Category: France

MIL-OSI USA News: Remarks by President Biden on Lowering the Cost of Prescription Drugs | Concord, NH

Source: The White House

NHTI Community College
Concord, New Hampshire

4:14 P.M. EDT

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you, everyone. Thank you, thank you, thank you. (Applause.)

What’s your name?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: (Inaudible.)

THE PRESIDENT: Oh, is that right?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: (Inaudible.)

THE PRESIDENT: All right. Well, thanks for being here.

Have a seat, everyone.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you, Joe!

THE PRESIDENT: (Laughs.) Well, thank you.

Look, Lauren, thanks for that introduction and for sharing your story. Unfortunately, there are too many stories like yours all across America. Sadly, it’s a familiar one to many Americans.

People lay in bed at night, literally, staring at the ceiling, wondering what would happen if their spouse became seriously ill or got cancer, if their child gets sick, or if something happens to you. Do you have enough insurance? Can you afford the medical bills? Will you have to sell the house? Will you have to get a mortgage? “How in God’s name are we going to pay for those prescriptions? Prescription drugs are so damn high.”

And you find out a big reason why you’re lying awake at night and asking these questions is because Big Pharma is charging you exorbitant prices for the prescriptions you may badly need — literally, higher prices than anywhere in the world — and that’s not hyperbole; it’s a fact — anywhere in the world.

I’ve been fighting, like others, Big Pharma since I was a United States senator, back in the days when we were told they couldn’t be touched. They had an exemption basically. Unlike other parts of the health care system, Big Pharma got a special cut- — carveout that prevented Medicare from negotiating prescription drug prices with them. They weren’t allowed to do that.

For years, advocates, like many of you here today, have worked tirelessly to change that and to give Medicare the power to lower prescription drug prices, just like the Department of Veterans Affairs was able to do for veterans. Same power. And it matters. It matters a lot.

That’s why one of the proudest things I’ve ever done was pass the Inflation Reduction Act that allowed us to negotiate lower prices for prescription drugs. Not a single Republican voted for this — not one single Republican in the House or Senate voted. Not one.

But thanks to the Inflation Reduction Act, we finally beat Big Pharma — in no small part because of your delegation. Not a joke. (Applause.)

Because of partners like Senator Jeanne Shaheen and — I tell you what, she’s got a special secret weapon, Billy — (laughter) — you want to be in a foxhole, man, you want Billy in that foxhole with you, man — and Maggie Hassan; Representative Annie — Annie Kuster; and especially Senator Bernie Sanders from Vermont.

That’s why we’re here today, to talk about a law that Democrats passed and is lowering prescription drug prices and — I might add, and I’ll explain in a moment — saving the taxpayers billions of dollars. Not just the individual recipients of the — the benefit, the taxpayers.

Americans pay more for prescription drugs, as has been pointed by Bernie, than any other advanced nation in the world.

I can take you to the airport and put you on Air Force One with me and take you to any pharmacy from Tor- —

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I’m in!

THE PRESIDENT: All right, man. (Laughter.) All right.

I can take you to Toronto, Canada; Paris, France; Rome, Italy; Bel- — I can take you anywhere in the world, literally, and you’ll pay half or less than you’d pay in America for the exact same drug made by the exact same pharmaceutical company. Same drug. Same pharta- — same pharmaceutical company.

But not anymore. With the help of Democrats in Congress — and Kamala, by the way, pac- — cast the tiebreaking vote to make sure it passed. (Applause.) Don’t — don’t tell me one vote doesn’t count.

He told us it would — I told them what I — when I wrote this bill that I couldn’t get it passed. We had a one-vote majority, and I mean — that it wouldn’t — never happen, but we stuck together. We finally got it done, and it was a hell of a fight.

The pharmaceutical company — as Bernie referenced, in another way — spent nearly $400 million — $400 million to defeat this single bill — $400 million — but we beat the special interests and we delivered for the American people.

Because of this law, not only could Medicare finally negotiate lower prices but it also capped prescription drug costs for seniors total — this year at $3,500 in 2024 and next — in the next six months —

By the way, in the first six months of this alone — year alone, on out-of-pocket spending, we saved the people enrolled in Medicare nearly $1 billion in six months — $1 billion less out of your pocket, nationwide, in just the first six months.

That means, as of June, 1.5 million Americans who are enrolled in Medicare hit the cap and do not have to pay a dime more for drugs for the rest of the year, no matter what their costs are.

And here — (applause) — but this is bill is so extensive people don’t fully understand it.

And guess what? Starting this January — this January, the total cap on prescription drug costs for seniors on Medicare will be even lower. It will go down to $2,000. They don’t have to pay more than $2,000, no matter what the cost of their drugs are — no matter what.

For example, as some of you unfortunately know, some of the cancer drugs can cost $10-, $12-, $15,000 a year. That’s not hyperbole. That’s a fact. This change is expected to save 19 million seniors and other people on Medicare — save them — just those ones on Medicare — $7.4 billion in out-of-pocket spending starting in January.

But here’s the deal. It’s also going to save the American taxpayers billions of dollars. I’ll go into this a little more detail, but the fact — the bill we passed — the extent of it is — guess what? — the American taxpayer is going to save $160 billion (inaudible) — (applause) — $160 billion dollars. Because they no longer have — and Medicare — have to pay $400 instead of $35 for insulin, for example.

But that’s not all. Thanks to the law I signed for — seniors are already saving on their prescription drug costs now. For example, take insulin to treat diabetes. One in ten Americans — one in ten Americans has diabetes. I’m not going to ask you if you — if you’re the one, but I bet — how many of you know someone who needs to take insulin for their diabetes? Raise your hand. So, a good c- — you know how much it costs to make that insulin? Ten dollars. T-E-N.

And you know the guy who invented it, who dis- — who discovered the prescription to do it, he made sure that he didn’t patent it, because he wanted it available for everyone — for everyone. That’s what he did. That’s what he did for everyone.

But guess what? Now they charge as much as $400 a month.

Three years ago, I was down in Northern Virginia and doing a town hall. And I met a 13-year-old boy named Joshua. He and his dad both have Type 1 diabetes, which means they needed insulin every day. I spoke with Joshua’s mom. Imagine what it’s like to look at your child — and I mean this sincerely. Think of this in personal terms. Imagine what it’s like to look at your child who needs insulin and you’re looking and know you have no idea — no idea how you’re going to pay for it. Not a joke.

One woman in that meeting said, “I have two children that need it. I have to cut their prescription in half. And some- — sometimes I have to choose which one gets the — gets insulin.”

What does that do to a parent’s dignity, their sense of self-worth, your ability to look your child in the eye — and I mean this from the bottom of my heart — look your child in the eye and say, “Honey, I’m sorry. I’m sorry.”

Or imagine the senior having to cut your pills in half, to skip doses, or forego your prescriptions altogether because you just can’t afford them.

Folks, this is the United States of America. So, when we had — when we got elected, we were told we’d never get anything done. We have a one-vote majority and h- — anyway, we’d never get anything big done. We got a hell of a lot big done. (Applause.) No — because of this group right here.

And thanks to one of those laws — (applause) — thanks to one of those laws, the Inflation Reduction Act, seniors with diabetes, as you’ve heard, now pay — and many of you know — $35 a month instead of $400 a month. Thirty- — that changes someone’s life.

Growing up with the family I grew up in, my dad used to have an expression. He’d say, “Joey, family is the” — I mean this sincerely, my word as a Biden — “family is the beginning, the middle, and the end. And everyone — everyone is entitled to be treated with dignity.”

What’s it do to a parent? What’s it do to a parent when you can’t provide something you know your child and your spouse badly needs and there’s no way you can pay for it?

But Kamala and I wanted $35 insulin for everyone — not just seniors, for everybody. (Applause.) And she’s going to get it done.

Look, folks, they’re still going to make a profit. They’re still making 350 percent profit. Costs them 10 bucks to make it. Think about that.

We’re taking on the cost of more than just insulin. Medicare, in the same bill, which people are only beginning to find out — understandably, because this bill is a bill that’s passed, but it goes on for years. Medicare is now able to negotiate lower prices for some of the costliest drugs that treat everything from heart disease to arthritis to cancer. And here’s what the law has already — we’ve already passed has done.

For the first time ever, every year from this point on — every year, calendar year — Medicare will negotiate the cost of additional prescription drugs.

Earlier this year, I announced that Medicare reached an agreement with drug manufacturers on 10 new drugs that Medicare picked and said, “We’re going to negotiate.” The most common, most expensive drugs that treat everything from kidney disease to arthritis to blood cancer and more.

These new low prices for all 10 drugs will go into effect in January 2026 and cut the prices on the — those 10 drugs by between 40 and 80 percent.

Next year — the next year, Medicare will negotiate another price — lower price for 15 additional drugs and every year ther- — thereafter until we get after 20 — and 20 drugs, until every drug is covered that’s on the market — every one. (Applause.)

It’s already passed. And, folks, it isn’t just saving seniors money. As I said, it’s also saving taxpayers billions of dollars because Medicare will no longer have to pay exorbitant prices to Pharma.

Over the next 10 years — just so far — the newer, lower drug prices and other reforms, we’ve cut the federal deficit by $160 billion, while he raised it by $200 billion. (Applause.) I’m serious. Think about it.

Look, I’m a capitalist. I was listed for 36 years as the poorest man in Congress, but I’m still a capitalist. (Laughter.) You think I’m kidding. I got a phone call; I was campaigning for a — a colleague who was — no longer around but was up in this neck of the woods, in Vermont — not Bernie but his predecessor. And I got a phone call from my wife. She said, “Joe” — well, actually, I called home. When I’m away, I’d call b- — see how the kids are doing before she goes off to teach.

I said, “Hey, Jill, how are you?” “Fine.” (Laughter.) You know you’re in trouble when you get that answer. (Laughter.) This is — I give you my word as a Biden — this is a true story.

She said, “Did you read today’s paper?” I said, “Honey, they don’t have the Wilmington News Journal up here.” (Laughter.) She said, “Well, headline: ‘Biden, Poorest Man in Congress.’ Is that true?” (Laughter.) I said, “I don’t know,” but I guess I was for 36 years. (Laughter.) I never thought — I didn’t have any money, but I had a good salary.

Look, but I’m a capitalist. (Laughs.) And without competition, it’s not capitalism; it’s exploitation. When Big Pharma doesn’t play by the rules, competitors can’t offer lower-priced drugs and devices that carry those drugs so prices stay artificially high.

And, look — but we’re taking action. For example, we called out drug companies, as Bernie mentioned, that make inhalers so the people with asthma, they — and some severe asthma — I have asthma, but it’s not severe — that they need to breathe — for charging Americans — and he was right; this was not an exaggeration — 70 times more than companies in ch- — in — in Europe charge for the same exact prescription. It’s outrageous. I think it borders on immoral.

As a result, three of the largest companies, as I skillfully and very privately and peacefully called their CEOs to tell them — (laughter) — who make these inhalers are saying that instead of charging up to $600 out of pocket for — to cap the cost at $35. And so, it’s about time.

But, again, Bernie is a big reason why this is happening. You don’t want to screw around with Bernie. (Laughter.)

But we have to do more. Bernie and I said this summer, it’s time for drug manufacturers to lower the prices on anti-obesity medications that you hear so much about these days. And, by the way, it’s not just cosmetically. It saves people’s lives, these obesity medicines. It saves their lives because of — they’re so overweight and there’s so much problems associated with it.

You just heard from Bernie about what these drug companies are doing. The prices of these o- — anti-obesity drugs can be six times higher in America than in other countries, from Canada to Sweden. This is cr- — where I come from, it’s called price gouging and corporate greed.

And I know a little about corporations. There are more corporations incorporated in Delaware than every other state in the Union combined. So, I’m used to dealing with corporations.

Americans don’t like to be played for suckers. We don’t like that. I’m — and we’re tired of it. And it’s outrageous. It’s got to stop.

Look, today’s announcement follows actions we’ve already taken to reduce the health care costs for average Americans. Because of Bernie’s leadership, we took action to reduce the cost of hearing aids for 1 million Americans by as much as $3,000. You see them advertise on television. You go for the prescription drug hearing aid, it’s $3,060 or some- — whatever the number — over 3,000 bucks. And you get the same hearing aid and you get it for $3,000 less because you don’t have to go for the prescription; you can go right to the drug — you can go to the drug store for the — right to the counter.

In addition, my administration is banning junk health insurance. These guys are get- — they’ve been co- — coming and going. There are plans for health insurance that will look affordable but then stick consumers with big, unexpected charges.

You know, we ended the — those unfair surprise medical bills. When I was — years ago, when I was in — in the Senate, and I was a — I had — I had two cranial aneurysms, and I was hospitalized for a long time. And you have what they call surprise medical bills. If the insurance you have doesn’t cover a particular provider and not in-network, they charge you significantly more. And so, you get these surprise hospital bills.

So, hospitals that are in-network can’t send you a bill for out-of-network doctors who d- — you didn’t choose and are not part of your — you didn’t n- — you never consulted them. That’s banned. I did that by executive order.

Kamala and I are also protecting and expanding the Affordable Care Act. Today, there are 21 million Americans — 21 million Americans covered by the Affordable Care Act marketplace. That’s 9 million more people, individuals, since I’ve been in office that are now covered by the Affordable Care Act.

More Americans — (applause) — more Americans have health care today than ever in American history — today — than ever. And it’s in part because I expanded tax credits that save an average of $800 per person per year, reducing health care premiums for millions of working families who have coverage under the Affordable Care Act.

These enhancements expire next year, though. And I’m calling on Congress to make the expanded health care tax credits permanent. (Applause.)

And Trump — Trump and his MAGA Republican friends want to cut the Affordable Care Act out completely. You know how many times they’ve tried to introdu- — they’ve introduced bills over the last three years to do that? Fifty-one times. Fifty-one times. He wants to replace the Affordable Care Act. We can’t let that happen.

Look, he calls — he wants to replace it with hi- — I love his — I love this guy. (Laughter.) I’m trying to be a very good fella. (Laughter.) I’m not letting my Irish get the best of me. (Laughter.)

But my predecessor, the distinguished former president — (laughter) — he wants to replace the Affordable Care Act with — he calls — this is what he refers to it: a “concept of a plan.” (Laughter.) I’ve heard that concept of a plan now for almost eight years. “A concept of a plan.” What the hell is a concept of a — he has no concept of anything. (Applause.) No plan.

If we don’t elect Kamala and he gets elected, Trump could kick up to 45 million people off their health insurance — 45 million. Over 100 million people could lose health care coverage because they have a preexisting condition. The only reason they could get it is because of the Affordable Care Act.

Trump and MAGA Republicans want to eliminate the Inflation Reduction Act, which they’re talking — the “big bill” — which made all these savings possible, raising prescription drug prices again for millions of Americans. They’re — state it. They’re not — and he b- — this guy means what he says — means what he says.

Look, during the last administration, my predecessor exploded the national debt more than any previous president in a single term. This guy raised the national debt by $2 trillion because of a tax cut that overwhelmingly benefitted the very wealthy and the biggest corporations.

Now, he’s saying, if elected — remember what he said now. If elected, he wants another $5 trillion tax cut for the very wealthy. That’s the tax cut he wants.

He won’t just get rid of the Department of Education, which he wants to do, and the Affordable Care Act. He’ll gut Social Security and Medicare, which he says he wants to do, h- — hurt hardworking people.

I’ve got a better idea. Let’s protect Social Security and Medicare and finally start making the very wealthy pay their fair share to keep these programs (inaudible). (Applause.) I mean it.

By the way, you know what the average tax rate is for a billionaire in America? There are a thousand billionaires since COVID. 8.2 percent. Anybody who wants to change places with a billionaire’s tax ra- — rate, raise your hand. (Laughter.) I’m serious. Not a joke. 8.2 percent.

I proposed raising it to 25 percent, which isn’t even close to the highest rate. You know how much that would raise? Five hundred billion dollars over the next five years — (applause) — just paying 25 percent.

Look, let me repeat what I have said since day one and that Kamala has continued to c- — she’s be- — continued to commit to. We made a commitment that no one — no one in America earning less than $400,000 a year, which is really high, will pay a single additional penny in federal taxes — not a single penny — $400 million — $400,000. They haven’t, and they won’t. If Kamala is president, they will continue not to.

So, th- — I don’t want to hear this stuff about “Biden going after the rich.” I did that to make sure we understand what the superrich are paying.

And, folks, let me close with this. Bernie and I are going to — going to — have been doing this work for a long time. I know we both look like we’re 40, but we’re a little older — (laughter and applause) — at least I am. I can’t even say it anymore. Anyway. (Laughter.)

We know we’ve made historic progress in the last three years: 35 bucks for insulin, 35 bucks for inhalers, $2,000-a-year cap, and things continue to go.

We’re showing how health care should be a right, not a privilege in America. That’s why I’ve never been more optimistic about our future, and I mean it.

We’re at one of those inflection points, folks. The decisions we make in the next election are going to determine what this country looks like for the next four or five decades. And that’s not hyperbole. That’s a fact.

And, folks, I’m — I’m taking too much of your time, but let me say it this way. We just have to remember who in the hell we are. We’re the United States of America. We’re the United States. There’s nothing beyond our capacity — not a damn thing beyond our capacity. (Applause.)

We’re the only nation in history of the world that’s come out of every crisis stronger than we went in — every one. Because when we act together, there’s nothing beyond our capacity.

The rest of the world is looking to us. We have the strongest economy in the world, and now we just got to make sure it’s available to every single American.

So, I leave you by saying I can’t tell you how much I appreciate what you’re about to do in this election. (Laughs.) As — as a friend of mine would say, from my lips to God’s ears on that one. But, look, you’ve got great candidates. You got great candidates. And I really mean — we got to get back to the days where we actually can talk to the other team.

This is not your father’s Republican Party.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: No.

THE PRESIDENT: No, no. I mean — I mean it’s not even close.

I came up in an era — I got elected when I was 29 years old to the United States Senate. I had to wait 17 days to be able to be sworn in. I got there as a young civil rights guy in the — when Strom Thurmond and all those guys were still there. But at least (inaudible) — be — honest to God — you could talk to him. And people change.

After all those years serving with Strom Thurmond, on his deathbed, he — 100 years old, his wife called me from Walter Reed Hospital. She said, “Joe?” I said, “Yeah, Nancy.” And sh- — she said, “Strom asked me to come out. I’m at the nurse’s station with Doctor” — she named his doctor. “He asked me if you’d do him a favor.” And I said, “Sure.” He said, “Will you do his eulogy?”

I did Strom Thurmond’s eulogy. I didn’t lie. I started off and I said, “Grandpa Finnegan, please forgive me for what I’m about to do.” (Laughter.)

But all kidding aside, even by the time he left, he had the most racially diverse staff in America. He voted for a lot — he voted for the change in all the laws that he had voted for before. There was headline in 1946 of Thurmond — “Thurmond: Hope of the South” — because he was against separate but equal. Not the proposition you couldn’t separate the races but the proposition that if you had separate but e- — you had to spend the exact amount of money in a Black school as a white school.

My generic point is: People change. But these guys just keep getting worse. (Laughter.) No, I really mean it. They mean what they say. They mean what they say.

I’ll conclude by saying that, you know, I — I’ll just say something that’s both revealing and self-defeating. You know, there is — are only a few advantages of being the oldest guy around. That is, I have more experience in foreign policy than anybody ever that had this job in American history.

I’ve known every major world leader personally in the last 40 years. Every international meeting I attend, including just being in Germany, as we’re walking out — whether at the G20 or the G7, whatever it is — they’ll pull me aside, one leader after another, quietly, and say, “Joe, he can’t win. My democracy is at stake. My democracy is at stake.”

If America walks away, who leads the world? Who? Name me a country. And we’re doing it without expending American blood by having Americans at war.

So, folks, there’s so much at stake. So, please — I know you’ll all vote, but please call your neighbors, get your friends, get your relatives, get them to vote, because this is — the nation’s democracy, in my view, depends on it.

God bless you all. And may God protect our troops. Thank you. (Applause.)

Thank you.

Oh, there you are.

SENATOR SANDERS: (Laughs.)

THE PRESIDENT: We’ve been doing this a long time, pal.

SENATOR SANDERS: I know. (Laughs.)

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you, thank you, thank you. (Applause.)

4:44 P.M. EDT

MIL OSI USA News –

January 25, 2025
MIL-OSI Economics: Joint IMF-Regional Financing Arrangements Press Release on the Ninth High-level RFAs Dialogue

Source: International Monetary Fund

October 23, 2024

Washington, DC: The 9th High-level Regional Financing Arrangements (RFAs) Dialogue was held on 23 October 2024 in Washington DC at a time when the global economic outlook is improving but remains weak amid a complex geoeconomic environment and elevated policy uncertainty. The heightened volatility observed in global financial markets over the summer reaffirmed the importance of having a strong Global Financial Safety Net, including effective collaboration between the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and RFAs, to safeguard against external risks.

During the dialogue, representatives from the IMF and the RFAs (the Arab Monetary Fund, the ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research Office cum the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralisation, the BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement, the Eurasian Fund for Stabilization and Development, the European Commission, the European Stability Mechanism, and the Latin American Reserve Fund) provided an update on institutional activities since their last meeting in October 2023 in Marrakech, covering a range of issues from policy and instrument enhancements to capacity and analytical developments.

The exchange demonstrated the RFAs’ continued efforts to prepare their institutions for an uncertain economic and financial landscape, marked by risks of geoeconomic fragmentation, the threat of climate change, and a transforming global economy under the influence of artificial intelligence and digital progress.

The IMF is continuing to adapt to ensure that its policy advice, financial resources, and capacity development can best support its global membership. IMF staff updated RFAs on recent lending toolkit reforms that directly benefit its membership while reinforcing the IMF’s strong financial position. The recently completed Review of Charges and the Surcharge Policy reduces charges and surcharges on regular IMF lending, and the Review of the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust puts in place a comprehensive package that secures the concessional lending capacity to support low-income countries. IMF staff also discussed how the institution is implementing its Climate Strategy across its operations. As the institution at the center of the global financial safety net, the IMF serves as a critical platform for cooperation to tackle global economic challenges.

The IMF and RFAs appreciated the exchange of views with Joaquim Levy and Siddharth Tiwari, in their capacity as members of the Bretton Woods Committee Multilateral Reform Working Group, on how to empower multilateralism amid geoeconomic fragmentation. The roundtable discussion offered an opportunity to explore the role that RFAs can play in advancing global solutions to shared challenges. The RFAs stressed that the IMF and the World Bank, with their global memberships and decades-long expertise, are best suited to take the lead in such efforts. The RFAs can support the Bretton Woods institutions’ work by leveraging their regional knowledge and the close ties that they have cultivated with each other and the IMF in recent years. Participants also welcomed the timely update from the French co-chair of the G20 International Financial Architecture Working Group on the group’s priorities, especially on its quest towards a more effective and representative global financial architecture.

Recognising that the system of international cooperation is under strain, the IMF and RFAs reiterated their continued commitment to maintain an open and candid dialogue to share crisis experiences and expertise and support multilateralism.

The 9th Joint RFA Research Seminar will be held in Colombia in the first half of 2025. The 10th High-level RFA Dialogue will be convened at the margins of the next IMF/World Bank Annual Meetings in October 2025.

IMF Communications Department

MEDIA RELATIONS

PRESS OFFICER: Julie Ziegler

Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

@IMFSpokesperson

MIL OSI Economics –

January 25, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: Press release – Investigation into missing unaccompanied child migrants wins the 2024 Daphne Caruana Galizia Prize for Journalism

Source: European Parliament 3

Lost in Europe on Wednesday won the 2024 Daphne Caruana Galizia Prize for Journalism for its investigation into the disappearance of over 50 000 unaccompanied child migrants.

The investigation, run by media from Germany, Italy, Greece, the Netherlands, Belgium, Ireland and the UK revealed that at least 51 433 unaccompanied child migrants disappeared after arriving in European countries between 2021 and 2023.

Roberta Metsola, President of the European Parliament, Pina Picierno, Vice-President responsible for the Prize, and representatives of the independent European-wide Jury of the Prize participated in the award ceremony held in the European Parliament’s Daphne Caruana Galizia Press Room in Strasbourg.

President Metsola said: “Daphne Caruana Galizia’s legacy continues through the work of journalists who live to tell the truth and refuse to be silenced. Their fight for justice prevails over the threats that try to undermine their important work. Press freedom is non-negotiable. Seven years after Daphne’s assassination, we continue to honour her memory with a prize that reminds us of this Parliament’s long-standing commitment to these fundamental values”.

Between 3 May and 31 July 2024, hundreds of journalists from the 27 EU countries submitted their stories for consideration. Thirteen of the 318 submissions were shortlisted by the jury before the winner was chosen.

About the Winning Story

Lost in Europe uncovered the staggering reality that, since 2021, on average nearly 47 children have vanished each day after arriving in Europe.

Data collected by Lost in Europe from 31 European countries, including Austria, Germany, and Italy, reveal that tens of thousands of migrant children are missing.

The months-long investigation shows that the number of missing migrant children could be even higher, as inconsistent documentation and the lack of data collection by some countries contribute to significant gaps in reporting.

This latest investigation builds on Lost in Europe’s 2021 research, which revealed that over 18 000 migrant children went missing in Europe between 2018 and 2020.

As Aagje Leven, Secretary General of Missing Children Europe, noted, the findings are likely just the “tip of the iceberg,” as more child migrants continue to disappear at alarming rates in Europe, with many feared to be victims of human trafficking and modern slavery.

The publishing partners for this investigation were De Standaard, (Belgium), Small Stream Media (the Netherlands), RBB (Germany), Knack (Belgium), ANSA (Italy), Domani (Italy), CNN (UK/US), VRT (Belgium), Εfimerida ton Syntakton (Greece), , The Journal (Ireland), Tagesschau (Germany), and NRC (the Netherlands).

About the Prize

The Daphne Caruana Prize was initiated by a decision of the European Parliament’s Bureau in December 2019 as a tribute to Daphne Caruana Galizia, a Maltese anti-corruption investigative journalist and blogger who was killed in a car bomb attack in 2017.

Every year, the Prize rewards (on the anniversary of the assassination of Daphne Caruana Galizia) outstanding journalism that promotes or defends the core principles and values of the European Union such as human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, rule of law, and human rights.

Professional journalists and teams of professional journalists of any nationality can submit in-depth pieces that have been published or broadcast by media based in one of the European Union’s 27 member states. The aim is to support and highlight the importance of professional journalism in safeguarding freedom, equality and opportunity.

The independent jury is composed of representatives of the press and civil society from the 27 EU member states and a representative of the International Federation of Journalists.

The Prize and the €20 000 in prize money demonstrate the European Parliament’s strong support for investigative journalism and a free press.

Past winners

2021 – “The Pegasus Project”, coordinated by the Forbidden Stories

2022 – Documentary on “The Central African Republic under Russian Influence” by Clément Di Roma and Carol Valade (ARTE/France24/Le Monde)

2023 – Joint investigation on the Pylos migrant boat shipwreck (Solomon, in collaboration with Forensis, StrgF/ARD, and The Guardian)

Who was Daphne Caruana Galizia?

Daphne Caruana Galizia was a Maltese journalist, blogger and anti-corruption activist who reported extensively on corruption, money laundering, organised crime, sale of citizenship and the Maltese government’s links to the Panama Papers. Following harassment and threats, she was murdered in a car bomb explosion on 16 October 2017. The outcry over the authorities’ handling of her murder investigation ultimately prompted the resignation of Prime Minister Joseph Muscat. Critical of failings in the investigation, in December 2019, MEPs called on the European Commission to take action.

MIL OSI Europe News –

January 25, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: JOINT MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the situation in Azerbaijan, violation of human rights and international law and relations with Armenia – RC-B10-0133/2024

Source: European Parliament

Rasa Juknevičienė, François‑Xavier Bellamy, Michael Gahler, Andrzej Halicki, David McAllister, Sebastião Bugalho, Nicolás Pascual De La Parte, Isabel Wiseler‑Lima, Daniel Caspary, Loucas Fourlas, Sandra Kalniete, Łukasz Kohut, Andrey Kovatchev, Andrius Kubilius, Miriam Lexmann, Vangelis Meimarakis, Ana Miguel Pedro, Davor Ivo Stier, Michał Szczerba
on behalf of the PPE Group
Yannis Maniatis, Nacho Sánchez Amor, Raphaël Glucksmann, Udo Bullmann, Matthias Ecke, Francisco Assis
on behalf of the S&D Group
Emmanouil Fragkos, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Assita Kanko, Marion Maréchal, Aurelijus Veryga, Geadis Geadi, Rihards Kols, Bert‑Jan Ruissen, Charlie Weimers
on behalf of the ECR Group
Nathalie Loiseau, Petras Auštrevičius, Helmut Brandstätter, Benoit Cassart, Olivier Chastel, Bernard Guetta, Karin Karlsbro, Ľubica Karvašová, Moritz Körner, Veronika Cifrová Ostrihoňová, Marie‑Agnes Strack‑Zimmermann, Hilde Vautmans, Lucia Yar, Dainius Žalimas
on behalf of the Renew Group
Sergey Lagodinsky
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

European Parliament resolution on the situation in Azerbaijan, violation of human rights and international law and relations with Armenia

(2024/2890(RSP))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Azerbaijan, Armenia and the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh,

– having regard to the relevant documents and international agreements, including but not limited to the United Nations Charter, the Helsinki Final Act and the Alma-Ata Declaration of 21 December 1991,

– having regard to the European Convention on Human Rights of 1950, ratified by Azerbaijan in 2002 and to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,

– having regard to the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict,

– having regard to the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement of 22 April 1996 between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Azerbaijan, of the other part [1],

– having regard to the statements by the European External Action Service spokesperson of 29 May 2024 on the human rights situation in Azerbaijan and of 3 September 2024 on early parliamentary elections in Azerbaijan,

– having regard to Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe resolution 2527 (2024) of 24 January 2024 entitled ‘Challenge, on substantive grounds, of the still unratified credentials of the parliamentary delegation of Azerbaijan’,

– having regard to the Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions of the Election Observation Mission to the Early Presidential Elections held on 7 February 2024 and to the Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions of the International Election Observation Mission to the Early Parliamentary Elections in Azerbaijan held on 1 September 2024,

– having regard to the report of 29 March 2023 by the Council of Europe’s European Commission against Racism and Intolerance on Azerbaijan and to the memorandum of 21 October 2021 by the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights on the humanitarian and human rights consequences following the 2020 outbreak of hostilities between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh,

– having regard to the orders of the International Court of Justice of 22 February 2023, of 6 July 2023 and of 17 November 2023 on the request for the indication of provisional measures for the application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Armenia v Azerbaijan),

– having regard to Rules 136(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas the choice of Azerbaijan’s capital Baku as the venue for the 29th United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP29), scheduled to take place from 11 to 22 November 2024, has sparked controversy, notably owing to Azerbaijan’s worsening human rights record, as well as recent and blatant violations of international law, including aggressive behaviour towards its neighbour Armenia; whereas respect for fundamental human rights and civil society participation are enshrined in the host country agreement through which the Azerbaijani Government committed to uphold these rights; whereas in the lead-up to this major international conference, the Azerbaijani authorities have intensified their repression of civil society organisations, activists, opposition politicians and the remaining independent media through detentions and judicial harassment; whereas corruption and a lack of judicial independence further undermine governance;

B. whereas civil society organisations list over 300 political prisoners in Azerbaijan, including Gubad Ibadoghlu, Anar Mammadli, Bakhtiyar Hajiyev, Tofig Yagublu, Ilhamiz Guliyev, Aziz Orujov, Bahruz Samadov, Akif Gurbanov and many others; whereas there are credible reports of violations of prisoners’ human rights, including detention in inhumane conditions, torture and refusal of adequate medical care;

C. whereas prominent human rights defender and climate advocate, Anar Mammadli, has been in pre-trial detention since 30 April 2024 on bogus charges of conspiracy to bring illegal foreign currency into the country and his health has deteriorated significantly while in custody; whereas Gubad Ibadoghlu, a political economist, opposition figure and one of the finalists for the 2024 Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought, was arrested by Azerbaijani authorities in July 2023 and remained in detention until 22 April 2024, when he was transferred to house arrest; whereas his health has deteriorated significantly since his arrest, as a result of torture, inhumane detention conditions and refusal of adequate medical care, thus endangering his life; whereas the health of Gubad Ibadoghlu’s wife, Irada Bayramova, continues to deteriorate as a result of the physical violence she suffered during her detention by the Azerbaijani authorities; whereas on 4 December 2023 human rights activist Ilhamiz Guliyev was arrested on politically motivated charges a few months after he gave an anonymous interview to Abzas Media about the alleged police practice of planting drugs on political activists;

D. whereas for more than a decade and with increasing determination, Azerbaijani authorities have been reducing space for civil society, arbitrarily closing down non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and arresting or forcing into exile civil society representatives; whereas in recent years, the Azerbaijani authorities have imposed increasingly stringent restrictions on civil society organisations; whereas activists, journalists, political opponents and others have been imprisoned on fabricated and politically motivated charges;

E. whereas according to human rights defenders, crackdowns on civil society have occurred around other major international events hosted by Azerbaijan, including Eurovision 2012 and the European Games 2015;

F. whereas the Azerbaijani regime appears to extend its repressive actions beyond its borders; whereas the ongoing crackdown on freedom of expression in Azerbaijan is also reflected in reports of transnational repression and reprisals against family members of detainees; whereas, since 2020, Mahammad Mirzali, an Azerbaijani dissident blogger, has been the target of several assassination attempts in France; whereas, on 29 September 2024, Vidadi Isgandarli, a critic of the Azerbaijani regime living as a political refugee in France, was attacked in his home and succumbed to his injuries two days later; whereas the Azerbaijani authorities have also engaged in politically motivated prosecutions of EU citizens, as seen in the case of Théo Clerc, prompting at least one Member State to formally warn its citizens against travelling to Azerbaijan owing to the risk of arbitrary detention;

G. whereas Azerbaijan has implemented a systematic policy of bribing officials and elected representatives in Europe in order to downplay Azerbaijan’s human rights record and to silence critics, as part of a widely used strategy described as ‘caviar diplomacy’; whereas some cases have been investigated and some of those involved have been prosecuted and convicted by national courts in several EU Member States;

H. whereas a number of European Court of Human Rights decisions have found that Azerbaijan has violated human rights; whereas according to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, more than 320 court judgments against Azerbaijan have not yet been executed or have been only partially implemented, which is the highest number among all state parties to the European Convention on Human Rights;

I. whereas on 3 July 2024, the Council of Europe’s European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) publicly denounced Azerbaijan’s ‘refusal to improve the situation in the light of the Committee’s recommendations’ and the ‘persistent lack of cooperation of the Azerbaijani authorities with the CPT’;

J. whereas the PACE decided in January 2024 not to ratify the credentials of the Azerbaijani delegation, noting its ‘very serious concerns as to …[Azerbaijan’s] respect for human rights’; whereas the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe noted that its Monitoring Committee’s rapporteurs were not allowed to meet with people who had been detained on allegedly politically motivated charges, and that the Azerbaijani delegation refused to allow the rapporteur for the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights to visit the country;

K. whereas according to the Election Observation Mission led by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR), the early presidential election held on 7 February 2024 took place in a restrictive environment and was marked by the stifling of critical voices and the absence of political alternatives; whereas Azerbaijan held early parliamentary elections on 1 September 2024 in what the OSCE/ODIHR-led International Election Observation Mission described as a restrictive political and legal environment that did not enable genuine pluralism and resulted in a contest devoid of competition; whereas in the period leading up to the parliamentary elections, several government critics were detained;

L. whereas media legislation in Azerbaijan has become increasingly repressive, with the February 2022 media law effectively legalising censorship; whereas several other laws affecting the media also violate the country’s international obligations with regard to freedom of expression and press freedom; whereas public criticism of the authorities is subject to severe penalties;

M. whereas according to Reporters Without Borders, virtually the entire media sector in Azerbaijan is under official control, with no independent television or radio broadcasts from within the country, and all critical print newspapers shut down; whereas the authorities continue to suppress the last remaining independent media and repress journalists who reject self-censorship; whereas Azerbaijan has intensified its repression against the remaining independent media, such as Abzas Media, Kanal 13 and Toplum TV, through detentions and judicial harassment;

N. whereas the Azerbaijani laws regulating the registration, operation and funding of NGOs are highly restrictive and arbitrarily implemented, thus effectively criminalising unregistered NGO activity; whereas Freedom House’s 2024 index ranks Azerbaijan among the least free countries in the world, below Russia and Belarus;

O. whereas gas contracts between Gazprom and SOCAR for the delivery of one billion cubic metres of gas from Russia to Azerbaijan between November 2022 and March 2023 have raised significant concerns about the re-export of Russian gas to the European market, particularly in the context of the signed memorandum of understanding on the strategic partnership in the field of energy; whereas the EU aims to reduce European dependence on Russian gas, but this agreement could be seen as undermining that goal, as Russian gas would still be flowing into Azerbaijan, thus potentially freeing up Azerbaijani gas for increased re-export to the EU; whereas there are also worrying reports of Russian gas being rebranded as Azerbaijani for sale in the EU;

P. whereas Azerbaijani leaders have engaged in anti-EU and anti-Western rhetoric; whereas Azerbaijan has intensified its disinformation campaigns targeting the EU and its Member States, with a specific focus on France; whereas Azerbaijan has actively interfered in European politics under the guise of ‘anti-colonialism’, notably in overseas countries and territories such as New Caledonia;

Q. whereas in addition, in September 2023, after months of the illegal blockade of Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan launched a pre-planned, unjustified military attack on the territory, forcing over 100 000 ethnic Armenians to flee to Armenia, which amounts to ethnic cleansing; whereas as a result, Nagorno-Karabakh has been almost entirely emptied of its Armenian population, who had been living there for centuries; whereas this attack represents a gross violation of human rights and international law, a clear breach of the trilateral ceasefire statement of 9 November 2020 and a failure to uphold commitments made during EU-mediated negotiations;

R. whereas the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh lost their property and belongings while fleeing the Azerbaijani military push in 2023 and have been unable to recover them since; whereas actions amounting to ethnic cleansing have continued since then; whereas the EU has provided humanitarian aid to people displaced from Nagorno-Karabakh; whereas credible reports confirm the organised destruction of Armenian cultural and religious heritage in Nagorno-Karabakh; whereas Azerbaijani leaders and officials repeatedly use hate speech against Armenians;

S. whereas both Azerbaijan and Armenia are bound by international humanitarian law and the Third Geneva Convention protects prisoners of war from all forms of torture and cruel treatment; whereas reports indicate that 23 Armenian prisoners are currently being held in Azerbaijani prisons without adequate legal representation, including eight former leaders of Nagorno-Karabakh, some of whom have received long prison sentences;

T. whereas in February 2023, the EU deployed the European Union Mission in Armenia (EUMA) to observe developments at the international border with Azerbaijan; whereas Azerbaijan has refused to cooperate with EUMA and the mission has been the target of disinformation by Azerbaijani authorities and government-controlled media; whereas the Azerbaijani leadership continues to make irredentist statements with reference to the sovereign territory of Armenia; whereas the Azerbaijani army continues to occupy no less than 170 km2 of the sovereign territory of Armenia;

U. whereas Armenia and Azerbaijan have engaged in negotiations on a peace treaty, the normalisation of their relations and border delimitation, both before and after the 2023 attack on Nagorno-Karabakh; whereas, despite mediation efforts by the EU and others, no peace agreement has been signed between Azerbaijan and Armenia; whereas, although both governments have stated that they are close to an agreement, recent remarks by the Azerbaijani president raise concern about Baku’s willingness to find a compromise to conclude the negotiations;

V. whereas the EU fully supports the sovereignty and territorial integrity of both Azerbaijan and Armenia and actively supports efforts towards a sustainable peace agreement between the two countries, achieved by peaceful means and respecting the rights of the population concerned;

W. whereas since Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, Azerbaijan has deepened its relations with Russia, including political and economic ties, as well as increased cooperation between their intelligence services; whereas Russia has openly backed Azerbaijan in its aggressive behaviour towards Armenia;

1. Strongly condemns the domestic and extraterritorial repression by the Azerbaijani regime against activists, journalists, opposition leaders and others, including EU nationals, which has noticeably intensified ahead of COP29; urges the Azerbaijani authorities to release all persons arbitrarily detained or imprisoned on account of their political views, to drop all politically motivated charges and to cease all forms of repression, both within and beyond Azerbaijan; recalls in this context the names of Tofig Yagublu, Akif Gurbanov, Bakhtiyar Hajiyev, human rights defenders and journalists, including Ulvi Hasanli, Sevinj Vagifgizi, Nargiz Absalamova, Hafiz Babali and Elnara Gasimova, Aziz Orujov, Rufat Muradli, Avaz Zeynalli, Elnur Shukurov, Alasgar Mammadli, Ilhamiz Guliyev and Farid Ismayilov, as well as of civil society activists arrested after March 2024 such as Anar Mammadli, Farid Mehralizade, Igbal Abilov, Bahruz Samadov, Emin Ibrahimov and Famil Khalilov; expresses deep concern about the environment of fear that this has created inside the country, leaving civil society effectively silenced;

2. Reiterates its call for the Azerbaijani authorities to drop all charges against Dr Gubad Ibadoghlu and allow him to travel abroad, unhindered and to the country of his choice, to reunite with his family, to receive the medical care he urgently needs and attend the Sakharov Prize ceremony in Strasbourg in December 2024; calls on Azerbaijan to ensure that he receives an independent medical examination by a doctor of his own choosing and to allow him to receive treatment abroad; calls on all EU representatives and individual Member States to actively support the release from house arrest of Dr Gubad Ibadoghlu and insist on his release in every exchange with the Azerbaijani authorities;

3. Demands that freedom of the press and expression be guaranteed and that media organisations not be restricted; calls, therefore, on the Azerbaijani Government to release journalists working for Abzas Media and Toplum TV, including Ulvi Hasanli, Sevinj Vagifqizi and Alasgar Mammadli;

4. Considers that Azerbaijan’s ongoing human rights abuses are incompatible with its hosting of COP29; urges EU leaders, in particular Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, to use COP29 as an opportunity to remind Azerbaijan of its international obligations and to meaningfully address the country’s human rights record in their interactions with the Azerbaijani authorities, including by calling for the unconditional release of all persons arbitrarily detained or imprisoned on account of their political views and by requesting to meet with political prisoners while in the country; calls for the EU and its Member States to do their utmost to ensure that United Nations Climate Change conferences are not hosted in countries with poor human rights records;

5. Reminds the Azerbaijani authorities of their obligations to respect fundamental freedoms, and calls on them to repeal repressive legislation that drives independent NGOs and media to the margins of the law; calls on the Azerbaijani authorities to repeal repressive legislation on the registration and funding of NGOs to bring them into line with Venice Commission recommendations;

6. Recalls that the 1996 EU-Azerbaijan Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, which is the legal basis for bilateral relations, is based on respect for democracy and the principles of international law and human rights and that these have been systematically violated in Azerbaijan;

7. Reminds the Azerbaijani Government of its international obligations to safeguard the dignity and rights of detainees, ensuring that they receive adequate medical care, are detained in humane conditions and are protected from any mistreatment; calls on the Azerbaijani Government to swiftly comply with long-standing recommendations of the Council of Europe’s European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment on the subject of the widespread recourse to physical ill treatment – including, on occasion, torture – by the police in Azerbaijan; calls on the Azerbaijani Government to implement all the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights;

8. Reiterates its call for EU sanctions to be imposed under the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime on Azerbaijani officials who have committed serious human rights violations; calls on the EU Special Representative for Human Rights to request meetings with political prisoners in Azerbaijan;

9. Insists that any future partnership agreement between the EU and Azerbaijan be made conditional on the release of all political prisoners, the implementation of legal reforms and the overall improvement of the human rights situation in the country, as well as on Azerbaijan demonstrating its genuine readiness to faithfully engage in the negotiation of a peace agreement with Armenia and to respect the rights of Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians;

10. Calls for the EU to end its reliance on gas exports from Azerbaijan; calls on the Commission to suspend the 2022 memorandum of understanding on the strategic partnership in the field of energy and to act accordingly;

11. Reaffirms its support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of both Azerbaijan and Armenia and strongly supports the normalisation of their relations based on the principles of the mutual recognition of territorial integrity and the inviolability of borders, in accordance with the 1991 Alma-Ata Declaration; reiterates its demand for the withdrawal of Azerbaijan’s troops from the entirety of Armenia’s sovereign territory; calls on Azerbaijan to unequivocally commit to respecting Armenia’s territorial integrity; highlights that Azerbaijan’s connectivity issues with its exclave of Nakhchivan should be resolved with full respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Armenia; reiterates its position that the EU should be ready to impose sanctions on any individuals and entities that threaten the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Armenia;

12. Condemns any military aggression, use of force or hybrid threats against Armenia, as well as foreign interference and attempts to destabilise the political situation in Armenia; welcomes, furthermore, the decision to adopt the first assistance measure under the European Peace Facility in support of Armenian armed forces and calls for the cooperation between Armenia and the EU to be further reinforced in the field of security and defence; welcomes the actions undertaken by several Member States to provide defensive military support to Armenia and urges the Member States to consider similar initiatives; welcomes the new momentum in bilateral relations between the EU and Armenia, which is strongly supported by the authorities in Yerevan; calls on the Commission and the Council to actively support Armenia’s desire for increased cooperation with the EU;

13. Expresses its support for the activities of the European Union Mission in Armenia (EUMA) and underscores the important role it plays; reiterates its concern regarding the repeated smear campaigns originating from Azerbaijan against EUMA; calls on EUMA to continue to closely monitor the evolving security situation on the ground, provide transparent reporting to Parliament and actively contribute to conflict resolution efforts; calls for the EU and its Member States to strengthen EUMA’s mandate, increase its size and extend its duration;

14. Supports all initiatives and activities that could lead to the establishment of peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan and the signing of a long-awaited peace agreement; calls on Azerbaijan to demonstrate genuine efforts to this end; warns Azerbaijan that any military action against Armenia would be unacceptable and would have serious consequences for the partnership between Azerbaijan and the EU; welcomes the Armenia-Azerbaijan joint statement of 7 December 2023 on confidence-building measures; welcomes the progress made in the framework of the Armenia-Azerbaijan border delimitation process, which has led to an agreement on several sections of the border; encourages both sides to take further steps on the remaining sections; calls for the EU to cease all technical and financial assistance to Azerbaijan that might contribute to strengthening its military or security capabilities; calls on the Member States to freeze exports of all military and security equipment to Azerbaijan;

15. Calls for the full implementation of all orders issued by the International Court of Justice, including the order of 17 November 2023 indicating provisional measures regarding the safe, unimpeded and expeditious return of people who fled Nagorno-Karabakh; recalls that the decision to host COP29 in Baku was made after Azerbaijan failed to comply with the above-mentioned International Court of Justice order as well as those of 7 December 2021 and of 22 February 2023; reiterates its call for independent investigations into the abuses committed by Azerbaijani forces in Nagorno-Karabakh; reiterates its call on the Azerbaijani authorities to allow the safe return of the Armenian population to Nagorno-Karabakh, to genuinely engage in a comprehensive and transparent dialogue with them, to provide robust guarantees for the protection of their rights, including their land and property rights, the protection of their distinct identity and their civic, cultural, social and religious rights, and to refrain from any inflammatory rhetoric that could incite discrimination against Armenians; urges the Azerbaijani authorities to release all 23 Armenian prisoners of war detained following Azerbaijan’s retaking of the Nagorno-Karabakh region;

16. Reiterates its call for the EU institutions and the Member States to continue to offer assistance to Armenia to deal with the refugees from Nagorno-Karabakh; calls for the EU, in this regard, to provide a new package of assistance to Armenia to help the Armenian Government address the humanitarian needs of refugees; welcomes all efforts by the Government of Armenia to provide shelter and aid to the displaced Armenians;

17. Expresses deep concern regarding the preservation of cultural, religious and historical heritage in Nagorno-Karabakh following the massive exodus of its Armenian population; urges Azerbaijan to refrain from further destruction, neglect or alteration of the origins of cultural, religious or historical heritage in the region and calls on it instead to strive to preserve, protect and promote this rich diversity; demands the protection of the Armenian cultural, historical and religious heritage in Nagorno-Karabakh in line with UNESCO standards and Azerbaijan’s international commitments; insists that Azerbaijan allow a UNESCO mission to Nagorno-Karabakh and grant it the necessary access;

18. Deplores steps taken by Azerbaijan towards the secessionist entity in occupied Cyprus, which are against international law and the provisions of UN Security Council Resolutions 541 (1983) and 550 (1984); calls on Azerbaijan to respect the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of states and to not invite the secessionist entity in occupied Cyprus to any meetings of the Organization of Turkic States;

19. Condemns Azerbaijan’s repeated attempts to denigrate and destabilise Member States, including through the so-called Baku Initiative Group; condemns in particular its support for irredentist groups and disinformation operations targeting France, especially in the French departments and territories of New Caledonia, Martinique and Corsica; recalls that these methods were used against Germany in 2013; denounces the smear campaigns targeting Denmark; regrets the smear campaign aimed at damaging France’s reputation by calling into question its capacity to host the 2024 Olympic Games, launched by actors suspected of being close to the Azerbaijani regime;

20. Condemns the arbitrary arrests of EU citizens based on spurious accusations of espionage and their disproportionate sentencing;

21. Strongly condemns the public insults and direct threats made by Azerbaijani diplomatic or government representatives, or members of the Azerbaijani Parliament, targeting elected officials of EU Member States; demands, in this regard, that access to EU institutional buildings be denied to the Azerbaijani officials concerned until further notice;

22. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the President, Government and Parliament of the Republic of Azerbaijan, the President, Government and Parliament of the Republic of Armenia, the Director-General of UNESCO, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the United Nations and the Council of Europe.

MIL OSI Europe News –

January 25, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: JOINT MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the misinterpretation of UN resolution 2758 by the People’s Republic of China and its continuous military provocations around Taiwan – RC-B10-0134/2024

Source: European Parliament

Michael Gahler, Miriam Lexmann, Sebastião Bugalho, Rasa Juknevičienė, Danuše Nerudová
on behalf of the PPE Group
Yannis Maniatis, Kathleen Van Brempt, Tonino Picula
on behalf of the S&D Group
Joachim Stanisław Brudziński, Adam Bielan, Mariusz Kamiński, Charlie Weimers, Michał Dworczyk, Alexandr Vondra, Veronika Vrecionová, Ondřej Krutílek, Rihards Kols, Maciej Wąsik, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Alberico Gambino, Bert‑Jan Ruissen, Carlo Fidanza
on behalf of the ECR Group
Engin Eroglu, Petras Auštrevičius, Helmut Brandstätter, Dan Barna, Veronika Cifrová Ostrihoňová, João Cotrim De Figueiredo, Bernard Guetta, Svenja Hahn, Ľubica Karvašová, Karin Karlsbro, Moritz Körner, Nathalie Loiseau, Jan‑Christoph Oetjen, Ana Vasconcelos, Dainius Žalimas
on behalf of the Renew Group
Markéta Gregorová
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

European Parliament resolution on the misinterpretation of UN resolution 2758 by the People’s Republic of China and its continuous military provocations around Taiwan

(2024/2891(RSP))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan,

– having regard to its resolution of 16 September 2021 on a new EU-China strategy [1],

– having regard to its recommendation of 21 October 2021 to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on EU-Taiwan political relations and cooperation [2],

– having regard to its resolution of 7 June 2022 on the EU and the security challenges in the Indo-Pacific [3],

– having regard to its resolution of 15 September 2022 on the situation in the Strait of Taiwan [4],

– having regard to its resolution of 13 December 2023 on EU-Taiwan trade and investment relations [5],

– having regard to the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence, approved by the Council on 21 March 2022,

– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 16 September 2021 entitled ‘The EU strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific’ (JOIN(2021)0024),

– having regard to the EU’s ‘One China’ policy,

– having regard to the EU-China summit of 7 December 2023,

– having regard to the European Council conclusions on China of 30 June 2023,

– having regard to the visits of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of 25 to 27 July 2023 and of the Committee on International Trade of 19 to 21 December 2022 to Taiwan,

– having regard to the statement of 1 September 2024 by the Spokesperson of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the latest dangerous actions in the South China Sea,

– having regard to the statements by the Spokesperson of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on China’s military drills around Taiwan, including the most recent statement of 14 October 2024,

– having regard to the G7 Foreign Ministers’ statements of 18 April 2023 and of 3 August 2022 on preserving peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait,

– having regard to the statement by the Chair of the G7 Foreign Ministers’ Meeting of 23 September 2024,

– having regard to the joint declaration by the G7 Defence Ministers of 19 October 2024,

– having regard to the urgency motion on Taiwan passed by the Australian Senate on 21 August 2024,

– having regard to UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 (XXVI) of 25 October 1971,

– having regard to the motion on UN Resolution 2758 passed by the Dutch House of Representatives on 12 September 2024,

– having regard to the press statement by the US Department of State of 13 October 2024,

– having regard to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),

– having regard to Article 7 of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), concluded on 9 May 1992,

– having regard to Rule 5 of the Standing Rules of Procedure of the Assembly of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO),

– having regard to Article 4 of the Constitution of the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol),

– having regard to Article 8 and Article 18(h) of the Constitution of the World Health Organization (WHO),

– having regard to Rules 136(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas UN Resolution 2758 was passed by the UN General Assembly on 25 October 1971 and shifted the official recognition from the Republic of China (Taiwan) to the People’s Republic of China (PRC); whereas today Taiwan, while not being a member of the United Nations, maintains diplomatic relations with 11 of the 193 United Nations member states, as well as with the Holy See;

B. whereas the EU and Taiwan are like-minded partners that share the common values of freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law; whereas Taiwan is a vibrant democracy, with a flourishing civil society; whereas Taiwan held peaceful and well-organised elections on 13 January 2024;

C. whereas following the adoption of UN Resolution 2758, Taiwan lost its access to participation in multilateral forums, such as the WHO;

D. whereas Taiwan has never been part of the PRC; whereas the Republic of China was established in 1912 and the PRC in 1949;

E. whereas UN Resolution 2758 addresses the status of the PRC, but does not determine that the PRC enjoys sovereignty over Taiwan, nor does it make any judgement on the future inclusion of Taiwan in the UN or any other international organisation; whereas, however, the PRC continues to misinterpret UN Resolution 2758 to block Taiwan’s meaningful participation in international organisations and unilaterally change the status quo; whereas these actions highlight the PRC’s ambition to alter the existing multilateral international order and undermine international law, and can be seen as an expression of systemic rivalry;

F. whereas the EU continues to maintain its own ‘One China’ policy, which is different from the PRC’s ‘One China’ principle; whereas the EU’s long-standing position has been to support the status quo and a peaceful resolution of differences across the Taiwan Strait, while encouraging dialogue and constructive engagement;

G. whereas through their statement of 23 September 2024 the G7 members, among other things, underlined their support for ‘Taiwan’s meaningful participation in international organizations as a member where statehood is not a prerequisite and as an observer or guest where it is’;

H. whereas supporting Taiwan’s participation in international organisations does not undermine the EU’s commitment to its ‘One China’ policy, which remains the political foundation of EU-China relations;

I. whereas over the past decade the PRC has persistently tried to increase its influence over international institutions, using this to sideline Taiwan and prevent Taiwanese passport holders, including journalists, non-governmental organisation workers and political activists, from accessing international institutions; whereas the PRC exercises transnational repression by misusing extradition treaties to target Taiwanese people abroad and therefore put them at risk of arbitrary persecution and human rights abuses;

J. whereas the statutes of most international organisations tasked to address global issues, including the WHO, the UNFCCC, Interpol and the ICAO, provide opportunities for entities such as Taiwan to participate without infringing on the rights of member states;

K. whereas Taiwan has consistently demonstrated a peaceful and cooperative attitude globally, has significantly enhanced global developments and thus could contribute greatly to the work of various international organisations;

L. whereas the PRC is a one-party state that is entirely controlled and ruled by the Chinese Communist Party;

M. whereas in a speech on Taiwan’s national day of 10 October 2024, Taiwan’s President Lai Ching-te stated that the PRC has ‘no right to represent Taiwan’ and reiterated that the two sides are ‘not subordinate’ to each other; whereas the PRC has justified its recent military exercise by claiming that President Lai Ching-te is pursuing a separatist strategy;

N. whereas on 14 October 2024 the PRC launched a large-scale military drill, named Joint Sword-2024B, that simulated a blockade of Taiwan; whereas during this exercise a record number of 153 PRC aircraft,18 warships and 17 PRC coastguard ships were detected around Taiwan;

O. whereas during the exercises four formations of the PRC coastguard patrolled the island and briefly entered its restricted waters; whereas the very frequent deployment of the coastguard by the PRC in the Strait in what the PRC considers ‘law enforcement’ missions is putting constant pressure on the Taiwanese authorities and causing a dangerous increase in the risk of collisions, in what is one of the most concrete indications of the PRC’s intention to erode the status quo; whereas the exercises launched on 14 October 2024 were the fourth round of large-scale war games by the PRC in just over two years;

P. whereas these activities were condemned by Taiwan as an ‘unreasonable provocation’ and are the latest in a series of war games conducted by the PRC against Taiwan; whereas these military drills came days after Lai Ching-te, Taiwan’s new president, gave a speech vowing to protect Taiwan’s sovereignty in the face of challenges from the PRC;

Q. whereas the median line, which was set up in a decades-old tacit agreement between both sides of the Taiwan Strait, was designed to reduce the risk of conflict by keeping the military aircraft from both sides of the Strait at a safe distance and thus prevent fatal miscalculations; whereas the PRC’s People’s Liberation Army violated the median line only four times between 1954 and 2020, but now routine incursions reflect Beijing’s intent to irreversibly reset long-standing benchmarks;

R. whereas the press statements by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the US Department of State reaffirm that peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait are of strategic importance for regional and global security and prosperity; whereas the High Representative’s statement recalls the need to preserve the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, opposes any unilateral actions that change the status quo by force or coercion and calls on all parties to exercise restraint and avoid any actions that may further escalate cross-Strait tensions;

S. whereas on 23 May 2024 the PRC launched a military drill called Joint Sword-2024A, just days after the inauguration of Lai Ching-te as the new President of Taiwan;

T. whereas over the past few years the PRC has held similar military drills around Taiwan; whereas these military drills have increased in intensity and have been moved closer and closer to Taiwan’s mainland; whereas during a previous drill in August 2022 the PRC also fired missiles into Japan’s exclusive economic zone;

U. whereas on top of military pressure the PRC has long been pursuing a sophisticated strategy of targeting Taiwan with foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), including hybrid and cyberattacks with the goal of undermining Taiwan’s democratic society;

V. whereas the PRC, under the leadership of Xi Jinping, has said that it will not renounce the use of force to seek unification with Taiwan;

W. whereas the PRC’s 2005 Anti-Secession Law includes the use of non-peaceful means, triggered by ambiguous thresholds, to achieve what the PRC calls ‘unification’ with Taiwan; whereas such military action is a grave threat to the security and stability of the entire region, with potentially dire global consequences; whereas EU and US deterrence is of strategic importance to dissuade the PRC from undertaking any unilateral action against Taiwan;

X. whereas the PRC’s increasingly aggressive behaviour, in particular in its own neighbourhood, such as the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, poses a risk to regional and global security; whereas since 2019 the PRC has violated the Taiwanese air defence identification zone (ADIZ) with increasing regularity; whereas the PRC has been behaving aggressively across vast areas of the Indo-Pacific and exerting varying degrees of military or economic coercion, which has led to disputes with neighbours such as Japan, India, the Philippines and Australia;

Y. whereas the EU has condemned the dangerous actions conducted by Chinese coastguard vessels against lawful Philippine maritime operations in the South China Sea on 31 August 2024; whereas this incident is the latest in a series of actions endangering the safety of life at sea and violating the right to freedom of navigation and overflight in compliance with international law; whereas maritime security and freedom of navigation must be ensured in accordance with international law and, in particular, UNCLOS;

Z. whereas the PRC is supporting Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, in particular through the export of dual-use goods to Russia and the ongoing involvement of PRC-based companies in sanctions evasion and circumvention;

AA. whereas as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, the PRC has a responsibility to work for peace and stability in the region, and particularly in the Taiwan Strait;

AB. whereas through its 2021 strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, the EU and its Member States increased their presence in the region, including through a higher military presence of certain Member States and the continued passage of military ships through the Taiwan Strait;

AC. whereas Taiwan is located in a strategic position in terms of trade, notably in high-tech supply chains; whereas the Taiwan Strait is the primary route for ships travelling from China, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan towards Europe; whereas Taiwan dominates semiconductor manufacturing markets, as its producers manufacture around 50 % of the world’s semiconductor output; whereas the EU’s strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific argues for increasing trade and investment cooperation with Taiwan;

AD. whereas the EU is Taiwan’s fourth largest trading partner after the PRC, the United States and Japan; whereas in 2022 Taiwan was the EU’s 12th largest trading partner; whereas the EU is the largest source of foreign direct investment in Taiwan; whereas Taiwanese investments in the EU remain below their potential;

AE. whereas members of the Australian Senate and of the Dutch House of Representatives have recently adopted motions concerning the distortion of UN Resolution 2758 by the PRC and called for support for Taiwan’s greater participation in multilateral organisations;

1. Reiterates that Taiwan is a key EU partner and a like-minded democratic friend in the Indo-Pacific region; commends Taiwan and the Taiwanese people for their strong democracy and vibrant civil society, demonstrated once more by the peaceful and well-organised elections of 13 January 2024;

2. Opposes the PRC’s constant distortion of UN Resolution 2758 and its efforts to block Taiwan’s participation in multilateral organisations; calls for the EU and its Member States to support Taiwan’s meaningful participation in relevant international organisations such as the WHO, the ICAO, Interpol and the UNFCCC; further calls on the UN Secretariat to grant Taiwanese nationals and journalists the right to access UN premises for visits, meetings and newsgathering activities;

3. Strongly condemns the PRC’s unwarranted military exercises of 14 October 2024, its continued military provocations against Taiwan and its continued military build-up, which is changing the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific, and reiterates its firm rejection of any unilateral change to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait; lauds the restraint and disciplined reaction of the Taiwanese authorities and calls for regular exchanges between the EU and its Taiwanese counterparts on relevant security issues;

4. Reaffirms its strong commitment to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait; underlines that any attempt to unilaterally change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, particularly by means of force or coercion, will not be accepted and will be met with a decisive and firm reaction;

5. Underlines that UN Resolution 2758 takes no position on Taiwan; strongly rejects and refutes the PRC’s attempts to distort history and international rules;

6. Reiterates the EU’s commitment to its ‘One China’ policy as the political foundation of EU-China relations; recalls that the EU’s China strategy emphasises that constructive cross-strait relations are part of promoting peace and security in the whole Asia-Pacific region and that the EU supports initiatives aimed at dialogue and confidence-building;

7. Underlines that in Taiwan it is up to the people to democratically decide how they want to live and that the status quo in the Taiwan Strait must not be unilaterally changed by the use or threat of force;

8. Reiterates its strong condemnation of statements by Chinese President Xi Jinping that the PRC will never renounce the right to use force with respect to Taiwan; underlines that the PRC’s use of force or threats or other highly coercive measures to achieve unification is incompatible with international law; expresses grave concern over the PRC’s use of hostile disinformation to undermine trust in Taiwan’s democracy and governance; reiterates its previous calls for the EU and its Member States to cooperate with international partners in helping to sustain democracy in Taiwan, keeping it free from foreign interference and threats; underlines that only Taiwan’s democratically elected government can represent the Taiwanese people on the international stage;

9. Condemns the PRC’s systematic grey-zone military actions, including cyber and disinformation campaigns against Taiwan, and urges the PRC to halt these activities immediately; calls, in this regard, for cooperation between the EU and Taiwan to be deepened further to enhance structural cooperation on countering disinformation and foreign interference; welcomes the posting of a liaison officer at the European Economic and Trade Office in Taiwan to coordinate joint efforts to tackle disinformation and interference as a first important step towards deeper EU-Taiwan cooperation, and calls for the EU to further deepen cooperation with Taiwan in this key area; praises the courage of the Taiwanese people and the proportionate and dignified reactions of the Taiwanese authorities and institutions in the face of intensifying Chinese threats and activities;

10. Firmly rejects the PRC’s economic coercion against Taiwan and other countries, as well as against EU Member States, and underlines that such practices are not only illegal under World Trade Organization rules, but that they also have a devastating effect on the PRC’s reputation around the world and will lead to a further loss of trust in the PRC as a responsible actor; stresses the independent right of the EU and its Member States to develop relations with Taiwan in line with their interests and shared values of democracy and human rights without foreign interference; calls on EU and Member State missions abroad to address and provide alternatives to malign PRC business practices, especially in the Global South;

11. Is very concerned at the adoption of the so-called guidelines for punishing ‘diehard Taiwan independence separatists’ for committing crimes of secession and the incitement of secession jointly announced by the Supreme People’s Court, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, the ministries for public security and state security and the justice ministry in June 2024, which could lead to harsh punishments for the crime of secession, up to and including the death penalty; strongly condemns the sentencing of one Taiwanese activist to nine years in prison in September 2024 after his arrest in the PRC in 2022, as well as the constant harassment of Taiwanese people working and living in the PRC;

12. Is seriously concerned about the situation in the East and South China Seas; recalls the importance of respecting international law, including UNCLOS and, in particular, its provisions on the obligation to settle disputes by peaceful means and on maintaining the freedom of navigation and overflight; calls on all countries that have not done so to swiftly ratify UNCLOS; calls for the EU and its Member States to step up their own maritime capacities in the region; reminds the PRC of its responsibilities, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, to uphold international law and emphasises the obligation to resolve disputes peacefully;

13. Reaffirms its grave concerns about China’s increasing military investments and capabilities; expresses grave concerns about the renewed Chinese and Russian commitment to further strengthen their military ties and condemns the Chinese supply of components and equipment to Moscow’s military industry; welcomes the Council decision to impose sanctions on Chinese companies for supporting Russia’s war against Ukraine; deplores the ‘no limits’ partnership between Russia and the PRC; welcomes the increasing commitment and military presence of the United States in the Indo-Pacific; reiterates its calls for a coordinated approach to deepening EU-US cooperation on security matters, including through transatlantic parliamentary dialogue;

14. Strongly welcomes the close cooperation and alignment of Taiwan with the EU and the United States in responding to Russia’s war against Ukraine and issuing sanctions in response to this blatant violation of international law; recalls Taiwan’s help in addressing the humanitarian crisis caused by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and its continuous involvement and support for the Ukrainian government and countries hosting Ukrainian refugees;

15. Highlights that the PRC’s various actions in the field of cognitive and legal warfare are slowly undermining the status quo, as well as intensifying grey-zone activities that are intended to circumvent detection, existing laws and response thresholds; calls for the EU to establish and enforce its redlines through its toolbox of sanctions, including sectoral sanctions, against hybrid activities and cyberthreats, and to coordinate strong diplomatic and economic deterrence measures with liked-minded partners;

16. Expresses its gratitude for Taiwan’s help and assistance during the COVID-19 pandemic;

17. Recognises the importance of Taiwan in securing global supply chains, especially in the high-tech sector where Taiwan is the leading producer of semiconductors, and calls for the EU and its Member States to engage in closer cooperation with Taiwan;

18. Calls on the Commission to launch, without delay, preparatory measures for negotiations on a bilateral investment agreement, or other kinds of agreement, with Taiwan; highlights the potential for cooperation on foreign direct investment screening policy and on tackling economic coercion and retaliation;

19. Applauds the increase in freedom of navigation exercises conducted by several EU countries, including France, the Netherlands and Germany; notes that these activities are in line with international law and calls for more cooperation and coordination with regional partners in order to increase freedom of navigation operations in the region;

20. Welcomes visits by former and current Taiwanese politicians to Europe, including the recent visit of former President Tsai Ing-wen to the European Parliament on 17 October 2024; welcomes, furthermore, continued exchanges of its Members with Taiwan and encourages further visits of official European Parliament delegations to Taiwan; additionally encourages further exchanges between the EU and Taiwan at all levels, including political meetings and people-to-people encounters;

21. Encourages, in this light, increased economic, scientific and cultural interactions and exchanges, focusing, among other areas, on youth, academia, civil society, sports, culture and education, as well as city-to-city and region-to-region partnerships; reiterates its call on the Member States to engage in meaningful and structural technical cooperation with Taiwan’s National Fire Agency and National Police Agency and with local administrations in the field of civil protection and disaster management;

22. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the governments of the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan.

MIL OSI Europe News –

January 25, 2025
MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Union Minister Shri Jayant Chaudhary to felicitate WorldSkills 2024 winners tomorrow

Source: Government of India

Posted On: 23 OCT 2024 5:45PM by PIB Delhi

Minister of State (I/C), Ministry of Skill Development and Entrepreneurship (MSDE) and MoS, Ministry of Education Shri Jayant Chaudhary to honor the outstanding achievements of the Indian delegation at the WorldSkills 2024 competition during a Felicitation Ceremony in New Delhi tomorrow.

India has made a remarkable mark on the global stage at WorldSkills 2024 at Lyon in France, by winning four Bronze medals in different categories. These are: Ashwitha Police in Patisserie and confectionery; Dhrumil Kumar Dhirendra Kumar Gandhi and Sathyajith Balakrishnan in Industry 4.0; Joethir Adithya Krishnapriya Ravikumar in Hotel Reception and Amaresh Kumar Sahu in Renewable Energy category.

In addition, the Indian delegation earned 12 Medallions of Excellence, a testament to their exceptional skills and consistent performance across various trades. India’s performance at WorldSkills 2024 was a strong showing on the global stage, with the country competing against other global giants like China, Japan, Germany, and the USA.

The event will also be graced by Shri Atul Kumar Tiwari, Secretary, MSDE, and Shri Ved Mani Tiwari, CEO, NSDC, Sector Skill Council Experts and Industry/Academia Partners for WorldSkills 2024.

WorldSkills Lyon 2024 saw more than 1,400 participants from over 70 countries competing in diverse skill categories, and the Indian competitors stood its ground among the best in the world, showcasing their talent and innovation in front of an international audience. India competed in 52 skills against countries like China, Japan, Korea, Singapore, Germany, Brazil, Australia, Columbia, Denmark, France, UK, South Africa, Switzerland, USA, etc.

The Indian contingent’s success at WorldSkills 2024 is a significant milestone in the country’s journey toward becoming a global skills leader. Winning the Bronze medal in Patisserie and Confectionery in France, the global epicenter of fine pastry and baking, is an extraordinary achievement. It signifies India’s rising prowess in culinary arts, proving that Indian talent can stand shoulder-to-shoulder with the best in a country renowned for its mastery in this craft.

India’s 12 Medallions of Excellence at WorldSkills 2024 highlight the nation’s prowess across a range of traditional and emerging skills, from Mechatronics and Cyber Security to Jewellery and Beauty Therapy. These achievements underscore India’s leadership in both innovation-driven fields like Additive Manufacturing and Web Technology, as well as craftsmanship in areas like Cabinet Making and Cooking.

The success of the Indian competitors at WorldSkills 2024 is a testament to the rigorous preparation and industry support they received throughout their journey. Each participant underwent extensive training, supported by industry experts, mentors, and the best-in-class infrastructure provided by organizations across various sectors.

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MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

January 25, 2025
MIL-OSI United Nations: Experts of the Human Rights Committee Welcome France’s Efforts to Combat Homophobia, Raise Questions on Violence in New Caledonia and Rules Governing Identity Checks

Source: United Nations – Geneva

The Human Rights Committee today concluded its consideration of the sixth periodic report of France on how it implements the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, with Committee Experts welcoming France’s national plan combatting hatred against lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons and plans to combat homophobia, while raising questions on violence in New Caledonia and rules governing identity checks.

One Committee Expert said the Committee welcomed the national plan for equality and against hatred and discrimination against lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons (2020-2026) and the government plan (2023-2026) to combat homophobia and discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity.

Another Expert said it appeared that the current violence in the non-self-governing territory of New Caledonia was linked to reforms of the Nouméa Accord and a lack of progress in the decolonisation process. What was the progress made on the issue of self-determination of the non-self-governing territory of New Caledonia as well as that of French Polynesia, and the participation and consultation processes put in place with the indigenous peoples living in these territories to obtain their free and informed consent and access to independence?

Another Expert asked if the State party could indicate whether mandatory training on racial and ethnic discrimination and profiling was systematically offered to law enforcement officials, both in metropolitan France and in the overseas territories? Did the State party systematically collect data to monitor the use of identity checks, both in metropolitan France and in the overseas territories? Would the State party be prepared to implement a template for all individuals subject to an identity check? Would it be willing to introduce a centralised record of all identity checks to have an overview of how they were used, with whom and where?

The delegation said France supported the recognition of indigenous peoples. New Caledonia was one of the most advanced examples of the French Government recognising the rights of indigenous peoples. Since the Nouméa Accord, an institutional framework had been put into place allowing for shared governance between the communities, representing the customs of the Kanak people. On 1 October, the Prime Minister announced the postponement of elections in 2025, which was unanimously agreed by Parliament. Since 1998, France had been cooperating with the decolonisation committee and the work had been fruitful.

The delegation said all French citizens were equal before the law. The code of ethics for the police and national gendarmerie prohibited discriminatory identity checks. When the law authorised an identity check, the police should not rely on any physical trait, unless there were specific grounds. Any act of discrimination could be reported by someone who believed they were a victim of discriminatory profiling. There were several ways to do this, including through the various controlling and monitoring authorities and the judiciary.

Introducing the report, Isabelle Rome, Ambassador for Human Rights of France and head of the delegation, said human rights were a priority for France. In December 2023, the President of the Republic announced that a House of Human Rights would be created in Paris to support civil society organizations. France had strengthened its public policies on the judiciary, democracy and the law enforcement agencies since 2022, paying particular attention to conditions for the use of force, and compliance with the rules of ethics during all police operations. Ms. Rome concluded by saying that France believed in its democratic model, in liberty, equality and fraternity, as illustrated this summer by the Olympic and Paralympic Games.

In concluding remarks, Ms. Rome thanked the Committee for the dialogue. France was deeply attached to the rule of law and the Committee’s recommendations would be scrupulously considered. The country was committed to renewing dialogue with the territory of New Caledonia and its inhabitants.

Tania María Abdo Rocholl, Committee Chairperson, thanked the delegation for the dialogue, which had covered a wide range of subjects under the Covenant. The Committee aimed to ensure the highest level of implementation of the Covenant in France.

The delegation of France was made up of representatives of the Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs; the Ministry of the Interior and Overseas; the Ministry of Justice; the State Council; the Interministerial delegation to the fight against racism, anti-Semitism, and hatred; the French office for the protection of refugees and stateless persons; and the Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations Office at Geneva.

The Human Rights Committee’s one hundred and forty-second session is being held from 14 October to 7 November 2024. All the documents relating to the Committee’s work, including reports submitted by States parties, can be found on the session’s webpage. Meeting summary releases can be found here. The webcast of the Committee’s public meetings can be accessed via the UN Web TV webpage.

The Committee will next meet in public at 3 p.m. on Wednesday, 23 October, to begin its consideration of the second periodic report of Türkiye (CCPR/C/TUR/2).

Report

The Committee has before it the sixth periodic report of France (CCPR/C/FRA/6).

Presentation of Report

ISABELLE ROME, Ambassador for Human Rights of France and head of the delegation, said human rights were a priority for France. In December 2023, the President of the Republic announced that a House of Human Rights would be created in Paris to support civil society organizations. Launched in 2021, the Marianne initiative for human rights defenders aimed to encourage the activities of human rights defenders, both in their country of origin, and by welcoming them in France. The fight against the death penalty was also a priority for France. France would host the ninth World Congress against the Death Penalty in Paris in 2026. France was also contributing to the organization of the first World Congress on Enforced Disappearances in Geneva on 15 and 16 January 2025.

The State’s new feminist diplomacy strategy would be published by the end of 2024. France was proud that the Paris 2024 Olympic and Paralympic Games were the first gender-balanced games in history. Through its diplomatic and consular network, France supported projects of democratic governance, respect for the rule of law, the fight against impunity, access to justice, and mechanisms to monitor the effective exercise of civil and political rights. In 2019, France launched the Partnership for Information and Democracy, which was joined by 54 States from all regions, to guarantee freedom of expression. In May 2024, the President of the French Republic and the Prime Minister of New Zealand announced the creation of a new non-governmental organization, the Christchurch Call Foundation, to coordinate the work of the Christchurch Call to eliminate terrorist and violent extremist content online.

France had strengthened its public policies on the judiciary, democracy and the law enforcement agencies since 2022, paying particular attention to conditions for the use of force, and compliance with the rules of ethics during all police operations. The national law enforcement plan published in 2021 provided for an adaptation of the employment strategies of the republican security companies and the mobile gendarmerie squadrons during public demonstrations. The right to demonstrate was guaranteed by the Constitution in France. By getting in touch with the prefects and police units involved in public demonstrations, journalists could be added to communication channels, allowing them to receive live information and ask questions.

Between 2020 and 2024, the Ministry of Justice’s budget increased by 33 per cent, from €7.6 billion in 2020 to €10.1 billion in 2024. In five years, the French Ministry of Justice would have recruited as many magistrates as in the last 20 years. To combat prison overcrowding, the Ministry of Justice was implementing a proactive prison regulation policy, based on the development of alternatives to incarceration, the strengthening of early release mechanisms, and an ambitious prison real estate programme creating 15,000 net prison places. An Interministerial Committee for Overseas Territories was set up in July 2023. France had mobilised authorities to enable and guarantee the return to calm and security of people in New Caledonia. Emergency measures were deployed last June. The mediation and work mission continued its work, with the aim of renewing political dialogue.

France had been implementing a new interministerial plan for gender equality 2023-2027, which contained 161 measures divided into four priority areas: the fight against violence against women; the global approach to women’s health; professional and economic equality; and the dissemination and transmission of a culture of equality. The law of July 2023 aimed at strengthening women’s access to responsibilities in the public service. It increased the mandatory quota of first-time female appointments to senior and management positions to 50 per cent. On 8 March 2024, France became the first country in the world to enshrine the freedom to have access to voluntary termination of pregnancy in its Constitution.

Questions by Committee Experts

A Committee Expert welcomed that France’s report was prepared in consultation with the National Consultative Commission on Human Rights, whose role was to monitor France’s international commitments and the implementation of recommendations issued by international and regional bodies. In May 2024, despite the provisions of the Nouméa Accord which provided for a process of gradual transfer of power from France to New Caledonia, the National Assembly voted in favour of expanding the electorate of New Caledonia. Thousands of Kanak demonstrators mobilised to denounce these reforms, which were allegedly passed without adequate consultation or free, prior and informed consent. In the absence of sufficient dialogue on the part of the authorities, a violent conflict had been raging since that date.

The French Government had deployed considerable military resources to restore order, but at the cost of numerous allegations of excessive use of force that led to several deaths among Kanak protesters and security forces, as well as injuries. According to information received by the Committee, at least 11 people were shot dead and 169 others were injured; 2658 demonstrators were arrested, many of whom were arbitrarily arrested and detained, dozens of them were also transferred to metropolitan France.

It appeared that the current violence in the non-self-governing territory of New Caledonia was linked to reforms of the Nouméa Accord and a lack of progress in the decolonisation process. What was the progress made on the issue of self-determination of the non-self-governing territory of New Caledonia as well as that of French Polynesia, and the participation and consultation processes put in place with the indigenous peoples living in these territories to obtain their free and informed consent and access to independence?

There had been several prominent court cases regarding the removal of headscarves in France. In the opinion of the French State, should the Committee’s Views be followed only in the case where the Committee considered a complaint to be inadmissible or agreed with the arguments presented by the French Government? Were there intentions to lift reservations to the Covenant? Who currently appointed the magistrates of the courts? What was the current state of the constitutional reform initiated with a view to making the Prosecutor’s Office independent of the executive? How could the full independence of judges and prosecutors be guaranteed?

Since 2015, France had put in place measures to combat terrorism, which had been seen over the years to be increasingly detrimental to people’s rights and freedoms.

Was the new legislation accompanied by sufficient guarantees against the risk of arbitrary and discriminatory implementation of these measures? What independent and impartial expertise did public authorities have to assess the impact of new technologies on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by the Covenant?

It was understood that mass surveillance technology was used during the Olympic and Paralympic Games. How did the State party ensure that it did not lead to profiling that disproportionately affected racial, ethnic and religious minorities? How did the State party ensure that continuous surveillance by algorithm-based systems did not violate the right to privacy and respected the requirements of proportionality and necessity? For how long could the data collected in this way be kept?

What were the current conditions for the communication of information to the intelligence services, particularly in the area of sensitive data? What information could be transmitted and what traceability requirements were in place? Under what conditions could information provided by the intelligence services be made available to the judicial authority and the Public Prosecutor’s Office? What means of access was available to defendants and those accused of acts of terrorism?

Another Expert said the Committee was informed that people of colour were subjected to identity checks by the police about 20 times more often than other citizens. They also faced discriminatory treatment during police stops and searches, including direct fines, often without objective suspicion and without being informed of the reasons. What could be done to ensure that the use of identity checks and fines was not left to the discretion of law enforcement agencies, and was based only on objective and individualised conditions, and not on racial origins? Did the State party have explicit guidelines for law enforcement agencies that clearly prohibited racial profiling in police operations as well as discriminatory identity checks?

Could the State party indicate whether mandatory training on racial and ethnic discrimination and profiling was systematically offered to law enforcement officials, both in metropolitan France and in the overseas territories? Did the State party systematically collect data to monitor the use of identity checks, both in metropolitan France and in the overseas territories? Would the State party be prepared to implement a template for all individuals subject to an identity check? Would it be willing to introduce a centralised record of all identity checks to have an overview of how they were used, with whom and where?

The Committee had received extensive information that showed the persistent problem of systemic racial discrimination, as well as the use of negative stereotypes against minorities. What measures had the State party taken to effectively combat all forms of hate speech and hate crimes against racial, ethnic and religious minorities? What training was provided to law enforcement officers, judges and prosecutors, and what awareness campaigns were organised to prevent and combat hate crime and hate speech? Would France develop data collection and research in compliance with data protection rules, to effectively identify cases of racial or ethnic profiling and offences in metropolitan France and overseas?

The Committee welcomed the national plan for equality and against hatred and discrimination against lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons (2020-2026) and the government plan (2023-2026) to combat homophobia and discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity. How would the State party ensure adequate resources and the active participation of civil society in the implementation of these plans? Did these programmes sufficiently take into account minorities within minorities, such as lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex asylum seekers?

The Committee was informed that some of the measures granting extensive powers to the administrative authorities, developed in the context of the state of emergency, had been granted permanent status. What measures had the State party taken to ensure that initial emergency measures were in conformity with the Covenant in terms of necessity and proportionality? How did the State party promote the accessibility of judicial procedures and ensure that they were effective?

How would France ensure that anti-terrorism legislation did not disproportionately target Muslims and that actions were based on alleged criminal behaviour rather than religious practices? How did the State party ensure that house searches and dissolution of organizations were conducted by the courts? What was the percentage of terrorist offences in relation to criminal offences committed in the last five years? The Committee was informed of the law establishing a new security regime, which subjected the accused to certain obligations, with a view of ensuring their reintegration. How did France ensure that this monitoring system, which was based on the rather vague notion of “dangerousness”, was not arbitrary and did not disproportionately infringe on the rights of persons who had served their sentences?

One Committee Expert said the Committee particularly welcomed the State party’s commitment of significant financial resources to address the needs of vulnerable groups during the health crisis of COVID-19. What was the impact of the measures described in the State party’s report, to ensure that the COVID-19 pandemic did not exacerbate inequalities, discrimination and exclusion, including among vulnerable groups? Specifically, regarding domestic violence against women, which was said to have increased during the pandemic, what was the assessment of the effectiveness and impact of the measures taken?

While noting the information provided by the State party, including on the judicial review of the restrictions imposed, could the proportionality of the measures imposed to address COVID-19 be explained, including the ban on any gathering of more than 10 people imposed for a certain period? What assessment did the State party make of this experience for a better consideration of human rights in future crises?

Another Expert said the State party had reported on humanitarian repatriations from Syria of women and children of French nationality. With regard to returns, according to public reports, there was still a significant number of women and children detained or held in camps and rehabilitation centres in Syria. What was the number, the current situation, and the measures taken by the State party to ensure the full repatriation of all French women and children still in detention camps and rehabilitation centres for minors in Syria?

What was the estimated number of detained men and women in Syria who participated as Islamic State fighters? Had measures been taken to ensure that due process standards were strictly respected in the trials before the Syrian national courts? According to information, in May and June 2019, 11 French nationals had been sentenced to death in Iraq for their involvement as Islamic State fighters. Could the delegation provide an update on that information and indicate what steps the State party had taken to prevent the continued imposition of death sentences on its nationals in that country? What other penalties had been applied to these French nationals in lieu of the death penalty?

The Committee had requested information related to the Arms Trade Treaty, in order to know whether the State party carried out an evaluation for the granting of export licenses aimed at determining that the recipient country used the weapons included in the respective license within the framework of respect for the right to life. Did the evaluation of an arms export take this into account? Had any measures been taken to ensure a total ban on arms sales to countries where there was a clear risk that such weapons could be used to violate international human rights law? Was it possible to access information on arms exports so that civil society could carry out oversight? What measures had been taken to prevent the negative effects on the right to life of the operations of French companies abroad, especially in the province of Cabo Delgado in Mozambique?

A Committee Expert said the Committee was informed that there had been a rise in police violence in recent years, with multiple incidents resulting in fatal outcomes, some of them young boys. Could more information be provided on trainings on racism for police officers? Had improvements been made, bearing in mind previous incidents? The Committee was informed that investigations and legal procedures of unlawful killings by law enforcement officials were not expeditious, sometimes even leading to de facto police impunity, or that sentences were not commensurate with the gravity of the crime.

Had there been plans to amend legal norms and review legal conditions for the use of firearms by the police and the gendarmerie, aiming to reduce the risks of disproportionate use of lethal force, and to strike a better balance with the principles of absolute necessity and strict proportionality? What was the status of investigations of fatalities and injuries, including those related to alleged excessive use of force, which emerged during conflicts that started in May 2024 in New Caledonia? Had trainings been undertaken for those operating in France’s overseas territories?

The Committee welcomed the reported introduction of the new right to appeal introduced by article 803-8 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as a step forward. However, Experts had been informed that there were several challenges preventing its full use and benefits. Since the right to a judicial remedy against undignified conditions of detention was introduced in 2021, what were the steps taken by the State party to disseminate it within the incarcerated population? Was the information on the creation of a new legal tool easily reachable in all penitentiaries under the jurisdiction of the State party? Had legal aid been introduced to those incarcerated persons who could not afford a lawyer or judicial taxes? Were there plans to introduce wider use of alternatives to detention or a more restricted use of detention as a last resort?

Responses by the Delegation

The delegation said France supported the recognition of indigenous peoples. New Caledonia was one of the most advanced examples of the French Government recognising the rights of indigenous peoples. Since the Nouméa Accord, an institutional framework had been put into place allowing for shared governance between the communities, representing the customs of the Kanak people. On 1 October, the Prime Minister announced the postponement of elections in 2025, which was unanimously agreed by Parliament. Since 1998, France had been cooperating with the decolonisation committee and the work had been fruitful.

Since 2015, the technical intelligence community had been working on a specific legal framework. The law included respect for the private lives of citizens and had a strict principle of proportionality. The law set forth the procedures to be respected when it came to implementing intelligence techniques, including prior authorisation by the Prime Minister. There were restrictions on how long the data could be held. The enhanced video surveillance was enacted in advance of the Olympics and Paralympics Games. France chose to engage in a rigorous oversight mechanism regarding this surveillance. This was a tool for detecting events without having to resort to facial recognition.

All French citizens were equal before the law. The code of ethics for the police and national gendarmerie prohibited discriminatory identity checks. When the law authorised an identity check, the police should not rely on any physical trait, unless there were specific grounds. Any act of discrimination could be reported by someone who believed they were a victim of discriminatory profiling. There were several ways to do this, including through the various controlling and monitoring authorities and the judiciary.

At the end of the state of emergency, which followed the attacks carried out on France in 2015, the Government acknowledged the need to keep these tools in place due to the possibility of other attacks. Four new measures had then been created. These laws were only for preventing terrorism and were accompanied with significant guarantees for citizens. The law of 30 July 2021 on preventing acts of terrorism gave these measures permanency. The Constitutional Council believed this was a balanced approach that ensured achieving the goal of preventing terrorism while respecting private life. House searches could not be instigated unless there was prior authorisation from a judge; 1,447 remedies were presented for the state of emergency. The law of 2021 applied to people who had been sentenced to acts of terrorism. Sentences for terrorist activities represented around 0.04 per cent of all criminal activities.

A plan had been developed to prepare the plan on combatting lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex hatred, involving members of civil society. The plan contained 16 key measures, including a ten-million-euro fund by 2027 to improve the host centres for these individuals. The goal was to have two centres per region in France. For hate speech, the legislation provision had recently been strengthened. In 2021, there was a vote to govern the digital space and that law had a set of provisions on combatting online hate speech to better regulate illegal behaviour. There had been significant progress made in this area, given that a bill had been introduced in the European Parliament to regulate heinous content online.

In France, 2020 was the year that the State had the lowest rate of femicide. This meant that the measures set up were effective, and that the police and justice systems were able to act swiftly to combat family violence. There were also provisions which allowed complaints to be raised.

Measures adopted during the pandemic were considered to be proportional. The measures taken to address the pandemic did not overturn other measures in place. During COVID-19, the number of calls to victim support groups for violence had increased. The accelerated measures implemented by France to support victims included electronic bracelets to ensure restraining orders were complied with. In 2021, emergency plans were implemented to ensure people were protected. At the end of the pandemic, the State provided hotlines 24/7 and reception centres in shopping malls. More specialised support was also provided in courts.

International commitments by France to human rights did not involve a repatriation of citizens in an area where France had no control. Authorities responded systematically to requests for repatriation made by French citizens. Since 2019, repatriation efforts for minors had been organised. France exported weapons to countries that wished to strengthen their armies, only with strict national oversight.

Force was only used when necessary in cases set forth by law and in a manner which was proportional to the threat. A police or member of the gendarmerie would only use force if it was essential in their work, such as in cases of self-defence. Police had additional guidelines on the use of weapons. There should never be doubt regarding the reasons of an arrest warrant.

France had a law which allowed for all inmates to request guarantees for their detention conditions, ensuring they were dignified. A provision was in place which allowed individuals to benefit from jurisdictional support, in place since 2023. Template forms for this purpose were provided to all detainees upon their detention.

Questions by Committee Experts

A Committee Expert said the problem with the New Caledonia information was the outcome of the projects which arose in France in 1984. The idea of postponing elections to 2025 was a positive sign as this would allow for mediation between the local and French authorities. Over recent years, there had been a considerable strengthening of anti-terrorist measures. However, the majority of terrorist threats were foiled by international cooperation efforts. Were the measures justified by the threats the State faced? How could this be transmitted between different intelligence branches? How long was intelligence data stored and what measures were provided to keep the information secure?

Another Expert asked for disaggregated data on what law enforcement officials had been charged with? Were inmates allowed to apply to a collective appeal so that others could benefit?

An Expert said there were laws which prohibited discrimination in identification checks; how was it ensured that this legislation was implemented?

Another Committee Expert asked for the delegation to bear in mind the matter of redress granted to victims of violence.

One Expert asked for a more specific response to the measures adopted to comply with the rulings of the European courts against certain cases against France? How did the State party ensure effective judicial control and parliamentary oversight in weapon exportation?

Responses by the Delegation

The delegation said the French overseas territories met all international criteria under the law. France had completed the decolonisation process and no longer administered non-self-governing territories. As for French Polynesia, in 2023, France decided to speak before the General Assembly, illustrating ongoing dialogue between the State and French Polynesia. France supported the development of French Polynesia.

The French Government followed the individual communications procedure before the Committee. Any communications were the subject of broad consultations among many ministries and institutions.

When France ended the state of emergency of 2015 to 2017, the risk of terrorism in the country was still high. While this risk had come down, threats still persisted; 45 attacks had been foiled between 2017 and now.

In 2022, over 700 people brought cases to court regarding acts of violence committed by people in public authority. Over 200 of these led to convictions.

The Ministry of Education and Youth was currently creating a programme to consider the new kinds of racism and anti-Semitism which had cropped up in recent years.

The French law enforcement force represented the population and was diverse. Inmates could ask for specific improvements to detention conditions which impacted their dignity. Improvements had been carried out in several penitentiaries as a result of this. Several inmates could present these complaints together.

Questions by Committee Experts

A Committee Expert said since the end of the state of health emergency on 10 July 2020, the situation of exiled people in Calais had deteriorated. The nearly 1,200 homeless men, women and children in Calais had seen their living conditions deteriorated due to the brutal “evacuations” of several large camps, and the dramatic reduction in vital services such as food distributions, and lack of access to showers and water points. Additionally, around 100 unaccompanied minors had settled in tents in Jules Ferry Square to highlight that they had been abandoned by the State. Could the State party comment on this?

According to information received, journalists and media organizations were reportedly facing increasing challenges in carrying out their duties, including restrictions on reporting, potential abuses of power, and other pressures that undermined press freedom. Reporters without Borders reported that police reportedly assaulted several “clearly identifiable” journalists. There were several cases cited to support these allegations, including journalists in New Caledonia who stated they were constantly harassed for their coverage of the riots. Could the delegation comment on these allegations? What measures did the State party intend to take to better protect journalists and human rights defenders in the exercise of their work? Had the perpetrators of the mentioned cases been prosecuted and what was the outcome, including convictions and reparations?

Another Expert noted the numerous allegations of prison overcrowding in the State party and the serious health risks during the most critical period of the COVID-19 pandemic, asking what were the reasons for providing, through decree-law 2020-303, for the full continuation of pre-trial detention, which even affected minors? What were the conditions for the application of the measure of full maintenance of pre-trial detention to children and how many children were affected by this measure? How did law no. 2021-646 of 25 May 2021 on global security preserving freedoms effectively guarantee respect for privacy, especially in the use of portable cameras by law enforcement officers and cameras installed on unmanned aerial vehicles? Did it include the principles of proportionality and necessity? In the case of the use of surveillance devices in public demonstrations by law enforcement officers, were there safeguards or limitations to prevent their use from affecting the right to peaceful assembly and freedom of expression?

It was alleged that four former national secretaries of the General Confederation of Labour were being investigated for defamation and public slander following a complaint filed against them by the Directorate of the National School of Prison Administration. Could information on this be provided? The Committee would also like information on the processes followed against various union, political and community leaders for the crime of glorifying terrorism after the Hamas attacks of 7 October 2023. It was reported that during the recent Olympic Games, there were many cases of systematic Islamophobia that mainly affected Muslim athletes and communities, a situation exacerbated by the security measures adopted. Could the delegation comment on this? What measures had the State party taken to combat hate speech against lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons?

One Expert said the Committee had unfortunately been informed that the situation of migrants in Calais and Grande-Synthe was still very worrying, with authorities continuing to apply the “zero point of fixation” policy, under which temporary shelters were systematically dismantled, sometimes with excessive use of force, every 48 hours. How were migrants informed of the 48 hour rule and the possible dismantling of their temporary shelters? Could the State consider the use of more humane and proportionate alternatives to dismantling these shelters, including increasing the capacity of reception centres? What measures had been adopted to facilitate reporting on police abuses?

The Committee was concerned by reports that migrants had been detained at the French-Italian border without having obtained legal documents explaining their detention. How did France ensure that such detentions were not arbitrary and that all migrants were informed of their procedural rights? The Committee was also informed that the immigration law of 2 January 2024 expanded the criteria for expulsion to include minor offences, and allowed authorities to place a foreign person in administrative detention for reasons related to a potential threat to public order without justification, as well as allowing detention to be extended and reducing procedural rights. How was it ensured that these measures were compatible with the provisions of the Covenant?

The Committee had received information that the State party continued to issue expulsion notices for the return of persons to countries where they were at risk of serious violations of their rights. How did the State party ensure respect for the principle of non-refoulement in all cases of expulsion? Regarding the internal borders of the Schengen area, in particular the issue of rapid refoulement at the border between France and Italy, the Committee noted with appreciation the State party’s follow-up to the conclusion of the Court of Justice of the European Union. The Committee welcomed the annulment by the Council of State, in February, of certain parts of the Code on the Entry and Residence of Foreigners and the Right of Asylum.

However, information had been received that foreign nationals continued to be forcibly returned to Italy without having had access to a proper asylum procedure. How did France ensure the individualised examination of all applications and effective access to asylum procedures? Did the State intend to end the use of bone tests in law and in practice? What was the objective of the January 2024 law to establish files to identify unaccompanied minors suspected of a criminal offence? Who controlled these files and who kept them? What measures had been taken to ensure adequate temporary accommodation and emergency accommodation for unaccompanied minors?

One Committee Expert said France had adopted the third national action plan against human trafficking (2024-2027) at the beginning of 2024. Could the evaluation of achievements from the second action plan be provided and what goals were set for the third plan? What were the measures developed to combat trafficking? Could victims receive compensation within the criminal procedure, or did they have to undergo civil suits for compensation? What safeguards were in place to protect victims themselves from criminal accountability? What methods had been developed for victims’ identification? Had trainings been organised for prosecutors, judges and lawyers on human trafficking?

The Committee was concerned by numerous reports that the ban on manifestation of religious beliefs by means of clothing, headgear or other religious symbols was a source of tension in French society and was seen by some as disrespect for multiculturism, fuelling the sense of discrimination, racism, anti-Semitism, and Islamophobia. What measures were being taken to ensure that the ban on expressing religion by means of religious clothing, headgear or symbols did not have a discriminatory effect in practice? How was it ensured that all visible religious symbols were treated equally? What criteria was used to decide what symbol should be treated as conspicuous and thus be banned, while others were treated as discrete and allowed? How did the State party avoid that the ban on manifestation of religious beliefs by means of clothing affected predominantly Muslim girls and women?

What safeguards were in place to ensure that provisions on the dissolution of association would not be broadly interpreted and end in violating the right to freedom of assembly? There had been examples of associations, such as Uprisings of the Earth, labelled as eco-terrorists. Could the delegation provide its views on this? The Committee was concerned at the expansion of police powers to stop and check persons in the vicinity of protests, and the effect that this could have on the effective enjoyment of the right of peaceful assembly. A significant number of protesters had been arrested and detained and a small percentage of the protesters arrested had been charged. What was the position of the State party on these allegations? How were personal dignity and respect understood by the courts?

Another Expert said the year 2023 was marked by a succession of bans on demonstrations, particularly related to the mobilisation against the pension reform, or those carried out in support of the Palestinian people. In October 2023, the Minister of the Interior issued a memo calling on local authorities to pre-emptively ban all demonstrations of solidarity with the Palestine people. The ban was challenged before the Council of State, which determined that local authorities had to judge on a case-by-case basis the risks to public order and thus avoid repression by invoking public order, excessive force or arbitrary arrest. This had had repercussions, even in the area of the right to information, which was concerning.

Did the National Law Enforcement Scheme adopted in September 2020 mention the path of “de-escalation”, as a strategic principle for policing political manifestations in Europe, supported by the European Union? The Committee had expressed concern about allegations of ill treatment, excessive use of force, and disproportionate use of intermediate force weapons, in particular during arrests, forced evacuations, and law enforcement operations. A 2017 law (the Cazeneuve law) created a common framework for the use of weapons, allowing police to use armed force in five different cases. However, the number of deaths had increased fivefold after the 2017 law, causing France to become the country in the European Union with the largest numbers of people killed or injured by shots fired by police.

Could the delegation explain the extent to which law enforcement agencies followed the applicable protocols in practice, with supporting statistics, and respected the principles of necessity, proportionality, precaution, non-discrimination and self-defence in the use of weapons? What measures, in terms of training for law enforcement agencies, were envisaged? Would the State party be willing to review the legal framework on the use of weapons and limit the use of firearms within the Security Code? What follow-up had been given to decision 2020-131 of the Defender of Rights on general recommendations on law enforcement practices with regard to the rules of ethics?

According to a decision by the Ombudsman, France was the only country in Europe to use stun grenades to keep demonstrators at bay. Would grenades continue to be used despite the serious mutilations and injuries they caused? Could the delegation provide updated information on the number of persons who had died as a result of police operations during arrests, including through the excessive use of force, and on the outcome of investigations into such deaths, sanctions imposed, and reparations provided to victims and their families? Could statistics be provided on the number of proposals for sanctions presented by the Defender of Rights and what became of them, in particular the number of prosecutions?

Would the Brigades for the Repression of Motorised Violent Actions be dissolved? The State party’s report provided information on complaints and investigations initiated concerning members of the security forces. What measures would be taken to make the relevant statistical data more reliable, disaggregated and complete?

Responses by the Delegation

The delegation said the evacuations of camps in Calais which took place were done through either a legal or an administrative decision. These decisions were carried out with proper supervision and were overseen by the Government and social organizations. Unaccompanied minors were housed in emergency shelter systems when possible and the same for adults when possible.

France guaranteed the right to protest and freedom of collective speech and expression of ideas. The French State allowed journalists free circulation. France was seeking to strike a balance because there were now many journalists without press identification who ran risks, placing themselves between protesters and law enforcement officials. Law enforcement officers were called on to show professional behaviour at all times, including in situations where protests were violent.

Videos in public spaces were used to call attention to pre-determined actions; they did not have any impact on the right to protest. France supported the European plan for protecting journalists against violence. This had allowed for additional guarantees to be provided in certain cases.

French authorities were mobilised to support efforts against hate speech, and there were efforts to address this phenomenon within the Ministry of Justice. When cases were thrown out, they could be appealed before the appeals court. Investigations into allegations of hate speech were underway.

The administrative police were evacuating camps, which were aimed at putting an end to illegal occupation and squatting of lands. These operations on the ground involved parameters being established. Regarding expulsions in Calais, 36 operations had taken place. They were based on the same legal foundations; the anti-squat laws had been utilised to proceed with the evacuation. Minors were always supported. The State was aware of the situation of unaccompanied minors in Calais. Systems had been put in place to address these realities and identify the unaccompanied minors. Work was being done with associations on the ground in Calais, including Doctors without Borders. The shelters were only 20 minutes from Calais and allowed for daily operations and support. This distance was far enough to protect unaccompanied minors from traffickers found in these camps.

When foreigners were not eligible for asylum seeking procedures, they could then be placed under administrative detention in administrative detention centres. These decisions were subjected to oversight by judges. During the detention period, foreigners benefitted from health care support and legal counsel. Voluntary returnees received financial support. Some countries were not considered to be safe, and therefore returns were only on a voluntary basis. Since October 2022, the Government was active in Mayotte, allowing active participation in the asylum-seeking process.

There were 2,100 victims of trafficking and exploitation in 2023, a six per cent increase compared to 2022. Around 882 people had been sentenced for exploitation and trafficking. France thanked civil society for helping contribute to the National Action Plan against Trafficking. Training was an important part of the strategy to combat trafficking; there was a training course on human trafficking with a focus on modern slavery. Training was provided to 150 different professionals. To care for the victims of human trafficking, several mechanisms were in place, including an early detection mechanism.

France guaranteed the rights of citizens at the highest level, and any restrictions applied to all religions equally. There was freedom for an individual to display religious signs, but this needed to be assessed on a case-by-case basis. Any restriction on a religious symbol was only imposed if they were identified as a risk to the public service.

Freedom of expression was guaranteed in France, but this could result in some groups promoting racist and hate speech. The law of 2021 amended the list of cases where a dissolution could take place, broadening the list of discriminatory measures which could lead to a dissolution.

The Public Ministry could carry out prosecutions. Sometimes the Prosecutor could enact educational measures instead, which was used in some cases of minors. The judges of France were required to argue for their decisions, given that there were no automatic sentences in the State. This was also true for those found guilty of threatening public order.

France was one of the first countries to call for a ceasefire in Gaza. There had been a significant increase in anti-Semitic acts since October 2023. Freedom to demonstrate was a fundamental right protected by the Constitution and protests were not subjected to authorisation. There should be a notification to law enforcement around 15 days before to protect the safety of those participating and those living in the area. The prohibition of protests was only carried out if it was believed they were a threat to public order, and this was done with the oversight of a judge. Exceptionally, some protests had been prohibited due to the risk they posed to public order.

The use of firearms in France was regulated by the Criminal Code. This allowed a gradual response to respect necessity and proportionality to the violence and the threat. The goal was to reduce the risk of threatening life and the integrity of people. The police and gendarmerie were trained on how to use these weapons. Regarding the brigades, several changes in the practices of demonstrators, including the increase in use of social media, had meant that for three years, the strategy had changed. On average, there were two to three protests every day in Paris. To meet this challenge, the brigades were developed and had been used to break up certain disruptive groups. Since October 2023, the Ministry of Justice had circulated a document on combatting offences related to terrorist activities.

The fight against Islamophobia was a strong State policy. The strong Muslim community in France should be able to live with their beliefs peacefully to enjoy their religion. Any law which might be seen as a restriction did not target any specific population or any specific religion.

Questions by Committee Experts

A Committee Expert asked if minors in Mayotte could be afforded the same protections as in metropolitan France?

Another Expert said hate speech online affected artists and activists in the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex community. What had been done to prevent this?

An Expert said there had been a significant increase in those killed or wounded during protests or police operations. Were grenades and defensive bullets still used? What happened when police used these weapons? Was there a compulsory inquiry? Was there oversight regarding each use of weapons?

Responses by the Delegation

Minors were subjected to an age evaluation before they were recorded as minors. If recorded as a minor, they should not undergo another evaluation. The dismantling of camps was based on public legal rulings. The individuals were informed, and efforts were made to help them find shelters or to change their immigration status. Readmission into the Schengen space was a complex issue.

There was a doctrine for the use of medium weapons which allowed gradual and proportionate use. Recent changes allowed France to address the risk of wounds with these weapons. Law enforcement officers needed to be clearly trained on each type of weapon on a regular basis. There was a proposal to replace grenades with non-lethal “flash-bangs”. Random visits were undertaken to police and gendarmerie stations as a form of auditing. Efforts were made to identify the amount of time weapons were used.

Closing Remarks

ISABELLE ROME, Ambassador for Human Rights of France and head of the delegation, thanked the Committee for the dialogue. France was deeply attached to the rule of law and was a living democracy; the Committee’s recommendations would be scrupulously considered. France would continue to progress with an open-minded spirit, in partnership with civil society and the national human rights institution. The country was committed to renewing dialogue with the territory of New Caledonia and its inhabitants.

TANIA MARÍA ABDO ROCHOLL, Committee Chairperson, thanked the delegation for the dialogue, which had covered a wide range of subjects under the Covenant. The Committee aimed to ensure the highest level of implementation of the Covenant in France.

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CCPR.24.024E

Produced by the United Nations Information Service in Geneva for use of the information media; not an official record.

English and French versions of our releases are different as they are the product of two separate coverage teams that work independently.

MIL OSI United Nations News –

January 25, 2025
MIL-OSI Economics: [Galaxy Unpacked 2025] Galaxy Tech Forum ② Health AI: Integrated Wellness Solutions for Smarter Health Management

Source: Samsung

Samsung hosted the Galaxy Tech Forums on January 23 in San Jose, California. The panels provided an in-depth exploration of Samsung’s AI innovations and the challenges they address across four key areas — Sustainability, Health AI, Galaxy AI and Home AI. During the Health AI session, experts shared insights into how AI technologies are shaping the future of daily health management.

Samsung Electronics is leveraging AI technology to enhance its comprehensive health solutions, delivering more meaningful and personalized health experiences.

To understand how Samsung’s AI ecosystem is poised to transform the future of wellness, Samsung Newsroom observed the second Tech Forum session, titled “The Role of Technology for a Healthier Life.”

▲ (From left to right) Dr. Vanessa Hill, Dr. Hon Pak, Dr. Patrick O’Connor, Emily English and Dr. Kyu Rhee

Healthy Living Starts With a Holistic Approach
Moderator Dr. Vanessa Hill, an award-winning science communicator and sleep scientist, started the discussion by providing insights into the practical utility of today’s health technology.

While advancements such as wearable devices, health apps and telehealth platforms have made health management more accessible, the sheer volume of information can lead to confusion — making it easy to overlook critical insights amid an overwhelming sea of data.

▲ Dr. Patrick O’Connor from the University of Georgia

“The issue is not the amount of data but the fragmentation,” said Dr. Patrick O’Connor, a professor in the Department of Kinesiology at Mary Frances Early College of Education, University of Georgia. “The key is to bring the scattered data together to create a comprehensive understanding, as health requires a holistic approach due to the interconnectedness of so many factors.”

“As a sleep scientist I know the importance of gathering health data around the clock. Identifying abnormalities in metrics like heart rate, temperature or even snoring during sleep is key to not only unlocking better sleep, but better overall health,” said Dr. Hill, who emphasized that sleep is the foundation of holistic health.

Personalized Care Through Various Health Metrics and Continuous Tracking
The discussion also explored the importance of adding new health metrics to track, and monitoring those metrics in a continuous manner.

▲ Dr. Kyu Rhee from the NACHC

“Continuous health monitoring of physical activity, sleep, nutrition and stress should become new, additional vital signs for users and health professionals,” said Dr. Kyu Rhee, President and CEO of the National Association of Community Health Centers (NACHC). “Combining this essential health data with clinical data powered by AI insights has the potential to transform the health system by improving health outcomes, reducing healthcare costs, and empowering patients, their caregivers and healthcare teams.”

▲ Dr. Hon Pak from Samsung Electronics

One health metric receiving a substantial amount of attention from both Samsung and the digital health industry in general is blood glucose.

“Blood glucose is an area Samsung has been deeply invested in, and we’ve made significant progress in developing CGM-integrated nutrition coaching as well as enhancing non-invasive technologies for tracking blood glucose levels,” said Dr. Hon Pak, Senior Vice President and Head of Digital Health Team, Mobile eXperience Business at Samsung Electronics, sharing the company’s roadmap for blood glucose management and end-to-end (E2E) healthcare experiences. “These advancements are all part of our work to deliver more proactive and preventive disease detection solutions to everyone, helping lower healthcare burdens on people, their families and society at large.”

▲ Emily English, a BSc nutritionist

“There isn’t a one-size-fits-all approach to health and nutrition, it’s a journey that requires a holistic understanding of yourself,” said Emily English, a BSc nutritionist. “Wellness technology is helping provide a full 360-view of your life. New solutions that offer easy access to health metrics like blood glucose will offer a more holistic understanding of our bodies and revolutionize the way we manage our everyday health.”

Ushering in the Era of Personalized Health Insights
The discussion touched on how AI can translate tracked health data into actionable and meaningful insights.

▲ The Tech Forum discussion on Health AI

In an effort to consolidate disparate data onto a single platform, Samsung has collaborated with Dr. O’Connor’s research team to develop Energy Score — a feature that enhances the digital healthcare experience. “New AI-enabled features like Energy Score have become a jumping off point for broader health innovations,” explained Dr. Pak. Calculated based on health indicators such as activity levels, sleep, heart rate during sleep and heart rate variability during sleep, Energy Score exemplifies how wearable devices and AI can support a holistic and personalized approach to health and wellness management.

▲ Dr. Patrick O’Connor describes Energy Score.

“Monitoring overall readiness might benefit from minimally invasive brain sensing technology,” said Dr. O’Connor. “Today, we are able to leverage non-invasive technology, the available science and AI to generate an Energy Score, helping translate complex data into an intuitive and understandable index.”

Dr. Pak also teased Samsung’s upcoming plans to expand the AI capabilities of Energy Score to include nutrition, mental health and even mobile usage patterns — offering users deeper and more comprehensive insights into their overall well-being.

The Health AI session underscored the importance of a holistic approach to health management, highlighting the potential of personalized health experiences powered by continuous health monitoring. As AI becomes an indispensable partner in modern wellness, Samsung’s innovative technology is set to drive a new era of tailored and comprehensive health solutions.

MIL OSI Economics –

January 25, 2025
MIL-OSI Submissions: Environment – First global gathering of Food and Plastics Networks to prevent devastating environmental impacts

Source: WRAP

Pact Network Connect 2025 – First global gathering of Food and Plastics Networks share actions to cut food and plastic waste and prevent devastating effects on planet.

Representatives from 15 countries met in Mexico this week for Pact Network Connect 2025, a three-day programme focussed on addressing the issue of our broken food systems, and the spiralling environmental cost of plastic pollution and waste.

Convened by global environmental action NGO WRAP, Pact Network Connect 2025 was the first time the two networks – 13 international Plastics Pacts run in conjunction with the Ellen MacArthur Foundation – and 11 Food Pacts met as one to share experiences and strategies to strengthen collaborative efforts on the two environmental crises.

The Pacts represent collaborative action initiatives formed in country by private and public sector organisations, charities and NGOs. Representatives from the Pact Secretariats joined investors and philanthropic organisations to co-design solutions to key food and plastics triggers. Focus was on generating practical steps and actions to tackle plastics pollution within the 19 countries comprising the Plastics Pact Network – and share more widely, and address food waste and loss in the 10 countries encompassing the first Food Pact Network.

Harriet Lamb, CEO WRAP, “The numerous Pacts are the engine rooms driving forward a new circular economy for plastics and food. They give me hope that we can correct the failures of our food and plastic systems. They show that ahead of securing global inter-governmental agreements at scale, companies, ngos and governments can get behind voluntary action as an agile and effective front runner along the road to transformation. We’re delighted to be in Mexico, bringing together leaders from the food and plastics Pacts for the first ever joint global meeting to share solutions and accelerate change.”

Pact Network Connect 2025 built on the learnings and progress achieved in the first Plastic Pact Network meeting, held in South Africa in 2024 inspiring the move to bring together both Food and Plastics Pacts to amplify impact. The Plastics Pact Network meeting had an added sense of urgency this year, given the lack of agreement on key elements for a global treaty to end plastic pollution at INC5 negotiations in Busan 2024. To achieve this, we need ambitious regulation to complement and accelerate voluntary efforts and create a level playing field for all businesses. The Plastics Pacts are uniquely placed to inform and enable policymaking and treaty implementation through the Network’s large repository of tools, insights, guidance, and standardised definitions.

Marta Longhurst, Pacts and Field-building Lead Ellen MacArthur Foundation, “The Plastics Pacts have proved that such a network can deliver real impact towards eliminating plastic waste and pollution. Thanks to Plastics Pacts, tens of billions of problematic or unnecessary plastic items have been eliminated; design for reusability, recyclability, and composability in practice and at scale has increased by 23%; and incorporation of recycled content back into packaging has increased by 44%. We are pleased to see the tangible impact of the Plastics Pacts, and to see this knowledge shared and applied to other sectors to accelerate the transition to a circular economy worldwide.”

The Plastics Pact Network is a global coordinated response to the hazards plastics pose to people and the planet. Managed through a partnership between WRAP and the Ellen MacArthur Foundation, in just six years the Plastic Pacts have led work tackling pollution and delivering impact on national and global scales. The Network includes over 900 local and global organisations across a 19-country membership. Its members have eliminated more than 360,000 tonnes of problematic and unnecessary plastics and increased recycled content in their packaging by 44% – reducing virgin plastic by 2.2 million tonnes by 2022. All Plastics Pacts align in a common vision to create a circular economy for plastics and eliminate waste and pollution.

Alejandra Kopaitic, Directora Consumo y Producción Sustentable y Pacto Chileno de los Plásticos, “Pact Network Connect is a key event when many countries can share experiences, foster regional collaboration, and strengthen our global partnerships. It will enrich the Chilean Plastics Pact as part of this international network committed to systemic change. We are here to listen, learn, and collaborate, while showcasing the work we are doing in Chile and aligning our goals with international experience and best practices.”

Ninel Escobar, Director of Climate Change WWF Mexico, “In México, between 38% and 58% of plastic waste is mismanaged. Resolving this problem requires us to work along the whole life cycle of plastic, using a systemic approach. We are pleased to join our Pact partners at Pact Network Connect to share our experiences of resolving these complex problems.”

The Food Pact Network connects collaborative action initiatives within individual countries to a global community dedicated to reducing food loss and waste. This is the first time the group has joined forces in person as the Food Pact Network, and through the universal adoption of the principles of Target-Measure-Act the Pacts are changing how food is produced and consumed to support the UN Sustainable Development Goal 12.3 to halve global food waste by 2030.

Notes

The Plastics Pact Network includes: ANZPAC Plastics Pact, The Canada Plastics Pact, Polski Pakt Plastikowy – The Polish Plastics Pact, The U.S. Plastics Pact, Pacto Português para os Plásticos- The Portuguese Plastics Pact, The South African Plastics Pact, UK Plastics Pact, Pacte National sur les emballages plastiques – French Plastics Pact, Circula El Plástico – The Chilean Plastics Pact, The Kenya Plastics Pact (KPP), Colombia Plastics Pact, India Plastics Pact and Mexico Plastics Pact.

The Food Pact Network includes: Courtauld Commitment 2030 (UK), South Africa Food Loss and Waste Initiative, Pacific Coast Food Waste Commitment, Pacto Por La Comida (Mexico), GRASP 2030 (Indonesia), Brasil Sem Desperdisio (Brazil, launching in 2025), U.S. Food Waste Pact, Samen Tegen Voedselverspilling (Netherlands) , Kai Commitment (New Zealand) and the International Food Waste Coalition.

WRAP is a global environmental action NGO catalysing policy makers, businesses and individuals to transform the systems that create our food, textiles and manufactured products. Together these account for nearly 50% of global greenhouse emissions. Our goal is to enable the world to transition from the old take-make-dispose model of production to more sustainable approaches that will radically reduce waste and carbon emissions from everyday products. To do so we examine sustainability challenges through the lens of people’s day-to-day lives and create solutions that can transform entire systems to benefit the planet, nature and people.

Our work includes: UK Plastics Pact, Courtauld Commitment 2030, Textiles 2030 and the campaigns Love Food Hate Waste and Recycle Now. We run Food Waste Action Week and Recycle Week.

MIL OSI – Submitted News –

January 25, 2025
MIL-OSI New Zealand: Activist News – No humanitarian visas for Palestinians victims of genocide but plenty of rest and recreation for Israeli soldiers involved in genocide – PSNA

Source: Palestine Solidarity Network Aotearoa (PSNA)

Nationwide rallies this weekend will be calling for the government to suspend entry to New Zealand from soldiers in the Israeli Defence Forces.

“New Zealand should not be providing rest and recreation for Israeli soldiers fresh from the genocide in Gaza”, says PSNA National Chair John Minto. “We wouldn’t allow Russian soldiers to come here for rest and recreation from the invasion of Ukraine so why would we accept soldiers from the genocidal, apartheid state of Israel?”

As well as the working holiday visa, since 2019 Israelis can enter New Zealand for three months without needing a visa at all. This visa-waiver is used by Israeli soldiers for “rest and recreation” from the genocide in Gaza.

Israeli Defence Forces actions have resulted in at least 47,000 Palestinians killed – 70% of whom are women and children.

The International Court of Justice has declared Israeli actions a “plausible genocide” Amnesty International, and Human Rights Watch have used the terms genocide and extermination which the latest report from United Nations Special Rapporteur, Francesca Albanese, is entitled “Genocide as colonial erasure”.

Meanwhile the International Criminal Court has issued arrest warrants for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Israeli Defence minister Yoav Gallant for war crimes and crimes against humanity.

All these red flags for genocide have been visible for months but the government is still giving the green light to those involved in war crimes to enter New Zealand.

PSNA has written to the government again in December asking for the suspension of travel to New Zealand for all Israeli soldiers and reservists.

New Zealand has signed the Genocide convention which requires us to prevent and punish the crime of genocide. The government is complicit with its silence.

It’s long past the time for the government to step up.

John Minto

National Chair

Palestine Solidarity Network Aotearoa

MIL OSI New Zealand News –

January 25, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – Case of Boualem Sansal in Algeria – P10_TA(2025)0005 – Thursday, 23 January 2025 – Strasbourg

Source: European Parliament

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to its previous resolutions on Algeria,

–  having regard to Rules 150(5) and 136(4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.  whereas on 16 November 2024 the Algerian authorities arrested French-Algerian writer Boualem Sansal, who had publicly taken a robust stance against the authoritarian regime, calling for freedom of expression in Algeria; whereas his whereabouts remained unknown for over a week, during which time he was denied access to his family and legal counsel, contrary to international law; whereas Sansal was interrogated without his lawyer, violating his right to a fair trial; whereas he was subsequently charged with national security-related offences under Article 87bis of the Algerian Penal Code, a provision frequently used against government critics, including human rights defenders; whereas Sansal has been hospitalised several times;

B.  whereas Algeria is a signatory to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; whereas Algeria has undertaken to respect and promote freedom of expression in full compliance with its international obligations, the EU-Algeria partnership priorities, and its Constitution; whereas new amendments to the Penal Code were adopted in 2024 imposing significant restrictions on freedom of expression;

C.  whereas freedom of expression in Algeria has deteriorated, with the country falling to 139th place on the 2024 World Press Freedom Index; whereas journalists have been placed under increasing pressure and are often detained and prosecuted; whereas at least 215 people are being held in Algeria as prisoners of opinion, according to Algerian human rights defenders; whereas censorship, trials and harsh punishment of independent media, often accused of colluding with foreign powers against national security, continue to increase;

D.  whereas between 2021 and 2024 the EU disbursed EUR 213 million to Algeria under the Multiannual Indicative Programme;

1.  Condemns the arrest and detention of Boualem Sansal and calls for his immediate and unconditional release;

2.  Equally condemns the arrests of all other activists, political prisoners, journalists, human rights defenders and others detained or sentenced for exercising their right to freedom of opinion and expression, including journalist Abdelwakil Blamm and writer Tadjadit Mohamed, and calls for their release;

3.  Urges the EU institutions and the EU Delegation to publicly share their concerns with the Algerian authorities, and to organise a medical mission to assess Sansal’s health;

4.  Calls on the Algerian authorities to review all repressive laws restricting freedoms, in particular Articles 87bis, 95bis and 196bis of Algeria’s Penal Code, and the judiciary’s independence, in order to protect the freedom of the press as enshrined in Article 54 of Algeria’s Constitution;

5.  Reiterates, as enshrined in the EU-Algeria Partnership Priorities, the importance of the rule of law in order to consolidate freedom of expression; stresses that renewing this agreement must be based upon continued and substantial progress in the aforementioned domains and underscores that all future disbursements of EU funds should consider the progress made in this regard;

6.  Instructs its President to have this resolution translated into Arabic and forwarded to the Algerian Authorities, the Commission and the VP/HR.

MIL OSI Europe News –

January 25, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – Situation in Venezuela following the usurpation of the presidency on 10 January 2025 – P10_TA(2025)0007 – Thursday, 23 January 2025 – Strasbourg

Source: European Parliament

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to its previous resolutions on Venezuela, in particular that of 19 September 2024 on the situation in Venezuela(1),

–  having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and to other UN human rights treaties and instruments,

–  having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,

–  having regard to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC),

–  having regard to the Venezuelan Constitution,

–  having regard to the statements of the Carter Center of 30 July 2024 on the Venezuelan election, and of 2 October 2024 legitimising the electoral records presented by the democratic opposition,

–  having regard to the detailed findings of the independent international fact-finding mission on the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela of 14 October 2024,

–  having regard to the report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of 27 December 2024 on human rights violations following the elections in Venezuela,

–  having regard to the statement of 10 January 2025 by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on behalf of the European Union on the events of 10 January 2025,

–  having regard to the statement of 15 January 2025 by the Spokesperson of the European External Action Service (EEAS) on recent decisions by the Venezuelan authorities,

–  having regard to the Partial Agreement on the Promotion of Political Rights and Electoral Guarantees for All, signed by Nicolás Maduro’s regime and the Venezuelan opposition alliance, the Unitary Platform, in October 2023 (the Barbados Agreement),

–  having regard to Rule 136(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.  whereas on 28 July 2024, the Venezuelan people voted peacefully and in large numbers to determine the future of their country, demonstrating outstanding civic and democratic behaviour; whereas after voting closed, the regime-controlled National Electoral Council (CNE) refused to publish the official record of electoral records (‘actas’) and falsified the results of the election, announcing the false victory of Maduro; whereas millions of Venezuelans voted for democratic change by supporting Edmundo González Urrutia by a significant majority (67,05 % of votes cast), according to publicly available copies of electoral records corroborated by the only credible and impartial international observers, the UN mission and the Carter Center;

B.  whereas in the aftermath of the election, peaceful protests took place across the country to contest the fraudulent display by the Maduro regime; whereas these protests were met with extreme violence and repression, resulting in at least 23 deaths and over 2 500 arrests and enforced disappearances, including of approximately 120 children; whereas Venezuelan non-governmental organisations have reported that, as of 1 January 2025, there are at least 1 697 political prisoners in the country;

C.  whereas several foreign nationals, including EU citizens, remain under arrest on false charges of ‘destabilisation’;

D.  whereas the democratic opposition to the regime faced ongoing persecution even before the elections of 28 July 2024, but this harassment has escalated significantly since then, in particular through enforced disappearances and arbitrary arrests; whereas María Corina Machado remains forced to live clandestinely because of threats against her life and Edmundo González Urrutia was forced to flee the country with his family as a result of serious threats; whereas since 20 March 2024, six close collaborators of Vente Venezuela have sought refuge in the Argentinian embassy in Caracas, where they continue to face increasing pressure and harassment by the Venezuelan security forces;

E.  whereas human rights violations continue, including arbitrary detentions, excessive use of force, unlawful killings, enforced disappearances, harassment, persecution and prosecution of citizens exercising their right to peaceful assembly and freedom of expression, as well as violations of due process; whereas in addition to the political and institutional crisis, Venezuela is experiencing a deep economic, social and demographic crisis that is severely affecting the lives of its citizens;

F.  whereas on 19 September 2024, Parliament recognised Edmundo González Urrutia as the legitimate and democratically elected President of Venezuela and María Corina Machado as the leader of the democratic forces in Venezuela; whereas other democratic states in the region and throughout the world have recognised González as President-elect; whereas he should have been sworn in on 10 January 2025; whereas on 17 December 2024, Parliament awarded the 2024 Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought to María Corina Machado, as the leader of the democratic forces in Venezuela, and to President-elect Edmundo González Urrutia, representing all Venezuelans inside and outside the country fighting for the reinstitution of freedom and democracy;

G.  whereas just days before 10 January 2025, the regime kidnapped Edmundo González’s son-in-law Rafael Tudares and his whereabouts remain unknown; whereas, in the same way, the regime harassed María Corina Machado’s mother in her own house; whereas many other politicians and staff of the democratic opposition to the regime have also faced persecution, arbitrary arrests and enforced disappearances, including presidential candidate Enrique Márquez;

H.  whereas on 9 January 2025, the Venezuelan people, led by María Corina Machado, protested in the streets against Nicolás Maduro’s latest attempt to illegitimately seize power; whereas María Corina Machado was abducted by the regime’s forces while attempting to leave the protest, and was later released, in a blatant act of targeted intimidation and harassment that received widespread international condemnation;

I.  whereas on 10 January 2025, dictator Nicolás Maduro illegitimately took power in a fraudulent act, without any democratic legitimacy and verifiable evidence of electoral integrity; whereas the ceremony was attended by no democratically elected head of state or government; whereas the borders of the country were closed and the airspace was heavily guarded, which prevented Edmundo González Urrutia from travelling to Venezuela;

J.  whereas since the fraudulent and illegitimate seizure of power, the Maduro regime has ordered the diplomatic presence of some EU Member States to be considerably reduced, in an arbitrary manner, which the regime justifies as being in response to ‘the hostile behaviour of the governments of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, France, and Italy, characterised by their support for extremist groups and their interference in internal affairs’;

K.  whereas according to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), around eight million Venezuelans have left the country since 2014, the largest exodus in Latin America’s recent history and one of the largest displacement crises in the world;

L.  whereas on 10 January 2025, the Council decided to adopt a new package of targeted sanctions against 15 individuals responsible for undermining democracy, the rule of law or human rights in Venezuela;

1.  Condemns in the strongest possible terms the usurpation of the presidency by Nicolás Maduro and highlights that his regime is illegitimate and his usurpation of the presidency constitutes an unlawful attempt to remain in power by force;

2.  Recalls that on the basis of the electoral records submitted by the democratic opposition to the regime and as stated by the independent international organisations present at the elections on 28 July 2024, namely the United Nations mission and the Carter Center, Parliament recognised Edmundo González Urrutia as the legitimate winner of the presidential elections, a victory acknowledged by the EU and its Member States;

3.  Reiterates its call in its resolution of September 2024, and also expressed on numerous occasions by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, on the regime-controlled CNE to publish the electoral records of the elections of 28 July 2024;

4.  Coincides with the Member States that the Venezuelan regime has missed a key opportunity to respect the will of the people and ensure a transparent democratic transition in the country and that as a result Maduro lacks any democratic legitimacy and therefore Parliament does not recognise him;

5.  Welcomes the statement of the High Representative on behalf of the EU Member States recognising the victory of Edmundo González Urrutia by a significant majority, and Parliament considers that he should have taken the presidential oath on 10 January 2025; also welcomes the commitment by the EU to continue to address the urgent needs of the people of Venezuela, who are suffering the consequences of the long humanitarian crisis;

6.  Commends the democratic opposition’s resilience and the Venezuelan people’s commitment to democracy in the face of repression and adversity; reiterates that respecting the will of the Venezuelan people as expressed in the elections remains the only way for Venezuela to restore democracy, allowing for a peaceful and genuine transition, and to solve the current humanitarian and socio-economic crisis; urges the Venezuelan regime to revoke the unjustified arrest warrant issued for Edmundo González Urrutia;

7.  Welcomes the recent Council decision of 10 January 2025 to extend the targeted sanctions to 15 additional individuals; calls for these sanctions to be strengthened and expanded to include Nicolás Maduro, his inner circle and their families, including Jorge Rodríguez and Vladimir Padrino López, and all those responsible for violations of human rights, the illegitimate assertion of authority, the usurpation of official functions and all repressive acts in Venezuela;

8.  Expresses concern for Alberto Trentini, an Italian citizen and a volunteer for the non-governmental organisation Humanity & Inclusion that helps people with disabilities, who was arrested by the Venezuelan authorities on 15 November 2024 during a humanitarian mission and of whom there has been no news since his arrest; highlights that Mr Trentini also suffers from health problems and does not have medicines or any basic necessities with him;

9.  Further condemns the persecution perpetrated by the regime against the democratic opposition to the regime and the Venezuelan people, as well as against many EU citizens who have been arbitrarily detained and remain unjustly imprisoned; calls for an end to the systematic pattern of human rights violations; demands the immediate and unconditional release of all political prisoners and arbitrarily detained persons; demands that the Maduro regime cease its policy of human rights abuses and violations and hold those responsible to account, and that it ensure that all fundamental freedoms and human rights are fully respected;

10.  Fully supports the ICC investigations into the Venezuelan regime’s extensive crimes and acts of repression;

11.  Urges the EU, its Member States and all democratic regional and international actors to unconditionally align, as a moral duty, with the democratic forces of Venezuela and to do their utmost to restore democracy in the country in order to show solidarity with and respect for the Venezuelan people and their legitimate will and right to live in freedom and peace in a democratic system; reaffirms its unwavering commitment to the Venezuelan people and to defending democracy, the rule of law and human rights; stands in solidarity with Venezuela’s democratic forces;

12.  Welcomes the return to Caracas of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR); believes that the OHCHR, the UN Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Venezuela, the ICC and relevant regional mechanisms should operate freely and without interference;

13.  Draws attention to the fact that the illegitimate seizure of power by Maduro has exacerbated a pre-existing dire humanitarian crisis, which had already driven over eight million Venezuelans to seek refuge abroad, and will likely force even more to flee, leading to renewed and escalating migratory pressure that will be felt most acutely in the direct neighbourhood of Venezuela; recalls that the situation of Venezuelan refugees and migrants demands long-term solutions; recognises the numerous efforts by neighbouring countries to provide not only food and housing, but also regular legal documentation, schooling and medical support; calls for the EU to do its utmost to assist Venezuelans leaving their country in line with international standards and existing legal pathways;

14.  Deplores the decision of January 2025 by the Venezuelan authorities to substantially reduce the accredited diplomatic staff of several Member States in Caracas and urges the immediate reversal of this unacceptable unilateral action;

15.  Believes that in the disjunction between democracy and dictatorship, there is no room for ambiguity or middle ground, as one is either on the side of the democrats and those that suffer from repression, or on the side of the dictators;

16.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the EU-Community of Latin American and Caribbean States summit participants, the Euro-Latin American Parliamentary Assembly, the Organization of American States, the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the authorities of the Venezuelan regime.

(1) OJ C, C/2024/7215, 10.12.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/7215/oj.

MIL OSI Europe News –

January 25, 2025
MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: India Charts Path for Global Leadership in Frontier Technologies at “Technology Dialogue 2025”

Source: Government of India (2)

India Charts Path for Global Leadership in Frontier Technologies at “Technology Dialogue 2025”

Dr. Jitendra Singh Unveils “Vision India Techade”, envisaging global leadership role for India

Cites ANRF, Quantum Mission and AI Push

The Minister Highlights AI Summit and UN Quantum Science Contributions

Dr.Jitendra Singh Stresses Cross-Sector Synergies to Harness AI and Quantum for Societal Impact

Posted On: 24 JAN 2025 8:08PM by PIB Delhi

Addressing the “Technology Dialogue 2025”, held at the Indian Institute of Science (IISc) here, Dr. Jitendra Singh, Minister of State (Independent Charge) for Science & Technology, unveiled “Vision India Techade”, envisaging global leadership role for India, particularly in innovation and technology.

Dr. Jitendra Singh emphasized that science and technology form the cornerstone of India’s vision to transform into a global hub for innovation, economic growth and solutions to pressing global issues such as climate change and public health. Highlighting the government’s initiatives like the Anusandhan National Research Foundation (ANRF), National Quantum Mission, and the India AI mission, he affirmed India’s commitment to making the 2020s a “Techade for India.”

Union Minister Dr. Jitendra Singh virtually addressing the “Technology Dialogue 2025” conducted by Indian Institute of Science (IISc), Bengaluru.

“Strategic international collaborations are essential for India to cement its place as a global technology leader,” Dr. Jitendra Singh noted. He underscored the need to partner with like-minded nations to advance critical technologies like quantum computing, artificial intelligence, and green hydrogen.

India’s leadership role in global technology governance was highlighted through its co-chairmanship of the Summit for Action on Artificial Intelligence, set to take place in France next month, and its active contributions to the United Nations’ International Year of Quantum Science and Technology in 2025. “Our aim is to foster equitable partnerships that address global challenges while enhancing India’s integration into the global value chain,” he said.

The Minister also focused on integrating cross-sectoral synergies, such as combining AI with biotechnology or quantum computing with secure communication systems, to amplify societal and economic impact. Ethical technology governance, responsible innovation, and robust intellectual property protections are pivotal, he emphasized, for ensuring that technological progress benefits all.

India’s vibrant StarUp ecosystem, with over 100 unicorns and a supportive policy environment, was described as a magnet for foreign direct investments in frontier technologies. Dr. Jitendra Singh stressed the importance of strong intellectual property rights frameworks to attract global investors while fostering equitable technology sharing.

The Indian diaspora’s vital role in strengthening international partnerships was another key point. Dr. Jitendra Singh highlighted initiatives like the VAIBHAV Summit and OCI Scientist Scheme, which connect Indian innovators abroad with domestic stakeholders to drive co-innovation and capacity-building.

In conclusion, the Minister said, “India’s technological journey is about contributing meaningfully to global progress while ensuring sustainable and inclusive growth.” With its talent, dynamic startups, and global partnerships, India is poised to lead the world into a future powered by transformative technologies.

The event brought together dignitaries, industry leaders, and academics from around the world to discuss priorities for India’s International Technology Engagement Framework (ITEF).

*****

NKR /PSM

(Release ID: 2095961) Visitor Counter : 65

MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

January 25, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Export of asbestos banned in the EU – P-002866/2024(ASW)
Source: European Parliament

Regulation (EU) No 649/2012[1] implements the United Nations Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent (PIC) procedure for certain hazardous chemicals and pesticides in international trade.

The export notification is built on the principle that it is for importing countries to decide whether to consent to the import of certain chemicals ( including asbestos ) and that exporting countries must respect those decisions.

According to the Commission’s information, in the past 5 years Chrysotile was exported in 2021 from France to India in a quantity of 0.001 tonnes in the form of articles containing the fibre (contained in aircrafts).

As regards exports of asbestos fibres ( Actinolite, Amosite, Anthophyllite, Chrysotile, Crocidolite, Tremolite) in the past 5 years, according to the database on export notifications[2], exports from EU Member States had only been planned in 2020 (to Australia, Canada, China, Israel, Switzerland, Singapore, Taiwan, United States) and in 2022 (to the United Kingdom).

These exports are exempted from the scope of the PIC Regulation as the chemicals are ‘exported for the purpose of research or analysis in quantities that are unlikely to affect human health or the environment and that in any event do not exceed 10 kg from each exporter to each importing country per calendar year’[3]. But the Commission does not know whether these exports took place and in which quantity below 10 kg.

In parallel, the Chemicals strategy for sustainability[4] states that the EU will, in line with international commitments, ensure that hazardous chemicals banned in the EU are not produced for export, including by amending relevant legislation if and as needed. A study on this initiative is ongoing and will inform about the available options.
- [1] Regulation (EU) No 649/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 concerning the export and import of hazardous chemicals (recast), OJ L 201, 27.7.2012, p. 60-106.
- [2] https://echa.europa.eu/fr/information-on-chemicals/pic/export-notifications
- [3] Article 2(3) of the PIC Regulation.
- [4] https://environment.ec.europa.eu/strategy/chemicals-strategy_en
MIL OSI Europe News –
January 25, 2025

MIL-OSI Europe: Debates – Thursday, 23 January 2025 – Strasbourg – Revised edition

Source: European Parliament

Verbatim report of proceedings

344k

764k

Thursday, 23 January 2025 – Strasbourg

1.	Opening of the sitting
2.	Combating Desertification: 16th session of the Conference of the Parties (COP16) of the United Nations Convention (debate)
3.	Resumption of the sitting
4.	Cryptocurrencies – need for global standards (debate)
5.	Resumption of the sitting
6.	Composition of new committees
7.	Composition of committees and delegations
8.	Voting time
	8.1.	Case of Jean-Jacques Wondo in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (RC-B10-0069/2025, B10-0065/2025, B10-0069/2025, B10-0070/2025, B10-0072/2025, B10-0078/2025, B10-0081/2025, B10-0084/2025) (vote)
	8.2.	Systematic repression of human rights in Iran, notably the cases of Pakhshan Azizi and Wrisha Moradi, and the taking of EU citizens as hostages (RC-B10-0066/2025, B10-0063/2025, B10-0066/2025, B10-0067/2025, B10-0073/2025, B10-0082/2025, B10-0085/2025, B10-0086/2025) (vote)
	8.3.	Case of Boualem Sansal in Algeria (RC-B10-0087/2025, B10-0087/2025, B10-0088/2025, B10-0089/2025, B10-0090/2025, B10-0091/2025, B10-0092/2025, B10-0093/2025) (vote)
	8.4.	Russia’s disinformation and historical falsification to justify its war of aggression against Ukraine (RC-B10-0074/2025, B10-0074/2025, B10-0075/2025, B10-0076/2025, B10-0077/2025, B10-0079/2025) (vote)
	8.5.	Situation in Venezuela following the usurpation of the presidency on 10 January 2025 (RC-B10-0064/2025, B10-0064/2025, B10-0068/2025, B10-0071/2025, B10-0080/2025, B10-0083/2025) (vote)
9.	Resumption of the sitting
10.	Approval of the minutes of the previous sitting
11.	Major interpellations (debate)
12.	Explanations of votes
13.	Approval of the minutes of the sitting and forwarding of texts adopted
14.	Dates of forthcoming sittings
15.	Closure of the sitting
16.	Adjournment of the session

PRÉSIDENCE: YOUNOUS OMARJEE
Vice-Président

1. Opening of the sitting

(La séance est ouverte à 09h01)

2. Combating Desertification: 16th session of the Conference of the Parties (COP16) of the United Nations Convention (debate)

Jessika Roswall, Member of the Commission. – Mr President, honourable Members, healthy soils are fundamental for our collective future. Without rich and fertile soils, we have no food and many farmers have their livelihoods affected. We must pay more attention to combating land degradation and enhancing drought resilience for our economy and for our security.

Europe is not immune to these issues. One of our key political priorities for the coming mandate, the new water resilience strategy, comes from the realisation that our European and global waters are under unsustainable pressure. At the same time, our Joint Research Centre Soil Observatory notes that at least 62 % of EU soils are affected by degradation.

Droughts have substantial impacts on nearly all regions of the EU. This is why I travelled to Riyadh for the opening of the desertification COP16 on my first day as European Commissioner. I wanted to send a strong signal of the EU’s clear commitment to multilateralism and to cooperation with international partners on our key environmental challenges.

The desertification COP followed the two meetings of the climate and biodiversity COPs. The day before it started, countries failed to agree on a global treaty on plastic pollution. On desertification, despite the EU’s strong engagement, we reached a mixed result in Riyadh. Parties were not able to reach a compromise on the main topic on the agenda – an instrument to address droughts. It is disappointing that we cannot bridge our differences and reach consensus on such critical issues.

We were also disappointed in the outcome on gender and civil society organisations. The participation of these organisations increases transparency and democratic accountability. Their contribution is essential. However, some countries increasingly challenge the role and contributions of civil society organisations.

Finally, we were disappointed that the parties were reluctant to embrace synergies across the three Rio Conventions on desertification, climate and biodiversity.

However, we did also make progress on several fronts, and every bit of multilateral success is worth celebrating. We reached an agreement on establishing the Science-Policy Interface as a permanent body. We also adopted decisions on land tenure, on migration related to desertification, land degradation and droughts, and on avoiding, reducing and reversing degradation on agricultural land. It was the first time in the history of the Convention that agricultural land degradation was addressed. We must look at sustainable agricultural practices and healthy land together.

Finally, after a 10‑year freeze, the parties agreed to increase the core budget of the Convention. This is an important step to ensure that global challenges like desertification, drought and water scarcity are properly addressed in the multilateral agenda.

The EU is contributing to the concrete implementation of the Convention, particularly through our continued support for the Great Green Wall, an inspiring UNCCD flagship initiative that the EU is proud to champion. Building on this commitment, the EU has launched the second phase of the UN World Restoration Flagship, Regreening Africa, which is a key contribution to the Green Wall Initiative.

Honourable Members, the EU and its Member States will need to step up efforts to protect our values and implement international commitments in the UNCCD and within the EU. In this regard, I am happy to report that the Commission is responding to the commitments of the European Court of Auditors by developing a methodology to assess land degradation and certification for the EU. This will require careful preparation and strategic alliances. We need to address land use, climate change, biodiversity loss, water scarcity and pollution in a coherent manner.

Honourable Members, these are reflections from my first ever COP, and I am convinced that this COP on desertification needs to be more central. We also cannot look at the outcome of Riyadh without acknowledging that international negotiations have become more difficult, more complex and interconnected when the world is facing several ecological crises. Biodiversity, climate, food, water and energy challenges are all interconnected with land use.

I’m now looking forward to hearing your views.

Carmen Crespo Díaz, en nombre del Grupo PPE. – Señor presidente, señora comisaria, gracias por el empuje al tema del agua desde la nueva Comisión. Creemos que es fundamental. Yo soy de una tierra desértica, al lado del desierto de Europa de Tabernas, y allí se demuestra con la huerta de Europa —porque el 80 % del producto de frutas y hortalizas se exporta desde allí —que es posible abordar esta cuestión. ¿Por qué? Porque hay veinte veces menor huella hídrica en todos los productos agroalimentarios.

Ese es el gran milagro: que para las infraestructuras hidráulicas se utilicen los fondos Next Generation, el Banco Europeo de Inversiones y se creen infraestructuras donde la ciencia, con todo lo que se está investigando, permita. Creo en estos momentos que es fundamental prestar atención a todas las fuentes hídricas: todas son necesarias, algunas en prevención y otras adecuadas a las cuestiones agrarias. Creo que es importantísima la economía circular, y las aguas residuales nos dan una oportunidad en Europa de tener agua regenerada, que incluso podemos inyectar a nuestra hucha del futuro, que son, en este caso, todas las aguas subterráneas.

Por ello, creo que se puede hacer, que tenemos la obligación de hacerlo y que, además, en este momento, los países como España, como el mío, deberían trabajar en estas infraestructuras hidráulicas de prevención —también adaptadas a lo que es el tema agrario— y, por supuesto, bajar los impuestos, el IVA de los alimentos, que la rebaja no se ha prorrogado en este momento en ese decreto trampa que ayer llevaron al Congreso de los Diputados. Creo que es fundamental la seguridad alimentaria y, para conseguirla, tenemos que trabajar en las infraestructuras hidráulicas, como la nueva Comisión y la nueva comisaria están haciendo en este momento en Europa.

Marta Temido, em nome do Grupo S&D. – Senhor Presidente, Senhora Comissária, Caros Colegas, a desertificação e a degradação dos solos, tal como as alterações climáticas, são uma realidade que põe em causa os direitos humanos mais básicos, como o direito à alimentação ou o direito ao acesso à água limpa e segura. Atingem, em especial, as comunidades mais vulneráveis, as mulheres, as crianças, os povos indígenas, mas, potencialmente, vão atingir-nos a todos.

E a COP 16, que decorreu em Riade no passado mês de dezembro, reforçou a urgência do combate a estes fenómenos, através da intensificação da colaboração internacional e de uma abordagem integrada. A União Europeia reafirmou o seu compromisso com a meta global de neutralidade da degradação da terra e o empenho em atingir este objetivo até 2030, através de incentivos aos Estados-Membros para que adotem políticas que favoreçam a restauração das terras e a implementação de práticas agrícolas sustentáveis.

Por isso, a União Europeia tem de continuar a incentivar a adoção destas práticas agrícolas regenerativas, que respeitem os ecossistemas naturais e contribuam para a restauração de solos degradados, e deve bater-se pela implementação da Lei do Restauro da Natureza. Mas a inclusão da sociedade civil e do setor privado neste combate são essenciais, e isso exige iniciativas de apoio.

Quero referir, aqui, uma iniciativa da sociedade civil do meu país, Portugal, que exemplifica bem esta luta que precisamos de levar a cabo com ela. E é a iniciativa Pró-Montado Alentejo, um projeto que visa promover a construção de uma barreira florestal ativa na região sul de Portugal, baseada no montado de sobreiro e azinheira, com o objetivo de mitigar os efeitos das alterações climáticas, combater a desertificação, proteger a diversidade e, enfim, combater o despovoamento.

Julien Leonardelli, au nom du groupe PfE. – Monsieur le Président, la COP16 a été, sans aucun doute, la plus grande réunion d’États à ce jour sur le sujet de la désertification. Elle se tenait à Riyad, ce qui a permis aux participants de constater à quel point ce problème bouleverse des puissances régionales qui reposaient autrefois sur l’agriculture, comme l’Éthiopie ou l’Égypte. Ce véritable fléau est aujourd’hui à nos portes. On l’observe déjà en Grèce, en Italie, mais aussi dans ma région au sud de la France, en Occitanie, où l’eau courante des habitants est désormais rationnée en été, lors des canicules, où les agriculteurs ne peuvent pas toujours arroser leurs cultures et où les feux de forêt se font de plus en plus fréquents.

Aujourd’hui, le temps n’est plus aux belles intentions et aux fausses promesses, mais au changement. Les Européens touchés par l’artificialisation des sols et la sécheresse méritent mieux que les ânonnements suffisants de ceux qui se tiennent dans des tours de verre et de béton. Pour répondre à ce défi, il faut privilégier les circuits courts, réduire le libre-échange débridé qui pollue notre air et nos océans et se tourner vers l’innovation et la recherche, à l’image des pays du Golfe. Ne restons pas spectateurs, soyons les acteurs de notre salut avant qu’il ne soit trop tard.

Francesco Ventola, a nome del gruppo ECR. – Signor Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, dal rapporto COP16 la desertificazione e la siccità rappresentano non solo emergenze ambientali, ma anche minacce sociali ed economiche per intere regioni.

I dati forniti sottolineano che oltre il 40 % delle terre globali è degradato e che la siccità provoca perdite economiche annuali che superano i 300 miliardi. In Italia, questo si traduce in una crisi che colpisce soprattutto il comparto agricolo.

Si rende sempre più necessaria e indispensabile la realizzazione di infrastrutture che ottimizzino il sistema di raccolta, conservazione e distribuzione della risorsa acqua. È necessario investire in impianti di riuso delle acque reflue. Nessuna goccia deve essere dispersa: non ce lo possiamo permettere.

Non possiamo più accettare false politiche ambientali ideologizzate, che bloccano sui territori la realizzazione di progetti innovativi e realmente sostenibili. Bisogna intraprendere tutte le strade che la scienza e la tecnologia ci offrono per fronteggiare il rischio desertificazione.

Cari colleghi, non limitiamoci solo a parlare dei problemi: agiamo per risolverli e facciamolo con determinazione, per il bene dei nostri territori, dell’Europa e delle generazioni future.

Martin Hojsík, za skupinu Renew. – Vážený pán predsedajúci, vážená pani komisárka, vážené kolegyne, vážení kolegovia, aj keď sa takpovediac symbolicky konferencia dohody OSN o dezertifikácii konala v Saudskej Arábii uprostred púšte, nie je to téma, ktorá sa týka len Arabského polostrova a Afriky. Je to téma, ktorá sa veľmi bytostne týka aj nás v Európe. Dezertifikácia je každodenným problémom na Cypre, v Španielsku, v Taliansku, ale aj uprostred Európy. U nás doma na Slovensku každým rokom vidíme väčší a väčší podiel pôdy, ktorú už farmári nedokážu obhospodarovať, ktorá sa nám stráca takpovediac priamo pred očami, pretože sa vysušuje. O tom je dezertifikácia. Sucho a nedostatok vody sa stali fenoménom našej doby a keď prídu, tak prídu ako záplavy. Klimatická kríza sa mení na klimatickú katastrofu. Ničíme biodiverzitu a meníme krajinu v púšť. V niektorých častiach Slovenska farmári prišli až o 40 % svojich výnosov kvôli dezertifikácii. Taký obrovský to je problém. Preto ako spravodajca Európskeho parlamentu pre zákon o pôde, naozaj vás chcem vyzvať, aby ste ho podporili. Dúfam, že sa nám spolu s Komisiou a Radou podarí dosiahnuť čoskoro v trialógu dohodu. Základom je mať kvalitné informácie. V Rijáde sa dohodla medzinárodná platforma. V Európe takú nemáme, zákon o pôde ju vie poskytnúť.

Pär Holmgren, för Verts/ALE gruppen. – Herr talman! Kommissionär Roswall! Klimatförändringarna handlar verkligen inte bara om att det blir varmare på planeten, utan ett mycket större hot i stora delar av världen är förändringarna i nederbördsklimatet. Det blir mer nederbörd, kraftigare nederbörd på de platser där vi redan har mycket vatten. Men framför allt, i det här sammanhang som vi diskuterar nu, på många platser, inte minst där vi har en stor del av mänskligheten, där vi har en stor del av jordbruk och matproduktion, blir det nu sakta men säkert torrare.

Det är ett enormt stort akut hot mot oss och vår matproduktion. Det här gäller inte bara andra delar av världen, det gäller här hemma i Europa också. Vi ser delar av framför allt Sydeuropa, hur skördar av till exempel majs och vete redan har sjunkit med storleksordningen 60 %.

Vi vet också att det torrare klimatet, det torrare, lokala och regionala klimatet, medför en massa riskkonsekvenser. Till exempel de förskräckliga översvämningar som vi såg i Valencia senast förvärrades så mycket av att marken där först hade blivit så torr och hård att den inte kunde ta emot vatten.

Som kommissionär Roswall konstaterade: På COP16, visst i vissa steg, i vissa sammanhang tog vi steg framåt, men som ofta i sådana här sammanhang var det lite blandade resultat. Det största problemet är att vi återigen misslyckades med att få ett bindande globalt ramverk när det gäller att bekämpa torka.

Hade ansvariga politiker redan i slutet på 1900‑talet tagit hänsyn till den forskning som fanns då hade vi förhoppningsvis inte varit där vi är nu. Men nu är vi där vi är, och det innebär att vi, inte minst här i EU, måste höja ambitionerna, både när det gäller att minska utsläppen och arbeta ännu mer aktivt med klimatanpassning.

Catarina Martins, em nome do Grupo The Left. – Senhor Presidente, nos próximos 25 anos, três em cada quatro pessoas será afetada pela seca a nível mundial. É uma catástrofe e está aqui. A Europa está a aquecer mais rápido do que o resto do mundo e a seca prolongada chegou décadas antes do que estava previsto.

Por isso mesmo, e apesar do veto dos Estados Unidos e do Japão a um acordo para um regime global de resiliência à seca, a União Europeia não pode desistir desse objetivo e deve agir a todos os níveis.

Venho de um país, Portugal, onde a agricultura superintensiva condena boa parte da população alentejana e algarvia, incluindo os pequenos agricultores, a uma vida sem água. O que produzem não alimenta essas populações nem deixa riqueza no país. Tudo é exportado, incluindo os lucros. Por lá, ficam só os solos degradados.

Por isso, bem sei que esta não é a luta da ecologia contra a agricultura, é a das nossas vidas, incluindo a produção alimentar, contra a voragem das multinacionais do agronegócio. E por isso, Senhora Comissária, vai ser mesmo preciso coragem para enfrentar alguns dos mais poderosos interesses económicos.

Zsuzsanna Borvendég, a ESN képviselőcsoport nevében. – Tisztelt Elnök Úr! Magyarország termőföldjei az emberi tevékenység miatt száradnak ki. A Kárpát-medence természetes vízháztartása elegendő vizet biztosítana, ha a tájnak megfelelő módon gazdálkodnánk.

De ma mindent a profitéhség határoz meg, amely kizsákmányolja a környezetet. Ártereink helyén zöldhasút termő szántóföldek vannak. Hagyjuk, hogy a folyók átvágtassanak az országon, ahelyett, hogy átitatnák a talajt az éltető vízzel.

Az uniós döntéshozatal a klímaválság kapcsán a levegő összetételére fókuszál, és erre hivatkozva betarthatatlan emissziós szabályokat alkot, de az ennek érdekében használt új technológiák a talaj és a talajvizek elszennyeződését fokozzák.

Magyarországon az aszállyal párhuzamosan az akkumulátorgyárak vízszennyező hatásával is számolni kell, vagyis nálunk is a gazdasági lobbik írják felül a környezetvédelmet.

A Föld egy komplex rendszer, amely komplex válaszokat igényel, nem lehet kiragadni egyes problémákat. Ha valós megoldásokat akarunk, akkor a lokalitás felé kell mozdulnunk, és uniós forrásokból is a helyi sajátosságoknak megfelelő természetközeli megoldásokat kell támogatnunk.

Christine Schneider (PPE). – Herr Präsident, Frau Kommissarin, meine sehr geehrten Damen und Herren! Wüstenbildung ist eine globale Herausforderung, und Europa ist immer stärker betroffen. Unsere Ernährungssicherheit, die wir lange für selbstverständlich hielten, ist bedroht. Eine Lösung kann nur mit und nicht gegen unsere Landwirtinnen und Landwirte gefunden werden. Was passiert, wenn wir über ihre Köpfe hinweg entscheiden, das haben die letzten Jahre gezeigt. Bauernproteste sind zwischenzeitlich vor diesem Haus zum Alltag geworden. Daher mein dringender Appell: Beziehen Sie von Anfang an den Berufsstand mit ein, insbesondere bei der angekündigten Water Resilience Strategy.

Drei Aspekte möchte ich hervorheben: Wir brauchen erstens ein intelligentes Wassermanagement. Nutzen wir die künstliche Intelligenz, um Wasserressourcen effizient zu verteilen. Setzen wir auf Wiederverwendung von Grauwasser und Abwasser, und bauen wir wassersparende Infrastruktur aus. So können wir Wasser nachhaltig zwischen den Regionen und Sektoren nutzen. Zweitens: dürreresistentes Saatgut. Es ist unverzichtbar, um Erträge selbst unter extremen Klimabedingungen zu sichern. Dazu brauchen wir neue Züchtungstechnologien, und die Blockade im Rat muss beendet werden. Drittens: Innovative Bewässerungslösungen, Tröpfchen- und Präzisionsbewässerung nutzen Sensorendaten, setzen Wasser ganz gezielt ein und vermeiden dadurch Verluste. Diese Technologien müssen wir stärker fördern, um unsere Landwirtschaft noch effizienter und nachhaltiger zu machen.

Kurz zusammengefasst: Wenn wir Ernährungssicherheit wollen, brauchen wir neue Technologien und innovative Lösungen in enger Zusammenarbeit mit unseren internationalen Partnern, mit unseren Landwirten, aber auch mit uns Verbraucherinnen und Verbrauchern.

Σάκης Αρναούτογλου (S&D). – Κύριε Πρόεδρε, η Γη μας, πηγή ζωής για αιώνες, αντιμετωπίζει τον κίνδυνο να μετατραπεί σε πηγή αφανισμού. Οφείλουμε να αποτρέψουμε τη μετατροπή εύφορων περιοχών σε ερημωμένα τοπία. Όταν το έδαφος καταστρέφεται, διακυβεύεται το μέλλον της ανθρωπότητας. Η ζωή δεν μπορεί να ευδοκιμήσει σε καμένη γη. Η Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση καλείται να αναλάβει ηγετικό ρόλο, διακηρύσσοντας την ανάγκη για ορθολογική διαχείριση των φυσικών πόρων και τερματισμό επιτέλους της αδράνειας. Η συνέχιση της παρούσας πορείας θα οδηγήσει στη συγκομιδή των συνεπειών της αδιαφορίας μας και όχι των καρπών της γης. Προτείνω τη σύναψη ενός Συμφώνου για Ζωντανή Γη, μια συμφωνία που θα προβλέπει την αντιστάθμιση κάθε χαμένης έκτασης με την αναγέννηση διπλάσιας έκτασης μέσω βιώσιμων επενδύσεων. Μια τέτοια πρωτοβουλία θα μπορούσε να αποτελέσει ένα νέο παγκόσμιο πρότυπο για τη βιώσιμη διαχείριση των εδαφών. Δεν πρόκειται για μια ουτοπική ιδέα, αλλά για μια επιτακτική ανάγκη. Παρά τις προσπάθειες για την προστασία του πλανήτη, παρατηρούμε την εστίαση ορισμένων στην εξερεύνηση διαστημικών προορισμών, παραβλέποντας την ανάγκη για άμεση δράση στη Γη. Φαίνεται να προκρίνεται η κατάκτηση ενός απομακρυσμένου κόκκινου πλανήτη εις βάρος της διαφύλαξης του πράσινου πλανήτη μας. Επιπλέον, διαπιστώνεται η ενίσχυση ρητορικών που αμφισβητούν την κρισιμότητα της κατάστασης, υποβαθμίζοντας τις περιβαλλοντικές προκλήσεις σε πολιτικά παιχνίδια. Η φύση μάς απευθύνει επείγουσα έκκληση. Ας την αφουγκραστούμε, πριν η σιωπή της γίνει πιο εκκωφαντική από οποιαδήποτε φωνή. Ο χρόνος για δράση είναι τώρα. Και σε όσους αναζητούν καταφύγιο σε άλλους πλανήτες, ας τους υπενθυμίσουμε ότι εκεί οι συνθήκες είναι ήδη ερημικές και θα έρθει η ερημοποίηση και στον πλανήτη μας, αν αυτό επιζητούν.

Mireia Borrás Pabón (PfE). – Señor presidente, señora comisaria, señorías, voy a ser muy clara: la CP16 ha sido otro espectáculo bochornoso de hipocresía, con líderes mundiales que vuelan en sus jets privados a Arabia Saudí; un país, por cierto, que incumple el 75 % de las restricciones medioambientales que ustedes desde aquí, desde Bruselas, imponen sin piedad a nuestros agricultores. Sí, aquellos mismos que evitan la desertificación del territorio. ¿Y qué resultados hemos obtenido? Ninguno, ningún compromiso vinculante.

Nos enfrentamos a un gran problema, señora comisaria: casi el 70 % de las tierras agrícolas mediterráneas están en riesgo de desertificación y solo en España —en mi país— dos millones de hectáreas ya están clasificadas como desérticas. ¿Y qué hace la Comisión al respecto? Lo de siempre: culpabilizar al cambio climático. Pero ¿se han planteado, por un momento, que el principal problema fuera, por ejemplo, la falta de inversión en infraestructuras hídricas? En Europa se pierden millones de toneladas de agua de riego debido a infraestructuras hídricas que están tremendamente anticuadas.

Miremos a Israel —un país que tiene recursos hídricos muy escasos y condiciones casi desérticas—, que ha revolucionado su agricultura con tecnología muy avanzada; mientras ellos aumentan su productividad un 30 %, aquí en Europa nuestros agricultores se ven obligados a abandonar sus tierras. Desde Vox ya seguimos en esta línea y propusimos un plan: un gran Plan Hidrológico Nacional para garantizar el agua y cohesionar el territorio. ¿Y qué es lo que votó toda la izquierda en bloque? Un no rotundo. ¿Y qué es lo que votó el Partido Popular? Pues se abstuvo, como siempre, cuando le gustan nuestras iniciativas, pero tienen complejo en admitirlo.

Miremos ahora a Jaén: Marmolejo, Arjona, Lopera. ¿Les suenan, señores del PP? Son lugares de España donde el Partido Popular está expropiando tierras cultivadas con olivos para construir masivamente plantas fotovoltaicas. ¿Les preocupa de verdad la desertificación, señores del PP? 100 000 olivos a la basura, en nombre de la sostenibilidad. Empezamos a pensar que ustedes prefieren el aceite de Marruecos al aceite de Jaén, pero lo cierto es que no me extrañaría ver dentro de muy poco tanto al Partido Popular como a la izquierda manifestándose juntos en contra de sus propias políticas, esta vez no en apoyo de las nucleares, sino en su falsa solidaridad con los agricultores de Jaén, tan falsa como la sostenibilidad que defienden.

Laurence Trochu (ECR). – Monsieur le Président, Madame la Commissaire, mes chers collègues, face aux enjeux climatiques, il est triste de voir que les solutions idéologiques prennent trop souvent le pas sur le bon sens. La question de la désertification n’y fait pas exception et les réponses apportées à ce problème, que personne ne nie d’ailleurs, sont souvent illusoires. À ce titre, l’opposition féroce et même, parfois, violente des écologistes français à des solutions de bon sens telles que les mégabassines, qui stockent le surplus d’eau de l’hiver pour le réutiliser l’été, est un exemple éloquent.

Alors, plutôt que de voir en l’homme uniquement un prédateur-pollueur, l’homme doit être la solution, par l’innovation, le progrès technique et la recherche. La désertification ne peut être combattue par une écologie punitive et normative à outrance, ruineuse pour notre compétitivité, comme l’a d’ailleurs souligné le rapport Draghi.

Nos agriculteurs, qui ont façonné nos paysages, sont las d’être désignés comme les principaux responsables et d’être écrasés de normes. Dernier artefact idéologique, le changement climatique est aussi utilisé comme prétexte pour justifier une immigration de masse venue du Sud dont plus personne ne veut. Alors, chers collègues, pour relever le défi du climat, sortons enfin de l’idéologie.

Billy Kelleher (Renew). – Mr President, as I stand here, my home country of Ireland is preparing to be battered by one of the strongest storms in decades. And if you look at the weather forecasts across Europe, there’s rain in many areas. So it’s a concept that is very hard to understand when we sometimes speak about desertification.

But, in reality, the scale of this problem – the desertification – should be everyone’s concern. It affects the land of homes to 1.5 billion people. The UN estimates that 135 million people have already been displaced due to desertification, and this could rise to 700 million by 2050. This land is also important agricultural land, and the UN estimates that 40 % of agricultural land has already been degraded.

The consequences are far-reaching: humanitarian, migration, environmental problems, food and water security, political stability or political instability, for global security, for trade and supply chains there are significant challenges. And each of these consequences will have an impact also on Europe and the daily lives of our citizens.

We cannot reverse the problems in the very short term, but we have to plan and we must make real collective efforts to halt its spread and to address its long-term implications. So while I welcome the commitments at the COP16 of the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification, especially regarding the financial commitments from both the public and private sector, we do need to ensure that we make a common effort to bring forward the challenges regarding drought and the protocols with regard to tackling the same.

If we are going to halt this runaway train, we need to have a common, coherent plan for tackling drought and that involves governments, businesses, local people, scientists and engineers.

Kai Tegethoff (Verts/ALE). – Mr President, the summer of 2024 is the hottest on record in the EU and globally. Thirteen Member States, meaning almost 50 % of the Member States of the EU, are affected by desertification and almost 25 % of the territory is sensitive to desertification. Still, while the EU promotes the leadership role globally, we are not prepared ourselves.

The desertification COP16 failed to agree on a global drought framework, and the Commission promised to present a water resilience strategy already a year ago. I hope this will come very soon.

And Commissioner Roswall, in your introduction, in your first sentence you said that we need to focus on helping farmers, and in the second sentence it was ‘focus on economy’. I think what we really need in that water resilience strategy is water saving targets. We need to improve efficiency and reuse of water. We need to protect and restore our water supplies and the whole catchment area.

And then at the same time, considering the wildfires and the flooding that we deal with here every single plenary session, we have to make sure that this water resilience strategy is accompanied and embedded into a real European climate adaptation law.

João Oliveira (The Left). – Senhor Presidente, o problema da desertificação é um problema ambiental ou climático, mas é essencialmente um problema da relação do ser humano com a natureza, é um problema humano, social e económico.

As conclusões da COP16 contêm muitos dos elementos relevantes para o debate sobre o combate à desertificação, mas revelam também as muitas dificuldades que é preciso ainda superar.

Há muito por fazer para que haja verdadeiramente soluções, relativamente ao uso e à gestão eficientes da água e dos recursos hídricos, relativamente à ocupação e ordenamento equilibrado do território, relativamente à promoção de práticas produtivas sustentáveis, equilibradas, seja na agricultura, na pecuária, na silvicultura. Há muito por fazer no investimento público que é preciso nos territórios rurais, para travar o abandono da população e a consequente desertificação do território.

Permitam-me trazer, aqui, um aspeto que é relevante em Portugal, que é o montado de sobreiros e azinheiras, que é característico do meu país. O montado não é apenas um conjunto de árvores que retêm carbono e resistem melhor aos incêndios. O montado é um sistema agrosilvopastoril que tem de ser encarado como tal em todas as suas dimensões, não apenas pelo valor ambiental, mas pelo enorme valor social que tem, porque cria emprego, fixa as populações, permite práticas produtivas sustentáveis e equilibradas, garante um adequado ordenamento do território na compatibilização da sua utilização para fins produtivos, mas também tem preocupações ambientais.

Este é um exemplo do investimento que precisamos de fazer em áreas e em recursos que, sendo naturais de cada país, naturalmente permitem uma resposta mais eficaz ao combate à desertificação.

Daniel Buda (PPE). – Domnule președinte, doamnă comisară, doamnelor și domnilor colegi, deșertificarea este o realitate care nu poate fi contestată, iar la COP 16 s-a subliniat acest lucru. Potrivit datelor oficiale, deșertificarea generează costuri globale de peste 300 de miliarde de euro și afectează mai mult de 1,5 miliarde de oameni, crescând presiunile migraționiste și alimentând războaiele pentru resurse.

Uniunea pierde anual 74 de miliarde de euro din cauza degradării terenurilor, iar lipsa acțiunii va reduce randamentele culturilor cu cel puțin 10 % până în 2050, generând o penurie, atât pentru apă, cât și pentru alimente. România, țara mea, se confruntă din plin cu aceste fenomene. Avem nevoie urgent de acțiuni curajoase, care nu doar să prevină acest fenomen, ci chiar să-l inverseze pe termen lung.

Pentru a ne proteja securitatea alimentară, trebuie să investim în tehnologii și soluții inovatoare, precum noile tehnici genomice în gestionarea durabilă a apei și dezvoltarea unor sisteme inteligente de irigații la prețuri accesibile pentru toți fermierii, și subliniez acest lucru: la prețuri accesibile pentru toți fermierii.

În același timp, se impune utilizarea eficientă a apelor uzate, mai ales în jurul marilor centre urbane, și investiții serioase în ceea ce înseamnă desalinizarea apei marine, toate acestea trebuind să devină o prioritate strategică și o obligație față de cetățenii noștri.

Investițiile din sectorul privat trebuie încurajate, iar Comisia trebuie să se asigure că statele membre utilizează eficient și rapid banii pentru împăduriri și perdele forestiere. Europa are la dispoziție soluții, însă fără investiții direcționate și finanțare adecvată, nu va putea face față acestor provocări.

Stimați colegi, alegerea este a noastră: să acționăm acum sau generațiile viitoare vor suporta consecințele imobilismului nostru destructibil.

Maria Grapini (S&D). – Domnule președinte, doamnă comisară, stimați colegi, sigur, dezbatem o problemă foarte importantă, păcat că sunt așa de puțini membri ai Parlamentului European în sală. Așa cum s-a declarat și aici, cum a fost și în declarația Convenției, se degradează anual terenul. S-a ajuns la 70 % din terenuri care au fost transformate din starea lor naturală.

Secetele cauzează pagube și costuri și daune, peste 300 de miliarde pe an. Unde merg aceste daune și pagube? Evident, la fermieri și, până la urmă, la cetățeni. Doar în perioada 2015-2019, circa 100 de milioane de hectare de terenuri sănătoase și productive au fost degradate anual, amenințând evident, securitatea alimentară a globului, precum și disponibilitatea apei.

Ce trebuie făcut, doamnă comisară? Ne-ați relatat ce a fost la Convenție și că nu s-a ajuns la compromisuri importante. Eu cred că Uniunea Europeană trebuie să fie preocupată mai ales de ce se întâmplă în Uniunea Europeană, sigur, și global. Eu cred că trebuie să îmbunătățim instrumentele politice naționale și europene pentru abordarea productivă de gestionare a secetei. Aici avem foarte mult de făcut. Este nevoie de alocarea de bugete pentru finanțarea restaurării terenurilor, creșterea rezistenței la secetă, prin cercetare și inovare.

Comisia Europeană trebuie să aibă un plan de acțiuni la nivelul Uniunii Europene care să combată degradarea terenurilor în colaborare cu statele membre. Și mai trebuie făcut ceva, doamnă comisară: politicile Uniunii Europene, ale Comisiei, nu trebuie să se anuleze ca la algebră – plus și minus – sunt mii de hectare acum, cu parcuri fotovoltaice, terenuri care nu mai sunt recuperate zeci de ani.

Trebuie să vedem cum corelăm politica energetică cu această politică de protejare a terenurilor și cred foarte mult că este nevoie să vă gândiți, în principal, la cum să nu creăm presiune asupra fermierilor din Uniunea Europeană, asupra cetățenilor din Uniunea Europeană, atât timp cât în restul globului, Statele Unite, Japonia și celelalte state, nu au votat la această Convenție.

Mathilde Androuët (PfE). – Monsieur le Président, à l’issue de la COP16 consacrée à la désertification qui a eu lieu à Riyad, 12 milliards ont été sécurisés d’ici 2030 pour améliorer les terres, dont dix proviennent de la Banque islamique de développement. Dans un rassemblement international, les pétromonarchies sont donc venues au secours des déserts de sable, déserts où parfois on construit, en dépit de tout souci environnemental et économique, des pistes de ski.

Voilà, une fois de plus, la démonstration qu’aux problèmes environnementaux, qui sont des problèmes localisés, on ne peut avoir de réponse globalisée. Les COP sont des rassemblements de déblocage ou de création de fonds financiers, aucunement des lieux de réflexion et d’apport de solutions environnementales. Aussi, sur le problème majeur de la désertification et de l’assèchement des sols, ayons une vision et des solutions locales. La gestion de l’eau est une question sensible et différente d’un pays à l’autre et, parfois, d’une région à l’autre dans un seul et même pays. L’an passé, dans le nord de la France, les cultures ont souffert de trop de pluies, soit l’inverse exact des Pyrénées orientales, en manque d’eau permanent.

Si vous vous refusez au traitement local pour n’opérer qu’à l’échelle européenne, prenons des problèmes communs. En Bulgarie comme en Guadeloupe, 60 % de l’eau est perdue tant les infrastructures sont vétustes et fuyardes. De même, encouragez le reboisement, le replantage des haies pour favoriser la captation de l’eau par les sols. Bref, appuyez-vous sur ceux qui connaissent le mieux leur environnement, à savoir les paysans, plutôt que sur les financiers des pétromonarchies pour régler nos problèmes d’eau et de désertification en Europe. À problème local, solution nationale.

Marie Toussaint (Verts/ALE). – Monsieur le Président, la désertification, c’est l’autre nom de l’injustice climatique et de la vulnérabilité. C’est d’ailleurs peut-être parce qu’elle a d’abord touché les pays les plus pauvres que les pays les plus riches n’y ont, pendant si longtemps, prêté que si peu d’attention. La désertification est aujourd’hui sur nous. La Corse et les parties les plus pauvres de la Méditerranée, Perpignan et ses quartiers parmi les plus précaires de France, ou encore la dévastée Mayotte, n’ont plus d’eau. En Guadeloupe, l’érosion côtière frappe, puisant dans l’assèchement des terres. Quand dans le Massif central, ce sont évidemment les petits paysans qui souffrent le plus et qui n’ont pas les moyens d’acheter du foin pour leurs élevages lorsque celui-ci vient à manquer.

Au fond, la désertification continue dans l’indifférence, parce qu’elle frappe d’abord et de manière évidente les plus vulnérables. Mais ne soyons pas naïfs: nous réaliserons bientôt que la désertification est notre affaire à tous. Espérons qu’alors il ne sera pas trop tard. En Afrique, c’est déjà 16 % du PIB qui s’est évaporé du fait de la désertification.

Madame la Commissaire, nous ne sommes pas impuissants, ici, sur le territoire européen, pour un enjeu qui est bien un enjeu planétaire. La désertification est liée au dérèglement climatique et aux énergies fossiles. Alors sortons-en, et plus vite qu’aujourd’hui. Elle est aussi liée à l’agriculture intensive et à la déforestation que nous pouvons, que nous devons combattre. Alors agissons! Il n’y a plus de temps à perdre.

Valentina Palmisano (The Left). – Signor Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, non è necessario guardare al Sahara per comprendere la desertificazione: i deserti si trovano ormai dietro casa. Sempre più spesso, immagini surreali, e allo stesso tempo drammatiche, mostrano paesaggi trasformati, fiumi ridotti a sentieri e laghi completamente prosciugati.

Il 40 % del suolo del Sud Italia è già a rischio, come tanti paesi del Mediterraneo. In questo modo, stiamo trasformando paesaggi millenari.

E questo non è soltanto il risultato del cambiamento climatico, ma anche di pratiche agricole non sostenibili, che hanno impoverito il nostro suolo. Ecco, il nostro approccio deve cambiare, privilegiando la qualità delle produzioni e la rigenerazione del suolo.

Il degrado non è inevitabile, per fortuna: possiamo invertire la rotta. Servono però incentivi per modelli agricoli basati sulla qualità e sulla rigenerazione del suolo. La politica deve smettere di finanziare pratiche obsolete e supportare invece l’innovazione.

Colleghi, la desertificazione, infatti, non è soltanto una sfida tecnica, ma è anche una questione di giustizia verso i nostri territori e soprattutto verso le generazioni future.

Il mio monito è che non sia la COP17 a salvare il suolo europeo, ma il nostro impegno concreto, oggi.

Salvatore De Meo (PPE). – Signor Presidente, signora Commissaria, onorevoli colleghi, la desertificazione è una delle sfide più urgenti del nostro tempo, aggravata dal cambiamento climatico e dalle attività dell’uomo.

Non è solo una crisi ambientale, ma un problema sociale ed economico che minaccia la biodiversità, la sicurezza alimentare e la stabilità delle nostre comunità, alimentando tensioni e migrazioni forzate.

Pensate che, ogni anno, 12 milioni di ettari vengono degradati, mettendo a rischio la sopravvivenza di oltre un miliardo di persone. Questo dato ci allarma e ci ricorda che la desertificazione, insieme alla crescente scarsità dell’acqua, richiede risposte immediate, coordinate e ambiziose.

La COP16 è stata un’occasione per riflettere sulle nostre responsabilità, perché l’Unione europea manca di un’azione comune adeguata e le risorse dedicate sono ancora troppo limitate rispetto alla portata degli interventi.

Dobbiamo impegnarci e sostenere lo sviluppo di politiche sostenibili, promuovendo pratiche agricole rigenerative e resilienti, un uso responsabile delle risorse idriche e l’innovazione tecnologica per ripristinare gli ambienti degradati.

La cooperazione internazionale, inoltre, è importante perché nessun paese può affrontare da solo questa battaglia. La desertificazione non conosce confini e le sue conseguenze si ripercuotono su scala globale. Solo lavorando insieme possiamo affrontare la complessità di questa sfida. Ciò significa condividere conoscenze, tecnologie e risorse, oltre a costruire – come si sta facendo – partenariati solidi tra governi, organizzazioni internazionali, società civile e settore privato.

Combattere la desertificazione significa investire nel futuro, nella nostra diversità, nella sicurezza alimentare e nella stabilità delle generazioni future.

Thomas Bajada (S&D). – Mr President, desertification is not a story from far, far away. Its serious implications have long been affecting the Mediterranean region due to its unique ecosystems, economic dependencies and limited natural resources.

In southern Spain, over-irrigation has led to soil erosion. In Crete, aquifers have been overexploited, leading to salinisation. In the neighbouring Sahel region, desertification has displaced millions of people, increasing migratory pressures towards Europe. And in Malta, increased pressure on desalinisation plants raised energy consumption and costs, which are passed on to households and businesses.

Today this is not a story only for southern Europeans. It is also a story shared with other Europeans from temperate and humid climates like Bulgaria. In fact, last year 45 % of the EU’s territory faced drought, threatening food production and water security.

Desertification is about humanity, our dependence on water for survival, and our need for water security and food security. Therefore, our response must be people-centred. The fight against desertification demands global cooperation, but it also starts at home in this very House. We need to dramatically increase our political commitment to water – we need to preserve our lands, help our nature to recover and conserve our water. And, dear Commissioner, we need to act now, with an ambitious European water resilience strategy before it is too late.

As rapporteur of the Parliament’s initiative, I call for decisive action to protect our people and resources and build a sustainable future of a liveable world for future generations to come.

France Jamet (PfE). – Monsieur le Président, la désertification est une menace importante, mais il en est une dont on ne parle pas assez, c’est la désertification de nos fonds marins. Déplorer l’acidification de nos océans, le réchauffement des eaux ou la hausse du niveau de la mer ne suffit pas. Il faut aussi dénoncer les causes de ce désastre. En France, par exemple, dans le Morbihan, on les trouve dans la construction stérilisante de parcs éoliens offshores ou dans les ravages de bateaux-usines sans-frontiéristes. Deux activités nocives, deux activités pourtant encouragées par l’Union européenne, qui témoignent de l’hypocrisie générale, voire de l’imposture pseudo-écologiste sur la préservation et la pérennité de nos écosystèmes.

Depuis quinze ans, on constate la dégradation alarmante de nos océans, qui menace nos richesses maritimes, les métiers qui en dépendent, au premier rang desquels nos pêcheurs, et nos ressources alimentaires. Cet équilibre si fragile, aggravé par la pollution terrestre qui se déverse dans nos mers, a aussi un impact sur nos climats et sur la désertification terrestre. La pluie salvatrice qu’attendent nos agriculteurs et les populations touchées par la sécheresse, cette pluie salvatrice ne tombe pas du ciel, elle vient de nos océans.

Alors tous ces vœux pieux et autres déclarations d’intention ne résoudront rien si nous ne remettons pas en cause l’écosystème mondialiste que vous avez mis en place, basé sur un libre-échangisme dérégulé au détriment d’un localisme raisonné et national.

Vicent Marzà Ibáñez (Verts/ALE). – Señor presidente, en los últimos diez años, la superficie desertificada en la península ibérica se ha multiplicado por veintitrés. Es especialmente preocupante en el sur de Alicante, en la Vega Baja, un territorio de transición, precisamente donde la presión urbanística es salvaje, donde la presión del sobreturismo es salvaje, y donde ahora ya no ocurre de forma aislada que se corte el agua, sino que ya es de forma recurrente. Y no solo se corta en verano, también en otros periodos del año. Ni pasa solo con el agua destinada a la gente y, por lo tanto, con el agua de boca, sino también con la que usan los agricultores.

En el mismo territorio también ya hay una lucha que se va viviendo en toda Europa, que es por la privatización del agua. Tenemos cada vez menos agua y cada vez está gestionada por menos manos y mirando siempre hacia el negocio. Por eso, hacen falta de una vez por todas políticas valientes que custodien el territorio, que nos adapten al cambio climático y que protejan a la ciudadanía, por ejemplo, ante situaciones como la dana que hemos vivido en Valencia. Y hace falta que el agua sea gestionada de forma pública para que sea un derecho garantizado para el conjunto de la ciudadanía.

(El orador acepta responder a una pregunta formulada con arreglo al procedimiento de la «tarjeta azul»)

João Oliveira (The Left), Pergunta segundo o procedimento «cartão azul». – Senhor Deputado, o Governo de Portugal avançou recentemente com uma lei chamada Lei dos Solos, que tem como objetivo permitir a construção em solos onde até hoje essa construção não era permitida. Esta decisão, naturalmente, favorece a especulação imobiliária, mas cria também problemas de desordenamento do território.

O senhor deputado vem da região de Valência — onde ainda recentemente houve uma tragédia, na sequência de umas cheias —, por isso, queria colocar-lhe uma questão precisamente a partir da sua experiência.

Considerando a experiência na região de Valência, decisões como esta do Governo português, de desordenamento do território e de favorecimento da especulação imobiliária, permitem a solução de algum problema, por exemplo, o problema da habitação — que é o pretexto que o Governo português utiliza —, ou o combate à desertificação dos territórios? Ou, pelo contrário, opções destas de desordenamento do território agravam ainda mais as consequências de catástrofes naturais, como aquelas que atingiram a região de Valência?

Vicent Marzà Ibáñez (Verts/ALE), respuesta de «tarjeta azul». – Sí, señor diputado Oliveira, la presión urbanística y la urbanización salvaje de hoy son las víctimas del mañana. Lo hemos visto en nuestra tierra con la dana: se ha construido donde no se podía construir, porque se ha visto que el territorio solo era un espacio de especulación y no para que la gente tuviera garantizado su espacio vital y se protegieran sus vidas.

La gente ha muerto por estar, entre otras cosas, urbanizando territorios que no se pueden urbanizar. Ha habido una dana que ha llegado con esa cantidad de agua brutal porque estaba absolutamente todo cimentado, porque la tierra no ha podido acoger toda el agua también. Por eso es tan importante que se combatan esas iniciativas como la del Gobierno portugués que usted dice, porque urbanizar, insisto, de forma salvaje es crear víctimas en el futuro.

Sebastian Everding (The Left). – Herr Präsident, liebe Kolleginnen und Kollegen! „Wälder gehen den Völkern voran, die Wüsten folgen ihnen“. Das sagte schon im 17. Jahrhundert der französische Schriftsteller Chateaubriand. Der Klimawandel und der massive Einsatz von Düngemitteln verstärken die Bodenerosion und auch das Artensterben. Grundwasserentnahmen für Bergbautätigkeiten, die industrielle Massentierhaltung und die Bewässerung in der Landwirtschaft entziehen Wäldern das Grundwasser, das dringend für die Regeneration in Dürrezeiten benötigt wird. Sie tragen zur Bodenversandung bei, schädigen das Ökosystem und trocknen CO2-Senken wie Moore aus. Hier muss dringend durch mehr Schutzzonen und mehr Entnahmeeinschränkungen gehandelt werden.

Ein weiteres Mittel gegen Wüstenbildung könnte ein stärkerer Fokus auf die Agroforstwirtschaft sein. Dürren bedrohen bereits jetzt die Lebensgrundlage von rund 1,8 Milliarden Menschen weltweit und bringen gefährdete Gemeinschaften immer weiter an den Rand des Abgrundes. Darüber hinaus kosten sie 300 Milliarden US‑Dollar pro Jahr und bedrohen wichtige Wirtschaftssektoren wie die Landwirtschaft, Energie und Wasser. Liebe Frau Kommissarin, liebe Kolleginnen und Kollegen, wie bei allen anderen Aspekten des Klimawandels gilt auch hier: Es ist weitaus günstiger, jetzt zu handeln, als später zu versuchen, die Folgen zu kompensieren.

(Der Redner ist damit einverstanden, auf eine Frage nach dem Verfahren der „blauen Karte“ zu antworten.)

Gabriella Gerzsenyi (PPE). – Tisztelt Elnök Úr! A teve helyes állat, de nem szeretnénk közlekedési eszközként használni. Az éghajlatváltozás miatt az elsivatagosodás Magyarországon is egyre nagyobb probléma. Duna-Tisza közi homokhátság hazánk területének mintegy 10%-a, most már az ENSZ szerint hivatalosan is félsivatag.

Ez a kormányzati tétlenségnek a szimbóluma. Csökkennek a terméshozamok, megnehezül a megélhetés, homokviharok előfordulnak, tavak száradnak ki és élőhelyek szűnnek meg. S nem csak környezeti, hanem társadalmi és gazdasági válság is, hiszen veszélyben az élelmiszer-ellátás és elnéptelenedik a vidék.

Már két évtizede tudományos tanulmány és program készült a problémára. Az akkori kormány elfogadta, a Fidesz-kormány azonban tudatosan figyelmen kívül hagyja a szakértők figyelmeztetéseit, elhanyagolja a vízgazdálkodást, a talajvédelmet, ellenben százmilliárdokat költ presztízsberuházásokra, például stadionokra.

A megoldás kulcsa az uniós, nemzeti és a helyi összefogás. Úgy véljük, hogy európai szinten átfogó stratégiára van szükség a fenntartható földhasználat és a vízvisszatartó technológiák támogatására.

A Tisza Magyarország legnépszerűbb pártja. Kormányra kerülésünk után vissza fogjuk állítani az önálló környezetvédelmi minisztériumot. Kiemelten foglalkozni fogunk a talajvédelemmel, vízgazdálkodással, európai forrásokat irányítunk az érintett közösségekhez, és támogatni fogjuk a gazdákat ebben a küzdelemben is.

César Luena (S&D). – Señor presidente, señorías, es un debate en un contexto bastante difícil, porque tenemos al nuevo inquilino de la Casa Blanca y su negacionismo, y un Grupo PPE retardista, ya lo siento. El discurso de ayer del señor Tusk nos lleva por esos senderos peligrosos.

Presento dos ideas que son como dos evidencias. El suelo es un recurso no renovable, es importante no olvidarlo. ¿Saben cuánto han aumentado las sequías en los últimos 25 años? Un 30 %. Y, en este contexto, señora comisaria, ¿qué puede hacer la Unión? Le digo que defender las políticas verdes —al paso que vamos— va a ser algo casi contracultural. Pues mire, en primer lugar, una evaluación de riesgo de desertificación y degradación de las tierras, como sugirió el Tribunal de Cuentas Europeo en el año 2018. No sabemos nada de ese informe. La Ley de vigilancia del suelo, por favor, se lo pido a sus colegas del Grupo PPE, porque la están rebajando y rebajando, como todas las normativas medioambientales. Podemos declararnos como región en riesgo de desertificación en el marco de la Convención de las Naciones Unidas. Para eso no tenemos que esperar a ninguna cumbre internacional, eso podemos hacerlo ya nosotros. Y, sobre todo, presente una estrategia específica de desertificación, como le ha dicho este Parlamento.

Fíjese: hasta cuatro grandes medidas podemos hacer nosotros solos —la Unión Europea— y dar ejemplo en el mundo. Pero claro, hay demasiado retardismo en la derecha. No caiga en eso, señora comisaria, hay muchos Grupos que la vamos a apoyar.

(El orador acepta responder a una pregunta formulada con arreglo al procedimiento de la «tarjeta azul»)

César Luena (S&D), respuesta de «tarjeta azul». – Estaba mirando, señor presidente, por si era alguien de la extrema derecha, porque no hubiera aceptado nunca nada, ni tarjeta azul ni verde.

Mire, todo lo relacionado con los fondos europeos, a pesar de su Grupo y de su política en España, lo estamos sacando adelante bien. Y no quiero recordar aquí lo que han intentado ustedes hacer con la vicepresidenta primera, Teresa Ribera. Es decir, que a pesar de que ustedes aquí estén en contra de todo y siempre estén poniendo obstáculos y problemas, nosotros estamos aplicando muy bien los fondos NextGenerationEU en España y lo seguiremos haciendo. Solo le pido una cosa: está bien que me haga esa pregunta, pero después, en España, ayuden, que siempre están en contra de todo.

Jutta Paulus (Verts/ALE). – Herr Präsident, Frau Kommissarin, liebe Kolleginnen und Kollegen! Als ich ein Kind war, war Wüste die Sahara oder die Gobi. Ferne, beeindruckende Orte, beschrieben in den Romanen von Karl May oder den Schilderungen von Sven Hedin. Und heute, nur wenige Jahrzehnte später, sehen wir Wüstenbildung in Spanien, in Portugal, in Italien, in Griechenland, in Ungarn, in Bulgarien. Wer sich da wundert, hat die Wissenschaft ignoriert oder den Einflüsterern der fossilen Industrie geglaubt. Die haben Milliarden investiert, um Zweifel zu säen – Zweifel an den Erkenntnissen, die Exxon selbst schon in den 70ern ermittelt hatte, um sie dann in den Giftschrank zu legen und öffentlich die Wissenschaft zu diskreditieren.

Die Leugner sitzen auch in diesem Haus bei den Rechten, den noch Rechteren und den noch noch Rechteren, und bei der Welt‑Wüsten‑Konferenz haben wir leider auch keine großen Fortschritte gemacht, denn auch hier sitzen ja die Petrostaaten mit am Tisch. Deshalb: Europa muss handeln. Wir brauchen ein Klimaanpassungsgesetz, das naturbasierte Lösungen in den Mittelpunkt stellt, und eine glaubwürdige Unterstützung für die Länder, die am stärksten betroffen sind.

(Die Rednerin ist damit einverstanden, auf eine Frage nach dem Verfahren der „blauen Karte“ zu antworten.)

Jutta Paulus (Verts/ALE), Antwort auf eine Frage nach dem Verfahren der „blauen Karte“. – Vielen Dank, Frau Kollegin, für die Frage. Es ist mir ein Rätsel, wo Sie Ihre Anschuldigungen und Informationen hernehmen, denn wir sind ja durchaus die Partei, die für eine bäuerliche, kleinbäuerliche, familienzentrierte Landwirtschaft eintritt, die für eine nachhaltige Landwirtschaft eintritt, die im Einklang mit dem steht, was uns die Wissenschaft empfiehlt.

Da brauchen Sie bloß mal in die Berichte unserer eigenen Agentur zu schauen – die Europäische Umweltagentur ist eine Agentur dieser Europäischen Union. Da sitzen hochmögende Wissenschaftlerinnen und Wissenschaftler, die sich seit Jahren und Jahrzehnten mit diesen Fragen beschäftigen. Und das, was wir in unseren Programmen, in unseren Vorschlägen aufgreifen, entspricht dem, was diese Wissenschaft uns vorschlägt, denn wir stehen auf dem Boden der Wissenschaft und nicht auf dem Boden der Lobbyinteressen, die hier leider ihre Papiere verbreiten.

Borja Giménez Larraz (PPE). – Señor presidente, el agua es vida y el agua es desarrollo. Hoy vemos como la desertificación avanza. La falta de agua se ha convertido en una amenaza, especialmente para los países y las regiones del sur de Europa. Aunque algunos somos más vulnerables, este desafío nos afecta a todos. Hablamos del acceso a un bien básico. Hablamos de un recurso fundamental para la agricultura y para la ganadería, para la industria, para crear empleo y fijar la población.

La Unión Europea debe implicarse de lleno en el impulso de un pacto europeo del agua que establezca medidas integrales para garantizar una gestión sostenible y eficiente de los recursos hídricos. Y ese pacto hay que dotarlo de fondos: necesitamos fondos para construir y modernizar infraestructuras hidráulicas, como embalses y presas que permitan regular cauces y gestionar periodos de sequía de forma más eficaz. Necesitamos fondos para mejorar y modernizar los sistemas de regadío. Todo ello acompañado de políticas de gestión eficiente del agua. Y hay que actuar con urgencia.

En España, en mi región, Aragón, que tiene zonas profundamente áridas y desérticas, el Parlamento autonómico aprobó por unanimidad en 1992 el llamado Pacto del Agua, un acuerdo que reivindica las obras hidráulicas necesarias para garantizar las necesidades presentes y futuras de la comunidad. Pues bien, en estos treinta años hemos avanzado muy poco: tenemos más de treinta obras pendientes. Sabemos desde hace décadas qué es lo que queremos, lo que necesitamos, pero la falta de voluntad y fondos lo ha dejado en el olvido. Ante la inacción del Gobierno de España, la Unión Europea debe adoptar un papel activo. Debe contribuir a financiar estas obras. Hoy ya no es una opción: es una obligación.

Camilla Laureti (S&D). – Signor Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, la desertificazione va affrontata a livello globale, perché mette a rischio biodiversità, risorse idriche e sicurezza alimentare e fa tremare la giustizia sociale.

Spaventa pensare che, anche a causa degli effetti della desertificazione e della siccità, entro il 2050 oltre 200 milioni di persone potrebbero essere costrette a migrare.

Lo vediamo anche in Europa: il Sud soffre sempre di più per siccità e carenza di acqua. In Italia abbiamo intere regioni che restano per lunghi periodi senz’acqua, anche a causa di una scorretta gestione della risorsa idrica. L’acqua – il nostro bene più prezioso – non è una merce, ma è un diritto, e dobbiamo incentivarne conservazione e riuso e lavorare sulle reti idriche.

Dobbiamo proteggere e ripristinare i nostri suoli, favorire con finanziamenti ad hoc e risorse il passaggio da metodi di coltivazione intensivi a pratiche agricole sostenibili. Se perdiamo i nostri suoli, perdiamo il pianeta.

La desertificazione l’abbiamo vista arrivare e porta anche, e soprattutto, la nostra impronta: per questo, dobbiamo smettere di far finta che non esista e dobbiamo agire sin da ora.

Marco Falcone (PPE). – Signor Presidente, signora Commissaria, onorevoli colleghi, in un momento in cui larga parte del continente fronteggia l’inverno, potrebbe apparire fuori contesto parlare di desertificazione e carenza idrica. Eppure, questo dovrebbe essere l’atteggiamento che qui in Europa dovremmo tutti avere: occuparci per tempo di questa enorme sfida, di questa enorme emergenza, prima che sia troppo tardi.

E ve lo dice chi arriva qua a Strasburgo da una delle due più importanti isole del Mediterraneo, la Sicilia, e rappresenta due delle più importanti isole – assieme alla Sicilia, anche la Sardegna – entrambe fortemente a rischio. Si immagina che più del 50 % del territorio delle due regioni, addirittura entro i prossimi trent’anni, potrebbe essere a rischio desertificazione.

Certo, il cambiamento climatico è un fattore decisivo. Purtroppo, però, la lotta alla desertificazione non può essere affidata solo alle misure collegate in qualche modo al Green Deal. Anzi, questo grande contenitore potrebbe diventare un luogo in cui tutto si perde, e già la Corte dei conti europea, nel 2018, aveva invitato l’Unione europea ad avere una visione completa e a porre in essere dei programmi di pianificazione.

Ecco perché noi del Partito Popolare Europeo siamo per la difesa del territorio, certamente, e riteniamo che le isole debbano essere guardate con grande attenzione. Come? Tramite un serio programma di investimenti e, se vogliamo, di infrastrutture, non solo di transizione energetica.

L’Europa deve avere il coraggio di varare un grande piano di stanziamenti strutturali per la lotta all’avanzare del deserto.

(L’oratore accetta di rispondere a una domanda “cartellino blu”)

Marco Falcone (PPE), risposta a una domanda “cartellino blu”. – Noi del Partito Popolare Europeo guardiamo a un approccio molto pragmatico. Certamente, la transizione ecologica diventa per noi il faro, ma al contempo riteniamo che un serio programma di investimenti debba essere calibrato alle esigenze del territorio. Non dobbiamo eccedere in un senso, ma nemmeno in un altro.

Certamente, gli interventi in agricoltura, gli interventi tecnologici e, se vogliamo, anche un serio piano di investimenti, soprattutto in condutture idriche di adduzione e, se vogliamo, di approvvigionamento, possono rappresentare certamente una soluzione.

Lo dico per la Sicilia – io provengo dalla Sicilia – dove l’acqua non manca, ma mancano le infrastrutture. Per cui, grazie per il suo input.

Leire Pajín (S&D). – Señor presidente, señorías, se ha dicho aquí reiteradamente, nos enfrentamos a una crisis aparentemente silenciosa, pero profundamente devastadora: la desertificación, la pérdida de suelos fértiles y de recursos hídricos. De nuevo, es una crisis global que nos afecta a todos, también en Europa, especialmente en el Mediterráneo, en países como España, en regiones como Alicante.

Hasta el 40 % de las tierras del mundo —casi la mitad— están degradadas. Esto supone una amenaza a la biodiversidad, pero también a la seguridad alimentaria. Las cifras lo dejan bien claro: el 90 % de la población mundial pasa hambre; es decir, más de 700 millones de personas, por no hablar de los cientos de miles de desplazados y de refugiados por la desertificación y por el cambio climático.

El derecho a la alimentación es fundamental. Señorías, no podemos estar hablando aquí de las sequías y de la desertificación, pero luego intentar retrasar y retardar las normas que protegen contra la degradación de los suelos o que protegen la biodiversidad. No podemos hablar aquí de las cifras, pero después querer ser más laxos con las leyes que luchan contra eso.

Por eso, señorías, como dijo el Tribunal de Cuentas, como dijo Naciones Unidas y como ha dicho el Consejo, necesitamos un plan ambicioso, transversal, que se coordine con otras Convenciones de las Naciones Unidas, con presupuesto y con objetivos, sin más demora.

Manuela Ripa (PPE). – Herr Präsident! Die Wüstenbildung ist eines der drängendsten Probleme unserer Zeit – nicht nur etwa in Afrika oder in Asien, auch in Europa. 13 EU‑Länder in Süd‑, Mittel‑ und Osteuropa sind nach eigenen Angaben bereits betroffen. Auch in anderen Teilen Europas schreitet die Austrocknung von Böden voran. Zukünftig könnten auch hier Wüsten entstehen. Dass es dringenden Handlungsbedarf gibt, dieses Bewusstsein war nicht ausreichend vorhanden bei der COP16 in Riad. Auch in der EU wird definitiv nicht genügend getan. Probleme sind voranschreitende Bodenversiegelung, Entwaldung, zu intensive Landnutzung, falsche Bewirtschaftung. Der Klimawandel mit Dürren und Starkregenereignissen beschleunigt zudem noch den Verlust fruchtbarer Böden.

Daher ist es von entscheidender Bedeutung, dass wir in Europa neben einer effektiven Wasserstrategie das EU‑Bodengesetz verabschieden – als erster wichtiger Schritt hin zu mehr Bodenschutz und gegen Wüstenbildung. Bei der Wüstenbildung ist es wie beim Klimawandel. Es ist viel kostengünstiger und einfacher, jetzt Gegenmaßnahmen zu ergreifen, als die Dinge umzukehren, wenn der Schaden schon eingetreten ist. Denn dann ist es zu spät.

Jean-Marc Germain (S&D). – Monsieur le Président, mes chers collègues, Bakou, Cali, Riyad, les différentes COP se suivent et se ressemblent. Elles sont toujours utiles par leur existence même, mais jamais à la hauteur: 40 % des sols seraient dégradés dans le monde et 75 % de la population mondiale en sera affectée d’ici à 2050, 75 %. On le sait, les plus vulnérables en sont les premières victimes.

Appelons un chat un chat: cette COP fut une déception. Et si l’Europe a fait preuve de volontarisme sur la promotion de la résilience à la sécheresse, son rôle a été plus ambigu: en s’opposant à un protocole juridiquement contraignant sur la sécheresse, en portant insuffisamment les pratiques agricoles durables et par une contribution financière insuffisante. Le Partenariat mondial de résilience à la sécheresse et ses 12 milliards de promesses a le mérite d’exister. Mais c’est une goutte d’eau, si je puis dire, par rapport aux 2 500 milliards nécessaires pour restaurer le milliard d’hectares de terres dégradées.

Alors que Donald Trump vient de sortir de l’accord sur le climat, faisons preuve de leadership. Allons en Mongolie pour la COP17 avec des propositions et des aides concrètes, faute de quoi la planète et les générations futures ne nous le pardonneront pas.

Dan-Ştefan Motreanu (PPE). – Doamnă comisară, domnule președinte, stimați colegi, deșertificarea afectează deja 13 state membre, iar seceta cauzează pierderi de 9 miliarde de euro anual. Doar în România, 400 de mii de hectare sunt afectate de deșertificare. Adoptarea Regulamentului privind restaurarea naturii impune statelor membre să refacă 20 % din terenurile degradate până în 2030.

Din păcate, regulamentul nu a fost însoțit de alocări bugetare suplimentare. Drept urmare, solicit Comisiei Europene ca în următorul exercițiu financiar să abordeze această insuficiență și să pună fonduri concrete la dispoziția țărilor din Uniune.

Totodată, pentru menținerea securității alimentare, este esențial să sporim investițiile în dezvoltarea sistemelor de irigații inteligente, utilizarea apelor urbane reziduale tratate, captarea apei pluviale și construirea de rezervoare.

În plus, rezultatele cercetării privind desalinizarea apei marine din programul Orizont Europa trebuie să fie accesibile statelor membre pentru implementarea acestor tehnologii moderne la costuri reduse.

Stefano Bonaccini (S&D). – Signor Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, siccità, incendi e pratiche produttive che minano la fertilità dei suoli stanno innalzando il rischio di desertificazione anche qui in Europa, dove 13 paesi, tra cui il mio e altri sei nel bacino del Mediterraneo in particolare, sono colpiti da questo fenomeno.

A rimetterci sono produzione e sicurezza alimentare, tessuto sociale ed economico delle aree colpite, e i nostri agricoltori, prime vittime dei cambiamenti climatici che qualcuno, addirittura ancora oggi, nega.

L’Unione europea deve essere protagonista in questa sfida a livello globale, diffondendo nei paesi più a rischio buone pratiche – ad esempio, irrigazione di precisione o depurazione e riuso agricolo delle acque reflue – e con un piano europeo per le acque, e per l’acqua, che con più risorse per le politiche di sviluppo regionale e rurale – confido per delega nel Commissario Fitto – sostenga e semplifichi investimenti per una maggiore capacità di accumulo – dighe invasi, bacini e reti di distribuzione più efficienti – e autorizzi nuove colture che necessitano di meno acqua.

Il prossimo bilancio pluriennale, allora, deve diventare l’occasione per migliorare alcune politiche dell’Unione e sostenere con i fatti, e non le parole, cittadini e imprese nel contrasto al cambiamento climatico.

Ştefan Muşoiu (S&D). – Domnule președinte, doamnă comisară, dragi colegi, la nivelul Uniunii, deșertificarea afectează 8 % din teritoriu, așa cum au precizat și colegii mei antevorbitori. Zonele cele mai prejudiciate însă sunt cele din Europa Centrală, de Sud și de Est. Și țara mea, România, suferă din cauza acestui proces nesănătos al naturii. 40 % din suprafața sa agricolă este în pericol să se transforme în dune de nisip.

De aceea, nu trebuie să permitem ca acest neajuns major să devină o amenințare la adresa siguranței alimentare a generațiilor viitoare de europeni. Acest fenomen grav trebuie decelerat prin strategii comunitare concrete și ferme.

Trebuie să avem în vedere că micii fermieri din toate aceste zone de pe continent, afectate de deșertificare, sunt și ei în pericol. Nu au cum să se lupte singuri împotriva naturii și trebuie să le venim în ajutor. Au nevoie de susținere financiară europeană care să dubleze eforturile mai mari sau mai mici ale guvernelor naționale. Mizez pe înțelepciunea noastră comună și pe o reacție mai bine conturată a Comisiei pentru frânarea acestui fenomen natural periculos.

Interventions à la demande

Hélder Sousa Silva (PPE). – Senhor Presidente, Senhora Comissária, a desertificação é um desafio crescente que se coloca à União Europeia, especialmente nos Estados-Membros do Sul e, particularmente, próximos do Mediterrâneo.

A falta de água, a exaustão dos solos e as alterações climáticas são, hoje, uma dura realidade nalgumas zonas da União e, além disso, assistimos também ao despovoamento de algumas regiões do interior por falta de atratividade e de competitividade.

Portugal enfrenta cumulativamente estes dois problemas. As regiões do Alentejo e do Algarve evidenciam uma brutal falta de água, quer para agricultura, quer para consumo humano. E as regiões próximas da fronteira com Espanha sofrem de despovoamento.

Em resultado destas duas situações, assistimos a fluxos migratórios do interior para o litoral, das zonas rurais para as zonas urbanas, que são verdadeiros problemas. Por isso, considero que o próximo quadro financeiro plurianual deve responder à desertificação e ao despovoamento e, assim, resolver o problema de coesão territorial que enfrentamos na nossa União.

Seán Kelly (PPE). – (Níor phioc an micreafón suas tús na hóráide) … labhairt ar an ábhar tábhachtach seo, gaineamhlú an domhain.

And depending on who you’re listening to, between 20 % and 40 % of land is threatened with desertification, particularly in places like the Sahel, Gobi Desert, South America. I think it’s good that the European Union are now emphasising that deforestation, in particular, has to end in any free trade deals we’ll be doing.

Within Europe, we will be shortly discussing the next CAP and, obviously, protection of the soil, nature restoration are going to be key in that. And I would make one suggestion: give every farmer in Europe a minimum of 50 trees native to their own area to set on their farm. This would help to restore nature, protect the soils and be a small step to end desertification.

Bímis ag dul ar aghaidh de réir a chéile, mar de réir a chéile a dhéantar na caisleáin.

(Fin des interventions à la demande)

Jessika Roswall, Member of the Commission. – Mr President, honourable Members, your interventions show how important it is for the EU to continue tackling the interconnected challenges of droughts, land use, climate change, biodiversity loss and water scarcity together for our economy, our security and our livelihoods. They show that we are not ignoring the difficulties we face in the current geopolitical climate. And as many of you have also mentioned, we are all affected.

I just also want to say – and this is to César Luena – that the Commission is not ignoring this. And I just want to repeat one thing that I said in my first remark: the Commission is responding to the recommendation of the European Court of Auditors by developing a methodology to assess land degradation and desertification for the EU.

Although we didn’t leave Riyadh with all our desired outcomes, we should still acknowledge and build on the important progress that was made. So now we need to keep up the momentum. We need to accelerate implementation at national and international levels, and continue our work to agree on the outstanding COP16 decisions, especially on droughts.

Many of you have underlined the importance of water and the need to make progress on strengthening our water resilience, so I also want to say – as I said earlier, and I know you know – that the Commission has made it a priority to present a new strategy on this.

I know Parliament is already making progress on its reports on this. I thank you today for your input, and I look forward to close dialogue with you, with your rapporteur, Thomas Bajada, and all of you on this important topic, and of course, on continuing fighting desertification.

(La séance est suspendue quelques instants)

IN THE CHAIR: CHRISTEL SCHALDEMOSE
Vice-President

3. Resumption of the sitting

(The sitting resumed at 10:29)

4. Cryptocurrencies – need for global standards (debate)

Magnus Brunner, Member of the Commission. – Madam President, honourable Members, first of all, sorry I’m a couple of minutes late – I was in the office, actually, but I didn’t make it here on time, I’m sorry about that. Also, thank you for the opportunity to contribute to this debate on the need to agree on global policy standards for crypto. As you may well know, these standards, of course, do exist and have been agreed in international fora. Let me give you a brief overview of how they came about and where the EU stands in their implementation.

International regulatory and policy organisations have been working on international crypto standards for a number of years now. Early on, there was an international understanding that crypto markets are global markets and are largely unregulated and pose, of course, also risks that need to be addressed. And then in 2023 the G20 unveiled the crypto-asset policy implementation roadmap, which reflected the policy and regulatory responses developed primarily by the International Monetary Fund, the Financial Stability Board and standard-setting bodies covering specific areas of finance such as the International Organization of Securities Commissions on investor protection, or also the Financial Action Task Force on anti-money laundering.

The core of these international standards on crypto are the FSB recommendations on crypto-asset markets and activities, and recommendations for global stablecoin arrangements. The European Union is the first major jurisdiction to have reflected those standards in law. We have done this by adopting the regulation on markets in crypto-assets (MiCA), which has now started to apply, and we have also amended other legislation such as the Anti-Money Laundering Directive and also the Transfer of Funds Regulation.

We are strongly committed to ensuring the global implementation of international standards. We regularly advocate this in the relevant international fora in which we as a European Union participate.

Implementation of international standards of course is necessary, not only to ensure a minimum level of policy and regulatory convergence internationally, but also to ensure that jurisdictions follow a sensible common denominator in addressing the risks also posed by the crypto markets. This is particularly important in crypto markets, which are global in nature, of course – yes, everyone knows that, with crypto exchanges and platforms operating across borders and assets also moving on open networks that are widely accessible.

The adoption of international crypto standards has so far been incremental. Indeed, jurisdictions have made progress also in implementing the policy and also the regulatory responses developed by, as I said, the IMF, the FSB and the standard‑setting bodies. Almost all FSB jurisdictions have plans to develop new – or at least revise existing – regulatory frameworks for crypto.

Information gathered at the international level suggests that the majority of FSB member jurisdictions expect to achieve alignment with the FSB framework by this year, by 2025. And this is of course very good news. We will continue to support relevant international organisations to ensure that the momentum we have now in implementing international standards on crypto is maintained. And we stand, of course, ready to work with jurisdictions that wish to benefit from our experience with MiCA. This includes the US. The US has been heavily involved in defining, together with other partners, the international standards on crypto, and I’m convinced that the new administration is fully aware of the fact that a robust policy response to crypto requires also an international effort.

We therefore look forward, of course, to continuing working with the US authorities as they consider their policy approach to crypto assets and related service providers, and we would view it as a positive development if the US were to make progress on crypto‑specific legislation that would provide greater legal clarity on the treatment of crypto assets and related service providers, while at the same time also addressing the risks we are facing. And we believe existing international standards should form the basis of any crypto framework, including, of course, the one in the US, not least because they ensure international convergence in this area and contribute to a level playing field.

Our experience in the European Union has shown that ensuring legal clarity is the right way to support innovation in these markets, while mitigating, on the other hand, of course, also the risks we are facing. Developments in the crypto market since the adoption of MiCA have only strengthened the case for legal clarity. Whatever approach the US ultimately takes, we do hope it will ensure that innovation flourishes while allowing, of course, on the other hand, also bad actors to be weeded out.

Markus Ferber, im Namen der PPE-Fraktion. – Frau Präsidentin, Herr Kommissar, liebe Kolleginnen, liebe Kollegen! Diverse Kryptowährungen, allen voran Bitcoin, haben in den vergangenen Tagen Rekordkurse erklommen. Der Grund ist klar: Die neue Administration in den Vereinigten Staaten ist diese Woche ins Amt gekommen, und sie wird sehr viel kryptofreundlicher sein als die Vorgängerverwaltung. Der neue US-Präsident spricht gar davon, eine strategische Bitcoin-Reserve aufzubauen und die USA zum Krypto-Mekka der Welt machen zu wollen. Dass Donald Trump es wohl ernst meint, sieht man auch daran, dass er selbst einen eigenen Meme Coin aufgelegt hat, der wohl nur ein Ziel hat: seinen Reichtum noch etwas zu vergrößern. Ich glaube, die Anleger werden nichts davon haben.

Unabhängig davon, wie man zu Kryptowährungen steht, unterstreicht diese Entwicklung ein grundsätzliches Problem: Obwohl Kryptowährungen ein globales Phänomen sind, haben wir keinen internationalen Ordnungsrahmen. Ein Regierungswechsel in den USA führt deshalb sehr schnell dazu, dass sich die Marktlage rapide verändert und da auch der Verbraucherschutz, auch für europäische Anleger, massiv unter die Räder kommt. In anderen Teilen des Finanzmarkts, vom Bankensektor bis zum Clearing, haben wir uns aus guten Gründen auf internationale Standards verständigt. Die haben wir im Kryptosektor bisher nicht, und das rächt sich jetzt auch.

In der Europäischen Union sind wir mit der Verordnung über Märkte für Krypto-Assets, der MiCAR, weltweit Vorreiter. Wir haben in der EU ein glaubwürdiges Regelwerk geschaffen, das den Wildwest-Auswüchsen wie in den USA einen Riegel vorschiebt und gleichzeitig Vorhersehbarkeit und Planbarkeit für alle Marktteilnehmer schafft. Es gäbe also bereits eine Blaupause für internationale Mindeststandards. Deswegen, lieber Herr Kommissar, sollten wir von dieser Blaupause Gebrauch machen und auf internationale Lösungen hinwirken. Dass das nicht einfach ist, ist klar. Aber wenn wir nicht anfangen, werden wir es nie schaffen.

Jonás Fernández, en nombre del Grupo S&D. – Señora presidenta, señor comisario, sin duda, yo creo que todos podríamos convenir en la necesidad de esas normas internacionales para el mercado de las cripto. Así he entendido las palabras de la Comisión apelando a la necesidad de fijar esos estándares mínimos.

Pero, ciertamente, viendo lo que estamos viendo al otro lado del Atlántico, yo creo que deberíamos empezar a reconsiderar los buenos propósitos y empezar a trabajar más para proteger Europa, en un tiempo en que Donald Trump e incluso su mujer emiten su propia moneda —como decía mi colega Markus Ferber— en los días previos a tomar posesión, mostrando poco respeto, en mi opinión, por la propia institucionalidad. Deberíamos recibir el mensaje en Europa, y yo creo que el mensaje que tenemos que recibir es que no podemos contar con la Administración estadounidense en los próximos años para llegar a ningún tipo de acuerdo mínimo sobre criptomonedas.

Por lo tanto, en vez de apelar a los buenos propósitos en los que llevamos empeñados años, deberíamos tener una posición mucho más asertiva y ser conscientes de que ese escenario va a ser casi imposible y que, por lo tanto, tenemos que aplicar el Reglamento MiCA —claro que hay que aplicar el Reglamento MiCA—, pero tenemos que también proteger a nuestro sector financiero, a nuestros bancos y a nuestros seguros de posibles impactos de inestabilidad financiera derivada de las cripto más allá de Europa. Y debemos también acelerar la negociación para tener un euro digital en Europa que permita ofrecer una respuesta propia a las necesidades, al parecer, de algunos inversores.

Marlena Maląg, w imieniu grupy ECR. – Szanowni Państwo. Unia Europejska dzięki wprowadzeniu przepisów MICA stała się globalnym pionierem w regulacji rynku kryptoaktywów, wyzwalając je tak naprawdę z szarej strefy. Należy docenić fakt, że regulacja MICA wprowadza obowiązek raportowania, zapewnia mechanizmy kontroli wewnętrznej oraz wymaga separacji aktywów klienta od aktywów dostawców usług kryptowalutowych. To podstawy, które zapewniają większą przejrzystość, bezpieczeństwo inwestorów. Co ważne, zabezpieczone są także interesy państw członkowskich spoza strefy euro.

Kryptowaluty, jak wiemy, nie mają granic. Musimy sobie jednak jasno powiedzieć, że różnice między krajami znacząco obniżają atrakcyjność tego rynku i spowalniają jego rozwój. Dlatego konieczne jest wypracowanie globalnych standardów regulacyjnych. Unia Europejska, choć jest liderem w tej dziedzinie, musi uważać, by nie przyjąć jak zwykle zbyt restrykcyjnego podejścia, które mogłoby wepchnąć innowacje, inwestycje w bardziej elastyczne rynki spoza Unii Europejskiej.

Jeszcze niedawno kryptowaluty ożywiały marzenia części inwestorów o infrastrukturze finansowej niezależnej od banków centralnych. Dziś te marzenia nieco osłabły. Ale kryptowaluty są i będą trwałym elementem globalnej gospodarki. Naszym zadaniem jest traktowanie kryptowalut jako narzędzi finansowych, które wymagają odpowiedniej regulacji, ale bliskich rynkom tradycyjnym, takich regulacji, które zapewnią bezpieczeństwo inwestorom, nie tłumiąc jednocześnie innowacji. Nie możemy przespać tej rewolucji. Przyszłość rynku kryptowalut wymaga równowagi między ochroną interesów klienta a umożliwieniem przede wszystkim dalszego rozwoju.

Stéphanie Yon-Courtin, au nom du groupe Renew. – Madame la Présidente, Monsieur le Commissaire, aux États-Unis, Donald Trump se rêve en président de la crypto. Résultat, la cryptosphère s’enflamme, une cryptomonnaie créée à son effigie et une autre dédiée à Melania, le bitcoin qui s’envole et la démission du président de l’Autorité des marchés financiers américains. Pendant ce chaos, en Europe, nous avons fait un choix différent: réguler pour protéger.

Avec le règlement MiCA, nous avons posé les bases d’un marché des cryptomonnaies sécurisé, imposant des mesures solides contre le blanchiment d’argent et contre le financement du terrorisme, comme par exemple la vérification des identités et le signalement des activités suspectes. Car oui, les cryptomonnaies ont des avantages. Elles offrent de nouvelles opportunités d’investissement, encouragent les plus jeunes à venir investir, et permettent un soutien vital face à des systèmes corrompus ou en zone de guerre, comme pour la diaspora ukrainienne.

Mais elles ne doivent pas devenir une jungle mondiale au service des fraudeurs et des criminels. À ceux qui, en Europe, flirtent avec les leaders américains du bitcoin: savez-vous que leur véritable objectif est de contourner nos devises officielles, à commencer par l’euro, et de saboter notre système monétaire en Europe? Drôles de souverainistes. Comme pour l’intelligence artificielle ou la taxation minimale, l’Europe doit pousser pour un cadre mondial. Les cryptomonnaies ne doivent pas devenir un eldorado pour les tricheurs, mais un outil au service de tous les investisseurs 2.0.

Monsieur le Commissaire, agissez maintenant pour adopter au plus vite des normes mondiales minimales. Il y va de la souveraineté de l’Europe, de celle de l’euro et de la protection de nos concitoyens européens.

Rasmus Andresen, im Namen der Verts/ALE-Fraktion. – Frau Präsidentin! Seit knapp einer Woche gibt es den Trump Meme Coin – ökonomisch wertlos und für Trump‑Fans vor allem eine emotionale Bindung zu ihrem großen Idol. Der TrumpCoin ist eine Betrugsmaschine, das zum Teil auch ausländische Geld geht in die Kassen der Trump‑Familie. Während Ex‑US‑Präsident Jimmy Carter Ende der 70er-Jahre noch seine Erdnussfarm verkaufen musste, als er gewählt wurde, betrügt Trump auf der ganzen Linie. Aber der TrumpCoin ist vor allem auch eine Symbolik für eine andere US‑Politik im Bereich der Kryptowährungsregulierung, und das sollte uns Sorgen machen. Wir sollten hier ganz klar feststellen, dass Anlagen in Kryptos mit hohen Risiken verbunden sind und dass wir auch wissen, dass das Geldwäscherisiko bei Kryptowährungen deutlich höher ist als in anderen Bereichen.

Der Mehrwert, der durch Kryptowährungen geschaffen wird, ist fraglich. US‑Präsident Trump öffnet mit blinder Deregulierung und auch, indem er Krypto‑Ultras in wichtige Finanzämter in seiner Administration befördert, der Privatisierung des Währungssystems Tür und Tor. Lassen Sie mich ganz klar sagen: Das darf nicht der europäische Weg sein. Ich bin froh, dass eigentlich aus den großen Fraktionen fast alle Redner auch Skepsis zum Ausdruck gebracht haben und deutlich gemacht haben, dass wir auf der einen Seite internationale Standards brauchen – ja –, aber dass wir nicht den Kurs einschlagen sollten, den die Trump‑Administration hier auf den Weg bringt.

Pasquale Tridico, a nome del gruppo The Left. – Signora Presidente, signor Commissario, onorevoli colleghi, mentre negli Stati Uniti, con l’insediamento di Trump, il Bitcoin raggiunge valori storici e persino una moneta meme di Trump guadagna miliardi di capitalizzazione, in Europa il dibattito sulle valute digitali resta fermo, specialmente per quanto riguarda l’euro digitale.

L’euro digitale emesso dalla Banca centrale europea rappresenterebbe una risposta pubblica, sicura e indipendente, a sostegno della nostra autonomia strategica ed economica rispetto alle criptovalute, che, a causa della loro volatilità e della mancanza di regolamentazione, non possono offrire un metodo di pagamento stabile.

Questo progetto, però, rimane bloccato per alcuni paesi che mettono il veto e gruppi politici. Noi, invece, sosteniamo con forza l’introduzione di questo strumento, perché garantirebbe l’indipendenza strategica dell’Europa dai colossi stranieri, principalmente americani, che monopolizzano i pagamenti elettronici, permetterebbe la costruzione di un’infrastruttura europea per i pagamenti digitali, ridurrebbe i costi di transazione per consumatori e venditori e, inoltre, aumenterebbe la stabilità finanziaria.

L’euro digitale rappresenterebbe anche una risposta cruciale nella lotta all’evasione, che ogni anno priva il welfare europeo di 824 miliardi di euro di gettito fiscale.

Commissario, Le chiediamo un passo in avanti rispetto all’euro digitale.

René Aust, im Namen der ESN-Fraktion. – Frau Präsidentin! In den vergangenen Jahren sind weltweit die staatlichen Möglichkeiten gewachsen, uns Bürger zu überwachen. Der Wunsch, sich gegen diese Überwachung zu schützen, wächst jedoch ebenso. Darum erleben Kryptowährungen wie Bitcoin einen solchen Aufschwung. Während der Coronazeit haben wir beispielsweise in Kanada erleben müssen, wie unliebsamen Regierungskritikern die Konten gesperrt wurden. Manche Betroffene hatten nach diesen Kontoschließungen nicht einmal mehr die Möglichkeit, ihre Mieten zu bezahlen. Kryptowährungen schützen durch Verschlüsselungstechnologien unsere Bürger vor übergriffigen Staaten. Gut so!

Darüber hinaus wollen wir, dass unser Geld sicher ist vor staatlicher Manipulation. Immer mehr Gelddruckerei durch Zentralbanken entwertet das Geld weltweit. Der Euro hat seit dem Jahr 2001 um mehr als ein Drittel seiner Kaufkraft verloren. Darum wollen viele Bürger eine manipulationssichere Währung. Auch das versprechen Kryptowährungen. Im Übrigen: Wenn hier gerade davon gesprochen wird, dass Terrorfinanzierung und Drogenfinanzierung durch Bitcoin begangen wird: 90 Prozent aller Terrorfinanzierungen finden nach wie vor durch Dollar oder Euro statt. Wir setzen uns für die Souveränität unserer Nationen ein, aber genauso setzen wir uns ein für die Souveränität unserer Bürger. Wir trauen ihnen zu, für sich selber zu entscheiden. Darum wollen wir Neuerungen wie Bitcoin und Co. auch weiterhin zulassen, und zwar so, dass nicht Politiker, die keine Ahnung von diesen Dingen haben, darin rummanipulieren. Die neue Trump‑Regierung macht es vor: keine Angst vor Innovation, sondern die Chancen ergreifen. Technologieoffenheit also auch im Finanzbereich.

Regina Doherty (PPE). – Madam President, colleagues, we have spent the last few months since I’ve been here intensively talking about the importance of innovation, and it is clear that, despite all of the risks it entails, crypto stems from a desire to innovate and operate outside traditional norms and structures.

In general, legislators and regulators should focus on creating the conditions for innovation and sectors to thrive. But in this case, there’s vital issues of trust, consumer protection and there is obviously the serious potential for financial crime that still exists.

And yet, on the other side of the Atlantic, we hear the promises of the new administration of the sector, even as the President’s own meme coins were launched and then crashed and lost half their value in the space of one weekend.

I think there are serious questions that have to be asked about a situation where the most powerful politician and one of the richest men in the world can self‑enrich himself through a scheme while purporting to be in charge of the regulators of that particular innovation? And while these questions go unaddressed, the cryptocurrency industry will continue to face serious pushback by some of us in this Chamber and outside.

The EU’s legal framework for the sector seeks to promote innovation while tackling market abuse and the very large elements of criminality, and its full implementation has literally only just begun, it’s in its infancy. So, I hope that when we eventually come to review and have an international standard, that our efforts will be used for that global standard.

Eero Heinäluoma (S&D). – Madam President, despite the hurray mood in parts of the crypto world since the election of Trump, it’s important to look at the facts. I see at least three reasons to remain concerned about this bubble.

Firstly, despite all the measures adopted, crypto seems to remain the favourite tool for sanctions evaders and gangsters, including cocaine cartels, North Korean hackers, Iranian and Russian spies and fentanyl smugglers. If we want to tackle these problems seriously, let’s hit them where it hurts. Secondly, as well outlined by the ECB, the recent rise in Bitcoin value benefits mainly a happy few at the expense of the many. From an investor protection perspective, this is far from optimal. Finally, in times of high energy prices and energy scarcity, investing in infrastructure to mine bitcoins is wasting energy.

Therefore, it is good to have this debate. We indeed need global standards for crypto to tackle these challenges, and the EU should take the lead as MiCA and the AML package can give some inspiration. But we should go further and we need a MiCA 2 to close remaining regulatory loopholes, for example, around NFTs and decentralised finance applications. We count, therefore, on this new commission to pick up this role and push this agenda forward.

Aleksandar Nikolic (PfE). – Madame la Présidente, comme avec Internet, le cloud et l’IA, nous sommes une fois encore à la charrette des grandes puissances sur la cryptomonnaie. 10 % des Européens détiendraient des cryptomonnaies. En France, ils seraient déjà 12 %, soit plus de 8 millions de Français. Et cela continue d’augmenter.

Et vous? Votre premier réflexe, c’est d’avoir peur. Ce n’est pas de savoir comment investir dans cette nouvelle technologie, la fameuse chaîne de blocs, mais comment la réguler, comment taxer les profits de monsieur Tout-le-Monde et comment la contrôler. Car au fond, c’est ça qui vous terrifie dans le monde de la crypto: il échappe aux technocrates. Quand il y a une nouvelle technologie, immédiatement vous en avez peur et vous voulez la réguler.

Nous, on se demande comment s’y adapter et comment en tirer profit. Nos préoccupations sont: pourquoi l’Europe n’innove plus et comment utiliser ces technologies pour booster notre compétitivité. Plutôt que de taxer, favorisons l’investissement dans l’industrie européenne et l’économie réelle, incitons les détenteurs de crypto à transformer les plus-values en actions dans des entreprises innovantes, faisant en sorte que les futurs Nakamoto ou Musk soient européens et créent des technologies de rupture sur notre sol. Soyons enfin un continent d’avenir. Oui, il faut rendre la crypto utile et pour cela, il faut se débarrasser des technos inutiles.

Guillaume Peltier (ECR). – Madame la Présidente, partout, le socialisme mène à la ruine. Il y eut, certes, l’URSS, Cuba, l’Angola ou le Brésil qui se réveillèrent pauvres comme jamais. Mais aujourd’hui, c’est l’Europe que les gauches tentent d’asservir. Pas un jour qui ne passe sans que les politiciens de gauche n’inventent, en France ou ailleurs, une nouvelle norme, une nouvelle taxe, une nouvelle contrainte. Pas un jour qui ne passe sans que les vieilles gauches sur ces bancs ne hurlent contre le mérite, l’effort, le succès, le travail. Alors, je le dis à tous ces politiciens: laissez-nous tranquilles. Quand laisserez-vous respirer les entrepreneurs et les originaux de tout poil dont vous sabordez le talent?

Le pénible babil technocratique de ce débat sur les cryptomonnaies est le symptôme d’une Europe en dormition, épuisée par la fièvre socialiste. Dépassée et déclassée, voilà l’Europe que vous proposez au monde, transformant la terre de Jacques Cœur en mouroir de l’esprit d’entreprise. Pire: à l’heure où le monde entier fait le choix de la liberté avec Donald Trump, Elon Musk ou Javier Milei, vous voulez nous contraindre à la relégation. Pourtant, l’histoire est têtue. En connaissez-vous beaucoup des gens de gauche qui, à la chute du mur de Berlin, se sont enfuis à l’Est? Le monde entier s’éveille et vous, la gauche, vous voulez continuer à dormir de vos vieilles lunes ou, pire, vous ronflez de vos impôts fatigués. Alors écoutez bien: nous ne voulons plus de vous, nous ne voulons plus être ni taxés ni spoliés, nous voulons être libres!

Gilles Boyer (Renew). – Madame la Présidente, Monsieur le Commissaire, les cryptomonnaies gagnent d’évidence en popularité. Elles fonctionnent en dehors de toute législation financière et dans l’anonymat le plus total. Comme tout instrument de spéculation, elles feront la fortune des uns et l’infortune des autres, sans jamais contribuer à l’économie réelle. Mais n’oublions pas, et c’est notre rôle, que c’est avant tout à la puissance publique d’organiser la circulation des monnaies en s’adaptant aux nouveaux usages et de garantir la stabilité et l’utilisation de l’euro.

C’est le sens du projet d’euro numérique, un équivalent à l’argent liquide dans un portefeuille numérique, émis et garanti par la Banque centrale européenne, à l’inverse des cryptomonnaies. Ce sera un moyen de paiement gratuit, sécurisé, accepté partout en Europe, même dans les zones sans connexion Internet et avec, dans certains cas, un niveau d’anonymat similaire à l’argent liquide. L’euro numérique permettra à l’Union européenne de préserver et de renforcer sa souveraineté monétaire dans un secteur des paiements de plus en plus numérisé. Les colégislateurs doivent s’y atteler sans tarder, au premier rang desquels notre Parlement.

Catarina Martins (The Left). – Senhora Presidente, todas as épocas tiveram as suas bolhas e fraudes financeiras. Hoje, são as criptomoedas, uma burla disfarçada de investimento, que gera uma montanha de poluição sem produzir um alfinete.

Sem surpresa e sem escrúpulos, Trump acaba de anunciar a criação da sua própria criptomoeda, que será regida pelas regras que o próprio criará como presidente dos Estados Unidos. Como em qualquer esquema de pirâmide, só os criadores, como Trump, sairão sempre cheios de dinheiro, mas, neste caso, dinheiro real, euros, dólares. Os incautos e deslumbrados vão perder tudo.

Senhor Comissário, ao permitir as criptomoedas a pretexto da regulação, as instituições europeias estão a normalizar a burla, contribuindo para enganar cidadãos e, ao permitir aos bancos a constituição de carteiras de criptoativos, estão a criar um mecanismo crescente de contágio aos mercados, ignorando até os avisos do FMI. Na crise do Silicon Valley Bank, já tivemos um cheiro deste mecanismo.

Sejamos claros: regular as criptomoedas tem de ser proibir as criptomoedas, impedir os bancos de as comprar, proteger as pessoas da burla, evitar a próxima crise financeira.

Kateřina Konečná (NI). – Paní předsedající, vážený pane komisaři, vážené kolegyně, vážení kolegové, kryptoměny s sebou nesou příslib inovací, ale také celou řadu rizik. Miliony lidí v nich vidí příležitost, ale bohužel je zde i mnoho těch, kteří kvůli podvodům a nejasným pravidlům již přišli o své celoživotní úspory. A to vyžaduje od států a jejich institucí velkou opatrnost. Kryptoměny nelze apriori odmítat. Přináší nové možnosti v oblasti financí, nezávislosti i v investicích. Nicméně je nezbytné, aby jejich rozvoj byl ukotven v jasných principech. Jedním z těch klíčových je i právo občanů platit hotově, což považuji za základní svobodu, kterou musíme chránit. Nové metody oběhu finančních prostředků nemohou vést k zániku těch stávajících, které slouží právě jako pojistka celého systému. Kryptoměny a blockchain mohou ohrozit například prudký vývoj kvantových počítačů. Na toto všechno musíme být připraveni. Proto vyzývám k vytvoření globálních standardů, které zajistí ochranu uživatelů, jejich případné odškodnění v případě podvodů, transparentnost trhu, pravidla zdanění a zároveň respekt k finančním právům občanů.

Kinga Kollár (PPE). – Tisztelt Elnök Asszony! Világszinten növekedik a kriptoeszközökbe való befektetések volumene. Ugyanakkor az nem kérdés, hogy ez a befektetési forma különösen kockázatos. Ezért az ilyen termékekkel való kereskedéshez nagyfokú pénzügyi jártasság és tudatosság szükséges.

Legyünk reálisak! Egy OECD-jelentés szerint a befektetők kevesebb, mint fele érti a kamatos kamat számítását, így azt gondolom, jól tettük, hogy Európa megfelelő időben a szabályozás mellett tette le voksát, és globális standardokért harcol.

Hiszen jól tudjuk a kétezres évekből, hogy a pénzügyi válságok nem állnak meg a határokon. Az áttekintő szabályozást az is indokolja, hogy a kriptoeszközök a feketegazdaság valutájaként is funkcionálnak.

Ugyanakkor a túlszabályozást is el kell kerülnünk, mert az sem elfogadható, hogy a szabályozás akadályozza az európai innovációt, és ezáltal az európai vállalkozások lemaradnak a globális piacokon.

Versenyképesség, prudencia, fogyasztóvédelem és a magas standardok globális kiterjesztése. Ez az irány, amit követnünk kell, de még inkább a pénzügyi ismeretek és tudatosság növelésére van szükség, mert ez a kulcs ahhoz, hogy az európai állampolgárok jó befektetési döntéseket hozzanak, és ezáltal növeljék vagyonukat, Európa vagyonát.

Aurore Lalucq (S&D). – Madame la Présidente, Monsieur le Commissaire, chers collègues, parce que sans régulation, le marché des crypto-actifs, ce ne sont pas des monnaies, ce ne sont pas des technologies, ce sont des actifs financiers. Ce serait fait d’arnaques, de financements, de pratiques illicites en tout genre, dont celle du financement de groupes terroristes tels que Daesh. Nous avons choisi de les réglementer dans un climat hostile, violent, toxique, fait de menaces et de cyber-harcèlement.

Il est donc cocasse de voir aujourd’hui que ceux-là mêmes qui nous harcelaient à l’époque et hurlaient qu’ils allaient partir aux États-Unis à cause de nous, se plaignent des pratiques actuelles de l’administration de Donald Trump, lequel a déstabilisé le marché avec le lancement de son «coin». Ils sont en train d’expérimenter ce qu’est la loi du plus fort quand elle ne leur est pas favorable. Donc oui, évidemment, comme nous l’avons toujours dit, il nous faut des réglementations au niveau international. Il faut aussi protéger la nôtre, se renforcer sur la question de la stabilité financière, mais surtout, par pitié, ne perdons pas trop de temps avec ce débat. On sait ce qu’il faut faire dans le domaine des cryptomonnaies. En revanche, on doit avancer en ce qui concerne l’euro numérique et la création de nos propres «big tech».

Mathilde Androuët (PfE). – Madame la Présidente, l’essor des cryptomonnaies est un défi majeur pour nos États et pour l’Union européenne. Ces systèmes alternatifs, échappant souvent au contrôle des banques centrales, ne doivent pas compromettre un principe fondamental: la souveraineté monétaire des nations. La monnaie est un attribut régalien indispensable pour garantir la stabilité économique et protéger nos concitoyens.

Pourtant, pendant que l’Europe s’interroge, d’autres pays avancent à grands pas. Les États-Unis, par exemple, ne se contentent pas d’encadrer ces nouvelles technologies; ils les soutiennent, les développent et les utilisent comme un levier d’influence stratégique à l’échelle mondiale. De leur côté, la Chine et d’autres puissances investissent massivement pour asseoir leur domination numérique.

Face à cela, l’Europe ne peut rester figée dans une culture de la surréglementation. Certes, il est essentiel de garantir un cadre sûr, transparent et respectueux de nos valeurs. Mais réglementer sans agir, c’est accepter de subir. Nous devons changer de paradigme. Investissons dans les technologies numériques comme la chaîne de blocs, soutenons les entreprises innovantes et encourageons l’émergence de solutions européennes compétitives. Il en va de notre souveraineté économique et monétaire.

Nous ne pouvons pas laisser des acteurs extérieurs imposer leurs règles, dicter leurs normes et nous asservir à des technologies qu’ils contrôlent seuls. Soyons ambitieux, bâtissons une Europe qui ose, qui innove et qui s’affirme comme un leader mondial. Oui, l’avenir de notre souveraineté ne s’écrira pas dans l’attentisme; l’Europe doit être forte, visionnaire et audacieuse.

Adrian-George Axinia (ECR). – Doamnă președintă, un aforism care a devenit celebru în ultimii ani este că regulile fizicii se aplică indiferent dacă noi credem sau nu în ele. Parafrazând și luând în considerare propunerea de reglementare Markets in Crypto Assets (MiCA) putem spune că aceste monede virtuale vor exista, indiferent dacă Uniunea Europeană sau orice alt stat membru crede că sunt bune sau încearcă să le controleze total. Ceea ce nu înțelege Comisia Europeană, ține de rațiunea de a exista a acestor criptomonede.

Li se aplică logica unei monede bazate pe încredere, a cetățenilor sau a piețelor. Or, apariția acestor monede virtuale este mai degrabă rezultatul neîncrederii în modul de funcționare a economiei și al sistemelor politico-administrative complexe. Mulți se refugiază în cripto pentru a-și proteja valoarea proprietății în fața inflației, a turbulențelor financiare și economice, dar și ca tentativă de ocolire a unui sistem Big Brother care vrea să știe la secundă ce face fiecare cetățean cu banii.

În forma actuală, Markets in Crypto Assets va eșua tocmai din dorința prea mare de a intra în intimitatea oamenilor și de a verifica și controla fluxurile financiare. Exact cum s-a întâmplat și cu tentativa de interzicere sau limitare a plăților cash.

Abordarea propusă de Comisie este deci mai aproape de China, unde tranzacțiile cripto sunt interzise, decât de un sistem financiar deschis spre inovație. Inclusiv în această privință, Bruxelles-ul ar avea de învățat de la noua administrație de la Washington.

Cynthia Ní Mhurchú (Renew). – A Uachtaráin, criptea-airgeadraí. Forbairt mhór teicneolaíochta, gan dabht, le deiseanna dearfacha ar nós córas airgeadais níos ionchuimsithí, idirbhearta trasteorann níos tapúla agus féidearthachtaí réabhlóideacha trí theicneolaíocht bhlocshlabhra. Níor chóir dúinn san Eoraip neamhaird a dhéanamh de chriptea. Ach, ná ligimis orainn go mbeidh sé seo brea éasca.

Tá fíordhúshlán ag baint leis na deiseanna seo. Guagacht praghsanna, gníomhaíochtaí mídhleathacha agus easpa cosaintí láidre do thomhaltóirí. Ábhair imní dhlisteanacha iad seo a éilíonn freagairt láidir shoiléir, ach, ag an am céanna, níor cheart dúinn rialú iomarcach a dhéanamh ar bhonn eagla na heagla. Má dhéanaimid nuálaíocht a thachtadh, tá an baol ann go gcaillfimid an borradh díreach céanna a d’fhéadfadh ceannaire domhanda a dhéanamh den Eoraip sa gheilleagar digiteach.

Seachas sin, caithfidh ár gcur chuige a bheith cliste, ag féachaint chun tosaigh agus réidh le lúbadh mar a oireann. Tá rialacha ag teastáil a chuireann trédhearcacht chun cinn, mar shampla cosaintí láidre i gcoinne sciúradh airgid agus cosaintí do thomhaltóirí. Ar an gcaoi chéanna, ní mór dúinn an nuálaíocht a chothú trí oibriú le nuálaithe príobháideacha, trí chreataí solúbtha a chruthú. I ndeireadh na dála, tá deis ar leith ag an Eoraip anseo le criptea. Ba chóir dúinn an deis a thapú.

Giuseppe Antoci (The Left). – Signora Presidente, signor Commissario Brunner, onorevoli colleghi, Europol ci segnala un incremento nell’uso criminale delle criptovalute nel riciclaggio di denaro e per la richiesta dei riscatti dopo gli attacchi informatici. La blockchain facilita trasferimenti rapidi di capitali a livello globale, offrendo ai criminali un vantaggio significativo.

Nel campo della cibercriminalità emergono tecniche avanzatissime, che richiedono competenze elevate degli investigatori. Tali competenze necessitano di personale adeguatamente formato.

Inoltre, cresce l’uso di criptovalute ancorate al valore delle materie prime, apprezzate dai capi criminali per la loro stabilità e facile comprensione.

La mancanza di strumenti adeguati per il tracciamento delle criptovalute in alcuni Stati membri sta facendo aumentare le richieste di supporto investigativo a Europol.

Di fronte a queste sfide – e conoscendo la Sua grande sensibilità – è essenziale un impegno coordinato per sviluppare standard globali e condivisi, al fine di combattere efficacemente l’uso illegale di questa tecnologia.

Marcin Sypniewski (ESN). – Pani Przewodnicząca! Noblista Fryderyk von Hayek powiedział, że nie ma odpowiedzi, dlaczego monopol na emisję pieniądza jest taki niezbędny w dzisiejszym świecie. I gdy po kryzysie w 2008 roku chroniliście banki przed upadkiem, do którego pośrednio doprowadziliście, to programista czy grupa programistów, znani jako Satoshi Nakamoto, powiedzieli „dość”. Powiedzieli dość pokusie nadużycia, z której korzystają rządy i banki, dość psucia pieniądza przez jego emisję, dość fałszywemu pieniądzowi. I w ten sposób powstał bitcoin. Jest to najlepszy kandydat do stania się pieniądzem. Jest rzadki, podzielny, trudny do podrobienia, a przede wszystkim nie uznaje nad sobą dyktatów rządów i banków. Jest też antykruchy. I wszystkie te zakusy, żeby go ograniczyć, tylko go wzmacniają. I patrząc na te wszystkie proponowane ograniczenia, wiem chyba, jaka jest odpowiedź na pytanie Hayeka. Powiedział on, że najgorszym monopolem w rękach rządów jest monopol na pieniądz. I te dążenia do ograniczenia kryptowalut wynikają z tego, że są to niepaństwowe środki wymiany, które wygrywają z inwigilowanym, przeregulowanym pieniądzem dekretowym. Pamiętajmy o tym, że pieniądz powinien służyć ludziom, a nie – elitom.

Luis-Vicențiu Lazarus (NI). – Doamnă președintă, stimați colegi, România a fost teatrul unor operațiuni financiare absolut tragice pentru poporul român în anii 90. Scheme Ponzi implementate de tipi care erau manipulați de servicii secrete și politicieni au reușit să devalizeze buzunarele poporului român.

Ulterior, sigur, societatea a evoluat. În 2001 au apărut avioanele care au dărâmat blocurile gemene și, sigur, a început războiul împotriva terorismului. În 2008 a apărut Bitcoin pe fondul crizei din America, criză ce s-a transferat și în Europa, desigur, și ulterior criptomonedele au luat avânt.

V-ați gândit, poate, că acest imbold al statelor împotriva cetățeanului de a bloca deținerea cash-ului a favorizat acest avânt al criptomonedelor? Și acum, noi vrem să reglementăm. A apărut acest regulament MiCA ce reglementează anumite lucruri, dar nu reușește să facă o diferență între oamenii care au rea-voință de la început și oamenii care într-adevăr vor să facă proiecte serioase în criptomonede.

Lídia Pereira (PPE). – Senhora Presidente, mais do que exportar legislação, a Europa tem de exportar inovação. Mas vamos ser claros: não fomos pioneiros na tecnologia que suporta os criptoativos e devíamos ter sido, mas para criar o regulamento, obrigações e burocracias, aí não perdemos tempo.

É evidente que os criptoativos precisam de um quadro legal. São um ativo financeiro, por isso, há mínimos de transparência e, muito importante, de proteção do investidor. Mas é também evidente que essas leis têm de garantir segurança e previsibilidade para quem quer inovar e investir.

Se aqui na Europa não estamos a garantir nem uma coisa nem outra, como vamos defender uma regulação global? Primeiro, temos de garantir que o regulamento de mercado de criptoativos é bem implementado. Segundo, temos de apoiar a inovação em blockchain com a consciência de que é uma tecnologia que não se esgota em criptomoedas, mas que pode e deve ser aplicada noutras áreas. Terceiro, temos de perceber que criptomoedas são hoje ativos financeiros como qualquer outro.

Tentar uma regulação global tem impacto na concorrência livre, na dinâmica do mercado e na liberdade financeira das pessoas. Não podemos viver num faroeste financeiro, quando falamos de criptomoedas, mas também não podemos aprisionar novos projetos, novas ideias e novos investimentos que criam emprego e oportunidades.

Este já não é o tempo de desconfiar de tudo quanto é novo, é o tempo de confiar naqueles que inovam, que investem, que fazem futuro no presente.

Nikos Papandreou (S&D). – Madam President, Commissioner, from this discussion I think the answer is staring us in the face.

We have two distinct philosophies, one on one side of the Atlantic and one on the other side. The US is a free market, let it bloom, let’s have the $TRUMP coin and then we regulate. Ours is let’s regulate and see what happens.

What’s happening now is, besides the criminal activities with crypto, it’s also used by poor people in countries with inflation. So they put it into crypto, a very unsafe coin, and then turn it back into their currency.

What we need to do is to create the Spinelli coin, which is the digital euro, and to have our own digital crypto competing so that we can impose international standards with safe asset from Europe.

We will not be able to regulate the huge space from the rest of the world, unless we have our own digital coin that people will trust in, not only in Europe but internationally. MiCA helps on that. The way we will impose international standards and MiCA is by having our own innovation and our own Europe.

(The speaker agreed to take a blue-card question)

Diana Iovanovici Şoşoacă (NI), întrebare adresată conform procedurii „cartonașului albastru”. – Ați vorbit de regulamentul MiCA. Aici avem o regulă în care se menționează că ofertanții sau persoanele care solicită admiterea la tranzacționare cu criptoactive, altele decât jetoanele de referință la active și jetoanele de bani electronici, trebuie să fie persoane juridice, să publice o carte albă, iar următoarea regulă este: să acționați cinstit, corect și profesional. Puteți să-mi spuneți, vă rog frumos – și în calitate de avocat, vă întreb – cum veți ajunge la concluzia că persoana respectivă acționează cinstit, corect și profesional, înainte de a fi în calitatea lor de ofertanți sau persoanele care solicită admiterea la tranzacționare?

Angéline Furet (PfE). – Madame la Présidente, la chaîne de blocs et les cryptomonnaies sont nées d’une idée simple: redonner le contrôle aux individus, renforcer la transparence et garantir un accès équitable à des systèmes ouverts. Décentralisation, transparence et sécurité sont donc les valeurs fondamentales de cette révolution. Mais aujourd’hui, la chaîne de blocs va bien au-delà des transactions financières. Elle révolutionne la gestion des données, la traçabilité et la confiance numérique en transcendant les frontières et en appelant à une coopération mondiale. Cependant, avec cet immense potentiel viennent aussi des défis: fraudes, inégalités d’accès et manque de réglementations claires.

C’est donc ici que réside notre responsabilité collective. Il faut bâtir des normes mondiales, non pas pour étouffer l’innovation, mais pour l’encadrer et l’amplifier. Ces normes doivent donc 1) sécuriser les utilisateurs; 2) préserver la décentralisation; 3) favoriser un cadre propice à l’innovation.

L’Europe, avec des initiatives comme le règlement MiCA, a démontré qu’une réglementation, bien que partielle, est envisageable. Elle doit donc maintenant agir comme un pont pour initier un dialogue mondial. La chaîne de blocs est une chance unique de construire des systèmes plus justes et équitables. Ensemble, nous pouvons orienter cette révolution vers un avenir plus ouvert et prospère.

Ondřej Krutílek (ECR). – Vážená paní předsedající, vážený pane komisaři, ke kryptoměnám musíme přistupovat konstruktivně. Od loňského roku platí nařízení MiCA a já věřím, že jeho zavádění do praxe probíhá bez větších problémů.

V Česku se díky našemu poslanci Jiřímu Havránkové podařilo prosadit jak automatické právo na zřízení bankovního účtu pro kryptopodnikatele, tak osvobození od daně při prodeji kryptoměn po třech letech. Myslím si, že tímto přístupem by se mohly inspirovat i další evropské státy. Naopak nápady typu zdanění nerealizovaných zisků z kryptoměn, které slyšíme z některých zemí, bych opravdu nedoporučoval.

Američané mají k regulaci kryptoměn odlišný přístup, a tak se domnívám, že dosažení globálních standardů minimálně v tuhle chvíli nepřichází v úvahu. I proto bychom měli být opatrní s jakoukoli další možnou regulací od nás z Evropské unie. Důležité je, aby přehnaná regulace a nepředvídatelné právní prostředí nemotivovaly startupy a další firmy k úprku z Evropy.

Pokud se bavíme o blockchainu, je to technologie budoucnosti, která nabízí řadu praktických aplikací. Příští týden v úterý pořádám v Bruselu akci, na kterou bych vás chtěl všechny pozvat. Bude na ní mimo jiné představen i projekt Českého vysokého učení technického a půjde o inovativní blockchainovou platformu pro decentralizované vydávání dluhopisů pro malé a střední podniky. Tak se stavte.

Adnan Dibrani (S&D). – Fru talman! Kommissionär! Kryptovaluta, som en gång varit väldigt nischat, har snabbt fått genomslag i hela världen. Det är också en digital revolution som öppnat upp nya möjligheter inom andra sektorer.

Det finns en stor potential i blockchain‑tekniken som kan innebära vinster för till exempel offentlig sektor, för mer robusta och effektiva system. Just nu undersöks därhemma till exempel hur vi ska använda den här tekniken inom vården, för att kunna säkrare hantera och dela personlig hälsodata.

Det är viktigt att vi främjar ny teknik när den kommer, men samtidigt är det viktigt att den nya tekniken har en viss kontroll. Teknik får inte användas för att skada konsumenter, för terrorismfinansiering, för penningtvätt och så vidare. Här har EU gått före och reglerat krypto. Men krypto existerar på global nivå och därav behöver vi standarder på global nivå, så att vi kan dra nytta av potentialen, inte hämma den, och se till så att tekniken används på rätt sätt och inte används av suspekta nationer för att skada konsumenter och våra system som vi håller så kärt.

Diego Solier (NI). – Señora presidente, señor comisario, el Reglamento MiCA, aunque presentado como un avance hacia la regulación de los criptoactivos, representa una amenaza directa a los derechos de los ciudadanos.

Bajo el pretexto de proteger al consumidor y garantizar la estabilidad financiera, este marco podría socavar la privacidad, la libertad financiera y la innovación. Imponer estándares globales en un sistema creado para ser descentralizado es, literalmente, ponerle puertas al campo.

Medidas como la recopilación masiva de datos personales, requisitos de capital inalcanzables para start-ups y la prohibición de ciertos criptoactivos no solo ahogan la innovación, sino que limitan la libertad de elección de los ciudadanos. Además, la vigilancia y la supervisión excesiva abren la puerta a un control digital sin precedentes.

Mi pregunta es clara: ¿estamos regulando para proteger al ciudadano o para reforzar el control de los grandes poderes económicos y políticos sobre sus vidas? No podemos permitir que este Reglamento traicione la esencia de las criptomonedas: descentralización, autonomía y libertad.

Andrey Kovatchev (PPE). – Madam President, Commissioner, dear colleagues, the European tech sector faces challenges that create a perception of stagnation compared to dynamic regions like South‑East Asia and the US. The EU is a global pioneer in the introduction of regulations such as the MiCA, with the aim to protect customers, but without hamper the growth. Yes, we need global standards, and the EU must be in the lead of this introduction. But also, we need to wake up.

Talent migration is a big concern, with 90 % of the EU tech workers willing to relocate to the US for better salaries and funding opportunities. To reclaim the position of Europe, we need innovation‑friendly policies, including clear regulatory frameworks and sandbox environments for start-ups that will promote prosperity and growth.

The rapid development of cryptocurrency markets highlights the urgent need to educate people on how to navigate the evolving landscape responsibly. Without proper knowledge, individuals and businesses risk falling victim to scams, fraud, financial crimes or malign global players. Europe needs to act now and act fast, if we are serious about our fostering competitiveness, and to act together with the responsible crypto community and not in a war with them.

Are we ready to take bold decisions to ensure our success or will we risk again being left behind as others seize opportunities which we hesitate to explore? Commission and Council and colleagues, we need to act now.

Waldemar Buda (ECR). – Doregulować, przeregulować i zabić. Taka jest regulacja i takie są działania Unii Europejskiej w wielu sprawach. Tak było z przedsiębiorcami, tak było z rolnikami. I teraz dokładnie tak samo podchodzimy do blockchain i kryptowalut. Za chwilę się okaże, że cały świat na tym zarabia, cały świat się rozwija, a my nie traktujemy tego jako szansy, tylko traktujemy to jako zagrożenie. Dzisiaj największe aktywa w kryptowalutach mają Chiny i Stany Zjednoczone, a Europa zastanawia się, jak to ograniczyć? Jak to zwalczyć? Za chwilę miliard osób na świecie będzie miało kryptowaluty.

W Polsce 12% osób w wieku produkcyjnym ma już kryptowaluty. Ja się więc bardziej boję tego, że wy będziecie doregulowywać niż że nie będziecie robić nic, bo to pewnie zabije ten rynek i inni będą na tym zarabiać. Oczywiście nieprawidłowości trzeba ścigać, ale rozsądnie. Dzisiaj jak w Polsce się próbuje to uregulować, to lobbyści obsiedli urzędy i instytucje i ciężko cokolwiek zrobić. I ci, co mają na tym zarobić, i tak zarobią. A zwykli ludzie niestety nie mogą inwestować i się w tej sprawie rozwijać.

Caterina Chinnici (PPE). – Signor Presidente, signor Commissario Brunner, onorevoli colleghi, “follow the money”: è questo il metodo per contrastare davvero la criminalità organizzata, come l’esperienza investigativa e giudiziaria italiana ci insegna da oltre quarant’anni. E “focus on the money” è oggi il motto della Procura europea nel solco di quell’insegnamento.

Quando il denaro si fa virtuale, le sfide per le autorità di regolamentazione e di contrasto si complicano, mentre invece si moltiplicano le opportunità per le organizzazioni criminali: decentralizzazione, anonimato, bassa tracciabilità, scarsità di controlli, possibilità di effettuare rapidi trasferimenti di denaro transfrontalieri e di creare catene complesse di transazioni sono solo alcune delle ragioni che rendono criptovalute e blockchain strumenti sempre più utili per la criminalità organizzata transnazionale e per le organizzazioni terroristiche globali.

In criptovalute si pagano i traffici di droga, armi ed esseri umani e, attraverso le operazioni che le criptovalute consentono, i capitali illeciti vengono riciclati e reinvestiti agevolmente nell’economia legale.

Per questo, è necessario regolamentare il fenomeno. Certo, con il regolamento sui mercati delle cripto‑attività, le norme sui trasferimenti di cripto‑attività e le nuove norme su antiriciclaggio e confisca abbiamo iniziato a farlo, però l’Unione deve continuare a sostenere l’adozione di regole uniformi e standard globali, per impedire alle organizzazioni criminali di sfruttare a proprio vantaggio lacune e differenze normative, arginare il jurisdiction shopping e, così, contrastare davvero il crimine economico e finanziario.

Seán Kelly (PPE). – Madam President, digital and cryptocurrencies present an important opportunity for Europe, provided we establish the necessary safeguards. We must strike the right balance between regulating to enhance consumer protection and promote financial stability, while ensuring we do not hinder innovation or impede the financial inclusion that cryptocurrencies can offer.

The MiCA Regulation demonstrates Europe’s willingness to lead in establishing best-in-class regulatory frameworks. Recent events, such as the collapse of the FTX in November 2022, have shown why proper standards are essential to protect our citizens from irresponsible, and even fraudulent, market behaviour.

However, the new Trump administration’s pro-crypto stance provides an opportunity for us to reflect. We hear from the crypto industry that the US is now becoming a more attractive jurisdiction than the EU, with its regulatory approach expected to be looser than ours. On this I make two points.

One: here in Europe we must approach this industry with the same competitiveness lens we apply to all sectors. It is vital to monitor the impact of our regulations and remain adaptable enough to amend them if needed, ensuring we maintain the right balance.

Two: those in the crypto industry eyeing Trump’s America with enthusiasm might reflect on the Trump coin debacle before this week’s inauguration. Be careful what you wish for!

Ultimately, the cross-border and decentralised nature of cryptocurrencies demands international cooperation to address clear regulatory gaps, as was stated by the Commissioner and my colleague Markus Ferber. So let us collaborate closely with our global partners to establish clear and enforceable global standards.

Catch-the-eye procedure

Niels Geuking (PPE). – Frau Präsidentin, Herr Kommissar! Die ursprüngliche Idee von Kryptowährungen, ein globales und dezentrales Finanzsystem aufzubauen, hatte schon ihren Reiz und war leicht faszinierend, aber selbst der Bitcoin ist heute eine Riesenmogelpackung: 60 Prozent aller Bitcoins werden gerade mal von weniger als 18 000 Adressen verwahrt. Wo ist da der dezentrale Gedanke geblieben?

Auf dem Kryptomarkt insgesamt herrscht dann auch eine Wildwest-Mentalität. Die Meme Coins sind Betrug mit Ansage. Vom Hawk Tuah Girl bis zum TrumpCoin – es mangelt schlicht und ergreifend überall an Substanz. Am Ende versucht dann jeder, jemand Dümmeren zu finden, der bereit ist, mehr zu bezahlen, als man selbst investiert hat. Es ist ein Spiel mit Verlierern und ein modernes Beispiel der Tulpenmanie, getrieben von Profitgier und Dummheit. 2021 sagte Trump selbst noch, Kryptowährungen seien eine potenzielle Katastrophe, gar Betrug – zumindest, bis er selbst einen Deal machen konnte. Weltweit durchsetzbare Regeln ohne die USA? Schwierig. Dabei braucht es sie, und zwar vor allem für die Technologie und den Fortschritt brauchen wir die globalen Standards. Zur Not …

(Die Präsidentin entzieht dem Redner das Wort.)

Maria Grapini (S&D). – Doamnă președintă, domnule comisar, de teama evaziunii nu trebuie să ne opunem inovației. Sigur, criptomonedele sunt rezultatul unei inovații. Ați spus foarte bine, avem regulament, avem directivă, ne gândim la standarde internaționale, pentru că da, nu suntem singuri pe lume, avem o piață globală.

Problema este că, din punctul meu de vedere, nu trebuie să obstrucționăm cetățenii în a-și folosi veniturile, nu trebuie să obstrucționăm întreprinderile să investească așa cum doresc, ci trebuie să avem reguli pe care să le respecte.

Ați spus, domnule comisar, între altele, că doriți să scoateți actorii dăunători. Trebuie să vedeți și cum, trebuie să spuneți ce măsuri, trebuie foarte multă transparență. Nu știu dacă aveți o statistică în Uniunea Europeană, în statele membre: Câte cazuri avem de evaziune, de înșelătorii prin criptomonede?

Dar trebuie făcute aceste lucruri și cred că trebuie să rămânem cu această inovație – criptomonede – și în Uniunea Europeană, însă cu o reglementare și o supraveghere corectă.

(Președinta a retras cuvântul vorbitoarei)

Alexander Jungbluth (ESN). – Frau Präsidentin! Ich glaube, diese heutige Debatte hat wieder gezeigt, dass es unterschiedliche Menschenbilder gibt, die in diesem Parlament hier vertreten werden. Und eigentlich werden hier in diesem Haus immer Debatten darüber geführt, dass man Dinge regulieren muss, Dinge steuern muss. Freie Meinungen werden über den DSA eingeschränkt, und bei den Kryptowährungen ist es auch das Ziel, das möglichst an die kurze Leine zu legen.

Ich glaube, wir sollten hier an dieser Stelle mal feststellen, dass unser Menschenbild ist, dass wir freie, mündige Bürger haben. Und freie, mündige Bürger sind auch in der Lage, sich eine freie Währung zu suchen. Und aus dem Grund, glaube ich, sind Kryptowährungen genau das Mittel, sich gegen staatliche Repressionen zu wehren, sich abzukoppeln von Staaten und einer Europäischen Union, die immer übergriffiger werden.

Vytenis Povilas Andriukaitis (S&D). – Gerbiama pirmininke, komisare G. Braunai, labai malonu pasveikinti ir labai tikrai geras sumanymas ir teisinga linkme. Čia vienas kolega kalbėjo apie Dievo laiminimą, tai jam priminsiu, kad Dievas ne tik laimino, bet davė Dekalogą ir davė virš trijų šimtų įsakų ir įsakymų. Taigi, reguliavimas prasidėjo nuo Dievo. Tai visiems linkiu to nepamiršti. Toliau, antras dalykas, noriu atkreipti dėmesį – taip, godumas, spekuliacijos, pinigų plovimas, visos šitos bėdos yra didžiulės. Prisiminkite, kas atsitiko su finansų krize, kai griuvo didieji bankai. Tuomet su privačiais lėktuvais važiavo gelbėtis pas ką? Pas vyriausybes. Kai įvyko didžiulės krizės jau su kripto bankais vėl gi buvo tas pats. Todėl išties tie, kurie per daug kalbate apie laisvę, atminkit vieną, kai būna skaudžios pasekmės, tuomet ir tenka ieškoti pagalbos ne kitur, o valstybėse ir reguliuojamuose bankuose.

(posėdžio pirmininkė iš kalbėtojo atima žodį)

Diana Iovanovici Şoşoacă (NI). – Am văzut că vă deranjează foarte mult că Donald Trump și-a făcut propriul Bitcoin. Bravo lui! De ce nu faceți și dumneavoastră? Dumneavoastră sunteți cu băncile, băncile opresive! Ca avocat, am văzut cum băncile și-au bătut joc de clienții lor, i-au lăsat fără case, fără pământuri, fără nimic, oameni care s-au sinucis din cauza băncilor – cămătari legali.

În acest context, bitcoinul – vreți și pe acesta să îl monopolizați, să îi faceți regulamente, oricum, extrem de proaste, pentru că niciodată nu o să puteți să garantați că o persoană sau o companie acționează cinstit, corect și profesional. În fapt, nicio companie nu poate acționa cinstit, corect și profesional din cauza impozitelor voastre.

Mi-aduc aminte, statul român, ca să mă oprească, în „plandemie”, să mai lupt împotriva măștii și a vaccinării, mi-au blocat toate conturile și mi-au luat toți banii din bănci și mi-au dat 30 000 de euro amendă. Așa, ca să fiu controlată, să nu mai am cu ce să-mi cresc copiii. Bitcoinul este libertate și …

(Președinta a retras cuvântul vorbitoarei)

(End of catch-the-eye procedure)

Magnus Brunner, Member of the Commission. – Madam President, ladies and gentlemen, what an interesting discussion and God bless Europe, I would say. I would like to conclude maybe this discussion by saying that we, of course, remain strong supporters of international standards for crypto. These represent a common set of principles around which jurisdictions around the world can converge.

These standards ensure, at the end, an appropriate policy framework for crypto markets allowing innovation – yes, that is very important – to take place while ensuring that risks are appropriately mitigated. And with this EU MiCA Regulation all of you and most of you were talking about, Europe is the first major jurisdiction to achieve compliance also with international crypto standards.

However, the Commission is well aware that our efforts alone, or even a partial international effort, cannot ensure that the risks posed by these global crypto markets are adequately addressed, and it is therefore crucial that the adoption of international crypto standards continues to grow.

The US, that was mentioned as well as a key partner, of course, in promoting the adoption of international standards. We therefore do hope that the new administration will act as a catalyst for further progress in bringing regulatory clarity to crypto asset markets in the United States. And we would expect that any new policy and regulatory developments in the US fully, of course, reflect international standards.

Thanks again for the discussion and for giving the Commission also the opportunity to participate in this very important exchange.

(The sitting was suspended at 11:48)

IN THE CHAIR: SABINE VERHEYEN
Vice-President

5. Resumption of the sitting

(The sitting resumed at 11:59)

6. Composition of new committees

President. – Following the creation of the standing committees on security and defence and public health, and the special committees on the European Democracy Shield and on the housing crisis in the European Union, the political groups and the non-attached Members have notified the President of appointments to these new standing and special committees as of 23 January 2025.

The list of the committees’ members will be published online and in the minutes.

7. Composition of committees and delegations

President. – Sorry. We have clear rules on what are points of order. Some colleagues are very generous when there are actual accidents or things that are happening. But sorry, we have to stick to the points of order, because on Monday we have the one-minute speeches so you can make your position on special issues you want to raise.

But we are here exactly for points of order. And that is what I exercise, clearly to the Rules. And there is no discussion about what has happened yesterday or the week after, or 20 weeks before or later. Sorry, we have clear order to rule it like it is.

(Applause)

8. Voting time

President. – The next item is the vote.

8.1. Case of Jean-Jacques Wondo in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (RC-B10-0069/2025, B10-0065/2025, B10-0069/2025, B10-0070/2025, B10-0072/2025, B10-0078/2025, B10-0081/2025, B10-0084/2025) (vote)

President. – The first vote is on the joint motion for a resolution tabled by five groups on the case of Jean-Jacques Wondo in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (see minutes, item 8.1).

8.2. Systematic repression of human rights in Iran, notably the cases of Pakhshan Azizi and Wrisha Moradi, and the taking of EU citizens as hostages (RC-B10-0066/2025, B10-0063/2025, B10-0066/2025, B10-0067/2025, B10-0073/2025, B10-0082/2025, B10-0085/2025, B10-0086/2025) (vote)

President. – The next vote is on the joint motion for a resolution tabled by five groups on the systematic repression of human rights in Iran, notably the cases of Pakhshan Azizi and Wrisha Moradi, and the taking of EU citizens as hostages (see minutes, item 8.2).

8.3. Case of Boualem Sansal in Algeria (RC-B10-0087/2025, B10-0087/2025, B10-0088/2025, B10-0089/2025, B10-0090/2025, B10-0091/2025, B10-0092/2025, B10-0093/2025) (vote)

President. – The next vote is on the joint motion for a resolution tabled by five groups on the case of Boualem Sansal in Algeria (see minutes, item 8.3).

8.4. Russia’s disinformation and historical falsification to justify its war of aggression against Ukraine (RC-B10-0074/2025, B10-0074/2025, B10-0075/2025, B10-0076/2025, B10-0077/2025, B10-0079/2025) (vote)

President. – The next vote is on the joint motion for a resolution tabled by five groups on Russia’s disinformation and historical falsification to justify its war of aggression against Ukraine (see minutes, item 8.4).

9. Resumption of the sitting

(Sēde tika atsākta plkst. 15:00.)

10. Approval of the minutes of the previous sitting

Priekšsēdētājs. – Ir pieejams vakardienas sēdes protokols un pieņemtie teksti. Vai ir kādas piezīmes? Protokols ir apstiprināts.

11. Major interpellations (debate)

Priekšsēdētājs. – Nākamais darba kārtības punkts ir debates par plašu interpelāciju, uz kuru jāatbild rakstiski un kurai seko debates, un kuru ECR vārdā iesniedza Charlie Weimers, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Kristoffer Storm, Jaak Madison, Carlo Fidanza, Adam Bielan, Alexandr Vondra, Patryk Jaki, Johan Van Overtveldt, Roberts Zīle, Emmanouil Fragkos, Georgiana Teodorescu, Geadis Geadi, Marion Maréchal, Ivaylo Valchev, Kosma Złotowski, Mariusz Kamiński, Maciej Wąsik, Dick Erixon, Joachim Stanisław Brudziński, Beatrice Timgren, Nicolas Bay, Jadwiga Wiśniewska, Ondřej Krutílek, Guillaume Peltier, Michał Dworczyk, Laurence Trochu, Şerban-Dimitrie Sturdza, Tobiasz Bocheński un Gheorghe Piperea Komisijai par ES finansējumu fiziskiem robežu aizsardzības elementiem, piemēram, sienām, žogiem vai citām barjerām, pie ES ārējām robežām (G-001002/2024).

Jaak Madison, author. – Mr President, first of all, we are pretty many Members here on the last day of the week.

First of all, in September, on September 20, 30 Members of the Parliament, so pretty many, have addressed written questions to the Commission. Unfortunately, we haven’t got any answer in six weeks. So, c’est la vie, and the result is that we have to discuss the question here.

And I’m even more happy that on this very important topic, we can ask directly from the new Commissioner from Austria, who understands probably very well about the consequences of the illegal migration, about security, about the defence questions.

The question was about the EU funds and is there any kind of consideration in the European Commission to finance also the projects to protect our external borders physically? For example, in February 2023, the European Council implored the Commission to immediately mobilise substantial EU funds and means in order to help countries bolster their border protection capabilities and infrastructure.

Commission President von der Leyen has said that the EU will act to strengthen our external borders, specifically by providing an integrated package of mobile and stationary infrastructure from cars to cameras, from watchtowers to electronic surveillance.

Unfortunately, we understand very well that it’s not enough to fight against, for example, the hybrid attacks by Russia, where they are using thousands of people as a weapon against Finland, against Poland, Lithuania, maybe next day to Estonia. And if those people are used by Russia’s hybrid attack, how can we stop to move them to Germany, to Austria, to the inside of the European Union, thanks to the Schengen free movement that we have?.

That is why we had only two concrete questions: why has the Commission not yet recognised the reality on the ground at the EU’s external borders and moved to lift its anachronistic moratorium on EU funding for physical border barriers?

And secondly, considering the ongoing hostile activities at the eastern border and the Member States have taken to constructing border barriers to counter the instrumentation of migrants, will the Commission change its approach and support Member States’ external border barrier projects financially via the EU budget?

Magnus Brunner, Member of the Commission. – Mr President, honourable Members, thank you, first of all, for bringing this very important topic to the agenda this afternoon. Let me start by saying that I fully agree with the imperative of reinforced management of our external borders. It must be, of course, us and not the smugglers who decide who comes to our European Union and under what circumstances. This is all the more imperative given precisely the hybrid threats you mentioned. Our response must be as united as it is resolute.

Coming from a ministry of finance for the last three years, allow me to start my intervention with some figures. In 2024, we saw a 38 % drop in irregular arrivals compared with the previous year. So it’s 239 000 compared with 386 000. And this includes a sharp 78 % drop on the Western Balkan route and 59 % fall on the central Mediterranean route. And that’s stated, as you mentioned, by President von der Leyen in her latest letter also to the European Council. This is the result of the EU’s active engagement with our partner countries, and it is working. We see that and we must continue to pursue these efforts.

But, as you rightly mentioned, in parallel, we are very much aware that some regions are still under pressure, of course. In particular, there was a threefold increase in irregular crossings at the eastern border, in part as a result, as you mentioned, of the instrumentalisation of migrants by Russia and Belarus in their attempt to destabilise the European Union and undermine also our security. As a response, last month, the Commission issued a communication on countering hybrid threats from the weaponisation of migration and also strengthening security at the EU’s external borders. The Commission recognised that Member States can take proportionate, on the one hand, and also temporary measures to address the threat posed by both Russia and Belarus.

Member States have the responsibility, of course, also to maintain law and order and safeguard national security. That’s pretty obvious. But they do so with the support of the European Union and also its budget on a European Union level. Those Member States bordering Russia and Belarus have recently received additional funding of EUR 170 million to enhance border surveillance altogether.

This is just part of the broader picture of EU budgetary support to border management. All EU funding for border management has more than tripled over the past three multiannual financial frameworks (the famous MFF), with up to 7.7 billion allocated for border management and also visa instrument in the current 2021 to 2027 period. With these funds, the European Union is building one of the most advanced border management systems in the world and the largest share of this amount – that’s EUR 4.3 billion – is allocated directly to Member States under their national programmes.

Also the EU’s decentralised agencies – Frontex, eu-LISA, the EUAA, of course, the asylum agency – they also play a key role when it comes to border management, and their budget for the current period amounts to EUR 9.8 billion. In the future, the strengthening of Frontex with increased operational capabilities, including a tripling of its standing corps, will also further contribute to supporting the Member States – because that’s what Frontex is here for – in addressing the challenges at the external borders.

I would therefore argue that not only has the Commission recognised the reality on the ground, but it is actively also supporting enhanced border management with substantial means, actually. I would also underline that this remains a key priority for me and for the Commission in general. And we are committed to continuing to strengthen the EU’s external borders and supporting the Member States, of course, both operationally and financially, to boost border surveillance.

I am also very keenly aware, however, that budgets are limited, and the EU budget, of course, is no exception here. It is essential to make the most of every single euro, channelling it to where it is most effective at the end of the day and has the biggest impact, of course. Given these considerations, the Commission has so far focused funding, where the needs are the most urgent and where European money can have a real added value. This has included financing for mobile and stationary units, for border surveillance systems and equipment, for refurbishment of border crossing points, new installations for IT systems, plus also, of course, the maintenance of the equipment. All this increases situational awareness on border control capabilities, which are, of course, crucial for effective border protection, combined, as I said before, with continued support and also continued deployment by Frontex.

That is the picture of today: EU funding is available to Member States to provide well‑equipped and also modern infrastructure for a very high level of security at the European external borders and to help also combat irregular migration. These things must go hand in hand. On top of this, Member States can decide, of course, themselves to finance structures such as fences, for instance, themselves, while always ensuring, of course, respect for fundamental rights.

Now, the next step – and this is very important what I’m going to say now – going forward, Mr Madison, and following the trend also observed in the last years, it is clear that the overall needs for border management must be reassessed as part of the preparation of the next multiannual financial framework. This process is currently underway and should of course not be pre-empted. We will, of course, take into account the border management needs we have for the next months and years to come, which must be considered in a holistic manner for the different needs, priorities and resources available, whilst always ensuring that measures are, of course, proportionate and also respect fundamental rights.

The views of the European Parliament in preparation of that process are, of course, incredibly important. At the same time, constant engagement is necessary to achieve results on external border management, and the European Union will continue to deepen these comprehensive and strategic relations that it is building with key countries of origin, but also key countries of transit, including migration in the spectrum of key interests covered by these agreements.

Lena Düpont, on behalf of the PPE Group. – Mr President, Commissioner, I’d like to address the topic of today on two levels: on a procedural one and on a content one.

On the procedure, as a representative of this House, of course, I also need to underline the request towards the Commission to respect the timelines and, of course, to adhere to the timelines. There’s a reason why we set timelines for the answering of the questions, and I think that we can do more actually also to work together to come closer again in that sense.

On content, as it is mainly about instrumentalism – where, by the way, the ECR had the rapporteurship in the previous term – I think the question here at stake does not necessarily reflect the dynamic in the policy field. The Commission, the Commission President, they are in close debate with the Member States concerned. There are proposals on the table, both with financial support and additional money, but also in the adaptation of the policy response.

As a general remark, Europe is the strongest when we act together and we, as the EPP, will make sure to do so further down the road. And while I say that some here in the House need to accept that there is a thing such instrumentalism – that it is part of hybrid attacks, and it needs to be seen in the geopolitical context – other parts here in the House also need to accept that as well, because the very same reason why we are speaking about this cynical, state-sponsored and state-accepted smuggling business is Moscow and Minsk attacking – trying to pressure – the European Union.

So at least actors, some here in the House, want to align closer with. I would call that cognitive dissonance, but solve that out on your own. Rest assured that we, as the EPP, will go forward working on a common solution as a European Union that is strong and proud of its roots and values.

Ana Catarina Mendes, em nome do Grupo S&D. – Senhor Presidente, Senhor Comissário, Caros Colegas, fiquei muito preocupada com o final da sua intervenção, Senhor Comissário, permita-me partilhar isto consigo.

Em 2021, quando se aumentou a verba para o Fundo de Gestão Integrada das Fronteiras, a Senhora Presidente da Comissão afirmou — e cito — «a União Europeia não financiará nem muros, nem arame, nem cercas». O Senhor Comissário terminou a sua intervenção a dizer: «vamos aumentar o financiamento para as cercas».

E queria dizer-lhe, em nome dos Socialistas e Democratas, que estamos totalmente de acordo que é preciso gerir as nossas fronteiras, mas gerir as nossas fronteiras não significa violação dos direitos humanos, como temos assistido frequentemente.

Por isso, as verbas que foram atribuídas — mais verbas —, para as fronteiras, para este fundo, não podem ser para as câmaras de vigilância, para as cercas, para os muros, porque isso é ao arrepio daquilo que tem sido a política de migrações da União Europeia ao longo dos anos.

E, por isso, Senhor Comissário, aquilo que lhe queria dizer é que tenha em conta os dados que aqui referiu, que eu, ontem, referi na minha outra intervenção, e que são verdade: em 2024, houve um decréscimo da imigração irregular em 38 %.

Isso significa, Senhor Comissário, que nós temos de continuar a estar atentos à implementação do Pacto das Migrações e ter uma visão humanista daquilo que é a imigração. Nós não vamos parar a imigração com a mão, como não paramos o vento com as mãos, é impossível. Os fluxos migratórios existem desde sempre.

A Frontex tem sido, muitas vezes, acusada de violar direitos fundamentais e, recentemente, a plataforma para a cooperação sobre cidadãos não documentados alertou para a violação sistemática, nas fronteiras, dos direitos humanos destes cidadãos, por isso, aquilo que lhe peço é que continue a ser o guardião dos tratados e a tratar as pessoas com dignidade.

András László, on behalf of the PfE Group. – Mr President, EU countries want border walls and other barriers against illegal immigration, and the EU should pay for it. The majority of European leaders demanded that the European Commission immediately mobilise substantial funding for this. This was two years ago and Ursula von der Leyen did nothing.

What did the Commission do instead? They sued Hungary for defending the EU’s external borders. For not allowing illegal entry into the EU, Hungary received a EUR 200 million fine. In addition, they demand that we pay a fine of EUR 1 million for each and every day that we refuse to give up our efforts to keep illegal migrants out of the EU.

European citizens don’t want a Christmas like in Magdeburg. They don’t want a New Year’s Eve like in Brussels or Cologne. Europeans want tough border protection on the outer borders of the European Union. The radical ideology of Brussels elites about open borders is a failure. It goes against the will of EU governments, it goes against the will of European citizens and it goes against common sense.

Ultimately, European citizens pay the highest price for it. In 10 years, Hungary has already spent EUR 2 billion to defend the EU’s borders on the south. In the east, several countries are now spending vast resources to keep illegal immigrants out.

Pay for the fence in Hungary; pay for the fence in Finland; pay for the fence in Poland and all other countries that defend our external borders. This was the demand of the European governments so that European citizens won’t have to pay with their blood.

Joachim Stanisław Brudziński, w imieniu grupy ECR. – Panie Przewodniczący! Szanowni Państwo, od czerwca 2021 roku Polska, Łotwa i Litwa doświadczają kryzysu na swojej granicy z Białorusią, gdzie dziesiątki tysięcy migrantów i osób ubiegających się o azyl, głównie z Afryki i Bliskiego Wschodu, próbowały przedostać się i próbują przedostać się do Unii Europejskiej przy wsparciu władz białoruskich. Od 2023 roku dołączyła tutaj również Finlandia. Już bezpośrednio Rosja, bez pomocy swojego pomocnika, jakim jest Łukaszenka, tak samo próbuje wepchnąć na terytorium Unii Europejskiej nielegalnych imigrantów.

Tymczasem nowe rozporządzenie kryzysowe, które jest częścią Paktu o Azylu i Migracji, odnosi się do problemu instrumentalizacji migracji jedynie z perspektywy prawa azylowego i jedynie poprzez zapewnienie bardzo ograniczonego katalogu odstępstw od obowiązujących przepisów, które mają być stosowane przez państwa członkowskie zaatakowane w ten hybrydowy sposób. Oczekujemy jednak, jako Europejczycy od Unii Europejskiej bardziej asertywnych rozwiązań, skupiających się przede wszystkim na bezpieczeństwie obywateli Unii Europejskiej. Rozwiązania takie powinny obejmować wzmocnienie infrastruktury granicznej, budowę barier fizycznych i modernizację systemu granic, współpracę organów ścigania i odpowiednie wsparcie Europolu i Frontexu z wykorzystaniem również narzędzi współpracy międzynarodowej, w tym skutecznej współpracy z państwami trzecimi w zakresie powrotów i umów o readmisji.

Szanowni Państwo, chciałbym przypomnieć też o sytuacji, która miała miejsce, kiedy ta hybrydowa wojna Putina się rozpoczęła. Byliśmy świadkami w tej Izbie festiwalu hipokryzji i wystąpień zgoła kabaretowych. Przedstawiciele nie tylko lewicy, ale również PPE atakowali w sposób grubiański i skrajnie niemądry ówczesny rząd polski, rząd Prawa i Sprawiedliwości za budowę muru na granicy polsko- białoruskiej i za ochronę granicy zewnętrznej Unii Europejskiej. Ba, nawet został zdymisjonowany ówczesny szef Frontexu, za to tylko, że wsparł ówczesne działania rządu polskiego. Nie kto inny, jak ówczesny lider PPE, sam Donald Tusk, grzmiał, że migranci zwiezieni przez Łukaszenkę to biedni ludzie, których należy wpuścić, bo przybywają oni tutaj w poszukiwaniu lepszego życia.

Europosłowie Platformy Obywatelskiej, którzy dzisiaj zasiadają w tej Izbie, pajacowali na granicy, atakując werbalnie funkcjonariuszy polskiej Straży Granicznej, policji czy wojska. A dzisiaj jesteśmy świadkami cudu. Nie kto inny, a ten sam Donald Tusk wczoraj z tego miejsca mówi, że najważniejsze jest bezpieczeństwo i wzywa do ochrony granic zewnętrznych.

Szanowni Państwo, jego kolega, pan Max Weber z tego miejsca gratuluje Tuskowi odsunięcie Prawa i Sprawiedliwości od władzy i wysyła premiera Jarosława Kaczyńskiego na emeryturę. Panie Weber, gdyby nie premier Jarosław Kaczyński, którego siła i wola polityczna powstrzymała ten nielegalny proceder, to te setki tysięcy migrantów miałby Pan dzisiaj w Berlinie, w Monachium i w innych miastach niemieckich. Jeżeli ktoś ma iść na emeryturę to Pan, Ursula von der Leyen i zabierzcie Tuska, dzięki Wam ma już wysoką emeryturę europejską.

Fabienne Keller, au nom du groupe Renew. – Monsieur le Président, cher Roberts Zīle, Monsieur le Commissaire Magnus Brunner, nous avons eu ce débat de très nombreuses fois et, en dépit d’arguments logiques, factuels, et de statistiques démontrant que construire des murs aux frontières non seulement ne marche pas, mais que ce n’est pas non plus dans notre ADN européen, nous y voilà encore.

Contrairement à ce qu’aime prétendre l’extrême droite, il ne suffit pas de construire des murs à nos frontières pour régler la question de l’immigration illégale. Bien sûr que nous devons protéger nos frontières, nous organiser pour les faire respecter, comme vous l’avez expliqué, Monsieur le Commissaire; nous nous y employons. Mais la meilleure gestion de la migration et la meilleure protection de nos frontières, elle passe aussi par l’application de ce pacte, qui n’est pas encore en œuvre. En effet, un volet majeur de la mise en œuvre du pacte est consacré à cette protection des frontières.

Cela passe par la création de procédures accélérées aux frontières, d’un filtrage rigoureux, d’une base de données sur l’asile et la migration et de moyens budgétaires supplémentaires. Le pacte comprend également un volet de coopération avec les États tiers afin de prévenir les départs irréguliers, de lutter contre le trafic des migrants, de coopérer en matière de réadmission et de promouvoir des voies d’accès légales. Ce sont ces mesures novatrices que nous devons financer avec le budget européen.

Ce budget doit être utilisé pour rassembler. Il doit être mis au service des citoyens et de la solidarité. Le budget européen, chers collègues, doit construire des ponts, pas des murs.

Mélissa Camara, au nom du groupe Verts/ALE. – Monsieur le Président, Monsieur le Commissaire, chers collègues, barrières, barbelés, divisions. Là est l’obsession d’une partie de la classe politique européenne. Partout où des États ont dressé des murs, ils n’ont semé que souffrance et désespoir. Aujourd’hui, une soixantaine de murs parsèment le globe de cicatrices de béton. Depuis une vingtaine d’années, les barrières physiques se multiplient aux frontières de l’Union européenne, en Hongrie, en Espagne, en Grèce, en Bulgarie. Ce sont désormais 13 % des frontières terrestres de l’Union européenne qui sont clôturées.

Les murs, donc, comme seule perspective politique, partout. Regardez ce mur entre les États-Unis et le Mexique érigé sous Bush, toujours plus haut sous Trump, plus de 1 000 kilomètres d’acier et de méfiance. Ce mur que, chaque année, des centaines de milliers de personnes cherchent à franchir, poussées par l’espoir d’une vie meilleure. Et ici, en Europe, c’est la même histoire. Ceuta et Melilla, par exemple. Une porte close, des regards détournés. Ces barrières ne résolvent rien. Elles brisent des vies, elles éteignent les rêves et tuent. Souvenons-nous du 24 juin 2022 à Melilla: le gaz lacrymogène, les balles en caoutchouc, des migrants piégés entre les clôtures, blessés, abandonnés, sans soins… 23 vies fauchées. Et combien d’autres en Europe?

Les murs n’arrêtent pas les pas. Ils allongent les routes. Ils poussent les exilés vers des chemins plus périlleux où l’ombre de la traite les guette. Les murs ne stoppent pas non plus les catastrophes humanitaires et climatiques, les guerres, les persécutions qui ont lieu partout dans le monde. Je l’ai dit hier dans une autre intervention et je souhaite le rappeler aujourd’hui: personne ne quitte son pays, ses repères, sa famille et ses proches par choix. Les murs ne protègent pas, ils séparent, ils creusent des fossés entre les peuples. Ils nourrissent la peur et la haine.

Puisque les murs ne suffisent pas, désormais, des caméras, des drones de surveillance et tout un arsenal numérique sont déployés aux frontières de l’Europe. Mais les gens continueront d’essayer. Leur permettre de franchir les frontières n’est ici qu’une question d’humanité et de solidarité.

Cette Europe forteresse n’est pas la mienne. Mon Europe est celle d’un accueil digne et inconditionnel, celle des droits humains et de l’égalité. Jamais nous n’accepterons la surenchère des moyens sécuritaires contre les personnes exilées, comme la droite et l’extrême droite de ce Parlement le réclament. Des milliards qui partent en fumée chaque année, pour quelle protection? Pour quel résultat, sinon la mort et le désespoir? Cessons enfin l’apathie morale. L’Europe doit choisir l’humanité, la solidarité, les ponts et refuser les murs.

Christine Anderson, im Namen der ESN-Fraktion. – Herr Präsident! Europa wird angegriffen – nicht durch Panzer oder Raketen, sondern durch den Migrantenansturm auf unsere Grenzen, der als Waffe gegen uns eingesetzt wird. Und das funktioniert, weil wir uns von linken Spinnern haben einreden lassen, Pushbacks seien illegal. Pushbacks – also das konsequente Zurückweisen von Migranten an den Grenzen – sind aber das effektivste Mittel, um illegale Grenzübertritte zu verhindern und diesen Angriff auf unsere Heimatländer abzuwehren.

Dass wir sie nicht nutzen dürfen, verdanken wir einer massiven Lobbyarbeit von Pro-Migrations-NGOs, finanziert von exzentrischen Milliardären, die sich als moralische Instanz aufspielen. Tatsächlich aber gefährdet deren Agenda nicht nur die Sicherheit Europas, sondern Europa an sich. Jedes souveräne Land hat das Recht, ja, die Pflicht, seine Grenzen zu schützen. Die Behauptung, dass dies rechtswidrig sei, ist eine dreiste Lüge, die Europa jeder Möglichkeit der Selbstverteidigung beraubt.

Und natürlich brauchen wir physische Barrieren an den Außengrenzen – sie wirken, sie schützen, sind legal und legitim. Diese Zäune und Mauern sind nichts anderes als ein in Stacheldraht und Beton gegossener Pushback. Also bauen wir sie endlich, diese physischen Barrieren, und schützen wir endlich unsere Heimatländer und unsere Bürger.

Auch Sie, Herr Kommissar Brunner, sollten doch inzwischen zur Kenntnis genommen haben, dass die politische Landschaft im Wandel ist. Ihre christdemokratische Partei wird bald Juniorpartner der FPÖ sein. Sie werden Ihren Kurs ohnehin ändern müssen. Warum nicht jetzt? Und wenn nicht jetzt, wann dann?

Aber die nächsten Wahlen werden ohnehin zeigen, dass die Bürger keine Parteien mehr wählen werden, die sich weigern, die Grenzen zu schützen. Sie werden keine Parteien mehr wählen, die die Sicherheit der eigenen Bürger auf dem Altar imaginärer Rechte und Ansprüche von Millionen von rückständigen Masseninvasoren opfern und – mehr noch – sie ihnen erbarmungslos zum Fraß vorwerfen.

Kommen Sie endlich zur Besinnung. Handeln Sie – und zwar entschieden und jetzt!

Murielle Laurent (S&D). – Monsieur le Président, Monsieur le Commissaire, chers collègues, «structures physiques de protection des frontières», il s’agit là du titre de ce débat. Ce n’est en réalité que du verbiage politiquement correct pour parler de murs, de barrières, de barbelés. Cette sémantique nous renvoie à une période bien sombre de notre histoire.

La Communauté européenne a été bâtie sur un idéal de paix, d’union et d’ouverture. Notre but n’est pas d’ériger des murs, mais de les faire tomber, comme ce fut le cas le 9 novembre 1989 avec la chute du mur de Berlin. Financer de telles infrastructures serait une insulte à la construction européenne. Plutôt que de construire des murs, nous devrions consacrer notre budget à défendre la démocratie, menacée par les populistes et non par les migrants. Comme je l’ai dit hier, ici même, lors du débat sur les liens entre la criminalité et la migration: il n’y a qu’en assumant une migration positive, en mettant en place des voies légales de migration et en engageant des partenariats sérieux avec les autres pays que nous pourrons y parvenir. Non, ce ne sont pas des idioties, c’est du bon sens. Le respect des droits fondamentaux, c’est du bon sens.

France Jamet (PfE). – Monsieur le Président, 30 000 personnes. 30 000 personnes sont mortes en tentant de traverser la Méditerranée, à la poursuite d’un eldorado fictif, à la poursuite d’un eldorado que vous leur avez vendu. Ces morts tragiques, elles ne sont pas à mettre sur le compte de la lutte contre l’immigration illégale, mais sur celui de votre idéologie sans-frontiériste, des pompes aspirantes que vous avez mises en place et de votre mansuétude vis-à-vis des réseaux mafieux de passeurs. On voit d’ailleurs à Mayotte, sur notre sol, aujourd’hui, le résultat de cette politique du laissez-faire.

Alors c’est vrai, construire des infrastructures pour stopper cette pression migratoire, qui pèse sur nos comptes publics, notre économie et la sécurité de nos compatriotes, ne sera pas suffisant sans un arsenal juridique et la volonté politique. Pour cela, il faut d’abord avoir le courage de dire: «Sachez que si vous entrez illégalement sur notre territoire, ce sera l’expulsion et le retour.»

Brīvais mikrofons

Bogdan Rzońca (ECR). – Panie Przewodniczący! Chciałem zabrać głos, żeby oddać hołd 21 letniemu Mateuszowi Sitkowi. Polski żołnierz, 21 letni żołnierz, został zabity przez bandytów na granicy polsko-białoruskiej. Zabity, zamordowany. I chcę o tym tu powiedzieć, bo wtedy, kiedy my, Polacy, broniliśmy granicy Unii Europejskiej, kiedy Putin i Łukaszenka wpychał uchodźców do Polski, prowadząc wojnę hybrydową, wy świetnie tu bawiliście się w Parlamencie Europejskim na fałszywym filmie polskiej reżyserki, która ośmieszała polską policję, polskich żołnierzy, tych wszystkich, którzy bronili granicy Unii Europejskiej.

Musicie się za to wstydzić. Będę wam o tym zawsze przypominał, dlatego że dzisiaj oczywiście ta debata jest ważna, cieszę się, że komisarz przyjął takie, a nie inne stanowisko, ale wołaliśmy o te pieniądze na granicy, o to bezpieczeństwo w poprzednich latach i się nie udawało. A wczoraj oklaskiwaliście Donalda Tuska, który tutaj, w Brukseli, powiedział tak: To, co robi polski rząd Prawa i Sprawiedliwości, to szpetna propaganda. A myśmy po prostu zwyczajnie bronili granicy Unii Europejskiej. (przewodniczący odebrał mówcy głos)

(Przewodniczący przerwał mówcy)

Siegbert Frank Droese (ESN). – Herr Präsident! Ich hatte selber die Gelegenheit, als Bundestagsabgeordneter die litauische Außengrenze, die bulgarische Außengrenze zu besuchen, und es gab immer Kritik an den Finanzierungsmöglichkeiten durch die EU, dass eben zu viel humanitäre Maßnahmen gefördert wurden, aber kein robuster Grenzschutz. Insofern sind die Ausführungen von Politkommissar Brunner ein kleiner Fortschritt.

Alleine mir fehlt der Glaube an den Willen. Wir brauchen den Willen zur Festung Europa. Wir brauchen einen, wenn Sie so wollen, neuen Eisernen Vorhang an den Außengrenzen Europas. Aber wir brauchen auch im Inneren Europas Ordnung. Wir werden daher nicht umhin kommen, Millionen von Straftätern und illegalen Migranten auszuweisen. Also wir brauchen millionenfache Remigration innerhalb Europas.

Und das ist leider in Ihren Worten, Herr Politkommissar Brunner, überhaupt nicht vorgekommen. Solange dieses Thema nicht zentral als Aufgabe von Ihnen angesehen wird, kann ich leider Ihren schönen Worten keinen Glauben schenken.

(Brīvā mikrofona uzstāšanos beigas.)

Magnus Brunner, Member of the Commission. – Mr President, ladies and gentlemen, honourable Members, thank you very much, first of all, for your interventions.

Border protection, I think we all agree, is a shared responsibility. We know the dimension of the challenge, definitely. And we will continue to dedicate also massive resources to meet it in cooperation, of course, with national authorities, with the EU agencies dealing with the topic, and with partner countries of origin and also of transit, as I said in my former statement.

EU funds will have a strong role to play in this, and the preparation of the next MFF will be the moment to reassess the needs for border management and how these can be better addressed, whilst always ensuring – and this is also very important – that measures are proportionate and of course respect fundamental rights.

I stand ready to engage with you on this in the weeks to come. I think that is very important. And I stand, of course, also ready to listen to you all.

President. – Thank you very much, Commissioner.

The debate is closed.

12. Explanations of votes

Priekšsēdētājs. – Nākamais darba kārtības punkts bija paredzēts balsojumu skaidrojumi, bet tā kā neviens balsojuma skaidrojums nav saņemts, tad pāreju pie šīs sēdes nobeiguma.

13. Approval of the minutes of the sitting and forwarding of texts adopted

Priekšsēdētājs. – Šīs sēdes protokols tiks iesniegts Parlamentam apstiprināšanai nākamās sēdes sākumā.

Ja nav iebildumu, šodienas sēdē pieņemtās rezolūcijas nosūtīšu tajās norādītajām personām un struktūrām.

14. Dates of forthcoming sittings

Priekšsēdētājs. – Nākamā sesija notiks 2025. gada 29. janvārī Briselē.

15. Closure of the sitting

(Sēde tika slēgta plkst. 15:41.)

16. Adjournment of the session

Priekšsēdētājs. – Eiropas Parlamenta sesiju pasludinu par pārtrauktu.

MIL OSI Europe News –

January 25, 2025

MIL-OSI United Nations: Experts of the Committee on the Rights of the Child Praise Ecuador’s Social Expenditure for Children, Ask about December 2024 Child Murders and Excessive Use of Force against Child Demonstrators

Source: United Nations – Geneva

The Committee on the Rights of the Child today concluded its consideration of the seventh periodic report of Ecuador, with Committee Experts praising the State’s social expenditure for children and adolescents, and raising questions about the murder of four children in December 2024 and excessive use of force against child demonstrators by the police.

Mary Beloff, Committee Expert and Coordinator of the Country Taskforce for Ecuador, praised the efforts made by the country to enhance social expenditure aimed at children and adolescents. She said it was a pleasure to hear the focus being placed on resource allocation to guarantee rights in early childhood.

However, she said the examination was marked by the atrocious events that took place in Guayaquil in December 2024, related to the illegal detention, forced disappearance and subsequent murder of four children. Investigating the social conditions that led to these events was an essential part of the Committee’s work.

Velina Todorova, Committee Expert and Taskforce Member, said that in October 2019, in the context of the national strike, the personal integrity of at least 12 children was severely impacted by the public forces. During the June 2022 strike, violence was also used against children. How was the State safeguarding the rights of children to freedom of assembly?

Marcelo Vázquez Bermúdez, Permanent Representative of Ecuador to the United Nations Office at Geneva, presenting the report, said Ecuador had several cash transfers for social protection for children or adolescents in situations of poverty and vulnerability, including the human development bonus, the Joaquín Gallegos Lara bonus, and the lifetime pension.

The murder of four minors in December 2024 had profoundly shocked the Government and the people of Ecuador, the delegation said. The Ecuadorian State had acted immediately following these events and had been carrying out due actions to investigate and punish the perpetrators. Investigations had begun and 16 members of the armed forces were now in pretrial detention.

Measures had been taken to prevent cases of excessive use of force by the police against children from reoccurring, the delegation said. Institutional guidelines had been developed to protect the rights of citizens involved in demonstrations, and an organic law regulating the legitimate use of force had been developed and disseminated. The State party recognised that all children and adolescents had the right to protest peacefully.

In closing remarks, Ms. Beloff said that the dialogue had provided insight on the issues faced by Ecuador and areas that needed to be focused on in public policies. The Committee hoped that the State party would be able to achieve its goals for the benefit of all Ecuadorian children.

Zaida Rovira, Minister of Economic and Social Inclusion of Ecuador, in concluding remarks, said that the State party was committed to taking on its challenges by increasing the budget for children, and developing robust standards and laws and an institutional system with sufficiently trained staff. The topics discussed in the dialogue would inform the State’s future efforts for children and adolescents.

The delegation of Ecuador consisted of representatives from the Ministry of Economic and Social Inclusion; the Ministry of Education; the Ministry of Women and Human Rights; Ecuador Grows without Child Malnutrition; the National Comprehensive Care Service for Adults Persons Deprived of Liberty and Adolescent Offenders; and the Permanent Mission of Ecuador to the United Nations Office at Geneva.

The Committee will issue the concluding observations on the report of Ecuador at the end of its ninety-eighth session on 31 January. Those, and other documents relating to the Committee’s work, including reports submitted by States parties, will be available on the session’s webpage. Summaries of the public meetings of the Committee can be found here, while webcasts of the public meetings can be found here.

The Committee will next meet in public on Thursday, 30 January at 3 p.m. to hold an informal meeting with States.

Report

The Committee has before it the seventh periodic report of Ecuador (CRC/C/ECU/7).

Presentation of Report

MARCELO VÁZQUEZ BERMÚDEZ, Permanent Representative of Ecuador to the United Nations Office at Geneva, said Ecuador was fully committed to fulfilling its international obligations under the Convention. In May 2024, the organic law for the support and reparation for relatives of victims of femicide and violent deaths for gender reasons was adopted. Between 2023 and 2024, the Attorney General’s Office issued seven key technical instruments to strengthen the protection and care of victims, especially children, adolescents and persons affected by gender-based violence. These instruments included guidelines on complaints and protective measures against physical, psychological, or sexual violence; guidelines to avoid revictimisation; and operational guides for the investigation of crimes such as human trafficking and the recruitment of children and adolescents for criminal purposes.

Through the Child Development Centres and the “growing with our children” programme, the Government provided comprehensive care to 289,000 children and adolescents in vulnerable situations in 2024. In addition, there was close collaboration with indigenous, Afro-descendant, and Montubio communities and children on the move. There were also several cash transfers for social protection for children or adolescents in situations of poverty and vulnerability, namely the human development bonus, the Joaquín Gallegos Lara bonus, and the lifetime pension.

One of the most outstanding achievements was the creation of the Technical Secretariat for the “Ecuador grows without child malnutrition” policy and the implementation of its strategy, as well as the intersectoral strategic plan for the prevention and reduction of chronic child malnutrition. These allowed effective collaboration between various government entities, focusing on the prevention and reduction of chronic malnutrition in children under two years of age. Due to the implementation of the strategy, by 2024, the indicator on prevalence of chronic malnutrition in children under two years of age was reduced to 19.3 per cent, from the previous level of 24.8 per cent. The programme was expected to achieve the goal of reducing the malnutrition rate to less than 15 per cent.

As an important component of the strategy, there was a cash transfer called the “1,000 days voucher”, which consisted of a fixed transfer and payments conditional on the commitment to attend prenatal check-ups and early registration of the birth in the Civil Registry. Furthermore, all beneficiaries of the “1,000 days bonus” had the right to receive weekly family counselling services from specialised educators of the Ministry of Economic and Social Inclusion.

ZAIDA ROVIRA, Minister of Economic and Social Inclusion of Ecuador, said Ecuador guaranteed access to quality vaccines approved by the World Health Organization, ensuring that every child received the appropriate vaccine to prevent diseases. As of August 2024, 95 out of every 100 Ecuadorian children had completed their vaccination schedule. Between 2020 and 2023, maternal mortality was almost halved. The suicide prevention manual had been issued, which focused on the construction of support networks, from 10 years of age onwards. Around 2,724 people had been trained in using the manual for the early identification of suicidal ideation, and 21 community support networks had been established for the prevention of suicide.

The Ministry of Labour, in collaboration with the International Labour Organization and the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, had implemented a tool called the child labour risk identification model, which made it possible to identify the territories most prone to child labour and estimate the impact of various associated factors. More than 1,000 labour inspections took place between January 2023 and July 2024. In addition, 217 dialogue tables had been held with key actors, such as decentralised autonomous governments and civil society organizations, to design local intervention strategies.

Digital literacy campaigns had been carried out to educate the population on the safe and effective use of information technologies; 919 digital points had been opened nationwide. Between 2023 and 2024, more than 9,000 visas were issued for children and adolescents seeking refuge, with particular focus on the Venezuelan population. Between 2023 and 2024, Ecuadorian Consulates had handled 10,668 cases of children and adolescents in vulnerable conditions abroad, managing to resolve the majority of these cases.

The National Service for the comprehensive care of adults deprived of liberty and adolescent offenders, through the horizon of change work plan, had strengthened the comprehensive development of socio-educational measures by strengthening care for more than 739 adolescents in conflict with the law. In addition, awareness-raising talks and trainings were carried out in educational units, reaching more than 7,000 adolescents. Ms. Rovira hoped the exchange with the Committee members would help the country delve deeper into progress made and provide clarity on any issues.

Questions by Committee Experts

MARY BELOFF, Committee Expert and Taskforce Coordinator, said the Committee was aware that the national context in which the dialogue was taking place was complex in many ways, especially since the declaration of an internal armed conflict. The examination being carried out by the Committee was inevitably marked by the atrocious events that took place in Guayaquil in December 2024, related to the illegal detention, forced disappearance and subsequent murder of four children: Saúl Arboleda (15 years old); the brothers Josué Arroyo (14 years old) and Ismael Arroyo (15 years old); and Steven Medina (11 years old). Investigating the social conditions that led to these events was an essential part of the work of the Committee in order to contribute to ensure that similar events never happened again in the country.

There were more than 50 norms and standards to do with the rights of the child and adolescents which required legislative amendments. What was the timeline for this? Where did the difficulties lie in this regard? The Committee praised the efforts made by the country to enhance social expenditure aimed at children and adolescents. However, there had been a regressive trend after the pandemic in this respect. How did the State plan to draw up a budget which considered the specific needs of children and adolescents in the country? If a crisis were to occur again, how would expenditure on child-related matters be protected? What were the State’s plans to ensure there was a coordination body at the national and local levels in order to facilitate missing data? How was the State planning to extend its scope to cover the entire population, particularly those at the greatest risk of social disadvantage?

Ecuador faced a situation described as one of structural discrimination, which had a direct link to poverty. This affected indigenous populations, Afro-indigenous populations, and children in State custody. What were the comprehensive policies which the State was planning to establish to put an end to structural discrimination? How was the monitoring of centres where children were deprived of their liberty carried out, particularly during the state of emergency? How was it ensured that legislation relating to child labour was enforced? The Committee was aware of the number of instruments relating to child participation. However, it was indicated that children’s voices were not really being heard. How was Ecuador going to include the voices of children and adolescents, particularly when it pertained to their rights?

VELINA TODOROVA, Committee Expert and Taskforce Member, said in October 2019, in the context of the national strike, the personal integrity of at least 12 children was severely impacted by the public forces. Children suffered from injuries, as well as what could be as considered acts of torture. During the June 2022 strike, violence was also used against children, which was serious and unjustifiable. How was the State safeguarding the rights of children to freedom of assembly? Could the Committee be informed of investigations, prosecutions and reparations relating to these events? Over the past few years, there had been acts of cruelty towards children by the Ecuadorian State. Ecuador was in a state of deep regression of children’s rights, which the Committee had expressed concern about in 2016. There were many reasons for this, and the State had failed to address the root causes.

The Committee understood that children in Ecuador did not feel safe in their families, neighbourhoods, and schools due to the increase presence of gangs in schools. Many children had witnessed violent acts by gangs, including shootings. Was this a real concern for the Government? There had been a shocking increase in the number of deaths of children by 640 per cent, between 2019 and 2023, as well as enforced disappearances and acts of torture. The Committee was informed that children in marginalised communities were most affected by security operations. What progress had been made in investigations into these events? How could the Government guarantee that perpetrators would face justice and convictions?

Another worrying trend was the use of children and adolescents by organised crime groups. Boys as young as eight years old were recruited, as well as indigenous children and those from remote communities. There were also many reports of illiteracy in these areas. Could the delegation explain the actions by the State to approve legislation trying children as adults in certain cases, such as murder? In 2023, the forced recruitment of children and adolescents in the context of armed conflict was criminalised in Ecuador, which was highly commendable. However, to date there had been no convictions under this crime. What was the Government doing to address the human rights of children?

Every second child in Ecuador between 0 and five years of age suffered violence at home. Did high profile politicians or celebrities in Ecuador ever condemn this kind of violence publicly? Would the Government implement a programme for respectful parenting? What were the plans for the proper implementation of the law on femicide? What measures had been taken to implement an early warning system on femicide? How many children reported violence to the Public Defenders Service? The levels of sexual abuse were a disgrace for Ecuador; girls were often victims of rape within their close circles of trust, including fathers, brothers and teachers. Many cases were not reported and there was a high degree of impunity. Why was there such a high level of impunity for perpetrators? Could this be attributed to the lack of trained prosecutors? How were victims interviewed with the view to avoid harmful repetitive interviews?

One of the greatest issues in Ecuador was teenage pregnancy. Six girls under 14 became mothers every day. Although abortion was decriminalised, it was understood that the legal restrictions on abortion violated the rights of pregnant women. How did the State guarantee that rape victims could access safe abortions without obstacles? What measures had been adopted to guarantee the non-criminalisation of doctors who performed abortions?

Responses by the Delegation

The delegation said when it came the murder of the four minors, this case had profoundly shocked the Government and the people of Ecuador. The Ecuadorian State had acted immediately following these events and had been carrying out due actions to investigate and punish the perpetrators. These events took place in December 2024, when the disappearance of the minors was reported. The competent authorities then took all necessary actions to locate the children. Investigations had begun and 16 members of the armed forces were now in pretrial detention. All actions were being undertaken to ensure that the perpetrators were punished for this serious crime.

Ecuador was a country with limited resources but it had focused on addressing childhood issues. There had been a delay concerning the Code of Children and Adolescents, which would end the scattered pieces of legislation that were a cause for concern. The early childhood law was before the Assembly, as was the law on malnutrition. Chronic malnutrition was high in Ecuador, and this had been a key focus of the State since 2018. Many ministries were involved in this process and a system allowed information to be received from all ministries, allowing work to be honed into the vulnerable territories and ascertain where the greatest vulnerability level lay. Chronic malnutrition had been reduced by four points, which showed that the strategies were working. The strategy focused on ages 0 to two, as well as pregnant mothers, and it was hoped this could be extended to other ages.

“Ecuador grows without malnutrition” was the pilot project being rolled out to address one of the main problems of the enjoyment of the rights of children and adolescents in the country. Follow-up was carried out on each of the households for all families living in poverty and extreme vulnerability. It was ensured that all care services for children and adolescents had a budget for the entire year. Each of the State’s services had been and would be monitored continually to ensure their efficiency with funds.

More than 20,000 new families had been included in the “human development voucher” cash programme. In Ecuador there were money transfers for children who had no parents due to violent deaths. They received support from several Government ministries to provide them with priority, comprehensive reparations. The Ombudsman law ensured anyone could defend their rights without discrimination. Ecuador had conducted around 1,000 annual inspections for child labour. These were conducted on the ground and online to ensure a nationwide reach.

Ecuador had received an award for best practices because of work being done with the youth. The programme “horizon of change” aimed to be a worldwide reference point by 2035. Currently, the programme was working with high-level methodologies, including a therapeutic system used with the youth. The State was also investing heavily in occupational vocational activities, including through a programme which covered topics, including baking and juvenile fashion, among other areas.

In centres with young offenders, there was a whole staff of psychologists and medical professionals on hand. The State was also working to bolster the self-esteem of young offenders through art and culture. A life skills programme aimed to teach young offenders how to handle depression and anxiety, and work in this area had also been carried out in schools.

There were approximately 40,000 children and adolescents who were not in the education system. The Government had identified them and was encouraging them to go back to school. School dropout had dropped between 2021 and 2023. Children within the educational system had the right to participation. There was a participation model which placed children and adolescents closer to the centre on issues which related to them. A campaign had been drafted to reduce racial discrimination, and another to address violence in the education system. The shared responsibility of families was promoted throughout the education system, and child rearing skills programmes were offered, including on communication skills, emotional sympathy, learning support, preventing sexual violence, and teenage pregnancy, among others. Over one million families benefited from these sessions in 2024.

Teen pregnancy was an issue of concern in the country, particularly the health of the baby due to malnutrition. The teen fertility rate had decreased. There were many communications strategies which addressed the issue of teen pregnancy. There was a law in force for abortion in cases of violence. Pregnancy in the case of rape could be terminated up to 12 weeks.

Questions by Committee Experts

VELINA TODOROVA, Committee Expert and Taskforce Member, asked if the malnutrition of the baby was really the key issue when it came to teen pregnancy? Could examples of the messaging to pregnant girls be provided? Had it been considered that boys or men who were responsible for the pregnancy also needed to receive messages? The Committee had received many reports that the phenomenon of child marriage existed, and was underrated by the Government. Information had been received that around 30,000 girls lived in early unions, particularly in Amazon communities. There was an increase in early unions between girls 12 and 14 years old. Many of these adolescent girls remained in these unions until they were 18 and then they married. Did the delegation not consider this a trend which needed the attention of the Government?

Had the State ever considered the reason for the high number of missing girls? Was it likely that some of these girls were sold by parents or were involved in prostitution? One form of using children in prostitution was the so-called “prepaid” with contact being made discreetly and in advance. What were the policies of the Government regarding this issue?

MARY BELOFF, Committee Expert and Taskforce Coordinator, said it was a pleasure to hear the focus being placed on resource allocation to guarantee rights in early childhood. This trend was promising, and it was hoped it would be consolidated in coming years. What would the budgetary allocation be for the new Code of Children and Adolescents? Were there any plans to increase the investment per capita amongst children? What was the State planning to do to reach out to all vulnerable populations to grapple with the issue of recruitment proactively?

A Committee Expert said between January and November 2024, there had been nine complaints of enforced disappearance, 80 complaints of torture, and 145 complaints of excessive use of force. It would appear the poorest neighbourhoods were the most impacted. What was the State doing to prevent this pattern? Afro-Ecuadorians, migrants and trans children were groups which faced discrimination. There were two cases before the court on trans children. What was the State doing to address this issue of discrimination?

Another Expert asked if the consent form was used in cases of all children in terms of abortion? Could a minor give their consent for abortion? Were parents informed if their child requested an abortion? Was there any special support put in place for young girls to ascertain if the pregnancy was the result of a rape? What was being done to protect the young girls in this context?

An Expert asked if a young girl who was over the age of 14 who was pregnant due to rape was required to bring the pregnancy to term?

VELINA TODOROVA, Committee Expert and Taskforce Member, asked about the inclusiveness of policies for children with disabilities in the areas of care and education? Did Ecuador implement a policy of inclusive education and community-based care for children who could not stay with their families? What was the difference between comprehensive child development services and specialised comprehensive rehabilitation centres of the Ministry of Health?

ZARA RATOU, Committee Expert and Taskforce Member, said in the case of children deprived of a family environment, the technical standard was part of the strategy for the deinstitutionalisation of children and promoted their reintegration into the family environment. What progress had been made in terms of ending institutionalisation and the adoption of a strategy and action plan for the deinstitutionalisation of children and adolescents to take into account judicial proceedings? Was there information on the effective implementation of the technical standard of family support, family custody, and foster care? Had a framework been set up by the Government to guarantee extended coverage for children? What measures had been taken to facilitate the rehabilitation and social reintegration of children? What measures had been taken to strengthen the capacity of professionals working with families and children, including judges, law enforcement, and social workers to ensure alternative care solutions?

What measures had been taken by the Government to speed up the national adoption process, including by increasing the number of family judges and ensuring that properly trained professionals worked in foster care centres? Could information be provided on the implementation and results of the application of the technical standard of family support, family custody, and foster care placement to expedite the adoption process?

What steps was the Government taking to adopt a comprehensive strategy to ensure equal access to essential health services for children living in marginalised situations? How did the State maintain and strengthen measures to achieve universal immunisation coverage, such as the 2023 national immunisation campaign for a polio-free, measles-free, and rubella-free Ecuador? What measures had the Government implemented to maintain and strengthen Ecuador’s national strategy to ensure that children grow up free of child malnutrition? What was the Government doing to improve prevention strategies on anaemia, diarrhoea, and respiratory diseases? What support was given to breastfeeding campaigns? What measures was the Government taking to provide appropriate support to mothers through counselling structures in hospitals and the implementation of the baby-friendly hospitals initiative throughout the country?

According to the information received, the suicide rate had increased from 1.7 per cent in 2018 to 7.2 per cent in 2022. Could information be provided on the adoption and implementation of the national mental health policy and the national suicide prevention strategy? Ms. Ratou commended the Government for the efforts of the intersectoral policy for the prevention of pregnancy among girls and adolescents, which had achieved remarkable results in 2019-2022. However,

could more information on the implementation of the policy for the prevention of pregnancies be provided? How was the Government providing children and adolescents with accurate and objective information on the prevention of substance abuse, such as tobacco and alcohol?

What steps had been taken to improve the follow-up treatment of HIV/AIDS-infected mothers and their children? Were there revised and harmonised laws and policies on HIV/AIDS to ensure access to confidential HIV testing services? What measures had been taken to provide counselling to adolescents without the need for parental consent? Was there specific data on government strategies to protect intersex children? What steps were being taken to fully guarantee the rights of inter-sex children?

MARY BELOFF, Committee Expert and Taskforce Coordinator, asked if any mechanism had been implemented to allow children who were not registered to benefit from cash transfers? What strategy could be used to reach these children who lived in remote areas? What was the State’s responsibility in terms of the oil and mining industry and its impact on the environment, which could violate the rights of children and adolescents? What mechanisms were there for oversight and sanctioning? What were the mitigation measures used to address the environmental impacts felt by the country? Was there any policy on this issue? How often were the most affected communities consulted?

BENYAM MEZMUR, Committee Expert and Taskforce Member, acknowledged the efforts made by the State party despite the challenges. Significant resources went to the education of children between the ages of five and 17. How would early childhood education be addressed? What had been the impact of interventions to address school dropout? Had there been improvements to the water and sanitation systems in schools? The intersectoral policy for the prevention of pregnancy in girls and adolescents was positively noted. Why were all complaints not transferred to the Ombudsman’s office? What was the criteria to establish which complaints were transferred? The State should be congratulated on progress in learning outcomes since the COVID-19 pandemic. What was the Government doing to move beyond this?

Some school bus drivers were recognised as committing sexual violence against children. How was the State addressing this? There were concerns about access to justice for asylum seeking migrants and children. How would this be addressed? There were also concerns around the regularisation process in the State party. To what extent were temporary residents’ visas being issued to individuals? How would the Government address shortcomings faced by migrant children, particularly those from Venezuela? To what extent were efforts to combat xenophobic speech against migrant and refugee children effective? Could information be provided on children in street situations, including violence faced at the hands of law officials? There were concerns around the lack of resources for monitoring of rehabilitation centres, where children were deprived of their liberty. What was the State party doing to address this challenge? Would 14 be maintained as the criminal age of responsibility?

Responses by the Delegation

The delegation said over 37,000 members of the armed forces and 57,000 police officers were trained on the principles of human rights, and manuals, protocols, and training modules had been developed on protecting the rights of children and adolescents. There were internal investigation units that could issue sanctions against police officers and armed forces personnel who committed human rights violations. The Attorney-General also conducted investigations of such cases and could pursue criminal proceedings.

An inter-sectoral prevention policy was in place to reduce incidences of teenage pregnancy. Personalised school curricula and virtual learning platforms had been developed for girls who fell pregnant. The State had sexual and reproductive health education programmes, manuals on adolescent health, and over 1,000 health centres providing reproductive health care for adolescents. The Ministry of Health was working to properly implement the law on the voluntary termination of pregnancy and had trained over 5,000 public health workers on the law.

The State party was working to use online tools to identify and prevent cases of gender-based violence. There was a national plan in place to prevent violence against children and a safe schools project. The State sought to guarantee clear paths of redress for victims of ill treatment. More than 33,000 teachers had been trained in early detection of incidences of violence.

The bill on the rights of boys, girls, and adolescents, which sought to establish a governing body on the rights of children and adolescents, was being debated in the National Assembly. The budget for children and adolescents had significantly increased in recent years. For example, from 2021 to 2025, the budget for early childhood education had increased by more than 20 per cent. In 2024, there was a 1.5 per cent reduction in the poverty rate from 2023, from 26 to 24.5 per cent. The State party had implemented various actions, including cash transfers and vouchers, to reduce the poverty rate.

State law guaranteed comprehensive care for all children with HIV, who were entitled to free treatment. Programmes promoting screening for HIV and child prophylaxis had helped to reduce mother-to-child transmission.

The State party also aimed to improve the availability and quality of mental health care clinics across the country. The organic law on mental health established processes for diagnosis, rehabilitation, and reintegration into the community.

Ecuador had established support groups for mothers that encouraged breastfeeding. The breastfeeding rate had recently increased from 51 to 53 per cent. Over 3,000 breastfeeding-friendly areas had been certified by the State. A book on baby nutrition had been produced and breast milk banks had been set up.

Ecuador had a national immunisation project that was based on World Health Organization guidelines. Eighteen vaccinations were provided to children and adults by public health care clinics. The rate of children who were vaccinated before the age of one had increased to 91 per cent. Vaccinations were voluntary and free of charge. Interventions in remote provinces had been carried out to promote vaccination. In the second half of 2025, the State party would start to provide cellular vaccinations against various diseases.

One of the pillars of the State’s strategy to tackle malnutrition was to improve access to safe water supplies. The national Government was supporting decentralised governments to bolster the development of water filtration. The prevalence of acute diarrhoea and respiratory infections in children under two had decreased in recent years.

Alternative care modalities, including institutional and foster care, had been established to provide care to children who were victims of violence. A national guardianship programme was also in place to bolster family ties and reduce institutionalisation. Over 19 million United States dollars had been invested in the protection system in 2024. The State party focused on deinstitutionalisation and family integration. Placement in foster homes was a measure of last resort. An independent committee was monitoring the implementation of child protection policies. There were two specialised units working to care for child victims of trafficking and reinsert them into family environments.

Ecuador had regulated the adoption process and was working to reduce delays in the process. Registration of adoptive families was now done online. An entry interview was conducted and families were assessed, then they underwent a four-week training course. Adoption units monitored the situation in adoptive families for two years after children were adopted.

Ecuador recognised the right of children and adolescents to live in a safe environment. The State’s second nationally determined contribution under the Paris Agreement for 2026 to 2035 was approved yesterday. It highlighted indigenous knowledge as key to combatting climate change, and aimed to ensure social protection for children, encouraging them to engage in climate action. A roundtable on the protection of environmental human rights defenders had been set up and was drafting a public policy on their protection. Standards on free, prior and informed consent had been developed and were considered in court cases relating to development projects.

The Constitution, the Organic Law on Disability, and the Code on Children and Adolescents promoted the rights of children with disabilities. Over 1,400 caregivers participated in a support network for children with disabilities. Subsidies, vouchers, and pensions were provided to families caring for persons with disabilities to lighten the economic burden. Around 34 million United States dollars was allocated to this annually. In 2023 and 2024, there were over 38,000 students with disabilities in the regular school system, while around 3,000 were enrolled in special schools. A public policy was in place to prevent violence against children with disabilities. Around 1,300 civil servants had been trained to improve care for children with disabilities. The State party sought to broaden programmes for children with disabilities in remote areas and ensure that they could fully enjoy their rights.

Questions by Committee Experts

MARY BELOFF, Committee Expert and Taskforce Coordinator, asked whether the worsening security situation in the country would affect public opinion regarding proposed legislation on the rights of children and adolescents. The various reforms of the social protection sector were very welcome. Why was there such a high number of persons behind bars? What measures were in place to provide alternatives to detention for adolescents?

VELINA TODOROVA, Committee Expert and Taskforce Member, asked why no information had been provided on cases of the use of force by State officials against children in 2017 and 2022? A commission had been established to investigate allegations of sexual abuse against children by members of the Catholic Church in 2017, which identified several cases of cover-ups of such abuse. Did the State party plan to establish a Truth Commission related to this issue? How were teachers, parents, and children prepared to support children with disabilities in inclusive education? What was meant by the concept of “care by agreement”?

BENYAM MEZMUR, Committee Expert and Taskforce Member, cited concerns regarding the potential abuse of children’s rights in the implementation of the state of emergency. How would the State party prevent this? Were there plans to develop distinct legislation addressing the recruitment of children by non-State armed groups? There had reportedly been a decline in vaccination coverage recently; why was this?

ZARA RATOU, Committee Expert and Taskforce Member, asked whether cellular vaccines, which could have undesired effects on children, would be administered to them.

Other Committee Experts asked questions on strategies to address high rates of child murders and suicides; measures to protect children from structural violence and organised crime; plans for full vaccination against the pneumococcal virus and polio; the coverage of the sexual and reproductive health education programme; measures to protect children in the Galapagos islands from abuse; plans to restore speciality to the juvenile justice system; why children vaccinated in the public sector did not receive the same vaccines as in the private sector; when the State party would update the national vaccination schedule; measures to ensure all births were registered; whether pregnant girls’ parents needed to consent to abortions; whether the national preventive mechanism provided specialised oversight of the detention of children; and inquiries into human rights violations occurring in international intercountry adoptions.

Responses by the Delegation

The delegation said thousands of institutions were providing inclusive education for children with disabilities, and over 126,000 teachers had received training on providing inclusive education. A new national curriculum had been developed to encourage inclusive education, and there were also models of education tailored to the needs of children with various disabilities. A programme had been developed to support children whose education had been delayed and there were policies in place to promote reinsertion for children who had dropped out of school. Around one per cent of educational institutions were in a state of disrepair. The State party was investing more funds in refurbishing schools. A voluntary early childhood education system had been developed, and 18,000 children were enrolled in the system.

All complaints of sexual violence occurring in schools needed to be reported to the police. Health services provided psychological care to child victims. Schools were required to report complaints of abuse of students by bus drivers, which prosecutors duly investigated. Data on violence in schools was collected to inform public protection policies and to provide specialised care to students. A plan of action to prevent gender-based violence against children with disabilities in the education system was being implemented.

Ecuador had growing rates of violence and terrorist crimes, which were an affront to the State’s sovereignty. Given this situation, the Government declared a state of emergency in 2024. All states of emergency were reviewed by the Constitutional Court, which had found them to be lawful. All policies administered under states of emergency respected the rights of children and adolescents and promoted peace and human rights.

The Constitution banned discrimination based on migration status. The organic law on people on the move and other legislation ensured the rights of all migrant children in Ecuador and the provision of comprehensive care to them. A specialised policy had been developed on caring for and regularising the status of unaccompanied minors. Between 2021 and 2025, more than 4,900 children and adolescents were granted international protection by Ecuador. Single parent migrant families had access to free legal representation. There was an awareness raising campaign in place aiming to prevent discrimination against migrants on the northern border. Guides had been developed that promoted the inclusion of migrant children in society and the education system. All foreign persons had the same access to education and healthcare as Ecuadorian nationals.

Ecuador had stepped up efforts to combat trafficking in persons. It had produced guidance booklets against these crimes and was implementing preventive checks at border points. The State party had managed to prevent over 3,000 irregular exits by children in recent years. Training had been provided to border officials on detecting victims of trafficking, and an interactive map had been developed that displayed patterns in criminal activity. Funding in the response to trafficking had been boosted in recent years.

The police had a unit that was investigating illegal intercountry adoptions and taking measures to prevent such adoptions. A protocol for the searching for the origins of adoptees had been developed.

Measures had been taken to prevent cases of excessive use of force by the police against children from reoccurring. Institutional guidelines had been developed to protect the rights of citizens involved in demonstrations, and an organic law regulating the legitimate use of force had been developed and disseminated. The State party recognised that all children and adolescents had the right to protest peacefully.

The State party was raising awareness of the importance of juvenile justice. Measures imposed on adolescents aimed to ensure that they could rehabilitate and return to society. These measures could be applied on adolescents for a minimum period of one year and a maximum of eight, depending on the severity of the crime. There were custodial and non-custodial socio-educational measures. Units for social reintegration had bedrooms instead of cells, recreational areas, canteens, and educational workshops. Around 430 adolescents were housed in these units, around half of whom had committed rape. The “good citizenship” programme was addressing the issue of adolescent rape. No young persons had passed away in these centres in 2024.

Parents did not need to give permission for girls to seek abortions. Babies needed to be registered within 45 days of birth. The cellular vaccine that the State would use had been scientifically tested and found to be safe for children aged six months and over.

Concluding Remarks

MARY BELOFF, Committee Expert and Taskforce Coordinator, thanked the delegation for its efforts to answer the Committee’s questions. The dialogue had provided insight on the issues faced by Ecuador and areas that needed to be focused on in public policies. Ecuador had expressed its commitment to implementing the Convention. The Committee hoped that the State party would be able to achieve its goals for the benefit of all children.

ZAIDA ROVIRA, Minister of Economic and Social Inclusion of Ecuador, said that the dialogue had been sincere and candid. The delegation had provided information on the implementation of the Convention through public policies, plans, and programmes aimed at protecting the rights of children and adolescents. It had submitted official, verified information that it hoped had dispelled the Committee’s concerns. It called for the Committee’s support to build a system for the protection of all children and adolescents. It hoped to make its policies a reality in a short space of time.

The State party had a debt to children and adolescents in the country. It was committed to taking on its challenges by increasing the budget for children, developing robust standards and laws and an institutional system with sufficiently trained staff, and promoting cooperation with civil society. The topics discussed in the dialogue would inform the State’s future efforts for children and adolescents.

Produced by the United Nations Information Service in Geneva for use of the media;
not an official record. English and French versions of our releases are different as they are the product of two separate coverage teams that work independently.

CRC25.008E

MIL OSI United Nations News –

January 25, 2025
MIL-OSI Russia: January 25 is the day of the legal end of the war between the USSR and Germany

Translation. Region: Russian Federation –

Source: State University of Management – Official website of the State –

On June 22, 1941, Nazi German troops treacherously invaded the territory of the Soviet Union, marking the beginning of the bloodiest war in history.

The Second World War in Europe ended on May 9, 1945, when Germany signed the act of surrender. But legally, the Soviet Union stopped considering Germany an enemy only on January 25, 1955. On that day, the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR “On the termination of the state of war between the Soviet Union and Germany” was issued.

Why did it take 10 years between the end of the fighting and this decree? The document itself explains that at the Potsdam Conference in 1945, the victorious countries decided that Germany should become a united, peaceful and democratic country. It was also decided that a peace treaty should be signed with Germany.

But 10 years passed and Germany was still divided and there was no peace treaty. The Soviet government believed that this was wrong and that the German people should not be in an unequal position compared to other nations.

The decree stated that the USA, England and France were doing everything to ensure that West Germany rearmed and joined military alliances. This prevented an agreement to unite Germany on peaceful terms and sign a peace treaty.

Despite this, the Soviet leadership decided to put an end to these difficult relations and declare peace with Germany.

“Having in mind the strengthening and development of friendly relations between the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic, based on the recognition of the principles of sovereignty and equality, taking into account the opinion of the Government of the German Democratic Republic and taking into account the interests of the population of both East and West Germany.

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR by this Decree declares:

The state of war between the Soviet Union and Germany is terminated and peaceful relations are established between them. All legal restrictions arising in connection with the war with respect to German citizens who were considered citizens of an enemy state are no longer in force. The declaration of the termination of the state of war with Germany does not change its international obligations and does not affect the rights and obligations of the Soviet Union arising from existing international agreements of the four powers concerning Germany as a whole.”

The document was signed by the Chairman and Secretary of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR K. Voroshilov and N. Pegov.

Did you know about this fact? Share in the comments on our official pages.

Subscribe to the TG channel “Our GUU” Date of publication: 01/25/2025

Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

MIL OSI Russia News –

January 25, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: Nuclear Energy in the Clean Energy Transition

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

Dispatchable energy

Unlike wind and solar, nuclear power plants and hydropower offer dispatchable energy, meaning they are able to adjust their output to meet electricity demand. Additionally, the expanded use of nuclear power for non-electric applications, including district heating, hydrogen production, desalination and heat for industrial processes, offers further options to reduce emissions.

To support this increasing nuclear energy demand, the IAEA is actively assisting countries by providing technical expertise and capacity building to help them establish or expand nuclear power plants.

Integrated Nuclear Infrastructure Reviews (INIR) are an example where the IAEA assists countries to assess the status of their national infrastructure as they embark on establishing nuclear power plants. INIR missions enable countries to engage in discussions and receive guidance from experts about recommendations and best practices in nuclear power infrastructure development.

These missions ensure that the infrastructure necessary for the safe, secure and sustainable use of nuclear power is developed and implemented in a responsible and orderly manner.

In 2009, the IAEA conducted the first INIR Mission to a country initiating the use of nuclear power. Since then, INIR missions have been hosted by various states including the United Arab Emirates, that has successfully established the Barakah Nuclear Energy Plant. This year, it is expected to supply around 25 per cent of the UAE’s electricity, up from its current contribution of 20 per cent, reducing the country’s carbon emissions by 22 million tonnes annually.

Similarly, countries like Sweden, France and Finland have utilized nuclear energy combined with hydro and renewables to largely decarbonize their electricity production. France has an extremely low level of CO2 emissions from electricity generation, since over 90 per cent of its electricity is from low-carbon sources, 70 per cent of that from nuclear power. And 94 percent of Sweden’s electricity comes from low carbon sources in Sweden with more than a third coming from nuclear, according to the IEA.

Newcomer countries

The IAEA is also supporting newcomer countries and developing countries in their transition to nuclear energy, with trainings, technical assistance, and technology transfer of tools and methodologies to help them evaluate the role of different technologies in meeting their future energy needs while reducing greenhouse gas emissions.

“A few years ago, discussions might have been about phasing out nuclear energy. Today, at the World Economic Forum, we’re on the road to tripling nuclear capacity. This shows a shift in how nuclear energy is increasingly seen as essential for net-zero and energy transition,” said Mr Grossi this week at the first ever public session on nuclear energy at the World Economic forum Annual Meeting in Davos.

The IAEA’s latest projections indicate that world nuclear capacity will increase 2.5 times the current capacity by 2050. At present, 31 countries operate power plants, with 419 reactors in operation, a combined electrical capacity of 378.1 gigawatt GW, producing about 10 per cent of the world’s electricity. Additionally, over 62 reactors are currently under construction, highlighting the growing adoption of nuclear energy worldwide.

“I am confident 2025 will see commitments translated into concrete projects. Nuclear energy is still providing the world with a quarter of its low-carbon power and supporting the roll out of intermittent renewables like solar and wind. In future we will see even more nuclear deliver the clean, reliable, and secure power the world needs. As always, IAEA will be there to assist countries in making it happen,” said Mr Grossi.

MIL Security OSI –

January 25, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: France: EIB supports investment by Trifyl to recover value from household waste

Source: European Investment Bank

Ambroise Fayolle, Vice-President of the European Investment Bank (EIB), made a trip to Labessière-Candeil to visit the headquarters of Trifyl, the joint association for waste recycling for the department of Tarn in southern France. He toured Trifyl’s facility for waste sorting and value recovery. Fayolle, the EIB Vice-President responsible for climate and the environment, was received by Trifyl President Daniel Vialelle, Member of the European Parliament Claire Fita, and many other elected representatives in attendance.

MIL OSI Europe News –

January 25, 2025

MIL-OSI Europe: Minutes – Thursday, 23 January 2025 – Strasbourg – Final edition

Source: European Parliament

PV-10-2025-01-23

iPlPv_Sit

Minutes

Thursday, 23 January 2025 – Strasbourg

Abbreviations and symbols

+	adopted
–	rejected
↓	lapsed
W	withdrawn
RCV	roll-call votes
EV	electronic vote
SEC	secret ballot
split	split vote
sep	separate vote
am	amendment
CA	compromise amendment
CP	corresponding part
D	deleting amendment
=	identical amendments
§	paragraph

IN THE CHAIR: Younous OMARJEE
Vice-President

1. Opening of the sitting

The sitting opened at 09:01.

2. Combating Desertification: 16th session of the Conference of the Parties (COP16) of the United Nations Convention (debate)

Commission statement: Combating Desertification: 16th session of the Conference of the Parties (COP16) of the United Nations Convention (2025/3018(RSP))

Jessika Roswall (Member of the Commission) made the statement.

The following spoke: Carmen Crespo Díaz, on behalf of the PPE Group, Marta Temido, on behalf of the S&D Group, Julien Leonardelli, on behalf of the PfE Group, Francesco Ventola, on behalf of the ECR Group, Martin Hojsík, on behalf of the Renew Group, Pär Holmgren, on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group, Catarina Martins, on behalf of The Left Group, Zsuzsanna Borvendég, on behalf of the ESN Group, Christine Schneider, Sakis Arnaoutoglou, Mireia Borrás Pabón, Laurence Trochu, Billy Kelleher, Kai Tegethoff, João Oliveira, Daniel Buda, Maria Grapini, Mathilde Androuët, Marie Toussaint, Valentina Palmisano, Salvatore De Meo, Thomas Bajada, France Jamet, Vicent Marzà Ibáñez, who also answered a blue-card question from João Oliveira, Sebastian Everding, who also answered a blue-card question from Sander Smit, Gabriella Gerzsenyi, César Luena, who also answered a blue-card question from Carmen Crespo Díaz, Jutta Paulus, who also answered a blue-card question from Maria Grapini, Nikolas Farantouris, Borja Giménez Larraz, Camilla Laureti, Marco Falcone, who also answered a blue-card question from Kai Tegethoff, Leire Pajín, Manuela Ripa, Jean-Marc Germain, Dan-Ştefan Motreanu, Stefano Bonaccini and Ştefan Muşoiu.

The following spoke under the catch-the-eye procedure: Grzegorz Braun, Hélder Sousa Silva and Seán Kelly.

The following spoke: Jessika Roswall.

The debate closed.

(The sitting was suspended for a few moments.)

IN THE CHAIR: Christel SCHALDEMOSE
Vice-President

3. Resumption of the sitting

The sitting resumed at 10:29.

4. Cryptocurrencies – need for global standards (debate)

Commission statement: Cryptocurrencies – need for global standards (2025/2514(RSP))

Magnus Brunner (Member of the Commission) made the statement.

The following spoke: Markus Ferber, on behalf of the PPE Group, Jonás Fernández, on behalf of the S&D Group, Pierre Pimpie, on behalf of the PfE Group, Marlena Maląg, on behalf of the ECR Group, Stéphanie Yon-Courtin, on behalf of the Renew Group, Rasmus Andresen, on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group (the President reminded the speaker of the rules on conduct), Pasquale Tridico, on behalf of The Left Group, René Aust, on behalf of the ESN Group, Regina Doherty, Eero Heinäluoma, Aleksandar Nikolic, Guillaume Peltier, Gilles Boyer, Damian Boeselager, Catarina Martins, Stanislav Stoyanov, Kateřina Konečná, Kinga Kollár, Aurore Lalucq, Mathilde Androuët, Adrian-George Axinia, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Giuseppe Antoci, Marcin Sypniewski, Luis-Vicențiu Lazarus, Lídia Pereira (the President provided some clarifications on the blue-card procedure), Nikos Papandreou, who also answered a blue-card question from Diana Iovanovici Şoşoacă, Angéline Furet, Ondřej Krutílek, Michalis Hadjipantela, Adnan Dibrani, Diego Solier, Andrey Kovatchev, Waldemar Buda, Caterina Chinnici and Seán Kelly.

The following spoke under the catch-the-eye procedure: Niels Geuking, Maria Grapini, Alexander Jungbluth, Grzegorz Braun, Vytenis Povilas Andriukaitis and Diana Iovanovici Şoşoacă.

The following spoke: Magnus Brunner.

The debate closed.

(The sitting was suspended at 11:48.)

IN THE CHAIR: Sabine VERHEYEN
Vice-President

5. Resumption of the sitting

The sitting resumed at 11:59.

6. Composition of new committees

Following the creation of the standing committees on security and defence and on public health, and the creation of the special committees on the European Democracy Shield and on the housing crisis in the European Union, the President had received nominations for membership of these new standing and special committees from the political groups and the non-attached Members, in accordance with Rules 212 and 213.

The decisions took effect as of that day.

The lists of Members nominated to form these committees are annexed to these minutes (minutes of 23.1.2025 Annex 1).

7. Composition of committees and delegations

The Renew Group and non-attached Members had notified the President of the following decisions changing the composition of committees:

– ITRE Committee: Oihane Agirregoitia Martínez to replace Barry Andrews, Elena Yoncheva

– REGI Committee: Elsi Katainen

– LIBE Committee: Raquel García Hermida-Van Der Walle

– PETI Committee: Cynthia Ní Mhurchú and Eugen Tomac were no longer members, Taner Kabilov

The decisions took effect as of that day.

⁂

The following spoke: Jordan Bardella, Carlo Fidanza and Patryk Jaki on points of order (the President cut off the speakers as their remarks did not constitute points of order).

8. Voting time

For detailed results of the votes, see also ‘Results of votes’ and ‘Results of roll-call votes’.

8.2. Systematic repression of human rights in Iran, notably the cases of Pakhshan Azizi and Wrisha Moradi, and the taking of EU citizens as hostages (vote)

Motions for resolutions RC-B10-0066/2025 (minutes of 23.1.2025, item I), B10-0063/2025, B10-0066/2025, B10-0067/2025, B10-0073/2025, B10-0082/2025, B10-0085/2025 and B10-0086/2025 (minutes of 22.1.2025, item 1) (2025/2511(RSP))

The debate had taken place on 22 January 2025 (minutes of 22.1.2025, item 16.2).

(Majority of the votes cast)

JOINT MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION

Adopted (P10_TA(2025)0004)

(Motions for resolutions B10-0063/2025 and B10-0067/2025 fell.)

Detailed voting results

9. Resumption of the sitting

The sitting resumed at 15:00.

10. Approval of the minutes of the previous sitting

The minutes of the previous sitting were approved.

11. Major interpellations (debate)

Major interpellation for written answer with debate (G-001002/2024) submitted by Charlie Weimers, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Kristoffer Storm, Jaak Madison, Carlo Fidanza, Adam Bielan, Alexandr Vondra, Patryk Jaki, Johan Van Overtveldt, Roberts Zīle, Emmanouil Fragkos, Georgiana Teodorescu, Geadis Geadi, Marion Maréchal, Ivaylo Valchev, Kosma Złotowski, Mariusz Kamiński, Maciej Wąsik, Dick Erixon, Joachim Stanisław Brudziński, Beatrice Timgren, Nicolas Bay, Jadwiga Wiśniewska, Ondřej Krutílek, Guillaume Peltier, Michał Dworczyk, Laurence Trochu, Şerban-Dimitrie Sturdza, Tobiasz Bocheński, Gheorghe Piperea, on behalf of the ECR Group, to the Commission: EU funding of physical border protection structures such as walls, fences or other barriers at the external border (B10-0001/2025)

Jaak Madison moved the major interpellation.

Magnus Brunner (Member of the Commission) answered the major interpellation.

The following spoke: Lena Düpont, on behalf of the PPE Group, Ana Catarina Mendes, on behalf of the S&D Group, András László, on behalf of the PfE Group, Joachim Stanisław Brudziński, on behalf of the ECR Group, Fabienne Keller, on behalf of the Renew Group, Mélissa Camara, on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group, Christine Anderson, on behalf of the ESN Group, Fredis Beleris, Murielle Laurent, France Jamet and Riho Terras.

The following spoke under the catch-the-eye procedure: Kinga Kollár, Bogdan Rzońca and Siegbert Frank Droese.

The following spoke: Magnus Brunner.

The debate closed.

12. Explanations of vote

Written explanations of vote

Explanations of vote submitted in writing under Rule 201 appear on the Members’ pages on Parliament’s website.

13. Approval of the minutes of the sitting and forwarding of texts adopted

In accordance with Rule 208(3), the minutes of the sitting would be put to the House for approval at the beginning of the afternoon of the sitting on Monday, 10 February 2025.

With Parliament’s agreement, the texts adopted during the part-session would be forwarded to their respective addressees without delay.

14. Dates of forthcoming sittings

The next sitting would be held on 29 January 2025.

15. Closure of the sitting

The sitting closed at 15:41.

16. Adjournment of the session

The session of the European Parliament was adjourned.

Alessandro Chiocchetti	Roberta Metsola
Secretary-General	President

LIST OF DOCUMENTS SERVING AS A BASIS FOR THE DEBATES AND DECISIONS OF PARLIAMENT

I. Motions for resolutions tabled

Case of Jean-Jacques Wondo in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Joint motion for a resolution tabled under Rule 150(5) and Rule 136(4):

on the case of Jean-Jacques Wondo in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (2025/2510(RSP)) (RC-B10-0069/2025)
(replacing motions for resolutions B10-0069/2025, B10-0072/2025, B10-0078/2025, B10-0081/2025 and B10-0084/2025)
Sebastião Bugalho, Wouter Beke, Isabel Wiseler-Lima, Michael Gahler, Luděk Niedermayer, Christophe Gomart, Antonio López-Istúriz White, Danuše Nerudová, Davor Ivo Stier, Michał Wawrykiewicz, Jessica Polfjärd, Tomáš Zdechovský, Andrey Kovatchev, Inese Vaidere
on behalf of the PPE Group
Yannis Maniatis, Francisco Assis, Elio Di Rupo
on behalf of the S&D Group
Waldemar Tomaszewski, Joachim Stanisław Brudziński, Sebastian Tynkkynen
on behalf of the ECR Group
Bernard Guetta, Petras Auštrevičius, Oihane Agirregoitia Martínez, Malik Azmani, Dan Barna, Benoit Cassart, Olivier Chastel, Svenja Hahn, Karin Karlsbro, Ľubica Karvašová, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, Jan-Christoph Oetjen, Urmas Paet, Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, Hilde Vautmans, Lucia Yar
on behalf of the Renew Group
Catarina Vieira
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Systematic repression of human rights in Iran, notably the cases of Pakhshan Azizi and Wrisha Moradi, and the taking of EU citizens as hostages

Joint motion for a resolution tabled under Rule 150(5) and Rule 136(4):

on the systematic repression of human rights in Iran, notably the cases of Pakhshan Azizi and Wrisha Moradi, and the taking of EU citizens as hostages (2025/2511(RSP)) (RC-B10-0066/2025)
(replacing motions for resolutions B10-0066/2025, B10-0073/2025, B10-0082/2025, B10-0085/2025 and B10-0086/2025)
Sebastião Bugalho, Tomáš Zdechovský, Loucas Fourlas, Isabel Wiseler-Lima, David McAllister, Michael Gahler, Željana Zovko, Christophe Gomart, Isabel Benjumea Benjumea, Javier Zarzalejos, Luděk Niedermayer, Wouter Beke, Davor Ivo Stier, Michał Wawrykiewicz, Jessica Polfjärd, Danuše Nerudová, Andrey Kovatchev, Inese Vaidere
on behalf of the PPE Group
Yannis Maniatis, Francisco Assis, Evin Incir, Chloé Ridel, Daniel Attard, Alessandra Moretti
on behalf of the S&D Group
Rihards Kols, Mariusz Kamiński, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Carlo Fidanza, Reinis Pozņaks, Aurelijus Veryga, Ondřej Krutílek, Veronika Vrecionová, Alberico Gambino, Joachim Stanisław Brudziński, Dick Erixon, Beatrice Timgren, Waldemar Tomaszewski, Alexandr Vondra, Marion Maréchal, Małgorzata Gosiewska, Carlo Ciccioli, Charlie Weimers
on behalf of the ECR Group
Petras Auštrevičius, Oihane Agirregoitia Martínez, Malik Azmani, Dan Barna, Benoit Cassart, Olivier Chastel, Veronika Cifrová Ostrihoňová, Bart Groothuis, Bernard Guetta, Svenja Hahn, Karin Karlsbro, Ľubica Karvašová, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, Nathalie Loiseau, Jan-Christoph Oetjen, Urmas Paet, Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, Hilde Vautmans, Sophie Wilmès, Lucia Yar
on behalf of the Renew Group
Hannah Neumann
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group
Per Clausen, Hanna Gedin, Jonas Sjöstedt

Case of Boualem Sansal in Algeria

Joint motion for a resolution tabled under Rule 150(5) and Rule 136(4):

on the case of Boualem Sansal in Algeria (2025/2512(RSP)) (RC-B10-0087/2025)
(replacing motions for resolutions B10-0087/2025, B10-0089/2025, B10-0091/2025, B10-0092/2025 and B10-0093/2025)
Sebastião Bugalho, Christophe Gomart, Isabel Wiseler-Lima, Michael Gahler, Luděk Niedermayer, Wouter Beke, Davor Ivo Stier, Michał Wawrykiewicz, Jessica Polfjärd, Tomáš Zdechovský, Andrey Kovatchev, Inese Vaidere
on behalf of the PPE Group
Yannis Maniatis, Francisco Assis, Marta Temido
on behalf of the S&D Group
Adam Bielan, Ondřej Krutílek, Veronika Vrecionová, Joachim Stanisław Brudziński, Waldemar Tomaszewski, Alexandr Vondra, Marion Maréchal, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Małgorzata Gosiewska
on behalf of the ECR Group
Helmut Brandstätter, Petras Auštrevičius, Malik Azmani, Dan Barna, Benoit Cassart, Olivier Chastel, Bernard Guetta, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, Nathalie Loiseau, Urmas Paet, Lucia Yar
on behalf of the Renew Group
Leoluca Orlando
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Russia’s disinformation and historical falsification to justify its war of aggression against Ukraine

Motions for resolutions tabled under Rule 136(2) to wind up the debate:

on Russia’s disinformation and historical falsification to justify its war of aggression against Ukraine (2024/2988(RSP)) (B10-0074/2025)
Yannis Maniatis, Nacho Sánchez Amor, Thijs Reuten, Raphaël Glucksmann
on behalf of the S&D Group

on Russia’s disinformation and historical falsification to justify its war of aggression against Ukraine (2024/2988(RSP)) (B10-0075/2025)
Rasa Juknevičienė, Michael Gahler, Andrzej Halicki, Sebastião Bugalho, David McAllister, Siegfried Mureşan, Željana Zovko, Isabel Wiseler-Lima, Nicolás Pascual de la Parte, Mika Aaltola, Krzysztof Brejza, Daniel Caspary, Sandra Kalniete, Seán Kelly, Ondřej Kolář, Łukasz Kohut, Andrey Kovatchev, Miriam Lexmann, Antonio López-Istúriz White, Danuše Nerudová, Mirosława Nykiel, Ana Miguel Pedro, Paulius Saudargas, Davor Ivo Stier, Michał Szczerba, Alice Teodorescu Måwe, Ingeborg Ter Laak, Matej Tonin, Pekka Toveri, Inese Vaidere, Milan Zver
on behalf of the PPE Group

on Russia’s disinformation and historical falsification to justify its war of aggression against Ukraine (2024/2988(RSP)) (B10-0076/2025)
Sergey Lagodinsky, Hannah Neumann, Markéta Gregorová, Mārtiņš Staķis, Maria Ohisalo, Virginijus Sinkevičius, Villy Søvndal, Nicolae Ştefănuță, Reinier Van Lanschot
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

on Russia’s disinformation and historical falsification to justify its war of aggression against Ukraine (2024/2988(RSP)) (B10-0077/2025)
Bernard Guetta, Petras Auštrevičius, Malik Azmani, Dan Barna, Olivier Chastel, Karin Karlsbro, Ľubica Karvašová, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, Michał Kobosko, Jan-Christoph Oetjen, Urmas Paet, Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, Eugen Tomac, Hilde Vautmans, Sophie Wilmès, Lucia Yar, Dainius Žalimas
on behalf of the Renew Group

on Russia’s disinformation and historical falsification to justify its war of aggression against Ukraine (2024/2988(RSP)) (B10-0079/2025)
Adam Bielan, Mariusz Kamiński, Małgorzata Gosiewska, Joachim Stanisław Brudziński, Rihards Kols, Ondřej Krutílek, Jaak Madison, Ivaylo Valchev, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Veronika Vrecionová, Roberts Zīle, Aurelijus Veryga, Maciej Wąsik, Michał Dworczyk, Cristian Terheş, Reinis Pozņaks, Alexandr Vondra
on behalf of the ECR Group

Joint motion for a resolution tabled under Rule 136(2) and (4):

on Russia’s disinformation and historical falsification to justify its war of aggression against Ukraine (2024/2988(RSP)) (RC-B10-0074/2025)
(replacing motions for resolutions B10-0074/2025, B10-0075/2025, B10-0076/2025, B10-0077/2025 and B10-0079/2025)
Rasa Juknevičienė, Michael Gahler, Andrzej Halicki, Sebastião Bugalho, David McAllister, Siegfried Mureşan, Željana Zovko, Isabel Wiseler-Lima, Nicolás Pascual de la Parte, Mika Aaltola, Krzysztof Brejza, Daniel Caspary, Sandra Kalniete, Seán Kelly, Ondřej Kolář, Łukasz Kohut, Andrey Kovatchev, Miriam Lexmann, Antonio López-Istúriz White, Danuše Nerudová, Mirosława Nykiel, Ana Miguel Pedro, Paulius Saudargas, Davor Ivo Stier, Michał Szczerba, Alice Teodorescu Måwe, Ingeborg Ter Laak, Matej Tonin, Pekka Toveri, Inese Vaidere, Milan Zver
on behalf of the PPE Group
Yannis Maniatis, Nacho Sánchez Amor, Thijs Reuten, Raphaël Glucksmann
on behalf of the S&D Group
Adam Bielan, Rihards Kols, Reinis Pozņaks, Jadwiga Wiśniewska, Roberts Zīle, Ondřej Krutílek, Veronika Vrecionová, Jaak Madison, Małgorzata Gosiewska, Cristian Terheş, Maciej Wąsik, Ivaylo Valchev, Aurelijus Veryga, Joachim Stanisław Brudziński
on behalf of the ECR Group
Bernard Guetta, Petras Auštrevičius, Malik Azmani, Dan Barna, Benoit Cassart, Olivier Chastel, Karin Karlsbro, Veronika Cifrová Ostrihoňová, Ľubica Karvašová, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, Michał Kobosko, Nathalie Loiseau, Jan-Christoph Oetjen, Urmas Paet, Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, Eugen Tomac, Hilde Vautmans, Sophie Wilmès, Lucia Yar, Dainius Žalimas
on behalf of the Renew Group
Sergey Lagodinsky
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Situation in Venezuela following the usurpation of the presidency on 10 January 2025

Motions for resolutions tabled under Rule 136(2) to wind up the debate:

on the situation in Venezuela following the usurpation of the presidency on 10 January 2025 (2025/2519(RSP)) (B10-0064/2025)
Gabriel Mato, Sebastião Bugalho, Davor Ivo Stier
on behalf of the PPE Group

on the situation in Venezuela following the usurpation of the presidency on 10 January 2025 (2025/2519(RSP)) (B10-0068/2025)
Jorge Buxadé Villalba, Hermann Tertsch, Jorge Martín Frías, Silvia Sardone, Nikola Bartůšek, Susanna Ceccardi, Roberto Vannacci, António Tânger Corrêa, Enikő Győri
on behalf of the PfE Group

on the situation in Venezuela following the usurpation of the presidency on 10 January 2025 (2025/2519(RSP)) (B10-0071/2025)
Leire Pajín
on behalf of the S&D Group
Catarina Vieira, Ville Niinistö, Nicolae Ştefănuță
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

on the situation in Venezuela following the usurpation of the presidency on 10 January 2025 (2025/2519(RSP)) (B10-0080/2025)
Oihane Agirregoitia Martínez, Petras Auštrevičius, Malik Azmani, Dan Barna, Helmut Brandstätter, Benoit Cassart, Olivier Chastel, João Cotrim De Figueiredo, Valérie Devaux, Karin Karlsbro, Ľubica Karvašová, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, Urmas Paet, Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, Ana Vasconcelos, Hilde Vautmans, Lucia Yar
on behalf of the Renew Group

on the situation in Venezuela following the usurpation of the presidency on 10 January 2025 (2025/2519(RSP)) (B10-0083/2025)
Carlo Fidanza, Adam Bielan, Mariusz Kamiński, Alberico Gambino, Waldemar Tomaszewski, Joachim Stanisław Brudziński, Diego Solier, Rihards Kols, Ondřej Krutílek, Jaak Madison, Nora Junco García, Şerban-Dimitrie Sturdza, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Veronika Vrecionová, Małgorzata Gosiewska, Jadwiga Wiśniewska, Alexandr Vondra
on behalf of the ECR Group

Joint motion for a resolution tabled under Rule 150(5) and Rule 136(4):

on the situation in Venezuela following the usurpation of the presidency on 10 January 2025 (2025/2519(RSP)) (RC-B10-0064/2025)
(replacing motions for resolutions B10-0064/2025, B10-0080/2025 and B10-0083/2025)
Gabriel Mato, Sebastião Bugalho, Davor Ivo Stier, Francisco José Millán Mon
on behalf of the PPE Group
Carlo Fidanza, Adam Bielan, Mariusz Kamiński, Ivaylo Valchev, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Ondřej Krutílek, Veronika Vrecionová, Rihards Kols, Alexandr Vondra, Małgorzata Gosiewska, Alberico Gambino, Joachim Stanisław Brudziński
on behalf of the ECR Group
Oihane Agirregoitia Martínez, Petras Auštrevičius, Dan Barna, Helmut Brandstätter, Benoit Cassart, Olivier Chastel, Veronika Cifrová Ostrihoňová, João Cotrim De Figueiredo, Karin Karlsbro, Ľubica Karvašová, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, Urmas Paet, Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, Ana Vasconcelos, Hilde Vautmans, Lucia Yar
on behalf of the Renew Group

II. Decisions to draw up own-initiative reports

Decisions to draw up own-initiative reports (Rule 55)

(Following the Conference of Presidents’ decision of 15 January 2025)

AFCO Committee

– Reform of the European Electoral Act – hurdles to ratification and implementation in the Member States (2025/2028(INI))

– Institutional aspects of the Report on the future of European Competitiveness (Draghi Report) (2025/2013(INI))

– Stock-taking of the European elections 2024 (2025/2012(INI))

AFET Committee

– 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Ukraine (2025/2026(INI))

– 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Moldova (2025/2025(INI))

– 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Georgia (2025/2024(INI))

– 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Türkiye (2025/2023(INI))

– 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Serbia (2025/2022(INI))

– 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on North Macedonia (2025/2021(INI))

– 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Montenegro (2025/2020(INI))

– 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Kosovo (2025/2019(INI))

– 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Bosnia and Herzegovina (2025/2018(INI))

– 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Albania (2025/2017(INI))

DEVE Committee

– Financing for development – ahead of the Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development in Seville (2025/2004(INI))

– Implementation and delivery of the Sustainable Development Goals in view of the 2025 High-Level Political Forum (2025/2014(INI))
(opinion: FEMM)

IMCO Committee

– Implementation and streamlining of EU internal market rules to strengthen the single market (2025/2009(INI))

ITRE Committee

– Future of the EU biotechnology and biomanufacturing sector: leveraging research, boosting innovation and enhancing competitiveness (2025/2008(INI))

– European technological sovereignty and digital infrastructure (2025/2007(INI))

– Electricity grids: the backbone of the EU energy system (2025/2006(INI))

JURI Committee

– Monitoring the application of European Union law in 2023 and 2024 (2025/2016(INI))
(opinion: PETI)

– European Union regulatory fitness and subsidiarity and proportionality – report on Better Law-Making covering 2023 and 2024 (2025/2015(INI))

PECH Committee

– Fisheries management approaches for safeguarding sensitive species, tackling invasive species and benefiting local economies (2025/2011(INI))

– The role of social, economic and environmental standards in safeguarding fair competition for all aquatic food products and improving food security (2025/2010(INI))

PETI Committee

– Deliberations of the Committee on Petitions in 2023 (2025/2027(INI))

(Following the Conference of Presidents’ decision of 19 December 2024)

– The multiannual plan for the Baltic Sea and ways forward (2024/2127(INI))

– The impact of the implementation of the Maritime Spatial Planning Directive 2014/89/EU on fisheries in selected fishing areas and sea basins (2024/2126(INI))

– Decarbonisation and modernisation of EU fisheries, and the development and deployment of fishing gear (2024/2123(INI))

AGRI Committee

– The position of farmers in the agri-food value chain (2024/2122(INI))

ECON Committee

– The role of simple tax rules and tax fragmentation in European competitiveness (2024/2118(INI))

– A coherent tax framework for the EU’s financial sector (2024/2117(INI))

– Facilitating the financing of investments and reforms to boost European competitiveness and creating a Capital Markets Union (Draghi Report) (2024/2116(INI))
(opinion: BUDG)

FEMM Committee

– Gender Equality Strategy 2025 (2024/2125(INI))
(opinion: LIBE)

– Women’s entrepreneurship in rural and island areas and outermost regions (2024/2124(INI))
(opinion: AGRI)

IMCO Committee

– A new legislative framework for products that is fit for the digital and sustainable transition (2024/2119(INI))

REGI Committee

– The role of cohesion policy in supporting the just transition (2024/2121(INI))
(opinion: EMPL)

– The role of cohesion policy investment in resolving the current housing crisis (2024/2120(INI))
(opinion: EMPL)

III. Consent procedure

Reports with a motion for a non-legislative resolution (consent procedure) (Rule 107(5))

(Following notification by the Conference of Committee Chairs on 15 January 2025)

AFET Committee

– Interim report in view of the consent procedure on the Agreement establishing an association between the EU and the Principality of Andorra and the Republic of San Marino (2024/0101R(NLE) – 2024/0101(NLE))
(opinion: ECON, IMCO)

IV. Petitions

Petitions Nos 1427-24 to 1518-24 had been entered in the register on 17 January 2025 and had been forwarded to the committee responsible, in accordance with Rule 232(9) and (10).

The President had, on 17 January 2025, forwarded to the committee responsible, in accordance with Rule 232(15), petitions addressed to the European Parliament by natural or legal persons who were not citizens of the European Union and who did not reside, or have their registered office, in a Member State.

V. Documents received

The following documents had been received from Members:

– Mathilde Androuët, Gerolf Annemans, Jordan Bardella, Nikola Bartůšek, Rachel Blom, Barbara Bonte, Paolo Borchia, Mireia Borrás Pabón, Irmhild Boßdorf, Jaroslav Bžoch, Klara Dostalova, Marieke Ehlers, Dick Erixon, Tomasz Froelich, Petras Gražulis, Branko Grims, Catherine Griset, Enikő Győri, Roman Haider, Fernand Kartheiser, Ondřej Knotek, Vilis Krištopans, Julien Leonardelli, Jorge Martín Frías, Milan Mazurek, Tiago Moreira de Sá, Jana Nagyová, Hans Neuhoff, Julie Rechagneux, Dominik Tarczyński, Hermann Tertsch, Isabella Tovaglieri, António Tânger Corrêa, Milan Uhrík, Tom Vandendriessche, Harald Vilimsky, Ewa Zajączkowska-Hernik and Auke Zijlstra. Motion for a resolution on Dismantling Overregulation and Government Encroachment: reclaiming competitiveness and innovation in the European Union (B10-0214/2024)
referred to committee responsible: JURI
opinion: ITRE

– Pekka Toveri and Sebastian Tynkkynen. Motion for a resolution on restricting the ability of passenger and cargo traffic to enter European Union airspace from Russia (B10-0220/2024)
referred to committee responsible: TRAN
opinion: AFET

– Matthieu Valet. Motion for a resolution on EU policy on Syrian refugees following the overthrow of the Bashar al-Assad regime (B10-0237/2024)
referred to committee responsible: LIBE

– Christine Anderson, Anja Arndt, René Aust, Arno Bausemer, Zsuzsanna Borvendég, Markus Buchheit, Petr Bystron, Elisabeth Dieringer, Siegbert Frank Droese, Marc Jongen, Mary Khan, Sarah Knafo, Maximilian Krah and Jaroslava Pokorná Jermanová. Motion for a resolution on financial and organisational support for Member States to repatriate Syrian nationals (B10-0238/2024)
referred to committee responsible: LIBE

ATTENDANCE REGISTER

Present:

Aaltola Mika, Abadía Jover Maravillas, Adamowicz Magdalena, Aftias Georgios, Agirregoitia Martínez Oihane, Agius Peter, Agius Saliba Alex, Allione Grégory, Al-Sahlani Abir, Anadiotis Nikolaos, Anderson Christine, Andersson Li, Andresen Rasmus, Andrews Barry, Andriukaitis Vytenis Povilas, Androuët Mathilde, Angel Marc, Annemans Gerolf, Antoci Giuseppe, Arias Echeverría Pablo, Arimont Pascal, Arłukowicz Bartosz, Arnaoutoglou Sakis, Arndt Anja, Arvanitis Konstantinos, Asens Llodrà Jaume, Assis Francisco, Attard Daniel, Aubry Manon, Auštrevičius Petras, Axinia Adrian-George, Azmani Malik, Bajada Thomas, Baljeu Jeannette, Ballarín Cereza Laura, Bardella Jordan, Barley Katarina, Barna Dan, Barrena Arza Pernando, Bartulica Stephen Nikola, Bartůšek Nikola, Bausemer Arno, Bay Nicolas, Bay Christophe, Beke Wouter, Beleris Fredis, Bellamy François-Xavier, Benea Adrian-Dragoş, Benifei Brando, Benjumea Benjumea Isabel, Beňová Monika, Berendsen Tom, Berger Stefan, Berg Sibylle, Berlato Sergio, Bernhuber Alexander, Biedroń Robert, Bielan Adam, Bischoff Gabriele, Blaha Ľuboš, Blinkevičiūtė Vilija, Blom Rachel, Bloss Michael, Bocheński Tobiasz, Boeselager Damian, Bogdan Ioan-Rareş, Bonaccini Stefano, Bonte Barbara, Borchia Paolo, Borrás Pabón Mireia, Borvendég Zsuzsanna, Borzan Biljana, Bosanac Gordan, Bosse Stine, Botenga Marc, Boyer Gilles, Boylan Lynn, Brandstätter Helmut, Brasier-Clain Marie-Luce, Braun Grzegorz, Brejza Krzysztof, Bricmont Saskia, Brnjac Nikolina, Brudziński Joachim Stanisław, Bryłka Anna, Buczek Tomasz, Buda Daniel, Buda Waldemar, Budka Borys, Bugalho Sebastião, Buła Andrzej, Burkhardt Delara, Buxadé Villalba Jorge, Bžoch Jaroslav, Camara Mélissa, Canfin Pascal, Carberry Nina, Casa David, Caspary Daniel, Cassart Benoit, Castillo Laurent, del Castillo Vera Pilar, Cavazzini Anna, Cavedagna Stefano, Ceccardi Susanna, Cepeda José, Ceulemans Estelle, Chahim Mohammed, Chaibi Leila, Chastel Olivier, Chinnici Caterina, Christensen Asger, Ciccioli Carlo, Cifrová Ostrihoňová Veronika, Ciriani Alessandro, Cisint Anna Maria, Clausen Per, Clergeau Christophe, Cormand David, Corrado Annalisa, Costanzo Vivien, Cotrim De Figueiredo João, Cowen Barry, Cremer Tobias, Crespo Díaz Carmen, Cristea Andi, Cunha Paulo, Danielsson Johan, Dauchy Marie, Dávid Dóra, David Ivan, Decaro Antonio, de la Hoz Quintano Raúl, Della Valle Danilo, Deloge Valérie, De Masi Fabio, De Meo Salvatore, Demirel Özlem, Deutsch Tamás, Devaux Valérie, Dibrani Adnan, Diepeveen Ton, Dieringer Elisabeth, Dîncu Vasile, Di Rupo Elio, Doherty Regina, Doleschal Christian, Dömötör Csaba, Do Nascimento Cabral Paulo, Donazzan Elena, Dorfmann Herbert, Dostál Ondřej, Droese Siegbert Frank, Düpont Lena, Ecke Matthias, Ehler Christian, Ehlers Marieke, Eriksson Sofie, Erixon Dick, Eroglu Engin, Everding Sebastian, Ezcurra Almansa Alma, Falcone Marco, Farantouris Nikolas, Farreng Laurence, Farský Jan, Ferber Markus, Fernández Jonás, Fidanza Carlo, Fiocchi Pietro, Firmenich Ruth, Fita Claire, Fourlas Loucas, Fourreau Emma, Fragkos Emmanouil, Freund Daniel, Frigout Anne-Sophie, Fritzon Heléne, Froelich Tomasz, Fuglsang Niels, Furet Angéline, Furore Mario, Gahler Michael, Galán Estrella, Gálvez Lina, Gambino Alberico, García Hermida-Van Der Walle Raquel, Garraud Jean-Paul, Gasiuk-Pihowicz Kamila, Geadi Geadis, Gedin Hanna, Geese Alexandra, Geier Jens, Geisel Thomas, Gemma Chiara, Georgiou Giorgos, Gerbrandy Gerben-Jan, Germain Jean-Marc, Gerzsenyi Gabriella, Geuking Niels, Gieseke Jens, Giménez Larraz Borja, Girauta Vidal Juan Carlos, Glavak Sunčana, Glück Andreas, Glucksmann Raphaël, Goerens Charles, Gomart Christophe, Gomes Isilda, Gómez López Sandra, Gonçalves Bruno, Gonçalves Sérgio, González Pons Esteban, Gori Giorgio, Gosiewska Małgorzata, Gotink Dirk, Gozi Sandro, Grapini Maria, Gražulis Petras, Grims Branko, Griset Catherine, Gronkiewicz-Waltz Hanna, Groothuis Bart, Grossmann Elisabeth, Grudler Christophe, Gualmini Elisabetta, Guarda Cristina, Guetta Bernard, Guzenina Maria, Hadjipantela Michalis, Hahn Svenja, Haider Roman, Halicki Andrzej, Hassan Rima, Häusling Martin, Hava Mircea-Gheorghe, Hazekamp Anja, Heide Hannes, Heinäluoma Eero, Henriksson Anna-Maja, Herbst Niclas, Herranz García Esther, Hetman Krzysztof, Hohlmeier Monika, Hojsík Martin, Holmgren Pär, Hölvényi György, Homs Ginel Alicia, Humberto Sérgio, Ijabs Ivars, Imart Céline, Incir Evin, Inselvini Paolo, Iovanovici Şoşoacă Diana, Jalloul Muro Hana, Jamet France, Jerković Romana, Jongen Marc, Joński Dariusz, Joron Virginie, Jouvet Pierre, Joveva Irena, Juknevičienė Rasa, Junco García Nora, Jungbluth Alexander, Kabilov Taner, Kalfon François, Kaljurand Marina, Kalniete Sandra, Kamiński Mariusz, Kanev Radan, Karlsbro Karin, Kartheiser Fernand, Karvašová Ľubica, Katainen Elsi, Kefalogiannis Emmanouil, Kelleher Billy, Keller Fabienne, Kelly Seán, Kemp Martine, Kennes Rudi, Khan Mary, Kobosko Michał, Köhler Stefan, Kohut Łukasz, Kokalari Arba, Kolář Ondřej, Kollár Kinga, Kols Rihards, Konečná Kateřina, Kopacz Ewa, Körner Moritz, Kountoura Elena, Kovatchev Andrey, Krah Maximilian, Krištopans Vilis, Kruis Sebastian, Krutílek Ondřej, Kubín Tomáš, Kuhnke Alice, Kulja András Tivadar, Kulmuni Katri, Kyllönen Merja, Kyuchyuk Ilhan, Lagodinsky Sergey, Lakos Eszter, Lalucq Aurore, Lange Bernd, Langensiepen Katrin, Laššáková Judita, László András, Laurent Murielle, Laureti Camilla, Laykova Rada, Lazarov Ilia, Lazarus Luis-Vicențiu, Le Callennec Isabelle, Leggeri Fabrice, Lenaers Jeroen, Leonardelli Julien, Lewandowski Janusz, Lexmann Miriam, Liese Peter, Lins Norbert, Loiseau Nathalie, Løkkegaard Morten, Lopatka Reinhold, López Javi, López Aguilar Juan Fernando, López-Istúriz White Antonio, Lövin Isabella, Luena César, Łukacijewska Elżbieta Katarzyna, Lupo Giuseppe, McAllister David, Madison Jaak, Magoni Lara, Maij Marit, Maląg Marlena, Manda Claudiu, Mandl Lukas, Maniatis Yannis, Mantovani Mario, Maran Pierfrancesco, Marczułajtis-Walczak Jagna, Mariani Thierry, Marino Ignazio Roberto, Martín Frías Jorge, Martins Catarina, Martusciello Fulvio, Marzà Ibáñez Vicent, Matthieu Sara, Mavrides Costas, Mayer Georg, Mazurek Milan, Mažylis Liudas, McNamara Michael, Mebarek Nora, Mehnert Alexandra, Meleti Eleonora, Mendes Ana Catarina, Mendia Idoia, Mertens Verena, Mesure Marina, Metsola Roberta, Metz Tilly, Mikser Sven, Millán Mon Francisco José, Miranda Paz Ana, Molnár Csaba, Montero Irene, Montserrat Dolors, Morace Carolina, Moreira de Sá Tiago, Moreno Sánchez Javier, Moretti Alessandra, Motreanu Dan-Ştefan, Mularczyk Arkadiusz, Müller Piotr, Mullooly Ciaran, Mureşan Siegfried, Muşoiu Ştefan, Nagyová Jana, Navarrete Rojas Fernando, Negrescu Victor, Nemec Matjaž, Nerudová Danuše, Nesci Denis, Neuhoff Hans, Neumann Hannah, Nevado del Campo Elena, Niebler Angelika, Niedermayer Luděk, Niinistö Ville, Nikolic Aleksandar, Ní Mhurchú Cynthia, Noichl Maria, Nordqvist Rasmus, Novakov Andrey, Nykiel Mirosława, Obajtek Daniel, Ódor Ľudovít, Oetjen Jan-Christoph, Ohisalo Maria, Oliveira João, Olivier Philippe, Omarjee Younous, Ondruš Branislav, Ó Ríordáin Aodhán, Ozdoba Jacek, Paet Urmas, Pajín Leire, Palmisano Valentina, Papadakis Kostas, Papandreou Nikos, Pappas Nikos, Pascual de la Parte Nicolás, Pedro Ana Miguel, Pedulla’ Gaetano, Pellerin-Carlin Thomas, Peltier Guillaume, Penkova Tsvetelina, Pennelle Gilles, Pereira Lídia, Peter-Hansen Kira Marie, Petrov Hristo, Picaro Michele, Picula Tonino, Piera Pascale, Pimpie Pierre, Piperea Gheorghe, de la Pisa Carrión Margarita, Pokorná Jermanová Jaroslava, Polato Daniele, Polfjärd Jessica, Popescu Virgil-Daniel, Pozņaks Reinis, Princi Giusi, Protas Jacek, Pürner Friedrich, Rackete Carola, Radev Emil, Radtke Dennis, Rafowicz Emma, Ratas Jüri, Rechagneux Julie, Regner Evelyn, Repasi René, Repp Sabrina, Ressler Karlo, Reuten Thijs, Riba i Giner Diana, Ricci Matteo, Riehl Nela, Ripa Manuela, Rodrigues André, Ros Sempere Marcos, Roth Neveďalová Katarína, Rougé André, Ruissen Bert-Jan, Ruotolo Sandro, Rzońca Bogdan, Saeidi Arash, Salini Massimiliano, Salis Ilaria, Salla Aura, Sánchez Amor Nacho, Sanchez Julien, Sancho Murillo Elena, Saramo Jussi, Sardone Silvia, Šarec Marjan, Sargiacomo Eric, Satouri Mounir, Saudargas Paulius, Sbai Majdouline, Sberna Antonella, Schaldemose Christel, Schaller-Baross Ernő, Schenk Oliver, Scheuring-Wielgus Joanna, Schieder Andreas, Schilling Lena, Schneider Christine, Schwab Andreas, Scuderi Benedetta, Seekatz Ralf, Sell Alexander, Serrano Sierra Rosa, Serra Sánchez Isabel, Sienkiewicz Bartłomiej, Simon Sven, Singer Christine, Sinkevičius Virginijus, Sippel Birgit, Sjöstedt Jonas, Śmiszek Krzysztof, Smith Anthony, Smit Sander, Sokol Tomislav, Solier Diego, Sommen Liesbet, Sonneborn Martin, Sorel Malika, Sousa Silva Hélder, Søvndal Villy, Squarta Marco, Staķis Mārtiņš, Stancanelli Raffaele, Stier Davor Ivo, Stöteler Sebastiaan, Stoyanov Stanislav, Strack-Zimmermann Marie-Agnes, Strada Cecilia, Streit Joachim, Strik Tineke, Strolenberg Anna, Stürgkh Anna, Sypniewski Marcin, Szczerba Michał, Szekeres Pál, Szydło Beata, Tamburrano Dario, Tânger Corrêa António, Tarquinio Marco, Târziu Claudiu-Richard, Tavares Carla, Tegethoff Kai, Temido Marta, Teodorescu Georgiana, Teodorescu Måwe Alice, Ter Laak Ingeborg, Terras Riho, Thionnet Pierre-Romain, Timgren Beatrice, Tinagli Irene, Tobback Bruno, Tobé Tomas, Tolassy Rody, Tomašič Zala, Tomc Romana, Tonin Matej, Toom Jana, Topo Raffaele, Torselli Francesco, Tosi Flavio, Toussaint Marie, Toveri Pekka, Tridico Pasquale, Trochu Laurence, Tsiodras Dimitris, Tudose Mihai, Tynkkynen Sebastian, Uhrík Milan, Ušakovs Nils, Vaidere Inese, Valchev Ivaylo, Vălean Adina, Valet Matthieu, Van Brempt Kathleen, Van Brug Anouk, van den Berg Brigitte, Vandendriessche Tom, Van Dijck Kris, Van Lanschot Reinier, Van Leeuwen Jessika, Vannacci Roberto, Van Overtveldt Johan, Van Sparrentak Kim, Varaut Alexandre, Vasconcelos Ana, Vasile-Voiculescu Vlad, Vautmans Hilde, Vedrenne Marie-Pierre, Ventola Francesco, Verheyen Sabine, Verougstraete Yvan, Veryga Aurelijus, Vieira Catarina, Vigenin Kristian, Vilimsky Harald, Vincze Loránt, Vind Marianne, Vistisen Anders, Vivaldini Mariateresa, Volgin Petar, von der Schulenburg Michael, Vondra Alexandr, Voss Axel, Vozemberg-Vrionidi Elissavet, Vrecionová Veronika, Vázquez Lázara Adrián, Waitz Thomas, Walsmann Marion, Warborn Jörgen, Warnke Jan-Peter, Wąsik Maciej, Wawrykiewicz Michał, Wcisło Marta, Wechsler Andrea, Werbrouck Séverine, Wiesner Emma, Wiezik Michal, Wilmès Sophie, Winkler Iuliu, Winzig Angelika, Wiseler-Lima Isabel, Wiśniewska Jadwiga, Wölken Tiemo, Wolters Lara, Yar Lucia, Yon-Courtin Stéphanie, Zacharia Maria, Zajączkowska-Hernik Ewa, Zalewska Anna, Žalimas Dainius, Zan Alessandro, Zarzalejos Javier, Zdechovský Tomáš, Zdrojewski Bogdan Andrzej, Zijlstra Auke, Zīle Roberts, Zingaretti Nicola, Złotowski Kosma, Zoido Álvarez Juan Ignacio, Zovko Željana, Zver Milan

Excused:

Sidl Günther

ANNEX 1 – Composition of new committees

C01A SEDE

[ 20/01/2025 – ]

Комисия по сигурност и отбрана

Comisión de Seguridad y Defensa

Výbor pro bezpečnost a obranu

Udvalget om Sikkerhed og Forsvar

Ausschuss für Sicherheit und Verteidigung

Julgeoleku- ja kaitsekomisjon

Επιτροπή Ασφάλειας και Άμυνας

Committee on Security and Defence

Commission de la sécurité et de la défense

An Coiste um Shlándáil agus Cosaint

Odbor za sigurnost i obranu

Commissione per la sicurezza e la difesa

Drošības un aizsardzības komiteja

Saugumo ir gynybos komitetas

ssBiztonság- és Védelempolitikai Bizottság

Kumitat għas-Sigurtà u d-Difiża

Commissie veiligheid en defensie

Komisja Bezpieczeństwa i Obrony

Comissão da Segurança e da Defesa

Comisia pentru securitate și apărare

Výbor pre bezpečnosť a obranu

Odbor za varnost in obrambo

Turvallisuus- ja puolustuspolitiikan valiokunta

Utskottet för säkerhet och försvar

(43 members)

PPE (11)

BEKE Wouter

DE MEO Salvatore

GOMART Christophe

HERBST Niclas

MEIMARAKIS Vangelis

NOVAKOV Andrey

PASCUAL DE LA PARTE Nicolás

SZCZERBA Michał

TEODORESCU MÅWE Alice

TERRAS Riho

TOVERI Pekka

S&D (8)

CREMER Tobias

DI RUPO Elio

GLUCKSMANN Raphaël

LÓPEZ Javi

MAVRIDES Costas

MENDES Ana Catarina

MIKSER Sven

TUDOSE Mihai

PfE (5)

HÖLVÉNYI György

POKORNÁ JERMANOVÁ Jaroslava

STÖTELER Sebastiaan

THIONNET Pierre-Romain

VANNACCI Roberto

ECR (5)

DONAZZAN Elena

DWORCZYK Michał

GAMBINO Alberico

POZŅAKS Reinis

VONDRA Alexandr

Renew (5)

AUŠTREVIČIUS Petras

LOISEAU Nathalie

ŠAREC Marjan

STRACK-ZIMMERMANN Marie-Agnes

YAR Lucia

Verts/ALE (3)

NEUMANN Hannah

STAĶIS Mārtiņš

VAN LANSCHOT Reinier

The Left (3)

BOTENGA Marc

DEMIREL Özlem

KYLLÖNEN Merja

ESN (1)

NEUHOFF Hans

NI (2)

PAPADAKIS Kostas

VON DER SCHULENBURG Michael

C08A SANT

[ 20/01/2025 – ]

Комисия по обществено здраве

Comisión de Salud Pública

Výbor pro veřejné zdraví

Udvalget om Folkesundhed

Ausschuss für öffentliche Gesundheit

Rahvatervishoiu komisjon

Επιτροπή Δημόσιας Υγείας

Committee on Public Health

Commission de la santé publique

An Coiste um Shláinte Phoiblí

Odbor za javno zdravlje

Commissione per la sanità pubblica

Sabiedrības veselības komiteja

Visuomenės sveikatos komitetas

Közegészségügyi Bizottság

Kumitat għas-Saħħa Pubblika

Commissie volksgezondheid

Komisja Zdrowia Publicznego

Comissão da Saúde Pública

Comisia pentru sănătate publică

Výbor pre verejné zdravie

Odbor za javno zdravje

Kansanterveyden valiokunta

Utskottet för folkhälsa

(43 members)

PPE (11)

ARŁUKOWICZ Bartosz

CASTILLO Laurent

HADJIPANTELA Michalis

JARUBAS Adam

KULJA András Tivadar

LIESE Peter

MORATTI Letizia

NEVADO DEL CAMPO Elena

POLFJÄRD Jessica

SCHENK Oliver

SOKOL Tomislav

S&D (8)

ANDRIUKAITIS Vytenis Povilas

CLERGEAU Christophe

GONZÁLEZ CASARES Nicolás

JERKOVIĆ Romana

MORETTI Alessandra

NEGRESCU Victor

PAPANDREOU Nikos

WÖLKEN Tiemo

PfE (5)

BRASIER-CLAIN Marie-Luce

DE LA PISA CARRIÓN Margarita

FERENC Viktória

HAUSER Gerald

KNOTEK Ondřej

ECR (5)

BUDA Waldemar

FRAGKOS Emmanouil

PICARO Michele

RAZZA Ruggero

TROCHU Laurence

Renew (5)

BOSSE Stine

CANFIN Pascal

CHASTEL Olivier

CIFROVÁ OSTRIHOŇOVÁ Veronika

VASILE-VOICULESCU Vlad

Verts/ALE (3)

HÄUSLING Martin

MARINO Ignazio Roberto

METZ Tilly

The Left (3)

MARTINS Catarina

PALMISANO Valentina

TAMBURRANO Dario

ESN (1)

ANDERSON Christine

NI (2)

BEŇOVÁ Monika

DOSTÁL Ondřej

CS01 EUDS

[ 20/01/2025 – ]

Специална комисия относно европейския щит за демокрацията

Comisión Especial sobre el Escudo Europeo de la Democracia

Zvláštní výbor pro Evropský štít pro demokracii

Det Særlige Udvalg om Det Europæiske Demokratiskjold

Sonderausschuss für den Europäischen Schutzschild für die Demokratie

Euroopa demokraatia kaitse erikomisjon

Ειδική Επιτροπή για την Ευρωπαϊκή Ασπίδα Δημοκρατίας

Special committee on the European Democracy Shield

Commission spéciale sur le bouclier européen de la démocratie

An Coiste Speisialta um an Sciath Eorpach don Daonlathas

Posebni odbor za europski štit za zaštitu demokracije

Commissione speciale sullo scudo europeo per la democrazia

Īpašā komiteja attiecībā uz Eiropas demokrātijas vairogu

Specialusis komitetas Europos demokratijos skydo klausimais

Az európai demokráciapajzzsal foglalkozó különbizottság

Kumitat Speċjali dwar it-Tarka Ewropea għad-Demokrazija

Bijzondere Commissie inzake een schild voor de Europese democratie

Komisja Specjalna ds. Europejskiej Tarczy Demokracji

Comissão Especial sobre o Escudo Europeu da Democracia

Comisia specială pentru Scutul democrației europene

Osobitný výbor pre európsky štít na obranu demokracie

Posebni odbor za evropski ščit za demokracijo

Eurooppalaista demokratian kilpeä käsittelevä erityisvaliokunta

Särskilda utskottet för det europeiska demokratiförsvaret

(33 members)

PPE (9)

AALTOLA Mika

BOGDAN Ioan-Rareş

DÜPONT Lena

KALNIETE Sandra

MARTUSCIELLO Fulvio

SIENKIEWICZ Bartłomiej

TOBÉ Tomas

ZDECHOVSKÝ Tomáš

ZOIDO ÁLVAREZ Juan Ignacio

S&D (6)

DÎNCU Vasile

MENDES Ana Catarina

MOLNÁR Csaba

PICIERNO Pina

SCHALDEMOSE Christel

VAN BREMPT Kathleen

PfE (4)

BŽOCH Jaroslav

LEGGERI Fabrice

SCHALLER-BAROSS Ernő

TÂNGER CORRÊA António

ECR (4)

CAVEDAGNA Stefano

KANKO Assita

SZYDŁO Beata

TERHEŞ Cristian

Renew (4)

BRANDSTÄTTER Helmut

GROOTHUIS Bart

LOISEAU Nathalie

WILMÈS Sophie

Verts/ALE (2)

GEESE Alexandra

VAN SPARRENTAK Kim

The Left (2)

ARVANITIS Konstantinos

DELLA VALLE Danilo

ESN (1)

ANDERSON Christine

NI (1)

PANAYIOTOU Fidias

CS02 HOUS

[ 20/01/2025 – ]

Специална комисия относно жилищната криза в Европейския съюз

Comisión Especial sobre la Crisis de la Vivienda en la Unión Europea

Zvláštní výbor pro krizi v oblasti bydlení v Evropské unii

Det Særlige Udvalg om Boligkrisen i Den Europæiske Union

Sonderausschuss zur Wohnraumkrise in der Europäischen Union

Euroopa Liidu eluasemekriisi erikomisjon

Ειδική Επιτροπή για τη στεγαστική κρίση στην Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση

Special committee on the Housing Crisis in the European Union

Commission spéciale sur la crise du logement dans l’Union européenne

An Coiste Speisialta um an nGéarchéim Tithíochta san Aontas Eorpach

Posebni odbor za stambenu krizu u Europskoj uniji

Commissione speciale sulla crisi degli alloggi nell’Unione europea

Īpašā komiteja mājokļu krīzes risināšanai Eiropas Savienībā

Specialusis komitetas būsto krizės Europos Sąjungoje klausimais

Az Európai Unióban tapasztalható lakhatási válsággal foglalkozó különbizottság

Kumitat Speċjali dwar il-Kriżi tal-Akkomodazzjoni fl-Unjoni Ewropea

Bijzondere Commissie inzake de huisvestingscrisis in de Europese Unie

Komisja Specjalna ds. Kryzysu Mieszkaniowego w Unii Europejskiej

Comissão Especial sobre a Crise de Habitação na União Europeia

Comisia specială pentru criza locuințelor în Uniunea Europeană

Osobitný výbor pre krízu bývania v Európskej únii

Posebni odbor za stanovanjsko krizo v Evropski uniji

Asuntokriisiä Euroopan unionissa käsittelevä erityisvaliokunta

Särskilda utskottet för bostadskrisen i Europeiska unionen

(33 members)

PPE (9)

BUGALHO Sebastião

CASA David

DOHERTY Regina

EZCURRA ALMANSA Alma

FALCONE Marco

FERBER Markus

GOTINK Dirk

LE CALLENNEC Isabelle

MARCZUŁAJTIS-WALCZAK Jagna

S&D (6)

BISCHOFF Gabriele

GOMES Isilda

HOMS GINEL Alicia

MEBAREK Nora

SCHIEDER Andreas

TINAGLI Irene

PfE (4)

BLOM Rachel

DOSTALOVA Klara

HÖLVÉNYI György

RECHAGNEUX Julie

ECR (4)

JUNCO GARCÍA Nora

MAGONI Lara

SBERNA Antonella

TEODORESCU Georgiana

Renew (4)

HOJSÍK Martin

MULLOOLY Ciaran

TOOM Jana

VAN DEN BERG Brigitte

Verts/ALE (2)

MARZÀ IBÁÑEZ Vicent

OHISALO Maria

The Left (2)

CHAIBI Leila

MONTERO Irene

ESN (1)

BOSSDORF Irmhild

NI (1)

ZACHARIA Maria

MIL OSI Europe News –

January 25, 2025

MIL-OSI Economics: Signature of MGCS Project Company shareholder agreement

Source: Thales Group

Headline: Signature of MGCS Project Company shareholder agreement

24 Jan 2025

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Friday, January 24, 2025 – Thales, KNDS Deutschland, KNDS France and Rheinmetall Landsysteme signed the articles of association for MGCS Project Company GmbH, Cologne, on Thursday 23 January 2025 in Paris in the presence of the French Minister of Defence, Sébastien Lecornu, and the German Minister of Defence, Boris Pistorius.

MGCS, which stands for Main Ground Combat System, is a German-Franco armament program designed to replace the Leopard 2 and Leclerc main battle tanks with a cross-platform combat system by 2040.

The signing of the shareholder agreement marks an essential step in the forthcoming creation of the MGCS Project Company. After negotiating a contract with the Federal Office of Bundeswehr Equipment, Information Technology and In-Service Support (BAAINBw), acting on behalf of the two states through a German-Franco Combined Project Team (CPT), this project company will be responsible as the industrial prime contractor for the implementation of the next phase of the MGCS program. In particular, it will consolidate the concept and the main technological pillars of the system.

The company will be equally owned by the parties, 25% each, with a national workshare of 50% Germany and 50% France, and will be based in Cologne, Germany.

The industrial partners in the MGCS program are delighted with this signature, which follows on from the impetus given by the French and German governments in the spring of 2024, with the signing of a Letter Of Intent (LOI).

About KNDS:

KNDS is the result of the association of Krauss-Maffei Wegmann (KMW) and Nexter, two of the leading European manufacturers of military land systems based in Germany and France.

KNDS forms a Group of around 10,000 employees, with a 2023 turnover of 3.3 billion euro, an order backlog of around 16 billion euro and incoming orders of 7.8 billion euro. The range of its products includes main battle tanks, armored vehicles, artillery systems, weapons systems, ammunition, military bridges, customer services, battle management systems, training solutions, protection solutions and a wide range of equipment.

The formation of KNDS represents the beginning of consolidation in land defense systems industry in Europe. The strategic alliance between KMW and Nexter enhances both groups’ competitiveness and international positions, as well as their ability to meet the needs of their respective national army. In addition, it offers to its European and NATO customers the opportunity of increased standardization and interoperability for their defense equipment, with a dependable industrial base.

KNDS headquarters are based in Amsterdam.

Press contact: guillem.monsonis@knds.fr

About Rheinmetall:

Rheinmetall AG of Duesseldorf, a listed company, is a leading international defence contractor and a driver of future-oriented technological and industrial innovation in civil markets. With over 31,000 employees and 171 sites worldwide, Rheinmetall generated sales of €7.2 billion in 2023. With its technologies, products and systems, the company creates the indispensable basis for peace, freedom and sustainable development security. Rheinmetall Landsysteme GmbH is part of the Rheinmetall Division Vehicle Systems Europe and is one of the leading land system manufacturers.

Media contact: oliver.hoffmann@rheinmetall.com

About Thales:

Thales (Euronext Paris: HO) is a global leader in advanced technologies specialized in three business domains: Defence, Aerospace and Cyber & Digital. It develops products and solutions that help make the world safer, greener and more inclusive.

The Group invests close to €4 billion a year in Research & Development, particularly in key innovation areas such as AI, cybersecurity, quantum technologies, cloud technologies and 6G.

Thales has close to 81,000 employees in 68 countries. In 2023, the Group generated sales of €18.4bn.

Media contact: camille.heck@thalesgroup.com

MIL OSI Economics –

January 25, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: AFRICA/DR CONGO – Escalation of violence in North Kivu: M23 rebels advance towards Goma

Source: Agenzia Fides – MIL OSI

Kinshasa (Agenzia Fides) – The North Kivu region, in the east of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), is facing a serious escalation of violence, with intense fighting between the Congolese armed forces (FARDC) and the M23 rebels, who are supported by Rwandan soldiers. For their part, government troops are supported by Burundian soldiers, the Southern African Development Community Mission in the DRC (SAMIDRC), the blue helmets of MONUSCO and Wazilendo militiamen.The advance of the rebels has been significant, managing to conquer the towns of Mumbambiro and Sake, located just 30 km from the city of Goma, capital of North Kivu. In recent days, fighting has focused on strategic arteries such as Sake-Kirotshe, Sake-Mushaki and Sake-Kitshanga. The heavy fighting in Sake has triggered a new mass exodus of displaced people towards Goma, where the humanitarian situation is already alarming. Clashes have now reached the territory of Nyiragongo, near Goma, particularly in Kibumba, some 20 km from the city. Heavy artillery shelling can be heard in the northern districts of Goma, while the camps for internally displaced people in Bulengo, Kimashini and Lushagara, west of the city, have been evacuated, forcing their occupants to seek refuge in the city centre. The chaos is exacerbated by the spread of contradictory news, such as the alleged assassination of the military governor of North Kivu, Péter Cirimwami. While media close to the rebels claim his death, other sources close to the government deny it, although there has been no official confirmation. The Congo River Alliance, the political arm of the M23, has issued a statement in English and French urging SAMIDRC troops and MONUSCO blue helmets not to intervene alongside Congolese forces. In addition, the rebels have announced their intention to advance on Goma with the declared aim of “bringing peace and stability to the region.” Given the seriousness of the situation, Congolese President Félix Tshisekedi returned to Kinshasa from Davos on January 23 to meet urgently with the Ministers of the Interior and Defense. He also chaired an extraordinary meeting of the High Council of Defense on January 24 to address the crisis. In parallel, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, on a visit to Kigali, Rwanda, expressed his willingness to mediate between Rwanda and the DRC to end the conflict. (L.M.) (Agenzia Fides, 24/1/2025)
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MIL OSI Europe News –

January 25, 2025
MIL-OSI Canada: Learn about Kindergarten registration in the Yukon
Learn about Kindergarten registration in the Yukon
jlutz
January 22, 2025 – 8:47 am
The Department of Education is hosting a Zoom webinar to provide information about Kindergarten registration and Early French Immersion Kindergarten programs for the 2025–2026 school year.

The session will be held on Wednesday, January 22, at 7 pm.

All Yukon parents and guardians are invited to attend this information session to learn about the registration process, program details and to have their questions answered by department staff.

Yukon children who will be five years old by December 31, 2025, are eligible to start Kindergarten this coming school year.

Kindergarten registration details:
- Whitehorse Schools: Online registration opens Tuesday, February 4, 2025. This includes French Immersion Kindergarten programs (at École Selkirk Elementary and École Whitehorse Elementary), First Nation School Board schools (Takhini Elementary and Grey Mountain Primary) and Catholic schools (Christ the King Elementary and Holy Family Elementary)
- Registration for all Whitehorse schools is online at yukon.ca/register-child-school.
- French Immersion Kindergarten programs: The deadline to register is Sunday, February 16, 2025.
- Rural Schools: Registration is in person at the school and can be done at any time before the school year starts.
MIL OSI Canada News –
January 25, 2025
MIL-OSI: The Drone Market Size Continues to Rise Steeply Generating Lucrative Revenue Opportunity

Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

PALM BEACH, Fla., Jan. 24, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — FN Media Group News Commentary – The drone platform services segment dominated the global drone services market share in recent years and is estimated to be the fastest growing through 2032. This is due to the growing use of drones for emergency response and public safety. Drone platform services refer to a range of software and hardware solutions that enable the safe and efficient operation of drones. Drone MRO services comprise maintenance, repair, and overhaul services for items such as wind turbine blades, solar plates, and oil & gas pipelines, especially in hard-to-reach locations. The drone MRO services segment is expected to register significant growth during the forecast period due to increasing demand for low cost and effective inspection services across various sectors. Autonomous drones are UAVs that can operate without human intervention, using advanced software, sensors, and cameras. These drones have been playing an essential role in various industries such as agriculture, construction, mining, and logistics. The introduction of artificial intelligence (AI) software improves the overall performance of unmanned aerial systems, enabling drones to recognize objects, examine information, and provide real-time analytical feedback. A report from Fortune Business Insights said that: “The increase in precision farming needs, aiming to boost crop productivity, drives market growth. Drone OEMs are investing in R&D for thermal cameras, multispectral sensors, and LiDAR, improving drone efficacy in monitoring fields, creating vegetation maps, and detecting issues such as disease and irrigation irregularities. Thus, it drives the market growth during the forecast period.” Active Companies in the markets today include ZenaTech, Inc. (NASDAQ: ZENA), AgEagle Aerial Systems Inc. (NYSE: UAVS), Palladyne AI Corp. (NASDAQ: PDYN), Red Cat Holdings, Inc. (NASDAQ: RCAT), Ambarella, Inc. (NASDAQ: AMBA).

Fortune Business Insights continued: “Agricultural drones, flying at a specific altitude with sensors, provide crucial analytical data for controls crop health, treatment, exploration, field soil analysis, and yield assessments, aiding farmers in making informed decisions and reducing time and costs. The surveillance & inspection segment dominates the market. It is estimated to be the fastest growing segment during the forecast period, owing to rising demand for surveillance and inspection operations from agriculture, oil & gas, mining, and other sectors. The product delivery segment held the second-largest share in the application segment. It refers to the use of drones to deliver goods to customers. This entails specialized drones equipped with sensors and GPS technology to navigate and deliver packages to their intended destinations. The rising demand for fast and efficient delivery services is anticipated to boost the product delivery segment.”

ZenaTech (NASDAQ:ZENA) Announces Listing of its Common Shares on the Mexican Stock Exchange – ZenaTech, Inc. (FSE: 49Q) (BMV: ZENA) (“ZenaTech”), a technology company specializing in AI (Artificial Intelligence) drone, Drone-as-a-Service (DaaS), enterprise SaaS and Quantum Computing solutions, announces that it its common shares are approved for listing and trading on the BMV: Bolsa Mexicana de Valores (Mexican Stock Exchange). The shares trade under the symbol “ZENA” on its International Quotation System (SIC), effective January 23, 2025.

“As we continue to expand our business into new geographical markets, this additional listing on the Mexican Stock Exchange not only broadens our international exposure but provides increased liquidity for our shareholders. We look forward to sharing our story with Mexican investors as we continue to drive value for our shareholders,” said CEO Shaun Passley, Ph.D.

In Additional ZENA News – ZenaTech Inc.’s (NASDAQ:ZENA) Acquires KJM Land Surveying LLC, a Second Acquisition to Accelerate Drone Innovation in Land Surveys and Establish a Southeast Base for its Drone as a Service Business – ZenaTech, a technology company specializing in AI (Artificial Intelligence) drone, Drone-as-a-Service (DaaS), enterprise SaaS and Quantum Computing solutions, announces that it has acquired KJM Land Surveying LLC, a well-established Pensacola Florida land survey engineering company with a long history and roster of repeat customers. This is ZenaTech’s second acquisition as part of a larger roll-up strategy to disrupt the land survey industry by accelerating the use of drones for speed, accuracy and innovation benefits. The acquisition will also form the base of the Southeast US region of its national Drone as a Service or DaaS business which utilizes drone solutions from its subsidiary company ZenaDrone.

“Closing this second acquisition is another step in our Drone as a Service or DaaS strategy, establishing a Southeast base with an experienced team and customer relationships, which adds to our Northwest base and national rollout. We have the opportunity to significantly disrupt the land survey business at scale using drone technologies. We view our DaaS business model as similar as to how Uber disrupted the taxi industry,” said CEO Shaun Passley, Ph.D. “This acquisition, as well as the 20 others we have identified, have the potential to add accretive revenue over the short term as well as the long term.”

The US Surveying and Mapping Services industry is estimated at $10.3 billion according to Business Research Insights, growing at least 3% annually. Remotely piloted drones with an array of sensors and cameras, LiDAR (Light Detection and Ranging), and GPS systems for capturing high-resolution pictures and data are revolutionizing the land survey industry gathering aerial data across expansive terrains in a matter of hours instead of weeks or months using traditional methods. Continued… Read this full release by visiting: https://www.financialnewsmedia.com/news-zena/

Other recent developments in the technology industry include:

Ambarella, Inc. (NASDAQ: AMBA) recently announced during CES the N1-655 edge GenAI system-on-chip (SoC), which provides on-chip decode of 12x simultaneous 1080p30 video streams, while concurrently processing that video and running a hybrid of multiple, multimodal vision-language models (VLMs) and traditional CNNs. This SoC’s high AI processing performance supports most of the popular multimodal VLMs and large-language models (LLMs), while consuming only 20 watts of power—10-100x lower than cloud processors. For example, the N1-655 reliably runs the Phi, Gemma, LLaVA-OneVision and Llama models, without the need for an internet connection, on data inputs like visuals and speech in applications such as on-premise AI boxes, autonomous mobile robots (AMRs), and smart-city security video recorders.

Following its initial N1 SoC introduced last year, Ambarella is building up a family of edge GenAI SoCs for tasks that go beyond what can be done on-camera. Both of the current family members process GenAI models locally to improve privacy with state-of-the-art performance per watt, significantly reducing power consumption as well as the total cost of ownership compared to cloud-based inference processing.

AgEagle Aerial Systems Inc. (NYSE: UAVS) recently announced the completion of its previously announced historic order of eBee VISION systems to its reseller for French Army surveillance operations. Each system consists of an eBee VISION UAV, ground control systems, comms and antenna package, and a tactical backpack unit. The final 15 units have been delivered pursuant to this purchase order, with the total order valued at $3.4M, which represents the largest single order since the Company was founded.

Bill Irby, AgEagle President, stated, “As AgEagle embarks on what we anticipate being a promising new year in the expanding drone market, closing out this historic requisition serves as a strong indicator of what we believe will be our most successful year to date. In conjunction with our reseller partner we have conducted multiple training events with the French Army which provided invaluable real-time feedback we are leveraging to accelerate the evolution of our eBee VISION. We believe these insights, in addition to our recent significant milestone achievements, will be essential to the scaling of our high-value intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance product offerings to military and commercial operations worldwide. We look forward to driving ongoing sustainable revenue growth and remain committed to building long-term value for all our stakeholders.”

Palladyne AI Corp. (NASDAQ: PDYN) and Red Cat Holdings, Inc. (NASDAQ: RCAT), a drone technology company integrating robotic hardware and software for military, government, and commercial operations, recently announced the completion of the first successful flight in which multiple Teal drones equipped with Palladyne™ Pilot AI software autonomously collaborated to identify, prioritize, and track objects of interest on the ground. The flight demonstrates how the Palladyne Pilot AI software leverages sensor management and platform collaboration to enable a flight of two or more drones to autonomously collaborate and share multi-modal sensor information under constrained communication between drones. This follows Palladyne AI’s announcement in December 2024 that it had successfully demonstrated a single drone’s ability to interface with a small drone’s autopilot system using Palladyne Pilot to autonomously identify, prioritize, and track terrestrial targets.

“Enabling multiple Teal and Black Widow drones to synthesize and share multi-modal sensor fusion information in real-time will dramatically improve situational awareness in the field,” said Geoff Hitchcock, Chief Revenue Officer, Red Cat Holdings, Inc. “Even more compelling is the ability to translate that shared information into autonomous navigation, enabling a single operator to manage multiple drones with a substantially reduced cognitive load and in operational environments with limited connectivity. We look forward to engaging with our customers to showcase the value of this groundbreaking joint-solution.”

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The MIL Network –

January 25, 2025

MIL-OSI: Fidelity D & D Bancorp, Inc. First Quarter 2025 Dividend

Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

DUNMORE, Pa., Jan. 24, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — The Board of Directors of Fidelity D & D Bancorp, Inc. (NASDAQ: FDBC), parent company of The Fidelity Deposit and Discount Bank, announce their declaration of the Company’s 2025 first quarter dividend of $0.40 per share, a 5% increase above the prior year’s first quarter dividend paid of $0.38 per share. The dividend is payable March 10, 2025 to shareholders of record at the close of business on February 14, 2025.

Fidelity D & D Bancorp, Inc. serves Lackawanna, Luzerne, Northampton and Lehigh Counties through The Fidelity Deposit and Discount Bank’s 21 full-service community banking offices, along with the Fidelity Bank Wealth Management Minersville Office in Schuylkill County. Fidelity Bank provides a digital and virtual experience via digital services and digital account opening through Online Banking and the Fidelity Mobile Banking app.

For more information visit our investor relations web site through http://www.bankatfidelity.com.

This press release may contain forward-looking statements as defined in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. Actual results and trends could differ materially from those set forth in such statements due to various factors. These factors include the possibility that increased demand or prices for the company’s financial services and products may not occur, changing economic, interest rate and competitive conditions, technological developments and other risks and uncertainties, including those detailed in the company’s filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission.

Contacts:
Daniel J. Santaniello President and Chief Executive Officer 570-504-8035		Salvatore R. DeFrancesco, Jr. Treasurer and Chief Financial Officer 570-504-8000

The MIL Network –

January 25, 2025

MIL-OSI Global: The Holocaust poets who can help us to understand genocides past and present

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Jean Boase-Beier, Emeritus Professor, School of Literature, Drama and Creative Writing, University of East Anglia

On Holocaust Memorial Day we remember the victims of the Nazi Holocaust in 1940s Europe and all those affected by later genocides.

I believe that reading poetry is an important way to commemorate these victims because it is such a personal form.

The events of the Holocaust are familiar to many people as dates and numbers. The first concentration camp opened in Dachau in 1933. In 1942 the infamous meeting at the Wannsee took place in Berlin to decide upon the “final solution” to the perceived problem of Jewish people in Germany and beyond.

Some 6 million Jewish people were murdered, some 200,000 disabled and ill people were killed in Germany alone and 400,000 people were forcibly sterilised because they possessed traits the Nazis deemed undesirable.

Such statistics are well documented by Holocaust historians. But behind these numbers, overwhelming in their sheer vastness, are individuals, those whose voices we hear especially clearly in poems.

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People wrote poetry as realisation grew of their likely fate even before the murderous events that later came to be called the Holocaust. Many wrote poetry about the Holocaust later, because they survived and wanted the world to hear their stories, or because they lost family members and wanted to remember them.

Among those who wrote after the Holocaust was German poet Volker von Törne, who was wracked with vicarious guilt for his father’s Nazi past.

But it is the poems written as the events of the Holocaust were unfolding that strike a particular chord. These are poems by prisoners facing execution, by Jewish members of society forced to live in overcrowded ghettos, by those in camps and those about to be transported to camps. Often such poems were written on odd scraps of paper, carefully hidden or buried in the ground, or smuggled out of prison, ghetto or camp.

These writers, desperate to tell their stories, chose poetry because of its immediacy, its conciseness, its emotional impact and its ability to say what cannot easily be said in prose.

Almost none of them wrote in English, so English speakers read them via translators who can speak their words for them, fashioning new versions that aim to capture the style of the originals with all its resonances and as much of their immediacy and impact as possible.

Poets of the Holocaust

Some Holocaust poets became famous, and their work has been translated many times. One of the best known, Paul Celan, was a Romanian-German poet. His parents died in the Holocaust. He died by suicide in 1970, having written some of the most memorable poems about the Holocaust, including Death-Fugue (1948), which described the repetitive and deadly rhythm of camp life and death.

German poet Nelly Sachs, who escaped at the last minute to Sweden, won the Nobel prize in 1966. Her work is readily available in a number of excellent recent translations.

Other famous poets of the Holocaust include Yiddish poet Abraham Sutzkever, Italian essayist Primo Levi and Hungarian poet Miklós Radnóti.

But the stories told by these famous poets, important though they are, can only give a partial picture. Often the fine details of everyday experience, the fears and hopes of individual women, men and children, have a particular resonance in the work of lesser-known poets.

Romanian-German poet Selma Meerbaum-Eisinger was only 17 when she wrote her poetry of fearful anticipation. She was transported to a concentration camp where she died a year later.

Lithuanian poet Matilda Olkinaitė was murdered at 19. How would their poetry have developed had they lived? We will never know. But what they have left us, recreated through their translators, is a highly sensitive view of life in the chaos of approaching catastrophe.

Voices in anthologies

For readers who want a fuller picture of Holocaust poetry, anthologies are invaluable. They usually have an introduction, or notes, providing the context that is so crucial to understanding the poems.

Two older anthologies, Holocaust Poetry by Hilda Schiff (1995) and Beyond Lament by Marguerite Striar (1998) are still very useful.

More recently, I co-edited the anthology Poetry of the Holocaust (2019), which arose from a research project funded by the Arts and Humanities Research Council. Our aim was to collect less well-known Holocaust poetry, and, with the help of 35 translators from languages as varied as Yiddish, Norwegian, Japanese and Hungarian, to present the poems in original and translation, with a contextual note for each.

We tried to include a broader range of poems than earlier anthologies have tended to do. The anonymous Song of the Roma, for example, laments the fate of the more than 200,000 Gypsy, Roma and Traveller victims of the Nazis.

Many poems in the anthology document very specific events, such as French writer Andrė Sarcq’s To the Twice-Murdered Men, which depicts the dreadful detail of his lover’s death at the hands of the Nazis, who treated gay men with unfathomable barbarity.

Polish Resistance member Irena Bobowska suffered the cruel removal of the wheelchair upon which she depended. She imagined the world she has lost in So I Learn Life’s Greatest Art.

German poet Alfred Schmidt-Sas wrote with extreme difficulty, as his hands were bound. He reflected on his imminent beheading in Strange Lightness of Life. And in My God, French poet Catherine Roux told of the horrifying and mundane details of her arrival in a concentration camp: “I’ve no hair / I’ve no hanky.”

It is only by listening to these individual voices that we can really begin to understand what the many millions of Holocaust victims went through, and what victims of genocides all over the world have suffered and are suffering at this moment. Poetry helps us to do this.

Jean Boase-Beier acts as Translations Editor for Arc Publications. She has received funding from the Arts and Humanities Research Council for research relevant to this article.

– ref. The Holocaust poets who can help us to understand genocides past and present – https://theconversation.com/the-holocaust-poets-who-can-help-us-to-understand-genocides-past-and-present-248205

MIL OSI – Global Reports –

January 25, 2025
MIL-OSI United Nations: The 2025 Call for nominations UNESCO-Greece Melina Mercouri International Prize for the Safeguarding and Management of Cultural Landscapes is open
Source: UNESCO World Heritage Centre

From Borneo to Tikal, from Longyearbyen to Puerto Toro, UNESCO is calling on communities around the world to celebrate and protect some of the planet’s most stunning cultural landscapes. Nominations are now open for the UNESCO-Greece Melina Mercouri International Prize for the Safeguarding and Management of Cultural Landscapes.

This prestigious award honours the deep connections communities have forged with their environments and encourages further efforts in the knowledge, practice, and research necessary to protect these landscapes. The Prize includes a US$30,000 endowment and emphasizes the crucial role of cultural landscape preservation in safeguarding our shared heritage while inspiring future action.

Established in 1995 in tribute to the iconic Greek actress and former Minister of Culture, Melina Mercouri, the Prize has recognised outstanding conservation efforts for over two decades, promoting the sustainable management of cultural landscapes in alignment with the United Nations’ 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

Who Should Apply?

Whether you represent a community, an institution, or NGO focused on the safeguarding and enhancement cultural landscapes, this is your opportunity to gain international recognition. Cultural landscapes are powerful symbols of the connection between people and nature, offering living narratives of human history and creativity.

Key Details
- Nominations must be submitted by governments, National Commissions for UNESCO, or professional organizations.
- Nominated cultural landscapes do not need to be inscribed on the World Heritage List to be eligible.
- Sites under review for possible inscription on the World Heritage List in 2025 are not eligible.
How to Apply

Submit your application online by 30 April 2025 (midnight CET, UTC+1). For full details and to apply, visit the UNESCO-Greece Melina Mercouri International Prize for the Safeguarding and Management of Cultural Landscapes website.

Do not miss this opportunity to showcase the importance of cultural landscapes for sustainable development and ensure that your work receives the recognition it deserves.

Apply

The nomination process takes place online only on the UNESCO website. Online nominations must be submitted in English or French no later than 30 April 2025 (midnight CET, UTC+1).

English French

Introduction leaflet of the UNESCO-Greece Melina Mercouri International Prize for the Safeguarding and Management of Cultural Landscapes

English French

For further information visit: UNESCO-Greece Melina Mercouri International Prize for the Safeguarding and Management of Cultural Landscapes

Questions can be directed to the Secretariat of the Prize at: melinamercouriprize@unesco.org

MIL OSI United Nations News –
January 25, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: International Day of Education (24.01.25)

Source: Republic of France in English
The Republic of France has issued the following statement:

On this International Day of Education, France renews its commitment to a lifelong quality education that is both inclusive and equitable. In keeping with our new international strategy on basic education (2024-2028), we are working with our partners to ensure that education has a prominent place on the international agenda.

With 250 million children worldwide still deprived of schooling, Minister Delegate for Franophonie and International Partnerships Thani Mohamed-Soilihi welcomed those who make education their priority on a daily basis at the Hôtel du Ministre today.

This event, which was organized in partnership with UNESCO, AFD and Coalition Éducation, reaffirmed the importance of investing in education for sustainable development and the key role it plays for peace and the protection of human rights, especially the rights of children. Two roundtables featured representatives of civil society groups, international organizations and AFD, as well as young activists, who discussed possible solutions to educational issues in anticipation of the Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development, which will be held in Seville this summer.

In 2024, the Minister Delegate for Francophonie reasserted the priority importance of education and training for French-language learning at the Villers-Cotterêts Francophonie summit. The new Collège international de Villers-Cotterêts will offer training in French-language educational frameworks as well as residences for teachers and education researchers in a multilingual environment.

In 2025, the education of girls and gender equality in and through education will be central themes of the Feminist Foreign Policy Conference to be held in Paris.

MIL OSI Europe News –

January 25, 2025

MIL-OSI: Fidelity D & D Bancorp, Inc. First Quarter 2025 Dividend

Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

For more information visit our investor relations web site through http://www.bankatfidelity.com.

Contacts:
Daniel J. Santaniello President and Chief Executive Officer 570-504-8035		Salvatore R. DeFrancesco, Jr. Treasurer and Chief Financial Officer 570-504-8000

The MIL Network –

January 25, 2025

MIL-Evening Report: UN experts ‘alarmed’ by Kanaky New Caledonia deaths as Pacific fact-finding mission readies

By Stefan Armbruster of BenarNews

France has been criticised for the “alarming” death toll in New Caledonia during recent protests and its “cold shower” approach to decolonisation by experts of the UN Human Rights Committee.

The UN committee met this week in Geneva for France’s five-yearly human rights review with a focus on its Pacific territory, after peaceful protests over electoral changes turned violent leaving 13 people dead since May.

French delegates at the hearing defended the country’s actions and rejected the jurisdiction of the UN decolonisation process, saying the country “no longer has any international obligations”.

A delayed fact-finding mission of Pacific Islands Forum leaders is due to arrive in New Caledonia this weekend to assess the situation on behalf of the region’s peak regional inter-governmental body.

Almost 7000 security personnel with armoured vehicles have been deployed from France to New Caledonia to quell further unrest.

“The means used and the intensity of their response and the gravity of the violence reported, as well as the amount of dead and wounded, are particularly alarming,” said committee member Jose Santo Pais, assistant Prosecutor-General of the Portuguese Constitutional Court.

“There have been numerous allegations regarding an excessive use of force and that would have led to numerous deaths among the Kanak people and law enforcement,” the committee’s vice-chair said on Wednesday.

Months of protests
Violence erupted after months of protests over a unilateral attempt by President Emmanuel Macron to “unfreeze” the territory’s electoral roll. Indigenous Kanaks feared the move would dilute their voting power and any chance of success at another independence referendum.

Eleven Kanaks and two French police have died. The committee heard 169 people were wounded and 2658 arrested in the past five months.

New Caledonia’s economy is in ruins with hundreds of businesses destroyed, tens-of-thousands left jobless and the local government seeking 4 billion euros (US$4.33 billion) in recovery funds from France.

France’s reputation has been left battered as an out-of-touch colonial power since the deadly violence erupted.

Santos Pais questioned France’s commitment to the UN Declaration on Indigenous People and the “sufficient dialogue” required under the Nouméa Accord, a peace agreement signed in 1998 to politically empower Kanak people, that enabled the decolonisation process.

“It would seem that current violence in the territory is linked to the lack of progress in decolonisation,” said Santos Pais.

Last week, the new French Prime Minister announced controversial electoral changes that sparked the protests had been abandoned. Local elections, due to be held this year, will now take place at the end of 2025.

Pacific mission
Tomorrow, Tonga’s prime minister Hu’akavameiliku Siaosi Sovaleni will lead a Pacific “observational” mission to New Caledonia of fellow leaders from Cook Islands, Fiji and Solomon Islands Minister for Foreign Affairs, together known as the “Troika-Plus”.

The PIF leaders’ three-day visit to the capital Nouméa will see them meet with local political parties, youth and community groups, private sector and public service providers.

“Our thoughts have always been with the people of New Caledonia since the unrest earlier this year, and we continue to offer our support,” Sovaleni said in a statement on Friday.

The UN committee is a treaty body composed of 18 experts that regularly reviews compliance by 173 member states with their human rights obligations and is separate from the Human Rights Council, a political body composed of states.

Serbian committee member Tijana Surlan asked France for an update on investigations into injuries and fatalities “related to alleged excessive use of force” in New Caledonia. She asked if police firearms use would be reviewed “to strike a better balance with the principles of absolute necessity and strict proportionality.”

France’s delegation responded saying it was “committed to renewing dialogue” in New Caledonia and to striking a balance between the right to demonstrate and protecting people and property with the “principle of proportionality.”

Alleged intimidation by French authorities of at least five journalists covering the unrest in New Caledonia was highlighted by committee member Kobauyah Tchamdja Kapatcha from Togo. France responded saying it guarantees freedom of the press.

French Ambassador for Human Rights Isabelle Rome addresses the UN Human Rights Committee meeting in Geneva, pictured on 23 October 2024. Image: UNTV

France rejects ‘obligations’
The French delegation led by Ambassador for Human Rights Isabelle Rome added it “no longer administers a non-self-governing territory.”

France “no longer has any international obligations in this regard linked to its membership in the United Nations”, she told the committee on Thursday.

New Caledonia voted by modest majorities to remain part of France in referendums held in 2018 and 2020 under a UN-mandated decolonisation process. Three referendums were part of the Nouméa Accord to increase Kanaks’ political power following deadly violence in the 1980s.

A contentious final referendum in 2021 was overwhelmingly in favor of continuing with the status quo. Supporters of independence rejected its legitimacy due to a very low turnout — it was boycotted by Kanak political parties — and because it was held during a serious phase of the covid-19 pandemic, which restricted campaigning.

“France, through the referendum of September [2021], has therefore completed the process of decolonisation of its former colonies,” ambassador Rome said. She added that New Caledonia was one of the most advanced examples of the French government recognising indigenous rights, with a shared governance framework.

Another of its Pacific territories — French Polynesia — was re-inscribed on the UN decolonisation list in 2013 but France refuses to recognise its jurisdiction.

No change in policy
After a decade, France began attending General Assembly Decolonisation Committee meetings in 2023 to “promote dialogue” and that it was not a “change in [policy] direction”, Rome said.

“There is no process between the French state and the Polynesian territory that reserves a role for the United Nations,” she added.

Santos Pais responded saying, “what a cold shower”.

“The General Assembly will certainly have a completely different view from the one that was presented to us,” he said.

Earlier this month pro-independence French Polynesian President Moetai Brotherson told the UN Decolonisation Committee’s annual meeting in New York that “after a decade of silence” France must be “guided” to participate in “dialogue.”

The Human Rights Committee is due to meet again next month to adopt its findings on France.

Copyright ©2015-2024, BenarNews. Republished with the permission of BenarNews.

MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

January 24, 2025

Category: France

IMF Communications Department

MEDIA RELATIONS

India Charts Path for Global Leadership in Frontier Technologies at “Technology Dialogue 2025”Dr. Jitendra Singh Unveils “Vision India Techade”, envisaging global leadership role for India

Dispatchable energy

Newcomer countries

Poets of the Holocaust

Voices in anthologies

Who Should Apply?

Key Details

How to Apply

Apply

India Charts Path for Global Leadership in Frontier Technologies at “Technology Dialogue 2025”

Dr. Jitendra Singh Unveils “Vision India Techade”, envisaging global leadership role for India