Source: United States SOUTHERN COMMAND
The United States and Panama will co-host the Central America Security Conference (CENTSEC), in Panama April 8-10. Through CENTSEC, SOUTHCOM seeks to promote and facilitate dialogue and cooperation among regional security partners focused on common challenges and objectives. This year’s conference will focus on regional defense through joint operations and cybersecurity.
Source: US State of South Carolina
(COLUMBIA, S.C.) – South Carolina Attorney General Alan Wilson announced today that his office will prosecute Rosali Fernandez Cruz, an illegal immigrant from El Salvador charged in the hit-and-run that led to the death of 21-year-old University of South Carolina student Nathanial “Nate” Baker, a native of Virginia.
“This is a tragic situation, and our hearts go out to the family of Nate Baker, who had a bright future ahead of him,” said Attorney General Wilson. “His family sent him from Virginia to South Carolina to attend his parents’ alma mater and pursue his education. The individual charged in this case is an illegal immigrant ordered to be deported over seven years ago.”
Baker, a junior business major and active leader in the Phi Gamma Delta fraternity, was riding his motorcycle Tuesday when he collided with the suspect at the intersection of Blossom and Assembly Streets. Cruz, driving a pickup truck, fled the scene and was arrested shortly after by the Columbia Police Department. He now faces multiple charges, including:
Authorities have confirmed Cruz is in the country illegally and has had an order for removal since 2018. Attorney General Wilson’s office is coordinating with Immigration and Customs Enforcement to ensure there are no loopholes or escapes from justice.
“Illegal immigration is one of the top priorities for the state of South Carolina,” said Attorney General Wilson. “As the state’s top prosecutor, I will always make it a priority to enforce the law. Our office will prosecute this case directly. Law and order, border security, and the safety of South Carolina and the nation’s families are of utmost importance to me and my office. The people of this state expect action, and this office will ensure the rule of law is respected and enforced.”
After Cruz’s arrest, an active Immigration and Customs Enforcement detainer was placed on him. This should result in his deportation back to El Salvador once the criminal process is completed.
You can find the letter sent to Solicitor Byron Gipson here.
Attorney General Wilson stresses all defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty under the law.
Source: US State of California
California’s 12th lawsuit against the Trump Administration seeks to protect federal workers and the essential services they provide to support American families, businesses, workers, and our cultural heritage
OAKLAND – California Attorney General Bonta today joined a coalition of 21 attorneys general in filing a lawsuit challenging the Trump Administration’s unlawful Executive Order No. 14238 (Closure Order) directing several Congressionally-established agencies, including the Institute of Museum and Library Services, the Minority Business Development Agency, and the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, to eliminate every component and function not required by statute and reduce their statutorily required functions and associated staff to the minimum required by law. The President also ordered the Office of Management and Budget to deny these agencies authorization to spend federal funds already allocated by Congress for any functions beyond the minimum required by statute. The March 14, 2025 Closure Order is the Trump Administration’s latest attempt to unlawfully dismantle agencies that Americans rely on. This time, he is targeting agencies that provide services and funding supporting public libraries and museums, workers, and minority-owned businesses nationwide. The agencies subject to the Closure Order collectively provide billions of dollars in funding to States to support libraries, museums, and disadvantaged businesses, provide services that States rely on to peaceably resolve labor disputes, and more. In the lawsuit, the attorneys general argue that the Closure Order and its implementation are unlawful and cannot stand.
“The Trump Administration is once again violating the U.S. Constitution and the rule of law by attempting to unilaterally shut down agencies the President doesn’t like, including agencies that give the public access to facts, knowledge, and cultural heritage for free or at low cost,” said Attorney General Bonta. “Dismantling these agencies would have a devastating impact on the public and on states across the nation — they provide important services for Americans and collectively provide billions of dollars to States to support libraries and museums, innovation and entrepreneurship for disadvantaged businesses, and help resolve labor disputes. The Order also threatens the livelihoods of federal workers employed at these agencies, once again flying in the face of the President’s promise to ease the financial burden felt by American families. The Trump Administration’s actions to strip these agencies down to their studs is blatantly illegal. As the President continues to flout his duty to the American people and the rule of law, I will continue to stand with my fellow attorneys general to uphold the Constitution and protect the crucial services that Californians rely on.”
Following the Closure Order, the President directed agencies to report within one week whether they had achieved “full compliance” with the order, despite the fact that “full compliance” means near-total incapacitation of these agencies. As of April 4, the functions of at least three of these agencies have been completely incapacitated. For example, the Minority Business Development Agency has placed all but five of its more than 40 personnel on administrative leave and instructed them to wind down the agency’s remaining work. The Minority Business Development Agency supports more than 70 public-private business centers throughout the nation that provide business consultation, including centers that are specifically geared toward manufacturing businesses and businesses in rural areas. Three of these centers are located in California: in Los Angeles, Sacramento, and San Jose. In 2023 alone, the agency served more than 2,000 entrepreneurs who, in turn, created nearly 19,000 jobs. The President’s unlawful actions have also incapacitated the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, an agency that drives economic growth and innovation by mediating labor disputes in industries that affect commerce and negotiating collective bargaining agreements. The Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service has slashed its staff from roughly 200 to fewer than 15 individuals and ordered its staff to stop mediating labor disputes for public center entities, handling grievances arising out of collective bargaining agreements, or conducting public training or education efforts—essentially abandoning many of the core functions of this nearly 80-year-old agency.
The Institute of Museum and Library Services (IMLS) has also been materially harmed by the President’s Closure Order. IMLS supports libraries, museums, and related institutions through grant funding, research, and policy development, with the aim of advancing innovation, lifelong learning, and cultural and civic engagement. IMLS’ largest funding program —and the largest source of federal funding for library services — is its Grants to States Program. In 2024, IMLS invested $180 million in libraries nationwide under its Grants to States Program. The administration’s action will threaten hundreds of library staff across the country that provide essential services to their communities. As of April 1, IMLS placed 85% of its staff on administrative leave, dramatically curtailed its administration of hundreds of grants and grant applications, and terminated statutorily mandated grant awards to several States.
The gutting of IMLS will cause destructive harm to California’s libraries and museums and the communities they serve. For example, California libraries employ approximately 17,000 employees who staff the State’s 1,127 libraries and serve 23 million California library card holders. The California State Library budget for this year included $15.7 million in IMLS funding allocated for staffing and continued operations. Over the last 40 years, IMLS funds have paid for multiple statewide library programs, including support for tutors helping adults and children read, write, and learn English; summer reading and activity programs; and services that help feed low-income children when school is out. IMLS funds also pay for continuing education for librarians and library workers, a 300,000-title eBook library accessible to all Californians, and digital efforts to protect California’s cultural heritage and local history. If the Closure Order stands, all functions and staff positions paid for with IMLS funding will cease to exist. The loss of these services would particularly harm lower-income families, seniors, and veterans who rely on libraries to help them navigate an increasingly digital world. The Trump Administration’s actions also threaten grants that support California’s incredible museums from the San Diego Zoo to the Exploratorium in San Francisco to Los Angeles’ Autry Museum of the American West.
In today’s lawsuit, Attorney General Bonta and a multistate coalition demonstrate that President Trump’s directive to shut down these agencies, and the steps taken to implement that directive, are unlawful and must be reversed. The coalition establishes that the Trump Administration cannot undo the many acts of Congress that authorize these agencies, dictate their responsibilities, and appropriate funds for the agencies to administer. The Trump Administration’s attempt to do so through the Closure Order violates the Executive Branch’s obligation to take care that the law is faithfully executed. Further, as the complaint details, the Closure Order and its implementation by the agencies violate both the Appropriations Clause and Separation of Powers Clause of the U.S. Constitution and broadly exceed the narrow discretion the Executive possesses under the Impoundment Control Act.
Attorney General Bonta joined the lawsuit alongside the attorneys general of New York, Rhode Island, Hawaii, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oregon, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin.
A copy of the lawsuit is available here.
Source: United Nations – Geneva
The Committee on Enforced Disappearances this afternoon closed its twenty-eighth session after adopting concluding observations on the reports of the Gambia and Malta under the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, reports on additional information from Belgium and Serbia, reports on stand-alone requests for additional information from Peru and Argentina, and on the implementation of the Convention by the Central African Republic, considered in absence of a report.
Juan Pablo Albán Alencastro, Committee Rapporteur, said the Committee had adopted concluding observations on the Gambia, Malta, Belgium, Serbia, Peru, Argentina and the Central African Republic after public dialogues with all these States, apart from Argentina, for which a desk review of the State’s written response was conducted. The concluding observations, which would be made public next Tuesday, identified positive aspects, pointed out areas of concern, and presented the Committee’s recommendations to support the authorities of the States concerned in implementing the Convention, in order to prevent and eradicate enforced disappearances.
Olivier de Frouville, Committee Chairperson, said the Rapporteur’s report showed that the Committee had made the best use of its three-week session, achieving impressive results. He said that five Experts’ mandates were concluding at the end of the session: those of Juan Pablo Albán Alencastro (Ecuador), Mohammed Ayat (Morocco), Suela Janina (Albania), Milica Kolakovic-Bojovic (Serbia) and Horacio Ravenna (Argentina). Mr. de Frouville thanked these Experts for their dedication to the work of the Committee. The treaty body system rested on the efforts of people like them. They had worked hard to make the world a better place for the next generation and were an inspiration to future Experts.
All documents relating to the Committee’s work, including reports submitted by States parties, can be found on the session’s webpage. Summaries of the public meetings of the Committee can be found here, while webcasts of the public meetings can be found here.
Information on the Committee’s twenty-ninth session will be announced on the Committee web page at a later date.
Statements
JUAN PABLO ALBÁN ALENCASTRO, Committee Rapporteur, reported that, during the opening of the Committee’s session, the Committee paid tribute to the victims of enforced disappearance, and in that context heard the testimony of Obeida Dabbagh, who recounted the arrest and subsequent disappearance of his brother Mazen Dabbagh and his nephew Patrick in November 2013 at the hands of Syrian Air Force intelligence agents, and the efforts made since then by the family to seek truth, justice and reparation.
Mr. Albán Alencastro said the Committee had adopted concluding observations on the Gambia, Malta, Belgium, Serbia, Peru, Argentina and the Central African Republic after public dialogues with all these States, apart from Argentina, for which a desk review of the State’s written response was conducted. The concluding observations, which would be made public next Tuesday, identified positive aspects, pointed out areas of concern, and presented the Committee’s recommendations to support the authorities of the States concerned in implementing the Convention, in order to prevent and eradicate enforced disappearances.
Mr. Albán Alencastro reported that the Committee also adopted lists of issues in relation to reports under article 29, section one of the Convention by Croatia, Luxembourg and Togo; as well as lists of priority issues in relation to the reports submitted under article 29, section four of the Convention by Armenia, Gabon and Montenegro, in preparation for their future reviews; and the follow-up report on the implementation of concluding observations by Panama.
On 17 March, Mr. Albán Alencastro said, the Committee held a private hearing in relation to individual communication 5/2021 concerning Mexico, to receive additional information from the parties and to ask questions relating to the admissibility and merits of the case. It subsequently adopted its decision on this communication. Also, during the session, the Committee adopted its report on its visit to Colombia from 21 November to 5 December 2024, which set out the Committee’s main findings and made a series of recommendations to support the Colombian authorities in the development and implementation of an effective and efficient national policy for the prevention and eradication of enforced disappearances.
Further, Mr. Albán Alencastro reported, the Committee held discussions on its working methods, in particular examining requests for the application of article 34 of the Convention; adopted its report on the urgent action mechanism, in which it highlighted trends in requests registered since the last session and identified lessons learned in the implementation of this procedure; adopted its annual report to the General Assembly and the provisional agenda of its twenty-ninth session; discussed possible strategies for follow-up to the outcome of the First World Congress on Enforced Disappearances held in January this year; and held productive meetings with States parties to the Convention, civil society organizations, and victims.
During the session, Mr. Albán Alencastro concluded, the Committee continued the process for the future adoption of a general comment on women and enforced disappearance, to which end it adopted a concept note. Mr. Albán Alencastro said that this was his last address as Rapporteur of the Committee, as his mandate was coming to an end. He thanked all Committee Experts for their dedication and support throughout his mandate.
OLIVIER DE FROUVILLE, Committee Chairperson, said the Rapporteur’s report showed that the Committee had made the best use of its three-week session, achieving impressive results. He expressed thanks to the Committee’s secretariat and members of the Committee, who had demonstrated exemplary professionalism and their unwavering commitment at a time when it was sorely needed.
Five Experts’ mandates were concluding at the end of the session: those of Juan Pablo Albán Alencastro (Ecuador), Mohammed Ayat (Morocco), Suela Janina (Albania), Milica Kolakovic-Bojovic (Serbia), and Horacio Ravenna (Argentina). Mr. de Frouville thanked these Experts for their dedication to the work of the Committee. The treaty body system rested on the efforts of people like them. They had worked hard to make the world a better place for the next generation and were an inspiration to future Experts.
Mr. de Frouville said that, during the session, under the procedures of article 29 of the Convention, the Committee had reviewed no less than 14 States parties, a record number, demonstrating the effectiveness of the Committee’s new working methods. The Committee hoped that the concluding observations that emerged from these reviews would help the States concerned to make the necessary changes to prevent and eradicate enforced disappearances.
All the situations the Committee examined were different, the Chair said, yet all demonstrated the tragic relevance of enforced disappearance. The crime of enforced disappearance continued to be committed in countries like the Central African Republic. The wounds inflicted by past crimes of enforced disappearance in some countries, such as the Gambia and Serbia, had still not healed, and families were still seeking the truth and justice. In countries like Malta, the risk of disappearance was heightened by the closure of borders and increasingly strict asylum policies. Countries such as Belgium were also lifting the veil on the reality of illegal intercountry adoptions, some of which had their origins in enforced disappearance. Several special procedures mandate holders raised the alarm about this phenomenon in a joint statement in 2022.
Mr. de Frouville said that the Committee’s report on its visit to Colombia was an unprecedented feat; it conducted precise analysis of the phenomenon of enforced disappearance over a 60-year period, and made targeted recommendations for ensuring truth, justice and reparation. The Committee would continue to cooperate with Colombia and support the implementation of its recommendations.
During the session, Mr. de Frouville said, the Committee had also examined the troubling situation in Mexico, including through its urgent action and individual communication procedures, as well as the procedure under article 34 of the Convention. Under the latter provision, the Committee had received concerning reports that enforced disappearance was practiced in a widespread or systematic manner in Mexico, and had decided to request additional information from the State on the phenomenon in the coming weeks. The Committee’s aim was constructive dialogue with the State party to achieve the common goal of the full implementation of the Convention.
The Committee had also adopted the report on its urgent actions procedure, which was a sad reflection of the current practice of enforced disappearances. To date, the Committee had recorded 2,010 urgent action requests in 31 countries. The equivalent procedure of the United Nations Working Group on Enforced Disappearances, in place since 1980, had registered more than 61,000 cases in 115 States. The Committee’s report on urgent actions highlighted a recent increase in the practice of “short-term enforced disappearances”. In their joint statement on the phenomenon, the Working Group on Enforced Disappearances and the Committee stressed that, under international human rights law, the definition of enforced disappearance did not address the length of the crime. Thus, the obligations imposed on States were the same regardless of the length of the crime.
Mr. de Frouville said that during the session, the Committee had held consultations with the head of the Independent Institution on Missing Persons in the Syrian Arab Republic. The Committee called on Syria to ratify the Convention and recognise the competence of the Committee under articles 31 and 32, to demonstrate the commitment of the new authorities to combat the practices of the past while responding to the legitimate demands of families in search of truth, justice and reparation. It also called on all States parties to assist Syrian families in search efforts and help fight against impunity for the perpetrators of enforced disappearances in Syria through judicial cooperation.
The United Nations’ liquidity crisis continued to hamper the Committee’s work; there was still uncertainty about whether the Committee’s next session would be held, Mr. de Frouville said. In fact, no treaty body sessions scheduled from May onwards had been confirmed yet, including that of the Committee on the Rights of the Child, due to start on 5 May. This was an unprecedented situation. It was Member States’ responsibility to ensure the smooth operation of the treaty bodies. This unique system, which was built on the ruins of the Second World War to build global peace, was now in peril. At a time when peace was under threat around the world, when the independence of the judiciary was under attack, when the media, human rights defenders and universities were the victims of an unprecedented offensive, everyone needed more international guarantees, not less. States needed to shoulder their responsibilities now; tomorrow would be too late.
Mr. de Frouville closed by thanking the Committee for its work and expressing hope that the Committee’s next session would be held in September as planned.
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Produced by the United Nations Information Service in Geneva for use of the media;
not an official record. English and French versions of our releases are different as they are the product of two separate coverage teams that work independently.
CED25.008E
Source: United Nations – Geneva
Extends 16 Country Specific and Thematic Mandates and Establishes an Intergovernmental Working Group to Draft a Legally Binding Instrument on the Human Rights of Older Persons
Invites General Assembly to Consider Establishing a Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes Committed by All Parties in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and Israel since 2014
The Human Rights Council today concluded its fifty-eighth regular session after adopting 32 resolutions. In these texts, among other things, the Council voted to extend 16 country specific and thematic mandates, and to establish an open-ended intergovernmental working group to draft an international legally binding instrument on the human rights of older persons.
In a resolution on the human rights situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the obligation to ensure accountability and justice, the Council invited the General Assembly to consider establishing an ongoing international, impartial and independent mechanism to assist in the investigation and prosecution of persons responsible for the most serious crimes under international law committed by all parties in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and Israel since 2014. The Council also adopted resolutions on human rights in the occupied Syrian Golan, the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, and on Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and in the occupied Syrian Golan.
The Council extended 13 country mandates during the session. It decided to extend, for a period of one year, the mandate of the Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan under agenda item two. It also extended, for a period of one year, the mandates of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea; the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Belarus and the Group of Independent Experts on the Situation of Human Rights in Belarus; the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar; the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Islamic Republic of Iran; the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine; and the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic under agenda item four.
Under agenda item 10, the Council extended for a period of one year the mandates of the Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in Mali; and the independent human rights expert appointed by the High Commissioner and tasked with undertaking the monitoring of the human rights situation in Haiti. It also extended, for a period of two years, the mandate of the Group of Human Rights Experts on Nicaragua; and the capacity of the Office of the High Commissioner, including its field-based structure in Seoul, to allow the implementation of relevant recommendations made by the group of independent experts on accountability for human rights violations in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in its report, under agenda item four.
The Council decided to extend, for a period of three years, the mandates of the
Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, the Special Rapporteur on the right to food, and the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism.
The Council requested its Advisory Committee to prepare, in close cooperation with the Special Rapporteur on the negative impact of unilateral coercive measures, an in-depth study review on the negative impact of unilateral coercive measure on the right to health of individuals in vulnerable situations. It also requested its Advisory Committee to draft a set of recommended guidelines for applying the existing human rights framework to the conception, design, development, testing, use and deployment of neurotechnologies.
Further resolutions adopted concerned cultural rights and the protection of cultural heritage; the negative impact of the non-repatriation of funds of illicit origin to the countries of origin on the enjoyment of human rights; human rights, democracy and the rule of law; the question of the realisation in all countries of economic, social and cultural rights; the promotion of the enjoyment of the cultural rights of everyone and respect for cultural diversity; the effects of foreign debt and other related international financial obligations of States on the full enjoyment of all human rights, particularly economic, social and cultural rights; women, diplomacy and human rights; the human right to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment: ocean and human rights; the impact of anti-personnel mines on the full enjoyment of all human rights; human rights defenders and new and emerging technologies; combatting intolerance, negative stereotyping and stigmatisation of, and discrimination, incitement to violence and violence against, persons based on religion or belief; and technical assistance and capacity-building for South Sudan.
The Council appointed three members of the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Member from Central and Eastern Europe, the Russian Federation, Central Asia and Transcaucasia, Antonina Gorbunova (Russian Federation); Member from Central and South America, and the Caribbean, Anexa Brendalee Alfred Cunningham (Nicaragua); and member from the Pacific, Valmaine Toki (New Zealand).
The Council also adopted ad referendum the draft report of the fifth-eighth session.
Jürg Lauber, President of the Human Rights Council, said the Council had reviewed and adopted the results of the Universal Periodic Review of 14 countries; adopted 32 resolutions; and appointed three mandate holders of the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. He expressed sincere gratitude to the Bureau of the Council, the Secretariat, and the Member States, for their support and cooperation during the session.
The fifty-ninth regular session of the Human Rights Council is scheduled to be held from 16 June to 11 July 2025.
Action on Resolutions
Action on Resolutions Under Agenda Item Two on the Annual Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and Reports of the Office of the High Commissioner and the Secretary-General
In a resolution (A/HRC/58/L.6) on Advancing human rights in South Sudan, adopted by a vote of 24 in favour, 6 against and 17 abstentions, the Council decides to extend the mandate of the Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan, composed of three members, for a further period of one year; requests the Commission to present a comprehensive report on the situation of human rights in South Sudan to the Council at its sixty-first session, to be followed by an enhanced interactive dialogue, and that the report and an easy-to-read version of it be made available on the website of the Office of the High Commissioner in an accessible format and also requests the Commission to present its latest report, in combination with an oral update on its work, to the General Assembly at its eightieth session, followed by an interactive dialogue.
In a resolution (A/HRC/58/L.30/Rev.1) on the Human rights situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the obligation to ensure accountability and justice, adopted by a vote of 27 in favour, 4 against and 16 abstentions (as orally revised), the Council reiterates its request to the Commission of Inquiry to report on both the direct and the indirect transfer or sale of arms, munitions, parts, components and dual-use items to Israel, the occupying Power, and requests, instead, that the report be submitted to the Council at its sixty-first session; invites the General Assembly to consider establishing an ongoing international, impartial and independent mechanism to assist in the investigation and prosecution of persons responsible for the most serious crimes under international law committed by all parties in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and Israel since 2014, to closely cooperate with the Commission of Inquiry to collect, consolidate, preserve and analyse evidence of violations of international law and violations and abuses of human rights, and to prepare case files in order to facilitate and expedite fair and independent criminal proceedings, in accordance with international legal standards, in national, regional and international courts or tribunals that have or may in the future have jurisdiction over these crimes, in accordance with international law; and requests the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to report on the implementation of the present resolution to the Human Rights Council at its sixty-first session, to be followed by an interactive dialogue.
Action on Resolutions Under Agenda Item Three on the Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, including the Right to Development.
In a resolution (A/HRC/58/L.1) on the Negative impact of unilateral coercive measures on the enjoyment of human rights, adopted by a vote of 28 in favour, 16 against and 3 abstentions, the Council requests the Advisory Committee of the Council to prepare, in close cooperation with the Special Rapporteur on the negative impact of unilateral coercive measures, an in-depth study review on the negative impact of unilateral coercive measure on the right to health of individuals in vulnerable situations, and to present its comprehensive report and findings to the Council at its sixty-fourth session; requests the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to organise a biennial panel discussion, to be held at the sixtieth session of the Council, on the impact of unilateral coercive measures and overcompliance on the right to food and food security, and requests the Special Rapporteur to act as rapporteur of the panel discussion and to prepare a report thereon, and to submit and present the report to the Council at its sixty-first session.
In a resolution (A/HRC/58/L.4/Rev.1) on Cultural rights and the protection of cultural heritage, adopted without a vote, the Council requests the High Commissioner to convene, before the sixty-fourth session of the Council, a one-day workshop to review and promote the tools for the dissemination of good practices and possible methods of, as well as challenges encountered in, implementing an approach to digital heritage that promotes universal respect for cultural rights by all, and to make the workshop accessible to persons with disabilities; also requests the High Commissioner to submit a report thereon to the Council at its sixty-sixth session; and decides to remain seized of the matter.
In a resolution (A/HRC/58/L.5) on Freedom of religion or belief, adopted without a vote, the Council decides to extend the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief for a further period of three years; requests the Special Rapporteur to report annually to the Council and to the General Assembly in accordance with their respective programmes of work; and decides to remain seized of this question under the same agenda item and to continue its consideration of measures to implement the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief.
In a resolution (A/HRC/58/L.9) on Neurotechnology and human rights, adopted without a vote, the Council requests its Advisory Committee to draft a set of recommended guidelines for applying the existing human rights framework to the conception, design, development, testing, use and deployment of neurotechnologies and to present it to the Council at its sixty-fourth session.
In a resolution (A/HRC/58/L.16) on the Negative impact of the non-repatriation of funds of illicit origin to the countries of origin on the enjoyment of human rights, and the importance of improving international cooperation, adopted by a vote of 29 in favour, 15 against and 3 abstentions, the Council requests the High Commissioner for Human Rights to organise, prior to the sixty-second session of the Council, a one-day intersessional expert meeting, fully accessible to persons with disabilities, on strengthening international cooperation and shared responsibilities in facilitating the repatriation of illicit funds to advance human rights; requests the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights to organise, before the sixty-third session of the Council, a regional expert meeting in Africa on ways to support governments’ efforts in repatriating funds of illicit origin; and also requests the Office of the High Commissioner to prepare a substantive report on enhancing international cooperation and national efforts to facilitate the repatriation of illicit funds and ensure the effective use of repatriated funds for sustainable development and realisation of economic, social and cultural rights, and to present the report to the Council at its sixty-fourth session.
In a resolution (A/HRC/58/L.17/Rev.1) on Human rights, democracy and the rule of law, adopted without a vote, the Council decides that the theme of the sixth session of the Forum on Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law, to be held in 2026, will be “Education for civic participation: empowering future generations, fostering knowledge and critical thinking”; and decides that participation in the sixth session of the Forum will be in accordance with the modalities set out by the Council in its resolutions 28/14, 34/41, 40/9, 46/4 and 52/22.
In a resolution (A/HRC/58/L.7) on the Question of the realisation in all countries of economic, social and cultural rights, adopted without a vote, the Council decides to convene, at its sixty-first session, a panel discussion, accessible to persons with disabilities and open to the participation of States and other relevant stakeholders, on promising practices and measures to mobilise public resources to finance sustainable development in a manner consistent with States’ economic, social and cultural rights obligations; and requests the Secretary-General to prepare and submit to the Council, at its sixty-fourth session, a report, in formats accessible to persons with disabilities, on the question of the realisation in all countries of economic, social and cultural rights under agenda item 3.
Before the resolution was adopted, the Council rejected amendment L.33 by a vote of 9 in favour, 24 against and 13 abstentions.
In a resolution (A/HRC/58/L.12) on the Mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the right to food, adopted without a vote, the Council decides to extend the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the right to food for a period of three years; requests the Special Rapporteur to provide advice and guidance to States and all relevant stakeholders on shaping food systems governance in line with international human rights law; and requests the Special Rapporteur to report annually on the implementation of the mandate to the Council and the General Assembly in accordance with their programmes of work.
In a resolution (A/HRC/58/L.13) on the Promotion of the enjoyment of the cultural rights of everyone and respect for cultural diversity, adopted without a vote, the Council requests the Special Rapporteur to continue to work with relevant stakeholders towards the comprehensive promotion and protection of cultural rights, and to report regularly to the Council and the General Assembly, in accordance with their respective programmes of work.
In a resolution (A/HRC/58/L.14) on the Effects of foreign debt and other related international financial obligations of States on the full enjoyment of all human rights, particularly economic, social and cultural rights, adopted by a vote of 29 in favour, 12 against and 6 abstentions, the Council requests the High Commissioner for Human Rights to provide global analytical and policy strategies in the context of reforms of the international financial architecture; and requests the Independent Expert on the effects of foreign debt and other related international financial obligations of States on the full enjoyment of all human rights, particularly economic, social and cultural rights, to continue to report regularly to the Council and the General Assembly in accordance with their programmes of work.
In a resolution (A/HRC/58/L.24/Rev.1) on the Open-ended intergovernmental working group for the elaboration of a legally binding instrument on the promotion and protection of the human rights of older persons, adopted without a vote, the Council decides to establish an open-ended intergovernmental working group with the mandate of elaborating and submitting to the Council a draft international legally binding instrument on the human rights of older persons with the objective of promoting, protecting and ensuring the full enjoyment of human rights by older persons; also decides that the open-ended intergovernmental working group will meet for two five-day sessions each year in Geneva in a hybrid format, should the General Assembly agree to reintroduce such a format, and that it will be webcast, and that the organisational session should be held before the end of 2025 and no later than the start of the sixty-first session of the Human Rights Council, for three working days; and requests the open-ended intergovernmental working group to submit a report on progress made to the Council for its consideration at its sixty-third session and to make the report available in an easy-to-read accessible format.
In a resolution (A/HRC/58/L.29) on the Mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, adopted without a vote, the Council decides to extend the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism for a period of three years, with the same terms as provided for by the Human Rights Council in its resolution 49/10.
In a resolution (A/HRC/58/L.15) on Women, diplomacy and human rights, adopted without a vote, the Council decides to commemorate the International Day of Women in Diplomacy during one panel at the annual full-day discussion on the human rights of women, to be held during the fifty-ninth, the sixty-second and the sixty-fifth sessions of the Council, including with discussions on the elimination of discrimination and structural barriers that hinder women’s participation and representation in decision-making; and invites all States, organizations of the United Nations system and civil society to participate in this celebration.
In a resolution (A/HRC/58/L.26/Rev.1) on the Human right to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment: ocean and human rights, adopted without a vote, the Council calls upon States to adopt and implement strong laws ensuring, among other things, the rights to participation, to access to information and to justice, including to an effective remedy, in environmental matters; and calls upon all States to conserve, protect and restore healthy ecosystems and biodiversity and to ensure their sustainable management and use by applying a human rights-based approach that emphasizes participation, inclusion, transparency and accountability in the management of natural resources.
In a resolution (A/HRC/58/L.21) on the Impact of anti-personnel mines on the full enjoyment of all human rights, adopted without a vote, the Council calls upon all States and other relevant stakeholders to cooperate effectively to address the impact of anti-personnel mines on the protection and promotion of all human rights; and requests the High Commissioner for Human Rights to prepare a report, in consultation with States and other relevant stakeholders, on the impact of antipersonnel mines on the enjoyment of all human rights, with particular emphasis on economic, social and cultural rights, and to present the report to the Council at its sixty-second session, followed by an interactive dialogue.
In a resolution (A/HRC/58/L.27/Rev.1) on Human rights defenders and new and emerging technologies: protecting human rights defenders, including women human rights defenders, in the digital age, adopted without a vote (as orally revised), the Council requests the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights to convene three regional workshops, including through hybrid modalities, to assess risks created by digital technologies to human rights defenders and best practices to respond to these concerns in different geographical areas, bearing in mind current and emerging business models and gender, geographic and other digital divides and sensitivities, with participation from civil society, human rights defenders and the private sector; and also requests the Office of the High Commissioner to prepare a report containing a summary of those consultations, which could include recommendations for due diligence and improved responses to risks created by digital technologies to human rights defenders, including those exposed to discrimination and those working in situations of armed conflict, and to present it to the Council at its sixty-third session.
Before the resolution was adopted, the Council rejected amendment L.35 by a vote of 4 in favour, 26 against and 15 abstentions; L.36 by a vote of 10 in favour, 23 against and 14 abstentions; and L.37 by a vote of 7 in favour, 24 against and 15 abstentions.
Action on Resolutions Under Agenda Item Four on Human Rights Situations that Require the Council’s Attention
In a resolution (A/HRC/58/L.2) on the Situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, adopted without a vote, the Council decides to renew, for a period of two years, the capacity of the Office of the High Commissioner, including its field-based structure in Seoul, to allow the implementation of relevant recommendations made by the group of independent experts on accountability for human rights violations in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in its report; requests the High Commissioner to provide an oral update on the progress made in this regard to the Council at its sixty-first session and to submit a full report on the implementation of the recommendations to the Council at its sixty-fourth session; decides to extend the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, in accordance with Council resolution 37/28, for a period of one year; and requests the Office of the High Commissioner to continue to organise a series of consultations and outreach activities with victims, affected communities and other relevant stakeholders.
In a resolution (A/HRC/58/L.3) on the Promotion and protection of human rights in Nicaragua, adopted by a vote of 29 in favour, 4 against and 14 abstentions, the Council decides to renew, for a period of two years, the mandate of the Group of Human Rights Experts on Nicaragua as established in its resolution 49/3; requests the Group to submit a comprehensive report to the Council at its sixty-first and sixty-fourth sessions, during an interactive dialogue, and to present an oral update to the Council at its sixtieth and sixty-third sessions; also requests the Group to present its most recent report, in combination with an oral update on its work, to the General Assembly at its eightieth and eighty-first sessions, followed by an interactive dialogue; and requests the High Commissioner to strengthen monitoring and engagement, including by preparing reports that are comprehensive, gender-responsive and take into account race and ethnic origin on the situation of human rights in Nicaragua, and to present them to the Council at its sixtieth and sixty-third sessions, to be followed by an interactive dialogue, and to present an oral update to the Council at its fifty-ninth and sixty-second sessions.
In a resolution (A/HRC/58/L.10) on the Situation of human rights in Belarus, adopted by a vote of 25 in favour, 5 against and 17 abstentions, adopted without a vote (as orally revised), the Council decides to extend the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Belarus for a further period of one year, effective from the end of its fifty-ninth session, and requests the Special Rapporteur to continue to monitor developments and to make recommendations on ways to strengthen respect for and protection and fulfilment of human rights in Belarus, and to submit a report on the situation of human rights in Belarus to the Council at its sixty-second session and to the General Assembly at its eighty-first session, including in an easy-to-read version and in an accessible format; also decides to extend the mandate of the Group of Independent Experts on the Situation of Human Rights in Belarus for a further period of one year; and requests the Group of Independent Experts to give an oral update to the Council at its sixtieth session and to present a comprehensive report at its sixty-first session, including in an easy-to-read version and in an accessible format, both to be followed by an interactive dialogue.
In a resolution (A/HRC/58/L.11/Rev.1) on the Situation of human rights in Myanmar, adopted without a vote (as orally revised), the Council calls for the timely designation of a resident coordinator of United Nations local agencies in Myanmar on a permanent basis; decides to extend the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar for a further period of one year; requests the Special Rapporteur to present, during an enhanced interactive dialogue, an oral update to the Council at its fifty-ninth session and to submit a report to the Third Committee of the General Assembly at its eightieth session and to the Council at its sixty-first session, and also requests the Special Rapporteur to continue to monitor the situation of human rights in Myanmar; requests the High Commissioner to submit to the Council, at its sixty-second session, a comprehensive report on the overall situation of human rights in Myanmar; and reiterates the need to establish a country office of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in Myanmar and to issue a standing invitation to all special procedures of the Council.
In a resolution (A/HRC/58/L.20/Rev.1) on the Situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, adopted by a vote of 24 in favour, 8 against and 15 abstentions, the Council decides to extend the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran for a further period of one year in order to continue to monitor the ongoing situation of human rights, and requests the Special Rapporteur to submit a report to the Council at its sixty-first session and to the General Assembly at its eightieth session; also decides that the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Islamic Republic of Iran should continue for one year to thoroughly and independently monitor and investigate allegations of recent and ongoing serious human rights violations in the Islamic Republic of Iran; and requests the Fact-Finding Mission to present a report to the Council at its sixty-first session during a joint interactive dialogue with the Special Rapporteur, and to present an oral update, to be followed by an interactive dialogue, on the implementation of the mandate to the General Assembly at its eightieth session.
In a resolution (A/HRC/58/L.22) on the Situation of human rights in Ukraine stemming from the Russian aggression, adopted by a vote of 25 in favour, 4 against and 18 abstentions, the Council decides to extend the mandate of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine, defined by the Human Rights Council in its resolution 49/1, for a further period of one year, complementing, consolidating and building upon the work of the human rights monitoring mission in Ukraine, in close coordination with the human rights monitoring mission in Ukraine and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights; and requests the Commission of Inquiry to give an oral update to the Human Rights Council at its sixtieth session, to be followed by an interactive dialogue, to submit a comprehensive report to the Council at its sixty-first session, to be followed by an interactive dialogue, and to submit a report to the General Assembly at its eightieth session, also to be followed by an interactive dialogue.
In a resolution (A/HRC/58/L.25) on the Situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic, adopted without a vote (as orally revised), the Council decides to extend the mandate of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic for a period of one year; requests the Office of the High Commissioner to strengthen the resources of the Commission of Inquiry in order for it to completely fulfil its mandate within the Syrian Arab Republic, in particular with regard to security and logistical support and victim protection expertise, welcomes the broad access granted by the interim authorities to the Commission, and encourages the interim authorities to grant the Commission necessary access throughout the Syrian Arab Republic and to cooperate closely with the Commission; requests the Commission of Inquiry to present an oral update to the Human Rights Council at both its fifty-ninth and sixtieth sessions, to be followed by an updated report during an interactive dialogue at the sixty-first session of the Council; and reaffirms its decision to transmit the report and oral updates of the Commission of Inquiry to relevant bodies of the United Nations.
Action on Resolutions Under Agenda Item Seven on the Human Rights Situation in Palestine and Other Occupied Arab Territories
In a resolution (A/HRC/58/L.19) on Human rights in the occupied Syrian Golan, adopted by a vote of 27 in favour, 6 against and 14 abstentions, the Council demands that Israel stop its repressive measures against the Syrian citizens in the occupied Syrian Golan and release immediately the Syrian detainees in Israeli prisons; requests the Secretary-General to disseminate the present resolution as widely as possible and to report on this matter to the Council at its sixty-first session; and decides to continue its consideration of the human rights violations in the occupied Syrian Golan at its sixty-first session.
In a resolution (A/HRC/58/L.31) on the Right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, adopted by a vote of 43 in favour, 2 against and 2 abstentions, the Council calls upon Israel, the occupying Power, to end immediately its unlawful presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, which constitutes a wrongful act of continuing character entailing its international responsibility, and to reverse and redress any impediments to the political independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Palestine, in accordance with the legal findings and determinations of the International Court of Justice in its advisory opinion of 19 July 2024, and reaffirms its support for the solution of two States, Palestine and Israel; and urges all States to adopt measures to promote the realisation of the right to self-determination of the Palestinian people, and to render assistance to the United Nations regarding the implementation of this right.
In a resolution (A/HRC/58/L.32/Rev.1) on Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and in the occupied Syrian Golan, adopted by a vote of 34 in favour, 3 against and 10 abstentions (as orally revised), the Council reiterates its request to the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and Israel, as mandated by the Human Rights Council in its resolution 55/32 of 5 April 2024, to prepare a report on the identities of settlers, as well as settler groups and their members, that have engaged in or continue to engage in acts of violence, intimidation, harassment or terror against Palestinian civilians and the actions taken by Israel, the occupying Power, and by third States to ensure accountability for violations or abuses of international law in this regard, and requests, instead, that the report be submitted to the Council at its sixty-first session; and requests the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to report on the implementation of the provisions of the present resolution to the Human Rights Council at its sixty-first session.
Action on Resolutions Under Agenda Item Nine on Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Forms of Intolerance: Follow-up to and Implementation of the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action
In a resolution (A/HRC/58/L.18) on Combatting intolerance, negative stereotyping and stigmatisation of, and discrimination, incitement to violence and violence against, persons based on religion or belief, adopted without a vote, the Council requests the High Commissioner to prepare and submit to the Council at its sixty-first session a comprehensive follow-up report with elaborated conclusions based upon information provided by States on the efforts and measures taken for the implementation of the present resolution.
Action on Resolutions Under Agenda Item 10 on Technical Assistance and Capacity Building
n a resolution (A/HRC/58/L.8) on Technical assistance and capacity-building for Mali in the field of human rights, adopted without a vote, the Council decides to extend the mandate of Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in Mali for a period of one year in order to permit the mandate holder to continue to evaluate the situation of human rights in Mali; and requests the Independent Expert to submit a report to the Council at its sixty-first session; decides to hold a dialogue at its sixty-first session, in the presence of the Independent Expert and representatives of the Government of Mali, to assess the changes in the situation of human rights in the country.
In a resolution (A/HRC/58/L.23) on Technical assistance and capacity-building for South Sudan, adopted without a vote, the Council requests the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, in cooperation and collaboration with the Government of South Sudan and relevant mechanisms of the African Union, to enhance the technical assistance provided to the Government of South Sudan to continue to assist it in addressing human rights challenges in the post-conflict transition; also requests the Office of the High Commissioner to present a comprehensive report to the Council at its sixty-second session, to be followed by an interactive dialogue, with the participation of representatives of the African Union; and further requests the Office of the High Commissioner to submit the above-mentioned report and recommendations to the Human Rights Council, then to share them with the African Union and all relevant organs of the United Nations, including the United Nations Mission in South Sudan.
In a resolution (A/HRC/58/L.28) on Technical assistance and capacity-building to improve the situation of human rights in Haiti, in connection with a request from the authorities of Haiti for coordinated and targeted international action, adopted without a vote, the Council decides to extend, for a renewable period of one year, the mandate of the independent human rights expert appointed by the High Commissioner and tasked with undertaking, with the assistance of the Office of the High Commissioner and in collaboration with the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti, the monitoring of the human rights situation in Haiti, ensuring, in particular, the inclusion of a gender perspective in all of his work; requests the independent expert to devote greater attention to the situation of children, women and girls and to trafficking in persons, to monitor the impact of illicit arms trafficking on the human rights situation in Haiti and to formulate recommendations to consolidate national, regional and international responses on this issue; also requests the independent expert to provide advice and technical assistance to the Government of Haiti, national human rights institutions and civil society organizations, including women’s rights organizations, to assist in their efforts to ensure respect for and the promotion and protection of human rights; and requests the High Commissioner to provide to the Council, within the framework of an interactive dialogue with the participation of the independent human rights expert, an oral update on the situation of human rights in Haiti at its sixtieth session and a report on the subject at its sixty-first session.
Other Matters
The Council appointed three members of the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Member from Central and Eastern Europe, the Russian Federation, Central Asia and Transcaucasia, Antonina Gorbunova (Russian Federation); Member from Central and South America, and the Caribbean, Anexa Brendalee Alfred Cunningham (Nicaragua); and member from the Pacific, Valmaine Toki (New Zealand).
The Council also adopted its draft report ad referendum for the fifty-eighth session.
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Produced by the United Nations Information Service in Geneva for use of the media;
not an official record. English and French versions of our releases are different as they are the product of two separate coverage teams that work independently.
HRC25.005E
Source: Washington State News
SEATTLE — Attorney General Nick Brown today joined 20 other attorneys general in suing the Trump administration to stop the dismantling of three federal agencies that provide services and funding supporting public libraries and museums, workers, and minority-owned businesses nationwide.
In March, the Trump administration issued an executive order that would dismantle federal agencies created by Congress that collectively provide hundreds of millions of dollars for programs in every state. As a result of this executive order, the Institute of Museum and Library Services (IMLS) – one of the targeted agencies – has placed almost its entire staff on administrative leave and will cut hundreds of grants for state libraries and museums.
The lawsuit filed by Brown and the coalition seeks to stop the targeted destruction of the IMLS and two other agencies targeted in the administration’s EO that millions of Americans rely on, especially those in underserved communities.
The three agencies targeted in the executive order are:
“Communities throughout Washington benefit from the work of these agencies to support libraries, promote minority-owned businesses, and protect workers’ rights,” Brown said. “Trump claims he’s carving up wasteful spending, but in reality he’s illegally gutting popular programs that support people with limited resources in our towns and cities.”
In 2024, IMLS invested $180 million in libraries nationwide under its Grants to States Program. The administration’s action will threaten hundreds of library staff across the country that provide essential services to their communities.
In addition, the Trump administration has cut the staff of MBDA from 40 to just five individuals and has effectively stopped issuing new grants, hurting vulnerable small businesses across the country. The FMCS has slashed its staff from roughly 200 to fewer than 15 individuals and announced the termination of several of its core programs, making it harder for unionized workers to secure their rights.
The executive order violates the Constitution and the Administrative Procedure Act by eliminating the programs of agencies without any regard for the laws and regulations that govern each source of federal funding. The coalition argues that the president cannot decide to unilaterally override laws governing federal spending, and that this executive order unconstitutionally overrides Congress’s power to decide how federal funds are spent.
This lawsuit is led by the attorneys general of New York, Hawaii, and Rhode Island. Joining the lawsuit are the attorneys general of Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oregon, Vermont, and Wisconsin.
The lawsuit can be found here.
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Source: Office of United States Attorneys
LOS ANGELES – Working alongside law enforcement partners at United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement, federal prosecutors this week filed criminal charges against 24 defendants who allegedly were found in the U.S. following removal, the Justice Department announced today.
Among these defendants included criminals who previously were convicted of felonies prior to their removal from the United States, including one previously convicted of narcotics crimes involving methamphetamine and cocaine.
The crime of being found in the United States following removal carries a base sentence of up to two years in federal prison. Defendants who were removed after being convicted of a felony face a maximum 10-year sentence and defendants removed after being convicted of an aggravated felony face a maximum of 20 years in federal prison.
Some of the recently filed cases are summarized below:
Criminal complaints and indictments contain allegations. All defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law.
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement and Homeland Security Investigations are investigating these matters.
These cases are part of Operation Take Back America, a nationwide initiative that marshals the full resources of the Department of Justice to repel the invasion of illegal immigration, achieve the total elimination of cartels and transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), and protect our communities from the perpetrators of violent crime. Operation Take Back America streamlines efforts and resources from the Department’s Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETF) and Project Safe Neighborhood (PSN).
Source: National Ocean Industries Association – NOIA
Headline: NOIA Announces 2025-2026 Term for the Executive Committee, Board of Directors
Washington, D.C. – The National Ocean Industries Association (NOIA) appointed and approved the 2025-2026 term of the NOIA Board of Directors and Executive Committee. In a separate press release today, NOIA announced the election of Joe Leimkuhler, Chief Operating Officer of Beacon Offshore Energy, as the NOIA Chair and Eric Zimmermann, Chief Operating Officer of LLOG, as the incoming NOIA Vice Chair.
Note: NOIA Executive Committee Members also serve on the NOIA Board of Directors.
Appointed to the NOIA Executive Committee of the Board of DirectorsChris Bradshaw, President & CEO, Bristow GroupPaul Danos, Owner, President & CEO, DanosChris Golden, Senior Vice President, U.S. Upstream, EquinorBrent Gros, Vice President, Gulf of Mexico Business Unit, ChevronLee Jackson, Chairman & CEO, Jackson Offshore OperatorsAndy Krieger, Senior Vice President Gulf of Mexico and Canada, bpJonathan Landes, President, Subsea, TechnipFMCJoe Leimkuhler, COO, Beacon Offshore EnergyRichard Lynch, Senior Vice President, Technology & Services, HessSasha Mackler, SVP, Global Head of Strategic Policy, ExxonMobilMike McCauley, Senior Vice President, Asset Management & Special Projects, White Fleet AbandonmentCourt Ramsay, President & CEO, Aries Marine CorporationMolly Smith, SVP, Engineering & Technology, Murphy OilRick Tallant, EVP, Supply Chain & Contracting Procurement, ShellClay Thompson, Director, Gulf of Mexico Operations, OxyEric Zimmermann, COO, LLOG
Appointed to the NOIA Board of DirectorsPaa-Joe Akoto-Ampaw, Vice President, Gulf of Mexico, Woodside EnergyKarthik Annadorai, President & Chief Revenue Officer, GATE EnergyDavid Barton, Senior Vice President Gulf of Mexico, Marubeni Oil & GasLanis Belaire, Co-Founder & Owner, Pharma-Safe Industrial ServicesCraig Broussard, Vice President Gulf of Mexico, Subsea 7David Cherechinsky, President, CEO and Director, DistributionNOWMark Cizek, Vice President and General Manager, Gulf of Mexico, WilliamsAmanda Dasch, Region CEO, ØrstedRobert Eifler, President & CEO, Noble CorporationBryan Ellis, President, Services Division, Superior Energy ServicesLoren Fowler, Vice President Sales & Business Development – Americas, Heerema Marine ContractorsJohn Gellert, President & CEO, SEACOR MarineCéline Gerson, Group Director Americas/President USA, FugroAnna Guichard, Managing Director North America Offshore, SLBDavid Hajovsky, Executive Vice President, Multi-Client, TGSRichard Kirkland, CEO, CantiumCliffe Laborde, Managing Member, Laborde MarineRod Larson, President & CEO, Oceaneering InternationalTerry Lechinger, Vice President, Stress EngineeringTodd Lee, CEO, TotalEnergies E&P USAJennifer Medcalf, President, The REACH GroupChet Morrison, CEO, Morrison Energy GroupScott Moses, Executive Vice President & COO, Oil States InternationalBill New, President, New IndustriesBrent Ozenne, CEO, Arena OffshoreJoe Pope, Vice President – Sales & Marketing, ValarisDavid Reid, Chief Technology Officer & Chief Marketing Officer, NOVMark Richard, President, Western Hemisphere, HalliburtonW. David de Roode, Partner & Executive Vice President, Global Energy & Marine, Lockton PartnersNeal Shah, CFO, Kosmos EnergyNiloy Shah, COO, Ridgewood EnergySteve Weyel, Founder & Owner, EnVen Energy VenturesJim Wicklund, Managing Director – Energy Group, PPHB
Source: National Ocean Industries Association – NOIA
Headline: Beacon Offshore Energy’s Joe Leimkuhler elected as NOIA Chair; LLOG’s Eric Zimmermann approved as Vice Chair
Beacon Offshore Energy’s Joe Leimkuhler elected as NOIA Chair; LLOG’s Eric Zimmermann approved as Vice Chair
Washington, D.C. – Washington, D.C. – The National Ocean Industries Association (NOIA) Board of Directors has elected Joe Leimkuhler, Chief Operating Officer of Beacon Offshore Energy, as the NOIA Chair for the 2025-2026 term. Eric Zimmermann, Chief Operating Officer of LLOG, was elected as the 2025-2026 Vice Chair. Joe and Eric were confirmed in their positions during the NOIA Board of Directors meeting this morning.
In a separate press release, NOIA announced the Executive Committee and Board of Directors positions for the 2025-2026 term.
NOIA President Erik Milito said, “In 2025, the Gulf of America stands as a cornerstone of our nation’s energy future, bolstered by the leadership of President Trump and Secretary Doug Burgum. Their commitment to unleashing America’s offshore energy potential can set the stage for unprecedented opportunity. All forms of offshore energy are additive and complementary, working together to strengthen energy security, drive economic growth, and advance lower-carbon solutions. Whether it’s expanding oil and gas lease sales, shipping LNG to our allies, pioneering carbon sequestration in the Gulf, accelerating offshore wind development, or building the nation’s capacity for deep-sea mining, NOIA’s advocacy efforts continue to recognize the synergy of these resources. NOIA is eager to collaborate with the Administration and Congress, through the leadership of Joe and Eric to ensure the U.S. offshore energy industry thrives, delivering jobs, innovation, and a robust energy portfolio that powers America and the world.”
“We also extend our gratitude to outgoing NOIA chair Jon Landes of TechnipFMC for his leadership and unwavering dedication in championing the offshore energy sector during his tenure as the NOIA Chair.”
Incoming NOIA Chair Joe Leimkuhler said, “NOIA is a vital conduit—bridging the expertise of our diverse member companies, the dedication of workers, and the vision of energy leaders to educate and inspire Washington, D.C. policymakers. The diversity of NOIA’s members covers energy producers and the full range of suppliers and service providers, which strengthens our ability to champion cross-industry stability through smart, innovative policies. Our collective experience in the Gulf of America and beyond positions us to shape a generational shift in energy policy for the better. I’m proud to lead this effort and work alongside our member companies to deliver a clear, unified message to D.C.: America’s offshore energy future is innovative and bright, and we’re ready to lead the way.”
NOIA Vice Chair Eric Zimmermann added, “I am thrilled to collaborate with Joe, NOIA’s dedicated membership, and the NOIA staff in my role as Vice Chair. NOIA’s mission is more vital than ever as the global demand for responsible and reliable energy sources intensifies. The U.S. offshore energy industry sets the gold standard, and we are committed to partnering with our nation’s elected officials and policymakers to establish policies that proclaim that U.S. offshore is unequivocally ‘open for business.’ My father was in the marine side of the business, my grandfather was on the marketing side of the business, and being in the upstream has helped me gain a vision deep vision and appreciation for the breadth and importance of the offshore space.”
About Joe LeimkuhlerJoe graduated with a MS in Petroleum Engineering from Wyoming 1987. Over the next 25 years, he worked the deepwater Gulf of Mexico at Shell culminating with managing all offshore well operations in the U.S. After Shell, Joe spent 7 years at LLOG where he was the VP of Well Operations, HSE and Engineering. Over the past 6 years, Joe has been at Beacon Offshore Energy, and as COO has helped to build the company into a deepwater operator.
About Eric ZimmermannEric received his Bachelor of Science and Master of Science in Geology at Louisiana State University. Eric currently is Chief Operating Officer of LLOG Exploration a position he has held since 2020. He has worked been with the company since 2007, holding the positions of Exploration Geologist and Vice President of Geology. Prior to LLOG, Mr. Zimmermann worked for BP in Houston and Dominion Exploration in New Orleans. His experience has been focused on exploration and development projects in the deepwater Gulf of Mexico for his entire career. He is a Professional Geologist in the states of Texas and Louisiana and is a Fellow of the Geological Society of London.
About NOIA The National Ocean Industries Association (NOIA) represents and advances a dynamic and growing offshore energy industry, providing solutions that support communities and protect our workers, the public and our environment.
Source: US State of California 2
What you need to know:As President Trump’s tariffs take effect, Governor Gavin Newsom is pursuing new strategic partnerships with international trading partners while calling for California-made products to be excluded from any retaliatory measures and affirming California’s long-standing commitment to fair, open, and mutually beneficial global trade.
Los Angeles, California – California took a major step forward in correcting the damage from 50 years of neglect to the state’s mental health system with the passage of Proposition 1. This historic measure — a signature priority of Governor Gavin Newsom — adds rocket fuel to California’s overhaul of the state’s behavioral health systems. It provides a full range of mental health and substance abuse care, with new accountability metrics to ensure local governments deliver for their communities.
Governor Gavin Newsom
California is the fifth-largest economy in the world, the strongest economy in the nation, and the largest importer among all U.S. states, with more than $675 billion in two-way trade supporting millions of jobs throughout the state. California’s gross domestic product of $3.9 trillion is 50% bigger than the GDP of the nation’s next largest state, Texas, and is the key to the United States’ economic growth. California sends more than $83 billion to the federal government annually.
California is home to the most Fortune 500 companies, beating out Texas, Florida, and all other states. California remains #1 in the nation for new business starts, #1 for access to venture capital funding, #1 for manufacturing, #1 for high-tech, and #1 for agriculture.
California stands as the center for manufacturing output in the United States with over 36,000 manufacturing firms and employing over 1.1 million Californians. Since California supplanted New York in 1965, our manufacturing firms have created new industries and supplied the world with manufactured goods spanning aerospace, computers and electronics, and, most recently, zero-emission vehicles.
California is home to 32 of the world’s 50 leading AI companies, high-impact research and education institutions, and a quarter of the technology’s patents and conference papers. California’s population has increased multiple years in a row and has one of the most equitable tax systems in the entire country. Travel spending reached an all-time high of $150.4 billion.
California’s long-standing commitment to global cooperation, innovation, and openness has helped power its rise to the world’s fifth-largest economy — leading in good-paying jobs to support California’s working families. With the Governor’s announcement today, the state will extend that leadership through strategic, mutually beneficial partnerships rooted in respect, trust, and shared growth.
With this announcement, Governor Newsom is directing his Administration to identify collaborative opportunities with trading partners that protect California’s economic interests — workers, manufacturers, and businesses — and the broader supply chains linked to the state’s economy. The administration will explore ways to:
California’s economy and workers rely heavily on trade with Mexico, Canada, and China. Over 40% of California imports come from these countries, totaling $203 billion of the more than $491 billion in goods imported by California in 2024. The tariffs will also affect access to important construction materials critical to rebuilding after the Los Angeles fires, including timber and wood, steel and aluminum, and the most important components of drywall.
Retaliatory tariffs will also have an outsized impact on California businesses, particularly its more than 60,000 small business exporters. Mexico, Canada, and China are California’s top three export destinations, buying nearly $67 billion in California exports, which was over one-third of the state’s $183 billion in exported goods in 2024. Retaliatory tariffs also impact farmers and ranchers during a difficult time in the U.S. farm economy – fostering a greater need for mitigation and expanding foreign market share.
The magnitude of these tariffs on our North American allies, and the retaliation, will also result in major disruptions to cross-border supply chains, including the mutually beneficial co-production that takes place in the California-Baja mega-region. If these goods are taxed each time they cross the border, the price of the final product will rise and ultimately be passed on to California consumers. This will have far-reaching impacts, affecting everything from semiconductors to aerospace and automotive products.
Analysis by the Yale Budget Lab found that the tariffs announced by the Trump Administration thus far will likely result in a 2.3% increase in overall inflation this year alone — including a 2.8% increase in food prices and an 8.4% increase in automotive prices — translating to an impact of $3,800 on the average American household.
California has long been a key player on the international stage — from taking joint action on climate change to identifying new pathways and partnerships for sustained economic growth. During the Newsom Administration alone, California has signed 38 international agreements with 28 different foreign partners that lay critical groundwork for prolonged economic success as well as prioritizing workers and businesses that benefit from these new opportunities.
Source: United Nations (Video News)
Noon briefing by Stéphane Dujarric, Spokesperson for the Secretary-General.
Highlights:
Myanmar
Occupied Palestinian Territory
Sudan
South Sudan
Democratic Republic of the Congo
Haiti
Ukraine
Food Prices
Mine Awareness Day
Colombia
International Days
Deputy Secretary-General
Antisemitism
MYANMAR
As announced by the Secretary-General yesterday, Tom Fletcher, the Emergency Relief Coordinator, arrived this morning. Upon arrival, he met with humanitarian teams in Yangon. In the afternoon, he travelled to Mandalay, which as you know, is the epicentre of the earthquake, where tomorrow he is expected to meet with people impacted by the earthquake, as well as with local responders and other humanitarian workers.
More than 25 search-and-rescue teams are working, medical teams and supplies have been deployed, and water and shelter kits have been distributed in Mandalay and beyond. Just yesterday, more than 30 tons of medical supplies arrived in Myanmar, bringing the total to 100 tons since the earthquakes struck.
The UN Refugee Agency, for its part, has deployed plastic sheets and kitchen sets for about 25,000 people impacted.
The agency is also mobilizing supplies from its warehouses in Myanmar for an additional 25,000 people, but it will need to replenish stocks urgently to meet the massive needs due to the quake.
Our humanitarian colleagues are preparing a new appeal aligned with the Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan, which, as you know, calls for $1.1 billion as needs continue to outpace available supplies and response capacity. So far, less than 5 per cent of this appeal has been received.
For its part, UNHCR is appealing for $16 million to assist 1.2 million people. The funds will be used to manage displacement sites and support vulnerable people in six impacted regions until the end of the year.
OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORY
The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reports that thousands more families have now fled westward in the Gaza Strip, in response to another displacement order issued by Israeli forces and covering parts of Gaza City. OCHA warns that these displacement orders have left civilians exposed to hostilities and deprive them of access to essential services for their basic survival.
All crossings, as you know, continue to be closed. We are now in the second month. So, no supplies can come into Gaza.
The World Food Programme has warned that food stocks in Gaza are running out, and assistance programmes are gradually shutting down. As we told you earlier this week, all WFP-supported bakeries had to close. Now, food parcel distributions are soon to end. Hot meals currently continue, but with dwindling supplies. The World Food Programme reminds us that a single hot meal provides 25 per cent or less of a person’s daily dietary needs.
Meanwhile, sanitation conditions across Gaza are likely worsening public health risks. Our humanitarian colleagues say that three makeshift displacement sites in Al Mawasi are now reporting infestations of fleas and mites, causing rashes and other health issues. Treating these infestations require chemicals and other items that will only be available once the crossings are again open for the entry of supplies.
UN humanitarian partners warn that criminal looting and general insecurity are again on the rise, linked to the closure and to lack of basic supplies. On Wednesday, one of the distribution points used by UNRWA was looted, along with nearby buildings. In a social media post, our colleagues at UNRWA said this wasn’t an isolated incident, but rather a symptom of a broader breakdown in civil order.
Turning to the West Bank, OCHA reports that tens of thousands of people remain displaced, unable to return home due to ongoing operations by Israeli forces in the north, mainly in Jenin and Tulkarm. Our humanitarian partners are providing urgent aid and psychosocial support to those impacted.
Full highlights: https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/noon-briefing-highlight?date%5Bvalue%5D%5Bdate%5D=04%20April%202025
Source: Government of India
Posted On: 04 APR 2025 8:31PM by PIB Delhi
Good evening, all of you.
Shri Sunil Kumar Gupta, his description goes beyond an IAS officer of 1987 batch. He’s an alumnus of IIT Kanpur. Shri Sujeet Kumar, a member of the Upper House, the Council of States, House of Elders, popularly known as Rajya Sabha. I have had the good occasion and benefit to know the Hon’ble Member of Parliament inside out. He’s a lawyer, he’s an academician, he’s a positive thinker, he acts subterranean, but makes very effective contribution in the Council of States, and equally impactful contribution as part of international delegation of Bharat to global institutions.
I had the good fortune to interact with him briefly while he was invited to the banquet when we had the presence of Chilean president a decade younger to you. He’s 49, the president of Chile happens to be about 39. I must recognise a very distinguished presence of Smt. Sudha Murthy, has been accoladed for her simplicity, contribution to society, and captivating smile, ever positive. I remember in Rajya Sabha when the time came for her to ask a supplementary, it was 12 noon, which means Question Hour starts that was Zero Hour. I said, I’ll give you precedence.
A veteran member reacted, she is always in public domain. I said, well earned, well deserved, public spirited, for a public cause. We had the occasion also, me and Dr. Sudesh Dhankhar, when we were at the coronation of King Charles in London in that ceremony, we found a slim, simple looking girl coming to us and discovered she was then a spouse of the Prime Minister of UK, her son-in-law, and it was her daughter.
So the traditions of what we say, sanskar, rightly filtered to the next generation. Shri Haris Beeran, he shares one thing in common with Sudha Ji, a charming smile. Rekha Sharma recently became a member of Rajya Sabha from the state of Haryana, but has all India perspective, having occupied a very significant position of Chairperson of National Women’s Commission.
Mithlesh Kumar, well grounded to real politics, and also his presence at this function reveals he is very forward looking. Well, these constitute the, if I may say, contingent from the Upper House. We are enormously benefited by Tapir Gao, a member in the House of People, popularly known as Lok Sabha, from the state of Arunachal. Me and Dr. Sudesh Dhankar had the occasion to attend a very important programme just a month or two back in his state, a great state, a state with many tribes, culture and his colleague, Kiren Rijiju Ji is our minister for Minority Affairs.
Ladies and gentlemen, it is for the first time in this country that a person professing Buddhism is a Cabinet Minister that indicates our inclusive approach. The world must learn from India, Bharat, the concept of inclusivity. Yet, some try to impart lessons to us. It does happen on occasions that those who are to learn quickly become your teachers. But then, they learn fast if they are in positive frame.
Shri Pradeep Gandhi, I share something very different with him. He’s an ex-MP, I’m also one. But I am an ex-MP with a difference. My category of MPs in 89 to 91, 96 to 97, 98. axed-MP, we did not have the occasion to complete our term. We have amongst us Shri Rajit Punhani, an IAS officer of 1991 batch, Secretary to the Council of States, alumnus of Doon School, alumnus of St. Stephen’s College, President of the Union of St. Stephen’s, Harvard. IIM Bangalore, and he’s from the State of Bihar.
I must commend his role in human resource transformation in Rajya Sabha, and for crafting a very innovative skill for Rajya Sabha interns. Alongside, Sumant Narain, another Harvard product, Indian Audits and Accounts Service. We have Mahaveer Singhvi, Indian Foreign Service.
We have a journalist here who is more seen on television, like some of our parliamentarians. Because our parliamentarians are drawn from my one-time fraternity. I say one-time fraternity because, when I took oath of office of Governor of the State of West Bengal, my son as a senior advocate had to be suspended. So, I parted company with the jealous mistress. I see him. He’s extremely fond of young lawyers and promoting them on television.
There’s another journalist also, nearly having the same size as he has, with a little more height. I was having you in mind. Then, of course, Tosif Alam, the co-author. Well, I greet each and everyone present in this hall. But my real greetings to team Sujeet Kumar.
Ladies and gentlemen, I was extremely, all my life, benefited from intelligence. That intelligence, I call it SDI, Sudesh Dhankar Intelligence. That intelligence has always held me in good state, generating in me transparency, accountability, and has a very strong sense of disciplining. I dare not reveal the rest of it.
AI on Trial is a fascinating, illuminating book on a subject of huge contemporaneous relevance. Artificial intelligence invasion, incursion in our daily life is being felt by all of us. Its seismic impact is on every part of our activity. Disruptive technologies, artificial intelligence, Internet of Things, blockchain, machine learning, used to be just words but now, artificial intelligence is the buzzword. On a lighter note, let me tell you, a member of the Parliament from journalistic category, did not reflect due diligence while sending a notice to get suspension of the working of the house, so that her subject, I have revealed the gender inadvertently, gets precedence. She sent it on a particular date and wanted suspension of the house that had already taken place five days ago.
I lamented that even artificial intelligence cannot help me to suspend which has already fructified but we never know, there may be a time when artificial intelligence couldn’t go that far also. While I congratulate the authors for their dedication to this critical field and for contributing in an area that will define not only our economic trajectory, in a sense guide our ethical compass for decades to come, but also impacts every societal activity. Artificial intelligence has got such fast traction. It is known to one and all, be it a village, be it semi-urban, urban, or highly urbanised areas, the meadows. It has agitated our minds, also generated concerns but ladies and gentlemen, let me remind you, last 10 years, India is defined as the nation that has had the highest growth amongst large nations.
Its exponential economic upsurge, phenomenal infrastructure growth have been accoladed by global institutions like the IMF and the World Bank. But the greatest certification has emanated from global institutions in respect of technological penetration. India’s landscape is now dotted with technological footprint everywhere and that is why the World Bank President reflected what India has achieved in technologically spread out in about six years that is not possible even in four decades.
We as a Nation have tested accessibility of technology and revealed to the world high degree of adaptability resulting in transparency, accountability of services. Youngsters would not even know that to pay an electricity bill or a water bill or a telephone bill. One was compelled to take a day’s leave. The queue was long. Getting a railway ticket or a platform ticket. All this is now in your hand, your mobile. Our mobile coverage, I can say, is reaching nearly saturation point.
The visionary leadership of Prime Minister Modi was reflected. When he thought of banking inclusion and brought about 550 million people, mostly in the villages, into banking service industry. In the shortest time that has stood us in good state during COVID. And also, imagine a Nation where farmers, hundred million in number, get three times a year, direct transfer into their bank accounts but we have to be extremely worry also. AI, the gene, is out of the bottle and it can be extremely destructive. It can create havoc if not regulated, in the age of defects, working of deep state, wokeism. These menacing trends can get wings if this gene of artificial intelligence is not regulated.
To put it for young minds, a nuclear power can give you energy. Nuclear power can lighten houses, run industry but it can also be destructive. Therefore, we have both the possibilities before us. This calls for something on which the book has deeply focused. The author, Shri Sujeet Kumar, has given illustrations. If you see one of the most widely propagated on social media, one was taking a route using artificial intelligence but the road was broken in between. AI did not show it and it was a disaster.
It can be a challenge to nations, organised societies, because it is a power that is now available to all. India, being the fastest growing country in the last 10 years, is no longer a nation with a potential. Our objective is well set out to be a developed nation by 2047, if not before. And that requires for us to harness every available area and vista of opportunity because our income has to go eightfold per capita and that being the situation, we must look to harness artificial intelligence for our benefit and that surely can be done.
I would say India is amongst the few nations in the world that have focused on this aspect, much before others. But we are the most populous country, largest, oldest, most vibrant democracy. Regulating artificial intelligence is daunting, frightening, but imperative. Right balance will have to be struck between regulating artificial intelligence and fostering innovation, this is fundamental. Overregulation can choke like over disciplining a child. We don’t have to impede the spirit of entrepreneurship but at the same time, we have to be extremely cognisant of the evil effects. Underregulation can endanger public safety, perpetuate bias, and erode trust.
The author in his address had reflected on these problems. One of the greatest challenges that we face these days is, and let me come to the institution which I preside, every word is spoken in the Council of States by a member of Parliament. The Member of Parliament has the immunity from civil prosecution, criminal prosecution. The constitutional protection given to the member, even if the observations are slanderous, malicious, defamatory, damaging reputations of people, setting narratives that are anti-national, not factually well-premised, no citizen of the country can take action. Therefore, action has to be taken by the Council of States, self-regulation. But then, the quickest we can do is, if an Hon’ble Member makes an objectionable observation, it can be expunged. That is expunged only from the record. That is expunged only for posterity. But it gets the widest traction, how to deal with it.
I have tasked a committee headed by a senior parliamentarian, Ghanshyam Tiwari Ji. He heads a committee on ethics, to devise ways and means. One is counselling members. Secondly, calling upon the political parties that put their people in these institutions to discipline them, sensitise them but the critical question is, how do we save the damage? Artificial intelligence has an answer. Machine learning for me, to begin with, was only machine plus learning but it’s a mechanism that can deal with this menace in split seconds. So technology will have to be availed to make things a little more soothing to society.
We must therefore design regulation as a scaffold, not a cage. Our goal should be to enable a framework where responsible innovation thrives and sinister designs, pernicious designs, are neutralised. A risk-based, sector-specific, and principle-driven approach may serve us well in this regard. For instance, the level of scrutiny required for AI used in medical diagnostics should differ from the artificial intelligence creating social media feeds. We must assert India’s cyber sovereignty as much as we do the sovereignty understood in common parlance. But we have to be aligned to global standards. There can be no stand-alone activity in such kind of situations. There will have to be global convergence. All stakeholders will have to come on one platform so that we have a global, rule-based order in the field of artificial intelligence.
India is a unique country, our civilisational depth is more than 5,000 years. Our ethos, our culture, our values, our knowledge is reflected in our Vedas, our epics. India has been a thought leader for centuries. A global centre of culture. Our institutes of excellence were thrown by scholars from all over the world Takshashila, Nalanda, to name only two. They came, gave us much, took away much, shared it, our treasure.
In G20, India has taken a great initiative to generate a global community and that was reflected in India’s G20 motto, “One Earth, One Family, One Future.” Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam. It was the vision of the Prime Minister that brought in the fold of G20 nations of the African Union. European Union was already represented. Global South in neglect for quite long. A word not even known to many. But an important segment of countries in global polity and economy was put on the centre stage. We need to work out something where artificial intelligence can be on that level. The first step has been taken through our India Stack Programme. We are making many of our digital governance solutions open source so the journey of other developing nations gets this facility. Most importantly, the impact of artificial intelligence on ordinary citizens must be at the heart of regulatory regime.
An ordinary person will not be able to find solutions on his own. The system must provide automatic, inbuilt relief to ordinary citizens. To protect our citizens from the hazards of artificial intelligence, we need enforceable rights, such as right to explanation, the right to contest automated decisions. Decisions are automated. How to contest them, we are not aware and the right to opt out of algorithmic processing, especially when decisions impact livelihoods, liberty, and dignity.
Artificial Intelligence has generated a compulsive scenario for us. It has forced us to re-examine existing jurisprudence. Traditional legal concepts like liability, or even personhood come under pressure when actions are carried out by autonomous systems. Artificial intelligence opacity challenges legal transparency and accountability principles. Delegating legal interpretation to unexplainable systems undermines judicial trust.
Current legal artificial intelligence use lacks, this use is not complete. If we use current legal artificial intelligence, we find one deficiency. It lacks comprehensive regulation and oversight. There is urgent need for standards and safeguards to prevent consequences of unregulated artificial intelligence. Debate continues to raise all over whether artificial intelligence promotes legal consistency or perpetuates historical biases.
Justice at the risk, and the risk is great, justice at risk when algorithms lacking human qualities influence law, judgments can’t be robotised. There can be no artificial intelligence replication. Sometimes the distinction is too fine to be detected even by artificial intelligence. It is the brain of the judge, the discerning brain, that finds a resolution.
This book, friends, provides a road map for responsible artificial intelligence integration through case studies and regulation proposals. To put it in layman’s language, if you wish to know a gentleman, Google has enough to give you. You can assimilate it, but trust me, you will be ignorant of the person. You have to go much beyond Google, you have to go much beyond artificial intelligence to know the man.
Future of legal artificial intelligence requires deliberate shaping by professionals and policy makers. Friends, if artificial intelligence is not regulated, we will face trial by artificial intelligence. That will be a tough trial. The fundamentals of legal jurisprudence, like opportunity of hearing, a fair process, are its first casualty. Therefore, to prevent that, time is now to focus on ‘Artificial Intelligence on Trial’.
Every person now has power in his hand because of smartphones. Media has come to be defined very differently.
People are increasingly focused. The focus is intense on social media. The news sharing is the fastest on social media but what happens if it is moderated? It is manipulated? It is inspired by interests inimical to Bharat? It is aimed at destroying our constitutional institutions? Let me give you a highly alarmingly concerning aspect.
Access to judiciary is a fundamental right and when it comes to challenge to individual’s fundamental rights, the doors of the highest court are open under Article 32 petitions but what we have seen of late?
Access to judiciary has been weaponised by forces in a systemic manner, fuelled by extra-legal mechanisms, dubiously financed, and the object being to destroy core values of Bharat. We have to be extremely worried.
I must share a deep concern with you, while institutions have to self-regulate themselves but parliamentary institutions and judiciary blossom only when they self-regulate. We must have respect for these institutions’ inter se, and I hold every institution in high regard. But I firmly believe if there is an incursion in the domain of an institution, be it executive, judiciary, or legislature, by another institution, the doctrine of separation of powers will be stressed. The stress will be severe. The consequences may be huge.
Therefore, time has come. These institutions also, one, to apply technology like artificial intelligence to enhance, to secure cutting-edge in their administrative working, and in delivering in their core areas, like judiciary has to deliver through judgments, legislature has to do it through legislation, and holding the executive accountable.
But similarly, and it is undoubtedly a considered proposition, in all democratic nations, executive governance is the only way of life, because people elect their representatives for governance and for legislation but those who have the numbers get into executive seat from governments. If executive function is performed not by the government but by legislature or by judiciary, where is the accountability? Executive governance by another institution other than government is antithetical to our constitutional values.
It is negation of power of the people, ‘We the People’, who gave us this constitution. Therefore, such kind of technologies can really get into even-handedness working, equitable working. The equilibrium can be maintained. I strongly advocate that we must be extremely sensitive to institutional domains. But at the same time, we must have highest regard for our institutions.
We as a nation are proud for our Parliament, that we are proud of our judiciary. We are equally proud of our executive and you have to look back for last 10 years, our performance, and you will know the statement is well thought out, well premised.
I must also advert to another aspect. India’s Digital Personal Data Protection Act, much is being talked about it. People are having varying opinions, and that is the essence of democracy. Because a dialogue requires varying opinions. No one can be judgmental that I alone am right in democracy. Our Digital Personal Data Protection Act is a landmark step, but it now has to evolve in tandem with artificial intelligence regulation. Consent must be meaningful, those who are lawyers know it. A consent that is not free is no consent in law. And free means real freedom to give your consent. Consent cannot be buried in opaque and abstruse terms of service. I am sometimes surprised when I use my mobile phone, go to some application, there is pressure, I agree.
Now in utter helplessness, you concede a very personal ground. Unknowingly, you are lured or forced. Otherwise, the utilisation doesn’t fructify with ease. Consent cannot be in opaque and abstruse terms of service. Anonymisation, data minimisation, and purpose limitation must be rigorously enforced.
The regulation of artificial intelligence must be very transparent. It must go hand in hand with re-skilling and workforce planning. As artificial intelligence displaces certain tasks, it will. Because it has come to your house, come to your office. It does jobs sometimes better than normal resource and then an impression is gathered. Are we risking the jobs of people who work? Maybe in some situations, but then it does offer the stars of involvement. We must look in that direction. This requires that we must invest very heavily in education, vocational training, digital literacy, particularly for those who are marginalised, who are vulnerable, who need hand-holding situations.
Artificial intelligence, the governance part of it, I see it after deep thought, cannot be left only to technocrats or corporations. Democratic oversight is quintessence of democracy. Citizen engagement and transparency are essential. India’s parliamentary committees, judicial forums, and civil society, all are stakeholders. They must converge to secure the citizen against ill effects, evil effects of artificial intelligence.
Now, artificial intelligence, disruptive technologies are like another industrial revolution. There is paradigm shift every moment. We seem to be on quicksand when it comes to technological changes. Changes are taking place by the hour, I can say by the seconds. Therefore, to regulate something that is as dynamic as artificial intelligence, we need an agile and empowered institutional framework.
A national artificial intelligence authority or commission, independent but accountable with representation from government, industry, academia, and civil society could serve as a think tank. Let me give a simple illustration. This is turning out into a huge problem. People are losing the money from their banks. Now, artificial intelligence must find a solution that once something is stolen by electronic means on account of an inadvertent error or whereas citizen becomes prey to mischief in technology to neutralise and ensure traction of money is controlled. We are still very conventional.
The person has to go to a police station, and we find the area is in another state, so a physical visit has to be made. By that time, the crooks, the rogues who get themselves this kind of unjust enrichment move their working pattern. We need to do something about it.
I greatly appreciate the effort of Sujeet Kumar and his young colleague, Tosif Alam, and I have carefully gone through, having had the benefit of book in advance, of the comments that emanated from Justice Ranjan Gogoi and our N. R. Narayana Murthy, Justice T. S. Sivagnanam. He was a judge when I was governor of the state of Bengal.
Rajeev Chandrasekhar, a technocrat with deep belief, I share one thing in common with our young friend, Tauseef Alam. Salman Khurshid is a dear friend of mine, a distinguished senior advocate, and you have to learn a lot from his style. He absorbs everything which is a challenge by way of thought process, but makes his point in a subtle manner.
Friends, in conclusion, the topic of regulation of AI will determine the kind of society we aspire to be. It has become a most important factor where we will be. Do we wish to become a digital dystopia where humans serve algorithm or a humane artificial Indian society where technology serves the people? The choice is ours. The choice is well known. There is nothing in artificial intelligence, it is far away from the human mind, so we must use capacity of human mind to regulate this artificial intelligence. It is on trial as per the book.
Let artificial intelligence not put us on trial. I’m extremely happy to release this book. It will be an eye-opener to everyone in all spheres of life. I wish the authors success for their next venture.
Thank you so much.
****
JK/RC/SM
(Release ID: 2119066) Visitor Counter : 24
Source: Government of India
| AYUSH
AYUSH Chair in foreign universities to promote and strengthen traditional Indian medicine systems globally 50 Institute-to- Institute Memorandum of Understanding with foreign institutions to facilitate research and academic exchange in AYUSH Posted On: 04 APR 2025 4:45PM by PIB Delhi The Ayurveda, Yoga & Naturopathy, Unani, Siddha, and Homoeopathy (AYUSH) Chair Programme is an initiative by the Ministry of Ayush, Government of India, to promote and strengthen traditional Indian medicine systems (AYUSH) globally. Under this program, AYUSH Chairs are established in foreign universities and institutions to facilitate academic collaboration, research, and awareness about AYUSH systems. The Ministry of Ayush, has established AYUSH academic chairs in Bangladesh, Australia, Mauritius, Latvia and Malaysia. These chairs are part of a broader strategy to promote AYUSH systems of medicine internationally. The specific objectives being pursued through this initiative are as under:
The Ministry of Ayush, Government of India has signed 50 Institute-to-Institute Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with foreign institutions to facilitate research and academic exchange in AYUSH. The details of the Institutes with whom the Ministry of Ayush has signed the MoUs are placed at Annexure. -3- These initiatives help to enhance global propagation, recognition, and acceptance of AYUSH systems of medicines. For assessing the impact of AYUSH Chair, a monthly report on activities undertaken is obtained from the chair. The evaluation of the chair’s impact is being conducted based on the report. Annexure
This information was given by Union Minister of State (I/C) for Ayush, Shri Prataprao Jadhav in a written reply in Lok Sabha today. *** MV/AKS (Release ID: 2118854) |
US Senate News:
Source: United States Senator for Vermont – Bernie Sanders
WASHINGTON, April 4 – Sen. Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.) today released the following statement regarding Trump’s widespread tariffs on more than 60 countries:
As someone who helped lead the effort against disastrous unfettered free trade deals with China, Mexico and other low-wage countries, I understand that we need trade policies that benefit American workers, not just the CEOs of large corporations. And that includes targeted tariffs which can be a powerful tool in stopping corporations from outsourcing American jobs and factories abroad. Bottom line: We need a rational, well-thought-out and fair trade policy. Trump’s across-the-board tariffs are not the way to do it. We do not need a blanket and arbitrary sales tax on imported goods which will raise prices on products that the American people desperately need. We should be doing everything we can to lower prices, not make them incredibly higher.
Further, and most importantly, what Trump is doing is illegal and another step toward authoritarianism. In pushing his tariffs he is usurping the power of Congress and abrogating existing agreements under “emergency” provisions – when there are no real emergencies. In other words, he is incorporating more and more power into his own hands. That is unacceptable.
Source: US Immigration and Customs Enforcement
BALTIMORE — U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement arrested Edvin Giovanni Ceron-Reyes, 37, an illegal alien and Guatemalan citizen, in Cumberland, Maryland, March 31, after he was transferred to ICE custody by the Western Correctional Facility. Ceron has been convicted of attempted first-degree murder.
“The apprehension of this convicted attempted murderer demonstrates the critical role that immigration enforcement plays in protecting our communities,” said ICE Baltimore Acting Field Office Director Nikita Baker. “Thanks to an honored immigration detainer, this dangerous criminal alien was safely transferred into ICE custody instead of being released back into the public. ICE Baltimore remains steadfast in our commitment to enforcing our nation’s immigration laws and prioritizing public safety.”
Ceron entered the United States on an unknown date at an unknown location without being inspected, admitted, or paroled by an immigration official.
The Howard County Police Department arrested and charged Ceron with attempted first-degree murder July 7, 2011. On that same day, ICE Baltimore lodged an immigration detainer with the Howard County Detention Center. The Circuit Court for Howard County convicted Ceron of two counts of attempted first-degree murder Jan. 19, 2012, and sentenced him to 20 years in prison.
ICE Baltimore issued Ceron a final order of removal order Sept. 13, 2013.
The Western Correctional Institution transferred custody of Ceron to ICE Baltimore March 31. He will remain in ICE custody pending removal from the United States to Guatemala.
Members of the public can report crimes and suspicious activity by dialing 866-DHS-2-ICE (866-347-2423) or completing the online tip form.
Learn more about ICE’s mission to increase public safety in our Maryland communities on X: @EROBaltimore.
Source: Office of United States Attorneys
HARRISBURG – The United States Attorney’s Office for the Middle District of Pennsylvania announced that Oseas Froilan Gomez-Tebalan, age 30, a citizen of Guatemala, was sentenced to 21 months’ imprisonment by United States District Judge Jennifer P. Wilson for illegally reentering the United States.
According to Acting United States Attorney John C. Gurganus, Gomez-Tebalan was previously removed from the United States on March 18, 2017, through Phoenix, Arizona, having been convicted in California of assault with a deadly weapon. Gomez-Tebalan was subsequently found in the United States again, for a third time, without having first obtained legal permission to reenter the country.
This case is part of Operation Take Back America, a nationwide initiative that marshals the full resources of the Department of Justice to repel the invasion of illegal immigration, achieve the total elimination of cartels and transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), and protect our communities from the perpetrators of violent crime. Operation Take Back America streamlines efforts and resources from the Department’s Project Safe Neighborhood (PSN).
The case was investigated by the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement and Removal Operations. Assistant United States Attorney K. Wesley Mishoe prosecuted the case.
# # #
Source: European Parliament
A number of public hearings and exchanges of views will take place this week. Topics include human rights in Cuba, press freedom, crypto-assets, internet safety for minors, the Rule of Law Conditionality Mechanism and legal proceedings by popular action in Spain. Members will also discuss the digital euro and Ukraine’s energy sector. Follow the links below to find out more about the highlighted events.
Source: European Parliament
The European Parliament,
– having regard to the Treaty on European Union (TEU), in particular Articles 14, 16, 21, 24, 36 and 41 thereof,
– having regard to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 16 December 2020 between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on budgetary discipline, on cooperation in budgetary matters and on sound financial management, as well as on new own resources, including a roadmap towards the introduction of new own resources(1),
– having regard to the report of 20 June 2024 by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) entitled ‘Common Foreign and Security Policy Report – Our Priorities in 2024’,
– having regard to the ‘Strategic Compass for Security and Defence – For a European Union that protects its citizens, values and interests and contributes to international peace and security’, endorsed by the European Council on 21 March 2022,
– having regard to NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept, adopted on 29 June 2022,
– having regard to the European Council conclusions of 22 March 2024, 18 April 2024, 27 June 2024, 19 December 2024, 6 March 2025 and 20 March 2025,
– having regard to the Foreign Affairs Council conclusions of 18 March 2024, 22 April 2024, 24 May 2024, 24 June 2024, 22 July 2024, 14 October 2024, 18 November 2024, 16 December 2024, 27 January 2025, 24 February 2025 and 17 March 2025,
– having regard to the declaration of the Summit between the EU and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) adopted on 18 July 2023,
– having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/509 of 22 March 2021 establishing a European Peace Facility, and repealing Decision (CFSP) 2015/528(2),
– having regard to the Political Guidelines of the Commission President for 2024-2029,
– having regard to the 2024 enlargement reports presented by the Commission on 30 October 2024,
– having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘2024 Communication on EU enlargement policy’ (COM(2024)0690),
– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1449 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans(3),
– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2025/535 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 March 2025 on establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Republic of Moldova(4),
– having regard to Sauli Niinistö’s report of 30 October 2024 on strengthening Europe’s civil and military preparedness and readiness,
– having regard to the EU Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders, adopted in 2004, updated in 2008 and further supplemented in 2020 with a guidance note on the Guidelines’ implementation,
– having regard to its resolutions on breaches of human rights, democracy and the rule of law, adopted in accordance with Rule 150 of its Rules of Procedure,
– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 20 June 2023 on European Economic Security Strategy (JOIN(2023)0020),
– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 16 December 2020 entitled ‘The EU’s Cybersecurity Strategy for the Digital Decade’ (JOIN(2020)0018),
– having in regard to the Commission Recommendation of 3 October 2023 on critical technology areas for the EU’s economic security for further risk assessment with Member States (C(2023)6689),
– having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/797 of 17 May 2019 concerning restrictive measures against cyber-attacks threatening the Union or its Member States(5),
– having regard to its resolution of 1 June 2023 on foreign interference in all democratic processes in the European Union, including disinformation(6),
– having regard to its resolution of 9 October 2024 on strengthening Moldova’s resilience against Russian interference ahead of the upcoming presidential elections and a constitutional referendum on EU integration(7),
– having regard to its resolution of 24 October 2024 on the misinterpretation of UN resolution 2758 by the People’s Republic of China and its continuous military provocations around Taiwan(8),
– having regard to its resolution of 17 January 2024 on the security and defence implications of China’s influence on critical infrastructure in the European Union(9),
– having regard to its resolutions of 24 October 2024 on the situation in Azerbaijan, violation of human rights and international law and relations with Armenia(10) and of 5 October 2023 on the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh after Azerbaijan’s attack and the continuing threats against Armenia(11),
– having regard to its resolutions on historical remembrance, including its resolutions of 2 April 2009 on European conscience and totalitarianism(12), of 19 September 2019 on the importance of European remembrance for the future of Europe(13), of 15 December 2022 on 90 years after the Holodomor: recognising the mass killing through starvation as genocide(14) and of 17 January 2024 on European historical consciousness(15),
– having regard to the report of 9 May 2022 on the final outcome of the Conference on the Future of Europe,
– having regard to the EU Action Plan on Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment in External Action 2021-2025 (GAP III),
– having regard to the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (the Istanbul Convention), which entered into force in the EU on 1 October 2023,
– having regard to the UN resolution adopted by the UN General Assembly on 25 September 2015 at the UN Sustainable Development Summit in New York entitled ‘Transforming our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development’ (Agenda 2030), which established the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs),
– having regard to the UN resolution adopted by the UN General Assembly on 8 December 1949 on assistance to Palestine refugees,
– having regard to the UN Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967 on a peaceful and accepted settlement of the Middle East situation,
– having regard to the UN Security Council resolution of 11 August 2006on the situation in the Middle East,
– having regard to the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948 and the UN Human Rights Council resolution of 22 June 2020 on the prevention of genocide,
– having regard to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC),
– having regard to the agreement between the International Criminal Court and the European Union of 28 April 2006 on cooperation and assistance(16),
– having regard to the advisory opinion requested from the International Court of Justice by the UN General Assembly in its resolution of 30 December 2022 on Israeli practices affecting the human rights of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem,
– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 19 March 2025 entitled ‘Joint White Paper for European Defence Readiness 2030’ (JOIN(2025)0120),
– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,
– having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0010/2025),
A. whereas the world faces rapid geopolitical shifts, with autocratic powers, both individually and in coordinated efforts, actively challenging the international rules-based order and its multilateral institutions, international law, democratic institutions and societies, as well as our alliances; whereas all EU leverage should be assessed in order to dissuade countries from supporting Russia’s aggression;
B. whereas the BRICS summit held in Kazan, Russia, from 22 to 24 October 2024 underscores how Putin leverages international platforms to counteract isolation and build alliances; whereas a unified and strategic EU response is required to uphold the principles of the rules-based international order;
C. whereas the EU and its Member States should review development assistance to governments of countries that openly support Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and monitor their votes on relevant UN resolutions;
D. whereas the geopolitical confrontation between democracies and authoritarian and dictatorial regimes is growing, conflicts are multiplying, and the use of force is increasingly treated as a standard tool for pursuing political aims; whereas force is wielded not only by states but also by an expanding array of non-state actors; whereas the EU needs to reinforce transatlantic relations and build constructive partnerships with like-minded partners in the Global South;
E. whereas the geopolitical context in which the EU is operating has accentuated the need for more ambitious, credible, decisive and unified EU action and a fully fledged European foreign policy on the world stage and has highlighted the necessity for Member States to demonstrate the required political will to rebuild their defence capabilities, while strengthening the EU’s transatlantic bonds and partnerships with like-minded countries; whereas the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) needs to become a fully fledged EU policy through which the EU can address the key geopolitical challenges; whereas the EU should be guided in its external action by the values and principles enshrined in Article 2, Article 3(5) and Article 21 TEU, which have inspired the EU’s own creation, development and enlargement; whereas it is in the EU’s interest to stand up accordingly for universal values, norms and principles such as freedom and democratic standards, as well as human rights, the rule of law, international justice and the Helsinki Final Act, in particular as regards the non-violation of international borders;
F. whereas the EU is faced with the rapid rise of new threats at its borders and on its territory, which are destabilising the EU’s functioning, in particular targeted disinformation, cyber and hybrid attacks, the instrumentalisation of migratory flows, in addition to international terrorism and religious radicalism;
G. whereas strategic autonomy requires the EU to act independently on the global stage when needed, particularly in foreign and security policy; whereas the EU has recognised the need to reduce undue reliance on external actors for safeguarding its interests in an unpredictable and multipolar world;
H. whereas the EU needs to develop an independent and autonomous European diplomacy, including public and cultural, economic, climate, digital and cyber diplomacy, led by an EU diplomatic service which is driven by a common diplomatic culture;
I. whereas the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine violates the rules-based international order, fundamental principles of international law as enshrined in the UN Charter and key conventions and resolutions, the Helsinki Final Act and the European Convention on Human Rights;
J. whereas the Russian violations of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War comprise executions of prisoners and the denial of access to humanitarian organisations and medical treatment for prisoners;
K. whereas the ICC has issued an arrest warrant for Vladimir Putin and the Russian High Commissioner for Children, Maria Lvova-Belova, for their involvement in the abduction of Ukrainian children to Russia; whereas Russia, assisted by the Belarusian regime, is undertaking to re-educate Ukrainian hildren and erase their Ukrainian identity; whereas Aliaksandr Lukashenka’s regime in Belarus has to be held fully accountable for its complicity in the war of aggression against Ukraine and war crimes such as the abduction of thousands of Ukrainian children;
L. whereas the ICC has additionally issued arrest warrants for Russian military leaders Sergei Shoigu, Valery Gerasimov, Viktor Sokolov and Sergei Kobylash, accused of directing attacks on civilian targets;
M. whereas the Hungarian Government is blocking the EUR 5 billion Ukraine Assistance Fund set up in March 2024 within the European Peace Facility (EPF); whereas the Hungarian Government has been blocking the eighth tranche of EPF reimbursements for Member States that have delivered military aid to Ukraine since May 2023;
N. whereas Russian shadow fleet tankers pose a considerable risk to maritime and environmental security by turning off or manipulating their automatic identification systems; whereas these tankers provide an estimated USD 12 billion to Russia’s war budget each month, thereby directly funding its aggressive military operations;
O. whereas Vladimir Putin’s regime has instrumentalised history in an attempt to secure the loyalty of the Russian population by creating nostalgia for the supposed greatness of the Soviet Empire, falsifying the history of Russia and Ukraine, rejecting Nikita Khrushchev’s policy to acknowledge and condemn Stalinist crimes, reneging on Mikhail Gorbachev’s recognition and condemnation of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, and declaring the collapse of the Soviet Union as the greatest tragedy of the previous century;
P. whereas Russia and other malign actors in its neighbouring countries promote anti-Western and divisive rhetoric and exploit ethnic tensions in the Western Balkans in order to inflame conflict and divide communities, including through the instrumentalisation of the Serbian Orthodox Church;
Q. whereas 2024 marked the 20th anniversary of the ‘big bang’ enlargement when 10 countries joined the EU; whereas enlargement is of the utmost strategic importance for the EU, as it represents a geostrategic investment in long-term peace, democracy, stability, security, climate protection and prosperity across the continent, and in particular in the face of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine; whereas the preparation for enlargement requires reforms in the EU and whereas the EU should conduct the enlargement process in parallel with the institutional and decision-making reforms necessary to safeguard the EU’s integration capacity;
R. whereas the EU must maintain the momentum for the acceleration of its enlargement policy while accession countries continue to reform and achieve the required benchmarks related to the EU acquis; whereas consistent messages and a clear path towards integration for candidate countries are vital for keeping the pro-European perspective alive;
S. whereas the future of the Balkans and the countries in the Eastern Neighbourhood lies in the EU;
T. whereas the Union is founded on the values of democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights, which are part of the Copenhagen criteria, which are the key set of criteria for EU membership; whereas the accession process is a merit-based and reversible process;
U. whereas joining the EU requires foreign policy alignment, including on the votes on United Nations General Assembly resolutions, support for Ukraine and alignment with sanctions against Russia; whereas most of the countries of the Western Balkans have reached high levels of alignment with the CFSP, a notable exception being Serbia;
V. whereas North Macedonia concluded the Prespa Agreement with Greece and the Treaty of friendship, good-neighbourliness and cooperation with Bulgaria;
W. whereas the citizens of Georgia have demonstrated their commitment to democratic values and to their country making progress with EU integration; whereas the democratic backsliding in Georgia needs to be reversed; whereas the Georgian authorities should heed the will of the Georgian people to join the EU and should ensure free and fair elections, stop democratic backsliding, abandon the laws that jeopardise Georgia’s European future and pursue pro-European democratic reforms; whereas Georgia should align with the EU’s CFSP, including the sanctions adopted unanimously against Russia;
X. whereas any partnership agreement between the EU and Azerbaijan – including on energy – must have strong conditions attached on the respect of international law, fundamental rights and international obligations and, in particular, on Azerbaijan making substantial progress towards a comprehensive and sustainable peace agreement with Armenia;
Y. whereas the Mediterranean is of great importance to the EU, both historically and geographically; whereas the countries of the Southern Neighbourhood play an important role in ensuring that irregular migration flows are managed on the basis of the principles of solidarity, balance, shared responsibility and in full compliance with applicable EU and international law and, in particular, human rights and humanitarian law;
Z. whereas strategic partnerships and agreements between the EU and countries of origin and transit, such those between EU and Mauritania, are proving to be a successful model for the prevention of irregular migration and the fight against migrant smugglers;
AA. whereas the supply of thousands of Shahed drones from the Islamic Republic of Iran to Russia has further cemented Iran’s role as a pariah state; whereas North Korea and China further demonstrate their unwavering disregard to international laws and norms;
AB. whereas on 28 May 2024, Norway, Ireland and Spain recognised the State of Palestine, followed on 4 June 2024 by a decision of Slovenia’s parliament to do the same;
AC. whereas China defines itself as a ‘near-Arctic state’ and endeavours to develop, in close partnership with Russia, a Polar Silk Road;
AD. whereas the Belt and Road Initiative, known in China as the One Belt One Road, challenges the EU’s interests;
AE. whereas on 14 October 2024 the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the British Foreign Secretary agreed to launch strategic consultations on issues such as the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, the Indo-Pacific, the Western Balkans and hybrid threats;
AF. whereas all UN agencies embody the rules-based international order as they uphold and implement both the letter and the spirit of the UN Charter, to which all UN Member States must abide;
AG. whereas the EU’s credibility and coherence is a paramount requirement for the correct implementation of its external action, as this reinforces trust in the EU among various actors and non-EU countries; whereas the efficiency of the EU’s actions worldwide is contingent on ensuring the highest level of coordination and coherence in the EU’s external action; whereas coordination between the Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) should be strengthened, particularly due to the insufficient operational budget of the EEAS;
AH. whereas the implementation of gender equality and the WPS agenda requires initiatives that promote gender-responsive leadership, protect women’s rights and combat sexual and gender-based violence in conflict and post-conflict settings; whereas the funding of these initiatives is essential for supporting local civil society organisations and providing survivor-centred support;
AI. whereas human rights defenders (HRDs) are the EU’s main allies in defending and promoting human rights abroad; whereas HRDs are increasingly at risk of attacks and threats from state and non-state actors; whereas Parliament has consistently called for the proper and coordinated implementation of the EU Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders (2008); whereas the Member States, alongside the EU institutions, should implement these Guidelines, which include a range of specific commitments, such as regular reporting, coordination and action in support of HRDs;
AJ. whereas the consequences of climate change will have an ever-increasing effect on various spheres of human life, including geopolitical order and global stability; whereas it is of crucial importance that fighting climate change, necessitating climate action, and aiding those who are hardest hit by its repercussions, becomes a cornerstone of the CFSP; underlines the fundamental role which the Commission and the Member States, in a joint approach, must play in the advancement of climate diplomacy globally;
AK. whereas the report entitled ‘Safer Together – Strengthening Europe’s Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness’, presented by Sauli Niinistö, Special Adviser to the President of the European Commission, provides strategic recommendations for enhancing Europe’s civilian and military preparedness in the light of escalating and complex security threats;
AL. whereas this report first reviews the VP/HR’s annual CFSP report and subsequently complements it with Parliament’s positions on the CFSP objectives in 2025; whereas in so doing, the report expands particularly on (1) the global consequences of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, (2) conflict and peace in the Middle East, (3) cooperation with like-minded partners and (4) the general visibility and influence of EU action abroad; whereas Parliament’s forward-looking CFSP position is ultimately underlined by key demands concerning the next multiannual financial framework (MFF) and the parliamentary oversight of the MFF; whereas there is a need to defend and strengthen the rules-based international order, the universal norms, values and principles of the UN Charter such as human rights and international justice, multilateralism, and the Helsinki Final Act, in particular as regards the non-violation of international borders;
1. Underscores that its resolutions on the implementation of the CFSP are a key component of its contribution to EU foreign policymaking; underlines that these resolutions manifest the practical implication of the strengthened right of scrutiny in the area of foreign policy conferred on Parliament by the Treaty of Lisbon; recalls that the 2024 resolution is the first of this nature in this legislative term and aims to serve as a guide for the EU executive when setting foreign policy priorities for this term; highlights the fact that in an ever volatile international environment, the EU needs to simultaneously tackle numerous foreign policy challenges affecting it directly or indirectly, such as the ongoing Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, the conflicts in the Middle East, increasing great power competition, constant attempts to undermine the multilateral rules-based international order and an increased nexus of foreign and internal crises; strongly believes that in order to stay relevant on the international stage, the EU needs to pursue a determined, disciplined and assertive foreign policy that fulfils the EU’s own strategic objectives and continues defining, asserting and defending its interests in the world; recalls that the EU should be guided in its external action by the values and principles enshrined in Article 2, Article 3(5) and Article 21 TEU, which have inspired the EU’s own creation, development and enlargement, including democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, and the principles of equality and solidarity; further believes that the CFSP should ensure the implementation of the UN’s 2030 Agenda and the SDGs;
2. Emphasises that the core principles of the EU’s CFSP are rooted in the EU’s steadfast commitment to a rules-based, multilateral international order, as enshrined in the UN Charter, and in the EU’s clear preference for peaceful, diplomatic cooperation among all its Member States; encourages all parties to resolve disputes through dialogue, with mutual respect for international law, sovereignty and territorial integrity; reaffirms its dedication to advancing global peace and stability by promoting diplomatic initiatives aimed at conflict prevention and dispute resolution and which foster international collaboration on key global challenges, such as climate change, human rights and sustainable economic development; calls for ongoing partnerships with international actors to ensure the effectiveness of global peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts;
I.The VP/HR’s 2024 annual report
3. Notes that the report was submitted to the European Parliament on 20 June 2024; recalls that the report should be forward-looking in nature; comments hereinafter on several developments emphasised by the VP/HR in his report;
4. Welcomes in particular:
| – | the local, vibrant civil societies in the enlargement countries that play a constructive role in the EU integration processes, while underlining that civil society is vital in fostering democracy and pluralism and promoting good governance as well as social progress and that the enlargement countries should provide an enabling space and an appropriate framework for cooperation to ensure their meaningful involvement; | |
| – | the successful finalisation of the screening process for Albania at the end of 2023 and the opening of the first cluster of negotiating chapters on fundamentals and on external relations (Cluster 6) in 2024; welcomes Albania’s ambition of closing accession negotiations swiftly; highlights the need to further intensify reforms to address deficiencies that persist regarding the ‘fundamentals’, in particular concerning the rule of law, fighting corruption and organised crime; cautions against undermining the work of independent institutions such as the Special Anti-Corruption and Organised Crime Structure (SPAK); underscores the importance of a viable political pluralism and a competitive opposition and calls for dialogue and constructive engagement between the majority and the opposition to overcome the strong political polarisation in the country and to foster inclusive democratic processes that respects all parties, including the Greek, Roma and Egyptian minorities in the country; commends the country’s consistent, full alignment with the EU’s foreign and security policy, including with the EU’s restrictive measures against Russia and Belarus; | |
| – | the decision on the opening of accession negotiations with Bosnia and Herzegovina; encourages the authorities to take all of the relevant steps set out in the Commission’s recommendation of 12 October 2022; urges the country’s political leaders to implement a substantial set of reforms, including electoral reforms, in accordance with the decisions of domestic and international courts, in order to ensure the principles of equality and non-discrimination for all citizens and constituent peoples, as enshrined in its constitution and in full respect of the judgments of domestic and international courts, including all rulings of the European Court of Human Rights regarding Bosnia and Herzegovina; denounces the recurring inflammatory rhetoric and secessionist laws and policies of the leadership of the entity ‘Republika Srpska’ (RS), including the celebration of the unconstitutional ‘RS Day’ on 9 January 2025; calls on the Member States and representatives of the international community in Bosnia and Herzegovina to promote and support the implementation of these judgments; takes note of the ruling of the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the case of Milorad Dodik on 26 February 2025 and condemns his unprecedented attacks on the institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina, together with the RS leadership, and the intimidation of the opposition in RS; reiterates its call for targeted sanctions against destabilising actors within Bosnia and Herzegovina, notably Milorad Dodik, as well as other high-ranking officials of RS and Serbian officials providing political and material support for secessionist policies; endorses the statement made by NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte on 10 March 2025 in Sarajevo and calls for dialogue between all parties to safeguard stability in the country; calls on all Member States to ensure that such sanctions can be adopted by the Council and to impose them bilaterally or in concert with other Member States if their adoption in the Council is not possible; welcomes the agreement reached to extend the mandate of the EU forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Operation Althea until November 2025 and recalls that this mission still plays a pivotal role in the security and stability of Bosnia and Herzegovina; welcomes the arrival of the reserve forces of EUFOR Althea; urges the EU’s military mission to actively prevent unlawful parades and other provocations as well as threats against all people working to help the victims of genocide and investing in inter-ethnic reconciliation and a peaceful future for the country; calls for security at the Srebrenica-Potočari Memorial Centre to be ensured; | |
| – | the progress in the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue, especially in the areas of freedom of movement and energy; calls on Kosovo and Serbia to continuously engage in this dialogue in good faith and in the spirit of compromise to achieve a comprehensive, legally binding agreement on the normalisation of their relations, based on mutual recognition, in accordance with international law and without further delay; regrets, in this context, the lack of progress in the implementation of the path to normalisation and calls for efforts to be made and capacity to be dedicated to the EU-facilitated dialogue; commits, hence, to work closely with the outgoing as well as the incoming EU Special Representative for the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue and other Western Balkan regional issues; calls on the VP/HR to take advantage of the new term of the Commission to overcome the stalemate and give a new impetus to the dialogue and to come up with a new, innovative and balanced approach to the mediation; | |
| – | the 2024 Enlargement Report on Serbia, presented by the Commission on 31 October 2024; reiterates its position that accession negotiations with Serbia should advance only if the country aligns with EU sanctions against Russia and makes significant progress on its EU-related reforms, in particular in the area of the ‘fundamentals’; reminds the Serbian authorities that the proper functioning of democratic institutions is at the core of Serbia’s EU accession process and the EU accession methodology; recalls in this context its position that the Serbian parliamentary and local elections held on 17 December 2023 deviated from international standards and Serbia’s commitments to free and fair elections; reiterates its serious concerns over these irregularities and the overall election environment, which fell below the standards expected of an EU candidate country; urges Serbia’s political leadership to ensure constructive, inclusive dialogue across the political spectrum and to deliver on the necessary reforms for Serbia to progress on the path to EU accession; has closely followed the large mobilisation of students, joined by other groups of citizens following the tragic incident of the Novi Sad railway station; recalls that freedom of assembly is a fundamental right and upholds a no tolerance policy towards violence against peaceful protesters; condemns the reported cases of abusive attacks against and the digital surveillance and harassment of journalists, human rights activists and civil society organisations in Serbia, including, most recently, a police raid on four leading civil society organisations on 25 February 2025 ostensibly regarding their misuse of USAID funds; calls for a thorough, impartial and speedy investigation into the allegations of violence against demonstrators and of police misconduct during protests; expresses its solidarity with the participants of the peaceful demonstrations, most notably those at the demonstration of 15 March 2025, the largest mass protest in the modern history of Serbia; regrets the appeasing approach of the Commission towards Serbia despite its year-long roll-back on the rule of law, democracy and fundamental rights, as well as its destabilising influence on the whole region; urges the Commission, including at the highest level, to use clearer language towards Serbia and to consistently address its significant shortcomings, lack of progress and even backsliding, thus upholding the EU’s fundamental values; | |
| – | Kosovo’s application for EU membership and the Kosovo Report 2024 and reiterates its call on the Member States in the European Council to mandate the Commission to present the questionnaire and to submit its opinion on the merits of the country’s application; recalls that Kosovo’s bid to be considered a candidate country will be assessed on the basis of its own merits and of its success in meeting the Copenhagen criteria for EU membership; welcomes, however, the lifting of visa requirements for Kosovo citizens; regrets the restrictive measures imposed by the Council against Kosovo and calls for their immediate lifting, as proposed by the VP/HR; | |
| – | the progress made by Montenegro in meeting the interim benchmarks for Chapters 23 and 24 of the EU acquis; encourages the country to continue to make progress on and implement EU-related reforms swiftly; expresses, nonetheless, its concerns over controversial ideas for legislative proposals on citizenship and foreign agents floated in public; stresses the importance of the new government being able and committed to take forward the EU-related reforms and keep Montenegro firmly on the EU strategic path; expects the country to start closing chapters in the accession negotiations and to be ready to join the EU within the next couple of years; | |
| – | the successful finalisation of the screening process for North Macedonia at the end of 2023; urges the government of North Macedonia to achieve tangible results in fulfilling its obligation under the EU negotiating framework and the conclusions of the European Council meeting of 18 July 2022, including relevant constitutional changes, in line with the country’s commitments; | |
| – | the successful resumption of the CFSP dialogue between the EU and its partners in the Western Balkans and the importance of these partnerships for peace and security; recalls that EU enlargement is a geostrategic investment, which requires commitment from both the EU and the enlargement countries on their pathways to accession; recalls in this context the continued need for reforms regarding the rule of law, fundamental rights and public administration, and for alignment with the CFSP, including on sanctions and on the EU’s visa policy; highlights, additionally, the threats posed by malign foreign interference in the region and underlines the importance of combating disinformation to contain anti-Western and divisive rhetoric which seeks to exploit and exacerbate ethnic tensions in the region; cautions against engagement with the EU’s systemic rivals, which could undermine the prosperous, sustainable and secure future that EU accession offers; recalls, in this context, the added value of the investments made by the EU under the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance III, the newly established Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans, and the Western Balkans Investment Framework; calls on the Western Balkan countries to use all the resources made available to support their alignment with the EU acquis; calls upon the Commissioner for Enlargement to increase the visibility of EU action in the Balkans; | |
| – | the decision to open accession negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova; commends the fact that the CFSP alignment rate of Moldova has substantially increased from 54 % in 2022 to 86 % in 2024 and encourages Ukraine and Moldova to continue this positive trend towards full alignment; calls for the acceleration of the screening process and the timely organisation of the subsequent intergovernmental conferences; | |
| – | Armenia’s decision to suspend its participation in the Collective Security Treaty Organization and cease all payments to its budget in 2024, following Russia’s failure to assist Armenia against Azerbaijan’s military aggression, and to seek a more reliable security architecture; supports Armenia’s official request for the Russian Federation to withdraw its Federal Security Service border guards from its international airport and the Armenia-Iran border; welcomes the regular meetings under the EU-Armenia Political and Security Dialogue format and the EU-Armenia Partnership Council and commends the decision to adopt the assistance measures under the EPF in support Armenian armed forces on 13 June and 22 July 2024 respectively; | |
| – | the successful conclusion of negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan on the full text of the draft Agreement on Peace and Establishment of Interstate Relations; commends Armenia for paving the way for the finalisation of the text and urges the Azerbaijani leadership to sign and implement the peace agreement in good faith, as concluded in the negotiations; encourages further progress in the framework of the Armenia-Azerbaijan border delimitation process, which has led to an agreement on several sections of the border and the opening of regional communications on the basis of the sovereignty and jurisdiction of both countries, and reciprocity and equality, as a key measure to unblock regional development, enhance connectivity and foster sustainable peace and prosperity, as well as facilitate reconciliation among communities based on increased people-to-people contacts; reaffirms its support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of both Armenia and Azerbaijan and strongly supports the normalisation of their relations based on the principles of the mutual recognition of territorial integrity and the inviolability of borders, in accordance with the 1991 Alma-Ata Declaration; reiterates its demand for the withdrawal of Azerbaijan’s troops from the entirety of Armenia’s sovereign territory and the release of the 23 remaining Armenian hostages; | |
| – | the activities of the civilian European Union Mission in Armenia (EUMA) under the common security and defence policy (CSDP), which contributes to security in the region by substantially decreasing the number of incidents in conflict-affected and border areas, and reduces the level of risks for the population living in such areas; welcomes Armenia’s assistance with the activities of the EUMA on its territory; commends the Council for the decision to increase the number of deployed observers as well as the mission’s capacity and to extend its deployment timeframe; calls for further expansion and presence in the region; calls on the Commission to provide support for Armenia for de-mining; | |
| – | the continued work of the EEAS on addressing and countering foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) through the EU FIMI Toolbox, the setting up of a STRATCOM taskforce, and through close cooperation with Member States, international partners, civil society and other relevant stakeholders; reiterates its call to promote the continuous flow of intelligence from Member States to the EEAS on foreign and security issues occurring outside the EU; calls, in this regard, for strengthening the EU INTCEN, the EEAS Crisis Response Centre and the EU Satellite Centre by enhancing its staff, financial resources and capabilities; | |
| – | the proposal of the VP/HR for an anti-corruption sanctions regime, which would allow the EU to target serious acts of corruption worldwide; calls for its swift adoption by the Council; |
5. Condemns in particular:
| – | the ongoing illegal and unjustifiable Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and the increasing Russian attacks against civilian targets and civilian infrastructure within Ukraine; demands that Russia and its proxy forces cease all military action and that the Russian Federation immediately and unconditionally withdraw its troops and equipment from Ukraine and any other country whose territory, or parts thereof, it unlawfully occupies; reiterates its policy of non-recognition of Ukrainian territories temporarily occupied by Russia, including but not limited to the Crimean Peninsula; condemns any hybrid attacks executed by Russia in Ukraine and strongly denounces the spread of Russia’s propaganda about its war in Ukraine; | |
| – | the role of the illegitimate regime of Aliaksandr Lukashenka in allowing the country to serve as a Russian military base, effectively surrendering national sovereignty to the Kremlin in order to maintain its grip on Belarus, while brutally oppressing the Belarusian people in order to stay in power; deplores the fact that severe human rights abuses were committed in the run-up to the sham election on 26 January 2025; is alarmed by the Putin and Lukashenka regimes’ instrumentalisation of migration, particularly in the light of the influx of thousands of migrants into Poland, Lithuania and Latvia, which Russia and Belarus orchestrate to force their passage into the EU; deplores the Putin regime’s political instrumentalisation of migration, which has led to the closing of the Finnish border with Russia; | |
| – | the illegal North Korean involvement in the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine by its sending of military equipment and ammunition to Russia, as well as by its sending of thousands of soldiers to wage war against Ukraine; | |
| – | North Korea’s continued weapons testing and development of its nuclear programme, in violation of the UN resolution, further escalating tensions in the Indo-Pacific region; demands that North Korea abandon its weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner; urges the North Korea authorities to cease their ongoing crimes against humanity and to undertake a process of reform whereby all human rights are respected and protected; | |
| – | the increasing malicious activities, interference and hybrid warfare deployed by the Russian Federation, its institutions and proxies in undermining and subverting the democratic stability and sovereignty of Georgia and the Republic of Moldova and in particular the recent interference in the constitutional referendum on EU accession and the presidential elections; | |
| – | the attack on Kosovan police officers by well-organised Serbian paramilitaries in Banjska/Banjskë in the north of Kosovo on 24 September 2023 which resulted in the death of the Kosovan police officer Afrim Bunjaku and the injuring of two more Kosovan police officers; condemns the hideous terrorist attack on critical infrastructure near Zubin Potok; stresses that the perpetrators of these deplorable attacks must be held accountable and face justice without delay; | |
| – | the continued illegal occupation, under international law, by Türkiye, a NATO member country, of 37 % of Cyprus, an EU Member State; | |
| – | the brutal and indiscriminate terrorist attacks committed by Hamas across Israel on 7 October 2023, which triggered a Israeli military response and a conflict in Gaza that has a devastating effect on civilians and caused a catastrophic humanitarian situation; | |
| – | the fact that Hamas has taken and is still holding innocent people, including women and children, hostages, and calls for the unconditional and immediate release of hostages; | |
| – | the deliberate and malignant fuelling of an exceptionally tense situation, through repeated attacks targeting Israel since 7 October 2023, by state and non-state actors in the region with Iran being the main instigator, as well as the Houthis in Yemen and Hezbollah in Lebanon acting as some of its proxies; | |
| – | Iran’s persistent non-compliance with its legal safeguard obligations under its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and with its commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) condemns, further, the advancement of its nuclear programme beyond all credible civilian justification and the destabilisation of the Middle East this causes, including through proxies, such as attacks on Israel and sponsoring terrorism and civil conflicts; the attacks perpetrated or attempted within the EU by terrorist organisations and networks affiliated to Iran; | |
| – | the wrongful detention of European citizens in Iran, the execution of the European citizen of dual German-Iranian nationality Jamshid Sharmahd on 29 October 2024, and the brutal oppression of the people of Iran, in particular the women; reiterates its unwavering support for the women of Iran, who are still subjected to gross violations of their fundamental rights two years after the Women, Life, Freedom movement was brutally repressed; urges the VP/HR to do the utmost to free these citizens and to put an end to the practice of Iranian hostage diplomacy, through which it detains foreign civilians and dual nationals, including by encouraging the Member States to recommend that their citizens abstain from travelling to Iran; | |
| – | the growing military cooperation between Iran and Russia, in particular the intention to sign a treaty on a comprehensive strategic partnership and Iran’s provision of drones and ballistic missiles to Russia for use against Ukraine and its people; | |
| – | the recent adoption of the law on the ‘promotion of virtue and prevention of vice’ in Afghanistan, as well as the systematic violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms, in particular the extreme interpretation of sharia which erases women from public life, bars them from working, hinders their access to all public places without being chaperoned by a male relative and to education beyond the sixth grade, amounting to gender apartheid; demands from the de facto authorities of Afghanistan that all gender-based restrictions on women be lifted and stresses that this must be a key condition for any engagement of the international community with the Taliban; insists on maintaining strict, conditional engagement with the Taliban based on the five benchmarks set by the Council for engaging with the de facto authorities and by holding the perpetrators of these grave violations of girls’ and women’s rights accountable, including through restrictive measures; | |
| – | the increasing breadth and intensity of operations, including cyberattacks and foreign information manipulation by the Chinese Government, as well as vessels and aircraft attempting to intimidate China’s neighbours, which violate peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and surrounding international waters and impede the freedom of navigation rights of all other parties; strongly condemns statements by the Chinese President that the People’s Republic of China will never renounce the right to use force with respect to Taiwan, and insists that the use of coercive measures to achieve unification contradicts international law; | |
| – | the government-led system of forced labour and the persistent violations of human rights, in particular the systematic repression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang Province; observes with concern the intense crackdown on ethnic minorities in Tibet, Hong Kong and Macau and the transnational repression of Chinese dissidents, as well as the persistent presence of Chinese police officers on EU territory; has taken note of and deplores the People’s Republic of China (PRC) for not implementing the recommendations of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR); calls on the PRC to allow the OHCHR independent access to the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region and invites the OHCHR to issue a comprehensive situational update and an action plan for holding the PRC accountable; calls on all EU Member States to suspend extradition treaties with Hong Kong and the PRC and to protect those individuals who are being harassed and persecuted; | |
| – | the deterioration of stability in the Sahel, exacerbated by the numerous military coups in the region in recent years; recalls that stability in the Sahel has direct repercussions for the security of European external borders and the management of irregular migration flows from the African continent; emphasises that the EU should urgently review its regional strategy for the Sahel; | |
| – | the coups in Burkina Faso and in Niger, with President Bazoum being detained and the constitution suspended; is increasingly concerned by the decision of the central Sahel military regimes in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger to leave the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), thus plunging ECOWAS into a deep political crisis; condemns additionally the physical attack on 29 September 2024 on an ECOWAS Member of Parliament and other participants of an officially declared opposition rally in Lomé; calls on the Togolese authorities to ensure the promotion and protection of the fundamental principles of human and peoples’ rights enshrined in Article 4 of the revised ECOWAS Treaty, such as the rights of peaceful assembly, freedom of association, belief and expression; calls on the ECOWAS authorities and its member states to support the efforts needed to safeguard the principles of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights throughout the subregion; takes note of the closure of the European Union Military Partnership Mission in Niger (EUMPM Niger) and of the Capacity Building Mission in Niger (EUCAP Sahel Niger) and the non-renewal of the European Union Training Mission in Mali (EUTM); observes with concern how Russia has intensified the development of state-to-state relationships and cooperation initiatives with African states through military cooperation and a commitment to cooperate on the development of nuclear energy; condemns the rise of terrorist attacks and heavy civilian losses in the Sahel, as well as the presence and predation activities of Russian paramilitaries, which have led to the population being displaced and an influx of refugees, also caused by the instability in the region; deplores the fact that the void UN peacekeepers have left has effectively been filled by Wagner Group mercenaries and Russian and Turkish military, whose industries supply arms to Sahelian capitals; | |
| – | the civil war in Sudan, the devastating consequences for the civil population, the atrocities committed against them and, in particular, the despicable large-scale use of rape as a weapon of war; | |
| – | the last minute tactical and technical constraints imposed by the authorities of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), which prevented the EU Election Observation Mission from monitoring the presidential elections; condemns the violence committed by the Rwanda-backed M23 rebel movement destabilising the eastern DRC; calls for a review of the EU strategy for the Great Lakes region; | |
| – | the authoritarian regime of Daniel Ortega and Rosario Murillo, who are systematically undermining Nicaragua’s democratic structures; recalls that the regime in Nicaragua maintains strong ties with other autocracies, such as those in Iran, Venezuela and Cuba; condemns the systematic human rights violations and abuses perpetrated by the Cuban regime; strongly condemns and fully rejects the electoral fraud orchestrated by the regime in Venezuela and demands that the Maduro government cease its policy of repression and attacks on civil society and the opposition; recalls that on 19 September 2024, Parliament recognised Edmundo González Urrutia as the legitimate and democratically elected President of Venezuela and María Corina Machado as the leader of the democratic forces in Venezuela; highlights the fact that various democratic states in the region and throughout the world have recognised González as president-elect; recalls that he should have been sworn in on 10 January 2025; expresses satisfaction that on 17 December 2024, Parliament awarded the 2024 Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought to María Corina Machado, as the leader of the democratic forces in Venezuela, and to president-elect Edmundo González Urrutia, representing all Venezuelans inside and outside the country fighting for the reinstitution of freedom and democracy; | |
| – | the employment of the ‘Cuban medical brigade’ in some European countries as a form of infringement of fundamental rights and freedoms and of slavery and forced labour; | |
| – | the risk of collapse of the state structures and difficult humanitarian situation in Haiti due to rampant gang violence; | |
| – | the fact that the PRC, Russia, Iran and other totalitarian or authoritarian regimes use information manipulation and malign interference as integral instruments to exert pressure on multilateral institutions and democratic values and norms, to abuse power, to increase the incidence and severity of human rights violations, to constrict spaces for civil society, independent media and democratic opposition movements, to spread anti-Western disinformation and to use various forms of transnational repression to intimidate and constrict spaces for civil society, independent media and democratic opposition movements in the diaspora; | |
| – | the increasing attacks, harassment, arbitrary detention, torture and killings of HRDs worldwide, especially those advocating for environmental, indigenous, women’s, LGBTQI+ and anti-corruption rights; further notes the increasingly sophisticated tactics used by state and non-state actors, including digital surveillance and smear campaigns, aimed at silencing HRDs; stresses the urgent need to protect HRDs, who also play a critical role in upholding democracy and the rule of law globally; calls for enhanced support and protection mechanisms for HRDs facing threats, harassment and violence, especially those in high-risk areas or working on sensitive issues such as environmental, indigenous and women’s rights; | |
| – | attempts to circumvent EU and international sanctions, which it sees as strategies posing direct threats to the international rules-based order; | |
| – | the failure by Azerbaijan to comply with the order of 17 November 2023, issued by the International Court of Justice, indicating provisional measures regarding the safe, unimpeded and expeditious return of the 100 000 ethnic Armenians who fled Nagorno-Karabakh after the September 2023 pre-planned, unjustified military attack by Azerbaijan, as well as the refusal of Azerbaijani authorities to release all 23 Armenian prisoners of war it currently detains; stresses the need to support all initiatives and activities that could lead to the establishment of lasting peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan; demands, to that end, the withdrawal of Azerbaijan’s troops from the entirety of Armenia’s sovereign territory and warns, simultaneously, that any further military action against Armenia would be unacceptable and would have serious consequences for the partnership between Azerbaijan and the EU; highlights the fact that Azerbaijan’s connectivity issues with its exclave Nakhchivan should be resolved with full respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Armenia; reiterates its position that the EU should be ready to impose sanctions on any individuals and entities that threaten the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Armenia; stresses that Parliament’s multiple warnings on the situation have not led to any change in the EU’s stance towards Azerbaijan; calls for the EU to end its reliance on gas exports from Azerbaijan; calls on the Commission to suspend the 2022 memorandum of understanding on the strategic partnership in the field of energy and to act accordingly; insists that any future partnership agreement between the EU and Azerbaijan be conditional on the release of all political prisoners and the improvement of the human rights situation in the country; condemns the Russian ‘gas laundering’ through Azerbaijan and the Azerbaijani authorities’ facilitation of Russia’s circumvention of EU sanctions; calls for the EU to cease all technical and financial assistance to Azerbaijan that might contribute to strengthening its military or security capabilities; calls on the Member States to freeze exports of all military and security equipment to Azerbaijan; condemns Azerbaijan’s repeated attempts to denigrate and destabilise Member States, including through the so-called Baku Initiative Group; condemns the ongoing deterioration of the human rights situation in the country; |
6. Concurs with:
| – | the need to improve relations with Türkiye; welcomes the partial de-escalation of tensions in the east Mediterranean and the Aegean but reiterates its concern that Türkiye’s foreign policy continues to be at odds with EU priorities under the CFSP; recalls, in this context, the signature and the evocation of the memorandum of understanding between Türkiye and Libya on comprehensive security and military cooperation and on the delimitation of maritime zones; | |
| – | the call on Türkiye to work on a constructive, and not assertive nor aggressive, approach in its neighbourhood, including the Southern Caucasus; regrets that Türkiye continues to dispute the sovereignty and sovereign rights of an EU Member State; recalls that Türkiye’s accession process is contingent on its full compliance with the Copenhagen criteria and on its normalisation of relations with all EU Member States, including the Republic of Cyprus; calls for the status of the buffer zone and the mandate of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus to be respected; urges Türkiye and the Turkish Cypriot leadership to cease and reverse all such unilateral activities and refrain from any further actions and provocations; calls for engagement in peaceful UN-led negotiations and for real progress to be made in the Cyprus settlement talks, firmly within the agreed UN framework, which is the only framework accepted by the EU and the international community, and in line with EU law, values and principles; | |
| – | the assessment that, in the absence of a drastic change of course by the Turkish Government and the recognition of the Republic of Cyprus as a sovereign state, Türkiye’s EU accession process cannot be resumed; is alarmed by the recent arrest of the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality Mayor, Ekrem İmamoğlu, of the Republican People’s Party (CHP), days before he was chosen by the CHP as its candidate for the next presidential election, and deplores the permanent targeting of the political opposition; | |
| – | the urgent need for the EU and the Turkish Government to move forward toward a mutual reflection process, including a modernised association agreement, which would lead to a mutually beneficial, more dynamic and strategic partnership, with strict conditionality on the respect of rule of law, fundamental rights, international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, and good neighbourly relations, considering the key role played by Türkiye, for example, in the Black Sea region and its significance as a NATO ally; | |
| – | the fact that Türkiye is making an inadequate effort in aligning with the EU’s CFSP, including on sanctions and the anti-circumvention of sanctions, as well as with the need for Türkiye to cooperate closely with the EU’s Sanctions Envoy; deplores the unacceptable nature of the solidarity and support that the President of Türkiye has publicly provided to the terrorist organisation Hamas; reiterates its concerns about the ongoing deterioration of democratic standards in Türkiye; recalls that Türkiye also targets the EU with foreign information manipulation and interference and that its government is considering introducing a Russian-style foreign agents law; underlines the incompatibility between Türkiye’s candidacy for BRICS+ and the EU’s CFSP; | |
| – | the concern over democratic backsliding in Georgia, manifested by the fact that the parliamentary elections held on 26 October 2024 did not respect international standards for democratic elections or its commitments as a member of the OSCE to carry out free and fair elections, thus undermining the legitimacy of the results and the public’s trust in the government; emphasises that violations of electoral integrity are incompatible with the standards expected from an EU candidate country; rejects any recognition of the parliamentary elections and considers Georgia to be a state captured by the illegitimate Georgian Dream regime and thus rejects any decisions taken by the body that has taken control of the country, such as the rushed adoption of amendments to the Code on Administrative Offences, the Criminal Code and the Law on Assemblies and Manifestations; calls urgently for early elections conducted in an improved election environment, managed by an independent and impartial election administration with widespread international observation, to ensure a genuinely free, fair and transparent process that would represent the will of the people of Georgia; concurs with the European Council’s conclusions of 27 June 2024 that a failure to reverse the current course of action, including the law on ‘transparency of foreign influence’, the law on ‘family values and protection of minors’, as well as the changes to the Electoral Code, jeopardises Georgia’s EU path, de facto leading to a halt of the accession process; continues to recognise Salome Zourabichvili as the legitimate President of Georgia and representative of the Georgian people; praises her efforts to peacefully steer the country back towards a democratic and European path of development; calls on the President of the European Council to invite President Zourabichvili to represent Georgia at an upcoming European Council meeting and at the next European Political Community summit; reiterates its unwavering support for the Georgian people’s legitimate European aspirations, which are being betrayed by the Georgian Government; demands the immediate release of all people detained for peacefully protesting against the recent decisions by Georgia concerning a suspension of EU integration; calls for the EU’s funding mechanisms to be adjusted to take into account the needs that arise in a more hostile and anti-democratic environment; highlights the urgency of the need to support civil society in the light of growing repression and the suspension of the activities of the US Agency for International Development (USAID), and therefore urges the Commission to ramp up support without delay; maintains the view that the measures taken so far by the EU in response to the flagrant democratic backsliding and reneging on previous commitments do not yet fully reflect the severity of the situation in Georgia and the latest developments; welcomes the Council’s decision to suspend visa-free travel for Georgian diplomats and officials, but considers it necessary to initiate reflection on the possible suspension of Georgia’s visa-free status, based on non-compliance with fundamental rights benchmarks; deplores the obstruction by the Hungarian and Slovak Governments of the Council decisions on the introduction of sanctions against individuals responsible for democratic backsliding in Georgia; calls on the Commission to use the frozen EUR 120 million originally intended as support for the Georgian authorities to enhance the EU’s support for Georgia’s civil society, in particular the non-governmental sector and independent media, which are increasingly coming under undue pressure from the ruling political party and the authorities, as well as to support programmes supporting democratic resilience and electoral integrity; strongly encourages the EU and its Member States to introduce personal sanctions against all key figures of the political regime, as well as their family members and the regime’s enablers in administration, business, the media, the justice system and law enforcement agencies; calls for the EU, in cooperation with other jurisdictions, in particular the United Kingdom, to freeze the financial assets of Bidzina Ivanishvili; encourages individual Member States and relevant regional organisations to avoid actively legitimising the self-appointed Georgian Dream authorities and call, in this regard, for suspending the EU Georgia Association Council; | |
| – | the observation that Russia and China have become significant players in the Southern Neighbourhood, especially North Africa, while Türkiye and the Gulf states, chief among them the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, have risen as regional forces; argues that the idea of a single ‘neighbourhood’ for both Eastern and Southern Europe overlooks their distinct challenges; concurs further with the strategic relevance of the Southern Neighbourhood, its stability, economic development and prosperity; recalls that instability and insecurity in the Southern Neighbourhood remains an ongoing challenge for European external border management; underlines the interference of strategic competitors in the region and calls strongly for the EU to send a solid and clear political message in favour of renewed cooperation with countries of the Southern Neighbourhood; calls on the VP/HR and the Commission to release, as an urgent matter, the new pact for the Mediterranean and to secure adequate resources for its timely and effective implementation; reiterates that a dynamic network of strategic partnerships tailored to the specific needs and aspirations of each country in our Southern Neighbourhood should be at the centre of the new pact; believes, in this context, that the EU should conduct a thorough review of the current incentive structure that combines the promise of financial assistance and trade benefits in exchange for political and economic reforms and ensure that it aligns with broader EU objectives, including the promotion of human rights and democratic values; stresses that besides prioritising bilateral cooperation, the EU should also continue to foster regional cooperation through existing frameworks such as the Union for the Mediterranean, which offers a valuable platform for promoting dialogue and joint action on issues of common concern; | |
| – | the concern about Russian and Chinese pressure exerted in Central Asia and stresses the need to scale up the EU’s presence in the region in response, given its geostrategic importance; highlights the hesitation of Central Asian states to lend support to Russia’s war of aggression given the effect the war is having on the region; underlines the EU’s interest in increasing economic relations and intensifying political ties with the countries of Central Asia, in part to address the circumvention of sanctions against Russia and Belarus; calls on the authorities of the Central Asian states, particularly Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, to cooperate closely with the EU, in particular with its Sanctions Envoy; encourages the Commission and the Member States to continue promoting political and economic reforms that strengthen the rule of law, democracy, good governance and respect for human rights; | |
| – | the fact that the Arctic is of geostrategic importance as regards the expansion of potential maritime routes, access to natural resources, climate conservation and territorial claims; stresses that this importance is heightened not only by Russian military expansion in the High North but also by China’s increasing presence and interest in the region, and its self-proclamation as a ‘near-Arctic state’; underscores the need for ensuring freedom and safety of navigation amid these two states’ growing influence and militarisation; underlines the importance of preserving security, stability and cooperation in the Arctic; stresses that the region must remain free from military tensions and natural resource exploitation, while respecting the rights of indigenous peoples; reiterates the need to include the EU’s Arctic policy in the CFSP and engage in effective cooperation with NATO; calls for the Arctic to be addressed regularly within the Political and Security Committee and Council meetings; | |
| – | the strategic importance of the Taiwan Strait and the Indo-Pacific in the face of increasing Chinese intimidation in the region, including through military and hybrid means, and stresses the need to scale up the EU’s presence in the region; underlines the EU’s interest in increasing economic relations and intensifying substantial ties with like-minded partners in the region, including Taiwan; asks the Commission and the Member States to follow a coordinated EU strategy of preparedness and anticipation of possible scenarios in the Taiwan Strait, while regularly informing Parliament and providing an impact assessment; | |
| – | the effectiveness of the implementation of a Gulf strategy, advancing in a strategic partnership with each of the Gulf countries and working together to promote global and regional security and prosperity; | |
| – | the focus on achieving accountability in the cyberspace, through the operationalisation of the EU digital diplomacy toolbox and the attention given to strengthening global cyber resilience; calls for an increased focus on building the cyber resilience capacity of developing democracies faced with hybrid challenges to their electoral systems; calls for increasing joint cyber defence exercises between the EU and NATO in order to improve interoperability and readiness to counter hybrid threats; | |
| – | the commitment to place democracy promotion at the forefront of the CFSP and to ensure the EU’s proactive role in this regard, building on lessons learned from previous democracy support actions, in particular in support of civil society, HRDs, critical voices, democratic opposition and media; | |
| – | the need to fight impunity and strengthen accountability efforts globally, including through the ICC, and to stand up for international law and international humanitarian law; remains deeply concerned about the trend of state officials undermining decisions of international institutions and their employees; expresses its utmost concern about the US sanctions against the ICC, its prosecutors, judges and staff, which constitute a serious attack on the international justice system; calls on the Commission to urgently activate the blocking statute and on the Member States to urgently increase their diplomatic efforts in order to protect and safeguard the ICC as an indispensable cornerstone of the international justice system; regrets the failure of some ICC member states to execute ICC arrest warrants, thereby undermining the ICC’s work; | |
| – | the urgent and ongoing need to promote gender equality and women’s empowerment through all EU external action a foreign policy that takes into account gender mainstreaming in line with the 2021-2025 Gender Action Plan, especially in light of the current global rollback of women’s rights; emphasises that at the current rate of progress, achieving gender equality worldwide will take another 131 years, underscoring the critical importance of accelerating efforts to safeguard and advance women’s rights and opportunities; |
II.CFSP objectives in 2025
7. Identifies, in the following section, Parliament’s CFSP objectives in 2025, thus complementing the views expressed in the VP/HR’s annual CFSP report;
Addressing the global consequences of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine
8. Emphasises that Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and its consequences, including economic uncertainty, food insecurity and high energy prices, in combination with the revisionist behaviour of the Russian Federation against a number of states neighbouring the Black Sea, destabilises and threatens the Eastern Neighbourhood and the Western Balkans, which in turn erodes the European security architecture; underlines, in this context, the need for reinforcing the EU’s capacities to support democratic institutions in our immediate neighbourhood; underlines, also, the importance of the protection of the EU’s eastern border, which contributes to the security of the entire EU; stresses that the East Shield and the Baltic Defence Line should be the flagship EU projects for fostering deterrence and overcoming potential threats from the east and would establish an integrated land border management system that is designed to strengthen the EU’s external land border with Russia and Belarus against military and hybrid threats;
9. Notes that the EU’s response to the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine is being closely watched by autocratic actors around the world and will have a decisive influence in shaping their behaviour on the international stage; is concerned by the growing cooperation and coordination among autocratic regimes, including through their material or other support for Russia’s aggression against Ukraine; urges the Council to impose restrictive measures against countries that deliver military goods, such as unmanned aerial vehicles and surface-to-surface missiles, to the Russian Federation for use against civilian targets; recalls that the use of such military goods against civilian targets is a war crime; notes, with grave concern, the increasing cooperation between the Russian Federation and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), and underscores that the employment of North Korean troops by Russia is widening the scale of the conflict; emphasises, equally, the urgent need for further sanctions against Belarus, mirroring all sanctions against Russia;
10. Holds the view that the EU and its Member States are now Ukraine’s only strategic allies and accordingly calls for the EU and its Member States to meaningfully increase and speed up military and economic support, humanitarian assistance, as well as financial aid in every possible way to put Ukraine in a position of strength, in order to liberate all its people and to deter any further aggression by Russia following a potential ceasefire agreement; suggests, to this end, strengthening the European Union Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine, which has trained approximately 75 000 Ukrainian troops, and underlines the urgent need to provide Ukraine with increased air defence and surface-to-surface capacities to defend its critical energy infrastructure, and calls on the Member States to immediately lift restrictions on the use of Western weapons systems, such as long-range Taurus missiles, delivered to Ukraine, against legitimate military targets on Russian territory, which would be fully in line with Ukraine’s right to self-defence according to the UN Charter;
11. Reaffirms its commitment to supporting Ukraine’s desire for a just and lasting peace and to the peace formula and Victory Plan put forward by Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy; recalls that any initiative, in particular diplomatic solutions, aimed at ending the Russian war of aggression and achieving a just and lasting peace needs to be based on terms and input provided by Ukraine and ultimately accepted by the Ukrainian people; expresses, in this context, deep concern over the apparent shift in the United States’ stance on the Russian war of aggression, which has included openly blaming Ukraine for the ongoing war, suspending US military aid and attempting to coerce Ukraine into relinquishing its legitimate right to self-defence; strongly deplores any attempts at blackmailing Ukraine’s leadership into surrendering to the Russian aggressor for the sole purpose of announcing a so-called peace deal and considers that the current attempt by the US administration to negotiate a ceasefire and peace agreement without the involvement of European states, which will ultimately have to bear the outcome, is counterproductive, as it empowers the belligerent Russian State, thus showing that aggressive policy is not punished but rewarded; is cautiously optimistic about the proposal for a 30-day ceasefire agreement; recalls that a ceasefire can be an effective tool for suspending hostilities, but only if the aggressor fully adheres to it; expects, therefore, Russia to agree to it and follow it by ceasing all attacks on Ukraine, its military positions, civilian population, infrastructure and territory; concludes, nevertheless, taking into account the history of Russia’s violations of previous agreements, that peace can only be achieved by empowering Ukraine through robust security guarantees; is, conversely, of the opinion, that any settlement that undermines Ukraine’s legitimate aspirations, such as its right to choose its own security arrangements, or which lacks credible security guarantees, will risk subjecting Ukraine and other European countries to renewed Russian aggression; insists, therefore, that the EU engage in security commitments towards Ukraine as recommended in the Kyiv Security Compact in order to deter further Russian aggression;
12. Highlights that the financial support provided by the EU and its Member States to Ukraine exceeds that of any single country, reflecting the EU’s unparalleled commitment to Ukraine; underscores that the EU’s role in any negotiations impacting the security of Europe must be commensurate with its political and economic weight; reaffirms that there can be no negotiations relating to European security without the EU at the table;
13. Expects the Member States to keep its sanctions against Russia in place as long as needed to secure a just and lasting peace and until accountability has been achieved; calls, in the interim, for the EU and the Member States to reinforce the effectiveness and impact of its sanction packages adopted so far and to agree on new ones as soon as the need arises; points, in this context, towards sectors of special importance for the Russian economy, in particular banking, the metallurgy, nuclear, chemical and agricultural sectors, and raw materials such as aluminium, steel, uranium, titanium and nickel; calls for a ban or targeted tariffs on Russian imports to the EU with the aim of fully closing the flow of grain, potash and fertilisers; recalls that the strict implementation and uniform application of restrictive measures in all Member States is a precondition for the credibility and effectiveness of the EU’s external action; underscores, thus, the importance of ending all EU imports of Russian energy and supporting G7 efforts to lower the oil price cap; calls on the Commission to impose penalties on all European companies that continue to engage in business with the Russian Federation, as well as to further assess and combat sanction circumvention;
14. Appeals for proactive diplomacy with non-EU countries in order to minimise the circumvention of these sanctions; calls on the Commission to critically assess EU assistance to non-EU countries that actively support Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and urges the Council to impose restrictive measures on non-EU countries enabling Russia’s war of aggression, whether through the facilitation of sanction circumvention or through the provision of direct military assistance, such as in the case of Belarus, Iran or North Korea; calls on all countries to fully align with all EU sanctions packages;
15. Deplores the ‘no limits’ partnership between Russia and China, in particular the renewed commitment to strengthen their military ties; welcomes the Council’s decision to impose sanctions on Chinese companies for their support of Russia’s war in Ukraine;
16. Expresses its most serious concerns over Russia’s and China’s surveillance and sabotage of critical maritime infrastructures, such as seabed communication cables and offshore energy facilities; expresses in particular its strong concern about the damage to two subsea communications cables, one linking Finland and Germany and the other connecting Sweden to Lithuania, within less than 24 hours on 17 and 18 November 2024, and about the damaging by a tanker of the Russian shadow fleet of the EstLink2 power cable, linking Estonia and Finland, on 25 December 2024; calls on the EU to put in place effective monitoring and surveillance systems and regional coastguard cooperation to ensure the prevention and rapid detection of attacks against such infrastructures; welcomes in that regard, the launch of the operation ‘Baltic Sentry’ by NATO, with the participation of several Member States, to improve the security of critical undersea infrastructures in the Baltic Sea; calls on Member States to fully abide by the commitments of the New York joint statement on the security and resilience of undersea cables; recalls also that similar sabotage activities targeting critical underwater infrastructure are taking place in the Taiwan Strait;
17. Calls for the EU and its Member States to exercise strict control over, prevent and limit the activities of Russia’s shadow fleets which, in addition to violating EU and G7 sanctions, poses an immense ecological threat to ecosystems as a result of its technical deficiencies and frequent breakdowns; urges the Commission to take swift action, within the framework of the EU’s cooperation with the International Maritime Organization, and to design more targeted sanctions against the shadow fleet in the next sanctions package against Russia; specifies that such sanctions should designate all possible individual shadow fleet vessels, as well as their owners, operators, managers, etc.; recommends banning tanker sales to countries facilitating trade with Russia; notes that the flag states contributing to the Russian shadow fleet are thereby also helping the Russian war effort;
18. Reiterates its call for the necessary measures to be taken to return forcibly deported and illegally adopted Ukrainian children from Russia or occupied Ukrainian territory;
19. Calls on the Commission and the Council to designate the Russian State-funded private military Wagner Group as a terrorist organisation; draws attention to the so-called ‘Africa Corps’ that was created following the death of the Wagner Group’s former leader Yevgeny Prigozhin, in August 2023, and placed directly under the control of the Russian Ministry of Defence, in an effort to regroup Wagner elements under government control;
20. Reiterates that Ukraine, as a victim of aggression, has the legitimate right to self-defence in line with Article 51 of the UN Charter; calls on the VP/HR, the Commission the Council and the Member States concerned to enable effective Ukrainian countermeasures against Russia; recalls that Russia has violated international law and that the full seizure of the frozen Russian assets is an appropriate step towards enforcing Russia’s obligation to abide by international law, and to compensate Ukraine and other injured parties for the losses caused by Russia’s war of aggression; calls on the Commission to establish a sound legal regime for the confiscation of Russian State assets frozen by the EU; reminds the Commission that any such proposal does not take away the need for continued financial, political, military and humanitarian support; calls for the inclusion of all assets of the Russian State, Russian local authorities, Russian State-owned companies, and of individuals on the EU sanctions list, and for those assets to be used to compensate Ukraine for the damage caused by this war;
21. Points to the estimate of the latest Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment that at least EUR 506 billion will be required over the next decade for Ukraine’s recovery and reconstruction; welcomes the EU’s Ukraine Facility, which has a budget of almost EUR 50 billion, and the EU’s Loan Cooperation Mechanism, which offers loans to Ukraine of up to EUR 45 billion and which responds to Parliament’s call and builds upon the decision of the Council to direct extraordinary revenues stemming from immobilised Russian State assets to the Ukraine Assistance Fund and the Ukraine Facility, as well as upon the G7’s decision to offer Ukraine a USD 50 billion loan secured through immobilised Russian State assets; expresses its conviction that the new Ukraine Loan Cooperation Mechanism is a substantive step towards making Russia financially compensate for the massive damage it continues to cause in Ukraine;
22. Denounces the abusive use by the Hungarian Government of its veto power to delay or effectively block EU essential aid from being granted to Ukraine, attempting to undermine the unified EU position on Ukraine; calls on the VP/HR and the Council President as well as the Member States to use all available tools to prevent the Hungarian Government from further blocking aid;
23. Urges the VP/HR and the other Member States to overcome the blockade by the Hungarian Government of the EPF’s funding and disbursement decision, i.e. the one of EUR 450 million to Poland, being compensation for equipment delivered to Ukraine; urges them to guarantee that the EU’s only instrument in support of military aid to Ukraine becomes fully functional again; calls on the VP/HR to advance proposals to prevent such blockades in the future or to find an alternative mechanism that is fully reliable;
24. Underscores the urgent need for the EU and its Member States to push for the creation of a special international tribunal with jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute the crime of aggression committed against Ukraine by the political and military leadership of the Russian Federation and its allies; condemns the execution of Ukrainian prisoners of war by Russian forces; underscores that no peace will be sustainable without justice; welcomes the establishment of the International Centre for the Prosecution of the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine in The Hague; expresses support for all the activities of the ICC and International Court of Justice in prosecuting the crimes committed on Ukrainian territory; welcomes Ukraine’s ratification of the Rome Statute of the ICC, which allowed it to become a state party to it as of January 2025;
25. Commends Ukraine for its progress in the EU accession screening process despite wartime conditions and calls on Ukraine to continue its progress towards EU membership using all the resources made available to it under the Ukraine Facility and to ensure the meaningful involvement of its civil society in the implementation and monitoring phases thereof; recalls that EU accession is a strictly merit-based process that requires the fulfilment of the Copenhagen criteria for EU membership, including those concerning democracy, the rule of law, and fundamental values and the fight against corruption;
26. Believes that both Ukraine’s and Moldova’s accession to the EU would be a mutually beneficial investment in a united and strong Europe; welcomes the growth plan for the Republic of Moldova and the adoption of the Reform and Growth Facility for the Republic of Moldova, worth EUR 1,9 billion, which serves the purpose of accelerating EU-related reforms; expresses concern about the negative consequences of the suspension of USAID to Moldova; considers that this gap should be offset to the extent possible by EU sources, the European Endowment for Democracy and others; encourages the VP/HR to additionally enhance the CFSP partnership with Ukraine and Moldova and in this context welcomes the signature of the security and defence partnership between the EU and Moldova in May 2024; recalls the fact that the security of the Republic of Moldova is inextricably linked to the security of Ukraine; underscores, hence, the need to increase financial contributions from the EPF to further enhance Moldova’s defence capabilities;
27. Praises the Moldova for running the presidential election and the referendum professionally and with an extraordinary sense of duty and dedication, despite the continued massive interference from Russia and its proxies; welcomes the outcome of the 2024 Moldovan European Union membership referendum which enshrined the commitment to joining the EU in the country’s constitution; expresses its support to Moldova in defending its democracy; strongly condemns such constant and coordinated attempts by the Russian Federation, pro-Russian oligarchs and Russian-sponsored local proxies to destabilise the Republic of Moldova, sow divisions within Moldovan society and derail the country’s pro-European direction through hybrid attacks, the weaponisation of energy supplies, disinformation campaigns, bomb threats and staged protests as well as the threat or use of violence; commends the establishment and operations of the EU Partnership Mission in Moldova which have enhanced the Moldovan authorities’ capabilities to address Russian interference; calls on the Council, the Commission and the EEAS to provide the additional resources, including human and financial resources, equipment and civilian experts, necessary to continue implementing the mission’s mandate beyond May 2025;
28. Stresses the importance of the EPF for enhancing the EU’s ability to prevent conflicts, build peace and strengthen international security;
29. Welcomes the launch of the Belarus-EU consultative group to enable continuous dialogue between the EU and the Belarusian democratic forces; reiterates its support for the release of all political prisoners and the brave activists and journalists in Belarus who continue to resist the regime of the illegitimate leader in spite of ongoing crackdowns, notably the refusal to renew the passports of Belarussians abroad, and who have expressed their desire for democratic development in Belarus and for membership of the EU, including at the New Belarus Conference held in Warsaw in August 2023; underlines that such efforts demonstrate the fundamental role of civil society in strengthening democracy;
Resolving conflict and supporting peace in the Middle East
30. Affirms the right of Israel to defend itself as enshrined in and constrained by international law; recalls that Israel has the obligation to address the risk of mass starvation and the outbreak of disease epidemics in Gaza; recalls that Israel also has the obligation to protect the civilian population and that military operations must be proportionate and in line with international humanitarian law; expresses its concern about the military action by the Israeli Defence Forces in the Gaza Strip and in the West Bank and in Lebanon; calls for an immediate and permanent ceasefire including the unconditional release of all hostages;
31. Deeply regrets the breakdown of the ceasefire in Gaza, which has caused a large number of civilian casualties in recent air strikes; deplores, in this context, the refusal of Hamas to hand over the remaining hostages; calls for an immediate return to the full implementation of the ceasefire-hostage release agreement and stresses the need for progress towards its second phase; praises the commitment of mediators, including the US, Egypt and Qatar, whose efforts were pivotal in achieving the ceasefire-hostage release agreement in the first place; stands ready to engage in discussions on future concrete contributions to support a ceasefire; considers that it is crucial that all obligations made under the deal are upheld, ensuring the release of all hostages and establishing a lasting cessation of violence, as well as allowing unrestrained access and sustained distribution of humanitarian and medical assistance in the Gaza Strip; welcomes, to that end, the redeployment of EUBAM Rafah on 31 January 2025 to support the Palestinian Authority in facilitating crossings for medical evacuations; expresses its unease about the recent closing of the Rafah Crossing Point until further notice as a result of military operations in Gaza initiated on 18 March 2025; calls for all parties to fully commit to their obligations and to prioritise the protection of civilians; urges all European and international actors to actively oversee the implementation of the ceasefire and hold accountable those who fail to comply;
32. Believes that the Association Council with Israel, held in Brussels on 24 February 2025, was a first step towards re-engaging in frank and open discussion with the Israeli Foreign Minister, which will require following up; acknowledges the value of engaging with Israel to strengthen the EU’s role in the Middle East, while stressing that the partnership must be based on full respect for rights and values; recalls that compliance with Article 2 of the Association Agreement is a crucial element of the partnership and calls for continued monitoring and assessment of its implementation by the Israeli Government; welcomes the anticipated High-Level Dialogue with the Palestinian Prime Minister in April 2025;
33. Reiterates its unwavering support for a negotiated two-state solution on the basis of the 1967 borders, with two sovereign, democratic states as peaceful neighbours and with Jerusalem as their shared capital, which remains the most viable path to lasting peace and security for both Israelis and Palestinians; calls for the VP/HR to support all efforts to this end, and in particular the Global Alliance for the Implementation of the two-State Solution; calls on all parties to renew efforts to remove the obstacles to this solution and to engage in dialogue aimed at achieving mutual understanding and respect; welcomes the prospect of a return of the Palestinian Authority to Gaza; regrets the fact that the Palestinian Authority has not held elections since 2005, which hampers its credibility, and expects elections to be held soon; is convinced that there can be no prospect for peace, security, stability and prosperity for Gaza as well as for reconciliation between the Israeli and Palestinian populations as long as Hamas and other terrorist groups play a role in the Gaza Strip; calls, therefore, on the EU Special Representative for the Middle East Peace Process to support efforts to counteract the further radicalisation of young people in the region; condemns the acceleration of the illegal Israeli settlement of Palestinian territory, which violates international law, undermines efforts towards achieving a two-state solution, and poses a significant obstacle to lasting peace; expresses concern over the rising violence committed by Israeli forces and extremist settlers in the West Bank and East Jerusalem and welcomes sanctions adopted against extremist Israeli settlers; reiterates the important role of the Abraham Accords as a framework for achieving durable peace stability and prosperity in the Middle East; welcomes the Arab Recovery and Reconstruction Plan presented at the Cairo Summit on 4 March 2025, which represents a serious basis for discussions on the future of the Gaza Strip; encourages the VP/HR and the Commissioner for the Mediterranean to engage constructively with Arab partners to provide credible solutions for the reconstruction, governance and security of Gaza; rejects, on the other hand, the ‘Trump-Gaza’ proposal, which ignores the volatile security conditions across the Middle East; holds the opinion that the extent of destruction and human suffering in Gaza requires comprehensive international engagement, with the United States, together with the EU, the UN, Arab states, and other international partners, complementing each other’s efforts in order for negotiations to resume and to be constructive; is committed to the future normalisation efforts between Israel and Arab states in the region;
34. Supports a just and viable solution to the question of Palestinian refugees; underscores that the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) plays an important role in providing humanitarian aid and essential services which in the present circumstances must not be interrupted, and considers that all UN agencies active in the region must be supported in their efforts; recalls, however, its concern regarding serious allegations made against staff members of UNRWA which suggest that UNRWA has employed members of the terrorist organisation Hamas; welcomes the actions taken by the UN following the allegations regarding the Agency’s staff and welcomes UNRWA’s full commitment to implement the recommendations stemming from the ‘Colonna report’; echoes the European Council conclusions of 17 October 2024 which condemn any attempt to abrogate the 1967 agreement between Israel and UNRWA; insists that the Commission ensure that no funds from the EU budget finance, contribute to or support the activities of Hamas or Hezbollah; stresses that additional measures may be needed in the future to strive for even more transparency and accountability;
35. Expresses concern about rising tensions in the Middle East and urges all involved parties to uphold international humanitarian law, to show maximum restraint and to commit to de-escalation, as a regional conflict must be avoided at all costs; deplores the loss of thousands of civilian lives; urges the disarmament of Hezbollah as part of broader measures to reduce hostilities and ensure regional stability; calls on the VP/HR to come forward with a comprehensive EU Middle East strategy, to increase the EU’s effective presence in the region, to promotes long-term stability and peace in the region and to strengthen partnerships with key regional stakeholders; stresses that the strategy must be fleshed out within the first months of the new Commission’s mandate and should be reflected in the forthcoming MFF for it to have any tangible impact on a rapidly deteriorating situation; underscores the need for Member States to step up their diplomatic efforts with international partners, including with the Gulf countries, in order to encourage urgent de-escalation and meaningful dialogue; underlines the need to prioritise and strengthen civil society organisations in the region, particularly organisations working on the protection of human rights and peacebuilding;
36. Strongly condemns the destabilising role that the Iranian regime and its network of non-state actors play in the region; recalls that Iran has stepped out of the shadow of its proxies and condemns Iran’s two direct and open attacks on Israel’s territory in 2024, to which Israel retaliated both times, representing an unprecedented scaling up of the conflict; strongly condemns Hezbollah’s attacks against Israel which led to an Israeli ground invasion in Lebanon causing a high number of civilian casualties, forced displacement and escalating violence in Lebanon; takes note of the ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah, agreed on 27 November 2024 for a period of 60 days; urges Israel to withdraw from southern Lebanon in line with UN Security Council Resolution 1701; recalls the need for a permanent cessation of hostilities as soon as possible to create space for a diplomatic solution along the Blue Line; demands the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701 in its entirety, as the only path to de-escalate tensions and stabilise the Israel-Lebanon border in a durable manner and fully restore the sovereignty, territorial integrity and stability of Lebanon; welcomes the Council Decision of 21 January 2025 to adopt a third assistance measure under the European Peace Facility worth EUR 60 million to the benefit of the Lebanese Armed Forces;
37. Calls on the Council and the VP/HR to add Hezbollah in its entirety to the EU list of terrorist organisations;
38. Takes note of the arrest warrant issued by the ICC on 21 November 2024;
39. Echoes the call of ICC President Judge Tomoko Akane for the EU to take immediate action to protect the ICC and the rule of law in the international community, including by swiftly amending the EU blocking statute to bring the ICC within its scope;
40. Welcomes the formation of a new government; wishes President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam success in delivering on the aspirations of the Lebanese people; is committed to supporting the country in rebuilding state institutions capable of fulfilling their mission at the service of all citizens, in taking forward a reform-oriented and forward-looking agenda, particularly regarding civil liberties and the rule of law; supports reconstruction efforts while embarking on a path of political stabilisation and socio-economic recovery; calls on the VP/HR to relaunch the EU-Lebanon Partnership, including by holding an Association Council soon;
41. Strongly condemns recent attacks against the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) by the Israeli Defence Forces and Hezbollah; reiterates the inviolability of all UN personnel and premises and reaffirms the essential stabilising role played by UNIFIL in southern Lebanon, to which 16 Member States contribute, and calls for an immediate end to these attacks;
42. Welcomes the EU’s decision to renew sanctions against Iran until July 2025, including by sanctioning Iran’s production of unmanned drones and missiles and its supply thereof to Russia and the wider Middle Eastern region; highlights the strong links between Iran and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), its proxies such as the Houthis and militias operating in Iraq and Syria; strongly condemns the high number of terrorist and assassination attacks, or attempted attacks, perpetrated by the IRGC all over the world, including on European soil, over the past few decades; reiterates its call for the IRGC to be added to the EU list of terrorist organisations; points out that the sanctioning options that have not yet been exhausted include a much more restrictive approach to technology transfers through exports of products that are not categorised as ‘dual-use’;
43. Strongly condemns the destabilising Houthi attacks against commercial as well as military vessels transiting the Red Sea; stresses that these have caused significant disruption to global trade as shipping companies are forced to reroute much of the Red Sea’s traffic around the southern tip of Africa; calls for collective action and encourages enhanced EU engagement and international cooperation, and strongly urges for continued action to ensure the freedom of navigation in one of the world’s most critical waterways; calls for the immediate cessation of these illegal attacks;
44. Shares the objective of preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons at all costs; points, however, to the fact that the regime in Tehran has clearly rejected a revival of the JCPOA and has refused to cooperate in its ongoing dispute with the International Atomic Energy Agency; highlights that, at the same time, Iran has increased its nuclear weapons capability; regrets the fact that there is currently no strategy in place to persuade Iran to refrain from building military nuclear capacity, nor a plan of action for the event that Iran does cross the nuclear threshold; calls upon the VP/HR to put forward a revised strategy towards Iran that prepares for all events;
45. Expresses concern regarding the inflammatory rhetoric, fuelled by mis- and disinformation, that surrounds this conflict, and its instrumentalisation by malicious actors to sow distrust and hatred including within European societies, as illustrated notably, but not solely, by the worrying rise of antisemitism; warns that it should be a primary focus of the EU fight against disinformation and calls for a coordinated approach by the Commission, taking into account the external and internal dimensions of its policies, including but not limited to the forthcoming strategic communication plan to promote the EU’s role in the Southern Neighbourhood;
46. Welcomes the historic fall of the Assad regime in Syria; recalls that it only survived so long thanks to the support of its Russian and Iranian allies and that its collapse shows they are weakened; welcomes the fresh start in EU-Syria relations, manifested by the appointment of an EU Chargé d’Affaires in Damascus, diplomatic engagement and high-level meetings undertaken by Member States and EU leaders, as well as the ninth Brussels Conference that took place on 17 March 2025 with the participation of interim Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shibani; considers that the establishment of diplomatic relations with the new Syrian authorities should not be a pretext for leniency for Member State nationals who fought as part of Islamist groups in Syria; declares that these fighters still represent a threat to the countries of which they are nationals and to all Member States of the EU; reiterates its unwavering support for the territorial integrity of Syria and highlights the need to urgently step up humanitarian aid and protection for the 16,7 million people in need; welcomes, to this end, the indefinite extension of humanitarian exemptions and the gradual, yet conditional, suspension of sanctions on a range of economic sectors so as to provide the Syrian economy with a much-needed lifeline; pledges to closely monitor the political transition process and to call on the Member States to reverse the lifting of sanctions should the Syrian authorities not live up to their stated commitments; recognises the challenge for orderly state-building linked to the risk of insurgency by armed groups loyal to the former regime and encourages the caretaker authorities to urgently organise paramilitary and civilian disarmament, especially following the inacceptable retaliatory targeting of the Alawite community based on its perceived association with the Assad regime; calls for the EU and its Member States to support the implementation process of the agreement between the Syrian transitional government and the Kurdish-led SDF, in order to guarantee the Kurdish community full recognition and political participation in Syria; calls on all parties to contribute to a peaceful and Syrian-led political transition towards an inclusive, democratic governance model that ensures the representation, participation and equal rights of women, minorities and all members of Syrian society regardless of ethnicity or religion and that puts the good functioning of the state institutions and the wellbeing of the Syrian people at the heart of their actions; welcomes the caretaker President al-Sharaa’s acknowledgement of Syria’s diversity, while taking note that the composition of the current interim government is lacking in this regard; strongly believes that the success of the Syrian political transition, notably the safeguarding of civil peace and the building of trust in state institutions, hinges on transitional justice and reconciliation as a path to fighting the impunity of all parties responsible for violations of international humanitarian law; stresses that the fight against impunity in Syria is a moral and political imperative for Europe and the international community; calls on the EU and its Member States to support the work of the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011; encourages Syria to ratify the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and align national legislation accordingly, as well as give the ICC retroactive jurisdiction through a declaration; calls on the EU and its Member States to consider the establishment of a special mission, in cooperation with international partners, to help document cases of serious crimes by the Assad regime, as well as by all other factions; stresses the importance of preserving the territorial integrity of Syria, also to help preserve stability in the region; calls on the VP/HR and the Member States to take immediate steps to prevent any re-establishment or reinforcement of Russian forces, paramilitaries or intelligence in the country;
Incentivising cooperation with like-minded partners
47. Acknowledges that the requirement for unanimity forces the Member States to work relentlessly to achieve compromise and unity, which is the source of the EU’s political leverage on the world stage; points out, however, that the trade-off between the ideal of unity and the high costs of unanimity in terms of credibility on the global stage should be assessed critically, particularly bearing in mind the effective functioning of an enlarged EU;
48. Regrets, in this context, the fact that individual Member States have used their veto right to water down agreements, delay decision-making or thwart a common policy altogether; regrets that the potential for fast, efficient and effective foreign, security and defence action, as provided for, inter alia, by the passerelle clauses of the TEU, has never been used;
49. Reiterates its call for the Council to gradually switch to qualified majority voting for decisions in areas of the CFSP that do not have military or defence implications; acknowledges the concerns of some Member States, which fear a decreased ability to influence foreign and security policy at EU level; encourages, pending the full application of qualified majority voting to decisions without military or defence implications, the full use of all currently existing possibilities to enhance decisiveness in this regard, including the use of constructive abstention in line with Article 31(1) TEU; recognises that progress towards the application of qualified majority voting can only be gradual, building on the formation of a European strategic culture;
50. Highlights that the world is becoming more multipolar and less multilateral; emphasises that multilateral forums, chief among them the UN and its agencies, should be considered the EU’s format of cooperation of choice; calls on the Member States to reinforce inclusive forms of multilateral governance and encourages, in this context, the Commission, the EEAS and the Council to step up interinstitutional cooperation with multilateral organisations that are integral to the international rules-based order and thereby protect the UN and the multilateral system as a whole; expresses concern, in this respect, about the increasing relevance of exclusive formats of cooperation, which experience increasing competition; expresses concern at the growing membership of the BRICS group, which currently includes 45 % of the world’s population; stresses that such cooperation provides Russia with the means to circumvent measures intended to politically isolate the country and enables China to further extend its influence through its modus operandi of financing infrastructure projects; underlines that the seriousness of China’s engagement will depend on its willingness to make concessions to address the management and the restructuring of the debt of the countries of the Global South; observes, at the same time, that international institutions and norms are increasingly being instrumentalised and undermined by autocratic regimes; stresses that this trend puts the EU in a delicate position, having to balance the need to appeal for a broad and inclusive concept of multilateralism while reinforcing cooperation with selected, like-minded partners;
51. Calls on the Commission and the Council to re-evaluate and reassess the EU’s approach towards the BRICS group and its partners and to develop a separate EU policy towards BRICS+;
52. Calls strongly for a review of EU financial assistance to third countries to ensure that it does not support governments that challenge European values, spread anti-Western propaganda, support Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and undermine the current international order that upholds democracy, human rights and the fight against corruption;
53. Stresses, in this context, that the geopolitical context in which the EU is operating remains marked by radical uncertainty and a shift from cooperation to competition; observes with concern how all types of interaction are being weaponised and notes that this trend impairs international cooperation at a time when global transitions need to accelerate in order to effectively address global challenges; recalls that the EU cannot afford to turn inwards and must remain open and engaged in the world to defend its values and its interests; underlines that, in light of intensified efforts by third countries to destabilise the international order and undermine multilateralism through the spread of disinformation, enhanced cooperation and coordination with like-minded partners is essential;
54. Calls for the EU institutions and the Member States to actively support a comprehensive institutional reform of multilateral institutions, first and foremost the UN system and particularly the UN Security Council, which should include measures aimed at limiting the use of veto powers, boosting regional representation, making the executive body accountable to the assembly that elects it and redefining the composition to better reflect geopolitical reality, including by establishing a permanent seat for the EU; stresses that such reforms are essential to strengthen multilateralism, improve global governance and values-based decision-making, and address international challenges more inclusively and responsively;
55. Recalls the importance of a strong and constructive partnership with the UK given not only the existence of an unprecedentedly comprehensive Trade and Cooperation Agreement, the foundation of shared values such as democracy, support for multilateralism and human rights, but also the scope of the issues of common interest in fields such as defence, climate and energy, border management, the fight against terrorism, organised crime and the promotion of peace and stability; welcomes, especially, the renewed impetus from the new UK Government to reflect with the EU on possibilities for closer and more permanent foreign policy and security cooperation, underpinned by concrete actions and building on the good cooperation at UN level as well as the effective coordination between the EU and the UK on the adoption and monitoring of the implementation of sanctions against Russia; believes that such coordination is of added value for both the EU and the UK and hence welcomes the agreement to work towards the creation of an EU-UK security partnership based on shared interest and collective responsibility; believes that in the scope of such a partnership, topics such as maritime security should be consulted on; demands that Parliament be duly involved and informed in such reflections before and after the anticipated UK-EU Summit;
56. Takes note of the result of the presidential and congressional elections in the United States; expresses concern over the fast pace at which the new US administration has been reversing established partnerships and diplomatic tradition; expresses dismay concerning the current policy of appeasing Russia and targeting traditional allies; regrets recent comments made by US Vice President Vance, which question shared values underpinning the transatlantic partnership; warns that through such erratic policy, the Trump administration is gambling with a scarce good, namely trust in the US; believes, nonetheless, that the transatlantic relationship remains indispensable for the security of the partners on both sides of the Atlantic and is therefore worth investing in; deems it more crucial than ever to continue engaging with US counterparts at federal and state level; encourages Member States to pursue bilateral diplomatic channels with counterparts in the US as the format of cooperation preferred by the US administration, showing unity and commitment to a common EU position; reiterates the importance of EU-US summits to be held on a regular basis to provide top-level impetus to the future cooperation; fully supports the deepening of cooperation in the framework of the EU-US transatlantic dialogue, such as through transatlantic parliamentary diplomacy;
57. Deplores the decision by the US to bring a sudden halt to most of its humanitarian aid and development assistance, including but not limited to the aid provided until now by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), with devastating effects on countless people’s lives, but which also risks severe consequences for human rights and global security; recognises that the EU cannot replace USAID, but needs to strategically and smartly reallocate resources through a Team Europe approach so as to mitigate impacts, in both the interests of the countries affected and our own interests; welcomes the announcement by the Commission and the EEAS that efforts are underway to inject liquidity in severely affected areas through redeploying and increasing pre-financing; commends the decision to initiate mapping at EU level, which should also take into account secondary effects, and asks for the results to be shared with the Member States and with Parliament; asks the Commission to issue a statement taking stock of the holistic response of the EU to this crisis;
58. Calls on the Commission to foster closer ties with Canada in order to counter global challenges that affect our shared values, interests, security and prosperity; believes that the bilateral security and defence dialogue as well as the upcoming security and defence partnership provide the basis for enhanced security and defence cooperation, including on respective initiatives to boost defence industry production;
59. Reiterates, irrespectively, the need for Member States to fully operationalise the concept of EU strategic autonomy and defence readiness and to this end make collective and well-coordinated investments in their security and defence with the objective of achieving a genuine European Defence Union that is interoperable and complementary with the NATO alliance and can act independently when needed; considers that the EU must act urgently to reduce its dependencies on non-EU countries for its defence capabilities, in particular for strategic enablers, ensuring its own autonomous security; recalls that the EDTIB is a strategic asset for both the Union’s security and defence and for its foreign policy; calls for its significant strengthening and for the deepening of defence industrial partnerships and integration of the industrial basis of like-minded reliable partners into the EDTIB, first and foremost Ukraine;
60. Encourages close relations with western European non-EU countries, in particular cooperation in certain areas of EU external action; welcomes in this context the conclusion of negotiations on a broad package of measures for future EU-Switzerland relations, which mark a significant milestone in advancing and deepening the already close relationship; calls on the Commission to modernise and deepen bilateral relations between the EU and Switzerland; stresses the importance of promoting stronger relations with Norway, particularly in the scope of the security and defence partnership as well as the cooperative management of shared stocks and the continuation of long-standing fishing activities; calls for the swift signing of the association agreement between the EU and Andorra and San Marino;
61. Welcomes the new momentum in bilateral relations between the EU and Armenia, which is strongly supported by the authorities in Yerevan; calls on the Commission and the Council to actively support Armenia’s desire for increased cooperation with the EU; expresses full support for the newly launched work on the EU-Armenia Partnership Agenda, establishing more ambitious joint priorities for cooperation across all dimensions;
62. Expresses its strong support for the activities of the European Union Mission in Armenia (EUMA) and underscores the important role it plays; calls on EUMA to continue to closely monitor the evolving security situation on the ground, provide transparent reporting to Parliament and actively contribute to conflict resolution efforts; calls for the EU and its Member States to strengthen EUMA’s mandate, increase its size and extend its duration; calls on the Azerbaijani authorities to agree to have such a civilian mission on their side of the border as well;
63. Is of the view that the centre of gravity in the global order is shifting towards the Indo-Pacific and that the EU must strengthen its active role and presence in this region to safeguard its interests, promote stability and uphold a rules-based international order; reiterates that a peaceful, free, stable and rules-based Indo-Pacific region is of vital European interest; is concerned that great power competition in the region is imposing parameters on the EU’s ability to promote multilateralism in the region; points out, in this context, that the Asia-Europe Meeting is still hamstrung because of the geopolitical tensions with Russia; calls, in this context for enhanced foreign, security and defence policy ties with like-minded partners in the region in line with the EU strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific; encourages the VP/HR to promote the visibility and impact of the EU’s external action together with our Indo-Pacific partners, particularly Australia, India, New Zealand, South Korea, Japan and Taiwan;
64. Recalls, in this context, the strategic partnership the EU enjoys with Japan, which should serve as a role model for a fruitful bilateral partnership that allows effective policy-shaping in multilateral contexts; notes that the EU and Japan are celebrating 50 years of their respective diplomatic missions in 2024 and strongly emphasises the EU’s interest in deepening and broadening this partnership bilaterally in the 50 years to come; welcomes, to this end, the EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement and the EU-Japan Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA), the latter of which provides for, among other things, consultations on the development of respective defence initiatives including exchange of information on defence industry-related matters, as well as the exploration of possible mutual involvement in respective defence initiatives;
65. Notes that geopolitical challenges have strengthened the shared interest of the EU and India in ensuring security, prosperity and sustainable development; calls for an India-EU summit to keep bilateral relations high on the agenda; identifies climate change and green growth, digitalisation and new technologies, research and development, connectivity, trade and investment, foreign, security and defence policy as the key areas of cooperation; calls, in this respect, for stronger buy-in from Member States; calls, equally, on the Member States to expand and broaden the India-EU cooperation on maritime security in response to China’s evolving presence in the Indo-Pacific; highlights the need to engage with India on its heavy military dependency on Russia as well as its supply of restricted critical technologies to Russia; urges India to condemn Russia’s illegal war of aggression against Ukraine and to join the EU sanctions policy towards Russia;
66. Considers India an important democratic partner and encourages the EU to strictly engage with the Indian Government on the respect of human rights and rule of law, both internally and worldwide; calls for the full implementation of the EU Strategy on India of 2018 and the EU-India Roadmap to 2025 in close coordination with Member States’ own actions; stresses in particular the need to promote greater synergies in foreign and security policy through existing dialogue mechanisms and other forums set up under the EU-India Roadmap to 2025; believes that the momentous visit of the President of the Commission and the College of Commissioners to India on 27 and 28 February 2025 marked the beginning of a new chapter in the history of EU-India relations and reaffirmed the strategic link and its untapped potential; welcomes the announcement of a forthcoming strategic EU-India agenda;
67. Recalls the EU’s commitment to its ‘One China’ policy as one of the principles of EU-China relations; underscores that Taiwan is a key democratic partner for the EU in the Indo-Pacific region; recognises the importance of Taiwan in securing global supply chains, especially in the high-tech sector, and urges the EU and its Member States to engage in closer cooperation with Taiwan in order to further boost economic, trade and investment ties; encourages the Commission to launch, without delay, preparatory measures for negotiations on an investment agreement with Taiwan; emphasises that any attempt from authoritarian regimes to restrict the benign development of EU-Taiwan relations is not acceptable;
68. Strongly condemns China’s continued military provocations against Taiwan and reiterates its firm rejection of any unilateral change to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait; calls for the EU and its Member States to ensure, through clear and consistent signalling, that any attempt to unilaterally change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, particularly by means of force or coercion, cannot be accepted and will have high costs; highlights that China’s territorial claims have no basis in international law and that only Taiwan’s democratically elected government can represent the Taiwanese people; denounces, furthermore, China’s blocking of Taiwan’s meaningful participation in multilateral organisations, such as the WHO, the International Civil Aviation Organization and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, by its continuous distortion of UN General Assembly Resolution 2758; calls, accordingly, for the EU and its Member States to support Taiwan’s meaningful participation in relevant international organisations;
69. Expresses deep concern about the latest shifts in China’s domestic and military posture since the 20th national congress of the Chinese Communist Party; holds the view that China demonstrates that it has both the intent and increasingly the economic, diplomatic, technological and military power to redefine the global order; underscores that the military-civil fusion strategy is a testament to such means; stresses, in this context, that the EU needs to be more assertive and unified in its approach to China and therefore calls on the VP/HR and the Member States to review the strategy towards China that takes full account of the increasingly oppressive domestic policies, the assertive foreign policy as well as the use of economic coercion as a means by which China aims to reach its objectives; considers that the challenges stemming from the rise of China as a global actor require a balanced multi-dimensional response along the principle of ‘cooperate where possible, compete where needed and confront where necessary’, through which the EU maintains its selective engagement with China as a permanent member of the UN Security Council on a number of key issues;
70. Highlights that the PRC’s increasingly aggressive posture poses a threat to the freedom of navigation and jeopardises the stability which is vital for global trade; emphasises that this situation is being watched with concern by a growing number of like-minded partners committed to peace and stability in the region; underlines the need to shore up deterrence against destabilising behaviour, including through regular operations to assert freedom of navigation over the PRC’s attempts to impose control over international waters and airspace;
71. Holds the view that China, through the continued growth of the Sino-Russian strategic partnership, including in the areas of technology and military capability transfers, (indirectly) enables the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine;
72. Reiterates its condemnation of China’s violation of its international commitments, its breaches of the Sino-British and Sino-Portuguese Joint Declarations, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the ‘one country, two systems’ principle and the Hong Kong Basic Law as well as the crackdown on the special administrative region’s autonomy and opposition figures, including members of civil society and their family members; calls on the Commission to assess the autonomous status of Hong Kong and Macao in the light of China’s breaches of the Sino-British and Sino-Portuguese Joint Declarations and the crackdown on Hong Kong’s autonomy;
73. Is concerned about the growing economic penetration of Chinese companies within the EU, including in strategic sectors such as battery manufacturing; stresses the urgent need to continue the policy of de-risking by continuing to reduce economic dependence in critical sectors, in line with the EU’s economic security strategy;
74. Reiterates that the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is a crucial partner in reinforcing rules-based multilateralism; supports ASEAN’s efforts to finalise negotiations with China on an effective and substantive code of conduct in the South China Sea; encourages enhanced EU engagement and cooperation with ASEAN and efforts towards a comprehensive strategic partnership, building on economic ties and sustainable growth, and in particular on political cooperation with regard to human rights and democracy; calls for increased support for Myanmar’s national unity government and for greater pressure to be applied to ASEAN countries to align on international sanctions against Myanmar’s military junta;
75. Urges the VP/HR and the Member States to focus on bilateral relations with partners in Africa, among others South Africa, Ghana, Morocco, Kenya, Senegal and Mauretania, taking into account mutual needs and interests in order to foster real and balanced partnerships; believes that the ‘more for more’ principle should be integrated fully into relations with non-EU countries, whereby the EU develops stronger partnerships with those countries that uphold the principles of the CFSP and the common security and defence policy (CSDP), and the fundamental values of the EU; is of the belief that the EU needs to maintain a continued focus on Africa, which is already a strategic continent and will become an increasingly important player in the future;
76. Calls for the EU to suspend both its Memorandum of Understanding on raw materials and all military cooperation with Rwanda, including through the EPF and any other mechanisms, until Rwanda ends its illegal support for armed groups and fully respects the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC); condemns the breaches of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the eastern DRC by the rebels of M23; condemns the capture of Goma and Bukavu by the M23 armed group and its continued offensive in South Kivu, which has further exacerbated the acute humanitarian crisis, heightened the risk of the DRC’s destabilisation and a full-blown regional war; supports the Luanda Nairobi peace process to achieve a political solution to the conflict by diplomatic means and urges the VP/HR to continue diplomatic outreach to the conflict and regional parties and to increase pressure on parties to re-engage in peaceful negotiations, including through the postponing of the EU Security and Defence Consultations with Rwanda and adoption of sanctions depending on the situation on the ground and progress in ongoing regional mediations processes; is deeply concerned about the humanitarian situation of thousands of displaced persons in the area; urges the VP/HR to engage in clear actions in line with the EU’s Great Lakes strategy in order to restore stability and to cooperate with the UN Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) for the protection of civilians in the eastern DRC;
77. Underlines that the recent developments in Tunisia have raised concerns about human rights and democratic standards, with reports indicating limited transparency, restricted opposition participation and reduced political competition in the presidential election; underlines the EU’s continued commitment to and support for Tunisia during this politically and socio-economically sensitive period, through maintaining contact at various levels;
78. Underscores that the EU has a direct and vital interest in the stability, security and economic growth of the Mediterranean basin as well as the wider Southern Neighbourhood; recalls that the European neighbourhood policy was launched with the laudable goals of fostering stability, prosperity and good governance in the southern Mediterranean; acknowledges, however, that it is evident today that its instruments, objectives and principles are no longer aligned with the region’s current realities; regrets that, almost 30 years after the launch of the so-called Barcelona Process, the creation of an area of shared prosperity, stability and freedom with the Mediterranean countries of the Southern Neighbourhood has not been achieved; calls on the Commission to present a new pact for the Mediterranean; believes that the EU and the countries of the Southern Neighbourhood should conclude memorandums of understanding aimed at promoting stability, prosperity and the defence of human rights, conditional on cooperating on migration; recalls that instability and insecurity in the Southern Neighbourhood remains an ongoing challenge for European external border management; argues that, while prioritising bilateral relations with countries in the region, the EU should also continue to foster regional cooperation through existing frameworks such as the Union for the Mediterranean; welcomes the appointment of a Commissioner in charge of the Mediterranean;
79. Stresses the need for the EU to strengthen and deepen its cooperation with Arab countries and the Gulf, in response to the pressing geopolitical, social, and economic challenges facing the region; emphasises that enhanced collaboration should prioritise key areas such as migration, digital transformation, security, the green transition and cultural exchange to build a resilient partnership; calls for a strategic approach that tailors engagement with each country to foster sustainable development and mutual understanding;
80. Welcomes the successful conclusion of the first EU-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Summit and believes this summit to have marked a pivotal moment in the relationship between the EU and its partners from the GCC, stressing mutual commitment to strengthening ties across key strategic, economic, and cultural areas;
81. Underlines the importance of upholding and promoting democratic values in the region; condemns the rise of hate speech, including against the European institutions, and attacks on individual freedoms and the international order, both within Member States and abroad;
82. Emphasises that the countries of the EU, Latin American and the Caribbean are like-minded and share values, languages, history, culture and religion, which should make them natural partners in today’s geopolitical context; notes that the EU’s engagement in the region has dwindled in recent decades, which has created a vacuum for the growing influence of China and Russia; urges countries across Latin America to adopt a firmer attitude of condemnation of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine; calls on the Member States and the EEAS to pursue proactive diplomacy in the region, with a strong emphasis on defending the multilateral global order, international law and respect for democracy and human rights; urges for multilateral initiatives to address political instability in the most volatile countries in the region, for instance in Haiti;
83. Welcomes the signing of the EU-Chile Advanced Framework Agreement and calls for its swift and full ratification; welcomes, equally, the conclusion of the negotiations on the modernised EU-Mexico Global Agreement, which was announced by the Commission on 17 January 2025 and for which Parliament still has to give its consent; highlights that the agreement would reinforce the EU’s strategic partnership with Mexico, recognising the country’s pivotal role in Latin America and its ambition to diversify trade and political partnerships to reduce economic dependency on the US;
84. Takes note of the conclusion of the agreement with Mercosur; expresses concern regarding its potentially negative impact on EU sustainability and safety standards and on the competitiveness of the EU agri-food sector, and underlines that Parliament must examine whether the agreement meets the EU sustainability standards and complies with the reciprocity principle, before ratification can be considered;
85. Welcomes the EU-Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) informal meeting and the implementation of initiatives under the EU-CELAC Roadmap 2023-2025 and, in this regard, underlines the need to adopt a new and ambitious roadmap at the 2025 summit, that keeps strengthening the partnership and takes into account best practices accomplished so far;
86. Underlines the need for a tougher approach to address violence against environmental defenders and to step up the EU’s efforts to assist in the preservation of biodiversity and in adaptation to the climate emergency; suggests further strengthening cooperation against organised crime and drug trafficking which also has an impact on the EU; calls for a substantial increase in bi-regional cooperation in the fight against this phenomenon;
87. Calls on the VP/HR to make the work with like-minded democracies a priority of her term and to systematise cooperation and consultation with democratic like-minded partners in order to promote democracy and improve common preparedness and access to crisis response resources; reiterates, in this context, the recommendation to deepen ties with regional organisations such as ASEAN and the African Union to enhance cooperative security frameworks;
88. Reiterates its support for the European Political Community as a platform for discussion, dialogue and cooperation with European partners on the foreign policy and security challenges we are facing, with the aim of strengthening security and stability in Europe and pursuing political and security cooperation based on shared interests; calls for the close involvement of Parliament in the clarification of the scope and the future work of this community; underlines that, for the future success and coherence of this format, some level of alignment on democratic values and principles is essential; reiterates that the European Political Community may under no circumstances become a pretext for delays to the EU accession of enlargement countries;
89. Believes also in the significance of building new alliances, inter alia with the countries in our neighbourhood as well as in the Global South, taking into account mutual needs and interests in order to foster real, balanced and equal partnerships; stresses the importance of establishing these political agreements with third countries, based on common European values and fundamental rights; calls for the EU to respond to partner countries’ expectations and to deliver quickly on political agreements with them in order to show that the EU is a reliable and strategic partner and demonstrate that the international rules-based system can meet contemporary challenges; calls on the Commission to ensure the active involvement of Parliament in the establishment, implementation and monitoring of the future clean trade and investment partnerships; calls, in this context, for collaborative initiatives between the EU and Global South countries to assess and tackle the debt crisis; notes that agreements with the Global South, especially on raw materials, should contribute to local economic development rather than deepening dependence and excessive resource exploitation;
Fostering EU action abroad
90. Highlights the role of the VP/HR as a bridge-builder between the CFSP and EU external relations to ensure the highest level of coordination and coherence in EU external action; stresses the need for the EU to foster the visibility and effectiveness of its external action and development cooperation efforts, regrets, nonetheless, that in some cases there is a lack of clarity in the external representation of the EU, hindering the EU’s strategic communication abroad; stresses the need to clearly define the competences of the VP/HR, the President of the Commission and the President of the European Council with regard to the EU’s external action and representation so that the EU’s voice is coherent and perceived as such by its partners; calls on the Commission to strengthen its coordination with the EEAS in external action, including by ensuring full compliance with Articles 3.2 and 9 of the EEAS Decision(17), which may need to be updated;
91. Calls for the EEAS – both its headquarters and EU delegations – to be strengthened through the provision of the appropriate financial and human resources so that the EU can be better prepared for current and emerging global challenges; calls for the EEAS to be able to select and recruit its permanent EU diplomatic staff and to ensure a fair gender and geographical balance among Member States across all levels within the EEAS; calls on the VP/HR to swiftly come up with proposals for the future operational structure of the EU’s external action and to that end to fully take into account Parliament’s recommendation of 15 March 2023 taking stock of the functioning of the EEAS and for a stronger EU in the world(18); stresses the need to strengthen strategic communication and the EU’s work on countering disinformation via dedicated resources and offices in strategically relevant regions and countries;
92. Recalls that the EU has a strategic interest in advancing sustainable development, poverty reduction and equality globally, as these efforts contribute to long-term global peace and security; calls on the Commission to effectively and swiftly use the Global Gateway Initiative as a sustainable alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative and as an instrument to increase the EU’s presence and visibility worldwide; recalls that the Global Gateway Initiative is to be understood as a strategic concept integrating foreign, economic and development policy, including the climate and digital transitions, as well as infrastructure investment in order to strengthen close partnership based on mutual benefits, economic development and resilient supply chains; stresses, in this context, that coordination with international financial institutions, well-defined private-sector involvement and tailored strategic communications, including in the recipient countries, are essential in order for the instrument to reach the desired scale; is concerned by reports that a number of Global Gateway projects are being implemented by Chinese companies in direct violation of the initiative’s aims and objectives, which includes the strengthening of the EU’s economic security and fostering economic development and mutually beneficial partnerships with third countries; calls, therefore, for an immediate investigation and the removal of all Chinese companies involved in Global Gateway; stresses that the EU’s support should complement other initiatives such as the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment, the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor and the Lobito Corridor, and should in particular aim at achieving the Sustainable Development Goals;
93. Reiterates that Parliament plays an integral role in the CFSP and makes a specific contribution thereto by virtue of its parliamentary diplomacy and its distinct instruments, channels and contacts, including its democracy support programmes, the Foreign Affairs Committee, regular parliamentary dialogues and official delegations; emphasises that parliamentary diplomacy has a great potential to engage key political stakeholders and facilitate democratic governance; stresses, in particular, the added value of parliamentary diplomacy during the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and highlights, in this context, the valuable cooperation at political and technical level between the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and the European Parliament;
94. Firmly believes that diplomacy is a significant part of EU action; calls, in this light, for the further development of the EU’s preventive diplomacy as a proactive external policy tool to pre-empt, mediate and peacefully resolve conflict between parties, calls on the EEAS to integrate the EU’s preventive diplomacy tools within structural prevention mechanisms and actions, such as political agreements among different actors involved in conflicts, national dialogues for reconciliation, peacebuilding and transitional justice, as well as truth and reconciliation commissions; urges the EEAS to conduct ‘lessons learnt’ exercises to assess diplomatic efforts, identify areas for improvement and integrate best practice into future initiatives; calls for the EEAS’ capacities in those regards to be increased, in particular in the relevant crisis preparedness and response divisions; stresses the urgent need to double the relevant EU budget within the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument and strongly increase EU action on mediation, dialogue and reconciliation;
95. Reaffirms the role of the EU special representatives (EUSRs), who promote the EU’s policies and interests in specific regions and countries and play an important role in the development of a stronger and more effective CFSP by providing the EU with an active political presence in key countries and regions, acting as a ‘voice’ and ‘face’ for the EU and its policies; emphasises the importance of equipping EUSRs with sufficient resources enabling them to effectively implement those tasks; stresses the importance for EUSRs of having a broad, flexible mandate, capable of adapting to evolving geopolitical circumstances in order to promote the EU’s policies and interests in specific regions and countries and play an active role in preventive diplomacy efforts; insists that the appointment of new EUSRs should take place only after a hearing in Parliament;
96. Underlines that corruption enables and exacerbates human rights violations, abuses, and the erosion of democratic principles and the rule of law; calls for the EU and its Member States to address the risks that corruption poses to stability, governance and peace, and to prevent and counter these threats to EU interests and to global prosperity and security, particularly in the EU’s eastern and southern neighbourhoods; encourages closer coordination between the EU, its Member States and allies and partners wherever possible, in order to tackle systemic corruption that empowers autocratic regimes, facilitates the spread of malign influence, deprives societies of essential resources and undermines democratic values, human rights and the rule of law; stresses the crucial role of civil society and independent journalists in non-EU countries in monitoring and exposing corruption; calls, therefore, for the EU to adopt a comprehensive and swiftly implemented anti-corruption framework within its foreign policy, encompassing the EU sanctions regime, the proposed anti-corruption directive and the broader EU anti-corruption strategy; urges the VP/HR to propose concrete and far-reaching measures in this regard, and supports the inclusion of anti-corruption provisions in EU trade agreements with non-EU countries;
97. Underlines the EU’s missions and operations abroad for promoting peace, security and progress in Europe and in the world; calls on the VP/HR:
| – | to prepare the proposals for the necessary CFSP missions to be launched in 2025, using the EU’s Rapid Deployment Capacity (RDC) as preventive military reinforcement; recalls that the administrative expenditure for these measures, including the RDC’s standby expenditure, should be charged to the EU budget; | |
| – | to work with Cyprus, Türkiye, the UK and the UN to implement concrete measures for a demilitarisation of the buffer zone in Cyprus, and to improve security on the island, both of the Greek Cypriot community and of the Turkish Cypriot community; | |
| – | to support an increased role of the two EU civilian CSDP missions, EUPOL COPPS and EUBAM Rafah, in line with European Council conclusions of 21 and 22 March 2024, recalling they can play an important role based on the principle of the two-state solution and the viability of a future Palestinian state, and to participate in the facilitation of the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the Gaza Strip, to improve the efficiency of the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank, and to prepare for its return to the Gaza Strip; | |
| – | to create the necessary conditions for the full reactivation of EUBAM Rafah to allow it to act as a neutral third party at the Rafah crossing point, in coordination with the Palestinian Authority as well as the Israeli and Egyptian authorities; expects the reinforcement of the scope and mandates of EUPOL COPPS and EUBAM Rafah on the ground to be included as key priorities of the forthcoming EU-Middle East strategy; | |
| – | to further increase the number of observers deployed as part of the EU civilian mission in Armenia on the Armenian side of the international border with Azerbaijan and reiterate calls for Azerbaijan to cooperate with the mission and cease its smear campaign against it; | |
| – | to work with Australia, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, Japan, Taiwan and ASEAN member states to facilitate the peace and security of the Indo-Pacific and south-east Asian regions; | |
| – | to develop strategies to counter hybrid attacks on the EU’s eastern border and in the outermost regions of the EU, particularly those involving instrumentalising migration as a tactic to destabilise Member States and exert political pressure, to encourage solidarity among the Member States with the countries faced with such attacks, such as Poland and Lithuania, and to propose retaliatory measures against Comoros for its exploitation of the waves of migration in Mayotte; |
98. Calls on the VP/HR to follow up on the examples of the successful evacuation actions in Sudan and of the stepped-up consular protection, and to work towards a comprehensive system of protection for EU citizens abroad; stresses that the impact of continuous crises and conflicts worldwide can entail the risk of overloading Member States’ consular protection and/or assistance capacities and calls, in this regard, for the strengthening of the capabilities and resources of the EEAS Crisis Response Centre and the EU Civil Protection Mechanism; recalls its longstanding position of applying a similar level of protection for the local staff in EU delegations and CFSP missions and operations;
III.The next MFF and its parliamentary oversight
99. Believes that there is a need for stronger institutionalised parliamentary oversight of the EU’s external action, including regular and timely, yet secure, access to confidential information and briefings in the European Parliament in line with Article 36 TEU; emphasises the need for more feedback from the VP/HR and the EEAS about the actions taken and the effects achieved, in order to fulfil Parliament’s recommendations outlined in the resolutions on foreign affairs matters;
100. Underlines that in the CFSP, which comprises the CSDP, the European Parliament exercises its budgetary function jointly with the Council; recalls that the European Parliament also exercises the function of political control and consultation over those policies as referred to in Article 36 TEU;
101. Recalls that in line with Article 41 TEU, all CFSP and CSDP administrative and operating expenditure should be charged to the EU budget, except for such expenditure arising from operations having military or defence implications;
102. Underlines that CFSP or CSDP decisions entailing expenditure always constitute basic choices for those policies and must be subject to parliamentary oversight; calls on the VP/HR to consult Parliament before proposing CFSP or CSDP decisions, thereby ensuring transparency and accountability in line with Article 36 TEU;
103. Recalls that Parliament’s exercise of its budgetary function is inextricably linked to its function of political control and consultation; recalls that Article 36 TEU establishes a specific relationship between the VP/HR and the European Parliament, which is a prerequisite for Parliament to exercise those functions, and that the VP/HR should support Parliament in those regards;
104. Regrets that the budget for civilian CSDP missions is insufficient; recalls that the number and tasks of such missions have increased, the security environment has become more challenging, and the cost of operations has increased; urges the European Council to provide for a substantive increase in CFSP funding placed under a separate Civilian CFSP and Crisis Management heading; calls for the efficient use of the funds allocated to civilian CSDP missions to be ensured, in order to make sure that these missions are able to respond effectively to crisis situations and unforeseen events; calls on the VP/HR and the Commission to come forward with joint proposals to those ends;
105. Is deeply concerned that the EEAS is structurally underfunded and that this already entails serious and far-reaching negative consequences for the EU’s external action and the performance of the EU institutions in this area; underlines that a specific approach to the EEAS’ administrative budget is necessary and recalls that the absence of corrective action risks having a severe impact on the EU’s relations with third countries;
106. Calls on the Commission to consider in its proposal for the next MFF under the EU external action heading:
| – | robust capabilities and resources for EU external action that take into account the increasingly challenging international arena, recalling in this regard that it is crucial to further strengthen EU support for human rights, democracy and development in third countries; | |
| – | resources for the EU’s digital diplomacy, given the current context of rapid technological advancements and geopolitical competition; | |
| – | resources for green diplomacy; | |
| – | a dedicated budget for specific EU foreign policy actions on gender equality and the women, peace, and security (WPS) agenda, in order to integrate gender perspectives into EU diplomatic and human security efforts, | |
| – | resources for preventive scrutiny of potential beneficiaries to ensure that EU funds under no circumstance directly or indirectly support activities, projects or literature that incite violence and hatred, including antisemitism, and to ensure that all recipients of EU funding are monitored accordingly; |
107. Calls on the Commission to present its proposals for the next MFF in the first semester of 2025 to allow for sufficient time to negotiate the programmes; underlines the need for a more detailed budgetary nomenclature in the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument, the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance and the CFSP budget, which allow the budgetary authority to set policy and geographic priorities in the framework of the annual budgetary procedure;
108. Underlines that each matter raised above requires an appropriate response by the executive; calls on the VP/HR to respond to Parliament’s calls, requests and concerns swiftly and in writing; considers that oral statements in committee or plenary can only constitute a sufficient response in exceptional or urgent cases; stresses that in the current challenging geopolitical context, close cooperation and partnership between the European Parliament and the VP/HR are of strategic importance; expects more systematic exchanges prior to the adoption of mandates and CFSP strategies and an improved flow of information on negotiations and the implementation of international agreements, as well as memoranda of understanding; expects, in addition, Parliament to be effectively incorporated throughout EU external policies and action, thereby mobilising parliamentary diplomacy in support of the VP/HR’s efforts;
o
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109. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the European Council, the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the governments and parliaments of the Member States.
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Source: European Parliament
Question for written answer E-001247/2025
to the Commission
Rule 144
Isabel Serra Sánchez (The Left)
The European Union has been a long-standing supporter of the Colombian Peace Agreement, as well as initiatives under the ‘total peace’ plan, such as the social and legal dialogues between the two main armed groups in the city of Buenaventura, the largest import port, but also the country’s most violent city (according to a statement made during a municipal Security Council meeting, so far in 2025 there has been a 75% increase in homicides compared to the same period in 2024).
The port has not brought development to the wider area: Buenaventura has a multidimensional poverty index three times that of the department’s capital and twice the national average. Afro-descendant communities face daily risks of displacement due to the port expansion project and violence. In March 2024, EU funding of EUR 2.5 million was announced for these peace talks in Buenaventura, which appear to be deadlocked.
Submitted: 25.3.2025
Source: European Parliament
The European Parliament,
– having regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,
– having regard to the European Convention on Human Rights,
– having regard to Articles 2, 3, 8, 21 and 23 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU),
– having regard to Articles 17 and 207 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),
– having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other United Nations human rights treaties and instruments,
– having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
– having regard to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
– having regard to the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,
– having regard to the United Nations 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol thereto,
– having regard to the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948 and United Nations Human Rights Council Resolution 43/29 of 22 June 2020 on the prevention of genocide,
– having regard to the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women of 18 December 1979,
– having regard to the United Nations Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment of 10 December 1984 and the Optional Protocol thereto, adopted on 18 December 2002,
– having regard to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities of 12 December 2006 and the Optional Protocol thereto, adopted on 13 December 2006,
– having regard to the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid of 1976,
– having regard to the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, proclaimed by United Nations General Assembly Resolution 36/55 of 25 November 1981,
– having regard to the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities of 18 December 1992,
– having regard to the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights Defenders, adopted by consensus by the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 53/144 on 9 December 1998,
– having regard to the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples of 13 September 2007,
– having regard to the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Peasants and Other People Working in Rural Areas of 28 September 2018,
– having regard to the Programme of Action of the Cairo International Conference of Population and Development in 1994 and its review conferences,
– having regard to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child of 20 November 1989 and the two Optional Protocols thereto, adopted on 25 May 2000,
– having regard to the United Nations Arms Trade Treaty, which entered into force on 24 December 2014, and the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports of 5 June 1998,
– having regard to the United Nations Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action of September 1995 and its review conferences,
– having regard to the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development adopted on 25 September 2015, in particular goals 1, 3, 4, 5, 8, 10 and 16 thereof,
– having regard to the United Nations Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration adopted on 19 December 2018 and the United Nations Global Compact on Refugees adopted on 17 December 2018,
– having regard to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court adopted on 17 July 1998, which entered into force on 1 July 2002,
– having regard to the Agreement between the European Union and the International Criminal Court on cooperation and assistance of 10 April 2006(1),
– having regard to the Council of Europe Conventions of 4 April 1997 for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine, and the Additional Protocols thereto, of 16 May 2005 on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings, and of 25 October 2007 on the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse,
– having regard to the Council of Europe Convention of 11 May 2011 on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (the Istanbul Convention), which not all Member States have ratified but which entered into force for the EU on 1 October 2023,
– having regard to Protocols Nos 6 and 13 to the Council of Europe Convention of 28 April 1983 for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty,
– having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2020/1998 of 7 December 2020 concerning restrictive measures against serious human rights violations and abuses(2),
– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/947 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 June 2021 establishing the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe(3),
– having regard to the Council conclusions of 22 January 2024 on EU Priorities in UN Human Rights Fora in 2024,
– having regard to the EU Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy 2020-2024, adopted by the Council on 17 November 2020 and its Mid-term Review adopted on 9 June 2023,
– having regard to the Council conclusions of 27 May 2024 on the alignment of the EU Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy 2020-2024 with the Multiannual Financial Framework 2021-2027,
– having regard to the EU Gender Action Plan (GAP) III – an ambitious agenda for gender equality and women’s empowerment in external action (JOIN(2020)0017),
– having regard to the EU Gender Equality Strategy 2020-2025 (COM(2020)0152),
– having regard to the EU LGBTIQ Equality Strategy 2020-2025 (COM(2020)0698),
– having regard to the EU strategy on the rights of the child (COM(2021)0142),
– having regard to the EU Strategy for the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 2021-2030 (COM(2021)0101),
– having regard to the EU anti-racism action plan 2020-2025 (COM(2020)0565),
– having regard to the EU Roma strategic framework for equality, inclusion and participation (COM(2020)0620),
– having regard to the EU Guidelines on human rights defenders, adopted by the Council on 14 June 2004 and revised in 2008, and the second guidance note on the Guidelines’ implementation, endorsed in 2020,
– having regard to the EU Guidelines on violence against women and girls and combating all forms of discrimination against them, adopted by the Council on 8 December 2008,
– having regard to the EU Guidelines on promoting compliance with international humanitarian law (IHL) of 2005, as updated in 2009,
– having regard to the EU Guidelines on the death penalty, as updated by the Council on 12 April 2013,
– having regard to the EU Guidelines to promote and protect the enjoyment of all human rights by LGBTI persons, adopted on 24 June 2013,
– having regard to the EU Guidelines on the promotion and protection of freedom of religion or belief, adopted by the Council on 24 June 2013,
– having regard to the EU Guidelines on freedom of expression online and offline, adopted by the Council on 12 May 2014,
– having regard to the EU Guidelines on non-discrimination in external action, adopted by the Council on 18 March 2019,
– having regard to the EU Guidelines on safe drinking water and sanitation, adopted by the Council on 17 June 2019,
– having regard to the revised EU Guidelines on EU policy towards third countries on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, adopted by the Council on 16 September 2019,
– having regard to the revised EU Guidelines on human rights dialogues with partner/third countries, approved by the Council on 22 February 2021,
– having regard to the revised EU Guidelines on children and armed conflict, approved by the Council on 24 June 2024,
– having regard to the Commission communication of 12 September 2012 entitled ‘The roots of democracy and sustainable development: Europe’s engagement with Civil Society in external relations’ (COM(2012)0492),
– having regard to the Council conclusions of 10 March 2023 on the role of the civic space in protecting and promoting fundamental rights in the EU,
– having regard to Directive (EU) 2024/1760 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 on corporate sustainability due diligence and amending Directive (EU) 2019/1937 and Regulation (EU) 2023/2859(4),
– having regard to the Commission proposal of 14 September 2022 for a regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on prohibiting products made with forced labour on the Union market (COM(2022)0453),
– having regard to the joint proposal from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 3 May 2023 for a Council regulation on restrictive measures against serious acts of corruption (JOIN(2023)0013),
– having regard to the 2023 EU Annual Report on Human Rights and Democracy in the World,
– having regard to its Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought, which in 2024 was awarded to María Corina Machado, as the leader of the democratic forces in Venezuela, and President-elect Edmundo González Urrutia, representing all Venezuelans inside and outside the country fighting for the reinstitution of freedom and democracy,
– having regard to its resolution of 15 January 2019 on EU Guidelines and the mandate of the EU Special Envoy on the promotion of freedom of religion or belief outside the EU(5),
– having regard to its resolution of 23 October 2020 on Gender Equality in EU’s foreign and security policy(6),
– having regard to its resolution of 19 May 2021 on human rights protection and the EU external migration policy(7),
– having regard to its resolution of 8 July 2021 on the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime (EU Magnitsky Act)(8),
– having regard to its resolution of 28 February 2024 on human rights and democracy in the world and the European Union’s policy on the matter – annual report 2023(9), and to its previous resolutions on earlier annual reports,
– having regard to its resolutions on breaches of human rights, democracy and the rule of law (known as urgency resolutions), adopted in accordance with Rule 150 of its Rules of Procedure, in particular those adopted in 2023 and 2024,
– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,
– having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality,
– having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0012/2025),
A. whereas the EU is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, as set out in Articles 2 and 21 TEU; whereas the EU’s action worldwide must be guided by the universality and indivisibility of human rights and by the fact that the effective protection and defence of human rights and democracy is at the core of the EU’s external action;
B. whereas rulings of the European Court of Human Rights are an essential part of the human rights architecture in Europe;
C. whereas consistency and coherence across the EU’s internal and external policies are key for achieving an effective and credible EU human rights policy, and in defending and supporting freedom and democracy;
D. whereas democratic systems are the most suitable to guarantee that every person has the ability to enjoy their human rights and fundamental freedoms; whereas effective rules-based multilateralism is the best organisational system to defend democracies;
E. whereas the EU strongly believes in and fully supports multilateralism, a rules-based global order and the set of universal values, principles and norms that guide the UN member states and that the UN member states have pledged to uphold, in accordance with the UN Charter; whereas a world of democracies, understood as a world of political systems that defend and protect human rights worldwide, is a safer world, as democracies have significant checks and balances in place to prevent the unpredictability of autocracies;
F. whereas gender equality is paramount to the development of free and equal societies; whereas the human rights of women, girls and non-binary people are still not guaranteed throughout the world, and the space for civil society organisations, especially women’s rights, indigenous and grassroots organisations, is shrinking in many countries;
G. whereas the rise in authoritarianism, totalitarianism and populism threatens the global rules-based order, the protection and promotion of freedom and human rights in the world, as well as the values and principles on which the EU is founded;
H. whereas in December 2023, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights celebrated its 75th anniversary; whereas today, more than ever since the UN’s foundation, totalitarian regimes challenge the UN Charter’s basic principles, seek to rewrite international norms, undermine multilateral institutions and threaten peace and security globally;
I. whereas in November 2024, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child celebrated its 35th anniversary;
J. whereas the United Nations Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action is regarded as a turning point for the global agenda on gender equality and will celebrate its 30th anniversary in 2025;
K. whereas the legitimacy and functioning of the international rules-based order are dependent on compliance with the orders of, and respect for, international bodies, such as United Nations General Assembly and Security Council resolutions and orders and decisions of the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court (ICC); whereas multilateralism is being challenged by increasing global threats, such as terrorism and extremism, which threaten compliance with such orders and decisions, as well as, generally, with provisions of international law, human rights law and international humanitarian law in emerging and ongoing conflict situations; whereas international institutions, their officials, and those cooperating with them, are the subject of attacks and threats; whereas the international community, including the EU, has a responsibility to uphold the international rules-based order by enforcing universal compliance, including by its partners;
L. whereas the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court establishes a framework of accountability for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes; whereas the independence of the ICC is vital to ensure that justice is delivered impartially and without political interference;
M. whereas the 2023 Mid-term Review of the EU Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy 2020-2024, now extended to 2027, has shown that, despite the progress achieved so far, more needs to be done, in cooperation with like-minded democratic partners, especially in the context of the unprecedented challenges the world has experienced since its adoption;
N. whereas human rights defenders (HRDs) and civil society organisations (CSOs) are crucial partners in the EU’s efforts to safeguard and advance human rights, democracy and the rule of law, as well as to prevent conflicts globally; whereas state and non-state actors around the world are increasingly censoring, silencing and harassing, among others, HRDs, CSOs, journalists, religious communities, opposition leaders and other vulnerable groups in their work, shrinking the civil space ever further; whereas this behaviour includes measures encompassing strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs), restrictive government policies, transnational repression, defamation campaigns, discrimination, intimidation and violence, including extrajudicial and extraterritorial killings, abductions, and arbitrary arrests and detention; whereas attacks on HRDs are increasingly extending to their families and communities, including those living in exile;
O. whereas gender equality is a core EU value, and the human rights of women and girls, including their sexual and reproductive rights, continue to be violated across the world; whereas women experience unique and disproportionate impacts from conflicts, climate change and migration, including increased risks of gender-based violence, economic marginalisation and barriers to accessing resources; whereas women HRDs and CSOs continue to experience shrinking space for their critical work, as well as threats of violence, harassment and intimidation;
P. whereas the past year has been marked by a further proliferation of laws on ‘foreign agents’ or foreign influence, including in countries with EU candidate status, targeting CSOs and media outlets and attempting to prevent them from receiving financial support from abroad, including from the EU and its Member States, fostering a climate of fear and self-censorship;
Q. whereas in 2024, more than half the world’s population went to the polls, and many of these elections were marked by manipulation, disinformation and attempts at interference from inside or outside the country;
R. whereas the 2024 World Press Freedom Index by Reporters Without Borders (RSF) warns of a decline in the intent of states and other political forces to protect press freedom; whereas, according to the RSF’s 2024 Round-up, 54 journalists and media workers were killed, most of them in conflict zones, 550 were being detained, 55 were being held hostage, and 95 were missing in 2024;
S. whereas 251 million children and young people are deprived of their fundamental right to education and remain out of school, according to the UNESCO Global Education Monitoring Report 2024; whereas girls and women are affected not only by poverty but also by cultural norms, gender bias, child marriage and violence through official, discriminatory policies that prevent them from accessing education and the labour market and attempt to erase them from public life;
T. whereas at least one million people are unjustly imprisoned for political reasons, among them several laureates and finalists of Parliament’s Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought;
U. whereas, according to Article 21 TEU, the Union must seek to develop relations and build partnerships with third countries based, among other principles, on democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law; whereas numerous EU partners, despite benefiting for years from various preferences and advantages stemming from agreements with the EU, fail to comply with their obligations;
V. whereas environmental harm and the impacts of climate change are intensifying precariousness, marginalisation and inequality, and increasingly displacing people from their homes or trapping them in unsafe conditions, thereby heightening their vulnerability and jeopardising their human rights;
Global challenges to democracy and human rights
1. Reasserts the universality, interdependence, interrelatedness and indivisibility of human rights and the inherent dignity of every human being; reaffirms the duty of the EU and its Member States to promote and protect democracy and the universality of human rights around the world; calls for the EU and its Member States to lead by example, in line with its values, to promote and strictly uphold human rights and international justice;
2. Insists that respect, protection and fulfilment of human rights and fundamental freedoms must be the cornerstone of the EU’s external policy, in line with its founding principles; strongly encourages the EU and its Member States, to that end, to strive for a continued ambitious commitment to make freedom, democracy and human rights and their protection a central part of all EU policies in a streamlined manner and to enhance the consistency between the EU’s internal and external policies in this field, including through all of its international agreements;
3. Stresses that the EU must be fully prepared to counter the rise of authoritarianism, totalitarianism and populism, as well as the increasing violations of the principles of universality of human rights, democracy and international humanitarian law;
4. Condemns the increasing trend of violations and abuses of human rights and democratic principles and values across the world, such as, among others, threats of backsliding on human rights, notably women’s rights, as well as executions, extrajudicial killings, arbitrary arrests and detentions, torture and ill treatment, gender-based violence, clampdowns on civil society, political opponents, marginalised and vulnerable groups including children and elderly people, migrants, refugees and asylum seekers, and ethnic and religious minorities; condemns, equally, slavery and forced labour, excessive use of violence by public authorities, including violent crackdowns on peaceful protests and other assemblies, systematic and structural discrimination, instrumentalisation of the judiciary, censorship and threats to independent media, including threats in the digital sphere such as online surveillance and internet shutdowns, political attacks against international institutions and the rules-based international order, and increasing use of unlawful methods of war in grave breach of international humanitarian law and human rights law; deplores the weakening of the protection of democratic institutions and processes, and the shrinking space for civil societies around the world; denounces the transnational repression, by illiberal regimes, of citizens and activists who have sought refuge abroad, including on EU soil; condemns the arrest and sentencing by an Algerian court to five years in prison of the Franco-Algerian writer Boualem Sansal; calls for his immediate release and hopes that the Algerian authorities will see the urgent need for this;
5. Notes with deep concern the ongoing international crisis of accountability and the challenge to the pursuit of ending impunity for violations of core norms of international human rights and humanitarian law in conflicts around the world; reaffirms the neutrality and importance of humanitarian aid in all conflicts and crises; underlines the serious consequences of discrediting and attacking the organisations of multilateral forums, such as the UN, which can foster a culture of impunity and undermine the trust in and functioning of the UN system; calls for the EU to uphold the international legal system and take effective measures to enforce compliance;
6. Notes with satisfaction that there are also ‘human rights bright spots’ within this context of major challenges to human rights worldwide; highlights, in particular, the work of CSOs and HRDs; underlines the need for a more strategic communication on human rights and democracy by spreading news about positive results, policies and best practices; supports the Good Human Rights Stories initiative as a way of promoting positive stories about human rights and recommends that it be updated; underlines the role of the EU’s public and cultural diplomacy, as well as international cultural relations, in the promotion of human rights, and calls for the Strategic Communication and Foresight division of the European External Action Service (EEAS) to increase its efforts in this regard;
Strengthening the EU’s toolbox for the promotion and protection of human rights and democracy around the world
7. Notes with concern the increasing divide worldwide; stresses the shared responsibility of the EU to continue defending democratic values and principles and human rights, international justice, peace and dignity around the world, which are even more important to defend in the current volatile state of global politics; calls upon the EU to keep communication channels open with different stakeholders and to continue to develop a comprehensive toolbox to strengthen human rights and democracy globally;
EU action plan on human rights and democracy
8. Observes that the EU and its Member States have made substantial progress in implementing the EU action plan on human rights and democracy, although they have not reached all of its goals, in part also due to the unprecedented challenges the world has experienced since its adoption; welcomes, in this sense, the extension of the action plan until 2027, with a view to maximising the synergies and complementarity between human rights and democracy at local, national and global levels;
EU Special Representative (EUSR) for Human Rights
9. Fully supports the work of the EUSR for Human Rights in contributing to the visibility and coherence of the EU’s human rights actions in its external relations; upholds the EUSR’s central role in the EU’s promotion and protection of human rights by engaging with non-EU countries and like-minded partners; underlines the need for close cooperation between the EUSR for Human Rights and other EUSRs and Special Envoys in order to further improve this coherence, and calls for greater visibility for the role of the EUSR for Human Rights; calls for the EUSR to be supported in his work with increased resources and better coordination with EU delegations around the world; regrets, despite continuous calls, Parliament’s exclusion from the process of selecting the EUSR; insists on the need for the EUSR to report back to Parliament regularly;
Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe and the human rights and democracy thematic programme
10. Recalls the fundamental role of the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI) – Global Europe, including its thematic programme on human rights and democracy, as a flagship EU instrument in promoting and protecting human rights and democracy around the world; highlights the need to engage with civil society in all the EU’s relevant external activities, including the Global Gateway Strategy which is financed through the NDICI-Global Europe; reiterates the importance of streamlining a human-rights based approach in the EU’s external action instruments; underlines Parliament’s role in the instrument’s programming process and calls on the Commission and the EEAS to share all relevant information in a timely manner in order to enable Parliament to play its role accordingly, in particular during high-level geopolitical dialogues with the Commission and in the mid-term review process as well as in its resolutions; calls on the EEAS and the Commission to ensure that a response is provided to the recommendation letters following each geopolitical dialogue and each resolution; urges the Commission to develop and launch a comprehensive, centralised website dedicated to the NDICI-Global Europe, including information on all the multiannual indicative programmes, detailing their respective budgets, associated actions and the financial allocations they are backing, organised both by country and by theme; notes that the NDICI-Global Europe and all future instruments must focus on the fundamental drivers of ongoing challenges, including the need to strengthen the resilience of local communities and democracy support activities by supporting economic development;
11. Calls for independent, ex ante assessments to determine the possible implications and risks of projects with regard to human rights, in line with Article 25(5) of Regulation (EU) 2021/947; calls for independent human rights monitoring throughout the implementation of projects in third countries, especially in relation to projects entailing a high risk of violations; calls for a suspension of projects that (in)directly contribute to human rights violations in non-EU countries; reiterates the prohibition on allocating EU funds to activities that are contrary to EU fundamental values, such as terrorism or extremism; calls on the Commission to share all human rights-related assessments with Parliament in a proactive manner;
EU trade and international agreements
12. Reiterates its call to integrate human rights assessments and include robust clauses on human rights in agreements between the EU and non-EU countries, supported by a clear set of benchmarks and procedures to be followed in the event of violations; calls on the Commission and the EEAS to ensure that the human rights clauses in current international agreements are actively monitored and effectively enforced and to improve their communication with Parliament concerning considerations and decisions regarding this enforcement; reiterates that in the face of persistent breaches of human rights clauses by its partner countries, including those related to the Generalised Scheme of Preferences Plus programme, the EU should react swiftly and decisively, including by suspending the agreements in question if other options prove ineffective; calls for the EU Ombudsman’s recommendation concerning the creation of a complaint-handling portal to be implemented, within the framework of EU trade and financial instruments, or for the Commission’s Single Entry Point to be adapted to allow complaints regarding failure to comply with human rights clauses to be submitted; calls on the EU institutions to engage regularly with the business community and civil society in order to strengthen the links between international trade, human rights and economic security; calls for the EU to ensure human rights promotion and protection through its Global Gateway investments and projects, by ensuring that they do no harm;
EU human rights dialogues
13. Stresses the important role of human rights dialogues within the EU’s human rights toolbox and as a key vehicle for the implementation of the EU action plan on human rights and democracy; highlights that these dialogues must address the overall situation of human rights and democracy with the relevant countries; notes that human rights dialogues should be seen as a key element of sustained EU engagement and not as a free-standing instrument, and that the persistent failure of non-EU countries to genuinely engage in dialogues and to implement key deliverables should lead to the use of other appropriate foreign policy tools; recalls that these dialogues need to be used in conjunction and synergy with other instruments, using a more-for-more and a less-for-less approach; reiterates the need to raise individual cases, in particular those of Sakharov Prize laureates and those highlighted by Parliament in its resolutions, and ensure adequate follow-up; calls on the EEAS and EU delegations to increase the visibility of these dialogues and their outcomes, ensuring that they are results-oriented and based on a clear set of benchmarks that can be included in a published joint press statement, and to conduct suitable follow-up action on it; calls for the enhanced and meaningful involvement of civil society in the dialogues; stresses that genuine CSOs must not be impeded from participating in human rights dialogues and that any dialogue must include all genuine CSOs without any limitations;
EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime (GHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act)
14. Welcomes the increasing use of the EU GHRSR as a key political tool in the EU’s defence of human rights and democracy across the world; regrets, however, that its use has continued to be limited, especially in the current geopolitical landscape; notes, however, the challenges that the requirement of unanimity poses in the adoption of sanctions and reiterates its call on the Council to introduce qualified majority voting for decisions on the GHRSR; recalls, in this regard, the formal request submitted by Parliament to the Council in 2023, on calling an EU reform convention, with the aim, among others, of increasing the number of decisions taken by qualified majority; calls for a stronger use of the GHRSR and other ad hoc sanctions regimes on those responsible for serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, including high-level officials; fully supports the possibility of imposing targeted anti-corruption sanctions within the EU framework in this regard, which has been a long-standing priority of Parliament, whether through its inclusion in the GHRSR or under a different regime; highlights the need for the complete enforcement of sanctions and calls for circumventions to be tackled;
Democracy support activities
15. Reiterates its concern regarding the increasing attacks by authoritarian and illiberal regimes on democratic principles, values and pluralism; stresses that the defence and support of democracy around the world is increasingly becoming of geopolitical and strategic interest; emphasises the importance of Parliament’s efforts in capacity-building for partner parliaments, promoting mediation and encouraging a culture of dialogue and compromise, especially among young political leaders, and empowering women parliamentarians, HRDs and representatives from civil society and independent media; reiterates its call on the Commission to continue and expand its activities in these areas by increasing funding and support for EU bodies, agencies and other grant-based organisations; stresses the critical importance of directly supporting civil society and persons expressing dissenting views, particularly in the current climate of growing global tensions and repression in increasing numbers of countries; reiterates the importance of EU election observation missions and Parliament’s contribution to developing and enhancing their methodology; calls for the development of an EU toolbox to be used in cases of disputed or non-transparent election results in order to prevent political and military crises in the post-election environment; calls for enhanced EU action to counter manipulative and false messages against the EU in election campaigns, in particular in countries that receive significant EU humanitarian and development assistance and in countries that are candidates for EU membership; calls for enhanced collaboration between Parliament’s Democracy Support and Election Coordination Group, the relevant Commission directorates-general and the EEAS; calls on the EU to raise gender equality issues, including sexual and reproductive health and rights, with non-EU countries; calls for human rights dialogues to be given more visibility, ensuring that they are results-oriented and based on a clear set of benchmarks that enable effective monitoring, including through effective ex ante and ex post consultation with civil society and through the publication of joint press statements and the execution of appropriate follow-up actions;
16. Underlines the importance of strengthening the participation of women in democratic systems order to tackle the discrepancy in the representation of women in decision-making; calls for the EU’s external action to facilitate better participation of women in politics, business and civil society;
EU support for human rights defenders
17. Is extremely concerned by the continuing restriction of civil society space and rising threats to the work of HRDs and members of CSOs, as well as their families, communities and lawyers, and finds particularly concerning the increasingly sophisticated means used to persecute them; strongly condemns their arbitrary detentions and killings; deplores the harassment of CSOs through legislative provisions such as foreign agents laws and similar, and other restrictions they face; deplores the fact that women HRDs continue to face relentless and ever more sophisticated violations against them, including targeted killings, physical attacks, disappearances, smear campaigns, arrests, judicial harassment and intimidation; notes with concern that these attacks seem designed to systematically silence women HRDs and erase their voices from the public sphere; supports wholeheartedly the work of HRDs and EU action to ensure their protection worldwide; underscores the pressing need for a comprehensive and timely revision of the EU Guidelines on HRDs, with a view to addressing the emerging challenges and threats, and to ensuring their applicability and effectiveness in the protection of HRDs globally, while integrating gender-sensitive and intersectional approaches in the updated Guidelines, reflecting the diverse backgrounds and experiences of HRDs, and taking into account the specific vulnerabilities they may face; calls for the complete and consistent application of the EU Guidelines on HRDs by the EU and its Member States; calls for efforts to enhance communication strategies to increase the visibility of EU actions and channels for the protection of and the support mechanisms for HRDs;
18. Raises serious concerns over the increasing phenomenon of transnational repression against HRDs, journalists and civil society; calls for the formulation of an EU strategy harmonising national responses to transnational repression;
19. Expresses deep concern regarding the increasingly precarious financial landscape faced by HRDs and communities advocating for rights, particularly within a global context characterised by intensifying repression; notes that, as a result of the current geopolitical context, HRDs’ need for support has increased; calls, therefore, for the EU and its Member States to make full use of their financial support for HRDs, ensuring the establishment of flexible, accessible and sustained funding mechanisms that enable these defenders to continue their vital work in the face of mounting challenges;
20. Insists that the EEAS, the Commission and the EU delegations pay particular attention to the situation of the Sakharov Prize laureates and finalists at risk and take resolute action, in coordination with the Member States and Parliament, to ensure their well-being, safety or liberation; pays tribute to the Sakharov Prize laureates and finalists who have lost their lives in the fight for human rights, democracy and freedom;
21. Welcomes the update of the EU Visa Code Handbook in relation to HRDs and calls for its full and consistent application by the Member States; reiterates its call for the Commission to take a proactive role in the establishment of a coordinated approach among the Member States for HRDs at risk;
Combating impunity and corruption
22. Underlines that both impunity and corruption enable and aggravate human rights violations and abuses and the erosion of democratic principles; welcomes the anti-corruption actions in EU external policies in the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 3 May 2023 on the fight against corruption (JOIN(2023)0012), which should be followed by the implementation of a strict anti-corruption framework into law, such as through the EU’s Anti-Corruption Directive, and by comprehensively addressing this issue within the EU’s anti-corruption strategy; supports the anti-corruption provisions included in the EU trade agreements with non-EU countries; stresses the important role of civil society and journalists in non-EU countries in the oversight of the fight against impunity and corruption; calls for the EU and its Member States to increase their efforts in justice reforms, the fight against impunity, and the improvement of transparency and of anti-corruption institutions in non-EU countries; encourages the EU and its Member States to coordinate more closely with allies and partners wherever possible in order to counter systemic corruption that enables autocrats to maintain power, deprives societies of key resources and undermines democracy, human rights and the rule of law;
23. Insists on the need for the EU to take clear steps to recognise the close link between corruption and human rights violations in order to target economic and financial enablers of human rights abusers;
EU actions at multilateral level
24. Reaffirms that promoting the respect, protection and fulfilment of human rights around the world requires strong international cooperation at a multilateral level; underlines the particularly important role of the UN and its bodies as the main forum which must be able to effectively advance efforts for peace and security, sustainable development and respect for human rights and international law; calls for the EU and its Member States to continue supporting the work of the UN, its agencies and special procedures, both politically and financially, to ensure that it is fit for purpose, and to push back against the influence of authoritarian and totalitarian regimes; stresses that the current multilateral order needs to fully incorporate into its architecture the new global actors, especially those focusing on democracy and human rights; reiterates the need for the EU and its Member States to speak with one voice at the UN and in other multilateral forums in order to effectively tackle global challenges to human rights and democracy in multilateral forums and to support the strongest possible language in line with international human rights standards; calls, to this end, for progress in ensuring that the EU has a seat in international organisations, including the UN Security Council, in addition to the existing Member States’ seats; calls for EU delegations to play a stronger role in multilateral forums, for which they should have appropriate resources available;
25. Is deeply concerned by growing attacks against the rules-based global order by authoritarian and totalitarian regimes, including through unprovoked and unjustified aggression against peaceful neighbours and through the undermining of the functioning of UN bodies, namely the abuse of veto power at the UN Security Council; underlines that the diminished effectiveness of these bodies brings with it real costs in terms of conflicts, lives lost and human suffering, and seriously weakens the general ability of countries to deal with global challenges; calls on the Member States and like minded partners to develop a robust strategy and to intensify their efforts to reverse this trend and to send a united and strong message of support to those organisations when they are attacked or threatened; believes that the UN, its bodies, and other multilateral organisations are in need of reform, in order to address these growing challenges and threats;
26. Strongly regrets the decision of some countries to withdraw from the UN Human Rights Council;
27. Reiterates the strong support of the EU for the International Court of Justice and the ICC as essential, independent and impartial jurisdictional institutions amid a particularly challenging time for international justice; recalls that a well-funded ICC is essential for the effective prosecution of serious international crimes; welcomes the political and financial support the EU has given to the ICC, including the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) of the ICC, and the launch of the ‘Global initiative to fight against impunity for international crimes’ offering financial support to CSOs dedicated to fostering justice and accountability for international crimes and serious human rights violations, including by facilitating survivors’ participation in legal proceedings; calls for the EU and its Member States to continue and intensify their support to the ICC – including to the ICC Trust Fund for Victims – with the necessary means, including resources and political backing, and to use all instruments at their disposal to combat impunity worldwide and enable the ICC to fulfil its mandate effectively; calls on all the Member States to respect and implement the actions and decisions of the International Court of Justice and all organs of the ICC, including the OTP and the Chambers, to urge other countries to join and cooperate with the court, including to enforce ICC arrest warrants, and to support their work as an independent and impartial international justice institution everywhere in the world; regrets the failure of some ICC member states to execute ICC arrest warrants, thereby undermining the court’s work; calls for the EU to urge non-EU countries, including its major partners, to recognise the ICC and become a state party to the Rome Statute;
28. Reiterates the strong support of the EU for the European Court of Human Rights; urges all signatory States to the European Convention on Human Rights to fully abide by rulings of the Court;
29. Stresses the importance of not politicising the ICC, as trust in the court is eroded if its mandate is misused; condemns, in particular and in the most critical terms, the political attacks, sanctions and other coercive measures introduced or envisaged against the ICC itself and against its staff; calls on the Member States and the EU institutions to cooperate to work on solutions in order to protect the institution of the ICC and its staff from any future sanctions that would threaten the functioning of the court;
30. Expresses its utmost concern over the sanctions against the ICC, its prosecutors, judges and staff, which constitute a serious attack on the international justice system; calls on the Commission to urgently activate the Blocking Statute and on the Member States to increase their diplomatic efforts in order to protect and safeguard the ICC as an indispensable cornerstone of the international justice system;
31. Recognises universal jurisdiction as an important tool of the international criminal justice system to prevent and combat impunity and promote international accountability; calls on the Member States to apply universal jurisdiction in the fight against impunity;
32. Calls for the EU and its Member States to lead the global fight against all forms of extremism and welcomes the adoption of an EU strategy to this end; demands that the fight against terrorism be at the top of the EU’s domestic and foreign affairs agenda;
Upholding international humanitarian law
33. Notes with concern the increasing disregard for international humanitarian law and international human rights law, particularly in the form of ongoing conflicts around the world; strongly condemns the increase in deliberate, indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks on civilians and civilian objects in multiple conflict settings; underlines that it is of the utmost importance that all UN and humanitarian aid agencies are able to provide full, timely and unhindered assistance to all people in vulnerable situations and calls on all parties to armed conflicts to fully respect the work of these agencies and ensure they can meet the basic needs of civilians without interference; denounces attempts to undermine UN agencies delivering humanitarian aid; urges all parties to armed conflicts to protect civilian populations, humanitarian and medical workers, and journalists and media workers; calls on all parties to armed conflicts to respect the legitimacy and inviolability of UN peacekeeping missions; calls on all states to unconditionally and fully conform with international humanitarian law; calls on the international community, and the Member States in particular, to promote accountability and the fight against impunity for grave breaches of international humanitarian law; calls for the systematic creation of humanitarian corridors in regions at war and in combat situations, whenever necessary, in order to allow civilians at risk to escape conflicts, and strongly condemns any attacks on them; demands unhindered access for humanitarian organisations monitoring and assisting prisoners of war, as provided for in the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War; expects international organisations to abide by international law regarding the treatment of prisoners of war; calls for international cooperation and assistance in the return of forcibly deported persons, in particular children and hostages;
34. Is seriously concerned by the persistence of the scourge of protracted occupation or annexation of territories; calls for special attention to be paid to the human rights situation in the illegally occupied territories, including in cases of protracted occupation, and for effective measures to be taken with the aim of preventing grave human rights abuses on the ground, including the violation of right to life, restriction of freedom of movement, and discrimination;
35. Reiterates its call on the Member States to help contain armed conflicts and serious violations of human rights or international humanitarian law by strictly abiding by the provisions of Article 7 of the UN Arms Trade Treaty of 2 April 2013 on Export and Export Assessment and Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008 defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment;
36. Urges reliable, like-minded third countries to strengthen their defence, resilience and civil preparedness capabilities, in order to effectively deter aggression and uphold human rights globally;
37. Given the gendered impacts of armed conflicts, deplores the insufficient priority and focus given to sexual and gender-based violence and to sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR) across the EU’s humanitarian and refugee response; reiterates that humanitarian crises intensify SRHR- and gender-related challenges and recalls that in crisis zones, particularly among vulnerable groups such as refugees and migrants, women and girls are particularly exposed to sexual violence, sexually transmitted diseases, sexual exploitation, rape as a weapon of war and unwanted pregnancies; calls on the Commission and the Member States to give high priority to gender equality and SRHR in their humanitarian aid and refugee response, as well as accountability and access to justice and redress for sexual and reproductive rights violations and gender-based violence, including in terms of training for humanitarian actors, and existing and future funding;
Team Europe approach
38. Recognises the potential for stronger alignment in approaches to human rights protection and promotion between EU institutions, Member States’ embassies and EU delegations in non-EU countries, particularly in encouraging those countries to comply with their international obligations and to refrain from harassment and persecution of critical voices; emphasises the opportunity for Member States’ embassies to take an increasingly active role in advancing and safeguarding human rights, while also supporting civil society in these countries; calls for the EU and its Member States to use all possible means to assess detention conditions, and observe trials and court procedures, to increase pressure and awareness, and in order to urge countries and actively work towards the release of political prisoners; highlights the importance of shared responsibility between Member States and EU delegations in these efforts; calls for the EU and its Member States to intensify their collective efforts to promote the respect, protection and fulfilment of human rights and to support democracy worldwide; encourages careful monitoring and assessment of the capacity of EU delegations to ensure that each one has a designated point of contact for cases of human rights violations, and that this mandate is allocated sufficient resources to respond in an effective and timely manner; reiterates, in this context, the importance, for the EU delegations, of existing EU guidelines related to specific areas of human rights;
Responding to universal human rights and democracy challenges
Right to freedom from torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment
39. Condemns any action or attempt to legalise, instigate, authorise, consent or acquiesce to torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment methods under any circumstances; condemns the increasing reports of the use of torture by state actors in many different contexts, including in custodial and extra-custodial settings – of political prisoners, among others – and in conflict situations around the world, notably in violation of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War, as well as the killing of prisoners of war, which amounts to a war crime, and reiterates the non-derogable nature of the right to be free from torture or other forms of inhuman or degrading treatment; reiterates the EU’s zero-tolerance policy to torture and other ill-treatment and calls on the relevant institutions, including the European Court of Human Rights, to take a thorough stance on any such case;
40. Reiterates its calls for universal ratification of the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and its Optional Protocol thereto, and for the need for states to bring their national provisions in this respect in line with international standards; reiterates, in accordance with the revised Guidelines on the EU’s policy towards third countries on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, adopted by the Council on 16 September 2019, the importance of engaging with relevant stakeholders in the fight to eradicate torture, and to monitor places of detention;
Right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association
41. Reiterates the need to protect the EU democratic space and the exercise of fundamental freedoms therein, particularly freedoms of assembly and association; highlights the growing violent repression of protest and peaceful assemblies within the EU civic space, with cases of torture and ill-treatment resulting in deaths and other serious violations; underscores the need to strengthen this fundamental right in conjunction with the absolute prohibition of torture and ill-treatment;
Right to food, water and sanitation
42. Recalls that the right to food, including having physical and economic access to adequate food or the means to its procurement, is a human right; is extremely concerned about the challenges to the right to food worldwide, especially in situations of war and conflicts; condemns the increasing reports of the weaponisation of food in situations of armed conflict; calls for the EU and its Member States to promote mandatory guidelines on the right to food without discrimination within the UN system; urges the EU and the Member States to fully support, politically and financially, organisations and agencies working to secure the right to food in conflict zones; recalls the importance of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Peasants and Other People Working in Rural Areas in view of attaining food security; commends the work of the UN World Food Programme, in this regard;
43. Reaffirms the rights to safe drinking water and to sanitation as human rights, both rights being complementary; underlines that access to clean drinking water is indispensable to a healthy and dignified life and is essential for the maintenance of human dignity; highlights the fact that the right to water is a fundamental precondition for the enjoyment of other rights, and as such must be guided by a logic grounded in the public interest, and in common public and global goods; underscores the importance of the EU Guidelines on safe drinking water and sanitation, and urges the EU institutions and the Member States to implement and promote their application in non-EU countries and in multilateral forums;
Climate change and the environment
44. Highlights that climate change and its impact on the environment has direct effects on the effective enjoyment of all human rights; recognises the important work of CSOs, indigenous peoples and local communities, land and environmental HRDs and indigenous activists for the protection of a clean, healthy and sustainable environment, including access to land and water sources; deplores the risks that environmental HRDs and indigenous activists face and calls for their effective protection to be guaranteed; notes that communities contributing the least to climate change are the ones more likely to be affected by climate risks and natural disasters and calls, in this regard, for increasing support to the most vulnerable groups; recalls that indigenous peoples and local communities play an important role in the sustainable management of natural resources and the conservation of biodiversity; recalls that the transition to clean energy must be fair and respect everyone’s fundamental rights; reiterates the importance of the achievement of the UN sustainable development goals (SDGs) for the protection of the human rights of present and future generations;
45. Notes with deep concern the increasing threats to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment posed by the deployment of weapons of mass destruction and other forms of warfare that adversely and disproportionately affect the environment; stresses the need to effectively address the displacement of people caused by environmental destruction and climate change, which increases the risk of human rights violations and heightens vulnerabilities to different forms of exploitation; recognises that children face more acute risks from climate-related disasters and are also one of the largest groups to be affected; calls for the EU to focus on addressing the impacts of climate change on the enjoyment of the rights of the child;
Rights of the child
46. Calls for a systematic and consistent approach to promoting and defending children’s rights, including for those most marginalised and those in the most vulnerable situations, through all of the EU’s external policies; calls for more concerted efforts to promote the respect, protection and fulfilment of children’s rights in crisis or emergency situations; condemns the decline in respect for the rights of the child and the increasing violations and abuses of these rights, including through violence, early and forced marriage, sexual abuse including genital mutilation, trafficking, child labour, honour killings, recruitment of child soldiers, lack of access to education and healthcare, malnutrition and extreme poverty; further condemns the increase in deaths of children in situations of armed conflict and stresses the need for effective protection of children’s rights in active warfare; calls for new EU initiatives to promote and protect children’s rights, with a view to rehabilitating and reintegrating conflict-affected children, ensuring that they have a protected, family- and community-based environment as a natural context for their lives, in which assistance and education are fundamental elements; reiterates its call for a systematic and consistent approach to promoting and defending children’s rights through all EU external policies; calls on all countries to ratify the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child as a matter of urgency, in order to allow for the universal ratification of this foundational instrument;
47. Emphasises the urgent necessity to uphold the rights of pregnant women, ensuring that they receive comprehensive support for their health, safety and dignity that includes guaranteed access to maternal healthcare services, availability of childcare facilities such as nurseries, and the establishment of fair workplace policies that protect their well-being, income and career advancement;
48. Stresses the importance of closing the financing gap that would enable countries to meet their SDG 4 targets on quality education and ensure access to education for all children and young people; reiterates its calls to address cultural norms and gender biases that prevent girls and women from receiving an education and urges the creation of gender-responsive education systems worldwide;
49. Stresses that education represents the starting point for cultivating principles and values that contribute to the personal development of children, as well as to social cohesion and democracy, and the rule of law around the world; to that end calls for the EU to promote its values through supporting access to education and learning for women and girls;
Rights of women and gender equality
50. Stresses that women’s rights and gender equality are indispensable and indivisible human rights, as well as a basis for the rule of law and inclusive resilient democracies; deplores the fact that millions of women and girls continue to experience discrimination and violence, especially in the context of conflicts, post-conflict situations and displacements, and are denied their dignity, autonomy and even life; condemns the impunity with which perpetrators commit violations against women HRDs; is appalled by the use of rape and sexual violence as a weapon of war and stresses the need to shed light on these instances, and for better international cooperation on fighting impunity for these crimes; calls for the EU, its Member States and like-minded partners to step up their efforts to ensure the full enjoyment and protection of women’s and girls’ human rights, and to incorporate a gender mainstreaming approach across all policies, taking into account the differentiated impacts of global challenges such as climate change or conflicts; emphasises that SRHR are fundamental human rights that must be upheld globally and in the Member States and expresses deep concern over global setbacks in gender equality and SRHR; reaffirms that the denial of quality and comprehensive sexual and reproductive health services constitutes a form of gender-based violence; stresses the importance of leading by example; calls for the EU to prioritise access to SRHR as part of the promotion of human rights and the achievement of sustainable development goals; condemns in the strongest terms the increasing attacks on SRHR around the world, as well as gender-based violence, including the use of sexual violence as a weapon of war; calls for the EU and its Member States to uphold SRHR as human rights, enshrine the right to legal and safe abortion in the Charter of Fundamental Rights and prioritise access to SRHR in order to advance human rights and sustainable development goals; strongly deplores cases of female genital mutilation, honour killings, child marriages and forced marriages; welcomes the accession of the EU to the Istanbul Convention and strongly encourages the remaining Member States to ratify the Istanbul Convention without further delay; calls for the EU and its international partners to strengthen their efforts to ensure that women fully enjoy human rights and are treated equally to men; emphasises the importance of safeguarding the rights of women, ensuring that their health, safety and dignity are protected, particularly in the context of healthcare access and workplace protections; underlines the need to keep opposing and condemning, in the strongest terms, anti-abortion laws that punish women and girls with decades-long jail sentences, even in cases of rape, incest or when the life of the pregnant woman is at risk; stresses the need to pursue efforts to fully eradicate the practice of female genital mutilation; fully supports the role of the EU Ambassador for Gender and Diversity;
51. Recognises that the promotion and protection of SRHR is essential to achieving gender equality and affirms the right to access comprehensive SRHR services, including modern contraception, free, safe and legal abortion, maternal, prenatal and postnatal healthcare, assisted reproduction and access to education and information on SRHR, including comprehensive sexuality education, without any form of discrimination, coercion or violence; echoes human rights bodies’ recognition that banning abortion may subject women to suffering amounting to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment;
52. Recognises that gender apartheid constitutes a systematic and institutionalised form of oppression, depriving women and girls of fundamental rights solely on the basis of their gender; notes with deep concern the entrenchment of gender apartheid in certain regions, where women face extensive restrictions on education, employment, healthcare and freedom of movement, often underpinned by legal and cultural frameworks that reinforce gender-based discrimination; urges the EU and the Member States to proactively address gender apartheid through strengthened diplomatic efforts, targeted economic measures and accountability mechanisms that support civil society organisations advocating for gender equality; calls for the formal recognition of gender apartheid as a distinct human rights violation and for support for international initiatives for its classification as a crime against humanity, thus contributing to the establishment of a global accountability standard;
Rights of refugees and asylum seekers
53. Denounces the erosion of the human rights and the safety of refugees, asylum seekers and forcibly displaced persons; reaffirms their inalienable human rights and fundamental right to seek asylum; recalls the obligation of states to protect them in accordance with international law; underlines the importance of identification and registration of individuals, including children, as a key tool for protecting refugees and ensuring the integrity of refugee protection systems, preventing human trafficking and the recruitment of children into armed militias; calls for the EU and its Member States to effectively uphold their rights in the EU’s asylum and migration policy and in the EU’s cooperation with partner countries in this regard; deplores the increasing xenophobia, racism and discrimination towards migrants, as well as the different forms of violence they face, including during their displacement, and the many barriers they face, including in access to healthcare; condemns the instrumentalisation of migration at EU borders by foreign actors, which constitutes hybrid attacks against the Member States as well as a dehumanisation of migrants; stresses that the EU should step up its efforts to acknowledge and develop ways to address the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement, building the resilience of migrants’ communities of origin and helping them offer their members the possibility to enjoy a decent life in their home country; calls for the EU and its Member States to continue and, where possible, step up their support for countries hosting the most refugees, as well as for transit countries; reiterates that close cooperation and engagement with non-EU countries, with full respect for fundamental rights, remain key to preventing migrant smuggling; stresses, in this regard, that the dissemination of information and awareness-raising campaigns on the risks of smuggling are crucial, as well as of the migration laws of the destination countries, in order to prevent the undertaking of unnecessarily risky journeys by those who do not have grounds for asylum; calls for EU-funded humanitarian operations to take into consideration the specific needs and vulnerabilities of children and to ensure their protection while they are displaced; underlines the importance of developing an effective framework of safe and legal pathways to the EU and welcomes, in this regard, the Commission communication on attracting skills and talent to the EU(10), including the development of talent partnerships with partner countries; calls for respect for the principle of non-refoulement to countries where the life and liberty of people would be threatened; calls for the EU and its Member States to discuss the phenomenon of instrumentalised migration orchestrated by authoritarian regimes and organised crime groups, and emphasises the need to conduct a comprehensive analysis of this phenomenon, develop effective countermeasures, and consider its implications for the human rights framework;
Rights of LGBTIQ+ persons
54. Condemns the human rights violations, including discrimination, persecution, violence and killings, stigmatisation, hate crimes, hate speech, conversion therapies, intersex genital mutilation and sexual violence against lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans, non-binary, intersex and queer (LGBTIQ+) persons around the world; calls for the EU and its Member States to denounce these injustices and commit to protecting the rights, dignity and safety of LGBTIQ+ individuals; is extremely concerned by the spreading of hatred and anti-LGBTIQ+ narratives and legislation that target LGBTIQ+ persons and HRDs; denounces, in this regard, conversion practices targeting LGBTIQ+ persons aimed at changing, repressing or suppressing the sexual orientation, gender identity and/or gender expression of their victims; calls for the implementation of an EU-wide policy to illegalise practices of this kind; calls for the adoption of policies that protect LGBTIQ+ people and give them the tools to safely report a violation of their rights, in line with the EU Guidelines to Promote and Protect the Enjoyment of all Human Rights by LGBTI Persons; emphasises the increasing concerns and fears within LGBTIQ+ communities and urges the EU to take a firm stance against any legislative or social actions that endanger LGBTIQ+ people; expresses special concern over LGBTIQ+ people living under non-democratic regimes or in conflict situations, and calls for rapid response mechanisms to protect them as well as their defenders; reiterates its calls for the full implementation of the LGBTIQ Equality Strategy 2020-2025 as the EU’s tool for improving the situation of LGBTIQ+ people around the world; calls for the use of the death penalty to be rejected under all circumstances, including any legislation that would impose the death penalty for homosexuality; calls for the EU and its Member States to further engage the countries with such legislation in reconsidering their position on the death penalty; notes further that the imposition of the death penalty on the basis of such legislation is arbitrary killing per se, and a breach of Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;
Rights of persons with disabilities
55. Is concerned by the challenges to the full enjoyment of the rights of persons with disabilities; reiterates its calls for the EU to assist partner countries in the development of policies in support of carers of persons with disabilities; calls for the raising of social awareness and the combating of discriminatory behaviours against persons with disabilities; points to the additional complications faced by persons with disabilities in conflict situations and natural disasters, as they are more vulnerable to violence and often do not receive adequate support; urges all parties to conflict situations worldwide to take adequate measures to mitigate the risks to them as much as possible; emphasises the need to safeguard children with disabilities from any form of exploitation; calls for the EU, in its external policy, to make use of the strategy for the rights of persons with disabilities 2021-2030 as a tool to improve the situation of persons with disabilities, particularly concerning poverty and discrimination, but also problems with access to education, healthcare and employment, and participation in political life; encourages the EU to support partner countries in developing inclusive economic policies that promote accessible vocational training and employment opportunities for persons with disabilities, fostering their full and active economic participation;
Rights of elderly people
56. Reiterates its call for the EU and its Member States to develop new avenues to strengthen the rights of elderly people, taking into account the multiple challenges they face, such as age-based discrimination, poverty, violence and a lack of social protection, healthcare and other essential services, as well as barriers to employment; calls for the implementation of specific measures to combat the risk of poverty for older women through increased social support; underlines the work of the UN Open-ended Working Group on Ageing on a legally binding instrument to strengthen the protection of the human rights of older people and calls for the EU and its Member States to consider actively supporting that work; stresses the need for a cross-cutting intergenerational approach in EU policies, in order to build and encourage solidarity between young people and elderly people;
Right to equality and non-discrimination
57. Reiterates its condemnation of all forms of racism, intolerance, antisemitism, Islamophobia, persecution of Christians, xenophobia and discrimination on the basis of race, ethnicity, nationality, social class, disability, caste, religion, belief, age, sexual orientation or gender identity; condemns the growing international threat of hate speech and speech that incites violence, including online; reiterates the crucial role of education and dialogue in promoting tolerance, understanding and diversity; calls for the adoption or the strengthening of mechanisms for reporting discriminatory behaviours as well as access to effective legal remedies, to help end the impunity of those who engage in this behaviour;
Right to life: towards the universal abolition of the death penalty
58. Reiterates its principled opposition to the death penalty, which is irreversible and incompatible with the right to life and with the prohibition of torture, and a cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment; stresses that the EU must be relentless in its pursuit of the universal abolition of the death penalty as a major objective of its human rights foreign policy; notes that despite the trend in some non-EU countries to take steps towards abolishing the death penalty, significant challenges in this regard still exist; deplores the fact that in other non-EU countries the number of death sentences that have been carried out has reached its highest level in the last five years; reiterates its call for all countries to completely abolish the death penalty or establish an immediate moratorium on the use of the death penalty (sentences and executions) as a first step towards its abolition; urges, in this regard, the EU to intensify diplomatic engagement with countries that continue to practise the death penalty, encouraging dialogue and cooperation on human rights issues and providing support for the development of judicial reforms that could lead towards its abolition;
Right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief
59. Reiterates its concern regarding violations of the right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief; is concerned about the worldwide increase in intolerance towards different religious communities; deplores the instrumentalisation of religious or belief identities for political purposes and the exclusion of persons belonging to religious and belief minorities and religious communities, including from political participation, as well as the destruction and vandalism of sites and works of art of cultural and historical value, in certain non-EU countries; stresses that the freedom to choose one’s religion, to believe or not to believe is a human right that cannot be punished; condemns, therefore, the existence and implementation of so-called apostasy laws and blasphemy laws that lead to harsh penalties, degrading treatment and, in some cases, even to death sentences; calls for the abolition of apostasy laws and blasphemy laws; stresses that the Special Envoy for the promotion and protection of freedom of religion or belief outside the EU should be granted more resources so that he can efficiently carry out his mandate; highlights the need for the Special Envoy to continue to work closely and in a complementary manner with the EUSR for Human Rights and the Council Working Party on Human Rights; calls for the EU and its Member States to step up their efforts to protect the right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief, to raise these issues at UN human rights forums and to continue working with the relevant UN mechanisms and committees; calls for the EU to request and consolidate reports by EU delegations on the state of freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief;
60. Recalls that most of the drivers of violent conflicts worldwide involve minority grievances of exclusion, discrimination and inequalities linked to violations of the human rights of minorities, as observed by the UN Special Rapporteur on minority issues; stresses the need to mainstream the protection of the rights of minorities and for the development of protection mechanisms at the level of the UN; recalls the obligations of states to protect the rights of their national, ethnic, cultural, religious or linguistic minorities within their respective territories; calls on the Commission to support the protection of the rights of persons belonging to minorities worldwide, including this as a priority under the human rights and democracy thematic programme of the EU’s NDICI-Global Europe;
Right to freedom of expression, academic freedom, media freedom and the right to information
61. Emphasises the critical significance of freedom of expression and access to trustworthy and diverse sources of information for sustaining democracy and a thriving civic space; recalls that democracies can only function when citizens have access to independent and reliable information, making journalists key players in the safeguarding of democracy; is therefore seriously concerned about the increasing restrictions on freedom of expression in numerous countries worldwide, particularly for journalists, through censorship, enforced self-censorship, so-called foreign agents laws and the misuse of counter-terrorism or anti-corruption laws to suppress journalists and civil society groups; is concerned by the use of hate speech against journalists, both online and offline, leading to a deterrent effect; raises concerns, additionally, about the physical security of journalists and media workers and their being targeted in conflict zones; deplores the fact that in 2024, 54 journalists and media workers were killed – most of them in conflict zones – 550 were being detained, 55 were being held hostage, and 95 were missing;
62. Calls urgently for the EU to back trustworthy media and information outlets that promote the accountability of authorities and support democratic transitions, while stressing the need to preserve the principles of pluralism, transparency and independence; highlights the role played by fact checkers in the media landscape, ensuring that the public can trust the information they receive; is concerned that they are therefore major targets for attacks by illiberal regimes that originate and disseminate disinformation, propaganda and fake news; condemns the extensive use of SLAPPs to silence journalists, activists, trade unionists and HRDs globally; welcomes, in this context, the directive designed to shield journalists and HRDs from abusive legal actions and SLAPPs; encourages lawmakers in non-EU countries to develop legislation with the same goal, as part of broader efforts to promote and protect media freedom and pluralism; requests that attacks on media freedom, as well as the persistent and systematic erosion of the right to information, be taken into account in the EU’s monitoring of the compliance of international agreements;
63. Welcomes the Commission’s plan to finance initiatives that support journalists on legal and practical matters, including beyond the EU, through the European Democracy Action Plan; calls for the EU to strengthen its efforts to aid targeted journalists globally, recalling that independent journalists are on the frontline of the fight against disinformation, which undermines democracies; acknowledges the contribution to achieving this goal of programmes such as the now-defunct Media4Democracy and other EU-funded activities, including those of the European Endowment for Democracy; strongly regrets the decision to halt funding to Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Radio Free Asia and Voice of America, which are outlets with a vital role in combating disinformation, promoting democratic values and reporting in places where press freedom is severely curtailed or non-existent; calls for the EU to urgently step in and provide the funding needed in order to ensure that reliable news sources available in countries that restrict press freedom;
64. Remains deeply concerned by the deteriorating state of press freedom around the world; condemns the censorship of journalists, HRDs and CSOs through the application of so-called foreign agents laws, as well as other legislative and non-legislative measures adopted by authoritarian and illiberal regimes;
65. Reaffirms its commitment to protecting and promoting academic freedom as a key component of open and democratic societies; underlines the attacks to academic freedom not only by authoritarian and totalitarian regimes, but also by extreme and populist forces worldwide; calls for the development of benchmarks for academic freedom into institutional quality assurance within academic rankings, procedures and criteria;
66. Underlines the indispensable work of organisations such as Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty in their promotion of democracy, media pluralism and access to neutral information; draws attention to the fact that where the voice of democracy is cancelled, it is easy for propaganda against democratic values to take over; highlights the need to ensure the consistent financing of such institutions, and calls for the EU to step up the financing of such organisations and fill researching gaps that may occur;
67. Notes with concern that more than half of the world’s population lives within environments of completely or severely restricted levels of academic freedom, which has severe consequences for the right to education, the enjoyment of the benefits of scientific progress and the freedom of opinion and expression; urges the EU and its Member States to step up their efforts to halt censorship, threats or attacks on academic freedom, and especially the imprisonment of scholars worldwide; welcomes the inclusion of academics at risk in the EU Human Rights Defenders Mechanism; calls on the Commission to ensure continued high-level support for the Global Campus of Human Rights, which has provided a safe space for students and scholars who had to flee their countries for defending democracy and human rights;
Rights of indigenous peoples
68. Notes with regret that indigenous peoples continue to face widespread and systematic discrimination and persecution worldwide, including forced displacements; condemns arbitrary arrests and the killing of human rights and land defenders who stand up for the rights of indigenous peoples; stresses that the promotion of the rights of indigenous peoples and their traditional practices are key to achieving sustainable development, combating climate change and conserving biodiversity; urges governments to pursue development and environmental policies that respect economic, social and cultural rights, and that are inclusive of indigenous peoples and local populations, in line with the UN SDGs; reiterates its call for the EU, its Member States and their partners in the international community to adopt all necessary measures for the recognition, protection and promotion of the rights of indigenous people, including as regards their languages, lands, territories and resources, as set out in the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, including the principle of free, prior and informed consent; calls on all states to ensure that indigenous peoples and local communities are included in the deliberations and decision-making processes of international climate diplomacy; encourages the Commission to continue to promote dialogue and collaboration between indigenous peoples and the EU;
Right to public participation
69. Deplores that the right to participate in free and fair elections is not respected in authoritarian, illiberal, and totalitarian regimes; highlights that these regimes conduct fake elections with the aim of entrenching their power, as they lack real political contestation and pluralism; is alarmed by current trends in electoral processes, such as the increasing decline in electoral participation and democratic performance or the growing disputes concerning the credibility of elections; highlights with deep concern the growing interference by some states in other countries’ elections through hybrid tactics; reaffirms the necessity of increasing political representation of women, young people and vulnerable groups and to guarantee the public participation of minorities; underlines that distrust in the electoral process can be exacerbated not only by irregularities but also by public statements, including from participants; emphasises that public perception of electoral process is as crucial as the process itself, as its manipulation can lead to polarisation or targeted attacks; calls on non-EU countries to reinforce their efforts to clearly communicate all the steps of their respective electoral processes and systems, as well as the existing accountability mechanisms in case of irregularities; calls on the EEAS and the Commission to analyse and report to Parliament their initiatives to tackle the challenges posed by artificial intelligence (AI) in electoral processes;
Human rights, business and trade
70. Stresses the role of trade as a major instrument to promote and improve the human rights situation in the EU’s partner countries; urges the Commission to improve coordination between the EU’s trade, investment and development policies and prioritise and promote the development of human rights through EU trade policies, including the Generalised Scheme of Preferences Plus; notes, however, that there has been little to no improvement in some of the countries concerned; stresses the responsibilities of states and other actors, such as corporations, to mitigate the effects of climate change, prevent their negative impact on human rights and promote appropriate policies in compliance with human rights obligations; deplores the detrimental effects of some excessive and exploitative business activities on human rights and democracy; welcomes the harmonisation resulting from the adoption of the Directive on corporate sustainability due diligence with binding EU rules on responsible corporate behaviour with regard to human, labour and environmental rights; further welcomes the Regulation on prohibiting products made with forced labour on the Union market(11) and calls for its swift implementation at Member State level; calls for the implementation of the EU Ombudsman’s recommendation concerning the creation of a complaint-handling portal, within the framework of EU trade and financial instruments, and for the adaptation of the Commission’s Single Entry Point to allow for the submission of complaints regarding failures to comply with human rights clauses, which should be accessible, citizen-friendly and transparent; calls for the EU to continue its efforts to eliminate child labour, and forced and bonded labour; stresses the importance of remediation and access to justice measures that are in line with the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, including financial and non-financial measures in consultation with the victims; calls on the Council to adopt an ambitious mandate for the EU to engage in the ongoing negotiations on the UN legally binding instrument on business and human rights as soon as possible;
71. Highlights that in many regions of the world, micro-, small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) are often the driving force of local economies with an increasing number of women running them; underlines that MSMEs account for 90 % of businesses, 60 to 70 % of employment and 50 % of gross domestic product worldwide; highlights the importance of MSMEs in their contribution to the 2030 Agenda and the achievement of the SDGs, namely those on the eradication of poverty and decent working conditions for all;
Human rights and digital technologies
72. Is concerned by the threat that AI can pose to democracy and human rights, especially if it is not duly regulated; highlights the need for oversight, robust transparency and appropriate safeguards for new and emergent technologies, as well as a human-rights based approach; welcomes the Council conclusions on Digital Diplomacy of 26 June 2023 to strengthen the EU’s role and leadership in global digital governance, in particular its position as a shaper of the global digital rulebook based on democratic principles; welcomes, in this regard, the adoption of the EU Artificial Intelligence Act which aims to harmonise the rules on AI for protecting human rights, and the advantages that AI can bring to human wellbeing; is deeply concerned about the harmful consequences of the misuse of AI and deepfakes, particularly for women and children; notes with concern the adverse effects of the ‘fake content industry’ on the right to information and press freedom, including the rapid development of AI and the subsequent empowerment of the disinformation industry(12); condemns the use of new and emerging technologies, such as facial recognition technology and digital surveillance, as coercive instruments and their use in the increasing harassment, intimidation and persecution of HRDs, activists, journalists and lawyers; calls on the Council for the listing under the EUGHRSR of state and non-state actors that are engaging in these practices; notes with concern the rapid development of AI in military applications, as well as the potential development and deployment of autonomous systems that could make life-or-death decisions without human input;
73. Recalls that the international trade in spyware to non-EU countries where such tools are used against human rights activists, journalists and government critics, is a violation of the fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter;
74. Welcomes the adoption in May 2024 of the first Council of Europe Framework Convention on Artificial Intelligence and Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law, aimed at ensuring that activities within the entire life cycle of AI systems are fully consistent with human rights, democracy and the rule of law; reiterates the need for greater legislative attention to be paid to the profound changes arising from activities within the life cycle of AI systems, which have the potential to promote human prosperity, individual and social well-being, sustainable development, gender equality, and the empowerment of all women and girls, but also pose the risk of creating or exacerbating inequalities and incentivising cyber and physical violence, including violence experienced by women and individuals in vulnerable situations;
75. Stresses that the internet should be a place where freedom of expression prevails; considers, nevertheless, that the rights of individuals need to be respected; is of the opinion that, where applicable, what is considered to be illegal offline, should be considered illegal online; expresses concern for the growing number of internet shutdowns; highlights that internet shutdowns are often used by authoritarian regimes, among others, to silence political dissidence and curb political freedom; calls urgently for the EU to combat this alarming phenomenon, including considering allowing EU-based providers to offer safe communication tools to people who have been thereby deprived of online access; urges the EU to take a firm stance against any attempts by tech giants to circumvent or undermine national legal systems and independent court decisions, and to protect democratic principles and implement measures to maintain the integrity of elections, as well as to protect the right to information, especially during electoral periods;
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76. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the European Union Special Representative for Human Rights, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the United Nations Security Council, the United Nations Secretary-General, the President of the 79th session of the United Nations General Assembly, the President of the United Nations Human Rights Council, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the European Union Heads of Delegation.
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Source: Office of United States Attorneys
BIRMINGHAM, Ala. – A federal grand jury in the Northern District of Alabama has charged 15 individuals with immigration crimes, announced U.S. Attorney Prim Escalona.
The following defendants were indicted for illegally reentering the United States after having previously been deported:
The following defendants were charged with being an alien in possession of a firearm:
Maria Monserrat de Jesus Bautista-Hernandez, 41, of Mexico, has been charged with illegal re-entry after a prior removal and for being an alien in possession of a firearm.
These cases are part of Operation Take Back America, a nationwide initiative that marshals the full resources of the Department of Justice to repel the invasion of illegal immigration, achieve the total elimination of cartels and transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), and protect our communities from the perpetrators of violent crime. Operation Take Back America streamlines efforts and resources from the Department’s Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETFs) and Project Safe Neighborhood (PSN). Operation Take Back America partners, Homeland Security Investigations – Atlanta, U.S. Postal Inspection Service – Houston Division, and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives Nashville Field Division, investigated these cases.
An indictment contains only charges. A defendant is presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty.
Source: US Immigration and Customs Enforcement
BUFFALO, N.Y. — U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement and federal law enforcement partners apprehended 133 illegal aliens during an enhanced targeted enforcement operation focusing on criminal illegal alien offenders and other immigration violators in western, central, and northern New York to bolster public safety, national security and border security March 24-28.
“By leveraging our federal partnerships and intelligence-driven investigations, ICE continues to carry out its mission in a way that best serves national security, public safety and border security,” said ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations Buffalo acting Deputy Field Office Director Philip Rhoney. “I am grateful for the professionalism, dedication and support from all of our partners during this week-long operation to remove dangerous alien offenders from our New York communities.”
ICE and federal partners concentrated their efforts in and around the Buffalo area, but operations extended throughout western and upstate New York. Operations led to arrests of 84 illegal aliens from the Buffalo and Rochester areas, and 49 illegal aliens from Syracuse, Albany, Rouses Point, and Massena.
“The success of this enhanced enforcement operation underscores the importance of utilizing a whole-of-government approach when protecting the public from criminal aliens and dangerous individuals living in our western, central, and northern New York communities,” said ICE Homeland Security Investigations Buffalo Special Agent in Charge Erin Keegan. “Standing side-by-side with our partners, ICE HSI will utilize every tool at our disposal to ensure the safety and security of New Yorkers. I commend our partners from the FBI, CBP, USBP, ATF, DEA, DSS, and USMS for their unwavering collaboration in support of this vital mission.”
Of those arrested, 20 had criminal convictions or charges including three who were convicted of homicide. Nine of the arrests were of aliens who have been previously removed from the United States.
Four criminal search warrants were executed during the operation. They were executed during the worksite enforcement component of the operation for federal violations of bringing in and harboring certain aliens and resulted in multiple bookings and records seizures as well as 18 administrative arrests for violations of immigration law.
Among those arrested during the enhanced targeted operation include:
Partner law enforcement agencies participating in the operation were FBI Buffalo; FBI Albany; Drug Enforcement Administration New York; U.S. Customs and Border Protection Buffalo; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives New York; U.S. Marshals Service Buffalo; USCIS Fraud Detection and National Security; Department of State Diplomatic Security Service; and the U.S. Attorney’s Offices for the Western and Northern Districts of New York.
Members of the public can report crimes and suspicious activity by dialing 866-347-2423 or completing ICE’s online tip form.
Learn more about ERO Buffalo’s mission to preserve public safety on X, @EROBuffalo.
Source: US Immigration and Customs Enforcement
HOUSTON — U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement removed Ruben Alonso Urbina Martinez, a 39-year-old illegal alien from Honduras, from the U.S. April 2. Urbina is a foreign fugitive wanted in Honduras for murder.
Urbina was transported aboard a flight coordinated by ICE’s Air Operations Unit from the Alexandria Staging Facility in Alexandria, Louisiana, to the Ramon Villeda Morales International Airport in San Pedro Sula, Honduras. Upon arrival, he was transferred into the custody of Honduran authorities.
Urbina illegally entered the U.S. on an unknown date and at an unknown location. ICE received information Feb. 20 confirming that Urbina was wanted in Honduras for murder and safely took him into custody that same day in Dublin, Texas, during a targeted enforcement action with the Erath County Sheriff’s Office. Urbina was processed as an expedited removal and repatriated to Honduras April 2.
“This foreign fugitive fled to the United States to evade prosecution for murder in his home country of Honduras,” said ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations Houston Field Office Director Bret A. Bradford. “Working in tandem with our partners at the Erath County Sheriff’s Office, we were able to quickly locate him and safely take him into custody. By repatriating him to Honduras to face justice for his alleged crimes, we have eliminated a threat to public safety in our local communities and sent a resounding message that Southeast Texas will not be a refuge for foreign fugitives or anyone else who undermines the integrity of our nation’s immigration laws.”
ERO Honduras and the Security Alliance for Fugitive Enforcement Task Force assisted with Urbina’s removal.
The SAFE Program is a fugitive enforcement and information sharing partnership that was created in 2012 to better use subject information derived from local in-country investigative resources and leads to locate, apprehend, detain, and remove individuals residing in the U.S. illegally who were subject to foreign arrest warrants. The SAFE Program operates under the respective host nation’s Assistant Attaché for Removal, which constructs a SAFE task force composed of relevant foreign law enforcement agencies, immigration authorities, attorneys general, and national identification repositories – as well as other regional, national, state, and local government agencies. The managing AAR ensures that each task force member complies with SAFE policies and standards consistent with the program’s standard operating procedures. Once established, the AAR-led SAFE task force generates new leads and vets existing SAFE fugitive referrals for ERO action.
Members of the public who have information about foreign fugitives are urged to contact ICE by calling the ICE Tip Line at 1 (866) 347-2423 or internationally at 001-1802-872-6199. They can also file a tip online by completing ICE’s online tip form.
For more news and information on how the ICE ERO Houston Field Office carries out its immigration enforcement mission in Southeast Texas follow us on X, formerly known as Twitter, @EROHouston.
Source: Washington State News
OLYMPIA — Attorney General Nick Brown co-led today a multistate lawsuit filed against the Trump Administration for its unlawful attempt to disrupt grant funding issued by the National Institutes of Health (NIH). It is the second lawsuit filed by state attorneys general against NIH for cancelled funding.
The lawsuit, filed in U.S. District Court for Massachusetts by attorneys general from 16 states, challenges the administration’s unreasonable and intentional delays in reviewing NIH grant applications, as well as its termination of hundreds of grants issued already. The lawsuit asserts that NIH recently terminated large swaths of grants for projects that are currently underway based on the federal government disfavoring them — like projects the Trump administration deems as related to diversity, equity and inclusion initiatives or fears about vaccines.
As a result of the administration’s delays and terminations, the states argue their public research institutions have experienced significant harm. For instance:
“The Trump administration’s illegal withholding of funding stops life-saving advances in medical, agricultural, and public health research,” Brown said. “The harm is not only to the advances in science, but also to the jobs of researchers doing this vital work. We are asking the court to allow funds that have already been allocated to flow to Washington’s centers of research.”
The attorneys general ask a federal judge to compel the administration to promptly review and issue decisions on delayed grant applications. Currently, the states bringing the lawsuit are awaiting decisions on billions of dollars in requested research funding.
Joining Attorney General Brown in filing today’s lawsuit, which he co-led with the attorneys general of Massachusetts, California, and Maryland, were the attorneys general of Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, Hawai‘i, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island and Wisconsin.
The lawsuit can be found here.
In February, Brown joined a coalition of 22 attorneys general in filing a separate lawsuit against the Trump administration for its attempts to unilaterally cut “indirect cost” reimbursements for NIH grants at nearly every research institution in the country. On March 5, a federal judge issued a preliminary injunction that prevented the administration from cutting the funding as the case proceeds.
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Source: Office of United States Attorneys
Bowling Green, KY – An illegal alien man was sentenced yesterday to 2 years and 6 months in federal prison for illegally reentering the United States after previously having been deported or removed.
U.S. Attorney Michael A. Bennett of the Western District of Kentucky, Special Agent in Charge Rana Saoud of Homeland Security Investigations Nashville, and Sam Olson, Field Office Director, Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) Chicago, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement made the announcement.
According to court documents, David Lopez-Guillen, 48, a citizen of Mexico, was sentenced to 2 years and 6 months in prison, followed by a 3-year term of supervised release, for illegally reentering the United States after previously having been deported or removed. On April 14, 2022, in Russell County, Kentucky, Lopez-Guillen was an alien found in the United States after having been denied admission, excluded, deported, and removed from the United States three previous times, on or about January 19, 2001, April 25, 2005, and August 31, 2020. This is Lopez-Guillen’s second conviction in the Western District of Kentucky for illegal reentry.
There is no parole in the federal system.
This case was investigated by HSI Bowling Green and ICE ERO.
Assistant U.S. Attorney Mark J. Yurchisin II, of the U.S. Attorney’s Bowling Green Branch Office, prosecuted the case.
This case was sentenced under Operation Take Back America, a nationwide initiative that marshals the full resources of the Department of Justice to repel the invasion of illegal immigration, achieve the total elimination of cartels and transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), and protect our communities from the perpetrators of violent crime. Operation Take Back America streamlines efforts and resources from the Department’s Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETFs) and Project Safe Neighborhood (PSN).
###
Source: US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
SPC AC 041243
Day 1 Convective Outlook
NWS Storm Prediction Center Norman OK
0743 AM CDT Fri Apr 04 2025
Valid 041300Z – 051200Z
…THERE IS A MODERATE RISK OF SEVERE THUNDERSTORMS FROM THE
ARKLATEX INTO SOUTHEAST MISSOURI…
…SUMMARY…
Several clusters of severe storms are expected from central Texas
across the ArkLaTex and into the lower Ohio Valley through tonight.
The greatest threat for tornadoes, large hail and damaging winds
will be from the ArkLaTex across western Arkansas into southeast
Missouri, including potential for strong to potentially intense
tornadoes.
…Synopsis…
Early morning satellite imagery shows a deep upper trough extending
across the western CONUS, with an embedded shortwave trough moving
through the southern High Plains. Another embedded shortwave trough
exists farther west and is currently moving across the central Baja
Peninsula. The lead wave is forecast to continue northeastward into
the central Plains throughout the day, while the second wave
continues eastward into northern/central Mexico.
At the surface, a stalled frontal boundary currently extends from a
weak low near DRT northeastward to another weak low in northeast TX.
Widespread showers and thunderstorms are ongoing north of this
boundary, supported by a warm-air advection from a strong low-level
jet that covers much of central/eastern TX and the Lower MS Valley.
Expectation is for the low-level jet to persist throughout the day,
gradually shifting eastward in response to modest eastward progress
of the upper troughing. Eastern portion of the stationary front
should transition to a warm front while elevated thunderstorms
continue north of this boundary. Northward progression of this front
will allow the very moist airmass in place across east TX and LA to
surge northward into more of the Mid-South/Mid MS Valley, resulting
in a broad and unstable warm sector by early afternoon. At the same
time, the portion of the front over TX will begin drifting
southeastward as a cold front. Severe thunderstorms are expected as
this front interacts with the moist and unstable warm sector in
place.
…Eastern OK into the Mid MS Valley this morning…
Ongoing showers and thunderstorms across eastern OK and
northern/western AR are expected to shift northeastward this
morning, gradually losing intensity as buoyancy weakens with
northern extent. Expectation is for these storms to stay elevated
north of the warm front, but there should still be enough buoyancy
for large hail within the strongest storms.
…Arklatex through the Mid-South this afternoon/evening…
As mentioned in the synopsis, the warm front across the region is
expected to surge quickly northward, with very moist air expected to
advect into the region in its wake. 70s dewpoints are already in
place across east TX and northwest LA and consensus within the
guidance takes these 70s dewpoints into central AR and western TN by
later this afternoon. Modest heating within this airmass will bring
temperatures into the upper 70s/low 80s. These surface conditions
beneath a residual EML will support robust destabilization and a
large area of 2000+ J/kg of MLCAPE. A vigorous low-level jet will
extend across this region as well, resulting in robust low-level
shear. Some mid-level weakness is noted in forecast hodographs, but
the bulk shear is still more than enough to support supercells.
A combination of convergence along the front and strengthening
large-scale ascent is expected to result in initial development
around 18Z from far west-central/southwest OK through the Arklatex
into northeast TX. Given the strong buoyancy and shear, this
development should mature quickly into supercells capable of all
severe hazards, including strong to intense tornadoes and very large
(i.e. greater than 2″ in diameter) hail. With the increasing ascent
and little to no convective inhibition, overall storm coverage will
be high and storm interactions could have a large role in
determining supercell longevity. That being said, environmental
conditions do support the potential for long-track tornadoes.
…Lower MO Valley into the Mid MS and Lower OH Valleys this
afternoon/evening…
A persistent low-level jet coupled with modest height falls and
perhaps even some convectively enhanced vorticity maxima will
support widespread elevated thunderstorms. Some hail is possible
with the stronger, more consistent cores as this activity moves
northeastward. There is some chance that storms along the
southernmost tier of this activity begin to interact with the warm
front (and potentially a weak frontal low) in the southeast
MO/southern IL/far western KY vicinity. As a result, there could be
a period where a more organized convective line develops, with an
attendant threat for damaging wind gusts.
…Southwest TX/TX Hill Country tonight…
Second shortwave trough mentioned in the synopsis is forecast to
cross northern/central Mexico and move into the southern High Plains
late tonight. Steep mid-level lapse and associated significant
elevated buoyancy will be in place, and thunderstorm development is
anticipated as the shortwave moves into the region. Strong shear
will also be in place, which will likely aid in the development of
supercells capable of large to very large hail.
..Mosier/Kerr.. 04/04/2025
CLICK TO GET WUUS01 PTSDY1 PRODUCT
NOTE: THE NEXT DAY 1 OUTLOOK IS SCHEDULED BY 1630Z
US Senate News:
Source: United States Senator for Texas John Cornyn
WASHINGTON – U.S. Senators John Cornyn (R-TX) and Ted Cruz (R-TX) today introduced a Senate resolution honoring the life and legacy of Houston native and professional boxer George Foreman, who passed away on March 21, 2025. Text is below, and you can view the full resolution here.
“Whereas George Foreman was born on January 10, 1949, in Marshall, Texas;
Whereas George Foreman was raised in Houston, Texas;
Whereas George Foreman earned his general education degree and gained vocational skills through the Lyndon B. Johnson Job Corps;
Whereas George Foreman began his boxing career in 1966 after meeting Doc Broaddus, a boxing instructor, who worked for Job Corps;
Whereas George Foreman won his first amateur fight on January 26, 1967, in the Parks Diamond Bell Tournament;
Whereas George Foreman won the National Boxing Championship heavyweight title in Toledo, Ohio, in 1968;
Whereas George Foreman won a gold medal in the boxing and heavyweight division during the 1968 Mexico City Olympic Games;
Whereas George Foreman began his professional boxing career in 1969;
Whereas George Foreman won 37 consecutive fights, of which 35 were by knockout;
Whereas, on January 22, 1973, George Foreman won the World Heavyweight Championship title by defeating Joe Frazier;
Whereas George Foreman maintained the title of World Heavyweight Champion until October 30, 1974, in a fierce matchup, known as the “Rumble in the Jungle”, with Muhammad Ali;
Whereas George Foreman stepped back from his boxing career to become an ordained minister in 1978 and served the congregation at Church of the Lord Jesus Christ, which he founded in 1980, in Houston, Texas;
Whereas, in 1984, George Foreman opened the George Foreman Youth and Community Center in Houston, Texas, to provide opportunities to youth across Harris County;
Whereas George Foreman announced his return to boxing in 1987 and won his first fight back against Steve Zouski;
Whereas George Foreman earned the title of World Heavyweight Champion again on November 5, 1994, against Michael Moorer, breaking multiple records, including the oldest fighter to win a world heavyweight championship after the most time between world heavyweight championships and with the largest age gap between competitors in a heavyweight boxing championship fight;
Whereas George Foreman fought for the final time in 1997 against Shannon Briggs;
Whereas George Foreman had a final career record of 76 to 5;
Whereas George Foreman became a successful businessman, most notably with the George Foreman Lean Mean Grilling Machine, of which more than 100,000,000 units have been sold globally;
Whereas George Foreman was recognized by the American Legion in 2013 with the James V. Day “Good Guy” Award for his patriotism and service to his community;
Whereas George Foreman remained a beloved public figure and boxing legend until his death;
Whereas George Foreman died in Houston, Texas, on March 21, 2025;
Whereas George Foreman was preceded in death by his daughter, Freeda; and
Whereas George Foreman is survived by his wife of 40 years, Mary Joan, and 11 of his children and their families: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved, That—
(1) the Senate—
(A) honors the life and legacy of George Foreman for—
(i) his accomplishments as a boxing legend;
(ii) the example he provides to future generations of community leaders; and
(iii) his dedication to Houston and his support of vulnerable youth in the community;
(B) respectfully requests the Secretary of the Senate—
(i) communicate this resolution to the House of Representatives; and
(ii) transmit an enrolled copy of this resolution to the family of George Foreman; and
(2) when the Senate adjourns today, it stands adjourned as a further mark of respect to the memory of George Foreman.”
Source: Office of United States Attorneys
Jacksonville, Florida – United States Attorney Gregory W. Kehoe announces the return of an indictment charging Samuel Ortiz-Ordonez (24, Guatemala) with illegal reentry by a previously deported alien. If convicted, Ortiz-Ordonez faces up to two years in federal prison and subsequent deportation and removal from the United States.
According to court documents, Ortiz-Ordonez was previously removed from the United States on June 15, 2023. Ortiz-Ordonez has never applied to the Attorney General of the United States and/or the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security for permission to lawfully reenter the United States. On March 13, 2025, Ortiz-Ordonez was found voluntarily back in the United States in Jacksonville, where he was encountered by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officers. After being approached by ICE officers, Ortiz-Ordonez abandoned the vehicle that he was driving and fled on foot through a local residential neighborhood. After a brief chase, he was apprehended by ICE officers.
This case was investigated by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO). It is being prosecuted by Assistant United States Attorney D. Rodney Brown.
An indictment is only an allegation, and every defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty.
This case is part of Operation Take Back America a nationwide initiative that marshals the full resources of the Department of Justice to repel the invasion of illegal immigration, achieve the total elimination of cartels and transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), and protect our communities from the perpetrators of violent crime. Operation Take Back America streamlines efforts and resources from the Department’s Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETFs) and Project Safe Neighborhood (PSN).
Source: Office of United States Attorneys
MIAMI – The U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Florida, FBI Miami, Broward Sheriff’s Office (BSO), and other law enforcement worked in partnership to solve four local homicides connected to the MS-13 gang, a transnational criminal organization and recognized terrorist group. So far, the law enforcement collaboration has led to federal indictments in the Southern District of Florida charging murder in aid of racketeering activity (22-cr-60078 and 25-cr-20102); convictions that carry mandatory life sentences for six MS-13 members and associates; and pending charges against three defendants facing the death penalty.
The Investigation:
Beginning in 2015, BSO Homicide Unit detectives investigated two murders that took place in a small area of Oakland Park, Florida, appeared to be gang related, and were carried out using knives or machetes:
O.G., 18. On January 7, 2015, BSO detectives found the body of O.G. in Oakland Park, Florida. O.G. was 18 years old when he was killed by machete strikes to his head and neck.
C.O., 25. On October 19, 2015, BSO detectives responded to the scene of a stabbing in Oakland Park, Florida. They found 25-year-old C.O. in an alleyway. He had been stabbed many times in the neck and chest. C.O. was taken to the hospital but died soon after getting there.
Investigative leads on the two cases went cold in about 2016. In 2020, the BSO Cold Case Unit reopened the unsolved homicides and partnered with FBI Miami and the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Florida (the investigative team). They learned of two additional murders with similarities to the ones BSO had reopened:
G.V.P., 22. On May 3, 2015, the body of G.V.P. was discovered in a vacant lot in Palm Beach, Florida. G.V.P. was 22 years old when he was stabbed repeatedly in the face, neck, torso, and groin. He was also shot in the head. The Palm Beach County Sheriff’s Office, which was handling that case, collaborated with the investigative team.
J.C.L., 18. In May 2021, the investigative team discovered the body of victim J.C.L. after an extensive, multi-day excavation in Oakland Park, Florida. He had been punched, kicked, stabbed to death, and buried in a makeshift grave. J.C.L. was 18 years old when his family reported him missing.
Through investigative techniques and modern technologies, the team pieced together evidence showing that MS-13 was responsible for the four homicides.
The Federal Prosecutions:
The team secured federal indictments in two cases in the Southern District of Florida related to these MS-13 murders: the July 2022 federal criminal case against six defendants (22-cr-60078) and the March 2025 federal criminal case against three defendants (25-cr-20102).
In the 2022 case, all six defendants have been convicted of murder in aid of racketeering activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C.§1959:
Andy Tovar (a/k/a “Fearless”) pled guilty to two counts of murder in aid of racketeering activity. Tovar, an MS-13 gang leader, approved the murder of victim O.G., and participated in victim G.V.P.’s murder in 2015 – including shooting him in the eye.
Tovar has been sentenced to life in prison.
Wilson Tirado-Silva (a/k/a “Sombra”) pled guilty to four charges of murder in aid of racketeering activity for his role in: the 2014 stabbing murder of victim J.C.L., the 2015 murder by machete of victim O.G., the 2015 stabbing and gunshot murder of victim G.V.P., and the 2015 stabbing murder of victim C.O. Tirado-Silva was a local MS-13 leader responsible for growing the gang in South Florida. He took MS-13 recruits on kills as part of gang initiation.
Tirado-Silva faces a mandatory life sentence.
Miguel Angel Cabrera-Granados (a/k/a “Mariachi”) pled guilty to one count of murder in aid of racketeering activity. He participated in the 2014 stabbing murder of victim J.C.L. to gain gang membership credit.
Cabrera-Granados faces a mandatory life sentence.
Melvin David Cruz-Ortiz (a/k/a “Bigfoot”) pled guilty to three counts of murder in aid of racketeering activity for his role in the 2014 stabbing murder of victim J.C.L., the 2015 stabbing and gunshot murder of victim G.V.P., and the 2015 stabbing murder of victim C.O. Cruz-Ortiz committed the murders to gain gang membership credit.
Cruz-Ortiz faces a mandatory life sentence.
Kevin Ricardo Gamez-Melendez (a/k/a “Ardilla”) pled guilty to one count of murder in aid of racketeering activity for his role in the 2015 stabbing and gunshot murder of victim G.V.P.
Gamez-Melendez faces a mandatory life sentence.
Wilber Geovanni Vigil-Benitez (a/k/a “Solitario”) was convicted by a federal jury in the Southern District of Florida earlier this year for murder in aid of racketeering. The jury found Vigil-Benitez guilty for his role in the 2015 stabbing and gunshot murder of victim G.V.P.
Vigil-Benitez faces a mandatory life sentence.
In the March 2025 case (25-cr-20102), three defendants are charged with murder in aid of racketeering activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1959, in connection with the MS-13 stabbing and gunshot killing of victim G.V.P. They are all in federal custody:
Jose Ezequiel Gamez-Maravilla (a/k/a “Chango”)
Hugo Adiel Bermudez-Martinez (a/k/a “Blue”)
Wilber Rosendo Navarro-Escobar (a/k/a “Power”)
The three defendants, whose cases are pending, face a mandatory minimum sentence of life in prison and a maximum sentence of death. The indictment against them is an accusation and they are presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty in a court of law.
“These vicious and callous acts by MS-13 not only shattered lives but also undermined the safety and security of South Florida communities,” said Hayden P. O’Byrne, United States Attorney for the Southern District of Florida. “Through my office’s unwavering partnership with other federal, state, and local law enforcement, we are sending a clear message to those who inflict violence, feed drug addiction, or cause other harm to the people of our district: We will find you; we will prosecute you; and we will apply the full force of American justice.”
“Nine MS-13 terrorists have been taken off our streets and four cold murder cases have been solved thanks to the great investigative work of the FBI and our law enforcement partners,” said Attorney General Pamela Bondi. “Let this be a lesson: no matter how long it takes, we will never give up in our pursuit of justice.”
“This investigation reflects the FBI’s unwavering commitment to arrest dangerous criminals who threaten the safety of our citizens and our communities. Combating violent crime continues to be a top priority for the FBI and the Miami Field Office,” said Brett Skiles, acting Special Agent in Charge FBI Miami. “The FBI is grateful for its close collaboration with numerous local, state, federal, and international law enforcement partners, whose combined efforts were essential to track down these violent suspects in South Florida, Central Florida, Kearney, Nebraska, Saint Paul, Minnesota, and Mexico City, Mexico. We commend our partners on their professionalism, diligence, and dedication to keeping our nation safe. However, the FBI and our law enforcement partners cannot do it alone. We ask the public to contact law enforcement if they have information about cold cases or any criminal activity. Two-way communication with our communities is vital to our work, and often holds the answers to solving crimes. Together, we will use all tools available and go to farthest reaches of the globe to bring to justice those who seek to endanger our citizens and society. We will not relent.”
“The heartless and brutal actions of these ruthless and violent criminals demonstrate a complete disregard for human life,” Sheriff Dr. Gregory Tony said. “BSO’s Cold Case Homicide investigators, who worked closely with our federal partners, proved once again that justice has no expiration date. We owe it to the families of the victims and to this community to make sure the people who committed these heinous crimes are held accountable.”
Southern District of Florida Special Prosecutions Chief Brian Dobbins and Assistant U.S. Attorney Elena Smukler are prosecuting these cases. FBI Miami and BSO investigated, with valuable assistance from Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) Miami, Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Miami, Palm Beach Sheriff’s Office, NCIS Southeast Field Office, and Florida Department of Corrections.
The U.S. Department of Justice has stated that MS-13 is a violent transnational gang composed primarily of immigrants or descendants from El Salvador that operates throughout parts of the United States. MS-13 is a recognized terrorist organization.
This effort is part of an Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETF) operation. OCDETF identifies, disrupts, and dismantles the highest-level criminal organizations that threaten the United States using a prosecutor-led, intelligence-driven, multi-agency approach. Additional information about the OCDETF Program can be found at https://www.justice.gov/ocdetf.
This matter is also part of Operation Take Back America, a nationwide initiative that marshals the full resources of the Department of Justice to repel the invasion of illegal immigration, achieve the total elimination of cartels and transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), and protect our communities from the perpetrators of violent crime. Operation Take Back America streamlines efforts and resources from the Department’s Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETFs) and Project Safe Neighborhood (PSN).
FBI and HSI have nationwide tip lines for individuals who wish to share information about the MS-13 gang and its activities. The FBI tipline is 1-866-STP-MS13 (1-866-787-6713), and the HSI tipline is 1-866-DHS-2423
Related court documents and information may be found on the website of the District Court for the Southern District of Florida at www.flsd.uscourts.gov or at http://pacer.flsd.uscourts.gov, under case numbers 22-cr-60078 and 25-cr-20102.
###
US Senate News:
Source: United States Senator John Kennedy (Louisiana)
Watch Kennedy’s comments here.
WASHINGTON – Sen. John Kennedy (R-La.) argued that Russian President Vladimir Putin has not been taking peace negotiations with Ukraine seriously and warned him not to disrespect President Trump in a speech on the U.S. Senate floor.
Key excerpts of the speech are below:
“To get respect, you have to act respectfully. To be taken seriously, you have to act seriously. We know that. It is a matter of common sense. President Putin in Russia is not acting with respect toward the United States of America or President Trump. President Putin is not acting seriously.
“I don’t know a single fair-minded person with an IQ above his age who doesn’t want peace in Ukraine. . . . We all want to see peace in Ukraine. President Zelenskyy wants to see peace in Ukraine. President Trump wants to see peace in Ukraine. I thought President Putin did. I am beginning to wonder.”
. . .
“[President Putin] said, ‘I want China to be part of the negotiations and India and Brazil and South Africa’—and get this; this will curdle your lunch—‘North Korea.’ Mama Gump said that stupid is as stupid does. President Putin is not interested in peace.”
Watch Kennedy’s speech here.