Category: France

MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the nomination of Lucian Romașcanu as a Member of the Court of Auditors – A10-0039/2025

Source: European Parliament

ANNEX 1: CURRICULUM VITÆ OF LUCIAN ROMAȘCANU

ABOUT ME

Married, two children

Politician with top parliamentary and governmental experience with a wealth of prior experience in the private sector.

Solid experience in working with public and European funds in the public positions held, minister, senator or head of a higher administrative territorial unit.

EDUCATION AND TRAINING

[ 2000 – 2002 ] Executive MBA

University Of Washington, Seattle / ASEBUSS Bucharest

City: Bucharest | Country: Romania |

[ 1986 – 1991 ] BSc

Academy Of Economic Studies

City: Bucharest | Country: Romania |

WORK EXPERIENCE

[ 28/10/2024 – Current ] President

Buzău County Council

City: Buzău | Country: Romania

• uninominal elected position

• administrative coordination of Buzău county, 404 000 inhabitants and 87 administrative territorial units

• yearly budget – over EUR 100 million

[ 21/12/2016 – 27/10/2024 ] Senator

The Senate of Romania

City: Bucharest | Country: Romania

Various positions in the parliament of Romania:

• Chair, Culture and Media Committee

• President, Romanian parliament delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)

• Leader, Social-Democratic Party senators

[ 11/2021 – 06/2023 ] Minister Of Culture

Government of Romania

City: Bucharest | Country: Romania

• yearly budget – over EUR 300 million

[ 06/2017 – 01/2018 ] Minister Of Culture

Government of Romania

City: Bucharest | Country: Romania

• yearly budget – over EUR 270 million

[ 2015 – 2016 ] Management Advisor to the President of the Board

Romanian National Television

City: Bucharest | Country: Romania

• 100 % state owned

• 5 TV Channels

• EUR 67 million yearly turnover

• 2 450 employees

[ 2012 – 2015 ] Managing Director

Dogan Media International

City: Bucharest | Country: Romania

• Turkish capital

• EUR 20 million yearly turnover

• over 400 employees

• 32 % y-o-y revenue growth

[ 2009 – 2012 ] General Manager

Cancan Media

City: Bucharest | Country: Romania

• EUR 8 million yearly turnover

• 140 employees

• 12% y-o-y revenue growth

[ 2006 – 2009 ] Managing Director

Ringier Romania

City: Bucharest | Country: Romania

• Swiss capital

• EUR 30 million yearly turnover

• 240 employees

[ 2004 – 2006 ] Managing Director

Best Print Services

City: Bucharest | Country: Romania

• EUR 10 million yearly turnover

• 110 employees

• financing negotiations, investment programme supervising

• ERP design and implementation

• 18 % y-o-y revenue growth

[ 2002 – 2004 ] General Manager

HL Display Romania

City: Bucharest | Country: Romania

• Swedish capital

• start-up

• EUR 1 million yearly turnover

• 5 employees

• Accountable for the Profit and Loss (P&L) statement

• budgeting, revenue and cost control responsibility

[ 1999 – 2002 ] Sales Director

Ringier Romania

City: Bucharest | Country: Romania

• Swiss capital

• sales team coordination (14 people)

• crafting sales strategy, planning action, setting sales objectives

• sales presentations delivered to media agencies, key clients; contract negotiation

[ 1997 – 1999 ] Sales Director

MediaPro Holding

City: Bucharest | Country: Romania

• organising and harmonising the sales structures of the different group companies

• crafting sales strategy, planning action, setting sales objectives

• sales presentations delivered to media agencies, key clients; negotiating sales budgets responsibility, in depth reorganisation of the sales structure of 16 different companies

[ 1993 – 1997 ] Country Representative Amorim Irmaos

City: Bucharest | Country: Romania

• start-up

• EUR 4 million yearly turnover

• building the presence on the Romanian market, obtaining and maintaining the leader position (90 % market share)

[ 1991 – 1993 ] Account manager

Vinexport Trading Co.

City: Bucharest | Country: Romania

• coordinating exports to Dutch, Canadian and Israeli markets

• taking part in negotiations, supervising deliveries, preparing export documents.

MANAGEMENT AND LEADERSHIP SKILLS

Team leader, good negotiator

• good teams coordination

• precise identification and delimitation of competences and hierarchies, multitasking with attention to detail

• analytical but also action and results oriented

• very good communication and presentation skills

• strong negotiation skills with different typologies or cultures

COMMUNICATION AND INTERPERSONAL SKILLS

Excellent communicator, adaptable and perseverant

• excellent interpersonal and communication skills within different environments, coordinating and motivating teams of various sizes

• committed, self-starter, dynamic, perseverant, adaptable, rapidly assimilating new information from various fields

LANGUAGE SKILLS

Mother tongue(s): Romanian

Other language(s):

English

LISTENING C2 READING C2 WRITING C2

SPOKEN PRODUCTION C2 SPOKEN INTERACTION C2

French

LISTENING B2 READING B2 WRITING B1

SPOKEN PRODUCTION B1 SPOKEN INTERACTION B1

Levels: A1 and A2: Basic user; B1 and B2: Independent user; C1 and C2: Proficient user

DIGITAL SKILLS

My Digital Skills

Excellent command of Microsoft Office (Word, Excel, Outlook) | Proficiency of using computer and internet | Enterprise-Resource-Planning-Software (ERP) | Implement change management: from organisational changes to CRMs launch

DRIVING LICENCE

Motorbikes: A

Cars: B

HOBBIES AND INTERESTS

Avid reader, passionate about sports and music

ANNEX 2: ANSWERS BY LUCIAN ROMAȘCANU TO THE QUESTIONNAIRE

Questionnaire for Candidates for Membership of the Court of Auditors

Professional experience

1. Please list your professional experience in public finance be it in budgetary planning, budget implementation or management or budget control or auditing.

• As manager in the private sector

i. I proposed, negotiated, approved and controlled budgets of EUR tens of millions in the different companies I managed.

• As Senator in the Romanian Parliament:

i. I discussed, amended and approved eight of the Romanian yearly budgets with all the activities involved in this laborious process.

ii. I received, analysed, and was involved in amending, approving or rejecting the budgets of the institutions that operate directly under the supervision of the Senate of Romania – Romanian National Television, Romanian National Radio, the Romanian Cultural Institute, the Audio Visual Council, among others.

iii. I was involved in top level decisions during major crises, including the pandemic and the energy crisis, where the budgetary impact and control over decisions was a key priority.

• As Minister of Culture

i. I analysed past years’ budgets and drew conclusions on the performance of the previous budgets and implemented corrective measures where necessary.

ii. I drew up the yearly budgets, negotiated them with the Ministry of Finance and presented them in front of the Romanian parliament – the yearly budget of the Ministry of Culture is about EUR 300 million.

iii. I oversaw the execution of the yearly budgets both in terms of performance and legality.

iv. I worked closely with the Romanian Court of Accounts in all aspects related to their activities concerning my ministry.

• As President of Buzau County

i. I analysed the previous years’ budgets to allow me to draw conclusions on the County’s financial performance and subsequently prepared budgetary corrections for the next period.

ii. I drew up the 2025 budget and supervised its approval by the County counsellors – the yearly budget is about EUR 110 million.

2. What have been your most significant achievements in your professional career?

A: Considering the scope of this questionnaire, I would list some of the achievements related to the financial and budgetary fields:

i. In my first mandate as Minister, I was able to increase the budget of the Ministry of Culture by 47 % and oversaw an execution rate of more than 98 % without any adverse opinion from the Romanian Court of Accounts.

ii. As the leader of the group of the Social Democratic Party senators I was a key actor in the negotiation and successful vote of the Romania’s annual budgets in due time.

iii. As member of the Parliament during the COVID-19 crisis I was able, together with my colleagues, to ensure – through the necessary Parliamentary decisions – all the resources that the state needed to fight the pandemic and follow-up the way the resources were allocated and spent.

3. What has been your professional experience of international multicultural and multilinguistic organisations or institutions based outside your home country?

i. In the private sector I worked on top executive positions for multinational companies, where I exposed to different cultures within the organisations I worked for.

ii. As a member of the Romanian parliament and a committee chair, I was constantly involved in activities of parliamentary diplomacy with representatives of different countries and cultures. As the President of the Romanian Parliament delegation to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) I was involved in meetings, discussions and negotiations with representatives from more than 50 member countries.

iii. As a minister I had the opportunity to have a full international agenda with meetings and negotiations with colleagues from different countries and cultures.

4. Have you been granted discharge for the management duties you carried out previously, if such a procedure applies?

A: The duties I carried out previously were not subject to a discharge procedure.

5. Which of your previous professional positions were a result of a political nomination?

A: For the past eight years of my career, I was in the public service following general or local elections and I was appointed twice as Minister of Culture. All positions were held as a member of the Social Democratic Party (PSD).

6. What are the three most important decisions to which you have been party in your professional life?

A: Having a career that spans over decades, there were several important decisions that made the difference, and I am proud of. I will mention three of them, which are relevant for the three main chapters of my career so far, in the private sector, government and parliament:

i. One of my important decisions I made during my years as manager in the private sector was the deep restructuring of the division I was in charge of in within Ringier Romania, the result being that the newspaper and magazine titles in my portfolio accounted for 50 % of the group’s turnover and almost 100 % of the group’s profit.

ii. As Minister of Culture, I was able to restructure and streamline the budget to allocate 270 % more money to domestic cultural projects than in the preceding year.

iii. As a senator and group leader I supported, negotiated in the committees and got the votes for the investment programmes of the Government, including recovery and resilience fund (RRF) projects, which reached almost 7 % of Romania’s GDP in 2024.

Independence

7. The Treaty stipulates that the Members of the Court of Auditors must be ‘completely independent’ in the performance of their duties. How would you act on this obligation in the discharge of your prospective duties?

A: If confirmed, as a Member of the Court of Auditors, I commit myself to carry out my duties in full independence and with the highest ethical standards, in the general interest of the European Union and of the European citizens, and in full respect of the Treaties’ provisions and the Rules of Procedure of the Court. I will fully comply with the provisions of the Code of conduct for ECA members and observe the ethical principles enshrined therein: integrity, independence, objectivity, competence, professional behaviour, confidentiality, transparency, dignity, commitment, loyalty, discretion and collegiality.

I will neither seek nor take instructions from any government or other institution, body office, or entity. At the same time, I shall refrain from any action incompatible with my prospective duties, striving to set an example by my personal conduct. Even after the cessation of my duties, I undertake to ensure the confidentiality of information and respect the rules concerning appointments and benefits.

In this role, I will ensure that the Court’s independence is rigorously protected and that my duties are performed with integrity, impartiality and a strong commitment to the highest standards of public service.

8. Do you or your close relatives (parents, brothers and sisters, legal partner and children) have any business or financial holdings or any other commitments, which might conflict with your prospective duties?

A: Neither I nor any member of my family have any business or financial interests that could give rise to a conflict of interest with the duties and responsibilities associated with the role of Member of the European Court of Auditors (ECA).

9. Are you prepared to disclose all your financial interests and other commitments to the President of the Court and to make them public?

A: Yes, I am ready to disclose all requested information and provide a declaration of interest in accordance with the European Court of Auditors’ Code of Conduct and ethical guidelines, ensuring complete transparency and accountability.

10. Are you involved in any current legal proceedings? If so, please provide us with details.

A: No, I am not involved in any current legal proceedings.

11. Do you have any active or executive role in politics, if so at what level? Have you held any political position during the last 18 months? If so, please provide us with details.

A: Yes, I am currently the leader of the Buzau County organisation of the Social Democratic Party and the national spokesperson of the party for all matters.

12. Will you step down from any elected office or give up any active function with responsibilities in a political party if you are appointed as a Member of the Court?

A: Yes, without any hesitation. Becoming a member of ECA means that I will put an end to my political career.

13. How would you deal with a major irregularity or even fraud and/or corruption case involving persons in your Member State of origin?

A: If such a case happens, I would handle it in the same manner as any other case of fraud in any other Member State, with the utmost independence and integrity, taking a fully impartial, objective, unbiased and professional approach.

Upholding impartiality and integrity, respecting the rule of law, strictly following established policies, rules, and procedures, and ensuring fairness and equal treatment are all essential for any institution to function effectively and maintain the trust of EU citizens.

Performance of duties

14. What should be the main features of a sound financial management culture in any public service? How could the ECA help to enforce it?

A: Within the framework set by the Financial Regulation, sound financial management is understood as budget implementation in compliance with the three principles of:

i) economy

ii) efficiency

iii) effectiveness.

Public funds must be used for the public good, upholding the fundamental principles of transparency and accountability, which are the two key pillars of good governance.

I strongly believe that transparency, fairness and accountability, with a focus on performance as well, should be seen as the main features of implementing these principles and fostering a sound financial management culture in public service and these have been guiding elements in both my private and public-sector career.

What is more, the challenging context we are facing requires that we all do our utmost to rebuild and strengthen citizens’ trust in public institutions and decision-making processes at national and European levels. In this regard, I see added value in a multilayered approach aiming to ensure that proper budgetary planning is accompanied by ethical governance and transparent reporting, followed by a thorough controlling and accountability process, all supported by clear and proactive communication efforts at each of these stages. Not least, I see merit in incorporating early risk analysis and mitigation in all stages described above, to ensure the best possible outputs.

The ECA has the important role of helping to establish a culture of professional financial management and ensuring its sustainability across all EU institutions. The ECA delivers recommendations and monitors their implementation, both key activities for the above-mentioned role. Identifying best practices and issuing audit recommendations are essential ways to strengthen sound financial management. Furthermore, the ECA’s substantial moral authority can help inspire more transparent and accountable accounting practices throughout the EU.

The ECA also plays a significant role in simplifying the legislative framework and administrative procedures where appropriate, contributing to effective financial management and facilitating necessary reforms. The EU needs simpler procedures with less bureaucracy, and the ECA can play a vital role in Europe’s simplification agenda.

15. Under the Treaty, the Court is required to assist Parliament in exercising its powers of control over the implementation of the budget. How would you further improve the cooperation between the Court and the European Parliament (in particular, its Committee on Budgetary Control) to enhance both the public oversight of the general spending and its value for money?

A: As a prospective Member of the Court of Auditors, I assure you of my commitment to building a relationship based on openness, transparency, mutual trust and efficiency between the European Parliament – in particular its Committee on Budgetary Control (CONT) – and the Court of Auditors. As we are still early in the current institutional and legislative cycle, I believe we need to work, from both sides, to further strengthen the connection between the two institutions and foster a culture of constant engagement between the CONT Committee and the ECA. As such, if confirmed, I would like to assure you of my full openness to dialogue and suggestions on how to improve and strengthen the Court’s contributions in support of the decision-making process in the CONT Committee, meant to allow Parliament to exercise its democratic oversight effectively, particularly when exercising its powers of control over the implementation of the budget. Also given the current difficult regional and international context, I cannot stress enough the importance of safeguarding the EU budget – both at EU and national levels – and I am aware that this is a prime concern for this Parliament and for the CONT Committee in particular.

By working together, we can ensure that any expenditure of EU money is made in a legal, responsible, and accountable manner, having at heart the best interests of the EU and its citizens.

Moreover, since Members of the European Parliament directly represent the interests of EU citizens, it is crucial to incorporate their perspectives to ensure the ECA’s work remains relevant to the challenges faced by EU citizens, while upholding the Court’s full independence in its work.

16. What added value do you think performance auditing brings and how should the findings be incorporated in management procedures?

A: Compliance audits, financial audits and performance audits complement each other. While compliance auditing verifies whether activities and programmes comply with applicable legal and regulatory requirements, performance auditing evaluates whether these activities and programmes have been executed optimally.

In the context of the implementation of the current multi-annual financial framework for 2021-2027, the Court of Auditors has already recommended future-proofing EU funding for climate adaptation as part of the EU’s economic growth strategy, with implications for the EU’s competitiveness both internally and externally. This contributed to building a results-oriented approach and ensuring that financial decisions are properly translated into effective actions and solutions to the benefit of EU citizens.

Building on this model, further actions could be envisaged in order to support the proper follow-up to the efficiency of spending on the EU’s competitiveness objectives, based on performance auditing, also taking into account the need to consider the EU’s overall development objectives.

In the same logic, a stronger focus on performance could prove useful in support of the new Commission objectives related to simplification and accountability, also with respect to public procurement procedures. Performance-based evaluations could also consider the administrative costs at the level of Member States, as well as at the level of the business community. Performance auditing offers forward-looking insights, evaluating whether processes are functioning effectively to achieve the set targets and goals.

Given the projected increased complexity of the EU financial instruments, accountability and traceability of EU funds becomes even more important, also as a prerequisite of the performance-based model, to be considered in the future endeavours of the Court of Auditors, as well as in the relationship with the other EU institutions with budgetary responsibilities – namely the European Commission and the European Parliament.

That being said, we must always strive to make recommendations that are both relevant and practical, and that can be clearly understood and embraced by the audited entity, especially by the appropriate management level with the competence to implement them optimally in terms of time, cost, and resources.

17. How could cooperation between the Court of Auditors, the national audit institutions and the European Parliament (Committee on Budgetary Control) on auditing of the EU budget be improved?

A: At this stage, I cannot provide a definitive answer, as I have yet to assess the matter from the perspectives of either the Committee on Budgetary Control or ECA. Gaining practical experience at the Court of Auditors will be essential in forming a well-informed view.

What is clear, however, is that the cooperation between the Court of Auditors and national audit bodies, as outlined in Article 287(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, is crucial for effective budgetary control. In the context of shared management, leveraging the expertise of national auditors is particularly important.

Maintaining an open dialogue with the budgetary and legislative authorities, national SAIs, and other stakeholders strengthen the institution’s relevance and the impact of its work.

Both the European Parliament (through the CONT Committee) and national audit institutions that report to national parliaments are key stakeholders for the ECA, with a shared goal of safeguarding the EU budget and ensuring optimal use of EU taxpayers’ money. In this regard, the ECA should continue to share its relevant reports with national audit bodies and other institutions to keep them informed of its activities and to communicate its recommendations on pertinent policy areas.

Therefore, I believe that a well organised, transparent exchange of information, a strong understanding of each side’s needs, and effective collaborative arrangements are key to success. Any actions taken must uphold the legal framework for cooperation, ensuring both the obligation to work in good faith and the independence of the Court of Auditors and national audit bodies.

Moreover, I would encourage direct structured dialogue between the Contact Committee and the EP Committee on Budgetary Control, with regular exchanges on good practices and lessons learned, effective budget implementation and control, governance, transparency and accountability matters. Additionally, I believe that joint risk analyses could also be a part of this more structured dialogue, a common understanding on challenges and specific risk across the EU, and exchange on ways to address these.

At its end, the European Parliament also plays a significant role in raising awareness of the ECA’s work and the EU budget control system among their constituents. Also, the Members of the European Parliament should help the audit authorities in their respective Member States to better understand the challenges they face in carrying out their duties.

18. How would you further develop the reporting of the ECA to give the European Parliament all the necessary information on the accuracy of the data provided by the Member States to the European Commission?

A: High-quality reporting is based mainly on the quality of data provided. ECA evaluation and reporting depends on the quality of the data provided, especially since it supports the European Parliament in consolidating its budgetary decisions.

In this respect, also considering that European statistics are public goods, and building on the current Regulation on European Statistics, it is important to analyse, in dialogue with the European Commission and the other institutions, how the current system could be improved to focus on new data sources, new technologies and insights generated by the digital era, as to ensure that the data provided reflect the new set of challenges and economic realities in order to support the reasoning of EU decisions and policy objectives.

Always remembering that the Court itself has limited resources and must best use them to report its work.

ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

The rapporteur declares under his exclusive responsibility that he did not receive input from any entity or person to be mentioned in this Annex pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure.

INFORMATION ON ADOPTION IN COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE

Date adopted	18.3.2025
Result of final vote	+: –: 0:	22 2 5
Members present for the final vote	Georgios Aftias, Gilles Boyer, Caterina Chinnici, Tamás Deutsch, Dick Erixon, Daniel Freund, Gerben-Jan Gerbrandy, Niclas Herbst, Monika Hohlmeier, Virginie Joron, Kinga Kollár, Giuseppe Lupo, Marit Maij, Claudiu Manda, Csaba Molnár, Fidias Panayiotou, Jacek Protas, Julien Sanchez, Jonas Sjöstedt, Carla Tavares, Tomáš Zdechovský
Substitutes present for the final vote	Maria Grapini, Erik Marquardt, Bert-Jan Ruissen, Vlad Vasile-Voiculescu, Annamária Vicsek
Members under Rule 216(7) present for the final vote	Andrzej Halicki, Valentina Palmisano, Georgiana Teodorescu

MIL OSI Europe News –

March 25, 2025

MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Ethanol – E-001089/2025
Source: European Parliament

Question for written answer E-001089/2025
to the Commission
Rule 144
Christine Singer (Renew), Engin Eroglu (Renew), Joachim Streit (Renew), Maria Grapini (S&D), Ondřej Krutílek (ECR), Stefan Köhler (PPE), Elżbieta Katarzyna Łukacijewska (PPE), Aldo Patriciello (PfE), Carlo Ciccioli (ECR), Anna Zalewska (ECR), Tobiasz Bocheński (ECR), Antonella Sberna (ECR), Daniele Polato (ECR), Chiara Gemma (ECR), Paolo Inselvini (ECR), Flavio Tosi (PPE), Massimiliano Salini (PPE), Sergio Berlato (ECR), Francesco Ventola (ECR), Alessandro Ciriani (ECR), Letizia Moratti (PPE), Carlo Fidanza (ECR), Herbert Dorfmann (PPE), Nicola Procaccini (ECR), Mariateresa Vivaldini (ECR), Elena Donazzan (ECR), Nikola Minchev (Renew)

Ethanol (‘alcohol’) is a substance that is easily biologically degradable. As part of the evaluation procedure for biocidal active substances, it is proposed that ethanol be classified as toxic to reproduction and carcinogenic (Category 1), because these effects can be observed after the oral intake of alcoholic beverages. This classification would have the consequence that ethanol, due to EU chemical regulations (REACH[1] or CLP[2]), could no longer be used in detergents, care and cleaning products, disinfectants and cosmetics.
- 1.What costs does the Commission expect for the modification of hundreds of thousands of cosmetics, cleaning and disinfecting agents, and many other product groups, in the event that ethanol is classified in Category 1 as carcinogenic and toxic to reproduction?
- 2.What impact on the competitiveness of the EU economy does the Commission expect, in the event that ethanol is classified in Category 1 as carcinogenic and toxic to reproduction?
- 3.How does the Commission assess the compatibility of ethanol’s potential classification in Category 1 with one of the goals of the European Green Deal, namely sustainable raw material extraction, given that classification in Category 1 would effectively ban the use of ethanol in many product groups?
Supporter[3]

Submitted: 12.3.2025
- [1] Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2006 concerning the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH), establishing a European Chemicals Agency (OJ L 396, 30.12.2006, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2006/1907/oj).
- [2] Regulation (EC) No 1272/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on classification, labelling and packaging of substances and mixtures (OJ L 353, 31.12.2008, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2008/1272/oj).
- [3] This question is supported by a Member other than the authors: Fernand Kartheiser (ECR)
MIL OSI Europe News –
March 25, 2025

MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on providing macro-financial assistance to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan – A10-0038/2025

Source: European Parliament

DRAFT EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTION

on the proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on providing macro-financial assistance to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan

(COM(2024)0159 – C9‑0146/2024 – 2024/0086(COD))

(Ordinary legislative procedure: first reading)

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2024)0159),

– having regard to Article 294(2) and Article 212 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C9‑0146/2024),

– having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

– having regard to Rule 60 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the budgetary assessment by the Committee on Budgets,

– having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Foreign Affairs,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on International Trade (A10-0038/2025),

1. Adopts its position at first reading, taking over the Commission proposal;

2. Calls on the Commission to refer the matter to Parliament again if it replaces, substantially amends or intends to substantially amend its proposal;

3. Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments.

EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

In an increasingly challenging global economic context, Jordan faces persistent structural challenges compounded by significant external shocks. While the country has maintained moderate growth of around 2% in recent years, this level remains insufficient to address fundamental economic needs: reducing high unemployment (22.9% in 2022) and alleviating a substantial public debt burden (88.7% of GDP in 2023).

These domestic challenges are further exacerbated by heightened regional tensions, including the war between Israel and Gaza and ongoing instability in Syria, which are disrupting trade, straining public resources and jeopardizing key sectors such as tourism. Therefore, Jordan is facing a series of unfavorable factors with economic, political, social and demographic consequences, and must receive appropriate and rapid support as a reliable and stable partner of the EU. Moreover, the migratory pressure is very high in the Kingdom with 1.3 million refugees from Syria out of total of 3.8 million of refugees. It means 1/3 of the Kingdom population are refugees.

To support Jordan’s economic stability and cover the country’s residual financing needs over the operation’s availability period, the Commission proposes a macro-financial assistance (MFA) operation of up to €500 million in loans, despite the Jordan’s request for €700 million.

This assistance is designed to address pressing economic challenges, including high public debt, a structurally elevated budget deficit (5.1% of GDP in 2023), and a persistent external deficits (average of around 6.5% of GDP over the last five years). It also aims to mitigate the fiscal constraints exacerbated by recent crises, such as the COVID-19 pandemic and regional instability.

The political and economic conditions necessary for granting the proposed MFA are fulfilled, as confirmed by the Commission’s evaluation of Jordan’s current situation. The loan will be provided under the External Action Guarantee with a provisioning at a rate of 9%, which will be programmed under the NDICI-GE, for a total amount of EUR 45 million. To ensure risk coverage, the EU will provision 9% of the total amount, or €45 million, under the External Action Guarantee.

The MFA will have a validity period of two and a half years following the entry into force of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). The disbursement of funds will occur in three tranches, contingent upon the full and timely implementation of the agreed-upon economic policies outlined in the MoU. These policies include ambitious reforms in key areas such as public governance, fiscal management, and anti-corruption efforts, ensuring that the assistance supports Jordan’s long-term economic resilience.

This assistance complements the ongoing IMF program approved in January 2024, which provides $1.2 billion over four years, and aligns with support from other international partners, including substantial U.S. grants. It also builds on Jordan’s track record with macro-financial assistance, being the fourth MFA operation since 2014, totaling €1.08 billion to date. These successive programs underscore the EU’s ongoing commitment to strengthening Jordan’s institutional capacity and promoting economic stability.

By addressing Jordan’s immediate financing needs and supporting reforms in key areas, the MFA reinforces the country’s economic resilience while contributing to regional stability. Subordinated to clear economic policy conditions, this assistance ensures accountability and progress. The full and timely implementation of these policies will remain a prerequisite for the disbursement of each tranche, ensuring that Jordan continues to meet its reform commitments.

Jordan is a key partner in the region, able to engage in dialogue with the various geopolitical players in the Middle East. It is important to give Jordan due consideration and not to take its support for granted. It is therefore important to build a global and strategic partnership with Jordan, alongside and in addition to this MFA, in order to quickly lay the foundations for tomorrow’s collaboration.

ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

Pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure, the rapporteur declares that she received input from the following entities or persons in the preparation of the report, prior to the adoption thereof in committee:

Entity and/or person

European Commission – DG ECFIN

European Commission – DG NEAR

EEAS

Embassy of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan

The list above is drawn up under the exclusive responsibility of the rapporteur.

Where natural persons are identified in the list by their name, by their function or by both, the rapporteur declares that she has submitted to the concerned natural persons the European Parliament’s Data Protection Notice No 484 (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/data-protect/index.do), which sets out the conditions applicable to the processing of their personal data and the rights linked to that processing.

BUDGETARY ASSESSMENT OF THE COMMITTEE ON BUDGETS (4.2.2025)

for the Committee on International Trade

on the proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on providing macro-financial assistance to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan

(COM(2024)0159 – C9‑0146/2024 – 2024/0086(COD))

Rapporteur for budgetary assessment: Johan Van Overtveldt

The Committee on Budgets has carried out a budgetary assessment of the proposal under Rule 58 of the Rules of Procedure and has reached the following conclusions:

A. whereas Jordan continues to face significant external financing needs and economic challenges, with a current account deficit of 7.1 % of gross domestic product (GDP) in the first half of 2023, driven by persistent deficits in trade in goods; whereas Jordan’s public debt burden remains high at 88.7 % of GDP in 2023, raising concerns about long-term fiscal sustainability;

B. whereas Jordan’s narrow revenue base, with domestic tax revenue at only 16 % of GDP, raises concerns about long-term fiscal sustainability and capacity to service external debts;

C. whereas the policy measures associated with macro-financial assistance (MFA) cover selected provisions related to the Association Agreement and the EU-Jordan Partnership Priorities 2021-2027;

D. whereas significant structural challenges hinder economic growth, with deficiencies in the business environment, access to finance, labour market flexibility and public administration; whereas unemployment remains high, especially among women, youth and university graduates, with women’s labour force participation at just 14 % in 2023, among the lowest globally; whereas the EU-Jordan Partnership Priorities 2021-2027 aim to address these issues by fostering decent work, innovation, skills development and comprehensive social protection systems;

E. whereas the EU-Jordan Partnership Priorities 2021-2027 highlight cooperation in inter-religious and intercultural dialogue and the protection of cultural heritage as drivers of peace and sustainable development; whereas these efforts can include safeguarding historical manuscripts and archives, contributing to inclusive dialogue and mutual understanding;

F. whereas Jordan’s economy has suffered significantly from protracted conflicts and crises in the region, notably in neighbouring Syria, and most recently in Israel/Gaza and the Red Sea; whereas these pose further risks to Jordan’s economic outlook, particularly affecting tourism and trade, with disruptions to exports and vessel traffic;

G. whereas the severe deterioration of external accounts and Jordan’s strategic importance for regional stability justify this support package;

H. whereas the conflicts in Gaza and the wider region have been exacerbating socioeconomic challenges in Jordan given its geographical position;

1. Notes that the Commission proposal of EUR 500 million in MFA requires EUR 45 million in provisioning under the External Action Guarantee from the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe; points out that the evolving financial and economic realities in Jordan might require a revision of the proposed amount of MFA, consequently having an effect on provisioning;

2. Notes that the assistance will be disbursed in three instalments between 2024 and 2027, with release strictly linked to the progress of the implementation of both the International Monetary Fund programme and additional policy measures;

3. Recalls that this represents the fourth MFA operation for Jordan since 2014, bringing total MFA support to EUR 1.58 billion, demonstrating the EU’s sustained commitment to supporting Jordan’s economic stability;

4. Acknowledges that the loan structure includes a grace period and spreads repayments over a long period, creating extended contingent liabilities for the EU budget that require monitoring over multiple financial frameworks;

5. Acknowledges that the International Monetary Fund assessed Jordan’s public debt level as sustainable in its report of January 2024, while noting that debt sustainability risks remain significant;

6. Recalls that previous MFA operations for Jordan have demonstrated positive track records in terms of repayment;

7. Emphasises that the MFA underpins Jordan’s continued commitment to values shared with the Union, including democracy, rule of law, good governance and respect for human rights; highlights that these commitments are key to ensuring effective reforms and long-term stability; stresses that a precondition for granting the Union’s macro-financial assistance is that Jordan respects effective democratic mechanisms – including a multi-party parliamentary system – and guarantees respect for human rights;

8. Stresses the importance of the regular verification of Jordan’s compliance with the preconditions, ongoing conditionality and objectives to protect the EU’s financial interests and ensure the implementation of the MFA in accordance with the regulation;

9. Calls for proper monitoring and regular reporting to Parliament and the Council on developments relating to the assistance as well as the continuous monitoring of conditions and objectives;

10. Recalls that while MFA is meant to be an exceptional crisis response instrument, its increasing use to address structural economic challenges in partner countries risks diluting its emergency nature;

11. Concludes that the proposal for a decision on providing macro-financial assistance to Jordan is compatible with the EU’s budgetary framework and financial rules.

ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS
FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR FOR BUDGETARY ASSESSMENT HAS RECEIVED INPUT

The Chair in his capacity as rapporteur for budgetary assessment declares under his exclusive responsibility that he did not receive input from any entity or person to be mentioned in this Annex pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure.

PROCEDURE – COMMITTEE ASKED FOR BUDGETARY ASSESSMENT

Title	Macro-financial assistance to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan
References	COM(2024)0159 – C9-0146/2024 – 2024/0086(COD)
Committee(s) responsible	INTA
Date announced in plenary	BUDG 25.4.2024
Rapporteur for budgetary assessment Date appointed	Johan Van Overtveldt 5.12.2024
Discussed in committee	16.1.2025
Date adopted	29.1.2025
Result of final vote	+: –: 0:	35 2 1
Members present for the final vote	Georgios Aftias, Rasmus Andresen, Isabel Benjumea Benjumea, Tobiasz Bocheński, Olivier Chastel, Tamás Deutsch, Angéline Furet, Jens Geier, Thomas Geisel, Jean-Marc Germain, Sandra Gómez López, Monika Hohlmeier, Alexander Jungbluth, Janusz Lewandowski, Giuseppe Lupo, Siegfried Mureşan, Matjaž Nemec, Danuše Nerudová, João Oliveira, Ruggero Razza, Karlo Ressler, Julien Sanchez, Hélder Sousa Silva, Joachim Streit, Carla Tavares, Nils Ušakovs, Lucia Yar, Auke Zijlstra
Substitutes present for the final vote	Damian Boeselager, Michalis Hadjipantela, Moritz Körner, Tiago Moreira de Sá, Rasmus Nordqvist, Michele Picaro, Jacek Protas, Beata Szydło
Members under Rule 216(7) present for the final vote	Thierry Mariani, Aodhán Ó Ríordáin

FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL
IN COMMITTEE ASKED FOR BUDGETARY ASSESSMENT

35	+
ECR	Tobiasz Bocheński, Michele Picaro, Ruggero Razza, Beata Szydło
NI	Thomas Geisel
PPE	Georgios Aftias, Isabel Benjumea Benjumea, Michalis Hadjipantela, Monika Hohlmeier, Janusz Lewandowski, Siegfried Mureşan, Danuše Nerudová, Jacek Protas, Karlo Ressler, Hélder Sousa Silva
PfE	Tamás Deutsch, Angéline Furet, Thierry Mariani, Tiago Moreira de Sá, Julien Sanchez
Renew	Olivier Chastel, Moritz Körner, Joachim Streit, Lucia Yar
S&D	Jens Geier, Jean-Marc Germain, Sandra Gómez López, Giuseppe Lupo, Matjaž Nemec, Aodhán Ó Ríordáin, Carla Tavares, Nils Ušakovs
Verts/ALE	Rasmus Andresen, Damian Boeselager, Rasmus Nordqvist

2	–
PfE	Auke Zijlstra
The Left	João Oliveira

1	0
ESN	Alexander Jungbluth

Key to symbols:

+ : in favour

– : against

0 : abstention

OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS (31.1.2025)

for the Committee on International Trade

on the proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on providing macro-financial assistance to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan

(COM(2024)0159 – C9‑0146/2024 – 2024/0086(COD))

Rapporteur for opinion: Malik Azmani

AMENDMENTS

The Committee on Foreign Affairs submits the following to the Committee on International Trade, as the committee responsible:

Amendment 1

Proposal for a decision

Recital 2


Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
(2) Since 2011, Jordan has embarked on a number of political reforms to strengthen parliamentary democracy and the rule of law. A Constitutional Court and an Independent Electoral Commission have been set up and a number of major laws, including the Electoral Act and the Political Parties Act as well as laws on decentralisation and municipalities, have been passed by the Jordanian Parliament. Legislative improvements as regards the independence of the judiciary and women’s rights have been adopted.	(2) Since 2021, Jordan has embarked on a number of political reforms to strengthen parliamentary democracy and the rule of law. A Constitutional Court and an Independent Electoral Commission have been set up and a number of major laws, including the Electoral Act and the Political Parties Act as well as laws on decentralisation and municipalities, have been passed by the Jordanian Parliament. Legislative improvements as regards the independence of the judiciary and women’s rights have been adopted. The European Election Observation Mission in Jordan took note of the inclusive and well-organised parliamentary elections that took place on 10 September 2024 in the context of the political modernisation initiated by the King in 2021. It is crucial that the Union continues to support peace in Jordan and does everything within its power to preserve the unique Jordanian model of ethnic and religious representation in order to ensure legitimate representation of those groups.

Amendment 2

Proposal for a decision

Recital 3


Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
(3) The Jordanian economy has suffered significantly from protracted conflicts in the region, notably in neighbouring Syria, and most recently in Israel/Gaza and the Red Sea. Since the start of the war in Syria, the Jordanian economy has been impacted by a large inflow of Syrian refugees, which has increased pressure on its fiscal position, public services and infrastructure. In addition to regional instability, the macroeconomic and fiscal challenges related to the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020/2021, commodity price developments following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, high exposure to trade fluctuations and the increase of borrowing costs for emerging markets globally continued to weigh on the Jordanian economy. As a result, Jordan experienced an economic contraction in 2020, followed by a slow economic recovery, as unemployment increased significantly in 2020 and remained high, and new fiscal and external financing needs emerged.	(3) The Jordanian economy has suffered significantly from protracted conflicts in the region, notably in neighbouring Syria, and most recently in Israel/Gaza and the Red Sea. Since the start of the war in Syria, the Jordanian economy has been impacted by a large inflow of Syrian refugees, which has increased pressure on its fiscal position, public services and infrastructure. The current uncertainty in Syria further exacerbates the already highly detrimental instability for Jordan. Jordan hosts around 1,3 million refugees, making it one of the countries with the highest number of refugee populations per capita. In addition to regional instability, the macroeconomic and fiscal challenges related to the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020/2021, commodity price developments following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, high exposure to trade fluctuations and the increase of borrowing costs for emerging markets globally continued to weigh on the Jordanian economy. As a result, Jordan experienced an economic contraction in 2020, followed by a slow economic recovery, as unemployment increased significantly in 2020 and remained high, and new fiscal and external financing needs emerged. Moreover, significant structural issues hinder economic growth, particularly in the area of private sector development. Challenges such as an unfavourable business environment and inflexibility in the labour market remain unresolved.

Amendment 3

Proposal for a decision

Recital 4 a (new)


Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
	(4a) The Union recognises Jordan’s pivotal role in promoting regional stability and mediating conflicts, particularly amidst heightened tensions. The proposed macro-financial assistance aims to support Jordan in maintaining its positive role in the region. In that context, and in recognition of Jordan being one of the Union’s strongest regional partners, it is imperative for the Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) to further deepen and strengthen the EU-Jordan partnership, thereby advancing cooperation.

Amendment 4

Proposal for a decision

Recital 21


Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
(21) A pre-condition for granting the Union’s macro-financial assistance should be that Jordan respects effective democratic mechanisms – including a multi-party parliamentary system – and the rule of law, and guarantees respect for human rights. In addition, the specific objectives of the Union’s macro-financial assistance should strengthen the efficiency, transparency and accountability of the public finance management systems in Jordan and promote structural reforms aimed at supporting sustainable and inclusive growth, employment creation and fiscal consolidation. Both the fulfilment of the pre-conditions and the achievement of those objectives should be regularly monitored by the Commission and the EEAS.	(21) A pre-condition for granting the Union’s macro-financial assistance should be that Jordan respects effective democratic mechanisms – including a multi-party parliamentary system – and the rule of law, and guarantees respect for human rights. In addition, the specific objectives of the Union’s macro-financial assistance should strengthen the efficiency, transparency and accountability of the public finance management systems in Jordan and promote structural reforms aimed at supporting sustainable and inclusive growth, employment creation, and fiscal consolidation and policies. Both the fulfilment of the pre-conditions and the achievement of those objectives should be regularly monitored by the Commission and the EEAS, which should subsequently be reported to the European Parliament. The Union should encourage Jordan’s efforts toward economic diversification and sustainability, particularly in sectors such as renewable energy, technology and digital services, in order to reduce its reliance on tourism and chemical exports and to enhance long-term resilience.

Amendment 5

Proposal for a decision

Recital 27


Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
(27) The Union’s macro-financial assistance should be subject to economic policy conditions, to be laid down in a Memorandum of Understanding. In order to ensure uniform conditions of implementation and for reasons of efficiency, the Commission should be empowered to negotiate such conditions with the Jordanian authorities under the supervision of the committee of representatives of the Member States in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011. Under that Regulation, the advisory procedure should, as a general rule, apply in all cases other than as provided for in that Regulation. Considering the potentially important impact of assistance of more than EUR 90 million, it is appropriate that the examination procedure be used for operations above that threshold. Considering the amount of the Union’s macro-financial assistance to Jordan, the examination procedure should apply to the adoption of the Memorandum of Understanding, and to any reduction, suspension or cancellation of the assistance.	(27) The Union’s macro-financial assistance should be subject to clear and measurable economic, as well as democracy, rule of law and human rights policy conditions, to be laid down in a Memorandum of Understanding. In order to ensure uniform conditions of implementation and for reasons of efficiency, the Commission should be empowered to negotiate such conditions with the Jordanian authorities under the supervision of the committee of representatives of the Member States in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011. Under that Regulation, the advisory procedure should, as a general rule, apply in all cases other than as provided for in that Regulation. Considering the potentially important impact of assistance of more than EUR 90 million, it is appropriate that the examination procedure be used for operations above that threshold. Considering the amount of the Union’s macro-financial assistance to Jordan, the examination procedure should apply to the adoption of the Memorandum of Understanding, including clear and measurable benchmarks to evaluate the implementation of each instalment, and to any reduction, suspension or cancellation of the assistance.

Amendment 6

Proposal for a decision

Article 2 – paragraph 2


Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
2. The Commission and the European External Action Service shall monitor the fulfilment of this pre-condition throughout the life cycle of the Union’s macro-financial assistance..	2. The Commission and the European External Action Service shall monitor the fulfilment of this pre-condition throughout the life cycle of the Union’s macro-financial assistance in a transparent process in which independent third parties are able to contribute meaningfully. The Commission and the EEAS shall also report, both regularly and in writing, to the European Parliament and to the Council on the fulfilment of the pre-condition referred to in paragraph 1.

Amendment 7

Proposal for a decision

Article 3 – paragraph 2


Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
2. The conditions referred to in paragraph 1 shall aim, in particular, at enhancing the efficiency, transparency and accountability of the public finance management systems in Jordan, including for the use of the Union’s macro-financial assistance. Progress in mutual market opening, the development of rules-based and fair trade, and other priorities in the context of the Union’s external policy shall also be duly taken into account when designing the policy measures. Progress in attaining those objectives shall be regularly monitored by the Commission.	2. The conditions referred to in paragraph 1 shall aim, in particular, at enhancing the efficiency, transparency and accountability of the public finance management systems in Jordan, including for the use of the Union’s macro-financial assistance. This shall include the publication of regular and detailed reports by the Jordanian government on the use of funds, specifying allocations for key sectors such as healthcare, education, and infrastructure, ensuring public access to such information. Progress in public services, mutual market opening, the development of rules-based and fair trade, and other priorities in the context of the Union’s external policy, including those related to democracy, rule of law and human rights, shall also be duly taken into account when designing the policy measures. Progress in attaining those objectives shall be regularly monitored by the Commission and the EEAS, and shall be communicated to the European Parliament.

Amendment 8

Proposal for a decision

Article 4 – paragraph 4


Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
4. Where the conditions referred to in the first subparagraph of paragraph 3 are not met, the Commission shall temporarily suspend or cancel the disbursement of the Union’s macro-financial assistance. In such cases, it shall inform the European Parliament and the Council of the reasons for the suspension or cancellation.	4. Where the conditions referred to in the first subparagraph of paragraph 3 are not met, the Commission shall temporarily suspend or cancel the disbursement of the Union’s macro-financial assistance. In such cases, it shall inform the European Parliament and the Council of the reasons for the suspension or cancellation and of the subsequent steps.

ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS
FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR FOR THE OPINION HAS RECEIVED INPUT

Pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure, the rapporteur for the opinion received input from the following entities or persons in the preparation of the opinion:

Entity and/or person

European Commission – DG ECFIN

The Court of Auditors

The Ambassador of Jordan to the EU

Member of the Royal committee to Modernize the Political System in Jordan

The list above is drawn up under the exclusive responsibility of the rapporteur for the opinion.

Where natural persons are identified in the list by their name, by their function or by both, the rapporteur for the opinion declares that he has submitted to the concerned natural persons the European Parliament’s Data Protection Notice No 484 (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/data-protect/index.do), which sets out the conditions applicable to the processing of their personal data and the rights linked to that processing.

PROCEDURE – COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION

Title	Macro-financial assistance to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan
References	COM(2024)0159 – C9-0146/2024 – 2024/0086(COD)
Committee(s) responsible	INTA
Opinion by Date announced in plenary	AFET 25.4.2024
Rapporteur for the opinion Date appointed	Malik Azmani 14.10.2024
Date adopted	30.1.2025
Result of final vote	+: –: 0:	54 11 6
Members present for the final vote	Mika Aaltola, Lucia Annunziata, Petras Auštrevičius, Jordan Bardella, Dan Barna, Wouter Beke, Robert Biedroń, Ioan-Rareş Bogdan, Marc Botenga, Grzegorz Braun, Sebastião Bugalho, Danilo Della Valle, Özlem Demirel, Elio Di Rupo, Michael Gahler, Geadis Geadi, Giorgos Georgiou, Raphaël Glucksmann, Bernard Guetta, Rima Hassan, Rasa Juknevičienė, Sandra Kalniete, Łukasz Kohut, Rihards Kols, Andrey Kovatchev, Vilis Krištopans, Nathalie Loiseau, Claudiu Manda, David McAllister, Sven Mikser, Francisco José Millán Mon, Arkadiusz Mularczyk, Leoluca Orlando, Kostas Papadakis, Tonino Picula, Nacho Sánchez Amor, Andreas Schieder, Alexander Sell, Villy Søvndal, Davor Ivo Stier, Sebastiaan Stöteler, Stanislav Stoyanov, Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, Michał Szczerba, António Tânger Corrêa, Marta Temido, Cristian Terheş, Riho Terras, Hermann Tertsch, Pierre-Romain Thionnet, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Reinier Van Lanschot, Roberto Vannacci, Hilde Vautmans, Harald Vilimsky, Željana Zovko
Substitutes present for the final vote	Malik Azmani, Engin Eroglu, Sandra Gómez López, Evin Incir, András László, Ana Catarina Mendes, Hans Neuhoff, Nicolás Pascual de la Parte, Tineke Strik, Ingeborg Ter Laak, Matej Tonin, Ivaylo Valchev, Isabel Wiseler-Lima, Milan Zver
Members under Rule 216(7) present for the final vote	Catarina Vieira

FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL IN COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION

54	+
ECR	Geadis Geadi, Rihards Kols, Arkadiusz Mularczyk, Cristian Terheş, Ivaylo Valchev
PPE	Mika Aaltola, Wouter Beke, Ioan-Rareş Bogdan, Sebastião Bugalho, Michael Gahler, Rasa Juknevičienė, Sandra Kalniete, Łukasz Kohut, Andrey Kovatchev, David McAllister, Francisco José Millán Mon, Nicolás Pascual de la Parte, Davor Ivo Stier, Michał Szczerba, Ingeborg Ter Laak, Riho Terras, Matej Tonin, Isabel Wiseler-Lima, Željana Zovko, Milan Zver
PfE	András László
Renew	Petras Auštrevičius, Malik Azmani, Dan Barna, Engin Eroglu, Bernard Guetta, Nathalie Loiseau, Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, Hilde Vautmans
S&D	Lucia Annunziata, Robert Biedroń, Elio Di Rupo, Raphaël Glucksmann, Sandra Gómez López, Evin Incir, Claudiu Manda, Ana Catarina Mendes, Sven Mikser, Tonino Picula, Nacho Sánchez Amor, Andreas Schieder, Marta Temido
The Left	Özlem Demirel, Rima Hassan
Verts/ALE	Leoluca Orlando, Villy Søvndal, Tineke Strik, Reinier Van Lanschot, Catarina Vieira

11	–
ECR	Sebastian Tynkkynen
NI	Grzegorz Braun, Kostas Papadakis
PfE	Jordan Bardella, Vilis Krištopans, Sebastiaan Stöteler, António Tânger Corrêa, Hermann Tertsch, Pierre-Romain Thionnet, Roberto Vannacci, Harald Vilimsky

6	0
ESN	Hans Neuhoff, Alexander Sell, Stanislav Stoyanov
The Left	Marc Botenga, Danilo Della Valle, Giorgos Georgiou

Key to symbols:

+ : in favour

– : against

0 : abstention

PROCEDURE – COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE

Title	Macro-financial assistance to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan
References	COM(2024)0159 – C9-0146/2024 – 2024/0086(COD)
Date submitted to Parliament	8.4.2024
Committee(s) responsible	INTA
Committees asked for opinions Date announced in plenary	AFET 25.4.2024
Rapporteurs Date appointed	Céline Imart 30.9.2024
Discussed in committee	14.10.2024	30.1.2025
Date adopted	20.3.2025
	BUDG 29.1.2025
Result of final vote	+: –: 0:	35 2 3
Members present for the final vote	Christophe Bay, Brando Benifei, Anna Bryłka, Udo Bullmann, Benoit Cassart, Markéta Gregorová, Bart Groothuis, Céline Imart, Karin Karlsbro, Bernd Lange, Ilia Lazarov, Thierry Mariani, Javier Moreno Sánchez, Ştefan Muşoiu, Daniele Polato, Majdouline Sbai, Lukas Sieper, Dominik Tarczyński, Francesco Torselli, Kathleen Van Brempt, Jörgen Warborn, Iuliu Winkler, Bogdan Andrzej Zdrojewski, Juan Ignacio Zoido Álvarez
Substitutes present for the final vote	Mika Aaltola, Nicolas Bay, Markus Buchheit, João Cotrim De Figueiredo, Danilo Della Valle, Borja Giménez Larraz, Vicent Marzà Ibáñez, Marina Mesure, Martin Schirdewan, Kris Van Dijck
Members under Rule 216(7) present for the final vote	Hildegard Bentele, Mélanie Disdier, Niels Geuking, Chloé Ridel, Romana Tomc, Matthieu Valet
Date tabled	24.3.2025

FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL BY THE COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE

35	+
ECR	Daniele Polato, Dominik Tarczyński, Francesco Torselli, Kris Van Dijck
NI	Lukas Sieper
PPE	Mika Aaltola, Hildegard Bentele, Niels Geuking, Borja Giménez Larraz, Céline Imart, Ilia Lazarov, Romana Tomc, Jörgen Warborn, Iuliu Winkler, Bogdan Andrzej Zdrojewski, Juan Ignacio Zoido Álvarez
PfE	Christophe Bay, Anna Bryłka, Mélanie Disdier, Thierry Mariani, Matthieu Valet
Renew	Benoit Cassart, João Cotrim De Figueiredo, Bart Groothuis, Karin Karlsbro
S&D	Brando Benifei, Udo Bullmann, Bernd Lange, Javier Moreno Sánchez, Ştefan Muşoiu, Chloé Ridel, Kathleen Van Brempt
Verts/ALE	Markéta Gregorová, Vicent Marzà Ibáñez, Majdouline Sbai

2	–
ECR	Nicolas Bay
ESN	Markus Buchheit

3	0
The Left	Danilo Della Valle, Marina Mesure, Martin Schirdewan

Key to symbols:

+ : in favour

– : against

0 : abstention

MIL OSI Europe News –

March 25, 2025

MIL-OSI Security: NEWARK EXPEDITER ADMITS CONSPIRING TO GIVE BRIBES TO NEWARK OFFICIALS AND OTHER FRAUD

Source: Office of United States Attorneys

NEWARK, N.J. – A Newark-based expediter today admitted to conspiring to give bribes to Newark public officials, including then-Newark Councilmember Joseph A. McCallum, Jr., in connection with real estate development and construction-related transactions and conspiring with others to create and sell falsified documents supposedly issued by the City of Newark in connection with development, construction, rental or sale of such properties in Newark. Baxter also admitted to feigning the need to pay a bribe to a Newark official to fraudulently obtain money for himself and participating in a separate scheme to fraudulently obtain federal COVID-19 Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) loans, U.S. Attorney John Giordano announced.

Lamont Baxter, 49, pleaded guilty before U.S. District Judge William J. Martini to seven counts in an information charging him with conspiring to give bribes to Newark officials, giving bribes to McCallum in connection with a developer’s real estate transactions, committing wire fraud in connection with a purported cash bribe payment, conspiring to commit wire fraud in connection with falsifying documents purportedly issued by the City of Newark, and committing wire fraud to obtain PPP loans.

According to documents filed in these cases and statements made in court:

As an expediter on real estate and construction matters in Newark, from 2017 through August 2022, Baxter served as a liaison between Newark officials and agencies and individuals seeking permits, Certificates of Continued Occupancy (CCO), Certificates of Code Compliance (CCC), approvals and other actions on an expedited basis. To provide these expediting services, for years, Baxter conspired with others, including developers, to pay cash bribes to various Newark officials so that these officials completed the official acts that Baxter requested on behalf of the developers and others. Baxter would often use the term “taking care of” a Newark official to indicate to a developer when additional cash or extra payment was needed to be added to official fees charged by Newark so that Baxter could use the extra money to bribe a Newark official, such as an official handling the issuance of a CCC.

In addition to paying bribes to Newark officials on behalf of others, Baxter also once fraudulently obtained a $10,000 cash payment for himself by falsely indicating to his developer client that the cash was needed to pay a bribe to a Newark official. In that instance, Baxter kept the entire payment for himself and simply pretended that he had given the payment to a Newark Official.

Part of Baxter’s participation in the bribery schemes included delivering cash bribes exceeding $5,000 from 2019 to 2020 to then-Councilmember McCallum on behalf of a Newark developer who sought and obtained McCallum’s official assistance in obtaining approvals for real estate projects in Newark. On March 15, 2022, before Judge William J. Martini, McCallum admitted receiving bribes while serving as a Councilmember and a director of the Newark Community Economic Development Corporation, as part of his guilty plea to wire fraud for devising a scheme to defraud Newark and of the right to McCallum’s honest services and subscribing to a false personal tax return for calendar year 2018.

Part of Baxter’s expediting services from 2017 to August 2022, included conspiring with others to create and deliver falsified and fraudulent CCOs, CCCs, and certificates of approval issued by the City of Newark notifying a utility that was to provide electricity for a property that the required inspection had been conducted at the property (known as “cut-in cards”) to individuals who needed these official documents in relation to the development, construction, rental or sale of properties in Newark. Baxter and others used this scheme to fraudulently obtain payments from the individuals who required these official documents from the City of Newark.

Baxter also used the various entities he incorporated to obtain payments as an expediter to facilitate a scheme to fraudulently obtain PPP loans during the COVID-19 pandemic. In 2020 and 2021, Baxter participated in preparing and submitting fraudulent PPP loan applications that included false tax forms and documents and contained false information on the application forms, concerning, among other things, the companies’ gross revenue. As part of this scheme, Baxter even attempted to obtain a PPP loan for a lounge that he did not actually own and control, pretending to be its owner. As a result of his fraudulent scheme, Baxter obtained over $40,000 in PPP loan funds.

The conspiracy to commit bribery charge in Count 1 of the information to which Baxter pleaded guilty carries a maximum penalty of 5 years in prison and the bribery charge in Count 2 to which Baxter pleaded guilty carries a maximum penalty of 10 years in prison. The wire fraud and wire fraud conspiracy charges in Counts 3 through 7 to which Baxter pleaded guilty each carry a maximum penalty of 20 years in prison. All of the charges carry a maximum fine of $250,000, or twice the pecuniary gain to the defendant or loss to the victims, whichever is greater. Sentencing for Baxter is scheduled for August 12, 2025 at 11 a.m.

U.S. Attorney Giordano credited special agents of the FBI’s Newark Field Office, under the direction of Special Agent in Charge in Newark Terence G. Reilly in Newark; special agents of IRS-Criminal Investigation, under the direction of Special Agent in Charge Jenifer L. Piovesan, and special agents of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of Inspector General, under the direction of Special Agent in Charge Shawn Rice, with the investigation leading to today’s guilty plea by Baxter.

The government is represented by Deputy Chief Jihee G. Suh and Assistant U.S. Attorney Francesca Liquori of the U.S. Attorney’s Office’s Special Prosecutions Division and Chief Katherine Calle of the U.S. Attorney’s Office’s Opioid Unit.

All other co-conspirators identified in the Information are presumed innocent until proven guilty.

                                                 ###

Defense counsel: John A. McMahon, Esq.

MIL Security OSI –

March 25, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: Latest IAEA Reports Confirm Japan’s ALPS Treated Water Release Continues to Meet International Safety Standards

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

The discharge of treated water from Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (FDNPS) is proceeding in line with international safety standards, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Task Force confirmed today in its third report since the water discharge began in August 2023.

During its mission to Japan from December 9 to 12, 2024, the Task Force assessed the technical and regulatory aspects of the ALPS-treated water discharge. This included an on-site visit to the FDNPS facility to directly observe the equipment and infrastructure installed by Japan’s Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO), the operator of the FDNPS for the water discharge. The report also summarised the Task Force’s discussions with the Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA), Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI).

The Task Force report reaffirmed the findings of the IAEA’s comprehensive safety review, stating that its overall conclusions remain consistent with those from its first and second missions conducted after the discharge began. It emphasized that Japan’s NRA has maintained a comprehensive inspection plan, including onsite monitoring to ensure the safety of the water that is discharged. Additionally, the Task Force confirmed that the equipment and facilities are operating in accordance with relevant international safety standards.

In the IAEA Comprehensive Report on the Safety Review of the ALPS-Treated Water at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station that was released in July 2023 prior to the discharge, the IAEA found Japan’s approach to discharging the treated water to be consistent with international safety standards. It also said that the discharges as planned would have a negligible radiological impact to people and the environment. The IAEA Task Force has carried out eight missions as part of the safety review since the beginning of the IAEA’s multiyear review that began two years before the water discharge.

Today’s report also reviewed the IAEA’s ongoing independent verification of Japan’s monitoring programs, as well as onsite sampling and analysis conducted by IAEA experts at FDNPS since July 2023, when Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi established an IAEA office at the site. The IAEA’s onsite laboratory has analyzed the first eleven water discharges, confirming that the tritium concentration in each batch of diluted ALPS-treated water remains well below Japan’s operational limit consistent with international safety standards.

The Task Force noted the importance of the IAEA’s ongoing corroboration activities and the IAEA onsite independent sampling and analyses in providing a comprehensive, transparent and independent verification of the accuracy and reliability of the data reported by TEPCO and the Government of Japan.

Interlaboratory Comparisons

The IAEA has also released reports today on two interlaboratory comparisons (ILCs) for determining radionuclides in ALPS-treated water and in marine environmental samples collected from near to FDNPS, part of the Agency’s comprehensive monitoring and assessment efforts.

ILCs involve multiple laboratories independently analyzing samples, then reporting their results to the IAEA for evaluation to assess their reliability and accuracy.

One report presents the findings from an ILC based on samples collected during a mission in October 2023 when the IAEA, with experts from third-party laboratories, observed Japan’s collection and pretreatment of samples of seawater, sediment, fish and seaweed from coastal and offshore locations and a fish market close to FDNPS. Laboratories in Canada, China and the Republic of Korea, as well as the IAEA’s laboratories in Austria and Monaco, analysed the samples and reported the results to the IAEA for intercomparison.

The IAEA report confirms that Japan’s methods for sampling follow the appropriate methodological standards and that Japanese laboratories have reported accurate results that demonstrate a high degree of proficiency. The IAEA notes that these findings provide confidence in Japan’s capability for conducting reliable and high-quality monitoring related to the discharge of ALPS treated water.

The second ILC report, also released today, corroborates Japan’s source monitoring of ALPS treated water from the eighth batch prior to discharge in August last year. Water sampled from the tanks was analysed in laboratories in China, the Republic of Korea, Switzerland and the United States, as well as in the IAEA laboratories. Following assessment of the results submitted, the IAEA said the findings provide confidence in TEPCO’s capability for conducting reliable and high-quality source monitoring.

Corroboration of Internal Exposure Monitoring

Additionally, the Agency released a report today confirming that TEPCO is accurately monitoring the internal radiation exposure of workers handling ALPS-treated water.

The report presents the findings from ILCs organized by the IAEA last year, which corroborated results from IAEA, French and Japanese laboratories. The findings highlight that TEPCO has demonstrated both a high level of accuracy in their measurements and strong technical competence. A report focusing on external radiation exposure monitoring was published in November 2024.

All reports, as well as additional information such as frequently asked questions and a timeline of activities, can be found on the IAEA’s Fukushima Daiichi ALPS Treated Water Discharge webpage.

MIL Security OSI –

March 25, 2025

MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Make in India Powers Defence Growth

Source: Government of India (2)

Make in India Powers Defence Growth

Production hit ₹1.27 lakh crore in FY 2023-24, Exports cross ₹21,000 crore

Posted On: 24 MAR 2025 7:19PM by PIB Delhi

Summary

India’s defence production reached ₹1.27 lakh crore in FY 2023-24, marking a 174% rise since 2014-15, driven by the Make in India initiative.

Defence exports hit a record ₹21,083 crore in FY 2023-24, expanding 30 times in a decade, with exports to 100+ countries.

Initiatives like iDEX and SAMARTHYA are driving technological advancements in AI, cyber warfare, and indigenous weapon systems.

14,000+ items indigenised under SRIJAN and 3,000 under Positive Indigenisation Lists.

India aims for ₹3 lakh crore in production, ₹50,000 crore in exports by 2029.

Summary

Introduction

India’s defence production has grown at an extraordinary pace since the launch of the “Make in India” initiative, reaching a record ₹1.27 lakh crore in FY 2023-24. Once dependent on foreign suppliers, the country now stands as a rising force in indigenous manufacturing, shaping its military strength through homegrown capabilities. This shift reflects a strong commitment to self-reliance, ensuring that India not only meets its security needs but also builds a robust defence industry that contributes to economic growth.

Strategic policies have fuelled this momentum, encouraging private participation, technological innovation, and the development of advanced military platforms. The surge in the defence budget, from ₹2.53 lakh crore in 2013-14 to ₹6.81 lakh crore in 2025-26, underlines the nation’s determination to strengthen its military infrastructure.

This commitment to self-reliance and modernisation is reflected in the recent approval by the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) for the procurement of the Advanced Towed Artillery Gun System (ATAGS), a significant step in enhancing the Army’s firepower. The deal includes 307 units of 155mm/52 caliber guns along with 327 High Mobility 6×6 Gun Towing Vehicles, equipping 15 Artillery Regiments under the Buy Indian–Indigenously Designed, Developed, and Manufactured (IDDM) category, at an estimated cost of ₹7,000 crore. Developed by DRDO with Bharat Forge and Tata Advanced Systems, ATAGS is a cutting-edge artillery system with a 40+ km range, advanced fire control, precision targeting, automated loading, and recoil management, thoroughly tested by the Indian Army in all terrains.

With modern warships, fighter jets, artillery systems, and cutting-edge weaponry being built within the country, India is now a key player in the global defence manufacturing landscape.

Surge in Indigenous Defence Production

India has achieved the highest-ever growth in indigenous defence production in value terms during Financial Year (FY) 2023-24, driven by the successful implementation of government policies and initiatives led by Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi, focusing on attaining Atmanirbharta. The value of defence production has surged to a record high of ₹1,27,265 crore, marking an impressive 174% increase from ₹46,429 crore in 2014-15, according to data from all Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSUs), other public sector units manufacturing defence items, and private companies.

This growth has been bolstered by the Make in India initiative, which has enabled the development of advanced military platforms including the Dhanush Artillery Gun System, Advanced Towed Artillery Gun System (ATAGS), Main Battle Tank (MBT) Arjun, Light Specialist Vehicles, High Mobility Vehicles, Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) Tejas, Advanced Light Helicopter (ALH), Light Utility Helicopter (LUH), Akash Missile System, Weapon Locating Radar, 3D Tactical Control Radar, and Software Defined Radio (SDR), as well as naval assets like destroyers, indigenous aircraft carriers, submarines, frigates, corvettes, fast patrol vessels, fast attack craft, and offshore patrol vessels.

Key points:

65% of defence equipment is now manufactured domestically, a significant shift from the earlier 65-70% import dependency, showcasing India’s self-reliance in defence.

A robust defence industrial base includes 16 DPSUs, over 430 licensed companies, and approximately 16,000 MSMEs, strengthening indigenous production capabilities.

The private sector plays a crucial role, contributing 21% to total defence production, fostering innovation and efficiency.

India targets ₹3 lakh crore in defence production by 2029, reinforcing its position as a global defence manufacturing hub.

Unprecedented Growth in Defence Exports

India’s expanding global footprint in defence manufacturing is a direct result of its commitment to self-reliance and strategic policy interventions. Defence exports have surged from ₹686 crore in FY 2013-14 to an all-time high of ₹21,083 crore in FY 2023-24, marking a 30-fold increase over the past decade.

Key points:

Defence exports have grown 21 times, from ₹4,312 crore in the 2004-14 decade to ₹88,319 crore in the 2014-24 decade, highlighting India’s expanding role in the global defence sector.

Defence exports surged by 32.5% year-on-year, rising from ₹15,920 crore in FY 2022-23 to ₹21,083 crore in FY 2023-24.

India’s diverse export portfolio includes bulletproof jackets, Dornier (Do-228) aircraft, Chetak helicopters, fast interceptor boats, and lightweight torpedoes.

Notably, ‘Made in Bihar’ boots are now part of the Russian Army’s gear, highlighting India’s high manufacturing standards.

India now exports defence equipment to over 100 countries, with the USA, France, and Armenia emerging as the top buyers in 2023-24.

The government aims to achieve ₹50,000 crore in defence exports by 2029, reinforcing India’s role as a global defence manufacturing hub while boosting economic growth.

Innovations for Defence Excellence (iDEX)

Launched in April 2018, Innovations for Defence Excellence (iDEX) has created a thriving ecosystem for innovation and technology development in defence and aerospace. By engaging MSMEs, startups, individual innovators, R&D institutes, and academia, iDEX has provided grants of up to ₹1.5 crore for developing innovative technologies. To further enhance self-reliance in defence technology, ₹449.62 crore has been allocated to iDEX, including its sub-scheme Acing Development of Innovative Technologies with iDEX (ADITI), for 2025-26. As of February 2025, 549 problem statements have been opened, involving 619 startups and MSMEs, with 430 iDEX contracts signed.

The scheme has three key objectives:

Facilitate rapid development of new, indigenised, and innovative technologies for the Indian Defence and Aerospace sector, to meet their needs in a shorter time span.

Create a culture of engagement with innovative startups, to encourage co-creation for Defence and Aerospace sectors.

Empower a culture of technology co-creation and co-innovation within the Defence and Aerospace sectors.

The recently launched ADITI scheme aims to support critical and strategic technologies such as satellite communication, advanced cyber technology, autonomous weapons, semiconductors, artificial intelligence, quantum technology, nuclear technologies, and underwater surveillance. Under this scheme, grants of up to ₹25 crore are provided to innovators.

Reinforcing its commitment to supporting startups and MSMEs, the Ministry of Defence has also cleared procurement of 43 items worth over ₹2,400 crore from iDEX startups and MSMEs for the Armed Forces as of February 2025. Additionally, projects worth over ₹1,500 crore have been approved for development.

SAMARTHYA: Showcasing India’s Defence Indigenisation

The success story of indigenisation and innovation in the defence sector was highlighted at the Aero India 2025 event ‘SAMARTHYA’, which showcased India’s progress in defence manufacturing. The event featured 33 major indigenised items, including 24 developed by Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSUs), the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), and the Indian Navy, along with nine successful innovation projects from iDEX.

Among the key indigenised items displayed were:

Electro Block of the Anti-Aircraft Machine Gun
Electric Mobile Part for Submarines
Torsion Bar Suspension for HMV 6×6
Extruded Aluminium Alloy for LCA MK-I/II and LCH Components
Indian High-Temperature Alloy (IHTA)
VPX-135 Single Board Computer
Naval Anti-Ship Missile (Short Range)
RudraM II Missile
C4ISR System
DIFM R118 Electronic Warfare Systems

The event further highlighted breakthroughs in AI-driven analytical platforms, next-generation surveillance systems, quantum-secure communication technologies, and counter-drone measures. Innovations like the 4G/LTE TAC-LAN, Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) system, Smart Compressed Breathing Apparatus, and Advanced Autonomous Systems for the Armed Forces reflect India’s evolving defence landscape.

Efforts are ongoing to bridge the gap between the Indian Army’s operational challenges and the innovative solutions developed by academia, industry startups, and research institutions. Additionally, the focus remains on conducting multi-domain operations in a data-centric environment, especially in light of emerging transformative technologies.

SAMARTHYA stands as a testament to India’s commitment to self-reliance in defence technology, reinforcing its ability to develop advanced, home-grown solutions for national security.

Advancing Self-Reliance

India’s pursuit of self-reliance in defence manufacturing has significantly reduced its dependence on foreign suppliers. Through strategic policies and indigenous innovation, the country is developing cutting-edge military platforms, strengthening both national security and economic growth.

Self-Reliant Initiatives through Joint Action (SRIJAN)

Launched by the Department of Defence Production (DDP) in August 2020 to promote indigenisation under Atmanirbhar Bharat.
Serves as a common platform for Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSUs) and the Armed Forces (SHQs) to list imported items for domestic manufacturing.
As of February 2025, over 38,000 items are available, with more than 14,000 successfully indigenised.

Positive Indigenisation Lists (PILs)

The Department of Defence Production (DDP) and the Department of Military Affairs (DMA) have issued five Positive Indigenisation Lists (PILs) for LRUs, assemblies, sub-assemblies, sub-systems, spares, components, and high-end materials.
These lists set fixed timelines beyond which procurement will be restricted to domestic manufacturers.
Out of over 5,500 items listed, more than 3,000 have been indigenised as of February 2025.
Key indigenised technologies include artillery guns, assault rifles, corvettes, sonar systems, transport aircraft, light combat helicopters (LCHs), radars, wheeled armoured platforms, rockets, bombs, armoured command post vehicles, and armoured dozers.

Defence Industrial Corridors

Two Defence Industrial Corridors (DICs) have been set up in Uttar Pradesh and Tamil Nadu to boost defence manufacturing. These corridors provide incentives to companies investing in the sector.
Investments worth more than Rs 8,658 crore have already been made in the 6 nodes of UP viz. Agra, Aligarh, Chitrakoot, Jhansi, Kanpur and Lucknow and 5 nodes of Tamil Nadu viz. Chennai, Coimbatore, Hosur, Salem and Tiruchirappalli.
As of February 2025, 253 MoUs have been signed, with a potential investment of ₹53,439 crore.

Ease of Doing Business (EoDB)

The government has introduced several measures to improve ease of doing business in the defence manufacturing sector.
The validity of export authorisation for parts and components has been extended from two years to the completion of the order or component, whichever is later.
In 2019, the Defence Product List was streamlined to reduce the number of items requiring a manufacturing licence.
Parts and components of defence items were de-licensed in September 2019 to encourage investment.
The validity of defence licences under the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951, has been extended from three years to 15 years, with a further extension option of up to 18 years.
Over 700 industrial licences have been issued to 436 companies in the defence sector.
The introduction of an end-to-end digital export authorisation system has improved efficiency, with more than 1,500 authorisations issued in the last financial year.

MAKE Projects: Driving Indigenous Defence Innovation

The MAKE procedure was first introduced in the Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP-2006) to promote indigenous design and development in the defence sector. Over the years, it has been simplified and streamlined through revisions in 2016, 2018, and 2020, ensuring faster development of defence equipment, systems, and components by both public and private industries.

MAKE projects have been divided into three categories:

MAKE-I (Government Funded)

Up to 70% government funding for prototype development (capped at ₹250 crore per Development Agency).
Minimum 50% Indigenous Content (IC) required.

MAKE-II (Industry Funded)

Focuses on import substitution, encouraging domestic industries to develop critical defence systems.
No government funding, with a minimum 50% Indigenous Content (IC) requirement.

MAKE-III (Manufactured in India through Transfer of Technology – ToT)

Involves manufacturing in India under Technology Transfer (ToT) from Foreign OEMs.
No design and development but require a minimum of 60% Indigenous Content (IC).

Key points:

As of March 24, 2025, a total of 145 projects have been undertaken under the MAKE initiative, with the participation of 171 industries, driving indigenous defence production.

The initiative includes 40 MAKE-I projects (Government Funded), 101 MAKE-II projects (Industry Funded), and 4 MAKE-III projects (Manufacturing through ToT), strengthening self-reliance in defence manufacturing.

Other Key Initiatives

In recent years, the Indian government has implemented a series of transformative initiatives aimed at bolstering the country’s defence production capabilities and achieving self-reliance. These measures are designed to attract investment, enhance domestic manufacturing, and streamline procurement processes. From liberalizing foreign direct investment (FDI) limits to prioritizing indigenous production, these initiatives reflect a robust commitment to strengthening India’s defence industrial base. The following points outline the key government initiatives that have been pivotal in driving growth and innovation in the defence sector.

Liberalized FDI Policy: Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the defence sector was liberalised in September 2020 to attract foreign investment, allowing up to 74% FDI through the automatic route and above 74% through the government route. Since April 2000, the total FDI in defence industries stands at $21.74 million.

TATA Aircraft Complex: Tata Aircraft Complex was inaugurated in Vadodara in October 2024 to manufacture C-295 aircraft, boosting Atmanirbharta in defence with 40 made-in-India aircraft out of 56 under the programme.

Manthan: The annual defence innovation event, Manthan, held during Aero India 2025 in Bengaluru, brought together leading innovators, startups, MSMEs, academia, investors, and industry leaders from the defence and aerospace sectors, reaffirming confidence in the government’s commitment to technological advancements and Aatmanirbhar Bharat.

Defence Testing Infrastructure Scheme (DTIS): DTIS aims to boost indigenisation by providing financial assistance for setting up eight Greenfield testing and certification facilities in the aerospace and defence sector, with seven test facilities already approved in areas like unmanned aerial systems, electronic warfare, electro-optics, and communications.

Priority for Domestic Procurement: Emphasis is placed on procuring capital items from domestic sources under the Defence Acquisition Procedure (DAP)-2020.

Domestic Procurement Allocation: MoD has earmarked 75% of modernisation budget amounting to Rs 1,11,544 crore for procurement through domestic industries during the current Financial Year.

Conclusion

India’s remarkable strides in defence production and exports underscore its transformation into a self-reliant and globally competitive military manufacturing hub. The combination of strategic policy interventions, increased domestic participation, and a focus on indigenous innovation has significantly strengthened the country’s defence capabilities. The surge in production, the exponential rise in exports, and the success of initiatives like the Make in India reflect India’s commitment to achieving Atmanirbharta in defence. With ambitious targets set for 2029, the nation is poised to further expand its global footprint, reinforcing its position as a dependable partner in the international defence market while enhancing national security and economic growth.

References:

Click here to see PDF.

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Santosh Kumar/ Sarla Meena/ Saurabh Kalia

(Release ID: 2114546) Visitor Counter : 28

MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

March 25, 2025

MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: CULMINATION OF BILATERAL NAVAL EXERCISE – VARUNA 2025

Source: Government of India (2)

Posted On: 24 MAR 2025 7:03PM by PIB Delhi

The bilateral naval exercise VARUNA 2025, held from 19 to 22 Mar 25, brought together Indian Navy and the French Navy, underscoring their enduring partnership.

This edition of the Exercise included exercises ranging across multi domain environments. The structured drills were designed to further fine-tune tactical and operational proficiency in complex scenarios. Advanced Air defence drills with the participation of Rafale-M of the French Navy and MIG-29K of the Indian Navy, simulating realistic combat scenarios, honed the ability of participating units to counter aerial threats jointly. Anti-Submarine Warfare exercises involving Indian submarine and Anti-Submarine frigates of the two forces focused on deepening the understanding and proficiency in underwater domain awareness and tactics. Surface warfare operations involved complex coordinated manoeuvres and simulated engagements, showcasing the combined combat power of the participating fleets. Replenishment At Sea exercises by the two Fleet Tankers proved the logistical interoperability and enhanced mutual support and endurance for sustained operations. This edition of the exercise achieved a higher degree of operational coordination between the two navies than the previous editions.

The exercise achieved its aim of enhanced Jointmanship and reinforced the shared commitment to upholding the principles of a rules-based maritime order and promoting stability in the Indo-Pacific. The complex drills provided invaluable operational experience, strengthening the collective capacity to address contemporary maritime security challenges. The exercise facilitated the critical exchange of Best Practices, fostering a deeper understanding of each other’s operational doctrines and enhancing the two navies’ ability to operate seamlessly in complex maritime environments. Since its inception, the Varuna exercise has been a cornerstone of India-France defence relations, with both countries recognising the importance of maritime security and collaborative defence efforts. France and India share a strong commitment to safeguarding global Sea lanes and addressing shared maritime security challenges.

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VM/SPS 65/25

(Release ID: 2114535) Visitor Counter : 47

MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

March 25, 2025
MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Union Minister Sarbananda Sonowal joins Global Maritime Leaders at Singapore Maritime Week (SMW)

Source: Government of India (2)

Union Minister Sarbananda Sonowal joins Global Maritime Leaders at Singapore Maritime Week (SMW)

Meets key Singapore Ministers to strengthen bilateral maritime & trade ties

Deliberates with ministerial counterparts from France, The Netherlands, Norway & Portugal on navigating Global Maritime Trends at SMW

Posted On: 24 MAR 2025 6:59PM by PIB Delhi

The Union Minister of Ports, Shipping & Waterways, Shri Sarbananda Sonowal joined Global Maritime Leaders at the Singapore Maritime Week (SMW) to discuss, deliberate and devise strategies based on the shared vision for a secure, sustainable and prosperous maritime future. The Minister highlighted the challenges and India’s vision to channel growth of the maritime sector around that. Shri Sonowal also argued for strengthening maritime connectivity and supply chains while the need for collective effort towards a green sustainable maritime future.

On digitalisation and future ready shipping, the Union Minister reiterated how it is the core strategy of India’s maritime policy. India’s maritime policies like ONOP, NLP (Marine), and MAITRI are streamlining port services, cutting transaction times, and enabling real-time data. India is also partnering with the UAE and Singapore to create Virtual Trade Corridors for seamless cargo movement.

Speaking on the occasion, the Union Minister, Sarbananda Sonowal said, “India’s maritime vision, rooted in ‘Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam’, promotes collaboration and shared prosperity. As a reliable and responsible partner, India is committed to building a green, secure, and inclusive maritime future. Alongside Singapore and global partners, we aim to drive innovation and collective action for a resilient maritime ecosystem.”

Shri Sonowal met Senior Minister and ex PM of Singapore, Lee Hsien Loong at the SMW. Union Minister was ushered to the bilateral meeting with Murali Pillai, Minister of State, Ministry of Law and Ministry of Transport, Singapore. The Union Minister also held individual meetings with other senior members of the government including Dr Tan See Leng, Minister for Manpower and Second Minister of Trade and Industry, Singapore; Vivian Balakrishnan, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Singapore. Sonowal said at the SMW that India is addressing supply chain vulnerabilities by developing key corridors like IMEEC, the Eastern Maritime Corridor, and the North-South Transport Corridor to secure trade routes. A USD 20 billion investment would enhance logistics, port connectivity, and trade facilitation. India targets a top-five global shipbuilding rank by 2047 through policy reforms and infrastructure upgrades. Ports aim to grow their global cargo share from 6% to 15% by 2047, supported by a Maritime Development Fund for fleet and shipyard expansion. The GIFT City is also rising as a global hub for maritime finance and ship leasing, offering a competitive gateway to global capital, highlighted Shri Sarbananda Sonowal at the SMW Adding further, he said, “The maritime sector faces both challenges and opportunities, from climate change and geopolitics to digital disruption and shifting trade patterns. Guided by PM Narendra Modi’s vision of Viksit Bharat and Atmanirbhar Bharat, India is advancing as a modern, self-reliant, and globally connected economy. The maritime sector is key to driving growth, resilience, and sustainable connectivity. India is expanding port infrastructure, integrating logistics, and boosting ease of doing business—resulting in greater port efficiency, stronger cargo flows, and growing investor confidence.”

In his concluding remark, Shri Sarbananda Sonowal said, “Sustainability is central to India’s maritime strategy. We are advancing green port infrastructure, promoting low-emission shipping, and supporting innovation in low-carbon vessels. Three Green Hydrogen Hub Ports— Kandla, Tuticorin, and Paradip—will drive alternative fuel adoption and green hydrogen production. India is also leading the IMO’s Green Voyage 2050 initiative, helping developing nations in their energy transitions. Our commitment, under the leadership of Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi ji, extends to developing Green Shipping Corridors, including the proposed India-Singapore Green and Digital Corridor, focused on clean energy and smart logistics. Oceans unite us. Through partnerships, we can turn today’s maritime challenges into shared, sustainable opportunities.” Sarbananda Sonowal also met Industry Captains including Jeremy Nixon, Global CEO, ONE and Masashi Hamada along with other corporate leaders from the Maritime Sector including APM Terminals, Gateway Terminals.

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GDH/HR

(Release ID: 2114536) Visitor Counter : 48

MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

March 25, 2025

MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Government steps to ensure energy security

Source: Government of India

Posted On: 24 MAR 2025 4:35PM by PIB Delhi

Prices of petrol and diesel are market determined and Public Sector Oil Marketing Companies (OMCs) take appropriate decision on pricing of petrol and diesel.

Domestically, Petrol and Diesel prices have come down to Rs. 94.77 and Rs. 87.67 per litre respectively (Delhi prices) as a result of various steps taken by Government and PSU OMCs, Central Excise duty was reduced by the Central Government by a total of Rs. 13/litre and Rs. 16/litre on petrol and diesel respectively in two tranches in November 2021 and May 2022, which was fully passed on to consumers. Some State Governments also reduced state VAT rates to provide relief to citizens. In March, 2024, OMCs reduced the retail prices of petrol and diesel by Rs. 2 per litre each.

India has been the only major economy in the world where the prices of petrol and diesel have come down in recent years. Changes in prices of petrol and diesel in some major economies between November 2021 and January 2025 are as under:

	% age Change in Prices between Nov-21 and Jan-25
Country	Petrol	Diesel
India (Delhi)	-13.60%	-10.92%
France	14.21%	15.08%
Germany	7.87%	12.43%
Italy	8.65%	11.39%
Spain	8.67%	12.93%
UK	0.08%	2.61%
Canada	10.52%	23.05%
USA	4.83%	12.86%

Changes in prices of petrol and diesel in some neighboring economies between November 2021 and January 2025

	% age Change in Prices between Nov-21 and Jan-25
Country	Petrol	Diesel
India (Delhi)	-13.60%	-10.92%
Pakistan	29.76%	34.97%
Bangladesh	13.94%	30.82%
Sri Lanka	53.98%	101.59%
Nepal	22.02%	31.32%

India imports about 60% of the domestic LPG consumed. Price of LPG in the country is linked to its price in the international market. While the average Saudi CP (international benchmark for LPG pricing) rose by 63% (from US$ 385/MT in July 2023 to US$ 629/MT in February 2025), the effective price for Pradhan Mantri Ujjwala Yojana (PMUY) consumers for domestic LPG was reduced by 44% (from Rs. 903 in August 2023 to Rs. 503 in February 2025).

The retail selling price of a 14.2 Kg domestic LPG cylinder is currently Rs. 803 in Delhi. After a targeted subsidy of Rs. 300/cylinder to PMUY consumers, Government of India is providing 14.2 Kg LPG cylinders at an effective price of Rs.503 per cylinder (in Delhi). This is available to more than 10.33 crore Ujjwala beneficiaries, across the country.

Globally, PMUY is the biggest program of its kind that provides Domestic LPG to more than 100 million poor households at an effective price of just about Rs. 35/Kg. Further, the effective price of domestic LPG cylinder in neighbouring countries as on 01.01.2025 is as below.

Country	Domestic LPG (Rs./14.2 kg.cyl.)
India	503.00*
Pakistan	1094.83
Sri Lanka	1231.53
Nepal	1206.65

Government of India is closely monitoring global energy markets as well as potential energy supply disruptions as a fall-out of the evolving geopolitical situation. To ensure security of crude supplies and to mitigate the risk of dependence on crude oil from single region, Public Sector Undertakings (PSUs) have diversified their petroleum import basket and are procuring crude from countries located at various geographical locations.

Government has adopted a multi-pronged strategy to reduce the dependency on crude oil which, inter alia, include demand substitution by promoting usage of natural gas as fuel/feedstock across the country towards increasing the share of natural gas in economy and moving towards gas based economy, promotion of renewable and alternate fuels like ethanol, second generation ethanol, compressed bio gas and biodiesel, refinery process improvements, promoting energy efficiency and conservation, efforts for increasing production of oil and natural gas through various policies initiatives, etc. For promoting the use of Compressed Bio Gas (CBG) as automotive fuel, Sustainable Alternative Towards Affordable Transportation (SATAT) initiative has also been launched.

The government has been taking various steps to boost domestic oil and gas production which, inter-alia, include:

i. Policy under PSC regime for early monetization of hydrocarbon discoveries, 2014.

ii. Discovered Small Field Policy, 2015.

iii. Hydrocarbon Exploration and Licensing Policy (HELP), 2016.

iv. Policy for Extension of PSCs, 2016 and 2017.

v. Policy for early monetization of Coal Bed Methane, 2017.

vi. Setting up of National Data Repository, 2017.

vii. Appraisal of Un-appraised areas in Sedimentary Basins under National Seismic Programme, 2017.

viii. Policy framework for extension of PSCs for Discovered Fields and Exploration Blocks

under Pre-New Exploration Licensing Policy (Pre-NELP), 2016 and 2017.

ix. Policy to Promote and Incentivize Enhanced Recovery Methods for Oil and Gas, 2018.

x. Policy Framework for exploration and exploitation of Unconventional Hydrocarbons under Existing Production Sharing Contracts (PSCs), Coal Bed Methane (CBM) Contracts and Nomination Fields, 2018.

xi. Natural Gas Marketing Reforms, 2020.

xii. Lower Royalty Rates, Zero Revenue Share (till Windfall Gain) and no drilling commitment in Phase-I in OALP Blocks under Category II and III basins to attract bidders.

xiii. Release of about 1 million Sq. Km. (SKM) ‘No-Go’ area in offshore which were blocked for exploration for decades.

xiv. Government is also spending about Rs.7500 Cr. for acquisition of seismic data in onland and offshore areas and drilling of stratigraphic wells to make quality data of Indian Sedimentary Basins available to bidders. Government has approved acquisition of additional 2D Seismic data of 20,000 LKM in onland and 30,000 LKM in offshore beyond Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of India.

This information was given by THE MINISTER OF STATE IN THE MINISTRY OF PETROLEUM AND NATURAL GAS SHRI SURESH GOPI, in a written reply in Rajya Sabha today.

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MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

March 25, 2025

MIL-Evening Report: Plants breathe with millions of tiny mouths. We used lasers to understand how this skill evolved

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Tim Brodribb, Professor of Plant Physiology, University of Tasmania

Stomata – the breathing ‘mouths’ of leaves – under the microscope. Barbol / Shutterstock

Plant behaviour may seem rather boring compared with the frenetic excesses of animals. Yet the lives of our vegetable friends, who tirelessly feed the entire biosphere (including us), are full of exciting action. It just requires a little more effort to appreciate.

One such behaviour is the dynamic opening and closing of millions of tiny mouths (called stomata) located on each leaf, through which plants “breathe”. In this process they let out water extracted from the soil in exchange for precious carbon dioxide from the air, which they need to produce sugar in the sunlight-powered process of photosynthesis.

Opening the stomata at the wrong time can waste valuable water and risk a catastrophic drying-out of the plant’s vascular system. Almost all land plants control their stomata very precisely in response to light and humidity to optimise growth while minimising the damage risk.

How plants evolved this extraordinary balancing act has been the subject of considerable debate among scientists. In a new paper published in PNAS we used lasers to find out how the earliest stomata may have operated.

Tiny valves, global consequences

Much depends on the way stomata behave: plant productivity, sensitivity to drought, and indeed the pace of the global carbon and water cycles.

However, they are difficult to observe in action. Each stomata is like a tiny, pressure-operated valve. They have “guard cells” surrounding an opening or pore which lets water vapour out and carbon dioxide in.

When pressure increases in stomata guard cells, the pore opens – and vice versa.
Artemide / Shutterstock

When fluid pressure increases inside the stomata’s guard cells, they swell up to open the pore. When pressure drops, the cells deflate and the pore closes. To understand stomata behaviour, we wanted to be able to measure the pressure in the guard cells – but it’s not easy.

Lasers, bubbles and evolution

Enter Craig Brodersen of Yale University with a newly developed microscope-guided laser. It can create microscopic bubbles inside the individual cells that operate the stomatal pore.

When Brodersen spent a sabbatical at the University of Tasmania (where I am based), we found we could determine the pressure inside stomatal cells by tracking the size of these bubbles and how quickly they collapsed. This involved theoretical calculations guided by bubble expert Philippe Marmottant, of the French National Centre for Scientific Research (CNRS) in Grenoble.

This new tool gave us the perfect opportunity to explore how the behaviour of stomata is different among major plant groups. The aim was to test our hypothesis that the evolution of stomatal behaviour follows a predictable trajectory through the history of plant evolution.

We argue it began with a relatively simple ancestral passive control state, currently represented in living ferns and lycophytes, and developed to a more active hormonal control mechanism seen in modern conifers and flowering plants.

Against this hypothesis, some researchers have previously reported complex behaviours in some of the most ancient of stomata-bearing plants, the bryophytes. We wanted to test this finding using our newly developed laser instrument.

400 million years of development

What we found was firstly that our laser pressure probe technique worked extremely well. We made nearly 500 measurements of stomatal pressure dynamics in the space of a few months. This was a marked improvement on the past 45 years, in which fewer than 30 similar measurements had been made.

Secondly, we found that the stomata of our representative bryophytes (hornworts and mosses) lacked even the most basic responses to light found in all other land plants.

The stomata of hornworts and mosses showed no response to changes in light.
Gondronx Studio / Shutterstock

This result supported our earlier hypothesis that the first stomata found in ancestors of the modern bryophytes 450 million years ago should have been very simple valves. They would have lacked the complex behaviours seen in modern flowering plants.

Our results suggest that stomatal behaviour has changed substantially through the process of evolution, highlighting critical changes in functionality that are preserved in the different major land plant groups that currently inhabit the Earth.

How plants will survive the future

We can now say with confidence that stomata in mosses, ferns, conifers and flowering plants all behave in very different ways. This has an important corollary: they will all respond differently to the heaving changes in atmospheric temperature and water availability that they face now and into the near future. Predicting stomatal behaviour in the future will help us to predict these impacts and highlight plant vulnerability.

In terms of agricultural benefit, our new laser method should be fast and sensitive enough to reveal even small differences in the the behaviour of closely related plants. This may help to identify crop variants that use water in a more efficient or productive way, which will assist plant breeders to find varieties that better translate increasingly unpredictable soil water supplies into food.

So next time you look upon a leaf, consider the frantic pace of dynamic calculation and adjustment of millions of little mouths, reacting as your breath falls upon them. Realise that our own fate, tied to the performance of forests and crops in future climates, hangs on the behaviour of the stomata of different species. A good reason for us to understand these unassuming little valves.

Tim Brodribb receives funding from the Australian Research Council.

– ref. Plants breathe with millions of tiny mouths. We used lasers to understand how this skill evolved – https://theconversation.com/plants-breathe-with-millions-of-tiny-mouths-we-used-lasers-to-understand-how-this-skill-evolved-249362

MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

March 25, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: ICE San Franciso and partners take transnational criminal off the streets in California

Source: US Immigration and Customs Enforcement

SAN FRANCISCO — U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement arrested Gurdev Singh, 23, an Indian national and criminal alien, March 12 in French Camp, California, as part of a targeted criminal enforcement action.

“ICE welcomes partnerships between federal and local law enforcement,” said ERO San Francisco acting Field Office Director Polly Kaiser. “Leveraging professionalism, dedication to public safety, and combined investigative resources saves lives and makes not only the U.S. a safer nation, but those from which criminal aliens come.”

Singh illegally entered the United States at an unknown location or date without admission or parole by U.S. immigration authorities. Singh was encountered by the U.S. Border Patrol near Lukeville, Arizona, Sept. 2, 2023, and was released on his own recognizance with a notice to appear before an immigration judge.

Singh was later identified as a person known to be associated with transnational criminal organizations and further investigation showed Singh was known to carry firearms illegally and was actively engaged in criminal activity in both the U.S. and abroad.

The California Highway Patrol arrested Singh March 6 for carrying a loaded firearm in public, not being the registered owner of a loaded firearm, possession of a stolen vehicle and child endangerment. An additional seven guns in Singh’s residence and two in a car located on the property were located with a subsequent search warrant.

ICE discovered Singh was in the custody of the San Joaquin Sheriff’s Office and lodged a detainer request on March 12, but the sheriff’s office was unable to honor that request. ICE took Singh into custody without incident at 11 p.m. that evening upon his release from San Joaquin County Jail. Singh will remain in ICE custody pending removal proceedings.

Members of the public who have information about foreign fugitives, transnational gang members, or other criminal aliens who are in the U.S. illegally are urged to contact ICE by calling the ICE Tip Line at 1 (866) 347-2423 or internationally at 001-1802-872-6199. They can also file a tip online by completing ICE’s online tip form. For more information, visit www.ice.gov or follow @EROSanFrancisco on X.

MIL OSI USA News –

March 25, 2025
MIL-Evening Report: Trump silences the Voice of America: end of a propaganda machine or void for China and Russia to fill?

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Valerie A. Cooper, Lecturer in Media and Communication, Te Herenga Waka — Victoria University of Wellington

Getty Images

Of all the contradictions and ironies of Donald Trump’s second presidency so far, perhaps the most surprising has been his shutting down the US Agency for Global Media (USAGM) for being “radical propaganda”.

Critics have long accused the agency – and its affiliated outlets such as Voice of America, Radio Free Europe and Radio Free Asia – of being a propaganda arm of US foreign policy.

But to the current president, the USAGM has become a promoter of anti-American ideas and agendas – including allegedly suppressing stories critical of Iran, sympathetically covering the issue of “white privilege” and bowing to pressure from China.

Propaganda is clearly in the eye of the beholder. The Moscow Times reported Russian officials were elated by the demise of the “purely propagandistic” outlets, while China’s Global Times celebrated the closure of a “lie factory”.

Meanwhile, the European Commission hailed USAGM outlets as a “beacon of truth, democracy and hope”. All of which might have left the average person understandably confused: Voice of America? Wasn’t that the US propaganda outlet from World War II?

Well, yes. But the reality of USAGM and similar state-sponsored global media outlets is more complex – as are the implications of the US agency’s demise.

Public service or state propaganda?

The USAGM is one of several international public service media outlets based in western democracies. Others include Australia’s ABC International, the BBC World Service, CBC/Radio-Canada, France Médias Monde, NHK-World Japan, Deutsche Welle in Germany and SRG SSR in Switzerland.

Part of the Public Media Alliance, they are similar to national public service media, largely funded by taxpayers to uphold democratic ideals of universal access to news and information.

Unlike national public media, however, they might not be consumed – or even known – by domestic audiences. Rather, they typically provide news to countries without reliable independent media due to censorship or state-run media monopolies.

The USAGM, for example, provides news in 63 languages to more than 100 countries. It has been credited with bringing attention to issues such as protests against COVID-19 lockdowns in China and women’s struggles for equal rights in Iran.

On the other hand, the independence of USAGM outlets has been questioned often, particularly as they are required to share government-mandated editorials.

Voice of America has been criticised for its focus on perceived ideological adversaries such as Russia and Iran. And my own research has found it perpetuates stereotypes and the neglect of African nations in its news coverage.

Leaving a void

Ultimately, these global media outlets wouldn’t exist if there weren’t benefits for the governments that fund them. Sharing stories and perspectives that support or promote certain values and policies is an effective form of “public diplomacy”.

Yet these international media outlets differ from state-controlled media models because of editorial systems that protect them from government interference.

The Voice of America’s “firewall”, for instance, “prohibits interference by any US government official in the objective, independent reporting of news”. Such protections allow journalists to report on their own governments more objectively.

In contrast, outlets such as China Media Group (CMG), RT from Russia, and PressTV from Iran also reach a global audience in a range of languages. But they do this through direct government involvement. CMG subsidiary CCTV+, for example, states it is “committed to telling China’s story to the rest of the world”.

Though RT states it is an autonomous media outlet, research has found the Russian government oversees hiring editors, imposing narrative angles, and rejecting stories.

A Voice of America staffer protests outside the Washington DC offices on March 17 2025, after employees were placed on administrative leave.
Getty Images

Other voices get louder

The biggest concern for western democracies is that these other state-run media outlets will fill the void the USAGM leaves behind – including in the Pacific.

Russia, China and Iran are increasing funding for their state-run news outlets, with China having spent more than US$6.6 billion over 13 years on its global media outlets. China Media Group is already one of the largest media conglomerates in the world, providing news content to more than 130 countries in 44 languages.

And China has already filled media gaps left by western democracies: after the ABC stopped broadcasting Radio Australia in the Pacific, China Radio International took over its frequencies.

Worryingly, the differences between outlets such as Voice of America and more overtly state-run outlets aren’t immediately clear to audiences, as government ownership isn’t advertised.

An Australian senator even had to apologise recently after speaking with PressTV, saying she didn’t know the news outlet was affiliated with the Iranian government, or that it had been sanctioned in Australia.

Switched off

Trump’s move to dismantle the USAGM doesn’t come as a complete surprise, however. As the authors of Capturing News, Capturing Democracy: Trump and the Voice of America described, the first Trump administration failed in its attempts to remove the firewall and install loyalists.

This perhaps explains why Trump has resorted to more drastic measures this time. And, as with many of the current administration’s legally dubious actions, there has been resistance.

The American Foreign Service Association says it will challenge the dismantling of the USAGM, while the Czech Republic is seeking EU support to keep Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty on the air.

But for many of the agency’s journalists, contractors, broadcasting partners and audiences, it may be too late. Last week the New York Times reported some Voice of America broadcasts had already been replaced by music.

Valerie A. Cooper does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Trump silences the Voice of America: end of a propaganda machine or void for China and Russia to fill? – https://theconversation.com/trump-silences-the-voice-of-america-end-of-a-propaganda-machine-or-void-for-china-and-russia-to-fill-252901

MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

March 25, 2025
MIL-OSI Canada: HMCS Ottawa returns from Operations HORIZON and NEON

Source: Government of Canada News (2)

March 24, 2025 – Esquimalt, B.C. – National Defence / Canadian Armed Forces

Today, His Majesty’s Canadian Ship (HMCS) Ottawa returned to its home port of Esquimalt, British Columbia, having completed its five-month deployment to the Indo-Pacific region under Operations HORIZON and NEON.

As part of Operation HORIZON, HMCS Ottawa and its crew conducted multinational exercises and maneuvers with Japan, the United States, the Republic of Korea, France, Australia, India, Malaysia, Indonesia, the United Kingdom and the Philippines. They participated in discussions on Women, Peace, and Security and conducted a Multilateral Maritime Cooperative Activity with the Philippines, held a port visit in Cambodia offering important first aid training to Cambodian forces, and participated in the French-led carrier strike group Exercise LA PEROUSE led by the French aircraft carrier Charles De Gaulle.

During Operation NEON, HMCS Ottawa’s crew identified and reported five vessels of interest—vessels that have, or are suspected of having, engaged in activity contrary to United Nations Security Council (UNSC) imposed sanctions against North Korea.

Canada’s routine presence in the Indo-Pacific region demonstrates our commitment to supporting peace, security, and stability in the region. The most recent actions and international engagements executed by the crew of HMCS Ottawa have shown Canada to be a reliable and capable international security partner.

MIL OSI Canada News –

March 25, 2025
MIL-OSI United Kingdom: UK-French relationship strengthened as Defence Chiefs discuss Ukraine and European security with their French counterparts
Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

Press release

UK-French relationship strengthened as Defence Chiefs discuss Ukraine and European security with their French counterparts

The UK and France have today continued top level defence engagements with a meeting of both nations Military Chiefs in London.
UK Military Chiefs with their French counterparts stood in front of MOD Main Building

UK and France working hand-in-hand to secure a lasting peace In Ukraine.

Historic Anglo-French Lancaster House Agreement to be strengthened in 2025.

Chiefs will discuss efforts to step-up on European security.

Leading international efforts to build a ‘Coalition of the Willing’ to support Ukraine’s future security, France and the UK have today continued top level defence engagements with a meeting of both nations Military Chiefs in London.

The heads of the defence forces for both countries, alongside the heads of the Armies, Navies and Air Forces, will be discussing UK and French efforts to galvanise the European response to the situation in Ukraine as well as the growing defence partnership between the two countries.

The third annual UK-France All Military Chiefs meeting comes at a pivotal time for European security and continues the acceleration of top level defence engagement around the Coalition of the Willing, where the UK and France have been leading discussions on how our military can support security guarantees for Ukraine’s future.

Admiral Sir Tony Radakin, Chief of the Defence Staff, said:

At this pivotal time for European security the third meeting of the British and French Chiefs of Staff should be seen as a sign of reassurance and commitment. Europe’s two leading nuclear powers are stepping up to forge a stronger and deeper partnership that has a vital foundational role to play in the security of the continent.

Today’s deliberations will help shape the future of British and French military cooperation, and our shared efforts to support Ukraine with military aid now and after any peace deal.

The combined convening power of Britain and France is immense. The political leadership of Prime Minister Starmer and President Macron is reflected in the military planning that is now underway between our respective staffs as we draw together a Coalition of the Willing from Europe and beyond.

This meeting comes after a series of high-level engagements hosted in both Paris and London, with the Prime Minister travelling to Paris and hosting leaders in London and the Defence Secretary conducting simultaneous visits to France as well as joining an operational planning meeting last week alongside the Prime Minister at the UK’s Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ).

The UK Is also set to host further joint planning meetings at PJHQ in Northwood this week, where intensive discussions will continue over several days.

Joint Anglo-French efforts to build political alignment and collective agreement amongst Euro-Atlantic security actors is essential to ensure that any Ukraine deal is adequately defended. As the Prime Minister and Defence Secretary have both clearly stated, a lasting peace in Ukraine can only be achieved if we provide real and credible security assurances to deter Putin.

The meetings will also provide an opportunity for dialogue ahead of UK-France Summit later in 2025. This summit will seek to enhance the 2010 Lancaster House Treaties on Security and Defence. These already provide the UK and France with a firm foundation of in-depth military cooperation, unmatched between European partners. The renewed treaties will be an ambitious refresh of our defence relationship and at this time of unprecedented challenge is vital to both of our security interests.

This work will aim to deliver the further integration of UK and French armed forces and include our shared Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (CJEF) concept, which has given the UK and France an unparalleled level of interoperability as allies.

Keeping the country safe is the Government’s first priority, and an integral part of its Plan for Change. The work of defence, is critical to the security and stability of the UK, supporting all of the Government’s five missions as a foundation of its plan.

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Published 24 March 2025
MIL OSI United Kingdom –
March 25, 2025
MIL-OSI: Credit Agricole Sa: Availability of Crédit Agricole S.A.’s 2024 Universal Registration Document and Annual Financial Report
Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

Press release

Montrouge, 24 March 2025

Availability of Crédit Agricole S.A.’s 2024 Universal Registration Document
and Annual Financial Report

Crédit Agricole S.A. informs the public that the French version of its 2024 Universal Registration Document and Annual Financial Report have been filed with the French Financial Market Authority (AMF) on March 24^th, 2025, under number D.25-0137.

The following documents are included in the Registration Document:
- the 2024 Annual Financial Report;
- the report on corporate governance;
- the informations on fees paid to the statutory auditors.
The French version of the document is available on the Crédit Agricole S.A. website
https://www.credit-agricole.com/finance/publications-financieres , as well as on the website of AMF.

A reproduction translated in English is also available on the website of Crédit Agricole S.A.
https://www.credit-agricole.com/en/finance/financial-publications

Press contacts of Crédit Agricole S.A.

Alexandre Barat : +33 1 57 72 12 19 – alexandre.barat@credit-agricole-sa.fr
Mathilde Durand : +33 1 57 72 19 43 – mathilde.durand@credit-agricole-sa.fr

See all our press releases on: www.credit-agricole.com – www.creditagricole.info

Attachment
- 2025 03 24 _ PR Universal Registration Document and Annual Financial Report 2024 UK
The MIL Network –
March 25, 2025
MIL-OSI Global: Giorgia Meloni’s government is still supporting Ukraine and backing NATO. Italy’s aerospace and defence sectors help explain why

Source: The Conversation – France – By Jean-Pierre Darnis, Full professor at the University of Côte d’Azur, director of the master’s programme in “France-Italy Relations”. Associate fellow at the Foundation for Strategic Research (FRS, Paris) and adjunct professor at LUISS University (Rome), Université Côte d’Azur

US President Donald Trump’s pivot toward Russia amid its war in Ukraine has collided with the stance of Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s government, which has always shown unwavering support for Kyiv as well as loyalty to Washington. When Trump came to power, Meloni wanted to appear connected to his administration, hoping to play the role of a bridge with Europe while France and Germany were in unfavourable political cycles. Trump’s pivot led to a revival of France’s role in Europe, while Germany emerged from its electoral period with its likely next chancellor, Friedrich Merz, calling for European defence’s “independence from the USA”.

Meloni’s position is not only weakening within the European context, where France, Germany and the UK play leading roles, but also in Italian politics, as US policy has created rifts within the three-part governing coalition. Meloni’s party, Fratelli d’Italia, supports Ukraine and Europe, as does Forza Italia. But the leader of Lega, Matteo Salvini, has come to embody Trumpism in Italy, taking an openly pro-Russian position and opposing European rearmament. If a break with Lega were to occur, it could call into question the viability of the government, as it would no longer hold an absolute majority in parliament.

Anti-French rhetoric

For her part, Meloni always tends to push back against any “European-only” defence solution proposed by France. This position is a way for Italy to avoid facing the fact that NATO has weakened. It also reactivates an anti-French rhetoric that is a classic refrain among Italian nationalists. Salvini has recently accused French President Emmanuel Macron of being “crazy” and calling for Europe to prepare for nuclear war.

However, Macron has not made any significant missteps toward Italy. Since the first informal emergency meeting in Paris after Trump’s policy shift toward Ukraine (a gathering that included the UK, Germany, Italy, Denmark, the Netherlands, Spain and Poland), the Italian government has always been involved. Moreover, Macron’s policy convergence with UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer has dulled criticisms, because Rome is traditionally close to London.

Both Meloni’s government and the opposition have put forward complicated if not unrealistic proposals for the war in Ukraine, such as a UN peacekeeping mission after a ceasefire, and repeatedly reaffirmed their commitment to NATO. In terms of public opinion, a poll published in mid-February – two weeks before Trump scolded Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky during a White House visit – found that 69 percent of Italians “are favourable toward a common European army”.

There is also a growing debate in Italy on nuclear deterrence. This issue had been taboo until now, with Italy benefitting from an arrangement in which US nuclear bombs are stored in bases on Italian soil. While Germany and Poland have expressed interest in an expansion of the French nuclear umbrella, Italian media and policymakers are also beginning to discuss it. The discussion may reflect doubts about US reliability within NATO, including Washington’s commitment to the alliance treaty’s Article 5, which holds that “an armed attack” on one member “shall be considered an attack against them all”.

À lire aussi :
French nuclear deterrence for Europe: how effective could it be against Russia?

Defence ties to Europe

There are also significant signals coming from Italian industry. While, in recent months, the Italian government appeared to want to use the telecommunications services of Starlink, the satellite network created by Elon Musk, for its defence needs, a contract no longer seems to be on the agenda. Musk’s fluctuating stance about the Starlink service provided to Kyiv, as well as the US decision that temporarily cut aid to Ukraine, introduced questions about reliability. This explains how, in just a few weeks, the French company Eutelsat, which owns the OneWeb constellation, has seen a resurgence of interest, as many countries assess its services as alternatives to Starlink. Following this turmoil, the Italian company Leonardo recently announced that it is planning to launch a constellation of 18 telecommunications satellites for defence purposes.

These developments also tie into Italy’s industrial position in aerospace and defence, because Leonardo and Fincantieri, another large, publicly owned company, do not limit their markets to the Italian armed forces. As part of a European strategy, Leonardo concluded an agreement with the German company Rheinmetall in 2024 to jointly produce battle tanks, and recently announced an agreement with the Turkish company Baykar to produce drones. Leonardo is part-owner, along with French defence company Thales, of Telespazio and of Thales Alenia Space, and is also in discussions with Airbus to form a European satellite production group. In the missile sector, Leonardo’s participation in European joint venture MBDA allowed Italy and France to produce the SAMP/T anti-missile system, which could lead to further developments for the European missile-defence network. In shipbuilding, Fincantieri has expressed interest in merging its activities with the German group Thyssen Krupp Marine Systems. And in aircraft, Italy is participating in the Global Air Combat Programme, which includes the UK and Japan in the production of fighter jets. These examples show that Italian aerospace and defence development is intrinsically linked to European collaborations and export markets.

Both in terms of industrial interests and politics, Italy is firmly anchored in the European camp. The positive stance that the Meloni government took toward Washington does not mean Rome is considering an alternative to EU affiliation. Italy is also facing continuous cyberattacks from Russian groups, which feeds a clear threat perception. The prime minister has stressed her differences with France and the UK during the recent European security summits, but while Italy may be reluctant to deploy peacekeeping troops in Ukraine, it cannot distance itself too much from the future defence architecture of Europe.

Jean-Pierre Darnis ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d’une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n’a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.

– ref. Giorgia Meloni’s government is still supporting Ukraine and backing NATO. Italy’s aerospace and defence sectors help explain why – https://theconversation.com/giorgia-melonis-government-is-still-supporting-ukraine-and-backing-nato-italys-aerospace-and-defence-sectors-help-explain-why-252683

MIL OSI – Global Reports –

March 25, 2025
MIL-OSI Africa: Secretary-General’s remarks to the Security Council – Advancing Adaptability in UN Peace Operations: responding to new realities [bilingual, as delivered; scroll down for all-English and all-French versions]

Source: United Nations – English

r. President, Excellencies,

I thank the government of Denmark for convening this high-level discussion.

United Nations peace operations safeguard people and communities in some of the most desperate places on earth.

These operations comprise both peacekeeping operations and special political missions.

Their work ranges from early warning to preventive diplomacy…

From peacemaking to verifying peace agreements to protecting civilians…

From negotiating ceasefires to helping parties implement them on the ground…

To electoral support and observer missions.

Collectively, these operations represent a critical tool at this Council’s disposal to maintain international peace and security in a variety of contexts.

Since the first special political mission and peacekeeping operation were deployed in 1948, our peace operations have grown, adapted and evolved.

Time and again, they allow us to mount tailored responses that have saved lives, reduced violence, prevented the expansion and spillover of deadly conflicts, and stopped atrocities.

Peace operations are designed not only to be an effective example of multilateralism in action — but a cost-effective one.

At their best, they show how when the UN comes together to address challenges, the burden is diminished on individual countries alone.

But as we all know, peace operations face serious barriers that demand new approaches.

Wars are becoming more complex and more deadly.

They last longer, and are more enmeshed in global and regional dynamics.

Negotiated settlements have been harder to achieve.

Meanwhile, our peace operations are confronted with a complex interplay of threats — many of which do not respect national borders.

Terror and extremist groups, organized crime, the weaponization of new technologies, and the effects of climate change are all testing our capacities to respond.

And, I regret to say, geopolitical divisions are undermining peace.

The bilateral and multilateral arrangements that — for decades — have managed tensions and maintained stability are eroding.

Violations of international law, human rights and the UN Charter are rampant — seemingly without consequence.

Trust is in short supply among — and within — countries and regions.

All of these challenges and more throw fuel on the fires of conflict.

Meanwhile, our peace responses are struggling.

We see a persistent mismatch between mandates and available resources.

And we see increasing differences of views — including in this Council itself — around how peace operations should work, under what circumstances, with what mandates they should be deployed, and for how long.

Excellencies,

This is a grim diagnosis, but we must face facts.

The good news is that, through the Pact for the Future, Member States committed to working to adapt peace operations for the future.

This is an important opportunity to gain a shared understanding of what makes peace operations successful …

What is hindering their effectiveness …

And what new models we can use to make them more adaptable, flexible and resilient — while recognizing the limitations in situations where there is little or no peace to keep.

My recent proposals to you in the context of Haiti are a good example.

We must keep working for a political process — owned and led by the Haitian people — that restores democratic institutions through elections.

And the UN has a clear role to play in supporting stability and security, while addressing the root causes of the appalling crisis.

The UN stands ready to assume the responsibility of the logistical and operational expenditures — including transportation, medical capabilities and support for the national police — that can support an enhanced international force by Member States that is able to confront the gangs in Haiti and create conditions for peace.

And the salaries of the force are paid through the trust fund that already exists.

This is a good example of how we can design a tailored and collective approach to peace operations in an extremely complex and dangerous environment.

Other examples of adapting our peace operations include UNIFIL, which recently developed an adaptation plan to support the parties to uphold their obligations under resolution 1701…

And our operations in Abyei, Sudan, where we reconfigured our peace operations into a multinational force.

We also increasingly see the enormous benefits of strengthening cooperation with regional and subregional organizations.

Security Council resolution 2719 is an important example.

This breakthrough has lifted our partnership with the African Union to a new level as we work to establish peace enforcement missions under the responsibility of the African Union, supported by the United Nations.

We are now working actively across our two Secretariats to meet the vision of the resolution, and I urge Council Members to fully support this work.

Excellencies,

It’s time to build on these examples and continue adapting our peace operations for current and future challenges.

Work is now underway to review all forms of peace operations, as requested by Member States in the Pact for the Future.

The review will aim to critically examine these tools and propose concrete recommendations to make them fit for today.

This will include extensive consultations with Member States and others to inform — and inspire — recommendations.

The review will build on the analysis presented in the New Agenda for Peace.

It will be informed by the first comprehensive study of the history of special political missions in the 80 years of the United Nations, which will be released soon.

And it will reflect the Pact’s call to ensure that peace operations engage at the earliest possible stage in planning transitions with host countries, UN Country Teams and local and regional groups.

The review also aligns with the Pact’s call to this Council to ensure that peace operations are guided by clear and sequenced mandates that are realistic and achievable — with viable exit strategies and transition plans.

And it will draw on the discussions taking place in preparation for the Peacekeeping Ministerial in Berlin in May focusing on the future of peacekeeping.

Excellences,

Tout au long de l’étude, nous mènerons des consultations approfondies afin de recueillir un éventail de vues aussi large que possible et de bénéficier d’une expertise mondiale.

Celle des États Membres, des pays hôtes, des pays fournisseurs de contingents ou de personnel de police et des contributeurs financiers…

Celle des organisations régionales, de la société civile et des milieux universitaires, ainsi que de nos propres hauts responsables et experts des opérations de paix des Nations Unies et du Secrétariat.

Bien entendu, l’étude contribuera à éclairer les efforts que nous déployons dans le cadre de l’initiative ONU80, afin de dégager des gains d’efficacité et des améliorations dans tous nos axes de travail – compte tenu des défis persistants de financement auxquels notre Organisation est confrontée.

Excellences,

Le débat public d’aujourd’hui est une occasion précieuse pour le Conseil de partager toute idée et point de vue qui pourrait contribuer à l’étude.

J’invite tous les États Membres à apporter leur pierre à l’édifice.

Et j’appelle ce Conseil à continuer à œuvrer pour surmonter les divisions et les désaccords entourant les opérations de paix, et bâtir le soutien politique unifié et cohérent dont nos opérations de paix – et les femmes et les hommes qui les mènent – ont tant besoin.

Je vous remercie.

***
All-English

Mr. President, Excellencies,

I thank the government of Denmark for convening this high-level discussion.

United Nations peace operations safeguard people and communities in some of the most desperate places on earth.

These operations comprise both peacekeeping operations and special political missions.

Their work ranges from early warning to preventive diplomacy…

From peacemaking to verifying peace agreements to protecting civilians…

From negotiating ceasefires to helping parties implement them on the ground…

To electoral support and observer missions.

Collectively, these operations represent a critical tool at this Council’s disposal to maintain international peace and security in a variety of contexts.

Since the first special political mission and peacekeeping operation were deployed in 1948, our peace operations have grown, adapted and evolved.

Time and again, they allow us to mount tailored responses that have saved lives, reduced violence, prevented the expansion and spillover of deadly conflicts, and stopped atrocities.

Peace operations are designed not only to be an effective example of multilateralism in action — but a cost-effective one.

At their best, they show how when the UN comes together to address challenges, the burden is diminished on individual countries alone.

But as we all know, peace operations face serious barriers that demand new approaches.

Wars are becoming more complex and more deadly.

They last longer, and are more enmeshed in global and regional dynamics.

Negotiated settlements have been harder to achieve.

Meanwhile, our peace operations are confronted with a complex interplay of threats — many of which do not respect national borders.

Terror and extremist groups, organized crime, the weaponization of new technologies, and the effects of climate change are all testing our capacities to respond.

And, I regret to say, geopolitical divisions are undermining peace.

The bilateral and multilateral arrangements that — for decades — have managed tensions and maintained stability are eroding.

Violations of international law, human rights and the UN Charter are rampant — seemingly without consequence.

Trust is in short supply among — and within — countries and regions.

All of these challenges and more throw fuel on the fires of conflict.

Meanwhile, our peace responses are struggling.

We see a persistent mismatch between mandates and available resources.

And we see increasing differences of views — including in this Council itself — around how peace operations should work, under what circumstances, with what mandates they should be deployed, and for how long.

Excellencies,

This is a grim diagnosis, but we must face facts.

The good news is that, through the Pact for the Future, Member States committed to working to adapt peace operations for the future.

This is an important opportunity to gain a shared understanding of what makes peace operations successful …

What is hindering their effectiveness …

And what new models we can use to make them more adaptable, flexible and resilient — while recognizing the limitations in situations where there is little or no peace to keep.

My recent proposals to you in the context of Haiti are a good example.

We must keep working for a political process — owned and led by the Haitian people — that restores democratic institutions through elections.

And the UN has a clear role to play in supporting stability and security, while addressing the root causes of the appalling crisis.

The UN stands ready to assume the responsibility of the logistical and operational expenditures — including transportation, medical capabilities and support for the national police — that can support an international force established by Member States that is able to confront the gangs in Haiti and create conditions for peace.

And the salaries of the force are paid through the trust fund that already exists.

This is a good example of how we can design a tailored and collective approach to peace operations in an extremely complex and dangerous environment.

Other examples of adapting our peace operations include UNIFIL, which recently developed an adaptation plan to support the parties to uphold their obligations under resolution 1701…

And our operations in Abyei, Sudan, where we reconfigured our peace operations into a multinational force.

We also increasingly see the enormous benefits of strengthening cooperation with regional and subregional organizations.

Security Council resolution 2719 is an important example.

This breakthrough has lifted our partnership with the African Union to a new level as we work to establish peace enforcement missions under the responsibility of the African Union, supported by the United Nations.

We are now working actively across our two Secretariats to meet the vision of the resolution, and I urge Council Members to fully support this work.

Excellencies,

It’s time to build on these examples and continue adapting our peace operations for current and future challenges.

Work is now underway to review all forms of peace operations, as requested by Member States in the Pact for the Future.

The review will aim to critically examine these tools and propose concrete recommendations to make them fit for today.

This will include extensive consultations with Member States and others to inform — and inspire — recommendations.

The review will build on the analysis presented in the New Agenda for Peace.

It will be informed by the first comprehensive study of the history of special political missions in the 80 years of the United Nations, which will be released soon.

And it will reflect the Pact’s call to ensure that peace operations engage at the earliest possible stage in planning transitions with host countries, UN Country Teams and local and regional groups.

The review also aligns with the Pact’s call to this Council to ensure that peace operations are guided by clear and sequenced mandates that are realistic and achievable — with viable exit strategies and transition plans.

And it will draw on the discussions taking place in preparation for the Peacekeeping Ministerial in Berlin in May focusing on the future of peacekeeping.

Excellencies,

Throughout, we will hold extensive consultations to capture as wide a spectrum of views as possible and to benefit from worldwide expertise.

From Member States, host States, troop- and police-contributing countries and financial contributors…

To regional organizations, civil society and academia, and our own leaders and experts within UN peace operations and the Secretariat.

And the review will, of course, help inform our efforts through our UN@80 initiative, to find efficiencies and improvements across our work in light of the continued funding challenges we face as an organization.

Excellencies,

Today’s open debate provides a vital opportunity for the Council to share perspectives and ideas to inform the review process.

I urge all Members to support it.

And I call on this Council to continue working to overcome divisions and disagreements around peace operations, and build the unified and consistent political support our peace operations — and the women and men who conduct them — need and deserve.

Thank you.

***
All-French

Monsieur le Président, Excellences,

Je remercie le Gouvernement danois d’avoir organisé ce débat de haut niveau.

Les opérations de paix des Nations unies protègent les personnes et les communautés dans certains des endroits les plus éprouvés de la planète.

Ces opérations comprennent à la fois les opérations de maintien de la paix et les missions politiques spéciales.

Leur travail va de l’alerte rapide à diplomatie préventive…

Du rétablissement de la paix à la vérification de l’application des accords de paix et de la protection des civils…

De la négociation de cessez-le-feu au soutien de leur mise en œuvre par les parties sur le terrain…

Ou encore aux missions d’observation et d’appui électoral.

Prises ensemble, ces opérations dotent le Conseil d’un outil essentiel pour maintenir la paix et la sécurité internationales dans divers contextes.

Depuis le déploiement de la première mission politique spéciale et de la première opération de maintien de la paix en 1948, nos opérations de paix se sont développées, adaptées et transformées.

Elles nous permettent régulièrement d’intervenir de façon ciblée pour sauver des vies, réduire la violence, enrayer l’élargissement et le débordement de conflits meurtriers, et mettre fin à des atrocités.

Les opérations de paix sont conçues pour démontrer non seulement l’efficacité du multilatéralisme en action mais aussi son intérêt en termes de coûts.

Dans le meilleur des cas, elles montrent qu’il est possible d’alléger le fardeau qui pèse sur chaque pays individuellement lorsque les Nations Unies se rallient pour agir.

Toutefois, comme nous le savons tous, les opérations de paix se heurtent à des obstacles de taille, et de nouvelles approches s’imposent.

Les guerres deviennent plus complexes et plus meurtrières.

Elles durent plus longtemps et sont davantage imbriquées dans des dynamiques mondiales et régionales.

Il est plus difficile de parvenir à des règlements négociés.

Parallèlement, un entrelacs complexe de menaces, dont beaucoup transcendent les frontières nationales, se dresse face aux opérations de paix.

Les groupes terroristes et extrémistes, la criminalité organisée, la militarisation des nouvelles technologies et les effets des changements climatiques sont autant de phénomènes qui mettent à l’épreuve nos capacités d’intervention.

Et – je suis navré de le constater – les divisions géopolitiques sapent la paix.

Les accords bilatéraux et multilatéraux qui, pendant des décennies, avaient permis de maîtriser les tensions et de préserver la stabilité s’érodent.

Les violations du droit international, des droits humains et de la Charte des Nations Unies sont légion – sans que cela ne porte à conséquence, semble-t-il.

La confiance se fait rare entre les pays, entre les régions, et à l’intérieur de ceux-ci.

Tous ces dangers, et bien d’autres encore, attisent la flamme des conflits.

De notre côté, nos interventions en faveur de la paix sont à la peine.

Nous constatons une asymétrie persistante entre les mandats confiés et les ressources disponibles.

Et nous constatons des divergences de vues de plus en plus marquées – y compris au sein même de ce Conseil – sur les modalités de fonctionnement des opérations de paix, les circonstances justifiant leur déploiement, la teneur de leur mandat et leur durée.

Excellences,

Le diagnostic peut paraître sombre, mais il correspond à la réalité.

La bonne nouvelle est que les États Membres se sont engagés dans le Pacte pour l’avenir à adapter les opérations de paix pour l’avenir.

Voilà une occasion privilégiée de dégager une réponse commune aux questions suivantes : quelles sont les conditions de réussite des opérations de paix ?

Quels obstacles se dressent sur le chemin ?

Et quels nouveaux modèles nous pouvons appliquer afin de les rendre plus adaptables, plus souples et plus résilientes – tout en reconnaissant les cas limites où l’on sait qu’il y a peu ou pas de paix à maintenir.

Les propositions que je vous ai faites récemment dans le contexte d’Haïti en sont une bonne illustration.

Nous devons continuer d’œuvrer en faveur d’un processus politique – maîtrisé et conduit par le peuple haïtien – qui rétablisse les institutions démocratiques par la voie électorale.

L’ONU a un rôle clair à jouer pour appuyer la stabilité et la sécurité, tout en s’attaquant aux causes profondes de cette crise effroyable.

L’ONU est prête à assumer la responsabilité des dépenses logistiques et opérationnelles – y compris le transport, les capacités médicales et le soutien envers la police nationale – qui peuvent appuyer une force internationale renforcée par les États membres, qui soit capable de faire face aux gangs en Haïti et de créer les conditions de la paix.

Les salaires de la force quant à eux sont couverts par le fonds d’affectation spéciale qui existe déjà.

Nous avons là un bon exemple de la manière dont nous pouvons concevoir une approche adaptée et collective des opérations de paix dans un environnement extrêmement complexe et dangereux.

Parmi les autres exemples d’adaptation de nos opérations de paix, citons la FINUL, qui a récemment élaboré un plan d’adaptation pour aider les parties à respecter les obligations que leur fait la résolution 1701.

On peut également évoquer nos opérations à Abyei, au Soudan, où nous avons reconfiguré nos opérations de paix en une force multinationale.

Nous prenons également de plus en plus la mesure des avantages considérables que présente le renforcement de la collaboration avec les organisations régionales et sous-régionales.

La résolution 2719 du Conseil de sécurité revêt une importance certaine à cet égard.

Cette avancée a porté notre partenariat avec l’Union africaine à un niveau supérieur, alors que nous œuvrons à la mise en place de missions d’imposition de la paix sous la responsabilité de l’Union africaine, avec le soutien des Nations unies.

Nos deux Secrétariats travaillent désormais activement à concrétiser la vision énoncée dans la résolution, et j’invite les membres du Conseil à y apporter leur plein concours.

Excellences,

Il est temps de s’inspirer de ces exemples et de continuer à adapter nos opérations de paix aux défis actuels et futurs.

Des travaux sont en cours pour réexaminer toutes les formes d’opérations de paix, comme l’ont demandé les États Membres dans le Pacte pour l’avenir.

L’objectif est de procéder à un examen critique de ces outils et de proposer des recommandations concrètes afin de les adapter au monde d’aujourd’hui.

Il s’agira notamment de mener des consultations approfondies avec les États Membres et d’autres parties prenantes afin de nourrir – et d’inspirer – ces recommandations.

L’étude fera fond sur l’analyse présentée dans le Nouvel Agenda pour la paix.

Elle prendra pour appui l’étude d’ensemble de l’histoire des missions politiques spéciales, la première effectuée en 80 ans d’existence de l’ONU, qui sera publiée prochainement.

Elle se fera aussi l’écho de l’appel lancé dans le Pacte pour veiller à ce que les opérations de paix s’engagent le plus tôt possible dans la planification des transitions avec les pays hôtes, l’équipe de pays des Nations Unies et les groupes locaux et régionaux.

L’étude s’inscrit également dans le sillage de la demande qui est adressée au Conseil dans le Pacte pour que les opérations de paix soient guidées par des mandats clairs et séquencés, réalistes et réalisables, ainsi que des stratégies de sortie et des plans de transition viables.

Elle s’appuiera enfin sur les discussions qui se tiennent en préparation de la Conférence ministérielle sur le maintien de la paix qui aura lieu à Berlin en mai et qui sera consacrée à l’avenir du maintien de la paix.

Excellences,

Tout au long de l’étude, nous mènerons des consultations approfondies afin de recueillir un éventail de vues aussi large que possible et de bénéficier d’une expertise mondiale.

Celle des États Membres, des pays hôtes, des pays fournisseurs de contingents ou de personnel de police et des contributeurs financiers…

Celle des organisations régionales, de la société civile et des milieux universitaires, ainsi que de nos propres hauts responsables et experts des opérations de paix des Nations Unies et du Secrétariat.

Bien entendu, l’étude contribuera à éclairer les efforts que nous déployons dans le cadre de l’initiative ONU80, afin de dégager des gains d’efficacité et des améliorations dans tous nos axes de travail – compte tenu des défis persistants de financement auxquels notre Organisation est confrontée.

Excellences,

Le débat public d’aujourd’hui est une occasion précieuse pour le Conseil de partager toute idée et point de vue qui pourrait contribuer à l’étude.

J’invite tous les États Membres à apporter leur pierre à l’édifice.

Et j’appelle ce Conseil à continuer à œuvrer pour surmonter les divisions et les désaccords entourant les opérations de paix, et bâtir le soutien politique unifié et cohérent dont nos opérations de paix – et les femmes et les hommes qui les mènent – ont tant besoin.

Je vous remercie.

MIL OSI Africa –

March 25, 2025
MIL-OSI Global: Three graphic novels that address the history of slavery – and commemorate resistance

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Dominic Davies, Senior Lecturer in English, City St George’s, University of London

Millions of people were abducted from west Africa and forcibly trafficked to the Americas over the 400 years of the transatlantic slave trade, from the 15th to the 19th century.

Slavery treated these people as forms of property. It forced them, with brutal violence, to work on plantations producing commodities such as cotton and coffee, sugar and tobacco. Their labour powered the world economy for several centuries.

While common understanding of this history has improved, less frequently remembered are those who spearheaded resistance against slavery. Revolutionary uprisings led by enslaved people themselves, as well as actions by radical groups such as Quakers and mutinous pirates, challenged slavery long before William Wilberforce and Britain’s abolition movement.

Now, an increasingly popular genre of the graphic novel is building public awareness and memory of these movements. Composing its stories of the past from framed documents, fragmented images and scraps of text, the form of the graphic novel resembles an archive. It is therefore well-placed to bring forgotten histories to life and to reflect on how those histories were recovered.

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Here are three recent graphic novels that can help us to remember resistance against slavery. They follow in the footsteps of historian Rebecca Hall’s collaboration with artist Hugo Martínez, Wake: The Hidden History of Women-Led Slave Revolts (2021), which I would also strongly recommend.

1. Toussaint Louverture: The Story of the Only Successful Slave Revolt in History

By C.L.R. James, Nic Watts, and Sakina Karimjee (2023)

In the early 1930s, the anti-colonial historian, C.L.R. James, wrote a play about the 1791 Haitian Revolution and its leader, Toussaint Louverture.

It dramatised the story of the only successful slave revolt in history, when 100,000 slaves rose up against their white masters and eventually secured independence after almost 15 years of struggle.

James’s play was performed only twice in 1936, with the great African American actor Paul Robeson in the title role. The script was then lost for several decades, until 2005, when the historian Christian Høgsberg discovered a copy in the archives at the University of Hull and published a new edition of the play.

In 2012, graphic artist, Nic Watts and theatre practitioner, Sakina Karimjee, decided to bring James’s play back to life – not on the stage, but in the pages of a graphic novel.

James, who died in 1989, might not have guessed that he would one day be a co-creator of a graphic novel. But he would surely have been impressed with Toussaint Louverture, which takes readers through the Haitian Revolution in almost 300 thrilling pages.

The graphic novel uses its uniquely spatial medium to map the connections between the French Revolution, which proclaimed universal rights for all men, and the slave uprising in Haiti, which sought to realise those rights in France’s colonies. It is packed with powerful symbols and imagery that build a rich picture of the strategies and tactics that led to the uprising’s eventual victory.

2. Prophet Against Slavery: Benjamin Lay, A Graphic Novel

By David Lester, edited by Paul Buhle and Marcus Rediker (2023)

Historian Marcus Rediker has devoted his career to uncovering early histories of resistance against slavery and sharing them in compelling and accessible formats.

In 2021 he teamed up with the illustrator, David Lester, and longtime graphic historian, Paul Buhle, to translate this work into graphic novels.

The first, Prophet Against Slavery, takes readers back to a Quaker meeting house in the early 1700s. In its dramatic opening scene, Benjamin Lay disrupts the meeting with a piece of performance theatre. He appears to stab his own arm in protest against slavery, though we later learn that the spouting blood was in fact “red pokeberry juice”.

Lay was an innovator of performance protest, and he developed the strategy of boycotting commodities produced by slave labour. As Prophet Against Slavery details, he was one of the earliest and most outspoken abolitionists, campaigning for the end of the transatlantic slave trade almost a century before Wilberforce.

He was also a pioneer of veganism and an advocate for animal rights. Lay saw the parallels between early capitalism’s enclosure of common land in England and slavery’s enclosure of people’s bodies in the US. The claustrophobic borders of Lester’s graphic novel dramatise these acts of property making, even as they document Lay’s stubborn attempts to liberate the oppressed from bondage.

The enslaved themselves do not have a voice in Prophet Against Slavery. But Lester uses powerful charcoal sketches and image-only panels to make sure their presence is never forgotten.

These haunting images remind readers of the human cost of slavery without presuming to speak for those whose voices have been excluded from the written archive.

3. Under the Banner of King Death: Pirates of the Atlantic, A Graphic Novel

By David Lester and Marcus Rediker (2023)

Rediker and Lester teamed up again for Under the Banner of King Death. The title refers to the skull and cross bones flag that flies on the masts of pirate ships.

But this is not your conventional story of evil pirates drinking rum and hunting for gold (although there is some of that). It is rather a portrait of the pirate ship as a space of self-determination and political freedom at a time when, as Rediker puts it, “poor people had no democratic rights anywhere in the world”.

The graphic novel tells the story of John Gwin, an African-American man who escaped from slavery in South Carolina. After being kidnapped by the Royal African Company to labour on a slaving ship, he decides to resist. He rallies his shipmates, liberates the Africans below deck, and leads a mutiny to overthrow Skinner, the tyrannical captain.

With Skinner deposed, the pirates establish a commune at sea: “A world turned upside down,” as Gwin calls it. “All captains and officers elected. All tars [sailors] treated as brothers. No tyranny of the lash.” There is no hierarchy on this ship. Instead, they return to west Africa and begin breaking people out of slave castles along the coast.

Lester’s pen-and-ink sketches and frantic page layouts capture the scattergun nature of pirate life in the 17th century. It was a dangerous existence. Such was the threat posed by pirates to the ruling order that the British Navy worked quickly to capture them and make an example. Under the Banner of King Death starts and ends with hanging scenes, where pirates were put to death in public.

But while the British state could hang the pirates, it couldn’t kill their idea of freedom from slavery. Lester and Rediker recover this history and remind us of the revolutionary spirit that the skull and cross bones flag once represented.

These graphic novels commemorate new histories of resistance to the slave trade, while also reminding us of the historiographic work that must be put into recovering and retelling them, now and in the future.

Dominic Davies does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Three graphic novels that address the history of slavery – and commemorate resistance – https://theconversation.com/three-graphic-novels-that-address-the-history-of-slavery-and-commemorate-resistance-251740

MIL OSI – Global Reports –

March 25, 2025
MIL-OSI United Nations: Secretary-General’s remarks to the Security Council – Advancing Adaptability in UN Peace Operations: responding to new realities [bilingual, as delivered; scroll down for all-English and all-French versions]

Source: United Nations secretary general

Mr. President, Excellencies,

I thank the government of Denmark for convening this high-level discussion.

United Nations peace operations safeguard people and communities in some of the most desperate places on earth.

These operations comprise both peacekeeping operations and special political missions.

Their work ranges from early warning to preventive diplomacy…

From peacemaking to verifying peace agreements to protecting civilians…

From negotiating ceasefires to helping parties implement them on the ground…

To electoral support and observer missions.

Collectively, these operations represent a critical tool at this Council’s disposal to maintain international peace and security in a variety of contexts.

Since the first special political mission and peacekeeping operation were deployed in 1948, our peace operations have grown, adapted and evolved.

Time and again, they allow us to mount tailored responses that have saved lives, reduced violence, prevented the expansion and spillover of deadly conflicts, and stopped atrocities.

Peace operations are designed not only to be an effective example of multilateralism in action — but a cost-effective one.

At their best, they show how when the UN comes together to address challenges, the burden is diminished on individual countries alone.

But as we all know, peace operations face serious barriers that demand new approaches.

Wars are becoming more complex and more deadly.

They last longer, and are more enmeshed in global and regional dynamics.

Negotiated settlements have been harder to achieve.

Meanwhile, our peace operations are confronted with a complex interplay of threats — many of which do not respect national borders.

Terror and extremist groups, organized crime, the weaponization of new technologies, and the effects of climate change are all testing our capacities to respond.

And, I regret to say, geopolitical divisions are undermining peace.

The bilateral and multilateral arrangements that — for decades — have managed tensions and maintained stability are eroding.

Violations of international law, human rights and the UN Charter are rampant — seemingly without consequence.

Trust is in short supply among — and within — countries and regions.

All of these challenges and more throw fuel on the fires of conflict.

Meanwhile, our peace responses are struggling.

We see a persistent mismatch between mandates and available resources.

And we see increasing differences of views — including in this Council itself — around how peace operations should work, under what circumstances, with what mandates they should be deployed, and for how long.

Excellencies,

This is a grim diagnosis, but we must face facts.

The good news is that, through the Pact for the Future, Member States committed to working to adapt peace operations for the future.

This is an important opportunity to gain a shared understanding of what makes peace operations successful …

What is hindering their effectiveness …

And what new models we can use to make them more adaptable, flexible and resilient — while recognizing the limitations in situations where there is little or no peace to keep.

My recent proposals to you in the context of Haiti are a good example.

We must keep working for a political process — owned and led by the Haitian people — that restores democratic institutions through elections.

And the UN has a clear role to play in supporting stability and security, while addressing the root causes of the appalling crisis.

The UN stands ready to assume the responsibility of the logistical and operational expenditures — including transportation, medical capabilities and support for the national police — that can support an enhanced international force by Member States that is able to confront the gangs in Haiti and create conditions for peace.

And the salaries of the force are paid through the trust fund that already exists.

This is a good example of how we can design a tailored and collective approach to peace operations in an extremely complex and dangerous environment.

Other examples of adapting our peace operations include UNIFIL, which recently developed an adaptation plan to support the parties to uphold their obligations under resolution 1701…

And our operations in Abyei, Sudan, where we reconfigured our peace operations into a multinational force.

We also increasingly see the enormous benefits of strengthening cooperation with regional and subregional organizations.

Security Council resolution 2719 is an important example.

This breakthrough has lifted our partnership with the African Union to a new level as we work to establish peace enforcement missions under the responsibility of the African Union, supported by the United Nations.

We are now working actively across our two Secretariats to meet the vision of the resolution, and I urge Council Members to fully support this work.

Excellencies,

It’s time to build on these examples and continue adapting our peace operations for current and future challenges.

Work is now underway to review all forms of peace operations, as requested by Member States in the Pact for the Future.

The review will aim to critically examine these tools and propose concrete recommendations to make them fit for today.

This will include extensive consultations with Member States and others to inform — and inspire — recommendations.

The review will build on the analysis presented in the New Agenda for Peace.

It will be informed by the first comprehensive study of the history of special political missions in the 80 years of the United Nations, which will be released soon.

And it will reflect the Pact’s call to ensure that peace operations engage at the earliest possible stage in planning transitions with host countries, UN Country Teams and local and regional groups.

The review also aligns with the Pact’s call to this Council to ensure that peace operations are guided by clear and sequenced mandates that are realistic and achievable — with viable exit strategies and transition plans.

And it will draw on the discussions taking place in preparation for the Peacekeeping Ministerial in Berlin in May focusing on the future of peacekeeping.

Excellences,

Tout au long de l’étude, nous mènerons des consultations approfondies afin de recueillir un éventail de vues aussi large que possible et de bénéficier d’une expertise mondiale.

Celle des États Membres, des pays hôtes, des pays fournisseurs de contingents ou de personnel de police et des contributeurs financiers…

Celle des organisations régionales, de la société civile et des milieux universitaires, ainsi que de nos propres hauts responsables et experts des opérations de paix des Nations Unies et du Secrétariat.

Bien entendu, l’étude contribuera à éclairer les efforts que nous déployons dans le cadre de l’initiative ONU80, afin de dégager des gains d’efficacité et des améliorations dans tous nos axes de travail – compte tenu des défis persistants de financement auxquels notre Organisation est confrontée.

Excellences,

Le débat public d’aujourd’hui est une occasion précieuse pour le Conseil de partager toute idée et point de vue qui pourrait contribuer à l’étude.

J’invite tous les États Membres à apporter leur pierre à l’édifice.

Et j’appelle ce Conseil à continuer à œuvrer pour surmonter les divisions et les désaccords entourant les opérations de paix, et bâtir le soutien politique unifié et cohérent dont nos opérations de paix – et les femmes et les hommes qui les mènent – ont tant besoin.

Je vous remercie.

***
All-English

Mr. President, Excellencies,

I thank the government of Denmark for convening this high-level discussion.

United Nations peace operations safeguard people and communities in some of the most desperate places on earth.

These operations comprise both peacekeeping operations and special political missions.

Their work ranges from early warning to preventive diplomacy…

From peacemaking to verifying peace agreements to protecting civilians…

From negotiating ceasefires to helping parties implement them on the ground…

To electoral support and observer missions.

Collectively, these operations represent a critical tool at this Council’s disposal to maintain international peace and security in a variety of contexts.

Since the first special political mission and peacekeeping operation were deployed in 1948, our peace operations have grown, adapted and evolved.

Time and again, they allow us to mount tailored responses that have saved lives, reduced violence, prevented the expansion and spillover of deadly conflicts, and stopped atrocities.

Peace operations are designed not only to be an effective example of multilateralism in action — but a cost-effective one.

At their best, they show how when the UN comes together to address challenges, the burden is diminished on individual countries alone.

But as we all know, peace operations face serious barriers that demand new approaches.

Wars are becoming more complex and more deadly.

They last longer, and are more enmeshed in global and regional dynamics.

Negotiated settlements have been harder to achieve.

Meanwhile, our peace operations are confronted with a complex interplay of threats — many of which do not respect national borders.

Terror and extremist groups, organized crime, the weaponization of new technologies, and the effects of climate change are all testing our capacities to respond.

And, I regret to say, geopolitical divisions are undermining peace.

The bilateral and multilateral arrangements that — for decades — have managed tensions and maintained stability are eroding.

Violations of international law, human rights and the UN Charter are rampant — seemingly without consequence.

Trust is in short supply among — and within — countries and regions.

All of these challenges and more throw fuel on the fires of conflict.

Meanwhile, our peace responses are struggling.

We see a persistent mismatch between mandates and available resources.

And we see increasing differences of views — including in this Council itself — around how peace operations should work, under what circumstances, with what mandates they should be deployed, and for how long.

Excellencies,

This is a grim diagnosis, but we must face facts.

The good news is that, through the Pact for the Future, Member States committed to working to adapt peace operations for the future.

This is an important opportunity to gain a shared understanding of what makes peace operations successful …

What is hindering their effectiveness …

And what new models we can use to make them more adaptable, flexible and resilient — while recognizing the limitations in situations where there is little or no peace to keep.

My recent proposals to you in the context of Haiti are a good example.

We must keep working for a political process — owned and led by the Haitian people — that restores democratic institutions through elections.

And the UN has a clear role to play in supporting stability and security, while addressing the root causes of the appalling crisis.

The UN stands ready to assume the responsibility of the logistical and operational expenditures — including transportation, medical capabilities and support for the national police — that can support an international force established by Member States that is able to confront the gangs in Haiti and create conditions for peace.

And the salaries of the force are paid through the trust fund that already exists.

This is a good example of how we can design a tailored and collective approach to peace operations in an extremely complex and dangerous environment.

Other examples of adapting our peace operations include UNIFIL, which recently developed an adaptation plan to support the parties to uphold their obligations under resolution 1701…

And our operations in Abyei, Sudan, where we reconfigured our peace operations into a multinational force.

We also increasingly see the enormous benefits of strengthening cooperation with regional and subregional organizations.

Security Council resolution 2719 is an important example.

This breakthrough has lifted our partnership with the African Union to a new level as we work to establish peace enforcement missions under the responsibility of the African Union, supported by the United Nations.

We are now working actively across our two Secretariats to meet the vision of the resolution, and I urge Council Members to fully support this work.

Excellencies,

It’s time to build on these examples and continue adapting our peace operations for current and future challenges.

Work is now underway to review all forms of peace operations, as requested by Member States in the Pact for the Future.

The review will aim to critically examine these tools and propose concrete recommendations to make them fit for today.

This will include extensive consultations with Member States and others to inform — and inspire — recommendations.

The review will build on the analysis presented in the New Agenda for Peace.

It will be informed by the first comprehensive study of the history of special political missions in the 80 years of the United Nations, which will be released soon.

And it will reflect the Pact’s call to ensure that peace operations engage at the earliest possible stage in planning transitions with host countries, UN Country Teams and local and regional groups.

The review also aligns with the Pact’s call to this Council to ensure that peace operations are guided by clear and sequenced mandates that are realistic and achievable — with viable exit strategies and transition plans.

And it will draw on the discussions taking place in preparation for the Peacekeeping Ministerial in Berlin in May focusing on the future of peacekeeping.

Excellencies,

Throughout, we will hold extensive consultations to capture as wide a spectrum of views as possible and to benefit from worldwide expertise.

From Member States, host States, troop- and police-contributing countries and financial contributors…

To regional organizations, civil society and academia, and our own leaders and experts within UN peace operations and the Secretariat.

And the review will, of course, help inform our efforts through our UN@80 initiative, to find efficiencies and improvements across our work in light of the continued funding challenges we face as an organization.

Excellencies,

Today’s open debate provides a vital opportunity for the Council to share perspectives and ideas to inform the review process.

I urge all Members to support it.

And I call on this Council to continue working to overcome divisions and disagreements around peace operations, and build the unified and consistent political support our peace operations — and the women and men who conduct them — need and deserve.

Thank you.

***
All-French

Monsieur le Président, Excellences,

Je remercie le Gouvernement danois d’avoir organisé ce débat de haut niveau.

Les opérations de paix des Nations unies protègent les personnes et les communautés dans certains des endroits les plus éprouvés de la planète.

Ces opérations comprennent à la fois les opérations de maintien de la paix et les missions politiques spéciales.

Leur travail va de l’alerte rapide à diplomatie préventive…

Du rétablissement de la paix à la vérification de l’application des accords de paix et de la protection des civils…

De la négociation de cessez-le-feu au soutien de leur mise en œuvre par les parties sur le terrain…

Ou encore aux missions d’observation et d’appui électoral.

Prises ensemble, ces opérations dotent le Conseil d’un outil essentiel pour maintenir la paix et la sécurité internationales dans divers contextes.

Depuis le déploiement de la première mission politique spéciale et de la première opération de maintien de la paix en 1948, nos opérations de paix se sont développées, adaptées et transformées.

Elles nous permettent régulièrement d’intervenir de façon ciblée pour sauver des vies, réduire la violence, enrayer l’élargissement et le débordement de conflits meurtriers, et mettre fin à des atrocités.

Les opérations de paix sont conçues pour démontrer non seulement l’efficacité du multilatéralisme en action mais aussi son intérêt en termes de coûts.

Dans le meilleur des cas, elles montrent qu’il est possible d’alléger le fardeau qui pèse sur chaque pays individuellement lorsque les Nations Unies se rallient pour agir.

Toutefois, comme nous le savons tous, les opérations de paix se heurtent à des obstacles de taille, et de nouvelles approches s’imposent.

Les guerres deviennent plus complexes et plus meurtrières.

Elles durent plus longtemps et sont davantage imbriquées dans des dynamiques mondiales et régionales.

Il est plus difficile de parvenir à des règlements négociés.

Parallèlement, un entrelacs complexe de menaces, dont beaucoup transcendent les frontières nationales, se dresse face aux opérations de paix.

Les groupes terroristes et extrémistes, la criminalité organisée, la militarisation des nouvelles technologies et les effets des changements climatiques sont autant de phénomènes qui mettent à l’épreuve nos capacités d’intervention.

Et – je suis navré de le constater – les divisions géopolitiques sapent la paix.

Les accords bilatéraux et multilatéraux qui, pendant des décennies, avaient permis de maîtriser les tensions et de préserver la stabilité s’érodent.

Les violations du droit international, des droits humains et de la Charte des Nations Unies sont légion – sans que cela ne porte à conséquence, semble-t-il.

La confiance se fait rare entre les pays, entre les régions, et à l’intérieur de ceux-ci.

Tous ces dangers, et bien d’autres encore, attisent la flamme des conflits.

De notre côté, nos interventions en faveur de la paix sont à la peine.

Nous constatons une asymétrie persistante entre les mandats confiés et les ressources disponibles.

Et nous constatons des divergences de vues de plus en plus marquées – y compris au sein même de ce Conseil – sur les modalités de fonctionnement des opérations de paix, les circonstances justifiant leur déploiement, la teneur de leur mandat et leur durée.

Excellences,

Le diagnostic peut paraître sombre, mais il correspond à la réalité.

La bonne nouvelle est que les États Membres se sont engagés dans le Pacte pour l’avenir à adapter les opérations de paix pour l’avenir.

Voilà une occasion privilégiée de dégager une réponse commune aux questions suivantes : quelles sont les conditions de réussite des opérations de paix ?

Quels obstacles se dressent sur le chemin ?

Et quels nouveaux modèles nous pouvons appliquer afin de les rendre plus adaptables, plus souples et plus résilientes – tout en reconnaissant les cas limites où l’on sait qu’il y a peu ou pas de paix à maintenir.

Les propositions que je vous ai faites récemment dans le contexte d’Haïti en sont une bonne illustration.

Nous devons continuer d’œuvrer en faveur d’un processus politique – maîtrisé et conduit par le peuple haïtien – qui rétablisse les institutions démocratiques par la voie électorale.

L’ONU a un rôle clair à jouer pour appuyer la stabilité et la sécurité, tout en s’attaquant aux causes profondes de cette crise effroyable.

L’ONU est prête à assumer la responsabilité des dépenses logistiques et opérationnelles – y compris le transport, les capacités médicales et le soutien envers la police nationale – qui peuvent appuyer une force internationale renforcée par les États membres, qui soit capable de faire face aux gangs en Haïti et de créer les conditions de la paix.

Les salaires de la force quant à eux sont couverts par le fonds d’affectation spéciale qui existe déjà.

Nous avons là un bon exemple de la manière dont nous pouvons concevoir une approche adaptée et collective des opérations de paix dans un environnement extrêmement complexe et dangereux.

Parmi les autres exemples d’adaptation de nos opérations de paix, citons la FINUL, qui a récemment élaboré un plan d’adaptation pour aider les parties à respecter les obligations que leur fait la résolution 1701.

On peut également évoquer nos opérations à Abyei, au Soudan, où nous avons reconfiguré nos opérations de paix en une force multinationale.

Nous prenons également de plus en plus la mesure des avantages considérables que présente le renforcement de la collaboration avec les organisations régionales et sous-régionales.

La résolution 2719 du Conseil de sécurité revêt une importance certaine à cet égard.

Cette avancée a porté notre partenariat avec l’Union africaine à un niveau supérieur, alors que nous œuvrons à la mise en place de missions d’imposition de la paix sous la responsabilité de l’Union africaine, avec le soutien des Nations unies.

Nos deux Secrétariats travaillent désormais activement à concrétiser la vision énoncée dans la résolution, et j’invite les membres du Conseil à y apporter leur plein concours.

Excellences,

Il est temps de s’inspirer de ces exemples et de continuer à adapter nos opérations de paix aux défis actuels et futurs.

Des travaux sont en cours pour réexaminer toutes les formes d’opérations de paix, comme l’ont demandé les États Membres dans le Pacte pour l’avenir.

L’objectif est de procéder à un examen critique de ces outils et de proposer des recommandations concrètes afin de les adapter au monde d’aujourd’hui.

Il s’agira notamment de mener des consultations approfondies avec les États Membres et d’autres parties prenantes afin de nourrir – et d’inspirer – ces recommandations.

L’étude fera fond sur l’analyse présentée dans le Nouvel Agenda pour la paix.

Elle prendra pour appui l’étude d’ensemble de l’histoire des missions politiques spéciales, la première effectuée en 80 ans d’existence de l’ONU, qui sera publiée prochainement.

Elle se fera aussi l’écho de l’appel lancé dans le Pacte pour veiller à ce que les opérations de paix s’engagent le plus tôt possible dans la planification des transitions avec les pays hôtes, l’équipe de pays des Nations Unies et les groupes locaux et régionaux.

L’étude s’inscrit également dans le sillage de la demande qui est adressée au Conseil dans le Pacte pour que les opérations de paix soient guidées par des mandats clairs et séquencés, réalistes et réalisables, ainsi que des stratégies de sortie et des plans de transition viables.

Elle s’appuiera enfin sur les discussions qui se tiennent en préparation de la Conférence ministérielle sur le maintien de la paix qui aura lieu à Berlin en mai et qui sera consacrée à l’avenir du maintien de la paix.

Excellences,

Tout au long de l’étude, nous mènerons des consultations approfondies afin de recueillir un éventail de vues aussi large que possible et de bénéficier d’une expertise mondiale.

Celle des États Membres, des pays hôtes, des pays fournisseurs de contingents ou de personnel de police et des contributeurs financiers…

Celle des organisations régionales, de la société civile et des milieux universitaires, ainsi que de nos propres hauts responsables et experts des opérations de paix des Nations Unies et du Secrétariat.

Bien entendu, l’étude contribuera à éclairer les efforts que nous déployons dans le cadre de l’initiative ONU80, afin de dégager des gains d’efficacité et des améliorations dans tous nos axes de travail – compte tenu des défis persistants de financement auxquels notre Organisation est confrontée.

Excellences,

Le débat public d’aujourd’hui est une occasion précieuse pour le Conseil de partager toute idée et point de vue qui pourrait contribuer à l’étude.

J’invite tous les États Membres à apporter leur pierre à l’édifice.

Et j’appelle ce Conseil à continuer à œuvrer pour surmonter les divisions et les désaccords entourant les opérations de paix, et bâtir le soutien politique unifié et cohérent dont nos opérations de paix – et les femmes et les hommes qui les mènent – ont tant besoin.

Je vous remercie.

MIL OSI United Nations News –

March 25, 2025
MIL-OSI Global: Who gets to brand Puerto Rico: Its tourism agency or its biggest star?

Source: The Conversation – USA – By Carlos A. Suárez Carrasquillo, Associate Instructional Professor in Political Science, Center for Latin American Studies, University of Florida

The Puerto Rican rapper Bad Bunny is one of the biggest stars of the music world. After becoming Spotify’s most-streamed artist for three years in a row – the first and only artist ever to do so – he sold out all 49 dates of his 2024 U.S. tour, netting US$211 million.

Earlier this year, after Bad Bunny co-hosted “The Tonight Show with Jimmy Fallon” and announced a 21-show residency in Puerto Rico, the recently reelected mayor of San Juan, Miguel Romero, quipped that the artist had done a better job of promoting Puerto Rico than the island’s official destination marketing organization.

That agency, Discover Puerto Rico, was founded in 2017 to market the island to both tourists and investors. Established during the administration of Gov. Ricardo Rosselló, it was part of a broader effort to professionalize Puerto Rico’s place branding and underscored the importance of tourism to the island’s economy.

As a scholar of Puerto Rican politics and place branding – and a native Puerto Rican – I think this case study raises interesting public policy questions: Who gets to brand Puerto Rico? Why does it matter if a place has a brand anyway? And if political leaders are dissatisfied with an agency whose sole purpose is to market the island, what comes next?

It’s not just a place – it’s a brand

Historically, place-branding campaigns have been led by governments seeking to attract tourism and investment. One of the most iconic examples was the “I Love New York” campaign, launched in 1977 as a collaboration between New York City and private partners. Similar public-private models became more common in the decades that followed.

Puerto Rico has seen various branding efforts over the years. Early boosterism efforts emerged during the first half of the 20th century, and in 1970, the Puerto Rico Tourism Company was created to promote the island as a
tourist destination. By the 1990s, many Puerto Rican municipalities had begun adopting different place branding strategies.

During Puerto Rico’s deepening fiscal crisis in the 2010s, branding efforts remained a bipartisan priority. But the two dominant political parties – the pro-territory Partido Popular Democrático, and the pro-statehood Partido Nuevo Progresista – each rebranded the island every time a new administration took office, raising concerns about consistency. The last major government-led initiative before Discover Puerto Rico was the “Isla Estrella” campaign, which included a sponsorship deal with Spain’s Sevilla FC soccer team.

The ‘Discover Puerto Rico’ era

In 2017, Discover Puerto Rico took control over the island’s place-branding efforts. However, its performance has been polarizing, with critics pointing to significant blunders. For example, an early ad in its “Live Boricua” campaign sparked backlash for featuring a family that didn’t look like most Puerto Ricans.

Beyond its marketing blunders, Discover Puerto Rico has struggled to navigate Puerto Rico’s politically charged place-branding landscape. In fact, it has been contested from the start, and remains so, as recently elected Gov. Jennifer González evaluates its future. It remains unclear to what extent efficiency and economic development will serve as the main criteria for evaluating its success, and to what extent party politics will influence the decision-making process.

Just a day before Mayor Romero made his remark about Bad Bunny, Discover Puerto Rico’s CEO, Brad Dean, resigned, taking a similar role in St. Louis. Dean has argued that during his tenure, Discover Puerto Rico has driven significant increases in tourism and tourism spending. While these self-reported figures suggest success, they don’t address a critical issue – the long-standing political controversy surrounding Puerto Rico’s branding.

Pop culture carries the weight

At the same time the future of Discover Puerto Rico remains uncertain, the island has gained unparalleled international attention thanks to popular music.

Reggaetón, an urban genre that originated in Puerto Rico in the 1990s, has amassed a massive global fan base, extending beyond Puerto Rico and Latin America to the rest of the world. In 2017, Daddy Yankee and Luis Fonsi’s video for the worldwide hit “Despacito” turned La Perla, a working-class barrio in Old San Juan, into a magnet for tourists from all over the world.

“Despacito” prompted a surge of visits to La Perla, as the French news agency AFP noted.

More recently, in January 2025, Bad Bunny released his latest album, “Debí Tirar Más Fotos,” which taps into traditional Puerto Rican music genres such as bomba, plena and música jíbara that aren’t usually associated with reggaetón. It charted at No. 1. Bad Bunny also announced a Puerto Rico-exclusive concert series, with some dates reserved for locals and others open to fans worldwide.

The success of Puerto Rican reggaetón artists raises an important question: Why have these organic cultural movements been so effective – perhaps even more so than the official expert-driven place-marketing agency – in promoting Puerto Rico as a brand?

I think the answer probably lies in authenticity. Unlike government-led initiatives, reggaetón’s global appeal stems from its cultural resonance and emotional connection with audiences worldwide, regardless of politics.

At this critical juncture for the island’s tourism agency, perhaps Discover Puerto Rico should rebrand itself as “Discover the Birthplace of Reggaetón.”

Carlos A. Suárez Carrasquillo does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Who gets to brand Puerto Rico: Its tourism agency or its biggest star? – https://theconversation.com/who-gets-to-brand-puerto-rico-its-tourism-agency-or-its-biggest-star-248825

MIL OSI – Global Reports –

March 25, 2025
MIL-OSI Global: Ukraine will need major rebuilding when war ends − here’s why the US isn’t likely to invest in its recovery with a new Marshall Plan

Source: The Conversation – USA – By Frank A. Blazich Jr., Curator of Military History, National Museum of American History, Smithsonian Institution

Europe after World War II? No, it’s the Ukrainian city of Bakhmut in 2023, after a year of Russian bombardment. AP Photo, File

President Donald Trump wants Ukraine to repay the United States for helping to defend the country against Russia’s invasion.

Since 2022, Congress has provided about US$174 billion to Ukraine and neighboring countries to assist its war effort. Trump inflated this figure to $350 billion in a March 2025 White House meeting with French President Emmanuel Macron. Separately, he has suggested Ukraine could reimburse the U.S. by giving America access to its minerals.

Ukraine is rich in titanium, graphite, manganese and other rare earth metals used to produce electric vehicle batteries and other tech devices.

Mining and refining these critical mineral resources would require major investment in infrastructure and economic development, including in parts of Ukraine severely damaged by fighting. Some analysts are calling for a return to the European Recovery Program, commonly known as the Marshall Plan.

The Marshall Plan used $13.3 billion in U.S. funds – roughly $171 billion in today’s dollars – to rebuild war-torn Western Europe from 1948 to late 1951. It is often evoked as a solution for reconstruction following global crises. Yet as a military historian and curator, I find that the Marshall Plan is not well understood.

For the U.S., the economic gains of the Marshall Plan did not come from European countries’ repaying loans or allowing the U.S. to extract their raw materials. Rather, the U.S. has benefited enormously from a half-century of goodwill, democratic stability and economic success in Europe.

European nations turn inward

After World War II ended in 1945, Western Europe faced a staggering burden of destruction and upheaval.

Allied bombardment of major industrial areas and German cities such as Berlin, Hamburg and Cologne had created massive housing shortages. Meanwhile, fighting through agricultural areas and a critical manpower shortage had curtailed food production. What harvest there was could not get to hungry civilians because so many of Europe’s roads, bridges and ports had been destroyed.

The United Kingdom, Italy, France, Germany and other European governments were buried in debt after so many years of war. They could not afford to rebuild on their own. Yet rather than cooperating on their mutual economic reconstruction, European nations looked inward, focusing primarily on their own political challenges.

The continent was politically and militarily divided, too. Europe’s western half was influenced by the democratic, capitalistic forces led by the U.S. Eastern Europe was beholden to the communist, command-economy forces of the Soviet Union.

In a 1946 speech at Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri, former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill articulated Europe’s growing postwar divide. Over the ruins of proud nations, he said, “an iron curtain” had “descended across the continent.”

US looks abroad

Unlike Europe, the U.S. emerged from World War II as the wealthiest nation in the world, with its territory intact and unharmed. Its steel and oil industries were booming. By 1947, the U.S. was the clear successor to Great Britain as the world’s superpower.

But President Harry Truman feared the ambitions of the war’s other great victor – the Soviet Union. In March 1947, he announced a new doctrine to contain communist expansion southward across Europe by giving $400 million in military and economic aid to Greece and Turkey.

Around the same time, U.S. Secretary of State George Marshall met with Soviet officials to plan Germany’s future. Following the Nazis’ surrender in May 1945, Germany had been divided into four occupied zones administered by U.S., British, French and Soviet forces.

Each nation had its own goals for its section of Germany. The U.S. wanted to revitalize Germany politically and economically, believing that a moribund Germany would thwart the economic reconstruction of all of Europe.

Marshall hoped that the Soviets would cooperate, but Soviet ruler Josef Stalin preferred extracting reparations from a prostrate Germany to investing in its recovery. A vibrant German economic engine, the Soviets felt, could just as easily rearm to attack the Russian countryside for the third time that century.

The Truman administration chose to unilaterally rebuild the three western Allied sectors of Germany – and Western Europe.

Marshall outlined his plan at a commencement address at Harvard University in June 1947. American action to restore global economic health, he said, would provide the foundation for political stability and peace in Europe. And an economically healthy Western Europe, in turn, would inhibit the spread of communism by plainly demonstrating the benefits of capitalism.

“Our policy is not directed against any country,” Marshall said, “but against hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos.”

Marshall’s plan

Marshall invited all European nations to participate in drafting a plan to first address the immediate humanitarian aid of Europe’s people, then rebuild its infrastructure. The U.S. would pay for it all.

For nearly bankrupt European nations, it was a lifeline.

In September 1947, the new Committee for European Economic Co-operation, composed of 16 Western – but not Eastern – European nations, delivered its proposal to Washington.

It would take a masterful legislative strategy for the Democratic Truman administration to persuade the Republican-led Congress to pass this $13 billion bill. It succeeded thanks to the dedicated effort of Republican Sen. Arthur Vandenberg, who convinced his isolationist colleagues that the Marshall Plan would halt the expansion of communism and benefit American economic growth.

In April 1948, Truman signed the Economic Cooperation Act. By year’s end, over $2 billion had reached Europe, and its industrial production had finally surpassed prewar levels seen in 1939.

NATO is born

Along with economic stability, the Truman administration recognized that Europe needed military security to defend against communist encroachment by the Soviet Union.

In July 1949, 12 European countries, the U.S. and Canada established the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. NATO committed each member country to the mutual defense of fellow NATO members.

Since 1947, NATO has steadily expanded eastward to include Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and other former Soviet satellite states directly bordering Russia.

Ukraine, which declared its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, is not yet a NATO member. But it desperately wants to be.

Ukraine applied for NATO membership in 2022 after Russia’s invasion. Its application is pending. Russian President Vladimir Putin has said any peace deal with Ukraine must bar NATO membership.

Would a Marshall Plan work for Ukraine?

Modern-day Ukraine mirrors the Western European countries of the Marshall Plan era in meaningful ways.

It suffers from the physical devastation of war, with its major cities heavily damaged. The threat of military attack from hostile neighbors remains urgent. And it has a functional, democratic government that would – in peacetime – be capable of receiving and distributing aid to develop the nation’s economic growth and stability.

U.S. global leadership, however, has changed dramatically since 1948.

Outright American taxpayer financing of Ukraine’s reconstruction seems impossible. Any plan to reconstruct the country after war will likely require public funding from multiple nations and substantial private investment. That private investment could well include mineral extraction and refinement ventures.

Ultimately, Ukraine’s recovery will most likely involve Ukraine and neighboring nations reaching agreement to restore its economic and military security. The European Union, which Ukraine also seeks to join, has the bureaucratic and economic resources necessary to reconstruct Ukraine, restore peace and ease tensions on the continent.

Any future Marshall Plan for Ukraine will probably be European.

Frank A. Blazich Jr. does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Ukraine will need major rebuilding when war ends − here’s why the US isn’t likely to invest in its recovery with a new Marshall Plan – https://theconversation.com/ukraine-will-need-major-rebuilding-when-war-ends-heres-why-the-us-isnt-likely-to-invest-in-its-recovery-with-a-new-marshall-plan-251872

MIL OSI – Global Reports –

March 25, 2025
MIL-OSI China: French FM to visit China

Source: China State Council Information Office

French Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs Jean-Noël Barrot will visit China from March 27 to 28, a Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson announced on Monday.

Jean-Noël Barrot will pay the visit at the invitation of Wang Yi, a member of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China Central Committee and minister of foreign affairs.

MIL OSI China News –

March 25, 2025
MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Over 100 creatives supported by Growth Programme in Winchester

Source: City of Winchester

Evolve, in partnership with Winchester City Council, has successfully completed the delivery of its Creative Industries Growth Programme.

Fully funded by Winchester City Council via the Government’s UK Shared Prosperity Fund, the series of free masterclasses, covering subjects such as business planning, Intellectual Property Law and branding and marketing, were held between January and early March.

The programme, which was curated based on the feedback provided by local creatives, was designed to support small businesses and freelancers within the sector to take their business to the next level. Over the course of nine sessions, over 100 creatives from different businesses across the district attended.

“The workshop was brilliant … it has made me feel more confident in my business skills by connecting with others in the field. I am more likely to ask for help now that I know so many have similar issues.” Helen Northcott – Artist and Educator

Rebecca Phillips, Programme Manager at Evolve, said: “It has been an absolute pleasure to work with Winchester City Council to deliver this programme. I’ve met so many inspiring creatives working in Winchester and experienced the amazing sense of community, and watched it grow. Bringing practical business support and new connections has resulted in clear increase in motivation levels and productivity for participants.”

Thanks to additional funding from University of Winchester, a peer group of creatives are now benefitting from focused and relevant learning as they continue to meet.

The University of Winchester has also agreed to fund a further series of workshops- ‘The Innovating Together: SME Business Success Programme’, which will be delivered in partnership with Evolve and will be launching soon.

“The creative growth course has been instrumental in turning my blurry dream into an actual strategy. Rebecca is an incredible professional, with endless reserves of knowledge, and I can’t thank her enough for the help she gave me. The highlights of the course, for me, were the business plan workshop and the 121 with Rebecca. I feel lucky to have been able to access the programme for free, and my deepest gratitude goes to both Winchester City Council and to Evolve for the splendid work they’ve done.” Francesco Sarti – Writer and Speaker

Jo Stark, Head of Innovation at the University of Winchester said: “We believe that as a civic university we should be supporting local businesses to thrive and recognise the particular strengths and challenges faced by the creative industries as typically micro-businesses and freelancers. The support provided by Evolve has proved invaluable and we wanted to be able to offer this to a broader range of small businesses.”

Throughout the programme, themes of sustainability and the circular economy (extending product life through repairing, sharing, reuse and recycling) were also woven in, encouraging businesses and individuals to think about the life cycle and environmental impact of their products and services and how they might make small changes to support sustainable action.

Councillor Lucille Thompson, Cabinet Member for Business and Culture, Winchester City Council, said: “The Winchester District Cultural Strategy identified our creative industries as a priority area for development, and we are pleased that the creative growth programme has proved to be popular and supported so many creatives. We are also thrilled that the university of Winchester are funding an extension and spin-off of the programme, offering further support to small businesses in our district. This is a great example of partnership working which is at the heart of our new strategy.”

Last Updated: Monday 24 March 2025

MIL OSI United Kingdom –

March 25, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: Francophonie Month 2025: Update on the implementation of the commitments made at the Villers-Cotterêts summit (21 March 2025)
Source: Republic of France in English
The Republic of France has issued the following statement:

To mark Francophonie Month, the Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs, Jean-Noël Barrot, and the Minister Delegate for Francophonie and International Partnerships, Thani Mohamed-Soilihi, welcome the progress in implementing the 16 commitments made by President Macron, the leaders of the Organisation internationale de la Francophonie, and civil society stakeholders during the 19th Francophonie summit, held in Villers-Cotterêts and Paris on 3 and 4 October 2024.
At the first meeting of the Villers-Cotterêts commitments monitoring committee, at the Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs on 6 March, the main project leaders – from the ministries, the operators and the Cité internationale de la langue française – highlighted the vitality of the projects launched at the 19th Francophonie summit in support of a practical, open, dynamic French language.

The Villers-Cotterêts commitments are directly connected to the challenges of our time, in the current international context: young people’s employability, artificial intelligence, women’s rights, the resilience of the information space, and media education.

Since the 19th Francophonie summit, the road map has been set in motion: the launch of the Francophone alliance for intellectual property; the signature on 8 March, with Quebec’s Minister of Francophonie and Equality , of agreements on the Francophone network for women’s equality and rights and on the Francophone feminist alliance; and the announcement of France’s contribution to the international Francophone mobility and employability programme (PIMEF), promoted by the Francophone University Agency.

In the coming weeks, active efforts by all the stakeholders involved will continue to make several major projects launched at the Villers-Cotterêts summit operational, such as:

The inauguration of the ALT-EDIC / LANGU:IA language technology centre in Villers-Cotterêts on 20 March and the launch of four projects led by the European consortium (data, language models etc.);

The creation of the France-Quebec committee for the discoverability of French-language scientific content on 9 April;

The development of programmes on the TiVi5 youth channel in the Maghreb in the spring;

The official creation of the Collège international de Villers-Cotterêts for teacher training on 4 June;

The signature of the tripartite agreement between the National Institute of Industrial Property, the World Intellectual Property Organization, and the Permanent Conference of African and Francophone Consular Chambers and Intermediary Organizations, in the framework of the Francophone alliance for intellectual property, at VivaTech on 11 June;

Map showing training opportunities in the cultural and creative industries to be launched in Rabat in June;

Launch of the Volunteers united for La Francophonie programme (1) between now and the summer.

With the power of the Francophone players taking them up – as at the trade fair for innovation in French, FrancoTech, which has been placed on a long-term footing and made an annual event in conjunction with the OIF and the Alliance of French-speaking Employers –, the wide-ranging Villers-Cotterêts commitments are directing energies towards a multilateralism that is more necessary than ever.

For M. Jean-Noël Barrot, Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs, “The Villers-Cotterêts commitments show that the OIF is at the service of citizens, especially young people, when it comes to building the tools, networks and levers appropriate to a changing world.”

For M. Thani Mohamed-Soilihi, Minister Delegate for Francophonie and International Partnerships, “We’re continuing to focus our efforts also on diversifying our partners, in order to ensure the long-term nature of the Villers-Cotterêts summit initiatives, stepping up communication efforts to highlight more effectively to our fellow citizens the impact of these projects.”

(1) Volontaires unis pour la Francophonie – a programme enabling 100 young nationals from OIF member States to travel to other OIF countries to take part in missions in civil-society organizations, local authorities and public bodies, working in the areas of educational cooperation, social entrepreneurship and promoting the values of Francophonie.
MIL OSI Europe News –
March 25, 2025
MIL-OSI Africa: Minister leads G20 environment working group
Source: South Africa News Agency

Minister of Forestry, Fisheries and the Environment, Dr Dion George, will this week lead the Group of Twenty (G20) Environment and Climate Sustainability Working Group (ECSWG) as part of South Africa’s Presidency of the G20.

“It is expected that the outcome of this first virtual G20 ECSWG meeting will provide strategic direction and a common understanding amongst G20 Member States on the key environmental and climate change priorities and deliverables,” the Minister said on Sunday.

Taking place under the theme: “Solidarity, Equality, and Sustainability,” the Minister is expected to open the meeting on Tuesday, by setting the scene for South Africa’s Presidency of the G20 ECSWG, provide an opportunity to discuss the five priorities and deliverables, and also present the proposed work plan for the G20 ECSWG for 2025.

The priority focus areas for South Africa’s Presidency of the G20 ECSWG include:
- Biodiversity and Conservation – Implementation of the Global Biodiversity Framework and the Biodiversity Economy;
- Land Degradation, Desertification and Drought – Land Degradation Neutrality targets;
- Chemicals and Waste Management – Sustainable Chemicals Management; Circular Economy; Waste Management; Waste to Energy; Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) implementation;
- Climate Change and Air Quality – Just Transition; Loss and Damage; Adaptation, including Climate Resilient Development (CRD); Climate Finance and Air Quality; and
- Oceans and Coastal Management – Marine Spatial Planning – ocean governance; combatting marine plastic pollution.
The G20 ECSWG aims to enhance cooperation amongst all G20 members and invitees to address environmental and climate change priorities.

The G20 comprises 19 countries: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Türkiye, United Kingdom and United States, as well as two regional bodies, namely the European Union and the African Union.

The G20 members represent about two-thirds of the world population, approximately 85% of the global GDP and over 75% of the global trade.

This platform is considered as the leading forum for international economic cooperation and plays an important role in shaping and strengthening global architecture and governance on all major international economic issues.

South Africa’s Presidency of the G20 commenced on 01 December 2024 and will continue until 30 November 2025.

The Presidency will build upon on the achievements of India (2023 Presidency) and Brazil (2024 Presidency), to ensure continuity in advancing the developmental agenda within the G20.

“South Africa’s G20 Presidency provides a unique opportunity for the country to champion the aspirations of emerging market economies and lead the developmental agenda of the African Continent within the framework of the G20.”

A total of three G20 ECSWG meetings and one ECSWG Ministerial meeting will be held in South Africa, with the first virtual meeting scheduled to take place from 25 – 28 March 2025; followed by the second meeting from 14-18 July 2025 at Kruger National Park, and the final meeting in October 2025 at Cape Town.

The Ministerial meeting will be held back-to-back with the third ECSWG meeting in October 2025.

The department will also roll out outreach and awareness activities in the buildup to the three G20 ECSWG meetings throughout the country to amplify the messaging on the focus areas for the G20 ECSWG.

“The department will leverage South Africa’s Presidency of the G20 to market and showcase the Kruger-Kirstenbosch-iSimangaliso Icon Status Strategy (KISS). Some of the meetings and activities will take place at these iconic world-class sites to showcase them on the global stage,” the Minister said. – SAnews.gov.za

MIL OSI Africa –
March 25, 2025

MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Advancing Cashless India

Source: Government of India (2)

Advancing Cashless India

₹1,500 Cr Incentive Scheme for Low-Value BHIM-UPI Transactions

Posted On: 24 MAR 2025 2:09PM by PIB Delhi

The Union Cabinet has approved a ₹1,500 crore incentive scheme for FY 2024–25 to promote low-value BHIM-UPI (P2M) transactions and encourage digital payments among small merchants.
The scheme ensures zero MDR on UPI transactions and offers a 0.15% incentive for transactions up to ₹2,000 made to small merchants.
The scheme aims to expand UPI infrastructure across rural and semi-urban areas through tools like UPI 123PAY, Lite, and LiteX.
According to the ACI Worldwide Report 2024, India contributed 49% of all global real-time transactions in 2023 — reaffirming its position as a global leader in digital payment innovation.

The Union Cabinet, chaired by Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi, has approved the ‘Incentive Scheme for Promotion of Low-Value BHIM-UPI Transactions (Person to Merchant – P2M)’ for the financial year 2024-25. This step supports the Government’s goal of boosting digital payments, encouraging small merchants to adopt UPI, and promoting financial inclusion.

Strengthening India’s Digital Payment Ecosystem

Promotion of digital payments is an integral part of the Government’s strategy for financial inclusion and providing wide-ranging payment options to the common man.

The expenditure incurred by the digital payment industry for providing services to customers/merchants is recovered through the Merchant Discount Rate (MDR). The merchant discount rate (MDR) is a fee that merchants and other businesses must pay to a payment processing company on debit or credit card transactions. The MDR typically comes in the form of a percentage of the transaction amount.

As per RBI, MDR of up to 0.90% of the transaction value is applicable across all card networks for debit cards. As per NPCI, MDR of up to 0.30% is applicable for UPI P2M (Person to Merchant) transactions. Since January 2020, to promote digital transactions, MDR has been made zero for RuPay Debit Card and BHIM-UPI transactions through amendments in Section 10A of the Payments and Settlement Systems Act, 2007 and Section 269SU of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

To support payment ecosystem participants in effective service delivery, the Government has implemented the “Incentive scheme for promotion of RuPay Debit Cards and low-value BHIM-UPI transactions (P2M)”, with due Cabinet approval. The incentive is paid by the Government to the Acquiring Bank (merchant’s bank) and is then shared among other stakeholders: Issuer Bank (customer’s bank), Payment Service Provider Bank (facilitates UPI onboarding/API integration), and App Providers (TPAPs). Year-wise incentive payout by the Government (in Rs. crore) during the last three financial years:

Scheme overview

The incentive scheme for promotion of low-value BHIM-UPI transactions (P2M) will be implemented at an estimated outlay of Rs 1,500 crore, from 1st April 2024 to 31st March 2025. It exclusively covers UPI (Person to Merchant – P2M) transactions of up to ₹2,000, specifically targeting small merchants to encourage the adoption of digital payments at the grassroots level.

UPI transactions have seen a significant surge in recent years, with total transaction value rising from ₹21.3 lakh crore in FY2019-20 to ₹213.8 lakh crore till January 2025. Of this, Person to Merchant (P2M) transactions have grown steadily, reaching ₹59.3 lakh crore, reflecting increased digital payment adoption among merchants.

P2P-Person to Person, P2M-Person to merchants

Scheme objectives

Promote BHIM-UPI Platform: Aim to reach ₹20,000 crore in transaction volume during FY 2024-25.
Strengthen Payment Infrastructure: Support participants in building secure digital payment systems.
Ensure Reliability: Maintain high uptime and reduce technical declines.
Rural Penetration: Expand UPI services in tier 3 to 6 cities and remote areas using:
- UPI 123PAY (for feature phones)
- UPI Lite and UPI LiteX (for offline payments)

Incentive Structure

Under the approved scheme, incentives are designed based on the merchant category and transaction value. For small merchants, UPI transactions up to ₹2,000 will attract zero Merchant Discount Rate (MDR) and will be eligible for an incentive of 0.15% of the transaction value. For transactions above ₹2,000, there will be zero MDR but no incentive. In the case of large merchants, all transactions—regardless of the amount—will have zero MDR and will not carry any incentive.

Reimbursement mechanism

80% of the admitted claim amount by the acquiring banks will be disbursed unconditionally each quarter.
Remaining 20% will be disbursed based on the following performance criteria:

10% of the admitted claim will be paid only if the acquiring bank’s technical decline rate (failed transactions due to technical issues on their side) is less than 0.75%.
The remaining 10% of the admitted claim will be paid only if the acquiring bank’s system uptime (availability of their systems) is more than 99.5%.

UPI – Benefits to merchants

Key benefits of scheme

Convenience & Speed: Seamless, secure, and fast payments improve cash flow and provide digital credit access.
No Extra Charges: Citizens can pay digitally without any additional fees.
Support for Small Merchants: Encourages cost-sensitive merchants to accept UPI payments.
Less-Cash Economy: Promotes formal, accountable digital transactions.
System Efficiency: High uptime and low failure rate conditions ensure reliable 24×7 payment services.
Balanced Approach: Encourages digital growth while managing Government expenditure prudently.

Unique features of BHIM-UPI

Instant Transfers: Round-the-clock money transfer via mobile devices, all 365 days.

Unified Access: One mobile app to access multiple bank accounts.

Single Click 2FA: Strong, seamless two-factor authentication.

Virtual Addresses: Enhanced security—no need to enter card or bank details.

QR Code Payments: Easy scan-and-pay experience.

Versatile Use: Suitable for in-app purchases, utility bills, donations, collections, and more.

Direct Complaint Handling: Users can raise issues via the mobile app itself.

UPI’s Global Expansion

India’s digital payments movement is gaining global attention, with UPI and RuPay expanding across borders. UPI is now operational in seven countries:
UAE, Singapore, Bhutan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, France, and Mauritius.

France marks UPI’s debut in Europe, allowing smooth payments for Indians abroad.
UPI is also being promoted within the BRICS group, enhancing remittances, financial inclusion, and global recognition.
As per the ACI Worldwide Report 2024, India accounted for 49% of all global real-time transactions in 2023 underscoring India’s leadership in digital payment innovation.

Towards an inclusive digital economy

The approved incentive scheme for FY 2024-25 marks a major step forward in India’s digital journey. It not only supports the use of BHIM-UPI among small merchants but also strengthens the country’s financial infrastructure. With UPI leading globally, India continues to set benchmarks in innovation, inclusion, and secure digital payments. Through this initiative, the Government aims to ensure that businesses of all sizes—especially at the grassroots—can benefit from seamless, secure, and cost-effective cashless transactions.

References:

.https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2112874

· https://static.pib.gov.in/WriteReadData/specificdocs/documents/2024/dec/doc2024121462101.pdf

· https://www.npci.org.in/what-we-do/upi/product-overview

· https://www.npci.org.in/what-we-do/upi-lite/upi-lite-x/product-overview

.http://npci.org.in/what-we-do/upi-123pay/product-overview

Click here to see in PDF:

Santosh Kumar/ Ritu Kataria/ Anchal Patiyal

(Release ID: 2114335) Visitor Counter : 98

MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

March 25, 2025

MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Yuge Yugeen Bharat National Museum in New Delhi

Source: Government of India (2)

Posted On: 24 MAR 2025 4:01PM by PIB Delhi

The North and South Blocks in New Delhi are set to house the new national museum, named as Yuge Yugeen Bharat National Museum. This initiative is part of the Central Vista Redevelopment Project. It includes the transformation of two blocks of symmetrical buildings into museum spaces for the creation of a new National Museum elucidating the thousands-year-old civilizational and cultural heritage. An agreement has been signed on 19^th December, 2024 between National Museum & France Museums Development for the technical cooperation for the development of the upcoming museum.

The project timeline and budget allocation is contingent on the outcomes of the feasibility study and subsequent formalities.

This project aimed at showcasing India’s cultural heritage – a celebration of timeless & eternal India to explore our proud past, illuminate the present & imagine the bright future.

This information was given by Union Minister for Culture and Tourism Shri Gajendra Singh Shekhawat in a written reply in Lok Sabha today.

***

Sunil Kumar Tiwari

pibculture[at]gmail[dot]com

(Release ID: 2114398) Visitor Counter : 27

MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

March 25, 2025

MIL-OSI Europe: RECOMMENDATION on the draft Council decision on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Union, of the Agreement between the European Union, Iceland, the Principality of Liechtenstein and the Kingdom of Norway on an EEA Financial Mechanism for the period May 2021 – April 2028, the Agreement between the Kingdom of Norway and the European Union on a Norwegian Financial Mechanism for the period May 2021 – April 2028, the Additional Protocol to the Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Kingdom of Norway and the Additional Protocol to the Agreement between the European Economic Community and Iceland – A10-0036/2025

Source: European Parliament

DRAFT EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTION

on the draft Council decision on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Union, of the Agreement between the European Union, Iceland, the Principality of Liechtenstein and the Kingdom of Norway on an EEA Financial Mechanism for the period May 2021 – April 2028, the Agreement between the Kingdom of Norway and the European Union on a Norwegian Financial Mechanism for the period May 2021 – April 2028, the Additional Protocol to the Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Kingdom of Norway and the Additional Protocol to the Agreement between the European Economic Community and Iceland

(10005/2024 – C10‑0103/2024 – 2024/0052(NLE))

(Consent)

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the draft Council decision (10005/2024),

– having regard to the draft Agreement between the European Union, Iceland, the Principality of Liechtenstein and the Kingdom of Norway on an EEA Financial Mechanism for the period May 2021–April 2028 (10057/2024),

– having regard to the draft Agreement between the Kingdom of Norway and the European Union on a Norwegian Financial Mechanism for the period May 2021–April 2028 (10146/2024),

– having regard to the draft Additional Protocol to the Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Kingdom of Norway (10149/2024),

– having regard to the draft Additional Protocol to the Agreement between the European Economic Community and Iceland (10148/2024),

– having regard to the request for consent submitted by the Council in accordance with Article 217 and Article 218(6), second subparagraph, point (a), of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (C10-0103/2024),

– having regard to Rule 107(1) and (4), and Rule 117(7) of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the recommendation of the Committee on International Trade (A10-0036/2025),

1. Gives its consent to the conclusion of the agreements and protocols;

2. Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the governments and parliaments of the Member States, Iceland, the Principality of Liechtenstein and the Kingdom of Norway.

EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

The European Economic Area (EEA) Agreement allows Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway to participate fully in the single market. As provided for in the Agreement, and since its entry into force in 1994, these three countries have therefore financially contributed to the alleviation of economic and social disparities in the EEA. In addition, Norway has contributed through a separate financial mechanism.

As the most recent financial mechanisms expired in 2021, the Commission opened negotiations in 2022 with Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway on an agreement on their future financial contributions. In parallel, a review of the Protocols to the Agreements between the European Economic Community (EEC) and Iceland and Norway related to imports into the European Union (EU) of certain fish and fishery products, was opened as provided for in the revision clauses of the Free Trade Agreements with these countries.

The negotiations were concluded at negotiators’ level, with the initiating in November 2023 of:

– an Agreement between the EU, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway on an EEA Financial Mechanism for the period May 2021 – April 2028;

– an Agreement between Norway and the EU on a Norwegian Financial Mechanism for the period May 2021 – April 2028;

– an Additional Protocol to the Agreement between the EEC and Norway; and

– an Additional Protocol to the Agreement between the EEC and Iceland.

The EEA Financial Mechanism Agreement and the Norway Agreement will together provide a financial contribution to economic and social cohesion in the EEA of EUR 3.268 billion for the period May 2021 – April 2028. The Protocols with Iceland and Norway will provide for new concessions for the period May 2021 – April 2028. Flexibility will be provided concerning the carry-over of unexhausted quotas at the end of the period. Norway will also renew the fish transit arrangement for EU vessels landing catches in its territory.

The rapporteur raises its concerns regarding the limits and imbalances of the fisheries-related Protocol between the EEC and Norway, but nonetheless gives the consent of the conclusion of the four arrangements as one package.

The rapporteur calls on the Commission to take the concerns raised seriously and address the imbalances in the EU fishing sector adequately and swiftly.

On 25 June 2024, the Council adopted the Decision on the signing, on behalf of the EU, and on the provisional application of the Agreements and Protocols.

ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

Entity and/or person

Ministry of Regional Development and European Union Funds of Republic of Croatia

Mission of Norway to the European Union

The list above is drawn up under the exclusive responsibility of the rapporteur.

PROCEDURE – COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE

Title	Agreement between the European Union, Iceland, the Principality of Liechtenstein and the Kingdom of Norway on an EEA Financial Mechanism for the period May 2021 – April 2028, the Agreement between the Kingdom of Norway and the European Union on a Norwegian Financial Mechanism for the period May 2021 – April 2028, the Additional Protocol to the Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Kingdom of Norway and the Additional Protocol to the Agreement between the European Economic Community and Iceland
References	10005/2024 – C10-0103/2024 – 2024/0052(NLE)
Date of consultation or request for consent	18.9.2024
Committee(s) responsible	INTA
Committees asked for opinions Date announced in plenary	PECH 7.10.2024
Not delivering opinions Date of decision	PECH 19.2.2025
Rapporteurs Date appointed	Željana Zovko 30.9.2024
Discussed in committee	30.1.2025	20.2.2025
Date adopted	20.3.2025
Result of final vote	+: –: 0:	33 7 0
Members present for the final vote	Christophe Bay, Brando Benifei, Anna Bryłka, Udo Bullmann, Benoit Cassart, Markéta Gregorová, Bart Groothuis, Céline Imart, Karin Karlsbro, Bernd Lange, Ilia Lazarov, Thierry Mariani, Javier Moreno Sánchez, Ştefan Muşoiu, Daniele Polato, Majdouline Sbai, Lukas Sieper, Dominik Tarczyński, Francesco Torselli, Kathleen Van Brempt, Jörgen Warborn, Iuliu Winkler, Bogdan Andrzej Zdrojewski, Juan Ignacio Zoido Álvarez
Substitutes present for the final vote	Mika Aaltola, Nicolas Bay, Markus Buchheit, João Cotrim De Figueiredo, Danilo Della Valle, Borja Giménez Larraz, Vicent Marzà Ibáñez, Marina Mesure, Martin Schirdewan, Kris Van Dijck
Members under Rule 216(7) present for the final vote	Hildegard Bentele, Mélanie Disdier, Niels Geuking, Chloé Ridel, Romana Tomc, Matthieu Valet
Date tabled	21.3.2025

MIL OSI Europe News –

March 24, 2025

MIL-OSI Security: More than 300 arrests as African countries clamp down on cyber threats

Source: Interpol (news and events)

24 March 2025

LYON, France — Authorities in seven African countries have arrested 306 suspects and seized 1,842 devices in an international operation targeting cyber attacks and cyber-enabled scams.

The arrests were made as part of Operation Red Card (November 2024 – February 2025) which aims to disrupt and dismantle cross-border criminal networks which cause significant harm to individuals and businesses. In particular, the operation targeted mobile banking, investment and messaging app scams. The cases uncovered during the operation involved more than 5,000 victims.

As part of the crackdown, Nigerian police arrested 130 people, including 113 foreign nationals, for their alleged involvement in cyber-enabled scams such as online casino and investment fraud. The suspects, who converted proceeds to digital assets to conceal their tracks, were recruited from different countries to run the illegal schemes in as many languages as possible. Nigerian authorities have established that some of the people working in the scam centres may also be victims of human trafficking, forced or coerced into criminal activities. Overall, the investigation led to the seizure of 26 vehicles, 16 houses, 39 plots of land and 685 devices.

In a significant case from South Africa, authorities arrested 40 individuals and seized more than 1,000 SIM cards, along with 53 desktops and towers linked to a sophisticated SIM box fraud scheme. This setup, which reroutes international calls as local ones, is commonly used by criminals to carry out large-scale SMS phishing attacks.

In Zambia, officers apprehended 14 suspected members of a criminal syndicate that hacked into victims’ phones. The scam involved sending a message containing a malicious link which, when clicked, installed malware to the device. This allowed hackers to take control of the messaging account, and ultimately the phone, giving them access to banking apps. The hackers were also able to use the victim’s messaging apps to share the malicious link within conversations and groups, enabling the scam to spread.

During the operation, Rwandan authorities arrested 45 members of a criminal network for their involvement in social engineering scams that defrauded victims of over USD 305,000 in 2024 alone. Their tactics included posing as telecommunications employees and claiming fake ‘jackpot’ wins to extract sensitive information and gain access to victims’ mobile banking accounts. Another method involved impersonating an injured family member to ask relatives for financial assistance towards hospital bills. Overall, USD 103,043 was recovered and 292 devices were seized.

Neal Jetton, INTERPOL’s Director of the Cybercrime Directorate, said:

“The success of Operation Red Card demonstrates the power of international cooperation in combating cybercrime, which knows no borders and can have devastating effects on individuals and communities. The recovery of significant assets and devices, as well as the arrest of key suspects, sends a strong message to cybercriminals that their activities will not go unpunished.”

Ahead of the operation, countries exchanged criminal intelligence on key targets. This intelligence was enriched by INTERPOL with insights into criminal modus operandi using data from its private sector partners—Group-IB, Kaspersky and Trend Micro.

The seven participating countries were Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Togo and Zambia.

The operation was delivered through INTERPOL’s African Joint Operation against Cybercrime (AFJOC), an initiative funded by the UK’s Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office.

MIL Security OSI –

March 24, 2025
MIL-OSI Africa: Ghana’s Surging Gold Exports Propel Mining Sector Expansion

Source: Africa Press Organisation – English (2) – Report:

ACCRA, Ghana, March 24, 2025/APO Group/ —

Ghana is capitalizing on its gold exports (https://apo-opa.co/4iOXHfD) to drive economic growth, with revenues increasing to $11.6 billion in 2024 – a 52.6% increase from the $7.6 billion recorded in 2023. Gold exports accounted for 57% of the country’s total export revenue (https://apo-opa.co/4hHk0lZ), solidifying the industry’s role as a key contributor to GDP expansion. Notably, small-scale miners contributed $5 billion to the sector’s export revenue.

As Ghana continues to enhance gold production and exports, the upcoming Mining in Motion conference, taking place from 2 – 4 June, will connect global investors with opportunities in Ghana’s gold value chain. The event will facilitate deal signings and strengthen trade relations with Ghana’s leading gold export markets.

While Ghana has maintained its position as Africa’s largest gold producer, it has also emerged as a key supplier to international markets. Asia ranks as the primary importer of Ghanaian gold, followed by Europe and Africa. In 2024, gold accounted for 65.4% of Ghana’s total exports to Asia, 60.2% of exports to Europe and 49.4% of exports across Africa. More than half of Ghanaian gold exports to each continent were concentrated in a single country; 53.1% of exports to Asia went to the United Arab Emirates (UAE), 60.2% of exports to Europe were directed to Switzerland and 60.5% of African exports were received by South Africa.

Asia strengthened its gold trading with Ghana, with countries such as China and India ranking amongst top export markets for Ghana. In Europe, the Netherlands, Spain, Italy, Germany, the United Kingdom, Belgium, France, Bulgaria, Portugal, Poland, Gibraltar and Estonia accounted for a significant share of Ghana’s gold exports. In Africa, Burkina Faso, the Ivory Coast, Togo and Mali rank as the top importers of Ghanaian gold.

Beyond these regions, Canada accounted for 58.6% of Ghana’s gold exports to North America, while Brazil received 94.1% of the country’s gold exports to Latin America.

Looking ahead, Ghana’s expanding gold production is expected to further strengthen trade with its top export markets, as these nations continue to invest in the country’s mining sector. The UAE’s Emiral Resources is the largest shareholder in Asante Gold Corporation (https://apo-opa.co/4bVIqXE), which is executing a $522 million expansion strategy, including the development of the Bibiani project. Meanwhile, India’s Rosy Royal Minerals holds an 80% stake in the Royal Ghana Gold Refinery, the country’s first gold refinery, positioning India as a key player in Ghana’s gold value chain.

Amid these developments, Mining in Motion will feature high-level discussions, networking sessions, and project showcases, reinforcing Ghana’s role as a key gold supplier to global markets.

Stay informed about the latest advancements, network with industry leaders, and engage in critical discussions on key issues impacting ASGM and medium to large scale mining in Ghana. Secure your spot at the Mining in Motion 2025 Summit by visiting www.MininginMotionSummit.com. For sponsorship opportunities or delegate participation, contact Sales@ashantigreeninitiative.org.

MIL OSI Africa –

March 24, 2025

Category: France

ANNEX 1: CURRICULUM VITÆ OF LUCIAN ROMAȘCANU

ANNEX 2: ANSWERS BY LUCIAN ROMAȘCANU TO THE QUESTIONNAIRE

ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

INFORMATION ON ADOPTION IN COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE

DRAFT EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTION

EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

BUDGETARY ASSESSMENT OF THE COMMITTEE ON BUDGETS (4.2.2025)

OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS (31.1.2025)

PROCEDURE – COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE

FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL BY THE COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE

Make in India Powers Defence GrowthProduction hit ₹1.27 lakh crore in FY 2023-24, Exports cross ₹21,000 crore

Union Minister Sarbananda Sonowal joins Global Maritime Leaders at Singapore Maritime Week (SMW)Meets key Singapore Ministers to strengthen bilateral maritime & trade ties

Tiny valves, global consequences

Lasers, bubbles and evolution

400 million years of development

How plants will survive the future

Public service or state propaganda?

Leaving a void

Other voices get louder

Switched off

UK-French relationship strengthened as Defence Chiefs discuss Ukraine and European security with their French counterparts

Admiral Sir Tony Radakin, Chief of the Defence Staff, said:

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Anti-French rhetoric

Defence ties to Europe

1. Toussaint Louverture: The Story of the Only Successful Slave Revolt in History

2. Prophet Against Slavery: Benjamin Lay, A Graphic Novel

3. Under the Banner of King Death: Pirates of the Atlantic, A Graphic Novel

It’s not just a place – it’s a brand

The ‘Discover Puerto Rico’ era

Pop culture carries the weight

European nations turn inward

US looks abroad

Marshall’s plan

NATO is born

Would a Marshall Plan work for Ukraine?

Advancing Cashless India₹1,500 Cr Incentive Scheme for Low-Value BHIM-UPI Transactions

DRAFT EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTION

EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

PROCEDURE – COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE

Make in India Powers Defence Growth

Production hit ₹1.27 lakh crore in FY 2023-24, Exports cross ₹21,000 crore

Union Minister Sarbananda Sonowal joins Global Maritime Leaders at Singapore Maritime Week (SMW)

Meets key Singapore Ministers to strengthen bilateral maritime & trade ties

Advancing Cashless India

₹1,500 Cr Incentive Scheme for Low-Value BHIM-UPI Transactions