide assistance to refugees, in particular through continuous, reinforced and predictable funding and continuous implementation on the ground; recalls that the EU must continue to alleviate other crises and assist the most vulnerable populations around the world through its humanitarian aid programme, as well as by maintaining its global positioning with the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument for supporting global challenges and promoting human rights, freedoms and democracy, as well as for the capacity building of civil society organisations and for delivering on the Union’s international climate and biodiversity commitments, within a comprehensive monitoring and control system;

    Cross-cutting issues in the 2026 budget

    33. Underlines that the repayment of the European Union Recovery Instrument (EURI) borrowing costs is a legal obligation for the EU and therefore non-discretionary; notes that borrowing costs depend on the pace of disbursements under the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) as well as on market fluctuations in bond yields and are therefore inherently partly unpredictable and volatile; insists, therefore, on the need for the Commission to provide reliable, timely and accurate information on NextGenerationEU (NGEU) borrowing costs and on expected RRF disbursements throughout the budgetary procedure as well as on available decommitments; expects the Commission to update the decommitments forecast when it presents the draft budget; recalls that the three institutions agreed that expenditures covering the financing costs of NGEU must aim at not reducing EU programmes and funds;

    34. Recalls its support for the amended Commission proposals for the introduction of new own resources; is highly concerned by the complete lack of progress on the new own resources in the Council, in particular in view of increasing investment and unforeseen needs; considers that the introduction of new own resources, in line with the roadmap in the interinstitutional agreement of 2020, is essential to cover NGEU borrowing costs while shielding the margins and flexibility mechanisms necessary to cater for these needs;

    35. Highlights again Parliament’s full support for the cohesion policy and its key role in delivering on the EU’s policy priorities and its general growth; reiterates that the cohesion policy’s optimal added value for citizens depends on its effective and timely implementation; in the same vein, urges the Member States and the Commission to accelerate the implementation of operational programmes under shared management funds as well as of the recovery and resilience plans so as to ensure swift budgetary execution and to avoid accumulated payment backlogs in the two last years of the MFF period, in particular through additional capacity building and technical assistance for Member States; reaffirms the imperative of a robust and transparent mechanism for accurately monitoring disbursements to beneficiaries;

    36. Notes that particular attention must be paid to rural and remote areas, areas affected by industrial transition and regions which suffer from severe and permanent natural or demographic handicaps, such as islands and outermost, cross-border and mountain regions and all those affected by natural disasters; stresses that these regions should benefit from adequate funding to offset the special characteristics and constraints of their structural social and economic situation, as referred to in Article 349 TFEU; stresses the vital importance of the POSEI programme for maintaining agricultural activity in the outermost regions and bringing food to local markets; calls for the programme budget to be increased to reflect the real needs of farmers in these regions; notes that there has been no such increase since 2013, despite the fact that farmers in these regions face higher production costs due to inflation and climate change; stresses also that the Overseas Countries and Territories associated with the EU, as referred to in Articles 198-204 TFEU, should benefit from adequate funding for their sustainable economic and social development, in the light of their geopolitical importance for global maritime trade routes and key partnerships such as those on sustainable raw materials value chains;

    37. Reiterates that EU programmes, policies and activities, where relevant, should be implemented in such a way that promotes gender equality in the delivery of their objectives; welcomes the Commission’s work on developing gender mainstreaming in order to meaningfully measure the gender impact of Union spending, as set out in the interinstitutional agreement;

    38. Takes note that the climate mainstreaming target of 30 % is projected to be met by 33.5 % in 2025, while the biodiversity target will be below 8.5 % in 2025, and unless dedicated action is undertaken the 10 % target will not be met in 2026; stresses the need for continuous efforts towards the achievement of the climate and biodiversity mainstreaming targets laid down in the interinstitutional agreement in the Union budget and the EURI expenditures;

    39. Stresses that the 2026 Union budget should be aligned with the Union’s ambitions of making the Union climate neutral by 2050 at the latest, as well as the Union’s international commitments, in particular under the Paris Agreement and the Kunming-Montreal Agreement, and should significantly contribute to the implementation of the European Green Deal and the 2030 biodiversity strategy;

    40. Recalls that effective programme implementation is achievable only with the backing of a committed administration; emphasises the essential work carried out by bodies and decentralised agencies and asserts that they must be properly staffed and sufficiently resourced, while taking into account inflation, so that they can fulfil their responsibilities effectively and contribute to the achievement of the Union political priorities, also when given new tasks and mandates;

    41. Recalls that, in accordance with the Financial Regulation, when implementing the budget, Member States and the Commission must ensure compliance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights and respect the Union’s values enshrined in Article 2 TEU; underlines in particular Articles 137, 138 and 158 of the Financial Regulation and recalls the Commission and the Member States’ obligation to exclude from Union funds any persons or entities found guilty by a final judgment of terrorist offences, as well as by final judgments of terrorist activities, inciting, aiding, abetting or attempting to commit such offences, and corruption or other serious offences; highlights the need to leverage efforts in tackling fraud both at Union and Member State level and to this end ensure appropriate financial and human resources covering the Union’s full anti-fraud architecture; recalls the importance of providing the Union Anti-Fraud Programme with sufficient financial resources;

    42. Underlines the importance of effective communication and the visibility of EU policies and programmes in raising awareness of the added value that the EU brings to citizens, businesses and partners;

    °

    ° °

    43. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the Court of Auditors.

    ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    The rapporteur declares under his exclusive responsibility that he did not receive input from any entity or person to be mentioned in this Annex pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure.

     

     

    OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS (20.2.2025)

    for the Committee on Budgets

    on guidelines for the 2026 budget – Section III

    (2024/2110(BUI))

    Rapporteur for opinion: Michael Gahler

     

    OPINION

    The Committee on Foreign Affairs calls on the Committee on Budgets, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following into its motion for a resolution:

    1. Welcomes the fact that the multiannual financial framework (MFF) revision in 2024 provided for additional funding under Heading 6 and for the EUR 50 billion Ukraine Facility; deplores, however, the fact that the MFF revision fell short of the needs identified by Parliament; reiterates the urgent need to increase funding, particularly in crisis-affected regions where the needs are greatest, and to address the various challenges in the neighbourhood, invest in partnerships and strengthen the geopolitical position of the EU; underlines in particular the need for continued efforts to finance Ukraine’s immediate funding needs; emphasises that the EU should without any delay intensify its efforts to enable frozen and immobilised Russian assets to be used for Ukraine’s reconstruction, reparations and budgetary needs, in full compliance with EU and international law; underlines that the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe (NDICI – Global Europe) and the Global Gateway are crucial instruments within the Union’s external action toolbox; stresses the importance of the EU’s humanitarian aid policies and instruments; calls in general for a more strategic and impactful approach to EU funding abroad while advancing open strategic autonomy;

    2. Reiterates that an increased level of funding should be allocated for the Southern Neighbourhood in 2025 to support political, economic and social reforms in the region; highlights in particular the pressing need to contribute significantly to the reconstruction of Gaza and to provide additional humanitarian aid in Gaza, Lebanon and Syria; recalls that the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNWRA) has up to now been the principal humanitarian assistance structure in Gaza and the West Bank as well as an essential service provider in the region; recalls the need to continue supporting key regional partners such as Jordan in order to foster peace in the region;

    3. Welcomes the new Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans and the proposed Facility for Moldova, as well as the role of the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) III in financing actions in the region; underlines that the Reform Agendas, which beneficiaries need to develop, are a promising instrument to speed up transformation and compliance with EU norms; calls on the Commission, in the interests of a successful accession process, to strictly apply the conditionalities enshrined in the two facilities; calls furthermore on the Commission to accompany all 10 enlargement countries on their path to European integration and to provide tailored assistance to address their respective challenges; calls on the Commission to allocate additional funding to support civil society and independent media organisations and journalists; calls on the Commission to ensure that it retains the possibility to withhold funds, either temporarily or indefinitely, if those funds would contribute to the budgets of governments – whether at the national or sub-national level – whose actions are significantly undermining the stability of the country or its neighbours, or the country’s progress towards European integration, particularly regarding democracy, the rule of law and the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms; calls, furthermore, on the Commission to present a proposal for an instrument for pre-accession assistance for the next MFF that incorporates the facilities to avoid overlaps and covers all 10 enlargement countries and which should ensure strong institutional and economic preparedness for EU membership; calls also on the Commission to speed up the integration of all candidate countries in the EU roaming area;

    4. Highlights the importance of the EU’s ensuring that EU funds do not go towards financing educational literature that romanticises martyrdom, violence or terrorism;

    5. Underlines the need for the Directorate-General for Enlargement and the Eastern Neighbourhood (DG ENEST), the Directorate-General for the Middle East, North Africa and the Gulf (DG MENA) and the European External Action Service (EEAS) to be provided with sufficient financial and human resources to promote peace, prosperity, security and EU values and interests in both the European neighbourhood and across the globe; underlines the need to provide adequate resources to both the EEAS and the Commission for strategic communication and to counter disinformation; highlights the need to maintain the current structure of the network of EU delegations around the world and to provide financing that is commensurate with the role that the Union expects all delegations to play on the ground; notes, furthermore, that the EEAS, with 145 delegations around the globe, cannot be measured according to the same logic as that applied to European institutions in Brussels and Luxembourg; calls, therefore, on the Commission and the Council not to apply the 2 % logic to the EEAS; insists on a budgetary increase for common foreign and security policy (CFSP) actions and common security and defence policy (CSDP) missions, as well as other appropriate peace, conflict and crisis response instruments; stresses the need to improve IT and security protocols within EEAS headquarters, EU Delegations and in Commission directorates-general with responsibilities in EU External Action; stresses the importance of investing in European security and defence by bolstering the Union’s strategic autonomy and collective defence capabilities;

    6. Welcomes the establishment of the EU Partnership Mission in Moldova (EUPM Moldova); highlights the essential role of the EUPM Moldova and calls on the EU and its Member States to extend the mission’s mandate beyond May 2025, while increasing resources to enhance its effectiveness;

    7. Reiterates the EU’s commitment to promoting gender equality and the empowerment of women globally, as enshrined in the EU Gender Action Plan III (2021–2025); calls for increased resources to support women’s rights, including efforts to eliminate gender-based violence, strengthen women’s participation in decision-making processes and promote economic empowerment; emphasises the importance of gender mainstreaming across all budgetary and policy initiatives to ensure equal opportunities and inclusivity; stresses that gender equality is not only a fundamental right but also a crucial driver of social and economic development;

    8. Calls on the Commission to collaborate with the EPLO office in Washington, D.C., and the EU delegation in the United States to identify, fund and implement initiatives aimed at strengthening the transatlantic relationship, including exchange programmes for professionals working in public institutions in both the EU and the United States;

    9. Underlines that any disbursements from the European budget must depend on the beneficiary country’s respect for the rule of law, human rights and compliance with international obligations, and with respect for international agreements;

    10. Considers that more EU funds need to be allocated to joint cyber defence in order to counter the digital threats from Russia, the People’s Republic of China and others; considers that the Commission needs to secure the necessary funding for a future cyber army that can help EU institutions and Member States to defend themselves against cyberattacks from hostile states;

    11. Stresses the need for the visibility and communication of EU aid, particularly in candidate countries, but also in other partner countries;

    12. Stresses the urgent need for the EU to invest in research and development concerning low-cost drones, not only in order to support Ukraine in its efforts to defend itself against Russia, but also to strengthen European defence; considers that the EU should cooperate with Ukraine on the development of a drone system following their successful use of drones.

    ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS
    FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    The rapporteur for the opinion declares under his exclusive responsibility that he did not receive input from any entity or person to be mentioned in this Annex pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure.

     

    INFORMATION ON ADOPTION BY COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION

    Date adopted

    19.2.2025

     

     

     

    Result of final vote

    +:

    –:

    0:

    40

    13

    8

    Members present for the final vote

    Mika Aaltola, Petras Auštrevičius, Dan Barna, Wouter Beke, Robert Biedroń, Ľuboš Blaha, Ioan-Rareş Bogdan, Marc Botenga, Helmut Brandstätter, Sebastião Bugalho, Tobias Cremer, Danilo Della Valle, Loucas Fourlas, Alberico Gambino, Giorgos Georgiou, Christophe Gomart, Rima Hassan, Rasa Juknevičienė, Sandra Kalniete, Łukasz Kohut, Ondřej Kolář, Rihards Kols, Andrey Kovatchev, Reinhold Lopatka, Antonio López-Istúriz White, Marion Maréchal, David McAllister, Vangelis Meimarakis, Sven Mikser, Francisco José Millán Mon, Hannah Neumann, Urmas Paet, Kostas Papadakis, Tonino Picula, Thijs Reuten, Nacho Sánchez Amor, Mounir Satouri, Andreas Schieder, Alexander Sell, Villy Søvndal, Davor Ivo Stier, Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, Cristian Terheş, Riho Terras, Pierre-Romain Thionnet, Reinier Van Lanschot, Nicola Zingaretti, Željana Zovko

    Substitutes present for the final vote

    Krzysztof Brejza, Jaroslav Bžoch, Engin Eroglu, Tomasz Froelich, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, Ana Catarina Mendes, Alessandra Moretti, Ana Miguel Pedro, Chloé Ridel, Şerban Dimitrie Sturdza, Marco Tarquinio

    Members under Rule 216(7) present for the final vote

    Anna Bryłka, Mélissa Camara, Alexander Jungbluth, Erik Marquardt, Leire Pajín, Kristian Vigenin

     

    FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL IN COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION

    40

    +

    ECR

    Cristian Terheş

    PPE

    Mika Aaltola, Wouter Beke, Ioan-Rareş Bogdan, Krzysztof Brejza, Sebastião Bugalho, Loucas Fourlas, Rasa Juknevičienė, Sandra Kalniete, Łukasz Kohut, Ondřej Kolář, Andrey Kovatchev, Reinhold Lopatka, Antonio López-Istúriz White, David McAllister, Vangelis Meimarakis, Francisco José Millán Mon, Davor Ivo Stier, Riho Terras, Željana Zovko

    Renew

    Petras Auštrevičius, Dan Barna, Helmut Brandstätter, Engin Eroglu, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, Urmas Paet, Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann

    S&D

    Robert Biedroń, Tobias Cremer, Ana Catarina Mendes, Sven Mikser, Alessandra Moretti, Tonino Picula, Thijs Reuten, Chloé Ridel, Nacho Sánchez Amor, Andreas Schieder, Marco Tarquinio, Kristian Vigenin, Nicola Zingaretti

     

    13

    ECR

    Rihards Kols, Marion Maréchal

    ESN

    Tomasz Froelich, Alexander Jungbluth, Alexander Sell

    NI

    Ľuboš Blaha, Kostas Papadakis

    PfE

    Jaroslav Bžoch, Pierre-Romain Thionnet

    The Left

    Marc Botenga, Danilo Della Valle, Giorgos Georgiou, Rima Hassan

     

    8

    0

    ECR

    Alberico Gambino, Şerban Dimitrie Sturdza

    Verts/ALE

    Mélissa Camara, Erik Marquardt, Hannah Neumann, Mounir Satouri, Villy Søvndal, Reinier Van Lanschot

     

    Key to symbols:

    + : in favour

     : against

    0 : abstention

     

     

    OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORT AND TOURISM (19.2.2025)

    for the Committee on Budgets

    on general guidelines for the preparation of the 2026 budget, Section III – Commission

    (2024/2110(BUI))

    Rapporteur for opinion: Gheorghe Falcă

     

    OPINION

    The Committee on Transport and Tourism calls on the Committee on Budgets, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following into its motion for a resolution:

    A. whereas the Connecting Europe Facility for Transport (CEF-T) has been a highly successful EU instrument for strategic investment in the development of the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T), aimed at transforming the EU’s roads, railways, ports, inland waterways and airways into a connected, safe, efficient, sustainable and competitive transport system; whereas the completion deadlines of 2030 for the core network, 2040 for the extended core network and 2050 for the comprehensive network are binding on the Member States and often require massive and sustained infrastructure investments; whereas the CEF-T should remain an important transport funding instrument in the 2028-2034 multiannual financial framework (MFF);

    B. whereas modern, interconnected and multimodal transport infrastructure within a single European transport area is central to creating growth and jobs in the EU, completing the European single market and ensuring territorial cohesion, including for the benefit of peripheral, rural, mountainous, island and outermost regions and other geographically disadvantaged areas; whereas the Draghi and Letta reports call on the EU to step up its efforts to develop a competitive industrial strategy in the face of global competition; whereas successful decarbonisation that safeguards the global competitiveness of European industries requires significant investment in renewable-energy-based transport networks and alternative fuel infrastructure for sustainable transport; whereas digitalisation across all transport sectors can yield significant efficiency gains, which often have the potential to exceed the initial investments; whereas sufficient investment is required to achieve this and other technological solutions to enhance interoperability between digital, energy and transport networks and to maximise network benefits; whereas increased investment in road safety is necessary to achieve the goals of the EU’s Vision Zero strategy and ensure the safety of roads and road users; whereas the transport sector faces labour and skills shortages, combined with sometimes poor working conditions;

    C. whereas the efficient use of EU funds is paramount to achieving strategic objectives within limited financial envelopes, particularly in the light of inflationary pressures that have led to significant increases in construction, energy and raw material costs, threatening the financial feasibility of key infrastructure projects of common European interest; whereas resilient and coordinated EU funding mechanisms are vital for maintaining project momentum despite economic volatility; whereas the imperative of maximising the impact of EU spending requires inflation-adjusted budgetary provisions, the reallocation of underutilised funds, as well as clear monitoring and improved reporting frameworks;

    D. whereas delays in planning, permitting and procurement processes also hinder the timely implementation of transport and infrastructure projects, jeopardising EU transport and infrastructure development; whereas establishing optimised approval procedures is crucial to accelerating project timelines and ensuring budget absorption;

    E. whereas, as envisaged under the Omnibus simplification package outlined by the Commission in its Competitiveness Compass, reducing regulatory and administrative burdens and simplifying implementation are key to ensuring equal access to funding for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), regional authorities and disadvantaged regions; whereas the simplification of EU regulatory and administrative processes at all levels, coupled with streamlined access to funding, are essential for achieving the timely and efficient implementation of projects under CEF-T and tourism programmes, particularly for SMEs and regional authorities;

    F. whereas the action plan on military mobility 2.0 outlines ambitious EU-level initiatives; whereas, however, inadequate funding remains a significant obstacle to their effective implementation;

    G. whereas Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, like the COVID-19 pandemic, has underscored the vulnerability of the EU’s transport and tourism sectors to external shocks; whereas it is more necessary now than ever before to strengthen transport connections with Ukraine and Moldova; whereas the EU-Ukraine road transport agreement, which facilitates road freight transport and transit by setting up solidarity corridors, has been extended until 30 June 2025, with the possibility of tacit renewal for a further six months; whereas the European transport network is critical infrastructure facing increasing digital and/or physical security risks and needs to be protected from external threats to maintain the societal functions for which it is vital;

    H. whereas tourism, a major economic activity accounting for almost 10 % of the EU’s GDP and identified in the Commission’s 2021 industrial strategy as a critical ecosystem for the EU’s economy and for employment, continues to face economic, environmental, employment-related and digital challenges;

    1. Calls for a significant increase in the CEF-T budget to secure adequate funding for ongoing and planned TEN-T projects, focusing on cross-border infrastructure with the highest added value for the EU and on the elimination of bottlenecks and missing links, including within Member States, in order to enhance passenger and freight flow throughout Europe; underlines, furthermore, the value of smaller-scale projects in improving cross-border connectivity and their eligibility for EU funding;

    2. Welcomes the Commission’s announcement that it will develop an EU industrial action plan for the automotive sector, as proposed in the Draghi report, and calls for swift progress in the ongoing strategic dialogue;

    3. Welcomes the Commission’s announcement that it will develop a new maritime industrial strategy to enhance the competitiveness, sustainability and resilience of the European maritime manufacturing sector; appreciates the Commission’s announcement that it would present a European port strategy to limit the risks of economic dependence, espionage and sabotage linked to the economic presence and operational involvement of entities from non-EU countries in EU ports;

    4. Calls, further, for a strategic action plan for the EU aviation sector to identify potential reductions in administrative burdens and to assess financial needs for maintaining the sector’s competitiveness in the face of decarbonisation pressures and the associated risks, including an uneven playing field and carbon leakage, and geopolitical challenges, and with regard to a cross-country analysis of working conditions as a determinant in attracting and retaining skilled workers and boosting productivity;

    5. Welcomes the commitment to put forward a plan to develop an ambitious European high-speed rail network to help connect EU capitals, including through night trains, and to accelerate rail freight, as well as to set up a single digital ticketing and booking system for railways as soon as possible, as already outlined in the revised TEN-T guidelines; underlines the need for ambitious support for the deployment of the European Rail Traffic Management System (ERTMS);

    6. Advocates a comprehensive strategy on hyperloop, with clear timelines, detailed investment frameworks and support for research, development and deployment;

    7. Welcomes, in this respect, the Commission’s announcement under the Competitiveness Compass presenting a sustainable transport investment plan and calls on the Commission to define financing measures for the above-mentioned strategies and action plans, including by de-risking the investment needed to swiftly ramp up charging infrastructure as well as for the production and distribution of renewable and low-carbon transport fuels, without jeopardising existing market choices;

    8. Underlines again the role of the Social Climate Fund in supporting investment for an inclusive transition towards more sustainable mobility and calls on the Member States to address transport poverty with specific policies and financing measures in their national Social Climate Plans;

    9. Highlights the need to address the shortage of qualified labour, women’s employment and an ageing workforce in the transport sector; calls, in this regard, for sufficient support for the safety and good working conditions of transport workers as well as for the funding of safe and secure truck parking areas across the EU;

    10. Calls for the digitalisation of transport through intelligent solutions and digital booking platforms to facilitate seamless cross-border travel; calls for the systematic reduction of EU regulatory burdens across all transport modes to free up resources, including EU budgetary means, for increased investment in transport infrastructure; underlines the strong need for prior impact assessments of all new legislative initiatives with respect to their budgetary implications but also the regulatory or administrative burdens that the proposals would create or resolve;

    11. Calls on the Commission to address inflationary pressures and resource scarcity by incorporating inflation adjustments into the budget; notes that the inclusion of realistic price adjustments is essential to safeguarding the viability of transport and infrastructure projects against the impact of inflation-induced cost increases; supports the reallocation of unused funds to strategic clusters, such as transport infrastructure, sustainable transport solutions and innovation; calls strongly for the integration of inflation-resilient frameworks and adaptive budget mechanisms within the MFF to avoid financing challenges in upcoming cycles;

    12. Emphasises the importance of bolstering co-financing mechanisms, particularly for large-scale projects such as the Clean Aviation, Single European Sky ATM Research (SESAR) and Europe’s Rail Joint Undertakings, to ensure their timely implementation despite economic constraints; insists on the leveraging of public-private partnerships (PPPs) to mobilise additional resources;

    13. Advocates innovative financing models, in particular the facilitation of PPPs by providing guarantees or implementing risk-sharing mechanisms, in order to attract private investment in transport and tourism infrastructure, including for a faster transition to alternative fuels; stresses that these PPPs can also contribute to knowledge-sharing, innovation and support for SMEs and start-ups;

    14. Stresses the need to reinforce the budgets of transport agencies, in particular the EU Aviation Safety Agency, the European Maritime Safety Agency, and the EU Agency for Railways, so that they can fulfil the additional tasks assigned to them by the co-legislators in recently adopted EU legislation, as well as in order to support critical safety, sustainability, interoperability, competitiveness, innovation and modernisation initiatives;

    15. Calls resolutely for the streamlining of application and reporting procedures in relation to EU funds in line with Directive 2021/1187[26]; insists on transparent and fair allocation of EU transport funding using digital platforms in order to simplify access for SMEs and regional stakeholders; calls for the establishment of expedited review processes for critical transport and infrastructure projects in order to reduce delays; proposes the implementation of the ‘once-only’ principle for administrative processes, allowing applicants to provide information once and reuse it across EU programmes, thus reducing redundancy and delays, including for the increased blending of EU funds;

    16. Insists on the restoration of the military mobility budget to the originally proposed EUR 6.5 billion over seven years; reiterates that the drastic cut of 75 % to military mobility funding within the transport pillar considerably weakens this policy; highlights the critical role of that funding in adapting parts of the TEN-T infrastructure for dual use along priority axes, in order to facilitate the short-notice, large-scale movement of military equipment and humanitarian aid across the continent, enabling a joint response to military threats to the EU Member States and their allied nations; calls for military mobility to be included in the white paper on the future of European defence;

    17. Reiterates that, to help Ukraine withstand Russia’s war of aggression and to accelerate its post-war recovery and integration into the EU market, alongside the upcoming decisions on the renewal of the EU-Ukraine road transport agreement, it is imperative to pursue projects to improve the capacity along the EU-Ukraine Solidarity Lanes, encompassing railway upgrades, improved border crossings and the crucial step of integrating relevant lines of Ukraine’s rail system into the EU’s standard gauge to facilitate the uninterrupted movement of goods and services; considers that the 2026 budget should also help alleviate the economic and social hardship faced by the people of the EU’s eastern border regions, especially the Baltic states, Finland, Poland and Romania, who have been particularly affected by economic losses and the suspension of cross-border mobility as a consequence of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; calls for the financing of further EU measures against the Russian shadow fleet;

    18. Reiterates its repeated request to create a specific EU programme and a dedicated budget line for tourism in the current MFF and beyond, increasing the sector’s resistance to economic shocks and contributing to further growth and jobs across the value chain, bringing significant benefits and long-term well-being to local people and their businesses; highlights the need to reduce administrative burdens for SMEs operating in the tourism sector by simplifying rules, minimising data collection requirements, where appropriate, and providing tailored financial support; notes that the tourism sector stands to benefit greatly from digital innovations, such as smart tourism platforms and integrated digital ticketing systems for attractions and services, which enhance visitor experiences while driving significant economic growth for local communities; stresses that the further development of sustainable tourism, including through the promotion of regional products to strengthen local value chains or the management of tourist flows, could foster economic growth in less popular, more remote and peripheral areas, improve urban-rural connectivity and bolster the climate resilience of EU territories.

     

    ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS
    FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    The rapporteur for the opinion declares under his exclusive responsibility that he did not receive input from any entity or person to be mentioned in this Annex pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure.

    INFORMATION ON ADOPTION BY THE COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION

    Date adopted

    19.2.2025

     

     

     

    Result of final vote

    +:

    –:

    0:

    36

    6

    0

    Members present for the final vote

    Oihane Agirregoitia Martínez, Daniel Attard, Tom Berendsen, Nina Carberry, Benoit Cassart, Carlo Ciccioli, Vivien Costanzo, Johan Danielsson, Valérie Devaux, Siegbert Frank Droese, Gheorghe Falcă, Jens Gieseke, Sérgio Humberto, François Kalfon, Elena Kountoura, Merja Kyllönen, Luis-Vicențiu Lazarus, Vicent Marzà Ibáñez, Milan Mazurek, Alexandra Mehnert, Ştefan Muşoiu, Jan-Christoph Oetjen, Philippe Olivier, Matteo Ricci, Arash Saeidi, Marjan Šarec, Rosa Serrano Sierra, Virginijus Sinkevičius, Kai Tegethoff, Elissavet Vozemberg-Vrionidi, Kosma Złotowski

    Substitutes present for the final vote

    Arno Bausemer, Ondřej Krutílek, Elżbieta Katarzyna Łukacijewska, Elena Nevado del Campo, Luděk Niedermayer, Andrey Novakov, Beata Szydło, Flavio Tosi, Kathleen Van Brempt

    Members under Rule 216(7) present for the final vote

    Marie Dauchy, Elisabeth Grossmann

     

    FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL
    BY THE COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION

    36

    +

    ECR

    Carlo Ciccioli, Ondřej Krutílek, Beata Szydło, Kosma Złotowski

    PPE

    Tom Berendsen, Nina Carberry, Gheorghe Falcă, Jens Gieseke, Sérgio Humberto, Elżbieta Katarzyna Łukacijewska, Alexandra Mehnert, Elena Nevado del Campo, Luděk Niedermayer, Andrey Novakov, Flavio Tosi, Elissavet Vozemberg-Vrionidi

    Renew

    Oihane Agirregoitia Martínez, Benoit Cassart, Valérie Devaux, Jan-Christoph Oetjen, Marjan Šarec

    S&D

    Daniel Attard, Vivien Costanzo, Johan Danielsson, Elisabeth Grossmann, François Kalfon, Ştefan Muşoiu, Matteo Ricci, Rosa Serrano Sierra, Kathleen Van Brempt

    The Left

    Elena Kountoura, Merja Kyllönen, Arash Saeidi

    Verts/ALE

    Vicent Marzà Ibáñez, Virginijus Sinkevičius, Kai Tegethoff

     

    6

    ESN

    Arno Bausemer, Siegbert Frank Droese, Milan Mazurek

    NI

    Luis-Vicențiu Lazarus

    PfE

    Marie Dauchy, Philippe Olivier

     

     

    Key to symbols:

    + : in favour

     : against

    0 : abstention

     

     

    OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT (19.2.2025)

    for the Committee on Budgets

    on general guidelines for the preparation of the 2026 budget – Section III – Commission

    (2024/2110(BUI))

    Rapporteur for opinion: Gabriella Gerzsenyi

     

     

    OPINION

    The Committee on Regional Development calls on the Committee on Budgets, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following into its motion for a resolution:

    A. whereas pursuant to Article 174 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), ‘in order to promote its overall harmonious development, the Union shall develop and pursue its actions leading to the strengthening of its economic, social and territorial cohesion. In particular, the Union shall aim at reducing disparities between the levels of development of the various regions and the backwardness of the least-favoured regions’;

    B. whereas cohesion policy is a key instrument for reducing disparities between the levels of development of the various regions within the Union and for addressing the fact that the least-favoured regions lag behind, playing a vital role in promoting sustainable development and also addressing environmental challenges, complementing national budgets and enhancing the EU’s ability to navigate global complexities;

    C. whereas among the regions concerned, particular attention must be paid to rural areas, areas affected by the industrial and automotive transitions, less-developed areas inside the so-called developed regions, eastern EU regions bordering on Russia, Belarus or Ukraine, regions which suffer from severe and permanent natural or demographic handicaps, as well as outermost regions, islands and Mediterranean regions facing environmental and economic vulnerabilities;

    D. whereas the absorption rate of cohesion policy funds remains very low partly owing to delays to the start of programmes and the high level of bureaucracy and complexity required in cohesion-funded projects, which can lead to unforced errors;

    E. whereas among the beneficiaries concerned, particular attention should be paid to vulnerable people, such as persons with disabilities;

    1. Considers that, as the EU’s main long-term investment instrument, cohesion policy is based on solidarity, creates sustainable growth and jobs across the Union and contributes to key Union objectives and priorities, including its climate, energy and biodiversity targets, competitiveness, as well as sustainable and socially inclusive economic growth, to tackle demographic challenges and ensure equitable access to affordable housing;

    2. Recalls that cohesion policy has proven to be a helpful tool in tackling challenges in various crises, such as the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and its effects on the energy supply, the high cost of living, inflation, and the needs of refugees and displaced persons, as well as natural disasters; underlines, however, that the resulting legislative amendments to cohesion policy have repeatedly brought unexpected changes to its objectives and resources, while cohesion policy should, when needed, complement rather than replace other financial instruments designed for emergency response;

    3. Reiterates the need for coordination at budgetary level between all the financial instruments supporting cohesion policy; believes that, to make the most of NextGenerationEU funds, these should support and complement cohesion policy measures;

    4. Emphasises the need to ensure that the ‘do no harm to cohesion’ principle is observed across the EU budget; stresses, in this regard, that cohesion policy should not undergo any fundamental changes which could jeopardise the structural and investment funds’ ability to deliver on their goals; stresses that the setting of new priorities should entail new resources and underlines that the long-term investment objectives of cohesion policy are to reduce regional disparities and enhance competitiveness;

    5. Is concerned about the state of implementation of cohesion policy programmes for 2021-2027; urges the Commission to step up monitoring efforts, ensuring respect for the rule of law, a transparent, fair and responsible use of EU resources, as well as their sound financial management; urges the Commission to strengthen its cooperation with the Member State authorities at all levels in order to reduce bureaucracy to make cohesion funds more accessible to local and regional authorities, among others, and to avoid decommitments, unfinished projects and any political manipulation of fund allocation; stresses, therefore, the need to introduce a ‘smart conditionality’ mechanism;

    6. Notes that the Just Transition Fund needs adequate financial resources and a long-term perspective to ensure its effectiveness in supporting regions’ transition towards climate neutrality, while ensuring that the most vulnerable regions are properly supported in the transition process; emphasises the need for a realistic and balanced approach to the just transition, ensuring economic, social and environmental sustainability, with the meaningful participation of local and regional authorities, as well as economic and social partners;

    7. Calls for further simplification of cohesion policy to reduce the growing administrative burden, enhance fund accessibility and ensure investments tailored to the specific needs of regions while enabling the effective management of funds in line with the needs of final beneficiaries; highlights, in this context, the importance of the newly-created EU Councillors network, which is jointly run by the European Committee of the Regions and the European Commission, as a key tool for strengthening the ability to gather evidence of how the Union operates at local level;

    8. Underlines that rural areas are a core part of Europe’s identity and economic potential; welcomes cohesion policy measures that recognise the contribution of more prosperous and resilient rural areas to Europe’s overall resilience; calls for adequate funding to enhance their role in environmental protection, food production, tourism and ensuring ‘the right to stay’; calls for increased public investment to tackle demographic challenges and support young people by improving services and infrastructure, expanding access to digital education, technologies and innovations, so as to raise living standards, increase the stock of affordable housing and foster equal access for citizens and families to culture and high quality education, essential social services and other public services, while making more efficient use of resources, reducing the impact on the environment and creating new opportunities for rural SMEs;

    9. Notes that the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and the Cohesion Fund support investments in sustainable urban development, underlining its importance as a key component of integrated territorial development, with at least 8 % of ERDF resources at the national level being allocated to urban areas through the relevant mechanisms; further notes that this should include special attention to the sustainable development of functional urban and metropolitan areas, facilitating the digital, green and industrial transitions;

    10. Calls for increased investment in digitalisation and innovation to enhance the competitiveness of SMEs in less-developed regions, including rural and peripheral areas, in order to bridge the digital divide and foster inclusive economic growth;

    11. Underlines that sustainable development is directly linked to having a highly skilled work force; insists, therefore, on the need for increased efforts to ensure an adequate degree of upskilling and reskilling of all relevant working age individuals, as well as initiatives to increase citizens’ acceptance of the economic, industrial and energy transitions;

    12. Recalls the importance of mechanisms and strategies adapted to the diversity of the EU’s territories, and therefore calls for a full use of Article 349 TFEU to adapt cohesion policy to the specificities of the outermost regions; reiterates that the outermost regions should receive specific additional allocations to offset the extra costs incurred as a result of permanent constraints on their development; calls for an Islands Pact to be considered by the EU institutions with the participation of the principal stakeholders, along the lines of the Urban Pact and the future Rural Pact;

    13. Reaffirms the need for close cooperation between national, regional, local and other authorities as well as their dialogue with civil society organisations and all relevant stakeholders, including economic and social partners, universities and innovation centres; recognises the importance of research and innovation policy in driving economic growth and enhancing competitiveness in order to fulfil cohesion policy objectives; highlights the need to support the commercialisation and scaling up of interregional innovation projects, underlining the importance of developing value chains, particularly in less-developed regions;

    14. Reiterates the need to strengthen the administrative capabilities and capacity of local, regional and national authorities, which are key components in the effective planning and implementation of initiatives and projects at the local level; highlights the importance of stronger ownership, responsibility, partnership and decentralisation; strongly considers that increased financial resources dedicated to technical assistance are key to effective project implementation;

    15. Emphasises that the implementation of cohesion policy must respect horizontal principles, including its place-based nature, multilevel governance, sustainability, the partnership principle, gender equality and non-discrimination, ensuring that all projects contribute to a more equitable and inclusive Union;

    16. Stresses the need to strengthen awareness-raising among European citizens about cohesion policy achievements and calls for further information measures promoting it such as accessible data platforms, as cohesion policy is a particularly effective means of promoting strong and balanced European regions.

     

     

    ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS
    FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    The rapporteur for the opinion declares under her exclusive responsibility that she did not receive input from any entity or person to be mentioned in this Annex pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure.

     

    INFORMATION ON ADOPTION BY COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION

    Date adopted

    19.2.2025

     

     

     

    Result of final vote

    +:

    –:

    0:

    29

    0

    1

    Members present for the final vote

    Adrian-Dragoş Benea, Gordan Bosanac, Irmhild Boßdorf, Daniel Buda, Klára Dobrev, Klara Dostalova, Raquel García Hermida-Van Der Walle, Gabriella Gerzsenyi, Krzysztof Hetman, Ľubica Karvašová, Elsi Katainen, Isabelle Le Callennec, Elena Nevado del Campo, Andrey Novakov, Valentina Palmisano, Vladimir Prebilič, Sabrina Repp, Marcos Ros Sempere, André Rougé, Antonella Sberna, Mārtiņš Staķis, Şerban Dimitrie Sturdza, Rody Tolassy, Francesco Ventola, Marta Wcisło

    Substitutes present for the final vote

    Dan Barna, Sofie Eriksson, Denis Nesci, Jacek Protas

    Members under Rule 216(7) present for the final vote

    Francisco Assis

     

     

    FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL IN COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION

    29

    +

    ECR

    Denis Nesci, Antonella Sberna, Şerban Dimitrie Sturdza, Francesco Ventola

    PPE

    Daniel Buda, Gabriella Gerzsenyi, Krzysztof Hetman, Isabelle Le Callennec, Elena Nevado del Campo, Andrey Novakov, Jacek Protas, Marta Wcisło

    PfE

    Klara Dostalova, André Rougé, Rody Tolassy

    Renew

    Dan Barna, Raquel García Hermida-Van Der Walle, Ľubica Karvašová, Elsi Katainen

    S&D

    Francisco Assis, Adrian-Dragoş Benea, Klára Dobrev, Sofie Eriksson, Sabrina Repp, Marcos Ros Sempere

    The Left

    Valentina Palmisano

    Verts/ALE

    Gordan Bosanac, Vladimir Prebilič, Mārtiņš Staķis

     

     

    1

    0

    ESN

    Irmhild Boßdorf

     

    Key to symbols:

    + : in favour

     : against

    0 : abstention

     

     

     

    OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT (19.2.2025)

    for the Committee on Budgets

    on guidelines for the 2026 budget – Section III

    (2024/2110(BUI))

    Rapporteur for opinion: Dario Nardella

     

    OPINION

    The Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development calls on the Committee on Budgets, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following into its motion for a resolution:

    1. Highlights the crucial role of agricultural and rural development policies, particularly the common agricultural policy (CAP), in achieving the Union’s objectives under Article 39 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union; highlights the fact that these policies are tools for farmers to provide safe, healthy, affordable and sustainable food of high quality, while ensuring fair and viable incomes for all farmers, in particular active, small-scale and young farmers, including targeting to prevent land abandonment and promoting short food supply chains; underlines that these policies aim to foster sustainable food systems and secure the long-term viability, profitability, sustainability and safety of EU agricultural production, the development of rural areas and the Union’s food sovereignty, while taking into consideration animal welfare standards, climate protection, mitigation and biodiversity measures; recalls, in this regard, that the strong and simplified EU financial support for a competitive and sustainable farming sector should be increased in the 2026 CAP budget allocation to better reflect the growing challenges in rural areas, including depopulation, and keep rural areas alive; underlines that, according to the latest Eurobarometer survey, support for the CAP has reached an all-time high, with over 70 % of respondents agreeing that the CAP fulfils its role in providing safe, healthy and sustainable food of high quality;

    2. Notes that spending under the CAP significantly exceeds the climate and biodiversity mainstreaming targets and requests that this surplus be used to allocate funds that directly contribute to achieving the primary objectives of the CAP;

    3. Calls on the Commission to secure additional funding for further nature objectives rather than relying on the CAP, which must above all remain a fund that ensures food security and a viable income for our farmers;

    4. Upholds the promotion of EU agricultural products as a cornerstone of agricultural policy, with the aim of strengthening the competitiveness and relevance of all production sectors, especially that of wine and high-quality products, which need to have better access to both internal and external markets so as to promote diversification and internationalisation; recalls the success achieved by such promotion programmes in the opening up and consolidation of new markets; stresses the need to ensure an adequate promotion-policy budget in the coming financial years;

    5. Stresses the need for a stronger, better equipped, flexible and more reactive agricultural reserve, with adequate funding to cope with market imbalances or unpredictable external factors, such as extreme and recurring weather events, animal diseases, water stress or an evolving geopolitical context, which are having an increasing impact on agricultural production and markets, farmers’ incomes, farm continuity and food security; calls on the Commission to make use of the crisis reserve in the most efficient, expeditious and transparent way; stresses the need to simplify administrative procedures in order to guarantee the swift disbursement of that aid; points out that an increase in the agricultural reserve must not affect direct payments; calls on the Commission to develop a comprehensive crisis management strategy for each major agricultural sector, ensuring the rapid and effective deployment of the crisis reserve, while considering the establishment of new crisis and risk management instruments; acknowledges though that the agricultural reserve alone cannot fully compensate for the increasing frequency and severity of extreme weather events caused by climate change; stresses the need to fund preventive mitigation and adaptation measures that enhance the resilience, including climate resilience, of rural areas and food production systems;

    6. Strongly opposes any proposals to reduce the level of pre-allocated funds from the CAP in the future budget; points out that those funds should be increased by at least the equivalent of cumulative inflation since the start of the current budget period in order to avoid hidden reductions in CAP funding; stresses that farmers need the continuity and predictability of the CAP and that emerging new priorities cannot lead to cuts to the CAP budget; advocates for transparency and accountability in the allocation of CAP funds and encourages Member States and the Commission to enhance cooperation and strengthen anti-fraud measures; stresses the need for a fair distribution of CAP support between and within Member States; calls on the Commission to mobilise funds outside the CAP, given the challenges facing EU agriculture and to simplify the administrative procedures for farmers who receive aid; insists that any revenue accruing to the Union budget from assigned revenue or repayments of irregularities relating to agriculture should remain under the agriculture component of Heading 3 of the multiannual financial framework (MFF);

    7. Underlines that CAP simplification measures adopted in 2024 must be the starting point for the next CAP reform;

    8. Recalls that innovation can play a key role in enhancing the productivity, competitiveness, resilience and adaptability of agriculture; underlines, in this regard, the importance of increasing funding for research, thereby avoiding additional bureaucracy, both in the future budget allocations in the framework of the Horizon Europe research programme, as well as in the CAP, while creating funding mechanisms that ensure the continuity of existing and successful agri-food projects, established and funded through the NextGenerationEU instrument; calls therefore for adequate funding for climate change mitigation, precision agriculture, circular economy projects, renewable energy production in rural areas, development and technology-neutral innovation, including for projects promoting animal and plant health and the efficient use of resources, such as water, in agriculture; notes that production efficiency may also be an aim in itself, and that such funding should, in addition to improving the competitiveness of the agricultural sector, increase its resilience to challenges such as climate change and the spread of animal diseases; stresses the importance of ensuring adequate resources for training and knowledge exchange through European instruments, such as the Agricultural Knowledge and Innovation Systems;

    9. Highlights the fact that digitalisation is a crucial tool in the development and enhancement of the value of rural areas, including inner areas, and plays a key role in addressing depopulation and attracting young people to these areas; welcomes the digital transformation in agriculture and rural areas, including its use in irrigation, to improve the efficiency, environmental, social and economic sustainability, traceability and precision of agricultural systems, ensuring more effective use of the EU’s budgetary resources and promoting entrepreneurship in rural areas, thus making them more attractive to people and businesses; calls on the Commission and the Member States, in this context, to strengthen the technological and communications infrastructure in rural areas, including broadband internet coverage, and encourages them to leverage technologies to enhance access to critical information and digitalise administrative processes for CAP support so as to reduce the bureaucratic burden and enable more efficient access to support and services; recalls that the uptake of innovative digital technologies requires sufficient funding, as well as targeted training, education and support programmes for farmers, particularly for small-scale and older farmers, to ensure equitable and affordable access to digital tools;

    10. Notes with concern the continuing loss of farms and farmers, which has a significant socio-economic impact on rural areas; urges, therefore, the EU institutions and Member States to address labour and skills shortages by stepping up their efforts to promote generational renewal in the agricultural sector and rural areas, including in outermost regions and inner areas; highlights the importance of improving the profitability of the agricultural sector by enhancing fiscal and support measures that make farming activities more attractive and by improving access to land, financing and insurance, particularly for women, families involved in small-scale farming, marginalised groups and first-time farmers, such as young people; underlines that young farmers have the potential to be a driving force in sustainable and climate-friendly farming and highlights the need to empower them, including through the use of Union funds and adapted advisory and training tools; underlines that building and modernising rural infrastructure improves the quality of life in rural areas, which is essential for generational renewal; proposes, in this context, the inclusion of a specific indicator in future policies to monitor the rate of generational renewal and the level of services and infrastructure in rural areas;

    11. Calls for EU programmes to prioritise projects that safeguard existing jobs in the agricultural sector and promote the creation of quality employment; stresses that all jobs in the agricultural sector must respect workers’ rights, provide stable and regulated pay, and ensure good working conditions; emphasises the importance of effectively combating poverty and social exclusion in rural areas;

    12. Recalls the challenges that the agri-food sector has faced and is facing, such as the COVID-19 crisis, the harmful effects of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, natural disasters and rising input costs; regrets that direct payments and CAP subsidies have decreased significantly in real terms due to inflation, resulting in difficulties in implementing rural development measures, while the administrative burden on farmers has increased due to the accumulation of bureaucracy; calls on the Commission to allocate adequate resources to help farmers cope with those inflationary effects, including fuel costs, and underscores that the 2 % deflator of the current MFF does not compensate for the loss of value resulting from inflation; asks the Commission to provide a more flexible deflator in the next MFF and, furthermore, to work closely with the Member States to implement best practices at national and European levels to help farmers cope with inflation and record costs;

    13. Requests that, following the repeated economic crises and extreme weather events caused by climate change that have affected agricultural companies, the unspent resources of the 2014-2022 rural development plans be spent by 31 December 2026 as a derogation from the N+3 rules laid down in Article 38 of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013[27];

    14. Welcomes the decision of the European Investment Bank to identify agriculture and the bio-economy as key priorities in its 2024-2027 Strategic Roadmap;

    15. Expresses its concern about the adverse effects on the European agri-food sector of political instability in certain Member States and at global level, as well as of geopolitical tensions related to trade or international crises; underlines that the signing of the Mercosur Agreement in December 2024 will have implications for Union farmers and producers; invites the Commission to improve trade agreements to protect EU farmers, to ensure fair competition and a level playing field, and to allocate sufficient funds to mitigate the negative effects of trade agreements on the agricultural sector; recalls that European farmers may face unfair competition from third country producers who do not meet the same production standards as those in the EU and calls therefore for a proper level of reciprocity; reiterates the negative cascade effects of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine on global food security and farmers’ livelihoods; highlights the need to make sure that the reform of the Association Agreement between the EU and Ukraine provides stability and protection for EU farmers; highlights the need to start better preparation for an enlargement of the Union, taking account of European farmers’ interests, especially with regard to the adoption of balanced and enhanced measures to safeguard the European agricultural sector, while also ensuring support for Ukraine;

    16. Calls on the Commission to encourage Member States to revise their national strategic plans, including the rapid use of funds from the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development, and to provide funding to strengthen the relative negotiating positions of farmers in value chains, and for the Commission to swiftly approve these modifications;

    17. Stresses the vital importance of the programme of options specifically relating to remoteness and insularity (POSEI) for maintaining agricultural activity in the outermost regions of Europe, for the provision of food and agricultural products there and for the food sovereignty of the EU as a whole; calls for the budget of the scheme, which has not been increased since 2013, to be increased to reflect the real needs of farmers in the outermost regions, as farmers in those areas are facing higher production costs; calls therefore on the Commission to apply without delay a 2 % deflator to the POSEI financial envelopes in order to mitigate the substantial losses for producers in real terms and ensure fairer support for all farmers;

    18. Urges the Commission to ensure adequate resources for the implementation of an EU water management strategy and to continue developing water collection, storage and distribution activities, while preserving the status of water bodies, in order to render the use of water reserves more efficient in agriculture, both in crop irrigation and livestock farming, given that droughts are becoming increasingly severe across the Union.

     

    ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS
    FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    The rapporteur for the opinion declares under his exclusive responsibility that he did not receive input from any entity or person to be mentioned in this Annex pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure.

     

    INFORMATION ON ADOPTION BY THE COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION

    Date adopted

    18.2.2025

     

     

     

    Result of final vote

    +:

    –:

    0:

    34

    2

    8

    Members present for the final vote

    Sergio Berlato, Stefano Bonaccini, Mireia Borrás Pabón, Daniel Buda, Waldemar Buda, Gheorghe Cârciu, Asger Christensen, Barry Cowen, Carmen Crespo Díaz, Ivan David, Valérie Deloge, Paulo Do Nascimento Cabral, Herbert Dorfmann, Carlo Fidanza, Luke Ming Flanagan, Maria Grapini, Cristina Guarda, Martin Häusling, Krzysztof Hetman, Céline Imart, Elsi Katainen, Stefan Köhler, Norbert Lins, Cristina Maestre, Dario Nardella, Maria Noichl, Gilles Pennelle, André Rodrigues, Katarína Roth Neveďalová, Bert-Jan Ruissen, Eric Sargiacomo, Christine Singer, Raffaele Stancanelli, Anna Strolenberg, Pekka Toveri, Jessika Van Leeuwen, Veronika Vrecionová, Thomas Waitz, Maria Walsh

    Substitutes present for the final vote

    Peter Agius, Benoit Cassart, Ton Diepeveen, Elisabetta Gualmini, Esther Herranz García

     

    FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL BY THE COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION

    34

    +

    ECR

    Sergio Berlato, Waldemar Buda, Carlo Fidanza, Bert-Jan Ruissen, Veronika Vrecionová

    NI

    Katarína Roth Neveďalová

    PPE

    Peter Agius, Daniel Buda, Carmen Crespo Díaz, Paulo Do Nascimento Cabral, Herbert Dorfmann, Esther Herranz García, Krzysztof Hetman, Céline Imart, Stefan Köhler, Norbert Lins, Pekka Toveri, Jessika Van Leeuwen, Maria Walsh

    PfE

    Raffaele Stancanelli

    Renew

    Benoit Cassart, Asger Christensen, Barry Cowen, Elsi Katainen, Christine Singer

    S&D

    Stefano Bonaccini, Gheorghe Cârciu, Maria Grapini, Elisabetta Gualmini, Cristina Maestre, Dario Nardella, Maria Noichl, André Rodrigues, Eric Sargiacomo

     

    2

    PfE

    Ton Diepeveen

    The Left

    Luke Ming Flanagan

     

    8

    0

    ESN

    Ivan David

    PfE

    Mireia Borrás Pabón, Valérie Deloge, Gilles Pennelle

    Verts/ALE

    Cristina Guarda, Martin Häusling, Anna Strolenberg, Thomas Waitz

     

    Key to symbols:

    + : in favour

     : against

    0 : abstention

     

     

    LETTER OF THE COMMITTEE ON BUDGETARY CONTROL (18.2.2025)

    Mr Johan Van Overtveldt

    Chair

    Committee on Budgets

    BRUSSELS

    Subject: Opinion on Guidelines for the 2026 Budget – Section III (2024/2110(BUI))

    Dear Mr Van Overtveldt,

    Under the procedure referred to above, the Committee on Budgetary Control has been asked to submit an opinion to your committee. At its meeting of 18 February 2025, the committee decided to send the opinion in the form of a letter.

    Yours sincerely,

    Niclas Herbst

     

    CONT Chair

    Rapporteur for the Commission Discharge

    OPINION

    1. Recalls its strong commitment to the fundamental principles and values enshrined in the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU);

    2. Stresses the fundamental importance of respect for the rule of law to protect the financial interests of the Union in the implementation of EU funds; recalls the improvements needed in the application of the Rule of law Conditionality Regulation and a swifter follow-up by the Commission on breaches of the rule of law principles that affect or risk affecting the EU financial interests, including the Single Market dimension, as for example procurement and state aid;

    3. Stresses that the sound and timely implementation of the budget contributes to addressing more efficiently and effectively the needs and challenges faced by the Union and its citizens in different policy areas; warns that the implementation of the budget under time pressure may lead to an increase in errors and irregularities;

    4. Recalls that for the last years all available flexibility measures in the EU Budget were used; reiterates the need for flexibility in the EU Budget to address potential new circumstances where EU action is necessary; notes that increasingly the headroom in the EU Budget is used to provide funding to respond to crises; notes in addition, that exposure of the EU Budget to guarantees and contingent liabilities is projected to rise in the coming years, putting additional strain on the headroom in the Budget which further limits the flexibility of the EU Budget, as are the increased interest payments for NGEU related borrowing; urges the Commission to work on a more stringent risk assessment framework to define the exposure more accurately to prevent over-burdening of the EU Budget;

    5. Stresses the need to protect the EU Budget from any misuse, particularly fraud and corruption, and calls on the Commission to continue to be vigilant and proactive in the current and future cases when the lack of respect for Union values and the Rule of Law affect or threaten to affect the Union’s financial interests;

    6. Stresses the importance of the EU anti-fraud architecture and the need to provide increased resources and to strengthen the role of the European anti-fraud office (OLAF), the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO), the European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation (Eurojust) and the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) in the fight against fraud and corruption; stresses the need for a comprehensive cooperation between all these institutions;

    7. Notes that while the digital transformation is indispensable to increase the efficiency, control and transparency of the EU Budget, this shift has also heightened its exposure to cyber fraud affecting the financial interests of the Union; calls on the Commission to allocate sufficient funds to strengthen EU digital infrastructure, research and development while ensuring that investments in cybersecurity are impactful and contribute to the overall protection of the Union’s financial interests;

    8. Is concerned that total outstanding commitments are reaching record levels for several years now; notes that the Commission projects outstanding commitments to decrease after 2024, when NGEU draws to a close; considers that until the projected decrease of the RAL, the risk of decommitments, and a related reduction of EU added value for the EU Budget, remains high; calls on the Commission to enact a more strategic, transparent, and proactive approach to managing decommitments, also considering the use of decommitments in the cascade mechanism;

    9. Is concerned that the Union’s debt continues to rise, with a large share of this increase attributed to the temporary recovery instrument NGEU; is concerned that the increased debt and the associated higher interest costs will have long-term consequences on the EU’s fiscal stability, potentially leading to greater financial strain and a reduced capacity to respond to future challenges or invest in key strategic areas; encourages the Commission to explore options to reduce the overall debt burden, such as optimising the timing and structure of debt issuance, and consider alternative financing mechanisms that could reduce reliance on high-interest debt; stresses that introducing new own resources is also necessary to prevent future generations from bearing the burden for past debts;

    10. Expresses regret that the overall error rate estimated by the Court has been increasing since the 2020 financial year, reaching 5,6 % for the 2023 financial year; notes significant variations in error rates across different budget headings, with some areas reporting error rates below the materiality threshold of 2 %, while cohesion policy has an error rate as high as 9,3 %; notes in particular the conclusion that errors found in 100 % EU-funded priorities contributed 5,0 % to the total estimated level of error of 9,3 %; is concerned that increasing flexibilities without at the same time either decreasing requirements or increasing ex ante checks and controls contributed to the high error rate; calls on the Commission to take careful consideration of the lessons learned from the implementation of EU crisis response tools, such as increased flexibility;

    11. Notes that the Court issued a qualified opinion on the legality and regularity of the RRF expenditure in 2023; expresses concern that the Court found 7 out of 23 RRF payments made in 2023 were impacted by quantitative issues, with 6 of these payments being affected by material errors; notes in addition that absorption of RRF funds was delayed in 2023, and that Member States may not be able to complete all measures at the end of the RRF’s implementation period; notes further that the second half of the RRF’s implementation period (post 2023) is more challenging with an increase in number of milestones and targets to be implemented, a shift from reforms to investments, and a high proportion of measures to be completed in the last year; calls on the Commission to support the Member States’ authorities in the implementation of funds, in particular where additional administrative capacity is needed, to stimulate absorption and reduce the occurrence of errors; calls on the Commission to transparently inform the Parliament about the progress of implementation and absorption of funds and to timely propose solutions where bottlenecks in the implementation are observed;

    12. Recalls the importance of protecting the Union’s own resources from any fraudulent irregularity and, to that end, stimulate the cooperation between anti-fraud services and customs agencies to detect, prevent and correct fraud affecting Union revenue; recalls its position on the amended Commission proposals endorsing the introduction of new own resources.

     

     

    ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS
    FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR FOR OPINION HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    The Chair in his capacity as rapporteur for opinion declares under his exclusive responsibility that he did not receive input from any entity or person to be mentioned in this Annex pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure.

     

     

    LETTER OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE ENVIRONMENT, CLIMATE AND FOOD SAFETY (18.2.2025)

     

    Mr Johan Van Overtveldt

    Chair

    Committee on Budgets

    BRUSSELS

     

    Subject: Opinion on Guidelines for the 2026 Budget – Section III (2024/2110(BUI))

    Dear Mr Chair,

    The Coordinators of the Committee on the Environment, Climate and Food Safety (ENVI) decided on 16 December 2024 that ENVI would provide an opinion on the Guidelines for the 2026 budget – Section III (2024/2110(BUI)) in the form of a letter. Therefore, as both ENVI Chair and Standing Rapporteur for the Budget, let me provide you with ENVI’s contribution in the form of resolution paragraphs, which was adopted by ENVI at its meeting[28] of 18 February 2025 and which I kindly request will be taken into account by your committee:

    1. Highlights that the current serious geopolitical context requires the Union to allocate sufficient resources for accelerating the green transition to transform the EU into a modern, resource-efficient and competitive economy; calls on the Commission and Member States to ensure the full execution of the REPowerEU Plan to accelerate the deployment of renewable energy sources and of energy efficiency technologies to speed up the green transition and end dependency on fossil fuels

    2. Stresses the importance of the Paris Agreement’s goal of keeping the global average temperature increase below 1,5°C compared to pre-industrial times; recalls the Union’s obligations to deliver the financial commitments made for international climate financing; considers that the Union should continue leading the efforts towards decarbonisation at global level;

    3. Stresses that the Union’s budget for 2026 should be aligned with the realisation of the European Union’s objectives to reduce pollution and enhance biodiversity, as well as the long-term vision for a prosperous, modern, competitive and climate-neutral economy, the legally enshrined objective to reach climate neutrality by 2050 and the Union’s intermediate climate targets for 2030 and 2040, as laid down in the European Climate Law;

    4. Points out that the European Green Deal is a growth strategy, whose effective implementation with adequate funding  is fundamentally connected to the Union’s strength and competitiveness; believes that the future Clean Industrial Deal and Circular Economy Act should further increase the Union’s competitiveness capacity and sustainability and resource-efficiency to achieve the European Green Deal objectives and ensure a just and inclusive transition;

    5. Reminds that the EU’s long-term budget for 2021-2027, together with NextGenerationEU, is aimed at implementing the EU’s long-term priorities in various areas, including climate and the environment; emphasizes, specifically, that 30 % of total EU expenditures under the MFF have to be allocated to climate-related projects, including clean-tech and innovation projects; stresses that the future Multi-Financial Framework post-2027 should maintain the level of ambition on climate and environment protection;

    6. Considers it unacceptable that the Union did not reach its objective of allocating at least 7.5 % of annual expenditure to biodiversity in 2024;  calls on the Member States and Commission to take the necessary measures to ensure that the 10 % objective will be reached in both 2026 and 2027 in order to achieve concrete outcomes, including the objectives set in the Kunming-Montreal Agreement, whilst ensuring cost-effectiveness and long-term sustainability; notes the importance of the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) to reach biodiversity objectives;

    7. Emphasises the need to allocate sufficient funding for each individual budget line that contributes to the achievement of the green transition, with a particular focus on sustainability, climate change, innovation, competitiveness, resource-efficiency and biodiversity conservation, such as attention to bees and pollinators’ protection and their role as indicators for healthy ecosystems; emphasizes the importance of the Social Climate Fund (SCF), established to support vulnerable groups in the Union’s green transition;

    8. Highlights the importance of improving disaster prevention and preparedness by implementing climate adaptation measures, allowing the Union to better prevent and respond to emergencies like recent climate change events; emphasizes the ongoing need to ensure sufficient funding for the Union’s civil protection mechanism;

    9. Notes the relevance of the reports adopted by the European Court of Auditors (ECA) in relation to the management of EU funds linked to climate and environment; urges the Commission and the Member States to implement the recommendations of the reports, in particular report 15/2024 on climate adaptation[29] regarding the need to ensure that all relevant EU-funded projects are adapted to the current and future climate conditions; recalls the importance of the ECA recommendations in its special report 14/2024[30], emphasising the need for the Commission to better estimate climate spending under future funding instruments, to ensure their adequate design, and to enhance the performance of green transition measures; 

    10. Emphasises the need for more ambitious funding allocations for programs like LIFE to support climate and environment-related projects, as well as for the Just Transition Fund to assist the most vulnerable carbon-intensive regions in addressing the economic and social impacts of the climate transition to leave no one behind; emphasises that the funding under LIFE is crucial for the protection of nature and biodiversity, the transition towards an energy efficient, circular, climate neutral, competitive and climate resilient economy and for democratic participation in decision-making processes;  notes that efficient and result-driven climate and biodiversity financing should be integrated into programming activities, while remaining flexible enough to address the diverse needs of different regions and sectors;

    11. Reminds that a stronger European Health Union requires adequate funding with health-related expenditure that follows the ‘One Health’ and ‘Health in all policies’ approaches, securing the proper implementation of, inter alia, the European Health Data Space and of the Europe’s Beating Cancer Plan;

    12. Strongly reiterates its regrets over the redeployment from the EU4Health programme of 1 billion EUR over the 2025-2027 period; considers that this funding shortfall threatens the programme’s ability to achieve its critical objectives; renews its call for the Commission, Member States, and other stakeholders to identify practical solutions to offset this cut, ensuring that the programme’s objective of building stronger, more resilient, and more accessible health systems is achieved; calls as well for increased amounts allocated to Cluster Health in Horizon Europe; recognises that stronger health systems directly contribute to economic stability and productivity by reducing health-related workforce disruptions and increasing the resilience of the labour market;

    13. Highlights the importance of effectively allocating sufficient human and financial resources to all relevant DGs for the implementation of the adopted legislation related to climate environment, chemicals and health as well as to the relevant European agencies, including the European Environment Agency (EEA), the European Chemicals Agency (ECHA) and the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA), the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the European Medicines Agency (EMA);

    14. Highlights the need for a strengthened EU own resources system that can address current challenges while supporting the Union’s environmental, climate and health objectives; stresses the importance of implementing the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism effectively, enabling the Commission to take compensatory measures to address any shortfalls in meeting the EU budget’s overall climate spending target.

    I have sent a similar letter to Mr Andrzej Halicki, general rapporteur for the 2026 budget.

    Yours sincerely,

    Antonio Decaro

     

     

     

    ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS
    FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    The Chair in his capacity as rapporteur for the opinion declares under his exclusive responsibility that he did not receive input from any entity or person to be mentioned in this Annex pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure.

     

     

     

    LETTER OF THE COMMITTEE ON INDUSTRY, RESEARCH AND ENERGY (19.2.2025)

    Mr Johan VAN OVERTVELDT

    Chair

    Committee on Budgets

     

    BRUSSELS

    Subject: Opinion in the form of a letter on the Guidelines for the 2026 budget – Section III (2024/2110(BUI))

    Dear Mr Chair,

    Under the procedure referred to above, the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy has been asked to submit an opinion to your committee. On 19 February 2024, the committee adopted an opinion in the form of letter during its regular meeting.

    The Committee on Industry, Research and Energy calls on the Committee on Budgets, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following suggestions into its motion for a resolution.

    Yours sincerely,

    Borys BUDKA  

    ITRE Chair

     

    SUGGESTIONS

    1.  Recalls that the Union Budget for 2026 should concretely reflect the political priorities of the new legislative term, considering also the various pledges made by Commissioners during their confirmation hearings in Parliament in November 2024; insists that the 2026 budget needs to fully implement all programmes agreed under the current Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), as well as set  in motion and finance new strategic EU initiatives, such as the Clean Industrial Deal for competitive industries and quality jobs; underscores that the 2026 budget must be aligned with the Union’s objectives and international commitments;

    2.  Notes that multiple challenges facing Europe require greater investment and coordination at European level, as well as more concrete action by Member States; calls on the Commission to propose a Union Budget for 2026 that reflects the urgent nature of these challenges; among others, the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine and hybrid attacks on Member States and their energy and digital infrastructure; maintains this requires multiple forms of EU and national level investments and preparedness, including improving the resilience of digital and energy infrastructure, direct support for Ukraine, accelerated investment in Europe’s defence industry, and support for the EU’s Eastern border regions most directly impacted by the war and Russian hybrid operations; the need to strengthen Europe’s economic competitiveness and industrial base in a volatile environment where global competitors benefit from extensive state support, leading to unfair competition for European companies; the urgent necessity to improve Europe’s research and innovation capabilities, including greater support for SMEs, start-ups and scale-ups; the digital revolution, including the acceleration of artificial intelligence and growing concerns about cybersecurity; and the need to achieve a just climate transition, as we adapt our economy to the Union’s long-term energy goals and climate neutrality by 2050, by accelerating the decarbonisation in Europe’s energy markets, implementing European Green Deal legislation and achieving a circular economy;

    3.  Notes that EU companies face considerably higher electricity and gas prices compared with the USA, China and other global actors, which presents a significant competitiveness disadvantage, especially but not only for Europe’s energy intensive industries; emphasises the need to  tackle energy poverty and limit the damaging effects of high energy prices on European consumers, many of whom are already struggling with a high cost of living; stresses the importance of reducing EU dependence on fossil-fuels and improving energy efficiency; underlines that security of supply concerns remain paramount and should be addressed in the 2026 budget, given  that energy supplies are easily weaponised by state actors; insists on the need to improve energy interconnections, modernise energy grids, integrate a higher share of renewables while ensuring sufficient clean baseload energy and system flexibilities, therefore calls for significantly increased funding for the Connecting Europe Facility – Energy, which is the flagship EU programme in this field but currently has limited resources to credibly advance Europe towards an interconnected, resilient and decarbonised energy system, able to deliver affordable prices; calls for urgently ending any remaining EU import dependencies on Russia:

    4.   Recalls the need to strengthen the resilience of the EU economy and the competitiveness of Union industries, with ambitious EU industrial policies that can create quality jobs and contribute significantly towards achieving the EU’s social, digital and green objectives, whilst preserving a level playing field in the Single Market; therefore believes that the Union Budget for 2026 should mark the start of the investment boost recommended in the Draghi report by investing strongly in industrial competitiveness, open strategic autonomy and creating pathways towards decarbonisation, while securing EU supply chains for strategic sectors and technologies and improving access to critical raw materials; insists that the 2026 budget must continue strengthening the Union’s competitiveness with increased support for SMEs, midcaps and start-ups, including greater support for scale up to compete globally, in particular through the European Innovation Council;

    5.  Recalls that the 2026 budget for Horizon Europe will be the first after the mid-term review of this strategic EU programme, and therefore needs to offer sufficient investment in fundamental and applied research, foster collaborative research and facilitate the scale-up and commercialisation of research results to ensure Europe can retain and further develop the necessary knowledge base to confront the scientific and economic challenges of the coming decades; regrets that the existing level of Horizon Europe funding is ultimately insufficient to develop the ideas and technologies necessary for the twin green and digital transitions, or to fully deliver on the stated EU goals of sustainable growth and open strategic autonomy; calls for an increase in the 2026 budget for Horizon Europe, including through the reuse of all available decommitments allowing each sub-programme to fund at least 50% of all excellent proposals, given that presently a majority of excellent proposals remain unfunded; calls for maintaining stable and sufficient funding of the ITER project;

    6.  Stresses that significant investments are necessary to address Europe’s connectivity gap and other Digital Decade 2030 targets; recalls that the European Commission estimates that achieving the full gigabit target could exceed €200 billion; calls therefore for adequate resources to be allocated to provide high speed connectivity including gigabit and 5G services, in addition to investments in next generation digital infrastructures and emerging technologies; calls for further investments that foster the development of European digital sovereignty and an EU-based digital sector in order to catch up in crucial areas such as quantum computing and Artificial Intelligence; calls on the Commission to allocate sufficient resources to ensure the full implementation and robust enforcement of the Digital Services Act and the Digital Markets Act; stresses the importance of tackling foreign interference, addressing the dangers of biased algorithms, and safeguarding transparency, accountability, and the integrity of the digital public space.

    7.  Underlines that a strong and sustainable European space sector is fundamental for European security, open strategic autonomy, secure connectivity, protection of critical infrastructure and advancing the twin green and digital transitions; regrets that EU and its Member States funding for space programmes is highly fragmented and only a fraction of the level in the US, while other global actors including China are rapidly increasing investments; calls on the Commission and Member States to ensure sufficient funding for the European space industry, which includes fostering investments from the private sector; calls furthermore for a sufficient level of  EU investments supporting R&I in the field of space;

    8.  Calls for adequate funding and staffing for all agencies and Union bodies in the policy areas of industry, research, energy, space and cybersecurity, in order to cope with increased workload and new regulatory obligations; 

     

     

    ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS
    FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    The rapporteur for the opinion declares under his exclusive responsibility that he did not receive input from any entity or person to be mentioned in this Annex pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure.

     

     

    LETTER OF THE COMMITTEE ON CULTURE AND EDUCATION (19.2.2025)

    Mr Johan Van Overtveldt

    Chair

    Committee on Budgets

    BRUSSELS

    Subject: Opinion on Guidelines for the 2026 Budget –Section III 2024/2110(BUI)

    Dear Mr Van Overtveldt,

    to above, the Committee on Culture and Education has been asked to submit an opinion to your committee. At its meeting of 3 December 2024, the committee decided to send the opinion in the form of a letter. It considered the matter at its meeting of 19 February 2025 and adopted the opinion at that meeting[31].

    The Committee on Culture and Education:

    1. Insists that funding for the most successful EU and crucial programmes like Erasmus+, the European Solidarity Corps (ESC), Creative Europe and the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values (CERV) programme has to be excluded from debt repayment needs for the European Union Recovery Instrument (EURI) over the whole remaining MFF period; stresses that the ‘EURI cascade mechanism’ has to be implemented effectively, protecting important programme initiatives that directly benefit citizens;

    2. Welcomes further simplification in line with EP calls, e.g. through the use of lump sums in Erasmus+ , for the programmes that are close to the citizens and need to be accessible also for organisations with limited administrative capacities, and calls for further efforts to achieve that end; underlines that attention should be given to peripheral, mountainous and rural areas that experience more difficulties in accessing EU funds; calls on the Commission to continue to share regularly with Parliament, including the Committee on Culture and Education, updated indicators and statistics on the absorption of funds in these programmes;

    3. Welcomes that mobility grants under Erasmus+ were increased to offset rising living costs, upon Parliament’s insistence on an increase to the programme’s budget, to ensure that the programme remains accessible and inclusive;

    4. Stresses necessary efforts to widen participation and to meet inclusivity targets in order to widen the participation of the most vulnerable youth groups and people with disabilities;

    5. Strongly warns against any cuts, and calls for an increase of the funding for the programme, taking into account the high implementation rates and absorption capacities of the programme; calls in particular to preserve funding to initiatives that support teacher development, such as the European Universities and the Erasmus+ Teacher Academies; highlights the growing number of applicants – e.g. a 94% increase  in school education mobility applications from 2022 to 2023 ; regrets, however, the consequence of  lower success rates, notably for school accreditations, which underscores the need for a substantial funding increase to meet the growing demand;

    6. Insists that all funding initially allocated to the programme will be used for investing in the future of young people;

    7. Emphasises the need to support sport under Erasmus+ to promote its role in improving physical and mental health and social inclusion, and to fight discrimination;

    8. Deplores the additional, unanticipated costs for the media strand of Creative Europe, including the implementation of not only the AVMSD, but also of EMFA, including the secretariat of the European Board for Media Services, an additional expenditure that was not taken into account when the current MFF was set up; insists that new initiatives should always be financed from fresh money;

    9. Stresses that the budget for the Creative Europe programme is insufficient to meet the high demand for projects across all its strands, with alarmingly low success rates (e.g. 17% in 2023 under the culture strand); calls for an increase of its funding and highlights the need for synergies between Creative Europe and other EU funds.

    10. Calls for an increase in funding for the ESC programme, given the modest year-on-year increases of about 2% of its budget under the MFF, which is not sufficient to offset inflation rates, and the fact that it is heavily over-subscribed, resulting in a high rejection rate and, therefore, in many cases, disappointment for the young applicants; welcomes the fact that the number of participants with fewer opportunities in the programme (38%)  is the highest of any EU programme and should be maintained;

    11. Stresses the importance of the CERV programme for building bridges between European citizens from different Member States and promoting their engagement and participation in the democratic life of the Union, while also contributing to preserving social cohesion and helping to prevent democratic backsliding, particularly in the current challenging political situation; insists, therefore, on an increase for its budget;

    12. Points out that pilot projects and preparatory actions (PPs and PAs) serve as testbeds for new policy initiatives and need adequate funding to properly fulfil that function; deplores any attempts to thwart potentially successful proposals for PPs and PAs already at the selection stage and calls for better cooperation between the Commission and the European Parliament on the selection and implementation of PPs and PAs.

    Yours sincerely,

    Nela Riehl

     

    ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS
    FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    The rapporteur for the opinion declares under his exclusive responsibility that he did not receive input from any entity or person to be mentioned in this Annex pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure.

    LETTER OF THE COMMITTEE ON CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS (18.2.2025)

    Mr Johan Van Overtveldt

    Chair

    Committee on Budgets

    BRUSSELS

    Subject: Opinion on Guidelines for the 2026 Budget – Section III (2024/2110(BUI))

    Dear Mr Van Overtveldt,

    Under the procedure referred to above, the Committee on Constitutional Affairs has been asked to submit an opinion to your committee. At its meeting of 29 January 2025, the committee decided to send the opinion in the form of a letter.

    The Committee on Constitutional Affairs considered the matter at its meeting of 18 February 2025. At that meeting[32], it decided to submit the opinion set out below to the Committee on Budgets, as the committee responsible.

    Yours sincerely,

    Sven Simon

     

     

    OPINION

    1. Points out that future substantial EU enlargement cannot be met without a larger EU budget and sufficient new own resources; calls for the necessary budgetary and institutional reforms to be agreed and adopted before substantial enlargement takes place;

    2. Reminds of the need to secure proper financing for the structures within the EU institutions that are responsible for communication with citizens and countering disinformation such as the Commission Representations and European Parliament Liaison Offices, in order to enable them to effectively fulfil their tasks;

    3. Recommends that the Authority for European Political Parties and European Political Foundations receives adequate resources, in particular for staffing purposes in view of the significant enlargement of its tasks as foreseen by the Commission proposal for the recast of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 1141/2014;

    4. Urges the Committee on Budgets to incorporate the above mentioned budget lines augmentations in its position, as they serve the purpose of delivering concrete results and quality communication to citizens.

     

     

    ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS
    FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    The Chair declares under his exclusive responsibility that he did not receive input from any entity or person to be mentioned in this Annex pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure.

     

     

     

     

    INFORMATION ON ADOPTION IN COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE

    Date adopted

    20.3.2025

     

     

     

    Result of final vote

    +:

    –:

    0:

    27

    8

    0

    Members present for the final vote

    Georgios Aftias, Rasmus Andresen, Isabel Benjumea Benjumea, Olivier Chastel, Tamás Deutsch, Angéline Furet, Thomas Geisel, Andrzej Halicki, Monika Hohlmeier, Alexander Jungbluth, Fabienne Keller, Ondřej Kovařík, Janusz Lewandowski, Victor Negrescu, Danuše Nerudová, João Oliveira, Karlo Ressler, Bogdan Rzońca, Julien Sanchez, Hélder Sousa Silva, Nicolae Ştefănuță, Carla Tavares, Nils Ušakovs, Lucia Yar, Auke Zijlstra

    Substitutes present for the final vote

    Stine Bosse, Mohammed Chahim, Rasmus Nordqvist

    Members under Rule 216(7) present for the final vote

    Sakis Arnaoutoglou, Łukasz Kohut, Marit Maij, Arkadiusz Mularczyk, Mirosława Nykiel, Leire Pajín, Krzysztof Śmiszek

     

    FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL BY THE COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE

    27

    +

    ECR

    Arkadiusz Mularczyk, Bogdan Rzońca

    PPE

    Georgios Aftias, Isabel Benjumea Benjumea, Andrzej Halicki, Monika Hohlmeier, Łukasz Kohut, Janusz Lewandowski, Danuše Nerudová, Mirosława Nykiel, Karlo Ressler, Hélder Sousa Silva

    Renew

    Stine Bosse, Olivier Chastel, Fabienne Keller, Lucia Yar

    S&D

    Sakis Arnaoutoglou, Mohammed Chahim, Marit Maij, Victor Negrescu, Leire Pajín, Krzysztof Śmiszek, Carla Tavares, Nils Ušakovs

    Verts/ALE

    Rasmus Andresen, Rasmus Nordqvist, Nicolae Ştefănuță

     

    8

    ESN

    Alexander Jungbluth

    NI

    Thomas Geisel

    PfE

    Tamás Deutsch, Angéline Furet, Ondřej Kovařík, Julien Sanchez, Auke Zijlstra

    The Left

    João Oliveira

     

     

    Key to symbols:

    + : in favour

     : against

    0 : abstention

     

     

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: ‘Unknown’ soldier’s grave identified 107 years after his death

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    News story

    ‘Unknown’ soldier’s grave identified 107 years after his death

    The final resting place of a Devonian man who served with the King’s (Liverpool Regiment) in World War 1 has been named in France almost exactly 107 years after his death.

    The Reverend Paul Robinson CF conducts the rededication service at Ham British Cemetery (Crown Copyright)

    A rededication service, at which Captain (Capt) Hubert Leslie Smith’s name was added to his gravestone, was held today (25 March) at his graveside in Commonwealth War Graves Commission (CWGC) Ham British Cemetery near Saint Quentin. 

    The service was organised by the MOD’s Joint Casualty and Compassionate Centre (JCCC), also known as the ‘War Detectives’ and was attended by serving soldiers of The Duke of Lancaster’s Regiment and The Royal Yorkshire Regiment. 

    Members of the Smith family stand at the graveside with the military party (Crown Copyright)

    Capt Smith died on 24 March 1918 and after the war his remains were recovered and buried in Ham British Cemetery as an unknown captain of The King’s (Liverpool Regiment). Because he was missing Capt Smith was commemorated on the Pozieres Memorial. 

    The location of Capt Smith’s grave came to light after a researcher submitted a case to CWGC hoping to have identified his final resting place. After further investigation by the National Army Museum and JCCC, it was confirmed. 

    JCCC Caseworker, Rosie Barron, said: 

    It has been a privilege to work with The Duke of Lancaster’s Regiment to organise the rededication service for Capt Smith today and to have had his family present at the service. Although Capt Smith died 107 years ago, his memory has lived on within his family. It is important that men such as Capt Smith, who paid the ultimate sacrifice for their country, are honoured and remembered for their bravery.

    The service was attended by Capt Smith’s great nephews and their families, who had travelled from the UK and the USA to attend the service. 

    Peter Smith, great nephew of Capt Smith said: 

    Today’s Smith family in both the UK and the USA were both surprised and pleased to have this opportunity to understand and recognise the life and service of a man we never met in person. Thank you JCCC and all those involved for discovering our relative and providing this opportunity to pay tribute to his life, service, and death from long ago.

    Reverend Paul Robinson CF, Chaplain to 4th Battalion The Duke of Lancaster’s Regiment who conducted the service said: 

    It is a great honour and privilege to be asked to preside at the Rededication Service of Captain Hubert Leslie Smith. As an Army Chaplain, honouring the fallen is one of our most sacred tasks. It is our role to silently shepherd an often-beleaguered nation through grief and we revere those who have died and lay to rest those who have served our nation with dignity and honour and treat their families with respect and compassion. Memorials reflect the emphasis the British people place on the worth and value of the individual.

    Captain Smith’s new headstone at Ham British Cemetery (Crown Copyright)

    The headstone over the grave was replaced by CWGC. Director for the France Area at the CWGC, Jeremy Prince, said:  

    We are honoured to mark Capt Smith’s grave with a new Commonwealth War Graves headstone, more than a century after his death. We will care for his grave, and those of his comrades at Ham British Cemetery, in perpetuity.

    Updates to this page

    Published 25 March 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Culinary expert, Christian Abegan, named WFP Chef advocate in West and Central Africa

    Source: World Food Programme

    Photo: WFP/Evelyn Fey. Chef Christian Abegan becomes WFP’s Chef Advocate for Food Security, Nutrition, Sustainable Food Systems.

    DAKAR – The United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) today announced Christian Abégan, -renowned culinary expert, author and TV Host, as its new Chef Advocate for food security, nutrition and sustainable food systems in West and Central Africa.

    A champion of sustainable food systems and healthy diets, Abégan has dedicated his career to elevating African gastronomy, advocating for food security and promoting the use of nutritious, locally sourced ingredients to fight hunger. Honoured with the Diplôme d’Honneur de l’Institut de la Gastronomie Française, laureate of the Afro-Caribbean Excellence Trophy and author, he brings a wealth of expertise and passion to WFP’s mission of fighting hunger and malnutrition worldwide.

    In his new role as WFP’s Chef Advocate, Christian Abégan will collaborate with WFP to promote fortified foods, advocate for homegrown school meals, and mobilize decision-makers to support global food security efforts. Chef Abegan will also share his culinary knowledge and techniques, empowering people to access nutritious meals using available resources.

    As a chef and a passionate advocate for nutritious and accessible food for all, I fully identify with WFP’s mission to fight hunger,” said Chef Christian Abégan. “Taking on this role is a great honour and a responsibility that I embrace with passion and determination. 

    For the past 35 years, Abégan has advocated for the power of food as a tool for better health, culture, community cohesion and growth. His expertise in African cuisine and sustainable food systems aligns with WFP’s efforts to promote nutrition, food security, support to smallholder farmers and education through its homegrown school feeding programme.

    “Chef Christian Abégan’s expertise and creativity bring a powerful synergy to WFP’s efforts in West and Central Africa, blending culinary innovation with social impact,” said Margot Van Der Velden, WFP’s Regional Director for Western Africa.  “WFP’s engagement with Chef Abégan exemplifies the powerful impact of partnerships in addressing hunger and improving food and nutrition security. Through culinary innovation, capacity building, advocacy, we will bring about positive change to communities around the world.” 

    Western Africa is in the grips of an acute food security and nutrition crisis with an estimated 52.7 million women, men and children projected to experience acute hunger by June 2025. This hunger crisis is mainly driven by conflict, displacement, economic crises and severe climate shocks, with devastating floods in 2024 affecting over six million people across the region. Moreover, 8 in 10 children under two lack access to dietary diversity in a region hosting 16 percent of the global burden of child stunting. 

    WFP has been instrumental in fostering local food solutions, delivering emergency assistance to those in   greatest need and enhancing access to affordable and nutritious diets. WFP’s response encompasses support for local agribusinesses, initiatives for the production of nutritious foods and efforts to connect farmers with school feeding programmes. 

    Over the last seven years, Chef Abégan has actively been supporting WFP, participating in campaigns and events, including the Healthy Not Hungry campaign in Burkina Faso, and WFP Fight Famine across the Sahel, raising awareness about the importance of healthy eating and sustainable food practices. His engaging presence and ability to connect with diverse audiences make him an effective advocate for WFP’s mission in West and Central Africa.

    #                 #                   #

    About WFP: 

    The United Nations World Food Programme is the world’s largest humanitarian organization saving lives in emergencies and using food assistance to build a pathway to peace, stability and prosperity for people recovering from conflict, disasters and the impact of climate change.

    Follow us on X, formerly Twitter, @wfp_media @wfp_wafrica @wfp_chad

    About Chef Christian Abégan:

    Chef Christian Abégan, a Cameroonian-born culinary expert and Le Cordon Bleu Paris graduate, is a master of African cuisine. Based in Paris, he is dedicated to showcasing the richness of African gastronomy. During the 2024 Paris Olympics, he launched L’Arche Culinaire Africain—a platform uniting African and Diaspora chefs to elevate local ingredients and promote nutrition-focused cuisine. In 2010, he received the Grand Diploma of Honor from the French Institute of Gastronomy, and in 2017, he was a finalist for the Archestrate Prize for his book Le Patrimoine Culinaire Africain (The African Culinary Heritage).  As a jury member on the Star Chef TV show from 2011 to 2016, he influenced culinary trends across 28 African countries. His ability to merge heritage and creativity earned him the Afro-Caribbean Excellence Trophy in 2009.

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI Global: Polarisation: poor countries disagree over the economy, richer countries on social issues – new findings

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Francesco Rigoli, Reader in Psychology, City St George’s, University of London

    Shutterstock/Lightspring

    It is hard nowadays to find topics on which people agree. Ironically, though, all agree on one point: that disagreement has reached peak levels. People are united in recognising that society has become polarised.

    Why has this happened? In a new study, I examined which characteristics of a country fuel polarisation – and whether economics is a factor. I found that poorer countries such as Ethiopia, Myanmar, Guatemala and Zimbabwe are indeed usually more polarised than richer countries. In fact, the poorer the nation, the greater the division on attitudes towards the economy, gender equality and immigration.

    This helps explain why poorer countries are also more vulnerable to revolutions and civil wars. They are more divided and slide more easily into actual armed conflict. It is not a coincidence that communist revolutions, which are often sparked by economic polarisation, have never occurred in rich countries, but in those at an early stage of industrialisation – think of Russia in 1917, China in 1949 and Ethiopia in 1974.

    However, people in rich countries such as France, Germany and the US report more polarised opinions on abortion, divorce, suicide and homosexuality. It is social norms, rather than economic views, that divide. Anyone who has paid attention to the culture wars raging in the west can attest to this. Think of the anti-abortion stance of evangelical Christians in the US and to the traditional family cherished by European parties like the Alternative for Germany and Brothers of Italy, and compare them with the growing importance of LGBTQ issues among liberals in the west.

    Why are rich countries more polarised on social customs? The study shows that people in poor countries have conservative views on these issues – for example, claiming that abortion and divorce are never justified. There is little margin for disagreement in these countries as far as social norms are concerned. By contrast, opinion on social norms in rich countries is split between liberals and conservatives. Conformity pressures are weak on these topics, boosting polarisation.

    Education may also play a role. I found that poorly educated people prefer redistribution and state intervention in the economy more than the highly educated. This divergence is greater in poor countries, partially explaining why attitudes on the economy are more polarised in poor countries.

    Meanwhile, my study found that highly educated people profess more liberal opinions on social norms than the poorly educated, but the divergence is greater in richer countries. In other words, in poor countries education is more divisive on economic attitudes, while in rich countries it is more divisive on social norms.

    Inequality and polarisation

    A 2021 study found that polarisation is higher in countries where the income distribution is more unequal. Interestingly, this applies across various domains, including opinions about the economy, immigration and social norms. This adds another important layer to the picture. It suggests that the increase in polarisation is linked to the increase in economic inequality over the past few decades.

    Wealthier nations polarise along social lines.
    norbu gyachung/unsplash

    Some researchers predict that, as people get richer, polarisation over social norms is destined to fade in the west. In their view, the west is polarised because the population is gradually shifting from a conservative to a liberal stance on social customs. In this view, our current polarisation is essentially an epochal shift. Economic prosperity, the argument goes, will ultimately lead western societies to converge to liberal views, deflating polarisation.

    There are two reasons to be cautious about such an assessment. First, the multiple crises faced today by the world, and by the west in particular, may stunt economic prosperity, implying that people may continue to be divided on social norms rather than converging on liberal views.

    Second, there is no evidence that economic inequality is going down in the west, and as the research shows, this is not a promising sign in terms of decreasing polarisation. So, citizens of western countries better get used to culture wars for the foreseeable future.

    Francesco Rigoli does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Polarisation: poor countries disagree over the economy, richer countries on social issues – new findings – https://theconversation.com/polarisation-poor-countries-disagree-over-the-economy-richer-countries-on-social-issues-new-findings-252552

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: External merchandise trade statistics for February 2025

    Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

    External merchandise trade statistics for February 2025 
         Due to the difference in timing of the Chinese New Year holidays, it is more appropriate to analyse the trade figures for January and February taken together in making year-on-year comparison.
     
         Taking January and February of 2025 together, the value of total exports of goods increased by 6.5% over the same period in 2024. Concurrently, the value of imports of goods increased by 5.7%. A visible trade deficit of $34.6 billion, equivalent to 4.6% of the value of imports of goods, was recorded in the first two months of 2025.
     
         In February 2025, the value of total exports of goods increased by 15.4% over a year earlier to $327.9 billion, after a year-on-year increase by 0.1% in January 2025. Concurrently, the value of imports of goods increased by 11.8% over a year earlier to $364.2 billion in February 2025, after a year-on-year increase by 0.5% in January 2025. A visible trade deficit of $36.3 billion, equivalent to 10.0% of the value of imports of goods, was recorded in February 2025.
     
         Comparing the three-month period ending February 2025 with the preceding three months on a seasonally adjusted basis, the value of total exports of goods increased by 8.6%. Meanwhile, the value of imports of goods increased by 3.4%.
     
    Analysis by country/territory
     
         Comparing February 2025 with February 2024, total exports to Asia as a whole grew by 25.0%. In this region, increases were registered in the values of total exports to some major destinations, in particular Vietnam (+114.2%), Taiwan (+73.0%), the Philippines (+32.3%) and the mainland of China (the Mainland) (+29.5%). On the other hand, a decrease was recorded in the value of total exports to India (-29.8%).
     
         Apart from destinations in Asia, decreases were registered in the values of total exports to some major destinations in other regions, in particular the Netherlands (-44.7%) and the USA (-18.5%). On the other hand, an increase was recorded in the value of total exports to the United Kingdom (+61.0%).
     
         Over the same period of comparison, increases were registered in the values of imports from some major suppliers, in particular France (+77.9%), the United Kingdom (+77.6%), Vietnam (+52.4%), Taiwan (+42.6%), Malaysia (+41.7%) and the Mainland (+18.1%). On the other hand, a decrease was recorded in the value of imports from Korea (-31.4%).
     
         For the first two months of 2025 as a whole, increases were registered in the values of total exports to some major destinations, in particular Vietnam (+89.9%), Taiwan (+29.2%), Singapore (+18.3%) and the Mainland (+10.9%). On the other hand, decreases were recorded in the values of total exports to the United Arab Emirates (-38.2%) and India (-25.6%).
     
         Over the same period of comparison, increases were registered in the values of imports from some major suppliers, in particular France (+106.7%), the United Kingdom (+58.7%), Vietnam (+50.4%), Malaysia (+48.1%), Taiwan (+39.9%) and the Mainland (+2.0%). On the other hand, a decrease was recorded in the value of imports from Korea (-25.3%).
     
    Analysis by major commodity
     
         Comparing February 2025 with February 2024, increases were registered in the values of total exports of some principal commodity divisions, in particular “electrical machinery, apparatus and appliances, and electrical parts thereof” (by $27.3 billion or +20.8%) and “office machines and automatic data processing machines” (by $20.5 billion or +68.9%). 
     
         Over the same period of comparison, increases were registered in the values of imports of most principal commodity divisions, in particular “electrical machinery, apparatus and appliances, and electrical parts thereof” (by $23.2 billion or +16.9%) and “office machines and automatic data processing machines” (by $16.6 billion or +76.3%).
     
         For the first two months of 2025 as a whole, increases were registered in the values of total exports of some principal commodity divisions, in particular “office machines and automatic data processing machines” (by $35.5 billion or +53.2%) and “electrical machinery, apparatus and appliances, and electrical parts thereof” (by $23.0 billion or +7.3%).
     
         Over the same period of comparison, increases were registered in the values of imports of some principal commodity divisions, in particular “office machines and automatic data processing machines” (by $30.5 billion or +63.3%) and “electrical machinery, apparatus and appliances, and electrical parts thereof” (by $30.2 billion or +10.1%).
     
    Commentary
     
         A Government spokesman said that Hong Kong’s merchandise exports continued to see solid increase in general in early 2025. Taking the first two months of 2025 together to remove the effect of the earlier arrival of the Chinese New Year this year, the value of merchandise exports grew by 6.5% over a year earlier. Exports to the Mainland increased visibly, and those to many other Asian markets also increased. Exports to the United States rose marginally, while those to the European Union declined.
     
         Looking ahead, the tariff measures introduced so far by the United States and the uncertainties surrounding protectionist policies would continue to pose challenges to Hong Kong’s merchandise trade performance. Nevertheless, the sustained growth in global economy in particular the Mainland economy, should render support to Hong Kong’s exports. The Government will monitor the situation closely.
     
    Further information
     
         Table 1 presents the analysis of external merchandise trade statistics for February 2025. Table 2 presents the original monthly trade statistics from January 2022 to February 2025, and Table 3 gives the seasonally adjusted series for the same period.
     
         The values of total exports of goods to 10 main destinations for February 2025 are shown in Table 4, whereas the values of imports of goods from 10 main suppliers are given in Table 5.
     
         Tables 6 and 7 show the values of total exports and imports of 10 principal commodity divisions for February 2025.
     
         All the merchandise trade statistics described here are measured at current prices and no account has been taken of changes in prices between the periods of comparison. A separate analysis of the volume and price movements of external merchandise trade for February 2025 will be released in mid-April 2025.
     
         The February 2025 issue of “Hong Kong External Merchandise Trade” contains detailed analysis on the performance of Hong Kong’s external merchandise trade in February 2025 and will be available in early April 2025. Users can browse and download the report at the website of the C&SD (www.censtatd.gov.hk/en/EIndexbySubject.html?pcode=B1020005&scode=230 
         Enquiries on merchandise trade statistics may be directed to the Trade Analysis Section of the C&SD (Tel: 2582 4691).
    Issued at HKT 16:30

    NNNN

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI Africa: Société Nationale des Pétroles du Congo (SNPC) Maixent Raoul Ominga to Speak at Invest in African Energy (IAE) 2025

    Source: Africa Press Organisation – English (2) – Report:

    PARIS, France, March 25, 2025/APO Group/ —

    The Invest in African Energy (IAE) Forum in Paris is pleased to announce Maixent Raoul Ominga, Director General of Société Nationale des Pétroles du Congo (SNPC), as a speaker, with SNPC also serving as a Gold Sponsor of the event. Ominga will contribute to discussions on Monetizing Congo’s Gas Opportunities, offering insights into the country’s substantial natural gas potential and the strategies being implemented to unlock its value.

    Congo’s gas sector is set for expansion, with significant developments aimed at maximizing its full potential. Eni’s Congo LNG project stands as a key pillar – eyeing production expansion up to four billion cubic meters per year by 2025 – strengthening the country’s position in the global energy market. Wing Wah’s Banga Kayo gas monetization project further accelerates this growth by optimizing stranded gas resources and supplying the domestic market with essential refined products. Additionally, the implementation of a new gas code and the development of a comprehensive gas master plan, which SNPC is actively helping to shape, will provide a clear regulatory framework and long-term strategy to attract investment, drive infrastructure development and optimize gas resource utilization.

    IAE 2025 (https://apo-opa.co/4hNID0n) is an exclusive forum designed to facilitate investment between African energy markets and global investors. Taking place May 13-14, 2025 in Paris, the event offers delegates two days of intensive engagement with industry experts, project developers, investors and policymakers. For more information, please visit www.Invest-Africa-Energy.com. To sponsor or participate as a delegate, please contact sales@energycapitalpower.com.

    As Director General of SNPC, Ominga offers deep expertise in Congo’s energy sector, with a focus on gas exploration, infrastructure development and international partnerships. The Monetizing Congo’s Gas Opportunities session will highlight the country’s untapped gas resources, exploring how Congo can leverage its natural assets for economic growth and regional energy security. The forum will also address the critical roles of investment, innovation and collaboration among public and private stakeholders.

    Congo is currently pursuing a major investment drive to attract global capital to its oil and gas sector. SNPC’s participation at IAE 2025, along with its role as a Gold Sponsor, represents a key stop on the country’s roadshow to engage European and international investors, highlighting its promising hydrocarbon exploration and gas monetization prospects. With a strategic focus on driving project investments and maximizing investor returns, IAE 2025 offers the ideal platform to foster high-level discussions and connect Congo with potential partners and investors to support the sector’s growth and long-term success

    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Escalation of violence against Christian minorities in Syria and the need for EU intervention – P-001149/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Priority question for written answer  P-001149/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Paolo Inselvini (ECR), Nicola Procaccini (ECR), Carlo Fidanza (ECR), Sergio Berlato (ECR), Alessandro Ciriani (ECR), Geadis Geadi (ECR), Chiara Gemma (ECR), Assita Kanko (ECR), Mario Mantovani (ECR), Ruggero Razza (ECR), Şerban Dimitrie Sturdza (ECR), Georgiana Teodorescu (ECR), Dominik Tarczyński (ECR), Francesco Torselli (ECR), Ivaylo Valchev (ECR), Mariateresa Vivaldini (ECR), Alexandr Vondra (ECR), Kosma Złotowski (ECR), Elena Donazzan (ECR)

    In recent days, Syria has witnessed a dramatic escalation of violence, particularly in Tartus and Latakia, traditional strongholds of Bashar al-Assad. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reports that the new Syrian regime’s forces have launched a harsh offensive in these areas, resulting in over 800 deaths, with numerous civilians, women and children among the victims.

    Particularly alarming are the targeted attacks against the Christian community. Testimonies report the killing of a Greek Orthodox priest and entire Christian families in their homes. The patriarchs of the Christian churches in Syria are denouncing a ‘dangerous escalation of violence, torture and killings’ against innocent civilians.

    The leader of the new Syrian regime, Ahmed al-Sharaa, pledged to protect Christian minorities as recently as January 2025. However, the recent wave of violence casts doubt on his actual willingness and ability to uphold these commitments.

    We therefore ask the Commission:

    • 1.What immediate measures does the Commission intend to take to protect Christian communities and other minorities in Syria?
    • 2.How will the Commission ensure that EU aid effectively reaches the affected communities?
    • 3.How does the Commission assess the actions of the new Syrian regime and its leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa, with respect to persecuted minorities?

    Supporter[1]

    Submitted: 18.3.2025

    • [1] This question is supported by a Member other than the authors: Fernand Kartheiser (ECR)

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Press release – Survey confirms Europe’s citizens want the EU to protect them and act in unity

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament’s Winter 2025 Eurobarometer survey, released today, highlights historic levels of approval for EU membership linked to peace and security.

    European Parliament President Roberta Metsola said: “Two thirds of Europeans want the EU to play a greater role in their protection. This is a clear call for action which we will answer. Europe needs to be stronger so that our citizens feel safer. The European Parliament will ensure that every proposal put forward is bold and ambitious enough to match the serious level of threat Europe faces. Europe must step up today, or it risks being stepped over tomorrow.”

    66% of EU citizens want the EU to take a more important role in protecting them against global crises and security risks. This view is particularly strong amongst younger respondents to the survey. At the national level, results for a stronger role of the EU range from 87% in Sweden to 47% in Romania and 44% in Poland.

    Almost three quarters of EU citizens (74%) believe their country has benefited from being a member of the EU. This is the highest result ever recorded in a Eurobarometer survey for this question since it was first asked in 1983. Fitting the current context, respondents mention the EU’s contribution to maintaining peace and strengthening security (35%) as the main reason why membership is considered beneficial.

    In addition, there is wide agreement among EU citizens that EU Member States should be more united to face current global challenges (89%) and that the European Union needs more means to deal with the challenges ahead (76%).

    Citizens expect the EU to strengthen security and defence and to enhance competitiveness

    In a rapidlychanging geopolitical environment, defence and security (36%) as well as competitiveness, economy and industry (32%) are identified as the areas on which the EU should focus most to reinforce its position in the world. These are also the topics that featured high on last week’s European Council with Parliament’s President calling for faster action and bolder ambition. While the results for defence and security have remained stable compared to February/March 2024, those for competitiveness, economy and industry have increased by five points. These two areas are followed by energy independence (27%), food security and agriculture (25%) and education and research (23%).

    Economic and security issues are also at the forefront when it comes to the topics citizens want the European Parliament to address as a priority. Four in ten Europeans mention inflation, rising prices and the cost of living (43%), followed by the EU’s defence and security (31%), the fight against poverty and social exclusion (31%) and support to the economy and the creation of new jobs (29%). Inflation, rising prices and the cost of living is a main priority across all age groups and with peak results recorded in Portugal (57%), France (56%), Slovakia (56%), Croatia (54%) and Estonia (54%).

    As shown by the EP’s previous survey, inflation and the cost of living had already played a major role as a driving force in the last European elections and the economic situation continues to be a main concern for many Europeans. A third (33%) expect their standard of living to decrease in the next five years, seven points more than in June-July 2024. This is the case for 53% of French respondents (+8 pp) and 47% of Germans (+15 pp).

    Peace and democracy remain EU core values

    Looking at the values Europeans would like the European Parliament to defend, peace (45%), democracy (32%) and the protection of human rights in the EU and worldwide (22%) come first. The results for this question have remained stable, underlining citizens steadfast support for the EU’s founding values and principles.

    Two-thirds of citizens support a stronger role for the EP

    As historic trend lines show, in moments of crisis citizens look to the EU for decisive actions and solutions. When the EU is perceived as coming together and delivering results, support indicators are high – which is currently the case.  50% of respondents have a positive image of the EU. In the last decade, this positive perception was only higher once (at 52%), in spring 2022 in the aftermath of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The positive image of the EP is stable at a high level (41%). A few months into the legislative term, over six in ten (62%) citizens would like to see the European Parliament play a more important role, a six- percentage point increase compared to February-March 2024, a few months before the June 2024 European elections.

    Full results can be found here.

    Background   

    The European Parliament’s Winter 2025 Eurobarometer survey was carried out between 09 January and 04 February 2025 in all 27 EU Member States. The survey was conducted face-to-face, with video interviews used additionally in Czechia, Denmark, Finland, Malta, Netherlands, and Sweden. 26.354 interviews were conducted in total and EU results are weighted according to the size of the population in each country.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Security: 36th Annual International Military Chiefs of Chaplains Conference and First Chaplain Africa Forum held in Brussels

    Source: United States AFRICOM

    The U.S. European Command (EUCOM) and Belgian Ministry of Defence, in partnership with U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) and U.S. Indo Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) Chaplain Directorates, hosted the world’s largest annual meeting of senior military religious leaders at the 36th Annual NATO & Partner International Military Chiefs of Chaplains Conference (IMCCC) in Brussels, Belgium, January 27-31, 2025.

    Over 200 military chaplains, academic experts, and special guests participated, representing 43 nations and more than 30 religious denominations. This year’s gathering included a special Africa Summit hosted by AFRICOM, highlighting the role of chaplains in fostering regional stability through spiritual and ethical leadership. Delegates divided into working groups to share information, identify training needs and areas cooperation, and update their future engagement plans.

    “This conference has not only strengthened our bonds across nations but has also underscored the indispensable role of chaplains in modern military operations, particularly in fostering resilience and ethical leadership in Africa and beyond.” said Major General Kenneth Ekman, DOD West Africa Coordination Lead, AFRICOM.

     AFRICOM’s Command Chaplain, U.S. Army Chaplain Colonel Karen Meeker said, “Our engagement at the IMCCC and the Africa Forum is crucial for developing a comprehensive approach to chaplaincy that resonates with the unique cultural and spiritual landscapes of Africa, ensuring our chaplains are well-prepared to support our service members and their families.”

    Experts from the United Nations, European Union, NATO, Belgium Armed Forces and other organizations briefed attendees on topics such as conflict resolution, interoperability and the importance of interworld view dialogue for achieving peace. Delegates collaborated to identify areas of cooperation and update their future engagement plans.

    EUCOM Command Chaplain, Colonel Christopher LaPack, shared, “First, I want to sincerely thank EUCOM’s co-hosts for this year’s IMCCC. The Belgian Planning Team, led by Chief Chaplain Hans De Cuester, provided a world-class forum for what turned out to be the biggest-ever IMCCC. I have no doubt that the engagements that took place this week will improve future interoperability amongst our chaplaincies. The change in security environment and NATO’s military posture in response to Russian aggression in the region means that our nations’ warfighters are more integrated than ever before. Military chaplains must be properly trained and ready to respond to the religious and spiritual needs of military personnel serving in multinational formations.”

    The Africa Forum agenda also highlighted the role of chaplains in the DoD State Partnership Program (SPP), which partners National Guard forces from the United States with militaries around the world. Chaplain General Henry Matifeyo, Zambian Ministry of Defence said, “The discussions here, especially the tri-lateral meetings, have opened new avenues for cooperation. We are keen on building a network that not only strengthens our chaplaincy but also addresses critical issues like PTSD and moral injury through a multi-disciplinary lens.”

    The IMCCC began in 1990 when the USEUCOM chaplain’s office convened twelve senior NATO military chaplains in order to provide a forum for dialogue to enhance interoperability among NATO chaplaincies, facilitate mutual support, and ensure professional pastoral care is available to all Allied Forces during combat or crisis circumstances. Over time, its scope has expanded to enhance religious affairs interoperability, strengthen international relations, support warfighter and family resilience, improve spiritual advisement for commanders, and promote religious freedom. The IMCCC 2025 has grown into a forum that includes not just European military religious leaders but also leaders from Africa, Asia and North America to share ideas and practices that support the collective security mission on a global scale. This year’s focus on Africa was a step forward in recognizing and addressing the unique needs of this diverse continent.

    List of national chaplaincies that participated in the 2025 conference: Armenia, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Burkina Faso, Botswana, Canada, Cote d’Ivoire, Cyprus, Czechia, Estonia, Eswatini, Finland, France, Gabon, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Italy, Kenya, Kosovo, Latvia, Lithuania, Malawi, , Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Poland, Serbia, , Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, , Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States, and Zambia.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI: ALE launches Private 5G solution powered by Celona to expand IoT connectivity

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    New solution expands high quality connectivity in complex enterprise environments, large outdoor areas through seamless integration with ALE networking portfolio

    COLOMBES, France, and CAMPBELL, Calif., March 25, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) —  Alcatel-Lucent Enterprise, a leader in secure Enterprise networking and communication solutions is proud to announce the launch of its innovative Private 5G solution powered by Celona. This new turnkey solution seamlessly integrates with ALE’s OmniVista, OmniSwitch and OmniAccess Stellar networking portfolio, enabling secure and high quality connectivity across complex enterprise environments including large outdoor spaces.

    This strategic partnership with Celona represents a significant leap in enterprise-grade connectivity, designed to empower critical operations with unparalleled reliability, performance and security in challenging environments worldwide.

    Transforming IoT Connectivity in Demanding Environments

    The cutting-edge technology in ALE’s Private 5G solution is engineered for ultra-reliable connectivity in complex industrial settings such as manufacturing, refineries, logistics warehouses, and ports including airport apron/ramp areas. The Private 5G solution offers large-area wireless coverage, secure and reliable high-speed mobility, supporting real-time, critical industrial applications, leading to enhanced IoT and Industry 4.0 integration.

    This technology enables connecting next-generation IoT devices and applications that demand ultra-low latency and deterministic performance in enterprises pioneering the use of state-of-the-art devices and technologies, including autonomous guided vehicles (AGVs), robotics, HD video analytics, augmented reality (AR), and virtual reality (VR) applications, all of which will benefit from robust wireless connectivity.

    Unmatched Enterprise Connectivity with ALE’s End-to-End Solution

    ALE is integrating Private 5G with its existing solutions, such as OmniVista Cirrus, OmniSwitch LAN, and OmniAccess Stellar WLAN, to deliver reliable augmented coverage across industrial sites, offices and campuses. This approach ensures end-to-end secure Zero Touch Network Access and high-performance connectivity for seamless operations and advanced applications.

    Private 5G powered by Celona delivers on the promise of strong security with robust SIM authentication and Celona’s patented MicroSlicing™ and Aerloc technologies, which ensure reliable service and application-level SLAs, policy enforcement, and zero trust security for business-critical applications.

    Stephan Robineau, EVP Network Business Division, Alcatel-Lucent Enterprise, comments:

    “This exciting partnership with Celona offers the best Private 5G wireless solution purpose-built for enterprise environments. The integration into our end-to-end portfolio further enhances our ability to provide enterprise-wide connectivity with unmatched reliability and performance.

    Furthermore, the advanced Private 5G technology aligns perfectly with our security-first approach and our vertical strategy, enabling us to meet the unique demands of industries like energy and utilities, transportation and the manufacturing industry.”

    Rajeev Shah, co-founder and CEO, Celona, said:

    “Our partnership with Alcatel-Lucent Enterprise is pivotal, and a testament to what can happen when two technology leaders come together. ALE has a rich history of innovation that resulted in world-class solutions. At Celona, after years of research and development with a focus on designing for the enterprise, our private 5G solution is best-in-class, highly secure, and easy to deploy and manage. It addresses wireless connectivity challenges in complex environments where some businesses still rely on pen and paper. To say this is a gamechanger is truly an understatement.”

    About Alcatel-Lucent Enterprise

    Alcatel-Lucent Enterprise provides secure networking and communication solutions which enable organizations and industries to accelerate their operational efficiencies and competitiveness. In the Cloud. On Premises. Hybrid.  

    All solutions have built-in security, limited environmental impact and are fully compliant with data protection requirements of organizations and individuals at a national sovereignty and international industry level.   

    Alcatel-Lucent Enterprise focus on providing sustainable technology solutions for the good of the environment, people, and business. 

    Over 100 years of innovation have made the company a trusted advisor to more than a million customers across the world. With headquarters in France and 3,400 business partners worldwide, Alcatel-Lucent Enterprise achieves an effective global reach with a local focus. 

    al-enterprise.com | LinkedIn | Facebook | Instagram

    About Celona

    Based in Silicon Valley, Celona is a pioneer and leading innovator of enterprise private wireless solutions. The company developed the industry’s first 5G LAN system, a turnkey private 5G solution that enables enterprises to address their growing needs for secure and reliable wireless connectivity for critical business applications. Celona 5G LAN has been deployed by a wide range of global customers across industries. To date, the company has raised over $135 million in venture funding from Lightspeed Venture Partners, Norwest Venture Partners, NTT Ventures, Cervin Ventures, DigitalBridge and Qualcomm Ventures. For more information, please visit celona.io.

    Media Contacts

    Carine Bowen, Global press Alcatel-Lucent Enterprise
    press@al-enterprise.com

    Janet Brumfield, IdealPR+ for Celona
    janet@idealprplus.com
    +1 614-582-9636

    A photo accompanying this announcement is available at https://www.globenewswire.com/NewsRoom/AttachmentNg/75ea0569-8ee5-404e-bf1b-d1d1e75744d2

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI: Vect-Horus appoints Carole Imbert as Chief Financial Officer to further reinforce its executive management team

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

                                                                            PRESS RELEASE

    • Brings extensive experience in investor relations and financial research and analysis
    • Will drive financial strategy to support internal pipeline and partnerships

    Marseille, France, March 25, 2025 – Vect-Horus, a privately held biotechnology company that designs and develops molecular vectors facilitating the targeted delivery of therapeutic molecules and imaging agents, today announced the appointment of Carole Imbert as Chief Financial Officer and to the Executive Committee. 

    Carole Imbert brings a wealth of experience in financial management and structuring. Most recently at Crédit Mutuel Arkéa, she served as Head of Financial and ESG Research for Arkea Investment Services, overseeing the asset management divisions of Schelcher Prince Gestion and Federal Finance Gestion. She has also held senior positions as a Financial Analyst at Natexis, CPR, and Exane and as Head of Investor Relations and Financial Communication at both BIC and Eurazeo. She holds degrees from the Institut Supérieur de Gestion and the Société Française des Analystes Financiers.

    “We are thrilled to welcome Carole to our management team. Her extensive background in financial strategy and investor relations will be complementary to our existing skilled team, and an invaluable asset to drive our growth and secure a strong financial position to underpin development of our vectors that facilitate targeting and delivery of therapeutics,” said Alexandre Tokay, co-founder and CEO of Vect-Horus. “Carole’s leadership will be crucial in driving our financial strategy forward, based on our proprietary VECTrans® technology both to develop an internal pipeline of products and through partnerships.”

    This is a further reinforcement of the experienced Vect-Horus leadership and will drive forward the company’s financial strategy. It follows the recent appointments of two new Board members: Jerome Berger, with vast expertise in strategy, finance, and venture capital in the technology and life sciences sectors, and Jean-Christophe Dantonel, who has more than two decades of profound expertise in biological sciences, project management, and clinical research.

    Carole Imbert said: “I am excited to join Vect-Horus to collaborate with a very skilled team at this pivotal moment in the company’s journey, with an impressive technology and pipeline and a dozen collaborations, including three strategic licensing agreements with major pharmaceutical companies. I am looking forward to strengthen the financial strategy of the Company to ensure smooth continuity and support Vect-Horus’ mission to enhance transport of therapeutics across biological barriers.”

    About Vect-Horus

    Vect-Horus designs and develops vectors that facilitate targeting and delivery of therapeutic or imaging agents to organs, including the brain, and to tumors. Founded in 2005, Vect-Horus is a spin-off of the Institute for Neurophysiopathology (INP, UMR7051, CNRS and Aix Marseille University), formerly headed by Dr Michel Khrestchatisky, co-founder of the company. Vect-Horus has 42 employees (most in R&D).

    To learn more about Vect-Horus, visit www.vect-horus.com.

    Contacts

        For more information, please contact Vect-Horus

        Emmanuelle Bettendorf, BD & Alliance Management,

        Vect-Horus contact@vect-horus.com

        Media Relations

        Sophie Baumont, Cohesion Bureau – sophie.baumont@cohesionbureau.com

    Attachment

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI: CoinShares Selected for BoursoBank’s Landmark Crypto ETP Launch

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    CoinShares, one of the two selected providers, offers five of the six products features in the BoursoBank’s new crypto offering

    March 25, 2025 | SAINT HELIER, Jersey | CoinShares International Limited (“CoinShares” or “the Group”) (Nasdaq Stockholm: CS; US OTCQX: CNSRF), a global leader in digital asset investing with over $6 billion in assets under management, announces today that five CoinShares Physical crypto ETPs will feature in BoursoBank’s groundbreaking entry into crypto investment products. This collaboration marks a significant step forward for mainstream crypto adoption in France, offering more than 7 million BoursoBank customers their first opportunity to invest in regulated crypto products listed on traditional exchanges.

    French retail investors have shown growing enthusiasm for digital assets but often struggle with limited access through regulated financial platforms. This partnership addresses that critical gap. CoinShares’ fully regulated crypto ETPs trade on traditional exchanges and qualify for inclusion in standard brokerage (“compte titre”) accounts, providing French investors with a secure, transparent, and familiar route into digital assets via France’s premier digital banking platform.

    Recognised as the most affordable French bank for 17 consecutive years, BoursoBank further enhances its competitive advantage by adding CoinShares’ cost-effective crypto ETPs—Europe’s most competitively priced offering—to its product portfolio, reinforcing its value-driven proposition to an expanding client base.

    CoinShares Physical ETPs available on the BoursoBank platform include:

    • CoinShares Physical Bitcoin: Annual management fees of 0.25%
    • CoinShares Physical XRP: Annual management fees of 1.50%
    • CoinShares Physical Staked Ethereum: Management fees reduced to 0.00%, 1.25% annual staking reward
    • CoinShares Physical Staked Solana: Management fees reduced to 0.00%, 3.0% annual staking reward
    • CoinShares Physical Staked Cardano: Management fees reduced to 0.00%, 2.0% annual staking reward

    Jean-Marie Mognetti, CEO of CoinShares, commented:

    “We are honoured to collaborate with BoursoBank on their groundbreaking venture into crypto ETPs. Our selection affirms CoinShares’ position as Europe’s leading institutional digital asset investment firm, known for transparency, regulatory compliance, innovation, reliability and cost-effectiveness.

    BoursoBank’s entry into crypto ETPs marks a crucial step for digital asset adoption in France. Their expanding clientele, remarkable growth and focus on investor education create an ideal platform for mainstream crypto investing.

    This partnership allows French investors to easily incorporate digital assets into their traditional investment portfolios through their trusted bank, underpinned by CoinShares’ expertise and robust security measures.”

    About CoinShares

    CoinShares is a leading global digital asset manager that delivers a broad range of financial services across investment management, trading and securities to a wide array of clients that includes corporations, financial institutions and individuals. Founded in 2013, the firm is headquartered in Jersey, with offices in France, Stockholm, the UK, and the US. CoinShares is regulated in Jersey by the Jersey Financial Services Commission, in France by the Autorité des marchés financiers, in the US by the Securities and Exchange Commission, National Futures Association and Financial Industry Regulatory Authority. CoinShares is publicly listed on the Nasdaq Stockholm under the ticker CS and the OTCQX under the ticker CNSRF.

    For more information on CoinShares, please visit: https://coinshares.com
    Company | +44 (0)1534 513 100 | enquiries@coinshares.com
    Investor Relations | +44 (0)1534 513 100 | enquiries@coinshares.com

    PRESS CONTACT

    CoinShares
    Benoît Pellevoizin
    bpellevoizin@coinshares.com

    M Group Strategic Communications
    Peter Padovano
    coinshares@mgroupsc.com

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Video: UN peace operations, Gaza & other topics – Daily Press Briefing (24 March 2025) | United Nations

    Source: United Nations (Video News)

    Noon Briefing by Stéphane Dujarric, Spokesperson for the Secretary-General.

    Highlights:
    – Security Council
    – Gaza
    – Occupied Palestinian Territory
    – Lebanon/Peacekeeping
    – Lebanon/Humanitarian
    – Ukraine
    – Democratic Republic Of The Congo
    – Sudan
    – Afghanistan
    – Libya
    – Rohingya Refugees
    – International Days
    – General Assembly Event
    – Upcoming Briefings
    – Noon Briefing Guest

    SECURITY COUNCIL
    The Secretary-General spoke to the Security Council this morning during a special session on UN peace operations.
    He reminded council members that UN peace operations safeguard people and communities in some of the most desperate places on earth, adding that they represent a critical tool at the Council’s disposal to maintain international peace and security.
    At their best, he said, they show how, when the UN comes together to address challenges, the burden is diminished on individual countries. But, Mr. Guterres added that peace operations face serious barriers that demand new approaches.
    The Secretary-General said that work is now underway to review all forms of peace operations, as requested by Member States in the recently adopted Pact for the Future.
    He said the review will build on the analysis presented in the New Agenda for Peace and it will be informed by the first comprehensive study of the history of special political missions in the 80 years of this organization and that report which will be released soon.
    The review will also help inform efforts – through the UN@80 initiative – to find efficiencies and improvements across our work, in light of the continued funding challenges we face as an organization.

    GAZA
    In the past week, Israel carried out devastating strikes on Gaza, claiming the lives of hundreds of civilians, including United Nations personnel, with no humanitarian aid being allowed to enter the Gaza Strip since early March.
    As a result, the Secretary-General has taken the difficult decision to reduce the United Nations’ footprint in Gaza, even as humanitarian needs soar and our concern over the protection of civilians intensifies.
    The United Nations is not leaving Gaza. We remain committed to continuing to provide aid that civilians depend on for their survival and protection.
    More than three weeks ago, the Israeli Government cut off the entry of humanitarian aid into Gaza – which is the longest such suspension since 7 October 2023.
    Israeli officials have indicated that they intend to continue their military activities in Gaza.
    Based on the information that is currently available, the strikes hitting a UN compound in Deir Al Balah on 19 March were caused by an Israeli tank shell. The strikes claimed the life of a UN colleague from Bulgaria and left six others – from France, Moldova, North Macedonia, Palestine and the United Kingdom – with severe injuries, some of them life-altering.
    The location of this UN compound was well known to all the parties to the conflict. I reiterate that all parties to the conflict are bound by international law to protect the inviolability of United Nations premises. Without this, our colleagues face intolerable risks as they work to save the lives of civilians.
    The Secretary-General strongly condemns these strikes and demands a full, thorough and independent investigation into this incident.
    All parties must comply fully with international law at all times. Civilians must be respected and they must be protected. The denial of lifesaving aid must end. The hostages must be released immediately and unconditionally.
    All States must use their leverage to stop the conflict and ensure respect for international law – by applying diplomatic and economic pressure and combating impunity.
    The Secretary-General renews his urgent call for the restoration of the ceasefire to bring an end to the anguish.

    Full Highlights: https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/noon-briefing-highlight?date%5Bvalue%5D%5Bdate%5D=24%20March%202025

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R_V-u7ye6jM

    MIL OSI Video

  • MIL-Evening Report: Fiji solidarity group condemns Rabuka plans for Israeli embassy in Jerusalem

    Asia Pacific Report

    A Fiji-based Pacific solidarity group supporting the indigenous Palestine struggle for survival against the Israeli settler colonial state has today issued a statement condemning Fiji backing for Israel.

    In an open letter to the “people of Fiji”, the Fijians for Palestine Solidarity Network (F4P) has warned “your government openly supports Israel despite its genocidal campaign against Palestinians”.

    “It is directly complicit in Israel’s genocide against Palestinians and history will not forgive their inaction.”

    The group said the struggle resonated with all who believed in justice, equality, and the fundamental rights of every human being.

    Fijians for Palestine has condemned Prime Minister Sitiveni Rabuka’s coalition government plans to open a Fijian embassy in Jerusalem with Israeli backing and has launched a “No embassy on occupied land” campaign.

    The group likened the Palestine liberation struggle to Pacific self-determination campaigns in Bougainville, “French” Polynesia, Kanaky and West Papua.

    Global voices for end to violence
    The open letter on social media said:

    “Our solidarity with the Palestinian people is a testament to our shared humanity. We believe in a world where diversity, is treated with dignity and respect.

    “We dream of a future where children in Gaza can play without fear, where families can live without the shadow of war, and where the Palestinian people can finally enjoy the peace and freedom they so rightly deserve.

    “We join the global voices demanding a permanent ceasefire and an end to the violence. We express our unwavering solidarity with the Palestinian people.

    “The Palestinian struggle is not just a regional issue; it is a testament to the resilience of a people who, despite facing impossible odds, continue to fight for their right to exist, freedom, and dignity. Their struggle resonates with all who believe in justice, equality, and the fundamental rights of every human being.

    “The images of destruction, the stories of families torn apart, and the cries of children caught in the crossfire are heart-wrenching. These are not mere statistics or distant news stories; these are real people with hopes, dreams, and aspirations, much like us.

    “As Fijians, we have always prided ourselves on our commitment to peace, unity, and humanity. Our rich cultural heritage and shared values teach us the importance of standing up for what is right, even when it is not popular or convenient.

    “We call on you to stand in solidarity with the Palestinian people this Thursday with us, not out of political allegiance but out of a shared belief in humanity, justice, and the inalienable human rights of every individual.

    “There can be no peace without justice, and we stand in unity with all people and territories struggling for self-determination and freedom from occupation. The Pacific cannot be an Ocean of Peace without freedom and self determination in Palestine, West Papua, Kanaky and all oppressed territories.

    “To the Fijian people, please know that your government openly supports Israel despite its genocidal campaign against Palestinians. It is directly complicit in Israel’s genocide against Palestinians and history will not forgive their inaction.”

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-OSI China: Violent escalation prompts UN staff reduction in Gaza

    Source: China State Council Information Office 3

    This photo taken on March 24, 2025 shows the rubble of buildings damaged by an Israeli shelling in the Shuja’iyya neighborhood, east of Gaza City. [Photo/Xinhua]

    Following the killing of hundreds of civilians, including UN staff, and the aid blockade, UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres has decided to reduce staff in the Gaza Strip, a UN spokesman said on Monday.

    “The Secretary-General has taken the difficult decision to reduce the United Nations’ footprint in Gaza, even as humanitarian needs soar and our concern over the protection of civilians intensifies,” said Stephane Dujarric, spokesman for Guterres, at a daily press briefing.

    “The United Nations is not leaving Gaza,” Dujarric said. “We remain committed to continuing to provide aid that civilians depend on for their survival and protection.”

    The spokesman said about 30 percent of the 100 international staff in Gaza, or about 30 people, were being withdrawn. Overall, there are about 13,000 UN personnel in Gaza, the bulk of them working for the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) and most of them are national staff.

    “Based on the information that is currently available, the strikes hitting a UN compound in Deir Al Balah on (Wednesday) were caused by an Israeli tank shell,” he said.

    The strikes claimed the life of a UN colleague from Bulgaria and left six others, from France, Moldova, North Macedonia, Palestine and the United Kingdom, with severe injuries, some of them life-altering, according to Dujarric.

    The spokesman told reporters that the UN compound’s location was well known to Israeli forces. The secretary-general strongly condemns these strikes and demands a full, thorough and independent investigation into this incident.

    Dujarric stressed that all parties must always comply fully with international law. Civilians must be respected, and they must be protected. The denial of lifesaving aid must end. The hostages must be released immediately and unconditionally.

    “All states must use their leverage to stop the conflict and ensure respect for international law, by applying diplomatic and economic pressure and combating impunity,” the spokesman said. “The secretary-general renews his urgent call for the restoration of the ceasefire to bring an end to the anguish.”

    However, Israeli officials have indicated they intend to continue their military activities in Gaza.

    The aid blockade began more than three weeks ago when Israel cut off the entry of humanitarian aid into Gaza. It is the longest such suspension of assistance since the deadly Oct. 7, 2023 Hamas raid on Israel.

    The UN emergency relief coordinator, Tom Fletcher, said he continues to receive horrific reports from Gaza of more health workers, ambulances and hospitals attacked as they try to save survivors.

    Dujarric said several casualties were reported after the surgical department of Nasser Medical Complex was hit and caught fire on Sunday. In Rafah, in southern Gaza, ambulances were reportedly hit in Tal Al Sultan, resulting in several casualties.

    The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reported that the United Nations and humanitarian partners continue to face constraints in providing health services.

    “Our partners called for the entry of additional emergency medical teams into Gaza to help health workers already on the ground who are exhausted and, of course, overwhelmed,” OCHA said. 

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-Evening Report: The ICC showed its might by arresting Rodrigo Duterte. Its reputation will take longer to fix

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Yvonne Breitwieser-Faria, Lecturer in International Law, Curtin University

    Only five days after the arrest warrant against former Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte was issued, he was apprehended and immediately put on a plane to The Hague to face charges before the International Criminal Court (ICC).

    The prompt action – and the fact he is the first former Asian head of state before the ICC – have been heralded as “a pivotal moment for the court”.

    While this is a rare success story in the court’s tumultuous history, many challenges remain. The successful arrest of one defendant will unfortunately do little to change negative perceptions of the court or remove the many obstacles it faces in prosecuting cases.

    A long history of criticism

    The ICC was conceived as a “court of last resort” in 1998 under the Rome Statute, the treaty that established it. The aim was to try individuals accused of war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide and aggression in cases where a state’s domestic courts refuse or are unable to do so.

    Shortly after it began its work in 2002, however, the ICC faced criticism for its perceived focus on Africa.

    In more recent years, it has also been criticised for its limited effectiveness, its perceived hypocrisy, and a lack of support from major powers, such as the US, China and Russia, which are not members.

    The court has long faced a public relations crisis it may never be able to resolve. When it does not investigate a potential case, it is said to be ineffective. And when it does initiate investigations, it is often said to be biased or acting beyond its capabilities.

    Putin and Netanyahu

    Currently, the ICC has 12 ongoing investigations, mostly in Africa and Asia. It has issued 56 arrest warrants, half of which have yet to be executed.

    As the focus of the court is limited to those who bear the greatest responsibility for international crimes, the cases frequently involve high-profile individuals.

    Current arrest warrants, for example, have been issued against Russian President Vladimir Putin on charges of allegedly deporting Ukrainian children to Russia and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu for alleged war crimes committed in Gaza.

    These two cases have been among the court’s most controversial. Critics say the ICC lacks jurisdiction because:

    • the alleged crimes did not occur in their own states
    • their states are not parties to the Rome Statute
    • the UN Security Council did not refer these cases to the ICC for investigation.

    Others have accused the court of selective prosecution and bias for pursuing a case against Netanyahu, specifically, instead of prioritising cases in states run by dictators, such as Syria.

    And some complain the court should be focusing on crimes allegedly committed by Western leaders in places like Iraq.

    Indicting leaders of states raises additional legal challenges. International law dictates that heads of state enjoy immunity in other states’ courts – unless this immunity is expressly waived by their own governments.

    The ICC defends its actions as fair. It argues it does have jurisdiction in the cases against Putin and Netanyahu because the alleged crimes took place in Ukraine and Palestine, two states who have explicitly accepted its jurisdiction.

    And Article 27 of the Rome Statute says the ICC can exercise jurisdiction over people with state immunity, although it’s debatable whether this must be first waived for leaders of states not party to the Rome Statute.

    Cooperation remains key

    The ICC is not only constrained by these complex legal questions, but also by the limited cooperation of states around the world.

    It relies on close cooperation with its 125 state parties, among others. But some states have been reluctant or even refused to cooperate with the court in executing the arrest warrants of controversial figures.

    For example, Putin was not arrested when he visited Mongolia, an ICC member, last year, in part, because Mongolia relies heavily on Russian energy. South Africa similarly refused to arrest Sudanese dictator Omar al-Bashir when he visited in 2015.

    Even when state parties do cooperate, the political fallout can impact the court’s reputation.

    Following Duterte’s arrest last week, a Filipino senator (the sister of the current president) launched an urgent investigation to ensure due process was followed and Duterte’s legal rights were upheld and protected. She acknowledged the arrest has “has deeply divided the nation”.

    The lack of support from the US – arguably, still the world’s most powerful democracy – remains a perennial problem, as well.

    While the US has generally supported the court’s mandate over the years, it has been wary of its jurisdiction over American citizens and those of its allies accused of crimes. Last month, President Donald Trump authorised new sanctions against ICC officials in an attempt to paralyse the international organisation.

    Although 79 states did declare their support for the ICC following the sanctions, the Trump adminstration’s rejection of the court’s jurisdiction, legitimacy and authority has had significant consequences for its operations.

    It remains to be seen how the case against Duterte will play out. Securing a conviction is not assured.

    However, his arrest demonstrates the court can fulfil its mandate and remain a relevant force in the fight against the gravest of crimes. It is also a significant moment for the families of those killed during Duterte’s rule, who have long sought justice for their loved ones.

    Yvonne Breitwieser-Faria does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. The ICC showed its might by arresting Rodrigo Duterte. Its reputation will take longer to fix – https://theconversation.com/the-icc-showed-its-might-by-arresting-rodrigo-duterte-its-reputation-will-take-longer-to-fix-252509

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-OSI China: Violent escalation, aid blockade prompt UN staff reduction in Gaza

    Source: China State Council Information Office

    This photo taken on March 24, 2025 shows the rubble of buildings damaged by an Israeli shelling in the Shuja’iyya neighborhood, east of Gaza City. [Photo/Xinhua]

    Following the killing of hundreds of civilians, including UN staff, and the aid blockade, UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres has decided to reduce staff in the Gaza Strip, a UN spokesman said on Monday.

    “The Secretary-General has taken the difficult decision to reduce the United Nations’ footprint in Gaza, even as humanitarian needs soar and our concern over the protection of civilians intensifies,” said Stephane Dujarric, spokesman for Guterres, at a daily press briefing.

    “The United Nations is not leaving Gaza,” Dujarric said. “We remain committed to continuing to provide aid that civilians depend on for their survival and protection.”

    The spokesman said about 30 percent of the 100 international staff in Gaza, or about 30 people, were being withdrawn. Overall, there are about 13,000 UN personnel in Gaza, the bulk of them working for the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) and most of them are national staff.

    “Based on the information that is currently available, the strikes hitting a UN compound in Deir Al Balah on (Wednesday) were caused by an Israeli tank shell,” he said.

    The strikes claimed the life of a UN colleague from Bulgaria and left six others, from France, Moldova, North Macedonia, Palestine and the United Kingdom, with severe injuries, some of them life-altering, according to Dujarric.

    The spokesman told reporters that the UN compound’s location was well known to Israeli forces. The secretary-general strongly condemns these strikes and demands a full, thorough and independent investigation into this incident.

    Dujarric stressed that all parties must always comply fully with international law. Civilians must be respected, and they must be protected. The denial of lifesaving aid must end. The hostages must be released immediately and unconditionally.

    “All states must use their leverage to stop the conflict and ensure respect for international law, by applying diplomatic and economic pressure and combating impunity,” the spokesman said. “The secretary-general renews his urgent call for the restoration of the ceasefire to bring an end to the anguish.”

    However, Israeli officials have indicated they intend to continue their military activities in Gaza.

    The aid blockade began more than three weeks ago when Israel cut off the entry of humanitarian aid into Gaza. It is the longest such suspension of assistance since the deadly Oct. 7, 2023 Hamas raid on Israel.

    The UN emergency relief coordinator, Tom Fletcher, said he continues to receive horrific reports from Gaza of more health workers, ambulances and hospitals attacked as they try to save survivors.

    Dujarric said several casualties were reported after the surgical department of Nasser Medical Complex was hit and caught fire on Sunday. In Rafah, in southern Gaza, ambulances were reportedly hit in Tal Al Sultan, resulting in several casualties.

    The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reported that the United Nations and humanitarian partners continue to face constraints in providing health services.

    “Our partners called for the entry of additional emergency medical teams into Gaza to help health workers already on the ground who are exhausted and, of course, overwhelmed,” OCHA said. 

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-Evening Report: Nerve-wracking twists, remarkable stardom and jet-black comedy: the 5 best films of the 2025 French Film Festival

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Ben McCann, Associate Professor of French Studies, University of Adelaide

    The Divine Sarah Bernhardt.
    Memento

    This year’s Alliance Française French Film Festival showcases a diverse selection of films from blockbusters and biopics to comedies and gripping thrillers for Australian audiences.

    I’ve written before about how this annual event, now in its 36th edition, is, in terms of tickets sold and films screened, the largest film festival dedicated to contemporary French cinema outside of France.

    The 2025 program once more shines a spotlight on the established icons and rising stars of French cinema.

    In the this year’s festival, 30% of the films are directed by women and thorny issues such as slavery, consent and caregiving are presented sensitively and provocatively.

    But from a competitive bunch, here are the best five films I saw this year.

    How To Make A Killing

    It’s Christmas in the Jura, France’s picturesque eastern region full of mountains, snow and pine trees. When Michel (Frank Dubosc) accidentally crashes his truck into a car, killing its driver and passenger, his wife Cathy (Laure Calamy) tells him he may have left fingerprints at the crime scene.

    They return – and discover two million euros in the car boot, and a loaded gun in the glove box.

    From this point on, How To Make A Killing features one improbable but amusingly nerve-wracking twist after another. There’s a local policeman in over his head and drug lords and contract killers who want their money back.

    Oh, and a black bear is on the loose.

    Writer-director Dubosc pays homage to the Coen brothers and sprinkles in a typically Gallic dose of black humour. What really gives the film zip and pizzazz is the fabulous Calamy. She has risen to the apex of contemporary French stardom and her performance is a delight.

    The Divine Sarah Bernhardt

    Sarah Bernhardt can lay claim to being the first film celebrity. Born in Paris in 1844, Bernhardt was first a legendary stage actress, performing Shakespeare and Racine across the world (including Melbourne and Sydney in 1891) before gravitating to silent cinema.

    Known for her extraordinary talent and intense stage presence (hence “divine”), she refused to play just female roles, famously playing Hamlet. Her eccentricity was equally renowned: she often travelled with an extensive menagerie of exotic pets.

    Guillaume Nicloux’s sumptuous biopic unfolds in a radical way. Rather than tracing Bernhardt’s career in the fairly bog-standard biopic way, Nicloux jumps around, focusing on key events from her life – the amputation of a leg, her death, her bisexuality, her hedonistic lifestyle.

    Through this bold achronological prism comes another daring choice: we never see Bernhardt act on stage or film. Her stardom emerges through the extraordinary effect she has on people who enter her orbit.

    At the centre is a remarkable performance by Sandrine Kiberlain. She captures Bernhardt’s glamour and narcissism but also taps into her vulnerability to reveal her gradual hollowing out as the vagaries of fame take their toll.

    It’s a cautionary tale that speaks to our current ambivalence towards stage-managed celebrity and “stardom at all costs”.

    My Brother’s Band

    Ever since its Cannes debut last May, Emmanuel Courcol’s My Brother’s Band has received rave reviews. It is sure to be an instant classic.

    Two brothers are separated at birth and are only reunited decades later when Thibaut (Benjamin Lavernhe) needs a bone marrow transplant. The only suitable donor is long-lost Jimmy (rising star Pierre Lottin).

    All that bonds the two is a shared love of music. Thibaut is an esteemed orchestra conductor while Jimmy plays the trombone in a local brass band.

    Lavernhe’s and Lottin’s scenes together are wonderfully wry and tender as the two brothers learn to appreciate each other’s lifestyles and ways of seeing the world. We also see how music can bind communities together during times of personal and collective crisis.

    Courcol shuttles between the stuffy, cathedral-like spaces of a Paris conservatorium and the cramped parish halls of northern France. Think Brassed Off meets Tár. My Brother’s Band brings the feel-good to the festival.

    When Fall is Coming

    When Fall is Coming, the latest work by prolific auteur François Ozon, is a broody family drama set in Burgundy.

    Behind the autumnal landscapes and off-the-beaten-track villages lies hidden trauma. Michelle (the outstanding Hélène Vincent, now 81) nervously awaits the arrival of her grandson and the daughter from whom she is long estranged (for reasons we don’t understand until much later).

    An innocuous first night meal turns to tragedy, and kickstarts a deeply engrossing, often menacing film. Pierre Lottin features again, this time as an ex-con slowly drawn into this unsettling web of secrets and lies.

    The “fall” in the title can be read any number of ways. Suffice to say, this slow-burner reminds us of Ozon’s knack in withholding plot points and revealing them gradually. With its blend of spiteful intimacy and startling revelations, When Fall is Coming quietly chills. You’ll not look at mushrooms in the same way again.

    Lucky Winners

    French filmgoers love to laugh. The top ten grossing French films in history are all comedies.

    Lucky Winners is a jet-black comedy about four different winners of France’s national lottery. Each becomes a millionaire overnight – but that’s when their troubles begin. Romain Choay and Maxime Govare’s witty film features a fine ensemble cast and a healthy dose of cruelty and squabbling.

    The dream sours. Money does not bring happiness, only guilt, revenge and greed. Feel-good quickly descends into feel-bad. I imagine Hollywood will be remaking this very soon.

    The Alliance Française French Film Festival is in cinemas around Australia on various dates until April 27.

    Ben McCann does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Nerve-wracking twists, remarkable stardom and jet-black comedy: the 5 best films of the 2025 French Film Festival – https://theconversation.com/nerve-wracking-twists-remarkable-stardom-and-jet-black-comedy-the-5-best-films-of-the-2025-french-film-festival-250153

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Experts of the Committee on Enforced Disappearances Commend Belgium’s Commitment to Human Rights, Ask about Foreign Unaccompanied Minors and Illegal International Adoptions

    Source: United Nations – Geneva

    The Committee on Enforced Disappearances today reviewed a report containing additional information submitted by Belgium under article 29 (4) of the Convention. Committee Experts commended the State party’s commitment to human rights, while raising questions on foreign unaccompanied minors and illegal international adoptions.

    Matar Diop, Committee Expert and Country Rapporteur for Belgium, commended the State party’s commitment and welcomed the important delegation, which demonstrated Belgium’s commitment to human rights and cooperation with the United Nations human rights bodies.

    Barbara Lochbihler, Committee Expert and Country Rapporteur for Belgium, askedwhat measures had been implemented by the State party to gather complex and disaggregated statistics relating to unaccompanied foreign minors? What measures did the State party intend to adopt to search for and investigate unaccompanied foreign minors? Could an update on current legislation relating to unaccompanied minors be provided?

    A Committee Expert said a number of measures had been adopted to support persons who felt they had been victims of illegal international adoption who were seeking to establish their origin. What form did the support take and what was its scope? Had these assistance measures been extended across the country, not just the Flemish community? Was the State party considering establishing a commission of inquiry which would shed light on the practice of illegal international adoptions? Would Belgium introduce a comprehensive prohibition on international adoptions at the national level?

    The delegation said Belgium did not have specific statistics on unaccompanied foreign minors. The breakdown of statistics was a concern for Belgian authorities. There had been three consecutive projects conducted since 2021 aimed at improving data collection in Belgium. There had been a memo from the College of Prosecutors in searching for missing persons, which set out that any disappearance of foreign unaccompanied minors warranted the heightened interest of all services of the police. The disappearance of foreign unaccompanied minors was always considered worrying.

    The delegation said the former Minister of Justice had encouraged cooperation between the stakeholders involved in investigating illegal international adoptions. In May 2024, the Government made a statement before the House of Representatives acknowledging problematic and illegal adoptions had occurred in Belgium between 1950 and today, and that those affected by the adoptions should be considered as victims. Other recent measures had been taken to further implement the resolution of the Chamber adopted in 2022 dedicated to cases of illegal adoptions in Belgium.

    Introducing the report, Steven Limbourg, General Advisor, Director of the Criminal Law Direction, Federal Public Service Justice of Belgium, said that at the federal level, Belgium had taken advantage of the drafting of its new Penal Code in 2024 to update and include new provisions that took account of enforced disappearance. The offences carried all the consequences required by the Convention, as well as provisions relating to mitigating and aggravating circumstances.

    In concluding remarks, Olivier De Frouville, Committee Chair, thanked Belgium for the constructive dialogue and their answers. Following the dialogue, the Committee would prepare concluding observations and propose recommendations, and from there it would then be decided how to continue the interaction with the State party.

    Christophe Payot, Permanent Representative of Belgium to the United Nations Office at Geneva and head of the delegation, expressed sincere thanks to all Committee members for the constructive and enriching dialogue. It was recognised that enforced disappearance may not have the same scope in all States parties, however, Belgium believed the Convention was vital for combatting impunity. The State looked forward to the Committee’s concluding observations.

    The delegation of Belgium consisted of representatives of the Federal Public Service Justice; the federal police; the French community of Belgium; the Flemish Government; and the Permanent Mission of Belgium to the United Nations Office at Geneva.

    All the documents relating to the Committee’s work, including reports submitted by States parties, can be found on the session’s webpage. Webcasts of the meetings of the session can be found here, and meetings summaries can be found here.

    The Committee will next meet in public at 3 p.m. on Monday, 24 March, to begin its consideration of the initial report of Malta (CED/C/MLT/1).

    Report

    The Committee has before it the report containing additional information submitted by Belgium under article 29 (4) of the Convention (CED/C/BEL/Al/1).

    Presentation of Report

    CHRISTOPHE PAYOT, Permanent Representative of Belgium to the United Nations Office at Geneva and head of the delegation, said due to Belgium’s unique federal structure, the implementation of the Convention fell under the jurisdiction of several governments. Belgium promoted the ratification of the Convention to States that had not yet ratified it, and during the fourth cycle of the Universal Periodic Review, it had made 50 interventions in this regard. Belgium had also actively participated in and made commitments at the First World Congress on Enforced Disappearances held last January in Geneva. Mr. Payot then introduced the delegation, illustrating the plurality of bodies responsible for the implementation of the Convention.

    STEVEN LIMBOURG, General Advisor, Director of the Criminal Law Direction, Federal Public Service Justice of Belgium, expressed appreciation to the Committee for its tireless work in the fight against enforced disappearances. At the federal level, Belgium had taken advantage of the drafting of its new Penal Code in 2024 to update and include new provisions that took account of enforced disappearance. Enforced disappearance that did not constitute a crime against humanity was now recognised as a stand-alone offence, punishable by a level six penalty, the same level as that for torture. Enforced disappearance constituting a crime against humanity also remained a free-standing offence, punishable by a sentence of level eight, the most serious level, which included life imprisonment or treatment under deprivation of liberty for 18 to 20 years. The offences carried all the consequences required by the Convention, as well as provisions relating to mitigating and aggravating circumstances.

    With regard to deprivation of liberty, the federal police had developed an electronic register, which was currently in the testing phase. Regarding the disappearances of unaccompanied foreign minors, a 2022 circular from the Prosecutor General outlined that they should be subject to increased vigilance by all the services concerned. In 2023, a working group comprised of federal and federated levels as well as representatives of civil society, published a practical guide on the disappearances of unaccompanied minors. The handbook was available to all relevant departments and was actively used by the staff and services concerned, including community youth aid organizations and the integrated police.

    Belgium had also taken measures to prevent illegal intercountry adoptions. At the federal level, the new Penal Code included the offences relating to fraudulent adoption, adding rules on punishable participation that made it possible to punish persons who participated in the offence of illegal adoption without being intermediaries. The new Criminal Code also expressly stated illegal adoption as a possible form of trafficking in human beings. In addition, all federal public services had started to implement a resolution of the Chamber adopted in 2022 dedicated to cases of illegal adoptions in Belgium.

    The Flemish Government had taken various political measures to adapt its policy and operation in the field of intercountry adoption, in particular through a reform of its legal framework. The new 2024 intercountry adoption decree provided for stricter control of adoptions in the best interests of the child, as well as guidelines and criteria on the screening of collaborations in countries of origin, making ratification of the Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption a key criterion. Similarly, in the French Community, the decree on adoption was amended in 2020 with the aim of authorising collaboration only with countries that had ratified the Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption.

    On the issue of the segregation suffered by the Métis during the period of Belgian colonisation in Africa, at the federal level, measures had been taken to respond to the various demands expressed in the “Métis” resolution, adopted by the Chamber in 2018. These included a procedure to remedy the absence of birth certificates, support in the identification of biological parents, and declassification of archives and access to them with a view to reuniting families separated under duress. In April 2024, a symposium for a delegation of mixed-race people from the Belgian colonisation of the Democratic Republic of the Congo was organised in Brussels, providing an opportunity to take stock of the measures taken by the Federal Government to implement the Métis resolution and to give participants the opportunity to clarify their questions and expectations towards Belgium. Mr. Limbourg expressed hope that the dialogue would indeed be most constructive.

    Questions by Committee Experts

    MATAR DIOP, Committee Expert and Country Rapporteur for Belgium, said this dialogue followed on from the dialogue held with Belgium in 2014. Mr. Diop commended the State party’s commitment and welcomed the important delegation, which demonstrated Belgium’s commitment to human rights and cooperation with the United Nations human rights bodies. The Committee took note of the new Criminal Code adopted in 2024 and commended this legislative amendment. Why were mitigating circumstances granted to a person for holding someone for less than five days? Did there need to be physical impacts of torture for it to be taken into account? Could psychological torture be taken into account?

    The law of criminal procedure, which came into force in April 2024, adopted a statute of limitations for public prosecution that varied according to the length of the sentence incurred. How would the duration of the statute of limitations be determined before the offence was the subject of a trial? The establishment of a register of persons deprived of their liberty was a major recommendation of the Committee in its 2014 concluding observations. What was the progress of this project? How were migrants registered? Had the existing system been developed? What were the existing legislative provisions regarding refoulement and pushbacks? Was training provided to staff working in the migration system in Belgium, at federal or at the federated entity level? Could information be provided on the existence and content of cooperation agreements with other States for the assistance of victims of enforced disappearance as well as the search, location and release of disappeared persons?

    The Committee noted that assistance to victims of deliberate acts of violence was subject to the condition that the acts were at least partly committed in Belgium, and that an assessment was made on a case-by-case basis. What happened when the act spanned more than one country? Could information be provided when it came to extending the jurisdiction of the Commission? Could specific data be provided on the financial support provided to victims, including the number of cases handled, reparations envisaged, and the number of beneficiaries? Could relatives of victims benefit from the support of the Commission?

    In December 2024, the Brussels Court of Appeal reversed a first instance judgment and declared as crimes against humanity the kidnappings and adoptions of five mixed-race females in the 1940s and 1950s in the Belgian Congo. These females had been abducted without their mothers’ consent and placed with an evangelical mission, later resulting in adoption. These adoptions had subsequently been considered illegal, and the females had been expected to receive compensatory amounts of around 50,000 euros. How did the State party plan to meet its obligations towards these five females? What measures did the State party plan to take to settle this case?

    BARBARA LOCHBIHLER, Committee Expert and Country Rapporteur for Belgium, thanked Belgium for following the work of the Committee actively and regularly. Could the delegation provide an update on the progress of creating an A status national human rights institution in full compliance with the Paris Principles? There had been some progress regarding the establishment of a national preventive mechanism, which could eventually allow for ratification of the Optional Protocol to the Convention. What was the estimated timeframe for this?

    The Joint Statement on Illegal Intercountry Adoption outlined four key principles to prevent illegal intercountry adoptions. What measures had been taken to prevent and investigate illegal intercountry adoptions, taking into account those principles?

    Were there any cases of victims, who suffered harm as a direct result of illegal intercountry adoption, and their right to reparation? Could the figures and cases of international illegal adoptions that had been reported by community centres be provided? According to information, initiatives taken in Belgium to study and recognise the scale and impact of illegal intercountry adoptions had led to little effect. Could the State party elaborate on these initiatives and what remained to be done to gain the knowledge for best prevention and compensation? What measures had been implemented by the State party to gather complex and disaggregated statistics relating to unaccompanied foreign minors? What measures did the State party intend to adopt to search for and investigate unaccompanied foreign minors? Could an update on current legislation relating to unaccompanied minors be provided? Did Belgium provide mutual legal assistance measures or cooperation and if so, with which countries?

    Belgium had ratified the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (2000) and its Protocol against the smuggling of migrants by land, sea and air and to prevent, supress and punish trafficking in persons, especially women and children. What was the State’s experiences with the implementation of this Convention in Belgium and what lessons could be learned from that in the field of preventing migrants from becoming victims of enforced disappearance? How was the work of the Federal Migration Centre contributing particularly to the prevention of enforced disappearances in the context of migration?

    A Committee Expert asked how many officials had been involved in corruption cases pertaining to international adoptions? Had criminal proceedings been brought forward?

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said in the new Criminal Code adopted in 2024, enforced disappearance which did not constitute a crime against humanity was considered a standalone crime, placing it in the same subdivision as enforced disappearance which did constitute a crime against humanity. This was done to ensure that they entailed the same consequences, including the inditements for attempts and ensuring hierarchical superiorities were held to account, among others. This was done to ensure enforced disappearance was addressed in a multi-dimensional way and highlight the stigma of this crime. The provisions in the new Criminal Code were prepared by legal experts who took into account all recommendations made by the United Nations Working Group on Enforced Disappearance and from civil society. The purpose was not to create a secondary category of enforced disappearance which was less severe.

    A register of persons deprived of liberty was a priority issue for Belgium. Discussions had been ongoing and there had been some delays and setbacks, but discussions were now back on track. The State was working to harmonise practices between the police, with a view to providing a register template to all police services which would meet international standards. An electronic register had been developed which was currently being tested.

    Belgium did not have specific mutual agreements with other countries in regard to enforced disappearance. There were national cooperation agreements between the Belgian communities and there were definitions of victims, as well as their families. Belgian legislation did not cover acts committed abroad, but acts which continued in Belgium could be covered. If an act of violence occurred in several States, there needed to be a case-by-case analysis.

    Emphasis was placed on migration when training people working directly with migrants, including customs officers or local police. Regarding the cases of the five mixed-race females, the Government had not yet taken any decision regarding the ruling of the court of appeal. The ruling was still being analysed.

    The Belgian authorities recognised the need to have a consistent structure dealing with human rights and the need for a status A national human rights institution. The institute established in 2019 was an important step in this direction. The Subcommittee on Accreditation requested certain amendments which had been partially implemented establishing the institute. However, Belgium wished to see a consistent structure throughout the country. Total cooperation with various national human rights institutions was vital. A significant step was taken in April 2024 with the adoption of a law designating the federal institution for the promotion of human rights as the preventive mechanism at the federal level. It was only competent for places of deprivation of liberty which fell under the federal level, meaning ratification of the Optional Protocol was not yet possible. A mechanism needed to be developed to cover all places of deprivation of liberty in Belgium.

    In recent years, the Flemish Government had taken measures to implement inter-country adoption operations. The Flemish Ministry for Family and Wellbeing set up a group to research previous best practices in intercountry adoptions. On the basis of the group’s recommendations, the Flemish Government reformed the legal framework for adoption. The most significant change included tighter control of adoption with the best interest of the child in mind. There was a long period of time for preserving records. In 2023, the Flemish Minister for Welfare called for all reports about irregularities in adoption to be flagged; there were over 200 irregularities reported, with 107 receiving an interview with the Flemish Centre for Adoption regarding questions or concerns about their case.

    Belgium did not have specific statistics on unaccompanied foreign minors. The breakdown of statistics was a concern for Belgian authorities. There had been three consecutive projects conducted since 2021 aimed at improving data collection in Belgium. There had been a memo from the College of Prosecutors in searching for missing persons, which set out that any disappearance of foreign unaccompanied minors warranted the heightened interest of all services of the police. The disappearance of foreign unaccompanied minors was always considered worrying. If there was an indication that human trafficking could be involved, criminal policy directives needed to be enforced. Detention of foreign unaccompanied minors was prohibited through the aliens act. The police had an agreement with the guardianship service when there was a disappearance of a foreign unaccompanied minor. Foreign unaccompanied minors should be a priority for receiving a State guardian. Information was given to guardians so they could manage cases of enforced disappearance.

    Questions by Committee Experts

    MATAR DIOP, Committee Expert and Country Rapporteur for Belgium, said it seemed as though the statute of limitations for enforced disappearance which was not considered a crime against humanity was 10 years. What was the statute of limitations for bringing criminal proceedings? Had the State lost an appeal before the court of cassation? Had a mechanism been established at the federal state level to allow potential victims of illegal adoptions to bring forth judicial proceedings or lodge a claim for reparations? Who had jurisdiction for what when it came to adoptions? Had the federal or federated entities imposed criminal penalties for involvement in illegal country adoptions?

    BARBARA LOCHBIHLER, Committee Expert and Country Rapporteur for Belgium, asked if there were mutual legal assistance measures of cooperation with countries regarding migrants? How were migrants in deprivation of liberty registered?

    A Committee Expert said a number of measures had been adopted to support persons who felt they had been victims of illegal international adoption who were seeking to establish their origin. What form did the support take and what was its scope? Determining origins could require more support in cooperation with countries of origin. Did the assistance provided by Belgium encompass such measures? Had these assistance measures been extended across the country, not just the Flemish community? Was the State party considering establishing a commission of inquiry which would shed light on the practice of illegal international adoptions? Would Belgium introduce a comprehensive prohibition on international adoptions at the national level?

    Another Expert asked how many court cases were underway which pertained to intercountry illegal adoptions? How many people had the State helped to recover their identity?

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said the statute of limitations was not applicable in both crimes of enforced disappearance, be they crimes against humanity or non-crimes against humanity. Psychological torture was always taken into account.

    Regarding the decision pertaining to the five mixed-race females, this ruling was being analysed and there would possibly be an appeal filed with the court of cassation. The court had until early April to do so.

    Belgian mutual legal assistance conventions were general in nature and there was not one specifically relating to the disappearance of migrants. The decision to remove a person or take them back to the border was suspended if this exposed them to a risk of refoulment.

    When a person required support around an adoption, the Flemish Adoption Centre and other State entities conducted an interview with the victims and provided care and support following the interview. It ensured that follow up was given regarding personal files. The Centre aimed to collect as much as possible during the interview, finding out what steps had been taken and what needed to be done moving forward. The person involved was given the opportunity to participate in all stages. There was significant cooperation taking place at the communities and federal level. In the French community, the Central Community Authority was there to support those in their search.

    The register on deprivation of liberty did not apply specifically to the registration of migrants, but rather it listed all deprivations of liberty carried out by the police services. The law on foreigners made it possible in certain situations for police services to detain a foreigner, not necessarily a migrant, who did not have identification documents with them.

    The former Minister of Justice had encouraged cooperation between the stakeholders involved in investigating illegal international adoptions. In May 2024, the Government made a statement before the House of Representatives, acknowledging problematic and illegal adoptions had occurred in Belgium between 1950 and today, and that those affected by the adoptions should be considered as victims. Other recent measures had been taken to further implement the resolution of the Chamber adopted in 2022 dedicated to cases of illegal adoptions in Belgium.

    Belgium’s whole legal framework had been enhanced in recent years to respond to events from the past.

    If an act of enforced disappearance had been less than five days, this constituted a level four offence which was still serious, with consequences of up to 10 years in prison.

    Closing Remarks

    OLIVIER DE FROUVILLE, Committee Chair, thanked Belgium for the constructive dialogue and their answers. Following a first constructive dialogue, it was up to the Committee to call for additional information, which was what had happened in this case. The Committee would then focus on certain subjects which it deemed necessary to raise again. Following the dialogue, the Committee would prepare concluding observations and propose recommendations, and from there it would then be decided how to continue the interaction with the State party.

    CHRISTOPHE PAYOT, Permanent Representative of Belgium to the United Nations Office at Geneva and head of the delegation, expressed sincere thanks to all Committee members for the constructive and enriching dialogue. Belgium attached great importance to the treaty body system which played a fundamental role in promoting and protecting human rights in the country. Belgium would benefit from a more predictable reporting cycle with the treaty bodies which would lead to greater participation by State members. It was recognised that enforced disappearance may not have the same scope in all States parties, however, Belgium believed the Convention was vital for combatting impunity. The State looked forward to the Committee’s concluding observations.

    Produced by the United Nations Information Service in Geneva for use of the media; 
    not an official record. English and French versions of our releases are different as they are the product of two separate coverage teams that work independently. 

     

     

    CED25.006E

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Guterres to reduce UN aid ‘footprint’ inside Gaza following ceasefire collapse

    Source: United Nations MIL OSI b

    Peace and Security

    The UN Secretary-General on Monday took the “difficult decision” to reduce the aid operation inside the Gaza Strip following the resumption of deadly Israeli airstrikes – but pledged that “the UN is not leaving” the enclave.

    In the past week, Israel carried out devastating strikes on Gaza, claiming the lives of hundreds of civilians, including United Nations personnel, with no humanitarian aid being allowed to enter the Strip since early March,” said a statement released by his Spokesperson.

    “As a result, the Secretary-General has taken the difficult decision to reduce the Organization’s footprint in Gaza, even as humanitarian needs soar and our concern over the protection of civilians intensifies.”

    The UN stressed that it remained fully committed to providing lifesaving aid. Around a third of the approximately 100 international staff working in Gaza will be temporarily relocated.

    After cutting off all humanitarian aid into Gaza for three weeks – the longest suspension since 7 October 2023 – Israeli officials have indicated that they intend to continue their military campaign across Gaza and annex territory to pressure Hamas.

    Strike on UN compound from ‘Israeli tank’

    The UN Spokesperson said that based on currently available information, “the strikes hitting a UN compound in Deir Al Balah on 19 March were caused by an Israeli tank.”.

    In the aftermath of Wednesday’s strike, Israel said it had not been behind the blast.

    “The strikes claimed the life of a UN colleague from Bulgaria and left six others – from France, Moldova, North Macedonia, Palestine and the United Kingdom – with severe injuries, some of them life-altering,” Monday’s statement continued.

    The location of the compound was well known to all the parties to the conflict.

    “I reiterate that all parties to the conflict are bound by international law to protect the absolute inviolability of UN premises,” the statement from Spokesperson Stéphane Dujarric continued.

    “Without this, our colleagues face intolerable risks as they work to save the lives of civilians.”

    The Secretary-General is demanding a full, thorough and independent investigation into Wednesday’s deadly strike, protection of all civilian life in the renewed fighting between Israeli forces and Hamas and the resumption of aid deliveries.

    Furthermore, all hostages “must be released immediately and unconditionally”.

    ‘Relentless bombardment’ again

    One week since Israeli bombing started again in Gaza, UN humanitarians have described deadly attacks hitting health workers, ambulances and hospitals.

    Senior UN humanitarian in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Jonathan Whittall, said that hundreds of children and adults have been killed since the ceasefire broke down between Hamas and Israel.

    The UN agency for Palestine refugees, UNRWA, also said on Monday that 124,000 people in the enclave have been forced to flee what it called “relentless bombardment”.

    Families carry what little they have with no shelter, no safety, and nowhere left to go; the Israeli authorities have cut off all aid,” UNRWA said in an online statement – warning that food is scarce and prices are soaring as the Israeli blockade continues.

    Relief chief Tom Fletcher tweeted that he was continuing to receive horrific reports from Gaza of more health workers, ambulances and hospitals attacked as they try to save survivors. Mr. Fletcher said we all must demand that hospitals and medics must not be targeted.

    In southern Gaza on Sunday, several casualties were reported after the surgical department of Nasser Medical Complex was hit and caught fire, Mr. Dujarric told journalists in New York at the daily briefing.

    In Rafah, ambulances were reportedly hit in Tal Al Sultan, resulting in several casualties. The Palestine Red Crescent Society said four of its ambulances were targeted, as well as 10 team members carrying out humanitarian work.

    “Communication with the team has been completely lost for 30 hours, and at this point, their fate remains unknown,” the UN Spokesperson continued.

    Call for additional emergency teams

    As hostilities continue across Gaza, aid coordination office, OCHA, and partners called for the entry of additional emergency medical teams into Gaza to help health workers already on the ground who are “exhausted and, of course, overwhelmed.”

    Israeli authorities on Sunday issued a new evacuation order in Rafah, covering around two per cent of the Strip and affecting five neighbourhoods.

    “With this latest directive, the overall area designated for evacuation over the past week covers an estimated 14 per cent of the Gaza Strip – along  with vast ‘no go’ zones along the borders and the Netzarim corridor,” Mr. Dujarric said.

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI USA News: More Investment, More Jobs, and More Money in Americans’ Pockets

    Source: The White House

    More Investment, More Jobs, and More Money in Americans’ Pockets

    Today, Hyundai announced a $20 billion investment in the United States — including $5.8 billion for a new steel plant in Louisiana, which will create nearly 1,500 jobs. The investment, which builds on Hyundai’s pledge earlier this year to “further localize production in the U.S.,” is the latest success in President Donald J. Trump’s pursuit of a Made in America renaissance.

    It’s further proof that President Trump’s economic agenda is working.

    Hyundai is far from the only automaker planning major investments as President Trump leverages tariffs to remake the U.S. into a global manufacturing powerhouse:

    • Stellantis announced a $5 billion investment in its U.S. manufacturing network — including re-opening an Illinois manufacturing plant — as it pledges to increase domestic vehicle production.
    • Volkswagen is considering shifting production of the high-end Audi and Porsche brands to the U.S.
    • Honda is expected to produce its next-generation Civic hybrid model in Indiana.
    • Nissan is considering moving production from Mexico to the U.S.
    • Rolls-Royce is expected to “ramp up” production in the U.S. by hiring more American workers and expand its U.S.-based operations.
    • Volvo is considering expanding its U.S.-based output.

    It’s not just the auto sector; domestic and foreign companies have pledged trillions in new investments since President Trump took office:

    • Project Stargate, led by Japan-based Softbank and U.S.-based OpenAI and Oracle, announced a $500 billion private investment in U.S.-based artificial intelligence infrastructure.
    • Apple announced a $500 billion investment in U.S. manufacturing and training.
    • Nvidia announced it will invest hundreds of billions of dollars over the next four years in U.S.-based manufacturing.
    • Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) announced a $100 billion investment in U.S.-based chips manufacturing.
    • Eli Lilly and Company announced a $27 billion investment in domestic manufacturing.
    • United Arab Emirates-based DAMAC Properties announced a $20 billion investment in new U.S.-based data centers.
    • France-based CMA CGM, a global shipping giant, announced a $20 billion investment in U.S. shipping and logistics, creating 10,000 new jobs.
    • Merck announced it will invest $8 billion in the U.S. over the next several years after opening a new $1 billion North Carolina manufacturing facility.
    • Clarios announced a $6 billion plan to expand its domestic manufacturing operations.
    • GE Aerospace announced a $1 billion investment in manufacturing across 16 states — creating 5,000 new jobs.
    • GE Vernova announced it will invest nearly $600 million in U.S. manufacturing over the next two years, which will create more than 1,500 new jobs.
    • London-based Diageo announced a $415 million investment in a new Alabama manufacturing facility.
    • Dublin-based Eaton Corporation announced a $340 million investment in a new South Carolina-based manufacturing facility for its three-phase transformers.
    • Germany-based Siemens announced a $285 million investment in U.S. manufacturing and AI data centers, which will create more than 900 new skilled manufacturing jobs.
    • Paris Baguette announced a $160 million investment to construct a manufacturing plant in Texas.
    • Switzerland-based ABB announced a $120 million investment to expand production of its low-voltage electrification products in Tennessee and Mississippi.
    • Saica Group, a Spain-based corrugated packaging maker, announced plans to build a $110 million new manufacturing facility in Anderson, Indiana.
    • Paris-based Saint-Gobain announced a new $40 million NorPro manufacturing facility in Wheatfield, New York.
    • India-based Sygene International announced a $36.5 million acquisition of a Baltimore biologics manufacturing facility.
    • Asahi Group Holdings, one of the largest Japanese beverage makers, announced a $35 million investment to boost production at its Wisconsin plant.
    • Samsung is considering moving its dryer production from Mexico to South Carolina.
    • LG is considering moving its refrigerator manufacturing from Mexico to Tennessee.
    • Italian spirits group Campari is “assessing the opportunities to expand its production in the U.S.”
    • Essity, a Swedish hygiene product manufacturer, is considering shifting production to the U.S.
    • Taiwan-based Compal Electronics is considering a U.S.-based expansion.
    • Taiwan-based Inventec is expected to expand its manufacturing operations into Texas.
    • LVMH, a French luxury giant, is “seriously considering” an expansion to its U.S.-based production capabilities.
    • Cra-Z-Art, the biggest toymaker in the U.S., said it will move a “large percentage” of its China-based manufacturing back home.
    • Prepac, a Canadian furniture manufacturer, announced it will move production from Canada to the U.S.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Promotion of Cruise and Adventure Tourism

    Source: Government of India (2)

    Posted On: 24 MAR 2025 4:02PM by PIB Delhi

    Development and promotion of tourist destinations and products, including adventure tourism is undertaken by the respective State Government/Union Territory (UT) Administration. The Ministry complements the efforts of States/UTs by developing and promoting various tourism products of the country, including cruise tourism through various schemes and initiatives.

    The Ministry of Tourism through its central sector schemes of Swadesh Darshan (SD)’, Pilgrimage Rejuvenation and Spiritual, Heritage Augmentation Drive (PRASHAD) and Assistance to Central Agencies for Tourism Infrastructure Development extends financial assistance to the State Governments/UT Administrations for tourism infrastructure development in the country.

    The list of projects sanctioned for Coastal Circuit and Cruise Project under Swadesh Darshan Scheme are given at Annexure-I. The list of projects sanctioned for infrastructure development at Ports and Waterways under the scheme of Assistance to Central Agencies are given at Annexure-II.

    In order to provide impetus to the development of adventure tourism in the country, National Strategy for adventure tourism has been prepared.

    The Strategy focuses on developing adventure destinations, promoting safety in adventure tourism, skill development, capacity building and marketing.

    This information was given by Union Minister for Tourism and Culture Shri Gajendra Singh Shekhawat in a written reply in Lok Sabha today.

    ***

     

    Sunil Kumar Tiwari

    tourism4pib[at]gmail[dot]com

     

     

    List of Projects sanctioned for Coastal Circuit and Cruise Project under Swadesh Darshan Scheme

    S.

    No.

    Name of State

    Year

    Project Name

    Amount Sanctioned

    1.

    Andhra Pradesh

    2014-15

    Developmentof Circuit at Kakinada – Hope Island – Coringa Wildlife Sanctuary – Passarlapudi – Aduru – S Yanam – Kotipally

    67.83

    2.

    Andhra Pradesh

    2015-16

    Developmentof         Nellore, Pulikat Lake, Ubblamadugu water falls, Nelapattu Bird          Sanctuary, Mypadu Beach, Ramatheertham

    49.55

    3.

    Puducherry

    2015-16

    Development of Dubrayapet, Arikamedu China Veerampattinam, Chunnabmar, Nallavadu, Manapet, Kalapet, French Quarter, Tamil Quarter and Yanam

    58.44

    4.

    West Bengal

    2015-16

    Development of Beach Circuit: Udaipur- Digha- Shankarpur- Tajpur- Mandarmani- Fraserganj- Bakkhlai-Henry Island

    67.99

    5.

    Maharashtra

    2015-16

    Development of Sindhudurg Coastal Circuit (Shiroda Beach, Sagareshwar, Tarkarli, Vijaydurg (Beach & Creek), Devgad (Fort & Beach), Mitbhav, Tondavali, Mocehmad and Nivati Fort).

    19.06

    6.

    Goa

    2016-17

    Development of Sinquerim-Baga, Anjuna- Vagator, Morjim-Keri, Aguada Fort and Aguada Jail.

    97.65

    7.

    Odisha

    2016-17

    Development of Gopalpur, Barkul, Satapada and Tampara.

    70.82

    8.

    Andaman & Nicobar Islands

    2016-17

    Development of Long Island-Ross Smith Island- Neil Island- Havelock Island- Baratang Island- Port Blair.

    27.57

    9.

    Tamil Nadu

    2016-17

    Developmentof         Chennai-Mamamallapuram–Rameshwaram–Kulasekaranpattinam            – Kanyakumari

    73.13

    10.

    Goa

    2017-18

    Developmentof         Rua      De Orum Creek-Don Paula-Colva – Benaulim

    99.35

    11.

    Kerala

    2018-19

    Development of Malanad Malabar Cruise Tourism Project

    57.35

     

    Total

    688.74

    *******

    ANNEXURE-II

     

     

    List of Projects sanctioned for infrastructure development at Ports and Waterways under the scheme of Assistance to Central Agencies

    S.

    No.

    States/ UTs

    Year

    Name of Projects

    Implementing Agency

    Amount sanctioned

    1.

    Tamil Nadu

    2012-13

    Cruise Passenger Facilities Centre in the existing Passenger Terminal at Chennai Port.

    Chennai Port Trust

    1724.66

    2.

    Goa

    2014-15

    Cruise Terminal Building at Mormugao Port Trust

    Mormugao Port trust

    879.04

    3.

    Kerala

    2016-17

    Development of a Walkway/ Promenade on Willingdon Island, Cochin, Kerala

    Cochin Trust Port

    901.00

    4.

    Kerala

    2016-17

    Central Financial Assistance forupgrading of Births & Backup area of Ernakulam Wharf

    Cochin Trust Port

    2141.00

    5.

    Maharashtra

    2016-17

    Central Financial Assistance to Mumbai Port Trust for Development of Kanoji Angre Lighthouse as a tourist Destination

    Mumbai Port trust

    1500.00

    6.

    Maharashtra

    2017-18

    Up-gradation /modernization to International Cruise terminal at Indira Dock, Mumbai.

    Mumbai Port Trust

    1250.00

    7.

    Goa

    2018-19

    Improvement of immigration facility and

    deepening of existing cruise berth at Mormougao

    Mormugao Port trust

    1316.40

    8.

    Kerala

    2018-19

    Developing infrastructure at Cochin Port Cruise Terminal.

    Cochin Trust Port

    120.79

    9.

    Kerala

    2018-19

    Creation of additional tourism facilities at the Cochin Port Trust Walkway

    Cochin Trust Port

    466.47

    10.

    Andhra Pradesh

    2018-19

    Construction of Cruise-cum-Coastal Cargo Terminal at  Channel berth area in Outer Harbour of Visakhapatnam Port

    Visakhapatnam Port Trust

    3850.00

    11.

    Kerala

    2019-20

    CFA for Development of Additional infrastructure in the new Cochin Port Trust Terminal

    Cochin Trust Port

    1029.70

    12.

    Goa

    2021-22

    Creation of facilities for International and Domestic Cruise Vessels at Mormugao Port, Goa by Mormugao Port Trust (MPT)

    Mormugao Port Trust

    5000.00

    13.

    Maharashtra

    2021-22

    Upgradation/ Moderni sation to International Cruise Terminal at Indira Dock, Mumbai Port Trust

    Mumbai Port Trust

    3750.00

    Total

    23929.06

     

    *******

    (Release ID: 2114401) Visitor Counter : 65

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI USA: NASA’s Curiosity Rover Detects Largest Organic Molecules Found on Mars

    Source: NASA

    Researchers analyzing pulverized rock onboard NASA’s Curiosity rover have found the largest organic compounds on the Red Planet to date. The finding, published Monday in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, suggests prebiotic chemistry may have advanced further on Mars than previously observed.
    Scientists probed an existing rock sample inside Curiosity’s Sample Analysis at Mars (SAM) mini-lab and found the molecules decane, undecane, and dodecane. These compounds, which are made up of 10, 11, and 12 carbons, respectively, are thought to be the fragments of fatty acids that were preserved in the sample. Fatty acids are among the organic molecules that on Earth are chemical building blocks of life.
    Living things produce fatty acids to help form cell membranes and perform various other functions. But fatty acids also can be made without life, through chemical reactions triggered by various geological processes, including the interaction of water with minerals in hydrothermal vents.
    While there’s no way to confirm the source of the molecules identified, finding them at all is exciting for Curiosity’s science team for a couple of reasons.
    Curiosity scientists had previously discovered small, simple organic molecules on Mars, but finding these larger compounds provides the first evidence that organic chemistry advanced toward the kind of complexity required for an origin of life on Mars.

    The new study also increases the chances that large organic molecules that can be made only in the presence of life, known as “biosignatures,” could be preserved on Mars, allaying concerns that such compounds get destroyed after tens of millions of years of exposure to intense radiation and oxidation.
    This finding bodes well for plans to bring samples from Mars to Earth to analyze them with the most sophisticated instruments available here, the scientists say.
    “Our study proves that, even today, by analyzing Mars samples we could detect chemical signatures of past life, if it ever existed on Mars,” said Caroline Freissinet, the lead study author and research scientist at the French National Centre for Scientific Research in the Laboratory for Atmospheres and Space Observations in Guyancourt, France
    In 2015, Freissinet co-led a team that, in a first, conclusively identified Martian organic molecules in the same sample that was used for the current study. Nicknamed “Cumberland,” the sample has been analyzed many times with SAM using different techniques.

    Curiosity drilled the Cumberland sample in May 2013 from an area in Mars’ Gale Crater called “Yellowknife Bay.” Scientists were so intrigued by Yellowknife Bay, which looked like an ancient lakebed, they sent the rover there before heading in the opposite direction to its primary destination of Mount Sharp, which rises from the floor of the crater.
    The detour was worth it: Cumberland turns out to be jam-packed with tantalizing chemical clues to Gale Crater’s 3.7-billion-year past. Scientists have previously found the sample to be rich in clay minerals, which form in water. It has abundant sulfur, which can help preserve organic molecules. Cumberland also has lots of nitrates, which on Earth are essential to the health of plants and animals, and methane made with a type of carbon that on Earth is associated with biological processes.
    Perhaps most important, scientists determined that Yellowknife Bay was indeed the site of an ancient lake, providing an environment that could concentrate organic molecules and preserve them in fine-grained sedimentary rock called mudstone.
    “There is evidence that liquid water existed in Gale Crater for millions of years and probably much longer, which means there was enough time for life-forming chemistry to happen in these crater-lake environments on Mars,” said Daniel Glavin, senior scientist for sample return at NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center in Greenbelt, Maryland, and a study co-author.

    [embedded content]

    The recent organic compounds discovery was a side effect of an unrelated experiment to probe Cumberland for signs of amino acids, which are the building blocks of proteins. After heating the sample twice in SAM’s oven and then measuring the mass of the molecules released, the team saw no evidence of amino acids. But they noticed that the sample released small amounts of decane, undecane, and dodecane.
    Because these compounds could have broken off from larger molecules during heating, scientists worked backward to figure out what structures they may have come from. They hypothesized these molecules were remnants of the fatty acids undecanoic acid, dodecanoic acid, and tridecanoic acid, respectively.
    The scientists tested their prediction in the lab, mixing undecanoic acid into a Mars-like clay and conducting a SAM-like experiment. After being heated, the undecanoic acid released decane, as predicted. The researchers then referenced experiments already published by other scientists to show that the undecane could have broken off from dodecanoic acid and dodecane from tridecanoic acid.
    The authors found an additional intriguing detail in their study related to the number of carbon atoms that make up the presumed fatty acids in the sample. The backbone of each fatty acid is a long, straight chain of 11 to 13 carbons, depending on the molecule. Notably, non-biological processes typically make shorter fatty acids, with less than 12 carbons.
    It’s possible that the Cumberland sample has longer-chain fatty acids, the scientists say, but SAM is not optimized to detect longer chains.
    Scientists say that, ultimately, there’s a limit to how much they can infer from molecule-hunting instruments that can be sent to Mars. “We are ready to take the next big step and bring Mars samples home to our labs to settle the debate about life on Mars,” said Glavin.This research was funded by NASA’s Mars Exploration Program. Curiosity’s Mars Science Laboratory mission is led by NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory in Southern California; JPL is managed by Caltech for NASA. SAM (Sample Analysis at Mars) was built and tested at NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center in Greenbelt, Maryland. CNES (the French Space Agency) funded and provided the gas chromatograph subsystem on SAM. Charles Malespin is SAM’s principal investigator.
    By Lonnie ShekhtmanNASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center, Greenbelt, Md.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Security Council Examines Ways to Strengthen United Nations Peacekeeping against New Threats

    Source: United Nations General Assembly and Security Council

    Delegates Debate ‘Christmas-Tree’ Add-on Mandates versus Focusing on Core Tasks

    The Security Council today debated ways to adapt United Nations peacekeeping to evolving threats with Member States emphasizing the need to partner with regional organizations and actively involve local communities, particularly women.  They also stressed the importance of aligning mandates with available resources, leveraging intelligence-led strategies and digital tools for data-driven decision-making, and avoiding overly broad “Christmas-tree mandates” that prolong operations and escalate costs.

    “Terror and extremist groups, organized crime, the weaponization of new technologies and the effects of climate change are all testing our capacities to respond,” United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres said during the Council’s day-long open debate focusing on the ability of United Nations peace operations to adjust to new realities on the ground.  These challenges along with more complex and deadly wars, he cautioned, “throw fuel on the fires of conflict”.

    He also highlighted a “persistent mismatch between mandates and available resources”, as well as growing divisions within Council itself.  To address this, he called for a tailored and collective approach to peace operations. Announcing a forthcoming United Nations peace operation review — mandated by Member States in the Pact for the Future, he said that this process will incorporate insights from the New Agenda for Peace and from the first comprehensive study of special political missions in the 80-year history of the United Nations.

    Peace operations, he emphasized, must engage early with host nations and local partners, guided by clear, achievable mandates and viable exit strategies.  “Today’s open debate provides a vital opportunity for the Council to share perspectives and ideas to inform the review process,” Mr. Guterres concluded.

    Cultural Shifts Required

    “The fact that peace operations are effective is one of the most verified findings in international relations literature,” said Jenna Russo, Director of Research at the International Peace Institute and Head of the Brian Urquhart Center for Peace Operations.  “Yet, there is often a dissonance between these findings and the lived experiences of those in conflict settings,” she added.

    Offering four recommendations, she first called for a stronger planning culture within the Secretariat.  Bureaucratic and political barriers have kept this culture of planning from taking root, she said, adding that the Organization should build the capacity to discern emerging trends, anticipate potential shifts and respond proactively.

    Secondly, she said, the Organization must embrace a “risk-tolerant culture around peace operations”, noting that “personnel are structurally disincentivized from trying new things and reporting what doesn’t work for fear that their budgets and jobs may suffer the consequences”.  She highlighted the need for a culture that creates space for trying and even failing, with the aim of learning and improving — “this culture must come from the top”.

    “The Secretariat should tell the Council what it needs to hear, not what it wants to hear,” she underscored as her third recommendation, citing the 2000 Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations.  Instead of the Secretariat pre-emptively lowering the bar on what is politically possible, she said, it should present a wide range of options and leave it to the Council to adjust the bar.

    Modular Approach — Building Blocks

    Her final recommendation was that the Council should consider the advantages and the risks of a modular approach to peace operations.  Mandated sets of activities like electoral support, human rights monitoring or security sector reform can be “treated like building blocks that can be scaled up or down over the lifespan of a mission”, she said.  This approach can promote more tailored responses and align mandates with available resources, but it comes with the risk that broader peacebuilding aspects “could fall by the wayside if the Council or host States view them as optional”, she added.

    In the ensuing open debate, speakers stressed the need to evolve with the times, underscored the importance of regional partnerships and called for a more people-centered approach that involves local communities, and specifically women, in peace efforts.

    Closer Cooperation with Regional Organizations

    “For millions, the blue flag and the blue helmets are symbols of hope,” said Lars Løkke Rasmussen, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Denmark and Council President for March, as he spoke in his national capacity.  However, just as conflicts and needs have evolved, so must the UN’s tools, he stressed, urging closer collaboration with regional and subregional organizations — “especially the African Union” — and the inclusion of women in peace processes.

    Zane Dangor, Director-General of the Department of International Relations and Cooperation of South Africa, said that deployments by regional and subregional organizations, such as the African Union and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), if authorized and supported by the UN, could off-set the limitations of the Organization’s peacekeeping operations.  Calling for the accelerated implementation of Council resolution 2719 (2023), he said the Council can also gain insights from the experiences of African peace operations that are often conducted in difficult conditions and with limited resources.

    Jiří Kozák, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic, emphasized that strong coordination with regional partners, such as the African Union and European Union, must be systematic, practical and based on the sharing of resources, information and best practices.  “Improved coordination will ensure stronger political and operational support,” he added.

    Similarly, Guyana’s representative highlighted the need for deeper collaboration with regional organizations and reiterated the calls of previous speakers who stressed that women must be present at all levels — from peacekeeping forces to peace negotiations.

    “Peace should be built from the ground up,” said Javier Martínez-Acha Vásquez, Panama’s Minister for Foreign Affairs.  Conflict-resolution mechanisms “are more likely to last when women are leaders and involved in the peacebuilding process”, he added.  Insun Kang, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea, called for a people-centered approach that respects host country priorities and national ownership.  “This approach views local populations as not just beneficiaries of peacekeeping efforts, but active participants,” she said, noting her country’s rice cultivation and vocational training initiatives in South Sudan.

    Noting that the Council has not mandated a new peacekeeping operation in 10 years, Syed Tariq Fatemi, Special Assistant to the Prime Minister of Pakistan, warned that the UN’s absence is being filled by “negative actors and soldiers of fortune”.  UN peacekeeping is cost effective, representing only 3 per cent of global military spending.  The Council must ensure it is properly funded and resourced.

    Accountability for Performance

    As the global leader of peacekeeping capacity-building, the United States aims to ensure that its programmes have measurable effects on the ground, said that country’s representative. “Robust accountability measures will enhance the effectiveness and efficiencies of UN peacekeeping missions,” she said, adding that accountability must incentivize positive performance and expedient consequences for performance failures.

    On that, Somalia’s delegate, pointing to Africa’s experience with peacekeeping operations, stressed that “success depends on two interlinked principles — clear strategic planning and operational adaptability”.

    Caution against ‘Christmas-Tree Mandates’

    Several speakers expressed concern about the overbroad mandates of UN peacekeeping missions, noting that these mandates often lead to prolonged missions in host countries, costing billions of dollars.  “The result is missions that are present in countries for decades and cost billions of dollars,” said the representative of the Russian Federation. Rather, she stressed that “the goal we need to be aiming for” is that, after a mandate is implemented, host States assume full responsibility for conflict prevention.

    “We must end the strange phenomenon where every mandate renewal leads to expansion,” said China’s representative, also rejecting the “unchecked growth of Christmas-tree mandates”.  He further underscored that the principles of consent, impartiality and non-use of force except in self-defence “should always be upheld as fundamental guidelines”.

    Similarly, Algeria’s delegate said: “We are witnessing, in some cases, what can be described as ‘Christmas-tree’ mandates, under which UN missions are tasked with an overwhelming number of responsibilities, thus hindering their ability to undertake focused and targeted engagements”.

    Slovenia’s delegate was among the speakers who stressed the need to enhance early warning and rapid response capabilities to address conflicts before they escalate.  “Missions must be proactive rather than reactive,” she said.  Greece’s delegate, echoing many other delegations, condemned attacks on peacekeepers and emphasized the need to ensure their absolute safety.

    Clear, Realistic Mandates, Use of Digital Tools 

    France’s delegate said that “peacekeeping is the heart” of the UN.  Peacekeeping missions “need to be part of a strategy, but in order for them to be successful, the mandate has to be based on clear, realistic and political objectives”, he added.  The representative of the United Kingdom said the UN needs to harness innovation, using data-driven decision-making, intelligence-led approaches and digital tools.  Peacekeepers must be trained on emerging threats, including cyberwarfare, disinformation campaigns and climate-related security risks.

    On the Secretary-General’s efforts to make the united Nations fit for purpose, Beate Meinl-Reisinger, Federal Minister for European and International Affairs of Austria, stated:  “Reform, yes; replace, no.”  Underlining the need for a “flexible toolbox of peace operations”, she stressed the importance of political solutions to the success of such operations.  “They can only keep peace where there is a peace to keep,” she observed.

    Over the past eight decades, the UN has deployed more than 120 peace operations in over 50 countries, and to a very large extent, these missions have helped prevent, manage and resolve conflicts, said the representative of Sierra Leone.  When his country was in the throes of a brutal civil war more than 20 years ago, the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) assisted in disarming more than 75,000 ex-combatants, restored State authority and oversaw the first post-conflict democratic elections.  “The Mission, at the time, was seen as a prototype for the UN’s new emphasis on peacebuilding and showed how a well-resourced and adaptable UN operation can support a country to rebuild, reconcile and reclaim its future,” he said.

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – International child abduction and implementation of the Brussels IIb Regulation – E-001054/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-001054/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Raphaël Glucksmann (S&D), Murielle Laurent (S&D), Emma Rafowicz (S&D)

    Despite the entry into force of the Brussels IIb Regulation in August 2022, the international abduction of European children remains a recurrent phenomenon, with more than a thousand cases a year. One very worrying case is that of Eva and Juliette Paris, which was investigated by the French judicial authorities.

    • 1.What is the Commission’s assessment at this stage of the implementation of the Brussels IIb Regulation by the Member States, in particular France?
    • 2.What action is the Commission taking to prevent and resolve cases of international abduction of European children and to ensure the implementation and enforcement of the Hague Convention and the Brussels IIb Regulation by the third countries concerned, including the United States?

    Submitted: 12.3.2025

    Last updated: 24 March 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on providing macro-financial assistance to the Arab Republic of Egypt – A10-0037/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    DRAFT EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTION

    on the proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on providing macro-financial assistance to the Arab Republic of Egypt

    (COM(2024)0461 – C10‑0009/2024 – 2024/0071(COD))

    (Ordinary legislative procedure: first reading)

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2024)0461),

     having regard to Article 294(2) and Article 212 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C10‑0009/2024),

     having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

     having regard to the budgetary assessment by the Committee on Budgets,

     having regard to Rule 60 of its Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Foreign Affairs,

     having regard to the report of the Committee on International Trade (A10-0037/2025),

    1. Adopts its position at first reading hereinafter set out;

    2. Calls on the Commission to refer the matter to Parliament again if it replaces, substantially amends or intends to substantially amend its proposal;

    3. Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments.

     

     

    Amendment  1

    Proposal for a decision

    Recital 1 a (new)

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

     

    (1a) This Decision has implications for the Union budget. Accordingly, the European Parliament’s Committee on Budgets adopted a budgetary assessment, which forms an integral part of Parliament’s mandate for negotiations.

    Amendment  2

    Proposal for a decision

    Recital 2 a (new)

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

     

    (2a) On 17 March 2024, Egypt and the European Union jointly decided to upgrade their relations to a strategic and comprehensive partnership, based on the values of equity and mutual respect and trust in order to strengthen their common stability, peace and prosperity.

    Amendment  3

     

    Proposal for a decision

    Recital 3

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (3) In line with the Partnership Priorities, the EU and Egypt are committed to ensuring accountability, the rule of law, the full respect of human rights, fundamental freedoms, promoting democracy, gender equality and equal opportunities as constitutional rights of all their citizens. These commitments contribute to the advancement of the partnership and to Egypt’s sustainable development and stability. The increased and constructive engagement between the EU and Egypt in the last period has opened the path to more meaningful dialogue on human rights related issues. The subcommittee on Political Matters, Human Rights and Democracy, International and Regional issues of December 2022 and the Association Committee of May 2023 provided the institutional platforms to exchange on an array of human rights issues, which the EU would like to continue and build on. The improvement of the human rights situation in Egypt will have a positive impact on EU-Egypt relations.

    (3) In line with the Partnership Priorities, the EU and Egypt are committed to ensuring accountability, the rule of law, the full respect of human rights, fundamental freedoms, promoting democracy, gender equality and equal opportunities as constitutional rights of all their citizens. These commitments contribute to the advancement of the partnership and to Egypt’s sustainable development, good governance and socio-economic stability. The increased and constructive engagement between the EU and Egypt in the last period has opened the path to more meaningful dialogue on human rights related issues. The subcommittee on Political Matters, Human Rights and Democracy, International and Regional issues of December 2022 and the Association Committee of May 2023 provided the institutional platforms to exchange on an array of human rights issues, which the EU would like to continue and build on. The steady improvement of the human rights situation and women’s rights and fundamental freedoms due to an active, coherent and proactive policy in that area in Egypt will have a positive impact on EU-Egypt relations.

    Amendment  4

    Proposal for a decision

    Recital 3 a (new)

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

     

    (3a) Egypt’s economic and financial situation has been marked by several macroeconomic adjustment programmes implemented under the aegis of the IMF in exchange for credit facilities (USD 12 billion from 2016 to 2019 and USD 3 billion in 2022, rising to USD 8 billion in March 2024);

    Amendment  5

     

    Proposal for a decision

    Recital 5

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (5) The EU recognises Egypt’s key role for regional security and stability. Terrorism, organised crime and conflicts are common threats against our security and the social fabric of nations across both sides of the Mediterranean. Therefore, the EU and Egypt have a common interest in strengthening cooperation highlighted in the Partnership Priorities, in full compliance with international law, including human rights and international humanitarian law.

    (5) The EU recognises Egypt’s key role for regional security and stability. Terrorism, organised crime, such as human trafficking, irregular migration, and conflicts, are common threats against our security and the social fabric of nations across both sides of the Mediterranean. Similarly, energy is also one of the most pressing challenges facing countries on both sides of the Mediterranean. The Energy Cooperation between the Union and Egypt in the Eastern Mediterranean could not only offer a source of economic prosperity for the region but also strengthen energy security for the Union by diversifying energy supplies and encouraging regional collaboration. In that respect, the East Mediterranean Gas Forum serves as a platform of positive regional cooperation. Therefore, the EU and Egypt have a common interest in strengthening cooperation highlighted in the Partnership Priorities, in full compliance with international law, including the International Law of the Sea, human rights and international humanitarian law.

    Amendment  6

     

    Proposal for a decision

    Recital 6

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (6) Recalling the geo-political challenges, such as the consequences of Hamas terrorist attacks across Israel on 7 October 2023 as well as the conflict in Sudan, and the strategic importance of Egypt as the largest country in the region and a pillar of stability for the whole Middle East, the Union is embarking on concluding a Strategic and Comprehensive partnership with Egypt as outlined in the Joint Declaration.

    (6) Recalling the global and regional geo-political challenges, such as the humanitarian crisis in Gaza, resulting from the aftermath of the Hamas terrorist attacks across Israel on 7 October 2023, the escalating tensions in the Horn of Africa and the safety of navigation in the Red Sea and the Suez Canal, as well as migratory pressure from the conflict in Sudan, uncertainties in Syria, the instability in Libya, Egypt’s responsibilities as a host to large numbers of refugees and migrants and the strategic importance of Egypt as the largest country in the region and a pillar of stability for the whole Middle East, the Union has embarked on a Strategic and Comprehensive partnership with Egypt as outlined in the Joint Declaration.

    Amendment  7

     

    Proposal for a decision

    Recital 7

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (7) The objective of the Strategic and Comprehensive Partnership with Egypt is to elevate the EU-Egypt political relations to a strategic partnership and enable Egypt to fulfil its key role of providing stability in the region. The partnership aims to contribute to support Egypt’s macroeconomic resilience and enable the implementation of ambitious socio-economic reforms in a manner that complements and reinforces the reform process foreseen under the IMF programme for Egypt. As outlined in the Joint Declaration, the partnership will address a wide set of policy measures clustered across six pillars of intervention, namely: political relations; economic stability; investment and trade; migration; security and law enforcement cooperation; demography and human capital.

    (7) The objective of the Strategic and Comprehensive Partnership with Egypt is to elevate the EU-Egypt political relations to a strategic partnership and enable Egypt to fulfil its key role of providing stability in the region, the Middle East and North Africa. The partnership aims to contribute to support Egypt’s macroeconomic resilience and enable the implementation of ambitious socio-economic reforms in a manner that complements and reinforces the reform process foreseen under the IMF programme for Egypt. As outlined in the Joint Declaration, the partnership will address a wide set of policy measures clustered across six pillars of intervention, namely: political relations; economic stability; investment and trade; irregular migration and mobility in respect of human rights; security and law enforcement cooperation; demography and human capital. Such Strategic and Comprehensive Partnership should be developed in line with initiatives at Union and Member State level such as the Global Gateway and the Mattei Plan for Africa.

    Amendment  8

     

    Proposal for a decision

    Recital 8

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (8) Underpinning the partnership will be a financial package of EUR 7.4 billion consisting of short- and longer-term support for the necessary macro-fiscal and socio-economic reform agenda, as well as increased amounts available to support investments in Egypt and targeted support for the implementation of the different strategic priorities. Part of the support package is the EU MFA package of up to EUR 5 billion in loans, composed of two MFA operations, one short-term for up to EUR 1 billion and a regular, more medium-term one for up to EUR 4 billion, financial instruments, such as guarantees and blending instruments, aimed at mobilising public and private investments with the objective of generating substantial new investments. This will be complemented by programmes to support specific priorities under the Strategic and Comprehensive Partnership through individual projects and technical assistance implemented under the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument2 .

    (8) Underpinning the partnership is a financial package of EUR 7.4 billion consisting of short- and longer-term support for the necessary macro-fiscal and socio-economic reform agenda, as well as increased amounts available to support investments in Egypt and targeted support for the implementation of the different strategic priorities, particularly in terms of irregular migration and renewable energy. Part of the support package is the EU MFA package of up to EUR 5 billion in concessional loans, composed of two MFA operations, one short-term for up to EUR 1 billion and a regular, more medium-term one for up to EUR 4 billion, financial instruments, such as guarantees and blending instruments, aimed at mobilising public and private investments that benefit the majority of Egyptians with the objective of generating substantial new investments. This will be complemented by programmes to support specific priorities under the Strategic and Comprehensive Partnership through individual projects and technical assistance implemented under the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument2.

    __________________

    __________________

    2 Established by Regulation (EU) 2021/947 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 June 2021 establishing the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe, amending and repealing Decision No 466/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU) 2017/1601 and Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 480/2009 (OJ L 209, 14.6.2021, p. 1)

    2 Established by Regulation (EU) 2021/947 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 June 2021 establishing the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe, amending and repealing Decision No 466/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU) 2017/1601 and Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 480/2009 (OJ L 209, 14.6.2021, p. 1)

    Amendment  9

     

    Proposal for a decision

    Recital 9

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (9) Egypt’s macro-fiscal situation has faced significant challenges and deteriorated substantially over recent months, as external pressures have intensified and public debt has increased further, with substantial downside risks to the economic outlook persisting. The repercussions of Russia’s war on Ukraine and of Hamas terrorist attacks against Israel have led to protracted capital outflows and lower foreign currency receipts, notably due to sharply falling income from tourism and Suez Canal proceeds. This is particularly challenging amid Egypt’s difficult fiscal situation, which is characterised by constant fiscal deficits and high and growing debt to GDP ratios.

    (9) Egypt’s macro-fiscal situation has faced significant challenges and deteriorated substantially over recent months, as external pressures have intensified and public debt has increased further, with substantial downside risks to the economic outlook persisting. The repercussions of Russia’s war on Ukraine and the geopolitical tensions and conflicts in the Middle East have led to protracted capital outflows and lower foreign currency receipts, notably due to sharply falling income from tourism, Suez Canal proceeds and gas production and loss of confidence among foreign investors. This is particularly challenging amid Egypt’s difficult fiscal situation, which is characterised by constant fiscal deficits and high and growing debt to GDP ratios. Despite that difficult external context, in 2024 Egypt was able to implement reforms, such as the unification of exchange rates and making progress in tightening monetary policy, to help preserve macroeconomic stability.

    Amendment  10

    Proposal for a decision

    Recital 12

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (12) Egypt re-engaged with the IMF in early 2024 and reached a staff-level agreement on 6 March 2024 on a revamped Extended Fund Facility programme scaled up to USD 8 billion. The new programme is expected to be adopted by IMF Executive Board decision in March 2024 and aims to address the areas of 1) credible exchange rate flexibility, 2) sustainable tightening of monetary policy, 3) fiscal consolidation to preserve debt sustainability, 4) a new framework to rein in infrastructure spending, 5) providing adequate levels of social spending to protect vulnerable groups, and 6) implementation of the State Ownership Policy and reforms to level the playing field. Together with the staff level agreement’s signature, Egypt also enacted a flexibilisation of the exchange rate, and raised the central bank’s key policy rate by a sizeable 600 basis points, in line with the IMF programme’s priorities.

    (12) Egypt re-engaged with the IMF in early 2024 and reached a staff-level agreement on 6 March 2024 on a revamped Extended Fund Facility programme scaled up to USD 8 billion. Negotiations at expert level on the fourth revision of Egypt’s economic reform programme were concluded in December 2024. The new programme aims to address the areas of 1) credible exchange rate flexibility, 2) sustainable tightening of monetary policy, 3) fiscal consolidation to preserve debt sustainability, 4) a new framework to rein in infrastructure spending, 5) providing adequate levels of social spending to protect vulnerable groups from the cost of living and energy price rises, and 6) implementation of the State Ownership Policy and reforms to level the playing field by promoting the development of the private sector in the economy. Together with the staff level agreement’s signature, Egypt also enacted a flexibilisation of the exchange rate, and raised the central bank’s key policy rate by a sizeable 600 basis points, in line with the IMF programme’s priorities.

    Amendment  11

    Proposal for a decision

    Recital 16

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (16) Given that there is still a significant residual external financing gap in Egypt’s balance of payments over and above the resources provided by the IMF and other multilateral institutions, the Union macro-financial assistance to be provided to Egypt is, under the current exceptional circumstances, considered to be an appropriate response to Egypt’s request for support to the economic stabilisation, in conjunction with the IMF programme. The Union’s macro-financial assistance package, including the MFA of up to EUR 4 billion under this proposal, would support the economic stabilisation and the structural reform agenda of Egypt, supplementing resources made available under the IMF’s financial arrangement.

    (16) Given that there is still a significant residual external financing gap in Egypt’s balance of payments over and above the resources provided by the IMF and other multilateral institutions and regional partners, the Union macro-financial assistance to be provided to Egypt is, under the current exceptional circumstances, considered to be an appropriate response to Egypt’s request for support to the economic stabilisation, in conjunction with the IMF programme. The Union’s macro-financial assistance package, including the MFA of up to EUR 4 billion under this proposal, would support the economic stabilisation and the structural reform agenda of Egypt, supplementing resources made available under the IMF’s financial arrangement.

    Amendment  12

     

    Proposal for a decision

    Recital 19

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (19) The Commission should ensure that the Union’s macro-financial assistance is legally and substantially in line with the key principles, objectives and measures taken within the different areas of external action and with other relevant Union policies.

    (19) The Commission should ensure that the Union’s macro-financial assistance is legally and substantially in line with the key principles, objectives and measures taken within the different areas of external action and with other relevant Union policies, including those relating to democracy, human rights and rule of law, in line with Article 2 of the EU-Egypt Association Agreement.

    Amendment  13

     

    Proposal for a decision

    Recital 22

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (22) A pre-condition for granting the Union’s macro-financial assistance to Egypt should be that the country continues to make concrete and credible steps towards respecting effective democratic mechanisms – including a multi-party parliamentary system – and the rule of law, and guarantees respect for human rights. In addition, the specific objectives of the Union’s macro-financial assistance should strengthen the efficiency, transparency and accountability of the public finance management systems, the governance and supervision of the financial sector in Egypt and promote structural reforms aimed at supporting sustainable and inclusive growth, decent employment creation and fiscal consolidation. The fulfillment of the pre-condition and the achievement of the specific objectives should be regularly monitored by the Commission services and the European External Action Service.

    (22) Macro-financial assistance should remain an economic instrument. However, a pre-condition for granting the Union’s macro-financial assistance to Egypt should be that the country continues to make concrete, credible and tangible steps towards respecting and strengthening effective democratic mechanisms – including a multi-party parliamentary system – and the rule of law, and guaranteeing respect for human rights. In addition, the specific objectives of the Union’s macro-financial assistance should strengthen the efficiency, transparency and accountability of the public finance management systems, the governance and supervision of the financial sector in Egypt and promote structural reforms aimed at supporting sustainable and inclusive growth, decent employment creation and fiscal consolidation. The fulfillment of the pre-condition and the achievement of the specific objectives should be regularly monitored by the Commission services and the European External Action Service.

    Amendment  14

    Proposal for a decision

    Recital 23

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (23) In order to ensure that the Union’s financial interests linked to the Union’s macro-financial assistance are protected efficiently, Egypt should take appropriate measures relating to the prevention of, and fight against, fraud, corruption and any other irregularities linked to the assistance. In addition, a loan agreement to be concluded between the Commission and the Egyptian authorities should contain provisions authorising European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) to carry out investigations, including on-the-spot checks and inspections, in accordance with the provisions and procedures laid down in Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council3 and Council Regulation (Euratom, EC) No 2185/964 , the Commission and the Court of Auditors to carry out audits and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office to exercise its competences with regard to the provision of the Union’s macro-financial assistance during and after its availability period.

    (23) It is essential to underline that Egypt has to meet the necessary economic pre-condition for eligibility. Egypt has demonstrated its solvency and financial stability, which have been verified by the Commission. However, in order to ensure that the Union’s financial interests linked to the Union’s macro-financial assistance are protected efficiently. Egypt should take appropriate measures relating to the prevention of, and fight against, fraud, corruption and any other irregularities linked to the assistance. In addition, a loan agreement to be concluded between the Commission and the Egyptian authorities should contain provisions authorising European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) to carry out investigations, including on-the-spot checks and inspections, in accordance with the provisions and procedures laid down in Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council3 and Council Regulation (Euratom, EC) No 2185/964 , the Commission and the Court of Auditors to carry out audits and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office to exercise its competences with regard to the provision of the Union’s macro-financial assistance during and after its availability period.

    __________________

    __________________

    3 Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 September 2013 concerning investigations conducted by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation (Euratom) No 1074/1999 (OJ L 248, 18.9.2013, p. 1).

    3 Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 September 2013 concerning investigations conducted by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation (Euratom) No 1074/1999 (OJ L 248, 18.9.2013, p. 1).

    4 Council Regulation (Euratom, EC) No 2185/96 of 11 November 1996 concerning on-the-spot checks and inspections carried out by the Commission in order to protect the European Communities’ financial interests against fraud and other irregularities (OJ L 292, 15.11.1996, p. 2).

    4 Council Regulation (Euratom, EC) No 2185/96 of 11 November 1996 concerning on-the-spot checks and inspections carried out by the Commission in order to protect the European Communities’ financial interests against fraud and other irregularities (OJ L 292, 15.11.1996, p. 2).

    Amendment  15

     

    Proposal for a decision

    Recital 26

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (26) The Union’s macro-financial assistance should be managed by the Commission. In order to ensure that the European Parliament and the Council are able to follow the implementation of this Decision, the Commission should regularly inform them of developments relating to the assistance and provide them with relevant documents.

    (26) The Union’s macro-financial assistance should be managed by the Commission. In order to ensure that the European Parliament and the Council are able to follow the implementation of this Decision, the Commission should regularly inform them with an annual report of developments relating to the assistance and on respect for effective democratic mechanisms, as per the pre-conditions referred to in this Decision, and provide them with relevant documents.

    Amendment  16

     

    Proposal for a decision

    Recital 28

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (28) The Union’s macro-financial assistance should be subject to economic policy conditions, to be laid down in a Memorandum of Understanding. In order to ensure uniform conditions of implementation and for reasons of efficiency, the Commission should be empowered to negotiate such conditions with the Egyptian authorities under the supervision of the committee of representatives of the Member States in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011. Under that Regulation, the advisory procedure should, as a general rule, apply in all cases other than as provided for in that Regulation. Considering the potentially important impact of assistance of more than EUR 90 million, it is appropriate that the examination procedure be used for operations above that threshold. Considering the amount of the Union’s macro-financial assistance to Egypt, the examination procedure should apply to the adoption of the Memorandum of Understanding, and to any reduction, suspension or cancellation of the assistance.

    (28) The Union’s macro-financial assistance should be subject to sustainable economic policy reforms, to be laid down in a Memorandum of Understanding. In order to ensure uniform conditions of implementation and for reasons of efficiency, the Commission should be empowered to negotiate such conditions with the Egyptian authorities under the supervision of the committee of representatives of the Member States in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011. Under that Regulation, the advisory procedure should, as a general rule, apply in all cases other than as provided for in that Regulation. Considering the potentially important impact of assistance of more than EUR 90 million, it is appropriate that the examination procedure be used for operations above that threshold. Considering the amount of the Union’s macro-financial assistance to Egypt, the examination procedure should apply to the adoption of the Memorandum of Understanding, and to any reduction, suspension or cancellation of the assistance.

    Amendment  17

     

    Proposal for a decision

    Article 1 – paragraph 1

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    1. The Union shall make macro-financial assistance of a maximum amount of up to EUR 4 billion available to Egypt (“the Union’s macro-financial assistance”), with a view to supporting Egypt’s economic stabilisation and a substantive reform agenda. The release of the Union’s macro-financial assistance is subject to the approval of the Union budget for the relevant year by the European Parliament and the Council. The assistance shall contribute to covering Egypt’s balance of payments needs as identified in the IMF programme.

    1. The Union shall make macro-financial assistance in the form of concessional loans of a maximum amount of up to EUR 4 billion available to Egypt (“the Union’s macro-financial assistance”), with a view to supporting Egypt’s socio-economic stabilisation and a substantive structural reform agenda, as well as its responsibility to mitigate the effects of irregular migration and managing migratory flows. The release of the Union’s macro-financial assistance is subject to the approval of the Union budget for the relevant year by the European Parliament and the Council. The assistance shall contribute to covering Egypt’s balance of payments needs as identified in the IMF programme.

    Amendment  18

    Proposal for a decision

    Article 1 – paragraph 3 a (new)

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

     

    3a. Macro-financial assistance may, as far as possible, contribute to the Union’s growth and economic resilience.

    Amendment  19

     

    Proposal for a decision

    Article 2 – paragraph 1

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    1. A pre-condition for granting the Union’s macro-financial assistance shall be that Egypt continues to make concrete and credible steps towards respecting effective democratic mechanisms – including a multi-party parliamentary system – and the rule of law, and guarantees respect for human rights.

    1. A pre-condition for granting the Union’s macro-financial assistance shall be that Egypt continues to make concrete and credible steps towards respecting and strengthening effective democratic mechanisms – including a multi-party parliamentary system – and the rule of law, and continues to make efforts in order to guarantee respect for human rights.

    Amendment  20

     

    Proposal for a decision

    Article 2 – paragraph 2

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    2. The Commission services and the European External Action Service shall monitor the fulfilment of this pre-condition throughout the life-cycle of the Union’s macro-financial assistance.

    2. The Commission services and the European External Action Service shall monitor the fulfilment of this pre-condition throughout the life-cycle of the Union’s macro-financial assistance and report, regularly and in writing, to the European Parliament and the Council on the fulfilment of the economic policy and financial conditions set out in the Memorandum of Understanding.

    Amendment  21

    Proposal for a decision

    Article 3 – paragraph 1

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    1. The Commission, in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 7(2), shall agree with the Egyptian authorities on clearly defined economic policy and financial conditions, focusing on structural reforms and sound public finances, to which the Union’s macro-financial assistance is to be subject, to be laid down in a Memorandum of Understanding (“the Memorandum of Understanding”) which shall include a timeframe for the achievement of those reforms. The economic policy and financial conditions set out in the Memorandum of Understanding shall be consistent with the agreements or understandings referred to in Article 1(3), including the macroeconomic adjustment and structural reform programmes implemented by Egypt with the support of the IMF.

    1. The Commission, in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 7(2), shall agree with the Egyptian authorities on clearly defined economic policy and financial conditions, focusing on structural reforms, such as the new criminal procedure reform, and sound public finances, to which the Union’s macro-financial assistance is to be subject, to be laid down in a Memorandum of Understanding (“the Memorandum of Understanding”) which shall include a timeframe for the achievement of those reforms. The economic policy and financial conditions set out in the Memorandum of Understanding shall be consistent with the agreements or understandings referred to in Article 1(3), including the macroeconomic adjustment and structural reform programmes implemented by Egypt with the support of the IMF.

    Amendment  22

     

    Proposal for a decision

    Article 3 – paragraph 2

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    2. The conditions referred to in paragraph 1 shall aim, in particular, at enhancing the efficiency, transparency and accountability of the public finance management systems in Egypt, including for the use of the Union’s macro-financial assistance. Progress in mutual market opening, the development of rules-based and fair trade, and other priorities in the context of the Union’s external policy shall also be duly taken into account when designing the policy measures. Progress in attaining those objectives shall be regularly monitored by the Commission.

    2. The economic policy and financial conditions referred to in paragraph 1 shall aim, in particular, at enhancing the efficiency, transparency and accountability of the public finance management systems in Egypt, including for the use of the Union’s macro-financial assistance. Progress in mutual market opening, including for SMEs, the development of rules-based and fair trade, sustainable development, good governance and other priorities in the context of the Union’s external policy shall also be duly taken into account when designing the policy measures. Progress in attaining those objectives shall be regularly monitored by the Commission.

    Amendment  23

    Proposal for a decision

    Article 4 – paragraph 4

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    4. Where the conditions in paragraph 3 are not met, the Commission shall temporarily suspend or cancel the disbursement of the Union’s macro-financial assistance. In such cases, it shall inform the European Parliament and the Council of the reasons for that suspension or cancellation.

    4. Where the conditions in paragraph 3 are not met, the Commission shall temporarily suspend or cancel the disbursement of the Union’s macro-financial assistance. In such cases, it shall inform the European Parliament and the Council without delay of the reasons for that suspension or cancellation.

    Amendment  24

    Proposal for a decision

    Article 5 – paragraph 1

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (1) In order to finance the support under the macro-financial assistance in the form of loans, the Commission shall be empowered, on behalf of the Union, to borrow the necessary funds on the capital markets or from financial institutions in accordance with Article 220a of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046.

    1. In order to finance the support under the macro-financial assistance in the form of loans, the Commission shall be empowered, on behalf of the Union, to borrow the necessary funds on the capital markets or from financial institutions in accordance with Article 223 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509.

     

    Amendment  25

    Proposal for a decision

    Article 5 – paragraph 2

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (2) The Commission shall enter into a loan agreement with Egypt in respect of the amount referred to in Article 1. The detailed terms of the support under the MFA in the form of loans shall be laid down in a loan agreement in accordance with Article 220 of the Financial Regulation, to be concluded between the Commission and the Egyptian authorities. The loan agreement shall lay down the availability period and the detailed terms of the support under the macro-financial assistance in the form of loans, including in relation to the internal control systems. The loans shall be granted at terms that allow Egypt to repay the loan over a long period, including a possible grace period. The maximum duration of the loans shall be 35 years. The Commission shall inform the European Parliament and the Council of developments in the operations referred to in paragraph 3.

    2. The Commission shall enter into a loan agreement with Egypt in respect of the amount referred to in Article 1. The detailed terms of the support under the MFA in the form of loans shall be laid down in a loan agreement in accordance with Article 223 of the Financial Regulation, to be concluded between the Commission and the Egyptian authorities. The loan agreement shall lay down the availability period and the detailed terms of the support under the macro-financial assistance in the form of loans, including in relation to the internal control systems. Egypt shall reimburse the loan, which shall be granted at terms that allow its repayment over a long period, including, after a formal notification to the European Parliament and the Council, a possible grace period. The maximum duration of the loans shall be 35 years. The Commission shall inform the European Parliament and the Council of developments in the operations referred to in paragraph 3.

    Amendment  26

    Proposal for a decision

    Article 6 – paragraph 1

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    1. The Union’s macro-financial assistance shall be implemented in accordance with Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council7.

    1. The Union’s macro-financial assistance shall be implemented in accordance with Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council7.

    _________________

    _________________

    7 Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union and repealing Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 966/2012 (OJ L 193, 30.07.2018, p. 1).

    7 Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (OJ L, 2024/2509, 26.9.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj).

    Amendment  27

    Proposal for a decision

    Article 8 – paragraph 1 – point b

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (b) assess the economic situation and prospects of Egypt, as well as progress made in implementing the policy measures referred to in Article 3(1);

    (b) assess the economic situation and prospects of Egypt, as well as progress made in implementing the policy measures referred to in Article 2 and Article 3(1);

    Amendment  28

    Proposal for a decision

    Article 8 – paragraph 1 – point c

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (c) indicate the connection between the economic policy reform measures laid down in the Memorandum of Understanding, Egypt’s on-going economic and fiscal performance and the Commission’s decisions to release the instalments of the Union’s macro-financial assistance.

    (c) indicate the connection between Egypt’s economic policy reforms under the Memorandum of Understanding, its fiscal performance, and the release of Union macro-financial assistance, while outlining steps taken towards democratic mechanisms, the rule of law and human rights.

     

     

    EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

    Political dialogue between Egypt and the EU was suspended after the revolution in 2011, and remained frozen through 2015. However, following Sisi’s election as president in May 2014, a rapprochement between Europe and Egypt gradually began to take place. The stability of the country became defining characteristics of European policy towards the Egypt. In 2024 the European Union (‘EU’) and Egypt have agreed to deepen their relationship and develop a strategic and comprehensive partnership for shared prosperity, stability and security, based on joint interest and mutual trust and building on the already existing positive agenda in EU-Egypt relations. The Strategic and Comprehensive Partnership covers specific areas of cooperation outlined in the Joint Declaration, clustered across six pillars of intervention, namely: political relations; economic stability; investment and trade; migration; security and law enforcement cooperation; demography and human capital.

    The partnership is based on a financial package consisting of short- and longer-term support for the necessary macro-fiscal and socio-economic reform agenda, as well as increased amounts available to support investments in Egypt and targeted support for the implementation of the different strategic priorities.

    Given Egypt’s critical economic and financial situation and Egypt’s role as an important stabilising factor amid geopolitical tensions in an increasingly volatile region, the Commission proposed on 15 March 2024 to support Egypt with macro-financial assistance (‘MFA’) of up to EUR 5 billion in loans as part of the EUR 7.4 billion financial package, divided into a short-term MFA operation of up to EUR 1 billion to be disbursed in one instalment, and a regular MFA operation of up to EUR 4 billion to be disbursed in three instalments.

    The short-term MFA was agreed without involvement of the European Parliament for urgency reasons. The rapporteur highlights that this can only be an exception and European Parliament should not be bypassed in the future.

    The amount of the proposed two new MFA operations corresponds to 56.7% of the estimated residual financing gap for the period FY24/25-FY26/27. This is consistent with standard practices on burden-sharing for MFA operations (for a country with an Association Agreement, the upper limit would be 60% according to the Council conclusions of 8 October 2002), taking into account the assistance pledged to Egypt by other bilateral and multilateral donors.

    The rapporteur would like to point out that the EU’s cooperation with Egypt does not begin with this MFA which is just a piece of the puzzle and in fact consequence of a longstanding cooperation with Egypt on human rights and security highlighted by the Association Agreement/Euro-Mediterranean Agreement (2004), the EU’s new Agenda for the Mediterranean (2021), the Partnership Priorities (2022) and the Joint Declaration launching a new Strategic and Comprehensive partnership (2024). Moreover, Egypt is a strategic, economic, military and geopolitical partner of the EU and the EU is the leading investor in Egypt.

    Given the instability in the region, Egypt remains a stable partner that engages in constructive dialogue with its partners. The EU need allies like that in the Middle East, and we need to emphasise their importance.

    But Egypt is also hit by a series of external shocks.

    A migratory shock first and foremost, with almost 10 million migrants and 800 000 registered refugees. Egypt is also committed to providing access to education for children, access to health services, help in finding housing and help in finding employment, with the support of NGOs. These commitments, if they are to be carried out properly, come at a cost.

    A geopolitical shock with the uncertainty of developments in Israel / Palestine and Syria.

    An economic shock, because Egypt, like many other countries, is seeing the cost of debt repayment and civil service salaries rise, thus limiting investment capacity.

    This MFA is based on strict pre-conditions requiring Egypt to continue to make concrete and credible steps towards democratic mechanism, rule of law and human rights. The rapporteur believes that those pre-conditions embedded in the long-term cooperation with Egypt will lead to reforms and long-term improvements in the country.

    Moreover, it is important to underline that Egypt already made big improvements in several areas.

    Firstly, on human rights, with a major plan launched in 2021 underlining the country’s commitment to this path. Some may feel that things are not moving fast enough, but it is hard to deny that the country is on the right track.

    Then there is the question of the place of women in society, which is very often a thermometer of democracy in a country. Wearing the veil is not compulsory. Women have access to public jobs and elected office (27% of women elected to the House, 13% to the Senate). Although Egyptian society is seen as patriarchal, the position of women has changed considerably in recent years.

    This is a financial instrument designed to support our partner in the face of the challenges it faces, but also to help it pursue change. The European Parliament will be closely monitoring progress and the rapporteur is asking the Commission to keep the European Parliament duly informed at all stages of the process. After all, the MFA is a loan and the grants are subject to reimbursement.

    To conclude the rapporteur would like to highlight that the MFA is an emergency instrument that has to be granted as soon as possible. The rapporteur is convinced that the MFA will be an effective incentive for – political and financial reforms in the country that will ensure a sustainable partnership between the EU and Egypt.

     

     

    ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    Pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure, the rapporteur declares that she received input from the following entities or persons in the preparation of the report, prior to the adoption thereof in committee:

    Entity and/or person

    European Commission – DG ECFIN

    European Commission – DG NEAR

    EEAS

    Embassy of Egypt

    Members of the Egyptian Parliament

    Amnesty International

    Human Rights Watch

    The list above is drawn up under the exclusive responsibility of the rapporteur.

    Where natural persons are identified in the list by their name, by their function or by both, the rapporteur declares that she has submitted to the concerned natural persons the European Parliament’s Data Protection Notice No 484 (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/data-protect/index.do), which sets out the conditions applicable to the processing of their personal data and the rights linked to that processing.

     

     

    MINORITY POSITION

    Pursuant to Rule 56(4) of the Rules of Procedure

    Vicent Marzà Ibáñez (Greens/EFA)

    On behalf of the Greens/EFA group, I would like to express our opposition to the fact that the European Commission has treated Egypt differently from other countries that receive Macro-Financial Assistance (MFA) from the EU.

    Following an agreement between the Council and Parliament, all MFAs should, as a pre-condition, respect human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. However, the Commission chose not to adhere to this policy when EC President Ursula von der Leyen announced a package of €7.4 billion in support for Egypt in March 2024, including €5 billion in Macro-Financial Assistance in the form of loans.

    We support providing Egypt with macro-financial assistance as a means to improve the living conditions of the Egyptian people, to reduce poverty and inequalities as well as to promote human rights. Our group has previously supported providing macro-financial assistance to alleviate financial burdens for countries in difficulty, while also promoting democratic values and human rights worldwide. However, the Commission must respect the agreements made by Parliament and the Council and act in line with the principles enshrined in the EU Treaties regarding external action.

     

     

    BUDGETARY ASSESSMENT OF THE COMMITTEE ON BUDGETS (29.1.2025)

    for the Committee on International Trade

    on the proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on providing macro-financial assistance to the Arab Republic of Egypt

    (COM(2024)0461 – C10‑0009/2024 – 2024/0071(COD))

    Rapporteur for budgetary assessment: Matjaž Nemec

     

    The Committee on Budgets has carried out a budgetary assessment of the proposal under Rule 58 of the Rules of Procedure and has reached the following conclusions:

     having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union[1] (Financial Regulation),

     having regard to Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 of 17 December 2020 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027[2],

     having regard to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 16 December 2020 between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission (IIA) on budgetary discipline, on cooperation in budgetary matters and on sound financial management, as well as on new own resources, including a roadmap towards the introduction of new own resources[3],

    A. whereas Egypt continues to face sizeable and unmet financing needs, with an external financing gap estimated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) programme at around USD 17.7 billion for 2024-2027, requiring substantial international support to maintain economic stability and implement crucial reforms;

    B. whereas recently, Egypt’s macro-fiscal situation has deteriorated noticeably, with intensified external pressures and increased debt, reflecting both domestic challenges and external shocks, including the repercussions of Russia’s war against Ukraine and regional instability;

    C. whereas the destructive and ongoing conflict in Gaza and the attacks in the Red Sea have severely impacted Egypt’s key sources of foreign currency earnings, particularly tourism revenues and Suez Canal proceeds, while persistent capital outflows and lower services exports have further strained the country’s external position; whereas Egypt’s socio-economic situation, including poverty rates and the Human Development Index, are also expected to be negatively impacted[4];

    D. whereas the severe deterioration of external accounts and the strategic importance of regional stability conditionally justify this comprehensive support package, while stressing the need for the EU to work towards a lasting long-term peace solution in the Middle East, which will help alleviate the reasons behind Egypt’s financial struggles;

    E. whereas Egypt’s public debt burden had increased substantially to 95.9 % of GDP at the end of the 2022/2023 fiscal year, up from 88.5 % the previous fiscal year, reaching its highest level since 2017 and raising concerns about long-term debt sustainability;

    F. whereas Egypt’s real GDP growth declined to 2.4 % in the 2023/2024 fiscal year due to inflation and external pressures, with food price inflation remaining a strain, especially on vulnerable households;

    G. whereas all major rating agencies have downgraded Egypt’s sovereign credit ratings to below-investment grade following the outbreak of the conflict in Gaza, reflecting increased regional risks and deteriorating humanitarian and economic conditions; whereas this has further complicated the country’s access to international financial markets;

    H. whereas the proposed macro-financial assistance (MFA) of up to EUR 4 billion would help Egypt address its external financing needs while supporting the implementation of structural reforms aimed at improving the macroeconomic situation, strengthening economic governance and transparency, and enhancing conditions for sustainable and inclusive growth;

    I. whereas on 12 April 2024, the Council adopted Decision (EU) 2024/1144 providing EUR 1 billion in short-term macro-financial assistance to the Arab Republic of Egypt[5], pursuant to the urgency procedure provided under Article 213 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), bypassing Parliament entirely; whereas the Commission adopted a decision on 20 December 2024 to release this single instalment to Egypt;

    J. whereas the IMF has confirmed Egypt’s implementation of key reforms that have contributed to preserving macroeconomic stability despite the challenging environment;

    K. whereas the short-term macro-financial assistance was subject to conditions set out in the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) agreed on and signed by the Commission and the Egyptian authorities on 29 June 2024, including the implementation of economic reforms, concrete and credible steps towards respecting democratic principles, and an on-track IMF programme; whereas the Commission and the European External Action Service undertook a review mission to Cairo in October 2024 and subsequently evaluated the Egyptian authorities’ written compliance reporting, with an overall positive assessment of Egypt’s progress in fulfilling these conditions;

    L. whereas Parliament, as one arm of the EU’s budgetary authority, was not involved in the negotiation and drafting of the MoU, which sets out the structural reform measures associated with the proposed MFA operation, including aspects of timing and sequencing for the disbursement of the initial assistance of EUR 1 billion;

    M. whereas the MoU to be concluded with the Egyptian authorities for the remainder of the MFA is an essential part of the assistance itself; whereas Parliament’s lack of involvement in this process severely hinders its budgetary scrutiny; whereas it is necessary to find an appropriate way to involve Parliament when such memorandums with non-EU countries are negotiated by the Commission;

    N. whereas the MoU should crucially provide the Commission with a mechanism to monitor progress as regards the implementation of structural reforms, notably the specific conditions for disbursement of the assistance;

    1. Recalls that while MFA is meant to be an exceptional crisis response instrument and should not serve as a substitute for structural development aid, its increasing use to address structural economic challenges in partner countries risks diluting its emergency nature;

    2. Highlights the importance of MFA in urgently addressing the situation in Egypt, taking into account Egypt’s critical economic and financial situation and its role as an important stabilising actor in an increasingly volatile region;

    3. Regrets the fact that the first proposal of this package bypassed the co-decision rights of Parliament and undermined its democratic oversight role by using Article 213 TFEU instead of Article 212 TFEU; insists that this should not set a precedent and that Parliament’s rights and role should be respected in future proposals; emphasises that MFA is an instrument requiring proper parliamentary and budgetary scrutiny;

    4. Notes that the Commission proposal of EUR 4 billion in MFA requires EUR 360 million in provisioning under the External Action Guarantee from the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe, which represents a significant allocation of limited resources;

    5. Recalls its previous concerns about the effectiveness of MFA in driving sustainable reforms; acknowledges, however, that linking this assistance to the broader strategic partnership framework can, when properly implemented, provide stronger leverage for implementing the agreed reform agenda; recalls that the partnership priorities cover three broad areas, namely sustainable modern economy and social development, partnering in foreign policy, and enhancing stability;

    6. Takes note of Egypt’s overall compliance with reform implementation under the previous MFA; reiterates its calls for transparent and timely reporting of assistance implementation; calls for adequate monitoring mechanisms with clear benchmarks and outcomes to be established in the MoU, and for regular reporting to the budgetary authority on developments related to the assistance, given the unprecedented size of this MFA package;

    7. Notes that while the MFA loan structure spreads repayments over a longer period, this creates extended contingent liabilities for the EU budget that require careful monitoring over multiple financial frameworks;

    8. Emphasises that the MFA constitutes a general budgetary support instrument for the benefit of Egypt and that the EU has no control over how the funds are actually spent; nevertheless encourages the Egyptian authorities and counterparties to disclose information on spending at the Commission’s request;

    9. Recalls that Article 6 of the Financial Regulation establishes the obligation for the Commission to ensure compliance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU and to respect the values enshrined in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union when implementing the EU budget; stresses that such a budgetary principle constitutes a core legal requirement for any form of EU financial assistance; underscores, therefore, the fact that the proposal lacks sufficient safeguards and clear benchmarks to measure progress towards compliance, particularly regarding respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities and freedom of belief, in order to protect the EU’s financial interests and ensure the MFA’s implementation in accordance with the Regulation;

    10. Recalls that a pre-condition for granting MFA involves respecting effective democratic mechanisms, including a multiparty parliamentary system and the rule of law, and guaranteeing respect for human rights; highlights that, in this case, Egypt should continue to make concrete and credible steps towards respecting these criteria; emphasises the need to ensure their robust implementation;

    11. Emphasises that strict adherence to democratic principles, the rule of law and fundamental freedoms should remain non-negotiable prerequisites for accessing EU financial support; calls on the Commission to withhold disbursements in the absence of credible progress on these fronts; notes that the Commission’s decision to disburse the short-term macro-financial assistance reflects Egypt’s progress in implementing reforms and the EU’s commitment to supporting Egypt’s economic stabilisation and reform agenda under the strategic and comprehensive partnership, while noting that human rights challenges in Egypt remain significant; stresses, in this respect, the importance of Egypt’s stability and its crucial role in the region, particularly in the current geopolitical context;

    12. Regrets Parliament’s lack of involvement in and scrutiny of the MoU concluded between the Commission and the Egyptian authorities, which, among other things, includes important budgetary provisions that fall within the remit of Parliament, will determine clearly defined economic policy and financial conditions, focusing on structural reforms and sound public finances, and will include a time frame for achieving those reforms, which are linked to loan disbursement;

    13. Concludes that the proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on providing macro-financial assistance to the Arab Republic of Egypt is compatible with the elements referred to in Rule 58(3) of the Rules of Procedure.

     

    As part of its budgetary assessment, the Committee on Budgets also submits the following amendments to the proposal:

     

    Amendment  1

    Proposal for a decision

    Recital 1 a (new)

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

     

    (1a) This Decision has implications for the Union budget. Accordingly, the European Parliament’s Committee on Budgets adopted a budgetary assessment, which forms an integral part of Parliament’s mandate for negotiations.

     

    Amendment  38

    Proposal for a decision

    Article 5 – paragraph 1

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (1) In order to finance the support under the macro-financial assistance in the form of loans, the Commission shall be empowered, on behalf of the Union, to borrow the necessary funds on the capital markets or from financial institutions in accordance with Article 220a of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046.

    (1) In order to finance the support under the macro-financial assistance in the form of loans, the Commission shall be empowered, on behalf of the Union, to borrow the necessary funds on the capital markets or from financial institutions in accordance with Article 223 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509.

     

    Amendment  39

    Proposal for a decision

    Article 5 – paragraph 2

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (2) The Commission shall enter into a loan agreement with Egypt in respect of the amount referred to in Article 1. The detailed terms of the support under the MFA in the form of loans shall be laid down in a loan agreement in accordance with Article 220 of the Financial Regulation, to be concluded between the Commission and the Egyptian authorities. The loan agreement shall lay down the availability period and the detailed terms of the support under the macro-financial assistance in the form of loans, including in relation to the internal control systems. The loans shall be granted at terms that allow Egypt to repay the loan over a long period, including a possible grace period. The maximum duration of the loans shall be 35 years. The Commission shall inform the European Parliament and the Council of developments in the operations referred to in paragraph 3.

    (2) The Commission shall enter into a loan agreement with Egypt in respect of the amount referred to in Article 1. The detailed terms of the support under the MFA in the form of loans shall be laid down in a loan agreement in accordance with Article 223 of the Financial Regulation, to be concluded between the Commission and the Egyptian authorities. The loan agreement shall lay down the availability period and the detailed terms of the support under the macro-financial assistance in the form of loans, including in relation to the internal control systems. The loans shall be granted at terms that allow Egypt to repay the loan over a long period, including a possible grace period. The maximum duration of the loans shall be 35 years. The Commission shall inform the European Parliament and the Council of developments in the operations referred to in paragraph 3.

     

    Amendment  40

    Proposal for a decision

    Article 6 – paragraph 1

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (1) The Union’s macro-financial assistance shall be implemented in accordance with Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council7.

    (1) The Union’s macro-financial assistance shall be implemented in accordance with Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council7.

    _________________

    _________________

    7 Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union and repealing Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 966/2012 (OJ L 193, 30.07.2018, p. 1).

    7 Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (recast) (OJ L, 2024/2509, 26.9.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj).

    Amendment  41

    Proposal for a decision

    Article 8 – paragraph 1 – point b

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (b) assess the economic situation and prospects of Egypt, as well as progress made in implementing the policy measures referred to in Article 3(1);

    (b) assess the economic situation and prospects of Egypt, as well as progress made in implementing the policy measures referred to in Articles 2 and 3(1);

    ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS
    FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR FOR BUDGETARY ASSESSMENT HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    Pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure, the rapporteur for budgetary assessment declares that he received input from the following entities or persons in the preparation of the budgetary assessment, prior to the adoption thereof in committee:

    Entity and/or person

    European Commission

    Ambassador of Egypt to the EU

    Head of delegation of the European Union to Egypt

    The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Arab Republic of Egypt

    The list is drawn up under the exclusive responsibility of the rapporteur for budgetary assessment.

    Where natural persons are identified in the list by their name, by their function or by both, the rapporteur for budgetary assessment declares that he has submitted to the natural persons concerned the European Parliament’s Data Protection Notice No 484 (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/data-protect/index.do), which sets out the conditions applicable to the processing of their personal data and the rights linked to that processing.

     

    PROCEDURE – COMMITTEE ASKED FOR BUDGETARY ASSESSMENT

    Title

    Macro-financial assistance to the Arab Republic of Egypt

    References

    COM(2024)0461 – C10-0009/2024 – 2024/0071(COD)

    Committee(s) responsible

    INTA

     

     

     

     Date announced in plenary

    BUDG

    13.11.2024

    Rapporteur for budgetary assessment

     Date appointed

    Matjaž Nemec

    24.10.2024

    Discussed in committee

    16.1.2025

     

     

     

    Date adopted

    29.1.2025

     

     

     

    Result of final vote

    +:

    –:

    0:

    32

    5

    1

    Members present for the final vote

    Georgios Aftias, Rasmus Andresen, Isabel Benjumea Benjumea, Tobiasz Bocheński, Olivier Chastel, Tamás Deutsch, Angéline Furet, Jens Geier, Thomas Geisel, Jean-Marc Germain, Sandra Gómez López, Monika Hohlmeier, Alexander Jungbluth, Janusz Lewandowski, Giuseppe Lupo, Siegfried Mureşan, Matjaž Nemec, Danuše Nerudová, João Oliveira, Ruggero Razza, Karlo Ressler, Julien Sanchez, Hélder Sousa Silva, Joachim Streit, Carla Tavares, Nils Ušakovs, Lucia Yar, Auke Zijlstra

    Substitutes present for the final vote

    Damian Boeselager, Michalis Hadjipantela, Moritz Körner, Tiago Moreira de Sá, Rasmus Nordqvist, Michele Picaro, Jacek Protas, Beata Szydło

    Members under Rule 216(7) present for the final vote

    Thierry Mariani, Aodhán Ó Ríordáin

     

    FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL
    IN COMMITTEE ASKED FOR BUDGETARY ASSESSMENT

    32

    +

    ECR

    Tobiasz Bocheński, Michele Picaro, Ruggero Razza, Beata Szydło

    NI

    Thomas Geisel

    PPE

    Georgios Aftias, Isabel Benjumea Benjumea, Michalis Hadjipantela, Monika Hohlmeier, Janusz Lewandowski, Siegfried Mureşan, Danuše Nerudová, Jacek Protas, Karlo Ressler, Hélder Sousa Silva

    PfE

    Tamás Deutsch, Angéline Furet, Thierry Mariani, Tiago Moreira de Sá, Julien Sanchez

    Renew

    Olivier Chastel, Moritz Körner, Joachim Streit, Lucia Yar

    S&D

    Jens Geier, Jean-Marc Germain, Sandra Gómez López, Giuseppe Lupo, Matjaž Nemec, Aodhán Ó Ríordáin, Carla Tavares, Nils Ušakovs

     

    5

    PfE

    Auke Zijlstra

    The Left

    João Oliveira

    Verts/ALE

    Rasmus Andresen, Damian Boeselager, Rasmus Nordqvist

     

    1

    0

    ESN

    Alexander Jungbluth

     

    Key to symbols:

    + : in favour

     : against

    0 : abstention

     

     

     

     

    OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS (30.1.2025)

    for the Committee on International Trade

    on the proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on providing macro-financial assistance to the Arab Republic of Egypt

    (COM(2024)0461 – C10‑0009/2024 – 2024/0071(COD))

    Rapporteur for opinion: Tineke Strik

     

    SHORT JUSTIFICATION

    As enshrined in the Treaties, the EU is required to uphold and promote the principles of human rights, democracy and the rule of law in its external action. While acknowledging the importance of the EU-Egypt strategic partnership and the need for MFA-support to Egypt in light of the economic impact of, among others, the current geopolitical situation, this opinion aims to integrate human rights, democracy and the rule of law as core parts of the MFA and to strengthen provisions related to parliamentary scrutiny and transparency. The Rapporteur is pleased that the Foreign Affairs Committee (AFET) confirmed that these founding principles of the EU should form the basis of EU-Egypt relations, and concrete improvement from Egypt in this regard is a precondition for the disbursement of the MFA. Moreover, the vote confirmed that the AFET Committee is convinced that Commission services and the European External Action Service have the responsibility to integrate this approach into the Memorandum of Understanding to be negotiated with Egypt, and report on progress on the specific conditions to the European Parliament and Council. Payment of each instalment should be subject to concrete improvements on human rights, democracy and the rule of law. The Rapporteur has full trust that the competences of the AFET Committee will be integrated into the report of the Committee on International Trade, and will engage with the respective Rapporteur to that end.

    AMENDMENTS

    The Committee on Foreign Affairs submits the following to the Committee on International Trade, as the committee responsible:

    Amendment  1

     

    Proposal for a decision

    Recital 3

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (3) In line with the Partnership Priorities, the EU and Egypt are committed to ensuring accountability, the rule of law, the full respect of human rights, fundamental freedoms, promoting democracy, gender equality and equal opportunities as constitutional rights of all their citizens. These commitments contribute to the advancement of the partnership and to Egypt’s sustainable development and stability. The increased and constructive engagement between the EU and Egypt in the last period has opened the path to more meaningful dialogue on human rights related issues. The subcommittee on Political Matters, Human Rights and Democracy, International and Regional issues of December 2022 and the Association Committee of May 2023 provided the institutional platforms to exchange on an array of human rights issues, which the EU would like to continue and build on. The improvement of the human rights situation in Egypt will have a positive impact on EU-Egypt relations.

    (3) In line with the Partnership Priorities, the EU and Egypt are committed to ensuring accountability, the rule of law, the full respect of human rights, fundamental freedoms, promoting democracy, gender equality and equal opportunities as constitutional rights of all their citizens. These commitments contribute to the advancement of the partnership and to Egypt’s sustainable social and economic development and stability. The increased and constructive engagement between the EU and Egypt in the last period has opened the path to more meaningful dialogue on human rights related issues. The subcommittee on Political Matters, Human Rights and Democracy, International and Regional issues of December 2022 and the Association Committee of May 2023 provided the institutional platforms to exchange on an array of human rights issues, which the EU would like to continue and build on. A future improvement of the human rights situation in Egypt, such as improving the rights to freedom of expression, association and peaceful assembly, introducing a moratorium on death penalty, combating torture and enforced disappearances, and improving the conditions of prisons, will have a positive impact on EU-Egypt relations.

    Amendment  2

     

    Proposal for a decision

    Recital 5

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (5) The EU recognises Egypt’s key role for regional security and stability. Terrorism, organised crime and conflicts are common threats against our security and the social fabric of nations across both sides of the Mediterranean. Therefore, the EU and Egypt have a common interest in strengthening cooperation highlighted in the Partnership Priorities, in full compliance with international law, including human rights and international humanitarian law.

    (5) The EU recognises Egypt’s key role for regional security and stability, and has a strong interest in preventing short-term economic instability in that country that could have broader consequences as well as benefit geopolitical rivals. Terrorism, organised crime, disinformation, conflicts and persecution of religious and ethnic minorities are common threats against our security and the social fabric of nations across both sides of the Mediterranean. Therefore, the EU and Egypt have a common interest in strengthening cooperation highlighted in the Partnership Priorities, in full compliance with international law, including human rights and international humanitarian law, as well as in promoting joint interests and addressing common challenges.

    Amendment  3

     

    Proposal for a decision

    Recital 6

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (6) Recalling the geo-political challenges, such as the consequences of Hamas terrorist attacks across Israel on 7 October 2023 as well as the conflict in Sudan, and the strategic importance of Egypt as the largest country in the region and a pillar of stability for the whole Middle East, the Union is embarking on concluding a Strategic and Comprehensive partnership with Egypt as outlined in the Joint Declaration.

    (6) Recalling the geo-political challenges, such as the broader consequences of the situation in the Middle East following the Hamas terrorist attacks of 7 October 2023, as well as the armed conflict in Sudan and instability in Syria, and the strategic importance of Egypt as the largest country in the region and a pillar of stability and security for the whole Middle East, the Union is embarking on concluding a Strategic and Comprehensive partnership with Egypt as outlined in the Joint Declaration.

    Amendment  4

     

    Proposal for a decision

    Recital 9

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (9) Egypt’s macro-fiscal situation has faced significant challenges and deteriorated substantially over recent months, as external pressures have intensified and public debt has increased further, with substantial downside risks to the economic outlook persisting. The repercussions of Russia’s war on Ukraine and of Hamas terrorist attacks against Israel have led to protracted capital outflows and lower foreign currency receipts, notably due to sharply falling income from tourism and Suez Canal proceeds. This is particularly challenging amid Egypt’s difficult fiscal situation, which is characterised by constant fiscal deficits and high and growing debt to GDP ratios.

    (9) Egypt’s macro-fiscal situation has faced significant challenges and deteriorated substantially over recent months, as external pressures have intensified and public debt has increased further, with substantial downside risks to the economic outlook persisting. The repercussions of Russia’s war on Ukraine and of the situation in the Middle East have led to protracted capital outflows and lower foreign currency receipts, notably due to sharply falling income from tourism and Suez Canal proceeds. This is particularly challenging amid Egypt’s difficult fiscal situation, which is characterised by constant fiscal deficits and high and growing debt to GDP ratios. Moreover, instability and uncertainty in Syria would further exacerbate the already existing macro-financial issues for Egypt.

    Amendment  5

     

    Proposal for a decision

    Recital 19

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (19) The Commission should ensure that the Union’s macro-financial assistance is legally and substantially in line with the key principles, objectives and measures taken within the different areas of external action and with other relevant Union policies.

    (19) As enshrined in Article 212 TFEU, the Commission should ensure that the Union’s macro-financial assistance is legally and substantially in line with the key principles, objectives and measures taken within the different areas of external action, and in particular with Article 2 of the EU-Egypt Association Agreement of 2004 concerning the respect of democratic principles and fundamental human rights and with other relevant Union policies.

    Amendment  6

     

    Proposal for a decision

    Recital 22

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (22) A pre-condition for granting the Union’s macro-financial assistance to Egypt should be that the country continues to make concrete and credible steps towards respecting effective democratic mechanisms – including a multi-party parliamentary system – and the rule of law, and guarantees respect for human rights. In addition, the specific objectives of the Union’s macro-financial assistance should strengthen the efficiency, transparency and accountability of the public finance management systems, the governance and supervision of the financial sector in Egypt and promote structural reforms aimed at supporting sustainable and inclusive growth, decent employment creation and fiscal consolidation. The fulfillment of the pre-condition and the achievement of the specific objectives should be regularly monitored by the Commission services and the European External Action Service.

    (22) A pre-condition for granting the Union’s macro-financial assistance to Egypt should be that the country takes concrete and credible steps towards respecting and enhancing effective democratic mechanisms – including a multi-party parliamentary system – and the rule of law, and guarantees respect for human rights, In addition, the specific objectives of the Union’s macro-financial assistance should strengthen the efficiency, transparency and accountability of the public finance management systems, the governance and supervision of the financial sector in Egypt and promote structural reforms aimed at supporting sustainable and inclusive growth, decent employment creation and fiscal consolidation. The fulfillment of the pre-condition and the achievement of the specific objectives should be regularly monitored by the Commission services and the European External Action Service.

    Amendment  7

     

    Proposal for a decision

    Recital 26

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (26) The Union’s macro-financial assistance should be managed by the Commission. In order to ensure that the European Parliament and the Council are able to follow the implementation of this Decision, the Commission should regularly inform them of developments relating to the assistance and provide them with relevant documents.

    (26) The Union’s macro-financial assistance should be managed by the Commission. In order to ensure that the European Parliament and the Council are able to follow the implementation of this Decision, the Commission should regularly inform them with an annual report of developments relating to the assistance and on the respect of effective democratic mechanisms, as per the pre-conditions referred to in this Decision and, provide them with relevant documents.

    Amendment  8

     

    Proposal for a decision

    Recital 28

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (28) The Union’s macro-financial assistance should be subject to economic policy conditions, to be laid down in a Memorandum of Understanding. In order to ensure uniform conditions of implementation and for reasons of efficiency, the Commission should be empowered to negotiate such conditions with the Egyptian authorities under the supervision of the committee of representatives of the Member States in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011. Under that Regulation, the advisory procedure should, as a general rule, apply in all cases other than as provided for in that Regulation. Considering the potentially important impact of assistance of more than EUR 90 million, it is appropriate that the examination procedure be used for operations above that threshold. Considering the amount of the Union’s macro-financial assistance to Egypt, the examination procedure should apply to the adoption of the Memorandum of Understanding, and to any reduction, suspension or cancellation of the assistance.

    (28) The Union’s macro-financial assistance should be subject to economic policy and democracy, rule of law and human rights conditions, to be laid down in a Memorandum of Understanding. In order to ensure uniform conditions of implementation and for reasons of efficiency, the Commission should be empowered to negotiate such conditions with the Egyptian authorities under the supervision of the committee of representatives of the Member States in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011. Under that Regulation, the advisory procedure should, as a general rule, apply in all cases other than as provided for in that Regulation. Considering the potentially important impact of assistance of more than EUR 90 million, it is appropriate that the examination procedure be used for operations above that threshold. Considering the amount of the Union’s macro-financial assistance to Egypt, the examination procedure should apply to the adoption of the Memorandum of Understanding, and to any reduction, suspension or cancellation of the assistance.

    Amendment  9

     

    Proposal for a decision

    Article 1 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    The release of the Union’s macro-financial assistance shall be managed by the Commission in a manner consistent with the agreements or understandings reached between the IMF and Egypt, and with the key principles and objectives of economic reforms set out in the EU-Egypt Association Agreement.

    The release of the Union’s macro-financial assistance shall be managed by the Commission in a manner consistent with the agreements or understandings reached between the IMF and Egypt, and with the key principles and objectives set out in the EU-Egypt Association Agreement.

    Amendment  10

     

    Proposal for a decision

    Article 1 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 2

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    The Commission shall regularly inform the European Parliament and the Council of developments regarding the Union’s macro-financial assistance, including disbursements thereof, and shall provide those institutions with the relevant documents in due time.

    The Commission shall regularly inform the European Parliament and the Council of developments regarding the Union’s macro-financial assistance, including disbursements thereof, as well as on the progress made relating to economic and democratic reforms in Egypt, and shall provide those institutions with the relevant documents, including third-party independent assessments, in due time.

    Amendment  11

     

    Proposal for a decision

    Article 1 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 2 a (new)

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

     

    The transparent management of funds allocated under this macro-financial assistance is essential in order to ensure that resources are used wisely, in accordance with the set objectives. The Union shall ensure that effective and independent control and audit mechanisms are put in place to prevent any misappropriation.

    Amendment  12

     

    Proposal for a decision

    Article 2 – paragraph 1

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    1. A pre-condition for granting the Union’s macro-financial assistance shall be that Egypt continues to make concrete and credible steps towards respecting effective democratic mechanisms – including a multi-party parliamentary system – and the rule of law, and guarantees respect for human rights.

    1. A pre-condition for granting the Union’s macro-financial assistance shall be that Egypt takes concrete and credible steps towards respecting effective democratic mechanisms – including a multi-party parliamentary system – and the rule of law, and made a quantitative and substantial improvement in the respect for human rights, since the signing in June 2024 of the Memorandum of Understanding linked to the EUR 1 billion macro-financial assistance package, and that it continues to make concrete and credible improvements in those areas throughout the period covered by this Decision.

    Amendment  13

     

    Proposal for a decision

    Article 2 – paragraph 2

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    2. The Commission services and the European External Action Service shall monitor the fulfilment of this pre-condition throughout the life-cycle of the Union’s macro-financial assistance.

    2. The Commission services and the European External Action Service shall monitor the fulfilment of this pre-condition throughout the life-cycle of the Union’s macro-financial assistance in a transparent process in which civil society and international entities such as UN organisations are able to contribute, and report, regularly and in writing, to the European Parliament on the conditions referred to in Article 2 (1).

    Amendment  14

     

    Proposal for a decision

    Article 3 – paragraph 1

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    1. The Commission, in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 7(2), shall agree with the Egyptian authorities on clearly defined economic policy and financial conditions, focusing on structural reforms and sound public finances, to which the Union’s macro-financial assistance is to be subject, to be laid down in a Memorandum of Understanding (“the Memorandum of Understanding”) which shall include a timeframe for the achievement of those reforms. The economic policy and financial conditions set out in the Memorandum of Understanding shall be consistent with the agreements or understandings referred to in Article 1(3), including the macroeconomic adjustment and structural reform programmes implemented by Egypt with the support of the IMF.

    1. The Commission, in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 7(2), shall agree with the Egyptian authorities on clearly defined economic policy and financial conditions, focusing on structural reforms and sound public finances, as well as on democracy, rule of law and human rights conditions, to which the Union’s macro-financial assistance and the release of each separate instalment is to be subject, to be laid down in a Memorandum of Understanding (“the Memorandum of Understanding”) which shall include a timeframe for the achievement of those reforms. The economic policy and financial conditions set out in the Memorandum of Understanding shall be consistent with the agreements or understandings referred to in Article 1(3), including the macroeconomic adjustment and structural reform programmes implemented by Egypt with the support of the IMF.

    Amendment  15

     

    Proposal for a decision

    Article 3 – paragraph 2

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    2. The conditions referred to in paragraph 1 shall aim, in particular, at enhancing the efficiency, transparency and accountability of the public finance management systems in Egypt, including for the use of the Union’s macro-financial assistance. Progress in mutual market opening, the development of rules-based and fair trade, and other priorities in the context of the Union’s external policy shall also be duly taken into account when designing the policy measures. Progress in attaining those objectives shall be regularly monitored by the Commission.

    2. The conditions referred to in paragraph 1 shall aim, in particular, at introducing reforms towards respecting effective democratic mechanisms – including a multi-party parliamentary system – and the rule of law, and ensuring respect for human rights, enhancing the efficiency, transparency and accountability of the public finance management systems in Egypt, including for the use of the Union’s macro-financial assistance. Progress in mutual market opening, poverty reduction, good governance, the fight against corruption, the development of rules-based and fair trade, and other priorities in the context of the Union’s external policy, including those relating to democracy, rule of law and human rights, shall also be duly taken into account when designing the policy measures. Progress in attaining those objectives shall be regularly monitored by the Commission.

    Amendment  16

     

    Proposal for a decision

    Article 4 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1 – point c

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (c) the satisfactory implementation of the economic policy conditions and financial conditions agreed in the Memorandum of Understanding.

    (c) the satisfactory implementation of the economic policy conditions, financial conditions, and democracy, rule of law and human rights conditions, agreed in the Memorandum of Understanding.

    Amendment  17

     

    Proposal for a decision

    Article 8 – paragraph 1 – point c a (new)

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

     

    (ca) outline the concrete and credible steps Egypt has taken towards respecting effective democratic mechanisms, including a multi-party parliamentary system, and the rule of law, and towards ensuring respect for human rights.

    ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS
    FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    Pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure, the rapporteur for the opinion received input from the following entities or persons in the preparation of the opinion:

    Entity and/or person

     

    European Commission – DG ECFIN

    EEAS

    Various Egyptian authorities on multiple occassion

    Amnesty International

    Euromed Rights

    CIHRS

    Egyptian Front for Human Rights

    Committee to Protect Journalists

    Various Members of the Egyptian Parliament

    UNHCR

    Save the Children

    Frontex

    Various diplomats of EU Member States in Caïro

    Various local civil society organisations in Egypt

    Third country diplomat in Egypt

    The list above is drawn up under the exclusive responsibility of the rapporteur for the opinion.

    Where natural persons are identified in the list by their name, by their function or by both, the rapporteur for the opinion declares that she has submitted to the concerned natural persons the European Parliament’s Data Protection Notice No 484 (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/data-protect/index.do), which sets out the conditions applicable to the processing of their personal data and the rights linked to that processing.

    PROCEDURE – COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION

    Title

    Macro-financial assistance to the Arab Republic of Egypt

    References

    COM(2024)0461 – C10-0009/2024 – 2024/0071(COD)

    Committee(s) responsible

    INTA

     

     

     

    Opinion by

     Date announced in plenary

    AFET

    13.11.2024

    Rapporteur for the opinion

     Date appointed

    Tineke Strik

    14.10.2024

    Discussed in committee

    3.12.2024

     

     

     

    Date adopted

    30.1.2025

     

     

     

    Result of final vote

    +:

    –:

    0:

    59

    6

    7

    Members present for the final vote

    Mika Aaltola, Lucia Annunziata, Petras Auštrevičius, Jordan Bardella, Dan Barna, Wouter Beke, Robert Biedroń, Ioan-Rareş Bogdan, Marc Botenga, Grzegorz Braun, Sebastião Bugalho, Danilo Della Valle, Özlem Demirel, Elio Di Rupo, Michael Gahler, Geadis Geadi, Giorgos Georgiou, Raphaël Glucksmann, Bernard Guetta, Rima Hassan, Rasa Juknevičienė, Sandra Kalniete, Łukasz Kohut, Rihards Kols, Andrey Kovatchev, Vilis Krištopans, Nathalie Loiseau, Claudiu Manda, David McAllister, Sven Mikser, Francisco José Millán Mon, Arkadiusz Mularczyk, Leoluca Orlando, Kostas Papadakis, Tonino Picula, Thijs Reuten, Nacho Sánchez Amor, Andreas Schieder, Alexander Sell, Villy Søvndal, Davor Ivo Stier, Sebastiaan Stöteler, Stanislav Stoyanov, Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, Michał Szczerba, António Tânger Corrêa, Marta Temido, Cristian Terheş, Riho Terras, Hermann Tertsch, Pierre-Romain Thionnet, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Reinier Van Lanschot, Roberto Vannacci, Hilde Vautmans, Harald Vilimsky, Željana Zovko

    Substitutes present for the final vote

    Jaume Asens Llodrà, Malik Azmani, Engin Eroglu, Sandra Gómez López, Evin Incir, András László, Ana Catarina Mendes, Hans Neuhoff, Nicolás Pascual de la Parte, Chloé Ridel, Tineke Strik, Şerban Dimitrie Sturdza, Ingeborg Ter Laak, Matej Tonin, Ivaylo Valchev, Isabel Wiseler-Lima

    Members under Rule 216(7) present for the final vote

    Catarina Vieira

     

     

    FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL IN COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION

    59

    +

    ECR

    Geadis Geadi, Rihards Kols, Arkadiusz Mularczyk, Şerban Dimitrie Sturdza, Cristian Terheş, Ivaylo Valchev

    PPE

    Mika Aaltola, Wouter Beke, Ioan-Rareş Bogdan, Sebastião Bugalho, Michael Gahler, Rasa Juknevičienė, Sandra Kalniete, Łukasz Kohut, Andrey Kovatchev, David McAllister, Francisco José Millán Mon, Nicolás Pascual de la Parte, Davor Ivo Stier, Michał Szczerba, Ingeborg Ter Laak, Riho Terras, Matej Tonin, Isabel Wiseler-Lima, Željana Zovko

    PfE

    András László, António Tânger Corrêa, Hermann Tertsch, Roberto Vannacci

    Renew

    Petras Auštrevičius, Malik Azmani, Dan Barna, Engin Eroglu, Bernard Guetta, Nathalie Loiseau, Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, Hilde Vautmans

    S&D

    Lucia Annunziata, Robert Biedroń, Elio Di Rupo, Raphaël Glucksmann, Sandra Gómez López, Evin Incir, Claudiu Manda, Ana Catarina Mendes, Sven Mikser, Tonino Picula, Thijs Reuten, Nacho Sánchez Amor, Andreas Schieder, Marta Temido

    The Left

    Özlem Demirel, Rima Hassan

    Verts/ALE

    Jaume Asens Llodrà, Leoluca Orlando, Villy Søvndal, Tineke Strik, Reinier Van Lanschot, Catarina Vieira

     

    6

    NI

    Grzegorz Braun, Kostas Papadakis

    PfE

    Jordan Bardella, Sebastiaan Stöteler, Pierre-Romain Thionnet, Harald Vilimsky

     

    7

    0

    ECR

    Sebastian Tynkkynen

    ESN

    Hans Neuhoff, Alexander Sell, Stanislav Stoyanov

    The Left

    Marc Botenga, Danilo Della Valle, Giorgos Georgiou

     

    Key to symbols:

    + : in favour

     : against

    0 : abstention

     

     

     

     

     

    PROCEDURE – COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE

    Title

    Macro-financial assistance to the Arab Republic of Egypt

    References

    COM(2024)0461 – C10-0009/2024 – 2024/0071(COD)

    Date submitted to Parliament

    15.3.2024

     

     

     

    Committee(s) responsible

    INTA

     

     

     

    Committees asked for opinions

     Date announced in plenary

    AFET

    13.11.2024

     

     

     

    Rapporteurs

     Date appointed

    Céline Imart

    30.9.2024

     

     

     

    Discussed in committee

    14.10.2024

    30.1.2025

     

     

    Date adopted

    20.3.2025

     

     

     

     

    BUDG

    29.1.2025

     

     

     

    Result of final vote

    +:

    –:

    0:

    28

    7

    5

    Members present for the final vote

    Christophe Bay, Brando Benifei, Anna Bryłka, Udo Bullmann, Benoit Cassart, Markéta Gregorová, Bart Groothuis, Céline Imart, Karin Karlsbro, Bernd Lange, Ilia Lazarov, Thierry Mariani, Javier Moreno Sánchez, Ştefan Muşoiu, Daniele Polato, Majdouline Sbai, Lukas Sieper, Dominik Tarczyński, Francesco Torselli, Kathleen Van Brempt, Jörgen Warborn, Iuliu Winkler, Bogdan Andrzej Zdrojewski, Juan Ignacio Zoido Álvarez

    Substitutes present for the final vote

    Mika Aaltola, Nicolas Bay, Markus Buchheit, João Cotrim De Figueiredo, Danilo Della Valle, Borja Giménez Larraz, Vicent Marzà Ibáñez, Marina Mesure, Martin Schirdewan, Kris Van Dijck

    Members under Rule 216(7) present for the final vote

    Hildegard Bentele, Mélanie Disdier, Niels Geuking, Chloé Ridel, Romana Tomc, Matthieu Valet

    Date tabled

    24.3.2025

     

    FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL BY THE COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE

    28

    +

    ECR

    Nicolas Bay, Daniele Polato, Dominik Tarczyński, Francesco Torselli, Kris Van Dijck

    ESN

    Markus Buchheit

    NI

    Lukas Sieper

    PPE

    Mika Aaltola, Hildegard Bentele, Niels Geuking, Borja Giménez Larraz, Céline Imart, Ilia Lazarov, Romana Tomc, Jörgen Warborn, Iuliu Winkler, Bogdan Andrzej Zdrojewski, Juan Ignacio Zoido Álvarez

    PfE

    Christophe Bay, Anna Bryłka, Mélanie Disdier, Thierry Mariani, Matthieu Valet

    Renew

    Benoit Cassart, João Cotrim De Figueiredo, Bart Groothuis, Karin Karlsbro

    S&D

    Javier Moreno Sánchez

     

    7

    S&D

    Udo Bullmann

    The Left

    Danilo Della Valle, Marina Mesure, Martin Schirdewan

    Verts/ALE

    Markéta Gregorová, Vicent Marzà Ibáñez, Majdouline Sbai

     

    5

    0

    S&D

    Brando Benifei, Bernd Lange, Ştefan Muşoiu, Chloé Ridel, Kathleen Van Brempt

     

    Key to symbols:

    + : in favour

     : against

    0 : abstention

     

     

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