NewzIntel.com

Category: Middle East

  • MIL-OSI China: Foreign journalists witness vitality of Beijing’s sub-center

    Source: China State Council Information Office 2

    A promotion event for Beijing’s sub-center was held on Thursday in the city’s Tongzhou district, where 50 foreign journalists from 45 countries were invited to report on its high-quality development.
    The journalists first visited the reception hall before the event to learn about the innovative practices and achievements in opening up of the sub-center in the construction of the “two zones,” which refer to the Integrated National Demonstration Zone for Opening up the Services Sector and the China (Beijing) Pilot Free Trade Zone.
    During the event, the journalists were introduced to the progress of the sub-center’s planning and construction, the development of key industries, and the layout of major projects. The event also included a business promotion, showcasing the innovative achievements of Tongzhou district in the field of technology.
    After the promotional event, the journalists visited businesses in the sub-center to conduct interviews.
    “China has made remarkable achievements in the fields of artificial intelligence and robotics, which has also provided us with numerous opportunities,” said a reporter from Suhail TV of Yemen when seeing the automatic charging robots at an enterprise.
    This year, the Foreign Affairs Office of the People’s Government of Beijing Municipality will continue to hold special promotional events for foreign media, so as to showcase Beijing’s investment environment and opportunities, as well as promote the city’s favorable business environment.

    MIL OSI China News –

  • MIL-OSI China: China, Russia, Iran reaffirm dialogue as only viable option for Iranian nuclear issue

    Source: China State Council Information Office

    Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, also a member of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China Central Committee, meets with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov Sergey Alexeevich and Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi in Beijing, capital of China, March 14, 2025.  (Xinhua/Liu Bin)

    China, Russia and Iran held a meeting in Beijing to discuss the Iranian nuclear issue on Friday, in a fresh bid to strengthen communication and pave the way for resumption of talks.

    The Beijing Meeting was chaired by Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Ma Zhaoxu, with participation of his Russian and Iranian counterparts Ryabkov Sergey Alexeevich and Kazem Gharibabadi.

    In a joint statement issued after the meeting, the three countries emphasized on the necessity of terminating all unlawful unilateral sanctions, and reiterated that political and diplomatic engagement and dialogue based on the principle of mutual respect remains the only viable and practical option.

    China and Russia welcomed Iran’s reiteration that its nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes, and not for development of nuclear weapons, and also welcomed Iran’s commitment to full compliance with its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and Comprehensive Safeguard Agreement, supported Iran’s policy to continue cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and stressed the need to fully respect Iran’s right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy as a State Party to the NPT.

    Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, also a member of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China Central Committee, meets with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov Sergey Alexeevich and Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi in Beijing, capital of China, March 14, 2025.  (Xinhua/Liu Bin)

    Wang Yi, member of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee and Chinese Foreign Minister, met with the deputy foreign ministers from Russia and Iran. Wang proposed staying committed to the framework of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) as the basis for new consensus.

    “China hopes that all parties will work toward the same direction and resume dialogue and negotiation as early as possible. The United States should demonstrate political sincerity and return to talks at an early date,” Wang said.

    He voiced opposition to pressing for intervention by the U.N. Security Council (UNSC). Under the current situation, hasty intervention by the UNSC will not help build confidence or bridge differences among the relevant parties. Initiating the snapback mechanism would undo years of diplomatic efforts, and must be handled with caution.

    The Beijing meeting was a useful effort by China, Russia and Iran in seeking to advance the settlement of the Iranian nuclear issue, China’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning said.

    China is ready to work with other parties for a just, balanced and sustainable resolution to the Iranian nuclear issue, uphold the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, and promote international and regional peace and stability, Mao added. 

    MIL OSI China News –

  • MIL-OSI China: China proposes five points on proper settlement of Iranian nuclear issue

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, also a member of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China Central Committee, meets with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov Sergey Alexeevich and Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi in Beijing, capital of China, March 14, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]

    BEIJING, March 14 — China proposed five points on the proper settlement of the Iranian nuclear issue, as Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi met with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov Sergey Alexeevich and Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi in Beijing on Friday.

    First, stay committed to peaceful settlement of disputes through political and diplomatic means, and oppose the use of force and illegal sanctions, said Wang, who is also a member of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China Central Committee.

    He added that all parties should uphold the vision of common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security, work actively to create conditions for the resumption of dialogue and negotiation, and refrain from actions that might escalate the situation.

    Second, stay committed to balancing rights and responsibilities, and take a holistic approach to the goals of nuclear non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy, said Wang.

    He noted that Iran should continue honoring its commitment to not developing nuclear weapons, and that all other parties should fully respect Iran’s right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy as a State Party to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

    Third, stay committed to the framework of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) as the basis for new consensus, said the Chinese foreign minister.

    China hopes that all parties will work toward the same direction and resume dialogue and negotiation as early as possible, Wang said, adding that the United States should demonstrate political sincerity and return to talks at an early date.

    Fourth, stay committed to promoting cooperation through dialogue, and oppose pressing for intervention by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), Wang stressed.

    He said that under the current situation, hasty intervention by the UNSC will not help build confidence or bridge differences among the relevant parties. Initiating the snapback mechanism would undo years of diplomatic efforts, and must be handled with caution, he pointed out.

    Fifth, stay committed to a step-by-step and reciprocal approach, and seek consensus through consultation, said Wang.

    “History has proven that acting from a position of strength would not lead to the key to resolving difficult issues,” said Wang.

    “Upholding the principle of mutual respect is the only viable path to finding the greatest common ground that accommodates the legitimate concerns of all parties and reaching a solution that meets the expectation of the international community,” he noted.

    Wang said that as a permanent member of the UNSC and a party to the JCPOA, China will stay in communication and coordination with all relevant parties, actively promote talks for peace, and play a constructive role in realizing early resumption of talks.

    MIL OSI China News –

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: India Participates in 353rd Governing Body Meeting of International Labour Organisation in Geneva

    Source: Government of India (2)

    India Participates in 353rd Governing Body Meeting of International Labour Organisation in Geneva

    Ms. Sumita Dawra, Secretary, Labour & Employment Leads Delegation and Makes Interventions on Key Global Labour and Employment Issues

    Secretary, L&E Holds Bilateral Discussions with Director-General and Senior Experts of ILO and Representatives of Other Countries

    India Reaffirms its commitment to Continue to Act as a Leading Voice on Advancing Labour Welfare, Quality Employment and Social Justice at Global Forum

    Social Protection, Responsible Business Conduct, Living Wages, AI and Future of Work, and Fair Global Migration Emerge as Key Areas of India-ILO Collaboration

    Posted On: 15 MAR 2025 12:34PM by PIB Delhi

    The 353rd Governing Body meeting of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) is being held in Geneva, Switzerland, from March 10 to March 20, 2025. The meeting brings together the tripartite constituents of ILO i.e. representatives from governments, workers, and employers, to discuss crucial matters relating to the world of work and the governance of ILO.

    The Indian delegation, led by Ms. Sumita Dawra, Secretary, Ministry of Labour and Employment, Government of India, made several interventions on key issues, showcasing India’s achievements, learnings and perspectives to advance the shared agenda of promoting labour welfare, social justice and quality employment generation globally.

    Second World Summit for Social Development

    India extended its support to ILO on the organization of the UN led Second World Summit for Social Development in Doha, Qatar later this year, as it aims at reinforcing the social dimension of the 2030 Agenda for Social Development. India’s inspiring progress in promoting social justice and development was highlighted, as India has doubled its social protection coverage to 48.8 percent, increasing the average global social protection coverage by over 5 percent.

    In this context, contribution of India’s flagship institutions and schemes such as EPFO (7.37 crore contributing members), ESIC (14.4 crore beneficiaries), e-Shram Portal (30.6 crore registered unorganized members), PM Jan Arogya Yojana (60 crore beneficiaries) and Targeted PDS (food security to 81.35 crore beneficiaries) was acknowledged.

    ILO Fair Migration Agenda and Action

    India, as one of the largest countries of origin of migrant workers and recipient of highest remittances, reiterated its support for greater global cooperation in promoting well-managed, skills-based migration pathways. ILO was urged to enhance efforts towards generating global momentum for securing social protection and rights for migrant workers through bilateral labour migration and social security agreements. Support was extended for ILO’s proposal to convene the first Tripartite Global Forum on Migration under the ILO based Global Coalition for Social Justice, by India as a leading partner of the Global Coalition.

    Global Framework on Chemicals

    India reaffirmed its commitment towards playing a leading role towards ensuring a planet free of harm from chemicals and waste, safeguarding workers, communities and the environment. The actions being undertaken by ILO in follow up to the Bonn Declaration were acknowledged.

    Key initiatives taken by India towards safeguarding the health and safety of workers and communities including Factories Act, 1948 and Occupational Safety, Health and Working Conditions Code, 2020, were underscored. Capacity-building measures under the Viksit Bharat 2047 Action Plan towards ensuring workplace safety in Major Accident Hazardous (MAH) units were highlighted.

    The Indian delegation also held several bilateral discussions with the Director General and senior experts of ILO, and representatives of other countries on labour and employment matters of keen interest to India.

    Bilateral Discussion with Director General-ILO

    Ms. Dawra met Mr. Gilbert F. Houngbo, the DG-ILO and congratulated him for his flagship initiative the Global Coalition for Social Justice, which has emerged as a robust platform for global collaboration to promote social justice. She also reiterated the need for ILO to consider in-kind benefits while assessing social protection coverage.

    This is crucial as India has commenced a State Specific Data Pooling exercise in collaboration with ILO to get a more accurate assessment of India’s social protection coverage.

    DG-ILO appreciated India for playing a leading role in the Global Coalition by championing the key Coalition intervention “Responsible business for sustainable and inclusive societies,” and successfully organizing the first ever “Regional Dialogue on Social Justice” at New Delhi last month. He added, “This has inspired other Coalition countries (partners) to enhance their contribution to the Coalition’s agenda”.

    Mr. Houngbo invited India to participate pro-actively in the upcoming Annual Forum on Social Justice, and showcase best practices of Indian industry in terms of Responsible Business Conduct, payment of Living Wages, and harnessing AI for a socially just Future of Work.

    The DG also expressed his appreciation for India’s first ever voluntary financial support to ILO towards conduct of a feasibility study on development of international reference classification of occupations by ILO and OECD. This India led initiative will facilitate in galvanizing global employment opportunities for Indian youth through benchmarking, and mutual recognition of skills and qualifications. Development of the international classification is a historic commitment made by the G20 leaders under India’s G20 presidency of 2023.

    India discussed future collaborations in pipeline with ILO on shared priorities including determination and operationalization of living wages, gig and platform workers’ welfare and decent work in value chains. The Indian delegation included Shri Rakesh Gaur, Deputy Director, Ministry of Labour & Employment.

    *****

    Himanshu Pathak

    (Release ID: 2111473) Visitor Counter : 155

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

  • MIL-OSI Security: CENTCOM Forces Kill ISIS Chief of Global Operations Who Also Served as ISIS #2

    Source: United States Central Command (CENTCOM)

    Tampa, Fla. – On March 13, U.S. Central Command forces, in cooperation with Iraqi Intelligence and Security Forces, conducted a precision airstrike in Al Anbar Province, Iraq, that killed the Global ISIS #2 leader, chief of operations and the Delegated Committee Emir – Abdallah Makki Muslih al-Rifai, alias “Abu Khadijah”, and one other ISIS operative.

    MIL Security OSI –

  • MIL-Evening Report: No apologies over fabricated terror plot from pollies or lobby groups

    COMMENTARY: By Greg Barns

    When it comes to antisemitism, politicians in Australia are often quick to jump on the claim without waiting for evidence.

    With notable and laudable exceptions like the Greens and independents such as Tasmanian federal MP Andrew Wilkie, it seems any allegation will do when it comes to the opportunity to imply Arab Australians, the Muslim community and Palestinian supporters are trying to destroy the lives of the Jewish community.

    A case in point. The discovery in January this year of a caravan found in Dural, New South Wales, filled with explosives and a note that referenced the Great Synagogue in Sydney led to a frenzy of clearly uninformed and dangerous rhetoric from politicians and the media about an imminent terrorist attack targeting the Jewish community.

    It was nothing of the sort as we now know with the revelation by police that this was a “fabricated terrorist plot”.

    As the ABC reported on March 10: “Police have said an explosives-laden caravan discovered in January at Dural in Sydney’s north-west was a ‘fake terrorism plot’ with ties to organised crime”, and that “the Australian Federal Police said they were confident this was a ‘fabricated terrorist plot’,” adding the belief was held “very early on after the caravan was located”.

    One would have thought the political and media class would know that it is critical in a society supposedly underpinned by the rule of law that police be allowed to get on with the job of investigating allegations without comment.

    Particularly so in the hot-house atmosphere that exists in this nation today.

    Opportunistic Dutton
    But not the ever opportunistic and divisive federal opposition leader Peter Dutton.

    After the Daily Telegraph reported the Dural caravan story on January 29,  Dutton was quick to say that this “was potentially the biggest terrorist attack in our country’s history”. To his credit, Prime Anthony Albanese said in response he does not “talk about operational matters for an ongoing investigation”.

    Dutton’s language was clearly designed to whip up fear and hysteria among the Jewish community and to demonise Palestinian supporters.

    He was not Robinson Crusoe sadly. New South Wales Premier Chris Minns told the media on January 29 that the Dural caravan discovery had the potential to have led to a “mass casualty event”.

    The Zionist Federation of Australia, an organisation that is an unwavering supporter of Israel despite the horror that nation has inflicted on Gaza, was even more overblown in its claims.

    It issued a statement that claimed: “This is undoubtedly the most severe threat to the Jewish community in Australia to date. The plot, if executed, would likely have resulted in the worst terrorist attack on Australian soil.”

    Note the word “undoubtedly”.

    Uncritical Israeli claims
    Then there was another uncritical Israel barracker, Sky News’ Sharri Markson, who claimed; “To think perpetrators would have potentially targeted a museum commemorating the Holocaust — a time when six million Jews were killed — is truly horrifying.”

    And naturally, Jilian Segal, the highly partisan so-called “Antisemitism Envoy” said the discovery of the caravan was a “chilling reminder that the same hatred that led to the murder of millions of Jews during the Holocaust still exists today”.

    In short, the response to the Dural caravan incident was simply an exercise in jumping on the antisemitism issue without any regard to the consequences for our community, including the fear it spread among Jewish Australians and the further demonising of the Arab Australian community.

    No circumspection. No leadership. No insistence that the matter had not been investigated fully.

    As the only Jewish organisation that represents humanity, the Jewish Council of Australia, said in a statement from its director Sarah Schwartz on March 10 the “statement from the AFP [Australian Federal Police] should prompt reflection from every politician, journalist and community leader who has sought to manipulate and weaponise fears within the Jewish community.

    ‘Irresponsible and dangerous’
    “The attempt to link these events to the support of Palestinians — whether at protests, universities, conferences or writers’ festivals — has been irresponsible and dangerous.” Truth in spades.

    And ask yourself this question. Let’s say the Dural caravan contained notes about mosques and Arab Australian community centres. Would the media, politicians and others have whipped up the same level of hysteria and divisive rhetoric?

    The answer is no.

    One assumes Dutton, Segal, the Zionist Federation and others who frothed at the mouth in January will now offer a collective mea culpa. Sadly, they won’t because there will be no demands to do so.

    The damage to our legal system has been done because political opportunism and milking antisemitism for political ends comes first for those who should know better.

    Greg Barns SC is national criminal justice spokesperson for the Australian Lawyers Alliance. This article was first published by Pearls and Irritations social policy journal and is republished with permission.

    MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Commission’s position on economic involvement in the occupied Palestinian territories – E-000966/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-000966/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Jaume Asens Llodrà (Verts/ALE)

    The International Court of Justice has confirmed that states and other economic actors must do everything possible to prevent and not participate in the colonisation of the occupied Palestinian territories. The UN Human Rights Council already has a database listing a limited number of companies profiting from the occupation and colonisation of the occupied Palestinian territories.

    Despite being warned about their unlawful actions, some of these companies – such as CAF, Booking, Carrefour, and eDreams – argue that there are no national laws explicitly prohibiting them from conducting business and profiting from activities that support colonisation in violation of international law.

    • 1.Given that the Commission considers occupation and colonisation by force illegal and has imposed sanctions on states and companies benefiting from such activities in various parts of the world, does it, in the case of Israel and the occupied Palestinian territories, allow and become complicit in the occupation and colonisation of Palestine and the Syrian Golan Heights by failing to enact EU regulations prohibiting economic activities in territories occupied by Israel?
    • 2.Does the Commission believe that it is up to the Member States to legislate or enforce existing laws to prevent violations of international law in this matter?

    Submitted: 6.3.2025

    Last updated: 14 March 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Türkiye and the European defence architecture – E-000967/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-000967/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Loucas Fourlas (PPE)

    The current geopolitical situation, with the gradual reduction of US security guarantees, is creating new dynamics in European defence cooperation. Türkiye, taking advantage of this situation, is attempting to strengthen its involvement in European defence structures and in the EU’s joint armaments programmes.

    However, this is a country that has illegally occupied European territory in Cyprus for 50 years, threatens European states with constant provocations and violations of international law, and operates as it pleases with regard to the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy.

    In view of the above, can the Commission answer the following:

    • 1.How is Türkiye’s inclusion in European defence initiatives justified, given its constant challenges to the EU and its member states, and at a time when it is obstructing Cyprus’s participation in European and other institutions?
    • 2.Does the Commission intend to set specific conditions and restrictions for the participation of third countries in European armaments programmes, so as not to undermine the Union’s strategic interests?
    • 3.Will steps be taken to prevent Türkiye from using defence cooperation as a means of extracting political and military concessions from the EU?

    Submitted: 6.3.2025

    Last updated: 14 March 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – The abominable massacre of Christians and Alawites in Syria and the urgent need for an immediate and decisive EU response – P-001051/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Priority question for written answer  P-001051/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Afroditi Latinopoulou (PfE)

    The recent massacres in Syria, in which 1 300 people, most of them civilians from the Alawite minority and Christians, were killed by Islamist security forces, constitute crimes against humanity and cannot go unanswered. This heinous attack against Christian minorities shows the true colours of the new government, which was formed from a group that has radical Islamist origins.

    While Europe stands by and watches as a passive observer, Christian communities and other minorities in Syria face an existential threat, adding to a long list of persecutions in the region.

    Considering the unquestionable responsibility the EU has to protect Christian minorities and combat religious persecution, can the Commission answer the following:

    • 1.Why has it still not firmly condemned these massacres, calling them by their real name, i.e. ethnic cleansing and genocide against Christians and Alawites?
    • 2.What immediate and specific measures will it take to put an end to the bloodshed and ensure the protection of the remaining Christian and Alawite communities in Syria?
    • 3.When will it finally acknowledge the obvious danger posed by the spread of radical Islamism in the region and take effective measures to protect European values and religious freedoms?

    Submitted: 12.3.2025

    Last updated: 14 March 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Deadly attacks in Syria against Alawite and Christian minorities – P-001075/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Priority question for written answer  P-001075/2025
    to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
    Rule 144
    Laurent Castillo (PPE), François-Xavier Bellamy (PPE), Christophe Gomart (PPE), Céline Imart (PPE), Nadine Morano (PPE)

    For several days, deadly attacks have been taking place in Syria against the Alawite and Christian minorities, which we condemn. Syria’s transitional government must assume its responsibilities and provide evidence to the European Union of its full commitment to prosecute and convict the perpetrators of these hate crimes. Syria must not descend into Islamism, as happened in Iraq and Libya when their dictatorial regimes fell, nor must it be so naive as to overlook the fact that Ahmed al-Sharaa was an al-Qaeda and Islamic State fighter before becoming President of the Syrian Arab Republic. On 17 January 2025 the Commission announced EUR 235 million in humanitarian aid for Syria and neighbouring countries, and on 24 February 2025 the Council of the European Union announced the suspension of sectoral measures, but we should be vigilant about any normalisation of diplomatic relations.

    • 1.How does the EU monitor the use of the funds allocated to Syria?
    • 2.How does the EU intend to investigate the deadly attacks committed in early March 2025 and determine the involvement of the new regime in those attacks?
    • 3.How will the EU’s sanctions regime against Syria change?

    Submitted: 12.3.2025

    Last updated: 14 March 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI USA News: WEEK EIGHT WINS: A Testament to American Greatness Under President Trump

    Source: The White House

    The past week was marked by another series of triumphs that underscore the commitment of President Donald J. Trump and his administration to making America stronger, safer, and more prosperous than ever before.

    Here is a non-comprehensive list of wins in week eight:

    • President Trump’s economic agenda came into focus as Americans saw needed economic relief following years of Bidenflation.
      • Consumer inflation “eased more than expected” in February, with core inflation at its lowest level in nearly four years — driven by a decline in airfare prices as Americans prepare for Spring Break.
      • Wholesale inflation came in much lower than expected in February.
      • Mortgage rates dropped to their lowest levels since December, while home purchase applications are at their highest level since January.
      • The price of a dozen eggs is down 36.6% since President Trump’s inauguration.
      • The average price for regular gas has fallen below $3/gallon in 31 states — the third straight week of decline — with the price of oil down nearly 15% since President Trump took office.
    • President Trump and his administration continued their remarkable progress in securing the border following the news that illegal crossings have plummeted to the lowest levels ever recorded.
      • In President Trump’s first 50 days, ICE arrested 32,809 illegal immigrants — nearly 75% of whom were accused or convicted criminals — virtually the same number of arrests over the entirety of Biden’s final year in office.
      • Just 77 “gotaways” were recorded in the past three weeks — a 95% decrease from the average daily number of “gotaways” under Biden in 2023.
      • Migration to the U.S. through Panama’s Darien Gap has dropped by 99% as would-be illegal border crossers turn around.
    • President Trump’s Section 232 tariffs on imported steel and aluminum took effect as the Trump Administration levels the playing field for American workers.
      • Steel Manufacturers Association: “As the revised steel tariff goes into effect today, President Trump is boldly declaring that America will no longer be a dumping ground for cheap, subsidized foreign steel … By closing loopholes in the tariff that have been exploited for years, President Trump will again supercharge a steel industry that stands ready to rebuild America.”
      • Five major organizations representing the steel industry issued a statement lauding the tariffs.
    • President Trump’s tariffs continued driving manufacturing back to the U.S.
      • Cra-Z-Art — the biggest toymaker in the country — is expanding its domestic manufacturing by 50%.
        • “We are moving a large percentage of what we have in China to here, duplicating some machinery and investing in high speed automation equipment,” said Chairman Lawrence Rosen. “When Trump announced the higher tariffs on China, it’s been full steam ahead.”
      • GE Aerospace announced a $1 billion investment in its U.S.-based manufacturing operation, which will create 5,000 new jobs.
      • Asahi Group Holdings, one of the largest Japanese beverage makers, announced a $35 million investment to boost production at its Wisconsin plant.
      • Angel Aligner, a global orthodontic manufacturer, announced it will build its first U.S.-based production facility in Wisconsin.
      • Pegatron Corp., a Taiwan-based artificial intelligence server maker, announced it will build its first U.S.-based facility and increase its U.S. investment.
      • Merck opened its $1 billion North Carolina manufacturing facility as it plans to invest $8 billion in the U.S. over the next several years.
      • Saica Group, a Spain-based corrugated packaging maker, announced plans to build a $110 million new manufacturing facility in Anderson, Indiana.
      • Saint Gobain Ceramics announced a new $40 million NorPro manufacturing facility in Wheatfield, New York.
      • LGM Pharma announced a $6 million investment to expand its manufacturing facility in Rosenberg, Texas.
    • President Trump forced Ontario, Canada, Premier Doug Ford to back down from his threat to implement 25% electricity tariffs on American consumers.
    • The Department of Homeland Security unveiled the CBP Home App, which repurposes the Biden-era CBP One App to give illegal immigrants the option of self-deporting.
    • The Trump Administration stripped the first visa of a foreign student linked to Hamas-supporting “disruptions” on a college campus.
    • The Environmental Protection Agency launched the “biggest day of deregulation in American history,” which included ending the Biden-Harris electric vehicle mandate, stopping the Biden Administration’s assault on power plants, and eliminating costly emissions standards.
    • The EPA canceled more than 400 “diversity, equity, and inclusion” and “environmental justice” grants, totaling $1.7 billion.
    • The Department of Education opened investigations into 45 universities under Title VI for alleged impermissible use of race-exclusionary preferences, race-based scholarships, and/or race-based segregation.
    • The Trump Administration announced Ukraine accepted an offer to enter into immediate negotiations for a ceasefire and ultimate end to the brutal war.
    • The Trump Administration secured an agreement by Israel and Lebanon to engage in land border negotiations.
    • Secretary of the Interior Doug Burgum officially fulfilled President Trump’s promise to rename the Anahuac National Wildlife Refuge in Texas as the Jocelyn Nungaray National Wildlife Refuge — honoring the memory of Jocelyn Nungaray, a young woman whose life was tragically cut short by an illegal immigrant.
    • The Department of the Interior announced the approval of a federal mining plan modification to extend the operational life of Montana’s Spring Creek Mine by 16 years — enabling the production of nearly 40 million tons of coal and supporting hundreds of full-time jobs.
    • The Department of Energy signed the third major liquefied natural gas export permit approval since President Trump reversed the Biden-era ban, allowing the Delfin LNG project — which was delayed by the Biden Administration — to move forward.
    • The Department of Justice’s new interagency task force arrested 214 criminals in its first two weeks, including violent MS-13 and Tren de Aragua gang members.
    • The Department of Veterans Affairs opened another new clinic — in addition to the three new clinics opened over the past several weeks — to serve thousands of additional veterans.
    • Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth ordered a department-wide review of the U.S. military’s physical and grooming guidelines to ensure the force is meeting the highest possible standard.
    • The Department of Defense terminated woke climate change programs and initiatives that were not in line with the department’s core warfighting mission.
    • Army Chief of Staff General George ordered a review of all general officer memorandums of reprimand that were issued to soldiers who refused to comply with the Biden Administration’s COVID vaccine mandate.
    • The Department of Transportation rescinded memos issued by the Biden administration that injected social justice, radical environmental agendas into infrastructure funding decisions.
    • The Department of the Treasury sanctioned Iran’s oil minister and shadow fleet operators and targeted Houthi terrorists involved in smuggling and procuring weapons.
    • The Department of Agriculture continued its push to root out fraud, waste, and abuse — including terminating a grant that supports “queer and trans farmers and urban consumers.”
    • The Department of Health and Human Services ended a loophole that allowed ingredient manufacturers to utilize chemicals with unknown safety data in food.
    • The Federal Communications Commission launched its sweeping “In Re: Delete, Delete, Delete” deregulation initiative to alleviate the unnecessary, burdensome regulatory assault on Americans.

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI Russia: IMF Holds Informal Board Briefing on Afghanistan, Iran, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    March 14, 2025

    Washington, DC: In line with the standard procedures for members whose Article IV consultations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) are delayed, on March 14, 2025 the Executive Board was briefed by staff on economic developments in Afghanistan, Iran, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen.

    The Board is routinely briefed based on publicly available information approximately every 12 months for members whose Article IV consultations are delayed by more than 18 months.

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Wafa Amr

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/03/14/pr-2565-mcd-imf-holds-informal-board-briefing-on-afghanistan-iran-sudan-syria-tunisia-yemen

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI Russia News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Cooperation between the Commission and a controversial Turkish agency – E-000895/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-000895/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Fabrice Leggeri (PfE), Malika Sorel (PfE), Catherine Griset (PfE)

    On 7 October 2024, exactly one year after the massacre in Israel, Gaziantep Islamic Science and Technology University, a member of the Erasmus+ programme, posted a message on its X account glorifying Hamas[1].

    Previously, the university’s rector had already been accused of paying tribute[2] to ‘martyr’ Ismail Haniyeh, the head of Hamas who was killed by an Israeli airstrike in July 2024.

    On 13 December 2024, the Commission wrote[3] that it was ‘currently investigating allegations made in the press, in cooperation with the national agency in Türkiye’ and that it had ‘asked the national agency to suspend the contracting process for the grant agreement on the recently selected cooperation project referred to in the Honourable Member’s written question until there is more clarity on the matter.’

    However, two months before the Commission’s statements, the director of the Turkish national agency responsible for implementing Erasmus+ visited the University of Gaziantep and reiterated the Turkish state’s support for it. He even publicly praised its rector[4].

    • 1.Does the Commission see no contradiction in the fact that it is investigating a Turkish university accused of sympathising with Hamas ‘in cooperation’ with a national agency whose head has supported the university in question in the face of these accusations?
    • 2.When did the Commission begin investigating in ‘cooperation’ with this agency?

    Supporter[5]

    Submitted: 3.3.2025

    • [1] https://x.com/gibtuni/status/1843258883352993960?s=12&t=BA8bZwb7Haunbvzca9wNhA
    • [2] https://www.lejdd.fr/societe/erasmus-lunion-europeenne-sous-le-feu-des-critiques-pour-avoir-integre-une-universite-pro-hamas-150023
    • [3] https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/P-10-2024-001922-ASW_EN.html
    • [4] https://x.com/ulusalajans/status/1846524202175631726?t=TK_UuTMBsy-6q4xTJDuJ7w&s=35
    • [5] This question is supported by a Member other than the authors: Jean-Paul Garraud (PfE)
    Last updated: 14 March 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – Continuing the unwavering EU support for Ukraine, after three years of Russia’s war of aggression – P10_TA(2025)0033 – Wednesday, 12 March 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to its previous resolutions on Ukraine and on Russia, in particular those adopted since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula on 19 February 2014,

    –  having regard to the Helsinki Final Act of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) of 1 August 1975, the Charter of Paris for a New Europe of the OSCE of 21 November 1990 and the UN Memorandum on Security Assurances in Connection with Ukraine’s Accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 5 December 1994 (the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances),

    –  having regard to the Association Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and Ukraine, of the other part(1), and to the accompanying Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area between the European Union and Ukraine, signed in 2014,

    –  having regard to the UN Charter, the Hague Conventions, the Geneva Conventions and the additional protocols thereto, and to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC),

    –  having regard to the European Council’s decision of 14 December 2023 to open accession negotiations with Ukraine, following the Commission’s positive recommendation of 8 November 2023 in this regard,

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/792 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 February 2024 establishing the Ukraine Facility(2), and to other forms of EU support for Ukraine,

    –  having regard to the joint statement by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission and the President of the European Parliament of 24 February 2025 on the third anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine,

    –  having regard to UN General Assembly Resolution ES-11/7 adopted on 24 February 2025 entitled ‘Advancing a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in Ukraine’,

    –  having regard to the Conclusions of the extraordinary European Council of 6 March 2025,

    –  having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

    A.  whereas Russia has been waging an illegal, unprovoked and unjustified full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine since 24 February 2022; whereas Russia’s war against Ukraine started in 2014 with the illegal occupation and annexation of the Crimean peninsula and the subsequent occupation of parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions; whereas this war of aggression constitutes a blatant and flagrant violation of the UN Charter and of the fundamental principles of international law and international humanitarian law, as established by the Geneva Conventions of 1949;

    B.  whereas Russia’s actions in Ukraine over the past three years continue to threaten peace and security in Europe and worldwide; whereas the Russian war of aggression is the largest military conflict on the European continent since the end of the Second World War and reflects the growing conflict between authoritarianism and democracy;

    C.  whereas Ukraine and its citizens have shown unwavering determination in resisting Russia’s war of aggression, successfully defending their country, despite the high cost in civilian and military casualties, along with the attacks on residential areas, destruction of civilian and public infrastructure – particularly that providing water and energy – and of the natural environment and cultural heritage, forced deportations, disappearances and illegal adoptions of deported children, illegal imprisonments, mass killings, executions of civilians, soldiers and prisoners of war, torture and the use of sexual violence and mass rape as weapons of war and altering the ethnic composition of the occupied territories of Ukraine, all of which constitute war crimes and crimes against humanity; whereas millions of Ukrainians remain displaced both inside and outside their country; whereas the United Nations has confirmed that more than 12 500 civilians, including hundreds of children, have been murdered since February 2022; whereas the Ukrainian authorities estimate that at least 20 000 Ukrainian children have been deported and forcibly displaced from their homes to Russia and Russian-occupied territories since the full-scale invasion began in February 2022; whereas the Russian Federation attempts to deny Ukraine and its people their ethnic, linguistic and historical identity by erasing signs of Ukrainian identity in occupied territories; whereas the brave people of Ukraine were awarded the 2022 Sakharov Prize as a tribute to their courage and resilience;

    D.  whereas the UN General Assembly, in its resolution of 2 March 2022, immediately qualified the Russian war against Ukraine as an act of aggression in violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, and, in its resolution of 14 November 2022, recognised the need to hold the Russian Federation accountable for its war of aggression and legally and financially responsible for its internationally wrongful acts, including by making reparation for the injury and damage caused;

    E.  whereas on 2 March 2022, the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court opened an investigation into the situation in Ukraine, focusing on war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide committed on Ukrainian territory from 21 November 2013 onwards and on 17 March 2023 issued arrest warrants for Vladimir Putin, President of the Russian Federation, and Maria Lvova-Belova, so-called Commissioner for Children’s Rights in the Office of the President of the Russian Federation, for the war crime of unlawful deportation of Ukrainian children, arrest warrants for Sergei Kuzhugetovich Shoigu and Valery Vasilyevich Gerasimov for crimes against humanity including the war crime of directing attacks at civilian objects and the war crime of causing excessive incidental harm to civilians or damage to civilian objects; whereas the EU supports the establishment of a special tribunal for the crime of aggression;

    F.  whereas a number of third countries, notably Iran, North Korea and Belarus, have provided Russia with substantial deliveries of weapons and ammunition, and Belarus has allowed Russia to use its territory to attack Ukraine which amounts to an act of aggression under international law; whereas North Korean troops have been deployed on the battlefield and are fighting alongside the Russian army; whereas Russia and China signed a ‘no-limits partnership’ on 4 February 2022, and subsequently, China has become a key enabler of the Russian war effort through its massive support for Russia’s economy and its defence industrial base, and by supplying dual-use equipment;

    G.  whereas the latest Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment report estimates that, as of December 2024, the total cost of reconstruction and recovery in Ukraine will be at least EUR 506 billion over the next decade, which is 2.8 times the estimated nominal gross domestic product of Ukraine for 2024; whereas a total financing gap of EUR 9,62 billion for recovery and reconstruction needs remains for 2025;

    H.  whereas the EU has recently adopted its 16th sanctions package against Russia to weaken its economic base, deprive it of critical technologies and limit its ability to wage war; whereas the new sanctions target additional individuals and entities, including military firms, sanctions evaders, non-EU country supporters, Kremlin propagandists, shadow fleet networks, and individuals involved in the deportation of Ukrainian children; whereas the EU sanctions now apply to over 2 400 individuals and entities, subjecting them to asset freezes, funding bans and travel restrictions;

    I.  whereas the EU and its Member States have provided the most substantial cumulative support for Ukraine in all areas since the start of the full-scale invasion, and have provided financial support amounting to close to EUR 140 billion, including over EUR 67 billion of support to Ukraine in the form of humanitarian and emergency assistance, budget support and macro-financial assistance and over EUR 48 billion of military aid; whereas approximately EUR 300 billion of Russian sovereign assets were frozen in different jurisdictions; whereas in May 2024, the EU Member States approved the use of financial proceeds generated by immobilised Russian sovereign assets held within the EU, estimated at around EUR 210 billion, to support Ukraine, with the aim of providing up to EUR 3 billion per year in support of Ukraine’s reconstruction and resilience efforts;

    J.  whereas many EU Member States continue to purchase fossil fuels from Russia, including liquefied natural gas, imports of which are rising, as well as uranium, contributing to the Russian economy and bolstering its war chest; whereas sales of Russian fossil fuels to the EU since the outbreak of the full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine have exceeded EUR 200 billion;

    K.  whereas the EU has welcomed more than four million refugees from Ukraine and has expressed its support for the people of Ukraine and their leadership by launching negotiations on Ukraine’s accession to the EU;

    L.  whereas the European Council decided to open accession negotiations with Ukraine following the positive recommendation of the Commission; whereas the first intergovernmental conference took place on 25 June 2024, launching the negotiation process and adopting the negotiating framework;

    M.  whereas, under the administration of US President Donald Trump, the United States has significantly changed its stance on Russia’s war against Ukraine; whereas President Trump is making demands towards Ukraine but has not expressed any demands towards the Russian side, moreover he has downplayed Moscow’s responsibility for starting the war and possibly envisages granting Russia sanctions relief in the short term; whereas between the time of the meeting between President Trump and President Zelenskyy on 28 February 2025 and 9 March 2025 alone, Russia carried out over 2 100 aerial assaults, including 1 200 guided bomb strikes and nearly 870 drone attacks;

    N.  whereas recent US-Russia talks in Riyadh excluded Ukraine and the EU, and the United States did not consult its European allies before ending its part in the effort to isolate Russia; whereas the new US administration, alongside Russia and its allies, voted against a UN General Assembly resolution of 24 February 2025 condemning Russia’s aggression; whereas the American U-turn on the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine threatens Ukraine’s capacity to withstand Russia’s aggression, makes clear that Washington’s commitment to hold Russia accountable is no longer dependable and undermines international efforts to address the crisis;

    O.  whereas on 3 March 2025 the United States suspended its military assistance to Ukraine, including that approved by the previous US administration, as well as intelligence sharing with Ukraine; whereas it then cut off Ukraine’s access to commercial satellite imagery collected by the US government system on 7 March 2025;

    P.  whereas, according to widely recognised democratic principles and Ukraine’s constitution, elections cannot be held during wartime and under martial law, especially when millions of Ukrainians have been displaced; whereas martial law was declared and continues to be in effect in Ukraine solely because of Russia’s war of aggression; whereas the EU continues to recognise President Zelenskyy as the legitimate leader of Ukraine until democratic elections can be held;

    Q.  whereas President Donald Trump ordered a sweeping freeze on US foreign aid, halting hundreds of critical projects in Ukraine, including demining activities, military veteran rehabilitation, humanitarian aid, independent media and anti-corruption initiatives, investigations into Russian war crimes, but also those bolstering Ukraine’s telecommunications networks against Russian cyberattacks;

    R.  whereas Russia’s war of aggression shows its imperialistic attitude towards its neighbours; whereas as long as Russia remains a state pursuing revisionist policies, it remains a threat to security on the European continent; whereas the Russian war of aggression is part of a broader set of objectives against the West and its interests and values, the international rules-based order, democracy and security, as openly declared by Vladimir Putin in the weeks preceding the full-scale invasion; whereas numerous international actors have recognised Russia as a state sponsor of terrorism and a state that uses means of terrorism;

    S.  whereas Ukraine’s defeat would be widely viewed as a strategic defeat for Europe, the United States and the entire NATO alliance and as a reward for Russia as the aggressor, with far-reaching security consequences, the extent of which cannot be overstated; whereas depending on the outcome of the war in Ukraine, it will likely have a ripple effects in other parts of the world, notably the Indo-Pacific, and could encourage other revisionist powers to pursue their own hegemonic ambitions;

    T.  whereas a Special European Council took place on 6 March 2025 dedicated to the situation in Ukraine and the need to strengthen European defence; whereas the European Council endorsed the defence package put forward by the Commission on strengthening European Defence through the ‘ReArm Europe’ plan, which could potentially mobilise as much as EUR 800 billion, and reiterated its support for Ukraine, highlighting in particular that there can be no negotiations on Ukraine without Ukraine and that there can be no negotiations that affect European security without Europe’s involvement, and furthermore that Ukraine’s security and European, transatlantic and global security are intertwined;

    U.  whereas since the outbreak of the war, undersea cables in the Baltic Sea and key infrastructure have been targeted, presumably by Russian and Chinese-linked actors;

    1.  Pays tribute, on the third anniversary of Russia’s full-scale aggression against Ukraine, to the thousands who have sacrificed their lives for a free and democratic Ukraine; reiterates its unwavering solidarity with the people of Ukraine and its support for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, within its internationally recognised borders; strongly underlines Ukraine’s inherent right to self-defence in line with Article 51 of the UN Charter;

    2.  Reiterates its condemnation, in the strongest possible terms, of Russia’s illegal, unprovoked and unjustifiable war of aggression against Ukraine, as well as of the involvement of Belarus, North Korea and Iran; demands that Russia and its proxy forces immediately completely and unconditionally cease all attacks against residential areas and civilian infrastructure, terminate all military action in Ukraine and withdraw all military forces, proxies and military equipment from the entire internationally recognised territory of Ukraine; reiterates its policy of non-recognition of temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine by Russia, including but not limited to Crimea; demands that the Russian Federation permanently cease violating or threatening the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Ukraine; condemns the atrocities committed against the Ukrainian population by the Russian invading force and the indiscriminate destruction of Ukraine’s infrastructure; demands the end of forced deportations of Ukrainian civilians, and the release and return of all detained Ukrainians, especially children;

    3.  Reiterates its condemnation of Russia’s full-scale aggression against Ukraine as an existential threat to European security and stability; emphasises that the crime of aggression against Ukraine is a grave violation of international law and the UN Charter; underlines that the Russian war of aggression has fundamentally changed the geopolitical situation in Europe and beyond, and threatens its security architecture, and that in response this calls for bold, brave and comprehensive political, security and financial decisions by the EU; believes that a Ukraine that is capable of defending itself effectively is an integral part of a stable and predictable European security landscape;

    4.  Believes that the outcome of the war and the stance taken by the international community will play a crucial role in influencing future action by other authoritarian regimes, which are closely observing the course of the war and assessing how much space there is for them to exert aggressive foreign policies, including by military means;

    5.  Expresses deep concern over the apparent shift in the United States’ stance on Russia’s war of aggression, which has included openly blaming Ukraine for the ongoing war, suspending US military aid, and attempting to coerce Ukraine into relinquishing its legitimate right to self-defence and into making territorial concessions; stresses that, in light of this change, the EU and its Member States are now Ukraine’s primary strategic allies and must maintain their role as the largest donor to Ukraine and significantly increase the much-needed assistance they provide to uphold Ukraine’s right to self-defence and step in, as far as possible, to replace suspended USAID funding, while ensuring long-term aid for reconstruction and recovery;

    6.  Reiterates its call on the Member States to substantially increase and accelerate their military support, in particular the provision of weapons and ammunition, as well as training, in response to pressing needs (inter alia long range weapons systems, air defence systems, artillery systems, electronic warfare systems, anti-drone capabilities and engineering equipment); urges Member States and their defence industries to invest in and partner with the Ukrainian defence industry in order to maximise the full potential of its production capabilities to produce critical equipment in the most efficient manner following the Danish and Dutch examples; reiterates its position that all EU Member States and NATO allies should collectively and individually commit to supporting Ukraine militarily, with no less than 0,25 % of their GDP annually; calls on the EU and its Member States to utilise their satellite imagery infrastructure for Ukraine; recalls that the military support to Ukraine must be sufficient to ultimately stop Russia’s war of aggression and allow Ukraine to liberate all its people, re-establish full control over its entire territory within its internationally recognised borders and deter any further aggression by Russia; notes in this context that a number of EU Member States are non-aligned and urges them to increase their support for Ukraine in line with their constitutions;

    7.  Reaffirms its commitment to supporting Ukraine’s desire for a just and lasting peace and to the Peace Formula and the Victory Plan presented by Ukraine’s President, Volodymyr Zelenskyy; believes that it is a comprehensive plan to restore Ukraine’s territorial integrity and includes the building blocks of a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in Ukraine based on the principles of the UN Charter and international law, which requires the full restoration of Ukraine’s territorial integrity, accountability for war crimes and the crime of aggression, Russian reparations for the massive damage caused in Ukraine, full accountability for those responsible, and exclusion of any future aggressions by Russia; urges the EU and its Member States to work with like-minded partners to ensure that peace negotiations take place in a way that respects the above mentioned principles;

    8.  Underlines that any genuine peace negotiations must be conducted in good faith and include Ukraine; recalls that any settlement that excludes Ukraine or undermines its legitimate aspirations, such as its right to choose its own security arrangements, or which lacks credible security guarantees for Ukraine that contribute to deterring future Russian aggression, will be neither just nor viable;

    9.  Insists that the EU must contribute to robust security guarantees for Ukraine in order to deter further Russian aggression; underlines that Ukraine must be empowered to resist and prevent further Russian attacks and reject hasty deals that weaken its security in the mid to long term and risk subjecting Ukraine and other European countries to renewed Russian aggression; underlines that Russia’s war economy is not sustainable and coupling orchestrated economic pressure with accelerated military support to Ukraine would enable Ukrainian forces to improve their positions while simultaneously harming Russia’s economy to ensure Ukraine has a stronger negotiating position for Ukraine when it agrees to engage in peace talks;

    10.  Strongly deplores any attempts at blackmailing Ukraine’s leadership into surrender to the Russian aggressor for the sole purpose of announcing a so-called ‘peace deal’; considers that the current attempts by the US administration to negotiate a ceasefire and peace agreement with Russia over the heads of Ukraine and other European states, in which the latter are confronted with the outcome without their meaningful participation, as counterproductive and dangerous, as it leads to empowering the belligerent state, thus showing that an aggressive policy is not punished but rewarded; concludes that, taking into account the history of Russia’s violations of previous agreements and fundamental principles of international law, such a peace can only be reached through strength, including effective security guarantees;

    11.  Highlights that the financial support provided by the EU and its Member States to Ukraine exceeds that of any other country, reflecting the Union’s unparalleled commitment to Ukraine and consequently to the security of Europe; underscores that the EU’s role in any negotiations impacting the security of Europe must be commensurate with its political and economic weight; reaffirms that there can be no negotiations touching on European security without the European Union at the table; welcomes efforts by France’s President Macron and the UK’s Prime Minister Starmer to host European emergency summits in Paris and London; welcomes the launch of a ‘coalition of the willing’ to enable a European-led enforcement of an eventual peace agreement;

    12.  Expresses dismay concerning the policy of the US administration of appeasing Russia and targeting its allies; warns that this policy undermines the trust of traditional US allies around the world and can have devastating consequences for the transatlantic bond, peace and stability in Europe and beyond;

    13.  Calls for the EU and its Member States to take the latest developments in the US-Ukraine relations as the final wakeup call for them to step in as Ukraine’s leading partner and actively work towards maintaining the broadest possible international support for Ukraine, including through building a ‘coalition of the able and willing’ with like-minded partners globally to support Ukraine and increase pressure on Russia;

    14.  Welcomes the joint statement by Ukraine and the United States following their meeting in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on 11 March 2025, including the resumption of US military assistance and intelligence sharing as well as a proposal for a 30-day ceasefire agreement; recalls that a ceasefire can be an effective tool for suspension of hostilities, only if the aggressor fully adheres to it; expects therefore Russia to agree to it and follow it by ceasing all attacks on Ukraine, its military positions, civilian population, infrastructure and territory;

    15.  Expresses concern about the increased tensions in the Baltic Sea with actions of hybrid warfare against critical infrastructure and considers closer cooperation between the Nordic states, Baltic states, Poland and Germany crucial;

    16.  Welcomes the conclusions of the Special European Council of 6 March 2025 and its support for a rapid strengthening of European defence through the ‘ReArm Europe’ plan and reiterating its support for Ukraine following the ‘peace through strength’ approach, highlighting in particular that Ukraine’s security and European, transatlantic and global security are intertwined;

    17.  Reiterates that Russia’s deliberate attacks on the civilian population of Ukraine, destruction of civilian infrastructure, use of sexual violence and rape as a weapon of war, deportation of thousands of Ukrainian citizens to the territory of the Russian Federation, forced transfer and adoption of Ukrainian children, and other serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law all constitute war crimes for which all perpetrators must be held accountable;

    18.  Emphasises that all those responsible for war crimes perpetrated in Ukraine must be held accountable and stresses that no peace will be sustainable without justice; reiterates its call on the Commission, the VP/HR and the Member States to work together with Ukraine and the international community on setting up a special tribunal to investigate and prosecute the crime of aggression committed against Ukraine by Russia and its allies and underlines the need for the jurisdiction of this tribunal to cover the entire leadership of Russia and Belarus responsible for the aggression against Ukraine; welcomes the establishment of the International Centre for the Prosecution of the Crime of Aggression in Ukraine in The Hague;

    19.  Emphasises its full support for the ongoing investigation by the Prosecutor of the ICC into the situation in Ukraine based on alleged war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide; welcomes Ukraine’s ratification of the Rome Statute of the ICC, which allowed it to become a state party to it as of January 2025; in this context, expresses its utmost concern about the US sanctions against the ICC, its prosecutors, judges and staff, which constitute a serious attack on the international justice system; calls on the Commission to urgently activate the Blocking Statute and on the Member States to urgently increase their diplomatic efforts in order to protect and safeguard the ICC as an indispensable cornerstone of the international justice system;

    20.  Welcomes the European Council’s decision to open accession negotiations with Ukraine once the Commission’s recommendations are met; reaffirms that Ukraine’s future lies in the EU; welcomes progress on accession-related reforms despite wartime conditions; calls for the acceleration of accession talks, recognising Ukraine’s EU integration as a strategic priority; underscores the importance of continued EU financial assistance, linked to concrete reform, as a key instrument to sustain and accelerate Ukraine’s transformation in line with European standards; underlines that the Copenhagen criteria and the required reforms, in particular concerning the rule of law, democracy, fundamental freedoms and human rights, are fundamental to the merit-based process of accession; believes that Ukraine’s membership of the EU represents a geostrategic investment in a united and strong Europe and that it equates to showing leadership, resolve and vision;

    21.  Recalls NATO’s commitments to admit Ukraine to the Alliance; notes in this regard NATO’s consistent open door policy, in accordance with which NATO remains open to all European democracies that share the values of the Alliance, and in accordance with which decisions on membership have to be taken only by NATO allies, with no third party having a say in this process;

    22.  Calls on the Ukrainian authorities to strengthen internal political unity in Ukraine, uphold parliamentary pluralism and engage in constructive cooperation with the political parties in the Verkhovna Rada; calls on Ukrainian political stakeholders to continue strengthening political unity and parliamentary pluralism and to engage in constructive cooperation within the Verkhovna Rada; calls for due regard to be given to the powers and rights of local self-governing bodies; calls for media pluralism to be guaranteed in line with the democratic principles and values that Ukrainians are so resolutely and bravely defending; suggests in light of the EU accession process to end all limitations of foreign travel of members of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine;

    23.  Commends Ukrainian, European and international civil society organisations for supporting families of abducted Ukrainian children, prisoners of war, and illegally detained civilians; calls for the EU, its Member States and the international community to assist their efforts and intensify pressure on Russia to return all abducted and detained Ukrainians;

    24.  Points to the estimate of the latest Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment that at least EUR 506 billion will be required over the next decade for Ukraine’s recovery and reconstruction; welcomes the EU’s Ukraine Facility, which has a budget of almost EUR 50 billion, and the EU’s Ukraine Loan Cooperation Mechanism, which, in cooperation with the G7, offers loans to Ukraine of up to EUR 45 billion; nevertheless, urges the EU to prepare for Ukraine’s reconstruction by dedicating and securing new resources; calls for the EU, the Member States and like-minded partners to provide comprehensive and coordinated political, economic, technical and humanitarian assistance to support the sustainable and inclusive post-war reconstruction and recovery of Ukraine; reaffirms the EU’s commitment to sustainable and long-term financial and economic support to Ukraine, including macro-financial assistance, support for reconstruction and economic and social recovery and measures to ensure the resilience of Ukraine’s economy and critical infrastructure; reiterates its firm conviction that Russia must pay for the massive damage caused in Ukraine and therefore calls for the Russian sovereign assets immobilised under EU sanctions to be confiscated for the purpose of supporting Ukraine’s defence and reconstruction;

    25.  Calls on the Council, the Commission and the Member States to increase the effectiveness and impact of sanctions on Russia in order to definitively undermine Russia’s ability to continue waging its brutal war of aggression against Ukraine and threatening the security of other European countries; calls for a ban or targeted tariffs on Russian imports to the EU with the aim of fully closing the flow of grain, potash and fertilisers as well as raw materials including steel, uranium, titanium, nickel, wood and wood products, and all types of oil and gas; calls on the Council to maintain, mirror where possible and extend its sanctions policy against Russia, and all the enabling states, such as Belarus, Iran, North Korea, and to sanction Chinese entities suppling dual-use goods and military items, while monitoring, reviewing and enhancing the policy’s effectiveness and impact; calls on the Commission and the Member States to ensure the swift implementation and strict enforcement of all packages of sanctions and to strengthen cooperation among Member States; asks the Commission for an impact assessment of the effectiveness of sanctions in hindering the Russian war effort and on the effectiveness of measures to prevent the circumvention of sanctions; calls on the Council to systematically tackle the issue of sanctions circumvention by EU-based companies, third parties and non-EU countries, and to adopt and strictly implement restrictive measures against all entities facilitating the circumvention of sanctions and providing the Russian military complex with military and dual-use technologies and equipment;

    26.  Calls for further sanctions against sectors of special importance for the Russian economy, in particular banking, the metallurgy, nuclear, chemical and agriculture sectors, raw materials such as aluminium, steel, uranium, titanium and nickel, as well as for anti-circumvention measures against all countries and entities that provide Russia with military and dual-use goods and technologies; calls for further actions against the Russian ‘shadow fleet’, in the light of sanctions circumvention, sabotage of critical infrastructure and environmental risks; calls on the Commission to jointly engage with flag and port states outside of the EU and take action against owners, operators and insurance operators in third countries that enable Russia’s shadow fleet; urges the Member States to further coordinate operational cooperation between coast guard agencies in order to increase the overall capacity for maritime surveillance; highlights that Russia is increasing its reliance on gas-derived fertilisers, which provide a growing source of revenue, while simultaneously compromising EU economies and threatening food security; expects the EU to keep its sanctions against Russia in place as long as needed to secure a just and lasting peace and until accountability is achieved;

    27.  Calls for the next EU sanctions package to sanction all known shadow fleet tankers and their owners, while also introducing sanctions on any oil tanker breaching the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships and enforcing strict implementation by all Member States of the measures prohibiting vessels, irrespective of flag, from sailing in European waters or into any EU Member State port if they have not followed the international rules regarding ship-to-ship transfers (STS) at sea or have illegally turned off their automatic identification system; urges the Commission and the Member States to ban ship-to-ship transfers of Russian oil in EU waters;

    28.  Calls on the Commission and the Member States to develop broader sanctions on Russian and Belarusian wood, including specifically prohibiting the import or purchase of wood products processed in non-EU countries that incorporate wood, particularly birch plywood, originating in Russia or Belarus, to support the enforcement of current sanctions;

    29.  Strongly condemns the Hungarian Government for threatening to block the renewal of the EU’s sanctions framework as well as to limit an appropriate EU response commensurate with the gravity of the situation; calls on the Member States to use all available tools to prevent the Hungarian Government from further blocking;

    30.  Calls for further limitations on Russian and Belarusian citizens entering the EU, especially through more stringent security screenings, including the submission of military service records during the Schengen visa application process, notwithstanding the need to issue humanitarian visas;

    31.  Strongly condemns the execution of Ukrainian prisoners of war by Russian forces; calls for the EU, its Member States and international partners to increase pressure on Russia to comply with its international obligations, particularly the Geneva Convention, and allow international organisations access to prisoners;

    32.  Condemns the devastating impact of Russia’s war on children; calls for increased EU support for children’s education, healthcare, mental health services, and for child protection, including trauma recovery and safe learning environments; urges the EU and Ukraine to prioritise children’s needs in aid and reconstruction efforts, in clearing landmines, and in integrating child welfare into the EU accession process;

    33.  Reiterates its concern about the situation at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, which is illegally controlled by Russia; supports efforts to maintain a continued International Atomic Energy Agency presence at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant; reiterates its deep concern about the broader long-term environmental impact of the war;

    34.  Calls for the EU and its Member States to strengthen EU strategic communication, particularly to publicly set the record straight about the EU’s leading support to Ukraine – especially in light of claims that seek to diminish its contribution – to counter hybrid threats and grey zone activities, and to prevent Russian interference in political, electoral, and other democratic processes in Ukraine and Europe; urges proactive communication on EU enlargement benefits to enhance public understanding and support for Ukraine’s accession in both Ukraine and the Member States; underlines that Ukraine’s EU integration is an opportunity for the development of both bordering regions and the Member States; calls strongly for the EU and the Member States to combat Russian disinformation about the war, by strengthening digital literacy, promoting fact-based narratives and holding social media platforms accountable for spreading harmful content by strictly enforcing the Digital Services Act(3);

    35.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the President, Government and Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

    (1) OJ L 161, 29.5.2014, p. 3, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_internation/2014/295/oj.
    (2) OJ L, 2024/792, 29.2.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/792/oj.
    (3) Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act) (OJ L 277, 27.10.2022, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj).

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Turkish attacks in Syria – P-000491/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The EU is closely following developments throughout Syria and supports an inclusive Syrian-led and Syrian-owned transition process, guided by the respect for international law, human rights, fundamental freedoms, pluralism and tolerance among all components of society. The interim leadership will be judged on their actions.

    The EU listing of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and its leaders is a transposition of the restrictive measures adopted by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), therefore any change in the listing status is a matter for the UNSC.

    The suspension of other, sectoral, EU sanctions on Syria will be rolled out in a staged and reversible manner, whilst regularly assessing whether further suspension remains appropriate based on close monitoring of the situation on the ground.

    The EU remains strongly engaged in the fight against Da’esh and its affiliates, including in the framework of the Global Coalition against Da’esh[1].

    The EU is particularly concerned by the current situation in the northeast of Syria, and how this might impact on the stabilisation and the future of the country.

    The EU is addressing the identified risks through counter-terrorism cooperation with regional partners, through its multilateral engagement with the UN and as co-chair of the Global Counterterrorism Forum[2], through security measures, support for repatriation, rehabilitation and reintegration programmes as well as through funding programmes to prevent and counter violent extremism, radicalisation and propaganda.

    The EU welcomes the founder of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) recent call to the PKK to lay down arms and dissolve. Finding a fair and lasting solution, respecting fundamental rights and the rule of law, would not only benefit all Turkish citizens but would also contribute to stability in the entire region.

    • [1] https://theglobalcoalition.org/en/
    • [2] https://www.thegctf.org/

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Latest news – Next SEDE meetings – Committee on Security and Defence

    Source: European Parliament

    18 March 2025:
    The Committees SEDE/CONT/TRAN will hold jointly a presentation of the ECA special report on Military moibility by its Rapporteur Marek Opiola, on Tuesday, 18 March 2025 from 14:30 – 16:00 in Brussels (ANTALL 4Q1).

    The draft agenda can be found here.

    19 and 20 March 2025:
    The next meeting of the Committee on Security and Defence (SEDE) is scheduled to take place on Wednesday, 19 March 2025 from 9:00 – 12:30 and 16.00-18.15 and Thursday, 20 March 2025 from 9:00 – 12:15 in Brussels (SPINELLI 3G3).

    Further information about the meeting can be found here.

    SEDE missions 2025:

    • Bosnia and Herzegovina – 24-27 February 2025
    • Israel and Palestine – 5-8 February 2025


    SEDE missions 2024:

    • United Kingdom – 28-30 October 2024
    • Ukraine – 25-26 October 2024

     

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – The need for EU support towards a just transition and reconstruction in Syria – P10_TA(2025)0035 – Wednesday, 12 March 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to UN Security Council Resolution 2254 (2015) of 18 December 2015,

    –  having regard to the establishment of the UN Independent Institution on Missing Persons in the Syrian Arab Republic, under UN General Assembly Resolution 77/301 of 29 June 2023,

    –  having regard to its recommendation of 28 February 2024 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the situation in Syria(1),

    –  having regard to the statement by the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 9 December 2024,

    –  having regard to the Council conclusions of 19 December 2024,

    –  having regard to the orders of the Paris Judicial Court of 14 November 2023 and 21 January 2025 issuing international arrest warrants for Bashar al-Assad and members of his family, and to universal jurisdiction cases in European courts,

    –  having regard to the joint statement by the Governments of France, Syria, Bahrain, Canada, Egypt, Germany, Greece, Iraq, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Türkiye, the United Arab Emirates and the United Kingdom, the European Union, the United Nations Special Envoy for Syria, the Secretary General of the League of Arab States and the Secretary General of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf of 13 February 2025,

    –  having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/406 of 24 February 2025 amending Decision 2013/255/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Syria(2),

    –  having regard to the statement issued following Syria’s National Dialogue Conference, held in Damascus on 25 February 2025,

    –  having regard to the statement of 8 March 2025 by the Spokesperson of the European External Action Service on the latest developments in Syria,

    –  having regard to Rules 136(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

    A.  whereas in December 2024 Syria witnessed momentous change, as a rebel coalition spearheaded by the armed group Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the Syrian National Army (SNA), the Southern Operations Room (formerly Southern Front) and several other opposition forces toppled Bashar al-Assad’s murderous regime; whereas the historic collapse of the Assad dynasty marked the end of half of a century of suffering for the Syrian people, with unprecedented tyranny and chaos unfolding after Bashar al-Assad brutally repressed the 2011 uprising and led the country into civil war, as well as the beginning of a new chapter for the Syrian people and the broader Middle East;

    B.  whereas the fallen Assad regime engaged in systematic repression, mass arrests, torture, enforced disappearances, extrajudicial executions and other grave human rights violations, and is responsible for documented war crimes and crimes against humanity, including the deliberate targeting of civilians, siege warfare leading to mass starvation, the use of barrel bombs and the deployment of chemical weapons, in violation of international law; whereas since 2011, at least half a million Syrians have died and 14 million have been forced to flee their homes, of which roughly 7 million have been internally displaced, as a result of the fierce repression and demographic engineering by the Assad regime and his allies, as well as at the hands of terrorist groups; whereas the fates and whereabouts of tens of thousands of people remain unknown;

    C.  whereas Russia and Iran, under the guise of strategic alliances, were both enablers and active players in the war waged by the bloody Assad regime against its own people and used Syria as a geopolitical battleground for destabilising the region, as a hub for arms and drug trafficking, as well as a testing ground for military capabilities and tactics, systematically targeting civilian infrastructure and humanitarian aid convoys in clear violation of international law; whereas Assad’s power relied on Russia and Iran’s continued support and their supply of manpower and weapons, as well as that of their proxies, including the Wagner Group, the Lebanese Hezbollah, Iraqi militias and Afghan mercenaries; whereas his sudden fall is a clear geostrategic defeat for both countries;

    D.  whereas after assuming a leading role in overthrowing the regime, former HTS leader Ahmed al-Sharaa was designated caretaker President and launched a political transition process, entailing plans for a new constitution and the holding of elections in four to five years from now; whereas the caretaker president was tasked with forming a temporary legislative council, appointed a caretaker government and pledged to establish, by early March 2025, a new non-sectarian, comprehensive, credible and inclusive government reflecting Syria’s ethnic and religious diversity; whereas on 24 and 25 February 2025, the Syrian interim government held the announced National Dialogue Conference; whereas the Syrian constitution of 2012 was nullified and the People’s Assembly and the Baath Party dissolved; whereas many armed groups also formally agreed to dissolve and be integrated into the Syrian army;

    E.  whereas the EU rightly refused to normalise its ties with the Assad regime right through to its demise and played a significant role as a major humanitarian donor to Syrian civilians and as host to 1,3 million refugees fleeing the conflicts; whereas since 2011, the EU and its Member States have mobilised more than EUR 33,3 billion in humanitarian, development, economic and stabilisation assistance focusing on life-saving aid, resilience programmes and the political implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2254 (2015); whereas in December 2024 the EU launched a humanitarian air bridge to deliver emergency healthcare and other essential supplies; whereas in the aftermath of the fall of the Assad regime, some Member States announced a suspension of pending asylum applications by Syrians; whereas the EU has suspended sanctions on key economic sectors to facilitate engagement with Syria and its reconstruction;

    F.  whereas the caretaker government authorities control most but not all of Syrian territory, with the overall security situation in Syria remaining fragmented and volatile; whereas violent events, including revenge killings, sectarian violence and criminal activities, are seen to be increasing, particularly in the coastal and rural areas; whereas pro-Assad armed groups and, allegedly, others have conducted coordinated attacks starting on 6 March 2025 in the Latakia, Tartus and Homs governorates, leading to deadly clashes with Syrian security forces; whereas in return, members of the Syrian security forces and the SNA, foreign fighters and jihadists reportedly participated in unjustifiable retaliations and executions targeting Alawite civilians on the basis of their ethno-religious affiliation; deplores also the confirmed killings of at least 10 Christians; whereas, despite the statement delivered by de facto President al-Sharaa, the fighting lasted several days and has so far caused over 1 000 casualties; whereas de facto President al-Shaara has announced the creation of a ‘fact-finding committee’ and of a ‘higher committee’;

    G.  whereas north-eastern Syria is still currently administered by the self-proclaimed Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria and controlled militarily by the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF); whereas on 10 March 2025 an agreement towards their integration within all institutions of the Syrian state was jointly signed by de facto President al-Sharaa and Commander in Chief of the SDF Mazloum Abdi; whereas since December 2024, the Turkish-backed SNA militias, some of which have not been included in the transitional government, and Türkiye itself, have intensified attacks and incursions within northern Syrian territory, including attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure in the Manbij and Kobani areas, which may amount to war crimes;

    H.  whereas Israel has occupied a part of the Syrian territory in the Golan Heights since 1967; whereas following the overthrow of the Assad regime, Israel has further seized the UN-patrolled demilitarised zone beyond the Golan Heights and repeatedly carried out strikes on military targets in Syria; whereas the Israeli Minister of Defence has declared that ‘the IDF will remain at the summit of Mount Hermon and the security zone indefinitely’;

    I.  whereas Russia seeks to retain its military bases in Syria, particularly the Tartus naval base and the Hmeimim military airfield; whereas Bashar al-Assad and his family fled the country and have been granted political asylum in Russia; whereas diplomatic contact has been made between Russia and the new Syrian authorities;

    J.  whereas the Assad regime supported Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and recognised the occupied Luhansk and Donetsk regions in Ukraine, as well as the Abkhazia region in Georgia; whereas Ukraine’s military intelligence service systematically reported that Russia was training mercenaries recruited in Syria to support Russia’s war against Ukraine; whereas the ‘Grain from Ukraine’ initiative was deployed in Syria after the suspension of Russian food exports;

    K.  whereas Daesh has caused tremendous suffering in Syria, triggered numerous terrorist attacks worldwide and continues to operate within and from Syria, relying on its centre for external operational planning in the Badia region; whereas approximately 10 000 Daesh fighters and 40 000 Daesh family members are currently being detained in the Al-Hol and Roj detention facilities, primarily guarded by the Kurdish-led SDF; whereas Syrian security forces may reportedly take over the management of the detention facilities following the agreement of 10 March 2025 made between de facto President al-Sharaa and SDF Commander in Chief Mazloum Abdi;

    L.  whereas Syria’s Christian population has steeply declined since 2011 due to its targeting by both the Assad regime, as well as by Daesh and other terrorist groups;

    M.  whereas the situation in Syria remains one of the world’s most acute humanitarian crises, with nine out of ten Syrians below the poverty line and almost 17 million people – 70 % of the population – requiring humanitarian assistance because of widespread food insecurity and a lack of basic infrastructure and public services;

    N.  whereas, according to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the humanitarian response for Syria is significantly underfunded, having secured less than 10 % of the USD 1.2 billion needed until March 2025; whereas the executive order issued by US President Donald Trump’s administration, enacting a 90-day suspension of all foreign assistance programmes, including those administered by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), has and will have an impact on the humanitarian programmes and non-governmental organisations that operate on the ground in Syria; whereas the UK and several EU Member States have also announced significant decreases in their global aid budgets;

    O.  whereas Syria finds itself in a tremendously dire economic situation, with soaring inflation in the country reaching a record high level of 40,2 % in 2024, electricity shortages and rising commodity prices; whereas the collapse of the Syrian economy was exacerbated by regime corruption, predatory economic policies and reliance on illicit activities, including the production and trafficking of Captagon; whereas a colossal reconstruction effort must be undertaken while navigating the shift to an open market economy, with exports having dramatically decreased compared to pre-war levels;

    P.  whereas 5,5 million Syrian refugees live in the five countries neighbouring Syria, namely Türkiye, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Egypt, with the EU providing financial assistance to help shoulder the associated costs; whereas approximately 500 000 internally displaced persons and 300 000 external refugees have returned to their areas of origin since the collapse of the Assad regime, with inadequate services, limited livelihoods and damaged infrastructure hindering their sustainable reintegration;

    1.  Praises the bravery, dignity and resilience of the Syrian people, who finally succeeded in overthrowing the cruel Assad dictatorship; pays tribute to the countless victims of the regime; calls for the EU to seize this historic opportunity to support a Syrian-led political transition in order to unite and rebuild the country, and to assist Syria in implementing its reconstruction and achieving a just and inclusive political transition; remains concerned, however, by the high degree of instability, both in Syria and in the region; underlines that a stable and peaceful Syria is in the interests of the Middle East, the EU’s southern neighbourhood and the EU itself;

    2.  Welcomes the fresh start in EU-Syria relations, manifested by the appointment of an EU Chargé d’affaires in Damascus, diplomatic engagement and high-level meetings undertaken by Member States and EU leaders, as well as the anticipated organisation of the Ninth Brussels Conference set to take place on 17 March 2025; encourages the EU and all its Member States to cooperate with Syria’s interim authorities in a transparent, coordinated and responsible manner, and to convey readiness to provide state-building assistance if and as needed; welcomes dialogue held alongside regional partners in the so-called ‘Aqaba’ format;

    3.  Strongly believes that stability in Syria will come from a pluralistic political transition that includes credible representatives of all components of Syrian society and of all geographical areas, that is to say all religious and ethnic communities, women, civil society and peaceful opposition forces; welcomes the caretaker president’s acknowledgement of Syria’s diversity while taking note that the composition of the current interim government is lacking in this regard; underlines the importance of the future government reflecting this plurality and for a future constitutional framework guaranteeing equal rights and access to opportunities for all Syrians, in line with democratic principles, the rule of law, fundamental rights and freedoms, including religious freedom, as upheld by international law, as well as clear and concrete evidence that these rights are respected in national and local decisions;

    4.  Acknowledges in this regard, the National Dialogue Conference that took place on 25 February 2025 as a starting point for establishing a culture of dialogue for all Syrians; expresses its concern about the exclusion of Kurdish political representatives, as well as the failure to ensure the participation of all segments of Syrian civil society, particularly women; recalls, further, that this dialogue ought to be upheld in order to prevent deepening societal divisions and discord within key segments of Syrian society and further destabilising an already fragile security situation; calls on the interim government to craft a roadmap setting out its plan for carrying out the political transition process and improve transparency in respect of Syrian citizens;

    5.  Notes with concern the violent past of factions that toppled the Assad regime and are now participating in government; takes good note of the caretaker President’s declarations of intent, while pledging to monitor the actions of national and local authorities when evaluating further engagement; expresses cautious optimism regarding the behaviour of the caretaker authorities regarding freedom of religion and encourages them to implement further confidence-building measures; calls on the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Member States to consistently speak out against any possible violation of fundamental freedoms and human rights in Syria by the interim government or other groups;

    6.  Is deeply worried by the fragile security situation across Syria, particularly the coastal area, and firmly condemns the retaliatory targeting of the Alawite community based on its perceived association with the Assad regime; calls on the caretaker authorities to rein in all violent factions, including those set to be incorporated within the Syrian army and security forces, protect all civilian citizens from violence and ensure their right to live in safety; calls for prompt, transparent and impartial investigations into all killings and other violations and for those responsible to be held to account, in line with international legal norms and standards; urges the caretaker government to ensure that all military and security appointments are based strictly on professional qualifications, respect for international human rights and humanitarian law, and a commitment to combating terrorism; expresses concern regarding the presence of foreign extremist fighters, including European citizens, among the forces that overthrew the Assad regime, and cautions against integrating them permanently into the Syrian security apparatus; recognises the challenge for orderly state-building linked to the risk of insurgency by armed groups loyal to the former regime; encourages caretaker authorities to organise paramilitary and civilian disarmament;

    7.  Praises the invaluable contribution of civil society, in Syria and abroad, as the legitimate repository and defender of the aspirations of the Syrian people during years of brutal oppression; pays particular tribute to the White Helmets, target of a regime-orchestrated and Russia-backed smear campaign; calls for the EU to increase financial support, especially for Syrian civil society organisations as they adapt to shifting operating conditions, with a focus on promoting civic dialogue, notably between ethnic, cultural and religious communities, to foster pluralism, peaceful coexistence and trust within Syrian society;

    8.  Stresses the importance of recognising the role of sexualised and gender-based violence in justice and accountability processes, as well as of policies to ensure women’s full participation and representation in political life, as well as their economic empowerment; calls, further, to address specifically the suffering inflicted on children;

    9.  Is concerned by the exponential rise of disinformation originating both within Syria and from abroad; warns of the risk of instrumentalisation of communities also by foreign actors; stresses the need for a pluralistic media landscape to flourish and operate free of censorship and under a legally protected freedom of the press; calls for the EU and its Member States to provide funding and capacity-building in this regard;

    10.  Strongly believes that the success of the Syrian political transition, notably the safeguarding of civil peace and the building of trust in state institutions, hinges on transitional justice and reconciliation as a path to fighting the impunity of all parties responsible for violations of international humanitarian law and human rights abuses; calls for judicial reform to be made an urgent political priority; encourages the caretaker Syrian Government to establish an independent transitional justice committee to ensure accountability for past human rights violations committed by all factions, emphasising that military unification cannot be achieved without a credible justice mechanism to build trust among armed groups, including representatives from the southern factions, the SDF and former regime officers;

    11.  Calls on caretaker authorities to fully cooperate with competent international instances, including UN mechanisms established specifically for investigating serious crimes in Syria, such as the UN International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism, the UN Commission of Inquiry on Syria, the UN Independent Institution on Missing Persons, and the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and facilitate their on-site operations; encourages Syria to ratify the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and align national legislation accordingly, as well as give the ICC retroactive jurisdiction through a declaration; recognises the irreplaceable contribution of Fareed al-Madhhan (‘Caesar’) to documenting regime crimes, as well as the Syrian Network of Human Rights’ work in tracking disappearances; stresses the importance of these processes now being completed; calls for the EU to support the renewal of the mandate of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Syria and increase funding for all relevant mechanisms, notably in light of US disinvestment;

    12.  Commends the steps taken to fight impunity through universal jurisdiction cases in Germany, France and other Member States, of individuals linked to the Assad regime and Daesh; encourages courts to continue such prosecutions and expects newfound evidence and fruitful cooperation with Syrian authorities to lead to leaps in investigations and convictions;

    13.  Stresses the need for Syria’s transitional authorities to urgently take all steps to secure and preserve physical evidence of serious international crimes across the country, including through cooperation and engagement with international experts and current international mechanisms, and to grant all competent organisations access to archival documents; encourages the EU to provide support for timely evidence collection on the ground, including forensic equipment and expertise to identify and analyse mass graves, as well as the collection of survivors’ testimonies;

    14.  Highlights that Syria is among the most heavily mine-contaminated countries; is alarmed by the rising number of victims, including children, who have been killed or injured by mines and other explosives, a problem that is further increasing as people start to return; commends efforts by international and local organisations in identifying, marking and clearing explosive ordnance, and calls for the EU to urgently support demining efforts jointly with specialised actors and Syrian authorities;

    15.  Reiterates its strongest condemnation of the appalling use of chemical weapons against Syrian civilians by the Assad regime; welcomes the announcement by Syria’s interim government to destroy any remaining stockpiles of chemical weapons in Syria and its openness to cooperate with the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons;

    16.  Appreciates the determination demonstrated by caretaker authorities in discontinuing the production and trafficking of drugs, in particular Captagon, which have negatively affected the whole region for years; encourages international cooperation against the trafficking of drugs, arms and human beings;

    17.  Highlights the importance of protecting Syria’s cultural heritage and calls for international collaboration to restore historical sites and religious landmarks and to prevent the illicit trade in looted artefacts; urges the EU to support Syria in efforts to restore areas and places of cultural significance to the Syrian public and the world, including the UNESCO site of Palmyra after its revolting partial destruction by Daesh in 2015;

    18.  Acknowledges that the Syrian economy is shattered, with considerable investment gaps towards achieving price stability and sustained job creation; calls for all necessary steps to be taken in order to incentivise and facilitate foreign direct investment in accordance with international standards, as well as for reforms addressing housing, land and property rights and policies balancing development across urban and rural areas to reduce regional disparities; encourages economic disentanglement from Russia and Iran after both countries have profited from Syria’s economic collapse to extract resources and control strategic industries;

    19.  Welcomes the gradual and conditional suspension of sanctions on a range of economic sectors and the indefinite extension of humanitarian exemptions; underlines that despite recent adjustments, the EU, US and UK sanctions policies towards Syria are an obstacle to reconstruction efforts; calls on the Commission and the Council to reach out to other countries imposing sanctions on Syria, notably the US and the UK; supports a full yet reversible lifting of all sectoral sanctions, with a focus on the financial sector, so as to provide the Syrian economy a much-needed lifeline, while closely monitoring the political transition process; expects over-compliance to remain an issue as long as extensive US and UK sanctions remain in place, notably due to the former’s extraterritorial dimension; calls on the Commission and the Member States to provide European businesses and banks with legal assurances to counteract over-compliance; calls, nevertheless, for individual sanctions against military personnel, officials, business entities and individuals associated with the Assad family to be maintained; expects the yearly update of the EU sanction regime ahead of its expiration on 1 June 2025 to adequately assess the relevance of all renewed sanctions, allowing for much-needed clarity, and asks the European Council to define and clearly communicate clear steps that Syria’s authorities must carry out, to secure further sanctions easing or prevent the activation of a snapback;

    20.  Welcomes the announcement by the Commission to allocate EUR 235 million in new humanitarian support to Syrians and calls for the EU and its Member States to sustain humanitarian and development aid efforts and to maintain financial support for neighbouring countries hosting Syrian refugees; invites the EU to explore pathways to use frozen assets of the Assad regime for a trust fund for Syrian reconstruction, rehabilitation and compensation of victims; is extremely concerned by the suspension of all USAID funding related to Syria or Syrian refugees and by the foreseen non-participation of the US in the next Brussels conference;

    21.  Calls for the EU to strategically extend its focus from humanitarian aid to accelerated and early economic recovery and reconstruction in key sectors such as energy, water supply, healthcare and education, in order to reach tangible results while ensuring that programming is accompanied by due diligence and independent monitoring; urges the European Union and its Members States to agree on the joint provision of sustainable funding at the forthcoming Ninth Brussels Conference;

    22.  Welcomes the decision taken, for example, by France to allow refugees to return to Syria and participate in its reconstruction without jeopardising their status, including for ‘go-and-see’ visits to Syria; calls on the Member States and third countries to urgently replicate this initiative; calls on the Commission to encourage and provide the Member States with guidance and best practice on the implementation of EU law on this issue, including as regards the difference between ‘travel’ and ‘re-establishment’; insists that all asylum status claims and renewals must be assessed individually and thoroughly; stresses the importance of balanced participation in the political transition process of the Syrian diaspora as a key asset for the country’s transition and reconstruction; recognises the importance of remittances alongside official development assistance and urges the Member States to lift any restrictions placed on sending remittances to Syria; recalls, moreover, that according to the UN Refugee Convention, conditions for the safe, voluntary and dignified return of refugees can only be met following fundamental and durable changes in Syria;

    23.  Recalls the presence of over 400 000 Palestinian refugees residing in Syria, some of them displaced multiple times, and the role of the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) in assisting its needs; remembers the siege of the Yarmouk camp by Assadist factions between 2013 and 2015;

    24.  Calls on Syria to break free from its notorious long-standing alliances with Tehran and Moscow, which have brought suffering to the Syrian people and destabilisation to the Middle East and beyond; calls, further, on the caretaker Syrian authorities to bring the Russian military presence in Syria to an end; condemns Russia for hosting Bashar al-Assad and his family and shielding them from justice, after having obstructed justice by actively interfering in international investigations and vetoing UN Security Council resolutions aimed at addressing the regime’s war crimes and their own;

    25.  Calls on neighbouring countries to respect Syria’s territorial integrity and sovereignty and to immediately cease all attacks and incursions on and occupation of Syrian territory in full compliance with international law;

    26.  Firmly believes that the unification of all segments of Syria, including the integration of all armed factions within a national army, require a Syrian-led political solution; calls for the EU and the Member States to use all diplomatic channels to advocate the stabilisation of Syria, which is in the interest of most countries in the region, and support discussions towards a peaceful and stable solution and ensure that the well-being and preservation of fundamental freedoms, economic, social and cultural rights, as well as the gender equality of all Syrians, notably those living in north-eastern Syria, remain at the centre of decisions; welcomes, in this regard, the agreement of 10 March 2025 between de facto President al-Sharaa and SDF Commander in Chief Mazloum Abdi and hopes for its smooth implementation; takes note of the positive result of recent negotiations between Kurdish armed groups in Türkiye and the Turkish Government towards disarmament;

    27.  Insists that different ethnic and religious groups must be protected in order to create a peaceful Syria; therefore calls for the European Union and the Member States to support the implementation process of the agreement between the Syrian transitional government and the Kurdish-led SDF, in order to guarantee the Kurdish community full recognition and political participation in Syria;

    28.  Stresses the importance of the fight led by the international coalition against Daesh, with the invaluable support of Kurdish fighters, and calls for it to cooperate with the Syrian interim government to prevent Daesh and other jihadist groups from reorganising; expresses deep concerns as attacks led or supported by Türkiye in north-eastern Syria not only cause civilian casualties and increase the number of internally displaced persons, but also threaten the efficiency and continuity of the fight against Daesh; urges the caretaker authorities to demonstrate clear commitment to the fight against terrorism and to cooperate with international partners both to fight remaining active cells in Syria and to investigate past crimes, notably against the Yazidi community;

    29.  Urgently calls for a lasting solution to be found among all the parties concerned as these camps continue to be breeding grounds for radicalisation and constitute a dormant threat to both Syrian and European security; warns against the serious international security risk a sudden disengagement of the United States in the region would cause in this uncertain context; reiterates its call on the Member States to repatriate all their nationals, especially children, from Al-Hol and Roj and to bring adults to justice in fair trials;

    30.  Calls on the Islamic Republic of Iran to cease all activities aimed at torpedoing the Syrian caretaker government’s political and economic efforts and forcedly altering the status quo; commends the interim authorities for intercepting Iranian weapon shipments destined for Hezbollah in Lebanon and welcomes the complete collapse of Iran’s extensive infrastructure and networks in Syria;

    31.  Welcomes de facto President al-Sharaa’s pledge to seek peaceful relations with all of Syria’s neighbours; calls on the caretaker Syrian authorities to ensure this commitment is turned into concrete action to prevent and refrain from taking any security-threatening measures against neighbouring countries and beyond;

    32.  Condemns those European politicians, including current and former MEPs, who have repeatedly spread pro-Assad narratives and actively engaged in whitewashing the bloody dictatorship; expresses deep concern regarding the recent invitation by Parliament’s Intergroup on Christians in the Middle East of organisations closely linked to EU-sanctioned Assadists;

    33.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the relevant EU institutions, the governments and parliaments of the Member States and the caretaker Syrian government, and to have it translated and published in Arabic.

    (1) OJ C, C/2024/6749, 26.11.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6749/oj.
    (2) OJ L, 2025/406, 25.2.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2025/406/oj.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – White paper on the future of European defence – P10_TA(2025)0034 – Wednesday, 12 March 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to Rules 136(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

    A.  whereas over the last decade, major geopolitical shifts, amplified by the return of large-scale war to our neighbourhood, have been threatening the security of the EU, its Member States, the candidate countries and their respective citizens; whereas the EU is currently under attack, with hybrid incidents inside its borders, a large-scale war in its neighbourhood and a realignment of global powers, all presenting real risks to the security of the EU and its citizens and requiring immediate, ambitious and decisive action; whereas Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has been a watershed moment in European history; whereas Putin’s war of aggression against Ukraine is widely recognised as an attack on the European peace order established after the Second World War and the global order as a whole;

    B.  whereas the global order is fragmenting and increasingly characterised by complex and entrenched instabilities;

    C.  whereas there cannot be any European security without security in its immediate neighbourhood, starting with Ukraine’s capacity to resist Russia’s war of aggression;

    D.  whereas recent statements by members of the US administration, accompanied by the heavy pressure exerted on Ukraine by the US leadership, reflect a shift in US foreign policy as the Trump administration is proposing the normalisation of ties with Russia and it is becoming increasingly clear that Europe needs to strengthen its security and defence to be able to help Ukraine to defend itself;

    E.  whereas the quickest and most extensive expansion of Russia’s capabilities is taking place near its borders with the West, while the EU is taking its time to enhance its defence capacity;

    F.  whereas China, driven by the ambition to become a global superpower, is eroding the rules-based international order by increasingly pursuing assertive foreign and hostile economic and competition policies and exporting dual-use goods deployed by Russia on the battlefield against Ukraine, thereby threatening European security and interests; whereas China is also investing tremendously in its armed forces, using its economic power to quash criticism worldwide and is striving to assert itself as the dominant power in the Indo-Pacific region; whereas China, by intensifying its confrontational, aggressive and intimidating actions against some of its neighbours, particularly in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, poses a risk to regional and global security as well as to the EU’s economic interests;

    G.  whereas the impact of wars, terrorism, instability, insecurity, poverty and climate change in the Sahel region, north-eastern Africa and Libya poses serious risks to EU security; whereas the instability and insecurity in the southern neighbourhood and the Sahel region are closely interlinked with, and remain an ongoing challenge for, the EU’s management of its external borders;

    H.  whereas European security is linked to stability on the African continent, and the growing presence of non-European actors is testament to the lack of sufficient security and diplomatic engagement in the region to effectively counter these challenges and protect the EU’s strategic interests;

    I.  whereas, in the light of the worsening external environment and despite the efforts made in recent years to enhance the EU’s crisis preparedness through new legislation, mechanisms and tools across various policy areas, the EU and its Member States remain vulnerable to multiple crisis scenarios;

    J.  whereas there is an urgent need to further reform and strengthen the EU’s defence policy in the light of Ukraine’s recent war experience and the use of new war technologies;

    K.  whereas the Member States have different military and security policies, including policies of neutrality, and such policies should be respected;

    L.  whereas it is in the EU’s interest to see Ukraine as an integral part of a genuine European security system;

    M.  whereas the Black Sea has shifted from a secondary to a primary military theatre for the EU and NATO, and alongside the Baltic Sea, it has become a pivotal strategic region for European security in countering the Russian threat;

    N.  whereas the Arctic region is becoming increasingly important in terms of economic development and transport, while, at the same time, facing challenges linked to climate change and militarisation, as well as those resulting from increasing geopolitical competition and migration;

    O.  whereas as a result of investment in military equipment and ammunition, numerous reports, notably the Defence Investment Gaps Analysis(1) of May 2022, have analysed a worrying capability gap in European defence;

    P.  whereas the Strategic Compass(2) was mainly drafted and negotiated before 24 February 2022; whereas the Strategic Compass is a very broad strategy that provides little guidance with regards to the urgent need to accomplish defence readiness and provide deterrence and defence capabilities to prepare for the most urgent military contingencies;

    Q.  whereas the 2024 Draghi report on the future of European competitiveness(3) highlighted a funding need of EUR 500 billion in European defence for the next decade, and underlines a combination of structural weaknesses affecting the competitiveness of the EU’s Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB), and identifies fragmentation, insufficient public defence investment and limited access to financing as obstacles to a capable EDTIB;

    R.  whereas the Niinistö report(4) underlines the fact that the EU and its Member States are not yet fully prepared for the most severe cross-sectoral or multidimensional crisis scenarios;

    S.  whereas building defence capabilities and adapting them to military needs requires a common strategic culture and shared threat perception and assessment, as well as the development of solutions to be combined in doctrine and concepts;

    T.  whereas the EU’s ability to take decisive action in response to external threats has been repeatedly hampered by the requirement for unanimity, with certain Member States and candidate countries blocking or delaying critical military aid to Ukraine and hence undermining European security;

    U.  whereas, in the light of the above challenges and analyses, the President of the European Commission tasked the Commissioner for Defence and Space and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy with presenting a white paper on the future of European defence within the first 100 days of their term of office;

    V.  whereas Parliament and experts have been calling for a white paper on defence for more than a decade;

    A historic time for European defence: ‘become a genuine security provider’

    1.  Considers that the EU must act urgently to ensure its own autonomous security, strengthening its partnerships with like-minded partners and significantly reducing its dependencies on non-EU countries; stresses, therefore, that the EU is now at a turning point in its history and construction; insists that a ‘business as usual’ approach is no longer an option as it would lead to the end of a safe and secure Europe; considers that the EU and its Member States must choose between joining forces and working in unison to overcome the threats and attacks on EU security, and standing alone at the mercy of aggressive adversaries and unpredictable partners;

    2.  Recalls that the EU is a peace project and should strive towards peace and stability, while condemning aggression; underlines that in order to achieve peace and stability, we must support Ukraine and become more resilient ourselves;

    3.  Stresses that Europe continues to stand firmly on the side of Ukraine as it courageously fights for our European values, and recalls its conviction that it is on the Ukrainian battlefields that the future of Europe will be decided; strongly believes that Europe is today facing the most profound military threat to its territorial integrity since the end of the Cold War;

    4.  Strongly believes that strengthening Europe’s security and defence requires not just a simple increase in ambition and action, but a complete overhaul of the way we act and invest in our security and defence, such that from now on we plan, innovate, develop, purchase, maintain and deploy capabilities together, in a coordinated and integrated fashion, and making full use of the complementary competences of all actors in Europe, including NATO, to achieve a common European defence;

    5.  Believes that Russia, supported by its allies including Belarus, China, North Korea and Iran, is the most significant direct and indirect threat to the EU and its security, as well as that of EU candidate countries and partners; reiterates its condemnation, in the strongest possible terms, of Russia’s unprovoked, illegal and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine; notes, however, the need to consider fully the instability in our southern neighbourhood, the rise in Chinese military power and the increased aggressiveness of the middle powers, which appear ready to jeopardise transatlantic cooperation on common security and make a deal with the Russian aggressor at the expense of Ukrainian and European security, which are one and the same; notes that the recent actions and statements of the US administration have further increased concerns about the future stance of the US vis-à-vis Russia, NATO and the security of Europe; regrets, in this regard, the votes of the US Government, aligned with the Russian Government, in the UN General Assembly and the UN Security Council on resolutions about the third anniversary of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; strongly condemns US threats against Greenland;

    6.  Insists that Europe must take on greater responsibilities within NATO, especially when it comes to ensuring security on the European continent;

    7.  Believes that diplomacy should remain a cornerstone of EU foreign policy;

    8.  Reiterates its call on Türkiye, a NATO member state and EU candidate country, to abide by international law, recognise the Republic of Cyprus and immediately end the occupation and withdraw its troops from the island;

    9.  Underlines that the EU must now adopt a holistic and horizontal approach that integrates a defence and security dimension into most EU policies, supported by both regulatory and financial instruments and identified capability needs and gaps;

    10.  Believes, therefore, that the time has come for a renewed political ambition to act and turn the EU into a genuine security provider, increase the EU’s defence readiness and build a true European Defence Union; recalls that the adoption of the Strategic Compass was a good starting point, but notes that its timely implementation remains necessary; welcomes the recently introduced EU defence instruments and insists on the urgent need to scale up as EU defence efforts cannot remain limited in size, fragmented in scope and lengthy in delivery; calls for a quantum leap and a new approach to defence, including strong decisions, an action plan and both short- to long-term defence investment plans; underlines that this requires vision, concreteness and shared commitments, both in the strictly military field and in the industrial, technological and intelligence sectors;

    11.  Deplores the reluctance of the Council and the EU Member States when it comes to addressing deep structural challenges of the European defence industrial landscape and the lack of ambition as regards cooperation at EU level between the Member States’ armed forces; calls on the Member States to join forces and support a major step towards a very ambitious and comprehensive framework on defence;

    12.  Urges the EU to adopt a coherent and robust comprehensive framework to strengthen its security and that of its partners, better identify potential future breaking points and prevent further crises, and coordinate joint responses with its Member States similar to those used in wartime;

    13.  Believes that the white paper on the future of European defence should put forward concrete measures and options to the European Council so that truly groundbreaking and necessary efforts can be undertaken, differentiating between short- and long-term plans and objectives, addressing defence sector capability issues, industrial competitiveness and investment needs, and framing the overall approach to EU defence integration; urges both the Council and the Commission to identify clear and concrete priorities for the short, medium and long term, with a corresponding timeline of actions;

    14.  Considers that common security and defence policy (CSDP) missions and operations need to be reassessed and reviewed from this perspective; insists that the CSDP must be strengthened and made more agile, including by becoming the EU’s main instrument to fight hybrid warfare, in order to fulfil its role as an insurance policy for Europe’s security, as well as a power and security provider;

    15.  Expects the white paper on the future of European defence to identify the most pressing threats, structural risks and competitors, and define the extent to which the EU can develop contingency plans to ensure mutual support in the event of large-scale security crises, and help Europe anticipate, prepare for and deter potential aggressors and defend itself in the short and long term, in order to become a credible power and European pillar within NATO; underlines that the protection of EU land, air and maritime borders contributes to the security of the entire EU, in particular the EU’s eastern border, and thus stresses that the East Shield and Baltic Defence Line should be the flagship EU projects for fostering deterrence and overcoming potential threats from the East;

    16.  Calls for immediate measures to enhance the security and defence of the EU’s north-eastern border with Russia and Belarus by establishing a comprehensive and resilient defence line across land, air and maritime domains to counter military and hybrid threats including energy weaponisation, infrastructure sabotage and the instrumentalisation of migration; emphasises the need to coordinate and integrate national efforts through EU regulatory and financial instruments to accelerate implementation;

    17.  Stresses the need to enhance capabilities and resources, while overcoming the fragmentation of the defence market; fully agrees with the Draghi report’s view that the EU and its Member States must urgently decide on incentives for the EU defence industry and find creative solutions for large-scale public and private investments in security and defence;

    Short-term: defending Ukraine against an existential threat to Europe’s security

    18.  Urges the EU and its Member States to stand firmly on the side of Ukraine; recalls its conviction that it is on the Ukrainian battlefields that the future of Europe will be decided and that the trajectory of Russia’s war against Ukraine will be decisively shifted; underlines that such a shift now depends almost entirely on Europe; urges the Member States, therefore, to provide more arms and ammunition to Ukraine before negotiations are concluded; warns that, if the EU were to fail in its support and Ukraine were forced to surrender, Russia would then turn against other countries, including possibly the EU Member States; calls on the EU Member States, international partners and NATO allies to lift all restrictions on the use of Western weapons systems delivered to Ukraine against military targets in Russian territory; calls for the EU and its Member States to actively work towards maintaining and achieving the broadest possible international support for Ukraine and identifying a peaceful solution to the war that must be based on full respect for Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, the principles of international law, accountability for war crimes and the crime of aggression, and Russian payments for the massive damage caused in Ukraine; urges the EU and its Member States to participate in establishing robust future security guarantees for Ukraine;

    19.  Strongly believes that the EU must further expand and improve its tailor-made training operations to respond to the needs of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, and, in return, create conditions for European armed forces to learn lessons and strategic practices from them; calls on the Member States to further expand training operations for the Ukrainian Armed Forces, including in Ukrainian territory;

    20.  Emphasises the importance of ensuring a geographically balanced distribution of defence financing in the next multiannual financial framework (MFF);

    21.  Urges the EU to develop a ‘Ukraine strategy’, outlining clear objectives for supporting Ukraine’s defence capabilities and the integration of the Ukrainian DTIB into the EDTIB, and to find the necessary resources to implement such a strategy, while supporting European defence industry activities in Ukraine; proposes the allocation of a specific multi-billion euro budget to the European Defence Industry Programme’s (EDIP) Ukraine Support Instrument reserved exactly for this purpose; underscores that such a Ukraine strategy must be an integral part of a ‘European defence’ strategy;

    22.  Calls for urgent financial support to ensure the timely supply of defence products through joint procurement, industrial coordination, stockpiling, access to finance for manufacturers and the expansion and modernisation of production capacities;

    23.  Praises the ‘Danish model’ for support for Ukraine, which consists of procuring defence capabilities produced directly in Ukraine; urges the EU and its Member States to strongly support this model and to make full use of its potential, as there is an underutilisation of Ukraine’s defence industrial capacity, estimated at around 50 %, and it brings many advantages to both sides, such as cheaper equipment, speedier and safer logistics, and greater ease of training and maintenance;

    24.  Calls for a significant increase in the financing of military support for Ukraine; calls, in this regard, for the swift adoption of the next military aid package, which should be the largest to date and reflect the level of ambition this juncture calls for; calls on the EU Member States to commit at least 0,25 % of their GDP to military aid for Ukraine; condemns the veto imposed by one Member State on the functioning of the European Peace Facility; calls on the EU Member States, together with their G7 partners, to immediately seize all frozen Russian assets to serve as a foundation for a substantial grant and loan to Ukraine, as a legally sound and financially significant way to maintain and increase our support for Ukraine’s military needs;

    25.  Urges the Council and the Member States to review and strengthen the enforcement of existing sanctions and to adopt and strictly implement restrictive measures against all entities and non-EU states facilitating the circumvention of sanctions, providing Russia’s military complex with military and dual-use technologies and equipment; urges the Member States to pay special attention to the Russian shadow fleet and the security and environmental risks this poses;

    26.  Insists on the paramount importance of cooperation with, and the integration of, the Ukrainian defence industry into the EDTIB, which offers clear advantages for both sides, and calls for its speedier integration; highlights the urgency of properly financing EDIP’s Ukraine Support Instrument, which is currently not budgeted; further proposes the provision of war insurance for critical EDTIB projects inside Ukraine; proposes the regular inclusion of Ukrainian Defence Ministry officials with observer status at meetings of relevant Council configurations;

    27.  Urges the Commission and the Member States to make full use of the lessons learnt from Ukraine’s advanced modern warfare capabilities, including drones and electronic warfare;

    28.  Calls on the Commission to propose an EU drones package, focusing on drone and anti-drone systems and auxiliary capabilities, containing plans and funds to stimulate research and development, which should draw on lessons learnt from the Ukrainian experience and be open to the participation of Ukraine’s highly innovative companies, as well as an industrial programme dedicated to the joint development, production and procurement of drone and anti-drone systems, and a regulation on the use of drones in civilian and military contexts;

    ‘Ready for the most extreme military contingencies’– a new long-term approach

    Preparedness

    29.  Stresses that preparedness for hybrid and grey zone attacks must become part of the EU’s strategic culture, with permanent exercises, joint threat assessments and pre-planned, coordinated responses among Member States, particularly in regions bordering hostile powers;

    30.  Calls for the EU to develop a comprehensive EU risk assessment to help identify the major cross-sectoral threats and hazards, as well as the concrete risks facing the EU as a whole, building on current sector-specific risk assessment procedures;

    31.  Insists on the importance of using the upcoming ‘Preparedness Union Strategy’ to put the EU on track for comprehensive preparedness;

    32.  Supports a ‘Preparedness by Design’ principle being embedded horizontally and consistently across the EU institutions, bodies and agencies; insists on the need to develop a mandatory ‘security and preparedness check’ for future impact assessments and ‘stress-tests’ for existing legislation; stresses the need to reduce the obstacles in current national and EU legislation that undermine the efficiency of European defence and security;

    33.  Recommends, in particular, the Niinistö report recommendations aimed at empowering citizens to make societal resilience work, inspired by the Finnish concept of total defence;

    34.  Invites the Commission and the Member States to explore the feasibility of an EU preparedness act, setting joint standards and long-term guidelines to align EU and national efforts when possible;

    35.  Calls for the EU and its Member States to establish and regularly conduct an EU comprehensive preparedness exercise to horizontally test both high-level decision-making and operational coordination in order to build strong links between actors and across sectors;

    36.  Calls for the EU and its Members States to facilitate the use of CSDP instruments in complementarity with internal security tools in the immediate vicinity of the EU’s territory and territorial waters, and to strengthen dual-use and civil-military cooperation at EU level, based on a whole-of-government approach; reiterates its call for the protection of critical underwater infrastructure via the establishment of EU-specific rapid response strategies for underwater infrastructure protection, operating in alignment with NATO; encourages investment in advanced detection and surveillance systems for underwater infrastructure monitoring;

    Readiness: the Strategic Compass and the European Defence Industrial Strategy as the right tools

    37.  Calls for the EU to urgently adapt its tools to new realities by designing an administrative capacity to move much faster through the procedures when faced with wars or other large-scale crises, and to adopt the appropriate tools;

    38.  Considers regular threat analyses, such as the one first conducted in the Strategic Compass, as an absolute necessity; recommends, therefore, updating the EU’s Strategic Compass and adapting the measures within it accordingly in order to reflect the magnitude of our threat environment, and conducting more frequent threat assessments, as they are a precondition for realistically and successfully planning our capabilities and operations; considers that the Strategic Compass, the CSDP, the white paper and the European Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS) should form the basis for a comprehensive vision of European defence;

    39.  Insists that the Rapid Deployment Capacity must achieve full operational capability in 2025 and should be upgraded to be able to face the most extreme military contingencies; reiterates its call to strengthen the EU’s Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC), establishing it as the preferred command and control structure for EU military operations and providing it with adequate premises, staff and effective communication and information systems for all CSDP missions and operations, including those of the Rapid Deployment Capacity;

    40.  Reiterates its call on Türkiye, a NATO member, to withdraw its troops from Cyprus, an EU Member State, and work constructively to find a viable and peaceful solution based on the relevant UN resolutions;

    41.  Strongly believes that, in the current geopolitical context, the operationalisation of Article 42(7) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) on mutual assistance is of utmost importance, ensuring solidarity among Member States, especially those whose geographical position leaves them directly exposed to imminent threats and challenges, regardless of whether they are NATO members;

    42.  Reiterates the importance of EU-NATO cooperation, as NATO remains, for those states that are members of it, an important pillar of their collective defence; stresses that EU-NATO cooperation should continue, in particular, in areas such as information exchange, planning, military mobility and the exchange of best practice, and to reinforce deterrence, collective defence and interoperability; calls, nonetheless, for the development of a fully capable European pillar of NATO able to act autonomously whenever necessary; reiterates its call to strengthen cooperation – through action, not only words – on military mobility, information exchange, coordination of planning, improved cooperation on their respective military operations and enhanced response to hybrid warfare aimed at destabilising the whole EU continent;

    43.  Invites the Member States to actively participate in a priority-ordering mechanism for defence production to help prioritise orders, contracts and the recruitment of employees in emergency situations; underlines that the Member States should go beyond their current defence applications to encompass other essential resilience-building infrastructure such as energy, transport and telecommunications;

    44.  Recognises that the starting point must be a realistic assessment of critical defence capability gaps and shortfalls in order to ramp up defence industry production; underlines the need to ensure the coherence of output between the EU’s Capability Development Plan (CDP) and Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) and NATO’s capability targets in order to identify and address the critical defence capability gaps and shortfalls in the EU and focus efforts on European strategic enablers to provide genuine EU added value in order to address most extreme military contingencies; calls on the Commission to act on the recommendations of the European Court of Auditor’s Special Report 04/2025 on military mobility and to give greater importance to the military assessment during the selection process for dual-use projects;

    45.  Urges the EU and its Member States, with regard to armed forces, to move from the ‘flow’ approach that prevailed during peaceful times to a ‘stock’ approach, with a stockpile of defence equipment ready for a sustained increase in demand; notes, in this regard, the advantages offered by mechanisms such as advance purchase agreements, the establishment of ‘ever-warm’ facilities and the creation of defence readiness pools; believes that the Commission should take any actions necessary to encourage the Member States to increase exchanges and build trust among them regarding long-term, transparent planning, more proactive measures aimed at securing raw materials, and policies to close gaps in production processes and on the labour market;

    46.  Calls for the EU to adopt a global and coherent approach to external aid in all of its dimensions, with much stronger alignment between common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and CSDP objectives and instruments; considers that the strategic environments in which many EU CSDP missions are present are radically deteriorating, which demonstrates the need for the white paper to ensure flexibility in a 360 degree approach to European security that strives towards building a credible and capable deterrence capacity for the Member States, and ensures that Member State civilian and military personnel can deter and respond rapidly to the growing threat environment;

    47.  Considers that the CSDP must strongly participate in the fight against hybrid warfare against partner countries, particularly candidate countries; is deeply worried by the sharp increase in hybrid attacks, including sabotage, cyberattacks, information manipulation and election interference, with the objective of weakening the EU and its candidate countries; calls on the EU Member States to consider appropriate deterrence and countermeasures, including through the use of Article 42(7) TEU; calls, furthermore, on the Member States to pool resources and expertise in the field of cybersecurity; strongly advocates the development of a unified European approach to cyber forces; further insists on the swift creation of joint European cyber capabilities; recalls the increasing threats of cyber warfare and underlines the need for the EU to establish an EU cyber defence coordination centre to monitor, detect and respond to cyber threats in real time;

    48.  Insists on the need to improve the CSDP’s ability to identify, prevent and counter information manipulation aimed at hindering the EU’s external action; reiterates its calls to establish an effective horizontal strategic communications strategy adapted to all EU channels;

    49.  Calls for the creation of an ‘EU crisis response air fleet’ under the CSDP, comprising military transport aircraft held at EU level and made available to Member States for EU deployments, the transport of equipment or troops (military mobility), or in the event of emergency evacuations – as shown by the capability gap during the withdrawal from Afghanistan – as well as for civil security missions, based on a model similar to the European Air Transport Command;

    Coherence and sovereignty

    Coherence

    50.  Expects the European External Action Service (EEAS) to carry out comprehensive and uncompromising reviews of CSDP missions and operations, taking into account, in particular, the feasibility of their respective mandates in relation to the resources allocated, the staff recruitment method for missions and operations, especially on the link between the skills required and the different profiles, as well as the rationalisation of resources and the management of missions and operations, transparency in calls for tender, activities and results obtained, lessons learnt from best practice and difficulties encountered; asks the Council, on the basis of these reviews, to take decisions aimed at adapting or abandoning ineffective missions and strengthening the most useful missions; believes that the governance of evaluation and the control of CSDP missions and operations must be improved;

    51.  Believes that the EU should develop wartime economic cooperation contingency plans with close partners to ensure mutual support in the case of large-scale security crises involving them directly, and should deepen wartime economic dialogues with European and global partners to provide early warning of hard, hybrid and cyber threats, and foster mutual support planning, the protection of critical infrastructure and maritime safety;

    52.  Calls for the EU to further accelerate the implementation of military mobility; believes that the EU has to move from ‘mobility’ to ‘military logistics’; stresses the need for significant investment in military mobility infrastructure to enhance cargo airlift capabilities, camps, fuel infrastructure through depots, ports, air, sea and rail transport platforms, railway lines, waterways, roads, bridges and logistic hubs; stresses that this must be done in cooperation with NATO by drafting a strategic plan for developing mobility; calls for the rapid implementation of the technical arrangement signed under the aegis of the European Defence Agency Cross-Border Movement Permission, the harmonisation of customs formalities and the preparation of a centralised and justified lifting of road and rail traffic standards in the event of a crisis situation;

    53.  Believes that, in order to create a favourable ecosystem for the European defence industry, the EU must decide on a united and clear long-term vision for the European defence industry in order to provide visibility to the industry and ensure that priority needs are addressed;

    54.  Stresses that EDIP must actively facilitate the participation of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and new market entrants through simplified access to funding; emphasises that EDIP should be designed as a stepping stone towards greater European sovereignty in defence production; suggests that successful Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and European Defence Fund (EDF) projects be prioritised along the line of known capability gaps and that sufficient funding be ensured for projects that have proven to deliver; reiterates its call on the Member States to provide an implementation report on PESCO projects to Parliament at least twice a year; calls for a more geographically balanced development of the EDTIB, ensuring that critical capabilities, such as ammunition production, air defence systems and drone technologies, are also developed in frontline states, which have a direct understanding of operational needs;

    55.  Is deeply convinced that the EU-level instruments should prioritise and massively increase support for SMEs and start-ups in the dual-use and defence sector; stresses the need to support SMEs and start-ups in bringing successfully tested prototypes to the market, including the scaling up of production; underlines the need to bridge the current funding gap as regards these important steps that would strengthen the EDTIB, including in close cooperation with the Ukrainian technological and defence industrial base;

    56.  Urges the EU to increase coherence between existing and future EU instruments, in particular between PESCO, on demand consolidation, and the EDF, on programmatic roadmaps; between the European Defence Industry Reinforcement through common Procurement Act (EDIRPA), on joint procurement, and the Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP), on industrial ramp-up; between EDIP, on the identification of dependencies, and the EDF, on the resolution of identified dependencies; or within EDIP itself, on coherence within the instrument of the implementation of actions related to the consolidation of demand and supply;

    57.  Calls for a significant increase in common procurement by the Member States of required European defence equipment and capabilities; calls on the Member States to aggregate demand by procuring defence equipment jointly, with the possibility of granting the Commission a mandate to procure on their behalf, ideally ensuring a long-term planning horizon for the EDTIB, thus improving the EDTIB’s production capacities and the interoperability of the European armed forces, and making efficient use of taxpayers’ money through economies of scale;

    58.  Welcomes the proposal for European Defence Projects of Common Interest on the development of common capabilities that go beyond the financial means of a single Member State; believes that these projects should be used to support the industrial and technological capacities that underpin the major common priorities of several Member States and in fields such as external border protection and defence, in particular in the land domain, as well as strategic enablers, particularly in space and European air defence, to act on the whole spectrum of threats, military mobility, in particular strategic and tactical air transport, deep strikes, drone and anti-drone technologies, missiles and munitions, and artificial intelligence, in order to develop sovereign infrastructure and critical enablers; emphasises that pragmatism must prevail due to the sheer number of priorities and the need to mobilise new resources; considers, in that regard, that the EU should focus, where possible, on rapidly available and proven European technologies that gradually reduce our dependencies and improve our security; highlights the need to support the development of pan-European value chains in EU defence cooperation by incorporating companies throughout the Union and to boost competitiveness in the sector by various means, such as mergers and champions; considers, furthermore, that instead of focusing on fair return, our defence policies should encourage the growth of EU centres of excellence;

    59.  Calls for the further development of an EU defence industrial policy to improve existing and develop defence-specific instruments where necessary, and to optimise the use of non-defence-specific instruments for the purposes of the EDTIB;

    60.  Recalls the need to ensure coherence in EU public policies, which must not generate obligations contradictory to the overall defence objectives, especially during a security crisis, where the concept of ‘strategic exception’ should be introduced; calls for the creation of a genuine defence environment in favour of defence that could support industrial ramp-up efforts by taking better advantage of the multi-sectoral Commission instruments by screening, reviewing and, where needed, revising existing ones to ensure that they do not undermine EU defence policy objectives;

    61.  Recommends the establishment of a security of supply regime, including joint strategic stocks of raw materials and critical parts, to ensure the availability of raw materials and components needed for the production of defence products, and to allow production cycles to be ramped up faster and shortened; calls for the Commission and the Member States to be jointly tasked with the mapping and monitoring of the EDTIB, with the aims of protecting its strengths, reducing its vulnerabilities, avoiding crises and providing it with an effective and efficient industrial policy;

    62.  Proposes that relevant defence-related entities/activities be allowed access to InvestEU and other EU funds, taking advantage of EU defence as a job creator; insists that defence-related entities/activities be prioritised as appropriate, with the support of the Chips Act(5) and the Critical Raw Materials Act(6); believes that the simplification efforts announced by the Commission must fully encompass the defence sector; calls on the Commission to leverage the full dual-use potential of space technologies, considering space as both a new operating domain and a critical enabler of multi-domain operations; underlines that the EU currently has a substantial gap in space capabilities compared to its main competitors and stresses that, in order to address this gap in space technologies, already existing flagship projects (i.e. Copernicus and Galileo) should be enhanced for defence applications; suggests, furthermore, that the EU should urgently pursue the development of its IRIS2 constellation, together with the development of further EU common projects, for example, for space domain awareness and space-based missile early-warning applications;

    63.  Insists on the need to ensure geographical coherence by taking stock of the will of the EU and the UK, first and foremost to build security guarantees for Ukraine and become closer security partners, and to sign a joint declaration with concrete engagements and structured dialogue in order to strengthen EU-UK cooperation on the full range of foreign and security challenges facing the continent, the budgetary and regulatory conditions of which remain to be negotiated, and keeping in mind the importance of the decision-making autonomy of the EU; underlines, in this regard, the importance of closer cooperation on information and intelligence sharing, military mobility, security and defence initiatives, crisis management, cyber defence, hybrid threats, foreign information manipulation and interference and in jointly addressing shared threats;

    64.  Calls for more coherence in support of companies by reducing unnecessary administrative burdens and cutting red tape, and ensuring much easier access for small- and mid-cap companies within the defence sector; underlines the need to review, simplify and harmonise the current framework for export licences and intra-EU transfer licences, as well as for cross-certification of equipment, as one of the priorities to foster better cooperation within the market and among Member States;

    65.  Encourages a common European certification scheme for weapons systems and a move beyond the current system of national certification in order to speed up the introduction of weapons systems into the armed forces of Member States;

    66.  Calls for greater coherence in governance as CSDP must become the key instrument of a powerful Europe; considers that this requires a real link in governance between the Member States, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) and the Commissioners; urges the Member States to overcome the complexity of decision-making processes in the governance of European defence; calls for the creation of a council of defence ministers and for the move from unanimity to qualified majority voting for decisions in the European Council, the Council of Ministers and EU agencies such as the EDA, excluding military operations with an executive mandate; calls, in the meantime, for the use of Article 44 TEU in the creation of a horizontal task force on defence in the Commission; calls for increased democratic accountability through enhanced oversight by Parliament;

    67.  Proposes the strengthening of Parliament’s oversight and scrutiny role, in line with the expansion of the EU’s role in defence; calls for the appointment of a Parliament representative to the new Defence Industrial Readiness Board proposed in EDIP, as there is currently none provided for;

    Sovereignty

    68.  Stresses that the creation of a single European defence market is a priority, as the fragmentation and lack of competitiveness of the European industry have so far hampered the capacity of the EU to assume more responsibility as a security provider; recalls that the concept of a ‘defence market’ implies a full recognition of its specificity and an appropriate and coherent application of EU public policies; recalls that European preference should be the aim of achieving this single ‘market’ by strictly linking territoriality and the added value generated in this territory;

    69.  Considers that European preference must be the guiding principle and long-term ambition of EU policies related to the European defence market, in order to develop and protect European technological excellence; stresses, however, that such preference must not be pursued at the expense of the defence readiness of the Union, given the extent of international supply and value chains in the defence sector;

    70.  Rejects a scenario in which EU funds contribute to perpetuating or deepening dependences on non-European actors, both for production of capabilities or their deployment;

    71.  Urges the Member States to stop invoking Article 346 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union as a means of avoiding the application of the Procurement Directive(7) (2009/81/EC), thus undermining the common market for defence; calls on the Commission to review the Directive on the transfer of defence-related products(8) and the Directive on defence procurement as well as the inter-community transfer directive (2009/43/EC) with a view to strengthening the common market for defence and introducing flexibility with regard to crisis situations like the one we are currently facing;

    72.  Calls on the Commission to design a better-resourced, more strategic and more efficient successor to the European Defence Fund that supports common research and innovation in defence all along the supply chain and to lay the conditions to address technological challenges: advanced persistent threats, artificial intelligence and machine learning, quantum computing, the internet of military things, security, supply chain attacks, zero-day exploits and cloud security; calls for the establishment of an EU agency, inspired by the US’s Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, as part of the European Defence Agency, which should be solely responsible for supporting research in emerging and disruptive technologies, equipped with an adequate amount of venture capital;

    Finance and investments

    73.  Is concerned that, without a substantial increase in defence investment, the EU’s security and defence objectives will not be reached, both in terms of military support for Ukraine and the improvement of our common security; highlights the fact that the cost of non-preparedness for the most extreme military contingencies would be much higher than the cost of decisive EU preparedness; calls for the EU and its Member States to work and agree on concrete ways and means to achieve a short- to long-term substantial increase in public and private investment in defence and security;

    74.  Considers that, in the EU’s next multiannual financial framework (MFF), defence spending lines will have to reflect the new ‘ready for the most extreme military contingencies’ priority;

    75.  Insists that urgent needs cannot wait for the next MFF; insists that innovative solutions for finding additional funding must be explored without delay, such as investing in the defence sector, making it easier and faster to repurpose funds from one project to another, and exploring the possibility of adjusting EU funding criteria to give new prominence to security criteria in allocating spending;

    76.  Welcomes the five-point ‘ReArm Europe’ plan proposed by the Commission President on 4 March 2025;

    77.  Strongly supports the idea that EU Member States must increase their defence and security financing to new levels; notes that some Member States have already increased their defence spending to 5 % of GDP;

    78.  Welcomes the proposals made in the recent Niinistö report as regards the financing of European defence; supports the establishment of a defending Europe facility and a securing Europe facility; equally welcomes and supports the proposal to establish an investment guarantee programme based on the model of InvestEU with open architecture to trigger private sector investment and to issue a ‘European preparedness bond standard’;

    79.  Is of the opinion that national recovery and resilience plans should be amended to allow for new defence funding; calls for these investments to also address vulnerabilities in both military capabilities and the social fabric, empowering us to fight all threats to our values, social model, security and defence;

    80.  Urges the Member States to support the establishment of a defence, security and resilience bank to serve as a multilateral lending institution designed to provide low-interest, long-term loans that can support key national security priorities such as rearmament, defence modernisation, rebuilding efforts in Ukraine and the buying back of critical infrastructure currently owned by hostile non-EU countries;

    81.  Calls for a system of European defence bonds to be explored for financing large-scale military investments up front; calls, similarly, for the use of unused ‘coronabonds’ for defence instruments to be explored, to complement the Commission’s ‘ReArm Europe’ plan, as the EU is now experiencing a pressing need to boost security and defence to protect its citizens, restore deterrence and support its allies, first and foremost Ukraine;

    82.  Reiterates, in line with the Commission’s ‘ReArm Europe’ plan, its call for the European Investment Bank (EIB) and other international financial institutions and private banks in Europe to invest more actively in the European defence industry; calls, in particular, for an urgent revision of the EIB’s lending policy and immediate flexibility to remove current restrictions on financing defence, and for the possibility of issuing earmarked debt for funding security and defence projects to be investigated;

    83.  Calls on European Council President António Costa to immediately convene the European Council, based on the conclusions of the white paper, so that EU leaders can agree on immediate and far-reaching decisions to implement the European Defence Union as laid out in Article 42(2) TEU and elaborate on the measures identified in the white paper;

    84.  Welcomes the outcomes of the special European Council of 6 March 2025 and asks the Member States to act decisively during the upcoming March Council meeting;

    85.  Underlines the need to enhance our partnerships with like-minded countries, particularly those in Europe, such as the UK and Norway; calls for a broad EU-UK security pact, also covering key subjects such as energy, migration and critical minerals; points to the added value of fostering our relationships with global partners such as the US, Japan and Australia;

    86.  Calls for enhanced cooperation with Western Balkan countries in the area of defence industries; emphasises that Western Balkan countries have significant expertise in defence industries and that the EU should consider procuring military equipment from Western Balkan countries; emphasises that this approach would help make Western Balkan countries stronger allies of the EU;

    87.  Believes that every effort must be made to maintain and, if possible, foster transatlantic cooperation in every field of the military and defence sector, while recalling the need to foster European defence and develop greater sovereignty;

    88.  Notes that the above is without prejudice to the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States;

    o
    o   o

    89.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the European Council, the Council, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the President of the Commission and competent Commissioners, the EU security and defence agencies and the governments and parliaments of the Member States.

    (1) Joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 18 May 2022 on the Defence Investment Gaps Analysis and Way Forward (JOIN(2022)0024).
    (2) Strategic Compass for Security and Defence – For a European Union that protects its citizens, values and interests and contributes to international peace and security, which was approved by the Council on 21 March 2022 and endorsed by the European Council on 24 March 2022.
    (3) Report by Mario Draghi of 9 September 2024 on the future of European competitiveness and in particular Chapter Four thereof on increasing security and reducing dependencies.
    (4) Report by Sauli Niinistö of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘Safer Together: Strengthening Europe’s Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness’.
    (5) Regulation (EU) 2023/1781 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 September 2023 establishing a framework of measures for strengthening Europe’s semiconductor ecosystem and amending Regulation (EU) 2021/694 (Chips Act) (OJ L 229, 18.9.2023, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/1781/oj).
    (6) Regulation (EU) 2024/1252 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 establishing a framework for ensuring a secure and sustainable supply of critical raw materials and amending Regulations (EU) No 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, (EU) 2018/1724 and (EU) 2019/1020 (OJ L, 2024/1252, 3.5.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1252/oj).
    (7) Directive 2009/81/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on the coordination of procedures for the award of certain works contracts, supply contracts and service contracts by contracting authorities or entities in the fields of defence and security, and amending Directives 2004/17/EC and 2004/18/EC (OJ L 216, 20.8.2009, p. 76, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2009/81/oj).
    (8) Directive 2009/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 May 2009 simplifying terms and conditions of transfers of defence-related products within the Community (OJ L 146, 10.6.2009, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2009/43/oj).

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Highlights – Ayman Safadi, Jordanian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs in AFET – Committee on Foreign Affairs

    Source: European Parliament

    Ayman Safadi – Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs © Thierry Monasse Getty Images Brussels

    On 18 March, Ayman Safadi, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, who last addressed the Committee on Foreign Affairs in July 2017, will speak with Members on EU-Jordan relations following the signing of the EU-Jordan Strategic and Comprehensive Partnership in January 2025, and on the situation in the region, in particular in Syria and Gaza.

    This exchange takes place the day after the ninth Brussels Syria Conference – “Standing with Syria: Meeting the Needs for a Successful Transition”.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Joint statement of the G7 Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Charlevoix

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments 3

    Press release

    Joint statement of the G7 Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Charlevoix

    A joint statement of the G7 Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Charlevoix

    1. We the G7 Foreign Ministers of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, and the High Representative of the European Union, met in Charlevoix on March 12 to 14, 2025. 

    Ukraine’s long-term prosperity and security

    1. We reaffirmed our unwavering support for Ukraine in defending its territorial integrity and right to exist, and its freedom, sovereignty and independence.

    2. We welcomed ongoing efforts to achieve a ceasefire, and in particular the meeting on March 11 between the U.S. and Ukraine in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. We applauded Ukraine’s commitment to an immediate ceasefire, which is an essential step towards a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in line with the Charter of the United Nations.

    3. We called for Russia to reciprocate by agreeing to a ceasefire on equal terms and implementing it fully. We discussed imposing further costs on Russia in case such a ceasefire is not agreed, including through further sanctions, caps on oil prices, as well as additional support for Ukraine, and other means. This includes the use of extraordinary revenues stemming from immobilized Russian Sovereign Assets. We underlined the importance of confidence-building measures under a ceasefire including the release of prisoners of war and detainees—both military and civilian—and the return of Ukrainian children.

    4. We emphasized that any ceasefire must be respected and underscored the need for robust and credible security arrangements to ensure that Ukraine can deter and defend against any renewed acts of aggression. We stated that we will continue to coordinate economic and humanitarian support to promote the early recovery and reconstruction of Ukraine, including at the Ukraine Recovery Conference which will take place in Rome on July 10-11, 2025.

    5. We condemned the provision to Russia of military assistance by DPRK and Iran, and the provision of weapons and dual-use components by China, a decisive enabler of Russia’s war and of the reconstitution of Russia’s armed forces. We reiterated our intention to continue to take action against such third countries.

    6. We expressed alarm about the impacts of the war, especially on civilians and on civilian infrastructure. We discussed the importance of accountability and reaffirmed our commitment to work together to achieve a durable peace and to ensure that Ukraine remains democratic, free, strong and prosperous.   

    Regional peace and stability in the Middle East  

    1. We called for the release of all hostages and for the hostages’ remains held by Hamas in Gaza to be returned to their loved ones. We reaffirmed our support for the resumption of unhindered humanitarian aid into Gaza and for a permanent ceasefire. We underscored the imperative of a political horizon for the Palestinian people, achieved through a negotiated solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that meets the legitimate needs and aspirations of both peoples and advances comprehensive Middle East peace, stability and prosperity. We noted serious concern over the growing tensions and hostilities in the West Bank and calls for de-escalation.

    2. We recognized Israel’s inherent right to defend itself consistent with international law. We unequivocally condemned Hamas, including for its brutal and unjustified terror attacks on October 7, 2023, and the harm inflicted on the hostages during their captivity and the violation of their dignity through the use of ‘handover ceremonies’ during their release. We reiterated that Hamas can have no role in Gaza’s future and must never again be a threat to Israel. We affirmed our readiness to engage with Arab partners on their proposals to chart a way forward on reconstruction in Gaza and build a lasting Israeli-Palestinian peace.

    3. We expressed our support for the people of Syria and Lebanon, as both countries work towards peaceful and stable political futures. At this critical juncture, we reiterated the importance of Syria’s and Lebanon’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. We called unequivocally for the rejection of terrorism in Syria. We condemned strongly the recent escalation of violence in the coastal regions of Syria, and called for the protection of civilians and for perpetrators of atrocities to be held accountable. We stressed the critical importance of an inclusive and Syrian-led political process. We welcomed the commitment by the Syrian interim government to work with the OPCW in eliminating all remaining chemical weapons.

    4. We stressed that Iran is the principal source of regional instability and must never be allowed to develop and acquire a nuclear weapon. We emphasized that Iran must now change course, de-escalate and choose diplomacy. We underscored the threat of Iran’s growing use of arbitrary detention and foreign assassination attempts as a tool of coercion.

    Cooperation to increase security and resilience across the Indo-Pacific  

    1. We reiterated our commitment to upholding a free, open, prosperous and secure Indo-Pacific, based on sovereignty, territorial integrity, peaceful resolution of disputes, fundamental freedoms and human rights.

    2. We remain seriously concerned by the situations in the East China Sea as well as the South China Sea and continue to oppose strongly unilateral attempts to change the status quo, in particular by force and coercion. We expressed concern over the increasing use of dangerous maneuvers and water cannons against Philippines and Vietnamese vessels as well as efforts to restrict freedom of navigation and overflight through militarization and coercion in the South China Sea, in violation of international law. We emphasized the importance of maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. We encouraged the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues and reiterated our opposition to any unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force or coercion. We also expressed support for Taiwan’s meaningful participation in appropriate international organizations.  

    3. We remain concerned with China’s military build-up and the continued, rapid increase in China’s nuclear weapons arsenal. We called on China to engage in strategic risk reduction discussions and promote stability through transparency.

    4. We emphasized that China should not conduct or condone activities aimed at undermining the security and safety of our communities and the integrity of our democratic institutions.

    5. We expressed concerns about China’s non-market policies and practices that are leading to harmful overcapacity and market distortions. We further called on China to refrain from adopting export control measures that could lead to significant supply chain disruptions. We reiterated that we are not trying to harm China or thwart its economic growth, indeed a growing China that plays by international rules and norms would be of global interest.

    6. We demanded that the DPRK abandon all its nuclear weapons and any other weapons of mass destruction as well as ballistic missile programs in accordance with all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions. We expressed our serious concerns over, and the need to address together, the DPRK’s cryptocurrency thefts. We called on DPRK to resolve the abductions issue immediately. 

    7. We denounced the brutal repression of the people of Myanmar by the military regime and called for an end to all violence and for unhindered humanitarian access. 

    Building stability and resilience in Haiti and Venezuela

    1. We strongly denounced the ongoing horrifying violence that continues to be perpetrated by gangs in Haiti in their efforts to seize control of the government. We reaffirmed our commitment to helping the Haitian people restore democracy, security and stability, including through support to the Haitian National Police and Kenya-led Multinational Security Support Mission and an increased role for the UN. We expressed support for Haitian authorities’ efforts to create a specialized anti-corruption jurisdiction that complies with the highest international standards.

    2. We reiterated our call for the restoration of democracy in Venezuela in line with the aspirations of the Venezuelan people who peacefully voted on July 28, 2024, for change, the cessation of repression and arbitrary or unjust detentions of peaceful protestors including youth by Nicolas Maduro’s regime, as well as the unconditional and immediate release of all political prisoners. We also agreed Venezuelan naval vessels threatening Guyana’s commercial vessels is unacceptable and an infringement of Guyana’s internationally recognized sovereign rights. We reaffirmed respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations as an enduring value.

    Supporting lasting peace in Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo

    1. We unequivocally denounced the ongoing fighting and atrocities in Sudan, including sexual violence against women and girls, which have led to the world’s largest humanitarian crisis and the spread of famine. We called for the warring parties to protect civilians, cease hostilities, and ensure unhindered humanitarian access, and urged external actors to end their support fueling the conflict. 

    2. We condemned the Rwanda-backed M23 offensive in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and the resulting violence, displacement and grave human rights and international humanitarian law violations. This offensive constitutes a flagrant disregard of the territorial integrity of the DRC. We reiterated our call for M23 and the Rwanda Defence Force to withdraw from all controlled areas. We urged all parties to support the mediation led by the East African Community and the Southern African Development Community, to promote accountability for human rights abuses by all armed actors, including M23 and the FDLR, and to commit to a peaceful and negotiated resolution of the conflict, including the meaningful participation of women and youth.

    Strengthening sanctions and countering hybrid warfare and sabotage

    1. We welcomed efforts to strengthen the Sanctions Working Group focused on listings and enforcement. We also welcomed discussions on the establishment of a Hybrid Warfare and Sabotage Working Group, and of a Latin America Working Group.

    Updates to this page

    Published 14 March 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: ILO Governing Body: UK Statement on the occupied Arab territories

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments 3

    Speech

    ILO Governing Body: UK Statement on the occupied Arab territories

    POL/5: UK Statement for the Enhanced programme of development cooperation for the occupied Arab territories. Delivered at the 353th ILO Governing Body in Geneva.

    Thank you Chair

    1. At each Governing Body meeting since the 7th of October, the UK has spoken of the horrors experienced by Palestinians and Israelis. The hostages have endured unimaginable suffering at the hands of Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. For the people of Gaza who have lost lives, homes or loved ones, this conflict has been a living nightmare. We need all parties to uphold the ceasefire and ensure it leads to a sustainable peace and the reconstruction of Gaza.

    2. We thank the Office for your update to the POL5 document and, as ever, I’d like to commend the ongoing actions of the ILO staff in the Occupied Palestinian Territories and the continued roll out and expansion of the ILO’s emergency response programme.

    3. We remain deeply concerned about the continued, profound impact on the economy across the Occupied Palestinian Territories with GDP decreased by 26% in the OPTs and 82% in Gaza. There are significant job losses, but for those in work, conditions have significantly worsened with low wages, poor safety standards, and lack of social protection.

    4. Since 7 October 2023, 200,000 permits for Palestinian workers in Israel have been revoked, further impacting the economy and contributing to rising poverty. We urge the government of Israel to reinstate these permits without delay.

    5. Economic stability is squarely in the interest of both parties. The UK also calls on Israel to fully implement the 1994 Paris Protocol and to reduce barriers to trade, helping the Palestinian private sector to recover.

    6. We also note with concern that the implementation of the Knesset legislation on UNRWA not only risks upending the humanitarian response, but threatens thousands of jobs across the OPT. We urge the government of Israel to work with international partners, including the UN, to ensure continuity of UNRWA’s operations; no other entity or UN Agency currently has the capacity or infrastructure to replace their mandate and experience.

    7. Chair, the UK believes that economic development programmes are the key to enabling Palestinians to preserve their economy, encourage private investment and restart economic growth. So, we encourage the international community to continue to provide this. UK support to date includes agricultural productivity, private sector investment and facilitation between Palestinians and Israelis in water, energy, trade. It included £10m in financial aid and Technical Assistance to strengthen the PA’s ability to deliver services, maintain stability, and deliver reform.

    To conclude, Chair, the UK supports the decision as amended by Oman on behalf of the Arab Group.  

    Thank you.

    Updates to this page

    Published 14 March 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Joint statement of the G7 Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Charlevoix (14 Mar. 2025)

    Source: Republic of France in English
    The Republic of France has issued the following statement:

    We the G7 Foreign Ministers of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, and the High Representative of the European Union, met in Charlevoix on March 12 to 14, 2025.

    Ukraine’s long-term prosperity and security

    We reaffirmed our unwavering support for Ukraine in defending its territorial integrity and right to exist, and its freedom, sovereignty and independence.

    We welcomed ongoing efforts to achieve a ceasefire, and in particular the meeting on March 11 between the U.S. and Ukraine in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. We applauded Ukraine’s commitment to an immediate ceasefire, which is an essential step towards a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in line with the Charter of the United Nations.

    We called for Russia to reciprocate by agreeing to a ceasefire on equal terms and implementing it fully. We discussed imposing further costs on Russia in case such a ceasefire is not agreed, including through further sanctions, caps on oil prices, as well as additional support for Ukraine, and other means. This includes the use of extraordinary revenues stemming from immobilized Russian Sovereign Assets. We underlined the importance of confidence-building measures under a ceasefire including the release of prisoners of war and detainees—both military and civilian—and the return of Ukrainian children.

    We emphasized that any ceasefire must be respected and underscored the need for robust and credible security arrangements to ensure that Ukraine can deter and defend against any renewed acts of aggression. We stated that we will continue to coordinate economic and humanitarian support to promote the early recovery and reconstruction of Ukraine, including at the Ukraine Recovery Conference which will take place in Rome on July 10-11, 2025.

    We condemned the provision to Russia of military assistance by DPRK and Iran, and the provision of weapons and dual-use components by China, a decisive enabler of Russia’s war and of the reconstitution of Russia’s armed forces. We reiterated our intention to continue to take action against such third countries.

    We expressed alarm about the impacts of the war, especially on civilians and on civilian infrastructure. We discussed the importance of accountability and reaffirmed our commitment to work together to achieve a durable peace and to ensure that Ukraine remains democratic, free, strong and prosperous.

    Regional peace and stability in the Middle East

    We called for the release of all hostages and for the hostages’ remains held by Hamas in Gaza to be returned to their loved ones. We reaffirmed our support for the resumption of unhindered humanitarian aid into Gaza and for a permanent ceasefire. We underscored the imperative of a political horizon for the Palestinian people, achieved through a negotiated solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that meets the legitimate needs and aspirations of both peoples and advances comprehensive Middle East peace, stability and prosperity. We noted serious concern over the growing tensions and hostilities in the West Bank and calls for de-escalation.

    We recognized Israel’s inherent right to defend itself consistent with international law. We unequivocally condemned Hamas, including for its brutal and unjustified terror attacks on October 7, 2023, and the harm inflicted on the hostages during their captivity and the violation of their dignity through the use of ‘handover ceremonies’ during their release. We reiterated that Hamas can have no role in Gaza’s future and must never again be a threat to Israel. We affirmed our readiness to engage with Arab partners on their proposals to chart a way forward on reconstruction in Gaza and build a lasting Israeli-Palestinian peace.

    We expressed our support for the people of Syria and Lebanon, as both countries work towards peaceful and stable political futures. At this critical juncture, we reiterated the importance of Syria’s and Lebanon’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. We called unequivocally for the rejection of terrorism in Syria. We condemned strongly the recent escalation of violence in the coastal regions of Syria, and called for the protection of civilians and for perpetrators of atrocities to be held accountable. We stressed the critical importance of an inclusive and Syrian-led political process. We welcomed the commitment by the Syrian interim government to work with the OPCW in eliminating all remaining chemical weapons.

    We stressed that Iran is the principal source of regional instability and must never be allowed to develop and acquire a nuclear weapon. We emphasized that Iran must now change course, de-escalate and choose diplomacy. We underscored the threat of Iran’s growing use of arbitrary detention and foreign assassination attempts as a tool of coercion.

    Cooperation to increase security and resilience across the Indo-Pacific

    We reiterated our commitment to upholding a free, open, prosperous and secure Indo-Pacific, based on sovereignty, territorial integrity, peaceful resolution of disputes, fundamental freedoms and human rights.

    We remain seriously concerned by the situations in the East China Sea as well as the South China Sea and continue to oppose strongly unilateral attempts to change the status quo, in particular by force and coercion. We expressed concern over the increasing use of dangerous maneuvers and water cannons against Philippines and Vietnamese vessels as well as efforts to restrict freedom of navigation and overflight through militarization and coercion in the South China Sea, in violation of international law. We emphasized the importance of maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. We encouraged the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues and reiterated our opposition to any unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force or coercion. We also expressed support for Taiwan’s meaningful participation in appropriate international organizations.

    We remain concerned with China’s military build-up and the continued, rapid increase in China’s nuclear weapons arsenal. We called on China to engage in strategic risk reduction discussions and promote stability through transparency.

    We emphasized that China should not conduct or condone activities aimed at undermining the security and safety of our communities and the integrity of our democratic institutions.16. We expressed concerns about China’s non-market policies and practices that are leading to harmful overcapacity and market distortions. We further called on China to refrain from adopting export control measures that could lead to significant supply chain disruptions. We reiterated that we are not trying to harm China or thwart its economic growth, indeed a growing China that plays by international rules and norms would be of global interest.

    We demanded that the DPRK abandon all its nuclear weapons and any other weapons of mass destruction as well as ballistic missile programs in accordance with all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions. We expressed our serious concerns over, and the need to address together, the DPRK’s cryptocurrency thefts. We called on DPRK to resolve the abductions issue immediately.

    We denounced the brutal repression of the people of Myanmar by the military regime and called for an end to all violence and for unhindered humanitarian access.

    Building stability and resilience in Haiti and Venezuela

    We strongly denounced the ongoing horrifying violence that continues to be perpetrated by gangs in Haiti in their efforts to seize control of the government. We reaffirmed our commitment to helping the Haitian people restore democracy, security and stability, including through support to the Haitian National Police and Kenya-led Multinational Security Support Mission and an increased role for the UN. We expressed support for Haitian authorities’ efforts to create a specialized anti-corruption jurisdiction that complies with the highest international standards.

    We reiterated our call for the restoration of democracy in Venezuela in line with the aspirations of the Venezuelan people who peacefully voted on July 28, 2024, for change, the cessation of repression and arbitrary or unjust detentions of peaceful protestors including youth by Nicolas Maduro’s regime, as well as the unconditional and immediate release of all political prisoners. We also agreed Venezuelan naval vessels threatening Guyana’s commercial vessels is unacceptable and an infringement of Guyana’s internationally recognized sovereign rights. We reaffirmed respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations as an enduring value.

    Supporting lasting peace in Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo

    We unequivocally denounced the ongoing fighting and atrocities in Sudan, including sexual violence against women and girls, which have led to the world’s largest humanitarian crisis and the spread of famine. We called for the warring parties to protect civilians, cease hostilities, and ensure unhindered humanitarian access, and urged external actors to end their support fueling the conflict.

    We condemned the Rwanda-backed M23 offensive in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and the resulting violence, displacement and grave human rights and international humanitarian law violations. This offensive constitutes a flagrant disregard of the territorial integrity of the DRC. We reiterated our call for M23 and the Rwanda Defence Force to withdraw from all controlled areas. We urged all parties to support the mediation led by the East African Community and the Southern African Development Community, to promote accountability for human rights abuses by all armed actors, including M23 and the FDLR, and to commit to a peaceful and negotiated resolution of the conflict, including the meaningful participation of women and youth.

    Strengthening sanctions and countering hybrid warfare and sabotage

    We welcomed efforts to strengthen the Sanctions Working Group focused on listings and enforcement. We also welcomed discussions on the establishment of a Hybrid Warfare and Sabotage Working Group, and of a Latin America Working Group.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Global: See you in the funny papers: How superhero comics tell the story of Jewish America

    Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Miriam Eve Mora, Managing Director of the Raoul Wallenberg Institute, University of Michigan

    A five-story replica of a stamp of Superman in 1998 in Cleveland, home of the superhero’s creators, Jerry Siegel and Joe Shuster. AP Photo/Tony Dejak, File

    Nearly a hundred years ago, a hastily crafted spaceship crash-landed in Smallville, Kansas. Inside was an infant – the sole survivor of a planet destroyed by old age. Discovering he possessed superhuman strength and abilities, the boy committed to channeling his power to benefit humankind and champion the oppressed.

    This is the story of Superman: one of the most recognizable characters in history, who first reached audiences in the pages of Action Comics in 1938 – what many fans consider the most important single comic in history.

    As a historian of American immigration and ethnicity – and a lifelong comics fan – I read this well-known bit of fiction as an allegory about immigration and the American dream. It is, at its core, the ultimate story of an immigrant in the early 20th century, when many people saw the United States as a land with open gates, providing such orphans of the world an opportunity to reach their fullest potential.

    Taken in and raised by a rural family under the name Clark Kent, the baby was imbued with the best qualities of America. But, like all immigrant stories, Kent’s is a two-parter. There is also the emigrant story: the story of how Kal-El – Superman’s name at birth – was driven from his home on Planet Krypton to embrace a new land.

    That origin story reflects the heritage of Superman’s creators: two of the many Jewish American writers and artists who ushered in the Golden Age of comic books.

    Jewish history…

    A card from 1909, found in the Jewish Museum of New York, depicts Jewish Americans welcoming Jews emigrating from Russia.
    Heritage Images/Hulton Archive via Getty Images

    The American comics industry was largely started by the children of Jewish immigrants. Like most publishing in the early 20th century, it was centered in New York City, home to the country’s largest Jewish population. Though they were still a very small minority, immigration had swelled the United States’ Jewish population more than a thousandfold: from roughly 3,000 in 1820 to roughly 3,500,000 in 1920.

    Comic books had not yet been devised, but strip comics in newspapers were a regular feature. They began in the late 19th century with popular stories featuring recurring characters, such as Richard F. Outcault’s “Yellow Kid” and “the Little Bears” by Jimmy Swinnerton.

    A few Jewish creators were able to break into the industry, such as Harry Hershfield and his comic “Abie the Agent.” Hershfield’s success was exceptional in three ways: He broke into mainstream newspaper comics, his titular character was also Jewish, and he never adopted an anglicized pen name – as many other Jewish creators felt they must.

    Shoppers and vendors outside of haberdasheries on Hester Street in a Jewish neighborhood of New York’s Lower East Side around 1900.
    Photo by Hulton Archive/Getty Images

    Generally, however, Jews were barred from the more prestigious jobs in newspaper cartooning. A more accessible alternative was the cheaper, second-tier business of reprinting previously published works.

    In 1933, second-generation Jewish New Yorker Max Gaines – born Maxwell Ginzburg – began a new publication, “Funnies on Parade.” “Funnies” pulled together preexisting comic strips, reproducing them in saddle-stitched pamphlets that became the standard for the American comics industry. He went on to found All-American Comics and Educational Comics.

    Another publisher, Malcolm Wheeler-Nicholson, founded National Allied Publications in 1934 and published the first comic book to feature entirely new material, rather than reprints of newspaper strips. He joined forces with two Jewish immigrants, Harry Donenfeld and Jack Leibowitz. At National, they created and distributed Detective and Action Comics – the precursors to DC, which would become one of the two largest comics distributors in history.

    It was at Action Comics that Jerry Siegel and Joe Shuster, two second-generation immigrants from a Jewish neighborhood in Cleveland, found a home for Superman. It would also be where two Jewish kids from the Bronx, Bob Kane and Bill Finger – born Robert Kahn and Milton Finger – found a home for their character, Batman, in 1939.

    Jerry Siegel and Joe Shuster, creators of Superman, pictured in the 1940s.
    New Yorker/Wikimedia Commons

    The success of these characters inspired another prominent second-generation Jewish New Yorker, pulp magazine publisher Moses “Martin” Goodman, to enter comics production with his line, “Timely Comics.” The 1939 debut featured what would become two of the early industry’s most well-known superheroes: the Sub-Mariner and the Human Torch. These characters would be mainstays of Goodman’s company, even when it became better known as Marvel Comics.

    Thus were born the “big two,” Marvel and DC, from humble Jewish origins.

    …and Jewish stories

    The creation and popularization of superhero comics isn’t Jewish just because of its history. The content was, too, reflecting the values and priorities of Jewish America at the time: a community influenced by its origins and traditions, as well as the American mainstream.

    Some of the most foundational early comics echo Jewish history and texts, such as Superman’s story, which parallels the Jewish hero Moses. The biblical prophet was born in Egypt, where the Israelites were enslaved, and soon after Pharaoh ordered the murder of all their newborn sons. Similarly, Superman’s people, the Kryptonians, faced an existential threat: the destruction of their planet.

    Moses’ life is saved when his mother floats him down the Nile in a hastily constructed and tarred basket. Kal-El, too, is sent away to safety in a hastily constructed craft. Both boys are raised by strangers in a strange land and destined to become heroes to their people.

    Comics also reflected the feelings and fears of Jews in a moment in time. For example, in the wake of Kristallnacht – the 1938 night of widespread organized attacks on German Jews and their property, which many historians see as a turning point toward the Holocaust – Finger and Kane debuted Batman’s Gotham City. The city is a dark contrast to Superman’s shining metropolis, a place where villains lurked around every corner and reflected the darkest sides of modern humanity.

    Some comic artists and writers used their platform to make political statements. Jack Kirby – born Kurtzberg – and Hymie “Joe” Simon, creators of Captain America, explained that they “knew what was going on over in Europe. World events gave us the perfect comic-book villain, Adolf Hitler, with his ranting, goose-stepping and ridiculous moustache. So we decided to create the perfect hero who would be his foil.” The comic debut of Captain America in 1941 featured a brightly colored cover with the brand-new hero punching Adolf Hitler in the face.

    In later generations, characters penned by Jewish authors continued to grapple with issues of outsider status, hiding aspects of their identity, and maintaining their determination to better the world in spite of rejection from it. Think of Spider-Man, the Fantastic Four and X-Men. All of these were created by Stan Lee – another Jewish creator, born Stanley Martin Lieber – who was hired into Timely Comics at just 17 years old.

    With so many of the most popular comics written by New York Jews, and centered in the city, much of New York’s Yiddish-tinged, recognizably Jewish language made its way onto the pages. Lee’s Spider-Man, for example, frequently exclaims “oy!” or calls bad guys “putz” or “shmuck.”

    In later years, Jewish authors such as Chris Claremont and Brian Michael Bendis introduced or took over mainstream characters who were overtly Jewish – reflecting an emerging comfort with a more public Jewish ethnic identity in America. In X-Men, for example, Kitty Pryde recounts her encounters with contemporary antisemitism. Magneto, who is at times friend but often foe of the X-Men, developed a backstory as a Holocaust survivor.

    History is never solely about retelling; it’s about gaining a better understanding of complex narratives. Trends in comics history, particularly in the superhero genre, offer insight into the ways that Jewish American anxieties, ambitions, patriotism and sense of place in the U.S. continually changed over the 20th century. To me, this understanding makes the retelling of these classic stories even more meaningful and entertaining.

    Miriam Eve Mora does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. See you in the funny papers: How superhero comics tell the story of Jewish America – https://theconversation.com/see-you-in-the-funny-papers-how-superhero-comics-tell-the-story-of-jewish-america-248218

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

  • MIL-OSI Global: Saudi Arabia’s role as Ukraine war mediator advances Gulf nation’s diplomatic rehabilitation − and boosts its chances of a seat at the table should Iran-US talks resume

    Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, Fellow for the Middle East at the Baker Institute, Rice University

    Saudi Arabia is 2,000 miles from Ukraine and even more politically distant, so at first glance it might seem like it has nothing to do with the ongoing war there. But the Gulf state has emerged as a key intermediary in the most serious ceasefire negotiations since Russia invaded its neighbor three years ago.

    While it is U.S. officials who are undoubtedly leading the efforts for an agreement, it is the Saudi capital of Riyadh that has been staging the crucial talks.

    In a flurry of diplomatic activity on March 10, 2025, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, the country’s top political authority, hosted separate meetings with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and a U.S. delegation led by Secretary of State Marco Rubio and national security adviser Mike Waltz.

    The following day, senior Saudi officials facilitated face-to-face meetings between U.S. and Ukrainian delegations.

    The resulting agreement, which is now being mulled in Moscow, is all the more notable given that it followed a diplomatic breakdown just weeks before at the Oval Office between Zelenskyy, President Donald Trump and Vice President JD Vance.

    Whether the proposed interim 30-day ceasefire materializes is still uncertain. On March 14, Russian President Vladimir Putin said he agreed with the proposal in principle, but he added that a lot of the details needed to be sorted out.

    Should a deal be reached, there is every reason to believe it will be inked in Saudi Arabia, which has hosted not only the latest U.S.-Ukrainian talks but earlier rounds of high-level Russian-U.S. meetings.

    But why is a Gulf nation playing mediator in a conflict in Eastern Europe? As an expert on Saudi politics, I believe the answer to that lies in the kingdom’s diplomatic ambitions and its desire to present a more positive image to the world. And in the background is the goal of better positioning the nation in the event of diplomatic maneuvers in its own region, notably in regards to any talks between U.S. and Iran.

    The diplomatic convertion of MBS

    Saudi Arabia’s growing diplomatic role has been a feature of the kingdom’s foreign policy since 2022.

    Crown Prince Mohammed, who that year succeeded his father as prime minister, views Saudi Arabia as the convening power in the Arab and Islamic world.

    Accordingly, officials in the kingdom have been directed to lead regional diplomacy over a number of pressing issues, including the conflicts in Gaza and Sudan.

    At the same time, Saudis have started the process of reconciliation with Iran, which has long been perceived as the chief regional rival to Saudi influence.

    This turn to diplomacy marks a shift away from the confrontational policies adopted by the crown prince during his rise to power in Saudi Arabia between 2015 and 2018. Policies such as Saudi Arabia’s military intervention in Yemen, its blockade of Qatar, the detention of Lebanon’s Prime Minister Saad Hariri and the conversion of the Ritz-Carlton hotel in Riyadh into a makeshift prison all fed an image of the young prince as an impulsive decision-maker. Then in 2018 came the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi in the Saudi Consulate in Istanbul.

    This approach brought little in the way of stability. Rather, it left the country ensnared in an unwinnable war in Yemen, a fruitless row with Qatar, and diplomatic isolation by Western officials.

    A friend to Ukraine and Russia

    In regards to the war in Ukraine, Saudi Arabia’s intermediary role is helped by a perception of the kingdom as a neutral nation on the conflict.

    Saudi officials, in common with their counterparts in the other Gulf states, have long sought to avoid taking sides in the emerging era of great power competition and strategic rivalry. As such, the kingdom has maintained working relations with both Russia and pro-Western Ukraine since the outbreak of war in Europe.

    In 2022, for example, Saudi Arabia and Russia – both leaders of OPEC+ – coordinated oil production cuts to cushion Moscow from the effects of global sanctions the West imposed after it invaded Ukraine. Yet just months later, Saudi Arabia invited Zelenskyy to address an Arab League summit in the Saudi city of Jeddah.

    It was a prelude to a 2023 international summit, also in Jeddah, which brought together representatives from 40 countries to discuss the ongoing war.

    Despite failing to produce a breakthrough, the meeting illustrated the convening reach of the crown prince and his intention to act as a diplomatic go-between in the Ukraine-Russia war.

    Saudi Arabia and neighboring United Arab Emirates later facilitated occasional prisoner exchanges between the two countries – rare diplomatic successes in three years of conflict.

    Staging ground for diplomacy

    Direct engagement in high-stakes international diplomacy over the largest war in Europe since 1945 is undoubtedly a step up in Saudi ambitions. But the country’s efforts aren’t purely altruistic. Riyadh believes there’s mileage to be gained in such diplomatic endeavors.

    The advent of a Trump presidency has fit Saudi desires. Trump has made his desire to be seen as a dealmaker and peacemaker clear, but he needs a neutral venue in which the hard work of diplomacy can flourish.

    Just weeks into the new U.S. administration, the Saudi capital hosted the first meeting between a U.S. secretary of state and Russian foreign minister since Russia invaded in 2022.

    It yielded an agreement to “re-establish the bilateral relationship” and establish a consultation mechanism to “address irritants” in ties.

    The two rounds of dialogue in Riyadh – first with Russia, then Ukraine – have positioned the Saudi leadership firmly in the diplomatic process. It has also gone some way to rehabilitate Mohammed bin Salman’s image.

    The sight of the crown prince warmly greeting Zelenskyy contrasted sharply with the images from a fractious White House meeting that went around the world, presenting the crown prince as a statesmanlike figure.

    Turning to Tehran

    Such positive optics would have seemed inconceivable as recently as 2019, when the crown prince was shunned and then presidential candidate Joe Biden labeled the country a “pariah” state.

    Changing this negative global perception of Saudi Arabia is crucial if the kingdom is to attract the tens of millions of visitors that are pivotal to the success of the “giga-projects” – sports, culture and tourism events that the Saudis hope will drive its economy and allow the kingdom to be less economically dependent on fossil fuel exports.

    Whereas easing tensions with Iran and supporting Yemen’s fragile truce are about derisking the kingdom’s vulnerability to regional volatility, facilitating diplomacy over Ukraine is a relatively cost-free way to reinforce the changing narratives about Saudi Arabia.

    After all, any breakdown in the Russia-U.S.-Ukraine negotiations is unlikely to be blamed on the Saudis.

    Indeed, Saudi officials may view their engagement with U.S. officials over Ukraine as the prelude to further diplomatic cooperation. And this will be especially true if Crown Prince Mohammed is able to establish himself as an indispensable partner in the eyes of Trump.

    Saudi officials were excluded from the last major talks between Iran and the U.S., which also involved several other major world powers and led to the 2016 Iran nuclear deal. Trump withdrew from the deal shortly after assuming office for the first time in 2017, and U.S.-Iranian relations have been moribund since then.

    The U.S. administration has already mooted the idea of a resumption of negotiations with Tehran over its nuclear capabilities.

    Placing Saudi Arabia in the middle of any attempts to secure a new nuclear agreement that would replace or supersede that earlier deal would be a high-risk move, given the intensity of feeling on both the U.S. and Iranian sides and the uneasy coexistence between Tehran and Riyadh.

    But doing so would give the kingdom what it most desires: a seat at the table.

    Kristian Coates Ulrichsen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Saudi Arabia’s role as Ukraine war mediator advances Gulf nation’s diplomatic rehabilitation − and boosts its chances of a seat at the table should Iran-US talks resume – https://theconversation.com/saudi-arabias-role-as-ukraine-war-mediator-advances-gulf-nations-diplomatic-rehabilitation-and-boosts-its-chances-of-a-seat-at-the-table-should-iran-us-talks-resume-252035

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

  • MIL-OSI Global: The White House press pool became a way to control journalists – Trump is taking this to new levels

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Colin Alexander, Senior Lecturer in Political Communications, Nottingham Trent University

    The recently appointed White House press secretary, Karoline Leavitt, has begun her tenure combatively, aggressively defending the Trump administration’s policies and, at times, mimicking Donald Trump’s methods of dealing with the mainstream news media.

    Faced recently with a legitimate question by an Associated Press (AP) reporter who challenged Trump’s introduction of tariffs against several countries, she accused the reporter of doubting her knowledge of economics. She then dismissed him, saying: “I now regret giving a question to the Associated Press.”

    AP is one of the key media organisations reporting on the White House. The largest news agency in the US, its stories are carried by news groups around the world. But recently, AP was ejected from the “press pool” that covers White House business

    It was excluded in mid-February for refusing to call the Gulf of Mexico “the Gulf of America”, after Trump changed its name by executive order. This was followed by an announcement that the White House would take greater control of the press pool and choose which outlets would be given most access to the president. This is likely to be based on favourable coverage rather than quality of reporting.

    To appreciate how significant this is, it is important to first state the fundamental purpose of journalism in a democratic society, which is to hold the powerful to account. This is known as its “watchdog” function.

    The work of Washington Post reporters Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein in exposing the Watergate scandal during the 1970s is often held up as the gold standard of watchdog journalism. It ultimately led to the resignation of Richard Nixon as president and the imprisonment of his lawyer, John Dean.

    “Pooling” describes the process by which a prominent organisation or individual attempts to oversee journalistic scrutiny by managing access. King Charles, for example, also operates a press pool.

    It works in two stages. First, news organisations or individual journalists apply to be members of the pool. Then, a handful of journalists from the pool are selected each day or week for access. These journalists – through their pool contract – are required to share the information they gather with the other journalists in the pool, which often leads to a genericisation of the content.

    Thus, while political organisations or elite individuals might claim the pooling system is used as a benign and fair tool to manage consistent press interest, in reality it is a weapon of communications control.

    The White House’s press pool was first established under President Dwight Eisenhower as a reflection of the growing number of journalists based in Washington. But in the modern era, the use of pooling was most controversial during and after the first Gulf War of the early 1990s.

    Rather than roaming the battlefields of Iraq and Kuwait, most western reporters spent the conflict at the media centre in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, some 250 miles from the Kuwait border. Here they were fed the information that the US military wanted the public to know. A small number of pooled journalists were then occasionally accompanied by US troops to the battlefield in what was a clear case of censorship by access and perspective limitation.

    This military-media power dynamic – and the subsequent mismatch between the actuality of the war and the reporting of it – led the French philosopher Jean Baudrillard to declare in a 1991 essay, published by Liberation and The Guardian, that “The Gulf war did not take place”.

    General “Stormin” Norman Schwarzkopf’s famous “luckiest man in Iraq” briefing is indicative of the close relationship that developed between military and media professionals during the conflict. Schwarzkopf showed journalists footage taken through the crosshairs of a US bomber of an Iraqi private car driving over a bridge moments before a US airstrike destroys it. You can hear the journalists laughing with Schwarzkopf as they watch this lucky escape.

    Legacy of Vietnam

    Despite widespread understanding that scrutiny is an important part of public officialdom, the legacy of the Vietnam War – a conflict the US was perceived both at home and around the world to have lost – led to a significant amount of distrust of journalists. US media analyst Daniel Hallin referred to Vietnam as the “uncensored war”. By this he meant that journalists enjoyed an unprecedented amount of freedom – exacerbated by the relatively new medium of television, which brought stark images of war directly into people’s living rooms.

    By February 1968, the US military’s daily briefings from the Rex Hotel in Saigon had become known as the “five o’clock follies”, on account of the gulf between official claims of the war’s “progress” and what was being reported by journalists who had ventured into the field. The military consistently presented a positive narrative – in stark contrast to the esteemed CBS reporter Walter Cronkite’s analysis that: “To say that we are mired in stalemate seems the only realistic, yet unsatisfactory, conclusion.”

    Vietnam could have been an opportunity for governments to think about their obligation to truth and the requirement to be more ethical in their approach. Instead, the feeling in Washington was that unfavourable press coverage had lost the war, and that journalists needed to be curtailed.

    Controlling the message

    The recent decision by the Trump administration to take over selection of pool journalists from the notionally independent White House Correspondents’ Association is unsurprising. The approach is consistent with the first Trump presidency’s refusal to answer questions from journalists who tried to carry out the press’s watchdog function.

    It also fits with Trump’s electioneering approach during 2024 when he shunned traditional news outlets, focusing instead on social media and appearing on the podcasts of Joe Rogan and Andrew Schulz, for example.

    To this end, the White House’s decision amounts to a power grab against the institution of modern journalism – even if much of the US media has been in thrall to the powerful ever since Vietnam.

    Colin Alexander does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. The White House press pool became a way to control journalists – Trump is taking this to new levels – https://theconversation.com/the-white-house-press-pool-became-a-way-to-control-journalists-trump-is-taking-this-to-new-levels-250960

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

  • MIL-OSI Video: Bangladesh, Myanmar, Geneva & other topics – Daily Press Briefing (14 March 2025) | United Nations

    Source: United Nations (Video News)

    Noon Briefing by Stéphane Dujarric, Spokesperson for the Secretary-General.

    Highlights:
    – Secretary-General/Bangladesh
    – Myanmar
    – Trip Announcement / Geneva
    – Trip Announcement / Brussels
    – Democratic Republic of the Congo
    – Central African Republic
    – Occupied Palestinian Territory
    – Syria
    – Global Trade 2025
    – Coffee Prices
    – Islamophobia
    – Commission on the Status of Women

    SECRETARY-GENERAL/BANGLADESH
    The Secretary-General today was in Cox’s Bazaar, Bangladesh, as part of his Ramadan solidarity visit with Rohingya refugees and their Bangladeshi host communities.
    The Secretary-General had the chance to meet with refugees, many of them young men and women, who told him about their experiences and concerns. He spoke to children who were grateful to be able to go to school in the camps, but missed their homes in Myanmar. And he met young people who still have hope to return to their homeland but are also worried about the impending funding cuts which would dramatically reduce their monthly food rations (from $12.50 to $6 per month). The Secretary-General also visited a jute center, where he had a chance to hear from women who are trying to build a livelihood inside the camps.
    The Secretary-General assured every one of the people he met that he would do everything he can to stop the funding cuts, and he apologized to them because the UN and the international community have not been able to stop the conflict in Myanmar.
    He later had a press encounter in which he said that he had heard two clear messages: first, Rohingyas want to go back to Myanmar; and second, they want better conditions in the camps.
    And at sunset, he shared an Iftar with some 60,000 refugees. He told them that sharing an Iftar with them is a symbol of his deep respect for their religion and their culture. He also said that we are facing a deep humanitarian crisis with the announced funding cuts, and he lamented that as a result, many people will suffer, and some people might die.
    “My voice will not end until the international community understands that they have the obligation to invest now in the Rohingya refugees,” he said.
    Chief Adviser Muhammad Yunus was also present at the Iftar, and they met separately earlier in the day. 

    MYANMAR
    The World Food Programme today warned that more than one million people in Myanmar will be cut off from its food assistance starting in April – due to critical funding shortfalls.
    WFP says these cuts come just as increased conflict, displacement and access restrictions are already sharply driving up food aid needs.
    Without immediate new funding WFP will only be able to assist 35,000 of the most vulnerable people, including children under the age of five, pregnant and breastfeeding women, and people living with disabilities.
    The cuts will also impact almost 100,000 internally displaced people in central Rakhine who will have no access to food without WFP assistance, including Rohingya communities in camps.
    WFP urgently needs US$ 60 million to maintain its life-saving food assistance to the people of Myanmar this year.
    Optional – A staggering 15.2 million people are unable to meet their minimum daily food needs in Myanmar, according to the Myanmar Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan; this is up from 13.3 million last year. Of these, according to the plan, some 2.3 million people are facing emergency levels of hunger. Even with regular support, these families who rely solely on WFP food assistance, are already reporting skipping meals, selling properties or going into debt just to survive.

    TRIP ANNOUNCEMENT / GENEVA
    On Sunday, the Secretary-General will arrive in Geneva, Switzerland, where, as we announced a few days ago, he is convening the two Cypriot leaders and the Guarantor Powers of Greece, Türkiye and the United Kingdom for an informal meeting on Cyprus at the United Nations Office in Geneva.
    The meeting will take place from 17 to 18 March and is being held in the context of the Secretary-General’s good offices efforts on the Cyprus issue and as agreed with the two leaders on 15 October 2024.
    The informal meeting will provide an opportunity for a meaningful discussion on the way forward on the Cyprus issue. The United Nations remains committed to supporting the Cypriot leaders and all Cypriots.

    Full Highlights: https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/noon-briefing-highlight?date%5Bvalue%5D%5Bdate%5D=14%20March%202025

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jt5yQOZfYG8

    MIL OSI Video –

  • MIL-OSI Video: Syria, Sudan/Security Council & other topics – Daily Press Briefing | United Nations

    Source: United Nations (Video News)

    Noon Briefing by Stéphane Dujarric, Spokesperson for the Secretary-General.

    Highlights:
    Secretary-General
    Syria
    Treaty on state border between the Kyrgyz Republic and the Republic of Tajikistan
    Haiti
    Sudan/Security Council
    Sudan / Humanitarian
    Occupied Palestinian Territory
    Yemen
    Bosnia and Herzegovina
    Ethiopia
    Measles / European Region
    Journalism Fellowship

    SECRETARY-GENERAL The Secretary-General just arrived in Dhaka, Bangladesh, to start off his Ramadan solidarity visit. Tomorrow, he will meet with the Chief Adviser of the government, Muhammad Yunus and travel with him to Cox’s Bazaar. They will meet there with Rohingya refugees who have been forcibly displaced from their homes in Myanmar and also, they will meet  with the host Bangladeshi communities who have been so generous in hosting them. The Secretary-General will also share an Iftar with the refugees, and he will also issue a call to the international community to step up their humanitarian assistance for these men, women and children who have already suffered so much. And on Saturday in Dhaka, the Secretary-General will meet with youth and representatives from civil society. He will also have a joint press conference with the Foreign Adviser, Touhid Hossain. 
    SYRIA Following the Constitutional Declaration issued by the Caretaker Authorities in Syria, the Special Envoy for Syria, Geir Pedersen, said he welcomes moves toward restoring the rule of law and notes that this development potentially fills an important legal vacuum.  The Special Envoy hopes the declaration can be a solid legal framework for a genuinely credible and inclusive political transition. Proper implementation will be key, he said, along with continued efforts to ensure transitional governance in an orderly manner. In a statement, the Secretary-General said that 14 years have now passed since the Syrian people stood up in peaceful protest for their universal rights and freedoms, only to be met with brutal repression.  Mr. Guterres added that what began as a call for peaceful change turned into one of the world’s most devastating conflicts, with an incalculable human cost.  The Secretary-General spoke about the millions of men, women and children who were displaced and subjected to unimaginable hardship. Yet, the Syrian people never wavered in their steadfast and courageous calls for freedom, for dignity, and for a just future.            Since 8 December, however, we saw renewed hope that Syrians can chart a different course and the chance to rebuild, the chance to reconcile, and the chance to create a nation where they can all live peacefully and in dignity.  The Secretary-General said nothing can justify the killing of civilians, that we have been reporting in recent days. He stressed that all violence must stop, and there must be a credible, an independent, an impartial investigation of violations and those responsible must be held to account.  He added that the caretaker authorities have repeatedly committed to building a new Syria based on inclusive and credible foundations for all Syrians. Now is the time for action, he said. He concluded by reiterating that we stand ready to work alongside the Syrians and support an inclusive political transition and we stand with the Syrian people towards the promise of a better Syria – for all Syrians.  
    TREATY ON STATE BORDER BETWEEN THE KYRGYZ REPUBLIC AND THE REPUBLIC OF TAJIKISTAN The Secretary-General warmly welcomes the signing of the Treaty on the State Border by the Presidents of the Kyrgyz Republic and the Republic of Tajikistan, and that took place today in Bishkek. He congratulates the two countries on this historic achievement and commends their leadership, their determination and their political will to bring the decades-long negotiation process to a successful conclusion. The Secretary-General looks forward to a sustained constructive engagement between the two countries towards fostering mutual trust, good-neighbourly relations and a peaceful future for their people and the broader region. 

    Full Highlights: https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/noon-briefing-highlight?date%5Bvalue%5D%5Bdate%5D=13%20March%202025

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yyL8dWzt2kI

    MIL OSI Video –

  • MIL-OSI USA News: Remarks by President Trump and NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte Before Bilateral Meeting

    Source: The White House

    class=”has-text-align-center”>Oval Office

    12:33 P.M. EDT

         PRESIDENT TRUMP:  Hello, everybody.  It’s great to be with a friend of mine, who was prime minister of the Netherlands, so I got to know him very well.  We had a great relationship always.

    SECRETARY GENERAL RUTTE:  Absolutely.

    PRESIDENT TRUMP:  Mark Rutte.  Now he’s secretary general of NATO and doing a fantastic job.  Everybody — every report I’ve gotten is what a great job he did.  And I’m not at all surprised when I hear it.  We had to support him, and we supported him as soon as I heard the name.  

    SECRETARY GENERAL RUTTE:  Thank you.

    PRESIDENT TRUMP:  But he was a fantastic prime minister, and he’s doing a fantastic job. An even tougher job.  Which is tougher: being the prime minister of Netherlands or?

    SECRETARY GENERAL RUTTE:  This job is quite tough.  Yeah.  (Laughter.)

    PRESIDENT TRUMP:  I would think this is a little tougher.

    SECRETARY GENERAL RUTTE:  But — but Dutch politics is also brutal.  So — (laughter).

    PRESIDENT TRUMP:  Yeah.  But this is pretty tough. 

    SECRETARY GENERAL RUTTE:  Yeah.

    PRESIDENT TRUMP:  But you’re doing good. 

    SECRETARY GENERAL RUTTE:  Thank you.

    PRESIDENT TRUMP:  We’re going to be discussing a lot of things.  Obviously, we’ll be discussing what’s happening with respect to Ukraine and Russia. 

    At this moment, we have people talking in Russia.  We have representatives over there — Steve Witkoff and others.  And they’re in very serious discussions.  As you know, Ukraine has agreed, subject to this — what’s happening today — to a complete ceasefire, and we hope Russia will do the same. 

    Thousands of people are being killed — young people, usually, mostly young people.  We were just talking about it.  Thousands of young people are being killed a week, and we want to see that stop.  And they’re not Americans, and they’re not from the Netherlands for the most part.

    SECRETARY GENERAL RUTTE:  No.

    PRESIDENT TRUMP:  They’re not from — they’re from Russia and they’re from Ukraine, but they’re people.  And I think everybody feels the same way.  We want it to stop.

    It’s also a tremendous cost to the United States and to other countries.  And it’s something that would have never happened if I were president, and it makes me very angry to see that it did happen.  But it happened, and we have to stop it.  

    And Mark has done some really good work over the last week.  We’ve been working together, and he’s done some really good work.  So, I’m very happy about that. 

    We’ll also be talking about trade and various other things, and I think we’ll have a very, very strong day.  We’re going to have lunch afterwards.  That’ll go.  And then we’ll see you all later. 

    But, Mark, would you like to say something?

    SECRETARY GENERAL RUTTE:  Yeah.  First of all, thank you so much, Mr. President, dear Donald, again for hosting me and — but also for taking time in Florida a couple of weeks after you —

    PRESIDENT TRUMP:  Right.  That’s right.

    SECRETARY GENERAL RUTTE:  — you were reelected. 

    PRESIDENT TRUMP:  That’s right.

    SECRETARY GENERAL RUTTE:  And, of course, our phone call a couple of weeks ago.  And I must say, Trump 45 — you basically — you originated the fact that in Europe we are now spending, when you take it to aggregate, $700 billion more on defense —

    PRESIDENT TRUMP:  Yeah.

    SECRETARY GENERAL RUTTE:  — than when you came in office in 2016 — in 2017.

    But that was Trump 45.  But when look at Trump 47 —

    PRESIDENT TRUMP:  Going to be hard to top.  (Laughter.)

    SECRETARY GENERAL RUTTE:  — what happened the last couple of weeks is really staggering.  The Europeans committing to a package of $800 billion defense spending.  The Germans now —

    PRESIDENT TRUMP:  Yeah.

    SECRETARY GENERAL RUTTE:  — potentially up to half a trillion extra in defense spending.  And then, of course, you have Keir Starmer here, the British prime minister, and others all committing to much higher defense spending.  

    They’re not there.  We need to do more.  But I really want to work together with you in a run-up to The Hague summit to make sure that we will have a NATO which is really reinvigorated under your leadership.  And we are getting there.  

    We also discussed defense production, because we need to produce more weaponry.  We are not doing enough — not in the U.S., not in Europe.  And we are lagging behind when you compare to the Russians and the Chinese.  And you have a huge defense industrial base, Europeans buying mo- — four times more here than the other — the other way around, which is good, because you have a strong defense industry. 

    But we need to do more there to make sure that we ramp up production and kill the red tape.  So, I would love to work with you on that. 

    And finally, Ukraine — you broke the deadlock.  As you said, all the killing, the young people dying, cities getting destroyed.  The fact that you did that, that you started the dialogue with the Russians and the successful talks in Saudi Arabia now with the Ukrainians — I really want to commend you for this.

    So, well, The Hague is my hometown.  I’d love to host you there in the summer and work together to make sure that —

    PRESIDENT TRUMP:  We’ll do that.

    SECRETARY GENERAL RUTTE:  — that will be a splash, a real success, projecting American power on the world stage. 

    PRESIDENT TRUMP:  What Mark is saying is: When I first went to NATO, my first meeting, I noticed that very few people were paying.  And if they were, they weren’t paying their fair share.  There were only seven countries that were paying what they were supposed to be paying, which was —

    SECRETARY GENERAL RUTTE:  It’s even worse, there were three.

    PRESIDENT TRUMP:  Yeah.

    SECRETARY GENERAL RUTTE:  That’s even worse.

    PRESIDENT TRUMP:  It could be even worse. 

    SECRETARY GENERAL RUTTE:  Yeah.

    PRESIDENT TRUMP:  But there were just very few countries that were paying.  And even the paying, it was at 2 percent, which is too low.  It should be higher.  It should be quite a bit higher.

    But you had Poland and I remember Poland was actually paying a little bit more than they were supposed to, which I was very impressed with.  And they’ve been actually terrific and some of the others.  But most of them weren’t paying or they were paying very little.  

    And I didn’t think it was appropriate to bring it up there, but I said, “It’s going to be brought up at my next meeting.”  And my next meeting — you know, the first meeting, you want to give them a little break.  The second meeting, it began.

    And I was able to raise —

    SECRETARY GENERAL RUTTE:  You did.  (Laughs.)

    PRESIDENT TRUMP:  — hundreds of billions of dollars.  I just said, “We’re not going to be involved with you if you’re not going to pay.”  And the money started pouring in.  And NATO became much stronger because of my actions and working along with a lot of people, including Mark.

    But they would not pay for other presidents.  I don’t think other presidents even knew that they weren’t paid.  I asked, first question, “Has everybody paid up?”  And literally, I mean, they showed — they told me seven.  You could be right.  It could be three.  But — that makes it even worse — but they just weren’t paying. 

    And I said, “No, I won’t protect if you’re not paying.  If you’re delinquent or if the money isn’t paid, why would we do that?”

    And as soon as I said that, got a little hit from the press, because they said, “Oh, gee, that’s not very nice.”  But if you said the other, nobody would have paid.  And the money started coming in by the billions.  

    And, you know, hundreds of billions of dollars flowed into NATO, and NATO became strong.

    SECRETARY GENERAL RUTTE:  Yeah.

    PRESIDENT TRUMP:  And you remember that.  And your predecessor, who I thought was a very good man actually.

    SECRETARY GENERAL RUTTE:  Absolutely.  Jens Stoltenberg.  He sends his best greetings.

    PRESIDENT TRUMP:  Yeah.  He was terrific.

    SECRETARY GENERAL RUTTE:  Yeah.

    PRESIDENT TRUMP:  Stoltenberg, secretary general.

    SECRETARY GENERAL RUTTE:  Great man.

    PRESIDENT TRUMP:  And he made the statement that when Trump came in, the money started coming in like we never saw before.  Hundreds of billions — it was actually probably close to $600 billion came in.  And NATO became strong from that standpoint.

    And now, we have to use it wisely.  And we have to get this war over with.  And you’ll be back to a normal — much more normal life. 

    And maybe we’re close.  We’re getting words that things are going okay in Russia, and it doesn’t mean anything until we hear what the final outcome is. 

    But they have very serious discussions going on right now with President Putin and others.  And hopefully, they all want to end this nightmare.  It’s a nightmare.  It’s a horrible thing, when you look.  I get pictures every week.  They give me the pictures of the battlefield, which I almost don’t want to see.  It’s so horrible to see.

    SECRETARY GENERAL RUTTE:  It’s so terrible.

    PRESIDENT TRUMP:  Young people laying — arms and legs and heads laying all over the field.  It’s the most terrible thing that you’ll ever see. 

    And it’s got to stop.  These are young people with mothers and fathers and sisters and brothers and friends, and it’s got to stop. 

    So, we hopefully are going to be in a good position sometime today to have a good idea.  We’ll have — we know where we are with Ukraine, and we are getting good signals outside of Russia as to where we are with Russia, and hopefully they’ll do the right thing.  

    It’s a really — humanity — we’re talking about humanity.  We’re not talking about the money.  But then you add the money to it, and, you know, hundreds of billions of dollars is being spent and, really, wasted so unnecessarily.  It should have never happened.  

    So, it’s an honor to have you here.  They picked a great gentleman.  I’ll tell you, that was — I was so happy to hear, because you had somebody — Stoltenberg was really good.  And you have somebody that’s going to do an incredible job.  And I was so much in favor of you, you have no idea. 

    They had another person that I did not like.  (Laughter.)  I was not happy.  And I think I kept him from — you know what I’m talking about.  I said, “This is the right man to do it.”  And he really did.  He was a great prime minister of the Netherlands.  He did a great job.  And that’s what he’s doing right now. 

    So, thank you, everybody, for being here.  And very great honor to have you.  And we even have some of our great energy people here today, right?  We have the governor, and we have Chris.  You know Chris.

    SECRETARY GENERAL RUTTE:  Yeah.  Absolutely.

    PRESIDENT TRUMP:  He’s supposed to be the most talented man in the world of energy, according to the governor.  (Laughter.)  So, I don’t know if he’s right.

    And we have — General, you’ve been fantastic.  Thank you very much. 

    And we have a lot of good people that won’t be so much involved with this, but they wanted to see what was happening.  It’s become a little bit of a show — (laughter) — but they wanted to see what was happening.  And I think a lot of good things are happening.  

    So, with that, if anybody would have a question.

    (Cross-talk.) 

    Q    Mr. President, o- — on Russia. 

    PRESIDENT TRUMP:  Please, go ahead.

    Q    Vlad- —

         Q    Sorry.  Sorry, Mary.  Steve Witkoff’s trip to Moscow, you spoke about it.  What sort of agreement do you hope he comes away from there with?

    PRESIDENT TRUMP:  Well, we’d like to see a ceasefire from Russia.  And we have, you know, not been working in the dark.  We’ve been discussing with Ukraine land and pieces of land that would be kept and lost and all of the other elements of a final agreement.  

    There’s a power plant involved — you know, a very big power plant involved.  Who’s going to get the power plant and who’s going to get this and that.  And so, you know, it’s not an easy process.

    But phase one is the ceasefire.  A lot of the individual subjects have been discussed, though.  You know, we’ve been discussing concepts of land, because you don’t want to waste time with the ceasefire if it’s not going to mean anything.  So, we’re saying, “Look, this is what you can get.  This is what you can’t get.” 

    They discussed NATO and being in NATO, and everybody knows what the answer to that is.  They’ve known that answer for 40 years, in all fairness. 

    So, a lot of the details of a final agreement have actually been discussed.  Now we’re going to see whether or not Russia is there, and if they’re not, it’ll be a very disappointing moment for the world. 

    Yeah. 

    Q    And Vladimir Putin just said he is open to a ceasefire, but he does still have some concerns.  He suggested that you two should speak directly.  Do you have plans to speak to him soon?  If so, when?

    PRESIDENT TRUMP:  Well, I would.  Yeah, sure.

    Q    And are you confident you can get this across the finish line?

    PRESIDENT TRUMP:  Sure.  He did say that today.  It was a very promising statement, because other people are saying different things, and you don’t know if they have anything to really — if they have any meaning, or I don’t know.  I think some of them were making statements.  I don’t think they have anything to do with it.

    No, he put out a very promising statement, but it wasn’t complete.  And, yeah, I’d love to meet with him or talk to him, but we have to get it over with fast.  You know, every day people are being killed.  It’s not like — as we sit here, two people will be killed.  Think of it.  Two people are going to be killed during this little period of time. 

         Thousands of people a week are dying, so we really don’t have very much time.  We have to make this fast.  It shouldn’t be very complicated.

    (Cross-talk.) 

    Yes.

    Q    Thank you, Mr. President.  A representative of Canada, the finance minister, are in town and will meet members of your administration during the day. 

    PRESIDENT TRUMP:  Sure.  Yeah.

    Q    Any chances that you will ban on the tariffs on aluminum and — and the — the ones that are planned for April 2nd?

    PRESIDENT TRUMP:  No.

    Q    You are not going to change your mind? 

    PRESIDENT TRUMP:  No, I’m not.  Look, we’ve been ripped off for years, and we’re not going to be ripped off anymore.  No, I’m not going to bend at all on aluminum or steel or cars.  We’re not going to bend.  We’ve been ripped off as a country for many, many years.  We’ve been subjected to costs that we shouldn’t be subjected to. 

    In the case of Canada, we’re spending $200 billion a year to subsidize Canada.  I love Canada.  I love the people of Canada. I have many friends in Canada.  “The Great One,” Wayne Gretzky, the great.  Hey, how good is Wayne Gretzky?  He’s the Great One.  

    But we have — I know many people from Canada that are good friends of mine.  But, you know, the United States can’t subsidize a country for $200 billion a year.  We don’t need their cars.  We don’t need their energy.  We don’t need their lumber.  We don’t need anything that they give. 

    We do it because we want to be helpful, but it comes a point when you just can’t do that.  You have to run your own country.  And to be honest with you, Canada only works as a state.  We don’t need anything they have.  As a state, it would be one of the great states anywhere.  

    This would be the most incredible country visually.  If you look at a map, they drew an artificial line right through it — between Canada and the U.S.  Just a straight artificial line.  Somebody did it a long time ago — many, many decades ago — and makes no sense.  

    It’s so perfect as a great and cherished state, keeping “O Canada,” the national anthem.  I love it.  I think it’s great.  Keep it, but it’ll be for the state.  One of our greatest states.  Maybe our greatest state.  

    But why should we subsidize another country for $200 billion?  It costs us $200 billion a year.  And again, we don’t need their lumber.  We don’t need their energy.  We have more than they do.  We don’t need anything.  We don’t need their cars.  I’d much rather make the cars here.  

    And there’s not a thing that we need.  Now, there’ll be a little disruption, but it won’t be very long.  But they need us.  We really don’t need them.  And we have to do this.  I’m sorry, we have to do this.  

    Yes. 

    Q    Mr. President — 

    PRESIDENT TRUMP:  Yeah. 

    Q    — you have made it very clear that NATO needs to step up, although great progress —

    PRESIDENT TRUMP:  Yeah.

    Q    — has been made in your first mandate.  How do you envision this new transatlantic —

    PRESIDENT TRUMP:  Are you talking about NATO stepping up?

    Q    Yes.

    PRESIDENT TRUMP:  Well, NATO is stepping up through this man. This man is a man that only knows how to step up.  And we have the same goal in mind: We want the war ended.  And he’s doing his job.  He only knows how to do a good job.  That’s one thing.  That’s why I fought for him to get that job —

    SECRETARY GENERAL RUTTE:  Thank you so much.

    PRESIDENT TRUMP:  — because they had some other candidates that I’ll tell you would not have done a very good job.

    SECRETARY GENERAL RUTTE:  I need this part of the — of the movie for my family.  (Laughter.)

         PRESIDENT TRUMP:  That’s right.  That’s right.  We’ll get you a clip. 

         SECRETARY GENERAL RUTTE:  Yeah.  Exactly.  (Laughs.)

         PRESIDENT TRUMP:  We’re going to get him a clip of that — of that little last essay.  But the rest of the statements he doesn’t care about.

    Q    Sir, how does this new transatlantic cooperation — how do you envision it?  What is it going to look like?

    PRESIDENT TRUMP:  Well, we have — that’s one thing.  I mean, you know, we’re the other side of the ocean, and they’re right there.  And yet, we’re in for $350 billion because of Biden, and they’re in for $100 billion.  So, it’s a big difference, and it’s unfair.  

    And I said, “You have to equalize.”  They should equalize.  They should have — it should have never happened, where Biden just gave his money away. 

    Now, as you know, we have an agreement with Ukraine on the rare earths and other things, and that’ll get us

    something back — a lot back.  It’ll get us our money back.  We’re not doing it for that, though.  We’re doing — I’m just doing this to get the war stopped.  I’m doing it, really, to save lives.

    But, at the same time, we were treated very unfairly, as we always are by every country.  And we’re in for very substantially more than the European nations are in for, and that shouldn’t be.

    You know, they’re much more affected by it than we are, because we do have an ocean in between. 

    But I don’t know.  I think good things are going to happen.  I really do.  I think good things are going to happen. 

    I do say — we were talking before, and Mark was very nice.  He said, “If you wouldn’t get involved, there would be” — you’d just be going on.

    SECRETARY GENERAL RUTTE:  Yeah.

    PRESIDENT TRUMP:  This thing would have gone on for a long time.

    SECRETARY GENERAL RUTTE:  Breaking a deadlock.  It was crucial.

    PRESIDENT TRUMP:  Yeah, we broke a deadlock. 

    SECRETARY GENERAL RUTTE:  Yeah. 

    PRESIDENT TRUMP:  We did break a deadlock.  I hope it’s meaningful. 

    SECRETARY GENERAL RUTTE:  Yeah. 

    PRESIDENT TRUMP:  Yes, did you have one?

    Q    Mr. President — 

    PRESIDENT TRUMP:  Yeah, please.

    Q    Yes, sir.  Thank you, Mr. President.  Amanda Head with Just the News.  On the southern border, you’ve got DHS and ICE, who are reporting that there was a little bit of fudging of numbers during the Biden administration —

    PRESIDENT TRUMP:  Yeah.

    Q    — on both the catch and the release side with respect to reporting the number of illegals coming into the country who were released.

    PRESIDENT TRUMP:  They cheated on the numbers.  They were — the numbers were — I love that question.

    Q    Right.

    PRESIDENT TRUMP:  Who are you with?

    Q    Just the News.  Amanda Head.

    PRESIDENT TRUMP:  Very nice.  That’s good.  That’s good.

    Q    Do you know how many of those are criminal illegal aliens? 

    PRESIDENT TRUMP:  Many of them.

    Q    And Biden is out of office —

    PRESIDENT TRUMP:   Yeah.

    Q    — Alejandro Mayorkas.  Who gets held accountable?

    PRESIDENT TRUMP:  No, Biden fudged the numbers.  The numbers were totally fake, and he gave fake numbers.  I knew they were fake.  Everybody knew they were fake, but now it came out.  And terrible what — what they did.  That administration was a horror show for this country.

    Q    Can you hold anyone accountable?

    PRESIDENT TRUMP:  Well, I don’t know.  They gave phony numbers, and phony numbers are a very bad thing to give.  But I’m not sure about that.  I don’t know how it would play.  We want to get it straightened out.  

    We have — we’re after many, many bad people that were let into our country.  And Kristi Noem and my friend Homan — how good is Tom Homan doing, right?  And they’re after them.  And they — I mean, you see: They’re taking them out in record numbers.  Gang members, gang leaders, drug dealers. 

    This is a problem the Netherlands does not have.  The Netherlands never had this problem.  If you’d like to take —

    SECRETARY GENERAL RUTTE:  We have a few drug- — drug dealers, I’m afraid.  (Laughter.)

    PRESIDENT TRUMP:  I could deliver some people.  I could deliver some nice people to the Netherlands if you’d like.  (Laughter.)

    SECRETARY GENERAL RUTTE:  I’m not sure.  (Laughs.)

    PRESIDENT TRUMP:  No, what he did to this country, letting 21 million people flow through an open border — many of those people were hard criminals from prisons and jails, from mental institutions, and I always say “insane asylums,” because they were seriously deranged.  And they’re here from not South America, from all over the world.  From South America, but from all over the world.  And it’s so sad. 

    You’d say, “Why would anybody do this?  Why?”

    Yeah, go ahead.

    Q    And — and one more.  There’s some new internal Democrat polling that doesn’t look great for Democrats, but it also has 54 percent unfavorability for Republicans in swing states and battlegrounds for the midterms.  Do you consider those voters cap- — capturable for — for Republicans?

    PRESIDENT TRUMP:  Yeah, well, we did — you know, I won every swing state, as you know, by a lot, and I won the popular vote by a lot, and we won the counties.  If you look at the counties and district plan, we had 2,725, and they had 501.  That’s a real — that’s why the map is all red.  So, we had a great thing.

    Yeah, I think winning from the Democrats — I saw — if you looked the other night, I made a speech, and I introduced two young ladies who were killed.  Two killed.  Viciously, violently killed.  Young.  Unbelievable.  Both outstanding people.  They were killed by illegal aliens.  And the Democrats wouldn’t get up and applaud.  The mothers were, I mean, inconsolable.  They were crying, and everybody was crying.  The Democrats sat there with stone faces.  They didn’t clap, they didn’t stand, they didn’t do anything.  

    We had a young man with very serious cancer, wanted to — his dream is to be with the police department someday, and he was introduced. 

    SECRETARY GENERAL RUTTE:  That was very touching.

    PRESIDENT TRUMP:  They didn’t even clap.

    SECRETARY GENERAL RUTTE:  Yeah, I saw it.

    PRESIDENT TRUMP:  I mean, they were disgusting.  Frankly, they were disgusting.  There’s something wrong with them.  They’re deranged.  They’re deranged.  Like Jack Smith, they’re deranged people. 

    And I never saw anything like it.  I’m standing up, and I introduce the mother and the parents of these two young girls that were just recently, essentially, killed.  Violently killed.  And the Democrats are like this.  It’s so sad.  

    And I saw this morning where — one of them is pretty well-known — one is arguing, fighting like crazy over men being able to play in women’s sports.  I said, “Yeah, I thought that was tried.”  I thought that was about a 95 — I think it’s a 95 percent issue.  

    But, in a way, I want them to keep doing it, because I don’t think they can win a race.  I mean — and I tell the Republicans, I said, “Don’t bring that subject up, because there’s no election right now.  But about a week before the election, bring it up, because you can’t lose.”  

    And everything is “transgender this, transgender that.”  You know, they have bad politics. 

    But one thing: They stick together.  You know?

    I wish — and the Republicans stick together, mostly, but we have a couple that are grandstanders.  You know, you always have grandstanders in life.

    But the Democrats, they don’t seem — they have grandstanders, but when it comes to a vote, they do stick together, right?

    VICE PRESIDENT VANCE:  They get in line.  Yes, sir.

    PRESIDENT TRUMP:  So.

    Q    It seems like they’ll stick together on the shutdown.  Will that hurt Democrats going into midterms?

    PRESIDENT TRUMP:  Well, if they do a shutdown and, ultimately, that might lead to very, very high taxes, because we’re talking about a shutdown.  We’re talking about getting to work immediately on the greatest tax bill ever passed.  That was the one we did.  It’s a renewal, and it’s an addition to it.  And we’re going to cut people’s taxes. 

    And if we don’t open, the Democrats are stopping all of these good things that we’re providing.  We’re providing the greatest package of benefits that this country has ever provided. 

    The biggest part of that’s going to be tax cuts for the middle class and for businesses, small businesses, employers — people that hire people and jobs. 

    And if it’s shut down, it’s only going to be — if there’s a shutdown, it’s only because of the Democrats, and they would really be taking away a lot from our country and from the people of our country.

    Q    Mr. President, on — on tariffs.  You made clear you’re not backing down from this, but many American small-business owners say they are concerned that these tariffs are going to hurt them.  What’s your message to them?

    PRESIDENT TRUMP:  They’re going to be so much richer than they are right now.

    And we have many — yesterday, General Motors was in.  They want to invest $60 billion.  The people from Facebook were in yesterday.  They’re going to invest $60 billion by the end of the year.  Other people are talking about numbers.  

    Apple, as you know, a few days ago, announced $500 billion investment.  They’re going to build their plants in the United States, which, as you know, almost all of their plants are in China.  Now they’re building in the United States.

    Look, the reason is two things.  Number one, the election. November 5th.  And the other thing is tariffs.  I think, probably, in that order. 

    But Tim Cook came in and he announced 500 — think of it, $500 billion, not million.  Five hundred million is a lot, when you think about it, right?  But —

    VICE PRESIDENT VANCE:  Yes, sir.

    PRESIDENT TRUMP:  I would have been happy with $500 million.  But it’s $500 billion investment by Apple in the United States, and that’s because of the election result and it’s because of the tariffs and the tax incentives too.  You know, tariffs and tax incentives.  And I’ve never seen anything like it. 

    We have plants going up now in Indiana.  We have plants going up in Michigan.  A lot of plants going to be planned from — I’m trying to steer them to Michigan, because Michigan got so badly beaten by, you know, what happened with Europe.

    You know, if you look at Europe. Take a look at the EU.  We’re not allowed to sell cars there.  It’s prohibitive because of their policies, and also their nonmonetary tariffs.  They put obstacles in your way that you can do nothing about.  

    But if you take a look at what happens — so, we sell no cars to Europe — I mean, virtually no cars — and they sell millions of cars to us.  They don’t take our agriculture.  We take their agriculture. It’s like a one-way street with them.

    The European Union is very, very nasty. 

    They sue our companies.  Apple was forced to pay $16 billion on a case that — very much like my cases that I won.  They shouldn’t have been even cases.  But we felt they had no case, and they ended up having an extremely favorable judge and decision.  

    But they’re suing Google, they’re suing Facebook, they’re suing all of these companies, and they’re taking billions of dollars out of American companies, many more than the ones I just mentioned.  And I guess they’re using it to run Europe or something.  I don’t know what they’re using it for. 

    But they treat us very badly.  China obviously treats this very badly.  Almost everybody does.  And I blame past presidents, to be honest. 

    Because when I was president, I — we received, so far, about $700 billion from China, over the years, on the tariffs that I put in.  No other president got 10 cents from China.  And that was only beginning.  Except for COVID, it would have — I would have been able to finish the process.  But we had to fight the COVID thing, and we did really well with it.  But we had to fight.

    And then we had actually — as you remember, Mark, we actually handed over the stock market.  It was higher than just previous to COVID coming in, which was sort of a miracle, frankly.  We did a good job.

    But the tariffs are very important.  And I think the psychology — there’s great spirit.  When Mark came in, he said, “Congratulations.  There’s a whole new spirit.  There’s a whole new light over this country, and really over the world” —

    SECRETARY GENERAL RUTTE:  Yeah.

    PRESIDENT TRUMP:  — because you have somebody that — a whole group of people, really, because I talk about this whole group, that we know what we’re doing.  And a lot of great things are happening.

    But I’ve never seen investment like this.  Trillions of dollars is being invested in the United States now that would have never — our country could have failed.  Another four years of this, what happened in the last four years, our country would have been a crime-ridden mess.  

    And I don’t know if you noticed — a little thing, they call it, but it’s not a little thing if you don’t have — if you like eggs and you don’t have a lot of money — eggs have gone down 25 percent in the last couple of weeks.  We inherited that problem: eggs.  

    Groceries have gone down a little bit.  Energy has gone down. 

    Do you want to speak to that for a second, Governor?  Would you just say a couple of words, you and Chris, about energy, what’s happened?

    SECRETARY BURGUM:  Well, happy to, but I think that — Chris and I just came from CERAWeek, which is the largest conference in the world.  So, global leaders, people from the EU, officials from all the energy-producing countries all there.  And all the global nationals, all the U.S.  The — the spirit of that group is through the roof, because now they realize that in the United States, that President Trump’s policies are pro — pro developing more energy, as opposed to we’re trying to shut down energy.  

    And that pro-growth, pro-business, pro- — pro-energy approach is giving people the optimism.  So, then the markets are reacting to that, and energy prices on the futures market are going to go down because people know we’re — we’re not going to be killing off the energy we need for prosperity in all of our countries, but also for peace, because people have used energy to fuel these wars that President Trump is working so hard to end.  And — and we — we know that energy — high energy prices were driving the inflation that he talked about. 

    So, it accomplishes two goals for us — which is prosperity for the world, peace for the world — when we have smart energy policies.  And — and President Trump has brought common sense back to how we think about energy.

    PRESIDENT TRUMP:  And it’s brought down now $65 a barrel,  I saw this morning.  That’s phenomenal news, and that’s going to bring — that’s what brought it up.  The energy went — they took our beautiful energy policies and they just messed them up.  And then they went immediately back to them, because — but by that time, they lost it.  They lost that bronco, as the expression goes.

    Chris, do you have something to say?

    SECRETARY WRIGHT:  I think Doug said it well, but you just can’t overstate how important the return of common sense, the return of knowledge about energy and pro-American consumers, pro investment in our country.  I think, globally, that was welcomed.  It means capital flows.  It means more sobriety and lower energy prices, more economic opportunity for Americans. 

    So, yeah, it was elated atmosphere at a global energy conference. 

    PRESIDENT TRUMP:  Well, we’re working on one project, and it should be very easy.  It’s a pipeline going through a small section of New York.  New York has held it up for years, actually.  For years they’ve wanted to do it. For years and years.  And it will reduce — 

    The most expensive energy, almost, in the world is in New England, because they have no way of getting it there because it’s been held up by New York.  And the whole of New England and Connecticut and New York — the energy prices are through the roof.  And this one pipeline will save per family, $2,500 just on heating and another $2,500 on everything else.  So, the energy — by just a simple pipeline going through an area that wants it — an area that’s not a rich area; it’s actually a very poor area — would create jobs and everything else.

    And it’s going to be way underground.  Nobody’s going to see it.  Once they fill it up, nobody’s going to see it.  Nobody’s going to know it’s there. 

    And families in New York and Connecticut and New England are going to save $5,000 a family.  Think of that.  Because, right now, they have the highest energy prices maybe in the world, they say.  New England is a disaster.  

    So, we’re working on that.  In fact, the governor is coming in — governor of New York, Kathy Hochul, who’s a very nice woman.  She’s coming in tomorrow morning at 9 o’clock to meet me on that and other things — not only that, but other things.

    So, I hope we don’t have to use the extraordinary powers of the federal government to get it done, but if we have to, we will.  But I don’t think we’ll have to. 

    I can tell you, Connecticut wants it and all of New England wants it.  And who wouldn’t want it?  And it’s also jobs on top of everything else.  So, that’s going to be very exciting.  So, we’re meeting with the governor tomorrow morning. 

    (Cross-talk.)

    Yeah. 

    Q    Thank you, Mr. President.  Greenland.  What is your vision for the potential annexation of Greenland and getting them, potentially, to —

    PRESIDENT TRUMP:  Yeah.

    Q    — to statehood?

    PRESIDENT TRUMP:  Well, I think it’ll happen.  And I’m just thinking — I didn’t give it much thought before, but I’m sitting with a man that could be very instrumental.  You know, Mark, we need that for international security — not just security, international.  We have a lot of our favorite players, you know, cruising around the coast, and we have to be careful.  And we’ll be talking to you.

    And it’s a very appropriate — really, a very appropriate question. 

    SECRETARY GENERAL RUTTE:  It’s an —

    PRESIDENT TRUMP:  Thank you very much.

    SECRETARY GENERAL RUTTE:  — an issue in the high north, so the Arctic.  So, what you did —

    So, when it comes to Greenland, yes or no, joining the U.S., I would leave that outside, for me, this discussion, because I don’t want to drag NATO in that. 

    But when it comes to the high north in the Arctic, you are totally right.  The Chinese and — are using these routes.  We know that the Russians already arming.  We know we have a lack of icebreakers.  So, the fact that the seven — outside of Russia, there are seven Arctic countries — working together on this, under U.S. leadership — it’s very important to make sure that that region, that that a part of the world stays safe.  And — and we know things are changing there, and we have to be there.

    Q    Well, they just had an election there the other day.  I mean, do you see a referendum, a plebiscite where the people of Greenland would be in a position to decide if they want to become part of the United States? 

    PRESIDENT TRUMP:  Yeah, it was a good election for us, as you know.  It was not a referendum.  It wouldn’t be called that.  It was an individual election.  But the person that did the best is a very good person, as far as we’re concerned.  And so, we’ll be talking about it.  And it’s very important. 

    Mark mentioned the word “icebreaker.”  So, we’re in the process of ordering 48 icebreakers, and Canada wants to know if they could use them.  I said, “Well, you know, you got to pay for them.”  Think of it.  Canada.  We pay for their military.  You know, Canada pays very little for their military, because they think we’re going to protect them, but — even with the icebreakers. 

    So, we’re going to order 48, and Canada wants to be part of the deal.  I say, “You got to get your own icebreakers.  I mean, if you’re a state, you can be part of the deal, but if you’re a separate country, you’ve got to get your own icebreakers.”  

    Russia, as you know, has about 40 of them, and we have 1 big icebreaker.  But that whole area is becoming very important and for a lot of reasons.  The routes are, you know, very direct to Asia, to Russia, and you have ships all over the place.  And we have to have protection.  So, we’re going to have to make a deal on that.

    And Denmark is not able to do that.  You know, Denmark is very far away and really has nothing to do. 

    What happens?  A boat landed there 200 years ago or something, and they say they have rights to it.  I don’t know if that’s true.  I’m not — I don’t think it is, actually.

    But we’ve been dealing with Denmark.  We’ve been dealing with Greenland.  And we have to do it.  We really need it for national security.  I think that’s why NATO might have to get involved in a way, because we really need Greenland for national security.  It’s very important.  

    You know, we have a couple of bases on Greenland already, and we have quite a few soldiers that — maybe you’ll see more and more soldiers go there.  I don’t know.

    What do you think about that, Pete? Don’t answer that, Pete.  (Laughter.)  Don’t answer that question.  

    But we have bases, and we have quite a few soldiers on Greenland already. 

    Q    Mr. President, some people question your commitment to NATO.  Will everything — anything change?

    Your com- — your commitment to NATO, will anything change?  Same amount of money?

    PRESIDENT TRUMP:  Well, I think they made —

    Q    Same number of troops?

    PRESIDENT TRUMP:  — a great step by putting Mark in charge.  I think, to me, that’s a great step, because he and I have seen eye to eye on everything for a long time.  We’ve been doing this a long time now.

    SECRETARY GENERAL RUTTE:  Nine years now.

    PRESIDENT TRUMP:  And so, that’s a great step. 

    You have to keep NATO strong.  You have to keep it relevant. 

    But the biggest thing we have to worry about right now is what’s going on right now.  I think the rest is going to take care of itself. 

    I don’t see this having — this was a fluke.  This was something that if we had a competent president, it would not have happened.  The man was grossly incompetent.  All you have to do is look in — take a look at — he signs by autopen.

    Who was signing all this stuff by autopen?  Who would think you signed important documents by autopen?  You know, these are major documents you’re signing.  You’re proud to sign them.  You have your signature on something — in 300 years, they say, “Oh, look.”  Can you imagine?  Everything was signed by autopen — almost everything.  Nobody has ever heard of such a thing. 

    Q    Do you —

    PRESIDENT TRUMP:  So —

    Q    Sorry. 

    PRESIDENT TRUMP:  Should have never happened. 

    Q    You’re speaking tomorrow at the Justice Department about law and order.  Could you tell us a little bit about that? 

    PRESIDENT TRUMP:  Yeah, we’re going to be with the Justice Department.  We have a great Justice Department.  Pam Bondi is so fantastic.  And Todd Blanche and Emil — you got to know him a little bit; he was acting for a little while — and some other people are incredible in the Justice Department. 

    And I consider the FBI to be a part of it, in a sense, and Kash is going to be fantastic, and all the people he’s — Dan Bongino, I love that.  I mean, I love that.  I think Dan is great. 

    I think we have unbelievable people.  And all I’m going to do is set out my vision.  It’s going to be their vision, really, but it’s my ideas.  And basically, we don’t want to have crime in the streets.  We don’t want to have people pushed into subways and killed, and then the — the person that did the pushing ends up in a 15-year trial and gets off scot-free.  We want to have justice, and we want to have safety in our cities, as well as our communities. 

    And we’ll be talking about immigration.  We’ll be talking about a lot of things.  Just the complete gamut.  So, I look forward to that.  That will be tomorrow at the Justice Department. 

    Q    Mr. President, you are a man of peace.  You’ve said it several times and made it very clear.  A man of peace dealing with belligerent people. 

    PRESIDENT TRUMP:  Yeah.

    Q    And I’m thinking we saw you handled Zelenskyy in this very own room.  What is your leverage on Putin?  Are you thinking sanctions?  What if he refuses to —

    PRESIDENT TRUMP:  Well, I do have leverage, but I don’t want to talk about leverage now, because right now we’re talking to him.  And based on the statements he made today, they were pretty positive, I think, so I don’t want to talk about that.  

    I hope Russia is going to make the deal too.  And I think once that deal happens, you’re never going to be in a process.  I don’t think they’re going back to shooting again.  I really believe if we get a peace treaty, a ceasefire treaty, I think that leads to peace.  That’s going to really lead to a —

    I don’t think anyone wants to go back.  They’ve been doing this for a long time, and it’s vicious and violent.  And I think if President Putin agrees and does a ceasefire, I think we’re going to be in very good shape to get it done.  We want to get it over with.  That’s why — it was very important what I instructed everybody, including Steve, what we’re looking for: to discuss concepts of land, concepts of —

    MR. WALTZ:  Yes, sir.   

    PRESIDENT TRUMP:  — of power plants because it’s complicated.  You know, you have a whole — you’re sort of creating the edge of a country. 

    The sad part is that country, if they didn’t — if this didn’t happen — and it wouldn’t have happened — I don’t know if they would have to give anything back.  I guess Crimea? 

    You know, I said it last time, Crimea was given by Obama, Biden gave them the whole thing, and Bush gave them Georgia.  And Trump didn’t give them anything. 

    I gave them — you know what I gave them?  I gave them Javelins.  And the Javelins were very effective, as you know.  I gave them nothing —

    SECRETARY GENERAL RUTTE:  2019. 

    PRESIDENT TRUMP:  And then also, if you take a look, I was the one that stopped the pipeline going into Europe.  It was totally stopped: Nord Stream 2.  Nobody ever heard of Nord Stream 2 before I came along.

    But I got along very well with President Putin.  I got along with most of them.  I get along great with President Xi.  I got along great with Kim Jong Un.  I got along great with all of them.  And we had no wars.  We had no problems.  We wiped out ISIS in record time. General “Razin” Kane.  And he wiped them out. 

    And he is going to be our new chief, right?  He’s going to be —

    SECRETARY HEGSETH:  Yes, sir.

    PRESIDENT TRUMP:  — the head of Joint Chiefs of Staff, and he’s a highly respected man.  He’s going to be great. 

    Pete is going to be fantastic.  I have no doubt about it.  We have a great team.  A really great team. 

    Yeah, please.  Go ahead, please.

    Q    Mr. President, some of our allies have said that they’re worried that they could be the next to be attacked by Russia.  You’ve spoken directly with the Russian president.

    PRESIDENT TRUMP:  Yeah.

    Q    Do you think those fears are justified?

    PRESIDENT TRUMP:  No, I don’t.  I think when this gets done, it’s done.  They’re going to all want to go home and rest.  I don’t see it happening.  Nope, I don’t see that happening.  And we’ll make sure it doesn’t happen.  Not going to happen.  But we’ll make sure it doesn’t happen. 

    Yeah, go ahead, please. 

    Q    Leaders from Russia and Iran are heading to Beijing tomorrow to discuss nuclear programs.  What do you hope to get out of that?

    PRESIDENT TRUMP:  Well, maybe they’re going to talk about non-nuclear programs.  Maybe they’re going to be talking about the de-escalation of nuclear weapons, because, you know, I was talking about that with President Putin very strongly.  And we could have done something.  Had that election not been rigged, we would have had something.  I think I would have made a deal with Putin on de-escalation, denuclearization, as they say.  But we would have de-escalated nuclear weapons, because the power of nuclear weapons is so great and so devastating. 

    And, right now, Russia and us have by far the most, but China will catch us within five years.  China doesn’t have — but they’re in the process of building.

    SECRETARY GENERAL RUTTE:  Yeah.

    PRESIDENT TRUMP: And they build.  And within four or five years, they’ll probably have the same.

    SECRETARY GENERAL RUTTE:  And, by the way, you — this is a Republican tradition.  Ronald Reagan, when he negotiated with Gorbachev —

    PRESIDENT TRUMP:  Right. 

    SECRETARY GENERAL RUTTE:  — in the 1980s —

    PRESIDENT TRUMP:  That’s right.

    SECRETARY GENERAL RUTTE:  — about bringing down the number of nuclear weapons is what you have been doing your first term.  And it is important. 

    PRESIDENT TRUMP:  It would be a great achievement if we could bring down the number.  We have so many weapons, and the power is so great. 

    And we — number one, you don’t need them to that extent.  And then we’d have to get others, because, as you know, in a smaller way — Kim Jong Un has a lot of nuclear weapons, by the way — a lot — and others do also.  You have India.  You have Pakistan.  You have others that have them, and we’d get them involved. 

    But we started off with Russia and us.  We have, by far — actually, by far, the most.  And we were going to denuclearize, and that was going to happen. 

    And then we were going to China.  And I spoke to China.  I spoke to President Xi about it.  And he really liked the idea.  You know, he’d like not to spend trillions of dollars building weapons that, hopefully, he’s never going to have to use.  And — because they are very expensive also.  So, that would have been great. 

    Okay, one or two more. 

    (Cross-talk.)

    Yeah, go ahead.  

    Q    Thank you.  We are looking at an impending government shutdown Friday at midnight.

    PRESIDENT TRUMP:  Yeah. 

    Q    Democrats, for 30 years straight, have said, if there’s a shutdown, bad things happen.  Do you anticipate direct negotiations yourself with conference leader of the Democrats, Chuck Schumer?

         PRESIDENT TRUMP:  Yeah, if they need me, I’m there a hundred percent.  It’s — right now, it’s two or three people.  If it shuts down, it’s not the Republicans’ fault.  You know, we passed a bill where we had an incredible Republican vote.  We only had one negative vote, a grandstander.  You know, one grandstander.  There’s always a grandstander in the lot. 

         But it was amazing.  People were amazed that the Republicans were able to vote in unison like that so strongly. 

         If there’s a shutdown, even the Democrats admit it will be their fault.  And I’m hearing a lot of Democrats are going to vote for it, and I hope they do.  This is an extension. 

         But ultimately, we want to vote for one big, beautiful bill where we put the taxes in, we put everything in.  We’re going to have big tax cuts.  We’re going to have tremendous incentives for companies coming into our country and employing lots of people.  

         It’ll be — I called it, in a rare moment, one big, beautiful bill.  That’s what I like.  And it seems to be that’s where they’re heading.  And we’ll have to take care of something to do with Los Angeles. 

         A place called Los Angeles almost burned to the ground.  By the way, I broke into Los Angeles.  Can you believe it?  I had to break in. 

         SECRETARY GENERAL RUTTE:  Yeah?

         PRESIDENT TRUMP:  I invaded Los Angeles.  And we opened up the water, and the water is now flowing down.  They have so much water, they don’t know what to do.  They were sending it out to the Pacific for environmental reasons.  Okay?  Can you believe it?  And in the meantime, they lost 25,000 houses.  They lost — and nobody’s ever seen anything like it. 

         But we have the water.  I’d love to show you a picture.  You’ve seen the picture.  The water is flowing through the half pipes.  You know, we have the big half pipes that go down.  Used to — 25 years ago, they used to have plenty of water, but they turned it off for — again, for environmental reasons.  Well, I turned it on for environmental reasons and also fire reasons. 

         And I’ve been asking them to do that during my first term.  I said, “Do it.”  I didn’t think anything like — could happen like this, but they didn’t have enough water. 

         Now the farmers are going to have water for their land, and the water is in there. 

         But I actually had to break in.  We broke in to do it because we had people that were afraid to give water.

         SECRETARY GENERAL RUTTE:  Yeah.

         PRESIDENT TRUMP:  They were — in particular, they were trying to protect a certain little fish.  And I say, “How do you protect a fish if you don’t have water?”  They didn’t have any water, so they’re protecting a fish, and that didn’t work out too well, by the way.  

         So, they have a lot of water going down throughout California, all coming out from the Pacific Northwest, even some from Canada. 

         Thank you, Canada, very much.  I appreciate it. 

         Next thing you know, they’ll want to turn the water off.  They’ll want to charge us for the water.

         But it comes up from the Pacific Northwest, and it’s a beautiful thing to see.  I mean, it is brimming with water. 

         Now, if they would have had that done, you wouldn’t have had the damage, because the fire would have been put out.  The fire hydrants would have been loaded.  The sprinklers in people’s living rooms and bedrooms would have been loaded up with the — they had no water.  The government makes them put sprinklers in.  They had no water in the sprinklers because they had no water. 

         So, the water is flowing, and we’re going to have to give a lot of money to Los Angeles to help them, and the Democrats are going to want to do that.  So, that’s the one thing different. 

         And I frankly, I think that makes it a lot easier.  But one of the big thing is we have the big, beautiful bill.  We got to get that done.  And that will put our country in a position like it’s never been in. 

         It’s a reduction of taxes.  It’s tremendous incentives for companies to come from all over the world into our country.  It’s great environmentally, but it’s not this environmental scam that we went through — that we all went through.  It provides for everything.  

         It’s a big, beautiful bill, and I hope we can get it approved.  And that will be next. 

         But in the meantime, we have the continuing resolution, and the Republicans have approved it, and now the Democrats have to approve it.  And I hope they will. 

         And I think a lot of them — I can tell you, they want to.  I’ve spoken to some of them.  They really want to.  Their leadership may not want them to.  And if it closes, it’s purely on the Democrats. 

         All right, one more.

         Q    On Korea, sir.  We’ve seen tension increasing in the Peninsula.  You’ve talked about Kim Jong Un.  Do you have any plans of getting — of reestablishing the relationship you had during the first meeting?

         PRESIDENT TRUMP:  Yeah.  Well, I would.  I had a great relationship with Kim Jong Un, North Korea.  If I wasn’t elected, if Hillary got in, you would have had a nuclear war with North Korea.  He expected it.  He expected it.  And they said, “Oh, thousands of people.”  No, millions of people would have been killed.  

         But I got in.  We went to Singapore.  We met.  We went to — to Vietnam.  We met.  We got along really good.  We had a very good relationship.  And we still do.  We still do.  You don’t have that threat that you had.

         Q    You have talked with — have you talked to him?  

         PRESIDENT TRUMP:  I mean, look, when I was running the first time, it looked like there was going to be a war with North Korea.  You know that better than anyone.

         SECRETARY GENERAL RUTTE:  Tensions were high.  Yes.  Yeah.

         PRESIDENT TRUMP.  Yeah.  And it started off —

         SECRETARY GENERAL RUTTE:  And everybody was — was startled that you —

         PRESIDENT TRUMP:  Yeah.

         SECRETARY GENERAL RUTTE:  — invited him for talks. 

         PRESIDENT TRUMP:  Right.

         SECRETARY GENERAL RUTTE:  But you did, and it —

         PRESIDENT TRUMP:  It started out very rough.  

         SECRETARY GENERAL RUTTE:  Yeah.  Yeah.

         PRESIDENT TRUMP:  And he wouldn’t meet with Obama.  Wouldn’t take his calls.  I said, “How many times did you call?” They called a lot.  He wouldn’t take their call.  He told me, “I wouldn’t take his call.” 

         But with me, it did start off rough, if you remember.  Very rough, actually.  Very nasty.  And — 

         SECRETARY GENERAL RUTTE:  That was in Singapore, the first one?

         PRESIDENT TRUMP:  Yeah, but then — no, before that.  Then it stopped.  The rhetoric was extremely tough.  It was a little bit —

         SECRETARY GENERAL RUTTE:  You had it in your speech at the U.N. I remember.  (Laughs.)

         PRESIDENT TRUMP:  Yeah, that’s right.  It was a little bit dangerous.  

         And then we met.  They asked for a meeting, and then we met.  And the meeting caused the Olympics, which was in South Korea, to become a tremendous success.  Nobody was buying tickets for the Olympics because they didn’t want to be nuked.  

         And I met, and not only did the Olympics become successful, but North Korea participated in the Olympics.

         SECRETARY GENERAL RUTTE:  Yeah.  His sister visited.

         PRESIDENT TRUMP:  It was an amazing thing.

         SECRETARY GENERAL RUTTE:  Yeah.

         PRESIDENT TRUMP:  And that was something that was an achievement of the Trump administration. Great achievement.  And so, I have a great relationship with Kim Jong Un.  And we’ll see what happens. 

         But certainly, he’s a nuclear power.

         Okay?  Thank you very much, everybody.  Thank you.  Thank you very much.

                                      END            1:20 P.M. EDT

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Lummis Mourns Loss of Senator Al Simpson

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Wyoming Cynthia Lummis

    Washington, D.C. — U.S. Senator Cynthia Lummis (R-WY) released the following statement on the passing of former Wyoming Senator Al Simpson. 

    “Today, our state and country mourn the passing of our dear Senator Alan Kooi Simpson,” Lummis said. “Al was larger than life and spent his entire life working on behalf of the state and people he loved. For 18 years in the U.S. Senate, 12 years in the Wyoming House of Representatives, and 28 years as an elder statesman – he worked to make Wyoming a better place for our citizens and an even greater place to work and raise a family. There was no stronger advocate for the needs, industries, and interests of Wyoming. During his Senate tenure, he was repeatedly elected by his colleagues to serve in leadership as the Republican Whip and was a close friend of both President Reagan and President Bush. 

    “Known for his famous humor and wit, Al was loved both in Wyoming and far outside our borders. Those who met Al knew that he never forgot a face or interaction. In addition to his service in the U.S. Army and the U.S. Senate, Al repeatedly stepped forward as a private citizen to work on important issues like the Iraq Study Group and the Simpson-Bowles Fiscal Responsibility Commission. In a deserving tribute commemorating his lifetime of service, Al was honored in 2022 with the Presidential Medal of Freedom. 

    “A proud son of Cody, Wyoming, Al came from an early pioneer family dedicated to public service. Wyoming and our nation have benefited greatly from Al Simpson’s many decades of work and leadership. At every gathering Al Simpson attended, people flocked to Al for a moment with a man each considered one of their closest friends. That’s the incredible effect he had on the people he served. I extend my deepest thoughts and prayers to his wife of more than 70 years, Ann, his children Colin, William, and Susan, and his grandchildren during this difficult time.” 

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI Canada: Joint statement of the G7 Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Charlevoix

    Source: Government of Canada News

    March 14, 2025 – Charlevoix, Quebec – Global Affairs Canada

    1. We the G7 Foreign Ministers of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, and the High Representative of the European Union, met in Charlevoix on March 12 to 14, 2025.

    Ukraine’s long-term prosperity and security

    2. We reaffirmed our unwavering support for Ukraine in defending its territorial integrity and right to exist, and its freedom, sovereignty and independence.

    3. We welcomed ongoing efforts to achieve a ceasefire, and in particular the meeting on March 11 between the U.S. and Ukraine in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. We applauded Ukraine’s commitment to an immediate ceasefire, which is an essential step towards a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in line with the Charter of the United Nations.

    4. We called for Russia to reciprocate by agreeing to a ceasefire on equal terms and implementing it fully. We discussed imposing further costs on Russia in case such a ceasefire is not agreed, including through further sanctions, caps on oil prices, as well as additional support for Ukraine, and other means. This includes the use of extraordinary revenues stemming from immobilized Russian Sovereign Assets. We underlined the importance of confidence-building measures under a ceasefire including the release of prisoners of war and detainees—both military and civilian—and the return of Ukrainian children.

    5. We emphasized that any ceasefire must be respected and underscored the need for robust and credible security arrangements to ensure that Ukraine can deter and defend against any renewed acts of aggression. We stated that we will continue to coordinate economic and humanitarian support to promote the early recovery and reconstruction of Ukraine, including at the Ukraine Recovery Conference which will take place in Rome on July 10-11, 2025.

    6. We condemned the provision to Russia of military assistance by DPRK and Iran, and the provision of weapons and dual-use components by China, a decisive enabler of Russia’s war and of the reconstitution of Russia’s armed forces. We reiterated our intention to continue to take action against such third countries.

    7. We expressed alarm about the impacts of the war, especially on civilians and on civilian infrastructure. We discussed the importance of accountability and reaffirmed our commitment to work together to achieve a durable peace and to ensure that Ukraine remains democratic, free, strong and prosperous.   

    Regional peace and stability in the Middle East  

    8. We called for the release of all hostages and for the hostages’ remains held by Hamas in Gaza to be returned to their loved ones. We reaffirmed our support for the resumption of unhindered humanitarian aid into Gaza and for a permanent ceasefire. We underscored the imperative of a political horizon for the Palestinian people, achieved through a negotiated solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that meets the legitimate needs and aspirations of both peoples and advances comprehensive Middle East peace, stability and prosperity. We noted serious concern over the growing tensions and hostilities in the West Bank and calls for de-escalation.

    9. We recognized Israel’s inherent right to defend itself consistent with international law. We unequivocally condemned Hamas, including for its brutal and unjustified terror attacks on October 7, 2023, and the harm inflicted on the hostages during their captivity and the violation of their dignity through the use of ‘handover ceremonies’ during their release. We reiterated that Hamas can have no role in Gaza’s future and must never again be a threat to Israel. We affirmed our readiness to engage with Arab partners on their proposals to chart a way forward on reconstruction in Gaza and build a lasting Israeli-Palestinian peace.

    10. We expressed our support for the people of Syria and Lebanon, as both countries work towards peaceful and stable political futures. At this critical juncture, we reiterated the importance of Syria’s and Lebanon’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. We called unequivocally for the rejection of terrorism in Syria. We condemned strongly the recent escalation of violence in the coastal regions of Syria, and called for the protection of civilians and for perpetrators of atrocities to be held accountable. We stressed the critical importance of an inclusive and Syrian-led political process. We welcomed the commitment by the Syrian interim government to work with the OPCW in eliminating all remaining chemical weapons.

    11. We stressed that Iran is the principal source of regional instability and must never be allowed to develop and acquire a nuclear weapon. We emphasized that Iran must now change course, de-escalate and choose diplomacy. We underscored the threat of Iran’s growing use of arbitrary detention and foreign assassination attempts as a tool of coercion.

    Cooperation to increase security and resilience across the Indo-Pacific  

    12. We reiterated our commitment to upholding a free, open, prosperous and secure Indo-Pacific, based on sovereignty, territorial integrity, peaceful resolution of disputes, fundamental freedoms and human rights.

    13. We remain seriously concerned by the situations in the East China Sea as well as the South China Sea and continue to oppose strongly unilateral attempts to change the status quo, in particular by force and coercion. We expressed concern over the increasing use of dangerous maneuvers and water cannons against Philippines and Vietnamese vessels as well as efforts to restrict freedom of navigation and overflight through militarization and coercion in the South China Sea, in violation of international law. We emphasized the importance of maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. We encouraged the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues and reiterated our opposition to any unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force or coercion. We also expressed support for Taiwan’s meaningful participation in appropriate international organizations.  

    14. We remain concerned with China’s military build-up and the continued, rapid increase in China’s nuclear weapons arsenal. We called on China to engage in strategic risk reduction discussions and promote stability through transparency.

    15. We emphasized that China should not conduct or condone activities aimed at undermining the security and safety of our communities and the integrity of our democratic institutions.16. We expressed concerns about China’s non-market policies and practices that are leading to harmful overcapacity and market distortions. We further called on China to refrain from adopting export control measures that could lead to significant supply chain disruptions. We reiterated that we are not trying to harm China or thwart its economic growth, indeed a growing China that plays by international rules and norms would be of global interest.

    16. We demanded that the DPRK abandon all its nuclear weapons and any other weapons of mass destruction as well as ballistic missile programs in accordance with all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions. We expressed our serious concerns over, and the need to address together, the DPRK’s cryptocurrency thefts. We called on DPRK to resolve the abductions issue immediately.

    17. We denounced the brutal repression of the people of Myanmar by the military regime and called for an end to all violence and for unhindered humanitarian access.

    Building stability and resilience in Haiti and Venezuela

    18. We strongly denounced the ongoing horrifying violence that continues to be perpetrated by gangs in Haiti in their efforts to seize control of the government. We reaffirmed our commitment to helping the Haitian people restore democracy, security and stability, including through support to the Haitian National Police and Kenya-led Multinational Security Support Mission and an increased role for the UN. We expressed support for Haitian authorities’ efforts to create a specialized anti-corruption jurisdiction that complies with the highest international standards.

    19. We reiterated our call for the restoration of democracy in Venezuela in line with the aspirations of the Venezuelan people who peacefully voted on July 28, 2024, for change, the cessation of repression and arbitrary or unjust detentions of peaceful protestors including youth by Nicolas Maduro’s regime, as well as the unconditional and immediate release of all political prisoners. We also agreed Venezuelan naval vessels threatening Guyana’s commercial vessels is unacceptable and an infringement of Guyana’s internationally recognized sovereign rights. We reaffirmed respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations as an enduring value.

    Supporting lasting peace in Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo

    20. We unequivocally denounced the ongoing fighting and atrocities in Sudan, including sexual violence against women and girls, which have led to the world’s largest humanitarian crisis and the spread of famine. We called for the warring parties to protect civilians, cease hostilities, and ensure unhindered humanitarian access, and urged external actors to end their support fueling the conflict.

    21. We condemned the Rwanda-backed M23 offensive in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and the resulting violence, displacement and grave human rights and international humanitarian law violations. This offensive constitutes a flagrant disregard of the territorial integrity of the DRC. We reiterated our call for M23 and the Rwanda Defence Force to withdraw from all controlled areas. We urged all parties to support the mediation led by the East African Community and the Southern African Development Community, to promote accountability for human rights abuses by all armed actors, including M23 and the FDLR, and to commit to a peaceful and negotiated resolution of the conflict, including the meaningful participation of women and youth.

    Strengthening sanctions and countering hybrid warfare and sabotage

    22. We welcomed efforts to strengthen the Sanctions Working Group focused on listings and enforcement. We also welcomed discussions on the establishment of a Hybrid Warfare and Sabotage Working Group, and of a Latin America Working Group.

    MIL OSI Canada News –