Category: Intelligence Agencies

MIL-OSI Security: Justice Department Charges 12 Chinese Contract Hackers and Law Enforcement Officers in Global Computer Intrusion Campaigns
Source: United States Attorneys General

Chinese Law Enforcement and Intelligence Services Leveraged China’s Reckless and Indiscriminate Hacker-for-Hire Ecosystem, Including the ‘APT 27’ Group, to Suppress Free Speech and Dissent Globally and to Steal Data from Numerous Organizations Worldwide,
Note: View the indictments in U.S. v. Wu Haibo et al., U.S. v. Yin Kecheng, U.S. v. Zhou Shuai et al. here.

The Justice Department, FBI, Naval Criminal Investigative Service, and Departments of State and the Treasury announced today their coordinated efforts to disrupt and deter the malicious cyber activities of 12 Chinese nationals, including two officers of the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) Ministry of Public Security (MPS), employees of an ostensibly private PRC company, Anxun Information Technology Co. Ltd. (安洵信息技术有限公司) also known as “i-Soon,” and members of Advanced Persistent Threat 27 (APT27).

These malicious cyber actors, acting as freelancers or as employees of i-Soon, conducted computer intrusions at the direction of the PRC’s MPS and Ministry of State Security (MSS) and on their own initiative. The MPS and MSS paid handsomely for stolen data. Victims include U.S.-based critics and dissidents of the PRC, a large religious organization in the United States, the foreign ministries of multiple governments in Asia, and U.S. federal and state government agencies, including the U.S. Department of the Treasury (Treasury) in late 2024.

“The Department of Justice will relentlessly pursue those who threaten our cybersecurity by stealing from our government and our people,” said Sue J. Bai, head of the Justice Department’s National Security Division. “Today, we are exposing the Chinese government agents directing and fostering indiscriminate and reckless attacks against computers and networks worldwide, as well as the enabling companies and individual hackers that they have unleashed. We will continue to fight to dismantle this ecosystem of cyber mercenaries and protect our national security.”

“The FBI is committed to protecting Americans from foreign cyber-attacks,” said Assistant Director Bryan Vorndran of the FBI’s Cyber Division. “Today’s announcements reveal that the Chinese Ministry of Public Security has been paying hackers-for-hire to inflict digital harm on Americans who criticize the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). To those victims who bravely came forward with evidence of intrusions, we thank you for standing tall and defending our democracy. And to those who choose to aid the CCP in its unlawful cyber activities, these charges should demonstrate that we will use all available tools to identify you, indict you, and expose your malicious activity for all the world to see.”

According to court documents, the MPS and MSS employed an extensive network of private companies and contractors in China to hack and steal information in a manner that obscured the PRC government’s involvement. In some cases, the MPS and MSS paid private hackers in China to exploit specific victims. In many other cases, the hackers targeted victims speculatively. Operating from their safe haven and motivated by profit, this network of private companies and contractors in China cast a wide net to identify vulnerable computers, exploit those computers, and then identify information that it could sell directly or indirectly to the PRC government. The result of this largely indiscriminate approach was more worldwide computer intrusion victims, more systems worldwide left vulnerable to future exploitation by third parties, and more stolen information, often of no interest to the PRC government and, therefore, sold to other third-parties. Additional information regarding the indictments and the PRC’s hacker-for-hire ecosystem is available in Public Service Announcements published by the FBI today.

U.S. v. Wu Haibo et al., Southern District of New York

Today, a federal court in Manhattan unsealed an indictment charging eight i-Soon employees and two MPS officers for their involvement, from at least in or around 2016 through in or around 2023, in the numerous and widespread hacking of email accounts, cell phones, servers, and websites. The Department also announced today the court-authorized seizure of the primary internet domain used by i-Soon to advertise its business.

“State-sponsored hacking is an acute threat to our community and national security,” said Acting U.S. Attorney Matthew Podolsky for the Southern District of New York. “For years, these 10 defendants — two of whom we allege are PRC officials — used sophisticated hacking techniques to target religious organizations, journalists, and government agencies, all to gather sensitive information for the use of the PRC. These charges will help stop these state-sponsored hackers and protect our national security. The career prosecutors of this office and our law enforcement partners will continue to uncover alleged state-sponsored hacking schemes, disrupt them, and bring those responsible to justice.”

The defendants remain at large and wanted by the FBI. Concurrent with today’s announcement, the U.S. Department of State’s Rewards for Justice (RFJ) program, administered by the Diplomatic Security Service, announced a reward of up to $10 million for information leading to the identification or location of any person who, while acting at the direction or under the control of a foreign government, engages in certain malicious cyber activities against U.S. critical infrastructure in violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. The reward is offered for the following individuals who are alleged to have worked in various capacities to direct or carry out i-Soon’s malicious cyber activity:
- Wu Haibo (吴海波), Chief Executive Officer
- Chen Cheng (陈诚), Chief Operating Officer
- Wang Zhe (王哲), Sales Director
- Liang Guodong (梁国栋), Technical Staff
- Ma Li (马丽), Technical Staff
- Wang Yan (王堰), Technical Staff
- Xu Liang (徐梁), Technical Staff
- Zhou Weiwei (周伟伟), Technical Staff
- Wang Liyu (王立宇), MPS Officer
- Sheng Jing (盛晶), MPS Officer
i-Soon and its employees, to include the defendants, generated tens of millions of dollars in revenue as a key player in the PRC’s hacker-for-hire ecosystem. In some instances, i-Soon conducted computer intrusions at the request of the MSS or MPS, including cyber-enabled transnational repression at the direction of the MPS officer defendants. In other instances, i-Soon conducted computer intrusions on its own initiative and then sold, or attempted to sell, the stolen data to at least 43 different bureaus of the MSS or MPS in at least 31 separate provinces and municipalities in China. i-Soon charged the MSS and MPS between approximately $10,000 and $75,000 for each email inbox it successfully exploited. i-Soon also trained MPS employees how to hack independently of i-Soon and offered a variety of hacking methods for sale to its customers.

The defendants’ U.S.-located targets included a large religious organization that previously sent missionaries to China and was openly critical of the PRC government and an organization focused on promoting human rights and religious freedom in China. In addition, the defendants targeted multiple news organizations in the United States, including those that have opposed the CCP or delivered uncensored news to audiences in Asia, including China and the New York State Assembly, one of whose representatives had communicated with members of a religious organization banned in China.

The defendants’ foreign-located targets included a religious leader and his office, and a Hong Kong newspaper that i-Soon considered as being opposed to the PRC government. The defendants also targeted the foreign ministries of Taiwan, India, South Korea, and Indonesia.

Assistant U.S. Attorneys Ryan B. Finkel, Steven J. Kochevar, and Kevin Mead for the Southern District of New York and Trial Attorney Gregory J. Nicosia Jr. of the National Security Division’s National Security Cyber Section are prosecuting the case.

U.S. v. Yin Kecheng and U.S. v. Zhou Shuai et al., District of Columbia

Today, a federal court unsealed two indictments charging APT27 actors Yin Kecheng (尹可成) and Zhou Shuai (周帅) also known as “Coldface” for their involvement in the multi-year, for-profit computer intrusion campaigns dating back, in the case of Yin, to 2013. The Department also announced today court-authorized seizures of internet domains and computer server accounts used by Yin and Zhou to facilitate their hacking activity.

The defendants remain at large. View the FBI’s Wanted posters for Shuai and Kecheng here.

Concurrent with today’s announcement, the Department of States State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs is announcing two reward offers under the Transnational Organized Crime Rewards Program (TOCRP) of up to $2 million each for information leading to the arrests and convictions, in any country, of malicious cyber actors Yin Kecheng and Zhou Shuai, both Chinese nationals residing in China.

“These indictments and actions show this office’s long-standing commitment to vigorously investigate and hold accountable Chinese hackers and data brokers who endanger U.S. national security and other victims across the globe,” said Interim U.S. Attorney Edward R. Martin Jr. for the District of Columbia. “The defendants in these cases have been hacking for the Chinese government for years, and these indictments lay out the strong evidence showing their criminal wrongdoing. We again demand that the Chinese government to put a stop to these brazen cyber criminals who are targeting victims across the globe and then monetizing the data they have stolen by selling it across China.”

The APT27 group to which Yin and Zhou belong is also known to private sector security researchers as “Threat Group 3390,” “Bronze Union,” “Emissary Panda,” “Lucky Mouse,” “Iron Tiger,” “UTA0178,” “UNC 5221,” and “Silk Typhoon.” As alleged in court documents, between August 2013 and December 2024, Yin, Zhou, and their co-conspirators exploited vulnerabilities in victim networks, conducted reconnaissance once inside those networks, and installed malware, such as PlugX malware, that provided persistent access. The defendants and their co-conspirators then identified and stole data from the compromised networks by exfiltrating it to servers under their control. Next, they brokered stolen data for sale and provided it to various customers, only some of whom had connections to the PRC government and military. For example, Zhou sold data stolen by Yin through i-Soon, whose primary customers, as noted above, were PRC government agencies, including the MSS and the MPS.

The defendants’ motivations were financial and, because they were profit-driven, they targeted broadly, rendering victim systems vulnerable well beyond their pilfering of data and other information that they could sell. Between them, Yin and Zhou sought to profit from the hacking of numerous U.S.-based technology companies, think tanks, law firms, defense contractors, local governments, health care systems, and universities, leaving behind them a wake of millions of dollars in damages.

The documents related to the seizure warrants, also unsealed today, further allege that Yin and Zhou continued to engage in hacking activity, including Yin’s involvement in the recently announced hack of Treasury between approximately September and December 2024. Virtual private servers used to conduct the Treasury intrusion belonged to, and were controlled by, an account that Yin and his co-conspirators established. Yin and his co-conspirators used that same account and other linked accounts they controlled to lease servers used for additional malicious cyber activity. The seizure warrant unsealed today allowed the FBI to seize the virtual private servers and other infrastructure used by the defendants to perpetrate these crimes.

On Jan. 17, Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) announced sanctions against Yin for his role in hacking that agency between September and December 2024. Concurrent with today’s indictments, OFAC also announced sanctions on Zhou and Shanghai Heiying Information Technology Company Ltd., a company operated by Zhou for purposes of his hacking activity.

Private sector partners are also taking voluntary actions to raise awareness and strengthen defenses against the PRC’s malicious cyber activity. Today, Microsoft published research that highlights its unique, updated insights into Silk Typhoon tactics, techniques, and procedures specifically its targeting of the IT supply chain.

Assistant U.S. Attorneys Jack F. Korba and Tejpal S. Chawla for the District of Columbia and Trial Attorney Tanner Kroeger of the National Security Division’s National Security Cyber Section are prosecuting the case.

***

The above disruptive actions targeting PRC malicious cyber activities were the result of investigations conducted by FBI New York and Washington Field Offices, FBI Cyber Division, the Naval Criminal Investigative Service. The U.S. Attorney’s Offices for the Southern District of New York and District of Columbia and the National Security Division’s National Security Cyber Section are prosecuting the case.

The Department acknowledges the value of public-private partnerships in combating advanced cyber threats and recognizes Microsoft, Volexity, PwC, and Mandiant for their valuable assistance in these investigations.

The details in the above-described indictments and warrants are merely allegations. All defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law.
MIL Security OSI –
March 6, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Former Alabama Police Officer Pleads Guilty to Federal Civil Rights Violation and Child Sexual Exploitation

Source: US State Government of Utah

A former Killen, Alabama, Police Department officer pleaded guilty yesterday for sexually assaulting a woman while on duty and for receiving sexually explicit photos of a minor.

As part of the plea agreement, Jarrod Gailen Webster admitted that, on Nov. 12, 2023, he violated the civil rights of a woman after initiating a traffic stop on the woman’s vehicle. Webster asked the woman to step out of her vehicle and he asked her what she wanted to do to “get out of this.” When the woman told Webster that she was not going to do anything for him, Webster handcuffed the woman and sexually assaulted her.

Further, Webster admitted that, between June 2016 and October 2018, he communicated with a minor by phone. Webster asked the minor to produce and send him sexually explicit images of herself. The minor victim sent multiple photos to Webster at his request, at least one of which constituted child sexual abuse material (CSAM).

“Jarrod Webster took an oath to protect and serve citizens of his community. He violated that oath when he sexually assaulted a woman and exploited a minor to produce and send sexually explicit images,” said U.S. Attorney Prim F. Escalona for the Northern District of Alabama. “We will continue to work with our law enforcement partners to ensure that those who violate positions of public trust are held accountable for their actions.”

“Police officers are given immense trust and responsibility to serve and protect, and are therefore held to a higher standard, so there are serious consequences when one tarnishes the badge by breaking the law,” said Special Agent in Charge Carlton Peeples of the FBI Birmingham Field Office. “Jarrod Gailen Webster disgraced the uniform when he abused his authority, his sentencing affirms that the FBI has zero tolerance for officials who prey on the citizens they have sworn to protect.”

Webster pleaded guilty to one count of deprivation of rights under color of law and one count of sexual exploitation of children. He is scheduled to be sentenced on May 20.

Webster faces a maximum penalty of life in prison, five years of supervised release, and a fine of up to $250,000 for the count of deprivation of rights under color of law. He faces a mandatory minimum penalty of 15 years and maximum penalty of 30 years in prison, supervised release for life, and a fine of up to $250,000 for the count of sexual exploitation of children. A federal district court judge will determine any sentence after considering the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors.

The FBI Birmingham Field Office investigated the case.

Assistant U.S. Attorney Michael Royster for the Northern District of Alabama and Senior Sex Crimes Counsel Maura White and Trial Attorney Sarah Howard of the Civil Rights Division’s Criminal Section are prosecuting the case.

MIL OSI USA News –

March 6, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: Former Alabama Police Officer Pleads Guilty to Federal Civil Rights Violation and Child Sexual Exploitation

Source: Office of United States Attorneys

A former Killen, Alabama, Police Department officer pleaded guilty yesterday for sexually assaulting a woman while on duty and for receiving sexually explicit photos of a minor.

As part of the plea agreement, Jarrod Gailen Webster admitted that, on Nov. 12, 2023, he violated the civil rights of a woman after initiating a traffic stop on the woman’s vehicle. Webster asked the woman to step out of her vehicle and he asked her what she wanted to do to “get out of this.” When the woman told Webster that she was not going to do anything for him, Webster handcuffed the woman and sexually assaulted her.

Further, Webster admitted that, between June 2016 and October 2018, he communicated with a minor by phone. Webster asked the minor to produce and send him sexually explicit images of herself. The minor victim sent multiple photos to Webster at his request, at least one of which constituted child sexual abuse material (CSAM).

“Jarrod Webster took an oath to protect and serve citizens of his community. He violated that oath when he sexually assaulted a woman and exploited a minor to produce and send sexually explicit images,” said U.S. Attorney Prim F. Escalona for the Northern District of Alabama. “We will continue to work with our law enforcement partners to ensure that those who violate positions of public trust are held accountable for their actions.”

“Police officers are given immense trust and responsibility to serve and protect, and are therefore held to a higher standard, so there are serious consequences when one tarnishes the badge by breaking the law,” said Special Agent in Charge Carlton Peeples of the FBI Birmingham Field Office. “Jarrod Gailen Webster disgraced the uniform when he abused his authority, his sentencing affirms that the FBI has zero tolerance for officials who prey on the citizens they have sworn to protect.”

Webster pleaded guilty to one count of deprivation of rights under color of law and one count of sexual exploitation of children. He is scheduled to be sentenced on May 20.

Webster faces a maximum penalty of life in prison, five years of supervised release, and a fine of up to $250,000 for the count of deprivation of rights under color of law. He faces a mandatory minimum penalty of 15 years and maximum penalty of 30 years in prison, supervised release for life, and a fine of up to $250,000 for the count of sexual exploitation of children. A federal district court judge will determine any sentence after considering the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors.

The FBI Birmingham Field Office investigated the case.

Assistant U.S. Attorney Michael Royster for the Northern District of Alabama and Senior Sex Crimes Counsel Maura White and Trial Attorney Sarah Howard of the Civil Rights Division’s Criminal Section are prosecuting the case.

MIL Security OSI –

March 6, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: Eielson Airman Sentenced to Five Years for Possessing Child Pornography

Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) State Crime News

FAIRBANKS, Alaska – An Eielson Airman was sentenced today to five years in prison and will serve 15 years on supervised release for paying to receive child pornography.

According to court documents, on Nov. 7, 2023, Kyle Cozens, 32, who was stationed on Eielson Air Force Base, was interviewed by the FBI in a related case from Illinois involving child sexual abuse material (CSAM). Cozens allowed agents to review messages on his phone and they observed CSAM images of a known victim. Agents obtained a search warrant for Cozens’ phone and discovered he was communicating with individuals on messaging apps and buying CSAM images from them. Agents discovered multiple CSAM images and videos on his phone, with some visuals depicting prepubescent females.

On March 1, 2024, law enforcement searched Cozens’ residence and seized over 30 electronic devices. To date, law enforcement has identified over 80 videos and over 680 images depicting child sexual abuse on Cozens’ devices.

On Nov. 15, 2024, Cozens pleaded guilty to one count of receipt of child pornography. In addition to prison time and supervised release, Cozens is required to register as a sex offender upon release from prison as part of his sentence.

“The widespread dissemination of images of children forced to endure sexual abuse is a horrific crime that law enforcement fights every day. Mr. Cozens contributed to the revictimization of those children by paying for visuals of child sexual abuse,” said First Assistant U.S. Attorney Kathryn R. Vogel for the District of Alaska. “My office will continue to protect our most vulnerable by partnering with law enforcement to find and prosecute anyone who targets children for nefarious purposes.”

“The defendant purchased and possessed large amounts of CSAM, directly contributing to online child exploitation and the re-victimization of young children,” said Special Agent in Charge Rebecca Day of the FBI Anchorage Field Office. “This sentencing underscores the FBI’s commitment to ensuring child predators are identified and held accountable for their crimes against children.”

“Interagency partnerships, like the ones utilized in this case, are vital to fighting child exploitation,” said Special Agent Tyler Pierson, Air Force Office of Special Investigations Detachment 632. “AFOSI is committed to these partnerships and our mission of protecting the Department of the Air Force from criminal behavior that threatens the mission, equipment and people of the Department.”

The FBI Anchorage Field Office, Fairbanks Resident Agency, and U.S. Air Force Office of Special Investigations investigated the case, with assistance from the FBI Springfield Field Office.

Assistant U.S. Attorney Carly Vosacek prosecuted the case.

This case was brought as part of Project Safe Childhood, a nationwide initiative to combat the growing epidemic of child sexual exploitation and abuse launched in May 2006 by the Department of Justice. Led by U.S. Attorneys’ Offices and CEOS, Project Safe Childhood marshals federal, state, and local resources to better locate, apprehend and prosecute individuals who exploit children via the Internet, as well as to identify and rescue victims. For more information about Project Safe Childhood, please visit https://www.justice.gov/psc.

###

MIL Security OSI –

March 6, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Florida Dentist Sentenced for Threatening Public Figures and an Election Official

Source: US State of Vermont

A Florida dentist was sentenced yesterday to two years in prison for threatening public figures, an election official, and others between 2019 and 2024.

According to court documents, from September 2019 to July 2020, Richard Glenn Kantwill, 61, of Tampa, sent over 100 threats via Facebook and Instagram messages, email, and text to various public figures based on their political commentary. As charged in the superseding information, those communications included threats to an author, a religious figure, and a television personality. Kantwill also sent at least seven additional threats to four public figures via Facebook from April 2022 to April 2024, including a threat to an election official in another state in February 2024.

Kantwill pleaded guilty in November 2024 to four counts of interstate transmission of a threat.

Supervisory Official Antoinette T. Bacon of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division, Acting U.S. Attorney Sara C. Sweeney for the Middle District of Florida, and Special Agent in Charge Matthew Fodor of the FBI Tampa Field Office made the announcement.

The FBI investigated the case.

Trial Attorney Aaron L. Jennen of the Criminal Division’s Public Integrity Section and Assistant U.S. Attorney Abigail K. King for the Middle District of Florida prosecuted the case, with assistance from the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Colorado.

MIL OSI USA News –

March 6, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: Two Venezuelan Gang Members Arrested, Charged with Bank Theft and Conspiracy

Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) State Crime News

BUFFALO, N.Y. –U.S. Attorney Michael DiGiacomo announced today that David Jose Gomez Cegarra, 24, and Jesus Segundo Hernandez-Gil, 19, both of Venezuela, were arrested and charged by criminal complaint with bank theft and conspiracy to commit bank theft. The charges carry a maximum penalty of ten years in prison.

Assistant U.S. Attorneys Jeffrey E. Intravatola and Douglas A.C. Penrose, who are handling the case, stated that the defendants are members of the Tren de Aragua Gang, which has been designated by the White House as a Global Terrorist Organization. They are accused of participating in an ATM Jackpotting scheme. ATM Jackpotting involves removing an ATM’s cover and infecting the ATMs hard drive with malware or removing the hard drive and replacing it with an infected hard drive, which allows the operator to assume control of the ATM and cause it to dispense currency.

According to the complaint, Gomez-Cegarra, Hernandez-Gil, and other co-conspirators successfully completed an ATM Jackpotting scheme at a Radius Federal Credit Union in Kenmore, NY, on October 5, 2024. Video surveillance shows that at approximately 4:05 p.m., a vehicle, driven by Gomez-Cegarra, approached the drive-up ATM, a co-conspirator exited the vehicle and opened the ATM utilizing a key, appeared to install something in the ATM, pressed buttons, and closed the ATM. The vehicle then left the area. Over the next several hours, the vehicle re-appeared multiple times at the ATM and conducted illegal withdrawals. Radius Federal Credit Union reported that $110,440.00 was stolen from the ATM during this ATM Jackpotting event.

Gomez-Cegarra, Hernandez-Gil, and other co-conspirators are also believed to be responsible for ATM Jackpotting events St. Maly’s Federal Credit Union in Framingham, Massachusetts, on October 6, 2024, at First National Bank of Dryden in Dryden, NY, on October 17, 2024, and at two Community First Bank locations in Mount Vernon, Illinois, on November 11, 2024. During these events, approximately $187,000 was reported stolen.

On November 11, 2024, the Mahomet, Illinois Police Department stopped Gomez-Cegarra and Hernandez-Gil in a vehicle together for suspicious activity. Both men presented Venezuelan identifications. They were arrested by the Mahomet Police Department, and ultimately charged by the Mount Vernon Police Department in relation to the incidents that occurred at the Community First Bank locations in Mount Vernon, IL.

The complaint is the result of an investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, under the direction of Special Agent-in-Charge Matthew Miraglia, the Kenmore Police Department, under the direction of Chief Thomas Phillips, the Homer, NY, Police Department, under the direction of Chief Robert Pitman, the Framingham, MA, Police Department, under the direction of Chief Lester Baker, and the Mahomet, Illinois, Police Department.

The fact that a defendant has been charged with a crime is merely an accusation and the defendant is presumed innocent until and unless proven guilty.

# # # #

MIL Security OSI –

March 6, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: Florida Dentist Sentenced for Threatening Public Figures and an Election Official

Source: United States Attorneys General 1

A Florida dentist was sentenced yesterday to two years in prison for threatening public figures, an election official, and others between 2019 and 2024.

According to court documents, from September 2019 to July 2020, Richard Glenn Kantwill, 61, of Tampa, sent over 100 threats via Facebook and Instagram messages, email, and text to various public figures based on their political commentary. As charged in the superseding information, those communications included threats to an author, a religious figure, and a television personality. Kantwill also sent at least seven additional threats to four public figures via Facebook from April 2022 to April 2024, including a threat to an election official in another state in February 2024.

Kantwill pleaded guilty in November 2024 to four counts of interstate transmission of a threat.

Supervisory Official Antoinette T. Bacon of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division, Acting U.S. Attorney Sara C. Sweeney for the Middle District of Florida, and Special Agent in Charge Matthew Fodor of the FBI Tampa Field Office made the announcement.

The FBI investigated the case.

Trial Attorney Aaron L. Jennen of the Criminal Division’s Public Integrity Section and Assistant U.S. Attorney Abigail K. King for the Middle District of Florida prosecuted the case, with assistance from the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Colorado.

MIL Security OSI –

March 6, 2025
MIL-OSI: Siili Solutions Plc – Managers’ Transactions – Pienimäki

Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

Siili Solutions Plc – Managers’ Transactions – Pienimäki

Siili Solutions Plc Stock Exchange Release 5 March 2025 at 14:00 EET

____________________________________________

Person subject to the notification requirement

Name: Pienimäki, Tomi

Position: Chief Executive Officer

Issuer: Siili Solutions Plc

LEI: 7437003WYXJUSV27Q316

Notification type: INITIAL NOTIFICATION

Reference number: 7437003WYXJUSV27Q316_20250304130136_93

____________________________________________

Transaction date: 2025-03-04

Venue not applicable

Instrument type: FINANCIAL INSTRUMENT LINKED TO A SHARE OR A DEBT INSTRUMENT

Instrument name: Option 2024A

Nature of the transaction: ACCEPTANCE OF A STOCK OPTION

(X) Linked to stock option programme

Transaction details

(1): Volume: 406 Unit price: 0.00 EUR

Aggregated transactions

(1): Volume: 406 Volume weighted average price: 0.00 EUR

The MIL Network –

March 6, 2025

MIL-OSI: NuVista Energy Ltd. Announces Record Year End 2024 Reserves, Financial and Operating Results

Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

CALGARY, Alberta, March 05, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — NuVista Energy Ltd. (“NuVista” or the “Company“) (TSX: NVA) is pleased to announce record-setting reserves and strong financial and operating results for the three months and year ended December 31, 2024. The repeatable, predictable and profitable nature of our assets have once again underpinned significant growth in our reserves. Continued success in the Lower Montney and sanctioning of our Gold Creek area expansion have set the stage for continued growth toward 125,000 Boe/d. We are entering 2025 in a strong financial position with operational momentum and a commitment to shareholder returns. We are pleased to reaffirm our annual capital and production guidance for the year.

Operational and Financial Highlights

During the fourth quarter and year ended December 31, 2024, NuVista:

Produced an average of 85,635 Boe/d in the fourth quarter, exceeding our guidance range of 83,000 – 84,000 Boe/d. We achieved our highest-ever annual average production of 83,084 Boe/d, an 8% increase from 2023. Annual production composition aligned with guidance, with a volume weighting of 30% condensate, 9% NGLs and 61% natural gas;

Successfully executed a capital expenditure⁽²⁾ program, investing $498.9 million in well and facility activities, including the drilling of 43 wells and the completion of 38 wells throughout the year. Fourth quarter, capital expenditures totaled $71.1 million, with 9 wells drilled;

Delivered annual adjusted funds flow⁽¹⁾ of $552.2 million ($2.68/share, basic⁽³⁾), with adjusted funds flow from the fourth quarter contributing $137.1 million ($0.67/share, basic);

Generated free adjusted funds flow⁽²⁾ of $39.6 million for the year ($0.19/share, basic⁽³⁾);

Repurchased and cancelled 5.9 million common shares in 2024 at an average price of $12.52 per common share, for a total cost of $74.4 million. Since the inception of the Company’s normal course issuer bid (“NCIB”) in 2022, we have repurchased and cancelled 36.5 million common shares for an aggregate cost of $438.3 million or $12.01 per share;

Exited the year with $5.4 million drawn on our $450 million credit facility and net debt⁽¹⁾ of $232.5 million, maintaining a favorable net debt to annualized fourth quarter adjusted funds flow⁽¹⁾ ratio of 0.4x;

Achieved annual net earnings of $305.7 million ($1.48/share, basic), including $99.2 million ($0.48/share, basic) in the fourth quarter;

Added LNG sales to our natural gas diversification portfolio by gaining exposure to the Japan/Korea marker (“JKM”) through a netback agreement with Trafigura based on 21,000 MMbtu/d of LNG for a period of up to thirteen years commencing January 1, 2027; and

Recognized as part of the TSX30 for the third consecutive year. The TSX30 recognizes the thirty top-performing companies on the Toronto Stock Exchange (“TSX”) over the prior three-year period (see www.tsx.com/tsx30). We ranked a notable sixth place overall.

Notes:

(1)	Each of “adjusted funds flow”, “net debt” and “net debt to annualized fourth quarter adjusted funds flow” are capital management measures. Reference should be made to the section entitled “Non-GAAP and Other Financial Measures” in this press release.
(2)	Each of “free adjusted funds flow” and “capital expenditures” are non-GAAP financial measures that do not have any standardized meanings under IFRS Accounting Standards and therefore may not be comparable to similar measures presented by other companies where similar terminology is used. Reference should be made to the section entitled “Non-GAAP and Other Financial Measures” in this press release.
(3)	Each of “adjusted funds flow per share” and “free adjusted funds flow per share” are supplementary financial measures. Reference should be made to the section entitled “Non-GAAP and Other Financial Measures” in this press release.

Significant Profitable and Repeatable Reserves Growth

NuVista is pleased to announce the results of our year end 2024 independent reserves evaluation conducted by GLJ Ltd. (“GLJ”) effective as at December 31, 2024 (the “GLJ Report”). NuVista’s proven track record of continuous improvement, along with the substantial depth and quality of our undeveloped resources, reinforces our ability to deliver sustained shareholder returns in our journey to 125,000 Boe/d.

Our GLJ Report includes the following key accomplishments:

Reported Proved Developed Producing (“PDP”) reserves of 177.3 MMBoe, a year-over-year increase of 9%, or a 12% increase on a per share basis, driven by a successful 2024 development program and 2% positive technical revisions due to new well outperformance;

Recorded Total Proved plus Probable (“TP+PA”) reserves of 779.7 MMBoe, a year-over-year increase of 21%, or a 24% increase on a per share basis, attributed to the continued success in NuVista’s multi-layer Montney development in Pipestone and successful Lower and Upper Montney delineation in Wapiti;

Replaced 150% and 550% of 2024 production on a PDP and TP+PA basis⁽¹⁾, respectively, reflecting the success of our 2024 capital program and continued expansion of our undeveloped location inventory;

Delivered PDP Finding, Development and Acquisition Cost (“FD&A”)⁽¹⁾ of $11.13/Boe that exceeded our expectations due to well outperformance and cost reductions;

Achieved a PDP recycle ratio⁽¹⁾ of 1.8x based on our 2024 operating netback⁽¹⁾;

TP+PA FD&A was $6.97/Boe, driven by the planned expansion of our infrastructure to 125,000 Boe/d and a 26% increase in undeveloped TP+PA drilling locations;

Total developed wells increased by 42 to 395, while the total undeveloped drilling locations increased by 9 to 1,189, which reflects over 25 years of development at the current pace⁽³⁾; and

PDP, TP, and TP+PA before-tax net present value, discounted at 10% (NPV10)⁽²⁾, are $10.01, $20.56, and $30.11 per share, respectively, at December 31, 2024, reflecting the underlying value of our assets.

Notes:

(1)	Each of “reserve replacement”, “FD&A costs”, “recycle ratio” and “operating netback” are non-GAAP financial ratios. See “Oil and Gas Advisories” and “Non-GAAP and Other Financial Measures” in this press release for information relating to these specified financial measures.
(2)	Reference to “net present value per share” is a supplementary financial measure. Reference should be made to the section entitled “Non-GAAP and Other Financial Measures” in this press release.
(3)	Total undeveloped locations include 422 undeveloped proved plus probable drilling locations and 767 undeveloped contingent resource drilling locations. See “Oil and Gas Advisories”.

The detailed summary of our year end 2024 reserves disclosure and other oil and gas information is included below, and further information will be included in our Annual Information Form which will be filed on or before March 28, 2025 on SEDAR+ at www.sedarplus.ca.

Return of Capital to Shareholders and Balance Sheet Strength

NuVista’s approach to capital allocation is focused on the compounding effect of absolute growth and a reduction in our outstanding common shares to produce industry leading total returns. We intend to allocate a minimum of $100 million in 2025, to the repurchase of the Company’s common shares pursuant to our NCIB and will allocate at least 75% of any incremental free adjusted funds flow towards additional share repurchases.

We ended the year in a position of low debt and significant financial flexibility. As at December 31, 2024, our net debt was $232.5 million, well below our soft ceiling of approximately $350 million. We were minimally drawn on our $450 million covenant-based credit facility, at $5.4 million, with a net debt to annualized fourth quarter adjusted funds flow ratio of 0.4x. The net debt soft ceiling ensures that based on current production levels, our net debt to adjusted funds flow ratio remains at or below 1.0x in a stress test price environment of US$45/Bbl WTI and US$2.00/MMBtu NYMEX.

We remain focused on our disciplined and value-adding growth strategy, and providing significant shareholder returns. We continue to view share repurchases as the most effective initial method of returning capital to shareholders and will reassess this approach as our growth plan progresses.

Operations and 2025 Guidance

Operations through the end of the year and into the first quarter of 2025 have progressed well. Consistent utilization of our two drilling rigs continues to pay dividends with new spud to rig release records being set. Completion operations kicked off again in January and despite extremely frigid temperatures, pumping efficiency has come in better than planned. With strong execution thus far in 2025 capital costs are trending below budget and we are forecasting a well cost reduction of 3% year-over-year.

In Wapiti, we brought on a 5-well pad in Bilbo in January, which targeted three benches, including a Lower Montney, initial results from the pad are encouraging and in-line with expectations. We have finished drilling a 5-well pad in Elmworth, which is slated to come on-stream during the second quarter. In Gold Creek we are drilling a 4-well pad, including two Lower Montney wells, which is expected to come on-stream later in the second quarter. Notably, the 6-well pad between Gold Creek and Elmworth, which was co-developed across the entire stack of 4 zones, has reached its IP90 milestone producing on average 1,500 Boe/d per well, including 33% condensate. Importantly, the Lower Montney has performed in-line with the other benches. In Pipestone, we are completing a 14-well pad that is expected to come on-stream in the second quarter. Additionally, we are drilling an 8-well pad that is expected to come on-stream in the third quarter.

Production in January and February has been trending favorably, we forecast first quarter production to average 87,000 – 88,000 Boe/d. As exhibited above we have material production additions slated to come on-line in the coming months. As previously communicated, the majority of our 2025 growth will come from the Pipestone area with the start-up of a third-party gas plant (“Pipestone Plant”), which is expected to be online during the second quarter. The Pipestone Plant will unlock approximately 8,000 – 10,000 Boe/d of additional productive capacity for NuVista. Given the performance of our base assets and current outlook, we anticipate our annual production to average approximately 92,000 Boe/d, assuming a second quarter start-up of the Pipestone Plant. If this start-up is delayed into the fourth quarter of the year, our expected annual average production will be approximately 88,000 Boe/d. Consequently, this range allows us to reiterate our annual production guidance of approximately 90,000 Boe/d.

Further we reaffirm our annual capital expenditure guidance target of approximately $450 million, which will allow us to continue to prioritize at least a triple-digit return of capital to shareholders through the repurchase of our outstanding common shares.

We are fortunate that our business has the flexibility, superior asset quality and underlying balance sheet strength to afford this. We intend to continue our track record of carefully directing free adjusted funds flow towards a prudent balance of capital return to shareholders and debt reduction, while investing in high return growth projects. NuVista’s top quality asset base, deep inventory, and management’s relentless focus on value maximization supports our medium-term plans for value-adding growth to the plateau level of 125,000 Boe/d. We will continue to closely monitor and adjust to the environment to maximize the value of our asset base and ensure the long-term sustainability of our business. We would like to thank our staff, contractors, and suppliers for their continued dedication and delivery, and we thank our Board of Directors and our shareholders for their continued guidance and support.

The 2025 guidance does not include any potential impact of tariffs or trade-related regulations that have been announced by the U.S. and Canada, including the tariffs imposed by the U.S. on Canada effective March 4, 2025. See “Advisory regarding forward-looking information and statements”. Please note that our corporate presentation will be available at www.nuvistaenergy.com on March 5, 2025. NuVista’s audited financial statements, notes to the financial statements and management’s discussion and analysis for the year ended December 31, 2024, will be filed on SEDAR+ (www.sedarplus.ca) on March 5, 2025 and can also be obtained at www.nuvistaenergy.com.


FINANCIAL AND OPERATING HIGHLIGHTS
	Three months ended December 31						Year ended December 31
($ thousands, except otherwise stated)	2024		2023		% Change		2024		2023		% Change
FINANCIAL
Petroleum and natural gas revenues	281,454		365,497		(23	)	1,215,234		1,398,097		(13	)
Cash provided by operating activities	135,831		211,761		(36	)	600,253		721,342		(17	)
Adjusted funds flow ⁽³⁾⁽⁷⁾	137,059		201,987		(32	)	552,196		756,943		(27	)
Per share, basic ⁽⁶⁾	0.67		0.95		(29	)	2.68		3.50		(23	)
Per share, diluted ⁽⁶⁾	0.66		0.93		(29	)	2.64		3.40		(22	)
Net earnings	99,152		89,513		11		305,718		367,678		(17	)
Per share, basic	0.48		0.42		14		1.48		1.70		(13	)
Per share, diluted	0.48		0.41		17		1.46		1.65		(12	)
Total assets							3,450,419		3,058,053		13
Net capital expenditures ⁽¹⁾	71,090		113,258		(37	)	498,876		518,294		(4	)
Net debt ⁽³⁾							232,503		183,551		27
OPERATING
Daily Production
Natural gas (MMcf/d)	327.1		310.5		5		304.3		276.0		10
Condensate (Bbls/d)	22,657		26,889		(16	)	24,709		24,633		—
NGLs (Bbls/d)	8,455		7,287		16		7,661		6,545		17
Total (Boe/d)	85,635		85,924		—		83,084		77,185		8
Condensate & NGLs weighting	36	%	40	%			39	%	40	%
Condensate weighting ⁽⁸⁾	26	%	31	%			30	%	32	%
Average realized selling prices ⁽⁵⁾
Natural gas ($/Mcf)	2.78		3.45		(19	)	2.51		4.19		(40	)
Condensate ($/Bbl)	83.58		99.20		(16	)	94.83		100.02		(5	)
NGLs ($/Bbl) ⁽⁴⁾	30.38		32.46		(6	)	27.86		31.80		(12	)
Netbacks ($/Boe)
Petroleum and natural gas revenues ⁽⁷⁾	35.72		46.24		(23	)	39.96		49.62		(19	)
Realized gain on financial derivatives	1.75		0.46		280		0.86		0.41		110
Other income	0.01		—		—		0.11		—		—
Royalties ⁽⁷⁾	(3.13	)	(4.50	)	(30	)	(4.30	)	(4.80	)	(10	)
Transportation expense	(4.57	)	(4.54	)	1		(4.78	)	(4.77	)	—
Net operating expense ⁽²⁾	(11.07	)	(10.65	)	4		(11.37	)	(11.40	)	—
Operating netback ⁽²⁾	18.71		27.01		(31	)	20.48		29.06		(30	)
Corporate netback ⁽²⁾	17.40		25.55		(32	)	18.15		26.86		(32	)
SHARE TRADING STATISTICS
High ($/share)	14.18		13.72		3		14.86		13.72		8
Low ($/share)	10.34		10.40		(1	)	9.59		9.93		(3	)
Close ($/share)	13.82		11.04		25		13.82		11.04		25
Common shares outstanding (thousands of shares)							203,701		207,584		(2	)

NOTES:

⁽¹⁾	Non-GAAP financial measure that does not have any standardized meaning under IFRS Accounting Standards and therefore may not be comparable to similar measures presented by other companies where similar terminology is used. Reference should be made to the section entitled “Specified Financial Measures”.
⁽²⁾	Non-GAAP ratio that does not have any standardized meaning under IFRS Accounting Standards and therefore may not be comparable to similar measures presented by other companies where similar terminology is used. Reference should be made to the section entitled “Specified Financial Measures”.
⁽³⁾	Capital management measure. Reference should be made to the section entitled “Specified Financial Measures”.
⁽⁴⁾	Natural gas liquids (“NGLs”) includes butane, propane and ethane revenue and sales volumes, and sulphur revenue.
⁽⁵⁾	Product prices exclude realized gains/losses on financial derivatives.
⁽⁶⁾	Supplementary financial measure. Reference should be made to the section entitled “Specified Financial Measures”.
⁽⁷⁾	Includes the impact of a facility allocation adjustment, which impacted condensate revenues, royalties and transportation expense, reducing adjusted funds flow by $23.1 million for the three months and year ended December 31, 2024.
⁽⁸⁾	Includes the impact of a facility allocation adjustment. Excluding this adjustment, NuVista’s condensate weighting for the three months ended December 31, 2024 was 28%.

DETAILED SUMMARY OF CORPORATE RESERVES DATA

The following table provides summary reserve information based upon the GLJ Report using the published 3 Consultants’ Average January 1, 2025 price forecast:

	Natural Gas⁽²⁾	Natural Gas Liquids⁽⁴⁾	Oil⁽³⁾	Total
Reserves category⁽¹⁾⁽⁵⁾	Company Gross	Company Gross	Company Gross	Company Gross
	(MMcf)	(MBbls)	(MBbls)	(MBoe)
Proved
Developed producing	680,168	63,913	–	177,275
Developed non‑producing	93,825	10,140	–	25,777
Undeveloped	938,058	86,693	–	243,036
Total proved	1,712,051	160,747	–	446,088
Total probable	1,313,477	114,729	–	333,642
Total proved plus probable	3,025,528	275,475	–	779,730

NOTES:

⁽¹⁾	Numbers may not add due to rounding.
⁽²⁾	Includes conventional natural gas and shale gas.
⁽³⁾	Includes light and medium crude oil.
⁽⁴⁾	NGLs includes ethane, propane, butane, condensate and pentane plus.
⁽⁵⁾	Reserves have been presented on gross basis which are the Company’s total working interest share before the deduction of any royalties and without including any royalty interests of the Company.

The following table is a summary reconciliation of the year end working interest reserves for 2024, with the year end working interest reserves for 2023:

Company Gross	Natural Gas⁽¹⁾⁽³⁾ (MMcf)		Natural Gas Liquids⁽¹⁾⁽⁵⁾ (MBbls)		Oil⁽¹⁾⁽⁴⁾ (MBbls)		Total Oil Equivalent⁽¹⁾ (MBoe)
Total proved
Balance, December 31, 2023	1,546,471		144,132		–		401,877
Exploration and development⁽²⁾	234,672		24,335		–		63,447
Technical revisions	30,118		2,912		11		7,942
Acquisitions	18,123		1,720		–		4,741
Dispositions	(156	)	(18	)	–		(44	)
Economic Factors	(5,809	)	(498	)	–		(1,466	)
Production	(111,368	)	(11,837	)	(11	)	(30,409	)
Balance, December 31, 2024	1,712,051		160,747		–		446,088
Total proved plus probable
Balance, December 31, 2023	2,505,894		225,374		–		643,023
Exploration and development⁽²⁾	597,808		57,452		–		157,087
Technical revisions	12,434		2,496		11		4,579
Acquisitions	22,817		2,161		–		5,964
Dispositions	(201	)	(22	)	–		(56	)
Economic Factors	(1,857	)	(148	)	–		(458	)
Production	(111,368	)	(11,837	)	(11	)	(30,409	)
Balance, December 31, 2024	3,025,528		275,475		–		779,730

NOTES:

⁽¹⁾	Numbers may not add due to rounding.
⁽²⁾	Reserve additions for drilling extensions, infill drilling and improved recovery.
⁽³⁾	Includes conventional natural gas and shale gas.
⁽⁴⁾	Includes light and medium crude oil.
⁽⁵⁾	NGLs includes ethane, propane, butane, condensate and pentane plus.

The following table summarizes the future development capital required to bring undeveloped reserves and proved plus probable undeveloped reserves on production:

($ thousands, undiscounted)	Proved Producing⁽¹⁾	Proved⁽¹⁾	Proved plus Probable⁽¹⁾
2025	10,000	270,190	283,615
2026	–	441,337	441,337
2027	–	378,915	378,915
2028	–	582,820	623,529
2029	–	210,425	385,690
Remaining	–	–	1,205,057
Total (undiscounted)	10,000	1,883,686	3,318,141

NOTE:

⁽¹⁾	Numbers may not add due to rounding.

The following table outlines NuVista’s corporate finding, development and acquisition (“FD&A”) costs in more detail:

	3 Year-Average ⁽¹⁾				2024 ⁽¹⁾				2023 ⁽¹⁾
			Proved plus				Proved plus				Proved plus
	Proved		probable		Proved		probable		Proved		probable
Finding and development costs ($/Boe)	$	10.06	$	8.69	$	9.28	$	7.18	$	10.92	$	12.59
Finding, development and acquisition costs ($/Boe)	$	9.95	$	8.60	$	8.79	$	6.97	$	11.12	$	12.86

NOTE:

⁽¹⁾

F&D costs and FD&A are used as a measure of capital efficiency. The calculation for F&D costs includes all exploration and development capital for that period as outlined in the Company’s year-end financial statements plus the change in future development capital for that period. This total capital including the change in the future development capital is then divided by the change in reserves for that period including revisions for that same period. The aggregate of the exploration and development costs incurred in the most recent financial year and the change during the year in estimated future development costs generally will not reflect total finding and development costs related to reserve additions for the year. FD&A costs are calculated in the same manner except in addition to exploration and development capital and the change in future development capital, acquisition capital (net of any disposition proceeds) is also included in the calculation.

Summary of Corporate Net Present Value Data of Future Net Revenue

The estimated net present values of future net revenue before income taxes associated with NuVista’s reserves effective December 31, 2024 and based on the published 3 Consultants’ Average price forecast as at January 1, 2025 as set forth below, are summarized in the following table:

	Before Income Taxes
	Discount Factor (%/year)
Reserves category ⁽¹⁾⁽²⁾ ($ thousands)	0%	5%	10%	15%	20%
Proved
Developed producing	3,311,450	2,531,022	2,038,337	1,715,462	1,491,640
Developed non‑producing	589,610	437,020	350,631	295,990	258,256
Undeveloped	4,450,580	2,705,801	1,798,236	1,270,234	934,810
Total proved	8,351,651	5,673,843	4,187,204	3,281,686	2,684,706
Probable	7,457,152	3,482,560	1,946,864	1,232,453	849,096
Total proved plus probable	15,808,803	9,156,404	6,134,068	4,514,138	3,533,801

NOTES:

⁽¹⁾	Numbers may not add due to rounding.
⁽²⁾	All future net revenues are stated prior to the provision for interest income and other general and administrative expenses and after deduction of royalties, operating costs, estimated well and facility abandonment and reclamation costs and estimated future capital expenditures.
⁽³⁾	The estimated future net revenue contained in this press release does not necessarily represent the fair market value of the reserves.

The following table is a summary of pricing and inflation rate assumptions based on published 3 Consultants’ Average forecast prices and costs as at January 1, 2025:

Year	AECO Gas ($Cdn/ MMBtu)	NYMEX Gas ($US/ MMBtu)	Midwest Gas at Chicago ($US/ MMBtu)	Edmonton C5+ ($Cdn/Bbl)	Edmonton Propane ($Cdn/Bbl)	Edmonton Butane ($Cdn/Bbl)	WTI Cushing Oklahoma ($US/Bbl)	Edmonton Par Price 40 API ($Cdn/Bbl)	Exchange Rate⁽²⁾ ($US/$Cdn)
Forecast
2025	2.36	3.31	3.05	100.14	33.56	51.15	71.58	94.79	0.712
2026	3.33	3.73	3.53	100.72	32.78	49.98	74.48	97.04	0.728
2027	3.48	3.85	3.66	100.24	32.81	50.16	75.81	97.37	0.743
2028	3.69	3.93	3.73	102.73	33.63	51.41	77.66	99.80	0.743
2029	3.76	4.01	3.82	104.79	34.30	52.44	79.22	101.79	0.743
2030	3.83	4.09	3.89	106.86	34.99	53.49	80.80	103.83	0.743
2031	3.91	4.17	3.97	109.00	35.69	54.56	82.42	105.91	0.743
2032	3.99	4.26	4.05	111.19	36.40	55.65	84.06	108.02	0.743
2033	4.07	4.34	4.13	113.41	37.13	56.76	85.75	110.19	0.743
2034	4.15	4.43	4.21	115.69	37.87	57.90	87.46	112.39	0.743
2035	4.24	4.52	4.30	118.01	38.63	59.05	89.21	114.64	0.743
2036	4.32	4.61	4.39	120.37	39.40	60.24	90.99	116.93	0.743
2037	4.41	4.70	4.48	122.77	40.19	61.44	92.82	119.27	0.743
2038	4.49	4.79	4.56	125.23	41.00	62.67	94.67	121.65	0.743
2039	4.58	4.89	4.65	127.73	41.82	63.92	96.57	124.09	0.743
2040+	+2.0%/yr	+2.0%/yr	+2.0%/yr	+2.0%/yr	+2.0%/yr	+2.0%/yr	+2.0%/yr	+2.0%/yr	0.743

NOTES:

⁽¹⁾	Costs were not inflated in 2025 and inflated at 2% per annum thereafter.
⁽²⁾	Exchange rate used to generate the benchmark reference prices in this table.
⁽³⁾	NuVista’s future realized gas prices are forecasted based on a combination of various benchmark prices in addition to the AECO benchmark in order to reflect the favorable price diversification to other markets which NuVista has undertaken. Pricing at these markets has been accounted for in the GLJ Report. Additional information on NuVista’s gas marketing diversification will be available in our corporate presentation.

Advisories Regarding Oil and Gas Information

The reserve data provided in this press release presents only a portion of the disclosure required under National Instrument 51-101. All required information will be contained in the Company’s Annual Information Form for the year ended December 31, 2024, on SEDAR+ (www.sedarplus.ca).

There are numerous uncertainties inherent in estimating quantities of crude oil, natural gas and NGL reserves and the future cash flows attributed to such reserves. The reserve and associated cash flow information set forth above are estimates only. In general, estimates of economically recoverable crude oil, natural gas and NGL reserves and the future net cash flows therefrom are based upon a number of variable factors and assumptions, such as historical production from the properties, production rates, ultimate reserve recovery, timing and amount of capital expenditures, marketability of oil and natural gas, royalty rates, the assumed effects of regulation by governmental agencies and future operating costs, all of which may vary materially. For these reasons, estimates of the economically recoverable crude oil, NGL and natural gas reserves attributable to any particular group of properties, classification of such reserves based on risk of recovery and estimates of future net revenues associated with reserves prepared by different engineers, or by the same engineers at different times, may vary. The Company’s actual production, revenues, taxes and development and operating expenditures with respect to its reserves will vary from estimates thereof and such variations could be material.

BOEs may be misleading, particularly if used in isolation. A BOE conversion ratio of 6 Mcf: 1 Bbl is based on an energy equivalency conversion method primarily applicable at the burner tip and does not represent a value equivalency at the wellhead. As the value ratio between natural gas and crude oil based on the current prices of natural gas and crude oil is significantly different from the energy equivalency of 6:1, utilizing a conversion on a 6:1 basis may be misleading as an indication of value.

This press release contains a number of oil and gas metrics prepared by management, including F&D costs, FD&A costs, PDP per share, TP+PA per share, recycle ratio, operating netback, corporate netback and reserves replacement costs, which do not have standardized meanings or standard methods of calculation and therefore such measures may not be comparable to similar measures used by other companies. Such metrics have been included herein to provide readers with additional measures to evaluate NuVista’s performance on a comparable basis with prior periods; however, such measures are not reliable indicators of the future performance of NuVista, and future performance may not compare to the performance in previous periods. Details of how F&D costs, FD&A costs, operating netback, corporate netback and recycle ratios are calculated are set forth under the heading “Non-GAAP and Other Financial Measures – Non-GAAP Ratios”. Reserves replacement is calculated as the reserves category divided by estimated production.

Any references in this press release to initial production rates are useful in confirming the presence of hydrocarbons, however, such rates are not determinative of the rates at which such wells will continue production and decline thereafter. While encouraging, readers are cautioned not to place reliance on such rates in calculating the aggregate production for NuVista.

Any reference to capital efficiency has been prepared by management and is used to measure performance. NuVista calculates capital efficiency as the sum of the capital expenditures divided by average first year production rate for the applicable well(s). This term does not have a standardized meaning or standard calculation and is not comparable to similar measures used by other entities.

This press release discloses NuVista’s potential drilling locations in two categories: (i) undeveloped proved plus probable (TP+PA) drilling locations; and (ii) undeveloped contingent resources (2C) drilling locations. Undeveloped TP+PA drilling locations are derived the GLJ Report, and account for undeveloped drilling locations that have associated proved and/or probable reserves, as applicable. Undeveloped 2C drilling locations are derived from a report prepared by GLJ evaluating NuVista’s contingent resources as of December 31, 2024 (“GLJ Contingent Resource Report”), and account for undeveloped drilling locations that have associated contingent resources based on a best estimate of such contingent resources. There is no certainty that we will drill all drilling locations and if drilled, there is no certainty that such locations will result in additional oil and gas production. The drilling locations on which we actually drill wells will ultimately depend upon the availability of capital, regulatory approvals, seasonal restrictions, oil and natural gas prices, costs, actual drilling results, additional reservoir information that is obtained and other factors. Contingent resources are those quantities of petroleum estimated, as of a given date, to be potentially recoverable from known accumulations using established technology or technology under development, but which are not currently considered to be commercially recoverable due to one or more contingencies. Economic contingent resources are those contingent resources that are currently economically recoverable. The sub-classes included under economic contingent resources are Development Pending CR, Development on Hold CR, and Development Unclarified CR. Development Pending are resources where resolution of the final conditions for development is being actively pursued (high chance of development). Development on Hold are resources where there is a reasonable chance of development but there are major non-technical contingencies to be resolved that are usually beyond the control of the operator. Development Unclarified are resources where the evaluation is incomplete and there is ongoing activity to resolve any risks or uncertainties. Development Not Viable are resources that are not viable in the conditions prevailing at the effective date of the evaluation, and where no further data acquisition or evaluation is currently planned and hence there is a low chance of development. In the case of the contingent resources estimated in the GLJ Contingent Resource Report, contingencies include: (i) further delineation of interest lands; (ii) corporate commitment, and; (iii) final development plan. To further delineate interest lands additional wells must be drilled and tested to demonstrate commercial rates on the resource lands. Reserves are only assigned in close proximity to demonstrated productivity. As continued delineation drilling occurs, a portion of the contingent resources are expected to be reclassified as reserves. Confirmation of corporate intent to proceed with remaining capital expenditures within a reasonable timeframe is a requirement for the assessment of reserves. Finalization of a development plan includes timing, infrastructure spending and the commitment of capital.

Definitions of Oil and Gas Reserves

Reserves are estimated remaining quantities of crude oil and natural gas and related substances anticipated to be recoverable from known accumulations, as of a given date, based on the analysis of drilling, geological, geophysical, and engineering data; the use of established technology; and specified economic conditions, which are generally accepted as being reasonable. Reserves are classified according to the degree of certainty associated with the estimates as follows:

Proved Reserves are those reserves that can be estimated with a high degree of certainty to be recoverable. It is likely that the actual remaining quantities recovered will exceed the estimated proved reserves.

Probable Reserves are those additional reserves that are less certain to be recovered than proved reserves. It is equally likely that the actual remaining quantities recovered will be greater or less than the sum of the estimated proved plus probable reserves.

PDP or Proved Developed Producing Reserves are those reserves that are expected to be recovered from completion intervals open at the time of the estimate. These reserves may be currently producing or, if shut-in, they must have previously been on production, and the date of resumption of production must be known with reasonable certainty.

Basis of presentation

Unless otherwise noted, the financial data presented in this press release has been prepared in accordance with Canadian generally accepted accounting principles (“GAAP”) also known as International Financial Reporting Standards (“IFRS”).

Natural gas liquids are defined by National Instrument 51-101 – Standards of Disclosure for Oil and Gas Activities” to include ethane, butane, propane, pentanes plus and condensate. Unless explicitly stated in this press release, references to “NGL” refers only to ethane, butane and propane and references to “condensate” refers to only to condensate and pentanes plus. NuVista has disclosed condensate and pentanes plus values separately from ethane, butane and propane values as NuVista believes it provides a more accurate description of NuVista’s operations and results therefrom.

Production split for Boe/d amounts referenced in the press release are as follows:

*Reference*	*Total Boe/d*	Natural Gas %		Condensate %		NGLs %

Q4 2024 production – actual	*85,635*	64	%	26	%	10	%
Q4 2024 production – guidance	*83,000 – 84,000*	61	%	30	%	9	%
2024 annual production – actual	*83,084*	61	%	30	%	9	%
2024 annual production – guidance	*83,500 – 86,000*	61	%	30	%	9	%
Q1 2025 production – guidance	*87,000 – 88,000*	63	%	28	%	9	%
2025 annual production – guidance	*~90,000*	61	%	30	%	9	%

Reserves advisories

The GLJ Report was prepared in accordance with National Instrument 51-101 – Standards of Disclosure for Oil and Gas Activities and the Canadian Oil and Gas Evaluation Handbook (“COGE Handbook”) and is dated effective as of December 31, 2024. The GLJ Report was based on 3 Consultants’ Average January 1, 2025 forecast pricing and foreign exchange rates at January 1, 2025. All reserves information has been presented on a gross basis, which is the Company’s working interest share before deduction of royalties and without including any royalty interests of the Company. The reserves have been categorized accordance with the reserves definitions as set out in the COGE Handbook. The recovery and reserve estimates contained herein are estimates only and there is no guarantee that the estimated reserves will be recovered. Also, estimates of reserves and future net revenue for individual properties may not reflect the same confidence level as estimates and future net revenue for all properties due to the effect of aggregation. All required reserve information for the Company will be contained in its Annual Information Form for the year ended December 31, 2024, which will be accessible at www.sedarplus.ca.

With respect to disclosure contained herein regarding resources other than reserves, there is uncertainty that it will be commercially viable to produce any portion of the resources and there is significant uncertainty regarding the ultimate recoverability of such resources.

Advisory regarding forward-looking information and statements

This press release contains forward-looking statements and forward-looking information (collectively, “forward-looking statements”) within the meaning of applicable securities laws. The use of any of the words “will”, “expects”, “believe”, “plans”, “potential” and similar expressions are intended to identify forward-looking statements. More particularly and without limitation, this press release contains forward looking statements, including but not limited to:

our intention to allocate $100 million to repurchase our common shares in 2025, with at least 75% of any incremental free adjusted funds flow also allocated to the repurchase of our common share pursuant to our NCIB;

that our soft ceiling net debt will allow our current production levels to be sustainable and maintain an adjusted funds flow ratio below 1.0x in a stress test price environment of US$45/Bbl WTI and US$2.00/MMBtu NYMEX;

NuVista’s ability to continue directing free adjusted funds flow towards a prudent balance of return of capital to shareholders and debt reduction, while investing in high return growth projects;

the anticipated allocation of free adjusted funds flow;

our expectation that our capital efficiency will continue to be strong in 2025, allowing us to realize a well cost reduction of 3% year-over-year;

our expectation that a 5-well pad in Elmworth, a 4-well pad in Gold Creek, and a 14-well pad in Pipestone will be brought on-stream during the second quarter;

our expectation that an 8-welll pad in Pipestone will be brought on-stream in the third quarter;

our expectations regarding the consistency in deliverability of inventory in the Elmworth and Gold Creek areas;

guidance with respect to first quarter 2025 production and production mix;

our expectation that growth in 2025 will be largely supported by the Pipestone area;

the expected timing of start-up of a third-party gas plant in the Pipestone area and the anticipated benefits thereof;

our 2025 full year production, full year production mix and capital expenditures guidance ranges;

our plan to continue to maintain an efficient drilling program by employing 2-drill-rig execution;

our expectation that our value-adding growth plateau level will be approximately 125,000 Boe/d;

our future focus, strategy, plans, opportunities and operations; and

other such similar statements.

Statements relating to “reserves” are also deemed to be forward-looking statements, as they involve the implied assessment, based on certain estimates and assumptions, that the reserves described exist in the quantities predicted or estimated and that the reserves can be profitably produced in the future.

The future acquisition of our common shares pursuant to a share buyback (including through our normal course issuer bid), if any, and the level thereof is uncertain. Any decision to acquire common shares pursuant to a share buyback will be subject to the discretion of the Board of Directors and may depend on a variety of factors, including, without limitation, the Company’s business performance, financial condition, financial requirements, growth plans, expected capital requirements and other conditions existing at such future time including, without limitation, contractual restrictions and satisfaction of the solvency tests imposed on the Company under applicable corporate law. There can be no assurance of the number of common shares that the Company will acquire pursuant to a share buyback, if any, in the future.

By their nature, forward-looking statements are based upon certain assumptions and are subject to numerous risks and uncertainties, some of which are beyond NuVista’s control, including the impact of general economic conditions, industry conditions, current and future commodity prices and inflation rates; that other than the tariffs that have been announced and implemented by the U.S. and Canadian governments on March 4, 2025, neither the U.S. nor Canada (i) increases the rate or scope of such tariffs, or imposes new tariffs, on the import of goods from one country to the other, and/or (ii) imposes any other form of tax, restriction or prohibition on the import or export of products from one country to the other, the impact of ongoing global events, including Middle East and European tensions, with respect to commodity prices, currency and interest rates, anticipated production rates, borrowing, operating and other costs and adjusted funds flow; the timing, allocation and amount of capital expenditures and the results therefrom; anticipated reserves and the imprecision of reserve estimates; the performance of existing wells; the success obtained in drilling new wells; the sufficiency of budgeted capital expenditures in carrying out planned activities; access to infrastructure and markets; competition from other industry participants; availability of qualified personnel or services and drilling and related equipment; stock market volatility; effects of regulation by governmental agencies including changes in environmental regulations, tax laws and royalties; the ability to access sufficient capital from internal sources and bank and equity markets; that we will be able to execute our 2025 drilling plans as expected; our ability to carry out our 2025 production and capital guidance as expected; the risk that (i) the U.S. or Canadian governments increases the rate or scope of the currently implemented tariffs, or imposes new tariffs on the import of goods from on the import or export of products from one country to the other, and (ii) the tariffs imposed by the U.S. on other countries and responses thereto could have a material adverse effect on the Canadian, U.S. and global economies, and by extension the oil and gas industry; and including, without limitation, those risks considered under “Risk Factors” in our Annual Information Form.

Readers are cautioned that the assumptions used in the preparation of such information, although considered reasonable at the time of preparation, may prove to be imprecise and, as such, undue reliance should not be placed on forward-looking statements. NuVista’s actual results, performance or achievement could differ materially from those expressed in, or implied by, these forward-looking statements, or if any of them do so, what benefits NuVista will derive therefrom. NuVista has included the forward-looking statements in this press release in order to provide readers with a more complete perspective on NuVista’s future operations and such information may not be appropriate for other purposes. NuVista disclaims any intention or obligation to update or revise any forward-looking statements, whether as a result of new information, future events or otherwise, except as required by law.

This press release also contains financial outlook and future oriented financial information (together, “FOFI”) relating to NuVista including, without limitation, capital expenditures in 2025 and production which are based on, among other things, the various assumptions disclosed in this press release including under “Advisory regarding forward-looking information and statements” and including assumptions regarding benchmark pricing as it relates to the 2025 capital allocation framework. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the FOFI contained in this press release does not include the potential impact of tariff or trade-related regulation that have been announced by the U.S. and Canada, including the tariffs imposed by the U.S. on Canada effective March 4, 2025. Readers are cautioned that the assumptions used in the preparation of such information, although considered reasonable at the time of preparation, may prove to be imprecise and the impact of the tariffs on NuVista’s business operations and financial condition, while currently unknown, may be material and adverse and, as such, undue reliance should not be placed on FOFI. NuVista’s actual results, performance or achievement could differ materially from those expressed in, or implied by, these FOFI, or if any of them do so, what benefits NuVista will derive therefrom. NuVista has included the FOFI in order to provide readers with a more complete perspective on NuVista’s future operations and such information may not be appropriate for other purposes.

These forward-looking statements and FOFI are made as of the date of this press release and NuVista disclaims any intent or obligation to update any forward-looking statements and FOFI, whether as a result of new information, future events or results or otherwise, other than as required by applicable securities law.

Non-GAAP and other financial measures

This press release uses various specified financial measures (as such terms are defined in National Instrument 52-112 – Non-GAAP Disclosure and Other Financial Measures Disclosure (“NI 51-112”)) including “non-GAAP financial measures”, “non-GAAP ratios”, “capital management measures” and “supplementary financial measures” (as such terms are defined in NI 51-112), which are described in further detail below. Management believes that the presentation of these non-GAAP measures provides useful information to investors and shareholders as the measures provide increased transparency and the ability to better analyze performance against prior periods on a comparable basis.

⁽¹⁾ Non-GAAP financial measures

NI 52-112 defines a non-GAAP financial measure as a financial measure that: (i) depicts the historical or expected future financial performance, financial position or cash flow of an entity; (ii) with respect to its composition, excludes an amount that is included in, or includes an amount that is excluded from, the composition of the most directly comparable financial measure disclosed in the primary financial statements of the entity; (iii) is not disclosed in the financial statements of the entity; and (iv) is not a ratio, fraction, percentage or similar representation.

These non-GAAP financial measures are not standardized financial measures under IFRS Accounting Standards and might not be comparable to similar measures presented by other companies where similar terminology is used. Investors are cautioned that these measures should not be construed as alternatives to or more meaningful than the most directly comparable GAAP measures as indicators of NuVista’s performance. Set forth below are descriptions of the non-GAAP financial measures used in this press release.

Free adjusted funds flow

Free adjusted funds flow is adjusted funds flow less net capital expenditures, power generation expenditures, and asset retirement expenditures. Each of the components of free adjusted funds flow are non-GAAP financial measures. Please refer to disclosures under the headings “Capital management measures” and “Capital expenditures” for a description of each component of free adjusted funds flow. Management uses free adjusted funds flow as a measure of the efficiency and liquidity of its business, measuring its funds available for additional capital allocation to manage debt levels and return capital to shareholders through its NCIB program and/or dividend payments. By removing the impact of current period net capital and asset retirement expenditures, management believes this measure provides an indication of the funds NuVista has available for future capital allocation decisions.

The following table sets out our free adjusted funds flow compared to the most directly comparable GAAP measure of cash provided by operating activities less cash used in investing activities for the applicable periods:

	Three months ended December 31				Year ended December 31
($ thousands)	2024		2023		2024		2023
Cash provided by operating activities	135,831		211,761		600,253		721,342
Cash used in investing activities	(71,090	)	(132,646	)	(499,579	)	(531,586	)
Excess (deficit) cash provided by operating activities over cash used in investing activities	64,741		79,115		100,674		189,756

Adjusted funds flow	137,059		201,987		552,196		756,943
Net capital expenditures	(71,090	)	(113,258	)	(498,876	)	(518,294	)
Power generation expenditures	—		(16,904	)	(1,680	)	(16,904	)
Asset retirement expenditures	(3,551	)	(1,208	)	(12,029	)	(11,195	)
Free adjusted funds flow	62,418		70,617		39,611		210,550

Capital expenditures

Capital expenditures are equal to cash used in investing activities, excluding changes in non-cash working capital, other asset expenditures, power generation expenditures, proceeds on property dispositions and costs of acquisitions. NuVista considers capital expenditures to represent its organic capital program and a useful measure of cash flow used for capital reinvestment.

The following table provides a reconciliation between the non-GAAP measure of capital expenditures to the most directly comparable GAAP measure of cash used in investing activities for the applicable periods:

	Three months ended December 31				Year ended December 31
($ thousands)	2024		2023		2024		2023
Cash used in investing activities	(71,090	)	(132,646	)	(499,579	)	(531,586	)
Changes in non-cash working capital	—		2,484		(977	)	(13,112	)
Other asset expenditures	—		—		—		9,500
Power generation expenditures	—		16,904		1,680		16,904
Property acquisition	—		44,000		—		44,000
Proceeds on property disposition	—		—		—		(26,000	)
Capital expenditures	(71,090	)	(69,258	)	(498,876	)	(500,294	)

Net capital expenditures

Net capital expenditures are equal to cash used in investing activities, excluding changes in non-cash working capital, other asset expenditures, and power generation expenditures. The Company includes funds used for property acquisitions or proceeds from property dispositions within net capital expenditures as these transactions are part of its development plans. NuVista considers net capital expenditures to represent its organic capital program inclusive of capital spending for acquisition and disposition proposes and a useful measure of cash flow used for capital reinvestment.

The following table provides a reconciliation between the non-GAAP measure of net capital expenditures to the most directly comparable GAAP measure of cash used in investing activities for the applicable periods:

	Three months ended December 31				Year ended December 31
($ thousands)	2024		2023		2024		2023
Cash used in investing activities	(71,090	)	(132,646	)	(499,579	)	(531,586	)
Changes in non-cash working capital	—		2,484		(977	)	(13,112	)
Other asset expenditures	—		—		—		9,500
Power generation expenditures	—		16,904		1,680		16,904
Net capital expenditures	(71,090	)	(113,258	)	(498,876	)	(518,294	)

The following table provides a breakdown of capital expenditures, net capital expenditures and power generation expenditures by category for the applicable periods:

	Three months ended December 31				Year ended December 31
($ thousands, except % amounts)	2024	% of total	2023	% of total	2024	% of total	2023		% of total
Land and retention costs	—	—	15	—	6,968	1	7,507		2
Geological and geophysical	38	—	249	—	1,164	—	691		—
Drilling and completion	43,915	62	51,413	74	353,583	72	392,663		78
Facilities and equipment	25,508	36	16,193	24	130,628	26	93,252		19
Corporate and other	1,629	2	1,388	2	6,533	1	6,181		1
Capital expenditures	71,090		69,258		498,876		500,294
Property acquisitions	—		44,000		—		44,000
Proceeds on property disposition	—		—		—		(26,000	)
Net capital expenditures	71,090		113,258		498,876		518,294
Power generation expenditures	—		16,904		1,680		16,904

Net operating expense

NuVista considers that any incremental gross costs incurred to process third party volumes at its facilities are offset by the applicable fees charged to such third parties. However, under IFRS Accounting Standards, NuVista is required to reflect operating costs and processing fee income separately on its statements of earnings. Management believes that net operating expense, calculated as gross operating expense less processing income and other recoveries, is a meaningful measure for investors to understand the net impact of NuVista’s operating activities.

The following table sets out net operating expense compared to the most directly comparable GAAP measure of operating expenses for the applicable periods:

	Three months ended December 31				Year ended December 31
($ thousands)	2024		2023		2024		2023
Operating expense	88,891		85,207		354,253		324,196
Other income ⁽¹⁾	(1,646	)	(1,038	)	(8,605	)	(3,058	)
Net operating expense	87,245		84,169		345,648		321,138

⁽¹⁾	Processing income and other recoveries, included within Other Income as presented in the table below:

	Three months ended December 31		Year ended December 31
($ thousands)	2024	2023	2024	2023
Other income	57	—	3,235	—
Processing income and other recoveries	1,646	1,038	8,605	3,058
Other Income	1,703	1,038	11,840	3,058

(2) Non-GAAP ratios

NI 52-112 defines a non-GAAP ratio as a financial measure that: (i) is in the form of a ratio, fraction, percentage or similar representation; (ii) has a non-GAAP financial measure as one or more of its components; and (iii) is not disclosed in the financial statements of the entity. Set forth below is a description of the non-GAAP ratios used in this MD&A.

These non-GAAP ratios are not standardized financial measures under IFRS Accounting Standards and might not be comparable to similar measures presented by other companies where similar terminology is used. Investors are cautioned that these ratios should not be construed as alternatives to or more meaningful than the most directly comparable IFRS Accounting Standards measures as indicators of NuVista’s performance.

Per Boe disclosures for petroleum and natural gas revenues, realized gains/losses on financial derivatives, royalties, transportation expense, G&A expense, financing costs, and DD&A expense are non-GAAP ratios that are calculated by dividing each of these respective GAAP measures by NuVista’s total production volumes for the period.

Non-GAAP ratios presented on a “per Boe” basis may also be considered to be supplementary financial measures (as such term is defined in NI 51-112).

Operating netback and corporate netback (“netbacks”), per BoeNuVista calculated netbacks per Boe by dividing the netbacks by total production volumes sold in the period. Each of operating netback and corporate netback are non-GAAP financial measures. Operating netback is calculated as petroleum and natural gas revenues, realized financial derivative gains/losses and other income, less royalties, transportation expense and net operating expense. Corporate netback is operating netback less general and administrative expense, cash share-based compensation expense (recovery), financing costs excluding accretion expense, and current income tax expense (recovery).
Management believes both operating and corporate netbacks are key industry benchmarks and measures of operating performance for NuVista that assists management and investors in assessing NuVista’s profitability, and are commonly used by other petroleum and natural gas producers. The measurement on a Boe basis assists management and investors with evaluating NuVista’s operating performance on a comparable basis.

Net operating expense, per BoeNuVista calculated net operating expense per Boe by dividing net operating expense by NuVista’s production volumes for the period.
Management believes that net operating expense, calculated as gross operating expense less processing income and other recoveries, which are included in NuVista’s statements of earnings, is a meaningful measure for investors to understand the net impact of the Company’s operating activities. The measurement on a Boe basis assists management and investors with evaluating NuVista’s operating performance on a comparable basis.

Reference has been also been made to certain terms that do not have standardized meanings or standard calculations and therefore such measures may not be comparable to similar measures used by other entities. These terms are used by NuVista’s management to measure the success of replacing reserves and to compare operating performance to previous periods on a comparable basis.

F&D costsNuVista calculated F&D costs as the sum of development costs plus the change in future development costs (“FDC”) for the period when appropriate, divided by the change in reserves within the applicable reserves category, excluding those reserves acquired or disposed.
NuVista calculated TP+PA 3-year average F&D costs as the sum of development costs plus the sum of the change in FDC over the last three completed financial years, divided by the sum of the change in the total proved and probable reserves over the last three completed financial years.

FD&A costsNuVista calculated FD&A costs are calculated as the sum of development costs plus acquisition costs net of disposition proceeds plus the change in FDC for the period when appropriate, divided by the change in reserves within the applicable reserves category, inclusive of changes due to acquisitions and dispositions.

Recycle RatioNuVista calculates recycle ratio as the operating netback divided by F&D costs for the applicable period.

(3) Capital management measures

NI 52-112 defines a capital management measure as a financial measure that: (i) is intended to enable an individual to evaluate an entity’s objectives, policies and processes for managing the entity’s capital; (ii) is not a component of a line item disclosed in the primary financial statements of the entity; (iii) is disclosed in the notes to the financial statements of the entity; and (iv) is not disclosed in the primary financial statements of the entity.

NuVista has defined net debt, adjusted funds flow, and net debt to annualized fourth quarter adjusted funds flow ratio as capital management measures used by the Company in this press release.

Adjusted funds flow

NuVista considers adjusted funds flow to be a key measure that provides a more complete understanding of the NuVista considers adjusted funds flow to be a key measure that provides a more comprehensive view of the company’s ability to generate cash flow necessary for financing capital expenditures, meeting asset retirement obligations, and fulfilling its financial commitments. Adjusted funds flow is calculated by adjusting cash flow from operating activities to exclude changes in non-cash working capital and asset retirement expenditures. Management believes these elements are subject to timing variations in collection, payment, and occurrence. By excluding them, management is able to provide a more meaningful performance measure of NuVista’s ongoing operations. Specifically, expenditures on asset retirement obligations may fluctuate depending on the company’s capital programs and the maturity of its operating areas, while environmental remediation recovery is tied to an infrequent incident that management does not expect to recur regularly. The settlement of asset retirement obligations is managed through NuVista’s capital budgeting process, which incorporates the available adjusted funds flow.

A reconciliation of adjusted funds flow is presented in the following table:

	2024			2023
Cash provided by operating activities	$	600,253		$	721,342
Asset retirement expenditures		12,029			11,195
Change in non-cash working capital		(60,086	)		24,406
Adjusted funds flow	$	552,196		$	756,943

Net debt is used by management to provide a more comprehensive understanding of NuVista’s capital structure and to assess the company’s liquidity. NuVista calculates net debt by considering accounts receivable, prepaid expenses, accounts payable and accrued liabilities, long-term debt (the Credit Facility), senior unsecured notes, and other liabilities. Management uses total market capitalization and the ratio of net debt to annualized adjusted funds flow for the current quarter to analyze balance sheet strength and liquidity.

The following is a summary of total market capitalization, net debt, annualized current quarter adjusted funds flow, and net debt to annualized current quarter adjusted funds flow:

	2024			2023
Basic common shares outstanding (thousands of shares)		203,701			207,584
Share price	$	13.82		$	11.04
Total market capitalization	$	2,815,148		$	2,291,727
Accounts receivable and other		(132,538	)		(139,451	)
Prepaid expenses		(45,584	)		(45,241	)
Accounts payable and accrued liabilities		206,862			157,711
Current portion of other liabilities		18,451			14,082
Long-term debt		5,353			16,897
Senior unsecured notes		163,258			162,195
Other liabilities		16,701			17,358
Net debt	$	232,503		$	183,551
Annualized current quarter adjusted funds flow	$	548,236		$	807,948
Net debt to annualized current quarter adjusted funds flow		0.4			0.2
Adjusted funds flow	$	552,196		$	756,943
Net debt to adjusted funds flow		0.4			0.2

(4) Supplementary financial measures

This press release may contain certain supplementary financial measures. NI 52-112 defines a supplementary financial measure as a financial measure that: (i) is intended to be disclosed on a periodic basis to depict the historical or expected future financial performance, financial position or cash flow of an entity; (ii) is not disclosed in the financial statements of the entity; (iii) is not a non-GAAP financial measure; and (iv) is not a non-GAAP ratio.

NuVista calculates: (i) “adjusted funds flow per share” by dividing adjusted funds flow for a period by the number of weighted average common shares of NuVista for the specified period; (ii) “operating netback per share” by dividing operating netback for a period by the number of weighted average common shares of NuVista for the specified period; (iii) “corporate netback per share” by dividing operating netback for a period by the number of weighted average common shares of NuVista for the specified period; (iv) “net debt to adjusted funds flow” by dividing the net debt at the end of a period by the adjusted funds flow for such period; and (v) “net present value per share” is the net present value (discounted at 10%) in the reserve category divided by the basic common shares outstanding at the end of the period.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Mike J. Lawford	Ivan J. Condic
President and CEO	VP, Finance and CFO
(403) 538-1936	(403) 538-1945

The MIL Network –

March 6, 2025

MIL-OSI: Synaptics Seeks to Alter the Trajectory of the IoT at Embedded World With Contextual Edge AI and Wireless Innovations
Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

NUREMBERG, Germany, March 05, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Synaptics^® Incorporated (Nasdaq: SYNA) will showcase its latest innovations in Edge AI and wireless connectivity at Embedded World 2025 in Nuremberg, Germany, unveiling a new family of microcontroller units (MCUs) and a new family of wireless systems-on-chips (SoCs) designed for a wide range of ultra-low-power Internet of Things (IoT) devices that exhibit contextually-aware artificial intelligence (AI) and ultra-reliable connectivity.

For IoT system designers, they will be able to combine ultra-low-power (ULP), multimodal processing, contextually aware AI, and excellent wireless rate-over-range with reliable interoperability, all with surprisingly low system cost, opening the door to an array of cognitive IoT applications and intuitive user experiences.

The devices that Synaptics’ new products will support include smartwatches and other wearables, consumer audio, appliances, security cameras, asset trackers, and factory automation systems, with the opportunity to add powerful functions such as predictive maintenance, and enhanced security.

At EW2025? Join us in Booth #4A-259 to learn about our advances in Edge AI, wireless connectivity, and automotive display technologies. Email press@synaptics.com for an appointment.

Engineers from Synaptics will be on hand throughout Embedded World to describe new products, capabilities, and features. In-booth demonstrations will include:
- An illustration of the concept and the value of contextually aware AI, with partners Leedarson, a provider of IoT devices for the home, and the Fraunhofer Institute
- A demonstration of AI hubs with partner Arcadyan, a provider of 5G, DOCSIS, and Wi-Fi 6 home routers
- A demonstration of AI-enabled industrial vision systems with partner Arcturus, a specialist in machine vision
- An introduction to the concept of AI-enabled Wi-Fi sensing, which makes Wi-Fi more than a mere data pipeline
Synaptics engineers will also demonstrate an automotive dashboard display with local dimming for high contrast and Knob-on-Display capability. This demo is based on the company’s new SB7900 SmartBridge™ advanced automotive display processor integrated with its touch and display controllers, touch sense, and display driver technologies.

Join Synaptics at Embedded World 2025 at booth 4A-259 from March 11-13 for an exclusive look at the technologies driving the future of the IoT. Engage with expert engineers and discover how edge AI is transforming ultra-low-power devices.

About Synaptics Incorporated
Synaptics (Nasdaq: SYNA) is driving innovation in AI at the Edge, bringing AI closer to end users and transforming how we engage with intelligent connected devices, whether at home, at work, or on the move. As a go-to partner for forward-thinking product innovators, Synaptics powers the future with its cutting-edge Synaptics Astra™ AI-Native embedded compute, Veros™ wireless connectivity, and multimodal sensing solutions. We’re making the digital experience smarter, faster, more intuitive, secure, and seamless. From touch, display, and biometrics to AI-driven wireless connectivity, video, vision, audio, speech, and security processing, Synaptics is the force behind the next generation of technology enhancing how we live, work, and play. Follow Synaptics on LinkedIn, X, and Facebook, or visit www.synaptics.com.

Synaptics and the Synaptics logo are trademarks of Synaptics in the United States and/or other countries. All other marks are the property of their respective owners.

For further information, please contact:

Media Contact
Patrick Mannion
Synaptics
+1-631-678-1015
patrick.mannion@synaptics.com

Danielle Burness
Senior Account Manager
Publitek Ltd.
danielle.burness@publitek.com

The MIL Network –
March 6, 2025
MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Protecting national security

Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments 3

Oral statement to Parliament

Protecting national security

Statement by the Security Minister on new measures to tackle state threats from Iran.

With your permission Madam Deputy Speaker, I will make a statement on the growing threat to the UK from Iran and the steps the government is taking to combat these threats.

The threat from Iran sits in a wider context of the growing, diversifying and evolving threat that the UK faces from malign activity by a number of states.

The threat from states has become increasingly interconnected in nature, blurring the lines between: domestic and international; online and offline; and states and their proxies.

In the last year, the number of state threat investigations being run by MI5 has jumped by 48%.

This statistic is a stark indication of the increased threat.

Iranian threats

Turning specifically to Iran, the regime has become increasingly emboldened, asserting itself more aggressively to advance their objectives and undermine ours.

This is evidenced by the fact that direct action against UK targets has substantially increased over recent years.

The Director General of MI5 recently stated that since the start of 2022 the UK has responded to 20 Iran-backed plots, presenting potentially lethal threats to British citizens and UK residents.

The Iranian regime is targeting dissidents.

And it is targeting media organisations and journalists reporting on the violent oppression of the regime.

It is also no secret that there is a long-standing pattern of targeting Jewish and Israeli people internationally by the Iranian Intelligence Services.

It is clear that these plots are a conscious strategy of the Iranian regime to stifle criticism through intimidation and fear.

These threats are unacceptable. They must and will be defended against at every turn.

Now it is a testament to our world-leading law enforcement and intelligence services that through their tireless commitment, so many plots have been thwarted.

And I am sure the whole House will join me in paying tribute to the brave men and women of our law enforcement and intelligence agencies who work day in, day out to keep us safe.

In seeking to tackle this threat, we must understand it.

The Iranian Intelligence Services, which include the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the IRGC, and the Ministry of Intelligence and Security, or MOIS, direct this damaging activity.

But often, rather than working directly on UK shores, they use criminal proxies to do their bidding. This helps to obfuscate their involvement, while they sit safely ensconced in Tehran.

We see that in intelligence, but we have also seen it publicly, with the conviction in 2023 of the Chechen born Austrian national, who was imprisoned for conducting surveillance on Iran International’s UK headquarters.

These threats are not only physical in nature.

The National Cyber Security Centre has also seen malicious cyber activity conducted by Iranian state-affiliated actors targeting a range of state sectors, including in the UK.

Our response

The government is absolutely committed to ensuring that our intelligence and law enforcement agencies have the tools they need to disrupt and degrade the threats that we face from Iran.

So I can announce today that we will place the whole of the Iranian State – including Iran’s intelligence services, the IRGC and MOIS – on to the enhanced tier of the new Foreign Influence Registration Scheme.

The Foreign Influence Registration Scheme, or FIRS, is a critical disruptive tool for the UK.

This action will mean that those who are directed by Iran to conduct activities in the UK – such as criminal proxies – must register that activity, whatever it is, or face 5 years in prison.

They will face a choice – expose their actions to the government, or face jail.

The Home Office will lay regulations in Parliament as soon as possible, with a view to having the scheme up and running by the summer.

On proscription, as members will know, we do not routinely comment on groups being considered for proscription, but I can assure the House that we do and will continue to keep the list of groups considered under constant review.

However, what has become increasingly clear is the challenges inherent in applying our existing counter-terror legislation to state and state-linked threats to our national security.

This challenge was first raised by the Home Secretary in Opposition. She warned of a lack of a comprehensive strategic approach for state threats to mirror that adopted on terrorism, and the specific difficulties in using a proscription mechanism, designed for groups like Al Qaeda, on state bodies.

We are progressing work at pace to address this challenge.

So I can announce today that Jonathan Hall KC has been asked to review the parts of our counter-terrorism framework which could be applied to modern day state threats, such as those from Iran.

This includes giving specific consideration to the design of a proscription mechanism for state and state-linked bodies, providing more flexibility than is offered under the existing powers.

As the Independent Reviewer of both State Threats Legislation and of Terrorism Legislation, Mr Hall is perfectly placed to undertake this review and we are grateful for his agreement to provide this advice.

Let there be no doubt: we are utterly determined to stay ahead of those who threaten our country – and any step that could aid us in that critical endeavour will be considered.

But the UK is not alone in facing this threat. States across the western world are threatened by Iran.

So we will work with our allies to better understand, expose and condemn Iranian actions – and bring Iranian-linked criminals to justice wherever in the world they may be. We regularly collaborate with our Five Eyes and European partners to protect our democracies from hostile Iranian attack.

Here at home, we are going further too.

The National Security Act 2023, which was supported on both sides of the House, has given the police new powers to target evolving activity.

For example, the act criminalises assisting a foreign intelligence service, such as the IRGC or MOIS. The maximum penalty for these offences is 14 years in prison, the same maximum as for a proscription offence.

And I can also announce that training and guidance on state threats activity is now being offered by Counter Terrorism Policing to all 45 territorial police forces across the UK.

This will mean that when any frontline officer encounters a suspected state threats incident, they will know what to do and what to look for to ensure that our communities are kept safe.

Furthermore, we have recently issued guidance on the National Security Act and how it applies to the UK security profession, including private investigators.

This ensures they are aware of the law and understand where they may be criminally liable if they are working for any foreign power, such as Iran.

We will also continue to go after the criminal networks and enablers that Iran uses to carry out its work. The leader of the Zindashti organised crime group, a group frequently used by the Iranian regime, has already been sanctioned.

We will explore further sanctions against other Iranian-linked criminals and the National Crime Agency will target those who assist the IRGC and others to launder their money.

Alongside the recently launched Border Security Command, which strengthens Britain’s border security and disrupts criminal smuggling gangs, I have asked officials to consider new ways to enforce our robust immigration rules to specifically address threats from Iran.

This work will focus on further protecting the UK from Iranian infiltration, including those who promote Iranian interference in the UK.

I am clear that our response must be a UK-wide effort. So I welcome the Charity Commission’s statutory inquiries into both the Islamic Centre of England and the Al-Tawheed Charitable Trust.

I have also asked officials to review where any Iranian interference is being conducted in the UK and FIRS will shine more light on any undisclosed relationships between the Iranian state and UK-based institutions and individuals.

Finally, the National Protective Security Authority and Counter Terrorism Policing will continue to provide protective security advice and support to individuals and organisations threatened by the Iranian regime and its criminal proxies, including Persian language media organisations and their employees.

And we will continue to maintain funding for protective security measures to synagogues, Jewish community centres and schools, ensuring we do all we can to keep our Jewish communities safe.

Conclusion

Madam Deputy Speaker, in a dangerous, volatile world, Britain must lead the way.

That means proudly promoting our values and straining every sinew to keep our people safe.

The measures I have set out today should reassure the House and the public about our unflinching commitment to these objectives.

Under this government, security will be the foundation on which everything else is built.

We will resist attacks on our way of life as vigorously as we counter threats to life – whatever their source.

…we will work relentlessly to root out those intent on causing harm on our streets.

…and we will do whatever it takes to protect our country and our democracy.

I commend this statement to the House.

Updates to this page

Published 4 March 2025

MIL OSI United Kingdom –

March 5, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: United States Arrests ISIS-K Attack Planner for Role in Killing of U.S. Military Service Members at Abbey Gate, Afghanistan

Source: US State of North Dakota

Note: View the affidavit and complaint here.

On March 2, 2025, the United States charged Mohammad Sharifullah, also known as “Jafar,” a member of the terrorist organization the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham-Khorasan Province (ISIS-K), with providing and conspiring to provide material support and resources to a designated foreign terrorist organization resulting in death, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B. Sharifullah has been arrested and is expected to appear in the Eastern District of Virginia on March 5, 2025.

“This evil ISIS-K terrorist orchestrated the brutal murder of 13 heroic Marines,” said Attorney General Pamela Bondi. “Under President Trump’s strong leadership on the world stage, this Department of Justice will ensure that terrorists like Mohammad Sharifullah have no safe haven, no second chances, and no worse enemy than the United States of America.”

“The lethal attack that killed 13 American service members and Afghan civilians during the U.S. troop withdrawal from Afghanistan was an act of terrorism,” said FBI Director Kash Patel. “ISIS-K brazenly claimed responsibility for the carnage. Now thanks to the assistance of the FBI, Department of Justice, and the CIA, we have secured Sharifullah’s apprehension and transport to the U.S. to face American justice. The FBI will never forget the loss of these American heroes, we will continue to hunt down those who viciously murdered our warriors, we will find all responsible and bring them to justice.”

“The charges announced today carry an unmistakable message: the commitment of the United States to hold accountable all who facilitate and carry out acts of terror against us will never waver,” said U.S. Attorney Erik S Siebert for the Eastern District of Virginia. “Our message to those who have been impacted by these horrific crimes is that you are not forgotten. We will continue to pursue justice no matter how long or how far it takes us.”

On Aug. 26, 2021, American and other Coalition military forces were conducting an evacuation operation at Hamid Karzai International Airport in Kabul, Afghanistan. Abbey Gate was the main entry point for the operation. Thousands of civilians were at Abbey Gate for evacuation.

At approximately 5:36 p.m., ISIS-K member Abdul Rahman al-Logari detonated a body-worn suicide bomb at Abbey Gate, killing 13 U.S. military service members and approximately 160 civilians.

During an interview with FBI Special Agents on March 2, 2025, after waiving his Miranda rights, Sharifullah admitted to helping prepare for the Abbey Gate attack, including scouting a route near the airport for an attacker. Sharifullah specifically checked for law enforcement and American or Taliban checkpoints; he then communicated to other ISIS-K members that he believed the route was clear and that the attacker would not be detected. Sharifullah also admitted to recognizing al-Logari as an ISIS-K operative he had previously known.

During his interview with the FBI, Sharifullah also admitted to supporting and conducting activities on behalf of ISIS-K in multiple other lethal attacks.

On June 20, 2016, a suicide bomber acting for ISIS-K detonated a bomb that killed over ten embassy guards and multiple civilians and wounded other soldiers guarding the Canadian embassy in Kabul. ISIS claimed responsibility for the attack. As alleged in the complaint, prior to the attack, Sharifullah conducted surveillance to prepare the suicide bomber and later transported the bomber to the attack area.

On March 22, 2024, a group of ISIS-K gunmen attacked Crocus City Hall near Moscow, Russia. The attack killed approximately 130 people and injured numerous others. Russian authorities arrested four gunmen in connection with the attack. During his interview with the FBI, Sharifullah admitted that, on behalf of ISIS-K, he had shared instructions on how to use AK-style rifles and other weapons to would-be attackers. Sharifullah also admitted to recognizing two of the four arrested gunmen as those he had previously instructed.

If convicted, Sharifullah faces a maximum penalty of life in prison. A federal district court judge will determine any sentence after considering the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors.

Assistant U.S. Attorneys Michael P. Ben’Ary and Troy A. Edwards, Jr., for the Eastern District of Virginia and Trial Attorneys Alicia Cook, Charles Kovats, and Ryan White for the Department of Justice’s National Security Division are prosecuting the case.

The details described above are allegations. All defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law.

MIL OSI USA News –

March 5, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: United States Arrests ISIS-K Attack Planner for Role in Killing of U.S. Military Service Members at Abbey Gate, Afghanistan

Source: United States Attorneys General 9

Note: View the affidavit and complaint here.

On March 2, 2025, the United States charged Mohammad Sharifullah, also known as “Jafar,” a member of the terrorist organization the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham-Khorasan Province (ISIS-K), with providing and conspiring to provide material support and resources to a designated foreign terrorist organization resulting in death, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B. Sharifullah has been arrested and is expected to appear in the Eastern District of Virginia on March 5, 2025.

“This evil ISIS-K terrorist orchestrated the brutal murder of 13 heroic Marines,” said Attorney General Pamela Bondi. “Under President Trump’s strong leadership on the world stage, this Department of Justice will ensure that terrorists like Mohammad Sharifullah have no safe haven, no second chances, and no worse enemy than the United States of America.”

“The lethal attack that killed 13 American service members and Afghan civilians during the U.S. troop withdrawal from Afghanistan was an act of terrorism,” said FBI Director Kash Patel. “ISIS-K brazenly claimed responsibility for the carnage. Now thanks to the assistance of the FBI, Department of Justice, and the CIA, we have secured Sharifullah’s apprehension and transport to the U.S. to face American justice. The FBI will never forget the loss of these American heroes, we will continue to hunt down those who viciously murdered our warriors, we will find all responsible and bring them to justice.”

“The charges announced today carry an unmistakable message: the commitment of the United States to hold accountable all who facilitate and carry out acts of terror against us will never waver,” said U.S. Attorney Erik S Siebert for the Eastern District of Virginia. “Our message to those who have been impacted by these horrific crimes is that you are not forgotten. We will continue to pursue justice no matter how long or how far it takes us.”

On Aug. 26, 2021, American and other Coalition military forces were conducting an evacuation operation at Hamid Karzai International Airport in Kabul, Afghanistan. Abbey Gate was the main entry point for the operation. Thousands of civilians were at Abbey Gate for evacuation.

At approximately 5:36 p.m., ISIS-K member Abdul Rahman al-Logari detonated a body-worn suicide bomb at Abbey Gate, killing 13 U.S. military service members and approximately 160 civilians.

During an interview with FBI Special Agents on March 2, 2025, after waiving his Miranda rights, Sharifullah admitted to helping prepare for the Abbey Gate attack, including scouting a route near the airport for an attacker. Sharifullah specifically checked for law enforcement and American or Taliban checkpoints; he then communicated to other ISIS-K members that he believed the route was clear and that the attacker would not be detected. Sharifullah also admitted to recognizing al-Logari as an ISIS-K operative he had previously known.

During his interview with the FBI, Sharifullah also admitted to supporting and conducting activities on behalf of ISIS-K in multiple other lethal attacks.

On June 20, 2016, a suicide bomber acting for ISIS-K detonated a bomb that killed over ten embassy guards and multiple civilians and wounded other soldiers guarding the Canadian embassy in Kabul. ISIS claimed responsibility for the attack. As alleged in the complaint, prior to the attack, Sharifullah conducted surveillance to prepare the suicide bomber and later transported the bomber to the attack area.

On March 22, 2024, a group of ISIS-K gunmen attacked Crocus City Hall near Moscow, Russia. The attack killed approximately 130 people and injured numerous others. Russian authorities arrested four gunmen in connection with the attack. During his interview with the FBI, Sharifullah admitted that, on behalf of ISIS-K, he had shared instructions on how to use AK-style rifles and other weapons to would-be attackers. Sharifullah also admitted to recognizing two of the four arrested gunmen as those he had previously instructed.

If convicted, Sharifullah faces a maximum penalty of life in prison. A federal district court judge will determine any sentence after considering the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors.

Assistant U.S. Attorneys Michael P. Ben’Ary and Troy A. Edwards, Jr., for the Eastern District of Virginia and Trial Attorneys Alicia Cook, Charles Kovats, and Ryan White for the Department of Justice’s National Security Division are prosecuting the case.

The details described above are allegations. All defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law.

MIL Security OSI –

March 5, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: Security News: United States Arrests ISIS-K Attack Planner for Role in Killing of U.S. Military Service Members at Abbey Gate, Afghanistan

Source: United States Department of Justice 2

Note: View the affidavit and complaint here.

On March 2, 2025, the United States charged Mohammad Sharifullah, also known as “Jafar,” a member of the terrorist organization the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham-Khorasan Province (ISIS-K), with providing and conspiring to provide material support and resources to a designated foreign terrorist organization resulting in death, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B. Sharifullah has been arrested and is expected to appear in the Eastern District of Virginia on March 5, 2025.

“This evil ISIS-K terrorist orchestrated the brutal murder of 13 heroic Marines,” said Attorney General Pamela Bondi. “Under President Trump’s strong leadership on the world stage, this Department of Justice will ensure that terrorists like Mohammad Sharifullah have no safe haven, no second chances, and no worse enemy than the United States of America.”

“The lethal attack that killed 13 American service members and Afghan civilians during the U.S. troop withdrawal from Afghanistan was an act of terrorism,” said FBI Director Kash Patel. “ISIS-K brazenly claimed responsibility for the carnage. Now thanks to the assistance of the FBI, Department of Justice, and the CIA, we have secured Sharifullah’s apprehension and transport to the U.S. to face American justice. The FBI will never forget the loss of these American heroes, we will continue to hunt down those who viciously murdered our warriors, we will find all responsible and bring them to justice.”

“The charges announced today carry an unmistakable message: the commitment of the United States to hold accountable all who facilitate and carry out acts of terror against us will never waver,” said U.S. Attorney Erik S Siebert for the Eastern District of Virginia. “Our message to those who have been impacted by these horrific crimes is that you are not forgotten. We will continue to pursue justice no matter how long or how far it takes us.”

On Aug. 26, 2021, American and other Coalition military forces were conducting an evacuation operation at Hamid Karzai International Airport in Kabul, Afghanistan. Abbey Gate was the main entry point for the operation. Thousands of civilians were at Abbey Gate for evacuation.

At approximately 5:36 p.m., ISIS-K member Abdul Rahman al-Logari detonated a body-worn suicide bomb at Abbey Gate, killing 13 U.S. military service members and approximately 160 civilians.

During an interview with FBI Special Agents on March 2, 2025, after waiving his Miranda rights, Sharifullah admitted to helping prepare for the Abbey Gate attack, including scouting a route near the airport for an attacker. Sharifullah specifically checked for law enforcement and American or Taliban checkpoints; he then communicated to other ISIS-K members that he believed the route was clear and that the attacker would not be detected. Sharifullah also admitted to recognizing al-Logari as an ISIS-K operative he had previously known.

During his interview with the FBI, Sharifullah also admitted to supporting and conducting activities on behalf of ISIS-K in multiple other lethal attacks.

On June 20, 2016, a suicide bomber acting for ISIS-K detonated a bomb that killed over ten embassy guards and multiple civilians and wounded other soldiers guarding the Canadian embassy in Kabul. ISIS claimed responsibility for the attack. As alleged in the complaint, prior to the attack, Sharifullah conducted surveillance to prepare the suicide bomber and later transported the bomber to the attack area.

On March 22, 2024, a group of ISIS-K gunmen attacked Crocus City Hall near Moscow, Russia. The attack killed approximately 130 people and injured numerous others. Russian authorities arrested four gunmen in connection with the attack. During his interview with the FBI, Sharifullah admitted that, on behalf of ISIS-K, he had shared instructions on how to use AK-style rifles and other weapons to would-be attackers. Sharifullah also admitted to recognizing two of the four arrested gunmen as those he had previously instructed.

If convicted, Sharifullah faces a maximum penalty of life in prison. A federal district court judge will determine any sentence after considering the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors.

Assistant U.S. Attorneys Michael P. Ben’Ary and Troy A. Edwards, Jr., for the Eastern District of Virginia and Trial Attorneys Alicia Cook, Charles Kovats, and Ryan White for the Department of Justice’s National Security Division are prosecuting the case.

The details described above are allegations. All defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law.

MIL Security OSI –

March 5, 2025
MIL-OSI: Mavenir and e& UAE Announce Multi-Year Strategic Technology Partnership at #MWC25 Starting with Collaboration in Converged 5G Packet Core

Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

BARCELONA, Spain, March 05, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Mavenir, the cloud-native network infrastructure provider, and e& UAE, telecom arm of global technology group e&, announced a collaboration to advance e& UAE’s future of cloud-native converged packet core networks across 4G, 5G (NSA and SA) at Mobile World Congress in Barcelona. This marks a significant milestone in the journey towards next-generation connectivity and digital transformation.

This long-term partnership leverages cutting-edge technologies and advanced features, including AI-enabled 5G services, automation, and orchestration. This robust infrastructure is designed to support a wide range of future use cases, from enhanced mobile broadband and ultra-reliable low-latency communications to massive machine-type communications.

With Mavenir and e& UAE coming together, it sets the stage for innovative use cases, including smart cities, autonomous vehicles, industrial IoT, and immersive AR/VR experiences using the latest AI technology. The converged packet core environment ensures seamless transition and readiness for 6G capabilities, paving the way for future advancements in connectivity supporting the expanding business needs of e& UAE.

Pardeep Kohli, President and CEO of Mavenir: “We are thrilled to partner with e& UAE in deploying a state-of-the-art 5G core network. This collaboration underscores our commitment to driving innovation and delivering cutting-edge solutions that empower our customers. The advanced features and technologies integrated into this network will unlock new possibilities and set the foundation for future 6G capabilities.”

Khaled Al Suwaidi, core networks and platforms, e& UAE, said: “Our successful collaboration with Mavenir marks a significant step forward in our mission to provide world-class connectivity and digital services to our customers. The deployment of this advanced 5G core network not only enhances our current offerings but also positions us at the forefront of technological innovation. We look forward to exploring new areas together in AI, automation, orchestration, digital BSS, and RCS, to continue delivering exceptional value to our customers.”

Mavenir and e& UAE are committed to ongoing collaboration in various domains to drive continuous innovation and deliver transformative digital experiences to customers across the region.

About Mavenir

Mavenir is building the future of networks today with cloud-native, AI-enabled solutions which are green by design, empowering operators to realize the benefits of 5G and achieve intelligent, automated, programmable networks. As the pioneer of Open RAN and a proven industry disruptor, Mavenir’s award-winning solutions are delivering automation and monetization across mobile networks globally, accelerating software network transformation for 300+ Communications Service Providers in over 120 countries, which serve more than 50% of the world’s subscribers. For more information, please visit www.mavenir.com

About e& UAE

e& UAE is the flagship telecom arm of e& in the UAE, built on a 5-decades legacy of connectivity excellence. Our mission is to deliver world-class superior connectivity experiences that fuel the UAE’s future-focused innovation.

Leveraging the latest world-class technologies, e& UAE aims to transform lives and industries, turning every connection into an opportunity for growth and every interaction into a transformative possibility.

We are focused on expanding our core services and digital marketplaces by enriching consumer value propositions that cater to new lifestyles and emerging demands beyond core telecom services, including health, insurance and gaming.

As a trusted enterprise partner, e& UAE continues to power entire industries with 5G and AI, delivering a tailored ecosystem of solutions to meet their connectivity needs and more, empowering them to automate, innovate, transform, and scale.

Strengthening our leadership position as an AI-powered telco, e& UAE delivers seamless connectivity, cutting-edge AI solutions, and sustainable innovation to uplift people and communities, and empower businesses and industries, so everyone thrives in a digital-first world.

To learn more about e& UAE, please visit: https://www.etisalat.ae

Media Contacts

For more information, please contact:

A photo accompanying this announcement is available at https://www.globenewswire.com/NewsRoom/AttachmentNg/5719a435-212f-48b7-b56f-e318b5f9a125

The MIL Network –

March 5, 2025
MIL-Evening Report: Safe for autocracy: the world according to Putin and Trump

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Matthew Sussex, Associate Professor (Adj), Griffith Asia Institute; and Fellow, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University

What does an ideal world look like for Russian President Vladimir Putin and his US counterpart Donald Trump? In a word: ugly.

Trump’s embrace of Russia’s dictator, his bullying of a weakened Ukraine, his musings about new US territorial conquests, and his dismantling of US democratic institutions would, in any other age, have resulted in his immediate removal from office.

And yet he has succeeded in beating his political opponents into submission, while his cultish following applauds every fresh outrage he visits on America’s friends, and every undeserved boon he grants its enemies.

American interests?

When discussing foreign policy, we typically use the term “national interests” to frame our understanding of what countries want, and the enablers and constraints that affect their chances of achieving it. Essentially, we to try to identify some parameters about what countries can, can’t, and might do.

It assumes that factors such as economic heft, military capability, natural resources, alliance networks and geopolitical position all create a kind of baseline unique to each nation. It also assumes a fair amount of continuity in foreign policy, as new governments invariably face the same kinds of challenges and opportunities as past ones.

And crucially, it assumes leaders will recognise it: that in democracies, for instance, elected public servants will continue acting in the broader public good.

Not so for Trump. His behaviour is far more reminiscent of Putin’s. Like the Russian autocrat he idolises, Trump’s main domestic and foreign agendas revolve around his personal fortune, cementing his political power, and creating a narrative that existential forces – as well as internal enemies – are to blame for America’s problems.

By presenting himself as the nation’s only possible saviour, Trump is directly plagiarising the Putin playbook.

Like Russia’s tsar in all but name, Trump is creating an image of the state in which regime security and national security are innately linked. In that way, America First and Trump First are not just compatible, but actually synonymous.

Trajectories of power

Where the two differ, though, is that Putin’s recipe for dominating Russian politics has tended to increase his country’s raw national power, rather than diminishing it.

Certainly, Putin’s renationalisation of Russia’s energy sector helped turn Russia into a petro-giant. That Putin has remained at the top of Russian politics for so long has been at least partly because he has distributed Russian wealth beyond a clique of oligarchs.

The result was a larger middle class, apathetic to politics and tolerant of dictatorship, as long as living standards were improving.

At the same time, Putin’s erosion of freedoms created powerful disincentives to express any opposition to his regime. After all, when criticising Russia’s “special military operation” in Ukraine can lead to beatings, ostracism from society, being sent to the front, or a prison sentence of up to 15 years, where’s the value in speaking out?

There are plenty of signs that Trump would like to emulate Putin’s progress. From installing loyalists in the military and the ostensibly independent Department of Justice and FBI, coupled with threats against freedom of the press, his subversion of US democracy looks eerily familiar.

But Trump’s recipe for success looks almost certain to weaken the US, not strengthen it.

He has surrounded himself with completely unqualified supplicants in key roles, chosen on the basis of loyalty rather than competence.

Purges at the CIA are weakening America’s vaunted intelligence-gathering capabilities. Orders to stop cyber operations against Russia are an extraordinary own-goal.

Trump’s punishment of partners via tariffs – along with continued suggestions about annexing Canada, and his belittling of Prime Minister Justin Trudeau by calling him “governor” – are costing America friendships built on decades of trust.

These schisms are becoming evident across the Atlantic too. In France, for instance, even the far-right nationalist Marine Le Pen has criticised Trump’s standover tactics in suspending military aid to Ukraine. A recent French poll found that fully 73% of respondents believed Trump’s US was no longer an ally.

A new age of empires

The recent – and historically breathtaking – statement by Putin’s press secretary, Dmitry Peskov, that Russian and US worldviews now largely align speaks volumes about the kind of world both regimes now agree on.

It is, put simply, a new Age of Empires. This has long been a central theme of Russian geopolitical propaganda: that all major decisions affecting the world should be taken in only three of its capitals: Moscow, Beijing and Washington.

In this brutal order, the strong do as they will, and the weak do as they must. It envisages a world cleaved into spheres of influence, with Russia permitted to run rampant over Eastern Europe, the US dominating the Americas and the East Pacific, and China as a hybrid maritime and continental power exerting hegemony in Asia.

So how worried should we be? When we think of past global dangers, events such as the Cuban Missile Crisis come to mind. This is, of course, not the same: there isn’t the potential imminence of nuclear war.

But there should nonetheless be not just deep concern but also immediate action to inoculate ourselves, as best we can, from the slow-burn effect of a world made safe for autocracy rather than democracy.

There is also a legitimate counterargument that Trump’s bark is worse than his bite; that he will be a lame duck after the mid-term elections in 2026; and that all US allies need do is to keep a low profile until then.

That may have been an appropriately soothing sentiment during Trump’s first term, but in his second one it rings increasingly hollow.

For one thing, the goalposts have shifted. Trump has shown he will act with near-total impunity. He will doubtless try to manipulate elections, and he has shown before that he is perfectly prepared to reject their outcomes. For another, this time he will have not just a pliant legislature and cabinet, but also a loyal bureaucracy, and key supporters in law enforcement and military posts.

Given that, it is one thing to hope for the best. But it makes sense also to plan for the worst. If the past few weeks have taught us anything, it is to be prepared for virtually daily episodes of disappointment. Or, to put it bluntly: things will get worse before they get better.

Matthew Sussex has received funding from the Australian Research Council, the Atlantic Council, the Fulbright Foundation, the Carnegie Foundation, the Lowy Institute and various Australian government departments and agencies.

– ref. Safe for autocracy: the world according to Putin and Trump – https://theconversation.com/safe-for-autocracy-the-world-according-to-putin-and-trump-251246

MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

March 5, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Republican Senators Reintroduce Bill to Increase Accountability at Federal Prisons

US Senate News:

Source: United States Senator for Kentucky Mitch McConnell
Washington, D.C. – U.S. Senator Mitch McConnell (R-KY), alongside Senators Rand Paul (R-KY), Chuck Grassley (R-IA), Marsha Blackburn (R-TN), and James Lankford (R-OK) announced the introduction of the Federal Prisons Accountability Act of 2025. This bill would bring greater accountability to our nation’s federal prisons by requiring the Director of the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) to be confirmed by the U.S. Senate.
Currently, the BOP Director is not subject to Senate confirmation despite having significant authority over taxpayer dollars and federal personnel. Unlike most U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) administrators and directors, the BOP Director is appointed by the U.S. Attorney General – not the President – without Senate consideration.
The Federal Prisons Accountability Act of 2025 would require the President to appoint the BOP Director with the advice and consent of the Senate. The legislation would also delineate any newly confirmed BOP Director’s tenure to a single, 10-year term at the head of the Bureau.
“The Senate plays a vital role in staffing the federal government, evaluating the qualifications of more than a thousand presidential nominees to ensure transparency and accountability. The Director of the Bureau of Prisons oversees thousands of employees and a multi-billion dollar budget, and should be subject to Senate review and confirmation as well,” said Senator McConnell. “Our bill would extend the Senate’s advice and consent role to the Bureau of Prisons Director and expand supervision over this federal agency. The thousands of Americans – and hundreds of Kentuckians – employed by the Bureau of Prisons deserve Senate oversight and an added layer of protection from harm.”
“No agency as large as the Bureau of Prisons should have so little accountability. Our bill ensures the concerns of those who work in prisons are heard and acted upon and will provide much needed Senate oversight of a taxpayer funded system,” said Dr. Paul.
“The Director of the Bureau of Prisons oversees a massive budget and thousands of employees, including many Iowans. It’s a significant responsibility that requires serious oversight to protect inmates and employees from mismanagement or abuse. Requiring the BOP Director to face Senate confirmation would bring much needed transparency and accountability to the federal prison system,” Senator Grassley said.
“Any government agency that has over 30,000 employees, manages a multi-billion dollar budget, and directly impacts thousands of lives should not be exempt from Senate oversight,” said Senator Blackburn. “This bipartisan bill extends the Senate’s duty of advice and consent to the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, fostering greater transparency for employees and further protecting taxpayer dollars in the federal prison system.”
“The Senate confirmation process ensures that Oklahoman voices are heard. Requiring Senate confirmation will improve transparency and give taxpayers the accountability they deserve,” said Senator Lankford.
The BOP Director supervises the federal prison employees who serve in over 120 facilities across the country working under hazardous conditions to protect the public from harm. The legislation announced today would subject the Director to the same congressional scrutiny as other top law enforcement agency chiefs within the DOJ, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) Directors and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Administrator. By extending Senate consideration to the BOP Director, this legislation would encourage the Bureau to provide greater responsiveness to the safety needs of its dedicated federal corrections workers.

MIL OSI USA News –

March 5, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: Reeds Woman Sentenced to 12 Years for Meth Conspiracy

Source: United States Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms and Explosives (ATF)

SPRINGFIELD, Mo. – A Reeds, Mo., woman was sentenced in federal court today for her role in a conspiracy to distribute large quantities of methamphetamine in southwest Missouri.

Kimberly C. Elliott, 45, was sentenced by U.S. District Judge M. Douglas Harpool to 12 years in federal prison without parole.

On June 8, 2023, Elliott pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine and one count of money laundering.

Elliott admitted that she participated in a conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine in Barry, Stone, Polk, Lawrence, Greene, Jasper, and Newton Counties from Nov. 1, 2020, to April 28, 2022. According to court documents, Elliott personally distributed more than 16 pounds of methamphetamine, an extremely conservative estimate for her involvement. During this conspiracy, law enforcement seized more than 30 pounds of methamphetamine from various co-conspirators.

Elliott sold 62 grams of methamphetamine to an undercover law enforcement officer on May 3, 2021. At the time of that transaction, Elliott was in possession of at least an additional pound of methamphetamine.

On May 12, 2021, Elliott traded her red Chevrolet Colorado for a black 2017 Ford Explorer. Elliott purchased this vehicle with approximately $15,000 from the proceeds of unlawful methamphetamine distribution. Elliott was arrested while driving the Explorer without a driver’s license on June 16, 2021. Elliott had approximately 60 grams of methamphetamine, approximately nine grams of marijuana, and six hydrocodone tablets in her purse. A user quantity of suspected heroin and methamphetamine was located in the driver’s side door pocket of the vehicle, and approximately $7,165 in cash was found in a zipper bag between the driver’s seat and center console.

Elliott told investigators she had obtained one pound of methamphetamine approximately two days prior to the traffic stop from a co-conspirator, and what was located in her vehicle was what was left from that transaction. Elliott stated she had been purchasing methamphetamine for the past two months and estimated she had purchased between five and 10 pounds of methamphetamine. She also investigators that conspirators were receiving shipments of 250 pounds of methamphetamine every two weeks from California.

Elliott is among 20 defendants who have been convicted in this case, and the fourth defendant to be sentenced.

This case is being prosecuted by Assistant U.S. Attorney Jessica R. Eatmon. It was investigated by the Missouri State Highway Patrol, the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, the FBI, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the Ozarks Drug Enforcement Team, the Barry County, Mo., Sheriff’s Office, the Stone County, Mo., Sheriff’s Office, COMET (the Combined Ozark Multi-Jurisdictional Enforcement Team), the Oklahoma Highway Patrol, the Greene County, Mo., Sheriff’s Office, the Polk County, Mo., Sheriff’s Office, the Ottawa County, Ok., Sheriff’s Department, the Bolivar, Mo., Police Department, the Cassville, Mo., Police Department, the Kimberling City, Mo., Police Department, the Springfield, Mo., Police Department, and the U.S. Marshals Service.

Organized Crime and Drug Enforcement Task Force

This case is part of an Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETF) operation. OCDETF identifies, disrupts, and dismantles the highest-level criminal organizations that threaten the United States using a prosecutor-led, intelligence-driven, multi-agency approach. Additional information about the OCDETF Program can be found at https://www.justice.gov/OCDETF.

MIL Security OSI –

March 5, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: Salem Man Sentenced to Federal Prison for Trafficking Fentanyl

Source: Office of United States Attorneys

PORTLAND, Ore.—A Mexican national residing in Salem, Oregon, was sentenced to federal prison Monday for his role in trafficking fentanyl and other narcotics in Oregon.

Leonel Covarrubias Hernandez, 48, was sentenced to 144 months in federal prison and five years’ supervised release.

According to court documents, as part of a drug trafficking investigation, investigators identified Covarrubias as a narcotics distributer operating in Oregon. Between August and December 2022, investigators conducted several controlled buys in which Covarrubias sold counterfeit oxycodone pills containing fentanyl.

On December 27, 2022, investigators conducted a traffic stop on Covarrubias and his co-conspirator near their residence. Investigators searched the vehicle and seized counterfeit pills containing fentanyl, more than $11,000 in cash, and a firearm. On the same day, investigators located and seized more than 29 pounds of methamphetamine, 11 pounds of fentanyl, 12 pounds of cocaine and two pounds of heroin, 24 firearms, a 3D printer, and more than $43,000 in cash from the residence.

On November 18, 2024, Covarrubias pleaded guilty to possessing fentanyl with the intent to distribute.

This case was investigated by the FBI and Salem Police Department. It was prosecuted by Bryan Chinwuba, Assistant U.S. Attorney for the District of Oregon.

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March 5, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: Former Honolulu City Officials Admit They Conspired to Secretly Pay Corrupt Former Chief of Honolulu Police Department $250,000

Source: Office of United States Attorneys

HONOLULU, Hawaii – Former Honolulu City Attorney Donna Leong and former Honolulu Police Commission Chair Max Sword pleaded guilty in federal court today, admitting that they conspired to illegally pay then-Honolulu Police Chief Louis Kealoha $250,000 from city coffers without the approval of the Honolulu City Council while he was under federal investigation for corruption.

Additionally, former Honolulu City Manager Roy Amemiya entered a deferred prosecution agreement for his role in the same conspiracy.

The defendants were immediately sentenced to time served and were ordered to pay $250,000 in restitution to the city.

The resolution of these cases marks the end of a decade-long series of public corruption prosecutions in Honolulu, which began with the investigation and conviction of Chief Kealoha and former Honolulu prosecutor Katherine Kealoha.

According to court documents, Leong, Sword, and Amemiya admitted that they conspired in their official capacities as Honolulu city officials to reach a settlement agreement for the retirement of then-Police Chief Kealoha while he was under federal investigation for corruption. The defendants also paid Kealoha $250,000 from the city’s purse without first seeking and obtaining the approval of the Honolulu City Council, which was required by city laws. Leong, Sword, and Amemiya admitted that their decision not to seek and obtain City Council approval violated the law and deprived the citizens of Honolulu of their due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of a hearing before, and approval by, their elected City Council for the use of city funds.

Following their guilty pleas, Leong and Sword were sentenced by U.S. District Judge Leslie E. Kobayashi to time served and one year of supervised release. During today’s hearing, Judge Kobayashi characterized Leong and Sword’s actions as “truly misguided” and reprimanded them for exercising a “complete disregard for the separation of powers” by not presenting the settlement agreement to City Council. She further stated that their actions caused “serious harm” to the community of Honolulu.

As part of a deferred prosecution agreement, in addition to admitting his involvement in the criminal conspiracy, Amemiya’s agreement requires him to comply with certain conditions for a period of two years, including completion of 200 hours of community service and restriction from holding public office. Per the terms of his deferred prosecution agreement, if he complies in full for two years, the charges against Amemiya will be dismissed.

Importantly, all three defendants agreed to pay restitution in the amount of $250,000 to the City and County of Honolulu—the exact amount of taxpayer money paid to then-Chief Kealoha as part of the unlawful settlement agreement.

The conclusion of the criminal case against Leong, Sword, and Amemiya is the last in a decade-long series of public corruption prosecutions in Hawaii conducted by the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of California, which prosecuted these cases after the District of Hawaii was recused. These prosecutions have charged and convicted over a dozen individuals, most of whom were public officials or persons of prominence in Honolulu, including the Kealohas, Honolulu police officers, and anesthesiologist Rudy Puana, Katherine Kealoha’s brother. The resolution of the charges against Leong, Sword, and Amemiya marks a historic end to this journey of seeking justice for the citizens of Honolulu.

“After a decade-long battle against public corruption in Hawaii, we have successfully brought numerous cases to a close. This achievement is a testament to the unwavering dedication of our law enforcement partners, the prosecutors, our legal support staff, and the community,” said Acting U.S. Attorney Andrew R. Haden. “Together, we have demonstrated that no one is above the law. Hopefully, our efforts have also restored some faith in law enforcement and local government for the Hawaiian community. But let these cases also be a reminder, the fight against corruption must never end. The Department of Justice has a proud history and stands ready to fight for the principles of justice and fairness for all.”

“The cases against these three defendants are the last among a decade-long series of public corruption prosecutions in Hawaii,” said FBI Honolulu Special Agent in Charge David Porter. “I am proud of the agents and prosecutors who devoted years to these investigations—their tireless efforts reflect our continued commitment to root out corruption in our communities.”

This case and the series of public corruption cases brought over the last decade were led by Special Attorneys Michael G. Wheat, Joseph J.M. Orabona, Janaki G. Chopra, Colin M. McDonald and Andrew Y. Chiang.

DEFENDANTS                                             Case Number 21cr00142-LEK

Donna Yuk Lan Leong                                   Age: 69                                   Honolulu, HI

Max John Sword                                             Age: 73                                   Honolulu, HI

Roy Keiji Amemiya, Jr.                                  Age: 69                                   Honolulu, HI

SUMMARY OF CHARGES

Conspiracy to Deprive Rights under Color of Law – Title 18, U.S.C., Sections 371 and 242

Maximum penalty: One year in prison and $100,000 fine

INVESTIGATING AGENCY

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Honolulu Division

MIL Security OSI –

March 5, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: King Highlighting Veterans Staffing Cuts: “Those Operating with a Scalpel have a Better Chance of Saving Lives than those Operating with a Chainsaw”

US Senate News:

Source: United States Senator for Maine Angus King
WASHINGTON, D.C. – Today, U.S. Senator Angus King (I-ME) discussed the latest Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) staffing cuts throughout the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) with leadership from the Veterans of Foreign Wars. In a discussion with Alfred J. “Al” Lipphardt, King asked about the denial of benefits resulting from these DOGE cuts and how those cuts are also affecting employment of veterans who put their life on the line for our country.
The conversation comes as the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) has dismissed 1,000 probationary federal employees and announced plans to cut an additional 1,400 probationary employees in a second round of layoffs — all part of the current Administration’s reckless efforts to trim the federal workforce. Additionally, job cuts across federal agencies are disproportionally impacting veterans who make up nearly 30% of the federal workforce. In back-to-back joint hearings last week of the Senate Veterans Affairs Committee (SVAC) and the House Veterans Affairs Committee (HVAC), Senator King also sounded the alarm on the detrimental impact these reckless firings will have on veteran care and support.
Senator King began the discussion by sharing the impacts of the firings on veteran care and employment.
Senator King began, “These staffing cuts, there have actually been 2400 firings at the V.A., but then there was a hiring freeze that left a couple of thousand places open, so we are really down 5000 people in the last month at the V.A. Here’s how random it is. At first, they were going to have the hiring freeze apply to doctors and nurses. Then they said no, those are direct care workers, we will exempt them. If nobody is there to answer the phone when a veteran calls for an appointment, that’s a denial of benefits.
“Yes, sir,” Commander Lipphardt said.
Senator King responded, “The point has been made, 30% of federal employees are veterans, so when you see a headline that says 1000 people were fired at the CIA, wherever it is, that’s 300 veterans. In our hospital, Togus, in Maine, we had seven people laid off. Five were veterans. That’s a hell of a way to treat someone who put their life on the line for the country.”
Senator King then pointed out that skillful and thoughtful department trim downs would be much better for the care of our service members and veterans.
Senator King concluded, “You put it well in your statement, you said ‘I was wounded in combat during Vietnam and am thankful that the medics who treated me chose not to take my whole arm for the sake of efficiency. It took a trained eye and a skillful hand, human intuition to fix me up and get me back in the fight. In my experience, those operating with a scalpel have a better chance of saving lives than those who operate with a chainsaw.’ Thank you, Mr. Commander, for making that statement.”
Representing one of the states with the highest rates of military families and veterans per capita, Senator King has been a staunch advocate for America’s servicemembers and veterans. A member of the Senate Veterans’ Affairs Committee (SVAC), he works to ensure American veterans receive their earned benefits and that the VA is properly implementing various programs such as the PACT Act, the State Veterans Homes Domiciliary Care Flexibility Act, and the John Scott Hannon Act.
In February, in a letter to VA Secretary Doug Collins, Senator King joined his colleagues in urging for immediate action to secure veterans’ personal information provided by VA or other agencies to Elon Musk and his “Department of Government Efficiency” (DOGE), a measure that would protect millions of veterans’ medical records stored in VA’s computer systems. Previously, Senator King introduced the Lethal Means Safe Storage for Veteran Suicide Prevention Act to provide firearm storage to veterans in an effort to reduce suicides among the veteran population. In addition, he helped pass the Veterans COLA Act, which increased benefits for 30,000 Maine veterans and their families. Recently, Senator King introduced bipartisan legislation alongside SVAC Chairman Senator Jerry Moran (R-KS) to improve care coordination for veterans who rely on both VA health care and Medicare.
Last week, Senator King was honored by the Disabled American Veterans as its 2025 Legislator of the Year. Last year, he was recognized by the Wounded Warrior Project as the 2024 Legislator of the Year for his “outstanding legislative effort and achievement to improve the lives of the wounded, ill, and injured veterans.”

MIL OSI USA News –

March 5, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: Recidivist felon sentenced to over nine years in prison after being arrested in possession of four firearms

Source: Office of United States Attorneys

RICHMOND, Va. – A Richmond man was sentenced today to nine years and two months in prison for being a felon in possession of a firearm.

According to court documents, on April 19, 2024, agents with the FBI Capital Area Human Trafficking Task Force arrested Herman Leroy Mallory Jr., 40, on outstanding warrants from Louisa County. When agents removed Mallory from the vehicle, they observed in plain view a handgun on top of the speaker deck and another handgun partially covered with a t-shirt on the floorboard.

During a search of the vehicle, investigators recovered two rifles, a 50-round drum magazine, and additional ammunition and firearm magazines. They also discovered a pack containing baggies of narcotics, including 27.51 grams of cocaine, 9.46 grams of a mixture containing methamphetamine, 0.62 grams of fentanyl, and 6.27 grams of a mixture containing heroin, methamphetamine, cocaine, and fentanyl.

Mallory previously was convicted of felony larceny, grand larceny, conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine base, and conspiracy to commit breaking and entering. As a previously convicted felon, he cannot legally possess firearms or ammunition.

On April 30, 2024, a victim reported to police that a rifle had been stolen from his home approximately three weeks earlier when Mallory had been a guest in his home. On June 9, 2024, the victim contacted police again to report that three other firearms had been stolen. Mallory admitted to law enforcement that the handgun observed on top of the speaker deck in his vehicle and one of the recovered rifles had come from the victim.

Erik S. Siebert, U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia; Anthony A. Spotswood, Special Agent in Charge of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives Washington Field Division; and Jason S. Miyares, Attorney General of Virginia, made the announcement after sentencing by Senior U.S. District Judge John A. Gibney Jr.

Special Assistant U.S. Attorney Eric Gilliland, an Assistant Attorney General with the Virginia Attorney General’s Office, and Assistant U.S. Attorney Stephen W. Miller prosecuted the case.

A copy of this press release is located on the website of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of Virginia. Related court documents and information are located on the website of the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia or on PACER by searching for Case No. 3:24-cr-149.

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March 5, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: Pine Ridge Man Sentenced to Over 21 Years in Federal Prison for Sexual Abuse

Source: Office of United States Attorneys

RAPID CITY – United States Attorney Alison J. Ramsdell announced today that U.S. District Judge Camela C. Theeler has sentenced a Pine Ridge, South Dakota, man convicted of Sexual Abuse. The sentencing took place on February 10, 2025.

Kaleb Mills, a/k/a Kayleb Mills, age 31, was sentenced to 21 years and 10 months in federal prison, followed by five years of supervised release, and ordered to pay a $100 special assessment to the Federal Crime Victims Fund.

A federal grand jury indicted Mills in March 2024. He pleaded guilty on October 2, 2024.

The conviction stems from Mills sending a Facebook message to a 17-year-old female asking her if she wanted to hang out. She agreed and Mills found her a ride from her house to his house at Pine Ridge. That evening, he injected the female with methamphetamine. While she was under the influence of the methamphetamine and unable to consent to sexual activity, Mills engaged in sexual activity with her. Mills was previously convicted of a similar charge in 2013.

This case was brought as part of Project Safe Childhood, a nationwide initiative to combat the growing epidemic of child sexual exploitation and abuse, launched in May 2006 by the Department of Justice. Led by the U.S. Attorneys’ Offices and the DOJ’s Child Exploitation and Obscenity Section, Project Safe Childhood marshals federal, state, and local resources to locate, apprehend, and prosecute individuals who exploit children, as well as identify and rescue victims. For more information about Project Safe Childhood, please visit https://www.justice.gov/psc.

This matter was prosecuted by the U.S. Attorney’s Office because the Major Crimes Act, a federal statute, mandates that certain violent crimes alleged to have occurred in Indian country be prosecuted in Federal court as opposed to State court.

This case was investigated by the FBI. Assistant U.S. Attorney Megan Poppen prosecuted the case.

Mills was immediately remanded to the custody of the U.S. Marshals Service.

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March 5, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: Ex-Girlfriend of Crypto ‘Godfather’ Agrees to Plead Guilty to Tax Charge for Failing to Report More Than $2.6 Million in Illicit Income

Source: Office of United States Attorneys

LOS ANGELES – The former girlfriend of a cryptocurrency fraudster who dubbed himself “The Godfather” has agreed to plead guilty to a federal criminal tax charge for failing to report more than $2.6 million in ill-gotten gains she obtained via her then-boyfriend’s criminal activities, the Justice Department announced today.

Iris Ramaya Au, 35, of Irvine, is charged in a single-count information with subscribing to a false tax return.

Au has agreed to plead guilty to the felony charge and is expected to make her initial appearance in United States District Court in downtown Los Angeles in the coming days.

According to Au’s plea agreement, from 2020 to 2024, Iza committed a series of crimes, including fraudulently obtaining access to advertising accounts and lines of credit provided by Facebook Inc. and Meta Platforms Inc. and selling access to those accounts. Iza obtained millions of dollars of unreported income as a result of these schemes.

Separately, Iza engaged active Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department (LASD) deputies to provide private security for him and caused the deputies, among other things, to obtain court-authorized search warrants and confidential law enforcement information targeting people with whom Iza had financial and personal disputes.

At Iza’s direction, Au created shell corporations and opened bank accounts in the names of those entities. She then used the illicit funds placed into those accounts to pay approximately $1 million to the deputies, mostly in cash, purchase or lease luxury real estate, cars, jewelry, and clothing, pay for recreational activity for Iza and herself valued at nearly $10 million, and acquire approximately $16 million in cryptocurrency for Iza.

Au admitted in her plea agreement that she transferred more than $2.6 million from these various accounts to her personal bank accounts during the period 2020 through 2023, income that she willfully failed to report to the IRS on her federal tax returns.

After pleading guilty, Au will face up to three years in federal prison.

On January 30, Iza appeared before a federal judge and pleaded guilty to a first superseding information charging him with conspiracy against rights, wire fraud, and tax evasion. His sentencing hearing is scheduled for June 16, at which time he will face up to 35 years in federal prison. Iza has been in federal custody since September 2024.

IRS Criminal Investigation and the FBI are investigating this matter.

Assistant United States Attorneys Daniel J. O’Brien and J. Jamari Buxton of the Public Corruption and Civil Rights Section, and Assistant United States Attorney Maxwell K. Coll of the Cyber and Intellectual Property Crimes Section are prosecuting this case.

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March 5, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: Former Jackson Police Department Officer Sentenced to 24 Months in Prison for Making a False Statement in the Acquisition of a Firearm

Source: Office of United States Attorneys

JACKSON, MS – Torrence Donell Mayfield, of Raymond, a former Jackson Police Department officer was sentenced today to 24 months in prison for making a false statement to a firearms dealer in the acquisition of a firearm. Mayfield was also ordered to pay a $5,000 fine.
According to court documents and statements in open court, Mayfield, 53, purchased a firearm for another person on October 26, 2021. That purchase was made at a pawn shop which is a Federal Firearms Licensee. Mayfield was required to complete a certain written form to purchase the firearm. On that written form, Mayfield indicated that he was purchasing the firearm for himself, not someone else. That statement was false. It is against federal law to make a false statement to a firearm dealer to acquire a firearm.
Acting U.S. Attorney Patrick A. Lemon of the Southern District of Mississippi; and Federal Bureau of Investigation Special Agent in Charge Robert A. Eikhoff made the announcement.
The FBI investigated the case.
Assistant U.S. Attorneys Herbert S. Carraway and Charles W. Kirkham prosecuted the case.

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March 5, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: Canadian Drug Traffickers Sentenced to Prison for Transporting Methamphetamine and Cocaine on Behalf of the Wolfpack Alliance

Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) State Crime Alerts (c)

Matthew Podolsky, the Acting United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, announced today that MICHAEL HABIB, an associate of the Canadian criminal organization known as the Wolfpack Alliance, was sentenced to 17 and a half years in prison for trafficking narcotics. HABIB pled guilty on December 20, 2023, before U.S. District Judge John P. Cronan, who imposed today’s sentence. HABIB’s sentencing follows the imposition of sentences of 18 years, 17 and a half years, and four and half years on his co-defendants, SURINDER SINGH CHEEMA, BHUPINDER SINGH VIRK, and CHRISTOPHER BURGOS, on December 19, 2024, July 17, 2024, and December 16, 2024, respectively.

Acting U.S. Attorney Matthew Podolsky said: “Wolfpack and its associates have spread drugs and violence in the United States and in Canada. Michael Habib and his co-conspirators are responsible for transporting thousands of kilograms of cocaine and methamphetamine across our northern border, ordering drug-related shootings and kidnappings, and attempting to smuggle wanted international hitmen into the United States from Canada. Today’s prison sentence will help protect the public from wanton violence and dangerous narcotics, and demonstrates our resolve to root out transnational criminal organizations like Wolfpack.”

FBI Assistant Director in Charge James E. Dennehy said: “The associates of the Wolfpack Alliance have all been rightly sentenced for establishing an international drug trafficking route to assist the flow of thousands of kilograms of methamphetamine and cocaine through our country into Canada. This conspiracy caused significant amounts of dangerous drugs to enter the United States, endangering the public’s safety. The FBI will continue to dismantle and hold accountable any criminal enterprise member, regardless of their origin, which utilizes our nation as an economic foothold and throughfare for their illegal operations.”

According to the Indictment, public filings, and statements made in court proceedings:

From at least in or about February 2022 through at least in or about November 2022, HABIB, CHEEMA, VIRK, BURGOS and others conspired to distribute narcotics by shipping thousands of kilograms of methamphetamine and cocaine across the U.S. and into Canada. In or about March 2022, law enforcement seized approximately 400 kilograms of cocaine shipped by the conspirators from a warehouse in New Jersey, and approximately 96 kilograms of cocaine and 86 kilograms of methamphetamine in the vicinity of Kansas City, Kansas. In connection with their guilty pleas, HABIB admitted to conspiring to distribute at least approximately 400 kilograms of cocaine; CHEEMA admitted to conspiring to distribute at least approximately 1.3 metric tons of methamphetamine and 764 kilograms of cocaine; VIRK admitted to conspiring to distribute at least approximately 1.1 metric tons of methamphetamine and 480 kilograms of cocaine; and BURGOS admitted to conspiring to distribute at least approximately 400 kilograms of cocaine.

The defendants engaged in additional criminal activities. HABIB and BURGOS, on behalf of the Wolfpack Alliance, assisted two Wolfpack-aligned hitmen, Gene Lahrkamp and Duncan Bailey, in their attempt to escape Canada and evade Canadian law enforcement, until Lahrkamp and Bailey were killed in an accidental plane crash in Canada on or about April 30, 2022. CHEEMA, in or about the spring of 2024, subsequent to his guilty plea and while awaiting sentencing at the Metropolitan Detention Center in Brooklyn, New York, directed his confederates in the greater Toronto, Canada area to conduct shootings and issue threats of violence in connection with drug debts. VIRK was arrested in or about November 2022 in California with three unregistered “ghost” guns and approximately $487,900 in cash.

* * *

In addition to their prison terms, HABIB, 38, of Toronto, Canada; CHEEMA, 31, of Brampton, Canada; VIRK, 31, of Fresno, California; and BURGOS, 36, of Brooklyn, New York, were sentenced to five, four, four, and three years of supervised release, respectively, and were ordered to forfeit $487,900 and a 2020 Mercedes Benz AMG GT63.

Mr. Podolsky praised the outstanding investigative work of the FBI and U.S. Customs and Border Protection. Mr. Podolsky further thanked the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and Peel Ontario Regional Police for their assistance and cooperation in the investigation.

This prosecution is part of an Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (“OCDETF”) operation. OCDETF identifies, disrupts, and dismantles criminal organizations using a prosecutor-led, intelligence-driven, multi-agency approach. Additional information about the OCDETF Program can be found at https://www.justice.gov/OCDETF.

This case is being handled by the Office’s Narcotics Unit. Assistant U.S. Attorneys Thomas S. Burnett, Jane Y. Chong, and Matthew R. Shahabian are in charge of the prosecution.

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March 5, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: Former CEO of Special Purpose Acquisition Company Charged with Accounting Fraud, Obstruction of Justice, and Perjury

Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) State Crime Alerts (c)

Matthew Podolsky, the Acting United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, and James E. Dennehy, the Assistant Director in Charge of the New York Field Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), announced today the unsealing of an Indictment charging VADIM KOMISSAROV, the former Chief Executive Officer of Trident Acquisitions Corp. (“TDAC”), a publicly traded special purpose acquisition company (“SPAC”), with engaging in a scheme to defraud TDAC investors and investors in TDAC’s successor company, Lottery.com Inc., by publicly reporting false and misleading revenue and business information. KOMISSAROV was arrested yesterday evening and will be presented this afternoon before U.S. Magistrate Judge Sarah Netburn. The case has been assigned to U.S. District Judge Alvin K. Hellerstein.

Acting U.S. Attorney Matthew Podolsky said: “As alleged, Vadim Komissarov, the former CEO of Trident Acquisitions Corp., engineered sham transactions and reported false and misleading revenue, all to ensure his SPAC merger went through and to make himself wealthy. To make matters worse, he tried to cover up his crimes by lying to the SEC under oath. This Office, and our partners at the FBI, will continue to pursue executives of public companies, including executives of SPACs, who defraud unsuspecting investors.”

FBI Assistant Director in Charge James E. Dennehy said: “Vadim Komissarov allegedly tried to secure a winning ticket by developing an elaborate scheme comprised of inflated profits, falsified transactions, and perjurious statements to sell company shares. Komissarov allegedly abused his authority as the company’s CEO to conjure a façade of success and interfere with an investigation into his suspected misconduct. The FBI will never permit any individual who attempts to unlawfully cash out at the expense of their investors’ money and trust.”

According to the allegations contained in the Indictment[1] unsealed today in Manhattan federal court:

From November 2020 through May 2022, KOMISSAROV engaged in a scheme to defraud TDAC investors and investors in TDAC’s successor company, Lottery.com Inc., by publicly reporting false and misleading revenue and business information about a prospective acquisition target and by profiting from the effect of the deception by selling shares of Lottery.com before other market participants realized the true state of the company (the “Revenue Scheme”).

The Revenue Scheme arose from an effort by KOMISSAROV to identify a suitable target for TDAC before TDAC reached a deadline to either use or return investor funds that had been raised to support an acquisition. In November 2020, KOMISSAROV settled on AutoLotto, Inc., d/b/a Lottery.com as a target for TDAC. To deceive TDAC shareholders about the nature of AutoLotto’s business, and to thereby secure their approval for TDAC’s acquisition of AutoLotto (the “Business Combination”), KOMISSAROV worked with others to improperly and misleadingly inflate AutoLotto’s revenue and to report those inflated figures to TDAC’s shareholders through public filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), which KOMISSAROV signed or caused to be filed as the principal executive, financial, and accounting officer of TDAC.

The Revenue Scheme created the false appearance of revenue-generating business activity for AutoLotto and later for Lottery.com through a series of sham transactions, including a fraudulent $9 million roundtrip transaction that KOMISSAROV engineered using the alias “Vlad.”

In April 2022 and May 2022, KOMISSAROV sold almost 300,000 Lottery.com shares for more than $600,000, months before Lottery.com disclosed to investors that it had identified errors in the company’s reported revenue and available cash.

By June 2023 and August 2023, the enforcement staff of the SEC had begun to investigate TDAC and Lottery.com. After receiving a subpoena from the SEC for documents and testimony in connection with the SEC’s investigation, KOMISSAROV schemed to obstruct the SEC’s investigation. For example, during a call with two Lottery.com executives, KOMISSAROV said he wanted to “sync” his “clock[]” with them and align on a false and misleading narrative that concealed his involvement in some of the sham transactions that were part of the Revenue Scheme. KOMISSAROV warned the Lottery.com executives, “guys, you do understand, you say that I was involved with this transaction . . . . if Trident and me specifically knew about it, then I am in deep, deep, deep, deep water . . . . So, if you come out and say that I was involved, then I am in deep shit.”

KOMISSAROV also personally tried to obstruct the SEC’s investigation. On November 20, 2024, KOMISSAROV provided sworn testimony to the SEC in connection with the SEC investigation into TDAC and Lottery.com. During his testimony, KOMISSAROV gave false and misleading answers about his prior communications with the Lottery.com executives and his involvement in the $9 million fraudulent roundtrip transaction that was part of the Revenue Scheme.

* * *

KOMISSAROV, 53, of New York, New York, was charged in the Indictment with one count of conspiracy to commit securities fraud, to make false and misleading statements in proxy statements, and to make false filings with the SEC; one count of securities fraud; five counts of making false and misleading statements in proxy statements; one count of obstruction of justice; and one count of perjury. The conspiracy charge and the perjury charge each carry a maximum term of imprisonment of five years. The charges of securities fraud, making false and misleading statements in proxy statements, and obstruction of justice each carry a maximum prison term of 20 years.

The maximum potential sentence in this case is prescribed by Congress and is provided here for informational purposes only, as any sentencing of the defendant will be determined by a judge.

Mr. Podolsky praised the outstanding work of the FBI. Mr. Podolsky also thanked the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for its assistance and cooperation in the investigation.

This case is being handled by the Office’s Securities and Commodities Fraud Task Force. Assistant United States Attorneys Justin V. Rodriguez and Matthew R. Shahabian are in charge of the prosecution.

The charges contained in the Indictment are merely accusations, and the defendant is presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty.

[1] As the introductory phrase signifies, the entirety of the text of the Indictment and the descriptions of the Indictment constitute only allegations, and every fact described should be treated as an allegation.

MIL Security OSI –

March 5, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: Franklin Resident Convicted of Multiple Cyber Stalking Charges

Source: Office of United States Attorneys

NASHVILLE – A federal jury on Friday convicted McKenzie McClure a/k/a Kalvin McClure, 31, of Franklin, Tennessee, of cyberstalking, announced Robert E. McGuire, Acting United States Attorney for the Middle District of Tennessee.

According to the evidence presented at trial, the defendant, between February 2024 and April 2024, posted countless Tweets on X fixated on Christ Presbyterian Academy (“CPA”) and Christ Presbyterian Church in Nashville, school shootings, school lockdowns, guns, and other violent incidents. The defendant also visited the CPA school campus on Sunday, February 25, 2024, during the afternoon when almost no one would be present. During that time, the defendant was observed attempting to enter the locked doors of the church sanctuary three times, taking pictures of the maps of the school grounds, and flipping off the school campus while standing on the school crest. Then, on Sunday, March 24, 2024, on the eve of the one-year anniversary of the day of the Covenant School shooting, the defendant then left a menacing five-minute voicemail on CPA’s main phone line. In the voicemail, the defendant referenced multiple historical violent incidents and expressed anger and hostility at the school. The voicemail also referenced the movie Deadpool 2 in which a former student attempts to go back to his school to exact revenge and kill the headmaster. Countless school officials and the headmaster die in that movie. As a result of the defendant’s conduct, CPA closed school on Monday, March 25, 2024.

“Children, parents, teachers, administrators and staff need to feel safe from harm while at school,” said Acting U.S. Attorney Robert E. McGuire. “Our office, and our law enforcement partners, are fully committed to keeping our school communities safe and will have no tolerance for those who would put our kids at risk.”

“The defendant’s concerning actions and social media posts emotionally devastated the school and church community and threatened their safety,” said Joseph E. Carrico of the FBI Nashville Field Office. “The FBI and our partners are committed to protecting the communities we serve and we encourage the public to remain vigilant and report suspicious or threatening behavior to law enforcement.”

“No one should have to worry about their safety at school—students, parents, and teachers deserve peace of mind. Because of that, the Tennessee Office of Homeland Security is committed to protecting our communities and making sure threats like this are taken seriously,” said Commissioner Jeff Long, Tennessee Department of Safety and Homeland Security. “We’ll continue working closely with our law enforcement partners to hold individuals accountable and ensure Tennessee remains a safe place to live, learn, and work.”

McClure will be sentenced on Monday, July 7, 2025. At sentencing, McClure faces a maximum term of incarceration of five years in federal prison.

The case was investigated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Nashville Field Office, and the Tennessee Department of Safety and Homeland Security.

Assistant U.S. Attorneys Katy Risinger and Joshua Kurtzman prosecuted the case.

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MIL Security OSI –

March 5, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: Armed Carjacking Spree and Shooting at Police Officers Nets District Man 17 Years in Federal Prison

Source: Office of United States Attorneys

WASHINGTON – Tywan J. Cummings, 44, of Washington D.C., was sentenced today to 204 months in federal prison for an armed carjacking spree in May 2020 that led to a car chase with police, his firing shots on police officers, and his burglarizing an occupied residence where he was eventually caught hiding.

The sentencing was announced by U.S. Attorney Edward R. Martin, Jr., for the District of Columbia, FBI Special Agent in Charge Sean Ryan of the Washington Field Office Criminal and Cyber Division, and Chief Pamela Smith of the Metropolitan Police Department.

Cummings pleaded guilty August 18, 2023, in U.S. District Court in the District of Columbia to carjacking; using, possessing, carrying, and brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence; and assaulting, resisting, or interfering with a police officer with a dangerous weapon. In addition to the prison term, U.S. District Court Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly ordered Cummings to serve five years of supervised release.

According to the government’s evidence, on the morning of May 17, 2020, in the Trinidad neighborhood of Northeast Washington, D.C., Cummings pointed an AR-style rifle at a man who was putting air into his tire of his BMW 325i on the 1200 block of Raum Street. Cummings took the vehicle at gunpoint. Cummings then drove the BMW, with the valve of the pump still attached to the tire, into Maryland and, minutes later, carjacked a nurse of her Hyundai Tucson at gunpoint outside a hospital in Prince George’s County. In the early morning hours of May 18, 2023, multiple Maryland law enforcement agencies from the Bowie, Montgomery County, and Prince George’s County Police Departments pursued Cummings—who was by this time driving a stolen Honda Ridgeline—into Southeast Washington, D.C. MPD officers were also on scene to assist.

At the intersection of Pennsylvania Avenue SE and Alabama Avenue SE, Cummings crashed the Honda into another car near a gas station. On foot with police in pursuit, Cummings fired multiple shots on Maryland and MPD police officers with a handgun. Shortly after 2 a.m., Cummings broke into an occupied residence on the 3900 block of Pennsylvania Avenue SE and hid in an upstairs bedroom. Police declared a barricade at 2:28 a.m.

Members of the MPD’s Emergency Response Team responded and apprehended Cummings. Officers recovered a .40 caliber semiautomatic handgun, the AR-style rifle from the stolen vehicle, and over 100 rounds of ammunition. No victim sustained physical injuries during the spree. Cummings has been in custody since his arrest.

This case was investigated by the FBI Washington Field Office’s Violent Crimes Task Force and the Metropolitan Police Department with valuable assistance provided by the Bowie Police Department, the Montgomery County Police Department, and the Prince George’s County Police Department. The matter was prosecuted by Assistant United States Attorneys Emory V. Cole and Paul V. Courtney.

20cr0115

MIL Security OSI –

March 5, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: Irish And U.K. Nationals Charged With Multi-State Construction Fraud That Targeted Vulnerable Homeowners

Source: Office of United States Attorneys

Matthew Podolsky, the Acting United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, and Leslie R. Backschies, the Acting Assistant Director in Charge of the New York Field Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), announced today the unsealing of a Complaint in Manhattan federal court charging JAMES DINNIGAN, a/k/a “Charlie Ward,” and MARTIN MAUGHAN, a/k/a “Lawrence Rogers,” with conspiracy to commit wire fraud for their participation in a multi-year, multi-state organized construction fraud scheme that targeted at least 24 victims, including numerous elderly and vulnerable victims. MAUGHAN was transferred from state custody to federal custody this afternoon and will be presented today before U.S. Magistrate Robyn Tarnofsky. DINNIGAN is in federal immigration custody and will be transferred to the Southern District of New York.

Acting U.S. Attorney Matthew Podolsky said: “As alleged, these defendants and their co-conspirators carried out a brazen scheme to defraud vulnerable members of our community by posing as legitimate home repair contractors and tricking homeowners into paying for thousands of dollars in unnecessary and unwanted home repairs. Today’s charges should serve as a reminder that this Office and its law enforcement partners are committed to investigating and bringing to justice those who seek to enrich themselves by victimizing vulnerable members of our community.”

Acting Assistant Director in Charge Leslie R. Backschies said: “James Dinnigan and Martin Maughan allegedly enticed prospective consumers with illegitimate home improvement advertisements before intentionally destroying their property to extort unanticipated additional costs. These illegal foreign nationals allegedly laid the foundation to prey upon a vulnerable population across the northeast, ultimately stealing a significant sum from elderly victims. The FBI remains committed to protecting our citizens from any fraudulent company attempting to cement false promises to garner illicit profits.”

As alleged in the Complaint unsealed today in Manhattan federal court:[1]

Between at least in or around October 2023 through at least in or about February 2025, DINNIGAN and MAUGHAN participated in a construction fraud scheme involving dozens of victims in New York, New Jersey, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, and several other states. Participants in the scheme were usually foreign nationals from Ireland and the United Kingdom who were illegally in the U.S. and falsely posed as legitimate home repair contractors.

The scheme generally proceeded as follows: To get hired by the victims, members of the scheme made false statements to victims about their operation of legitimate home repair businesses, their occupation as contractors or engineers, and about home improvement and construction projects the victims needed to obtain. After being hired, members of the scheme tricked victims into paying for additional unwanted or unnecessary home repairs and other construction, including by purposefully damaging or destroying the victims’ property. The perpetrators of the scheme then forced victims, including through threats, into paying them tens or even hundreds of thousands of dollars.

DINNIGAN, MAUGHAN, and other perpetrators of the scheme communicated with victims using cellphones and email. The victims frequently wrote checks and transferred money to bank accounts controlled by members of the scheme, including into an account at a particular financial institution in Manhattan, New York. The perpetrators of the scheme also operated websites in the names of at least two purported construction companies: Local Masonry and Construction and Pine Valley Home Improvements, Inc. Below are screenshots from websites that the perpetrators used to lure victims into the scheme:

The FBI has identified more than two dozen victims—many who are elderly individuals—who have lost at least $1 million as a result of this scheme.

DINNIGAN entered the U.S. on or about April 4, 2023, using a tourist visa. A review of relevant records has revealed no known documentation showing that DINNIGAN departed the U.S. as required, or that DINNIGAN applied for and received authorization to legally remain in the U.S. On or about February 25, 2025, DINNIGAN was encountered by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) in Champlain, New York.

On or about August 9, 2023, MAUGHAN was encountered by CBP officers in the vicinity of Laredo, Texas. MAUGHAN was subsequently ordered removed from the U.S. to the United Kingdom on or about October 30, 2023. According to MAUGHAN’s order of removal, he was prohibited from reentering or attempting to reenter the U.S. for a period of five years. On or about February 7, 2025, MAUGHAN was found inside the U.S. when he was arrested at the Boston Logan International Airport moments before departing on a flight to Dublin, Ireland.

If you believe that you have additional information about this scheme or if you believe you have been a victim of the defendants or their co-conspirators, please contact the FBI at tips.fbi.gov, and reference this case.

* * *

DINNIGAN, 27, of Ireland, and MAUGHAN, 31, of the United Kingdom, are each charged with one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud, which carries a maximum term of 20 years in prison.

The maximum potential sentences in this case are prescribed by Congress and provided here for informational purposes only, as any sentencing of the defendants will be determined by a judge.

Mr. Podolsky praised the outstanding investigative work of the FBI’s New York and Philadelphia field offices. Mr. Podolsky also thanked CBP; U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Enforcement and Removal Operations; Lower Merion Police Department; Cheltenham Police Department; Bernards Township Police Department; and Lambertville Police Department for their assistance in the investigation.

The case is being prosecuted by the Office’s Violent and Organized Crime Unit. Assistant U.S. Attorney Brandon D. Harper is in charge of the prosecution, with assistance from paralegal specialist William A. Coleman IV.

The charges contained in the Complaint are merely accusations, and the defendants are presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty.

[1] As the introductory phrase signifies, the entirety of the text of the Complaint and the description of the Complaint set forth herein constitute only allegations, and every fact descried therein should be treated as an allegation.

MIL Security OSI –

March 5, 2025

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