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  • MIL-OSI Video: Reporters Without Borders Voices heard but repressed: #MeToo: What impact on journalism?

    Source: Reporters Without Borders (RSF) (Video Release)

    #MeToo, #EuTambém, #EnaZeda, #Cuéntalo.. “Voices heard but repressed: #MeToo: What impact on journalism?” An exclusive report and documentary with Lénaïg Bredoux (@Mediapart), Laurène Daycard (freelance journalist and author of this report) and Jovanna García (freelance journalist).

    It cannot be denied: this worldwide movement to liberate women’s voices has significantly impacted the media landscape. Even if the #MeToo wave only had a weak echo in some countries, it has led to the emergence of new stories and new media outlets worldwide. While some pioneers had already paved the way — including Awa in Senegal in the 1970s, Sharika Wa Laken in Lebanon since 2012, and Axelle magazine, created in Belgium in 1998 — they have, in turn, benefited from this new exposure. Yet investigating women’s rights remains dangerous.

    To accompany the report, RSF has published recommendations to support journalists working on women’s rights and gender violence.
    We have issued recommendations for governments, police, judicial authorities, social media platforms and newsrooms, to ensure the right to information on women’s rights and gender violence is truly guaranteed.

    Read the report on rsf.org

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z-6EjSBchy8

    MIL OSI Video –

  • MIL-Evening Report: What’s the difference between fusion and fission? A nuclear physicist explains

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Matthew Hole, Professor, Mathematical Sciences Institute and School of Computing, Australian National University

    Quality Stock Arts/Shutterstock

    Globally, nuclear power accounts for roughly 10% of electricity generation. In some countries, such as France, this figure is nearly 70%.

    Big tech companies such as Google are also turning to nuclear power to meet the huge power demands of their data centres.

    The source of all nuclear power is the binding energy of an atom. The energy stored in an atom can be released in two main ways: fission or fusion. Fission involves splitting big heavy atoms into smaller, lighter ones. Fusion involves combining little atoms together into bigger ones.

    Both processes release a lot of energy. For example, one nuclear fission decay of U235, an isotope of uranium typically used as the fuel in most power plants, produces more than 6 million times the energy per single chemical reaction of the purest coal. This means they are great processes for generating power.

    What is fission?

    Fission is the process behind every nuclear power plant in operation today. It occurs when a tiny subatomic particle called a neutron is slammed into an uranium atom, splitting it. This releases more neutrons, which continue colliding with other atoms, setting off a nuclear chain reaction. This in turn releases a tremendous amount of energy.

    To convert this energy to electricity a heat exchanger is installed, which turns water to steam, driving a turbine to produce power.

    The fission reaction can be controlled by suppressing the supply of neutrons. This is achieved by inserting “control rods” which soak up neutrons. Historically, nuclear accidents such as Chernobyl have occurred when the control rods fail to engage and quench the neutron supply, and/or coolant circulation fails.

    So called “third generation” designs improve on early designs by incorporating passive or inherent safety features which require no active controls or human intervention to avoid accidents in the event of malfunction. These features may rely on pressure differentials, gravity, natural convection, or the natural response of materials to high temperatures.

    The first third generation reactors were the Kashiwazaki 6 and 7 advanced boiling water reactors in Japan.

    The Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station in Japan.
    Tokyo Electric Power Co, CC BY-SA

    An unresolved challenge for fission is that the byproducts of the reaction are radioactive for a long time, in the order of thousands of years. If reprocessed, the fuel source and waste can also be used to make a nuclear weapon.

    Fission power is a demonstrated technology. It is also scalable from large scale (the largest is the 7.97 gigawatt Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Plant in Japan) through to small-to-medium reactors that produce around 150 megawatts of electricity, as used on a ship or nuclear submarine. These are the reactors that will power Australia’s eight nuclear submarines promised as part of a trilateral security partnership with the United Kingdom and the United States.

    What is fusion?

    Fusion is the process that powers the Sun and stars. It is the opposite process to fission. It occurs when atoms are fused together.

    The easiest reaction to initiate in the laboratory is the fusion of isotopes of hydrogen, deuterium and tritium. Per unit mass, the reaction produces 4 times more energy than the fission of U235.

    The fuel ion deuterium is incredibly abundant on Earth and in the universe. Tritium is radioactive with a half-life of 12 years, so is very rare on Earth. The universe is 13.8 billion years old; the only isotopes of light nuclei (hydrogen, helium and lithium) found in nature are those that are stable on those time scales.

    In a fusion power plant, tritium would be manufactured using a “lithium blanket”. This is a solid lithium wall in which fusion neutrons slow and ultimately react to form tritium.

    However, at present it’s very difficult for scientists to create a fusion reaction outside of the laboratory. That’s because it requires incredibly hot conditions to fuse: the optimal conditions are 150 million degrees Celsius.

    Fusion is the process that powers the Sun.
    SOHO (ESA & NASA)

    At these temperatures the fuel ions exist in the plasma state, where electrons and (nuclear) ions are dissociated. The byproduct of this process isn’t radioactive; rather, it’s helium, an inert gas.

    The leading technology path to demonstrate sustained fusion is called “toroidal magnetic confinement”. This is when the plasma is confined at extreme temperatures in a very large doughnut-shaped magnetic bottle.

    Unlike fission, this technology path requires continuous external heating to reach fusion conditions and a strong confining field. Terminate either and the reaction stops. The challenge is not uncontrolled meltdown, but getting the reaction to occur at all.

    A major unresolved challenge for toroidal magnetic confinement fusion, which attracts the majority of research interest, is the demonstration of a burning self-heated plasma. This is when the heating power produced by the reaction itself is primary. This is the objective of the publicly funded multi-national ITER project, the world’s largest fusion experiment, and the privately funded SPARC experiment at Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

    However, the consensus of much of the scientific community is that fusion will not be commercially viable until at least 2050.

    A climate solution?

    I am often asked if nuclear power could save Earth from climate change. I have many colleagues in climate science, and indeed my late wife was a high-profile climate scientist.

    The science is clear: it is too late to stop climate change. The world needs to do everything it can to reduce carbon dioxide emissions and minimise catastrophic damage, and it needs to have done it decades ago.

    For the planet, fission is part of that global solution, together with widespread rollout and adoption of renewable sources of power such as wind and solar.

    On a longer time scale, one hopes that fusion might replace fission. The fuel supply is much larger and ubiquitously distributed, the waste problem is orders of magnitude smaller in volume and timescale, and the technology cannot be weaponised.

    Matthew Hole receives funding from the Australian government through the Australian Research Council and the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO), and the Simons Foundation. He is also affiliated with ANSTO, the ITER Organisation as an ITER Science Fellow, and is Chair of the Australian ITER Forum.

    – ref. What’s the difference between fusion and fission? A nuclear physicist explains – https://theconversation.com/whats-the-difference-between-fusion-and-fission-a-nuclear-physicist-explains-240438

    MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

  • MIL-Evening Report: Labor looks set for a resounding defeat in Queensland. But the state’s elections have long thrown up surprises

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Pandanus Petter, Research Fellow School of Politics and International Relations, Australian National University

    On Saturday October 26, Queensland Premier Steven Miles’ Labor is vying for a fourth consecutive term in government, up against David Crisafulli’s Liberal National Party (LNP).

    Although Labor won the previous election in 2020 comfortably, opinion polls in the lead up to this election have consistently pointed to an LNP win.

    Recent Queensland history shows voters can produce dramatic election results, such as the 2012 wipeout of Labor, and its equally dramatic return to government in 2015. With no upper house to provide a check on government power, whoever wins will likely have a relatively free hand to enact their policy agenda.

    A continuing trend of increased early voting means many Queenslanders have already made their judgement. But what have been the big issues dominating the campaign, and what priorities will the next government be working toward?

    The usual suspects

    The big issues of concern to voters in Queensland are likely familiar to people in other states:

    • cost of living

    • housing

    • crime

    • health

    • to a lesser extent, economic management.

    However, the two main parties have different emphases and approaches.

    A campaign on crime and crises

    The LNP is focused on attacking Labor’s record. Crisafulli has largely tried to keep the party firmly on-message, highlighting what they describe as “crises” in housing, youth crime, cost of living, health and government integrity for at least the last year.

    The extent of youth crime, what causes it and what solves it are a matter of debate.

    But the LNP has been keen to present themselves as proposing tougher solutions than their opponents. They’ve made promises to change youth sentencing laws to deter offenders under the slogan “adult crime, adult time”.

    They’ve also promised to provide “tough love” to at-risk youth with mandatory re-training camps.

    On other issues, they’ve been promising more efficient health services, incentives to home ownership and greater government transparency.

    However, they’ve been careful to try to avoid more controversial issues and present a “small target” on economic management. Interestingly, the LNP has largely confirmed they’ll adopt many of Labor’s budgetary priorities on cost of living relief.

    Despite this, a last minute emphasis on the possible reversal of legislation decriminalising abortion and voluntary assisted dying has threatened to derail their careful messaging.

    Reverting to old ways, the LNP is backing an “indefinite” commitment to coal fired power plants and dumping a controversial proposed hydroelectric dam.

    Crisafulli has walked back earlier support for Treaty with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people.

    If they win government, the LNP would also likely shut down the freshly minted Truth Telling and Healing Inquiry, claiming they will focus on “practical” help for Indigenous communities instead.

    They’re also promising electoral reform with a longstanding commitment to remove “corrupt” compulsory preferential voting and the reversal of laws that banned property developer donations.

    Progressive balancing act

    Steven Miles took over from Annastacia Palaszczuk as Labor leader and premier less than a year ago.

    Labor has also been focused on using incumbency to address key issues, while trying to stake out a position as a force for progressive change.

    They have warned of the potential “hidden” dangers of the LNP, pointing to unpopular cuts to the civil service last time the LNP governed.

    On cost of living, they’ve given direct relief to households, with 50 cent fares for public transport, $1000 household energy rebates and promised free lunches for public school students.

    They have been keen to say this is a dividend from increased royalties charged to coal mining companies.

    On housing, they have continued their focus on addressing the undersupply of social and affordable housing alongside modest reforms to renters’ rights (although ruling out any caps on prices).

    They’re promising a new era of state intervention to improve competition in petrol and energy retail.

    On crime, Labor has followed the LNP’s lead in some matters, such as investing in extra police resources. They’ve also controversially ignored the Human Rights Act to keep youth imprisoned while emphasising diversion over punishment.

    Of more comfort to progressive voters, they have positioned themselves as firmly committed to keeping their abortion and voluntary assisted dying legislation intact. Labor will also continue the transition to renewable energy.

    Disenchantment with the major parties

    Despite their efforts, or perhaps because of Crisafulli’s disciplined messaging, it doesn’t look as if voters have been swayed to keep the government. There’s a clear mood for change.

    However, it should be noted this isn’t exactly a ringing endorsement of Crisafulli or the LNP’s whole agenda, as opinion polls show neither is particularly popular.

    After trailing for most of the campaign, Miles is still behind, but has made up a lot of ground in the past week.

    Whoever wins, they will have to govern in an era when more people are disenchanted with the mainstream parties.

    Among those vying to hold or increase their crossbench seats in regional Queensland are the socially conservative Katter’s Australian Party, as well as some popular local mayors running as independents.

    Meanwhile, the Greens are pushing to claim more Brisbane seats.

    The minor parties are campaigning hard on persistent problems in housing, cost of living, health and crime. These are all hard to solve quickly and not necessarily helped by rushed responses.

    The next parliament will have to find a way to represent a state divided in public opinion between those in the city and those in regional areas across all of the key issues.

    Pandanus Petter receives funding from the Australian Research Council to study public opinion polling, democratic responsiveness and the idea of ‘the Fair Go’ in public policy.

    – ref. Labor looks set for a resounding defeat in Queensland. But the state’s elections have long thrown up surprises – https://theconversation.com/labor-looks-set-for-a-resounding-defeat-in-queensland-but-the-states-elections-have-long-thrown-up-surprises-241774

    MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

  • MIL-Evening Report: Are cats good for our health?

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Susan Hazel, Associate Professor, School of Animal and Veterinary Science, University of Adelaide

    Yerlin Matu/Unsplash

    Cats have lived with humans for thousands of years. And long before cat memes and viral TikToks took over the internet, they’ve been comforting us with their purrs and making us laugh with their weird antics.

    But what does the research say – are cats good for us?

    Living with a cat can have a profound – and sometimes surprising – effect on our physical and mental health. Still, living with cats is not without risks.

    Part of the family

    You may have heard cats don’t have owners, they have “staff”. In fact, multiple studies show the humans who live with them feel more like beloved relatives.

    In a study of 1,800 Dutch cat owners, half said their cat was family. One in three viewed their cat as a child or best friend and found them loyal, supportive and empathetic.

    Another US study developed a “family bondedness” scale and found cats were just as important a part of families as dogs.



    Read more:
    Is owning a dog good for your health?

    Many cats would choose human interaction over food or toys. And they can distinguish when we are talking to them (rather than another human).

    In fact we’ve adapted to each other. Cats are more likely to approach human strangers who first give a “kitty kiss” – narrowing your eyes and blinking slowly. And research suggests cats have developed specific meows that tune into our nurturing instincts.

    What does this close relationship mean for health outcomes?

    Cats slow blink when they’re feeling relaxed.
    beton studio/Shutterstock

    A sense of purpose

    Owning a pet is associated with less social isolation. And some cat owners say “providing for the cat” increases their feelings of enjoyment and sense of purpose.

    But the benefits of the relationship may depend on how you relate to your cat.

    One study looked at different relationship styles between humans and cats, including “remote”, “casual” and “co-dependent”. It found people whose relationship with their cat was co-dependent or like a friend had a higher emotional connection to their pet.

    Links to heart health

    People who own – or have owned – a cat have a lower risk of dying from cardiovascular diseases such as stroke or heart disease. This result has been repeated in several studies.

    However a problem interpreting population studies is they only tell us about an association. This means while people with cats have lower risk of dying from cardiovascular diseases, we can’t say for sure cats are the cause.

    People who own a cat – or have in the past – are at lower risk of stroke and heart disease.
    Ruth McHugh-Dillon, CC BY-NC

    Cat ownership has also been associated with some positive changes in the gut microbiota, especially in women, such as improved blood glucose control and reduced inflammation.

    Helping mental health

    Having cat or dog is also associated with higher psychological well-being. For people with depression, patting or playing with their cat has been shown to reduce symptoms (although this was over a short, two-hour period and can’t be extrapolated longer-term).

    Another way to find out about the health impact of cats is qualitative research: asking people what their cats mean to them, beyond the numbers.

    When colleagues and I surveyed veterans, we found people more attached to their pets actually had poorer mental health scores. But their survey responses told a different story. One respondent said, “my cats are the reason I get up in the morning”.

    Another wrote:

    I consider my pet to be a service animal. My cat helps me to relax when I’m dealing with my anxiety, depression or when I wake during the night from the frequent nightmares I have. My cat isn’t just a pet to me, my cat is a part of me, my cat is part of my family.

    It may be that veterans were more attached to their cats because they had worse mental health – and relied on their cats more for comfort – rather than the other way around.

    Mental health downsides

    It is possible being attached to your cat has downsides. If your cat becomes sick, the burden of caring for them may have a negative impact on your mental health.

    In our study of owners whose cats had epilepsy, around one third experienced a clinical level of burden as caregivers that was likely to interfere with their day-to-day functioning.

    People with depression report reduced symptoms after playing with their cat.
    Artacke Pictures/Shutterstock

    Toxoplasmosis

    Cats can also carry zoonotic diseases, which are infections which spread from animals to humans.

    They are the main host for toxoplasmosis, a parasite excreted in cat faeces which can affect other mammals, including humans. The parasite is more likely to be carried by feral cats that hunt for their food than domestic cats.

    Most people have mild symptoms that may be similar to flu. But infection during pregnancy can lead to miscarriage or stillbirth, or cause problems for the baby including blindness and seizures.

    Pregnant women and people with lowered immunity are most at risk. It is recommended these groups don’t empty cat litter trays, or use gloves if they have to. Changing the litter tray daily prevents the parasite reaching a stage that could infect people.

    Allergies

    Up to one in five people have an allergy to cats and this is increasing.

    When cats lick their fur, their saliva deposits an allergen. When their fur and dander (flakes of skin) come loose, it can set off an allergic reaction.

    People without severe allergies can still live with cats if they regularly wash their hands, clean surfaces and vacuum to eliminate dander. They can also exclude cats from areas they want to be allergen-free, such as bedrooms.

    People with allergies can live with cats if their symptoms aren’t severe.
    Ruth McHugh-Dillon, CC BY-NC

    While cats can provoke allergic reactions, there is also evidence contact with cats can have a protective role in preventing asthma and allergic reactions developing. This is because exposure may modify the immune system, making it less likely allergic reactions will occur.

    Susan Hazel is affiliated with the Dog & Cat Management Board of South Australia, Animal Therapies Ltd and the RSPCA South Australia.

    – ref. Are cats good for our health? – https://theconversation.com/are-cats-good-for-our-health-238993

    MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

  • MIL-Evening Report: No home left behind: a postcode approach to electrification

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Gill Armstrong, Researcher in architecture and urban planning, Climateworks Centre

    EndeavourEnergy

    In Australia and overseas, it’s clear that homes without gas – running on clean energy – are healthier, have cheaper power bills, and produce lower greenhouse emissions.

    The emissions part is crucial. Collectively, homes are responsible for 10% of Australia’s greenhouse emissions. But how do we get Australia’s 11 million homes to ditch gas and switch to electricity for cooking, hot water and home heating?

    The current approach is slow and piecemeal. State and local governments offer incentives to individual households, but few adopt them. For those that do, little coordinated support and guidance is available. The households must deal with suppliers and tradies on their own, which can be a frustrating and lonely process.

    A pilot project to electrify 500 homes in a single postcode south of Sydney could show a better way. After a two-year campaign by residents, “Electrify 2515” has won A$5.4 million in federal funding, along with industry support. Challenges remain, but this pilot promises to demonstrate how household electrification can be accelerated and coordinated at scale.

    As independent climate transitions specialists within Monash University, Climateworks Centre has no direct involvement in this project. But our ongoing Renovation Pathways Program focuses on ways to decarbonise Australia’s existing houses and bring about a national renovation wave. So we are watching with keen interest.

    Testing extra incentives

    The 2515 postcode sits between Wollongong and Sydney in New South Wales. It covers the suburbs of Austinmer, Clifton, Coledale, Scarborough, Thirroul and Wombarra.

    The pilot encourages households to retire three types of gas appliance: water heaters, space heaters and cookers. Financial subsidies of up to $1,000 off electric hot water systems, reverse-cycle air conditioners and induction cooktops, and up to $1,500 off home batteries, are available. Higher subsidies are available to low-income households.

    Successful applicants receive the subsidies as a discount on the purchase price of these new electrical appliances, rather than a rebate. Money for this is coming from the federal government’s Australian Renewable Energy Agency (ARENA).

    Such incentives prompt households within a single community to make the switch together, retiring their electric appliances before their gas appliances fail or break, speeding up the transition.

    A fully subsidised smart energy device, valued at around $1,500, is also installed in every home to track and optimise energy use. Subsidies are also available for upgrades to switchboards where required to meet modern safety standards.

    Rooftop solar and electric vehicle chargers can also be purchased through the pilot, but will not be subsidised.

    How it works.
    Electrify 2515

    The 2515 difference

    2515 is not the first community to rally behind clean energy. Grassroots initiatives are scattered around the country, such as in Yackandandah in northeast Victoria, Parkes in central west NSW, and Broken Hill in far west NSW.

    Home energy pilot projects are also already underway through the Cooperative Research Centre Race2030, which partners with industry and research institutions. But these initiatives, along with those at a state and local government level, tend to recruit individual households across a wider geographic area.

    In contrast, Electrify 2515 offers holistic support for households within a community. It is not driven by a single government program, or by a gas supply problem – which was the case for the people of Esperance in Western Australia.

    By electrifying 500 homes in a single community, Electrify 2515 will provide a tangible measure of what’s required to drive rapid household electrification. The main challenge isn’t technological – it’s social. The technology is here. Getting the social drivers and settings right, at scale, is the key.

    The holistic approach will demonstrate what consumers need to make the shift from gas to electricity. This includes what conversations are needed and which incentives enable all households to act in a coordinated way.

    Local 2515 residents explain why everyone should join them in applying for the Electrify 2515 Community Pilot.

    The bright side of a community approach

    The whole-of-community focus brings technical and financial advantages.

    After completing an application form and receiving an offer, households receive guidance and support from the installation partner Brighte, a commercial company that provides consumer loans for clean energy appliances such as solar panels and batteries. The service streamlines the decision-making process, which is often the biggest barrier stopping households from progressing with electrification.

    Being able to work with a larger number of homes at once is likely to streamline and scale up installation with dedicated teams of installers and tradespeople.

    It also helps build households’ trust in literature about payback times and financial benefits through friendly neighbourhood conversations and, importantly, through access to local real-world evidence, not just theory.

    Thermal efficiency is also key

    The electrification pilot is a solid starting point, especially for a community in a relatively mild coastal climate such as postcode 2515.

    For homes in more extreme climates, or for inefficient older homes – which a lot of Australia’s homes sadly are – the fundamental thermal efficiency of the building must be improved alongside electrification of appliances.

    The thermal efficiency of homes can be improved by insulating ceilings, walls and floors, double-glazing windows and sealing gaps. These measures make a home more comfortable for occupants. They can also reduce peak demand on the energy network and save on household energy bills.

    Electrify 2515 currently focuses on appliance upgrades but adding thermal efficiency upgrades could take it to the next level. Without these upgrades, there is a risk of households in harsher climates using more electricity in a heatwave if homes are draughty and inefficient.

    There are various ways to upgrade a home’s capacity to stay cool in summer and warm in winter.
    Climateworks Centre, 2023, Climate-ready homes: Building the case for a renovation wave in Australia.

    When paired with electrification, thermal upgrades could save Australian households around $2,200 annually on their energy bills (based on 2023 gas and electricity prices), according to Climateworks Centre analysis.

    Projects like Electrify 2515 should include both home thermal efficiency improvements and electrification efforts, particularly for communities in harsher climates in order to maximise benefits to households.

    Electrification challenges

    Electrify 2515 caters for low-income households, by offering higher subsidies to households in the lowest 25% income percentile to ensure these groups comprise 25% of community buy-in.

    Renters are encouraged to put their hand up too. But it may still be challenging to encourage their landlords to invest in upgrades.

    Further challenges include decarbonising homes that cannot generate electricity from rooftop solar panels due to being shaded by taller buildings or trees. This can sometimes be an issue for homes in colder winter climates with higher annual energy demands, such as Victoria, Tasmania and the ACT.

    Building momentum for widescale rollout

    The technology for all-electric homes exists. Now we must identify the key social drivers and settings required to spur Australia’s electrification wave.

    Electrify 2515 is a promising approach. It’s a way to build momentum, showcase technology at scale, and prompt meaningful discussions around the benefits and challenges of getting off gas.

    This program, and others like it, can provide a tangible real-world foundation to bring about bills savings, emissions reductions and healthier homes across Australia. And it will help ensure no one is left behind.

    Climateworks Centre is a part of Monash University. It receives funding from a range of external sources including philanthropy, governments and businesses.

    – ref. No home left behind: a postcode approach to electrification – https://theconversation.com/no-home-left-behind-a-postcode-approach-to-electrification-241471

    MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

  • MIL-Evening Report: Rebuilding homes after a disaster is an opportunity to build back better – why isn’t the insurance industry on board?

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Antonia Settle, Lecturer, Monash University

    For many Australians, 2022 was a dark and devastating year. Major floods wreaked havoc on hundreds of communities in Queensland, New South Wales, Victoria and Tasmania. But for some, the floods themselves were only half the disaster.

    As a recent report by Financial Counselling Victoria showed, many affected households had their insurance claims rejected or diminished, whether due to complicated exclusion clauses or because their “sum insured” had been whittled away by unexpected costs.

    A long parliamentary inquiry sought to examine the insurance industry’s response to this disaster. Its final report – released to little fanfare last Friday – revealed a sector in crisis.

    The report put forward 86 recommendations, which taken together could deliver real progress in pushing the insurance sector to deliver on its promises.

    Some standout areas of focus included abolishing a principle called “like-for-like reinstatement” and increasing accountability and oversight. Making sure households can rely on their own coverage is a vital step.

    But the report also highlighted just how vulnerable Australia’s housing stock is to climate change, which is no easy problem to solve.



    Read more:
    How extreme weather and costs of housing and insurance trap some households in a vicious cycle

    Forced to repeat the same mistakes

    To address the challenge of rising climate risk, we need to increase the resilience of Australian homes. Insurance will only be affordable if risk exposure can be brought down.

    Recommendation 26 of the inquiry’s final report deals with the principle of “like-for-like reinstatement”. Written into many policies, this protects insurers from having to pay for home improvements in an insurance claim – known as “betterment” in insurance jargon.

    ‘Like-for-like’ rules can prevent households from improving their disaster resilience when rebuilding.
    Anna Mente/Shutterstock

    The underlying idea is to stop households sneaking an extra en-suite bathroom into their insurer-funded rebuild. The same dimensions and building materials have to be used.

    But this can mean a home that has been flooded ends up being rebuilt with exactly the same flood risk.

    This was the experience of Madeleine Serle, whose home was flooded in Melbourne in 2022. She told me she had asked her insurer to rebuild using polished concrete floors in the downstairs rooms of her home, instead of the plasterboard and wood that had soaked up the floodwaters. Serle reasoned that if it flooded again, it wouldn’t cause so much damage.

    Her insurer refused. Even when Serle offered to pay any extra costs herself that might arise from concrete flooring, her insurer insisted on a “like-for-like reinstatement”. This meant using the same low-resilience materials that will likely be destroyed if inundated again by floodwater.

    Bringing ‘betterment’ to the fore

    Serle was actively trying to reduce her future flood risk, but this was precluded by the terms of her insurance contract.

    By seeking an end to like-for-like reinstatement, recommendation 26 is pushing for “betterment” to be brought to the forefront of how we think about insurer rebuilds.

    It proposes allowing households to swap out size for quality in an insurer rebuild. That could allow them to use the money saved from reducing the footprint of their home on resilience measures, which are often much more expensive.

    This wouldn’t just reduce their exposure to climate risks – fire, flooding and so on. It could also improve the energy efficiency of our houses, which is another key part of the climate challenge in Australia.

    Standardised products

    Many of the report’s other recommendations centred on the better handling of claims and better outcomes for households.

    This includes by strengthening accountability through stronger regulatory oversight (recommendations 2, 4, 9, 41, 47, 49), tightening up some key loopholes (recommendations 3, 10, 13), and penalising insurers for delays in the resolution of claims (recommendations 19 and 57).

    It also laid out ways to improve communications between insurers and households (recommendations 6, 10, 24, 25, 28, 33), so people can better understand what they should expect from their insurer – and when their insurer might be falling short.

    These proposed reforms aim to create more standardised insurance products across the industry. But they could have gone further. The report didn’t go as far as recommending a fully standardised insurance product that all insurers would have to offer.

    Making insurance products more standardised could make them easier to compare.
    DC Studio/Shutterstock

    As the Financial Rights Legal Centre has argued, standardisation is vital to untangling the “confusopoly” that leaves households unable to make informed decisions about the merits of different policies on the market without reading reams of product disclosure statements.

    Reform alone isn’t enough

    The inquiry’s final report recommends the government buy back some of the riskiest homes (recommendation 81), alongside much stronger government support for households looking to mitigate their own risks.

    But insurance reform alone isn’t enough to solve the problem that Australian households face in securing their housing amid worsening climate risk.

    The bigger overarching problem faced by Australia is one of climate change mitigation and adaption. While our country is exposed to relatively high levels of climate risk, much of this risk is borne by individuals through home ownership.

    With nearly half of all renter retirees living in poverty, Australians know owning their own home is a powerful way to secure their economic future. That’s why home ownership is referred to as part of the “third pillar” of the retirement income system (voluntary private savings), along with superannuation and the public pension.

    Reforming our insurance system can make important strides in providing households with better tools to manage climate risk.

    Only with stronger safety nets, and by grappling with risks at the societal level, can we counteract the extreme individualisation of climate risk that we experience here in Australia.



    Read more:
    Some New Zealand homes are becoming uninsurable because of natural disasters – but all may not be lost

    Antonia Settle does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Rebuilding homes after a disaster is an opportunity to build back better – why isn’t the insurance industry on board? – https://theconversation.com/rebuilding-homes-after-a-disaster-is-an-opportunity-to-build-back-better-why-isnt-the-insurance-industry-on-board-241576

    MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

  • MIL-OSI: AvePoint to Announce Third Quarter 2024 Financial Results on November 7

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    JERSEY CITY, N.J., Oct. 22, 2024 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — AvePoint (NASDAQ: AVPT), the global leader in robust data management and data governance, will report its third quarter 2024 financial results after the US financial markets close on Thursday, November 7, 2024.

    The company will host a conference call at 4:30pm ET on Thursday, November 7, 2024. CEO and Co-Founder Dr. Tianyi Jiang (TJ) and CFO Jim Caci will provide an overview of these results, discuss current business trends, and conduct a question-and-answer session. You may access the call and register with a live operator by dialing 1-833-816-1428 for US participants and 1-412-317-0520 for those outside the US. The passcode for the call is 7094823.

    A live webcast will be available in the Investor Relations section of AvePoint’s website at: https://ir.avepoint.com/events. A replay of the webcast will be available for approximately 90 calendar days.

    About AvePoint

    Securing the Future. AvePoint is a global leader in data management and data governance, and over 21,000 customers worldwide rely on our solutions to modernize the digital workplace across Microsoft, Google, Salesforce and other collaboration environments. AvePoint’s global channel partner program includes over 3,500 managed service providers, value added resellers and systems integrators, with our solutions available in more than 100 cloud marketplaces. To learn more, visit http://www.avepoint.com.

    Disclosure Information

    AvePoint uses the https://ir.avepoint.com/ website as a means of disclosing material non-public information and for complying with its disclosure obligations under Regulation FD.

    Forward-Looking Statements

    This press release contains certain forward-looking statements within the meaning of the “safe harbor” provisions of the United States Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 and other federal securities laws including statements regarding the future performance of and market opportunities for AvePoint. These forward-looking statements generally are identified by the words “believe,” “project,” “expect,” “anticipate,” “estimate,” “intend,” “strategy,” “future,” “opportunity,” “plan,” “may,” “should,” “will,” “would,” “will be,” “will continue,” “will likely result,” and similar expressions. Forward-looking statements are predictions, projections and other statements about future events that are based on current expectations and assumptions and, as a result, are subject to risks and uncertainties. Many factors could cause actual future events to differ materially from the forward-looking statements in this press release, including but not limited to: changes in the competitive and regulated industries in which AvePoint operates, variations in operating performance across competitors, changes in laws and regulations affecting AvePoint’s business and changes in AvePoint’s ability to implement business plans, forecasts, and ability to identify and realize additional opportunities, and the risk of downturns in the market and the technology industry. You should carefully consider the foregoing factors and the other risks and uncertainties described in the “Risk Factors” section of AvePoint’s most recent Annual Report on Form 10-K and its registration statement on Form S-3 and related prospectus and prospectus supplements filed with the SEC. Copies of these and other documents filed by AvePoint from time to time are available on the SEC’s website, http://www.sec.gov. These filings identify and address other important risks and uncertainties that could cause actual events and results to differ materially from those contained in the forward-looking statements. Forward-looking statements speak only as of the date they are made. Readers are cautioned not to put undue reliance on forward-looking statements, and AvePoint does not assume any obligation and does not intend to update or revise these forward-looking statements after the date of this release, whether as a result of new information, future events, or otherwise, except as required by law. AvePoint does not give any assurance that it will achieve its expectations.

    Investor Contact
    AvePoint
    Jamie Arestia
    ir@avepoint.com
    (551) 220-5654

    Media Contact
    AvePoint
    Nicole Caci
    pr@avepoint.com
    (201) 201-8143

    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-OSI Canada: CRTC adds Uvagut TV to basic TV package in Canada

    Source: Government of Canada News

    Today, the CRTC approved the addition of Uvagut TV, a channel offered by the Nunavut Independent Television Network, to the basic TV package in Canada.

    October 22, 2024—Ottawa–Gatineau—Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC)

    Today, the CRTC approved the addition of Uvagut TV, a channel offered by the Nunavut Independent Television Network, to the basic TV package in Canada.

    Uvagut TV primarily offers programming in Inuktut, which will provide Inuit communities, who previously lacked access, with culturally relevant content. This addition also enriches the diversity of programming available to all Canadians.

    The CRTC received more than 5,000 comments from the public in support of the addition of an Inuit television service to the basic TV package.

    Importantly, Uvagut TV will be included in the basic TV package without increasing its maximum monthly cost of $25.

    Associated links

    General Inquiries
    Telephone: 819-997-0313
    Toll free: 1-877-249-CRTC (2782)
    TTY: 819-994-0423

    MIL OSI Canada News –

  • MIL-OSI: Vicor Corporation Reports Results for the Third Quarter Ended September 30, 2024

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    ANDOVER, Mass., Oct. 22, 2024 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Vicor Corporation (NASDAQ: VICR) today reported financial results for the third quarter ended September 30, 2024. These results will be discussed later today at 5:00 p.m. Eastern Time, during management’s quarterly investor conference call. The details for the call are below.

    Revenues for the third quarter ended September 30, 2024 totaled $93.2 million, a 13.6% decrease from $107.8 million for the corresponding period a year ago, and an 8.5% sequential increase from $85.9 million in the second quarter of 2024.

    Gross margin decreased to $45.7 million for the third quarter of 2024, compared to $55.9 million for the corresponding period a year ago but increased from $42.8 million for the second quarter of 2024. Gross margin, as a percentage of revenue, decreased to 49.1% for the third quarter of 2024, compared to 51.8% for the corresponding period a year ago and 49.8% for the second quarter of 2024. Operating expenses increased to $40.4 million for the third quarter of 2024, compared to $40.2 million for the corresponding period a year ago, and decreased sequentially from $42.6 million for the second quarter of 2024.

    Net income for the third quarter was $11.6 million, or $0.26 per diluted share, compared to net income of $16.6 million or $0.37 per diluted share, for the corresponding period a year ago and net loss of $(1.2) million, or $(0.03) per diluted share, for the second quarter of 2024.

    Cash flow from operations totaled $22.6 million for the third quarter, compared to cash flow from operations of $23.8 million for the corresponding period a year ago, and cash flow from operations of $15.6 million in the second quarter of 2024. Capital expenditures for the third quarter totaled $8.4 million, compared to $7.7 million for the corresponding period a year ago and $6.1 million for the second quarter of 2024. Cash and cash equivalents as of September 30, 2024 increased 6.2% sequentially to approximately $267.6 million compared to approximately $251.9 million as of June 30, 2024.

    Backlog for the third quarter ended September 30, 2024 totaled $150.6 million, a 13.8% decrease from $174.7 million for the corresponding period a year ago, and 2.1% sequential decrease from $153.8 million at the end of the second quarter of 2024.

    Commenting on third quarter performance, Chief Executive Officer Dr. Patrizio Vinciarelli stated: “Revenues and cash flow improved in Q3 while gross margins were impacted primarily by product mix. We are close to initial deliveries of 2nd generation, high density VPD systems for leading AI applications with current multipliers achieving superior density, bandwidth and signal integrity. Vicor’s VPD will enable AI processors setting new standards for compute performance and power system efficiency.”

    “We are off to a good start asserting our Intellectual Property against unscrupulous actors playing a game of “catch me if you can”. As indicated in a recent Initial Determination from the International Trade Commission (“ITC”), contract manufacturers may be precluded from importing computing systems using infringing modules. Redesigned modules, or discrete alternatives, may still infringe and OEMs condoning infringement are taking chances with their supply chain. Leaders in Artificial Intelligence licensing Vicor IP are wisely securing a resilient supply chain of enabling power system solutions.”

    For more information on Vicor and its products, please visit the Company’s website at http://www.vicorpower.com.

    Earnings Conference Call

    Vicor will be holding its investor conference call today, Tuesday, October 22, 2024 at 5:00 p.m. Eastern Time. Vicor encourages investors and analysts who intend to ask questions via the conference call to register with Notified, the service provider hosting the conference call. Those registering on Notified’s website will receive dial-in info and a unique PIN to join the call as well as an email confirmation with the details. Registration may be completed at any time prior to 5:00 p.m. on October 22, 2024. For those parties interested in listen-only mode, the conference call will be webcast via a link that will be posted on the Investor Relations page of Vicor’s website prior to the conference call. Please access the website at least 15 minutes prior to the conference call to register and, if necessary, download and install any required software. For those who cannot participate in the live conference call, a webcast replay of the conference call will also be available on the Investor Relations page of Vicor’s website.

    This press release contains certain forward-looking statements within the meaning of Section 27A of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, and Section 21E of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended. Any statement in this press release that is not a statement of historical fact is a forward-looking statement, and, the words “believes,” “expects,” “anticipates,” “intends,” “estimates,” “plans,” “assumes,” “may,” “will,” “would,” “should,” “continue,” “prospective,” “project,” and other similar expressions identify forward-looking statements. Forward-looking statements also include statements regarding bookings, shipments, revenue, profitability, targeted markets, increase in manufacturing capacity and utilization thereof, future products and capital resources. These statements are based upon management’s current expectations and estimates as to the prospective events and circumstances that may or may not be within the company’s control and as to which there can be no assurance. Actual results could differ materially from those projected in the forward-looking statements as a result of various factors, including those economic, business, operational and financial considerations set forth in Vicor’s Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2023, under Part I, Item I — “Business,” under Part I, Item 1A — “Risk Factors,” under Part I, Item 3 — “Legal Proceedings,” and under Part II, Item 7 — “Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations.” The risk factors set forth in the Annual Report on Form 10-K may not be exhaustive. Therefore, the information contained in the Annual Report on Form 10-K should be read together with other reports and documents filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission from time to time, including Forms 10-Q, 8-K and 10-K, which may supplement, modify, supersede or update those risk factors. Vicor does not undertake any obligation to update any forward-looking statements as a result of future events or developments.

    Vicor Corporation designs, develops, manufactures, and markets modular power components and complete power systems based upon a portfolio of patented technologies. Headquartered in Andover, Massachusetts, Vicor sells its products to the power systems market, including enterprise and high performance computing, industrial equipment and automation, telecommunications and network infrastructure, vehicles and transportation, and aerospace and defense electronics.

    For further information contact:

    James F. Schmidt, Chief Financial Officer
    Office: (978) 470-2900
    Email: invrel@vicorpower.com

                   
    VICOR CORPORATION
                   
    CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED STATEMENT OF OPERATIONS      
    (Thousands except for per share amounts)
                   
      QUARTER ENDED   YEAR ENDED
      (Unaudited)   (Unaudited)
                   
      SEPT 30,   SEPT 30,   SEPT 30,   SEPT 30,
      2024   2023
    		   2024   2023
                   
                   
    Net revenues $93,166     $107,844     $262,892     $312,407  
    Cost of revenues   47,422       51,966       129,254       154,822  
    Gross margin   45,744       55,878       133,638       157,585  
                   
    Operating expenses:              
    Selling, general and administrative   23,398       22,422       72,715       63,020  
    Research and development   16,960       17,752       51,938       50,556  
    Litigation-contingency expense   –       –       19,500       –  
    Total operating expenses   40,358       40,174       144,153       113,576  
                   
    Income (loss) from operations   5,386       15,704       (10,515 )     44,009  
                   
    Other income (expense), net   3,713       1,917       9,244       5,643  
                   
    Income (loss) before income taxes   9,099       17,621       (1,271 )     49,652  
                   
    Less: (Benefit) provision for income taxes   (2,455 )     1,038       2,832       4,716  
                   
    Consolidated net income (loss)   11,554       16,583       (4,103 )     44,936  
                   
    Less: Net income attributable to noncontrolling interest   2       1       14       9  
                   
    Net income (loss) attributable to Vicor Corporation $11,552     $16,582     ($4,117 )   $44,927  
                   
                   
    Net income (loss) per share attributable to Vicor Corporation:              
    Basic $0.26     $0.37     ($0.09 )   $1.01  
    Diluted $0.26     $0.37     ($0.09 )   $1.00  
                   
    Shares outstanding:              
    Basic   45,117       44,433       44,829       44,275  
    Diluted   45,174       45,187       44,829       45,000  
                   
    VICOR CORPORATION
           
    CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEET
    (Thousands)
           
      SEPT 30,   DEC 31,
      2024   2023
      (Unaudited)   (Unaudited)
    Assets      
           
    Current assets:      
    Cash and cash equivalents $ 267,605     $ 242,219  
    Accounts receivable, net   58,525       52,631  
    Inventories   105,761       106,579  
    Other current assets   18,933       18,937  
    Total current assets   450,824       420,366  
           
    Long-term deferred tax assets   288       296  
    Long-term investment, net   2,640       2,530  
    Property, plant and equipment, net   158,779       157,689  
    Other assets   20,231       14,006  
           
    Total assets $ 632,762     $ 594,887  
           
    Liabilities and Equity      
           
    Current liabilities:      
    Accounts payable $ 15,724     $ 12,100  
    Accrued compensation and benefits   12,449       11,227  
    Accrued expenses   6,429       5,093  
    Accrued litigation   26,550       6,500  
    Sales allowances   2,640       3,482  
    Short-term lease liabilities   1,739       1,864  
    Income taxes payable   642       746  
    Short-term deferred revenue and customer prepayments   4,198       3,157  
           
    Total current liabilities   70,371       44,169  
           
    Long-term deferred revenue   –       1,020  
    Long-term income taxes payable   1,916       2,228  
    Long-term lease liabilities   5,605       6,364  
    Total liabilities   77,892       53,781  
           
    Equity:      
    Vicor Corporation stockholders’ equity:      
    Capital stock   402,687       384,395  
    Retained earnings   292,557       296,674  
    Accumulated other comprehensive loss   (1,198 )     (1,273 ) 
    Treasury stock   (139,424 )      (138,927 ) 
    Total Vicor Corporation stockholders’ equity   554,622       540,869  
    Noncontrolling interest   248       237  
    Total equity   554,870       541,106  
           
    Total liabilities and equity $ 632,762     $ 594,887  
           

    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-OSI: Eos Energy Enterprises Announces Date for Third Quarter 2024 Financial Results

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    EDISON, N.J., Oct. 22, 2024 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Eos Energy Enterprises, Inc. (NASDAQ: EOSE) (“Eos” or the “Company”), a leading provider of safe, scalable, efficient, and sustainable zinc-based long duration energy storage systems, today announced it will release its third quarter 2024 financial results after the U.S. market closes on November 5, 2024. A conference call to discuss its results will take place the following morning on November 6 at 8:30 a.m. Eastern Time.

    Registration Information

    A live webcast of the earnings call will be available on the “Investor Relations” page of the Company’s website at https://investors.eose.com or may be accessed using this link (registration link). To avoid delays, we encourage participants to join the conference call fifteen minutes ahead of the scheduled start time.

    The conference call replay will be available via webcast through Eos’ investor relations website for twelve months following the live presentation. The webcast replay will be available from 11:30 a.m. ET on November 6, 2024, and can be accessed by visiting https://investors.eose.com/events-and-presentations.

    About Eos Energy Enterprises

    Eos Energy Enterprises, Inc. is accelerating the shift to clean energy with positively ingenious solutions that transform how the world stores power. Our breakthrough Znyth™ aqueous zinc battery was designed to overcome the limitations of conventional lithium-ion technology. It is safe, scalable, efficient, sustainable, manufactured in the U.S., and the core of our innovative systems that today provides utility, industrial, and commercial customers with a proven, reliable energy storage alternative for 3 to 12-hour applications. Eos was founded in 2008 and is headquartered in Edison, New Jersey. For more information about Eos (NASDAQ: EOSE), visit eose.com.

    Contacts        
    Investors:            ir@eose.com
    Media:                 media@eose.com

    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-OSI: Baker Hughes Declares Quarterly Dividend

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    HOUSTON and LONDON, Oct. 22, 2024 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Baker Hughes (NASDAQ: BKR) announced today that the Baker Hughes Board of Directors declared a quarterly cash dividend of $0.21 per share of Class A common stock payable on Nov. 14, 2024, to holders of record on Nov. 4, 2024.

    In line with our stated goal to responsibly grow the dividend over time, the dividend reflects a 5% increase, or $0.01, compared to the same quarter last year.

    Baker Hughes expects to fund its quarterly cash dividend from cash generated from operations.

    About Baker Hughes:
    Baker Hughes (NASDAQ: BKR) is an energy technology company that provides solutions to energy and industrial customers worldwide. Built on a century of experience and conducting business in over 120 countries, our innovative technologies and services are taking energy forward – making it safer, cleaner and more efficient for people and the planet. Visit us at bakerhughes.com.

    For more information, please contact:

    Investor Relations

    Chase Mulvehill
    +1 346-297-2561
    investor.relations@bakerhughes.com

    Media Relations

    Adrienne M. Lynch
    +1 713-906-8407
    adrienne.lynch@bakerhughes.com

    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-OSI Security: Three ordered to prison for trafficking $29M in meth

    Source: United States Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms and Explosives (ATF)

    McALLEN, Texas – Three Houston-area residents have been sent to prison following their convictions of possessing with intent to distribute 777 kilograms of meth, announced U.S. Attorney Alamdar S. Hamdani.

    Eduardo Figueroa Jr., 29, Cleveland, and Cynara Lucia Sarmiento, 26, Conroe, pleaded guilty March 22, 2023. Marlon Deon Martin, 31, Conroe, pleaded guilty March 21, 2023.

    U.S. District Chief Judge Randy Crane has now ordered Figueroa, Sarmiento and Martin to serve 144, 60 and 37 months in federal prison, respectively. All three must also serve three years of supervised release following their sentences. In handing down the prison terms, Chief Judge Crane informed Figueroa that he would end up with the biggest sentence as he was the organizer of this offense. During his statement at sentencing, Figueroa took responsibility for getting his co-conspirators involved and stated that he was in charge. Chief Judge Crane noted that he handed down lighter sentences as the co-conspirators were young and foolish with little to no criminal history who he wanted to help get back on the right path.  

    At the time of his plea, Figueroa admitted he hired Sarmiento as his personal assistant and tasked her with leasing warehouse space and forming Hive Logistics, a business warehouse located in Houston. Figueroa recruited Martin to help unload the narcotics.

    On May 12, 2021, authorities executed a search at the location and discovered 777 kilograms of meth, 10 kilograms of cocaine, ledgers, two pistols and five magazines. The meth was located inside metal barrels marked as mango puree.

    In furtherance of his plea, Figueroa admitted the meth was part of a larger shipment he had received, of which approximately 800 kilograms had already been delivered to several individuals. Sarmiento also admitted to creating a ledger for the drugs and delivering them on at least one occasion with Figueroa.

    The estimated street value of the meth is $29 million.

    This case is part of an exportation and straw purchasing of firearms investigation from March 2021 where Figueroa was identified as a recruiter. He also pleaded guilty to conspiracy to straw purchase five shotguns on Nov. 22, 2021, and was sentenced to 60 months in prison to run concurrently.

    Sarmiento and Martin were permitted to remain on bond and voluntarily surrender to a U.S. Bureau of Prisons (BOP) facility to be determined in the near future. Figueroa will remain in custody pending transfer to a BOP facility to be determined in the near future.

    Homeland Security Investigations and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives conducted the investigation. Assistant U.S. Attorney M. Alexis Garcia prosecuted the case.

    MIL Security OSI –

  • MIL-OSI Security: Winston-Salem Man Sentenced to 17.5 Years for Trafficking Methamphetamine and Cocaine

    Source: United States Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms and Explosives (ATF)

    ELIZABETH CITY, N.C. – Maximino Sandoval Penaloza, a 44-year-old resident of Winston-Salem, has been sentenced to 210 months in prison for the distribution of 50 grams or more of methamphetamine in the Wilmington area.  Penaloza pled guilty on March 7, 2023.

    According to the court documents and other information presented in court, in 2020 law enforcement investigated drug trafficking activities occurring in the Winston-Salem and Wilmington areas of North Carolina.  Ultimately, law enforcement learned that a drug trafficking organization was distributing large quantities of cocaine and methamphetamine in various communities in the Eastern District of North Carolina.  Penaloza was identified as a member of this organization.

    From approximately December 7, 2020, through December 16, 2020, Penaloza communicated with an undercover law enforcement agent regarding the purchase of methamphetamine.  On December 16, 2020, Penaloza directed a courier to meet with the undercover law enforcement agent to deliver 191.66 grams of methamphetamine.  During additional conversations with the undercover agent, in March of 2021 Penaloza admitted having one kilogram of cocaine for sale.  Later, in September of 2021 the undercover agent purchased 519.1 grams of methamphetamine arranged by Penaloza and delivered by a courier.

    The investigation further uncovered that Penaloza, is illegally present in the United States, has three prior felony convictions for trafficking cocaine and possessing with the intent to distribute cocaine, resisting a law enforcement officer, and has been previously deported from the United States and returned to Mexico on at least two occasions.

    The prosecution of Penaloza was a part of an Organized Crime and Drug Enforcement Task Force Operation (OCDETF). OCDETF identifies, disrupts, and dismantles the highest-level drug traffickers, money launders, gangs, and transnational criminal organizations that threaten the United States by using a prosecutor-led, intelligence-driven, multi-agency approach that leverages the strengths of federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies against criminal networks.   

    Michael F. Easley, Jr., U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of North Carolina, made the announcement after sentencing by Judge Terrence W. Boyle. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) investigated the case and Assistant U.S. Attorney Jennifer C. Nucci and Julie Childress prosecuted the case.

    A copy of this press release is located on our website. Related court documents and information can be found on the website of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina or on PACER by searching for case number 5:22-CR-00104-BO.

    MIL Security OSI –

  • MIL-OSI Security: Media Advisory – U.S. Attorney to Announce Charges Related to 2023 Quintuple Murder in Sampson County

    Source: United States Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms and Explosives (ATF)

    RALEIGH, N.C. – United States Attorney Michael F. Easley, Jr., Sampson County Sheriff Jimmy Thornton, and other state and federal law enforcement partners, will hold a press conference tomorrow to announce indictments and arrests related to the October 2023 murder of five people in Clinton.

    WHERE: U.S. Attorney’s Office – 150 Fayetteville Street, Suite 2100, Raleigh, NC 27601

    WHEN: Wednesday, October 23rd at 10:30 a.m.

    Media: please arrive by 10:00 a.m. for set up.

    For logistical information in advance of the media availability, please contact Katie Holcomb at USANCE.PublicInfoOfficer@usdoj.gov. No case specific information is available until the press conference.

    MIL Security OSI –

  • MIL-OSI Security: Norman Wells — Norman wells RCMP respond to serious assaults

    Source: Royal Canadian Mounted Police

    On September 22nd, 2024, Norman Wells RCMP received a report that a person had been stabbed at a residence. Officers attended the location and confirmed a person had been the victim of a stabbing.

    Further investigation revealed a significant altercation had occurred at the residence and another person had been both shot with a crossbow and bear-sprayed. Both victims were transported out of the community for treatment.

    Police subsequently located and took 23-year-old Teagan Sutherland into custody in relation to the matter. He has been charged with:

    • Breaking and Entering with Intent, contrary to section 348(1)(a) of the Criminal Code
    • Disguised with intent to commit an offence, contrary to section 351(2) of the Criminal Code
    • Uttering threats against a person (2 counts), contrary to section 264.1(1)(a) of the Criminal Code
    • Possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose, contrary to section 88(1) of the Criminal Code
    • Aggravated Assault, contrary to section 268(2) of the Criminal Code

    At the time of his arrest, Sutherland had an active warrant for his arrest and was already facing charges from a prior incident on September 11th, 2024. They are as follows:

    • Breaking and Entering with Intent, contrary to section 348(1)(a) of the Criminal Code
    • Disguised with intent to commit an offence (2 counts), contrary to section 351(2) of the Criminal Code
    • Possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose (2 counts), contrary to section 88(1) of the Criminal Code.
    • Assault with a weapon (2 counts), contrary to section 267(a) of the Criminal Code
    • Uttering threats against a person, contrary to section 264.1(1)(a) of the Criminal Code

    Sutherland has appeared before a Justice of the Peace on all charges and was remanded into custody to appear again on September 25th, 2024

    Investigation into this matter remains ongoing at this time.

    Norman Wells RCMP are aware that several people witnessed this event and are asking those witnesses to contact the Norman Wells detachment at 587-1111 or Crimestoppers at http://www.p3tips.com.

    MIL Security OSI –

  • MIL-OSI Security: Fentanyl Trafficker and DC Rapper Sentenced for Bringing Thousands of Counterfeit Oxycodone Pills into the District

    Source: United States Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms and Explosives (ATF)

                WASHINGTON – Columbian Thomas, 26, of Washington D.C., was sentenced today in U.S. District Court to 160 months in federal prison for participating in a massive fentanyl trafficking conspiracy that distributed hundreds of thousands of fentanyl-laced counterfeit oxycodone pills from Southern California to destinations throughout the United States, including the District. Thomas, aka “Cruddy Murda,” was one of more than two dozen co-defendants arrested over the course of 2023 in D.C., Virginia, Maryland, San Diego, and Los Angeles and charged in the conspiracy.

                The sentence was announced by U.S. Attorney Matthew M. Graves, DEA Special Agent in Charge Jarod Forget of the Washington Division, Inspector in Charge Damon E. Wood of the U.S. Postal Inspection Service Washington Division, and Chief Pamela A. Smith of the Metropolitan Police Department.

                Thomas pleaded guilty on May 30 to conspiring to distribute 400 grams or more of fentanyl. In addition to the 160-month prison term, U.S. District Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly ordered Thomas to serve five years of supervised release.

                The impetus for this investigation was the overdose death of Diamond Lynch, a young mother in Southeast D.C. In addition to investigating and prosecuting the death-resulting case [1] , law enforcement followed the evidence and uncovered a vast network of traffickers who transported fentanyl from Mexico to Los Angeles to the District of Columbia. Since then, investigators have seized more than 450,000 fentanyl pills, 1.5 kilograms of fentanyl powder, and 30 firearms.        

    According to court documents, Thomas entered into the conspiracy after he was introduced to a Los Angeles-based drug trafficker, who was a distributor of fentanyl-laced counterfeit oxycodone pills. Thomas would travel to Southern California to purchase the fake oxycodone from the L.A. supplier and return to the District with the drugs. 

               Thomas and his co-conspirators employed two primary methods to transport the pills to the District: they smuggled them in luggage or carry-on items on airline flights, or they shipped the pills using commercial mail carriers.

               Thomas often bragged on social media about the lucrative business of fentanyl trafficking and proudly showcased the spoils of his drug trafficking. The below-pictured social media post shows Thomas holding a large stack of U.S. currency, exclaiming “I [love] Cali!!!!”

               On June 2, 2023, the date of his arrest, law enforcement found Thomas in the bedroom of his home and recovered a baggie containing about 100 blue M-30 fentanyl-laced counterfeit oxycodone pills, along with a loaded Glock 21 Gen4 pistol that had been equipped with a “giggle switch,” which converted the firearm into a fully automatic machine gun.

               In addition to possessing a machine gun and conspiring to distribute more than 400 grams of fentanyl, Thomas, whose rap stage name is “Cruddy Murda,” often boasted about firearms and acts of violence in his songs. Below is a chart outlining the status and charges of other defendants in the case:

    DEFENDANT

    AGE

    LOCATION

    CHARGES/SENTENCE  

    Hector David Valdez,

    aka “Curl”

     

    26

    		 Santa Fe Springs, California

    Conspiracy to distribute 400 grams or more of fentanyl;

    Conspiracy to commit international money laundering.

    Craig Eastman

     

    20

    		 Washington, D.C.

    Pleaded guilty July 25, 2024, to conspiracy to distribute more than 400 grams of fentanyl.

    Sentencing: January 7, 2025.
    Charles Jeffrey Taylor

    20

    		 Washington, D.C.

    Conspiracy to distribute 400 grams or more of fentanyl;

    Possession with intent to distribute fentanyl.
    Raymond Nava, Jr.

    20

    Bell Gardens,

    California

    		 Sentenced Sept. 17, 2024, to 14 years for conspiracy to distribute 400 grams or more of fentanyl.
    Ulises Aldaz

    28

    Bell Gardens,

    California

    		 Sentenced June 28, 2024, to 95 months in prison for conspiracy to distribute 400 grams or more of fentanyl.
    Max Alexander Carias Torres

    26

    Bell Gardens,

    California

    Conspiracy to distribute 400 grams or more of fentanyl;

    Conspiracy to commit international money laundering
    Teron Deandre McNeil, aka “Wild Boy”

    34

    		 Washington, D.C. Conspiracy to distribute 400 grams or more of fentanyl.

    Marvin Anthony Bussie,

    aka “Money Marr”

    21

    		 Washington, D.C. Sentenced June 28, 2024, to 120 months in prison for conspiracy to distribute 400 grams or more of fentanyl.
    Marcus Orlando Brown

    28

    		 Washington, D.C. Sentenced on October 9, 2024, to 108 months in prison for conspiracy to distribute 40 grams or more of fentanyl.

    Columbian Thomas, aka

    “Cruddy Murda”

    26

    		 Washington, D.C. Sentenced October 22, 2024, to 160 months in prison for conspiracy to distribute 400 grams or more of fentanyl.
    Wayne Rodell Carr-Maiden

    29

    		 Washington, D.C. Sentenced April 29, 2024, to 45 months in prison for conspiracy to distribute 40 grams or more of fentanyl.

    Andre Malik Edmond,

    aka “Draco”

    23

    		 Temple Hills, Maryland Sentenced July 22, 2024, to 130 months in prison for conspiracy to distribute 400 grams or more of fentanyl.

    Treyveon James Johnson,

    aka “Treyski”

    20

    		 Alexandria, Virginia Sentenced Sept. 5, 2024, to 108 months in prison for conspiracy to distribute 40 grams or more of fentanyl.

    Karon Olufemi Blalock,

    aka “Fat Bags”

    30

    		 Alexandria, Virginia Conspiracy to distribute 400 grams or more of fentanyl.

    Ronte Ricardo Greene,

    aka “Cardiddy”

    28

    		 Washington, D.C.

    Conspiracy to distribute 400 grams or more of fentanyl;

    Possession with intent to distribute fentanyl.
    Melvin Edward Allen, Jr., aka “21”

    38

    		 Washington, D.C. Conspiracy to distribute 400 grams or more of fentanyl.

    Darius Quincy Hodges,

    aka “Brick”

    34

    		 Glen Allen, Virginia Conspiracy to distribute 400 grams or more of fentanyl.

    Lamin Sesay,

    aka “Rock Star”

    27

    		 Alexandria, Virginia Conspiracy to distribute 400 grams or more of fentanyl.
    Paul Alejandro Felix

    25

    Glendale,

    California

    Pleaded guilty July 1, 2024, to conspiracy to distribute 400 grams or more of fentanyl.

    Sentencing: November 6, 2024

    Omar Arana,

    aka “Frogs”

    27

    Cudahy,

    California

    		 Conspiracy to distribute 400 grams or more of fentanyl.
    Edgar Balderas, Jr., aka “Nano”

    26

    San Diego,

    California

    		 Conspiracy to distribute 400 grams or more of fentanyl.
    Raul Pacheco Ramirez

    30

    Long Beach,

    California

    Pleaded guilty July 19, 2024, to conspiracy to distribute 400 grams or more of fentanyl.

    Sentencing: November 26, 2024.
    Giovani Alejandro Briones

    30

    		 Victorville, California

    Conspiracy to distribute 400 grams or more of fentanyl;

    Conspiracy to commit international money laundering.
    Alfredo Rodriguez Gonzalez

    26

    		 Rosarito, Mexico

    Conspiracy to distribute 400 grams or more of fentanyl;

    Conspiracy to commit international money laundering.

               The prosecutions followed a joint investigation by the DEA Washington Division and the U.S. Postal Inspection Service Washington Division, in partnership with the Metropolitan Police Department and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF), with additional support from the DEA Los Angeles, San Diego, and Riverside Field Offices, the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Washington Field Office, and the Charles County, Maryland Sheriff’s Office. Valuable assistance was provided by the U.S. Attorney’s Offices in the Central and Southern Districts of California, the Eastern District of Virginia, and the District of Maryland.

               The case is being prosecuted by Assistant U.S. Attorneys Matthew W. Kinskey, Solomon S. Eppel, and Iris McCranie of the Violence Reduction and Trafficking Offenses (VRTO) Section.

    23cr73

    MIL Security OSI –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the situation in Azerbaijan, violation of human rights and international law and relations with Armenia – B10-0141/2024

    Source: European Parliament

    Rasa Juknevičienė, François‑Xavier Bellamy, Michael Gahler, Andrzej Halicki, David McAllister, Sebastião Bugalho, Nicolás Pascual De La Parte, Isabel Wiseler‑Lima, Daniel Caspary, Loucas Fourlas, Sandra Kalniete, Łukasz Kohut, Andrey Kovatchev, Andrius Kubilius, Miriam Lexmann, Vangelis Meimarakis, Ana Miguel Pedro, Davor Ivo Stier, Michał Szczerba
    on behalf of the PPE Group

    B10‑0141/2024

    European Parliament resolution on the situation in Azerbaijan, violation of human rights and international law and relations with Armenia

    (2024/2890(RSP))

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to its previous reports and resolutions on Azerbaijan and Armenia,

    – having regard to the European Convention on Human Rights of 1950, ratified by Azerbaijan in 2002,

    – having regard to the relevant documents and international agreements, including but not limited to the United Nations Charter, the Helsinki Final Act of 1 August 1975 and the Alma-Ata Declaration of 21 December 1991,

    – having regard to the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Azerbaijan, of the other part, signed on 22 April 1996[1],

    – having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

    A. whereas 300 people remain in detention in Azerbaijan on politically motivated charges; whereas prominent human rights defender and climate advocate, Anar Mammadli, has been in pre-trial detention since 30 April 2024 on bogus charges of conspiracy to bring illegal foreign currency into the country and his health has deteriorated significantly while in custody; whereas economist and political activist Gubad Ibadoghlu was moved to house arrest on 22 April 2024 after 274 days in detention;

    B. whereas Azerbaijan has also intensified its repression against the remaining independent media, such as Abzas Media and Toplum TV, through detentions and judicial harassment;

    C. whereas the Azerbaijani laws regulating the registration, operation and funding of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are highly restrictive and arbitrarily implemented, thus effectively criminalising unregistered NGO activity;

    D. whereas Freedom House’s 2024 index ranks Azerbaijan among the least free countries in the world, below Russia and Belarus;

    E. whereas on 19 September 2023, after a nine-month illegal blockade of the Lachin corridor and disregarding both the commitments it made in the trilateral statement of 9 November 2020 and an International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruling, Azerbaijan launched an offensive on the remaining parts of Nagorno-Karabakh not already under its control;

    F. whereas more than 100 000 Armenians had to flee the territory, including 30 000 children, resulting in Nagorno-Karabakh being almost entirely emptied of its Armenian population, who had been living there for centuries; whereas this amounts to ethnic cleansing;

    G. whereas the Russian peacekeeping force did not act in accordance with its mandate, as laid down in the trilateral statement of 9 November 2020, taking no action against Azerbaijan’s blockade of the Lachin corridor, the establishment of the Azerbaijani checkpoint at the entrance to the corridor or the offensive in Nagorno-Karabakh in September 2023;

    H. whereas the Azerbaijani leadership continues to make irredentist statements with reference to the sovereign territory of Armenia; whereas the Azerbaijani army continues to occupy no less than 170 km2 of the sovereign territory of Armenia;

    1. Stresses its profound concern regarding the human rights situation in Azerbaijan;

    2. Urges the Azerbaijani authorities to immediately and unconditionally release all human rights defenders, journalists, environmental, political and other activists prosecuted under fabricated and or politically motivated charges; recalls in this context the names of Tofig Yagublu, Akif Gurbanov, Bakhtiyar Hajiyev, as well as human rights defenders and journalists including Ulvi Hasanli, Sevinj Vagifgizi, Nargiz Absalamova, Hafiz Babali and Elnara Gasimova, Aziz Orujov, Rufat Muradli, Avaz Zeynalli, Elnur Shukurov, Alasgar Mammadli and Farid Ismayilov; underlines that since April 2024, Azerbaijan has carried out further arrests of civil society activists on bogus charges, including Farid Mehralidze, Igbal Abilov, Bahurz Samadov, Emin Ibrahimov and Famil Khalilov;

    3. Recalls the need to lift the travel ban in force against Gubad Ibadoghlu and drop all charges against him, and calls on Azerbaijan urgently to ensure an independent medical examination by a doctor of his own choosing, and allow him to receive treatment abroad;

    4. Reminds the Azerbaijani authorities of their obligations to respect human dignity and fundamental freedoms in accordance with their international commitments and calls on them to repeal repressive legislation that drives independent NGOs and media to the margins of the law;

    5. Calls for the EU to impose sanctions under its global human rights sanctions regime on Azerbaijani officials who have committed serious human rights violations; reiterates its position that the EU should be ready to impose sanctions on any individuals and entities that threaten the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Armenia;

    6. Recalls that the 1996 EU-Azerbaijan Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, which is the legal basis for bilateral relations, is based on respect for democracy and the principles of international law and human rights and that these have been systematically violated in Azerbaijan;

    7. Reiterates the EU’s unequivocal support for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability of the borders of Armenia; strongly supports the normalisation of relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan on the basis of the principles of the mutual recognition of territorial integrity and the inviolability of borders based on the 1991 Alma-Ata Declaration;

    8. Recalls its previous condemnation of the pre-planned and unjustified military attack by Azerbaijan of 19-20 September 2023 against the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh, which led to the expulsion of the entirety of the ethnic Armenian community which had been living there for centuries, amounting to ethnic cleansing; recalls that this attack resulted in the complete dissolution of the structures of the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh and the establishment of full Azerbaijani control over the region; demands the release of all remaining Armenian political prisoners and prisoners of war;

    9. Reiterates its demand for the withdrawal of Azerbaijan’s troops from the entirety of the sovereign territory of Armenia; rejects and expresses its grave concern regarding the irredentist and inflammatory statements made by the Azerbaijani President and other Azerbaijani officials threatening the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Armenia; warns Azerbaijan against any potential military adventurism against Armenia proper; highlights that Azerbaijan’s connectivity issues with its exclave of Nakhchivan should be resolved with full respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Armenia;

    10. Calls on Azerbaijan to genuinely engage in a comprehensive and transparent dialogue with the Karabakh Armenians to ensure respect for their rights and guarantee their security, including their right to return to and live in their homes in dignity and safety, overseen by an international presence, to access their land and property rights, to maintain their distinct identity and to fully enjoy their civic, cultural, social and religious rights;

    11. Calls for the establishment of an ad hoc committee within the European institutions to identify or develop international mechanisms to guarantee the collective, safe, dignified and sustainable return of the inhabitants of Nagorno-Karabakh to their ancestral land; calls for the creation of a mechanism to monitor the implementation of the reports and resolutions adopted by Parliament on Nagorno-Karabakh;

    12. Urges Azerbaijan to refrain from further destroying, neglecting or altering the origins of cultural, religious or historical heritage in the region, bearing in mind the destruction of cultural, religious and historical heritage that has occurred since the beginning of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and calls on it to instead strive to preserve, protect and promote this rich diversity; demands the protection of the Armenian cultural, historical and religious heritage in Nagorno-Karabakh in line with UNESCO standards and Azerbaijan’s international commitments;

    13. Recognises the urgent need to strengthen the cooperation between the EU and Armenia in the field of security and defence; welcomes the fact that Armenia has frozen its participation in the Collective Security Treaty Organization; notes the added value of regular EU-Armenian Political and Security Dialogues, as an umbrella platform for all security related matters; welcomes the actions undertaken by several Member States to provide defensive military support to Armenia and urges other Member States to consider similar initiatives;

    14. Expresses its support for the decision of Armenia to discontinue the presence of Russian Federal Security Service border guards at the international airport in Yerevan, and its understanding for the suspension of relations with Belarus;

    15. Calls for the EU to end its dependency on gas exports from Azerbaijan; is seriously concerned about Azerbaijan’s import of Russian gas and the substantial Russian share in the production and transportation of Azerbaijani gas for the EU, which contradicts the EU’s objective of undermining Russia’s capacity to continue its war of aggression against Ukraine by cutting its revenues from oil and gas exports to the EU; urges the Commission to investigate suspicions that Azerbaijan actually exports Russian gas to the EU;

    16. Calls for the suspension of all imports of oil and gas from Azerbaijan to the EU; recalls its demand, in the light of Azerbaijan’s 2023 invasion of Nagorno-Karabakh, for the suspension of the Memorandum of Understanding on a Strategic Partnership in the Field of Energy between the European Union and Azerbaijan;

    17. Supports all initiatives and activities that could lead to the establishment of peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan and the signing of a long-awaited peace agreement; believes that if a peace agreement is to be lasting, it requires genuine engagement from the parties, not the escalation of rhetoric and demands; welcomes the recent achievement in the Commission on Delimitation and Border Security of a preliminary agreement on the delimitation of several sectors of the Armenia-Azerbaijan border;

    18. Welcomes the new momentum in bilateral relations between the EU and Armenia, which is strongly supported by the authorities in Yerevan; takes good note of Armenia’s European aspirations, as expressed by the Armenian foreign minister, among others; recalls its previous position that, pursuant to Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union, any European state may apply to become a member of the European Union provided that it adheres to the Copenhagen criteria and the principles of democracy, respects fundamental freedoms and human and minority rights, and upholds the rule of law; considers that, should Armenia be interested in applying for candidate status and continuing on its current path of sustained reforms consolidating its democracy, this could set the stage for a transformative phase in EU-Armenia relations; calls on the Commission and the Council to actively support Armenia’s desire for increased cooperation with the EU, not only in the area of economic partnership but also in political dialogue, people-to-people contacts, sectoral integration and security cooperation; believes that the experience stemming from the Association Agreements / Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas with Ukraine, Georgia and the Republic of Moldova should serve as a good basis for closer EU-Armenia cooperation, in particular in relation to a gradual sectoral integration with the single market;

    19. Welcomes the decision of 22 July 2024 to launch the visa liberalisation dialogue with Armenia, which is the first step towards achieving a visa free regime for short stays in the EU; welcomes further the decision to adopt the first assistance measure under the European Peace Facility (EPF) in support of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Armenia, worth EUR 10 million; calls for the EU to cease all technical and financial assistance to Azerbaijan that might contribute to strengthening its military or security capabilities; calls on the Member States to freeze exports of all military and security equipment to Azerbaijan;

    20. Condemns the Baku Initiative Group’s repeated attempts to denigrate and destabilise EU Member States; condemns in particular its support for irredentist groups and disinformation operations targeting France, especially in the French departments and territories of New Caledonia, Martinique and Corsica; recalls that these methods were used against Germany in 2013; denounces the smear campaigns targeting Denmark; strongly opposes the allegations made by Ilham Aliyev himself at the Baku Initiative Group meeting in Baku in November 2023;

    21. Condemns the arbitrary arrests of EU citizens based on spurious accusations of espionage and their disproportionate sentencing;

    22. Regrets the smear campaign aimed at damaging France’s reputation by calling into question its capacity to host the 2024 Olympic Games, launched by actors suspected of being close to the Azerbaijani regime;

    23. Strongly condemns the intimidation, death threats and assassination attempts against opponents of the Azerbaijani Government, including in EU countries, and against Azerbaijani citizens who have been granted political asylum by Member States, such as Mahammad Mirzali in France; calls on the Member States to cooperate, if necessary, in the investigation into the murder, in September 2024, of Vivadi Isgandarl, an Azerbaijani political opponent residing in France; stresses that for the Member States, preventing any act of retaliation on their territory is a matter of democracy, human rights, security and sovereignty; insists that Europol should closely monitor this matter;

    24. Strongly condemns the public insults and direct threats made by Azerbaijani diplomatic or government representatives, or members of the Azerbaijani Parliament, targeting elected officials of EU Member States; demands, in this regard, that access for all Azerbaijani officials to EU institutional buildings be denied until further notice;

    25. Welcomes the fact that the Republic of Armenia formally deposited the instrument of ratification of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court in 2023 and that the statute entered into force for Armenia on 1 February 2024;

    26. Deplores steps taken by Azerbaijan towards the secessionist entity in occupied Cyprus, which are against international law and the provisions of UN Security Council Resolutions 541 (1983) and 550 (1984); calls on Azerbaijan to respect the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of states and to not invite the secessionist entity in occupied Cyprus to any meetings of the Organization of Turkic States;

    27. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Member States and the President, Government and Parliament of Azerbaijan.

     

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Briefing – Improving use of rail infrastructure capacity – 22-10-2024

    Source: European Parliament

    In July 2023, the European Commission tabled a package of proposals aimed at greening freight transport. One of these proposals focuses on improving the use of rail infrastructure capacity. The proposed text suggests changes to the rules governing the planning and allocation of railway infrastructure capacity, which are currently outlined in Directive 2012/34/EU and Regulation (EU) No 913/2010. The goal of the changes is to enhance the management of rail infrastructure capacity and traffic so as to improve service quality, optimise railway network usage, increase traffic capacity and enhance the transport sector’s contribution to decarbonisation. In the European Parliament, the file was referred to the Committee on Transport and Tourism (TRAN), which appointed Tilly Metz (Greens/EFA, Luxembourg) as rapporteur. The TRAN committee adopted its report on 4 March 2024. Parliament adopted its first-reading position during its March 2024 plenary session. Following the European elections, the TRAN committee voted on 7 October 2024 to start interinstitutional negotiations. Fourth edition. The ‘EU Legislation in Progress’ briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on People’s Republic of China’s misinterpretation of the UN resolution 2758 and its continuous military provocations around Taiwan – B10-0138/2024

    Source: European Parliament

    to wind up the debate on the statement by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy

    Adam Bielan, Charlie Weimers, Bert‑Jan Ruissen, Mariusz Kamiński, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Michał Dworczyk, Carlo Fidanza, Alexandr Vondra, Alberico Gambino, Rihards Kols, Reinis Pozņaks, Ondřej Krutílek, Veronika Vrecionová, Assita Kanko, Małgorzata Gosiewska, Joachim Stanisław Brudziński
    on behalf of the ECR Group

    B10‑0138/2024

    European Parliament resolution on People’s Republic of China’s misinterpretation of the UN resolution 2758 and its continuous military provocations around Taiwan

    (2024/2891(RSP))

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to its previous reports, recommendations and resolutions on the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan,

    – having regard to the urgency motion on Taiwan, passed by the Australian Senate on 21 August 2024,

    – having regard to the motion of 12 September 2024 passed in the Second Chamber of the Dutch Parliament on UN resolution 2758,

    – having regard to the statement by the spokesperson of the European External Action Service of 14 October on China’s latest military drills around Taiwan,

    – having regard to the UN Charter,

    – having regard to UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 (XXVI) of 25 October 1971,

    – having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

    A. whereas, in the 1970s, in the hope of enhancing prosperity, stability and peace, the PRC was offered a place in the UN; whereas Beijing seized this opportunity, benefiting from close ties with the West, joining the World Trade Organization, enjoying freedom of navigation and experiencing stabilisation in the seas and straits of South-East Asia, all of which opened the door to the country’s unprecedented economic and technological development;

    B. whereas, in recent years, through its actions – such as supporting Russia’s barbaric aggression and assertively expanding in the region, particularly with the threat of invading Taiwan – Beijing is failing to uphold the commitments expected of UN Security Council members and the commitments enshrined in the UN Charter; whereas UN resolution 2758 does not establish the PRC’s sovereignty over Taiwan and does not determine the future status of Taiwan in the United Nations, nor of Taiwanese participation in UN agencies or international organisations;

    C. whereas the PRC has falsely leveraged some interpretations of UN Resolution 2758 to advance its ‘One China’ narrative globally and put pressure on Taiwan, limiting its voice on the international stage and influencing its diplomatic relationships;

    D. whereas the Australian and Dutch Parliaments have already decided not to go along with the PRC’s interpretation of UN Resolution 2758;

    E. whereas the PRC is perpetuating its overly aggressive actions, and trying to erode the status quo in the Taiwan Strait; whereas since 2019 the PRC has violated the Taiwanese air defence identification zone (ADIZ) with increasing regularity; whereas the PRC has been behaving aggressively across vast areas of the Indo-Pacific and exerting varying degrees of military or economic coercion, which has led to disputes with neighbours such as Japan, India, the Philippines and Australia;

    F. whereas on 14 October 2024 the PRC launched, without prior warning, a large-scale military drill named Joint Sword 2024-B that simulated a blockade of Taiwan; whereas the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) deployed 153 aircraft and 36 naval and coastguard ships around Taiwan, setting single-day records;

    G. whereas the PLA’s air manoeuvres have increased from under 20 incursions into Taiwan’s ADIZ in 2019 to 2 459 so far in 2024; whereas the threat is exacerbated by Beijing’s announcement that it was practising for a blockade of Taiwan’s key ports and military bases; whereas the PLA’s primary locus for ADIZ operations has shifted over time from the South China Sea to the Taiwan Strait; whereas the PLA’s flight activity to the east of Taiwan has increased, demonstrating a shift from training and navigation operations to testing likely combat concepts in the event of a blockade or military invasion of Taiwan;

    H. whereas, besides military pressure, the PRC has for years pursued a sophisticated strategy of targeting Taiwan with foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), including hybrid and cyberattacks, with the goal of undermining Taiwan’s democratic society;

    I. whereas the PRC under the leadership of Xi Jinping has said that it will not renounce the use of force to seek unification with Taiwan;

    J. whereas on 25 September 2024 the PRC fired an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) into the Pacific Ocean for the first time since 1980;

    K. whereas the PRC’s increasingly aggressive posture, in particular in its own neighbourhood, such as the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, poses a risk to regional and global security;

    L. whereas Beijing’s active support of the Russian Federation’s aggressive actions against Ukraine contradicts the PRC’s claim to be a ‘stabilising power’; whereas the Russian war of aggression is being closely watched by the PRC as a test bed for the possible future invasion of Taiwan and to gauge the likely reaction of the international community;

    M. whereas the EU and Taiwan are like-minded partners that share the common values of freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law;

    N. whereas the PRC is a one-party state controlled and ruled entirely by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP); whereas the CCP has used its growing influence in international organisations to reshape the open, rules-based international order to protect and advance its own interests;

    O. whereas Taiwan is located in a strategic position in terms of trade; whereas the Taiwan Strait is the primary route for ships travelling from the PRC, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan towards Europe; whereas the EU remains the largest source of foreign direct investment (FDI) in Taiwan; whereas there is considerable potential for increasing Taiwan’s FDI in the EU; whereas Taiwan dominates semiconductor manufacturing markets, as its producers manufacture around 50 % of the world’s semiconductor output; whereas the EU’s Indo-Pacific strategy argues for increasing trade and investment cooperation with Taiwan and advocates stabilising tensions in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait;

    1. Reiterates that Taiwan is an important EU partner and a like-minded democratic ally in the Indo-Pacific region;

    2. Condemns the sustained efforts made by representatives of the PRC to distort the meaning of UN resolution 2758, historical documents and international rules;

    3. Remains deeply committed to the EU’s ‘One China’ policy, which does not equate with the PRC’s ‘One China’ principle’;

    4. Stresses that nothing in resolution 2758 prevents Taiwan’s participation in international organisations and that it has no bearing on the sovereign choices of other countries with respect to their relationship with Taiwan;

    5. Regrets the PRC’s efforts to block Taiwan’s participation in multilateral organisations; calls for the EU and its Member States to support Taiwan’s meaningful participation, in line with the key UN principles of universal representation, in relevant international organisations such as the World Health Organization, the International Civil Aviation Organization, the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change in order to better protect global interests and address the serious challenges facing humanity, such as pandemics, climate change and human rights;

    6. Strongly condemns the PRC’s provocative, irresponsible, disproportionate and destabilising military exercises, including the recent exercises of 14 October, as well as its continued military provocations against Taiwan and its aggressive posture in the wider region; expresses its concern about the PRC’s recent launch of an ICBM into the Pacific Ocean, which has contributed to further tensions across the Indo-Pacific region;

    7. Reaffirms its strong commitment to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait; calls for the EU and its Member States to ensure that any attempt to unilaterally change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, particularly by means of force or coercion, will not be accepted and will be met with a decisive and firm reaction;

    8. Highlights that the PRC’s increasingly aggressive posture poses a threat to the freedom of navigation and jeopardises the stability which is vital for global trade; emphasises that this situation is being watched with concern by a growing number of like-minded partners committed to peace and stability in the region, including across the Taiwan Strait; underlines the need to shore up deterrence against destabilising behaviour, including through regular operations to assert freedom of navigation over the PRC’s attempts to impose control over international waters and airspace;

    9. Reiterates its strong condemnation of statements by President Xi Jinping that the PRC will never renounce the right to use force with respect to Taiwan;

    10. Urges the PRC to immediately cease all actions and intrusions into the Taiwanese ADIZ and the airspace violations above Taiwan’s outer islands, and to restore the full respect of the Taiwan Strait’s median line, all of which also poses a risk to international aviation, and stop all other grey-zone military actions, including cyber and disinformation campaigns;

    11. Recalls that maintaining peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific is a core interest for the free world, including the EU and its Member States; stresses that a military conflict in the Taiwan Strait would not only cause significant economic disruption affecting European interests and prosperity, but would also seriously undermine the rules-based order in the region, as well as democratic governance with human rights, democracy and the rule of law at its core;

    12. Recalls Taiwan’s help and assistance during both the COVID-19 pandemic and the humanitarian crises caused by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, as well as its continuous involvement and support for the Ukrainian government and countries hosting Ukrainian refugees;

    13. Reiterates the importance of respecting international law, in particular the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and its provisions on the obligation to settle disputes by peaceful means and on maintaining the freedom of navigation and overflight;

    14. Reiterates its call for the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs to change the name of the European Economic and Trade Office in Taiwan to ‘European Union Office in Taiwan’ to reflect the broad scope of our ties;

    15. Reiterates its previous call for the Commission to launch, without delay, an impact assessment, public consultation and scoping exercise on a bilateral investment agreement with the Taiwanese authorities in preparation for negotiations on deepening bilateral economic ties;

    16. Recommends further deepening cooperation between the EU and Taiwan to enhance structural cooperation on countering disinformation and foreign interference; recommends posting a liaison officer at the European Economic and Trade Office to coordinate joint efforts on tackling disinformation and interference; condemns any form of pressure and threats of reprisals, including economic coercion, with regard to the independent right of the EU and its Member States to develop relations with Taiwan in line with their interests and shared values of democracy and human rights, without foreign interference;

    17. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Governments of the PRC and Taiwan.

     

     

     

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Social clause in sustainable fisheries partnership agreements – E-002060/2024

    Source: European Parliament

    14.10.2024

    Question for written answer  E-002060/2024
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Isabelle Le Callennec (PPE)

    The Commission recently amended the social clause in sustainable fisheries partnership agreements (SFPAs). This clause requires EU vessels to comply with decisions, such as that on the basic minimum wage for seafarers, made by the Joint Maritime Commission of the International Labour Organisation (ILO). It does not cite either ILO Convention No 188 on Work in Fishing or Directive 2017/159.

    In December 2023, the Commission informed the social partners in the Sectoral Social Dialogue Committee on Sea-Fisheries (SSDC-F) that it did not have the authority to set a minimum wage in SFPAs. However, in April, July and then September 2024, it proceeded to send them three successive versions of the same social clause. The first imposed the basic minimum wage for seafarers, doing away with the share remuneration system. The second saw the Commission row back, stating that the minimum wage was no longer compulsory, only for that to be reversed two months later by a third clause, with the Commission blaming a translation error in the July version.

    • 1.Does the Commission have the authority to set a minimum wage in SFPAs? In that context, could the Commission provide the legal opinion set out in Ares(2023)6074027 and Ares(2024)4969475?
    • 2.Can the Commission impose the results of biennial wage negotiations on the fishing sector when its social partners are excluded from those negotiations?

    Submitted: 14.10.2024

    Last updated: 22 October 2024

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Shortage of bus drivers in Europe – P-002139/2024

    Source: European Parliament

    17.10.2024

    Priority question for written answer  P-002139/2024
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Rosa Serrano Sierra (S&D), Idoia Mendia (S&D), Alicia Homs Ginel (S&D)

    The Draghi report acknowledges that the European transport sector faces a common challenge: a shortage of professional drivers. In 2023, 105 000 bus driver positions were unfilled in Europe, a figure which could double by 2028, according to the International Road Transport Union (IRU). The shortage could reduce the frequency of or disrupt public transport services, affecting both access to essential services and sectors such as tourism and undermining one of the EU’s fundamental principles: territorial cohesion.

    The Commission has already acknowledged the problem. In 2023, it included bus drivers in the EU talent pool initiative, which makes it easier to recruit third-country workers in professions with shortages. The lack of drivers is also recognised as a challenge to be addressed in the mission letter of the future Commissioner for Transport.

    Against that backdrop:

    • 1.Does the Commission share concerns about the shortage of bus drivers in the EU?
    • 2.What steps, such as improving working conditions or promoting the inclusion of women, could be taken to make the profession more attractive?
    • 3.Is this state of affairs affecting territorial connectivity in the EU?

    Submitted: 17.10.2024

    Last updated: 22 October 2024

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – The role of the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD) in EU border and migration policy – E-002064/2024

    Source: European Parliament

    14.10.2024

    Question for written answer  E-002064/2024
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Raquel García Hermida-Van Der Walle (Renew), Tineke Strik (Verts/ALE)

    On 5 October 2024, it was reported how the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD), once a research and dialogue centre, is playing an increasingly prominent role in implementing EU border and migration policy. It provides input, delivers border and surveillance material, and manages training centres. In 2023, the Commission gave EUR 93 million to the ICMPD. Part of this contribution was for a project in Lebanon aimed at preventing Syrian refugees from moving onward to Europe. The ICMPD has been criticised by experts for lacking transparency, democratic oversight and legal accountability, and for its potential for fundamental rights violations[1].

    • 1.How are the accountability structures of the ICMPD arranged, considering that it carries out EU border- and migration-related tasks, including enforcement tasks, supported by considerable EU funding, and how does the Commission ensure that such ICMPD projects comply with fundamental rights?
    • 2.Can the Commission explain why the evaluation reports of projects managed by the ICMPD are ‘not public’, considering that these projects implement EU border and migration policy and are financed by EU funding?
    • 3.Will the Commission provide more transparency regarding the activities of the ICMPD for the EU, which are financed by public funding, so that democratic control can be reinforced?

    Submitted: 14.10.2024

    Last updated: 22 October 2024

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the situation in Azerbaijan, violation of human rights and international law and relations with Armenia – B10-0133/2024

    Source: European Parliament

    Sergey Lagodinsky, Ville Niinistö, Maria Ohisalo, Catarina Vieira, Hannah Neumann, Nicolae Ştefănuță, Markéta Gregorová, Michael Bloss, Alice Kuhnke, Isabella Lövin, Pär Holmgren, Marie Toussaint
    on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

    B10‑0133/2024

    European Parliament resolution on the situation in Azerbaijan, violation of human rights and international law and relations with Armenia

    (2024/2890(RSP))

     

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to its previous resolutions on Azerbaijan and Armenia, and in particular its resolution of 25 April 2024 on Azerbaijan, notably the repression of civil society and the cases of Dr Gubad Ibadoghlu and Ilhamiz Guliyev[1],

    – having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,

    – having regard to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,

    – having regard to the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,

    – having regard to the European Convention on Human Rights,

    – having regard to the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners,

    – having regard to the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Azerbaijan, of the other part[2],

    – having regard to the statement of 29 May 2024 by the Spokesperson of the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the human rights situation in Azerbaijan,

    – having regard to Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly (PACE) resolution 2527 (2024) of 24 January 2024 entitled ‘Challenge, on substantive grounds, of the still unratified credentials of the parliamentary delegation of Azerbaijan’,

    – having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

    A. whereas Azerbaijan’s track record on human rights has reached a historic low point owing to the fact that, since late 2022, the government has intensified its systematic repression of critics and dissident voices, with a new and ongoing wave of arrests of human rights defenders, political and civic activists, journalists and independent researchers on the basis of politically motivated baseless charges;

    B. whereas the detained journalists and activists listed in its urgency resolution of 25 April 2024 remain in custody;

    C. whereas these developments are taking place in the lead-up to the 29th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP29) in Baku, as part of a concerted effort by the Azerbaijani authorities to effectively silence the few remaining dissenting voices and stifle Azerbaijani civil society; whereas Azerbaijan was granted the status of COP29 host city by the UN Regional Group of Eastern European States, which includes 11 EU Member States;

    D. whereas people are being detained for actions such as participating in public protests, giving media interviews, criticising the government on social media, exposing police brutality and alleging government corruption, which is in violation of the Azerbaijani Government’s obligations under international human rights law; whereas in addition to politically motivated persecution, the Azerbaijani authorities also use tools of intimidation and harassment to incite fear and effectively censor independent voices;

    E. whereas there are credible reports of severe acts of ill treatment and even of torture inflicted upon detained persons by police officers in Azerbaijan; whereas Azerbaijan refuses to cooperate with the Council of Europe’s European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment;

    F. whereas Anar Mammadli, who leads the Election Monitoring and Democracy Studies Center and is a founding member of the Climate Justice Initiative, which seeks to advocate for civic freedoms and environmental justice in conjunction with COP29, was arrested by Azerbaijani authorities on 29 April 2024 on bogus smuggling charges; whereas Mr Mammadli’s health has deteriorated significantly while in custody;

    G. whereas researcher and activist Bahruz Samadov was arrested on 21 August 2024 and charged with ‘high treason’ for his articles criticising Azerbaijan’s Nagorno-Karabakh policy;

    H. whereas women human rights defenders continue to face threats, coercion, violations of their right to privacy and smear campaigns that are gender-specific and target them as women;

    I. whereas Azerbaijani laws regulating the registration, operation and funding of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are highly restrictive, and Azerbaijani authorities arbitrarily implement these laws; whereas this results in the effective criminalisation of unregistered NGO activity;

    J. whereas civil society activists have been fleeing the country in growing numbers since November 2023; whereas the ongoing crackdown on freedom of expression in Azerbaijan is also reflected in reports of transnational repression and reprisals against family members of detainees;

    K. whereas the media sector is under the official control of the authorities, and any remaining independent media outlets, primarily AbzasMedia and Toplum TV, have been targeted through judicial harassment and the detention of its journalists;

    L. whereas many international and domestic human rights activists and organisations have called on the international community to recognise and respond to the urgency and gravity of the human rights situation in Azerbaijan;

    M. whereas PACE officially suspended the Azerbaijan delegation on 24 January 2024 owing to Azerbaijan’s failure to conduct free and fair elections and ensure the separation of powers, the weakness of its legislature vis-à-vis the executive, and the lack of independence of the judiciary and respect for human rights;

    N. whereas a number of European Court of Human Rights decisions have found that Azerbaijan has violated human rights; whereas more than 320 court judgments against Azerbaijan have not yet been executed or have been only partially implemented, which is the highest number among all state parties to the European Convention on Human Rights;

    O. whereas the EU has intensified its energy trade relations with Azerbaijan over the past two years with a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on a Strategic Partnership in the Field of Energy and more recently an MoU on wind energy cooperation; whereas Commissioner Kadri Simson earlier this year praised the dynamism of the EU’s energy cooperation with Azerbaijan;

    P. whereas Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) stipulates that the Union’s action must be guided by democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law;

    Q. whereas, separately, peace talks between Azerbaijan and Armenia are ongoing, with both sides stating that negotiations are edging towards a peace agreement; whereas several significant deadlocks seemingly remain, owing to issues including Azerbaijani demands in relation to Armenia’s constitution and a corridor to connect mainland Azerbaijan with its Nakhchivan exclave via southern Armenia, disregarding Armenia’s sovereignty; whereas earlier this year a deal was signed on a joint border commission to demarcate and delimit their shared border;

    1. Reiterates its profound concern regarding the human rights situation in Azerbaijan, in particular the government’s severe restrictions on freedoms of expression, assembly and association that have worsened over the past two years;

    2. Is deeply concerned about the systematic repression of freedom of expression by the Azerbaijani authorities, targeting civil society, civic and political activists, journalists and human rights defenders, including acts of harassment, intimidation, arbitrary detention and severe ill treatment and torture by police officers, and politically motivated legal persecution; expresses deep concern about the environment of fear that this has created inside the country, leaving civil society effectively silenced;

    3. Urges the Government of Azerbaijan to immediately and unconditionally release Anar Mammadli, Bahruz Samadov, Igbal Abilov, Farid Mehralizade, Emin Ibrahimov and Famil Khalilov, as well as political prisoners named in previous urgency resolutions, including Ilhamiz Guliyev, Tofig Yagublu, Akif Gurbanov and Bakhtiyar Hajiyev, and human rights defenders and journalists Ulvi Hasanli, Sevinj Vagifgizi, Nargiz Absalamova, Hafiz Babali, Elnara Gasimova, Aziz Orujov, Rufat Muradli, Avaz Zeynalli, Elnur Shukurov, Alasgar Mammadli and Farid Ismayilov; calls, further, for the vacation of any convictions against those released and the removal of restrictions on their freedom of movement;

    4. Reminds Azerbaijan that the provision of healthcare for prisoners is the responsibility of the state; calls for adequate healthcare and medical treatment to be provided to all those detained in Azerbaijan on politically motivated charges;

    5. Urges the Azerbaijani authorities to drop all charges against renowned scholar, anti-corruption activist and shortlisted finalist of the 2024 Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought Dr Gubad Ibadoghlu, release him from house arrest, and allow him to travel abroad for urgent medical care without delay and attend the Sakharov Prize ceremony in Strasbourg in December;

    6. Is deeply concerned about Azerbaijan’s violations of the freedom of association through undue restrictions and misuse of NGO legislation, resulting in the persecution of civil society and curtailing of its work; calls on the Azerbaijani Government to repeal the restrictive NGO and media legislation and ensure that civil society can operate without undue hindrance or fear of reprisals and persecution;

    7. Encourages the Commission to review its approach to supporting human rights in Azerbaijan and recommends a reassessment of its funding mechanisms for Azerbaijani independent civil society and media, aligning them more closely with the strategies used to support these sectors in Belarus;

    8. Condemns the continued repression of the right to freedom of assembly, for instance in the case of anti-pollution protests in the village of Soyudlu in 2023, which were quashed by security forces using violence and arrests;

    9. Calls on the Azerbaijani Government to swiftly comply with long-standing recommendations of the Council of Europe’s European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment on the subject of the widespread recourse to physical ill treatment (including, on occasion, torture) by the police in Azerbaijan;

    10. Calls on the Azerbaijani Government to implement all decisions by the European Court of Human Rights, reminds it of its obligations to respect human dignity and fundamental freedoms and calls on it to repeal repressive legislation on the registration and funding of NGOs, to bring it in line with Venice Commission recommendations;

    11. Deeply regrets statements by various Commission representatives, including President Ursula von der Leyen, calling Azerbaijan a ‘reliable partner’ in the field of energy; insists that, in the interest of its geopolitical security, integrity and pursuit of the Sustainable Development Goals, the EU end its reliance on fossil-fuel-rich authoritarian countries once and for all;

    12. Reiterates its denunciation of Azerbaijan’s systematic bribery of European politicians, including in the context of PACE;

    13. Considers that the ongoing human rights violations in Azerbaijan are incompatible with the country’s role as COP29 host; urges the EU and the Member States to use COP29 as an occasion for the international community to remind Azerbaijan of its international obligations and to condemn and address in a meaningful way Azerbaijan’s human rights violations in interactions with the Azerbaijani authorities in Baku during COP29; calls on delegates attending COP29 on behalf of the EU and the Member States, in particular President Ursula von der Leyen, to make public and private calls for the immediate and unconditional release of arbitrarily detained journalists, activists and human rights defenders and to request meetings with political prisoners while in the country;

    14. Stresses the fact that Azerbaijan will host COP29 on behalf of the UN Regional Group of Eastern European States, which includes EU Member States, and that they cannot allow the Azerbaijani Government to use the occasion to whitewash its image and human rights track record; demands that the organisers and the Member States make clear to the Azerbaijani authorities how important a thriving and independent civil society is to the conference’s success, and ensure that human rights, fundamental freedoms and the effective participation of civil society are guaranteed during the event;

    15. Calls for the EU and the Member States to prioritise, in line with Article 21 TEU, addressing Azerbaijan’s appalling human rights situation in their relations with the country and introducing stronger human rights conditions in the EU’s relations with Azerbaijan; calls for the EU’s economic and political ties with and support for Azerbaijan, including any cooperation on energy, to be made conditional on the release of all political prisoners, reform of laws and regulations governing NGOs and their funding, and the improvement of the overall human rights situation in the country; insists, in this regard, that the EU and the Member States suspend all energy trade relations with Azerbaijan, including the MoU on a Strategic Partnership in the Field of Energy, and make any reinstatement conditional on meeting the above requirements;

    16. Calls on the Commission to investigate options for imposing targeted sanctions under the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime on those individuals responsible for the grave and consistent human rights violations in Azerbaijan;

    17. Welcomes, separately, the ongoing negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan on all pending issues with the aim of concluding a peace treaty, and calls on both parties to remain fully committed to a lasting and peaceful settlement of the long-standing dispute, through dialogue and negotiations; believes that an agreement between these two countries needs to be negotiated in good faith and be based on the recognition of sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-use of force; recalls that, meanwhile, all rights of the Armenian minority in Azerbaijan must be safeguarded and calls for all prisoners of war to be released in line with the 1949 Third Geneva Convention;

    18. Urges the Commission and the Council to ensure the EU’s ability to credibly and effectively continue supporting the negotiations directed at a lasting peace for the benefit of all people in the region;

    19. Calls on Türkiye to take more diplomatic responsibility in the region by actively contributing to the promotion of peace negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and by playing a constructive role in facilitating a lasting and peaceful resolution of the conflict;

    20. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the European External Action Service, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the President and Parliament of Azerbaijan and the President, Prime Minister and Parliament of Armenia.

     

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Common charger for e-bikes – P-002152/2024

    Source: European Parliament

    17.10.2024

    Priority question for written answer  P-002152/2024
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Katarina Barley (S&D), Delara Burkhardt (S&D)

    Consumers throughout the EU are bothered by the need to have several different chargers for the same category of products. This not only applies to mobile phones, for which the EU has now established the requirement to use a common charger, but also to e-bikes.

    The Batteries Regulation obliges the Commission to ‘assess how best to introduce harmonised standards for a common charger for rechargeable batteries designed for light means of transport’, such as e-bikes, by 1 January 2025 (Regulation (EU) 2023/1542, Article 94(6)).

    • 1.Will the Commission carry out this assessment on time?
    • 2.Does the Commission already have preliminary findings?
    • 3.Does the Commission plan to propose legislation on a common charger for e-bikes if the assessment deems common chargers advantageous for consumers in the EU?

    Submitted: 17.10.2024

    Last updated: 22 October 2024

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Scrutiny of EU funding for a university that promotes antisemitism – E-002065/2024

    Source: European Parliament

    14.10.2024

    Question for written answer  E-002065/2024
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Lukas Mandl (PPE), Monika Hohlmeier (PPE), Alice Teodorescu Måwe (PPE), Sabine Verheyen (PPE), Antonio López-Istúriz White (PPE), Miriam Lexmann (PPE), Karlo Ressler (PPE), Petras Auštrevičius (Renew), Moritz Körner (Renew), Andrey Kovatchev (PPE), Tomáš Zdechovský (PPE), Niclas Herbst (PPE)

    According to media reports, EU money is going to a university in Türkiye whose rector is known for his anti-Zionist and antisemitic position. We refer in particular to the article published on welt.de on 8 October 2024 under the headline ‘Rector incites against Israel – EU co-finances Hamas-friendly university’[1]. The article refers to relevant quotes and mentions projects that are financially supported by the EU through the Erasmus programme.

    • 1.Did the above-referenced cash flows to the relevant projects actually take place, and what other cash flows have there been from the Erasmus programme or other EU programmes to this Turkish institution?
    • 2.Are those responsible in the Commission and in the Erasmus programme aware that the rector’s above-referenced statements are incompatible with any concept of academic integrity and are capable of causing and justifying violence?
    • 3.What measures will the Commission take to reclaim the money already disbursed, and to ensure that this institution and others that lack scientific character or even engage in hate speech are not further funded with EU taxpayers’ money?

    Submitted: 14.10.2024

    • [1] https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article253897712/Erasmus-Programm-Rektor-hetzt-gegen-Israel-EU-finanziert-Hamas-freundliche-Uni-mit.html.
    Last updated: 22 October 2024

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Briefing – Poland’s National Recovery and Resilience Plan: Latest state of play – 22-10-2024

    Source: European Parliament

    In nominal terms, Poland is the third biggest beneficiary of the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), after Italy and Spain. EU support for implementing Poland’s amended national recovery and resilience plan (NRRP) – Krajowy Plan Odbudowy – amounts to €59.8 billion, and includes €25.3 billion in grants and €34.5 billion in loans. The amount is €24.5 billion (+69 %) higher than the one initially approved, and takes into account a 2022 update of the maximum financial contribution, additional loans requested by Poland, and the non-repayable allocation for REPowerEU made available in 2023. RRF support per capita for Poland totals €1 584 (up from €935 initially). Poland’s NRRP has twice been amended, on 8 December 2023 to add the REPowerEU chapter, and on 16 July 2024 to adjust the timeline and scope of selected measures. The NRRP includes 54 reforms and 57 investments, and is strongly focused on the green transition and changes in energy production and consumption. The biggest components are dedicated to REPowerEU (41 % of the total allocation) and green energy and energy intensity reduction (26 %). Other priority areas include economic competitiveness, healthcare, well-functioning public institutions and the judiciary. On 28 December 2023, Poland received €5 billion in pre-financing for the REPowerEU chapter. After the satisfactory fulfilment of 37 milestones and one target, including the commitments concerning the reforms of the judicial system (‘super milestones’), and improvements of the audit and control systems, Poland received the first achievements-based payment on 15 April 2024 (€6.3 billion). On 13 September, Poland submitted payment requests for the second and third instalments, amounting to €9.4 billion and linked to achieving 38 milestones and three targets. The European Parliament participates in interinstitutional forums for cooperation and discussion on RRF implementation, and scrutinises the European Commission’s work. This briefing is one in a series covering all EU Member States. Third edition. The ‘NGEU delivery’ briefings are updated at key stages throughout the lifecycle of the plans.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Liability of online marketplaces – E-002043/2024

    Source: European Parliament

    14.10.2024

    Question for written answer  E-002043/2024
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Christel Schaldemose (S&D)

    Has the Commission given thought to whether online marketplaces should be regulated at all according to the same principles as social media and music and film services, etc., the former being intermediaries for physical products and the latter involving speech and intangible content?

    Submitted: 14.10.2024

    Last updated: 22 October 2024

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Commission clears JD Sports acquisition of Courir subject to conditions

    Source: European Commission

    European Commission Press release Brussels, 22 Oct 2024 The European Commission has approved, under the EU Merger Regulation, the proposed acquisition of Groupe Courir SAS (‘Courir’) by JD Sports Fashion Plc Group (‘JD Sports’). The approval is conditional upon full compliance with the commitments offered by the parties.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – EU measures on customs controls and duties for online purchases of low-cost and low-quality products from China – E-002053/2024

    Source: European Parliament

    14.10.2024

    Question for written answer  E-002053/2024
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Carlo Fidanza (ECR)

    The growth in online purchases of cheap and very low-quality products from China is seriously harming the economy and the safety of European consumers.

    Those products, which are often sold at derisory prices, not only undermine the competitiveness of European businesses, but also pose serious risks to consumers’ health and safety. Many of them do not meet the quality and safety standards imposed by the European Union and, as a result, numerous cases of defective or dangerous products have been reported.

    In the light of the above:

    • 1.What steps will the Commission take to scale up customs controls on products imported from China by means of e-commerce platforms?
    • 2.Is it considering introducing specific import duties for products that do not meet European quality and safety standards?
    • 3.What initiatives are being planned that will help European companies to compete with Chinese companies’ low-cost, low-quality products?

    Submitted: 14.10.2024

    Last updated: 22 October 2024

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Growing Russian oil trade continues to support the war in Ukraine – E-002061/2024

    Source: European Parliament

    14.10.2024

    Question for written answer  E-002061/2024
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Tomáš Zdechovský (PPE)

    Despite EU sanctions, the Russian budget’s revenues from crude oil and refined petroleum products were 56 % higher for January to August 2024 than for the same months in 2023. This is one and a half times higher than one year ago and are almost the same as in the record year 2022[1].

    The biggest problem and challenge for the EU are the illegal ‘shadow’ tanker fleets that account for 90 % of Russia’s seaborne oil exports[2]. These allow Russia to ignore the price caps, so the Kremlin still has enough money to continue the war. If everything remains as it is, reserves will last at least two more years, according to analysts. Ukraine’s allies should therefore take advantage of Russia’s economic vulnerabilities and step up sanctions pressure now.

    • 1.How will the Commission enforce more decisive sanctions against all Russian crude oil and refined petroleum products and ensure that these sanctions cannot be evaded easily?
    • 2.Will the Commission consider placing greater emphasis on checking compliance with sanctions and monitoring their impact on the Russian economy?
    • 3.How else will the Commission contribute to blocking the illegal flow of Russian oil to the European market?

    Submitted: 14.10.2024

    • [1] https://kse.ua/about-the-school/news/kse-institute-s-russia-chartbook-global-prices-weigh-on-oil-exports-cbr-continues-to-struggle-with-inflation/.
    • [2] https://energyandcleanair.org/august-2024-monthly-analysis-of-russian-fossil-fuel-exports-and-sanctions/.
    Last updated: 22 October 2024

    MIL OSI Europe News –