NewzIntel.com

Category: Intelligence Agencies

  • MIL-OSI Security: New Jersey Man Admits to Concealing Material Support and Resources to ISIS

    Source: United States Attorneys General 7

    Kyse S. Abushanab, 27, of Budd Lake, New Jersey, pleaded guilty today to a one-count information charging him with concealing material support and resources to a designated foreign terrorist organization.

    According to court documents, between in or around March 2021 and in or around January 2022, Abushanab compiled resources, including information pertaining to the manufacture and use of weapons of mass destruction, with the aim of providing members of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS or the Islamic State), a designated foreign terrorist organization, and its supporters with a repository of information and resources to help carry out ISIS’s mission. This material included, among other things, videos and documents showing step-by-step instructions on how to make suicide belts or vests, detonators and timers, improvised bombs, and other explosives and incendiary devices. In an effort to evade detection by law enforcement, Abushanab took steps to conceal his efforts to assist ISIS by, among other things, using encrypted applications, untraceable email accounts, and a secured cloud storage space to gather and store information on how to make a variety of weapons of mass destruction.

    The charge of concealment of provision of material support carries a maximum penalty of 10 years in prison and a fine of up to $250,000. Sentencing is scheduled for Sept. 24.

    Sue Bai, head of the Justice Department’s National Security Division; Acting U.S. Attorney Vikas Khanna for the District of New Jersey; Assistant Director David J. Scott of the FBI’s Counterterrorism Division; and Acting Special Agent in Charge Terence G. Reilly of the FBI Newark Field Office made the announcement.

    The FBI is investigating the case, with valuable assistance provided by the Morris County Sheriff’s Office.

    Assistant U.S. Attorney Sammi Malek for the District of New Jersey and Trial Attorney Ryan White of the National Security Division’s Counterterrorism Section are prosecuting the case.

    MIL Security OSI –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Luján Presses Budget Office Nominee on Firing FBI Victim Specialist, Attacks on Social Security

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator Ben Ray Luján (D-New Mexico)
    Luján Helped Lead Opposition to Project 2025 Chief Architect to Serve as OMB Director

    Washington, D.C. – U.S. Senator Ben Ray Luján (D-N.M.), a member of Senate Committee on the Budget, pressed Dan Bishop, the nominee to be Deputy Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), on firing career civil servants and Elon Musk’s attacks on Social Security following President Trump’s Joint Address to Congress.  
    Senator Luján shared the story on behalf of a New Mexican who was fired as an FBI victim specialist, saying, “I am not waste, fraud, and abuse. I am not the enemy. I’m not expendable. For more than 22 years, it has been my greatest honor to be with people in their darkest hour, to bring light into the darkness at the cost of my own well-being. I do not deserve to be forced out under fear or duress or discarded.”
    “When Elon Musk is calling the shots, firing people across the country, cutting budgets, cutting programs, putting people on the chopping block using chainsaw as a tool who says Social Security is a Ponzi scheme, I think that requires us to take notice,” Senator Luján said, in part, in the hearing. “Elon Musk was described by President Trump last night at the address to the American people as being in charge. There’s been a lot of questions over the last eight weeks if he is in charge or not, but Elon Musk is calling the shots right now.”
    “I’m not sitting this one out. I’m going to stand up and fight for my constituents,” concluded Senator Luján.
    Video of Senator Luján’s exchange with Dan Bishop is available HERE.
    An excerpt of Senator Luján’s questioning is available below:
    Sen. Luján: I’m going to accept the challenge of my colleague. I’m going to read you a note, Representative Bishop, from a constituent that was fired:
    “I am an FBI victim specialist, civil servant, a career government employee. I am there when your loved one is killed by an actual shooter, when your child is sexually exploited online, when your family member is kidnapped and held for ransom, when your mother, sister, daughter is the victim of interstate domestic violence or stalking. When the federal agent is injured or killed in the line of duty. When your elderly parent is defrauded of their life savings, when your child is kidnapped by the other parent. When you or someone you love is victimized in so many ways. I am not waste, fraud, and abuse. I am not the enemy. I’m not expendable. For more than 22 years, it has been my greatest honor to be with people in their darkest hour, to bring light into the darkness at the cost of my own well-being. I do not deserve to be forced out under fear or duress or discarded. For if I am, you and those you love will have to walk in that darkness alone. There are so many of us throughout the United States with stories just like this, examples of how they responded to crime victims.”
    I agree. Let’s root out waste, fraud, and abuse. But we should both agree, when there is a victim of a sexual crime or someone from across the border that is going to kill someone or do something to them, they don’t deserve to be fired. That is the nonsense going on here.
    I accept this responsibility, but I’m not sitting this one out. Not on behalf of my constituents. There’s a better way for us to do these things.
    As Deputy [Director] of the Office of Management and Budget, Representative, it seems like you will be working in lockstep with Elon Musk and DOGE. I appreciate the conversations we have had on both sides of the aisle, speaking about what Elon Musk and others are doing here.
    Over the weekend, Elon Musk said something. He said, “Social Security is the biggest Ponzi scheme of all time.” Do you believe that Social Security is a Ponzi scheme?
    Mr. Bishop: It really isn’t my place. What I’m doing is sitting to be the Deputy Director of OMB, to implement President Trump’s policies. I’m not in a position to comment on every comment that Elon Musk makes. But I know President Trump has said he is not touching Social Security or Medicare, he will ensure those benefits. That is the policy I’m going to be seeking to work with Director Vought to implement.
    Sen. Luján: Elon Musk was described by President Trump last night at the address to the American people as being in charge. There’s been a lot of questions over the last eight weeks if he is in charge or not, but Elon Musk is calling the shots right now. President Trump is going to Daytona, and golfing. I believe in finding balance. But I believe the president is able to do those things because the other president [Elon Musk] is calling the shots.
    When Elon Musk is passing things down to Director Vought and others, some of which were documented, and these ideas came from Director Vought which are part of Project 2025, and you have someone who is calling the shots, firing people across the country, cutting budgets, cutting programs, putting people on the chopping block using chainsaw as a tool who says Social Security is a Ponzi scheme, I think that requires us to take notice. Your responsibility, sir, is going to be making decisions with Director Vought to the president about these budgets. You said you want to get to a balanced budget. That will require cuts. This notion that Medicaid and Medicare are not on the chopping block–
    I would ask voters, Democrats and Republicans, look at the votes cast last week. Read the document. Go back and read the document that Speaker Paul Ryan put together when he was Speaker of the House that described going after this program. Go back when Paul Ryan was the chairman of the Ways and Means Committee and went after that program. Look in 2017 when Republicans were trying to eliminate all aspects of Medicaid, eliminating the Affordable Care Act, and took John McCain coming to the floor — may he rest in peace, the great hero that he is — and said no. Fighting brain cancer. This is not new. It is not some secret. These are the facts. Look them up.
    Representative Bishop, We did not vote the same a lot, but I appreciate you being here and stepping up, and I pray for you and the president because we have got to do better for the American people.
    And I’ll close the way I started: I’m not sitting this one out. I’m going to stand up and fight for my constituents.

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI Security: Okmulgee Couple Sentenced For Child Abuse And Child Neglect

    Source: Office of United States Attorneys

    MUSKOGEE, OKLAHOMA – The United States Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of Oklahoma announced that John Ray Collins Jr., age 49, and Tambara Lorene Collins, age 38, of Okmulgee, Oklahoma, appeared in United States District Court for sentencing.

    John Ray Collins Jr. was sentenced to 240 months in prison for one count of Attempted Murder, and 360 months each on two counts of Child Abuse, and 360 months for one count of Child Neglect.  The terms of imprisonment will run concurrently for a total of 30 years imprisonment, to be followed by a five year term of supervised release.

    Tambara Lorene Collins, age 38, of Okmulgee, Oklahoma, was sentenced to 216 months in prison per count on two counts of Child Abuse, and 216 months in prison for one count of Child Neglect.  The terms of imprisonment will run concurrently for a total of 18 years imprisonment, to be followed by a five year term of supervised release.

    The charges arose from an investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Okmulgee County Sheriff’s Office, and the Muscogee (Creek) Nation Lighthorse Police.

    On November 17, 2023, a federal jury convicted John Collins at trial of all counts.  On October 24, 2023, Tambara Collins entered a guilty plea to two counts of child abuse and one count of child neglect.

    According to investigators, between January 1, 2023, and June 12, 2023, John and Tambara Collins repeatedly abused and failed to protect two children in their care.  The children sustained bruising and abrasions to the face, ears, back, legs, and feet.  In mid-June, John Collins escalated his abuse, beating one of the children with a pipe.  The child was then denied food, water, medical care, and sanitary living conditions.  The child suffered head lacerations, internal bleeding, a broken arm, broken fingers, and traumatic skeletal muscle deterioration before rescuers were able to remove the children from the Collins residence.

    The crimes occurred in Okmulgee County, within the boundaries of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation Reservation, within the Eastern District of Oklahoma.

    “The suffering these innocent children endured at the hands of two people who were supposed to love and care for them is horrific and unconscionable,” said FBI Oklahoma City Special Agent in Charge Doug Goodwater.  “The FBI is proud to have been part of the investigative team that helped put John and Tambara Collins behind prison bars where they undoubtedly belong.”

    “The defendants subjected children in their care to unthinkable abuse and neglect, and I am thankful for the collaborative work of county, tribal, and federal investigators and federal prosecutors in securing convictions and significant sentences in this case,” said United States Attorney Christopher J. Wilson.

    The Honorable John F. Heil, III, U.S. District Judge in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma, presided over the hearing.  The defendants will remain in the custody of the U.S. Marshals Service pending transportation to a designated United States Bureau of Prisons facility to serve a non-paroleable sentence of incarceration.

    Assistant U.S. Attorneys Caila M. Cleary and Sarah McAmis represented the United States.

    MIL Security OSI –

  • MIL-OSI Security: Reno Man Sentenced To 10 Years In Prison For Assaulting Federal Officer During Arrest

    Source: Office of United States Attorneys

    RENO – A Reno resident was sentenced today by United States District Judge Miranda M. Du to 10 years in prison to be followed by three years of supervised release for assaulting a federal officer with a deadly or dangerous weapon during the execution of his arrest warrant.

    According to evidence presented at trial, on February 16, 2022, Matthew John Nason, 39, fired a handgun in the direction of a Deputy United States Marshal while the Deputy was attempting to serve a valid arrest warrant for Nason and his girlfriend at Nason’s residence. Nason had an outstanding arrest warrant for drug and firearms violations out of the District of North Dakota. The 10-year sentence is to run consecutive to the sentence Nason received in the District of North Dakota.

    In November 2024, following the three-day trial, a jury convicted Nason of assault of a federal officer with a dangerous weapon.

    Acting United States Attorney Sue Fahami for the District of Nevada, Special Agent in Charge Spencer L. Evans for the FBI Las Vegas Division, and Marshal Gary Schofield for the United States Marshals Service made the announcement.

    This case was investigated by the FBI, United States Marshals Service, and the Reno Police Department. Assistant United States Attorneys Megan Rachow and Randy St. Clair prosecuted the case.

    ###

     

     

    MIL Security OSI –

  • MIL-OSI Security: Colombian National Sentenced to Prison and Another Pleads Guilty for Roles in Conspiracy to Kidnap and Assault U.S. Army Soldiers in Colombia

    Source: United States Attorneys General 12

    A Colombian national was sentenced and another pleaded guilty in separate hearings today in the Southern District of Florida for their respective roles in kidnapping and assaulting two members of the U.S. military who were on temporary duty in Bogotá, Colombia.

    Pedro Jose Silva Ochoa, 47, was sentenced to 27 years and three months in prison. Silva Ochoa pleaded guilty in December 2024 to conspiracy to kidnap an internationally protected person.

    Kenny Julieth Uribe Chiran, 35, pleaded guilty to conspiracy to kidnap an internationally protected person. A sentencing date has not yet been set. A federal district court judge will determine any sentence after considering the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors.

    “Protecting Americans, wherever they may be throughout the world, is of paramount importance, and the United States will use every available tool to bring to justice those who harm our citizens,” said Supervisory Official Antoinette Bacon of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division. “In particular, kidnapping and assaulting two U.S. military service members will not go unanswered, and we will hold to account anyone who commits these violent acts against those who protect us.”

    “Members of our military, whether serving here or abroad, can count on this Department of Justice’s respect, support, and protection,” said U.S. Attorney Hayden P. O’Byrne for the Southern District of Florida. “Kidnappings and assaults against U.S. service members will not be tolerated. To those who would dare commit such reprehensible acts against America’s heroes, know this: We will identify you; we will find you; and we will prosecute you as aggressively as the law permits.”

    “The FBI’s commitment to investigate criminal acts against the U.S. military beyond our borders is clearly demonstrated by our persistent pursuit of justice for the two kidnapped soldiers,” said Acting Special Agent in Charge Brett D. Skiles of the FBI Miami Field Office. “Our close cooperation with Colombian and Chilean law enforcement authorities was essential to this international investigation’s success. To all would be kidnappers the message is clear: target our citizens with violence anywhere in the world and we will hold you accountable for your actions.”

    According to court documents, Silva Ochoa and Uribe Chiran, both of Bogotá, and their co-defendant, Jeffersson Arango Castellanos, targeted, incapacitated, and kidnapped two U.S. soldiers in Bogotá. The two victims, while serving on orders in Colombia, went to an entertainment district in Bogotá to watch a soccer game on the evening of March 5, 2020. They eventually went to a pub, where they lost consciousness until the following day, by which point they had been separated. Medical examinations later confirmed the presence of benzodiazepines in the two victims. The defendants targeted the two victims at the pub, incapacitated them with drugs, and kidnapped them to acquire the victims’ valuables and credit and debit card information. Silva Ochoa and Arango Castellanos used one victim’s credit card and the other victim’s debit card to make purchases and withdraw money.

    Silva Ochoa was extradited in April 2024 from Chile to the United States. Uribe Chiran was extradited in September 2024 from Colombia to the United States. Co-defendant Arango Castellanos was extradited in May 2023 from Colombia to the United States, pleaded guilty in January 2024, and was sentenced in May 2024 to 48 years and nine months in prison.

    The FBI Miami Field Office is investigating the case. The Justice Department’s Office of International Affairs, the Criminal Division’s Narcotic and Dangerous Drug Section’s Office of the Judicial Attaché in Bogotá, and the FBI’s Legal Attaché Offices in Bogotá and Santiago, Chile, provided significant assistance in this matter. The United States thanks Colombian and Chilean law enforcement authorities for their valuable assistance.

    Trial Attorneys Clayton O’Connor and Elizabeth Nielsen of the Criminal Division’s Human Rights and Special Prosecutions Section and Assistant U.S. Attorney Bertila Fernandez for the Southern District of Florida are prosecuting the case.

    MIL Security OSI –

  • MIL-OSI Security: Former small business office manager sentenced to 4+ years in federal prison for embezzlement, identity theft

    Source: Office of United States Attorneys

    A district judge sentenced a Collinsville woman to 51 months’ imprisonment after she embezzled more than $158,000 and stole the identity of a coworker while employed by AMK Heating and Cooling in Edwardsville.

    Angela L. Cooper, 47, pleaded guilty to one count of wire fraud, one count of bank fraud, one count of aggravated identity theft and three counts of tax fraud. In addition to imprisonment, the judge ordered her to pay $168,536.12 in restitution and serve three years of supervised release.

    “The U.S. Attorney’s Office aggressively prosecutes identity theft because the crime causes so much harm. Its victims suffer not only drained bank accounts, but they also endure sleepless nights, and it can sometimes take years to undo the damage,” said U.S. Attorney Steven D. Weinhoeft. “The U.S. Attorney’s Office is proud of our partnership with IRS Criminal Investigation and the FBI, and we will continue to hold those who harm small businesses accountable.”

    According to court documents, Cooper served as the office manager for AMK and had access to the company’s checkbook and accounting software. Using these tools, Cooper fraudulently wrote more than 100 checks payable to herself and forged the signature of the business’s owner. Cooper tried to conceal her fraud by disguising the checks as payroll and loans to her from AMK. Over a two-year period, Cooper embezzled $158,658.41 from AMK.

    “By nature, greed continues to grow if left unchecked. For two years, Angela Cooper found multiple ways to steal from her employer. Cooper’s greed even extended to a coworker,” said FBI Springfield Special Agent in Charge Christopher Johnson. “The FBI is proud to work alongside our IRS law enforcement partners to thwart corporate fraud and ensure justice for victims.”

    While employed by AMK, Cooper also had access to employee files and personal information like birthdates and social security numbers. Cooper used a coworker’s information to apply for and fraudulently obtain a Discover credit card. Cooper maxed out the credit card, accruing $9,877.71 in charges on the card in a matter of weeks. In doing so, she committed bank fraud and aggravated identity theft, which carried a mandatory two year minimum sentence.

    “Ms. Cooper broke the trust of her employer by embezzling well over $100,000 from them in her role as a bookkeeper,” said Special Agent in Charge Bill Steenson, IRS Criminal Investigation’s St. Louis Field Office. “The crime was compounded when she failed to report the stolen funds as income on her tax returns. All income is taxable, even stolen income and this sentence helps drive that point home.”

    Finally, Cooper failed to report the additional income in her 2019, 2020 and 2021 tax returns to the IRS. Although fraudulently obtained, the income was required to be reported on her tax returns. Her omission of the additional income caused a tax loss of over $35,000 to the IRS.

    IRS Criminal Investigation and the FBI Springfield Field Office contributed to the investigation, and Assistant U.S. Attorney Zoe Gross prosecuted the case.

    MIL Security OSI –

  • MIL-OSI: Amplify Energy Announces Fourth Quarter and Full-Year 2024 Results, Year-End 2024 Proved Reserves, Juniper Capital Acquisition Update and Standalone Full-Year 2025 Guidance

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    HOUSTON, March 05, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Amplify Energy Corp. (NYSE: AMPY) (“Amplify,” the “Company,” “us,” or “our”) announced today its operating and financial results for the fourth quarter and full-year 2024, year-end 2024 proved reserves, Juniper Capital (“Juniper”) acquisition update and full-year 2025 standalone guidance for the Company.

    Key Highlights

    • 2025 strategic initiatives include:
      • Completing the previously announced transformational combination with certain Juniper portfolio companies which own substantial oil-weighted producing assets and significant leasehold interests in the DJ and Powder River Basins (the “Transaction”) and integrating such assets into our operations
      • Continuing the Beta development program with six completions planned for 2025 including the C-48 and the A-45 which were deferred from the 2024 program
      • Expanding Magnify Energy Services, a wholly owned subsidiary of Amplify (“Magnify”), to enhance Amplify’s competitive advantage in operating our mature assets located in East Texas and Oklahoma
      • Creating incremental value in East Texas by monetizing portions of our portfolio and/or participating in joint development opportunities focused within the Haynesville formation
    • During the fourth quarter of 2024, the Company:
      • Achieved average total production of 18.5 MBoepd
      • Generated net cash provided by operating activities of $12.5 million and a net loss of $7.4 million
      • Delivered Adjusted EBITDA of $21.8 million and Adjusted Net Income of $5.1 million
      • Generated $2.9 million of free cash flow
      • Completed the sale of undeveloped Haynesville acreage in East Texas for $1.4 million
    • For full-year 2024, the Company:
      • Achieved average total production of 19.5 MBoepd
      • Generated net cash provided by operating activities of $51.3 million and net income of $12.9 million
      • Delivered Adjusted EBITDA of $103.0 million and Adjusted Net Income of $35.8 million
      • Generated $18.0 million of free cash flow
      • Renegotiated prior surety bonds and reduced sinking fund payments by approximately $7.0 million per year
      • Initiated development drilling program at Beta, with the completion of two wells, which outperformed type curves
      • Generated $3.1 million of Adjusted EBITDA at Magnify
      • Renegotiated the iodine contract in Oklahoma, increasing annual Adjusted EBITDA by $2.4 million
    • Amplify’s year-end 2024 total proved reserves, utilizing Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) pricing of $75.48/Bbl for oil and NGLs and $2.13/MMBtu for natural gas, totaled 93 MMBoe and had a PV-10 value of approximately $736 million
    • As of December 31, 2024, Amplify had $127.0 million outstanding under the revolving credit facility
      • Net Debt to Last Twelve Months (“LTM”) Adjusted EBITDA of 1.2x1
         
      (1) Net debt as of December 31, 2024, consisting of $127 MM outstanding under its revolving credit facility with ~$0.0 MM of cash and cash equivalents, and LTM Adjusted EBITDA as of the fourth quarter of 2024.
         

    Martyn Willsher, Amplify’s President and Chief Executive Officer, commented, “In early 2024, we told stakeholders that 2024 had the potential to be a transformative year for the Company, and we believe that we delivered on that expectation throughout the year. The recently announced transaction with Juniper Capital expands our operations into the DJ and Powder River Basins, increases our scale, operating efficiency and margins, improves our inventory of attractive drilling locations, and provides us with a new core area for potential M&A activity. The transaction also resulted in a new long-term partnership with Juniper Capital, who have a long history of delivering substantial value to shareholders. At Beta, we safely and successfully initiated a drilling program, which has increased our confidence regarding the future inventory of the field and has enabled us to expand our development plans for this prolific asset in 2025 and beyond.”

    Mr. Willsher continued, “While we have focused our attention and resources on these two significant initiatives, our team has also delivered value to stockholders by pursuing opportunities to reduce operating expenses and maximize the value of our existing asset base. For example, Magnify Energy Services, our wholly owned subsidiary that provides oilfield services to Amplify-operated wells, expanded meaningfully in scope, realizing a significant increase in revenue and efficiency and reducing operating costs in East Texas and Oklahoma. We also renegotiated several existing contracts, like our iodine extraction contract, to receive improved economics. Although smaller in scope, these efforts have demonstrated management’s commitment to identifying areas to improve our operations and deliver value to stockholders. On the value maximizing front, we were able to monetize a portion of our acreage with Haynesville rights for several million dollars, while retaining an interest to realize upside value.”

    Mr. Willsher concluded, “We believe that our strategic and operational accomplishments in 2024 set the foundation for Amplify’s future and that in 2025 we will begin to capitalize on the growth potential of this significantly enhanced asset base.  By delivering on our 2025 strategic initiatives, we believe we can create immediate and long-term value for Amplify’s stockholders.”

    Juniper Capital Rocky Mountain Assets Update

    On January 15, 2025, Amplify announced that it has entered into a definitive merger agreement with privately held Juniper to combine with certain Juniper portfolio companies owning assets and leasehold interests in the DJ and Powder River Basins. Such portfolio companies are oil-weighted and include approximately 287,000 net acres. We expect to close the acquisition in the second quarter of 2025. Amplify has provided more information on the portfolio companies and their assets and the value potential of the Transaction in its latest investor presentation, available on its investor relations website.

    On March 4, 2025, a definitive proxy statement was filed providing additional details on the Transaction. A special meeting of stockholders, to be held virtually, has been scheduled for April 14, 2025, at 9:00 am Central Time, where stockholders of record as of March 3, 2025 can vote to approve the issuance of common stock, par value $0.01 per share (the “Common Stock”) (as described in more detail in the definitive proxy statement) in connection with the Transaction. In order to virtually attend, stockholders must register in advance at www.cesonlineservices.com/ampysm_vm prior to April 13, 2025 at 9:00 a.m. Central Time. More information can be found in the definitive proxy statement on the SEC’s website at www.sec.gov and the Company’s website, www.amplifyenergy.com, under the Investor Relations section. Upon approval from our stockholders of the issuance of Common Stock and the resulting closing of the Transaction, Amplify and Juniper are expected to own approximately 61% and 39%, respectively, of the combined company’s outstanding equity.

    In anticipation of closing, Amplify is currently working with Juniper and its portfolio companies on integrating the Juniper assets into the Amplify organization. Furthermore, the Company expects to refinance a substantial portion of its outstanding debt and approximately $133 million in principal amount of the portfolio companies’ outstanding debt prior to closing the Transaction. Amplify intends to update the market with developments of the Transaction as they progress.

    East Texas Haynesville Monetization Update

    Starting in 2024, several operators expressed increased interest in buying or partnering with Amplify on our East Texas Haynesville interests. In December 2024, Amplify monetized ninety percent (90%) of its interests in certain units with Haynesville rights in Panola and Shelby Counties, while retaining a ten percent (10%) working interest and the ability to participate in any well drilled within the boundary of such units. Upon closing, such transaction generated approximately $1.4 million in proceeds.

    In January 2025, Amplify completed a second transaction with a separate counterparty. Amplify sold ninety percent (90%) of its interest in certain units with Haynesville rights in Harrison County, Texas, in addition to 11 gross operated wells. This transaction also established an Area of Mutual Interest (“AMI”) with the counterparty covering 10,000 gross acres. Amplify retained a ten percent (10%) working interest in the units it divested and purchased a ten percent (10%) working interest in the counterparty’s acreage. Amplify generated net proceeds of $6.2 million from these transactions and estimates the AMI has more than 30 potential gross drilling locations.

    2024 Year-End Proved Reserve Update

    The Company’s estimated proved reserves at SEC pricing for year-end 2024 totaled 93.0 MMBoe, which consisted of 82.2 MMBoe of proved developed reserves and 10.8 MMBoe of proved undeveloped reserves. Proved developed reserves were lower year-over-year, primarily due to lower SEC pricing for oil and natural gas, which fell from $78.22 to $75.48 for oil and from $2.64 to $2.13 for natural gas, and the impact of 2024 production roll-off. Total proved reserves were comprised of 44% oil, 19% NGLs, and 37% natural gas.

    At year-end 2024, Amplify’s total proved reserves and proved developed reserves had PV-10 values of approximately $736 million and $507 million, respectively, using SEC pricing. Proved developed reserve value at Bairoil was lower than 2023 due to a combination of SEC pricing, production performance and higher operating cost assumptions due to significant increases in regulated electricity rates. Proved undeveloped reserves have increased materially as a result of the successful 2024 Beta development program, with the Company adding 23 additional locations and approximately $200 million in PV-10 value. The initial production rates for the two Beta wells brought on-line in 2024 exceeded the type-curves included in our year-end reserve report, and Amplify will consider increasing the type curve assumptions for Beta development wells after evaluating results from the 2025 development program. Detail on the Company’s reserves by asset is provided in the table below. Additionally, Amplify has provided more information on its Beta development program and the substantial value potential of the field in its latest investor presentation, available on its investor relations website.

      Estimated Net Reserves1
    Region MMBoe % Oil and NGL Proved Developed PV-10 Proved Undeveloped PV-10 Total Proved PV-10
          (in millions)
               
    Beta 19.1 100% $144 $214 $358
    Oklahoma 27.0 46% 138 – 138
    Bairoil 16.4 100% 118 – 118
    East Texas/ North Louisiana 28.0 30% 75 4 79
    Eagle Ford (Non-op) 2.5 90% 32 11 43
               
    Total 93.0 63% $507 $229 $736
    (1) Amplify’s year-end 2024 total proved reserves, utilizing SEC pricing of $75.48/Bbl for oil and NGLs and $2.13/MMBtu for natural gas.
       

    Amplify’s reserves estimates were prepared by its third-party independent reserve consultant, Cawley, Gillespie & Associates, Inc.

    Key Financial Results

    During the fourth quarter of 2024, the Company reported a net loss of approximately $7.4 million. The net loss was primarily attributable to a non-cash unrealized loss on commodity derivatives during the period. Excluding the impact of the non-cash unrealized loss on commodity derivatives in addition to other one-time impacts, Amplify generated Adjusted Net Income of $5.1 million in the fourth quarter of 2024.

    Fourth quarter Adjusted EBITDA was $21.8 million, a decrease of approximately $3.7 million from $25.5 million in the prior quarter. The decrease was primarily due to lower realized oil prices (net of hedges) in the fourth quarter compared to the prior quarter.

    Free cash flow was $2.9 million for the fourth quarter, a decrease of $0.7 million compared to the prior quarter. Amplify has now generated positive free cash flow in 18 of the last 19 fiscal quarters.

      Fourth Quarter Third Quarter
    $ in millions 2024   2024  
    Net income (loss)   ($7.4 )   $22.7  
    Net cash provided by operating activities   $12.5     $15.7  
    Average daily production (MBoe/d)   18.5     19.0  
    Total revenues excluding hedges   $69.0     $69.9  
    Adjusted EBITDA (a non-GAAP financial measure)   $21.8     $25.5  
    Adjusted net income (loss), (a non-GAAP financial measure)   $5.1     $9.8  
    Total capital   $15.3     $18.2  
    Free Cash Flow (a non-GAAP financial measure)   $2.9     $3.6  
         

    Revolving Credit Facility

    As of December 31, 2024, Amplify had $127.0 million outstanding under its revolving credit facility, and net debt to LTM Adjusted EBITDA was 1.2x (net debt as of December 31, 2024 and 4Q24 LTM Adjusted EBITDA). Fourth quarter net debt increased from the prior quarter due to expected changes in working capital and increased development activity, primarily at Beta.

    Corporate Production and Pricing

    During the fourth quarter of 2024, average daily production was approximately 18.5 Mboepd, a decrease of 0.5 Mboepd from the prior quarter. The decrease in production was driven by gas volumes, which were impacted by gas plant realizations in East Texas. Our oil volumes, although slightly higher compared to the prior quarter, were impacted by platform shutdowns following the completion of the emission reduction and electrification facility projects and several unexpected well failures and subsequent interventions at Beta. With the successful completion of the electrification and emissions reduction project in the fourth quarter 2024 and the intervention projects completed by end of January 2025, we are projecting Beta production to be significantly higher than the fourth quarter, before the impact of the 2025 drilling program. As of March 2, 2025, current 7-day average production rates at Beta were 4,834 gross Bopd (3,635 net Bopd), representing an approximate 9% increase from fourth quarter 2024 volumes, with minimal contribution from the recently completed C48 well, which we continue to draw down since completing in mid-February.

    The Company’s product mix for the quarter was 45% crude oil, 17% NGLs, and 38% natural gas.

      Three Months   Three Months
      Ended   Ended
      December 31, 2024   September 30, 2024
           
    Production volumes – MBOE:      
    Bairoil   293       294  
    Beta   308       304  
    Oklahoma   436       454  
    East Texas / North Louisiana   609       638  
    Eagle Ford (Non-op)   60       62  
    Total – MBoe   1,706       1,752  
    Total – MBoe/d   18.5       19.0  
    % – Liquids   62 %     60 %
           

    Total oil, natural gas and NGL revenues for the fourth quarter of 2024 were approximately $67.2 million, before the impact of derivatives. The Company realized a net gain on commodity derivatives of $4.1 million during the fourth quarter. Oil, natural gas and NGL revenues, net of realized hedges, decreased $3.3 million for the fourth quarter compared to the prior quarter.

    The following table sets forth information regarding average realized sales prices for the periods indicated:

      Crude Oil ($/Bbl) NGLs ($/Bbl) Natural Gas ($/Mcf)
                           
      Three Months Ended December 31, 2024   Three Months Ended September 30, 2024   Three Months Ended December 31, 2024   Three Months Ended September 30, 2024   Three Months Ended December 31, 2024   Three Months Ended September 30, 2024
                           
    Average sales price exclusive of realized derivatives and certain deductions from revenue $ 66.82     $ 71.74     $ 23.46     $ 21.63     $ 2.52     $ 1.84  
    Realized derivatives   1.43       (0.24 )     –       –       0.76       1.38  
                           
    Average sales price with realized derivatives exclusive of certain deductions from revenue $ 68.25     $ 71.50     $ 23.46     $ 21.63     $ 3.28     $ 3.22  
    Certain deductions from revenue   –       –       (1.37 )     (1.33 )     (0.01 )     0.00  
                           
    Average sales price inclusive of realized derivatives and certain deductions from revenue $ 68.25     $ 71.50     $ 22.09     $ 20.30     $ 3.27     $ 3.22  
                           

    Costs and Expenses

    Lease operating expenses in the fourth quarter of 2024 were approximately $35.1 million, or $20.57 per Boe, a $1.8 million increase compared to the prior quarter. Due to increased well failures in the fourth quarter, Beta lease operating costs were higher compared to the prior quarter. Lease operating expenses do not reflect $0.9 million of income generated by Magnify in the fourth quarter.

    Severance and ad valorem taxes in the fourth quarter were approximately $5.4 million, a decrease of $0.6 million compared to $6.0 million in the prior quarter, and in line with expectations. Severance and ad valorem taxes as a percentage of revenue were approximately 8.0% in the fourth quarter.

    Amplify incurred $4.5 million, or $2.62 per Boe, of gathering, processing and transportation expenses in the fourth quarter, compared to $4.3 million, or $2.45 per Boe, in the prior quarter.

    Cash G&A expenses in the fourth quarter were $6.3 million, an increase of $0.1 million compared to the prior quarter and in-line with expectations.

    Depreciation, depletion and amortization expense in the fourth quarter totaled $8.4 million, or $4.93 per Boe, compared to $8.1 million, or $4.62 per Boe, in the prior quarter.

    Net interest expense was $3.7 million in the fourth quarter, a decrease of $0.1 million compared to $3.8 million in the prior quarter.

    Amplify recorded a current income tax benefit of $2.1 million in the fourth quarter.

    Fourth Quarter and Full-Year Capital Investments

    Cash capital investment during the fourth quarter of 2024 was approximately $15.3 million. During the fourth quarter, the Company’s capital allocation was approximately 65% for Beta development drilling and facility projects, with the remainder distributed across the Company’s other assets.

    The following table details Amplify’s capital invested during the fourth quarter of 2024:

      Fourth Quarter   Full-Year
      2024 Capital   2024 Capital
      ($ MM)   ($ MM)
    Bairoil $ 0.2     $ 2.9  
    Beta $ 10.0     $ 53.7  
    Oklahoma $ 0.1     $ 3.2  
    East Texas / North Louisiana $ 2.8     $ 5.6  
    Eagle Ford (Non-op) $ 2.1     $ 4.1  
    Magnify Energy Services $ 0.1     $ 1.1  
    Total Capital Invested $ 15.3     $ 70.6  
           

    2025 Operations & Development Plan

    The following table details Amplify’s 2025 projected capital investments of $70 – $80 million:

    Capital Investment by Type (% of Total):  
    Beta Development 41 %
    Beta Facility 16 %
    Workovers & Other Facilities 25 %
    Non-op Development 18 %
    Total Capital Investments: 100 %
         

    Amplify’s 2025 operations and development plan is designed to continue unlocking the underlying value of the Company’s assets. To achieve this goal, we intend to 1) continue our development program at Beta, 2) execute on low-cost, high-return workover projects, and 3) reduce operating costs by increasing activity at Magnify.

    At Beta, Amplify intends to complete six wells in 2025. The C48 well, the first of the six wells to be completed in 2025, was drilled in the fourth quarter of 2024 and completed in mid-February. Similar to the A50 and C59 wells drilled in 2024, the completion of the C48 well was initially designed to target the D-sand. However, drilling conditions encountered in the D-sand and the quality of the C-Sand observed while drilling through the formation, led the team to alter the completion design and target the C-sand instead. The C48 will be the first test of the horizontal potential of the C-sand and we will share the results of the C48 well after obtaining sufficient initial production data.

    In 2024 Amplify brought online two new wells at Beta, the A50 well (brought online in June) and the C59 well (brought online in October), both of which exceeded internal projections and increased Beta’s overall production approximately 15% in January 2025 compared to January of 2024. Similarly, the six Beta completions planned in 2025 are expected to significantly increase Amplify’s oil production year-over-year. Additional information regarding the Beta development plan can be found in the investor presentation on the Company’s investor relations website.

    In addition to drilling and completing the six wells, Amplify intends to make continued investments in Beta’s facilities. In 2025, the Company expects to invest approximately $8 million to upgrade a 2-mile pipeline that ships all produced fluid from platform Eureka to platform Elly.

    At Bairoil, we continue to focus on enhancing water-alternating-gas injection performance through targeted well recompletions and conversions, which helps offset the asset’s nominal production declines. Our plan also includes an investment at our CO2 gas plant intended to reduce overall power usage and lease operating expenses in the second half of 2025.

    Amplify’s operating strategy in Oklahoma remains focused on prioritizing a stable free cash flow profile by managing production through an active workover program, artificial lift enhancements, extending well run-times and continuing to reduce operating costs.

    In East Texas, we are participating in the completion of four non-operated development projects, which we expect to be online by mid-year. The Company also continues to focus on prudent management of the field, such as optimizing field compression, artificial lift enhancement, and equipment insourcing, which is expected to improve the production profile and lower lease operating costs.

    In late 2023, we formed Magnify to in-source specific oilfield services to improve service reliability and to reduce overall operating expenses for the Company. Since its inception, Magnify has generated $3.7 million of Adjusted EBITDA with a capital investment of only $1.7 million. In 2025, we expect to invest an additional $1.4 million of capital in Magnify and project 2025 Adjusted EBITDA of approximately $5 million (with an annualized run rate of $6 million by year-end). We are evaluating additional accretive services for Magnify to service Amplify operated assets.

    In the Eagle Ford, we are participating in 14 gross (0.7 net) new development wells and two gross (0.4 net) recompletion projects. These non-operated wells, with highly accretive returns, are currently scheduled to be completed in the first half of 2025.

    Full-Year 2025 Guidance

    The following standalone guidance is subject to the cautionary statements and limitations described under the “Forward-Looking Statements” caption at the end of this press release. Amplify’s 2025 guidance is based on its current expectations regarding capital investment levels and flat commodity prices for crude oil of $71/Bbl (WTI) and natural gas of $3.75/MMBtu (Henry Hub), and on the assumption that market demand and prices for oil and natural gas will continue at levels that allow for economic production of these products. Additionally, the Company expects to invest approximately 90% of its capital in the first three quarters of the year primarily in connection with the Beta development program. Upon closing of the Transaction with Juniper, the Company will provide updated guidance to include the acquired assets.

    A summary of the standalone guidance is presented below:

      FY 2025E
           
      Low   High
           
    Net Average Daily Production      
    Oil (MBbls/d) 8.5 – 9.4
    NGL (MBbls/d) 3.0 – 3.3
    Natural Gas (MMcf/d) 45.0 – 51.0
    Total (MBoe/d) 19.0 – 21.0
           
    Commodity Price Differential / Realizations (Unhedged)      
    Oil Differential ($ / Bbl) ($3.25) – ($4.25)
    NGL Realized Price (% of WTI NYMEX) 27% – 31%
    Natural Gas Realized Price (% of Henry Hub) 85% – 92%
           
    Other Revenue      
    Magnify Energy Services ($ MM) $4 – $6
    Other ($ MM) $2 – $3
    Total ($ MM) $6 – $9
           
    Gathering, Processing and Transportation Costs      
    Oil ($ / Bbl) $0.65 – $0.85
    NGL ($ / Bbl) $2.75 – $4.00
    Natural Gas ($ / Mcf) $0.55 – $0.75
    Total ($ / Boe) $2.25 – $2.85
           
    Average Costs      
    Lease Operating ($ / Boe) $18.50 – $20.50
    Taxes (% of Revenue) (1) 6.0% – 7.0%
    Cash General and Administrative ($ / Boe) (2)(3) $3.40 – $3.90
           
    Adjusted EBITDA ($ MM) (2)(3) $100 – $120
    Cash Interest Expense ($ MM) $12 – $18
    Capital Expenditures ($ MM) $70 – $80
    Free Cash Flow ($ MM) (2)(3) $10 – $30
           
    (1) Includes production, ad valorem and franchise taxes
    (2) Refer to “Use of Non-GAAP Financial Measures” for Amplify’s definition and use of Cash G&A, Adjusted EBITDA and free cash flow, non-GAAP measures (cash income taxes, which are not included in free cash flow, are expected to range between $0 – $2 million for the year)
    (3) Amplify believes that a quantitative reconciliation of such forward-looking information to the most comparable financial measure calculated and presented in accordance with GAAP cannot be made available without unreasonable efforts. A reconciliation of these non-GAAP financial measures would require Amplify to predict the timing and likelihood of future transactions and other items that are difficult to accurately predict. Neither of these forward-looking measures, nor their probable significance, can be quantified with a reasonable degree of accuracy. Accordingly, a reconciliation of the most directly comparable forward-looking GAAP measures is not provided.
     

    Hedging

    Recently, the Company took advantage of volatility in the futures market to add to its hedge position, further protecting future cash flows. Amplify executed crude oil swaps covering the second half of 2025 through year-end 2026 at a weighted average price of $68.10. The Company also added natural gas collars for a portion of 2027 with a weighted average floor of $3.63 per MMBtu and a weighted average ceiling of $3.98 per MMBtu.

    The following table reflects the hedged volumes under Amplify’s commodity derivative contracts and the average fixed floor and ceiling prices at which production is hedged for January 2025 through December 2027, as of March 4, 2025:

        2025       2026       2027  
               
    Natural Gas Swaps:          
    Average Monthly Volume (MMBtu)   585,000       500,000       87,500  
    Weighted Average Fixed Price ($) $ 3.75     $ 3.79     $ 3.76  
               
    Natural Gas Collars:          
    Two-way collars          
    Average Monthly Volume (MMBtu)   500,000       500,000       87,500  
    Weighted Average Ceiling Price ($) $ 3.90     $ 4.06     $ 4.20  
    Weighted Average Floor Price ($) $ 3.50     $ 3.55     $ 3.50  
               
    Oil Swaps:          
    Average Monthly Volume (Bbls)   128,583       72,750      
    Weighted Average Fixed Price ($) $ 70.85     $ 69.19      
               
    Oil Collars:          
    Two-way collars          
    Average Monthly Volume (Bbls)   59,500          
    Weighted Average Ceiling Price ($) $ 80.20          
    Weighted Average Floor Price ($) $ 70.00          
               

    Amplify has posted an updated investor presentation containing additional hedging information on its website, www.amplifyenergy.com, under the Investor Relations section.

    Annual Report on Form 10-K

    Amplify’s financial statements and related footnotes will be available in its Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2024, which Amplify expects to file with the SEC on March 5, 2025.

    About Amplify Energy

    Amplify Energy Corp. is an independent oil and natural gas company engaged in the acquisition, development, exploitation and production of oil and natural gas properties. Amplify’s operations are focused in Oklahoma, the Rockies (Bairoil), federal waters offshore Southern California (Beta), East Texas / North Louisiana, and the Eagle Ford (Non-op). For more information, visit www.amplifyenergy.com.

    Conference Call

    Amplify will host an investor teleconference tomorrow at 10 a.m. Central Time to discuss these operating and financial results. Interested parties may join the call by dialing (888) 999-5318 at least 15 minutes before the call begins and providing the Conference ID: AEC4Q24. A telephonic replay will be available for fourteen days following the call by dialing (800) 654-1563 and providing the Access Code: 71724906. A transcript and a recorded replay of the call will also be available on our website after the call.

    Forward-Looking Statements

    This press release includes “forward-looking statements” within the meaning of Section 27A of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, and Section 21E of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended. All statements, other than statements of historical fact, included in this press release that address activities, events or developments that the Company expects, believes or anticipates will or may occur in the future are forward-looking statements. Terminology such as “may,” “will,” “would,” “should,” “expect,” “plan,” “project,” “intend,” “anticipate,” “believe,” “estimate,” “predict,” “potential,” “pursue,” “target,” “outlook,” “continue,” the negative of such terms or other comparable terminology are intended to identify forward-looking statements. These statements include, but are not limited to, statements about the Company’s expectations of plans, goals, strategies (including measures to implement strategies), objectives and anticipated results with respect thereto. These statements address activities, events or developments that we expect or anticipate will or may occur in the future, including things such as projections of results of operations, plans for growth, goals, future capital expenditures, competitive strengths, references to future intentions and other such references. These forward-looking statements involve risks and uncertainties and other factors that could cause the Company’s actual results or financial condition to differ materially from those expressed or implied by forward-looking statements. These include risks and uncertainties relating to, among other things: the Company’s ability to successfully complete the proposed business combination between the Company and certain of Juniper’s portfolio companies, or the “Mergers”; the Company’s evaluation and implementation of strategic alternatives; risks related to the redetermination of the borrowing base under the Company’s revolving credit facility; the Company’s ability to satisfy debt obligations; the Company’s need to make accretive acquisitions or substantial capital expenditures to maintain its declining asset base, including the existence of unanticipated liabilities or problems relating to acquired or divested business or properties; volatility in the prices for oil, natural gas and NGLs; the Company’s ability to access funds on acceptable terms, if at all, because of the terms and conditions governing the Company’s indebtedness, including financial covenants; general political and economic conditions, globally and in the jurisdictions in which we operate, including the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and ongoing conflicts in the Middle East, and the potential destabilizing effect such conflicts may pose for the global oil and natural gas markets; expectations regarding general economic conditions, including inflation; and the impact of local, state and federal governmental regulations, including those related to climate change and hydraulic fracturing, and the current administration’s potential reversal thereof. Please read the Company’s filings with the SEC, including “Risk Factors” in the Company’s Annual Report on Form 10-K, and if applicable, the Company’s Quarterly Reports on Form 10-Q and Current Reports on Form 8-K, which are available on the Company’s Investor Relations website at https://www.amplifyenergy.com/investor-relations/sec-filings/default.aspx or on the SEC’s website at http://www.sec.gov, for a discussion of risks and uncertainties that could cause actual results to differ from those in such forward-looking statements. You are cautioned not to place undue reliance on these forward-looking statements, which speak only as of the date of this press release. All forward-looking statements in this press release are qualified in their entirety by these cautionary statements. Except as required by law, the Company undertakes no obligation and does not intend to update or revise any forward-looking statements, whether as a result of new information, future results or otherwise.

    No Offer or Solicitation

    A portion of this press release relates to a proposed business combination transaction between the Company and certain Juniper portfolio companies. This communication is for informational purposes only and does not constitute an offer to sell or the solicitation of an offer to buy any securities or a solicitation of any vote or approval, in any jurisdiction, pursuant to the proposed business combination transaction or otherwise, nor shall there be any sale, issuance, exchange or transfer of the securities referred to in this document in any jurisdiction in contravention of applicable law. No offer of securities shall be made except by means of a prospectus meeting the requirements of Section 10 of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended.

    Important Additional Information Regarding the Mergers Will Be Filed With the SEC

    In connection with the proposed transaction, the Company has filed a definitive proxy statement. The definitive proxy statement will be sent to the stockholders of the Company. The Company may also file other documents with the SEC regarding the proposed transaction. INVESTORS AND SECURITY HOLDERS OF AMPLIFY ARE ADVISED TO CAREFULLY READ THE DEFINITIVE PROXY STATEMENT AND ANY OTHER RELEVANT MATERIALS FILED WITH THE SEC WHEN THEY BECOME AVAILABLE BECAUSE THEY WILL CONTAIN IMPORTANT INFORMATION ABOUT THE MERGERS, THE PARTIES TO THE MERGERS AND THE RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH THE MERGERS. Investors and security holders may obtain a free copy of the definitive proxy statement and other relevant documents filed by Amplify with the SEC from the SEC’s website at www.sec.gov. Security holders and other interested parties will also be able to obtain, without charge, a copy of the definitive proxy statement and other relevant documents (when available) by (1) directing your written request to: 500 Dallas Street, Suite 1700, Houston, Texas or (2) contacting our Investor Relations department by telephone at (832) 219-9044 or (832) 219-9051. Copies of the documents filed by the Company with the SEC will be available free of charge on the Company’s website at http://www.amplifyenergy.com.

    Participants in the Solicitation

    Amplify and certain of its respective directors, executive officers and employees may be considered participants in the solicitation of proxies in connection with the proposed transaction. Information regarding the persons who may, under the rules of the SEC, be deemed participants in the solicitation of the stockholders of Amplify in connection with the proposed transaction, including a description of their respective direct or indirect interests, by security holdings or otherwise, is included in the definitive proxy statement filed with the SEC. Additional information regarding the Company’s directors and executive officers is also included in Amplify’s Notice of Annual Meeting of Stockholders and 2024 Proxy Statement, which was filed with the SEC on April 5, 2024. These documents are available free of charge as described above.

    Use of Non-GAAP Financial Measures

    This press release and accompanying schedules include the non-GAAP financial measures of Adjusted EBITDA, Adjusted net income, free cash flow, net debt, PV-10 and cash G&A. The accompanying schedules provide a reconciliation of these non-GAAP financial measures to their most directly comparable financial measures calculated and presented in accordance with GAAP. Amplify’s non-GAAP financial measures should not be considered as alternatives to GAAP measures such as net income, operating income, net cash flows provided by operating activities, standardized measure of discounted future net cash flows, or any other measure of financial performance calculated and presented in accordance with GAAP. Amplify’s non-GAAP financial measures may not be comparable to similarly titled measures of other companies because they may not calculate such measures in the same manner as Amplify does.

    Adjusted EBITDA. Amplify defines Adjusted EBITDA as net income (loss) plus Interest expense; Income tax expense (benefit); DD&A; Impairment of goodwill and long-lived assets (including oil and natural gas properties); Accretion of AROs; Loss or (gain) on commodity derivative instruments; Cash settlements received or (paid) on expired commodity derivative instruments; Amortization of gain associated with terminated commodity derivatives; Losses or (gains) on sale of assets and other, net; Share-based compensation expenses; Exploration costs; Acquisition and divestiture related expenses; Reorganization items, net; Severance payments; and Other non-routine items that we deem appropriate. Adjusted EBITDA is commonly used as a supplemental financial measure by management and external users of Amplify’s financial statements, such as investors, research analysts and rating agencies, to assess: (1) its operating performance as compared to other companies in Amplify’s industry without regard to financing methods, capital structures or historical cost basis; (2) the ability of its assets to generate cash sufficient to pay interest and support Amplify’s indebtedness; and (3) the viability of projects and the overall rates of return on alternative investment opportunities. Since Adjusted EBITDA excludes some, but not all, items that affect net income or loss and because these measures may vary among other companies, the Adjusted EBITDA data presented in this press release may not be comparable to similarly titled measures of other companies. The GAAP measures most directly comparable to Adjusted EBITDA are net income and net cash provided by operating activities.

    Adjusted Net Income. Amplify defines Adjusted Net Income as net income (loss) adjusted for loss (gain) on commodity derivative instruments, acquisition & divestiture related expenses, unusual and infrequent items, and the income tax expense or benefit of these adjustments using our federal statutory tax rate. Adjusted Net Income (Loss) excludes the impact of unusual and infrequent items affecting earnings that vary widely and unpredictably, including derivative gains and losses. This measure is not meant to disassociate these items from management’s performance but rather is intended to provide helpful information to investors interested in comparing our performance between periods. Adjusted net income (loss) is not considered to be an alternative to net income (loss) reported in accordance with GAAP.

    Free cash flow. Amplify defines free cash flow as Adjusted EBITDA, less cash interest expense and capital expenditures. Free cash flow is an important non-GAAP financial measure for Amplify’s investors since it serves as an indicator of the Company’s success in providing a cash return on investment. The GAAP measures most directly comparable to free cash flow are net income and net cash provided by operating activities.

    Net debt. Amplify defines net debt as the total principal amount drawn on the revolving credit facility less cash and cash equivalents. The Company uses net debt as a measure of financial position and believes this measure provides useful additional information to investors to evaluate the Company’s capital structure and financial leverage.

    PV-10. PV-10 is a non-GAAP financial measure that represents the present value of estimated future cash inflows from proved oil and natural gas reserves that are calculated using the unweighted arithmetic average first-day-of-the-month prices for the prior 12 months, less future development and operating costs, discounted at 10% per annum to reflect the timing of future cash flows. The most directly comparable GAAP measure to PV-10 is standardized measure. PV-10 differs from standardized measure in its treatment of estimated future income taxes, which are excluded from PV-10. Amplify believes the presentation of PV-10 provides useful information because it is widely used by investors in evaluating oil and natural gas companies without regard to specific income tax characteristics of such entities. PV-10 is not intended to represent the current market value of our estimated proved reserves. PV-10 should not be considered in isolation or as a substitute for the standardized measure as defined under GAAP.

    Cash G&A. Amplify defines cash G&A as general and administrative expense, less share-based compensation expense; acquisition and divestiture costs; bad debt expense; and severance payments. Cash G&A is an important non-GAAP financial measure for Amplify’s investors since it allows for analysis of G&A spend without regard to share-based compensation and other non-recurring expenses which can vary substantially from company to company. The GAAP measures most directly comparable to cash G&A is total G&A expenses.

    Contacts

    Jim Frew — Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
    (832) 219-9044
    jim.frew@amplifyenergy.com

    Michael Jordan — Director, Finance and Treasurer
    (832) 219-9051
    michael.jordan@amplifyenergy.com


    Selected Operating and Financial Data (Tables)

    Amplify Energy Corp.
    Selected Financial Data – Unaudited
    Statements of Operations Data
           
      Three Months   Three Months
      Ended   Ended
    (Amounts in $000s, except per share data) December 31, 2024   September 30, 2024
           
    Revenues:      
    Oil and natural gas sales $ 67,189     $ 68,135  
    Other revenues   1,832       1,723  
    Total revenues   69,021       69,858  
           
    Costs and Expenses:      
    Lease operating expense   35,100       33,255  
    Pipeline incident loss   2,405       247  
    Gathering, processing and transportation   4,468       4,290  
    Exploration   10       –  
    Taxes other than income   5,356       5,997  
    Depreciation, depletion and amortization   8,418       8,102  
    General and administrative expense   9,486       8,251  
    Accretion of asset retirement obligations   2,156       2,125  
    Realized (gain) loss on commodity derivatives   (4,052 )     (6,375 )
    Unrealized (gain) loss on commodity derivatives   13,357       (18,672 )
    (Gain) loss on sale of properties   (1,367 )     –  
    Other, net   334       38  
    Total costs and expenses   75,671       37,258  
           
    Operating Income (loss)   (6,650 )     32,600  
           
    Other Income (Expense):      
    Interest expense, net   (3,684 )     (3,756 )
    Other income (expense)   (113 )     (130 )
    Total other income (expense)   (3,797 )     (3,886 )
           
    Income (loss) before reorganization items, net and income taxes   (10,447 )     28,714  
           
    Income tax benefit (expense) – current   2,132       (412 )
    Income tax benefit (expense) – deferred   886       (5,650 )
           
    Net income (loss) $ (7,429 )   $ 22,652  
           
    Earnings per share:      
    Basic and diluted earnings (loss) per share $ (0.19 )   $ 0.54  
           
    Selected Financial Data – Unaudited      
    Operating Statistics      
           
      Three Months   Three Months
      Ended   Ended
    (Amounts in $000s, except per unit data) December 31, 2024   September 30, 2024
           
    Oil and natural gas revenue:      
    Oil Sales $ 50,817     $ 54,353  
    NGL Sales   6,602       6,096  
    Natural Gas Sales   9,770       7,686  
    Total oil and natural gas sales – Unhedged $ 67,189     $ 68,135  
           
    Production volumes:      
    Oil Sales – MBbls   760       758  
    NGL Sales – MBbls   299       301  
    Natural Gas Sales – MMcf   3,883       4,165  
    Total – MBoe   1,706       1,752  
    Total – MBoe/d   18.5       19.0  
           
    Average sales price (excluding commodity derivatives):      
    Oil – per Bbl $ 66.82     $ 71.74  
    NGL – per Bbl $ 22.09     $ 20.29  
    Natural gas – per Mcf $ 2.52     $ 1.85  
    Total – per Boe $ 39.37     $ 38.88  
           
    Average unit costs per Boe:      
    Lease operating expense $ 20.57     $ 18.98  
    Gathering, processing and transportation $ 2.62     $ 2.45  
    Taxes other than income $ 3.14     $ 3.42  
    General and administrative expense $ 5.56     $ 4.71  
    Realized gain/(loss) on commodity derivatives $ 2.38     $ 3.64  
    Depletion, depreciation, and amortization $ 4.93     $ 4.62  
           
    Selected Financial Data – Unaudited      
    Asset Operating Statistics      
           
      Three Months   Three Months
      Ended   Ended
      December 31, 2024   September 30, 2024
           
    Production volumes – MBOE:      
    Bairoil   293       294  
    Beta   308       304  
    Oklahoma   436       454  
    East Texas / North Louisiana   609       638  
    Eagle Ford (Non-op)   60       62  
    Total – MBoe   1,706       1,752  
    Total – MBoe/d   18.5       19.0  
    % – Liquids   62 %     60 %
           
    Lease operating expense – $M:      
    Bairoil $ 11,800     $ 13,164  
    Beta   12,113       9,520  
    Oklahoma   3,948       3,644  
    East Texas / North Louisiana   5,887       5,592  
    Eagle Ford (Non-op)   1,351       1,335  
    Total Lease operating expense: $ 35,099     $ 33,255  
           
    Capital expenditures – $M:      
    Bairoil $ 190     $ 1,224  
    Beta   10,001       12,047  
    Oklahoma   168       1,449  
    East Texas / North Louisiana   2,758       2,303  
    Eagle Ford (Non-op)   2,125       1,157  
    Magnify Energy Services   82       44  
    Total Capital expenditures: $ 15,324     $ 18,224  
           
    Selected Financial Data – Unaudited              
    Balance Sheet Data              
                   
    (Amounts in $000s) December 31, 2024   September 30, 2024
                   
    Assets              
    Cash and Cash Equivalents $ –     $ –  
    Accounts Receivable   39,713       32,295  
    Other Current Assets   32,064       37,862  
    Total Current Assets $ 71,777     $ 70,157  
                   
    Net Oil and Gas Properties $ 386,218     $ 378,871  
    Other Long-Term Assets   289,081       290,188  
    Total Assets $ 747,076     $ 739,216  
                   
    Liabilities              
    Accounts Payable $ 13,231     $ 18,107  
    Accrued Liabilities   43,413       36,699  
    Other Current Liabilities   11,494       11,362  
    Total Current Liabilities $ 68,138     $ 66,168  
                   
    Long-Term Debt $ 127,000     $ 120,000  
    Asset Retirement Obligation   129,700       127,556  
    Other Long-Term Liabilities   13,326       10,822  
    Total Liabilities $ 338,164     $ 324,546  
                   
    Shareholders’ Equity              
    Common Stock & APIC $ 440,380     $ 438,709  
    Accumulated Earnings (Deficit)   (31,468 )     (24,039 )
    Total Shareholders’ Equity $ 408,912     $ 414,670  
                   
    Selected Financial Data – Unaudited      
    Statements of Cash Flows Data      
           
      Three Months   Three Months
      Ended   Ended
    (Amounts in $000s) December 31, 2024   September 30, 2024
           
           
    Net cash provided by (used in) operating activities $ 12,455     $ 15,737  
    Net cash provided by (used in) investing activities   (19,379 )     (18,078 )
    Net cash provided by (used in) financing activities   6,924       1,839  
           
    Selected Operating and Financial Data (Tables)
    Reconciliation of Unaudited GAAP Financial Measures to Non-GAAP Financial Measures
    Adjusted EBITDA and Free Cash Flow
           
      Three Months   Three Months
      Ended   Ended
    (Amounts in $000s) December 31, 2024   September 30, 2024
           
    Reconciliation of Adjusted EBITDA to Net Cash Provided from Operating Activities:    
    Net cash provided by operating activities $ 12,455     $ 15,737  
    Changes in working capital   4,770       5,937  
    Interest expense, net   3,684       3,756  
    Cash settlements received on terminated commodity derivatives   –       (793 )
    Amortization of gain associated with terminated commodity derivatives   159       –  
    Amortization and write-off of deferred financing fees   (315 )     (310 )
    Exploration costs   10       –  
    Acquisition and divestiture related costs   1,424       186  
    Plugging and abandonment cost   754       372  
    Current income tax expense (benefit)   (2,132 )     412  
    Pipeline incident loss   2,405       247  
    (Gain) loss on sale of properties   (1,367 )     –  
    Adjusted EBITDA: $ 21,847     $ 25,544  
           
    Reconciliation of Free Cash Flow to Net Cash Provided from Operating Activities:    
    Adjusted EBITDA: $ 21,847     $ 25,544  
    Less: Cash interest expense   3,598       3,721  
    Less: Capital expenditures   15,324       18,224  
    Free Cash Flow: $ 2,925     $ 3,599  
           
    Selected Operating and Financial Data (Tables)
    Reconciliation of Unaudited GAAP Financial Measures to Non-GAAP Financial Measures
    Adjusted EBITDA and Free Cash Flow
           
           
      Twelve Months   Twelve Months
      Ended   Ended
    (Amounts in $000s, except per share data) December 31, 2024   December 31, 2023
           
    Reconciliation of Adjusted EBITDA1to Net Cash Provided from Operating Activities:    
    Net cash provided by operating activities $ 51,293     $ 141,590  
    Changes in working capital   32,272       (8,517 )
    Interest expense, net   14,599       17,719  
    Cash settlements received on terminated commodity derivatives   (793 )     (658 )
    Amortization of gain associated with terminated commodity derivatives   159       658  
    Amortization and write-off of deferred financing fees   (1,233 )     (1,980 )
    Exploration costs   61       57  
    Acquisition and divestiture related costs   1,633       219  
    Plugging and abandonment cost   1,640       2,239  
    Current income tax expense (benefit)   232       4,817  
    Pipeline incident loss   3,859       19,981  
    (Gain) loss on sale of properties   (1,367 )     –  
    LOPI – timing differences   –       (4,636 )
    Litigation settlement   –       (84,875 )
    Other   686       1,418  
    Adjusted EBITDA: $ 103,041     $ 88,032  
           
    Reconciliation of Free Cash Flow to Net Cash Provided from Operating Activities:    
    Adjusted EBITDA1: $ 103,041     $ 88,032  
    Less: Cash interest expense   14,438       16,263  
    Less: Capital expenditures   70,644       33,744  
    Free Cash Flow: $ 17,959     $ 38,025  
      (1) Adjusted EBITDA includes a revenue suspense release of $8.4 million for the twelve months ended December 31, 2024. See “Revenue Payables in Suspense” table for additional information.
         
    Selected Operating and Financial Data (Tables)
    Reconciliation of Unaudited GAAP Financial Measures to Non-GAAP Financial Measures
    Adjusted EBITDA1 and Free Cash Flow
           
      Three Months   Three Months
      Ended   Ended
    (Amounts in $000s) December 31, 2024   September 30, 2024
           
    Reconciliation of Adjusted EBITDA to Net Income (Loss):      
    Net income (loss) $ (7,429 )   $ 22,652  
    Interest expense, net   3,684       3,756  
    Income tax expense (benefit) – current   (2,132 )     412  
    Income tax expense (benefit) – deferred   (886 )     5,650  
    Depreciation, depletion and amortization   8,418       8,102  
    Accretion of asset retirement obligations   2,156       2,125  
    (Gains) losses on commodity derivatives   9,305       (25,047 )
    Cash settlements received (paid) on expired commodity derivative instruments   4,052       5,582  
    Amortization of gain associated with terminated commodity derivatives   159       –  
    Acquisition and divestiture related costs   1,424       186  
    Share-based compensation expense   1,686       1,815  
    (Gain) loss on sale of properties   (1,367 )     –  
    Exploration costs   10       –  
    Loss on settlement of AROs   334       38  
    Bad debt expense   28       26  
    Pipeline incident loss   2,405       247  
    Adjusted EBITDA1: $ 21,847     $ 25,544  
           
    Reconciliation of Free Cash Flow to Net Income (Loss):      
    Adjusted EBITDA: $ 21,847     $ 25,544  
    Less: Cash interest expense   3,598       3,721  
    Less: Capital expenditures   15,324       18,224  
    Free Cash Flow: $ 2,925     $ 3,599  
           
    Selected Operating and Financial Data (Tables)
    Reconciliation of Unaudited GAAP Financial Measures to Non-GAAP Financial Measures
    Adjusted EBITDA and Free Cash Flow
           
           
      Twelve Months   Twelve Months
      Ended   Ended
    (Amounts in $000s, except per share data) December 31, 2024   December 31, 2023
           
           
    Reconciliation of Adjusted EBITDA1to Net Income (Loss):      
    Net income (loss) $ 12,946     $ 392,750  
    Interest expense, net   14,599       17,719  
    Income tax expense (benefit) – current   232       4,817  
    Income tax expense (benefit) – deferred   2,196       (253,796 )
    Depreciation, depletion and amortization   32,586       28,004  
    Accretion of asset retirement obligations   8,438       7,951  
    (Gains) losses on commodity derivatives   2,047       (40,343 )
    Cash settlements received (paid) on expired commodity derivative instruments   17,617       (8,273 )
    Amortization of gain associated with terminated commodity derivatives   159       658  
    Acquisition and divestiture related costs   1,633       219  
    Share-based compensation expense   6,799       5,280  
    (Gain) loss on sale of properties   (1,367 )     –  
    Exploration costs   61       57  
    Loss on settlement of AROs   470       1,003  
    Bad debt expense   80       98  
    Pipeline incident loss   3,859       19,981  
    LOPI – timing differences   –       (4,636 )
    Litigation settlement   –       (84,875 )
    Other   686       1,418  
    Adjusted EBITDA: $ 103,041     $ 88,032  
           
    Reconciliation of Free Cash Flow to Net Income (Loss):      
    Adjusted EBITDA1: $ 103,041     $ 88,032  
    Less: Cash interest expense   14,438       16,263  
    Less: Capital expenditures   70,644       33,744  
    Free Cash Flow: $ 17,959     $ 38,025  
      (1) Adjusted EBITDA includes a revenue suspense release of $8.4 million for the twelve months ended December 31, 2024. See “Revenue Payables in Suspense” table for additional information.
         
    Selected Operating and Financial Data (Tables)
    Reconciliation of Unaudited GAAP Financial Measures to Non-GAAP Financial Measures
    Net Income (Loss) to Adjusted Net Income (Loss)
           
      Three Months   Three Months
      Ended   Ended
    (Amounts in $000s, except per share data) December 31, 2024   September 30, 2024
           
    Reconciliation of Adjusted Net Income (Loss):      
    Net income (loss) $ (7,429 )   $ 22,652  
    Unrealized (gain) loss on commodity derivatives   13,357       (18,672 )
    Acquisition and divestiture related costs   1,424       186  
    Non-recurring costs:      
    Income tax expense (benefit) – deferred   (886 )     5,650  
    Gain on sale of properties   (1,367 )     –  
    Litigation settlement   –       –  
    Tax effect of adjustments   (12 )     (39 )
    Adjusted net income (loss) $ 5,087     $ 9,777  
           
    Selected Operating and Financial Data (Tables)
    Reconciliation of Unaudited GAAP Financial Measures to Non-GAAP Financial Measures
    Net Income (Loss) to Adjusted Net Income (Loss)
           
      Twelve Months   Twelve Months
      Ended   Ended
    (Amounts in $000s, except per share data) December 31, 2024   December 31, 2023
           
    Reconciliation of Adjusted Net Income (Loss):      
    Net income (loss) $ 12,946     $ 392,750  
    Unrealized (gain) loss on commodity derivatives   20,457       (47,958 )
    Acquisition and divestiture related costs   1,633       219  
    Non-recurring costs:      
    Income tax expense (benefit) – deferred1   2,196       (253,796 )
    Gain on sale of properties   (1,367 )     –  
    Litigation settlement2   –       (84,875 )
    Tax effect of adjustments3   (56 )     17,778  
    Adjusted net income (loss) $ 35,809     $ 24,118  
      (1) In 2023, we achieved three years of cumulative book income which resulted in the release of our valuation allowance of $284.9 million.
      (2) In 2023, non-recurring costs included a litigation settlement with the shipping companies and the containerships whose anchors struck the Company’s pipeline.
      (3) The federal statutory rates were utilized for all periods presented.
         
    Selected Operating and Financial Data (Tables)
    Reconciliation of Unaudited GAAP Financial Measures to Non-GAAP Financial Measures
    Cash General and Administrative Expenses
                   
      Three Months      Three Months
      Ended   Ended
    (Amounts in $000s) December 31, 2024   September 30, 2024
                   
    General and administrative expense $ 9,486     $ 8,251  
    Less: Share-based compensation expense   1,686       1,815  
    Less: Acquisition and divestiture costs   1,424       186  
    Less: Bad debt expense   28       26  
    Less: Severance payments   —       —  
    Total Cash General and Administrative Expense $ 6,348     $ 6,224  
                   
    Selected Operating and Financial Data (Tables)
    Reconciliation of Unaudited GAAP Financial Measures to Non-GAAP Financial Measures
    Cash General and Administrative Expenses
                   
      Twelve Months      Twelve Months
      Ended   Ended
    (Amounts in $000s) December 31, 2024   December 31, 2023
                   
    General and administrative expense $ 35,895     $ 32,984  
    Less: Share-based compensation expense   6,799       5,280  
    Less: Acquisition and divestiture costs   1,633       219  
    Less: Bad debt expense   80       98  
    Less: Severance payments   344       965  
    Total Cash General and Administrative Expense $ 27,039     $ 26,422  
                   
    Selected Operating and Financial Data (Tables)
    Reconciliation of Unaudited GAAP Financial Measures to Non-GAAP Financial Measures
    Revenue Payables in Suspense
           
      Three Months      Twelve Months
      Ended   Ended
    (Amounts in $000s) December 31, 2024   December 31, 2024
           
           
    Oil and natural gas sales $ –     $ 4,023  
    Other revenues   –       4,829  
    Severance tax and other deducts   –       (433 )
    Total net revenue $ –     $ 8,419  
           
    Production volumes:      
    Oil (MBbls)   –       33  
    NGLs (MBbls)   –       31  
    Natural gas (MMcf)   –       441  
    Total (Mboe)   –       138  
    Total (Mboe/d)   –       0.38  
           
        As of       As of  
      December 31,       December 31,  
      2024       2023  
    Standardized measure of future net cash flows, discounted at 10% ($ M)   $608,239       $626,131  
    Add: PV of future income tax, discounted at 10% ($ M)   $127,526       $130,882  
    PV-10 ($ M)   $735,765       $757,013  
                   

    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-OSI: SVT Robotics Unveils New Cloud-Based Portal for SOFTBOT® Platform, Providing Unprecedented Automation Visibility Across Multiple Sites

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    NORFOLK, Va., March 05, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — SVT Robotics, a software provider that empowers companies to integrate, monitor and scale automation, announced the launch of its new cloud-based portal for the SOFTBOT Platform, providing IT and operations teams with a central control hub for monitoring and managing automation across multiple sites.

    “As automation adoption continues to grow, companies need a centralized way to monitor and troubleshoot their technology,” said A.K. Schultz, CEO of SVT Robotics. “These new SOFTBOT Platform advancements provide real-time monitoring across diverse facilities, instant alerts on system issues, and faster resolution—all from a single, unified interface. This level of transparency and control allows businesses to reduce downtime and dependency on limited IT resources and ultimately unlock new levels of automation scalability.”

    SVT’s new cloud-based portal provides a centralized monitoring toolset, where operational and IT users gain real-time visibility into critical issues and early warning signs before they escalate. To ensure teams can respond instantly to errors, the portal offers unified engine management and alerts, streamlining oversight across all deployments. When combined with the enhanced troubleshooting capabilities, the process of diagnosing and resolving issues is simplified and accelerated.

    Nick Leonard, SVP of Product, explained, “Managing automation at scale has historically been complex, but the new SOFTBOT Platform portal makes it significantly easier. Enhanced troubleshooting tools like workflow tracking and execution logs accelerate issue resolution, while role-based access control simplifies user management as teams scale. Together, these advancements help IT and operations teams manage their automation with greater efficiency.”

    SVT Robotics will be at ProMat 2025, March 17-20, booth S3184, where attendees can get exclusive insights into the new SOFTBOT Platform enhancements directly from SVT experts, and discover how these innovations can simplify their automation management needs and drive efficiency across diverse facilities.

    About SVT Robotics 
    SVT Robotics empowers IT teams to integrate, orchestrate, monitor, and scale industrial software and robotics with the tech-agnostic SOFTBOT Platform. This reduces custom development and support needs by providing a standard way for technologies to communicate. The SOFTBOT Platform also delivers enhanced system visibility, simplified troubleshooting, maximized uptime, and access to aggregated data, enabling companies to optimize operations across their businesses. Visit svtrobotics.com. 

    Contact:
    Trevi Communications for SVT Robotics
    Gene Hunt
    gene@trevicomm.com

    A photo accompanying this announcement is available at https://www.globenewswire.com/NewsRoom/AttachmentNg/313a95e3-a192-41df-865c-5736719bc7eb

    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-OSI Security: Repeat Gun Offender Sentenced for Unlawful Possession of a Firearm and Aggravated Assault While Armed

    Source: Office of United States Attorneys

                WASHINGTON – Traquon Demonte McCalip, 21, of Washington D.C., was sentenced today in U.S. District Court to 114 months in federal prison for unlawfully possessing a Canik T9SF Elite 9mm handgun and using it to shoot a victim in the middle of the day at a busy fast-food restaurant parking lot on the 3900 block of Minnesota Avenue NE.

                The sentence was announced by U.S. Attorney Edward R. Martin, Jr., FBI Special Agent in Charge Sean T. Ryan of the Washington Field Office’s Criminal and Cyber Division, and Chief Pamela Smith of the Metropolitan Police Department (MPD).

                McCalip pleaded guilty on August 23, 2024, to unlawful possession of a firearm and ammunition by a person convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year and to aggravated assault while armed. In addition to the prison term, U.S. District Court Judge Amit P. Mehta ordered McCalip to serve five years of supervised release.

                According to court documents, on March 20, 2024, McCalip approached an individual standing in a fast-food parking lot on the 3900-block of Minnesota Avenue NE, and claimed that he wanted to buy cigarettes from him. After discussing cigarette prices, McCalip attempted to take the individual’s bag. McCalip then drew his loaded, concealed handgun and shot the individual in the abdomen. As a struggle ensued between McCalip and the victim, McCalip spotted a marked police vehicle that had arrived on scene. McCalip took his firearm’s magazine that had fallen out of his gun, and fled in a vehicle that he had parked in the lot with his firearm’s magazine but left behind his firearm. Police chased McCalip and ultimately arrested him near 1805 Bladensburg Road NE. Officers recovered the firearm magazine and ammunition on the driver’s seat of the car McCalip was driving.

                This case was investigated by the Metropolitan Police Department and the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Washington Field Office. It was prosecuted by Trial Attorney Ethan Cantor of the Department of Justice.

    24cr161

    MIL Security OSI –

  • MIL-OSI Security: Ninedee Gang Member Sentenced to 35 Years in Prison for Murder of Former Federal Witness

    Source: Office of United States Attorneys

    Brooklyn Street Gang Plotted Retaliatory Murder of Shatavia Walls at the Pink Houses

    Earlier today, in federal court in Brooklyn, Quintin Green, also known as “Wild Child,” was sentenced by United States District Judge LaShann DeArcy Hall to 35 years’ imprisonment for the murder of former federal witness Shatavia Walls in July 2020.  Green, a member of the Ninedee Gang, a violent criminal enterprise operating out of the Louis H. Pink Houses in East New York, pleaded guilty in April 2024 to causing Walls’ death through use of firearms.  Green also pleaded guilty to attempted Hobbs Act robbery for attempting to steal televisions from a Target store in Staten Island in November 2020 and was sentenced to a concurrent term of five years in prison.

    John J. Durham, United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York, Leslie R. Backschies, Acting Assistant Director in Charge, Federal Bureau of Investigation, New York Field Office (FBI) and Jessica S. Tisch, Commissioner, New York City Police Department (NYPD), announced the sentence.

    “The calculated murder of Shatavia Walls by members and associates of the Ninedee Gang arose from a twisted desire to murder her in retaliation for her federal testimony and perceived disrespect of the gang,” stated United States Attorney Durham.  “Quintin Green shot an unarmed woman in cold blood to make a name for himself in the gang, but he should be called out for what he truly is, a cowardly killer.  He deservedly will spend decades in a federal prison.  I commend the FBI special agents, the NYPD detectives and the prosecutors in my Office who worked tirelessly to dismantle this gang, achieve justice for Ms. Walls and make the Pink Houses and the surrounding area in East New York a safer place for the law-abiding residents of that community.”

    “Along with other Ninedee members, Quintin Green targeted and callously killed Shatavia Walls and then bragged across social media about his abhorrent crimes in an effort to bolster the gang’s dangerous reputation,” stated FBI Acting Assistant Director in Charge Backschies.  “This premeditated ambush was an unjust retributive attack against a former government witness trying to protect her community from further gang violence. May today’s sentencing reflect the FBI’s continued refusal to tolerate any attempts to intimidate those who speak out against gang violence.”

    “Today, we are bringing a cold-blooded murderer to justice,” stated NYPD Commissioner Tisch.  “Quintin Green and the Ninedee Gang terrorized their neighborhood, put children in danger, and viciously killed an unarmed woman. Let this serve as a clear message that we will go after violent gangs that break the law and cause widespread harm and fear. I thank the NYPD detectives and the prosecutors in this case for their tireless work to hold these perpetrators accountable.”

    As set forth in [the government’s sentencing memorandum and other court filings], Green and other members of the Ninedee Gang targeted Walls for murder because she testified against a Ninedee Gang member in federal court in Brooklyn in 2019, had a confrontation with Ninedee Gang members who were setting fireworks off near children on July 4, 2020 and her affiliation with the rival “7” and “8” Pink House apartment buildings.  For those reasons, she was considered by the gang to be a high-value target. The defendant became known as “Wild Child” due to his reputation for violence and, in order to earn status in the gang, boasted about his willingness to shoot rivals.  He was one of two shooters who gunned Walls down on July 7, 2020.

    Further, as proven at the trial of Green’s co-defendant, Ninedee Gang leader Maliek Miller, Ninedee Gang members were affiliated with the “5” and “6” Pink Houses apartment buildings and engaged in ongoing gang-related violence within and outside of the New York City Housing Authority complex.  Ninedee Gang protected its turf through violence and sought to silence anyone who they perceived to be working with law enforcement. 

    The murder of Walls was coordinated by Ninedee Gang members, including Green.  Prior to her court testimony, fliers had been posted around the Pink Houses stating, “Shatavia Been a Rat And She Still Ratting.” 

    On July 4, 2020, Walls and others were involved in a physical altercation with members of Ninedee for lighting fireworks around young children.  Miller went to the scene of the altercation, called Walls a “snitch,” fought with her and fired a gunshot.  Following the altercation, Miller planned with other Ninedee Gang members, including Green, to kill Walls.

    On July 7, 2020, Walls was spotted by Green and his co-defendant Joe Santana.  Green and Santana began shooting at her.  Green then chased Walls down a path at the Pink Houses, continuing to shoot her. Walls suffered numerous gunshot wounds and died of her injuries 10 days later. 

    Co-defendant Shakur Bey destroyed the clothing that Green and Santana wore during the shooting by throwing the items down an incinerator chute. Co-defendant Kevin Wint, who was not present at the murder, rented a hotel room at a Best Western Hotel near John F. Kennedy International Airport to provide a place where Green and others could hide out overnight.  In the days after the murder, Green and Wint posted to social media claiming credit to the Ninedee Gang for the killing.   

    Miller was convicted in June 2024 of murder in-aid of racketeering and faces a mandatory term of life in prison when he is sentenced.  Santana and Fernandez pleaded guilty to their roles in the murder. Santana was sentenced to 22 years in prison and Fernandez is awaiting sentencing.  Wint pleaded guilty in March 2023 and was sentenced to 110 months’ imprisonment. Bey pleaded guilty in December 2023 and was sentenced to 60 months’ imprisonment.  Ninedee leader Raquel Dunton is charged with acting as an accessory after-the-fact to Walls’ murder and obstruction of justice for assisting fellow gang members in concealing evidence of the crime.  Dunton is also charged with trafficking cocaine and is awaiting trial.

    In addition to the murder, Green pleaded guilty to attempting to commit a November 3, 2020 robbery of a Staten Island Target store. Green attempted to steal two flat- screen televisions and was stopped by a security guard. Green punched the security guard causing her to fall and attempted to flee with one of the two televisions. He was arrested by police after fleeing the scene.

    The government’s case is being handled by the Office’s Organized Crime and Gang Section.  Assistant United States  Attorneys Emily J. Dean, Margi Schierberl and Irisa Chen are in charge of the prosecution with the assistance of Paralegal Specialist Elizabeth Reed and Intelligence Analysts Eungee Hwang and Ashley Hinkson.

    The Defendant:

    QUINTIN GREEN (also known as “Wild Child”)
    Age: 24
    Brooklyn, New York

    E.D.N.Y. Docket No. 20-CR-331 (LDH)

    Defendant Convicted at Trial:

    MALIEK MILLER
    Age: 31
    Brooklyn, New York

    E.D.N.Y. Docket No. 20-CR-331 (LDH)

    Defendants Who Previously Pleaded Guilty:

    JOE SANTANA (also known as “Baby Joe”)
    Age: 20
    Brooklyn, New York

    CHAYANNE FERNANDEZ (also known as “White Boy”)
    Age: 24
    Brooklyn, New York

    KEVIN WINT (also known as “Kev G”)
    Age: 31
    Brooklyn, New York

    SHAKUR BEY (also known as “Speedy”)
    Age: 27
    Brooklyn, New York

    E.D.N.Y. Docket No. 20-CR-331 (LDH)

    Defendant Awaiting Trial:

    RAQUEL DUNTON (also known as “Rah”)
    Age: 38
    Brooklyn, New York

    E.D.N.Y. Docket No. 24-CR-344 (LDH)

    MIL Security OSI –

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Tech companies can play key roles in making rural healthcare safer

    Source: Microsoft

    Headline: Tech companies can play key roles in making rural healthcare safer

    A new report on how Microsoft is helping rural communities protect critical healthcare infrastructure

    Last year, Microsoft launched its Cybersecurity for Rural Hospitals Program an initiative designed to help protect access to healthcare for the 46 million people living in rural America. Funded through a philanthropic investment, the program now has more than 550 rural hospitals, nearly one-third of all US rural hospitals, participating to receive free cybersecurity assessments, cybersecurity training, Microsoft security product discounts, and AI solutions designed to promote hospital resiliency.  

    Today, we are releasing a new white paper sharing what we’ve learned in the last year, including insights on the current cybersecurity landscape for rural health and the role technology companies can play. Our goal with this program is to address both the immediate cyber risks facing these critical community resources as well as broader systemic challenges facing rural health.   

    Click here to read the Microsoft report 

    Rural hospitals are a cornerstone of healthcare in communities across the United States, providing critical services for roughly 14% of the U.S. population. The need to support rural hospitals is immense. These hospitals are often the only healthcare option for over 50 miles in the communities they serve. A cyberattack that disrupts care for weeks or months in these isolated settings can have a devastating impact and endanger human lives. When a rural hospital’s IT systems go down, patients often need to travel even longer distances for medical care. Long travel distances for healthcare are directly associated with higher mortality rates, particularly for time-sensitive conditions like heart attacks and strokes. 

    The rural health cybersecurity landscape

    According to an FBI report, the healthcare sector reported more ransomware attacks in 2023 than any of the other critical infrastructure areas in the study. Given the highly sensitive personal data involved, healthcare is a rich target for increasingly sophisticated cybercriminals and nation-state threat actors launching cyberattacks. According to a recent report based on a survey of 402 healthcare organizations, 67% experienced a ransomware attack in the past year, with the average admitted ransom payment amounting to $4.4 million.  

    And while larger hospitals can often pay ransoms to avoid patient care disruptions, ransomware attacks pose a particular threat to rural hospitals who operate with much smaller operational teams and financial margins. Rural hospitals are prime targets for these attacks due to their often-limited resources and legacy technology. For rural hospitals, a ransomware attack may represent a tipping point toward closure, impacting not just the hospital, but the communities they serve with potentially life-threatening consequences.  

    As we’ve worked with these hospitals in the last year, our goal has been to help create strong security not just through our products but to also help address specific practice needs and identify broader systemic issues. For example, early on, we found most rural hospitals hadn’t implemented basic cybersecurity best practices, such as email security and multi-factor authentication. By delivering a holistic solution that includes free assessment, curated learning pathways for employees, and non-profit pricing for Critical Access and Rural Emergency Hospitals, we can help these hospitals to be less vulnerable to common threats and ultimately, better serve their communities.  

    Supporting rural health resilience

    With the release of today’s white paper, we hope to increase awareness and understanding of these issues and drive more collaboration between technology companies, policymakers, and healthcare providers to enhance the cybersecurity resilience of rural hospitals.  

    In the coming months, Microsoft will continue to expand efforts to support rural hospitals, ensuring they have the tools and resources needed to mitigate cyber threats and enhance their overall resilience. Leveraging AI for greater efficiency—by streamlining and automating some hospital processes—is just one way we are looking to provide support.   

    By addressing both immediate cybersecurity risks and broader systemic challenges, we can help ensure that rural hospitals remain a vital part of the healthcare ecosystem, providing essential services to millions of Americans. 

    Tags: AI, cybersecurity, healthcare, Microsoft Cybersecurity Program, Rural America, Rural Hospitals

    MIL OSI Economics –

  • MIL-OSI Security: Five People Convicted in $1 Million Fraud Scheme Involving Elderly Victims

    Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) State Crime Alerts (b)

    TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA – Five defendants who participated in a conspiracy and a fraud scheme involving 401(k) accounts of elderly retired Florida school district employees have been convicted after three defendants pleaded guilty and two defendants were found guilty by a federal jury.  Michelle Spaven, Acting United States Attorney for the Northern District of Florida, announced the convictions of the following defendants:

    Evidence presented at trial and court records show that the defendants were involved in a conspiracy to steal retirement funds from participants in a retirement 401(k) savings program comprised largely of Florida school district employees or prior employees. Between January 2022, and March 2022, Vargas, who worked for the company handling the retirement fund, conspired with the other defendants to have fraudulent withdraw forms faxed to the company requesting that the victims’ retirement funds be transferred to accounts controlled by members of the conspiracy.  In total, the conspirators withdrew and attempted to withdraw retirement funds from 25 different 401(k) accounts, resulting in a net total of $1.1 million being stolen. Evidence presented at trial also established that Bostic was engaging in money laundering with the stolen funds. 

    Sentencing hearings for all defendants are scheduled for April 28, 2025, beginning at 10:00 a.m., at the United States Courthouse in Tallahassee before United States District Judge Robert L. Hinkle. All defendants face up to 20 years’ imprisonment and up to three years on supervised release for Conspiracy to Commit Wire Fraud. Vargas, Levy, Grace Aguebor, and Bostic face a mandatory minimum sentence of two years imprisonment—consecutive to any other prison sentence imposed by the court.

    These convictions were the result of a joint investigation by the Tallahassee Police Department and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The case was prosecuted by Assistant United States Attorney Justin M. Keen.

    If you or someone you know is age 60 or older and has experienced financial fraud, experienced professionals are standing by at the National Elder Fraud Hotline 1-833-FRAUD-11 (1-833-372-8311). This Justice Department hotline, managed by the Office for Victims of Crime, can provide personalized support to callers by assessing the needs of the victim and identifying relevant next steps. Case managers will identify appropriate reporting agencies, provide information to callers to assist them in reporting, connect callers directly with appropriate agencies and provide resources and referrals, on a case-by-case basis. Reporting is the first step. Reporting can help authorities identify those who commit fraud and reporting certain financial losses due to fraud as soon as possible can increase the likelihood of recovering losses. The hotline is open Monday through Friday from 10:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. ET. English, Spanish, and other languages are available.

    More information about the department’s efforts to help American seniors is available at www.justice.gov/elderjustice. For more information about the Consumer Protection Branch and its enforcement efforts visit www.justice.gov/civil/consumer-protection-branch. Elder fraud complaints can be filed with the FTC at www.reportfraud.ftc.gov/ or at 877-FTC-HELP. The Justice Department provides a variety of resources relating to elder fraud victimization through its Office for Victims of Crime, at www.ovc.gov.

    The United States Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of Florida is one of 94 offices that serve as the nation’s principal litigators under the direction of the Attorney General. To access public court documents online, please visit the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida website. For more information about the United States Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of Florida, visit http://www.justice.gov/usao/fln/index.html.

    MIL Security OSI –

  • MIL-OSI Security: Former Bank Employee Pleads Guilty to Role in International Money Laundering Conspiracy

    Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) State Crime Alerts (b)

    BOSTON – A Brooklyn, N.Y. man pleaded guilty today in federal court in Boston in connection with his role in a sophisticated international money laundering and drug trafficking organization.

    Rongjian Li, 38, pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit money laundering. U.S. District Judge Angel Kelley scheduled sentencing for June 5, 2025.

    In May 2023, Li was among 12 individuals from Massachusetts, Rhode Island, New York and California charged in a superseding indictment for their alleged involvement in a sophisticated international money laundering and drug trafficking organization led by Jin Hua Zhang. The investigation revealed that, for a fee, Zhang laundered bulk cash for drug dealers and laundered profits from other illegal businesses. In less than a year, Zhang and his organization laundered at least $25 million worth of drug proceeds and funds from other illegal businesses through undercover agents. Funds were eventually traced to, and seized from, accounts in Hong Kong and elsewhere in China, India, Cambodia and Brazil, among other locations.

    The investigation identified Li as a member of the money laundering conspiracy who, from 2021 through 2022, used his position as a Bank of America employee to knowingly open several accounts through which the organization laundered illicit funds. Li was also aware that some of the accounts were opened using fraudulent passports. As part of his involvement, when the bank’s financial auditing systems flagged or froze accounts for suspicious activity, Li helped Zhang circumvent the bank’s anti-money laundering protocols and move illicit funds elsewhere. In addition, Li was observed sitting next to Zhang at a dinner in New York, where Zhang discussed the different fee percentages he charged various criminal groups for drug trafficking and scams.

    Zhang pleaded guilty in September 2023 and is scheduled to be sentenced on May 15, 2025.

    The charge of money laundering conspiracy provides for a sentence of up to 20 years in prison, up to three years of supervised release and a fine of up to $500,000, or twice the amount involved, whichever is greater. Sentences are imposed by a federal district court judge based upon the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and statutes which govern the determination of a sentence in a criminal case.

    United States Attorney Leah B. Foley and Jodi Cohen, Special Agent in Charge of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Boston Division made the announcement today. Assistant U.S. Attorneys Christopher Pohl, Brian A. Fogerty and Meghan C. Cleary of the Criminal Division are prosecuting the case.

    The details contained in the indictment are allegations. The remaining defendants are presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law.

    MIL Security OSI –

  • MIL-OSI Security: Baldwinsville Man Sentenced to 45 Years in Prison for Sexual Exploitation of a Child and Distribution and Receipt of Child Pornography

    Source: Office of United States Attorneys

    Kenneth Koegel, Jr. Had a Prior Conviction for Sexual Abuse in the 1st Degree Involving a 6-Year-Old

    SYRACUSE, NEW YORK – Kenneth Koegel, Jr., 40, of Baldwinsville, New York was sentenced today to 45 years in federal prison and lifetime supervised release following his conviction by guilty plea to seven counts of sexual exploitation of a child, one count of commission of a felony offense involving a minor by a registered sex offender, one count of distribution of child pornography, and one count of receipt of child pornography. Acting United States Attorney Daniel Hanlon and Craig L. Tremaroli, Special Agent in Charge of the Albany Field Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) made the announcement.

    As part of his prior guilty plea, Koegel admitted that he was convicted in 2004 in Monroe County Court of sexual abuse in the first degree for exposing his penis to a 6-year-old girl in a public park and touching her vagina with his hand and that he was required to register as a sex offender because of that conviction. He then admitted that, starting in or about 2014 and continuing until October 2022, he sexually abused a girl from the time she was approximately 2 years old until she was approximately 9 years old. During that time, Koegel created numerous sexually explicit images and videos depicting the sexual abuse of his victim, including Koegel subjecting her to multiple sex acts. He also used a social messaging application to distribute the material he produced to someone else, with whom he also traded thousands of other child pornography files.

    In addition to the 45-year imprisonment term and lifetime supervision, the district court also ordered Koegel to pay $12,000 in restitution and a $1,000 special assessment. Koegel will have to register as a sex offender upon release from prison.

    This case was investigated by the FBI’s Albany Division Child Exploitation and Human Trafficking Task Force – comprised of FBI Special Agents and state and local police investigators, including from the New York State Police. The case was prosecuted by Assistant United States Attorneys Michael D. Gadarian and Adrian S. LaRochelle as part of Project Safe Childhood.

    Project Safe Childhood is a nationwide initiative to combat the growing epidemic of child sexual exploitation and abuse. Launched in May 2006 by the Department of Justice and led by the U.S. Attorneys’ Offices and the Criminal Division’s Child Exploitation and Obscenity Section (CEOS), Project Safe Childhood marshals federal, state and local resources to better locate, apprehend and prosecute individuals who exploit children via the Internet, as well as to identify and rescue victims. For more information about Project Safe Childhood, please visit https://www.justice.gov/psc.

    MIL Security OSI –

  • MIL-OSI Security: Former Executive of Chicago-Area Non-Profit Pleads Guilty in $1.8 Million Fraud Scheme

    Source: Office of United States Attorneys

    CHICAGO — A former executive of a Chicago-area non-profit organization has pleaded guilty to a federal fraud charge for her role in misappropriating $1.8 million intended to support the charity’s work with underprivileged youth.

    BARBARA HARRIS served as the Executive Director of the Center for Community Academic Success Partnerships (CCASP), which received government grants and other funds to provide after-school programs to schools in the Chicago area.  The grants included funds from the 21st Century Community Learning Centers Program, a federal program offering financial support for academic enrichment opportunities.  The 21st Century program issued grants to its local administrator, the Illinois State Board of Education, which in turn disbursed the funds to CCASP.

    Harris stated in a plea agreement that from 2012 to 2017, she schemed with another CCASP executive, TONY BELL, to submit grant applications that inflated CCASP’s projected annual expenses and falsely claimed that the organization would receive services from five subcontractors.  In reality, Harris knew that the subcontractors, two of which were other non-profit groups run by Harris and Bell, provided no actual services to CCASP.  The fraud scheme resulted in approximately $1.8 million in actual loss to the Illinois Department of Education.

    Harris further admitted in the plea agreement that from 2021 to 2023, she participated in a separate fraud scheme that bilked the federally funded AmeriCorps VISTA program, which awarded grants to non-profit organizations working to bring communities out of poverty.  Harris, who at the time of this scheme was serving as Co-Executive Director of the non-profit South Suburban Community Services, submitted grant applications falsely representing that VISTA members would work for SSCS developing programs aimed at bringing economic opportunities to the south suburbs of Chicago. Harris knew that the VISTA members would actually be used at SSCS to support already-funded job training and afterschool violence prevention programs.  Harris fraudulently obtained approval for eleven VISTA members to work at SSCS, none of whom performed services in accordance with their VISTA assignment descriptions, causing a loss to the VISTA program of $98,699.

    Harris, 55, of South Holland, Ill., pleaded guilty on Feb. 27, 2025, to a wire fraud charge.  U.S. District Judge Andrea R. Wood set sentencing for July 11, 2025, at 10:30 a.m.

    Harris’s guilty plea was announced by Morris Pasqual, Acting United States Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois, John F. Woolley, Special Agent-in-Charge of the U.S. Department of Education Office of Inspector General’s Midwestern Regional Office, Douglas S. DePodesta, Special Agent-in-Charge of the Chicago Field Office of the FBI, Ramsey Covington, Acting Special Agent-in-Charge of IRS Criminal Investigation in Chicago, and Stephen Ravas, Acting Inspector General of the AmeriCorps Office of Inspector General.  The Illinois Office of Executive Inspector General provided valuable assistance.  The government is represented by Assistant U.S. Attorneys Kristen Totten and Caitlin Walgamuth.

    Bell, 64, of Matteson, Ill., has pleaded not guilty to charges of conspiracy, money laundering, and wire fraud.  He is awaiting trial.  The public is reminded that the indictment against Bell is not evidence of guilt.  Bell is presumed innocent and entitled to a fair trial at which the government has the burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 

    MIL Security OSI –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Florida businessman sentenced for migrant labor employment scheme, payroll tax evasion, worker death

    Source: US Immigration and Customs Enforcement

    WASHINGTON — A Florida man was sentenced Feb. 20 to 48 months in prison and ordered to forfeit more than $5.5 million to the United States as well as forfeit numerous real properties and cash, and to pay over $55 million in restitution for conspiracy to commit wire fraud, conspiracy to defraud the United States and willful violation of a workplace standard that resulted in the death of his employee following a joint agency investigation with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement.

    Manual Domingos Pita, of Wesley Chapel, previously pleaded guilty to those charges on July 9, 2024.

    According to court documents, Pita owned and operated Domingos 54 Construction, a subcontracting business for the wood framing of new construction homes. Domingos 54 was a shell construction company that Pita used to provide workers, including undocumented aliens, with construction jobs. However, Pita failed to secure the required workers compensation insurance coverage for these employees by falsifying in worker’s compensation insurance applications the number of workers for which he sought coverage. In addition, Pita failed to pay any federal employment taxes on the wages that these workers earned during the course of the scheme between 2018 and 2022. As a result, Pita caused several worker’s compensation insurance companies to sustain a loss of over $22.7 million in premiums that they could have charged had they been aware of the number of workers which they had been manipulated into covering with their policies. In addition, Pita failed to pay to the IRS over $33.7 million in federal employment taxes on those workers’ wages.

    Between February and July 2019, investigators with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) issued six citations to Domingos 54 for failure to provide fall protection to workers. Even after being cited for these violations, Pita continued to ignore OSHA requirements. In March 2020, Pita assigned a worker and three other carpenters to install sheeting on the roof of a residential home in windy conditions without providing the required fall-protection gear or ensuring its use. As a result, one of the workers was blown off the roof and died from his injuries.

    The FBI, IRS Criminal Investigation, ICE Tampa, Florida Department of Financial Services’ Bureau of Insurance Fraud-Criminal Investigations and the Department of Labor’s Office of Inspector General investigated the case.

    Assistant U.S. Attorney Jay L. Hoffer for the Middle District of Florida and Senior Trial Attorney Banumathi Rangarajan of the Environment and Natural Resources Division’s Environmental Crimes Section prosecuted the case.

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: ICE Newark worksite enforcement operation results in 16 arrests

    Source: US Immigration and Customs Enforcement

    NEWARK, N.J. — On Feb. 26, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement personnel joined U.S. Customs and Border Protection at the Port of New York/Newark in conducting an unannounced inspection of a CBP-bonded warehouse in North Bergen, New Jersey, to ensure individuals working in government-regulated facilities were lawfully present and permitted to work in the United States. ICE and CBP worked alongside the FBI Newark Field Office, DEA New Jersey Division, and ATF, to ensure that all facility personnel were acting in compliance with U.S. employment laws.

    This operation resulted in the discovery of 16 individuals who were present in the U.S. illegally. The individuals were apprehended and placed under administrative arrest.

    “This operation underscores HSI’s unwavering commitment to safeguarding the integrity of our trade infrastructure and, in turn, the wellbeing of the public at-large,” said ICE Homeland Security Investigations Newark Special Agent in Charge Ricky J. Patel. “ICE HSI Newark is proud to stand side-by-side with our law enforcement partners to ensure the safety of our neighborhoods and our livelihoods.”

    “In the current threat climate, enforcement efforts like this are critical,” added CBP Acting Port Director Jeffrey Greene. “Holding our trade industry partners accountable provides a baseline for operational proficiency.  This baseline allows us to be laser focused on our broader enforcement efforts — keeping bad actors and bad things from harming our country.”

    Additionally, this operation was conducted in part to determine whether imported merchandise was properly secured. Unannounced inspections serve to identify unauthorized manipulations of commercial merchandise within bonded areas, noncompliance with customs regulations, and unauthorized access by employees who lack the authority to access the bonded areas.

    ICE is the federal agency responsible for upholding the laws established by the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, which requires employers to verify the identity and work eligibility of all individuals they hire. These laws help protect jobs for U.S. citizens and others who are lawfully employed, eliminate unfair competitive advantages for companies that hire an illegal workforce, and strengthen public safety and national security.

    Under federal law, employers are required to verify the identity and employment eligibility of all individuals they hire, and to document that information using the Employment Eligibility Verification Form I-9. ICE uses the I-9 inspection program to promote compliance with the law, part of a comprehensive strategy to address and deter illegal employment. Inspections are one of the most powerful tools the federal government uses to ensure that businesses are complying with U.S. employment laws.

    ICE’s worksite enforcement strategy includes leveraging the agency’s other investigative disciplines, since worksite investigations can often involve additional criminal activity, such as alien smuggling, human trafficking, money laundering, document fraud, worker exploitation and/or substandard wage and working conditions.

    ICE uses a three-pronged approach to worksite enforcement: compliance, from I-9 inspections, civil fines and referrals for debarment; enforcement, through the criminal arrest of employers and administrative arrest of unauthorized workers.

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Mr. Pickle’s Sandwich Shop Launches Samsung Kiosks and Digital Menu Boards

    Source: Samsung

    Samsung announces Mr. Pickle’s Sandwich Shop, a growing premium sandwich chain, will introduce Samsung Kiosks powered by GRUBBRR® and dynamic digital menu boards. With these new solutions, Mr. Pickle’s aims to enhance operational efficiency and customer experience across its more than 60 locations.
    GRUBBRR’s dynamic technology, which is seamlessly integrated with Mr. Pickle’s existing PAR point-of-sale (POS) system was chosen for its rich technical functionality and capability to streamline operations while driving incremental revenue. Samsung Kiosks with GRUBBRR’s self-ordering software will enable Mr. Pickle’s to create operational efficiencies, reduce wait times and increase average ticket sizes with intelligent upselling features.
    “Today’s diners seek convenience, quality service, personalized choices and seamless technology,” said Sara Grofcsik, Head of Sales, Display Division, Samsung Electronics America. “Mr. Pickle’s Sandwich Shop embraces these expectations by leveraging Samsung and GRUBBRR solutions to enhance every dining experience. Through frictionless ordering and dynamic content management, the brand is able to stand out and create lasting connections with its loyal customers.”

    In addition to kiosks, Mr. Pickle’s is implementing Samsung digital menu boards to enhance the customer experience and streamline operations. Positioned as the first thing customers see upon entering, these menu boards provide a visually engaging way to showcase menu offerings. Through the integration with Mr. Pickle’s POS system, they deliver real-time updates to menu items and pricing, ensuring accuracy and flexibility while creating a dynamic and modern in-store experience.
    Samsung’s restaurant and retail solutions are renowned for their reliability, sleek design and cutting-edge display technology, making them the perfect fit for creating an engaging and efficient customer experience. Samsung Kiosks are designed to handle high-traffic environments with ease, ensuring durability and performance, while the digital menu boards deliver crisp, vibrant visuals that enhance in-store branding and communication. The Samsung Visual eXperience Transformation (VXT) cloud-native content management system (CMS) empowers Mr. Pickle’s to remotely create and deploy content across its entire network of displays.

    “We are excited to partner with Mr. Pickle’s Sandwich Shop, a brand that shares our commitment to leveraging technology for operational excellence and superior customer experiences,” said Sam Zietz, Chief Executive Officer, GRUBBRR. “By integrating our dynamic solutions with their existing systems, we’re empowering them to streamline operations, boost revenue and create engaging experiences for their guests.”
    GRUBBRR software will capture and analyze data from customer interactions with the Samsung Kiosk, such as customer order patterns and popular menu items. Mr. Pickle’s can then leverage these insights to optimize menu design, minimize waste and enhance the effectiveness of their digital menu boards.

    “At Mr. Pickle’s, we are always looking for innovative ways to enhance our operations and provide the best experience for our customers,” said Chris Schefler, Chief Operating Officer, Mr. Pickle’s Sandwich Shop. “GRUBBRR’s technology, combined with Samsung’s hardware, gives us the tools we need to not only improve efficiency but also elevate our in-store experience with impactful, real-time digital solutions.”
    The rollout of GRUBBRR’s self-ordering kiosks and Samsung digital menu boards marks a significant step forward for Mr. Pickle’s in adopting next-generation technology to support its growth and deliver exceptional customer experiences. Looking ahead, Mr. Pickle’s plans to launch the GRUBBRR Retail Media Network as a new revenue channel, leveraging Samsung Visual eXperience Transformation (VXT) to manage advertising content on its kiosks and in-window displays.

    MIL OSI Economics –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Grassley Report Reveals Obama-Biden State Department’s Refusal to Exact Justice Against Iranian Terrorists

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Iowa Chuck Grassley
    WASHINGTON – Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Chuck Grassley (R-Iowa) today released investigative findings detailing the full scope of the Obama-Biden State Department’s pervasive obstruction of FBI law enforcement efforts before, during and after the Iran Nuclear Deal negotiations. According to legally protected whistleblower disclosures, FBI arrest efforts against high-level Iranian targets were severely hampered until President Trump took office in 2016; Trump’s election “result[ed] in an immediate move back toward normal enforcement of the law against the Iran regime and its supporters.”
    “This report offers chilling evidence the Obama-Biden administration jeopardized our national security and demoralized the morale of FBI agents who were working to keep Americans safe,” Grassley said. “Democrats’ historic refusal to get tough on Iran emboldened its regime and allowed Tehran to continue funding global acts of terrorism, like what we saw on October 7, 2023. We should all be breathing a sigh of relief President Trump is back in the White House to restore American strength on the world stage and hold Iran accountable for its evil acts.”
    Per a legally protected whistleblower disclosure: “The State Department and Obama-Biden administration officials persistently and systematically derailed criminal and national security investigations, creating a shadow amnesty program that protected scores of additional Iranian criminals. FBI offices abandoned dozens of Iran-related investigations and U.S. Attorneys shut down prosecutions after recognizing the State Department and DOJ obstruction would thwart effective enforcement efforts.”
    Read Grassley’s staff report HERE.
    Findings:
    Unclassified FBI email records show the State Department, under the leadership of then-Secretary of State John Kerry, repeatedly blocked FBI officials from executing arrests on individuals involved in Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs. Per an FBI official, in at least once instance, “Secretary of State [Kerry] personally told DOJ officials that they were to stand down on an arrest.” Kerry’s actions flew in the face of his sworn testimony to Congress; ahead of the Iran Nuclear Deal’s signing, Kerry promised Congress the deal would not prevent the U.S. from using its authorities to hold Iran accountable “for terrorism, human rights, missiles or any other non-nuclear reason.” 

    FBI officials elevated their concerns regarding the State Department’s obstruction to the highest rungs of DOJ leadership – including then-Attorney General Loretta Lynch – to no avail. As arrest opportunities passed, one FBI official wrote, “We are all beside ourselves on asking the field to stand down on a layup arrest, however as it stands right now we all have to sit back and wait until all the US and Iran negotiations resolve themselves.”

    A State Department official characterized the absurdity of the Obama-Biden administration’s inactive law enforcement posture, writing to an FBI official, “it’s a little like WTF that [the arrest is] being held up (if you’ll excuse the phrasing). However it is what it is.”

    Ultimately, FBI officials resigned to take steps documenting the State Department’s stonewalling “should there ever be a special investigation/hearing etc. on why FBI could not action law, and potentially prevent [a] national security incident.”

    The Biden-Harris administration last year failed to muster a response to Grassley’s initial findings regarding this obstruction. Today’s report provides the fullest public account of the Obama-Biden State Department’s unlawful actions.
    -30-

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Membership Updates for March 2025

    Source: International Association of Drilling Contractors – IADC

    Headline: Membership Updates for March 2025

    IADC welcomes 21 new Members:

    • APEX WELLS B.V. – Velp, The Netherlands
    • JFETC UK – Westhill, Aberdeenshire, UK 
    • LAST MILE ENERGY, INC – Odessa, Texas, US
    • NANCE UNIVERSAL HVACR TECHNICAL SCHOOL INC – Beaumont, Texas, US 
    • RED FORT PPE INDUSTRIES PVT LTD – Mumbai, India 
    • SEATAG AUSTRALASIAN SERVICES PTE LTD – Singapore, Singapore
    • SMARTCHAIN – Houston, Texas, US 
    • WELL GUIDANCE B.V. – Obdam, North Holland, The Netherlands
    • CRESTON ENERGY GROUP – Bryan, Texas, US
    • INGERSOLL RAND – Davidson, North Carolina, US
    • NANCE INTERNATIONAL INC – Beaumont, Texas, US
    • SURVIVAL SYSTEMS INTERNATIONAL MIDDLE EAST LLC – Dubai, UAE 
    • ZELIM LTD – Edinburgh, UK
    • GRACIANO RODRIGUEZ – Madrid, Spain
    • ALAQ AL- EZDEHAR CO. – Basra, Basra, Iraq 
    • ASET – ABERDEEN SKILLS AND ENTERPRISE TRAINING LTD – Altens, Aberdeen, UK
    • PT NEOTEK INOVASI GLOBAL – BSD City, Indonesia 
    • SEED BUSINESS GROUP LTDA – Macae, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil 
    • LIBYAN GROUP FOR OIL AND ENERGY SERVICES LLC – Tripoli, Libya 
    • SEQ DRILLING INC – Hanover, Virginia, US
    • CONSTRUCCIONES Y PROYECTOS DEL NORTE C.A – Caracas, Miranda, Venezuela

    MIL OSI Economics –

  • MIL-OSI USA: ICE Dallas arrests foreign fugitive wanted in his home country for rape

    Source: US Immigration and Customs Enforcement

    DALLAS – U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement arrested Dieudonne Ishimwe, 38, a Rwandan foreign fugitive wanted for rape, in Fort Worth, March 3.

    Ishimwe was served with a notice to appear following an arrest warrant issued by the government of his home country for rape.

    “Foreign fugitives who attempt to evade responsibility for their criminal actions should take heed that we will find them,” said ICE Enforcement and Removals Operations Dallas acting Field Office Director Josh Johnson. “ICE will work relentlessly with our state, local and federal law enforcement partners by arresting and removing those who threaten the public safety of our communities.”

    Ishimwe was residing in Fort Worth without authorization prior to his arrest. The FBI assisted in the apprehension.

    Ishimwe entered the United States legally but violated the terms of his admission. The Prosecutor General of Rwanda issued a warrant for his arrest for rape Oct. 29, 2024.  

    He remains in ICE custody pending removal proceedings.

    Members of the public can report crimes and suspicious activity by dialing 866-DHS-2-ICE (866-347-2423) or completing the online tip form.

    For more news and information on ICE ERO’s efforts to enforce our nation’s immigration laws follow us on X at @ @ERODallas.

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Cornyn on President Trump’s Joint Address to Congress

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Texas John Cornyn

    WASHINGTON – U.S. Senator John Cornyn (R-TX) released the following statement on President Trump’s Joint Address to Congress:

    “Tonight, President Trump laid out his vision to renew the American dream, which he is already putting into action at an unprecedented pace. In just over six weeks, the President has made historic strides to reduce illegal immigration, cut waste and fraud, get our economy back on track, and restore American dominance on the world stage. Nowhere is this success more apparent than our southern border, where U.S. Customs and Border Protection are reporting record low crossings. That’s called deterrence, and Texans are safer for it.

    “President Trump delivered a message of peace, prosperity, and strength in tonight’s address, which was a welcome change after four years of failure and weakness under Joe Biden. I look forward to continuing to work alongside President Trump and my colleagues in Congress to enact his America First agenda and fulfill his promises to the American people.”

    Sen. Cornyn has voted to confirm all of President Trump’s nominees in both his first and second administrations, including Kristi Noem as Homeland Security Secretary, Pete Hegseth as Defense Secretary, and Kash Patel as FBI Director. Additionally, Sen. Cornyn supported the Laken Riley Act, the first bill to be signed into law in President Trump’s second term, which included his amendment to require U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to detain illegal immigrants who assault a member of law enforcement. He is also a member of the Senate Budget Committee and the Senate DOGE Caucus, where he is focused on rooting out fraud and reining in spending.

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI Security: Convicted Felon Sentenced to 2 1/2 Years in Prison for Gun Crime Related to Road Rage Incident

    Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) State Crime News

    BIRMINGHAM, Ala. – A convicted felon has been sentenced for illegal possession of a firearm, announced U.S. Attorney Prim F. Escalona and FBI Special Agent in Charge Carlton Peeples.

    U.S. District Court Judge Ann Marie Axon sentenced David Lee Hooker, 53, to 30 months in prison.  In November 2024, Hooker pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm stemming from a road rage incident in Jefferson County.

    This sentence sends a clear message that violent and reckless behavior on our roads will not be tolerated,” U.S. Attorney Escalona said. “We will continue to work with our law enforcement partners to hold accountable those who threaten the safety of our communities and endanger innocent lives.”

    “The safety of our communities is a priority,” said Special Agent in Charge Carlton Peeples, Birmingham Division. “The strong collaboration between FBI Birmingham and our state and local law enforcement partners works as a force multiplier to remove violent offenders from the communities we protect and serve.”

    According to the plea agreement, on April 4, 2023, Hooker was involved in a road rage incident at the intersection of Bessemer Road and BY Williams Sr. Drive. Hooker’s vehicle remained stationary during two cycles of the traffic light, and the individual in the vehicle behind Hooker continued to blow their horn.  When Hooker made a left turn, he pulled to the right side of the roadway. As the driver of the second vehicle drove by, Hooker drove up beside the vehicle and pointed a firearm at the driver.  The driver of the second vehicle then pulled into a nearby parking lot. Hooker followed the driver into the parking lot where he got out of his vehicle and proceeded to walk toward the second vehicle.  A Jefferson County Sherriff’s Office Task Force Officer witnessed this and activated his emergency lights to intervene. Hooker placed the firearm into his front pocket and raised his hands above his head.  The officer recovered a Smith &Wesson 9mm pistol from Hooker.     

    The FBI investigated the case along with the Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office. Assistant U.S. Attorney Benjamin A. Keown, Sr., prosecuted the case.

    MIL Security OSI –

  • MIL-OSI USA: 12 men sentenced for conspiring to distribute fentanyl, methamphetamine, marijuana in Tennessee, California

    Source: US Immigration and Customs Enforcement

    NASHVILLE, Tenn. – Twelve members of a drug trafficking conspiracy were sentenced to more than 70 years combined for their roles in conspiring to distribute and possess with intent to distribute controlled substances in middle Tennessee and elsewhere following a joint investigation with U.S. Immigrations and Customs Enforcement Nashville.

    According to court documents, around 2022, agents with ICE Nashville, FBI, and Drug Enforcement Administration began investigating large shipments of counterfeit fentanyl-laced pills that were inscribed “M30,” methamphetamine, and marijuana that someone was shipping to Tennessee and approximately 16 other states from California.

    Agents reviewed shipping materials, monitored social media accounts, and conducted surveillance before identifying Matthew Cox as the individual who was shipping these packages to members of the drug trafficking conspiracy. In their messages on social media applications and phones, the defendants discussed drug prices, drug shipments, and quality of the drugs. One defendant, Quortez Duncan, told Cox that he wanted stronger pills to get customers hooked on the pills to increase profits. Cox complied and attempted to send Duncan these pills, but agents seized them. Agents also learned that another defendant, Khyre McClain, attempted to establish and launder money through a limited liability corporation.

    In addition to this evidence of shipments to other states, agents seized packages of drugs that were being shipped to Tennessee. Specifically, on July 25, 2022, ICE agents seized a package from a UPS Store in Sebastopol, Calif., which was destined for Nashville. This package contained thousands of counterfeit fentanyl-laced pills weighing over two kilograms. The package also contained more than eight pounds of methamphetamine. On Aug. 9, 2022, ICE agents intercepted two additional packages from the Santa Rosa, Calif., area which were destined for residences in Nashville. One package contained 472 grams of counterfeit fentanyl-laced pills, and the other package contained approximately four pounds of methamphetamine.

    After collecting an overwhelming amount of evidence, law enforcement officers executed search warrants at multiple residences in California and Tennessee. They recovered handguns, assault rifles, bulk cash, expensive cars, marijuana, and large amounts of counterfeit fentanyl-laced pills.

    Each defendant was convicted of conspiring to distribute controlled substances. Three defendants were also convicted of unlawfully possessing firearms after previously being convicted of felony offenses.

    The defendants were sentenced as follows:

    • Quortez Duncan, age 37, was sentenced to 15 years in federal prison.
    • Mathew Cox, age 28, was sentenced to 11 years and 8 months in federal prison.
    • Jonny Rodriguez-Gonzalez, age 26, was sentenced to 11 years and 2 months in federal prison.
    • Ricardo Molinero-Alcarez, age 29, was sentenced to 10 years in federal prison.
    • Khyre McClain, age 23, was sentenced to 10 years in federal prison.
    • Davontay Holt, age 30, was sentenced to 10 years in federal prison.
    • Marcus Johnson, age 27, was sentenced to 5 years in federal prison.
    • Tristain Orr, age 25, was sentenced to 5 years in federal prison.
    • Ethan Kimes, age 22, was sentenced to 2 years in federal prison.
    • Marquitues Sawyers, age 24, was sentenced to 1 year and 8 months in federal prison.
    • Jahari Armstrong, age 22, was sentenced to 3 years of probation.
    • Jaydan Armstrong, age 22, was sentenced to 3 years of probation.

    This case was investigated by ICE in Tennessee and California, the Drug Enforcement Administration, the U.S. Postal Inspection Service, the FBI Nashville Field Office, the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation, and the Columbia Police Department.  Assistant U.S. Attorneys Ahmed Safeeullah and Rachel Stephens prosecuted this case.

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Justice Department Charges 12 Chinese Contract Hackers and Law Enforcement Officers in Global Computer Intrusion Campaigns

    Source: US State of California

    Chinese Law Enforcement and Intelligence Services Leveraged China’s Reckless and Indiscriminate Hacker-for-Hire Ecosystem, Including the ‘APT 27’ Group, to Suppress Free Speech and Dissent Globally and to Steal Data from Numerous Organizations Worldwide,

    Note: View the indictments in U.S. v. Wu Haibo et al., U.S. v. Yin Kecheng, U.S. v. Zhou Shuai et al. here.

    The Justice Department, FBI, Naval Criminal Investigative Service, and Departments of State and the Treasury announced today their coordinated efforts to disrupt and deter the malicious cyber activities of 12 Chinese nationals, including two officers of the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) Ministry of Public Security (MPS), employees of an ostensibly private PRC company, Anxun Information Technology Co. Ltd. (安洵信息技术有限公司) also known as “i-Soon,” and members of Advanced Persistent Threat 27 (APT27).

    These malicious cyber actors, acting as freelancers or as employees of i-Soon, conducted computer intrusions at the direction of the PRC’s MPS and Ministry of State Security (MSS) and on their own initiative. The MPS and MSS paid handsomely for stolen data. Victims include U.S.-based critics and dissidents of the PRC, a large religious organization in the United States, the foreign ministries of multiple governments in Asia, and U.S. federal and state government agencies, including the U.S. Department of the Treasury (Treasury) in late 2024.

    “The Department of Justice will relentlessly pursue those who threaten our cybersecurity by stealing from our government and our people,” said Sue J. Bai, head of the Justice Department’s National Security Division. “Today, we are exposing the Chinese government agents directing and fostering indiscriminate and reckless attacks against computers and networks worldwide, as well as the enabling companies and individual hackers that they have unleashed. We will continue to fight to dismantle this ecosystem of cyber mercenaries and protect our national security.”

    “The FBI is committed to protecting Americans from foreign cyber-attacks,” said Assistant Director Bryan Vorndran of the FBI’s Cyber Division. “Today’s announcements reveal that the Chinese Ministry of Public Security has been paying hackers-for-hire to inflict digital harm on Americans who criticize the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). To those victims who bravely came forward with evidence of intrusions, we thank you for standing tall and defending our democracy. And to those who choose to aid the CCP in its unlawful cyber activities, these charges should demonstrate that we will use all available tools to identify you, indict you, and expose your malicious activity for all the world to see.”

    According to court documents, the MPS and MSS employed an extensive network of private companies and contractors in China to hack and steal information in a manner that obscured the PRC government’s involvement. In some cases, the MPS and MSS paid private hackers in China to exploit specific victims. In many other cases, the hackers targeted victims speculatively. Operating from their safe haven and motivated by profit, this network of private companies and contractors in China cast a wide net to identify vulnerable computers, exploit those computers, and then identify information that it could sell directly or indirectly to the PRC government. The result of this largely indiscriminate approach was more worldwide computer intrusion victims, more systems worldwide left vulnerable to future exploitation by third parties, and more stolen information, often of no interest to the PRC government and, therefore, sold to other third-parties. Additional information regarding the indictments and the PRC’s hacker-for-hire ecosystem is available in Public Service Announcements published by the FBI today.

    U.S. v. Wu Haibo et al., Southern District of New York

    Today, a federal court in Manhattan unsealed an indictment charging eight i-Soon employees and two MPS officers for their involvement, from at least in or around 2016 through in or around 2023, in the numerous and widespread hacking of email accounts, cell phones, servers, and websites. The Department also announced today the court-authorized seizure of the primary internet domain used by i-Soon to advertise its business.

    “State-sponsored hacking is an acute threat to our community and national security,” said Acting U.S. Attorney Matthew Podolsky for the Southern District of New York. “For years, these 10 defendants — two of whom we allege are PRC officials — used sophisticated hacking techniques to target religious organizations, journalists, and government agencies, all to gather sensitive information for the use of the PRC. These charges will help stop these state-sponsored hackers and protect our national security. The career prosecutors of this office and our law enforcement partners will continue to uncover alleged state-sponsored hacking schemes, disrupt them, and bring those responsible to justice.”

    The defendants remain at large and wanted by the FBI. Concurrent with today’s announcement,  the U.S. Department of State’s Rewards for Justice (RFJ) program, administered by the Diplomatic Security Service, announced a reward of up to $10 million for information leading to the identification or location of any person who, while acting at the direction or under the control of a foreign government, engages in certain malicious cyber activities against U.S. critical infrastructure in violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. The reward is offered for the following individuals who are alleged to have worked in various capacities to direct or carry out i-Soon’s malicious cyber activity:

    • Wu Haibo (吴海波), Chief Executive Officer
    • Chen Cheng (陈诚), Chief Operating Officer
    • Wang Zhe (王哲), Sales Director
    • Liang Guodong (梁国栋), Technical Staff
    • Ma Li (马丽), Technical Staff
    • Wang Yan (王堰), Technical Staff
    • Xu Liang (徐梁), Technical Staff
    • Zhou Weiwei (周伟伟), Technical Staff
    • Wang Liyu (王立宇), MPS Officer
    • Sheng Jing (盛晶), MPS Officer

    i-Soon and its employees, to include the defendants, generated tens of millions of dollars in revenue as a key player in the PRC’s hacker-for-hire ecosystem. In some instances, i-Soon conducted computer intrusions at the request of the MSS or MPS, including cyber-enabled transnational repression at the direction of the MPS officer defendants. In other instances, i-Soon conducted computer intrusions on its own initiative and then sold, or attempted to sell, the stolen data to at least 43 different bureaus of the MSS or MPS in at least 31 separate provinces and municipalities in China. i-Soon charged the MSS and MPS between approximately $10,000 and $75,000 for each email inbox it successfully exploited. i-Soon also trained MPS employees how to hack independently of i-Soon and offered a variety of hacking methods for sale to its customers.

    The defendants’ U.S.-located targets included a large religious organization that previously sent missionaries to China and was openly critical of the PRC government and an organization focused on promoting human rights and religious freedom in China. In addition, the defendants targeted multiple news organizations in the United States, including those that have opposed the CCP or delivered uncensored news to audiences in Asia, including China and the New York State Assembly, one of whose representatives had communicated with members of a religious organization banned in China.

    The defendants’ foreign-located targets included a religious leader and his office, and a Hong Kong newspaper that i-Soon considered as being opposed to the PRC government. The defendants also targeted the foreign ministries of Taiwan, India, South Korea, and Indonesia.

    Assistant U.S. Attorneys Ryan B. Finkel, Steven J. Kochevar, and Kevin Mead for the Southern District of New York and Trial Attorney Gregory J. Nicosia Jr. of the National Security Division’s National Security Cyber Section are prosecuting the case.

    U.S. v. Yin Kecheng and U.S. v. Zhou Shuai et al., District of Columbia

    Today, a federal court unsealed two indictments charging APT27 actors Yin Kecheng (尹可成) and Zhou Shuai (周帅) also known as “Coldface” for their involvement in the multi-year, for-profit computer intrusion campaigns dating back, in the case of Yin, to 2013. The Department also announced today court-authorized seizures of internet domains and computer server accounts used by Yin and Zhou to facilitate their hacking activity.

    The defendants remain at large. View the FBI’s Wanted posters for Shuai and Kecheng here.

    Concurrent with today’s announcement, the Department of States State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs is announcing two reward offers under the Transnational Organized Crime Rewards Program (TOCRP) of up to $2 million each for information leading to the arrests and convictions, in any country, of malicious cyber actors Yin Kecheng and Zhou Shuai, both Chinese nationals residing in China.

    “These indictments and actions show this office’s long-standing commitment to vigorously investigate and hold accountable Chinese hackers and data brokers who endanger U.S. national security and other victims across the globe,” said Interim U.S. Attorney Edward R. Martin Jr. for the District of Columbia. “The defendants in these cases have been hacking for the Chinese government for years, and these indictments lay out the strong evidence showing their criminal wrongdoing. We again demand that the Chinese government to put a stop to these brazen cyber criminals who are targeting victims across the globe and then monetizing the data they have stolen by selling it across China.”

    The APT27 group to which Yin and Zhou belong is also known to private sector security researchers as “Threat Group 3390,” “Bronze Union,” “Emissary Panda,” “Lucky Mouse,” “Iron Tiger,” “UTA0178,” “UNC 5221,” and “Silk Typhoon.” As alleged in court documents, between August 2013 and December 2024, Yin, Zhou, and their co-conspirators exploited vulnerabilities in victim networks, conducted reconnaissance once inside those networks, and installed malware, such as PlugX malware, that provided persistent access. The defendants and their co-conspirators then identified and stole data from the compromised networks by exfiltrating it to servers under their control. Next, they brokered stolen data for sale and provided it to various customers, only some of whom had connections to the PRC government and military. For example, Zhou sold data stolen by Yin through i-Soon, whose primary customers, as noted above, were PRC government agencies, including the MSS and the MPS.

    The defendants’ motivations were financial and, because they were profit-driven, they targeted broadly, rendering victim systems vulnerable well beyond their pilfering of data and other information that they could sell. Between them, Yin and Zhou sought to profit from the hacking of numerous U.S.-based technology companies, think tanks, law firms, defense contractors, local governments, health care systems, and universities, leaving behind them a wake of millions of dollars in damages.

    The documents related to the seizure warrants, also unsealed today, further allege that Yin and Zhou continued to engage in hacking activity, including Yin’s involvement in the recently announced hack of Treasury between approximately September and December 2024. Virtual private servers used to conduct the Treasury intrusion belonged to, and were controlled by, an account that Yin and his co-conspirators established. Yin and his co-conspirators used that same account and other linked accounts they controlled to lease servers used for additional malicious cyber activity. The seizure warrant unsealed today allowed the FBI to seize the virtual private servers and other infrastructure used by the defendants to perpetrate these crimes.

    On Jan. 17, Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) announced sanctions against Yin for his role in hacking that agency between September and December 2024. Concurrent with today’s indictments, OFAC also announced sanctions on Zhou and Shanghai Heiying Information Technology Company Ltd., a company operated by Zhou for purposes of his hacking activity.

    Private sector partners are also taking voluntary actions to raise awareness and strengthen defenses against the PRC’s malicious cyber activity. Today, Microsoft published research that highlights its unique, updated insights into Silk Typhoon tactics, techniques, and procedures specifically its targeting of the IT supply chain.

    Assistant U.S. Attorneys Jack F. Korba and Tejpal S. Chawla for the District of Columbia and Trial Attorney Tanner Kroeger of the National Security Division’s National Security Cyber Section are prosecuting the case.

    ***

    The above disruptive actions targeting PRC malicious cyber activities were the result of investigations conducted by FBI New York and Washington Field Offices, FBI Cyber Division, the Naval Criminal Investigative Service. The U.S. Attorney’s Offices for the Southern District of New York and District of Columbia and the National Security Division’s National Security Cyber Section are prosecuting the case.

    The Department acknowledges the value of public-private partnerships in combating advanced cyber threats and recognizes Microsoft, Volexity, PwC, and Mandiant for their valuable assistance in these investigations.

    The details in the above-described indictments and warrants are merely allegations. All defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law.

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI Security: Chinese Nationals with Ties to the PRC Government and “APT27” Charged in a Computer Hacking Campaign for Profit, Targeting Numerous U.S. Companies, Institutions, and Municipalities

    Source: Office of United States Attorneys

    Department Seizes Virtual Private Server Account and Domains Tied to Malicious Activity to include the U.S. Department of Treasury Hack

                WASHINGTON – A federal judge in Washington, D.C., today, unsealed two separate indictments that allege Chinese nationals Yin Kecheng, 38, (尹 可成) a/k/a “YKC” (“YIN”) and Zhou Shuai, 45, (周帅) a/k/a “Coldface” (“ZHOU”) violated various federal statutes by participating in years-long, sophisticated computer hacking conspiracies that successfully targeted a wide variety of U.S.-based victims from 2011 to the present-day. According to the documents unsealed today, the defendants targeted a multitude of U.S. victim companies, municipalities, and organizations for profit, causing millions of dollars’ worth of damages. YIN and ZHOU, who have ties to the government of the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”), are alleged to have stolen and exfiltrated data from numerous U.S.-based technology companies, think tanks, defense contractors, government municipalities, and universities that they later brokered for sale. Arrest warrants have been issued for YIN and ZHOU, who both remain fugitives.

                The unsealing by the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia is part of the coordinated effort by Department of Justice (the “Department”), other U.S. Attorney’s Offices, the U.S. Department of Treasury (“Treasury”), and private sector partners that highlights the Chinese government’s unique role in intentionally promoting and protecting the wide-scale computer hacking activity by its citizens. According to court documents unsealed today, the PRC Ministry of Public Security (“MPS”) and Ministry of State Security (“MSS”) directed or financed Chinese hackers, such as the defendants, to conduct computer intrusions against high-value targets in the United States and elsewhere. Victims include U.S.-based critics and dissidents of the PRC, a large religious organization in the United States, the foreign ministries of multiple governments in Asia, and U.S. federal and state government agencies, including most recently in 2024.

                According to court documents, the MPS and MSS employed an extensive network of private companies and contractors in China to hack and steal information in a manner that obscured the PRC government’s direct involvement. By employing these hackers-for-hire, the PRC government further allowed these same hackers to profit by committing additional computer intrusions around the world with impunity, and then to sell stolen data through Chinese data brokers. The PRC government’s state-sponsorship and protection of these hackers resulted in the loss of sensitive, valuable and personal identification information that was a direct harm to U.S. entities and other foreign governments and victims.

                In conjunction with the unsealing, the Department announced the judicially authorized seizure of internet domains linked to YIN that he used in facilitating the conspiracy’s network intrusion activity. In addition, the Department announced the judicially authorized seizure of a Virtual Private Server (“VPS”) account linked to ZHOU that he used to facilitate network intrusion activity. In conjunction with these actions, the Treasury announced sanctions against ZHOU and his company Shanghai Heiying Information Technology company, Limited (“Shanghai Heiying”).  YIN was previously sanctioned for his role in the recent Treasury network compromise in January 2025.

    “These indictments and actions show this Office’s long-standing commitment to vigorously investigate and hold accountable Chinese hackers and data brokers who endanger U.S. national security and other victims across the globe,” said U.S. Attorney Edward R. Martin, Jr. “The defendants in these cases have been hacking for the Chinese government for years, and these indictments lay out the strong evidence showing their criminal wrongdoing. We, again, demand that the Chinese government put a stop to these brazen cyber criminals who are targeting victims across the globe and then monetizing the data they have stolen by selling it across China.”

                “The defendants allegedly waged a yearslong hacking campaign against U.S.-based organizations to steal their data and sell it to various customers, some of whom had connections to the Chinese government,” said FBI Acting Assistant Director in Charge Roman Rozhavsky of the FBI Washington Field Office. “Today’s indictment is the first step toward bringing these perpetrators to justice for endangering U.S. national security and causing significant financial losses for both U.S. and foreign companies. The FBI and our partners will continue to pursue these hostile cyber actors to the full extent of the law.”

                “The defendants’ years-long hacking conspiracy to steal data from Cleared Defense Contractors that support the U.S. military—among many other U.S.-based victims—and sell it to customers with ties to the Chinese government poses a significant threat to our national security,” said NCIS Cyber Operations Field Office Special Agent in Charge Josh Stanley. “NCIS remains committed to working with the FBI and our law enforcement partners around the world to expose malicious actors who seek to undermine the cybersecurity of the Department of the Navy.”

                “The Department of State appreciates the opportunity to collaborate with the Department of Treasury, FBI, and the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia in announcing today’s actions,” said Senior Bureau Official F. Cartwright Weiland of the Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL). “With reward offers up to $2 million each for malicious cyber actors Zhou Shuai and Yin KeCheng under the Transnational Organized Crime Rewards Program, we ask the public to contact the FBI with tips to help bring these cybercriminals to justice.”

    Overview

                Today’s announcement reflects nearly a decade-long effort by the Department and the FBI.   The action targets actors that various security researchers have historically referred to as “APT27,” “Threat Group 3390,” “Bronze Union,” “Emissary Panda,” “Lucky Mouse,” and “Iron Tiger,” and more recently referred to as “UTA0178,” “UNC 5221,” and “Silk Typhoon.” 

                The Department obtained a 19-count indictment against YIN on May 2, 2018 (the “2018 Indictment”) from a grand jury sitting in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The 2018 Indictment, which alleges conduct between August 2013 and December 2015, charges wire fraud, aggravated identity theft, and violations of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”).

                Another federal grand jury in the District of Columbia indicted both YIN and ZHOU on March 28, 2023 (the “2023 Indictment”), with similar offenses.  Specifically, the 2023 Indictment, which alleges conduct between June 2018 and November 2020, charges conspiracy, wire fraud, various violations of the CFAA, aggravated identity theft, and money laundering. 

                On March 4, 2025, a federal magistrate judge sitting in the District of Columbia authorized FBI to seize a VPS account and multiple internet domains involved in the criminal activity.  According to the unsealed affidavits in support of those warrants, ZHOU utilized the VPS account to create additional accounts used to facilitate computer intrusion activity and to discuss the sale of access to compromised computer networks. Separately, YIN utilized his own servers and stood up the seized domains to exploit victim computer networks to include networks at Treasury.

    Computer Hacking Scheme

                As alleged in the documents unsealed today, at various points between August 2013 and December 2024, YIN, ZHOU, and their unindicted co-conspirators used sophisticated hacking tools and techniques in their efforts to overcome network defenses and avoid detection of numerous hardened targets in the United States and around the world. The defendants and their co-conspirators would routinely scan victim networks for vulnerabilities, exploit those vulnerabilities with sophisticated hacking techniques, and conduct reconnaissance once inside a victim’s network. The defendants and their co-conspirators and would install malware that would allow them to maintain persistent access and enable them to communicate with malicious external servers and other hacking infrastructure. The defendants and their co-conspirators would identify and steal data from the compromised networks by exfiltrating the data to servers under their control. The stolen data was then brokered for sale and provided to various customers, some of whom had connections to the PRC government and military.

    Targeting of U.S. Victims

                According to the 2018 Indictment, YIN targeted U.S.-based defense contractors, technology firms, and think tanks, among other victims. The 2018 Indictment alleges YIN openly discussed his preference for targeting American victims. For example, on one occasion in September 2013, YIN told an associate he wanted to “mess with the American military” and “break into a big target” so that he could earn enough money to buy a car. YIN used mapping software to identify network vulnerabilities for the purpose of gaining unlawful access to victim computer and installing malware. YIN used stolen network credentials to maintain persistent access to victim networks and utilized intermediary servers or “hop points” and malicious domains to remotely access and exfiltrate victim computer data.

                According to the 2023 Indictment, YIN, ZHOU, and others targeted U.S.-based companies like technology and defense contractors, law firms, communication service providers, local governments, health care systems, and think tanks. The 2023 Indictment charges YIN and ZHOU with scanning victim networks for access points and also exploiting zero-day vulnerabilities. Once inside the networks, YIN other conspirators would then install malware such as web shells to maintain persistent access. YIN and other conspirators would then use hop point servers to exfiltrate stolen data to servers under YIN’s control. ZHOU then brokered access to such stolen data to interested third parties for a financial profit. The indictment further alleged that YIN, ZHOU, and other conspirators laundered cryptocurrency payments for their operational infrastructure from locations outside of the United States through the U.S. financial system.

                The affidavit in support of the seizure warrant for the VPS account alleges that ZHOU used servers created by the account in order to establish a virtual private network (“VPN”) that would encrypt network traffic such that the true location and IP address of the actor or actors would be obfuscated. ZHOU also used the VPS accounts to create other accounts through which he communicated with buyers who were interested in obtaining access to computer networks compromised by YIN. ZHOU also used the accounts for victim reconnaissance purposes.

                The affidavit in support of the seizure of the domains alleges that funds used to purchase computer network infrastructure used in numerous victim network breaches ultimately connected to an account registered in YIN’s name, from China, using an email address and phone number belonging to YIN. Of particular note, a virtual private server account controlled by YIN was associated with the compromise at Treasury.

                This case is being investigated by the FBI’s Washington Field Office and the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) who continue to investigate malicious cyber activity associated with these defendants and threat actors and continue to notify affected victims immediately once any networks intrusions are discovered. The FBI’s Cyber Division and Department of Defense’s Cyber Crimes Center provided valuable assistance to the investigation.  Private partners from Microsoft, Volexity, Palo Alto Networks Unit 42, and Mandiant also provided valuable assistance with this investigation. The case is being prosecuted by Assistant U.S. Attorneys Jack F. Korba, and Tejpal S. Chawla, and National Security Division’s National Security Cyber Section Trial Attorney Tanner Kroeger. Paralegal Specialist Michael Watts and former Assistant U.S. Attorneys Demian Ahn and Opher Shweiki for the United States Attorney’s Office in the District of Columbia provided assistance on this case.

                An indictment is merely an allegation and a defendant is presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law.  

    MIL Security OSI –

  • MIL-OSI Security: Former Clovis CPA Pleads Guilty to Stealing Over $800,000 From a Bank

    Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) State Crime Alerts (b)

    FRESNO, Calif. — Kenneth Gould, 68, formerly of Clovis, pleaded guilty to bank larceny for stealing more than $800,000 from a bank, Acting U.S. Attorney Michele Beckwith announced today.

    According to court records, Gould was a Certified Public Accountant (CPA) and operated a payroll services company in Clovis. From October 2017 through March 2018, he initiated several fraudulent electronic payments from one of his clients’ accounts to his payroll company’s account at the bank. Gould then withdrew the money in cashier’s checks while the payments were pending. After the bank had credited the fraudulent payments to the payroll company’s account for a short period of time, it realized there were insufficient funds to cover the payments, denied the payments, and attempted to recover its money, but it was too late. Approximately $830,000 of the credited funds was already gone. Gould gave the funds to the client from whose account he initiated the fraudulent payments because he had loaned that individual money and was hopeful that the individual would pay him back. Instead, the client gambled the money away.

    This case is the product of an investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Assistant U.S. Attorney Joseph Barton is prosecuting the case.

    Gould is scheduled to be sentenced by U.S. District Judge Jennifer L. Thurston on June 2, 2025. Gould faces maximum statutory penalties of 10 years in prison and a $250,000 fine. The actual sentence, however, will be determined at the discretion of the court after consideration of any applicable statutory factors and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, which take into account a number of variables.

    MIL Security OSI –

  • MIL-OSI Security: Stockton Man Pleads Guilty for His Role in Large-Scale Methamphetamine Distribution Conspiracy

    Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) State Crime Alerts (b)

    SACRAMENTO, Calif. — Jose Manuel Ontiveros Verdugo, 39, of Stockton, pleaded guilty today to conspiring to possess and distribute methamphetamine, Acting U.S. Attorney Michele Beckwith announced.

    According to court documents, between July 2019 and December 2019, Verdugo conspired with his co-defendants and others to distribute methamphetamine both in Stockton and throughout the country. During the investigation, an undercover source bought a total of 11 pounds of methamphetamine and a half pound of heroin from this drug trafficking organization. Law enforcement interdicted the group’s shipments of 50 pounds of methamphetamine destined for Nebraska, as well as a 21‑pound shipment destined for Pennsylvania.

    This case is the product of an investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation with assistance from the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Customs and Border Protection, the Drug Enforcement Administration, Homeland Security Investigations, San Joaquin County Probation, the Stockton Police Department, and the Tracy Police Department. Assistant U.S. Attorney Adrian T. Kinsella is prosecuting the case.

    Charges are pending against co-defendants Jorge Omar Arredondo Garcia, 46, of Lodi; Gregorio Ontiveros Verdugo, 41, of Morada; Alberto Navarro Zapata, 50, of Stockton; and Wilfredo Reyes, 48, of Manteca. The charges against them are only allegations; they are presumed innocent until and unless proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

    Verdugo is scheduled to be sentenced by U.S. District Judge Dale A. Drozd on June 16, 2025. Verdugo faces a maximum statutory penalty of life in prison and a $10 million fine. The actual sentence, however, will be determined at the discretion of the court after consideration of any applicable statutory factors and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, which take into account a number of variables.

    The case was investigated under the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETF). OCDETF identifies, disrupts, and dismantles the highest-level criminal organizations that threaten the United States using a prosecutor-led, intelligence-driven, multi-agency approach. For more information, please visit Justice.gov/OCDETF. 

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  • MIL-OSI Security: Cocaine Trafficker Sentenced to 210 Months for Drug Distribution Conspiracy

    Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) State Crime Alerts (b)

    SAN DIEGO – Rodolfo Benjamin Silva, a prolific cocaine, methamphetamine, and fentanyl trafficker who called himself the “King of Coke,” was sentenced in federal court today to 17.5 years in prison for distributing large quantities of illicit drugs in the U.S. and for facilitating the movement of cartel hitmen into the United States.

    At today’s hearing, prosecutors described Silva as a long-time San Diego-based drug distributor who worked directly with Mexican counterparts to receive narcotic shipments from Mexico. According to his plea agreement, in October 2022, Silva provided a drug courier with 114 pounds of methamphetamine and a kilogram of fentanyl for transport to Indianapolis, but it was interdicted in Oklahoma.

    Silva also admitted in his plea agreement to threatening, directing or using violence as part of his drug trafficking activities. Prosecutors told the court today that Silva assisted in bringing assassins known as “sicarios” from Mexico into the San Diego area for cartel enforcement operations. On one occasion, Silva hired a sicario from Mexico to come to San Diego where that individual attempted to fatally shoot one of Silva’s rivals, prosecutors said.

    This investigation was led by FBI and DEA in San Diego with integral assistance from the U.S. Attorney’s Office in the Southern District of Indiana and FBI’s Indianapolis Field Office.

    This case is being prosecuted by Assistant U.S. Attorney Ashley Goff.

    This prosecution is part of an Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETF) Strike Force Initiative, which provides for the establishment of permanent multi-agency task force teams that work side-by-side in the same location. This co-located model enables agents from different agencies to collaborate on intelligence-driven, multi-jurisdictional operations to disrupt and dismantle the most significant drug traffickers, money launderers, gangs, and transnational criminal organizations.

    DEFENDANT                                               Case Number 23CR02513-WQH                            

    Rodolfo Benjamin Silva, aka “Rudy”            Age: 44                       San Diego, CA

    SUMMARY OF CHARGES

    Conspiracy to Distribute Cocaine – Title 21, U.S.C., Sections 841(a)(1) and 846

    Maximum penalty: Mandatory minimum 10 years and up to life in prison, $10 million fine

    INVESTIGATING AGENCIES

    Federal Bureau of Investigation

    Drug Enforcement Administration

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  • MIL-OSI Security: New York Man Who Ran Multimillion-Dollar Cryptocurrency Investment Scheme Found Guilty of Wire Fraud and Money Laundering

    Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) State Crime Alerts (b)

    SAN FRANCISCO – A federal jury convicted Douglas Jae Woo Kim, 32, of New York, New York, on 14 counts of wire fraud, international money laundering, and money laundering.  The jury reached its verdict yesterday afternoon, following a three-week trial before Senior U.S. District Judge Charles R. Breyer.  

    According to court documents and evidence presented at trial, between October 2017 and June 2020, after moving to San Francisco, Kim engaged in a scheme to defraud investors, many of whom were friends and acquaintances, of over $7 million in money and cryptocurrency by holding himself out as a legitimate trader of cryptocurrency, a form of virtual currency.  Kim falsely represented that he was seeking short-term liquidity in the form of loans or investments for cryptocurrency trading or other legitimate business purposes and promised to trade or invest the cryptocurrency provided by investors and lenders to make a profit.  He also told victims that the loans carried no or very low risk, promised high rates of return on their loans, and claimed that he had sufficient funds to personally guarantee the loans.  

    “This case may involve the new world of virtual currency, but there’s nothing new about the defendant’s scheme to defraud,” said Acting United States Attorney Patrick D. Robbins.  “Douglas Kim made bogus promise after promise to investors and lenders, only to cheat them and send their money to offshore gambling sites.  Today’s verdict sends a clear message to anyone who engages in fraud in the Northern District of California: you will be prosecuted, and you will face serious consequences.”

    “Mr. Kim deceived those who trusted him, exploiting their confidence to fund his personal gambling activities rather than the legitimate investments he offered his victims. The FBI remains committed to identifying and bringing to justice individuals who manipulate and defraud others for financial gain,” said FBI Acting Special Agent in Charge Dan Costin.

    In October 2017, Kim contacted a victim by text message and said he was looking for investors interested in making what he called a short-term loan for a “fairly modest operation.”  Kim represented that he was investing in a cryptocurrency operation in which he would make a profit from fees charged to a peer-to-peer network and from exchange transactions, and informed the victim that the operation “isn’t very risky to me.”  Within days of receiving cryptocurrency from the victim to finance the investment, Kim transferred almost all of it to bitcoin sports betting sites located outside the United States.  Kim went on to obtain over a million dollars’ worth of funds from this victim over the course of the scheme, the majority of which went to offshore sports betting sites.

    In November 2017, Kim contacted another victim by email and said he was looking for cryptocurrency for a trading strategy.  Kim assured that the victim that “my activities are fairly low risk.”  On Dec. 1, 2017, Kim obtained a cryptocurrency loan from this victim worth approximately $186,000 at the time. Once the cryptocurrency was obtained, Kim immediately sent all of it to offshore sports betting sites. In total, Kim obtained over $500,000 in funds from this victim.

    In an agreement dated Jan. 1, 2018, Kim set out the terms of a similar investment with a third victim.  The agreement called for the victim to provide cryptocurrency valued at approximately $200,000 at the time.  The same day, Kim converted more than half of the funds to bitcoin and, in the following days, transferred substantially all the converted cryptocurrency to his account with an offshore casino.  Kim went on to obtain over $4 million in funds from this victim.

    Kim defrauded numerous other victims, including nine who testified at trial, until at least July 2020, when he was charged by federal complaint.  In 2023, while he was out on pretrial release, Kim allegedly renewed his scheme to defraud.  One count related to this renewed period of fraud remains pending.  

    The jury acquitted Kim of one count of international money laundering.

    Kim is scheduled to appear on June 25, 2025, to set a date for sentencing.  He faces a maximum penalty of 20 years in prison for each count of wire fraud and international money laundering, and 10 years in prison for each count of money laundering.  Any sentence will be imposed by the Court after consideration of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and the federal statute governing the imposition of a sentence, 18 U.S.C. § 3553.  

    Assistant U.S. Attorneys Noah Stern and Maya Karwande are prosecuting the case with the assistance of Veronica Hernandez, Maryam Beros, Andy Ding, Lynette Dixon, and Christine Tian. The prosecution is the result of an investigation by the FBI and IRS Criminal Investigation. 
     

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