Category: Latin America

MIL-OSI New Zealand: Environment – Have your say on biological controls to combat noxious weed – EPA

Source: Environmental Protection Authority

The Environmental Protection Authority (EPA) wants people’s views on an application to release two biological control agents to combat Darwin’s barberry, an invasive weed.

Environment Canterbury has applied to introduce Darwin’s barberry flower weevil ( Anthonomus kuscheli) and Darwin’s barberry rust fungus ( Puccinia berberidis-darwinii) to target this unwanted shrub. If approved, these agents could also be used to target Darwin’s barberry elsewhere in Aotearoa New Zealand.

All organisms new to New Zealand must receive approval from the EPA as the national environmental regulator.

Darwin’s barberry is a resilient noxious weed found in disturbed forests, pastures, shrubland and short tussock-land. It is a threat to indigenous ecosystems throughout the country, as well as to pastures where livestock graze.

It is native to Chile and Argentina and was introduced to Aotearoa New Zealand as a garden plant in the 1940s. Fruit-eating birds deposit seeds far from the parent bush, increasing its spread.

The plant can be found throughout New Zealand – particularly in the Canterbury, Otago, and Wellington regions.

Both the flower weevil and the rust fungus proposed for introduction are native to South America.

Dr Chris Hill, the EPA’s General Manager of Hazardous Substances and New Organisms, says the applicant’s risk assessment demonstrates these organisms are highly unlikely to harm native plants or animals.

“The weevil doesn’t bite or sting, so there is no health risk to people. The rust fungus is similarly benign.

“New Zealand has a track record of using biological control agents to reduce the environmental impact of invasive plants, with little to no adverse impact on the native ecology,” says Dr Hill.

The consultation enables people in relevant industries, iwi and the public to provide additional information on the risks and benefits of introducing organisms to control the spread of Darwin’s barberry.

“We really want to encourage anyone with an interest in combatting this weed, and the methods proposed to do so, to make a submission. Good decision-making on this proposal will be underpinned, in part, by diverse and considered feedback,” says Dr Hill.

Submitters can provide information, make comments, and raise issues to contribute to the EPA decision-making process.

Submissions close at 5.00pm on 22 April 2025.

Read more about this application and how to submit here:

Application for two biocontrols to combat the weed Darwin’s barberry | EPA: https://www.epa.govt.nz/public-consultations/open-consultations/biocontrols-darwins-barberry

MIL OSI New Zealand News –

March 7, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: Federal Grand Jury in Louisville Indicts Illegal Alien For Methamphetamine Trafficking and Firearms Offenses

Source: Office of United States Attorneys

Louisville, KY – A federal grand jury in Louisville, Kentucky, returned an indictment on March 4, 2025, charging an illegal alien with federal drug and gun crimes.

U.S. Attorney Michael A. Bennett of the Western District of Kentucky, Acting Special Agent in Charge A.J. Gibes of the ATF Louisville Field Division, Special Agent in Charge Rana Saoud of Homeland Security Investigations, Sam Olson, Field Office Director for Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) Chicago, U.S. Immigration Customs, and Chief Paul Humphrey of the Louisville Metro Police Department made the announcement.

According to the indictment, Edi Diaz-Lopez, a/k/a Edy Diaz-Lopez, age 30, a citizen of Mexico, was charged with possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, possession of a firearm by a prohibited person, and possession of a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking. On January 3, 2025, Diaz-Lopez possessed a Phoenix, .25 caliber pistol, and a Bryco, model 59, 9-millimeter pistol. Diaz-Lopez was prohibited from possessing firearms because he was an alien illegally and unlawfully in the United States.

Diaz-Lopez made his initial appearance before a United States Magistrate Judge for the Western District of Kentucky on March 6, 2025. He was ordered detained pending trial. If convicted, Diaz-Lopez faces a maximum sentence of 40 years in prison. A federal district court judge will determine any sentence after considering the sentencing guidelines and other statutory factors.

There is no parole in the federal system.

This case is being investigated by ATF, HSI, ICE/ERO, and LMPD.

Assistant U.S. Attorney Frank Dahl is prosecuting this case.

An indictment is merely an allegation. All defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law.

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MIL Security OSI –

March 7, 2025
MIL-OSI Economics: Transcript of COM Regular Press Briefing, March 6, 2025

Source: International Monetary Fund

March 6, 2025

SPEAKER: Ms. Julie Kozack, Director of the Communications Department, IMF

* * * * *

MS. KOZACK: Good morning, everyone, and welcome to this IMF press briefing. It is very good to see you all, both those of you who are here in person and, of course, our colleagues online as well.

I am Julie Kozak, Director of the Communications Department. As usual, this briefing is embargoed until 11 a.m. Eastern Time in the U.S. I will start with a short announcement and then take your questions in person on Webex and via the Press Center.

The 2025 Spring Meetings of the IMF and World Bank Group will take place from Monday, April 21 through Saturday, April 26. Press registration to attend the spring meetings in person in Washington D.C. is now open and you can register through www.IMFconnect.org.

And with that, I will now open the floor for your questions. For those connecting virtually, please turn on both your camera and microphone when speaking. And with that, over to you.

QUESTIONER: If the Congress does not approve the future agreement, as it is established by the local law, does the IMF give the money to Argentina?

MS. KOZACK: Okay, so that is a question on Argentina. Any other questions on Argentina? I do not see any hands up in the room. Let us go online. QUESTIONER: Do you think we are already in the final stage? And what remains to announce the Staff Agreement with the IMF?

QUESTIONER: Good morning. I was wondering about also there have been versions of a new loan up to $20 billion and the first deployment of $8 billion this year. Can you confirm that, or can you give us an insight into the fresh funds that could be coming in the new agreement? And also, when can we expect a signing of the letter of intent?

QUESTIONER: So, my question is about the Congress. President Milei confirmed that the staff-level agreement must be approved by the Parliament as indicated by the Argentine law. So, is that also a requirement from the IMF itself or could the President sign a decree avoiding the current law that requires the staff-level agreement to be approved by Parliament.

QUESTIONER: I want to ask about the scope of the potential agreement with Argentina. There are reports out saying it could be as high, or there is an expectation it could be as high as $20 billion.

QUESTIONER: I think a few people have already asked, but when [do] you expect to reach a staff-level agreement, whether, as the Argentine government has said, it is only the final numbers that need to be agreed and not other technical aspects? And whether the IMF requires that the entirety of the SLA be reviewed by Congress for approval or if whether a general outline produced by the government will be enough?

MS. KOZACK: Okay, very good. So, with that, let me go ahead and talk about Argentina. So, first, I just want to start by saying, as I think many of you know, both the Managing Director and the First Deputy Managing Director recently met with the Argentine authorities. And as they recently emphasized, we are continuing to make good progress toward a program, and we are working constructively with the Argentine authorities in this regard. The authorities’ stabilization and growth plan is delivering significant results.

It has made notable strides in reducing inflation, stabilizing the economy, and fostering a return to growth in the country, and poverty is finally beginning to decline in Argentina. To sustain these early gains, there is a shared understanding about the need to continue to adopt a consistent set of fiscal, monetary and exchange rate policies, while very importantly, advancing growth enhancing reforms. And the new program would build on the progress achieved so far while also addressing Argentina’s remaining challenges.

Now, with respect to some of the questions regarding Congressional approval, we do take note of President Milei’s commitment to seek congressional support for a new IMF supported program. As we have often said in the past, strong ownership and broad support are key to the program’s success,

Here, I want to emphasize, though, that securing congressional support is a decision of the authorities as legislated in Argentine domestic law. And at the same time, of course, as I just noted, broad political and social support can enhance program implementation. Questions regarding the specific process on achieving or seeking congressional support should be addressed really to the Argentine authorities because it is a matter of domestic law.

From our side, as I noted, the negotiations are continuing in a constructive manner. In terms of the process from the IMF side. Once the negotiations are completed, as with any IMF program or proposed program, the final arrangement, the documents, will require approval of the IMF’s Executive Board. And we will provide further updates as we have them.

With respect to some of the questions about the details of the negotiations, the potential size of the program. All I can say right now is this is still under discussion as part of the ongoing and constructive dialogue that we are having with the authorities. And we will provide an update when we have more information that we can share with you.

QUESTIONER: On Lebanon, so following recent reports that the Lebanese government is in discussions with IMF over a potential deal on its financial default in public debt. I just want to see if the IMF can confirm these reports. If so, what does it look like? Are there any contingencies to this? And will there be an IMF mission visiting Lebanon? Thank you.

MS. KOZACK: So, what I can share on Lebanon is that an IMF team will visit Lebanon very soon, March 10th to 14th. This mission is aimed at, of course, meeting the new authorities, discussing Lebanon’s recent economic developments, its reconstruction needs, and the authorities’ economic priorities in the near-term. This is a fact-finding mission that will take place. But beyond this fact-finding mission, as we look ahead, future next steps could include helping the authorities to formulate a comprehensive economic reform program.

Our staff continues to be closely engaged with the authorities. We are providing policy advice and capacity development to help the authorities’ efforts to rebuild Lebanon’s economy and institutions in coordination with other international partners. And that is what I have for now on Lebanon.

QUESTIONER: I wanted to ask you about what is happening in the United States. The trade wars have begun, and we are seeing some impact already, both in terms of market reaction and a lot of volatility in the markets, ups, and downs. We are also seeing some interesting developments in terms of bond markets and yields; it is going to increase the cost of borrowing. So, I wanted to ask you if you, at this point, I know we’ve asked this question before, but I wonder if you’ve got an additional assessment, as we’re now seeing some of these policies that had been promised taking effect, and whether you can say now whether you’re expecting an impact on the global economy and also on the U.S. economy and the affected economies that have been targeted thus far — China, Canada, Mexico.

QUESTIONER: As a follow up to [that] question, does the IMF consider that the ongoing developments of the U.S. tariffs and trade wars would push other nations to seek more trade relations and more alliances with other economic organizations and trade organizations such as BRICS, for example, or others? And broadly speaking, what is the IMF assessment of the global fragmentation that is going on right now? Do you see that it is slowing down or opposite it is moving faster, taking into account the latest developments in the United States?

QUESTIONER: I would like to focus on the development of 10 years of U.S. bond yield movement. The 10-year bond yield now decreased, dropping substantially. And what does it mean? What is the implication of the movement? Does it represent some U.S. recession or U.S. economy?

QUESTIONER: With the tariffs actually now in place, has the IMF undertook a study to determine the potential impact on small island states that are heavily dependent on flows and goods and commodities coming out of the United States, more specifically, those countries within the Caribbean region who are very much dependent and could face significant inflationary pressures based on these tariffs?

MS. KOZACK: So, first I want to just step back a little bit to recognize that we have seen now several new and significant developments over the past few days. The U.S. has imposed tariffs on Canada and Mexico as well as additional tariffs on China. Canada and China have, in response, announced tariffs on some U.S. goods and other measures. And Mexico has indicated that it will provide more details in the coming days.

And as we have said before, you know, while assessing the full impact of tariffs on economic activity and inflation will depend on many factors, we do expect to provide an analysis of this, certainly at the global level and for the most affected countries at the time of our World Economic Outlook update in April. And of course we will also cover this issue, I imagine, in some of the regional updates where relevant. And I want to also emphasize that as part of our bilateral surveillance with countries, the individual Article IV reports this topic will also be covered to the extent that the countries are affected.

What I can say today is that if sustained the impact of the U.S. tariffs on Canada and Mexico can be expected to have a significant adverse economic impact on those countries given their very strong integration and exposure to the U.S. market.

Now, more broadly, there were some questions about financial market movements. So let me also just step back for a moment on some of these, and here I want to refer to some remarks that our Managing Director has been making recently. As she’s been saying, we are now in the midst of significant transformations, and these include the rapid advance of AI to changing patterns of capital flows and trade. She has also been mentioning that trade is no longer the engine of global growth that it used to be.

For example, during the period of 2000 to 2019, global trade growth reached nearly 6 percent on an annual basis, whereas over the more recent period of 2022 to 2024, global trade is growing closer to 3 percent. So global trade growth has been on a downward — has declined. And of course, it is in this more global context that governments are recalibrating their approaches and adjusting policies.

I also want to recognize, of course, that we have seen increased volatility in financial markets. We see that in indicators such as the VIX. We also have seen indicators of global uncertainty showing an increase. And what will be critical to assess what the economic impact of this will be — will be whether these trends are short-lived or whether they are sustained. Generally speaking, our research shows that both historically and across countries, sustained periods of elevated uncertainty can be associated with both households and firms holding back on consumption and investment decisions. And as I said, we will be providing a comprehensive analysis of our views on the global economy and individual economies as part of the World Economic Outlook that will be released in April.

On the specific question on U.S. bond yields, we do recognize of course, that U.S. bond yields have moved lower since the beginning of the year. And it does seem that on that basis markets may be reappraising or reassessing their views, particularly on the outlook for monetary policy. I will stop there and move on.

QUESTIONER: When is the IMF Board expected to review and approve the next disbursement for Ukraine? Are there any remaining conditions or procedural steps that Ukraine must fulfill before approval? And the Ukrainian government is engaging in debt restructuring efforts with its creditors. How does the IMF assess Ukraine’s debt sustainability and what role does this play in bord’s decision making process regarding future disbursement announcements?

QUESTIONER: So, to follow up on previous question. In February, you stated, that Ukraine would have access to about U.S. $900 million for the next review. Now we are speaking about $400 million. So, why the IMF has made a decision to adjust to the total sum of disbursement that will be provided to Ukraine?

QUESTIONER: And do you think that it can impact financial stability of Ukrainian economy or there is no risk for them?

QUESTIONER: How do you expect the freezing of the U.S. aid for Ukraine might impact the program you have already on course right now? And how does this affect the global plan that had been made like a year ago or two years ago now?

QUESTIONER: I just want to follow up the last question about the impact — what the impact Trump administration is doing. Does this impact the IMF projections on Ukraine this and next year?

QUESTIONER: An adjacent question, maybe related to the prospect for ending the war. And, you know, we have seen economic developments in Russia continue to percolate along even though the war has been going on and there have been sanctions. Have you started to look at what the end of the war could mean for both the Russian and Ukrainian economies in terms of, you know, perhaps, you know, assuming that there would be an end of sanctions once there was a cessation of hostilities, whether that would give a boost to the Russian economy, maybe the European economy in general could lower costs, things like that? So just kind of walk us through what you are seeing there.

MS. KOZACK: Okay, let me go ahead on Ukraine. So, just to bring everyone up to speed. So, on February 28th, the IMF staff, and the Ukrainian authorities reached a staff-level agreement on the Seventh Review of the four-year EFF arrangement. This is subject to approval of the IMF’s Executive Board. Ukraine is expected to draw, as noted, about U.S. $400 million, and that would bring total disbursements under the program to U.S. $10.1 billion.

I just want to note that program performance in Ukraine remains strong. All of the end December quantitative performance criteria were met, and understandings were reached between the Ukrainian authorities and IMF staff on a set of policies and reforms to sustain macroeconomic stability. The structural reform agenda in Ukraine is continuing to make good progress, and there are strong commitments from the Ukrainian authorities in a number of other areas.

Now on some of the specific questions, first on the matter of the disbursement, what I can say there is that it is not unusual over the life of a program for the pattern of disbursements to shift based on evolving balance of payments needs. And that is what has happened in this case. It is also important to emphasize that the overall size of the program, which is $15.6 billion, remains unchanged. And so that shift in disbursement pattern reflects the shifting balance of payments pattern for Ukraine.

So, on the issue the debt restructuring and debt process, what I can say there is that restoring debt sustainability in Ukraine hinges on continued implementation of the authority’s debt restructuring strategy, where completing the treatment of the GDP warrants remains important. And it also hinges very much on continuation of the revenue-based fiscal adjustment strategy, which is supported under the program. And as you know, Ukraine’s debt has been assessed in the last review to be sustainable on a forward-looking basis contingent on these two areas that I just mentioned. And of course, there will be a revised debt sustainability assessment as part of the ongoing review.

With respect to the other question, what I can say here is that the Ukrainian economy, you know, has shown continued resilience despite the challenges arising from the war. At the time of the Seventh Review, the last review, we estimated GDP growth to be 3.5 percent in 2024. But we did expect it at that time to moderate to 2 to 3 percent in 2025. And that was reflecting some headwinds from labor constraints and damage to energy infrastructure, given the ongoing war. It is the case in general for Ukraine, and we have been saying this throughout the life of the program, that the outlook remains exceptionally uncertain, especially as the war continues and it is taking a heavy toll on Ukraine’s people, economy, and infrastructure.

On the more recent developments that you were referring to, we are following these developments very closely. It is premature at the moment to comment on them, but we are following them, and we will make an assessment in due course.

And on your question, the answer is essentially the same. We are following the developments very closely, and we will, as developments evolve, be undertaking obviously an assessment of what a peace deal could potentially look like and what would be the implications for all of the involved parties.

QUESTIONER: Julie, can you on the basis of having studied previous conflicts ending, can you just give us divorced from Ukraine and Russia, but just can you give us an indication of what generally happens when a conflict ends, what that means? And is there anything that we can draw on, at least just from history?

MS. KOZACK: So, I do not have, you know, off the top of my head a piece of research that I can kind of point to in terms of the interest analysis. What I certainly can say is that we always, for all of our member countries, hope for peace and stability in all of our member countries. And I think at that moment this is really what I can say. But I take note of the importance of your point, and we will, I have no doubt, in due course be conducting all of the necessary analysis as events unfold.

QUESTIONER: I have two questions mainly on Egypt. as Egypt is scheduled for 10th of March for the discussion of the Fourth Review of the EFF for the country, what are we expecting from this meeting? And if you please, could you update us on the RSF facility worth $1.2 billion for the country? Thank you so much.

QUESTIONER: I would second exactly those questions. And just to add to that, I know it says on the IMF Executive Board calendar that the Board will be discussing waivers of non-observance for some of the performance criteria related to Egypt’s loan program and modifications for others. Are you able to tell us any more about exactly which criteria the Board will be looking at? And on the RSF, if you are able to give us any more detail about the prospective value of that. I know it has been put at $1 billion before. A related question, not on Egypt but on Gaza. I would be interested to know if the IMF has begun to think, whether internally or with partners in the region, about what its potential role would be in funding a reconstruction plan for Gaza given the $50 billion, upwards of $50 billion, cost of any reconstruction.

QUESTIONER: I may repeat questions about the value of current tranche to be given to Egypt and the timing of when the central bank of Egypt to receive it. And also, I have another question about the program of state assets selling. Will we witness some steps, new steps in that program? Could it be connected with the decision to be taken in March?

MS. KOZACK: And any other questions on Egypt? All right. And then I have a question that came in through the Press Center. I am going to read it out loud – ’Does the IMF’s approval of the fourth tranche to Egypt require Egypt to implement some reforms? And when will the Fifth Review of the loan be held? What is the estimated size of the loan allocated to Egypt, and here will it be dispersed in installments or in one lump sum?’

On Egypt – on March 10th, our Executive Board will be discussing Egypt’s Article IV consultation and the fourth review under the EFF. It will also be discussing at the same time Egypt’s request for an RSF, the Resilience and Sustainability Facility. Subject to completion by the Executive Board, the authorities, would have access to $1.2 billion under the EFF. So, under the EFF program. And then in addition, subject again to approval by our Executive Board, the size of the RSF would be about U.S. $1.3 billion. Regarding the RSF, like all of the IMF programs, the RSF is also delivered in tranches. So, it is not one lump sum up front. It is a phased program where tranches are dispersed on the basis of conditions being met.

And with respect to some of the other questions, what I can say today is just that we will provide, of course, more details following the Board meeting and on the question of waivers and modifications and also the questions on the state-owned enterprises. And again, the board meeting will be on March 10th.

QUESTIONER: I have two questions related to Japan. Firstly, amid rising uncertainty due to President Trump’s tariff policy, I would like to ask you — ask your thoughts on whether the Bank of Japan, currently in a rate hike phase, should continue raising rate or take more cautious approach in assessing the impact. And secondly, President Trump recently made remarks suggesting that Japan and China are engaging in currency devaluation. I would appreciate it if you share your views on Japan’s foreign exchange policy. Thank you.

MS. KOZACK: So, maybe just stepping back to give a bit of context on Japan. What I can say on Japan is that on the growth side, growth this year is expected to strengthen, and we also expect inflation to converge to the Bank of Japan’s 2 percent target by the end of 2025.

In 2024, growth in Japan slowed due to some temporary supply disruptions. But since then, we have seen a strengthening in growth driven by domestic demand, particular — particularly private consumption in Japan and rising wages. And we expect this to continue into 2025, where we project growth, at the time of the January WEO, we projected growth at 1.1 percent for Japan in 2025. And of course, just to say that we will be updating this projection as part of the April forecast.

Looking at inflation — headline and core inflation, as I said, are expected to decline gradually toward the 2 percent target. We have been supportive of the Bank of Japan’s recent monetary policy decisions. We believe that these decisions will help anchor inflation expectations at the 2 percent target but also given balance risks around inflation, our assessment has been that further hikes in the policy interest rate should continue to be data dependent, and they should proceed at a gradual pace over time.

With respect to the question on the exchange rate, what I can say there is that the Japanese authorities have affirmed their commitment to a flexible exchange rate regime. Japan’s flexible exchange rate regime has helped the country or has helped the economy absorb the impact of shocks. And it also supports the focus of monetary policy on price stability. And at the same time, what I can say is that that flexible exchange rate regime is helping maintain an external position that is in line with fundamentals.

QUESTIONER: Could you give us an update on the negotiations for Ethiopia, please? And on El Salvador, the deal that you agreed on in December and was approved a couple of weeks ago involves the government not increasing its exposure to Bitcoin. Government has continued to buy through the Office of Bitcoin, which is linked to the presidential palace. But yesterday the Fund said that these purchases do not increase the government’s exposure to Bitcoin. Could you please explain that?

QUESTIONER: Also on El Salvador, obviously he was saying to not to not buy it as a government reserve. I just wanted to, I guess, contrast to the U.S. I mean, President Trump has very much announced a digital assets reserve, including Ethereum and other coins, as well as Bitcoin. And I wondered if the IMF could – can you comment on the U.S. program or how would you distinguish the two countries and why the IMF might be taking a different approach?

MS. KOZACK: All right, let me go ahead and take the El Salvador question in Ethiopia and then we will go back. I see many hands up online.

So, on El Salvador, as you know, last week our Executive Board approved a 40-month Extended Fund Facility, EFF, for U.S. $1.4 billion and with an immediate disbursement of $113 million. The program is expected to catalyze financial and technical support from other IFIs. And this will lead to a combined total over the program period of about U.S. $3.5 billion of support for El Salvador. The goals of the program are to restore fiscal sustainability, rebuild external and financial buffers, strengthen governance and transparency, and ultimately create the conditions for stronger and more resilient growth.

Regarding Bitcoin, in particular, the program aims to address the risks associated with the Bitcoin project to protect consumers and investors, as well as to limit potential fiscal costs. So, to start, there were recent legal reforms that have made the acceptance of Bitcoin voluntary, and taxes can be paid only in U.S. dollars. Under the program, the government has committed to not accumulate for their Bitcoins at the level of the overall public sector.

Regarding the recent increase in Bitcoin holding by the Strategic Bitcoin Reserve Fund, the authorities have confirmed that these are consistent with the agreed program conditionality, and we do remain engaged with the authorities on this important issue.

And then, to your question. We are obviously closely monitoring President Trump’s announcement in this area. The Presidential Working Group on Digital Asset Markets has not yet completed its work. So, we do not yet have details on the implementation of this proposal, but we will come back in due course.

And then turning to the question on Ethiopia. So just an update on Ethiopia. On January 17th, the IMF Executive Board completed the Second Review of the arrangement, the ECF arrangement for Ethiopia, and that allowed for a drawdown of about U.S. $245 million. The ECF arrangement supports the authorities’ reforms to address macroeconomic imbalances, restore external debt sustainability, and lay the foundation for strong private sector-led growth.

I can also just remind you that the Managing Director recently traveled to Ethiopia. She was there February 8th and 9th. She met with Prime Minister Abiy and his team to take stock of the economic reforms and the progress that is being made in the country. And she also took the opportunity to meet with other stakeholders, including representatives of the private sector.

QUESTIONER: My question is on USAID. USAID has now totally stopped its business. And to what extent do you see the impact, especially on lower income countries at the global level? And should you consider using your facility to support them just in case?

MS. KOZACK: So, on this issue, we are obviously again paying close attention to developments, and we are working with our country authorities. But it is, at the same time, it is too early to really say what the precise impact may be. And so, we will come back in due course. For now, we are monitoring.

QUESTIONER: I have a question on Senegal. Following a recent audit of the country’s debt, it was found to be 99.7 percent of GDP. That was in 2023. And I know that IMF has said before that Senegal debt was stable even though it was high. I am wondering if that is the figure that you still consider sustainable. And then also with regards on talks of a new IMF program, I am wondering if Senegal could be asked to reimburse previous dispersion under this reporting period.

QUESTIONER: Still on Senegal, as soon as the report from the Audit Supreme Court was released, we saw rating agency downgrading Senegal sovereign notes. So, the country is now stuck. It cannot raise funds from the internal market, and it cannot go in a very comfortable position in international markets while they still face a lot of challenges. So, I am wondering why the IMF is working fast and bold to find a solution for Senegal in the midterm or even long-term. Is there any situation where IMF can provide a short-term, I mean, short-term relief to the country so they can go through these hard moments in a very soft way?

MS. KOZACK: So, on Senegal, what I can say is that we are actively engaged in discussions with the authorities with respect to the Court of Auditors Report and the associated misreporting under the IMF program. The Court of Auditors Report was released on February 12th. The Court confirmed that the fiscal deficit and debt were under reported during the period of 2019 to 2023.

So, what we are doing is working closely with the authorities in their efforts to preserve fiscal and debt sustainability. We are working actively to advance on our discussions following the publication of the report, and we are also working with the authorities on measures to correct and remedy the misreporting that took place. What I can add is that the resolution of the misreporting in line with IMF policy is a precondition for discussions of any future financial assistance by the IMF.

And with respect to potential consequences, I can say that the IMF does not impose any sanctions for misreporting cases. It is up to our Executive Board to decide on the next steps. And those next steps, you know, could include a waiver. And that waiver could — it could also include; it could be a waiver without a request for reimbursement. So, all of those discussions on Senegal are now underway. We are actively, very much working with the authorities, supporting as much as possible their efforts on fiscal and debt sustainability, as I said. And we will come back and report back when we have more information on Senegal.

I have a question here online that I am going to read. It came from the Press Center on Thailand. And the question is – ‘The upcoming World Bank IMF Annual Meetings in Thailand will bring significant attention to Southeast Asia’s economic outlook. From the from IMF’s perspective, how can Thailand best leverage this opportunity to address regional challenges such as digital transformation, climate change adaptation, and income inequality? And what collaborative initiatives between the IMF and Thailand are being planned to ensure lasting economic benefits for the country beyond the meetings themselves?’

So, on this very important question, a very nice question, actually, what I can say is that we are very much looking forward to having Thailand host the annual meetings in 2026. So, this will be in October of 2026. Every three years, we do our Annual Meetings abroad. 2026, October will be Thailand. So, mark your calendar. I can also add that preparations are underway. The Fund, the IMF staff are working hand in hand with the Thai authorities to make this a highly successful event and showcasing the significant strides that Thailand has made since it last hosted our annual meetings in 1991. So, it will be 25 years when we get to 2026.

The Managing Director recently met with Bank of Thailand’s Governor Sethaput at the AlUla Conference in Saudi Arabia. They discussed the preparations for the annual meetings and agreed that it would be a very good opportunity to showcase on the global stage the region’s dynamism and economic activities. And of course, the meetings will also allow Thailand to position itself as a key contributor to the international economic dialogue and to gather views and experiences from countries throughout the membership of the IMF and the World Bank.

This ongoing close relationship leading up to and beyond, we hope, the Annual Meetings will focus on prioritizing reform reforms that are necessary to ensure the lasting benefits for Thailand and building the relationships and the shared policy, dialogue and experiences we hope will deepen our engagement, our excellent engagement and relationship with Thailand and will be sustained even past the Annual Meetings in 2026.

QUESTIONER: My question is, what are the IMF growth projections for Jordan amid the ongoing impact of the Gaza war? And when will the Third Review under the EFF begin? And are any adjustments expected to the war’s region effect on Jordan’s economy?

MS. KOZACK: So, what I can share on Jordan is that the Executive Board on December 12th completed the Article IV Consultation with Jordan and the Second Review under the EFF arrangement. The mission for the next review, which will be the Third Review, is expected to take place in April.

What I can also say is that Jordan has demonstrated resilience and maintained macroeconomic stability throughout the prolonged regional conflict. This resilience reflects the authority’s continued implementation of sound macroeconomic policies and progress with reforms. While recent developments in the region, particularly the ceasefire agreements, give rise to some cautious optimism, uncertainty, of course, in Jordan does remain high. And with respect to the growth projections, what I can say is that growth in 2024 was 2.3 percent. We are projecting growth at 2.5 percent in 2025 and a further increase in growth in 2026 to 3 percent. But like in all countries, we will be updating these projections as both part of our April World Economic Outlook Global Forecast, and also, of course, the team will be doing a full assessment of the Jordanian economy as part of their mission in April

And so, with this, I’m going to bring this press briefing to a close. Thank you all very much. Thank you very much for participating today. As a reminder, the briefing is embargoed until 11 a.m. Eastern Time in the U.S. The transcript, as always, will be made available later today on IMF.org. And in case of clarifications or additional questions, please reach out to my colleagues at media@IMF.org. And I wish everyone a wonderful day, and I look forward to seeing you next time. Thank you very much.

* * * * *

IMF Communications Department

MEDIA RELATIONS

PRESS OFFICER: Boris Balabanov

Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

@IMFSpokesperson

MIL OSI Economics –

March 7, 2025
MIL-OSI USA News: Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Adjusts Tariffs on Canada and Mexico to Minimize Disruption to the Automotive Industry
Source: The White House
USING LEVERAGE TO PROTECT AMERICANS: Today, President Donald J. Trump announced adjustments to tariffs imposed on imports from Canada and Mexico in recognition of the structure of the automotive supply chain that strives to bring production into America.
- Duties imposed to address the flow of illicit drugs across our borders are now:
  
  25% tariffs on goods that do not satisfy U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) rules of origin.
  
  A lower 10% tariff on those energy products imported from Canada that fall outside the USMCA preference.
  
  A lower 10% tariff on any potash imported from Canada and Mexico that falls outside the USMCA preference.
  
  No tariffs on those goods from Canada and Mexico that claim and qualify for USMCA preference.
- While the situations at our Northern and Southern borders continue to require appropriate action from the Governments of Canada and Mexico, our American automotive industry, which provides American jobs, should not suffer significant disruption just because of the structure of its supply chain.
ENSURING BORDER SECURITY AND ECONOMIC SECURITY: President Trump will not allow our national security to be compromised by our closest trading partners, Canada and Mexico, but recognizes the unique impact that these tariffs could have on American automotive manufacturers.
- President Trump will never stop standing up for the safety of the American people and is using tariffs as a tool to take decisive actions that put Americans’ safety and our national security first.
- On Tuesday, March 4, tariffs were issued on Canada and Mexico under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) to curb the flow of illegal border crossings and drugs into our country.
- In order to minimize disruption to the U.S. automotive industry and workers, it is appropriate to adjust the tariffs on articles of Canada and Mexico so that they do not bear a disproportionate brunt of Canada and Mexico’s failure to respond to the crises at our borders.
- America’s manufacturers, including our automakers, have strengthened our economy and expanded our workforce.
- Today’s actions promote a level playing field for American manufacturers, bringing supply chains closer to home, especially for our auto industry, which has been hit hard by offshoring.
DEALMAKER-IN-CHIEF: President Trump continues to leverage America’s economic power to secure our border and stop the flow of fentanyl into our country, while protecting American industry.
- In November, President Trump promised that tariffs on Mexico and Canada would remain in effect until drugs and illegal aliens stop invading our country.
- Following the President imposing tariffs on both countries, Mexico and Canada announced measures to combat illegal immigration and fentanyl trafficking.
- President Trump secured the extradition of 29 Mexican drug cartel bosses to face charges for their crimes in the United States, including one accused of killing a DEA agent.
- In President Trump’s first month in office, illegal border crossings plummeted to the lowest level ever recorded, down 96% from the all-time high under the Biden-Harris Administration.
As President Trump stated in the America First Trade Policy Presidential Memorandum, trade policy is an integral component of our economic and national security
MIL OSI USA News –
March 7, 2025

MIL-OSI: IDT Corporation Reports Record Second Quarter 2025 Results

Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

Record levels of gross profit +16%; income from operations +77%; Adjusted EBITDA^*+56%

GAAP EPS increased to $0.80 from $0.57; Non-GAAP EPS^*increased to $0.84 from $0.67

IDT raised its quarterly dividend 20% to 6 cents

NEWARK, NJ, March 06, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — IDT Corporation (NYSE: IDT), a global provider of fintech, cloud communications, and traditional communications solutions, today reported results for its second quarter fiscal year 2025, the three months ended January 31, 2025.

SECOND QUARTER HIGHLIGHTS

(Throughout this release, unless otherwise noted, results for the second quarter of fiscal year 2025 (2Q25) are compared to the second quarter of fiscal year 2024 (2Q24). All earnings per share (EPS) and other ‘per share’ results are per diluted share.

Key Businesses / Segments
- NRS
  - Recurring revenue^**: +32% to $31.6 million;
  - Income from operations: +71% to $9.1 million;
  - Adjusted EBITDA: +65% to $10.1 million;
  - ‘Rule of 40’ score**: 55
- BOSS Money / Fintech segment
  - BOSS Money transactions: +36% to 5.7 million;
  - BOSS Money revenue: +34% to $33.5 million;
  - Fintech segment gross profit: +35% to $21.7 million;
  - Fintech segment income from operations: increased to $3.1 million from a loss of $(0.7) million;
  - Fintech segment Adjusted EBITDA: increased to $3.9 million from a loss of $(12) thousand;
- net2phone
  - Subscription revenue^**: +9% to $21.0 million (+14% on a constant currency basis);
  - Income from operations: increased to $1.1 million from $0.4 million;
  - Adjusted EBITDA: +55% to $2.9 million;
- Traditional Communications
  - Gross profit: +2% to $43.1 million;
  - Income from operations: +24% to $18.1 million;
  - Adjusted EBITDA: +19% to $20.2 million;
IDT Consolidated
- Revenue: +2% to $303.3 million;
- Gross profit (GP) / margin: GP +16% to $112 million; GP margin +420 bps to 37.0%;
- Income from operations: +77% to $28.3 million;
- Net income attributable to IDT: +41% to $20.3 million;
- GAAP EPS: Increased to $0.80 from $0.57;
- Non-GAAP net income: +26% to $21.3 million;
- Non-GAAP EPS: Increased to $0.84 from $0.67;
- Adjusted EBITDA: +56% to $34.0 million;
- CapEx: +6% to $4.8 million;
- Stock buyback: Repurchased 179,338 shares of IDT Class B common stock in market transactions during 2Q25 for $8.5 million at an average share price of $47.59;
- Common stock dividend: IDT increased its quarterly dividend from $0.05 to $0.06.

REMARKS BY SHMUEL JONAS, CEO

“IDT had a strong second quarter led by NRS and BOSS Money, and supported by robust results from our Traditional Communications segment, which increased its cash generation for the third consecutive quarter. On a consolidated basis, we again generated record levels of gross profit, income from operations, and Adjusted EBITDA.

“NRS continued to deepen its penetration of the independent retailer market. We are now launching new features and functionalities that increase the value of our solution for retailers and will help us to drive additional growth.

“BOSS Money delivered another quarter of strong year-over-year transaction and revenue growth. In the second quarter, we continued to focus on improving the margin contribution, particularly in our retail channel, and that effort helped to boost our Fintech segment’s gross profit and Adjusted EBITDA less CapEx to record levels.

“net2phone continued its expansion led by further growth in the U.S. market. We are especially excited about last week’s launch of net2phone’s virtual AI agent. It has been very well received by our internal BOSS and NRS teams that are using it with great success to enhance the quality and consistency of customer interactions while reducing costs. We are confident that net2phone clients will find that it provides them with great value right out of the gate. Moreover, as they build with our AI agent, it will provide clients with increasingly sophisticated, tailored solutions that add value across disparate functions within their organizations.

“Our Traditional Communications segment increased Adjusted EBITDA for the third sequential quarter and surpassed $20 million for the first time since fiscal 2022.

“In light of our solid financial position and positive outlook, and mindful of the feedback we’ve received from our investors, we stepped up our repurchases of stock during the second quarter and have increased our regular quarterly dividend by 20%.”

2Q25 RESULTS BY SEGMENT

(For all periods presented, capital expenditures (CapEx), previously provided on a consolidated basis, is now also provided for each business segment.)

National Retail Solutions (NRS)

*National Retail Solutions (NRS)* (Terminals and accounts at end of period. $ in millions, except for average revenue per terminal)
		2Q25			1Q25			2Q24		2Q25-2Q24 (% Δ)
Terminals and payment processing accounts
Active POS terminals		34,800			33,100			28,700		+21	%
Payment processing accounts		23,900			22,700			18,200		+32	%

Recurring revenue
Merchant Services & Other	$	18.1		$	17.2		$	12.5		+45	%
Advertising & Data	$	10.0		$	8.5		$	8.7		+15	%
SaaS Fees	$	3.5		$	3.3		$	2.7		+30	%
Total recurring revenue	$	31.6		$	28.9		$	23.9		+32	%
POS terminal sales	$	1.3		$	1.4		$	1.3		+2	%
Total revenue	$	33.0		$	30.4		$	25.2		+31	%

Monthly average recurring revenue per terminal^**	$	310		$	295		$	285		+9	%

Gross profit	$	30.3		$	27.6		$	22.5		+35	%
Gross profit margin		91.8	%		91.0	%		89.1	%	+270	bps
Technology & development	$	2.2		$	2.0		$	1.9		+14	%
SG&A	$	19.0		$	19.0		$	15.2		+25	%
Income from operations	$	9.1		$	6.6		$	5.3		+71	%
Adjusted EBITDA	$	10.1		$	7.6		$	6.1		+65	%
CapEx	$	0.9		$	1.2		$	1.0		(4	)%

NRS Take-Aways / Updates:

NRS added approximately 1,700 net active terminals and approximately 1,200 net payment processing accounts during 2Q25. Net active terminal additions included the impact of approximately 300 terminals operating in seasonal stores that suspended operations following the quarter close.
The 45% year-over-year increase in Merchant Services & Other revenue was driven by the growth in payment processing accounts, and higher merchant services revenue per account, driven in part by the increased percentage of retail transactions paid with a credit or debit card.
The 30% year-over-year increase in SaaS Fees revenue reflects the growth of net active terminals and migration of retailers to premium SaaS plans.

Fintech

*Fintech* (Transactions in millions. $ in millions, except for average revenue per transaction)
		2Q25			1Q25			2Q24			2Q25-2Q24 (% Δ, $)
BOSS Money transactions		5.7			5.6			4.2			+36	%

Fintech Revenue
BOSS Money	$	33.5		$	33.7		$	25.0			+34	%
Other	$	3.3		$	3.4		$	2.9			+13	%
Total Revenue	$	36.8		$	37.1		$	28.0			+32	%

Average revenue per BOSS Money transaction^**	$	5.87		$	6.01		$	5.98		$	(0.11	)

Gross profit	$	21.7		$	21.6		$	16.1			+35	%
Gross profit margin		58.9	%		58.2	%		57.5	%		140	bps
Technology & development	$	2.3		$	2.3		$	2.5			(8	)%
SG&A	$	16.3		$	16.1		$	14.3			+14	%
Income (loss) from operations	$	3.1		$	3.2		$	(0.7	)		+$3.8
Adjusted EBITDA	$	3.9		$	4.0		$	0			+$3.9
CapEx	$	0.8		$	1.1		$	0.8			+1	%

Fintech Take-Aways:

The 36% increase in BOSS Money transactions reflected a 40% year-over-year increase in digital transactions and a 22% increase in retail transactions.
BOSS Money revenue increased 34% year-over-year driven by a 38% year-over-year increase in digital channel revenue. The 1% sequential decrease in revenue reflected BOSS Money’s continued focus on expanding per-transaction margins, particularly at retail, which boosted gross profit while dampening transaction volume growth and revenue.
The strong increases in the Fintech segment’s income from operations and Adjusted EBITDA were driven by BOSS Money revenue growth, higher margins on BOSS Money transactions and improved operating leverage as the business continues to scale.
BOSS Money continued to expand to new destinations during 2Q25 (Venezuela and Eritrea) with Brazil expected to come online in 3Q25. BOSS Money also launched debit card payment capabilities at BOSS Money retailers across the U.S. and continued to build out its already extensive payout network in key destination markets.

net2phone

*net2phone* *(Seats in thousands at end of period. $ in millions)*
		2Q25			1Q25			2Q24		2Q25-2Q24 (% Δ, $)
Seats^**		410			406			375		+9	%

Revenue
Subscription revenue	$	21.0		$	21.0		$	19.3		+9	%
Other revenue	$	0.5		$	0.6		$	1.0		(54	)%
Total Revenue	$	21.5		$	21.6		$	20.4		+6	%

Gross profit	$	17.0		$	17.1		$	16.1		+6	%
Gross profit margin		79.2	%		79.0	%		78.9	%	20	bps
Technology & development	$	2.8		$	3.0		$	2.6		+5	%
SG&A	$	13.0		$	13.1		$	13.1		(1	)%
Income from operations	$	1.1		$	1.0		$	0.4		+201	%
Adjusted EBITDA	$	2.9		$	2.5		$	1.8		+55	%
CapEx	$	1.8		$	1.6		$	1.4		+28	%

net2phone Take-Aways:

The 9% year over year increase in total seats served was powered by continued expansion in key markets led by the U.S., Brazil, and Mexico. CCaaS seats served increased by 10% year-over year.
Subscription revenue increased by 9% year-over-year. The increase reflected net seat growth and increased subscription revenue per seat^** in the U.S., offset by the negative FX impact of a strengthened U.S. dollar versus local currencies in net2phone’s key Latin American markets. On a constant currency basis, subscription revenue increased by 14% year over year.
Operating margin^*^* increased to 5% from 2% in 2Q24, and Adjusted EBITDA margin^*^* increased to 13% from 9% in 2Q24. Additional steady margin improvement remains a key strategic focus.
Following the quarter close, net2phone launched its AI agent, a scalable virtual assistant providing exceptional customer experiences across sales, support, and administrative tasks.

Traditional Communications

*Traditional Communications* ($ in millions)
		2Q25			1Q25			2Q24		2Q25-2Q24 (% Δ)
Revenue
IDT Digital Payments	$	101.6		$	105.1		$	99.7		+2	%
BOSS Revolution	$	53.3		$	56.8		$	66.7		(20	)%
IDT Global	$	51.3		$	52.4		$	48.7		+5	%
Other	$	5.9		$	6.2		$	7.5		(22	)%
Total Revenue	$	212.0		$	220.5		$	222.5		(5	)%

Gross profit	$	43.1		$	41.3		$	42.3		+2	%
Gross profit margin		20.3	%		18.8	%		19.0	%	+130	bps
Technology & development	$	5.4		$	5.5		$	5.9		(9	)%
SG&A	$	19.4		$	20.0		$	21.4		(9	)%
Income from operations	$	18.1		$	15.7		$	14.6		+24	%
Adjusted EBITDA	$	20.2		$	17.8		$	17.0		+19	%
CapEx	$	1.2		$	1.4		$	1.4		(8	)%

Take-Aways:

IDT Global continues to mitigate the impacts of the ongoing industry-wide declines in paid-minute voice through a traffic mix shift to higher margin routes, new service offerings, and operational efficiencies.
For the third consecutive quarter, Traditional Communications’ income from operations and Adjusted EBITDA both increased sequentially. In 2Q25, the increases were driven by increasing gross profit contributions from each of the three major lines of business, as well as by continued efforts to streamline operations and remove costs.

OTHER FINANCIAL RESULTS

Consolidated results for all periods presented include corporate overhead. In 2Q25, Corporate G&A expense decreased to $3.0 million from $3.2 million in 2Q24.

As of January 31, 2025, IDT held $171.1 million in cash, cash equivalents, debt securities, and current equity investments. Also at January 31, 2025, current assets totaled $462.1 million and current liabilities totaled $278.2 million. The Company had no outstanding debt at the quarter end.

Net cash provided by operating activities decreased to $20.2 million in 2Q25 from $28.4 million in 2Q24. Exclusive of changes in customer funds deposits at IDT’s Fintech segment, net cash provided by operating activities decreased to $7.3 million in 2Q25 from $25.4 million in 2Q24. This decrease predominantly reflects the timing of payments made by IDT to cover anticipated BOSS Money disbursement prefunding.

Capital expenditures increased to $4.8 million in 2Q25 from $4.6 million in 2Q24.

IDT EARNINGS ANNOUNCEMENT INFORMATION

This release is available for download in the “Investors & Media” section of the IDT Corporation website (https://www.idt.net/investors-and-media) and has been filed on a current report (Form 8-K) with the SEC.

IDT will host an earnings conference call beginning at 5:30 PM Eastern today with management’s discussion of results followed by Q&A with investors. To listen to the call and participate in the Q&A, dial 1-888-506-0062 (toll-free from the US) or 1-973-528-0011 (international) and provide the following access code: 145736.

A replay of the conference call will be available approximately three hours after the call concludes through March 20, 2025. To access the call replay, dial 1-877-481-4010 (toll-free from the US) or 1-919-882-2331 (international) and provide this replay passcode: 51975. The replay will also be accessible via streaming audio at the IDT investor relations website.

NOTES

^*Adjusted EBITDA and Non-GAAP EPS are Non-GAAP financial measures intended to provide useful information that supplements IDT’s or the relevant segment’s results in accordance with GAAP. Please refer to the Reconciliation of Non-GAAP Financial Measures later in this release for an explanation of these terms and their respective reconciliations to the most directly comparable GAAP measures.

^*^*See ‘Explanation of Key Performance Metrics’ at the end of this release.

ABOUT IDT CORPORATION

IDT Corporation (NYSE: IDT) is a global provider of fintech and communications solutions through a portfolio of synergistic businesses: National Retail Solutions (NRS), through its point-of-sale (POS) platform, enables independent retailers to operate more effectively while providing advertisers and marketers with unprecedented reach into underserved consumer markets; BOSS Money facilitates innovative international remittances and fintech payments solutions; net2phone provides enterprises and organizations with intelligently integrated cloud communications and contact center services across channels and devices; IDT Digital Payments and the BOSS Revolution calling service make sharing prepaid products and services and speaking with friends and family around the world convenient and reliable; and, IDT Global and IDT Express enable communications services to provision and manage international voice and SMS messaging.

All statements above that are not purely about historical facts, including, but not limited to, those in which we use the words “believe,” “anticipate,” “expect,” “plan,” “intend,” “estimate,” “target” and similar expressions, are forward-looking statements within the meaning of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. While these forward-looking statements represent our current judgment of what may happen in the future, actual results may differ materially from the results expressed or implied by these statements due to numerous important factors. Our filings with the SEC provide detailed information on such statements and risks and should be consulted along with this release. To the extent permitted under applicable law, IDT assumes no obligation to update any forward-looking statements.

CONTACT

IDT Corporation Investor Relations
Bill Ulrey
william.ulrey@idt.net
973-438-3838

IDT CORPORATION
CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS

	January 31, 2025			July 31, 2024
	(Unaudited)
	(in thousands, except per share data)
Assets
Current assets:
Cash and cash equivalents	$	142,152		$	164,557
Restricted cash and cash equivalents		105,554			90,899
Debt securities		23,852			23,438
Equity investments		5,091			5,009
Trade accounts receivable, net of allowance for credit losses of $7,295 at January 31, 2025 and $6,352 at July 31, 2024		45,127			42,215
Settlement assets, net of reserve of $1,804 at January 31, 2025 and $1,866 at July 31, 2024		41,779			22,186
Disbursement prefunding		57,676			30,736
Prepaid expenses		15,989			17,558
Other current assets		24,914			25,927
Total current assets		462,134			422,525
Property, plant, and equipment, net		38,380			38,652
Goodwill		26,149			26,288
Other intangibles, net		5,583			6,285
Equity investments		6,748			6,518
Operating lease right-of-use assets		2,498			3,273
Deferred income tax assets, net		22,333			35,008
Other assets		11,903			11,546
Total assets	$	575,728		$	550,095
Liabilities, redeemable noncontrolling interest, and equity
Current liabilities:
Trade accounts payable	$	22,482		$	24,773
Accrued expenses		89,472			103,176
Deferred revenue		28,384			30,364
Customer funds deposits		104,720			91,893
Settlement liabilities		16,975			12,764
Other current liabilities		16,157			16,374
Total current liabilities		278,190			279,344
Operating lease liabilities		1,349			1,533
Other liabilities		1,093			2,662

Total liabilities		280,632			283,539
Commitments and contingencies
Redeemable noncontrolling interest		11,228			10,901
Equity:
IDT Corporation stockholders’ equity:
Preferred stock, $.01 par value; authorized shares—10,000; no shares issued		—			—
Class A common stock, $.01 par value; authorized shares—35,000; 3,272 shares issued and 1,574 shares outstanding at January 31, 2025 and July 31, 2024		33			33
Class B common stock, $.01 par value; authorized shares—200,000; 28,233 and 28,177 shares issued and 23,491 and 23,684 shares outstanding at January 31, 2025 and July 31, 2024, respectively		282			282
Additional paid-in capital		306,781			303,510
Treasury stock, at cost, consisting of 1,698 and 1,698 shares of Class A common stock and 4,742 and 4,493 shares of Class B common stock at January 31, 2025 and July 31, 2024, respectively		(137,475	)		(126,080	)
Accumulated other comprehensive loss		(19,599	)		(18,142	)
Retained earnings		121,573			86,580
Total IDT Corporation stockholders’ equity		271,595			246,183
Noncontrolling interests		12,273			9,472
Total equity		283,868			255,655
Total liabilities, redeemable noncontrolling interest, and equity	$	575,728		$	550,095

IDT CORPORATION
CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF INCOME
(Unaudited)

	Three Months Ended January 31,						Six Months Ended January 31,
	2025			2024			2025			2024
	(in thousands, except per share data)

Revenues	$	303,349		$	296,098		$	612,915		$	597,302
Direct cost of revenues		191,239			199,171			393,178			406,382
Gross profit		112,110			96,927			219,737			190,920
Operating expenses (gain):
Selling, general and administrative (i)		70,721			67,346			141,772			131,723
Technology and development (i)		12,612			12,925			25,372			25,335
Severance		233			345			410			869
Other operating expense (gain), net		227			294			227			(190	)
Total operating expenses		83,793			80,910			167,781			157,737
Income from operations		28,317			16,017			51,956			33,183
Interest income, net		1,354			1,195			2,782			2,039
Other income (expense), net		207			2,534			(76	)		(3,053	)
Income before income taxes		29,878			19,746			54,662			32,169
Provision for income taxes		(7,665	)		(3,992	)		(13,967	)		(7,939	)
Net income		22,213			15,754			40,695			24,230
Net income attributable to noncontrolling interests		(1,944	)		(1,329	)		(3,178	)		(2,146	)
Net income attributable to IDT Corporation	$	20,269		$	14,425		$	37,517		$	22,084
Earnings per share attributable to IDT Corporation common stockholders:
Basic	$	0.81		$	0.57		$	1.49		$	0.88
Diluted	$	0.80		$	0.57		$	1.48		$	0.87
Weighted-average number of shares used in calculation of earnings per share:
Basic		25,161			25,175			25,182			25,176
Diluted		25,324			25,317			25,343			25,297
(i) Stock-based compensation included in:
Selling, general and administrative expense	$	768		$	2,357		$	1,602		$	2,998
Technology and development expense	$	95		$	130		$	172		$	260

IDT CORPORATION
CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF CASH FLOWS (Unaudited)

	Six Months Ended January 31,
	2025			2024
	(in thousands)
Operating activities
Net income	$	40,695		$	24,230
Adjustments to reconcile net income to net cash provided by operating activities:
Depreciation and amortization		10,490			10,146
Deferred income taxes		12,674			5,787
Provision for credit losses, doubtful accounts receivable, and reserve for settlement assets		2,472			1,696
Stock-based compensation		1,774			3,258
Other		1,077			2,829
Changes in assets and liabilities:
Trade accounts receivable		(4,978	)		(7,040	)
Settlement assets, disbursement prefunding, prepaid expenses, other current assets, and other assets		(46,244	)		9,966
Trade accounts payable, accrued expenses, settlement liabilities, other current liabilities, and other liabilities		(11,844	)		(6,200	)
Customer funds deposits		15,701			15
Deferred revenue		(1,500	)		(1,381	)
Net cash provided by operating activities		20,317			43,306
Investing activities
Capital expenditures		(10,100	)		(8,885	)
Purchase of convertible preferred stock in equity method investment		(673	)		(1,009	)
Purchases of debt securities and equity investments		(15,997	)		(19,357	)
Proceeds from maturities and sales of debt securities and redemption of equity investments		16,751			31,231
Net cash (used in) provided by investing activities		(10,019	)		1,980
Financing activities
Dividends paid		(2,524	)		—
Distributions to noncontrolling interests		(50	)		(59	)
Proceeds from borrowings under revolving credit facility		24,534			30,588
Repayment of borrowings under revolving credit facility		(24,534	)		(30,588	)
Purchase of restricted shares of net2phone common stock		—			(3,558	)
Proceeds from exercise of stock options		—			172
Repurchases of Class B common stock		(11,395	)		(3,170	)
Net cash used in financing activities		(13,969	)		(6,615	)
Effect of exchange rate changes on cash, cash equivalents, and restricted cash and cash equivalents		(4,079	)		(3,182	)
Net (decrease) increase in cash, cash equivalents, and restricted cash and cash equivalents		(7,750	)		35,489
Cash, cash equivalents, and restricted cash and cash equivalents at beginning of period		255,456			198,823
Cash, cash equivalents, and restricted cash and cash equivalents at end of period	$	247,706		$	234,312
Supplemental Schedule of Non-Cash Financing Activities
Shares of the Company’s Class B common stock issued to an executive officer for bonus payment	$	1,824		$	—
Value of the Company’s Class B common stock exchanged for National Retail Solutions shares	$	—		$	6,254

^*Reconciliation of Non-GAAP Financial Measures for the Second Quarter Fiscal 2025 and 2024

In addition to disclosing financial results that are determined in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles in the United States of America (GAAP), IDT also disclosed for 2Q25, 1Q25, and 2Q24, Adjusted EBITDA, and for 2Q25 and 2Q24, non-GAAP earnings per diluted share (Non-GAAP EPS). Adjusted EBITDA and Non-GAAP EPS are non-GAAP financial measures intended to provide useful information that supplements IDT’s or the relevant segment’s results in accordance with GAAP. The following explains these terms and their respective reconciliations to the most directly comparable GAAP measures

Generally, a non-GAAP measure is a numerical measure of a company’s performance, financial position, or cash flows that either excludes or includes amounts that are not normally excluded or included in the most directly comparable measure calculated and presented in accordance with GAAP.

IDT’s measure of Non-GAAP EPS is calculated by dividing non-GAAP net income by the diluted weighted-average shares. IDT’s measure of non-GAAP net income starts with net income attributable to IDT in accordance with GAAP and adds severance expense, stock-based compensation, and other operating expenses, and deducts other operating gains. These additions and subtractions are non-cash and/or non-routine items in the relevant fiscal 2025 and fiscal 2024 periods.

Management believes that IDT’s Adjusted EBITDA and Non-GAAP EPS are measures which provide useful information to both management and investors by excluding certain expenses and non-routine gains and losses that may not be indicative of IDT’s or the relevant segment’s core operating results. Management uses Adjusted EBITDA, among other measures, as a relevant indicator of core operational strengths in its financial and operational decision making. In addition, management uses Adjusted EBITDA and Non-GAAP EPS to evaluate operating performance in relation to IDT’s competitors. Disclosure of these financial measures may be useful to investors in evaluating performance and allows for greater transparency to the underlying supplemental information used by management in its financial and operational decision-making. In addition, IDT has historically reported similar financial measures and believes such measures are commonly used by readers of financial information in assessing performance, therefore the inclusion of comparative numbers provides consistency in financial reporting.

Management refers to Adjusted EBITDA, as well as the GAAP measures income (loss) from operations and net income, on a segment and/or consolidated level to facilitate internal and external comparisons to the segments’ and IDT’s historical operating results, in making operating decisions, for budget and planning purposes, and to form the basis upon which management is compensated.

While depreciation and amortization are considered operating costs under GAAP, these expenses primarily represent the non-cash current period allocation of costs associated with long-lived assets acquired or capitalized in prior periods. IDT’s Adjusted EBITDA, which is exclusive of depreciation and amortization, is a useful indicator of its current performance.

Severance expense is excluded from the calculation of Adjusted EBITDA and Non-GAAP EPS. Severance expense is reflective of decisions made by management in each period regarding the aspects of IDT’s and its segments’ businesses to be focused on in light of changing market realities and other factors. While there may be similar charges in other periods, the nature and magnitude of these charges can fluctuate markedly and do not reflect the performance of IDT’s core and continuing operations.

Other operating (expense) gain, net, which is a component of income (loss) from operations, is excluded from the calculation of Adjusted EBITDA and Non-GAAP EPS. Other operating (expense) gain, net includes, among other items, legal fees net of insurance claims related to Straight Path Communications Inc.’s stockholders’ class action and gain from the write-off of a contingent consideration liability. From time-to-time, IDT may have gains or incur costs related to non-routine legal, tax, and other matters, however, these various items generally do not occur each quarter. IDT believes the gain and losses from these non-routine matters are not components of IDT’s or the relevant segment’s core operating results.

Stock-based compensation recognized by IDT and other companies may not be comparable because of the variety of types of awards as well as the various valuation methodologies and subjective assumptions that are permitted under GAAP. Stock-based compensation is excluded from IDT’s calculation of Non-GAAP EPS because management believes this allows investors to make more meaningful comparisons of the operating results per share of IDT’s core business with the results of other companies. However, stock-based compensation will continue to be a significant expense for IDT for the foreseeable future and an important part of employees’ compensation that impacts their performance.

Adjusted EBITDA and Non-GAAP EPS should be considered in addition to, not as a substitute for, or superior to, income (loss) from operations, cash flow from operating activities, net income, basic and diluted earnings per share or other measures of liquidity and financial performance prepared in accordance with GAAP. In addition, IDT’s measurements of Adjusted EBITDA and Non-GAAP EPS may not be comparable to similarly titled measures reported by other companies.

Following are reconciliations of Adjusted EBITDA and Non-GAAP EPS to the most directly comparable GAAP measure, which are, (a) for Adjusted EBITDA, income (loss) from operations for IDT’s reportable segments and net income for IDT on a consolidated basis, and (b) for Non-GAAP EPS, diluted earnings per share.

IDT Corporation
Reconciliation of Net Income to Adjusted EBITDA
(unaudited) in millions. Figures may not foot or cross-foot due to rounding to millions

	Total IDT Corporation			Traditional Communica-tions		net2phone		NRS		Fintech		Corporate
Three Months Ended January 31, 2025 (2Q25)
Net income attributable to IDT Corporation	$	20.3
Adjustments:
Net income attributable to noncontrolling interests		1.9
Net income		22.2
Provision for income taxes		7.7
Income before income taxes		29.9
Interest income, net		(1.4	)
Other income, net		(0.2	)
Income (loss) from operations		28.3		$	18.1	$	1.1	$	9.1	$	3.1	$	(3.1	)
Depreciation and amortization		5.2			1.9		1.6		1.0		0.8		–
Other operating expense, net		0.2			–		0.2		–		–		–
Severance		0.2			0.2		–		–		–		–
Adjusted EBITDA	$	34.0		$	20.2	$	2.9	$	10.1	$	3.9	$	(3.1	)

IDT Corporation
Reconciliation of Net Income to Adjusted EBITDA
(unaudited) in millions. Figures may not foot or cross-foot due to rounding to millions

	Total IDT Corporation			Traditional Communica-tions		net2phone		NRS		Fintech		Corporate
Three Months Ended October 31, 2024 (1Q25)
Net income attributable to IDT Corporation	$	17.2
Adjustments:
Net income attributable to noncontrolling interests		1.2
Net income		18.5
Provision for income taxes		6.3
Income before income taxes		24.8
Interest income, net		(1.4	)
Other expense, net		0.3
Income (loss) from operations		23.6		$	15.7	$	1.0	$	6.6	$	3.2	$	(2.9	)
Depreciation and amortization		5.2			2.0		1.6		1.0		0.7		–
Severance		0.2			0.2		–		–		–		–
Adjusted EBITDA	$	29.1		$	17.8	$	2.5	$	7.6	$	4.0	$	(2.9	)

	Total IDT Corporation			Traditional Communica-tions		net2phone			NRS		Fintech			Corporate
Three Months Ended January 31, 2024 (2Q24)
Net income attributable to IDT Corporation	$	14.4
Adjustments:
Net income attributable to noncontrolling interests		1.3
Net income		15.8
Provision for income taxes		4.0
Income before income taxes		19.7
Interest income, net		(1.2	)
Other income, net		(2.5	)
Income (loss) from operations		16.0		$	14.6	$	0.4		$	5.3	$	(0.7	)	$	(3.6	)
Depreciation and amortization		5.1			2.0		1.6			0.8		0.7			–
Severance		0.3			0.3		–			–		–			–
Other operating expense (gain), net		0.3			–		(0.1	)		–		–			0.4
Adjusted EBITDA	$	21.8		$	17.0	$	1.8		$	6.1	$	–		$	(3.2	)

IDT Corporation
Reconciliation of Earnings per share to Non-GAAP EPS
(unaudited) in millions, except per share data. Figures may not foot due to rounding to millions.

		2Q25			2Q24

Net income attributable to IDT Corporation	$	20.3		$	14.4
Adjustments (add) subtract:
Stock-based compensation		(0.9	)		(2.5	)
Severance expense		(0.2	)		(0.3	)
Other operating expense, net		(0.2	)		(0.3	)
Total adjustments		(1.3	)		(3.1	)
Income tax effect of total adjustments		(0.3	)		(0.6	)
		1.0			2.5
Non-GAAP net income	$	21.3		$	16.9

Earnings per share:
Basic	$	0.81		$	0.57
Total adjustments		0.03			0.10
Non-GAAP – basic	$	0.84		$	0.67

Weighted-average number of shares used in calculation of basic earnings per share		25.2			25.2

Diluted	$	0.80		$	0.57
Total adjustments		0.04			0.10
Non-GAAP – diluted	$	0.84		$	0.67

Weighted-average number of shares used in calculation of diluted earnings per share		25.3			25.3

^*^*Explanation of Key Performance Metrics

NRS’ recurring revenue is calculated by subtracting NRS’ revenue from POS terminal sales from its revenue in accordance with GAAP. NRS’ Monthly Average Recurring Revenue per Terminal is calculated by dividing NRS’ recurring revenue by the average number of active POS terminals during the period. The average number of active POS terminals is calculated by adding the beginning and ending number of active POS terminals during the period and dividing by two. NRS’ recurring revenue divided by the average number of active POS terminals is divided by three when the period is a fiscal quarter. Recurring revenue and Monthly Average Recurring Revenue per Terminal are useful for comparisons of NRS’ revenue and revenue per customer to prior periods and to competitors and others in the market, as well as for forecasting future revenue from the customer base.

The NRS ‘Rule of 40’ score is a metric used to evaluate the performance of SaaS providers. It postulates that a SaaS company’s growth rate when added to its free cash flow rate should equal or exceed 40 percent. For NRS, the ‘Rule of 40’ result for 2Q25 is computed by adding the growth rate of NRS’ recurring revenue for 2Q25 compared to 2Q24 to NRS’ Adjusted EBITDA less CapEx as a percentage of total NRS revenue for the twelve months ended January 31, 2025. The ‘Rule of 40’ is a common SaaS industry metric to assess a company’s balance between growth and profitability. A total above 40 is thought to indicate a healthy combination of expansion and financial stability, making it a useful tool for investors and management to gauge the potential for long-term success and make informed decisions about resource allocation and business strategy.

net2phone’s subscription revenue is calculated by subtracting net2phone’s equipment revenue and revenue generated by a legacy SIP trunking offering in Brazil from its revenue in accordance with GAAP. net2phone’s cloud communications and contact center offerings are priced on a per-seat basis, with customers paying based on the number of users in their organization. The number of seats served and subscription revenue trends and comparisons between periods are used in the analysis of net2phone’s revenues and direct cost of revenues and are strong indications of the top-line growth and performance of the business.

net2phone’s subscription revenue per seat is calculated by dividing net2phone’s subscription revenue, as defined in the preceding paragraph, by the average number of seats served during the period. The average number of seats served is calculated by adding the beginning and ending number of seats served and dividing by two. Subscription revenue per seat is the amount of revenue generated by each seat sold during the period. It provides a basis for pricing seat-based services, as well as for comparing performance in past periods and projecting future revenue, and for comparing the value of each seat served to competitors.

net2phone’s operating margin is calculated by dividing GAAP income from operations by GAAP revenue for the period indicated. Operating margin measures the percentage that each dollar of revenue contributes to profitability. Operating margin is useful for evaluating current period profitability relative to sales, for comparisons to prior period performance, for forecasting future income from operations levels based on projected levels of sales, and for comparing net2phone’s relative profitability to its competitors and peers.

net2phone’s Adjusted EBITDA margin is calculated by dividing net2phone’s Adjusted EBITDA, a Non-GAAP measure, by net2phone’s GAAP revenue for the comparable quarter or period. Adjusted EBITDA margin measures the percentage that each dollar of revenue contributes to profitability before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization, and other adjustments as described in the Reconciliation of Non-GAAP Financial Measures. net2phone’s Adjusted EBITDA margin is useful for evaluating current period profitability relative to sales, for comparisons to prior period performance, for forecasting future Adjusted EBITDA levels based on projected levels of sales, and for comparing net2phone’s relative profitability to its competitors and peers.

BOSS Money’s Average Revenue per Transaction is calculated by dividing BOSS Money’s revenue in accordance with GAAP by the number of transactions during the period. Average Revenue per Transaction is useful for comparisons of BOSS Money’s revenue per transaction to prior periods and to competitors and others in the market, as well as for forecasting future revenue based on transaction trends.

# # #

The MIL Network –

March 7, 2025

MIL-OSI Russia: Transcript of COM Regular Press Briefing, March 6, 2025

Source: IMF – News in Russian

March 6, 2025

SPEAKER: Ms. Julie Kozack, Director of the Communications Department, IMF

* * * * *

MS. KOZACK: Good morning, everyone, and welcome to this IMF press briefing. It is very good to see you all, both those of you who are here in person and, of course, our colleagues online as well.

I am Julie Kozak, Director of the Communications Department. As usual, this briefing is embargoed until 11 a.m. Eastern Time in the U.S. I will start with a short announcement and then take your questions in person on Webex and via the Press Center.

The 2025 Spring Meetings of the IMF and World Bank Group will take place from Monday, April 21 through Saturday, April 26. Press registration to attend the spring meetings in person in Washington D.C. is now open and you can register through www.IMFconnect.org.

And with that, I will now open the floor for your questions. For those connecting virtually, please turn on both your camera and microphone when speaking. And with that, over to you.

QUESTIONER: If the Congress does not approve the future agreement, as it is established by the local law, does the IMF give the money to Argentina?

MS. KOZACK: Okay, so that is a question on Argentina. Any other questions on Argentina? I do not see any hands up in the room. Let us go online. QUESTIONER: Do you think we are already in the final stage? And what remains to announce the Staff Agreement with the IMF?

QUESTIONER: Good morning. I was wondering about also there have been versions of a new loan up to $20 billion and the first deployment of $8 billion this year. Can you confirm that, or can you give us an insight into the fresh funds that could be coming in the new agreement? And also, when can we expect a signing of the letter of intent?

QUESTIONER: So, my question is about the Congress. President Milei confirmed that the staff-level agreement must be approved by the Parliament as indicated by the Argentine law. So, is that also a requirement from the IMF itself or could the President sign a decree avoiding the current law that requires the staff-level agreement to be approved by Parliament.

QUESTIONER: I want to ask about the scope of the potential agreement with Argentina. There are reports out saying it could be as high, or there is an expectation it could be as high as $20 billion.

QUESTIONER: I think a few people have already asked, but when [do] you expect to reach a staff-level agreement, whether, as the Argentine government has said, it is only the final numbers that need to be agreed and not other technical aspects? And whether the IMF requires that the entirety of the SLA be reviewed by Congress for approval or if whether a general outline produced by the government will be enough?

MS. KOZACK: Okay, very good. So, with that, let me go ahead and talk about Argentina. So, first, I just want to start by saying, as I think many of you know, both the Managing Director and the First Deputy Managing Director recently met with the Argentine authorities. And as they recently emphasized, we are continuing to make good progress toward a program, and we are working constructively with the Argentine authorities in this regard. The authorities’ stabilization and growth plan is delivering significant results.

It has made notable strides in reducing inflation, stabilizing the economy, and fostering a return to growth in the country, and poverty is finally beginning to decline in Argentina. To sustain these early gains, there is a shared understanding about the need to continue to adopt a consistent set of fiscal, monetary and exchange rate policies, while very importantly, advancing growth enhancing reforms. And the new program would build on the progress achieved so far while also addressing Argentina’s remaining challenges.

Now, with respect to some of the questions regarding Congressional approval, we do take note of President Milei’s commitment to seek congressional support for a new IMF supported program. As we have often said in the past, strong ownership and broad support are key to the program’s success,

Here, I want to emphasize, though, that securing congressional support is a decision of the authorities as legislated in Argentine domestic law. And at the same time, of course, as I just noted, broad political and social support can enhance program implementation. Questions regarding the specific process on achieving or seeking congressional support should be addressed really to the Argentine authorities because it is a matter of domestic law.

From our side, as I noted, the negotiations are continuing in a constructive manner. In terms of the process from the IMF side. Once the negotiations are completed, as with any IMF program or proposed program, the final arrangement, the documents, will require approval of the IMF’s Executive Board. And we will provide further updates as we have them.

With respect to some of the questions about the details of the negotiations, the potential size of the program. All I can say right now is this is still under discussion as part of the ongoing and constructive dialogue that we are having with the authorities. And we will provide an update when we have more information that we can share with you.

QUESTIONER: On Lebanon, so following recent reports that the Lebanese government is in discussions with IMF over a potential deal on its financial default in public debt. I just want to see if the IMF can confirm these reports. If so, what does it look like? Are there any contingencies to this? And will there be an IMF mission visiting Lebanon? Thank you.

MS. KOZACK: So, what I can share on Lebanon is that an IMF team will visit Lebanon very soon, March 10th to 14th. This mission is aimed at, of course, meeting the new authorities, discussing Lebanon’s recent economic developments, its reconstruction needs, and the authorities’ economic priorities in the near-term. This is a fact-finding mission that will take place. But beyond this fact-finding mission, as we look ahead, future next steps could include helping the authorities to formulate a comprehensive economic reform program.

Our staff continues to be closely engaged with the authorities. We are providing policy advice and capacity development to help the authorities’ efforts to rebuild Lebanon’s economy and institutions in coordination with other international partners. And that is what I have for now on Lebanon.

QUESTIONER: I wanted to ask you about what is happening in the United States. The trade wars have begun, and we are seeing some impact already, both in terms of market reaction and a lot of volatility in the markets, ups, and downs. We are also seeing some interesting developments in terms of bond markets and yields; it is going to increase the cost of borrowing. So, I wanted to ask you if you, at this point, I know we’ve asked this question before, but I wonder if you’ve got an additional assessment, as we’re now seeing some of these policies that had been promised taking effect, and whether you can say now whether you’re expecting an impact on the global economy and also on the U.S. economy and the affected economies that have been targeted thus far — China, Canada, Mexico.

QUESTIONER: As a follow up to [that] question, does the IMF consider that the ongoing developments of the U.S. tariffs and trade wars would push other nations to seek more trade relations and more alliances with other economic organizations and trade organizations such as BRICS, for example, or others? And broadly speaking, what is the IMF assessment of the global fragmentation that is going on right now? Do you see that it is slowing down or opposite it is moving faster, taking into account the latest developments in the United States?

QUESTIONER: I would like to focus on the development of 10 years of U.S. bond yield movement. The 10-year bond yield now decreased, dropping substantially. And what does it mean? What is the implication of the movement? Does it represent some U.S. recession or U.S. economy?

QUESTIONER: With the tariffs actually now in place, has the IMF undertook a study to determine the potential impact on small island states that are heavily dependent on flows and goods and commodities coming out of the United States, more specifically, those countries within the Caribbean region who are very much dependent and could face significant inflationary pressures based on these tariffs?

MS. KOZACK: So, first I want to just step back a little bit to recognize that we have seen now several new and significant developments over the past few days. The U.S. has imposed tariffs on Canada and Mexico as well as additional tariffs on China. Canada and China have, in response, announced tariffs on some U.S. goods and other measures. And Mexico has indicated that it will provide more details in the coming days.

And as we have said before, you know, while assessing the full impact of tariffs on economic activity and inflation will depend on many factors, we do expect to provide an analysis of this, certainly at the global level and for the most affected countries at the time of our World Economic Outlook update in April. And of course we will also cover this issue, I imagine, in some of the regional updates where relevant. And I want to also emphasize that as part of our bilateral surveillance with countries, the individual Article IV reports this topic will also be covered to the extent that the countries are affected.

What I can say today is that if sustained the impact of the U.S. tariffs on Canada and Mexico can be expected to have a significant adverse economic impact on those countries given their very strong integration and exposure to the U.S. market.

Now, more broadly, there were some questions about financial market movements. So let me also just step back for a moment on some of these, and here I want to refer to some remarks that our Managing Director has been making recently. As she’s been saying, we are now in the midst of significant transformations, and these include the rapid advance of AI to changing patterns of capital flows and trade. She has also been mentioning that trade is no longer the engine of global growth that it used to be.

For example, during the period of 2000 to 2019, global trade growth reached nearly 6 percent on an annual basis, whereas over the more recent period of 2022 to 2024, global trade is growing closer to 3 percent. So global trade growth has been on a downward — has declined. And of course, it is in this more global context that governments are recalibrating their approaches and adjusting policies.

I also want to recognize, of course, that we have seen increased volatility in financial markets. We see that in indicators such as the VIX. We also have seen indicators of global uncertainty showing an increase. And what will be critical to assess what the economic impact of this will be — will be whether these trends are short-lived or whether they are sustained. Generally speaking, our research shows that both historically and across countries, sustained periods of elevated uncertainty can be associated with both households and firms holding back on consumption and investment decisions. And as I said, we will be providing a comprehensive analysis of our views on the global economy and individual economies as part of the World Economic Outlook that will be released in April.

On the specific question on U.S. bond yields, we do recognize of course, that U.S. bond yields have moved lower since the beginning of the year. And it does seem that on that basis markets may be reappraising or reassessing their views, particularly on the outlook for monetary policy. I will stop there and move on.

QUESTIONER: When is the IMF Board expected to review and approve the next disbursement for Ukraine? Are there any remaining conditions or procedural steps that Ukraine must fulfill before approval? And the Ukrainian government is engaging in debt restructuring efforts with its creditors. How does the IMF assess Ukraine’s debt sustainability and what role does this play in bord’s decision making process regarding future disbursement announcements?

QUESTIONER: So, to follow up on previous question. In February, you stated, that Ukraine would have access to about U.S. $900 million for the next review. Now we are speaking about $400 million. So, why the IMF has made a decision to adjust to the total sum of disbursement that will be provided to Ukraine?

QUESTIONER: And do you think that it can impact financial stability of Ukrainian economy or there is no risk for them?

QUESTIONER: How do you expect the freezing of the U.S. aid for Ukraine might impact the program you have already on course right now? And how does this affect the global plan that had been made like a year ago or two years ago now?

QUESTIONER: I just want to follow up the last question about the impact — what the impact Trump administration is doing. Does this impact the IMF projections on Ukraine this and next year?

QUESTIONER: An adjacent question, maybe related to the prospect for ending the war. And, you know, we have seen economic developments in Russia continue to percolate along even though the war has been going on and there have been sanctions. Have you started to look at what the end of the war could mean for both the Russian and Ukrainian economies in terms of, you know, perhaps, you know, assuming that there would be an end of sanctions once there was a cessation of hostilities, whether that would give a boost to the Russian economy, maybe the European economy in general could lower costs, things like that? So just kind of walk us through what you are seeing there.

MS. KOZACK: Okay, let me go ahead on Ukraine. So, just to bring everyone up to speed. So, on February 28th, the IMF staff, and the Ukrainian authorities reached a staff-level agreement on the Seventh Review of the four-year EFF arrangement. This is subject to approval of the IMF’s Executive Board. Ukraine is expected to draw, as noted, about U.S. $400 million, and that would bring total disbursements under the program to U.S. $10.1 billion.

I just want to note that program performance in Ukraine remains strong. All of the end December quantitative performance criteria were met, and understandings were reached between the Ukrainian authorities and IMF staff on a set of policies and reforms to sustain macroeconomic stability. The structural reform agenda in Ukraine is continuing to make good progress, and there are strong commitments from the Ukrainian authorities in a number of other areas.

Now on some of the specific questions, first on the matter of the disbursement, what I can say there is that it is not unusual over the life of a program for the pattern of disbursements to shift based on evolving balance of payments needs. And that is what has happened in this case. It is also important to emphasize that the overall size of the program, which is $15.6 billion, remains unchanged. And so that shift in disbursement pattern reflects the shifting balance of payments pattern for Ukraine.

So, on the issue the debt restructuring and debt process, what I can say there is that restoring debt sustainability in Ukraine hinges on continued implementation of the authority’s debt restructuring strategy, where completing the treatment of the GDP warrants remains important. And it also hinges very much on continuation of the revenue-based fiscal adjustment strategy, which is supported under the program. And as you know, Ukraine’s debt has been assessed in the last review to be sustainable on a forward-looking basis contingent on these two areas that I just mentioned. And of course, there will be a revised debt sustainability assessment as part of the ongoing review.

With respect to the other question, what I can say here is that the Ukrainian economy, you know, has shown continued resilience despite the challenges arising from the war. At the time of the Seventh Review, the last review, we estimated GDP growth to be 3.5 percent in 2024. But we did expect it at that time to moderate to 2 to 3 percent in 2025. And that was reflecting some headwinds from labor constraints and damage to energy infrastructure, given the ongoing war. It is the case in general for Ukraine, and we have been saying this throughout the life of the program, that the outlook remains exceptionally uncertain, especially as the war continues and it is taking a heavy toll on Ukraine’s people, economy, and infrastructure.

On the more recent developments that you were referring to, we are following these developments very closely. It is premature at the moment to comment on them, but we are following them, and we will make an assessment in due course.

And on your question, the answer is essentially the same. We are following the developments very closely, and we will, as developments evolve, be undertaking obviously an assessment of what a peace deal could potentially look like and what would be the implications for all of the involved parties.

QUESTIONER: Julie, can you on the basis of having studied previous conflicts ending, can you just give us divorced from Ukraine and Russia, but just can you give us an indication of what generally happens when a conflict ends, what that means? And is there anything that we can draw on, at least just from history?

MS. KOZACK: So, I do not have, you know, off the top of my head a piece of research that I can kind of point to in terms of the interest analysis. What I certainly can say is that we always, for all of our member countries, hope for peace and stability in all of our member countries. And I think at that moment this is really what I can say. But I take note of the importance of your point, and we will, I have no doubt, in due course be conducting all of the necessary analysis as events unfold.

QUESTIONER: I have two questions mainly on Egypt. as Egypt is scheduled for 10th of March for the discussion of the Fourth Review of the EFF for the country, what are we expecting from this meeting? And if you please, could you update us on the RSF facility worth $1.2 billion for the country? Thank you so much.

QUESTIONER: I would second exactly those questions. And just to add to that, I know it says on the IMF Executive Board calendar that the Board will be discussing waivers of non-observance for some of the performance criteria related to Egypt’s loan program and modifications for others. Are you able to tell us any more about exactly which criteria the Board will be looking at? And on the RSF, if you are able to give us any more detail about the prospective value of that. I know it has been put at $1 billion before. A related question, not on Egypt but on Gaza. I would be interested to know if the IMF has begun to think, whether internally or with partners in the region, about what its potential role would be in funding a reconstruction plan for Gaza given the $50 billion, upwards of $50 billion, cost of any reconstruction.

QUESTIONER: I may repeat questions about the value of current tranche to be given to Egypt and the timing of when the central bank of Egypt to receive it. And also, I have another question about the program of state assets selling. Will we witness some steps, new steps in that program? Could it be connected with the decision to be taken in March?

MS. KOZACK: And any other questions on Egypt? All right. And then I have a question that came in through the Press Center. I am going to read it out loud – ’Does the IMF’s approval of the fourth tranche to Egypt require Egypt to implement some reforms? And when will the Fifth Review of the loan be held? What is the estimated size of the loan allocated to Egypt, and here will it be dispersed in installments or in one lump sum?’

On Egypt – on March 10th, our Executive Board will be discussing Egypt’s Article IV consultation and the fourth review under the EFF. It will also be discussing at the same time Egypt’s request for an RSF, the Resilience and Sustainability Facility. Subject to completion by the Executive Board, the authorities, would have access to $1.2 billion under the EFF. So, under the EFF program. And then in addition, subject again to approval by our Executive Board, the size of the RSF would be about U.S. $1.3 billion. Regarding the RSF, like all of the IMF programs, the RSF is also delivered in tranches. So, it is not one lump sum up front. It is a phased program where tranches are dispersed on the basis of conditions being met.

And with respect to some of the other questions, what I can say today is just that we will provide, of course, more details following the Board meeting and on the question of waivers and modifications and also the questions on the state-owned enterprises. And again, the board meeting will be on March 10th.

QUESTIONER: I have two questions related to Japan. Firstly, amid rising uncertainty due to President Trump’s tariff policy, I would like to ask you — ask your thoughts on whether the Bank of Japan, currently in a rate hike phase, should continue raising rate or take more cautious approach in assessing the impact. And secondly, President Trump recently made remarks suggesting that Japan and China are engaging in currency devaluation. I would appreciate it if you share your views on Japan’s foreign exchange policy. Thank you.

MS. KOZACK: So, maybe just stepping back to give a bit of context on Japan. What I can say on Japan is that on the growth side, growth this year is expected to strengthen, and we also expect inflation to converge to the Bank of Japan’s 2 percent target by the end of 2025.

In 2024, growth in Japan slowed due to some temporary supply disruptions. But since then, we have seen a strengthening in growth driven by domestic demand, particular — particularly private consumption in Japan and rising wages. And we expect this to continue into 2025, where we project growth, at the time of the January WEO, we projected growth at 1.1 percent for Japan in 2025. And of course, just to say that we will be updating this projection as part of the April forecast.

Looking at inflation — headline and core inflation, as I said, are expected to decline gradually toward the 2 percent target. We have been supportive of the Bank of Japan’s recent monetary policy decisions. We believe that these decisions will help anchor inflation expectations at the 2 percent target but also given balance risks around inflation, our assessment has been that further hikes in the policy interest rate should continue to be data dependent, and they should proceed at a gradual pace over time.

With respect to the question on the exchange rate, what I can say there is that the Japanese authorities have affirmed their commitment to a flexible exchange rate regime. Japan’s flexible exchange rate regime has helped the country or has helped the economy absorb the impact of shocks. And it also supports the focus of monetary policy on price stability. And at the same time, what I can say is that that flexible exchange rate regime is helping maintain an external position that is in line with fundamentals.

QUESTIONER: Could you give us an update on the negotiations for Ethiopia, please? And on El Salvador, the deal that you agreed on in December and was approved a couple of weeks ago involves the government not increasing its exposure to Bitcoin. Government has continued to buy through the Office of Bitcoin, which is linked to the presidential palace. But yesterday the Fund said that these purchases do not increase the government’s exposure to Bitcoin. Could you please explain that?

QUESTIONER: Also on El Salvador, obviously he was saying to not to not buy it as a government reserve. I just wanted to, I guess, contrast to the U.S. I mean, President Trump has very much announced a digital assets reserve, including Ethereum and other coins, as well as Bitcoin. And I wondered if the IMF could – can you comment on the U.S. program or how would you distinguish the two countries and why the IMF might be taking a different approach?

MS. KOZACK: All right, let me go ahead and take the El Salvador question in Ethiopia and then we will go back. I see many hands up online.

So, on El Salvador, as you know, last week our Executive Board approved a 40-month Extended Fund Facility, EFF, for U.S. $1.4 billion and with an immediate disbursement of $113 million. The program is expected to catalyze financial and technical support from other IFIs. And this will lead to a combined total over the program period of about U.S. $3.5 billion of support for El Salvador. The goals of the program are to restore fiscal sustainability, rebuild external and financial buffers, strengthen governance and transparency, and ultimately create the conditions for stronger and more resilient growth.

Regarding Bitcoin, in particular, the program aims to address the risks associated with the Bitcoin project to protect consumers and investors, as well as to limit potential fiscal costs. So, to start, there were recent legal reforms that have made the acceptance of Bitcoin voluntary, and taxes can be paid only in U.S. dollars. Under the program, the government has committed to not accumulate for their Bitcoins at the level of the overall public sector.

Regarding the recent increase in Bitcoin holding by the Strategic Bitcoin Reserve Fund, the authorities have confirmed that these are consistent with the agreed program conditionality, and we do remain engaged with the authorities on this important issue.

And then, to your question. We are obviously closely monitoring President Trump’s announcement in this area. The Presidential Working Group on Digital Asset Markets has not yet completed its work. So, we do not yet have details on the implementation of this proposal, but we will come back in due course.

And then turning to the question on Ethiopia. So just an update on Ethiopia. On January 17th, the IMF Executive Board completed the Second Review of the arrangement, the ECF arrangement for Ethiopia, and that allowed for a drawdown of about U.S. $245 million. The ECF arrangement supports the authorities’ reforms to address macroeconomic imbalances, restore external debt sustainability, and lay the foundation for strong private sector-led growth.

I can also just remind you that the Managing Director recently traveled to Ethiopia. She was there February 8th and 9th. She met with Prime Minister Abiy and his team to take stock of the economic reforms and the progress that is being made in the country. And she also took the opportunity to meet with other stakeholders, including representatives of the private sector.

QUESTIONER: My question is on USAID. USAID has now totally stopped its business. And to what extent do you see the impact, especially on lower income countries at the global level? And should you consider using your facility to support them just in case?

MS. KOZACK: So, on this issue, we are obviously again paying close attention to developments, and we are working with our country authorities. But it is, at the same time, it is too early to really say what the precise impact may be. And so, we will come back in due course. For now, we are monitoring.

QUESTIONER: I have a question on Senegal. Following a recent audit of the country’s debt, it was found to be 99.7 percent of GDP. That was in 2023. And I know that IMF has said before that Senegal debt was stable even though it was high. I am wondering if that is the figure that you still consider sustainable. And then also with regards on talks of a new IMF program, I am wondering if Senegal could be asked to reimburse previous dispersion under this reporting period.

QUESTIONER: Still on Senegal, as soon as the report from the Audit Supreme Court was released, we saw rating agency downgrading Senegal sovereign notes. So, the country is now stuck. It cannot raise funds from the internal market, and it cannot go in a very comfortable position in international markets while they still face a lot of challenges. So, I am wondering why the IMF is working fast and bold to find a solution for Senegal in the midterm or even long-term. Is there any situation where IMF can provide a short-term, I mean, short-term relief to the country so they can go through these hard moments in a very soft way?

MS. KOZACK: So, on Senegal, what I can say is that we are actively engaged in discussions with the authorities with respect to the Court of Auditors Report and the associated misreporting under the IMF program. The Court of Auditors Report was released on February 12th. The Court confirmed that the fiscal deficit and debt were under reported during the period of 2019 to 2023.

So, what we are doing is working closely with the authorities in their efforts to preserve fiscal and debt sustainability. We are working actively to advance on our discussions following the publication of the report, and we are also working with the authorities on measures to correct and remedy the misreporting that took place. What I can add is that the resolution of the misreporting in line with IMF policy is a precondition for discussions of any future financial assistance by the IMF.

And with respect to potential consequences, I can say that the IMF does not impose any sanctions for misreporting cases. It is up to our Executive Board to decide on the next steps. And those next steps, you know, could include a waiver. And that waiver could — it could also include; it could be a waiver without a request for reimbursement. So, all of those discussions on Senegal are now underway. We are actively, very much working with the authorities, supporting as much as possible their efforts on fiscal and debt sustainability, as I said. And we will come back and report back when we have more information on Senegal.

I have a question here online that I am going to read. It came from the Press Center on Thailand. And the question is – ‘The upcoming World Bank IMF Annual Meetings in Thailand will bring significant attention to Southeast Asia’s economic outlook. From the from IMF’s perspective, how can Thailand best leverage this opportunity to address regional challenges such as digital transformation, climate change adaptation, and income inequality? And what collaborative initiatives between the IMF and Thailand are being planned to ensure lasting economic benefits for the country beyond the meetings themselves?’

So, on this very important question, a very nice question, actually, what I can say is that we are very much looking forward to having Thailand host the annual meetings in 2026. So, this will be in October of 2026. Every three years, we do our Annual Meetings abroad. 2026, October will be Thailand. So, mark your calendar. I can also add that preparations are underway. The Fund, the IMF staff are working hand in hand with the Thai authorities to make this a highly successful event and showcasing the significant strides that Thailand has made since it last hosted our annual meetings in 1991. So, it will be 25 years when we get to 2026.

The Managing Director recently met with Bank of Thailand’s Governor Sethaput at the AlUla Conference in Saudi Arabia. They discussed the preparations for the annual meetings and agreed that it would be a very good opportunity to showcase on the global stage the region’s dynamism and economic activities. And of course, the meetings will also allow Thailand to position itself as a key contributor to the international economic dialogue and to gather views and experiences from countries throughout the membership of the IMF and the World Bank.

This ongoing close relationship leading up to and beyond, we hope, the Annual Meetings will focus on prioritizing reform reforms that are necessary to ensure the lasting benefits for Thailand and building the relationships and the shared policy, dialogue and experiences we hope will deepen our engagement, our excellent engagement and relationship with Thailand and will be sustained even past the Annual Meetings in 2026.

QUESTIONER: My question is, what are the IMF growth projections for Jordan amid the ongoing impact of the Gaza war? And when will the Third Review under the EFF begin? And are any adjustments expected to the war’s region effect on Jordan’s economy?

MS. KOZACK: So, what I can share on Jordan is that the Executive Board on December 12th completed the Article IV Consultation with Jordan and the Second Review under the EFF arrangement. The mission for the next review, which will be the Third Review, is expected to take place in April.

What I can also say is that Jordan has demonstrated resilience and maintained macroeconomic stability throughout the prolonged regional conflict. This resilience reflects the authority’s continued implementation of sound macroeconomic policies and progress with reforms. While recent developments in the region, particularly the ceasefire agreements, give rise to some cautious optimism, uncertainty, of course, in Jordan does remain high. And with respect to the growth projections, what I can say is that growth in 2024 was 2.3 percent. We are projecting growth at 2.5 percent in 2025 and a further increase in growth in 2026 to 3 percent. But like in all countries, we will be updating these projections as both part of our April World Economic Outlook Global Forecast, and also, of course, the team will be doing a full assessment of the Jordanian economy as part of their mission in April

And so, with this, I’m going to bring this press briefing to a close. Thank you all very much. Thank you very much for participating today. As a reminder, the briefing is embargoed until 11 a.m. Eastern Time in the U.S. The transcript, as always, will be made available later today on IMF.org. And in case of clarifications or additional questions, please reach out to my colleagues at media@IMF.org. And I wish everyone a wonderful day, and I look forward to seeing you next time. Thank you very much.

* * * * *

IMF Communications Department

MEDIA RELATIONS

PRESS OFFICER: Boris Balabanov

Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

@IMFSpokesperson

https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/03/06/tr030625-transcript-of-com-regular-press-briefing

MIL OSI

MIL OSI Russia News –

March 7, 2025
MIL-OSI Global: Money laundering plays a key role in every part of the illegal drugs industry – here’s how it works
Source: The Conversation – UK – By Mark Berry, Lecturer In Criminology, Bournemouth University

R Mendoza/Shutterstock

The global illicit drugs trade is estimated to be worth at least half a trillion US dollars each year. Drugs such as cocaine, methamphetamine and heroin generate large revenues all along their supply chains, from where the products (and precursor materials) are grown or made – principally Colombia and Bolivia, China, Afghanistan, and the “golden triangle” of Myanmar, Laos and Thailand – to wherever the finished drugs are consumed.

Earnings in the illicit drug trade are variable. Few people will make the kind of money that once put the Mexican former cartel boss Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán on the Forbes list of global billionaires. But while drug “kingpins” are the industry’s biggest individual earners, they do not hold the majority of the drug money that is generated throughout the global supply chain.

Despite their frequent glamorisation in film and TV portrayals, drug cartels are basically international logistics companies. They work with distributors in different countries who deliver the drugs to regional wholesalers, who in turn supply the local retailers (dealers) who sell drugs to individuals.

Everyone along the supply chain takes their cut, with most people making much more modest incomes than the millionaire drug traffickers of narcocorrido lore. In our interviews with illicit drug entrepreneurs in the US and UK, we routinely spoke to sellers whose incomes ranged from pocket money to providing a moderately comfortable life.

Illicit drug use is damaging large parts of the world socially, politically and environmentally. Patterns of supply and demand are changing rapidly. In our longform series Addicted, leading experts bring you the latest insights on drug use and production as we ask: is it time to declare a planetary emergency?

Around 70% to 80% of the overall revenue generated by illicit drugs is shared among the many wholesale and street-level dealers in destination countries such as the UK and US, where the price per gram is at its highest. How this money moves and is used to sustain the illicit drug trade should be an important part of any worthwhile counter-narcotics strategy. But it rarely is.

Professional money launderers

The people and organisations responsible for laundering drug revenues – that is, transforming them into untraceable money that can easily be spent, or into assets that can be held or sold – often exist under the radar of law enforcement and the media.

Yet the ways illicit drug money is laundered are hardly a mystery. Techniques include wire transfers to offshore bank accounts, investments in shell companies or deposits in cash businesses, and buying foreign currencies or (to a small extent) cryptocurrencies. In addition, the straightforward physical transportation of cash across national borders is an often-used method known as a “bulk cash transfer”.

The largest players in the illicit drugs industry, such as international cartels, national distributors and large-scale wholesalers, often use professional money launderers – some of whom have seemingly reputable jobs in the financial sector. In one recent case, US financial regulators fined TD Bank US$3 billion (£2.4 billion) – a record penalty for a bank – for facilitating the laundering of millions of dollars of drug cartel money.

Over six years, more than 90% of the bank’s transactions went unmonitored, enabling “three money laundering networks to collectively transfer more than US$670 million through TD Bank accounts”. Then-US attorney general Merrick Garland commented: “By making its services convenient for criminals, [TD Bank] became one.”

Video: CBC News.

Some money laundering networks are as global as the drug supply chains they service. In June 2024, the US Department of Justice’s (DoJ) multi-year “Operation Fortune Runner” investigation saw LA-based associates of Mexico’s Sinaloa drug cartel charged with conspiring with money-laundering groups linked to a Chinese underground banking network. According to the IRS’s head of criminal investigation, Guy Ficco:

Drug traffickers generate immense amounts of cash through their illicit operations. This case is a prime example of Chinese money launderers working hand-in-hand with drug traffickers to try to legitimise profits generated by drug activities.

According to the DoJ, “many wealthy Chinese nationals” barred from transferring large amounts to the US by the Chinese government’s capital flight restrictions seek informal alternatives to the conventional banking system – including via schemes to launder illicit drug money. The DoJ explained how this works:

The China-based investor contacts an individual who has US dollars available to sell in the United States. This seller of US dollars provides identifying information for a bank account in China, with instructions for the investor to deposit Chinese currency (renminbi) in that account. Once the owner of the account sees the deposit, an equivalent amount of US dollars is released to the buyer in the United States.

These arrangements are not unique to Chinese actors. Similar arrangements occur throughout the world, including schemes to leverage the black market peso exchange and the Hawala international money transfer system.

Professional launderers are both creating and exploiting vulnerabilities in the global financial system. Such corruption allows suspicious transactions to occur without proper checks or oversight. This not only reduces transparency in the financial system but erodes public trust in it.

How cartels launder their money

International drug cartels and national wholesalers have a smaller markup on their transactions, compared with retailers. But because they are responsible for moving enormous quantities of illicit drugs, they still generate millions of dollars worth of revenue.

The most prolific known drug distributors in US history, Margarito Flores Jr and his twin brother Pedro, delivered billions of dollars worth of cocaine, heroin and methamphetamines to their US and Canadian wholesale clients between 1998 and 2009. They were working for Guzmán and Ismeal “El Mayo” Zambada García, then leaders of the Sinaloa cartel, as well as the Mexican Beltrán Leyva brothers whose cartel bore their surname.

Today, Margarito Flores Jr trains law enforcement across the US in the methods he and his brother used to traffic drugs and run their business. In January 2015, both men were sentenced to 14 years for drug trafficking – Margarito Flores Jr would later reach out to one of this article’s authors (R.V. Gundur) after reading his book, Trying to Make It: The Enterprises, Gangs, and People of the American Drug Trade, which includes a comprehensive account of the Flores crew’s activities.

In a subsequent interview, he told us: “My brother and I estimate that, if we added up all of the money we sent back to Mexico over the decade we sold drugs, it was probably more than US$3.5 billion.”

The billions they remitted to Mexico were used by Guzmán, Zambada and the Beltrán Levya brothers not only to expand their drug businesses, but to corrupt powerful figures such as Mexico’s former secretary of public security, Genaro García Luna.

García Luna, who was Mexico’s highest-ranking law enforcement official from 2006 to 2012, was sentenced to nearly 40 years in prison in October 2024 after being found guilty of taking millions of dollars in bribes from the Sinaloa cartel, as well as enabling the trafficking of more than a million kilograms of cocaine into the US. Flores explained to us:

It’s important to understand that corruption impacts people at all levels of government. Our payoffs included local police and other people in the community, up to higher-positioned people in government. Lots of that money ended up funding the violent conflicts between cartels.

While there has been widespread coverage of cartel drug money being laundered through high-profile businesses and banks such as Wachovia and HSBC, Flores suggested that “the money involved in the drug trade is a lot more than anybody really can understand”. The reason for this, he said, is that it’s very hard to track the flow of hard cash via lorries, boats, planes and even drones. Flores told us:

It’s a misconception that everyone who makes a lot of money in drugs or other illegal business makes an effort to launder their money. My brother and I held much of what we earned in cash. We knew the government could eventually take everything [else].

The twins were right: in time, that’s exactly what the US government did.

‘Everyday’ money laundering

In our study of money laundering strategies used by people involved in the illicit drug trade in the UK and US, we found that street dealers do not typically undertake sophisticated laundering processes. Rather, they spend their cash on food and other routine living expenses. One independent UK drug dealer, whose experience was typical of many, used the money earned from his cocaine sales to buy groceries and pay bills for himself and his daughter.

Spending money, even small amounts, gained through illegal activities is a money laundering offence – albeit one that is seldom prosecuted. As a result, these everyday activities that return illicit drug money to the legal economy are not well accounted for – even though the street value of drugs drives global market value estimates.

Business-savvy street dealers can earn gross revenues that approach the earnings of high-paid white-collar workers. But they must disguise their earnings’ origins before they can spend them, of course, and various tactics are used to do this.

Some dealers solicit close friends or family members to act as “strawmen”. These are people willing to put assets paid for by illicit drug money – such as cars, properties or even businesses – in their names on behalf of the dealer. Idris Elba’s character Stringer Bell in HBO’s The Wire was an accurate portrayal of someone investing in legal enterprises using illicit drug money.

A guide to Stringer Bell’s character in The Wire. Video: Just an Observation.

These strategies occur wherever illegal enterprise exists, and have done for well over a century. In the US, we interviewed wholesalers who had used family members to own houses and other properties on their behalf. This is done to mitigate against the risk of asset forfeiture should they be convicted of a crime. If an illicit enterprise can create a plausible beneficial owner who is not involved in crime, then the asset is harder to seize. This is why the Donald Trump administration’s recent suspension of beneficial owner oversight is problematic from a drug enforcement perspective.

In liberal democracies, governments cannot investigate someone’s finances simply because they are related to criminals. The dirty money that is put into their accounts can also be disguised as legitimate income making it difficult to identify, although thorough investigations may uncover it.

In the UK, we also talked to successful drug retailers who had set up local businesses in their own names. The EU’s law enforcement agency, Europol, has reported similar activities throughout Europe.

Legal businesses are a common – and often hard-to-detect – vehicle to launder drug money. Bars, clubs, gyms, and hair, nail and tanning salons can be readily set up with drug money, as large cash infusions to establish a business are often not well scrutinised. These businesses are comparatively easy to run with significant cash flows, providing suitable cover for dirty money.

For example, a beauty salon, especially one that offers high-value boutique services, could easily incorporate drug revenue into its financial accounts by reporting sales that do not occur. Tanning salons can be set up with little expense since they require only sunbeds and the rental of a property.

Along with bars, clubs and salons, construction companies and restaurants stand out as other cash-intensive businesses with high volumes of transactions – characteristics that make good fronts for laundering money.

It’s hard to spot a ‘dirty’ business

There is no surefire way to tell whether a business is a laundering front. While some may look like enterprises struggling to stay afloat, others develop into viable operations that eventually no longer need dirty money to sustain them.

Some drug dealers incorporate laundering practices within their legitimate jobs. Tradespeople such as electricians or plumbers, for example, can launder money by generating invoices for fake jobs, then reporting the income on their tax returns.

In both the UK and US, tax authorities are not charged with evaluating the veracity of the funds reported, and are generally satisfied once tax is paid. In other words, they generally trust declared income as proof of legal business activity. Moreover, they, along with the police, lack the resources to investigate these businesses for money laundering.

Through their legal businesses, many drug dealers pay significant taxes on their illegal revenue, and thus contribute to the economy.

Paying income tax effectively renders this income laundered. It can be invested and used to set up other businesses, or to purchase cars and properties without suspicion. It can also bolster credit ratings, and improve access to legal financial services such as bank loans.

Many small-time drug dealers start legal businesses in order to exit the illicit drug trade. We interviewed one cocaine dealer who had used his drug money to set up a retail electronics store; once it was successful, he stopped dealing. Similarly, the person behind a semi-legitimate nitrous oxide enterprise used his proceeds to set up a legitimate alcohol delivery service.

Through self-laundering, these modest drug dealers transform their proceeds of crime into spendable cash – and may eventually leave criminality behind altogether.

The (losing) battle against laundered money

Across the world, anti-money laundering efforts against organised criminal gangs are notoriously ineffective.

The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) – an intergovernmental organisation formed in 1999 to combat money laundering and the financing of terrorism – assesses financial regulators’ anti-money laundering controls all over the world. Countries designated as a risk that require monitoring are placed on the task force’s “grey list”, while severe, high-risk countries go on its “black list”. Being put on these lists can result in a withdrawal of international investment and implementation of sanctions by other countries.

Although developing countries have often scored badly in their assessments, there has been some progress. While Kenya remained on the grey list in 2024, for example, it was found to have strengthened its measures to tackle both money laundering and terrorist financing. In the same year, though, Lebanon was added to the grey list over concerns on both counts.

The FATF’s evaluation processes are designed to provide an objective assessment of whether a country has implemented its anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing recommendations. However, the success of the FATF’s anti-money laundering controls remains unclear.

Video: The Financial Action Task Force.

Often lost in the criminal financing narrative is the role of bulk cash transfers. Even in a world that is moving to cashless transactions, cash generally remains the primary currency of both the illicit drug trade and corruption.

The biggest and most successful drug traffickers have significant cash reserves which are used to pay workers, replace drugs that are lost or seized, accrue assets, and bribe key officials.

Reflecting on his former illicit enterprise, Margarito Flores observed: “For every kilo of cocaine or heroin or methamphetamine we sold in the US, at least a kilo of cash went back to Mexico.” For deals in Europe, Flores said: “Given the markup the further away you trade, the amount of cash sent back could be even higher – I would estimate it to be a kilo and a half.”

Flores described the ineptitude of law enforcement in policing cash that was leaving the US:

No matter how careful we were, my brother and I lost a handful of loads of drugs heading north [from Mexico into the US]. Heading south was different: we just had the money put on tractor trailers and had it driven it across the border. We never lost a dollar. That’s where politicians don’t pay enough attention. That cash lets traffickers keep doing business.

Focus on the money as well as the drugs

So long as demand for illicit drugs exists, the industry will continue – and the revenue it generates will be laundered.

We believe that to curb the drugs trade, enforcement strategies need to go beyond simply capturing drugs and focus much more on capturing the money. Governments should go after reserves held not only by drug cartels but high-level distributors, such as those who replaced the Flores twins, and also wholesalers. People like these – comparatively high earners in destination countries – are the backbone of the illicit drugs trade.

Transnational law enforcement should prioritise detecting and seizing bulk cash transfers. These high-volume proceeds underwrite the wellbeing of drug trafficking organisations. Digital tools, such as machine learning and artificial intelligence, can be developed to create new techniques to track and trace suspicious transactions, although they alone won’t solve all laundering problems.

Corruption of officials also remains a problem. Governments need to ensure their officials are well paid and sufficiently monitored in their roles – be they working in government, border control, banks, police departments or prisons. Unfortunately, the US has shirked its leadership in global anti-corruption efforts with the recent halting of the enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, which bans the bribing of foreign officials.

Read more:
Mexico’s drug corruption has more to do with US demand than crooked politicians

Anti-money laundering efforts need to be consistently supported and required. Lamentably, the US has undermined its anti-money laundering toolkit by suspending the enforcement of beneficial ownership information reporting requirements. Establishing beneficial ownership helps financial institutions to identify parties that are hiding their financial interests, which can be an indication of money laundering or other criminal activity.

Similarly, foreign investment in producer countries can strengthen their capacity to counter laundering by supporting intelligence infrastructure and improved training. Recent cuts to USAid and the reduction of US State Department efforts in these areas is another indication that the US will no longer lead in these domains.

As cash businesses provide an easy mechanism for cleaning money, moving to a cashless society that uses digital transactions may help ensure that money is traceable. At the same time, cryptomarkets provide a minor, but potentially increasing, pathway to hiding dirty money digitally.

Ultimately, we should recognise the decades-long “war on drugs” for what it is: a policy costing trillions of dollars that combined mass incarceration with insufficient public health investment, and which has harmed the very communities the illicit drug trade affects the most. It is a difficult balance, but the pathway forward needs to reorient the objectives regarding drugs: invest in people, then go after the money that keeps the cartels, distributors and wholesalers afloat.

For you: more from our Insights series:
To hear about new Insights articles, join the hundreds of thousands of people who value The Conversation’s evidence-based news. Subscribe to our newsletter.

Mark Berry received funding from the Dawes Trust for a prestigious PhD scholarship to undertake work that informs the contents of this article.

R.V. Gundur received funding from the Economic and Social Research Council to undertake work that informs the contents of this article. He is also a professional member of the International Compliance Association.

The authors wish to thank Margarito Flores Jr (kingpintoeducator.com) for his help with this article.

– ref. Money laundering plays a key role in every part of the illegal drugs industry – here’s how it works – https://theconversation.com/money-laundering-plays-a-key-role-in-every-part-of-the-illegal-drugs-industry-heres-how-it-works-251288
MIL OSI – Global Reports –
March 7, 2025
MIL-OSI United Nations: UN emergency aid fund releases $110 million for neglected humanitarian crises

Source: United Nations 2

6 March 2025 Humanitarian Aid

Amid deep cuts to global humanitarian funding, the UN’s Central Emergency Response Fund, CERF, on Thursday allocated $110 million to neglected crises across Africa, Asia and Latin America.

The UN’s top aid official, Tom Fletcher, said that more than 300 million people urgently need assistance.

But funding has been falling annually, and this year’s levels are projected to drop to a record low.

“Brutal funding cuts don’t mean that humanitarian needs disappear; today’s emergency fund allocation channels resources swiftly to where they’re needed most,” he said.

One third of the CERF money will support Sudan and neighbouring Chad, which is home to many uprooted Sudanese.

The funds will also bolster the aid response in Afghanistan, the Central African Republic, Honduras, Mauritania, Niger, Somalia, Venezuela and Zambia.

Part of the allocation will go towards life-saving initiatives to protect vulnerable people from climate shocks, too.

Funding cuts impact aid for millions: UNICEF

Funding cuts to overseas aid levels in multiple countries are severely limiting the UN Children Fund’s ability to reach millions of children in dire need, the agency’s Executive Director said on Thursday.

UNICEF chief Catherine Russell highlighted cuts “by numerous donor countries follow two years of aid reductions at a time of unprecedented need. Millions of children are affected by conflict, need to be vaccinated against deadly diseases such as measles and polio, and must be educated and kept healthy.”

She added that needs are outpacing resources and despite introducing efficiencies and innovation to their work, UNICEF teams have stretched every contribution to its limit.

“But there is no way around it, these new cuts are creating a global funding crisis that will put the lives of millions of additional children at risk.”

Funded entirely by voluntary contributions, the UN children’s agency has helped save millions, making “historic progress”.

Since 2000, global under-fives mortality has dropped by 50 per cent: “UNICEF implores all donors to continue to fund critical aid programs for the world’s children. We cannot fail them now,” Ms. Russell underlined.

Afghanistan: Lives and livelihoods on the line

Offering one snapshot of how cuts and shortfalls in aid are impacting one of the world’s most vulnerable nations, UN Spokesperson Stéphane Dujarric highlighted conditions in Afghanistan.

“Our humanitarian colleagues warn that Afghanistan continues to face a severe humanitarian crisis defined by decades of conflict, entrenched poverty, climate-induced shocks and rising protection risks, especially for women and girls,” he told reporters at the regular daily briefing in New York.

More than half of the population – or 23 million people – need humanitarian assistance in the country, which has been run by the Taliban since they seized power from the democratically elected Government in August 2021.

Nearly 3.5 million children under five and more than a million pregnant and breastfeeding women are expected to become acutely malnourished, while explosive hazards continue to pose a lethal threat following decades of brutal civil conflict.

An estimated 55 people are killed or injured by ordnance every month – most of them are children.

Cuts already taking a toll

“Funding cuts are already significantly constraining the humanitarian community’s efforts to provide assistance to those most in need,” Mr Dujarric said.

In the past month, more than 200 health facilities have closed, depriving 1.8 million people from essential health services.

Malnutrition services for children have also been impacted.

“Our humanitarian partners warn that aid funding cuts will cost both lives and livelihoods – and undermine development gains,” said the UN Spokesperson.

UN agencies and partners on the ground are urgently reprioritising programmes to ensure communities and areas most in need can be reached.

MIL OSI United Nations News –

March 7, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: 2025-34 ATTORNEY GENERAL LOPEZ SECURES NATIONWIDE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AGAINST TRUMP ADMINISTRATION FOR DEFUNDING MEDICAL AND PUBLIC HEALTH INNOVATION RESEARCH

Source: US State of Hawaii

2025-34 ATTORNEY GENERAL LOPEZ SECURES NATIONWIDE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AGAINST TRUMP ADMINISTRATION FOR DEFUNDING MEDICAL AND PUBLIC HEALTH INNOVATION RESEARCH

Posted on Mar 6, 2025 in Latest Department News, Newsroom

STATE OF HAWAIʻI

KA MOKU ʻĀINA O HAWAIʻI

DEPARTMENT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

KA ʻOIHANA O KA LOIO KUHINA

JOSH GREEN, M.D.
GOVERNOR

KE KIAʻĀINA

ANNE LOPEZ

ATTORNEY GENERAL

LOIO KUHINA

ATTORNEY GENERAL LOPEZ SECURES NATIONWIDE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AGAINST TRUMP ADMINISTRATION FOR DEFUNDING MEDICAL AND PUBLIC HEALTH INNOVATION RESEARCH

News Release 2025-34

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

March 5, 2025

HONOLULU – Attorney General Anne Lopez and a coalition of 21 other attorneys general have secured a nationwide preliminary injunction in Massachusetts v. NIH. The order prevents the Trump Administration, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and the National Institutes of Health (NIH) from cutting billions of dollars in funds that support cutting-edge medical and public health research at universities and research institutions across the country regardless of whether their states have joined the lawsuit.

“As the court confirmed, the Trump administration’s attempt to cut lifesaving, essential scientific and medical research funding for public health institutions was as illegal as it was arbitrary,” said Attorney General Lopez. “Once again, the courts are sending a clear message that President Trump’s efforts to paralyze the government through arbitrary funding cuts are illegal. The people of Hawaiʻi rightfully expect that the federal administration will act lawfully, and my department will work to protect the interests of this state.”

“We sincerely appreciate the Attorney General’s efforts to obtain this injunction,” said University of Hawaiʻi Vice President for Research and Innovation Vassilis Syrmos. “NIH’s proposed drastic reduction of our facilities and administrative rate would result in the elimination of approximately $16.5M in funding that the University of Hawaiʻi uses to support its research programs and graduate students, including debt service payments for facilities that support translational research and clinical trials. As our state’s only medical school, JABSOM is required to do research that benefits our population. The level and quality of research cannot be sustained with the proposed cuts. The negative impact on communities in Hawaiʻi and elsewhere that already experience the highest rates of chronic disease, more severe health conditions, and shortened life expectancies, will be severe.”

The state of Hawaiʻi is represented in this litigation by Special Assistant to the Attorney General Dave Day and Solicitor General Kalikoʻonālani Fernandes, who added: “We are very pleased with this decision. The relief obtained in this case for the University of Hawaiʻi underscores the importance of standing up for the rule of law and the interests of Hawaiʻi against unlawful federal actions.”

The preliminary injunction protects critical funds that facilitate biomedical research, like lab, faculty, infrastructure, and utility costs. Without them, the lifesaving and life-changing medical research in which the United States has long been a leader, could be compromised.

On February 10, less than six hours after the coalition filed its lawsuit against the Administration, a judge in the U.S. District Court for Massachusetts issued a temporary restraining order against NIH, barring its attempts to cut the critical research funding. Today’s order takes the place of the temporary restraining order and prevents the Trump Administration from cutting this important category of funding as the case proceeds. It will remain in effect until a final ruling is made.

The NIH is the primary source of federal funding for medical research in the United States. Medical research funding by NIH grants have led to innumerable scientific breakthroughs, including the discovery of treatment for cancers of all types and the first sequencing of DNA. Additionally, dozens of NIH-supported scientists have earned Nobel Prizes for their groundbreaking scientific work.

Joining Hawaiʻi in this coalition are the attorneys general of Arizona, California, Connecticut, Colorado, Delaware, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington and Wisconsin. This lawsuit is being co-led by the attorneys general of Massachusetts, Illinois, and Michigan.

# # #

Media contacts:

Dave Day

Special Assistant to the Attorney General

Office: 808-586-1284

Email: [email protected]

Web: http://ag.hawaii.gov

Toni Schwartz
Public Information Officer
Hawai‘i Department of the Attorney General
Office: 808-586-1252
Cell: 808-379-9249
Email: [email protected]

Web: http://ag.hawaii.gov

MIL OSI USA News –

March 7, 2025
MIL-OSI Banking: CSO-3 optical Earth-observation satellite successfully launched
Source: Thales Group

Headline: CSO-3 optical Earth-observation satellite successfully launched
- The CSO system comprises three defense and security satellites
- This trio has two distinct missions: reconnaissance for CSO-1 and CSO-3, and identification for CSO-2, affording higher resolution and refined analysis
- The very-high-resolution optical instrument flying on each satellite is a marvel of technology built by prime contractor Thales Alenia Space
Cannes, March 6^th, 2025 – The CSO-3 military observation satellite has been successfully launched by Arianespace atop an Ariane 6 from Europe’s spaceport in French Guiana. Carrying a very-high-resolution optical instrument built by Thales Alenia Space, the joint venture between Thales (67%) and Leonardo (33%), the satellite was developed by prime contractor Airbus Defence & Space for the French defense procurement agency DGA on behalf of the French Air and Space Force’s Space Command, with delegated oversight from the French space agency CNES.

CSO © CNES

The third and last component in the CSO system for France’s MUSIS* military program, CSO-3 will provide increased coverage and revisit capabilities to enable more effective conduct of military operations and faster crisis response.

Designed to the most stringent intelligence and defense requirements, CSO-3 is equipped with a cutting-edge instrument developed by Thales Alenia Space. This instrument is the core of the mission, affording exceptional resolution and detail of Earth’s surface. Its unrivaled performance enables it to acquire imagery at extremely high resolution, even in low-light conditions and at night thanks to its infrared capabilities. Its advanced technologies include latest-generation optical systems and ultra-sensitive sensors.

CSO © CNES

Like for the previous Helios 1, Helios 2 and Pleiades satellites, Thales Alenia Space designed strategic equipment for the CSO system, including the solar arrays, very-high-throughput image telemetry systems, and encryption/decryption modules to ensure data security and confidentiality. The company also supplied the system’s telemetry, tracking and control transponders.

“The launch of CSO-3 is a major milestone for French sovereignty in space, both in terms of launch capabilities and satellite technology,” said Hervé Derrey, Thales Alenia Space CEO. “With the completion of this system, France is leading the way in optical space reconnaissance. The CSO system’s exceptional performance is based in particular on the optical instrument built by the teams at Thales Alenia Space and our industry partners. These unique skills in Europe are strategically important and demonstrate our ability to meet the new challenges facing French and European sovereignty.”

*Multinational Space-based Imaging System for Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Observation

About THALES ALENIA SPACE

Drawing on over 40 years of experience and a unique combination of skills, expertise and cultures, Thales Alenia Space delivers innovative solutions for telecommunications, navigation, Earth observation, environmental management, exploration, science and orbital infrastructures. Governments and private industry alike count on Thales Alenia Space to design and build satellite-based systems that provide anytime, anywhere connections and positioning, monitor our planet, enhance management of its resources and explore our Solar System and beyond. Thales Alenia Space sees space as a new horizon, helping to build a better, more sustainable life on Earth. A joint venture between Thales (67%) and Leonardo (33%), Thales Alenia Space also teams up with Telespazio to form the parent companies’ Space Alliance, which offers a complete range of services. Thales Alenia Space posted consolidated revenues of approximately €2.2 billion in 2023 and has around 8,600 employees in 8 countries, with 16 sites in Europe.
MIL OSI Global Banks –
March 7, 2025
MIL-OSI Banking: Members share experiences on going beyond tariff codes to implement environmental measures

Source: WTO

Headline: Members share experiences on going beyond tariff codes to implement environmental measures

Organized and moderated by Luis Oña-Garcés of Ecuador, the session featured experience-sharing by members implementing environmental measures which are controlled at the border based on tariff classification categories beyond the Harmonized System codes.
A series of key questions guided delegations in addressing environmental measures implemented through tariff classification, exploring the use of specific codes and additional categories designed for this purpose. Other mechanisms used at the border, such as certifications or licences, were also analysed. Good practices identified in the implementation and monitoring of these measures were shared. The objective was to understand the challenges and results of these strategies.
The European Union shared its process used to track trade in products covered by regulations of fluorinated greenhouse gases, ozone-depleting substances, and deforestation. This included the EU TARIC databases which identify specific products beyond 6-digit HS codes. This more exact definition helped customs operations by enhancing traceability and smoothing the cross-border process.
The EU suggested that the World Customs Organization (WCO) put in place a project aimed at improving the classification of green technology and environmentally friendly products by refining definitions and collaborating with international organizations. The EU noted that updating the current HS system to recognize products under green initiatives and the circular economy will streamline processes, enhance policy enforcement, and improve trade efficiency and traceability.
The United Kingdom indicated that collaboration between trade and customs is essential to understand limitations posed by the HS and to apply solutions that can be implemented at the border. The UK emphasized that differentiation of production processes or end-use, especially for environmental products, is challenging. It noted that national tariff lines and harmonized definitions/standards are alternatives to HS amendments.
The UK presented a case study showing that HS codes have no precise categories for recycling, reuse and waste of textiles, which hamper monitoring trade. Discrepancies in customs classification and contamination cause trade barriers due to HS code definitions not conforming with industry procedures. To avoid this, the UK said greater WTO member cooperation can enhance knowledge of trade restrictions due to unclear HS nomenclature.
The Dominican Republic reported on the successful implementation of Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs) and their integration into the country’s customs tariff system. It has introduced further subdivisions in its tariff structure, beyond the HS standard codes, to monitor environmentally sensitive products and institutionalised interagency planning and coordination through the creation of a Green Customs Department.
Addressing challenges and opportunities, the Dominican Republic noted the obstacles encountered, particularly on outdated law frameworks, and emphasized the significance of effective technology-driven customs regulation and staff training to improve understanding and implementation of environmental policies while maintaining trade efficiency.
Jamaica also highlighted its efforts in enforcing environmental policies on plastics pollution, hazardous waste treatment and disposal, and the development of renewable energy through customs policy. However, Jamaica noted the numerous challenges that hinder effective enforcement both at the national level and regionally within the Caribbean Community (CARICOM). These include insufficient stakeholder knowledge of MEAs and lack of coordination among regulatory and customs institutions. Jamaica said that enforcement continues to be difficult despite advancement because of a shortage of resources and the need for additional interagency coordination. The country continues to modernize customs practices and simplify policies according to international environmental commitments, with the aim of striking a balance between trade facilitation and sustainability goals.
The HS is a multipurpose international product nomenclature developed by the WCO. It comprises more than 5,000 commodity groups or categories, each of them identified by a six-digit code. See here for the current HS 2022 nomenclature.
The system is used by 212 economies as a basis for their customs tariffs and for the collection of international trade statistics. Over 98% of the merchandise in international trade is classified in terms of the HS.
A first thematic session on Greening the HS was held in June 2024. It provided a detailed presentation of the HS role and structure, including its potential and limitations in identifying goods of policy interest. The challenge of defining environmental goods and making them visible in the HS were discussed, as were proposed HS amendments by the Food and Agriculture Organization and the Basel, Rotterdam and Stockholm Conventions.
The Chair of the Committee on Market Access, Nicola Waterfield of Canada, said that the presentations gave members an opportunity to learn about a very wide range of challenges and solutions beyond the HS to implement their environmental policies. They also highlighted the crossovers between greening efforts and the work of the Committee on transparency in import and export restrictions and prohibitions which would be notified as quantitative restrictions.
As with past thematic sessions in the Committee, and to respond to a demand by members, the WTO Secretariat will prepare a factual summary report based on information shared.

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MIL OSI Global Banks –

March 7, 2025
MIL-OSI Submissions: Global Bodies – IPU report: Parliamentary gender gap narrowed over the past 30 years but progress stalled in 2024

Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union

Geneva, Switzerland, Thursday 6 March 2025 – A new IPU report analysing three decades of women in national parliaments reveals that the percentage of seats held by women has risen from 11.3% in 1995 to 27.2% in 2025.

The IPU report Women in parliament 1995-2025 commemorates 30 years since the 1995 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, the landmark UN framework which set out a roadmap for gender equality and women’s rights. (ref. https://www.ipu.org/resources/publications/reports/2025-03/women-in-parliament-1995-2025 )

The report shows that, from 2000 to 2015, the proportion of women in parliament rose steadily. However, in recent years, this progress has slowed.

And in 2024, despite a high number of elections with 73 chamber renewals globally, women’s parliamentary representation increased by only 0.3 percentage points, marking the slowest rate of progress since 2017.

Parity achieved in six countries

In 1995, no parliament had achieved gender parity.

In 2025, six parliaments have parity or more women than men in their single or lower chambers (Rwanda, Cuba, Nicaragua, Mexico, Andorra and the United Arab Emirates).

Regional differences

The Americas have seen the most significant increase in women’s parliamentary participation, with a 22.7 percentage point gain across all chambers combined over 30 years. The region now has the highest average, with 35.4% of seats held by women.

From leading the world 30 years ago for gender equality in parliament, Asia now lags behind; the region recorded the slowest growth with a gain of just 8.9 points since 1995.

2024 elections: More diversity and prominence for gender issues

Despite the current pushback against diversity in the United States, the November 2024 elections saw two Black women elected to the Senate for the first time and the first openly transgender person to be elected to Congress.

The United Kingdom Parliament elected in 2024 is also the most ethnically diverse in the country’s history with Black, Asian and ethnic minorities, both men and women, comprising around 13% of the House of Commons.

The report notes that gender issues, particularly abortion rights and issues of gender identity, had a polarizing effect on many of the elections last year, in some cases spurring an anti-feminist backlash and in others serving to mobilize female voters.

Violence against women in politics

The report also points to political violence against women in 2024 elections:

Mexico’s 2024 election was one of its most violent, with an estimated 130 candidates, including 30 women, allegedly attacked, according to Data Cívica.

In the Republic of Korea, a woman MP was physically attacked during the election campaign.

In the United Kingdom, the 2024 election saw an “alarming rise” in candidate abuse according to a report by the country’s Electoral Commission, disproportionately affecting women.

However, some countries, with IPU support, have taken noteworthy steps to address gender-based violence in elections and parliaments, including Australia and the United Republic of Tanzania.

Proactive steps towards gender parity

Countries which have taken steps towards ensuring greater gender balance have seen the most laudable progress.

These steps include implementing well-designed quotas, making parliaments more gender-sensitive and addressing violence against women.

The report underlines that two factors have made a significant difference in the share of women elected to parliaments: electoral systems – especially proportional representation or mixed systems – and gender quotas in any form.

In countries with gender quotas in place, the proportion of women elected or appointed was 31.2% in 2024 compared to 16.8% in countries without.

Quotes

IPU President, Tulia Ackson: “True progress in women’s political representation requires political will, intentional steps and a long-term commitment. At a time when women’s rights are on the backfoot in some regions of the world, women’s leadership is more important than ever.”

President of the IPU Forum of Women Parliamentarians, Cynthia López Castro: “The journey from 11% to 27% women in parliaments over 30 years shows us that change is possible, but also that our work is far from done as we aim for gender parity. We need to encourage the next generation to come forward and continue the fight.”

IPU Secretary General, Martin Chungong: “IPU analysis shows that the gender glass ceiling in parliaments has cracked but is far from shattered. There has been progress but the backlash against women’s rights in some countries is extremely worrying. It will take both women and men to overcome these challenges and accelerate progress towards gender parity.”

The IPU is the global organization of national parliaments. It was founded in 1889 as the first multilateral political organization in the world, encouraging cooperation and dialogue between all nations. Today, the IPU comprises 181 national Member Parliaments and 15 regional parliamentary bodies. It promotes peace, democracy and sustainable development. It helps parliaments become stronger, younger, greener, more innovative and gender-balanced. It also defends the human rights of parliamentarians through a dedicated committee made up of MPs from around the world.

MIL OSI – Submitted News –

March 7, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Mercosur – E-002261/2024(ASW)
Source: European Parliament
The EU-Mercosur agreement involves the Member States and the Mercosur countries[1]. Ukraine is not part of Mercosur and therefore the EU-Mercosur agreement will not regulate trade between the EU and Ukraine.

Regarding sensitive EU agricultural products, such as beef, poultry, pigmeat, sugar, rice, honey and sweetcorn the EU has negotiated limited concessions in the form of tariff rate quotas that represent a small fraction of EU consumption, and using quota segmentation for some products, to avoid concentrating imports in the most sensitive part of the market.

These partial openings will be introduced in gradual stages to allow for a smooth transition. The text of the 2019 agreement is publicly available at the Directorate General for Trade and Economic Security website[2].

On 6 December 2024 at the Mercosur Summit in Montevideo, the EU and Mercosur reached a political agreement concluding the negotiations.

The text of the negotiated outcome was published simultaneously in the site of the Commission[3] and the official sites of the Mercosur partners on 10 December 2024.

[1] Mercosur countries are Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay.

[2] https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/mercosur/eu-mercosur-agreement/text-agreement_en

[3] See footnote 2.
Last updated: 6 March 2025
MIL OSI Europe News –
March 7, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: Turkish national arrested for allegedly selling counterfeit goods at mall kiosks

Source: Office of United States Attorneys

DAYTON, Ohio – A man who operates kiosks at a local mall was arrested today by federal agents for allegedly trafficking counterfeit goods.

Emre Teski, 25, is a citizen of Turkey and illegally entered the United States of America from Mexico on September 10, 2022. Teski admitted to illegally crossing the international boundary without being inspected by an immigration officer at a designated Port of Entry. On January 3, 2024, Teski was ordered removed from the United States, but has since appealed this decision and was permitted employment authorization while his appeal is pending. Teski operates kiosks selling counterfeit goods at the Mall at Fairfield Commons in Beavercreek.

According to charging documents, Teski ran one kiosk that primarily sold replica professional soccer jerseys and hats containing trademarked soccer teams, including FC Barcelona, Club Internacional de Fútbol Miami, Manchester City and Arsenal. Teski operated another kiosk that sold primarily oversized slippers that look like sneakers and included Nike and Air Jordan trademarks.

Teski allegedly sold an investigator counterfeit Nike slippers that illegally used the trademark Nike Swoosh. It is alleged that he also sold a counterfeit pink Messi jersey.

Agents executed a search warrant at the kiosks today and seized numerous items containing confirmed or suspected counterfeit trademarks.

Trafficking counterfeit goods is a federal crime punishable by up to 10 years in prison.

Kelly A. Norris, Acting United States Attorney for the Southern District of Ohio; and Jared Murphey, Acting Special Agent in Charge, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s (ICE) Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) Detroit; announced the charges. Assistant United States Attorney Ryan A. Saunders is representing the United States in this case.

A criminal complaint merely contains allegations, and defendants are presumed innocent unless proven guilty in a court of law.

# # #

MIL Security OSI –

March 7, 2025
MIL-OSI Video: Afghanistan, Ukraine & other topics – Daily Press Briefing

Source: United Nations (Video News)

Noon Briefing by Stéphane Dujarric, Spokesperson for the Secretary-General.

Highlights:
– Central Emergency Response Fund
– Afghanistan
– Ukraine
– Democratic Republic of the Congo
– Occupied Palestinian Territory
– Yemen/Security Council
– Mexico
– Financial Contributions

CENTRAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE FUND
With global humanitarian funding being scaled back precipitously, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs announced today that $110 million has been allocated from the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF).
The aim is to boost life-saving assistance in 10 of the world’s most underfunded and neglected crises across Africa, Asia and Latin America.
OCHA warns that more than 300 million people around the world urgently need humanitarian aid, but funding has been dwindling annually, with this year’s levels projected to drop to a record low.
Tom Fletcher, the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, said that for countries battered by conflict, climate change and economic turmoil, brutal funding cuts don’t mean that humanitarian needs disappear.
The new funding will go towards Afghanistan, the Central African Republic, Chad, Honduras, Mauritania, Niger, Somalia, Sudan, Venezuela and Zambia.
Resources will also support vulnerable people from climate shocks.

AFGHANISTAN
And turning to Afghanistan, OCHA is warning that the country continues to face a severe humanitarian crisis defined by decades of conflict, entrenched poverty, climate-induced shocks and rising protection risks, especially for women and girls.
More than half of the population – almost 23 million people – are in need of humanitarian assistance in the country. This number is one of the highest globally, second only to Sudan – where 30 million people currently need aid and protection.
Both food insecurity and malnutrition remain stubbornly high.
During the first quarter of this year, nearly 15 million people – one in every three Afghans – will experience high levels of acute food insecurity. This is according to the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification, or IPC.
Nearly 3.5 million children under 5 and more than 1 million pregnant and breastfeeding women are expected to become acutely malnourished.
Explosive hazards continue to pose a lethal threat, with an estimated 55 people killed or injured every month – most of them children.

Full Highlights: https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/noon-briefing-highlight?date%5Bvalue%5D%5Bdate%5D=06%20March%202025

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EP_F6noLmbw

MIL OSI Video –

March 7, 2025
MIL-OSI Video: Pledge to Climate, Peace and Security on Yemen – Security Council Media Stakeout | United Nations

Source: United Nations (Video News)

Joint statement of the Security Council members signatories of the Joint Pledges related to Climate, Peace and Security on Yemen read by Ambassador Christina Markus Lassen, PR of Denmark. Other participants – Slovenia, Guyana, Republic of Korea, Panama, Greece, United Kingdom, Sierra Leone, France.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Mt_A-7c0wnM

MIL OSI Video –

March 7, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Rosen Joins Senate Colleagues to Demand Trump Administration Ensure Legal Representation for Vulnerable Children in Immigration Custody

US Senate News:

Source: United States Senator Jacky Rosen (D-NV)

WASHINGTON, DC – U.S. Senator Jacky Rosen (D-NV) joined 33 of her Senate colleagues in a letter demanding that Secretary of Health and Human Services Robert F. Kennedy Jr. and Secretary of the Interior Doug Burgum ensure legal services are available, as required by law, for unaccompanied children caught up in the U.S. immigration system. Last month, the Trump Administration issued a stop work order to organizations that provide legal services for unaccompanied children. Then, following public pressure, the order was rescinded.
“Pausing or terminating the provision of legal services to unaccompanied children under this contract runs directly counter to the requirements of the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA) and places 26,000 unaccompanied children at increased risk of trafficking, exploitation, and other harm,” wrote the Senators. “The TVPRA, passed by Congress in 2008 on a bipartisan basis, requires the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to ensure, to the greatest extent practicable, that all unaccompanied children have counsel to represent them in legal proceedings and protect them from mistreatment, exploitation, and trafficking.”
“Cutting off access to legal services makes it more likely that the government will lose track of unaccompanied children, given the challenges such children would face in independently appearing for immigration court hearings, submitting address updates, or otherwise communicating with immigration authorities,” they continued. “Not only will this make children more vulnerable to trafficking, but it will also create further inefficiencies in an already backlogged immigration court system.”
The full letter can be found HERE.
Senator Rosen has been clear in her support for securing the border and making sure the asylum process is humane and orderly. Last month, she helped introduce legislation to reaffirm access to legal counsel during immigration proceedings. She has also been outspoken in opposing mass deportation, and strongly supporting DACA and TPS recipients and their families. She also condemned the Trump Administration’s decision to revoke a previously authorized TPS extension for Venezuelans.

MIL OSI USA News –

March 7, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: 03.06.2025 Senate Approves Coast Guard Authorization Act Unanimously

US Senate News:

Source: United States Senator for Texas Ted Cruz

WASHINGTON, D.C. – U.S. Senator Ted Cruz (R-Texas), Chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee, Ranking Member Maria Cantwell (D-Wash.), and Sens. Dan Sullivan (R-Alaska) and Tammy Baldwin (D-Wis.), introduced the Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2025, and it passed the Senate by unanimous consent. The bipartisan measure was agreed to at the end of last year by leaders of both the Senate Commerce Committee and House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, but the session ended before final passage could occur. The bill authorizes funding to strengthen the Coast Guard’s ability to protect our borders, facilitate maritime commerce, unleash American energy, bolster deterrence efforts, and improve support for Coast Guard personnel and their families.
Sen. Cruz delivered the following remarks on the Senate floor regarding the Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2025:
“The United States Coast Guard is essential to protecting our Nation’s maritime borders from threats like illegal drugs, illegal immigration, and transnational crime. The Coast Guard saves American lives and ensures that commerce flows smoothly at our ports.
“The Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2025 is bipartisan legislation that Senator Cantwell and I negotiated and agreed to with House Transportation & Infrastructure Committee Chairman Sam Graves and Ranking Member Rick Larsen. It authorizes funding to bolster the Coast Guard’s critical missions of border security, facilitating maritime commerce, and enforcing the rule of law in domestic and international waters.
“I want to draw attention to several key provisions in this bill.
“Last year, the Coast Guard seized over 106 metric tons of cocaine. Unfortunately, cartels are now using technology like miniature, remote-controlled drone ships to smuggle drugs across our maritime border. Without this legislation, the Coast Guard would remain unable to prosecute criminals using these remote-controlled, autonomous vessels.
“The Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2025 expands the Coast Guard’s and Customs and Border Protection’s use of cutting-edge tools like Tactical Maritime Surveillance Systems, which are blimp-based radar systems—to find and interdict drug runners, poachers, and human traffickers at the Texas-Mexico border in the Gulf of America, in San Diego, Key West, and San Juan Puerto Rico.
“I ask my colleagues to stand with me and support President Trump’s vision of protecting our borders from drugs and illegal immigrants and of building ships to revitalize the Coast Guard’s fleet. I urge my colleagues to support the Coast Guard Authorization Act.”
Read the bill text here.
BACKGROUND
The Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2025 makes several enhancements to the Coast Guard’s operations by:

Expanding efforts to interdict and prosecute illicit drug trafficking. The Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act will now ensure the United States can prosecute drug traffickers who utilize remote-controlled or autonomous vessels to smuggle illegal narcotics.

Protecting personnel from illicit drug exposure. All Coast Guard installations will be required to maintain a supply of medication to treat opioid overdoses, including fentanyl.

Upgrading icebreaker fleet. The bill directs the Coast Guard to establish a replacement plan for aging icebreaking tug fleets and expedite the delivery of new icebreakers.

Addressing grossly negligent operations of vessels. With the steady rise of vessel traffic on U.S. waterways, individuals who operate a vessel in a grossly negligent manner and cause serious bodily injury will be held accountable with appropriate criminal penalties.

Mapping Arctic maritime routes. The Arctic Circle has strategic economic and military significance for the United States. This provision would promote American interests in the region and improve emergency response capabilities and infrastructure needed to support vessel traffic.

Increasing the Coast Guard’s deterrence capabilities. With increased instances of illegal fishing operations and illicit drug trafficking in the South China Sea, it is critical that the United States Coast Guard and Taiwan Coast Guard Administration conduct joint and integrated maritime operational and leadership training to combat violations of maritime law and threats to our national security.

Improving the livelihoods of Coast Guard families. The Coast Guard will grant a cash allowance to pregnant officers to purchase maternity-related uniform items, allow the Coast Guard to acquire more housing, and identify Coast Guard duty locations in which there is a misalignment between the basic allowance for housing and prevailing housing costs.

Refining procedures to prevent and respond to sexual assaults. The Coast Guard will establish confidential reporting for sexual harassment, strengthen protective orders for victims, and provide access to the Department of Defense’s Defense Sexual Assault Incident Database. The bill also overhauls the transfer process for victims and allows victims of sex-related offenses to request temporary separation.

Requiring the Coast Guard Academy to study its safety infrastructure. The Coast Guard Academy will be required to modify policy related to sexual assault matters, install electronic locking mechanisms to secure cadet rooms and common spaces, and update the Academy’s Board of Visitors to ensure better Congressional oversight and engagement.

Adding units to the Coast Guard’s Junior Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (JROTC) program. The bill will increase the number of units from 14 to 20 to better recruit and retain a robust and well-qualified Coast Guard officer corps.

With about 2,000 Coast Guard personnel stationed in Texas, the Service’s men and women have contributed significantly to Texas’s border security and economy. The Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2025 will specifically help Texans by:

Allowing the Coast Guard to use a proven, performance-driven approach for inspecting foreign flag tank vessels.An overwhelming majority of the Coast Guard’s gas carrier compliance exams are conducted in Texas. Performance-driven examinations will allow the Coast Guard to work more efficiently and advance President Trump’s direction to ‘Unleash American Energy.’

Establishing safety zones for space activities and offshore energy development activities. Texas is home to a robust commercial space and energy industry, and this authority allows the Coast Guard to establish safety zones in support of space launches and recovery, as well as offshore energy development activities, ensuring more job growth and greater energy security.

Streamlining the process of data sharing between the Coast Guard and U.S. Customs and Border Protection.Tactical maritime surveillance systems (TMSS) at the Coast Guard Station on South Padre Island will be used for the purposes of data integration and information sharing with U.S. Customs and Border Protection to aid in the detection and interdiction of illegal aliens and fish poachers.

Upgrading Coast Guard facilities to support border security operations and future aviation missions. The bill specifically requires studies on improving Texas-based Coast Guard Stations on South Padre Island, Port Aransas, and Port O’Connor, as well as the Coast Guard Air Station in Corpus Christi.

MIL OSI USA News –

March 7, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Kaine & Cornyn Introduce Bipartisan Bill to Strengthen Security, Combat Corruption and Drug Trafficking in the Caribbean
US Senate News:
Source: United States Senator for Virginia Tim Kaine

WASHINGTON, D.C. – Today, U.S. Senator Tim Kaine (D-VA), Ranking Member of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, and U.S. Senator John Cornyn (R-TX), a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, introduced the Caribbean Basin Security Authorization Act, bipartisan legislation to improve security cooperation, combat drug trafficking, strengthen the rule of law, counter malign influence from China and Russia, and expand natural disaster resilience in the Caribbean region.

“What happens in the Caribbean affects the security and economic prosperity of the United States,” said Kaine. “This bipartisan legislation is critical to promoting stability, countering China’s growing influence, and combating drug cartel activity in the region. Not only will I continue to urge the Administration to carry out the foreign assistance investments that Congress has previously voted to fund, I will continue to push for legislation like this one to work with our partners to protect our national security.”

The Caribbean Basin Security Authorization Act would boost support for the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI), a foreign assistance program that began in 2009 and includes Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Dominica, the Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, and Trinidad, and Tobago. Specifically, the legislation would:
- Authorize funding between Fiscal Years 2025-2029 for CBSI to promote citizen safety, security, and rule of law; prioritize efforts to combat corruption; counter malign influence from the China, Russia, Iran, and other authoritarian regimes; and promote strategic engagement, including consultation with civil society and the private sector.
- Require the Secretary of State, in consultation with the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, and the Inter-American Foundation, to promote efforts to improve disaster response and resilience.
- Require the Secretary of State, in consultation with USAID, to submit an implementation plan for CBSI within 180 days of enactment.
- Encourage increased law enforcement collaboration between CBSI beneficiaries and Haiti – a country that is on the brink of collapse.
- Promote greater U.S. interagency cooperation in implementing CBSI.
Full text of the bill is available here.
MIL OSI USA News –
March 7, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: Latest news – Meeting of the DMER Delegation of 6 March 2025 – Delegation for relations with Mercosur

Source: European Parliament

This meeting of the Delegation for relations with Mercosur (DMER) took place on 6 March 2025.

It included an exchange of views on the EU-Mercosur Partnership Agreement in terms of the appraisal of the provisions on trade on agricultural and livestock products in the Agreement. There was also an exchange of views on the political and human rights situation in Venezuela with the two Sakharaov laureates of 2024.

MIL OSI Europe News –

March 7, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: A Dozen Illegal Aliens Charged with Assaulting Federal Officers

Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) State Crime News

McALLEN, Texas – A federal grand jury has returned an indictment charging 12 illegal aliens for assaulting two federal correctional officers in January 2025, announced U.S. Attorney Nicholas J. Ganjei.

All are expected to make their initial appearances before U.S. Magistrate Judge Juan F. Alanis at 9 a.m.

Those charged include Mexican nationals Bryan Hernandez-Ruiz, 25, Francisco Antonio Hernandez-Mora, 27, Ivan Ramirez-Zapata, 40, Adrian David Guzman-Salas, 28, David Ramirez-Bautista, 21, Roberto Fabian Garza-Castaneda, 49, Jose Alberto Resendez-Hernandez, 27, Jose Ramos-Lerma, 45, Ruben Gonzalez-Balderas, 29, and Oscar Ambrocio Hernandez, 25, as well as Osman Joel Hernandez-Pavon, 22, and Roger Emmanuel Lemus, 42, both of Guatemala.

The charges allege that all 12 men aided and abetted the assault of two federal corrections officers at the East Hidalgo Detention Center in La Villa.

“The Department of Justice has zero tolerance for violence against law enforcement officers,” said Ganjei. “The grand jury has returned an indictment that alleges a serious attack on two corrections officers, and, rest assured, the Southern District of Texas will hold accountable all those found guilty.”

If convicted, each face up to eight years in federal prison and a possible $250,000 maximum fine.

All have been and will remain in custody.

FBI and U.S. Marshals Service conducted the investigation. Assistant U.S. Attorneys Laura Garcia and Avery Benitez prosecuted the case.

An indictment is a formal accusation of criminal conduct, not evidence. A defendant is presumed innocent unless convicted through due process of law.

MIL Security OSI –

March 7, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: ICE arrests 4 during worksite enforcement action in Philadelphia

Source: US Immigration and Customs Enforcement

PHILADELPHIA – U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement conducted a worksite enforcement operation at Jumbo Meat Market in Philadelphia, Feb. 27. The operation resulted in the administrative arrest of four Brazilian nationals who had no status to enter or remain in the United States legally, or who had violated the terms of their lawful admission into the U.S.

“Worksite enforcement is a crucial component in ensuring the integrity of our nation’s employment laws. By conducting these operations, we not only uphold the law but also protect the rights of legal workers and create a level playing field for businesses that comply with regulations,” said ICE Homeland Security Investigations Philadelphia Special Agent in Charge Edward V. Owens. “ICE remains steadfast in its commitment to targeting employers who knowingly hire unauthorized workers, as well as those undocumented aliens who exploit the system. This worksite enforcement operation underscores our dedication to maintaining lawful employment practices and securing our nation’s economic and public safety interests.”

Employers are required by federal law to verify the identity and employment eligibility of all individuals they hire, and to document that information using the Employment Eligibility Verification Form, or I-9. ICE uses the I-9 inspection program to promote compliance with the law, part of a comprehensive strategy to address and deter illegal employment. Inspections are one of the most powerful tools the federal government uses to ensure that businesses are complying with U.S. employment laws.

ICE is focused on public safety and national security threats first and foremost. However, any individual illegally present in the United States who is encountered during an enforcement operation may be taken into custody and processed for removal as stated by law.

Members of the public with information can report crimes or suspicious activity by dialing the ICE Tip Line at 866-DHS-2-ICE (866-347-2423) or completing the online tip form.

Learn more about ICE Philadelphia’s mission to increase public safety in our Pennsylvania and Delaware communities on X at @HSIPhiladelphia.

MIL OSI USA News –

March 7, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: 2 Mexican nationals, defendants in ICE cases secured in Arizona

Source: US Immigration and Customs Enforcement

PHOENIX, Ariz. – Two Mexican nationals who are targets of an ongoing U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement investigation appeared for their initial appearances Feb. 28, after they were secured from Mexico the previous day.

Jose Bibiano Cabrera-Cabrera, 37 and Jesus Humberto Limon-Lopez, 43, were taken into U.S. custody after members of drug cartels were recently designated as Foreign Terrorist Organizations and Specially Designated Global Terrorists, such as the Sinaloa Cartel, Cártel de Jalisco Nueva Generación, Cártel del Noreste, La Nueva Familia Michoacana, and Cártel de Golfo.

These defendants are collectively alleged to have been responsible for the importation into the United States of massive quantities of poison, including cocaine, methamphetamine, fentanyl, and heroin, as well as associated acts of violence.

Limon-Lopez is charged with Continuing Criminal Enterprise; Conspiracy to Distribute Methamphetamine, Fentanyl, Heroin, and Cocaine; Conspiracy to Import Methamphetamine, Fentanyl, Heroin, and Cocaine; Distribution of Methamphetamine; Distribution of Fentanyl; Distribution of Heroin; Distribution of Cocaine; and Conspiracy to Unlawfully Export Firearms and Ammunition. He faces up to life imprisonment.

Cabrera-Cabrera is charged with Conspiracy to Distribute Methamphetamine, Fentanyl, Heroin, and Cocaine; Conspiracy to Import Methamphetamine, Fentanyl, Heroin, and Cocaine; and Conspiracy to Unlawfully Export Firearms and Ammunition. He faces up to life imprisonment.

An indictment is merely an allegation of criminal conduct, not evidence. An individual is presumed innocent until evidence is presented to a jury that establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

This prosecution is part of an Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces Strike Force Initiative, which provides for the establishment of permanent multi-agency task force teams that work side-by-side in the same location. This co-located model enables agents from different agencies to collaborate on intelligence-driven, multi-jurisdictional operations to disrupt and dismantle the most significant drug traffickers, money launderers, gangs, and transnational criminal organizations.

The OCDETF Arizona Strike Force is comprised of agents and officers from Customs and Border Protection, the Department of Homeland Security, ICE Homeland Security Investigations, the Drug Enforcement Administration, FBI, the Internal Revenue Service, Criminal Investigations, the United States Marshals Service, the United States Postal Service, United States Postal Inspection Service, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, the Arizona Army National Guard, the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office, the Pima County Sheriff’s Office, and the Scottsdale Police Department.

The prosecution is being handled by the United States Attorney Office for the District of Arizona.

MIL OSI USA News –

March 7, 2025
MIL-Evening Report: US trade wars with China – and how they play out in Africa

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Lauren Johnston, Associate Professor, China Studies Centre, University of Sydney

Since taking office, US president Donald Trump has implemented policies that have been notably hostile towards China. They include trade restrictions. Most recently, a 20% tariff was added to all imports from China and new technological restrictions were imposed under the America First Investment Policy. This isn’t the first time US-China tensions have flared. Throughout history the relationship has been fraught by economic, military and ideological conflicts.

China-Africa scholar and economist Lauren Johnston provides insights into how these dynamics may also shape relations between Africa and China.

How has China responded to hostile US policies?

First, China tends to have a defiant official response. It expresses disappointment, then states that the US policy position is not helpful to any country or the world economy.

Second, China makes moves domestically to prioritise the interests of key, affected industries.

Third, China will sometimes impose retaliatory sanctions.

In 2018, for instance, China imposed a 25% tariff on US soybeans, a critical animal feed source. The US Department of Agriculture had to compensate US soybean farmers for their lost income.

Another example is how, following US tech sanctions, China took a more independent technology path. It has channelled billions into tech funds. The goal is to make financing available for Chinese entrepreneurs and to push technological boundaries in areas of US sanction, such as semiconductors. These efforts are backed up by subsidies and tax reductions. In some cases, the Chinese state will invest directly in tech companies.

More recently, China retaliated to the US trade war by
announcing tariffs on 80 US products. China is set to place 15% tariffs on certain energy exports, including coal, natural gas and petroleum. An additional 10% tariffs will be placed on 72 manufactured products including trucks, motor homes and agricultural machinery.

Agricultural trade has been hard hit. The day the US announced a 10% tariff on Chinese imports, China announced “an additional 15% tariff on imported chicken, wheat, corn and cotton originating from the US”. Also, “sorghum, soybeans, pork, beef, aquatic products, fruits, vegetables and dairy products will be subject to an additional 10% tariff”.

How have these Chinese responses affected Africa?

We can’t say for certain that China’s response to US trade tensions has explicitly affected its Africa policy, but there are some notable coincidences.

Less than one month after Trump’s return to the White House in 2025, and soon after the first tariffs were slapped on China’s exports to the US, China announced new measures to foster China-Africa trade efforts. The policy package aims to “strengthen economic and trade exchanges between China and Africa.”

This is the latest in a series of Chinese actions.

In January 2018 trade hostilities began to escalate after Trump imposed a first round of tariffs on all imported washing machines and solar panels. These had an impact on China’s exports to the US.

Later the same year, China imposed 25% tariffs on US soy bean imports and took steps to reduce dependence on US agricultural products. China also took steps to expand trade with Africa, agricultural trade in particular.

In September 2018, Beijing hosted the Forum on China and Africa Cooperation summit, a triennial head of state gathering. It was announced that China would set up a China-Africa trade expo and foster deeper agricultural cooperation. In the days after the summit, China’s Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs was already acting on this. A gathering of African agricultural ministers took place in Changsha, Hunan province.

Hunan province has since taken centre stage in China-Africa relations. It’s now the host of a permanent China-Africa trade exhibition hall and a larger biennial China-Africa economic and trade exhibition (known as CAETE).

Hunan also hosts the pilot zone for In-Depth China-Africa Economic and Trade Cooperation. The zone has numerous initiatives designed to overcome obstacles to China-Africa trade and investment, like support in areas of law, technology and currency, and vocational training.

Finally, the zone is located in a bigger free-trade zone that is better connected to Africa by air, water and land corridors. African agricultural exports to China pass through Hunan, where local industry either uses these imports or distributes them across the country to retailers.

Companies in Hunan are well placed to play a key role in supporting China-Africa trade, capitalising on the opportunities left by China-US hostilities.

Hunan’s agritech giant Longping High-Tech, for instance, is investing in Tanzanian soybean farmers.

Hunan is also home to China’s construction manufacturing and electronic transportation frontier. This includes global construction giant Sany, which produces heavy industry machinery for the construction, mining and energy sectors. China’s global electronic vehicle manufacturing BYD and its electronic railway industry are also in Hunan. They have deep and increasing interests in Africa and can also support China’s key minerals and tech race with the US.

As US-China hostility enters a new era, what are the implications for China-Africa relations?

As my new working paper sets out, African countries are, for example, responding to the new opportunities from China.

At the end of 2024, while the world waited for Trump’s second coming, various African countries made moves to strengthen economic ties with China, Hunan province especially.

In December 2024, Tanzania became the first African country to open an official investment promotion office in the China-Africa Cooperation Pilot Zone in Changaha.

In November 2024, both the China-Africa Economic and Trade Expo in Africa and the China Engineering Technology Exhibition were held in Abuja, Nigeria. Equivalent events were hosted in Kenya.

Early in 2025 in Niamey, Niger, a joint pilot cooperation zone was inaugurated , and which is direct partner of the China-Africa Pilot zone in Hunan.

As China moves away from US agricultural produce, for instance, African agricultural producers can benefit. Substitute African products and potential exports will enjoy a price boost, and elevated Chinese support.

China’s newly elevated interest in African development and market potential will bring major prospects. The question will be whether African countries are ready to grasp them, and to use that potential to foster an independent development path of their own.

Lauren Johnston does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. US trade wars with China – and how they play out in Africa – https://theconversation.com/us-trade-wars-with-china-and-how-they-play-out-in-africa-249609

MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

March 7, 2025
MIL-OSI United Nations: What is the World Health Organization and why does it matter?

Source: United Nations MIL OSI

By Eileen Travers

21 January 2025 Health

When the plague, cholera and yellow fever rippled deadly waves across a newly industrialised and interconnected world in the mid-19th century, taking a global approach to health became an imperative. Doctors, scientists, presidents and prime ministers urgently convened the International Sanitary Conference in Paris in 1851, a precursor to what is now the largest of its kind: the World Health Organization, known as WHO.

From laboratories to battlefields, the United Nations specialised health agency has been dedicated to the wellbeing of all people since 1948. It is guided by science and supported by its 194 member nations, including the United States, a co-founder that on Monday announced plans to withdraw.

What has WHO done for the world? The short answer is – a lot. The UN agency currently works with its membership and on the health frontlines in more than 150 locations and has achieved many public health milestones.

© WHO/Neil Nuia

WHO and partners provide COVID-19 and other vaccines to remote communities, including in Kuvamiti in the Solomon Islands. (file)

Here’s what you need to know about the planet’s biggest health body:

Tackling emergencies

Amid crises, conflict, the continuing threat of disease outbreaks and climate change, WHO has responded, from wars in Gaza, Sudan and Ukraine to ensuring lifesaving vaccines and medical supplies arrive in remote or dangerous areas.

With healthcare facing unprecedented risks, WHO documented in 2023 over 1,200 attacks affecting workers, patients, hospitals, clinics and ambulances across 19 countries and territories, resulting in over 700 deaths and nearly 1,200 injuries.

Indeed, WHO teams often go where others do not. They routinely evacuate injured patients and provide lifesaving equipment, supplies and services in conflict or disaster-ravaged areas.

Watch below as WHO teams helped to unroll a multi-agency polio vaccination campaign in war-torn besieged Gaza in September 2024, when the fast-spreading virus reappeared 25 years after it had been eradicated:

[embedded content]

Tracking and addressing health crises

Every day and through the night, teams of WHO experts sift through thousands of pieces of information, including scientific papers and disease surveillance reports, scanning for signals of disease outbreaks or other public health threats, from avian flu to COVID-19.

WHO mobilises to prevent, detect and respond to infectious disease outbreaks while also strengthening access to essential health services.

That includes bolstering hospital capacity to do everything from delivering new babies to treating war injuries and training healthcare workers.

© WHO/Ploy Phutpheng

A laboratory scientist works at a WHO collaborating research centre in Thailand. (file)

Eliminating diseases around the world

A wide range of diseases and conditions are ripe for elimination given the right public health policies, including neglected infectious and vector-borne diseases, sexually transmitted infections, diseases passed from mother to child and those that vaccines can prevent.

The UN health agency supplies essential medicines and medical equipment while working to enable – and where possible, strengthen – laboratory capacity to diagnose diseases.

In 2024, WHO Member States achieved several milestones in tackling these major global health challenges. Seven countries (Brazil, Chad, India, Jordan, Pakistan, Timor-Leste, and Viet Nam) eliminated a range of tropical diseases, including leprosy and trachoma.

Mother-to-child transmission of HIV and syphilis have been eliminated in Belize, Jamaica and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Namibia reached a key milestone towards elimination of mother-to-child transmission of HIV and hepatitis B.

WHO has also played a key role over the past seven decades, including in eradicating smallpox in 1980, achieving the near eradication of polio and providing lifesaving assistance in Gaza during the recent war.

© WHO/Sebastian Meyer

A WHO mobile clinic provides services in Duhok, Iraq. (file)

AI and digital health

WHO is embracing new frontiers, including artificial intelligence (AI), in digital health.

As the influence of emerging AI technologies continues to grow, WHO is working to ensure its safety and effectiveness for health.

That includes new guidance published last October listing key regulatory considerations on such issues as harnessing the potential of AI to treat or detect conditions like cancer or tuberculosis while minimising risks like unethical data collection, cybersecurity threats and amplifying biases or misinformation.

WHO/Blink Media/Juliana Tan

In Singapore, digital devices help patients reach their healthcare providers. (file)

Taking on deadly climate-related health crisis

The climate-related health crisis affects at least 3.5 billion people – nearly half of the global population.

Extreme heat, weather events and air pollution caused millions of deaths in 2023, putting enormous pressure on health systems and the working population, from current wildfires burning across the US west coast to deadly flash floods in Indonesia.

WHO/J.D.Kannah

An Ebola virus survivor in the Democratic Republic of Congo has his eyes checked at a WHO-supported eye clinic in North Kivu. (file)

Part of WHO’s response has been to protect health from the wide range of impacts of climate change, which includes assessing vulnerabilities and developing plans.

The UN agency has also worked on implementing response systems for key risks, such as extreme heat and infectious disease and supporting resilience and adaptation in health-determining sectors such as water and food.

What’s WHO working on now?

WHO is leading efforts for a global treaty take a further, deeper step to strengthen pandemic prevention, preparedness and response, much along the lines of the founders of the 1851 International Sanitary Conference.

The UN agency is also currently working to achieve its “triple billion targets”.

Set in 2019, the targets are that by 2025, one billion more people will be benefitting from universal health coverage, one billion more people will be better protected from health emergencies and one billion more people will be enjoying better health and wellbeing.

Who leads WHO?

The leadership is truly international.

Based in Geneva, the UN agency is headed by Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus.

The current approved biennium programme budget for 2024-2025 is $6.83 billion, coming from member assessments, alongside voluntary contributions.

WHO’s decision-making body, the World Health Assembly, is made up of its member nations, which meet annually to agree on WHO priorities and policies.

Members make decisions on health goals and strategies that will guide their own public health work and the work of the WHO Secretariat to move the world towards better health and wellbeing for all. That includes implementing reform measures that have made WHO more effective.

Learn more about WHO here and in our latest video below:

MIL OSI United Nations News –

March 7, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Multistate coalition secures court order blocking Trump administration from freezing federal funds

Source: Washington State News

PROVIDENCE, R.I. – A federal judge today blocked the Trump administration from abruptly freezing trillions of dollars in federal funds to the states, a move he said had resulted in “catastrophic consequences” across the country, hitting particularly hard on vulnerable populations.

The order came in a lawsuit filed by 23 states’ attorneys general, including Washington Attorney General Nick Brown.

Judge John J. McConnell of the U.S. District Court for the District of Rhode Island granted the preliminary injunction, concluding the states had demonstrated a high likelihood of success on their claims that the funding freeze policy is unlawful, explaining that the president cannot put himself above Congress.

“This is an important victory,” Brown said today. “The judge made clear this was a ham-handed, arbitrary, capricious, and fact-free attempt to circumvent the U.S. Constitution.”

The judge rejected the administration’s argument that the funding freeze was needed because of unspecified claims of widespread fraud.

“It is difficult to perceive any rationality in this decision — let alone thoughtful consideration of practical consequences — when these funding pauses endanger the States’ ability to provide vital services, including but not limited to public safety, health care, education, childcare, and transportation infrastructure,” the judge wrote.

The states submitted a myriad of examples to show how their residents were impacted when federal funds were abruptly cut off. The Trump administration, the judge wrote, “presented no answer, no evidence, and no counter to the States’ extensive evidence.”

The administration’s funding freeze policy came through an array of actions, including a Jan. 27 memorandum from the Office of Management and Budget, that illegally withheld trillions of dollars in federal funds for states and community-based organizations, creating immediate chaos and uncertainty for millions in urban and rural areas who rely on state programs that receive these federal funds.

The court also required the administration to provide evidence of their compliance with regard to unfreezing Federal Emergency Management Agency funds by March 14 and to alert all agencies about the court’s order.

The lawsuit is led by the attorneys general of California, Illinois, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, and Rhode Island. Joining the lawsuit are the attorneys general of Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon, Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin, and the District of Columbia.

MIL OSI USA News –

March 7, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: Former Olympian Wanted for Running Transnational Drug Enterprise and Ordering Several Murders Added to FBI’s List of Ten Most Wanted Fugitives

Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) State Crime Alerts (b)

At present, Wedding is wanted for allegedly running a transnational drug trafficking network that routinely shipped hundreds of kilograms of cocaine from Colombia, through Mexico and Southern California, to Canada and other locations in the United States, and for orchestrating multiple murders and an attempted murder in furtherance of these drug crimes.

Wedding’s placement on the top ten list marks the 535th addition to the FBI’s list of notorious fugitives. Wedding will replace Alexis Flores who is wanted by FBI Philadelphia. Although Flores is being removed from the list today, he will remain on the FBI’s website on its Most Wanted page.

“Wedding went from shredding powder on the slopes at the Olympics to distributing powder cocaine on the streets of U.S. cities and in his native Canada,” said Akil Davis, the Assistant Director of the FBI’s Los Angeles Field Office. “The alleged murders of his competitors make Wedding a very dangerous man, and his addition to the list of Ten Most Wanted Fugitives, coupled with a major reward offer by the State Department, will make the public our partner so that we can catch up with him before he puts anyone else in danger.”

Additionally, the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs announced that it is offering a $10-million-reward for information leading to Wedding’s arrest and/or conviction. The reward was authorized by Secretary of State Marco Rubio under the Narcotics Rewards Program (NRP), which supports law enforcement efforts to disrupt transnational crime globally and bring fugitives to justice. This reward offering supplements the FBI’s current offering of $50,000 for information leading to Wedding’s apprehension, arrest, and extradition, and further, is jointly being offered with assistance from the Canadian and Mexican governments as part of a unified effort to bring Wedding to justice.

In June 2024, Wedding and his second-in-command Andrew Clark, 34, also Canadian, were charged in an indictment out of the Central District of California with running a continuing criminal enterprise; committing murder in connection with a continuing criminal enterprise and assorted drug crimes; and conspiring to possess, distribute, and export cocaine. Clark, who was arrested last October by Mexican authorities, was among the 29 fugitives whom Attorney General Pamela Bondi announced had arrived in the United States from Mexico last week.

In September 2024, a federal grand jury in Los Angeles returned a superseding indictment naming 14 additional defendants and including, among other counts, an attempted murder charge against Wedding and Clark. The superseding indictment alleges that Wedding, Clark, and others conspired to ship bulk quantities of cocaine – weighing hundreds of kilograms – from Southern California to Canada through a Canada-based drug transportation network run by Hardeep Ratte, 46, of Ontario, Canada, and Gurpreet Singh, 31, of Ontario, Canada, from approximately January 2024 to August 2024. The cocaine shipments were transported from Mexico to the Los Angeles area, where the cocaine trafficking organization’s operatives stored the cocaine in stash houses, before delivering it to the transportation network couriers for delivery to Canada using long-haul semi-trucks.

“As alleged in the superseding indictment, defendant Ryan Wedding – a former Olympian – led a transnational criminal organization that murdered innocent people and put thousands of kilograms of narcotics on our streets,” said Acting United States Attorney Joseph T. McNally. “The reward offered today will help bring this defendant to justice in the United States. We urge anyone with information about Wedding to contact law enforcement and help us get Mr. Wedding into custody.”

The superseding indictment also alleges that Wedding and Clark’s organization resorted to violence – including multiple murders – to achieve its aims. Wedding and Clark allegedly directed the November 20, 2023, murders of two members of a family in Ontario, Canada, in retaliation for a stolen drug shipment that passed through Southern California. Another member of that family survived the shooting but was left with serious physical injuries. Wedding and Clark allegedly also ordered the murder of another victim on May 18, 2024, over a drug debt. In addition, Clark and Malik Damion Cunningham, 23, a dual Canadian-American citizen, are charged with the April 1, 2024, murder of another victim in Ontario, Canada.

“The RCMP is committed to working with our international partners in the fight against transnational criminals,” said Liam Price, Director General, Royal Canadian Mounted Police International program. “It’s imperative that Ryan Wedding faces justice for the charges against him. We will continue to stand with and support our US and Mexican partners in this and other investigations to protect the public.”

If convicted, Wedding and Clark would face a mandatory minimum penalty of life in federal prison on their respective continuing criminal enterprise charge. The murder and attempted murder charges carry a mandatory minimum penalty of 20 years in federal prison. The drug trafficking charges carry mandatory minimum penalties of 10 to 15 years in prison.

“The former Canadian snowboarder unleashed an avalanche of death and destruction, here and abroad,” said Matthew Allen, Special Agent in Charge of the Drug Enforcement Administration’s Los Angeles Field Division. “He earned the name ‘El Jefe’, becoming boss of a violent transnational drug trafficking organization. Now, his face will be on ‘The Top 10 Most Wanted’ posters. He’s unremitting, callous and greed-driven. Today’s announcement beams an even brighter searchlight on him. We ask that you help us find him.”

The FBI urges anyone with information as to Wedding’s whereabouts to call the FBI via WhatsApp, Signal or Telegram at +1-424 495-0614. These are neither government-operated nor government-controlled platforms. Callers may also contact their local FBI office, the nearest American Embassy or Consulate, or submit a tip online at tips.fbi.gov. Confidentiality will be granted to anyone who calls with information.

Investigators believe that Wedding is residing in Mexico but have not ruled out his presence in the United States, Canada, Colombia, Honduras, Guatemala, Costa Rica, or elsewhere. Wedding is further described as follows:

Aliases: James Conrad King, Jesse King
DOB: September 14, 1981
Hair: Brown, may wear a beard and/or mustache
Eyes: Blue
Height: 6’3”
Weight: 240 lbs. (may vary)
Nationality: Canadian
Place of Birth: Thunder Bay, Canada
Monikers: “Giant,” “Public Enemy,” “El Jefe”

Photographs and reward information about Wedding will be posted on digital billboards in key locations, as well as on fbi.gov, and on the FBI’s social media platforms. Additional information about Wedding and other Top Ten Fugitives is available at this link: Top Ten Fugitives.

The FBI’s Ten Most Wanted Fugitives list was established in March 1950. Since its inception, 535 fugitives have been placed on the list of “Ten Most Wanted Fugitives,” 496 of whom were apprehended or located; 163 were due to citizen cooperation.

The FBI is investigating Wedding and Clark’s drug trafficking enterprise with the Los Angeles Police Department, DEA Los Angeles, and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police – Federal Policing. In addition, significant assistance has been provided by U.S. law enforcement partners, including Homeland Security Investigations – Detroit, and United States Customs and Border Protection – Buffalo; Canadian law enforcement partners, including Niagara Regional Police Service, Ontario Provincial Police, Toronto Police Service, and Peel Regional Police; Mexican law enforcement partners; and Colombian law enforcement partners, including Colombian National Police – Directorate of Criminal Investigation and Interpol, Special Interagency Investigation Group (Policía Nacional de Colombia – Dirección de Investigación Criminal e Interpol, Grupo Especial de Investigación Interagenciales).

Assistant United States Attorneys Lyndsi Allsop and Maria Jhai of the Violent and Organized Crime Section and Ryan Waters of the Asset Forfeiture and Recovery Section are prosecuting this case. The Justice Department’s Office of International Affairs provided substantial assistance.

This case is part of an Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETF) operation. OCDETF identifies, disrupts, and dismantles the highest-level criminal organizations that threaten the United States using a prosecutor-led, intelligence-driven, multi-agency approach. Additional information about the OCDETF Program can be found at https://www.justice.gov/OCDETF.

An indictment contains allegations that a defendant has committed a crime. Every defendant is presumed to be innocent until and unless proven guilty in court.

MIL Security OSI –

March 7, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: INTERPOL General Assembly provides roadmap for Organization’s future

Source: Interpol (news and events)

24 October 2013

CARTAGENA DE INDIAS, Colombia – The 82nd session of the INTERPOL General Assembly closed today with strong foundations in place for the Organization’s future to better support all 190 member countries in tackling transnational crime and terrorism.

Mick O’Connell, INTERPOL’s Director of Operational Support, gives an update on the activities of the Organization’s Integrated Border Management Task Force.

Delegates attending the General Assembly meeting.

Ralph Market, INTERPOL’s Assistant Director for Strategic Partnerships and Development, briefs the General Assembly on plans for new public-private initiatives.

A number of Resolutions were passed, along with cooperation agreements with other organizations.

Delegates attending the General Assembly meeting.

Eugene Kaspersky, CEO of Kasperky Lab, addresses delegates on the subject of international police and private companies in the age of cybercrime.

Igor Shunevich, Belarus’s Minister of Internal Affairs (left) and INTERPOL Secretary General Ronald K. Noble sign an agreement for an INTERPOL team to support security for the 2014 Ice Hockey World Championship.

Minister Shunevich (right) and Mr Noble discuss how the INTERPOL team can detect potential threats of terrorism, hooliganism and serious crime, and secure Belarus’s borders during the Ice Hockey Championship.

The General Assembly endorsed INTERPOL’s new e-extradition initiative which will significantly speed up and facilitate extradition requests through the Organization’s secure communications channels.

Rwanda was chosen as the host country for the 84th session of the INTERPOL General Assembly in 2015.

Every year, a technology exhibition allows private sector companies to showcase their latest innovations to the global police community. This year’s participants were recognized in a special ceremony.

Colombia became the 64th member country to recognize the INTERPOL Travel Document.

Colombia hands over the INTERPOL flag to Monaco, the hosts of next year’s General Assembly meeting.

INTERPOL President Mireille Ballestrazzi delivers her closing remarks.

Monaco will host the 83rd General Assembly exactly 100 years after it held the first International Criminal Police Congress in 1914, where the idea of INTERPOL was born.

Secretary General Noble thanks Giuliano Zaccardelli, INTERPOL’s Director of Strategic Planning.

‘Dios y Patria’ was written by Dutch police officers as a testimony to Erazo’s dedication to the police and as an inspiration to all those around the world who fight against crime and terrorism.

Colombian police officer Sergeant Luis Erazo Maya (left) was held hostage by the FARC for almost 12 years. A book launched at the 82nd session of the INTERPOL General Assembly tells his story.

Luiz Fernando Corrêa, Rio 2016 Security Director (left) and INTERPOL Secretary General Ronald K. Noble sign an agreement for the world police body to provide additional support to Brazilian authorities for the upcoming Games.

The General Assembly is INTERPOL’s supreme governing body. It meets once a year and takes all major decisions affecting policy, resources, working methods, finances and activities.

INTERPOL President, Mireille Ballestrazzi, speaking at the press conference.

Some 630 police chiefs and senior law enforcement officials attended the event in Cartagena de Indias, Colombia.

A total of 144 countries were represented at the conference.

Delegates attending the General Assembly meeting.

Delegates attending the General Assembly meeting.

Among the topics discussed were illicit goods, counterfeiting and pharmaceutical crime.

Delegates attending the General Assembly meeting.

With the four-day (21-24 October) conference coming just one month after the Westgate shopping centre attacks in Nairobi, Kenya, senior police officials discussed the Organization’s priorities and strategic roadmap for the next three years, focusing on policing needs in the field addressing threats ranging from terrorism to cybercrime.

INTERPOL’s new e-extradition initiative, a technical platform which will significantly speed up and facilitate extradition requests through the world police body’s secure communications channels, was strongly endorsed as a ground-breaking initiative by delegates.

“The resolutions adopted by this General Assembly will develop and further strengthen the partnerships between INTERPOL and other international organizations,” said INTERPOL President Mireille Ballestrazzi.

“The various discussions and debates during the past four days reflect the collective experience of member countries and the INTERPOL General Secretariat, and will enable us all to continue to develop initiatives to enhance the safety of all citizens throughout the world,” concluded the President.

A key decision by delegates was the endorsement of a resolution for extrabudgetary resources to be identified in order to provide long-term financial assistance towards INTERPOL’s activities and operational support to all member countries in combating transnational crime and terrorism.

INTERPOL Secretary General Ronald K. Noble said the decisions taken by the General Assembly paved the way for the Organization to plan for its future and provide additional assistance to member countries.

“As the world’s largest police organization we must ensure that all of our 190 member countries can count on our support whenever and wherever needed,” said Secretary General Noble.

“Many of the decisions taken during this General Assembly will provide us with an even stronger framework to address the various transnational crime challenges facing the global law enforcement community,” concluded the INTERPOL Chief.

Strengthening relationships between police and prosecutorial authorities was also an important element during the conference, with the approval of a Memorandum of Understanding between INTERPOL and Eurojust.

At the conclusion of the conference Juan Carlos Pinzón Bueno, Minister of National Defence, announced Colombia’s recognition of the INTERPOL Travel Document (ITD) thereby significantly speeding up the ability for INTERPOL officials to respond to any calls for assistance or support. To date, 64 INTERPOL member countries have officially recognized the ITD.

The 83rd INTERPOL General Assembly will be held in Monaco, 100 years after the country hosted the first International Criminal Police Congress in 1914, where the idea of INTERPOL was born.

MIL Security OSI –

March 7, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: First INTERPOL iARMS ‘hit’ on stolen firearm links previously unrelated cases in Costa Rica and Panama

Source: Interpol (news and events)

20 November 2013

LYON, France – The INTERPOL illicit Arms Records and Tracing Management System (iARMS) has recorded its first ‘hit’, matching a firearm seized by police in Panama to one stolen in Costa Rica 18 months earlier.

Launched at the start of 2013, iARMS which currently contains more than 288,000 records provided by nearly 100 countries, provides a centralized system for the reporting and querying of lost, stolen, trafficked and smuggled firearms by all 190 INTERPOL member countries.

In January 2012, a cache of 216 firearms were reported stolen by the Costa Rican authorities. To alert other countries of the possible threat posed by the missing firearms, INTERPOL issued an Orange Notice warning that the weapons could potentially be smuggled into other countries in the region.

When Costa Rica joined iARMS in April 2013, its authorities recorded details of the missing firearms for inclusion in the database. It was one of the first countries from the region to add its records into the iARMS system.

In a separate case, in August 2013 police in Panama seized a handgun during a raid on a residence in relation to suspected drug crimes. A check against the iARMS database revealed that the weapon recovered in the raid was a match to one of those stolen in Costa Rica in 2012.

“This first hit in iARMS demonstrates the importance of this tool for uncovering links between cases which at first appear unrelated,” said Jeffrey Stirling, Head of INTERPOL’s Firearms Programme.

“We hope this example of the success of iARMS encourages more member countries to add their records of stolen, lost, trafficked, smuggled and crime-related firearms to the database, making it an even stronger tool for law enforcement,” concluded Mr Stirling.

Authorities in Costa Rica and Panama are now working closely to share information, identify potential firearm trafficking and smuggling routes between the two countries, and the organizations which could be involved.

In addition to assisting countries match illicit firearms, iARMS also enables law enforcement to check when and where a weapon was manufactured which can assist in tracing its movements from initial circulation to seizure.

MIL Security OSI –

March 7, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: Countries unite to identify illegal fishing vessel via INTERPOL

Source: Interpol (news and events)

LYON, France – A joint effort by New Zealand, Australia and Norway to find a vessel suspected of illegal fishing has led to the publication of an INTERPOL Purple Notice to assist in identifying its location.

An INTERPOL Purple Notice has been issued to find a vessel suspected of illegal fishing. Pictured is ‘Thunder’ as Wuhan N 4 in Singapore, October 2012.

Thunder as Wuhan N 4 – bow view – Singapore October 2012

Circulated to all 190 INTERPOL member countries the Notice, requested by New Zealand supported by the Australian Fisheries Management Authority (AFMA) and the Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries, also seeks information about the individuals and networks which own, operate and profit from the suspected illegal activities of the vessel, currently believed to be called ‘Thunder’.

During the past two years, the vessel has operated under at least three different names and under several flags, in order to avoid detection of illegal fishing activities.

In July 2012, Mongolian registration papers for a vessel called ‘Wuhan 4’ were issued; however in August 2012 the vessel was sighted in the North Indian Ocean under the name ‘Kuko’. In October 2012, the vessel was spotted at a Singapore shipyard under the name ‘Wuhan N 4’ and under a Mongolian flag.

In April 2013, the same vessel requested access to a port in Malaysia under the name ‘Wuhan 4’ but when inspected a few days later in Indonesia, it was using the name ‘Thunder’ and with the Nigerian flag.

“Thunder has been operating under a number of names and flags over several years and we believe this is being done to avoid been caught violating international laws and conventions,” said Gary Orr, Manager, Operational Coordination with New Zealand’s Ministry for Primary Industries.

“Fisheries crime is not constrained by borders and is commonly carried out by transnational organized networks. Norway is deeply concerned about its global effects. We need an international, coordinated response to effectively tackle these networks, and I welcome the good cooperation we have established with Australia and New Zealand via INTERPOL,” said Norway’s Minister of Fisheries, Elisabeth Aspaker.

AFMA’s Fisheries Operations General Manager Peter Venslovas said illegal fishing activities seriously undermine the sustainability of fisheries: “Ongoing cooperation between countries across the globe to combat illegal fishing is having a real impact and making it harder for these operators to make a profit.”

It is possible that the owners of ‘Thunder’ have earned more than USD 60 million from its illegal fishing activities since it was blacklisted by the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) in February 2006.

The vessel is currently believed to be operating in the Southern Ocean around Antarctica where it may be fishing illegally for Patagonian toothfish, also known as Chilean Sea Bass, a highly sought after protected species.

This is the third INTERPOL Purple Notice issued in connection with illegal fishing activities, with the first published in September this year at the request of Norwegian authorities for a vessel named ‘Snake’.

INTERPOL’s Purple Notices are used to seek or provide information on modi operandi, objects, devices and concealment methods used by criminals.

MIL Security OSI –

March 7, 2025

Category: Latin America

Source: Environmental Protection Authority

IMF Communications Department

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