Category: housing

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Dmitry Chernyshenko: Implementation of AI will give BRICS economies about 2-3 trillion dollars by 2030

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: Government of the Russian Federation – An important disclaimer is at the bottom of this article.

    At the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation Dmitry Chernyshenko held a plenary session entitled “AI Science: A New Path to Leadership.” Leading Russian and foreign scientists discussed how AI science and innovation are shaping Russia’s new technological path to global leadership.

    At the session, the Deputy Prime Minister emphasized that the expected effect of introducing AI into the economies of the BRICS countries by 2030 will be around 2–3 trillion dollars:

    “According to various estimates, the expected effect of using AI technologies in the BRICS countries is between 2 and 3 trillion dollars. There is something to fight for – the share of advanced generative AI systems in this market is currently about 20%. Those who are the first to see the “golden” directions in the development of AI will discover a new Klondike, and if we conduct exploratory research in all areas, we will increase our chances of getting there.”

    The Deputy Prime Minister recalled that in December 2024, at the AI Journey conference, President Vladimir Putin proposed holding an international foresight in Russia – a strategic session on the future of artificial intelligence – in order to determine the directions of technology development together with scientists from around the world.

    The foresight is being implemented by the International AI Alliance Network, an organization that unites industry associations from 14 countries. The Russian part of the foresight is supervised by the Ministry of Economic Development of Russia and the Strategic Agency for Support and Formation of AI Developments (SAPFIR), a project office created on the basis of the Skolkovo Foundation, on behalf of the President of Russia.

    “In Russia, the President has set a national goal – ‘Technological Leadership’. One of the tasks is to form a new AI market for Russia. We are building a complete system – a foundation for Russia’s long-term leadership in AI science. At the same time, we understand that scientific leadership in AI is impossible without international cooperation and coordination of efforts. The future of AI should be built in cooperation, taking into account various scientific schools, cultures and approaches. For this reason, the results of the foresight are published openly, and every scientist in the world can make a contribution. The alliance plans to present the results to the UN and to Russian President Vladimir Putin at the annual AI Journey conference before November this year. This is our manifesto of openness, accessibility and trust for every member of the global AI community,” the Deputy Prime Minister said.

    Last year, Russian experts identified 10 key areas of fundamental scientific research in the field of AI. They formed the basis for discussion at this year’s international foresight. Several sessions of the scientific dialogue on the global prospects of AI have already been held in Morocco, the UAE, Serbia and China. One of the foresight iterations took place at the Sber tech hub in St. Petersburg.

    Dmitry Chernyshenko emphasized that the state’s task is to ensure the completeness of research and competencies in the field of AI. To this end, within the framework of the federal project “Artificial Intelligence”, the Ministry of Economic Development of Russia is holding a grant competition among research centers, according to the results of which 13 teams were selected.

    “Investments in research centers have already demonstrated their success and effectiveness: 13 centers provide half of Russia’s entire scientific reserve in AI,” the Deputy Prime Minister noted.

    Dmitry Chernyshenko noted that the issue of personnel with knowledge of AI is also being addressed systematically.

    “Studying the effects of AI on humans, including dependence on AI decisions, is a meaningful scientific task, where major research is ahead. We are faced with a challenge: to provide not just education, but to cultivate a new type of thinking. To this end, a strategy for the development of education is being developed in Russia, which provides for the creation of a digital environment, individual educational, upbringing, career trajectories and assistants,” the Deputy Prime Minister said.

    An important topic of the session was international foresight – a joint initiative aimed at identifying priority areas of research and development of AI at the global level. Participants also discussed current issues of artificial intelligence development, consolidation of efforts at the international level, tools for accelerating scientific progress and new forms of financing.

    The discussion was attended by Professor Ajit Abraham from India, who created a unique network of machine intelligence laboratories, uniting more than 1,000 researchers from 100 countries.

    Another participant was the CEO of the AIRI Institute of Artificial Intelligence, Ivan Oseledets, one of the leading experts in the field of machine learning, the second most cited Russian mathematician, professor at the Russian Academy of Sciences, and laureate of the Russian Presidential Prize.

    The speakers also included First Deputy Chairman of the Board of Sberbank PJSC Alexander Vedyakhin, Vice-Rector for Research at Serbia’s Singidunum University Nebojsa Bakanin, Professor at China’s Anhui University Ye Tian, Rector of Innopolis University Alexander Gasnikov, and Skoltech Professor Anhui Fan from Vietnam.

    Speakers focused on the role of fundamental science and support for research initiatives, including issues of task-oriented machine learning algorithms (narrow AI), as well as computation and data for AI, fundamental and generative models, human-machine interactions, optimization and mathematics.

    The results of the discussions at the session will form the basis of a foresight study to identify fundamental scientific problems in the field of AI.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI NGOs: Wrecking the future: The Trump war on the ocean, climate, and communities

    Source: Greenpeace Statement –

    During his first 100 days President Trump has been actively working to dismantle and weaken environmental protections and attack those who fight to protect nature and our shared climate, putting the corporate profits of his billionaire friends ahead of people and the planet. © Saf Suleyman / Greenpeace

    President Trump’s second term

    The first months of any administration are often dedicated to setting the tone of what constituents can expect for the next four years. For Trump’s second term, that message is clear: let it all burn

    Drastic agency cuts, reckless executive orders, and blatant industry giveaways promise devastating immediate and long-term consequences for our oceans, our climate, and our communities. 

    Dismantling climate defense 

    NOAA, the nation’s premier science agency for understanding, monitoring, and protecting our oceans, atmosphere, and climate, plays an essential role in safeguarding ecosystems and communities. Its data, forecasts, scientific expertise, and stewardship also support major sectors like tourism, transportation, food, and retail that rely on NOAA’s services to operate safely, efficiently, and sustainably.

    Yet the Trump Administration has moved aggressively to gut NOAA’s capacity–firing scientists, defunding critical research, and shutting down its extreme weather database, a vital tool that has tracked the financial toll of climate disasters since the 1980s. These cuts come as extreme weather events are becoming more intense and frequent. In 2024 alone, Americans faced at least $182.7 billion in damages from 27 weather and climate disasters. Undermining NOAA’s ability to forecast threats, inform the American and global public, and support disaster response endangers lives while ensuring greater loss and damage, higher costs, and deep suffering as the climate crisis accelerates.  

    Among NOAA Fisheries’ vital programs is the Seafood Import Monitoring Program (SIMP), the nation’s primary line of defense against seafood linked to fraud, forced labor, and environmental harm. With more than 80% of the seafood consumed in the U.S. imported and the global seafood supply chain riddled with these problems, SIMP plays a crucial role in ensuring the integrity of what ends up on American plates. Cuts to NOAA directly harm domestic fisheries as well, which rely on the agency to provide weather and pollution alerts

    These efforts have been further supported by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Department of Labor’s Bureau of International Labor Affairs (ILAB), whose programs help combat child labor, forced labor, and human trafficking around the world. 

    So while Americans have made it clear that they want to know where their food comes from and to trust that it is safe, ethical, and sustainable, the Trump administration is undermining the very systems that deliver these safeguards. By weakening SIMP and cancelling $500 million in ILAB grants, it is putting seafood workers at greater risk of abuse and exploitation, and exposing Americans to products tainted by these harms.

    Endangering ocean futures

    While more countries move towards a ban, moratorium, or pause on deep sea mining, the Trump Administration is charging in the opposite direction– reviving a cold war-era law, the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, to launch an unnecessary industry that threatens irreversible harm to fragile ecosystems we are only beginning to understand.

    Trump’s executive order “Unleashing America’s Offshore Critical Minerals and Resources” directs federal agencies to fast-track permits for seabed mining in both U.S. and international waters. Widely condemned as environmentally reckless and politically explosive, the move is a direct attempt to sidestep the International Seabed Authority (ISA)—the UN body charged with protecting the deep ocean as the “common heritage of humankind.” In doing so, it threatens to unravel global cooperation, weaken environmental oversight, and set a dangerous precedent for the exploitation of one of Earth’s last untouched frontiers. The order, while lining up another ‘get richer scheme’ for the billionaire broligarchy, also ignores calls from over 35 countries for a moratorium, disregards the voices of Pacific Island communities, and pushes forward despite overwhelming ecological, legal, and moral objections. 

    The push is further reinforced by a pair of sweeping executive orders that aim to bulldoze environmental safeguards in the name of “energy dominance.” One declares a so-called “national energy emergency,” suspending key regulatory safeguards under bedrock environmental laws like the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the Endangered Species Act, and the Clean Water Act. 

    Together, these orders will not just fast-tack deep sea mining but also accelerate offshore drilling, fracking infrastructure, and fossil fuel exports. This isn’t just deregulation—it’s a declaration of open season on the ocean. 

    All this comes as cobalt and nickel prices are plummeting, further undermining the already shaky economic case for mining the seafloor. Meanwhile, safer, cleaner, and more cost-effective alternatives, such as mineral recycling and domestic refining efforts, many of which are backed by the U.S. Department of Defense, are gaining momentum. But instead of investing in these sustainable solutions, the White House is reaching into the past to gamble with the future of our oceans and our planet. 

    ‘Unleashing’ America’s fishing industry into collapse

    In another destructive move, the Trump Administration has targeted New England’s fishing industry by opening the Northeast Canyons and Seamounts National Marine Monument–the first and only National Marine Monument in the U.S. Atlantic–to commercial fishing. This follows similar rollbacks opening the Pacific Islands Heritage Marine National Monument–long considered off-limits due to its ecological significance–to commercial fishing and broader dismantling of domestic fishing regulations.  

    There is no evidence that these protected areas harmed the fishing economy. But opening them to industrial fishing will cause irreversible damage, from increased bycatch and habitat destruction to plastic pollution from fishing gear, undoing decades of progress to end overfishing, rebuild fish stocks, and restore America’s fisheries

    At the same time, the earlier-mentioned cuts to NOAA will also hurt domestic fishing by leaving fishers without vital scientific insight needed for planning and responding to changing ocean conditions. This approach paves the way for overfishing and fishery collapse–again, directly contradicting the Trump Administration’s stated goal of supporting American fishing communities. 

    Scientists agree that protecting at least 30% of the world’s oceans by 2030 is essential to help marine ecosystems recover and thrive. When fish populations collapse, so do fishing jobs and fishing communities. Yet with these actions, the Trump Administration is again steering the US in the wrong direction—sidelining science, sustainability, and long-term economic resilience by jeopardizing the entire industry and the coastal communities it supports. 

    Taxing our health

    Trump’s chaotic tariff edicts have strained relationships with several key allies and raised costs for average Americans, all while giving fossil fuel interests a free pass. By exempting petrochemicals and polymers, the Administration has ensured that plastic packaging will remain cheap, abundant, and toxic. Companies like Coca-Cola, already the largest global producer of plastic packaging and the biggest source of branded plastic waste, are planning to ramp up plastic production in response to the tariffs on aluminum.  

    At the same time, the Administration issued yet another executive order, accompanied by a 36-page report, aimed at “bringing America back” to plastic straws. So, while more Americans struggle to make ends meet, they can be sure of one thing: there will be plenty of microplastics to go around.

    Plastics are not just a pollution problem; they are a public health crisis. Over 3,200 chemicals in plastics have been linked to a host of serious health conditions, including cancer, hormone disruption, reproductive problems, metabolic changes, obesity, premature births, neurological disorders, and learning disabilities. Toxic chemicals in plastic already cost Americans nearly $250 billion in healthcare expenses each year.

    And that burden is not shared equally. BIPOC and low-income communities face disproportionate exposure to pollution from plastic production, disposal, and incineration infrastructure, which are often located in or near their communities. These facilities poison the air, the water, and their bodies. While oil and gas companies rake in record profits and their billionaire CEO’s grow richer, these communities and working families across America are left paying the price. 

    Voters across the political spectrum – Democrats and Republicans alike– support strong action to reduce plastic pollution and protect public health. Yet, without pause at the staggering irony, the Trump Administration is slashing Medicaid, gutting personnel and budget from the Department of Health and Human Services, and increasing our exposure to toxic plastic— all while touting a “Make America Healthy Again” agenda. But even in an era of  “alternative facts” and the attempted erasure of diversity, equity, and inclusion, the truth is impossible to ignore. There is nothing left to sacrifice. 

    Time to resist 

    While the pace and scale of recent changes can seem overwhelming, it is worth remembering that part of this administration’s strategy is to flood the zone and try to get ahead of legal challenges and other obstacles to their agenda. The Trump Administration, like the “tech bros” who fell in line behind the President, is moving fast and breaking things. But there is growing resistance to their actions. In the last few weeks, especially, the number of new and successful legal challenges has been growing, with some law firms and academic institutions pushing back against the administration’s demands. This includes EarthJustice, Greenpeace, and allies in a joint litigation against Trump’s attempt to continue offshore drilling. 

    Meanwhile, millions of Americans—across generations, faiths, races, genders, and political ideologies—have been hitting the streets to defend their human rights, their environment, and their democracy. These peaceful protests have made one thing clear: We will not be silenced. We won’t back down. We won’t stop defending our communities in the face of government corruption and corporate greed. 

    MIL OSI NGO

  • MIL-OSI USA: Senators Collins, Reed Lead Bipartisan Group of Appropriators Urging Labor Department to Reverse Closure of Job Corps Centers

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Maine Susan Collins

    Washington, D.C. – U.S. Senators Susan Collins, Chair of the Senate Appropriations Committee, and Jack Reed (D-RI) led a bipartisan group of Appropriations Committee members in sending a letter to Department of Labor (DOL) Secretary Lori Chavez-DeRemer, urging the DOL to reverse its decision to begin the closure of Job Corps Centers nationwide.

    Joining Senators Collins and Reed in signing the letter were Senators Patty Murray (D-WA), Lisa Murkowski (R-AK), Tammy Baldwin (D-WI), John Boozman (R-AR), Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH), Cindy Hyde-Smith (R-MS), and Jeff Merkley (D-OR).

    “The sudden announcement that the Department of Labor began the process of closing all Job Corps Centers on May 29, 2025, will harm students and local economies in every state across the nation,” the Senators wrote. “We urge you to retract this announcement and to faithfully implement the Fiscal Year (FY) 2025 Full-Year Continuing Resolution Act, which President Trump signed into law and which includes $1,760,155,000 for Job Corps.”

    “Job Corps has helped millions of young people, ages 16 to 24, many of whom face significant economic and social challenges, develop the skills and resilience they need to succeed in work and in life through intensive education, training, and support services in a residential setting since its creation in 1964,” they continued. “The sudden closure of Job Corps Centers not only puts young people’s lives at risk, but local communities will pay a steep price, especially the thousands of individuals who work at the Centers and will lose their livelihoods.”

    “Abruptly canceling contracts for the nation’s Job Corps Centers will leave students and communities in the lurch and will undermine opportunities for young people to get education and training to succeed in valuable trades. While we would be pleased to work with you to improve the Job Corps program to do even more to serve our young people and address growing workforce needs, it is essential that you faithfully implement the program in accordance with the FY 2025 Continuing Resolution and reopen all Job Corps Centers,” the Senators concluded.

    The complete text of the letter can be read here.

    In April, Senator Collins sent a letter to Secretary Chavez-DeRemer urging the DOL to lift the halt on enrollment at Loring and Penobscot Job Corps Centers in Maine. Last month, Senators Collins and Reed sent a separate letter to Secretary Chavez-DeRemer requesting that the DOL provide information on the Job Corps’ contracts, background check processing, and evaluation plan.

    Also last month, at a hearing to review the Fiscal Year 2026 budget request for the DOL, Senator Collins urged Secretary Chavez-DeRemer to reverse the Department’s halt of new enrollment at Maine’s two Job Corps centers and the proposed elimination of the Job Corps program altogether. During the hearing, Senator Collins spoke about Adais Viruet-Torres, a graduate of the Loring Job Corps Center and later Husson University who overcame homelessness and now works as a nurse practitioner.

    A long time champion of Job Corps, Senator Reed questioned U.S. Labor Secretary Chavez-DeRemer at a May 22 hearing about the Trump Administration’s efforts to terminate Job Corps.  Senator Reed helped launch Exeter Job Corps Center in Rhode Island, which has a capacity for 185 students, with rolling admissions throughout the year.  Exeter Job Corps Center employs a staff of about 85 and offers vocational training in 6 trades, a GED program, and two high school diploma programs.  Reed recently led a rally to help save Job Corps.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Warren Demands Answers on Trump’s Potential Contract with Shadowy Humanitarian Group, Urges More Aid to Gaza Through Responsible Partners

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Massachusetts – Elizabeth Warren

    June 20, 2025

    Letter follows reports that Secretary of State Marco Rubio is considering giving GHF $500 million despite concerns about its funding sources, neutrality, basic competence in providing aid, and more

    “It is critical that the United States stop the humanitarian disaster in Gaza. But that must be done through funding professional humanitarian organizations.”

    Text of Letter (PDF)

    Washington, D.C. — In a new letter to the Secretary of State and the United States Agency for International Aid (USAID), U.S. Senator Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.) raised her concerns about the Department of State’s reported plan to give $500 million to the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF). 

    “Reports of deadly violence against starving Palestinians connected with the GHF’s aid network are deeply troubling, as are reports of the organization’s ties to the Israeli government, and the lack of financial transparency regarding its donors, and its new connections – via its executive director – to the Trump administration and campaign,” said Senator Warren

    In May 2025, the World Health Organization and its partners determined that “Nineteen months into the conflict, the Gaza Strip is still confronted with a critical risk of Famine,” with over 2 million people facing high levels of acute food insecurity. This includes 71,000 cases of acute malnutrition among children and 17,000 pregnant women who will “need treatment for acute malnutrition.”

    Before the blockade in March 2025, food aid was distributed in Gaza at 400 locations through experienced humanitarian organizations, many of whom worked in the region for decades. After the blockade was partially lifted in May, the Israeli government only allowed aid to resume under a distribution network managed by the newly-created GHF. 

    From the beginning, GHF limited distribution of aid to four hubs in southern Gaza, under the watch of private security contractors. Additionally, it agreed to let the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to take position up to 1000 feet of GHF distribution sites, where it attacks Gazans who step out of the zone designated for waiting for aid collection. In its first three weeks of operation, more than 200 people seeking aid were killed and thousands wounded near GHF distribution sites. 

    Senator Warren also raised concerns about the GHF’s funding and ownership. Humanitarian groups typically report clear expenditure reports and disclosure requirements surrounding all aid distribution. GHF has, to date, refused to disclose its funding sources or its total budget. Israeli media recently reported that around $200 million was quietly reapportioned from the Israeli government’s budget towards the aid effort in Gaza and another $100 million came from an anonymous “Western European nation”.

    “This raises questions around the lack of impartiality, and neutrality, of GHF’s operations in Gaza,” said Senator Warren

    GHF’s leadership has also been marked by turmoil. The founder and first executive director of the GHF, Jake Wood, quit hours before the organization was supposed to start distributing aid on May 26th, claiming “it is not possible to implement this plan while also strictly adhering to the humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality, and independence.” He was replaced by Reverend Johnnie Moore, who served as co-chair for President Trump’s presidential campaign’s evangelical advisory board. 

    Just three months after the launch of the organization, the GHF’s Swiss affiliate was shut down by Switzerland’s government for “not fulfilling various legal obligations.” 

    “It is critical that the United States stop the humanitarian disaster in Gaza. But that must be done through funding professional humanitarian organizations,” wrote Senator Warren

    “The questions surrounding GHF – its funding sources and connection to the Trump Administration, its use of private contractors, its ability to serve and be seen as a neutral entity, its abandonment by its founders, and its basic competence in providing aid – must be answered before the State Department commits any funding to the organization,” concluded Senator Warren

    Senator Warren asked the State Department and USAID to provide clarity on its potential plans to use GHF, how the agencies plan to measure success for the distribution of aid, and their plans to ensure contractors follow U.S. law when distributing aid by July 2, 2025. 

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: IMF Executive Board Concludes the Fifth Reviews Under the Extended Fund Facility and the Resilience and Sustainability Facility with Barbados

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    June 20, 2025

    • The IMF Executive Board concluded the fifth and final reviews under the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) and the Resilience and Sustainability Facility (RSF) arrangements with Barbados, allowing an immediate disbursement of about US$19 million under the EFF arrangement and about US$39 million under the RSF arrangement.
    • Implementation of the home-grown Barbados Economic Recovery and Transformation (BERT 2022) plan has remained strong and the broad objectives of the EFF and RSF arrangements have been achieved. Macroeconomic stability has been reinforced, and reforms have been implemented to boost fiscal sustainability, enhance growth, and build resilience.
    • Barbados’ economy has continued to perform well. Growth has been robust, inflation has moderated, the fiscal and external positions have improved, and the public debt-to-GDP ratio has continued to decline. The outlook is stable but subject to downside risks, given heightened global uncertainty and vulnerabilities to external shocks and natural disasters.

    Washington, DC: The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) today concluded the fifth and final reviews of the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) and the Resilience and Sustainability Facility (RSF) arrangements with Barbados. The completion of the reviews allows the authorities to draw the equivalent of SDR 14.175 million (about US$19 million) under the EFF arrangement and SDR 28.35 million (about US$39 million) under the RSF arrangement, bringing total disbursements under the EFF arrangement to SDR 85.05 million (about US$116 million) and SDR 141.75 million (about US$193 million) under the RSF arrangement. The authorities have consented to the publication of the staff report prepared for these reviews.[1]

    Economic activity in 2024 remained robust, with growth estimated at 4 percent, driven by tourism, construction, and business services. Inflation moderated to an average of 1.4 percent due to easing global commodity prices and prices of domestic goods and services. The external position strengthened further, with the current account deficit narrowing to 4.5 percent of GDP, supported by tourism receipts, declining import prices, and one-off current transfers. Gross international reserves reached US$1.6 billion at end-2024, equivalent to over 7 months of import cover, providing continued strong support to the exchange rate peg.

    The near-term outlook is stable. Growth is expected to reach 2.7 percent in 2025, supported by construction of tourism-related projects and government investment. Inflation is expected to pick up in 2025 due to the rising cost of non-fuel imports and some domestic agricultural products. Nevertheless, risks to the outlook are tilted to the downside, amidst the highly uncertain external economic environment and Barbados’ continued vulnerability to global shocks and natural disasters.

    Program performance has remained strong. All quantitative performance criteria and indicative targets were met. The authorities exceeded the primary fiscal surplus target for FY2024/25 and are targeting 4.4 percent of GDP for FY2025/26. Public debt has fallen below 105 percent of GDP, and the authorities remain committed to bringing it down to 60 percent of GDP by FY2035/36. The authorities met the EFF structural benchmarks for the review, including completing the assessment of human resource needs at the Barbados Customs and Excise Department, preparing a public-private partnership (PPP) framework, and developing a daily liquidity forecasting framework. Both reform measures for the RSF fifth review were also implemented. Key elements to strengthen the integration of climate concerns into public financial management have been completed, including the development of project appraisal guidelines, the deepening of fiscal risk analysis, and the preparation of the PPP framework. The Central Bank of Barbados has also included physical climate risk analysis in its bank stress testing.

    Following the Executive Board discussion on Barbados, Mr. Bo Li, Deputy Managing Director and Acting Chair, issued the following statement:

    “The implementation of Barbados’ homegrown Economic Recovery and Transformation program has remained strong, supported by the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) and the Resilience and Sustainability Facility (RSF) arrangements. The completion of the fifth and final reviews marks the successful conclusion of the Fund arrangements.

    “While the outlook is stable, risks remain tilted to the downside, given the highly uncertain external economic environment and Barbados’ vulnerability to shocks and natural disasters. The authorities remain strongly committed to ensuring macroeconomic stability and implementing structural reforms to boost potential growth and build resilience.

    “Maintaining strong fiscal surpluses will be necessary to achieve the public debt target of 60 percent of GDP by FY2035/36. The authorities’ focus on strengthening revenue mobilization and improving public financial management is appropriate. These measures will be key to preserving fiscal sustainability and creating space for public investment. Finalizing ambitious reforms of state-owned enterprises is a priority. The authorities are taking the necessary steps to mobilize external financing.

    “The exchange rate peg remains a critical anchor for macroeconomic stability, supported by ample international reserves. Measures have been taken to strengthen the monetary policy framework and financial safety nets. Efforts to enhance the local payments market and infrastructure are advancing, with the goal of moving to a digital payments system in 2026.

    “Reforms to improve the business environment and boost growth potential are key. Important measures include advancing the digitalization of government services and investing in skills and education. The authorities focus on boosting macroeconomic resilience to natural disasters and facilitating the transition to renewable energy is welcome.”

    [1] Under the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, publication of documents that pertain to member countries is voluntary and requires member consent. The staff report will be published shortly on the www.imf.org/Barbados page.

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Meera Louis

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/06/20/pr-25210-barbados-imf-concludes-5th-reviews-under-the-eff-and-resil-and-sustainability-facility

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Experts of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women Praise Ireland for Increasing Women’s Representation in Decision-Making, Raise Issues Concerning Historic Rights Violations and Sexual Violence

    Source: United Nations – Geneva

    The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women today concluded its consideration of the eighth periodic report of Ireland, with Committee Experts praising the State’s efforts to increase women’s representation in decision-making and raising questions concerning redress for historic rights violations and measures to address sexual and gender-based violence.

    In the dialogue, several Committee Experts commended Ireland’s achievements in promoting women’s representation in decision-making, including its 40 per cent quota for female candidates in national elections.  Jelena Pia-Comella, Committee Expert and Rapporteur for Ireland, said statistics on Irish women’s participation in diplomacy were outstanding.

    Ms. Pia-Comella said the Committee was deeply concerned that there had yet to be recognition that women and girls of the Magdalene Laundries had experienced degrading treatment and gender-based discrimination; that arbitrary barriers to redress persisted within the Mother and Baby Institutions payment scheme; and that the State had failed to adequately implement the 2014 O’Keeffe judgment.  How would these issues be addressed?

    Another Committee Expert said one in five women in Ireland reportedly experienced non-consensual sex in their lifetimes.  There was insufficient funding for measures to address sexual offences.  What measures would the State party take to increase protection for women victims of sexual violence?

    Introducing the report, Colm Brophy, Minister of State for Migration of Ireland and head of the delegation, said the national strategy for women and girls 2017-2021 put a spotlight on promoting greater gender balance in decision-making.  Ireland’s largest listed companies had now reached the key milestone of 40 per cent female directors overall.  Legislation was also introduced in 2012 requiring political parties to meet gender quotas for candidates in parliamentary elections or face financial penalties.  The quota for the most recent elections in 2024 was 40 per cent.

    The delegation added that women made up 49 per cent of senior management of Ireland’s Foreign Service, and 54 per cent of heads of foreign missions.

    In the context of Mother and Baby and County Home Institutions, Mr. Brophy said the State repeatedly failed to protect vulnerable citizens, and to uphold their most fundamental rights.  The delegation added that the redress scheme established in 2013 regarding Magdalene Laundries was accessible for women living abroad.  The payment scheme was one of a large suite of actions implemented to redress the harms caused.  It was expected that legislation to implement the European Court of Human Rights decision on the O’Keeffe case would be implemented in coming weeks.

    Mr. Brophy also said the national strategy for women and girls prioritised action to combat domestic and gender-based violence.  Launched in 2022, the third national strategy on domestic, sexual and gender-based violence instituted fundamental structural reforms to Ireland’s approach to tackling the issue.  A new agency, Cuan, was established in 2024 to deliver services to victims.

    In closing remarks, Mr. Brophy said the Committee had invested significant time in understanding the issues facing women and girls in Ireland.  The State would develop measures in response to the Committee’s concluding observations.  Ireland was committed to its obligations under the Convention and to the United Nations.

    Nahla Haidar, Committee Chair, in concluding remarks, thanked the State party for its support to the treaty bodies, international law and the rule of law.  The dialogue had provided the Committee with further insight into the efforts made by Ireland to implement the Convention for the benefit of women and girls in the State.

    The delegation of Ireland consisted of representatives from the Department of Children, Disability and Equality; Department of Education and Youth; Department of Health; Department of Justice, Home Affairs and Migration; Office of the Attorney General; Department of Social Protection; Cuan, the Domestic, Sexual and Gender-Based Violence Agency; Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade; Department of Enterprise, Tourism and Employment; and the Permanent Mission of Ireland to the United Nations Office at Geneva.

    The Committee will issue the concluding observations on the report of Ireland at the end of its ninety-first session on 4 July. All documents relating to the Committee’s work, including reports submitted by States parties, can be found on the session’s webpage.  Meeting summary releases can be found here.  The webcast of the Committee’s public meetings can be accessed via the UN Web TV webpage.

    The Committee will next meet at 3 p.m. on Monday, 23 June to meet with representatives from non-governmental organizations and national human rights institutions who will brief the Committee on the situation of women in Afghanistan, San Marino, Chad and Botswana, the reports of which the Committee will review next week.

    Report

    The Committee has before it the eighth periodic report of Ireland (CEDAW/C/IRL/8).

    Presentation of Report

    COLM BROPHY, Minister of State for Migration of Ireland and head of the delegation, said Ireland had worked actively over the period since 2017 to promote equality for women and to address issues facing them.  A national strategy for women and girls was launched in 2017 as the whole of Government framework for action on gender equality.  Women’s organizations participated in the strategy committee, chaired at Ministerial level, which monitored implementation.  A successor strategy was currently being finalised, in consultation with women across Ireland.

    Travellers were recognised as an ethnic minority in a landmark decision of Ireland’s Parliament in March 2017, a decision supported by all political parties at the time. The Government was working on identifying and eliminating barriers to access to public services for Travellers. The Irish health system partnered with Traveller organizations to train Travellers to become community health peer workers.  The success of these projects was reflected in higher rates of uptake of screening amongst Traveller women relative to the general population for breast and cervical cancers.  In education, the Traveller and Roma education strategy 2024–2030 committed to supporting Traveller and Roma women on their educational journey.

    The needs of migrant women were addressed through a combination of mainstream public services and a wide range of targeted supports, funded by grants from various national and European integration funds.  These supports played a crucial role in improving outcomes for migrant women in areas of particular concern, including labour market access and housing. A national migration and integration strategy, due to be published next year, would provide a cohesive policy framework for recognising and addressing the integration challenges facing migrant women. 

    The national strategy for women and girls 2017-2021 put a spotlight on promoting greater gender balance in decision-making.  The Government launched a business-led initiative entitled Balance for Better Business in 2018 which spearheaded a series of initiatives contributing to a significant improvement in the percentage of women on corporate boards, particularly of publicly listed companies. Ireland’s largest listed companies had now reached the key milestone of 40 per cent female directors overall, compared to 18 per cent in 2018.  Ireland now ranked sixth in the European Union for female board representation and fifth for leadership teams.

    Legislation was introduced in 2012 requiring political parties to meet gender quotas for candidates in parliamentary elections or face financial penalties.  The quota for the most recent elections in 2024 was 40 per cent and this would apply for future national elections.  Maternity leave entitlements were introduced for elected members of local authorities in 2022, and for members of both chambers of Ireland’s parliament in 2024.  A funding scheme had also been in place since 2019 to incentivise political parties to increase the number of women candidates for local elections.  The Government also provided funding for civil society organizations providing support for women candidates, and the new national Traveller and Roma inclusion strategy 2024-2028 included a commitment to promote greater participation by Traveller and Roma women in political and public life, including in leadership positions.

    During the period under review, the Government introduced major initiatives to enable parents to access childcare and had increased public funding of early learning and childcare to unprecedented levels.  Government expenditure now exceeded 1.37 billion euros in 2025, a 200 per cent increase on investment since 2017.  The early childhood care and education programme provided two years of pre-school without charge and enjoyed participation rates of 96 per cent each year. The national childcare scheme, introduced in 2019, provided targeted and universal subsidies to reduce the costs for parents.  In addition, the equal start scheme introduced in 2024 was specifically targeted at enabling children from disadvantaged households to access early learning and childcare.

    Mr. Brophy introduced Government measures to increase family leave entitlements, including extending parental leave to 26 weeks under the parental leave (amendment) act 2019; establishing a statutory right to flexible work arrangements; establishing the right to five days of paid sick leave through the sick leave act 2022; increasing the national minimum wage by 46 per cent, from 9.25 euros per hour in 2017 to 13.50 euros in 2025; and requiring relevant organizations to report on their gender pay gaps and transpose the European Union pay transparency directive. The Government had focused on promoting greater participation by women and girls in science, technology, engineering and maths subjects.  Thanks to Government action, the number of female apprentices doubled between 2021 and 2025. 

    The national strategy for women and girls prioritised action to combat domestic violence and gender-based violence.  This was reflected in Ireland’s decision to ratify the Council of Europe’s Istanbul Convention on Preventing and Combatting Violence against Women and Domestic Violence in 2019.  Ireland enacted the domestic violence act in 2018, which strengthened the protections available to those experiencing domestic violence and made coercive control a criminal offence. 

    Launched in 2022, the third national strategy on domestic, sexual and gender-based violence instituted fundamental structural reforms to Ireland’s approach to tackling the issue.  A new agency, Cuan, was established in 2024 to deliver services to victims and implement awareness raising campaigns on such violence.  Ireland also became one of the first countries to enable persons experiencing domestic violence to have five days of paid leave.  The Government had also introduced significant measures to combat trafficking.  The third national action plan to prevent and combat trafficking, launched in 2023, was working to implement a more victim-centred approach, while raising awareness among service providers of trafficking and providing appropriate training.

    Mr. Brophy also presented measures to address women’s health needs, including the establishment of the Women’s Health Taskforce in 2019; the women’s health action plans for 2022-2023 and 2024-2025, which ensured a continued focus and delivery of key women’s health actions; the allocation of over 180 million euros since 2020 in additional funding, including funding for free contraception for women from 17 to 35 years, in vitro fertilisation treatment, and public menopause clinics. 

    Ireland was the first county in the world to decide by referendum in 2015 that same-sex couples should be able to marry.  A referendum on removing the reference in article 41.2 of the Constitution to women’s place in the home was also held in March 2024, but this was defeated.  The people of Ireland voted in a referendum in May 2018 to amend the Irish Constitution to permit Ireland’s parliament to legislate for abortion.  All 19 maternity hospitals were now providing termination services, in accordance with legislation.  There had also been a sustained increase in community providers, which now stood at 455.

    In the context of Mother and Baby and County Home Institutions, the State repeatedly failed to protect vulnerable citizens, and to uphold their most fundamental rights. The Government was conscious of the terrible hurt and pain caused, and the impact that this had had, and continued to have on many individuals and their families.  The Commission of Inquiry’s report, and the official State apology which followed, were a starting point for the further restorative measures now being progressed.  Six of the seven major commitments made by the Government to survivors were in place, while the seventh, a National Centre for Research and Remembrance, was in progress. 

    Ireland enacted the landmark birth information and tracing act 2022, which had provided clear rights of access to birth and early life information, and a Mother and Baby Institutions payment scheme opened to applications in March 2024 and provided payments and health benefits to survivors.  To date, more than 4,500 payments had been made totalling over 66 million euros.  Last Monday, work began to excavate at the site of the former Tuam Mother and Baby Home so as to ensure the dignified burial of any babies found to have been buried there.  In addition, many women who spent time in Magdalen Laundries had now benefited from the Government’s redress scheme, which remained open for any further applications.

    The Government aimed to make equality a lived reality for women and girls in all of their diversity. There were areas where further progress or change was needed, but the Government was committed to creating a better society for women and girls.

    Statement by the National Human Rights Institution of Ireland

    DEIRDRE MALONE, Director, Ireland’s Human Rights and Equality Commission, said Ireland played a leadership role in the global struggle for gender equality.  However, its international ambition for gender equality was not always matched with domestic action on gender equality.  There had been procrastination in ratifying key treaties and removing reservations; delay in incorporating international standards into national law; continuing failure to implement the recommendations of treaty bodies, including those of the Committee; and in the case of O’Keeffe, a continuing refusal to follow the judgement of the European Court of Human Rights regarding redress.

    In areas such as the needs of Traveller and Roma women and access to abortion, Ireland had clear and comprehensive policies and strategies which were not being implemented.  In those areas where there was progress, it was often frustratingly slow.  While domestic, sexual and gender-based violence policy had seen several positive reforms in recent years, it was necessary to bridge the gap between the progressive policies and legislation that Ireland had enacted and the reality on the ground. 

    Women suffered disproportionately from an inadequate, arbitrary, and overly bureaucratic social welfare system, which was not benchmarked against the cost of living or indexed against national wages.  Some 4.8 per cent of women lived in consistent poverty with lone parent households headed by women, and low-income families being more susceptible to poverty. The Gender Pay Gap and the Gender Pension Gap remained stark.

    In areas including the treatment of women in prison and women’s participation in politics, there had been regression.  Prison overcrowding worsened daily.  Given the impact of prison on women and family life, Irish penal policy needed to be reformed in line with the Bangkok Rules.

    More than 75 per cent of seats in parliament were held by men; only three out of 15 newly appointed cabinet Ministers were women.  Ireland had made a commitment to the principles of the Convention but was not matching that commitment with action that transformed the lived realities of its women and girls.  By investing in an equal future, the Irish State – one that prided itself on its adherence to human rights and rule of law – could show leadership to other nations, at a time when such leadership was so badly needed.

    Questions by a Committee Expert 

    JELENA PIA-COMELLA, Committee Expert and Rapporteur for Ireland, congratulated Ireland on placing gender equality at the forefront of its agenda during its 2021-2022 tenure at the United Nations Security Council.

    The Committee regretted that, despite its previous recommendation, the State party did not intend to remove its reservations to the Convention and remained concerned that the Irish Constitution’s outdated language on women’s duties at home continued to discriminate against women’s rights in the economic and social spheres. Did the State party intend to devise a plan to implement the relevant recommendations of the gender equality bodies of the Citizen’s Assembly and Parliamentary Committee?  What was the status of review of the equality (miscellaneous provisions) bill of 2024?

    The Committee welcomed that State apologies had been issued for past human rights violations. However, it was deeply concerned that there had yet to be recognition that women and girls of the Magdalene Laundries had experienced degrading treatment and gender-based discrimination; that arbitrary barriers to redress persisted within the Mother and Baby Institutions payment scheme; and that the State had failed to adequately implement the 2014 O’Keeffe judgment. 

    What steps was the State party taking to provide up-front payment to women residing abroad; and to comprehensively address concerns raised regarding the operation of commissions of investigation?  Would the State overhaul the current model of investigations to embed human rights and equality principles in their operation?  Would the proposed commission of investigation into sexual abuse in day and boarding schools include non-religious schools, including the school Louise O’Keeffe attended?  What was the status of the National Centre for Research and Remembrance and how would it address the needs and views of affected persons?

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said significant progress had been made in implementing the recommendations of the Citizen’s Assembly on Gender Equality.  Of 205 actions, 190 had been completed or were in progress.  The recommendations addressed sexual and gender-based violence, education in challenging gender stereotypes, and actions to improve the share of women in politics.

    The redress scheme established in 2013 regarding the Magdalene Laundries was accessible for women living abroad.  The State had worked actively to keep conditions under review.  Persons under 66 were entitled to a symbolic payment, which had been increased to 120 euros per week.  Women continued to receive payments under the scheme.  The payment scheme was one of a large suite of actions made to redress the harms caused in Mother and Baby County Home Institutions, including measures to support access to information.  Some 16,000 applications had been processed thus far.  The National Remembrance Centre would be in Dublin. A steering committee for the Centre was established in 2022 and development permission was received in 2025.

    To address shortcomings, a revised version of the O’Keeffe payment scheme was put in place in 2021, after which 128 applications were received.  It was expected that legislation to implement the decision of the European Court of Human Rights on this case would be implemented in coming weeks. A report into incidents of sexual abuse in residential institutions was published in 2024, and the Government was preparing measures to implement the recommendations of the report.

    A voluntary redress scheme had provided compensation to more than 375 women who had undergone symphysiotomy procedures.  The Government had fulfilled its obligations to women who had suffered due to these procedures.

    Equality legislation was currently being drafted and would be reviewed by a parliamentary committee over the summer.

    Questions by a Committee Expert 

    A Committee Expert asked about the timeline for the adoption of the new national strategy on women and girls?  How would it incorporate lessons from the previous cycle and align with Convention standards?  Would Traveller women’s needs be addressed in the strategy?  What measures were in place to monitor equality policies of Government bodies?  What training on gender equality was provided to Government officials?

    Ireland’s national human rights institution had “A” status under the Paris Principles and the appointment process for its commissioners was transparent.  Did the institution promote international and regional human rights frameworks?  Was the State party considering implementing the recommendation of the Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions to establish a fixed term for members?

    The Committee welcomed that political parties would have their funding reduced by 50 per cent if they failed to present at least 40 per cent female candidates.  It called for a quota of 50 per cent female representation to be established.  Efforts to implement gender quotas had not produced meaningful representation of Traveller women.  It was welcome that women represented 40 per cent of board members in the largest publicly listed companies.  However, the share of female executive directors remained low, at 11 per cent. None of these companies had a female chief executive officer.  How would this be addressed, and how would the State party increase the representation of Traveller women in Government?

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said representatives from Government and civil society monitored the implementation of actions on gender equality.  The forthcoming national strategy for women and girls was close to finalisation.  Work was underway to embed a focus on Traveller women in the new strategy.  It also included measures to strengthen training on gender equality for Government officials.  Some 6,900 civil servants had enrolled in online training on gender equality. A professional diploma on human rights was offered for public officials, which covered gender equality.

    The national human rights institution had its own dedicated budget, provided on an annual basis. Its funding allocations had been increased substantially in recent years – its allocation in 2025 was 3.5 million euros higher than in 2015.  The Government did not play a role in the appointment of its commissioners.

    The Balance for Better Business programme monitored gender representation on the boards of Irish companies.  The average level of female representation on the boards of all publicly listed companies was now at 37 per cent.  A new five-year strategy had been developed which set targets for more than 40 per cent female representation on the boards of all companies by 2028.  It included measures to improve the recruitment of women and promote women’s career pathways.

    Amendments were made to the electoral act of 1997 that improved the gender balance in political parties, with the introduction of 40 per cent quotas for women candidates in national elections.  There were no plans to extend these quotas to local elections.  Policies had been developed to promote the representation of Traveller women in politics, and the Women for Election organization, which was funded by the Government, was working toward this goal.

    Questions by Committee Experts 

    A Committee Expert said that Ireland’s work towards gender equality on the boards of companies was very impressive.

    One Committee Expert recognised progress in addressing gender-based violence, including the adoption of the Istanbul Protocol and the national strategy to combat domestic, sexual and gender-based violence.  What further measures would be adopted to address gender stereotypes with an intersectional approach?  Forced sterilisation of women with disabilities was still practiced and hate crimes against women had risen by four per cent over the reporting period. When would the State party develop a national action plan to address hate crimes and adopt measures to ban forced sterilisation?  What measures were in place to ensure that victims of female genital mutilation had access to health services?  Would it increase the number of specialised female genital mutilation clinics?

    One in five women in Ireland reportedly experienced non-consensual sex in their lifetimes. There were delays in access to justice and insufficient funding for measures to address sexual offences. What measures would the State party take to increase access to legal aid and protection for women victims of sexual violence?  What resources would be provided to strengthen support structures?  Would the State party consolidate legislation on sexual violence into one law?

    A Committee Expert said Ireland had made considerable efforts to combat trafficking, including by developing a national action plan to combat trafficking and establishing an independent monitoring mechanism.  However, there were shortcomings in identifying victims, particularly girls.  Only five children were identified as victims of trafficking in 2023, and the training of officials reportedly did not lead to effective prosecutions.  How would the State party train the judiciary and increase the prosecution of trafficking offences?  What steps had been taken to improve the identification of victims and ensure that no victims were excluded from support?  The Committee welcomed that a trafficking specific shelter had been established in 2023, but it was not large enough; were there plans to extend it?  There had only been 15 convictions of consumers of sex services in 2023; were there plans to increase prosecutions? 

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said the national strategy for women and girls included measures to address gender stereotypes and to collect data on such stereotypes.  Ireland had taken measures to address gender stereotypes in the media, including through a media forum held in 2025, and measures to promote gender balance in the media.  A campaign on reporting harmful online content had also been developed.

    Women’s health services were trained on responding to victims of female genital mutilation, and management guidelines had been developed on caring for victims, who had access to free counselling services.  A project was underway to reduce waiting times for healthcare for victims of female genital mutilation.  Ireland had ratified the Council of Europe Convention that prohibited forced sterilisation.

    Work was ongoing to update legislation on hate crimes and to introduce a prohibition of the incitement of hatred online.  The Government had also drafted legislation on removing the guardianship rights of parents who killed their partners.  Ireland had comprehensive laws on sexual offences.  There had been a three-fold increase in funding for support for victims of domestic, sexual and gender-based violence, and a body had been established to promote the collection and accessibility of data on sexual violence.

    Competent authorities, as well as non-governmental organizations, were now able to refer suspected victims of human trafficking.  The Government was looking at expanding the shelter for victims of trafficking.  It funded several non-governmental organizations to provide trauma-informed support to victims.  The Irish police forces had worked to increase prosecutions of organised crime cases, which had proven effective in preventing trafficking.  Ireland had recently decriminalised the sale of sex; there was no plan to change this legislation.  The Government was planning to introduce on-the-spot fines and mobile phone searches to increase prosecutions for the consumption of sex services.

    Questions by Committee Experts 

    JELENA PIA-COMELLA, Committee Expert and Rapporteur for Ireland, welcomed the State party’s proactive efforts to address coercive practices.  Could it provide more information on the special measures it had developed to address rape?

    Another Committee Expert asked if legislation was planned to address drink spiking?  What services were provided to victims of gender-based violence in prisons?

    A Committee Expert asked how the State party was promoting the meaningful participation of women, including marginalised women, in the Foreign Service?  The Committee was concerned about online threats against women involved in politics and public life.  What monitoring mechanisms were in place?  There was no clear gender-responsive climate strategy.  How did the State party ensure that women and girls were included in decision-making processes on climate action?

    Another Committee Expert said there was no formal procedure for the determination of statelessness in Ireland.  How would the State party amend this deficiency?  What did the State party plan to do in response to the recent court decision on the right to guardianship for babies born through surrogacy?

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said the Government was prioritising the drafting of legislation on coercive practices.  The prison service provided support to persons who had experienced domestic, sexual and gender-based violence.  An intervention model was also in place to prevent revictimisation upon release. Drink spiking was a criminal offence.

    Last year, of the 67 persons identified as victims of human trafficking, 10 were children.  The third national action plan on trafficking included measures to tackle trafficking in children.  A series of training programmes had been developed for prosecutors on sexual offences.

    Women made up 49 per cent of senior management in Ireland’s Foreign Service, and 54 per cent of heads of foreign missions.  A code of conduct on countering online hate speech had been developed, as had guidance for candidates who faced online harassment on lodging complaints.

    The Government was working to provide pathways to the parents of babies born through surrogacy to have their parental rights recognised.

    Questions by Committee Experts 

    JELENA PIA-COMELLA, Committee Expert and Rapporteur for Ireland, said that the statics of female participation in diplomacy were outstanding.  The Committee welcomed the State party’s higher education authority act. The primary curriculum did not address gender equality; would it do so in future?  What measures were in place to promote equal access to education? How did the State party ensure that its sexual and reproductive health education addressed same-sex relationships, gender identity and abortion?

    Another Committee Expert said the Committee welcomed the reduction of the gender pay gap to 9.6 per cent in 2022. What enforcement mechanisms were in place to ensure private sector compliance with equal pay mechanisms? Women constituted 60 per cent of low paid workers.  How did the State party address the barriers faced by women in accessing decent work? Roma women had an estimated unemployment rate of 80 per cent; how was the State party addressing this issue? Were there plans to introduce a universal State pension to address the gender pension gap, which was currently at 36 per cent?

    The Committee was concerned about the unequal distribution of unpaid care work.  What measures were in place to ensure access to affordable childcare for all children and to encourage greater uptake of parental leave by men? How did the State party ensure effective redress in cases of workplace harassment?

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said the sexual and reproductive health education curriculum was being reviewed, and the updated curriculum would be introduced from 2027.  It focused on promoting healthy relationships, gender equality and safety online, preventing harmful gender narratives, addressing the root causes of domestic and sexual violence, assessing responses to unplanned pregnancies and rape, and the harms of pornography.

    The accessibility and affordability of early learning and childcare had been improved since 2017.  Up to two years of preschool education was now offered at no cost.  Universal subsidies were provided to families.  More than two million children were covered by the national childcare scheme, which had a budget of 529 million euros in 2025.  The equal start scheme provided targeted support in disadvantaged areas for Traveller, Roma and refugee children.

    Reporting on the gender pay gap required employers to consider the reasons for the gap.  Guidelines were being developed for different sectors on addressing gender pay gaps.  Employees could lodge complaints when their employer did not report on gender pay gaps. Paid parental leave created individual, non-transferrable entitlements for each parent.  The Government planned to increase awareness of parents’ entitlements. 

    One of the actions in the national Roma and Traveller strategy promoted their employment and participation in internships.  The Government was reaching out to marginalised groups to encourage participation in voluntary employment services.

    Questions by a Committee Expert

    A Committee Expert said Ireland had made significant progress in terms of women’s health.  How did the State ensure free access to healthcare for marginalised women?  How did the roadmap for digital health to 2030 address the needs of women and girls, including persons who had difficulties accessing digital services? Could the delegation provide data on women who had accessed legal abortions in 2023 and 2024?  How many women had had to travel abroad to obtain abortions?  How was the State party combatting stigma related to abortions and conscientious objections?  Was the State party considering abolishing the mandatory three-day waiting period for abortions?

    How was free, prior and informed consent guaranteed for medical interventions on institutionalised women and transgender persons?  There were reported cases of forced sterilisations and forced abortions; how did the State sanction such harmful practices, and how many cases of such practices had been brought before the courts?  How was the State party ensuring that mental health services were community-based and gender sensitive?  What steps had been taken to ensure that victims of gender-based violence could benefit from free mental health services?  Would the State prohibit the use of confidential health data of victims in court cases?

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said the parental leave scheme encouraged fathers to use it.  In 2024, over 66,000 parents had received parental benefits, of which 32 per cent were men.  Ireland’s State pension system recognised periods spent outside the workforce for caring requirements.  The long-term carers’ contribution supported the pensions of women who provided full-time care for long periods of time; over 7,000 women had been added to this scheme last year.  The difference in average pay to men and women was negligible in terms of the State pension.  The proposal of a universal pension could undermine progress made in recognising time spent by women providing care and would not resolve the pension issue. Ireland was in the process of adopting an auto-enrolment process for pensions which would particularly benefit women.

    The Government was considering ratifying International Labour Organization Conventions 156 and 183. The Workplace Relations Commission was responsible for deciding on workplace discrimination claims.  Some 63 claims had been received in 2024.  The Commission did not collect reasons for withdrawals of complaints.  It assisted all parties to reach a suitable outcome for a claim.

    The State party promoted collective bargaining to promote access to decent working conditions and wages. There was no legal impediment to collective bargaining.  The Government supported the rights of all workers to join and form trade unions. 

    Ireland was committed to gender transformative climate action.  Its delegation at the most recent Conference of the Parties in Baku was 50 per cent female. The Just Transition Commission had published a report that called for assessment of the gender implications of climate measures.

    Free hormone replacement therapy was provided to women experiencing the symptoms of menopause.  The Government was committed to ensuring safe and equitable access to pregnancy termination services for marginalised groups of society. In 2023, 10,033 women used termination services, while in 2022, 214 women went abroad to access such services. The free contraception scheme provided for the cost of contraception and related health consultations.  More than 200,000 women benefited from the scheme last year.  Since 2016, several million euros had been invested in maternity services, funding a large increase in maternity health staff.

    Women’s mental health remained a key priority in the national mental health strategy.  The State was providing mental health services to victims of violence that considered their gender and experience of trauma.  The State party was not aware of cases of forced sterilisation and forced abortion.

    Children could remain in the care of their mother in prison until 12 months of age.  High quality antenatal care was provided to women in prisons and there were mother and baby units in the State’s two women’s prisons.  Draft legislation had been developed that would limit the use of counselling records in court proceedings.  Banning disclosure of such records entirely could affect the right to a fair trial.  Measures were being developed to reduce revictimisation of survivors through disclosure hearings.

    The State was rolling out campaigns to encourage victims of sexual and gender-based violence to come forward and access support services, and was working with partners to ensure that frontline staff were delivering trauma-informed and culturally sensitive care to victims of violence.  The State was working to map the mental health needs of adolescent girls, which would inform the development of the national mental health strategy.

    Questions by Committee Experts

    A Committee Expert said Ireland had developed initiatives to promote the empowerment of women.  Some 32 per cent of start-ups were headed by women in 2022. There was a risk of poverty and exclusion for single, women-headed families – there had been a 171 per cent increase in the number of women who were unable to access housing in 2023. How was the State party addressing this? What progress had been made in developing a second action plan on business and human rights?  How did the State party ensure obligatory due diligence in human rights?

    One Committee Expert said Traveller women were disproportionately represented in prisons.  How were prison services aligned with the Bangkok Rules? The Traveller and Roma women national strategy did not address access to justice.  Would this be rectified?  How many women of colour were represented in decision-making bodies?  How was Ireland promoting unimpeded access to humanitarian assistance to women and girls on the frontlines of conflict, and how did the State party encourage consideration of intersectionality globally?

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said single parents were a target of social benefit schemes, including school meals programmes and the child benefit scheme, which had been extended to children up to age 18 in full-time education.  Ireland had piloted equality budgeting measures, including for gender budgeting. It was designing a tagging framework that would ensure the recording of expenditure on equality issues.

    Ireland was working to increase female participation in entrepreneurial activity through a six-year action plan, which included schemes for financial support for high potential start-ups led by women.  Mentorship, training and networking programmes were offered to women entrepreneurs. There was double the number of women accessing such training compared to men.

    Ireland’s first national action plan on business and human rights had concluded in 2023, and a consultation process for developing the second plan was currently underway.  A working outline of the plan was presented in June 2024. The next plan was likely to finish in 2028 or 2029.  The Government planned to include gender responsive due diligence in the plan.

    The Government was committed to providing affordable social homes at scale.  There were more than 20,000 social housing solutions delivered in 2024. Several million euros would be invested in programmes to address homelessness in 2025.  Around 15,500 persons accessed emergency accommodation in April 2025, including 4,700 children.  A national homelessness action committee was established in 2021 to address the issue; it had developed a national support framework. 

    The zero-tolerance strategy sought to increase the number of refuge units and safe homes for victims of violence. There were 141 refuge units at the outset of the strategy; the current number was 159.  By the end of 2025, more than 200 would be established.  There had been investments of over 100 million euros in Traveller-specific accommodation.

    There was disproportionate representation of Travellers within the justice system.  The family support model for Traveller women in prison provided intensive support at all judicial stages.  Services were being extended to pre-sentencing and post-release stages. There were plans for the establishment of an open women’s prison.

    Ireland was consistent in its participation in multilateral fora addressing lethal autonomous weapons.  It was presenting a value-based message that addressed gender issues.

    Questions by a Committee Expert 

    A Committee Expert asked why the findings of the independent review of the legal aid scheme of 2021 were not published.  How could women who could not afford legal representation have access to justice? How was the right of access to justice of women with disabilities respected?

    The Committee welcomed efforts to support women’s access to child maintenance payments.  Could the State party provide statistics on fathers who did not pay child maintenance?  Why had the State party decided not to establish a child maintenance agency? How did it respond to non-payment of maintenance?  Would it publish the results of a study into the economic consequences of divorce on both parents?  Women with disabilities were reportedly discriminated against in child custody decisions.  Would the State party investigate this issue?

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said the child maintenance review group was established in 2020 to assess whether to establish a State child maintenance agency; it had decided that such an agency should not be established.  Instead, it had called for a review of the enforcement of child maintenance orders to be undertaken and had issued 26 recommendations to ensure compliance with such orders.  Guidelines on the implementation of the recommendations were being developed. There had been significant increases in child support and working family payments recently.

    New legislation passed last year included provisions to make the family court process more accessible and less costly. The best interests of the child were a primary consideration in all family court proceedings.

    Frontline professionals across the justice sector were trained on identifying risks of sexual and gender-based violence and responding to such violence effectively.  Staff of the probation service were also trained on risk assessment and recognising cases of sexual and gender-based violence.

    The civil legal aid review was completed in May 2025 and the Government was now considering its results.  The judicial appointments act included provisions promoting equal numbers of men and women as members of the judiciary. The gender pay gap platform would allow for assessment of the pay gap in the legal sector.

    Concluding Remarks 

    COLM BROPHY, Minister of State for Migration of Ireland and head of the delegation, thanked the Committee for the constructive dialogue.  The Committee had invested significant time in understanding the issues facing women and girls in Ireland.  Ireland was committed to its obligations under the Convention and to the United Nations more broadly.  The State would develop measures in response to the Committee’s concluding observations, and brief civil society on them.  Mr. Brophy closed by thanking all those who had contributed to the dialogue. 

    NAHLA HAIDAR, Committee Chair, thanked the State party for its responses and its support to the treaty bodies, international law and the rule of law.  The dialogue had provided the Committee with further insight into the efforts made by Ireland to implement the Convention for the benefit of women and girls in the State.  The Committee would develop concluding observations to strengthen the implementation of the Convention in Ireland, including recommendations for immediate follow-up.  It looked forward to its next dialogue with the State party.

    ___________

    Produced by the United Nations Information Service in Geneva for use of the media; 
    not an official record. English and French versions of our releases are different as they are the product of two separate coverage teams that work independently.

     

    CEDAW25.015E

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: An impact-based early warning module in Nepal’s BIPAD portal

    Source: UNISDR Disaster Risk Reduction

    Nepal has developed an impact-based forecasting tool for floods, earthquakes, forest fires and air pollution, with historical loss data informing the impact estimates. Originally designed as a prototype for riverine floods and piloted at two river stations in West Nepal, the tool has since developed and improved and is designed for near-real-time estimates of impact, providing visualisations of hotspots for potential damage and loss

    The National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Authority of the Government of Nepal oversees and manages the national disaster information management system, the Building Information Against Disaster (BIPAD) portal. The system consists of separate platforms for national, provincial, and municipal governments, and features several modules, including risk information as well as damage and loss data.

    Recently, a new module on impact-based forecasting has been developed and integrated into the portal (Figure 6).

    The module quantifies and visualises three main elements in a dashboard: exposed buildings, road and land use in flood-prone regions using OpenStreetMap data overlayed with flood hazard maps; at-risk households, using household-level data collected by the Nepal Red Cross Society and scoring risk based on the INFORM Index; and potential flood impact. The potential flood impact is estimated including the use of historical disaster loss data as a reference.

    The prototype module is being tested and planned improvements include the integration of local forecasts from the Department of Hydrology and Meteorology with higher accuracy for shorter lead times. For this, more reliable and locally available flood forecast data needs to be integrated into the portal along with flood extent maps.

    Recent studies have shown that risk model outputs for early warning become more sensitive to vulnerability parameters as compared to hazard, the shorter the lead time. This means, while hazard-based risk forecasts provide useful information in the weeks of even several days ahead of an event, pre-existing vulnerability and historical impact data becomes more important for impact estimates one or two days or just hours ahead of the event.

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI Canada: B.C. strengthens response to repeat violent offending

    Source: Government of Canada regional news

    Abbotsford Police Department:

    A total of $643,000 in SITE funding was allocated to support the Abbotsford Police Department’s Project Spotlight, an eight-month initiative targeting repeat violent offenders involved in violent property crimes.

    Combining uniformed and undercover resources, officers employed a variety of tactics including surveillance and patrols by vehicle, foot, bike and ATV. The project involved collaboration with loss prevention officers, business owners and criminal-justice partners to remove repeat violent offenders from the community and streamline justice processes.

    The project resulted in 272 individuals investigated, 108 people charged with 271 offences, and 122 warrant arrests. Officers also seized weapons, drugs, cash and stolen property, issued 106 violation tickets, prohibited eight impaired drivers and impounded several vehicles.

    Cranbrook RCMP:

    Two projects with more than $148,000 in funding were used to engage with a prolific repeat violent offender who had committed armed robbery. The investigation and subsequent arrest disrupted the individual’s ongoing criminal activities, resulting in seized firearms and yielding evidence that resulted in Criminal Code charges.

    Kelowna RCMP:

    Three projects with more than $216,000 in funding were used to support a joint Lake Country and Kelowna RCMP operation targeting a violent offender’s property.

    Surveillance led to investigations into various property crime offenders and drug traffickers, resulting in recovered stolen vehicles and the seizure of drugs (meth, cocaine, fentanyl) and weapons, including 20 firearms, ammunition and a live grenade.

    Twenty-two individuals were investigated during this time, of whom five individuals were charged with 16 offences. Since the search warrant was enforced, there was a notable decrease in activity at the residence and the surrounding area.

    Prince George RCMP:

    To address rising violent crime and street disorder linked to the opioid crisis, homelessness and public disruptions in downtown Prince George, the RCMP secured more than $93,000 in SITE funding to support overtime patrols from November 2023 to April 2024.

    Overtime members conducted high-visibility patrols in violent crime hot spots, assisted with the removal of illegal encampments and disrupted ongoing criminal activity. The initiative resulted in more than 380 individuals investigated, including 12 ReVOII-prioritized individuals, 50 arrests on outstanding warrants, five breach-related arrests and 32 individuals charged with a total of 86 charges. Officers also seized numerous weapons and illicit substances. Throughout the initiative, officers engaged directly with business owners and civilians, who expressed strong appreciation for the increased police presence and its impact on community safety.

    Surrey police service (SPS):

    The SPS has received more than $181,000 for two projects focused on dealing with repeat violent offenders in the community.

    In December 2024, the SPS was notified of the imminent release of a high-priority ReVOII individual from provincial custody.

    In response, the SPS swiftly implemented an operational plan to conduct surveillance of the individual over a weekend period. This proactive approach allowed officers to gather updated intelligence on the offender. Within two weeks, the individual breached probation conditions and was arrested by SPS officers. During the arrest, a knife and a conducted energy weapon were seized. At the conclusion of the SITE-funded initiative, the ReVOII offender remained in custody.

    Surrey RCMP:

    When police of jurisdiction, the Surrey RCMP received almost $314,000 in SITE funding for six projects focused on dealing with repeat violent offenders in the community.

    Projects involved visible, proactive police work in specific areas of the city to prevent crime. Some were also done in conjunction with the Metro Vancouver Transit Police and involved uniformed foot patrols around Surrey’s transit hubs. These patrols aimed to make people feel safer and deter violence.

    Projects also focused on taking quick action to deal with a violent repeat offender living in the community.

    Vancouver Police Department (VPD):

    In Vancouver, more than $2 million has been allocated to the VPD to support 16 police operations to address repeat offending in the downtown core, particularly street disorder and associated forms of violent crime, including projects focused in the Downtown Eastside.

    In September 2024, the Province committed up to $1 million in SITE funding to the VPD for Project Brighthaven (part of Task Force Barrage) to address public safety concerns related to violence and street disorder in the Gastown and Hastings area.

    On Feb. 20, 2025, the VPD reported that in Hastings Crossing, violent crime decreased 27% between Oct. 1, 2024, and Jan. 31, 2025, compared to the preceding four months and was down 18% compared to the same period one year previously.

    In Gastown, assaults involving weapons and assaults causing bodily harm decreased by 45% compared to the preceding four months and were down 59% compared to the same period one year previously.

    Thanks to the SITE initiative, January 2025 saw the fewest number of violent crimes and property crimes in Hastings Crossing in more than two years.

    Victoria Police Department (VicPD):

    VicPD secured more than $150,000 in SITE funding to implement three iterations of Project Lifter, an initiative targeting organized retail theft involving violence.

    Through overtime patrols, officers worked in partnership with 13 retailers and more than 30 loss-prevention officers over 11 days. The initiative focused on individuals engaged in violent thefts and incorporated outreach efforts to connect repeat offenders with housing, substance-use and other community supports.

    The projects led to 141 individuals being investigated, 113 individuals charged and 155 charges recommended to Crown. Police also made 31 arrests for warrants or breaches, including 13 individuals arrested multiple times and two identified as ReVOII-prioritized. Officers seized a range of weapons, and recovered more than $65,000 in stolen merchandise.

    MIL OSI Canada News

  • MIL-OSI Canada: Samuel De Champlain Bridge: Special Illumination for National Indigenous Peoples Day

    Source: Government of Canada News

    Media advisory

    Montreal, Quebec, June 20, 2025 — On June 21, the Samuel De Champlain Bridge will be lit up in yellow, blue, green, orange and pink from sunset to 1 a.m. to mark National Indigenous Peoples Day.

    Contacts

    For more information (media only), please contact:

    Sofia Ouslis
    Press Secretary
    Office of the Minister of Housing, Infrastructure and Communities
    Sofia.Ouslis@infc.gc.ca

    Media Relations
    Housing, Infrastructure and Communities Canada
    613-960-9251
    Toll free: 1-877-250-7154
    Email: media-medias@infc.gc.ca
    Follow us on XFacebookInstagram and LinkedIn
    Web: Housing, Infrastructure and Communities Canada

    MIL OSI Canada News

  • MIL-OSI USA: FEMA Authorizes Funds to Fight Upper Applegate Road Fire in Oregon

    Source: US Federal Emergency Management Agency

    Headline: FEMA Authorizes Funds to Fight Upper Applegate Road Fire in Oregon

    FEMA Authorizes Funds to Fight Upper Applegate Road Fire in Oregon

    BOTHELL, Wash

     –  The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) authorized the use of federal funds to help with firefighting costs for the Upper Applegate Road Fire burning in Jackson County, Oregon

     The state of Oregon’s request for a declaration under FEMA’s Fire Management Assistance Grant (FMAG) program was approved by FEMA Region 10 Acting Administrator Vincent J

    Maykovich on Wednesday, June 18, 2025 at 8:49 p

    m

    PT

    He determined that the Upper Applegate Road Fire threatened to cause such destruction as would constitute a major disaster

     This is the third FMAG declaration in 2025 to help fight Oregon wildfires

     At the time of the state’s request, the wildfire threatened homes in and around the communities of Upper Applegate, Ruch, and Buncom

     The fire was also threatening communication infrastructure, electric utilities, trail and campground recreation sites, watershed, fishing and spawning sites, environmental resources, and cultural resources

     FMAGs make funding available to pay up to 75 percent of a state’s eligible firefighting costs for fires that threaten to become major disasters

    Eligible items can include expenses for field camps, equipment use, materials, supplies and mobilization and demobilization activities attributed to fighting the fire

    These grants do not provide assistance to individual home or business owners and do not cover other infrastructure damage caused by the fire

      
    joy

    li
    Fri, 06/20/2025 – 17:37

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: President Donald J. Trump Approves Major Disaster Declaration for Tennessee

    Source: US Federal Emergency Management Agency

    Headline: President Donald J

    Trump Approves Major Disaster Declaration for Tennessee

    President Donald J

    Trump Approves Major Disaster Declaration for Tennessee

    WASHINGTON — FEMA announced that federal disaster assistance is available to the state of Tennessee to supplement recovery efforts in the areas affected by severe storms, straight-line winds, tornadoes and flooding from April 2-24, 2025

     The President’s action makes federal funding available to affected individuals in Cheatham, Davidson, Dickson, Dyer, Hardeman, McNairy, Montgomery, Obion and Wilson counties

    Assistance can include grants for temporary housing and home repairs, low-cost loans to cover uninsured property losses and other programs to help individuals and business owners recover from the effects of the disaster

     Federal funding is also available to state and eligible local governments and certain private nonprofit organizations on a cost-sharing basis for emergency work and the repair or replacement of facilities damaged by the severe storms, straight-line winds, tornadoes and flooding in Cheatham, Davidson, Decatur, Dyer, Fayette, Gibson, Grundy, Hardeman, Hardin, Haywood, Henry, Hickman, Lauderdale, Madison, McNairy, Obion, Perry, Stewart and Tipton counties

     Darryl L

    Dragoo has been named the Federal Coordinating Officer for federal recovery operations in the affected areas

    Additional designations may be made at a later date if warranted by the results of damage assessments

     Individuals and business owners who sustained losses in the designated areas should first file claims with their insurance providers and then apply for assistance by registering online at www

    DisasterAssistance

    gov, by calling 1-800-621-3362 or by using the FEMA App

    If you use a relay service, such as video relay service (VRS), captioned telephone service or others, provide FEMA the number for that service

    amy

    ashbridge
    Fri, 06/20/2025 – 15:54

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: FEMA Authorizes Funds to Fight Utah’s Forsyth Fire

    Source: US Federal Emergency Management Agency

    Headline: FEMA Authorizes Funds to Fight Utah’s Forsyth Fire

    FEMA Authorizes Funds to Fight Utah’s Forsyth Fire

    DENVER – This morning, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) authorized the use of federal funds to help with firefighting costs for the Forsyth Fire burning in Washington County, Utah near Pine Valley

    FEMA Region 8 approved the state’s request for a federal Fire Management Assistance Grant (FMAG) after receiving the request Thursday night and determining that the fire threatened such destruction that it would constitute a major disaster

    At the time of the request, the Forsyth Fire was threatening more than 400 homes, which were under an evacuation order

    The fire started on Thursday and has burned more than 500 acres

    The authorization makes FEMA funding available to pay 75 percent of the state’s eligible firefighting costs under an approved grant for managing, mitigating and controlling designated fires

    These grants do not provide assistance to individual home or business owners and do not cover other infrastructure damage caused by the fire

    Fire Management Assistance Grants are provided through the President’s Disaster Relief Fund and are made available by FEMA to assist in fighting fires that threaten to cause a major disaster

    Eligible items can include expenses for field camps; equipment use, repair and replacement; mobilization and demobilization activities; and tools, materials and supplies

     For more information on FMAGs, visit  https://www

    fema

    gov/fire-management-assistance-grants-program-details

    minh

    phan
    Fri, 06/20/2025 – 13:59

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: NASA History News and Notes – Summer 2025

    Source: NASA

    In the summer 2025 issue of the NASA History Office’s News & Notes newsletter, examples of leadership and critical decision-making in NASA’s history form the unifying theme. Among the topics discussed are NASA’s Shuttle-Centaur program, assessing donations to the NASA Archives, how the discovery of the first exoplanet orbiting a sun-like star catalyzed NASA’s exoplanet program, and Chief of the Medical Operations Office Charles A. Berry’s decisions surrounding crew health when planning the Project Gemini missions.

    Volume 42, Number 2Summer 2025

    From the Chief Historian
    By Brian Odom
    NASA’s is a history marked by critical decisions. From George Mueller’s 1963 decision for “all up” testing of the Saturn V rocket to Michael Griffin’s 2006 decision to launch a final servicing mission to the Hubble Space Telescope, the agency has continually met key inflection points with bold decisions. These choices, such as the decision to send a crewed Apollo 8 mission around the Moon in December 1968, stand at the center of the agency’s national legacy and promote confidence in times of crisis.  Continue Reading
    Shuttle-Centaur: Loss of Launch Vehicle Redundancy Leads to Discord
    By Robert Arrighi
    “Although the Shuttle/Centaur decision was very difficult to make, it is the proper thing to do, and this is the time to do it.” With those words on June 19, 1986, NASA Administrator James Fletcher canceled the intensive effort to integrate the Centaur upper stage with the Space Shuttle to launch the Galileo and Ulysses spacecraft. The decision, which was tied to increased safety measures following the loss of Challenger several months earlier, brought to the forefront the 1970s decision to launch all U.S. payloads with the Space Shuttle. Continue Reading

    A View into NASA’s Response to the Apollo 1 Tragedy
    By Kate Mankowski
    On January 27, 1967, Mission AS-204 (later known as Apollo 1) was conducting a simulated countdown when a fire suddenly broke out in the spacecraft, claiming the lives of astronauts Virgil I. “Gus” Grissom, Edward H. White, and Roger B. Chaffee. The disaster highlighted the risks that come with spaceflight and the work that still needed to be accomplished to meet President Kennedy’s challenge of going to the Moon before the end of the decade. With the complexity of the Apollo spacecraft, discerning the cause of the fire proved to be incredibly difficult. Continue Reading
    The Fight to Fund AgRISTARS
    By Brad Massey
    Robert MacDonald, the manager of NASA’s Large Area Crop Inventory Experiment (LACIE), was not pleased in January 1978 after he read a draft copy of the U.S. General Accounting Office’s (GAO’s) “Crop Forecasting by Satellite: Progress and Problems” report. The draft’s authors argued that LACIE had not achieved its goals of accurately predicting harvest yields in the mid-1970s. Therefore, congressional leaders should “be aware of the disappointing performance of LACIE to date when considering the future direction of NASA’s Landsat program and the plans of the Department of Agriculture.” Continue Reading
    The Hubble Space Telescope: The Right Project at the Right Time
    By Jillian Rael
    This year, NASA commemorates 35 years of the Hubble Space Telescope’s study of the cosmos. From observations of never-before-seen phenomena within our solar system, to the discovery of distant galaxies, the confirmation of the existence of supermassive black holes, and precision measurements of the universe’s expansion, Hubble has made incredible contributions to science, technology, and even art. Yet, for all its contemporary popularity, the Hubble program initially struggled for congressional approval and consequential funding. For its part, NASA found new ways to compromise and cut costs, while Congress evaluated national priorities and NASA’s other space exploration endeavors against the long-range value of Hubble. Continue Reading

    Appraisal: The Science and Art of Assessing Donations to the NASA Archives
    By Alan Arellano
    The major functions of an archivist center include appraising, arranging, describing, preserving, and providing access to historical records and documents. While together these are pillars of archival science, they are more of an art than a science in their application, fundamentally necessitating skilled decision making. Throughout the NASA archives, staff members make these decisions day in and day out. Continue Reading
    Orbit Shift: How 50 Pegasi b Helped Pull NASA Toward the Stars in the 1990s
    By Lois Rosson
    On October 20, 1995, the New York Times reported the detection of a distant planet orbiting a Sun-like star. The star, catalogued as 51 Pegasi by John Flamsteed in the 18th century, was visible to the naked eye as part of the constellation Pegasus—and had wobbled on its axis just enough that two Swiss astronomers were able to deduce the presence of another object exerting its gravitational pull on the star’s rotation. The discovery was soon confirmed by other astronomers, and 51 Pegasi b was heralded as the first confirmed exoplanet orbiting a star similar to our own Sun. Continue Reading

    Four, Eight, Fourteen Days: Charles A. Berry, Gemini, and the Critical Steps to Living and Working in Space
    By Jennifer Ross-Nazzal
    In 1963, critical decisions had to be made about NASA’s upcoming Gemini missions if the nation were to achieve President John F. Kennedy’s lunar goals. Known as the bridge to Apollo, Project Gemini was critical to landing a man on the Moon by the end of the decade and returning him safely to Earth. The project would demonstrate that astronauts could rendezvous and dock their spacecraft to another space vehicle and give flight crews the opportunity to test the planned extravehicular capabilities in preparation for walking on the lunar surface on future Apollo flights. Perhaps most importantly, Gemini had to show that humans could live and work in space for long periods of time, a fiercely debated topic within and outside of the agency.  Continue Reading

    Imagining Space: The Life and Art of Robert McCall
    By Sandra Johnson
    As we walked into Bob McCall’s Arizona home, it quickly became obvious that two talented and creative people lived there. Tasked with interviewing one of the first artists to be invited to join the NASA Art Program, our oral history team quickly realized the session with McCall would include a unique perspective on NASA’s history. We traveled to Arizona in the spring of 2000 to capture interviews with some of the pioneers of spaceflight and had already talked to an eclectic group of subjects in their homes, including a flight controller for both Gemini and Apollo, an astronaut who had flown on both Skylab and Space Shuttle missions, a former NASA center director, and two former Women’s Airforce Service Pilots (WASPs) who ferried airplanes during WWII. However, unlike most interviews, the setting itself provided a rare glimpse into the man and his inspiration.  Continue Reading
    Inside the Archives: Biomedical Branch Files
    By Alejandra Lopez
    The Biomedical Branch Files (1966–2008) in the Johnson Space Center archives showcase the inner workings of a NASA office established to perform testing to provide a better understanding of the impacts of spaceflight on the human body. Ranging from memos and notes to documents and reports, this collection is an invaluable resource on the biomedical research done with NASA’s Apollo, Skylab, Space Shuttle, and Space Station projects. Files in the collection cover work done by groups within the branch such as the Toxicology, Microbiology, Clinical, and Biochemistry Laboratories. It also reveals the branch’s evolution and changes in its decision-making process over the years. Continue Reading

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Cornyn, Colleagues Introduce Resolution Recognizing Juneteenth

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Texas John Cornyn
    News
    June 18, 2025
    WASHINGTON – Today, U.S. Senator John Cornyn (R-TX), who successfully led the effort in Congress to make Juneteenth a federal holiday, introduced a bipartisan Senate resolution along with 31 of his Senate colleagues recognizing Juneteenth Independence Day. Text is below, and you can view the full resolution here.
    “Whereas news of the end of slavery did not reach the frontier areas of the United States, in particular the State of Texas and the other Southwestern States, until months after the conclusion of the Civil War, more than 21⁄2 years after President Abraham Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation on January 1, 1863;
    Whereas, on June 19, 1865, Union soldiers, led by Major General Gordon Granger, arrived in Galveston, Texas, with news that the Civil War had ended and the enslaved were free;
    Whereas African Americans who had been slaves in the Southwest celebrated June 19, commonly known as “Juneteenth National Independence Day,” as inspiration and encouragement for future generations;
    Whereas African Americans from the Southwest have continued the tradition of observing Juneteenth National Independence Day for more than 150 years;
    Whereas Juneteenth National Independence Day began as a holiday in the State of Texas and is now a Federal holiday that is celebrated in all 50 States and the District of Columbia as a special day of observance in recognition of the emancipation of all slaves in the United States;
    Whereas Juneteenth National Independence Day celebrations have been held to honor African-American freedom while encouraging self-development and respect for all cultures;
    Whereas the faith and strength of character demonstrated by former slaves and the descendants of former slaves remain an example for all people of the United States, regardless of background, religion, or race;
    Whereas slavery was not officially abolished until the ratification of the 13th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States in December 1865; and
    Whereas, over the course of its history, the United States has grown into a symbol of democracy and freedom around the world: Now, therefore, be it
    Resolved, That the Senate—
    (1)   commemorates June 19, 2025, as “Juneteenth National Independence Day;”
    (2)   recognizes the historical significance of Juneteenth National Independence Day to the United States;
    (3)   supports the continued nationwide celebration of Juneteenth National Independence Day to provide an opportunity for the people of the United States to learn more about the past and to better understand the experiences that have shaped the United States; and
    (4)   recognizes that the observance of the end of slavery is part of the history and heritage of the United States.”
    Senators Kirsten Gillibrand (D-NY), Ted Cruz (R-TX), Bill Cassidy (R-LA), Catherine Cortez Masto (D-NV), Susan Collins (R-ME), Angus King (I-ME), Richard Blumenthal (D-CT), Kevin Cramer (R-ND), Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH), Raphael Warnock (D-GA), Mark Kelly (D-AZ), Ron Johnson (R-WI), Sheldon Whitehouse (D-RI), Maria Cantwell (D-WA), Mazie Hirono (D-HI), Cindy Hyde-Smith (R-MS), John Hickenlooper (D-CO), Tim Scott (R-SC), John Hoeven (R-ND), Roger Wicker (R-MS), Todd Young (R-IN), Marsha Blackburn (R-TN), Jim Justice (R-WV), Katie Britt (R-AL), Bernie Sanders (I-VT), Tim Kaine (D-VA), Dick Durbin (D-IL), Ron Wyden (D-OR), Jeff Merkley (D-OR), Alex Padilla (D-CA), and Cory Booker (D-NJ) joined the resolution.
    Background:
    Sen. Cornyn has been a leader in introducing a resolution honoring Juneteenth each year since 2011. In 2021, Sen. Cornyn’s legislation to establish Juneteenth as a federal holiday was signed into law. He also authored a bill with the late Congresswoman Sheila Jackson Lee (TX-18) for a federal study of a National Emancipation Trail from Galveston to Houston, following the path of slaves freed on June 19, 1865 to spread the news, which was signed into law in 2020.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: EIB backs new military base in Lithuania with €540 million loan

    Source: European Investment Bank

    • EIB approves €540 million loan for Lithuanian military base in Rūdninkai to strengthen NATO defence capabilities.
    • Base near border with Belarus to host German military brigade, feature training, medical and housing facilities.
    • EIB financing reflects commitment to European security and defence.

    The European Investment Bank (EIB) plans to lend €540 million for Lithuania to build a military base south of the capital Vilnius, highlighting Europe’s collective commitment to bolster its defence infrastructure and deterrence capacity. The new base in Rūdninkai will host a German brigade, strengthening the rapid-response capabilities of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the region.

    Construction of the Rūdninkai military site, which will be located 35 kilometres from the border with Belarus, is due to begin in 2026. The project will span 170 hectares, lay out 11 kilometres of roads and feature around 150 buildings including medical centres, residential units, training facilities, warehouses, hangars and helipads.

    “This is a landmark step in how we support Europe’s security,” EIB Group President Nadia Calviño said in Luxembourg where she met Lithuanian Finance Minister Rimantas Šadžius. “By financing large-scale military infrastructure, we’re demonstrating our readiness to meet the region’s evolving defence needs. It reflects the EIB’s growing role in safeguarding stability across the European Union.”

    The initiative is strategically important for NATO’s eastern defence. Rūdninkai is near a narrow corridor that represents the only land route between the Baltic states and the rest of NATO as well as of the EU. The corridor, known as the Suwałki Gap, is bordered by Belarus to the southeast and Russia’s Kaliningrad exclave to the northwest.

    The financing from the EIB is part of its recently expanded scope of activities in the areas of security and defence to include military investments that align with the EU’s goals of bolstering preparedness and crisis management. The approved EIB loan will be to private partners to be selected by the Lithuanian Ministry of Defence to carry out the project.

    “I greatly appreciate the invaluable expertise and financial support from the EIB in implementing the Rūdninkai project that will strengthen Lithuania’s defense capabilities,” said Lithuanian Finance Minister Šadžius. “We are already seeing the results of financial diplomacy and we can confidently state that the EIB’s involvement will contribute not only to Lithuania’s debt sustainability and stronger fiscal stance but also to the security of our country.”

    The EIB Board of Directors approved the €540 million loan at a meeting on 19 June in Luxembourg. The endorsement paves the way for legal and financial negotiations over the loan that are expected to be completed in the coming months. 

    “This investment marks a historic milestone for Lithuania’s national security and NATO’s collective defence,” said Lithuanian Minister of National Defence Dovilė Šakalienė. “The Rūdninkai military base will not only strengthen our defence posture but also serve as a permanent home for the German brigade – a cornerstone of NATO’s deterrence in the region. The EIB’s support is a clear sign that European resilience begins with shared responsibility.”

    The EIB backing for the Rūdninkai military site will help spread the costs of the project, easing the burden on Lithuanian finances and on companies involved in an initiative that takes the form of a public-private partnership (PPP). The EIB is also providing advisory services to ensure that the PPP agreements meet market standards and follow best practices.

    The Rūdninkai base will accommodate around 4,000 German troops and 750 civilian personnel.

    In April 2025 Germany activated the 45th Panzer Brigade of the German Armed Forces (Bundeswehr), also known as the Lithuania Brigade. For Germany, it`s the first brigade-sized unit to be based abroad permanently since World War II.

    Background information   

    EIB Group

    The European Investment Bank (ElB) is the long-term lending institution of the European Union, owned by its Member States. Built around eight core priorities, the EIB finances investments that contribute to EU policy objectives by bolstering climate action and the environment, digitalisation and technological innovation, security and defence, cohesion, agriculture and the bioeconomy, social infrastructure, the capital markets union and a stronger Europe in a more peaceful and prosperous world.  

    The EIB Group, which also includes the European Investment Fund (EIF), signed nearly €89 billion in new financing for over 900 high-impact projects in 2024, boosting Europe’s competitiveness and security.    

    The EIB Group stepped up its support to Europe’s security and defence industry by expanding the scope of projects eligible for financing and setting up a one-stop shop to streamline processes, doubling investment to €1 billion in 2024. The EIB Group expects to multiply this amount in 2025 to new record.

    The Board of Directors in March approved a series of additional measures to further contribute to European peace and included peace and security as a cross-cutting Public Policy Goal to finance large-scale strategic projects in areas such as land-border protection, military mobility, critical infrastructure, military transport, space, cybersecurity, anti-jamming technologies, radar systems, military equipment and facilities, drones, bio-hazard and seabed infrastructure protection, critical raw materials and research. 

    High-quality, up-to-date photos of the EIB Group’s headquarters for media use are available here

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI NGOs: On World Refugee Day, States throughout the Americas must uphold the right to seek asylum  

    Source: Amnesty International –

    In response to measures being adopted by states across the Americas that violate the human rights of people seeking safety, Ana Piquer, Americas director at Amnesty International, said the following:

    “On World Refugee Day, we are witnessing a devasting erosion of the rights of people seeking safety and asylum protections across the Americas. The Trump administration has issued a barrage of executive actions which have halted the US Refugee Admissions Program and make it nearly impossible to seek asylum in the United States, placing countless lives at risk. These policies have already resulted in thousands of people being forcibly returned to places where their lives or safety are at risk. Currently, there is no longer any way for people to seek asylum at the US-Mexico border. This is not only unlawful but inhumane and cruel.

    The Trump administration has issued a barrage of executive actions which have halted the US Refugee Admissions Program and make it nearly impossible to seek asylum in the United States, placing countless lives at risk…This is not only unlawful but inhumane and cruel.

    Ana Piquer, Americas director at Amnesty International.

    The Trump administration has also dismantled other critical protections for people seeking safety, including stripping Temporary Protected Status from individuals of certain nationalities and revoking humanitarian parole granted to Cubans, Haitians, Nicaraguans and Venezuelans, which contradicts the narrative that these very same countries are experiencing the most dire human rights crises in the region. At the same time, the United States has escalated mass immigration raids, is detaining and separating families, is unlawfully removing individuals from the US with no due process guarantees, and is criminally prosecuting individuals for the way in which they entered the country – treating people in need of international protection as criminals.

    These harmful policies have rippled across the region. Costa Rica and Panama have accepted deportation flights of third-country nationals from the United States – many with ongoing asylum claims – leaving them stranded with limited access to humanitarian assistance and international protection. El Salvador is complicit in the enforced disappearance of hundreds of Venezuelans illegally expelled from the US under the guise of the Alien Enemies Act in the notorious CECOT prison, who were in the midst of ongoing court processes, were arrested while complying with their immigration obligations, were already granted protections in the United States including under the Convention Against Torture, and were labeled as gang members for their tattoos or connection to the Venezuelan state of Aragua with no other evidence.

    The Safe Third Country Agreement (STCA) between Canada and the United States bars most people crossing into Canada via the United States from seeking refugee protection in Canada, and vice versa. The agreement has forced individuals to attempt dangerous border crossings and has pushed people underground in order to seek safety, and resulted in people and families detained in the US. As the United States becomes increasingly unsafe for asylum seekers, the Canadian government must withdraw from the agreement immediately. 

    The Dominican Republic has been implementing a series of racist migration policies, without even recognizing the right to seek asylum for those fleeing violence from Haiti, and targeting people of Haitian origin. Haitians are being collectively expelled from the Dominican Republic despite the worsening humanitarian and security crisis in Haiti, placing those forcibly returned at grave risk and undermining the principle of non-refoulement.   

    People from Venezuela, Haiti, Cuba, Nicaragua, and across the region and beyond are fleeing widespread human rights crises. Instead of finding refuge and protection, they are being met with hostility, militarized borders and criminalization. The immigration and asylum policies being implemented by countries across the Americas are fueled by racist and xenophobic rhetoric that dehumanizes people seeking safety. 

    The immigration and asylum policies being implemented by countries across the Americas are fueled by racist and xenophobic rhetoric that dehumanizes people seeking safety. 

    Ana Piquer, Americas director at Amnesty International.

    The situation is further exacerbated by the US government’s severe cuts to foreign assistance, which have weakened shelters and frontline organizations that provide life-saving support to people seeking safety and internally displaced people. From Costa Rica to Mexico to the Haiti-Dominican Republic border, organizations have been forced to scale back or close food, shelter and legal and psychosocial programs for people seeking safety, just as need grows. 

    On World Refugee Day, Amnesty International urgently calls on states in the Americas to protect, not punish, people seeking safety. States must immediately restore access to asylum, reverse discriminatory policies and uphold their obligations under international law. We stand in solidarity with people across the region who have been forced to flee their homes in search of safety and dignity. Seeking safety is a human right. It’s time for governments to act like it.”

    MIL OSI NGO

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – Implementation report on the Recovery and Resilience Facility – P10_TA(2025)0128 – Wednesday, 18 June 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to Article 175 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/241 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 February 2021 establishing the Recovery and Resilience Facility(1) (RRF Regulation),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2023/435 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 February 2023 amending Regulation (EU) 2021/241 as regards REPowerEU chapters in recovery and resilience plans and amending Regulations (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) 2021/1060 and (EU) 2021/1755, and Directive 2003/87/EC(2) (REPowerEU Regulation),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget(3) (Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation),

    –  having regard to Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/765 of 29 February 2024 amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027(4) (MFF Regulation),

    –  having regard to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 16 December 2020 between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on budgetary discipline, on cooperation in budgetary matters and on sound financial management, as well as on new own resources, including a roadmap towards the introduction of new own resources(5) (the IIA),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union(6) (Financial Regulation),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/795 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 February 2024 establishing the Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform (STEP), and amending Directive 2003/87/EC and Regulations (EU) 2021/1058, (EU) 2021/1056, (EU) 2021/1057, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) 2021/1060, (EU) 2021/523, (EU) 2021/695, (EU) 2021/697 and (EU) 2021/241(7),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1263 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2024 on the effective coordination of economic policies and on multilateral budgetary surveillance and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97(8),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 23 June 2022 on the implementation of the Recovery and Resilience Facility(9),

    –  having regard to the Commission notice of 22 July 2024 entitled ‘Guidance on recovery and resilience plans’(10),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 21 February 2024 on strengthening the EU through ambitious reforms and investments (COM(2024)0082),

    –  having regard to the Commission’s third annual report of 10 October 2024 on the implementation of the Recovery and Resilience Facility (COM(2024)0474),

    –  having regard to the Court of Auditors’ (ECA) annual report of 10 October 2024 on the implementation of the budget for the 2023 financial year, together with the institutions’ replies,

    –  having regard to special report 13/2024 of the ECA of 2 September 2024 entitled ‘Absorption of funds from the Recovery and Resilience Facility – Progressing with delays and risks remain regarding the completion of measures and therefore the achievement of RRF objectives’, special report 14/2024 of the ECA of 11 September 2024 entitled ‘Green transition – Unclear contribution from the Recovery and Resilience Facility’, and special report 22/2024 of the ECA of 21 October 2024 entitled ‘Double funding from the EU budget – Control systems lack essential elements to mitigate the increased risk resulting from the RRF model of financing not linked to costs’,

    –  having regard to the study of December 2023 supporting the mid-term Evaluation of the Recovery and Resilience Facility,

    –  having regard to the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) 2024 annual report published on 3 March 2025,

    –  having regard to the report of September 2024 by Mario Draghi entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness’ (Draghi report),

    –  having regard to the opinion of the Committee of the Regions of 8 October 2024 entitled ‘Mid-term review of the post-COVID European recovery plan (Recovery and Resilience Facility)’(11),

    –  having regard to the information published on the Recovery and Resilience Scoreboard (RRF Scoreboard),

    –  having regard to the Commission staff working document of 20 November 2024 entitled ‘NGEU Green Bonds Allocation and Impact report 2024’ (SWD(2024)0275),

    –  having regard to its in-house research, in-depth analysis and briefings related to the implementation of the RRF(12),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 18 January 2024 on the situation in Hungary and frozen EU funds(13),

    –  having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure, as well as Article 1(1)(e) of, and Annex 3 to, the decision of the Conference of Presidents of 12 December 2002 on the procedure for granting authorisation to draw up own-initiative reports,

    –  having regard to the opinions of the Committee on Budgetary Control, the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs, the Committee on the Environment, Climate and Food Safety and the Committee on Transport and Tourism,

    –  having regard to the joint deliberations of the Committee on Budgets and the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs under Rule 59 of the Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgets and the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (A10-0098/2025),

    A.  whereas the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) was created to make European economies and societies more sustainable, resilient and better prepared in the light of unprecedented crises in 2019 and 2022, by supporting Member States in financing strategic investments and in implementing reforms;

    B.  whereas reforms and investments under the RRF help to make the EU more resilient and less dependent by diversifying key supply chains and thereby strengthening the strategic autonomy of the EU; whereas reforms and investments under the RRF also generate European added value;

    C.  whereas the RRF, as well as other EU funds, such as the European instrument for temporary support to mitigate unemployment risks in an emergency, has helped to protect labour markets from the risk of long-term damage caused by the double economic shock of the pandemic and the energy crisis;

    D.  whereas RRF expenditure falls outside the ceilings of the multiannual financial framework (MFF) and borrowing proceeds constitute external assigned revenue; whereas Parliament regrets that they do not form part of the budgetary procedure; whereas based on the Financial Regulation’s principle of transparency, citizens should know how and for what purpose funds are spent by the EU;

    E.  whereas, due to the lack of progress in introducing new own resources in the EU and the need to ensure the sustainability of the EU’s repayment plan, a clear and reliable long-term funding strategy is essential to meet repayment obligations without forcing difficult trade-offs in the EU budget that could undermine future investments and policy priorities; whereas further discussions and concrete financial solutions will be necessary to secure the long-term viability of the EU’s debt repayment plan;

    F.  whereas the borrowing costs for NextGenerationEU (NGEU) have to be borne by the EU budget and the actual costs exceed the 2020 projections by far as a result of the high interest rates; whereas the total costs for NGEU capital and interest repayments are projected to be around EUR 25 to 30 billion per year from 2028, equivalent to 15-20 % of the 2025 annual budget; whereas Parliament has insisted that the refinancing costs be placed over and above the MFF ceilings; whereas a three-step ‘cascade mechanism’ including a new special EURI instrument was introduced during the 2024 MFF revision to cover the significant cost overruns resulting from NGEU borrowing linked to major changes in the market conditions; whereas an agreement was reached during the 2025 budgetary procedure to follow an annual 50/50 benchmark, namely to finance the overrun costs in equal shares by the special EURI instrument de-commitment compartment and the Flexibility Instrument;

    G.  whereas the bonds issued to finance the RRF are to be repaid in a manner that ensures the steady and predictable reduction of liabilities, by 2058 at the latest; whereas the Council has yet to adopt the adjusted basket of new own resources proposed by the Commission, which raises concerns about the viability of the repayment of the debt undertaken under NGEU;

    H.  whereas the social dimension is a key aspect of the RRF, contributing to upward economic and social convergence, restoring and promoting sustainable growth and fostering the creation of high-quality employment;

    I.  whereas the RRF should contribute to financing measures to strengthen the Member States’ resilience to climate disasters, among other things, and enhance climate adaptation; whereas the Member States should conduct proper impact assessments for measures and should share best practice on the implementation of the ‘do no significant harm’ (DNSH) principle;

    J.  whereas the RRF plays an important role in supporting investments and reforms in sustainable mobility, smart transport infrastructure, alternative fuels and digital mobility solutions, thus enhancing connectivity and efficiency across the EU; whereas it is regrettable that only a few Member States chose to use the RRF to support investments, particularly in high-speed railway and waterway infrastructure, aimed at developing European corridors, despite the encouragement of cross-border and multi-country projects; whereas it is crucial to increase investments in transport infrastructure, particularly in underserved regions, to improve connectivity, support regional cohesion and contribute to the green transition;

    K.  whereas by 31 December 2024, Member States had submitted 95 payment requests and the level of RRF disbursements including pre-financing stood at EUR 197,46 billion in grants (55 % of the total grants envelope) and EUR 108,68 billion in loans (37 % of the total loans envelope); whereas three Member States have already received their fifth payment, while one Member State has not received any RRF funding; whereas all Member States have revised their national recovery and resilience plans (NRRP) at least once; whereas 28 % of milestones and targets have been satisfactorily fulfilled and the Commission has made use of the possibility to partially suspend payments where some milestones and targets linked to a payment request were not found to be satisfactorily fulfilled; whereas delays in the execution of planned reforms and investments, particularly in social infrastructure and public services, could lead to the underutilisation of available resources, thereby reducing the expected impact on economic growth, employment and social cohesion;

    L.  whereas the ECA has revealed various shortcomings of the RRF, in particular in relation to its design, its transparency and reporting, the risk of double funding and the implementation of twin transition measures;

    M.  whereas according to the ECA, performance is a measure of the extent to which an EU-funded action, project or programme has met its objectives and provides value for money; whereas moreover, financing not linked to costs does not, in itself, make an instrument performance-based;

    N.  whereas robust audit and control systems are crucial to protect the financial interests of the EU throughout the life cycle of the RRF; whereas the milestones commonly known as ‘super milestones’, in particular related to the rule of law, had to be fulfilled prior to any RRF disbursements;

    O.  whereas the RRF Regulation refers to the RRF’s ‘performance-based nature’ but does not define ‘performance’; whereas RRF performance should be linked to sound financial management principles and should measure how well an EU-funded action, project or programme has met its objectives and provided value for money;

    P.  whereas effective democratic control and parliamentary scrutiny over the implementation of the RRF require the full involvement of Parliament and the consideration of all its recommendations at all stages;

    Q.  whereas the Commission has to provide an independent ex post evaluation report on the implementation of the RRF by 31 December 2028, consisting of an assessment of the extent to which the objectives have been achieved, of the efficiency of the use of resources and of the European added value, as well as a global assessment of the RRF, and containing information on its impact in the long term;

    R.  whereas the purpose of this report is to monitor the implementation of the RRF, in accordance with Parliament’s role as laid down in the RRF Regulation, by pointing to the benefits and shortcomings of the RRF, while drawing on the lessons learnt during its implementation;

    Strengthening Europe’s social and economic resilience

    1.  Highlights the fact that the RRF is an unprecedented instrument of solidarity in the light of two unprecedented crises and a cornerstone of the NGEU instrument, ending in 2026; emphasises the importance of drawing lessons from its implementation for the upcoming MFF, including as regards transparency, reporting and coherent measurement of deliverables; highlights the stabilising effect of the RRF for Member States at a time of great economic uncertainty, as it mitigates negative economic and social consequences and supports governments by contributing to the implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights, by promoting economic recovery and competitiveness, boosting resilience and innovation, and by supporting the green and digital transitions;

    2.  Highlights the important role of the RRF in preventing the fragmentation of the internal market and the further deepening of macroeconomic divergence, in fostering social and territorial cohesion by providing macroeconomic stabilisation, and in offering assurance to the financial markets by improving investor confidence in turbulent times, thereby lowering yield spreads;

    3.  Welcomes the fact that the RRF is a one-off instrument providing additional fiscal space that has contributed to the prevention of considerable economic and social divergences between Member States with diverse fiscal space; highlights the Commission finding that the RRF has led to a sustained increase in investments across the EU and that the Commission expects the RRF to have a lasting impact across the EU beyond 2026, given its synergies with other EU funds; is, however, concerned that the RRF expiration in 2026 poses a significant risk of a substantial decline in public investment in common European priorities;

    4.  Recalls that the MFF and RRF combined amount to almost EUR 2 trillion for the 2021-2027 programming period, but points to the fact that the high inflation rates and the associated increases in the cost of goods and services have decreased the current value of European spending agreed in nominal terms;

    5.  Takes note of the Commission’s projection in 2024 concerning the potential of NGEU’s impact on the EU’s real gross domestic product (GDP) by 2026, which is significantly lower than its simulation in 2020 (1,4 % compared with 2,3 %), due in part to adverse economic and geopolitical conditions, and of the estimation that NGEU could lead to a sizeable, short-run increase in EU employment by up to 0,8 %; notes that the long-term benefits of the RRF on GDP will likely exceed the budgetary commitments undertaken by up to three to six times , depending on the productivity effects of RRF investment and the diligent implementation of reforms and investments;

    6.  Highlights the difficulty of quantifying the precise social and economic impact of the RRF, as it takes time for the impact of reforms and investments to become clear; stresses the need for further independent evaluations to assess the effective impact of reforms and investments and for further improvements of the underlying methodology; notes the Commission’s finding that approximately half of the expected increase in public investment between 2019 and 2025 is related to investment financed by the EU budget, particularly by the RRF, but notes that some investments have not yet delivered measurable impact;

    7.  Notes that the RRF has incentivised the implementation of some reforms included in the country-specific recommendations made in the context of the European Semester through the inclusion of such reforms in the NRRPs; underlines that there has been a qualitative leap forward in terms of monitoring RRF implementation; recalls that the RRF Scoreboard is used to monitor the progress made towards achieving milestones and targets, as well as compliance with horizontal principles, and in particular the six pillars, namely the green transition, the digital transformation, smart, sustainable and inclusive growth (including economic cohesion, jobs, productivity, competitiveness, research, development and innovation, and a well-functioning internal market with strong small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)), social and territorial cohesion, health, economic, social and institutional resilience with the aim of, inter alia, increasing crisis preparedness and crisis response capacity, and policies for the next generation, children and young people, such as education and skills; highlights that the overall uptake of country-specific recommendations made in the context of the European Semester remains low and has even dropped;

    8.  Highlights that in the context of the new economic governance framework, the set of reforms and investments underpinning an extension of the adjustment period should be consistent with the commitments included in the approved NRRPs during the period of operation of the RRF and the Partnership Agreement under the Common Provisions Regulation(14); observes that the five Member States that requested an extension of the adjustment period by 31 December 2024 relied partly on the reforms and investments already approved under the RRF to justify the extension; takes note of the fact that most Member States have included information on whether the reforms and investments listed in the medium-term fiscal-structural plans are linked to the RRF;

    9.  Welcomes the fact that the RRF provides support for both reforms and investments in the Member States, but notes with concern that the short timeframe for the remaining RRF implementation poses challenges to the completion of key reforms and large-scale investments that are to be finalised towards the end of the RRF and to the timely fulfilment of the 70 % of milestones and targets that are still pending;

    10.  Recalls that RRF expenditure should not substitute recurring national budgetary expenditure, unless duly justified, and should respect the principle of additionality of EU funding; insists that the firm, sustainable and verifiable implementation of non-recurrence, together with the targeting of clearly defined European objectives of reforms and investments, is key to ensure additionality and the long-lasting effect of additional European funds; recalls the need to uphold this principle and appeals against the crowding out or replacement of cohesion policy by the RRF or other temporary instruments, as cohesion policy remains essential for long-term sustainable territorial cohesion and convergence;

    11.  Highlights that prioritising RRF implementation, the lack of administrative capacity in many Member States and challenges posed by global supply chains have contributed to the delayed implementation of cohesion policy; calls on the Commission, in this context, to provide a comprehensive assessment of the RRF’s impact on other financial instruments and public investments, technical support, and the administrative and absorption capacities of the Member States;

    12.  Recalls that, in reaction to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, the REPowerEU revision contributes to Europe’s energy security by reducing its dependence on fossil fuels, diversifying its energy supplies, investing in European resources and infrastructure, tackling energy poverty and investing in energy savings and efficiency in all sectors, including transport; emphasises that through REPowerEU, an additional EUR 20 billion in grants was made available in 2023, including EUR 8 billion generated from the front-loading of Emissions Trading System allowances and EUR 12 billion from the Innovation Fund; highlights Parliament’s successes in negotiations, in particular on the provisions on replenishing the Innovation Fund, the 30 % funding target for cross-border projects, the focus of investments on tackling energy poverty for vulnerable households, SMEs and micro-enterprises, and the flexible use of unspent cohesion funds from the 2014-2020 MFF and of up to 7,5 % of national allocations under the 2021-2027 MFF;

    13.  Recalls its call to focus RRF interventions on measures with European added value and therefore regrets the shortage of viable cross-border or multi-country measures, including high-speed railway and sustainable mobility infrastructure projects for dual use that are essential for completing the TEN-T network, and the related risk of re-nationalising funding; notes that the broad scope of the RRF objectives has contributed to this by allowing a wide variety of nationally focused projects to fall within its remit;

    14.  Highlights the modification of Article 27 of the RRF Regulation through REPowerEU, which significantly strengthened the cross-border and multi-country dimensions of the RRF by encouraging the Member States to amend their NRRPs to add RepowerEU chapters, including a spending target of at least 30 % for such measures in order to guarantee the EU’s energy autonomy; is concerned by the broad interpretation adopted by the Commission, which allows any reduction in (national) energy demand to make a case for a cross-border and multi-country dimension;

    15.  Welcomes the possibility of using RRF funding to contribute to the objectives of the Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform (STEP) by supporting investments in critical technologies in the EU in order to boost its industrial competitiveness; notes that no Member State has made use of the possibility to include in its NRRP an additional cash contribution to STEP objectives via the Member State compartment of InvestEU; recalls that Member States can still amend their national plans in that regard; expects the revision processes to be efficient, streamlined and simple, especially considering the final deadline of 2026, the current geopolitical context and the need to invest in European defence capabilities;

    16.  Recalls the application of the DNSH principle for all reforms and investments supported by the RRF, with a targeted derogation under REPowerEU for energy infrastructure and facilities needed to meet immediate security of supply needs; encourages the Commission to assess the feasibility of a more uniform interpretation of the DNSH principle between the RRF and the EU taxonomy for sustainable activities, while taking into account the specificities of the RRF as a public expenditure programme;

    Financial aspects of the RRF

    17.  Stresses that the RRF is the first major performance-based instrument at EU level which is exclusively based on financing not linked to costs (FNLC); recalls that Article 8 of the RRF Regulation stipulates that the RRF must be implemented by the Commission in direct management in accordance with the relevant rules adopted pursuant to Article 322 TFEU, in particular the Financial Regulation and the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation; regrets that the Council did not agree to insert specific rules in the Financial Regulation to address the risks of this delivery model, such as double funding; considers that the rules of the Financial Regulation should be fully applicable to future instruments based on FNLC, including as regards fines, penalties and sanctions;

    18.  Notes that only 13 Member States have requested loans and that EUR 92 billion of the EUR 385,8 billion available will remain unused since this amount was not committed by the deadline of 31 December 2023; takes note of the fact that loans were attractive for Member States that faced higher borrowing costs on the financial markets or that sought to compensate for a reduction in RRF grants; points out that some Member States have made limited use of RRF loans, either due to strong fiscal positions or administrative considerations; calls on the Commission to analyse the reasons for the low uptake in some Member States and to consider these findings when designing future EU financial instruments; notes with concern that national financial instruments to implement the NRRPs have not been sufficiently publicised, leading to limited awareness and uptake by potential beneficiaries; considers that a political discussion is needed on the use of unspent funds in the light of tight public budgets and urgent EU strategic priorities; calls for an assessment of how and under which conditions unused RRF funds could be redirected to boost Europe’s competitiveness, resilience, defence, and social, economic and territorial cohesion, particularly through investments in digital and green technologies aligned with the RRF’s original purpose;

    19.  Recalls the legal obligation to ensure full repayment of NGEU expenditure by 31 December 2058 at the latest; reminds the Council and the Commission of their legal commitment under the interinstitutional agreement concluded in 2020 to ensure a viable path to refinancing NGEU debt, including through sufficient proceeds from new own resources introduced after 2021 without any undue reduction in programme expenditure or investment instruments under the MFF; deplores the lack of progress made in this regard, which raises concerns regarding the viability of the repayment of the debt undertaken under NGEU, and urges the Council to adopt new own resources without delay and as a matter of urgency; urges the Commission, furthermore, to continue efforts to identify additional genuine new own resources beyond the IIA and linked to EU policies, in order to cover the high spending needs associated with the funding of new priorities and the repayment of NGEU debt;

    20.  Notes with concern the Commission’s estimation that the total cost for NGEU capital and interest repayments are projected to be around EUR 25 to 30 billion per year from 2028, equivalent to 15-20 % of the 2025 annual budget ; recalls that recourse to special instruments had to be made in the last three budgetary procedures to cover EURI instrument costs; highlights that the significant increase in financing costs puts pressure on the future EU budget and limits the capacity to respond to future challenges;

    21.  Takes note of the Commission’s target to fund up to 30 % of NGEU costs by issuing greens bonds; notes that by 31 December 2024 the Commission had issued European green bonds amounting to EUR 68.2 billion;

    Design and implementation of NRRPs

    22.  Notes that 47 % of the available RRF funds had been disbursed by 31 December 2024, with grants reaching 55 % and loans 37 %, which has resulted in a high proportion of measures still to be completed in 2025 and 2026; is concerned, however, about the ECA’s finding that only 50 % of disbursed funds had reached final beneficiaries in 15 out of 22 Member States by October 2023; calls on the Commission to take the recommendations of the ECA duly into account in order to improve the functioning of any future performance-based instruments similar to the RRF, in particular in the context of a more targeted MFF;

    23.  Welcomes the fact that all Member States have surpassed the targets for the green (37 %) and the digital transitions (20 %), with average expenditure towards climate and digital objectives of the RRF as a whole standing at 42 % and 26 % respectively; notes that the ECA has cast doubt on how the implementation of RRF measures has contributed to the green transition and has recommended improvements to the methodologies used to estimate the impact of climate-related measures; highlights the fact that the same methodological deficiencies exist across all pillars of the RRF;

    24.  Notes the tangible impact that the RRF could have on social objectives, with Member States planning to spend around EUR 163 billion; underlines that such spending must be result-oriented, ensuring measurable economic and/or social benefits; stresses the need to accelerate investments in the development of rural, peripheral and outermost, isolated and remote areas, and in the fields of affordable housing, social protection and the integration of vulnerable groups, and youth employment, where expenditure is lagging behind; calls for an in-depth evaluation by the Commission, under the RRF Scoreboard, of the projects and reforms related to education and young people implemented by Member States under the RRF; regrets the delayed implementation of health objectives observed in certain Member States, given that the instrument should also improve the accessibility and capacity of health systems, and of key social infrastructure investments, including early childhood education and care facilities; stresses that these delays, in some cases linked to shifting budgetary priorities and revised national implementation timelines, risk undermining the achievement of the RRF’s social cohesion objectives;

    25.  Reiterates its negotiating position to include targets for education (10 %) and for cultural activities (2 %); encourages the Commission’s effort to evaluate these targets as a benchmark in its assessment of education policy in NRRPs, through the RRF Scoreboard;

    26.  Observes that a large majority of NRRPs include a specific section explaining how the plan addresses gender-related concerns and challenges; is concerned, however, that some NRRPs do not include an explanation of how the measures in the NRRP are expected to contribute to gender equality and equal opportunities for all and calls on the Member States concerned to add such explanations without delay;

    27.  Stresses the importance of reforms focusing on labour market fragmentation, fostering quality working conditions, addressing wage level inequalities, ensuring decent living conditions, and strengthening social dialogue, social protection and the social economy;

    28.  Notes the tangible impact that the RRF could have on the digital transformation objective, with EUR 166 billion allocated to corresponding plans; welcomes the contributions made under the smart, sustainable and inclusive growth pillar, in particular to competitiveness and support for SMEs; notes the need for an acceleration of investments in transnational cooperation, support for competitive enterprises leading innovation projects, and regulatory changes for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, which are lagging behind;

    29.  Stresses that the success of EU investments depends on well-functioning capital markets; calls on the Member States to ensure a more effective and timely disbursement of funds, particularly for SMEs and young entrepreneurs, to streamline application procedures with a view to enhancing accessibility and to implement specific measures to provide targeted support to help them play a more prominent role in the process of smart and inclusive growth;

    30.  Is concerned that the achievement of milestones and targets lags behind the indicative timetable provided in the NRRPs, and that the pace of progress is uneven across Member States; regrets the time lag between the fulfilment of milestones and targets and the implementation of projects; highlights that the RRF will only achieve its long-term and short-term potential if the reform and investment components, respectively, are properly implemented; welcomes the fact that, following a slow start, RRF implementation has picked up since the second half of 2023 but significant delays affecting key reforms and investments still persist and have been attributed to various factors, including the revisions linked to the inclusion of REPowerEU, mounting inflation, the insufficient administrative capacity of Member States, in particular the smaller Member States, uncertainties regarding specific RRF implementation rules, high energy costs, supply shortages and an underestimation of the time needed to implement measures; notes that the postponement of key implementation deadlines by some governments to 2026 raises concerns about the capacity of some Member States to fully absorb the allocated funds within the set timeframe of the RRF; stresses the importance of maintaining a realistic and effective implementation schedule to prevent the risk of incomplete projects and missed opportunities for structural improvements; calls on the Commission to ensure that administrative bottlenecks are urgently addressed;

    31.  Recalls the modification of the RRF Regulation through the inclusion of the REPowerEU chapter; stresses the importance of the REPowerEU chapters in NRRPs and calls on the Member States to prioritise mature projects and implement their NRRPs more quickly, both in terms of reforms and investments, and, where necessary, to adjust NRRPs in line with the RRF’s objectives, without undermining the overall balance and level of ambition of the NRRPs, in order to respond to challenges stemming from geopolitical events and to tackle current realities on the ground;

    32.  Highlights the fact that the RRF could have helped to mitigate the effects of the current EU-wide housing crisis; regrets that some Member States did not make use of this opportunity and stresses the importance for the Member States to accelerate investments in availability and affordability of housing;

    33.  Highlights the role of ‘super milestones’ in protecting the EU’s financial interests against rule of law deficiencies and in ensuring the full implementation of the requirements under Article 22 of the RRF Regulation; welcomes the fact that all but one Member State have satisfactorily fulfilled their ‘super milestones’; recalls that the Commission must recover any pre-financing that has not been netted against regular payment requests by the end of the RRF;

    34.  Notes the high administrative burden and complexity brought by the RRF; stresses the considerable efforts required at national level to implement the RRF in parallel with structural funds; notes that between 2021 and 2024 the demand-driven Technical Support Instrument supported more than 500 RRF-related reforms in the Member States, directly or indirectly related to the preparation, amendment, revision and implementation of the NRRPs; takes note of the Commission guidance of July 2024 with simplifications and clarifications to streamline RRF implementation but expects the Commission to act swiftly on its promise to cut the administrative burden by 25 %; urges the Commission to give clear and targeted technical support to the Member States, allowing them to develop efficient administrative capacity to implement the milestones and targets; calls on the Commission to decrease the level of complexity of EU public procurement rules which apply to higher-value contracts;

    35.  Expresses concern over the complexity of application procedures for RRF funding, particularly for SMEs and non-governmental organisations, which require external consultancy services even for small grants; emphasises that such bureaucratic obstacles contradict the original objectives of the RRF, which aimed to provide rapid and direct financial support; calls for an urgent simplification of application and reporting requirements, particularly for smaller beneficiaries, to maximise the absorption and impact of funds and to assist with their contribution to the green and digital transitions;

    36.  Believes that implementation delays underscore the risk that measures for which RRF funding has been paid will not be completed by the 2026 payment deadline; welcomes the Commission’s statement at the Recovery and Resilience Dialogue (RRD) of 16 September 2024 that it will not reimburse non-implemented projects; considers it a shortcoming that RRF funds paid for milestones and targets assessed as fulfilled cannot be recovered if related measures are not eventually completed; encourages the Commission to take into account the ECA’s recommendations related to this and to assess, in cooperation with the Member States, the measures most at risk of not being completed by 31 August 2026; stresses the importance of monitoring these measures, facilitating timely follow-up and working towards solutions to overcome delays;

    37.  Notes with concern that the remaining implementation timeframe of the RRF is too short for the implementation of many innovative projects; further notes that innovative projects, by definition, are more difficult to plan and more likely to encounter obstacles during implementation, making them unsuited to the RRF’s strict deadlines; urges the Commission to create future programmes that are flexible enough to give proper answers in changing circumstances and that at the same time guarantee a certain degree of predictability;

    38.  Notes that some milestones and targets may be no longer achievable because of objective circumstances; stresses that any NRRP revisions should be made in accordance with the RRF Regulation, including the applicable deadlines, and should not entail backtracking on reforms, commitments or lower quality projects but should maintain the overall ambition and the efficiency of public spending;

    39.  Is concerned about the Commission’s uneven assessment of NRRPs, which has led to double standards in the application of the Regulation; is further concerned about the uneven and different definition of milestones and targets from one NRRP to the other, as consistently reported by the ECA;

    40.  Highlights that the duration of the Commission’s assessment of payment requests by Member States differs considerably among the Member States and stresses the need for more transparency from the Commission; urges the Commission to accelerate its assessments and to ensure the equal treatment of the Member States; highlights the need to ensure a level playing field across the EU for measures and indicators that are used to assess all RRF projects;

    41.  Urges the Member States to increase their efforts to address administrative bottlenecks and provide sufficient administrative capacity to accelerate RRF implementation in view of the 2026 deadline and to avoid concentrating RRF projects in more developed regions and capitals by enabling RRF funds to flow into projects in the most vulnerable regions, thereby serving the RRF’s objective to enhance the EU’s social, territorial and economic cohesion; emphasises the importance of fair regional distribution within the NRRPs while ensuring that RRF funds are allocated based on economic and social impact, feasibility and long-term benefits;

    42.   Calls for an 18-month extension of mature RRF projects through an amendment of the RRF Regulation by co-decision, if needed; emphasises that the envisaged extension of projects will be conducted by the Commission based on objective, clear and fair benchmarks; welcomes the possibility of establishing a targeted and performance-based prioritisation and transfer system after the 2026 deadline in order to allow for the finalisation of ongoing projects through other funding schemes, including the European Investment Fund and a possible new European competitiveness fund; urges the Commission to present a strategy to address the huge demand for public investment beyond 2026 without compromising budgetary resources in other critical areas;

    43.  Calls for an evaluation of how this framework could enable targeted investments in EU defence supply chains, strategic stockpiles and defence innovation, ensuring alignment with broader European security objectives;

    44.  Is concerned that some Member States might choose to forego parts of the amounts or entire amounts associated with their last payment request, thus avoiding the fulfilment of the last milestones and targets;

    Transparency, monitoring and control

    45.  Takes note of the fact that the Commission had planned to conduct 112 RRF audits in all Member States in 2024; reminds the Commission of its obligation, in accordance with Article 24(9) of the RRF Regulation, to recover funding in case of incorrect disbursements or reversals of measures;

    46.  Notes that the Commission relies on its own methodologies when calculating partial payments and suspensions of funds; regrets that these methodologies were only developed two years after the start of the RRF implementation and without the consultation of Parliament;

    47.  Welcomes the extensive work of the ECA in relation to the RRF and deems it important to thoroughly assess its findings, in particular its findings that milestones and targets are often rather vague and output-oriented and are therefore not fit to measure results and impacts, and its findings regarding the risks of double funding resulting from overlaps with other policies; notes that the Commission has accepted many but not all of the ECA’s recommendations; stresses that weaknesses in financial controls, as highlighted by the ECA, must be urgently addressed to prevent double funding, cost inefficiencies, and mismanagement of EU funds; calls for enhanced transparency and for the full consideration of the ECA’s recommendations without adding unnecessary administrative burden;

    48.  Notes that the ECA considers that the RRF focuses on progress on implementation rather than performance, particularly because RRF-funded measures focus on outputs rather than results, vary in ambition, sometimes lack clarity and do not always cover a measure’s key implementation stages, including completion;

    49.  Notes that the ECA’s audits revealed several cases in which funding had been disbursed but the requirements related to the fulfilment of corresponding milestones and targets had not been adequately met; further notes that the Commission framework for assessing the ‘satisfactory fulfilment’ of the relevant milestones and targets contains discretionary elements, such as ‘minimal deviation from a requirement’ or ‘proportional delays’, and that the methodology for the determination of partial payments does not provide an explanation for the values chosen as coefficients, thereby leaving room for interpretation; asks the Commission to provide Parliament with further clarification;

    50.  Insists that, as a rule, measures already included in other national plans benefiting from EU funding (e.g. cohesion, agriculture, etc.) should not be included in NRRPs, even if they do not incur any costs; urges the Commission to remain vigilant and proactive in identifying any potential situation of double funding in particular in regard to the different implementation models of the RRF and other EU funding instruments;

    51.  Regrets the lack of a proper RRF audit trail and the persistent lack of transparency despite the bi-annual reporting requirement for Member States on the 100 largest final recipients, which was introduced into REPowerEU upon Parliament’s request; regrets the delays in reporting by some Member States and the limited informative value of the information provided, which ultimately prevents compliance checks by the Commission or the ECA; reiterates its call for the lists of the largest final recipients for each Member State to be regularly updated and published on the RRF Scoreboard and to include information on the economic operators involved, including contractors and sub-contractors, and their beneficial owners, and not simply ministries or other government bodies or state companies; further regrets that the current definition of ‘final recipient’ leaves room for interpretation, resulting in different final beneficiaries for similar measures among Member States; calls on the Commission, in this context, to ensure a common understanding of what constitutes a ‘final recipient’ so that this can be applied consistently;

    52.  Is concerned about persistent weaknesses in national reporting and control mechanisms, due in part to absorption pressure affecting the capacity to detect ineligible expenditure and due to the complexity of the audit and control procedures, which created uncertainty in the Member States and an overload of administrative procedures; calls on the Commission to provide assurance on whether Member States’ control systems function adequately and to check the compliance of RRF-funded investment projects with EU and national rules; calls for payments to be reduced and, where appropriate, amounts to be recovered in accordance with Article 22 of the RRF Regulation, should weaknesses persist in the national control systems; regrets the reliance on manual cross-checks and self-declarations by recipients of EU funds in the absence of interoperable IT tools and harmonised standards, despite the existence of tools such as the Early Detection and Exclusion System and ARACHNE, whose use is currently not mandatory, thereby risking that expenditure is declared twice; recalls, in this regard, the reluctance of the Member States to make progress in developing the relevant IT tools in a timely manner;

    53.  Shares the view of the ECA that the FNLC model does not preclude reporting on actual costs; notes that having clear insights on costs also facilitates the work of control and oversight bodies, as well as the EPPO and the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), and enables enhanced public scrutiny;

    54.  Reiterates the role of the RRF Scoreboard in providing information for citizens on the overall progress in the implementation of NRRPs; underlines the importance of the Scoreboard in strengthening transparency and calls on the Commission to increase the level of transparency and data visualisation in the Scoreboard;

    55.  Recalls that the reporting on the progress of implementation in the RRF Scoreboard is based on information provided by the Member States on a bi-annual basis;

    56.  Highlights the important role of the EPPO and OLAF in protecting the EU’s financial interests; welcomes the fact that EPPO investigations into RRF-related fraud and corruption cases have led to several arrests, indictments and seizures of RRF funds; recalls that the EPPO was handling 307 active cases related to the RRF in 2024, corresponding to about 17 % of all expenditure fraud investigations and causing an estimated damage to the EU’s financial interests of EUR 2,8 billion; expects the number of investigations to grow as RRF implementation advances; calls on the Commission to look into the management declarations of the Member States in terms of their reporting of detected fraud and the remedial measures taken;

    Role of the European Parliament

    57.  Reiterates the importance of Parliament’s role in scrutinising and monitoring the implementation of the RRF and in holding the Commission accountable; highlights Parliament’s input provided through various channels, in particular through various plenary debates, parliamentary resolutions, bi-monthly RRD meetings with the responsible Commissioners, over 30 meetings of the standing working group on the scrutiny of the RRF, numerous parliamentary questions, the annual discharge procedure of the Commission and the regular flow of information and ad hoc requests for information from the Commission; regrets that the model of using milestones and targets to trigger disbursement was not accompanied by adequate budgetary control mechanisms, resulting in a diminished role for Parliament compared to its scrutiny of MFF spending;

    58.  Recalls Parliament’s rights as laid down in Article 25 of the RRF Regulation, in particular the right to simultaneously receive from the Commission information that it transmits to the Council or any of its preparatory bodies in the context of the RRF Regulation or its implementation, as well as an overview of its preliminary findings concerning the satisfactory fulfilment of the relevant milestones and targets included in the NRRPs; encourages the sharing of relevant outcomes of discussions held in Council preparatory bodies with the competent parliamentary committees;

    59.  Recalls further the right of Parliament’s competent committees to invite the Commission to provide information on the state of play of the assessment of the NRRPs in the context of the RRD meetings;

    60.  Regrets the fact that Parliament has no role in the design of NRRPs and is not consulted on payment requests; criticises furthermore the fact that Parliament has not been provided with a clear and traceable overview of the implementation status of projects and payments; expects to be informed about the context of NRRP revisions in order to make its own assessment of the revisions and to have an enhanced role in possible future instruments based on the RRF experience;

    Stakeholder involvement

    61.  Regrets the insufficient involvement of local and regional authorities (LRAs), civil society organisations, social partners, national parliaments and other relevant stakeholders in the design, revision or implementation of NRRPs leading to worse policy outcomes, as well as limited ownership; regrets that in the design and implementation of the NRRPs, some Member States have clearly favoured some LRAs or stakeholders to the detriment of others; recalls that the participation of LRAs, national authorities and those responsible for developing these policies is crucial for the success of the RRF, as stated in Article 28 of the RRF Regulation; recalls that Parliament supported a binding provision in the RRF to establish a multilevel dialogue to engage relevant stakeholders and discuss the preparation and implementation of NRRPs with them, with a clear consultation period; calls, therefore, for the maximum possible stakeholder involvement in the implementation of NRRPs, in accordance with the national legal framework and based on clear and transparent principles;

    62.  Reiterates the need for regular interaction between national coordinating authorities and national stakeholders involved in the monitoring of the implementation of the NRRPs, in line with the principle of transparency and accountability; stresses that more regular and public communication from the national coordinating authorities is needed to ensure that updated information about the progress of the implementation of NRRPs is made available;

    63.  Stresses that decisions should be made at the level that is most appropriate; is convinced that the application of the partnership principle and a stronger involvement of LRAs could make project implementation more efficient, reduce disparities within Member States and result in more and better quality measures with a cross-border and multi-country dimension;

    64.  Believes that valuable lessons can be drawn from the RRF to be reflected in the design of performance-based instruments in the next MFF, in particular in the light of the EU’s competitiveness and simplification agendas;

    Lessons for the future

    65.  Believes that the combination of reforms and investments has proved successful but that a clearer link is needed between the two; highlights the importance of aligning any funding with the objectives of the instrument and disbursing it in line with the progress made towards them; insists that the level of ambition of NRRPs should not be lowered but should be commensurate with the RRF timeline to ensure their successful implementation;

    66.  Is convinced, as highlighted by the Draghi report, that boosting EU competitiveness, decarbonising the EU’s economy and making it more circular and resource-efficient, as well as closing the skills gap, creating quality jobs and enhancing the EU’s innovation capacity, will be central priorities beyond 2026; is concerned that a sizeable funding gap will arise after the RRF ceases to operate at the end of 2026, notably for public investment in common European priorities, since financial resources from national budgets vary significantly among Member States; highlights the need to use the lessons learned from the RRF to better leverage public and private investments with a view to addressing the financing gap in European objectives and transitions, which the Draghi report estimates at over EUR 800 billion annually, while ensuring seamless continuity of investments in common European goods;

    67.  Welcomes the enhanced use of financial instruments made possible by the option to channel RRF funds towards the Member States’ compartment of InvestEU;

    68.  Urges the Commission to apply the lessons learned and the ECA’s observations, and to ensure that future performance-based instruments are well-targeted, aligned with the aim of financing European public goods and prioritising the addressing of clearly defined strategic challenges, economic sustainability and competitiveness; calls for it to be ensured that all future instruments are designed to measure not only inputs or short-term outputs and progress but also results in terms of long-term impacts backed by outcomes;

    69.  Notes that, according to the ECA, it is essential that future performance-based instruments are not designed and implemented in a way that is detrimental to accountability and, in particular, that appropriate control systems are in place in the Member States and are checked by the Commission before implementation starts; notes that this would involve setting minimum requirements for the Member States’ controls and the Commission’s checks;

    70.  Calls on the Commission to conduct an independent evaluation and to report on the RRF impact on private investments at aggregate EU level, in particular on its potential crowding-out effect on private investments and its determinants; calls further for objective and clear analyses from the Commission on how the implementation of reforms and investments within the NRRPs affects the economies of the individual Member States, with special regard to smart, sustainable and inclusive growth; urges the Commission to take the lessons learned from these analyses and from the ECA’s observations on the RRF implementation into account when drawing up its proposals for the next programming period;

    71.  Underlines that all EU-funded investments and reforms should be coordinated and coherent with strategic planning at national level and should focus on projects with a clear European added value; underlines the need for a spending target for cross-border and multi-country investments; calls on the Commission to develop a credible methodology to assess the cross-border and multi-country dimensions of EU funded projects;

    72.  Highlights that meaningful social and territorial dialogues with a high level of involvement of LRAs, social partners, civil society organisations and national parliaments within the national legal framework are essential for national ownership, successful implementation and democratic accountability; expresses concern over the insufficient involvement of all relevant stakeholders in the implementation and oversight of RRF-funded initiatives; stresses in particular that regions and city councils cannot be mere recipients of decisions, without being given the opportunity to have a say on reforms and investments that truly transform their territories;

    73.  Believes that it is essential to adopt differentiated strategies that recognise the cultural diversity of the various regions and enhance their economic and social cohesion instead of applying a homogeneous or one-size-fits-all approach that could be to the detriment of the less developed regions; calls, therefore, for dialogues with stakeholders to be strengthened and more diligently employed as they could inspire future initiatives and mechanisms in the EU and its Member States;

    74.  Underlines the requirement of the RRF Regulation to publicly display information about the origin of funding for projects funded by the EU to ensure buy-in from European citizens;

    75.  Highlights that the RRD meetings have been an important tool in enhancing transparency and accountability, which are crucial for the optimal implementation of the RRF;

    76.  Reiterates that further efforts are required to improve the transparency and traceability of the use of EU funds; stresses the need to ensure that data that is relevant for performance measurement is available and that information on performance is presented in a better and more transparent manner; stresses that the feedback mechanism between performance information and programme design or adjustment should be enhanced;

    77.  Considers that better training and capacity-building across all regions and authorities involved, in particular at national level, could have accelerated the RRF’s implementation and enabled the implementing authorities to better adapt to the performance-based nature of the RRF; considers that the Commission could have assisted Member States more at the planning stage and provided earlier implementation guidance, in particular with a view to strengthening their audit and control systems and the cross-border dimension of the RRF;

    78.  Highlights the importance of mitigating the risk of double funding; suggests the deployment of an integrated and interoperable IT and data mining system and the development of clear standards for datasets to be applied across Member States, with a view to allowing comprehensive and automated expenditure tracking; calls for improved coordination mechanisms that define clear responsibilities among the bodies involved in the implementation of the various EU and national programmes, while avoiding unnecessary bureaucratic complexity and ensuring an efficient allocation of funds; encourages the integration of advanced data analytics and AI tools to enhance performance tracking, evaluation and reporting to alleviate manual workload and to streamline reporting processes; underlines that such progress can only happen if there is also operational support to digitalise administrations;

    79.  Strongly urges the Commission and the Member States to ensure that any type of EU FNLC or EU funding that is performance based complies with EU and national rules, ultimately protecting the financial interests of the EU; reiterates the accountability and responsibility of the Commission and the Member States to ensure the legality and the regularity of EU funding, as well as the respect of sound financial management principles;

    80.  Considers that the role of Parliament in the monitoring of the RRF should be further enhanced;

    81.  Calls for future performance-based instruments to have a single audit trail to trace budget contributions to the projects funded; underlines the need for project-level auditing to mitigate reputational risks in the eyes of the general public and to facilitate the recovery of funds in case measures are reversed; underlines the need to reduce administrative bottlenecks and burden;

    82.  Demands that any possible future performance-based programmes make clearer links between the milestones and targets and the actual projects being implemented; stresses that there should be less of a delay between the fulfilment of milestones and the implementation of projects;

    83.  Reiterates its call for an open platform which contains data on all projects, final recipients and the regional distribution of funding, thereby facilitating auditing and democratic oversight;

    84.  Stresses that any possible future budgetary decisions on EU borrowing should respect the unity of the budget and Parliament’s role as part of the budgetary authority; highlights the risks of cost overruns for the repayment of debt, resulting inter alia from volatile interest rates; deems it important to ensure from the outset that sufficient funding is available to cover these costs without presenting a detriment to other programmes or political priorities;

    85.  Invites the Commission and the Member States to closely assess and learn from instruments and tools such as the RRF, in order to maximise the efficiency and impact of EU funding, investments and reforms, streamline policy objectives, improve the collaboration of the institutions and stakeholders at national and European level, and increase national ownership;

    86.  Notes the declared intention of the Commission to draw on the RRF experience when designing its proposals for the post-2027 EU funding programmes, due later this year; acknowledges that the independent ex post evaluation will come too late to feed into the process leading up to the next programming period, but expects the Commission and the co-legislators to take due account of the lessons learned from the RRF and of the recommendations of relevant stakeholders, in particular LRA, civil society organisations and social partners; believes that, as the EU plans for future economic resilience, there is also a need to further mobilise private investment, strengthen capital markets and ensure that public spending remains fiscally responsible and strategically targeted to make the EU more resilient and sovereign in an ever more conflictual geopolitical context;

    o
    o   o

    87.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, and to the governments and parliaments of the Member States.

    (1) OJ L 57, 18.2.2021, p. 17, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/241/oj.
    (2) OJ L 63, 28.2.2023, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/435/oj.
    (3) OJ L 433I, 22.12.2020, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/2092/oj.
    (4) OJ L, 2024/765, 29.2.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/765/oj.
    (5) OJ L 433 I, 22.12.2020, p. 28.
    (6) OJ L, 2024/2509, 26.9.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj.
    (7) OJ L, 2024/795, 29.2.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/795/oj.
    (8) OJ L, 2024/1263, 30.4.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1263/oj.
    (9) OJ C 32, 27.1.2023, p. 42.
    (10) OJ C, C/2024/4618, 22.7.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/4618/oj.
    (11) OJ C, C/2024/7057, 4.12.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/7057/oj.
    (12) European Parliament, Think Tank https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/research/advanced-search?textualSearch=RRF&startDate=01%2F07%2F2019&endDate=&sort=RELEVANCE.
    (13) OJ C, C/2024/5742, 17.10.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/5742/oj.
    (14) Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 laying down common provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund Plus, the Cohesion Fund, the Just Transition Fund and the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund and financial rules for those and for the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, the Internal Security Fund and the Instrument for Financial Support for Border Management and Visa Policy (OJ L 231, 30.6.2021, p. 159, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1060/oj).

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Censorship attempts by France in the run-up to the Romanian presidential elections – E-002390/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002390/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Petra Steger (PfE), Mary Khan (ESN)

    According to Telegram founder Pawel Durow, France made deliberate attempts to silence conservative voices in Romania on his platform ahead of the second round of the Romanian presidential elections[1]. It is striking that, just two days before the elections, the head of the French foreign intelligence service, Nicolas Lerner – who had allegedly asked Durow to implement this censorship – travelled to Romania especially to meet the leaders of the Romanian secret service[2]. Even more seriously, Macron’s bosom buddy and Renew Group leader Valérie Hayer issued an open statement to France Info saying that every effort would be made on the ground to ensure that the next Romanian President is pro-European[3]. These rampantly proliferating fantasies of control and censorship are nothing more than an attack on democracy. After all, any attempt to influence national elections through digital platforms such as Telegram constitutes a violation of fundamental European values. What is more, in statements made by ex-Commissioner Thierry Breton – who openly contemplated nullifying undesirable election results – the Commission has itself revealed a dangerous readiness to undermine democratic processes.

    • 1.What information does the Commission have on the censorship allegations made by Telegram founder Pawel Durow?
    • 2.Is the Commission planning to open an investigation to look into these serious allegations?
    • 3.What specific measures is the Commission taking to prevent such interference by Member States in national elections?

    Submitted: 13.6.2025

    • [1] https://www.spiegel.de/netzwelt/web/pawel-durow-telegram-gruender-kritisiert-franzoesische-einmischung-in-rumaenien-wahl-a-1eddfa73-f872-4ece-bf7c-64459e217159
    • [2] https://www.berliner-zeitung.de/news/vorwurf-der-einmischung-frankreichs-geheimdienstchef-soll-rumaenien-kurz-vor-der-wahl-besucht-haben-li.2327797
    • [3] https://www.lejdd.fr/International/presidentielle-en-roumanie-valerie-hayer-accusee-dingerence-au-profit-du-candidat-centriste-pro-ue-157948
    Last updated: 20 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – 2023 and 2024 reports on Moldova – P10_TA(2025)0131 – Wednesday, 18 June 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘2024 Communication on EU enlargement policy’ (COM(2024)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Republic of Moldova 2024 Report’ (SWD(2024)0698),

    –  having regard to the Commission opinion of 17 June 2022 on the application by the Republic of Moldova (hereinafter ‘Moldova’) for membership of the European Union (COM(2022)0406) and the joint staff working document of 6 February 2023 entitled ‘Association Implementation Report on the Republic of Moldova’ (SWD(2023)0041),

    –   having regard to Regulation (EU) 2025/535 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 March 2025 on establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Republic of Moldova(1),

    –  having regard to its previous resolutions on Moldova,

    –  having regard to the Commission analytical report of 1 February 2023 on Moldova’s alignment with the EU acquis (SWD(2023)0032),

    –  having regard to the proposal of 9 October 2024 for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Republic of Moldova (COM/2024/0469),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 9 October 2024 on the Moldova Growth Plan (COM/2024/0470),

    –  having regard to the Council conclusions of 17 December 2024 on enlargement,

    –  having regard to the visit of the delegation of the Committee on Foreign Affairs to Moldova on 25-27 February 2025,

    –  having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0096/2025),

    A.  whereas, following Moldova’s application for EU membership of 3 March 2022, the European Council granted it candidate status on 23 June 2022 and subsequently decided to open accession negotiations on 14 December 2023;

    B.  whereas in June 2024 negotiations on Moldova’s EU accession started;

    C.  whereas Moldova held a referendum on 20 October 2024, the outcome of which confirmed the embedding of EU accession into its Constitution, despite various forms of manipulative interference to destabilise the country, illicit financing of political actors, disinformation campaigns and cyberattacks;

    D.  whereas the Association Agreement(2), which includes a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (AA/DCFTA), remains the basis for political association and economic integration between the EU and Moldova, and a regular political and economic dialogue is ongoing between the two sides;

    Progress with EU accession-related reforms, in particular on the rule of law and governance

    1.  Commends Moldova’s exemplary commitment and steady progress with EU accession-related reforms despite significant internal and external challenges – such as Russia’s full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine – which made it possible for accession negotiations to start in June 2024, half a year after the relevant decision by the European Council on 14 December 2023 and less than two years after the country’s application for EU membership on 3 March 2022;

    2.  Recognises that EU-Moldova relations have entered into a new phase, with intensifying cooperation, gradual alignment across all policy areas of the EU acquis and advancement on the EU integration path; welcomes the progress achieved in the bilateral screening process since it started in July 2024 and the recent closing of screening for cluster 1 (fundamentals) and cluster 2 (internal market); commends and supports the ambition of the Moldovan Government to open negotiations on cluster 1 (fundamentals), cluster 2 (internal market) and cluster 6 (external relations) in the coming months, as well as completing the screening process for all clusters by the end of 2025; calls on the Commission to enhance its support to the Moldovan Government in order to ensure the successful achievement of these key objectives; encourages the Council to take a merit-based approach in its decisions on Moldova’s negotiation process; deplores the bilateralisation and instrumentalisation of the EU accession process, such as the opposition of the Hungarian Government to opening negotiations on clusters 1, 2 and 6, which has led to a delay and serves Russia’s objective of obstructing the European integration of the region;

    3.  Believes that Moldova’s capacity to consolidate its current progress with EU accession-related reforms and sustain the ambitious pace towards EU membership will require the strong and genuine support of a parliamentary majority after the elections in autumn 2025;

    4.  Notes that the outcomes of both the constitutional referendum on EU accession, held on 20 October 2024, and the presidential election, held on 20 October 2024 and 3 November 2024, confirmed the support of a majority of the people of Moldova for the country’s goal of EU membership and the required pro-EU reforms; underlines that this referendum and election were held professionally and with an extraordinary sense of duty and dedication, despite a massive hybrid campaign by Russia and its proxies which used various tools, such as the strategic exploitation of social media, AI-generated content, ‘leaks’ of fake documents, intimidation, which entailed various forms of manipulative interference to destabilise the country, illicit financing of political actors, vote-buying, including by Russia’s instrumentalisation of parts of the clergy from the Metropolis of Chisinau and All Moldova, disinformation campaigns and cyberattacks; recalls that these attacks had four key strategies: divide society, delegitimise institutions, discredit democratic actors and promote Russian influence; welcomes the outcome of the 2024 constitutional referendum which enshrined the commitment to joining the EU in the country’s constitution; strongly condemns the increasing attempts by Russia, pro-Russian oligarchs and Russian-sponsored local proxies to destabilise Moldova, sow divisions within Moldovan society and derail the country’s pro-EU direction through hybrid attacks, the instrumentalisation of energy supplies, disinformation, manipulation and intimidation campaigns targeting civil society organisations and independent media;

    5.  Notes that the upcoming parliamentary elections on 28 September 2025 will be of crucial importance for the continuation of Moldova’s pro-EU trajectory; is concerned about the likely intensification of foreign, in particular Russian, malign interference and hybrid attacks ahead of the elections; calls for the EU to increase its support, including financial and technical support, for the Moldovan Government’s efforts to counter such interference in the country’s democratic process, including through additional sanctions listings, an extension and consolidation of the mandate and resources of the EU Partnership Mission (EUPM) in Moldova and the granting of additional support thereto, and the sharing of expertise in foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), countering hybrid threats and strengthening resilience; calls similarly for an increase in efforts by the Moldovan authorities and the EU in support of independent media and pro-democracy civil society, in order to enable journalists at national and regional level to counter FIMI and to strengthen digital literacy;

    6.  Stresses the importance of strategic communication, debunking and combating false, Russia-promoted narratives about the EU and its policies and of highlighting the concrete short- and long-term benefits of EU accession for the people of all of Moldova, with a special focus on regions such as Gagauzia as well as socio-economically disadvantaged communities in rural areas; calls for the EU to step up its support for Moldova in this regard;

    Socio-economic reforms

    7.  Welcomes the Commission’s Moldova Growth Plan, which is aimed at supporting Moldova’s socio-economic and fundamental reforms and enhancing access to the EU’s single market; welcomes the Reform and Growth Facility for Moldova, which underpins the Growth Plan and is worth EUR 2,02 billion, making it the largest EU financial support package for Moldova since its independence; underlines that this facility provides Moldova with EUR 520 million in non-repayable support and a maximum amount of EUR 1,5 billion in loans, with an 18 % pre-financing rate, demonstrating the EU’s recognition of the urgency of supporting Moldova’s reforms and resilience; calls on the Commission to support the Moldovan authorities in implementing the necessary Reform Agenda for the effective absorption of funds from this facility, ensuring that the benefits of this support are promptly felt by Moldova’s citizens; looks forward to the announced impact assessment of the Reform and Growth Facility for Moldova in the form of a Commission staff working document within three months of the adoption of the corresponding regulation;

    8.  Calls on the Commission to include adequate dedicated pre-accession funds for Moldova in the EU’s next multiannual financial framework, and to begin preparing Moldova for the efficient use of future pre-accession funds as a newly designated EU candidate country;

    9.  Reiterates that the support of the people of Moldova for European integration can be strengthened with a tangible improvement in their livelihoods, by strengthening state institutions and public administration in order to use project funding effectively and to implement and enforce the EU acquis, ensuring a robust welfare system and fighting corruption and oligarchic influence and ensuring accountability; calls on the Moldovan authorities to continue to ensure the meaningful involvement of civil society organisations, diaspora, vulnerable groups and social partners, including trade unions, in order to strengthen trust in democratic institutions and processes and boost public support for EU accession-related reforms;

    10.  Stresses the importance of civil society organisations in monitoring governance and progress with EU-related reforms, promoting transparency, defending human rights and countering disinformation and external malign influence by anti-reform political actors and Russian proxies;

    11.  Calls for comprehensive social policy reforms to address poverty and persistent large-scale emigration, increase healthcare coverage, strengthen public education, improve working conditions and develop adequate social protection systems; emphasises that economic development must be inclusive and sustainable, with opportunities for small and medium-sized enterprises; stresses the need for targeted social investment in Moldova’s young people and rural areas to reduce regional disparities and safeguard social cohesion;

    12.  Calls for special emphasis on Moldova’s participation in EU social, educational, and cultural programmes in order to promote social convergence, innovation and technological advancement;

    13.  Calls on Moldova to implement the Reform Agenda, which outlines the key socio-economic and fundamental reforms to accelerate the growth and competitiveness of Moldova’s economy and its convergence with the EU on the basis of enhanced implementation of the AA/DCFTA;

    14.  Strongly calls for the acceleration of Moldova’s gradual integration into the EU and the single market by continuing to align its legal and regulatory framework with the EU acquis and associating the country to more EU programmes and initiatives, including through the granting of observer status to Moldovan officials and experts in relevant EU bodies, which would deliver tangible socio-economic benefits even before the country formally joins the EU; congratulates Moldova on its inclusion in the geographical scope of the Single Euro Payments Area payment schemes, facilitating transfers in euro and reducing costs for Moldova’s citizens and businesses; commends the inclusion of roaming liberalisation in the updated EU–Moldova Association Agreement; welcomes Moldova’s recent progress in the transposition of the EU’s roaming and telecommunications acquis and expresses support for a swift decision on the inclusion of Moldova into the EU ‘roam like at home’ area; calls on the service providers to cooperate in good faith with the Moldovan authorities on implementing ‘roam like at home’;

    15.  Welcomes the renewal of the EU’s temporary trade liberalisation measures in July 2024 in order to support Moldova’s economy, substituting the loss of trade caused by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and its unfriendly policies towards Moldova; calls for the EU to take swift and significant steps towards the permanent liberalisation of its tariff-rate quotas, in order to ensure predictability and increase the country’s attractiveness to investors;

    16.  Notes that the recent decision of the US administration to suspend support for civil society, independent media, key reforms and infrastructure projects has created additional urgent needs in Moldova, regarding which the EU should step in; calls on the Commission, in this regard, to increase its funding for EU instruments supporting democracy, such as the European Endowment for Democracy, and for other key projects that had until recently been funded by the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and other US agencies;

    Human rights

    17.  Notes Moldova’s progress towards achieving gender equality, including its adoption of the Programme for Promoting and Ensuring Equality between Women and Men for the 2023-2027 period, and calls for its continued efforts in this regard, particularly to reduce the gender pay gap, fight against stereotypes, discrimination and gender-based violence, and to increase the representation of women in politics and business;

    18.  Welcomes the efforts by the Moldovan authorities to combat violence against women and improve protection for survivors, in particular the adoption of the National Programme on Preventing and Combatting Violence against Women and Domestic Violence for the 2023-2027 period; notes that the impact of this, however, is still lacking and therefore calls for the establishment of more shelters for survivors of domestic violence, for adequate attention by the justice system to violence against women and for policy changes and increased awareness-raising among men regarding gender-based violence;

    19.  Calls on the Moldovan Government to strengthen its efforts, including the effective implementation of its legislative framework, to combat racial discrimination, marginalisation, racist hate speech and hate crimes targeting members of ethnic minority groups, including the Roma;

    20.  Commends Moldova’s efforts to improve the rights of the LGBTIQ+ community in recent years;

    21.  Calls on the Moldovan Government to fully align its legislation on the rights of persons with disabilities with the EU acquis and to tackle the systemic problem of children with intellectual disabilities being placed in psychiatric institutions;

    Energy, environment and connectivity

    22.  Condemns Russia’s instrumentalisation of energy against Moldova, most recently by halting gas supplies to the Transnistrian region on 1 January 2025, in violation of contractual obligations, and thereby provoking a serious crisis in the region; applauds the Commission’s swift proposal of a Comprehensive Strategy for Energy Independence and Resilience and its support package worth EUR 250 million, which will reduce the energy bills of Moldovan consumers, including in the Transnistrian region, support Moldova’s decoupling from Russia’s energy supplies and integrate Moldova into the EU energy market; emphasises the need for the EU and the Moldovan authorities to effectively communicate about the substantial EU support package aimed at addressing Moldova’s energy crisis;

    23.  Commends the alignment of the Moldovan energy sector with the EU acquis; calls on the Moldovan Government to continue its efforts, with EU support that includes the tools available from the Reform and Growth Facility for Moldova, to diversify gas and electricity supply routes, develop connectivity, increase energy efficiency and its internal production and storage capacity, as well as advance its full integration into the EU energy market in order to ensure Moldova’s energy security and resilience; stresses the importance of the completion of the Vulcanesti-Chisinau 400 kV overhead power line by the end of 2025 in order to reduce Moldova’s reliance on energy infrastructure in the Transnistrian region; calls on the EU to mobilise the necessary resources to help compensate for the withdrawal of USAID support for Moldova’s energy sector;

    24.  Commends the Moldovan Government for its progress on decarbonisation, energy efficiency and transitioning to a green economy, including doubling the share of renewable energy to 30 % by 2030; encourages the EU and its Member States to continue to provide financial support and expertise to Moldovan counterparts in this area; welcomes the adoption in 2023 of Moldova’s National Climate Change Adaptation Programme until 2030 and its Action Plan for this purpose; calls on the Moldovan Government to adopt and begin implementing its National Energy and Climate Plan for the 2025-2030 period; notes the importance of implementing the commitments of the Energy Community’s Decarbonisation Roadmap, and implementing the Monitoring, Reporting, Verification and Accreditation package with a view to introducing carbon pricing and aligning with the EU emissions trading system;

    25.  Believes that an extension of the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T) corridor Baltic Sea-Black Sea-Aegean Sea (Corridor IX) to include the route of Chisinau-Constanta-Varna-Bourgas would be a strategic investment in the region’s transport infrastructure, enhancing connectivity and promoting economic growth, in view of the enlargement of the EU to the east and the potential positive impact of this extension on the region’s security and stability, serving as a key logistics route for NATO and enhancing the EU’s geostrategic autonomy;

    Rule of law and good governance

    26.  Underlines that comprehensive justice reform remains key for the success of Moldova’s democratic and EU accession-related reforms; recognises Moldova’s sustained efforts to build an independent, impartial, accountable and professional judicial system and conclude the vetting process by the end of 2026; calls, therefore, for the EU to continue actively supporting the justice reform and the process of vetting both judges and prosecutors, including the attraction, training and recruitment of qualified judicial personnel and increase in judicial capacity;

    27.  Notes that Moldova has achieved progress in the fight against and prevention of corruption, but stresses the need to continue the fight against money laundering; welcomes the entry into force in February 2024 of Moldova’s National Integrity and Anti-Corruption Programme for 2024-2028; highlights the need to ensure enhanced coordination among all key anti-corruption and justice institutions in order to implement comprehensive reforms and to ensure that they have adequate resources and capacities; stresses that results in terms of prosecution and conviction in corruption cases need to be delivered in order to ensure public trust in the ongoing reforms;

    28.  Recalls the importance of continuing the investigation and bringing to justice those responsible for the 2014 bank fraud; welcomes the fact that, after long efforts by the Moldovan authorities, Interpol has finally added one of the alleged perpetrators, Vladimir Plahotniuc, to its list of internationally wanted persons;

    29.  Welcomes the adoption by Moldova in 2023 of a new national strategy for preventing and combating human trafficking, aligned with the EU acquis, and the cooperation of Moldova with Europol in combating drug trafficking;

    30.  Expresses its readiness to continue supporting the Parliament of Moldova through mutually agreed democracy support activities that respond to the needs of the institution, its elected members and staff; underlines the importance of the Parliament of Moldova in fostering public debate about the country’s European future and achieving a broad consensus over, and democratic legitimacy of, EU accession-related reforms across political parties and among broader society; highlights the decision of 10 March 2025 to open a European Parliament office in Chisinau to further strengthen Parliament’s engagement with the Eastern Partnership region;

    Cooperation in the field of common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and progress on resolving the Transnistrian conflict

    31.  Welcomes Moldova’s consistent cooperation on foreign policy issues and the significantly increased rate, notably from 54 % in 2022 to 86 % in 2024, of its alignment with the EU’s CFSP positions and restrictive measures; invites it to continue to improve this alignment, including on restrictive measures against Russia, and to continue cooperation on preventing the circumvention of sanctions against Russia and Belarus related to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine;

    32.  Underlines that Moldova is a key contributor to the regional and European security, including through its unwavering support to Ukraine since the start of Russia’s war of aggression, for example by welcoming Ukrainian war refugees, and through its contributions to the EU Civil Protection Mechanism, for example by deploying firefighting teams to tackle severe wildfires in Greece;

    33.  Expresses its support for the EUPM in Moldova and calls on the Member States to contribute the necessary experts and financial resources, in anticipation of a potential intensification of hybrid threats; welcomes the recent extension of the EUPM’s mandate until April 2026; encourages the Moldovan authorities to make full use of the EUPM’s expertise to enhance its preparedness, particularly in view of repeated electoral interference ahead of the parliamentary elections on 28 September 2025; calls for the EU to draw from the experience gained in Moldova in protecting the electoral process and democratic institutions in the EU itself; encourages the European External Action Service and the Commission to use all available EU instruments in the area of countering hybrid threats, in order to continue to support Moldova, including by swiftly deploying a Hybrid Rapid Response Team; welcomes the establishment of Moldova’s Centre for Strategic Communications and Countering Disinformation, as a means of coordinating the fight against foreign interference among the various Moldovan institutions, and of the National Agency for Cyber Security and the National Institute for Cyber Security Innovations; notes that Moldova’s National Security Strategy, adopted in December 2023, highlights EU accession as a key objective and for the first time identifies Russia as the source of major threats to Moldova’s security; stresses the importance of improving information sharing and intelligence cooperation between Moldova and the EU and its Member States on security threats;

    34.  Reiterates its full commitment to Moldova’s territorial integrity and to the peaceful resolution of the conflict, based on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Moldova in its internationally recognised borders;

    35.  Welcomes the Commission’s initiatives to include proactive support for the Transnistrian region in its energy emergency support packages, and exchange of information and practical cooperation between the Moldovan Government and the de facto authorities of the Transnistrian region throughout the energy crisis caused by Russia; welcomes the progress regarding the conditionalities for Tiraspol in light of the recent gas transit agreement and calls for the full implementation of these conditionalities, including the release of all political prisoners by Tiraspol and the dismantling of the remaining illegal checkpoints;

    36.  Welcomes Moldova’s keen interest in contributing to the EU’s common security and defence policy (CSDP) and the fact that Moldova is the first country to sign a security and defence partnership with the EU; welcomes Moldova’s continued active participation in EU missions and operations under the CSDP, namely the EU Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Operation Althea) and the EU Training Mission in Somalia, its interest in participation in PESCO projects and the ongoing negotiations on a framework agreement with the European Defence Agency; calls on the EU to include Moldova in the EU security and defence programmes and related budget allocations, including the European Defence Industry Programme and Readiness 2030, allowing the country to participate in joint procurement alongside the Member States;

    37.  Welcomes the allocation of EUR 50 million to modernise the defence capacities of the Moldovan Armed Forces in the context of the current security challenges through the European Peace Facility (EPF) for 2024; notes that Moldova is the second-largest EPF beneficiary after Ukraine, with a total of EUR 137 million allocated since 2021; welcomes the announced support of EUR 60 million to be provided to Moldova from the EPF budget in 2025; calls on the Member States to progressively increase the EPF funding for Moldova to further enhance the country’s defence capabilities;

    o
    o   o

    38.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and to the President, Government and Parliament of the Republic of Moldova.

    (1) OJ L, 2025/535, 21.3.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/535/oj.
    (2) Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Moldova, of the other part (OJ L 260, 30.8.2014, p. 4, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_internation/2014/492/oj).

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Warner, Kaine, Scott Urge EPA to Reinstate Funding for Canceled Community Resilience Grants

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Commonwealth of Virginia Mark R Warner

    WASHINGTON – Today, U.S. Sens. Mark R. Warner, Tim Kaine (both D-VA), and Rep. Bobby Scott (D-VA-03) sent a letter to Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Administrator Lee Zeldin urging the agency to reverse its decision to terminate two major Community Change Grants in Virginia. The canceled grants – approximately $40 million – would have supported dozens of community projects aimed at strengthening flood resilience, reducing pollution, and improving energy efficiency in Hampton and across Southwest Virginia.

    The grants, funded by the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), were intended to support projects that increase resilience to major weather events, reduce pollution, and build community capacity.

    The City of Hampton received $20 million in federal funding to address severe flood risk in the Aberdeen Gardens neighborhood. That funding would have advanced 51 projects ranging from stormwater infrastructure upgrades and rain garden construction to stream restoration efforts and improved public health protections for an area where over 22 percent of properties fall within FEMA-designated flood zones.

    United Way of Southwest Virginia and the University of Virginia’s College at Wise also received nearly $20 million in federal funding to support flood-resilient housing, the construction of a community center and flood shelter in Dickenson County, and energy efficiency upgrades at childcare centers in eight counties in Southwest Virginia. These investments would have delivered long-term savings, improved disaster readiness, and supported vulnerable Appalachian communities hit hard by extreme weather in recent years.

    In the letter, the lawmakers wrote, “We are deeply concerned that the EPA no longer considers community resiliency, environmental conservation, and economic development to be administration funding priorities.”

    They continued, “EPA’s decision to terminate these grants will leave communities in Virginia less resilient, less prosperous, and more vulnerable to extreme weather-related disasters. We urge you to reinstate this critical funding for communities throughout Virginia.”

    Sens. Warner, Kaine, and Rep. Scott have long advocated for resiliency efforts in Virginia, championing legislation and funding to help communities strengthen infrastructure against extreme weather. The senators were strong supporters of the Inflation Reduction Act, which authorized the Community Change Grants program to help historically neglected and underserved communities address flooding, pollution, and climate vulnerabilities.

    The lawmakers have also continuously stood up against the Trump administration’s efforts to cancel necessary federal funding for Virginia’s communities. Most recently, Sens. Warner, Kaine, and Rep. Scott wrote to Department of Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem to reverse the cancellation of critical infrastructure funding for the Commonwealth. 

    Text of the letter is available here and below.

    Dear Administrator Zeldin:

    We write regarding the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) decision to terminate approximately $40 million in funding intended to prevent localized pollution and mitigate the effects of flooding in Hampton, Virginia, and to support economic development, enhance resilient infrastructure, and lower energy costs across seven counties in Southwest Virginia. We strongly urge you to reverse this decision that will impact efforts to improve resiliency, environmental conservation, energy efficiency, and economic outcomes in communities across the Commonwealth.

    The Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) provided approximately $2 billion to EPA to establish the Community Change Grants Program. Congress intended this funding to be used to support projects that increase community resilience, reduce pollution, and build community capacity. In 2024, EPA selected 105 projects, including two projects in Virginia.

    The City of Hampton, Virginia, was awarded just over $20 million to address significant flood risk in the historic Aberdeen Gardens neighborhood. In a locality where 22 percent of properties are in Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)-designated Special Flood Hazard Areas, the city and their nonprofit partner, Wetlands Watch, planned to leverage federal funding to advance 51 projects to update stormwater infrastructure, initiate stream-restoration projects, and construct community rain gardens. These projects were intended to mitigate flood risk, lessen the financial burden of flooding on the neighborhood’s residents, and improve environmental and public health outcomes.

    The United Way of Southwest Virginia and the University of Virginia were awarded nearly $20 million to fund eight projects across the Virginia coalfields. Funding would have supported the construction of flood-resilient housing infrastructure in Buchanan County and a new community center and flood shelter in Dickenson County, two communities that have been devastated by flooding and extreme weather in recent years. Additionally, the grant would support energy efficiency upgrades at childcare facilities in eight counties, enabling thousands of dollars of energy cost savings to go towards childcare worker salaries.

    In terminating these grants, EPA wrote to awardees that, “the objectives of the award are no longer consistent with EPA funding priorities.” We are deeply concerned that the EPA no longer considers community resiliency, environmental conservation, and economic development to be administration funding priorities. EPA’s decision to terminate these grants will leave communities in Virginia less resilient, less prosperous, and more vulnerable to extreme weather-related disasters. We urge you to reinstate this critical funding for communities throughout Virginia. 

    Thank you for your attention to this letter. We look forward to your response.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Warner & Kaine Decry GOP Plan’s Devastating Impact on Rural Virginia Communities

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Virginia Tim Kaine

    WASHINGTON, D.C. – U.S. Senators Mark R. Warner and Tim Kaine (both D-VA) today issued the following statement slamming congressional Republicans’ bill that would devastate rural communities across Virginia by gutting Medicaid and accelerating hospital closures:

    “The big GOP plan is a direct threat to families in rural Virginia who rely on Medicaid to access care and keep their community hospitals open. This bill would strip health care from thousands of Virginians, gut funding for struggling rural hospitals, and undo decades of progress. Almost forty percent of kids in rural Virginia are covered by Medicaid. Without that lifeline, families would face impossible choices, and many local hospitals wouldn’t survive. For rural Virginia, this bill might mean the difference between a hospital that’s five minutes away and one that’s 50. It is a slap in the face to the health care workers, parents, and local leaders doing everything they can to keep their communities afloat. We refuse to stand by while Republicans gamble with Virginians’ lives.”

    Small towns and rural areas in Virginia have the highest rates of Medicaid coverage. According to research by the Georgetown Center for Children and Families:

    • 37.9 percent of children in Virginia’s small towns and rural areas rely on Medicaid/CHIP for their coverage, compared to 30 percent in metro/urban areas;
    • Among Virginia adults younger than 65, 18.9 percent of those in small towns and rural areas get their coverage through Medicaid/CHIP, compared to 13.7 percent in metro areas; and
    • Among seniors, 11.7 percent of those living in Virginia’s small towns and rural areas were covered by Medicaid, compared to 10.7 percent in metro/urban areas.

    Nearly half – 47 percent – of rural births in the U.S. are covered by Medicaid, as are 65 percent of nursing home residents in rural counties.

    Almost half of rural hospitals nationwide are already operating at a financial loss, according to the American Hospital Association. The GOP’s proposed Medicaid cuts would push already-struggling rural hospitals further toward financial collapse, particularly in areas like Southwest and Southside Virginia. Detailed data from the Cecil G. Sheps Center for Health Services Research at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill concluded that Republican health care cuts could place more than 300 rural hospitals across the U.S. – including six hospitals in Southwest and Southside Virginia – at disproportionate risk of closure, conversion, or service reductions.

    Since the Affordable Care Act expanded Medicaid in Virginia, the uninsured rate has fallen dramatically, and rural hospitals have seen a critical infusion of funds to help keep their doors open. The GOP’s plan to give giant tax cuts to the ultra wealthy while slashing Medicaid and other investments threatens to reverse that trend.

    Warner and Kaine have long championed Medicaid expansion and rural health infrastructure, including broadband-enabled telehealth services and rural hospital stabilization programs. They have pledged to fight the GOP plan as long as Republicans in Congress continue to insist on gutting vital programs in order to pay for tax breaks for the richest Americans, noting that the GOP bill would strip health insurance from more than 302,000 Virginians, cut SNAP benefits, raise energy costs for Virginia households, jeopardize more than 20,000 Virginia jobs, raise taxes on minimum wage workers while giving the richest 0.1% a $188,000 tax cut, make tax filing more expensive, and explode the deficit, among other devastating impacts to Virginia families.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Azerbaijan approves cooperation plan with China on Belt and Road initiative

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    Baku, June 20 /Xinhua/ — Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev has approved a cooperation plan with China to jointly advance the Belt and Road initiative, the presidential press service said on Friday.

    According to the signed decree, the document has been officially adopted. The plan provides for the development of cooperation in the field of transport, trade and logistics, aimed at strengthening the interconnectedness and expanding economic ties between the two countries.

    According to the decree, the Ministry of Economy of Azerbaijan will coordinate the implementation of the plan’s provisions, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been instructed to notify the Chinese government after completing all necessary internal procedures.

    The adoption of the plan was a continuation of the agreements reached during I. Aliyev’s state visit to China. On April 23, a signing ceremony of the document was held in Beijing with the participation of Chinese President Xi Jinping and Azerbaijani President I. Aliyev. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI USA: REP TED LIEU AND SENATOR JEANNE SHAHEEN LEAD 23 SENATORS AND 49 MEMBERS IN INTRODUCING RESOLUTION RECOGNIZING WORLD REFUGEE DAY

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Congressman Ted Lieu (33 District of California)

    WASHINGTON—Today, Congressman Ted Lieu (D-Los Angeles County) and Senator Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH), Ranking Member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, introduced a resolution to honor World Refugee Day and the United States’ commitment to supporting refugees and forcibly displaced persons worldwide. The World Refugee Day Resolution was cosponsored by 23 Senators and 49 Members of Congress.

    “There used to be more consensus among Democrats and Republicans that the world’s wealthiest nation has an obligation to help those seeking refuge from violence, persecution, human rights abuses, and other dangers,” said Representative Lieu. “A strong U.S. foreign aid program was once considered both morally correct policy, and a smart return on investment that engendered good will and protected our national security. Now, Trump has turned his back on the world’s most vulnerable people by banning refugees and pulling funding for foreign aid programs. This is a terrible abdication of our duty to help those who need it the most. On World Refugee Day, those of us who want the world to be a more peaceful, prosperous place for everyone reiterate our call to help refugees who are fleeing unimaginable circumstances. Everyone deserves to live freely and safely.”

    “Conflict, persecution and violence continue to force millions of people from their homes – with more than 123 million people forcibly displaced at the end of 2024, including Afghans, Burmese Rohingya and Sudanese,” said Ranking Member Shaheen. “The United States has long been a leader in supporting refugees overseas and welcoming the most vulnerable, promoting stability around the world and boosting the U.S. economy through refugees’ contributions. Yet the Trump Administration is turning its back on this bipartisan legacy of support, slashing U.S. foreign aid programs that help refugees and host communities and indefinitely suspending the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program. On this World Refugee Day, our resolution honors the resilient spirit of forcibly displaced persons globally and calls on the Trump Administration to recommit to supporting refugees and displaced persons.”

     This bill as the support of:

    “With an ongoing refugee ban leaving so many with no path to protection – it is imperative we take this opportunity to stand in solidarity with all those forced to flee their homes around the world,” said Erol Kekic, Chief Strategy Officer at Church World Service. “CWS thanks Senator Shaheen and Representative Lieu for honoring refugees and leading this year’s congressional World Refugee Day resolution. From 80 years of walking alongside newcomers, CWS knows that refugees and immigrants enrich our communities – culturally, artistically, religiously, and economically. They are our neighbors and friends. They are mothers and fathers working to build better futures for their children.” 

    “Today, more than 123 million people around the world have been forcibly displaced from their homes—the highest number in recorded history,” said Myal Greene, President and CEO of World Relief. “On World Refugee Day, we remember that behind every statistic is a person made in the image of God, longing for safety, stability, and hope. This crisis should stir the conscience of lawmakers and citizens alike–particularly those, like me, motivated by the Christian faith. We urge Congress to champion policies that protect the persecuted, restore dignity, and uphold America’s long legacy of welcoming those fleeing violence and oppression.” 

    “On World Refugee Day, we are reminded that the right to seek safety is both a legal commitment and a moral imperative,” said Sharif Aly, President of the International Refugee Assistance Project (IRAP). “The United States has the capacity, and the obligation, to uphold its commitments to refugees and asylum seekers. Yet today, tens of thousands of people who were promised protection under the U.S. resettlement program remain stranded due to unlawful and discriminatory policies. We commend this resolution for reaffirming the values enshrined in our Constitution and refugee laws and urge our leaders to restore U.S. leadership in protecting the rights and dignity of those forced to flee.” 

    “There has never been a more urgent moment for Congress to reaffirm America’s support for refugees, both at home and abroad,” said Jeremy Konyndyk, President of Refugees International. “On World Refugee Day, we must renew our pledge to advance refugee protection, including by ensuring refugees have a role in shaping policy; to uphold the right to seek asylum; and to generously welcome those who seek safety and the chance to rebuild their lives with dignity and opportunity.” 

    “RCUSA reminds the Trump administration of the incredible contributions that refugees have made in the 45-year history of the refugee resettlement program,” said John Slocum, Executive Director of Refugee Council USA. “We stand in solidarity with those forced to flee their homes due to violence and persecution – families and individuals continue to seek safety, dignity, freedom, and opportunity in the face of unimaginable hardship. As global displacement reaches historic highs, the United States must lead with compassion and courage. That means rejecting fear-based policies and recommitting to a system that upholds the rights of all people to seek safety. Congress must invest in our nation’s capacity to welcome refugees and asylum seekers — and safeguard the use of public resources in good faith. RCUSA calls on all people of conscience to stand with refugees, asylum seekers, and immigrants, not only today but every day. Our work is far from over.”  

    The resolution is supported by the following organizations: Church World Service, Center for Gender and Refugee Studies, Center for Human Rights and Constitutional Law, Center for Victims of Torture, Climate Refugees, Dorothy Day Catholic Worker, Florence Immigrant & Refugee Rights Project, Franciscan Action Network, Friends Committee on National Legislation, HIAS, International Refugee Assistance Project (IRAP), Just Neighbors, National Partnership for New Americans, Presidents’ Alliance on Higher Education and Immigration, Refugee Advocacy Lab, Refugee Council USA, Refugee Congress, Refugees International, Unitarian Universalists for Social Justice, United Church of Christ, Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), World Relief and Women’s Refugee Commission. 

    The House resolution is cosponsored by Representatives Gabe Amo (D-RI), Yassmin Ansari (D-AZ), Becca Balint (D-VT), Joyce Beatty (D-OH), Sheila Cherfilus-McCormick (D-FL), Judy Chu (D-CA), Gil Cisneros (D-CA), Steve Cohen (D-TN), Danny Davis (D-IL), Diana Degette (D-CO), Suzan DelBene (D-WA), Mark DeSaulnier (D-CA), Adriano Espaillat (D-NY), Chuy Garcia (D-IL), Robert Garcia (D-CA), Sylvia Garcia (D-TX), Jonathan L. Jackson (D-IL), Pramila Jayapal (D-WA), Hank Johnson (D-GA), Ro Khanna (D-CA), Troy A. Carter, Sr. (D-LA), Summer Lee (D-PA), Teresa Leger Fernandez (D-NM), Stephen Lynch (D-MA), Jennifer McClellan (D-VA), Betty McCollum (D-MN), Jim McGovern (D-MA), Robert Menendez (D-NJ), Gwen Moore (D-WI), Seth Moulton (D-MA), Kevin Mullin (D-CA), Jerrold Nadler (D-NY), Eleanor Norton (D-DC), Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (D-NY), Ilhan Omar (D-MN), Nancy Pelosi (D-CA), Mark Pocan (D-WI), Delia Ramirez (D-IL), Jan Schakowsky (D-IL), Darren Soto (D-FL), Shri Thanedar (D-MI), Dina Titus (D-NV), Rashida Tlaib (D-MI), Jill Tokuda (D-HI), Paul Tonko (D-NY), Derek Tran (D-CA), Nydia Velazquez (D-NY), Bonnie Watson Coleman (D-NJ), Nikema Williams (D-GA).

    The Senate resolution is cosponsored by Senators Michael Bennet (D-CO), Richard Blumenthal (D-CT), Cory Booker (D-NJ), Chris Coons (D-DE), Tammy Duckworth (D-IL), Dick Durbin (D-IL), John Fetterman (D-PA), John Hickenlooper (D-CO), Mazie Hirono (D-HI), Tim Kaine (D-VA), Angus King (I-ME), Amy Klobuchar (D-MN), Ed Markey (D-MA), Jeff Merkley (D-OR), Chris Murphy (D-CT), Patty Murray (D-WA), Jacky Rosen (D-NV), Brian Schatz (D-HI), Adam Schiff (D-CA), Chris Van Hollen (D-MD), Peter Welch (D-VT), Sheldon Whitehouse (D-RI) and Ron Wyden (D-OR).  

    ### 

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Hungary: Staff Concluding Statement of the 2025 Article IV Mission

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    June 20, 2025

    A Concluding Statement describes the preliminary findings of IMF staff at the end of an official staff visit (or ‘mission’), in most cases to a member country. Missions are undertaken as part of regular (usually annual) consultations under Article IV of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, in the context of a request to use IMF resources (borrow from the IMF), as part of discussions of staff monitored programs, or as part of other staff monitoring of economic developments.

    The authorities have consented to the publication of this statement. The views expressed in this statement are those of the IMF staff and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF’s Executive Board. Based on the preliminary findings of this mission, staff will prepare a report that, subject to management approval, will be presented to the IMF Executive Board for discussion and decision.

    Washington, DC: An International Monetary Fund (IMF) mission, led by Anke Weber and comprising Aleksandra Alferova, Jakree Koosakul, Moheb Malak, Augustus Panton, and Atticus Weller, visited Budapest during June 5-17 to conduct discussions on the 2025 Article IV Consultation with the Hungarian authorities. At the end of the visit, the mission issued the following statement:

    The Hungarian economy is at a challenging juncture. Output has stagnated over the past 3 years, while inflation remains well above the central bank’s 3 percent target. Regulatory measures—such as price, interest and margin caps, along with windfall taxes and subsidized lending schemes—have distorted market signals and added uncertainty. Despite significant fiscal adjustment in recent years, public debt remains elevated given high financing costs. Timely domestic policy reforms are needed to reinforce resilience amid an unsettled external environment. Key to this will be well-designed fiscal measures to strengthen public finances, a continued tight monetary policy to bring down inflation, and structural reforms to raise productivity and safeguard growth against trade tensions and heightened uncertainty.    

     

    Economic Outlook

    High domestic and external uncertainty are expected to continue weighing on the outlook. Modest consumption-driven growth of 0.7 percent is expected in 2025, underpinned by favorable wage dynamics. Growth is projected to increase to 2 percent in 2026—on a recovery in investment and a positive impulse from German fiscal expansion—and to converge to its long-term potential of around 2½ percent by 2030. Inflation is forecast at 4.5 percent in Q4:2025, and to gradually decelerate to the MNB’s 3 percent target by 2027. The current account surplus is expected to fall to around 1¼ percent of GDP in 2025 and to increase gradually over the medium term as battery and electric vehicle production expands. These projections are based on the IMF’s April World Economic Outlook global assumptions.

    Risks to growth remain on the downside. Deepening geoeconomic fragmentation and rising trade tensions would affect Hungary’s exports directly, while indirect effects may be even larger, arising from prolonged trade uncertainty undermining private investment and further weakening global economic activity. Geopolitical tensions could lead to commodity price volatility, intensifying inflationary pressures and negatively impacting fiscal and external balances. On the domestic front, a delay in the needed fiscal adjustment could heighten market concerns about debt sustainability, further increase risk premia, and exacerbate sovereign-bank linkages. A lack of progress on governance reforms being discussed with the EC could further delay or result in cancellation of EU funds with negative consequences for growth and market confidence. Inflation could be more persistent than projected, including from larger-than-anticipated effects of minimum wage hikes necessitating tighter monetary policy for longer.

    Strengthening Fiscal Sustainability for Future Growth

    Staff estimates that currently announced policies fall short of achieving the authorities’ budget targets. The authorities remain committed to reaching their 2025 and 2026 deficit targets of 4.1 and 3.7 percent of GDP, respectively. Their medium-term fiscal structural plan (MTFSP) envisages a further deficit reduction to below 2 percent of GDP by 2028. Under staff’s baseline scenario, which incorporates only legislated or officially endorsed measures, the deficit is projected to decline slightly to 4.8 percent of GDP in 2025 and 4.6 percent of GDP in 2026. In the medium term, the deficit would remain around 4½ percent of GDP, while the debt-to-GDP ratio would rise to about 79 percent in 2030 from 73½ percent in 2024. Debt dynamics have deteriorated since last year, following fiscal slippages and a weaker outlook, and remain sensitive to the real interest and growth path.

    Significant additional fiscal efforts are needed to preserve fiscal space and rebuild buffers. Over the medium term, a surplus of around 1¾ percent of GDP excluding debt servicing and adjusting for economic cycles would appropriately balance debt sustainability and output stabilization objectives. The implied cumulative adjustment of around 2 percent of GDP over 2025-2028 would bring the deficit below 3 percent of GDP by 2027 and reduce the public debt ratio below 70 percent by 2029. Any additional defense spending should be accommodated within staff’s recommended path.

    Measures underpinning the adjustment should be well-designed and growth-friendly.

    • Revenue enhancements: The recent doubling of family tax allowances and expansion of personal income tax exemptions for mothers will significantly reduce revenues. In staff’s view an alternative that would minimize fiscal costs and labor market distortions would be to provide capped tax credits per child for both parents. A more targeted tax regime with fewer exemptions would raise revenue, improve efficiency, and simplify administration. Staff notes that a higher marginal personal income tax rate for high earners would increase revenue and fairness while taxation of corporates could be made more equitable and efficient by rationalizing tax incentives. A reduced reliance on distortionary windfall and financial transactions taxes would be more conducive to investment and growth.
    • Expenditure rationalization: A phaseout of distortive retail energy subsidies and their replacement by targeted cash transfers would free up fiscal resources. A review of procurement and government employment would help the authorities to better target a reduction of administrative expenditures, which are high relative to peers, while a strategy is needed to limit transfers to SOEs and other public organizations. The realized savings from these measures could be used to bolster underfunded areas—health, primary education, and social protection. Public financial management reforms and a strengthened expenditure review process could enhance spending efficiency and support better fiscal governance. Relying on capital spending cuts to achieve targets would weaken growth and should be avoided.

    Further efforts will be needed to reduce long-term spending pressures. Population aging is expected to add roughly 3.5 percent of GDP in additional pension and healthcare costs by 2050. An increase in the retirement age, adjustment of benefit levels, and a limited increase in the social security contribution rate would help to control pension costs in the long term. mproved digitalization and efficient procurement would help to contain health expenditures.  

    Fiscal risk monitoring and mitigation could be improved. A comprehensive, consolidated and regular risk assessment of SOEs would provide early warning of potential vulnerabilities. The issuance of new guarantees should be capped by ceilings, and the stock of guarantees, risk of their activation, and performance of underlying liabilities assessed on an annual basis. Channeling public resources into fund management structures or private equity undermines budgetary transparency, risks resource misallocation and could result in unforeseen contingent liabilities. Finally, to mitigate distortions, it would be beneficial to limit the use of subsidized lending by state-owned banks to addressing market failures.

    Bringing Inflation Durably Back to Target

    The monetary policy stance will need to remain tight into next year to durably return inflation to target. Monetary policy has been appropriately cautious, with the MNB signaling that maintaining tight monetary conditions is warranted. With average inflation expected to remain above the tolerance band in 2025, staff sees limited scope for rate cuts this year. However, the balance of risks to growth and inflation is evolving. Given exceptional uncertainty, the MNB should thus maintain a data-driven approach. The flexible exchange rate regime and adequate reserve coverage can continue to help reduce Hungary’s vulnerability to external shocks. Price, fee, and margin controls are not a sustainable path to lasting disinflation and should be phased out.

    Staff welcomes ongoing efforts to refine the MNB’s focus on the core objectives of price and financial stability. The proposed change to the MNB Act—prohibiting foundations from engaging in asset management activities—is a step in the right direction. In this context, a broader review of the MNB’s non-core functions is warranted, including measures relating to its secondary goal of environmental sustainability. While the MNB should play an active role in climate-risk supervision, prudential regulation should remain risk focused, and all climate-related initiatives be consistent with the MNB’s price and financial stability mandates.

    Safeguarding Financial Sector Stability

    Systemic risks in the financial sector are assessed as broadly contained. Overall, the banking system remains well-capitalized, liquid, profitable, and resilient to external shocks. But emerging pockets of vulnerability merit continued vigilance, including an increase in the share of FX corporate loans, banks’ growing sovereign exposure and significant FX positions, elevated commercial real estate (CRE) vacancies, and buoyant house prices.

    The capital-based macroprudential toolkit is broadly appropriate, though further refinements may be warranted. The planned introduction of a one percent positive neutral countercyclical capital buffer (CCyB) in July 2025 amid heightened uncertainty is welcome, as was the reactivation of the systemic risk buffer (SyRB) for banks’ CRE exposures in 2024. While risks arising from banks’ growing sovereign exposures are partially mitigated by their high leverage ratio (capital-to-total exposure), consideration could be given to incorporating appropriate sovereign-bank nexus stress scenarios into regular supervisory stress testing.

    Differentiation in borrower-based macroprudential limits should be introduced only on financial stability grounds. Recent relaxations of loan-to-value (LTV) and debt-service-to-income (DSTI) limits for first-time buyers and green homes appear to be partly driven by housing affordability and energy efficiency concerns. Such considerations should instead be tackled through appropriate structural and fiscal policies. Moreover, DSTI limits of 60 percent for first-time home buyers and for energy-efficient homes appear high relative to the overall limits in some peers. The reintroduction of voluntary APR ceilings for housing loans, while more restricted in scope, distorts risk pricing and should be reversed. Scaling back housing-related fiscal incentives would help contain future price pressures and safeguard financial stability.

    Boosting Productivity Through Reforms

    Boosting productivity growth will require comprehensive reforms that foster firm dynamism. Firm entry and exit rates remain low amid high regulatory barriers and an insolvency framework that impedes the timely exit of non-viable firms. Streamlining licensing and overlapping permits and enabling creditor-initiated and out-of-court restructuring would enhance capital and labor mobility toward more productive business ventures. Public R&D support should be performance-based and policy efforts aimed at promoting entrepreneurship and technology adoption better targeted, especially toward young, high-growth firms.

    Productivity gains from industrial policy interventions remain elusive, underscoring the need for more effective horizontal reforms. Hungary has implemented repeated waves of industrial policies (IP) to boost competitiveness and productivity in targeted sectors. Yet, their impact on sustained productivity growth remains elusive. Given their high fiscal cost, IP should not substitute for broader structural reforms. Where used, such measures must be appropriately targeted to address market failures and be time-bound and transparent. As a small, open economy, Hungary would benefit most from a coordinated approach to state aid and IP at the EU-level.

    Strengthening energy security can enhance competitiveness and facilitate the green transition. Ongoing efforts to diversify energy supply and increase renewable energy generation are commendable. Still, the Hungarian economy remains energy-intensive with high corporate energy prices weighing on cost competitiveness. EU-wide policy measures—including regional electricity market integration—should be complemented with domestic reforms such as targeted phaseout of household fossil fuel subsidies, enhanced energy efficiency standards, and accelerated permitting procedures for renewable energy investment.

    Governance reforms are foundational for fostering a predictable business environment and boosting potential growth. Hungary has taken some important steps, including the 2023 judicial reforms aimed at strengthening the National Judicial Council. Further governance reforms and their effective enforcement—including related to public procurement, scope of the asset declaration system, conflict-of-interest rules, regulatory oversight, and functioning of the Integrity Authority—could unlock EU funds and amplify the growth dividends of other reforms.

    The mission thanks the Hungarian authorities and our other interlocutors in Hungary for the productive collaboration, constructive policy dialogue, and warm hospitality.

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Eva-Maria Graf

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/06/20/hungary-staff-concluding-statement-of-the-2025-article-iv-mission

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Cantwell Questions Energy Secretary Why DOE is Spiking Clean Energy Projects, Increasing Electricity Costs

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Washington Maria Cantwell
    06.20.25
    Cantwell Questions Energy Secretary Why DOE is Spiking Clean Energy Projects, Increasing Electricity Costs
    Cantwell presses Secretary Wright on whether DOE will renege on $1B promised for PNW green hydrogen hub On hydropower, Secretary acknowledges to Cantwell that “hydro has been a great resource for this country” that is “quite beneficial to our electricity grid”
    WASHINGTON, D.C. – Today, U.S. Senator Maria Cantwell (D-WA), a senior member of the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee, pressed U.S. Department of Energy Secretary Chris Wright on whether the Trump Administration is attempting to roll back hydrogen production investments secured and awarded under the Biden Administration — including a $1 billion grant awarded to the Pacific Northwest Hydrogen Association in 2023 to become a one of seven Regional Clean Hydrogen Hubs, as well as a 2022 tax credit aimed at spurring more investment in clean hydrogen production called 45V.  The budget reconciliation bill passed last month by the House of Representatives eliminates the hydrogen credit, as would the proposal released earlier this week by Senate Finance Committee Chairman Mike Crapo (R-ID).
    Sen. Cantwell: “I actually think getting rid of the tax credits that we have, some of the other ones, broadly, are going to lead to electricity increased cost. And so, can I get you to tell me about the hydrogen hubs, whether you believe you support the hydrogen hubs and moving forward on this?”
    Wright: “So, we put together, as I’m sure you’ve heard, and we’ve published it on the website, this project review process. We have a cross-functional team that evaluates every project. We’re going through 500 projects.”
    Sen. Cantwell: “But is that data call a way to kill the projects? Or no, you really believe in funding some?”
    Wright: “Oh, absolutely. No, we are funding plenty of projects right now, and we don’t stop funding any project. We’re funding all of the existing projects right now, and when we evaluate them – no, plenty of projects will pass. Plenty of projects will pass. Other projects we’ll say, “Hey, can you modify it this way to make it much more beneficial?” Some projects will be modified, and some projects will be ended. “
    Video of their Q&A is HERE; a transcript is HERE.
    Hydrogen is a clean fuel that, when consumed in a fuel cell, produces no dirty emissions — only water. Hydrogen can be produced from existing power resources, such as solar and hydropower.
    Sen. Cantwell helped secure the Regional Clean Hydrogen Hubs (H2Hubs) program and other key hydrogen investments in the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law (BIL) during consideration in the Energy and Natural Resources Committee in July 2021, where she is a senior member, and push for its successful passage through the Senate. The H2Hubs program designated up to $7 billion in competitive grants to establish between six and 10 regional clean hydrogen hubs across the United States. These networks of hydrogen producers, consumers, and local connective infrastructure were meant to help accelerate the use of hydrogen as clean energy and work toward achieving former President Biden’s goal of a 100 percent clean electrical grid by 2035 and net-zero carbon emissions by 2050.
    In October 2023, with support from the region’s Congressional delegation led by Sen. Cantwell, the Pacific Northwest Hydrogen Association received a $1 billion grant through the H2Hubs program. With continued federal support, the Pacific Northwest Hydrogen Association will be able to build out a robust network of hydrogen suppliers and off-takers in both the western and eastern parts of Washington and Oregon, as well as parts of Montana. Clean hydrogen can support decarbonization efforts already being made in the transportation, industrial, and agricultural sectors, as well as the rapidly expanding zero-carbon aviation sector being pioneered in the Pacific Northwest.
    In 2022, President Biden signed the Inflation Reduction Act into law, which included the 45V hydrogen production tax credit to incentivize projects that produce clean hydrogen power. In July 2024, Sen. Cantwell joined a group of colleagues in sending a letter urging then-Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen to issue guidance on 45V eligibility that capitalizes on the “opportunity to reduce greenhouse gas emissions faster and enhance our energy security, while strengthening our economy, creating thousands of jobs, and combating the climate crisis.” The budget bill currently being negotiated in the House and the Senate would drastically shorten the timeline for projects to qualify for the 45V credits – requiring them to begin construction by Jan. 1, 2026 rather than the previous deadline of Jan. 1, 2033 – and cut funding for the H2Hubs program. The Trump Administration is also currently reviewing the remaining H2Hubs financing.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI: Alectra marks Indigenous History Month with key achievement towards truth and reconciliation efforts

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    MISSISSAUGA, Ontario, June 20, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Alectra announced today its achievement of Phase 1 certification in the Partnership Accreditation in Indigenous Relations (PAIR) program, marking an important milestone in its ongoing commitment to advancing Truth and Reconciliation. The announcement coincides with National Indigenous History Month, a time to reflect on the diverse cultures, contributions, and histories of First Nations, Inuit, and Métis Peoples.

    Offered by the Canadian Council for Indigenous Business (CCIB), PAIR is a progressive certification framework that evaluates and strengthens corporate performance in Indigenous relations. Completion of Phase 1 signals Alectra’s commitment to building respectful, reciprocal, and meaningful relationships with Indigenous communities across its service territory.

    “As an organization operating on the traditional territories of Indigenous Nations, we recognize that reconciliation is not a one-time act, but a continued responsibility that requires action, accountability, and partnership,” said Brian Bentz, President and Chief Executive Officer, Alectra Inc. “Marking this milestone during National Indigenous History Month and approaching National Indigenous Peoples Day, reinforces our commitment to learning, listening, and engaging.”

    Key elements of Alectra’s Phase 1 certification include:

    • Alectra’s Indigenous Relations Policy: A guiding framework that outlines Alectra’s commitments across leadership, employment, business development, and community relationships.
    • Leadership Statement: A formal affirmation of Alectra’s support for reconciliation and its responsibility to promote equitable Indigenous relations.
    • The PAIR Working Group: A cross-functional employee team focused on implementing a transparent and culturally aware approach to Indigenous engagement.
    • Identifying Indigenous Communities: A respectful and collaborative process to identify Indigenous communities within Alectra’s service area to support shared objectives.
    • Cultural Awareness Training – Company-wide learning initiatives to build knowledge, understanding, and allyship among employees.

    Phase 1 certification lays the foundation for Alectra’s broader Indigenous strategy. Work is already underway to advance toward Phase 2 and Phase 3 of the PAIR program, which will deepen Alectra’s commitments and ensure its activities continue to align with the priorities of Indigenous communities.

    To learn more about Alectra’s 2025 Community Support Plan, visit: alectra.com/investing-people-alectras-2025-community-support-plan.

    About Alectra’s Family of Companies

    Serving more than one million homes and businesses in Ontario’s Greater Golden Horseshoe area, Alectra Utilities is now the largest municipally-owned electric utility in Canada, based on the total number of customers served. We contribute to the economic growth and vibrancy of the 17 communities we serve by investing in essential energy infrastructure, delivering a safe and reliable supply of electricity, and providing innovative energy solutions.

    Our mission is to be an energy ally, helping our customers and the communities we serve to discover the possibilities of tomorrow’s energy future.

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    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Global: MPs may have passed the assisted dying bill, but the debate is just beginning

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Suzanne Ost, Professor of Law, Lancaster University

    Now that the assisted dying bill has passed its momentous third reading in the House of Commons, it may seem like legalisation in England and Wales is a done deal. But despite this significant milestone, the bill is not yet law and its journey through the House of Lords is far from a formality.

    While the terminally ill adults (end of life) bill is now closer than ever to becoming law, both the Commons and the Lords must agree on its final wording. And just like in the Commons, there are passionate supporters and vocal opponents in the Lords. Peers are expected to focus their attention on a number of outstanding, and controversial, issues.

    One of the biggest concerns that surfaced during both the report stage and today’s third reading relates to the speed and process of drafting the legislation.

    Because this is a private member’s bill, introduced by Labour MP Kim Leadbeater, it was subject to strict timelines. Leadbeater had just 85 days to work with legal drafters and set out a policy framework before the bill was published ahead of its second reading in November 2024.

    Despite this, the democracy-supporting charity the Hansard Society has noted that the bill is “among the most heavily scrutinised in recent times”, and it could ultimately receive up to 200 hours of parliamentary debate, especially now that it has moved to the Lords.

    Still, the fast turnaround meant that many important decisions, such as what medications will be approved for use in assisted dying, have been left for the secretary of state to determine later through what’s known as delegated legislation (secondary laws made without a full parliamentary vote).

    One area likely to receive particular scrutiny is the bill’s inclusion of so-called “Henry VIII clauses”. These are controversial powers that allow ministers to make changes to existing primary legislation, effectively altering acts of parliament without needing a new law. A key example is clause 38 that would let ministers revise the NHS Act 2006 to formally include assisted dying within NHS services.

    Stronger safeguards but concerns persist

    Several amendments aimed at strengthening the bill’s safeguards were supported during the Commons stages. These included the introduction of independent advocates, a new disability advisory board, and additional protections for people with learning disabilities, mental health conditions, or autism.

    An amendment from Labour MP Naz Shah was also supported at the third reading, ensuring that a person who chooses to stop eating and drinking will not automatically be considered terminally ill. This is a protection designed to prevent the system being used inappropriately.

    Yet despite these measures, concerns remain. Critics worry about the risk of coercion, both from others and self imposed. There is particular unease about people feeling pressured to choose assisted dying because they consider themselves a burden.

    Questions have also been raised about whether those with conditions like anorexia might qualify for assisted dying under the current wording of the bill.

    Even with the new safeguards, including mandatory training for doctors to detect coercion and assess mental capacity, many feel the bill needs tighter definitions and clearer criteria to protect the most vulnerable.

    The role of palliative care

    The impact on palliative and end-of-life care continues to be a major point of debate. Today, MPs backed an amendment from Liberal Democrat MP Munira Wilson that would require the government to assess the state of palliative care services within one year of the law being enacted.

    Peers in the House of Lords may push further on this issue. Some may argue that before a person can request assisted dying, they should first be referred to a palliative care specialist to fully understand their options. Others may want the law to spell out more clearly who is qualified to assess these requests.

    Another key question is who should provide assisted dying services. The British Medical Association has previously suggested a model where assisted dying operates outside the core NHS system. This would be a kind of parallel service overseen by the health secretary but delivered by independent providers. This would be similar to how early medical abortions are offered in some parts of the UK.

    Time is tight in the Lords, so peers will probably focus on a few high priority areas. Any amendments will need to be proposed, debated and approved quickly if the bill is to continue progressing this session.

    Even if the bill passes, it includes a four year implementation period to allow for the development of more detailed policies, including training for professionals, protocols for medication and clearer guidance on safeguarding.

    The passing of the bill in the Commons is historic. But the national conversation on assisted dying is not over. And the next phase will determine how this sensitive and deeply personal issue is handled in practice.

    Suzanne Ost has previously received funding from the AHRC for her assisted dying research.

    Nancy Preston receives funding from Horizon Europe, Horizon 2020 and the NIHR

    ref. MPs may have passed the assisted dying bill, but the debate is just beginning – https://theconversation.com/mps-may-have-passed-the-assisted-dying-bill-but-the-debate-is-just-beginning-259460

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Global: MPs may have passed the assisted dying bill, but the debate is just beginning

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Suzanne Ost, Professor of Law, Lancaster University

    Now that the assisted dying bill has passed its momentous third reading in the House of Commons, it may seem like legalisation in England and Wales is a done deal. But despite this significant milestone, the bill is not yet law and its journey through the House of Lords is far from a formality.

    While the terminally ill adults (end of life) bill is now closer than ever to becoming law, both the Commons and the Lords must agree on its final wording. And just like in the Commons, there are passionate supporters and vocal opponents in the Lords. Peers are expected to focus their attention on a number of outstanding, and controversial, issues.

    One of the biggest concerns that surfaced during both the report stage and today’s third reading relates to the speed and process of drafting the legislation.

    Because this is a private member’s bill, introduced by Labour MP Kim Leadbeater, it was subject to strict timelines. Leadbeater had just 85 days to work with legal drafters and set out a policy framework before the bill was published ahead of its second reading in November 2024.

    Despite this, the democracy-supporting charity the Hansard Society has noted that the bill is “among the most heavily scrutinised in recent times”, and it could ultimately receive up to 200 hours of parliamentary debate, especially now that it has moved to the Lords.

    Still, the fast turnaround meant that many important decisions, such as what medications will be approved for use in assisted dying, have been left for the secretary of state to determine later through what’s known as delegated legislation (secondary laws made without a full parliamentary vote).

    One area likely to receive particular scrutiny is the bill’s inclusion of so-called “Henry VIII clauses”. These are controversial powers that allow ministers to make changes to existing primary legislation, effectively altering acts of parliament without needing a new law. A key example is clause 38 that would let ministers revise the NHS Act 2006 to formally include assisted dying within NHS services.

    Stronger safeguards but concerns persist

    Several amendments aimed at strengthening the bill’s safeguards were supported during the Commons stages. These included the introduction of independent advocates, a new disability advisory board, and additional protections for people with learning disabilities, mental health conditions, or autism.

    An amendment from Labour MP Naz Shah was also supported at the third reading, ensuring that a person who chooses to stop eating and drinking will not automatically be considered terminally ill. This is a protection designed to prevent the system being used inappropriately.

    Yet despite these measures, concerns remain. Critics worry about the risk of coercion, both from others and self imposed. There is particular unease about people feeling pressured to choose assisted dying because they consider themselves a burden.

    Questions have also been raised about whether those with conditions like anorexia might qualify for assisted dying under the current wording of the bill.

    Even with the new safeguards, including mandatory training for doctors to detect coercion and assess mental capacity, many feel the bill needs tighter definitions and clearer criteria to protect the most vulnerable.

    The role of palliative care

    The impact on palliative and end-of-life care continues to be a major point of debate. Today, MPs backed an amendment from Liberal Democrat MP Munira Wilson that would require the government to assess the state of palliative care services within one year of the law being enacted.

    Peers in the House of Lords may push further on this issue. Some may argue that before a person can request assisted dying, they should first be referred to a palliative care specialist to fully understand their options. Others may want the law to spell out more clearly who is qualified to assess these requests.

    Another key question is who should provide assisted dying services. The British Medical Association has previously suggested a model where assisted dying operates outside the core NHS system. This would be a kind of parallel service overseen by the health secretary but delivered by independent providers. This would be similar to how early medical abortions are offered in some parts of the UK.

    Time is tight in the Lords, so peers will probably focus on a few high priority areas. Any amendments will need to be proposed, debated and approved quickly if the bill is to continue progressing this session.

    Even if the bill passes, it includes a four year implementation period to allow for the development of more detailed policies, including training for professionals, protocols for medication and clearer guidance on safeguarding.

    The passing of the bill in the Commons is historic. But the national conversation on assisted dying is not over. And the next phase will determine how this sensitive and deeply personal issue is handled in practice.

    Suzanne Ost has previously received funding from the AHRC for her assisted dying research.

    Nancy Preston receives funding from Horizon Europe, Horizon 2020 and the NIHR

    ref. MPs may have passed the assisted dying bill, but the debate is just beginning – https://theconversation.com/mps-may-have-passed-the-assisted-dying-bill-but-the-debate-is-just-beginning-259460

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI USA: ICYMI: Warren Gains Commitment from Hegseth to Follow Supreme Court Orders on Deploying Troops to American Cities

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Massachusetts – Elizabeth Warren

    June 20, 2025

    Trump has already ordered 4,000 National Guard troops and 700 Marines to L.A.

    Hegseth: “We’ve got contingencies and plans for any number of capabilities should governors be unable…to actually secure (their) own federal agents in their cities.”

    Video of Exchange (YouTube)

    Washington, D.C. – At a hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee, U.S. Senator Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.) pressed Department of Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth on her concerns with President Trump’s deployment of the National Guard and U.S. Marines to Los Angeles despite state and local officials’ objections. 

    On June 7, President Trump announced he was deploying the National Guard and the Marines to Los Angeles (L.A.). As of April 2025, the Department of Defense reported there are about 167,951 Marines, 451,024 soldiers in the Army, and 433,000 members of the National Guard. About 4,000 National Guard troops and 700 Marines have been sent to L.A., including about 500 National Guard troops who have been trained to accompany Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents on immigration operations.

    Senator Warren questioned Secretary Hegseth on the deployment of troops to Los Angeles over state and local officials’ objections, citing President Trump’s threat to deploy ICE agents to other cities, and whether troops would be deployed to cities like Chicago and New York if the President ordered it. Secretary Hegseth refused to answer whether he would send more Marines to other cities if President Trump ordered it. Senator Warren also asked for an analysis of the number of troops that can be deployed domestically without undermining readiness internationally, but Secretary Hegseth avoided providing specific numbers.

    On June 12, U.S. District Judge Charles Breyer ruled that the Guard deployment was illegal and violated the 10th Amendment, as the protests in LA “fall far short of a rebellion” that would authorize the President to call them up for federal service.

    Secretary Hegseth committed that he would follow Supreme Court orders if they ruled for troops to be removed from American cities, saying, “If the Supreme Court rules on a topic, we will abide by that.” 

    Last week, Department of Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem made remarks during a press conference, saying, “We are not going away. We are staying here to liberate the society from the socialists and the burdensome leadership that this governor and that this mayor have placed on this country and what they have tried to insert into the city.” Senator Warren criticized Secretary Noem’s comments, highlighting that both the mayor and the governor were democratically elected by a majority of voters in the city. 

    “This is un-American, and it makes us unsafe. I wish our Republican colleagues would speak up,” concluded Senator Warren.

    Transcript: Hearings to examine the President’s proposed budget request for fiscal year 2026 and the Future Years Defense Program for the Department of Defense
    Senate Armed Services Committee
    June 18, 2025

    Senator Elizabeth Warren: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. So, President Trump has deployed the National Guard and then the U.S. Marines to Los Angeles, over the objections of state and local officials, saying that the troops are needed to support immigration detention operations that are being carried out by ICE. On Sunday night, the president threatened to deploy ICE agents to other cities around the country that he sees as “the core of the Democrat power center,” specifically mentioning Chicago and New York. 

    Secretary Hegseth, if the President wanted to deploy Marines to Chicago and New York City like he did in Los Angeles, would you carry out that order, even if the local governors and mayors objected?

    Honorable Peter B. Hegseth, Secretary of Defense: Well, Senator, because Governor Newsom was unwilling to address protecting federal law enforcement agents in Los Angeles, President Trump had all the authorities, and the Defense Department happily supported defending our ICE agents in the conduct of their job. They have the right as Americans to be able to do their job without being attacked by mobs, and we will protect them in that process. And if others needed it, we would provide that.

    Senator Warren: I know that you heard my question, so you would be willing to send troops if the President ordered it to Chicago, New York City, is that right? 

    Secretary Hegseth: Well, thankfully, New York City, unlike California, unlike Gavin Newsom, is willing to step up and address the issue with their local law enforcement.

    Senator Warren: I will take that as a yes. How about if the President says he wants to send troops to 15 cities? Would you be willing to do that?

    Secretary Hegseth: Senator, I don’t accept your hypothetical, because it’s—

    Senator Warren: That’s a hypothetical. That’s the question. You’re the Secretary of Defense, would you send troops to 15 cities? If the President thought it, said, “Do it.” Would you do it? 15 cities?

    Secretary Hegseth: Again, Senator, it’s a complete hypothetical, lacking any context at all. 

    Senator Warren: Look, you’re the Secretary of Defense —

    Secretary Hegseth: I refuse to box myself in based on questioning, on a hypothetical.

    Senator Warren: Well, you can refuse, but you’re here asking for a trillion dollars, and I want to know how you’re going to spend it. And so my question is, if Donald Trump tells you to send troops to 15 American cities, are you going to spend the money and send the troops?

    Secretary Hegseth: Thankfully, we’re spending money on securing our southern border. A way the previous administration abandoned and allowed 21 million illegals to enter our country. So defending our homeland is a real, serious priority under this administration, and we’re doing it.

    Senator Warren: I understand the question about defense. Secretary Hegseth, about 4000 National Guard troops and 700 Marines have been sent to LA. Is there a number of troops deployed to American cities over the objections of governors and mayors, at which you would be concerned that we are undermining our national defense? 

    Secretary Hegseth: Senator, we’ve spent two decades guarding other people’s borders. We think at the Defense Department it’s about time we shore up ours. 

    Senator Warren: So, that’s my question. Is there a number at which sending those troops to Los Angeles or Chicago or New York starts to undermine our ability to defend ourselves around the globe? Is there a number?

    Secretary Hegseth: Senator, we look at capabilities and readiness around the globe all the time, and we’re quite satisfied with our capabilities to defend the homeland, and we’ll provide more if and when it’s necessary. 

    Senator Warren: So, you are satisfied with our capabilities? Let me just ask, have you actually done the analysis and figured out how many troops you can deploy domestically before you start to undermine readiness around the world? Have you done that analysis? 

    Secretary Hegseth: Yes, ma’am. 

    Senator Warren: Then would you let the rest of us in on it? We are the Senate Armed Services Committee, and you’re here to ask for a trillion dollars. What’s the number?

    Secretary Hegseth: We’ve got contingencies and plans for any number of capabilities should governors be unable, as Governor Gavin Newsom has been, to actually secure his own federal agents in their cities.

    Senator Warren: But can you give us a ballpark on what that number is? How many troops can you deploy domestically before you start to cut into our readiness internationally?

    Secretary Hegseth: As I said, previous administrations deployed our National Guard all around the globe in numbers far beyond what we were capable of supporting, so limited contingencies inside the United States to protect federal law enforcement is doable. 

    Senator Warren: You have a number, but you’re just not going to tell us? So, let me ask you one more question, if the Supreme Court orders you to remove troops from American city streets. Will you do so?

    Secretary Hegseth: Can you repeat the question, please? 

    Senator Warren: Yes. If the Supreme Court orders you to remove troops from American cities. Will you do so? 

    Secretary Hegseth: As I’ve said, Senator, I don’t believe district courts should determine national security policy, but if the Supreme Court rules on a topic, we will abide by that. 

    Senator Warren: Okay. You know, during her press conference last week, Secretary Noem said, “We are staying here to liberate the city from its mayor and its governor,” people who were elected by a majority of voters. Secretary Hegseth is saying he is ready to deploy more troops and won’t tell us what the implications are for our national defense. This is un-American, and it makes us unsafe. I wish our Republican colleagues would speak up.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Collins, Reed Lead Bipartisan Group of Appropriators Urging Trump Admin. to Reverse Closure of Job Corps Centers

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Rhode Island Jack Reed

    WASHINGTON, DC – U.S. Senators Susan Collins, Chair of the Senate Appropriations Committee, and Jack Reed (D-RI), a leading Democrat on the committee, led a bipartisan group of Appropriations Committee members in sending a letter to Department of Labor (DOL) Secretary Lori Chavez-DeRemer, urging the DOL to reverse its decision to begin the closure of Job Corps Centers nationwide.

    Joining Senators Collins and Reed in signing the letter were U.S. Senators Patty Murray (D-WA), Lisa Murkowski (R-AK), Tammy Baldwin (D-WI), John Boozman (R-AR), Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH), Cindy Hyde-Smith (R-MS), and Jeff Merkley (D-OR).

    “The sudden announcement that the Department of Labor began the process of closing all Job Corps Centers on May 29, 2025, will harm students and local economies in every state across the nation,” the nine Senators wrote. “We urge you to retract this announcement and to faithfully implement the Fiscal Year (FY) 2025 Full-Year Continuing Resolution Act, which President Trump signed into law and which includes $1,760,155,000 for Job Corps.”

    “Job Corps has helped millions of young people, ages 16 to 24, many of whom face significant economic and social challenges, develop the skills and resilience they need to succeed in work and in life through intensive education, training, and support services in a residential setting since its creation in 1964,” they continued. “The sudden closure of Job Corps Centers not only puts young people’s lives at risk, but local communities will pay a steep price, especially the thousands of individuals who work at the Centers and will lose their livelihoods.”

    “Abruptly canceling contracts for the nation’s Job Corps Centers will leave students and communities in the lurch and will undermine opportunities for young people to get education and training to succeed in valuable trades. While we would be pleased to work with you to improve the Job Corps program to do even more to serve our young people and address growing workforce needs, it is essential that you faithfully implement the program in accordance with the FY 2025 Continuing Resolution and reopen all Job Corps Centers,” the Senators concluded.

    The complete text of the letter can be read here.

    In April, Senator Collins sent a letter to Secretary Chavez-DeRemer urging the DOL to lift the halt on enrollment at Loring and Penobscot Job Corps Centers in Maine. Last month, Senators Collins and Reed sent a separate letter to Secretary Chavez-DeRemer requesting that the DOL provide information on the Job Corps’ contracts, background check processing, and evaluation plan.

    Also last month, at a hearing to review the Fiscal Year 2026 budget request for the DOL, Senator Collins urged Secretary Chavez-DeRemer to reverse the Department’s halt of new enrollment at Maine’s two Job Corps Centers and the proposed elimination of the Job Corps program altogether. During the hearing, Senator Collins spoke about Adais Viruet-Torres, a graduate of the Loring Job Corps Center and later Husson University who overcame homelessness and now works as a nurse practitioner.

    A long time champion of Job Corps, Senator Reed questioned U.S. Labor Secretary Chavez-DeRemer at a May 22 hearing about the Trump Administration’s efforts to terminate Job Corps.  Senator Reed helped launch Exeter Job Corps Center in Rhode Island, which has a capacity for 185 students, with rolling admissions throughout the year.  Exeter Job Corps Center employs a staff of about 85 and offers vocational training in 6 trades, a GED program, and two high school diploma programs.  Reed recently led a rally to help save Job Corps.

    MIL OSI USA News