Antigonish County District RCMP is investigating a fatal collision that occurred on Hwy. 104 in Linwood.
On February 13, at approximately 12:56 p.m., Antigonish County District RCMP, fire services, and EHS responded to a report of a two-vehicle collision on Hwy. 104 in Linwood. RCMP officers learned that a westbound Chevrolet Impala and an eastbound tractor trailer collided head on.
The driver and sole occupant of the Impala, a 55-year-old man from Antigonish County, was pronounced deceased at the scene. The driver of the tractor trailer, a 59-year-old man from Baddeck, suffered minor injuries.
An RCMP collision reconstructionist attended the scene and the investigation is ongoing. Hwy. 104 was closed for several hours but has since reopened.
Our thoughts are with the victim’s loved ones at this difficult time.
Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) State Crime News
SACRAMENTO—February is the month of love; unfortunately, not everyone who seems to be looking for love has good intentions. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Sacramento Field Office is issuing an urgent warning: perpetrators are posing as perfect partners to ensnare heart and wallets. Their schemes are very sophisticated and have harvesting and personal information and savings.
The warning about these scams has never been more urgent. Confidence fraud and romance scams result in some of the most significant financial losses when compared to other Internet-facilitated crimes. In 2023 alone, 17,832 victims reported more than $650 million in losses. Sadly, this number is conservative. Many victims suffer in silence, too ashamed or afraid to come forward.
While finding love on dating sites or with remote partners with whom you’ve connected with through social networks or affinity groups online isn’t impossible, heartless perpetrators lurk within online communities and platforms, seeking hearts and finances to ensnare. If you think you won’t be targeted, think again; people of all ages and backgrounds can fall victim to a romance scam.
Romance and confidence scams start with seemingly innocent contact online and builds into a carefully orchestrated scheme. While the elements may vary to best ensnare the intended victim, thee scams often include the following elements:
The person harvests information about you from your online presence to establish a quick and seemingly significant bond.
The person showers you with attention and appears to have an unusually high number of common interests and similar background.
Images are exchanged and video chats are conducted using images and content that are synthetic or gleaned from online sources.
The FBI urges the public to beware of some common red flags:
You have yet to physically meet your beloved and have been met with excuses when trying to arrange an in-person connection.
You have been asked to provide money, gift cards, or cryptocurrency.
You have been given directions for investing money on specific online platforms.
You have been asked to receive and send money on their behalf.
You have been asked to share images that you would not want posted publicly.
If any of the red flags apply to you:
Immediately report any transfer of funds to your financial institution.
File a complaint with the FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center at www.ic3.gov.
Contact the FBI Sacramento Field Office at 916-746-7000 or your local law enforcement agency.
If you plan to travel to meet your long-distance love, proceed with caution, especially if those plans involve travel to a foreign country. Some victims who have agreed to meet in person with an online love interest have been reported missing or have been injured, and at least one was reported dead. Always review the State Department’s Travel Advisories at http://travel.state.gov/ before travelling.
Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) State Crime Alerts (c)
NEW YORK, NY—The New York FBI/NYPD Child Exploitation and Human Trafficking Task Force is searching for possible victims involved in a child sexual exploitation investigation involving a man named Ramel Warner. A federal grand jury in the Eastern District of New York indicted Warner on January 28, 2025, with one count of sexual exploitation of a child. The FBI’s New York Office believes there may be additional victims in this case.
Investigators say that Warner, who goes by the nickname Menah, allegedly raped a child in 2022 when he was supposed to be babysitting the child. The defendant recorded six videos of his sexual abuse of the child, which were subsequently distributed on the dark web.
As detailed in court filings, Warner, in the past, has had repeated and close access to children, including in schools. Warner has previously worked with afterschool programs in Brooklyn. At the time of his arrest, the defendant was also involved in a dance group for minor children operating out of a Brooklyn middle school.
The FBI is asking parents or guardians, possible victims, or anyone with information about sexual exploitation by Warner should contact the FBI at RWarnerCase@fbi.gov.
A spontaneous memorial of flowers in St Petersburg, Russia, on the day of Alexei Navalny’s death, February 16 2024.Aleksey Dushutin/Shutterstock
This is the best day of the past five months for me … This is my home … I am not afraid of anything and I urge you not to be afraid of anything either.
These were Alexei Navalny’s words after landing at Moscow’s Sheremetyevo Airport on January 17 2021. Russia’s leading opposition figure had spent the past months recovering in Germany from an attempt on his life by the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB). Minutes after making his comments, Navalny was detained at border control. And he would remain behind bars until his death on February 16 2024, in the remote “Polar Wolf” penal colony within the Arctic Circle.
“Why did he return to Russia?” That’s the question I’m asked about Navalny most frequently. Wasn’t it a mistake to return to certain imprisonment, when he could have maintained his opposition to Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin, from abroad?
But Navalny’s decision to return didn’t surprise me. I’ve researched and written about him extensively, including co-authoring Navalny: Putin’s Nemesis, Russia’s Future?, the first English-language, book-length account of his life and political activities. Defying the Kremlin by returning was a signature move, reflecting both his obstinacy and bravery. He wanted to make sure his supporters and activists in Russia did not feel abandoned, risking their lives while he lived a cushy life in exile.
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Besides, Navalny wasn’t returning to certain imprisonment. A close ally of his, Vladimir Ashurkov, told me in May 2022 that his “incarceration in Russia was not a certainty. It was a probability, a scenario – but it wasn’t like he was walking into a certain long-term prison term.”
Also, Navalny hadn’t chosen to leave Russia in the first place. He was unconscious when taken by plane from Omsk to Berlin for treatment following his poisoning with the nerve agent Novichok in August 2020. Navalny had been consistent in saying he was a Russian politician who needed to remain in Russia to be effective.
In a subsequent interview, conducted in a forest on the outskirts of the German capital as he slowly recovered, Navalny said: “In people’s minds, if you leave the country, that means you’ve surrendered.”
Video: ACF.
Outrage, detention and death
Two days after Navalny’s final return to Russia, the Anti-Corruption Foundation (ACF) – the organisation he established in 2011 – published its biggest ever investigation. The YouTube video exploring “Putin’s palace” on the Black Sea coast achieved an extraordinary 100 million views within ten days. By the start of February 2021, polling suggested it had been watched by more than a quarter of all adults in Russia.
Outrage at Navalny’s detention, combined with this Putin investigation, got people on to the streets. On January 23 2021, 160,000 people turned out across Russia in events that did not have prior approval from the authorities. More than 40% of the participants said they were taking part in a protest for the first time.
But the Russian authorities were determined to also make it their last time. Law enforcement mounted an awesome display of strength, detaining protesters and sometimes beating them. The number of participants at protests on January 31 and February 2 declined sharply as a result.
Between Navalny’s return to Russia in January 2021 and his death in February 2024, aged 47, he faced criminal case after criminal case, adding years and years to his time in prison and increasing the severity of his detention. By the time of his death, he was in the harshest type of prison in the Russian penitentiary system – a “special regime” colony – and was frequently sent to a punishment cell.
The obvious intent was to demoralise Navalny, his team and supporters – making an example of him to spread fear among anyone else who might consider mounting a challenge to the Kremlin. But Navalny fought back, as described in his posthumously published memoir, Patriot. He made legal challenges against his jailers. He went on hunger strike. And he formed a union for his fellow prisoners.
He also used his court appearances to make clear his political views, including following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, declaring: “I am against this war. I consider it immoral, fratricidal, and criminal.”
Navalny’s final public appearance was via video link. He was in good spirits, with his trademark optimism and humour still on display. Tongue firmly in cheek, he asked the judge for financial help:
Your Honour, I will send you my personal account number so that you can use your huge salary as a federal judge to ‘warm up’ my personal account, because I am running out of money.
Navalny died the following day. According to the prison authorities, he collapsed after a short walk and lost consciousness. Although the Russian authorities claimed he had died of natural causes, documents published in September 2024 by The Insider – a Russia-focused, Latvia-based independent investigative website – suggest Navalny may have been poisoned.
A mourner adds her tribute to Alexei Navalny’s grave in Moscow after his burial on March 1 2024. Aleksey Dushutin/Shutterstock
Whether or not Putin directly ordered his death, Russia’s president bears responsibility – for leading a system that tried to assassinate Navalny in August 2020, and for allowing his imprisonment following Navalny’s return to Russia in conditions designed to crush him.
Commenting in March 2024, Putin stated that, just days before Navalny’s death, he had agreed for his most vocal opponent to be included in a prisoner swap – on condition the opposition figure never returned to Russia. “But, unfortunately,” Putin added, “what happened, happened.”
‘No one will forget’
Putin is afraid of Alexei, even after he killed him.
Yulia Navalnaya, Navalny’s wife, wrote these words on January 10 2025 after reading a curious letter. His mother, Lyudmila Navalnaya, had written to Rosfinmonitoring – a Russian state body – with a request for her son’s name to be removed from their list of “extremists and terrorists” now he was no longer alive.
The official response was straight from Kafka. Navalny’s name could not be removed as it had been added following the initiation of a criminal case against him. Even though he was dead, Rosfinmonitoring had not been informed about a termination of the case “in accordance with the procedure established by law”, so his name would have to remain.
This appears to be yet another instance of the Russian state exercising cruelty behind the veil of bureaucratic legality – such as when the prison authorities initially refused to release Navalny’s body to his mother after his death.
“Putin is doing this to scare you,” Yulia continued. “He wants you to be afraid to even mention Alexei, and gradually to forget his name. But no one will forget.”
Alexei Navalny and his wife, Yulia Navalnaya, at a protest rally in Moscow, May 2012. Dmitry Laudin/Shutterstock
Today, Navalny’s family and team continue his work outside of Russia – and are fighting to keep his name alive back home. But the odds are against them. Polling suggests the share of Russians who say they know nothing about Navalny or his activities roughly doubled to 30% between his return in January 2021 and his death three years later.
Navalny fought against an autocratic system – and paid the price with his life. Given the very real fears Russians may have of voicing support for a man still labelled an extremist by the Putin regime, it’s not easy to assess what people there really think of him and his legacy. But we will also never know how popular Navalny would have been in the “normal” political system he fought for.
What made Navalny the force he was?
Navalny didn’t mean for the humble yellow rubber duck to become such a potent symbol of resistance.
In March 2017, the ACF published its latest investigation into elite corruption, this time focusing on then-prime minister (and former president), Dmitry Medvedev. Navalny’s team members had become masters of producing slick videos that enabled their message to reach a broad audience. A week after posting, the film had racked up over 7 million views on YouTube – an extraordinary number at that time.
The film included shocking details of Medvedev’s alleged avarice, including yachts and luxury properties. In the centre of a large pond in one of these properties was a duck house, footage of which was captured by the ACF using a drone.
Video: ACF.
Such luxuries jarred with many people’s view of Medvedev as being a bit different to Putin and his cronies. As Navalny wrote in his memoir, Medvedev had previously seemed “harmless and incongruous”. (At the time, Medvedev’s spokeswoman said it was “pointless” to comment on the ACF investigation, suggesting the report was a “propaganda attack from an opposition figure and a convict”.)
But people were angry, and the report triggered mass street protests across Russia. They carried yellow ducks and trainers, a second unintended symbol from the film given Medvedev’s penchant for them.
Another reason why so many people came out to protest on March 26 2017 was the organising work carried out by Navalny’s movement.
The previous December, Navalny had announced his intention to run in the 2018 presidential election. As part of the campaign, he and his team created a network of regional headquarters to bring together supporters and train activists across Russia. Although the authorities had rejected Navalny’s efforts to register an official political party, this regional network functioned in much the same way, gathering like-minded people in support of an electoral candidate. And this infrastructure helped get people out on the streets.
The Kremlin saw this as a clear threat. According to a December 2020 investigation by Bellingcat, CNN, Der Spiegel and The Insider, the FSB assassination squad implicated in the Novichok poisoning of Navalny had started trailing him in January 2017 – one month after he announced his run for the presidency.
At the protests against Medvedev, the authorities’ growing intolerance of Navalny was also on display – he was detained, fined and sentenced to 15 days’ imprisonment.
The Medvedev investigation was far from the beginning of Navalny’s story as a thorn in the Kremlin’s side. But this episode brings together all of the elements that made Navalny the force he was: anti-corruption activism, protest mobilisation, attempts to run as a “normal” politician in a system rigged against him, and savvy use of social media to raise his profile in all of these domains.
Courting controversy
In Patriot, Navalny writes that he always “felt sure a broad coalition was needed to fight Putin”. Yet over the years, his attempts to form that coalition led to some of the most controversial points of his political career.
In a 2007 video, Navalny referred to himself as a “certified nationalist”, advocating for the deportation of illegal immigrants, albeit without using violence and distancing himself from neo-Nazism. In the video, he says: “We have the right to be Russians in Russia, and we’ll defend that right.”
Although alienating some, Navalny was attempting to present a more acceptable face of nationalism, and he hoped to build a bridge between nationalists and liberals in taking on the Kremlin’s burgeoning authoritarianism.
But the prominence of nationalism in Navalny’s political identity varied markedly over time, probably reflecting his shifting estimations of which platform could attract the largest support within Russia. By the time of his thwarted run in the 2018 presidential election, nationalist talking points were all but absent from his rhetoric.
However, some of these former comments and positions continue to influence how people view him. For example, following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, Navalny tried to take a pragmatic stance. While acknowledging Russia’s flouting of international law, he said that Crimea was “now part of the Russian Federation” and would “never become part of Ukraine in the foreseeable future”.
Many Ukrainians take this as clear evidence that Navalny was a Russian imperialist. Though he later revised his position, saying Crimea should be returned to Ukraine, some saw this as too little, too late. But others were willing to look past the more controversial parts of his biography, recognising that Navalny represented the most effective domestic challenge to Putin.
Another key attempt to build a broad political coalition was Navalny’s Smart Voting initiative. This was a tactical voting project in which Navalny’s team encouraged voters to back the individual thought best-placed to defeat the ruling United Russia candidate, regardless of the challenger’s ideological position.
The project wasn’t met with universal approval. Some opposition figures and voters baulked at, or flatly refused to consider, the idea of voting for people whose ideological positions they found repugnant – or whom they viewed as being “fake” opposition figures, entirely in bed with the authorities. (This makes clear that Navalny was never the leader of the political opposition in Russia; he was, rather, the leading figure of a fractious constellation of individuals and groups.)
But others relished the opportunity to make rigged elections work in their favour. And there is evidence that Smart Voting did sometimes work, including in the September 2020 regional and local elections, for which Navalny had been campaigning when he was poisoned with Novichok.
In an astonishing moment captured on film during his recovery in Germany, Navalny speaks to an alleged member of the FSB squad sent to kill him. Pretending to be the aide to a senior FSB official, Navalny finds out that the nerve agent had been placed in his underpants.
How do Russians feel about Navalny now?
It’s like a member of the family has died.
This is what one Russian friend told me after hearing of Navalny’s death a year ago. Soon afterwards, the Levada Center – an independent Russian polling organisation – conducted a nationally representative survey to gauge the public’s reaction to the news.
The poll found that Navalny’s death was the second-most mentioned event by Russian people that month, after the capture of the Ukrainian city of Avdiivka by Russian troops. But when asked how they felt about his death, 69% of respondents said they had “no particular feelings” either way – while only 17% said they felt “sympathy” or “pity”.
And that broadly fits with Navalny’s approval ratings in Russia. After his poisoning in 2020, 20% of Russians said they approved of his activities – but this was down to 11% by February 2024.
Video: BBC.
Of course, these numbers must be taken for what they are: polling in an authoritarian state regarding a figure vilified and imprisoned by the regime, during a time of war and amid draconian restrictions on free speech. To what extent the drop in support for Navalny was real, rather than reflecting the increased fear people had in voicing their approval for an anti-regime figure, is hard to say with certainty.
When asked why they liked Navalny, 31% of those who approved of his activities said he spoke “the truth”, “honestly” or “directly”. For those who did not approve of his activities, 22% said he was “paid by the west”, “represented” the west’s interests, that he was a “foreign agent”, a “traitor” or a “puppet”.
The Kremlin had long tried to discredit Navalny as a western-backed traitor. After Navalny’s 2020 poisoning, Putin’s spokesman, Dmitry Peskov, said that “experts from the United States’ Central Intelligence Agency are working with him”. The Russian state claimed that, rather than a patriot exposing official malfeasance with a view to strengthening his country, Navalny was a CIA stooge intent on destroying Russia.
Peskov provided no evidence to back up this claim – and the official propaganda wasn’t believed by all. Thousands of Russians defied the authorities by coming out to pay their respects at Navalny’s funeral on March 1 2024. Many, if not all, knew this was a significant risk. Police employed video footage to track down members of the funeral crowd, including by using facial recognition technology.
The first person to be detained was a Muscovite the police claimed they heard shouting “Glory to the heroes!” – a traditional Ukrainian response to the declaration “Glory to Ukraine!”, but this time referencing Navalny. She spent a night in a police station before being fined for “displaying a banned symbol”.
Putin always avoided mentioning Navalny’s name in public while he was alive – instead referring to him as “this gentleman”, “the character you mentioned”, or the “Berlin patient”. (The only recorded instance of Putin using Navalny’s name in public when he was alive was in 2013.)
However, having been re-elected president in 2024 and with Navalny dead, Putin finally broke his long-held practice, saying: “As for Navalny, yes he passed away – this is always a sad event.” It was as if the death of his nemesis diminished the potency of his name – and the challenge that Navalny had long presented to Putin.
Nobody can become another Navalny
Someone else will rise up and take my place. I haven’t done anything unique or difficult. Anyone could do what I’ve done.
So wrote Navalny in the memoir published after his death. But that hasn’t happened: no Navalny 2.0 has yet emerged. And it’s no real surprise. The Kremlin has taken clear steps to ensure nobody can become another Navalny within Russia.
In 2021, the authorities made a clear decision to destroy Navalny’s organisations within Russia, including the ACF and his regional network. Without the organisational infrastructure and legal ability to function in Russia, no figure has been able to take his place directly.
More broadly, the fate of Navalny and his movement has had a chilling effect on the opposition landscape. So too have other steps taken by the authorities.
Russia has become markedly more repressive since the start of its war on Ukraine. The human rights NGO First Department looked into the number of cases relating to “treason”, “espionage” and “confidential cooperation with a foreign state” since Russia introduced the current version of its criminal code in 1997. Of the more than 1,000 cases, 792 – the vast majority – were initiated following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
Russian law enforcement has also used nebulous anti-extremism and anti-terrorism legislation to crack down on dissenting voices. Three of Navalny’s lawyers were sentenced in January 2025 for participating in an “extremist organisation”, as the ACF was designated by a Moscow court in June 2021. The Russian legislature has also passed a barrage of legislation relating to so-called “foreign agents”, to tarnish the work of those the regime regards as foreign-backed “fifth columnists”.
Mass street protests are largely a thing of the past in Russia. Restrictions were placed on public gatherings during the COVID pandemic – but these rules were applied selectively, with opposition individuals and groups being targeted. And opportunities for collective action were further reduced following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
Freedom of speech has also come under assault. Article 29, point five of the Russian constitution states: “Censorship shall be prohibited.” But in September 2024, Kremlin spokesperson Peskov said: “In the state of war that we are in, restrictions are justified, and censorship is justified.”
Legislation passed very soon after the 2022 invasion of Ukraine made it illegal to comment on the Russian military’s activities truthfully – and even to call the war a war.
YouTube – the platform so central to Navalny’s ability to spread his message – has been targeted. Without banning it outright – perhaps afraid of the public backlash this might cause – the Russian state media regulator, Roskomnadzor, has slowed down internet traffic to the site within Russia. The result has been a move of users to other websites supporting video content, including VKontakte – a Russian social media platform.
In short, conditions in Russia are very different now compared to when Navalny first emerged. The relative freedom of the 2000s and 2010s gave him the space to challenge the corruption and authoritarianism of an evolving system headed by Putin. But this space has shrunk over time, to the point where no room remains for a figure like him within Russia.
In 2019, Navalny told Ivan Zhdanov, who is now director of the ACF: “We changed the regime, but not in the way we wanted.” So, did Navalny and his team push the Kremlin to become more authoritarian – making it not only intolerant of him but also any possible successor?
There may be some truth in this. And yet, the drastic steps taken by the regime following the start of the war on Ukraine suggest there were other, even more significant factors that have laid bare the violent nature of Putin’s personal autocracy – and the president’s disdain for dissenters.
Plenty for Russians to be angry about
How can we win the war when dedushka [grandpa] is a moron?
In June 2023, Evgeny Prigozhin – a long-time associate of Putin and head of the private military Wagner Group – staged an armed rebellion, marching his forces on the Russian capital. This was not a full-blown political movement against Putin. But the target of Prigozhin’s invective against Russia’s military leadership had become increasingly blurry, testing the taboo of direct criticism of the president – who is sometimes referred to, disparagingly, as “grandpa” in Russia.
And Prigozhin paid the price. In August 2023, he was killed when the private jet he was flying in crashed after an explosion on board. Afterwards, Putin referred to Prigozhin as a “talented person” who “made serious mistakes in life”.
In the west, opposition to the Kremlin is often associated with more liberal figures like Navalny. Yet the most consequential domestic challenge to Putin’s rule came from a very different part of the ideological spectrum – a figure in Prigozhin leading a segment of Russian society that wanted the Kremlin to prosecute its war on Ukraine even more aggressively.
Video: BBC.
Today, there is plenty for Russians to be angry about, and Putin knows it. He recently acknowledged an “overheating of the economy”. This has resulted in high inflation, in part due to all the resources being channelled into supporting the war effort. Such cost-of-living concerns weigh more heavily than the war on the minds of most Russians.
A favourite talking point of the Kremlin is how Putin imposed order in Russia following the “wild 1990s” – characterised by economic turbulence and symbolised by then-president Boris Yeltsin’s public drunkenness. Many Russians attribute the stability and rise in living standards they experienced in the 2000s with Putin’s rule – and thank him for it by providing support for his continued leadership.
The current economic problems are an acute worry for the Kremlin because they jeopardise this basic social contract struck with the Russian people. In fact, one way the Kremlin tried to discredit Navalny was by comparing him with Yeltsin, suggesting he posed the same threats as a failed reformer. In his memoir, Navalny concedes that “few things get under my skin more”.
Although originally a fan of Yeltsin, Navalny became an ardent critic. His argument was that Yeltsin and those around him squandered the opportunity to make Russia a “normal” European country.
Navalny also wanted Russians to feel entitled to more. Rather than be content with their relative living standards compared with the early post-Soviet period, he encouraged them to imagine the level of wealth citizens could enjoy based on Russia’s extraordinary resources – but with the rule of law, less corruption, and real democratic processes.
‘Think of other possible Russias’
When looking at forms of criticism and dissent in Russia today, we need to distinguish between anti-war, anti-government, and anti-Putin activities.
Despite the risk of harsh consequences, there are daily forms of anti-war resistance, including arson attacks on military enlistment offices. Some are orchestrated from Ukraine, with Russians blackmailed into acting. But other cases are likely to be forms of domestic resistance.
Criticism of the government is still sometimes possible, largely because Russia has a “dual executive” system, consisting of a prime minister and presidency. This allows the much more powerful presidency to deflect blame to the government when things go wrong.
There are nominal opposition parties in Russia – sometimes referred to as the “systemic opposition”, because they are loyal to the Kremlin and therefore tolerated by the system. Within the State Duma, these parties often criticise particular government ministries for apparent failings. But they rarely, if ever, now dare criticise Putin directly.
Nothing anywhere close to the challenge presented by Navalny appears on the horizon in Russia – at either end of the political spectrum. But the presence of clear popular grievances, and the existence of organisations (albeit not Navalny’s) that could channel this anger should the Kremlin’s grip loosen, mean we cannot write off all opposition in Russia.
Navalny’s wife, Yulia, has vowed to continue her husband’s work. And his team in exile maintain focus on elite corruption in Russia, now from their base in Vilnius, Lithuania. The ACF’s most recent investigation is on Igor Sechin, CEO of the oil company Rosneft.
But some have argued this work is no longer as relevant as it was. Sam Greene, professor in Russian politics at King’s College London, captured this doubt in a recent Substack post:
[T]here is a palpable sense that these sorts of investigations may not be relevant to as many people as they used to be, given everything that has transpired since the mid-2010s, when they were the bread and butter of the Anti-Corruption Foundation. Some … have gone as far as to suggest that they have become effectively meaningless … and thus that Team Navalny should move on.
Navalny’s team are understandably irritated by suggestions they’re no longer as effective as they once were. But it’s important to note that this criticism has often been sharpest within Russia’s liberal opposition. The ACF has been rocked, for example, by recent accusations from Maxim Katz, one such liberal opposition figure, that the organisation helped “launder the reputations” of two former bank owners. In their response, posted on YouTube, the ACF referred to Katz’s accusations as “lies” – but this continued squabbling has left some Russians feeling “disillusioned and unrepresented”.
So, what will Navalny’s long-term legacy be? Patriot includes a revealing section on Mikhail Gorbachev – the last leader of the Soviet Union, whom Navalny describes as “unpopular in Russia, and also in our family”. He continues:
Usually, when you tell foreigners this, they are very surprised, because Gorbachev is thought of as the person who gave Eastern Europe back its freedom and thanks to whom Germany was reunited. Of course, that is true … but within Russia and the USSR he was not particularly liked.
At the moment, there is a similar split in perceptions of Navalny. Internationally, he was nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize, awarded the Sakharov Prize by the European Parliament, and a documentary about him won an Oscar.
But there are also those outside of Russia who remain critical: “Navalny’s life has brought no benefit to the Ukrainian victory; instead, he has caused considerable harm,” wrote one Ukrainian academic. “He fuelled the illusion in the west that democracy in Russia is possible.”
Trailer for the Oscar-winning documentary Navalny.
Inside Russia, according to Levada Center polling shortly after his death, 53% of Russians thought Navalny played “no special role” in the history of the country, while 19% said he played a “rather negative” role. Revealingly, when commenting on Navalny’s death, one man in Moscow told RFE/RL’s Russian Service: “I think that everyone who is against Russia is guilty, even if they are right.”
But, for a small minority in Russia, Navalny will go down as a messiah-like figure who miraculously cheated death in 2020, then made the ultimate sacrifice in his battle of good and evil with the Kremlin. This view may have been reinforced by Navalny’s increasing openness about his Christian faith.
Ultimately, Navalny’s long-term status in Russia will depend on the nature of the political system after Putin has gone. Since it seems likely that authoritarianism will outlast Putin, a more favourable official story about Navalny is unlikely to emerge any time soon. However, how any post-Putin regime tries to make sense of Navalny’s legacy will tell us a lot about that regime.
While he was alive, Navalny stood for the freer Russia in which he had emerged as a leading opposition figure – and also what he called the “Beautiful Russia of the Future”. Perhaps, after his death, his lasting legacy in Russia remains the ability for some to think – if only in private – of other possible Russias.
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Ben Noble has previously received funding from the British Academy and the Leverhulme Trust. He is an Associate Fellow of Chatham House.
In December 2024, the Home Secretary announced the introduction of a new Independent Prevent Commissioner role. In January 2025, Lord David Anderson KC was confirmed as the Interim Prevent Commissioner until the appointment of a permanent holder. The commissioner will have the specific remit of reviewing the programme’s effectiveness, identifying gaps and problems before they emerge. The appointment will be announced in due course.
The Commission for Countering Extremism (CCE) provides the government with independent expert advice on extremism, with the current commissioner, Robin Simcox’s fixed term due to end in July. He has held the appointment since March 2021, first in an interim capacity, then on a substantive basis since July 2022. The appointment of a new commissioner will also be announced in due course.
The role of Independent Adviser on Political Violence and Disruption, previously held by Lord Walney, will come to an end. The CCE will take forward work as part of its new strengthened remit.
Security Minister, Dan Jarvis, said:
To continue our fight against extremism and terrorism in whatever form they take we need expert advice and oversight. The role holders will be crucial in those efforts, and I look forward to working with the successful candidates.
I would also like to thank Lord Walney and Robin Simcox for their work in their respective roles as Independent Advisor on Political Violence and Disruption and as Commissioner for Countering Extremism.
The victim of a fatal stabbing in Ealing has been named – as detectives continue to appeal for witnesses.
Police were called at around 22:15hrs on Monday, 10 February, to the Grosvenor pub in Oaklands Road, Hanwell, to reports that a man had stumbled into the pub with serious injuries.
Officers attended the scene alongside London Ambulance Service crews, and found 33-year-old Dariusz Serafin there with a several knife wounds. Despite the efforts of paramedics, he was pronounced dead at the scene.
Homicide detectives are carrying out extensive enquiries to establish the circumstances of the incident. There have not been any arrests.
Detective Chief Inspector Alison Foxwell, from the Met’s Specialist Crime unit, said: “We are making good progress with our investigation, and a number of leads are being followed up.
“Our enquiries thus far lead us to believe that the stabbing took place in the vicinity of Sydney Road junction with Regina Road. Although this is a predominantly residential area, its proximity to The Broadway – and a number of shops, pubs and restaurants still open at the time of the incident – leads us to believe there will have been witnesses who may have seen or heard something.
“We urge anyone with information to contact us urgently. There may also be CCTV, ring doorbell or dash cam footage which may be relevant to the investigation.
“We urge anybody who was in the area to check their footage from between 20.30hrs and 22.30hrs on Monday, 10 February, and to notify the police if they believe they have captured anything which may assist our investigation.”
The victim’s family are being supported by specialists. In a statement, they said: “Dariusz, known for his boundless empathy and loving spirit for people and animals, touched everyone he met with his kindness and compassion. His presence will be deeply missed, but his memory will live on in the hearts of those he loved.
“In his honour, his family urges everyone to help end senseless knife crime in the streets of London, and to assist in bringing the person responsible for his death to justice. Rest peacefully, Dariusz.”
Anyone with information is asked to contact 101 or ‘X’ @MetCC, quoting CAD 7176/10FEB25. You can also provide information anonymously to the independent charity Crimestoppers on 0800 555 111.
Information can also be provided directly to police via an online portal.
MIDLAND, Texas – A Mexican national unlawfully residing in Texas was sentenced Thursday to life in federal prison for his criminal actions as the leader of a drug trafficking organization tied to a Mexican cartel.
According to court documents, Jose Ramon Castillo-Lopez aka “Pepo,” 30, of Namiquipa, Chihuahua, Mexico, supplied a co-conspirator with a firearm, along with methamphetamine, cocaine, heroin, and fentanyl “M30” pills for distribution purposes. Castillo-Lopez also utilized a garage in Midland to disassemble stolen vehicles as load vehicles used to transport illicit drugs and money.
On Oct. 1, 2022, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents learned that Castillo-Lopez had been arrested and charged with attempted capital murder for allegedly shooting a Seminole, Texas police officer. Through a review of his phone calls in the Gaines County Jail, DEA agents confirmed that Castillo-Lopez was the leader of a United States-based DTO, working directly with his counterpart on the Mexican side of the organization. Additionally, Castillo-Lopez had instructed in detail two co-defendants, his girlfriend Myra Mendez and her brother Aaron Mendez, to take over the DTO operations in the United States.
Castillo-Lopez was responsible for the distribution of 100-300 pounds of actual methamphetamine per month, more than 20 kgs of cocaine, and several hundred grams of fentanyl M-30 pills and heroin. Additionally, Castillo-Lopez was responsible for telling the Mexican side of the DTO how much and what types of narcotics were needed for distribution, the collection of narcotics proceeds, and he ensured distribution occurred in Midland/Odessa, San Antonio, Amarillo, San Angelo and throughout the state of Mississippi.
Castillo-Lopez pleaded guilty on Sept. 23, 2024, to one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of actual methamphetamine and 5 kgs or more of a mixture and substance containing a detectable amount of cocaine.
“This federal life sentence is a significant victory for the United States in combatting the Mexican cartels and their drug trafficking organizations,” said U.S. Attorney Jaime Esparza for the Western District of Texas. “Castillo-Lopez was responsible for orchestrating the movement of massive amounts of dangerous narcotics into our country and through our communities. This case is a testament to the dedication and expertise of our federal, state and local law enforcement partners. Together, we prioritize the safety of Americans and will bring the full force of justice to criminal organizations.”
“Mr. Castillo-Lopez now has a lifetime to contemplate the terrible choices he made,” said Towanda R. Thorne-James, Special Agent in Charge of the DEA’s El Paso Division. “He willingly put the lives of Texans and Mississippians at risk and now he’s facing the consequences. The men and women of the DEA will continue to bring other drug traffickers like him to their own day of reckoning.”
The DEA investigated the case with valuable assistance from the Texas Department of Public Safety, Midland Sheriff’s Office, Odessa Police Department and the Midland Police Department.
Assistant U.S. Attorney Patrick Sloane prosecuted the case.
The investigation has so far identified 85 individuals linked to the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine. The National Police of Ukraine has opened a special criminal case, which contains information about the recruitment, training, financing, and the use of the alleged mercenaries in combat actions against Ukraine. This information has been shared with authorities in Moldova, where new preliminary…
Government scientists at NOAA collect and provide crucial public information about coastal conditions that businesses, individuals and other scientists rely on.NOAA’s National Ocean Service
Information on the internet might seem like it’s there forever, but it’s only as permanent as people choose to make it.
That’s apparent as the second Trump administration “floods the zone” with efforts to dismantle science agencies and the data and websites they use to communicate with the public. The targets range from public health and demographics to climate science.
We are a research librarian and policy scholar who belong to a network called the Public Environmental Data Partners, a coalition of nonprofits, archivists and researchers who rely on federal data in our analysis, advocacy and litigation and are working to ensure that data remains available to the public.
In just the first three weeks of Trump’s term, we saw agencies remove access to at least a dozen climate and environmental justice analysis tools. The new administration also scrubbed the phrase “climate change” from government websites, as well as terms like “resilience.”
Here’s why and how Public Environmental Data Partners and others are making sure that the climate science the public depends on is available forever:
Why government websites and data matter
The internet and the availability of data are necessary for innovation, research and daily life.
If the data and tools used to understand complex data are abruptly taken off the internet, the work of scientists, civil society organizations and government officials themselves can grind to a halt. The generation of scientific data and analysis by government scientists is also crucial. Many state governments run environmental protection and public health programs that depend on science and data collected by federal agencies.
Removing information from government websites also makes it harder for the public to effectively participate in key processes of democracy, including changes to regulations. When an agency proposes to repeal a rule, for example, it is required to solicit comments from the public, who often depend on government websites to find information relevant to the rule.
And when web resources are altered or taken offline, it breeds mistrust in both government and science. Government agencies have collected climate data, conducted complex analyses, provided funding and hosted data in a publicly accessible manner for years. People around the word understand climate change in large part because of U.S. federal data. Removing it deprives everyone of important information about their world.
The second Trump administration seems different, with more rapid and pervasive removal of information.
In response, groups involved in Public Environmental Data Partners have been archiving climate datasets our community has prioritized, uploading copies to public repositories and cataloging where and how to find them if they go missing from government websites.
Most federal agencies decreased their use of the phrase ‘climate change’ on websites during the first Trump administration, 2017-2020. Eric Nost, et al., 2021, CC BY
As of Feb. 13, 2025, we hadn’t seen the destruction of climate science records. Many of these data collection programs, such as those at NOAA or EPA’s Greenhouse Gas Reporting Program, are required by Congress. However, the administration had limited or eliminated access to a lot of data.
Maintaining tools for understanding climate change
We’ve seen a targeted effort to systematically remove tools like dashboards that summarize and visualize the social dimensions of climate change. For instance, the Climate and Economic Justice Screening Tool mapped low-income and other marginalized communities that are expected to experience severe climate changes, such as crop losses and wildfires. The mapping tool was taken offline shortly after Trump’s first set of executive orders.
Most of the original data behind the mapping tool, like the wildfire risk predictions, is still available, but is now harder to find and access. But because the mapping tool was developed as an open-source project, we were able to recreate it.
Preserving websites for the future
In some cases, entire webpages are offline. For instance, the page for the 25-year-old Climate Change Center at the Department of Transportation doesn’t exist anymore. The link just sends visitors back to the department’s homepage.
During Donald Trump’s first week back in office, the Department of Transportation removed its Climate Change Center webpage. Internet Archive Wayback Machine
Fortunately, our partners at the End of Term Web Archive have captured snapshots of millions of government webpages and made them accessible through the Internet Archive’s Wayback Machine. The group has done this after each administration since 2008.
If you are worried that certain data currently still available might disappear, consult this checklist from MIT Libraries. It provides steps for how you can help safeguard federal data.
Narrowing the knowledge sphere
What’s unclear is how far the administration will push its attempts to remove, block or hide climate data and science, and how successful it will be.
Already, a federal district court judge has ruled that the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s removal of access to public health resources that doctors rely on was harmful and arbitrary. These were putback online thanks to that ruling.
We worry that more data and information removals will narrow public understanding of climate change, leaving people, communities and economies unprepared and at greater risk. While data archiving efforts can stem the tide of removals to some extent, there is no replacement for the government research infrastructures that produce and share climate data.
Eric Nost is affiliated with the Environmental Data and Governance Initiative and the Public Environmental Data Partners, which have received funding for some of the work reviewed in this piece from Bloomberg Philanthropies, the Sustainable Cities Fund, and the David and Lucile Packard Foundation.
Alejandro Paz is affiliated with the Environmental Data and Governance Initiative.
An alarming increase in the number of young people distracted while driving has been reported by road campaigners.
In a bid to combat the rising tide of mobile phone use behind the wheel, Liverpool City Council has launched a hard-hitting campaign aimed at young drivers.
The message is clear: Driving demands 100 per cent focus, and any distraction, especially from mobile phones, can have devastating consequences.
The campaign comes as alarming statistics reveal a surge in mobile phone use among young drivers. According to the RAC’s 2024 Report on Motoring, a staggering 43 per cent of young motorists admit to listening to voice notes while driving without hands-free technology, and 40 per cent confess to recording messages. These figures starkly contrast with the overall driving population, where the rates are just 14 per cent and 9 per cent, respectively.
Merseyside Police enforced nearly 2,500 mobile phone offences across Merseyside in 2024 – up from just over 1,600 in 2023.
The consequences of getting caught using a handheld phone while driving are severe: six penalty points on your license and a £200 fine. If you get six or more points within two years of passing your test, your licence will be revoked – which means you’ll also have to apply and pay for a new provisional licence and pass both theory and practical parts of the driving or riding test again to get a full licence.
You can also be taken to court where you can:
• be banned from driving or motor cycle riding. • get a maximum fine of £1,000.
Liverpool City Council is committed to making the City’s roads safer for everyone. This campaign is just one step in ongoing efforts to educate drivers and enforce the law.
Cllr Dan Barrington, Liverpool City Council Cabinet Member for Transport and Connectivity, said: “Driving is a responsibility, not a game.
“When you’re behind the wheel, your only ‘screen time’ should be looking through the windscreen. A momentary glance at your phone can lead to a lifetime of regret.
“It’s deeply concerning to see such a high proportion of young drivers putting themselves and others at risk,” Cllr Barrington added.
“We need to change this culture of distraction and make it clear that using a mobile phone while driving is simply unacceptable.
“We understand the temptation to check your phone, especially for young people who are constantly connected,” Cllr Barrington acknowledged. “But no message, no notification, no call is worth risking your life or the lives of others. Put your phone away, focus on the road, and arrive safely.”
Inspector Gavin Dixon of Merseyside Police, Roads Policing Department, said: “As a Roads Policing Department we have to deal with the very real consequences of distracted driving.
“Every year people are killed or serious injured by drivers not paying attention, whether that be mobile phone use or some other in car distraction. We use a number of tactics to catch drivers that wish to put their own convenience before other people’s safety.
“In the last 12 months, we have deployed unmarked vehicles, unmarked motorcycles, AI camera detection equipment and arial CCTV resulting in more and more people getting caught.
“Our message is simple, leave your phone alone or we might be speaking to you next. We can’t be everywhere, but we can be anywhere.”
The Met has confirmed details of the policing operation ahead of a protest and counter protest in central London on Saturday, 15 February.
A march organised by groups under the Palestine Coalition banner will assemble in Whitehall from noon, before proceeding to area around the US Embassy in Nine Elms Lane in the vicinity of the US Embassy. The march will go via Millbank and Vauxhall Bridge. Once at the destination, speeches will take place.
A protest organised by the group known as ‘Stop the Hate’ will hold a static counter protest at the junction of Grosvenor Road and Vauxhall Bridge which is on the route of the Palestine Coalition march. There will be a significant policing presence to ensure that while the groups are within sight and sound of each other, they cannot physically come together.
Commander Glen Pavelin, who will oversee this weekend’s policing operation, said: “We have been in touch with the organisers of both protests in the lead up to Saturday and we will have a significant number of officers deployed in the central London boroughs where events will take place. Our role is to ensure all those exercising their right to protest can do so without incident and without causing serious disruption to the lives of the wider community.
“We have imposed conditions under the Public Order Act, in relation to routes, assembly areas and start and finish times, to ensure that is the case. I would ask anyone attending to familiarise themselves with the conditions, which are set out below. Breaching conditions, or inciting others to do so, is a criminal offence.
“As with any large gathering or event, we would encourage people to keep their eyes and ears open and to report anything suspicious by calling 999 or by speaking to an officer. They are there to keep everyone safe.”
Details of the conditions are set out below:
The Palestine Coalition protest must form up in Whitehall in the area shown on the map below. The procession must set off by 13:00hrs.
Those taking part in the Palestine Coalition protest must not deviate from the agreed route shown on the map below. The march must keep moving, without separate static assemblies forming along the route.
Anyone taking part in the assembly following the Palestine Coalition march must remain in the area of Nine Elms Lane shown in purple on the map below. The stage must be erected at the position marked with the blue rectangle.
The speeches and any use of amplified equipment must end by 16:00hrs, with all participants dispersed and any infrastructure removed by 17:00hrs.
Anyone participating in the Stop the Hate static assembly must remain in the area shown on the map below, which is at the junction of Millbank, Bessborough Gardens, Grosvenor Road and Vauxhall Bridge.
Those taking part cannot begin to assemble before 12:00hrs and they must disperse by 15:30hrs.
NASHVILLE – A U.S. Immigration Customs and Enforcement investigation with the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation led to a four-count indictment which was unsealed in the Middle District of Tennessee charging eight defendants, with ties to the Tren da Aragua (TdA) gang, with various offenses stemming from their involvement with a transnational commercial sex enterprise.
“The success of this operation to stop Tren da Aragua operating in our communities is a significant step forward in our ongoing battle against human trafficking and transnational organized crime,” said ICE Homeland Security Investigations Nashville Special Agent in Charge Rana Saoud. “This investigation exemplifies the importance of collaboration among local, state, and federal agencies in ending these crimes in our communities. Human exploitation leaves a trail of suffering in its wake.”
The defendants, Yilibeth del Carmen Rivero-De Caldera, 51, Kleiver Daniel Mota-Rivero, 35, Yuribetzi Del Valle Gomez Machuca, 39, Wilmarys Del Valle Manzano Solorzano, 22, Frankyanna Del Valle Romero-Rivero, 30, Endrik Alexander Morales-Rivero, 25, Jesus Enrique Castillo Rodriguez, 24, Ariannys Beatriz Gutierrez-Carrillo, 24; all of Venezuela, operated an illegal commercial sex and sex trafficking enterprise out of Nashville motels from July 2022 through March 2024, according to court documents.
The defendants facilitated the victims’ arrival into the United States and used online commercial sex websites to post advertisements and internet or cellular communications to conduct illicit criminal activities, according to the indictment.
“This indictment demonstrates our commitment to stop human trafficking whenever and wherever we find it, and to hold those involved accountable” said acting U.S. Attorney for the Middle District of Tennessee Robert E. McGuire. “We are coming after transnational criminal organizations like TdA, but this case shows that we will also do whatever it takes to stop those who would traffic women and girls no matter who is behind their suffering.”
“We will not allow TdA – or any criminal organization – to get a stronghold in Tennessee,” said Tennessee Bureau of Investigations Director David Rausch. “We are thankful for our local, state, and federal partners who joined us in investigating this case, and we stand prepared to continue aggressively investigating human trafficking in our state, holding traffickers and buyers accountable and helping victims take their first steps toward becoming survivors.”
A grand jury in the Middle District of Tennessee previously returned the four-count indictment charging all eight defendants for roles in facilitating the recruiting of young women from impoverished parts of Venezuela and other South and Central American countries, and their transportation across the U.S. southern border and state lines to engage in commercial sex in the Nashville area.
Three of the defendants, Yilibeth del Carmen Rivero-De Caldera, Kleiver Daniel Mota-Rivero, and Yuribetzi Del Valle Gomez Machuca, are additionally charged with sex trafficking conspiracy for conspiring to use force, fraud, and coercion to compel the women into engaging in commercial sex acts for the defendants’ profit that include invoking alleged ties to the Venezuelan gang TdA and its reputation for violence. The indictment further charges defendant Kleiver Daniel Mota-Rivero with one count of possession of a firearm by an illegal alien.
Mother and son defendants Rivero-De Caldera and Mota-Rivero are charged with conspiring to impose a coercive debt scheme upon the victims to compel them to continue engaging in commercial sex acts until the defendants deemed their debts repaid. Defendants Rivero-De Caldera and Mota-Rivero previously were arrested and detained on state charges relating to their conduct.
The defendants face a maximum penalty of life in prison if convicted of conspiracy to commit sex trafficking. Conspiracy to commit interstate transportation for purposes of prostitution carries a maximum penalty of five years in prison, and conspiracy to commit interstate and foreign travel or transportation in aid of racketeering enterprises carries a maximum penalty of five years in prison.
Mota-Rivero also faces a maximum penalty of 15 years in prison if convicted of possession of a firearm by an illegal alien.
In addition to ICE HSI Nashville and TBI, the FBI, the DEA, the Metropolitan Nashville Police Department, Shelbyville Police Department, U.S. Secret Service, and additional federal, state, and local Organized Crime and Drug Enforcement Task Force partners who coordinated related law enforcement operations across multiple jurisdictions assisted in this investigation.
Assistant U.S. Attorney Brooke K. Schiferle for the Middle District of Tennessee and Trial Attorneys Lindsey Roberson and Jessica Arco of the Civil Rights Division’s Human Trafficking Prosecution Unit are prosecuting the case.
To report any information about human trafficking, child sexual abuse, or the trafficking in child sexual abuse material contact the ICE Tip Line at 1-866-347-2423.
Five men who targeted shops across Barnet have been convicted as part of the Met’s continued drive to bring London’s most prolific shoplifters to justice.
Officers in Colindale made 18 arrests in the space of just four days and secured 85 charges.
They identified the 15 worst affected shops across the borough that were repeatedly targeted over the past six months. They worked with staff and security teams to streamline the way they gathered evidence to identify persistent offenders.
The operation was carried out between Thursday, 30 January and Sunday, 2 February.
In one case, officers spotted a man wanted for a string of thefts in the area acting suspiciously by the Co-op on East Barnet Road at 07:30hrs on Saturday, 1 February, before heading inside.
This led to them carrying out a carefully coordinated sting to arrest the offender, who was tackled to the ground by the exit as he attempted to make off on an electric scooter with a bag of stolen meat.
The incident was caught on CCTV and the footage recovered as part of the investigation.
Gavin Fonti, 44 (20.12.81), of no fixed address, was charged with theft from the store, as well as a further five counts of theft from a nearby BP Garage on Great North Road.
He appeared at Willesden Magistrates Court on Monday, 3 February, where he was sentenced to 20 weeks in prison.
Sergeant Dave Salmon, from the Colindale Emergency Response Policing Team, said:
“This is an excellent example of neighbourhood policing at its best, and thanks to the awareness and quick-thinking of our officers, we’ve been able to remove more prolific shoplifters from our streets.
“We know shoplifting has a significant impact on businesses and shop staff, as well as members of the public. It often fuels other crime and anti-social behaviour, so we’ve taken a proactive approach with the worst affected stores.
“This is not only building stronger relationships between Safer Neighbourhood officers and local businesses, but also instilling more trust and confidence in local policing.”
This work is another example of the steps the Met is taking to remove the worst offending shoplifters across the capital.
Elsewhere in London, recent enforcement activity in Lambeth has led to 11 of the 14 most prolific shoplifters in the area serving prison terms, while in Homerton, officers have made 15 arrests relating to more 50 crimes since September 2024, of which six people are currently serving prison terms.
Those sentenced alongside Fonti for offences in the Barnet area were:
Craig Buttery, 36 (18.04.89), of no fixed address, was charged with 22 thefts and two breaches of a Community Banning Order, and will serve four months behind bars.
Geoff Kilday, 49 (01.11.76), of no fixed address, has been handed a 12-week prison sentence after being charged with one count of theft.
Mohammed Bey, 52 (13.11.73), of Creighton Avenue, Muswell Hill, was charged with one count of theft and given a 12-week suspended sentence for 12 months.
While Leon Day, 42 (02.08.1983), of no fixed address, was sentenced to 24 weeks’ imprisonment after being charged with 21 counts of theft.
Source: The Conversation – UK – By Stephen Clear, Lecturer in Constitutional and Administrative Law, and Public Procurement, Bangor University
It has been less than a month since Donald Trump retook the Oval Office. But with dozens of executive orders, every day has brought substantial change.
While Trump claims he has a democratic mandate to cut government waste, it is the unelected Elon Musk who has been behind the most radical changes. Musk, the world’s richest man, joined the US government as head of the new Department of Government Efficiency (Doge), which Trump established by executive order.
Want more politics coverage from academic experts? Every week, we bring you informed analysis of developments in government and fact check the claims being made.
Their actions have not been without legal challenge. A judge issued a temporary order restricting Musk from accessing the Treasury’s files due to the risk of exposing sensitive data. In response, Trump has expanded Musk’s power further, instructing government officials to cooperate with Doge.
A key question for the UK is whether something similar could happen here. In theory, the answer is yes – but it would be difficult for anybody to enact.
There have been ongoing concerns, including some raised by the current government, around the size of the UK government and the budget deficit. Politicians from the Reform party are already saying that Britain needs to adopt a Musk-style approach to cut government waste.
Compared to other systems of government, UK prime ministers have almost unparalleled power to change existing, and establish new, government departments as they see fit. So it would be well within the gift of the prime minister to establish a new department like Doge – though there could be limits to its power to change things like national spending, given the need for budgetary approval by parliament.
There is also plenty of precedent for private citizens like Musk to work in the UK government. This could be as a special adviser: a temporary “political” civil servant who advises the government and is appointed under the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010. Previous examples include Alastair Campbell (Tony Blair’s spokesman) and Dominic Cummings (Boris Johnson’s senior adviser). While cabinet ministers hire their special advisers, the prime minister approves all appointments.
Alternatively, civilians can be brought more directly into government as ministers. Under constitutional convention, a member of the UK government is a member of either the Commons or Lords. Someone who is not an elected politician can be appointed to the Lords (and a ministerial role) by the prime minister. Rishi Sunak did this when he made David Cameron foreign secretary, as did Keir Starmer with businessman-turned-minister for prisons James Timpson.
There have even been debates in recent years over whether this convention of government ministers needing to be members of parliament can be dispensed with, given it lacks legal enforcement. But this raises questions about how you afford parliament opportunities to scrutinise the work of such ministers, if they are not even in the Lords.
However, the kind of actions that Trump and Musk are currently undertaking could not strictly pan out the same way under the UK’s constitutional arrangements.
While it does not have executive orders in the same way as the US, there are means for the UK government to administratively act without passing legislation through parliament.
The government’s power can be exercised through orders in council via the monarch. These can either be via statutory orders (where the power has been granted through an act of parliament) or prerogative powers.
The prerogative refers to powers that government ministers have, which do not require the consent of parliament. For example, to enter international treaties or wars, or the ability to call an election.
The monarch also retains some prerogative powers – for example, to appoint or dismiss a prime minister, and to summon or prorogue (end a session of) parliament. But by convention, the monarch fulfils these functions in a ceremonial and symbolic capacity – without input in the decisions. In reality, they merely follow the advice of the prime minister on these matters.
Importantly, prerogative powers can only be used when legislation does not exist to the contrary – and the UK government cannot arbitrarily change prerogative powers or create new ones.
President Trump signals that there is more to come from Doge.
One way a Musk-style takeover would struggle in the UK is if a proposed change affected primary legislation and left it redundant. It has been established since 1610 that prerogative powers cannot be used to change or make law without parliament.
Should this happen, the courts can intervene. This was tested in Miller 1, the legal case over whether the prime minister alone had the power to leave the EU, or whether parliamentary approval was needed. It was decided that the government could not rely on its prerogative powers to trigger Brexit without parliament’s approval, as this would change primary law.
And, as was clear when it came to Boris Johnson’s decision to prorogue parliament, the Supreme Court will nullify government action which it deems unconstitutional.
In this sense, it is a well-established common law principle that judges will rely on the rule of law to check what the government is doing, and would view parliament as never truly intending to pass any law which would exclude that oversight. Any attempt to legislate to block courts from having that check would be an unconstitutional violation.
Here, the UK has the advantage of a strong independence of the courts. Since 2006, judicial appointments have been the responsibility of an independent commission. There is also a separate, independent selection process for the Supreme Court. This effectively bars the prime minister from changing the composition of the courts in the same way the US president can.
What if parliament went rogue?
Some may be minded that, if a reformist government had a majority in parliament and existing laws were preventing change in the UK, then it could easily change the law through an act of parliament. This was the risk of the now-defunct Rwanda plan, where the government effectively tried, through legislation, to overrule the Supreme Court and send asylum seekers to Rwanda.
Should this have continued, it would probably have faced legal challenges at the European court of human rights. Here is where efforts to remove the UK from the European convention on human rights, or to repeal the Human Rights Act, would have become consequential.
Of course, even with the strongest majorities, backbench MPs do not always vote with their government, and would be less likely to do so if the leader was attempting to do something extreme, unprincipled and unconscionable.
We would be in relatively uncharted constitutional waters if the prime minister then ignored a Supreme Court ruling. But while rarely used, there are mechanisms available to parliament in such cases to use motions of no confidence in the government to instigate change to the executive.
Unless the law is radically changed, the machinery of parliament, with the checks and balances of the Supreme Court, would make a US-style overhaul challenging – if not, theoretically, impossible. But while it is not codified into one text, the UK does still have a constitution and the safeguards that come with it – as well as hundreds of years of convention to back it up.
Stephen Clear does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
Abuja (Agenzia Fides) – The extension of the application of Islamic law (Sharia) in the States of Nigeria where there are religiously mixed families was the warning expressed by Fr. Lawrence Chukwunweike Emehel, Director of the Department of Mission and Dialogue of the Catholic Secretariat of Nigeria (CSN), during a press conference yesterday, February 13.”The Constitution allows the application of Sharia in personal matters, but its implementation must be handled with caution to avoid the exclusion of other religious groups,” said Fr. Emehel.The priest warned that favoring one religious group over another could have a destabilizing effect, especially in the southwest, where families often have members of different faiths living together.The issue was raised in the context of a controversy that has erupted in southwest Nigeria over the establishment of Sharia commissions in the region, with Muslim leaders stressing their right to self-determination and non-Muslim groups expressing concern over the potential impact of such Muslim commissions.It all started late last year when a Muslim group in the town of Oyo, in southwestern Oyo State, announced its intention to establish a Sharia committee in the area.The Supreme Council for Sharia in Nigeria (SCSN, Oyo branch) announced it would indefinitely postpone the inauguration scheduled for January 11, following protests that have erupted since then. At the heart of the controversy is the distinction between Sharia courts and Sharia commissions. According to Muslim leaders, Sharia panels are not courts but arbitration committees that regulate civil matters such as marriage, divorce, inheritance and disputes over contractual agreements between Muslims. “The desire to enforce Sharia stems from dissatisfaction with the current system, but it is crucial to ensure that any legal reform promotes integration and respect for religious diversity. We must recognize that Nigerians do not live in isolation and no law should hinder or restrict others in their practices. Our national identity and the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom must not be undermined,” concluded Fr. Emehel in this regard.During the press conference, the emergence of another concern on the part of the Nigerian Bishops was underlined: that of the spread among young people of forms of neo-paganism linked to materialism and the thirst for easy money. “To combat the allure of corruption and neo-paganism, we must focus on the formation of consciences. Without a solid moral foundation, people have difficulty distinguishing between right and wrong. The family remains the cornerstone of society: if we want to combat the “get rich quick” mentality, we must instill values of honesty, hard work and dignity in work, starting from the home, schools and places of worship”, said Fr. Michael Banjo, Secretary General of the CSN. (L.M.) (Agenzia Fides, 14/2/2025)
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by Gianni ValenteDamascus (Agenzia Fides) – Her name is Hind Aboud Kabawat, she teaches at American universities and is the only Christian in the seven-member committee (five men and two women) tasked with preparing the announced “National Conference of Syria”, which will begin the process of drafting a new constitution and defining the new institutional structure of the Middle Eastern country.The seven members of the committee were chosen by the self-proclaimed “interim” president Ahmad al-Sharaa. Under the name Abu Muhammad Jolani, al-Sharaa led for years “Hayat Tahrir al Sham”, an Islamist group that played a leading role in the group of armed militias that joined forces to fight the Assad regime, which collapsed in December last year.By including Hind Kabawat in the committee that is supposed to help pave the political path to a constitution and elections, the current rulers in Syria want to send a signal that concretely confirms their declared open and inclusive attitude towards the local Christian communities. And a look at the professional profile of the Syrian-Canadian professor reveals details about the criteria of the geopolitical strategies of the new Syrian leadership. Hind Kabawat, a Catholic, has two children – a boy and a girl – and comes from an interdenominational Christian family: a Greek Catholic father, a Greek Orthodox mother. Her CV is full of outstanding references, which also attest to her constant commitment to initiatives and institutions supporting interreligious dialogue and strategies for mediation, pacification and the promotion of women in Syria, which has been torn apart by conflict and atrocities in recent years.Hind Kabawat studied economics at the University of Damascus and obtained a second degree in law from the Arab University of Beirut. She continued her academic training with a master’s degree in international relations from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University (near Boston, Massachusetts) and certificates in conflict resolution and negotiation strategies from the universities of Toronto and Harvard.The Syrian-born professor heads the Interfaith Peacebuilding program at the Center for World Religions, Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution (CRDC) at George Mason University (Virginia) and was deputy head of the Geneva office of the Syrian Negotiations Commission, formerly known as the High Negotiations Committee (HNC).In her role at the then HNC, Hind Kabawat had already participated in the eight rounds of Geneva peace talks on Syria in 2017. Her skills were therefore known in networks and bodies outside Syria that dealt with the situation in Syria. Hind Kabawat was also involved in the creation of the “Tastakel” center, an educational center for women dedicated to promoting non-violence and dialogue to resolve conflict situations.The spokesman for the preparatory committee for the conference on national dialogue, Hassan Dagheim, said in an interview with the official Syrian news agency “SANA” that the committee would work to ensure that all social, ethnic, cultural and religious realities in Syria are represented and that the diversity of the various Syrian provinces is respected. At the same time, with regard to the appointment of Hind Kabawat, local analysts are wondering what significance the contribution of a Christian woman has in a committee in which the radical Islamist component seems to be predominant.As in Aleppo, many local councils of professional associations (doctors, lawyers, etc.) have recently been reorganized, and the new organizational charts are predominantly made up of people linked to “Hayat Tahrir al Sham” and other influential groups in post-Assad Syria.As early as the end of August 2022, the Islamist militiamen of “Hayat Tahrir al Sham” had again allowed the celebration of a mass in a church that had been closed for ten years in the area of Idlib province under their control (see Fides, 6/9/2022). The leader of the jihadist group al-Jolani himself had “guaranteed” the celebration of the mass in the Armenian Apostolic Church “Saint Anne” near the village of Yacoubia in the northwest of Idlib. Dozens of Christians of various denominations took part in the liturgical celebration in the holy site, which previously served as a refuge for refugees. Pictures of the celebration were distributed by the Islamist militias themselves. In the previous weeks, Muhammad al-Jolani had told representatives of the Christian communities who were still in then villages of Qunaya, Yacoubia and al-Jadida, announced his intention to “protect” their liturgical celebrations and to guarantee them the gradual return of the land previously confiscated from the Christian owners. Even then, al-Jolani’s move had provoked mixed reactions. Other Salafist groups such as “Hurras al Din” had accused al-Jolani of making the province of Idlib “less Muslim”. Other analysts saw the initiative as part of a strategy by this Islamist group to make its declared “moderate turn” known internationally. Militiamen of the “Hayat Tahrir al Sham” emphasized the need to “open a new chapter” and reaffirm that Islam does not prohibit non-Muslims – including Christians – from practicing their faith freely.In 2013, al-Jolani himself was still classified as a “global terrorist” by the US State Department. In 2022, Aaron Y. Zelin wrote in an analysis of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, published at the time on the website of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, that al-Jolani was “no longer just the leader of a terrorist group or a rebel group” but should be seen as a representative of a change that also includes a change in attitude towards the United States. Zelin also reported that Hayat Tahrir al-Sham allegedly used secret channels to convey the following message to US officials: “We want to be your friends. We are not terrorists. We are only fighting against Assad. We are not a threat to you”. (GV) (Agenzia Fides, 14/2/2025)
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Police appealed for information to locate Adam Glanville who had been reported missing and was believed to be with his mother Karima Mahmoud.
We are pleased to confirm that Adam was located safe and well on 13 February and is now with family.
Karima Mahmoud, 44, was in breach of a court order and is due to appear at the Central Family Court on Monday, 17 February.
We also appealed for assistance to trace two men who were involved in an altercation with another man at the time Adam and his mother were last seen together in Richmond on 3 June 2024.
Both these men, aged in their 50s, have been traced and arrested on suspicion of child abduction. They have both been bailed pending further enquiries.
A third man, also aged in his 50s, was arrested on suspicion of child abduction – he has been bailed pending further enquiries.
We thank the media for their assistance in publicising our appeals in relation to this case and now that Adam has been located and the two men identified, we ask that all images are removed from circulation.
Source: The Conversation – UK – By Joan Taylor, Professor Emerita of Christian Origins and Second Temple Judaism, King’s College London
In current US politics, a “biblical” view of the Middle East informs foreign policy – perhaps more than it has for decades. This makes it very important to understand what the Bible actually says, particularly about the idea of a “promised land”.
Biblical scholars and historians like me often observe that the Bible does not provide a full, holistic history. It shines the torch on certain events and memories, for particular purposes. It tells of origins, laws, ethics, divine revelations and a nation’s relationship with God.
It does not speak with one voice, but with many voices from different times and places in a collection of books. The Hebrew Bible, or Old Testament, was finalised largely from the eighth century BC to the second century BC, and the Christian Bible added literature of the 1st century AD in the form of the New Testament.
The Bible doesn’t always speak plainly, either, and has been translated and interpreted in different ways. The Bible has a lot to say about land, but there isn’t a single clear message throughout. Instead, there are various agreements made between God and different men (it’s a patriarchal world) about where certain people should live.
God sends Abraham to the Land of Canaan: ‘In you all the families of the earth will be blessed’ (Gen. 12:3). Rijksmuseum
To a herder, this is about the right to move around with flocks. Nothing is said of Abraham destroying existing cities or evicting people, though he might form alliances and fight if his close family is attacked. He also makes agreements with rulers. On this biblical view, there is room for different people to live together in the same region. It is a patchwork.
Abraham’s sons Ishmael and Isaac go on to inherit key promises (as herders). This breaks down as follows: Isaac’s portion is the “Land of Canaan”, and Ishmael’s “east of Egypt as one goes to Assyria”. Canaan roughly corresponds to the area of modern-day Israel, northwestern Jordan and the Occupied Palestinian Territories. The area was also known as “Palestine” from at least the fifth century BC.
Isaac has two sons, Esau and Jacob. Jacob is promised Canaan, while Esau goes to Edom, a region spanning present-day southwestern Jordan and (in due course) southern Israel.
Jacob, renamed Israel, has 12 sons – the founders of the 12 tribes of Israel, or Israelites. They then also inherit the promise to settle (with families and herds) in Canaan. Among these tribes is the tribe of Judah – the Judahites (Jews).
From the books of Exodus to Deuteronomy, however, the Israelites are no longer herders. Enslaved in Egypt, they escape, under the leadership of the prophet Moses. In Deuteronomy, God promises the Israelites possession of land on condition of obedience to his commandments: “But if your heart turns away and you are not obedient … I declare to you this day that you will certainly be destroyed. You will not live long in the land.” It is an ominous note.
Moses receives the law from God. Carolingian book illuminator circa 840
On this biblical view, holding land is correlated with the Israelites’ obedience to the laws. To give a pertinent example – Leviticus 19:33-34: “When a foreigner lives among you in your land, do not mistreat them. The foreigner living among you must be treated as your home-born. Love them as yourself, for you were foreigners in the land of Egypt.”
In the Book of Joshua, the Israelites take possession of parts of Canaan by means of conquest, mass slaughter and destruction common in ancient warfare, but totally at variance with today’s laws of war. The 12 tribes of Israel then notionally divide the territory (conquered and unconquered) between them. Judah’s territory is around Jerusalem and to the south.
However, already in the next book, Judges, the Israelites are actually only one of several peoples living in the area, and are not even entirely united. On this biblical view, the land is still a patchwork.
In the books of the prophets (Amos, Hosea, Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel and others), Israelites are continually berated for failing in ethical matters, and warned of dire consequences. The theme remains that the promise is conditional, and Israel is failing to keep the law.
The biblical story arc
The Book of Joshua is actually the starting point of a story that tells of continual wars and – apart from some grand successes – a downhill slide into territorial loss. There is a slow, painful working out of God’s disappointment, as God allows other local peoples and foreign nations to take back territory the Israelites seized, until it is nearly all gone. The Jews are taken into exile in Babylon.
In the books of Ezra and Nehemiah, the Jews retake possession of their former temple city of Jerusalem and its surrounding region. A biblical view based on those accounts would be that Judah restores and settles peaceably in that area, but claims nowhere else.
Other Israelite tribes were largely gone, apart from a pocket in Samaria. There was yet hope for tribal restoration. In Ezekiel, it is predicted that God would eventually see off oppressive empires and re-enliven the 12 tribes of Israel in a region the prophet called “the land of Israel”, under the rule of a Jewish king: the Messiah (Ezekiel 37:22 and 24). On this biblical view, only the Messiah can lead a miraculously reconstituted Israel to the land.
And a big question is, on this view of restoration: who even represents Israel? This takes us beyond the Hebrew Bible to later times.
Adding to the story
In the 2nd century BC, Jewish priest-kings in Judah, which had become known as Judaea, started to conquer neighbours, including other remaining Israelites. Jews settled in conquered territories and some other inhabitants – the now culturally Greek Palestinians – converted.
For the priest-kings, Jews were the only true representatives of all the tribes of Israel, exclusively inheriting the promise. Their rule lasted just over a century. But that story is not in the Bible.
Then came Christianity. In the fourth century AD, Christianity became the religion of Roman emperors, and they took a special interest in Palestine. For Christians, following Jesus as the Messiah, they had become the heirs of God’s promise. Jewish claims were superseded.
Thus we later get the Byzantine empire’s provinces of Palestine, the concept of the Holy Land and the Crusades. All this was justified by interpretations of certain passages of the Bible.
Despite the varied and nuanced concepts of how to settle in “the promised land” found throughout the Bible, it is the Book of Joshua’s divisions that provide some people today with a model for a “biblical” territorial claim. But this is combined with the non-biblical assertion that Jews alone have inherited the promise.
Joshua has become a paradigm for extremist Zionist settler claims and even aspects of the Israeli army, as American Bible scholar Rachel Havrelock has explored. The Book of Joshua is lifted out of the total story arc of the Bible.
And if we move beyond the Bible there is so much other history in this region to remember. People converted and married as well as fought each other. Later on, Jews could become Christians, Christians could become Muslims – and all peoples could become Arabs (with Arabisation and cultural transition in the 7th-9th centuries).
People could flee or be evicted, but keep their identities and traditions and return. The return of Jewish people to the land has been momentous in terms of Jewish national life. But the Palestinians, too, are the descendants of the people of old, from the places of old.
The Bible’s narrative concerns God’s love for Israel, but the land is a patchwork. After all, as Abraham was told, through him “all the families of the earth will be blessed”.
Joan Taylor has received funding from the Commonwealth scholarships and Fulbright schemes, the Wellcome Trust, Leverhulme and various academic societies. In terms of religious faith she is a Quaker.
On November 1 2024, the roof of a newly €55 million renovated railway station in Novi Sad, Serbia’s second biggest city, collapsed and killed 15 people. The deaths sparked Serbia’s largest wave of student-led anti-government protests since Yugoslavia’s disintegration in 2000.
The protests pose the most serious threat to Serbian president Aleksandar Vučić’s power since he became prime minister in 2014, and president in 2017. The protest movement has highlighted Vučić’s growing authoritarian rule and widespread corruption in Serbia.
Serbians believe that the deadly roof collapse was caused by government corruption. The station was renovated by a Chinese-led consortium as part of China’sBelt and Road Initiative investments and growing political ties with Serbia. The Chinese consortium and Vučić refused to publish the railway station restoration procurement contract after protesters demanded it.
The protesters have four demands: the publication of all procurement documents concerning the renovation of the station, a stop to the prosecution of students arrested during the protests, the prosecution of police and security forces involved in attacking students during the protests and a 20% increase in the budget for higher education.
However, the Serbian government and media — most of which Vučić controls through a network of political patronage and cronyism – are downplaying the protests and threatening students.
Vučić claims that foreign powers are behind the protests to topple him and destabilise Serbia. Russia and China have fully supported Vučić’s claims that Serbia is the target of a western plot to orchestrate the protesters and overthrow Vučić.
Serbia’s history of corruption
In the decade after former president Slobodan Milošević was overthrown, Serbia implemented a number of democratic and anti-corruption reforms. As a result, the country climbed to 72nd place out of 180 countries in Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index in 2013. Serbia opened EU membership negotiations the following year.
However, since Vučić took office, Serbia has become more authoritarian. Corruption is widespread, and the government has exploited tensions and instability with most of its western Balkans neighbours, primarily Kosovo, for political gain.
Serbia was downgraded to partly free by Freedom House in 2019, and the V-Dem Institute (Varieties of Democracy) labelled it as as an “electoral autocracy”. Serbia dropped to 105th place in Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index in 2024.
Many international organisations monitoring anti-corruption, human rights and democracy have reported Vučić’sauthoritarian tendencies and corruption in Serbia.
A report from Amnesty International published in December 2024 describes Serbia as a “digital prison”. It has been reported that Serbian authorities are using surveillance technology to monitor and suppress the protesters and other political opponents.
International response
The EU has mostly stayed silent since the protests began. After receiving letters from NGOs and activists, EU Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos stated that the EU is following the protests in Serbia, and backed the rule of law and freedom of assembly.
This is a far cry from the EU’s response to protests in Georgia last year. EU commission president Ursula von der Leyen said “the Georgian people are fighting for democracy” – yet has stayed silent on the protests in Serbia.
Some argue this (lack of) response is because in August 2024, Vučić made a deal with the EU to provide lithium to the bloc – a boon to the EU’s electric vehicle production. There were also widespread protests against the lithium deal over its transparency and concerns that the mine would cause irreversible environmental destruction to Serbia’s Jadar Valley.
The US has also stayed quiet. President Donald Trump’s associates were recently granted permission to build a Trump hotel in Belgrade. Further, Rod Blagojevich, the former governor of Illinois who served eight years in prison for corruption, is being considered as the new US ambassador to Serbia. Blagojevich, whose father is from Serbia, expressed support for Vučić and visited the country.
What is next for Serbia?
Serbia’s prime minister, Miloš Vučević, and Novi Sad’s mayor, Milan Đurić, both resigned in an effort to de-escalate the protests. Following the resignation of the PM, Vučić has said that he is open to the new government making the documents about the station collapse public.
While this may be a sign that the protests are loosening Vučić’s grip, the movement has only intensified, spreading to more than 200 towns on February 1.
Vučić has pledged to either form a new government within one month, or organise a new parliamentary election in the spring to address the protesters’ demands. However, this would barely paper over the cracks of systemic corruption in Serbia.
The student movement has revealed how democracy and the rule of law have eroded since Vučić came to power in 2014.
The protests have also exposed the international community’s complicity in supporting Vučić under the premise that he is a constructive partner for regional cooperation and stability in the western Balkans.
But to have a lasting impact in Serbia, the protesters should also demand a transitional government to undertake anti-corruption and democratic reforms to strengthen the rule of law, and to organise the next elections.
At the heart of these reforms must be constitutional changes, such as term limits on elected public office. Research shows stricter term limits can reduce the costs of corruption, abuse of power and attacks on the rule of law and democracy.
Term limits would also prevent figures with authoritarian tendencies, like Vučić, from becoming the state themselves with unlimited and unaccountable power.
The EU also has a role to play here. By not putting pressure on Vučić, the EU is empowering his authoritarian tendencies. Second, in EU membership negotiations, it should introduce electoral reform as a new requirement for all EU candidate countries.
Other leaders in the western Balkans have adopted similar authoritarian government models and patronage systems as Serbia to maintain power. These would undermine and threaten the EU rule of law, if they were to join the bloc today.
The EU must also publicly support student protesters who want Serbia to become more democratic and accountable. After all, the students are fighting for the very ideals on which the EU was founded.
Andi Hoxhaj does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
A major new partnership, Policing Futures London, has been announced with the potential to transform the delivery of police degree apprenticeships in the capital.
The collaboration brings together Anglia Ruskin University (ARU) and the University of West London (UWL) – two universities that are at the forefront of police education in the UK – with the aim of leading the Metropolitan Police’s initial recruit training from 2026, in line with the Mayor’s Police and Crime Plan 2025-2029.
Policing Futures London’s mission closely aligns with the A New Met for London strategy, ensuring that officers are not only highly skilled but are deeply connected to the city’s communities and its policing priorities.
With world-class facilities in east London, near Canary Wharf, and west London, the two universities have already been providing policing education at scale since 2021, all within 60 minutes travel of the Metropolitan Police’s 12 Basic Command Units.
Anglia Ruskin University and the University of West London have a track record for delivering quality, integrated Police Constable Entry Route (PCER) programmes and could accommodate the full cohort of Metropolitan Police’s recruits at any one time.
Anglia Ruskin University has successfully co-delivered PCER programmes alongside the seven forces in the South East and East of England to over 2,600 student police officers since 2021, while together Anglia Ruskin and the University of West London have four years’ experience of working with the Metropolitan Police, training more than 3,870 Met officers.
Building on the delivery over the last four years, with the rich knowledge and experience of the collective academic staff, new programmes would be co-designed with the police service and led by teams who live and work in London, ensuring that officers are fully equipped to police the communities they serve.
Policing Futures London would prioritise support for widening access and inclusive outreach recruitment programmes, would embed community engagement models to build trust between new officers and the diverse communities of London, and would be delivered by both police professionals and academic experts.
Policing Futures London is backed up by world-class research, with Anglia Ruskin University home to both the International Policing and Public Protection Research Institute and the Centre of Excellence for Equity in Uniformed Public Services.
In the last 18 months, Anglia Ruskin University has been named University of the Year at the UK Social Mobility Awards, the Times Higher Education University of the Year, and is in the top 20% of universities in the country for teaching quality, having been awarded a Gold rating in the Teaching Excellence Framework (TEF).
University of West London was the number one London university for overall student satisfaction in the National Student Survey 2024* and was named best university for Student Experience and Teaching Quality in the UK in The Times and Sunday Times Good University Guide 2024.
“This partnership is about more than just delivering quality education – it’s about shaping the future of policing in London. By bringing together two institutions with deep experience in police education, we are ensuring that London’s officers receive the highest quality training, close to the communities they serve, and preparing them for the challenges of 21st-century law enforcement.”
Sara Archer, Head of Police Education at Anglia Ruskin University
“This exciting partnership brings together two powerhouses in policing education, not only in London but nationally, ready to deliver police training programmes that London deserves: resilient, innovative, and reflective of its communities. Policing Futures London is a once-in-a-generation opportunity to build that.”
Adrian Ellison, Pro Vice-Chancellor and executive lead for policing education at the University of West London
“As a London university we understand London and its unique policing needs. We have directly influenced the design of the new PCDA standard, based on our extensive experience working with the MPS, to place practice-based learning and assessment at its heart. Understanding the need for everyone to work to ever tightening budgets, we will never sacrifice quality for cost.
“This exciting new partnership combines a wealth of knowledge, experience and expertise with the aim of giving Londoners the continued quality of policing they deserve.”
Andy Rose, Head of the Institute for Policing Studies at the University of West London
*calculated as the average of all questions by registered populations. Excludes specialist providers, National Student Survey 2024.
Egyptian authorities must immediately reveal the whereabouts of Egyptian-Libyan activist and TV anchor Nasser al-Hawari, who was forcibly disappeared after being seized by plainclothes security officers outside his family home in Alexandria on 9 February, escorted into an unmarked van, and driven away, Amnesty International said today.
He was arrested on the same day his TV show addressed violations against prisoners held in eastern Libya, an area under de facto control by the self-proclaimed Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF) armed group, under the command of Khalifa Heftar. During the show, aired on the Libyan channel Al-Jamahiriya and broadcast from Egypt, Nasser al-Hawari promised to reveal further evidence of these violations.
“Nasser al-Hawari’s distressed family have not heard from him since he was seized without explanation or an arrest warrant and subjected to enforced disappearance. Egyptian authorities must immediately reveal Nasser al-Hawari’s whereabouts and allow him to contact his family and lawyers,” said Amnesty International Researcher Mahmoud Shalaby.
Egyptian authorities must immediately reveal Nasser al-Hawari’s whereabouts and allow him to contact his family and lawyers
Mahmoud Shalaby, Amnesty International
“They must also drop any investigations and charges solely related to his legitimate media work or for exercising his right to freedom of expression. The close relationship between the Egyptian government and Khalifa Heftar should never justify retaliating against Nasser al-Hawari for exposing human rights violations committed by forces under Khalifa Heftar’s command.”
Nasser al-Hawari’s younger brother, who was with him at the time, was also arrested, briefly blindfolded and handcuffed in a van before being released and threatened with arrest if he reported his brother’s arrest. Security forces also confiscated his mobile phone.
Since then, the family’s attempts to get information about Nasser al-Hawari’s whereabouts from the authorities have gone unanswered. Amnesty International reviewed copies of complaints sent by the family to Public Prosecution on 10 February to inquire about al-Hawari’s whereabouts. The family have yet to receive a response.
Nasser al-Hawari, who established and headed the Libyan organization, Victims for Human Rights, fled Libya for Tunisia in January 2024, and reported being briefly detained by the Deterrence Apparatus for Combatting Terrorism and Organized Crime (DACTO) militia in Tripoli on 29 January 2024. He travelled to Egypt in June 2024.
After videos appeared online in January 2025 showing detainees in Libya being subjected to torture and other ill-treatment, including beatings and flogging, in Gernada prison, under the control LAAF, Nasser al-Hawari made a number of public statements and TV appearances highlighting impunity for such crimes in eastern Libya, and calling for independent and impartial investigations. Amnesty International has long documented crimes under international law and other serious human rights violations committed by LAAF and allied armed groups, amid a climate of impunity and a brutal crackdown on all forms of dissent.
Union Home Minister and Minister of Cooperation Shri Amit Shah chairs a review meeting on the implementation of three new criminal laws in Maharashtra, in the presence of Chief Minister Shri Devendra Fadnavis in New Delhi Modi government is committed to provide a speedy and transparent justice system to the countrymen
Maharashtra government should implement the new criminal laws in all the commissionerates of the state as soon as possible
Maharashtra should establish a model Directorate of Prosecution system in line with the new laws
To strengthen law and order, it is essential for crimes to be registered, there should be no delay in filing FIRs
Efforts should be made to achieve more than 90 per cent conviction rates in cases with sentences of more than 7 years
Posted On: 14 FEB 2025 4:54PM by PIB Delhi
Union Home Minister and Minister of Cooperation Shri Amit Shah chaired a review meeting on the implementation of three new criminal laws in Maharashtra, in the presence of Chief Minister Shri Devendra Fadnavis, in New Delhi today. The meeting reviewed the implementation and present status of various new provisions related to police, prisons, courts, prosecution, and forensics in the state. The meeting was attended by the Union Home Secretary, the Chief Secretary and Director General of Police of Maharashtra, the Director General of the Bureau of Police Research and Development (BPRD), the Director General of the National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB), and other senior officials from the Union Home Ministry and the state government.
Union Home Minister and Minister of Cooperation said that Modi government is committed to provide a speedy and transparent justice system to the countrymen. He said that to strengthen law and order, it is essential for crimes to be registered, so there should not be any delay in filing FIRs.
Union Home Minister said that Maharashtra should establish a model Directorate of Prosecution system in line with the new criminal laws. He emphasized that efforts should be made to achieve over 90 per cent conviction rate in cases with sentences of more than 7 years, and that the police, government lawyers, and judiciary should work together to ensure that the guilty are punished as swiftly as possible.
Home Minister reiterated that senior police officers should regularly monitor cases of organized crime, terrorism, and mob lynching to prevent the misuse of the sections related to these crimes. He noted that there should be a system for recording evidence through video conferencing in facilities such as prisons, government hospitals, banks, Forensic Science Laboratories (FSL), etc. Shri Shah also said that a system should be implemented where FIRs can be transferred between two states through the Crime and Criminal Tracking Network and Systems (CCTNS). He recommended that Maharashtra should adopt CCTNS 2.0 and ICJS 2.0.
Union Home Minister and Minister of Cooperation stated that the police should provide information about individuals held in custody for interrogation on an electronic dashboard. He emphasized on need to improve internet connectivity in police stations. Shri Shah also said that the availability of forensic science mobile vans should be ensured in every police sub-division. Home Minister stressed the recruitment of forensic experts and urged the prompt filling of vacant positions in the forensic department.
Shri Amit Shah urged the Maharashtra government to integrate state’s fingerprint identification system with the National Automated Fingerprint Identification System (NAFIS). He also mentioned that the police should establish a system to return the property recovered from criminals to its rightful owner as per the provisions of the new criminal laws. He emphasized the importance of making police stations more aesthetically pleasing.
Union Home Minister stated that the Chief Minister of Maharashtra should conduct a bi-weekly review of the implementation of the new criminal laws in the state, while the Chief Secretary and Director General of Police should carry out a weekly review.
Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region
CE meets Chief Executive of Macao SAR (with photos/video) CE meets Chief Executive of Macao SAR (with photos/video) *********************************************************
The Chief Executive, Mr John Lee, met with the Chief Executive of the Macao Special Administrative Region (SAR), Mr Sam Hou-fai, at Government House today (February 14) to exchange views on further promoting Hong Kong’s co-operation with Macao and the high-quality development of the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area (GBA). Also attending the meeting were the Chief Secretary for Administration, Mr Chan Kwok-ki; the Financial Secretary, Mr Paul Chan; the Secretary for Constitutional and Mainland Affairs, Mr Erick Tsang Kwok-wai; the Secretary for Innovation, Technology and Industry, Professor Sun Dong; the Secretary for Transport and Logistics, Ms Mable Chan; the Secretary for Culture, Sports and Tourism, Miss Rosanna Law; and the Director of the Chief Executive’s Office, Ms Carol Yip. Mr Lee welcomed Mr Sam and his delegation to Hong Kong. Noting that Hong Kong and Macao are the country’s special administrative regions that enjoy distinctive advantages under the “one country, two systems” principle, Mr Lee said that the two cities are as close as brothers, with frequent people-to-people and cultural exchanges, alongside solid economic and trade relations. He noted that the “one country, two systems” principle is a good policy for maintaining the long-term prosperity and stability of Hong Kong and Macao. Hong Kong will continue to firmly uphold the principle of “one country” and leverage the benefits of “two systems” with Macao. He also noted that Hong Kong and Macao, both of which are core cities of the GBA, can achieve complementarity and participate in and promote the development of the GBA together, benefiting the people of both cities with the fruits of economic development. Mr Lee said that Hong Kong and Macao have been working closely in such areas as economy, cross-boundary infrastructure, tourism and trade. The Hong Kong-Zhuhai-Macao Bridge (HZMB), has remarkably shortened the distance between Hong Kong and Macao, promoting closer communication and connections between the two cities. The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) Government has long provided dedicated support to the cross-boundary transportation arrangements and measures of the HZMB to maximise the economic and transport benefits of the bridge. Besides, the “Mutual Use of QR Code between HKSAR and Macao SAR Clearance Service”, jointly launched by the HKSAR Government and the Macao SAR Government in July last year, provides a faster and more convenient immigration experience for residents of both cities and further facilitates their exchanges. In promoting tourism, Mr Lee said that Hong Kong and Macao will work together to expand the market of twin-destination tourism of the two cities. Hong Kong will collaborate with other cities in the GBA, including Macao, to establish a regional and international tourism brand. Mr Lee also welcomed Mr Sam’s visit earlier today to the Centre for Chinese Herbal Medicine Drug Development at Hong Kong Science Park and the Hong Kong Palace Museum to learn more about the research and development of traditional Chinese medicine and cultural tourism in Hong Kong. Mr Lee said he looks forward to working with Mr Sam in further enhancing exchanges and co-operation between Hong Kong and Macao in various aspects.
Union Minister for Social Justice and Empowerment (SJ&E), Dr. Virender Kumar, visited Jammu in connection with implementation of schemes of the Ministry, in the Union Territory. On the occasion, the Minister distributed Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) kits and Ayushman health cards to Sewer and Septic Tank Workers (SSWs) (Safai Mitras), under the flagship scheme of National Action for Mechanized Sanitation Ecosystem (NAMASTE).
The Government has formulated the NAMASTE scheme with an objective to provide dignity to Safai Karamcharis and to empower them socially and economically. The scheme is to ensure safety and dignity of sanitation workers in urban India and enhancing their occupational safety through capacity building and improved access to PPE Kits, safety devices and machines.
PPE kits consist of various protective garments and accessories designed to shield individuals from potential health hazards or infections. These kits typically include items such as masks, gloves, goggles, face shields, gowns, and shoe covers. They are crucial for ensuring the safety of frontline workers, especially those who are exposed to hazardous environments or infectious diseases, such as sewer and septic tank workers.
The Ayushman health card is a form of identification issued under the Ayushman Bharat Pradhan Mantri Jan Arogya Yojana (AB-PMJAY), a government-sponsored health insurance scheme in India. It provides beneficiaries with access to cashless and paperless healthcare services at empaneled hospitals. The card contains essential information about the beneficiary, including their unique identification number and details of covered healthcare services.
During the visit, the Minister also visited the Outreach and Drop In Centre (ODIC), run by the NGO, ‘JK Society for the Promotion of Youth and Masses’ at Jammu, under Scheme of National Action Plan for Drug Demand Reduction (NAPDDR).
The event witnessed the reaffirmation of the government’s commitment to ‘Vanchiton Ko Variyata’, ensuring that those who have been historically underserved or overlooked are given the attention and support they deserve. This dedication to prioritizing the marginalized reflects the government’s broader vision of ‘Viksit Bharat’, where every individual has the opportunity to contribute to and benefit from India’s development journey. Through collaborative efforts and concerted initiatives, the Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment remains steadfast in its mission to leave no one behind and build a more equitable and empowered society.
The occasion was also attended by Ms. Sakina Masood (Itoo), Minister for Education, Health & Medical Education and Social Welfare Department, Jammu & Kashmir; Shri Shyam Lal Sharma, MLA (Jammu North); Shri Yudvir Sethi, MLA (Jammu East); Shri Arvind Gupta, MLA (Jammu West); Shri Prabhat Kumar Singh, Managing Director, National Safai Karamcharis Finance & Development Corporation (NSKFDC), Shri Devansh Yadav, Commissioner (Jammu Municipal Corporation).
Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region
DH conducts enforcement operation “Pipepurge” against waterpipe smoking in no smoking areas (with photos) DH conducts enforcement operation “Pipepurge” against waterpipe smoking in no smoking areas (with photos) ******************************************************************************************
The Tobacco and Alcohol Control Office (TACO) of the Department of Health (DH) conducted an enforcement operation, codenamed “Pipepurge”, in Mong Kok last night (February 13) against illegal waterpipe smoking activities in no smoking areas and a total of three fixed penalty notices (FPNs) were issued. During the operation, officers from TACO (including plainclothes officers) carried out inspections and enforcement action at one bar in Mong Kok, and issued a total of three FPNs to persons illegally smoking waterpipes. TACO’s investigation is ongoing, and prosecution may also be taken against operators of the bar who are suspected of aiding and abetting smoking offences. TACO will also refer the cases to the Liquor Licensing Board for appropriate follow-up action. Under the Ordinance, conducting a smoking act in a statutory no smoking area (such as indoor areas of bars or restaurants) is prohibited. Any person doing a smoking act in statutory no smoking areas is liable to a fixed penalty of $1,500. Moreover, where smoking products (including waterpipes) are sold, in bars or otherwise, the restrictions on the promotion and sale of smoking products stipulated in the Ordinance apply. Offenders are liable on a summary conviction to a maximum fine of $50,000. Venue managers of statutory no smoking areas are empowered by the Ordinance to request a smoking offender cease the act; if the offender is not co-operative, the manager may contact the Police for assistance. In addition, under the Criminal Procedure Ordinance, any person who aids, abets, counsels or procures the commission by another person of any offence shall be guilty of the same offence. “The DH will continue to closely monitor and take stringent enforcement action against illegal waterpipe smoking. Last year (2024), TACO conducted 162 operations against illegal waterpipe smoking activities in no smoking areas. A total of 162 FPNs were issued against smoking offenders, while 89 summonses were issued to staff members and operators of the bars/restaurants for other related offences,” the Head of TACO, Dr Fung Ying, said. Dr Fung reminded the public that a waterpipe is also a smoking product, and its combustion of fuel (e.g. charcoal) releases carbon monoxide. Exposure to a low concentration of carbon monoxide can lead to a range of symptoms such as dizziness, headache, tiredness and nausea; whereas exposure to a high concentration of carbon monoxide can lead to impaired vision, disturbed co-ordination, unconsciousness, brain damage or even death. People should seek medical attention immediately if they suspect they are developing symptoms of carbon monoxide poisoning. Due to deeper inhalation and longer smoking sessions, waterpipe users usually inhale more toxins than they would when smoking cigarettes. A typical one-hour waterpipe smoking session exposes the user to 100 to 200 times the volume of smoke inhaled from a single conventional cigarette. Moreover, sharing a waterpipe apparatus increases the risk of transmitting infectious diseases, such as tuberculosis. Dr Fung cautioned against waterpipe smoking and the use of other smoking products. Smokers should quit smoking as early as possible for their own health and that of others. For more information on the hazards of waterpipe smoking, please visit www.livetobaccofree.hk/pdfs/waterpipe_leaflet_new.pdf.
Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region
Appointments to Committee on Financial Assistance for Family Members of those who Sacrifice their Lives to Save Others Appointments to Committee on Financial Assistance for Family Members of those who Sacrifice their Lives to Save Others ******************************************************************************************
The Government today (February 14) announced the reappointment of one incumbent member, as well as the appointments of three new members, namely Miss Dana Lau Sing-she, Ms Janus Lau Yuen-yee and Mr Solomon Yung Sze-hon, to the Committee on Financial Assistance for Family Members of those who Sacrifice their Lives to Save Others for a term of two years with effect from February 15, 2025. The Secretary for Labour and Welfare, Mr Chris Sun, welcomed the appointments and said he looks forward to working closely with members of the Committee in the new term. Mr Sun also thanked the outgoing members, Miss Edna Chow On-lai, Mr Law King-shing and Ms Wong May-kwan, for their contributions to the Committee. The Committee considers and approves applications under the Financial Assistance Scheme for Family Members of those who Sacrifice their Lives to Save Others. The Scheme represents the Government’s recognition of the brave acts and sacrifice undertaken by these individuals and seeks to alleviate the financial hardship that their family members may face as a consequence of their death. The list of non-official members of the Committee in the new term is as follows:Miss Dana Lau Sing-sheMs Janus Lau Yuen-yeeMs Lee Sau-kingMr Solomon Yung Sze-hon
For Serbians to use more electric cars, new rules and regulations need to be adopted. To help, the government is halting the import of used vehicles that do not meet specific standards, and it is introducing incentives for new car purchases. Currently, about 2.8 million vehicles in Serbia are an average of 18 years old.
Serbia is adopting new regulations to help expand its charging network. At the end of 2024, the country adopted the Law on Energy, which for the first time addresses electric vehicle charging. The new law defines energy policies to ensure that there is a reliable energy supply, and it helps regulate the energy market. The law also covers the integration of electric vehicles into the electricity network.
“Now, it is important to define specific regulations in line with the EU standards to tackle technical and legal conditions, software, data structure and classification, rights and obligations of providers and users,” Zjačić says.
Southeast Gateway pipeline project achieves mechanical completion Increases common share dividend for the twenty-fifth consecutive year
CALGARY, Alberta, Feb. 14, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — TC Energy Corporation (TSX, NYSE: TRP) (TC Energy or the Company) released its fourth quarter results today. François Poirier, TC Energy’s President and Chief Executive Officer commented, “Our strategic priorities that emphasize safety, operational excellence and project execution continue to deliver solid growth, low risk and repeatable performance. For the full year 2024, comparable EBITDA1 from continuing operations increased approximately six per cent, and segmented earnings from continuing operations increased approximately 56 per cent compared to 2023.” Poirier continued, “Reaching mechanical completion 13 per cent under budget on the Southeast Gateway pipeline project is a monumental milestone for the company and for Mexico, and a testament to our unwavering focus on project execution. We remain aligned with the CFE on achieving a May 1, 2025 in-service date, which will mark a material inflection point for TC Energy; providing Southeast Mexico with access to safe, reliable and affordable energy. Driven by our consistently strong performance, TC Energy’s Board of Directors approved a quarterly dividend increase of 3.3 per cent for the quarter ending March 31, 2025, equivalent to $3.40 per common share on an annualized basis. The increase in quarterly dividend is based on TC Energy’s proportionate allocation of the dividend post-spin, and represents our twenty-fifth consecutive year of dividend growth.”
Financial Highlights (All financial figures are unaudited and in Canadian dollars unless otherwise noted)
Following the spinoff of our Liquids Pipelines business into South Bow on October 1, 2024, Liquids Pipelines results are reported as a discontinued operation
Fourth quarter 2024 financial results from continuing operations:
Comparable earnings1 of $1.1 billion or $1.05 per common share1 compared to $1.2 billion or $1.15 per common share in fourth quarter 2023
Net income attributable to common shares of $1.1 billion or $1.03 per common share compared to net income attributable to common shares of $1.2 billion or net income per common share of $1.20 in fourth quarter 2023
Comparable EBITDA of $2.6 billion compared to $2.7 billion in fourth quarter 2023
Segmented earnings of $1.9 billion compared to $2.0 billion in fourth quarter 2023
Year ended December 31, 2024 financial results from continuing operations:
Comparable EBITDA of $10.0 billion compared to $9.5 billion in 2023
Segmented earnings of $8.0 billion compared to $5.1 billion in 2023
Year ended December 31, 2024 financial results including a nine-month contribution from the Liquids Pipelines business:
2024 comparable earnings of $4.4 billion or $4.27 per common share compared to $4.7 billion or $4.52 per common share in 2023
Net income attributable to common shares of $4.6 billion or $4.43 per common share compared to $2.8 billion or $2.75 per common share in 2023
Comparable EBITDA of $11.2 billion compared to $11.0 billion in 2023
Segmented earnings of $8.7 billion compared to $6.1 billion in 2023
TC Energy’s Board of Directors approved a 3.3 per cent increase in the quarterly common share dividend to $0.85 per common share for the quarter ending March 31, 2025, equivalent to $3.40 per common share on an annualized basis. The increase in quarterly dividend is based on TC Energy’s proportionate allocation of the dividend post-spin
2025 outlook for continuing operations:
Comparable EBITDA outlook for 2025 continuing operations is expected to be $10.7 to $10.9 billion, driven by new projects anticipated to be placed in service in 2025, including the Southeast Gateway pipeline, along with the full year contribution from projects placed in service in 2024, higher contributions from the NGTL System resulting from the five-year negotiated revenue requirement settlement, partially offset by reduced generation from Bruce Power due to the commencement of the Unit 4 Major Component Replacement (MCR)
Comparable earnings per common share (EPS) for 2025 for continuing operations is expected to be lower than 2024 comparable EPS from continuing operations due to the net impact of an increase in comparable EBITDA, lower AFUDC related to the Southeast Gateway pipeline expected to be placed in service on May 1, 2025, lower interest income as a result of lower cash balances and lower interest rates, increased depreciation rates on the NGTL System related to the five-year negotiated revenue requirement settlement, higher effective tax rates and reduced capitalized interest due to the Coastal GasLink pipeline commercial in-service
Capital expenditures are expected to be $6.1 to $6.6 billion, on a gross basis, or $5.5 to $6.0 billion of net capital expenditures2 after considering capital expenditures attributable to non-controlling interests of entities we control.
Operational Highlights
Canadian Natural Gas Pipelines deliveries averaged 25.6 Bcf/d, up seven per cent compared to fourth quarter 2023
Total NGTL System deliveries set a new record of 17.7 Bcf on February 9, 2025
Canadian Mainline fourth quarter deliveries averaged 6.3 Bcf/d, up 11 per cent compared to fourth quarter 2023
U.S. Natural Gas Pipelines daily average flows were 27.0 Bcf/d
U.S. Natural Gas Pipelines set a new all-time record of 37.9 Bcf on January 20, 2025
ANR set a new all-time record of 10.0 Bcf on January 20, 2025
Mexico Natural Gas Pipelines flows averaged 2.7 Bcf/d
Sur de Texas pipeline set a single-day flow record above 1.7 Bcf/d on November 20, 2024 highlighting its importance as a key import route for U.S. natural gas production into Mexico
Bruce Power achieved 99 per cent availability in fourth quarter 2024
Cogeneration power plant fleet achieved 98 per cent availability in fourth quarter 2024, attributed to fewer forced outages and successful completion of planned outages.
Project Highlights
Completed the successful spinoff of the Liquids Pipelines business (the Spinoff Transaction) on October 1, 2024
Achieved mechanical completion of the Southeast Gateway pipeline project on January 20, 2025. We continue to be aligned with the CFE on finalizing the remaining project completion activities for achieving a May 1, 2025 in-service date
Declared commercial in-service of the Coastal GasLink pipeline in November 2024, allowing for the collection of tolls from customers retroactive to October 1, 2024
Approved the Pulaski and Maysville projects on our Columbia Gulf System. These mainline extension projects off Columbia Gulf will facilitate full coal-to-gas conversion at two existing power plants and are each expected to provide 0.2 Bcf/d of capacity for incremental gas-fired generation. The projects have anticipated in-service dates in 2029 and total estimated costs of US$0.7 billion
Approved the US$0.3 billion Southeast Virginia Energy Storage Project. This is an LNG peaking facility in southeast Virginia that will serve an existing LDC’s growing winter peak day load and mitigate its peak day pricing exposure, as well as increase operational flexibility on the Columbia Gas system. The project has an anticipated in-service date of 2030
Placed the US$0.1 billion GTN XPress project into service in December 2024
Bruce Power announced Stage 3a of Project 2030 which will provide incremental capacity of approximately 90 MW at the site. TC Energy’s share of the capital required is approximately $175 million. Bruce Power will not be requesting an incremental capital call for this stage. By optimizing its existing Units through this program, when complete, Project 2030 is expected to increase the Bruce Power site peak output to 7,000 MW. All of this output will be sold under Bruce Power’s long-term contract with the IESO
Removed Bruce Power’s Unit 4 from service on January 31, 2025 to commence its MCR program. The Unit 5 MCR final cost and schedule estimate was submitted to the IESO on January 31, 2025
TC Energy and prospective partners Saugeen Ojibway Nation will advance pre-development work on the Ontario Pumped Storage Project following the Ontario Government’s recent announcement on January 24, 2025 to invest up to $285 million to complete a detailed cost estimate and environmental assessments to determine the feasibility of the project.
three months ended December 31
year ended December 31
(millions of $, except per share amounts)
2024
20231
2024
20231
Net income (loss) attributable to common shares
971
1,463
4,594
2,829
from continuing operations
1,069
1,249
4,199
2,217
from discontinued operations2
(98
)
214
395
612
Net income (loss) per common share – basic
$0.94
$1.41
$4.43
$2.75
from continuing operations
$1.03
$1.20
$4.05
$2.15
from discontinued operations2
($0.09
)
$0.21
$0.38
$0.60
Comparable EBITDA3
2,619
3,107
11,194
10,988
from continuing operations
2,619
2,715
10,049
9,472
from discontinued operations2
—
392
1,145
1,516
Comparable earnings3
1,094
1,403
4,430
4,652
from continuing operations
1,094
1,192
3,865
3,896
from discontinued operations2
—
211
565
756
Comparable earnings per common share3
$1.05
$1.35
$4.27
$4.52
from continuing operations
$1.05
$1.15
$3.73
$3.78
from discontinued operations2
—
$0.20
$0.54
$0.74
Prior year results have been recast to reflect the split between continuing and discontinued operations.
Represents nine months of Liquids Pipelines earnings in 2024 compared to a full year of Liquids Pipelines earnings in 2023. Refer to the Discontinued operations section of this news release for additional information.
For additional information on the most directly comparable GAAP measure, refer to the Non-GAAP measures section of this news release.
three months ended December 31
year ended December 31
(millions of $, except per share amounts)
2024
2023
2024
2023
Cash flows1
Net cash provided by operations2
2,084
1,860
7,696
7,268
Comparable funds generated from operations2,3
1,665
2,405
7,890
7,980
Capital spending4
2,307
2,985
7,904
12,298
Acquisitions, net of cash acquired
—
(5
)
—
(307
)
Proceeds from sales of assets, net of transaction costs
—
33
791
33
Disposition of equity interest, net of transaction costs5
—
5,328
419
5,328
Dividends declared
per common share6
$0.8225
$0.93
$3.7025
$3.72
Basic common shares outstanding (millions)
– weighted average for the period
1,038
1,037
1,038
1,030
– issued and outstanding at end of period
1,039
1,037
1,039
1,037
Includes continuing and discontinued operations.
Represents nine months of Liquids Pipelines earnings in 2024 compared to a full year of Liquids Pipelines earnings in 2023. Refer to the Discontinued operations section of this news release for additional information.
Comparable funds generated from operations is a non-GAAP measure used throughout this news release. This measure does not have any standardized meaning under GAAP and therefore is unlikely to be comparable in similar measures presented by other companies. The most directly comparable GAAP measure is Net cash provided by operations. For more information on non-GAAP measures, refer to the Non-GAAP measures section of this news release.
Capital spending reflects cash flows associated with our Capital expenditures, Capital projects in development and Contributions to equity investments net of Other distributions from equity investments of $3.1 billion in 2024 in the Canadian Natural Gas Pipelines segment. Refer to Note 7, Coastal GasLink in the Consolidated financial statements of our 2024 Annual Report and the Segmented information of our Condensed consolidated financial statements of this news release for additional information.
Included in the Financing activities section of the Condensed consolidated statement of cash flows.
Dividends declared in fourth quarter 2024 reflect TC Energy’s proportionate allocation following the Spinoff Transaction. Refer to the Discontinued operations section of this news release for additional information.
three months ended December 31
year ended December 31
(millions of $, except per share amounts)
2024
20231
2024
20231
Segmented earnings (losses) from continuing operations
Canadian Natural Gas Pipelines
506
692
2,016
(90
)
U.S. Natural Gas Pipelines
918
955
4,053
3,531
Mexico Natural Gas Pipelines
214
150
929
796
Power and Energy Solutions
276
263
1,102
1,004
Corporate
(16
)
(34
)
(136
)
(144
)
Segmented earnings (losses) from continuing operations
1,898
2,026
7,964
5,097
Comparable EBITDA from continuing operations
Canadian Natural Gas Pipelines
851
1,034
3,388
3,335
U.S. Natural Gas Pipelines
1,200
1,225
4,511
4,385
Mexico Natural Gas Pipelines
234
208
999
805
Power and Energy Solutions
341
266
1,214
1,020
Corporate
(7
)
(18
)
(63
)
(73
)
Comparable EBITDA from continuing operations
2,619
2,715
10,049
9,472
Depreciation and amortization
(639
)
(632
)
(2,535
)
(2,446
)
Interest expense included in comparable earnings
(836
)
(777
)
(3,176
)
(2,966
)
Allowance for funds used during construction
233
132
784
575
Foreign exchange gains (losses), net included in comparable earnings
(44
)
40
(85
)
118
Interest income and other
120
119
324
272
Income tax (expense) recovery included in comparable earnings
(168
)
(253
)
(772
)
(890
)
Net (income) loss attributable to non-controlling interests included in comparable earnings
(163
)
(128
)
(620
)
(146
)
Preferred share dividends
(28
)
(24
)
(104
)
(93
)
Comparable earnings from continuing operations
1,094
1,192
3,865
3,896
Comparable earnings per common share from continuing operations
$1.05
$1.15
$3.73
$3.78
Prior year results have been recast to reflect continuing operations only.
three months ended December 31
year ended December 31
(millions of $, except per share amounts)
2024
2023¹
20242
2023¹
Segmented earnings (losses) from discontinued operations
(109
)
301
716
1,039
Comparable EBITDA from discontinued operations
—
392
1,145
1,516
Depreciation and amortization
—
(85
)
(253
)
(332
)
Interest expense included in comparable earnings3
—
(63
)
(176
)
(287
)
Interest income and other included in comparable earnings4
—
2
3
6
Income tax (expense) recovery included in comparable earnings5
—
(35
)
(154
)
(147
)
Comparable earnings from discontinued operations
—
211
565
756
Comparable earnings per common share from discontinued operations
—
$0.20
$0.54
$0.74
Prior year results have been recast to reflect the Liquids Pipelines business as a discontinued operation as a result of the Spinoff Transaction.
Represents nine months of Liquids Pipelines earnings in 2024 compared to a full year of Liquids Pipelines earnings in 2023. Refer to the Discontinued operations section in our 2024 Annual Report for additional information.
Excludes pre-tax carrying charges of $5 million for the three months ended December 31, 2023 as a result of a charge related to the FERC Administrative Law Judge decision on Keystone in respect of a tolling-related complaint pertaining to amounts recognized in prior periods.
Excludes pre-tax Liquids Pipelines business separation costs of $10 million related to insurance provisions for the three months ended December 31, 2024.
Excludes the impact of income taxes related to the specified items mentioned above as well as a $14 million U.S. minimum tax recovery in fourth quarter 2023 on the Keystone XL asset impairment charge and other related to the termination of the Keystone XL pipeline project.
CEO Message 2024 has been a transformational year for TC Energy. Through maintaining focus on a clear set of strategic priorities, we have delivered on our commitments and solidified our position as an industry leading natural gas and power company. With the successful spinoff of our Liquids Pipelines business, significant progress towards our debt-to-EBITDA3 leverage targets, and achieving mechanical completion on Southeast Gateway, we are well positioned to capitalize on the unprecedented demand we are seeing in natural gas and power and energy solutions across Canada, the U.S. and Mexico. Building on our solid foundation, our strong operational and financial results in 2024 are a direct reflection of our best safety performance in five years that has driven the highest level of asset availability and reliability across our portfolio.
Our priorities for 2025 are clear. We will continue to maximize the value of our assets through safety and operational excellence, execute our selective portfolio of growth projects and ensure financial strength and agility. We believe that our renewed focus on natural gas and power, and our portfolio of highly contracted assets gives us a strategic competitive advantage in the industry, enabling us to continue achieving solid growth, low risk and repeatable performance.
TC Energy’s focus on project execution continues to deliver results. The Southeast Gateway pipeline project reached mechanical completion on January 20, 2025 with the final golden welds at Coatzacoalcos and Paraíso. The estimated final cost for the project is approximately US$3.9 billion, which is at the low end of our prior guidance of US$3.9 to US$4.1 billion and 13 per cent below our original cost estimate. We continue to be aligned with the CFE on finalizing the remaining project completion activities for achieving a May 1, 2025 in-service date. The Southeast Gateway project highlights the success of the CFE’s first public-private partnership with TC Energy. BrucePower Unit 4 was removed from service on January 31, 2025 to commence its MCR program, with a return to service expected in 2028, and the Unit 3 MCR program continues to advance on plan for both cost and schedule. The Unit 5 MCR final cost and schedule estimate was submitted to the IESO on January 31, 2025. In 2024, approximately $7 billion of projects have been placed in service, including natural gas pipeline capacity projects along our extensive North American asset footprint, our share of equity contributions related to the Coastal GasLink pipeline, as well as progressing the Bruce Power life extension program. We continue to expect approximately $8.5 billion of projects to be placed in service in 2025, including the Southeast Gateway pipeline project.
In November 2024, Coastal GasLink LP executed a commercial agreement with LNG Canada (LNGC) and LNGC Participants that declared commercial in-service for the pipeline, allowing for the collection of tolls from customers retroactive to October 1, 2024. In March 2022, we announced the signing of option agreements to sell up to a 10 per cent equity interest in Coastal GasLink LP to Indigenous communities across the project corridor, from our current 35 per cent equity ownership. The equity option is exercisable after commercial in-service of the Coastal GasLink pipeline, subject to customary regulatory approvals and consents, including the consent of LNGC. As a result of the commercial agreement with LNGC and LNGC Participants, which has allowed for an earlier commercial in-service than the LNGC plant, we are actively collaborating with the Indigenous communities to establish a mutually agreeable timeframe in which the option can be exercised.
We continue to assess ongoing trade negotiations between the U.S., Canada and Mexico and potential impacts of proposed tariffs to our business and our customers. On February 3, 2025, a 30-day pause on potential tariffs was implemented which we believe will support increased engagement with North America’s leaders in order to reach an agreement that will benefit consumers across the continent. There is significant energy flow between the U.S., Canada and Mexico, including oil, gas, electricity, and uranium, making our energy markets highly interdependent. Our assets support this cross-border flow of natural gas to critical markets in the U.S. Northeast, Midwest and Pacific Northwest and we remain committed to providing competitive and reliable service to our customers on both sides of the border.
Given 97 per cent of our comparable EBITDA is underpinned by regulated cost-of-service frameworks or take-or-pay negotiated contracts, we bear minimal commodity price or volumetric risk. As such, we do not anticipate any significant impact to our financial performance.
The cost-of-service framework of our regulated Canadian Natural Gas Pipelines business, which transports natural gas to be exported to the U.S. by our shippers, provides TC Energy with protection in the event of higher cost and/or loss of volumes. Our Mexico Natural Gas Pipelines business primarily receives southern U.S. natural gas supply, transported for our customers for delivery into key demand markets in Mexico. We do not transport any natural gas from Mexico into the U.S. Our contracts in Mexico are U.S. dollar-denominated and based on long-term, take-or-pay agreements. In our Power and Energy Solutions business, our most significant contributor is Bruce Power, where more than 90 per cent of capital and resource costs are spent in Canada.
We recognize prolonged tariffs could impact capital allocation decisions and we will allocate capital to the markets where the demand for energy continues to grow. We have the benefit of a diverse portfolio across three jurisdictions, along with opportunities in natural gas, nuclear and other power and energy solutions that provides flexibility in our capital allocation.
Reinforced by the strength of our base business and the confidence in our future outlook, TC Energy’s Board of Directors approved a 3.3 per cent increase in the quarterly common share dividend to $0.85 per common share for the quarter ending March 31, 2025, equivalent to $3.40 per common share on an annualized basis. This is the twenty-fifth consecutive year the Board has raised the dividend.
Teleconference and Webcast We will hold a teleconference and webcast on Friday, February 14, 2025 at 6:30 a.m. (MST) / 8:30 a.m. (EST) to discuss our fourth quarter 2024 financial results and Company developments. Presenters will include François Poirier, President and Chief Executive Officer; Sean O’Donnell, Executive Vice-President and Chief Financial Officer; and other members of the executive leadership team.
Members of the investment community and other interested parties are invited to participate by calling 1-844-763-8274 (Canada/U.S.) or 1-647-484-8814 (International). No passcode is required. Please dial in 15 minutes prior to the start of the call. Alternatively, participants may pre-register for the call here. Upon registering, you will receive a calendar booking by email with dial in details and a unique PIN. This process will bypass the operator and avoid the queue. Registration will remain open until the end of the conference call.
A replay of the teleconference will be available two hours after the conclusion of the call until midnight EST on February 21, 2025. Please call 1-855-669-9658 (Canada/U.S.) or 1-412-317-0088 (International) and enter passcode 6438166.
The audited annual consolidated financial statements and Management’s Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) are available on our website atwww.TCEnergy.comand will be filed today under TC Energy’s profile on SEDAR+ atwww.sedarplus.caand with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on EDGAR atwww.sec.gov.
About TC Energy We’re a team of 6,500+ energy problem solvers connecting the world to the energy it needs. Our extensive network of natural gas infrastructure assets is one-of-a-kind. We seamlessly move, generate and store energy and deliver it to where it is needed most, to homes and businesses in North America and across the globe through LNG exports. Our natural gas assets are complemented by our strategic ownership and low-risk investments in power generation.
TC Energy’s common shares trade on the Toronto (TSX) and New York (NYSE) stock exchanges under the symbol TRP. To learn more, visit us at www.TCEnergy.com.
Forward-Looking Information This release contains certain information that is forward-looking and is subject to important risks and uncertainties and is based on certain key assumptions. Forward-looking statements are usually accompanied by words such as “anticipate”, “expect”, “believe”, “may”, “will”, “should”, “estimate” or other similar words. Forward-looking statements in this document may include, but are not limited to, statements related to Coastal GasLink and Southeast Gateway, including mechanical completion and expected in-service dates and related expected capital expenditures, expected comparable EBITDA and comparable earnings in total and per common share and the sources thereof, and targeted debt-to-EBITDA leverage metrics for 2025, expectations with respect to Indigenous investment, expectations with respect to Bruce Power, including Project 2030, expectations with respect to the approximate value of projects to be placed in-service in 2025, expectations with respect to our strategic priorities, including the expected impacts of the five-year negotiated revenue requirement settlement for the NGTL System, and the execution thereof, our sustainability commitments, expectations with respect to our ability to maximize the value of our assets through safety and operational excellence, expected cost and schedules for planned projects, including projects under construction and in development and the associated capital expenditures, expectations about our ability to execute our identified portfolio of growth projects and ensure financial strength and agility, our ability to deliver solid growth, low risk and repeatable performance, our expected net capital expenditures, including timing, and expected industry, market and economic conditions, and ongoing trade negotiations, including their expected impact on our business, customers and suppliers. Our forward-looking information is subject to important risks and uncertainties and is based on certain key assumptions. Forward-looking statements and future-oriented financial information in this document are intended to provide TC Energy security holders and potential investors with information regarding TC Energy and its subsidiaries, including management’s assessment of TC Energy’s and its subsidiaries’ future plans and financial outlook. All forward-looking statements reflect TC Energy’s beliefs and assumptions based on information available at the time the statements were made and as such are not guarantees of future performance. As actual results could vary significantly from the forward-looking information, you should not put undue reliance on forward-looking information and should not use future-oriented information or financial outlooks for anything other than their intended purpose. We do not update our forward-looking information due to new information or future events, unless we are required to by law. For additional information on the assumptions made, and the risks and uncertainties which could cause actual results to differ from the anticipated results, refer to the most recent Quarterly Report to Shareholders and the 2024 Annual Report filed under TC Energy’s profile on SEDAR+ at www.sedarplus.ca and with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission at www.sec.gov and the “Forward-looking information” section of our Report on Sustainability and our GHG Emissions Reduction Plan which are available on our website at www.TCEnergy.com.
Non-GAAP and Supplementary Financial Measures This release contains references to the following non-GAAP measures: comparable EBITDA, comparable earnings, comparable earnings per common share and comparable funds generated from operations. It also contains references to debt-to-EBITDA, a non-GAAP ratio, which is calculated using adjusted debt and adjusted comparable EBITDA, each of which are non-GAAP measures. These non-GAAP measures do not have any standardized meaning as prescribed by GAAP and therefore may not be comparable to similar measures presented by other entities. These non-GAAP measures are calculated by adjusting certain GAAP measures for specific items we believe are significant but not reflective of our underlying operations in the period. These comparable measures are calculated on a consistent basis from period to period and are adjusted for specific items in each period, as applicable except as otherwise described in the Condensed consolidated financial statements and MD&A. Refer to: (i) each business segment and the discontinued operations section for a reconciliation of comparable EBITDA to segmented earnings (losses); (ii) Consolidated results section and the discontinued operations section for reconciliations of comparable earnings and comparable earnings per common share to Net income attributable to common shares and Net income per common share, respectively; and (iii) Financial condition section for a reconciliation of comparable funds generated from operations to Net cash provided by operations. Refer to the Non-GAAP Measures section of the MD&A in our most recent quarterly report for more information about the non-GAAP measures we use. The MD&A is included with, and forms part of, this release. The MD&A can be found on SEDAR+ at www.sedarplus.ca under TC Energy’s profile.
With respect to non-GAAP measures used in the calculation of debt-to-EBITDA, adjusted debt is defined as the sum of Reported total debt, including Notes payable, Long-term debt, Current portion of long-term debt and Junior subordinated notes, as reported on our Consolidated balance sheet as well as Operating lease liabilities recognized on our Consolidated balance sheet and 50 per cent of Preferred shares as reported on our Consolidated balance sheet due to the debt-like nature of their contractual and financial obligations, less Cash and cash equivalents as reported on our Consolidated balance sheet and 50 per cent of Junior subordinated notes as reported on our Consolidated balance sheet due to the equity-like nature of their contractual and financial obligations. Adjusted comparable EBITDA is calculated as the sum of comparable EBITDA from continuing operations and comparable EBITDA from discontinued operations excluding Operating lease costs recorded in Plant operating costs and other in our Consolidated statement of income and adjusted for Distributions received in excess of (income) loss from equity investments as reported in our Consolidated statement of cash flows which we believe is more reflective of the cash flows available to TC Energy to service our debt and other long-term commitments. We believe that debt-to-EBITDA provides investors with useful information as it reflects our ability to service our debt and other long-term commitments. See the Reconciliation section for reconciliations of adjusted debt and adjusted comparable EBITDA for the years ended December 31, 2022, 2023 and 2024.
This release contains references to net capital expenditures, which is a supplementary financial measure. Net capital expenditures represent capital costs incurred for growth projects, maintenance capital expenditures, contributions to equity investments and projects under development, adjusted for the portion attributed to non-controlling interests in the entities we control. Net capital expenditures reflect capital costs incurred during the period, excluding the impact of timing of cash payments. We use net capital expenditures as a key measure in evaluating our performance in managing our capital spending activities in comparison to our capital plan.
Reconciliation The following is a reconciliation of adjusted debt and adjusted comparable EBITDAi.
year ended December 31
(millions of Canadian $)
2024
2023
2022
Reported total debt
59,366
63,201
58,300
Management adjustments:
Debt treatment of preferred sharesii
1,250
1,250
1,250
Equity treatment of junior subordinated notesiii
(5,524
)
(5,144
)
(5,248
)
Cash and cash equivalents
(801
)
(3,678
)
(620
)
Operating lease liabilities
511
457
430
Adjusted debt
54,802
56,086
54,112
Comparable EBITDA from continuing operationsiv
10,049
9,472
8,483
Comparable EBITDA from discontinued operationsiv
1,145
1,516
1,418
Operating lease cost
117
105
95
Distributions received in excess of (income) loss from equity investments
67
(123
)
(29
)
Adjusted Comparable EBITDA
11,378
10,970
9,967
Adjusted Debt/Adjusted Comparable EBITDAi
4.8
5.1
5.4
Adjusted debt and adjusted comparable EBITDA are non-GAAP measures. The calculations are based on management methodology. Individual rating agency calculations will differ.
50 per cent debt treatment on $2.5 billion of preferred shares as of December 31, 2024.
50 per cent equity treatment on $11.0 billion of junior subordinated notes as of December 31, 2024. U.S. dollar-denominated notes translated at December 31, 2024, USD/CAD foreign exchange rate of 1.44.
Comparable EBITDA from continuing operations and Comparable EBITDA from discontinued operations are non-GAAP financial measures. See the Forward-looking information and Non-GAAP measures sections in our 2024 Annual Report for more information. Comparable EBITDA from discontinued operations represents nine months of Liquids Pipelines earnings in 2024 compared to a full year of Liquids Pipelines earnings in 2023. Refer to the Discontinued operations section in our 2024 Annual Report for additional information.
Media Inquiries: Media Relations media@tcenergy.com 403.920.7859 or 800.608.7859
Investor & Analyst Inquiries: Gavin Wylie / Hunter Mau investor_relations@tcenergy.com 403.920.7911 or 800.361.6522
________________________ 1 Comparable EBITDA, comparable earnings and comparable earnings per common share are non-GAAP measures used throughout this news release and are applicable to each of our continuing operations and discontinued operations. These measures do not have any standardized meaning under GAAP and therefore are unlikely to be comparable to similar measures presented by other companies. The most directly comparable GAAP measures are Segmented earnings, Net income attributable to common shares and Net income per common share, respectively. We do not forecast Segmented earnings. For more information on non-GAAP measures, refer to the Non-GAAP measures section of this news release. 2 Net capital expenditures are adjusted for the portion attributed to non-controlling interests and is a supplementary financial measure used throughout this news release. For more information on non-GAAP measures and the supplementary financial measure, refer to the Non-GAAP and Supplementary financial measures sections of this news release. 3 Debt-to-EBITDA is a non-GAAP ratio. Adjusted debt and adjusted comparable EBITDA are non-GAAP measures used to calculate debt-to-EBITDA. For more information on non-GAAP measures, refer to the non-GAAP measures of this news release. These measures do not have any standardized meaning under GAAP and therefore are unlikely to be comparable to similar measures presented by other companies.
Source: Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht – In English
The Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin) warns consumers about the company Zinsverwalter and the services it is offering. BaFin suspects the unknown operators of the websites zinsverwalter.de and zinsverwalter.com of offering consumers financial, investment and cryptoasset services without the required authorisation. These offers are not provided by WALTER Investment-Vermittlungs GmbH, Stuttgart, which has no connection to the aforementioned websites. This is a case of identity fraud.
The unknown operators are contacting consumers, claiming that their offer is from WALTER Investment-Vermittlungs GmbH. In addition, when advertising its services, the company claims to be supervised by BaFin. However, none of this information is correct. This is a case of identity fraud. Moreover, BaFin does not supervise WALTER Investment-Vermittlungs GmbH.
Anyone providing financial, investment or cryptoasset services in Germany may do so only with authorisation from BaFin. However, some companies offer these services without the necessary authorisation.
BaFin is issuing this information on the basis of section 37 (4) of the German Banking Act (Kreditwesengesetz – KWG) and section 10 (7) of the German Cryptomarkets Supervision Act (Kryptomärkteaufsichtsgesetz).
Please be aware:
BaFin, the German Federal Criminal Police Office (Bundeskriminalamt – BKA) and the German state criminal police offices (Landeskriminalämter) recommend that consumers seeking to invest money online should exercise the utmost caution and do the necessary research beforehand in order to identify fraud attempts at an early stage.
Oxford City Council has agreed a Budget that will see new homes, new community centres and increased grass cutting of verges across Oxford.
The Budget – which is balanced for the next four years – comes against a backdrop of austerity, rising costs, especially around homelessness, inflation and councils declaring bankruptcy across the UK.
This has been achieved in part through the ‘Oxford Model’, which will see the Council’s companies generate £19m in profit over the next four years to help fund services.
The Budget was agreed at a Full Council meeting yesterday evening.
Key Budget proposals
The Council’s Budget includes funding for:
1,558 new council homes over the next eight years
Two new community centres, in East Oxford and Blackbird Leys
Increased grass cutting – to at least three times a year – across Oxford
Increased litter picking across Oxford and a new graffiti removal service
Better gritting of cycle lanes and pavements
A new splash park in Hinksey and renewal of outdoor gym equipment
A freeze on pitch-hire fees for sports teams
The Budget will take the number of council homes owned by Oxford City Council to almost 9,500, which, thanks to the energy efficiency work, will be warmer and use less energy.
The Council will also continue to maintain its leisure centres, community centres, parks, youth clubs, and other existing services for residents and businesses.
Changes to the Budget
The Council’s Budget was first proposed in December 2024.
Since then, the Government has provided additional funding to local authorities, including a further £600,000 to assist in prevention of homelessness.
As Oxford City Council had already budgeted to provide some support for homeless people, this has freed up funding that can be spent on other priorities.
The changes to the Budget compared to the consultation Budget include:
£200,000 to pilot a new scheme to help people in supported accommodation
£310,000 for additional graffiti removal across Oxford
£157,000 for additional gritting of pavements and bike lanes
£170,000 to provide free leisure facilities in Blackbird Leys and £60,000 for a new play area in the city centre if a site can be found
£100,000 to replace outdoor gym equipment across Oxford
£316,000 to reverse planned cuts to ward member and community grants
The Council also agreed £2.5m to help reopen passenger services on the Cowley Branch Line, and a further £1m to enhance the £8m redevelopment of the Covered Market.
Oxford Model
Oxford City Council owns two companies, ODS and OX Place, that generate income to help fund frontline services. This is known as the ‘Oxford Model’.
ODS carries out street cleaning, bin collections and parks maintenance for Oxford residents, but also sells those services to businesses and institutions to generate income.
OX Place’s main aim is to build new council homes for Oxford residents, but it also builds open market sale and shared ownership homes to generate income.
The companies are expected to generate about £19m in dividends returns over the next four years.
The ‘Oxford Model’ now represents 10% of the Council’s annual Budget. This compares to 26% for fees and charges, 20% for Council Tax, 15% for Business Rates and 15% for commercial rent. Government grants represent just 6% of the Council’s budget.
Council Tax
Council Tax will increase by 2.99% in 2025/26.
For a Band D Council Tax property, a 2.99% increase equates to £10.36 per year (or 20p a week), bringing a total charge of £356.72 per annum (or £6.86 per week) to fund Oxford City Council.
Separate Council Tax precepts support Oxfordshire County Council, the Thames Valley Police and Crime Commissioner and the Parish Councils in Blackbird Leys, Old Marston, Littlemore and Risinghurst & Sandhills.
Oxford City Council continues to provide a full discount on Council Tax for Oxford residents on the lowest incomes. It is one of relatively few councils across the UK to still do so.
Second homes in Oxford will be charged double Council Tax from 2025.
Comment
“We’ve been listening: our residents’ survey said that people wanted their City Council to get the basics right, so we are stepping up spend on graffiti removal, pavement repairs and gritting, verge cutting, litter picking and free play provision. We will build more than 1,500 new council homes to help local families in housing need. We are going to retain our award-winning youth ambition service, grants to voluntary organisations and will build two new communty centres at East Oxford and Blackbird Leys.
“This is in the context of a shortfall in government funding, but we have managed to avoid major cuts to frontline services by our ‘Oxford Model’, which uses income from our wholly owned companies, partnerships and commercial property to support the front line.”
Councillor Ed Turner, Deputy Leader and Cabinet Member for Finance and Asset Management
