Category: KB

  • MIL-OSI: YieldMax® ETFs Announces Distributions on XYZY, WNTR, SMCY, AIYY, MSTY, and Others

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    CHICAGO and MILWAUKEE and NEW YORK, June 04, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — YieldMax® today announced distributions for the YieldMax® Weekly Payers and Group D ETFs listed in the table below.

    ETF Ticker1 ETF Name Distribution
    Frequency
    Distribution
    per Share
    Distribution
    Rate
    2,4
    30-Day
    SEC Yield3
    ROC5 Ex-Date &
    Record Date
    Payment
    Date
    CHPY YieldMax® Semiconductor Portfolio Option Income ETF Weekly $0.3455 34.50% 0.38% 100.00% 6/5/25 6/6/25
    GPTY YieldMax® AI & Tech Portfolio Option Income ETF Weekly $0.2977 33.62% 0.00% 100.00% 6/5/25 6/6/25
    LFGY YieldMax® Crypto Industry & Tech Portfolio Option Income ETF Weekly $0.4664 61.02% 0.00% 100.00% 6/5/25 6/6/25
    QDTY YieldMax® Nasdaq 100 0DTE Covered Call ETF Weekly $0.2307 28.16% 0.00% 100.00% 6/5/25 6/6/25
    RDTY YieldMax® R2000 0DTE Covered Call ETF Weekly $0.2108 24.27% 0.89% 95.29% 6/5/25 6/6/25
    SDTY YieldMax® S&P 500 0DTE Covered Call ETF Weekly $0.2175 25.86% 0.00% 100.00% 6/5/25 6/6/25
    ULTY YieldMax® Ultra Option Income Strategy ETF Weekly $0.0945 78.74% 0.00% 100.00% 6/5/25 6/6/25
    YMAG YieldMax® Magnificent 7 Fund of Option Income ETFs Weekly $0.2089 70.40% 66.50% 97.56% 6/5/25 6/6/25
    YMAX YieldMax® Universe Fund of Option Income ETFs Weekly $0.1721 65.23% 88.53% 92.64% 6/5/25 6/6/25
    AIYY YieldMax® AI Option Income Strategy ETF Every 4 weeks $0.3209 88.81% 2.97% 96.86% 6/5/25 6/6/25
    AMZY YieldMax® AMZN Option Income Strategy ETF Every 4 weeks $0.5955 48.28% 3.09% 94.01% 6/5/25 6/6/25
    APLY YieldMax® AAPL Option Income Strategy ETF Every 4 weeks $0.3119 30.96% 3.42% 89.96% 6/5/25 6/6/25
    DISO YieldMax® DIS Option Income Strategy ETF Every 4 weeks $0.5588 50.22% 3.16% 94.89% 6/5/25 6/6/25
    MSTY YieldMax® MSTR Option Income Strategy ETF Every 4 weeks $1.4707 85.27% 1.76% 97.45% 6/5/25 6/6/25
    SMCY YieldMax® SMCI Option Income Strategy ETF Every 4 weeks $1.5795 99.93% 3.05% 97.21% 6/5/25 6/6/25
    WNTR YieldMax® Short MSTR Option Income Strategy ETF Every 4 weeks $3.0725 104.26% 2.89% 97.57% 6/5/25 6/6/25
    XYZY YieldMax® XYZ Option Income Strategy ETF Every 4 weeks $0.8732 109.59% 2.93% 98.01% 6/5/25 6/6/25
    YQQQ YieldMax® Short N100 Option Income Strategy ETF Every 4 weeks $0.2650 23.18% 3.35% 86.54% 6/5/25 6/6/25
    Weekly Payers & Group A ETFs scheduled for next week: CHPY GPTY LFGY QDTY RDTY SDTY UTLY YMAG YMAX CRSH FEAT FIVY GOOY OARK SNOY TSLY TSMY XOMO YBIT

    Standardized Performance and Fund details can be obtained by clicking the ETF Ticker in the table above or by visiting us at www.yieldmaxetfs.com

    Performance data quoted represents past performance and is no guarantee of future results. Investment return and principal value of an investment will fluctuate so that an investor’s shares, when sold or redeemed, may be worth more or less than their original cost and current performance may be lower or higher than the performance quoted above. Performance current to the most recent month-end can be obtained by calling (833) 378-0717.

    Note: DIPS, FIAT, CRSH, YQQQ and WNTR are hereinafter referred to as the “Short ETFs.”

    Distributions are not guaranteed. The Distribution Rate and 30-Day SEC Yield are not indicative of future distributions, if any, on the ETFs. In particular, future distributions on any ETF may differ significantly from its Distribution Rate or 30-Day SEC Yield. You are not guaranteed a distribution under the ETFs. Distributions for the ETFs (if any) are variable and may vary significantly from period to period and may be zero. Accordingly, the Distribution Rate and 30-Day SEC Yield will change over time, and such change may be significant.

    Investors in the Funds will not have rights to receive dividends or other distributions with respect to the underlying reference asset(s).

    1All YieldMax® ETFs shown in the table above (except YMAX, YMAG, FEAT, FIVY and ULTY) have a gross expense ratio of 0.99%. YMAX, FEAT have a Management Fee of 0.29% and Acquired Fund Fees and Expenses of 0.99% for a gross expense ratio of 1.28%. YMAG has a management fee of 0.29% and Acquired Fund Fees and Expenses of 0.83% for a gross expense ratio of 1.12%. FIVY has a Management Fee of 0.29% and Acquired Fund Fees and Expenses of 0.59% for a gross expense ratio of 0.88%. “Acquired Fund Fees and Expenses” are indirect fees and expenses that the Fund incurs from investing in the shares of other investment companies, namely other YieldMax® ETFs. ULTY has a gross expense ratio of 1.40%, and a net expense ratio after the fee waiver of 1.30%. The Advisor has agreed to a fee waiver of 0.10% through at least February 28, 2026.

    2The Distribution Rate shown is as of close on June 3, 2025. The Distribution Rate is the annual distribution rate an investor would receive if the most recent distribution, which includes option income, remained the same going forward. The Distribution Rate is calculated by annualizing an ETF’s Distribution per Share and dividing such annualized amount by the ETF’s most recent NAV. The Distribution Rate represents a single distribution from the ETF and does not represent its total return. Distributions may also include a combination of ordinary dividends, capital gain, and return of investor capital, which may decrease an ETF’s NAV and trading price over time. As a result, an investor may suffer significant losses to their investment. These Distribution Rates may be caused by unusually favorable market conditions and may not be sustainable. Such conditions may not continue to exist and there should be no expectation that this performance may be repeated in the future.

    3The 30-Day SEC Yield represents net investment income, which excludes option income, earned by such ETF over the 30-Day period ended May 31, 2025, expressed as an annual percentage rate based on such ETF’s share price at the end of the 30-Day period.

    4Each ETF’s strategy (except those of the Short ETFs) will cap potential gains if its reference asset’s shares increase in value, yet subjects an investor to all potential losses if the reference asset’s shares decrease in value. Such potential losses may not be offset by income received by the ETF. Each Short ETF’s strategy will cap potential gains if its reference asset decreases in value yet subjects an investor to all potential losses if the reference asset increases in value. Such potential losses may not be offset by income received by the ETF.
    5ROC refers to Return of Capital. The ROC percentage indicates how much the distribution reflects an investor’s initial investment. The figures shown for each Fund in the table above are estimates and may later be determined to be taxable net investment income, short-term gains, long-term gains (to the extent permitted by law), or return of capital. Actual amounts and sources for tax reporting will depend upon the Fund’s investment activities during the remainder of the fiscal year and may be subject to changes based on tax regulations. Your broker will send you a Form 1099-DIV for the calendar year to tell you how to report these distributions for federal income tax purposes.

    Each Fund has a limited operating history and while each Fund’s objective is to provide current income, there is no guarantee the Fund will make a distribution. Distributions are likely to vary greatly in amount.

    Important Information

    This material must be preceded or accompanied by the prospectus. For all prospectuses, click here.

    Contact Vince DiLullo vdilullo@tidalfg.com for more information.

    Tidal Financial Group is the adviser for all YieldMax® ETFs.

    THE FUND, TRUST, AND ADVISER ARE NOT AFFILIATED WITH ANY UNDERLYING REFERENCE ASSET.

    Risk Disclosures (applicable to all YieldMax ETFs referenced above, except the Short ETFs)

    YMAX, YMAG, FEAT and FIVY generally invest in other YieldMax® ETFs. As such, these two Funds are subject to the risks listed in this section, which apply to all the YieldMax® ETFs they may hold from time to time.

    Investing involves risk. Principal loss is possible.

    Referenced Index Risk. The Fund invests in options contracts that are based on the value of the Index (or the Index ETFs). This subjects the Fund to certain of the same risks as if it owned shares of companies that comprised the Index or an ETF that tracks the Index, even though it does not.

    Indirect Investment Risk. The Index is not affiliated with the Trust, the Fund, the Adviser, or their respective affiliates and is not involved with this offering in any way. Investors in the Fund will not have the right to receive dividends or other distributions or any other rights with respect to the companies that comprise the Index but will be subject to declines in the performance of the Index.

    Russell 2000 Index Risks. The Index, which consists of small-cap U.S. companies, is particularly susceptible to economic changes, as these firms often have less financial resilience than larger companies. Market volatility can disproportionately affect these smaller businesses, leading to significant price swings. Additionally, these companies are often more exposed to specific industry risks and have less diverse revenue streams. They can also be more vulnerable to changes in domestic regulatory or policy environments.

    Call Writing Strategy Risk. The path dependency (i.e., the continued use) of the Fund’s call writing strategy will impact the extent that the Fund participates in the positive price returns of the underlying reference asset and, in turn, the Fund’s returns, both during the term of the sold call options and over longer periods.

    Counterparty Risk. The Fund is subject to counterparty risk by virtue of its investments in options contracts. Transactions in some types of derivatives, including options, are required to be centrally cleared (“cleared derivatives”). In a transaction involving cleared derivatives, the Fund’s counterparty is a clearing house rather than a bank or broker. Since the Fund is not a member of clearing houses and only members of a clearing house (“clearing members”) can participate directly in the clearing house, the Fund will hold cleared derivatives through accounts at clearing members.

    Derivatives Risk. Derivatives are financial instruments that derive value from the underlying reference asset or assets, such as stocks, bonds, or funds (including ETFs), interest rates or indexes. The Fund’s investments in derivatives may pose risks in addition to, and greater than, those associated with directly investing in securities or other ordinary investments, including risk related to the market, imperfect correlation with underlying investments or the Fund’s other portfolio holdings, higher price volatility, lack of availability, counterparty risk, liquidity, valuation and legal restrictions.

    Options Contracts. The use of options contracts involves investment strategies and risks different from those associated with ordinary portfolio securities transactions. The prices of options are volatile and are influenced by, among other things, actual and anticipated changes in the value of the underlying instrument, including the anticipated volatility, which are affected by fiscal and monetary policies and by national and international political, changes in the actual or implied volatility or the reference asset, the time remaining until the expiration of the option contract and economic events.

    Distribution Risk. As part of the Fund’s investment objective, the Fund seeks to provide current income. There is no assurance that the Fund will make a distribution in any given period. If the Fund does make distributions, the amounts of such distributions will likely vary greatly from one distribution to the next.

    High Portfolio Turnover Risk. The Fund may actively and frequently trade all or a significant portion of the Fund’s holdings. A high portfolio turnover rate increases transaction costs, which may increase the Fund’s expenses.

    Liquidity Risk. Some securities held by the Fund, including options contracts, may be difficult to sell or be illiquid, particularly during times of market turmoil.

    Non-Diversification Risk. Because the Fund is “non-diversified,” it may invest a greater percentage of its assets in the securities of a single issuer or a smaller number of issuers than if it was a diversified fund.

    New Fund Risk. The Fund is a recently organized management investment company with no operating history. As a result, prospective investors do not have a track record or history on which to base their investment decisions.

    Price Participation Risk. The Fund employs an investment strategy that includes the sale of call option contracts, which limits the degree to which the Fund will participate in increases in value experienced by the underlying reference asset over the Call Period.

    Single Issuer Risk. Issuer-specific attributes may cause an investment in the Fund to be more volatile than a traditional pooled investment which diversifies risk or the market generally. The value of the Fund, which focuses on an individual security (ARKK, TSLA, AAPL, NVDA, AMZN, META, GOOGL, NFLX, COIN, MSFT, DIS, XOM, JPM, AMD, PYPL, SQ, MRNA, AI, MSTR, Bitcoin ETP, GDX®, SNOW, ABNB, BABA, TSM, SMCI, PLTR, MARA, CVNA), may be more volatile than a traditional pooled investment or the market as a whole and may perform differently from the value of a traditional pooled investment or the market as a whole.

    Inflation Risk. Inflation risk is the risk that the value of assets or income from investments will be less in the future as inflation decreases the value of money. As inflation increases, the present value of the Fund’s assets and distributions, if any, may decline.

    Indirect Investment Risk. The Index is not affiliated with the Trust, the Fund, the Adviser, or their respective affiliates and is not involved with this offering in any way.

    Risk Disclosures (applicable only to GPTY)

    Artificial Intelligence Risk. Issuers engaged in artificial intelligence typically have high research and capital expenditures and, as a result, their profitability can vary widely, if they are profitable at all. The space in which they are engaged is highly competitive and issuers’ products and services may become obsolete very quickly. These companies are heavily dependent on intellectual property rights and may be adversely affected by loss or impairment of those rights. The issuers are also subject to legal, regulatory, and political changes that may have a large impact on their profitability. A failure in an issuer’s product or even questions about the safety of the product could be devastating to the issuer, especially if it is the marquee product of the issuer. It can be difficult to accurately capture what qualifies as an artificial intelligence company.

    Technology Sector Risk. The Fund will invest substantially in companies in the information technology sector, and therefore the performance of the Fund could be negatively impacted by events affecting this sector. Market or economic factors impacting technology companies and companies that rely heavily on technological advances could have a significant effect on the value of the Fund’s investments. The value of stocks of information technology companies and companies that rely heavily on technology is particularly vulnerable to rapid changes in technology product cycles, rapid product obsolescence, government regulation and competition, both domestically and internationally, including competition from foreign competitors with lower production costs. Stocks of information technology companies and companies that rely heavily on technology, especially those of smaller, less-seasoned companies, tend to be more volatile than the overall market. Information technology companies are heavily dependent on patent and intellectual property rights, the loss or impairment of which may adversely affect profitability.

    Risk Disclosure (applicable only to MARO)

    Digital Assets Risk: The Fund does not invest directly in Bitcoin or any other digital assets. The Fund does not invest directly in derivatives that track the performance of Bitcoin or any other digital assets. The Fund does not invest in or seek direct exposure to the current “spot” or cash price of Bitcoin. Investors seeking direct exposure to the price of Bitcoin should consider an investment other than the Fund. Digital assets like Bitcoin, designed as mediums of exchange, are still an emerging asset class. They operate independently of any central authority or government backing and are subject to regulatory changes and extreme price volatility.

    Risk Disclosures (applicable only to BABO and TSMY)

    Currency Risk: Indirect exposure to foreign currencies subjects the Fund to the risk that currencies will decline in value relative to the U.S. dollar. Currency rates in foreign countries may fluctuate significantly over short periods of time for a number of reasons, including changes in interest rates and the imposition of currency controls or other political developments in the U.S. or abroad.

    Depositary Receipts Risk: The securities underlying BABO and TSMY are American Depositary Receipts (“ADRs”). Investment in ADRs may be less liquid than the underlying shares in their primary trading market.

    Foreign Market and Trading Risk: The trading markets for many foreign securities are not as active as U.S. markets and may have less governmental regulation and oversight.

    Foreign Securities Risk: Investments in securities of non-U.S. issuers involve certain risks that may not be present with investments in securities of U.S. issuers, such as risk of loss due to foreign currency fluctuations or to political or economic instability, as well as varying regulatory requirements applicable to investments in non-U.S. issuers. There may be less information publicly available about a non-U.S. issuer than a U.S. issuer. Non-U.S. issuers may also be subject to different regulatory, accounting, auditing, financial reporting, and investor protection standards than U.S. issuers.

    Risk Disclosures (applicable only to GDXY)

    Risk of Investing in Foreign Securities. The Fund is exposed indirectly to the securities of foreign issuers selected by GDX®’s investment adviser, which subjects the Fund to the risks associated with such companies. Investments in the securities of foreign issuers involve risks beyond those associated with investments in U.S. securities.

    Risk of Investing in Gold and Silver Mining Companies. The Fund is exposed indirectly to gold and silver mining companies selected by GDX®’s investment adviser, which subjects the Fund to the risks associated with such companies.

    The Fund invests in options contracts based on the value of the VanEck Gold Miners ETF (GDX®), which subjects the Fund to some of the same risks as if it owned GDX®, as well as the risks associated with Canadian, Australian and Emerging Market Issuers, and Small-and Medium-Capitalization companies.

    Risk Disclosures (applicable only to YBIT)

    YBIT does not invest directly in Bitcoin or any other digital assets. YBIT does not invest directly in derivatives that track the performance of Bitcoin or any other digital assets. YBIT does not invest in or seek direct exposure to the current “spot” or cash price of Bitcoin. Investors seeking direct exposure to the price of Bitcoin should consider an investment other than YBIT.

    Bitcoin Investment Risk: The Fund’s indirect investment in Bitcoin, through holdings in one or more Underlying ETPs, exposes it to the unique risks of this emerging innovation. Bitcoin’s price is highly volatile, and its market is influenced by the changing Bitcoin network, fluctuating acceptance levels, and unpredictable usage trends.

    Digital Assets Risk: Digital assets like Bitcoin, designed as mediums of exchange, are still an emerging asset class. They operate independently of any central authority or government backing and are subject to regulatory changes and extreme price volatility. Potentially No 1940 Act Protections. As of the date of this Prospectus, there is only a single eligible Underlying ETP, and it is an investment company subject to the 1940 Act.

    Bitcoin ETP Risk: The Fund invests in options contracts that are based on the value of the Bitcoin ETP. This subjects the Fund to certain of the same risks as if it owned shares of the Bitcoin ETP, even though it does not. Bitcoin ETPs are subject, but not limited, to significant risk and heightened volatility. An investor in a Bitcoin ETP may lose their entire investment. Bitcoin ETPs are not suitable for all investors. In addition, not all Bitcoin ETPs are registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940. Those Bitcoin ETPs that are not registered under such statute are therefore not subject to the same regulations as exchange traded products that are so registered.

    Risk Disclosures (applicable only to the Short ETFs)

    Investing involves risk. Principal loss is possible.

    Price Appreciation Risk. As part of the Fund’s synthetic covered put strategy, the Fund purchases and sells call and put option contracts that are based on the value of the underlying reference asset. This strategy subjects the Fund to certain of the same risks as if it shorted the underlying reference asset, even though it does not. By virtue of the Fund’s indirect inverse exposure to changes in the value of the underlying reference asset, the Fund is subject to the risk that the value of the underlying reference asset increases. If the value of the underlying reference asset increases, the Fund will likely lose value and, as a result, the Fund may suffer significant losses.

    Put Writing Strategy Risk. The path dependency (i.e., the continued use) of the Fund’s put writing (selling) strategy will impact the extent that the Fund participates in decreases in the value of the underlying reference asset and, in turn, the Fund’s returns, both during the term of the sold put options and over longer periods.

    Purchased OTM Call Options Risk. The Fund’s strategy is subject to potential losses if the underlying reference asset increases in value, which may not be offset by the purchase of out-of-the-money (OTM) call options. The Fund purchases OTM calls to seek to manage (cap) the Fund’s potential losses from the Fund’s short exposure to the underlying reference asset if it appreciates significantly in value. However, the OTM call options will cap the Fund’s losses only to the extent that the value of the underlying reference asset increases to a level that is at or above the strike level of the purchased OTM call options. Any increase in the value of the underlying reference asset to a level that is below the strike level of the purchased OTM call options will result in a corresponding loss for the Fund. For example, if the OTM call options have a strike level that is approximately 100% above the then-current value of the underlying reference asset at the time of the call option purchase, and the value of the underlying reference asset increases by at least 100% during the term of the purchased OTM call options, the Fund will lose all its value. Since the Fund bears the costs of purchasing the OTM calls, such costs will decrease the Fund’s value and/or any income otherwise generated by the Fund’s investment strategy.

    Counterparty Risk. The Fund is subject to counterparty risk by virtue of its investments in options contracts. Transactions in some types of derivatives, including options, are required to be centrally cleared (“cleared derivatives”). In a transaction involving cleared derivatives, the Fund’s counterparty is a clearing house rather than a bank or broker. Since the Fund is not a member of clearing houses and only members of a clearing house (“clearing members”) can participate directly in the clearing house, the Fund will hold cleared derivatives through accounts at clearing members.

    Derivatives Risk. Derivatives are financial instruments that derive value from the underlying reference asset or assets, such as stocks, bonds, or funds (including ETFs), interest rates or indexes. The Fund’s investments in derivatives may pose risks in addition to, and greater than, those associated with directly investing in securities or other ordinary investments, including risk related to the market, imperfect correlation with underlying investments or the Fund’s other portfolio holdings, higher price volatility, lack of availability, counterparty risk, liquidity, valuation and legal restrictions.

    Options Contracts. The use of options contracts involves investment strategies and risks different from those associated with ordinary portfolio securities transactions. The prices of options are volatile and are influenced by, among other things, actual and anticipated changes in the value of the underlying reference asset, including the anticipated volatility, which are affected by fiscal and monetary policies and by national and international political, changes in the actual or implied volatility or the reference asset, the time remaining until the expiration of the option contract and economic events.

    Distribution Risk. As part of the Fund’s investment objective, the Fund seeks to provide current income. There is no assurance that the Fund will make a distribution in any given period. If the Fund does make distributions, the amounts of such distributions will likely vary greatly from one distribution to the next.

    High Portfolio Turnover Risk. The Fund may actively and frequently trade all or a significant portion of the Fund’s holdings.

    Liquidity Risk. Some securities held by the Fund, including options contracts, may be difficult to sell or be illiquid, particularly during times of market turmoil.

    Non-Diversification Risk. Because the Fund is “non-diversified,” it may invest a greater percentage of its assets in the securities of a single issuer or a smaller number of issuers than if it was a diversified fund.

    New Fund Risk. The Fund is a recently organized management investment company with no operating history. As a result, prospective investors do not have a track record or history on which to base their investment decisions.

    Price Participation Risk. The Fund employs an investment strategy that includes the sale of put option contracts, which limits the degree to which the Fund will participate in decreases in value experienced by the underlying reference asset over the Put Period.

    Single Issuer Risk. Issuer-specific attributes may cause an investment in the Fund to be more volatile than a traditional pooled investment which diversifies risk or the market generally. The value of the Fund, for any Fund that focuses on an individual security (e.g., TSLA, COIN, NVDA, MSTR), may be more volatile than a traditional pooled investment or the market as a whole and may perform differently from the value of a traditional pooled investment or the market as a whole. Inflation Risk. Inflation risk is the risk that the value of assets or income from investments will be less in the future as inflation decreases the value of money. As inflation increases, the present value of the Fund’s assets and distributions, if any, may decline.

    Risk Disclosures (applicable only to CHPY)

    Semiconductor Industry Risk. Semiconductor companies may face intense competition, both domestically and internationally, and such competition may have an adverse effect on their profit margins. Semiconductor companies may have limited product lines, markets, financial resources or personnel. Semiconductor companies’ supply chain and operations are dependent on the availability of materials that meet exacting standards and the use of third parties to provide components and services.

    The products of semiconductor companies may face obsolescence due to rapid technological developments and frequent new product introduction, unpredictable changes in growth rates and competition for the services of qualified personnel. Capital equipment expenditures could be substantial, and equipment generally suffers from rapid obsolescence. Companies in the semiconductor industry are heavily dependent on patent and intellectual property rights. The loss or impairment of these rights would adversely affect the profitability of these companies.

    Risk Disclosures (applicable only to YQQQ)

    Index Overview. The Nasdaq 100 Index is a benchmark index that includes 100 of the largest non-financial companies listed on the Nasdaq Stock Market, based on market capitalization.

    Index Level Appreciation Risk. As part of the Fund’s synthetic covered put strategy, the Fund purchases and sells call and put option contracts that are based on the Index level. This strategy subjects the Fund to certain of the same risks as if it shorted the Index, even though it does not. By virtue of the Fund’s indirect inverse exposure to changes in the Index level, the Fund is subject to the risk that the Index level increases. If the Index level increases, the Fund will likely lose value and, as a result, the Fund may suffer significant losses. The Fund may also be subject to the following risks: innovation and technological advancement; strong market presence of Index constituent companies; adaptability to global market trends; and resilience and recovery potential.

    Index Level Participation Risk. The Fund employs an investment strategy that includes the sale of put option contracts, which limits the degree to which the Fund will benefit from decreases in the Index level experienced over the Put Period. This means that if the Index level experiences a decrease in value below the strike level of the sold put options during a Put Period, the Fund will likely not experience that increase to the same extent and any Fund gains may significantly differ from the level of the Index losses over the Put Period. Additionally, because the Fund is limited in the degree to which it will participate in decreases in value experienced by the Index level over each Put Period, but has significant negative exposure to any increases in value experienced by the Index level over the Put Period, the NAV of the Fund may decrease over any given period. The Fund’s NAV is dependent on the value of each options portfolio, which is based principally upon the inverse of the performance of the Index level. The Fund’s ability to benefit from the Index level decreases will depend on prevailing market conditions, especially market volatility, at the time the Fund enters into the sold put option contracts and will vary from Put Period to Put Period. The value of the options contracts is affected by changes in the value and dividend rates of component companies that comprise the Index, changes in interest rates, changes in the actual or perceived volatility of the Index and the remaining time to the options’ expiration, as well as trading conditions in the options market. As the Index level changes and time moves towards the expiration of each Put Period, the value of the options contracts, and therefore the Fund’s NAV, will change. However, it is not expected for the Fund’s NAV to directly inversely correlate on a day-to-day basis with the returns of the Index level. The amount of time remaining until the options contract’s expiration date affects the impact that the value of the options contracts has on the Fund’s NAV, which may not be in full effect until the expiration date of the Fund’s options contracts. Therefore, while changes in the Index level will result in changes to the Fund’s NAV, the Fund generally anticipates that the rate of change in the Fund’s NAV will be different than the inverse of the changes experienced by the Index level.

    YieldMax® ETFs are distributed by Foreside Fund Services, LLC. Foreside is not affiliated with Tidal Financial Group, or YieldMax® ETFs.

    © 2025 YieldMax® ETFs

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI NGOs: Voices from South Darfur

    Source: Médecins Sans Frontières –

    Violence, insecurity and hunger are devastating people’s lives in South Darfur, Sudan, according to a new report released today by Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF).

    The report, Voices from South Darfur, illustrates in vivid testimony how the impact of pervasive violence, a healthcare system in ruins and an inadequate international response have all combined to push people’s coping strategies to their limits. 

    Voices from South Darfur pdf — 31.43 MB Download

    MIL OSI NGO

  • MIL-OSI Europe: ECB reports on Bulgaria’s progress towards euro adoption

    Source: European Central Bank

    4 June 2025

    • ECB report assesses Bulgaria’s progress towards Economic and Monetary Union
    • Positive assessment with respect to possible euro adoption on 1 January 2026

    Bulgaria has made good progress towards economic convergence with the euro area since 2024, according to the Convergence Report of the European Central Bank (ECB) published today.

    “This positive assessment of convergence paves the way for Bulgaria to introduce the euro as of 1 January 2026 and become the 21st EU Member State to join the euro area,” said Philip R. Lane, Member of the ECB Executive Board. “I wish to congratulate Bulgaria on its tremendous dedication to making the adjustments needed.”

    According to the ECB’s assessment, Bulgaria is within the reference values of the convergence criteria and complies with the legal requirements. Having participated in the exchange rate mechanism (ERM II) and the banking union since 10 July 2020, Bulgaria has made another step towards European integration under challenging economic conditions. Achieving an environment that is conducive to sustainable convergence in Bulgaria requires stability-oriented economic policies and wide-ranging structural reforms. These policies are discussed in more detail in the report.

    As regards the price stability criterion, in April 2025, the 12-month average rate of HICP inflation in Bulgaria stood at 2.7%, i.e. just below the reference value of 2.8% (Chart 1). The reference value is based on the three best performing Member States in terms of price stability, i.e. Ireland (1.2%), Finland (1.3%) and Italy (1.4%), taking their average inflation over the past 12 months and adding 1.5 percentage points.

    Chart 1

    HICP inflation and reference value

    (annual percentage changes)

    Sources: European Commission (Eurostat) and ECB calculations.
    Notes: 12-month moving average rounded to one decimal.

    Regarding the fiscal criterion, Bulgaria has not been subject to an excessive deficit procedure since 2012. The country’s general government budget deficit stood at 3.0% of GDP in 2024, i.e. at the level of the 3% reference value (Chart 2). Its general government gross debt-to-GDP ratio stood at 24.1%, i.e. well below the 60% reference value, and it has been well below 60% of GDP for the past 20 years.

    Chart 2

    General government balance and debt

    (as a percentage of GDP)

    Sources: European System of Central Banks and European Commission (Eurostat).

    As regards the exchange rate criterion, the Bulgarian lev participated in ERM II in the two-year reference period from 20 May 2023 to 19 May 2025. Over the reference period, the lev did not exhibit any deviation from the central rate of 1.95583 levs per euro. Bulgaria has completed almost all of its ERM II post-entry commitments, but further progress is needed to address the outstanding shortcomings in the area of anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism.

    Long-term interest rates in Bulgaria stood at 3.9%, on average, over the reference period from May 2024 to April 2025 and were therefore below the 5.1% reference value for the interest rate convergence criterion.

    As for the compatibility of national legislation, Bulgarian law is compatible with the Treaties and the Statute of the ESCB, as required under Article 131 of the Treaty.

    Today’s report was published following Bulgaria’s request, the next regular Convergence Report of the ECB will be published in 2026.

    For media queries, please contact Benoit Deeg, tel.: +49 172 1683704.

    Notes

    • European Commission Convergence Report 2025
    • Close cooperation established between ECB and Bulgaria
    • The Convergence Report of the ECB reviews the economic and legal convergence of non-euro area EU Member States with a derogation every second year or at the request of a specific country. It assesses the degree of sustainable economic convergence with the euro area, whether the national legislation is compatible with the EU legal framework, and whether the statutory requirements are fulfilled for the respective national central banks. Given its “opt-out” clause, Denmark is not covered by this assessment unless this is specifically requested by the country.
    • The cut-off date for the statistics included in this Convergence Report was 19 May 2025. The reference period for the price stability criterion and the long-term interest rate criterion is from May 2024 to April 2025. Forecasts are based on the European Commission’s Spring 2025 Economic Forecast and other information relevant to a forward-looking assessment of the sustainability of convergence.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Foreign minister Caspar Veldkamp to temporarily take over Foreign Trade and Development portfolio

    Source: Government of the Netherlands

    On June 3, 2025, Prime Minister Dick Schoof tendered the resignation of the members of government belonging to the Freedom Party (PVV) to His Majesty the King. All other ministers and state secretaries will continue in the capacity of a caretaker government. For the time being, Minister of Foreign Affairs Caspar Veldkamp will take over the duties of former foreign trade and development minister Reinette Klever.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Chancellor unveils biggest ever investment in city region local transport

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    Speech

    Chancellor unveils biggest ever investment in city region local transport

    Chancellor of the Exchequer Rachel Reeves spoke at Mellor Bus Factory in Rochdale on 4 June 2025.

    It’s fantastic to be in Rochdale, at Mellor Bus Factory;  

    Not just a good local business; although it is that 

    But also a key part of the Bee Network supply chain. 

    And good to see so many familiar faces here – including the leaders of some of our local councillors.  

    Eleven months ago today, this government was elected on a promise of change. 

    To deliver security for working people and renewal for our country.  

    To build a stronger, and more resilient Britain; 

    A country built on, and powered through, the contribution of people in all parts of our country. 

    Today, I will set out more of our plans to make that a reality.

    I know how hard the last few years have been for so many people.  

    I have always been clear that the central challenge facing this government is to improve living standards and to renew our public services. 

    And that the only sustainable way to do that is to turn around Britain’s growth performance after fourteen wasted years. 

    To put more money in people’s pockets; 

    To revive our high streets; 

    To give our children the opportunities that they need to succeed. 

    Put simply: to make working people –to make our country – better off.

    The central barrier to economic growth has been underinvestment.  

    For too long, Britain has lagged behind every other G7 economy when it comes to business investment as a share of GDP; 

    One of the consequences was that the last Parliament was the worst on record for living standards.  

    This government’s economic strategy is designed to fix that problem, underpinned by the three pillars that I set out before the election: 

    First, stability – so that investors, businesses and families have the confidence to plan for the future; 

    Second, reform – to remove the barriers that get in the way of so much potential; 

    And third, investment – the lifeblood of growth, and therefore of living standards. 

    My cabinet colleagues and I have wasted no time in pursuing this agenda: 

    Overhauling our planning system – the single greatest barrier that businesses told me was standing in their way… 

    … starting, in our first week in office, with the biggest reforms to our planning system in a generation; 

    Launching Britain’s first National Wealth Fund, to help mobilise more than £70billion of private sector investment into some of the industries of the future like clean energy, defence and tech; 

    Reforming our pensions system, to unlock billions of  pounds of investment in British assets; 

    Forging three new major trade deals to save and create jobs – with India, the United States and the European Union – covering steel, manufacturing, and agriculture 

    And, alongside that, we will be shaping a modern industrial strategy and ten-year infrastructure strategy, bringing together government, business and working people, to focus on the high potential parts of our economy and our future.

    We have already made significant progress:  

    While it is just one quarter, the most recent numbers showed Britain to be the fastest growing economy in the G7;

    And real wages rose by more in less than ten months [redacted political content].

    But we know that not enough people are feeling that yet; 

    That trust remains low, and prosperity is too narrowly shared; 

    I know that we must do more.  

    In a week’s time, I will set out a spending review targeted squarely on the renewal of Britain; 

    Focused on the priorities of working people;  

    By investing in our security, in our health, and in our economic growth. 

    To deliver on the promise of change to make you and your family better off.

    I have long said that the only viable strategy for growth today is one that builds on strong and broad foundations.  

    A Britain that is better off cannot rely on a handful of places forging ahead of the rest; 

    And so we must reject once and for all the exhausted idea that a strong economy can be powered by just a few people, just a few industries, just a few parts of the country.  

    The result of such thinking has been growth created in too few places, and too few people feeling the benefits; 

    Wide gaps between regions, and between our cities and towns; 

    A sense of injustice, as our social contract frays;  

    And diminishing returns for growth and productivity.  

    For every success story, and there are many, there is potential held back:

    By the long legacy of deindustrialisation [redacted political content] that consigned whole industries – and whole communities that depended upon them – to decline;  

    And, yes, by spending decisions made down in London.

    I’ve been a Leeds MP for fifteen years, another great city.  

    Like so many of my colleagues, wherever they represent – and so many of our constituents – I am painfully familiar with big promises that come to nothing.  

    The frustration people feel, as good work and opportunity slip away; 

    While young people are presented with a choice to stay close to home where they want to be, or to move away to find a better job, paying better wages.  

    Families wrenched apart or opportunities missed out on.  

    No one should have to make that choice.  

    So, that is why I and my colleagues are determined to change things.  

    Because I know there is brilliant talent to be found right across our country. 

    I can see the potential in all our towns and our cities; 

    The creativity and scientific rigour in our universities; 

    The leading businesses pushing at the frontier… 

    … in sectors that will be at the core of our modern industrial strategy – in tech, energy, transport, and finance. 

    I see that potential everywhere that I go. 

    I know that a prosperous United Kingdom depends on the economic strength of all its parts. 

    And on the contribution of working people everywhere.   

    And that is why, this autumn, I will be partnering with the Business Secretary, and with the mayor of the West Midlands, Richard Parker, to host a Regional Investment Summit…  

    … to showcase the investment potential that all of our regions have to offer.

    Over the next week, you will hear a lot of debate about my so-called “self-imposed” fiscal rules.  

    Now, contrary to some conventional wisdom, I didn’t come into politics because I care passionately about fiscal rules. 

    I came into politics because I want to make a difference to the lives of working people.  

    Because I believe – [redacted political content] –  that every person should have the same opportunities as others to thrive and succeed… 

    … no matter what their parents do…  

    … no matter where they grow up.  

    And because I know that economic responsibility and social justice go hand in hand. 

    After 2022, no one should need to be told about the dangers of reckless borrowing for the financial security of ordinary families.

    [redacted political content]

    And the results would be the same:  

    Market instability and interest rates rising… 

    … with soaring rents and thousands of pounds extra on families’ mortgages…Businesses would pay more for their borrowing and 

    Pensions that people save hard for would be put in peril, again. 

    I would never take those risks. [redacted political content].

    Strong and transparent fiscal rules are an indispensable safeguard for working people – and that is why my rules are non-negotiable. 

    So let’s be clear:  

    It is not me ‘imposing’ borrowing limits on government… 

    Those limits are the product of economic reality. 

    So fiscal rules do matter.

    [redacted political content]

    At the budget last year, I changed Britain’s fiscal rules to better serve both stability and investment, giving us the strong foundations that we need to renew our country as we promised. 

    The first rule is for stability: 

    That day-to-day government spending should be paid for by tax receipts.  

    That is the sound economic choice; 

    And it is the fair choice – because it is not right to expect future generations to pay for the services we rely on today.

    [redacted political content]

    Instead, we inherited a total mess:  

    A £22 billion black hole in day-to-day spending, and debt at its highest level since the early 1960s…  

    … and yet, at the same time public services at breaking point.  

    Last year, I made the decisions I judged right and necessary to get Britain on a sound financial footing…  

    … and to provide the urgent resource that our public services needed. 

    That is why I made decisions – some of them extremely difficult, and certainly not all of them popular – to raise taxes on business and indeed on the wealthiest in the budget; 

    Enabling a £190 billion real-terms increase over the Spending Review period [redacted political content]…

    … spending for our schools, our hospitals, and our police the services upon which we all rely. 

    Even with those decisions and even with that injection of cash, not every department will get everything that they want next week;  

    And I have had to say no to things that I want to do, too.  

    But that is not because of my fiscal rules; 

    It is the result of [redacted political content].

    It is the stability that my rules supports, and the choices we made as a government in October, that have helped facilitate four cuts to interest rates since the last election – saving £650 a year for a family taking out a new, typical two-year fixed-rate mortgage. 

    My second fiscal rule is what enables us to invest in Britain’s economic renewal – to keep Britain’s public sector debt on a sustainable path, while allowing government to invest in the infrastructure that will provide stronger growth in future.  

    The decisions that we made in October meant that, for the first time, the Treasury takes account of the benefits, and not just the costs, of investment. 

    Together the fiscal rules mean that, unlike our predecessors, we will not be balancing the books by cutting investment.  

    And that is why we can increase investment by over £113 billion more than the last government plans; 

    Meaning public investment will be at its highest sustained level since the 1970s. 

    Combined, these changes deliver over £300 billion of extra spending across five years, on our public services and on our economic future. 

    Britain faces a binary choice – investment, or decline.  

    And I choose investment.

    Because I believe in an entrepreneurial, and an active state; 

    And I reject wholeheartedly the old-fashioned, dogmatic view that the only good thing a government can do is to get out of the way. 

    These choices, that I am making, are about realising that entrepreneurial, and active state. 

    At the spending review, I will set out, in detail, the allocation of those additional resources – to power growth and renew our public services. 

    The choice is already clear:

    [redacted political content] we offer change.  

    Change that we can now deliver, because of the choices we have made.

    Today, I can tell you about one part of those investments. 

    They are underpinned by a step change in how government approaches and evaluates the case for investing in all of our regions. 

    The Treasury Green Book sets the guidance for how public servants assess the value for money of government projects. It may sound dry, but it’s one of the reasons why there hasn’t been enough investment in the North and Midlands for decades. 

    I have heard from mayors across the country – from Andy, but also from Steve Rotheram, the mayor of Liverpool– that previous governments have wielded the Green Book against them as an excuse to deny important investment in their areas and their people. 

    That’s why, in January, I ordered a review of the Green Book and how it is being used, to make sure that this government gives every region a fair hearing when it comes to investment. 

    I will publish the full conclusions of that review next week. 

    However, I can tell you now, that it will mark a new approach to decision-making in government; 

    And an end to siloed Whitehall thinking… 

    … making sure that government is taking account of the reinforcing economic effects of infrastructure investments, in housing, in skills and in jobs; 

    To invest in all our nations and regions, not just a few.

    Next week, I will set out our plans in full – for England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland; in housing, in energy, in roads and in rail. 

    But today, I want to tell you about just one part of our plan – renewing our transport systems in England’s largest mayoral regions, including here in Greater Manchester and across the North and the Midlands. 

    Because connectivity is an absolutely critical factor in unlocking the potential of towns and cities outside of London; 

    One of the areas in which previous governments have promised most, but delivered least. And that will now change.

    Let me tell you why it matters. 

    Modern growth rests on dynamic, connected city-regions;  

    Creating clusters of activity so that people can get around… 

    … communicate… 

    … share ideas…  

    … commute… 

    … find good work… 

    … and earn wages that flow back into strong local economies. 

    Stronger transport links within cities and the towns around them create opportunity by connecting labour markets… 

    … and making it easier for firms to buy and sell goods and services in different places, to different people.

    [redacted political content] strong investment in the past in strongly integrated transport systems, including in London, helps explain London’s  global success, and also its advantage over other UK cities.   

    We want London to succeed.

    But it is the lack of that infrastructure which puts England’s other great cities – Birmingham, Liverpool, Newcastle – at a disadvantage compared to their European counterparts that have this infrastructure. 

    That helps to explain our underperformance relative to other European economies. 

    If we were to increase the productivity of those second cities in the UK to match the national average, our economy would be £86 billion larger. 

    And so, because this government believes that prosperity must come from the contribution of us all… 

    Because all of the sizeable evidence that public investment can crowd in many times its volume in private investments… 

    And because we know the potential that exists in all of our towns and cities…  

    … I can tell you today that we will be making the biggest ever investment by a British government in transport links within our city regions, and their surrounding towns; 

    £15.6 billion in transport funding settlements, to be delivered by our regional mayors;  

    More than doubling real-terms spending on city-region connectivity.

    [redacted political content]

    Thanks to the changes to our fiscal framework announced in the budget – this government now does have the money to fund it. 

    And that money is going to our mayors, to deliver on the priorities of their communities: 

    New trams, new train stations, and bus routes to link up our towns and cities; 

    Unlocking new homes, new jobs, new investment and leisure opportunities across our regions.  

    Let me take you through those city regional investments in turn. 

    Investment in Greater Manchester… 

    … to help make the Bee Network, that is built here in Rochdale, the UK’s first fully integrated, zero-emission public transport system by 2030… 

    … with new tram stops in Bury, North Manchester and Oldham… 

    … and a new Metrolink extension to Stockport…  

    … meaning shorter commutes into central Manchester… 

    … making sure that ninety percent of Greater Manchester residents will live within a five-minute walk of a bus or tram that comes at least once every half-hour… 

    … and opening up connections for people in Bury, in Heywood, in Rochdale and in Oldham to the tens of thousands of new jobs at the Northern Gateway.  

    Investment in the Liverpool city region…  

    … backing the mayor Steve Rotheram, to deliver three new rapid bus routes… 

    … linking up the city centre, John Lennon Airport, Anfield, the new Everton stadium on Bramley-Moore Dock, and new homes built on the Central Docks redevelopment; 

    Alongside the largest ever investment in Merseyside railway stations, to serve Halton, St Helens, and Woodchurch;  

    Investment in West Yorkshire, so that Tracy Brabin can fulfil her manifesto commitment to the people of West Yorkshire to deliver the Mass Transit system…  

    … with spades in the ground by 2028, unlocking in the process over seven thousand new homes… 

    Improving local transport for 700,000 people… 

    To link up Bradford, Kirklees, Calderdale, Wakefield, Pudsey, and Leeds…  

    … the largest city in western Europe without a light rail or metro system – but not for much longer. 

    Investment in the North East…  

    … to allow our mayor Kim McGuinness to extend the Tyne and Wear Metro…  

    … linking Washington with Newcastle and Sunderland…  

    … and – in line with our industrial strategy priorities – strengthening one of the largest advanced manufacturing zones in Europe, connecting Nissan and the businesses in its supply chain to a wider pool of talent. 

    Investment in South Yorkshire, supporting our mayor Oliver Coppard… 

    … so that, in addition to the reopening of Doncaster Airport…  

    … he can renew the existing, and now publicly controlled, Supertram network… 

    … with track replacements, overhead line maintenance, and rolling stock renewal 

    … with a full fleet of new vehicles by 2032… 

    … a bigger and better integrated transport network… 

    … linking jobs and homes in Sheffield and Rotherham. 

    Investment in the West of England…  

    … backing the mayor Helen Godwin’s plans for mass transit development across the region… 

    … and improved rail infrastructure, to help unlock more services between Brabazon and the city centre… 

    … meaning shorter journey times to Bristol Temple Meads from across the wider area. 

    Investment in the Tees Valley, in Middlesborough station, unblocking local networks and increasing capacity on local lines; 

    Investment in the East Midlands, so that our mayor Claire Ward can forge the Trent Arc – linking Derby and Nottingham to create tens of thousands of new jobs and homes… 

    … connecting Infinity Park Investment Zone and the East Midlands Freeport, with sites including Ratcliffe-on-Soar, clean energy and advanced manufacturing, and East Midlands Intermodal Park, home of Toyota in the region, along the Trent Arc Corridor; 

    And investment in the West Midlands, backing our mayor Richard Parker’s plans for a metro extension from Birmingham city centre to the new Sports Quarter – to unlock more than £3 billion of private investment in an area with some of the lowest levels of economic activity in all of theUK… 

    … with the potential to create more than 8,000 jobs and catalyse the regeneration of East Birmingham and of Solihull.  

    For people living in some of our biggest cities and the towns around them, these measures will mean shorter commute times;  

    They will mean good work, and money flowing back into local economies; 

    They will mean businesses connecting with workers, customers, and supply chains;  

    They will mean the revival of high streets;

    They will mean young people able to stay close to homes and pursue the opportunities that they dream of; 

    It will mean more growth, more parts of our country benefitting, and more people and more places across the UK feeling better off.  

    In short – they will mean the renewal of our cities and our towns all across the UK.

    As we build train stations, tram lines and buses, that will mean orders for steel made here in Britain.  

    Six weeks ago, this government was presented with a choice.  

    To allow British Steel in Scunthorpe to close, or to intervene – in a way that British governments have been too reluctant to do for far too long.  

    In opposition, I promised that our economic policy would be guided by what I call “securonomics”. 

    A belief that an active state should, and would, take the necessary action to provide security for families and resilience for our national economy.  

    That we would end the days when governments turned a blind eye to where things are made and who makes them. 

    And I meant what I said. 

    And so I was not prepared to tolerate a situation in which Britain’s steel capacity was fundamentally undermined; 

    In which our infrastructure, our industries, our security became dependent on foreign imports.  

    And I was not prepared to see another working-class community lose its pride, the prosperity, the dignity that industry provides. 

    So we intervened, to save British steel and the jobs that went with it.  

    And in line with that principle, as we invest in transport for our regions, that investment will support British supply chains. 

    I promised that this [redacted political content] government would buy, make and sell more here in Britain.  

    And I meant it: 

    Growth, made in Britain.  

    Jobs, here in Britain.  

    And a new generation of crucial national infrastructure, built right here in Britain.

    What I have set out today is just one part of our ambitious plan for the renewal of Britain. 

    A plan which marks a decisive break with the days when government stood back and shrugged its shoulders, as jobs, industry and aspiration were drained away from so many of our towns and cities.   

    Steps towards a new economic model – driven by investment in all parts of the country, not just a few. 

    That is how we intend to deliver on that promise of change; 

    To make you and your family better off.  

    Next week, there will be more to come.  

    This government promised change.  

    And we are keeping that promise.  

    Thank you.

    Updates to this page

    Published 4 June 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Record number of local businesses back Southsea Food Festival

    Source: City of Portsmouth

    The popular Southsea Food Festival returns on 5 and 6 July and is supported by a record number of local businesses.  Over 80 food and drink businesses are taking part of which over half are from the Portsmouth area and backed by regional businesses that have come forward to sponsor the event.

    Celebrating its 17th anniversary, Southsea Food Festival has grown into one of the South Coast’s biggest food festivals. New for 2025 supported by Southsea Deli, Waitrose (Southsea) and Express FM is the Kitchen Stage where chefs and restaurateurs from Portsmouth businesses including The Briny and Natty’s Jerk will showcase their specialities, offering tips and tasty treats. The event is also supported by Victorious Festivals Ltd, Nation Radio, Hovertravel, toob and Portsmouth marketing specialist Evosa.

    Councillor Steve Pitt, Leader of Portsmouth City Council with responsibility for economic development said:

    “I want to thank all the local and regional businesses who have stepped up to support this year’s Southsea Food Festival. Their backing not only helps make the event a success but also supports our local economy. By working together, we can create great events for our communities, support local jobs, and showcase the incredible talent and businesses we have right here in Portsmouth.”

    The two-day event takes place in the heart of Southsea, forming a vibrant hub of activity around Clarendon Road, Palmerston Road, Osborne Road, and Avenue De Caen. Food lovers can try locally produced smokehouse BBQ, macarons, chilli sauces, wines, brewed beers and even Portsmouth’s own award-winning aged rum.  Alongside the local suppliers there are traders showcasing foods from far flung corners of the world plus plenty of options for veggies, vegans and even pet dogs. Plus, many of the hot food traders will be offering smaller “taster” portions to allow visitors to sample a greater variety of dishes.

    Southsea Food Festival is part of a programme of activities to support small businesses in Portsmouth. The event celebrates the thriving and diverse food scene of Portsmouth & Southsea’s independent restaurants, retailers, and communities.

    Find out more at rediscoverportsmouth.co.uk

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI Russia: No restrictions on train traffic between Novye Cheryomushki and Oktyabrskaya are planned for June

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: Moscow Government – Government of Moscow –

    Restrictions on the section between the stations “Novye Cheryomushki” and “Oktyabrskaya” of the Kaluzhsko-Rizhskaya line are no longer planned in June. They were necessary to create a transition to the future metro station “Akademicheskaya” of the Troitskaya line.

    “To minimize inconvenience to passengers, we introduced restrictions on weekends, when fewer people use transport. In addition, we launched free compensation buses, which transported more than 113 thousand people. Employees of the Passenger Mobility Center were on duty at stations and helped build alternative routes,” said the Deputy Mayor of Moscow for Transport and Industry

    Maxim Liksutov.

    The first two sections Troitskaya line opened Sergei Sobyanin last year. The line will connect the ZIL station with Troitsk. By 2030, the length of this line will be more than 43 kilometers. It will become the longest metro line outside the Moscow Ring Road. Now, you can transfer from the Troitskaya Line to Sokolnicheskaya and Bolshaya Koltsevaya, in the future, there will be transfers to Kaluzhsko-Rizhskaya and the Moscow Central Circle.

    Quickly find out the main news of the capital inofficial telegram channel the city of Moscow.

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    https: //vv.mos.ru/nevs/ite/154814073/

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Schools, clinics and sports complexes: what social facilities are being built in the city

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: Moscow Government – Government of Moscow –

    About 230 social infrastructure facilities are being built in the capital using municipal and extra-budgetary funds. Among them are educational, medical, sports and cultural institutions. This was reported by the Deputy Mayor of Moscow for Urban Development Policy and Construction Vladimir Efimov.

    “Currently, 149 educational and 45 sports facilities, more than 20 buildings for medical organizations and 12 for cultural institutions are being built in the capital using all sources of financing. Of the total number of social facilities under construction, 193 are being built by investors. Among them are 128 educational facilities, 42 sports complexes, 15 health and wellness institutions and eight cultural and educational facilities. In particular, in total, more than 78 thousand school and preschool places will be created in the capital at the expense of the city and investors, and clinics and medical centers will be able to accept about four thousand patients per shift,” said Vladimir Efimov.

    Modern buildings appear next to new residential developments and also complement the social infrastructure of historically established areas of the city.

    “Developers are actively involved in creating comfortable and modern social infrastructure: they are building kindergartens, schools, medical centers and sports complexes along with housing. In the future, the educational facilities they build will provide the capital with an additional 68 thousand school and preschool places. For example, in the Yuzhnoye Medvedkovo district, a kindergarten is being built on the territory of a new residential area on Polyarnaya Street. The area of the building will be about 4.4 thousand square meters, it is designed for 220 pupils,” added the Minister of the Moscow Government, Head of the Department of Urban Development Policy of the City of Moscow

    Vladislav Ovchinsky.

    Permits for the construction of all facilities were issued by the capital’s State Construction Supervision Committee. According to the head of the department Anton Slobodchikova, the committee supervises 209 buildings of various social purposes. As part of control and supervision activities, inspectors check the compliance of the erected structures and materials used with the requirements of the design documentation. Specialists of the subordinate Center for Expertise, Research and Testing in Construction carry out instrumental control, including finishing work. This guarantees the quality and safety of schools and kindergartens during their further operation.

    Investors also pay great attention to the development of sports infrastructure. Thus, in the Severnoye Butovo district, a sports and recreation complex with a football field and tennis courts will appear. Its total area will be more than 10 thousand square meters. The facility will appear near the Butovsky forest park at the address: Sadki communal zone, Polyany street, building 12, plot 2.

    Schools, kindergartens and sports centers: what social infrastructure facilities are being built in the capital

    Earlier, Sergei Sobyanin announced plans for a large-scale renovation district sports facilities.

    The construction of social facilities in Moscow corresponds to the goals and initiatives of the national project “Infrastructure for life”.

    Get the latest news quickly official telegram channelthe city of Moscow.

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    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI New Zealand: Local News – Porirua’s BizFest announces two outstanding speakers

    Source: Porirua City Council

    One of New Zealand’s most iconic athletes will be speaking at Porirua’s BizFest on 1 July, joining the founder of an international dance company who grew up in Cannons Creek.
    BizFest 2025: Kōpū i te pae – Light up the Horizon will take place on 1 July, a day that aims to inspire and connect business people in our city. Topics of discussion on the day will include what’s on the economic horizon, how business leaders are navigating uncertain times in the business world, and what are the key ingredients for innovation and success now and into the future.
    Dame Valerie Adams is recognised worldwide for her feats in shot put and is a leader and role model in the Pacific community for her work outside athletics.
    From 2006 to 2016, Dame Valerie was unbeaten in major championships and won Olympic gold at Beijing 2008 and London 2012. A seven-time Halberg sportswoman of the year, her story is one that inspires – post her shot put career, she works in the community to support a number of causes and with commercial partners, while also being chair of the World Athletics Athletes’ Commission, a World Athletics Council member and on the board of High Performance Sport New Zealand.
    Porirua Mayor Anita Baker says having Dame Valerie speak in Porirua is a coup, bringing value to the event by being able to share her experiences as an athlete at the very highest level, her commitment to her community and health and wellbeing, and her advocacy for athletes, especially among women in sport.
    “Someone like Dame Valerie will add immense value to BizFest – she is someone who has demonstrated perseverance, discipline and an amazing work ethic, prioritising health and wellbeing, and commitment to helping others. I can’t wait to hear what she has to say about pushing through challenges and building resilience,” Mayor Baker says.
    Black Grace’s Neil Ieremia, meanwhile, will add a homegrown flavour to BizFest, with his journey one of inspiration and perspiration.
    Born in Cannons Creek and of Samoan heritage, Ieremia left home and his banking job at 19 and enrolled in a fulltime dance programme.
    Founding dance company Black Grace in 1995, he has enjoyed sell-out performances in the US, Mexico and Canada and won numerous accolades at home and abroad for what Black Grace has achieved across the world.
    Appointed an Officer of the New Zealand Order of Merit in 2016, Ieremia received the inaugural Moana Creative Enterprise Award at the 2022 Pacific Business Trust Awards and is an honorary member of Dance ICONS, the international organisation of choreographers, along with numerous other honours.
    Mayor Baker says Ieremia’s talk at BizFest should not be missed.
    “Neil was rightly inducted into our Hall of Fame at Te Rauparaha Arena in 2022 – he is a local who has gone on to impressive heights around the world and will have a beautiful and authentic story to tell about seizing opportunities and taking our stories from Porirua to the global stage.” 

    MIL OSI New Zealand News

  • MIL-OSI New Zealand: Healthline celebrates its 25-year anniversary of trusted service and impact – and launches a GP booking initiative

    Source: Whakarongorau Aotearoa

    An estimated 3.45 million people have contacted Healthline since it launched 25 years ago
    Whether it is for a 2am check on their baby’s continuous crying, a rash on an arm, or information about where to get more help, the people of Aotearoa know they can rely on the free, 24/7, trusted support from Healthline clinicians. They have relied on that for 25 years – a milestone that is being acknowledged this month.
    There are thousands of people across Aotearoa who have a Healthline magnet on their fridge, who have the 0800 611 116 number in their phone, and who rely on unseen Healthline nurses and paramedics. Healthline plays a critical role in improving access to care.
    Hannah Sleeman, lives in a remote area of the Waikato and has used Healthline several times including when her sore ear symptom was quickly identified by a Healthcare clinician as shingles, and she was advised to see a doctor. She was given the costs and locations of local clinics and was able to get the care she needed quickly.
    The Healthline service has grown from an initial 16 nurses managing 20,000 calls in its first year, to over 150 nurses and paramedics managing 400,000 contacts annually – that’s 1,000 every day.
    What started as a phone service in May 2000 has expanded to include online services, with callers able to share videos and photos to help Healthline clinicians provide the most accurate advice. In addition to calling the trusted 0800 611116 number, people now access Healthline’s healthy.org.nz website for reliable health information, and can request a call back from a clinician, if their query isn’t urgent. The service also now includes the option for people to speak with a Māori clinician.
    Healthline is funded by Health New Zealand and since 2015 has been run by Whakarongorau Aotearoa / New Zealand Telehealth Services.
    Whakarongorau CEO Glynis Sandland said “Healthline is a virtual first responder for health queries, across multiple digital channels. It also plays a critical role in health sector – with 84% of Healthline callers managed through self-care at home or directed to community care, significantly reducing strain on our hospital emergency departments. We know that Healthline is considered by many as a taonga / treasure for the people of New Zealand.”
    Elle Edwards is a mother who was unsure what to do when she accidentally took a double dose of medication late in the night. She called Healthline to ask if she could breastfeed her baby. “They were so helpful and patient and reassuring,” said Elle.
    “Our clinicians are all experienced and specifically tele-triage trained experts and are seriously good at what they do. That’s why 98% of people who contact Healthline follow the advice they are given,” said Sandland.
    “Over the last 25 years Healthline clinicians have seen it all and they have supported people through major events including the Canterbury earthquakes, measles outbreaks, and the COVID pandemic.
    “Healthline has a proud and impactful past, and a very important future. That is definitely something to celebrate.”
    Helen Parry was one of the first nurses on the Healthline team in 2000 and her family were surprised when she said she was going to be providing health triage over the phone. “I was really pleased to be part of such an innovative new way to care and a wonderful service,” said Parry.
    The Healthline 25th anniversary was celebrated at an event at parliament 4 June 2025 hosted by Associate Minister of Health Matt Doocey. At the event Whakarongorau – who run Healthline – announced a new booking initiative
    From next month, when a Healthline nurse or paramedic recomm

    MIL OSI New Zealand News

  • MIL-OSI New Zealand: Culture and Heritage – Manatū Taonga releases draft report on culture in a digital age

    Source: Ministry for Culture and Heritage

    Manatū Taonga Ministry for Culture and Heritage has released a draft Long-term Insights Briefing – a futures-thinking report – on culture in the digital age.
    A Long-term Insights Briefing (LTIB) provides analysis and information about medium and long-term tr

    MIL OSI New Zealand News

  • MIL-OSI New Zealand: University Research – Multiple sclerosis prevalence on the sharp increase: study – UoA

    Source: University of Auckland (UoA)

    The number of people diagnosed with multiple sclerosis (MS) in New Zealand increased by a third between 2006 and 2022, according to research from the University of Auckland.

    The prevalence of multiple sclerosis in New Zealand has sharply risen since 2006, especially in some communities, according to a University of Auckland study.

    Lead author Dr Natalia Boven, a postdoctoral fellow from the University’s COMPASS Research Centre, says the study found the MS prevalence rate had climbed to 96.6 per 100,000 people as of June 2022, an increase from 72.4 per 100,000 in 2006. 

    “And notably, while European New Zealanders are being diagnosed with MS at a higher rate (132.4 per 100,000), we found MS increased substantially for Māori, Pacific peoples and Asian ethnic groups over the same period,” she says.

    Boven says Māori rates rose from 15.0 per 100,000 to 33.1 per 100,000 in 2022, the Pacific rate rose to 9.2 per 100,000 and the Asian ethnic group rate increased to 16.0 per 100,000.

    “And of concern is the data shows people living in more deprived areas were less likely to be diagnosed with MS,” says Boven. “This pattern was more pronounced for Māori and Pacific peoples, which suggests they may face barriers accessing services to receive a MS diagnosis.”

    As a social scientist, she says more research is needed to find out whether this is the case, and what the barriers might be, as an early diagnosis can make all the difference in terms of delaying disease progression and therefore improving quality of life.

    Experts agree that multiple sclerosis is a manageable and treatable condition in most cases, especially with early diagnosis.
     
    Recently published in the New Zealand Medical Journal, the study was backed by Multiple Sclerosis New Zealand (MSNZ).

    National manager Amanda Rose says patients regularly report the biggest barriers to diagnosis are a lack of MS awareness in the community, and critical shortages of specialist services which can delay diagnosis from a couple of weeks to as long as several years in some instances.  

    “Too many New Zealanders face delays in being diagnosed with MS due to limited access to specialist neurologist appointments and MRI scans,” says Rose.

    “The longstanding shortage of neurologists in Aotearoa has created long waiting lists for many people with neurological conditions, including MS. We’ve been advocating for over ten years to increase our number of neurologists, with little to no progress.” 

    The study used the Stats NZ Integrated Data Infrastructure (IDI) and included anonymous data from hospitalisations, disability support, pharmaceutical dispensing of MS treatments and needs assessments.  

    To build on the study’s findings and support targeted advocacy for those with the condition, Multiple Sclerosis New Zealand has now contracted University researchers at COMPASS to expand their scope.

    They will again be using IDI data to explore the demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of people living with MS in Aotearoa; including geographic distribution, education, income, and employment history, access to disability support, allied healthcare, and income support.  

    Identifying multiple sclerosis in linked administrative health data in Aotearoa New Zealand by Natalia Boven, Deborah Mason, Barry Milne, Anna Ranta, Andrew Sporle, Lisa Underwood, Julie Winter-Smith, and Vanessa Selak is published in the 28 March edition of the New Zealand Medical Journal.

    MIL OSI New Zealand News

  • MIL-OSI New Zealand: Transporting NZ – Mid-term pass mark for transport but Govt must try harder

    Source: Ia Ara Aotearoa Transporting New Zealand

    Transporting New Zealand says the Coalition Government is making good progress on transport, halfway through their first term and six months since Minister Chris Bishop was appointed to the portfolio.
    However, the road freight body is warning that ongoing ferry delays and roading cost pressures are shaping up as big challenges.
    Head of Policy and Advocacy Billy Clemens says that of the eight practical commitments identified in Transporting New Zealand’s (February 2025) Briefing to the Incoming Minister, the Government has achieved or progressed half, two were ongoing, and two had earned fail grades.
    “Upon Minister Bishop’s appointment we identified eight quick-win commitments, across transport and other portfolios, that would provide practical support and reassurance to our road freight members.”
    “This followed a similar list of priorities in our Briefing to Minister Brown in December 2023.”
    Transporting New Zealand noted excellent progress on random roadside drug testing, tax incentives for business investments, vocational training reform, and road maintenance.
    Progress on Cook Strait Ferry replacements, freight exemptions for congestion charging, and responding to cost pressure on roading projects had been disappointing.
    “You’re starting to see the delay in ferry procurement start to bite, with the Awatere’s retirement leaving KiwiRail with only two vessels for the next four years.”
    “NZTA’s proposed downgrades to the tolled Ōtaki to North of Levin new highway also demonstrate the need for the Government stump up with additional funding to deliver their roading promises.”
    Transporting New Zealand says the Government also has an excellent opportunity to support safety and productivity outcomes through driver licensing and High Productivity Motor Vehicle reforms.
    Transporting New Zealand’s Scorecard (as per quick-wins listed in their February 2025 Briefing to the Incoming Minister)
    Transport
    1. Additional roading investment in Budget 2025 – Partially Achieved
    While there were important boosts for road repair in Hawke’s Bay and the East Coast, the Budget should have provided additional support to the Roads of Regional and National Significance, that NZTA are now under pressure to downgrade, with serious implications for efficiency and safety.
    2. Random roadside drug testing – Achieved
    Legislation enabling random roadside drug testing passed in March, with the support of National, ACT, New Zealand First, and Labour. The roadside drug testing regime is expected to be in place by December, with the government wanting police to undertake 50,000 tests a year.
    3. Freight exemptions to time-of-use charging – Ongoing
    Congestion charging enabling legislation is currently being considered by the Transport and Infrastructure Select Committee. Transporting New Zealand’s suggested amendments would prevent congestion charges acting as a de facto goods tax.
    4. Tax incentives for efficient heavy vehicles – Achieved
    The Government’s Investment Boost tax incentive will help get more productive, efficient heavy vehicles on the road, and support investment across the entire economy.
    5. Incentivising fleet renewal through emissions regulations – Ongoing
    Work on vehicle standards and reducing regulatory barriers to importing efficient heavy vehicles is currently being worked through.
    Transport, State-Owned Enterprises and Rail
    6. Prioritise the prompt delivery of replacement Cook Strait ferries – Not Achieved
    It has been 539 days since Cabinet advised KiwiRail that the Government was pulling the plug on the iReX Project following repeated cost blowouts. Despite contrary advice from a Ministerial Advisory Group, the Government is proceeding with rail-enabled vessels, that have still not been procured.
    Immigration and Workforce Development
    7. Support vocational training and allowing migrant drivers to fill critical workforce shortages – Partially Achieved
    The Government’s tertiary education reforms will ensure automotive vocational education is relevant to both trainees and employers alike. However, the termination of the temporary residence pathway for migrant truck drivers has left businesses in hard-to-staff regions facing recruitment challenges.
    ACC
    8. Save ACC’s Fleet Saver levy reduction programme – Not Achieved
    ACC is proceeding to close the safe fleet management incentive to new members from this year, and close it completely in 2029. The Minister for ACC still has the opportunity to defer this decision until an effective alternative can be developed, that will maintain safety benefits for all road users. 
    About Ia Ara Aotearoa Transporting New Zealand
    Ia Ara Aotearoa Transporting New Zealand is the peak national membership association representing the road freight transport industry. Our members operate urban, rural and inter- regional commercial freight transport services throughout the country.
    Road is the dominant freight mode in New Zealand, transporting 92.8% of the freight task on a tonnage basis, and 75.1% on a tonne-km basis. The road freight transport industry employs over 34,000 people across more than 4700 businesses, with an annual turnover of $6 billion.

    MIL OSI New Zealand News

  • MIL-OSI New Zealand: NZNO backs people’s pay equity select committee

    Source: New Zealand Nurses Organisation

    Representing a third of the pay equity claims scrapped by the Coalition Government, NZNO is throwing its full support behind the People’s Select Committee on Pay Equity.
    Members of the New Zealand Nurses Organisation Tōpūtanga Tapuhi Kaitiaki o Aotearoa (NZNO) had 12 pay equity claims being progressed across the health sector including aged care, primary health care, hospices, Plunket, community health and laboratories when the scheme was gutted on 6 May.
    These claims covered almost 10,000 nurses, health care assistants, allied health workers and administration staff. A further 35,000 NZNO Te Whatu Ora members had their pay equity review halted by the changes, meaning their pay would again fall behind.
    NZNO Primary Health Care Nurses College chair Tracey Morgan says it was devastating to the 5000 primary health care members that their claim was scuppered without warning or legitimate reason.
    “It was antidemocratic and an attack on women for the Government not to have consulted the workers whose lives they were changing. Primary and community health care nurses, like their hospice, Plunket and aged care counterparts, accepted lower wage increases in their collective agreements on the understanding they were likely to receive pay equity settlements.
    “Now they can have their say through the People’s Select Committee on Pay Equity.
    “The committee of 10 former women MPs from across the political spectrum are strong wahine who helped establishment the previous system to address the gender discrimination which has kept down their wages their whole working lives.”
    Most New Zealanders – 68 percent – believe the Government should have consulted on the changes, a new poll released today found.
    Tracey Morgan says NZNO urges all its members to submit their views to the Select Committee so they can be heard when it meets in August.

    MIL OSI New Zealand News

  • MIL-OSI New Zealand: Education – Open Polytechnic launches new Introduction to Generative AI micro-credential

    Source: Open Polytechnic

    A new micro-credential developed by Open Polytechnic, New Zealand’s specialist online learning provider, in conjunction with Spark, offers businesses and individuals the opportunity to understand and utilise Artificial Intelligence (AI).
    The Introduction to Generative AI micro-credential, now open for enrolment, provides ākonga (learners) with an introductory understanding of how generative artificial intelligence can drive efficiency and innovation in Aotearoa New Zealand.
    Topics covered in the micro-credential include practical guidelines for getting the most out of generative AI, the ethical use of AI, and Māori data sovereignty.
    “Open Polytechnic is a world leader in online and distance education with significant expertise in educational technology,” says Open Polytechnic Executive Director Alan Cadwallader.
    “We are pleased to be able to combine our expertise with a company like Spark NZ to provide opportunities for busy adult learners to upskill in AI and learn more about the latest advancements.”
    “By completing this micro-credential, ākonga will learn how to integrate generative AI tools into their workflows, enhance communication, and leverage these technologies to streamline operations and enhance overall performance. This highly relevant micro-credential will also teach ākonga about the ethical implications and limitations of generative AI uniquely applied in an Aotearoa New Zealand context.”
    Once ākonga (learners) have completed this micro-credential, they will have a basic understanding of Generative Artificial Intelligence to support their productivity, in both personal and work contexts, and know how to assess the generated content for accuracy, quality, and relevance.
    This micro-credential is relevant for people in different industries including media and entertainment, advertising, education, healthcare, and finance.
    Open Polytechnic has been pleased to work with Spark in the development of this NZQA accredited micro-credential.
    Spark is on its own AI journey, with a focus on upskilling its people through Te Awe, a skills acceleration programme within Spark that is building the “hard to access” specialist digital skills needed in today’s world.
    “As the use of AI accelerates, we want to ensure that the skills shift we are experiencing does not further entrench existing inequities within the technology sector and our community. When we created Te Awe, our ambition was to eventually extend offering the digital skills and opportunities to learn them, to those groups who currently have low participation rates in the tech sector, to ensure we are intentionally growing a more inclusive high-tech workforce pipeline for the future,” says Heather Polglase, Spark People and Culture Director.
    “We are excited to build on Spark’s Te Awe foundations and take that next step now with the creation of an NZQA accredited Generative AI micro-credential. We have taken our learnings from Te Awe and collaborated with Open Polytechnic, as a business division of Te Pūkenga, to create a nationally recognised micro-credential, that will equip more New Zealanders with the skills and knowledge to co-create and engage with AI meaningfully.”
    Spark will be sponsoring micro-credentials for 30 digi-coaches (digital teachers) from around the country, who are a part of a Ministry of Social Development (MSD) and Digital Inclusion Alliance Aotearoa programme to support digital literacy in local communities. These digi-coaches will work in public libraries and community venues to help upskill digital literacy skills for local citizens.
    “We’re excited to be one of the first to engage with this new GenAI micro-credential”, said Laurence Zwimpfer, Operations Director for the Digital Inclusion Alliance Aotearoa.
    “We have invited 30 jobseekers on our Digi-Coach programme to complete this course as part of their 13-week training, which includes work placements in libraries and other community organisations. We believe this will give them a real advantage in securing jobs and helping the communities and organisations that they work with to better understand and use GenAI tools.”
    Ākonga who complete the micro-credential receive a digital badge that can then be shared on social media or mentioned on a work-related CV.
    The Level 3 micro-credential can be completed online in 40 learning hours, with two intakes each month, making it ideal for personal or professional development.
    If you are a business or individual that is interested in utilising AI technology, then go to the Open Polytechnic website. Terms and conditions apply. 
    At a glance
    Open Polytechnic
    Introduction to Generative Artificial Intelligence (AI) micro-credential
    Level: 3
    Credits: 4
    Total learning hours: 40 – study online at your own pace, up to 16 weeks to complete
    Cost: $99 including GST 

    MIL OSI New Zealand News

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Result of tenders of RMB Sovereign Bonds held on June 4, 2025

    Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

    Result of tenders of RMB Sovereign Bonds held on June 4, 2025 The following is issued on behalf of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority:

    Result of the tenders of RMB Sovereign Bonds held on June 4, 2025:

    Tender Result
    *******************************************************************
    Tender Date : June 4, 2025
    Bonds available for Tender : 2-year RMB Bonds
    Issuer : The Ministry of Finance of the People’s Republic of China
    Issue Number : BCMKFB25004 (Further Issuance)
    Issue and Settlement Date : June 6, 2025
    Maturity Date : February 21, 2027 (or the closest coupon payment date)
    Coupon Rate : 1.75 per cent
    Application Amount : RMB 10,940 million
    Issue Amount : RMB 3,500 million
    Average Accepted Price : 100.48
    Lowest Accepted Price : 100.43
    Highest Accepted Price : 100.68
    Allocation Ratio (At Lowest Accepted Price) : Approximately 33.82 per cent
    Tender Result
    *******************************************************************
    Tender Date : June 4, 2025
    Bonds available for Tender : 3-year RMB Bonds
    Issuer : The Ministry of Finance of the People’s Republic of China
    Issue Number : BCMKFB25005 (Further Issuance)
    Issue and Settlement Date : June 6, 2025
    Maturity Date : February 21, 2028 (or the closest coupon payment date)
    Coupon Rate : 1.80 per cent
    Application Amount : RMB 12,428 million
    Issue Amount : RMB 3,000 million
    Average Accepted Price : 100.85
    Lowest Accepted Price : 100.75
    Highest Accepted Price : 101.20
    Allocation Ratio (At Lowest Accepted Price) : Approximately 50.38 per cent
    Tender Result
    *******************************************************************
    Tender Date : June 4, 2025
    Bonds available for Tender : 5-year RMB Bonds
    Issuer : The Ministry of Finance of the People’s Republic of China
    Issue Number : BCMKFB25006 (Further Issuance)
    Issue and Settlement Date : June 6, 2025
    Maturity Date : February 21, 2030 (or the closest coupon payment date)
    Coupon Rate : 1.88 per cent
    Application Amount : RMB 10,957 million
    Issue Amount : RMB 3,000 million
    Average Accepted Price : 101.56
    Lowest Accepted Price : 101.27
    Highest Accepted Price : 102.19
    Allocation Ratio (At Lowest Accepted Price) : Approximately 7.27 per cent
    Tender Result
    *******************************************************************
    Tender Date : June 4, 2025
    Bonds available for Tender : 10-year RMB Bonds
    Issuer : The Ministry of Finance of the People’s Republic of China
    Issue Number : BCMKFB25007 (Further Issuance)
    Issue and Settlement Date : June 6, 2025
    Maturity Date : February 21, 2035 (or the closest coupon payment date)
    Coupon Rate : 2.08 per cent
    Application Amount : RMB 15,210 million
    Issue Amount : RMB 3,000 million
    Average Accepted Price : 103.32
    Lowest Accepted Price : 102.94
    Highest Accepted Price : 106.16
    Allocation Ratio (At Lowest Accepted Price) : Approximately 57.28 per cent
    Ends/Wednesday, June 4, 2025
    Issued at HKT 12:37

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: LCQ19: Protection of Wages on Insolvency Fund

    Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

    Following is a question by Reverend Canon the Hon Peter Douglas Koon and a written reply by the Secretary for Labour and Welfare, Mr Chris Sun, in the Legislative Council today (June 4):

    Question:

    Regarding the Protection of Wages on Insolvency Fund (PWIF), will the Government inform this Council:

    (1) of the number of approved applications under the PWIF and their percentage in the total number of bankruptcy cases over the past five years;

    (2) of the total amount of ex gratia payment released under the PWIF, the accumulated surplus of PWIF and the average amount approved per application in each of the past five years;

    (3) given that the PWIF implemented enhancement measures in June 2022, which included engagement of private law firms to assist applicants in filing winding-up/bankruptcy petitions against the employers, and setting up of an in-house legal team to make recommendations direct to the Labour Department (LD) in respect of applications under section 18 of the Protection of Wages on Insolvency Ordinance (Cap. 380), of the respective number of (a) cases referred to law firms for follow-up actions (broken down into (i) cases with assistance rendered to applicants in filing winding-up/bankruptcy petitions against employers and (ii) cases not requiring the filing of winding-up/bankruptcy petitions against employers), and (b) cases received by the in-house legal team (broken down into (i) cases with recommendations made to the LD in accordance with Cap. 380 and (ii) cases not requiring the making of recommendations), since the implementation of the said enhancement measures;

    (4) given that the Government has established an interdepartmental task force to strengthen co-operation in combating illegal activities relating to PWIF abuse, in respect of fraud and other illegal acts involving the PWIF in the past five years, of (i) the number of employers, company directors, responsible individuals and employees prosecuted by the government departments concerned, and (ii) the number of successful applications made by the government departments concerned to the court for disqualifying responsible individuals of companies from being directors and taking part in the formation or management of a company;

    (5) whether it will consider increasing the penalties for PWIF abuse by legislative amendments so as enhance deterrence; if so, of the details; if not, the reasons for that;

    (6) given that the Government indicated in the paper submitted to the Panel on Manpower of this Council on March 25 last year that it would review the coverage of ex gratia payment in respect of severance payment under PWIF to explore the room for further increasing the payment ceiling in order to enhance its fully covered rate, of the progress made in this regard, and whether the Government will consider extending the coverage of the PWIF to include mandatory contributions to the Mandatory Provident Fund defaulted by employers; whether it will consider establishing a mechanism to review the PWIF regularly; if so, of the details; if not, the reasons for that; and

    (7) given that starting from April 1 last year, the Government waives the business registration levy of $150 payable to the PWIF for two years, whether the Government will consider, on the premise of not affecting the PWIF’s operation, further reducing and/or waiving such levy in the light of the slowdown in economic growth; if so, of the details; if not, the reasons for that?

    Reply:

    President,

    Established under the Protection of Wages on Insolvency Ordinance (PWIO), the Protection of Wages on Insolvency Fund (PWIF) aims to provide timely financial relief in the form of ex gratia payment to employees in the event of business closure of their insolvent employers. The affected employees may apply for ex gratia payment from the PWIF in respect of arrears in wages, pay for untaken annual leave, pay for untaken statutory holidays, wages in lieu of notice and/or severance payments (SP) owed by their employers.

    In response to the Member’s question, the reply is provided below:

    (1) From 2020 to 2024, the number of approved applications under the PWIF in each year is at Annex 1. The Labour Department (LD) does not keep the total number of winding-up/bankruptcy cases.

    (2) From 2020 to 2024, the total amount of ex gratia payment released under the PWIF, the average amount of ex gratia payment released per application approved and the accumulated surplus in each year are at Annex 2.

    (3) Since November 2022, the PWIF has launched enhancement measures including appointing law firms to provide free legal service to applicants to assist them in filing winding-up or bankruptcy petitions against their employers for cases under section 16 of the PWIO, so as to save them from applying for legal aid at the Legal Aid Department (LAD) and undergoing the means test to expedite the processing of applications. In addition, the PWIF has set up an internal legal team to provide the LD with recommendations on applications involving section 18 of the PWIO in place of recommendations from the LAD.

    As at April 2025, the PWIF had referred 569 cases to the appointed law firms for follow-up, while the in-house legal team had received 1 116 cases. The breakdown of the number of cases referred to the law firms for follow-up by cases with assistance rendered to applicants in filing winding-up/bankruptcy petitions against their employers and cases not requiring the filing of winding-up/bankruptcy petitions against employers, and the breakdown of the number of cases received by the in-house legal team by cases with recommendations made to the LD under section 18 of the PWIO and cases not requiring the making of recommendations are at Annex 3.

    (4) and (5) The Government takes a serious view on suspected abuse of PWIF by employers, and has set up an inter-departmental Task Force comprising representatives from the LD, the Commercial Crime Bureau of the Hong Kong Police Force (the Police) and the Official Receiver’s Office (ORO) to strengthen proactive investigation of suspicious cases.

    The LD rigorously verifies and closely monitors every application to the PWIF, and pays attention to whether the company responsible persons are involved in any other unlawful acts while operating the business and managing the finance of the company. If it is found that the company responsible persons are suspected of illegal transfer of assets, theft of company money, evasion of liabilities by deception, failure to keep proper accounting records, etc, the LD will refer such cases to the Police and/or the ORO for follow-up. When there is sufficient evidence, the law enforcement agencies will take out prosecution in accordance with the legislation such as the Theft Ordinance and the Crimes Ordinance. Upon conviction, the maximum penalty is imprisonment for 14 years (for example, in the case of fraud). Besides, as stipulated under the PWIO, any person who, in providing information in respect of a PWIF application, makes any statement which he knows to be false, or recklessly makes a false statement, or produces any false documents or records with the intent to deceive, may be prosecuted. Upon conviction, the maximum penalty is a fine of $50,000 and imprisonment for three months.

    From 2020 to 2024, the LD referred five cases involving suspected abuse of the PWIF to the Police. No substantiated case of abusing the PWIF was detected during the period. Upon referrals from the LD, the ORO during the same period disqualified through the court a total of 15 company directors and/or responsible persons from assuming a director of a company and from taking part in the promotion, formation or management of a company.

    (6) The Protection of Wages on Insolvency Fund Board (PWIF Board) and the LD review the coverage of the PWIF from time to time taking into account the socio-economic development and needs, with a view to improving the protection for employees affected by business closure of their insolvent employers in a reasonably practicable manner.

    Upon the passage of a resolution of the Legislative Council under the PWIO on March 20, 2025, the maximum amount of ex gratia payment on SP under the PWIF was increased from $100,000 plus 50 per cent of excess entitlement to $200,000 plus 50 per cent of excess entitlement to further improve the protection for employees. The new maximum amount came into effect on March 21, 2025, upon gazettal of the resolution.

    The PWIF releases payment in the form of ex gratia payment to employees who are owed wages and major sums payable upon termination of employment contracts in accordance with the Employment Ordinance. On the other hand, the Mandatory Provident Fund Schemes Ordinance aims to assist employees in accumulating the Mandatory Provident Fund (MPF) to enhance retirement protection. As the policy objectives of the PWIF and the MPF are different, the Government has no plan to expand the scope of the PWIF to cover the defaulted MPF mandatory contributions of employers.

    (7) The PWIF is mainly financed by a levy per annum on business registration. From June 17, 2022, the levy is reduced from $250 to $150 a year. In the 2024-25 Budget, the Financial Secretary announced to increase the business registration fee by $200 to $2,200 with effect from April 1, 2024. To relieve the relevant impact on enterprises, the Government waived the levy of $150 payable to the PWIF with effect from the same date for two years until March 31, 2026. The PWIF will resume the collection of the levy from April 1, 2026.

    Considering the implementation of the abolition of MPF offsetting arrangement will result in additional expenditure for the ex gratia payment on SP, the PWIF Board will continue to closely monitor the financial position of the PWIF to ensure that the PWIF maintains a stable income and a reasonable accumulated surplus to meet the additional expenditure arising from economic downturns and to sustain its continuous operation. The Government has no plan to adjust the levy at this stage.

    Ends/Wednesday, June 4, 2025
    Issued at HKT 12:06

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: LCQ17: Incident of malfunction of air-conditioning system in private hospital

    Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

    Following is a question by the Hon Michael Tien and a written reply by the Secretary for Health, Professor Lo Chungmau, in the Legislative Council today (June 4): Question: It has been reported that in the middle of last year, a malfunction of the airconditioning system in the operating theatres of the main block of St. Teresa’s Hospital (the Hospital) in Kowloon lasted approximately 45 minutes, affecting a total of 12 operations. Some doctors and patients subsequently complained with the Department of Health (DH), which concluded its investigation in March of this year. DH stated that the Hospital had not breached the requirements. In this connection, will the Government inform this Council: (1) as it has been reported that a doctor indicated that at the time of the incident, he felt that airflow in the operating theatre had stopped, that condensation water had caused the operating lamp to drip, and that the endoscope lens and connecting components were suspected to be dampened. The Hospital once denied that the situation aforesaid had occurred in its operating theatres, but after the media reported the aforesaid incident, the Hospital changed its version of the incident several times. During the investigation conducted at the Hospital by DH, whether DH inspected the operating theatres in question (e.g. by conducting environmental simulations or taking samples in the operating theatres) and found out why the Hospital had changed 04/06/2025, 12:11 LCQ17: Incident of malfunction of air-conditioning system in private hospital https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/202506/04/P2025060400277p.htm 1/7 its statement several times; if so, of the details; if not, the reasons for that; (2) as DH has indicated that airconditioning interruption is not a reportable event of private hospitals and there was no breach of the requirements of the Private Healthcare Facilities Ordinance (Cap. 633) (the Ordinance) and the Code of Practice for Private Hospitals (the CoP) was found by the investigation, whether DH will review the Ordinance and the CoP in due course, following the occurrence of the aforesaid incident, to safeguard the level of medical safety in private healthcare facilities and enhance transparency in incident handling; if so, of the details; if not, the reasons for that; and (3) as it has been reported that the patient concerned has indicated that the Hospital has not yet explained the aforesaid incident to her, whether the authorities have put in place a mechanism to require private hospitals to follow up with patients concerned and find out more about their situation; if so, of the details; if not, the reasons for that? Reply: President, In consultation with the Department of Health (DH), the reply to the various parts of the question raised by the Hon Michael Tien is as follows: (1) and (2) The DH currently regulates private hospitals in accordance with the Private Healthcare Facilities Ordinance (Cap. 633) (Ordinance). The primary objective is to ensure that premises providing medical services can meet the stipulated facility and safety standards. In accordance with the Ordinance, the Government established the Advisory 04/06/2025, 12:11 LCQ17: Incident of malfunction of air-conditioning system in private hospital https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/202506/04/P2025060400277p.htm 2/7 Committee for Regulatory Standards for Private Healthcare Facilities (Advisory Committee), which comprises representatives from the Hong Kong Academy of Medicine and its constituent colleges, the Hospital Authority, the academia, as well as associations of private hospitals, medical practitioners and dentists. The terms of reference of the Advisory Committee include devising, reviewing and updating the standards of regulation for private healthcare facilities (PHFs), as well as making recommendations on the codes of practice for PHFs issued by the Director of Health (DoH). The Code of Practice for Private Hospitals (CoP), which is issued by the DoH in accordance with the Ordinance and updated from time to time, sets out the licensing and operating standards for private hospitals, including related requirements for hospital facilities and equipment. The current CoP stipulates that fittings and equipment of hospitals must be maintained in good operational order, and requires hospitals to have contingency plans for emergencies (e.g. fire outbreak, cessation of water and electricity supply). It also stipulates that healthcare engineering systems (i.e. electrical installations, specialised ventilation systems and medical gas supplies) must be properly maintained to meet service needs and ensure patient safety. Reportable events for private hospitals are also set out therein. Regarding the incident in Member’s question, the DH was notified by a doctor on September 2, 2024, about an air-conditioning interruption which happened in the operating theatres on the second floor of St. Teresa’s Hospital in the evening of July 31, 2024. Although air-conditioning interruption is not a reportable event for private hospitals under the current CoP, the DH 04/06/2025, 12:11 LCQ17: Incident of malfunction of air-conditioning system in private hospital https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/202506/04/P2025060400277p.htm 3/7 considered that the incident might involve potential patient safety concerns and therefore promptly initiated an investigation on the same day the notification was received (September 2, 2024). This included sending staff to conduct an inspection at the hospital concerned, checking relevant documents of the hospital, evaluating the effectiveness of its contingency measures, assessing the environmental condition of the operating theatres during the air-conditioning interruption and following up on the remedial actions. According to the investigation, the incident involved a malfunction of the airconditioning system used to regulate room temperature which lasted about one hour. During the time, a total of 10 surgeries were being performed in various operating theatres. The hospital explained to the DH that dehumidifiers were immediately deployed in the operating theatres where higher risk surgeries were being performed, including the one where the doctor was performing an operation. Upon the DH’s enquiry, hospital staff and the nurses on site stated that the severity of condensation in the operating theatres did not result in water dripping onto the surgical site of patients. The hospital did not change its statement to the DH during the course of investigation. As for media reports suggesting that “the hospital had changed its statement several times”, the DH will not offer any comment. The DH also examined the hospital’s records and noted that the ventilation system used for infection control in the operating theatres (including air filtration equipment, hourly air change rate and a positive pressure environment) was operating normally during the incident, and all surgeries had been completed according to the original schedule. After the incident, the hospital made a prompt follow-up by 04/06/2025, 12:11 LCQ17: Incident of malfunction of air-conditioning system in private hospital https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/202506/04/P2025060400277p.htm 4/7 conducting air sampling of the operating theatres and surveillance on conditions of patients who underwent surgeries during the affected period for infection. No abnormality was detected. Based on the available relevant evidence gathered on the incident, the DH considered that the hospital had taken appropriate contingency measures in response to the emergencies, and there was insufficient evidence to show that the hospital had contravened the requirements of the Ordinance or the CoP. Nevertheless, the DH will continue to closely monitor the licensed hospital. If there is new and concrete evidence, the DH will take appropriate follow-up actions as necessary. At the same time, the DH will continue to regularly evaluate and update the regulatory standards for PHFs with the experts of the Advisory Committee, and review the CoP in accordance with the established mechanism so as to better protect public interests. (3) The Ordinance established a two-tier complaints management system for handling public complaints against PHFs. Regarding the first tier, the Ordinance states that the licensee of a PHF must put in place a complaints handling procedure for receiving, managing and responding to public complaints against the PHF in the capacity of a service provider. Under the Ordinance, the licensee must ensure the complaints handling procedure is made known in an appropriate way to the patients or persons acting on their behalf. Upon receiving a complaint, the licensee must ensure that (a) an investigation of the complaint is conducted and findings are made; (b) if the case requires, an improvement measure is implemented; and (c) the complainant is informed of the findings of the investigation and any improvement measure and, if the case requires, of any 04/06/2025, 12:11 LCQ17: Incident of malfunction of air-conditioning system in private hospital https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/202506/04/P2025060400277p.htm 5/7 follow-up action taken/to be taken. As for the second tier of the system, the Government established the Committee on Complaints Against Private Healthcare Facilities (Complaints Committee) under the Ordinance in 2020, with the DH serving as the Secretariat. Apart from registered medical practitioners/dentists, its current members also include persons of varied backgrounds such as representatives from other healthcare professions, patients’ groups, the legal sector, the engineering sector and the consumer-interest body. Complainants who are not satisfied with the handling or reply of the PHF concerned may lodge a further complaint with the Complaints Committee. The Complaints Committee has put in place a statutory mechanism to receive and handle complaints against licensed PHFs from the public, and will consider whether the PHFs have complied with the Ordinance and the relevant codes of practice. Pursuant to the Ordinance, the Complaints Committee may make recommendations on the issue of complaint (e.g. whether any regulatory action against the PHF concerned should be taken) to the DoH or improvement measures to the PHF concerned. In addition, the Complaints Committee shall inform the complainant in writing of its decision and any action taken/to be taken in relation to the PHF according to the recommendations approved by the Complaints Committee. As for the complaint status of the patient concerned, it is observed that the allegation of the patient received no response despite having made four complaint calls to the DH as suggested by media reports does not actually align with the DH’s records. Existing records reveal that the Complaints Committee received a call on September 12, 2024, from a member of the public, who enquired about the procedure for 04/06/2025, 12:11 LCQ17: Incident of malfunction of air-conditioning system in private hospital https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/202506/04/P2025060400277p.htm 6/7 lodging a complaint against a PHF and mentioned having encountered a malfunction of the air-conditioning system of St. Teresa’s Hospital in the course of surgery. The Secretariat of the Complaints Committee has already explained to the enquirer the function of the Complaints Committee immediately, as well as the statutory procedures for lodging a complaint to the Complaints Committee. In addition, at the request of the enquirer, the Secretariat sent information on the complaint procedures, the complaint form and the statutory declaration form to the email address provided by the enquirer on the following day (September 13, 2024), with the enquirer confirmed receipt of the materials by email on the same day. After that, the Complaints Committee did not receive any complaint from the enquirer in relation to the incident. The Complaints Committee will continue to handle every complaint in a professional and impartial manner, endeavouring to bring forth service improvement of PHFs and safeguard patient safety. Ends/Wednesday, June

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Cardiovascular disease – E-002156/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002156/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Kathleen Funchion (The Left)

    What is the expected timeline for the Commission to produce a proposal on a European Cardiovascular Health Plan, in line with the stated goal in the 2024 Mission Letter to the Commissioner for Health and Animal Welfare and the Council conclusions of 14 November 2024 on the improvement of cardiovascular health in the EU, in particular pertaining to the implementation of measures to improve conditions and care for stroke survivors?

    Submitted: 28.5.2025

    Last updated: 4 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Moldova – A10-0096/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Moldova

    (2025/2025(INI))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘2024 Communication on EU enlargement policy’ (COM(2024)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Republic of Moldova 2024 Report’ (SWD(2024)0698),

     having regard to the Commission opinion of 17 June 2022 on the application by the Republic of Moldova (hereinafter ‘Moldova’) for membership of the European Union (COM(2022)0406) and the joint staff working document of 6 February 2023 entitled ‘Association Implementation Report on the Republic of Moldova’ (SWD(2023)0041),

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2025/535 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 March 2025 on establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Republic of Moldova[1],

     having regard to its previous resolutions on Moldova,

     having regard to the Commission analytical report of 1 February 2023 on Moldova’s alignment with the EU acquis (SWD(2023)0032),

     having regard to the proposal of 9 October 2024 for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Republic of Moldova (COM/2024/0469),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 9 October 2024 on the Moldova Growth Plan (COM/2024/0470),

     having regard to the Council conclusions of 17 December 2024 on enlargement,

     having regard to the visit of the delegation of the Committee on Foreign Affairs to Moldova on 25-27 February 2025,

     having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0096/2025),

    A. whereas, following Moldova’s application for EU membership of 3 March 2022, the European Council granted it candidate status on 23 June 2022 and subsequently decided to open accession negotiations on 14 December 2023;

    B. whereas in June 2024 negotiations on Moldova’s EU accession started;

    C. whereas Moldova held a referendum on 20 October 2024, the outcome of which confirmed the embedding of EU accession into its Constitution, despite various forms of manipulative interference to destabilise the country, illicit financing of political actors, disinformation campaigns and cyberattacks;

    D. whereas the Association Agreement[2], which includes a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (AA/DCFTA), remains the basis for political association and economic integration between the EU and Moldova, and a regular political and economic dialogue is ongoing between the two sides;

    Progress with EU accession-related reforms, in particular on the rule of law and governance

    1. Commends Moldova’s exemplary commitment and steady progress with EU accession-related reforms despite significant internal and external challenges – such as Russia’s full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine – which made it possible for accession negotiations to start in June 2024, half a year after the relevant decision by the European Council on 14 December 2023 and less than two years after the country’s application for EU membership on 3 March 2022;

    2. Recognises that EU-Moldova relations have entered into a new phase, with intensifying cooperation, gradual alignment across all policy areas of the EU acquis and advancement on the EU integration path; welcomes the progress achieved in the bilateral screening process since it started in July 2024 and the recent closing of screening for cluster 1 (fundamentals) and cluster 2 (internal market); commends and supports the ambition of the Moldovan Government to open negotiations on cluster 1 (fundamentals), cluster 2 (internal market) and cluster 6 (external relations) in the coming months, as well as completing the screening process for all clusters by the end of 2025; calls on the Commission to enhance its support to the Moldovan Government in order to ensure the successful achievement of these key objectives; encourages the Council to take a merit-based approach in its decisions on Moldova’s negotiation process; deplores the bilateralisation and instrumentalisation of the EU accession process, such as the opposition of the Hungarian Government to opening negotiations on clusters 1, 2 and 6, which has led to a delay and serves Russia’s objective of obstructing the European integration of the region;

    3. Believes that Moldova’s capacity to consolidate its current progress with EU accession-related reforms and sustain the ambitious pace towards EU membership will require the strong and genuine support of a parliamentary majority after the elections in autumn 2025;

    4. Notes that the outcomes of both the constitutional referendum on EU accession, held on 20 October 2024, and the presidential election, held on 20 October 2024 and 3 November 2024, confirmed the support of a majority of the people of Moldova for the country’s goal of EU membership and the required pro-EU reforms; underlines that this referendum and election were held professionally and with an extraordinary sense of duty and dedication, despite a massive hybrid campaign by Russia and its proxies which used various tools, such as the strategic exploitation of social media, AI-generated content, ‘leaks’ of fake documents, intimidation, which entailed various forms of manipulative interference to destabilise the country, illicit financing of political actors, vote-buying, including by Russia’s instrumentalisation of parts of the clergy from the Metropolis of Chisinau and All Moldova, disinformation campaigns and cyberattacks; recalls that these attacks had four key strategies: divide society, delegitimise institutions, discredit democratic actors and promote Russian influence; welcomes the outcome of the 2024 constitutional referendum which enshrined the commitment to joining the EU in the country’s constitution; strongly condemns the increasing attempts by Russia, pro-Russian oligarchs and Russian-sponsored local proxies to destabilise Moldova, sow divisions within Moldovan society and derail the country’s pro-EU direction through hybrid attacks, the instrumentalisation of energy supplies, disinformation, manipulation and intimidation campaigns targeting civil society organisations and independent media;

    5. Notes that the upcoming parliamentary elections on 28 September 2025 will be of crucial importance for the continuation of Moldova’s pro-EU trajectory; is concerned about the likely intensification of foreign, in particular Russian, malign interference and hybrid attacks ahead of the elections; calls for the EU to increase its support, including financial and technical support, for the Moldovan Government’s efforts to counter such interference in the country’s democratic process, including through additional sanctions listings, an extension and consolidation of the mandate and resources of the EU Partnership Mission (EUPM) in Moldova and the granting of additional support thereto, and the sharing of expertise in foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), countering hybrid threats and strengthening resilience; calls similarly for an increase in efforts by the Moldovan authorities and the EU in support of independent media and pro-democracy civil society, in order to enable journalists at national and regional level to counter FIMI and to strengthen digital literacy;

    6. Stresses the importance of strategic communication, debunking and combating false, Russia-promoted narratives about the EU and its policies and of highlighting the concrete short- and long-term benefits of EU accession for the people of all of Moldova, with a special focus on regions such as Gagauzia as well as socio-economically disadvantaged communities in rural areas; calls for the EU to step up its support for Moldova in this regard;

    Socio-economic reforms

    7. Welcomes the Commission’s Moldova Growth Plan,  which is aimed at supporting Moldova’s socio-economic and fundamental reforms and enhancing access to the EU’s single market; welcomes the Reform and Growth Facility for Moldova, which underpins the Growth Plan and is worth EUR 2.02 billion, making it the largest EU financial support package for Moldova since its independence; underlines that this facility provides Moldova with EUR 520 million in non-repayable support and a maximum amount of EUR 1.5 billion in loans, with an 18 % pre-financing rate, demonstrating the EU’s recognition of the urgency of supporting Moldova’s reforms and resilience; calls on the Commission to support the Moldovan authorities in implementing the necessary Reform Agenda for the effective absorption of funds from this facility, ensuring that the benefits of this support are promptly felt by Moldova’s citizens; looks forward to the announced impact assessment of the Reform and Growth Facility for Moldova in the form of a Commission staff working document within three months of the adoption of the corresponding regulation;

    8. Calls on the Commission to include adequate dedicated pre-accession funds for Moldova in the EU’s next multiannual financial framework, and to begin preparing Moldova for the efficient use of future pre-accession funds as a newly designated EU candidate country;

    9. Reiterates that the support of the people of Moldova for European integration can be strengthened with a tangible improvement in their livelihoods, by strengthening state institutions and public administration in order to use project funding effectively and to implement and enforce the EU acquis, ensuring a robust welfare system and fighting corruption and oligarchic influence and ensuring accountability; calls on the Moldovan authorities to continue to ensure the meaningful involvement of civil society organisations, diaspora, vulnerable groups and social partners, including trade unions, in order to strengthen trust in democratic institutions and processes and boost public support for EU accession-related reforms;

    10. Stresses the importance of civil society organisations in monitoring governance and progress with EU-related reforms, promoting transparency, defending human rights and countering disinformation and external malign influence by anti-reform political actors and Russian proxies;

    11. Calls for comprehensive social policy reforms to address poverty and persistent large-scale emigration, increase healthcare coverage, strengthen public education, improve working conditions and develop adequate social protection systems; emphasises that economic development must be inclusive and sustainable, with opportunities for small and medium-sized enterprises; stresses the need for targeted social investment in Moldova’s young people and rural areas to reduce regional disparities and safeguard social cohesion;

    12. Calls for special emphasis on Moldova’s participation in EU social, educational, and cultural programmes in order to promote social convergence, innovation and technological advancement;

    13. Calls on Moldova to implement the Reform Agenda, which outlines the key socio-economic and fundamental reforms to accelerate the growth and competitiveness of Moldova’s economy and its convergence with the EU on the basis of enhanced implementation of the AA/DCFTA;

    14. Strongly calls for the acceleration of Moldova’s gradual integration into the EU and the single market by continuing to align its legal and regulatory framework with the EU acquis and associating the country to more EU programmes and initiatives, including through the granting of observer status to Moldovan officials and experts in relevant EU bodies, which would deliver tangible socio-economic benefits even before the country formally joins the EU; congratulates Moldova on its inclusion in the geographical scope of the Single Euro Payments Area payment schemes, facilitating transfers in euro and reducing costs for Moldova’s citizens and businesses; welcomes Moldova’s recent progress in the transposition of the EU’s roaming and telecommunications acquis and expresses support for a swift decision on the inclusion of Moldova into the EU ‘roam like at home’ area; calls on the service providers to cooperate in good faith with the Moldovan authorities on implementing ‘roam like at home’;

    15. Welcomes the renewal of the EU’s temporary trade liberalisation measures in July 2024 in order to support Moldova’s economy, substituting the loss of trade caused by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and its unfriendly policies towards Moldova; calls for the EU to take swift and significant steps towards the permanent liberalisation of its tariff-rate quotas, in order to ensure predictability and increase the country’s attractiveness to investors;

    16. Notes that the recent decision of the US administration to suspend support for civil society, independent media, key reforms and infrastructure projects has created additional urgent needs in Moldova, regarding which the EU should step in; calls on the Commission, in this regard, to increase its funding for EU instruments supporting democracy, such as the European Endowment for Democracy, and for other key projects that had until recently been funded by the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and other US agencies;

    Human rights

     

    17. Notes Moldova’s progress towards achieving gender equality, including its adoption of the Programme for Promoting and Ensuring Equality between Women and Men for the 2023-2027 period, and calls for its continued efforts in this regard, particularly to reduce the gender pay gap, fight against stereotypes, discrimination and gender-based violence, and to increase the representation of women in politics and business;

    18. Welcomes the efforts by the Moldovan authorities to combat violence against women and improve protection for survivors, in particular the adoption of the National Programme on Preventing and Combatting Violence against Women and Domestic Violence for the 2023-2027 period; notes that the impact of this, however, is still lacking and therefore calls for the establishment of more shelters for survivors of domestic violence, for adequate attention by the justice system to violence against women and for policy changes and increased awareness-raising among men regarding gender-based violence;

    19. Calls on the Moldovan Government to strengthen its efforts, including the effective implementation of its legislative framework, to combat racial discrimination, marginalisation, racist hate speech and hate crimes targeting members of ethnic minority groups, including the Roma;

    20. Commends Moldova’s efforts to improve the rights of the LGBTIQ+ community in recent years;

    21. Calls on the Moldovan Government to fully align its legislation on the rights of persons with disabilities with the EU acquis and to tackle the systemic problem of children with intellectual disabilities being placed in psychiatric institutions;

    Energy, environment and connectivity

    22. Condemns Russia’s instrumentalisation of energy against Moldova, most recently by halting gas supplies to the Transnistrian region on 1 January 2025, in violation of contractual obligations, and thereby provoking a serious crisis in the region; applauds the Commission’s swift proposal of a Comprehensive Strategy for Energy Independence and Resilience and its support package worth EUR 250 million, which will reduce the energy bills of Moldovan consumers, including in the Transnistrian region, support Moldova’s decoupling from Russia’s energy supplies and integrate Moldova into the EU energy market; emphasises the need for the EU and the Moldovan authorities to effectively communicate about the substantial EU support package aimed at addressing Moldova’s energy crisis;

    23. Commends the alignment of the Moldovan energy sector with the EU acquis; calls on the Moldovan Government to continue its efforts, with EU support that includes the tools available from the Reform and Growth Facility for Moldova, to diversify gas and electricity supply routes, develop connectivity, increase energy efficiency and its internal production and storage capacity, as well as advance its full integration into the EU energy market in order to ensure Moldova’s energy security and resilience; stresses the importance of the completion of the Vulcanesti-Chisinau 400 kV overhead power line by the end of 2025 in order to reduce Moldova’s reliance on energy infrastructure in the Transnistrian region; calls on the EU to mobilise the necessary resources to help compensate for the withdrawal of USAID support for Moldova’s energy sector;

    24. Commends the Moldovan Government for its progress on decarbonisation, energy efficiency and transitioning to a green economy, including doubling the share of renewable energy to 30 % by 2030; encourages the EU and its Member States to continue to provide financial support and expertise to Moldovan counterparts in this area; welcomes the adoption in 2023 of Moldova’s National Climate Change Adaptation Programme until 2030 and its Action Plan for this purpose; calls on the Moldovan Government to adopt and begin implementing its National Energy and Climate Plan for the 2025-2030 period; notes the importance of implementing the commitments of the Energy Community’s Decarbonisation Roadmap, and implementing the Monitoring, Reporting, Verification and Accreditation package with a view to introducing carbon pricing and aligning with the EU emissions trading system;

    25. Believes that an extension of the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T) corridor Baltic Sea-Black Sea-Aegean Sea (Corridor IX) to include the route of Chisinau-Constanta-Varna-Bourgas would be a strategic investment in the region’s transport infrastructure, enhancing connectivity and promoting economic growth, in view of the enlargement of the EU to the east and the potential positive impact of this extension on the region’s security and stability, serving as a key logistics route for NATO and enhancing the EU’s geostrategic autonomy;

    Rule of law and good governance

    26. Underlines that comprehensive justice reform remains key for the success of Moldova’s democratic and EU accession-related reforms; recognises Moldova’s sustained efforts to build an independent, impartial, accountable and professional judicial system and conclude the vetting process by the end of 2026; calls, therefore, for the EU to continue actively supporting the justice reform and the process of vetting both judges and prosecutors, including the attraction, training and recruitment of qualified judicial personnel and increase in judicial capacity;

    27. Notes that Moldova has achieved progress in the fight against and prevention of corruption, but stresses the need to continue the fight against money laundering; welcomes the entry into force in February 2024 of Moldova’s National Integrity and Anti-Corruption Programme for 2024-2028; highlights the need to ensure enhanced coordination among all key anti-corruption and justice institutions in order to implement comprehensive reforms and to ensure that they have adequate resources and capacities; stresses that results in terms of prosecution and conviction in corruption cases need to be delivered in order to ensure public trust in the ongoing reforms;

    28. Recalls the importance of continuing the investigation and bringing to justice those responsible for the 2014 bank fraud; welcomes the fact that, after long efforts by the Moldovan authorities, Interpol has finally added one of the alleged perpetrators, Vladimir Plahotniuc, to its list of internationally wanted persons;

    29. Welcomes the adoption by Moldova in 2023 of a new national strategy for preventing and combating human trafficking, aligned with the EU acquis, and the cooperation of Moldova with Europol in combating drug trafficking;

     

    30. Expresses its readiness to continue supporting the Parliament of Moldova through mutually agreed democracy support activities that respond to the needs of the institution, its elected members and staff; underlines the importance of the Parliament of Moldova in fostering public debate about the country’s European future and achieving a broad consensus over, and democratic legitimacy of, EU accession-related reforms across political parties and among broader society; highlights the decision of 10 March 2025 to open a European Parliament office in Chisinau to further strengthen Parliament’s engagement with the Eastern Partnership region;

    Cooperation in the field of common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and progress on resolving the Transnistrian conflict

    31. Welcomes Moldova’s consistent cooperation on foreign policy issues and the significantly increased rate, notably from 54 % in 2022 to 86 % in 2024, of its alignment with the EU’s CFSP positions and restrictive measures; invites it to continue to improve this alignment, including on restrictive measures against Russia, and to continue cooperation on preventing the circumvention of sanctions against Russia and Belarus related to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine;

    32. Underlines that Moldova is a key contributor to the regional and European security, including through its unwavering support to Ukraine since the start of Russia’s war of aggression, for example by welcoming Ukrainian war refugees, and through its contributions to the EU Civil Protection Mechanism, for example by deploying firefighting teams to tackle severe wildfires in Greece;

    33. Expresses its support for the EUPM in Moldova and calls on the Member States to contribute the necessary experts and financial resources, in anticipation of a potential intensification of hybrid threats; welcomes the recent extension of the EUPM’s mandate until April 2026; encourages the Moldovan authorities to make full use of the EUPM’s expertise to enhance its preparedness, particularly in view of repeated electoral interference ahead of the parliamentary elections on 28 September 2025; calls for the EU to draw from the experience gained in Moldova in protecting the electoral process and democratic institutions in the EU itself; encourages the European External Action Service and the Commission to use all available EU instruments in the area of countering hybrid threats, in order to continue to support Moldova, including by swiftly deploying a Hybrid Rapid Response Team; welcomes the establishment of Moldova’s Centre for Strategic Communications and Countering Disinformation, as a means of coordinating the fight against foreign interference among the various Moldovan institutions, and of the National Agency for Cyber Security and the National Institute for Cyber Security Innovations; notes that Moldova’s National Security Strategy, adopted in December 2023, highlights EU accession as a key objective and for the first time identifies Russia as the source of major threats to Moldova’s security; stresses the importance of improving information sharing and intelligence cooperation between Moldova and the EU and its Member States on security threats;

     

    34. Reiterates its full commitment to Moldova’s territorial integrity and to the peaceful resolution of the conflict, based on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Moldova in its internationally recognised borders;

    35. Welcomes the Commission’s initiatives to include proactive support for the Transnistrian region in its energy emergency support packages, and exchange of information and practical cooperation between the Moldovan Government and the de facto authorities of the Transnistrian region throughout the energy crisis caused by Russia; welcomes the progress regarding the conditionalities for Tiraspol in light of the recent gas transit agreement and calls for the full implementation of these conditionalities, including the release of all political prisoners by Tiraspol and the dismantling of the remaining illegal checkpoints;

    36. Welcomes Moldova’s keen interest in contributing to the EU’s common security and defence policy (CSDP) and the fact that Moldova is the first country to sign a security and defence partnership with the EU; welcomes Moldova’s continued active participation in EU missions and operations under the CSDP, its interest in participation in PESCO projects and the ongoing negotiations on a framework agreement with the European Defence Agency; calls on the EU to include Moldova in the EU security and defence programmes and related budget allocations, including the European Defence Industry Programme and Readiness 2030, allowing the country to participate in joint procurement alongside the Member States;

    37. Welcomes the allocation of EUR 50 million to modernise the defence capacities of the Moldovan Armed Forces in the context of the current security challenges through the European Peace Facility (EPF) for 2024; notes that Moldova is the second-largest EPF beneficiary after Ukraine, with a total of EUR 137 million allocated since 2021; welcomes the announced support of EUR 60 million to be provided to Moldova from the EPF budget in 2025; calls on the Member States to progressively increase the EPF funding for Moldova to further enhance the country’s defence capabilities;

    °

    ° °

    38. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and to the President, Government and Parliament of the Republic of Moldova.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on electricity grids: the backbone of the EU energy system – A10-0091/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on electricity grids: the backbone of the EU energy system

    (2025/2006(INI))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 194 thereof,

     having regard to the Commission communication of 8 July 2020 entitled ‘Powering a climate-neutral economy: An EU Strategy for Energy System Integration’ (COM(2020)0299),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 28 November 2023 entitled ‘Grids, the missing link – An EU Action Plan for Grids’ (COM(2023)0757),

     having regard to the Commission report of January 2025 entitled ‘Investment needs of European energy infrastructure to enable a decarbonised economy’[1],

     having regard to the Commission communication of 26 February 2025 entitled ‘Action Plan for Affordable Energy – Unlocking the true value of our Energy Union to secure affordable, efficient and clean energy for all Europeans’ (COM(2025)0079),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 26 February 2025 entitled ‘The Clean Industrial Deal: A joint roadmap for competitiveness and decarbonisation’ (COM(2025)0085),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 5 March 2025 entitled ‘Industrial Action Plan for the European automotive sector’ (COM(2025)0095),

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1153 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 July 2021 establishing the Connecting Europe Facility and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1316/2013 and (EU) No 283/2014[2] (the CEF Regulation),

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2022/869 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2022 on guidelines for trans-European energy infrastructure, amending Regulations (EC) No 715/2009, (EU) 2019/942 and (EU) 2019/943 and Directives 2009/73/EC and (EU) 2019/944, and repealing Regulation (EU) No 347/2013[3] (the TEN-E Regulation),

     having regard to Directive (EU) 2019/944 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2019 on common rules for the internal market for electricity and amending Directive 2012/27/EU[4],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2019/943 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2019 on the internal market for electricity[5],

     having regard to Directive (EU) 2023/2413 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 October 2023 amending Directive (EU) 2018/2001, Regulation (EU) 2018/1999 and Directive 98/70/EC as regards the promotion of energy from renewable sources, and repealing Council Directive (EU) 2015/652[6] (the Renewable Energy Directive),

     having regard to Directive (EU) 2024/1275 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 April 2024 on the energy performance of buildings[7],

     having regard to Directive (EU) 2024/1711 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 amending Directives (EU) 2018/2001 and (EU) 2019/944 as regards improving the Union’s electricity market design[8],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1747 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 amending Regulations (EU) 2019/942 and (EU) 2019/943 as regards improving the Union’s electricity market design[9] (Electricity Market Design (EMD) Regulation),

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2018/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 on the Governance of the Energy Union and Climate Action, amending Regulations (EC) No 663/2009 and (EC) No 715/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council, Directives 94/22/EC, 98/70/EC, 2009/31/EC, 2009/73/EC, 2010/31/EU, 2012/27/EU and 2013/30/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council, Council Directives 2009/119/EC and (EU) 2015/652 and repealing Regulation (EU) No 525/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council[10], which reflects the EU’s electricity interconnection targets,

     having regard to the Council conclusions on ‘Advancing Sustainable Electricity Grid Infrastructure’, as approved by the Transport, Telecommunications and Energy Council at its meeting on 30 May 2024,

     having regard to its resolution of 10 July 2020 on a comprehensive European approach to energy storage[11],

     having regard to its resolution of 19 May 2021 on a European strategy for energy system integration[12],

     having regard to the report of January 2023 by the EU Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) on electricity transmission and distribution tariff methodologies in Europe,

     having regard to the report of 19 December 2023 by ACER entitled ‘Demand response and other distributed energy resources: what barriers are holding them back?’,

     having regard to the report of April 2025 by the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E) entitled ‘Bidding Zone Review of the 2025 Target Year’[13],

     having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the report of the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (A10-0091/2025),

    A. whereas electricity grids are essential for the Union to achieve its clean energy transition and to deliver renewable energy while supporting economic growth and prosperity; whereas inefficiencies and lack of full integration negatively impact energy prices for consumers and companies;

    B. whereas in light of the growing demand for electricity, significant investments and upgrades are required, along with regulatory oversight, to increase cross-border and national-level transmission capacity and modernise infrastructure, ensuring a decarbonised, flexible, more decentralised, digitalised and resilient electricity system;

    C. whereas poor connectivity and grid bottlenecks are among the main reasons the EU cannot fully benefit from the significant installed capacities of wind and solar energy, thereby ensuring affordable prices for households and industry; whereas the lack of strong interconnection between regions with different natural and climatic characteristics leads to the overproduction of energy and administrative limitation on renewable production in some regions, while other regions are struggling with insufficient supply and high prices;

    D. whereas transmission system operators (TSOs) are essential for integrating offshore renewable energy into the EU grid, in particular for those connected to more than one market; whereas, if TSOs fail to provide the agreed grid capacity, compensation should be paid to developers for lost export capacity, funded by congestion income; whereas such compensation should be shared fairly among TSOs and align with principles of non-discrimination and maximising cross-border trade; whereas this highlights the importance of maintaining a functioning interconnector backbone, as failures in interconnector capacity may result in costs for both producers and TSOs;

    E. whereas Europe will only reach its decarbonisation objectives if there is a coordinated, pan-European approach to electricity system planning, connecting borders, sectors and regions;

    F. whereas the planning of electricity transmission and distribution networks must be coordinated to ensure the effective development of the EU electricity system;

    G. whereas the EU electricity grid was built for a 20th century economy based on centralised, fossil fuel-fired electricity generation, and must be modernised to meet the demands of a digitalised economy with increased levels of electrification and a higher share of decentralised and variable renewable energy sources;

    H. whereas cross-border interconnectors, transmission and distribution grid infrastructure are critical for integrating renewables, reducing costs for European consumers and increasing the security of energy supply;

    I. whereas distribution level grid projects are already eligible for funds under the Connecting Europe Facility – Energy (CEF-E); whereas, however, only a small share has been allocated to distribution grids under the most recent Projects of Common Interest (PCI) list; whereas CEF-E should better reflect the role of distribution grids for the achievement of EU energy and climate targets;

    J. whereas ENTSO-E has calculated that cross-border electricity investment of EUR 13 billion per year until 2050 would reduce system costs by EUR 23 billion per year;

    K. whereas the ‘energy efficiency first’ principle is a fundamental principle of EU energy policy and is legally binding; notes that the correct implementation of this principle will significantly reduce energy consumption, thereby lowering the need for investment in electricity grids and interconnectors;

    L. whereas keeping the EU energy policy triangle of sustainability, security of supply and affordability in balance is key to a successful energy transition and to a reliable European energy system;

    M. whereas energy network planning is a long-term process closely linked to investment stability;

    N. whereas energy system flexibility needs are expected to double by 2030, in light of an increased share of renewables; whereas demand-side flexibility is therefore crucial for grid stability; whereas individual citizens, businesses and communities participating in the electricity market may bring manifold benefits to the grids, such as enhanced system efficiency, resilience, investment optimisation, improved social acceptance and lower energy costs; whereas serious delays and inconsistencies in implementing existing EU provisions on citizens’ energy, demand flexibility and smart network operations remain a concern;

    O. whereas although recycling meets between 40 % and 55 % of Europe’s aluminium and copper needs, further measures to extend recycling capacity, waste collection and supply chain efficiency must be considered;

    P. whereas the Commission and High Representative’s joint communication entitled ‘EU Action Plan on Cable Security’ highlights the importance of ensuring the secure supply of spare cable parts and the stockpiling of essential material and equipment;

    Q. whereas the electricity system blackout experienced in the Iberian Peninsula and parts of France on 28 April 2025 illustrated how important it is to increase the energy grid’s resilience by ensuring that it is well maintained, protected and balanced at all times, including through flexible system services and enhanced cross-border interconnections, to allow for an agile recovery in the event of system failure;

    R. whereas national and regional level system operators hold important responsibilities, particularly in the area of energy supply security; whereas all tasks of a regulatory nature should be performed by regulatory agencies acting in the public interest; whereas, however, alongside these responsibilities, a strengthened role for regulators and ACER in the planning processes can contribute to addressing shortcomings, such as ENTSO-E’s current 10-year network development plan (TYNDP) grid planning, as identified in the grid monitoring report; whereas, while acknowledging the TSOs’ responsibilities in drawing up these scenarios, ACER’s early involvement in the drawing-up process could help to ensure that the guidelines for the drawing-up of the scenarios are followed in accordance with the TEN-E Regulation;

    S. whereas interconnection development will contribute to further integrating the EU electricity market, which not only increases system flexibility and resilience, but also unlocks economies of scale in renewable electricity production;

    T. whereas the energy workforce will need to increase by 50 % to deploy the requisite renewable energy, grid and energy efficiency technologies[14];

    U. whereas small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are the backbone of the EU’s economy, entrepreneurship and innovation, comprising 99 % of businesses, providing jobs to more than 85 million EU citizens and generating more than 58 % of the EU’s GDP;

    V. whereas increasing decentralised electricity generation and demand response are important to reduce reliance on centralised production, which may be easily targeted by physical threats or cyberthreats, or compromised by climate-related events;

    1. Calls on the Member States to fully explore, optimise, modernise and expand their electricity grid capacity, including transmission and distribution; considers electricity grids to be the central element in the EU’s transition to a competitive, net zero economy by 2050, one that is capable of accommodating high volumes of variable renewable energy technologies and/or evolving demand sources driven by increased levels of electrification and the advancement of digital technologies; notes the Member States’ prerogative to determine their own energy mix;

    2. Calls on the Commission, the Member States, ACER, EU DSO Entity[15] and ENTSO-E[16] to implement the actions of the EU grid action plan, the action plan for affordable energy, the reform of the EU’s electricity market design and the Renewable Energy Directive without delay;

    3. Points out that the completion of the EU’s energy market integration will save up to EUR 40 billion annually, and that a 50 % increase in cross-border electricity trade could increase the EU’s annual GDP by 0.1 %[17];

    Relevance of electricity grids for the European energy transition

    4. Welcomes the Commission’s communication on grids[18]; underlines the expected increase in electricity consumption of 60 % by 2030, the rising need to integrate a large share of variable renewable power into the grid, and the need for grids to adapt to a more decentralised, digitalised and flexible electricity system, including the optimisation of system operations and the full utilisation of local flexibility resources, demand response and energy storage solutions to complement wholesale markets and enhance grid resilience, resulting in an additional 23 GW of cross-border capacity by 2025 and a further 64 GW of capacity by 2030; notes that over 40 % of the Union’s distribution grids are over 40 years old and need to be updated[19];

    5. Reiterates that, by 2030, the Union needs to invest around EUR375 to 425billion in distribution grids, and, overall, EUR 584 billion, in transmission and distribution electricity grids[20], including cross-border interconnectors and the adaptation of distribution grids to the energy transition;

    6. Notes with concern that in 2023 the costs of managing transmission electricity grid congestion in the EU were EUR 4.2 billion[21] and continue to rise, and that curtailment is an obstacle to increasing the share of renewable energy sources; notes that this figure does not include the distribution electricity grid; stresses that in 2023 nearly 30 TWh of renewable electricity were curtailed across several Member States due to insufficient grid capacity; further notes the sharp increase in annual hours of negative electricity prices, rising from 154 in 2018 to 1 031 as of September 2024[22], largely driven by grid congestion at borders, and the lack of sufficient storage, flexibility and demand response in the electricity market to temporally match variable renewable electricity supply with electricity demand; stresses that addressing these issues could help to absorb surplus supply, thereby maximising the use of existing grid infrastructure, but that existing market and regulatory frameworks often fail to provide adequate incentives for achieving this;

    7. Highlights that a failure to modernise and expand the EU’s electricity grid, alongside the rapid deployment of the high volumes of variable renewable energy required to deliver on its targets, has and will continue to result in high levels of dispatch-down (instructions to reduce output); believes that the dispatch-down of renewables, caused by grid congestion and curtailment, represents an unacceptable waste of high-value renewable electricity and money; calls on the Commission, as part of its forthcoming European Grids Package, to set out an EU strategy to vastly reduce the dispatch-down of renewable electricity;

    8. Highlights the role of smart grids in improving congestion management and optimising the electricity distribution of renewables; stresses their contribution to network flexibility by integrating digital tools that facilitate demand-side response and collective self-consumption; underlines that better grid management enhances energy resilience, reduces curtailments and secures supply during peak demand periods;

    9. Highlights that the electricity grid infrastructure is a priority for achieving the EU’s strategic autonomy and its climate and energy targets; notes the Clean Industrial Deal’s commitment to electrification with a key performance indicator of a 32 % economy-wide electrification rate by 2030, which would necessitate a significant and continuous update and deployment of grids; regrets that delays in responding to requests for connection to grids result in a slower pace of electrification, even in Member States where generation from renewables is rapidly increasing;

    10. Highlights, in particular, the crucial role that energy communities can play in supporting local economies; regrets that energy communities and smaller operators face disproportionate barriers to grid access and grid funding access due to regulatory hurdles and resource constraints; calls, therefore, on the Member States that are lagging behind in this regard to fully implement the Clean Energy Package, Fit for 55 and Renewable Energy Directive provisions, empowering citizens, municipalities, SMEs and companies to actively participate in the electricity market, in particular by developing enabling frameworks for renewable energy communities and the promotion of energy-sharing schemes; calls for grid-related EU and national level funding to take into account the specific needs of projects promoted by energy communities;

    Regulatory situation and challenges

    11. Is convinced that regulatory stability is a key condition for unlocking private investments in the electricity grid and, where feasible, enabling the affordable electrification of the EU’s economy, and reiterates the need to implement already adopted legislation before assessing potential new reviews;

    12. Underlines that integrated grid planning across sectors at local, regional, national and EU levels will lead to increased system efficiency and reduced costs; calls, therefore, on the Commission and on the Member States to work towards integrated planning and to ensure that electricity network development plans are aligned with the 2021-2030 national energy and climate plans (NECPs) for all voltage levels; notes that a strengthened governance framework would help to ensure alignment between grid development plans and national and EU level policy objectives; recognises that, while the Member States are required to report on their contributions to EU targets through the NECPs, there is currently no equivalent obligation on TSOs to systematically report at EU level;

    13. Underlines that the TEN-E Regulation and the Projects of Common Interest (PCI) and Projects of Mutual Interest (PMI) are powerful tools in the development of the Union’s cross-border energy infrastructure; regrets the shortcomings in the current TYNDP for European electricity infrastructure, which results in investment interests falling short of cross-border needs[23], and that grid planning does not fully leverage cross-border and cross-sectoral savings[24]; further regrets delays regarding to the completion of PCIs; urges the Commission to introduce more coordinated, long-term cross-sectoral planning to deliver the related savings and benefits across the EU; highlights that such coordinated planning could better inform cost sharing of infrastructure across the Member States; notes that, although the TEN-E Regulation enables smart electricity grid projects with a cross-border impact to obtain PCI status, even if such projects do not cross a physical border, the PCI list in 2023 included only five such projects; strongly believes, therefore, that the PCI process needs to be strengthened, simplified and streamlined for more clarity and transparency; calls on the Member States to fully complete the PCIs; calls on the Commission to urgently propose a targeted revision of the TEN-E Regulation in order to (1) introduce a robust planning process that combines system operators’ responsibilities with a strengthened role for ACER by mandating ACER to request amendments to the scenarios and the TYNDP, (2) ensure scenarios are drawn up in line with the decarbonisation agenda and enable easier access for smart electricity grid projects, and (3) introduce a simplified application process for small and medium-sized distribution system operators (DSOs);

    14. Emphasises that network planning is a long-term process closely linked to investment stability; proposes, therefore, extending the time frame for network development plans to 20 years; highlights that grid investment is urgently required by the EU’s competitive agenda and should not be delayed;

    15. Additionally notes that the EU will continue to have strong electricity links with its neighbouring countries and therefore believes the Commission should enhance such cooperation with neighbouring countries through PMIs with non-EU countries, as provided for in the TEN-E Regulation;

    16. Strongly emphasises that CEF-E has proven to be the crucial instrument for co-financing cross-border energy infrastructure and insists on its continuation; welcomes the inclusion of offshore electricity grid projects in the Commission’s most recent allocation of grants under CEF-E;

    17. Considers the lack of detailed, reliable and comparable data on national and EU grid planning an obstacle to more efficient grids; calls therefore on the Member States to thoroughly implement the relevant provision in the Electricity Directive[25], in particular Article 32, and to encourage smaller DSOs to apply this Article’s provision;

    18. Welcomes the EU DSO Entity’s report on good practices on Distribution Network Development Plans[26] (DNDPs), which calls on the Member States to include cost-benefit analyses in their DNDPs, in order to evaluate investment opportunities; urges the Commission to develop guidelines based on this report, in cooperation with the EU DSO Entity, to harmonise and increase transparency of national development planning for distribution grids, to publish a European overview of the DNDPs and to require all transmission and distribution operators to provide energy regulators with the necessary data about their current and future grid hosting capacity information and grid planning, to enable energy regulators to properly scrutinise grid planning; calls on the Member States to implement Article 31(3) of Directive 2024/1711, which requests grid operators to publish information on the capacity available in their area of operation, in order to ensure transparency and enable stakeholders to make informed investment decisions; calls on the Commission to develop a centralised online repository for all transmission plans and DNDPs;

    19. Highlights the significant risk posed by curtailment to the viability of renewable energy investment, especially considering that many Member States fail to compensate market participants for curtailed electricity volumes, despite the requirements set out in Articles 12 and 13 of Regulation (EU) 2019/943; regrets the lack of transparency, availability and data granularity regarding curtailed renewable energy volumes and congestion management costs;

    20. Highlights the value of putting clear metrics in place to measure whether the EU is on track to deliver the grid expansion and reinforcements needed to meet its 2050 objectives; notes that such metrics could include reductions in renewable energy curtailment, lower grid development costs relative to the amount of capacity delivered, increases in the efficient use of existing infrastructure, a reduction in losses and lower raw material intensity;

    21. Notes the work done by ENTSO-E and the EU DSO Entity on harmonised definitions of available grid hosting capacity for system operators and to establish an Union-wide overview thereof; believes that national regulatory authorities (NRAs) could benefit from clear legislative provisions as to how Member States can prioritise grid connections, so as to abandon the ‘first-come, first-served’ principle; therefore asks the Commission to amend Article 6 of Directive (EU) 2019/944 on the internal market for electricity, as part of the implementation review that the Commission must complete by 31 December 2025, and to consequently introduce transparent priority connection criteria to be chosen and further defined by the Member States for (1) generation connection, such as quality and maturity of the project, level of commitment, contribution to decarbonisation, social value, and for (2) consumer connection, such as quality and maturity of the project, level of commitment, contribution to decarbonisation, public interest or its strategic and/or social value, and grid optimisation; calls on the NRAs and the Member States to provide clear prioritisation rules according to their local and national specificities to allow the ‘first-come, first-served’ approach to be abandoned by disincentivising applications for connection that are not substantiated by a solid project, that are speculative or where the developer cannot show sufficient commitment to the realisation of a project;

    22. Underlines that improved cross-border interconnections offer substantial cost-saving potential at the system level, with annual reductions in generation costs estimated at EUR 9 billion up to 2040, while requiring annual investments of EUR 6 billion in cross-border infrastructure and storage capacity;

    23. Regrets that some Member States did not achieve the 10% interconnection target by 2020 and urges them to strive to achieve the current  15% interconnection target for 2030, as set out in Regulation (EU) 2018/1999, since interconnection capacity is crucial for the functioning of the EU’s internal electricity market, leading to significant cost savings at system level and decreasing generation costs by EUR 9 billion annually to 2040[27]; regrets that the 32 GW of cross-border capacity needed by 2030 remains unaddressed[28]; deplores the delays and uncertainties regarding several interconnection projects; calls, therefore, on the Commission to propose, by June 2026 at the latest, a binding interconnection target for 2036 based on a needs assessment; stresses the need for cooperation with non-hosting Member States and for the EU and its neighbouring countries to be involved in negotiations, in order to ensure the projects’ finalisation;

    24. Highlights the need to accelerate permitting procedures for electricity infrastructure; stresses that grid expansion should not be delayed by lengthy permitting procedures or excessive reporting requirements; therefore welcomes the positive progress made regarding provisions adopted in the latest revision of the Renewable Energy Directive, specifically Article 16f thereof, and the Emergency Regulation on Permitting[29] to accelerate, streamline and simplify permit-granting procedures for grid and renewable energy projects, especially the principle of public overriding interest for grid projects; notes, however, that some of the Member States have not seen a material improvement in project permitting timelines, despite the ambitious frameworks set out at EU level; therefore urges the Member States to implement these measures without delay and calls on the Commission to closely monitor the implementation of the Renewable Energy Directive, and regularly assess if revised permitting provisions are sufficient to deliver on the EU’s objectives; additionally calls on the Commission to set out guidelines for the Member States to include a principle of tacit approval in their national planning systems, as described in Article 16a of the Renewable Energy Directive; stresses that reinforcing administrative capacity, including through adequate staffing of planning and permitting authorities, will accelerate permitting procedures;

    25. Encourages the Member States to draw up plans to designate dedicated infrastructure areas for grid projects, as outlined in Article 15e of the Renewable Energy Directive; stresses that such plans are essential to account for local specificities and ensure respect for protected areas; emphasises that these plans should be closely coordinated with the designation of acceleration areas for renewables, to ensure a streamlined, efficient and integrated approach to energy infrastructure development;

    26. Notes that often documents need to be submitted in paper form; calls on the Member States to increase the digitalisation of these processes in order to accelerate permitting procedures; calls on the Commission and the Member States to revise all EU legislation relevant to permitting, such as the Environmental Impact Assessment Directive[30], with a view to introducing mandatory digital application, submission and processing requirements;

    27. Highlights the importance of public acceptance and public engagement when developing new grid projects and calls on the Commission to develop a set of best practices to be shared among the Member States in this regard; highlights the critical importance of effective communication with citizens and communities regarding grid projects and reinforcement; notes that local-level support can help to accelerate the delivery of critical infrastructure and thus meet national and EU level objectives; urges the swift implementation of the EU’s pact for engagement with the electricity sector and coordination with national signatories (TSOs, DSOs, NRAs) to guarantee early, meaningful and regular public participation in grid projects;

    28. Calls for the convening of a TAIEX[31] Group on Permitting within the forthcoming European Grids Package to support the Member States in addressing administrative bottlenecks, enhancing regulatory capacity and accelerating project approvals through the sharing of best practices and cross-border coordination;

    29. Welcomes the initiatives announced under the Action Plan for Affordable Energy; recommends that the Commission extend the ‘tripartite contract for affordable energy for Europe’s industry’ to smaller energy producers, including energy communities, SMEs and businesses, leveraging flexibility and demand response, and link the outcome of these cooperation structures with grid planning processes at national and EU level, in order to optimise planning, investment and grid utilisation from the outset;

    30. Highlights the need for improvements to be made to the public procurement framework, in order to tackle the challenges to grid operators regarding supply chains; therefore welcomes the Commission communication on the Clean Industrial Deal and the announcement by the Commission of a forthcoming review of the Public Procurement Directives[32]; stresses public procurement’s potential for the continued development of a strong EU manufacturing supply chain for electricity grid equipment, software and services; encourages the Commission to promote resilience, sustainability and security in public procurement procedures for grid operators; advocates for greater consistency between EU regulations on public procurement; calls on the Commission to adapt EU rules on public procurement with a view to harmonising and simplifying functional tendering specifications, in order to ramp up the production capacities of grid components;

    31. Believes that adequate standardisation and common technical specifications are necessary for achieving economies of scale, and to speed up technological development; considers, additionally, that it is essential to ensure the right level of standardisation so that manufacturers’ capacity to innovate is not reduced;

    32. Reiterates the need to consider new business models between equipment manufacturers and operators, such as long-term framework agreements that encourage the shift from one-off ‘grid projects’ to sustained and structured ‘grid programmes’, which result in more predictable planning for grid technology manufacturers; calls for the streamlining of tendering processes for the provision of grid equipment and services;

    33. Stresses that this forthcoming revision of the Public Procurement Directives will allow the inclusion of sustainability, resilience and European preference criteria in EU public procurement processes for strategic sectors, in line with the provisions set out in Article 25 of Regulation (EU) 2024/1735[33]; calls for grids and related technologies to be explicitly recognised as strategic sectors, to ensure their eligibility under the revised framework; underlines that strengthening European preference in public procurement processes is essential for reducing the EU’s dependence on non-EU suppliers, enhancing supply chain security, and fostering a resilient EU industrial base capable of supporting the energy transition; welcomes the introduction by the European Investment Bank (EIB) of a ‘Grids Manufacturing Package’ to support the European supply chain with at least EUR 1.5 billion in counter-guarantees for grid component manufacturers; calls for further similar financial instruments to be developed to provide long-term investment certainty and to accelerate the scaling-up of European production capacity;

    Financing

    34. Notes that over the past five years, global investment in power capacity has increased by nearly 40 %, while investment in grid infrastructure has lagged behind; notes that estimates of investment that the EU will need to make in its grid over the 2025-2050 period range from EUR 1 950 billion to EUR 2 600 billion[34];

    35. Observes with concern that the budget allocated under CEF-E has been insufficient to expedite all PCI and PMI categories; notes that with a EUR 5.84 billion budget for 2021-2027, the programme has restricted capacity and may struggle to keep pace with investment needs; calls on the Commission and the Member States to significantly increase the CEF-E envelope and the percentage of CEF-E funds dedicated to electricity infrastructure as a separate adequate resource, when proposing the next multiannual financial framework (MFF), and to ensure that projects both at the distribution and at the transmission levels with an EU added value are eligible for budget allocated under CEF-E; encourages the Commission to further explore co-financing possibilities between CEF-E and the Renewable Energy Financing Mechanism;

    36. States that EU funding is predominantly allocated to transmission grids with relatively insignificant allocations to distribution grids, despite their significant role in the EU energy transition, demonstrated by the fact that, between 2014 and 2020, CEF-E funded around EUR 5.3 billion worth of projects, of which around EUR 1.7 billion went to transmission grids and EUR 237 million to smart distribution grids; notes that the last PCI list only contained five smart electricity projects;

    37. Deeply regrets that, whereas regional funds such as the Cohesion Fund, the European Regional Development Fund or the Recovery and Resilience Facility provide for grid investments in principle, in practice they are underutilised for grid projects; regrets also that the evaluation criteria applied to the assessment of projects submitted in response to the EU Innovation Fund’s calls for proposals prevent funding for the demonstration and manufacturing of grid technologies; calls on the Commission and the Member States to ensure that a proportionate amount of such funding is also spent on grid investment;

    38. Calls on the Member States to simplify access to the EU funds managed by the Member States for grid operators, for instance through the establishment of a one-stop-shop in those Member States in which a large share of DSOs are of a small or medium size;

    39. Calls on the Commission to propose a dedicated funding instrument, such as one based on revenues from the market-based emission reduction scheme, to allow the Member States to support decentralised and innovative grid projects with a clear EU added value, including smaller projects, ensuring its effective use by the Member States for these purposes;

    40. Emphasises the need for regulatory frameworks to attract private investment and ensure cost-reflective tariffs, in addition to public funding mechanisms;

    41. Is convinced that anticipatory investments and forward-looking investments will help to address grid bottlenecks and prevent curtailment; points out that the EMD Regulation sets out regulatory elements for anticipatory investments but lacks a harmonised definition and implementation across the Union; calls on the Member States to swiftly implement the aforementioned provisions of the EMD Regulation and remove national legal barriers, on NRAs to remove barriers as regards regulatory incentives and disincentives, and on the Commission to urgently provide guidance regarding the approval of anticipatory investments, as announced in its Action Plan for Grids[35]; believes that further harmonisation in this respect might be beneficial; calls for detailed cost-benefit analyses and scenario-based planning to assess the likelihood of future utilisation, and recommends a two-step approval process for projects with a higher risk level by first approving smaller budgets for studies or planning, followed by a second approval for the more costly steps, in order to reduce the risk of stranded assets;

    42. Acknowledges that grid investments from capital markets can be incentivised by providing market-oriented conditions, such as suitable rates of return and a robust regulatory framework; emphasises that the EU and the Member States should encourage private investments by providing risk mitigation tools or Member State guarantees; calls on the Commission and the EIB to further strengthen financing and de-risking initiatives and tools, such as counter-guarantees, to support additional electricity grid expansion and modernisation at affordable rates for system operators; emphasises the relevance of ensuring that the EU’s electricity grid is financed and therefore owned by public and private capital only from EU actors, or previously screened non-EU investors, in view of the criticality of the infrastructure;

    43. Underlines that, while investment decisions should be guided by efficiencies, including energy and cost efficiency, investments should not only be focused on capital expenditure, and that investments optimising, renewing and modernising the existing infrastructure should be equally considered; therefore welcomes Article 18 of the EMD Regulation, which calls for tariff methodologies to give equal consideration to capital and operational expenditure, and remunerate operators to increase efficiencies in the operation and development of their networks, including through energy efficiency, flexibility and digitalisation; calls on the Commission and the Member States to thoroughly implement its provisions and to focus on ensuring fair and timely compensation to system operators for the costs borne by them;

    44. Notes that the electrification of the EU economy, where technically and economically feasible, would help to drive down network tariffs by spreading the costs across a wider range of users; highlights, therefore, the importance of ensuring that the development of the future network is fully aligned with demand projections driven by increases in the level of electrification; is concerned by experts’ forecasts of network tariff increases of around  50% to 100% by 2050[36]; stresses, therefore, the need for instruments and incentives that support grid operators in efficiently managing available grid capacity, including through procuring flexibility services, with a view to reducing imminent grid investment needs; highlights that flexible connection agreements, flexible network tariffs and local flexibility markets contribute to grid efficiency; invites NRAs to promote these flexible tariffs that allow consumers to easily react to price signals while shielding vulnerable households and businesses from price peaks; calls on the Commission and the Member States to actively address bottlenecks in tariffs, connection fees and regulations to facilitate cross-border and offshore hybrid grid investment;

    45. Calls on the Member States to implement the relevant EU legal framework to unlock demand-side flexibility by accelerating the deployment of smart meters, enabling access to data from all metering devices and ensuring efficient price signals, to allow industries and households to optimise their consumption and reduce their electricity bills, and at the same time help reduce operational costs and the need for additional grid investment;

    46. Stresses that the relaxation of network tariffs and certain charges, which could have the effect of lowering electricity prices, as proposed in the Affordable Energy Action Plan, has to be accompanied by a plan to replace the sources of the funds needed for grid investment with alternatives, in order to avoid facing underinvestment of the grids in the future;

    47. Highlights the importance of minimising the additional costs on consumers’ bills resulting from the investments required to deliver the grid modernisation and expansion needed to meet the EU’s climate and competitiveness goals; asks the Commission to work with the Member States to develop a coordinated set of best practices for investments and equitable network tariff composition, with a strong emphasis on increasing transparency and removing non-energy related charges from the tariffs;

    48. Points out that transmission infrastructure and availability of cross-zonal capacities are vital for an integrated market and for the exchange of low-marginal cost renewable energies, while respecting system security; notes that the EMD Regulation sets a minimum 70 % target of capacities available for cross-zonal trade by 2025 but Member States are far from reaching it; therefore urges the Member States and their TSOs to speed up their efforts to maximise cross-zonal trading opportunities, to ensure an efficient internal electricity market, appropriate investment decisions and renewable energy integration; regrets that achieving this target has often resulted in re-dispatch costs; notes that existing cost sharing mechanisms, such as cross-border cost allocation (CBCA), inter-transmission system operator (TSO) compensation and re-dispatching cost sharing, are limited and difficult to implement, which does not encourage cross-border investments, such as in offshore grids; calls on the Commission to holistically review and improve these mechanisms to ensure that they reflect the shared benefits of infrastructure and address the diversity of electricity flows, whether internal or cross-border, including a fair and balanced cost-benefit sharing mechanism for cross-border infrastructure projects that is based on objective criteria;

    49. Takes note of the report of April 2025 by ENTSO-E on potential alternative bidding zone configurations based on location marginal pricing simulations provided by TSOs;

    Grid-enhancing technologies, digitalisation, innovative solutions and resilience

    50. Underlines that grid-enhancing technologies, digital solutions, ancillary services and data management technologies, as well as smart energy appliances, often leveraging artificial intelligence, can significantly increase the efficiency of existing grid capacities and maximise the use of existing assets, reducing the requirement for new infrastructure, for instance by providing real-time information on energy flows; therefore insists that these technologies and innovative solutions must be explored; urges NRAs to incentivise TSOs and DSOs to rely more on such technologies, weighing up the costs and benefits of their use versus grid expansion and by using remuneration schemes based on benefits rather than costs, and to benchmark the TSOs and DSOs on their uptake of such technologies; invites the Commission to further promote such innovative technologies when assessing projects that apply for EU funding;

    51. Welcomes the work accomplished by ENTSO-E and the EU DSO Entity in developing the TSO/DSO Technopedia[37] so far, and calls on the Commission to mandate the biannual updating of the Technopedia to accurately reflect the technology readiness levels (TRLs) of technologies included;

    52. Urges the Commission and the Member States to further enable and increase the digitalisation of the European electricity system, enabling the optimisation of the operation of its power system and reducing pressure on the supply chain; underlines that data sharing and data interoperability are essential for grid planning and optimisation; encourages the Member States, the NRAs, the EU DSO Entity and ACER to continue to accelerate their work on the monitoring system based on indicators measuring the performance of smart grids (‘smart grid indicators’), as set out in the Electricity Directive;

    53. Stresses the urgent need to enhance the security of critical electricity infrastructure, including interconnectors and subsea cables at risk of sabotage, and increase its resilience to extreme weather events, climate change and physical and digital attacks; highlights the need to strengthen cooperation at national, regional and EU levels;

    54. Stresses the growing risk of coordinated cyberattacks targeting the EU’s entire electricity network; recalls the importance of the rapid implementation of cybersecurity and other related network codes and the related legislation, such as the NIS 2 Directive[38] and the Cybersecurity Act[39], and encourages the Commission to correct, in upcoming legislative reviews, the status of physical grid equipment, including remotely controllable grid equipment, such as inverters, which is currently not held to a high enough cybersecurity standard, especially in cases where the manufacturer is required, under the jurisdiction of a non-EU country, to report information on software or hardware vulnerabilities to the authorities of that non-EU country; calls for enhanced EU level cooperation between all parties to strengthen preparedness and resilience; considers that NRAs should acknowledge the costs incurred by operators in adopting cybersecurity and resilience measures, and provide incentives for investments pertaining to increasing the resilience of the energy infrastructure to cyberthreats, and physical and hybrid threats, including climate adaptation measures;

    55. Underlines the need to step up efforts to protect existing and future critical undersea and onshore energy infrastructure; considers that the EU should play a broader role in preventing incidents that threaten this infrastructure, in promoting surveillance and in restoring any damaged infrastructure using state of the art technologies; calls on the Commission and the Member States to find solutions to increase the protection and resilience of critical infrastructure, including solutions to financing such measures and technologies;

    56. Recognises that new high-voltage electricity grid projects provide a multifunctional and cost-efficient opportunity to integrate additional security measures (i.e. sensors, sonar, etc.) and environmental solutions (i.e. bird deflectors, fire detectors, nature corridors, etc.) if planned in a holistic manner; asks the Commission to develop guidelines for NRAs to ensure that initial grid project planning is carried out and financed with these elements in mind;

    57. Urges the Commission, DSOs and TSOs to develop an EU-owned Common European Energy Data Space, based on technical expertise and practice utilising the available data[40] and based on a common set of rules ensuring the secure, transparent portability and interoperability of energy data, where harmonised data is safely managed, exchanged and stored in the EU; stresses that this Common European Energy Data Space should facilitate data pooling and sharing through appropriate governance structures and data sharing services, supporting critical energy operations including transmission and distribution; underlines that European TSOs, DSOs and other previously screened electricity grid actors must be able to securely and smartly operate the grid, optimising its use by integrating flexibility and innovative technologies, in line with key principles of interoperability, trust, data value and governance; notes that data exchange arrangements must also take into account interactions with non-EU parties;

    58. Recognises the potential of flexibility as a necessary tool for optimising system operations, maintaining the stability of the system and empowering consumers by incentivising them to shift their consumption patterns; stresses the importance of implementing appropriate measures to guarantee efficient price signals that incentivise flexibility, including from all end-consumers, and ensuring that all resources contribute to system security, including by accelerating the deployment of smart meters, smart energy-efficient buildings, and enabling access to data from all metering devices; asks NRAs to recognise flexibility innovations and pilot projects in the system, insofar as these do not negatively impact the grid’s overall balance and stability, in order to continue incentivising innovation;

    59. Calls on NRAs to work closely with TSOs and DSOs to assess the flexibility potential, and needs of the national systems in current and future planning, taking into consideration the presence of industry, large consumers, large generators and storage; highlights in particular the critical role that storage assets, including long-duration electricity storage, capable of providing up to 100 hours of electricity, can play in providing congestion management services to the grid; notes that in order to provide these essential system services, investors in storage assets require stable, long-term revenue models, similar to the way in which support schemes have successfully provided revenue certainty for renewable generation assets;

    Supply chain, raw materials and the need for skills

    60. Notes with concern that global growth in the demand for grid technologies has put pressure on supply chains and the availability of cables, transformers, components and critical technologies; highlights the findings in the February 2025 International Energy Agency report, ‘Building the Future Transmission Grid’[41], that it now takes two to three years to procure cables and up to four years to secure large power transformers, and that average lead times for cables and large power transformers have almost doubled since 2021;

    61. Is concerned about the long lead times for many grid technology components and remains determined to maintain European technology leadership in grid technology, emphasising the need for innovation to develop, demonstrate and scale European high-capacity grid technologies and innovative grid-enhancing technologies;

    62. Stresses that critical and strategic raw materials are essential for grid infrastructure, with aluminium and copper demand set to rise by 33 % and 35 % respectively by 2050[42]; takes note of the Commission decision recognising certain critical raw materials projects as strategic projects under the Critical Raw Materials Act[43], in order to secure access to these key materials and diversify sources of supply; calls on the Commission and the Member States to enhance recycling, and support strategic partnerships and trade agreements to this end;

    63. Highlights the need to strengthen grid supply chains to increase the supply of grid technologies at affordable costs, and thereby limit the costs borne by consumers via network charges; calls for a strategic approach to acquiring energy technologies, components or critical materials related to grids, in order to avoid developing dependencies on single suppliers outside of the EU;

    64. Believes that holistic, coordinated, long-term grid planning across the entire European energy system is needed to solve the supply chain capacity bottleneck, and that such planning provides manufacturers with essential transparency and predictability for adequately planning manufacturing capacity increases; considers that such planning must be reliable and enable new business models, such as long-term framework agreements and capacity reservation contracts;

    65. Urges the maximum standardisation of key electricity grid equipment, insofar as is technically possible, via a joint technical assessment by the Commission, DSOs, TSOs and industry, covering all voltage levels in order to scale up production, lower prices and delivery times, and promote the interoperability of systems;

    66. Stresses the urgent need to address labour shortages in the energy sector; notes that the Commission has projected that the energy workforce needs to significantly increase in order to deploy renewable energies, upgrade and expand grids, and manufacture energy efficiency, grid and other relevant technologies; regrets the shortages of electrical mechanics and fitters reported in 15 of the Member States, increasing the staffing needs of DSOs and TSOs; highlights that the energy workforce must grow by 50 % by 2030 to support the deployment of renewables[44], grid expansion and energy efficiency, with an estimated 2 million additional jobs required in electricity distribution by 2050; calls for training, upskilling and reskilling initiatives, prioritising grid-related skills to close skills gaps; welcomes university-business partnerships and targeted EU skills academies for strategic sectors, including grids; encourages DSOs and TSOs to diversify their workforce, including by increasing women’s participation;

    67. Reiterates that the Member States and the EU should cooperate to adapt the relevant skills programmes and develop best practices to fulfil the growing skills demand across all educational levels, with a strong emphasis on encouraging gender balance in the sector;

    68. Highlights the crucial role of SMEs and EU businesses in supplying the technology sector for the electricity grid; points out the need to access affordable electrification, limiting the costs related to the supply chain and ensuring a skilled workforce;

    Offshore

    69. Acknowledges the strategic relevance of offshore development in delivering the EU’s objectives of energy autonomy, increased use of renewable energy, a resilient and cost-effective electricity system and climate neutrality by 2050; stresses the importance of fully utilising the potential of Europe’s five sea basins for offshore energy generation; highlights the particular significance of the North Seas (covering the geographical area of the North Seas, including the Irish and Celtic Seas), which offer favourable conditions and the highest potential, with an agreed target of 300 GW of installed offshore generation capacity by 2050 within the framework of the North Seas Energy Cooperation; welcomes the progress made in this regard; emphasises the need to develop a meshed offshore grid, including hybrid interconnectors, particularly in the North Seas, to fully harness offshore potential and improve electricity market integration; calls on the Commission and the Member States to strengthen regional cooperation on grid planning and energy cooperation across all sea basins with the EU’s neighbouring countries, in particular the UK and Norway, specifically in offshore wind energy development and the planning and manufacturing of electricity grids;

    70. Highlights the need for a stable and predictable regulatory framework that ensures the most optimal trading arrangements to provide the required investor confidence to support the development and interconnection of offshore grid and offshore wind projects, ensuring market efficiency and efficient cross-border flows, including with non-EU countries; underlines the necessity of strengthening national grids where required to maximise the benefits of offshore energy; acknowledges that combining offshore transmission with generation assets (offshore hybrids) will be an integral part of an efficient network system, as this comes with several advantages for the European energy system but still lacks the right regulatory framework to incentivise necessary investment;

    Cooperation with non-EU countries

    71. Calls on the Member States to increase cooperation and coordination with like-minded non-EU countries such as Norway and the UK; recalls that the development of electricity infrastructure to harness the offshore wind potential of the North Seas is a shared priority for both the EU and the UK;

    72. Highlights the need for a pragmatic and cooperative approach to EU-UK electricity trading; calls on the Commission to work closely with the UK administration to agree on a mutually beneficial trading arrangement that strengthens security of supply and the pathway to net zero for both jurisdictions; additionally, believes that efficiencies of trading arrangements can be improved further; calls on the Commission to engage with its UK counterparts constructively on this matter;

    Outermost regions

    73. Stresses the unique challenges faced by the EU’s outermost regions and other areas not connected to the European electricity grid; highlights their reliance on imports and high vulnerability to electricity blackouts and extreme climate hazards; notes the importance of developing resilient and autonomous energy systems through local grid development and cleaner energy production; calls on the Commission to address these regions’ specific needs in the European Grids Package and to propose additional financial support to improve the autonomy of their energy systems, and address their lack of interconnection and absence of broader grid connection benefits;

    °

    ° °

    74. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT containing a motion for a non-legislative resolution on the proposal for a Council decision on the termination of the Voluntary Partnership Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Cameroon on forest law enforcement, governance and trade in timber and derived products to the Union – A10-0094/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT NON-LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTION

    on the proposal for a Council decision on the termination of the Voluntary Partnership Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Cameroon on forest law enforcement, governance and trade in timber and derived products to the Union

    (05673/2025 – C10‑0012/2025 – 2024/0245M(NLE))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to the Commission proposal of 2 October 2024 for a Council decision on the termination of the Voluntary Partnership Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Cameroon on forest law enforcement, governance and trade in timber and derived products to the Union (COM(2024)0446),

     having regard to the draft Council decision on the termination of the Voluntary Partnership Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Cameroon on forest law enforcement, governance and trade in timber and derived products to the Union (C10‑0012/2025),

     having regard to the request for consent submitted by the Council in accordance with Article 207(4), first subparagraph, and Article 218(6), second subparagraph, point (a) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (C10-0012/2025),

     having regard to the Voluntary Partnership Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Cameroon on forest law enforcement, governance and trade in timber and derived products to the European Union (FLEGT)[1],

     having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 2173/2005 of 20 December 2005 on the establishment of a FLEGT licensing scheme for imports of timber into the European Community[2],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) No 995/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 October 2010 laying down the obligations of operators who place timber and timber products on the market[3] (EU Timber Regulation),

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2023/1115 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 May 2023 on the making available on the Union market and the export from the Union of certain commodities and products associated with deforestation and forest degradation and repealing Regulation (EU) No 995/2010[4] (EU Deforestation Regulation),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 11 December 2019 on the European Green Deal (COM(2019)0640),

     having regard to its resolution of 15 January 2020 on the European Green Deal[5],

     having regard to its resolution of 16 September 2020 on the EU’s role in protecting and restoring the world’s forests[6],

     having regard to its resolution of 22 October 2020 with recommendations to the Commission on an EU legal framework to halt and reverse EU-driven global deforestation[7],

     having regard to the Paris Agreement and to the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework on halting and reversing nature loss,

     having regard to the Partnership Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Members of the Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States, of the other part[8],

     having regard to the UN Sustainable Development Goals,

     having regard to the Glasgow Leaders’ Declaration on Forest and Land Use,

     having regard to its legislative resolution of [XXXX][9] on the draft Council decision,

     having regard to Rule 107(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Development,

     having regard to the report of the Committee on International Trade (A10-0094/2025),

    A. whereas the Voluntary Partnership Agreement (VPA) between the European Union and the Republic of Cameroon on forest law enforcement, governance and trade in timber and derived products to the Union (FLEGT) entered into force on 1 December 2011 and is one of the first agreements of this kind to be concluded; whereas the VPA’s objective is to provide a framework of legislation, systems, controls and verification procedures to ensure that all timber exports from Cameroon into the EU market have been acquired, harvested, transported and exported legally;

    B. whereas Cameroon has over 18 million hectares of forest, which accounts for approximately 40 % of its national territory; whereas Cameroon is Africa’s largest exporter of tropical hardwoods to the EU; whereas illegal logging and forest conversion, enabled by poor forest governance and driven by trade, are major contributors to deforestation in Cameroon; whereas 900 000 hectares of forest cover were lost between 2011 and 2022, representing 5 % of the country’s forest cover during this period;

    C. whereas nearly half of the total exports from Cameroon are directed to European markets, with timber as the third most important product after oil and cocoa; whereas all three of these sectors generally contribute to deforestation, and the growth of their production is part of Cameroon’s national development strategy for 2020-2030;

    D. whereas all shipments of timber and timber products from Cameroon destined for the EU market should comply with the EU Timber Regulation (EUTR) requiring operators to perform due diligence checks to ensure the timber products they place on the EU market are legal; whereas since 2015, Cameroon has been developing a timber legality assurance system (TLAS), as required by the VPA; whereas to date, Cameroon has not fully established the TLAS and thereby cannot qualify for a FLEGT licence; whereas the TLAS is based on a legality definition, supply chain controls, verification of compliance, FLEGT licensing and an independent audit; whereas this legality verification system is not yet operational;

    E. whereas the purpose and expected benefits of FLEGT VPAs go beyond the facilitation of trade in legal timber, as they are also designed to bring about systemic changes in forest governance, law enforcement, transparency and the inclusion of various stakeholders in the political decision-making process, including indigenous and local communities and civil society organisations;

    F. whereas the FLEGT licensing scheme, which forms an integral part of the VPA, was expected to be in place within five years of the reform of the legal framework; whereas this licensing scheme is not yet in place, implying that the VPA between the EU and Cameroon is not operational to date; whereas the EU FLEGT VPA programme, coordinated by the French Development Agency, was not implemented in Cameroon as planned for the years 2021-2025;

    G. whereas the forest reform, launched in 2008 with the aim of revising the 1994 forest code, was finalised in July 2024 with the publication of the new Forest Code; whereas illegal logging is conducted partly on the basis of small logging titles (ventes de coupe) that do not require management plans and are more difficult to control compared to the oversight of large-scale concessions; whereas the national control systems are not operational, due to corruption and insufficient resources, so enforcement and governance remain weak, making it possible for illegal and unsustainable logging operations to continue;

    H. whereas the development of the legality verification module in the traceability system is still pending, and the little progress made so far has not been independently audited, which would help build its credibility;

    I. whereas Cameroon has not been able to meet its VPA obligations over the last 10 years and the governance of the forest sector has worsened despite the existence of the VPA;

    J. whereas timber exports have shifted to Asian markets, particularly China and Vietnam diluting the economic incentive of the VPA, and consequently the relevance of the FLEGT licence; whereas Vietnam has become the second largest market for Cameroonian timber (after China), while Cameroon has become the largest supplier of tropical logs to Vietnam (accounting for 25 % of the logs imported between 2016 and 2019, in value); whereas a large part of timber trade flows concerns illegal logging, which deprives the Government of Cameroon of revenue and local communities of shared benefits; whereas the United States and the EU supported discussions between Cameroon and Vietnam to conclude a Memorandum of Understanding with the aim of improving the transparency of the timber trade between both countries; whereas transparency and traceability in timber trade flows are essential for the credibility of legality assurance schemes; whereas, in this context, the EU should continue encouraging partner countries to strengthen import controls and ensure that timber sourced from them complies with legal requirements under national and VPA frameworks;

    K. whereas the Cameroon-EU VPA entered into force in 2011; whereas, despite the initial positive impacts on legal reform, multi-stakeholder participation, access to information and transparency, the VPA process was stalled in 2018; whereas the parties agreed in 2023 to undertake a joint VPA review, with the resulting report presenting four options for next steps, one of which was termination of the VPA by consensus; whereas this report was not made public until after the Commission notified the Council of the decision to terminate; whereas the Commission made the unilateral call to end the partnership;

    L. whereas key exports from Central Africa to the EU include timber, cocoa and tropical fruits; whereas the EU and the Republic of Cameroon signed a provisional Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) in 2009, which remains in force as an interim arrangement while negotiations on a full regional EPA for Central Africa are ongoing; whereas future EU-Cameroon cooperation should aim to align trade policy instruments with sustainability goals, particularly under the EU Deforestation Regulation, in order to promote consistency, mutual benefit and predictability for operators on both sides;

    M. whereas the VPA is tacitly renewed every seven years, unless one party terminates it by notifying the other party of its decision at least 12 months before the expiry of the current seven-year period; whereas each party may terminate the VPA at any time by notifying the other party; whereas the VPA is terminated 12 months following that notification;

    N. whereas the continuation of the VPA could affect the credibility of the EU as a global champion of forest protection, sustainable and multifunctional agroforestry, soil and landscape protection, biodiversity, local rural economy and human rights standards and the integrity of VPAs as EU trade instruments; whereas the unilateral termination of the agreement could also tarnish the reputation of the EU as a reliable forestry actor and defender;

    O. whereas in its communication of 7 November 2024 on a strategic framework for international cooperation engagement, the Commission suggests that forest partnerships could build on or even replace VPAs; whereas, despite the challenges, VPAs have proven to be a key instrument in laying the groundwork for improved forest governance; whereas VPAs are legally binding agreements that can be complemented by forest partnerships; whereas there is a lack of information regarding the impacts of existing forest partnerships on the improvement of governance; whereas the Commission has not informed Parliament of the criteria underpinning its engagement in forest partnerships; whereas this failure to involve Parliament prior to developing partnerships with third countries has already occurred in the past; underscores the need for the EU to remain firmly committed to other existing VPAs;

    P. whereas a move away from the VPA model towards more extractive agreements such as raw materials partnerships or non-binding memoranda of understanding will undermine the EU’s credibility when it comes to the protection of biodiversity and the fight against deforestation;

    Q. whereas civil society in Cameroon is increasingly confronted with hostility and a shrinking space; whereas a circular published on 13 August 2024 obliges NGOs active in the forest sector to sign a Memorandum of Understanding with the Ministry of Forestry and Wildlife;

    1. Highlights that deforestation and forest degradation are key environmental challenges and are among the main drivers of climate change and biodiversity loss, while also having major negative social and economic impacts on producing communities and countries, especially on the more vulnerable parts of society and groups such as indigenous communities;

    2. Highlights that the environmental damage caused by deforestation will have hugely negative social and economic consequences for communities engaged in forestry;

    3. Recalls that the Samoa Agreement[10] between the EU and its Member States, and the Members of the Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States reaffirms that the parties must promote a multi-stakeholder approach, enabling the active engagement of a wide variety of actors in partnership dialogue and cooperation processes, including parliaments, local authorities, civil society and the private sector, that inclusive partnership dialogue and action tailored to the specificities of the parties are the main tools to achieve these objectives, and that there is a need for a high level of environmental protection, while committing to halting deforestation and forest degradation as a means of protecting ecosystems as well as vulnerable communities and indigenous people, preserving biodiversity and mitigating climate change;

    4. Recalls that sustainable and inclusive forest management and governance are essential for achieving the objectives set out in the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the Paris Agreement and the Kunming Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework on halting and reversing nature loss;

    5. Recalls that in the Glasgow Leaders’ Declaration on Forest and Land Use, the EU and Cameroon reaffirmed their commitment to halt and reverse forest loss and land degradation by 2030;

    6. Recalls Team Europe’s efforts in promoting political stability and economic development through sustainable and resilient territorial development in response to climate change;

    7. Underlines that the Global Gateway strategy should support Cameroon in promoting sustainable, inclusive and green development throughout its territory;

    8. Recalls that trade is an engine for inclusive economic growth and poverty reduction that helps to promote sustainable development; believes that VPAs provide an important legal framework for both the EU and its partner countries, but that this requires effective multi-stakeholder dialogue and good cooperation with and commitment from the countries concerned; recalls that in its early stages, the EU-Cameroon VPA resulted in concrete improvements, including on stakeholder participation and access to information, but that unfortunately this progress has stalled over the past 10 years; deplores the lack of progress in the implementation of the VPA with Cameroon, especially with regard to the enforcement, transparency and traceability of commitments, and is highly concerned about the ongoing deforestation and forest degradation not only by illegal logging, but also by other key drivers of deforestation, such as forest conversion for agricultural use and mining;

    9. Highlights the fact that addressing the root causes of deforestation, such as weak governance, ineffective law enforcement, insecure land tenures, lack of access to finance, shrinking civic space and corruption, requires the EU and its partner countries to carry out joint assessments based on the meaningful engagement of relevant stakeholders, such as indigenous people and local communities, with a view to overcoming regulatory implementation hurdles regarding transparency and traceability;

    10. Stresses that a robust and credible TLAS offers forest businesses greater legal certainty, simplified controls and more transparent processes, discouraging informal payments and corruption, while increasing revenues for both communities and the state;

    11. Underlines the importance of including civil society and local authorities in decision-making processes, of benefit-sharing with local communities and of reinforcing security and accountability;

    12. Regrets the need to end the legally binding VPA with Cameroon; agrees with the Commission that, in the light of the VPA’s shortcomings, this is the best policy option for the time being and stresses the need for the Commission to keep engaging with the Government of Cameroon on forestry; expresses concern about the impact of the termination of the VPA on diplomatic and economic relations between Cameroon and the EU and on the EU’s capacity to build meaningful future partnerships with the country; points out the potential negative impact on civic space, as the VPA facilitated dialogue between the Government of Cameroon and civil society; calls on the Commission to assess the impact of this decision on European businesses operating in or sourcing from Cameroon and to explore support mechanisms to preserve responsible trade channels and to ensure the sustainable management of natural resources;

    13. Underlines that the EU remains a committed partner of Cameroon in fostering economic growth and comprehensive human development; calls on the Commission and the European External Action Service to engage in dialogue with the authorities of Cameroon to explore possibilities for constructive cooperation based on areas of mutual interest, combat illegal logging, support forest conservation and boost economic cooperation and trade;

    14. Notes with concern that Cameroon ranks 140th out of 180 countries on the Corruption Perceptions Index; urges the Government of Cameroon to work towards stopping widespread corruption and to address other factors fuelling illegal logging and forest degradation, with particular regard to customs, in cooperation with other authorities; stresses the importance of protecting human, labour and indigenous people’s rights, notably by respecting the principle of free, prior and informed consent in all circumstances when sourcing goods and products for the EU market; calls, in this context, on local authorities to extend special protections to children and indigenous communities; emphasises the importance of ensuring that civil society actors are given the necessary space and possibilities to engage with governmental actors;

    15. Highlights the fact that joint consultations with local authorities in Cameroon should be strengthened to drive positive change and reinforce and boost the credibility of local governance;

    16. Stresses that countries all over the world that either have or aim to have regulated import markets for legal timber would benefit from cooperating with and, where possible, endorsing each other’s rules and systems, such as the EU’s FLEGT and VPAs; emphasises that international standards would be more effective and would promote long-term legal security for businesses and consumers;

    17. Recognises the shortcomings of the current forestry zoning system; acknowledges that forest management plans, intended to ensure sustainability, have largely failed due to corruption and weak governance; calls for renewed cooperation between the EU and its partner countries in order to develop new practices and governance mechanisms to address these challenges;

    18. Calls on the Commission to explore alternatives in close dialogue with Cameroon to ensure the legality of timber and timber products originating from Cameroon and to properly address the problem of illegal timber logging; considers that a forest partnership, as outlined in the EU Deforestation Regulation, could be a possible option for cooperation between the EU and Cameroon; emphasises the importance of conducting a thorough diagnostic and independent evaluation of forest governance and trade trends in Cameroon, building on existing assessments, prior to entering into negotiations on a forest partnership; underlines that in order to be effective, any potential future partnerships would have to be developed through an open, transparent, inclusive, deliberative and non-discriminatory process with meaningful participation from civil society, trade unions and local and international NGOs, the private sector including microenterprises and other small and medium-sized enterprises, local authorities, local and indigenous communities, and farmers; stresses that ending impunity in the forest sector is a cornerstone of this process, which requires the protection of environmental defenders as well as an effective system to tackle human rights violations; calls for the EU to continue supporting and engaging in dialogue with Cameroon in order to tackle the challenges arising from deforestation in a spirit of equal partnership, and to promote sustainable and inclusive development throughout its territory including by establishing the robust and transformative timber traceability systems that are necessary to comply with the expanding requirements of consumer market regulations worldwide, whether under the EU Deforestation Regulation or other foreign legislation;

    19. Stresses the importance of the parliamentary oversight and monitoring of the VPA by Parliament’s Committee on International Trade; underlines the need for the meaningful and timely involvement of Parliament with regard to the assessment of the implementation of existing VPAs, as well as the negotiation, signing and implementation of any future forest partnerships; stresses the need to also include consultations with civil society organisations, the private sector and particularly indigenous communities, environmental and human rights defenders and trade unions; asks the Commission to regularly report to Parliament on the implementation of the VPAs and forest partnerships, including on the work of the joint implementation committees and on the strategies to be pursued in the coming years; highlights the need for an in-depth diagnostic and independent assessment of forest governance in Cameroon and for the relevant experiences and lessons learnt from the VPA process to be integrated into any future forest partnership;

    20. Underlines that despite the unprecedented unilateral termination of the VPA with Cameroon, VPAs continue to provide an important legal framework for both the EU and its partner countries, which has been made possible through good cooperation with and commitment from the countries concerned; stresses that the EU should remain fully committed to existing VPAs and that new VPAs with additional partners should be promoted, as they play a crucial role in facilitating transparent and accountable forest management, addressing the root causes of illegal logging, combating climate change, strengthening local people’s land tenure rights and providing a tool for civil society and forest communities to be involved in decision-making processes;

    21. Calls on the Commission to ensure coherence between the EU’s trade and sustainability frameworks when engaging with Cameroon and the broader central African region; encourages the Commission to ensure that the requirements and objectives of the EU Deforestation Regulation and related legislation are adequately taken into account in the context of the ongoing negotiations on a full regional economic partnership agreement; underlines the importance of providing technical assistance and regulatory guidance to partner countries to help align trade practices with environmental standards, particularly in sectors such as timber, cocoa and tropical agriculture;

    22. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Government and Parliament of the Republic of Cameroon and all relevant stakeholders in the Voluntary Partnership Agreement process.

    EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

    The Voluntary Partnership Agreement (VPA) between the European Union and the Republic of Cameroon on forest law enforcement, governance and trade in timber and derived products to the European Union (FLEGT) entered into force on 1 December 2011 and is one of the first agreements of this kind that was concluded. The rapporteur regrets that Cameroon has not been able to honour its VPA obligations over the last 10 years and the governance of the forest sector has worsened despite the existence of the agreement. While the rapporteur believes that FLEGT VPAs provide an important legal framework for both the EU and its partner countries, they can only work properly when both sides are willing to cooperate and to adhere to their commitments. In the present case, the rapporteur believes that the best alternative is to terminate the agreement.

     

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Montenegro – A10-0093/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Montenegro

    (2025/2020(INI))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Montenegro, of the other part[1], which entered into force on 1 May 2010,

     having regard to Montenegro’s application for membership of the European Union of 15 December 2008,

     having regard to the Commission opinion of 9 November 2010 on Montenegro’s application for membership of the European Union (COM(2010)0670), the European Council’s decision of 16-17 December 2010 to grant Montenegro candidate status and the European Council’s decision of 29 June 2012 to open EU accession negotiations with Montenegro,

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1529 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 September 2021 establishing the Instrument for Pre-Accession assistance (IPA III)[2],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1449 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans[3],

     having regard to the Presidency conclusions of the Thessaloniki European Council meeting of 19-20 June 2003,

     having regard to the Sofia Declaration of the EU-Western Balkans summit of 17 May 2018 and the Sofia Priority Agenda annexed thereto,

     having regard to the declarations of the EU-Western Balkans summits of 13 December 2023 in Brussels, and of 18 December 2024 in Brussels,

     having regard to the Berlin Process launched on 28 August 2014,

     having regard to the Commission communication of 6 October 2020 entitled ‘An Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2020)0641),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘2023 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy’ (COM(2023)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Montenegro 2023 Report’ (SWD(2023)0694),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘New growth plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2023)0691),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 20 March 2024 on pre-enlargement reforms and policy reviews (COM(2024)0146),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 24 July 2024 entitled ‘2024 Rule of Law Report’ (COM(2024)0800), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘2024 Rule of Law Report – The rule of law situation in the European Union: Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Montenegro’ (SWD(2024)0829),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘2024 Communication on EU enlargement policy’ (COM(2024)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Montenegro 2024 Report’ (SWD(2024)0694),

     having regard to the Commission’s overview and country assessments of 31 May 2023 and of 13 June 2024 of the economic reform programme of Montenegro, and to the joint conclusions of the Economic and Financial Dialogue between the EU and the Western Balkans and Türkiye adopted by the Council on 16 May 2023 and to the joint conclusions of the Economic and Financial Dialogue between the EU and the Western Balkans Partners, Türkiye, Georgia, Republic of Moldova and Ukraine adopted by the Council on 14 May 2024,

     having regard to the EU-Montenegro Intergovernmental Accession Conferences of 22 June 2021, 13 December 2021, 29 January 2024, 26 June 2024 and 16 December 2024,

     having regard to the 11th EU-Montenegro Stabilisation and Association Council on 14 July 2022,

     having regard to the declaration and recommendations adopted at the 22nd meeting of the EU-Montenegro Stabilisation and Association Parliamentary Committee, held on 31 October and 1 November 2024,

     having regard to Montenegro’s accession to NATO on 5 June 2017,

     having regard to Special Report 01/2022 of the European Court of Auditors of 10 January 2022 entitled ‘EU support for the rule of law in the Western Balkans: despite efforts, fundamental problems persist’,

     having regard to the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (the Istanbul Convention), ratified by Montenegro in 2013, and to the recommendations of the Commission on gender equality and combating gender-based violence,

     having regard to the World Press Freedom Index report published annually by Reporters Without Borders,

     having regard to the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) data on the Ukraine Refugee Situation as of April 2025,

     having regard to its recommendation of 23 November 2022 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy concerning the new EU strategy for enlargement[4],

     having regard to its previous resolutions on Montenegro,

     having regard to its resolution of 29 February 2024 on deepening EU integration in view of future enlargement[5],

     having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0093/2025),

    A. whereas enlargement is a key EU foreign policy tool and a strategic geopolitical investment in peace, stability, security and prosperity;

    B. whereas the new enlargement momentum, sparked by the changing geopolitical reality and the EU membership applications by several Eastern Partnership countries, has prompted the EU to accelerate its efforts towards delivering on its long-overdue commitments to the Western Balkans; whereas the future of the Western Balkan countries lies within the EU;

    C. whereas each country is judged on its own merits in fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria, including full respect for democracy, the rule of law, good governance, fundamental EU values and alignment with EU foreign and security policy; whereas the implementation of necessary reforms in the area of ‘fundamentals’ determines the timetable and progress in the accession process;

    D. whereas Montenegro has gone furthest in the accession process, with all 33 chapters of the EU acquis open and six provisionally closed, and has significant public support therefor;

    E whereas the EU is Montenegro’s largest trading partner, investor and provider of financial assistance;

    F whereas Montenegro is exposed to malign foreign influence, disinformation campaigns and other forms of influence, including election meddling, hybrid warfare strategies and unfavourable investments from non-EU actors, particularly Russia and China, which are trying to influence Montenegro’s political, economic and strategic trajectory and threaten democratic processes and media integrity, jeopardising the country’s prospects for EU accession;

    G. whereas on 8 June 2024, an ‘All-Serb Assembly’ took place in Belgrade with the participation of high-ranking parliamentarians under the slogan ‘One people, one Assembly’;

    Commitment to EU accession

    1. Recognises Montenegro’s firm commitment to EU accession and reaffirms its full support for the country’s future EU membership; welcomes Montenegro’s leading regional position in the EU accession process as well as the overwhelming support of Montenegro’s citizens and the majority of political actors for joining the EU in 2028;

    2. Welcomes Montenegro’s positive progress in enacting EU-related reforms and measures, underpinned by an ambitious timeline and calls for collective efforts of political actors, civil society and citizens; commends Montenegro for meeting the interim benchmarks for Chapters 23 and 24, which continue to determine the overall pace of negotiations, and for receiving a positive Interim Benchmark Assessment Report; welcomes the closure of three more negotiating chapters, bringing the total to six;

    3. Encourages all political actors to stay focused on EU integration and the required reforms; stresses the need for political stability, commitment and constructive engagement in consensus building across party lines in order to move swiftly and more effectively towards closing additional chapters in 2025, so as to achieve the country’s ambitious timeline; stresses that the reforms adopted must be implemented effectively and consistently to ensure genuine progress and full alignment with EU legislation; calls for a strengthening of the functioning of, and coordination between, state institutions in order to achieve political stability and advance the country’s substantial progress in implementing key EU-related reforms, in particular electoral and judicial reforms and the fight against organised crime and corruption;

    4. Underlines that the credibility of the EU, including its enlargement policy as a whole, would be affected if tangible progress achieved by certain Western Balkan countries does not translate into clear advancements on the EU accession path;

    5. Welcomes Montenegro’s sustained full alignment with the EU’s common foreign and security policy (CFSP), including EU restrictive measures, inter alia, those related to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and those targeted against cyberattacks, as well as its support for the international rules-based order at UN level; encourages Montenegro to strengthen the enforcement of restrictive measures and avoid their circumvention and to seize the assets of those sanctioned; calls on all government representatives to respect and promote CFSP alignment and EU values and refrain from any activities that may threaten Montenegro’s strategic path towards EU membership and its sovereignty; is highly concerned, in this context, by public high officials’ statements in support of the President of the Republika Srpska entity, Milorad Dodik, who is undermining the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina; regrets the participation of high-ranking parliamentarians from Montenegro in the ‘All-Serbian Assembly’ in Belgrade as well as their support for the declaration adopted on that occasion undermining the sovereignty of Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo;

    6. Underlines the strategic importance of Montenegro’s NATO membership and welcomes its active involvement in EU common security and defence policy missions and operations, such as EU Naval Force Operation Atalanta, and in NATO and other international and multilateral missions; welcomes the decision of Montenegro’s Council for Defence and Security to approve the participation of its armed forces in the EU Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine and NATO’s Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine and calls on the Montenegrin Parliament to adopt these decisions, thereby reinforcing the country’s commitment to collective security;

    7. Commends Montenegro for its humanitarian and material support to Ukraine and for extending the temporary protection mechanism that grants persons fleeing Ukraine the right to stay in Montenegro for one year; recalls that Montenegro is among the Western Balkan countries hosting the largest number of Ukrainian refugees, with over 18 800 refugees from Ukraine registered in Montenegro as of 31 January 2025, according to UNHCR statistics;

    8. Remains seriously concerned by malign foreign interference, destabilisation efforts, cyberattacks, hybrid threats and disinformation campaigns, including attempts to influence political processes and public opinion, by third-country actors, which discredit the EU and undermine Montenegro’s progress on its accession path; urges Montenegro to adopt countermeasures in stronger cooperation with the EU and NATO and through increased regional cooperation among the Western Balkan countries; notes that religious institutions can be used as a tool for external influence and condemns any undue interference by the Serbian Orthodox Church in this regard; reiterates the importance of building resilience capacity against foreign information manipulation and interference, including through greater oversight of the media landscape, public awareness campaigns and media literacy programmes; recommends that Montenegro establish a dedicated hybrid threat task force;

    9. Urges the Commission, the European External Action Service (EEAS), the Delegation of the EU to Montenegro and the Montenegrin authorities to boost strategic communication to Montenegrin citizens on the benefits of the enlargement process and EU membership, as well as on the concrete accession criteria that Montenegro still needs to fulfil to align with EU requirements; urges them, furthermore, to improve the EU’s visibility in the country, including as regards EU-funded projects; calls for StratCom monitoring to be expanded in order to concentrate on cross-border disinformation threats in the Western Balkan countries and their neighbours; calls on the Commission to further support the efforts of the EEAS and the Western Balkans Task Force so as to expand outreach activities by increasing visibility in local media, fact-checking reports and partnering with civil society organisations to counter false narratives more effectively;

    10. Welcomes the Montenegrin Parliament’s renewed engagement in the Stabilisation and Association Parliamentary Committee;

    Democracy and the rule of law

    11. Recognises the Montenegrin Parliament’s key role in the accession process, notably as regards passing accession-related legislation, and underlines the importance of parliamentary cooperation in this regard; reiterates the European Parliament’s readiness to use its political and technical resources to advance the EU-related reform agenda, including through democracy support activities; notes, with concern, the re-emerging tensions and ethnic polarisation, which are slowing the reform process; calls for constructive dialogue and consensus building across the political spectrum, prioritising legislative quality, and strongly urges that solutions be found through parliamentary dialogue; calls for preventing identity politics from diverting attention from the EU agenda or straining relations with its neighbours, ensuring that Montenegro remains firmly on the EU path; welcomes the agreement between the Montenegrin Prime Minister and opposition leaders to request an opinion from the Venice Commission regarding the termination of the mandate of Constitutional Court judge Dragana Đuranović and for the opposition to return to the parliament;

    12. Expresses its concern about attempts to amend the law on Montenegrin citizenship in the Montenegrin Parliament, which could have serious and long-term implications for the country’s decision-making processes and identity, while emphasising that any discussions on identity politics must be handled with the utmost sensitivity to avoid further polarisation and should aim for broad societal consensus; encourages the Montenegrin authorities to consult and coordinate with the EU on any possible changes to the law on citizenship and stresses the importance of achieving consensus on any matters relating to this subject of crucial importance for the identity and independence of Montenegro;

    13. Strongly encourages the Montenegrin Parliament to hold inclusive and transparent public consultations and regular and meaningful engagement with civil society in decision-making from an early stage in the legislative process, notably for key legislation in the EU reform process; encourages a more active role for the Montenegrin Parliamentary Women’s Club;

    14. Calls on Montenegro to fully align its electoral legal framework with EU standards, notably as regards harmonising electoral legislation, voting and candidacy rights restrictions, transparency, dispute resolution mechanisms, campaign and media oversight, and political party and election campaign financing, and to implement the recommendations of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights[6]; urges Montenegro to increase transparency and control of political party spending and prevent the abuse of state resources by bringing the relevant legislation into line with EU standards, as well as enhancing the enforcement of third-party financing rules and strengthening sanctions for violations; highlights the role of the Agency for Prevention of Corruption (APC) in this regard, and calls for increased cooperation between the APC and financial intelligence authorities to detect and prevent foreign influence in political campaigns; calls, furthermore, on Montenegro to implement the recommendations of the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) on gender parity on electoral lists;

    15. Reiterates its call on the Montenegrin authorities to establish a single nationwide municipal election day, as provided for in the Law on Local Self-Government, in order to enhance governance efficiency, reduce political tensions and strengthen the stability and effectiveness of municipal and state institutions; recalls that future disbursement of funds under the Reform and Growth Facility is contingent on the fulfilment of this reform, in line with Montenegro’s commitments in its reform agenda, and should be pursued as a matter of priority; welcomes the fact that, in 2022, elections in 14 municipalities were held on the same day; calls for a robust legislative framework in this regard; is concerned by the misconduct of the electoral process in the municipality of Šavnik;

    16. Calls on the Montenegrin authorities to adopt the Law on Government that should enable an improved governance framework and the optimisation of public administration;

    17. Underlines the importance of a professional, merit-based, transparent and depoliticised civil service; calls on Montenegro to amend and implement the relevant legislation to provide a framework for the professionalisation, optimisation and rationalisation of state administration, including procedural safeguards against politically motivated decisions on appointments and dismissals, as well as high standards for managerial positions; regrets the lack of significant progress in adopting and effectively implementing such legislation and highlights that this allows for public service recruitment to remain subject to political influence;

    18. Welcomes Montenegro’s inclusion in the Commission’s 2024 Rule of Law Report; notes, with concern, the identified deficiencies, including judicial appointments and the independence of the prosecutor’s office;

    19. Welcomes the progress made in implementing key judicial reforms, adopting a new strategic framework and completing long-outstanding judicial appointments; calls on Montenegro to fill the remaining high-level judicial positions;

    20. Urges Montenegro to further align its legal framework, including the constitution, in particular on the composition and decision-making process of the Judicial Council, with EU laws and standards on the independence, accountability, impartiality, integrity and professionalism of the judiciary,  and to further depoliticise appointments to bolster independence, implement outstanding international recommendations, and determine criteria for the retirement of judges and prosecutors in line with European standards and in full compliance with the Constitution; regrets the pending case backlog and calls on Montenegro to take measures to reduce the duration of legal proceedings, particularly for serious and organised crime cases, notably on money laundering; recommends that Montenegro adopt the amendments to the Constitution in the final stage of the country’s EU accession negotiations;

    21. Notes the steps taken in the fight against corruption, including new laws and provisions on the protection of whistleblowers, the creation of a new National Council for the fight against corruption and a new anti-corruption strategy for 2024-2028; encourages Montenegro to further align with the EU acquis and EU standards and address recommendations by the Commission, the Venice Commission and the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO); encourages the Montenegrin authorities to continue addressing existing deficiencies in the handling of organised crime cases and the seizure and confiscation of criminal assets;

    22. Urges Montenegro to step up its criminal justice response to high-level corruption, including by strengthening the effective enforcement of existing criminal legislation and imposing effective and deterrent penalties, and to create conditions for judicial institutions and independent bodies dealing with corruption to function effectively, free from political influence;

    23. Notes the work of the Agency for Prevention of Corruption and calls for it to be provided with sufficient funding and for it to be depoliticised; expects the Agency to deliver tangible results and act non-selectively to strengthen its integrity and enhance its authority in carrying out its competences effectively; calls for a stronger corruption prevention framework;

    24. Urges Montenegro to align its weapons legislation with EU law and international standards, particularly as regards technical standards for firearm markings, deactivation procedures and regulations for alarm and signal weapons, as well as to establish a standardised and effective data collection and reporting system for firearms; is appalled by the tragic mass shooting in Cetinje and expresses its condolences to the victims’ families; expresses its concern over the exploitation of this tragedy for disinformation and ethnic polarisation; urges Montenegro to strengthen its crisis communication to counter disinformation and ensure responsible media reporting in the aftermath of violent incidents; calls for systematic actions in the areas of security, mental well-being and institutional transparency, as well as in civic education and public awareness, outreach and educational initiatives, on the dangers and risks of firearms, in line with citizens’ expectations and societal needs;

    25. Calls on Montenegro to urgently fully align its visa policy with that of the EU, especially as regards countries posing irregular migration or security risks to the EU; expresses its concern that, contrary to expectations, two additional countries have been added to the visa-free regime and that Russian and Belarusian passport holders continue to benefit from a visa-free regime; notes that the harmonisation of the visa policy is also provided for in Montenegro’s reform agenda under the Reform and Growth Facility;

    26. Welcomes the ongoing cooperation between Montenegro and the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex), Europol, Eurojust and the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training (CEPOL), and notes the importance of this cooperation in tackling cross-border crime, including the trafficking of weapons, drugs and human beings, and in combating terrorism and extremism; welcomes the entry into force of the upgraded agreement on operational cooperation in border management with Frontex on 1 July 2023 and encourages further cooperation between Montenegro and Frontex to strengthen border management, support asylum procedures, fight smuggling and enhance readmission;

    Fundamental freedoms and human rights

    27. Regrets that the most vulnerable groups in society still face discrimination; calls on Montenegro to adopt a new anti-discrimination law and relevant strategies, through an inclusive, transparent and meaningful process that actively involves those most affected, to improve vulnerable groups’ access to rights; underlines that respect for the rights of all national minorities is an integral part of the EU acquis; calls for stronger implementation to ensure equal treatment of all ethnic, religious, national and social groups so that they are guaranteed equal rights and opportunities and can fully participate in social, political and economic life;

    28. Welcomes Montenegro’s multi-ethnic identity and calls for the further promotion of and respect for the languages, cultural heritage and traditions of local communities and national minorities, as this is closely intertwined with Montenegro’s European perspective;

    29. Underlines the multi-ethnic identity of the Bay of Kotor; stresses that Montenegro’s European perspective is closely intertwined with the protection of minorities and their cultural heritage; calls on the Montenegrin authorities to nurture the multi-ethnic nature of the state, including the traditions and cultural heritage of the Croatian community in the Bay of Kotor;

    30. Expresses its grave concern over the endangered heritage sites in Montenegro such as the Bay of Kotor and Sveti Stefan; stresses that Sveti Stefan, along with Miločer Park, was listed among the ‘7 Most Endangered heritage sites in Europe’ for 2023;

    31. Calls on the Montenegrin authorities to address the difficult living conditions of Roma people in Montenegro and the discrimination they face, and calls for more measures to promote intercultural understanding in schools; calls on the Montenegrin authorities to also take measures to improve the climate of societal inclusion for LGBTI persons;

    32. Welcomes that Montenegro has aligned its legislative and institutional framework with the EU acquis and international human rights standards regarding compliance with the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and its optional protocols; urges the authorities to address shortcomings in implementation, namely related to accountability and monitoring;

    33. Calls for the effective implementation of strategies to uphold the rights of persons with disabilities across all sectors and policies;

    34. Condemns all hate speech, including online and gender-based hate speech, and hate crimes; welcomes the criminalisation of racism and hate speech;

    35. Emphasises the need to strengthen institutional mechanisms for gender quality and calls on the Montenegrin authorities to address the gender pay gap, to improve women’s participation in decision-making – in both the public domain, particularly public administration, and judicial and security sectors, and in business – to ensure the increased political participation of women, to introduce gender responsive budgeting, and to combat gender stereotypes and strengthen efforts to combat discrimination against women, particularly in rural areas; welcomes recent efforts aimed at boosting women’s representation in science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) and encourages further efforts in technology sectors;

    36. Is deeply concerned by the high rates of gender-based violence, including domestic violence and femicide; calls on Montenegro to fully align its definitions of gender-based violence and domestic violence with the Istanbul Convention, and with recommendations of international bodies, and to set up effective protection and prevention mechanisms and support centres, and ensure effective judicial follow-up for victims of domestic and sexual violence as well as a more robust penal policy towards perpetrators; calls for the collection of disaggregated data on gender-based violence and gender disparities to improve policy responses;

    37. Regrets that the draft law on legal gender recognition was not adopted in 2024, despite it being a measure under Montenegro’s EU accession programme; urges Montenegro to adopt the law without delay;

    38. Welcomes Montenegro’s new media laws and its strategy for media policy aimed at strengthening the legal framework to effectively protect journalists and other media workers; insists on a zero-tolerance policy with regard to pressure on, harassment of, or violence against journalists, particularly by public figures; underlines the need for effective investigations, the prosecution of all instances of hate speech, smear campaigns and strategic lawsuits against journalists, and follow-up of past cases; stresses the need to ensure journalists’ rights to access information and maintain a critical stance; notes a significant improvement in Montenegro’s press freedom, demonstrated by its progress on the World Press Freedom Index;

    39. Expresses its concern over cases where journalists, academics and civil society organisations have faced pressure for exercising free speech, including instances where the police have initiated misdemeanour proceedings against them; is concerned by the use of strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs) to target journalists;

    40. Regrets the prevailing high level of polarisation in the media and its vulnerability to political interests and foreign influence as well as foreign and domestic disinformation campaigns that spread narratives that negatively impact democratic processes in the country and endanger Montenegro’s European perspective; calls on Montenegro to further develop improved media literacy programmes and include them as a core subject in education; calls on the Montenegrin authorities to ensure the editorial, institutional and financial independence of the public service broadcaster RTCG, as well as the legality of the appointment of its management and full respect for court rulings concerning RTCG; recalls that it needs to comply with the law and the highest standards of accountability and integrity; regrets that the independence of public media is being weakened and undermined; calls on all media entities to comply with legal requirements on public funding transparency;

    41. Welcomes the publication of the 2023 population census results; calls on the authorities to avoid any politicisation of the process; encourages stakeholders to use these results in a non-discriminatory manner;

    42. Welcomes Montenegro’s vibrant and constructive civil society and underlines its importance in fostering democracy and pluralism and in promoting good governance and social progress; expresses its concern over the shrinking space for civil society organisations with a critical stance, and condemns all smear campaigns, intimidation and attacks against civil society organisations, notably by political figures in the context of proposals for a ‘foreign agent law’; notes that such laws have the potential to undermine fundamental freedoms and the functioning of civil society and are inconsistent with EU values and standards; calls for a supportive legal framework and clear and fair selection criteria in relation to public funding; calls for the Council for Cooperation between the Government and non-governmental organisations to resume work; underlines the importance of building collaborative relationships and genuinely consulting civil society on draft legislation from an early stage onwards;

    Reconciliation, good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation

    43. Recalls that good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation are essential elements of the enlargement process; commends Montenegro’s active involvement in regional cooperation initiatives; recalls that good neighbourly relations are key for advancing in the accession process;

    44. Regrets that Chapter 31 could not be closed in December 2024; calls on all engaged parties to find solutions to outstanding bilateral issues in a constructive and neighbourly manner and prioritise the future interests of citizens in the Western Balkans; recalls that using unresolved bilateral and regional disputes to block candidate countries’ accession processes should be avoided; welcomes bilateral consultations between the Republic of Croatia and Montenegro on the status of unresolved bilateral issues; encourages the authorities to continue pursuing confidence-building measures;

    45. Notes Montenegro’s amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code to address legal and practical obstacles to the effective investigation, prosecution, trial and punishment of war crimes in line with relevant recommendations; calls on Montenegro to apply a proactive approach to handling war crimes cases, in line with international law and standards, to identify, prosecute and punish the perpetrators and the glorification of war crimes and ensure access to, and delivery of justice, redress and reparations for victims, and clarify the fate of missing persons; calls on Montenegro to allocate sufficient resources to specialised prosecutors and courts and proactively investigate all war crime allegations and raise issues of command responsibility, as well as to review past cases that were not prosecuted in line with international or domestic law; calls for regional cooperation in the investigation and prosecution of individuals indicted for war crimes; recognises that addressing these issues and safeguarding court-based facts are an important foundation for trust, democratic values, reconciliation and strengthening bilateral relations with neighbouring countries, and encourages Montenegro to step up these efforts;

    46. Warns against the dangers of political revisionism, which distorts historical facts for political purposes, undermines accountability and deepens societal divisions; strongly condemns the glorification of war criminals and widespread public denial of international verdicts for war crimes, including by the Montenegrin authorities; considers that President Jakov Milatović’s statement expressing regret over the participation of Montenegrin forces in the bombardment of the city of Dubrovnik was a valuable contribution to regional peace and reconciliation;

    47. Reiterates its support for the initiative to establish the Regional Commission for the establishment of facts about war crimes and other gross human rights violations on the territory of the former Yugoslavia (RECOM);

    48. Reiterates its call for the archives that concern the former republics of Yugoslavia to be opened and for access to be granted to the files of the former Yugoslav Secret Service and the Yugoslav People’s Army Secret Service in order to thoroughly research and address communist-era crimes;

    Socio-economic reforms

    49. Welcomes Montenegro’s inclusion in SEPA payment schemes, lowering costs for citizens and businesses; underlines that this opens up opportunities for business expansion, increased competitiveness, innovation and improved access to foreign direct investments;

    50. Welcomes the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans, which aims to integrate the region into the EU’s single market, promote regional economic cooperation and deepen EU-related reforms, and which includes the EUR 6 billion Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans; welcomes Montenegro’s adoption of a reform agenda and encourages its full implementation; notes that the implementation of the defined reform measures under Montenegro’s reform agenda for the Growth Plan would provide access to over EUR 380 million in grants and favourable loans, subject to successful implementation; stresses the importance of inclusive stakeholder consultations, including local and regional authorities, social partners and civil society, in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation phases;

    51. Encourages Montenegro to make best use of all EU funding available under the Pre-accession Assistance Instrument (IPA III), the Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans, the IPARD programme and the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans, to accelerate socio-economic convergence with the EU and further align its legislation with the EU on fraud prevention; recalls the conditionality of EU funding, which may be modulated or suspended in the event of significant regression or persistent lack of progress on fundamentals;

    52. Calls for the EU and the Western Balkan countries to establish a framework for effective cooperation between the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) and the accession countries in order to facilitate close cooperation and the prosecution of the misuse of EU funds, including through the secondment of national liaison officers to the EPPO; encourages Montenegro to fully implement working arrangements with the EPPO; calls for the EU to make the necessary legal and political arrangements to extend the jurisdiction of the EPPO to EU funds devoted to Montenegro as a candidate country;

    53. Positively notes Montenegro’s economic growth; calls for more steps to reduce the budget deficit and public debt, and to further remove indirect tax exemptions that do not align with the EU acquis; welcomes the efforts to reduce these fiscal vulnerabilities; reiterates the need for increased public investment in the education system for sustainable social and economic development;

    54. Notes Montenegro’s public debt to foreign financial institutions and companies that can be used as a tool to influence its policy decisions, in particular those related to China and Russia; welcomes the efforts to reduce these vulnerabilities and calls on the authorities to further reduce economic dependence on China and to continue making use of the Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans, the EU Global Gateway initiative and the Reform and Growth Facility, with a view to finding greener and more transparent alternatives for financing infrastructure projects; calls on Montenegro to increase transparency in future infrastructure projects, ensure competitive bidding and avoid excessive debt dependence on foreign creditors;

    55. Calls on the Montenegrin authorities to take measures to counter depopulation and emigration, in particular through investments in education and healthcare, especially in the north of the country, as well as through decentralisation by investing in medium-sized cities;

    56. Encourages the Montenegrin authorities to boost the digital transformation and pursue evidence-based labour market policies to address the persistently high unemployment rate, in particular among women and young people, while bolstering institutional capacity and enhancing the underlying digital policy framework, and to effectively implement the Youth Guarantee and the new Youth Strategy; urges the authorities to address brain drain as a matter of urgency; encourages the development of targeted preventive measures and incentives to legalise informal businesses and employees, as a large informal sector continues to hinder economic and social development in Montenegro;

    57. Welcomes the calls for the prompt integration of all Western Balkan countries into the EU’s digital single market before actual EU membership, which would crucially enable the creation of a digitally safe environment;

    58. Calls for more transparency in public procurement, notably for procedures via intergovernmental agreements, and for full compliance with EU rules and principles; calls on Montenegro to reduce the number of public procurement procedures without notices; expresses its concern over the financial burden and lack of transparency surrounding the construction of the Bar-Boljare motorway financed by a Chinese loan; stresses that the secrecy surrounding loan agreements and construction contracts raises accountability concerns;

    59. Expresses its concern over any agreements or projects that circumvent public procurement rules, transparency obligations and public consultation requirements, as set out in national legislation and EU standards; calls on the Government of Montenegro to ensure full respect for the principles of transparency, accountability, inclusive decision-making and the rule of law in all public infrastructure and development initiatives;

    Energy, the environment, biodiversity and connectivity

    60. Urges Montenegro to advance the green transition, with the support of EU funding, improve its institutional and regulatory framework and enhance energy resilience by finally adopting and implementing the long-overdue National Energy and Climate Plan, adopting energy efficiency laws and integrating further with EU energy markets; calls for all new green transition projects to be implemented in line with EU standards on the environment, State aid and concessions;

    61. Regrets the lack of progress on key sector reforms in the area of transport policy; calls on the Montenegrin authorities to align the country’s transport development with the Sustainable and Smart Mobility Strategy for the Western Balkans, focusing on railways, multimodality and reducing CO2 emissions and other environmental impacts, and to further implement its Transport Development Strategy and strengthen administrative capacities for the implementation of trans-European transport networks;

    62. Welcomes the reduction of data roaming charges between the EU and the Western Balkan countries and calls on the authorities, private actors and all stakeholders to take all necessary steps towards the goal of bringing data roaming prices close to domestic prices by 2028; welcomes the entry into force of the first phase of the implementation of the roadmap for roaming between the Western Balkans and the EU;

    63. Encourages the adoption of sectoral strategies for waste management, air and water quality, nature protection and climate change, ensuring strategic planning for investments; notes the lack of progress and associated rising costs in building essential waste water treatment plants to prevent sewage pollution in rivers and the sea in seven municipalities;

     

    °

    ° °

     

    64. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Commissioner for Enlargement, the Commissioner for the Mediterranean, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, and to the President, Government and Parliament of Montenegro, and to have it translated and published in Montenegrin.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: RECOMMENDATION on the draft Council decision on the termination of the Voluntary Partnership Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Cameroon on forest law enforcement, governance and trade in timber and derived products to the Union – A10-0089/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    DRAFT EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTION

    on the draft Council decision on the termination of the Voluntary Partnership Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Cameroon on forest law enforcement, governance and trade in timber and derived products to the Union

    (05673/2025 – C10‑0012/2025 – 2024/0245(NLE))

    (Consent)

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to the draft Council decision (05673/2025),

     having regard to the Voluntary Partnership Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Cameroon on forest law enforcement, governance and trade in timber and derived products to the European Union (FLEGT)[1],

     having regard to the request for consent submitted by the Council in accordance with Articles 207(4) first subparagraph and Article 218(6) second subparagraph, point (a) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (C10‑0012/2025),

     having regard to its non-legislative resolution of …[2] on the draft decision,

     having regard to Rule 107(1) and (4) and Rule 117(7) of its Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Development,

     having regard to the recommendation of the Committee on International Trade (A10-0089/2025),

    1. Gives its consent to the termination of the agreement;

    2. Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the governments and parliaments of the Member States and of the Republic of Cameroon.

     

    ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    Pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure, the rapporteur declares that she received input from the following entities or persons in the preparation of the draft report, prior to the adoption thereof in committee:

     

    Entity and/or person

    Fern

     

    The list above is drawn up under the exclusive responsibility of the rapporteur.

     

    Where natural persons are identified in the list by their name, by their function or by both, the [rapporteur declares / rapporteurs declare] that [he/she has / they have] submitted to the natural persons concerned the European Parliament’s Data Protection Notice No 484 (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/data-protect/index.do), which sets out the conditions applicable to the processing of their personal data and the rights linked to that processing.

    OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON DEVELOPMENT (25.4.2025)

    for the Committee on International Trade

    on the draft Council decision on the termination of the Voluntary Partnership Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Cameroon on forest law enforcement governance and trade in timber and derived products to the Union

    (05673/2025 – C10‑0012/2025 – 2024/0245(NLE))

    Rapporteur for opinion: Ana Miranda Paz

     

     

    SHORT JUSTIFICATION

    The Voluntary Partnership Agreement (VPA) between the EU and the Republic of Cameroon entered into force on 1 December 2011 for a period of seven years. As it is tacitly renewable, the current seven-year period will expire on 30 November 2025.

    Located in the Congo Basin, nearly 40% of Cameroon’s territory is covered by tropical forests. However, deforestation remains a major issue, with 900,000 hectares of forest cover (equivalent to 5%) lost between 2011 and 2022. The primary drivers of deforestation include agricultural expansion, wood harvesting, extractive activities (such as iron mining and petroleum extraction), and infrastructure development. In addition, illegal and unsustainable logging continues to degrade the forests. Nearly half of Cameroon’s total exports are directed toward European markets, with timber ranking as the third most significant export, after petroleum and cocoa. However, all three sectors contribute to deforestation, and their expansion is a core part of Cameroon’s national development strategy for 2020-2030. The VPA was primarily designed to establish a legal framework ensuring the legality of timber exports to the EU by improving national control systems and governance while introducing legal verification and traceability systems.

    Since the VPA came into force, the Cameroonian government has failed to implement its key measures, particularly the Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) licensing scheme, as well as the legality verification and traceability systems. Furthermore, law enforcement remains weak due to a lack of resources and persistent corruption. Some slight improvements have been observed since 2020, including a decline in illegal logging rates in managed forests and a reduction in the share of illegal timber in both the export and domestic markets, as analysed in a report by the Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR). However, the VPA’s contribution to these changes is assessed as relatively weak, especially when compared to similar agreements with other developing countries.

    In recent years, Cameroon’s timber exports have shifted toward Asian markets, where legality and sustainability standards receive little attention. In 2021, 59% of timber exports were destined for China and Vietnam, compared to 38% for the EU. For logs, exports to these two Asian markets accounted for 98%. A 2020 investigation by the Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA) and the Centre pour l’Environnement et le Développement (CED) uncovered widespread violations of export laws, illegal harvesting, and labour violations, all at the core of the illegal timber trade between Cameroon and Vietnam.

    Your rapporteur believes that this situation damages the credibility of the EU as a global leader in forest protection, sustainable and multifunctional agroforestry, soil and landscape conservation, biodiversity, rural economic development, human rights standards, and the integrity of VPAs as EU trade instruments.

    Nonetheless, your rapporteur believes that it is of primary importance to draw key insights from the positive aspects of the FLEGT-VPAs process, particularly in terms of forest governance, and integrate them into any future Forest Partnership. Such partnerships should be established with the full involvement of the European Parliament. To be effective, they must be developed through an inclusive process that actively engages small-scale farmers, civil society, local communities and indigenous people while also incorporating an effective monitoring and enforcement mechanism.

    Given these challenges, the Council considers that continuing the VPA could undermine the credibility of both the EU and the VPAs as trade instruments. The VPA between the European Union and the Republic of Cameroon has not been successfully implemented. If it were to be terminated, EU cooperation with Cameroon should shift toward supporting the country in implementing measures aligned with the upcoming EU Deforestation Regulation.

    *******

    The Committee on Development calls on the Committee on International Trade, as the committee responsible, to recommend approval of the draft Council decision on the termination of the Voluntary Partnership Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Cameroon on forest law enforcement governance and trade in timber and derived products to the Union.

    ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS
    FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    The rapporteur for the opinion declares under her exclusive responsibility that she did not receive input from any entity or person to be mentioned in this Annex pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure.

     

    PROCEDURE – COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION

    Title

    Termination of the Voluntary Partnership Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Cameroon on forest law enforcement governance and trade in timber and derived products to the Union

    References

    05673/2025 – C10-0012/2025 – 2024/0245(NLE)

    Committee(s) responsible

    INTA

     

     

     

    Opinion by

     Date announced in plenary

    DEVE

    31.3.2025

    Rapporteur for the opinion

     Date appointed

    Ana Miranda Paz

    18.3.2025

    Date adopted

    24.4.2025

     

     

     

    Result of final vote

    +:

    –:

    0:

    19

    1

    1

    Members present for the final vote

    Abir Al-Sahlani, Barry Andrews, Robert Biedroń, Udo Bullmann, Rosa Estaràs Ferragut, Niels Geuking, Małgorzata Gosiewska, Marc Jongen, Isabella Lövin, Thierry Mariani, Tiago Moreira de Sá, Leire Pajín, Kristoffer Storm

    Substitutes present for the final vote

    Marieke Ehlers, Marit Maij, Carla Tavares

    Members under Rule 216(7) present for the final vote

    Wouter Beke, Vladimir Prebilič, Paulius Saudargas, Andrea Wechsler, Tomáš Zdechovský

     

    FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL
    BY THE COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION

    19

    +

    ECR

    Małgorzata Gosiewska, Kristoffer Storm

    PPE

    Wouter Beke, Rosa Estaràs Ferragut, Niels Geuking, Paulius Saudargas, Andrea Wechsler, Tomáš Zdechovský

    PfE

    Marieke Ehlers, Tiago Moreira de Sá

    Renew

    Abir Al-Sahlani, Barry Andrews

    S&D

    Robert Biedroń, Udo Bullmann, Marit Maij, Leire Pajín, Carla Tavares

    Verts/ALE

    Isabella Lövin, Vladimir Prebilič

     

    1

    PfE

    Thierry Mariani

     

    1

    0

    ESN

    Marc Jongen

     

    Key to symbols:

    + : in favour

     : against

    0 : abstention

     

     

     

    PROCEDURE – COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE

    Title

    Termination of the Voluntary Partnership Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Cameroon on forest law enforcement governance and trade in timber and derived products to the Union

    References

    05673/2025 – C10-0012/2025 – 2024/0245(NLE)

    Date of consultation or request for consent

    18.2.2025

     

     

     

    Committee(s) responsible

    INTA

     

     

     

    Committees asked for opinions

     Date announced in plenary

    DEVE

    31.3.2025

     

     

     

    Rapporteurs

     Date appointed

    Karin Karlsbro

    14.10.2024

     

     

     

    Discussed in committee

    18.11.2024

    7.4.2025

     

     

    Date adopted

    15.5.2025

     

     

     

    Result of final vote

    +:

    –:

    0:

    28

    4

    2

    Members present for the final vote

    Christophe Bay, Brando Benifei, Lynn Boylan, Anna Bryłka, Udo Bullmann, Bart Groothuis, Karin Karlsbro, Bernd Lange, Ilia Lazarov, Thierry Mariani, Javier Moreno Sánchez, Ştefan Muşoiu, Daniele Polato, Majdouline Sbai, Lukas Sieper, Dominik Tarczyński, Marie-Pierre Vedrenne, Catarina Vieira, Jörgen Warborn, Bogdan Andrzej Zdrojewski, Juan Ignacio Zoido Álvarez

    Substitutes present for the final vote

    Petras Auštrevičius, Markus Buchheit, João Cotrim De Figueiredo, Fabio De Masi, Lina Gálvez, Jean-Marc Germain, Pierre Pimpie, Jessika Van Leeuwen

    Members under Rule 216(7) present for the final vote

    Tobias Cremer, Niels Geuking, Cristina Guarda, Michalis Hadjipantela, Niels Flemming Hansen

    Date tabled

    16.5.2025

     

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • Trump’s birthright citizenship order to face first US appeals court review

    Source: Government of India

    Source: Government of India (4)

    The constitutionality of President Donald Trump’s executive order to curtail automatic birthright citizenship is set to be considered by a U.S. appeals court for the first time on Wednesday, even as the U.S. Supreme Court weighs his administration’s request to let it begin to take effect.

    A three-judge panel of the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals is slated to hear arguments in Seattle in the administration’s appeal of a judge’s ruling blocking enforcement nationwide of the executive order, which is a key element of the Republican president’s hardline immigration agenda.

    Seattle-based U.S. District Judge John Coughenour issued his preliminary injunction on Feb. 6 after declaring Trump’s action “blatantly unconstitutional” and accusing the Republican president of ignoring the rule of law for political and personal gain. Federal judges in Massachusetts and Maryland also have issued similar orders blocking the directive nationwide.

    Democratic attorneys general from 22 states and immigrant rights advocates in lawsuits challenging Trump’s directive argued that it violates the citizenship clause of the U.S. Constitution’s 14th Amendment, long been understood to recognize that virtually anyone born in the United States is a citizen.

    Trump signed his order on January 20, his first day back in office. It directed federal agencies to refuse to recognize the citizenship of U.S.-born children who do not have at least one parent who is an American citizen or lawful permanent resident, also known as a “green card” holder.

    The administration contends that the 14th Amendment’s citizenship language does not extend to immigrants in the country illegally or immigrants whose presence is lawful but temporary, such as university students or those on work visas.

    The 9th Circuit panel is scheduled to consider the constitutional questions regarding Trump’s action.

    The Supreme Court, which has a 6-3 conservative majority, heard arguments on May 15 in the administration’s bid to narrow the three injunctions.

    Those arguments did not center on the legal merits of Trump’s order, instead focusing on the issue of whether a single judge should be able to issue nationwide injunctions like the ones that have blocked Trump’s directive. The Supreme Court, which has yet to rule, could allow the directive to go into effect in large swathes of the country.

    More than 150,000 newborns would be denied citizenship annually if Trump’s order takes effect nationally, according to the plaintiffs.

    Coughenour, an appointee of Republican President Ronald Reagan, has presided over a legal challenge brought by the states of Washington, Arizona, Illinois and Oregon and several pregnant women.

    The 9th Circuit panel hearing arguments on Wednesday includes two judges appointed by Democratic President Bill Clinton and one appointed by Trump during his first presidential term.

    (Reuters)

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: ‘Farming the Flood’ shows Dartmoor farmers adapting to nature

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    Press release

    ‘Farming the Flood’ shows Dartmoor farmers adapting to nature

    Farmers are turning flood challenges into environmental opportunities in this new documentary.

    ‘Farming the Flood’ shows complex issues in a positive way and how farming can become resilient to climate and biodiversity issues.

    • ‘Farming the Flood’ showcases farmers using nature-based techniques to combat flooding, created in partnership with the Dartmoor Headwaters Project. 
    • The film demonstrates the role farmers can play in increasing resilience to flooding whilst restoring biodiversity, while aligning with their business interests.

    ‘Farming The Flood’, which will be released live to the public via YouTube on June 5, follows local British farmers in Dartmoor implementing natural flood management techniques to protect communities while enhancing biodiversity.  

    Made by South West-based filmmaker Harrison Wood and Dartmoor farmer Nick Viney of Leewood Studios, the film tells the stories of farmers who are actively shaping sustainable land management across the UK.  

    The film has been jointly funded in partnership with Dartmoor Headwaters Project and Dartmoor National Park Authority. 

    Filmmakers Harrison Wood and Nick Viney

    The Dartmoor Headwaters Project is a partnership of the Environment Agency, Dartmoor National Park authority and Devon County council. The Dartmoor Headwaters Project offers farmers and landowners in the Okement, Bovey, Dean Burn, Mardle, Erme, Yealm, Colleybrook, and Blackbrook catchments support to design, fund and deliver nature-based solutions. 

    Pamela Woods of Dartmoor National Park said: 

    The effects of flooding can be devastating, causing significant damage to homes, businesses, roads and nature. By 2070 we are predicted to experience 30% more rainfall, resulting in 41% higher river flows.

    The film conveys complex issues in a positive way while showing how support and funding can help people deliver nature and climate-based solutions.  

    It is wonderful to see the vital role moorland farmers play in mitigating the risks of flooding. We hope people enjoy and learn from ‘Farming the Flood’.

    Dartmoor, where the uplands play a crucial role in flood mitigation, from reintroducing wetlands to grazing that restores ecosystems while supporting farms. Photo: Harrison Wood

    Tom Dauben, flood and coastal risk management senior advisor at the Environment Agency, said: 

    Whilst Dartmoor’s rivers and farms are the subject of this film, it highlights the really important role famers across the country can play to increase resilience of the environment and communities to the threats of the climate and biodiversity crisis. 

    Every field has a part to play in tackling these issues, and it’s great to showcase some of the work being done locally by farmers, landowners and managers in the film.

    The documentary explores the crucial role uplands can play in flood mitigation, showcasing practical solutions from reintroducing wetlands and floodplain meadows to innovative grazing techniques that restore ecosystems while maintaining productive farms. 

    These techniques slow water flow, reduce downstream flooding, and enhance carbon capture and storage – delivering multiple benefits for communities, wildlife and farmers themselves, including making river catchments resilient to climate change pressures such as increased flood risk and heightened risk of drought. 

    Nick Viney interviewing water ecosystem and wetland expert, Professor Edward Maltby. Photo: Harrison Wood

    Harrison Wood, filmmaker, said:  

    The farmers featured in this film aren’t waiting for top-down solutions – they’re acting now.

    By working with nature rather than against it, they’re demonstrating how farming can be a key player in tackling environmental challenges.

    Co-director Nick Viney, a landscape restoration specialist with decades of experience in nature recovery, provided expert context for these pioneering approaches throughout the film. 

    ‘Farming The Flood’ highlights that many of these initiatives are accessible through government and private grants, making them available to farmers of all backgrounds and scales. 

    To learn more about the Headwaters Project, please visit Dartmoor Headwaters Natural Flood Management Project  or contact headwatersnfm@dartmoor.gov.uk.

    Updates to this page

    Published 4 June 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: LCQ5: Publicity for National Games and National Special Olympic Games

    Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

    Following is a question by the Hon Chan Yung and a reply by the Secretary for Culture, Sports and Tourism, Miss Rosanna Law, in the Legislative Council today (June 4):

    Question:

    This year, the 15th National Games (NG) and the 12th National Games for Persons with Disabilities and the 9th National Special Olympic Games (NGD and NSOG) will be co-hosted by Guangdong, Hong Kong and Macao. In this connection, will the Government inform this Council:

    (1) how the Culture, Sports and Tourism Bureau (CSTB) will collaborate with relevant government departments and organisations to publicise NG, NGD and NSOG;

    (2) of the plans of the CSTB and the Hong Kong Tourism Board (HKTB) to step efforts to attract Mainland and overseas visitors to Hong Kong for watching the tournaments of NG, NGD and NSOG; and

    (3) given that the 2025 Legislative Council General Election will be held immediately after the NG, how the Government will integrate the publicity efforts of the NG and the Legislative Council General Election so that the two mega events can mutually foster with each other; what is the current progress and timetable of the relevant work?

    Reply:

    President,

    The NG, NGD and NSOG, to be co-hosted by Guangdong, Hong Kong and Macao for the first time, will be held from November 9 to 21, 2025 and from December 8 to 15, 2025 respectively. The CSTB is committed to enhancing public awareness of and interest in the NG, NGD and NSOG through multi-channel publicity, including the use of traditional media, social media, city dress-up, roving exhibitions, as well as collaborations with community organisations, sports associations and schools.

    Our publicity strategies are rolled out in three stages. The first stage started in end-2024 to enhance public awareness of the NG, NGD and NSOG. The second stage, running from January to July this year, aims to foster a welcoming atmosphere for the Games in Hong Kong, including the launch of those photo-taking spots featuring the mascots Xiyangyang and Lerongrong. The third stage will start from August this year to significantly boost the popularity and participation of the NG, NGD and NSOG, including the organisation of the 100-day countdown, torch relay and the Sport For All Day, as well as other enhanced promotional efforts like city-dress-up initiatives.

    Our reply to Hon Chan Yung’s question is as follows:

    (1) The CSTB is working with various relevant government bureaux/departments and organisations to carry out publicity. Highlights include:

    (i) launching publicity campaign jointly with the Leisure and Cultural Services Department for the athlete selection sessions for the mass participation events of the NG, NGD and NSOG under the theme of “I want to join the National Games” (「我要上全運」), and taking the opportunity to promote the two mass participation events organised by Hong Kong, namely Bowling and Para Dance Sport;

    (ii) launching Announcements in the Public Interest and special programmes through the Information Services Department (ISD) and Radio Television Hong Kong respectively, covering local athletes, Mainland competition events and preparations of Guangdong, Hong Kong and Macao for the Games. The ISD also assisted in publicity in the Mainland and overseas, including promotion through social media and digital platforms in the Mainland as well as advertisements in overseas media;

    (iii) joining hands with the Home Affairs Department and the Education Bureau to conduct community engagement activities in all 18 districts across the territory and diversified promotional activities in schools, with a view to widely publicising the events both in the community and in schools;

    (iv) beautifying the cityscape in areas around the competition venues in collaboration with the Highways Department to infuse the community with elements of the NG, NGD and NSOG. Besides, we co-organised the Architectural Installation Design Competition for the 2025 National Games in Hong Kong with the Hong Kong Institute of Architects; and

    (v) collaborating with various organisations and groups, including the Sports Federation & Olympic Committee of Hong Kong, China, the China Hong Kong Paralympic Committee, the Hong Kong Sports Institute, related national sports associations and the HKTB, to include elements of the NG, NGD and NSOG in their events.

    (2) Guangdong, Hong Kong and Macao will deploy the same ticketing platform. The Guangdong Provincial Executive Committees for the NG, NGD and NSOG is actively working on the ticketing policies and the system setup. Upon confirmation of the ticketing arrangements, the CSTB will collaborate with the tourism industry to design various tourism products, with a view to attracting Mainland and overseas spectators and visitors. As for the Mainland market, the HKTB will target at sports enthusiasts by carrying out publicity work on related social media and other forms of media.

    (3) On December 7 this year, the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) will hold the 8th Legislative Council General Election. Given the relevance of this election to the successful and robust implementation of the principle of “patriots administering Hong Kong” and good governance and long-term stability of the HKSAR, the Government attaches great importance to the successful organisation of this election, the NG, NGD and NSOG, and is determined to carry out related publicity and promotion works well, striving to achieve extensive publicity effect. Currently, relevant Government bureaux and departments are actively considering the co-ordination arrangements for taking forward the publicity of these two major events, and will announce any specific arrangement at a later stage.

    Thank you, President.

    Ends/Wednesday, June 4, 2025
    Issued at HKT 16:40

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Special traffic and transport arrangements for Hong Kong International Dragon Boat Races in Tsim Sha Tsui East

    Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

    Special traffic and transport arrangements for Hong Kong International Dragon Boat Races in Tsim Sha Tsui East
         Tsim Sha Tsui Landing No. 1 will be suspended from 8am on June 6 to noon on June 9, and Tsim Sha Tsui Landing Nos. 2 and 5 have been suspended until noon on June 9.
    Part of the non-franchised bus pick-up/drop-off points on Salisbury Road westbound opposite Wing On Plaza will be suspended from noon on June 5 to 11pm on June 8.
    The bus stops of KMB route Nos. 5A, 8P, 92R, 260X, 268B, 269B, HK1 and Citybus route Nos. 796X, A25, H1 on Salisbury Road westbound opposite Wing On Plaza will be suspended from 7.30am to 7.30pm on June 7 and from 7.30pm to 6pm on June 8. 
         The TD and the Police will closely monitor the traffic situation and implement appropriate measures when necessary. The public should pay attention to the latest traffic news through radio, television or “HKeMobility”.
    Issued at HKT 18:50

    NNNN

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: LCQ8: Landscape architect

    Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

    ​Following is a question by the Hon Tony Tse and a written reply by the Secretary for Development, Ms Bernadette Linn, in the Legislative Council today (June 4):
     
    Question:

    There are views that good public open space and green space design will help enhance Hong Kong’s living environment, physical and mental health of its citizens, as well as increase its appeal to tourists from home and abroad, and that landscape architect profession can play a significant role in this regard. However, some members of the industry have reflected that the Government has failed to attach importance to and optimise the use of the landscape architect profession when launching related projects (such as construction of parks) or consultancy services. In this connection, will the Government inform this Council:

    (1) whether guidelines have been drawn up to specify that the relevant government departments will fully consult their in-house landscape architects when inviting tenders for the planning, design or construction contracts for projects or consultancy projects focusing on public open space or green space, or those with landscape design accounting for a significant proportion; if so, what are the contents of the guidelines and their implementation status; if not, whether it will consider formulating relevant guidelines;
    In addition, some landscape architects take on project management roles, co-ordinating various types of projects such as public open spaces and government buildings, overseeing project planning, construction, environmental compliance, cost control, and monitoring progress and quality. Landscape architects also provide professional advice in vetting assessment reports related to landscape and visual impacts under the Town Planning Ordinance and the Environmental Impact Assessment Ordinance.
    Landscape architects in the Government play a key role in greening and landscape matters, in particular after the establishment of the Greening and Landscape Office under the Development Bureau (DEVB) in 2010. Landscape architects of the office are responsible for the central co-ordination of the Government’s greening and landscape planning and design efforts. Landscape architect posts in various departments have gradually increased to meet the increasingly complex project requirements. For example, landscape architect posts were introduced to the DEVB’s Harbour Office to advance waterfront open space projects, and to the Leisure and Cultural Services Department to enhance public play spaces. The number of landscape architects managed by the DEVB has increased from about 60 to about 100, and three directorate posts at the rank of Chief Landscape Architect were created in 2017 and 2018. These measures demonstrate the importance that the Government attaches to the landscape architectural profession. To further strengthen the team’s capabilities, we also provide systematic training for landscape architects, covering professional knowledge, project management, and innovative technologies. This continuous professional development supports Hong Kong’s transformation into a sustainable and liveable city.

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Two incoming passengers convicted and jailed for possessing duty-not-paid cigarettes and importing alternative smoking products (with photos)

    Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

    Two incoming male passengers were sentenced to five months, two weeks, and three days’ imprisonment, and four months’ imprisonment with a fine of $1,000, at the West Kowloon Magistrates’ Courts yesterday (June 3) and today (June 4) respectively for possessing duty-not-paid cigarettes and failing to declare it to Customs Officers, as well as for importing alternative smoking products, in contravention of the Dutiable Commodities Ordinance (DCO) and the Import and Export Ordinance (IEO).

    Customs officers intercepted two incoming male passengers, aged 41 and 20, at Hong Kong International Airport on February 23 and April 8 respectively. About 83 000 duty-not-paid cigarettes and 24 000 alternative smoking products, with an estimated market value of about $434,000 and a duty potential of about $275,000 in total, were seized from their personal baggage. They were subsequently arrested.

    Customs welcomes the sentence. The custodial sentence has imposed a considerable deterrent effect and reflects the seriousness of the offences. 

    Under the DCO, tobacco products are dutiable goods to which the DCO applies. Any person who imports, deals with, possesses, sells or buys illicit cigarettes commits an offence. The maximum penalty upon conviction is a fine of $1 million and imprisonment for two years. 

    Under the IEO, any person who imports an alternative smoking product into Hong Kong commits an offence. The maximum penalty upon conviction is a fine of $2 million and imprisonment for seven years.

    Members of the public may report any suspected illicit cigarette activities to Customs’ 24-hour hotline 182 8080 or its dedicated crime-reporting email account (crimereport@customs.gov.hk) or online form (eform.cefs.gov.hk/form/ced002).

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News