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Category: Justice

  • MIL-OSI USA: Cornyn, Colleagues Introduce Resolution Recognizing Juneteenth

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Texas John Cornyn
    News
    June 18, 2025
    WASHINGTON – Today, U.S. Senator John Cornyn (R-TX), who successfully led the effort in Congress to make Juneteenth a federal holiday, introduced a bipartisan Senate resolution along with 31 of his Senate colleagues recognizing Juneteenth Independence Day. Text is below, and you can view the full resolution here.
    “Whereas news of the end of slavery did not reach the frontier areas of the United States, in particular the State of Texas and the other Southwestern States, until months after the conclusion of the Civil War, more than 21⁄2 years after President Abraham Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation on January 1, 1863;
    Whereas, on June 19, 1865, Union soldiers, led by Major General Gordon Granger, arrived in Galveston, Texas, with news that the Civil War had ended and the enslaved were free;
    Whereas African Americans who had been slaves in the Southwest celebrated June 19, commonly known as “Juneteenth National Independence Day,” as inspiration and encouragement for future generations;
    Whereas African Americans from the Southwest have continued the tradition of observing Juneteenth National Independence Day for more than 150 years;
    Whereas Juneteenth National Independence Day began as a holiday in the State of Texas and is now a Federal holiday that is celebrated in all 50 States and the District of Columbia as a special day of observance in recognition of the emancipation of all slaves in the United States;
    Whereas Juneteenth National Independence Day celebrations have been held to honor African-American freedom while encouraging self-development and respect for all cultures;
    Whereas the faith and strength of character demonstrated by former slaves and the descendants of former slaves remain an example for all people of the United States, regardless of background, religion, or race;
    Whereas slavery was not officially abolished until the ratification of the 13th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States in December 1865; and
    Whereas, over the course of its history, the United States has grown into a symbol of democracy and freedom around the world: Now, therefore, be it
    Resolved, That the Senate—
    (1)   commemorates June 19, 2025, as “Juneteenth National Independence Day;”
    (2)   recognizes the historical significance of Juneteenth National Independence Day to the United States;
    (3)   supports the continued nationwide celebration of Juneteenth National Independence Day to provide an opportunity for the people of the United States to learn more about the past and to better understand the experiences that have shaped the United States; and
    (4)   recognizes that the observance of the end of slavery is part of the history and heritage of the United States.”
    Senators Kirsten Gillibrand (D-NY), Ted Cruz (R-TX), Bill Cassidy (R-LA), Catherine Cortez Masto (D-NV), Susan Collins (R-ME), Angus King (I-ME), Richard Blumenthal (D-CT), Kevin Cramer (R-ND), Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH), Raphael Warnock (D-GA), Mark Kelly (D-AZ), Ron Johnson (R-WI), Sheldon Whitehouse (D-RI), Maria Cantwell (D-WA), Mazie Hirono (D-HI), Cindy Hyde-Smith (R-MS), John Hickenlooper (D-CO), Tim Scott (R-SC), John Hoeven (R-ND), Roger Wicker (R-MS), Todd Young (R-IN), Marsha Blackburn (R-TN), Jim Justice (R-WV), Katie Britt (R-AL), Bernie Sanders (I-VT), Tim Kaine (D-VA), Dick Durbin (D-IL), Ron Wyden (D-OR), Jeff Merkley (D-OR), Alex Padilla (D-CA), and Cory Booker (D-NJ) joined the resolution.
    Background:
    Sen. Cornyn has been a leader in introducing a resolution honoring Juneteenth each year since 2011. In 2021, Sen. Cornyn’s legislation to establish Juneteenth as a federal holiday was signed into law. He also authored a bill with the late Congresswoman Sheila Jackson Lee (TX-18) for a federal study of a National Emancipation Trail from Galveston to Houston, following the path of slaves freed on June 19, 1865 to spread the news, which was signed into law in 2020.

    MIL OSI USA News –

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI NGOs: Azerbaijan: Seven journalists sentenced in latest shocking crackdown on free speech

    Source: Amnesty International –

    Reacting to the sentencing to lengthy prison terms of seven media workers in the “Abzas Media case” in Azerbaijan, Marie Struthers, Amnesty International’s Eastern Europe and Central Asia Director, said:

    “The case against Abzas Media is an example of how Azerbaijan’s judicial system is being weaponized to muzzle independent journalism and calls for a strong international response. By pressing fabricated economic charges against journalists who exposed high-level corruption, the Azerbaijani authorities are sending a chilling message to anyone in the country who dares to challenge them. A strong international reaction should make clear that this is unacceptable.

    “The political repression in Azerbaijan today is staggering, yet we lack a united, principled stand against it from the international community, in defence of human rights. In stark contrast, major actors like the European Union persist in actively courting President Ilham Aliyev in search of lucrative gas deals.

    The political repression in Azerbaijan today is staggering, yet we lack a united, principled stand against it from the international community

    Marie Struthers, Amnesty International’s Eastern Europe and Central Asia Director

    “The international community must exert real pressure on the Azerbaijani authorities to immediately release the Abzas Media journalists, imprisoned media workers from Toplum TV, Meydan TV and Kanal 13, and all other government critics imprisoned solely for exercising their right to freedom of expression, and to put an end to the Azerbaijani government’s systemic campaign against dissent.”

    Background

    On 20 June, the Baku Court of Serious Crimes sentenced seven media workers affiliated with the independent investigative outlet Abzas Media – including director Ulvi Hasanli, editor-in-chief Sevinc Vagifgizi, investigative journalist Hafiz Babaly, reporters Nargiz Absalamova and Elnara Gasymova, translator Muhammad Kekalov, and economist and Radio Free Europe correspondent Farid Mehralizade – to prison terms ranging from seven and a half to nine years. The charges included “currency smuggling,” “money laundering,” “tax evasion” and forgery of documents.

    Their prosecution and imprisonment are widely believed to be in retaliation for the media organization’s investigations into corruption among President Ilham Aliyev’s family and inner circle. These include reports on post-war reconstruction in Nagorno-Karabakh and illicit financial networks tied to state-linked companies. During the hearings, the defence highlighted numerous procedural irregularities, pressure on the defendants and witnesses, and a lack of credible evidence. Witnesses have withdrawn or denied previous statements, and defendants have reported ill-treatment in custody.

    At least 25 journalists are currently imprisoned in the country. Azerbaijan has the highest number of imprisoned media workers held on politically motivated charges since it joined the Council of Europe in 2001. Just on 7 May, independent journalist Ulviyya Ali, a contributor to Voice of America, was arrested.

    MIL OSI NGO –

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Director of Hong Kong and Macao Work Office of CPC Central Committee and Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of State Council Mr Xia Baolong meets representatives of commercial and financial sectors in Hong Kong

    Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

    The Director of the Hong Kong and Macao Work Office of the Communist Party of China Central Committee and the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of the State Council, Mr Xia Baolong, today (June 20) in Hong Kong, met with representatives of the commercial and financial sectors, and learned about Hong Kong’s major tourism development projects.

    At an engagement session, Mr Xia interacted with representatives of Hong Kong’s commercial and financial sectors, including those from major chambers of commerce and enterprises. The session was also attended by the Chief Executive, Mr John Lee; the Financial Secretary, Mr Paul Chan; the Deputy Financial Secretary, Mr Michael Wong; the Secretary for Financial Services and the Treasury, Mr Christopher Hui; and the Acting Secretary for Commerce and Economic Development, Dr Bernard Chan.

    In the afternoon, Mr Xia visited Ocean Park in the company of Mr Lee; the Secretary for Culture, Sports and Tourism, Miss Rosanna Law; the Chairman of the Board of the Ocean Park Corporation (OPC), Mr Paulo Pong; and the Chief Executive of the OPC, Mr Ivan Wong. 

    Afterwards Mr Xia took a boat trip to Lamma Island with Mr Lee, Mr Wong and the Secretary for Development, Ms Bernadette Linn, to gain an understanding of the ex-Lamma quarry site’s development plan. Mr Xia also received briefings en route on major tourism development projects.

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – 2023 and 2024 reports on Montenegro – P10_TA(2025)0130 – Wednesday, 18 June 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Montenegro, of the other part(1), which entered into force on 1 May 2010,

    –  having regard to Montenegro’s application for membership of the European Union of 15 December 2008,

    –  having regard to the Commission opinion of 9 November 2010 on Montenegro’s application for membership of the European Union (COM(2010)0670), the European Council’s decision of 16-17 December 2010 to grant Montenegro candidate status and the European Council’s decision of 29 June 2012 to open EU accession negotiations with Montenegro,

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1529 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 September 2021 establishing the Instrument for Pre-Accession assistance (IPA III)(2),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1449 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans(3),

    –  having regard to the Presidency conclusions of the Thessaloniki European Council meeting of 19-20 June 2003,

    –  having regard to the Sofia Declaration of the EU-Western Balkans summit of 17 May 2018 and the Sofia Priority Agenda annexed thereto,

    –  having regard to the declarations of the EU-Western Balkans summits of 13 December 2023 in Brussels, and of 18 December 2024 in Brussels,

    –  having regard to the Berlin Process launched on 28 August 2014,

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 6 October 2020 entitled ‘An Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2020)0641),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘2023 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy’ (COM(2023)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Montenegro 2023 Report’ (SWD(2023)0694),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘New growth plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2023)0691),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 20 March 2024 on pre-enlargement reforms and policy reviews (COM(2024)0146),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 24 July 2024 entitled ‘2024 Rule of Law Report’ (COM(2024)0800), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘2024 Rule of Law Report – The rule of law situation in the European Union: Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Montenegro’ (SWD(2024)0829),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘2024 Communication on EU enlargement policy’ (COM(2024)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Montenegro 2024 Report’ (SWD(2024)0694),

    –  having regard to the Commission’s overview and country assessments of 31 May 2023 and of 13 June 2024 of the economic reform programme of Montenegro, and to the joint conclusions of the Economic and Financial Dialogue between the EU and the Western Balkans and Türkiye adopted by the Council on 16 May 2023 and to the joint conclusions of the Economic and Financial Dialogue between the EU and the Western Balkans Partners, Türkiye, Georgia, Republic of Moldova and Ukraine adopted by the Council on 14 May 2024,

    –  having regard to the EU-Montenegro Intergovernmental Accession Conferences of 22 June 2021, 13 December 2021, 29 January 2024, 26 June 2024 and 16 December 2024,

    –  having regard to the 11th EU-Montenegro Stabilisation and Association Council on 14 July 2022,

    –  having regard to the declaration and recommendations adopted at the 22nd meeting of the EU-Montenegro Stabilisation and Association Parliamentary Committee, held on 31 October and 1 November 2024,

    –  having regard to Montenegro’s accession to NATO on 5 June 2017,

    –  having regard to Special Report 01/2022 of the European Court of Auditors of 10 January 2022 entitled ‘EU support for the rule of law in the Western Balkans: despite efforts, fundamental problems persist’,

    –  having regard to the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (the Istanbul Convention), ratified by Montenegro in 2013, and to the recommendations of the Commission on gender equality and combating gender-based violence,

    –  having regard to the World Press Freedom Index report published annually by Reporters Without Borders,

    –  having regard to the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) data on the Ukraine Refugee Situation as of April 2025,

    –  having regard to its recommendation of 23 November 2022 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy concerning the new EU strategy for enlargement(4),

    –  having regard to its previous resolutions on Montenegro,

    –  having regard to its resolution of 29 February 2024 on deepening EU integration in view of future enlargement(5),

    –  having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0093/2025),

    A.  whereas enlargement is a key EU foreign policy tool and a strategic geopolitical investment in peace, stability, security and prosperity;

    B.  whereas the new enlargement momentum, sparked by the changing geopolitical reality and the EU membership applications by several Eastern Partnership countries, has prompted the EU to accelerate its efforts towards delivering on its long-overdue commitments to the Western Balkans; whereas the future of the Western Balkan countries lies within the EU;

    C.  whereas each country is judged on its own merits in fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria, including full respect for democracy, the rule of law, good governance, fundamental EU values and alignment with EU foreign and security policy; whereas the implementation of necessary reforms in the area of ‘fundamentals’ determines the timetable and progress in the accession process;

    D.  whereas Montenegro has gone furthest in the accession process, with all 33 chapters of the EU acquis open and six provisionally closed, and has significant public support therefor;

    E.  whereas the EU is Montenegro’s largest trading partner, investor and provider of financial assistance;

    F.  whereas Montenegro is exposed to malign foreign influence, disinformation campaigns and other forms of influence, including election meddling, hybrid warfare strategies and unfavourable investments from non-EU actors, particularly Russia and China, which are trying to influence Montenegro’s political, economic and strategic trajectory and threaten democratic processes and media integrity, jeopardising the country’s prospects for EU accession;

    G.  whereas on 8 June 2024, an ‘All-Serb Assembly’ took place in Belgrade with the participation of high-ranking parliamentarians under the slogan ‘One people, one Assembly’;

    Commitment to EU accession

    1.  Recognises Montenegro’s firm commitment to EU accession and reaffirms its full support for the country’s future EU membership; welcomes Montenegro’s leading regional position in the EU accession process as well as the overwhelming support of Montenegro’s citizens and the majority of political actors for joining the EU in 2028;

    2.  Welcomes Montenegro’s positive progress in enacting EU-related reforms and measures, underpinned by an ambitious timeline and calls for collective efforts of political actors, civil society and citizens; commends Montenegro for meeting the interim benchmarks for Chapters 23 and 24, which continue to determine the overall pace of negotiations, and for receiving a positive Interim Benchmark Assessment Report; welcomes the closure of three more negotiating chapters, bringing the total to six;

    3.  Encourages all political actors to stay focused on EU integration and the required reforms; stresses the need for political stability, commitment and constructive engagement in consensus building across party lines in order to move swiftly and more effectively towards closing additional chapters in 2025, so as to achieve the country’s ambitious timeline; stresses that the reforms adopted must be implemented effectively and consistently to ensure genuine progress and full alignment with EU legislation; calls for a strengthening of the functioning of, and coordination between, state institutions in order to achieve political stability and advance the country’s substantial progress in implementing key EU-related reforms, in particular electoral and judicial reforms and the fight against organised crime and corruption;

    4.  Underlines that the credibility of the EU, including its enlargement policy as a whole, would be affected if tangible progress achieved by certain Western Balkan countries does not translate into clear advancements on the EU accession path;

    5.  Welcomes Montenegro’s sustained full alignment with the EU’s common foreign and security policy (CFSP), including EU restrictive measures, inter alia, those related to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and those targeted against cyberattacks, as well as its support for the international rules-based order at UN level; encourages Montenegro to strengthen the enforcement of restrictive measures and avoid their circumvention and to seize the assets of those sanctioned; calls on all government representatives to respect and promote CFSP alignment and EU values and refrain from any activities that may threaten Montenegro’s strategic path towards EU membership and its sovereignty; is highly concerned, in this context, by public high officials’ statements in support of the President of the Republika Srpska entity, Milorad Dodik, who is undermining the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina; regrets the participation of high-ranking parliamentarians from Montenegro in the ‘All-Serbian Assembly’ in Belgrade as well as their support for the declaration adopted on that occasion undermining the sovereignty of Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo;

    6.  Underlines the strategic importance of Montenegro’s NATO membership and welcomes its active involvement in EU common security and defence policy missions and operations, such as EU Naval Force Operation Atalanta, and in NATO and other international and multilateral missions; welcomes the decision of Montenegro’s Council for Defence and Security to approve the participation of its armed forces in the EU Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine and NATO’s Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine and calls on the Montenegrin Parliament to adopt these decisions, thereby reinforcing the country’s commitment to collective security;

    7.  Commends Montenegro for its humanitarian and material support to Ukraine and for extending the temporary protection mechanism that grants persons fleeing Ukraine the right to stay in Montenegro for one year; recalls that Montenegro is among the Western Balkan countries hosting the largest number of Ukrainian refugees, with over 18 800 refugees from Ukraine registered in Montenegro as of 31 January 2025, according to UNHCR statistics;

    8.  Remains seriously concerned by malign foreign interference, destabilisation efforts, cyberattacks, hybrid threats and disinformation campaigns, including attempts to influence political processes and public opinion, by third-country actors, which discredit the EU and undermine Montenegro’s progress on its accession path; urges Montenegro to adopt countermeasures in stronger cooperation with the EU and NATO and through increased regional cooperation among the Western Balkan countries; notes that religious institutions can be used as a tool for external influence and condemns any undue interference by the Serbian Orthodox Church in this regard; reiterates the importance of building resilience capacity against foreign information manipulation and interference, including through greater oversight of the media landscape, public awareness campaigns and media literacy programmes; recommends that Montenegro establish a dedicated hybrid threat task force;

    9.  Urges the Commission, the European External Action Service (EEAS), the Delegation of the EU to Montenegro and the Montenegrin authorities to boost strategic communication to Montenegrin citizens on the benefits of the enlargement process and EU membership, as well as on the concrete accession criteria that Montenegro still needs to fulfil to align with EU requirements; urges them, furthermore, to improve the EU’s visibility in the country, including as regards EU-funded projects; calls for StratCom monitoring to be expanded in order to concentrate on cross-border disinformation threats in the Western Balkan countries and their neighbours; calls on the Commission to further support the efforts of the EEAS and the Western Balkans Task Force so as to expand outreach activities by increasing visibility in local media, fact-checking reports and partnering with civil society organisations to counter false narratives more effectively;

    10.  Welcomes the Montenegrin Parliament’s renewed engagement in the Stabilisation and Association Parliamentary Committee;

    Democracy and the rule of law

    11.  Recognises the Montenegrin Parliament’s key role in the accession process, notably as regards passing accession-related legislation, and underlines the importance of parliamentary cooperation in this regard; reiterates the European Parliament’s readiness to use its political and technical resources to advance the EU-related reform agenda, including through democracy support activities; notes, with concern, the re-emerging tensions and ethnic polarisation, which are slowing the reform process; calls for constructive dialogue and consensus building across the political spectrum, prioritising legislative quality, and strongly urges that solutions be found through parliamentary dialogue; calls for preventing identity politics from diverting attention from the EU agenda or straining relations with its neighbours, ensuring that Montenegro remains firmly on the EU path; welcomes the agreement between the Montenegrin Prime Minister and opposition leaders to request an opinion from the Venice Commission regarding the termination of the mandate of Constitutional Court judge Dragana Đuranović and for the opposition to return to the parliament;

    12.  Expresses its concern about attempts to amend the law on Montenegrin citizenship in the Montenegrin Parliament, which could have serious and long-term implications for the country’s decision-making processes and identity, while emphasising that any discussions on identity politics must be handled with the utmost sensitivity to avoid further polarisation and should aim for broad societal consensus; encourages the Montenegrin authorities to consult and coordinate with the EU on any possible changes to the law on citizenship and stresses the importance of achieving consensus on any matters relating to this subject of crucial importance for the identity and independence of Montenegro;

    13.  Strongly encourages the Montenegrin Parliament to hold inclusive and transparent public consultations and regular and meaningful engagement with civil society in decision-making from an early stage in the legislative process, notably for key legislation in the EU reform process; encourages a more active role for the Montenegrin Parliamentary Women’s Club;

    14.  Calls on Montenegro to fully align its electoral legal framework with EU standards, notably as regards harmonising electoral legislation, voting and candidacy rights restrictions, transparency, dispute resolution mechanisms, campaign and media oversight, and political party and election campaign financing, and to implement the recommendations of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights(6); urges Montenegro to increase transparency and control of political party spending and prevent the abuse of state resources by bringing the relevant legislation into line with EU standards, as well as enhancing the enforcement of third-party financing rules and strengthening sanctions for violations; highlights the role of the Agency for Prevention of Corruption (APC) in this regard, and calls for increased cooperation between the APC and financial intelligence authorities to detect and prevent foreign influence in political campaigns; calls, furthermore, on Montenegro to implement the recommendations of the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) on gender parity on electoral lists;

    15.  Reiterates its call on the Montenegrin authorities to establish a single nationwide municipal election day, as provided for in the Law on Local Self-Government, in order to enhance governance efficiency, reduce political tensions and strengthen the stability and effectiveness of municipal and state institutions; recalls that future disbursement of funds under the Reform and Growth Facility is contingent on the fulfilment of this reform, in line with Montenegro’s commitments in its reform agenda, and should be pursued as a matter of priority; welcomes the fact that, in 2022, elections in 14 municipalities were held on the same day; calls for a robust legislative framework in this regard; is concerned by the misconduct of the electoral process in the municipality of Šavnik;

    16.  Calls on the Montenegrin authorities to adopt the Law on Government that should enable an improved governance framework and the optimisation of public administration;

    17.  Underlines the importance of a professional, merit-based, transparent and depoliticised civil service; calls on Montenegro to amend and implement the relevant legislation to provide a framework for the professionalisation, optimisation and rationalisation of state administration, including procedural safeguards against politically motivated decisions on appointments and dismissals, as well as high standards for managerial positions; regrets the lack of significant progress in adopting and effectively implementing such legislation and highlights that this allows for public service recruitment to remain subject to political influence;

    18.  Welcomes Montenegro’s inclusion in the Commission’s 2024 Rule of Law Report; notes, with concern, the identified deficiencies, including judicial appointments and the independence of the prosecutor’s office;

    19.  Welcomes the progress made in implementing key judicial reforms, adopting a new strategic framework and completing long-outstanding judicial appointments; calls on Montenegro to fill the remaining high-level judicial positions;

    20.  Urges Montenegro to further align its legal framework, including the constitution, in particular on the composition and decision-making process of the Judicial Council, with EU laws and standards on the independence, accountability, impartiality, integrity and professionalism of the judiciary, and to further depoliticise appointments to bolster independence, implement outstanding international recommendations, and determine criteria for the retirement of judges and prosecutors in line with European standards and in full compliance with the Constitution; regrets the pending case backlog and calls on Montenegro to take measures to reduce the duration of legal proceedings, particularly for serious and organised crime cases, notably on money laundering; recommends that Montenegro adopt the amendments to the Constitution in the final stage of the country’s EU accession negotiations;

    21.  Notes the steps taken in the fight against corruption, including new laws and provisions on the protection of whistleblowers, the creation of a new National Council for the fight against corruption and a new anti-corruption strategy for 2024-2028; encourages Montenegro to further align with the EU acquis and EU standards and address recommendations by the Commission, the Venice Commission and the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO); encourages the Montenegrin authorities to continue addressing existing deficiencies in the handling of organised crime cases and the seizure and confiscation of criminal assets;

    22.  Urges Montenegro to step up its criminal justice response to high-level corruption, including by strengthening the effective enforcement of existing criminal legislation and imposing effective and deterrent penalties, and to create conditions for judicial institutions and independent bodies dealing with corruption to function effectively, free from political influence;

    23.  Notes the work of the Agency for Prevention of Corruption and calls for it to be provided with sufficient funding and for it to be depoliticised; expects the Agency to deliver tangible results and act non-selectively to strengthen its integrity and enhance its authority in carrying out its competences effectively; calls for a stronger corruption prevention framework;

    24.  Urges Montenegro to align its weapons legislation with EU law and international standards, particularly as regards technical standards for firearm markings, deactivation procedures and regulations for alarm and signal weapons, as well as to establish a standardised and effective data collection and reporting system for firearms; is appalled by the tragic mass shooting in Cetinje and expresses its condolences to the victims’ families; expresses its concern over the exploitation of this tragedy for disinformation and ethnic polarisation; urges Montenegro to strengthen its crisis communication to counter disinformation and ensure responsible media reporting in the aftermath of violent incidents; calls for systematic actions in the areas of security, mental well-being and institutional transparency, as well as in civic education and public awareness, outreach and educational initiatives, on the dangers and risks of firearms, in line with citizens’ expectations and societal needs;

    25.  Calls on Montenegro to urgently fully align its visa policy with that of the EU, especially as regards countries posing irregular migration or security risks to the EU; expresses its concern that, contrary to expectations, two additional countries have been added to the visa-free regime and that Russian and Belarusian passport holders continue to benefit from a visa-free regime; notes that the harmonisation of the visa policy is also provided for in Montenegro’s reform agenda under the Reform and Growth Facility;

    26.  Welcomes the ongoing cooperation between Montenegro and the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex), Europol, Eurojust and the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training (CEPOL), and notes the importance of this cooperation in tackling cross-border crime, including the trafficking of weapons, drugs and human beings, and in combating terrorism and extremism; welcomes the entry into force of the upgraded agreement on operational cooperation in border management with Frontex on 1 July 2023 and encourages further cooperation between Montenegro and Frontex to strengthen border management, support asylum procedures, fight smuggling and enhance readmission;

    Fundamental freedoms and human rights

    27.  Regrets that the most vulnerable groups in society still face discrimination; calls on Montenegro to adopt a new anti-discrimination law and relevant strategies, through an inclusive, transparent and meaningful process that actively involves those most affected, to improve vulnerable groups’ access to rights; underlines that respect for the rights of all national minorities is an integral part of the EU acquis; calls for stronger implementation to ensure equal treatment of all ethnic, religious, national and social groups so that they are guaranteed equal rights and opportunities and can fully participate in social, political and economic life;

    28.  Welcomes Montenegro’s multi-ethnic identity and calls for the further promotion of and respect for the languages, cultural heritage and traditions of local communities and national minorities, as this is closely intertwined with Montenegro’s European perspective;

    29.  Underlines the multi-ethnic identity of the Bay of Kotor; stresses that Montenegro’s European perspective is closely intertwined with the protection of minorities and their cultural heritage; calls on the Montenegrin authorities to nurture the multi-ethnic nature of the state, including the traditions and cultural heritage of the Croatian community in the Bay of Kotor;

    30.  Expresses its grave concern over the endangered heritage sites in Montenegro such as the Bay of Kotor and Sveti Stefan; stresses that Sveti Stefan, along with Miločer Park, was listed among the ‘7 Most Endangered heritage sites in Europe’ for 2023;

    31.  Calls on the Montenegrin authorities to address the difficult living conditions of Roma people in Montenegro and the discrimination they face, and calls for more measures to promote intercultural understanding in schools; calls on the Montenegrin authorities to also take measures to improve the climate of societal inclusion for LGBTI persons;

    32.  Welcomes that Montenegro has aligned its legislative and institutional framework with the EU acquis and international human rights standards regarding compliance with the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and its optional protocols; urges the authorities to address shortcomings in implementation, namely related to accountability and monitoring;

    33.  Calls for the effective implementation of strategies to uphold the rights of persons with disabilities across all sectors and policies;

    34.  Condemns all hate speech, including online and gender-based hate speech, and hate crimes; welcomes the criminalisation of racism and hate speech;

    35.  Emphasises the need to strengthen institutional mechanisms for gender quality and calls on the Montenegrin authorities to address the gender pay gap, to improve women’s participation in decision-making – in both the public domain, particularly public administration, and judicial and security sectors, and in business – to ensure the increased political participation of women, to introduce gender responsive budgeting, and to combat gender stereotypes and strengthen efforts to combat discrimination against women, particularly in rural areas; welcomes recent efforts aimed at boosting women’s representation in science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) and encourages further efforts in technology sectors;

    36.  Is deeply concerned by the high rates of gender-based violence, including domestic violence and femicide; calls on Montenegro to fully align its definitions of gender-based violence and domestic violence with the Istanbul Convention, and with recommendations of international bodies, and to set up effective protection and prevention mechanisms and support centres, and ensure effective judicial follow-up for victims of domestic and sexual violence as well as a more robust penal policy towards perpetrators; calls for the collection of disaggregated data on gender-based violence and gender disparities to improve policy responses;

    37.  Regrets that the draft law on legal gender recognition was not adopted in 2024, despite it being a measure under Montenegro’s EU accession programme; urges Montenegro to adopt the law without delay;

    38.  Welcomes Montenegro’s new media laws and its strategy for media policy aimed at strengthening the legal framework to effectively protect journalists and other media workers; insists on a zero-tolerance policy with regard to pressure on, harassment of, or violence against journalists, particularly by public figures; underlines the need for effective investigations, the prosecution of all instances of hate speech, smear campaigns and strategic lawsuits against journalists, and follow-up of past cases; stresses the need to ensure journalists’ rights to access information and maintain a critical stance; notes a significant improvement in Montenegro’s press freedom, demonstrated by its progress on the World Press Freedom Index;

    39.  Expresses its concern over cases where journalists, academics and civil society organisations have faced pressure for exercising free speech, including instances where the police have initiated misdemeanour proceedings against them; is concerned by the use of strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs) to target journalists;

    40.  Regrets the prevailing high level of polarisation in the media and its vulnerability to political interests and foreign influence as well as foreign and domestic disinformation campaigns that spread narratives that negatively impact democratic processes in the country and endanger Montenegro’s European perspective; calls on Montenegro to further develop improved media literacy programmes and include them as a core subject in education; calls on the Montenegrin authorities to ensure the editorial, institutional and financial independence of the public service broadcaster RTCG, as well as the legality of the appointment of its management and full respect for court rulings concerning RTCG; recalls that it needs to comply with the law and the highest standards of accountability and integrity; regrets that the independence of public media is being weakened and undermined; calls on all media entities to comply with legal requirements on public funding transparency;

    41.  Welcomes the publication of the 2023 population census results; calls on the authorities to avoid any politicisation of the process; encourages stakeholders to use these results in a non-discriminatory manner;

    42.  Welcomes Montenegro’s vibrant and constructive civil society and underlines its importance in fostering democracy and pluralism and in promoting good governance and social progress; expresses its concern over the shrinking space for civil society organisations with a critical stance, and condemns all smear campaigns, intimidation and attacks against civil society organisations, notably by political figures in the context of proposals for a ‘foreign agent law’; notes that such laws have the potential to undermine fundamental freedoms and the functioning of civil society and are inconsistent with EU values and standards; calls for a supportive legal framework and clear and fair selection criteria in relation to public funding; calls for the Council for Cooperation between the Government and non-governmental organisations to resume work; underlines the importance of building collaborative relationships and genuinely consulting civil society on draft legislation from an early stage onwards;

    Reconciliation, good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation

    43.  Recalls that good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation are essential elements of the enlargement process; commends Montenegro’s active involvement in regional cooperation initiatives; recalls that good neighbourly relations are key for advancing in the accession process;

    44.  Regrets that Chapter 31 could not be closed in December 2024; calls on all engaged parties to find solutions to outstanding bilateral issues in a constructive and neighbourly manner and prioritise the future interests of citizens in the Western Balkans; recalls that using unresolved bilateral and regional disputes to block candidate countries’ accession processes should be avoided; welcomes bilateral consultations between the Republic of Croatia and Montenegro on the status of unresolved bilateral issues; encourages the authorities to continue pursuing confidence-building measures;

    45.  Notes Montenegro’s amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code to address legal and practical obstacles to the effective investigation, prosecution, trial and punishment of war crimes in line with relevant recommendations; calls on Montenegro to apply a proactive approach to handling war crimes cases, in line with international law and standards, to identify, prosecute and punish the perpetrators and the glorification of war crimes and ensure access to, and delivery of justice, redress and reparations for victims, and clarify the fate of missing persons; calls on Montenegro to allocate sufficient resources to specialised prosecutors and courts and proactively investigate all war crime allegations and raise issues of command responsibility, as well as to review past cases that were not prosecuted in line with international or domestic law; calls for regional cooperation in the investigation and prosecution of individuals indicted for war crimes; recognises that addressing these issues and safeguarding court-based facts are an important foundation for trust, democratic values, reconciliation and strengthening bilateral relations with neighbouring countries, and encourages Montenegro to step up these efforts;

    46.  Warns against the dangers of political revisionism, which distorts historical facts for political purposes, undermines accountability and deepens societal divisions; strongly condemns the glorification of war criminals and widespread public denial of international verdicts for war crimes, including by the Montenegrin authorities; considers that President Jakov Milatović’s statement expressing regret over the participation of Montenegrin forces in the bombardment of the city of Dubrovnik was a valuable contribution to regional peace and reconciliation;

    47.  Reiterates its support for the initiative to establish the Regional Commission for the establishment of facts about war crimes and other gross human rights violations on the territory of the former Yugoslavia (RECOM);

    48.  Reiterates its call for the archives that concern the former republics of Yugoslavia to be opened and for access to be granted to the files of the former Yugoslav Secret Service and the Yugoslav People’s Army Secret Service in order to thoroughly research and address communist-era crimes;

    Socio-economic reforms

    49.  Welcomes Montenegro’s inclusion in SEPA payment schemes, lowering costs for citizens and businesses; underlines that this opens up opportunities for business expansion, increased competitiveness, innovation and improved access to foreign direct investments;

    50.  Welcomes the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans, which aims to integrate the region into the EU’s single market, promote regional economic cooperation and deepen EU-related reforms, and which includes the EUR 6 billion Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans; welcomes Montenegro’s adoption of a reform agenda and encourages its full implementation; notes that the implementation of the defined reform measures under Montenegro’s reform agenda for the Growth Plan would provide access to over EUR 380 million in grants and favourable loans, subject to successful implementation; stresses the importance of inclusive stakeholder consultations, including local and regional authorities, social partners and civil society, in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation phases;

    51.  Encourages Montenegro to make best use of all EU funding available under the Pre-accession Assistance Instrument (IPA III), the Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans, the IPARD programme and the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans, to accelerate socio-economic convergence with the EU and further align its legislation with the EU on fraud prevention; recalls the conditionality of EU funding, which may be modulated or suspended in the event of significant regression or persistent lack of progress on fundamentals;

    52.  Calls for the EU and the Western Balkan countries to establish a framework for effective cooperation between the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) and the accession countries in order to facilitate close cooperation and the prosecution of the misuse of EU funds, including through the secondment of national liaison officers to the EPPO; encourages Montenegro to fully implement working arrangements with the EPPO; calls for the EU to make the necessary legal and political arrangements to extend the jurisdiction of the EPPO to EU funds devoted to Montenegro as a candidate country;

    53.  Positively notes Montenegro’s economic growth; calls for more steps to reduce the budget deficit and public debt, and to further remove indirect tax exemptions that do not align with the EU acquis; welcomes the efforts to reduce these fiscal vulnerabilities; reiterates the need for increased public investment in the education system for sustainable social and economic development;

    54.  Notes Montenegro’s public debt to foreign financial institutions and companies that can be used as a tool to influence its policy decisions, in particular those related to China and Russia; welcomes the efforts to reduce these vulnerabilities and calls on the authorities to further reduce economic dependence on China and to continue making use of the Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans, the EU Global Gateway initiative and the Reform and Growth Facility, with a view to finding greener and more transparent alternatives for financing infrastructure projects; calls on Montenegro to increase transparency in future infrastructure projects, ensure competitive bidding and avoid excessive debt dependence on foreign creditors;

    55.  Calls on the Montenegrin authorities to take measures to counter depopulation and emigration, in particular through investments in education and healthcare, especially in the north of the country, as well as through decentralisation by investing in medium-sized cities;

    56.  Encourages the Montenegrin authorities to boost the digital transformation and pursue evidence-based labour market policies to address the persistently high unemployment rate, in particular among women and young people, while bolstering institutional capacity and enhancing the underlying digital policy framework, and to effectively implement the Youth Guarantee and the new Youth Strategy; urges the authorities to address brain drain as a matter of urgency; encourages the development of targeted preventive measures and incentives to legalise informal businesses and employees, as a large informal sector continues to hinder economic and social development in Montenegro;

    57.  Welcomes the calls for the prompt integration of all Western Balkan countries into the EU’s digital single market before actual EU membership, which would crucially enable the creation of a digitally safe environment;

    58.  Calls for more transparency in public procurement, notably for procedures via intergovernmental agreements, and for full compliance with EU rules and principles; calls on Montenegro to reduce the number of public procurement procedures without notices; expresses its concern over the financial burden and lack of transparency surrounding the construction of the Bar-Boljare motorway financed by a Chinese loan; stresses that the secrecy surrounding loan agreements and construction contracts raises accountability concerns;

    59.  Expresses its concern over any agreements or projects that circumvent public procurement rules, transparency obligations and public consultation requirements, as set out in national legislation and EU standards; calls on the Government of Montenegro to ensure full respect for the principles of transparency, accountability, inclusive decision-making and the rule of law in all public infrastructure and development initiatives;

    Energy, the environment, biodiversity and connectivity

    60.  Urges Montenegro to advance the green transition, with the support of EU funding, improve its institutional and regulatory framework and enhance energy resilience by finally adopting and implementing the long-overdue National Energy and Climate Plan, adopting energy efficiency laws and integrating further with EU energy markets; calls for all new green transition projects to be implemented in line with EU standards on the environment, State aid and concessions;

    61.  Regrets the lack of progress on key sector reforms in the area of transport policy; calls on the Montenegrin authorities to align the country’s transport development with the Sustainable and Smart Mobility Strategy for the Western Balkans, focusing on railways, multimodality and reducing CO2 emissions and other environmental impacts, and to further implement its Transport Development Strategy and strengthen administrative capacities for the implementation of trans-European transport networks;

    62.  Welcomes the reduction of data roaming charges between the EU and the Western Balkan countries and calls on the authorities, private actors and all stakeholders to take all necessary steps towards the goal of bringing data roaming prices close to domestic prices by 2028; welcomes the entry into force of the first phase of the implementation of the roadmap for roaming between the Western Balkans and the EU;

    63.  Encourages the adoption of sectoral strategies for waste management, air and water quality, nature protection and climate change, ensuring strategic planning for investments; notes the lack of progress and associated rising costs in building essential waste water treatment plants to prevent sewage pollution in rivers and the sea in seven municipalities;

    o
    o   o

    64.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Commissioner for Enlargement, the Commissioner for the Mediterranean, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, and to the President, Government and Parliament of Montenegro, and to have it translated and published in Montenegrin.

    (1) OJ L 108, 29.4.2010, p. 3, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_internation/2010/224/oj.
    (2) OJ L 330, 20.9.2021, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1529/oj.
    (3) OJ L, 2024/1449, 24.5.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1449/oj.
    (4) OJ C 167, 11.5.2023, p. 105.
    (5) OJ C, C/2024/6746, 26.11.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6746/oj.
    (6) https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/montenegro.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – The Commission’s 2024 Rule of Law report – P10_TA(2025)0129 – Wednesday, 18 June 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to the Treaty on European Union (TEU), in particular Articles 2, 3(1), 3(3), second subparagraph, 4(3), 5, 6, 7, 11, 19 and 49 thereof,

    –  having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), in particular to the articles thereof relating to respect for and the protection and promotion of democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights in the Union, including Articles 70, 258, 259, 260, 263, 265 and 267,

    –  having regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the Charter),

    –  having regard to the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 24 July 2024 entitled ‘2024 Rule of Law Report – The rule of law situation in the European Union’ (COM(2024)0800), and the annex thereto containing recommendations for the Member States,

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 on EU enlargement policy (COM(2024)0690) and its accompanying staff working documents (the Enlargement Package),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget(1) (the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 laying down common provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund Plus, the Cohesion Fund, the Just Transition Fund and the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund and financial rules for those and for the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, the Internal Security Fund and the Instrument for Financial Support for Border Management and Visa Policy(2) (the Common Provisions Regulation),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union(3) (the Financial Regulation), in particular Article 6(3) thereof,

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/692 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 April 2021 establishing the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values programme and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1381/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation (EU) No 390/2014(4),

    –  having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

    –  having regard to the UN instruments on the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRDP), the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities and the Recommendations of the UN Forum on Minority Issues, and to the recommendations and reports of the UN Universal Periodic Review, as well as the case-law of the UN treaty bodies and the special procedures of the Human Rights Council,

    –  having regard to the European Convention on Human Rights, the European Social Charter, the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the European Committee of Social Rights, and the conventions, recommendations, resolutions, opinions and reports of the Parliamentary Assembly, the Committee of Ministers, the Commissioner for Human Rights, the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, the Steering Committee on Anti-Discrimination, Diversity and Inclusion, the Venice Commission and other bodies of the Council of Europe,

    –  having regard to the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence,

    –  having regard to the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages and to the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities of the Council of Europe,

    –  having regard to the memorandum of understanding between the Council of Europe and the European Union of 23 May 2007 and the Council conclusions of 17 December 2024 on EU priorities for cooperation with the Council of Europe 2025-2026,

    –  having regard to the Commission’s reasoned proposal of 20 December 2017 for a Council decision on the determination of a clear risk of a serious breach by the Republic of Poland of the rule of law (COM(2017)0835), issued in accordance with Article 7(1) TEU,

    –  having regard to its resolution of 25 October 2016 with recommendations to the Commission on the establishment of an EU mechanism on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights(5),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 7 February 2018 on protection and non-discrimination with regard to minorities in the EU Member States(6);

    –  having regard to its resolution of 1 March 2018 on the Commission’s decision to activate Article 7(1) TEU as regards the situation in Poland(7),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 19 April 2018 on the need to establish a European Values Instrument to support civil society organisations which promote fundamental values within the European Union at local and national level(8),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 12 September 2018 on a proposal calling on the Council to determine, pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union, the existence of a clear risk of a serious breach by Hungary of the values on which the Union is founded(9),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 13 November 2018 on minimum standards for minorities in the EU(10),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 14 November 2018 on the need for a comprehensive EU mechanism for the protection of democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights(11),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 7 October 2020 on the establishment of an EU Mechanism on Democracy, the Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights(12),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 13 November 2020 on the impact of COVID-19 measures on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights(13),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 17 December 2020 on the European Citizens’ Initiative ‘Minority SafePack – one million signatures for diversity in Europe’(14),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 10 June 2021 on the rule of law situation in the European Union and the application of the Conditionality Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092(15),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 24 June 2021 on the Commission’s 2020 Rule of Law Report(16),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 8 July 2021 on the creation of guidelines for the application of the general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget(17),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 16 September 2021 with recommendations to the Commission on identifying gender-based violence as a new area of crime listed in Article 83(1) TFEU(18),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 11 November 2021 on strengthening democracy and media freedom and pluralism in the EU: the undue use of actions under civil and criminal law to silence journalists, NGOs and civil society(19),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 15 December 2021 on the evaluation of preventive measures for avoiding corruption, irregular spending and misuse of EU and national funds in case of emergency funds and crisis-related spending areas(20),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 8 March 2022 on the shrinking space for civil society in Europe(21),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 10 March 2022 on the rule of law and the consequences of the ECJ ruling(22),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 19 May 2022 on the Commission’s 2021 Rule of Law Report(23),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 9 June 2022 on the rule of law and the potential approval of the Polish national recovery plan (RRF)(24),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 15 September 2022 on the situation of fundamental rights in the European Union in 2020 and 2021(25),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 15 September 2022 on the proposal for a Council decision determining, pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union, the existence of a clear risk of a serious breach by Hungary of the values on which the Union is founded(26),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 20 October 2022 on the rule of law in Malta, five years after the assassination of Daphne Caruana Galizia(27),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 20 October 2022 on growing hate crimes against LGBTIQ+ people across Europe in light of the recent homophobic murder in Slovakia(28),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 10 November 2022 on racial justice, non-discrimination and anti-racism in the EU(29),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 24 November 2022 on the assessment of Hungary’s compliance with the rule of law conditions under the Conditionality Regulation and state of play of the Hungarian RRP(30),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 30 March 2023 on the 2022 Rule of Law Report – the rule of law situation in the European Union(31),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 18 April 2023 on the institutional relations between the EU and the Council of Europe(32),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 28 February 2024 ‘Report on the Commission’s 2023 Rule of Law report’(33),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 29 February 2024 on deepening EU integration in view of future enlargement(34),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 1 June 2023 on the breaches of the Rule of Law and fundamental rights in Hungary and frozen EU funds(35),

    –  having regard to the report of its Committee of Inquiry to investigate the use of Pegasus and equivalent surveillance spyware (PEGA) and to its recommendation of 15 June 2023 to the Council and the Commission following the investigation of alleged contraventions and maladministration in the application of Union law in relation to the use of Pegasus and equivalent surveillance spyware(36),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 11 July 2023 on the electoral law, the investigative committee and the rule of law in Poland(37),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 19 October 2023 on the rule of law in Malta: six years after the assassination of Daphne Caruana Galizia, and the need to protect journalists(38),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 6 December 2023 entitled ‘No place for hate: a Europe united against hatred’ (JOIN(2023)0051),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 18 January 2024 on the situation of fundamental rights in the European Union – annual report 2022 and 2023(39),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 18 January 2024 on extending the list of EU crimes to hate speech and hate crime(40),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 24 April 2024 on ongoing hearings under Article 7(1) TEU regarding Hungary to strengthen the rule of law and its budgetary implications(41),

    –  having regard to the conclusion of the Article 7 TEU procedure in relation to Poland, as announced by the Commission on 29 May 2024, following steps taken by Poland to restore compliance with EU rule of law standards;

    –  having regard to Resolution 2262 (2019) of 24 January 2019 of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on promoting the rights of persons belonging to national minorities,

    –  having regard to the recommendations and reports of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, the High Commissioner on National Minorities, the Representative on Freedom of the Media and other bodies of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), to the cooperation between the EU and the OSCE on democratisation, institution-building and human rights and to the annual OSCE hate crime report, in which participating states have committed themselves to passing legislation that provides for penalties that take into account the gravity of hate crime, to taking action to address under-reporting and to introducing or further developing capacity-building activities for law enforcement, prosecution and judicial officials to prevent, investigate and prosecute hate crimes,

    –  having regard to the special reports of the European Court of Auditors of 17 December 2024 on Enforcing EU Law (28/2024), of 22 February 2024 on the Rule of Law in the EU (03/2024), and of 10 January 2022 on EU support for the rule of law in the Western Balkans (01/2022), and to its review of 28 February 2024 on the Commission’s rule of law reporting (02/2024), and to their respective recommendations,

    –  having regard to the Political Guidelines for the next European Commission 2024-2029, presented to Parliament on 18 July 2024 by Ursula von der Leyen, candidate for President of the Commission,

    –  having regard to the 2024 Eurobarometer surveys on corruption, which show that corruption remains a serious concern for citizens and businesses in the EU,

    –  having regard to the feedback reports, mission reports, written questions and answers of its Democracy, Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights Monitoring Group (DRFMG)(42),

    –  having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Foreign Affairs,

    –  having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Legal Affairs,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (A10-0100/2025),

    A.  whereas the Union is founded on the common values enshrined in Article 2 TEU of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities – values that are common to the EU Member States and are reflected in the Charter and embedded in international human rights treaties; whereas the Charter is part of EU primary law; whereas democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights are mutually reinforcing values which, when undermined, pose a systemic threat to the rights and freedoms of the people living in the EU;

    B.  whereas it is apparent from Article 49 TEU, which provides the possibility for any European state to apply to become a member of the European Union, that the Union is composed of states which have freely and voluntarily committed themselves to the common values referred to in Article 2 TEU, which respect those values and which undertake to promote them; whereas EU law is thus based on the fundamental premise that each Member State shares with all the other Member States, and recognises that those Member States share with it, those same values; whereas that premise implies and justifies the existence of mutual trust between the Member States that those values will be recognised and, therefore, that the law of the EU that implements them will be respected(43),(44); whereas the Member State are required to ensure that any regression in the protection of the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU is prevented;

    C.  whereas civil society organisations (CSOs), the legal community, associations, independent media and grassroots movements remain a cornerstone of the rule of law by promoting transparency, accountability and citizen participation in democratic processes; whereas these actors have been instrumental in safeguarding judicial independence, freedom of expression and other constitutional values, often operating under increasing political and legal constraints;

    D.  whereas the principle of sincere cooperation in Article 4(3) TEU places an obligation on the Union and the Member States to assist each other in carrying out obligations that arise from the Treaties in full mutual respect, and on Member States to take any appropriate measure, general or particular, to ensure the fulfilment of the obligations arising from the Treaties or resulting from the acts of the institutions of the Union; whereas Member States should refrain from any measures which could jeopardise the attainment of the Union’s objectives;

    E.  whereas in a recent Eurobarometer survey, 74 % of respondents thought that the EU plays an important role in upholding the rule of law and 89 % believed that it is important for all Member States to respect the EU’s core values; whereas, in the current global economic and political context, bolstering citizens’ trust in the rule of law and the resilience of democracies at EU level is a crucial factor;

    F.  whereas accession to the EU must always be a merit-based procedure in which there is an assessment of whether an applicant fulfils the Copenhagen criteria, in particular those guaranteeing full respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law, in order to ensure that EU enlargement strengthens rather than weakens the EU and its single market; whereas the fundamental role of the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance as a Union instrument is to support the rule of law, democracy and human rights in candidate and potential candidate countries, including the strengthening of democratic institutions and CSOs, as well as progress on good governance and the fight against corruption, the promotion and protection of non-discrimination and gender equality and the strengthening of capacities for conflict prevention and resolution;

    Independence of the judiciary

    1.  Underlines that fair and accessible justice is a basic rule of law principle that requires an independent judiciary; reiterates that access to justice is essential for citizens to exercise rights, challenge discrimination and hold decision makers accountable;

    2.  Recalls that robust national legal systems are indispensable in Member States, candidate and potential candidate countries, given that the Commission relies on national judicial authorities to enforce EU law, and that they are fundamental to judicial cooperation across the EU and to fostering mutual trust; notes with concern that while some judicial systems may appear robust on paper, this does not always align with reality;

    3.  Stresses the need for the impartiality of judges; recalls that the appointment and promotion of judges must be determined solely by their qualifications and not be influenced by political or personal considerations, as the judges essential for safeguarding judicial independence; recalls that the criteria for nominations and appointments to high-level judicial positions must be fully transparent;

    4.  Underlines the important role of the national councils of the judiciary in safeguarding judicial independence; considers it necessary to evaluate the reforms that are in the process of being adopted in different Member States and encourages the adaptation of the composition and functioning of these bodies to the standards established by the Commission and the Council of Europe, and which have been endorsed by the CJEU; calls on the Commission in its future rule of law reports to place a particular focus on the roles, structures and functioning of Member States’ national judicial councils as part of its assessment of judicial independence;

    5.  Points out that the prosecution service is a key element in the capacity of a Member State to fight crime and corruption; regrets any governmental or political interference in corruption investigations and recalls that no one is above the law; condemns the misuse of the judicial system for political purposes, including the persecution of political opponents and interference in corruption investigations; stresses that both politically motivated prosecutions and amnesty laws and pardon procedures driven by political interests undermine public trust in constitutional principles and EU standards; highlights the importance of guaranteeing the autonomy and independence of the prosecution service, thereby preventing any political interference in its work, especially from the government; highlights the role of transparent appointment processes for prosecutors as a key factor in maintaining public confidence in criminal justice; highlights its concern about repeated attacks on judges and prosecutors who are conducting high-profile political investigations linked to cases of corruption and abuse of power perpetrated against political opponents;

    6.  Calls for disciplinary procedures for judges and prosecutors to be handled by independent bodies free from political influence and, where necessary, for the system of disciplinary procedures to be reformed to preclude their use by political authorities to control the judiciary;

    7.  Calls on the Commission to maintain constant oversight, ensuring that judges and prosecutors remain independent of the authorities responsible for appointing or reappointing them; calls on the Commission to proactively monitor and swiftly react to risks of rule of law backsliding in areas of judicial independence and access to justice, in line with the principle of non-regression as clarified in recent CJEU case-law;

    8.  Notes that the Commission has found that there are structural challenges with regard to improving the efficiency, accessibility and quality of the judiciary of some Member States(45) and of candidate and potential candidate countries; notes that the Commission has found that several Member States have allocated additional resources to strengthening the resilience of justice systems to ensure the timely resolution of cases and reduce backlogs, while in other Member States levels of remuneration continue to pose challenges, often leading to shortages and vacancies; notes that underfunding and understaffing can undermine the accessibility and effectiveness of judicial systems, thus eroding trust in the rule of law; emphasises that adequate remuneration is essential to attract and retain qualified judicial personnel; strongly believes that training is a key element that guarantees the independence of judges, as well as the quality and efficiency of the judicial system; states that an important element of the state of the rule of law and fair proceedings are judicial procedures conducted in a reasonable time frame; notes, in that context, that the justice scoreboard indicates significant discrepancies across the EU legal area;

    9.  Encourages the Member States to ensure training opportunities for judges; strongly believes that training should be multidisciplinary, with a particular focus on gender equality; reiterates that adequate resources, including funding, infrastructure and qualified personnel, are crucial for the efficiency and accessibility of the justice system; recognises the role of court staff, including notaries, in numerous Member States; calls on all Member States to follow up on corruption cases within a reasonable time limit so as to not foster a feeling of impunity among their citizens; invites Member States to take advantage of the opportunities offered by digitalisation to simplify procedures and processes, improve efficiency and accessibility, save time and reduce storage costs;

    10.  Stresses the importance of independent judicial systems and access to free legal aid in ensuring equal access to justice; reiterates that adequate resources, including infrastructure and personnel, are crucial to improving justice systems; recommends that Member States take concrete steps to improve access to justice for marginalised and vulnerable groups, including adequately funded, enhanced legal aid systems and measures to address language barriers and digital divides;

    11.  Recalls that the Commission’s 2024 Rule of Law Report states that serious concerns persist regarding judicial independence in Hungary and that political influence on the prosecution service remains, with the risk of undue interference in individual cases, and that the freedom of expression of judges remains under pressure and smear campaigns against judges continue in the media;

    12.  Welcomes the pivotal role of the CJEU in upholding the rule of law across the EU; endorses further initiatives to enhance the resources and the capabilities of the CJEU to effectively address further challenges to the rule of law; reiterates that, in accordance with Article 19 TEU and Article 267 TFEU, national courts cannot be hindered from using the possibility of a referral for preliminary ruling to the CJEU; calls on the Commission to carry out a systematic check in this regard as part of its annual rule of law report, and to start infringement proceedings in cases where national judges face obstacles in this regard;

    13.  Regrets the trend whereby some Member States are selectively applying, delaying or failing to implement CJEU and ECtHR judgments and calls for their timely and effective implementation; emphasises that Member States and EU institutions must systematically integrate and implement the latest CJEU case-law to uphold the rule of law and ensure the uniform application of EU law; calls for the swift adaptation of national legislation and institutional frameworks to comply with court rulings;

    14.  Reiterates its strong support for the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court (ICC) as essential, independent and impartial jurisdictional institutions at a particularly challenging time for international justice; recalls the need to fully implement the orders of the International Court of Justice, which are legally binding; calls for the Union, its Member States and candidate and potential candidate countries to continue to support the ICC;

    15.  Urges the Commission, as the guardian of the Treaties, to meet its responsibility for the enforcement of the Union’s basic values, including those laid down in Article 2 TEU and in the EU’s primary law, and not to rely only on citizens going to court themselves to ensure the application of EU law; stresses that the non-implementation of domestic and international judgments is violating the rule of law and risks leaving people without remedy and can create a perception among the public that judgments can be disregarded, undermining general trust in fair adjudication; underlines the fundamental role of the CJEU and the ECtHR in ensuring respect for the law and guaranteeing uniformity in its application; proposes establishing clear deadlines for the implementation of court rulings, as well as a detailed monitoring plan for the implementation of pending judgments; urges the Commission to launch infringement procedures if needed, together with motions for interim measures; calls on the Member States to implement pending judgments of the CJEU and the ECtHR promptly and suggests the establishment of a monitoring unit to monitor the implementation of CJEU and ECtHR rulings relating to democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights in EU countries, and to fully integrate the monitoring unit’s findings into the annual rule of law report; recommends that the Commission, in particular, take action regarding failures to implement CJEU judgments under Article 260(2) TFEU and apply the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation in cases of non-compliance with CJEU and ECtHR judgments where the breach identified affects or seriously risks affecting the Union budget or financial interests; stresses that systematic non-compliance with EU law must entail tangible financial penalties to ensure genuine deterrence; calls on the Commission to assess whether delays or non-compliance with such rulings warrant proceedings for failure to act under Article 258 TFEU; calls on the Commission to systematically analyse data on non-compliance with country-specific views of UN Treaty Bodies;

    16.  Welcomes the revision of the Victims’ Rights Directive(46) to close legal gaps, ensuring that victims can access justice and receive support; calls on the Council to include as much as possible from Parliament’s mandate, including provisions ensuring victims’ right to review decisions in criminal proceedings, on access to legal remedies and fair compensation, and on comprehensive support services, particularly for those in vulnerable situations; stresses the importance of effective data collection, of enhancing resource allocation for victim assistance and of safeguarding victims’ privacy and personal data to prevent secondary victimisation and ensure that victims, including undocumented migrants and asylum seekers, can safely report crimes; expects co-legislators to adopt solutions that are victim-centred;

    17.  Recognises the essential role of law enforcement in upholding the rule of law and protecting fundamental rights; calls on the Member States to ensure adequate funding, training and resources for the police and law enforcement agencies; calls on the Member States to take into account the Council of Europe’s Code of Police Ethics in this regard; emphasises that any use of force must be strictly necessary, proportionate and subject to clear safeguards; calls on the Member States to introduce guidelines for the transparent, independent and consistent selection, testing and trialling of weapons used by law enforcement agents, based on UN standards, recommendations and guiding principles; notes that this assessment should determine that such weapons are compliant with international human rights law and standards prior to their selection and deployment; calls on the Member States to thoroughly investigate any cases of excessive use of force and discriminatory treatment by law enforcement agencies;

    18.  Calls on the Commission to include, as a rule of law concern, the conditions in prisons in future rule of law reports, given the serious and growing concerns across Europe regarding overcrowding, inadequate living conditions and the alarming rates of suicide within prisons;

    19.  Calls on the Commission to pay special attention to analysing procedural justice with a view to identifying strengths, gaps, discrepancies and best practice in ensuring transparency, efficiency and fair treatment in strengthening administrative justice across the EU, as a means of ensuring the accountability of public authorities;

    Anti-corruption framework

    20.  Stresses that the rule of law requires that persons holding public office cannot act arbitrarily or abuse their power for personal gain; underlines that governments should adopt laws in the interest of the general public and not in the interest of specific individuals;

    21.  Reiterates that corruption is a serious threat to democracy, fundamental rights and the rule of law in Member States, candidate countries and potential candidate countries; underlines that corruption erodes citizens’ trust in public institutions; deplores the fact that the 2024 Eurobarometer on corruption shows that corruption remains a serious concern for EU citizens and businesses, with 68 % of Europeans considering corruption to be widespread in their country, 65 % believing that high-level corruption cases are not pursued sufficiently and 41 % believing that the level of corruption has increased; considers this a call for the EU to step up its efforts to combat corruption;

    22.  Reiterates its call on the Commission to immediately finalise negotiations on the EU’s membership of the Council of Europe’s Group of States against Corruption (GRECO); notes that such membership will ensure greater transparency, accountability and efficiency in the management of EU funds, the legislative process and the work of the EU institutions, and demands that the annual rule of law report cover EU institutions;

    23.  Reiterates its call on all Member States to adopt a code of conduct for judges following the GRECO recommendations, and taking into account the codes applicable at the ECtHR and the CJEU; calls on Member States to create independent mechanisms to investigate alleged violations of the code of conduct and other laws, to improve disclosure and transparency with regard to conflicts of interest and gifts received by the judiciary, and to address the issue of revolving doors;

    24.  Calls on the Member States, candidate countries and potential candidate countries, and the EU institutions to enhance transparency and accountability in public institutions by strengthening anti-corruption and conflict of competence legal frameworks and reporting processes to ensure the effective investigation and prosecution of corruption cases, including high-level corruption cases (inter alia those linked to public procurement procedures and those relating to high-risk areas such as ports or land borders), reinforcing oversight mechanisms and bodies and the independence and proper functioning of existing agencies, fostering protection for whistle-blowers, improving integrity frameworks and lobbying for legislation; regrets the lack of relevant progress made and stresses that final convictions and deterrent penalties are necessary to demonstrate genuine commitment to tackling corruption; calls on Member States to ensure the transparency and accountability of lobbying activities, including the establishment or improvement of mandatory lobbying registers and ‘legislative footprint’ mechanisms for tracking the influence of lobbying activities on lawmaking processes;

    25.  Acknowledges the important role of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) in safeguarding the rule of law and combating corruption within the EU; encourages the Commission to closely monitor Member States’ level of cooperation with the EPPO; endorses the reinforcement of the monitoring and coordinative powers of the EPPO with a view to strengthening its ability to combat corruption in Member States; calls on the Commission to propose, under Article 86(4) TFEU, an expansion of the mandate of the EPPO to avoid circumvention of EU restrictive measures and cross-border environmental crimes, and to accelerate the revision of the EPPO Regulation(47) and the Directive on the fight against fraud to the EU’s financial interests by means of criminal law(48) in order to safeguard and clarify the primary competence of the EPPO with regard to corruption offences affecting the EU’s financial interests or committed by EU officials;

    26.  Urges all Member States that have not yet done so to join the EPPO in order to enhance the effectiveness of the fight against corruption, particularly in relation to the protection of EU funds; calls on all candidate and potential candidate countries to establish a framework for effective cooperation with the EPPO;

    27.  Calls on European bodies such as Europol, Eurojust, the European Court of Auditors, the EPPO and the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) to improve their cooperation in the fight against corruption and fraud affecting EU finances;

    28.  Calls on the Commission to enhance transparency and accountability in all of its communications, visits and meetings, especially with high-level national actors;

    29.  Welcomes the Commission’s proposal for a directive on combating corruption which harmonises the definition of corruption offences in the public and private sector and the corresponding penalties; welcomes the inclusion of preventive measures, including on illicit political financing and training, in the directive on combating corruption, such as effective rules for the disclosure and management of conflicts of interest, open access to information and effective rules regulating the interaction between the private and the public sector; calls on the Member States to also put in place effective rules to address revolving doors, establish codes of conduct for public officials, establish a public legislative footprint, and ensure transparency in the funding of candidatures for elected public officials and political parties; appreciates that almost all Member States now have anti-corruption strategies in place; regrets, at the same time, that implementation and effectiveness vary; calls on the Member States that have not yet done so to develop and implement robust and effective anti-corruption strategies with the involvement of civil society; underlines the importance of the identification, notification, representation and coordination of victims of corruption; calls on the Member States to protect victims of corruption and enable them to have their views and concerns presented and considered at appropriate stages during criminal proceedings; calls on the Member States to ensure that victims of corruption have the right to adequate and proportionate compensation;

    30.  Calls on all the EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies to strengthen their anti-corruption measures with regard to the disclosure and management of conflicts of interest, open access to information, rules regulating the interaction of EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies with the private sector, revolving doors and the code of conduct for public officials; considers that during their term of office, Members of the European Parliament should not engage in paid side activities with for-profit organisations or businesses seeking to influence EU policymaking

    31.  Recognises the crucial role that whistle-blowers play in exposing corruption and promoting transparency across both the public and private sectors; stresses the need to protect whistle-blowers from retaliation and harassment; calls for independent and autonomous whistle-blower protection authorities to be further strengthened and further integrated into broader national anti-corruption frameworks, ensuring a unified and robust approach to combating corruption throughout all Member States;

    Media pluralism and freedom

    32.  Welcomes initiatives to promote free, independent and pluralistic media and a safe and enabling environment for journalists such as the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA)(49) and calls for its swift implementation; calls on the Member States and candidate and potential candidate countries to improve transparency in the allocation of state advertising online and offline and to follow the recommendations contained in Commission Recommendation (EU) 2021/1534 of 16 September 2021 on ensuring the protection, safety and empowerment of journalists and other media professionals in the European Union; calls on the Commission to provide the Member States with the necessary assistance in transposing the EMFA into national law, and to monitor its implementation, especially in certain Member States that rank poorly in freedom indices; underlines that the EMFA is a crucial milestone in safeguarding the independence, pluralism and integrity of the media landscape across the Union;

    33.  Expresses deep concern over the increasing attacks on journalists and publishers, with a disproportionate impact on women; calls on the Commission and the Member States and on candidate and potential candidate countries to ensure the safety and protection of journalists, including investigative journalists and fact checkers who are particularly exposed; highlights the fact that the most common forms of threat include verbal attacks, online harassment, intimidation through social media and email, and legal threats, including cases covered by the Anti-SLAPP (‘Strategic lawsuits against public participation’) Directive(50), as well as instances of stalking and personal harassment;

    34.  Calls on the Member States to fully implement the Anti-SLAPP Directive and Commission Recommendation (EU) 2022/758 of 27 April 2022 on protecting journalists and human rights defenders who engage in public participation from manifestly unfounded or abusive court proceedings(51), and to adopt comprehensive domestic anti-SLAPP measures to protect journalists and provide support for those facing intimidation, defamation and limitations on the ability to exercise their profession; recommends that, when transposing the directive, Member States extend its application to also include national cases, since the majority of SLAPP cases occur at the national level; calls on the Commission to put forward proposals to address SLAPP cases not covered under the current Directive;

    35.  Calls for the introduction of specific aggravating circumstances in criminal law for offences committed against journalists when such acts are motivated by or connected to their professional activities;

    36.  Urges the Member States and candidate and potential candidate countries to protect and promote media freedom and pluralism, ensure transparent allocation of public funds, prevent the concentration of media ownership, protect editorial independence and combat disinformation, particularly through robust laws, including specific provisions on media ownership transparency, and independent regulators; underlines the important role of public service media; welcomes initiatives at national level to create a media registry containing public information about ownership and advertising investment in order to ensure transparency, impartiality and verifiability; further calls on Member States to ensure adequate, sustainable and predictable funding and budgetary stability based on transparent and objective criteria for public service media; recommends the creation of a dedicated EU media freedom fund supporting independent journalism and local media outlets;

    37.  Condemns the spread of hate speech, including in mainstream and social media, as it poses a serious threat to democracy and the rule of law; calls for stronger enforcement of media regulations to combat hate speech and safeguard a diverse and inclusive media landscape, in accordance with its resolution of 18 January 2024 on the situation of fundamental rights in the European Union; underlines the fact that prominent public figures and politicians have to lead by example and need to ensure a respectful debate; recalls that freedom of expression is a fundamental value of democratic societies and should not be unjustifiably restricted; further recalls that any legislation on hate speech and hate crime should be grounded in the principles of necessity and proportionality; underlines that freedom of expression must be exercised within the law and in line with Article 11 of the Charter and should not be exploited as a shield for hate speech and hate crimes;

    38.  Acknowledges that citizens perceive signs of an erosion of democracy fuelled by misinformation and disinformation, and that the spread of false information through social media could lead to the erosion of general respect for the rule of law; calls on digital platforms to take immediate action by ensuring compliance with their own community standards and European laws, including the Digital Services Act(52) (DSA) and competition rules; calls on the Commission to assess such compliance regularly and take measures where necessary; recommends that Member States, candidate and potential candidate countries develop comprehensive strategies to combat disinformation and foreign interference in democratic processes, while safeguarding freedom of expression and media pluralism;

    39.  Strongly condemns state control and political interference in media operations; highlights the fact that media regulators must be adequately protected by legal safeguards to ensure their independence and freedom from political pressure, with sufficient budgetary resources at their disposal; underlines the democratic importance of independent media regulators;

    40.  Expresses deep concern over the abuse of spyware and the lack of sufficient safeguards against illegal surveillance of journalists; calls on the Commission to implement the recommendations of Parliament’s PEGA Inquiry Committee on banning politically motivated surveillance;

    41.  Urges Member States to ensure that the transposition of Directive (EU) 2016/343(53) on the presumption of innocence does not introduce restrictions on the right to report on and inform the public of matters of public interest, including judicial investigations, that are not provided for by the Directive; calls on Member States to review and, if necessary, modify existing national provisions that could limit journalistic freedoms;

    42.  Calls on the Member States to ensure that the national coordinators established under the DSA are fully empowered to perform their role in facilitating information exchange and cooperation at the European level;

    Civil society organisations (CSOs)

    43.  Agrees with the Commission’s assessment that CSOs, including those advocating for the rule of law and democracy, the protection of marginalised groups, environmental protection and social justice, and human rights defenders (HRDs) are essential for the checks and balances and for the protection of fundamental values and Union law that are a cornerstone of the EU; appreciates that CSOs and professional associations representing groups such as judges, prosecutors or journalists support the rule of law; underlines, in particular, the importance of local, vibrant civil societies in candidate and potential candidate countries, which play a constructive role in the EU accession processes; recognises their role as watchdogs against rule of law violations and their contribution to promoting and safeguarding democratic principles; recalls the need for a safe, supportive and enabling environment for their work;

    44.  Highlights the role of civil society and independent oversight bodies in monitoring, verifying and supporting the implementation of the recommendations of the 2024 Rule of Law Report; calls for a structured civil dialogue framework to integrate civil society contributions into the annual rule of law cycle, as recommended by the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC)(54) and civil society networks(55); reiterates the importance of broad consultation when drafting the report; supports the Commission’s plan to draft a strategy on space for and the protection of civil society and HRDs; recommends that the EU Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders be fully implemented; calls on the Commission to conduct visits to Member States on-site whenever possible, rather than virtually, as on-site visits could paint a fuller and more contextual picture of the local situation;

    45.  Is concerned by the growing trend of CSOs and HRDs facing further legal restrictions, a lack of funding, and attacks, which undermine freedom of association, freedom of assembly and freedom of expression; notes with concern that several Member States and candidate and potential candidate countries have imposed disproportionate measures, including the excessive use of force and the detention of protesters to prevent people from participating in protests in some Member States, as well as pre-emptive bans on public gatherings on the vague grounds of security; stresses that courts have overturned such bans in multiple cases; strongly condemns the use of ‘foreign agent laws’, which stifle dissent, harass CSOs and restrict their operations, creating a chilling effect on civil society and HRDs; regrets the fact that restrictions on freedom of assembly, expression and association and the use of excessive force often disproportionately affect specific causes or groups(56);

    46.  Stresses that peaceful assembly, freedom of association and expression, and freedom of the arts and sciences are fundamental rights protected by international law and are essential for democracy; condemns the increased pressure on these rights, where proven, and notes the trend of restricting them; condemns also, in this context, episodes of violence against police forces; calls on the Commission to reflect these freedoms in the annual report;

    47.  Expresses deep concern about the shrinking civic space and increasing persecution of CSOs and HRDs in the EU, particularly those working on anti-racism, climate justice, LGBTIQ rights, women’s rights and migrant supports; notes that these groups face a range of threats including legal and financial restrictions, funding suspensions, smear campaigns, intimidation and criminalisation; condemns, in particular, the growing repression of climate activism in several Member States, including the misuse of anti-terrorism and organised crime laws and the classification of peaceful climate activists as members of ‘criminal organisations’; calls on the Member States to refrain from disproportionate legal action against such activists; urges the Commission to systematically monitor the situation of these organisations in its rule of law reports and to expand dedicated EU funding for civil society actors combating racism and working on other fundamental rights;

    48.  Calls on the Commission to address such breaches in a dedicated pillar of the annual rule of law reports; calls on the Commission to strengthen the protection of CSOs and HRDs, by establishing early warning mechanisms, increasing the transparency of funding for all actors in the scope of the EU Transparency Register and expanding funding to support CSOs to enable them to operate freely and independently;

    49.  Urges the Member States to create an enabling environment for CSOs and HRDs, adopt the Anti-SLAPP Directive, and implement Commission Recommendation (EU) 2022/758 to protect CSOs from legal harassment; calls for strengthened independence of national oversight bodies, with adequate resources and safeguards against political interference; encourages support for CSOs in developing and disseminating educational initiatives to ensure broad outreach and accessibility;

    50.  Considers that the Commission and the Member States should improve funding mechanisms for CSOs and initiatives that strengthen the judiciary and uphold court independence, namely through the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values programme and the Justice programme; welcomes the fact that the Commission plans to draft a strategy for protecting civil society, recalls, at the same time, that there should be a special focus on HRDs; calls on the Commission to include a rapid response mechanism to support threatened CSOs and HRDs within the Union, drawing on the model of the EU-funded ‘Protect Defenders’ mechanism, which currently has a non-EU focus only; emphasises that this mechanism could provide resources for advocacy, legal aid and awareness campaigns, while ensuring that these organisations can operate without undue restrictions or harassment; calls for the full and consistent application of the Union guidelines on HRDs in candidate and potential candidate countries; is concerned, however, by the growing trend in some Member States of CSOs and HRDs facing challenges, with new legal restrictions, a lack of funding, and physical or verbal attacks, and by the deplorable acceptance of such practices and the chilling effect thereof, including on their freedom of speech within the Member States(57) and the EU institutions; considers that CSOs and HRDs play an essential supportive role in monitoring Member States’ compliance with the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU;

    Equality and non-discrimination before the law

    51.  Recalls that Member States’ legal frameworks must enshrine equal legal treatment and promote equality and the right of individuals not to be discriminated against in judicial proceedings; stresses that the rule of law and fundamental rights are interlinked and that violations of the rule of law have an immediate impact on fundamental rights and disproportionately affect women, minorities and vulnerable groups; calls on the Commission to monitor the effect of any violations of the rule of law on fundamental rights and to ensure that equality and non-discrimination before the law for all people are protected through the use of all relevant instruments, including infringement procedures, where appropriate;

    52.  Stresses the need to fight against all types of discrimination before the law; expresses its concern over the lack of progress in and implementation of equality and anti-discrimination laws in some Member States; regrets the fact that, despite existing EU legislation such as Directive 2000/78/EC(58) on equal treatment, gaps in the legal framework and in implementation persist, leaving victims without adequate legal recourse; recalls that Member States’ legal frameworks must enshrine equal legal treatment and promote equality and the right of individuals not to be discriminated against in legal remedy; calls on the Commission to act in cases of non-compliance with these principles; deplores the intention of the Commission to withdraw the proposal for a horizontal equal treatment directive(59) and urges the Council to adopt the directive without further delay;

    53.  Is concerned that the Commission’s 2024 Rule of Law Report noted that some Member States fail to effectively prosecute hate crimes or provide sufficient support to victims of hate crimes, undermining trust in judicial systems and perpetuating inequality before the law; calls on the Council to extend the current list of ‘EU crimes’ in Article 83(1) TFEU to include hate crimes and hate speech and calls on the Commission to put forward a legislative proposal on hate crime and hate speech; asks the Commission to focus on hate crimes in its rule of law reports and, in this regard, to closely monitor and record hate crimes;

    54.  Underlines that gender-based violence, online and offline, is a major and pervasive offence, as well as a radical violation of fundamental rights, and it violates the principle of equality before the law; calls on the Commission and the Member States to take action against gender-based violence, both online and offline, including violence committed through the use of digital platforms; calls for gender-based violence to be added to the list of EU crimes and for an EU legislative proposal on combating rape based on the lack of consent, also in candidate and potential candidate countries;

    55.  Recalls the need for access to sexual and reproductive rights and health and calls for access to safe, legal abortion to be enshrined in the Charter;

    56.  Calls on all Member States to protect LGBTIQ rights in compliance with Union law, the Charter, and CJEU and ECtHR case-law, recalls that legal barriers to recognising same-sex partnerships or parenthood across borders persist in several Member States; warns that such practices not only hinder the free movement of LGBTIQ families within the EU, but also violate the rule of law principle of non-discrimination before the law, highlighting the lack of uniform protection for LGBTIQ individuals across Member States; calls on the Member States who have not yet done so to introduce legal recognition of same-sex partnerships; calls on the Commission to recast Directive 2004/38/EC(60) in order to include an explicit cross-border recognition of private and family life rights, including parenthood for same-sex parents, in the light of the latest rulings(61) of the CJEU; stresses that all children are equal before the law and that Member States must act in the best interests of the child, increase legal certainty and reduce discrimination against the children of same-sex parents; recalls Parliament’s position supporting the recognition of parenthood across the EU, irrespective of how a child is conceived or born, or the type of family they have; urges the Commission to present a renewed LGBTIQ strategy that fully addresses the challenges throughout Europe; calls on the Commission and the Council to make LGBTIQ rights a cross-cutting priority across all policy fields; calls on the Commission to put forward appropriate legislative measures to ensure respect for these principles, as well as to rely on infringement procedures against Member States; urges the Commission to present legislative proposals to combat hate crimes and hate speech on grounds of gender identity, sex characteristics and sexual orientation;

    57.  Is deeply concerned about the discriminatory measures introduced in some Member States under the pretext of fighting ‘LGBTIQ propaganda’ and ‘gender ideology’ which are contributing to an alarming increase in hate crimes and hate speech targeting LGBTIQ individuals in several Member States and have a negative impact on children, families and workers; welcomes the CJEU’s opinion of 5 June 2025 stating that it considers Hungary to be in violation of EU law in prohibiting or restricting access to LGBTIQ+ content; highlights the negative impact of such measures on the freedom of expression and assembly for LGBTIQ groups and beyond; emphasises that these actions encourage discrimination against LGBTIQ individuals and contravene EU law; urges the Commission to present a proposal for a binding EU ban on conversion practices in all Member States; notes that in 2024, both the Commission and the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) noted an alarming increase in hate crimes and hate speech targeting LGBTIQ individuals and other minorities in several Member States, stresses the importance of the right to self-determination of LGBTIQ persons and reminds Member States that, in accordance with case-law, the right to self-determination is a fundamental right; therefore urges all Member States who have not done so yet to make sure that LGBTIQ individuals have access to legal gender recognition;

    58.  Is deeply concerned by and strongly condemns the rising levels of anti-Semitism across the EU; is also deeply concerned and strongly condemns the rising levels of Islamophobia and all other forms of discrimination across the EU, including acts of violence, intimidation, hate speech and the display of hate symbols in public spaces; calls on the Member States and candidate and potential candidate countries to make sure that members of all minorities are equal before the law; calls on the Member States to review laws and policies to ensure that they do not discriminate against minorities, directly or indirectly, and to review any discriminatory legal provisions and regulations; calls for sustained efforts at both EU and national levels to monitor, prevent and prosecute related hate crimes and to protect Jewish and Muslim communities from harassment and violence;

    59.  Emphasises that a lack of accountability disproportionately affects minorities’ communities, fair political representation, and economic opportunities; calls for increased transparency in public decision-making processes to ensure inclusive and equitable governance;

    60.  Calls on the Member States to fully implement Directive 2024/1500(62) and Directive 2024/1499(63), which establish minimum standards for equality bodies; calls for concrete measures to guarantee their independence and ensure their effectiveness in promoting equality;

    61.  Underlines that third-country nationals legally residing in the EU, regardless of their nationality or place of birth, must be treated in a non-discriminatory manner and enjoy fair and equal treatment in the areas specified by existing legislation; points out that third-country nationals, regardless of their nationality, place of birth or residence status, have the right to apply for international protection in compliance with international and EU law, of which the non-refoulement principle is an integral part; calls on the Commission to support the Member States in upholding the rule of law and fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter and in implementing the legislation adopted by the co-legislators; stresses the binding nature of the judgments of the CJEU and the ECtHR;

    62.  Urges the Commission to ensure that the free movement of persons within the EU, the right to reside freely, and family reunification are fully respected in the EU territory and that every citizen can enjoy equal rights and fully exercise their rights;

    63.  Urges the Commission to strengthen the focus in the annual rule of law report on strengthening the fight against all forms of discrimination in access to justice; calls on the Commission and the Member States to combat discrimination on grounds of racial and ethnic origin, religion or belief, nationality, political opinion, language, disability, age, gender, including gender identity and gender expression, and sexual orientation; urges the Council to reach an agreement on Directive 2008/0140(CNS)(64); urges the Commission to introduce new pillars in the annual rule of law report focusing on combating all forms of hatred and discrimination as enshrined in Article 21 of the Charter, namely regarding crimes that target minority groups and members of national, ethnic, linguistic and religious minorities, as well as the conditions of civil society in Member States; calls on the Commission to require Member States to collect comparable and robust disaggregated equality data to fully assess the impact of structural discrimination on the rule of law; calls on the Commission to reconsider its position on the Minority SafePack Initiative and to put forward legislative initiatives to safeguard the promotion of minority rights and language rights; reiterates its call for the EU to accede to the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages; calls for closer ties between the EU and the Council of Europe on minority rights, including in view of the enlargement process;

    64.  Emphasises the need for Member States to address the gender gap in the judiciary and other key democratic institutions; recommends implementing targeted measures to increase women’s representation in senior judicial and public administration positions;

    65.  Calls on the Member States to establish national human rights institutions, in accordance with the UN Paris Principles, to guarantee their independence and to ensure that they have the capacity to carry out their tasks effectively;

    Single market and the rule of law

    66.  Highlights the importance of the rule of law in ensuring the smooth and efficient functioning of the single market and reaffirms that well-functioning, independent judicial systems, effective anti-corruption frameworks and strong protection of media freedom are crucial for maintaining fair competition, upholding legal certainty and fostering trust among economic operators; underlines that non-compliance and circumvention of European regulations lead to enormous distortions of competition in the internal market; emphasises that reliable and stable rule of law structures are key pillars for investment and trade, which are essential for competitiveness and, therefore, for the capacity of the welfare system and the labour market in the EU;

    67.  Stresses that the proper functioning of the single market depends on the effective application of the principle of mutual trust and recognition in both judicial and administrative cooperation; recalls that such trust can only be sustained where the rule of law – as also recommended by the Venice Commission in its rule of law checklist – is fully upheld; indicates that the principle of mutual recognition should be suspended in cases of systemic breaches;

    68.  Underlines the negative economic impact that corruption and weak judiciary systems have on investor confidence and cross-border cooperation; is concerned that national governments and institutions which fail to uphold the rule of law may allow anti-competitive behaviour to flourish, or may even actively encourage it for political or economic gain, thereby potentially damaging the EU’s economy and undermining the fairness of its internal market;

    69.  Recalls that, within the scope of application of the Treaties, any discrimination on the grounds of nationality is prohibited in accordance with the Charter, and that freedom of establishment, service provision and movement of capital are fundamental to the single market; underlines that the rules regarding equality of treatment forbid overt and covert discrimination by reason of nationality or, in the case of a company, its seat; recalls its condemnation of the reported systemic discriminatory, non-transparent and unfair practices against companies in some Member States;

    70.  Condemns systemic discriminatory practices in Hungary, including the misuse of EU funds to benefit political allies, violations of EU competition rules, and the concentration of businesses in the hands of oligarchs with ties to the government; deplores the release of EU funds to the Hungarian Government despite ongoing deficiencies in judicial independence and anti-corruption frameworks; recommends suspending disbursements until all rule of law benchmarks are met; urges the Commission to ensure that EU funds reach the Hungarian population, including through direct and indirect funding mechanisms for beneficiaries independent of the Hungarian Government;

    71.  Highlights the importance of addressing economic inequality and social exclusion as threats to democratic participation and the rule of law;

    72.  Calls on the Commission to integrate the single market dimension of the rule of law more explicitly into its monitoring mechanisms, with a stronger focus on the uniform and rapid application, implementation and enforcement of existing legislation, ensuring that Member States’ adherence to rule of law principles is assessed not only from a democratic and judicial standpoint but also in terms of its economic impact on the single market and financial stability; requests that the Commission include in its 2025 rule of law report a dedicated chapter on the single market dimension; urges the Commission to use all available legal tools to address rule of law deficiencies, including launching infringement procedures and competition law enforcement powers when necessary, to preserve the functioning of the internal market;

    Rule of law toolbox

    73.  Stresses the importance of embedding rule of law milestones in funding instruments such as the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF); deplores the release of EU funds to the Hungarian Government despite ongoing deficiencies in judicial independence and anti-corruption frameworks; recommends suspending disbursements until all rule of law benchmarks are met; urges the Commission to ensure that EU funds reach the Hungarian population, including through direct and indirect funding mechanisms for beneficiaries independent of the Hungarian Government, while maintaining the full impact of the measures taken;

    74.  Criticises the Council’s inaction in advancing ongoing Article 7 TEU proceedings, which weakens the EU’s credibility in upholding the rule of law; urges the Council to unblock the next steps in the Article 7 TEU procedure in relation to Hungary, given persistent violations on judicial independence, media freedom and civil society, which necessitate immediate and decisive action; recommends that the Council ensure that hearings take place at least once per presidency during ongoing Article 7 procedures and also that new developments affecting the rule of law, democracy and fundamental rights are addressed; emphasises that there is no need for unanimity in the Council in order to identify a clear risk of a serious breach of Union values under Article 7(1) TEU, or to address concrete recommendations to the Member States in question and provide deadlines for the implementation of those recommendations; reiterates its call on the Council to do so, underlining that any further delaying of such action would amount to a breach of the rule of law principle by the Council itself; insists that Parliament should have a more active role in Article 7 TEU proceedings, including the ability to present reasoned proposals to the Council, attend Council hearings and be fully informed at every stage of the procedure;

    75.  Welcomes the preventive tools in the rule of law toolbox, such as the annual rule of law cycle, the EU justice scoreboard, the European Semester, EU funds to support civil society, judicial networks and media freedom and the rule of law milestones in the RRF; insists that a closer link between the findings of the 2024 Rule of Law Report and the allocation of financial support under the Union budget is introduced, in terms of milestones, ensuring that EU funds are tied to the achievement of necessary reforms; calls on the Commission to further develop a direct link between preventive and reactive instruments and hence, on the basis of the findings in the annual rule of law reports, to promptly and in a coordinated manner launch infringement procedures, set further steps in applying the Article 7 TEU procedure, and apply the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation and the horizontal enabling conditions related to the Charter, as well as provisions from the Financial Regulation and Common Provisions Regulation; calls on the Commission to assess and report on the potential risks to the Union budget posed by weaknesses in rule of law regimes in the annual rule of law reports starting with the 2025 report; underlines that both the triggering of the reactive instruments and the closure of relevant procedures must be based on the objective criterion of compliance with the rule of law and with EU and international law as interpreted by international courts;

    76.  Calls on the Commission to systemically resort to expedited procedures and applications for interim measures before the CJEU in infringement cases; calls on the Commission to revise its policy, outlined in its 2022 communication on enforcing EU law(65), not to use infringement actions for ‘individual’ redress, as this policy has led to serious deprivation of rights for citizens across the EU, especially where their own governments are refusing to comply with EU law or CJEU judgments, also because most of these cases are not merely individual but address strategic and fundamental issues; asks the Commission to report annually on the application and effectiveness of the tools used against breaches of the principles of the rule of law in Member States;

    77.  Underlines the need for an ever more comprehensive toolbox ensuring compliance, beyond its budgetary dimension, with EU values across all Union law, including financial instruments, to prevent backsliding; urges the Commission to identify the gaps and present relevant proposals broadening the scope of this toolbox; supports stronger application of the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation, with cross-cutting conditionality in EU funding programmes; maintains its position that frozen EU funds should only be released once meaningful reforms have been fully implemented and rule of law compliance has been verifiably achieved in practice; emphasises the need for consistency and transparency in applying the toolbox to protect Union values, without political considerations and using objective criteria to trigger reactive instruments; highlights the fact that conditionality should equally apply to candidate and potential candidate countries; insists on the importance of Parliament’s role in overseeing the use of those tools; urges the Commission to conduct systematic audits of the distribution of EU funds to prevent conflicts of interest, political instrumentalisation or opacity in fund allocation at the national level;

    78.  Insists on the introduction of a performance-based instrument in the multiannual financial framework (MFF) to strengthen the alignment between EU funds and the respect for Union values enshrined in Article 2 TEU such as democracy, fundamental rights and the rule of law; requests that the future MFF include robust rule of law safeguards applicable to all EU funds;

    79.  Expresses concern that the suspension of EU funds could be misused as a political weapon against civil society and local authorities; recalls that the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation ensures that final recipients should not lose access to EU funds if sanctions are applied to their government; calls for ‘smart conditionality’ that would enable national governments undermining the rule of law to be bypassed by allocating decommitted EU funds directly to local and regional authorities and to non-governmental organisations and businesses that comply with EU law, as well as by simplifying the reallocation of funds intended for the benefit of the Member State in question to other EU programmes; proposes the establishment of a transparent system for local authorities to request EU funds when national governments block or misuse EU funds; stresses the importance of strictly applying the conditionality mechanisms as enshrined in the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance and in the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans in a transparent manner;

    Checks and balances

    80.  Underlines the importance of safeguarding the separation of powers and a stable institutional framework in every Member State; calls on the Member States to ensure that any constitutional or legislative reforms affecting the separation of powers fully comply with EU fundamental values and legal principles;

    81.  Calls on the Member States to refrain from excessively using accelerated procedures that bypass stakeholder and civil society consultation, including parliamentary scrutiny or emergency powers, as these negatively impact the stability and the quality of lawmaking and democracy; calls on the Member States to set up transparent lawmaking processes following systematic and public consultation with various stakeholders and advisory bodies;

    82.  Encourages national governments and parliaments to publish publicly accessible impact assessments and consultation findings for every major legislative proposal;

    83.  Underlines the recommendation of the Venice Commission that complaints and appeals in the case of electoral irregularities, in particular with regard to vote buying, ballot-box stuffing and incorrect vote counting, be followed up effectively; recalls the importance of the EU legislation adopted in this regard, namely the DSA, the Digital Markets Act(66), the AI Act(67), Regulation (EU) 2024/900 on the transparency and targeting of political advertising(68) and the EMFA; calls on the Commission and the Member States to fully implement these acts and provide adequate public resources for the measures under them;

    84.  Calls on the Member States to strengthen the independence of national oversight bodies in order to ensure resources and freedom from political interference; stresses the importance of civil society and HRDs in promoting accountability and protecting fundamental rights;

    85.  Expresses deep concern about the rise of extremism and its corrosive effect on democratic norms and the rule of law in several Member States; notes with concern that extremist groups actively target minorities and contribute to a climate of fear, discrimination and polarisation; calls on the Commission to explicitly identify such groups as a threat to democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms, including academic and media independence, in its annual rule of law report; urges the Member States to take decisive action to counter their influence through robust legal frameworks, education promoting democratic values, and support for CSOs countering extremism; calls for coordinated EU action to counter this threat, including through education, social inclusion programmes and, where necessary, legal measures;

    86.  Expresses concern about the reported cases of the use of surveillance technologies by Member State governments against journalists, activists, opposition figures and staff of the EU institutions; recalls that the use of spyware must be strictly proportionate and necessary and urges the Commission to present a plan of measures to prevent its abuse without undue delay, making full use of all available legislative means provided by the Treaties, as recommended by the PEGA Committee;

    87.  Notes with concern the increasing use of artificial intelligence for national security and law enforcement purposes across the EU, stressing the risks to fundamental rights and freedoms(69); recalls the need to ensure robust data protection safeguards when Member States or national authorities employ surveillance software; calls for strengthened EU legislation to prevent mass surveillance and discrimination;

    88.  Is concerned about foreign interference in the Member States and in candidate and potential candidate countries, including social media manipulation and disinformation by forces both inside and outside the Union to manipulate public opinion and distort democratic debate; stresses the importance of transparency in platform algorithms, independent audits and robust fact-checking mechanisms to combat disinformation and safeguard democracy; calls on major digital platforms to cooperate with national law enforcement authorities to support investigations into illegal online activities; calls on the Commission and the Member States to monitor this and to apply the DSA and the Digital Markets Act swiftly, particularly regarding very large online platforms; calls on the Commission to include greater scrutiny of online platform disinformation in Pillar 3 (Pluralism and Media Freedom) of its rule of law report;

    89.  Stresses the importance of academic freedom as an integral aspect of the rule of law and urges the Member States to protect universities from political interference and ensure institutional autonomy; encourages the Member States to foster a culture of the rule of law through awareness campaigns, outreach initiatives and action promoting democratic values and principles;

    90.  Invites the Commission and the Member States to consider engaging in a process focused on improving administrative procedures and practices that have an impact on the functioning of key democratic processes and the exercise of checks and balances in line with the EU’s established, shared principles;

    Horizontal recommendations

    91.  Recognises the Commission’s rule of law report as a key preventive tool for monitoring the state of the rule of law across the EU, facilitating dialogue between Member States, and guiding reforms in areas such as judicial independence, anti-corruption, media freedom and other checks and balances;

    92.  Acknowledges that the Commission’s rule of law report has become more comprehensive since its inception in 2020; deplores, however, the fact that essential elements from Parliament’s 2016 resolution have not yet been implemented and that the Commission has not fully addressed the recommendations made by Parliament in its previous resolutions; considers that these recommendations remain valid and reiterates them; calls for the inclusion in the annual report of important missing elements of the Venice Commission’s rule of law checklist, such as prevention of the abuse of powers, equality before the law and non-discrimination; reiterates its position that the report should cover the full scope of the values of Article 2 TEU, as these cannot be seen in isolation; asks the Commission to explore the potential release, at around the same time, of all reports related to the rule of law or fundamental rights, such as the annual reports on compliance with the Charter or the report by the FRA, in order to enable a simultaneous global debate on these issues; regrets, however, that despite the growing threats of disinformation, propaganda and information manipulation targeting European democracy, a similar peer review practice among the Member States, in support of the efforts of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, has not yet been considered;

    93.  Calls on the Commission to expand the scope of the report next year; insists that the Commission’s 2025 rule of law report cover the entire scope of Article 2 TEU and include broader indicators, such as media independence, the role of civil society, fundamental rights, academic and artistic freedom, gender equality, the protection of minorities and vulnerable groups, respect for international law, free and fair elections and the functioning of democratic institutions, in order to provide a fuller picture of rule of law standards across the EU, and in candidate and potential candidate countries;

    94.  Calls on the Commission to publish the criteria it uses to select information from civil society, international bodies, national authorities and other stakeholders in the process of their rule of law reporting; repeats its call on the Commission to invite the FRA to provide methodological advice and conduct comparative research in order to add detail in key areas of the annual report, given the intrinsic links between fundamental rights and the rule of law;

    95.  Encourages the Commission to use clearer language and transparent assessment rules to evaluate compliance with the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU; reiterates its call to the Commission to differentiate clearly between systemic and isolated breaches of the rule of law in Member States, to avoid the risk of trivialising the most serious breaches of the rule of law, and to make clear that when the values of Article 2 TEU are systematically, deliberately and gravely violated over a period of time, Member States could fail to meet all criteria that define a democracy; indicates that the recommendations should better reflect negative findings in the report and be more detailed; believes that the assessment of the fulfilment of previous recommendations should be more precise and qualitative, not relying only on legislative changes but also on real and independent evidence of their implementation in practice; invites the Commission to conduct field visits and provide assessments based on concrete and independent evidence of implementation in practice;

    96.  Warns that failing to link monitoring to real consequences risks diminishing the report’s relevance in the Member States; calls for a greater focus on implementing country-specific recommendations, with timelines and measurable benchmarks, including, where relevant, reference to existing opinions of international bodies (e.g. the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission, UN Special Rapporteurs) or relevant court rulings (including from the ECtHR); calls on the Commission to detail the possible consequences in the event of non-compliance, including by referring to specific instruments from the toolbox, which includes budgetary tools and funding conditionality; believes that certain breaches of the values deserve immediate enforcement action and other breaches require recommendations to be implemented urgently; urges the Member States to implement the recommendations outlined in previous reports and commends those Member States that have not only implemented the recommendations but have also exceeded the established standards;

    97.  Notes that the release date of the annual rule of law report in July is not conducive to generating sufficient visibility and is contrary to the report’s intended purpose of generating a genuine public debate about its findings; urges the Commission to reconsider the publication date and undertake additional efforts to make its findings widely known in all Member States;

    98.  Recalls that decisions taken or not taken by the EU institutions often influence the rule of law situation in the Member States; criticises the fact that the rule of law status at the EU institutions remains outside the scope of the Commission’s 2024 Rule of Law Report; requests that a chapter on the EU’s adherence to rule of law standards, based on an independent review mechanism, be included in the Commission’s 2025 rule of law report;

    99.  Proposes a comprehensive interinstitutional mechanism on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights covering all the values set out in Article 2 TEU and involving all EU institutions, Member States and candidate countries in order to foster uniformity; emphasises the need to ensure full independence and objectivity in the composition and functioning of this body, while adapting its mandate specifically to address rule of law challenges;

    100.  Believes that EU-level interinstitutional dialogue and cooperation on the rule of law should be strengthened; regrets the fact that the Commission and the Council have so far rejected its offer to enter into an interinstitutional agreement on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights; reaffirms its willingness to resume talks on this agreement; calls on the other institutions, in the meantime, to at least explore further cooperation in the context of the proposed interinstitutional pilot on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights, which would help build trust between the institutions in a practical way, in particular by sharing monitoring, dialogue and meeting practices; calls on the Council to make its rule of law dialogue more inclusive by inviting other institutions, such as the Venice Commission, the Human Rights Commissioner and representatives of Parliament, to its sessions; believes that the Council’s rule of law dialogue should become more interactive, with systematic provision of feedback; calls on the Member States to invest in proper preparation for this dialogue; emphasises that increased transparency would enhance the rule of law dialogue within the Union and therefore invites the Council to provide detailed public conclusions; urges the Council to engage with national parliaments to enhance democratic oversight of Member States’ compliance with EU rule of law standards; stresses that the rule of law report should be evidence-based and objective, addressing the Member States and EU institutions, and should include preventive and corrective measures;

    101.  Calls on the Member States to ensure that emergency measures adopted in response to crises (such as pandemics or security threats) are subject to regular parliamentary scrutiny and judicial review, and are strictly time-limited and proportionate;

    102.  Considers that cooperation between the EU and international organisations such as the Council of Europe, the OSCE and the UN in promoting and defending democracy, the rule of law, fundamental freedoms and human rights, including the rights of minorities, should be further strengthened;

    103.  Encourages the Member States to develop and implement comprehensive civic education programmes that foster understanding of democratic institutions, the rule of law and fundamental rights among citizens of all ages;

    104.  Deplores the fact that the Commission has not incorporated many of Parliament’s repeated requests regarding the Commission’s rule of law reports; demands that the Commission issue a communication by 31 December 2025 detailing which of the requests adopted by Parliament in relation to the Commission’s rule of law reports since 2021 the Commission will implement, which it will not, and why;

    105.  Welcomes the extension of the Commission’s rule of law report to cover candidate countries, namely Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia, reinforcing the fact that the EU’s fundamental values must be respected not only by current Member States but also by future members during the accession processes; encourages a close evaluation of the rule of law in all countries in an accession process; encourages the Commission to provide concrete recommendations to accession countries on the state of the rule of law, and to ensure alignment with the enlargement report; expects the Commission to include all candidate countries in its 2025 rule of law report;

    o
    o   o

    106.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, the Council of Europe and the governments and parliaments of the Member States.

    (1) OJ L 433, 22.12.2020, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/2092/oj.
    (2) OJ L 231, 30.6.2021, p. 159, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1060/oj.
    (3) OJ L, 2024/2509, 26.9.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj.
    (4) OJ L 156, 5.5.2021, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/692/oj.
    (5) OJ C 215, 19.6.2018, p. 162.
    (6) OJ C 463, 21.12.2018, p. 21.
    (7) OJ C 129, 5.4.2019, p. 13.
    (8) OJ C 390, 18.11.2019, p. 117.
    (9) OJ C 433, 23.12.2019, p. 66.
    (10) OJ C 363, 28.10.2020, p. 13.
    (11) OJ C 363, 28.10.2020, p. 45.
    (12) OJ C 395, 29.9.2021, p. 2.
    (13) OJ C 415, 13.10.2021, p. 36.
    (14) OJ C 445, 29.10.2021, p. 70.
    (15) OJ C 67, 8.2.2022, p. 86.
    (16) OJ C 81, 18.2.2022, p. 27.
    (17) OJ C 99, 1.3.2022, p. 146.
    (18) OJ C 117, 11.3.2022, p. 88.
    (19) OJ C 205, 20.5.2022, p. 2.
    (20) OJ C 251, 30.6.2022, p. 48.
    (21) OJ C 347, 9.9.2022, p. 2.
    (22) OJ C 347, 9.9.2022, p. 168.
    (23) OJ C 479, 16.12.2022, p. 18.
    (24) OJ C 493, 27.12.2022, p. 108.
    (25) OJ C 125, 5.4.2023, p. 80.
    (26) OJ C 125, 5.4.2023, p. 463.
    (27) OJ C 149, 28.4.2023, p. 15.
    (28) OJ C 149, 28.4.2023, p. 22.
    (29) OJ C 161, 5.5.2023, p. 10.
    (30) OJ C 167, 11.5.2023, p. 74.
    (31) OJ C 341, 27.9.2023, p. 2.
    (32) OJ C, C/2023/442, 1.12.2023, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2023/442/oj.
    (33) OJ C, C/2024/6743, 26.11.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6743/oj.
    (34) OJ C, C/2024/6746, 26.11.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6746/oj.
    (35) OJ C, C/2023/1223, 21.12.2023, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2023/1223/oj.
    (36) OJ C, C/2024/494, 23.1.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/494/oj.
    (37) OJ C, C/2024/3995, 17.7.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/3995/oj.
    (38) OJ C, C/2024/2656, 29.4.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/2656/oj.
    (39) OJ C, C/2024/5739, 17.10.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/5739/oj.
    (40) OJ C, C/2024/5733, 17.10.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/5733/oj.
    (41) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2024)0367.
    (42) For all DRFMG monitoring activities, see: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/libe-democracy-rule-of-law-and-fundament/product-details/20190103CDT02662.
    (43) Opinion 2/13 of the Court of Justice of 18 December 2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454, paragraph 168.
    (44) Judgment of the Court of Justice of 24 June 2019, European Commission v Republic of Poland, C-619/18, ECLI:EU:C:2019:531, paragraph 42.
    (45) COM(2024)0800, Annex with recommendations, pp. 1, 9, 11, 19 and 24.
    (46) Directive 2012/29/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA (OJ L 315, 14.11.2012, p. 57, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2012/29/oj).
    (47) Council Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 of 12 October 2017 implementing enhanced cooperation on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (‘the EPPO’) (OJ L 283, 31.10.2017, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2017/1939/oj).
    (48) Directive (EU) 2017/1371 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2017 on the fight against fraud to the Union’s financial interests by means of criminal law (OJ L 198, 28.7.2017, p. 29, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2017/1371/oj).
    (49) Regulation (EU) 2024/1083 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 establishing a common framework for media services in the internal market and amending Directive 2010/13/EU (European Media Freedom Act) (OJ L, 2024/1083, 17.4.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1083/oj).
    (50) Directive (EU) 2024/1069 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 on protecting persons who engage in public participation from manifestly unfounded claims or abusive court proceedings (‘Strategic lawsuits against public participation’) (OJ L, 2024/1069, 16.4.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1069/oj).
    (51) OJ L 138, 17.5.2022, p. 30, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reco/2022/758/oj.
    (52) Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act) (OJ L 277, 27.10.2022, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj).
    (53) Directive (EU) 2016/343 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on the strengthening of certain aspects of the presumption of innocence and of the right to be present at the trial in criminal proceedings (OJ L 65, 11.3.2016, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2016/343/oj).
    (54) EESC opinion of 14 February 2024 entitled ‘Strengthening civil dialogue and participatory democracy in the EU: a path forward’.
    (55) Civil Society Europe, ‘Joint Civil Society Contribution on Civic Space to the 2024 Annual Rule of Law Report’, June 2024.
    (56) European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Addressing racism in policing, Publications Office of the European Union, 2024.
    (57) Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, Drozd v. Poland, 15158/19 of 6 April 2023, and Mándli and Others v Hungary, 63164/16 of 26 May 2020.
    (58) Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation (OJ L 303, 2.12.2000, p. 16, http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2000/78/oj).
    (59) Proposal for a Council Directive on implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation (COM(2008)0426).
    (60) Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC (OJ L 158, 30.4.2004, p. 77, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2004/38/oj).
    (61) Judgment of the Court of Justice of 5 June 2018, Relu Adrian Coman and Others v Inspectoratul General pentru Imigrări and Ministerul Afacerilor Interne, C‑673/16, ECLI:EU:C:2018:385.
    (62) Directive (EU) 2024/1500 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on standards for equality bodies in the field of equal treatment and equal opportunities between women and men in matters of employment and occupation, and amending Directives 2006/54/EC and 2010/41/EU (OJ L, 2024/1500, 29.5.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1500/oj).
    (63) Council Directive (EU) 2024/1499 of 7 May 2024 on standards for equality bodies in the field of equal treatment between persons irrespective of their racial or ethnic origin, equal treatment in matters of employment and occupation between persons irrespective of their religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation, equal treatment between women and men in matters of social security and in the access to and supply of goods and services, and amending Directives 2000/43/EC and 2004/113/EC (OJ L, 2024/1499, 29.5.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1499/oj).
    (64) Proposal for a Council Directive on implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation (COM(2008)0426).
    (65) Commission communication of 13 October 2022 entitled ‘Enforcing EU law for a Europe that delivers’ (COM(2022)0518).
    (66) Regulation (EU) 2022/1925 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2022 on contestable and fair markets in the digital sector and amending Directives (EU) 2019/1937 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Digital Markets Act) (OJ L 265, 12.10.2022, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/1925/oj).
    (67) Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence and amending Regulations (EC) No 300/2008, (EU) No 167/2013, (EU) No 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, (EU) 2018/1139 and (EU) 2019/2144 and Directives 2014/90/EU, (EU) 2016/797 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Artificial Intelligence Act) (OJ L, 2024/1689, 12.7.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1689/oj).
    (68) Regulation (EU) 2024/900 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 March 2024 on the transparency and targeting of political advertising (OJ L, 2024/900, 20.3.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/900/oj).
    (69) Europol, ‘AI and policing – The benefits and challenges of artificial intelligence for law enforcement’, Publications Office of the European Union, 2024.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – Implementation report on the Recovery and Resilience Facility – P10_TA(2025)0128 – Wednesday, 18 June 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to Article 175 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/241 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 February 2021 establishing the Recovery and Resilience Facility(1) (RRF Regulation),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2023/435 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 February 2023 amending Regulation (EU) 2021/241 as regards REPowerEU chapters in recovery and resilience plans and amending Regulations (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) 2021/1060 and (EU) 2021/1755, and Directive 2003/87/EC(2) (REPowerEU Regulation),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget(3) (Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation),

    –  having regard to Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/765 of 29 February 2024 amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027(4) (MFF Regulation),

    –  having regard to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 16 December 2020 between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on budgetary discipline, on cooperation in budgetary matters and on sound financial management, as well as on new own resources, including a roadmap towards the introduction of new own resources(5) (the IIA),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union(6) (Financial Regulation),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/795 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 February 2024 establishing the Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform (STEP), and amending Directive 2003/87/EC and Regulations (EU) 2021/1058, (EU) 2021/1056, (EU) 2021/1057, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) 2021/1060, (EU) 2021/523, (EU) 2021/695, (EU) 2021/697 and (EU) 2021/241(7),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1263 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2024 on the effective coordination of economic policies and on multilateral budgetary surveillance and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97(8),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 23 June 2022 on the implementation of the Recovery and Resilience Facility(9),

    –  having regard to the Commission notice of 22 July 2024 entitled ‘Guidance on recovery and resilience plans’(10),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 21 February 2024 on strengthening the EU through ambitious reforms and investments (COM(2024)0082),

    –  having regard to the Commission’s third annual report of 10 October 2024 on the implementation of the Recovery and Resilience Facility (COM(2024)0474),

    –  having regard to the Court of Auditors’ (ECA) annual report of 10 October 2024 on the implementation of the budget for the 2023 financial year, together with the institutions’ replies,

    –  having regard to special report 13/2024 of the ECA of 2 September 2024 entitled ‘Absorption of funds from the Recovery and Resilience Facility – Progressing with delays and risks remain regarding the completion of measures and therefore the achievement of RRF objectives’, special report 14/2024 of the ECA of 11 September 2024 entitled ‘Green transition – Unclear contribution from the Recovery and Resilience Facility’, and special report 22/2024 of the ECA of 21 October 2024 entitled ‘Double funding from the EU budget – Control systems lack essential elements to mitigate the increased risk resulting from the RRF model of financing not linked to costs’,

    –  having regard to the study of December 2023 supporting the mid-term Evaluation of the Recovery and Resilience Facility,

    –  having regard to the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) 2024 annual report published on 3 March 2025,

    –  having regard to the report of September 2024 by Mario Draghi entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness’ (Draghi report),

    –  having regard to the opinion of the Committee of the Regions of 8 October 2024 entitled ‘Mid-term review of the post-COVID European recovery plan (Recovery and Resilience Facility)’(11),

    –  having regard to the information published on the Recovery and Resilience Scoreboard (RRF Scoreboard),

    –  having regard to the Commission staff working document of 20 November 2024 entitled ‘NGEU Green Bonds Allocation and Impact report 2024’ (SWD(2024)0275),

    –  having regard to its in-house research, in-depth analysis and briefings related to the implementation of the RRF(12),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 18 January 2024 on the situation in Hungary and frozen EU funds(13),

    –  having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure, as well as Article 1(1)(e) of, and Annex 3 to, the decision of the Conference of Presidents of 12 December 2002 on the procedure for granting authorisation to draw up own-initiative reports,

    –  having regard to the opinions of the Committee on Budgetary Control, the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs, the Committee on the Environment, Climate and Food Safety and the Committee on Transport and Tourism,

    –  having regard to the joint deliberations of the Committee on Budgets and the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs under Rule 59 of the Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgets and the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (A10-0098/2025),

    A.  whereas the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) was created to make European economies and societies more sustainable, resilient and better prepared in the light of unprecedented crises in 2019 and 2022, by supporting Member States in financing strategic investments and in implementing reforms;

    B.  whereas reforms and investments under the RRF help to make the EU more resilient and less dependent by diversifying key supply chains and thereby strengthening the strategic autonomy of the EU; whereas reforms and investments under the RRF also generate European added value;

    C.  whereas the RRF, as well as other EU funds, such as the European instrument for temporary support to mitigate unemployment risks in an emergency, has helped to protect labour markets from the risk of long-term damage caused by the double economic shock of the pandemic and the energy crisis;

    D.  whereas RRF expenditure falls outside the ceilings of the multiannual financial framework (MFF) and borrowing proceeds constitute external assigned revenue; whereas Parliament regrets that they do not form part of the budgetary procedure; whereas based on the Financial Regulation’s principle of transparency, citizens should know how and for what purpose funds are spent by the EU;

    E.  whereas, due to the lack of progress in introducing new own resources in the EU and the need to ensure the sustainability of the EU’s repayment plan, a clear and reliable long-term funding strategy is essential to meet repayment obligations without forcing difficult trade-offs in the EU budget that could undermine future investments and policy priorities; whereas further discussions and concrete financial solutions will be necessary to secure the long-term viability of the EU’s debt repayment plan;

    F.  whereas the borrowing costs for NextGenerationEU (NGEU) have to be borne by the EU budget and the actual costs exceed the 2020 projections by far as a result of the high interest rates; whereas the total costs for NGEU capital and interest repayments are projected to be around EUR 25 to 30 billion per year from 2028, equivalent to 15-20 % of the 2025 annual budget; whereas Parliament has insisted that the refinancing costs be placed over and above the MFF ceilings; whereas a three-step ‘cascade mechanism’ including a new special EURI instrument was introduced during the 2024 MFF revision to cover the significant cost overruns resulting from NGEU borrowing linked to major changes in the market conditions; whereas an agreement was reached during the 2025 budgetary procedure to follow an annual 50/50 benchmark, namely to finance the overrun costs in equal shares by the special EURI instrument de-commitment compartment and the Flexibility Instrument;

    G.  whereas the bonds issued to finance the RRF are to be repaid in a manner that ensures the steady and predictable reduction of liabilities, by 2058 at the latest; whereas the Council has yet to adopt the adjusted basket of new own resources proposed by the Commission, which raises concerns about the viability of the repayment of the debt undertaken under NGEU;

    H.  whereas the social dimension is a key aspect of the RRF, contributing to upward economic and social convergence, restoring and promoting sustainable growth and fostering the creation of high-quality employment;

    I.  whereas the RRF should contribute to financing measures to strengthen the Member States’ resilience to climate disasters, among other things, and enhance climate adaptation; whereas the Member States should conduct proper impact assessments for measures and should share best practice on the implementation of the ‘do no significant harm’ (DNSH) principle;

    J.  whereas the RRF plays an important role in supporting investments and reforms in sustainable mobility, smart transport infrastructure, alternative fuels and digital mobility solutions, thus enhancing connectivity and efficiency across the EU; whereas it is regrettable that only a few Member States chose to use the RRF to support investments, particularly in high-speed railway and waterway infrastructure, aimed at developing European corridors, despite the encouragement of cross-border and multi-country projects; whereas it is crucial to increase investments in transport infrastructure, particularly in underserved regions, to improve connectivity, support regional cohesion and contribute to the green transition;

    K.  whereas by 31 December 2024, Member States had submitted 95 payment requests and the level of RRF disbursements including pre-financing stood at EUR 197,46 billion in grants (55 % of the total grants envelope) and EUR 108,68 billion in loans (37 % of the total loans envelope); whereas three Member States have already received their fifth payment, while one Member State has not received any RRF funding; whereas all Member States have revised their national recovery and resilience plans (NRRP) at least once; whereas 28 % of milestones and targets have been satisfactorily fulfilled and the Commission has made use of the possibility to partially suspend payments where some milestones and targets linked to a payment request were not found to be satisfactorily fulfilled; whereas delays in the execution of planned reforms and investments, particularly in social infrastructure and public services, could lead to the underutilisation of available resources, thereby reducing the expected impact on economic growth, employment and social cohesion;

    L.  whereas the ECA has revealed various shortcomings of the RRF, in particular in relation to its design, its transparency and reporting, the risk of double funding and the implementation of twin transition measures;

    M.  whereas according to the ECA, performance is a measure of the extent to which an EU-funded action, project or programme has met its objectives and provides value for money; whereas moreover, financing not linked to costs does not, in itself, make an instrument performance-based;

    N.  whereas robust audit and control systems are crucial to protect the financial interests of the EU throughout the life cycle of the RRF; whereas the milestones commonly known as ‘super milestones’, in particular related to the rule of law, had to be fulfilled prior to any RRF disbursements;

    O.  whereas the RRF Regulation refers to the RRF’s ‘performance-based nature’ but does not define ‘performance’; whereas RRF performance should be linked to sound financial management principles and should measure how well an EU-funded action, project or programme has met its objectives and provided value for money;

    P.  whereas effective democratic control and parliamentary scrutiny over the implementation of the RRF require the full involvement of Parliament and the consideration of all its recommendations at all stages;

    Q.  whereas the Commission has to provide an independent ex post evaluation report on the implementation of the RRF by 31 December 2028, consisting of an assessment of the extent to which the objectives have been achieved, of the efficiency of the use of resources and of the European added value, as well as a global assessment of the RRF, and containing information on its impact in the long term;

    R.  whereas the purpose of this report is to monitor the implementation of the RRF, in accordance with Parliament’s role as laid down in the RRF Regulation, by pointing to the benefits and shortcomings of the RRF, while drawing on the lessons learnt during its implementation;

    Strengthening Europe’s social and economic resilience

    1.  Highlights the fact that the RRF is an unprecedented instrument of solidarity in the light of two unprecedented crises and a cornerstone of the NGEU instrument, ending in 2026; emphasises the importance of drawing lessons from its implementation for the upcoming MFF, including as regards transparency, reporting and coherent measurement of deliverables; highlights the stabilising effect of the RRF for Member States at a time of great economic uncertainty, as it mitigates negative economic and social consequences and supports governments by contributing to the implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights, by promoting economic recovery and competitiveness, boosting resilience and innovation, and by supporting the green and digital transitions;

    2.  Highlights the important role of the RRF in preventing the fragmentation of the internal market and the further deepening of macroeconomic divergence, in fostering social and territorial cohesion by providing macroeconomic stabilisation, and in offering assurance to the financial markets by improving investor confidence in turbulent times, thereby lowering yield spreads;

    3.  Welcomes the fact that the RRF is a one-off instrument providing additional fiscal space that has contributed to the prevention of considerable economic and social divergences between Member States with diverse fiscal space; highlights the Commission finding that the RRF has led to a sustained increase in investments across the EU and that the Commission expects the RRF to have a lasting impact across the EU beyond 2026, given its synergies with other EU funds; is, however, concerned that the RRF expiration in 2026 poses a significant risk of a substantial decline in public investment in common European priorities;

    4.  Recalls that the MFF and RRF combined amount to almost EUR 2 trillion for the 2021-2027 programming period, but points to the fact that the high inflation rates and the associated increases in the cost of goods and services have decreased the current value of European spending agreed in nominal terms;

    5.  Takes note of the Commission’s projection in 2024 concerning the potential of NGEU’s impact on the EU’s real gross domestic product (GDP) by 2026, which is significantly lower than its simulation in 2020 (1,4 % compared with 2,3 %), due in part to adverse economic and geopolitical conditions, and of the estimation that NGEU could lead to a sizeable, short-run increase in EU employment by up to 0,8 %; notes that the long-term benefits of the RRF on GDP will likely exceed the budgetary commitments undertaken by up to three to six times , depending on the productivity effects of RRF investment and the diligent implementation of reforms and investments;

    6.  Highlights the difficulty of quantifying the precise social and economic impact of the RRF, as it takes time for the impact of reforms and investments to become clear; stresses the need for further independent evaluations to assess the effective impact of reforms and investments and for further improvements of the underlying methodology; notes the Commission’s finding that approximately half of the expected increase in public investment between 2019 and 2025 is related to investment financed by the EU budget, particularly by the RRF, but notes that some investments have not yet delivered measurable impact;

    7.  Notes that the RRF has incentivised the implementation of some reforms included in the country-specific recommendations made in the context of the European Semester through the inclusion of such reforms in the NRRPs; underlines that there has been a qualitative leap forward in terms of monitoring RRF implementation; recalls that the RRF Scoreboard is used to monitor the progress made towards achieving milestones and targets, as well as compliance with horizontal principles, and in particular the six pillars, namely the green transition, the digital transformation, smart, sustainable and inclusive growth (including economic cohesion, jobs, productivity, competitiveness, research, development and innovation, and a well-functioning internal market with strong small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)), social and territorial cohesion, health, economic, social and institutional resilience with the aim of, inter alia, increasing crisis preparedness and crisis response capacity, and policies for the next generation, children and young people, such as education and skills; highlights that the overall uptake of country-specific recommendations made in the context of the European Semester remains low and has even dropped;

    8.  Highlights that in the context of the new economic governance framework, the set of reforms and investments underpinning an extension of the adjustment period should be consistent with the commitments included in the approved NRRPs during the period of operation of the RRF and the Partnership Agreement under the Common Provisions Regulation(14); observes that the five Member States that requested an extension of the adjustment period by 31 December 2024 relied partly on the reforms and investments already approved under the RRF to justify the extension; takes note of the fact that most Member States have included information on whether the reforms and investments listed in the medium-term fiscal-structural plans are linked to the RRF;

    9.  Welcomes the fact that the RRF provides support for both reforms and investments in the Member States, but notes with concern that the short timeframe for the remaining RRF implementation poses challenges to the completion of key reforms and large-scale investments that are to be finalised towards the end of the RRF and to the timely fulfilment of the 70 % of milestones and targets that are still pending;

    10.  Recalls that RRF expenditure should not substitute recurring national budgetary expenditure, unless duly justified, and should respect the principle of additionality of EU funding; insists that the firm, sustainable and verifiable implementation of non-recurrence, together with the targeting of clearly defined European objectives of reforms and investments, is key to ensure additionality and the long-lasting effect of additional European funds; recalls the need to uphold this principle and appeals against the crowding out or replacement of cohesion policy by the RRF or other temporary instruments, as cohesion policy remains essential for long-term sustainable territorial cohesion and convergence;

    11.  Highlights that prioritising RRF implementation, the lack of administrative capacity in many Member States and challenges posed by global supply chains have contributed to the delayed implementation of cohesion policy; calls on the Commission, in this context, to provide a comprehensive assessment of the RRF’s impact on other financial instruments and public investments, technical support, and the administrative and absorption capacities of the Member States;

    12.  Recalls that, in reaction to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, the REPowerEU revision contributes to Europe’s energy security by reducing its dependence on fossil fuels, diversifying its energy supplies, investing in European resources and infrastructure, tackling energy poverty and investing in energy savings and efficiency in all sectors, including transport; emphasises that through REPowerEU, an additional EUR 20 billion in grants was made available in 2023, including EUR 8 billion generated from the front-loading of Emissions Trading System allowances and EUR 12 billion from the Innovation Fund; highlights Parliament’s successes in negotiations, in particular on the provisions on replenishing the Innovation Fund, the 30 % funding target for cross-border projects, the focus of investments on tackling energy poverty for vulnerable households, SMEs and micro-enterprises, and the flexible use of unspent cohesion funds from the 2014-2020 MFF and of up to 7,5 % of national allocations under the 2021-2027 MFF;

    13.  Recalls its call to focus RRF interventions on measures with European added value and therefore regrets the shortage of viable cross-border or multi-country measures, including high-speed railway and sustainable mobility infrastructure projects for dual use that are essential for completing the TEN-T network, and the related risk of re-nationalising funding; notes that the broad scope of the RRF objectives has contributed to this by allowing a wide variety of nationally focused projects to fall within its remit;

    14.  Highlights the modification of Article 27 of the RRF Regulation through REPowerEU, which significantly strengthened the cross-border and multi-country dimensions of the RRF by encouraging the Member States to amend their NRRPs to add RepowerEU chapters, including a spending target of at least 30 % for such measures in order to guarantee the EU’s energy autonomy; is concerned by the broad interpretation adopted by the Commission, which allows any reduction in (national) energy demand to make a case for a cross-border and multi-country dimension;

    15.  Welcomes the possibility of using RRF funding to contribute to the objectives of the Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform (STEP) by supporting investments in critical technologies in the EU in order to boost its industrial competitiveness; notes that no Member State has made use of the possibility to include in its NRRP an additional cash contribution to STEP objectives via the Member State compartment of InvestEU; recalls that Member States can still amend their national plans in that regard; expects the revision processes to be efficient, streamlined and simple, especially considering the final deadline of 2026, the current geopolitical context and the need to invest in European defence capabilities;

    16.  Recalls the application of the DNSH principle for all reforms and investments supported by the RRF, with a targeted derogation under REPowerEU for energy infrastructure and facilities needed to meet immediate security of supply needs; encourages the Commission to assess the feasibility of a more uniform interpretation of the DNSH principle between the RRF and the EU taxonomy for sustainable activities, while taking into account the specificities of the RRF as a public expenditure programme;

    Financial aspects of the RRF

    17.  Stresses that the RRF is the first major performance-based instrument at EU level which is exclusively based on financing not linked to costs (FNLC); recalls that Article 8 of the RRF Regulation stipulates that the RRF must be implemented by the Commission in direct management in accordance with the relevant rules adopted pursuant to Article 322 TFEU, in particular the Financial Regulation and the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation; regrets that the Council did not agree to insert specific rules in the Financial Regulation to address the risks of this delivery model, such as double funding; considers that the rules of the Financial Regulation should be fully applicable to future instruments based on FNLC, including as regards fines, penalties and sanctions;

    18.  Notes that only 13 Member States have requested loans and that EUR 92 billion of the EUR 385,8 billion available will remain unused since this amount was not committed by the deadline of 31 December 2023; takes note of the fact that loans were attractive for Member States that faced higher borrowing costs on the financial markets or that sought to compensate for a reduction in RRF grants; points out that some Member States have made limited use of RRF loans, either due to strong fiscal positions or administrative considerations; calls on the Commission to analyse the reasons for the low uptake in some Member States and to consider these findings when designing future EU financial instruments; notes with concern that national financial instruments to implement the NRRPs have not been sufficiently publicised, leading to limited awareness and uptake by potential beneficiaries; considers that a political discussion is needed on the use of unspent funds in the light of tight public budgets and urgent EU strategic priorities; calls for an assessment of how and under which conditions unused RRF funds could be redirected to boost Europe’s competitiveness, resilience, defence, and social, economic and territorial cohesion, particularly through investments in digital and green technologies aligned with the RRF’s original purpose;

    19.  Recalls the legal obligation to ensure full repayment of NGEU expenditure by 31 December 2058 at the latest; reminds the Council and the Commission of their legal commitment under the interinstitutional agreement concluded in 2020 to ensure a viable path to refinancing NGEU debt, including through sufficient proceeds from new own resources introduced after 2021 without any undue reduction in programme expenditure or investment instruments under the MFF; deplores the lack of progress made in this regard, which raises concerns regarding the viability of the repayment of the debt undertaken under NGEU, and urges the Council to adopt new own resources without delay and as a matter of urgency; urges the Commission, furthermore, to continue efforts to identify additional genuine new own resources beyond the IIA and linked to EU policies, in order to cover the high spending needs associated with the funding of new priorities and the repayment of NGEU debt;

    20.  Notes with concern the Commission’s estimation that the total cost for NGEU capital and interest repayments are projected to be around EUR 25 to 30 billion per year from 2028, equivalent to 15-20 % of the 2025 annual budget ; recalls that recourse to special instruments had to be made in the last three budgetary procedures to cover EURI instrument costs; highlights that the significant increase in financing costs puts pressure on the future EU budget and limits the capacity to respond to future challenges;

    21.  Takes note of the Commission’s target to fund up to 30 % of NGEU costs by issuing greens bonds; notes that by 31 December 2024 the Commission had issued European green bonds amounting to EUR 68.2 billion;

    Design and implementation of NRRPs

    22.  Notes that 47 % of the available RRF funds had been disbursed by 31 December 2024, with grants reaching 55 % and loans 37 %, which has resulted in a high proportion of measures still to be completed in 2025 and 2026; is concerned, however, about the ECA’s finding that only 50 % of disbursed funds had reached final beneficiaries in 15 out of 22 Member States by October 2023; calls on the Commission to take the recommendations of the ECA duly into account in order to improve the functioning of any future performance-based instruments similar to the RRF, in particular in the context of a more targeted MFF;

    23.  Welcomes the fact that all Member States have surpassed the targets for the green (37 %) and the digital transitions (20 %), with average expenditure towards climate and digital objectives of the RRF as a whole standing at 42 % and 26 % respectively; notes that the ECA has cast doubt on how the implementation of RRF measures has contributed to the green transition and has recommended improvements to the methodologies used to estimate the impact of climate-related measures; highlights the fact that the same methodological deficiencies exist across all pillars of the RRF;

    24.  Notes the tangible impact that the RRF could have on social objectives, with Member States planning to spend around EUR 163 billion; underlines that such spending must be result-oriented, ensuring measurable economic and/or social benefits; stresses the need to accelerate investments in the development of rural, peripheral and outermost, isolated and remote areas, and in the fields of affordable housing, social protection and the integration of vulnerable groups, and youth employment, where expenditure is lagging behind; calls for an in-depth evaluation by the Commission, under the RRF Scoreboard, of the projects and reforms related to education and young people implemented by Member States under the RRF; regrets the delayed implementation of health objectives observed in certain Member States, given that the instrument should also improve the accessibility and capacity of health systems, and of key social infrastructure investments, including early childhood education and care facilities; stresses that these delays, in some cases linked to shifting budgetary priorities and revised national implementation timelines, risk undermining the achievement of the RRF’s social cohesion objectives;

    25.  Reiterates its negotiating position to include targets for education (10 %) and for cultural activities (2 %); encourages the Commission’s effort to evaluate these targets as a benchmark in its assessment of education policy in NRRPs, through the RRF Scoreboard;

    26.  Observes that a large majority of NRRPs include a specific section explaining how the plan addresses gender-related concerns and challenges; is concerned, however, that some NRRPs do not include an explanation of how the measures in the NRRP are expected to contribute to gender equality and equal opportunities for all and calls on the Member States concerned to add such explanations without delay;

    27.  Stresses the importance of reforms focusing on labour market fragmentation, fostering quality working conditions, addressing wage level inequalities, ensuring decent living conditions, and strengthening social dialogue, social protection and the social economy;

    28.  Notes the tangible impact that the RRF could have on the digital transformation objective, with EUR 166 billion allocated to corresponding plans; welcomes the contributions made under the smart, sustainable and inclusive growth pillar, in particular to competitiveness and support for SMEs; notes the need for an acceleration of investments in transnational cooperation, support for competitive enterprises leading innovation projects, and regulatory changes for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, which are lagging behind;

    29.  Stresses that the success of EU investments depends on well-functioning capital markets; calls on the Member States to ensure a more effective and timely disbursement of funds, particularly for SMEs and young entrepreneurs, to streamline application procedures with a view to enhancing accessibility and to implement specific measures to provide targeted support to help them play a more prominent role in the process of smart and inclusive growth;

    30.  Is concerned that the achievement of milestones and targets lags behind the indicative timetable provided in the NRRPs, and that the pace of progress is uneven across Member States; regrets the time lag between the fulfilment of milestones and targets and the implementation of projects; highlights that the RRF will only achieve its long-term and short-term potential if the reform and investment components, respectively, are properly implemented; welcomes the fact that, following a slow start, RRF implementation has picked up since the second half of 2023 but significant delays affecting key reforms and investments still persist and have been attributed to various factors, including the revisions linked to the inclusion of REPowerEU, mounting inflation, the insufficient administrative capacity of Member States, in particular the smaller Member States, uncertainties regarding specific RRF implementation rules, high energy costs, supply shortages and an underestimation of the time needed to implement measures; notes that the postponement of key implementation deadlines by some governments to 2026 raises concerns about the capacity of some Member States to fully absorb the allocated funds within the set timeframe of the RRF; stresses the importance of maintaining a realistic and effective implementation schedule to prevent the risk of incomplete projects and missed opportunities for structural improvements; calls on the Commission to ensure that administrative bottlenecks are urgently addressed;

    31.  Recalls the modification of the RRF Regulation through the inclusion of the REPowerEU chapter; stresses the importance of the REPowerEU chapters in NRRPs and calls on the Member States to prioritise mature projects and implement their NRRPs more quickly, both in terms of reforms and investments, and, where necessary, to adjust NRRPs in line with the RRF’s objectives, without undermining the overall balance and level of ambition of the NRRPs, in order to respond to challenges stemming from geopolitical events and to tackle current realities on the ground;

    32.  Highlights the fact that the RRF could have helped to mitigate the effects of the current EU-wide housing crisis; regrets that some Member States did not make use of this opportunity and stresses the importance for the Member States to accelerate investments in availability and affordability of housing;

    33.  Highlights the role of ‘super milestones’ in protecting the EU’s financial interests against rule of law deficiencies and in ensuring the full implementation of the requirements under Article 22 of the RRF Regulation; welcomes the fact that all but one Member State have satisfactorily fulfilled their ‘super milestones’; recalls that the Commission must recover any pre-financing that has not been netted against regular payment requests by the end of the RRF;

    34.  Notes the high administrative burden and complexity brought by the RRF; stresses the considerable efforts required at national level to implement the RRF in parallel with structural funds; notes that between 2021 and 2024 the demand-driven Technical Support Instrument supported more than 500 RRF-related reforms in the Member States, directly or indirectly related to the preparation, amendment, revision and implementation of the NRRPs; takes note of the Commission guidance of July 2024 with simplifications and clarifications to streamline RRF implementation but expects the Commission to act swiftly on its promise to cut the administrative burden by 25 %; urges the Commission to give clear and targeted technical support to the Member States, allowing them to develop efficient administrative capacity to implement the milestones and targets; calls on the Commission to decrease the level of complexity of EU public procurement rules which apply to higher-value contracts;

    35.  Expresses concern over the complexity of application procedures for RRF funding, particularly for SMEs and non-governmental organisations, which require external consultancy services even for small grants; emphasises that such bureaucratic obstacles contradict the original objectives of the RRF, which aimed to provide rapid and direct financial support; calls for an urgent simplification of application and reporting requirements, particularly for smaller beneficiaries, to maximise the absorption and impact of funds and to assist with their contribution to the green and digital transitions;

    36.  Believes that implementation delays underscore the risk that measures for which RRF funding has been paid will not be completed by the 2026 payment deadline; welcomes the Commission’s statement at the Recovery and Resilience Dialogue (RRD) of 16 September 2024 that it will not reimburse non-implemented projects; considers it a shortcoming that RRF funds paid for milestones and targets assessed as fulfilled cannot be recovered if related measures are not eventually completed; encourages the Commission to take into account the ECA’s recommendations related to this and to assess, in cooperation with the Member States, the measures most at risk of not being completed by 31 August 2026; stresses the importance of monitoring these measures, facilitating timely follow-up and working towards solutions to overcome delays;

    37.  Notes with concern that the remaining implementation timeframe of the RRF is too short for the implementation of many innovative projects; further notes that innovative projects, by definition, are more difficult to plan and more likely to encounter obstacles during implementation, making them unsuited to the RRF’s strict deadlines; urges the Commission to create future programmes that are flexible enough to give proper answers in changing circumstances and that at the same time guarantee a certain degree of predictability;

    38.  Notes that some milestones and targets may be no longer achievable because of objective circumstances; stresses that any NRRP revisions should be made in accordance with the RRF Regulation, including the applicable deadlines, and should not entail backtracking on reforms, commitments or lower quality projects but should maintain the overall ambition and the efficiency of public spending;

    39.  Is concerned about the Commission’s uneven assessment of NRRPs, which has led to double standards in the application of the Regulation; is further concerned about the uneven and different definition of milestones and targets from one NRRP to the other, as consistently reported by the ECA;

    40.  Highlights that the duration of the Commission’s assessment of payment requests by Member States differs considerably among the Member States and stresses the need for more transparency from the Commission; urges the Commission to accelerate its assessments and to ensure the equal treatment of the Member States; highlights the need to ensure a level playing field across the EU for measures and indicators that are used to assess all RRF projects;

    41.  Urges the Member States to increase their efforts to address administrative bottlenecks and provide sufficient administrative capacity to accelerate RRF implementation in view of the 2026 deadline and to avoid concentrating RRF projects in more developed regions and capitals by enabling RRF funds to flow into projects in the most vulnerable regions, thereby serving the RRF’s objective to enhance the EU’s social, territorial and economic cohesion; emphasises the importance of fair regional distribution within the NRRPs while ensuring that RRF funds are allocated based on economic and social impact, feasibility and long-term benefits;

    42.   Calls for an 18-month extension of mature RRF projects through an amendment of the RRF Regulation by co-decision, if needed; emphasises that the envisaged extension of projects will be conducted by the Commission based on objective, clear and fair benchmarks; welcomes the possibility of establishing a targeted and performance-based prioritisation and transfer system after the 2026 deadline in order to allow for the finalisation of ongoing projects through other funding schemes, including the European Investment Fund and a possible new European competitiveness fund; urges the Commission to present a strategy to address the huge demand for public investment beyond 2026 without compromising budgetary resources in other critical areas;

    43.  Calls for an evaluation of how this framework could enable targeted investments in EU defence supply chains, strategic stockpiles and defence innovation, ensuring alignment with broader European security objectives;

    44.  Is concerned that some Member States might choose to forego parts of the amounts or entire amounts associated with their last payment request, thus avoiding the fulfilment of the last milestones and targets;

    Transparency, monitoring and control

    45.  Takes note of the fact that the Commission had planned to conduct 112 RRF audits in all Member States in 2024; reminds the Commission of its obligation, in accordance with Article 24(9) of the RRF Regulation, to recover funding in case of incorrect disbursements or reversals of measures;

    46.  Notes that the Commission relies on its own methodologies when calculating partial payments and suspensions of funds; regrets that these methodologies were only developed two years after the start of the RRF implementation and without the consultation of Parliament;

    47.  Welcomes the extensive work of the ECA in relation to the RRF and deems it important to thoroughly assess its findings, in particular its findings that milestones and targets are often rather vague and output-oriented and are therefore not fit to measure results and impacts, and its findings regarding the risks of double funding resulting from overlaps with other policies; notes that the Commission has accepted many but not all of the ECA’s recommendations; stresses that weaknesses in financial controls, as highlighted by the ECA, must be urgently addressed to prevent double funding, cost inefficiencies, and mismanagement of EU funds; calls for enhanced transparency and for the full consideration of the ECA’s recommendations without adding unnecessary administrative burden;

    48.  Notes that the ECA considers that the RRF focuses on progress on implementation rather than performance, particularly because RRF-funded measures focus on outputs rather than results, vary in ambition, sometimes lack clarity and do not always cover a measure’s key implementation stages, including completion;

    49.  Notes that the ECA’s audits revealed several cases in which funding had been disbursed but the requirements related to the fulfilment of corresponding milestones and targets had not been adequately met; further notes that the Commission framework for assessing the ‘satisfactory fulfilment’ of the relevant milestones and targets contains discretionary elements, such as ‘minimal deviation from a requirement’ or ‘proportional delays’, and that the methodology for the determination of partial payments does not provide an explanation for the values chosen as coefficients, thereby leaving room for interpretation; asks the Commission to provide Parliament with further clarification;

    50.  Insists that, as a rule, measures already included in other national plans benefiting from EU funding (e.g. cohesion, agriculture, etc.) should not be included in NRRPs, even if they do not incur any costs; urges the Commission to remain vigilant and proactive in identifying any potential situation of double funding in particular in regard to the different implementation models of the RRF and other EU funding instruments;

    51.  Regrets the lack of a proper RRF audit trail and the persistent lack of transparency despite the bi-annual reporting requirement for Member States on the 100 largest final recipients, which was introduced into REPowerEU upon Parliament’s request; regrets the delays in reporting by some Member States and the limited informative value of the information provided, which ultimately prevents compliance checks by the Commission or the ECA; reiterates its call for the lists of the largest final recipients for each Member State to be regularly updated and published on the RRF Scoreboard and to include information on the economic operators involved, including contractors and sub-contractors, and their beneficial owners, and not simply ministries or other government bodies or state companies; further regrets that the current definition of ‘final recipient’ leaves room for interpretation, resulting in different final beneficiaries for similar measures among Member States; calls on the Commission, in this context, to ensure a common understanding of what constitutes a ‘final recipient’ so that this can be applied consistently;

    52.  Is concerned about persistent weaknesses in national reporting and control mechanisms, due in part to absorption pressure affecting the capacity to detect ineligible expenditure and due to the complexity of the audit and control procedures, which created uncertainty in the Member States and an overload of administrative procedures; calls on the Commission to provide assurance on whether Member States’ control systems function adequately and to check the compliance of RRF-funded investment projects with EU and national rules; calls for payments to be reduced and, where appropriate, amounts to be recovered in accordance with Article 22 of the RRF Regulation, should weaknesses persist in the national control systems; regrets the reliance on manual cross-checks and self-declarations by recipients of EU funds in the absence of interoperable IT tools and harmonised standards, despite the existence of tools such as the Early Detection and Exclusion System and ARACHNE, whose use is currently not mandatory, thereby risking that expenditure is declared twice; recalls, in this regard, the reluctance of the Member States to make progress in developing the relevant IT tools in a timely manner;

    53.  Shares the view of the ECA that the FNLC model does not preclude reporting on actual costs; notes that having clear insights on costs also facilitates the work of control and oversight bodies, as well as the EPPO and the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), and enables enhanced public scrutiny;

    54.  Reiterates the role of the RRF Scoreboard in providing information for citizens on the overall progress in the implementation of NRRPs; underlines the importance of the Scoreboard in strengthening transparency and calls on the Commission to increase the level of transparency and data visualisation in the Scoreboard;

    55.  Recalls that the reporting on the progress of implementation in the RRF Scoreboard is based on information provided by the Member States on a bi-annual basis;

    56.  Highlights the important role of the EPPO and OLAF in protecting the EU’s financial interests; welcomes the fact that EPPO investigations into RRF-related fraud and corruption cases have led to several arrests, indictments and seizures of RRF funds; recalls that the EPPO was handling 307 active cases related to the RRF in 2024, corresponding to about 17 % of all expenditure fraud investigations and causing an estimated damage to the EU’s financial interests of EUR 2,8 billion; expects the number of investigations to grow as RRF implementation advances; calls on the Commission to look into the management declarations of the Member States in terms of their reporting of detected fraud and the remedial measures taken;

    Role of the European Parliament

    57.  Reiterates the importance of Parliament’s role in scrutinising and monitoring the implementation of the RRF and in holding the Commission accountable; highlights Parliament’s input provided through various channels, in particular through various plenary debates, parliamentary resolutions, bi-monthly RRD meetings with the responsible Commissioners, over 30 meetings of the standing working group on the scrutiny of the RRF, numerous parliamentary questions, the annual discharge procedure of the Commission and the regular flow of information and ad hoc requests for information from the Commission; regrets that the model of using milestones and targets to trigger disbursement was not accompanied by adequate budgetary control mechanisms, resulting in a diminished role for Parliament compared to its scrutiny of MFF spending;

    58.  Recalls Parliament’s rights as laid down in Article 25 of the RRF Regulation, in particular the right to simultaneously receive from the Commission information that it transmits to the Council or any of its preparatory bodies in the context of the RRF Regulation or its implementation, as well as an overview of its preliminary findings concerning the satisfactory fulfilment of the relevant milestones and targets included in the NRRPs; encourages the sharing of relevant outcomes of discussions held in Council preparatory bodies with the competent parliamentary committees;

    59.  Recalls further the right of Parliament’s competent committees to invite the Commission to provide information on the state of play of the assessment of the NRRPs in the context of the RRD meetings;

    60.  Regrets the fact that Parliament has no role in the design of NRRPs and is not consulted on payment requests; criticises furthermore the fact that Parliament has not been provided with a clear and traceable overview of the implementation status of projects and payments; expects to be informed about the context of NRRP revisions in order to make its own assessment of the revisions and to have an enhanced role in possible future instruments based on the RRF experience;

    Stakeholder involvement

    61.  Regrets the insufficient involvement of local and regional authorities (LRAs), civil society organisations, social partners, national parliaments and other relevant stakeholders in the design, revision or implementation of NRRPs leading to worse policy outcomes, as well as limited ownership; regrets that in the design and implementation of the NRRPs, some Member States have clearly favoured some LRAs or stakeholders to the detriment of others; recalls that the participation of LRAs, national authorities and those responsible for developing these policies is crucial for the success of the RRF, as stated in Article 28 of the RRF Regulation; recalls that Parliament supported a binding provision in the RRF to establish a multilevel dialogue to engage relevant stakeholders and discuss the preparation and implementation of NRRPs with them, with a clear consultation period; calls, therefore, for the maximum possible stakeholder involvement in the implementation of NRRPs, in accordance with the national legal framework and based on clear and transparent principles;

    62.  Reiterates the need for regular interaction between national coordinating authorities and national stakeholders involved in the monitoring of the implementation of the NRRPs, in line with the principle of transparency and accountability; stresses that more regular and public communication from the national coordinating authorities is needed to ensure that updated information about the progress of the implementation of NRRPs is made available;

    63.  Stresses that decisions should be made at the level that is most appropriate; is convinced that the application of the partnership principle and a stronger involvement of LRAs could make project implementation more efficient, reduce disparities within Member States and result in more and better quality measures with a cross-border and multi-country dimension;

    64.  Believes that valuable lessons can be drawn from the RRF to be reflected in the design of performance-based instruments in the next MFF, in particular in the light of the EU’s competitiveness and simplification agendas;

    Lessons for the future

    65.  Believes that the combination of reforms and investments has proved successful but that a clearer link is needed between the two; highlights the importance of aligning any funding with the objectives of the instrument and disbursing it in line with the progress made towards them; insists that the level of ambition of NRRPs should not be lowered but should be commensurate with the RRF timeline to ensure their successful implementation;

    66.  Is convinced, as highlighted by the Draghi report, that boosting EU competitiveness, decarbonising the EU’s economy and making it more circular and resource-efficient, as well as closing the skills gap, creating quality jobs and enhancing the EU’s innovation capacity, will be central priorities beyond 2026; is concerned that a sizeable funding gap will arise after the RRF ceases to operate at the end of 2026, notably for public investment in common European priorities, since financial resources from national budgets vary significantly among Member States; highlights the need to use the lessons learned from the RRF to better leverage public and private investments with a view to addressing the financing gap in European objectives and transitions, which the Draghi report estimates at over EUR 800 billion annually, while ensuring seamless continuity of investments in common European goods;

    67.  Welcomes the enhanced use of financial instruments made possible by the option to channel RRF funds towards the Member States’ compartment of InvestEU;

    68.  Urges the Commission to apply the lessons learned and the ECA’s observations, and to ensure that future performance-based instruments are well-targeted, aligned with the aim of financing European public goods and prioritising the addressing of clearly defined strategic challenges, economic sustainability and competitiveness; calls for it to be ensured that all future instruments are designed to measure not only inputs or short-term outputs and progress but also results in terms of long-term impacts backed by outcomes;

    69.  Notes that, according to the ECA, it is essential that future performance-based instruments are not designed and implemented in a way that is detrimental to accountability and, in particular, that appropriate control systems are in place in the Member States and are checked by the Commission before implementation starts; notes that this would involve setting minimum requirements for the Member States’ controls and the Commission’s checks;

    70.  Calls on the Commission to conduct an independent evaluation and to report on the RRF impact on private investments at aggregate EU level, in particular on its potential crowding-out effect on private investments and its determinants; calls further for objective and clear analyses from the Commission on how the implementation of reforms and investments within the NRRPs affects the economies of the individual Member States, with special regard to smart, sustainable and inclusive growth; urges the Commission to take the lessons learned from these analyses and from the ECA’s observations on the RRF implementation into account when drawing up its proposals for the next programming period;

    71.  Underlines that all EU-funded investments and reforms should be coordinated and coherent with strategic planning at national level and should focus on projects with a clear European added value; underlines the need for a spending target for cross-border and multi-country investments; calls on the Commission to develop a credible methodology to assess the cross-border and multi-country dimensions of EU funded projects;

    72.  Highlights that meaningful social and territorial dialogues with a high level of involvement of LRAs, social partners, civil society organisations and national parliaments within the national legal framework are essential for national ownership, successful implementation and democratic accountability; expresses concern over the insufficient involvement of all relevant stakeholders in the implementation and oversight of RRF-funded initiatives; stresses in particular that regions and city councils cannot be mere recipients of decisions, without being given the opportunity to have a say on reforms and investments that truly transform their territories;

    73.  Believes that it is essential to adopt differentiated strategies that recognise the cultural diversity of the various regions and enhance their economic and social cohesion instead of applying a homogeneous or one-size-fits-all approach that could be to the detriment of the less developed regions; calls, therefore, for dialogues with stakeholders to be strengthened and more diligently employed as they could inspire future initiatives and mechanisms in the EU and its Member States;

    74.  Underlines the requirement of the RRF Regulation to publicly display information about the origin of funding for projects funded by the EU to ensure buy-in from European citizens;

    75.  Highlights that the RRD meetings have been an important tool in enhancing transparency and accountability, which are crucial for the optimal implementation of the RRF;

    76.  Reiterates that further efforts are required to improve the transparency and traceability of the use of EU funds; stresses the need to ensure that data that is relevant for performance measurement is available and that information on performance is presented in a better and more transparent manner; stresses that the feedback mechanism between performance information and programme design or adjustment should be enhanced;

    77.  Considers that better training and capacity-building across all regions and authorities involved, in particular at national level, could have accelerated the RRF’s implementation and enabled the implementing authorities to better adapt to the performance-based nature of the RRF; considers that the Commission could have assisted Member States more at the planning stage and provided earlier implementation guidance, in particular with a view to strengthening their audit and control systems and the cross-border dimension of the RRF;

    78.  Highlights the importance of mitigating the risk of double funding; suggests the deployment of an integrated and interoperable IT and data mining system and the development of clear standards for datasets to be applied across Member States, with a view to allowing comprehensive and automated expenditure tracking; calls for improved coordination mechanisms that define clear responsibilities among the bodies involved in the implementation of the various EU and national programmes, while avoiding unnecessary bureaucratic complexity and ensuring an efficient allocation of funds; encourages the integration of advanced data analytics and AI tools to enhance performance tracking, evaluation and reporting to alleviate manual workload and to streamline reporting processes; underlines that such progress can only happen if there is also operational support to digitalise administrations;

    79.  Strongly urges the Commission and the Member States to ensure that any type of EU FNLC or EU funding that is performance based complies with EU and national rules, ultimately protecting the financial interests of the EU; reiterates the accountability and responsibility of the Commission and the Member States to ensure the legality and the regularity of EU funding, as well as the respect of sound financial management principles;

    80.  Considers that the role of Parliament in the monitoring of the RRF should be further enhanced;

    81.  Calls for future performance-based instruments to have a single audit trail to trace budget contributions to the projects funded; underlines the need for project-level auditing to mitigate reputational risks in the eyes of the general public and to facilitate the recovery of funds in case measures are reversed; underlines the need to reduce administrative bottlenecks and burden;

    82.  Demands that any possible future performance-based programmes make clearer links between the milestones and targets and the actual projects being implemented; stresses that there should be less of a delay between the fulfilment of milestones and the implementation of projects;

    83.  Reiterates its call for an open platform which contains data on all projects, final recipients and the regional distribution of funding, thereby facilitating auditing and democratic oversight;

    84.  Stresses that any possible future budgetary decisions on EU borrowing should respect the unity of the budget and Parliament’s role as part of the budgetary authority; highlights the risks of cost overruns for the repayment of debt, resulting inter alia from volatile interest rates; deems it important to ensure from the outset that sufficient funding is available to cover these costs without presenting a detriment to other programmes or political priorities;

    85.  Invites the Commission and the Member States to closely assess and learn from instruments and tools such as the RRF, in order to maximise the efficiency and impact of EU funding, investments and reforms, streamline policy objectives, improve the collaboration of the institutions and stakeholders at national and European level, and increase national ownership;

    86.  Notes the declared intention of the Commission to draw on the RRF experience when designing its proposals for the post-2027 EU funding programmes, due later this year; acknowledges that the independent ex post evaluation will come too late to feed into the process leading up to the next programming period, but expects the Commission and the co-legislators to take due account of the lessons learned from the RRF and of the recommendations of relevant stakeholders, in particular LRA, civil society organisations and social partners; believes that, as the EU plans for future economic resilience, there is also a need to further mobilise private investment, strengthen capital markets and ensure that public spending remains fiscally responsible and strategically targeted to make the EU more resilient and sovereign in an ever more conflictual geopolitical context;

    o
    o   o

    87.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, and to the governments and parliaments of the Member States.

    (1) OJ L 57, 18.2.2021, p. 17, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/241/oj.
    (2) OJ L 63, 28.2.2023, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/435/oj.
    (3) OJ L 433I, 22.12.2020, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/2092/oj.
    (4) OJ L, 2024/765, 29.2.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/765/oj.
    (5) OJ L 433 I, 22.12.2020, p. 28.
    (6) OJ L, 2024/2509, 26.9.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj.
    (7) OJ L, 2024/795, 29.2.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/795/oj.
    (8) OJ L, 2024/1263, 30.4.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1263/oj.
    (9) OJ C 32, 27.1.2023, p. 42.
    (10) OJ C, C/2024/4618, 22.7.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/4618/oj.
    (11) OJ C, C/2024/7057, 4.12.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/7057/oj.
    (12) European Parliament, Think Tank https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/research/advanced-search?textualSearch=RRF&startDate=01%2F07%2F2019&endDate=&sort=RELEVANCE.
    (13) OJ C, C/2024/5742, 17.10.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/5742/oj.
    (14) Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 laying down common provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund Plus, the Cohesion Fund, the Just Transition Fund and the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund and financial rules for those and for the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, the Internal Security Fund and the Instrument for Financial Support for Border Management and Visa Policy (OJ L 231, 30.6.2021, p. 159, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1060/oj).

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Pet breeding mills in the EU – E-001711/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    In 2021 an obligation for all establishments keeping animals, including dogs, to be registered was introduced in the Animal Health Law[1].

    Operators of these establishments must keep and maintain records on the health status of these animals. Furthermore, for disease prevention, such establishments must receive regular animal health visits from a veterinarian.

    This legislation also strengthened traceability rules for dogs by making the individual identification of these animals mandatory in the case of cross-border movements.

    Official controls in these establishments are the responsibility of Member States’ competent authorities, which must also ensure its effectiveness.

    The Commission proposed in 2023 the first EU Regulation on the welfare of dogs and cats and their traceability[2]. The proposal requires that breeding establishments producing above a threshold notify their activity to Member States’ competent authorities and that these establishments are approved before starting their activities.

    The approval must be granted with a certificate, following an on-site inspection by the competent authority that confirms that the establishment meets the animal welfare requirements of the regulation.

    This proposal requires that the competent authorities maintain a list of breeding establishments of dogs and cats, made publicly available. Penalties to operators breaching the proposed Regulation are set by Member States.

    The Commission proposal sets requirements that aim to prevent illegal breeders from reaching the EU market, thus promoting responsible adoption from legitimate breeders. For reasons of subsidiarity, awareness campaigns for the public are to be launched by Member States and are commonplace.

    • [1] http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/429/oj.
    • [2] Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on the welfare of dogs and cats and their traceability, COM/2023/769 final.
    Last updated: 20 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Adjuvants and their toxicity in plant protection products – E-000514/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The Commission would like to recall that, in light of the limited resources available to the Commission and to the Member States, it had to prioritise the various activities required for the full implementation of Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009[1] on plant protection products.

    The highest priority has been given to the implementation of actions related to the approval and renewal of approval of active substances, followed by actions related to the identification of co-formulants that are unacceptable in plant protection products (Article 27 of the regulation) and, most recently, the development of a work programme for the assessment of safeners and synergists (Article 26 of the regulation).

    At present, a significant amount of available resources must be dedicated to responding to requests for internal review of its decisions related to active substances submitted under the provisions of Article 10 of Regulation (EC) No 1367/2006[2] on the application of the Aarhus Convention and subsequent cases in Court, for which tight legal deadlines apply.

    Article 58 of the regulation does not set a deadline for the development of detailed rules for the authorisation of adjuvants at EU level and at this stage, a timeline for such procedure is not available.

    In the meantime, in accordance with Article 81(3) of the regulation, Member States may apply national provisions for their authorisation in their territories.

    • [1] Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 October 2009 concerning the placing of plant protection products on the market and repealing Council Directives 79/117/EEC and 91/414/EEC. OJ L 309, 24.11.2009, p. 1-50.
    • [2] Regulation (EC) No 1367/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 September 2006 on the application of the provisions of the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters to Community institutions and bodies. OJ L 264, 25.9.2006, p. 13-19.
    Last updated: 20 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI USA: Cassidy, Grassley, Republicans Introduce Legislation to Keep Communities Safe from Violent Criminals

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Louisiana Bill Cassidy

    WASHINGTON – U.S. Senator Bill Cassidy, M.D. (R-LA), Chuck Grassley (R-IA), and a group of Republican colleagues introduced the Combating Violent and Dangerous Crime Act to strengthen violent crime statutes and help prevent future crime. The bill would address ambiguity and conflicting court decisions by clarifying penalties for violent offenses like carjacking, robbery, and kidnapping.
    “Violent criminals should be kept far away from our families and children. While Republicans work to ensure they are, Democrats are silent on this issue. America is a country of law and order. Time to act like it,” said Dr. Cassidy.
    “Under the Biden-Harris administration, our nation saw a massive spike in violent crime. As the Trump administration works to clean up the previous administration’s mess, Congress has a duty to resolve any legal ambiguities that may weaken our ability to hold criminals fully accountable,” said Senator Grassley. “Our bill includes several modest, but meaningful, reforms to tamp down on future crime and ensure justice is served.”
    Among other provisions, the Combating Violent and Dangerous Crime Act would:

    Resolve conflicting circuit court decisions that have resulted in a higher burden to charge violent offenses;
    Clarify that an attempt or conspiracy to commit an offence involving physical force meets the legal definition of a violent crime;
    Increase the statutory maximum penalty for carjacking and remove a duplicative intent requirement needed to charge a carjacking offense;
    Clarify that attempted bank robbery and conspiracy to commit bank robbery are punishable under the current bank robbery statute;
    Outlaw the marketing of candy-flavored drugs to minors; and
    Establish a new category of violent kidnapping offences, allowing for greater penalties for violent kidnapping.

    Cassidy and Grassley were joined by U.S. Senators John Boozman (R-AR), Kevin Cramer (R-ND), James Lankford (R-OK), Mitch McConnell (R-KY), Susan Collins, (R-ME), Shelley Moore Capito (R-WV), Mike Crapo (R-ID), Thom Tillis (R-NC), and Jim Risch (R-ID) in introducing the legislation.

    MIL OSI USA News –

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI USA: Cassidy, Grassley, Republicans Introduce Legislation to Keep Communities Safe from Violent Criminals

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Louisiana Bill Cassidy

    WASHINGTON – U.S. Senator Bill Cassidy, M.D. (R-LA), Chuck Grassley (R-IA), and a group of Republican colleagues introduced the Combating Violent and Dangerous Crime Act to strengthen violent crime statutes and help prevent future crime. The bill would address ambiguity and conflicting court decisions by clarifying penalties for violent offenses like carjacking, robbery, and kidnapping.
    “Violent criminals should be kept far away from our families and children. While Republicans work to ensure they are, Democrats are silent on this issue. America is a country of law and order. Time to act like it,” said Dr. Cassidy.
    “Under the Biden-Harris administration, our nation saw a massive spike in violent crime. As the Trump administration works to clean up the previous administration’s mess, Congress has a duty to resolve any legal ambiguities that may weaken our ability to hold criminals fully accountable,” said Senator Grassley. “Our bill includes several modest, but meaningful, reforms to tamp down on future crime and ensure justice is served.”
    Among other provisions, the Combating Violent and Dangerous Crime Act would:

    Resolve conflicting circuit court decisions that have resulted in a higher burden to charge violent offenses;
    Clarify that an attempt or conspiracy to commit an offence involving physical force meets the legal definition of a violent crime;
    Increase the statutory maximum penalty for carjacking and remove a duplicative intent requirement needed to charge a carjacking offense;
    Clarify that attempted bank robbery and conspiracy to commit bank robbery are punishable under the current bank robbery statute;
    Outlaw the marketing of candy-flavored drugs to minors; and
    Establish a new category of violent kidnapping offences, allowing for greater penalties for violent kidnapping.

    Cassidy and Grassley were joined by U.S. Senators John Boozman (R-AR), Kevin Cramer (R-ND), James Lankford (R-OK), Mitch McConnell (R-KY), Susan Collins, (R-ME), Shelley Moore Capito (R-WV), Mike Crapo (R-ID), Thom Tillis (R-NC), and Jim Risch (R-ID) in introducing the legislation.

    MIL OSI USA News –

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI USA: REP TED LIEU AND SENATOR JEANNE SHAHEEN LEAD 23 SENATORS AND 49 MEMBERS IN INTRODUCING RESOLUTION RECOGNIZING WORLD REFUGEE DAY

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Congressman Ted Lieu (33 District of California)

    WASHINGTON—Today, Congressman Ted Lieu (D-Los Angeles County) and Senator Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH), Ranking Member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, introduced a resolution to honor World Refugee Day and the United States’ commitment to supporting refugees and forcibly displaced persons worldwide. The World Refugee Day Resolution was cosponsored by 23 Senators and 49 Members of Congress.

    “There used to be more consensus among Democrats and Republicans that the world’s wealthiest nation has an obligation to help those seeking refuge from violence, persecution, human rights abuses, and other dangers,” said Representative Lieu. “A strong U.S. foreign aid program was once considered both morally correct policy, and a smart return on investment that engendered good will and protected our national security. Now, Trump has turned his back on the world’s most vulnerable people by banning refugees and pulling funding for foreign aid programs. This is a terrible abdication of our duty to help those who need it the most. On World Refugee Day, those of us who want the world to be a more peaceful, prosperous place for everyone reiterate our call to help refugees who are fleeing unimaginable circumstances. Everyone deserves to live freely and safely.”

    “Conflict, persecution and violence continue to force millions of people from their homes – with more than 123 million people forcibly displaced at the end of 2024, including Afghans, Burmese Rohingya and Sudanese,” said Ranking Member Shaheen. “The United States has long been a leader in supporting refugees overseas and welcoming the most vulnerable, promoting stability around the world and boosting the U.S. economy through refugees’ contributions. Yet the Trump Administration is turning its back on this bipartisan legacy of support, slashing U.S. foreign aid programs that help refugees and host communities and indefinitely suspending the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program. On this World Refugee Day, our resolution honors the resilient spirit of forcibly displaced persons globally and calls on the Trump Administration to recommit to supporting refugees and displaced persons.”

     This bill as the support of:

    “With an ongoing refugee ban leaving so many with no path to protection – it is imperative we take this opportunity to stand in solidarity with all those forced to flee their homes around the world,” said Erol Kekic, Chief Strategy Officer at Church World Service. “CWS thanks Senator Shaheen and Representative Lieu for honoring refugees and leading this year’s congressional World Refugee Day resolution. From 80 years of walking alongside newcomers, CWS knows that refugees and immigrants enrich our communities – culturally, artistically, religiously, and economically. They are our neighbors and friends. They are mothers and fathers working to build better futures for their children.” 

    “Today, more than 123 million people around the world have been forcibly displaced from their homes—the highest number in recorded history,” said Myal Greene, President and CEO of World Relief. “On World Refugee Day, we remember that behind every statistic is a person made in the image of God, longing for safety, stability, and hope. This crisis should stir the conscience of lawmakers and citizens alike–particularly those, like me, motivated by the Christian faith. We urge Congress to champion policies that protect the persecuted, restore dignity, and uphold America’s long legacy of welcoming those fleeing violence and oppression.” 

    “On World Refugee Day, we are reminded that the right to seek safety is both a legal commitment and a moral imperative,” said Sharif Aly, President of the International Refugee Assistance Project (IRAP). “The United States has the capacity, and the obligation, to uphold its commitments to refugees and asylum seekers. Yet today, tens of thousands of people who were promised protection under the U.S. resettlement program remain stranded due to unlawful and discriminatory policies. We commend this resolution for reaffirming the values enshrined in our Constitution and refugee laws and urge our leaders to restore U.S. leadership in protecting the rights and dignity of those forced to flee.” 

    “There has never been a more urgent moment for Congress to reaffirm America’s support for refugees, both at home and abroad,” said Jeremy Konyndyk, President of Refugees International. “On World Refugee Day, we must renew our pledge to advance refugee protection, including by ensuring refugees have a role in shaping policy; to uphold the right to seek asylum; and to generously welcome those who seek safety and the chance to rebuild their lives with dignity and opportunity.” 

    “RCUSA reminds the Trump administration of the incredible contributions that refugees have made in the 45-year history of the refugee resettlement program,” said John Slocum, Executive Director of Refugee Council USA. “We stand in solidarity with those forced to flee their homes due to violence and persecution – families and individuals continue to seek safety, dignity, freedom, and opportunity in the face of unimaginable hardship. As global displacement reaches historic highs, the United States must lead with compassion and courage. That means rejecting fear-based policies and recommitting to a system that upholds the rights of all people to seek safety. Congress must invest in our nation’s capacity to welcome refugees and asylum seekers — and safeguard the use of public resources in good faith. RCUSA calls on all people of conscience to stand with refugees, asylum seekers, and immigrants, not only today but every day. Our work is far from over.”  

    The resolution is supported by the following organizations: Church World Service, Center for Gender and Refugee Studies, Center for Human Rights and Constitutional Law, Center for Victims of Torture, Climate Refugees, Dorothy Day Catholic Worker, Florence Immigrant & Refugee Rights Project, Franciscan Action Network, Friends Committee on National Legislation, HIAS, International Refugee Assistance Project (IRAP), Just Neighbors, National Partnership for New Americans, Presidents’ Alliance on Higher Education and Immigration, Refugee Advocacy Lab, Refugee Council USA, Refugee Congress, Refugees International, Unitarian Universalists for Social Justice, United Church of Christ, Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), World Relief and Women’s Refugee Commission. 

    The House resolution is cosponsored by Representatives Gabe Amo (D-RI), Yassmin Ansari (D-AZ), Becca Balint (D-VT), Joyce Beatty (D-OH), Sheila Cherfilus-McCormick (D-FL), Judy Chu (D-CA), Gil Cisneros (D-CA), Steve Cohen (D-TN), Danny Davis (D-IL), Diana Degette (D-CO), Suzan DelBene (D-WA), Mark DeSaulnier (D-CA), Adriano Espaillat (D-NY), Chuy Garcia (D-IL), Robert Garcia (D-CA), Sylvia Garcia (D-TX), Jonathan L. Jackson (D-IL), Pramila Jayapal (D-WA), Hank Johnson (D-GA), Ro Khanna (D-CA), Troy A. Carter, Sr. (D-LA), Summer Lee (D-PA), Teresa Leger Fernandez (D-NM), Stephen Lynch (D-MA), Jennifer McClellan (D-VA), Betty McCollum (D-MN), Jim McGovern (D-MA), Robert Menendez (D-NJ), Gwen Moore (D-WI), Seth Moulton (D-MA), Kevin Mullin (D-CA), Jerrold Nadler (D-NY), Eleanor Norton (D-DC), Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (D-NY), Ilhan Omar (D-MN), Nancy Pelosi (D-CA), Mark Pocan (D-WI), Delia Ramirez (D-IL), Jan Schakowsky (D-IL), Darren Soto (D-FL), Shri Thanedar (D-MI), Dina Titus (D-NV), Rashida Tlaib (D-MI), Jill Tokuda (D-HI), Paul Tonko (D-NY), Derek Tran (D-CA), Nydia Velazquez (D-NY), Bonnie Watson Coleman (D-NJ), Nikema Williams (D-GA).

    The Senate resolution is cosponsored by Senators Michael Bennet (D-CO), Richard Blumenthal (D-CT), Cory Booker (D-NJ), Chris Coons (D-DE), Tammy Duckworth (D-IL), Dick Durbin (D-IL), John Fetterman (D-PA), John Hickenlooper (D-CO), Mazie Hirono (D-HI), Tim Kaine (D-VA), Angus King (I-ME), Amy Klobuchar (D-MN), Ed Markey (D-MA), Jeff Merkley (D-OR), Chris Murphy (D-CT), Patty Murray (D-WA), Jacky Rosen (D-NV), Brian Schatz (D-HI), Adam Schiff (D-CA), Chris Van Hollen (D-MD), Peter Welch (D-VT), Sheldon Whitehouse (D-RI) and Ron Wyden (D-OR).  

    ### 

    MIL OSI USA News –

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Security: First Sentencing in Burglary of Dozens of Firearms from Maryland Pawn Shop

    Source: United States Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms and Explosives (ATF)

                WASHINGTON – Juwon Markel Anderson, 22, of the District of Columbia, was sentenced today in U.S. District Court to 84 months in federal prison for his role in the December 2023 burglary of a Maryland pawn shop that netted dozens of firearms and for his subsequent attempt to sell several of the stolen guns.

                The sentencing was announced by U.S. Attorney Jeanine Ferris Pirro, Special Agent in Charge Anthony Spotswood of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) Washington Field Division, and Chief Pamela A. Smith of the Metropolitan Police Department.   

                Anderson, aka “Peezy,” pleaded guilty on March 4, 2025, to one count of conspiracy to commit firearms trafficking. In addition to the prison term, Judge Amy Berman Jackson ordered Anderson to serve three years of supervised release.

                According to the court documents, on Dec. 13, 2023, Anderson and at least four co-conspirators drove in two vehicles from the District to the A&D Pawn Shop, a Federal Firearms Licensee, in Glen Burnie, Maryland.

                At the pawn shop, one of the co-conspirators used a portable saw to cut the locks on a pull-down security gate. Another co-conspirator then used a crowbar-type tool to pry open the main door. Once inside, the quintet grabbed an array of rifles, shotguns, and pistols from the shelves and display racks. They fled with at least 34 guns. Two days after the burglary, on December 15, 2023, Anderson was arrested with two of the stolen firearms. He has been detained ever since.

                Co-defendant Tyjuan McNeal, 27, is scheduled to be sentenced July 1 for conspiracy to commit firearms trafficking. Vincent Lee Alston, 23, and Niquan Odum, 23, pleaded guilty March 6, 2025. Alston, aka “Vedo,” pleaded to one count of conspiracy to commit firearms trafficking. Cy’juan Hemsley, who pleaded guilty on May 7, 2025, and Odumn, aka “Stickz,” pleaded to conspiracy to commit theft from a firearms licensee and to possession of stolen firearms.

                This case is being investigated by the ATF Washington Field Division and the Metropolitan Police Department, with assistance from the ATF Baltimore Field Division. It is being prosecuted by Assistant U.S. Attorney Shehzad Akhtar with valuable assistance from former Special Assistant U.S. Attorney Ryan Lipes.

    MIL Security OSI –

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Security: Southern District of Texas charges 215 people in third week of June in relation to border enforcement efforts

    Source: United States Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms and Explosives (ATF)

    HOUSTON – A total of 204 new cases have been filed in the last week related to immigration, border security and related offenses from June 13-19, announced U.S. Attorney Nicholas J. Ganjei. 

    Among those are 65 people who face charges of illegally reentering the country. The majority have prior felony convictions for narcotics, violent crime, prior immigration crimes and more. A total of 125 people are charged with illegally entering the country, while five cases allege various instances of human smuggling with the remainder involving other immigration crimes and more, including assault on officers.

    Two such charged include Adrian Alberto Castillo-Contador and Lorenzo Ramirez. Castillo-Contador, a Mexican national, allegedly attempted to make entry into the United States through the Hidalgo port of entry. The charges allege he failed to comply with commands and attempted to evade a Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officer. Castillo-Contador allegedly pushed the officer and caused injury but was apprehended before able to exit.

    In another case, authorities allegedly found Lorenzo Ramirez near an abandoned vehicle after a failed smuggling event near Weslaco. The criminal complaint alleges that as a Border Patrol (BP) agent approached him, Ramirez fled, and a foot chase ensued. Law enforcement caught him, but during the struggle, Ramirez punched and elbowed the agent in the thigh and head, respectively, according to the charges. Ramirez also allegedly kicked another agent in the leg. The charges further allege authorities had to taser him. Both men face up to eight years in federal prison if convicted for assaulting an officer.

    Also part of the new cases are several complaints alleging previous felons had illegally reentered the United States. Mexican nationals Ivan Edgar Martinez, Carlos Bartolo Santiago-Hernandez and Hugo Jimenez-Castillo had all been previously removed from the country on various dates between 2017-2014, acceding to their respective charges. However, all were allegedly found in the Rio Grande Valley area this week. Martinez and Santiago-Hernandez have convictions for illegal reentry, while Jimenez-Castillo had been sentenced to two years in prison for his driving while intoxicated conviction, according to the allegations. If convicted, all face up to 20 years in prison.

    Throughout the district, law enforcement partners made multiple arrests, including nearly two dozen charged in large drug and money laundering operation. Grand juries in Houston and McAllen returned the five separate, but related indictments in May. The charges allegedly involve cocaine, heroin and methamphetamine trafficking, firearms-related offenses and money laundering. The arrests are the culmination of multiple months-long Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETF) investigations dubbed Operation Red Ranger, Borrowed Time and Resurrection. During the investigation and operations, law enforcement also seized over 170 kilograms of cocaine and heroin, over two thousand kilograms methamphetamine, more than 100 firearms and nearly $3 million as well as four properties valued at $1.2 million.

    In Laredo, two cartel firearms traffickers have now been sent to federal prison. Mexican national Jorge Alberto Morales-Calvo received a 41-month-term, while Homero Arteaga Jr. previously received 57 months. At the hearing, the court heard additional evidence that the firearms were going to be smuggled across the border and delivered to the Jalisco New Generation Cartel. On Sept. 18, 2024, they planned to purchase a Barrett .50 caliber rifle for $15,000 and a FN Herstal Belgium, 5.7 x 28 caliber pistol with a large capacity magazine for $850. They were both arrested as they tried to complete the transaction.

    “The Department of Justice is looking to hit the cartels from every angle and at every opportunity, which includes vigorously prosecuting not just the members of these terror groups, but those that enable them as well,” said Ganjei. “Those that arm or otherwise empower the cartels are going to the meet the full force of the federal criminal justice system.”

    In Corpus Christi, an Arkansas man was ordered to prison for 36 months for transporting illegal aliens in wheel well and fuel tank. The jury deliberated for less than 30 minutes following a less than two-day trial before finding Noel Mercado guilty on two counts of alien smuggling March 11. At the sentencing hearing, the court noted the egregious crime and said the smuggled individuals had been “treated like trash.” All the illegal aliens were from the countries of Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala with no authority to be in the United States.

    “As we continue our successful campaign to secure the border, human smugglers are going to get increasingly desperate,” said Ganjei. “No matter how creative they think they are in their methods, our law enforcement partners are always one step ahead.”

    A Laredo felon was also sentenced for transporting illegal aliens. Braulio Ivan Rueda was ordered to serve 21 months after he had engaged in a high-speed chase. Rueda picked up several people running from the Rio Grande River into his SUV. When authorities tried to block the vehicle, four Guatemalan nationals fled towards the river. Rueda sped away and led authorities on a three-mile chase before stopping in a commercial parking lot and attempted to escape on foot. He admitted he needed money and agreed to smuggle the aliens for “easy money.”

    Also in Laredo, Anthony Jacob Garza was suspiciously driving a Ford Expedition about 20 miles north of the U.S.-Mexico border in April. He admitted he stopped at a gas station, where authorities ultimately found three illegal aliens hiding under a blanket in the SUV’s cargo area. He had picked them up near a county road. He faces up to 10 years in prison.

    Two Mexican nationals and convicted felons, one who had previously assaulted public servant, are on their way back to prison for illegal reentry into the country. Abelino Hernandez-Torres was ordered to serve 60 months. He has prior convictions for illegal reentry as well as evading arrest with a motor vehicle and assault on a public servant. He was first ordered removed from the United States in 2015 and again in 2019 and 2020, and returned illegally.

    Authorities had encountered Hector Ruben Cardenas-Morales in jail following charges of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and unlawful restraint. He has other convictions, including burglary, evading arrest with a motor vehicle and illegal reentry and was last removed in 2023. At the sentencing hearing, the court noted how this was his fifth time coming back and was not serving himself by returning to the country or learning from his mistakes, stating “Sir, you have no future in the United States.” He was sentenced to 63 months in federal prison.

    These cases were referred or supported by federal law enforcement partners, including Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) – Homeland Security Investigations, ICE – Enforcement and Removal Operations, BP, CBP, Drug Enforcement Administration, FBI, U.S. Marshals Service and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives with additional assistance from state and local law enforcement partners.

    The cases are part of Operation Take Back America, a nationwide initiative that marshals the full resources of the Department of Justice to repel the invasion of illegal immigration, achieve the total elimination of cartels and transnational criminal organizations and protect our communities from the perpetrators of violent crime. Operation Take Back America streamlines efforts and resources from the Department’s OCDTF and Project Safe Neighborhood.

    Under current leadership, public safety and a secure border are the top priorities for this district. Enhanced enforcement both at the border and in the interior of the district have yielded aliens engaged in unlawful activity or with serious criminal history, including human trafficking, sexual assault and violence against children.  

    The U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Texas remains one of the busiest in the nation. It represents 43 counties and more than nine million people covering 44,000 square miles. Assistant U.S. Attorneys from all seven divisions including Houston, Galveston, Victoria, Corpus Christi, Brownsville, McAllen and Laredo work directly with our law enforcement partners on the federal, state and local levels to prosecute the suspected offenders of these and other federal crimes. 

    An indictment or criminal complaint is a formal accusation of criminal conduct, not evidence. A defendant is presumed innocent unless convicted through due process of law.

    MIL Security OSI –

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI USA: Co-Founder of Los Cuinis Drug Cartel Sentenced to 30 Years in Prison; High-Ranking Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG) Operative Pleads Guilty

    Source: US State of California

    Today, a Mexican national and the co-founder of the armed, violent, and prolific Los Cuinis drug cartel was sentenced to 30 years in prison for his role in a major drug trafficking conspiracy. 

    According to court documents, Jose Gonzalez-Valencia, 49, of Michoacan, Mexico, was one of the top leaders — alongside his brothers, Gerardo Gonzalez-Valencia and Abigael Gonzalez-Valencia — of Los Cuinis, a major Mexican drug cartel responsible for trafficking multiple tons of cocaine from South America, through Mexico, into the United States. Los Cuinis financed the founding and growth of the Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG), which traffics hundreds of tons of cocaine, methamphetamine, and fentanyl into the United States and other countries, and is known for extreme violence, murders, torture, and corruption.

    In February 2025, President Trump designated CJNG a foreign terrorist organization. According to court documents, the top leader of CJNG, Nemesio Oseguera Cervantes, also known as “El Mencho,” is the brother-in-law of the Gonzalez-Valencia brothers. Closely allied, Los Cuinis and CJNG form one of the most violent and prolific transnational criminal organizations in the world, responsible for sending staggering amounts of drugs into the United States and inflicting extreme violence to further that objective.

    Also today, as part of the Department of Justice’s focus on dismantling CJNG, another Mexican national, Cristian Fernando Gutierrez-Ochoa, also known as “El Guacho,” a high-ranking CJNG member and El Mencho’s son-in-law, pleaded guilty to one count of international money laundering conspiracy.

    “Today, the Criminal Division dealt two more devastating blows to CJNG and Los Cuinis through the sentencing of Jose Gonzalez-Valencia and the conviction of Cristian Fernando Gutierrez-Ochoa,” said Matthew R. Galeotti, Head of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division. “These men and the cartels they led are responsible for immeasurable death and destruction in the United States and Mexico. The Justice Department will continue to dismantle CJNG, Los Cuinis and all other transnational criminal organizations that flood our streets with dangerous drugs and engage in extreme violence to control their operations.”

    “CJNG is one of the most powerful, influential, and ruthless criminal organizations to threaten our public safety and national security. Each leader and associate of CJNG who faces justice within the United States brings us one step closer to dismantling this terrorist organization,” said Acting Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Administrator Robert Murphy. “DEA will continue to use all available resources to disrupt CJNG’s drug trafficking and money laundering operations and systematically destroy their network.”

    From at least 2006 to 2016, according to court documents, Jose Gonzalez-Valencia directed and coordinated numerous multi-ton shipments of cocaine destined for the United States using air, land, sea, and underwater methods. In 2007 the U.S. Coast Guard seized one shipment from a semi-submersible vessel that was transporting at least 4,000 kilograms of cocaine from Colombia to Mexico for further distribution into the United States.

    As one of Los Cuinis’ top leaders, Jose Gonzalez-Valencia directed acts of extreme violence in furtherance of drug trafficking activities, including the murder of an individual who allegedly stole a shipment of approximately 1,000 kilograms of cocaine from Los Cuinis, according to court documents. Jose Gonzalez-Valencia personally carried firearms in furtherance of his drug trafficking activities and supplied weapons and ammunition to the CJNG.

    In 2015, Jose Gonzalez-Valencia went into hiding in Bolivia — a country that did not extradite anyone to the United States from 2001 to 2023, despite an existing extradition treaty — and resided there for over two years under a fictitious identity. In 2017, Jose Gonzalez-Valencia was arrested in Brazil while on vacation and was subsequently extradited to the United States. Brazil’s extradition treaty required that the U.S. Government not recommend more than a 30-year sentence.

    Pursuant to his plea agreement, Gutierrez-Ochoa admitted that he was a member of CJNG who was connected to CJNG’s top leadership. He also admitted that from at least 2023 until his arrest in 2024, he and other CJNG operatives used sophisticated money laundering methods involving real estate transactions, shell companies, and international money transfers to launder CJNG’s drug trafficking proceeds. For example, Gutierrez-Ochoa and others completed two wire transfers totaling $1.2 million of CJNG’s drug proceeds to purchase a luxury residence in Riverside, California, titled in the name of a Mexican entity owned and controlled by CJNG. When Gutierrez-Ochoa was arrested in November 2024, he was living at that property under a fictitious identity and possessed two untraceable and illegal firearms, approximately $2.2 million of CJNG’s drug proceeds, and numerous luxury items purchased with CJNG’s drug proceeds, including jewelry, watches, and vehicles.

    Gutierrez-Ochoa is scheduled to be sentenced on Nov. 7 and faces a maximum penalty of 20 years in prison. A federal district court judge will determine his sentence after considering the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors.

    Today’s sentencing of Gonzalez-Valencia and conviction of Gutierrez-Ochoa follow several recent strikes into CJNG’s most inner circle.

    El Mencho’s older brother, Antonio Oseguera Cervantes, and Erick Valencia Salazar, an alleged co-founder of CJNG and El Mencho’s close advisor, were among the 29 wanted cartel leaders taken into U.S. custody on Feb. 27, 2025.

    Shortly after, on March 7, 2025, El Mencho’s son, Ruben Oseguera-Gonzalez, known as El Menchito, was sentenced to a term of life in prison plus 30 years to run consecutively and ordered to forfeit over $6 billion in drug trafficking proceeds. Before his arrest, Oseguera-Gonzalez was CJNG’s second-in-command and led CJNG for nearly seven years. He is responsible for trafficking more than 50 metric tons of cocaine and supervising drug labs that produced more than 1,000 metric tons of methamphetamine in Mexico. In 2013, he was one of the first contributors to the fentanyl epidemic in the United States, pledging to “do it big” and build an empire from counterfeit oxycontin pills laced with fentanyl. As the evidence at trial showed, he also committed heinous acts of violence. According to statements made in court and trial testimony, Oseguera-Gonzalez ordered the murder of more than 100 people, some of whom he murdered himself.

    The DEA and the Criminal Division’s Narcotic and Dangerous Drug Section have been systematically dismantling the leadership of the CJNG and Los Cuinis at the highest level. To date, the ongoing investigation has led to indictments of approximately 30 high-value CJNG and Los Cuinis command-and-control targets, including seven Consolidated Priority Organization Targets (CPOTs), the top drug trafficking command-and-control leaders. As of June 2025, 12 defendants have been convicted, including two at trial.

    A number of indicted leaders of CJNG and Los Cuinis remain fugitives, including El Mencho, whose capture reward was recently increased to $15 million under the State Department’s Narcotic Rewards Program. Abigael Gonzalez-Valencia, another top leader of Los Cuinis and El Mencho’s brother-in-law, was arrested in 2015 by Mexican authorities pursuant to the U.S. indictment but since then has been fighting extradition to the United States.

    The DEA Los Angeles Field Division investigated the cases. The Justice Department’s Office of International Affairs provided critical assistance with obtaining foreign evidence and securing Jose Gonzalez-Valencia’s extradition to the United States.

    Trial Attorneys Lernik Begian, Gwen Stamper, and Douglas Meisel of the Criminal Division’s Narcotic and Dangerous Drug Section are prosecuting the cases.

    This case is part of Operation Take Back America, a nationwide initiative that marshals the full resources of the Department of Justice to repel the invasion of illegal immigration, achieve the total elimination of cartels and transnational criminal organizations and protect our communities from the perpetrators of violent crime. Operation Take Back America streamlines efforts and resources from the Department’s Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces and Project Safe Neighborhood. 

    MIL OSI USA News –

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI USA: Cantwell Questions Energy Secretary Why DOE is Spiking Clean Energy Projects, Increasing Electricity Costs

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Washington Maria Cantwell
    06.20.25
    Cantwell Questions Energy Secretary Why DOE is Spiking Clean Energy Projects, Increasing Electricity Costs
    Cantwell presses Secretary Wright on whether DOE will renege on $1B promised for PNW green hydrogen hub On hydropower, Secretary acknowledges to Cantwell that “hydro has been a great resource for this country” that is “quite beneficial to our electricity grid”
    WASHINGTON, D.C. – Today, U.S. Senator Maria Cantwell (D-WA), a senior member of the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee, pressed U.S. Department of Energy Secretary Chris Wright on whether the Trump Administration is attempting to roll back hydrogen production investments secured and awarded under the Biden Administration — including a $1 billion grant awarded to the Pacific Northwest Hydrogen Association in 2023 to become a one of seven Regional Clean Hydrogen Hubs, as well as a 2022 tax credit aimed at spurring more investment in clean hydrogen production called 45V.  The budget reconciliation bill passed last month by the House of Representatives eliminates the hydrogen credit, as would the proposal released earlier this week by Senate Finance Committee Chairman Mike Crapo (R-ID).
    Sen. Cantwell: “I actually think getting rid of the tax credits that we have, some of the other ones, broadly, are going to lead to electricity increased cost. And so, can I get you to tell me about the hydrogen hubs, whether you believe you support the hydrogen hubs and moving forward on this?”
    Wright: “So, we put together, as I’m sure you’ve heard, and we’ve published it on the website, this project review process. We have a cross-functional team that evaluates every project. We’re going through 500 projects.”
    Sen. Cantwell: “But is that data call a way to kill the projects? Or no, you really believe in funding some?”
    Wright: “Oh, absolutely. No, we are funding plenty of projects right now, and we don’t stop funding any project. We’re funding all of the existing projects right now, and when we evaluate them – no, plenty of projects will pass. Plenty of projects will pass. Other projects we’ll say, “Hey, can you modify it this way to make it much more beneficial?” Some projects will be modified, and some projects will be ended. “
    Video of their Q&A is HERE; a transcript is HERE.
    Hydrogen is a clean fuel that, when consumed in a fuel cell, produces no dirty emissions — only water. Hydrogen can be produced from existing power resources, such as solar and hydropower.
    Sen. Cantwell helped secure the Regional Clean Hydrogen Hubs (H2Hubs) program and other key hydrogen investments in the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law (BIL) during consideration in the Energy and Natural Resources Committee in July 2021, where she is a senior member, and push for its successful passage through the Senate. The H2Hubs program designated up to $7 billion in competitive grants to establish between six and 10 regional clean hydrogen hubs across the United States. These networks of hydrogen producers, consumers, and local connective infrastructure were meant to help accelerate the use of hydrogen as clean energy and work toward achieving former President Biden’s goal of a 100 percent clean electrical grid by 2035 and net-zero carbon emissions by 2050.
    In October 2023, with support from the region’s Congressional delegation led by Sen. Cantwell, the Pacific Northwest Hydrogen Association received a $1 billion grant through the H2Hubs program. With continued federal support, the Pacific Northwest Hydrogen Association will be able to build out a robust network of hydrogen suppliers and off-takers in both the western and eastern parts of Washington and Oregon, as well as parts of Montana. Clean hydrogen can support decarbonization efforts already being made in the transportation, industrial, and agricultural sectors, as well as the rapidly expanding zero-carbon aviation sector being pioneered in the Pacific Northwest.
    In 2022, President Biden signed the Inflation Reduction Act into law, which included the 45V hydrogen production tax credit to incentivize projects that produce clean hydrogen power. In July 2024, Sen. Cantwell joined a group of colleagues in sending a letter urging then-Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen to issue guidance on 45V eligibility that capitalizes on the “opportunity to reduce greenhouse gas emissions faster and enhance our energy security, while strengthening our economy, creating thousands of jobs, and combating the climate crisis.” The budget bill currently being negotiated in the House and the Senate would drastically shorten the timeline for projects to qualify for the 45V credits – requiring them to begin construction by Jan. 1, 2026 rather than the previous deadline of Jan. 1, 2033 – and cut funding for the H2Hubs program. The Trump Administration is also currently reviewing the remaining H2Hubs financing.

    MIL OSI USA News –

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Security: Co-Founder of Los Cuinis Drug Cartel Sentenced to 30 Years in Prison; High-Ranking Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG) Operative Pleads Guilty

    Source: United States Attorneys General

    Today, a Mexican national and the co-founder of the armed, violent, and prolific Los Cuinis drug cartel was sentenced to 30 years in prison for his role in a major drug trafficking conspiracy. 

    According to court documents, Jose Gonzalez-Valencia, 49, of Michoacan, Mexico, was one of the top leaders — alongside his brothers, Gerardo Gonzalez-Valencia and Abigael Gonzalez-Valencia — of Los Cuinis, a major Mexican drug cartel responsible for trafficking multiple tons of cocaine from South America, through Mexico, into the United States. Los Cuinis financed the founding and growth of the Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG), which traffics hundreds of tons of cocaine, methamphetamine, and fentanyl into the United States and other countries, and is known for extreme violence, murders, torture, and corruption.

    In February 2025, President Trump designated CJNG a foreign terrorist organization. According to court documents, the top leader of CJNG, Nemesio Oseguera Cervantes, also known as “El Mencho,” is the brother-in-law of the Gonzalez-Valencia brothers. Closely allied, Los Cuinis and CJNG form one of the most violent and prolific transnational criminal organizations in the world, responsible for sending staggering amounts of drugs into the United States and inflicting extreme violence to further that objective.

    Also today, as part of the Department of Justice’s focus on dismantling CJNG, another Mexican national, Cristian Fernando Gutierrez-Ochoa, also known as “El Guacho,” a high-ranking CJNG member and El Mencho’s son-in-law, pleaded guilty to one count of international money laundering conspiracy.

    “Today, the Criminal Division dealt two more devastating blows to CJNG and Los Cuinis through the sentencing of Jose Gonzalez-Valencia and the conviction of Cristian Fernando Gutierrez-Ochoa,” said Matthew R. Galeotti, Head of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division. “These men and the cartels they led are responsible for immeasurable death and destruction in the United States and Mexico. The Justice Department will continue to dismantle CJNG, Los Cuinis and all other transnational criminal organizations that flood our streets with dangerous drugs and engage in extreme violence to control their operations.”

    “CJNG is one of the most powerful, influential, and ruthless criminal organizations to threaten our public safety and national security. Each leader and associate of CJNG who faces justice within the United States brings us one step closer to dismantling this terrorist organization,” said Acting Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Administrator Robert Murphy. “DEA will continue to use all available resources to disrupt CJNG’s drug trafficking and money laundering operations and systematically destroy their network.”

    From at least 2006 to 2016, according to court documents, Jose Gonzalez-Valencia directed and coordinated numerous multi-ton shipments of cocaine destined for the United States using air, land, sea, and underwater methods. In 2007 the U.S. Coast Guard seized one shipment from a semi-submersible vessel that was transporting at least 4,000 kilograms of cocaine from Colombia to Mexico for further distribution into the United States.

    As one of Los Cuinis’ top leaders, Jose Gonzalez-Valencia directed acts of extreme violence in furtherance of drug trafficking activities, including the murder of an individual who allegedly stole a shipment of approximately 1,000 kilograms of cocaine from Los Cuinis, according to court documents. Jose Gonzalez-Valencia personally carried firearms in furtherance of his drug trafficking activities and supplied weapons and ammunition to the CJNG.

    In 2015, Jose Gonzalez-Valencia went into hiding in Bolivia — a country that did not extradite anyone to the United States from 2001 to 2023, despite an existing extradition treaty — and resided there for over two years under a fictitious identity. In 2017, Jose Gonzalez-Valencia was arrested in Brazil while on vacation and was subsequently extradited to the United States. Brazil’s extradition treaty required that the U.S. Government not recommend more than a 30-year sentence.

    Pursuant to his plea agreement, Gutierrez-Ochoa admitted that he was a member of CJNG who was connected to CJNG’s top leadership. He also admitted that from at least 2023 until his arrest in 2024, he and other CJNG operatives used sophisticated money laundering methods involving real estate transactions, shell companies, and international money transfers to launder CJNG’s drug trafficking proceeds. For example, Gutierrez-Ochoa and others completed two wire transfers totaling $1.2 million of CJNG’s drug proceeds to purchase a luxury residence in Riverside, California, titled in the name of a Mexican entity owned and controlled by CJNG. When Gutierrez-Ochoa was arrested in November 2024, he was living at that property under a fictitious identity and possessed two untraceable and illegal firearms, approximately $2.2 million of CJNG’s drug proceeds, and numerous luxury items purchased with CJNG’s drug proceeds, including jewelry, watches, and vehicles.

    Gutierrez-Ochoa is scheduled to be sentenced on Nov. 7 and faces a maximum penalty of 20 years in prison. A federal district court judge will determine his sentence after considering the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors.

    Today’s sentencing of Gonzalez-Valencia and conviction of Gutierrez-Ochoa follow several recent strikes into CJNG’s most inner circle.

    El Mencho’s older brother, Antonio Oseguera Cervantes, and Erick Valencia Salazar, an alleged co-founder of CJNG and El Mencho’s close advisor, were among the 29 wanted cartel leaders taken into U.S. custody on Feb. 27, 2025.

    Shortly after, on March 7, 2025, El Mencho’s son, Ruben Oseguera-Gonzalez, known as El Menchito, was sentenced to a term of life in prison plus 30 years to run consecutively and ordered to forfeit over $6 billion in drug trafficking proceeds. Before his arrest, Oseguera-Gonzalez was CJNG’s second-in-command and led CJNG for nearly seven years. He is responsible for trafficking more than 50 metric tons of cocaine and supervising drug labs that produced more than 1,000 metric tons of methamphetamine in Mexico. In 2013, he was one of the first contributors to the fentanyl epidemic in the United States, pledging to “do it big” and build an empire from counterfeit oxycontin pills laced with fentanyl. As the evidence at trial showed, he also committed heinous acts of violence. According to statements made in court and trial testimony, Oseguera-Gonzalez ordered the murder of more than 100 people, some of whom he murdered himself.

    The DEA and the Criminal Division’s Narcotic and Dangerous Drug Section have been systematically dismantling the leadership of the CJNG and Los Cuinis at the highest level. To date, the ongoing investigation has led to indictments of approximately 30 high-value CJNG and Los Cuinis command-and-control targets, including seven Consolidated Priority Organization Targets (CPOTs), the top drug trafficking command-and-control leaders. As of June 2025, 12 defendants have been convicted, including two at trial.

    A number of indicted leaders of CJNG and Los Cuinis remain fugitives, including El Mencho, whose capture reward was recently increased to $15 million under the State Department’s Narcotic Rewards Program. Abigael Gonzalez-Valencia, another top leader of Los Cuinis and El Mencho’s brother-in-law, was arrested in 2015 by Mexican authorities pursuant to the U.S. indictment but since then has been fighting extradition to the United States.

    The DEA Los Angeles Field Division investigated the cases. The Justice Department’s Office of International Affairs provided critical assistance with obtaining foreign evidence and securing Jose Gonzalez-Valencia’s extradition to the United States.

    Trial Attorneys Lernik Begian, Gwen Stamper, and Douglas Meisel of the Criminal Division’s Narcotic and Dangerous Drug Section are prosecuting the cases.

    This case is part of Operation Take Back America, a nationwide initiative that marshals the full resources of the Department of Justice to repel the invasion of illegal immigration, achieve the total elimination of cartels and transnational criminal organizations and protect our communities from the perpetrators of violent crime. Operation Take Back America streamlines efforts and resources from the Department’s Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces and Project Safe Neighborhood. 

    MIL Security OSI –

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Security: Co-Founder of Los Cuinis Drug Cartel Sentenced to 30 Years in Prison; High-Ranking Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG) Operative Pleads Guilty

    Source: United States Attorneys General

    Today, a Mexican national and the co-founder of the armed, violent, and prolific Los Cuinis drug cartel was sentenced to 30 years in prison for his role in a major drug trafficking conspiracy. 

    According to court documents, Jose Gonzalez-Valencia, 49, of Michoacan, Mexico, was one of the top leaders — alongside his brothers, Gerardo Gonzalez-Valencia and Abigael Gonzalez-Valencia — of Los Cuinis, a major Mexican drug cartel responsible for trafficking multiple tons of cocaine from South America, through Mexico, into the United States. Los Cuinis financed the founding and growth of the Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG), which traffics hundreds of tons of cocaine, methamphetamine, and fentanyl into the United States and other countries, and is known for extreme violence, murders, torture, and corruption.

    In February 2025, President Trump designated CJNG a foreign terrorist organization. According to court documents, the top leader of CJNG, Nemesio Oseguera Cervantes, also known as “El Mencho,” is the brother-in-law of the Gonzalez-Valencia brothers. Closely allied, Los Cuinis and CJNG form one of the most violent and prolific transnational criminal organizations in the world, responsible for sending staggering amounts of drugs into the United States and inflicting extreme violence to further that objective.

    Also today, as part of the Department of Justice’s focus on dismantling CJNG, another Mexican national, Cristian Fernando Gutierrez-Ochoa, also known as “El Guacho,” a high-ranking CJNG member and El Mencho’s son-in-law, pleaded guilty to one count of international money laundering conspiracy.

    “Today, the Criminal Division dealt two more devastating blows to CJNG and Los Cuinis through the sentencing of Jose Gonzalez-Valencia and the conviction of Cristian Fernando Gutierrez-Ochoa,” said Matthew R. Galeotti, Head of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division. “These men and the cartels they led are responsible for immeasurable death and destruction in the United States and Mexico. The Justice Department will continue to dismantle CJNG, Los Cuinis and all other transnational criminal organizations that flood our streets with dangerous drugs and engage in extreme violence to control their operations.”

    “CJNG is one of the most powerful, influential, and ruthless criminal organizations to threaten our public safety and national security. Each leader and associate of CJNG who faces justice within the United States brings us one step closer to dismantling this terrorist organization,” said Acting Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Administrator Robert Murphy. “DEA will continue to use all available resources to disrupt CJNG’s drug trafficking and money laundering operations and systematically destroy their network.”

    From at least 2006 to 2016, according to court documents, Jose Gonzalez-Valencia directed and coordinated numerous multi-ton shipments of cocaine destined for the United States using air, land, sea, and underwater methods. In 2007 the U.S. Coast Guard seized one shipment from a semi-submersible vessel that was transporting at least 4,000 kilograms of cocaine from Colombia to Mexico for further distribution into the United States.

    As one of Los Cuinis’ top leaders, Jose Gonzalez-Valencia directed acts of extreme violence in furtherance of drug trafficking activities, including the murder of an individual who allegedly stole a shipment of approximately 1,000 kilograms of cocaine from Los Cuinis, according to court documents. Jose Gonzalez-Valencia personally carried firearms in furtherance of his drug trafficking activities and supplied weapons and ammunition to the CJNG.

    In 2015, Jose Gonzalez-Valencia went into hiding in Bolivia — a country that did not extradite anyone to the United States from 2001 to 2023, despite an existing extradition treaty — and resided there for over two years under a fictitious identity. In 2017, Jose Gonzalez-Valencia was arrested in Brazil while on vacation and was subsequently extradited to the United States. Brazil’s extradition treaty required that the U.S. Government not recommend more than a 30-year sentence.

    Pursuant to his plea agreement, Gutierrez-Ochoa admitted that he was a member of CJNG who was connected to CJNG’s top leadership. He also admitted that from at least 2023 until his arrest in 2024, he and other CJNG operatives used sophisticated money laundering methods involving real estate transactions, shell companies, and international money transfers to launder CJNG’s drug trafficking proceeds. For example, Gutierrez-Ochoa and others completed two wire transfers totaling $1.2 million of CJNG’s drug proceeds to purchase a luxury residence in Riverside, California, titled in the name of a Mexican entity owned and controlled by CJNG. When Gutierrez-Ochoa was arrested in November 2024, he was living at that property under a fictitious identity and possessed two untraceable and illegal firearms, approximately $2.2 million of CJNG’s drug proceeds, and numerous luxury items purchased with CJNG’s drug proceeds, including jewelry, watches, and vehicles.

    Gutierrez-Ochoa is scheduled to be sentenced on Nov. 7 and faces a maximum penalty of 20 years in prison. A federal district court judge will determine his sentence after considering the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors.

    Today’s sentencing of Gonzalez-Valencia and conviction of Gutierrez-Ochoa follow several recent strikes into CJNG’s most inner circle.

    El Mencho’s older brother, Antonio Oseguera Cervantes, and Erick Valencia Salazar, an alleged co-founder of CJNG and El Mencho’s close advisor, were among the 29 wanted cartel leaders taken into U.S. custody on Feb. 27, 2025.

    Shortly after, on March 7, 2025, El Mencho’s son, Ruben Oseguera-Gonzalez, known as El Menchito, was sentenced to a term of life in prison plus 30 years to run consecutively and ordered to forfeit over $6 billion in drug trafficking proceeds. Before his arrest, Oseguera-Gonzalez was CJNG’s second-in-command and led CJNG for nearly seven years. He is responsible for trafficking more than 50 metric tons of cocaine and supervising drug labs that produced more than 1,000 metric tons of methamphetamine in Mexico. In 2013, he was one of the first contributors to the fentanyl epidemic in the United States, pledging to “do it big” and build an empire from counterfeit oxycontin pills laced with fentanyl. As the evidence at trial showed, he also committed heinous acts of violence. According to statements made in court and trial testimony, Oseguera-Gonzalez ordered the murder of more than 100 people, some of whom he murdered himself.

    The DEA and the Criminal Division’s Narcotic and Dangerous Drug Section have been systematically dismantling the leadership of the CJNG and Los Cuinis at the highest level. To date, the ongoing investigation has led to indictments of approximately 30 high-value CJNG and Los Cuinis command-and-control targets, including seven Consolidated Priority Organization Targets (CPOTs), the top drug trafficking command-and-control leaders. As of June 2025, 12 defendants have been convicted, including two at trial.

    A number of indicted leaders of CJNG and Los Cuinis remain fugitives, including El Mencho, whose capture reward was recently increased to $15 million under the State Department’s Narcotic Rewards Program. Abigael Gonzalez-Valencia, another top leader of Los Cuinis and El Mencho’s brother-in-law, was arrested in 2015 by Mexican authorities pursuant to the U.S. indictment but since then has been fighting extradition to the United States.

    The DEA Los Angeles Field Division investigated the cases. The Justice Department’s Office of International Affairs provided critical assistance with obtaining foreign evidence and securing Jose Gonzalez-Valencia’s extradition to the United States.

    Trial Attorneys Lernik Begian, Gwen Stamper, and Douglas Meisel of the Criminal Division’s Narcotic and Dangerous Drug Section are prosecuting the cases.

    This case is part of Operation Take Back America, a nationwide initiative that marshals the full resources of the Department of Justice to repel the invasion of illegal immigration, achieve the total elimination of cartels and transnational criminal organizations and protect our communities from the perpetrators of violent crime. Operation Take Back America streamlines efforts and resources from the Department’s Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces and Project Safe Neighborhood. 

    MIL Security OSI –

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Global: MPs may have passed the assisted dying bill, but the debate is just beginning

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Suzanne Ost, Professor of Law, Lancaster University

    Now that the assisted dying bill has passed its momentous third reading in the House of Commons, it may seem like legalisation in England and Wales is a done deal. But despite this significant milestone, the bill is not yet law and its journey through the House of Lords is far from a formality.

    While the terminally ill adults (end of life) bill is now closer than ever to becoming law, both the Commons and the Lords must agree on its final wording. And just like in the Commons, there are passionate supporters and vocal opponents in the Lords. Peers are expected to focus their attention on a number of outstanding, and controversial, issues.

    One of the biggest concerns that surfaced during both the report stage and today’s third reading relates to the speed and process of drafting the legislation.

    Because this is a private member’s bill, introduced by Labour MP Kim Leadbeater, it was subject to strict timelines. Leadbeater had just 85 days to work with legal drafters and set out a policy framework before the bill was published ahead of its second reading in November 2024.

    Despite this, the democracy-supporting charity the Hansard Society has noted that the bill is “among the most heavily scrutinised in recent times”, and it could ultimately receive up to 200 hours of parliamentary debate, especially now that it has moved to the Lords.

    Still, the fast turnaround meant that many important decisions, such as what medications will be approved for use in assisted dying, have been left for the secretary of state to determine later through what’s known as delegated legislation (secondary laws made without a full parliamentary vote).

    One area likely to receive particular scrutiny is the bill’s inclusion of so-called “Henry VIII clauses”. These are controversial powers that allow ministers to make changes to existing primary legislation, effectively altering acts of parliament without needing a new law. A key example is clause 38 that would let ministers revise the NHS Act 2006 to formally include assisted dying within NHS services.

    Stronger safeguards but concerns persist

    Several amendments aimed at strengthening the bill’s safeguards were supported during the Commons stages. These included the introduction of independent advocates, a new disability advisory board, and additional protections for people with learning disabilities, mental health conditions, or autism.

    An amendment from Labour MP Naz Shah was also supported at the third reading, ensuring that a person who chooses to stop eating and drinking will not automatically be considered terminally ill. This is a protection designed to prevent the system being used inappropriately.

    Yet despite these measures, concerns remain. Critics worry about the risk of coercion, both from others and self imposed. There is particular unease about people feeling pressured to choose assisted dying because they consider themselves a burden.

    Questions have also been raised about whether those with conditions like anorexia might qualify for assisted dying under the current wording of the bill.

    Even with the new safeguards, including mandatory training for doctors to detect coercion and assess mental capacity, many feel the bill needs tighter definitions and clearer criteria to protect the most vulnerable.

    The role of palliative care

    The impact on palliative and end-of-life care continues to be a major point of debate. Today, MPs backed an amendment from Liberal Democrat MP Munira Wilson that would require the government to assess the state of palliative care services within one year of the law being enacted.

    Peers in the House of Lords may push further on this issue. Some may argue that before a person can request assisted dying, they should first be referred to a palliative care specialist to fully understand their options. Others may want the law to spell out more clearly who is qualified to assess these requests.

    Another key question is who should provide assisted dying services. The British Medical Association has previously suggested a model where assisted dying operates outside the core NHS system. This would be a kind of parallel service overseen by the health secretary but delivered by independent providers. This would be similar to how early medical abortions are offered in some parts of the UK.

    Time is tight in the Lords, so peers will probably focus on a few high priority areas. Any amendments will need to be proposed, debated and approved quickly if the bill is to continue progressing this session.

    Even if the bill passes, it includes a four year implementation period to allow for the development of more detailed policies, including training for professionals, protocols for medication and clearer guidance on safeguarding.

    The passing of the bill in the Commons is historic. But the national conversation on assisted dying is not over. And the next phase will determine how this sensitive and deeply personal issue is handled in practice.

    Suzanne Ost has previously received funding from the AHRC for her assisted dying research.

    Nancy Preston receives funding from Horizon Europe, Horizon 2020 and the NIHR

    – ref. MPs may have passed the assisted dying bill, but the debate is just beginning – https://theconversation.com/mps-may-have-passed-the-assisted-dying-bill-but-the-debate-is-just-beginning-259460

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Global: MPs may have passed the assisted dying bill, but the debate is just beginning

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Suzanne Ost, Professor of Law, Lancaster University

    Now that the assisted dying bill has passed its momentous third reading in the House of Commons, it may seem like legalisation in England and Wales is a done deal. But despite this significant milestone, the bill is not yet law and its journey through the House of Lords is far from a formality.

    While the terminally ill adults (end of life) bill is now closer than ever to becoming law, both the Commons and the Lords must agree on its final wording. And just like in the Commons, there are passionate supporters and vocal opponents in the Lords. Peers are expected to focus their attention on a number of outstanding, and controversial, issues.

    One of the biggest concerns that surfaced during both the report stage and today’s third reading relates to the speed and process of drafting the legislation.

    Because this is a private member’s bill, introduced by Labour MP Kim Leadbeater, it was subject to strict timelines. Leadbeater had just 85 days to work with legal drafters and set out a policy framework before the bill was published ahead of its second reading in November 2024.

    Despite this, the democracy-supporting charity the Hansard Society has noted that the bill is “among the most heavily scrutinised in recent times”, and it could ultimately receive up to 200 hours of parliamentary debate, especially now that it has moved to the Lords.

    Still, the fast turnaround meant that many important decisions, such as what medications will be approved for use in assisted dying, have been left for the secretary of state to determine later through what’s known as delegated legislation (secondary laws made without a full parliamentary vote).

    One area likely to receive particular scrutiny is the bill’s inclusion of so-called “Henry VIII clauses”. These are controversial powers that allow ministers to make changes to existing primary legislation, effectively altering acts of parliament without needing a new law. A key example is clause 38 that would let ministers revise the NHS Act 2006 to formally include assisted dying within NHS services.

    Stronger safeguards but concerns persist

    Several amendments aimed at strengthening the bill’s safeguards were supported during the Commons stages. These included the introduction of independent advocates, a new disability advisory board, and additional protections for people with learning disabilities, mental health conditions, or autism.

    An amendment from Labour MP Naz Shah was also supported at the third reading, ensuring that a person who chooses to stop eating and drinking will not automatically be considered terminally ill. This is a protection designed to prevent the system being used inappropriately.

    Yet despite these measures, concerns remain. Critics worry about the risk of coercion, both from others and self imposed. There is particular unease about people feeling pressured to choose assisted dying because they consider themselves a burden.

    Questions have also been raised about whether those with conditions like anorexia might qualify for assisted dying under the current wording of the bill.

    Even with the new safeguards, including mandatory training for doctors to detect coercion and assess mental capacity, many feel the bill needs tighter definitions and clearer criteria to protect the most vulnerable.

    The role of palliative care

    The impact on palliative and end-of-life care continues to be a major point of debate. Today, MPs backed an amendment from Liberal Democrat MP Munira Wilson that would require the government to assess the state of palliative care services within one year of the law being enacted.

    Peers in the House of Lords may push further on this issue. Some may argue that before a person can request assisted dying, they should first be referred to a palliative care specialist to fully understand their options. Others may want the law to spell out more clearly who is qualified to assess these requests.

    Another key question is who should provide assisted dying services. The British Medical Association has previously suggested a model where assisted dying operates outside the core NHS system. This would be a kind of parallel service overseen by the health secretary but delivered by independent providers. This would be similar to how early medical abortions are offered in some parts of the UK.

    Time is tight in the Lords, so peers will probably focus on a few high priority areas. Any amendments will need to be proposed, debated and approved quickly if the bill is to continue progressing this session.

    Even if the bill passes, it includes a four year implementation period to allow for the development of more detailed policies, including training for professionals, protocols for medication and clearer guidance on safeguarding.

    The passing of the bill in the Commons is historic. But the national conversation on assisted dying is not over. And the next phase will determine how this sensitive and deeply personal issue is handled in practice.

    Suzanne Ost has previously received funding from the AHRC for her assisted dying research.

    Nancy Preston receives funding from Horizon Europe, Horizon 2020 and the NIHR

    – ref. MPs may have passed the assisted dying bill, but the debate is just beginning – https://theconversation.com/mps-may-have-passed-the-assisted-dying-bill-but-the-debate-is-just-beginning-259460

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI USA: Former Haitian Mayor and Human Rights Violator Sentenced to Nine Years in Prison for Lying about Past Involvement in Political Violence

    Source: US Justice – Antitrust Division

    Headline: Former Haitian Mayor and Human Rights Violator Sentenced to Nine Years in Prison for Lying about Past Involvement in Political Violence

    Jean Morose Viliena, the former Mayor of Les Irois, Haiti, was sentenced today to nine years in prison followed by three years of supervised release by Chief Judge F. Dennis Saylor IV for the District of Massachusetts for possessing and using a Permanent Resident Card he had fraudulently obtained by falsely stating that he had not ordered, carried out, or materially assisted in extrajudicial and political killings and other acts of violence against the Haitian people.

    MIL OSI USA News –

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Security: Former Haitian Mayor and Human Rights Violator Sentenced to Nine Years in Prison for Lying about Past Involvement in Political Violence

    Source: United States Attorneys General

    Note: See indictment here.

    Jean Morose Viliena, the former Mayor of Les Irois, Haiti, was sentenced today to nine years in prison followed by three years of supervised release by Chief Judge F. Dennis Saylor IV for the District of Massachusetts for possessing and using a Permanent Resident Card he had fraudulently obtained by falsely stating that he had not ordered, carried out, or materially assisted in extrajudicial and political killings and other acts of violence against the Haitian people. A federal jury convicted Viliena in March 2025 of three counts of visa fraud.

    “In Haiti, Jean Morose Viliena was involved in the violent killings, beatings, and assaults of whomever he believed threatened his power as mayor,” said Matthew R. Galeotti, Head of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division. “His lies to U.S. immigration authorities allowed him to unlawfully enter this country and obtain lawful permanent resident status. Individuals who commit violent crimes in their home countries should take note: we do not tolerate human rights abusers who lie to take refuge here. We will find you, investigate you, and prosecute you to ensure that you are held accountable to the maximum extent of U.S. law for your heinous criminal conduct.”

    “Jean Morose Viliena built a life in the United States by burying the truth about his violent past – a past marked by political persecution, bloodshed and the silencing of dissent in Haiti,” said U.S. Attorney Leah B. Foley for the District of Massachusetts. “For more than a decade, he lived freely and comfortably in this country while the victims of his brutality lived in fear, exile and pain. Today’s sentence brings a measure of justice for the lives he shattered and sends a clear message: the United States will not be a safe haven for human rights abusers. Lying to gain entry into this country and then lying again under oath to avoid accountability strikes at the heart of our immigration and legal systems. I commend the tremendous courage of the victims and witnesses who stood up and spoke the truth despite the risks and made this outcome possible.”

    “Today’s sentencing underscores the commitment of Homeland Security Investigations to ensuring that individuals who commit heinous acts of violence and fraud are held accountable, regardless of where those crimes were committed,” said Special Agent in Charge Michael J. Krol of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) New England. “Jean Morose Viliena’s actions were not only a gross violation of human rights but also a betrayal of the trust placed in him by his community. HSI will continue to work tirelessly with our partners to bring justice to victims and protect the American people from foreign criminals seeking to escape justice in their home countries.”

    Viliena, 53, was the Mayor of Les Irois, Haiti, from December 2006 until February 2010. As a candidate and as mayor, Viliena was backed by Korega, a political machine that used armed violence to exert power throughout the southwestern region of Haiti. Viliena personally supervised his mayoral staff and other armed supporters aligned with Korega and directed them to engage in armed violence to quash opposition to his authority.

    According to evidence presented at trial, on July 27, 2007, Viliena violently retaliated against an activist who had previously spoken at a judicial proceeding on behalf of a neighbor whom Viliena had assaulted. In a brutal act of reprisal, that evening, Viliena led an armed group to the activist’s home, where Viliena and his associates shot and killed the activist’s younger brother and then smashed the brother’s skull with a large rock before a crowd of bystanders.

    Viliena committed another act of violent retribution in April 2008, when he and his associates attacked community members who had founded a radio station that Viliena opposed. According to multiple witnesses’ testimony, Viliena mobilized armed members of his staff and supporters to forcibly shut down the radio station and seize its broadcasting equipment. Viliena distributed firearms to his men, some of whom also carried machetes and picks. According to the evidence presented at trial, during this incident, Viliena beat one man and ordered an associate to shoot him when he tried to flee. As a result, the man’s leg was later amputated above the knee. Viliena also beat a student who was at the radio station; when the student tried to flee, a bullet struck his face, leaving him permanently blind in one eye.

    Less than two months after the radio station attack, Viliena presented himself at the U.S. Embassy Consular Office in Port au Prince, Haiti, where he applied for a visa to enter the United States. The visa application specifically requires an applicant to state whether they are a member of any class of individuals excluded from admission into the United States, including those who have “ordered, carried out or materially assisted in extrajudicial and political killings and other acts of violence against the Haitian people.” Viliena falsely responded “no,” indicating that this category did not apply to him. Viliena thereafter swore to and affirmed before a U.S. Consular Officer that the contents of the application were true and signed the application.

    Based on Viliena’s false representations, the United States approved his visa application and permitted him to enter the country. The United States later granted Viliena lawful permanent resident status and a Permanent Resident Card, also known as a “Green Card.” For years, through the use of his fraudulently obtained Green Card, Viliena enjoyed a job; sufficient income; a comfortable home; a safe community; the ability to visit his family in Les Irois at any time; and the privilege of raising and educating a son who is now a U.S. citizen by birth.

    The HSI Boston Field Office investigated the case, with coordination provided by the Human Rights Violators and War Crimes Center (HRVWCC). Established in 2009, the HRVWCC furthers the government’s efforts to identify, locate, and prosecute human rights abusers in the United States, including those who are known or suspected to have participated in persecution, war crimes, genocide, torture, extrajudicial killings, female mutilation, and the use or recruitment of child soldiers. Invaluable assistance was also provided by U.S. Customs and Border Protection from Boston Logan Airport.

    Trial Attorney Alexandra Skinnion of the Criminal Division’s Human Rights and Special Prosecutions Section (HRSP) and Assistant U.S. Attorney Laura J. Kaplan for the District of Massachusetts prosecuted the case, with assistance from HRSP Historian/Analyst Dr. Christopher Hayden.

    Members of the public who have information about former human rights violators in the United States are urged to contact U.S. law enforcement through the HSI tip line at 1-866-DHS-2-ICE or its online tip form at www.ice.gov/exec/forms/hsi-tips/tips.asp. 

    MIL Security OSI –

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI USA: LEADER JEFFRIES STATEMENT ON RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST 

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Congressman Hakeem Jeffries (8th District of New York)

    Know Your Immigration Rights

    If you or a loved one encounter immigration enforcement officials, it is essential that you know your rights and have prepared your household for all possible outcomes.

    Ask for a warrant: The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution protects you from unreasonable search and seizure. You do not have to open your door until you see a valid warrant to enter your home or search your belongings.

    Your right to remain silent: The Fifth Amendment protects your right to remain silent and not incriminate yourself. You are not required to share any personal information such as your place of birth, immigration status or criminal history.

    Always consult an attorney: You have a right to speak with an attorney. You do not have to sign anything or hand officials any documents without speaking to an attorney. Try to identify and consult one in advance.

    The New York City Office of Civil Justice and the Mayor’s Office of Immigrant Affairs (MOIA) support a variety of free immigration legal services through local nonprofit legal organizations. To access these resources, dial 311 and say “Action NYC,” call the MOIA Immigration Legal Support Hotline at 800-354-0365 Monday through Friday from 9:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. or visit MOIA’s website.

    Learn more here: KNOW YOUR IMMIGRATION RIGHTS  – Congressman Hakeem Jeffries

    MIL OSI USA News –

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Security: HUMAN TRAFFICKING CONSPIRACY SPANNING FLORIDA PANHANDLE AND SOUTHERN ALABAMA DISMANTLED

    Source: United States Department of Justice (Human Trafficking)

    TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA – Kimberly Robinson Gandy, 47, of Gulfport, Mississippi, was found guilty on Wednesday afternoon, June 18, 2025, by a federal jury, of: Conspiracy to Commit Sex Trafficking by Force, Fraud, or Coercion; Sex Trafficking by Force, Fraud, or Coercion; and Money Laundering. Her codefendant, Chad Cornelius Seymore, 49, of Dothan, Alabama, pled as charged, on Monday, June 9, 2025, immediately prior to the scheduled trial, to: Conspiracy to Commit Sex Trafficking by Force, Fraud, or Coercion; Sex Trafficking by Force, Fraud, or Coercion; Receiving Benefits From Sex Trafficking; Interstate Travel In Aid of Racketeering; and Money Laundering. The guilty plea and verdict were announced by John P. Heekin, United States Attorney for the Northern District of Florida.

    U.S. Attorney Heekin said: “Thanks to the tireless efforts of our local, state, and federal law enforcement partners who investigated this case, and the tenacious work of the federal prosecutors and support staff in my office, we have dismantled this sex trafficking conspiracy and obtained justice on behalf of its victims.  My office is committed to fulfilling the promise of President Donald J. Trump and Attorney General Pam Bondi to aggressively prosecute those who prey upon and profit from human trafficking victims. This outcome is a testament to the outstanding collaborative work of the Capital City Human Trafficking Task Force.”

    Court documents reflect that over a four-year period Seymore conspired with others to bond adult women out of county jail and then force them to commit commercial sex acts in Alabama and North Florida. Seymore recruited women suffering from drug addictions at hotels and through online advertisements. He threatened and physically abused his sex trafficking victims.  Gandy conspired with Seymore to traffic women in Panama City Beach and Destin. They used online money exchange platforms to transfer funds received from commercial sex acts.  

    Sentencing for Chad Seymore is scheduled for August 15, 2025, at 2:00 p.m.  Kim Gandy will be sentenced on September 15, 2025, at 1:30 p.m.   The defendants will be sentenced at the United States Courthouse in Tallahassee before Chief United States District Judge Alan C. Winsor.

    The convictions were the result of a joint investigation by the Leon County Sheriff’s Office, Homeland Security Investigations, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Dothan, Alabama Police Department, the Panama City Beach Police Department, the Panama City Police Department, with assistance from the United States Marshal’s Service, the Bay County Sheriff’s Office, the Manatee County Sheriff’s Office, the Wakulla County Sheriff’s Office, the Walton County Sheriff’s Office, and the United States Attorney’s Office for the Middle District of Alabama. The case is being prosecuted by First Assistant United States Attorney Michelle Spaven.

    This case is part of Operation Take Back America (https://www.justice.gov/dag/media/1393746/dl?inline ) a nationwide initiative that marshals the full resources of the Department of Justice to repel the invasion of illegal immigration, achieve the total elimination of cartels and transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), and protect our communities from the perpetrators of violent crime. Operation Take Back America streamlines efforts and resources from the Department’s Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETFs) and Project Safe Neighborhood (PSN).

    The United States Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of Florida is one of 94 offices that serve as the nation’s principal litigators under the direction of the Attorney General.  To access public court documents online, please visit the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida website. For more information about the United States Attorney’s Office, Northern District of Florida, visit http://www.justice.gov/usao/fln/index.html.

    MIL Security OSI –

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Security: HUMAN TRAFFICKING CONSPIRACY SPANNING FLORIDA PANHANDLE AND SOUTHERN ALABAMA DISMANTLED

    Source: United States Department of Justice (Human Trafficking)

    TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA – Kimberly Robinson Gandy, 47, of Gulfport, Mississippi, was found guilty on Wednesday afternoon, June 18, 2025, by a federal jury, of: Conspiracy to Commit Sex Trafficking by Force, Fraud, or Coercion; Sex Trafficking by Force, Fraud, or Coercion; and Money Laundering. Her codefendant, Chad Cornelius Seymore, 49, of Dothan, Alabama, pled as charged, on Monday, June 9, 2025, immediately prior to the scheduled trial, to: Conspiracy to Commit Sex Trafficking by Force, Fraud, or Coercion; Sex Trafficking by Force, Fraud, or Coercion; Receiving Benefits From Sex Trafficking; Interstate Travel In Aid of Racketeering; and Money Laundering. The guilty plea and verdict were announced by John P. Heekin, United States Attorney for the Northern District of Florida.

    U.S. Attorney Heekin said: “Thanks to the tireless efforts of our local, state, and federal law enforcement partners who investigated this case, and the tenacious work of the federal prosecutors and support staff in my office, we have dismantled this sex trafficking conspiracy and obtained justice on behalf of its victims.  My office is committed to fulfilling the promise of President Donald J. Trump and Attorney General Pam Bondi to aggressively prosecute those who prey upon and profit from human trafficking victims. This outcome is a testament to the outstanding collaborative work of the Capital City Human Trafficking Task Force.”

    Court documents reflect that over a four-year period Seymore conspired with others to bond adult women out of county jail and then force them to commit commercial sex acts in Alabama and North Florida. Seymore recruited women suffering from drug addictions at hotels and through online advertisements. He threatened and physically abused his sex trafficking victims.  Gandy conspired with Seymore to traffic women in Panama City Beach and Destin. They used online money exchange platforms to transfer funds received from commercial sex acts.  

    Sentencing for Chad Seymore is scheduled for August 15, 2025, at 2:00 p.m.  Kim Gandy will be sentenced on September 15, 2025, at 1:30 p.m.   The defendants will be sentenced at the United States Courthouse in Tallahassee before Chief United States District Judge Alan C. Winsor.

    The convictions were the result of a joint investigation by the Leon County Sheriff’s Office, Homeland Security Investigations, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Dothan, Alabama Police Department, the Panama City Beach Police Department, the Panama City Police Department, with assistance from the United States Marshal’s Service, the Bay County Sheriff’s Office, the Manatee County Sheriff’s Office, the Wakulla County Sheriff’s Office, the Walton County Sheriff’s Office, and the United States Attorney’s Office for the Middle District of Alabama. The case is being prosecuted by First Assistant United States Attorney Michelle Spaven.

    This case is part of Operation Take Back America (https://www.justice.gov/dag/media/1393746/dl?inline ) a nationwide initiative that marshals the full resources of the Department of Justice to repel the invasion of illegal immigration, achieve the total elimination of cartels and transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), and protect our communities from the perpetrators of violent crime. Operation Take Back America streamlines efforts and resources from the Department’s Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETFs) and Project Safe Neighborhood (PSN).

    The United States Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of Florida is one of 94 offices that serve as the nation’s principal litigators under the direction of the Attorney General.  To access public court documents online, please visit the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida website. For more information about the United States Attorney’s Office, Northern District of Florida, visit http://www.justice.gov/usao/fln/index.html.

    MIL Security OSI –

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Security: Members Of Drug Conspiracy Distributing Fentanyl And Methamphetamine Are Sentenced To Prison

    Source: United States Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms and Explosives (ATF)

    CHARLOTTE, N.C. – Two members of a drug conspiracy that distributed fentanyl and methamphetamine were sentenced to prison yesterday, announced Russ Ferguson, U.S. Attorney for the Western District of North Carolina. Ashton Durrell Farley, 32, of Hickory, N.C., was sentenced to 235 months in prison followed by five years of supervised release. Thomas Eugene Ikard, 46, of Lenoir, N.C., was sentenced to 60 months in prison followed by four years of supervised release. Farley and Ikard pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute fentanyl and methamphetamine.

    U.S. Attorney Ferguson is joined in making the announcement by Alicia Jones, Special Agent in Charge of the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF), Charlotte Field Division, Sheriff Donald G. Brown II of the Catawba County Sheriff’s Office, and Chief Reed Baer of the Hickory Police Department.

    Two other members of the drug conspiracy were previously sentenced after pleading guilty to conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent to distribute fentanyl and methamphetamine. Dustin Eric Wilson, 35, of Charlotte was sentenced to 10 years in prison followed by five years of supervised release. Harold Marquis Wilfong, 37, of Hickory, was sentenced to 84 months in prison followed by three years of supervised release.

    According to court documents and court proceedings, federal charges were filed against the defendants following a 10-month investigation led by the ATF and the Hickory Police Department (HPD), aimed at reducing drug distribution and drug-induced criminal activity in Catawba County and surrounding areas. The drug trafficking ring operated out of Hickory and distributed large quantities of fentanyl and methamphetamine in the area. To identify the drug conspirators and their operations, ATF agents and HPD officers utilized controlled drug purchases, conducted physical surveillance, and executed search warrants. Over the course of the investigation, law enforcement determined that members of the drug ring used several residences either as “stash houses” to store drugs and/or guns, or to conduct drug sales and other drug trafficking activities. One of the alleged stash houses was located two blocks from the federal courthouse in Charlotte.

    According to court records, during the investigation, law enforcement seized multiple kilograms of fentanyl, methamphetamine, and marijuana. Law enforcement also seized multiple firearms used by some of the traffickers to support their drug distribution, including an AR-15 rifle and a privately made firearm or “ghost gun,” and ammunition.

    In making the announcement U.S. Attorney Ferguson commended the ATF, HPD, and the Catawba County Sheriff’s Office investigation of this case and thanked the U.S. Marshals Service for their invaluable assistance.

    This case is part of Operation Take Back America a nationwide initiative that marshals the full resources of the Department of Justice to repel the invasion of illegal immigration, achieve the total elimination of cartels and transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), and protect our communities from the perpetrators of violent crime. Operation Take Back America streamlines efforts and resources from the Department’s Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETFs) and Project Safe Neighborhood (PSN).

     

    MIL Security OSI –

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Security: Nearly 2 dozen charged in large drug and money laundering operation spanning multiple jurisdictions

    Source: United States Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms and Explosives (ATF)

    Operations Red Ranger, Borrowed Time, and Resurrection lead to seizure of drugs and millions in illicit proceeds

    HOUSTON – A total of 23 people are now in custody for various drug trafficking, firearms and money laundering charges following major law enforcement operations in Houston/Galveston and Rio Grande Valley areas of Texas this week, announced U.S. Attorney Nicholas J. Ganjei.

    Some of those arrested have already begun to make their appearances U.S. Magistrate Judges Christina Bryan in Houston, Andrew Edison in Galveston and Nadia Medrano in McAllen. Others are in state custody on related charges and expected in federal court in the near future. 

    Grand juries in Houston and McAllen returned the five separate, but related indictments in May. The charges allege crimes that occurred as early as January 2023 for some and between May 2024 and December 2024 for others and involve cocaine, heroin and methamphetamine trafficking, firearms-related offenses and money laundering.

    The charges allege some of the individuals were truck drivers delivering drugs north. According to information presented to the court, 10 kilograms of cocaine had been taken to Georgia and money returned to pay drivers and other expenses.

    The arrests are the culmination of multiple months-long Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETF) investigations dubbed Operation Red Ranger, Borrowed Time and Resurrection. During the investigation and operations, law enforcement also seized over 170 kilograms of cocaine and heroin, over two thousand kilograms methamphetamine, more than 100 firearms and nearly $3 million as well as four properties valued at $1.2 million.

    If convicted, many charged with drug trafficking offenses face up to life in federal prison and could pay millions in fines. Those charged with money laundering offenses face up to 20 years, while the firearms convictions carry up to 10 or 15 years in federal prison.

    The Drug Enforcement Administration, Immigration and Customs Enforcement – Homeland Security Investigations and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives conducted the OCDETF operations with the assistance of U.S. Marshals Service; Texas Department of Public Safety; sheriff’s offices in Fort Bend, Galveston, Chambers, Hidalgo, Harris and Kleberg counties; Texas Attorney General’s Office – Money Laundering Unit; West Tennessee Drug Task Force and police departments in Houston, Katy and Galveston as well as Houston and South Texas High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area programs. 

    Assistant U.S. Attorneys Leo J. Leo III, Patricia Cook Profit, Michael Day and Roberto Lopez are prosecuting the cases.

    This case is part of Operation Take Back America, a nationwide initiative that marshals the full resources of the Department of Justice to repel the invasion of illegal immigration, achieve the total elimination of cartels and transnational criminal organizations and protect our communities from the perpetrators of violent crime. Operation Take Back America streamlines efforts and resources from the Department’s OCDETF and Project Safe Neighborhood.

    An indictment is a formal accusation of criminal conduct, not evidence. A defendant is presumed innocent unless convicted through due process of law. 

    MIL Security OSI –

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Security: Largest Ever Seizure of Funds Related to Crypto Confidence Scams

    Source: US FBI

    United States Files Civil Forfeiture Complaint Against $225 Million in Funds Involved in Cryptocurrency Investment Fraud Money Laundering

                WASHINGTON – The U.S. Attorney’s Office filed a civil forfeiture complaint in U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia against more than $225.3 million in cryptocurrency. According to the complaint, the U.S. Secret Service and the FBI used blockchain analysis and other investigative techniques to determine that the cryptocurrency is connected to the theft and laundering of funds from victims of cryptocurrency investment fraud schemes, commonly referred to as cryptocurrency confidence scams.

                The civil action was announced by U.S. Attorney Jeanine Ferris Pirro, Matthew R. Galeotti, Head of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division, U.S. Secret Service Special Agent in Charge Shawn Bradstreet of the San Francisco Field Office, and FBI Special Agent in Charge Sanjay Virmani of the San Francisco Field Office.

                The complaint alleges that the cryptocurrency addresses that held the over $225.3 million in cryptocurrency were part of a sophisticated blockchain-based money laundering network that executed hundreds of thousands of transactions and was used to conceal the nature, source, control, and ownership of proceeds derived from cryptocurrency investment fraud. The scam operators dispersed proceeds across an extensive group of cryptocurrency addresses and accounts on the blockchain to conceal the source of the illicitly obtained funds.

                As part of the investigation of the laundering network, dozens of victims across the country were confirmed to have lost funds through the belief that they were making legitimate cryptocurrency investments, with more than 400 suspected victims around the world. The complaint discussed millions of dollars in victim losses.

                “Under my leadership, with the support of President Trump and Attorney General Bondi, the U.S. Attorney’s office for the District of Columbia is taking a leading role in the fight against crypto-confidence scams, partnering with law enforcement throughout the country to seize and forfeit stolen funds and rip them from the hands of foreign criminals, all with the eye toward making victims whole,” said U.S. Attorney Pirro.

                “Today’s civil forfeiture complaint is the latest action taken by the Department to protect the American public from fraudsters specializing in cryptocurrency-based scams, and it will not be the last,” said Matthew R. Galeotti, Head of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division. “These schemes harm American victims, costing them billions of dollars every year, and undermine faith in the cryptocurrency ecosystem. Our investigators and prosecutors are relentlessly pursuing these scammers and their ill-gotten gains, and we will relentlessly pursue recovery of victim funds.”

                “This seizure of $225.3 million in funds linked to cryptocurrency investment scams marks the largest cryptocurrency seizure in U.S. Secret Service history,” said Special Agent in Charge Shawn Bradstreet of the U.S. Secret Service’s San Francisco Field Office. “These scams prey on trust, often resulting in extreme financial hardship for the victims. The U.S. Secret Service, FBI, and our private partners worked diligently to trace these illicit transactions, identify victims and seize these funds so that they can eventually be returned to their rightful owners.”

                “Cryptocurrency investment schemes can have devastating and long-lasting consequences for victims, far beyond just financial losses,” said FBI Special Agent in Charge Sanjay Virmani of the San Francisco Field Office. “In this case, hundreds of victims lost millions of dollars to an elaborate scheme, and I commend the work of the FBI San Francisco investigative team and the United States Secret Service, San Francisco Office who worked tirelessly to return stolen assets to the victims. The FBI continues to aggressively pursue the criminals behind these heartless frauds, working alongside our federal partners and the private sector to disrupt malicious networks and recover funds for those targeted.”  

                According to the FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center’s 2024 Internet Crime Report, cryptocurrency investment fraud caused more than $5.8 billion in reported losses in 2024 alone.

                This investigation is being handled by the U.S. Secret Service San Francisco Field Office and the FBI San Francisco Field Office. The Department of Justice thanks Tether for its proactive assistance in this investigation.

                This case is being handled by Assistant U.S. Attorneys Kevin Rosenberg and Rick Blaylock, Jr., of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia, and Trial Attorneys Stefanie Schwartz and Ethan Cantor of the Justice Department’s Computer Crime & Intellectual Property Section (CCIPS).

                Members of the public who believe they are victims of cryptocurrency investment fraud and other cyber-enabled crime should contact the FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center at https://www.ic3.gov. If you believe you may be a victim of one of the scams alleged in the government’s complaint, add the code “BT06182025” in the narrative of your complaint, and if you have previously filed a related complaint, make note of the prior complaint in the narrative.

    MIL Security OSI –

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Security: Waterbury Woman Pleads Guilty, Admits Multiple Fraud Schemes

    Source: US FBI

    David X. Sullivan, United States Attorney for the District of Connecticut, announced that MARLENIN VITO, 46, of Waterbury, pleaded guilty today in New Haven federal court to an offense stemming from multiple fraud schemes.

    According to court documents and statements made in court, Vito was employed as Medicaid Coordinator at an assisted living facility (“Company A”) located in Stamford.  Vito’s responsibilities included assisting the residents in applying for nursing home level Medicaid reimbursements, monitoring the residents’ patient trust accounts, and ensuring compliance with Medicaid regulations.  She was also responsible for keeping journal entries for the residents’ trust accounts and to credit their accounts when funds were received, and for debiting patient accounts when payments were made on behalf of the residents or when cash was given to residents for incidental expenses.

    Between approximately December 2019 and May 2021, Vito defrauded Company A and its residents by generating checks from Company A’s system, forging a fellow employee’s signature on the checks, negotiating the fraudulent checks purportedly to give the cash proceeds to certain residents, and keeping the cash for her own use.  Vito then made false entries into Company A’s accounting ledger by debiting the fraudulently obtained cash from the residents’ respective trust accounts.  Many of the residents were not healthy enough or mentally capable of tracking their own expenses or monitoring the balances of their own trust accounts.

    In certain instances, Vito cancelled residents’ supplemental health insurance coverage, but continued to deduct funds from the trust accounts and took the funds for herself.  Also, when certain residents’ trust accounts were credited with Economic Impact Payments (“COVID-19 stimulus payments”), Vito took the funds for herself and then debited the residents’ accounts at a rate of approximately $60 a day until the stimulus funds were depleted.

    During the scheme, Vito fraudulently negotiated approximately 500 checks, stealing approximately $310,820.  When she was confronted by family members of certain residents, Vito created and provided to those family members false account statements that misrepresented the balances in the residents’ trust accounts.

    After she was terminated by Company A, Vito obtained employment as a bookkeeper and scheduler at an alarm company (“Company B”) located in White Plains, New York.  Vito stole from the company by making false representations about overtime for herself and her daughter, and by using company funds to order more than $10,000 worth of products to be delivered to her Waterbury residence.  Company B was defrauded of approximately $23,558 through these schemes.

    After she was terminated by Company B, Vito was employed as a bookkeeper at a law firm in Hartford (“Company C”).  Vito took fraudulently generated checks drawn on Company C’s bank account and issued as “Pay to the Order of ‘Petty Cash, ’” forged the signature of an authorized employee on the checks, cashed the checks, and kept the funds for herself.  She then recorded the fraudulently negotiated checks in Company C’s books and records as “Petty Cash.”  Vito stole approximately $27,179 from Company C.

    Vito pleaded guilty to one count of wire fraud, an offense that carries a maximum term of imprisonment of 20 years.  She is scheduled to be sentenced on September 10.

    Vito is released on a $25,000 bond pending sentencing.

    This investigation is being conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with the assistance of the Stamford Police Department, Hartford Police Department, Ridgefield Police Department, and the Putnam County (N.Y.) Sheriff’s Office.  The case is being prosecuted by Assistant U.S. Attorneys Michael S. McGarry and Nathan J. Guevremont.

    MIL Security OSI –

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: GAD’s first Public Service Pensions conference

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    News story

    GAD’s first Public Service Pensions conference

    Pensions professionals from across the public sector networked, and contributed to discussions, at GAD’s first pensions conference.

    Credit: Crown copyright

    More than 100 professionals from across the sector attended the Government Actuary’s Department’s (GAD) first public service pensions conference on Thursday 19 June 2025. The event brought together representatives from the pension schemes for all 8 public service workforces, across all 4 nations.

    Reflect and Connect

    The theme of the conference was ‘Reflect and Connect’. Opening the event, the Government Actuary highlighted a key objective for the day was providing an opportunity for those working in public service schemes to meet others doing similar work, encourage knowledge sharing and greater collaboration.

    The conference included a keynote address from Siobhan Amutharasan (HM Treasury) and Jan Claisse (GAD) and inspiring plenaries on pensions dashboards and pension board governance.

    Delegates also attended discussions on a wide range of topics including the McCloud remedy, AI opportunities and the gender pensions gap. The Office for Budget Responsibility, The Pensions Ombudsman and The Pensions Regulator also provided engaging and thought-provoking sessions.

    Energising and interesting

    Greg Ceely from the Office for National Statistics presented a session on Healthy Life Expectancy and the State Pension age review. Commenting on the event, he said: “It’s been very energising and interesting to find out how various pension elements fit together. It has been refreshing to know that people are thinking about pensions in a multifaceted way.”

    Claire Neale, the Head of Police Pensions from the National Police Chiefs Council noted: “It’s been a fabulous networking opportunity, and a real pleasure to connect with new people.”

    Clair Alcock, Head of Pensions at the Local Government Association remarked: “It was brilliantly put together and all the topics were really relevant.”

    Phil Bassingham-Searle, the Head of Armed Forces remuneration at the Ministry of Defence also noted: “It has been thought provoking and has brought together a group of people who don’t normally come together, who’ve got shared interests.”

    It was an inspiring and energising day that captured the spirit of collaboration and shared purpose at the heart of public service pensions. #ReflectAndConnect

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    Updates to this page

    Published 20 June 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI USA: Jayapal Announces Community Project Funding Requests for FY26

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Congresswoman Pramila Jayapal (7th District of Washington)

    SEATTLE, WA — U.S. Representative Pramila Jayapal (WA-07) is today announcing the Community Project Funding (CPF) requests that she will be advocating to include in the Fiscal Year 2026 (FY26) appropriations bills.

    “Delivering for the Seattle area is the most important part of my job, and I am so proud to be working to bring home this money for innovative and critical projects across our community,” said Jayapal. “This funding will make our community safer, more affordable, more resilient to the climate crisis, and overall a better place to live. As Republicans in Congress and the Administration work to cut funding in every corner of the country, including for UW, and make life more expensive for all of us, I will continue working to get these projects across the finish line.”

    Jayapal is submitting the following funding requests:

    • $3 million for the City of Burien’s Public Market
    • $3 million for the City of Lake Forest Park’s Lakefront Park Community Center
    • $10 million for the City of Seattle’s Fort Lawton Redevelopment 
    • $4 million for the City of Seattle’s Lake City Community Center and Affordable Housing Redevelopment
    • $3.75 million for the City of Seattle’s Third Avenue Revitalization 
    • $3 million for the City of Seattle’s Seattle Waterfront Elliott Bay Seawall Project, Phase 2
    • $4 million for the City of Shoreline’s Trail Along the Rail
    • $1.7 million for the Port of Seattle’s Pier 86 Grain Terminal Switcher Locomotive Replacement
    • $1 million for the Port of Seattle’s Seattle Waterfront Sea Level Rise Vulnerability Assessment
    • $3 million for Sound Transit’s Link Reliability Improvements 
    • $5 million for Southwest Suburban Sewer District’s Sewer Rehabilitation Project, Phase One
    • $5 million for the University of Washington’s Cold Lab
    • $2 million for the University of Washington’s Critical Campus Building Access Fixes 
    • $281,000 for the Washington State Department of Ecology’s Evaluating Shoreline Restoration Effectiveness on Vashon and Maury Island 
    • $7 million for the Washington State Department of Transportation’s Seattle Ferry Terminal Shoreside Electrification 

    In the FY24 budget, Jayapal secured $7,566,000 for affordable housing and emergency shelters, which is expected to build or renovate nearly 300 housing units throughout the district and maintain emergency shelter for 200 individuals. 

    However, in the FY25 budget process, Republicans eliminated non-profits from eligibility for certain funding streams, disqualifying multiple previously eligible housing projects in WA-07. The FY25 cycle resulted in a full-year continuing resolution where no projects were funded. For FY26, House Republican Leadership has announced they will limit Democratic projects to 37 percent of total CPF spending despite the nearly 50-50 makeup of the House of Representatives. 

    More detailed information on each of these projects can be found here. Since the reinstatement of CPF by the Democratic House leadership in the 117th Congress, Jayapal has secured $57,626,089 for 39 community projects in WA-07. The full lists from FY22 can be found here, FY23 here, and FY24 here.

    MIL OSI USA News –

    June 21, 2025
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