Category: France

MIL-OSI Security: Anderson County Man Pleads Guilty to $13 Million Ponzi Scheme and Cyber Stalking

Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) State Crime Alerts (c)

COLUMBIA, S.C. — Michael J. French, 41, of Pendleton, has pleaded guilty to operating a multimillion-dollar Ponzi scheme and to stalking two social media content creators.

Evidence put forth at the plea hearing established that French owned MJF Holdings, LLC and MJF Capital, LLC. Beginning in March 2019, through these companies, French offered promissory notes to investors that projected annual returns of 12 percent. He represented to investors that their funds would be used to provide loans to small businesses and that he had experience in the financial industry, including underwriting the loans in which the investor would be invested. French represented to investors that he would not receive compensation unless the promissory notes earned in excess of the 12 percent guaranteed to investors.

These were false representations. French paid previous investors with new investor monies because his investment product was not generating returns. This lulled investors into believing the product was successful, when, in fact, French was spending investor money to maintain a lavish lifestyle that included supporting female social media content creators by paying them thousands of dollars each month.

At one point, the content creators stopped communicating with French. He became angry with the women and began harassing them through various “burner” phone numbers and fake email accounts. French claimed that he was a sniper, had killed people, and that the police could not protect them. French traveled to one woman’s home unannounced, forcing her to hide in a locked vehicle in the garage with her 2-year-old child. She called 911 as French attempted to force his way into the home. He was arrested by local police before he could reach them.

United State Chief District Judge Timothy Cain accepted French’s guilty plea and will sentence him after receiving and reviewing a pre-sentence report from the U.S. Probation Office. French faces a maximum penalty of 20 years’ imprisonment.

The FBI Columbia Field Office and U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Office of Inspector General investigated the case. Assistant United States Attorney Bill Watkins is prosecuting the case.

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MIL Security OSI –

February 12, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: INTERPOL conference: Drawing on national policing expertise for global security

Source: Interpol (news and events)

11 February 2025

The three-day meeting brings together 310 law enforcement officials from 150 countries.

LYON, France – Senior police officials from around the world are gathering in Lyon this week for INTERPOL’s annual Heads of National Central Bureaus (NCBs) Conference.

As the primary point of contact between INTERPOL and national law enforcement agencies in its 196 member countries, NCBs are uniquely positioned to share knowledge, expertise, and best practices in the fight against transnational crime.

Bringing together some 310 delegates from 150 countries, the three-day (11 – 13 February) meeting will discuss strategies for using INTERPOL’s capabilities and network to tackle current and emerging security risks.

Harnessing technology

Through a series of panel-based discussions and regional roundtable sessions, attendees will address a range of crime threats including gang violence, extremism and radicalization and cybercrime, as well as the use of technologies such as virtual reality and artificial intelligence to enhance law enforcement capabilities.

INTERPOL President Ahmed Naser Al-Raisi said:

“In today’s world, the importance of cross-border collaboration and data sharing cannot be over-stated.

“National Central Bureaus are the critical link connecting police agencies across INTERPOL’s member countries to the General Secretariat and the wider global security community. The challenges we face are not easy, but together, we are stronger.”

INTERPOL Secretary General Valdecy Urquiza said:

“INTERPOL’s mission must always stay aligned with its member countries’ needs—needs that are constantly changing as the landscape of international crime evolves.

“The Heads of National Central Bureaus’ conference is an opportunity for us to understand the wide-ranging priorities and challenges of our membership, and more importantly how we can help. There will be no strong INTERPOL without strong NCBs.”

Leading platform

Now in its 20th edition, the Heads of NCB conference is a leading platform for international police cooperation.

The event provides senior policing officials with a valuable opportunity to directly engage with their counterparts from around the world, fostering collaboration and exchanging knowledge to drive progress in the global effort to combat transnational crime.

MIL Security OSI –

February 12, 2025
MIL-OSI Africa: Living with multiple chronic conditions cuts lives short – but Africans are overlooked in research

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Isaac Kisiangani, Researcher and PhD student, African Population and Health Research Center

When a person suffers from two or more long-term health conditions at the same time this is known as multimorbidity.

The World Health Organization says multimorbidity puts patients at greater risk and complicates primary care. It also drives up healthcare costs.

People with more than one condition face a higher risk of early death and poorer quality of life. They may also have to take multiple medications. Polypharmacy increases the risk of harmful drug interactions and side effects, and patients find it harder to stick to treatment.

In African countries the situation is further complicated by several disease burdens converging. Individuals may suffer non-communicable diseases like hypertension and diabetes, as well as from infectious diseases like HIV and tuberculosis.

Poverty and unequal access to healthcare add to the impact of multimorbidity.

Most research on multimorbidity has focused on populations of European ancestry. When people of African descent are included, the focus is often on African-Americans. This group does not represent the diversity or health challenges faced in Africa.

As specialists in genetic epidemiology and chronic diseases management, we set out to research the gaps in understanding multimorbidity among people with African ancestry.

Identifying gaps

We examined 232 medical research publications (published from 2010 to June 2022), and included those published in English and French. That’s not a lot if one considers all the different health challenges that people of African descent suffer globally.

Of these studies, 113 focused on continental African populations and 100 on the diaspora. Nineteen included both groups.

Our review spanned five major academic databases. We used search terms such as “multimorbidity”, “comorbidity” and “African population”. Restricting searches to titles and abstracts and relying on texts that our institutions could access may have excluded some studies.

Heart diseases dominate

Cardiometabolic diseases, including hypertension, heart disease and diabetes, were the most studied conditions in both populations (those in Africa and those elsewhere).

But notable differences emerged.

In populations on the continent, cardiometabolic diseases tended to occur along with chronic infectious diseases such as HIV and tuberculosis.

In diaspora populations, cardiometabolic diseases more commonly occurred along with other non-communicable diseases and psychiatric conditions such as depression and post-traumatic stress disorder.

Age, sex, poverty

As with all populations worldwide, older people in the studies we reviewed were the group most likely to have more than one health condition.

But on the continent, the burden of infectious diseases meant younger adults were also at risk of having more than one illness.

Women were more likely than men to have multiple conditions, particularly in relation to conditions such as hypertension and diabetes. This likely reflects both biological factors, such as hormonal differences, and social influences like income inequalities and differences in working environments.

Individuals with lower socioeconomic status (which often means women) would be more likely to be exposed to unhealthy lifestyles, and to have less access to preventive care.

What can be done?

Our review found that the way health conditions combine differs between people of African descent outside Africa and those on the continent. This means medical research should include a greater diversity of participants.

Expanded data collection should include genetic and metabolomic data.

It is also essential to study a wider range of chronic conditions.

The increasing co-existence of conditions means that treatment for cardiovascular, metabolic and infectious diseases should be integrated.

Some African countries, including South Africa and Kenya, have already introduced integrated care, with encouraging results. A patient with two or more diseases is offered treatment for the conditions at the same facility during the same visit.

– Living with multiple chronic conditions cuts lives short – but Africans are overlooked in research
– https://theconversation.com/living-with-multiple-chronic-conditions-cuts-lives-short-but-africans-are-overlooked-in-research-241627

MIL OSI Africa –

February 12, 2025
MIL-OSI NGOs: Energy Transfer thinks they can silence us

Source: Greenpeace Statement –

© Tegan Gregory / Greenpeace

Big Oil company Energy Transfer is trying to silence Greenpeace with a $300,000,000 lawsuit. If we actually had to pay that amount, Greenpeace USA could shut down.

This lawsuit from Energy Transfer against Greenpeace USA and Greenpeace International includes a racist attempted rewrite of the history of the Indigenous-led protests against the Dakota Access Pipeline. It’s also Big Oil’s message to environmentalists everywhere: if you dare to criticize us, you could be next.

The world has taken notice.

Word of this threat to the entire climate justice movement has spread across the world, and over the last few months, thousands of Greenpeace activists, allies, and supporters in more than two dozen countries have responded to Big Oil in one unified voice.

Our message is loud and clear: we will not be silenced. And that message is now echoing across the planet.

Take a look at these photos from more than 25 different countries — as you scroll, think about what our movement is capable of when we work together.

United States

© Tim Aubry / Greenpeace

Netherlands

© Gosse Bouma / Greenpeace

Germany

© Markus J. Feger / Greenpeace

Czech Republic

© Ray Baseley / Greenpeace

Sweden

© Jana Eriksson / Greenpeace

Denmark

© Philip Raissnia / Greenpeace

Indonesia

© Pangeran / Greenpeace

Thailand

© Purimpat Jansuwan / Greenpeace

Croatia

© Maja Bota / Greenpeace

Norway

© Greenpeace

Poland

© Greenpeace / Max Zielinski

United Kingdom

© David Mirzoeff / Greenpeace

Brazil

© Victor Bravo / Greenpeace

Hungary

© Zsuzsi Dorgo / Greenpeace

Switzerland

© Maksym Zaika / Greenpeace

France

© Fanny Noret / Greenpeace

Philippines

© Greenpeace

Spain

© Greenpeace / Pablo Blazquez

Finland

© Heikki S. Laherma / Greenpeace

Greece

© Evelina Manou / Greenpeace

Mexico

© Prometeo Lucero / Greenpeace

Slovenia

© Petra Godeša / Greenpeace

Romania

© Ioana Moldovan / Greenpeace

Ukraine

© Greenpeace

Aotearoa

© Clae Baxter / Greenpeace

Australia

© Greenpeace / Toby Davidson

Belgium

© Mathieu Soete / Greenpeace

Germany. Indonesia. Thailand. Poland. Brazil. Hungary. France. Spain. Greece. Mexico. Australia. Belgium.

Greenpeace is a global movement. Environmental justice is a global movement.

That’s what Big Oil fails to understand: if they try to silence one of us, millions more will speak out. We will not be silenced. We cannot be silenced.

Big Oil knows that free speech and protest are the best tools we have to demand a green and just world, and they’re afraid of what happens when we exercise those rights. So that’s what we’re going to continue doing.

Recently, we launched an open letter to pressure Energy Transfer to drop their lawsuit. We’re proud to say that hundreds of thousands of people have now signed it, along with more than 400 organizations representing millions of people around the world.

With less than two weeks until we go to trial in North Dakota, we must keep raising our voices.

In September, The Wall Street Journal reported that “some oil-and-gas investors expressed concerns” about Energy Transfer’s $300 million lawsuit against us. Their concern? “It makes the industry look vindictive and could result in a reinvigorated protest movement.”

That’s precisely what Energy Transfer has ignited — a reinvigorated movement.

We all know that Big Oil has infinite sums of money, and immense power. And it’s true that a defeat in court could threaten Greenpeace USA’s existence, and have far-reaching implications for the climate justice movement around the world.

But we will not be silenced.

Sign our open letter to Energy Transfer

MIL OSI NGO –

February 12, 2025
MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Statement from the 11th Tata Steel / Port Talbot Transition Board
Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments
English

Cymraeg

Welsh Secretary Jo Stevens chaired the eleventh Tata Steel/Port Talbot Transition Board in February 2025.
The Tata Steel / Port Talbot Transition Board met on 6 February 2025.

The Secretary of State for Wales and Chair of the Transition Board, Rt Hon Jo Stevens MP, sought endorsement from the Board to announce £8.2 million for the South Wales Industrial Transition from Carbon Hub (SWITCH). This project will support more than 100 jobs and generate more than £87 million for the South Wales economy, supporting the Government’s Plan for Change and economic growth mission.

This is the first project to receive funding as part of the growth and regeneration projects in Port Talbot. A collaboration between Swansea University, Cardiff University and the University of South Wales, with industry and public sector partners. The Transition Board funding is in addition to the £20 million from the Swansea Bay City Deal. SWITCH will deliver research to support and join up the decarbonisation transition. The announcement of further growth and regeneration projects are due to follow.

Today’s release of money is the fourth announcement from the UK Government’s £80m Tata Steel / Port Talbot Transition Board fund which, since last July, has announced £51 million to support individual steelworkers and businesses in Tata Steel’s supply chain to protect jobs and grow the local economy.

The Board also discussed mental health support, and further information on the interventions being developed to support mental health in the community will be announced at the next Transition Board meeting on 27th of March, following a mental health pilot at the Neath Port Talbot Council Support Hub in Aberafan Shopping Centre.

The Board also received updates on:

Tata Steel UK’s decarbonisation programme;

The Department of Business and Trade’s plans for a steel strategy;

The Community Union Support Hub for affected workers; and

The Transition Board funds that have already been announced, including applications received for the Supply Chain fund, and support being provided from the Employment and Skills fund.

Those in attendance included: Rt Hon Jo Stevens MP, Secretary of State for Wales; Rebecca Evans MS, Cabinet Secretary for Economy, Energy and Planning in the Welsh Government; Sarah Jones MP, Minister of State in the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero and the Department; Cllr Steve K Hunt, Leader of Neath Port Talbot Council; Frances O’Brien, CEO of Neath Port Talbot Council; Rajesh Nair, CEO of Tata Steel UK; Stephen Kinnock, MP for Aberafan Maesteg; David Rees, MS for Aberavon; Tom Giffard, MS for the region of South Wales West; Luke Fletcher MS for the region of South Wales West; Sarah Williams-Gardener; Anne Jessopp CBE; Katherine Bennett CBE independent members of the Board; Alun Davies, National Officer for Steel & Metals, Community Union and Jason Bartlett, Regional Officer for Unite the Union.

ENDS

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Published 11 February 2025
MIL OSI United Kingdom –
February 12, 2025
MIL-OSI: Briarwood Chase Management increases holding in French AI firm Sidetrade as it accelerates in the US
Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

Sidetrade, the global leader in AI-powered Order-to-Cash applications, announces that Briarwood Chase Management has increased its stake in the listed company, now holding over 5% of capital since year end 2024.

Briarwood Chase Management, a prominent US-based investment firm, has surpassed the 5% ownership threshold in Sidetrade (Euronext Growth: ALBFR.PA). The decision to build its shareholding follows a comprehensive analysis of the SaaS leader’s economic model and a meeting at Sidetrade’s headquarters, solidifying the firm’s confidence in the CEO’s visionary leadership, its AI roadmap and market potential.

Robert Blatt, Managing Director of Briarwood Chase Management, said: “Our position in Sidetrade underscores our commitment to investing in exceptional businesses and management teams. Sidetrade’s strategic focus on and growth in North America, and exceptional margin potential align with our investment philosophy. In today’s economic environment, Sidetrade distinguishes itself as a robust and high-quality SaaS player, offering built-in growth, strong revenue predictability and recurring income. Furthermore, its status as a sought-after contender in a consolidating market highlights its significant medium-term potential. We are looking forward to being long-term partners to the business and management team.”

Sidetrade, recognized as a leader by top US technology research and consulting firms, is transforming the Order-to-Cash industry by simplifying the daily operations of financial leaders in large organizations to deliver immediate productivity improvements while securing and accelerating cash flow generation. This innovative approach sets new standards and redefines what’s possible in accounts receivable.

“We are very excited to have the trust of Briarwood Chase Management in our growth journey”, Olivier Novasque, CEO of Sidetrade, commented. “After two years of rapid expansion to build a critical foothold in the US, 2024 was a year of strategic consolidation, focusing on strengthening our foundations and fine-tuning our teams. With the US market showing exceptional momentum, we are reigniting investments in 2025 to seize this unparalleled opportunity and drive Sidetrade’s growth to the next level.”

The rapid rise of generative AI and the growing demand for efficiency are leading businesses to adopt cutting-edge technologies like Sidetrade’s. At the heart of Sidetrade’s innovation is Aimie, the most unique AI which – powered by the Sidetrade Data Lake – drives smart customer insights and delivers value for businesses worldwide.

Media relations @Sidetrade
Becca Parlby 00 44 7824 5055 84 bparlby@sidetrade.com

About Sidetrade (www.sidetrade.com)
Sidetrade (Euronext Growth: ALBFR.PA) provides a SaaS platform designed to revolutionize how cash flow is secured and accelerated. Leveraging its next-generation AI, nicknamed Aimie, Sidetrade analyzes $6.1 trillion worth of B2B payment transactions daily in its Cloud, thereby anticipating customer payment behavior and the attrition risk of more than 38 million buyers worldwide. Aimie recommends the best operational strategies, dematerializes and intelligently automates Order-to-Cash processes to enhance productivity, results and working capital across organizations.
Sidetrade has a global reach, with 400+ talented employees based in Europe, the United States and Canada, serving global businesses in more than 85 countries. Amongst them: Bidcorp, Biffa, Bunzl, Engie, Expedia, Inmarsat, KPMG, Lafarge, Manpower, Opentext, Page, Randstad, Saint-Gobain, Securitas, Sodexo, Tech Data, UGI, and Veolia.
Sidetrade is a participant of the United Nations Global Compact, adhering to its principles-based approach to responsible business.

For further information, visit us at www.sidetrade.com and follow @Aimie on LinkedIn.
In the event of any discrepancy between the French and English versions of this press release, only the English version is to be taken into account.

Attachment
- Briarwood Chase increases holding in French AI firm Sidetrade as it accelerates in the US
The MIL Network –
February 12, 2025
MIL-OSI: StormFisher Hydrogen Secures US$50 million Commitment from Hy24 to Deliver Pipeline of Clean Fuel Production Projects in North America
Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)
- The investment will accelerate StormFisher Hydrogen’s current project pipeline deployment, including several facilities in the U.S. and Canada, with a total renewable capacity of up to 1.8 GW by 2030.
- Hy24, investing through their Clean Hydrogen Infrastructure Fund, is entering directly into the North American market, contributing to the advancement of clean fuel deployment in the region while supporting StormFisher Hydrogen’s export ambitions to European and Asian markets.
HOUSTON, Feb. 11, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — StormFisher Hydrogen, a leading developer and producer of clean fuels, announces today it has secured a US$50 million commitment from Hy24’s Clean Hydrogen Infrastructure Fund, the world’s leading low-carbon hydrogen asset manager. This strategic partnership will accelerate StormFisher Hydrogen’s pipeline of clean fuel production projects in North America, helping them to reach final investment decisions (FID) and catalyzing the transition to low carbon energy solutions.

“We are pleased to make our first direct investment in North America to support the growth of StormFisher Hydrogen,” said Pierre-Etienne Franc, co-founder and CEO of Hy24. “The company can leverage its energy platform approach, strong offtaker strategy, and a favorable international regulatory landscape to deploy its robust pipeline of e-Fuels projects and drive its export ambitions to European and Asian markets. These clean energy solutions present a significant opportunity for North America in its pursuit of energy security, economic growth, and its trade and continued leadership in the sector.”

StormFisher Hydrogen’s current project pipeline includes several facilities located across the United States (Texas, Kansas, Minnesota) and Canada (Ontario region). Together, they will have the capacity to convert up to 1.8 gigawatts (GW) of renewable energy from solar and wind into RFNBO e-Fuels (renewable fuel of non-biological origin), such as green hydrogen, e-Methanol, green ammonia, and e-Methane. The company’s most advanced project located in North Texas, U.S. is expected to reach FID in early 2026 and will have an e-Methanol production capacity of more than 120,000 tonnes per year.

“This collaboration with Hy24 enables us to advance projects in our pipeline and reinforces our role as a leader in project development,” said Judson Whiteside, President and CEO of StormFisher Hydrogen. “We bring a lot of value and long-term jobs to the communities we are developing in, while increasing molecule exports to Europe and Asia. With cutting-edge energy infrastructure and highly skilled workforce, the United States is poised to lead the global low-carbon fuels market. Our projects strengthen America’s position in the energy transition while enhancing domestic energy resilience and independence.”

StormFisher Hydrogen will make a significant contribution to the development of North America’s e-Fuel production capacity, which is critical for decarbonizing hard-to-abate industries such as maritime, aviation, and chemicals. It will also help establish the United States as a key supplier to the global market while reinforcing the country’s leadership in the energy sector.

With previous investment from ARC Financial Corp.’s ARC Energy Transition Fund and this new investment from Hy24, StormFisher Hydrogen is expected to deploy several billion dollars of capital over the next decade. The company’s clean fuel production facilities will have material economic benefits for local communities, creating approximately 50 permanent high-quality, full-time jobs per site.

“We are thrilled to partner with Hy24,” said Brian Boulanger, CEO of ARC Financial Corp. “Their deep expertise and sectoral focus in the hydrogen and e-Fuel space will be instrumental in accelerating StormFisher Hydrogen’s mission to lead in clean fuel development. With the management team’s proven track record in developing major projects, ARC Financial Corp.’s extensive North American investment experience, and Hy24’s global reach, we are well-positioned to deliver low-carbon hydrogen-derived products to our industrial customers at scale.”

About StormFisher Hydrogen

StormFisher Hydrogen develops and operates facilities that produce e-Fuels through the sourcing of renewable electricity to produce green hydrogen and the sourcing and use of carbon dioxide from industrial point sources. StormFisher Hydrogen works with hard-to-abate sectors such as transportation (maritime/aviation), heavy industry, and gas utility companies, as well as traditional methanol users seeking clean fuel solutions to support long-term decarbonization goals.

About Hy24

The Clean H2 Infra Fund is managed by Hy24, a 50/50 joint venture between Ardian, a world leading private investment house, and FiveT Hydrogen, a clean hydrogen investment pureplay. The world’s largest clean hydrogen infrastructure fund results from the initiative of Air Liquide, TotalEnergies and VINCI Concessions, combined with the one of Plug Power, Chart Industries and Baker Hughes, which were sharing a common objective to accelerate the development of the hydrogen sector. The fund is now up and running with €2 billion of allocations. With strong industrial and financial expertise at its core, Hy24 will have a unique capacity to accelerate the scaling up of hydrogen solutions along the whole value chain: production, conversion, storage, supply, and usage. Hy24 will support large early stage and strategic projects into becoming essential energy infrastructures. The infrastructure fund managed by Hy24 complies with Article 9 of the European regulation on sustainability-related disclosures in the financial services sector (SFDR). Hy24 is an alternative investment fund manager regulated by the French Autorité des marchés financiers under the number GP-202171. The Clean H2 Infra Fund is dedicated to professional investors and not commercialized in the United States of America.

About ARC Financial Corp.

Founded in 1989, ARC Financial Corp. is committed to building high-performing businesses that address the world’s energy and sustainability needs. To date, ARC has raised C$6.4 billion across eleven energy-focused funds since the launch of its private equity business in 1997, having invested capital in more than 180 companies across the energy landscape. ARC’s newest fund, ARC Energy Fund 10, is focused on infrastructure development and energy services & manufacturing opportunities in energy transition. For more information, please visit www.arcfinancial.com

Press Contacts

StormFisher Hydrogen
Karen Hamill, Director, Communications Strategy Group
khamill@wearecsg.com, W: https://stormfisher.com

Hy24
Elizabeth Adams, Senior Managing Director, FTI Consulting
Hy24@fticonsulting.com, W: https://hy24partners.com

The MIL Network –
February 12, 2025
MIL-OSI Global: The New Yorker turns 100 − how a poker game pipe dream became a publishing powerhouse

Source: The Conversation – USA – By Christopher B. Daly, Professor Emeritus of Journalism, Boston University

The New Yorker expanded the scope of journalism far beyond the standard categories of crime, courts, politics and sports. Design Uncensored

Literate in tone, far-reaching in scope, and witty to its bones, The New Yorker brought a new – and much-needed – sophistication to American journalism when it launched 100 years ago this month.

As I researched the history of U.S. journalism for my book “Covering America,” I became fascinated by the magazine’s origin story and the story of its founder, Harold Ross.

In a business full of characters, Ross fit right in. He never graduated from high school. With a gap-toothed smile and bristle-brush hair, he was frequently divorced and plagued by ulcers.

Ross devoted his adult life to one cause: The New Yorker magazine.

For the literati, by the literati

Born in 1892 in Aspen, Colorado, Ross worked out west as a reporter while still a teenager. When the U.S. entered World War I, Ross enlisted. He was sent to southern France, where he quickly deserted from his Army regiment and made his way to Paris, carrying his portable Corona typewriter. He joined up with the brand-new newspaper for soldiers, Stars and Stripes, which was so desperate for anybody with training that Ross was taken on with no questions asked, even though the paper was an official Army operation.

Harold Ross and Jane Grant in 1926.
University of Oregon Libraries

In Paris, Ross met a number of writers, including Jane Grant, who had been the first woman to work as a news reporter at The New York Times. She eventually became the first of Ross’ three wives.

After the armistice, Ross headed to New York City and never really left. There, he started meeting other writers, and he soon joined a clique of critics, dramatists and wits who gathered at the Round Table in the Algonquin Hotel on West 44th Street in Manhattan.

Over long and liquid lunches, Ross rubbed shoulders and wisecracked with some of the brightest lights in New York’s literary chandelier. The Round Table also spawned a floating poker game that involved Ross and his eventual financial backer, Raoul Fleischmann, of the famous yeast-making family.

In the mid-1920s, Ross decided to launch a weekly metropolitan magazine. He could see that the magazine business was booming, but he had no intention of copying anything that already existed. He wanted to publish a magazine that spoke directly to him and his friends – young city dwellers who’d spent time in Europe and were bored by the platitudes and predictable features found in most American periodicals.

First, though, Ross had to come up with a business plan.

The kind of smart-set readers Ross wanted were also desirable to Manhattan’s high-end retailers, so they got on board and expressed interest in buying ads. On that basis, Ross’ poker partner Fleischmann was willing to stake him US$25,000 to start – roughly $450,000 in today’s dollars.

Ross goes all in

In the fall of 1924, using an office owned by Fleischmann’s family at 25 West 45th St., Ross got to work on the prospectus for his magazine:

“The New Yorker will be a reflection in word and picture of metropolitan life. It will be human. Its general tenor will be one of gaiety, wit and satire, but it will be more than a jester. It will not be what is commonly called radical or highbrow. It will be what is commonly called sophisticated, in that it will assume a reasonable degree of enlightenment on the part of its readers. It will hate bunk.”

The magazine, he famously added, “is not edited for the old lady in Dubuque.”

In other words, The New Yorker was not going to respond to the news cycle, and it was not going to pander to middle America.

Ross’ only criterion would be whether a story was interesting – with Ross the arbiter of what counted as interesting. He was putting all his chips on the long-shot idea that there were enough people who shared his interests – or could discover that they did – to support a glossy, cheeky, witty weekly.

Ross almost failed. The cover of the first issue of The New Yorker, dated Feb. 21, 1925, carried no portraits of potentates or tycoons, no headlines, no come-ons.

Instead, it featured a watercolor by Ross’ artist friend Rea Irvin of a dandified figure staring intently through a monocle at – of all things! – a butterfly. That image, nicknamed Eustace Tilly, became the magazine’s unoffical emblem.

A magazine finds its footing

Inside that first edition, a reader would find a buffet of jokes and short poems. There was a profile, reviews of plays and books, lots of gossip, and a few ads.

It was not terribly impressive, feeling quite patched together, and at first the magazine struggled. When The New Yorker was just a few months old, Ross almost even lost it entirely one night in a drunken poker game at the home of Pulitzer Prize winner and Round Table regular Herbert Bayard Swope. Ross didn’t make it home until noon the next day, and when he woke, his wife found IOUs in his pockets amounting to nearly $30,000.

Fleischmann, who had been at the card game but left at a decent hour, was furious. Somehow, Ross persuaded Fleischmann to pay off some of his debt and let Ross work off the rest. Just in time, The New Yorker began gaining readers, and more advertisers soon followed. Ross eventually settled up with his financial angel.

A big part of the magazine’s success was Ross’ genius for spotting talent and encouraging them to develop their own voices. One of the founding editor’s key early finds was Katharine S. Angell, who became the magazine’s first fiction editor and a reliable reservoir of good sense. In 1926, Ross brought James Thurber and E.B. White aboard, and they performed a variety of chores: writing “casuals,” which were short satirical essays, cartooning, creating captions for others’ drawings, reporting Talk of the Town pieces and offering commentary.

E.B. White in his office at The New Yorker.
Bettmann/Getty Images

As The New Yorker found its footing, the writers and editors began perfecting some of its trademark features: the deep profile, ideally written about someone who was not strictly in the news but who deserved to be better known; long, deeply reported, nonfiction narratives; short stories and poetry; and, of course, the single-panel cartoons and the humor sketches.

Intensely curious and obsessively correct in matters grammatical, Ross would go to any length to ensure accuracy. Writers got their drafts back from Ross covered in penciled queries demanding dates, sources and endless fact-checking. One trademark Ross query was “Who he?”

During the 1930s, while the country was suffering through a relentless economic depression, The New Yorker was sometimes faulted for blithely ignoring the seriousness of the nation’s problems. In the pages of The New Yorker, life was almost always amusing, attractive and fun.

The New Yorker really came into its own, both financially and editorially, during World War II. It finally found its voice, one that was curious, international, searching and, ultimately, quite serious.

Ross also discovered still more writers, such as A.J. Liebling, Mollie Panter-Downes and John Hersey, who was raided from Henry Luce’s Time magazine. Together, they produced some of the best writing of the war, most notably Hersey’s landmark reporting on the use of the first atomic bomb in warfare.

A crown jewel of journalism

Over the past century, The New Yorker had a profound impact on American journalism.

For one thing, Ross created conditions for distinctive voices to be heard. For another, The New Yorker provided encouragement and an outlet for nonacademic authority to flourish; it was a place where all those serious amateurs could write about the Dead Sea Scrolls or geology or medicine or nuclear war with no credentials other than their own ability to observe closely, think clearly and put together a good sentence.

Finally, Ross must be credited with expanding the scope of journalism far beyond standard categories of crime and courts, politics and sports. In the pages of The New Yorker, readers almost never found the same content that they’d come across in other newspapers and magazines.

Instead, readers of The New Yorker might find just about anything else.

Christopher B. Daly does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. The New Yorker turns 100 − how a poker game pipe dream became a publishing powerhouse – https://theconversation.com/the-new-yorker-turns-100-how-a-poker-game-pipe-dream-became-a-publishing-powerhouse-246774

MIL OSI – Global Reports –

February 12, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: Defense News: Exercise Cutlass Express 2025 launches across East Africa

Source: United States Navy

Exercise Cutlass Express 2025, sponsored by U.S. Africa Command and enabled by U.S. 6th Fleet, brings together more than 20 multinational partners for two weeks of training to support collaborative maritime security operations in the region.

Throughout the exercise, U.S. forces will work alongside participating nations to enhance maritime domain awareness, improve international law enforcement capacity and increase interoperability between the U.S., African, and other multinational partner navies and coast guards.

“Cutlass Express continues to provide an exceptional venue to collaborate with our African partners on maritime security,” said Vice Adm. J. T. Anderson, commander, U.S. 6th Fleet. “When we combine the strength of our partnerships with the high level of training provided by exercises like this, we improve the overall security and economic prosperity of a region that extends far beyond the territorial waters and exclusive economic zones of each individual nation.”

This year’s exercise will focus training efforts in Mauritius, Seychelles and Tanzania, though information sharing and coordination will take place across nine maritime operation centers (MOCs) located throughout the region. Additionally, Exercise Cutlass Express 2025 is linked to U.S. Naval Forces Central Command’s International Maritime Exercise 2025 through information sharing between MOCs to improve theater-to-theater coordination, reduce regional seams, and strengthen U.S. and partner nation capabilities and interoperability.

Exercise Cutlass Express 2025 will also run concurrently with the U.S. Army Southern European Task Force, Africa led exercise Justified Accord 2025 in Kenya and Tanzania to improve defense capabilities of multi-domain forces and refine crisis and counterterrorism responses, ultimately reducing global maritime threats.

Participants in this year’s iteration of Cutlass Express include Belgium, Comoros, Djibouti, France, Georgia, India, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Senegal, Seychelles, Somalia, Tanzania, Tunisia, and the United Kingdom.

Cutlass Express is one of three regional maritime exercises led by U.S. 6th Fleet as part of a comprehensive strategy to provide collaborative opportunities to African forces and international partners to address maritime security concerns.

Commander, U.S. 6th Fleet, headquartered in Naples, Italy, conducts the full spectrum of joint and naval operations, often in concert with allied and interagency partners to advance U.S. national interests, security and stability in Europe and Africa.

MIL Security OSI –

February 12, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Phobos Ransomware Affiliates Arrested in Coordinated International Disruption

Source: US State of North Dakota

Note: View the superseding indictment here.

Phobos Group Alleged to have Attacked Over 1,000 Victims Worldwide

The Justice Department today unsealed criminal charges against Roman Berezhnoy, 33, and Egor Nikolaevich Glebov, 39, both Russian nationals, who allegedly operated a cybercrime group using the Phobos ransomware that victimized more than 1,000 public and private entities in the United States and around the world and received over $16 million in ransom payments. Berezhnoy and Glebov were arrested this week as part of a coordinated international disruption of their organization, which includes additional arrests and the technical disruption of the group’s computer infrastructure.

From May 2019, through at least October 2024, Berezhnoy, Glebov, and others allegedly caused victims to suffer losses resulting from the loss of access to their data in addition to the financial losses associated with the ransomware payments. The victims included a children’s hospital, health care providers, and educational institutions.

8Base Seizure Banner

According to court documents, Berezhnoy, Glebov, and others operated a ransomware affiliate organization, including under the names “8Base” and “Affiliate 2803,” among others, that victimized public and private entities through the deployment of Phobos ransomware.

As part of the scheme, Berezhnoy, Glebov, and others allegedly hacked into victim computer networks, copied and stole files and programs on the victims’ network, and encrypted the original versions of the stolen data with Phobos ransomware. The conspirators then allegedly extorted the victims for ransom payments in exchange for the decryption keys to regain access to the encrypted data by, among other things, leaving a ransom note on compromised victim computers and separately reaching out to victims to initiate ransom payment negotiations.

As alleged, the conspirators also threatened to expose victims’ stolen files to the public or to the victims’ clients, customers, or constituents if the ransoms were not paid. The conspirators are further alleged to have established and operated a darknet website where they repeated their extortionate threats and ultimately published the stolen data if a victim failed to pay the ransom.

After a successful Phobos ransomware attack, criminal affiliates paid fees to Phobos administrators for a decryption key to regain access to the encrypted files. Each deployment of Phobos ransomware was assigned a unique alphanumeric string in order to match it to the corresponding decryption key, and each affiliate was directed to pay the decryption key fee to a cryptocurrency wallet unique to that affiliate.

The charges unsealed today against Berezhnoy and Glebov follow the recent arrest and extradition of Evgenii Ptitsyn, a Russian national, on charges relating to his alleged administration of the Phobos ransomware variant.

In parallel with this week’s arrests, Europol and German authorities have announced an international operation involving the FBI and other international law enforcement partners to disrupt over 100 servers associated with this criminal network.

Berezhnoy and Glebov are charged in an 11-count indictment with one count of wire fraud conspiracy, one count of wire fraud, one count of conspiracy to commit computer fraud and abuse, three counts of causing intentional damage to protected computers, three counts of extortion in relation to damage to a protected computer, one count of transmitting a threat to impair the confidentiality of stolen data, and one count of unauthorized access and obtaining information from a protected computer. If convicted, Berezhnoy and Glebov face a maximum penalty of 20 years in prison on each wire fraud-related count; 10 years in prison on each computer damage count; and five years in prison on each of the other counts. A federal district court judge will determine any sentence after considering the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors.

Supervisory Official Antoinette T. Bacon of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division, U.S. Attorney Erek L. Barron for the District of Maryland, Assistant Director Bryan Vorndran of the FBI’s Cyber Division, and Special Agent in Charge William J. DelBagno of the FBI Baltimore Field Office made the announcement.

The FBI Baltimore Field Office is investigating the case. The Justice Department extends its thanks to international judicial and law enforcement partners in the United Kingdom, Germany, Japan, Spain, Belgium, Poland, Czech Republic, France, Thailand, Finland, and Romania, as well as Europol and the U.S. Department of Defense Cyber Crime Center, for their cooperation and coordination with the Phobos ransomware investigation. The National Security Division’s National Security Cyber Section and the Justice Department’s Office of International Affairs also provided valuable assistance.

Senior Counsel Aarash A. Haghighat of the Criminal Division’s Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section (CCIPS) and Assistant U.S. Attorney Thomas M. Sullivan for the District of Maryland are prosecuting the case. Former CCIPS Trial Attorney Riane Harper and former Assistant U.S. Attorneys Aaron S.J. Zelinsky and Jeffrey J. Izant for the District of Maryland provided substantial assistance.

Additional details on protecting networks against Phobos ransomware are available at StopRansomware.gov, including Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency Advisory AA24-060A.

An indictment is merely an allegation. All defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law.

MIL OSI USA News –

February 12, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: Phobos Ransomware Affiliates Arrested in Coordinated International Disruption

Source: Office of United States Attorneys

WASHINGTON — The Justice Department today unsealed criminal charges against Roman Berezhnoy, 33, and Egor Nikolaevich Glebov, 39, both Russian nationals, who allegedly operated a cybercrime group using the Phobos ransomware that victimized more than 1,000 public and private entities in the United States and around the world and received over $16 million in ransom payments. Berezhnoy and Glebov were arrested yesterday as part of a coordinated international disruption of their organization, which includes additional arrests and the technical disruption of the group’s computer infrastructure.

From May 2019, through at least October 2024, Berezhnoy, Glebov, and others allegedly caused victims to suffer losses resulting from the loss of access to their data in addition to the financial losses associated with the ransomware payments. The victims included a children’s hospital, health care providers, and educational institutions.

According to court documents, Berezhnoy, Glebov, and others operated a ransomware affiliate organization, including under the names “8Base” and “Affiliate 2803,” among others, that victimized public and private entities through the deployment of Phobos ransomware.

As part of the scheme, Berezhnoy, Glebov, and others allegedly hacked into victim computer networks, copied and stole files and programs on the victims’ network, and encrypted the original versions of the stolen data with Phobos ransomware. The conspirators then allegedly extorted the victims for ransom payments in exchange for the decryption keys to regain access to the encrypted data by, among other things, leaving a ransom note on compromised victim computers and separately reaching out to victims to initiate ransom payment negotiations.

As alleged, the conspirators also threatened to expose victims’ stolen files to the public or to the victims’ clients, customers, or constituents if the ransoms were not paid. The conspirators are further alleged to have established and operated a darknet website where they repeated their extortionate threats and ultimately published the stolen data if a victim failed to pay the ransom.

After a successful Phobos ransomware attack, criminal affiliates paid fees to Phobos administrators for a decryption key to regain access to the encrypted files. Each deployment of Phobos ransomware was assigned a unique alphanumeric string in order to match it to the corresponding decryption key, and each affiliate was directed to pay the decryption key fee to a cryptocurrency wallet unique to that affiliate.

The charges unsealed today against Berezhnoy and Glebov follow the recent arrest and extradition of Evgenii Ptitsyn, a Russian national, on charges relating to his alleged administration of the Phobos ransomware variant.

In parallel with today’s arrests, Europol and German authorities have announced an international operation involving the FBI and other international law enforcement partners to disrupt over 100 servers associated with this criminal network.

Berezhnoy and Glebov are charged in an 11-count indictment with one count of wire fraud conspiracy, one count of wire fraud, one count of conspiracy to commit computer fraud and abuse, three counts of causing intentional damage to protected computers, three counts of extortion in relation to damage to a protected computer, one count of transmitting a threat to impair the confidentiality of stolen data, and one count of unauthorized access and obtaining information from a protected computer. If convicted, Berezhnoy and Glebov face a maximum penalty of 20 years in prison on each wire fraud-related count; 10 years in prison on each computer damage count; and five years in prison on each of the other counts. A federal district court judge will determine any sentence after considering the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors.

Erek L. Barron, U.S. Attorney for the District of Maryland; Supervisory Official Antoinette T. Bacon of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division; and Special Agent in Charge William J. DelBagno of the FBI Baltimore Field Office, made the announcement.

The FBI Baltimore Field Office is investigating the case. The Justice Department extends its thanks to international judicial and law enforcement partners in the United Kingdom, Germany, Japan, Spain, Belgium, Poland, Czech Republic, France, Thailand, Finland, and Romania, as well as Europol and the U.S. Department of Defense Cyber Crime Center, for their cooperation and coordination with the Phobos ransomware investigation. The Justice Department’s National Security Division and Office of International Affairs also provided valuable assistance.

Assistant U.S. Attorney Thomas M. Sullivan for the District of Maryland and Senior Counsel Aarash A. Haghighat of the Criminal Division’s Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section (CCIPS) are prosecuting the case. Former CCIPS Trial Attorney Riane Harper and former Assistant U.S. Attorneys Aaron S.J. Zelinsky and Jeffrey J. Izant for the District of Maryland provided substantial assistance.

Additional details on protecting networks against Phobos ransomware are available at StopRansomware.gov, including Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency Advisory AA24-060A.

An indictment is merely an allegation. All defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law.

###

MIL Security OSI –

February 12, 2025
MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Second India-France AI Policy Roundtable held on the sidelines of AI Action Summit 2025 in Paris, France

Source: Government of India

Posted On: 11 FEB 2025 12:27AM by PIB Delhi

The Office of the Principal Scientific Adviser (PSA) to the Government of India in partnership with Indian Institute of Science (IISc), Bengaluru, IndiaAI Mission and Sciences Po Paris organised an official side-event to the AI Action Summit 2025, titled ‘2nd India-France AI Policy Roundtable’ on 10th February 2025 at the Sciences Po Paris university campus.

The roundtable discussion started with opening remarks by PSA Prof. Ajay Kumar Sood where he highlighted India’s priorities in global AI policy and governance, including responsible AI development and deployment, equitable benefit sharing, adoption of a techno-legal framework for AI governance, interoperable data flows, and collaboration on AI safety, research, and innovation. Prof. Sood also stressed upon the potential for India and France to synergize on various policy positions and technological initiatives, fostering benefits not only at the bilateral level but also on a global scale by leveraging complementary knowledge and skill sets.

Shri Amit A. Shukla, Joint Secretary, Cyber Diplomacy Division, Ministry of External Affairs of the Government of India and H.E. Henri Verdier, Ambassador for Digital Affairs, French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs gave co-chairs remarks highlighting (a) DPI for AI; (b) AI foundation models; (c) global AI governance and (d) Priority areas, such as integrating AI in addressing global challenges. They also mentioned cross-border data flows lacking arbitration mechanisms and the importance of aligned views on data sovereignty.

Following the co-chair remarks, interventions were made by Dr. Preeti Banzal (Adviser/Scientist G, Office of the Principal Scientific Adviser to the Government of India); Smt. Kavita Bhatia (Scientist ‘G’ & Group Coordinator, AI & Emerging Technology and Bhashini, MeitY, Government of India); Mr. Clément Bacchi (International Digital Policy Lead, Directorate General of Enterprises, Ministry of the Economy and Finance); Ms. Hélène Costa (Project Director, French ministry for the ecological transition); Mr. Sharad Sharma (Co-Founder, iSPIRT Foundation); Mr. Francis Rousseaux (International Technical Expert on AI, iSPIRT Foundation); Dr. Sarayu Natarajan (Founder, Aapti Institute); Mr. Charbel-Raphaël Segerie (Executive Director, Centre pour la Sécurité de l’IA); Mr. Saurabh Singh (Head, Digital and AI Policy, AWS India & South Asia); Mr. Alexandre Mariani (International Affairs Manager, Sciences Po Paris); Kapil Vaswani (Principal Researcher, Microsoft Research); Sunu Engineer (Entrepreneur, Co-Founder, Transforming.Legal); Vivek Raghavan (Co-Founder, Sarvam AI).

The interventions emphasized the need for democratized access to AI resources, and capacity building while recognizing the importance of techno-legal frameworks. The participants highlighted the significance of sovereign AI models, ethical AI deployment and the need to define globally accepted terminologies and standards. Speakers also aligned on multilingual LLMs, federated AI compute infrastructure, and interoperable access to AI research, datasets, and high-performance computing resources. The meeting also covered key discussions on collaboration between India and France. Opportunities mentioned included creating indigenous foundation models and adopting a balanced governance approach to minimize risks while fostering innovation. Sustainable AI and energy-efficient computing was highlighted, alongside the importance of cross-border cooperation in AI research, datasets, and startups. The conversation also touched on AI’s societal impact, data governance, and the role of global institutions in shaping AI safety frameworks.

The Second Roundtable built upon key objectives from the First Roundtable organised in IISc, Bengaluru during Technology Dialogue 2025 on 25th January 2025. The First Roundtable discussion focussed on inclusive AI frameworks, diverse datasets, infrastructure and skills, and foundational models. It also addressed governance and innovation, public-private partnerships, sustainability and health, and academic and data collaboration. Both discussions highlighted ethical and responsible AI, along with sector-specific and long-term goals.

For more information, visit: https://technologydialogue.in/ai-rt-feb.html

***

MJPS/ST

(Release ID: 2101570) Visitor Counter : 61

MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

February 12, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the escalation of violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo – B10-0127/2025

Source: European Parliament

Ingeborg Ter Laak, Michael Gahler, Lukas Mandl, Sebastião Bugalho, Wouter Beke
on behalf of the PPE Group

B10‑0127/2025

European Parliament resolution on the escalation of violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo

(2025/2553(RSP))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and the Great Lakes Region,

– having regard to the Council conclusions of 20 February 2023 entitled ‘A renewed EU Great Lakes Strategy: Supporting the transformation of the root causes of instability into shared opportunities’,

– having regard to the statement of 25 January 2025 by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on behalf of the EU on the latest escalation in eastern DRC,

– having regard to the Memorandum of Understanding of 26 October 2023 on sustainable raw materials between the EU and the Democratic Republic of the Congo,

– having regard to the Memorandum of Understanding of 19 February 2023 on Sustainable Raw Materials Value Chains between the EU and Rwanda,

– having regard to the letter of 27 December 2024 from the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the President of the UN Security Council,

– having regard to the press statement by the UN Security Council of 26 January 2025 on the situation in Democratic Republic of Congo,

– having regard to UN Security Council Resolution 1533 (2004) of 12 March 2004,

– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas for decades the resource-rich and multi-ethnic eastern region of the DRC has been plagued by violence, war and unimaginable human suffering; whereas the long-term consequences of the terrible 1994 Rwandan genocide against the Tutsi are still fuelling violence, hatred and forced displacements today;

B. whereas on 27 January 2025 the roughly 2 000-soldier-strong rebel group M23 gained control of Goma, the capital of the DRC region of North Kivu and a central hub with two million inhabitants; whereas numerous UN reports have confirmed the presence of 3 000-4 000 Rwandan soldiers in the DRC who are cooperating with the M23 and are taking part in combat operations; whereas on 6 February 2025 the M23 reiterated that it wanted to ‘liberate all of the Congo’ in its first public meeting as its fighters advanced towards South Kivu;

C. whereas there have been numerous UN reports about the illegal smuggling of minerals from the DRC to Rwanda, which then sells these minerals on the international market, claiming that they originate from Rwanda; whereas Rwandan exports of gold and coltan have risen sharply in recent years;

D. whereas numerous UN Group of Experts reports have documented that Rwanda is supporting the M23 rebel military group; whereas Rwanda has even sent numerous soldiers into the DRC; whereas in 2012 the M23 briefly captured Goma, but Rwanda ended its support for the rebel force due to international pressure and a cut in development funding;

E. whereas, since the resurgence of the M23, the already very dire humanitarian situation has further deteriorated, with a total lack of humanitarian assistance, forced evictions from camps for internally displaced people and increased violence against innocent civilians, including a large increase in sexual violence against girls and women;

F. whereas after a ceasefire that lasted several years, the M23 fighters took up arms again at the end of 2021; whereas martial law has been in force since 2021 in eastern DRC and the civilian government has been replaced by the military;

G. whereas, before this latest episode in the crisis, 800 000 internally displaced people were already in overcrowded sites for displaced people around Goma; whereas over 6.4 million people were already displaced throughout the country before the current escalation (of which 2.9 million were new displacements in 2024 alone);

H. whereas for decades the central DRC Government has not been able to ensure complete control over the vast territory of the DRC, particularly in eastern DRC; whereas more than 100 rebel groups have exploited this vacuum and are often supported by neighbouring countries to ensure access to the many natural resources in eastern DRC, among other reasons; whereas the rebel groups often recruit child soldiers in a blatant violation of international law and assault on humanity;

I. whereas the conflict is fuelled by the smuggling of minerals, such as tin, tungsten, coltan (tantalum), gold and diamonds, which are often mined in inhumane conditions; whereas armed groups control mining areas and smuggling routes, whereas gold and coltan, in particular, are transported across the border to Rwanda (and Uganda) and from there sold on as ‘conflict-free’ raw materials; whereas the DRC Government estimates that it loses USD 1 billion a year in revenue from raw materials illegally taken out of the country; whereas in addition to state and rebel actors from outside the DRC, many Congolese actors from the security sector are also part of these complex interdependencies;

J. whereas on 8 February 2025 at a joint summit in Tanzania’s capital Dar es Salaam, the regional blocs of southern Africa, the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and eastern Africa, the East African Community (EAC), called for an immediate and unconditional ceasefire, demanded the withdrawal of uninvited foreign armed forces from the DRC territory, urged all warring parties to hold peace talks within five days, and demanded the reopening of Goma airport and other key routes to facilitate humanitarian aid; whereas the African Union is set to address the matter at a meeting in Addis Ababa on 14 February 2025; whereas other mediation efforts are ongoing, notably by France, which aims to bring all actors to the negotiation table;

K. whereas the EU and Rwanda Memorandum of Understanding on Sustainable Raw Materials Value Chains is focused on the advancement of due diligence and traceability, cooperation in fighting against the illegal trafficking of raw materials and alignment with international environmental, social and governance standards; whereas the EU has a similar memorandum of understanding with the DRC and other countries in the region;

L. whereas Rwanda has repeatedly claimed that the DRC is supporting rebels from the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), an extremist group who aim to overthrow the government in Rwanda; whereas the FDLR is also accused of guerrilla attacks and assaults on civilians, such as the assassination of the late Italian Ambassador Luca Attanasio in 2021; whereas the government in Kinshasa published a declaration at the end of 2023 stating that all soldiers cooperating with the FDLR would be arrested; whereas Rwanda claims that the DRC Government is not militarily capable of providing full security in the east of its country;

M. whereas Uganda and the DRC have been cooperating in many ways, including in their efforts to fight terrorism in the region; whereas this has led to an increased Ugandan presence in eastern DRC, which has also resulted in increased illegal transfers of minerals from eastern DRC to Uganda;

N. whereas a private Romanian security company and a small number of independent military trainers had been active on the side of the DRC Government from the beginning of 2023, but largely withdrew in the midst of intensified fighting in late January 2025;

O. whereas the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Monusco) has been trying to stabilise eastern DRC since 1999; whereas the SADC Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo has been deployed since December 2023, with 2 100 soldiers from Tanzania and Malawi and 2 900 soldiers from South Africa;

P. whereas public sentiment in Kinshasa against perceived inaction by the international community led to attacks on and the looting of the diplomatic missions of France, Belgium, the Netherlands, the United States, Rwanda, Uganda, Kenya and the United Nations, as well as civil society organisations;

Q. whereas the EU is trying to intensify its presence in the region, including through its recent support for the ‘Green Corridor Kivu-Kinshasa’ programme via a Global Gateway initiative, which aims to help establish a sustainable 2 600 km corridor connecting eastern DRC to Kinshasa and the Atlantic Coast, covering 540 000 km2;

R. whereas the Commission announced new humanitarian support for the DRC, with an initial amount of EUR 60 million for 2025; whereas the EU is a major donor to the humanitarian response in the DRC and has provided over EUR 272 million in humanitarian assistance since early 2023;

S. whereas the DRC has been a clear critic of Russia’s illegal war of aggression against Ukraine and has supported numerous resolutions at the UN and other international forums condemning the Russian war of aggression and expansion;

T. whereas the Council appointed Johan Borgstam as the EU Special Representative for the Great Lakes Region on 1 September 2024;

1. Strongly condemns the breaches of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of eastern DRC by the rebels of the M23 and Rwanda;

2. Urges the Rwandan Government to withdraw its troops from DRC territory, the presence of whom is a clear violation of international law and the UN Charter, and cease cooperation with the M23 rebels; underlines that the territorial integrity of the DRC must be respected;

3. Calls on all regional actors to cease their support to the numerous rebel groups; demands therefore that both the M23 and FDLR groups, among others, be dissolved; underlines that, as well as Rwanda and the DRC, all regional actors have a special responsibility in this regard;

4. Recalls that only an inclusive and regional approach will be able to address and tackle the multifaceted long-standing problems in the region; strongly welcomes the joint SADC and EAC peace summit in Dar es Salaam on 8 February 2025; reiterates in this regard its full support to the Luanda and Nairobi processes and calls on all Great Lake countries, in particular the DRC and Rwanda, to urgently pursue negotiations in these frameworks; emphasises that any solution must also address the root causes of the conflict, including, but not limited to, the illicit trafficking of natural resources; underlines that regional organisations, such as the African Union, the SADC and the EAC, must play a central role in all of these efforts; underlines as well that a lasting solution requires a reform of the DRC security sector, with a better organised DRC army and administration;

5. Expresses concern over the lack of coherence in the EU response to the Great Lakes Region’s crises and calls on the Council to reassess the implementation of its renewed EU Great Lakes strategy; recalls that the EU and its special representative for the region are ready to assist all mediation efforts; urges the EU to cooperate with other actors on the ground, in particular Monusco, to ensure the protection of civilians in eastern DRC;

6. Is appalled by the shocking use of sexual violence as a tool of repression and weapon of war in eastern DRC, as well as the unacceptable recruitment of child soldiers by the various rebel groups; demands that these matters be addressed by the international community without delay; strongly reiterates that any attack against UN-mandated forces is inexcusable and might be considered a war crime;

7. Is outraged by the humanitarian catastrophe and lack of humanitarian assistance and expresses its concern that the crisis will further deteriorate unless immediate action is taken, including improved humanitarian access and improvements to the sanitary situation; is deeply concerned about the humanitarian situation of hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of displaced people in eastern DRC and in the DRC as a whole; underlines that all countries in the region have a legal and moral obligation to ensure the safety of international aid workers on their territories; underlines that Rwanda has a special responsibility to facilitate humanitarian access to the region;

8. Expresses its condolences to all the victims of the recent violence and expresses its gratitude to the numerous aid workers who, despite the very difficult and challenging conditions, continue to provide much-needed support to the population;

9. Reiterates its condemnation of hate speech and xenophobia, as well as ethnic-based politics; underlines that all those responsible for sustaining armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC must be held accountable;

10. Calls for an urgent increase in the overall EU support budget for the region, in particular given the unknown future engagement of the US Government;

11. Expresses its strong concern about the increasing presence of disinformation campaigns; condemns in particular efforts by Russia to foster anti-Western sentiments through the dissemination of fake news about Western players on social media;

12. Calls on the Commission to urgently review its engagement with Rwanda and prepare a set of possible measures with clear pathways towards implementation in case the Rwandan Government does not swiftly reverse its policies, including, among others, a possible suspension of bilateral assistance and a halt of the Memorandum of Understanding on Sustainable Raw Materials Value Chains;

13. Calls on the Member States to consider the adoption of additional restrictive measures against natural or legal persons, entities or bodies that sustain, support or benefit from the armed conflict, instability or insecurity in the DRC, as well as those responsible for inciting violence, or exploiting the armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC, including through the illicit exploitation and trade of natural resources;

14. Urges the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Member States to immediately cease military assistance to the Rwandan armed forces via the European Peace Facility;

15. Expresses its concern about the increasing presence of Chinese actors in the mining sector of the DRC and the region acting without respect for economic and social responsibilities; recalls that European industries and companies in the region will only have long-term security of supply if a long-lasting and peaceful solution to the conflict is found;

16. Strongly condemns the attack on diplomatic institutions of the EU, its Member States and civil society organisations, such as political foundations in Kinshasa, and underlines that the protection of civilians and diplomatic staff must be guaranteed; demands that those responsible be brought to justice;

17. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Governments of Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Rwanda, Zambia, Tanzania, Uganda, Zimbabwe and South Africa, as well as the secretariats of Monusco, the SADC and the EAC.

MIL OSI Europe News –

February 12, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: Press release – Press conference: Call for EU support for the International Criminal Court (ICC)

Source: European Parliament

Today, the Chair of the Subcommittee on Human Rights will hold a press conference in Strasbourg, after President Trump issued an executive order imposing sanctions on the ICC.

When: Tuesday 11 February 15.00 CET

Where: European Parliament, Strasbourg, Daphne Caruana Galizia press conference room (WEISS N -1/201)

Participants:

– Chair of the Subcommittee on Human rights (DROI) Mounir Satouri (Greens/EFA, France);
– Mama Bea, member of the NGO “Association des mamans Anti-Bwaki” (AMAB), implementing partner of the ICC Trust Fund for Victims in DRC;
– David Yambio, victim of Almasri in Libya, President and spokesperson for Refugees in Libya Association.

Interpretation will be provided in English, French, German, Italian, Spanish and Polish.

Accredited media representatives may attend the press conference in person. Journalists wishing to ask questions remotely can connect via Interactio. The press conference will also be web streamed live and recorded on the Parliament’s Multimedia Centre.

Background

On 6 February 2025, US President Donald Trump issued an executive order imposing sanctions on the International Criminal Court, including suspending the entry of ICC officials, employees, and agents, as well as their immediate family members into the United States.

A delegation of MEPs of the Subcommittee on Human rights travelled to The Hague on 29-30 October 2024 to meet with members of the International Court of Justice, the International Criminal Court (ICC), EUROJUST and other key partners. After the mission, DROI Chair said he was concerned about the serious threats these institutions face, underlining the crucial role of the ICC to support the victims and declared that International Criminal Court decisions were binding on all EU member states.

In their annual report 2023 on Human rights and democracy in the world and the EU’s policy on the matter, MEPs condemned attempts to undermine the work of the ICC and its legitimacy, and called for the EU and its member states to encourage their partners to ratify the Rome Statute and its amendments, expanding the Court’s jurisdiction.

Information for the media – Use Interactio to ask questions

To ask questions remotely during the press conference, please connect via Interactio using this link: https://ep.interactio.eu/s871-h7gf-91mi

Interactio is only supported on iPad (with the Safari browser) and Mac/Windows (with the Google Chrome browser). When connecting, enter your name and the media you are representing in the first name / last name fields. For better sound quality, use headphones and a microphone. Interpretation is only possible for interventions with video.

Journalists who have never used Interactio before are asked to connect 30 minutes before the start of the press event to perform a connection test. IT assistance can be provided if necessary. When connected, open the chat window (upper right corner) to be able to see the service messages.

MIL OSI Europe News –

February 12, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the further deterioration of the political situation in Georgia – B10-0106/2025

Source: European Parliament

Reinier Van Lanschot, Mārtiņš Staķis, Maria Ohisalo, Sergey Lagodinsky, Markéta Gregorová, Ville Niinistö, Erik Marquardt, Nicolae Ştefănuță, Villy Søvndal
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

B10‑0106/2025

European Parliament resolution on the further deterioration of the political situation in Georgia

(2025/2522(RSP))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Georgia,

– having regard to the statement of 1 December 2024 by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) Kaja Kallas and Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos on Georgia,

– having regard to the Council conclusions on Enlargement of 17 December 2024,

– having regard to the Association Agreement of July 2016 between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and Georgia, of the other part, and its establishment of a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area,

– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas mass grass-roots protests have been taking place in Georgia since the October 2024 parliamentary election; whereas civil society, opposition parties and international and local observers did not accept the reported election results and continue to demand a new election; whereas the protests have been marred by the police’s use of excessive and disproportionate violence, countless arrests and the ill treatment of detainees while in custody;

B. whereas local and international human rights organisations have documented a worrying trend of police brutality, stating that hundreds of protesters, dispersed and arrested by police, have faced violence that, in some cases, amounts to torture; whereas Georgia’s police forces are operating under a veil of apparent impunity, using sporadic acts of violence by protesters, often provoked by their own actions, as a pretext for repression; whereas no officials responsible for abuses have been held accountable;

C. whereas hundreds of anti-government protesters and activists are still being detained, of whom more than 300 are alleging that they suffer beatings, torture and other ill treatment in detention; whereas detainees face swift court hearings resulting in fines or detention for alleged administrative offences, while dozens of people have been arrested on criminal charges in the context of the ongoing anti-government protests;

D. whereas UN experts have condemned the pattern of repression and human rights violations in Georgia, while the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe has called this suppression a serious breach of the right of freedom of assembly;

E. whereas prominent journalist Mzia Amaghlobeli, founder of Georgian independent news outlets Batumelebi and Netgazeti, was detained in Batumi on 12 January 2025 for posting a protest poster and then detained again after she suffered ill treatment while in detention, which allegedly resulted in her slapping a Batumi police officer who had insulted her; whereas the Georgian Prosecutor’s Office then charged her with ‘attacking a police officer,’ a criminal offence that carries a prison sentence of four to seven years; whereas on 20 January, it became known that Amaghlobeli had begun a hunger strike; whereas international and local human rights organisations, foreign and Georgian politicians, 14 embassies and more than 300 Georgian journalists, editors and media managers have expressed deep concern about her medical condition and called for her immediate release;

F. whereas the ruling Georgian Dream party convened the new parliament in violation of the country’s constitution, resulting in a boycott of parliament by the opposition; whereas on 5 February 2025, Georgian Dream members of parliament (MPs) voted to strip 49 opposition MPs of their mandates; whereas Georgian authorities have arrested several opposition figures, including politicians Nika Melia and Gigi Ugulava;

G. whereas Georgian Dream has adopted new legislation that came into effect on 30 December 2024, which imposes further arbitrary restrictions on the rights of freedom of expression and peaceful assembly, along with hefty fines for the use of protest slogans or posters, and enables preventive detentions of anyone suspected of planning to violate these rules governing public assembly or other laws, for up to 48 hours; whereas the authorities are routinely abusing administrative and criminal proceedings by the Georgian authorities as part of the worsening crackdown on protest and peaceful dissent;

H. whereas the Georgian authorities continue to ignore the numerous local and international calls to repeal the law ‘on transparency of foreign influence’ and the law ‘on family values and protection of minors’; whereas Georgian Dream has, however, announced plans to replace the so-called foreign agent legislation with a tougher law it describes as a ‘direct copy of the current US Foreign Agents Registration Act’; whereas Georgian Dream has also announced plans for a new draft law on media control which would reportedly restrict media funding from foreign sources, establish ‘standards for media objectivity and journalistic ethics’ and define institutional mechanisms for monitoring and safeguarding these standards;

I. whereas a growing number of civil servants have been dismissed after speaking out against the halting of Georgia’s EU membership process, with Prime Minster Kobakhidze stating that the country’s civil service was going through a ‘process of self-cleansing’;

J. whereas Giorgi Gakharia, leader of the For Georgia party and former prime minister, and Zviad Koridze, a journalist and a member of Transparency International Georgia, were physically assaulted in two separate incidents on 15 January;

K. whereas Article 78 of the Georgian Constitution states that the constitutional bodies must take all measures within the scope of their competences to ensure the full integration of Georgia into the European Union;

L. whereas the EU has firmly halted Georgia’s EU accession process, redirected EU funding from Georgia’s government to civil society and suspended visa-free travel to the EU for Georgian diplomats and officials; whereas, at the December 2024 Foreign Affairs Council, Hungary and Slovakia blocked broadly demanded targeted sanctions against leading Georgian officials, including Bidzina Ivanishvili;

M. whereas Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have bilaterally imposed targeted sanctions against Ivanishvili and 10 government officials, including Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze and Interior Minister Vakhtang Gomelauri; whereas, in December 2024, the US imposed individual sanctions against Ivanishvili, while the UK imposed individual sanctions against Mr Gomelauri, Deputy Interior Minister Aleksandre Darakhvelidze, Tbilisi Police Department Director Sulkhan Tamazashvili, Chief of the Special Tasks Department Zviad Kharazishvili, and Deputy Head of the Special Tasks Department Mileri Lagazauri; whereas on 13 January 2025, UK MP James MacCleary put forward a motion to sanction Ivanishvili in the House of Commons;

N. whereas Ivanishvili and his family members have reportedly begun transferring their business assets, worth dozens of millions of euros, from offshore entities to Georgia-registered companies following the imposition of the US targeted sanctions;

O. whereas a significant incentive for Georgian Dream and Ivanishvili in particular to remain on their confrontational path with democracy at home and against European integration is their confidence in cultivating alternative economic development opportunities with Russia, and the continued and growing geo-economic leverage of Georgia in respect of the West; whereas Georgia is a key partner country of the ‘Middle Corridor’ in terms of connectivity, energy and trade relations;

1. Stands in solidarity with all people in Georgia who, for over three months, have been protesting for their country’s democracy and constitution, human rights and EU values; reiterates its unwavering support for the Georgian people’s legitimate European aspirations and their wish to live in a prosperous and democratic country, free from corruption, that fully respects fundamental freedoms, protects human rights and guarantees an open society, independent media and free and fair elections;

2. Reconfirms its position that the reported extensive electoral fraud during the October 2024 parliamentary election undermined the integrity of the election process, the legitimacy of the results and the public’s trust in any new government, and that the results therefore do not serve as a reliable representation of the will of the Georgian people; calls for a new election within a year, and for the process to be conducted in an improved electoral environment by an independent and impartial election administration, under diligent international observation, in order to ensure a genuinely fair and transparent electoral process;

3. Considers that the actions of the Georgian Dream party, both in parliament and on the streets against its own citizens, are rapidly steering the country towards authoritarianism, in a seemingly deliberate attempt to demonstrate that the will of the Georgian people no longer determines the country’s future;

4. Condemns all violence against protesters and the ill treatment of detainees by Georgia’s police forces, especially the growing reports of torture; strongly urges the Georgian authorities to guarantee the right of citizens to assemble and to refrain from using unwarranted force against them; demands that all officials responsible for unlawful use of force, including acts of torture and other ill treatment, must be held fully accountable;

5. Calls for the immediate and unconditional release of political prisoners and those detained during the anti-government protests; expresses its deep concern about the medical condition of Mzia Amaghlobeli and denounces Georgian Dream for her unlawful detention and criminal prosecution, which was intended to instil fear among independent media representatives, activists and civil society at large;

6. Condemns the termination of the mandates of 49 opposition MPs by Georgian Dream; considers this the latest step in Georgian Dream’s attack on political pluralism in the country; warns the Georgian authorities that any attempts to turn its threats of a ban on established political parties into a reality would alienate Georgia from the EU and make any move towards EU accession impossible;

7. Condemns the attacks on Giorgi Gakharia and Zviad Korids; demands an independent investigation into the incidents and for those responsible to be held accountable;

8. Reiterates its call on the Georgian authorities to repeal the law ‘on transparency of foreign influence’ and the law ‘on family values and protection of minors’; expresses concern about recently announced and introduced laws limiting freedom of expression and assembly, increasing state control of the media and further tightening of the so-called foreign agent legislation; underlines that the law and policies implemented by Georgian Dream are unconstitutional and incompatible with Georgia’s EU integration;

9. Condemns the broader campaign of attacks by the Georgian authorities vilifying civil society organisations and reputable international donors that support democracy, the rule of law and the protection of human rights in Georgia; notes in this regard attempts by Georgian Dream officials to align themselves on these issues with US President Donald Trump and Elon Musk;

10. Deplores efforts by Hungary and Slovakia to block EU targeted sanctions against Georgian Dream officials at the December 2024 Foreign Affairs Council; reiterates its call on the Council to impose, without delay, individual sanctions on the officials and political leaders in Georgia who are responsible for the democratic backsliding, violations of electoral laws and standards, brutality by police and their proxies and the ill treatment of detainees, administrative abuses and misuse of state institutions, such as Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze, Mayor of Tbilisi and Secretary General of the ruling Georgian Dream party Kakha Kaladze, Speaker of the Georgian Parliament Shalva Papuashvili, and Chairman of the Georgian Dream party Irakli Garibashvili, and to extend these sanctions to judges passing politically motivated sentences; reiterates its call on the Council and the EU’s democratic partners, in particular the UK, to impose immediate and targeted personal sanctions on Bidzina Ivanishvili and to freeze all his assets for his role in the deterioration of the political process in Georgia and for acting against the country’s constitutionally declared interests, including efforts to restore Russia’s sphere of influence over the country;

11. Welcomes in this regard the sanctions imposed bilaterally by Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania; encourages other Member States, especially those hosting relevant assets, to similarly impose targeted sanctions against Georgian Dream officials, in particular Mr Ivanishvili, in a coordinated fashion, if EU level sanctions fail to be adopted in the Council; calls on France to revoke Ivanishvili’s Légion d’honneur;

12. Reiterates its call for the EU and the Member States to adjust and accelerate the EU funding mechanisms for Georgian civil society and independent media to help make them resilient against efforts by the Georgian Government to cut off their financial lifeline; calls for the focus of that funding to reflect adjusted project needs in the context of a more hostile and anti-democratic environment; stresses that both fresh EU funding for Georgian civil society and the effective allocation of funding is more important than ever now that President Trump has frozen all such funding from the US; stresses that in Georgia’s increasingly repressive climate there is a rapidly growing need for EU and Member State emergency support for Georgian civil society and media, including core operational support, as well as support in countering disinformation;

13. Calls for targeted sanctions on the financial sector of Georgia, as well as political and financial divestment away from planned connectivity projects, in order to disincentive Georgian Dream’s efforts to become a thriving hub for (illicit) Russian financial markets, and a key ‘partner of necessity’ for the West in the Caucasus in the Middle Corridor; stresses that there can be no deep political and economic relations between Georgia and the EU without Georgia upholding fundamental rights and the Georgian Constitution;

14. Calls on VP/HR Kallas and Commissioner Kos, along with Magdalena Grono as the EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia, to travel to Georgia at their earliest convenience in order to meet with civil society and democratic/pro-European opposition leaders, express support for political prisoners, and more broadly show that the EU has not forgotten those in Georgia protesting for democracy and human rights; expresses its continued support for the efforts of Georgia’s fifth President, Salome Zourabichvili, who continues to represent Georgia’s democratic ambitions;

15. Calls for an immediate and comprehensive audit of EU policy towards Georgia in the context of the halt in the country’s EU accession process; calls on the Commission, in this regard, to conduct a review of the EU-Georgia Association Agreement, in particular Georgia’s adherence to the requirements of the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement and its general principles;

16. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the European External Action Service, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, and to the President, Prime Minister and Parliament of Georgia.

MIL OSI Europe News –

February 12, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the escalation of violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo – B10-0129/2025

Source: European Parliament

Sara Matthieu, Marie Toussaint, Mounir Satouri, Nicolae Ştefănuță, Saskia Bricmont, Majdouline Sbai, David Cormand, Ville Niinistö, Catarina Vieira, Erik Marquardt, Ignazio Roberto Marino
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

B10‑0129/2025

European Parliament resolution on the escalation of violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo

(2025/2553(RSP))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC),

– having regard to the UN Report of the Mapping Exercise documenting the most serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law committed within the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo between March 1993 and June 2003, of August 2010,

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2017/821 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 May 2017 laying down supply chain due diligence obligations for Union importers of tin, tantalum and tungsten, their ores, and gold originating from conflict-affected and high-risk areas (Conflict Minerals Regulation)[1],

– having regard to the Partnership Agreement between the EU and its Member States, of the one part, and the Members of the Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States, of the other part (the Samoa Agreement),

– having regard to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, which was adopted on 27 June 1981 and entered into force on 21 October 1986,

– having regard to the Constitution of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, adopted on 18 February 2006,

– having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

– having regard to the UN Charter,

– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas the March 23 Movement (M23) rebel group captured the towns of Minova on 21 January 2025, Sake on 23 January 2025 and Goma, the capital of the North Kivu region in the DRC, on 27 January 2025; whereas this constitutes a brutal violation of the territorial integrity of the DRC; whereas indiscriminate attacks with explosive weapons have increased in recent weeks in densely populated areas of North Kivu, including displacement camps and other highly populated areas near Goma; whereas unlawful killings, rapes and other apparent war crimes, as well as forced labour, forced recruitment and other abusive practices have reportedly been committed by M23 with the support of the Rwandan military;

B. whereas the UN Group of Experts on the DRC established estimates, pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1533 (2004), that between 3 000 and 4 000 Rwandan army troops are on the ground in the DRC, and considers that the deployment of the Rwandan Defence Force (RDF) violates the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the DRC, and that Rwanda’s de facto control and direction of M23 operations also renders Rwanda liable for the actions of M23;

C. whereas the UN Group of Experts on the DRC concluded that M23 and other armed groups are involved in illegal mineral exploitation and smuggling in the eastern DRC, and that ‘at least 150 tons of coltan’ have been fraudulently exported to Rwanda and mixed with Rwandan production, leading to the largest contamination of mineral supply chains in the Great Lakes region recorded to date;

D. whereas the resurgence of M23 relates to the deterioration of the security situation in the eastern DRC over the past year, with other armed groups, and at times government soldiers, committing widespread violence, unlawful killings and other grave abuses, putting civilians at greater risk;

E. whereas the DRC has one of the highest rates of internal displacement in the world; whereas many women and children live in precarious conditions and are being exposed to the risk of harassment, assault or sexual exploitation; whereas displaced populations often receive no basic life-saving services and are at risk of malnutrition and disease; whereas cities that host internally displaced people in precarious circumstances, such as Bunia, are also targets of attack by different militias, causing great distress to the displaced communities and to the local population; whereas there is a reported high risk of the spread of Mpox in Goma, due to the dire humanitarian situation;

F. whereas the deputy head of the UN peacekeeping force based in Goma has reported on the widespread rape and killing of women inmates in Goma’s Munzenze prison, and the DRC’s Minister for Human Rights Chantal Chambu Mwavit estimates that 163 women were burned alive in the prison; whereas the UN Human Rights Office reported that only between 9 and 13 female inmates, ‘all of whom had also been raped’, survived the blaze;

G. whereas the security situation in the eastern DRC has dramatically deteriorated in recent weeks and humanitarian access is blocked in the territories illegally occupied since January 2025 by M23;

H. whereas the Luanda Process, which was relaunched in July 2024 and is being facilitated by Angola, aims to mediate between the DRC and Rwanda regarding the conflict in the eastern DRC;

I. whereas the UN and the DRC agreed on the withdrawal of the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) in mid-2024, leading to a degradation of the security situation and affecting civilians, who were left exposed to human rights abuses by state security forces and armed actors;

J. whereas the M23 and Rwandan forces have obligations to civilians under international humanitarian law, including protecting and facilitating access to humanitarian assistance, and permitting freedom of movement;

K. whereas the International Criminal Court (ICC) investigations into the DRC have focused on alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity committed mainly in the eastern DRC, in the Ituri region and the North Kivu and South Kivu Provinces, since 1 July 2002; whereas the DRC made a second referral to the ICC in May 2023 concerning allegations of crimes committed in North Kivu since 1 January 2022;

L. whereas the coltan extraction zone in Rubaya in the DRC, controlled by M23, accounts for 15 % of the global supply of tantalum and, as a result, Rwanda recorded a 50 % increase in its coltan exports in 2023, becoming the world’s leading exporter – far exceeding its national production capacity;

M. whereas the Commission and the Rwandan Government signed on 19 February 2024 a memorandum of understanding (MoU) on sustainable raw materials value chains, which anticipates the adoption of an implementation roadmap, opening the door to the EU financing of strategic projects;

N. whereas this MoU clearly anticipates the risk of importing conflict minerals from the DRC into the EU market by requiring Rwanda to enforce ‘measures to intercept smuggled minerals entering the country and to repatriate them to the country of origin’;

O. whereas the EU has not made its cooperation with Rwanda on sustainable raw materials value chains conditional on the country joining the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), while the DRC is a member of the initiative, thereby creating disparities between transparency requirements on minerals from both countries;

P. whereas Parliament, unlike the Council, was not given the opportunity by the Commission to share its political assessment of the decision to negotiate an MoU with Rwanda, or to provide technical feedback on the draft MoU;

Q. whereas on 18 December 2024, the DRC filed criminal complaints against Apple subsidiaries in France and Belgium, accusing the tech firm of using conflict minerals in its supply chain;

R. whereas the DRC Foreign Affairs Minister Thérèse Kayikwamba Wagner and Nobel Prize laureate Denis Mukwege briefed Parliament on 5 February 2025 on the occupation of the eastern DRC and the dire humanitarian impact on the local population and internally displaced people; whereas women are particularly at risk, in these circumstances, of being victims of sexual abuse and rape; whereas the hospitals in Goma lack sufficient sanitary equipment and hundreds of patients are waiting to undergo life-saving surgery;

S. whereas a joint summit of the East African Community and the Southern African Development Community took place on 8 February 2025 in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, calling for the disengagement of Rwanda’s forces from the DRC and for the urgent provision of humanitarian assistance to the eastern DRC; whereas the Foreign Affairs Council of the Council of the EU is expected to exchange views on the situation in the DRC on 24 February 2025;

1. Is concerned by findings in the recent reports of the UN Group of Experts on the DRC established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the DRC, and fully supports their recommendations;

2. Condemns the fact that the RDF has deployed troops to the eastern DRC and has provided direct military support to M23, helping it to expand control in the eastern DRC; condemns the fact that Congolese army units have supported armed groups implicated in serious abuses in the fighting with M23;

3. Calls for a quick resumption of negotiations within the Luanda Process in order to find a lasting, peaceful and political solution, and urges all sides to fully honour their engagements within the Luanda Process, specifically the ceasefire agreed on 30 July 2024, the neutralisation of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda and the M23 rebel groups, as well as the withdrawal of the RDF from the territory of the DRC; calls for the EU to have an active role in the diplomatic efforts to de-escalate the conflict, advocating for an immediate ceasefire and a renewed commitment to dialogue, with the protection of civilians at the core of negotiations, in particular women and children;

4. Deplores the fact that fighting and the shelling of medical infrastructure in and around Goma has severely limited the delivery of humanitarian aid to those in need; calls on all neighbouring countries, particularly Rwanda, to facilitate access of humanitarian equipment and personnel to all areas occupied by the rebel groups in the eastern DRC, including through the reopening of Goma airport and of borders; highlights the precarious situation that women and girls face and calls on M23 to lift all restrictions on humanitarian interventions aimed at addressing and preventing gender-based violence and conflict-related sexual violence;

5. Calls on the UN Human Rights Council to create an independent mandate to investigate abuses by all parties to the current conflict as soon as possible;

6. Commends the Prosecutor of the ICC’s announcement that the ICC will continue to investigate alleged crimes committed by any person, irrespective of affiliation or nationality; is highly concerned about the fragile situation of the ICC, which is already undermining its crucial work in bringing justice to victims of the most serious crimes worldwide; reiterates the EU’s unwavering support for the ICC and calls on the Council and the Commission to fulfil their obligations to ensure the functioning and effectiveness of the ICC;

7. Calls on the Commission to continue supporting anti-corruption efforts and the strengthening of governance in the DRC;

8. Calls on the Commission and the Council to impose targeted sanctions against relevant senior M23 and other armed group commanders, army leaders and senior officials, particularly the individuals identified by the recent reports of the UN Group of Experts on the DRC as responsible for, or complicit in, recent serious human rights abuses by their forces, or those for which they have command responsibility, such as Rwanda’s major generals Eugene Nkubito, Ruki Karusisi and Emmy Ruvusha;

9. Exhorts the Commission and the Member States to take measures to ensure that support through the European Peace Facility for the deployment of Rwandan troops in northern Mozambique remains exclusively dedicated to the fight against terrorism in Mozambique and does not, directly or indirectly, support the abusive military operations in the eastern DRC;

10. Expresses regret that the Commission did not present the draft or seek feedback from Parliament in the preparation process of the MoU with Rwanda on sustainable raw materials value chains; regrets that the Council and Parliament were not treated equally in the drafting process of the MoU; highlights the importance of improving the early engagement of the Commission with Parliament in the drafting process of future MoUs;

11. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to suspend the application of the MoU between the Commission and Rwanda on sustainable raw materials value chains, and freeze any decision to select any project in Rwanda as a strategic project under the Critical Raw Materials Act [2], and to temporarily halt cooperation with Rwanda in the context of the EU’s Global Gateway initiative; calls on the Commission to render the future re-activation of cooperation on sustainable raw materials value chains conditional upon Rwanda joining the EITI, which the DRC is already part of;

12. Calls for the EU, Rwanda’s neighbouring countries and Rwanda’s main trading partners to put in place a trade embargo for all minerals, including processed minerals, exported from Rwanda, until a definitive withdrawal of the RDF and rebel group supported by Rwanda from the territory of the DRC;

13. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to swiftly adopt an export ban of weapons from the EU to Rwanda and for the immediate suspension of any further military and security assistance to Rwanda until the territorial integrity of the DRC is restored;

14. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to ensure a strong enforcement of the current Conflict Minerals Regulation, and for the Commission to swiftly propose a revision to the EU rules, with the aim of ensuring that the highest standards of traceability and transparency are met for each and every mineral imported into the EU, in particular from the DRC and Rwanda, to review accordingly the current import thresholds currently anticipated in the Regulation, and to enhance anti-circumvention and enforcement provisions regarding sanctions;

15. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the European External Action Service, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, and the authorities of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and of Rwanda.

MIL OSI Europe News –

February 12, 2025
MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Opening Address by Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi at the AI Action Summit, Paris

Source: Government of India

Posted On: 11 FEB 2025 3:41PM by PIB Delhi

Excellencies,

Friends,

Let me begin with a simple experiment.

If you upload your medical report to an AI app, it can explain in simple language, free of any jargon, what it means for your health. But, if you ask the same app to draw an image of someone writing with their Left hand, the app will most likely draw someone writing with their Right hand. Because that is what the training data is dominated by.

It shows that while the positive potential of AI is absolutely amazing, there are many biases that we need to think carefully about. That is why I am grateful to my friend, President Macron, for hosting this summit. And for inviting me to co-chair it.

Friends,

AI is already re-shaping our polity, our economy, our security and even our society. AI is writing the code for humanity in this century. But, it is very different from other technology milestones in human history.

AI is developing at an unprecedented scale and speed. And being adopted and deployed even faster. There is also a deep inter-dependence across borders. Therefore, there is a need for collective global efforts to establish governance and standards, that uphold our shared values, address risks, and build trust.

But, Governance is not just about managing risks and rivalries. It is also about promoting innovation, and deploying it for the global good. So, we must think deeply and discuss openly about innovation and governance.

Governance is also about ensuring access to all, especially in the Global South. It is where the capacities are most lacking – be it compute power, talent, data, or the financial resources.

Friends,

AI can help transform millions of lives by improving health, education, agriculture and so much more. It can help create a world in which the journey to Sustainable Development Goals becomes easier and faster.

To do this, we must pool together resources and talent. We must develop open-source systems that enhance trust and transparency. We must build quality data sets, free from biases. We must democratise technology and create people-centric applications. We must address concerns related to cyber security, disinformation, and deep fakes. And, we must also ensure that technology is rooted in local ecosystems for it to be effective and useful.

Friends,

Loss of jobs is AI’s most feared disruption. But, history has shown that work does not disappear due to technology. Its nature changes and new types of jobs are created. We need to invest in skilling and re-skilling our people for an AI-driven future.

Friends,

There is no doubt that the high energy intensity of AI needs to be looked into. This will require green power to fuel its future.

India and France have worked together for years through initiatives like the International Solar Alliance to harness the power of the sun. As we advance our partnership to AI, it is a natural progression from sustainability to innovation to shape a smarter and responsible future.

At the same time, Sustainable AI does not only mean using clean energy. AI models must also be efficient and sustainable in size, data needs and resource requirements. After all, the human brain manages to compose poetry and design space ships using less power than most lightbulbs.

Friends,

India has successfully built a Digital Public Infrastructure for over 1.4 billion people at a very low cost. It is built around an open and accessible network. It has regulations, and a wide range of applications to modernize our economy, reform governance and transform the lives of our people.

We have unlocked the power of data through our Data Empowerment and Protection Architecture. And, we have made digital commerce democratic and accessible to all. This vision is the foundation of India’s National AI Mission.

That is why, during our G20 Presidency, we built a consensus on Harnessing AI Responsibly, for Good, and for All. Today, India leads in AI adoption, and techno-legal solutions on data privacy.

We are developing AI applications for public good. We have one of the world’s largest AI talent pools. India is building its own Large Language Model considering our diversity. We also have a unique public-private partnership model for pooling resources like compute power. It is made available to our start-ups and researchers at an affordable cost. And, India is ready to share its experience and expertise to ensure that the AI future is for Good, and for All.

Friends,

We are at the dawn of the AI age that will shape the course of humanity. Some people worry about machines becoming superior in intelligence to humans. But, no one holds the key to our collective future and shared destiny other than us humans.

That sense of responsibility must guide us.

Thank you.

***

MJPS/SR

(Release ID: 2101740) Visitor Counter : 114

MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

February 12, 2025
MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: PRESS RELEASE – PRESENTATION OF CREDENTIALS OF THE AMBASSADOR OF FRANCE TO THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF SAMOA

Source: Government of Western Samoa

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(TUESDAY 4 FEBRUARY 2025)

His Excellency Mr Guillaume Lemoine presented his Letter of Credence to the Head of State of Samoa, Afioga Tuimalealiifano Vaaletoa Sualauvi II at a presentation of credential ceremony held this morning at the Head of State’s official residence in Vailele accrediting His Excellency as the first resident Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of France to Samoa.

Samoa and France have enjoyed cordial relations since the establishment of diplomatic relations on 1 March 1974. The Ambassador expressed that with over 50 years of diplomatic relations, the establishment of a permanent French Embassy in Apia is a historical step forward, which will contribute to strengthening the ties with Samoa and the French territories of French Polynesia, New Caledonia and Wallis & Futuna. The Head of State echoed the Ambassador’s sentiments and stated that the decision to set up an Embassy in Samoa “…places prominence on the recognition of our growing relations and the mutual respect we have for each other.”

Both the Head of State and the Ambassador acknowledged the contributions of Ms Zita Martel as the French Honorary Consul in Samoa for the last 25 years in strengthening bilateral relations through the promotion of culture and friendship. Afioga Tuimalealiifano expressed that he is confident that the appointment of H.E Guillaume Lemoine as the first Ambassador of France to Samoa with residence in Apia, will further strengthen the existing relations between our two countries.

His Excellency Mr Guillaume Lemoine holds a Master’s degree in Computer Science Management, a Post-graduate degree in Computerization of Organizations and is a former student of the Paris Institute of Political Studies. Mr Lemoine is a career diplomat who served in various diplomatic missions of France in Athens, Beirut, Kuwait and Lomé. Mr Lemoine was the Ambassador of France to Papua New Guinea prior to his appointment as the first resident Ambassador of France to Samoa. He was awarded distinctions in Medal of Honour of Foreign Affairs and as Knight of the National Order of Merit. Mr Guillaume Lemoine is married to Ms Olivia de Saint-Luc and they have three daughters.

END.

SOURCE – Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade

Photos by the Government of Samoa (Leaosa Faaifo Faaifo)

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February 11, 2025

MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

February 12, 2025
MIL-OSI Economics: Obesity market to reach $173.5 billion sales in 7MM by 2031, forecasts GlobalData

Source: GlobalData

Obesity market to reach $173.5 billion sales in 7MM by 2031, forecasts GlobalData

Posted in Pharma

The number of patients living with obesity keeps growing, and following the recent advances in the therapeutic space, more patients are being prescribed pharmacotherapy on top of the usual diet and exercise lifestyle changes, which by themselves are often unsuccessful. With physicians and patients awareness expected to increase, sales of obesity medications are forecast to reach $173.5 billion in the seven major markets (7MM*) by 2031, according to GlobalData, a leading data and analytics company.

GlobalData’s latest report “Obesity: Seven-Market Drug Forecast and Market Analysis- Update” reveals that the revolution in obesity treatment is not over yet, and many changes are still needed to fulfill the unmet needs in the obesity space.

Costanza Alciati, Pharma Analyst at GlobalData, comments: “The therapies available for obesity treatment are still limited, and many patients cannot access them due to their high cost. The most effective weight loss drugs on the market are currently Eli Lilly’s Mounjaro/Zepbound (tirzepatide) and Novo Nordisk’s Wegovy (semaglutide), which are expected to continue generating high sales for their respective manufacturers.”

According to GlobalData, more than 200 million people currently live with obesity in 7MM, and the numbers will be growing at an annual growth rate (AGR) of 0.7% until 2031.

Alciati continues: “Although Eli Lilly and Novo Nordisk are expected to maintain their role in the space, there is a big opportunity for new entrants. Pipeline therapies in development include drugs with new mechanisms of action, longer action resulting in a reduced number of treatment days, and oral candidates as potent as currently available injectables.”

Alciati concludes: “Many promising new drugs are expected to reach the market in the next few years. This will not only continue revolutionizing the obesity space, but also the whole cardiometabolic diseases sector.”

*7MM- US, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, UK, and Japan

MIL OSI Economics –

February 12, 2025

MIL-OSI Russia: Principality of Andorra: Staff Concluding Statement of the 2025 Article IV Mission

Source: IMF – News in Russian

February 11, 2025

A Concluding Statement describes the preliminary findings of IMF staff at the end of an official staff visit (or ‘mission’), in most cases to a member country. Missions are undertaken as part of regular (usually annual) consultations under Article IV of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, in the context of a request to use IMF resources (borrow from the IMF), as part of discussions of staff monitored programs, or as part of other staff monitoring of economic developments.

The authorities have consented to the publication of this statement. The views expressed in this statement are those of the IMF staff and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF’s Executive Board. Based on the preliminary findings of this mission, staff will prepare a report that, subject to management approval, will be presented to the IMF Executive Board for discussion and decision.

Andorra La Vella – February 11, 2025

The Andorran economy is doing well. This provides a window of opportunity to address substantial long-term challenges. The authorities have consolidated the country’s macro-financial framework and reinforced buffers. However, Andorra’s real GDP per capita—while high in absolute terms—has remained flat over the last 50 years, with growth largely driven by population increases. Going forward, population aging is both an economic and a fiscal concern, and climate change challenges an economic model largely dependent on winter tourism. Ambitious structural reforms are needed to unlock investment and lift productivity.

Economic Outlook

The Andorra economy continues to show resilience and to grow above its potential. Growth in 2024 surprised slightly on the upside, at an estimated 2.1 percent, driven by the service, banking and construction sectors. Inflation is subsiding gradually, reaching 2.6 percent at the end of 2024, despite limited economic slack and a still tight labor market. The current account surplus remains very large, estimated at 15.1 percent of GDP in 2024. The strong performance of banks continued in 2024 supported by high interest margins and increased fees and commissions.

Going forward, GDP is expected to slow to the level of potential growth. Real GDP growth is forecasted at 1.7 percent in 2025 and 1.5 percent from 2027 onwards. Inflation is projected to stabilize at 1.7 percent over the medium term. Short-term risks are balanced: greater uncertainty in the global economy and the potential for adverse shocks such as deepening geoeconomic fragmentation, supply disruptions, recurrent commodity price fluctuations and a reversal of monetary policy loosening are downside risks to growth and inflation. On the upside, Andorra, like other service-oriented economies in Europe, could benefit from stronger demand, and grow faster than projected. Solid buffers mitigate risks.

Challenges are concentrated over the medium-term, as stagnating income growth makes it challenging to address the impact of population aging and climate change. With long life expectancy and low fertility rates, Andorra’s population is expected to age rapidly—removing an engine for GDP growth and creating fiscal liabilities over the long term. Fiscal costs from pensions and healthcare will be substantial. More frequent climate shocks can affect the economic cycle in an economy largely reliant on winter tourism, and structurally warmer temperatures will require extensive adaptation.

Policy priorities

The solid macroeconomic position and the credibility of the policy framework provide Andorra with an opportunity for implementing far-reaching structural reforms. Diversifying the economy to enhance resilience, unlocking investment and lifting productivity to raise income levels, and addressing the costs of aging and climate change should be driving the policy agenda. The recently negotiated EU Association Agreement (EUAA), if approved by referendum, could offer an opportunity to support the reform momentum, but would also bring challenges.

Maintaining a solid fiscal framework given spending pressures over the medium term

Maintaining a disciplined fiscal policy within the fiscal framework is important and will provide room for more public investment. In a microstate that needs fiscal buffers against external shocks, entrenching fiscal space is important. In addition, the credibility of the fiscal framework and the primary surplus provide room for higher public investment to support potential growth and mitigate structural bottlenecks.

A balanced 2025 budget focused on economic priorities. The 2025 budget finds a welcome balance between maintaining a conservative fiscal stance but building on the authorities’ structural priorities, with a focus on health, housing, maintaining purchasing power, and education. Overall, the 2025 budget foresees a deficit of 0.9 percent of GDP. Given past practice of adjusting expenditures in line with incoming revenues, staff forecasts a small surplus of about 0.3 percent of GDP.
Room for growth-enhancing public spending. The fiscal framework, which prescribes an overall deficit limit of 1 percent of GDP and a central government debt ceiling of 40 percent of GDP, provides room for higher public spending targeted towards growth-enhancing investment. Spending should be focused on the structural needs of the economy: social and affordable housing, upskilling the workforce and addressing labor shortages, connectivity to support economic diversification, and investments to lift potential growth. As under-execution of budgeted public investment is customary, delivering on investment plans should be a policy objective.

Over the medium term, Andorra faces rising spending pressures from aging, as well as a need to adapt to climate change—engaging reforms early is paramount. Staff estimates that by 2050, pension system expenditures will rise by 6.7 percentage points while healthcare expenditures will increase by 2 percentage points. Acting early on pension and healthcare reforms is needed to anticipate and mitigate the fiscal impact of aging.

Pension reform has been on the government’s agenda for some time and is overdue. The menu of options to put the system on the sustainable path is well understood, from increasing contribution rates and reducing conversion rates to increasing the retirement age. Concluding the reform in an expeditious and comprehensive manner is needed to ensure the sustainability of the social security fund in the long run.
A reform of the healthcare system should aim to contain long-term costs while raising healthcare revenues . Experience from other advanced economies provides a blueprint for potential measures, in 4 areas: (i) enhance cost efficiency, (ii) strengthen preventive care, (iii) increase revenues for healthcare while preserving equity, and (iv) improve governance. The National Pact brought together stakeholders and should continue its work to strengthen the healthcare system.

· Beyond direct policies in the pension and healthcare areas, broader measures would be helpful to buffer the additional long-term fiscal costs of aging. Domestic revenue mobilization and migration policies can help.

Climate change also exposes the government to future contingent liabilities. Public investment needs to increase to meet Andorra’s climate change mitigation targets and to provide adequate support to the adaptation of the private sector. In addition, fiscal space will be increasingly needed to buffer the negative impact of climate shocks.

Precautionary borrowing and a rapid reduction in public debt provide the authorities with flexibility in managing the debt profile. The authorities are reaping the benefits of an effective debt management strategy that is projected to bring public debt down to 30 percent of GDP by 2026, that lengthened its maturity to 6.3 years and that keeps public debt service low. The authorities should continue to monitor market conditions for an upcoming debt maturity of €500 million public bonds in 2027, including for further diversifying debt and extending its maturity to decrease rollover risks and mitigate consequences from potential increases in interest rates.

Consolidating banking performance in a changing environment

Strengthening further the resilience of the banking system during periods of high profitability is appropriate. The banking sector displays solid fundamentals, with large capital and liquidity buffers. However, given the large size of the banking sector, the supervisor should remain vigilant. Available supervisory tools should complement each other, including by supporting the lender of last resort facility introduced in 2022 by continued close supervision and a well-designed resolution framework to ensure that critical problems are identified and addressed early. The activation of a countercyclical capital buffer in 2024 was timely to increase banking system resilience during high bank profitability.

The changing financial landscape, notably with the continued international expansion of banks and a possible EUAA, brings opportunities and challenges for Andorran banks. Banks have been growing in the EU where they run independent subsidiaries focused on private banking services, and the EUAA would facilitate this expansion, notably in the asset management business. Domestically, the EUAA has the potential to create a more dynamic domestic market but also to open Andorra to greater competition. The authorities should work closely with banks to prepare for the transition and safeguard financial stability.

Ambitious structural reforms to unlock investment and lift productivity, support the diversification of the economy and help mitigate climate change.

A comprehensive set of structural measures is important and should focus on the following:

Addressing frictions, notably labor and housing shortages. Public investment in education and well-designed immigration policies can improve knowledge capital in Andorra and raise labor productivity. Multiple housing measures were implemented recently—including the extension of existing rental contracts, the creation of a public affordable housing park, tax incentives for owners who offer affordable housing, suspension of tourist accommodation licenses, fees on empty houses and on real estate purchases by foreigners. The authorities should aim at providing market-based incentives for investing in affordable housing while minimizing distortions.
Creating a business environment conducive to higher investment. Recommendations encompass reducing administrative rigidities associated with doing business in Andorra, promoting access to financing, and implementing measures to attract and retain talent.
Supporting the development of higher value-added sectors, including the digital economy. With limited space for manufacturing, Andorra can look at the experience of peer countries that have successfully diversified towards the digital economy. Government policies, including the 2022 Law on the digital economy, entrepreneurship, and innovation and the Digitalization Strategy 2020-2030 were welcome initial steps.

The EUAA could provide further momentum for reforms towards diversification, unlock investment, and raise productivity in Andorra, but is not without its own challenges. The agreement signals a strong commitment to deeper integration with the EU and to reinforce Andorran institutions in their coherence with EU standards. Empirical evidence on the benefits of EU membership provides useful lessons for EU association. It suggests that while the impact can be significant and positive, it builds up over time, and is conditional on well-designed domestic reforms during the accession period. While the impact varies with country-specific circumstances, it materializes through a few channels: structural reforms in the period preceding accession/association, greater capital accumulation, notably FDI, and higher productivity. In Andorra, room for increasing investment and productivity is substantial. Transition periods for key sectors such as telecom and banking mitigate the risks of disruption and fiscal space can cover transition costs. Preparedness is essential to realize the benefits of association, and reduce potential downsides, such as greater regional competition.

The climate adaptation strategy needs to be accelerated given the macrocriticality of global warming for Andorra. Because of its higher altitude, Andorra is less exposed than other winter tourism locations in the region and should use this window of opportunity to enact needed policies, support the development of higher value-added service sectors and diversify away from winter tourism. The authorities should expedite the development and execution of a climate adaptation strategy.

The mission thanks the authorities and all our counterparts for a constructive and candid policy dialogue, for engaging in a productive and transparent collaboration, and for their hospitality during the official visit of the IMF to Andorra.

Andorra: Selected Social and Economic Indicators

	I. Social Indicators
	Population (2023)	85101		Population at risk of poverty (percent, 2020)					13
	Per capita income (2023, euros)	40511		Human Development Index Rank (2021)					40 (out of 189)
	Gini Index (2020)	32		Life expectancy at birth (2024)						83.9

	II. Economic Indicators
					Projections
		2022	2023	2024	2025	2026	2027	2028	2029		2030

	NATIONAL ACCOUNTS AND PRICES		(annual change, percent, unless otherwise indicated)
	Real GDP	9.6	2.6	2.1	1.7	1.6	1.5	1.5	1.5		1.5
	Nominal GDP	14.2	9.0	5.0	3.7	3.4	3.3	3.2	3.2		3.2
	GDP deflator	4.2	6.3	2.9	1.9	1.8	1.7	1.7	1.7		1.7
		(contribution to nominal GDP growth, percentage points)
	Consumption	6.5	7.0	3.6	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.4		2.4
	Private	6.2	3.5	1.7	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.4		1.4
	Public	0.3	3.4	1.9	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0		1.0
	Investment	6.8	-2.2	0.9	0.5	0.6	0.3	0.3	0.4		0.5
	Private 1/	6.4	-3.1	0.2	0.0	0.4	0.1	0.1	0.2		0.3
	Public	0.4	0.9	0.7	0.5	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2		0.2
	Net exports of goods and services	0.9	4.3	0.7	0.6	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4		0.4
	Exports	18.8	10.4	4.2	3.3	2.8	2.8	2.9	2.9		2.8
	Imports	18.0	6.1	3.5	2.7	2.5	2.4	2.5	2.5		2.4

	Prices
	Inflation (percent, period average)	6.2	5.6	3.1	2.2	1.8	1.7	1.7	1.7		1.7
	Inflation (percent, end of period)	7.2	4.6	2.6	2.0	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.7		1.7

	Unemployment rate (percent)	2.1	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.8	1.8	1.9	2.0		2.0

	EXTERNAL SECTOR	(percent of GDP, unless otherwise indicated)

	Current account	11.6	14.2	15.1	17.0	17.0	17.0	17.0	17.0		17.0
	Balance on goods and services	8.8	12.0	12.0	12.2	12.1	12.1	12.1	12.1		12.1
	Exports of goods and services	80.9	83.7	83.7	83.9	83.8	83.9	84.1	84.2		84.3
	Imports of goods and services	72.2	71.8	71.6	71.7	71.7	71.8	71.9	72.1		72.2
	Primary income, net	4.3	3.5	4.3	6.1	6.1	6.1	6.1	6.1		6.1
	Secondary income, net	-1.4	-1.3	-1.3	-1.3	-1.3	-1.3	-1.3	-1.3		-1.3
	Capital account	0.0	-0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		0.0
	Financial account	12.7	13.5	15.1	17.0	17.0	17.0	17.0	17.0		17.0
	Errors and omissions	1.1	-0.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		0.0
	Gross international reserves (millions of euros) 2/	338.4	338.7	399.0	399.0	399.0	399.0	399.0	399.0		399.0

	FISCAL SECTOR	(percent of GDP, unless otherwise indicated)

	General Government 3/
	Revenue	39.7	38.0	37.9	37.8	37.7	37.8	37.8	37.7		37.8
	Expenditure	34.9	35.9	36.5	36.7	36.6	36.9	36.9	37.0		37.0
	Interest	0.7	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.8	0.8	0.8		0.8
	Primary balance	5.6	2.7	2.0	1.7	1.6	1.6	1.7	1.6		1.6
	Net lending/borrowing (overall balance)	4.8	2.1	1.5	1.1	1.1	0.8	0.9	0.8		0.8
	Public debt	38.9	35.5	33.7	32.5	31.5	30.5	30.0	29.5		29.0

	Central Government 4/
	Revenue	21.7	19.8	21.3	20.8	20.8	20.8	20.8	20.8		20.9
	Expenditure	18.7	19.1	20.4	20.5	20.5	20.6	20.7	20.6		20.7
	Interest	0.7	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.7	0.7	0.7		0.7
	Primary balance	3.6	1.2	1.4	0.8	0.8	0.9	0.8	0.9		0.9
	Net lending/borrowing (overall balance)	2.9	0.7	0.9	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.1	0.2		0.2
	Public debt	37.1	34.0	32.3	31.2	30.1	29.2	28.7	28.3		27.9

	BANKING SECTOR5 /	(percent, unless otherwise indicated)

	Regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets	20.3	21.7	21.2	…	…	…	…	…		…
	Nonperforming loans to total gross loans	3.3	2.2	2.1	…	…	…	…	…		…
	Credit to nonfinancial private sector
	Level (percent of GDP)	116.4	101.3	94.5	…	…	…	…	…		…
	Corporates	61.8	55.1	51.1	…	…	…	…	…		…
	Households	54.6	46.2	43.4	…	…	…	…	…		…
	Growth (nominal)	-1.7	-5.2	-2.0	…	…	…	…	…		…
	Corporates	2.6	-2.8	-2.5	…	…	…	…	…		…
	Households	-6.1	-7.8	-1.3	…	…	…	…	…		…
	Credit to public sector
	Level (percent of GDP)	2.2	1.8	1.5	…	…	…	…	…		…
	Growth (nominal)	-8.4	-10.0	-13.0	…	…	…	…	…		…

	Memorandum items
	Exchange rate (€/USD, period average) 6/	0.95	0.92	0.92	0.97	0.97	0.97	0.97	0.97		0.97
	Nominal GDP (millions of euros)	3,210	3,501	3,676	3,811	3,942	4,070	4,202	4,338		4,478

	Sources: Andorran authorities, Eurostat, and IMF staff calculations.
	1/ The contribution of private investment is derived as a residual and includes investments of state-owned enterprises.
	2/ The increase of gross international reserves in 2022 is due to €100 million deposited at the Bank of Spain, €40 million at the Banque de France, and €60 million at the Nederlandsche Bank as gross international reserves. In 2024, additional €60 million reserves were accounted, mainly deposited at the Bank of Spain.
	3/ The general government comprises the central government, local governments, and the social security fund.
	4/ The central government comprises Govern d’Andorra, as well as nonmarket, nonprofit institutional units.
	5/ 2024 data corresponds to 2024Q3.
	6/ The table reports the exchange rate €/USD because Andorra is a euroized economy.

IMF Communications Department

MEDIA RELATIONS

PRESS OFFICER: Camila Perez

Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/02/11/andorra-cs-2025

MIL OSI

MIL OSI Russia News –

February 12, 2025

MIL-OSI: Declaration made pursuant to Article L. 233-8-II of the French Commercial Code and Article 223-16 of the General Regulation of the Autorité des Marchés Financiers

Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

Information
February 11, 2025

Declaration made pursuant to Article L. 233-8-II of the French Commercial Code and Article 223-16 of the General Regulation of the Autorité des Marchés Financiers

Information relating to the total number of shares and voting rights comprising the share capital as of January 31, 2025

Date	Total number of shares¹comprising the share capital	Theoretical number of voting rights²
01/31/2025	179,577,400	179,577,400

* *

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1 Each at a nominal value of EUR 7.8769723
2 The gross number of voting rights is calculated on the basis of all shares carrying voting rights, including shares whose voting rights have been suspended (Art. 223-11 of the General Regulation of the AMF)

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2025 02 11_SCOR_Information relating to the total number of shares and voting rights Wiztrust

The MIL Network –

February 12, 2025

MIL-OSI Economics: Principality of Andorra: Staff Concluding Statement of the 2025 Article IV Mission

Source: International Monetary Fund

February 11, 2025

Andorra La Vella – February 11, 2025

Economic Outlook

Policy priorities

Maintaining a solid fiscal framework given spending pressures over the medium term

A balanced 2025 budget focused on economic priorities. The 2025 budget finds a welcome balance between maintaining a conservative fiscal stance but building on the authorities’ structural priorities, with a focus on health, housing, maintaining purchasing power, and education. Overall, the 2025 budget foresees a deficit of 0.9 percent of GDP. Given past practice of adjusting expenditures in line with incoming revenues, staff forecasts a small surplus of about 0.3 percent of GDP.
Room for growth-enhancing public spending. The fiscal framework, which prescribes an overall deficit limit of 1 percent of GDP and a central government debt ceiling of 40 percent of GDP, provides room for higher public spending targeted towards growth-enhancing investment. Spending should be focused on the structural needs of the economy: social and affordable housing, upskilling the workforce and addressing labor shortages, connectivity to support economic diversification, and investments to lift potential growth. As under-execution of budgeted public investment is customary, delivering on investment plans should be a policy objective.

Pension reform has been on the government’s agenda for some time and is overdue. The menu of options to put the system on the sustainable path is well understood, from increasing contribution rates and reducing conversion rates to increasing the retirement age. Concluding the reform in an expeditious and comprehensive manner is needed to ensure the sustainability of the social security fund in the long run.
A reform of the healthcare system should aim to contain long-term costs while raising healthcare revenues . Experience from other advanced economies provides a blueprint for potential measures, in 4 areas: (i) enhance cost efficiency, (ii) strengthen preventive care, (iii) increase revenues for healthcare while preserving equity, and (iv) improve governance. The National Pact brought together stakeholders and should continue its work to strengthen the healthcare system.

Climate change also exposes the government to future contingent liabilities. Public investment needs to increase to meet Andorra’s climate change mitigation targets and to provide adequate support to the adaptation of the private sector. In addition, fiscal space will be increasingly needed to buffer the negative impact of climate shocks.

Consolidating banking performance in a changing environment

Ambitious structural reforms to unlock investment and lift productivity, support the diversification of the economy and help mitigate climate change.

A comprehensive set of structural measures is important and should focus on the following:

Addressing frictions, notably labor and housing shortages. Public investment in education and well-designed immigration policies can improve knowledge capital in Andorra and raise labor productivity. Multiple housing measures were implemented recently—including the extension of existing rental contracts, the creation of a public affordable housing park, tax incentives for owners who offer affordable housing, suspension of tourist accommodation licenses, fees on empty houses and on real estate purchases by foreigners. The authorities should aim at providing market-based incentives for investing in affordable housing while minimizing distortions.
Creating a business environment conducive to higher investment. Recommendations encompass reducing administrative rigidities associated with doing business in Andorra, promoting access to financing, and implementing measures to attract and retain talent.
Supporting the development of higher value-added sectors, including the digital economy. With limited space for manufacturing, Andorra can look at the experience of peer countries that have successfully diversified towards the digital economy. Government policies, including the 2022 Law on the digital economy, entrepreneurship, and innovation and the Digitalization Strategy 2020-2030 were welcome initial steps.

Andorra: Selected Social and Economic Indicators

	I. Social Indicators
	Population (2023)	85101		Population at risk of poverty (percent, 2020)					13
	Per capita income (2023, euros)	40511		Human Development Index Rank (2021)					40 (out of 189)
	Gini Index (2020)	32		Life expectancy at birth (2024)						83.9

	II. Economic Indicators
					Projections
		2022	2023	2024	2025	2026	2027	2028	2029		2030

	NATIONAL ACCOUNTS AND PRICES		(annual change, percent, unless otherwise indicated)
	Real GDP	9.6	2.6	2.1	1.7	1.6	1.5	1.5	1.5		1.5
	Nominal GDP	14.2	9.0	5.0	3.7	3.4	3.3	3.2	3.2		3.2
	GDP deflator	4.2	6.3	2.9	1.9	1.8	1.7	1.7	1.7		1.7
		(contribution to nominal GDP growth, percentage points)
	Consumption	6.5	7.0	3.6	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.4		2.4
	Private	6.2	3.5	1.7	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.4		1.4
	Public	0.3	3.4	1.9	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0		1.0
	Investment	6.8	-2.2	0.9	0.5	0.6	0.3	0.3	0.4		0.5
	Private 1/	6.4	-3.1	0.2	0.0	0.4	0.1	0.1	0.2		0.3
	Public	0.4	0.9	0.7	0.5	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2		0.2
	Net exports of goods and services	0.9	4.3	0.7	0.6	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4		0.4
	Exports	18.8	10.4	4.2	3.3	2.8	2.8	2.9	2.9		2.8
	Imports	18.0	6.1	3.5	2.7	2.5	2.4	2.5	2.5		2.4

	Prices
	Inflation (percent, period average)	6.2	5.6	3.1	2.2	1.8	1.7	1.7	1.7		1.7
	Inflation (percent, end of period)	7.2	4.6	2.6	2.0	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.7		1.7

	Unemployment rate (percent)	2.1	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.8	1.8	1.9	2.0		2.0

	EXTERNAL SECTOR	(percent of GDP, unless otherwise indicated)

	Current account	11.6	14.2	15.1	17.0	17.0	17.0	17.0	17.0		17.0
	Balance on goods and services	8.8	12.0	12.0	12.2	12.1	12.1	12.1	12.1		12.1
	Exports of goods and services	80.9	83.7	83.7	83.9	83.8	83.9	84.1	84.2		84.3
	Imports of goods and services	72.2	71.8	71.6	71.7	71.7	71.8	71.9	72.1		72.2
	Primary income, net	4.3	3.5	4.3	6.1	6.1	6.1	6.1	6.1		6.1
	Secondary income, net	-1.4	-1.3	-1.3	-1.3	-1.3	-1.3	-1.3	-1.3		-1.3
	Capital account	0.0	-0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		0.0
	Financial account	12.7	13.5	15.1	17.0	17.0	17.0	17.0	17.0		17.0
	Errors and omissions	1.1	-0.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		0.0
	Gross international reserves (millions of euros) 2/	338.4	338.7	399.0	399.0	399.0	399.0	399.0	399.0		399.0

	FISCAL SECTOR	(percent of GDP, unless otherwise indicated)

	General Government 3/
	Revenue	39.7	38.0	37.9	37.8	37.7	37.8	37.8	37.7		37.8
	Expenditure	34.9	35.9	36.5	36.7	36.6	36.9	36.9	37.0		37.0
	Interest	0.7	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.8	0.8	0.8		0.8
	Primary balance	5.6	2.7	2.0	1.7	1.6	1.6	1.7	1.6		1.6
	Net lending/borrowing (overall balance)	4.8	2.1	1.5	1.1	1.1	0.8	0.9	0.8		0.8
	Public debt	38.9	35.5	33.7	32.5	31.5	30.5	30.0	29.5		29.0

	Central Government 4/
	Revenue	21.7	19.8	21.3	20.8	20.8	20.8	20.8	20.8		20.9
	Expenditure	18.7	19.1	20.4	20.5	20.5	20.6	20.7	20.6		20.7
	Interest	0.7	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.7	0.7	0.7		0.7
	Primary balance	3.6	1.2	1.4	0.8	0.8	0.9	0.8	0.9		0.9
	Net lending/borrowing (overall balance)	2.9	0.7	0.9	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.1	0.2		0.2
	Public debt	37.1	34.0	32.3	31.2	30.1	29.2	28.7	28.3		27.9

	BANKING SECTOR5 /	(percent, unless otherwise indicated)

	Regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets	20.3	21.7	21.2	…	…	…	…	…		…
	Nonperforming loans to total gross loans	3.3	2.2	2.1	…	…	…	…	…		…
	Credit to nonfinancial private sector
	Level (percent of GDP)	116.4	101.3	94.5	…	…	…	…	…		…
	Corporates	61.8	55.1	51.1	…	…	…	…	…		…
	Households	54.6	46.2	43.4	…	…	…	…	…		…
	Growth (nominal)	-1.7	-5.2	-2.0	…	…	…	…	…		…
	Corporates	2.6	-2.8	-2.5	…	…	…	…	…		…
	Households	-6.1	-7.8	-1.3	…	…	…	…	…		…
	Credit to public sector
	Level (percent of GDP)	2.2	1.8	1.5	…	…	…	…	…		…
	Growth (nominal)	-8.4	-10.0	-13.0	…	…	…	…	…		…

	Memorandum items
	Exchange rate (€/USD, period average) 6/	0.95	0.92	0.92	0.97	0.97	0.97	0.97	0.97		0.97
	Nominal GDP (millions of euros)	3,210	3,501	3,676	3,811	3,942	4,070	4,202	4,338		4,478

	Sources: Andorran authorities, Eurostat, and IMF staff calculations.
	1/ The contribution of private investment is derived as a residual and includes investments of state-owned enterprises.
	2/ The increase of gross international reserves in 2022 is due to €100 million deposited at the Bank of Spain, €40 million at the Banque de France, and €60 million at the Nederlandsche Bank as gross international reserves. In 2024, additional €60 million reserves were accounted, mainly deposited at the Bank of Spain.
	3/ The general government comprises the central government, local governments, and the social security fund.
	4/ The central government comprises Govern d’Andorra, as well as nonmarket, nonprofit institutional units.
	5/ 2024 data corresponds to 2024Q3.
	6/ The table reports the exchange rate €/USD because Andorra is a euroized economy.

IMF Communications Department

MEDIA RELATIONS

PRESS OFFICER: Camila Perez

Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

MIL OSI Economics –

February 12, 2025

MIL-OSI: AMD and the Commissariat à l’énergie atomique et aux énergies alternatives (CEA) to Collaborate on the Future of AI Compute

Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

SANTA CLARA, Calif., Feb. 11, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — AMD (NASDAQ: AMD) today announced the signing of a Letter of Intent (LOI) with the Commissariat à l’énergie atomique et aux énergies alternatives (CEA) of France to collaborate on the advanced technologies, component and system architectures that will shape the future of AI computing. The collaboration will leverage the strengths of both organizations to push the boundaries on energy-efficient systems needed to support the world’s most compute-intensive AI workloads in fields from energy to medicine.

Through this initiative, AMD and CEA will engage in a structured collaboration, focused on technological advancements on next generation AI compute infrastructure. AMD and CEA also are planning a symposium on the future of AI compute in 2025 that will convene European stakeholders and global technology providers, startups, supercomputing centers, universities and policy makers to accelerate collaboration around state-of-the-art and emerging AI computing technologies.

“AI computing continues to drive innovation across industries, and international collaboration is critical to pushing the boundaries of what’s possible,” said Ralph Wittig, Corporate Fellow and head of research, AMD. “Through this collaboration with CEA and leading French engineers, we aim to bring cutting-edge AI research closer to real-world applications by advancing system architectures that meet the demands of tomorrow’s AI workloads, while growing the joint research and development opportunities between the U.S. and France.”

“CEA is committed to driving innovation in AI computing by advancing next-generation technologies opening the road for disruptive architectures that balance performance and energy efficiency. Our collaboration with AMD represents a significant step toward fostering international cooperation in high-performance computing, bringing together world-class expertise to address the growing demands of AI workloads,” said Julie Galland, Director of the Technological Research division at CEA, “By combining CEA’s research leadership with AMD’s cutting-edge technology, we aim to develop breakthrough solutions that will shape the future of AI computing in Europe and beyond.”

This effort underscores the AMD commitment to fostering international collaborations that accelerate AI innovation, making AI more inclusive and sustainable, and strengthening cooperation, in particular, between the United States and European research institutions.

Supporting Resources

About AMD
For more than 50 years AMD has driven innovation in high-performance computing, graphics and visualization technologies. Billions of people, leading Fortune 500 businesses and cutting-edge scientific research institutions around the world rely on AMD technology daily to improve how they live, work and play. AMD employees are focused on building leadership high-performance and adaptive products that push the boundaries of what is possible. For more information about how AMD is enabling today and inspiring tomorrow, visit the AMD (NASDAQ: AMD) website, blog, LinkedIn and X pages.

AMD, the AMD Arrow logo, and combinations thereof, are trademarks of Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. Other names are for informational purposes only and may be trademarks of their respective owners.

The MIL Network –

February 11, 2025
MIL-OSI Economics: Denis Beau: The foundations of trustworthy AI in the financial sector

Source: Bank for International Settlements

Ladies and gentlemen,

First of all, I’d like to thank the organizers for their invitation to launch this event focusing on the Paris financial centre’s AI strategy: just days before the international AI Action Summit, this gives me the opportunity to reiterate our determination at the Banque de France and the ACPR to take action on this major issue for the industry – and to do so in concert with all financial sector players. The summit will also be an opportunity for the Banque de France to reaffirm its commitment by organising a side event on 11 February, featuring a round table discussion on ethical and inclusive AI.

AI – as you are already well aware, is being increasingly used in the financial sector, whether to assess credit risk, set insurance rates or estimate asset volatility. For a supervisor, its impact is potentially double-edged: while AI is a source of opportunities for the sector – including for its supervisor – it is also a new vector of risk. This ambivalent impact partly explains the regulatory framework that has just been introduced in Europe.

The European Union has proven itself a pioneer in this area by adopting the AI Act in the summer of 2024. However, this legislation raises legitimate questions, especially for the financial sector: is there not a risk of hampering innovation in the name of controlling risk? I would like to reiterate, before you today, a strongly held conviction that may seem iconoclastic in the current environment: in the long run, regulating AI-related risks is good for competitiveness in both Europe and France. Without regulation, there can be no trust – and therefore no sustainable innovation.

Because my opening remarks this morning are from a supervisor’s perspective, I will discuss the opportunities and risks (I), then the conditions necessary for effective regulation of AI in the financial sector (II).

I/ To get a bit of perspective on things, I would like to revisit an initial observation: AI, combined with an abundance of available data, is a powerful vector of transformation for the financial sector.

1/ Our observations show that AI is increasingly being used by financial institutions along all segments of the value chain: i) to improve the “user experience”, ii) to automate and streamline internal processes, and iii) to control risks, particularly in the battle against fraud and against money laundering and the financing of terrorism.

The emergence of generative AI two years ago has triggered a revolution in the accessibility of AI technology, thanks to the possibility of interacting with algorithms using natural language – via Large Language Models (LLMs) – which makes adoption considerably easier. Generative AI is also boosting innovation within companies as computer code can now be written by a much broader group of people.

If harnessed properly, AI can therefore boost the efficiency of financial institutions, increase their revenues and provide them with risk management solutions.

2/ However, there is a downside, and the power of the solutions developed is accompanied by significant risks, both for each of the players in the financial system and for the stability of the system as a whole. I would like to mention three of these risks.

The first is that these technologies may be put to improper use. The complexity and newness of certain modelling techniques can result in more errors, either in systems design or use. This poses a risk not only for customers, but also for institutions’ financial health, as a poorly calibrated model could generate systematic losses. These risks are compounded by two factors. First, the adjustment of the parameters of certain models in real-time, which is one of their strengths, can also result in rapid drift. Second, certain AI systems are particularly opaque, generating a “black box” phenomenon.

The second risk I would like to highlight is cyber risk, which has become the number one operational risk in the financial sector over the past few years. AI amplifies this risk – both in terms of the danger posed by attackers and because it represents a new area of vulnerability. Conversely, we should be aware that AI can also enhance IT security, for example, by helping to detect suspicious behaviour.

Lastly, I’d like to highlight a third risk, which could become increasingly significant in the future, namely environmental risk. In the absence of reliable data provided by businesses or a commonly accepted basis of calculation, quantification of this risk is still subject to considerable variability. Nevertheless, it is clear that training the most recent generative AI models is a very energy-intensive process… and that if current trends continue, their regular use by billions of customers will be even more so. These factors naturally suggest that AI should be used rather frugally. In other words, AI systems should only be used when necessary.

II/ I would now like to turn to aspects of regulation, legislation and control, and primarily to the European AI Act. This will mainly concern the financial sector for two use cases: creditworthiness assessment for granting loans to individuals, and risk assessment and pricing in health and life insurance. The main impacts of this legislation will be felt from August 2026, and as market surveillance authority, the ACPR should be responsible for ensuring that it is properly applied.

With this in mind, I would like to share two simple messages with you this morning: i) the risks linked to AI can essentially be handled within the existing risk management frameworks; ii) however, we should not underestimate certain new AI-related technical challenges.

1/ The AI Act will not lead to any major upheaval in the way risks are managed in the financial sector.

Financial institutions have a sound risk management culture, as well as robust governance and internal control systems. The Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA), which has just come into force, rounds out the traditional regulatory framework with specific rules on operational resilience and IT risk management. The financial sector is therefore well equipped to meet the challenge of complying with the new regulations.

Admittedly, the objectives of the AI Act – first and foremost the protection of fundamental rights – and those of sectoral regulation – financial stability and the ability to meet commitments to customer– differ. But operationally, when the AI Act requires “high-risk systems” to have data governance, traceability and auditability, or guarantees of robustness, accuracy and cyber-security throughout the lifecycle, clearly, we are not in uncharted waters.

Rather, I would like to reiterate that the usual principles of sound risk management and governance continue to apply under the AI Act. Naturally these will guide the ACPR in assessing systems compliance when it is called upon to exercise its role of market surveillance authority. More specifically, our vision for deploying this new mission will be underpinned by three simple principles: (i) implementing “market surveillance” in accordance with the AI Act, i.e. primarily aimed at identifying systems likely to pose compliance problems; (ii) defining supervision priorities using a risk-based approach to ensure that the resources deployed are proportionate to the expected outcomes; and (iii) unlocking all possible synergies with prudential supervision. I believe that this was the intention of the European legislator when it entrusted national financial supervisors with the role of “market surveillance authority”. It is also the best way of ensuring that we don’t make the regulations any more complex at a time when our common objective should be to simplify them.

Naturally, the principles of good governance and internal control also apply to algorithms not considered high-risk by the AI Act, if they pose risks to the organisations concerned – think of the use of AI systems in market activities, for example. Here, lessons learned from implementing the AI Act and the resulting best practices will be invaluable for both supervisors and supervised entities.

2/ Nevertheless, the challenges posed by the use of AI should not be underestimated

Some of the issues raised by this technology are definitely new. Let me give you two examples. Firstly, explainability: with each advance in this field, artificial intelligence algorithms have become increasingly opaque and in a regulated sector like the financial sector, this is a problem. More specifically, day-to-day users of AI tools need to have a sufficient understanding of how they work and of their limitations if they are to make appropriate use of them and avoid the twin pitfalls of either blindly trusting the machine or systematically mistrusting it.

The second example is fairness. AI can accentuate biases present in data. Indeed, one of the aims of the AI Act is to detect and prevent such biases before they cause harm to citizens. This is a technically complex issue, as banning the use of certain protected variables is not enough to guarantee safe algorithms. This is particularly true for activities such as granting loans or pricing insurance, where customer segmentation is part of normal business and risk management practices in a competitive environment.

To address these new challenges and comply with the various regulatory requirements, financial institutions will need to acquire new human and technical resources and upskill. As market surveillance authority and prudential regulator, the ACPR will ensure that risks are effectively managed. Compliance with the AI Act will have to be more than just an internal administrative labelling exercise, and financial institutions will have to ensure that the algorithms are managed and monitored by competent people who understand their inner workings.

This means that the financial supervisor itself has to upskill and adapt its tools and methods. The ACPR has already published certain proposals in the past concerning the issue of explainability. It will eventually have to establish a doctrine on this topic as well as on algorithm fairness. We will also need to develop a specific methodology for auditing AI systems.

We cannot and must not take this methodological step forward alone. In addition to unlocking synergies with other AI supervisors in France and Europe, we need to cooperate with the financial sector. Supervisors and supervised entities share many challenges and they will overcome them more effectively if they are able to move forward together.

Events like today provide an opportunity to channel our collective efforts into a widely shared project. It is by working together that we will be able to lay the foundations for trustworthy AI in the financial sector.
I wish you fruitful discussions throughout this morning.

MIL OSI Economics –

February 11, 2025
MIL-OSI China: Traditional folk dance as cultural link

Source: China State Council Information Office 3

Drawn by the rhythmic beats of drums and spirited shouts, Thanita Raemee, a 20-year-old Thai exchange student, navigated through winding streets and bustling alleys until she arrived at the dynamic training grounds of the Ximen Women’s Yingge Dance Team.

Founded in 1952, this pioneering all-female team is the first of its kind in the Chaoshan region of south China’s Guangdong Province, with members ranging from teenagers to nearly 80-year-olds. Performers come from all walks of life — spirited young girls, agile middle-aged men, and even food delivery workers dancing between shifts.

The Yingge dance, or “dance to the hero’s song,” is a form of folk dance popular in south China’s Guangdong Province. Dating back to the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644), this traditional dance is often performed during traditional Chinese festivals. As a dynamic blend of theater, dance, and martial arts, it was listed among the first batch of national intangible cultural heritage in 2006.

Once a traditional folk performance, Yingge dance saw a recent surge in popularity. Videos of its energetic routines have flooded social media, earning it the title of the “ultimate Chinese New Year atmosphere booster.”

While men’s Yingge performances are inspired by the legendary “Water Margin,” one of the four great classical novels in Chinese literature, the women’s routines often draw from the tales of legendary Chinese heroines like Mu Guiying and Hua Mulan.

Thanita watched in awe as the dancers moved in perfect unison, their forms embodying both strength and grace.

“Incredible! How do they stay so synchronized? Compared to traditional Thai dance, this feels much more powerful and rhythmic — it’s exhilarating!” she exclaimed.

“Most of our members are under 20, balancing their studies and work. They train purely out of passion,” said the team’s coach Wu Yanhua, who left her job as a kindergarten teacher to focus on the team’s revival in 2011.

That passion was evident in every interaction. “My teammates take turns helping me with childcare. Yingge dance is part of my life — I even dream about it,” said a team member Zhou Yixiang while gently rocking her five-month-old baby in a stroller.

Six-year-old Huang Kexin eagerly demonstrated snake-dance moves she had just learned, hopping and twirling with a delightful burst of playful energy. Meanwhile, 11-year-old Lin Yahan patiently taught Thanita how to grip the Yingge hammer properly, while her twin sister nodded in encouragement.

During the recently concluded Spring Festival holiday, homestay tourism flourished across China. Shantou, a key city in Chaoshan known for its rich New Year traditions, saw bookings soar 13 times from last year. Lion dance, Yingge dance and other traditional performances have become festival favorites.

Thanita has family roots in Chaoshan — her father is an overseas Chinese descendant. For her, Yingge dance serves as a bridge between Chinese and Thai cultures. In fact, many in Thailand are already familiar with the dance.

In early 2023, a Thai Yingge team’s electrifying performance at a shopping mall in Thailand went viral, and later that year, the Yingge cultural exchange group from Thailand visited Chaoshan to engage with local dancers.

This year, Yingge dance teams from Shantou have also been invited to perform on multiple overseas stages for the Spring Festival celebrations.

Organized by the Department of Culture and Tourism of Guangdong Province, the 25-member Yingge team toured Germany and France from Jan. 28 to Feb. 4. They performed in cities like Hanau, Frankfurt, Paris, and Lyon, sharing the vibrant charm of Yingge dance.

Studying international Chinese education at Shantou University, Thanita deeply admires the dedication and enthusiasm of Yingge performers.

“One of my goals in coming to China was to explore the traditions my ancestors once lived by. Yingge has expanded my understanding of Chaoshan and Chinese culture while revealing the cultural ties between China and Thailand,” she said.

MIL OSI China News –

February 11, 2025

MIL-OSI: International Petroleum Corporation Announces 2024 Year-End Financial and Operational Results and 2025 Budget, Reserves and Guidance

Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

TORONTO, Feb. 11, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — International Petroleum Corporation (IPC or the Corporation) (TSX, Nasdaq Stockholm: IPCO) today released its financial and operating results and related management’s discussion and analysis (MD&A) for the three months and year ended December 31, 2024. IPC is also pleased to announce its 2025 budget, including that IPC continues to progress the development of the Blackrod Phase 1 project in Canada in line with schedule and budget. IPC previously announced the renewal of the normal course issuer bid (NCIB) under which IPC may acquire a further 5.3 million common shares up to December 2025, in addition to the 2.2 million common shares already purchased for cancellation under the NCIB in December 2024 and January 2025. IPC’s 2025 capital and decommissioning expenditure budget is USD 320 million and its 2025 average daily production guidance is between 43,000 and 45,000 barrels of oil equivalent (boe) per day (boepd). 2024 year-end proved plus probable (2P) reserves are 493 million boe (MMboe) and best estimate contingent resources (unrisked) are 1,107 MMboe.⁽¹⁾⁽²⁾

William Lundin, IPC’s President and Chief Executive Officer, comments: “We are very pleased to announce that IPC achieved strong operational results in 2024. Our average net production was 47,400 boepd for the full year, with very strong operational and ESG performance across all our areas of operation. 2024 was a very significant investment year for our Blackrod Phase 1 development project, and we have spent over two-thirds of the forecast capital expenditure by the end of 2024. We generated strong cash flows from our business, and we returned USD 102 million to shareholders through share buybacks in 2024. With gross cash resources of USD 247 million at 2024 year-end, we continue to be well positioned to deliver on our three strategic pillars of Organic Growth, Stakeholder Returns, and M&A that drive value creation for our stakeholders.⁽¹⁾⁽³⁾

On Organic Growth, we are very pleased with the progress of the development of Phase 1 of the Blackrod project, Canada, which remains in line with schedule and budget. Phase 1 of the Blackrod project continues to forecast first oil in late 2026, with peak production planned to increase to 30,000 bopd by 2028. In 2024, IPC achieved over 250% reserves replacement ratio, ending the year with 493 MMboe of 2P reserves, the highest in our history.⁽¹⁾⁽²⁾

On Stakeholder Returns, we completed the 2023/2024 NCIB program, purchasing and cancelling 8.3 million IPC common shares over the period of December 5, 2023 to December 4, 2024, representing approximately 6.5% of the common shares outstanding at the start of that program. We immediately recommenced purchasing under the renewed 2024/2025 NCIB, purchasing for cancellation 0.8 million common shares during December 2024 and over 1.4 million common shares during January 2024. We are permitted to purchase up to a further 5.3 million common shares by early December 2025, which will represent a 6.2% reduction in the number of shares common outstanding at the beginning of the 2024/2025 NCIB.

On M&A, we continue to review potential opportunities in Canada and internationally. IPC’s principal focus continues to be on progressing the Blackrod Phase 1 development as well as developing our existing asset base in Canada, France and Malaysia.

IPC is well-positioned for 2025 and beyond as our Blackrod Phase 1 project is progressing according to plan, our existing production operations continue to generate strong cash flows, and our balance sheet is strong. At the same time, we continue return value to our shareholders by repurchasing and cancelling our common shares under the NCIB. I look forward to another exciting year at IPC with our high quality assets and our highly skilled and motivated teams across all areas of operation.”

2024 Business Highlights

Average net production of approximately 47,400 boepd for the fourth quarter of 2024 was in line with the guidance range for the period (51% heavy crude oil, 15% light and medium crude oil and 34% natural gas).⁽¹⁾
Full year 2024 average net production was 47,400 boepd, above the mid-point of the 2024 annual guidance of 46,000 to 48,000 boepd.⁽¹⁾
Development activities on Phase 1 of the Blackrod project progressed in 2024 on schedule and on budget, with forecast first oil in late 2026. All major third-party contracts have been executed and construction is advancing according to plan, including construction of the central processing facility (CPF) and well pad facilities, finalization of the midstream agreements for the input fuel gas, diluent and oil blend pipelines, and advancement of drilling operations. As at the end of 2024, over two-thirds of the forecast Blackrod Phase 1 development capital expenditure of USD 850 million has been spent since project sanction in early 2023.
Drilling activity at the Southern Alberta assets in Canada continued with a total of thirteen wells drilled during 2024.
Successful completion of planned maintenance shutdowns at Onion Lake Thermal (OLT) in Canada and the Bertam field in Malaysia during 2024.
8.3 million common shares purchased and cancelled from December 2023 to early December 2024 under IPC’s 2023/2024 NCIB and a further 2.2 million common shares purchased for cancellation during December 2024 and January 2025 under the renewed 2024/2025 NCIB.
In Q3 2024, published IPC’s fifth annual Sustainability Report.

2024 Financial Highlights

Operating costs per boe of USD 18.2 for the fourth quarter of 2024 and USD 17.0 for the full year, in line with the most recent 2024 guidance of less than USD 18.0 per boe for the full year.⁽³⁾
Strong operating cash flow (OCF) generation for the fourth quarter and full year 2024 amounted to MUSD 78 and MUSD 342, respectively.⁽³⁾
Capital and decommissioning expenditures of MUSD 129 for the fourth quarter and MUSD 442 for the full year 2024, in line with the full year guidance of MUSD 437.
Free cash flow (FCF) generation for the full year 2024 of negative MUSD 135, with negative FCF generation of MUSD 61 for the fourth quarter in line with expectations and taking into account the significant capital expenditures during the quarter in respect of the Blackrod project. FCF for the full year 2024, before 2024 Blackrod Phase 1 development expenditure of MUSD 351, was MUSD 216.⁽³⁾
Net debt of MUSD 209 and gross cash of MUSD 247 as at December 31, 2024.⁽³⁾
Net result of MUSD 0.4 for the fourth quarter of 2024 and MUSD 102 for the full year 2024.
Entered into a letter of credit facility in Canada during 2024 to cover operational letters of credit, giving full availability under IPC’s undrawn CAD 180 million Revolving Credit Facility.

Reserves and Resources

Total 2P reserves as at December 31, 2024 of 493 MMboe, with a reserve life index (RLI) of 31 years.⁽¹⁾⁽²⁾
Contingent resources (best estimate, unrisked) as at December 31, 2024 of 1,107 MMboe.⁽¹⁾⁽²⁾
2P reserves net asset value (NAV) as at December 31, 2024 of MUSD 3,083 (10% discount rate).^(1)(2)(⁵⁾⁽⁶⁾

2025 Annual Guidance

Full year 2025 average net production forecast at 43,000 to 45,000 boepd.⁽¹⁾
Full year 2025 operating costs forecast at USD 18 to 19 per boe.⁽³⁾
Full year 2025 OCF guidance estimated at between MUSD 210 and 280 (assuming Brent USD 65 to 85 per barrel).⁽³⁾
Full year 2025 capital and decommissioning expenditures guidance forecast at MUSD 320, including MUSD 230 relating to Blackrod capital expenditure.
Full year 2025 FCF ranges from approximately MUSD 80 to 150 (assuming Brent USD 65 to 85 per barrel) before taking into account proposed Blackrod capital expenditures, or negative MUSD 150 to 80 including proposed Blackrod capital expenditures.⁽³⁾

Business Plan Production and Cash Flow Guidance

2025 – 2029 business plan forecasts:
- average net production forecast approximately 57,000 boepd.⁽¹⁾⁽⁸⁾
- capital expenditure forecast of USD 8 per boe, including USD 3 per boe for growth expenditure.⁽⁸⁾
- operating costs forecast of USD 18 to 19 per boe.⁽³⁾⁽⁸⁾
- FCF forecast of approximately MUSD 1,200 to 2,000 (assuming Brent USD 75 to 95 per barrel).⁽³⁾⁽⁸⁾
2030 – 2034 business plan forecasts:
- average net production forecast of approximately 63,000 boepd.⁽¹⁾⁽⁸⁾
- capital expenditure forecast of USD 5 per boe.⁽⁸⁾
- operating costs forecast of USD 18 to 19 per boe.⁽³⁾⁽⁸⁾
- FCF forecast of approximately MUSD 1,600 to 2,600 (assuming Brent USD 75 to 95 per barrel).⁽³⁾⁽⁸⁾

	Three months ended December 31				Year ended December 31
USD Thousands	2024		2023		2024		2023
Revenue	199,124		198,460		797,783		853,906
Gross profit	42,774		39,955		210,171		250,514
Net result	415		29,710		102,219		172,979
Operating cash flow ⁽³⁾	78,158		73,634		341,989		353,048
Free cash flow ⁽³⁾	(61,476	)	(64,688	)	(135,497	)	2,689
EBITDA ⁽³⁾	76,184		66,284		335,488		350,618
Net Cash / (Debt) ⁽³⁾	(208,528	)	58,043		(208,528	)	58,043

IPC was launched in 2017 by way of spinning off the non-Norwegian assets from Lundin Energy. The strategy and vision from the outset was to be the international E&P growth vehicle for the Lundin Group by pursuing growth organically and through acquisitions. The foundation of this strategy was and is predicated on maximising long-term stakeholder value through responsible business operations focused on operational excellence and financial resilience to underpin optimal capital allocation decision-making.

We are very pleased with the track record of value creation achieved by the company to date. IPC’s production, reserves, resources and cash flow exposure has increased materially through accretive acquisitions supplemented by base business investment. Excluding the growth capital expenditure assigned to the Blackrod Phase 1 development, over USD 1.5 billion in free cash flow (FCF) has been generated and over USD 0.5 billion has been returned to shareholders in the form of share buybacks since inception. IPC’s current shares outstanding are less than 5% higher than the original shares outstanding upon the formation of the company. IPC is determined to build on the historical success and the growth outlook has never been brighter.⁽³⁾

2024 was a milestone year for the company through successfully delivering the largest capital investment campaign in its history. The record investment was accompanied by strong safety, operational and financial performance. IPC returned USD 102 million of value to shareholders in the year through share repurchases, whilst maintaining a strong balance sheet.

Oil prices were rangebound in 2024 between Brent USD 70 to 90 per barrel, with a full year Brent average of USD 81 per barrel, in line with our original oil price sensitivities guided at CMD. The fourth quarter 2024 Brent price averaged USD 75 per barrel, the lowest quarterly price average in the year. The downward trend in benchmark oil prices through the second half of 2024 has been slightly reversed in current time as continuous crude inventory draws, strong demand, underwhelming non-OPEC production growth and continued OPEC production curtailments have supported the market balance. A new administration in the White House presents uncertainty for the oil market, as looming tariffs and sanctions pose a risk to global supply chain systems and trade flows. Around 40% of our 2025 Dated Brent and WTI exposure is hedged at USD 76 per barrel and USD 71 per barrel respectively.

The fourth quarter 2024 WTI to WCS price differentials averaged less than USD 13 per barrel, around USD 2 per barrel lower than the full year average of USD 15 per barrel. The fourth quarter differential was the lowest quarterly average since the Covid pandemic in 2020 when benchmark oil prices were more than USD 30 per barrel less than current levels. The TMX pipeline is driving the tighter differentials with excess take-away capacity in the Western Canadian Sedimentary Basin (WCSB) relative to supply. Close to 50% of our 2025 WCS to WTI differential exposure is hedged at USD 14 per barrel, which should assist in mitigating adverse effects of potential US tariffs on Canadian production.

Natural gas prices averaged CAD 1.5 per Mcf for 2024 and in the fourth quarter. Western Canada gas storage levels continue to sit above the five-year range. This is in part due to delays of the LNG Canada start-up project which was supposed to be onstream at end 2024, start-up is now anticipated for mid-2025. IPC has around 9,600 Mcf per day hedged at CAD 2.6 per Mcf for 2025.

Fourth Quarter and Full Year 2024 Highlights

During the fourth quarter of 2024, IPC’s assets delivered average net production of 47,400 boepd, in line with guidance for the quarter. Full year 2024 average net production of 47,400 boepd was above the 2024 mid-point guidance range of 46,000 to 48,000 boepd.⁽¹⁾

IPC’s operating costs per boe for the fourth quarter of 2024 was USD 18.2. Full year 2024 operating costs per boe was USD 17.0, in line with the most recent 2024 annual guidance of less than USD 18 per boe.⁽³⁾

Operating cash flow (OCF) generation for the fourth quarter of 2024 was USD 78 million. Full year 2024 OCF was USD 342 million in line with the most recent guidance of USD 335 to 342 million.⁽³⁾

Capital and decommissioning expenditure for the fourth quarter of 2024 was USD 129 million. Full year 2024 capital and decommissioning expenditure of USD 442 million was in line with guidance of USD 437 million.

Free cash flow (FCF) generation was in line with guidance at negative USD 61 million during the fourth quarter of 2024, reflecting the higher level of capital expenditure on the Blackrod Phase 1 development project. Full year 2024 FCF generation was negative USD 135 million, in line with the most recent guidance of negative USD 140 to 133 million.⁽³⁾

As at December 31, 2024, IPC’s net debt position was USD 209 million. IPC’s gross cash on the balance sheet amounts to USD 247 million which provides IPC with significant financial strength to continue progressing its strategies in 2025, including advancing the Blackrod development project, returning value to shareholders through the 2024/2025 NCIB, and remaining opportunistic to mergers and acquisitions activity.⁽³⁾

Blackrod Project

The Blackrod asset is 100% owned by IPC and hosts the largest booked reserves and contingent resources within the IPC portfolio. After more than a decade of pilot operations, subsurface delineation and commercial engineering studies, IPC sanctioned the Phase 1 Steam Assisted Gravity Drainage (SAGD) development in the first quarter of 2023. The Phase 1 development targets 259 MMboe of 2P reserves, with a multi-year forecast capital expenditure of USD 850 million to first oil planned in late 2026. The Phase 1 development is planned for plateau production of 30,000 bopd which is expected by early 2028.⁽¹⁾⁽²⁾

As at the end of 2024, USD 591 million of cumulative growth capital, has been spent on the Blackrod Phase 1 development since sanction with a peak annual investment of USD 351 million incurred in 2024. Significant progress has been made across all key scopes of the project including but not limited to: detailed engineering, procurement, fabrication, drilling, construction, third party transport pipelines, commissioning and operations planning. Site health and safety control has been excellent with zero lost time incidents since commercial development activities commenced.

Looking forward, USD 230 million is planned to be spent in 2025 mainly relating to advancing the remaining fabrication, construction and substantial completion of the Central Processing Facility (CPF) for the Phase 1 development. The remaining growth capital expenditure to first oil is forecast to be spent in 2026 on drilling, completions and commissioning of the CPF with first steam anticipated by end Q1 2026.

IPC is strongly positioned to deliver within plan with a clear line of sight to start-up. The Blackrod Phase 1 project is expected to generate significant value for all our stakeholders. And with over 1 billion barrels of best estimate contingent resources (unrisked) beyond Phase 1, IPC is pleased to announce a resource maturation plan that sees significant volume maturation into reserves through low cost of less than USD 0.15 per barrel. The 2P reserves attributable to Phase 1 has increased by 40 MMboe to 259 MMboe from year end 2023 to year end 2024.⁽²⁾

As at the end of 2024, 70% of the Blackrod Phase 1 development capital had been spent since the project sanction in early 2023. All major work streams are progressing as planned and the focus continues to be on executing the detailed sequencing of events as facility modules are safely delivered and installed at site. The total Phase 1 project guidance of USD 850 million capital expenditure to first oil in late 2026 is unchanged. IPC intends to fund the remaining Blackrod Phase 1 development costs with forecast cash flow generated by its operations and cash on hand.

Stakeholder Returns: Normal Course Issuer Bid

During the period of December 5, 2023 to December 4, 2024, IPC purchased and cancelled an aggregate of approximately 8.3 million common shares under the 2023/2024 NCIB. The average price of shares purchased under the 2023/2024 NCIB was SEK 131 / CAD 17 per share.

In Q4 2024, IPC announced the renewal of the NCIB, with the ability to repurchase up to approximately 7.5 million common shares over the period of December 5, 2024 to December 4, 2025. Under the 2024/2025 NCIB, IPC repurchased and cancelled approximately 0.8 million common shares in December 2024. By the end of January 2025, IPC repurchased for cancellation over 1.4 million common shares under the 2024/2025 NCIB. The average price of common shares purchased under the 2024/2025 NCIB during December 2024 and January 2025 was SEK 135 / CAD 17.5 per share.

As at February 7, 2025, IPC had a total of 117,781,927 common shares issued and outstanding, of which IPC holds 508,853 common shares in treasury.

Under the 2024/2025 NCIB, IPC may purchase and cancel a further 5.3 million common shares by December 4, 2025. This would result in the cancellation of 6.2% of shares outstanding as at the beginning of December 2024. IPC continues to believe that reducing the number of shares outstanding while in parallel investing in material production growth at Blackrod will prove to be a winning formula for our stakeholders.

Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) Performance

As part of IPC’s commitment to operational excellence and responsible development, IPC’s objective is to reduce risk and eliminate hazards to prevent occurrence of accidents, ill health, and environmental damage, as these are essential to the success of our business operations. During the fourth quarter and for the full year 2024, IPC recorded no material safety or environmental incidents.

As previously announced, IPC targets a reduction of our net GHG emissions intensity by the end of 2025 to 50% of IPC’s 2019 baseline and IPC remains on track to achieve this reduction. During 2024, IPC announced the commitment to remain at end 2025 levels of 20 kg CO2/boe through to the end of 2028.⁽⁴⁾

Reserves, Resources and Value

As at the end of December 2024, IPC’s 2P reserves are 493 MMboe. During 2024, IPC replaced 251% of the annual 2024 production. The reserves life index (RLI) as at December 31, 2024, is approximately 31 years.⁽¹⁾⁽²⁾

The net present value (NPV) of IPC’s 2P reserves as at December 31, 2024 was USD 3.3 billion. IPC’s net asset value (NAV) was USD 3.1 billion or SEK 287 / CAD 37 per share as at December 31, 2024.⁽¹⁾⁽²⁾⁽⁵⁾⁽⁶⁾⁽⁷⁾

In addition, IPC’s best estimate contingent resources (unrisked) as at December 31, 2024 are 1,107 MMboe, of which 1,025 MMboe relate to future potential phases of the Blackrod project.⁽¹⁾⁽²⁾

2025 Budget and Operational Guidance

IPC is pleased to announce its 2025 average net production guidance is 43,000 to 45,000 boepd. IPC forecasts operating costs for 2025 between USD 18 and 19 per boe.⁽¹⁾⁽³⁾

IPC’s 2025 capital and decommissioning expenditure budget is USD 320 million, with USD 230 million forecast relating to Blackrod capital expenditure. The remainder of the 2025 budget in Canada includes drilling and ongoing optimization work at Onion Lake Thermal and Suffield Area assets. IPC also plans to advance the next phase of infill drilling and complete well maintenance works at the Bertam field in Malaysia. IPC expects to conduct technical studies for future development potential in France. In all of IPC’s areas of operation, IPC has significant flexibility to control its pace of spend based on the development of commodity prices during 2025.

Notwithstanding a modest production decline expected in 2025, IPC’s production per share metric remains largely unchanged relative to 2024 and 2023. IPC has prioritised capital allocation to the transformational Blackrod Phase 1 development and share buybacks as opposed to further increasing its base business investment to preserve balance sheet strength and maximise long- term shareholder value.

Further details regarding IPC’s proposed 2025 budget and operational guidance will be provided at IPC’s Capital Markets Day presentation to be held on February 11, 2025 at 15:00 CET. A copy of the Capital Markets Day presentation will be available on IPC’s website at www.international-petroleum.com.

Notes:

(1) See “Supplemental Information regarding Product Types” in “Reserves and Resources Advisory” below. See also the material change report (MCR) available on IPC’s website at www.international-petroleum.com and filed on the date of this press release under IPC’s profile on SEDAR+ at www.sedarplus.ca.
(2) See “Reserves and Resources Advisory“ below. Further information with respect to IPC’s reserves, contingent resources and estimates of future net revenue, including assumptions relating to the calculation of NPV, are described in the MCR. The reserve life index (RLI) is calculated by dividing the 2P reserves of 493 MMboe as at December 31, 2024 by the mid-point of the 2025 CMD production guidance of 43,000 to 45,000 boepd. Reserves replacement ratio is based on 2P reserves of 468 boe as at December 31, 2024, sales production during 2024 of 16.6 MMboe, net additions to 2P reserves during 2024 of 41.7 MMboe, and 2P reserves of 493 MMboe as at December 31, 2024.
(3) Non-IFRS measure, see “Non-IFRS Measures” below and in the MD&A.
(4) Emissions intensity is the ratio between oil and gas production and the associated carbon emissions, and net emissions intensity reflects gross emissions less operational emission reductions and carbon offsets.
(5) Net present value (NPV) is after tax, discounted at 10% and based upon the forecast prices and other assumptions further described in the MCR. See “Reserves and Resources Advisory” below.
(6) Net asset value (NAV) is calculated as NPV less net debt of USD 209 million as at December 31, 2024.
(7) NAV per share is based on 119,059,315 IPC common shares as at December 31, 2024, being 119,169,471 common shares outstanding less 110,156 common shares held in treasury and cancelled in January 2025. NAV per share is not predictive and may not be reflective of current or future market prices for IPC common shares.
(8) Estimated FCF generation is based on IPC’s current business plans over the periods of 2025 to 2029 and 2030 to 2034, including net debt of USD 209 million as at December 31, 2024, with assumptions based on the reports of IPC’s independent reserves evaluators, and including certain corporate adjustments relating to estimated general and administration costs and hedging, and excluding shareholder distributions and financing costs. Assumptions include average net production of approximately 57 Mboepd over the period of 2025 to 2029, average net production of approximately 63 Mboepd over the period of 2030 to 2034, average Brent oil prices of USD 75 to 95 per bbl escalating by 2% per year, and average Brent to Western Canadian Select differentials and average gas prices as estimated by IPC’s independent reserves evaluator and as further described in the MCR. IPC’s market capitalization is at close on January 31, 2025 (USD 1,557 million based on 146.8 SEK/share, 117.7 million IPC shares outstanding (net of treasury shares) and exchange rate of 11.10 SEK/USD). IPC’s current business plans and assumptions, and the business environment, are subject to change. Actual results may differ materially from forward-looking estimates and forecasts. See “Forward-Looking Statements” and “Non-IFRS Measures” below.

International Petroleum Corp. (IPC) is an international oil and gas exploration and production company with a high quality portfolio of assets located in Canada, Malaysia and France, providing a solid foundation for organic and inorganic growth. IPC is a member of the Lundin Group of Companies. IPC is incorporated in Canada and IPC’s shares are listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) and the Nasdaq Stockholm exchange under the symbol “IPCO”.

For further information, please contact:

Rebecca Gordon SVP Corporate Planning and Investor Relations rebecca.gordon@international-petroleum.com Tel: +41 22 595 10 50		Or		Robert Eriksson Media Manager reriksson@rive6.ch Tel: +46 701 11 26 15

This information is information that International Petroleum Corporation is required to make public pursuant to the EU Market Abuse Regulation and the Securities Markets Act. The information was submitted for publication, through the contact persons set out above, at 07:30 CET on February 11, 2025. The Corporation’s audited condensed consolidated financial statements (Financial Statements) and management’s discussion and analysis (MD&A) for the three months and year ended December 31, 2024 have been filed on SEDAR+ (www.sedarplus.ca) and are also available on the Corporation’s website (www.international-petroleum.com).

Forward-Looking Statements
This press release contains statements and information which constitute “forward-looking statements” or “forward-looking information” (within the meaning of applicable securities legislation). Such statements and information (together, “forward-looking statements”) relate to future events, including the Corporation’s future performance, business prospects or opportunities. Actual results may differ materially from those expressed or implied by forward-looking statements. The forward-looking statements contained in this press release are expressly qualified by this cautionary statement. Forward-looking statements speak only as of the date of this press release, unless otherwise indicated. IPC does not intend, and does not assume any obligation, to update these forward-looking statements, except as required by applicable laws.

All statements other than statements of historical fact may be forward-looking statements. Any statements that express or involve discussions with respect to predictions, expectations, beliefs, plans, projections, forecasts, guidance, budgets, objectives, assumptions or future events or performance (often, but not always, using words or phrases such as “seek”, “anticipate”, “plan”, “continue”, “estimate”, “expect”, “may”, “will”, “project”, “forecast”, “predict”, “potential”, “targeting”, “intend”, “could”, “might”, “should”, “believe”, “budget” and similar expressions) are not statements of historical fact and may be “forward-looking statements”.

Forward-looking statements include, but are not limited to, statements with respect to:

2025 production ranges (including total daily average production), production composition, cash flows, operating costs and capital and decommissioning expenditure estimates;
Estimates of future production, cash flows, operating costs and capital expenditures that are based on IPC’s current business plans and assumptions regarding the business environment, which are subject to change;
IPC’s financial and operational flexibility to navigate the Corporation through periods of volatile commodity prices;
The ability to fully fund future expenditures from cash flows and current borrowing capacity;
IPC’s intention and ability to continue to implement its strategies to build long-term shareholder value;
The ability of IPC’s portfolio of assets to provide a solid foundation for organic and inorganic growth;
The continued facility uptime and reservoir performance in IPC’s areas of operation;
Development of the Blackrod project in Canada, including estimates of resource volumes, future production, timing, regulatory approvals, third party commercial arrangements, breakeven oil prices and net present values;
Current and future production performance, operations and development potential of the Onion Lake Thermal, Suffield, Brooks, Ferguson and Mooney operations, including the timing and success of future oil and gas drilling and optimization programs;
The potential improvement in the Canadian oil egress situation and IPC’s ability to benefit from any such improvements;
The ability of IPC to achieve and maintain current and forecast production in France and Malaysia;
The intention and ability of IPC to acquire further common shares under the NCIB, including the timing of any such purchases;
The return of value to IPC’s shareholders as a result of the NCIB;
IPC’s ability to implement its GHG emissions intensity and climate strategies and to achieve its net GHG emissions intensity reduction targets;
IPC’s ability to implement projects to reduce net emissions intensity, including potential carbon capture and storage;
Estimates of reserves and contingent resources;
The ability to generate free cash flows and use that cash to repay debt;
IPC’s continued access to its existing credit facilities, including current financial headroom, on terms acceptable to the Corporation;
IPC’s ability to identify and complete future acquisitions;
Expectations regarding the oil and gas industry in Canada, Malaysia and France, including assumptions regarding future royalty rates, regulatory approvals, legislative changes, and ongoing projects and their expected completion; and
Future drilling and other exploration and development activities.

Statements relating to “reserves” and “contingent resources” are also deemed to be forward-looking statements, as they involve the implied assessment, based on certain estimates and assumptions, that the reserves and resources described exist in the quantities predicted or estimated and that the reserves and resources can be profitably produced in the future. Ultimate recovery of reserves or resources is based on forecasts of future results, estimates of amounts not yet determinable and assumptions of management.

Although IPC believes that the expectations and assumptions on which such forward-looking statements are based are reasonable, undue reliance should not be placed on the forward-looking statements because IPC can give no assurances that they will prove to be correct. Since forward-looking statements address future events and conditions, by their very nature they involve inherent risks and uncertainties. Actual results could differ materially from those currently anticipated due to a number of factors and risks.

These include, but are not limited to general global economic, market and business conditions, the risks associated with the oil and gas industry in general such as operational risks in development, exploration and production; delays or changes in plans with respect to exploration or development projects or capital expenditures; the uncertainty of estimates and projections relating to reserves, resources, production, revenues, costs and expenses; health, safety and environmental risks; commodity price fluctuations; interest rate and exchange rate fluctuations; marketing and transportation; loss of markets; environmental and climate-related risks; competition; incorrect assessment of the value of acquisitions; failure to complete or realize the anticipated benefits of acquisitions or dispositions; the ability to access sufficient capital from internal and external sources; failure to obtain required regulatory and other approvals; and changes in legislation, including but not limited to tax laws, royalties, environmental and abandonment regulations.

Additional information on these and other factors that could affect IPC, or its operations or financial results, are included in the MD&A (See “Risk Factors”, “Cautionary Statement Regarding Forward-Looking Information” and “Reserves and Resources Advisory” therein), the Corporation’s material change report dated February 11, 2025 (MCR), the Corporation’s Annual Information Form (AIF) for the year ended December 31, 2023, (See “Cautionary Statement Regarding Forward-Looking Information”, “Reserves and Resources Advisory” and “Risk Factors”) and other reports on file with applicable securities regulatory authorities, including previous financial reports, management’s discussion and analysis and material change reports, which may be accessed through the SEDAR+ website (www.sedarplus.ca) or IPC’s website (www.international-petroleum.com).

Management of IPC approved the production, operating costs, operating cash flow, capital and decommissioning expenditures and free cash flow guidance and estimates contained herein as of the date of this press release. The purpose of these guidance and estimates is to assist readers in understanding IPC’s expected and targeted financial results, and this information may not be appropriate for other purposes.

Estimated FCF generation is based on IPC’s current business plans over the periods of 2025 to 2029 and 2030 to 2034, including net debt of USD 209 million as at December 31, 2024, with assumptions based on the reports of IPC’s independent reserves evaluators, and including certain corporate adjustments relating to estimated general and administration costs and hedging, and excluding shareholder distributions and financing costs. Assumptions include average net production of approximately 57 Mboepd over the period of 2025 to 2029, average net production of approximately 63 Mboepd over the period of 2030 to 2034, average Brent oil prices of USD 75 to 95 per bbl escalating by 2% per year, and average Brent to Western Canadian Select differentials and average gas prices as estimated by IPC’s independent reserves evaluator and as further described in the MCR. IPC’s current business plans and assumptions, and the business environment, are subject to change. Actual results may differ materially from forward-looking estimates and forecasts.

Non-IFRS Measures
References are made in this press release to “operating cash flow” (OCF), “free cash flow” (FCF), “Earnings Before Interest, Tax, Depreciation and Amortization” (EBITDA), “operating costs” and “net debt”/”net cash”, which are not generally accepted accounting measures under International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and do not have any standardized meaning prescribed by IFRS and, therefore, may not be comparable with similar measures presented by other public companies. Non-IFRS measures should not be considered in isolation or as a substitute for measures prepared in accordance with IFRS.

The definition of each non-IFRS measure is presented in IPC’s MD&A (See “Non-IFRS Measures” therein).

Operating cash flow
The following table sets out how operating cash flow is calculated from figures shown in the Financial Statements:

	Three months ended December 31				Year ended December 31
USD Thousands	2024		2023		2024		2023
Revenue	199,124		198,460		797,783		853,906
Production costs and net sales of diluent to third party¹	(119,371	)	(126,414	)	(447,481	)	(491,303	)
Current tax	(1,595	)	1,588		(8,313	)	(14,457	)
Operating cash flow	78,158		73,634		341,989		348,146

¹ Include net sales of diluent to third party amounting to USD 737 thousand for the fourth quarter of 2024 and the year ended December 31, 2024.

The operating cash flow for the year ended December 31, 2023 including the operating cash flow contribution of the Brooks assets acquisition from the effective date of January 1, 2023 to the completion date of March 3, 2023 amounted to USD 353,048 thousand.

Free cash flow
The following table sets out how free cash flow is calculated from figures shown in the Financial Statements:

	Three months ended December 31				Year ended December 31
USD Thousands	2024		2023		2024		2023
Operating cash flow – see above	78,158		73,634		341,989		348,146
Capital expenditures	(126,256	)	(128,825	)	(434,713	)	(312,729	)
Abandonment and farm-in expenditures¹	(3,364	)	(1,516	)	(8,302	)	(9,199	)
General, administration and depreciation expenses before depreciation²	(3,569	)	(5,762	)	(14,814	)	(16,886	)
Cash financial items³	(6,445	)	(2,219	)	(19,657	)	(5,812	)
Free cash flow	(61,476	)	(64,688	)	(135,497	)	3,520

¹ See note 19 to the Financial Statements
² Depreciation is not specifically disclosed in the Financial Statements
³ See notes 5 and 6 to the Financial Statements

The free cash flow for the year ended December 31, 2023 including the free cash flow contribution of the Brooks assets acquisition from the effective date of January 1, 2023 to the completion date of March 3, 2023 amounted to USD 2,689 thousand. Free cash flow is before shareholder distributions and financing costs.

EBITDA
The following table sets out the reconciliation from net result from the consolidated statement of operations to EBITDA:

	Three months ended December 31				Year ended December 31
USD Thousands	2024		2023		2024		2023
Net result	415		29,710		102,219		172,979
Net financial items	35,767		6,509		59,709		22,736
Income tax	3,852		4,691		33,325		55,362
Depletion and decommissioning costs	32,087		30,434		128,392		101,922
Depreciation of other tangible fixed assets	2,430		1,309		8,933		7,812
Exploration and business development costs	1,725		348		2,069		2,355
Depreciation included in general, administration and depreciation expenses¹	308		389		1,241		1,569
Sale of assets²	(400	)	(7,106	)	(400	)	(19,018	)
EBITDA	76,814		66,284		335,488		345,717

¹ Item is not shown in the Financial Statements
² Sale of assets is included under “Other income/(expense)” but not specifically disclosed in the Financial Statements

The EBITDA for the year ended December 31, 2023 including the EBITDA contribution of the Brooks assets acquisition from the effective date of January 1, 2023 to the completion date of March 3, 2023 amounted to USD 350,618 thousand.

Operating costs
The following table sets out how operating costs is calculated:

	Three months ended December 31				Year ended December 31
USD Thousands	2024		2023		2024		2023
Production costs	120,108		126,414		448,218		491,303
Cost of blending	(36,036	)	(44,473	)	(152,735	)	(172,996	)
Change in inventory position	(4,633	)	1,427		(1,473	)	3,655
Operating costs	79,439		83,368		294,010		321,962

The operating costs for the year ended December 31, 2023 including the operating costs contribution of the Brooks assets acquisition from the effective date of January 1, 2023 to the completion date of March 3, 2023 amounted to USD 328,763 thousand.

Net cash / (debt)
The following table sets out how net cash / (debt) is calculated from figures shown in the Financial Statements:

USD Thousands	December 31, 2024		December 31, 2023
Bank loans	(5,121	)	(9,031	)
Bonds¹	(450,000	)	(450,000	)
Cash and cash equivalents	246,593		517,074
Net cash / (debt)	(208,528	)	58,043

¹ The bond amount represents the redeemable value at maturity (February 2027).

Reserves and Resources Advisory
This press release contains references to estimates of gross and net reserves and resources attributed to the Corporation’s oil and gas assets. For additional information with respect to such reserves and resources, refer to “Reserves and Resources Advisory” in the MD&A and the MCR. Light, medium and heavy crude oil reserves/resources disclosed in this press release include solution gas and other by-products. Also see “Supplemental Information regarding Product Types” below.

Reserve estimates, contingent resource estimates and estimates of future net revenue in respect of IPC’s oil and gas assets in Canada are effective as of December 31, 2024, and are included in the reports prepared by Sproule Associates Limited (Sproule), an independent qualified reserves evaluator, in accordance with National Instrument 51-101 – Standards of Disclosure for Oil and Gas Activities (NI 51-101) and the Canadian Oil and Gas Evaluation Handbook (the COGE Handbook) and using Sproule’s December 31, 2024 price forecasts.

Reserve estimates, contingent resource estimates and estimates of future net revenue in respect of IPC’s oil and gas assets in France and Malaysia are effective as of December 31, 2024, and are included in the report prepared by ERC Equipoise Ltd. (ERCE), an independent qualified reserves auditor, in accordance with NI 51-101 and the COGE Handbook, and using Sproule’s December 31, 2024 price forecasts.

The price forecasts used in the Sproule and ERCE reports are available on the website of Sproule (sproule.com) and are contained in the MCR. These price forecasts are as at December 31, 2024 and may not be reflective of current and future forecast commodity prices.

The reserve life index (RLI) is calculated by dividing the 2P reserves of 493 MMboe as at December 31, 2024 by the mid-point of the 2025 CMD production guidance of 43,000 to 45,000 boepd. Reserves replacement ratio is based on 2P reserves of 468 MMboe as at December 31, 2023, sales production during 2024 of 16.6 MMboe, net additions to 2P reserves during 2024 of 41.7 MMboe and 2P reserves of 493 MMboe as at December 31, 2024.

The reserves and resources information and data provided in this press release present only a portion of the disclosure required under NI 51-101. All of the required information will be contained in the Corporation’s Annual Information Form for the year ended December 31, 2024, which will be filed on SEDAR+ (accessible at www.sedarplus.ca) on or before April 1, 2025. Further information with respect to IPC’s reserves, contingent resources and estimates of future net revenue, including assumptions relating to the calculation of net present value and other relevant information related to the contingent resources disclosed, is disclosed in the MCR available under IPC’s profile on www.sedarplus.ca and on IPC’s website at www.international-petroleum.com.

IPC uses the industry-accepted standard conversion of six thousand cubic feet of natural gas to one barrel of oil (6 Mcf = 1 bbl). A BOE conversion ratio of 6:1 is based on an energy equivalency conversion method primarily applicable at the burner tip and does not represent a value equivalency at the wellhead. As the value ratio between natural gas and crude oil based on the current prices of natural gas and crude oil is significantly different from the energy equivalency of 6:1, utilizing a 6:1 conversion basis may be misleading as an indication of value.

Supplemental Information regarding Product Types

The following table is intended to provide supplemental information about the product type composition of IPC’s net average daily production figures provided in this press release:

	Heavy Crude Oil (Mbopd)	Light and Medium Crude Oil (Mbopd)	Conventional Natural Gas (per day)	Total (Mboepd)
Three months ended
December 31, 2024	24.3	7.1	95.9 MMcf (16.0 Mboe)	47.4
December 31, 2023	25.7	6.6	103.8 MMcf (17.3 Mboe)	49.6
Year ended
December 31, 2024	23.9	7.7	95.1 MMcf (15.8 Mboe)	47.4
December 31, 2023	25.8	8.1	102.8 MMcf (17.1 Mboe)	51.1

This press release also makes reference to IPC’s forecast total average daily production of 43,000 to 45,000 boepd for 2025. IPC estimates that approximately 55% of that production will be comprised of heavy oil, approximately 12% will be comprised of light and medium crude oil and approximately 33% will be comprised of conventional natural gas.

Currency
All dollar amounts in this press release are expressed in United States dollars, except where otherwise noted. References herein to USD mean United States dollars. References herein to CAD mean Canadian dollars.

The MIL Network –

February 11, 2025

MIL-Evening Report: Whether we carve out an exemption or not, Trump’s latest tariffs will still hit Australia

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Scott French, Senior Lecturer in Economics, UNSW Sydney

US President Donald Trump and Prime Minister Anthony Albanese have stated an exemption for Australia from Trump’s executive order placing 25% tariffs on all steel and aluminium imported into the US is “under consideration”. But prospects remain uncertain.

Albanese would do well to secure an exemption using similar arguments as then-Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull did in 2018.

If Australia cannot obtain a carve-out from the tariffs, the main group affected will be the Australian producers of steel and aluminium. But the size of the hit they will take is difficult to predict.

Regardless of whether Australia gets an exemption, the world economy – and Australians – will be affected by Trump’s latest round of tariffs.

Producers will be hit

If ultimately imposed by the US, these tariffs will make steel and aluminium produced in Australia more expensive for US manufacturers relative to domestically produced alternatives. This will certainly result in reduced demand for the Australian products.

However, three factors will help limit the effects:

1. The price of metals produced in the US will rise

It will take time to ramp up US production to fill the gap of reduced imports, and the extra production will likely come from less efficient domestic producers. This means that US manufacturers will continue to buy imported metals, despite the higher prices.

2. The US is not a huge market for Australian steel and aluminium

Australia produced A$113 billion of primary and fabricated metal in the 2022-23 financial year, according to the ABS.

By comparison, less than $1 billion of steel and aluminium was exported to the US in 2023, according to data from UN Comtrade, consisting of about $500 million of aluminium and less then $400 million of steel. Exports to the US account for about 10% of Australia’s total exports of these metals.

3. Major markets

If major markets such as China and the European Union enact retaliatory tariffs on US metals, this could make Australian metals more competitive in these markets.

Some stand to benefit

While workers in Australian steel and aluminium plants will be watching the news with trepidation, some of Australia’s biggest manufacturing companies may be less concerned.

For example, BlueScope Steel has significant US steel operations, and saw its share price increase on news of the tariffs.

US-based Alcoa, which owns alumina refineries in Western Australia and an aluminium smelter in Victoria, will also expect to see its US operations benefit.

And Rio Tinto will be most concerned about its substantial Canadian operations. Its Canadian hub is responsible for close to half of its global aluminium production.

Demand for iron ore could fall

The US tariffs will also have wider ranging effects on the Australian economy, regardless of whether Australia’s products are directly targeted.

While aluminium is Australia’s top manufacturing export, it still makes up only about 1% of total exports, and steel makes up less than half that.

Iron ore, by contrast, makes up more than 20% of Australia’s exports, with aluminium ores making up an additional 1.5%.

This means the effect of the tariffs on demand for the raw materials to make steel and aluminium may have the largest detrimental effect on the Australian economy.

Because the tariffs will make steel and aluminium more expensive to US manufacturers, they will seek to reduce their use of them. This means global demand for the metals, and the ores used to produce them, will decline.

Investors appear to be betting on this, with shares of Australian miners like Rio Tinto and BHP falling since Trump announced the tariffs.

Imported goods will become more expensive

Many of the things Australians buy are likely to get more expensive.

All US products that use steel and aluminium at any stage of the production process will also become more expensive. Tariffs will raise the cost of steel and aluminium for US manufacturers, both directly and by reducing overall productivity in the US.

About 11% of Australia’s imports come from the US. And about half of this consists of machinery, vehicles, aircraft, and medical instruments, which typically contain steel and aluminium. Further, these goods are used by manufacturers around the world to produce and transport many of the other things Australians buy.

Scott French does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Whether we carve out an exemption or not, Trump’s latest tariffs will still hit Australia – https://theconversation.com/whether-we-carve-out-an-exemption-or-not-trumps-latest-tariffs-will-still-hit-australia-249493

MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

February 11, 2025
MIL-OSI China: French PM survives another no-confidence vote

Source: China State Council Information Office

French Prime Minister Francois Bayrou delivers his general policy speech at the National Assembly in Paris, France, on Jan. 14, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]

French Prime Minister Francois Bayrou survived another no-confidence vote on Monday, initiated by the hard-left party La France Insoumise (LFI).

Lacking support from its ally, the Socialist Party (PS), or the far-right National Rally (RN), the motion received only 115 votes – far below the 289 needed to remove Bayrou, according to National Assembly Speaker Yael Braun-Pivet.

On Feb. 5, after surviving two no-confidence votes, Bayrou once again invoked his special constitutional power to push through the second part of the Social Security financing bill. In response, LFI filed the latest no-confidence motion, which was put to a vote on Monday.

Shortly after the vote’s failure, Bayrou again invoked Article 49.3 of the French Constitution to bypass parliament and force through the “spending” section of the Social Security financing bill for 2025.

According to Le Figaro, the bill includes a 2.6 percent increase in health spending, bringing the total to 264.2 billion euros (272 billion U.S. dollars).

Bayrou was appointed prime minister by French President Emmanuel Macron on Dec. 13 after Michel Barnier was ousted in a no-confidence vote. (1 euro = 1.03 U.S. dollar)

MIL OSI China News –

February 11, 2025
MIL-OSI China: Europe vows to defend interests amid new US tariff threats

Source: China State Council Information Office

Flags of the European Union fly outside the Berlaymont Building, the European Commission headquarters, in Brussels, Belgium, Jan. 29, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]

The European Commission on Monday rejected the rationale for new U.S. tariffs on European exports, vowing to protect businesses, workers, and consumers across the bloc.

The statement came after U.S. President Donald Trump threatened to impose 25-percent tariffs on all steel and aluminum imports, reigniting fears of a transatlantic trade war.

European Union (EU) leaders swiftly condemned the proposed tariffs, which are expected to be formally announced later on Monday. The Commission said there is “no justification” for the U.S. measures, calling them unlawful and economically harmful, particularly given the deeply integrated EU-U.S. supply and production chains.

With European leaders signaling their readiness to retaliate, concerns are growing that the looming trade dispute could strain economic ties and disrupt global markets.

Tariffs could backfire

The European Commission, the EU’s executive body, strongly criticized the proposed tariffs, warning they would ultimately hurt U.S. businesses and consumers.

“Tariffs are essentially taxes,” it said in a statement, emphasizing that the move would increase costs for American companies, drive inflation, heighten economic uncertainty, and disrupt global market integration. Given the deep interdependence between European and American industries, the EU warned that such measures would be counterproductive, effectively imposing taxes on U.S. citizens as well.

European officials fear a repeat of 2018, when Trump’s previous steel and aluminum tariffs triggered swift EU retaliation. At the time, Brussels imposed countermeasures on U.S. goods such as whiskey, motorcycles, and orange juice.

With the formal announcement of the new U.S. tariffs expected later on Monday, European leaders are bracing for another escalation in trade tensions.

EU weighs retaliation

France was among the first to respond to Trump’s tariff threat, with Foreign Minister Jean-Noel Barrot warning on Monday that the EU would retaliate if the proposed tariffs take effect.

“There is no hesitation when it comes to defending our interests,” Barrot told French television TF1, recalling how the EU countered similar tariffs in 2018 and vowing to take the same approach if necessary.

Germany, Europe’s largest economy, is also preparing for action. A spokesperson for the German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action stated that while the EU and Germany are working to prevent the tariffs, they stand ready to implement countermeasures if needed.

During a televised debate on Sunday ahead of upcoming elections, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz warned that the EU could “act within an hour” if Trump proceeds with tariffs on European goods.

Industry leaders are also pushing for a firm response. Gunnar Groebler, president of the German Steel Association, urged the EU to react in a “united, strategic, and swift manner” to counter the tariff threat. “The U.S. is the largest buyer of European steel, importing around 1 million tonnes of mostly special steels from Germany alone each year,” he noted.

A lose-lose scenario

French President Emmanuel Macron cautioned that tariffs on EU goods would not be in the interests of the United States.

“If Washington imposes tariffs across multiple sectors, it will drive up the cost of goods and fuel inflation in the United States,” Macron said, pointing out that European savings play a crucial role in financing the U.S. economy.

Economic experts share Macron’s concerns. Paul Johnson, director of the London-based Institute for Fiscal Studies, warned that Trump’s planned tariffs could push up interest rates worldwide, having ripple effects on global monetary policy.

“It is going to create additional inflation, at the very least, in the United States, and that will have knock-on effects globally, particularly on interest rates,” Johnson explained.

Ferdinand Dudenhoeffer, a German automotive expert, argued that Trump is leveraging economic power to siphon off jobs and prosperity from other countries through his tariff policies. “He knows no friends or enemies. Even U.S. car manufacturers GM and Ford would suffer considerably from tariffs on cars from Canada and Mexico,” he said.

Dudenhoeffer noted that U.S. net vehicle imports totaled 5.6 million units in 2024. “Trump might ask how many jobs could be created if all these vehicles were produced domestically,” he said.

Despite the growing alarm, some analysts hold that the impact of Trump’s tariffs may be limited. Christian Helmenstein, chief economist of the Federation of Austrian Industries, described Trump’s plan as an “unfriendly pinprick” but not a severe blow.

He told the Austrian newspaper Kurier that the U.S. imports about a quarter of its steel needs, with much of it coming from Canada, Brazil, Mexico, and South Korea rather than Europe.

But Harald Oberhofer, an economist at the Austrian Institute of Economic Research, described Trump’s tariff plans as “an economically high-risk game.”

He pointed out that the United States was Austria’s largest export growth market last year amid weak overall exports and a trade war could further weaken Austria’s already fragile economy, which is projected to grow by just 0.6 percent this year.

As Trump moves closer to making his tariff announcement official, European leaders are making their stance clear: if the U.S. imposes new trade barriers, the EU stands ready to defend its economic interests with countermeasures.

MIL OSI China News –

February 11, 2025
MIL-OSI China: China’s Spring Festival spending spree fuels global business growth

Source: China State Council Information Office

On a balmy afternoon on the first day of the Chinese Spring Festival, a queue of nearly 40 people, over half of them being Chinese tourists, snaked around the plain ice cream stall of “Uncle Chieng” on Orchard Road, Singapore.

“Recently, more than half of the customers are Chinese tourists. Around the Spring Festival, I sell about 20 percent more ice cream each day compared to usual,” said Chieng Puay Chui, owner of the stall, which has become one of the must-visit spots for Chinese tourists.

This scene is just a microcosm of the vibrant Spring Festival celebrations that have swept China and beyond, the first Lunar New Year festivities after the Spring Festival was added to UNESCO’s intangible cultural heritage list.

The festival, which falls on Jan. 29 this year, with week-long nationwide celebrations around the date, has not only ignited a surge in domestic consumption but also created vast opportunities for international businesses, as Chinese consumers embrace global goods and cultures.

A girl participates in activities to celebrate the Chinese New Year in London, Britain, on Feb. 2, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]

Global goods, local celebrations

The Spring Festival, a time for family reunion and feasting, has seen a growing appetite for “foreign New Year goods” among Chinese consumers. From French wine to Chilean cherries, global delicacies have become essential elements of the Chinese New Year shopping list.

France’s Occitanie region, renowned for its wine, has been actively promoting its produce in China through platforms like the China International Import Expo and the “From French Farms to Chinese Tables” initiative. For French wine producers, the Spring Festival is one of the best opportunities to promote their products.

“Ahead of the Chinese New Year, we organized various events to support wine producers from the Occitanie region and importers in distributing their products so that they would be available during the Spring Festival,” said Catherine Machabert, food and wine international director of the economic development agency of the Occitanie Region.

“For the Year of the Snake, distributors have prepared a variety of gift boxes featuring snake-themed designs to promote the wines,” said Machabert, adding that Occitanie has always maintained strong ties with China and recognizes the importance of the Chinese market.

Meanwhile, French confectionery giant Andros has capitalized on the festive season by launching special gift packs and organizing in-store tastings. “Our sales during this Spring Festival are expected to double compared to previous years, setting a new record,” said Maxence Zeng, general manager of Andros China.

Chilean cherries, with their vibrant red hue and symbolic association with prosperity in the Chinese culture, have also become a favorite among Chinese consumers.

China is a very important market for fresh Chilean cherries, not only because it receives more than 90 percent of total exports, “but also because of the friendly relationship that has been built between our cherries and the people of China,” said Claudia Soler, executive director of the Chilean Cherry Committee.

A poster of the animated feature “Ne Zha 2” is pictured at a cinema in Shenyang, northeast China’s Liaoning Province, Feb. 6, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]

Two-way cultural exchanges

The Spring Festival is not just about shopping and feasting; it’s also a time for travel and cultural exploration. With extended holidays and visa-free policies, Chinese tourists have been flocking to international destinations, while foreign visitors have been arriving in China to experience the festivities firsthand.

On the pristine beaches of Zanzibar, Tanzania, Chinese tourists Li Chenguang and his wife, Zhao Xue, marveled at the natural beauty surrounding them. “We can witness the Great Migration in the Serengeti, the azure waters of the Indian Ocean and even the snow-capped peaks of Mount Kilimanjaro,” Zhao exclaimed with excitement.

Meanwhile, in Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur International Airport has been bustling as Chinese tourists head to Malaysia for tropical experiences and Malaysian travelers embark on winter adventures in China. “We’re planning to visit Harbin, hike up Changbai Mountain and savor traditional northeastern dishes like Guo Bao Rou (crispy sweet and sour pork),” said Zhou Jinglang, a tour guide of a Malaysian travel agency.

According to the National Immigration Administration, China recorded 14.37 million cross-border trips during the Spring Festival holiday season, a 6.3 percent increase from a year earlier. About 1 million of these trips were made by foreign nationals, marking a 22.9 percent year-on-year rise.

Meanwhile, the 2025 Spring Festival holiday has marked a new milestone for China’s thriving film industry, with box office revenue soaring to an unprecedented 9.51 billion yuan (approximately 1.33 billion U.S. dollars) between Jan. 28 and Feb. 4, according to the China Film Administration.

A staggering 187 million moviegoers flocked to cinemas throughout the holiday week, setting new all-time highs in both box office earnings and audience turnout.

Released on Jan. 29, the first day of Chinese New Year, Chinese animated blockbuster “Ne Zha 2” has shattered multiple box office records, becoming the first film to cross 1 billion dollars in a single market and the first non-Hollywood title to join the coveted billion-dollar club.

Customers select newly arrived Chilean cherries at a supermarket in Tianjin, north China, Dec. 26, 2024. [Photo/Xinhua]

Vast business opportunities

The Spring Festival consumption boom has not only showcased the resilience and vitality of China’s economy but also highlighted the potential for international collaboration. From French dairy products to Chilean cherries, foreign businesses are eager to tap into the vast Chinese market and capitalize on emerging consumer trends.

“Occitanie has always maintained strong ties with China and recognizes the importance of the Chinese market. With its Shanghai office, the regional agency will continue to support wine, agri-food, and cosmetics companies in entering or expanding in the Chinese market,” said Machabert, the trade official of the Occitanie Region.

Meanwhile, Herve Lanoe, chief executive officer of French dairy company Fit Group, noted that Chinese consumers are increasingly prioritizing quality and health. “Butter with a protected designation of origin is highly appreciated by our Chinese client,” he said, adding that the company will try to take advantage of this opportunity.

Over the years, Garces Fruit, Chile’s largest cherry exporter, has been actively expanding its presence in China. “The Chinese market is fundamental for the trade of Chilean cherries,” said Hernan Garces Gazmuri, the export manager of Garces Fruit.

“It is a clear example of win-win,” said Garces Gazmuri, who settled in China in 2017 and opened an office in 2018. “It produces a lot of employment, from the harvests, the packaging, all this positive dynamic is generated thanks to the Chinese market. This industry does not exist without China.”

“We want to continue to explore the market, developing e-commerce and boosting our Garces Fruit brand. I think there is a lot to do,” he said.

MIL OSI China News –

February 11, 2025

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