Category: France

  • MIL-OSI Security: Southern Ute Tribal Member Sentenced to 18 Years in Prison for Abusive Sexual Contact with Children

    Source: US FBI

    DURANGO – The U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Colorado announced that Kalin Burton Goodtracks, age 36, of Ignacio, Colorado, was sentenced to 18 years in federal prison, followed by 25 years of supervised release, and ordered to pay a Justice of Victims of Trafficking Act (JVTA) assessment of $10,000, after pleading guilty to two charges of Abusive Sexual Contact of a Child in Indian Country.

    According to the plea agreement, on separate incidents in 2019, Goodtracks sexually abused two minors under the age of 12 who were under his supervision. He committed the offenses at his home on the Southern Ute Indian Reservation. Both children were related to Goodtracks.

    “Mr. Goodtracks deserves to spend a long time in federal prison because he preyed upon children he was supposed to protect,” said United States Attorney Peter McNeilly. “Pursuing justice for the most vulnerable in Colorado—and especially our children—remains one of our top priorities.”

    “This case is a clear reminder that those who exploit children — including those on tribal lands—will find no safe haven from justice, no matter where they are,” said FBI Denver Special Agent in Charge Mark Michalek. “These predators pose a serious threat to the safety of our communities and the FBI will aggressively pursue anyone who targets children.”

    United States District Court Judge Gordon P. Gallagher sentenced the defendant on June 16, 2025.

    The Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Southern Ute Investigations Division within the Southern Ute Police Department conducted the investigation. Assistant United States Attorneys Jeffrey K. Graves and Lisa Franceware handled the prosecution of the case.

    Case Number: 1:23-cr-00491-GPG-JMC

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Canada: Statement by Prime Minister Carney on Saint-Jean-Baptiste Day

    Source: Government of Canada – Prime Minister

    “I wish a happy Saint-Jean-Baptiste Day to all those celebrating. From Saint Boniface to Shediac, from Québec City to Sudbury, Canada’s Francophones have always fiercely defended their language and culture, which are at the heart of Canada’s identity. 

    “For the millions of Canadians who cherish the beautiful French language, Saint-Jean-Baptiste Day is a time to come together and show their pride. It is an opportunity to celebrate the history, heritage, and vitality of Francophone communities in Québec and across the country. Canada’s new government is strengthening French language programming through CBC/Radio-Canada so more French-language stories get told throughout the country. 

    “Today, we celebrate the beauty and richness of the French language and culture in Canada, and we reiterate our commitment to preserving them.”

    MIL OSI Canada News

  • MIL-OSI Video: Climate, Peace and Security Group on Libya – Security Council Media Stakeout | United Nations

    Source: United Nations (video statements)

    Joint stakeout by Climate, Peace and Security Group on Libya, led by Ambassador Carolyn Rodrigues-Birkett, Permanent Representative of Guyana to the United Nations, and accompanied by Security Council Members including Denmark, Ecuador, France, Greece, Guyana, Malta, Panama, the Republic of Korea, Sierra Leone, Slovenia, the United Kingdom.

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F0ug_evEa6c

    MIL OSI Video

  • MIL-OSI Russia: China Acts as a “Peace Broker” in the Ukrainian Crisis – Chinese Ambassador to Russia Zhang Hanhui

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    Moscow, June 24 (Xinhua) — China is acting as a “peace broker” in the Ukrainian crisis and is making efforts to facilitate peace talks, Chinese Ambassador to Russia Zhang Hanhui said in a written interview with the Russian newspaper Izvestia on Monday.

    “Since the comprehensive escalation of the Ukrainian crisis, China has been acting as a ‘peace broker’ and has been making consistent efforts to end the fighting and facilitate peace talks,” he said.

    The Chinese ambassador stressed that China’s position on the Ukrainian issue is consistent and clear: the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states must be respected, the purposes and principles of the UN Charter must be observed, reasonable security concerns of all countries must be taken seriously, and all efforts for a peaceful settlement deserve support. “This is the authoritative position and fundamental principle of the Chinese side on the Ukrainian issue,” the ambassador explained, adding that China welcomes and supports all efforts aimed at achieving peace, and will continue to take an objective and fair position, promote consensus building and create conditions for resolving the crisis.

    According to Zhang Hanhui, Li Hui, the special representative of the PRC government for Eurasian affairs, has already conducted four rounds of “shuttle diplomacy,” covering four continents – Asia, Africa, Europe and Latin America. He visited both the parties to the conflict – Russia and Ukraine – and key European countries, including France and Germany. In addition, deep exchanges of views were held with countries of the Global South, such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Brazil, Indonesia and South Africa. “These efforts have received wide approval and high praise from the international community, including Russia,” the diplomat noted.

    In addition, in 2024, China and Brazil jointly established the Friends of Peace platform through the UN to seek ways to peacefully resolve the Ukrainian crisis, and several meetings have already been held. According to the ambassador, this group has become an important mechanism through which the countries of the Global South express their position on the Ukrainian issue and which reflects the common desire of the international community for a ceasefire and peace. “In its work, the group invariably adheres to an impartial, objective and open position, and is always ready to listen to the views and positions of all parties to the conflict, including Russia. The group adheres to the principle of consensus and focuses on promoting all actions that contribute to a political settlement and the restoration of peace,” the ambassador added.

    At the same time, Zhang Hanhui confirmed that China did not participate in the discussions on sending peacekeeping forces to the conflict zone. “The Chinese side believes that three basic principles must be observed when sending peacekeeping forces: consent of the parties to the conflict, impartiality, and non-use of force except in self-defense. At present, there are serious disagreements between the parties concerned on the issue of post-war peacekeeping, there is no sign of an end to hostilities, and the number of casualties continues to rise,” the diplomat noted, adding that China calls on all parties to continue efforts to reduce tensions, create favorable conditions for dialogue, and open a “window” of opportunity for peace.

    The Chinese ambassador acknowledged that the causes of the Ukrainian crisis are complex. He recalled the Chinese proverb that “a meter-thick layer of ice does not form in a day,” so “melting” it also takes time. “The end point of any conflict is the negotiating table. The Chinese side welcomes the holding of direct talks between Russia and Ukraine in Istanbul and hopes that all parties can reach a fair, sustainable, binding and mutually acceptable peace agreement through dialogue and negotiations,” he said.

    Zhang Hanhui pointed out that following the direct talks in Istanbul, Russia and Ukraine reached agreements on issues such as prisoner exchange, which created favorable conditions for establishing peace and was an important step forward. As the Chinese ambassador emphasized, China calls on the parties to the conflict to demonstrate a desire for negotiations, and also hopes that the parties concerned can provide favorable external conditions for the negotiation process, jointly support the trend towards peaceful negotiations, and ultimately come to a political settlement.

    According to the diplomat, China hopes that peace and stability will be restored on the European continent as soon as possible, and is ready to continue to make constructive contributions to this. “Regardless of how the situation develops, China will always stand on the side of peace, on the side of dialogue, and on the right side of history. We will continue to make efforts to resolve the crisis and end the fighting, maintain contact with all parties, and contribute Chinese wisdom and strength to promoting a political settlement of the Ukrainian crisis,” Zhang Hanhui assured. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Global: Turkey is stepping up its influence in west Africa – what’s behind its bid for soft power

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Issouf Binaté, enseignant-chercheur, Université Alassane Ouattara de Bouaké

    Turkey is stepping up its influence in west Africa as the geopolitical and economic landscape in the region shifts. In Senegal, the state-owned Turkish Petroleum Corporation has entered a key partnership in the oil and gas sector. Meanwhile, Karpowership, a company providing electricity via floating power plants, now supplies energy to eight African countries. But Turkey’s not stopping there. As part of its soft power strategy, it is also winning hearts and minds through education and culture while deepening trade and security ties.

    Historian Issouf Binaté, who has studied Turkey’s growing presence in west Africa, breaks down how Ankara is positioning itself as an alternative to both former colonial powers and newer global players competing for influence on the continent.

    What drives Turkey’s growing influence in west Africa?

    Turkey’s foreign policy in west Africa leans on two main pillars.

    One is institutional power, driven by state-backed agencies (embassies, the religious affairs directorate Diyanet, and the economic cooperation agency (TIKA) .

    The other is more grassroots, led by non-state actors such as religious foundations and NGOs.

    These groups laid the groundwork for Turkey’s African expansion long before Ankara officially stepped in.

    A key player in Turkey’s earlier outreach was the Gülen movement, named after preacher Fethullah Gülen (1941–2024). The Gülen movement pioneered Turkey’s soft power approach with “Turkish schools”, starting with the Yavuz Sultan Selim and Yavuz Selim-Bosphore high schools in Dakar in 1997.

    Also at the end of the 1990s a network composed of Turkish business leaders and social activists under the Turkish Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists, which claimed over 100,000 member companies, expanded Turkey’s influence across Africa. At that time, Turkey had only three diplomatic representations for the whole of sub-Saharan Africa.

    The more recent contact with Africa comes at a time when western hegemony faces growing criticism from a new generation of Africans engaged in decolonial movements. Gülen-affiliated institutions now number 113, alongside religious and secular schools run by other groups like Mahmud Hudayi Vakfi and Hayrat Vakfi. Since the 2016 political rift between Gülen and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, these schools were gradually transferred to Maarif Foundation, Turkey’s state-run overseas education arm.

    Back in 2003, Turkey had only 12 diplomatic missions across Africa. Today, that number has grown to 44, bolstered by Turkish religious foundations (like Mahmud Hudayi Vakfi and Hayrat Vakfi), NGOs, and entrepreneurs who have filled the gap left by the Gülen movement.

    Another powerful player in Turkey’s Africa strategy is Turkish Airlines, now one of the top carriers on the continent. It is now flying to 62 airports in 41 African countries.

    What role do west African students trained in Turkey play?

    By investing in education, Turkey didn’t just open its doors to African students. It also planted the seeds for a long-term influence strategy. These students, and more broadly young African migrants trained in Turkey, are now among the key messengers of “Turkishness” back home.

    In doing so, Ankara is following a familiar path once used by colonial powers. They used student mobility as a powerful tool for their diplomacy.

    This policy of openness took several forms. As early as 1960, it welcomed students from non-self-governing territories in accordance with UN General Assembly resolutions.

    Then, in the 1990s, Turkey continued this effort through a scholarship programme for African students, supported by the Islamic Development Bank. During this period, Turkey launched the Büyük Öğrenci Projesi (Great Student Project), which provided scholarships to international students.

    Starting in 2012, this programme was re-branded as YTB (Yurtdışı Türkler ve Akraba Topluluklar Başkanlığı, or Directorate for Turks Abroad and Related Communities). It introduced reforms, including a digital application process for scholarships via an app on the YTB website. This shift caused a dramatic spike in interest. Applications soared from 10,000 to 155,000 between 2012 and 2020.

    For non-scholarship students, Turkey simplified visa processes, reduced tuition fees, and offered other incentives. These measures contributed to a significant increase in the number of applicants to study in Turkey. As the number of universities in Turkey jumped from 76 to 193 between 2003 and 2015, the country became increasingly attractive.

    By 2017, Turkey had become the 13th most popular destination for students from sub-Saharan Africa, according to Campus France (a platform that supports international students studying in France). By 2019, there were an estimated 61,000 African students studying in Turkey.

    Now, nearly three decades into this strategy, many of these former students are stepping into new roles. They are taking over from Turkish entrepreneurs in fostering socioeconomic ties with Africa. They also act as bridges, promoting Turkish universities and supporting visitors in areas like medical and industrial tourism.

    In Istanbul, some run cargo companies – some of them informal – that ship goods to Africa. Others are working to formalise these ventures and build long-term economic bridges. Groups like Bizim Afrika, a network of African Turkish-speakers, and the Federation of African Students in Turkey (founded in 2019), are playing key roles in shaping this next chapter of Turkey–Africa relations.

    How is Turkey’s strategy in west Africa different from that of China or France?

    In substance, Turkey’s strategy isn’t so different from that of France or China. It also carries traces of colonial thinking, even though its approach leans more on religious soft power like building mosques across Africa. Unlike France, which used force in its colonial past, Turkey is trying to gain influence through other means. It uses familiar tools: embassies, schools, cinema, security services, and development agencies.

    However, Turkey has learned from the criticism faced by western powers at a pivotal moment in Africa’s global relations.

    While access to Europe, the US and Canada has become more difficult due to stricter visa rules, Turkey has opened its doors. It eased visa procedures for African business people, expanded its universities, and promoted medical tourism.

    Turkey has become a hub for several sectors. It’s a major centre for nose surgery (rhinoplasty), hair transplants, and textiles. Its textile industry now supplies traders at Makola Market in Accra, Adjamé’s Forum in Côte d’Ivoire, and the Grand Marché in Bamako.

    Turkey has also capitalised on the security crisis in the Sahel, where France’s military presence has become controversial. It stepped in by selling Bayraktar TB2 drones and offering private security services to some governments.

    Is this Turkish presence set to last?

    Turkey’s presence in Africa is now visible in several symbolic ways. You can see it in Maarif schools, murals at Abidjan airport, the “Le Istanbul” restaurant in Niamey’s government district, or the National Mosque in Accra, modelled after Istanbul’s Blue Mosque.

    Turkey’s engagement is a work in progress. But its outreach to Africa is already yielding results. Trade volume reached US$40.7 billion in 2022. The return of the first waves of African students trained in Turkey has shifted the dynamic. Cooperation no longer relies solely on Turkish business people and social entrepreneurs.

    Even though African elites often speak English, French or Arabic, new voices are emerging. Young people trained in Turkey are beginning to find their place. Many work in import-export, construction, and even Islamic religious leadership. This trend points to promising prospects for long-term ties.

    For Turkey, Africa represents a continent with major economic opportunities. Becoming a trusted partner is now a key goal. On the diplomatic level, Turkey gained observer status at the African Union in 2005 and has hosted Turkey-Africa summits in Istanbul since 2008.

    This growing involvement suggests that Turkey’s role in Africa is likely to last. It will depend on the continent’s market needs, especially at a time when many African countries are rethinking their relationships with traditional western powers and international institutions.

    Issouf Binaté does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Turkey is stepping up its influence in west Africa – what’s behind its bid for soft power – https://theconversation.com/turkey-is-stepping-up-its-influence-in-west-africa-whats-behind-its-bid-for-soft-power-256929

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Global: Turkey is stepping up its influence in west Africa – what’s behind its bid for soft power

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Issouf Binaté, enseignant-chercheur, Université Alassane Ouattara de Bouaké

    Turkey is stepping up its influence in west Africa as the geopolitical and economic landscape in the region shifts. In Senegal, the state-owned Turkish Petroleum Corporation has entered a key partnership in the oil and gas sector. Meanwhile, Karpowership, a company providing electricity via floating power plants, now supplies energy to eight African countries. But Turkey’s not stopping there. As part of its soft power strategy, it is also winning hearts and minds through education and culture while deepening trade and security ties.

    Historian Issouf Binaté, who has studied Turkey’s growing presence in west Africa, breaks down how Ankara is positioning itself as an alternative to both former colonial powers and newer global players competing for influence on the continent.

    What drives Turkey’s growing influence in west Africa?

    Turkey’s foreign policy in west Africa leans on two main pillars.

    One is institutional power, driven by state-backed agencies (embassies, the religious affairs directorate Diyanet, and the economic cooperation agency (TIKA) .

    The other is more grassroots, led by non-state actors such as religious foundations and NGOs.

    These groups laid the groundwork for Turkey’s African expansion long before Ankara officially stepped in.

    A key player in Turkey’s earlier outreach was the Gülen movement, named after preacher Fethullah Gülen (1941–2024). The Gülen movement pioneered Turkey’s soft power approach with “Turkish schools”, starting with the Yavuz Sultan Selim and Yavuz Selim-Bosphore high schools in Dakar in 1997.

    Also at the end of the 1990s a network composed of Turkish business leaders and social activists under the Turkish Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists, which claimed over 100,000 member companies, expanded Turkey’s influence across Africa. At that time, Turkey had only three diplomatic representations for the whole of sub-Saharan Africa.

    The more recent contact with Africa comes at a time when western hegemony faces growing criticism from a new generation of Africans engaged in decolonial movements. Gülen-affiliated institutions now number 113, alongside religious and secular schools run by other groups like Mahmud Hudayi Vakfi and Hayrat Vakfi. Since the 2016 political rift between Gülen and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, these schools were gradually transferred to Maarif Foundation, Turkey’s state-run overseas education arm.

    Back in 2003, Turkey had only 12 diplomatic missions across Africa. Today, that number has grown to 44, bolstered by Turkish religious foundations (like Mahmud Hudayi Vakfi and Hayrat Vakfi), NGOs, and entrepreneurs who have filled the gap left by the Gülen movement.

    Another powerful player in Turkey’s Africa strategy is Turkish Airlines, now one of the top carriers on the continent. It is now flying to 62 airports in 41 African countries.

    What role do west African students trained in Turkey play?

    By investing in education, Turkey didn’t just open its doors to African students. It also planted the seeds for a long-term influence strategy. These students, and more broadly young African migrants trained in Turkey, are now among the key messengers of “Turkishness” back home.

    In doing so, Ankara is following a familiar path once used by colonial powers. They used student mobility as a powerful tool for their diplomacy.

    This policy of openness took several forms. As early as 1960, it welcomed students from non-self-governing territories in accordance with UN General Assembly resolutions.

    Then, in the 1990s, Turkey continued this effort through a scholarship programme for African students, supported by the Islamic Development Bank. During this period, Turkey launched the Büyük Öğrenci Projesi (Great Student Project), which provided scholarships to international students.

    Starting in 2012, this programme was re-branded as YTB (Yurtdışı Türkler ve Akraba Topluluklar Başkanlığı, or Directorate for Turks Abroad and Related Communities). It introduced reforms, including a digital application process for scholarships via an app on the YTB website. This shift caused a dramatic spike in interest. Applications soared from 10,000 to 155,000 between 2012 and 2020.

    For non-scholarship students, Turkey simplified visa processes, reduced tuition fees, and offered other incentives. These measures contributed to a significant increase in the number of applicants to study in Turkey. As the number of universities in Turkey jumped from 76 to 193 between 2003 and 2015, the country became increasingly attractive.

    By 2017, Turkey had become the 13th most popular destination for students from sub-Saharan Africa, according to Campus France (a platform that supports international students studying in France). By 2019, there were an estimated 61,000 African students studying in Turkey.

    Now, nearly three decades into this strategy, many of these former students are stepping into new roles. They are taking over from Turkish entrepreneurs in fostering socioeconomic ties with Africa. They also act as bridges, promoting Turkish universities and supporting visitors in areas like medical and industrial tourism.

    In Istanbul, some run cargo companies – some of them informal – that ship goods to Africa. Others are working to formalise these ventures and build long-term economic bridges. Groups like Bizim Afrika, a network of African Turkish-speakers, and the Federation of African Students in Turkey (founded in 2019), are playing key roles in shaping this next chapter of Turkey–Africa relations.

    How is Turkey’s strategy in west Africa different from that of China or France?

    In substance, Turkey’s strategy isn’t so different from that of France or China. It also carries traces of colonial thinking, even though its approach leans more on religious soft power like building mosques across Africa. Unlike France, which used force in its colonial past, Turkey is trying to gain influence through other means. It uses familiar tools: embassies, schools, cinema, security services, and development agencies.

    However, Turkey has learned from the criticism faced by western powers at a pivotal moment in Africa’s global relations.

    While access to Europe, the US and Canada has become more difficult due to stricter visa rules, Turkey has opened its doors. It eased visa procedures for African business people, expanded its universities, and promoted medical tourism.

    Turkey has become a hub for several sectors. It’s a major centre for nose surgery (rhinoplasty), hair transplants, and textiles. Its textile industry now supplies traders at Makola Market in Accra, Adjamé’s Forum in Côte d’Ivoire, and the Grand Marché in Bamako.

    Turkey has also capitalised on the security crisis in the Sahel, where France’s military presence has become controversial. It stepped in by selling Bayraktar TB2 drones and offering private security services to some governments.

    Is this Turkish presence set to last?

    Turkey’s presence in Africa is now visible in several symbolic ways. You can see it in Maarif schools, murals at Abidjan airport, the “Le Istanbul” restaurant in Niamey’s government district, or the National Mosque in Accra, modelled after Istanbul’s Blue Mosque.

    Turkey’s engagement is a work in progress. But its outreach to Africa is already yielding results. Trade volume reached US$40.7 billion in 2022. The return of the first waves of African students trained in Turkey has shifted the dynamic. Cooperation no longer relies solely on Turkish business people and social entrepreneurs.

    Even though African elites often speak English, French or Arabic, new voices are emerging. Young people trained in Turkey are beginning to find their place. Many work in import-export, construction, and even Islamic religious leadership. This trend points to promising prospects for long-term ties.

    For Turkey, Africa represents a continent with major economic opportunities. Becoming a trusted partner is now a key goal. On the diplomatic level, Turkey gained observer status at the African Union in 2005 and has hosted Turkey-Africa summits in Istanbul since 2008.

    This growing involvement suggests that Turkey’s role in Africa is likely to last. It will depend on the continent’s market needs, especially at a time when many African countries are rethinking their relationships with traditional western powers and international institutions.

    Issouf Binaté does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Turkey is stepping up its influence in west Africa – what’s behind its bid for soft power – https://theconversation.com/turkey-is-stepping-up-its-influence-in-west-africa-whats-behind-its-bid-for-soft-power-256929

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Africa: National Football League (NFL) Hosts Women’s Flag Football Coaching Clinic in Egypt

    Source: Africa Press Organisation – English (2) – Report:

    Download logo

    The National Football League (www.NFL.com) hosted a women’s flag football coach education clinic in Cairo, Egypt as part of an ongoing strategy to accelerate the development and growth of the game across Africa.

    36 participants from Egypt, Nigeria and Morocco received both classroom and on-field learning, as the clinic looked to improve the skills of new and experienced coaches – helping to promote and enable further long-term flag football engagement and participation on the continent.

    Expert coaches delivering the sessions included:

    • Ameena Soliman – Philadelphia Eagles’ Director of Football Operations and Pro Scout
    • Afia Law – NFL Flag international development lead
    • Elisa De Santis – French national flag team captain and IFAF and NFL Global Flag Ambassador
    • Kris Durham – Head of Development at the NFL Academy Europe-Africa
    • Jordan Mabin – Football Development Manager at the NFL and former NFL player

    Fast-paced and accessible for all, flag football is spearheading extraordinary participation growth worldwide with more than 20 million players in 100 countries and women and girls driving some of the largest growth in participation.

    The women’s flag football coach education clinic in Cairo follows one held in Ghana in April 2025, which saw 50 coaches and officials from Cameroon, Egypt, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, South Africa, Tunisia, and Uganda attend the event as football development efforts continue to focus on engaging and upskilling more flag football coaches across the region.

    The NFL also hosted a series of wraparound activities in Cairo including:

    Led by two-time Super Bowl Champion and NFL Africa Lead Osi Umenyiora, the NFL hosted a football talent identification event with prospects from 5 different African countries, including Egypt, Nigeria, Cameroon, Kenya and South Africa. Athletes showcased their skills and abilities with the potential to advance to the NFL Academy Europe-Africa program in Loughborough, U.K. or the International Player Pathway (IPP) program — two core pillars of the NFL’s global football development initiatives.

    In collaboration with the International Federation of American Football (IFAF) and the Egyptian Federation of American Football (EFAF), U13 teams of boys and girls from Africa competed in an NFL Flag Continental Championship. The tournament saw Egypt claim the title to become the first ever African youth continental champions.

    Earlier in the week, 11 teams from eight nations, spanning the African continent, participated in Africa Flag – the first of IFAF’s continental championships series for 2025, with Nigeria crowned champions across both the men’s and women’s event. The tournament is the starting point for what will be the biggest and most important competition cycle in flag football history, culminating in the Olympic Games LA28.

    – on behalf of National Football League (NFL).

    Multimedia links: 
    Youth flag tournament – This is the one Egypt won – https://apo-opa.co/44ff9Ul
    Talent ID and Women’s coaching clinic – https://apo-opa.co/4ehf3A5

    For more information on IFAF:
    Visit: www.AmericanFootball.sport

    For more information on NFL Flag, the official flag football program of the NFL:
    Visit www.NFLFlag.com

    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI Africa: Turkey is stepping up its influence in west Africa – what’s behind its bid for soft power

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Issouf Binaté, enseignant-chercheur, Université Alassane Ouattara de Bouaké

    Turkey is stepping up its influence in west Africa as the geopolitical and economic landscape in the region shifts. In Senegal, the state-owned Turkish Petroleum Corporation has entered a key partnership in the oil and gas sector. Meanwhile, Karpowership, a company providing electricity via floating power plants, now supplies energy to eight African countries. But Turkey’s not stopping there. As part of its soft power strategy, it is also winning hearts and minds through education and culture while deepening trade and security ties.

    Historian Issouf Binaté, who has studied Turkey’s growing presence in west Africa, breaks down how Ankara is positioning itself as an alternative to both former colonial powers and newer global players competing for influence on the continent.

    What drives Turkey’s growing influence in west Africa?

    Turkey’s foreign policy in west Africa leans on two main pillars.

    One is institutional power, driven by state-backed agencies (embassies, the religious affairs directorate Diyanet, and the economic cooperation agency (TIKA) .

    The other is more grassroots, led by non-state actors such as religious foundations and NGOs.

    These groups laid the groundwork for Turkey’s African expansion long before Ankara officially stepped in.

    A key player in Turkey’s earlier outreach was the Gülen movement, named after preacher Fethullah Gülen (1941–2024). The Gülen movement pioneered Turkey’s soft power approach with “Turkish schools”, starting with the Yavuz Sultan Selim and Yavuz Selim-Bosphore high schools in Dakar in 1997.

    Also at the end of the 1990s a network composed of Turkish business leaders and social activists under the Turkish Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists, which claimed over 100,000 member companies, expanded Turkey’s influence across Africa. At that time, Turkey had only three diplomatic representations for the whole of sub-Saharan Africa.

    The more recent contact with Africa comes at a time when western hegemony faces growing criticism from a new generation of Africans engaged in decolonial movements. Gülen-affiliated institutions now number 113, alongside religious and secular schools run by other groups like Mahmud Hudayi Vakfi and Hayrat Vakfi. Since the 2016 political rift between Gülen and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, these schools were gradually transferred to Maarif Foundation, Turkey’s state-run overseas education arm.

    Back in 2003, Turkey had only 12 diplomatic missions across Africa. Today, that number has grown to 44, bolstered by Turkish religious foundations (like Mahmud Hudayi Vakfi and Hayrat Vakfi), NGOs, and entrepreneurs who have filled the gap left by the Gülen movement.

    Another powerful player in Turkey’s Africa strategy is Turkish Airlines, now one of the top carriers on the continent. It is now flying to 62 airports in 41 African countries.

    What role do west African students trained in Turkey play?

    By investing in education, Turkey didn’t just open its doors to African students. It also planted the seeds for a long-term influence strategy. These students, and more broadly young African migrants trained in Turkey, are now among the key messengers of “Turkishness” back home.

    In doing so, Ankara is following a familiar path once used by colonial powers. They used student mobility as a powerful tool for their diplomacy.

    This policy of openness took several forms. As early as 1960, it welcomed students from non-self-governing territories in accordance with UN General Assembly resolutions.

    Then, in the 1990s, Turkey continued this effort through a scholarship programme for African students, supported by the Islamic Development Bank. During this period, Turkey launched the Büyük Öğrenci Projesi (Great Student Project), which provided scholarships to international students.

    Starting in 2012, this programme was re-branded as YTB (Yurtdışı Türkler ve Akraba Topluluklar Başkanlığı, or Directorate for Turks Abroad and Related Communities). It introduced reforms, including a digital application process for scholarships via an app on the YTB website. This shift caused a dramatic spike in interest. Applications soared from 10,000 to 155,000 between 2012 and 2020.

    For non-scholarship students, Turkey simplified visa processes, reduced tuition fees, and offered other incentives. These measures contributed to a significant increase in the number of applicants to study in Turkey. As the number of universities in Turkey jumped from 76 to 193 between 2003 and 2015, the country became increasingly attractive.

    By 2017, Turkey had become the 13th most popular destination for students from sub-Saharan Africa, according to Campus France (a platform that supports international students studying in France). By 2019, there were an estimated 61,000 African students studying in Turkey.

    Now, nearly three decades into this strategy, many of these former students are stepping into new roles. They are taking over from Turkish entrepreneurs in fostering socioeconomic ties with Africa. They also act as bridges, promoting Turkish universities and supporting visitors in areas like medical and industrial tourism.

    In Istanbul, some run cargo companies – some of them informal – that ship goods to Africa. Others are working to formalise these ventures and build long-term economic bridges. Groups like Bizim Afrika, a network of African Turkish-speakers, and the Federation of African Students in Turkey (founded in 2019), are playing key roles in shaping this next chapter of Turkey–Africa relations.

    How is Turkey’s strategy in west Africa different from that of China or France?

    In substance, Turkey’s strategy isn’t so different from that of France or China. It also carries traces of colonial thinking, even though its approach leans more on religious soft power like building mosques across Africa. Unlike France, which used force in its colonial past, Turkey is trying to gain influence through other means. It uses familiar tools: embassies, schools, cinema, security services, and development agencies.

    However, Turkey has learned from the criticism faced by western powers at a pivotal moment in Africa’s global relations.

    While access to Europe, the US and Canada has become more difficult due to stricter visa rules, Turkey has opened its doors. It eased visa procedures for African business people, expanded its universities, and promoted medical tourism.

    Turkey has become a hub for several sectors. It’s a major centre for nose surgery (rhinoplasty), hair transplants, and textiles. Its textile industry now supplies traders at Makola Market in Accra, Adjamé’s Forum in Côte d’Ivoire, and the Grand Marché in Bamako.

    Turkey has also capitalised on the security crisis in the Sahel, where France’s military presence has become controversial. It stepped in by selling Bayraktar TB2 drones and offering private security services to some governments.

    Is this Turkish presence set to last?

    Turkey’s presence in Africa is now visible in several symbolic ways. You can see it in Maarif schools, murals at Abidjan airport, the “Le Istanbul” restaurant in Niamey’s government district, or the National Mosque in Accra, modelled after Istanbul’s Blue Mosque.

    The. Amuzujoe

    Turkey’s engagement is a work in progress. But its outreach to Africa is already yielding results. Trade volume reached US$40.7 billion in 2022. The return of the first waves of African students trained in Turkey has shifted the dynamic. Cooperation no longer relies solely on Turkish business people and social entrepreneurs.

    Even though African elites often speak English, French or Arabic, new voices are emerging. Young people trained in Turkey are beginning to find their place. Many work in import-export, construction, and even Islamic religious leadership. This trend points to promising prospects for long-term ties.

    For Turkey, Africa represents a continent with major economic opportunities. Becoming a trusted partner is now a key goal. On the diplomatic level, Turkey gained observer status at the African Union in 2005 and has hosted Turkey-Africa summits in Istanbul since 2008.

    This growing involvement suggests that Turkey’s role in Africa is likely to last. It will depend on the continent’s market needs, especially at a time when many African countries are rethinking their relationships with traditional western powers and international institutions.

    – Turkey is stepping up its influence in west Africa – what’s behind its bid for soft power
    – https://theconversation.com/turkey-is-stepping-up-its-influence-in-west-africa-whats-behind-its-bid-for-soft-power-256929

    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI Canada: A Journey Through Time Awaits You at the T. Rex Discovery Centre

    Source: Government of Canada regional news

    Released on June 24, 2025

    Looking for a summer adventure? Make sure to visit the T. Rex Discovery Centre (TRDC) in Eastend, southwest Saskatchewan.

    The TRDC is the home of Scotty, the world’s largest Tyrannosaurus rex. While at the centre, visitors can get a closeup look at the CN Scotty Gallery, and explore features like the Paleo Lab Experience, marine reptiles, prehistoric mammals and dinosaur fossils.

    “The T. Rex Discovery Centre is a thrilling destination where history comes to life,” Parks, Culture and Sport Minister Alana Ross said. “Whether you are visiting Scotty the T. rex or taking in the interactive exhibits and programming, there is something exciting for visitors of all ages!”

    Here is what’s in store this summer:

    Canada Day – July 1 

    • Hot dogs, pop and water while supplies last starting at 11:30 a.m. 
    • Theme week table on Canadian Fossils.
    • Discovery Theatre presentation at 1 p.m. on Canadian Fossil Finds Sea to Sea.

    Dino Days 2025 – July 25 to 27

    • The TRDC will be offering some fun-filled activities for the entire family to enjoy as part of Eastend’s Dino Days celebration.
    •  Discovery Theatre presentation on Where the Brontothere Roam, A history of South Fork Saskatchewan at 1 p.m. on July 27.

    Paleo Lab – Daily

    In the Paleo Lab, visitors can discover new micro fossils in the dig stations with hands-on fossil activities for visitors of all ages.

    Explore the Tylosaurus Exhibit – Daily

    Roughly 10 metres in length, the specimen was discovered in the hills around Lake Diefenbaker near Sask Landing Provincial Park.

    Explore the Area – Daily

    Explore the beautiful landscape of the Frenchman River Valley on the hiking trails situated around the discovery centre or uncover a new fossil in the Fossil Dig Sand Pit.

    The TRDC is open daily from 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. until Labour Day. Admission is by donation.

    The Royal Saskatchewan Museum (RSM) is Saskatchewan’s only natural history museum. Discover our shared history through engaging displays and exhibits.

    To learn more about the RSM’s and TRDC’s exhibits, events, programming and world class research, visit: https://royalsaskmuseum.ca/. 

    Follow us on Facebook or Instagram to stay up to date on different themes throughout the summer.

    -30-

    For more information, contact:

    MIL OSI Canada News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: European Union – Minister’s participation in the Foreign Affairs Council (June 24, 2025)

    Source: France-Diplomatie – Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development

    The Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs took part in the EU’s Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) held on June 23 in Brussels.

    With regard to the situation in Ukraine, the Ministers underscored the EU and its Member States’ continued support for Ukraine more than three years after the start of the Russian war of aggression. The Member States agreed to step up pressure on Russia and the third countries that support it economically through the swift adoption of large-scale sanctions targeting the Russian economy.

    The situation in the Middle East and the troubling escalation between Iran and Israel were also discussed. Coming a day after the joint statement issued on June 22 by the leaders of the E3 (Germany, France and the United Kingdom) on the situation in the Middle East, the meeting emphasized the importance of de-escalation and the need to achieve a diplomatic solution with regard to oversight of the nuclear program and stressed the need for Iran to cease its destabilizing actions.

    The Minister reiterated that the current escalation must not overshadow the intolerable situation in Gaza, and particularly the intolerable obstacles hindering access to humanitarian aid, as well as continued settlement activity in the West Bank. The Ministers took note of the report by the High Representative/Vice-President of the European Commission, which states that article 2 of the EU-Israel association agreement, dealing with human rights, is not being respected. They authorized Kaja Kallas to hold talks with the Israeli authorities to obtain concrete improvements in the situation and in respect for international humanitarian law. The Ministers will decide on this basis how they will follow up at the next Foreign Affairs Council meeting in July.

    Lastly, with regard to Georgia, the Ministers expressed their concern over the serious deterioration in the rule of law, violence against protesters and arbitrary arrests.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Canada: Statement by Minister Guilbeault on la Fête nationale du Québec

    Source: Government of Canada News

    OTTAWA, June 24, 2025

    Happy Fête nationale to all Quebecers!

    As a proud Quebecer, June 24 for me is a time to celebrate our history, our wonderful French language, our heritage as well as the traditions and values that shape our Belle Province.

    Quebec has produced artists, athletes, heads of state as well as many other extraordinary personalities who have gone on to leave their mark throughout our history. This June 24, let’s celebrate these icons who unite us, bolster our national pride and showcase Quebec and our culture throughout the world.

    On Saint-Jean-Baptiste Day, let’s also highlight our rich culture, which strengthens our Canadian identity.

    Quebec’s Fête nationale is also a time to recognize the important contributions of Indigenous Peoples and many other diverse communities who enrich Quebec.

    I encourage you to show up en masse at all the festivities and let Quebec’s pride shine!

    MIL OSI Canada News

  • MIL-OSI: CAISSE FRANCAISE DE FINANCEMENT LOCAL EMTN 2025-12

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Paris, 24 June 2025

    Capitalised terms used herein shall have the meaning specified for such terms in the Caisse Française de Financement Local base prospectus to the €75,000,000,000 Euro Medium Term Note Programme dated 10 June 2025 (the “Base Prospectus”).

    Caisse Française de Financement Local has decided to issue on 26 June 2025 – Euro 10,000,000 Fixed Rate Obligations Foncières due 26 June 2048.  

    The Base Prospectus dated 10 June 2025 approved by the Autorité des Marchés Financiers is available on the website of the Issuer (https://sfil.fr/caffil-notre-filiale/), at the registered office of the Issuer: 112-114, avenue Emile Zola, 75015 Paris, France, and at the office of the Paying Agent indicated in the Base Prospectus.

    The Final Terms relating to the issue will be available on the website of the AMF (www.amf-france.org) and of the Luxembourg Stock Exchange (www.bourse.lu), at the office of the Issuer and at the office of the Paying Agent.

    Attachment

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Situation in the Middle East – Repatriation flights for French nationals

    Source: France-Diplomatie – Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development

    Published on June 24, 2025

    Joint communiqué issued by the Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs and the Ministry for the Armed Forces (Paris, 22 June 2025)

    Following the meeting of the Defence and National Security Council (CDSN), at President Macron’s request, the Minister for the Armed Forces, M. Sébastien Lecornu, and the Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs, M. Jean-Noël Barrot, announce that in addition to civilian air links, in particular chartered flights leaving Amman, military (A400M) flights are now being deployed to transport French nationals who so wish from Ben Gurion Airport in Israel to Cyprus, subject to Israeli authorization.

    Since Friday 13 June, the Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs’s teams have been working actively to lend assistance to our French nationals in the region. Teams at the Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs’ Crisis and Support Centre have answered more than 4,500 calls. The Crisis and Support Centre’s emergency numbers are still accessible at all times. They are posted on our embassies’ and consulates’ websites.

    On Sunday 22 June, 160 French nationals, most of them in situations of emergency and vulnerability, accompanied by a doctor from the Ministry’s Crisis and Support Centre, are being repatriated from Jordan (Amman). Other flights will follow, in addition to direct or indirect commercial links leaving Amman (Jordan) and Sharm el Sheikh (Egypt).

    On Monday 23 June at 4.00 p.m., an additional commercial flight from Amman is being put in place by Royal Jordanian at France’s request; it will enable 150 French nationals to return; for Tuesday 24 June, the Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs is chartering a flight that will allow more than 150 nationals in vulnerable situations to return to France.

    Security advice and emergency information are being updated in real time here: https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/dossiers-pays/afrique-du-nord-moyen-orient/article/consignes-de-securite-a-destination-des-ressortissants-francais-au-proche-et

    We remind all French people of the need to register on the Fil d’Ariane prior to any trip abroad: https://fildariane.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fildariane-internet/accueil

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: ASIA/CAMBODIA – Apostolic Prefect of Battambang on the closure of the border with Thailand: “The crisis affects ordinary people above all”

    Source: Agenzia Fides – MIL OSI

    Tuesday, 24 June 2025

    Wiki Commons gary4now

    Battambang (Agenzia Fides) – The government of Cambodia has confirmed that the Thai army unilaterally closed all border crossings with Cambodia on the night of June 23. According to the Thai army, border crossings in six Thai provinces bordering Cambodia have been closed, with few exceptions for students or people receiving medical treatment. All other human or vehicle traffic is currently prohibited. The closure is the latest in a series of reprisals that have intensified since the border incident on May 28, in which a Cambodian soldier was killed in gunfire in the so-called “Emerald Triangle,” a small green area on the border between Thailand, Cambodia, and Laos.It is one of several disputed regions that both Thailand and Cambodia claim as part of their territory. The two armies accused each other of firing first. On June 7, the Thai army temporarily closed the border and then reduced its opening hours. On June 12, Cambodia announced the suspension of electricity imports and closed the international border at Daung, in Battambang province, for “security reasons.”Thailand and Cambodia are separated by a border approximately 820 kilometers long, which runs through several disputed territories. “This dispute has existed for more than a century and dates back to the time of the French colonial empire,” explains Bishop Enrique Figaredo, Apostolic Prefect of Battambang (Cambodia), in an interview with Fides.”The parties involved are basing their decision on a map from 1907, which France, which occupied Cambodia as a colonial power until 1953, first used to draw the border between the two countries. Thailand argues that the map is not binding. Cambodia has appealed to the International Court of Justice to determine the territorial ownership of four disputed territories. Thailand also does not agree to appeal to the Court,” the Prefect said.”It should be noted that this crisis,” he added, “is causing hardship and inconvenience for ordinary people. The border between Cambodia and Thailand is indeed very porous and is constantly crossed by a lively trade and workers. The closure of the border blocks the flow of people and goods, so vital to social, economic, and cultural life.” Bishop Figaredo says that many people in the province of Battambang, the territory of his apostolic prefecture, are affected by these flows. “The local people are experiencing this phase with great disappointment, surprise, and confusion,” he notes. “There are also hundreds of displaced people, people stuck on the other side of the border who cannot return home,” he says. The dispute has aroused nationalist sentiments in both countries. Thailand has banned tourists and Thai citizens from visiting or working in Poipet, a Cambodian city whose economy relies on the presence of eight casinos frequented almost exclusively by Thai citizens. In this context, Thailand has also included security measures to paralyze transnational criminal activities in the dispute with Cambodia, as declared by Thai Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra.The measures against fraud centers were implemented in early 2025, when Thailand cut off electricity, internet, and fuel supplies to some areas of Myanmar where cyber fraud activities were taking place. Thailand and Cambodia jointly dismantled a fraud center that housed hundreds of trafficked foreign workers in the city of Poipet. Cyber fraud and so-called “scam cities” have spread throughout Southeast Asia, especially in Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar. (PA) (Agenzia Fides, 24/6/2025)
    Share:

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Canada: Statement by Minister Guilbeault on Saint-Jean-Baptiste Day

    Source: Government of Canada News

    OTTAWA, June 24, 2024 

    On June 24, millions of Canadians celebrate Saint-Jean-Baptiste Day—a time of pride, culture and celebration for all those who share a love for the French language.

    The Francophonie is at the heart of our history and continues to shape our country’s identity. Every year in June, this holiday carries a special meaning for many of us. Whether it’s celebrating among friends, spending time with family or singing along with the songs by Francophone artists that defined our youth or marked more recent years, Saint-Jean-Baptiste Day brings us together and warms our hearts.

    Today is therefore an opportunity to celebrate the beauty, richness and energy of this Canadian Francophonie, strengthened by 10 million French speakers from coast to coast to coast.

    I invite you to take part in the festivities in your region and enjoy the music, the traditions and this vibrant language that allows our culture and our national identity to shine.

    Happy Saint-Jean-Baptiste Day

    MIL OSI Canada News

  • MIL-OSI: Online Crypto Casinos 2025: Recommended by All iGaming Experts

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    New York City, June 24, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — At All iGaming, we’ve meticulously tested over 100 crypto casinos to bring you the definitive list of the crypto casinos with no KYC for 2025, available here. Our evaluation focused on real-money & crypto play, scrutinizing payment processing, bonus fairness, licensing, and user experience. The result is a curated selection of the biggest crypto casinos that exceed industry standards. 

    This guide will help you find trusted no kyc crypto casinos for an exciting and secure gaming experience.

    Listed Legit Crypto Casinos For 2025 & Exclusive Bonuses

    Here’s our list of top performers:

    >>> For The Full List Of Top Crypto Casinos, Visit All igaming

    Why Choose Crypto Casinos?

    Crypto casinos are transforming online gambling with their unique advantages, making them a top choice for players seeking the most trusted bitcoin casinos. Here’s why you should consider these platforms:

    • Enhanced Privacy and Anonymity

    The online crypto casinos allow players to gamble with minimal personal information, ensuring a high level of privacy. This is particularly appealing to those who value discretion in their gaming activities.

    • Lightning-Fast Transactions

    Cryptocurrency transactions are processed in minutes, offering a significant advantage over traditional banking methods. Our tests found that the biggest online crypto casino’s average withdrawal times of under 10 minutes for cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin and Ethereum, compared to 24-48 hours for fiat-based platforms.

    • Lower Fees

    Crypto transactions typically have minimal fees, saving players money. During testing, we noted that the online Bitcoin casinos charge little to no withdrawal fees, unlike traditional casinos with high processing costs.

    • Global Accessibility

    Unlike traditional casinos restricted by geography, crypto gambling sites are accessible worldwide, provided local laws permit. This makes them ideal for players in regions with limited gambling options.

    • Provably Fair Gaming

    Many crypto casinos use blockchain technology to offer provably fair games, allowing players to verify game outcomes. Our team found that top platforms display fairness mechanisms, enhancing trust in the crypto casino experience.

    All iGaming’s Testing Method for Crypto Casinos

    At All iGaming, we apply a rigorous testing process to ensure only the crypto casinos make our list. Here’s how we evaluate each platform:

    • Licensing and Credibility

    We reviewed licensing details for over 100 crypto-gambling sites, discarding 10 that lacked verifiable regulatory information. The remaining platforms displayed valid licenses from reputable jurisdictions like Curacao or Malta, ensuring player protection.

    • Platform Stability and User Experience

    Our testers evaluated 90 platforms by:

    • Signing up on desktop and mobile.
    • Playing 20+ games per site.
    • Testing live chat responsiveness.
    • Processing deposits and withdrawals. Seventy platforms maintained smooth performance during stress tests, with average game load times of 2 seconds. The biggest crypto casinos use modern frameworks for faster navigation and mobile optimization, outperforming older platforms.
    • Bonus Clarity and Terms

    Of the tested platforms, 50 provided clear bonus terms before opt-in. These sites offered wagering requirements of 20x-35x and reasonable bet limits ($5-$10). Transparent bonus tracking reduced disputes, making these platforms stand out as the greatest Bitcoin casinos.

    • Cashout Reliability

    We tested withdrawal speeds across all platforms. Thirty processed payouts within 10 minutes, while five were delayed beyond 24 hours without explanation. The online crypto casinos verify identities upfront, ensuring smooth and fast withdrawals.

    • Innovative Features

    Top platforms introduced unique features like blockchain-based game trackers, achievement systems, and volatility filters. These additions enhanced gameplay, setting these crypto casinos apart from traditional platforms.

    Regulatory Landscape for Crypto Casinos

    The regulatory environment for crypto gambling is complex and varies significantly across jurisdictions. Unlike traditional online gambling, which is often subject to strict national regulations, crypto casinos operate in a more decentralized manner due to the nature of cryptocurrencies. 

    Here’s a detailed look at the regulatory landscape:

    • Global Variations:
      • In the United States, online gambling is regulated at the state level, with some states allowing crypto gambling while others impose restrictions. Players must check state-specific laws to ensure compliance.
      • In Europe, countries like the United Kingdom, Malta, and Gibraltar have established regulatory frameworks that include crypto gambling. The UK Gambling Commission, for instance, has guidelines for operators accepting cryptocurrencies (UK Gambling Commission).
      • In Asia, the situation is mixed. Japan has legalized online gambling, including crypto gambling, under strict regulations, while countries like China have comprehensive bans on all forms of gambling.
      • In Africa and South America, regulations are often less stringent, allowing offshore crypto casinos to operate freely in many regions.
    • Offshore Licenses:
      Many crypto casinos obtain licenses from offshore jurisdictions known for their gambling-friendly regulations. Common licensing authorities include:
      • Curacao eGaming: Popular for its flexible licensing requirements, making it a go-to for new crypto casinos.
      • Malta Gaming Authority (MGA): Known for its rigorous standards, offering high credibility (Malta Gaming Authority).
      • Isle of Man Gambling Supervision Commission: A respected jurisdiction for online gambling operators.
        These licenses ensure that the biggest Bitcoin casinos adhere to standards of fairness and security.
    • Player Responsibility:
      Players must verify the legal status of crypto gambling in their country. Playing at unlicensed casinos can lead to risks like unfair games or delayed payouts. These new crypto casinos display their licensing information prominently, making verification straightforward.
    • Future Trends:
      As cryptocurrencies gain mainstream acceptance, more countries are likely to develop specific regulations for crypto gambling. This could lead to increased clarity, enhanced player protections, and more opportunities for licensed operators. Blockchain technology may also play a role in creating transparent regulatory systems.

    Players should always choose licensed platforms and stay informed about local laws to ensure a safe and legal gaming experience at crypto gambling sites.

    Games at Crypto Casinos

    The crypto currency casinos offer diverse game libraries that rival traditional platforms, ensuring there’s something for every player. Here’s an in-depth look at the game types available:

    • Slot Games

    Slots are the cornerstone of crypto casinos, with libraries often exceeding 1,500 titles. Players can enjoy classic three-reel slots, modern video slots with immersive themes, and progressive jackpots offering massive payouts. 

    Popular titles include Book of Dead, Starburst, Gonzo’s Quest, and Mega Moolah. Many new crypto casinos feature exclusive slots with unique mechanics like Cluster Pays, Hold & Win, and cascading reels. These games often have RTPs between 95% and 97%, with clear volatility labels to aid bankroll planning.

    • Provably Fair Games

    Provably fair games are a hallmark of the biggest crypto casinos, leveraging blockchain technology to ensure transparency. Players can verify the randomness of each outcome, building trust. Popular provably fair games include:

    • Dice: Players bet on the outcome of a dice roll, with bets starting at $0.10.
    • Crash: A high-energy game where players cash out before a multiplier crashes, offering quick sessions and low stakes.
    • Roulette: A blockchain-based version of the classic game, ensuring verifiable fairness.
      These games are ideal for players who prioritize transparency and fast-paced gameplay.
    • Live Dealer Games

    Live dealer games bring the casino experience to your screen, powered by providers like Evolution Gaming and Pragmatic Play. These games feature professional dealers and high-definition streams, with bet ranges from $0.20 to $1,000. Common options include:

    • Blackjack: Variants like classic, multi-hand, and infinite blackjack.
    • Roulette: European, American, and French versions with diverse betting options.
    • Baccarat: Standard and squeeze baccarat for an interactive experience.
    • Game Shows: Titles like Dream Catcher and Crazy Time offer engaging, multiplier-based gameplay.
      Live dealer games are perfect for players seeking an authentic casino atmosphere.
    • Table Games

    Table games remain a staple, offering strategic and fast-paced options. Common names include:

    • Blackjack: Variants with side bets like Perfect Pairs and 21+3, with minimum bets of $1-$5.
    • Roulette: European, American, and French versions, each with unique rules.
    • Baccarat: Simple gameplay appealing to high rollers.
    • Poker: Texas Hold’em, Caribbean Stud, and video poker variants.
      These games cater to players who enjoy skill-based gaming with flexible betting limits.
    • Sports Betting

    Many crypto casinos offer sports betting, allowing players to wager on events using cryptocurrencies. Popular sports include:

    • Football (Soccer): From local leagues to the FIFA World Cup.
    • Basketball: NBA, EuroLeague, and international tournaments.
    • Tennis: Grand Slams and ATP/WTA tours.
    • Esports: Games like League of Legends, Dota 2, and Counter-Strike.
      Competitive odds and live betting options enhance the excitement, making crypto gambling sites a one-stop shop for sports enthusiasts.

    Bonuses and Promotions at Crypto Casinos

    Bonuses are a key attraction at the crypto currency casinos, designed to attract and retain players. Here’s what you’ll find:

    ✔️Welcome Bonuses

    Welcome bonuses typically offer a 100%-200% match on your first deposit, often up to 1 BTC, with free spins included. For example, a 100% match up to $1,000 doubles your deposit. Wagering requirements range from 20x to 40x, with these Bitcoin casinos applying wagering to the bonus only, not the deposit.

    ✔️Reload Bonuses

    Reload bonuses reward subsequent deposits, typically offering 25%-100% matches up to $300. These bonuses often have wagering requirements of 30x-45x and may be tied to specific days or player activity.

    ✔️Cashback Offers

    Cashback returns 5%-20% of net losses, often as real money or low-wager bonuses. The crypto casinos credit cashback automatically, with transparent loss calculations, enhancing player value.

    ✔️Free Spins

    Free spins (10-200) are tied to specific slots, with spin values of $0.10-$0.50. Winnings are subject to 20x-45x wagering, and the Bitcoin casinos state eligible games up front.

    ✔️VIP Programs

    VIP programs offer exclusive perks like higher betting limits, faster withdrawals, and personalized support. High rollers benefit from tailored bonuses and cashback, making these programs a draw for dedicated players.

    Always read bonus terms to understand wagering requirements, bet limits, and eligible games.

    >>> Get Matched With The Right Bonus Offers<<<

    Withdrawals at Crypto Casinos

    Fast withdrawals are a hallmark of the new online crypto casinos. Here’s what you need to know:

    • Speed: Most withdrawals processed in under 10 minutes, with Bitcoin taking 10-30 minutes and Ethereum often faster due to lower network congestion.
    • Fees: Crypto transactions have low or no fees, though some casinos charge minimal withdrawal fees.
    • Limits: Minimum withdrawals range from 0.001 BTC to 0.01 BTC, with daily limits of $2,000-$5,000.
    • Security: Use a secure wallet and enable two-factor authentication to protect your funds.

    Top platforms complete KYC during registration, ensuring hassle-free payouts.

    Tips for Playing at Crypto Casinos

    Maximize your experience with these tips:

    • Secure Your Wallet: Use a hardware or trusted software wallet to store cryptocurrencies.
    • Understand Volatility: Crypto values fluctuate, so plan deposits and withdrawals carefully.
    • Set a Budget: Limit spending to avoid overspending.
    • Test Games: Use demo modes to explore games before betting real money.
    • Contact Support: Test support responsiveness before depositing.

    Responsible Gambling at Crypto Casinos

    Responsible gambling is critical. The online crypto casinos offer tools like:

    • Deposit Limits: Cap deposits daily, weekly, or monthly.
    • Loss Limits: Set maximum loss thresholds.
    • Session Timers: Receive reminders to take breaks.
    • Self-Exclusion: Temporarily or permanently block your account.

    Set limits early to keep gambling fun and safe.

    Final Verdict on Crypto Casinos Of 2025

    Yes, if you choose wisely. The above-mentioned online crypto casinos in 2025 offer unmatched privacy, speed, and innovation, driven by blockchain technology and growing cryptocurrency adoption. Our testing at All iGaming identified platforms that excel in game variety, bonuses, and security. As cryptocurrencies become mainstream, new crypto casinos are poised to redefine online gambling with transparent systems and player-focused features. 

    However, always verify licensing and read terms carefully. With the right approach, crypto gambling sites provide a thrilling and secure experience. Play smart, stay safe, and enjoy the new crypto casinos!

    FAQ’s

    • Are crypto casinos safe?

    Yes, if licensed and transparent. Check for valid licenses and security measures.

    • How fast are withdrawals at crypto casinos?

    Most process within minutes, with Bitcoin taking 10-30 minutes.

    • Can I play anonymously?

    Many allow anonymous play, though large withdrawals may require KYC.

    • What cryptocurrencies are accepted?

    Bitcoin, Ethereum, Litecoin, Ripple, and various altcoins.

    • Are games fair?

    Reputable platforms use RNGs and provably fair systems.

    • What’s the biggest red flag?

    Hidden terms or delayed payouts. Avoid casinos lacking clear licensing.

    Contact

    All iGaming

    https://all-igaming.com/ 

    support@alligaming.com

    18+ Only. Gambling carries risks. Play responsibly and check local laws.

    Brand website:https://all-igaming.com/
    Project Name: All iGaming
    Full company Address: Oceanview Street 12, Sunnyville, Atlantis
    Postal Code:7299
    Media Contact:
    Full Name -Max Fraser
    Company website:https://all-igaming.com/
    Email:support@alligaming.com

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    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI: Online Crypto Casinos 2025: Recommended by All iGaming Experts

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    New York City, June 24, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — At All iGaming, we’ve meticulously tested over 100 crypto casinos to bring you the definitive list of the crypto casinos with no KYC for 2025, available here. Our evaluation focused on real-money & crypto play, scrutinizing payment processing, bonus fairness, licensing, and user experience. The result is a curated selection of the biggest crypto casinos that exceed industry standards. 

    This guide will help you find trusted no kyc crypto casinos for an exciting and secure gaming experience.

    Listed Legit Crypto Casinos For 2025 & Exclusive Bonuses

    Here’s our list of top performers:

    >>> For The Full List Of Top Crypto Casinos, Visit All igaming

    Why Choose Crypto Casinos?

    Crypto casinos are transforming online gambling with their unique advantages, making them a top choice for players seeking the most trusted bitcoin casinos. Here’s why you should consider these platforms:

    • Enhanced Privacy and Anonymity

    The online crypto casinos allow players to gamble with minimal personal information, ensuring a high level of privacy. This is particularly appealing to those who value discretion in their gaming activities.

    • Lightning-Fast Transactions

    Cryptocurrency transactions are processed in minutes, offering a significant advantage over traditional banking methods. Our tests found that the biggest online crypto casino’s average withdrawal times of under 10 minutes for cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin and Ethereum, compared to 24-48 hours for fiat-based platforms.

    • Lower Fees

    Crypto transactions typically have minimal fees, saving players money. During testing, we noted that the online Bitcoin casinos charge little to no withdrawal fees, unlike traditional casinos with high processing costs.

    • Global Accessibility

    Unlike traditional casinos restricted by geography, crypto gambling sites are accessible worldwide, provided local laws permit. This makes them ideal for players in regions with limited gambling options.

    • Provably Fair Gaming

    Many crypto casinos use blockchain technology to offer provably fair games, allowing players to verify game outcomes. Our team found that top platforms display fairness mechanisms, enhancing trust in the crypto casino experience.

    All iGaming’s Testing Method for Crypto Casinos

    At All iGaming, we apply a rigorous testing process to ensure only the crypto casinos make our list. Here’s how we evaluate each platform:

    • Licensing and Credibility

    We reviewed licensing details for over 100 crypto-gambling sites, discarding 10 that lacked verifiable regulatory information. The remaining platforms displayed valid licenses from reputable jurisdictions like Curacao or Malta, ensuring player protection.

    • Platform Stability and User Experience

    Our testers evaluated 90 platforms by:

    • Signing up on desktop and mobile.
    • Playing 20+ games per site.
    • Testing live chat responsiveness.
    • Processing deposits and withdrawals. Seventy platforms maintained smooth performance during stress tests, with average game load times of 2 seconds. The biggest crypto casinos use modern frameworks for faster navigation and mobile optimization, outperforming older platforms.
    • Bonus Clarity and Terms

    Of the tested platforms, 50 provided clear bonus terms before opt-in. These sites offered wagering requirements of 20x-35x and reasonable bet limits ($5-$10). Transparent bonus tracking reduced disputes, making these platforms stand out as the greatest Bitcoin casinos.

    • Cashout Reliability

    We tested withdrawal speeds across all platforms. Thirty processed payouts within 10 minutes, while five were delayed beyond 24 hours without explanation. The online crypto casinos verify identities upfront, ensuring smooth and fast withdrawals.

    • Innovative Features

    Top platforms introduced unique features like blockchain-based game trackers, achievement systems, and volatility filters. These additions enhanced gameplay, setting these crypto casinos apart from traditional platforms.

    Regulatory Landscape for Crypto Casinos

    The regulatory environment for crypto gambling is complex and varies significantly across jurisdictions. Unlike traditional online gambling, which is often subject to strict national regulations, crypto casinos operate in a more decentralized manner due to the nature of cryptocurrencies. 

    Here’s a detailed look at the regulatory landscape:

    • Global Variations:
      • In the United States, online gambling is regulated at the state level, with some states allowing crypto gambling while others impose restrictions. Players must check state-specific laws to ensure compliance.
      • In Europe, countries like the United Kingdom, Malta, and Gibraltar have established regulatory frameworks that include crypto gambling. The UK Gambling Commission, for instance, has guidelines for operators accepting cryptocurrencies (UK Gambling Commission).
      • In Asia, the situation is mixed. Japan has legalized online gambling, including crypto gambling, under strict regulations, while countries like China have comprehensive bans on all forms of gambling.
      • In Africa and South America, regulations are often less stringent, allowing offshore crypto casinos to operate freely in many regions.
    • Offshore Licenses:
      Many crypto casinos obtain licenses from offshore jurisdictions known for their gambling-friendly regulations. Common licensing authorities include:
      • Curacao eGaming: Popular for its flexible licensing requirements, making it a go-to for new crypto casinos.
      • Malta Gaming Authority (MGA): Known for its rigorous standards, offering high credibility (Malta Gaming Authority).
      • Isle of Man Gambling Supervision Commission: A respected jurisdiction for online gambling operators.
        These licenses ensure that the biggest Bitcoin casinos adhere to standards of fairness and security.
    • Player Responsibility:
      Players must verify the legal status of crypto gambling in their country. Playing at unlicensed casinos can lead to risks like unfair games or delayed payouts. These new crypto casinos display their licensing information prominently, making verification straightforward.
    • Future Trends:
      As cryptocurrencies gain mainstream acceptance, more countries are likely to develop specific regulations for crypto gambling. This could lead to increased clarity, enhanced player protections, and more opportunities for licensed operators. Blockchain technology may also play a role in creating transparent regulatory systems.

    Players should always choose licensed platforms and stay informed about local laws to ensure a safe and legal gaming experience at crypto gambling sites.

    Games at Crypto Casinos

    The crypto currency casinos offer diverse game libraries that rival traditional platforms, ensuring there’s something for every player. Here’s an in-depth look at the game types available:

    • Slot Games

    Slots are the cornerstone of crypto casinos, with libraries often exceeding 1,500 titles. Players can enjoy classic three-reel slots, modern video slots with immersive themes, and progressive jackpots offering massive payouts. 

    Popular titles include Book of Dead, Starburst, Gonzo’s Quest, and Mega Moolah. Many new crypto casinos feature exclusive slots with unique mechanics like Cluster Pays, Hold & Win, and cascading reels. These games often have RTPs between 95% and 97%, with clear volatility labels to aid bankroll planning.

    • Provably Fair Games

    Provably fair games are a hallmark of the biggest crypto casinos, leveraging blockchain technology to ensure transparency. Players can verify the randomness of each outcome, building trust. Popular provably fair games include:

    • Dice: Players bet on the outcome of a dice roll, with bets starting at $0.10.
    • Crash: A high-energy game where players cash out before a multiplier crashes, offering quick sessions and low stakes.
    • Roulette: A blockchain-based version of the classic game, ensuring verifiable fairness.
      These games are ideal for players who prioritize transparency and fast-paced gameplay.
    • Live Dealer Games

    Live dealer games bring the casino experience to your screen, powered by providers like Evolution Gaming and Pragmatic Play. These games feature professional dealers and high-definition streams, with bet ranges from $0.20 to $1,000. Common options include:

    • Blackjack: Variants like classic, multi-hand, and infinite blackjack.
    • Roulette: European, American, and French versions with diverse betting options.
    • Baccarat: Standard and squeeze baccarat for an interactive experience.
    • Game Shows: Titles like Dream Catcher and Crazy Time offer engaging, multiplier-based gameplay.
      Live dealer games are perfect for players seeking an authentic casino atmosphere.
    • Table Games

    Table games remain a staple, offering strategic and fast-paced options. Common names include:

    • Blackjack: Variants with side bets like Perfect Pairs and 21+3, with minimum bets of $1-$5.
    • Roulette: European, American, and French versions, each with unique rules.
    • Baccarat: Simple gameplay appealing to high rollers.
    • Poker: Texas Hold’em, Caribbean Stud, and video poker variants.
      These games cater to players who enjoy skill-based gaming with flexible betting limits.
    • Sports Betting

    Many crypto casinos offer sports betting, allowing players to wager on events using cryptocurrencies. Popular sports include:

    • Football (Soccer): From local leagues to the FIFA World Cup.
    • Basketball: NBA, EuroLeague, and international tournaments.
    • Tennis: Grand Slams and ATP/WTA tours.
    • Esports: Games like League of Legends, Dota 2, and Counter-Strike.
      Competitive odds and live betting options enhance the excitement, making crypto gambling sites a one-stop shop for sports enthusiasts.

    Bonuses and Promotions at Crypto Casinos

    Bonuses are a key attraction at the crypto currency casinos, designed to attract and retain players. Here’s what you’ll find:

    ✔️Welcome Bonuses

    Welcome bonuses typically offer a 100%-200% match on your first deposit, often up to 1 BTC, with free spins included. For example, a 100% match up to $1,000 doubles your deposit. Wagering requirements range from 20x to 40x, with these Bitcoin casinos applying wagering to the bonus only, not the deposit.

    ✔️Reload Bonuses

    Reload bonuses reward subsequent deposits, typically offering 25%-100% matches up to $300. These bonuses often have wagering requirements of 30x-45x and may be tied to specific days or player activity.

    ✔️Cashback Offers

    Cashback returns 5%-20% of net losses, often as real money or low-wager bonuses. The crypto casinos credit cashback automatically, with transparent loss calculations, enhancing player value.

    ✔️Free Spins

    Free spins (10-200) are tied to specific slots, with spin values of $0.10-$0.50. Winnings are subject to 20x-45x wagering, and the Bitcoin casinos state eligible games up front.

    ✔️VIP Programs

    VIP programs offer exclusive perks like higher betting limits, faster withdrawals, and personalized support. High rollers benefit from tailored bonuses and cashback, making these programs a draw for dedicated players.

    Always read bonus terms to understand wagering requirements, bet limits, and eligible games.

    >>> Get Matched With The Right Bonus Offers<<<

    Withdrawals at Crypto Casinos

    Fast withdrawals are a hallmark of the new online crypto casinos. Here’s what you need to know:

    • Speed: Most withdrawals processed in under 10 minutes, with Bitcoin taking 10-30 minutes and Ethereum often faster due to lower network congestion.
    • Fees: Crypto transactions have low or no fees, though some casinos charge minimal withdrawal fees.
    • Limits: Minimum withdrawals range from 0.001 BTC to 0.01 BTC, with daily limits of $2,000-$5,000.
    • Security: Use a secure wallet and enable two-factor authentication to protect your funds.

    Top platforms complete KYC during registration, ensuring hassle-free payouts.

    Tips for Playing at Crypto Casinos

    Maximize your experience with these tips:

    • Secure Your Wallet: Use a hardware or trusted software wallet to store cryptocurrencies.
    • Understand Volatility: Crypto values fluctuate, so plan deposits and withdrawals carefully.
    • Set a Budget: Limit spending to avoid overspending.
    • Test Games: Use demo modes to explore games before betting real money.
    • Contact Support: Test support responsiveness before depositing.

    Responsible Gambling at Crypto Casinos

    Responsible gambling is critical. The online crypto casinos offer tools like:

    • Deposit Limits: Cap deposits daily, weekly, or monthly.
    • Loss Limits: Set maximum loss thresholds.
    • Session Timers: Receive reminders to take breaks.
    • Self-Exclusion: Temporarily or permanently block your account.

    Set limits early to keep gambling fun and safe.

    Final Verdict on Crypto Casinos Of 2025

    Yes, if you choose wisely. The above-mentioned online crypto casinos in 2025 offer unmatched privacy, speed, and innovation, driven by blockchain technology and growing cryptocurrency adoption. Our testing at All iGaming identified platforms that excel in game variety, bonuses, and security. As cryptocurrencies become mainstream, new crypto casinos are poised to redefine online gambling with transparent systems and player-focused features. 

    However, always verify licensing and read terms carefully. With the right approach, crypto gambling sites provide a thrilling and secure experience. Play smart, stay safe, and enjoy the new crypto casinos!

    FAQ’s

    • Are crypto casinos safe?

    Yes, if licensed and transparent. Check for valid licenses and security measures.

    • How fast are withdrawals at crypto casinos?

    Most process within minutes, with Bitcoin taking 10-30 minutes.

    • Can I play anonymously?

    Many allow anonymous play, though large withdrawals may require KYC.

    • What cryptocurrencies are accepted?

    Bitcoin, Ethereum, Litecoin, Ripple, and various altcoins.

    • Are games fair?

    Reputable platforms use RNGs and provably fair systems.

    • What’s the biggest red flag?

    Hidden terms or delayed payouts. Avoid casinos lacking clear licensing.

    Contact

    All iGaming

    https://all-igaming.com/ 

    support@alligaming.com

    18+ Only. Gambling carries risks. Play responsibly and check local laws.

    Brand website:https://all-igaming.com/
    Project Name: All iGaming
    Full company Address: Oceanview Street 12, Sunnyville, Atlantis
    Postal Code:7299
    Media Contact:
    Full Name -Max Fraser
    Company website:https://all-igaming.com/
    Email:support@alligaming.com

    Attachment

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI: Volta Finance Limited – Net Asset Value(s) as at 31 May 2025

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Volta Finance Limited (VTA / VTAS)
    May 2025 monthly report

    NOT FOR RELEASE, DISTRIBUTION, OR PUBLICATION, IN WHOLE OR PART, IN OR INTO THE UNITED STATES

    Guernsey, June 24, 2025

    AXA IM has published the Volta Finance Limited (the “Company” or “Volta Finance” or “Volta”) monthly report for May 2025. The full report is attached to this release and will be available on Volta’s website shortly (www.voltafinance.com).

    Performance and Portfolio Activity

    Dear Investors,

    In May, Volta Finance’s net performance reached +3.3% bringing the performance from August 2024 to date to +10.7%. Our investments in CLO Debt and CLO Equity recovered some of their post-liberation day volatility due to improved market sentiment.

    May saw a more positive macroeconomic environment, helping markets recover most of the losses from the previous month. The 90-day tariff rollback from Washington towards China signaled a pause in the U.S. Both European and US Equity markets rose sharply, while credit indices showed a V-shaped recovery. U.S. 30-year Treasury yields rose above 5% for the first time since October 2023 after Moody’s downgraded the U.S. credit rating. Although yields fell back later in the month, this jump reminded investors of ongoing worries about fiscal health.

    In terms of macroeconomic data, US inflation was encouraging as CPIs cooled to 2.3 % year-on-year while the euro-area inflation held at 2.2 %. Impacted by tariffs, the U.S. Q1 GDP contracted by an annualized 0.3 % due to pre-tariff stockpiling, while the Eurozone experienced growth of +0.3% quarter-on-quarter, supported by resilient demand in the Services industry. Labor markets also showed positive figures on both sides of the Atlantic, with the euro-area unemployment rate reaching a record-low of 6.2 % notably.

    Credit markets performed strongly in May. The European High Yield index (Xover) was around 50bps tighter and closed 300bps. On the Loan side, Euro Loans closed almost 1pt up at 97.80px (Morningstar European Leveraged Loan Index) while US Loans closed c. 1 pt up at 96.70px. The primary CLO markets were active again, with levels tightening across the capital structure, notably with BBs in the Mid +500bps. In terms of performance, US BBs total returned +3% on the month. For comparison, US High Yield returned +1.7% in the same period while Euro High Yield was down +1.3% and Global Loans up +1.5%.

    In terms of loan fundamentals, default rates remained steady at 4.4% in the US (including Liability Management Exercises) but we noticed an uptick in downgrades with 12% of B- exposures downgraded down to CCC category by S&P in the US loan market.

    Due to ongoing uncertainties, we consciously decided not to fully reinvest our 16% cash position at the end of April. We ended May with c.10% of Volta’s NAV in cash, with capital deployment into €10.7m of CLO debt tranches as well as into our 2 warehouses. Our European CLO warehouse was converted into an effective CLO Equity at the end of the month. In addition, Volta Finance’s cashflow generation remained stable at €28.1m equivalent in interests and coupons over the last six months, representing close to 21% of May’s NAV on an annualized basis.

    Over the month, Volta’s CLO Equity tranches returned +5.9%** while CLO Debt tranches returned +2.8% performance**. The dollar slipped to a six-week low against the Euro at $1.15 per Euro with very limited impact of our long dollar exposure in terms of performance (-0.02%). In this uncertain macroeconomic environment, we have kept our net long USD exposure at c.13% to limit the potential for margin calls.

    As of end of May 2025, Volta’s NAV was €271.8m, i.e. €7.43 per share.

    *It should be noted that approximately 0.24% of Volta’s GAV comprises investments for which the relevant NAVs as at the month-end date are normally available only after Volta’s NAV has already been published. Volta’s policy is to publish its NAV on as timely a basis as possible to provide shareholders with Volta’s appropriately up-to-date NAV information. Consequently, such investments are valued using the most recently available NAV for each fund or quoted price for such subordinated notes. The most recently available fund NAV or quoted price was 0.17% as at 30 April 2025, 0.07% as at 31 March 2025.

    ** “performances” of asset classes are calculated as the Dietz-performance of the assets in each bucket, taking into account the Mark-to-Market of the assets at period ends, payments received from the assets over the period, and ignoring changes in cross-currency rates. Nevertheless, some residual currency effects could impact the aggregate value of the portfolio when aggregating each bucket.

    CONTACTS

    For the Investment Manager
    AXA Investment Managers Paris
    François Touati
    francois.touati@axa-im.com        
    +33 (0) 1 44 45 80 22

    Olivier Pons
    Olivier.pons@axa-im.com
    +33 (0) 1 44 45 87 30        

    Company Secretary and Administrator
    BNP Paribas S.A, Guernsey Branch
    guernsey.bp2s.volta.cosec@bnpparibas.com 
    +44 (0) 1481 750 853

    Corporate Broker
    Cavendish Securities plc
    Andrew Worne
    Daniel Balabanoff
    +44 (0) 20 7397 8900

    *****
    ABOUT VOLTA FINANCE LIMITED

    Volta Finance Limited is incorporated in Guernsey under The Companies (Guernsey) Law, 2008 (as amended) and listed on Euronext Amsterdam and the London Stock Exchange’s Main Market for listed securities. Volta’s home member state for the purposes of the EU Transparency Directive is the Netherlands. As such, Volta is subject to regulation and supervision by the AFM, being the regulator for financial markets in the Netherlands.

    Volta’s Investment objectives are to preserve its capital across the credit cycle and to provide a stable stream of income to its Shareholders through dividends that it expects to distribute on a quarterly basis. The Company currently seeks to achieve its investment objectives by pursuing exposure predominantly to CLO’s and similar asset classes. A more diversified investment strategy across structured finance assets may be pursued opportunistically. The Company has appointed AXA Investment Managers Paris an investment management company with a division specialised in structured credit, for the investment management of all its assets.

    *****

    ABOUT AXA INVESTMENT MANAGERS
    AXA Investment Managers (AXA IM) is a multi-expert asset management company within the AXA Group, a global leader in financial protection and wealth management. AXA IM is one of the largest European-based asset managers with 2,800 professionals and €859 billion in assets under management as of the end of June 2024.  

    *****

    This press release is published by AXA Investment Managers Paris (“AXA IM”), in its capacity as alternative investment fund manager (within the meaning of Directive 2011/61/EU, the “AIFM Directive”) of Volta Finance Limited (the “Volta Finance”) whose portfolio is managed by AXA IM.

    This press release is for information only and does not constitute an invitation or inducement to acquire shares in Volta Finance. Its circulation may be prohibited in certain jurisdictions and no recipient may circulate copies of this document in breach of such limitations or restrictions. This document is not an offer for sale of the securities referred to herein in the United States or to persons who are “U.S. persons” for purposes of Regulation S under the U.S. Securities Act of 1933, as amended (the “Securities Act”), or otherwise in circumstances where such offer would be restricted by applicable law. Such securities may not be sold in the United States absent registration or an exemption from registration from the Securities Act. Volta Finance does not intend to register any portion of the offer of such securities in the United States or to conduct a public offering of such securities in the United States.

    *****

    This communication is only being distributed to and is only directed at (i) persons who are outside the United Kingdom or (ii) investment professionals falling within Article 19(5) of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Financial Promotion) Order 2005 (the “Order”) or (iii) high net worth companies, and other persons to whom it may lawfully be communicated, falling within Article 49(2)(a) to (d) of the Order (all such persons together being referred to as “relevant persons”). The securities referred to herein are only available to, and any invitation, offer or agreement to subscribe, purchase or otherwise acquire such securities will be engaged in only with, relevant persons. Any person who is not a relevant person should not act or rely on this document or any of its contents. Past performance cannot be relied on as a guide to future performance.

    *****
    This press release contains statements that are, or may deemed to be, “forward-looking statements”. These forward-looking statements can be identified by the use of forward-looking terminology, including the terms “believes”, “anticipated”, “expects”, “intends”, “is/are expected”, “may”, “will” or “should”. They include the statements regarding the level of the dividend, the current market context and its impact on the long-term return of Volta Finance’s investments. By their nature, forward-looking statements involve risks and uncertainties and readers are cautioned that any such forward-looking statements are not guarantees of future performance. Volta Finance’s actual results, portfolio composition and performance may differ materially from the impression created by the forward-looking statements. AXA IM does not undertake any obligation to publicly update or revise forward-looking statements.

    Any target information is based on certain assumptions as to future events which may not prove to be realised. Due to the uncertainty surrounding these future events, the targets are not intended to be and should not be regarded as profits or earnings or any other type of forecasts. There can be no assurance that any of these targets will be achieved. In addition, no assurance can be given that the investment objective will be achieved.

    The figures provided that relate to past months or years and past performance cannot be relied on as a guide to future performance or construed as a reliable indicator as to future performance. Throughout this review, the citation of specific trades or strategies is intended to illustrate some of the investment methodologies and philosophies of Volta Finance, as implemented by AXA IM. The historical success or AXA IM’s belief in the future success, of any of these trades or strategies is not indicative of, and has no bearing on, future results.

    The valuation of financial assets can vary significantly from the prices that the AXA IM could obtain if it sought to liquidate the positions on behalf of the Volta Finance due to market conditions and general economic environment. Such valuations do not constitute a fairness or similar opinion and should not be regarded as such.

    Editor: AXA INVESTMENT MANAGERS PARIS, a company incorporated under the laws of France, having its registered office located at Tour Majunga, 6, Place de la Pyramide – 92800 Puteaux. AXA IMP is authorized by the Autorité des Marchés Financiers under registration number GP92008 as an alternative investment fund manager within the meaning of the AIFM Directive.

    *****

    Attachment

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Submissions: Middle East turmoil lays the case bare for real portfolio diversification – deVere Group

    Source: deVere Group

    June 24 2025 – The volatile developments across the Middle East—culminating in a dramatic US-brokered ceasefire between Israel and Iran—underscore, yet again, a powerful and urgent truth: diversification isn’t optional. It’s a necessity.

    Markets around the world have been on a knife’s edge for nearly two weeks, reacting sharply to every twist in the conflict.

    Brent crude tumbled nearly 5% after Iran’s missile strike on the Al Udeid air base, interpreted by markets as a restrained signal rather than an escalation.

    With confirmation of the ceasefire, European stocks have surged—Germany’s DAX jumped 2%, the French CAC 40 climbed 1.8%, and futures for the S&P 500 in the US are pointing higher. Yet energy stocks have taken a hit as oil prices slide.

    Nigel Green, CEO of global financial advisory deVere Group, said the “whiplash” in prices across commodities, equities, and safe-haven assets is not just a response to geopolitics—it’s a “flashing red warning light” for investors with narrow allocations.

    “The events of the past two weeks are a textbook case for true portfolio diversification,” he says.

    “One day oil is spiking on nuclear fears, the next it’s plunging on de-escalation. Stocks swing wildly depending on headlines out of Tehran or Tel Aviv. You can’t build or preserve wealth if your investment strategy is overly concentrated in one region, sector, or asset class. That’s not a strategy; that’s a gamble.”

    As the conflict escalated, oil prices spiked on fears of supply disruption. Brent crude surged above $72 before crashing back to near $68 following signs of restraint and the ceasefire announcement. Defence stocks rallied while Middle East-exposed emerging markets sank. Gold flirted with $2,400 as investors scrambled for safety.

    Nigel Green says that for investors, this sequence of events should trigger immediate action.

    “Every global investor must ask themselves today: Am I protected against geopolitical shocks? Do I have meaningful exposure to counter-correlated assets? Am I truly diversified across sectors, geographies, currencies, and asset classes?”

    He adds: “Diversification doesn’t mean owning five different tech stocks or parking all your money in a single bond fund. It means uncorrelated positions across the risk spectrum—think gold, infrastructure, dividend-paying stocks, green energy, and alternatives like real estate and digital assets.”

    Nigel Green also warns that while the ceasefire offers relief, it doesn’t remove risk.

    “This truce is fragile. It’s politically brokered and militarily uneasy. One wrong move and tensions could flare again, dragging markets down with them. That’s the danger of relying too heavily on a single narrative or region in your portfolio.”

    The deVere CEO notes that while markets may breathe a sigh of relief in the short term, the deeper issue is structural instability in a critical region for energy, security, and global trade routes.

    “The Middle East remains a geopolitical powder keg, and history tells us that calm doesn’t last.

    “What does last is a properly diversified portfolio, one that absorbs these shocks without falling apart.”

    With global equities rallying and oil prices sliding, some investors may be tempted to lean back into familiar strategies. Nigel Green says this would be a critical mistake.

    “When markets are jittery, many investors double down on what they know—often increasing risk without realising it. What’s needed now is a measured, deliberate shift into broader exposure.”

    He concludes: “You diversify when the skies are clear, so that you’re protected when the storm breaks.

    “But after what we’ve just seen in the Middle East, the need for real diversification isn’t hypothetical, it’s immediate.”

    deVere Group is one of the world’s largest independent advisors of specialist global financial solutions to international, local mass affluent, and high-net-worth clients.  It has a network of offices around the world, more than 80,000 clients, and $14bn under advisement.

    MIL OSI – Submitted News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – Electricity grids: the backbone of the EU energy system – P10_TA(2025)0136 – Thursday, 19 June 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 194 thereof,

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 8 July 2020 entitled ‘Powering a climate-neutral economy: An EU Strategy for Energy System Integration’ (COM(2020)0299),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 28 November 2023 entitled ‘Grids, the missing link – An EU Action Plan for Grids’ (COM(2023)0757),

    –  having regard to the Commission report of January 2025 entitled ‘Investment needs of European energy infrastructure to enable a decarbonised economy’(1),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 26 February 2025 entitled ‘Action Plan for Affordable Energy – Unlocking the true value of our Energy Union to secure affordable, efficient and clean energy for all Europeans’ (COM(2025)0079),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 26 February 2025 entitled ‘The Clean Industrial Deal: A joint roadmap for competitiveness and decarbonisation’ (COM(2025)0085),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 5 March 2025 entitled ‘Industrial Action Plan for the European automotive sector’ (COM(2025)0095),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1153 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 July 2021 establishing the Connecting Europe Facility and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1316/2013 and (EU) No 283/2014(2) (the CEF Regulation),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2022/869 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2022 on guidelines for trans-European energy infrastructure, amending Regulations (EC) No 715/2009, (EU) 2019/942 and (EU) 2019/943 and Directives 2009/73/EC and (EU) 2019/944, and repealing Regulation (EU) No 347/2013(3) (the TEN-E Regulation),

    –  having regard to Directive (EU) 2019/944 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2019 on common rules for the internal market for electricity and amending Directive 2012/27/EU(4),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2019/943 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2019 on the internal market for electricity(5),

    –  having regard to Directive (EU) 2023/2413 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 October 2023 amending Directive (EU) 2018/2001, Regulation (EU) 2018/1999 and Directive 98/70/EC as regards the promotion of energy from renewable sources, and repealing Council Directive (EU) 2015/652(6) (the Renewable Energy Directive),

    –  having regard to Directive (EU) 2024/1275 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 April 2024 on the energy performance of buildings(7),

    –  having regard to Directive (EU) 2024/1711 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 amending Directives (EU) 2018/2001 and (EU) 2019/944 as regards improving the Union’s electricity market design(8),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1747 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 amending Regulations (EU) 2019/942 and (EU) 2019/943 as regards improving the Union’s electricity market design(9) (Electricity Market Design (EMD) Regulation),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2018/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 on the Governance of the Energy Union and Climate Action, amending Regulations (EC) No 663/2009 and (EC) No 715/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council, Directives 94/22/EC, 98/70/EC, 2009/31/EC, 2009/73/EC, 2010/31/EU, 2012/27/EU and 2013/30/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council, Council Directives 2009/119/EC and (EU) 2015/652 and repealing Regulation (EU) No 525/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council(10), which reflects the EU’s electricity interconnection targets,

    –  having regard to the Council conclusions on ‘Advancing Sustainable Electricity Grid Infrastructure’, as approved by the Transport, Telecommunications and Energy Council at its meeting on 30 May 2024,

    –  having regard to its resolution of 10 July 2020 on a comprehensive European approach to energy storage(11),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 19 May 2021 on a European strategy for energy system integration(12),

    –  having regard to the report of January 2023 by the EU Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) on electricity transmission and distribution tariff methodologies in Europe,

    –  having regard to the report of 19 December 2023 by ACER entitled ‘Demand response and other distributed energy resources: what barriers are holding them back?’,

    –  having regard to the report of April 2025 by the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E) entitled ‘Bidding Zone Review of the 2025 Target Year’(13),

    –  having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (A10-0091/2025),

    A.  whereas electricity grids are essential for the Union to achieve its clean energy transition and to deliver renewable energy while supporting economic growth and prosperity; whereas inefficiencies and lack of full integration negatively impact energy prices for consumers and companies;

    B.  whereas in light of the growing demand for electricity, significant investments and upgrades are required, along with regulatory oversight, to increase cross-border and national-level transmission capacity and modernise infrastructure, ensuring a decarbonised, flexible, more decentralised, digitalised and resilient electricity system;

    C.  whereas poor connectivity and grid bottlenecks are among the main reasons the EU cannot fully benefit from the significant installed capacities of wind and solar energy, thereby ensuring affordable prices for households and industry; whereas the lack of strong interconnection between regions with different natural and climatic characteristics leads to the overproduction of energy and administrative limitation on renewable production in some regions, while other regions are struggling with insufficient supply and high prices;

    D.  whereas transmission system operators (TSOs) are essential for integrating offshore renewable energy into the EU grid, in particular for those connected to more than one market; whereas, if TSOs fail to provide the agreed grid capacity, compensation should be paid to developers for lost export capacity, funded by congestion income; whereas such compensation should be shared fairly among TSOs and align with principles of non-discrimination and maximising cross-border trade; whereas this highlights the importance of maintaining a functioning interconnector backbone, as failures in interconnector capacity may result in costs for both producers and TSOs;

    E.  whereas Europe will only reach its decarbonisation objectives if there is a coordinated, pan-European approach to electricity system planning, connecting borders, sectors and regions;

    F.  whereas the planning of electricity transmission and distribution networks must be coordinated to ensure the effective development of the EU electricity system;

    G.  whereas the EU electricity grid was built for a 20th century economy based on centralised, fossil fuel-fired electricity generation, and must be modernised to meet the demands of a digitalised economy with increased levels of electrification and a higher share of decentralised and variable renewable energy sources;

    H.  whereas cross-border interconnectors, transmission and distribution grid infrastructure are critical for integrating renewables, reducing costs for European consumers and increasing the security of energy supply;

    I.  whereas distribution level grid projects are already eligible for funds under the Connecting Europe Facility – Energy (CEF-E); whereas, however, only a small share has been allocated to distribution grids under the most recent Projects of Common Interest (PCI) list; whereas CEF-E should better reflect the role of distribution grids for the achievement of EU energy and climate targets;

    J.  whereas ENTSO-E has calculated that cross-border electricity investment of EUR 13 billion per year until 2050 would reduce system costs by EUR 23 billion per year;

    K.  whereas the ‘energy efficiency first’ principle is a fundamental principle of EU energy policy and is legally binding; notes that the correct implementation of this principle will significantly reduce energy consumption, thereby lowering the need for investment in electricity grids and interconnectors;

    L.  whereas keeping the EU energy policy triangle of sustainability, security of supply and affordability in balance is key to a successful energy transition and to a reliable European energy system;

    M.  whereas energy network planning is a long-term process closely linked to investment stability;

    N.  whereas energy system flexibility needs are expected to double by 2030, in light of an increased share of renewables; whereas demand-side flexibility is therefore crucial for grid stability; whereas individual citizens, businesses and communities participating in the electricity market may bring manifold benefits to the grids, such as enhanced system efficiency, resilience, investment optimisation, improved social acceptance and lower energy costs; whereas serious delays and inconsistencies in implementing existing EU provisions on citizens’ energy, demand flexibility and smart network operations remain a concern;

    O.  whereas although recycling meets between 40 % and 55 % of Europe’s aluminium and copper needs, further measures to extend recycling capacity, waste collection and supply chain efficiency must be considered;

    P.  whereas the Commission and High Representative’s joint communication entitled ‘EU Action Plan on Cable Security’ highlights the importance of ensuring the secure supply of spare cable parts and the stockpiling of essential material and equipment;

    Q.  whereas the electricity system blackout experienced in the Iberian Peninsula and parts of France on 28 April 2025 illustrated, among other things, how important it is to increase the energy grid’s resilience by ensuring that it is well maintained, protected and balanced at all times, including through flexible system services and enhanced cross-border interconnections, to allow for an agile recovery in the event of system failure;

    R.  whereas national and regional level system operators hold important responsibilities, particularly in the area of energy supply security; whereas all tasks of a regulatory nature should be performed by regulatory agencies acting in the public interest; whereas, however, alongside these responsibilities, a strengthened role for regulators and ACER in the planning processes can contribute to addressing shortcomings, such as ENTSO-E’s current 10-year network development plan (TYNDP) grid planning, as identified in the grid monitoring report; whereas, while acknowledging the TSOs’ responsibilities in drawing up these scenarios, ACER’s early involvement in the drawing-up process could help to ensure that the guidelines for the drawing-up of the scenarios are followed in accordance with the TEN-E Regulation;

    S.  whereas interconnection development will contribute to further integrating the EU electricity market, which not only increases system flexibility and resilience, but also unlocks economies of scale in renewable electricity production;

    T.  whereas the energy workforce will need to increase by 50 % to deploy the requisite renewable energy, grid and energy efficiency technologies(14);

    U.  whereas small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are the backbone of the EU’s economy, entrepreneurship and innovation, comprising 99 % of businesses, providing jobs to more than 85 million EU citizens and generating more than 58 % of the EU’s GDP;

    V.  whereas increasing decentralised electricity generation and demand response are important to reduce reliance on centralised production, which may be easily targeted by physical threats or cyberthreats, or compromised by climate-related events;

    1.  Calls on the Member States to fully explore, optimise, modernise and expand their electricity grid capacity, including transmission and distribution; considers electricity grids to be the central element in the EU’s transition to a competitive, net zero economy by 2050, one that is capable of accommodating high volumes of variable renewable energy technologies and/or evolving demand sources driven by increased levels of electrification and the advancement of digital technologies; notes the Member States’ prerogative to determine their own energy mix;

    2.  Calls on the Commission, the Member States, ACER, EU DSO Entity(15) and ENTSO-E(16) to implement the actions of the EU grid action plan, the action plan for affordable energy, the reform of the EU’s electricity market design and the Renewable Energy Directive without delay;

    3.  Points out that the completion of the EU’s energy market integration will save up to EUR 40 billion annually, and that a 50 % increase in cross-border electricity trade could increase the EU’s annual GDP by 0,1 %(17);

    Relevance of electricity grids for the European energy transition

    4.  Welcomes the Commission’s communication on grids(18); underlines the expected increase in electricity consumption of 60 % by 2030, the rising need to integrate a large share of variable renewable power into the grid, and the need for grids to adapt to a more decentralised, digitalised and flexible electricity system, including the optimisation of system operations and the full utilisation of local flexibility resources, demand response and energy storage solutions to complement wholesale markets and enhance grid resilience, resulting in an additional 23 GW of cross-border capacity by 2025 and a further 64 GW of capacity by 2030; notes that over 40 % of the Union’s distribution grids are over 40 years old and need to be updated(19);

    5.  Reiterates that, by 2030, the Union needs to invest around EUR375 to 425 billion in distribution grids, and, overall, EUR 584 billion, in transmission and distribution electricity grids(20), including cross-border interconnectors and the adaptation of distribution grids to the energy transition;

    6.  Notes with concern that in 2023 the costs of managing transmission electricity grid congestion in the EU were EUR 4,2 billion(21) and continue to rise, and that curtailment is an obstacle to increasing the share of renewable energy sources; notes that this figure does not include the distribution electricity grid; stresses that in 2023 nearly 30 TWh of renewable electricity were curtailed across several Member States due to insufficient grid capacity; further notes the sharp increase in annual hours of negative electricity prices, rising from 154 in 2018 to 1 031 as of September 2024(22), largely driven by grid congestion at borders, and the lack of sufficient storage, flexibility and demand response in the electricity market to temporally match variable renewable electricity supply with electricity demand; stresses that addressing these issues could help to absorb surplus supply, thereby maximising the use of existing grid infrastructure, but that existing market and regulatory frameworks often fail to provide adequate incentives for achieving this;

    7.  Highlights that a failure to modernise and expand the EU’s electricity grid, alongside the rapid deployment of the high volumes of variable renewable energy required to deliver on its targets, has and will continue to result in high levels of dispatch-down (instructions to reduce output); believes that the dispatch-down of renewables, caused by grid congestion and curtailment, represents an unacceptable waste of high-value renewable electricity and money; calls on the Commission, as part of its forthcoming European Grids Package, to set out an EU strategy to vastly reduce the dispatch-down of renewable electricity;

    8.  Highlights the role of smart grids in improving congestion management and optimising the electricity distribution of renewables; stresses their contribution to network flexibility by integrating digital tools that facilitate demand-side response and collective self-consumption; underlines that better grid management enhances energy resilience, reduces curtailments and secures supply during peak demand periods;

    9.  Highlights that the electricity grid infrastructure is a priority for achieving the EU’s strategic autonomy and its climate and energy targets; notes the Clean Industrial Deal’s commitment to electrification with a key performance indicator of a 32 % economy-wide electrification rate by 2030, which would necessitate a significant and continuous update and deployment of grids; regrets that delays in responding to requests for connection to grids result in a slower pace of electrification, even in Member States where generation from renewables is rapidly increasing;

    10.  Highlights, in particular, the crucial role that energy communities can play in supporting local economies; regrets that energy communities and smaller operators face disproportionate barriers to grid access and grid funding access due to regulatory hurdles and resource constraints; calls, therefore, on the Member States that are lagging behind in this regard to fully implement the Clean Energy Package, Fit for 55 and Renewable Energy Directive provisions, empowering citizens, municipalities, SMEs and companies to actively participate in the electricity market, in particular by developing enabling frameworks for renewable energy communities and the promotion of energy-sharing schemes; calls for grid-related EU and national level funding to take into account the specific needs of projects promoted by energy communities;

    Regulatory situation and challenges

    11.  Is convinced that regulatory stability is a key condition for unlocking private investments in the electricity grid and, where feasible, enabling the affordable electrification of the EU’s economy, and reiterates the need to implement already adopted legislation before assessing potential new reviews;

    12.  Underlines that integrated grid planning across sectors at local, regional, national and EU levels will lead to increased system efficiency and reduced costs; calls, therefore, on the Commission and on the Member States to work towards integrated planning and to ensure that electricity network development plans are aligned with the 2021-2030 national energy and climate plans (NECPs) for all voltage levels; notes that a strengthened governance framework would help to ensure alignment between grid development plans and national and EU level policy objectives; recognises that, while the Member States are required to report on their contributions to EU targets through the NECPs, there is currently no equivalent obligation on TSOs to systematically report at EU level;

    13.  Underlines that the TEN-E Regulation and the Projects of Common Interest (PCI) and Projects of Mutual Interest (PMI) are powerful tools in the development of the Union’s cross-border energy infrastructure; regrets the shortcomings in the current TYNDP for European electricity infrastructure, which results in investment interests falling short of cross-border needs(23), and that grid planning does not fully leverage cross-border and cross-sectoral savings(24); further regrets delays regarding to the completion of PCIs; urges the Commission to introduce more coordinated, long-term cross-sectoral planning to deliver the related savings and benefits across the EU; highlights that such coordinated planning could better inform cost sharing of infrastructure across the Member States; notes that, although the TEN-E Regulation enables smart electricity grid projects with a cross-border impact to obtain PCI status, even if such projects do not cross a physical border, the PCI list in 2023 included only five such projects; strongly believes, therefore, that the PCI process needs to be strengthened, simplified and streamlined for more clarity and transparency; calls on the Member States to fully complete the PCIs; calls on the Commission to urgently propose a targeted revision of the TEN-E Regulation in order to (1) introduce a robust planning process that combines system operators’ responsibilities with a strengthened role for ACER by mandating ACER to request amendments to the scenarios and the TYNDP, (2) ensure scenarios are drawn up in line with the decarbonisation agenda and enable easier access for smart electricity grid projects, and (3) introduce a simplified application process for small and medium-sized distribution system operators (DSOs);

    14.  Emphasises that network planning is a long-term process closely linked to investment stability; proposes, therefore, extending the time frame for network development plans to 20 years; highlights that grid investment is urgently required by the EU’s competitive agenda and should not be delayed;

    15.  Additionally notes that the EU will continue to have strong electricity links with its neighbouring countries and therefore believes the Commission should enhance such cooperation with neighbouring countries through PMIs with non-EU countries, as provided for in the TEN-E Regulation;

    16.  Strongly emphasises that CEF-E has proven to be the crucial instrument for co-financing cross-border energy infrastructure and insists on its continuation; welcomes the inclusion of offshore electricity grid projects in the Commission’s most recent allocation of grants under CEF-E;

    17.  Considers the lack of detailed, reliable and comparable data on national and EU grid planning an obstacle to more efficient grids; calls therefore on the Member States to thoroughly implement the relevant provision in the Electricity Directive(25), in particular Article 32, and to encourage smaller DSOs to apply this Article’s provision;

    18.  Welcomes the EU DSO Entity’s report on good practices on Distribution Network Development Plans(26) (DNDPs), which calls on the Member States to include cost-benefit analyses in their DNDPs, in order to evaluate investment opportunities; urges the Commission to develop guidelines based on this report, in cooperation with the EU DSO Entity, to harmonise and increase transparency of national development planning for distribution grids, to publish a European overview of the DNDPs and to require all transmission and distribution operators to provide energy regulators with the necessary data about their current and future grid hosting capacity information and grid planning, to enable energy regulators to properly scrutinise grid planning; calls on the Member States to implement Article 31(3) of Directive 2024/1711, which requests grid operators to publish information on the capacity available in their area of operation, in order to ensure transparency and enable stakeholders to make informed investment decisions; calls on the Commission to develop a centralised online repository for all transmission plans and DNDPs;

    19.  Highlights the significant risk posed by curtailment to the viability of renewable energy investment, especially considering that many Member States fail to compensate market participants for curtailed electricity volumes, despite the requirements set out in Articles 12 and 13 of Regulation (EU) 2019/943; regrets the lack of transparency, availability and data granularity regarding curtailed renewable energy volumes and congestion management costs;

    20.  Highlights the value of putting clear metrics in place to measure whether the EU is on track to deliver the grid expansion and reinforcements needed to meet its 2050 objectives; notes that such metrics could include reductions in renewable energy curtailment, lower grid development costs relative to the amount of capacity delivered, increases in the efficient use of existing infrastructure, a reduction in losses and lower raw material intensity;

    21.  Notes the work done by ENTSO-E and the EU DSO Entity on harmonised definitions of available grid hosting capacity for system operators and to establish an Union-wide overview thereof; believes that national regulatory authorities (NRAs) could benefit from clear legislative provisions as to how Member States can prioritise grid connections, so as to abandon the ‘first-come, first-served’ principle; therefore asks the Commission to amend Article 6 of Directive (EU) 2019/944 on the internal market for electricity, as part of the implementation review that the Commission must complete by 31 December 2025, and to consequently introduce transparent priority connection criteria to be chosen and further defined by the Member States for (1) generation connection, such as quality and maturity of the project, level of commitment, contribution to decarbonisation, social value, and for (2) consumer connection, such as quality and maturity of the project, level of commitment, contribution to decarbonisation, public interest or its strategic and/or social value, and grid optimisation; calls on the NRAs and the Member States to provide clear prioritisation rules according to their local and national specificities to allow the ‘first-come, first-served’ approach to be abandoned by disincentivising applications for connection that are not substantiated by a solid project, that are speculative or where the developer cannot show sufficient commitment to the realisation of a project;

    22.  Underlines that improved cross-border interconnections offer substantial cost-saving potential at the system level, with annual reductions in generation costs estimated at EUR 9 billion up to 2040, while requiring annual investments of EUR 6 billion in cross-border infrastructure and storage capacity;

    23.  Regrets that some Member States did not achieve the 10% interconnection target by 2020 and urges them to strive to achieve the current 15% interconnection target for 2030, as set out in Regulation (EU) 2018/1999, since interconnection capacity is crucial for the functioning of the EU’s internal electricity market, leading to significant cost savings at system level and decreasing generation costs by EUR 9 billion annually to 2040(27); regrets that the 32 GW of cross-border capacity needed by 2030 remains unaddressed(28); deplores the delays and uncertainties regarding several interconnection projects; calls, therefore, on the Commission to propose, by June 2026 at the latest, a binding interconnection target for 2036 based on a needs assessment; stresses the need for cooperation with non-hosting Member States and for the EU and its neighbouring countries to be involved in negotiations, in order to ensure the projects’ finalisation;

    24.  Highlights the need to accelerate permitting procedures for electricity infrastructure; stresses that grid expansion should not be delayed by lengthy permitting procedures or excessive reporting requirements; therefore welcomes the positive progress made regarding provisions adopted in the latest revision of the Renewable Energy Directive, specifically Article 16f thereof, and the Emergency Regulation on Permitting(29) to accelerate, streamline and simplify permit-granting procedures for grid and renewable energy projects, especially the principle of public overriding interest for grid projects; notes, however, that some of the Member States have not seen a material improvement in project permitting timelines, despite the ambitious frameworks set out at EU level; therefore urges the Member States to implement these measures without delay and calls on the Commission to closely monitor the implementation of the Renewable Energy Directive, and regularly assess if revised permitting provisions are sufficient to deliver on the EU’s objectives; additionally calls on the Commission to set out guidelines for the Member States to include a principle of tacit approval in their national planning systems, as described in Article 16a of the Renewable Energy Directive; stresses that reinforcing administrative capacity, including through adequate staffing of planning and permitting authorities, will accelerate permitting procedures;

    25.  Encourages the Member States to draw up plans to designate dedicated infrastructure areas for grid projects, as outlined in Article 15e of the Renewable Energy Directive; stresses that such plans are essential to account for local specificities and ensure respect for protected areas; emphasises that these plans should be closely coordinated with the designation of acceleration areas for renewables, to ensure a streamlined, efficient and integrated approach to energy infrastructure development;

    26.  Notes that often documents need to be submitted in paper form; calls on the Member States to increase the digitalisation of these processes in order to accelerate permitting procedures; calls on the Commission and the Member States to revise all EU legislation relevant to permitting, such as the Environmental Impact Assessment Directive(30), with a view to introducing mandatory digital application, submission and processing requirements;

    27.  Highlights the importance of public acceptance and public engagement when developing new grid projects and calls on the Commission to develop a set of best practices to be shared among the Member States in this regard; highlights the critical importance of effective communication with citizens and communities regarding grid projects and reinforcement; notes that local-level support can help to accelerate the delivery of critical infrastructure and thus meet national and EU level objectives; urges the swift implementation of the EU’s pact for engagement with the electricity sector and coordination with national signatories (TSOs, DSOs, NRAs) to guarantee early, meaningful and regular public participation in grid projects;

    28.  Calls for the convening of a TAIEX(31) Group on Permitting within the forthcoming European Grids Package to support the Member States in addressing administrative bottlenecks, enhancing regulatory capacity and accelerating project approvals through the sharing of best practices and cross-border coordination;

    29.  Welcomes the initiatives announced under the Action Plan for Affordable Energy; recommends that the Commission extend the ‘tripartite contract for affordable energy for Europe’s industry’ to smaller energy producers, including energy communities, SMEs and businesses, leveraging flexibility and demand response, and link the outcome of these cooperation structures with grid planning processes at national and EU level, in order to optimise planning, investment and grid utilisation from the outset;

    30.  Highlights the need for improvements to be made to the public procurement framework, in order to tackle the challenges to grid operators regarding supply chains; therefore welcomes the Commission communication on the Clean Industrial Deal and the announcement by the Commission of a forthcoming review of the Public Procurement Directives(32); stresses public procurement’s potential for the continued development of a strong EU manufacturing supply chain for electricity grid equipment, software and services; encourages the Commission to promote resilience, sustainability and security in public procurement procedures for grid operators; advocates for greater consistency between EU regulations on public procurement; calls on the Commission to adapt EU rules on public procurement with a view to harmonising and simplifying functional tendering specifications, in order to ramp up the production capacities of grid components;

    31.  Believes that adequate standardisation and common technical specifications are necessary for achieving economies of scale, and to speed up technological development; considers, additionally, that it is essential to ensure the right level of standardisation so that manufacturers’ capacity to innovate is not reduced;

    32.  Reiterates the need to consider new business models between equipment manufacturers and operators, such as long-term framework agreements that encourage the shift from one-off ‘grid projects’ to sustained and structured ‘grid programmes’, which result in more predictable planning for grid technology manufacturers; calls for the streamlining of tendering processes for the provision of grid equipment and services;

    33.  Stresses that this forthcoming revision of the Public Procurement Directives will allow the inclusion of sustainability, resilience and European preference criteria in EU public procurement processes for strategic sectors, in line with the provisions set out in Article 25 of Regulation (EU) 2024/1735(33); calls for grids and related technologies to be explicitly recognised as strategic sectors, to ensure their eligibility under the revised framework; underlines that strengthening European preference in public procurement processes is essential for reducing the EU’s dependence on non-EU suppliers, enhancing supply chain security, and fostering a resilient EU industrial base capable of supporting the energy transition; welcomes the introduction by the European Investment Bank (EIB) of a ‘Grids Manufacturing Package’ to support the European supply chain with at least EUR 1,5 billion in counter-guarantees for grid component manufacturers; calls for further similar financial instruments to be developed to provide long-term investment certainty and to accelerate the scaling-up of European production capacity;

    Financing

    34.  Notes that over the past five years, global investment in power capacity has increased by nearly 40 %, while investment in grid infrastructure has lagged behind; notes that estimates of investment that the EU will need to make in its grid over the 2025-2050 period range from EUR 1 950 billion to EUR 2 600 billion(34);

    35.  Observes with concern that the budget allocated under CEF-E has been insufficient to expedite all PCI and PMI categories; notes that with a EUR 5,84 billion budget for 2021-2027, the programme has restricted capacity and may struggle to keep pace with investment needs; calls on the Commission and the Member States to significantly increase the CEF-E envelope and the percentage of CEF-E funds dedicated to electricity infrastructure as a separate adequate resource, when proposing the next multiannual financial framework (MFF), and to ensure that projects both at the distribution and at the transmission levels with an EU added value are eligible for budget allocated under CEF-E; encourages the Commission to further explore co-financing possibilities between CEF-E and the Renewable Energy Financing Mechanism;

    36.  States that EU funding is predominantly allocated to transmission grids with relatively insignificant allocations to distribution grids, despite their significant role in the EU energy transition, demonstrated by the fact that, between 2014 and 2020, CEF-E funded around EUR 5,3 billion worth of projects, of which around EUR 1,7 billion went to transmission grids and EUR 237 million to smart distribution grids; notes that the last PCI list only contained five smart electricity projects;

    37.  Deeply regrets that, whereas regional funds such as the Cohesion Fund, the European Regional Development Fund or the Recovery and Resilience Facility provide for grid investments in principle, in practice they are underutilised for grid projects; regrets also that the evaluation criteria applied to the assessment of projects submitted in response to the EU Innovation Fund’s calls for proposals prevent funding for the demonstration and manufacturing of grid technologies; calls on the Commission and the Member States to ensure that a proportionate amount of such funding is also spent on grid investment;

    38.  Calls on the Member States to simplify access to the EU funds managed by the Member States for grid operators, for instance through the establishment of a one-stop-shop in those Member States in which a large share of DSOs are of a small or medium size;

    39.  Calls on the Commission to propose a dedicated funding instrument, such as one based on revenues from the market-based emission reduction scheme, to allow the Member States to support decentralised and innovative grid projects with a clear EU added value, including smaller projects, ensuring its effective use by the Member States for these purposes;

    40.  Emphasises the need for regulatory frameworks to attract private investment and ensure cost-reflective tariffs, in addition to public funding mechanisms;

    41.  Is convinced that anticipatory investments and forward-looking investments will help to address grid bottlenecks and prevent curtailment; points out that the EMD Regulation sets out regulatory elements for anticipatory investments but lacks a harmonised definition and implementation across the Union; calls on the Member States to swiftly implement the aforementioned provisions of the EMD Regulation and remove national legal barriers, on NRAs to remove barriers as regards regulatory incentives and disincentives, and on the Commission to urgently provide guidance regarding the approval of anticipatory investments, as announced in its Action Plan for Grids(35); believes that further harmonisation in this respect might be beneficial; calls for detailed cost-benefit analyses and scenario-based planning to assess the likelihood of future utilisation, and recommends a two-step approval process for projects with a higher risk level by first approving smaller budgets for studies or planning, followed by a second approval for the more costly steps, in order to reduce the risk of stranded assets;

    42.  Acknowledges that grid investments from capital markets can be incentivised by providing market-oriented conditions, such as suitable rates of return and a robust regulatory framework; emphasises that the EU and the Member States should encourage private investments by providing risk mitigation tools or Member State guarantees; calls on the Commission and the EIB to further strengthen financing and de-risking initiatives and tools, such as counter-guarantees, to support additional electricity grid expansion and modernisation at affordable rates for system operators; emphasises the relevance of ensuring that the EU’s electricity grid is financed and therefore owned by public and private capital only from EU actors, or previously screened non-EU investors, in view of the criticality of the infrastructure;

    43.  Underlines that, while investment decisions should be guided by efficiencies, including energy and cost efficiency, investments should not only be focused on capital expenditure, and that investments optimising, renewing and modernising the existing infrastructure should be equally considered; therefore welcomes Article 18 of the EMD Regulation, which calls for tariff methodologies to give equal consideration to capital and operational expenditure, and remunerate operators to increase efficiencies in the operation and development of their networks, including through energy efficiency, flexibility and digitalisation; calls on the Commission and the Member States to thoroughly implement its provisions and to focus on ensuring fair and timely compensation to system operators for the costs borne by them;

    44.  Notes that the electrification of the EU economy, where technically and economically feasible, would help to drive down network tariffs by spreading the costs across a wider range of users; highlights, therefore, the importance of ensuring that the development of the future network is fully aligned with demand projections driven by increases in the level of electrification; is concerned by experts’ forecasts of network tariff increases of around 50% to 100% by 2050(36); stresses, therefore, the need for instruments and incentives that support grid operators in efficiently managing available grid capacity, including through procuring flexibility services, with a view to reducing imminent grid investment needs; highlights that flexible connection agreements, flexible network tariffs and local flexibility markets contribute to grid efficiency; invites NRAs to promote these flexible tariffs that allow consumers to easily react to price signals while shielding vulnerable households and businesses from price peaks; calls on the Commission and the Member States to actively address bottlenecks in tariffs, connection fees and regulations to facilitate cross-border and offshore hybrid grid investment;

    45.  Calls on the Member States to implement the relevant EU legal framework to unlock demand-side flexibility by accelerating the deployment of smart meters, enabling access to data from all metering devices and ensuring efficient price signals, to allow industries and households to optimise their consumption and reduce their electricity bills, and at the same time help reduce operational costs and the need for additional grid investment;

    46.  Stresses that the relaxation of network tariffs and certain charges, which could have the effect of lowering electricity prices, as proposed in the Affordable Energy Action Plan, has to be accompanied by a plan to replace the sources of the funds needed for grid investment with alternatives, in order to avoid facing underinvestment of the grids in the future;

    47.  Highlights the importance of minimising the additional costs on consumers’ bills resulting from the investments required to deliver the grid modernisation and expansion needed to meet the EU’s climate and competitiveness goals; asks the Commission to work with the Member States to develop a coordinated set of best practices for investments and equitable network tariff composition, with a strong emphasis on increasing transparency and removing non-energy related charges from the tariffs;

    48.  Points out that transmission infrastructure and availability of cross-zonal capacities are vital for an integrated market and for the exchange of low-marginal cost renewable energies, while respecting system security; notes that the EMD Regulation sets a minimum 70 % target of capacities available for cross-zonal trade by 2025 but Member States are far from reaching it; therefore urges the Member States and their TSOs to speed up their efforts to maximise cross-zonal trading opportunities, to ensure an efficient internal electricity market, appropriate investment decisions and renewable energy integration; regrets that achieving this target has often resulted in re-dispatch costs; notes that existing cost sharing mechanisms, such as cross-border cost allocation (CBCA), inter-transmission system operator (TSO) compensation and re-dispatching cost sharing, are limited and difficult to implement, which does not encourage cross-border investments, such as in offshore grids; calls on the Commission to holistically review and improve these mechanisms to ensure that they reflect the shared benefits of infrastructure and address the diversity of electricity flows, whether internal or cross-border, including a fair and balanced cost-benefit sharing mechanism for cross-border infrastructure projects that is based on objective criteria;

    49.  Takes note of the report of April 2025 by ENTSO-E on potential alternative bidding zone configurations based on location marginal pricing simulations provided by TSOs;

    Grid-enhancing technologies, digitalisation, innovative solutions and resilience

    50.  Underlines that grid-enhancing technologies, digital solutions, ancillary services and data management technologies, as well as smart energy appliances, often leveraging artificial intelligence, can significantly increase the efficiency of existing grid capacities and maximise the use of existing assets, reducing the requirement for new infrastructure, for instance by providing real-time information on energy flows; therefore insists that these technologies and innovative solutions must be explored; urges NRAs to incentivise TSOs and DSOs to rely more on such technologies, weighing up the costs and benefits of their use versus grid expansion and by using remuneration schemes based on benefits rather than costs, and to benchmark the TSOs and DSOs on their uptake of such technologies; invites the Commission to further promote such innovative technologies when assessing projects that apply for EU funding;

    51.  Welcomes the work accomplished by ENTSO-E and the EU DSO Entity in developing the TSO/DSO Technopedia(37) so far, and calls on the Commission to mandate the biannual updating of the Technopedia to accurately reflect the technology readiness levels (TRLs) of technologies included;

    52.  Urges the Commission and the Member States to further enable and increase the digitalisation of the European electricity system, enabling the optimisation of the operation of its power system and reducing pressure on the supply chain; underlines that data sharing and data interoperability are essential for grid planning and optimisation; encourages the Member States, the NRAs, the EU DSO Entity and ACER to continue to accelerate their work on the monitoring system based on indicators measuring the performance of smart grids (‘smart grid indicators’), as set out in the Electricity Directive;

    53.  Stresses the urgent need to enhance the security of critical electricity infrastructure, including interconnectors and subsea cables at risk of sabotage, and increase its resilience to extreme weather events, climate change and physical and digital attacks; highlights the need to strengthen cooperation at national, regional and EU levels;

    54.  Stresses the growing risk of coordinated cyberattacks targeting the EU’s entire electricity network; recalls the importance of the rapid implementation of cybersecurity and other related network codes and the related legislation, such as the NIS 2 Directive(38) and the Cybersecurity Act(39), and encourages the Commission to correct, in upcoming legislative reviews, the status of physical grid equipment, including remotely controllable grid equipment, such as inverters, which is currently not held to a high enough cybersecurity standard, especially in cases where the manufacturer is required, under the jurisdiction of a non-EU country, to report information on software or hardware vulnerabilities to the authorities of that non-EU country; calls for enhanced EU level cooperation between all parties to strengthen preparedness and resilience; considers that NRAs should acknowledge the costs incurred by operators in adopting cybersecurity and resilience measures, and provide incentives for investments pertaining to increasing the resilience of the energy infrastructure to cyberthreats, and physical and hybrid threats, including climate adaptation measures;

    55.  Underlines the need to step up efforts to protect existing and future critical undersea and onshore energy infrastructure; considers that the EU should play a broader role in preventing incidents that threaten this infrastructure, in promoting surveillance and in restoring any damaged infrastructure using state of the art technologies; calls on the Commission and the Member States to find solutions to increase the protection and resilience of critical infrastructure, including solutions to financing such measures and technologies;

    56.  Recognises that new high-voltage electricity grid projects provide a multifunctional and cost-efficient opportunity to integrate additional security measures (i.e. sensors, sonar, etc.) and environmental solutions (i.e. bird deflectors, fire detectors, nature corridors, etc.) if planned in a holistic manner; asks the Commission to develop guidelines for NRAs to ensure that initial grid project planning is carried out and financed with these elements in mind;

    57.  Urges the Commission, DSOs and TSOs to develop an EU-owned Common European Energy Data Space, based on technical expertise and practice utilising the available data(40) and based on a common set of rules ensuring the secure, transparent portability and interoperability of energy data, where harmonised data is safely managed, exchanged and stored in the EU; stresses that this Common European Energy Data Space should facilitate data pooling and sharing through appropriate governance structures and data sharing services, supporting critical energy operations including transmission and distribution; underlines that European TSOs, DSOs and other previously screened electricity grid actors must be able to securely and smartly operate the grid, optimising its use by integrating flexibility and innovative technologies, in line with key principles of interoperability, trust, data value and governance; notes that data exchange arrangements must also take into account interactions with non-EU parties;

    58.  Recognises the potential of flexibility as a necessary tool for optimising system operations, maintaining the stability of the system and empowering consumers by incentivising them to shift their consumption patterns; stresses the importance of implementing appropriate measures to guarantee efficient price signals that incentivise flexibility, including from all end-consumers, and ensuring that all resources contribute to system security, including by accelerating the deployment of smart meters, smart energy-efficient buildings, and enabling access to data from all metering devices; asks NRAs to recognise flexibility innovations and pilot projects in the system, insofar as these do not negatively impact the grid’s overall balance and stability, in order to continue incentivising innovation;

    59.  Calls on NRAs to work closely with TSOs and DSOs to assess the flexibility potential, and needs of the national systems in current and future planning, taking into consideration the presence of industry, large consumers, large generators and storage; highlights in particular the critical role that storage assets, including long-duration electricity storage, capable of providing up to 100 hours of electricity, can play in providing congestion management services to the grid; notes that in order to provide these essential system services, investors in storage assets require stable, long-term revenue models, similar to the way in which support schemes have successfully provided revenue certainty for renewable generation assets;

    Supply chain, raw materials and the need for skills

    60.  Notes with concern that global growth in the demand for grid technologies has put pressure on supply chains and the availability of cables, transformers, components and critical technologies; highlights the findings in the February 2025 International Energy Agency report, ‘Building the Future Transmission Grid’(41), that it now takes two to three years to procure cables and up to four years to secure large power transformers, and that average lead times for cables and large power transformers have almost doubled since 2021;

    61.  Is concerned about the long lead times for many grid technology components and remains determined to maintain European technology leadership in grid technology, emphasising the need for innovation to develop, demonstrate and scale European high-capacity grid technologies and innovative grid-enhancing technologies;

    62.  Stresses that critical and strategic raw materials are essential for grid infrastructure, with aluminium and copper demand set to rise by 33 % and 35 % respectively by 2050(42); takes note of the Commission decision recognising certain critical raw materials projects as strategic projects under the Critical Raw Materials Act(43), in order to secure access to these key materials and diversify sources of supply; calls on the Commission and the Member States to enhance recycling, and support strategic partnerships and trade agreements to this end;

    63.  Highlights the need to strengthen grid supply chains to increase the supply of grid technologies at affordable costs, and thereby limit the costs borne by consumers via network charges; calls for a strategic approach to acquiring energy technologies, components or critical materials related to grids, in order to avoid developing dependencies on single suppliers outside of the EU;

    64.  Believes that holistic, coordinated, long-term grid planning across the entire European energy system is needed to solve the supply chain capacity bottleneck, and that such planning provides manufacturers with essential transparency and predictability for adequately planning manufacturing capacity increases; considers that such planning must be reliable and enable new business models, such as long-term framework agreements and capacity reservation contracts;

    65.  Urges the maximum standardisation of key electricity grid equipment, insofar as is technically possible, via a joint technical assessment by the Commission, DSOs, TSOs and industry, covering all voltage levels in order to scale up production, lower prices and delivery times, and promote the interoperability of systems;

    66.  Stresses the urgent need to address labour shortages in the energy sector; notes that the Commission has projected that the energy workforce needs to significantly increase in order to deploy renewable energies, upgrade and expand grids, and manufacture energy efficiency, grid and other relevant technologies; regrets the shortages of electrical mechanics and fitters reported in 15 of the Member States, increasing the staffing needs of DSOs and TSOs; highlights that the energy workforce must grow by 50 % by 2030 to support the deployment of renewables(44), grid expansion and energy efficiency, with an estimated 2 million additional jobs required in electricity distribution by 2050; calls for training, upskilling and reskilling initiatives, prioritising grid-related skills to close skills gaps; welcomes university-business partnerships and targeted EU skills academies for strategic sectors, including grids; encourages DSOs and TSOs to diversify their workforce, including by increasing women’s participation;

    67.  Reiterates that the Member States and the EU should cooperate to adapt the relevant skills programmes and develop best practices to fulfil the growing skills demand across all educational levels, with a strong emphasis on encouraging gender balance in the sector;

    68.  Highlights the crucial role of SMEs and EU businesses in supplying the technology sector for the electricity grid; points out the need to access affordable electrification, limiting the costs related to the supply chain and ensuring a skilled workforce;

    Offshore

    69.  Acknowledges the strategic relevance of offshore development in delivering the EU’s objectives of energy autonomy, increased use of renewable energy, a resilient and cost-effective electricity system and climate neutrality by 2050; stresses the importance of fully utilising the potential of Europe’s five sea basins for offshore energy generation; highlights the particular significance of the North Seas (covering the geographical area of the North Seas, including the Irish and Celtic Seas), which offer favourable conditions and the highest potential, with an agreed target of 300 GW of installed offshore generation capacity by 2050 within the framework of the North Seas Energy Cooperation; welcomes the progress made in this regard; emphasises the need to develop a meshed offshore grid, including hybrid interconnectors, particularly in the North Seas, to fully harness offshore potential and improve electricity market integration; calls on the Commission and the Member States to strengthen regional cooperation on grid planning and energy cooperation across all sea basins with the EU’s neighbouring countries, in particular the UK and Norway, specifically in offshore wind energy development and the planning and manufacturing of electricity grids;

    70.  Highlights the need for a stable and predictable regulatory framework that ensures the most optimal trading arrangements to provide the required investor confidence to support the development and interconnection of offshore grid and offshore wind projects, ensuring market efficiency and efficient cross-border flows, including with non-EU countries; underlines the necessity of strengthening national grids where required to maximise the benefits of offshore energy; acknowledges that combining offshore transmission with generation assets (offshore hybrids) will be an integral part of an efficient network system, as this comes with several advantages for the European energy system but still lacks the right regulatory framework to incentivise necessary investment;

    Cooperation with non-EU countries

    71.  Calls on the Member States to increase cooperation and coordination with like-minded non-EU countries such as Norway and the UK; recalls that the development of electricity infrastructure to harness the offshore wind potential of the North Seas is a shared priority for both the EU and the UK;

    72.  Highlights the need for a pragmatic and cooperative approach to EU-UK electricity trading; calls on the Commission to work closely with the UK administration to agree on a mutually beneficial trading arrangement that strengthens security of supply and the pathway to net zero for both jurisdictions; additionally, believes that efficiencies of trading arrangements can be improved further; calls on the Commission to engage with its UK counterparts constructively on this matter;

    Outermost regions

    73.  Stresses the unique challenges faced by the EU’s outermost regions and other areas not connected to the European electricity grid; highlights their reliance on imports and high vulnerability to electricity blackouts and extreme climate hazards; notes the importance of developing resilient and autonomous energy systems through local grid development and cleaner energy production; calls on the Commission to address these regions’ specific needs in the European Grids Package and to propose additional financial support to improve the autonomy of their energy systems, and address their lack of interconnection and absence of broader grid connection benefits;

    o
    o   o

    74.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.

    (1) European Commission: Directorate-General for Energy, Artelys, LBST, Trinomics, Finesso, A. et al., Investment needs of European energy infrastructure to enable a decarbonised economy – Final report, Publications Office of the European Union, 2025.
    (2) OJ L 249, 14.7.2021, p. 38, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1153/oj.
    (3) OJ L 152, 3.6.2022, p. 45, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/869/oj.
    (4) OJ L 158, 14.6.2019, p. 125, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2019/944/oj.
    (5) OJ L 158, 14.6.2019, p. 54, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2019/943/oj.
    (6) OJ L, 2023/2413, 31.10.2023, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2023/2413/oj.
    (7) OJ L, 2024/1275, 8.5.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1275/oj.
    (8) OJ L, 2024/1711, 26.6.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1711/oj.
    (9) OJ L, 2024/1747, 26.6.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1747/oj.
    (10) OJ L 328, 21.12.2018, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2018/1999/oj.
    (11) OJ C 371, 15.9.2021, p. 58.
    (12) OJ C 15, 12.1.2022, p. 45.
    (13) European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E), ‘Bidding Zone Review of the 2025 Target Year’, April 2025, https://eepublicdownloads.blob.core.windows.net/public-cdn-container/clean-documents/Network%20codes%20documents/NC%20CACM/BZR/2025/Bidding_Zone_Review_of_the_2025_Target_Year.pdf.
    (14) Commission communication of 5 March 2025 entitled ‘The Union of Skills’ (COM(2025)0090).
    (15) The EU DSO Entity is a technical expert body and association of distribution system operators (DSOs) mandated by the Electricity Market Regulation (2019/943/EU) to promote the functioning of the electricity market and to facilitate the energy transition.
    (16) The European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E) is the association for the cooperation of European transmission system operators (TSOs).
    (17) International Monetary Fund (IMF), IMF Staff Background Note on EU Energy Market Integration, 16 January 2025, as included in the Council background note of 17 January 2025 on EU energy market integration: https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-5438-2025-INIT/en/pdf.
    (18) Commission communication of 28 November 2023 entitled ‘Grids, the missing link – An EU Action Plan for Grids’ (COM(2023)0757).
    (19) ibid.
    (20) ibid.
    (21) ACER 2024 Market Monitoring Report, ‘Transmission capacities for cross-zonal trade of electricity and congestion management in the EU’, 3 July 2024.
    (22) ACER 2024 Market Monitoring Report, ‘Key developments in EU electricity wholesale markets’, 20 March 2024.
    (23) ACER 2024 Monitoring Report, ‘Electricity Infrastructure development to support a competitive and sustainable energy system’, 16 December 2024, p. 17.
    (24) ibid.
    (25) Directive (EU) 2019/944 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2019 on common rules for the internal market for electricity and amending Directive 2012/27/EU (OJ L 158, 14.6.2019, p. 125, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2019/944/oj).
    (26) EU DSO Entity, ‘DSO Entity’s identified good practices on Distribution Network Development Plans’, 1 July 2024.
    (27) ACER 2024 Monitoring Report, ‘Electricity Infrastructure development to support a competitive and sustainable energy system’, 16 December 2024.
    (28) Commission communication of 28 November 2023 entitled ‘Grids, the missing link – An EU Action Plan for Grids’ (COM(2023)0757).
    (29) Council Regulation (EU) 2022/2577 of 22 December 2022 laying down a framework to accelerate the deployment of renewable energy (OJ L 335, 29.12.2022, p. 36, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2577/oj).
    (30) Directive 2011/92/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment (OJ L 26, 28.1.2012, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2011/92/oj).
    (31) TAIEX is the Technical Assistance and Information Exchange instrument of the Commission. It supports public administrations with regard to the transposition, implementation and enforcement of EU legislation as well as facilitating the sharing of EU best practices.
    (32) Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC (OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, p. 65, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2014/24/oj).
    (33) Regulation (EU) 2024/1735 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 on establishing a framework of measures for strengthening Europe’s net-zero technology manufacturing ecosystem and amending Regulation (EU) 2018/1724 (OJ L, 2024/1735, 28.6.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1735/oj).
    (34) ACER 2024 Monitoring Report, ‘Electricity Infrastructure development to support a competitive and sustainable energy system’, 16 December 2024, p. 30.
    (35) Commission communication of 28 November 2023 entitled ‘Grids, the missing link – An EU Action Plan for Grids’ (COM(2023)0757).
    (36) ACER 2024 Monitoring Report, ‘Electricity Infrastructure development to support a competitive and sustainable energy system’, op. cit.
    (37) EU DSO Entity, ‘Implementation of Action 7 in the EU Action Plan for Grids: DSO/TSO Technopedia, ENTSO-E & DSO Entity’, 18 December 2024.
    (38) Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union, amending Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 and Directive (EU) 2018/1972, and repealing Directive (EU) 2016/1148 (NIS 2 Directive) (OJ L 333, 27.12.2022, p. 80, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2022/2555/oj).
    (39) Regulation (EU) 2019/881 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on ENISA (the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity) and on information and communications technology cybersecurity certification and repealing Regulation (EU) No 526/2013 (Cybersecurity Act) (OJ L 151, 7.6.2019, p. 15, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2019/881/oj).
    (40) European Commission: Directorate-General for Energy, Fraunhofer Institute for Systems and Innovation Research ISI, Guidehouse, McKinsey & Company, TNO, Trinomics, Utrecht University, Berkhout, V., Villeviere, C., Bergsträßer, J., Klobasa, M., Regeczi, D., Dognini, A., Singh, M., Stornebrink, M., Hülsewig, T., Seigeot, V., Lenzmann, F.Breitschopf, B., Common European Energy Data Space, Publications Office of the European Union, 2023.
    (41) International Energy Agency, ‘Building the Future Transmission Grid – Strategies to navigate supply chain challenges’, February 2025, https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/a688d0f5-a100-447f-91a1-50b7b0d8eaa1/BuildingtheFutureTransmissionGrid.pdf.
    (42) KU Leuven, Eurometaux, ‘Study quantifies metal supplies needed to reach EU’s climate neutrality goal’, 25 April 2022, https://www.eurometaux.eu/media/hxdhepyp/press-release-study-quantifies-metal-supplies-needed-to-reach-eu-s-climate-neutrality-goal.pdf.
    (43) Regulation (EU) 2024/1252 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 establishing a framework for ensuring a secure and sustainable supply of critical raw materials and amending Regulations (EU) No 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, (EU) 2018/1724 and (EU) 2019/1020 (OJ L, 2024/1252, 3.5.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1252/oj).
    (44) Commission communication of 5 March 2025 entitled ‘The Union of Skills’ (COM(2025)0090).

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – Dissolution of political parties and the crackdown on the opposition in Mali – P10_TA(2025)0134 – Thursday, 19 June 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to Rules 150(5) and 136(4) of its Rules of Procedure,

    A.  whereas the military has ruled Mali since the 2020 coup that installed General Assimi Goïta as transitional president, and the repeatedly promised elections have not taken place;

    B.  whereas on 13 May 2025, the military authorities dissolved political parties and organisations and repealed laws protecting political participation, sparking domestic protests and international concern over the consolidation of authoritarian rule and repression and criminalisation of the opposition and protesters;

    C.  whereas recent abductions and arrests of opposition members have added to the enforced disappearances dating back to at least 2021, and the military junta has intensified its repression of the political opposition and civil liberties;

    D.  whereas on 11 June 2025, the Malian Council of Ministers adopted a bill authorising a five-year renewable mandate for the transitional president without election;

    E.  whereas the EU continues to support civil society and provide humanitarian aid in Mali;

    F.  whereas al-Qaeda-affiliated Islamist terrorist groups have been killing civilians, including Christians and people from other religious minorities;

    G.  whereas the EU and several Member States have deployed troops who have lost their lives fighting jihadism at the request of the former Malian authorities, including 58 French soldiers, 2 Dutch soldiers and 1 Portuguese soldier;

    H.  whereas Mali is negatively affected by Russian disinformation;

    1.  Expresses deep concern about the alarming political and security situation in Mali; strongly condemns the dissolution of political parties and organisations and the crackdown on the opposition;

    2.  Criticises the Malian authorities’ intensified actions undermining democracy, human rights, freedom of expression and association, and peaceful assembly;

    3.  Urges the Malian authorities to respect international human rights law and Mali’s signed commitments on political and civil rights;

    4.  Recalls the transitional president’s instruction to his cabinet in November 2024 to create conditions for transparent and peaceful elections as soon as possible;

    5.  Urges the authorities to immediately release those arrested or abducted for political reasons, permanently end repression and intimidation, guarantee the safety of opposition members, activists and civil society actors, and ensure peace and stability in Mali;

    6.  Notes with regret that Mali is still plagued by violence and Islamist terrorism; recalls that Russian-sponsored mercenaries have failed to bring stability; calls for ensuring accountability for rights violations and abuses, including war crimes committed by the Wagner Group/Africa Corps against the Malian people;

    7.  Encourages closer cooperation between the EU, the EUSR for the Sahel, ECOWAS and the African Union in promoting stability and human rights in Mali;

    8.  Expresses serious concern over the growing illegal migration flows from Mali towards Europe, fuelled by growing insecurity, political instability and economic stagnation; calls on the Malian authorities to take full responsibility for preventing uncontrolled departures and urges the EU to strengthen return policies and cooperation on migration control with Mali and transit countries;

    9.  Underlines the EU’s clear support for restoring multi-party democracy, providing assistance to civil society and democratic actors and ensuring that human rights are the main priority for EU support under the renewed approach to the Sahel region;

    10.  Calls on the VP/HR and the Member States to raise with the Malian authorities the urgent need to restore democratic order and protect human rights;

    11.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the VP/HR, Mali’s transitional president, the Malian National Assembly, the African Union and ECOWAS.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • What is NATO’s new 5% defence spending target?

    Source: Government of India

    Source: Government of India (4)

    NATO leaders are expected to endorse a big new defence spending target at an alliance summit in The Hague on Wednesday, as demanded by U.S. President Donald Trump.

    Here are some key questions and answers about the new target.

    WHAT ARE NATO LEADERS EXPECTED TO APPROVE?

    They are expected to agree that NATO members should spend 5% of their economic output – or Gross Domestic Product (GDP) – on core defence and broader defence and security-related investments.

    That’s a hefty increase on the current goal of 2%, which was approved at an alliance summit in Wales in 2014. But the new target will be measured differently.

    NATO members will be expected to spend 3.5% of their GDP on core defence such as troops and weapons – the items currently covered by the old 2% target.

    They will also be expected to spend a further 1.5% of GDP on broader defence and security-related investments – such as adapting roads, bridges and ports for use by military vehicles, and on cyber-security and protecting energy pipelines.

    HOW BIG A LEAP WILL THIS BE FOR NATO COUNTRIES?

    Very big for a lot of them.

    Twenty-two of NATO’s 32 member countries spent 2% of GDP or more on defence last year.

    As a whole, alliance members spent 2.61% of NATO GDP on defence last year, according to a NATO estimate. But that number masks big differences in spending among members.

    Poland, for example, spent more than 4% of its GDP on defence, making it the biggest spender. At the other end of the spectrum, Spain spent less than 1.3%.

    WHEN ARE NATO COUNTRIES EXPECTED TO HIT THE TARGET?

    They will be expected to meet the target by 2035. The targets could also be adjusted when they are reviewed in 2029.

    HOW MUCH MORE CASH ARE WE ACTUALLY TALKING ABOUT?

    It’s hard to say exactly how much extra cash NATO members would have to spend, not least because it will depend on the size of their economies for years to come.

    Also, NATO does not currently measure spending on the new broader category of defence and security-related investments – so there is no baseline measurement to go by.

    But NATO countries spent over $1.3 trillion on core defence in 2024, up from about a trillion a decade earlier in constant 2021 prices. If NATO states had all spent 3.5% of GDP on defence last year, that would have amounted to some $1.75 trillion.

    So, hitting the new targets could eventually mean spending hundreds of billions of dollars more per year, compared with current spending.

    WHY ARE NATO COUNTRIES INCREASING SPENDING NOW?

    Russia’s continued war in Ukraine, concerns about a possible future threat from Russia, and U.S. pressure have led many European capitals to boost investment in defence and plan to increase it even further over the coming years.

    “Russia could be ready to use military force against NATO within five years,” NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte said earlier this month.

    Europe is also preparing for the possibility that the U.S. under President Donald Trump will decide to withdraw some of its troops and capabilities from Europe.

    “America can’t be everywhere all the time, nor should we be,” U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth said earlier this month.

    WHAT WILL THE NEW MONEY BE SPENT ON?

    NATO this month agreed on new capability targets for its members – the types of troops, military units, weapons and equipment that NATO says they should possess to defend themselves and the alliance.

    Those targets are classified but Rutte said after they were approved that the alliance needed to invest more in areas including “air defence, fighter jets, tanks, drones, personnel, logistics and so much more”.

    IS EVERYONE ON BOARD?

    Not quite. Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez says his country can meet its military capability targets by spending just 2.1% of GDP.

    His government approved the draft summit statement with the new spending target but made clear it does not intend to spend that much. NATO officials say Sanchez does not have an opt-out – Spain’s spending will be tracked and if it’s not investing enough to meet the military targets, it will need to improve.

    Some countries that have signed up to the targets may also not meet them, diplomats and analysts expect. But publicly, they have insisted they are committed.

    WHERE WILL THE MONEY COME FROM?

    Every NATO country will decide on its own where to find the cash to invest more in defence and how to allocate it.

    The European Union has moved to try to make it easier for capitals to spend on defence.

    The EU is allowing members to raise defence spending by 1.5% of GDP each year for four years without any disciplinary steps that would normally kick in once a national deficit is above 3% of GDP.

    EU ministers last month also approved the creation of a 150-billion-euro arms fund using joint EU borrowing to give loans to European countries for joint defence projects.

    Some European countries are pushing for EU joint borrowing to fund grants – rather than loans – for defence spending. But they have met resistance from fiscally conservative countries including Germany and The Netherlands.

    HOW DOES THE NATO TARGET COMPARE TO OTHER COUNTRIES’ DEFENCE SPENDING?

    NATO allies dedicate a much smaller share of their economic output to defence than Russia but, taken together, they spend significantly more cash than Moscow.

    Russia’s military spending rose by 38% in 2024, reaching an estimated $149 billion and 7.1% of GDP, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

    China, the world’s second-largest military spender, dedicated an estimated 1.7% of GDP to military expenditure last year, according to SIPRI.

    HOW DOES DEFENCE SPENDING COMPARE TO GOVERNMENT SPENDING IN OTHER AREAS?

    In NATO countries, defence tends to make up a small portion of national budgets.

    Military spending accounted for 3.2% of government spending in Italy, 3.6% in France and 8.5% in Poland in 2023, according to SIPRI data. In Russia that year, military expenditure made up nearly 19% of government spending.

    (Reuters)

  • MIL-OSI Economics: ICC Dispute Resolution Statistics: 2024

    Source: International Chamber of Commerce

    Headline: ICC Dispute Resolution Statistics: 2024

    2024 key statistics 

    +29000

    arbitrations since 1923

    2392

    parties

    136

    jurisdictions

    US$354billion

    in total caseload value, marking the highest ever total value of cases pending at year end. 

    831

    new arbitration cases under ICC Arbitration Rules, with 1,789 arbitration cases pending at year end 

    577

    draft awards approved in 11 languages

    The full 2024 statistical report reflects ICC’s standing as the preferred institution for international commercial and investment dispute resolution. 

    The amount in dispute in cases registered in 2024 varied from just below US$10,000 to US$53 billion, with over a third of the cases not exceeding US$3 million.

    Alexander G. Fessas, Secretary General of the ICC International Court of Arbitration and Director of ICC Dispute Resolution services said:

    “ICC Arbitration remains a preferred dispute resolution method globally, attracting high-value, high-impact disputes as well as lower-value disputes. The 2024 statistical report reflects the trust placed in our services, from businesses and states in need of fair, efficient and forward-looking dispute resolution.” 

    Distribution of parties by region

    Place of arbitration 

    ICC arbitrations were seated in 107 cities across 62 countries or independent territories.

    Representation of arbitrators 

    In addition to a wide geographic reach, diversity and inclusion are at the core of our service. 

    1,427 confirmations/ appointments of 1,020 arbitrators from 91 jurisdictions

    In 2024, 577 draft awards were approved in Spanish, French, Portuguese, German, Arabic, Italian, Romanian, Bulgarian, Turkish. and bilingually in Chinese/English, demonstrating the adaptability of ICC Dispute Resolution Services in tailoring arbitration services to assist businesses and state entities worldwide.

    Sectors and industries 

    Cases filed in 2024 covered a wide range of sectors. Top 10 sectors included construction/ engineering; energy; transportation; financing and insurance; telecoms and specialised technologies; health, pharmaceuticals and cosmetics; business services; general trade and distribution; leisure and entertainment and industrial equipment and services. 

    Mediation and other forms of amicable dispute settlement 

    The ICC International Centre for ADR administered 61 new cases in 2024 across its range of services which include mediation, expert proceedings, dispute boards and DOCDEX cases relating to trade finance instruments.  

    37

    requests for mediation 

    93

    parties

    33

    countries

    Expert proceedings accounted for 20 new filings, with the majority of proceedings from the construction and energy sectors. Parties and neutrals represented a broad geographic span including Africa, the Middle East, the Americas, and Asia-Pacific, reflecting the continuing adoption globally of ICC’s ADR services. 

    For an ICC DRS data overview, download our one-pager in English, Arabic, Chinese, French, Portuguese and Spanish. 

    Access statistical reports from previous years via the ICC Dispute Resolution Library.  

    MIL OSI Economics

  • MIL-OSI Africa: APO Group Launches WhatsApp Distribution to Expand Real-Time Media Reach Across Africa

    Source: Africa Press Organisation – English (2) – Report:

    APO Group (www.APO-opa.com), the leading, award-winning, pan-African communications consultancy and press release distribution service, has introduced WhatsApp into its growing distribution ecosystem. By leveraging Africa’s most widely used messaging app, APO Group is enhancing the speed, reach, and accessibility of reliable news. The newly launched Africa Newsroom WhatsApp channels provide a streamlined way for media practitioners to browse, share, and publish press releases. APO Group’s WhatsApp distribution now operates similarly to the company’s Telegram channels, offering news in English, French, Arabic, and Portuguese to accommodate Africa’s diverse languages and regional needs.

    With an estimated 200 million users across Africa—including 90–100 million in Nigeria, 28–29 million in South Africa, and 20–21 million in Ghana—WhatsApp stands as a vital communication tool. APO Group’s strategic move bridges the gap between PR professionals, journalists, and digital content creators, responding to the continent’s evolving media consumption habits.

    Bas Wijne, CEO of APO Group, commented: “At APO Group, we don’t just share Africa’s stories—we power them with purpose and precision. Integrating WhatsApp into our distribution network is more than innovation; it’s a commitment to making African voices more immediate, more accessible, and more impactful than ever before. This is how we honour the continent we serve—by meeting its people where they are, and delivering news that matters, faster and farther.”

    Following the success of its Telegram rollout, APO Group continues to adapt its PR services to meet the demands of a fast-paced, digital-first media environment. “This is more than distribution—it’s about empowerment, accessibility, and real-time storytelling,” Wijne added.

    By equipping clients and news professionals with the tools to communicate more effectively, APO Group is helping close the media gap and strengthen African narratives. With the Africa Newsroom platform, Telegram integration, and now WhatsApp, the company is reshaping the future of public relations across the continent and ensuring Africa’s voice resonates globally.

    – on behalf of APO Group.

    About APO Group:  
    Founded in 2007, APO Group (www.APO-opa.com) is the leading award-winning pan-African communications consultancy and press release distribution service. Renowned for our deep-rooted African expertise and expansive global perspective, we specialise in elevating the reputation and brand equity of private and public organisations across Africa. As a trusted partner, our mission is to harness the power of media, crafting bespoke strategies that drive tangible, measurable impact both on the continent and globally.    

    Our commitment to excellence and innovation has been recognised with multiple prestigious awards, including a PRovoke Media Global SABRE Award and multiple PRovoke Media Africa SABRE Awards. In 2023, we were named the Leading Public Relations Firm Africa and the Leading Pan-African Communications Consultancy Africa in the World Business Outlook Awards, and the Best Public Relations and Media Consultancy of the Year South Africa in 2024 in the same awards. In 2025, Brands Review Magazine acknowledged us as the Leading Communications Consultancy in Africa for the second consecutive year. They also named us the Best PR Agency and the Leading Press Release Distribution Platform in Africa in 2024. Additionally, in 2025, we were honoured with the Gold distinction for Best PR Campaign and Bronze in the Special Event category at the Davos Communications Awards.  

    APO Group’s esteemed clientele, which includes global giants such as Canon, Nestlé, Western Union, the UNDP, Network International, African Energy Chamber, Mercy Ships, Marriott, Africa’s Business Heroes, and Liquid Intelligent Technologies, reflects our unparalleled ability to navigate the complex African media landscape. With a multicultural team across Africa, we offer unmatched, truly pan-African insights, expertise, and reach across the continent. APO Group is dedicated to reshaping narratives about Africa, challenging stereotypes, and bringing inspiring African stories to global audiences, with our expertise in developing and supporting public relations campaigns worldwide uniquely positioning us to amplify brand messaging, enhance reputations, and connect effectively with target audiences.

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    MIL OSI Africa

  • Atletico exit Club World Cup despite Griezmann strike sealing win over Botafogo

    Source: Government of India

    Source: Government of India (4)

    A late strike from Antoine Griezmann handed Atletico Madrid a 1-0 win over Botafogo on Monday but the victory could not save the LaLiga side from a group stage exit at the Club World Cup.

    Following Paris St Germain’s 2-0 over Seattle Sounders in Monday’s other Group B game, the French side finished level on six points with Botafogo and Atletico.

    However, PSG secured top spot thanks to a superior goal difference, with Brazilian side Botafogo also advancing to the last 16 after finishing second.

    Atletico, in third, and Seattle, bottom with no points after three games, were eliminated.

    PSG will face the Group A runners-up on Sunday, while Botafogo will take on the Group A winners on Saturday.

    Even though they were aware that a two-goal defeat would secure them a place in the next round, Botafogo’s Igor Jesus and Jefferson Savarino forced Atletico keeper Jan Oblak to make a couple of brilliant saves.

    Following their shock 1-0 win over Champions League winners PSG, Botafogo defended their ground fairly well throughout a cagey encounter, with Atletico dominating possession but rarely presenting a real threat to goalkeeper John.

    However, tempers spilled over when Atletico appealed for a penalty after Botafogo’s Gregory appeared to step on Julian Alvarez’s foot inside the box.

    Following a VAR review, referee Cesar Ramos ruled out the penalty due to an earlier foul by Atletico’s Alexander Sorloth in the build-up.

    The decision left Atletico manager Diego Simeone furious, with the Argentine storming onto the pitch at halftime to confront the Mexican official.

    As Atletico made a late run desperately looking for the three goals they needed, substitute Griezmann fired the winner in the 87th minute from inside the box, a bittersweet goal that denied Botafogo a top-placed finish in the group and handing PSG that accolade.

    (Reuters)

  • MIL-OSI China: Chinese films score major wins at Golden Goblet Awards

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    The 27th Shanghai International Film Festival (SIFF) wrapped up Saturday with the Golden Goblet Awards, where the Kyrgyzstani film “Black Red Yellow” won best feature and three Chinese films took top honors in the main competition.

    Director Aktan Arym Kubat (center) accepts the best feature film award for “Black Red Yellow” at the Golden Goblet Awards ceremony in Shanghai, June 21, 2025. [Photo courtesy of SIFF Organizing Committee]

    “Black Red Yellow,” directed by Aktan Arym Kubat, follows a master weaver’s forbidden romance with a horse herder, which ends in silent separation and an unfinished carpet — until its unveiling years later stirs old memories.

    “This is a glorious moment for Kyrgyz cinema,” Kubat said in his acceptance speech. He said carpets are an inseparable part of traditional culture and daily life in Kyrgyzstan and noted that the award also marks the birth of his grandson. “Black Red Yellow” was the festival’s closing film.

    Chinese filmmaker Cao Baoping won best director for the comedy crime drama “One Wacky Summer,” a decade after earning the same honor for “The Dead End” at SIFF. Cao said the new film, with its dark humor, is sharper, funnier and more down-to-earth than his previous works.

    Chinese filmmaker Cao Baoping holds his best director trophy for the comedy crime drama “One Wacky Summer” at the Golden Goblet Awards ceremony in Shanghai, June 21, 2025. [Photo courtesy of SIFF Organizing Committee]

    The film continues the lighter, comic direction Cao first explored with his 2006 debut, “Trouble Makers.” Set in Tianjin at the turn of the century, “One Wacky Summer” follows a small-time thug who, trapped in debt, impulsively kidnaps his nephew in a failed extortion plot, sparking family feuds and criminal chaos.

    Cao thanked SIFF for recognizing his work for the second time in 10 years, saying it “shows the festival’s encouragement for artistic persistence, as well as its diversity and inclusiveness.”

    Wan Qian won best actress for her role as a desperate killer posing as a caregiver in Wang Tong’s “Wild Nights, Tamed Beasts.” The film weaves together themes of elder care, love and crime, delivering a stark examination of human nature and morality.

    Wan Qian accepts the best actress award for “Wild Nights, Tamed Beasts” at the Golden Goblet Awards ceremony in Shanghai, June 21, 2025. [Photo courtesy of SIFF Organizing Committee]

    “Turns out there really is a dawn after the wild night,” Wan said on stage. “I’m deeply grateful to the team behind ‘Wild Nights, Tamed Beasts.’ Your professionalism made the film remarkable. As we emerge from the long night and the light shines on us, I hope it’s not just me who is seen, but everyone behind me — because they are the ones truly holding up this trophy.”

    “Wild Nights, Tamed Beasts” also won the jury grand prix, an award it shared with the Japanese film “On Summer Sand” by Shinya Tamada.

    Director Qiu Sheng (center) holds the outstanding artistic achievement award for “My Father’s Son” at the Golden Goblet Awards ceremony in Shanghai, June 21, 2025. [Photo courtesy of SIFF Organizing Committee]

    “My Father’s Son,” a co-production between China and France, received the outstanding artistic achievement award. Director Qiu Sheng said the film is a tribute to his late father, who died in 2005.

    Additional major awards went to Portuguese actor Jose Martins, who won best actor for “The Scent of Things Remembered.” Korek Bojanowski and Katia Priwieziencew received best screenplay for the Polish film “Loss of Balance,” and Markus Nestroy was awarded best cinematography for “You Believe in Angels, Mr. Drowak?”

    Director Bian Zhuo jumps as he and producer Zhang Jie receive the Asian New Talent best feature film award for “As the Water Flows” at the Golden Goblet Awards in Shanghai, June 21, 2025. [Photo courtesy of SIFF Organizing Committee]

    In the Asian New Talent section, “As the Water Flows” by Bian Zhuo won best feature film, while Liryc Dela Cruz of the Philippines took best director for “Where the Night Stands Still.” Best actor went to Chinese actor Shi Pengyuan for “Water Can Go Anywhere” while Indian actress Meenakshi Jayan won best actress for “Victoria.” Prabath Roshan earned best cinematography for Sri Lanka’s “Riverstone,” with Lalith Rathnayake and Nilantha Perera sharing best scriptwriter.

    In other sections, the Spanish film “Constanza” won best documentary, while “The Songbirds’ Secret,” a France-Switzerland-Belgium co-production, took best animation. The Chinese film “Crow” won best live-action short, and the Russian-Kazakh film “Son” was named best animated short.

    This year’s Golden Goblet Awards received a record 3,900 submissions from 119 countries and regions. The main jury was chaired by Italian director Giuseppe Tornatore, best known for “Cinema Paradiso.”

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-Evening Report: The war won’t end Iran’s nuclear program – it will drive it underground, following North Korea’s model

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Anthony Burke, Professor of Environmental Politics & International Relations, UNSW Sydney

    The United States’ and Israel’s strikes on Iran are concerning, and not just for the questionable legal justifications provided by both governments.

    Even if their attacks cause severe damage to Iran’s nuclear facilities, this will only harden Iran’s resolve to acquire a bomb.

    And if Iran follows through on its threat to pull out of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), this will gravely damage the global nuclear nonproliferation regime.

    In a decade of international security crises, this could be the most serious. Is there still time to prevent this from happening?

    A successful but vulnerable treaty

    In May 2015, I attended the five-yearly review conference of the NPT. Delegates debated a draft outcome for weeks, and then, not for the first time, went home with nothing. Delegates from the US, United Kingdom and Canada blocked the final outcome to prevent words being added that would call for Israel to attend a disarmament conference.

    Russia did the same in 2022 in protest at language on its illegal occupation of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power station in Ukraine.

    Now, in the latest challenge to the NPT, Israel and the US have bombed Iran’s nuclear complexes to ostensibly enforce a treaty neither one respects.

    When the treaty was adopted in 1968, it allowed the five nuclear-armed states at the time – the US, Soviet Union, France, UK and China – to join if they committed not to pass weapons or material to other states, and to disarm themselves.

    All other members had to pledge never to acquire nuclear weapons. Newer nuclear powers were not permitted to join unless they gave up their weapons.

    Israel declined to join, as it had developed its own undeclared nuclear arsenal by the late 1960s. India, Pakistan and South Sudan have also never signed; North Korea was a member but withdrew in 2003. Only South Sudan does not have nuclear weapons today.

    To make the obligations enforceable and strengthen safeguards against the diversion of nuclear material to non-nuclear weapons states, members were later required to sign the IAEA Additional Protocol. This gave the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) wide powers to inspect a state’s nuclear facilities and detect violations.

    It was the IAEA that first blew the whistle on Iran’s concerning uranium enrichment activity in 2003. Just before Israel’s attacks this month, the organisation also reported Iran was in breach of its obligations under the NPT for the first time in two decades.

    The NPT is arguably the world’s most universal, important and successful security treaty, but it is also paradoxically vulnerable.

    The treaty’s underlying consensus has been damaged by the failure of the five nuclear-weapon states to disarm as required, and by the failure to prevent North Korea from developing a now formidable nuclear arsenal.

    North Korea withdrew from the treaty in 2003, tested a weapon in 2006, and now may have up to 50 warheads.

    Iran could be next.

    How things can deteriorate from here

    Iran argues Israel’s attacks have undermined the credibility of the IAEA, given Israel used the IAEA’s new report on Iran as a pretext for its strikes, taking the matter out of the hands of the UN Security Council.

    For its part, the IAEA has maintained a principled position and criticised both the US and Israeli strikes.

    Iran has retaliated with its own missile strikes against both Israel and a US base in Qatar. In addition, it wasted no time announcing it would withdraw from the NPT.

    On June 23, an Iranian parliament committee also approved a bill that would fully suspend Iran’s cooperation with the IAEA, including allowing inspections and submitting reports to the organisation.

    Iran’s envoy to the IAEA, Reza Najafi, said the US strikes:

    […] delivered a fundamental and irreparable blow to the international non-proliferation regime conclusively demonstrating that the existing NPT framework has been rendered ineffective.

    Even if Israel and the US consider their bombing campaign successful, it has almost certainly renewed the Iranians’ resolve to build a weapon. The strikes may only delay an Iranian bomb by a few years.

    Iran will have two paths to do so. The slower path would be to reconstitute its enrichment activity and obtain nuclear implosion designs, which create extremely devastating weapons, from Russia or North Korea.

    Alternatively, Russia could send Iran some of its weapons. This should be a real concern given Moscow’s cascade of withdrawals from critical arms control agreements over the last decade.

    An Iranian bomb could then trigger NPT withdrawals by other regional states, especially Saudi Arabia, who suddenly face a new threat to their security.

    Why Iran might now pursue a bomb

    Iran’s support for Hamas, Hezbollah and Syria’s Assad regime certainly shows it is a dangerous international actor. Iranian leaders have also long used alarming rhetoric about Israel’s destruction.

    However repugnant the words, Israeli and US conservatives have misjudged Iran’s motives in seeking nuclear weapons.

    Israel fears an Iranian bomb would be an existential threat to its survival, given Iran’s promises to destroy it. But this neglects the fact that Israel already possesses a potent (if undeclared) nuclear deterrent capability.

    Israeli anxieties about an Iranian bomb should not be dismissed. But other analysts (myself included) see Iran’s desire for nuclear weapons capability more as a way to establish deterrence to prevent future military attacks from Israel and the US to protect their regime.

    Iranians were shaken by Iraq’s invasion in 1980 and then again by the US-led removal of Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein in 2003. This war with Israel and the US will shake them even more.

    Last week, I felt that if the Israeli bombing ceased, a new diplomatic effort to bring Iran into compliance with the IAEA and persuade it to abandon its program might have a chance.

    However, the US strikes may have buried that possibility for decades. And by then, the damage to the nonproliferation regime could be irreversible.

    Anthony Burke received funding from the UK’s Economic and Social Research Council for a project on global nuclear governance (2014–17).

    ref. The war won’t end Iran’s nuclear program – it will drive it underground, following North Korea’s model – https://theconversation.com/the-war-wont-end-irans-nuclear-program-it-will-drive-it-underground-following-north-koreas-model-259281

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-OSI China: Britain unveils 10-year industrial strategy to cut energy costs, support key sectors

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    The British government on Monday unveiled a comprehensive 10-year Industrial Strategy designed to tackle long-standing structural challenges facing British industry, including high energy costs and lengthy delays in electricity grid connections.

    The plan also outlines targeted support for eight high-growth sectors, including advanced manufacturing, clean energy, and digital technology.

    A major component of the strategy is the British Industrial Competitiveness Scheme, which aims to reduce electricity bills by up to 25 percent for more than 7,000 energy-intensive businesses – including those in the steel and chemicals sectors – starting in 2027. These savings will come from removing several existing charges on electricity bills that currently fund renewable energy generation and backup supply systems.

    Complementing this initiative, the British Industry Supercharger program will expand support for approximately 500 companies in sectors such as ceramics, glass, and aluminum. These firms currently receive a 60 percent discount on electricity network charges, which will increase to 90 percent from 2026, a move expected to lower operating costs and enhance global competitiveness.

    To address persistent delays in connecting to the electricity grid, the government plans to launch a Connections Accelerator Service by the end of 2025. The service will work in coordination with energy providers, devolved governments, and local authorities to expedite grid access for major investment projects.

    British Prime Minister Keir Starmer hailed the strategy as “a turning point for Britain’s economy and a clear break from the short-termism and sticking plasters of the past.”

    Chancellor of the Exchequer Rachel Reeves emphasized the plan’s investment-friendly approach, noting that it would ease business energy costs, unlock funding for advanced technologies, and support job creation. “It will boost our economy and create jobs that put more money in people’s pockets,” she said.

    The government stressed that the reforms would not lead to higher taxes or household energy bills. Instead, they will be financed through adjustments to the national energy system and increased revenues from carbon pricing.

    Beyond energy reforms, the strategy includes sector-specific support for eight high-potential industries: advanced manufacturing, clean energy, creative industries, defense, digital and technologies, financial services, life sciences, and professional and business services. Each sector will receive tailored policy frameworks and funding packages over the next decade.

    While industry representatives have broadly welcomed the announcement, some experts and business leaders have voiced reservations. Critics argue that although the electricity price reforms may enhance competitiveness, they are unlikely to fully close the gap with lower industrial power costs in countries like France and Germany. Britain’s electricity prices remain closely linked to wholesale gas markets, which still account for a larger share of Britain’s energy mix than in many European countries.

    Others questioned the government’s ability to follow through on its long-term commitments, citing past inconsistencies in industrial policy. Several industry voices also called for faster implementation amid intensifying global competition for green investment.

    The government said detailed action plans for each sector will be published in phases over the coming months. 

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-OSI Security: Defense News: U.S. Army Garrison Italy remembers longtime auto skills mechanic

    Source: United States Army

    VICENZA, Italy – The military communities of U.S. Army Garrison Italy, including Vicenza and Camp Darby, are mourning the loss of Gene Willie Strahan Jr., a devoted automotive mechanic, beloved colleague and cherished friend.

    Strahan knew cars—especially BMWs, his favorite. Friends described him as a gentle giant who loved car shows, fishing and spending time with his tiny dog, Thor.

    A U.S. Army veteran, Strahan served in Germany in the 1980s. As a civilian, he began working in Mannheim, Germany. He later moved to Camp Darby, where he worked as a contractor and later at the post exchange. Many remember him from his time at Camp Darby’s Auto Skills Center. Following downsizing there, Strahan relocated to Vicenza, where he worked at the Auto Skills Center, part of the Directorate of Family and Morale, Welfare and Recreation.

    Strahan’s love of cars translated to a sincere dedication to community members who sought his help. He offered mechanical expertise to soldiers and civilians at Caserma Ederle with humility and genuine warmth. A few minutes in the shop with Strahan often felt more like catching up with an old friend than speaking with a mechanic.

    Over the years, Strahan earned several awards for his work. But his joy came from engaging with the community and making connections that lasted.

    News of his June 10 passing sparked an outpouring of online condolences from Americans and Italians in Vicenza and Camp Darby, as well as friends around the world who remembered his kindness during their time in Italy.

    Jimmy Roddy, DFMWR’s Business Recreation Division chief, first met Strahan 24 years ago at Camp Darby. There, Strahan helped organize the summer car show and became known for offering help to anyone with automotive issues.

    “A big guy, big smile with a bigger heart—always helpful,” Roddy said. “He was very low-key, for as big as he was. He was a gentle giant.”

    Nicknamed “The Frenchman” by fishing buddies, Strahan was born on Dec. 7, 1963 in France into a military family. He grew up around Army bases, to include time in Germany.

    Timothy Gordon, a friend from the Camp Darby days, recalled spending long hours fishing Italian rivers with him—a tradition that continued after both relocated to Vicenza. Another shared passion was cars.

    “If you asked him about a BMW, he could tell you about it from top to bottom,” Gordon said.

    In Vicenza, Strahan was often seen with Thor, a canine companion that went with him nearly everywhere.

    “The smallest dog you could imagine with the biggest man you could ever imagine,” Gordon said. “People would just watch them walk down the road. He just loved small dogs.”

    Strahan also befriended Soldiers, including Spc. Haron Palomo, a volunteer at the Auto Skills Center. Over the past two years, they joked, shared stories and discussed car repairs while Palomo restored a 1993 Honda Civic. As he did with other customers, Strahan offered tips on finding affordable parts.

    “Sadly, he didn’t get to see it finished,” Palomo said.

    Strahan is survived by his mother, daughter, sister and brothers, including Michael Strahan, a television host and former professional football player.

    A memorial service will be held at noon on June 25 at Caserma Ederle’s Chapel. A second service is scheduled for noon on June 26 at Camp Darby’s chapel.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI USA: Governor Kehoe Announces Appointments to St. Louis City Board of Police Commissioners

    Source: US State of Missouri

    JUNE 23, 2025

     — Today, at a press conference in St. Louis, Governor Mike Kehoe announced his appointments to the citizen-led St. Louis City Board of Police Commissioners. The board, established by the passage of landmark public safety legislation in House Bill (HB) 495, is charged to be the governing body of the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department (SLMPD).

    “This board represents a renewed commitment to public trust and local oversight,” said Governor Kehoe. “By bringing together respected voices from across the city who support the men and women of the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department, we are ensuring that public safety efforts reflect the needs, values, and concerns of the people of St. Louis and the department. These appointments mark a significant move toward transparency, collaboration, and a safer future for the city.”

    The six-member board includes the St. Louis City Mayor Cara Spencer, who will participate with full voting authority, four governor-appointed voting members who are residents of the city, and one governor-appointed non-voting commissioner who either resides or owns property in the city.

    Governor Kehoe’s appointments include the following individuals:

    • Brad Arteaga is a successful entrepreneur in St. Louis City, serving as the president and owner of Arteaga Photos Ltd., BAKM LLC., and Arteaga LLC. In addition to his proven track record of managing and growing successful businesses, Arteaga has decades of active leadership and service on multiple civic and community boards including the St. Louis City Judicial Committee, Dismas House of St. Louis, Friends of Frances Park, and more. Arteaga will serve a one-year term as a voting member of the board.
    • Donald “Don” Brown is lifelong St. Louis resident and experienced automotive executive, currently serving as the Dealer Operator of Don Brown Chevrolet. With a career spanning more than four decades, Brown has held leadership roles across multiple dealerships and has been deeply involved in the community through various boards including the 3rd Police District Business Association, the Better Business Bureau, and the Friends of Kids Board of Directors. Brown will serve a four-year term as the non-voting member of the board.
    • Sonya Jenkins-Gray is a nationally recognized human resources executive with more than two decades of leadership experience in both the public and private sectors. She previously served as the director of human resources for the City of St. Louis, overseeing HR operations for more than 5,000 employees. She also previously served on the board of Mound City Bar Foundation and is currently the chairperson for the Progressive National Baptist Convention. Jenkins-Gray will serve a two-year term as a voting member of the board.
    • Edward McVey is a seasoned business owner and operator of Maggie O’Brien’s Restaurant and Irish Pub in St. Louis, where he has led operations since 2008. With expertise in contract negotiation, strategic planning, and team leadership, McVey has built a strong track record of business development and community engagement. He is active in local organizations including the St. Patrick’s Center and the St. Louis Boys and Girls Club. McVey will serve a three-year term as a voting member of the board.
    • Chris Saracino is the owner-operator of Bartolino’s Hospitality Group, which includes several full-service restaurants across the city. He is also the co-founder of Campbell Security and Services Group, serving households and communities throughout Missouri. Saracino has held several leadership roles with the Hill Business Association, The Hill 2000 Neighborhood Association, and the St. Louis Regional Sports Authority. He also prioritizes community service as an active member of several charitable organizations including the Kiwanis Club of St. Louis City and the Italian Open Charities. Saracino will serve a four-year term as a voting member of the board.

    The board will begin work immediately, with the assistance of Transition Director Derek Winters, to ensure an orderly and responsible implementation period, without disruption to residents of the city and commissioned and civilian personnel of the SLMPD. During the implementation period, the commissioners will work to determine the board’s policies for meetings and bylaws and begin their work in overseeing the Chief of Police and the department’s policies, contracts, assets, and budgets. The day-to-day operations of the department will remain under the leadership of the Chief of Police.

    All media inquiries related to the board may now be directed to the SLMPD, at media@slmpd.org. A webpage with headshot photos for the board is forthcoming.

    For more information on the roles and responsibilities of the St. Louis City Police Board of Commissioners, as designated in HB 495, click here.

    ###

    MIL OSI USA News