Category: Middle East

MIL-OSI Europe: MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the white paper on the future of European defence – B10-0146/2025

Source: European Parliament

Rasa Juknevičienė, Nicolás Pascual de la Parte, Riho Terras, Michael Gahler, David McAllister, Sebastião Bugalho, Andrzej Halicki
on behalf of the PPE Group

B10‑0146/2025

European Parliament resolution on the white paper on the future of European defence

(2025/2565(RSP))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

– having regard to Title V of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), in particular Chapter Two, Section Two thereof on provisions on the common security and defence policy (CSDP),

– having regard to the Versailles Declaration adopted on 11 March 2022 at the informal meeting of Heads of State or Government,

– having regard to the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence – For a European Union that protects its citizens, values and interests and contributes to international peace and security, which was approved by the Council on 21 March 2022 and endorsed by the European Council on 24 March 2022,

– having regard to the national security strategies of the Member States,

– having regard to the Civilian CSDP Compact – Towards more effective civilian missions, approved by the Council on 22 May 2023,

– having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/1968 of 17 October 2022 on a European Union Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine (EUMAM Ukraine)[1],

– having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/890 of 18 March 2024 amending Decision (CFSP) 2021/509 establishing a European Peace Facility [2],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2019/452 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 March 2019 establishing a framework for the screening of foreign direct investments into the Union [3],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/697 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2021 establishing the European Defence Fund and repealing Regulation (EU) 2018/1092 [4],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2023/1525 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 July 2023 on supporting ammunition production (ASAP)[5],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2023/2418 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 October 2023 on establishing an instrument for the reinforcement of the European defence industry through common procurement (EDIRPA)[6],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1252 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 establishing a framework for ensuring a secure and sustainable supply of critical raw materials and amending Regulations (EU) No 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, (EU) 2018/1724 and (EU) 2019/1020 [7],

– having regard to the Commission proposal of 18 April 2023 for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down measures to strengthen solidarity and capacities in the Union to detect, prepare for and respond to cybersecurity threats and incidents (COM(2023)0209),

– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 21 February 2025 on an EU Action Plan on Cable Security (JOIN(2025)0009),

– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 10 March 2023 on a European Union Space Strategy for Security and Defence (JOIN(2023)0009),

– having regard to Commission Recommendation (EU) 2023/2113 of 3 October 2023 on critical technology areas for the EU’s economic security for further risk assessment with Member States [8],

– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 10 November 2022 entitled ‘Action plan on military mobility 2.0’ (JOIN(2022)0048),

– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 18 May 2022 on the Defence Investment Gaps Analysis and Way Forward (JOIN(2022)0024),

– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 10 March 2023 on the update of the EU Maritime Security Strategy and its Action Plan entitled ‘An enhanced EU Maritime Security Strategy for evolving maritime threats’ (JOIN(2023)0008),

– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 5 March 2024 entitled ‘A new European Defence Industrial Strategy: Achieving EU readiness through a responsive and resilient European Defence Industry’ (JOIN(2024)0010),

– having regard to the report by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 20 June 2024 entitled ‘Common Foreign and Security Policy Report – Our priorities in 2024’,

– having regard to the political guidelines for the next European Commission 2024-2029 by Ursula von der Leyen entitled ‘Europe’s choice’, published on 18 July 2024,

– having regard to the report by Enrico Letta entitled ‘Much more than a market’, published in April 2024, and in particular the section thereof entitled ‘Promoting peace and enhancing security: towards a Common Market for the defence industry’,

– having regard to the report by Mario Draghi of 9 September 2024 on the future of European competitiveness and in particular Chapter Four thereof on increasing security and reducing dependencies,

– having regard to the report by Sauli Niinistö of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘Safer Together: Strengthening Europe’s Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness’,

– having regard to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949,

– having regard to the Madrid Summit Declaration adopted by NATO heads of state and government at the North Atlantic Council meeting in Madrid on 29 June 2022,

– having regard to the NATO 2022 Strategic Concept and to the NATO Vilnius Summit Communiqué issued by NATO heads of state and government at the North Atlantic Council meeting in Vilnius on 11 July 2023,

– having regard to the joint declarations on EU-NATO cooperation signed on 8 July 2016, 10 July 2018 and 10 January 2023,

– having regard to the ninth progress report on the implementation of the common set of proposals endorsed by EU and NATO Councils on 6 December 2016 and 5 December 2017, submitted jointly by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the NATO Secretary General to the Council of the EU and the NATO Council on 13 June 2024,

– having regard to the Washington Summit Declaration issued by the NATO heads of state and government participating in the North Atlantic Council meeting in Washington on 10 July 2024,

– having regard to Ukraine’s victory plan presented by the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, to the European Council on 17 October 2024,

– having regard to the speeches and statements made at the Munich Security Conference on 14-16 February 2025,

– having regard to the statements made at the Leaders Meeting on Ukraine, held in London on 2 March 2025,

– having regard to the temporary halt of all United States military aid to Ukraine,

– having regard to the statement by the President of the Commission of 4 March 2025 on the defence package, the ReArm Europe Plan,

– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas the security situation in Europe has seen an unprecedented deterioration over the past years; whereas there is a common understanding that Europe needs to be able to effectively address European security challenges and achieve a state of defence readiness;

B. whereas Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has been a watershed moment in European history; whereas Putin’s war of aggression against Ukraine is widely recognised as an attack on the European peace order established after the Second World War and on the global order as a whole;

C. whereas despite previous signs and warnings, many countries have not taken the necessary defence measures; whereas the goal of committing 2 % of gross domestic product (GDP) to defence spending agreed by NATO members in 2014 is still not being met by all NATO members in the EU; whereas the gap between the 2 % goal and the actual defence spending by EU Member States amounts to EUR 1 770 billion over the 2006-2022 period [9]; whereas in 2024, 16 EU Member States that are also NATO allies were expected to exceed NATO’s 2 % defence investment guideline, compared to only nine in 2023;

D. whereas as a result of these investment gaps, numerous reports, notably the Defence Investment Gaps Analysis of May 2022, have analysed a worrying capability gap in European defence;

E. whereas the Draghi report highlighted a funding need of EUR 500 billion in European defence for the next decade and highlights a combination of structural weaknesses affecting the competitiveness of the EU’s defence technological and industrial base (EDTIB), and identifies fragmentation, insufficient public defence investment and limited access to financing as obstacles to a capable EDTIB; whereas the lending policy of the European Investment Bank (EIB) excludes the financing of ammunition and weapons, as well as equipment or infrastructure exclusively dedicated to military and police use;

F. whereas the Niinistö report underlines the fact that the EU and its Member States are not yet fully prepared for the most severe cross-sectoral or multidimensional crisis scenarios, especially given the further deteriorating environment outside of the EU; whereas it insists that this preparedness is necessary for the EU and its Member States to signal to potential adversaries that they will not be able to outlast the EU; whereas it deplores the fact that the EU lacks a common plan in the event of armed aggression and underlines that the EU needs to rethink the way it defines its security;

G. whereas Russia’s continued armament efforts and its cooperation with other authoritarian powers on armaments, vastly surpassing European stocks and production capacities, pose the most serious and unprecedented threat to world peace as well as to the security and territory of the EU and its Member States; whereas the Russian regime is strengthening its ties in particular with the autocratic leaderships of China, Iran and North Korea in order to achieve its objectives;

H. whereas the EU is also facing the most diverse and complex range of non-military threats since its creation, exacerbated by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, including foreign information manipulation and interference, cyberattacks, attacks against underwater infrastructure, economic pressures, food and energy blackmailing, instrumentalisation of migration and subversive political influence; whereas the EU should take these kind of threats seriously in its defence and security policies;

I. whereas the recent actions and statements by the US administration have further increased concerns about the future stance of the US vis-à-vis Russia, NATO and the security of Europe;

J. whereas the EU’s security environment has deteriorated not only in eastern Europe, but also in countries in the EU’s southern neighbourhood partnership and beyond;

K. whereas the disastrous impact of past or ongoing wars, instability, insecurity, poverty and climate change in the Sahel region, north-eastern Africa and Libya poses serious risks to the EU’s security and its economic and trade interests; whereas the instability and insecurity in the southern neighbourhood and the Sahel region are closely interlinked with and remain an ongoing challenge for EU external border management and mitigation of illegal migration;

L. whereas European security is linked to stability on the African continent, and the growing presence of non-European actors is testament to the lack of sufficient security and diplomatic engagement in the region to effectively counter the challenges and protect its strategic interests;

M. whereas the Black Sea has shifted from a secondary to a primary military theatre for the EU and NATO, and, alongside the Baltic Sea, has become a pivotal strategic region for European security in countering the Russian threat;

N. whereas the Arctic region is becoming increasingly important in terms of economic development and transport, while at the same time facing challenges linked to climate change and militarisation, as well as those resulting from increasing geopolitical competition and migration;

O. whereas China, driven by the ambition to become a global superpower, is eroding the rules-based international order by increasingly pursuing assertive foreign and hostile economic and competition policies and exporting dual-use goods deployed by Russia on the battlefield against Ukraine, thereby threatening European security and interests; whereas China is also investing tremendously in its armed forces, using its economic power to quash criticism worldwide, and is striving to assert itself as the dominant power in the Indo-Pacific region; whereas China, by intensifying its confrontational, aggressive and intimidating actions against some of its neighbours, particularly in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, poses a risk to regional and global security as well as to the EU’s economic interests; whereas China has promoted an alternative narrative for many years, challenging human rights, democratic values and open markets in multilateral and international forums; whereas China’s increasing influence in international organisations has impeded positive progress and further excluded Taiwan from rightful and meaningful participation in these organisations;

P. whereas in 2023, Parliament and the Council concluded agreements on the European defence industry reinforcement through common procurement act (EDIRPA) and the Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP), which, as short-term and emergency measures, aim to encourage the joint procurement of defence products, ramp up the European defence industry’s production capacity, and replenish depleted stocks;

Q. whereas in 2024, the Commission proposed the establishment of a European defence industrial strategy (EDIS) and a European defence industry programme (EDIP), addressing, in particular, the improvement of EU defence capabilities and the governance, security of supply and integration of the Ukrainian defence technological and industrial base (DTIB) into its EU counterpart, the EDTIB;

R. whereas building defence capabilities and adapting them to military needs requires a common strategic culture and shared threat perception and assessment, as well as the development of solutions to be combined in doctrine and concepts;

S. whereas in the light of the above challenges and analyses, the President of the European Commission tasked the Commissioner for Defence and Space and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy with drafting a white paper on the future of European defence, which is due to be published on 19 March 2025;

1. Believes that the white paper on the future of European defence must put forward concrete measures and options to the members of the European Council so that truly groundbreaking and much needed efforts can be made, in the shortest possible time frames, which must address the following pressing needs: to urgently and substantially increase defence capabilities, overcome fragmentation in the European defence industry market, enhance the capacity of the EDTIB, promptly identify and implement pragmatic solutions for the considerable funding needs, deepen EU-NATO cooperation through a robust European pillar in NATO, and ensure an increase in our military support to Ukraine and other neighbouring countries that share our European values;

2. Calls on Council President António Costa to immediately convene the European Council, based on the conclusions of the white paper, so that EU leaders can agree on immediate and far-reaching decisions to implement the European Defence Union as laid out in Article 42(2) TEU and elaborate on the measures identified in the white paper; urges both the Council and the Commission to identify clear and concrete priorities for the short, medium and long term, with a corresponding timeline of actions;

3. Reiterates its previous calls to take seriously the direct and indirect threat of a Russian attack against the EU and to prepare urgently, without any further delay, to do the utmost to improve European military capacities in order to ensure that Europe is ready for the most extreme military contingencies; calls therefore for the threat analysis of the EU’s Strategic Compass to be updated and upgraded to a threat assessment and for the measures within the compass to be adapted accordingly, in order to reflect the threat magnitude in our threat environment;

4. Strongly believes that Europeans must take on greater responsibility within NATO, especially when it comes to ensuring security on the European continent, and hence underlines that a strong and robust European pillar in NATO is the best way to foster our transatlantic security and ensure the security of all Europeans; recalls that a true transatlantic partnership means shared responsibility, joint efforts and equal burden-sharing;

5. Stresses the importance of learning from Ukraine’s experience in countering Russian aggression and calls for immediate measures to enhance the security and defence of the EU’s north-eastern border with Russia and Belarus by establishing a comprehensive and resilient defence line across land, air and maritime domains to counter military and hybrid threats; emphasises the need to coordinate and integrate national efforts through EU regulatory and financial instruments to accelerate implementation;

6. Stresses that Europe continues to stand firmly on the side of Ukraine as it courageously fights for our European way of life, and recalls its conviction that it is on the Ukrainian battlefields that the future of Europe will be decided; reiterates thus that the EU will support Ukraine for as long as it takes for Ukraine to win this war, as a forced surrender by Ukraine and acceptance of a ‘peace’ treaty on Putin’s terms could accelerate the timeline for Russia to shift its aggression toward the EU or NATO; urges the EU, accordingly, to develop a ‘Ukraine strategy’, outlining clear objectives for the support of Ukraine’s defence capabilities and the integration of the Ukrainian DTIB into the EDTIB, and to find the necessary resources to implement such a strategy, while supporting European defence industry activities in Ukraine in order to ramp up local production and enhance cooperation between Ukrainian and EU defence companies; underscores that such a Ukraine strategy must be an integral part of a ‘European defence’ strategy; calls on the EU Member States to commit at least 0.25 % of their GDP to military aid for Ukraine;

7. Emphasises the need for a holistic approach to European security, ensuring that all EU policies incorporate defence and security dimensions, supported by both regulatory and financial instruments;

8. Believes that the EU should develop economic cooperation contingency plans to prepare for mutual support in the event of large-scale security crises, and should deepen economic and defence industrial dialogues in relation to early warnings of hard, hybrid and cyberthreats, in order to foster mutual support planning, protection of critical infrastructure, maritime and underwater safety, and other forms of deeper defence industrial cooperation; calls, in cooperation with NATO, for an enhanced response to Russia’s hybrid war that aims at destabilising not only Ukraine but the whole European continent;

Addressing capability gaps

9. Underlines the need to urgently address the gaps in military equipment and ammunition by building on the success of the EDIRPA and ASAP programmes and to swiftly finalise EDIP so that, through common procurement, our common European and Ukrainian capabilities are increased and our stocks of crucial defence equipment and ammunition are replenished; welcomes EDIP’s potential to improve the defence capabilities of the EU and its Member States, to strengthen security of supply and to improve the effectiveness and coherence of EU efforts through new governance structures; stresses that EDIP’s financial envelope will fall well short of meeting the ambitions laid out in EDIP and calls, therefore, for additional funding sources to be identified immediately and to include exploring the possibility of reallocations within the current multiannual financial framework (MFF), notably with regard to European defence projects of common interest and to the Ukraine support instrument that currently lacks any funding; stresses, with regard to the threat assessment of a possible Russian attack on EU and NATO territory within the next few years, the urgent need for EDIP to be implemented swiftly and for additional and substantial funding to be provided for joint European defence efforts before the next MFF;

10. Calls for the need for a significant increase in availability of strategic enablers in the air, maritime, underwater, space and cyber domains to be addressed without delay;

11. Suggests that successful Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and European Defence Fund (EDF) projects be prioritised along the lines of known capability gaps and that sufficient funding be ensured for projects that have proven to deliver; calls for the closure of PESCO projects that do not deliver results and/or do not provide added value in the closing of capability gaps and/or European defence readiness; stresses, in the light of the limited financial envelope of the EDF, that duplicated efforts, especially in crucial capability areas such as the hypersonic interceptor or future main battle tank systems, waste EU tax payers’ money, will prolong development efforts and thus increase the probability of procurement of such capabilities from the US, thus undermining the ambition laid out in EDIS;

12. Calls for the architecture of the EU Defence Industrial Toolbox to be rationalised, as more financial resources alone will not ensure success, since it is even more important that these resources are spent in a more efficient and effective manner;

13. Underlines the need to ensure coherence of output between the EU’s Capability Development Plan (CDP) and Coordinated Annual Review on Defence and the NATO capability targets, without delay, to foster complementarity and to prevent dysfunctional duplications; calls for a concrete action plan to be drawn up, including a clear timeline for each priority in line with both the CDP and the NATO Defence Planning Process;

14. Welcomes the proposal for European defence projects of common interest on the development of common capabilities which go beyond the financial means of an individual Member State, such as a European air shield, autonomous space access and space surveillance, transport and communication capabilities, sovereign digital infrastructures, sovereign cloud infrastructure, long-range precision strike capabilities and integrated air defence, as well as complex maritime and underwater protective assets; stresses that the EU’s efforts in missile defence need to be aligned and integrated with NATO support for the European Sky Shield Initiative, driven by EU Member States; stresses the need to ensure adequate funding, to be established well before 2028, in order to deliver results with regard to the threat analyses of a possible Russian attack against EU and NATO territory within the next few years;

15. Calls for the establishment of EU-specific rapid response strategies for underwater infrastructure protection operating in alignment with NATO while maintaining EU autonomy; encourages investment in advanced detection and surveillance systems for underwater infrastructure monitoring;

16. Calls for the EU to further accelerate the implementation of military mobility; believes that the EU has to move from ‘mobility’ to ‘military logistics’; stresses the need for significant investment in military mobility infrastructure to enhance cargo airlift capabilities, camps, fuel infrastructure through depots, ports, air, sea and rail transport platforms, railway lines, waterways, roads, bridges and logistic hubs; stresses that this must be done in cooperation with NATO by drafting a strategic plan for developing mobility;

17. Underlines the need to quickly agree on additional common European military forces, given that the Rapid Deployment Capacity (RDC) designed as a crisis management instrument provides only a limited European capability to react and support NATO efforts in the event of Russian aggression against EU and NATO territory; recommends, therefore, that the Helsinki Headline Goal of 1999 be revived and that the RDC be gradually extended to ultimately establish a European corps of 60 000 troops, which should be part of a permanent EU structure while being integrated into NATO’s force model;

18. Recommends the establishment of a security of supply regime, including joint strategic stocks of raw materials and critical parts, to ensure the availability of raw materials and components needed for the production of defence products, and to allow production cycles to be ramped up faster and shortened;

Fostering the EU’s defence technological and industrial base (EDTIB)

19. Calls for a significant increase in common procurement by EU Member States of required European defence equipment and capabilities; calls on the Member States to aggregate demand by procuring defence equipment jointly, with the possibility of granting the Commission a mandate to procure on their behalf, ideally ensuring a long-term planning horizon for the EDTIB, thus improving the EDTIB’s production capacities and the interoperability of the European armed forces, and making efficient use of taxpayers’ money through economies of scale;

20. Underlines the outstanding success of the EU’s first joint procurement instrument, EDIRPA, by incentivising joint procurement by Member States; believes that there is a need to continue mechanisms similar to EDIRPA and ASAP while increasing the share of funding for joint procurements compared to support measures for research and development;

21. Believes that the development of the EU’s joint capability should be based on risk analysis provided in threat assessments and on the impact of projects on mitigating the EU’s joint security risks;

22. Believes that it is necessary to conduct systematic analyses of lessons learned from the war in Ukraine from a technology usage perspective, and analyses of the necessity of EU and NATO standards in comparison to how they affect the cost of technology and products compared to their usage effectiveness;

23. Stresses that EDIP must actively facilitate the participation of small and medium-sized enterprises and new market entrants through simplified access to funding, reduced regulatory barriers, and dedicated support mechanisms for scaling up operations; emphasises that EDIP should be designed as a stepping stone towards greater European sovereignty in defence production;

24. Highlights the need to support the development of pan-European value chains in EU defence cooperation by involving companies throughout the EU in the production of defence equipment and by distributing production facilities throughout the EU in order to improve security of supply, increase attractiveness of EU defence cooperation and, above all, enhance the resilience of the supply network, thus reducing our vulnerability in the event of an armed attack;

25. Calls for the review and adaptation of current and future legislation with regard to negative effects on the EDTIB, especially concerning production capacities and security of supply; calls for an extended mapping, in cooperation with the EDTIB, to identify all horizontal hindrances in the current legislation; calls for a detailed action plan to be developed to resolve the issues as soon as possible; underlines the need to review, simplify and harmonise the current framework for export licences and intra-EU transfer licences, as well as for cross-certification of equipment, as one of the priorities to foster better cooperation within the market and among Member States;

26. Strongly underlines the need to significantly increase our investment in emerging and disruptive technologies and structures in defence, taking care not to disperse our resources across too many projects, including cyber defence, outer space, complex underwater protective assets, novel materials and manufacturing, artificial intelligence, quantum computing, cloud computing and sovereign cloud infrastructure, high-performance computing, the internet of things, robotics, biotechnology and nanotechnology;

27. Calls on the Commission to leverage the full dual-use potential of space technologies, considering space as both a new operating domain and a critical enabler of multi-domain operations; underlines that the EU currently has a substantial gap in space capabilities compared to its main competitors and stresses that, in order to address this gap in space technologies, already existing flagship projects (i.e. Copernicus and Galileo) should be enhanced for defence applications; suggests, furthermore, that the EU should urgently pursue the development of its IRIS2 constellation, together with the development of further EU common projects, for example, for space domain awareness and space-based missile early-warning applications;

28. Recalls the increasing threats of cyber warfare and underlines the need for the EU to establish an EU cyber defence coordination centre to monitor, detect and respond to cyberthreats in real time;

29. Highlights the importance of the involvement of other industrial actors that do not undertake defence-related activities as potential partners in scaling up production when necessary;

30. Calls for the EU to foster stronger collaboration between our armed forces, academia, industries and investors;

Ensuring pragmatic sources of finance

31. Calls on the Commission to bring forward a legislative proposal containing a binding commitment for Member States to reach a minimum threshold of 3 % of their GDP on defence expenditure by 2026, with the need to further increase it to 4 % by 2028 and to commit at least 0.5 % of their GDP to EU common defence; stresses that, in the light of three decades of underinvestment, the current threat to the EU requires much higher defence investment, while underlining that the EU budget can only complement but can never replace the efforts of the Member States in that regard; emphasises that national defence investment by Member States will continue to serve as the backbone of defence readiness, while EU funding and its role in harmonising and streamlining the processes may have an important impact in enhancing and multiplying these efforts; calls for the EU and its Member States to work and agree on specific ways and means to achieve a short- to long-term substantial increase in public and private investment in defence and security on the national and European levels;

32. Welcomes the Commission’s announcement on the ReArm Europe Plan;

33. Welcomes the Commission’s proposal to activate the national escape clause of the Stability and Growth Pact;

34. Welcomes the Commission’s proposal for a new instrument providing EUR 150 billion in loans to Member States for joint defence investment;

35. Welcomes the Commission’s announcement of its plans to direct more funds towards defence-related investment, including making it possible for cohesion policy programmes to be used;

36. Calls for a system of European defence bonds to be explored for financing large-scale military investments up front, ensuring urgent capability development; calls for clear allocation criteria prioritising joint capability development, research and innovation, and military mobility infrastructure; calls, along the same lines, for the use of unused ‘coronabonds’ for defence instruments to be explored;

37. Underlines the role of public-private partnerships which are essential to finance defence investment; proposes, therefore, a dedicated EU instrument incentivising private investment in defence following the example of InvestEU;

38. Welcomes the Commission’s announcement of its plans to take action to mobilise private capital through an acceleration of the Savings and Investment Union and through the EIB; calls for an urgent revision of the EIB’s lending policy and immediate flexibility to remove current restrictions on financing ammunition, weapons and equipment or infrastructure dedicated to military use; stresses that this fundamental reform is necessary to unlock significant investment potential for the European defence sector, and to foster risk-sharing instruments to facilitate commercial bank lending to the sector; urges the EIB to take the necessary steps to facilitate private investment in defence, ensuring that the financial landscape supports the growing needs of the industry;

39. Demands a review of past and new legislation and taxonomy to ensure that they are best suited to advance our European defence industry;

40. Believes that environmental, social and governance criteria and taxonomy rules and their interpretation by rating agencies are an obstacle to ensuring increased public finance for defence and hence calls on the Commission to address this issue by, among other things, adapting the regulation on sustainability‐related disclosures in the financial services sector [10] with a view to explicitly ruling out a classification of the defence industry as sustainably or socially harmful;

Supporting innovation

41. Calls for the establishment of an EU agency, inspired by the US’s Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, as part of the European Defence Agency, which should be solely responsible for supporting research in emerging and disruptive technologies, equipped with an adequate amount of venture capital; emphasises the need for expanded research and development funding to ensure participation by all Member States through the creation of specialised ‘hubs’;

42. Believes in the need to increase the funding for academic research programmes to cooperate with the defence industry to ensure long-term in-depth research in defence;

Finalising the common market for defence

43. Urges Member States to stop invoking Article 346 TFEU as a means of avoiding the application of the Procurement Directive [11], thus undermining the common market for defence; calls on the Commission to close this loophole by immediately launching a review of this directive, as well as of the Intra-Community Transfer Directive [12], which is scheduled for the second half of 2025, and to recast both regulations as soon as possible with a view to strengthening the common market for defence, as well as to introducing flexibility with regard to crisis situations like those we are currently facing;

44. Calls for the transformation of NATO standards into EU legislation in order to facilitate the interoperability of European armed forces while strengthening our capacity to negotiate these standards within NATO and to enforce the consistent implementation of these standard in practice;

45. Presses for a common European certification scheme for weapons systems and a move beyond the current system of national certification in order to speed up the introduction of weapons systems into the armed forces of Member States;

Fostering effective governance

46. Deplores the lack of cohesion and effectiveness of EU defence structures and instruments resulting from the loose institutional connection between the Council and the Commission, which not only significantly limits the added value and the effectiveness of cooperation in the EU framework but also results in the ineffective use of taxpayers’ money;

47. Calls for the creation of a permanent Council of EU defence ministers;

48. Suggests that the Commissioner for Defence and Space should become the head of the European Defence Agency and should also be nominated as the coordinator for PESCO projects by recasting the respective Council decisions;

49. Encourages the creation of a ‘defence readiness board’ as proposed in EDIP, led by the Defence Commissioner, which should meet frequently in different configurations, for example, EU defence ministers, national procurement directors and industry representatives;

50. Believes that the Defence Commissioner should exercise supervision over the EU Military Committee, the EU Military Staff and military operations;

51. Suggests that the funding for PESCO and the European Defence Agency be transferred into the common EU budget;

52. Highlights the need for enhanced and effective parliamentary scrutiny in the area of defence, given its importance and the effects on other areas of increasing investment in defence; calls, therefore, for the establishment of an interinstitutional agreement ensuring Parliament’s access to classified information and the provision of physical infrastructure to that end, allowing for committee meetings to be conducted under the classification of EU restricted, or an even higher security classification;

Fostering EU-NATO complementarity

53. Calls for a true strategic partnership between the EU and NATO, in full respect of the agreed guiding principles of cooperation, as well as the decision-making autonomy of both organisations, and underlines that only together can we ensure our security and long-term prosperity;

54. Underlines the need for an agreement on the exchange of classified information between the EU and NATO;

55. Calls for the establishment of a regular joint armament conference between the EU and NATO in order to coordinate and align efforts with regard to capability development;

56. Recalls the need to ensure frequent EU-NATO meetings and summits on political and experts levels, in an inclusive, non-discriminatory and reciprocal manner;

57. Calls for the EU to reinforce the Structured Dialogue with NATO on the defence industry in order to enhance cooperation in key areas such as interoperability and standardisation;

Fostering cooperation with non-EU partners

58. Recalls that there is no alternative to strong and sustainable transatlantic cooperation and thus believes that every effort must be made to foster transatlantic cooperation in every field of the military and defence sectors, while recalling the need to foster European defence and develop our sovereignty;

59. Underlines the need to enhance our partnership with like-minded countries, particularly those in Europe, such as the UK and Norway; calls for an EU-UK broad security pact, also covering key subjects such as energy, migration and critical minerals; points to the added value of fostering our relationships with global partners such as the US, Japan and Australia;

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60. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the parliaments and governments of the EU Member States and NATO member countries.

MIL OSI Europe News –

March 7, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the white paper on the future of European defence – B10-0150/2025

Source: European Parliament

B10‑0150/2025

European Parliament resolution on the white paper on the future of European defence

(2025/2565(RSP))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas the EU is currently under attack, with hybrid incidents inside its borders, a large-scale war in its neighbourhood, and a realignment of global powers, all presenting real risks to the security of the EU and its citizens and requiring immediate, ambitious and decisive action;

B. whereas the Commissioner for Defence and Space and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy are expected to present a white paper on the future of European defence on 19 March 2025, which should serve as a roadmap for such action;

1. Urges the EU to act immediately to ensure its ability to protect its citizens, deter its enemies, support its allies and become a powerful defender of the rules-based international order and the principles of the European security architecture; urges the EU and its Member States to define a coherent, comprehensive and actionable strategy to achieve this; expects the Commission to present a proposal for such a strategy in its white paper on the future of European defence;

2. Is firmly convinced that a united EU can overcome all the challenges it faces and become a global power for peace, security, human rights and sustainable development, but that this requires a strong EU budget or additional European financial instruments, a reliable and sovereign industrial basis, a full spectrum of European military capabilities, including strategic enablers, and an integrated command allowing all national forces to act under a unified structure at the service of the EU, alone or in complementarity with other allied forces;

3. Believes that the strategy must include a renewed threat assessment, reflecting the recent unprecedented changes in the EU’s geopolitical context, a plan for supporting Ukraine against Russia’s war of aggression, as a key action to defend the EU’s values and protect its citizens and territory, a roadmap to close the capability gap, restore deterrence and enable autonomous EU action, and a plan to finance such vital transformations in the EU’s capacity to act;

4. Stresses its firm commitment to continued close cooperation with NATO to reinforce deterrence, collective defence and interoperability; calls nonetheless for the development of a fully-capable European Pillar of NATO able to act autonomously whenever necessary;

Assessing our threats and challenges

5. Is convinced that the EU needs to define its foreign policy goals and strategic defence doctrine, identifying the most pressing challenges, systemic threats and rival actors, and to shape its defence strategy accordingly;

6. Strongly believes that Europe is today facing the most profound military threat to its territorial integrity since the Second World War; believes that Russia and its allies are currently the most significant threat to our security and that of EU candidate countries and partners, and reiterates its condemnation in the strongest terms of Russia’s unprovoked, illegal and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine; notes, however, that the instability in our southern neighbourhood, the rise in Chinese military power, the increased aggressiveness of some middle powers and the behaviour of the Trump administration, which appears ready to jeopardise transatlantic cooperation on common security and make a deal with the Russian aggressor at the expense of Ukrainian and European security, which are one and the same, must also be fully taken into consideration;

7. Highlights the fact that on assessments by several European intelligence services, Russia will be ready to attack EU territory within 3 to 10 years, particularly if there is a ceasefire in its aggression against Ukraine that does not lead to a just and lasting peace; notes with deep concern that the Russian armed forces have grown in size and gained valuable battlefield experience, unlike any European forces with the exception of those of Ukraine, aims to have a 1.5 million-strong military by 2026 and has significantly ramped up its armaments production, making it an extremely worrisome threat for the EU’s security and for peace in Europe and globally;

8. Strongly condemns Russia’s escalating hybrid warfare tactics within the EU and its neighbourhood, which encompass both non-physical and physical actions, including attacks on critical infrastructure and disruption of elections; highlights that Russia’s strategic doctrine includes significant conventional conflict in its conception and execution of hybrid war and conceives hybrid wars as the main line of future military development, rather than a temporary phenomenon; calls for the EU to immediately and significantly step up its ability to defend, attribute and punish hybrid warfare waged within its territory and that of candidate countries;

9. Condemns all countries that are providing military equipment, financial support or any other form of assistance to Russia, thereby enabling and intensifying its ongoing aggression; warns of the very serious risks resulting from a widening of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine; is deeply concerned that the involvement of Iran and North Korea will provide them with important lessons to modernise their military capabilities, and may accelerate their paths towards nuclearisation;

10. Reaffirms its grave concerns about China’s increasing military investments and capabilities; expresses serious concerns about the renewed Chinese and Russian commitment to further strengthen their military ties and condemns China’s supplying of components and equipment to Moscow’s military industry;

11. Notes with concern the increase in both intra and inter-state conflicts in the EU’s wider neighbourhood, in part driven by the hegemonic ambitions of several middle powers, the presence of aggressive non-state actors and by the fragility of several states; also notes that this leads to clear threats to the EU’s security, namely by fostering terrorism and increasing the destabilisation of populations, often forcing their displacement;

12. Is deeply concerned by the recent actions of the Trump administration, which distance it from the values that have been at the core of its relationship with the EU, namely democracy, the rule of law, freedom of speech and support for the rules-based international order; regrets, in this regard, the votes of the US Government, aligned with the Russian Government, in the UN General Assembly and the UN Security Council on resolutions about the third anniversary of Russia’s war of aggression, as well as the unilateral decision to end Russia’s international isolation and to propose a normalisation of relations between them; strongly condemns any attempt to blame Ukraine, the victim, for the actions of the aggressor, Russia; urges the US Government to maintain maximum pressure on Russia until the latter agrees to a just and lasting peace for Ukraine; rejects any attempt by the US Government to impose a new security architecture on the EU and its Member States, and reiterates that any negotiation of such a security architecture must take place with the EU at the table; is deeply concerned by the actions of the US Government towards NATO and the doubts raised regarding the United States’ commitment to the security of the European continent; supports the peace process for Ukraine launched by European leaders, together with Ukraine, on 2 March 2025 in London, which seeks a just and lasting peace for Ukraine, and must be based on full respect for Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, the principles of international law, accountability for Russia’s war crimes and crime of aggression, Russian payments for the massive damage caused in Ukraine and credible security guarantees for Ukraine;

13. Concurs with the assessment of the Strategic Compass that the EU is surrounded by instability and conflicts, but notes that in the meantime the situation has changed dramatically; believes that, altogether, these developments produce an encirclement of Europe that reduces its scope for the pursuit of democratically defined and autonomous interests and values, and that this requires an immediate response; recognises the evolving nature of global security threats and therefore calls for the EU to conduct more frequent threat assessments, as they are the precondition for a realistic and successful planning of capabilities and operations;

Supporting Ukraine

14. Urges the EU and its Member States, together with international partners and NATO allies, to immediately increase their military support to Ukraine in order to assist it in exercising its legitimate right to self-defence against the Russian war of aggression according to Article 51 of the UN Charter; calls, in this regard, for the swift adoption of the next military aid package, which should be the largest to date and reflect the level of ambition this juncture calls for; calls on the Member States, international partners and NATO allies to lift all restrictions on the use of Western weapons systems delivered to Ukraine against military targets in Russian territory; calls for a significant increase in the financing of military support to Ukraine; calls on the Member States, together with their G7 partners, to immediately seize all frozen Russian assets in order to maintain and step up the EU’s response to Ukraine’s military needs;

15. Urges the Member States to immediately engage in joint procurement of additional capabilities, in particular ammunition for air defence and artillery, as well as any capabilities in which US assistance has played a key role thus far; further urges them to plan in advance for a possible sudden stop in US military assistance;

16. Welcomes the continued support for the Ukrainian Armed Forces through the EU Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine, which has already trained more than 60 000 Ukrainian troops, and calls on the mission to continue training as many troops as possible; stresses the importance of specific training modules aimed at developing the capacities of existing and future officers of the Ukrainian Armed Forces across all levels and in accordance with their needs; emphasises that the mission should also act as a platform for the exchange of best practices that would ensure that European forces also benefit from the lessons learnt on the battlefield by the Ukrainian Armed Forces; calls on the Member States to further expand training operations for the Ukrainian Armed Forces, including training operations in Ukrainian territory;

17. Insists on the paramount importance of cooperation with, and the integration of, the Ukrainian defence industry into the EU’s defence technological and industrial base (EDTIB), which offers clear advantages for both sides, and calls for speedier integration of the Ukrainian defence industry; recalls the importance of the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP) to that effect, and highlights the urgency of properly financing EDIP’s Ukraine Support Instrument, which is currently not budgeted; calls on the Commission to include Ukraine and its defence industry in all its defence industrial programmes;

18. Praises the ‘Danish Model’ for support to Ukraine, which consists of procuring defence capabilities produced directly in Ukraine; urges the EU and its Member States to strongly support this model and to make full use of its potential, as there is an underutilisation of Ukraine’s defence industrial capacity, estimated at around 50 %, and it brings many advantages to both sides, such as cheaper equipment, speedier and safer logistics as well as greater ease of training and maintenance;

19. Calls for the EU and its Member States to actively work towards maintaining and achieving the broadest possible international support for Ukraine and identifying a peaceful solution to the war that must be based on full respect for Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, the principles of international law, accountability for Russia’s war crimes and the crime of aggression, and Russian payments for the massive damage caused in Ukraine; urges the EU and its Member States to participate in establishing robust future security guarantees for Ukraine;

Closing the capabilities gap and restoring deterrence

20. Strongly believes that strengthening Europe’s security and defence requires not just a simple increase in ambition and action, but a complete overhaul of the way we act and invest in our security and defence, such that from now on we plan, innovate, develop, purchase, maintain and deploy capabilities together, in a coordinated and integrated fashion, while making full use of the complementary competences of all actors in Europe, including NATO;

21. Calls on the Commission to come up with a complete programme for defence, including against hybrid attacks, ensuring that planning, research, development, procurement and management of capabilities are all done through a European lens, and that all EU funds are used as a stimulus to joint EU action, instead of perpetuating the present state of market fragmentation, divergent and incompatible capabilities, and superfluous and wasteful investments; considers EDIP to be a good step forward and as such calls for its swift adoption;

22. Recognises that the starting point must be a realistic assessment of the current capabilities and capability gap; calls on the Commission, with the support of the European Defence Agency and in cooperation with NATO, to identify critical defence capability gaps and shortfalls in the EU, in particular for strategic enablers, where the Member States have fallen behind and become dependent on non-European allies; furthermore, calls on the Commission to transform the capability gaps into clear industrial targets that can be the object of planning and programming and benefit from an industrial policy;

23. Declares the EDTIB to be a strategic asset of the EU, and as such considers that the Commission should be tasked with its mapping and monitoring, so as to safeguard the EU’s strengths, reduce its vulnerabilities, avoid crises, and provide it with an effective and efficient industrial policy; calls on the Commission to draw on the EU Military Committee’s expertise in the definition of defence industries’ priorities and the formulation of defence initiatives in order to ensure alignment between industrial capabilities and military needs; recalls the importance of ensuring that the EDTIB is present in all Member States, distributing the burden and the benefits equitably, and preventing its disruption by a targeted attack on a particular area;

24. Strongly believes that EU support for the production and procurement of defence products should focus on stimulating the EDTIB, increasing production volumes and ensuring the development of native European solutions for key capabilities, in particular for domains of action where we have so far relied on support from allies, and thus be oriented towards EU-based companies; rejects a scenario in which EU funds contribute to perpetuating or deepening dependences on non-European actors, whether for production of capabilities or their deployment; notes with concern that the vast majority of EU defence investment is diverted to defence industry players outside the EU; highlights that our investments should also contribute to bringing our European allies closer together, first and foremost Ukraine, but also Norway and the UK, finding synergies between complementary industrial strengths and bolstering the interoperability of our fighting forces; states, however, that joining common projects in defence and security requires a steadfast commitment to the EU’s values and norms and demands that any industrial partnerships with non-EU allies include strong safeguards on technology transfer and design authority, ensuring that we do not face restrictions on the use of the capabilities acquired; highlights that EU funds will provide opportunities for the defence industry, but also require a commitment to give priority to orders linked to ensuring European security and defence, in particular in times of crisis;

25. Urges the Member States to radically change the way they procure defence products, choosing common procurement by default, and to consider tasking the Commission with undertaking joint procurement on their behalf; considers that all products procured in the EU, particularly those supported by EU funds, must respect strong safeguards on technology transfer and design authority;

26. Welcomes all measures that allow a faster and more effective ramp-up of production of defence products in Europe, in particular those that are most needed for a land war; calls for a change in paradigm from a ‘flow’ approach to a ‘stock’ approach, with stock piles of materiel ready for a sustained increase in demand; notes, in this regard, the advantages offered by mechanisms such as advance purchase agreements, the establishment of ‘ever-warm’ facilities and the creation of defence readiness pools; calls on the Commission to support the Member States in developing wartime economic cooperation contingency plans with close partners to prepare for mutual support in the case of large-scale security crises involving them directly, and to deepen wartime economic dialogues with European and global partners;

27. Highlights that the EDTIB cannot thrive without a true single market for defence; emphasises, in this regard, the need for an effective regulatory framework aimed at encouraging innovation and cross-border cooperation in production, procurement and investment; insists on the need to remove barriers to market entry for defence products across the EU and calls on the Commission to act upon the results of the reviews of the Directives on the transfer of defence-related products [1] and defence procurement [2], considering the obstacles and costs imposed by the current fragmented framework for certification of defence products; calls on the Commission to propose a regulation for common rules on the certification of defence products and the creation of a European defence certification authority; underlines at the same time the importance of maintaining fruitful competition between different undertakings in the single market for defence; calls on the Commission to propose a regulation on the standardisation of defence products with binding industrial standards, taking advantage of the lessons learnt from the implementation of NATO defence standards;

28. Stresses the need for greater transparency and convergence at the national and European levels on arms exports; points out the need for the Member States to respect the EU Common Position on Arms Exports, while acknowledging their competences in their defence acquisition policies;

29. Underlines the importance of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) in improving and harmonising the EU’s defence capabilities; reiterates its regret that Member States continue to not make full use of the PESCO framework; reiterates its call on the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Member States, and with the involvement of the Commission, to assess projects and their potential regularly and comprehensively with a view to streamlining the current set of projects to a small set of priority projects; believes that priority projects must focus on reducing our dependencies regarding strategic enablers, such as battlefield command and control (C2), aerial and satellite intelligence, surveillance and recognition, satellite communication, air defence and suppression of enemy air defences, military mobility, strategic and tactical air transport and aerial refuelling, missile and deep strike capabilities, drone and anti-drone technologies, combat engineering and wet-gap crossing, and airborne electronic attack; believes that these could be European Defence Projects of Common Interest (EDPCI); regrets that Parliament is not in a position to properly scrutinise PESCO projects and calls for a change of paradigm for the governance of EDPCIs, such that Parliament is adequately involved; reiterates its call on the Member States to provide an implementation report on PESCO projects to Parliament at least twice a year;

30. Calls on the Commission to propose an EU drones package, focusing on drone and anti-drone systems and auxiliary capabilities, containing plans and funds to stimulate research and development, which should learn from the Ukrainian experience and be open to the participation of Ukraine’s highly innovative companies, as well as an industrial programme dedicated to the joint development, production and procurement of drones and anti-drone systems, and a regulation on the use of drones in civilian and military contexts;

31. Calls on the Commission to step up the ambition of the European Defence Fund, both quantitatively and qualitatively, and to better align its work programme with the capability planning exercises; recalls that the EU’s investment in defence research and innovation is much lower than that of its industrial competitors; considers that part of the investment from the European Defence Fund (EDF) should be designed to foster partnerships between academia, ministries of defence and the defence industry, and to the creation of dedicated research centres for defence; highlights the importance of promoting the participation of the most innovative high-tech companies from the civilian sector in the EDF;

32. Recalls that the EDTIB is currently facing a shortage of skilled workers, and calls on the Commission and the Member States to develop a strategy to train, upskill and reskill workers; considers that funding from defence programmes must be paired with requirements regarding benefits for workers and communities where the investments are located, making the European defence industry a source of high-quality jobs and earning the EDTIB broad support from the population;

33. Calls for the EU and its Member States to quickly improve the state of military mobility and logistics, removing all unnecessary obstacles that slow down the speed at which the EU can react to threats and deploy its forces;

34. Calls for the EU to develop a comprehensive set of instruments to detect, prevent and react to hybrid attacks and threats and protect the Union’s citizens and assets, including critical infrastructure, but also democratic institutions and processes; reiterates its call on the Member States, the European External Action Service and the Commission to consider the creation of a well-resourced and independent structure tasked with identifying, analysing and documenting foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) threats against the EU as a whole to increase situational awareness and threat intelligence sharing, and develop attribution capabilities and countermeasures in relation to FIMI;

35. Stresses the importance of enhanced intelligence sharing and information exchange among the Member States and EU institutions, including Parliament, to improve situational awareness and to be able to better anticipate and counter threats to collective security and define common lines of action under the common security and defence policy (CSDP), particularly in the area of crisis management; calls on the Member States to use the EU Intelligence Analysis Centre (EU INTCEN) as an effective intelligence-sharing body to share intelligence securely, formulate a common strategic culture and provide strategic information to better anticipate and respond to crises within and outside the EU; reiterates its call for the deployment of intelligence-gathering capacities in all CSDP missions and operations, which would provide information to the EU INTCEN, EU military staff, the EU’s Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) and the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability;

36. Welcomes the Niinistö report and its recommendations for strengthening Europe’s civilian and military preparedness and resilience; supports the adoption of a whole-of-society approach to resilience, involving the active engagement of the EU institutions, the Member States, civil society and individual citizens in strengthening the Union’s security framework; urges the EU to increase the alignment of existing EU instruments and policies, as well as that between EU and national policies, pioneering a ‘preparedness in all policies’ approach to security and defence, ensuring they do not generate contradictory obligations or jeopardise overall defence objectives, especially during a security crisis; expects the upcoming EU strategy on preparedness to offer details of the implementation of the report;

Enabling autonomous EU action

37. Recalls that the Strategic Compass provides the EU and its Member States with a framework for strengthening the EU’s security and defence and for advancing towards a common forward-looking strategic culture; reiterates that the Strategic Compass’s ambitious aims and milestones can only be achieved with the corresponding political will, adequate financial contributions and openness to cooperation where necessary; calls for the Member States to take all the necessary steps and decisions and fully implement the Strategic Compass; reiterates its call to strengthen the EU-s MPCC, establishing it as the preferred command and control structure for EU military operations and providing it with adequate premises, staff, enhanced command and control, and effective communication and information systems for all CSDP missions and operations, including those of the Rapid Deployment Capacity; insists that the Rapid Deployment Capacity must achieve full operational capability in the first half of 2025 at the latest, with at least 5 000 troops; calls on the Member States to urgently pursue a more ambitious pace and scale of command integration and joint operational capability, with the goal of enabling the EU to conduct large-scale operations independently, without reliance on non-EU countries for any capability, including strategic enablers; stresses that the EU and its Member States cannot develop consistent foreign and defence policies without strong support for democratic and agile structures and decision-making processes; underlines that further institutional discussions on removing the unanimity requirement to enhance cooperation should be explored;

38. Underlines that in the current geopolitical context, the need for continuing to operationalise Article 42(7) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) on mutual assistance, ensuring solidarity among Member States, especially those whose geographical position leaves them directly exposed to imminent threats and challenges, regardless of whether or not they are NATO members, is of utmost importance; calls on the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to present concrete steps towards developing a true EU solidarity policy, including by clarifying the practical arrangements in the event of a Member State triggering Article 42(7) TEU;

39. Notes that EU candidate countries are frequently the target of destabilisation campaigns, and thus calls for the EU to ensure them greater support, in order to preserve stability and security and increase defence cooperation, especially in the fight against disinformation and hybrid warfare; is concerned that otherwise it will act as an invitation to Russia to invade them before they finally join the EU;

40. Reiterates the importance of EU-NATO cooperation, as NATO remains, for those states that are members of it, an important pillar of their collective defence, such that EU-NATO cooperation should continue, in particular in areas such as information exchange, planning, military mobility and exchange of best practices; highlights that all EU-NATO cooperation must be mutually beneficial and inclusive and respect the EU’s capacity to act autonomously; remains concerned, in this respect, that Türkiye, a NATO member and EU candidate country, excludes Cyprus from cooperation with NATO, hampering an enhanced relationship between the EU and NATO;

41. Underlines the need for a strong EU defence pillar within NATO, able to act autonomously from, and in complementarity with, NATO, turning the transatlantic alliance into a more equal partnership, and granting the necessary security guarantees to the EU, its Member States and whoever else they deem it necessary to extend them to;

42. Considers it essential to formalise a security and defence partnership with the United Kingdom as a means of strengthening European security and the European pillar of NATO, in particular in the context of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; underlines, in this regard, the importance of closer cooperation on information and intelligence sharing, military mobility, security and defence initiatives, crisis management, cyber defence, hybrid threats, FIMI and in jointly addressing shared threats;

43. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to ensure that all instruments of external action, including development aid and cooperation, are aligned with the EU’s security objectives, fostering resilient societies by promoting inclusive economic growth, good governance and human rights; emphasises the crucial role that diplomacy and development cooperation play alongside military efforts in ensuring long-term international security; underscores that sustainable peace cannot be achieved through military measures alone, but requires comprehensive strategies that address the root causes of instability, such as poverty, inequality, governance failures and climate change;

Financing our security and defence

44. Considers that, in order to be able to protect its citizens, deter its enemies, support its allies and become a powerful actor in the defence of a rules-based international order, the EU requires an immediate, substantial and sustained investment in security and defence, in particular at EU level, using a mix of public and private funds and incentivising better spending and better collective action; calls for the EU and the Member States to urgently agree on concrete financial solutions to finance security and defence-related investments; welcomes the ReArmEU initiative by the Commission as an important first step towards swift action;

45. Recalls that the Commission has estimated the funding needed at EUR 500 billion over the next 10 years (2025-2034), including EUR 400 billion to strengthen Member States’ defence capabilities and EUR 100 billion to support Ukraine; notes higher estimates, such as a Bruegel study referring to EUR 250 billion annually in the event that the United States withdraws its military presence from Europe; highlights that the cost of isolated action is much higher than the cost of joint action, and that the EU and its Member states can also increase their preparedness by making current investment more efficient and coordinated; highlights that the cost of non-preparedness and the consequent loss of autonomy and potential military defeat is much higher than the cost of acting decisively now;

46. Strongly supports increased investments in our security and defence to ensure that the EU and its Member States are able to face all types of threats, from hybrid to conventional, and establish strong deterrence, while reducing dependences; notes that insecurity, social exclusion and poverty are persistently weaponised by our enemies, as they make large swaths of people more vulnerable to hostile propaganda and anti-democratic narratives; demands therefore that the increased investments in our security and defence come on top of the important investments in social cohesion and welfare, and not instead of them; calls instead for a comprehensive EU investment strategy, based on a permanent fiscal capacity that addresses both vulnerabilities in military capabilities and in the social fabric, empowering us to fight all threats to our values, social model, security and defence; underlines that this pressing investment requires raising public financial resources quickly and in substantial volumes and that this should be based on the principle of social solidarity and a fair redistribution of wealth within our European societies; calls therefore on the Commission to propose new own resources and taxes on the stakeholders benefiting from the current economic and security situation, notably through windfall profits, in order to ensure a fair and sustainable contribution to our collective resilience; recalls that investing in security and defence brings many additional benefits for European society besides greater security and autonomy, and contributes to the desire to make the EU’s economy more competitive;

47. Warns that simply increasing national defence spending without addressing coordination issues, redundant efforts, and misaligned strategies could be counterproductive as it may exacerbate force integration challenges and drive up procurement costs for all Member States by intensifying competition between them; is therefore concerned by the Commission’s proposals in ReArmEU to activate the escape clause of the Stability and Growth Pact for defence investments, which would change the fiscal rules without creating more fiscal space and without accompanying it with proposals for increased coordinated or joint spending; recalls that any exemption should take into account the need to avoid moral hazard and avoid rewarding countries with long-standing inadequacies in their security and defence spending; demands that the Commission and the Member States design any exemptions for defence spending ramp-up in a way that incentivises coordinated spending and ensures the definition of such investments takes into account all threats, including hybrid, and the need to improve military mobility, resilience and security of communications and the availability of skilled workers;

48. Calls therefore for the bulk of the effort to serve EU-level action; regrets that the Commission’s ReArmEU initiative is mostly based on national expenditure; furthermore calls for the EU and its Member States to give prominent coordination roles to the Commission and the European Defence Agency in new financing instruments, which should be coupled with a complete programme for defence, including against hybrid attacks, ensuring that planning, development, procurement and management of capabilities is done together, in groupings of significant numbers of Member States, and often with the Commission and the European Defence Agency acting on their behalf;

49. Recognises that the present multiannual financial framework (MFF) is unable to provide sufficient resources for security and defence, and rejects any increases in security and defence spending in the present and future MFFs at the expense of cohesion policy funds, as proposed by the Commission in its ReArmEU initiative; calls on the Commission and the Member States to adapt the cohesion policy funds to a new geopolitical reality, shifting from a reactive, crisis-response stance to a more proactive policy focused on resilience; underlines that the EU budget alone cannot fill the defence spending gap, but has an important role to play; calls for additional EU-wide and European solutions to bridge the gap until the next MFF; highlights the importance of future MFFs in transforming the current immediate increases in security and defence into structural and sustainable EU-level efforts to ensure the EU’s security and defence;

50. Notes the proposals to make use of readily available sources of capital to finance security and defence, namely the unspent funds of NextGenerationEU and potential financial lines from the European Stability Mechanism, similar to the programme put together during the response to the COVID-19 pandemic; believes that these options could be explored, but would fall short of the needs estimated by the Commission;

51. Calls therefore on the Commission to raise common debt to provide the Union with the fiscal capacity to borrow in exceptional and crises situations, present and future, taking into account the experience and lessons learnt from NextGenerationEU, as we are now experiencing a pressing need to boost security and defence to protect the EU’s citizens, restore deterrence and support our allies, first and foremost Ukraine; notes additional ideas to create a rearmament bank or a special purpose vehicle with pooled national guarantees to ensure Member States have easier access to markets; underlines that the meaningful involvement of Parliament as one arm of the budgetary authority in the governance of future EU defence spending is a sine qua non; reiterates that the governance of whatever instrument is used should be such that it gives rise to a European defence programme that uses the funds to solve coordination problems in planning, developing, procuring, maintaining and deploying capabilities, reduces dependencies from non-European countries, supports the EDTIB and ultimately enables the EU and its close allies to act autonomously and in a coordinated manner;

52. Recognises the importance of mobilising private capital into security and defence; recalls, however, that, as governments remain the sole procurers of military capabilities, private capital will not replace public capital in the security and defence sector; calls on the Commission and the European Investment Bank (EIB) to consider an investment guarantee programme, similar to InvestEU, to assist in this effort; calls on the EIB to re-evaluate the list of excluded activities, to adjust its lending policy to increase the volume of available funding in the field of security and defence, and to investigate earmarked debt issuance for funding security and defence projects; calls for more consistent support for companies by reducing unnecessary administrative burdens and simplifying procedures, in particular by increasing information-sharing between public authorities, upholding the once-only principle and making full use of digital technologies; calls for the EU to start preparing emergency procedures for projects established in response to major crises or wars;

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53. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the European Council, the Council, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the President of the Commission and competent Commissioners, the EU security and defence agencies, and the governments and parliaments of the Member States.

MIL OSI Europe News –

March 7, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Greek and Christian communities suffering in Aleppo – E-002792/2024(ASW)
Source: European Parliament

The fall of Assad’s criminal[1] regime marks a historic moment for the Syrian people, who — irrespective of religion and ethnicity — have endured immense suffering under its rule.

This is a moment of hope, but also uncertainty, and all Syrians, in the country and the diaspora, must have an opportunity to reunify, stabilise and rebuild their country. It is essential that all Syrians be protected and that the transition be inclusive[2] of all components of society.

Whereas the competence for safety and diplomatic protection of citizens lies primarily with the Member States, the EU supports Member States’ efforts to evacuate or repatriate citizens from conflict zones through the EU Civil Protection Mechanism[3], which coordinates disaster response and contributes to transport and operational support.

The EU is actively engaging with Syria’s new leadership to prevent expansion of terrorism working with partners within the Global Coalition against Da’esh[4] to share information, assessing and addressing the threat posed by Da’esh and its affiliates.

EU measures include counter-terrorism cooperation with regional partners; multilateral engagement with the United Nations (UN) and with the Global Counterterrorism Forum[5] as co-chair; security measures; support for repatriation including financial support through the EU-UN Global Terrorism Threats Facility[6], rehabilitation, and reintegration; humanitarian aid, including mental health services; funding programmes to prevent and counter violent extremism, radicalisation and propaganda.

The EU provides humanitarian aid on a needs basis. Despite the highly challenging security environment, EU humanitarian partners, together with local organisations, are providing emergency assistance to all affected communities throughout the country.
- [1] As set out in the Foreign Affairs Council conclusions on the situation in the Middle East of 27 January 2025, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/fac/2025/01/27/
- [2] See footnote 1.
- [3] https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/what/civil-protection/eu-civil-protection-mechanism_en
- [4] https://theglobalcoalition.org/en/
- [5] https://www.thegctf.org/
- [6] https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/EU-UN-Global-Terrorism-Threats-Facility
MIL OSI Europe News –
March 7, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the white paper on the future of European defence – B10-0145/2025

Source: European Parliament

B10‑0145/2025

European Parliament resolution on the white paper on the future of European defence

(2025/2565(RSP))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to Articles 24(1), 42, 43 and 45 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU),

– having regard to the national security strategies of the Member States,

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2023/1525 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 July 2023 on supporting ammunition production (ASAP)[1],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2023/2418 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 October 2023 on establishing an instrument for the reinforcement of the European defence industry through common procurement (EDIRPA)[2],

– having regard to the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence,

– having regard to Commission Recommendation (EU) 2023/2113 of 3 October 2023 on critical technology areas for the EU’s economic security for further risk assessment with Member States [3],

– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 10 March 2023 entitled ‘European Union Space Strategy for Security and Defence’ (JOIN(2023)0009),

– having regard to the report by Sauli Niinistö of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘Safer Together – Strengthening Europe’s Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness’,

– having regard to the report by Mario Draghi of 9 September 2024 entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness’,

– having regard to Special Report 04/2025 of the European Court of Auditors of 5 February 2025 entitled ‘EU military mobility: Full speed not reached due to design weaknesses and obstacles en route’,

– having regard to the three Joint Declarations on EU-NATO cooperation signed on 8 July 2016, 10 July 2018 and 10 January 2023,

– having regard to the Madrid Summit Declaration adopted by the NATO heads of state and government at the North Atlantic Council meeting in Madrid on 29 June 2022,

– having regard to the NATO 2022 Strategic Concept and the 2023 NATO Summit in Vilnius,

– having regard to the opening remarks made by US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth in Brussels at the Ukraine Defense Contact Group meeting of 12 February 2025,

– having regard to the talks held in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, on 18 February 2025 between US and Russian negotiators,

– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas the Commission announced the release of a white paper on the future of European defence, co-authored by Commissioner for Defence and Space Andrius Kubilius and Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas, by 19 March 2025; whereas this document will be the first of its kind produced by the EU and emulates similar documents published by Member States;

B. whereas the white paper must respect the limits set by the TEU in terms of foreign policy and defence and it must take note of the international context and the strategic environment in order to provide a perspective and proposals that will enable the strengthening of Europe’s security;

C. whereas the white paper on the future of European defence will provide the framework for future defence projects and regulations and will be a key point of reference for incoming negotiations on the next multiannual financial framework;

D. whereas the international order is profoundly destabilised and is restructuring; whereas the international rules and organisations that emerged from the Second World War and then from the end of the Cold War are in crisis; whereas international relations are increasingly characterised by uncertainty, and the tendency to resort to armed force to resolve international disagreements is growing;

E. whereas Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has profoundly destabilised the security order in Europe; whereas this unilateral aggression has accelerated the integration of Sweden and Finland into NATO; whereas this war has considerably deteriorated relations and exchanges between Russia and the countries of Europe;

F. whereas the war in Ukraine has highlighted the chronic underinvestment by Member States in their armed forces; whereas the stocks of arms and ammunition in Europe are largely insufficient; whereas certain critical military capabilities are not possessed by any European military; whereas the infrastructure that is essential for the security and proper functioning of European societies and economies is vulnerable; whereas some Member States have encountered significant difficulties in deploying and transporting military resources within the EU itself;

G. whereas the relations between the United States and China will structure, to a large extent, the future of international relations in the 21st century; whereas the United States no longer has the will to maintain the same level of military involvement in Europe; whereas the US Secretary of Defence has expressly spoken of a ‘division of labour’ between allies, with the Americans prioritising the Pacific region, while emphasising that Europeans must be responsible for the defence of Europe and must increase their capabilities accordingly;

H. whereas the European Union is composed of 27 sovereign states, with each having the sovereign right to determine its own foreign and defence policy;

I. whereas it is in the interest of the Member States to adopt a common policy on matters of common interest to them; whereas enhanced cooperation on defence matters is mutually beneficial if it improves the security of the Member States against any direct aggression or if it increases their capacity to respond to any threat to their territorial integrity, sovereignty or prosperity;

J. whereas the European defence market is too fragmented; whereas for a single armament type, there can be several or even dozens of different varieties of equipment in the EU, representing a collective loss of resources because of duplication, and preventing economies of scale;

K. whereas Article 24(1) TEU stipulates that decisions related to the common foreign and security policy and the common security and defence policy are taken unanimously by the Council; whereas Article 24(1) TEU also stipulates that the EU cannot adopt legislative acts on foreign affairs and defence; whereas Article 36 TEU stipulates that Parliament has a consultative role;

L. whereas, on 30 January 2025, 19 EU countries sent a letter to the European Investment Bank calling for it ‘to play an even stronger role in providing investment funding and leveraging private funding for the security and defence sector’;

1. Stresses that diplomatic and defence policy issues are primarily the prerogative of the Member States, which remain the most relevant and the only legitimate political units in the international order; respects the right of every Member State to determine its own foreign and security policy; insists on the importance of maintaining the principle of unanimity in the Council for all decisions related to the common foreign and security policy and the common security and defence policy;

2. Underlines that strengthening the Member States’ militaries, based on threats, is necessary to compensate for the security deficit caused by decades of underinvestment and the gradual disengagement of the United States; emphasises that this rearmament policy led by the Member States must not aim to escalate tensions in Europe, but rather aim to reach a level that will deter any hostile actions, establish a continental balance and maintain peace;

3. Notes that the United States remains the EU’s main military ally and is an essential member of NATO; insists that, irrespective of the political orientation of the White House, US foreign policy will continue to make the Asia-Pacific region a geostrategic priority and to perceive Europe as a secondary theatre; stresses that Member States must no longer subcontract their security and defence to other powers;

4. Underlines that NATO is a crucial partner in the collective defence architecture in Europe; takes note of the ambition of building a European pillar within NATO; considers that a greater contribution from European states within the alliance must, for the sake of consistency, result in a more balanced distribution of command posts in favour of European military personnel; stresses that stepping up the defence capabilities of European states can go hand in hand with the deepening of EU-NATO cooperation with due respect for the neutrality of the EU Member States that are not part of the NATO alliance;

5. Highlights the need to overcome the fragmentation of the EU’s internal market for defence products through greater cooperation between Member States and to collectively work on the interoperability of military capabilities; calls on the Member States to encourage cross-border defence procurement in order to strengthen intra-European industrial cooperation and achieve the objective of European strategic autonomy;

6. Stresses that greater cooperation in the defence sector must actively involve defence SMEs, not only large defence actors, and serve as a platform for SME development, providing greater opportunities for them to contribute to the EU’s technological base and enhance European strategic autonomy;

7. Notes, however, that the strengthening of the European defence industry must not result in the attribution of new competences to the Commission, which would be in breach of the Treaties and would undermine the sovereignty of Member States without increasing efficacy; reiterates, therefore, that decision-making regarding military requirements, the prioritisation of capability development and the purchase of defence products should remain within the remit of Member States; underlines that, despite the need for increased cooperation in the field of defence, such as on joint procurement and joint production, the Member States must retain full sovereignty over their arms export policies;

8. Calls for the co-legislators to establish the principle of a European preference in future European defence regulations, including in the European defence industrial plan, so that European funds benefit European companies on European soil, which will enhance our industrial defence capabilities and will reduce our dependences on non-EU countries; recalls that this regulation must in no way restrict the freedom of the Member States to determine their own arms procurement and import/export policy;

9. Calls on the NATO-affiliated Member States to cooperate in order to identify and fill critical capability gaps by building on and complementing NATO’s Defence Planning Process targets, which are required for sustained full-spectrum operations, including space systems and launchers, long-range missiles, integrated air and missile defence systems, ammunition production, artificial intelligence (AI), maritime drone capability, command and control capability, electronic warfare systems and air-to-air refuelling capacity;

10. Calls on non-neutral Member States to adequately invest in their infrastructure to guarantee optimal military mobility across Europe in line with their respective military agreements and alliances;

11. Emphasises the importance for European states to have the capacity and a framework to act independently within the NATO framework where possible and outside of the NATO framework if necessary; points out that the Rapid Deployment Capacity, an inter-state initiative under the control of the Member States, only comprised of 5 000 troops, does not allow for the possibility of engagement in a context of intense combat; reaffirms that it is in the Member States’ interest to strengthen their ability to fight together by conducting joint training and exercises that enhance the interoperability of the various national instruments;

12. Expresses the need to consider European defence in all its dimensions, including land, air, naval, space and cybernetic; notes that contemporary strategic issues have a growing naval dimension and that the powers challenging the international order are deploying naval capabilities at regional level; stresses the importance of European cooperation at sea and welcomes the current progress of Operation Aspides, the lessons from which must be put to good use; stresses that European strategic autonomy has a maritime and naval dimension, and that European navies should cooperate more closely to ensure the protection of their maritime areas, as well as their underwater or surface infrastructure; stresses that the principle of freedom of navigation must be protected and calls, therefore, for an increase in surveillance and the ability to react quickly in the event of threats arising in European seas;

13. Notes that space will increasingly become a key aspect of power and sovereignty; underlines that the Member States must maintain and guarantee their independent access to space; welcomes the launch of Ariane 6, but is concerned by the accumulated delays; draws attention to the need for the space sector to be industrialised to increase the number of rockets launched to put European satellites into orbit; welcomes the launch of the European satellite constellation IRIS², which should enable secure communications solutions for sovereign and military issues by 2030; emphasises the need for the future EU space law not to hamper the competitiveness of European companies and to apply constraints on non-EU players; notes the importance of Galileo, Europe’s global navigation satellite system;

14. Underlines that, unlike the United States (Buy America Act) and China (Government Procurement Law), the European space industry is not shielded from international competition and does not benefit from a European preference; calls on the Member States and the Commission to implement a European preference in space industry procurement and promote innovation, research and development; stresses that the European Space Agency’s principle of geographical return hampers innovative European SMEs and start-ups from receiving adequate funding and contributes to the fragmentation of the European space industry; calls on the European Space Agency to abolish the principle of geographical return and adopt an innovative and efficiency-based approach to space procurement rather than a geographically driven one;

15. Underlines that the strengthening of European defence capabilities will require significant financing; calls on banks, pension funds, insurance companies and other actors in the Member States to simplify and significantly increase the financing of projects and companies operating in the field of defence; insists that in the context of the urgent need to increase defence spending, financial institutions should not consider investments in the field of defence to be damaging for their reputation; rejects, however, the idea of issuing joint debt, such as defence Eurobonds, to support defence spending;

16. Notes the growing importance of AI in warfare, particularly in the development of drones and autonomous weapons; recognises the indigenous AI advances in warfare made by Ukraine and Israel, demonstrating that the Member States are equally capable of developing similar capabilities; highlights that recent breakthroughs, such as the one made by the Chinese AI computing start-up DeepSeek, demonstrate the feasibility of cost-competitive AI systems; calls on the Member States to accelerate the development of AI capabilities; underlines that the AI Act [4], set to be implemented in 2025, creates uncertainty regarding the production and development of dual-use AI systems, an ambiguity that could hinder the development of essential defence industry products; calls for this issue to be clarified to ensure that the European defence industry is not disadvantaged compared to its American and Chinese counterparts;

17. Stresses that a strong civilian manufacturing industry, particularly in the steelmaking, automotive, aerospace and shipbuilding sectors, is essential for deterrence and for maintaining long-term military and industrial capabilities in the event of conflict; notes the decline of these industries since the 1990s, especially in western Europe; calls on the Commission and the Council to safeguard the manufacturing industries that are vital to national security, including through the use of tariffs; urges the Commission to revise the Green Deal and revoke the net-neutrality goal, since it destroys manufacturing competitiveness and is responsible for the deindustrialisation of key industries in the Member States; stresses that the relocation of essential manufacturing industries to non-EU countries is counterproductive both in terms of global environmental impact and national security;

18. Expresses concern over the growing dependence of the European defence industry on foreign components, particularly rare earths and semiconductors, which are essential for advanced military technologies; calls on the Member States to intensify efforts to develop domestic rare earth mining and semiconductor manufacturing capabilities to safeguard the autonomy of the European defence industry in the event of conflicts or severe supply chain disruptions;

19. Welcomes the Dutch Government’s decision to tighten export control rules on advanced lithography systems, which are essential for semiconductor production; stresses that EU technological transfers to non-EU countries have significantly contributed to the rise of foreign competition and the deindustrialisation of Europe; encourages the Member States to impose stricter export controls on critical dual-use technologies and manufacturing products;

20. Notes that 80 % of EU data is stored and managed in the United States and other non-EU countries, where it may be subject to extraterritorial intervention under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, the CLOUD Act, or China’s Data Security Law; stresses that protecting critical industrial and government data is essential to ensuring national security; welcomes the Swiss Government Cloud programme as a step toward cloud sovereignty and encourages the Member States to implement similar initiatives; encourages the Member States to strengthen regulations on telecommunications service providers, which are predominantly based outside Europe, creating a significant dependence on external actors;

21. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to Commissioner for Defence and Space Andrius Kubilius, Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas, the Commission, the European Council and the parliaments and governments of the Member States.

MIL OSI Europe News –

March 7, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the white paper on the future of European defence – B10-0144/2025

Source: European Parliament

B10‑0144/2025

European Parliament resolution on the white paper on the future of European defence

(2025/2565(RSP))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the common security and defence policy (CSDP) and the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) of the EU,

– having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 42 thereof,

– having regard to Title III, Article 3 of the Protocol on the concerns of the Irish people on the Treaty of Lisbon,

– having regard to the announced publication of the white paper on the future of European defence on 19 March 2025,

– having regard to the Helsinki Accords,

– having regard to the various European defence projects of recent years,

– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas, in line with the Treaties, the CSDP is part of the CFSP and is considered a policy framework through which Member States can develop a European strategic culture of security and defence, address conflicts and crises together, protect the Union and its citizens and strengthen international peace and security;

B. whereas Article 42(2) TEU states that the Union’s CSDP must be compatible with the common security and defence policy established within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), under the North Atlantic Treaty;

C. whereas NATO is largely dominated by the United States, and NATO membership entails a mandatory complementarity and compatibility of European weapons systems with US systems, hence impeding the strategic and operational autonomy of Member States and other European countries;

D. whereas at the NATO Summit in Bucharest in 2008, the US Government pushed for Ukrainian NATO membership against the opinion of several Member States; whereas following the Russian invasion, the United States pushed EU Member States to systematically increase the quantity and quality of arms deliveries to Ukraine;

E. whereas different Member States have different military and security policies, including policies of military neutrality;

F. whereas the United States saw windfall benefits from the Ukraine war through an increase of US shale gas exports to the European Union; whereas the US Government now unjustly wishes to control Ukrainian mineral resources and negotiate an end to the war in Ukraine with Putin, without involving Ukraine and the European Union;

G. whereas unlike nuclear weapon states such as India and the People’s Republic of China, NATO and Russia refuse to commit to a ‘no first use’ policy, whereby they would formally refrain from using nuclear weapons, except in retaliation to an attack by an enemy power using weapons of mass destruction;

H. whereas the US Government has launched a high number of wars and military operations that violated international law and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations; whereas, in light of 2024 advisory opinions of the International Court of Justice, the United States’ ongoing military support for Israel might make it complicit in genocide and illegal occupation; whereas the participation of EU Member States in violations of international law, including in wars of aggression and military invasions contrary to international law against countries such as the former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya, have undermined global adherence to the principles of international law;

I. whereas the United States has forwardly deployed new B61-12 gravity bombs on the territory of EU Member States, increasing the risk that these Member States will fall victim to preventive or retaliatory strikes related to US foreign policy;

J. whereas Russia’s repeated acts of war and aggression, starting with the war against Georgia in 2008, the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the ongoing illegal war of aggression against Ukraine, as well as an increasing number of acts of sabotage on critical infrastructure, have been factors in creating and exacerbating tensions;

K. whereas Article 41(2) TEU prohibits charging expenditure arising from operations with military or defence implications to the Union budget;

L. whereas the Commission has nevertheless launched several European defence projects over the last few years, including the European Defence Industrial Development Programme (EDIDP), the Preparatory Action on Defence Research (PADR), the European Defence Fund (EDF), the European Defence Industry Reinforcement through common Procurement Act (EDIRPA), the Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP) and, most recently, the European Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS) and the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP);

M. whereas according to 2023 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute figures, EU Member States, together with the United Kingdom, already spend more nominally on defence than all other countries in the world combined, with the exception of the United States;

N. whereas in April 2021, the Commission estimated that increased cooperation between Member States in the field of security and defence could save between EUR 25 billion and EUR 100 billion every year;

O. whereas the Commission’s Directorate-General for International Partnerships (DG INTPA) is planning to shut down more than four out of five of its hubs worldwide, reducing its diplomatic presence from around 100 delegations to 18 hubs;

P. whereas in 2024, EU leaders agreed to cut EUR 2 billion from the EU’s external action budget in the multiannual financial framework for 2021-2027; whereas several Member States, such as France and Belgium, have also made cuts and reforms to their diplomacy services;

Q. whereas Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has proposed a new common instrument to boost military spending across the EU to unlock up to EUR 800 billion of additional defence spending over the coming years;

R. whereas even the military spending of the United States, which maintains over 700 military installations in over 70 countries, does not exceed 3.46 % of its GDP;

S. whereas, nevertheless, the US Government, certain Member States and NATO and Commission officials are pushing for a further massive increase in defence expenditure, from an average of 1.9 % of GDP to 5 %;

T. whereas even the military-oriented Niinisto Report, entitled ‘Safer Together –Strengthening Europe’s Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness’ highlights the fact that threats to the security of European citizens, including increasingly frequent and intense extreme weather events, such as megadroughts, floods and heatwaves, and the risk of new pandemics, would require massive investment in public services;

U. whereas while the Draghi report on the future of European competitiveness highlights the need for massive investment in a variety of sectors, including energy, pharmaceuticals and transport, the Commission has placed seven Member States under an excessive deficit procedure, pushing for harsh austerity and structural reforms in social and public expenses;

V. whereas a further massive increase in military expenditure will instead lead to cuts in public services, and in social, climate and environmental spending throughout Europe, endangering the social and human security of European citizens;

W. whereas the Commission is nonetheless considering the suspension of economic governance rules for military expenses;

X. whereas the Commission has failed to present a fully autonomous assessment of European defence needs and priorities, relying instead on NATO assessments of critical gaps in defence capability;

Y. whereas Türkiye, a NATO member, illegally occupies 37 % of Cyprus, an EU Member State;

Z. whereas in international relations theory the ‘security dilemma’ refers to a phenomenon whereby actions, such as arms procurement, taken by a state actor to increase its own security provokes reactions from other states, such as increased arms procurement or preventive attacks, that ultimately lead to a decrease rather than an increase in the original state’s security;

AA. whereas the 1975 Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, concluded in Helsinki between the United States, Canada, the Soviet Union and all of the countries of Europe, except Albania, played an important role in easing tensions between East and West during the Cold War;

AB. whereas the Cold War collective security acquis has been systematically undermined by the United States’ withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM), the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) and the Open Skies Treaty, systematically followed by Russian withdrawals, and by the Russian withdrawal from the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and from the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty;

AC. whereas a new European security architecture will have to apply the principles of peaceful coexistence between countries with different political systems and offer security guarantees to all parties in order to avoid Europe being divided once again into two diametrically opposed blocs;

Towards a European collective security architecture

1. Recalls that the Treaties consider the CSDP part of the CFSP; asks, therefore, that any defence initiative at EU level be subordinated to a clear foreign and security policy and strategy for peace on the European continent;

2. Rejects the militarisation of the EU and any belligerent objectives of the CSDP;

3. Notes with great concern the diminishing respect for international and humanitarian law by parties all around the world, with Israel, Russia and the United States being flagrant examples; reiterates the need for European independence in shaping foreign and defence policy;

4. Considers that in light of the United States’ past and ongoing violations of international law and the negative impact of US military interventions on neighbouring regions, the foreign, security and defence policy of the Union and Member States can no longer be aligned with the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO); calls, therefore, on the European Council to start the process of revising the EU Treaties to remove this requirement from the TEU;

5. Recalls that NATO and the EU are distinct organisations which serve very different purposes and whose membership is not even identical; regrets the conflation of NATO, a military alliance, with the EU;

6. Is extremely worried by the fact that there are still more than 13 000 nuclear weapons scattered around the world, many of which can be deployed within minutes and could cause the end of humankind; notes with concern that despite a stated commitment to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, NATO’s nuclear member states invested USD 271 billion in nuclear weapons modernisation and maintenance between 2019 and 2023, while in 2023 China and Russia were the second and third largest spenders, with budgets of USD 11.9 billion and USD 8.3 billion respectively;

7. Believes that NATO’s refusal to commit to a ‘no first use’ policy on nuclear weapons and the forward deployment of US nuclear weapons in Europe increases the risk of Europe becoming a target of nuclear strikes; demands, therefore, the withdrawal of US nuclear weapons from the territory of Member States; is deeply concerned about nuclear threats to European security, including veiled warnings about the use of tactical nuclear weapons and Russia’s lowering of its threshold for using nuclear weapons;

8. Urges the Member States to work on a new long-term collective security architecture for Europe inspired by the principles of the Helsinki process and including the concept of mutual security guarantees; notes that a fundamental aspect of such an approach is respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations and a commitment to international law;

9. Insists that a new European security architecture apply the principles of peaceful coexistence between countries with different political systems, and offer security guarantees to all parties;

10. Calls on the Commission, in light of multiple threats ranging from climate-related catastrophes to pandemics, to abandon a narrow focus on military security and develop a policy centred on human security as defined in United Nations General Assembly resolution 66/290, which states that ‘human security is an approach to assist Member States in identifying and addressing widespread and cross-cutting challenges to the survival, livelihood and dignity of their people’ and calls for ‘people-centred, comprehensive, context-specific and prevention-oriented responses that strengthen the protection and empowerment of all people’;

11. Calls on the Commission and Member States to seek inspiration from Austria, which has enshrined neutrality in its constitution, committing not to join military alliances and not to permit the establishment of any foreign military bases on its territory;

12. Calls on the Commission and Member States to also look to the example set by Ireland, with its tradition of military neutrality; recalls that this tradition includes an active approach towards peace support operations and crisis management, contributions to conflict resolution and peacebuilding, work for human rights and development, and efforts to promote disarmament and the elimination of weapons of mass destruction;

13. Regrets the attacks on Irish neutrality and recalls that the people of Ireland were guaranteed continued military neutrality, underpinned by a commitment to only undertake operations with a United Nations mandate, ahead of their ratification of the Lisbon Treaty;

14. Reiterates its call on Türkiye, a NATO member, to withdraw its troops from Cyprus, an EU Member State, and to work constructively towards finding a viable and peaceful solution based on the relevant UN resolutions;

15. Calls for unanimity voting on defence issues to be maintained within the Council to promote consensus-based solutions that foster much-needed unity;

Diplomacy as the cornerstone of European security

16. Believes that diplomacy should remain a cornerstone of EU foreign policy;

17. Recalls that conflict prevention is paramount to any security and defence strategy; underlines the fact that diplomacy prevents and ends wars, and that every euro invested in conflict prevention saves around EUR 16 later on;

18. Believes that, given the deteriorating security situation on several fronts and increasing geopolitical tensions, preventive diplomacy requires sustained and enhanced attention; calls, therefore, on the Commission and Member States to immediately reverse the cutbacks made to diplomatic representations;

19. Believes that its systematic alignment with US foreign policy, most recently with regard to Israeli war crimes, ethnic cleansing and genocidal practices against Palestinians, has dramatically reduced the EU’s global diplomatic credibility and therefore worsened its security situation;

20. Recalls that the participation of EU Member States in illegal military operations and the support for violations of international law abroad gravely endangers the security of EU citizens; urges the Commission and Member States to explore a non-aligned foreign and security policy stance based on the principles of the UN Charter, including peaceful conflict resolution, diplomacy and multilateralism;

21. Believes that Europe has much to gain from diversifying its relations and maintaining diplomatic connections with as many countries as possible around the world;

Arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation

22. Is deeply concerned that world military expenditure continues to rise to new record levels; highlights the fact that an arms race will not create security for European citizens, but instead, in line with the security dilemma, heighten the risk of violent conflict; calls on the Commission to actively promote new arms control treaties;

23. Recalls that the EU strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction made non-proliferation a central goal of the EU’s CFSP, stating that ‘our objective is to prevent, deter, halt and, where possible, eliminate proliferation of concern worldwide’; calls, therefore, on Member States to sign and ratify the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons;

24. Notes that arms exports, also of small and light weapons, can fuel conflict and global terrorism and destabilise entire regions, states and societies, thereby thwarting sustainable development and crisis management efforts; calls on the Commission and Member States to strictly apply Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008 defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment in order to avoid a worsening of the security situation in the EU’s immediate neighbourhood;

25. Calls for the creation of a Directorate-General for Disarmament and Arms Control at the Commission;

26. Demands an immediate arms embargo against Israel and any other country directly or indirectly involved in armed conflict, except in the case of those that are the victim of invasion by others, in order to stop EU complicity in war crimes, ethnic cleansing and genocidal practices, whether perpetrated by Israel or any other country; calls on the Commission and Member States to base their foreign and security policy on the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and international law;

Defence expenditure

27. Urges the Commission and Member States to offer full transparency and a critical audit of the current defence expenditure within the Union, detailing why it estimates that European countries would be unable to defend themselves with budgets already vastly superior to those of most of the world’s countries;

28. Notes with concern that the Commission has presented a new EUR 150 billion common defence fund; believes that an increase in defence spending is not the solution to finding a lasting peace and that cuts in the EU structural funds should not be used for this purpose, given how vital these funds are to the development of local communities across the EU;

29. Notes that the share of GDP is not an adequate measure for the efficiency and impact of defence expenditure; calls on the Commission and Member States not to enter an arms race through a massive increase in defence budgets at the expense of both human and social security;

30. Regards the NATO demand for complementarity and compatibility of European weapons systems with US systems as incompatible with European strategic autonomy; regrets that the Commission and the Council have failed to present a detailed assessment of European critical defence capability gaps; calls on both institutions to present such an assessment, including specific priorities, before considering increased defence expenditure; recalls that these should focus on defensive tasks, not on building capacities for military intervention all over the world;

31. Recalls Commission estimates that increased cooperation between Member States in the field of security and defence could save up to EUR 100 billion every year; calls, in this regard, for inspiration to be drawn from existing intra-European cooperation structures, such as BACA, the Belgian-Dutch Naval cooperation BeNeSam and the Nordic Defence Cooperation, including Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden, which have increased the efficiency of the participating nations’ national defence, and to explore common synergies and facilitate efficient common solutions;

32. Considers that the military cooperation commitments that may be assumed in collective security organisations should be considered in light of strict respect for the UN Charter;

33. Rejects the allocation of appropriations on the EU budget to the EU’s militarisation; calls for the reallocation of EU budget funds earmarked for the ongoing militarisation of the EU and its programmes to respond to the social and economic needs of citizens and promote cohesion between Member States;

34. Highlights the fact that there can be neither autonomy nor security without digital sovereignty; calls on the Commission to prioritise the development of a democratic, public-led digital stack that includes digital infrastructure as a service, and universal platforms, such as search engines and foundation AI models, governed by new public institutions with public and civil society representation;

35. Calls for heightened cooperation between Member States on sectoral issues of critical infrastructure protection, such as submarine cables;

Defence industry

36. Recalls that over the past three years, the EU has adopted a number of new initiatives on defence, and that the new Commissioner for Defence and Space believes that an additional investment of EUR 500 billion is needed in the coming decade, though other sources speak of EUR 700 billion;

37. Recalls that the previous EU programmes have been implemented with a lack of transparency with regard to the application of EU ethical guidelines, and that decision-making is extremely opaque and heavily influenced by arms industry lobbyists;

38. States that without ethics in investment choices, the EU will contribute to the creation of a more dangerous and lawless world order, where imperialist powers can disregard international law without facing consequences, while countries of the global south are exploited for their resources;

39. Calls, in addition, for the EU to adopt a policy of transparent, mission-oriented military spending, with more conscious spending at the service of a defined foreign policy to ensure greater efficiency;

40. Recalls that under Article 41(2) TEU expenditure arising from operations having military or defence implications may not be charged to the EU budget; calls for a strict application of this article; demands a retroactive review of corresponding defence funds and budget lines and for their termination where needed;

41. Expresses deep concern about the increased subsidies and public support for the military-industrial complex amid record total global military expenditure of USD 2 443 billion in 2023, making 2023 the ninth consecutive year in which military expenditure increased;

42. Demands that European public money go to European companies and emphasises that public European companies should, by definition, remain in Europe, while private companies can relocate their activities if they so wish;

43. Observes that leading arms companies have benefited shamelessly from the war in Ukraine; notes that Lockheed Martin alone distributed USD 6.8 billion of cash to shareholders in dividends and share repurchases in 2024; demands that windfall profits be taxed to finance climate adaptation, public health and housing, which are also components of a broader understanding of security;

44. Considers that the use of public money should systematically correspond to a proportional public return on investment and not finance corporate profit;

45. Stresses that focusing our resources, notably research and development spending, on the military sector will also slow down the development of other strategic industries with civilian purposes, such as renewable energy or pharmaceuticals;

46. Adds that military spending does not address any of the major social or environmental challenges, and that, worse still, it reinforces polluting and energy-consuming industrial models, thus increasing pressure on resources and the climate, particularly critical materials;

47. Believes that a massive increase in purchases of US-made goods would not only be detrimental to the European economy but would equally prolong Europe’s military dependence on the United States, while creating new industrial and technological constraints;

48. Demands that the defence industry continue to be excluded from qualifying for the sustainability criteria with regard to investment;

49. Calls for EIB financing to be strictly limited to civilian projects, excluding dual-use items;

Reprioritising public services and social spending

50. Is deeply concerned that militarisation, and specifically the ReArm Europe plan, is being used to further attack public services across the EU, which are already facing the suffocating effects of austerity measures imposed by the Commission;

51. Is appalled by the fact that the Commission is willing to bend fiscal rules such as the Stability and Growth Pact to finance military spending, but considers it impossible to raise spending to fund crumbling public services and support social and economic upward convergence in Member States;

52. Firmly insists that health, education, green mobility, climate adaptation, climate mitigation, biodiversity, food security and digital transition are elements of human security and should be considered priorities that require investments rather than budgetary cuts;

53. Calls, in line with the concept of human security, for a reprioritisation of public services and social welfare spending, as well as for investments in fighting climate change, as imperative prerequisites for guaranteeing that people live in a safe and secure environment;

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54. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the European External Action Service.

MIL OSI Europe News –

March 7, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – IMEC’s strategic importance and development challenges – E-000876/2025
Source: European Parliament
Question for written answer E-000876/2025
to the Commission
Rule 144
Afroditi Latinopoulou (PfE)

The India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) is a critical initiative to strengthen geo-economic connectivity between Asia, the Middle East and Europe, with the aim of diversifying trade routes and reducing the EU’s dependence on China and the Suez Canal.

The agreement to implement the corridor was signed at the G20 in 2023, with the participation of the EU and the US. The IMEC acts as a Western counterweight to China’s Belt and Road Initiative, which creates problems for European countries hosting Chinese strategic investments. The European Union must address the critical issues of political stability and financing for part of the project in order to ensure its sustainability.

In view of the above:

1.What measures has the Commission put in place to accelerate the implementation of the IMEC and the necessary port/railway infrastructure?

2.How does the Commission plan to protect the corridor from external crises, such as the blockade of the Red Sea by the Houthis?

3.Given the potential of the BRI in Europe and the strategic importance of the IMEC, how will the Commission ensure that the corridor does not become economically dependent on third powers, such as Türkiye or Iran, thereby strengthening the interests of European states?

Submitted: 27.2.2025
Last updated: 6 March 2025
MIL OSI Europe News –
March 7, 2025
MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: India’s AI Revolution
Source: Government of India (2)

India’s AI Revolution

A Roadmap to Viksit Bharat

Posted On: 06 MAR 2025 4:09PM by PIB Delhi

Introduction

India is undergoing a remarkable transformation in Artificial Intelligence, driven by the visionary leadership of PM Modi. For the first time in India’s history, the government is actively shaping an AI ecosystem where computing power, GPUs, and research opportunities are accessible at an affordable cost.

Unlike in the past, AI in India is no longer confined to a privileged few or dominated by global tech giants. Through forward-looking policies, the Modi government is empowering students, startups, and innovators with world-class AI infrastructure, fostering a truly level playing field. Initiatives such as the IndiaAI Mission and the establishment of Centres of Excellence for AI are strengthening the country’s AI ecosystem, paving the way for innovation and self-reliance in this critical sector.

These efforts align with the vision of Viksit Bharat by 2047, where India aspires to become a global AI powerhouse, leveraging cutting-edge technology for economic growth, governance, and societal progress.

AI Compute and Semiconductor Infrastructure

India is rapidly building a strong AI computing and semiconductor infrastructure to support its growing digital economy. With the approval of the IndiaAI Mission in 2024, the government allocated ₹10,300 crore over five years to strengthen AI capabilities. A key focus of this mission is the development of a high-end common computing facility equipped with 18,693 Graphics Processing Units (GPUs), making it one of the most extensive AI compute infrastructures globally. This capacity is nearly nine times that of the open-source AI model DeepSeek and about two-thirds of what ChatGPT operates on.

Here are the key developments:
- Scaling AI Compute Infrastructure: The initial phase of the mission has already made 10,000 GPUs available, with the remaining units to be added soon. This will enable the creation of indigenous AI solutions tailored to Indian languages and contexts.
- Opening Access to High-Performance Computing: India has also pioneered the launch of an open GPU marketplace, making high-performance computing accessible to startups, researchers, and students. Unlike many countries where AI infrastructure is controlled by large corporations, this initiative ensures that small players have an opportunity to innovate.
- Robust GPU Supply Chain: The government has selected 10 companies to supply the GPUs, ensuring a robust and diversified supply chain.
- Indigenous GPU Capabilities: To further strengthen domestic capabilities, India aims to develop its own GPU within the next three to five years, reducing reliance on imported technology.
- Affordable Compute Access: A new common compute facility will soon be launched, allowing researchers and startups to access GPU power at a highly subsidised rate of ₹100 per hour, compared to the global cost of $2.5 to $3 per hour.
- Strengthening Semiconductor Manufacturing: In parallel, India is advancing semiconductor manufacturing, with five semiconductor plants under construction. These developments will not only support AI innovation but also reinforce India’s position in the global electronics sector.
Advancing AI with Open Data and Centres of Excellence (CoE)

Recognising the importance of data in AI development, the Modi government has launched the IndiaAI Dataset Platform to provide seamless access to high-quality, non-personal datasets. This platform will house the largest collection of anonymised data, empowering Indian startups and researchers to develop advanced AI applications. By ensuring diverse and abundant datasets, this initiative will drive AI-driven solutions across key sectors, enhancing innovation and accuracy.
- IndiaAI Dataset Platform for Open Data Access: The platform will enable Indian startups and researchers to access a unified repository of high-quality, anonymised datasets, reducing barriers to AI innovation.
- Boosting AI Model Accuracy with Diverse Data: By providing large-scale, non-personal datasets, the initiative will help reduce biases and improve the reliability of AI applications across domains such as agriculture, weather forecasting, and traffic management.
- Centres of Excellence: The government has established three AI Centres of Excellence (CoE) in Healthcare, Agriculture, and Sustainable Cities in New Delhi. The Budget 2025 further announced a new CoE for AI in education with an outlay of ₹500 crore, making it the fourth such centre.
- Skilling for AI-Driven Industries: Plans are in place for five National Centres of Excellence for Skilling, which will equip youth with industry-relevant expertise. These centres will be set up in collaboration with global partners to support the ‘Make for India, Make for the World’ vision in manufacturing and AI innovation.
India’s AI Models & Language Technologies

The government is facilitating the development of India’s own foundational models, including Large Language Models (LLMs) and problem-specific AI solutions tailored to Indian needs. To foster AI research, multiple Centres of Excellence have also been set up.
- India’s Foundational Large Language Models: IndiaAI has launched an initiative to develop indigenous foundational AI models, including LLMs and Small Language Models (SLMs), through a call for proposals.
- Digital India BHASHINI: An AI-led language translation platform designed to enable easy access to the internet and digital services in Indian languages, including voice-based access, and support content creation in Indian languages.
- BharatGen: The world’s first government-funded multimodal LLM initiative, BharatGen was launched in 2024 in Delhi. It aims to enhance public service delivery and citizen engagement through foundational models in language, speech, and computer vision. BharatGen involves a consortium of AI researchers from premier academic institutions in India.
- Sarvam-1 AI Model: A large language model optimised for Indian languages, Sarvam-1 has 2 billion parameters and supports ten major Indian languages. It is designed for applications such as language translation, text summarisation, and content generation.
- Chitralekha: An open-source video transcreation platform developed by AI4Bhārat, Chitralekha enables users to generate and edit audio transcripts in various Indic languages.
- Hanooman’s Everest 1.0: A multilingual AI system developed by SML, Everest 1.0 supports 35 Indian languages, with plans to expand to 90.
AI Integration with Digital Public Infrastructure

India’s Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI) has redefined digital innovation by combining public funding with private sector-led innovation. Platforms like Aadhaar, UPI, and DigiLocker serve as the foundation, while private entities build application-specific solutions on top of them. This model is now being enhanced with AI, integrating intelligent solutions into financial and governance platforms. The global appeal of India’s DPI was evident at the G20 Summit, where several countries expressed interest in adopting similar frameworks. Japan’s patent grant to India’s UPI payment system further underscores its scalability.

For Mahakumbh 2025, AI-driven DPI solutions played a crucial role in managing the world’s largest human gathering. AI-powered tools monitored real-time railway passenger movement to optimise crowd dispersal in Prayagraj. The Bhashini-powered Kumbh Sah’AI’yak Chatbot enabled voice-based lost-and-found services, real-time translation, and multilingual assistance. Its integration with Indian Railways and UP Police streamlined communication, ensuring swift issue resolution. By leveraging AI with DPI, Mahakumbh 2025 set a global benchmark for tech-enabled, inclusive, and efficient event management.

AI Talent & Workforce Development

India’s workforce is at the heart of its digital revolution. The country is adding one Global Capability Center (GCC) every week, reinforcing its status as a preferred destination for global R&D and technological development. However, sustaining this growth will require continuous investment in education and skill development. The government is addressing this challenge by revamping university curricula to include AI, 5G, and semiconductor design, aligning with the National Education Policy (NEP) 2020. This ensures that graduates acquire job-ready skills, reducing the transition time between education and employment.
- AI Talent Pipeline & AI Education: Under the IndiaAI Future Skills initiative, AI education is being expanded across undergraduate, postgraduate, and Ph.D. programs. Fellowships are being provided to full-time Ph.D. scholars researching AI in the top 50 NIRF-ranked institutes. To enhance accessibility, Data and AI Labs are being established in Tier 2 and Tier 3 cities, with a model IndiaAI Data Lab already set up at NIELIT Delhi.
- India Ranks 1st in Global AI Skill Penetration: According to the Stanford AI Index 2024, India ranks first globally in AI skill penetration with a score of 2.8, ahead of the US (2.2) and Germany (1.9). AI talent concentration in India has grown by 263% since 2016, positioning the country as a major AI hub. India also leads in AI Skill Penetration for Women, with a score of 1.7, surpassing the US (1.2) and Israel (0.9).
- AI Innovation: India has emerged as the fastest-growing developer population globally and ranks second in public generative AI projects on GitHub. The country is home to 16% of the world’s AI talent, showcasing its growing influence in AI innovation and adoption.
- AI Talent Hubs: The India Skills Report 2024 by Wheebox forecasts that India’s AI industry will reach USD 28.8 billion by 2025, with a CAGR of 45%. The AI-skilled workforce has seen a 14-fold increase from 2016 to 2023, making India one of the top five fastest-growing AI talent hubs, alongside Singapore, Finland, Ireland, and Canada. The demand for AI professionals in India is projected to reach 1 million by 2026.
AI Adoption & Industry Growth

India’s Generative AI (GenAI) ecosystem has seen remarkable growth, even amid a global downturn. The country’s AI landscape is evolving from experimental use cases to scalable, production-ready solutions, reflecting its growing maturity.
- Businesses Prioritising AI Investments: According to BCG, 80% of Indian companies consider AI a core strategic priority, surpassing the global average of 75%. Additionally, 69% plan to increase their tech investments in 2025, with one-third allocating over USD 25 million to AI initiatives.
- GenAI Startup Funding: According to a November 2024 report by National Association of Software and Service Companies (NASSCOM), Indian GenAI startup funding surged over six times quarter-on-quarter, reaching USD 51 million in Q2FY2025, driven by B2B and agentic AI startups.
- AI Transforming Workplaces: The Randstad AI & Equity Report 2024 states that seven in 10 Indian employees used AI at work in 2024, up from five in 10 a year earlier, showcasing AI’s rapid integration into workplaces.
- AI Empowering Small & Medium Businesses (SMBs): AI-driven technologies, such as autonomous agents, are helping SMBs scale efficiently, personalise customer experiences, and optimise operations. According to Salesforce, 78% of Indian SMBs using AI reported revenue growth, while 93% stated AI has contributed to increased revenues.
- Rapid Expansion of India’s AI Economy: As per the BCG-NASSCOM Report 2024, India’s AI market is projected to grow at a CAGR of 25-35%, reinforcing its potential for innovation and job creation. While AI automates routine tasks, it is simultaneously generating new opportunities in data science, machine learning, and AI-driven applications.
- AI Startup Support Ecosystem: India hosts 520+ tech incubators and accelerators, ranking third globally in active programs. 42% of these were established in the past five years, catering to the evolving needs of Indian startups. AI-focused accelerators like T-Hub MATH provide crucial mentorship in product development, business strategy, and scaling. In early 2024, MATH supported over 60 startups, with five actively discussing funding, highlighting India’s growing AI startup landscape.
A Pragmatic AI Regulation Approach

India’s pragmatic AI regulation balances innovation and accountability, steering clear of overregulation that could stifle growth and unchecked market-driven governance that may create monopolies. Instead of relying solely on legislation, India is investing in AI-driven safeguards, funding top universities and IITs to develop solutions for deep fakes, privacy risks, and cybersecurity threats. This techno-legal approach ensures AI remains a force for inclusive growth, fostering an ecosystem where innovation thrives while ethical concerns are proactively addressed.

Conclusion

India’s rapid advancements in artificial intelligence, underpinned by strategic government initiatives, have positioned the country as a global AI powerhouse. By expanding AI compute infrastructure, fostering indigenous AI models, enhancing digital public infrastructure, and investing in talent development, India is creating an inclusive and innovation-driven ecosystem. The emphasis on open data, affordable access to high-performance computing, and AI-driven solutions tailored to local needs ensures that the benefits of AI reach businesses, researchers, and citizens alike. As AI adoption accelerates across industries, India’s proactive approach is not only strengthening its digital economy but also paving the way for self-reliance in critical technologies. With a clear vision for the future, India is set to become a leader in AI innovation, shaping the global AI landscape in the years to come.

Source: Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology

Click to see in PDF

***

Santosh Kumar/ Ritu Kataria/ Saurabh Kalia

(Release ID: 2108810) Visitor Counter : 108

MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –
March 7, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: Turkish national arrested for allegedly selling counterfeit goods at mall kiosks

Source: Office of United States Attorneys

DAYTON, Ohio – A man who operates kiosks at a local mall was arrested today by federal agents for allegedly trafficking counterfeit goods.

Emre Teski, 25, is a citizen of Turkey and illegally entered the United States of America from Mexico on September 10, 2022. Teski admitted to illegally crossing the international boundary without being inspected by an immigration officer at a designated Port of Entry. On January 3, 2024, Teski was ordered removed from the United States, but has since appealed this decision and was permitted employment authorization while his appeal is pending. Teski operates kiosks selling counterfeit goods at the Mall at Fairfield Commons in Beavercreek.

According to charging documents, Teski ran one kiosk that primarily sold replica professional soccer jerseys and hats containing trademarked soccer teams, including FC Barcelona, Club Internacional de Fútbol Miami, Manchester City and Arsenal. Teski operated another kiosk that sold primarily oversized slippers that look like sneakers and included Nike and Air Jordan trademarks.

Teski allegedly sold an investigator counterfeit Nike slippers that illegally used the trademark Nike Swoosh. It is alleged that he also sold a counterfeit pink Messi jersey.

Agents executed a search warrant at the kiosks today and seized numerous items containing confirmed or suspected counterfeit trademarks.

Trafficking counterfeit goods is a federal crime punishable by up to 10 years in prison.

Kelly A. Norris, Acting United States Attorney for the Southern District of Ohio; and Jared Murphey, Acting Special Agent in Charge, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s (ICE) Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) Detroit; announced the charges. Assistant United States Attorney Ryan A. Saunders is representing the United States in this case.

A criminal complaint merely contains allegations, and defendants are presumed innocent unless proven guilty in a court of law.

# # #

MIL Security OSI –

March 7, 2025
MIL-OSI Video: Afghanistan, Ukraine & other topics – Daily Press Briefing

Source: United Nations (Video News)

Noon Briefing by Stéphane Dujarric, Spokesperson for the Secretary-General.

Highlights:
– Central Emergency Response Fund
– Afghanistan
– Ukraine
– Democratic Republic of the Congo
– Occupied Palestinian Territory
– Yemen/Security Council
– Mexico
– Financial Contributions

CENTRAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE FUND
With global humanitarian funding being scaled back precipitously, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs announced today that $110 million has been allocated from the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF).
The aim is to boost life-saving assistance in 10 of the world’s most underfunded and neglected crises across Africa, Asia and Latin America.
OCHA warns that more than 300 million people around the world urgently need humanitarian aid, but funding has been dwindling annually, with this year’s levels projected to drop to a record low.
Tom Fletcher, the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, said that for countries battered by conflict, climate change and economic turmoil, brutal funding cuts don’t mean that humanitarian needs disappear.
The new funding will go towards Afghanistan, the Central African Republic, Chad, Honduras, Mauritania, Niger, Somalia, Sudan, Venezuela and Zambia.
Resources will also support vulnerable people from climate shocks.

AFGHANISTAN
And turning to Afghanistan, OCHA is warning that the country continues to face a severe humanitarian crisis defined by decades of conflict, entrenched poverty, climate-induced shocks and rising protection risks, especially for women and girls.
More than half of the population – almost 23 million people – are in need of humanitarian assistance in the country. This number is one of the highest globally, second only to Sudan – where 30 million people currently need aid and protection.
Both food insecurity and malnutrition remain stubbornly high.
During the first quarter of this year, nearly 15 million people – one in every three Afghans – will experience high levels of acute food insecurity. This is according to the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification, or IPC.
Nearly 3.5 million children under 5 and more than 1 million pregnant and breastfeeding women are expected to become acutely malnourished.
Explosive hazards continue to pose a lethal threat, with an estimated 55 people killed or injured every month – most of them children.

Full Highlights: https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/noon-briefing-highlight?date%5Bvalue%5D%5Bdate%5D=06%20March%202025

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EP_F6noLmbw

MIL OSI Video –

March 7, 2025
MIL-OSI Video: Pledge to Climate, Peace and Security on Yemen – Security Council Media Stakeout | United Nations

Source: United Nations (Video News)

Joint statement of the Security Council members signatories of the Joint Pledges related to Climate, Peace and Security on Yemen read by Ambassador Christina Markus Lassen, PR of Denmark. Other participants – Slovenia, Guyana, Republic of Korea, Panama, Greece, United Kingdom, Sierra Leone, France.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Mt_A-7c0wnM

MIL OSI Video –

March 7, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Kaine & Cornyn Introduce Bipartisan Bill to Strengthen Security, Combat Corruption and Drug Trafficking in the Caribbean
US Senate News:
Source: United States Senator for Virginia Tim Kaine

WASHINGTON, D.C. – Today, U.S. Senator Tim Kaine (D-VA), Ranking Member of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, and U.S. Senator John Cornyn (R-TX), a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, introduced the Caribbean Basin Security Authorization Act, bipartisan legislation to improve security cooperation, combat drug trafficking, strengthen the rule of law, counter malign influence from China and Russia, and expand natural disaster resilience in the Caribbean region.

“What happens in the Caribbean affects the security and economic prosperity of the United States,” said Kaine. “This bipartisan legislation is critical to promoting stability, countering China’s growing influence, and combating drug cartel activity in the region. Not only will I continue to urge the Administration to carry out the foreign assistance investments that Congress has previously voted to fund, I will continue to push for legislation like this one to work with our partners to protect our national security.”

The Caribbean Basin Security Authorization Act would boost support for the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI), a foreign assistance program that began in 2009 and includes Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Dominica, the Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, and Trinidad, and Tobago. Specifically, the legislation would:
- Authorize funding between Fiscal Years 2025-2029 for CBSI to promote citizen safety, security, and rule of law; prioritize efforts to combat corruption; counter malign influence from the China, Russia, Iran, and other authoritarian regimes; and promote strategic engagement, including consultation with civil society and the private sector.
- Require the Secretary of State, in consultation with the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, and the Inter-American Foundation, to promote efforts to improve disaster response and resilience.
- Require the Secretary of State, in consultation with USAID, to submit an implementation plan for CBSI within 180 days of enactment.
- Encourage increased law enforcement collaboration between CBSI beneficiaries and Haiti – a country that is on the brink of collapse.
- Promote greater U.S. interagency cooperation in implementing CBSI.
Full text of the bill is available here.
MIL OSI USA News –
March 7, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: €10 million EIB Global and WHO initiative to strengthen public health across Lebanon
Source: European Investment Bank

EIB
- The European Investment Bank and the World Health Organization signed the agreement today at the EIB Group Forum in Luxembourg
- Lebanon’s health system is under significant economic and financial strain.
- The donor-funded initiative will re-establish Lebanon’s Central Public Health Laboratory and prioritise medication provision and healthcare support to over 50,000 people with chronic diseases like diabetes, cardiovascular issues, and cancer.
The European Investment Bank (EIB Global) and the World Health Organization (WHO) have formally launched a €10 million grant support to boost health resilience across Lebanon, including combating medicine scarcity and fragmented laboratory services.

The cooperation was signed at the EIB Forum in Luxembourg by WHO Director-General Dr Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus and EIB Vice President Thomas Östros and will support the re-establishment of the Central Public Health Laboratory in Lebanon crucial for enhancing the detection capacity for emerging infectious diseases. It will test for emergency infectious diseases, promptly confirming potential pathogens to prevent outbreaks, which will be especially relevant among vulnerable displaced populations and refugees. The CPHL will also test all blood donations to ensure safe transfusions.

Today’s agreement will also unlock provision of essential medicines and expert support to primary healthcare centres across Lebanon. This will enable public healthcare centres to restore services, including reproductive health and prevention of gender-based violence, addressing specific gender gaps in services.

EIB Group President Nadia Calviño said, “Strategic partnerships and win-win solutions are more important than ever in these challenging times. This important European Union financing for Lebanon’s public health system is also the fruit of our good cooperation with our fellow multilateral institutions and the excellent partnership with the World Health Organisation whose expertise on the ground is vital to deliver projects like this one.”

WHO Director-General, Dr Tedros said: “This initiative comes at a critical time for Lebanon and will make a real difference in strengthening Lebanon’s capacity to detect and respond rapidly to health emergencies, and in expanding access to lifesaving medicines. It’s a perfect example of the impact that WHO, EIB and other multilateral development banks aim to have around the world through the Health Impact Investment Platform.”

“We are grateful for the EIB and WHO’s support for Lebanon’s health sector. This initiative will help us address critical needs, improve the quality of care, and build a more resilient health system for people living across Lebanon,” said Ambassador of Lebanon to Belgium and Luxembourg Fadi Hajali.

“This joint initiative by the European Investment Bank and implemented by WHO is a crucial step towards strengthening Lebanon’s health system and ensuring that vital services reach the most vulnerable. By supporting the re-establishment of the central public health laboratory and bolstering primary healthcare centres, we are addressing immediate needs and building long-term resilience. This initiative is a prime example of the Team Europe approach, aligning with the European Union’s priorities in Lebanon and complementing our existing support for the health sector, particularly in ensuring access to essential medicines,” said Sandra De Waele, Ambassador of the European Union to Lebanon.

The grant is provided by the donor-financed EIB’s Economic Resilience Initiative (ERI) Fund, supported by EU member states

This project in Lebanon builds on previous projects co-managed by WHO and the EIB in Palestine, Rwanda and Angola. It paves the way for the operational launch of the Health Investment Platform- a unique financing approach that has seen several multilateral development banks, including the Islamic Development Bank and African Development Bank join the EIB and WHO to provide a targeted and strategic approach to primary health care financing.

Lebanon’s health system is under significant strain due to a severe economic and financial collapse, compounded by multiple crises, including conflict in southern Lebanon, the Beirut port explosion, the Syrian conflict and a cholera epidemic. Humanitarian challenges continue to escalate, making the population increasingly vulnerable.

The initiative will prioritise medication provision and healthcare support, including supporting over 50,000 people with chronic diseases like diabetes, cardiovascular issues, and cancer. Vulnerable populations, including those affected by the current conflict, Syrian refugees, and others will benefit from this initiative. Lebanon hosts approximately 1.5 million Syrian refugees and around 200,000 Palestinian refugees, constituting about one-third of the total Lebanese population. In addition, in 2025, the number of displaced people within Lebanon has risen to over 950,000.

The initiative will be implemented by the World Health Organization and is fully endorsed by the Lebanese Ministry of Public Health. The initiative will contribute to the Ministry of Public Health’s strategy to strengthen the health services among vulnerable populations, including those affected by the current conflict.

Background information

About EIB Global

The European Investment Bank (ElB) is the long-term lending institution of the European Union, owned by its Member States. It finances investments that contribute to EU policy objectives.

EIB Global is the EIB Group’s specialised arm devoted to increasing the impact of international partnerships and development finance, and a key partner of Global Gateway. We aim to support €100 billion of investment by the end of 2027 — around one-third of the overall target of this EU initiative. Within Team Europe, EIB Global fosters strong, focused partnerships alongside fellow development finance institutions and civil society. EIB Global brings the EIB Group closer to people, companies and institutions through our offices across the world.

About the Economic Resilience Initiative (ERI) Fund

The Economic Resilience Initiative (ERI) Fund, which backs this grant, was established by the EIB in 2017 to channel donors resources to impactful projects in the Southern Neighbourhood and Western Balkans to address the challenges posed by forced displacement and migration. The ERI Fund donors are Bulgaria, Croatia, Italy, Luxembourg, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Poland, and the United Kingdom.

Lebanon WHO Health Resilience Initiative
€10 million EIB Global and WHO initiative to strengthen public health across Lebanon
©EIB
Download original

Lebanon WHO Health Resilience Initiative
€10 million EIB Global and WHO initiative to strengthen public health across Lebanon
©EIB
Download original
MIL OSI Europe News –
March 7, 2025
MIL-Evening Report: ‘Orgasms are a marvellous happiness’. Shere Hite gave voice to female sexuality in a landmark book – but the backlash was fierce

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Camilla Nelson, Associate Professor in Media and Journalism, University of Notre Dame Australia

Owen Franken/Corbis via Getty Images

In our feminist classics series we revisit influential works.

Shere Hite’s The Hite Report was quickly dubbed a “sexual revolution in 600 pages”. It did something nobody had considered worth doing: investigating women’s sexuality by asking them to share their thoughts and feelings, then relaying those reflections to readers in women’s own words.

This might not sound unusual today. But in 1976, it was incendiary.

Based on a survey of 3,000 women distributed by the New York Chapter of the National Organisation for Women (the feminist group co-founded by Betty Friedan), more than 75% of the book comprises narrative responses to open ended survey questions.

It includes a plethora of startlingly frank – for its time – and explicitly detailed opinions, anecdotes, complaints and criticisms about sex, masturbation and orgasm. The book is an extraordinarily rich cultural artefact in the archive of human intimacy.

Unsurprisingly, the women who responded to Hite’s survey thoroughly enjoyed sex. “Orgasm is the ultimate pleasure – which women often deny themselves, but men never do,” claimed one. “Orgasms are a marvellous happiness”, added another. “Orgasm cancels out rage and longing for at least 48 hours,” said yet another.

But it was the manner in which Hite’s respondents got their orgasms that made the book a scandal. “I think masturbation is essential to one’s health,” said one respondent. “[A]s I learned in my marriage – a partner is not always good sexually, though he may be wonderful in other ways.”

Masturbation is better than “bad sex with an incompatible partner”, explained another respondent. “The only way I can have an orgasm is by masturbating,” said another.

‘A complex nature’

The Hite Report did not attempt to define a sexual norm, or produce a representative survey sample, or pretend its data could be generalised to an entire population. But it did contain some statistical findings.

The most significant of these – the source of the book’s notoriety – was that only 30% of women surveyed reported being able to regularly or reliably reach orgasm through heterosexual intercourse. And yet, 80% reported they could easily and regularly reach orgasm through clitoral stimulation, which was frequently obtained through masturbation, either alone, or with their partner.

In her preface Hite argued that the canonical sexological works of the past 100 years – including the works of Sigmund Freud, Alfred Kinsey, and William Masters and Virginia Johnson – had constructed female sexuality “as essentially a response to male sexuality and intercourse”. She set out to demonstrate that “female sexuality might have a complex nature of its own”.

Hite argued sex was a cultural institution, not a biological one. Historically, men had defined sex in terms of their own needs and preferences, then mandated their preferences as biological.

Freud, for example, knew female orgasm could be reliably obtained through clitoral stimulation, but defined clitoral orgasm as an “immature orgasm” and orgasm arising from heterosexual intercourse as a “mature orgasm”. He then labelled women who could not achieve orgasm in the required way “frigid” and “hysterical”.

The Hite Report is organised into eight chapters or themes, starting with “Masturbation”, followed by “Orgasm”, “Intercourse”, “Clitoral Stimulation”, “Lesbianism”, “Sexual Slavery”, “The Sexual Revolution” and “Older Women”. In a concluding chapter, Hite reflects on the issues raised by survey participants.

In the chapter “Lesbianism”, a significant number of heterosexual-identified women confess same sex attraction, or else identify as bisexual. They also describe lesbian sexuality as “more variable”, and the “physical actions more mutual”.

“The basic difference with a woman is that there’s no end,” claimed one respondent, “[…] it’s like a circle, it goes on and on.”

“Lesbianism” sits in stark contrast to the chapter on “Sexual Slavery”, where Hite seeks to investigate why women pursue unequal sexual relationships, especially where respondents claim to receive little or no sexual pleasure.

“Having a man love me and want to have sex with me is necessary to my happiness,” claimed one respondent. “Sex makes me feel I am a woman to my husband instead of just a live-in maid,” added another.

“I’ve never heard a word of praise from my husband in 21 years except while having intercourse,” claimed yet another. “While I resent this, I still love him […] ”

Wildly successful

Many women applauded the book. Author Erica Jong, writing in The New York Times, called it a “revelation”. Others warned of a possible male backlash. “It seems that women are finally reporting the facts of their own sex,” wrote journalist Ellen Willis in the Washington Post, “and men are putting on the earmuffs of fear and retreating to deeper fantasies.”

This backlash was not long in coming. Playboy apocryphally dubbed it “The Hate Report”, a label regularly recycled in media outlets around the world, including by female journalists. One male journalist, writing in the Miami Herald, argued women could not be regarded as truthful or reliable witnesses to their own lives. “What annoys me about The Hite Report,” he wrote, “is its smug assumption that just because women made these comments, they’re true”.

Despite – or perhaps because of – this controversy, the book was wildly successful. It was translated into ten different languages – including French, Spanish, German, Italian, Hebrew and Japanese – and sold over 2 million copies within the first 12 months.

It remains the 30th bestselling book of all time, with 50 million copies sold in 45 countries, including two recently translated editions in China, where it sparked conversations among intellectuals interested in formerly taboo western culture.

Faking orgasms

Born in smalltown Missouri, Hite gained a masters degree in social history and in 1967 moved to New York to enrol in a PhD program at Columbia University. She left when conservative faculty members refused to allow her to complete her dissertation on female sexuality. Hite worked as a model to pay her tuition fees. She joined the National Organisation for Women when they protested the sexism of the Olivetti advertising campaigns, after Hite was cast as an “Olivetti girl” for the typewriter company.

Increasingly tagged as a “man-basher” after the publication of her book, Hite’s public persona was conventionally, almost theatrically feminine. She revelled in a contemporary Baroque aesthetic; a mirage of red lipstick, froufrou dresses, pancake-style makeup and tousled orange or platinum curls. And she spoke about sex in explicit detail, in a voice that was earnest, articulate and unembarrassed.

Hite did not “discover” the clitoral orgasm. Instead, by centring women’s experiences, and taking their reflections seriously, her work threw into question centuries of sexological studies. These studies had either pathologised normal female sexual functioning or else insisted any pleasure women derived from sex had to be a by-product of conventional heterosexual intercourse.

Even Masters and Johnson, who, in their reports from 1966 onwards, clinically proved all female orgasms were the result of clitoral stimulation, had insisted on the centrality of coitus.

As Hite told television show host Geraldo in 1977,

Masters and Johnson made a tremendous step forward in that they studied, and showed clinically, for the first time, that all orgasms are caused by clitoral stimulation, and we really have them to thank for that. However, when they described how it’s done – the thrusting of the penis causes the vaginal lips to move, which causes the skin that’s connected to the clitoris to move, which causes the glands to move over the clitoris, which supposedly gives you orgasm. But that doesn’t work for most women.

And yet, although the participants in Hite’s study were overwhelmingly educated and politically progressive, many confessed they felt compelled to fake an orgasm during intercourse to please a man.

“I ‘perform’ and boost his ego and confidence,” claimed one. “I do not like to think of myself as a performer but I feel judged and also judge myself when I don’t have an orgasm.” “[M]en do expect it, so I often force myself […],” said another.

Participants also claimed how a woman was seen to orgasm mattered. “I don’t show the signs you’re supposed to,” worried one. “They think because I don’t pant, scream and claw I haven’t had one,” said another. “I used to go out of my way to offer all the mythical Hollywood signs,” revealed another.

One participant even suggested the whole issue of sex was so politically fraught that, “Maybe sex would be better if we’d never heard of orgasm”.

Respondents also told Hite the “sexual revolution” of the 1960s and 1970s had intensified, rather than reduced, gender prejudices and double standards.

Sexual violence

Another breathtaking aspect of the book is the way participants’ answers are shot through with sexual violence. On the issue of sexual coercion, for example, one participant replied, “I’m not supposed to say ‘no’ since I’m legally married”.

On a question about the use of force in sex, another replied, “Only with my husband.” (In 1976, marital rape was legal and “acceptable” in most western nations.)

Rape myths are also common. “I define as rape someone you don’t know who attacks you,” said one respondent. “I never defined it as […] someone you know. If you define rape that way, every woman has been raped over and over.”

Another suggested rape wasn’t rape if a victim gave up fighting. “He really raped me, but not in the legal way. I couldn’t prevent him, in other words.”

Hite identified toxic gender stereotypes as the major driver of sexual violence, especially the belief that “a man’s need for ‘sex’ is a strong and urgent ‘drive’” which women were obligated to satisfy. “Women aren’t always free to not have sex,” explained one respondent.

Archival insights

The Hite archive is housed in the Schlesinger Library of the Radcliffe Institute at Harvard University. It comprises over 250 filing boxes and folios, occupying more than 30 metres of shelf space. Most of the material relates to Hite’s public career as a sex researcher, with a small scattering of personal papers.

I was at Harvard doing research for a book on Hite’s contemporary Andrea Dworkin. Although the two feminists exist as polar opposites in the public imagination, they thoroughly agreed with one another, and enjoyed a supportive working relationship. And so I wanted to take a look.

Among the publishing agreements, speaking invitations, publicity material and the copies of the edited and revised questionnaires that formed the basis of the 1976 report – which are printed in vermillion – an occasional note flips out.

One, a seemingly unpublished open letter titled “Dear Women”, bears the traces of the intense, frequently misogynistic and overtly hostile media scrutiny that marked Hite’s wild catapult to fame.

“Sometimes I feel I am dying here in the midst of all this,” she writes, “without the support of anyone”.

Another, scrawled in a flamboyant purple felt tip pen in the midst of her 1977 book tour of France, reads, “I know that I have done something good – but somehow I feel evil […] When did that start?”

There are also letters from readers. One, sent from Milan in the wake of the controversy that accompanied the Italian edition of the book, bears the typewritten subject line “Personal”. It reads:

Dear Ms Hite,
I am 43 years old and have never written a fan letter in my life until today. But I feel a moral obligation to tell you that your ‘Report’ has rehabilitated me in my own eyes. After years of thinking there was something wrong with me, your book has shown me I’m normal.

Hite’s “Dear Women” letter describes the extraordinary challenges, including the financial challenges, she faced both before and after the book was published.

Macmillan, after purchasing the rights to the book, went cold on the project when the commissioning editor resigned or, as Hite phrases it, “quit/was fired depending on your point of view”. The publisher made no plan to promote the book and assigned a 22-year-old man to answer any media queries.

Hite decided to step in, when, working in the publisher’s offices late one evening, she found a letter from her male publicist declining an invitation to discuss The Hite Report on TV as “he thought my book/subject might be too ‘ticklish’ for television”.

Hite’s contract with Macmillan gave her little or no control over international editions of the book (and severely limited the income she could take from royalties, before it was ruled unconscionable by a court). In 1978, she “flew around the world twice” attempting to stop the book from being sensationalised.

In France, the publisher had promised Hite a plain print cover, but was overruled by an all-male advertising department who “printed a cover with a nude woman”. In the second printing, the publisher agreed to revert to plain text.

In Israel, entire sections of the first edition text were censored. Protests by local journalists led to the publisher engaging an Israeli feminist to re-translate the work.

In Japan, the male translator produced a translation that was “so embarrassed and vague that it made absolutely no sense”. But on this occasion, a sympathetic female editor stepped in to rewrite entire sections of the manuscript.

Hite’s Australian reception ranked among the most hostile. Her research assistant described the trip as “hideous”, alleging Hite had “never before encountered” such “vicious attitudes” as those exhibited by male journalists.

Hite’s research assistant revealed in a separate letter that Hite’s doctors had “absolutely forbid her to do anything but rest for the next few months” after the Australian trip.

Later life

In her preface, Hite writes that she hoped to start a conversation through which men and women might “begin to devise more kind, generous, and personal ways of relating”.

Sadly, this was not what happened. Hite went on to release four major reports on human sexuality, including a report on male sexuality, one on women and love, and one on the family. Then in 1996, she revoked her US citizenship and moved to Germany, saying the media’s hostility towards her made it impossible to continue working.

Living in Germany, and later in Paris and London, she published her autobiography, The Hite Report on Shere Hite, and The Hite Reader, containing a selection of her published work. She died in 2020, aged 77.

What marks the Hite Report as an artefact from another era is less the peculiar patois of the “Age of Aquarius”, than the way in which Hite’s respondents so often defined their identities through their husband’s, whether as a wife, former wife, or woman destined to be a wife. “Wifedom” is the default state.

Equally, what makes the book disturbing, is the reality of sexual violence and coercion that lurks in so many answers, even when respondents are not being questioned about violence or coercion directly.

With shocked recognition, the reader realises society has not changed nearly as much as some would like to think. The fact it has changed at all is partly due to the second sexual revolution ignited by Hite’s work.

Camilla Nelson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. ‘Orgasms are a marvellous happiness’. Shere Hite gave voice to female sexuality in a landmark book – but the backlash was fierce – https://theconversation.com/orgasms-are-a-marvellous-happiness-shere-hite-gave-voice-to-female-sexuality-in-a-landmark-book-but-the-backlash-was-fierce-246150

MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

March 7, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Crapo Reintroduces Legislation to Preserve Idaho’s 190th Fighter Squadron

US Senate News:

Source: United States Senator for Idaho Mike Crapo
Washington, D.C.–Since 1991, the U.S. Air Force fighter fleet has been severely reduced. U.S. Senators Mike Crapo (R-Idaho) and John Hickenlooper (D-Colorado) reintroduced the Fighter Force Preservation and Recapitalization Act, S. 873, to preserve U.S. Air Force (USAF) fighter force structure and prioritize the recapitalization of the 39 service-retained, combat-coded fighter squadrons available to the U.S. Secretary of Defense to respond globally to world events.
“Highly-trained, experienced and prepared forces are a key component of our country’s national defense,” said Crapo. “Closures of fighter squadrons within the U.S. Air Force’s Reserve component mean a permanent loss of these experienced pilot and maintainers. We must preserve and protect National Guard fighter squadrons, like the Idaho Air National Guard’s 190th Fighter Squadron, from force reductions that could harm our national security. This is a critical priority as we continue to face threats from foreign adversaries like Russia, China and Iran.”
“A strategy for the future of our Air National Guard fighter fleets strengthens our national security,” said Hickenlooper. “Our bipartisan bill directs the Air Force to update all National Guard fighter squadrons, including the Buckley-based 140th Wing, in order to preserve their flying missions and retain their experienced pilots.”
“Passage of the Fighter Force Preservation and Recapitalization Act of 2025 is crucial to ensuring our Air Force remains ready and lethal,” said Major General Tim Donnellan, Adjutant General of Idaho and Commander of the Idaho National Guard. “The Idaho Air National Guard’s 190th Fighter Squadron has a long history of operational excellence, and sustaining its capabilities and the expertise of its pilots is vital to protecting and defending America and its interests. As threats continue to evolve, maintaining a modernized and fully equipped fighter fleet is critical to preventing conflict and winning wars. We appreciate the continued support of our leaders in Congress who recognize the indispensable role the Air National Guard plays in delivering security around the globe.”
“Air National Guard fighter wings operate at 1/3rd the cost of their active-duty counterparts but still provide the same ‘fight-tonight’ capability,” said Major General Laura Clellan, Adjutant General of Colorado. “By acting as a retention net for talent exiting active duty and serving as a cost-effective model to both develop and retain fighter pilots, the Air National Guard presents the nation with an unrivaled value proposition. Throw in the secondary uses of Air Guardsman domestically such as wildfire mitigation, homeland airspace defense, and manpower for civil support all for a fraction of the cost of an active-duty Wing; the Air Guard’s value proposition truly is unparallelled. By providing 30% of the fighter force, for 1/3rd the cost, Air National Guard fighter wings operate as a shining example of efficient and effective use of taxpayer dollars. It’s simple, we provide more for less, without sacrificing capability.”
“Our ability to fight and win the wars of the future will require robust combat air power,” said Major General Francis McGinn (Ret.), National Guard Association of the United States President. “The Air National Guard is a critical part of that equation, making up 30 percent of USAF combat air power with only 7 percent of the total Air Force budget. The Fighter Force Preservation and Recapitalization Act will ensure the Air National Guard, the USAF reserve, and the active component have the modernized fleet they need to deter and deny our enemies. I thank Sen. Crapo, Sen. Hickenlooper, and their colleagues for their continued support of our the National Guard community.”
Idaho’s 190th Fighter Squadron has deployed frequently, supporting combat operations across Southwest Asia. Notable missions include its largest deployments, which occurred in 2020 in support of Operation Freedom’s Sentinel and in 2016 in support of Operation Inherent Resolve, as well as past support for Operations Enduring Freedom (2008), Iraqi Freedom (2007, 2003) and Southern Watch (2003). The unit is set to deploy again in 2025.
Crapo and Hickenlooper led introduction of the bill in the 118th Congress. The Fiscal Year 2025 National Defense Authorization Act contained a portion of the previous version of the Fighter Force Preservation and Recapitalization Act that requires the U.S. Air Force to develop a plan to sustain and recapitalize fighter fleets for the Air National Guard.
Of the 25 ANG Fighter Squadrons in existence today, 15 do not have a recapitalization or modernization plan to replace retiring legacy fighters. The Fighter Force Preservation and Recapitalization Act would:
Raise the minimum number of fighters in the Air Force inventory, requiring nearly two-thirds of aircraft to be combat capable;
Establish a robust reporter requirement to track Air Force Fighter force structure, giving Congress oversight authority of force structure modifications;
Prioritize recapitalization of Active Duty, Reserve and ANG units that are “service-retained” (i.e. not assigned to combatant commander) to maximize fighter assets; and
Require a report on recapitalization of ANG fighter squadrons.
Senators Jim Risch (R-Idaho), Mark Kelly (D-Arizona), Jim Banks (R-Indiana), Elissa Slotkin (D-Michigan), Rick Scott (R-Florida), Gary Peters (D-Michigan), Todd Young (R-Indiana), Angela Alsobrooks (D-Maryland), Ted Cruz (R-Texas), Chris Van Hollen (D-Maryland), Amy Klobuchar (D-Minnesota), Michael Bennet (D-Colorado), Alex Padilla (D-California), Tina Smith (D-Minnesota) and Ruben Gallego (D-Arizona) joined as original co-sponsors.
Representatives Don Bacon (R-Nebraska) and Jason Crow (D-Colorado) are leading identical companion legislation in the U.S. House of Representatives.
The Fighter Force Preservation and Recapitalization Act is supported by the National Guard Association of the Untied States (NGAUS) and the Enlisted Association of the National Guard of the United States (EANGUS).
Bill text available HERE.

MIL OSI USA News –

March 7, 2025
MIL-OSI United Nations: Yemen: ‘Fear of a return to full conflict is palpable’, says UN envoy

Source: United Nations 2

6 March 2025 Peace and Security

After several years of fragile truce, there is a “palpable” fear of a return to all-out war in Yemen, said Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen Hans Grundberg on Thursday, briefing the Security Council.

The “current trajectory is deeply concerning,” he told ambassadors, updating them on the latest political developments in the country, where Houthi rebels – formally known as Ansar Allah – have been battling Government forces backed by a Saudi-led coalition, for more than a decade.

He spoke alongside UN Emergency Relief Coordinator Tom Fletcher who updated on the recent humanitarian constraints and emphasised the impact of the worsening situation facing women in the country.

Recent developments

While a resumption of large-scale ground operations in Yemen has not occurred since the UN-mediated truce of April 2022, military activity continues – and the cessation of hostilities is increasingly at risk.

“We have seen a rise in rhetoric from the parties to the conflict, pre-positioning themselves publicly for military confrontation,” explained Mr. Grundberg.

“We must not allow this to happen. Words matter. Intent matters. Signals matter. Mixed messaging and escalatory discourse can have real impacts,” he underscored.

The Special Envoy described recent reports of shelling, drone attacks, infiltration attempts and mobilisation campaigns recently witnessed in Ma’rib as well as in other areas such as Al Jawf, Shabwa and Ta’iz.

He also deplored the Houthis’ arbitrary detention of UN personnel and workers from other organizations – some for years – calling for the immediate and unconditional release of all detainees.

“Some colleagues’ parents have passed away while they have been in detention, without knowing the fate of their children,” he gravely noted.

UN Photo/Loey Felipe

Hans Grundberg (on screen), Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen, briefs the Security Council on the situation in Yemen.

Humanitarian constraints

Tom Fletcher brought ambassadors’ attention to the recent funding cuts UN agencies have been facing, which “have been a body blow” to aid workers efforts to save lives.

“It is the pace at which so much vital work has been shut down that adds to the perfect storm that we face”, he said.

The Humanitarian Coordinator explained the implications of such cuts, which will put aid workers in impossible situations where they have to choose “which lives not to save”.

Assault on equality

As the world readies itself to celebrate International Women’s Day on 8 March, Mr. Fletcher emphasised the “deliberate pushback against equality” witnessed in Yemen.

The crisis has disproportionately and devastatingly impacted women and girls. In 2021, Yemen ranked second to last in the World Economic Forum’s Global Gender Gap Index. And “there is no sign of progress for them,” Mr. Fletcher noted.

Yemen’s maternal mortality rate is the highest in the Middle East – more than ten times that of Saudi Arabia or Oman. Meanwhile, 1.5 million girls remain out of school, denying them their right to education and preventing them from breaking the cycles of discrimination and violence.

As funding for Yemen evaporates, “the numbers in my next briefings will be worse,” Mr. Fletcher put to the room. And yet, despite bearing the greatest burdens of war, displacement and deprivation, women remain on the frontlines of survival and recovery.

“We will do what we can to support them with the dwindling resources we have,” Mr. Fletcher said.

It is a tough time to be a humanitarian but “much tougher for the people we serve,” he continued. “The decisions you take will determine whether it gets worse,” he told ambassadors.

UN Photo/Loey Felipe

Tom Fletcher (on screen), Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, briefs the Security Council on the situation in Yemen.

‘The only way forward’

The now unfolding US designation of Houthis as a Foreign Terrorist Organization has complicated international cooperation in peace efforts.

Preserving “the mediation space for the Yemenis” under the auspices of the UN to reach a just and inclusive peace is crucial, Mr. Grundberg said.

Reiterating his office’s commitment to its role, Mr. Grundberg highlighted that it would convene “the parties at any opportunity to bring an end to this decade-long conflict,” emphasising that any political process needs to include a “broad spectrum of Yemenis”.

“While this is possible to achieve, the environment for this to happen must be conducive,” he said. “Positive developments must be put on a more permanent footing.”

“We owe it to the millions of Yemenis not to waver or falter in our determination on this,” he concluded.

MIL OSI United Nations News –

March 7, 2025
MIL-OSI: KingsRock Advisors and BC Partners Credit Announce $500 million Co-Investment Strategic Alliance

Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

Strengthens KingsRock’s growing corporate finance advisory and capital raising business; Increases robust pipeline of investment opportunities for BC Partners Credit

Collaboration aims to capitalize on the rapidly growing $2.0 trillion private credit industry

NEW YORK and LONDON and STOCKHOLM and DUBAI, United Arab Emirates, March 06, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — KingsRock Advisors, LLC, the independent global advisory firm, and BC Partners Credit, the $8 billion credit arm of international investment firm BC Partners, today announced a non-exclusive strategic alliance, wherein BC Partners Credit will have the ability to co-invest up to $500 million in a robust pipeline of credit and special opportunity transactions originated and structured by KingsRock. Likewise, KingsRock will benefit from BC Partners’ deep expertise, resources and broad international network.

This collaboration aims to leverage their combined expertise to originate, structure, execute and invest in credit and hybrid capital opportunities. BC Partners offers KingsRock greater ability to lead, underwrite and co-invest in mandated private capital markets transactions, thus providing issuer clients an enhanced level of financing certainty and its wide investor base with stronger alignment of interest by co-investments.

“The private credit sector has seen tremendous growth and it will not slow down any time soon. By combining KingsRock’s global origination expertise and broad client mix with BC Partners’ strong capital base and extensive distribution networks, both firms are even better positioned to execute complex financing transactions with greater efficiency and volume. We look forward to partnering together on attractive credit and special situation opportunities” said Ted Goldthorpe, Head of BC Partners Credit.

“We are thrilled to announce our strategic alliance with BC Partners Credit,” said Håkan Wohlin, Founder & Managing Partner, and Louis Jaffe, Co-Founder & Managing Partner of KingsRock Advisors. “Having successfully collaborated on multiple high-profile projects across industries, we are building on a strong foundation. This will allow us to support our clients’ capital raising efforts, and wherever applicable take a lead in transactions with other investor partners, by also utilizing access to BC Partners Credit’s significant capital base and distribution reach. We look forward to working together to capitalize on new transaction opportunities.”

About BC Partners Credit

BC Partners is a leading international investment firm in private equity, private debt, and real estate strategies. BC Partners Credit was launched in February 2017, with a focus on identifying attractive credit opportunities in any market environment, often in complex market segments. The platform leverages the broader firm’s deep industry and operating resources to provide flexible financing solutions to middle-market companies across Business Services, Industrials, Healthcare and other select sectors. For further information, visit www.bcpartners.com/credit-strategy.

About KingsRock:

KingsRock Advisors LLC headquartered at 900 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10022, is an independent global advisory firm, with securities offered by KingsRock Securities LLC, a FINRA member firm and SIPC, as well as KingsRock Advisors UK Ltd and KingsRock Advisors Europe AB, both wholly owned subsidiaries of KingsRock Advisors LLC.

Founded in 2020, KingsRock comprises a team of approximately 30 professionals who advise on a wide range of private capital markets transactions including debt, hybrid, equity and M&A covering structures from vanilla to highly structured. The team collectively has worked on thousands of transactions across various industry sectors worldwide. Clients include private equity and private credit firms, corporations, financial institutions, government-related entities, and institutional investors.

KingsRock Advisors offers the experience and global reach of a large firm, combined with the structural agility and creativity of a boutique. An independent advisory firm with a global network that provides objective strategic and financial advisory services, along with innovative capital solutions and special situations. The firms’ bankers excel in complex transactions and deliver swift results often where large banks and traditional sources of financing do not have the ability to engage. KingsRock Advisors operates across all major industry sectors and is supported by a global network of 115 independent Senior Advisors across 45 countries, who bring decades of deal making experience.

Disclaimer:

Securities offered by KingsRock Securities LLC, a FINRA, member firm and a member of SIPC, a wholly owned subsidiary of KingsRock Advisors LLC , 900 Third Avenue, 10th Floor, New York, NY 10022.

KingsRock Advisors UK Ltd is a private limited company registered in England and Wales with registration number 15240371. KingsRock Advisors UK Ltd (FRN 1006329) is an Appointed Representative under Bluegrove Capital Management Ltd (FRN: 960363), which is authorized and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority.

KingsRock Advisors Europe AB is incorporated in Sweden (EU), with registered office at Grev Turegatan 14, 114 46 Stockholm, Sweden, and is a tied agent of Svensk Värdepappersservice i Stockholm AB, a Swedish investment firm authorized and regulated by the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority (Sw. Finansinspektionen) under the Swedish Securities Market Act (Sw. lag (2007:528) om värdepappersmarknaden).

This message is provided for information purposes and does not constitute an invitation, solicitation or offer to buy or sell any securities or investment. Neither KingsRock Securities LLC nor its affiliates provide accounting, tax or legal advice; such matters should be discussed with your advisors and/or counsel.

Press Inquiries

For KingsRock
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The MIL Network –

March 7, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: Defense News: Amphibious Assault Ships – LHD/LHA(R)

Source: United States Navy

Description

Amphibious warships are designed to support the Marine Corps tenets of Operational Maneuver From the Sea (OMFTS) and Ship to Objective Maneuver (STOM). They must be capable of sailing in harm’s way and enable rapid combat power buildup ashore in the face of opposition. Because of their inherent capabilities, these ships have been and will continue to be called upon to also support humanitarian and other contingency missions on short notice. The United States maintains the largest and most capable amphibious force in the world.

LHAs are the largest of all amphibious warfare ships, resembling a small aircraft carrier. They are capable of Vertical/Short Take-Off and Landing (V/STOL), Short Take-Off Vertical Landing (STOVL), Vertical Take-Off and Landing (VTOL) tilt-rotor and Rotary Wing (RW) aircraft operations. LHA Flight 0 will enhance Marine Corp aviation with greater maintenance capability and JP-5 fuel capacity in lieu of a well deck. LHA Flight 1 will reincorporate a well deck to enhance expeditionary war fighting capabilities while maintaining the principal aviation characteristics of the Flight 0.

Features
Modern U.S. Navy Amphibious Assault Ships project power and maintain presence by serving as the cornerstone of the amphibious ready group (ARG) or expeditionary strike group (ESG). These ships transport and land elements of the Marine expeditionary unit (MEU) or Marine expeditionary brigade (MEB) with a combination of aircraft and landing craft.

Background
The America-class LHAs and Wasp-class LHDs provide the Marine Corps with a means of ship-to-shore movement by helicopter in addition to movement by landing craft. LHAs (and later LHDs) have been participants in major humanitarian-assistance, occupation and combat operations in which the United States has been involved. Such operations have included participating as launch platforms for Marine Corps expeditionary forces into Afghanistan during Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001 and 2002, Iraq in Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003 and humanitarian support after the catastrophic Tsunami in 2004. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, two LHDs served as “Harrier carriers,” launching an air group of AV-8B attack aircraft against targets inside Iraq. In 2004, LHDs were used to transport thousands of Marines and their equipment to Iraq and Afghanistan for combat operations. Post Hurricane Katrina support was provided in New Orleans by LHD 7 (Iwo Jima) where thousands of police, fire and rescue personnel were hosted onboard during recovery operations and Iwo Jima operated as the central command and control hub.

The lead ship, USS WASP (LHD 1) was commissioned in July 1989 in Norfolk, Virginia. The delivery of LHA AMERICA Class ships is the next step in the incremental development of the “Big Deck Amphib.”

LHAs are the largest of all amphibious warfare ships, resembling a small aircraft carrier. They are capable of Vertical/Short Take-Off and Landing (V/STOL), Short Take-Off Vertical Landing (STOVL), Vertical Take-Off and Landing (VTOL) tilt-rotor and Rotary Wing (RW) aircraft operations.

The current LHA Class (AMERICA Class) consists of two Flights: Flight 0 (USS AMERICA (LHA 6), USS TRIPOLI (LHA 7) and Flight 1 (PCU BOUGAINVILLE (LHA 8), PCU FALLUJAH (LHA 9), PCU HELMAND PROVINCE (LHA 10).

The AMERICA Class LHAs ships replace the original TARAWA-Class LHAs, which have now all been decommissioned. The AMERICA Class LHAs are LHD variants designed to accommodate the Marine Corps’ future Air Combat Element (ACE) including F-35B Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) and MV-22 Osprey.

The AMERICA Class LHAs incorporate the gas turbine propulsion plant, electrical distribution and auxiliary systems designed and built for USS MAKIN ISLAND (LHD 8). Flight 0 AMERICA Class ships contain key differences from the LHD Class to include: an enlarged hangar deck, enhanced aviation maintenance facilities, increased aviation fuel capacity, additional aviation storerooms, removal of the well deck, and an electronically reconfigurable C4ISR suite. PCU BOUGAINVILLE (LHA 8) will be the first of the Flight 1 ships and will reincorporate a well deck to enhance expeditionary war fighting capabilities while maintaining the principal aviation characteristics of Flight 0 via a reduced island structure.

USS AMERICA (LHA 6) and USS TRIPOLI (LHA 7) were commissioned on October 11, 2014, and July 15, 2020, respectively. PCU BOUGAINVILLE (LHA 8) and PCU FALLUJAH (LHA 9) are currently under construction at Huntington Ingalls Industries (HII) in Pascagoula, Mississippi. PCU BOUGAINVILLE (LHA 8) is scheduled to deliver to the Navy in 2026, and PCU FALLUJAH (LHA 9) is scheduled to launch in 2027. PCU HELMAND PROVINCE (LHA 10) is under contract for the advanced procurement of long lead items and advanced planning and engineering to support a planned start of construction at HII in 2026.

General Characteristics, America Class LHA(R) Flight 0
Builder: Huntington Ingalls Industries Inc., Ingalls Operations, Pascagoula, Mississippi
Date Deployed: July 7, 2017 (USS America)
Propulsion: Two marine gas turbines, two shafts, 70,000 total brake horsepower, two 5,000 horsepower auxiliary propulsion motors.
Length: 855 feet (260.7 meters)
Beam: 106 feet (32.3 meters)
Displacement: Approximately 43,745 long tons full load (44,449 metric tons)
Speed: 20+ knots.
Crew: 1204 (102 officers)
Load: 1,687 troops (plus 184 surge)
Armament: Two RAM launchers; two NATO Sea Sparrow launchers (with Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM)); two 20mm Phalanx CIWS mounts; seven twin .50 cal. machine guns.
Aircraft: A mix of: F-35B Joint Strike Fighters (JSF) STOVL aircraft; MV-22 Osprey VTOL tiltrotors; CH-53E Sea Stallion helicopters; UH-1Y Huey helicopters; AH-1Z Super Cobra helicopters; MH-60S Sea Hawk helicopter
Ships:
USS America (LHA 6), Sasebo, Japan
USS Tripoli (LHA 7), San Diego, California

General Characteristics, America Class LHA(R) Flight 1 Builder: Huntington Ingalls Industries Inc., Ingalls Operations, Pascagoula, Mississippi
Propulsion: Two marine gas turbines, two shafts, 59,000 total brake horsepower, two 5,000 horsepower auxiliary propulsion motors.
Length: 855 feet (260.7 meters).
Beam: 106 feet (32.3 meters).
Displacement: Approximately 43,335 long tons full load (44,030 metric tons).
Speed: 20+ knots.
Crew: 1204 (102 officers)
Load: 1462 (150 surge)
Armament: Two RAM launchers; two NATO Sea Sparrow launchers (with Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM)); two 20mm Phalanx CIWS mounts; seven twin .50 cal. machine guns.
Aircraft: A mix of: F-35B Joint Strike Fighters (JSF) STOVL aircraft; MV-22 Osprey VTOL tiltrotors; CH-53E Sea Stallion helicopters; UH-1Y Huey helicopters; AH-1Z Super Cobra helicopters; MH-60S Sea Hawk helicopters.
Landing/Attack Craft: A mix of: Landing Craft, Air Cushion (LCAC) and Landing Craft Utility (LCU)
Ships:
PCU Bougainville (LHA 8) – Under Construction
PCU Fallujah (LHA 9) – Under Construction
PCU Helmand Province (LHA 10) – LLTM Under Procurement

General Characteristics, Wasp Class Builder: Northrop Grumman Ship Systems Ingalls Operations, Pascagoula, Mississippi
Date Deployed: July 29, 1989 (USS Wasp)
Propulsion: (LHDs 1-7) two boilers, two geared steam turbines, two shafts, 70,000 total brake horsepower; (LHD 8) two gas turbines, two shafts; 70,000 total shaft horsepower, two 5,000 horsepower auxiliary propulsion motors
Length: 844 feet (253.2 meters)
Beam: 106 feet (31.8 meters)
Displacement: LHDs 1-4: 40,650 tons full load (41,302.3 metric tons)
LHDs 5-7: 40,358 tons full load (41,005.6 metric tons)
LHD 8: 41,772 tons full load (42,442.3 metric tons)
Speed: 20+ knots (23.5+ miles per hour)
Crew: Ships Company: 66 officers, 1,004 enlisted
LHD 8: 65 officers, 994 enlisted
Marine Detachment: 1,687 troops (plus 184 surge)
Armament: Two RAM launchers; two NATO Sea Sparrow launchers; three 20 mm Phalanx CIWS mounts (two on LHD 5-8); four .50 cal. machine guns; four 25 mm Mk 38 machine guns (LHD 5-8 have three 25 mm Mk 38 machine guns)
Aircraft: 12 CH-46 Sea Knight helicopters; 4 CH-53E Sea Stallion helicopters; 6 AV-8B Harrier attack aircraft; 3 UH-1N Huey helicopters; 4 AH-1W Super Cobra helicopters (planned capability to embark MV-22 Osprey VTOL tilt-rotors) and F-35B Joint Strike Fighters (JSF) STOVL aircraft)
Landing/Attack Craft: 3 LCACs or 2 LCUs
Ships:
USS Wasp (LHD 1), Norfolk, Virginia
USS Essex (LHD 2), San Diego, California
USS Kearsarge (LHD 3), Norfolk, Virginia
USS Boxer (LHD 4), San Diego, California
USS Bataan (LHD 5), Norfolk, Virginia
USS Iwo Jima (LHD 7), Norfolk, Virginia
USS Makin Island (LHD 8), San Diego, California

MIL Security OSI –

March 7, 2025
MIL-OSI United Nations: What is the World Health Organization and why does it matter?

Source: United Nations MIL OSI

By Eileen Travers

21 January 2025 Health

When the plague, cholera and yellow fever rippled deadly waves across a newly industrialised and interconnected world in the mid-19th century, taking a global approach to health became an imperative. Doctors, scientists, presidents and prime ministers urgently convened the International Sanitary Conference in Paris in 1851, a precursor to what is now the largest of its kind: the World Health Organization, known as WHO.

From laboratories to battlefields, the United Nations specialised health agency has been dedicated to the wellbeing of all people since 1948. It is guided by science and supported by its 194 member nations, including the United States, a co-founder that on Monday announced plans to withdraw.

What has WHO done for the world? The short answer is – a lot. The UN agency currently works with its membership and on the health frontlines in more than 150 locations and has achieved many public health milestones.

© WHO/Neil Nuia

WHO and partners provide COVID-19 and other vaccines to remote communities, including in Kuvamiti in the Solomon Islands. (file)

Here’s what you need to know about the planet’s biggest health body:

Tackling emergencies

Amid crises, conflict, the continuing threat of disease outbreaks and climate change, WHO has responded, from wars in Gaza, Sudan and Ukraine to ensuring lifesaving vaccines and medical supplies arrive in remote or dangerous areas.

With healthcare facing unprecedented risks, WHO documented in 2023 over 1,200 attacks affecting workers, patients, hospitals, clinics and ambulances across 19 countries and territories, resulting in over 700 deaths and nearly 1,200 injuries.

Indeed, WHO teams often go where others do not. They routinely evacuate injured patients and provide lifesaving equipment, supplies and services in conflict or disaster-ravaged areas.

Watch below as WHO teams helped to unroll a multi-agency polio vaccination campaign in war-torn besieged Gaza in September 2024, when the fast-spreading virus reappeared 25 years after it had been eradicated:

[embedded content]

Tracking and addressing health crises

Every day and through the night, teams of WHO experts sift through thousands of pieces of information, including scientific papers and disease surveillance reports, scanning for signals of disease outbreaks or other public health threats, from avian flu to COVID-19.

WHO mobilises to prevent, detect and respond to infectious disease outbreaks while also strengthening access to essential health services.

That includes bolstering hospital capacity to do everything from delivering new babies to treating war injuries and training healthcare workers.

© WHO/Ploy Phutpheng

A laboratory scientist works at a WHO collaborating research centre in Thailand. (file)

Eliminating diseases around the world

A wide range of diseases and conditions are ripe for elimination given the right public health policies, including neglected infectious and vector-borne diseases, sexually transmitted infections, diseases passed from mother to child and those that vaccines can prevent.

The UN health agency supplies essential medicines and medical equipment while working to enable – and where possible, strengthen – laboratory capacity to diagnose diseases.

In 2024, WHO Member States achieved several milestones in tackling these major global health challenges. Seven countries (Brazil, Chad, India, Jordan, Pakistan, Timor-Leste, and Viet Nam) eliminated a range of tropical diseases, including leprosy and trachoma.

Mother-to-child transmission of HIV and syphilis have been eliminated in Belize, Jamaica and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Namibia reached a key milestone towards elimination of mother-to-child transmission of HIV and hepatitis B.

WHO has also played a key role over the past seven decades, including in eradicating smallpox in 1980, achieving the near eradication of polio and providing lifesaving assistance in Gaza during the recent war.

© WHO/Sebastian Meyer

A WHO mobile clinic provides services in Duhok, Iraq. (file)

AI and digital health

WHO is embracing new frontiers, including artificial intelligence (AI), in digital health.

As the influence of emerging AI technologies continues to grow, WHO is working to ensure its safety and effectiveness for health.

That includes new guidance published last October listing key regulatory considerations on such issues as harnessing the potential of AI to treat or detect conditions like cancer or tuberculosis while minimising risks like unethical data collection, cybersecurity threats and amplifying biases or misinformation.

WHO/Blink Media/Juliana Tan

In Singapore, digital devices help patients reach their healthcare providers. (file)

Taking on deadly climate-related health crisis

The climate-related health crisis affects at least 3.5 billion people – nearly half of the global population.

Extreme heat, weather events and air pollution caused millions of deaths in 2023, putting enormous pressure on health systems and the working population, from current wildfires burning across the US west coast to deadly flash floods in Indonesia.

WHO/J.D.Kannah

An Ebola virus survivor in the Democratic Republic of Congo has his eyes checked at a WHO-supported eye clinic in North Kivu. (file)

Part of WHO’s response has been to protect health from the wide range of impacts of climate change, which includes assessing vulnerabilities and developing plans.

The UN agency has also worked on implementing response systems for key risks, such as extreme heat and infectious disease and supporting resilience and adaptation in health-determining sectors such as water and food.

What’s WHO working on now?

WHO is leading efforts for a global treaty take a further, deeper step to strengthen pandemic prevention, preparedness and response, much along the lines of the founders of the 1851 International Sanitary Conference.

The UN agency is also currently working to achieve its “triple billion targets”.

Set in 2019, the targets are that by 2025, one billion more people will be benefitting from universal health coverage, one billion more people will be better protected from health emergencies and one billion more people will be enjoying better health and wellbeing.

Who leads WHO?

The leadership is truly international.

Based in Geneva, the UN agency is headed by Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus.

The current approved biennium programme budget for 2024-2025 is $6.83 billion, coming from member assessments, alongside voluntary contributions.

WHO’s decision-making body, the World Health Assembly, is made up of its member nations, which meet annually to agree on WHO priorities and policies.

Members make decisions on health goals and strategies that will guide their own public health work and the work of the WHO Secretariat to move the world towards better health and wellbeing for all. That includes implementing reform measures that have made WHO more effective.

Learn more about WHO here and in our latest video below:

MIL OSI United Nations News –

March 7, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: Henderson Man Sentenced to Over Five and a Half Years on Firearm Charge After Daytime Shootout at Gas Station

Source: Office of United States Attorneys

RALEIGH, N.C. – Jaymon Gibson, of Henderson, was sentenced today to 71 months in prison for possessing a firearm as a felon. Gibson, 26, pled guilty to the charges on October 10, 2024.

According to court documents and other information presented in court, law enforcement investigated two gang-related shooting incidents where Gibson possessed or fired guns. On May 10, 2022, at around 11:15 pm, the Henderson Police Department (HPD) responded to reports of a gunshot wound at a house on Powell Street in Henderson. The 911 caller led officers to Gibson, who was sitting in a car with gunshot wounds to his left arm. The 911 caller reported that she had seen someone shooting at Gibson from a black sedan. Officers canvassed the area and found a Glock 19 9mm handgun with an American flag pattern on it lying in the yard. They also found a 50-round drum magazine. Doorbell camera footage from the home showed Gibson walking with the Glock 9mm.

The next day, co-defendant Monica Ellis called HPD and reported that a Glock 19 and a drum magazine had been stolen from her car. Officers later confirmed with a firearms store that Ellis had purchased the firearm on March 8, 2022. Gibson was in prison in March 2022, following a state conviction for voluntary manslaughter, and officers were able to obtain jail calls between him and Ellis. These calls revealed that Gibson had directed Ellis to straw purchase the Glock 9mm for him, even placing a three-way phone call with Gibson and a gun store clerk.

On May 28, 2022, eighteen days after the Powell Street shooting, the HPD responded to a shots-fired call at the Gate City Foods gas station. Surveillance video revealed that a little after 4 p.m., a car with Gibson driving and a juvenile male in the front passenger seat pulled into a gas pump away from the store. A few minutes later, a white car with four occupants arrived and pulled up to a gas pump closer to the store. The front passenger, later identified as Jordan Turnage, walked into the store. Then a rear passenger, a juvenile, stepped out of the white car holding a long gun with a drum magazine. Gibson, who had moved to the front passenger seat, then stepped out of the car also holding a firearm. Moments later, gunfire erupted. Turnage fired a handgun from inside Gates City Foods through the window towards Gibson. At the same time, from the middle of the parking lot, the juvenile with the long gun began firing toward Gibson. The white car’s driver also stepped out with a long gun and shot several rounds, striking himself in the foot in the process. Gibson returned fire, shooting several rounds while crouching behind his car. Both groups then fled from the scene. Later investigation found that gunshots had damaged multiple nearby cars and apartments, including one gunshot that had struck a bedroom window while a resident was sleeping. Miraculously, no one was hurt in the incident. Five days later, law enforcement located and arrested Gibson at an apartment in Durham. They found a 22-caliber rifle with a high-capacity magazine that matched shell casings from where he had been parked at Gates City Foods.

“Keeping firearms out of the hands of criminals that endanger public safety remains a top priority for our office,” said Acting U.S. Attorney Daniel P. Bubar. “We will continue to work closely with our law enforcement partners to investigate and prosecute those that are the most significant contributors to violence.”

“Our partnership with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) and the U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of North Carolina has been vital in our ongoing efforts to combat gun violence in our community,” said Henderson Police Chief Marcus W. Barrow. “Throughout my tenure as Chief of Police, the ATF has maintained a steadfast presence in Henderson, demonstrating unwavering support and commitment to our shared goals. Their consistent presence is having a profound and lasting impact on our region. This case serves as yet another testament to our collective dedication in the fight against gun violence, and we remain resolute in our commitment to securing a safer future for all.”

Co-defendant Monica Ellis pled guilty to a felony offense of lying to a federal agent for statements she made related to straw-purchasing the Glock firearm. On March 14, 2024, she was sentenced to time served and two years of supervised release. Jordan Turnage, who was not a felon at the time of the shooting, was prosecuted in state court for related felony offenses and received an active sentence of 38 to 58 months.

Daniel P. Bubar, Acting U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of North Carolina made the announcement after sentencing by U.S. District Judge James C. Dever III. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF), Henderson Police Department, Durham Police Department, and N.C State Bureau of Investigation investigated this case. Assistant U.S. Attorney Jake D. Pugh prosecuted.

Related court documents and information can be found on the website of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina or on PACER by searching for Case No. 5:23-cr-0043-D.

###

MIL Security OSI –

March 7, 2025
MIL-OSI: Ezipay Coin Presale Goes Live, Starting the Next Phase in Making Digital Payments More Accessible
Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

DUBAI, United Arab Emirates, March 06, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Ezipay Coin, a unique digital currency built on innovative blockchain technology, has officially launched its presale, offering early investors the opportunity to be part of the future of digital payments. EziPay Coin is part of the greater EziPay ecosystem, that aims to redefine the way of handling payments, rewards, and investments. With strategic partnerships and a vision to create a more connected financial ecosystem, Ezipay Coin is poised to transform the way transactions are conducted across the globe.

Speaking to the media, Sumit Sharma, CTO of EziPay Coin, said, “As a safe, flexible, and easy-to-use cryptocurrency, EziPay Coin aims to transform digital payments. EziPay Coin wants to make cryptocurrency acceptance more universal, being used in normal life while facilitating borderless, quick, safe transactions.”

Borderless Transactions
EziPay Coin makes digital currencies useful for everyone by focusing on openness, sustainability, and accessibility. By eliminating excessive costs and sluggish processing times while remaining connected with conventional cross-border payments, EziPay Coin presents a quick, safe, and reasonably priced option for trade and global remittances

Some of the key features of EziPay Coin include:
- Non-Custodial Wallet: Full control over digital assets.
- Integrated Ecosystem: Works seamlessly within the EziPay app.
- Low Transaction Costs: Ideal for microtransactions and global remittances.
- Future Blockchain Development: A scalable and feature-rich blockchain is in progress.
- User-Centric Design: Intuitive and easy to use.
- Practical Utility: Designed for everyday transactions.
- Dedicated Blockchain: Ensures security and scalability.
- Seamless Integration: Works effortlessly within the EziPay app.
- Transparent and Secure: Built on blockchain technology.
- Expanding Ecosystem: Future integrations in healthcare, fintech, and agritech.
About EziPay Ecosystem
EziPay Coin is a part of the greater EziPay Ecosystem, which ensures that cryptocurrency has a real-world utility. It aims to make digital payments accessible, borderless, quick, and safe for everyone.

Some of the features of the EziPay Ecosystem include:
- Reward & Loyalty Programs: Use EziPay Coin across platforms like EziPay Global Digital Bank, EziPay Ghana, EziPay Francophone, and EziPay Sierra Leone to earn rewards and access financial services.
- Gaming Platform: Redeem EziPay Coin for free top-ups and bonuses on Ezivote, India’s fastest-growing political-based gaming app.
- Digital Learning: Get certified on Iripash using EziPay Coin.
- App Development: Use EziPay Coin to develop applications and projects in the crypto space.
By providing an all-in-one solution for payments, rewards, and investments, the EziPay Ecosystem with EziPay Coin is positioned to make digital currencies accessible to everyone.

To take part in the presale of EzPay Coin, visit: https://www.ezipaycoin.com/

About Ezipay Coin
Ezipay Coin is a next-generation cryptocurrency designed to provide secure, efficient, and borderless digital transactions. Backed by leading industry partners, it aims to bridge the gap between traditional finance and blockchain-powered solutions.

Join the conversation on:
X: https://x.com/EzipayCoin
Telegram: https://t.me/ezipaycoin

Media Contact
Company Name: EziPay Coin
Contact Person: Amit Gaur
Email: info@ezipaycoin.com
Website: https://www.ezipaycoin.com/

Disclaimer: This press release is provided by EziPay Coin. The statements, views, and opinions expressed in this content are solely those of the content provider and do not necessarily reflect the views of this media platform or its publisher. We do not endorse, verify, or guarantee the accuracy, completeness, or reliability of any information presented. This content is for informational purposes only and should not be considered financial, investment, or trading advice. Investing in crypto and mining related opportunities involves significant risks, including the potential loss of capital. Readers are strongly encouraged to conduct their own research and consult with a qualified financial advisor before making any investment decisions. However, due to the inherently speculative nature of the blockchain sector–including cryptocurrency, NFTs, and mining–complete accuracy cannot always be guaranteed. Neither the media platform nor the publisher shall be held responsible for any fraudulent activities, misrepresentations, or financial losses arising from the content of this press release.

A photo accompanying this announcement is available at https://www.globenewswire.com/NewsRoom/AttachmentNg/d74790f1-f33a-4217-9868-0f60dff3505a

The MIL Network –
March 7, 2025
MIL-OSI Global: Europe-Nato ‘coalition of the willing’ scrambles for collective response to hostility from Trump and threat from Putin

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, University of Birmingham

Six days after the infamous shouting match between the US president and Volodymyr Zelensky, the Ukrainian president is scrambling to try and repair what looked initially like a near-total breakdown in the relationship between the US and Ukraine.

Zelensky, urged by European leaders, including the British prime minister, Sir Keir Starmer, and the Nato secretary general, Mark Rutte, has tried to mend his ties with Trump. The US president acknowledged as much in his first post-inauguration speech to congress on March 5, saying that he appreciated Zelensky’s readiness to work for peace under US leadership.

But that happened just 24 hours after he decided to halt all military aid to Ukraine. And since then, the new director of the CIA, John Ratcliffe, and national security adviser, Mike Waltz, have confirmed that intelligence sharing with Kyiv, which was critical to Ukraine’s ability to hit strategic targets inside Russia, has also been suspended.

Neither of these two moves will have an immediate game-changing effect on the war, but they certainly increase pressure on Ukraine to accept whatever deal Trump will ultimately make with Putin.

So far, so bad for Zelensky. Yet Trump’s manoeuvring does not only affect Ukraine. It has also had a profound impact on the relationship between the US and Europe. On Sunday March 2, in the aftermath of the White House debacle, Starmer convened an emergency meeting in London with a select number of European leaders, as well as the Canadian prime minister, Justin Trudeau.

This “coalition of the willing”“ has been in the making for some time now. Its members straddle the boundaries of the EU and Nato, including – apart from the UK – non-EU members Norway and Turkey. Since the relatively disappointing first-ever EU meeting solely focused on defence on February 3 – which was more notable for the absence of a European vision for the continent’s role and place in the Trumpian world order – Europe has embarked on a course of more than just rhetorical change.

The UK was first out of the blocks. Ahead of Starmer’s visit to Washington, the UK government announced on February 25 an increase of defence spending to 2.5% of GDP by 2027. This was then followed on March 2 with a pledge of additional air defence missiles for Ukraine worth £1.6 billion.

Europe responds

In a crucial boost to defence spending at the EU level, the president of the European commission, Ursula von der Leyen, announced the “Rearm Europe” plan on March 4. It is projected to mobilise around €800 billion (£670 million) for European defence.

This includes a “national escape clause” for EU members, exempting national defence expenditures from the EU’s deficit rules. It also offers a new loan instrument worth up to €150 billion, allows for the use of already allocated funds in the EU budget for defence projects, and proposes partnerships with the private sector through the Savings and Investment Union and the European Investment Bank.

Perhaps most significantly, in Germany, the two main parties likely to form the next coalition government announced a major shift in the country’s fiscal policy on March 5, which will allow any defence spending above 1% of GDP to be financed outside the country’s strict borrowing rules.

This marks an important point of departure for Germany. Apart from what it means in fiscal terms, it also sends an important political signal that Germany – the continent’s largest economy – will use its financial and political muscle to strengthen the emerging coalition of the willing.

Read more:
Europe will need thousands more tanks and troops to mount a credible military defence without the US

Donald Trump reads a letter from Volodymyr Zelensky during his speech to Congress, March 4.

These are all important steps. Taken together, and provided that the current momentum is maintained, they are likely to accelerate Europe’s awakening to a world in which US security guarantees as no longer absolute.

The challenges that Europe faces on the way to becoming strategically independent from the US are enormous. But they are not insurmountable.

The conventional military threat posed by an aggressive and revanchist Russia is more easily manageable with the planned boost to conventional forces and air and cyber defences. Close cooperation with Ukraine will also add critical war-fighting experience which can boost the deterrent effect.

Europe for now, however, remains vulnerable in terms of its nuclear capabilities, especially if deprived of the US nuclear umbrella and faced with Russia’s regular threats to use its nuclear arsenal – the world’s largest nuclear power by warhead stockpiles.

But here, too, new strategic thinking is emerging. The French president, Emmanuel Macron, has indicated his willingness to discuss a more integrated European nuclear capability. And in Germany, a country with an otherwise very complex relationship with nuclear weapons, such a European approach has been debated, increasingly positively, for some time, starting during Trump’s first term in office between 2017 and 2021.

Read more:
French nuclear deterrence for Europe: how effective could it be against Russia?

Tectonic shift

A stronger, and strategically more independent Europe, even if it will take time to emerge, is also crucial for the war in Ukraine. Increased European defence spending, including aid for Ukraine, will help Kyiv in the short term to make up for at least some of the gaps left by the suspension – and possible complete cessation – of US military support.

In the long term, however, EU accession would possibly open up the route to a security guarantee for Ukraine under article 47.2 of the Lisbon treaty on European Union.

This so-called mutual defence clause has been derided in the past for lacking any meaningful European defence capabilities. But if the current European momentum towards beefing up the continent’s defences is sustained, it would acquire more teeth than it currently has.

With the benefit of hindsight, Zelensky may have walked away less empty handed from his clash with Trump last week than it seemed initially. If nothing else, Europeans have since then demonstrated not just in words but also in deeds that they are no longer in denial about just how dangerous Trump is and how much they are now on their own.

Threatened by both Moscow and Washington, Europe is now on the cusp of a second zeitenwende, the “epochal tectonic shift” that the then German chancellor Olaf Scholz acknowledged after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. They may finally even have found an answer to the question he posed at the time: “How can we, as Europeans and as the European Union, remain independent actors in an increasingly multi-polar world?”

Stefan Wolff is a past recipient of grant funding from the Natural Environment Research Council of the UK, the United States Institute of Peace, the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK, the British Academy, the NATO Science for Peace Programme, the EU Framework Programmes 6 and 7 and Horizon 2020, as well as the EU’s Jean Monnet Programme. He is a Trustee and Honorary Treasurer of the Political Studies Association of the UK and a Senior Research Fellow at the Foreign Policy Centre in London.

Tetyana Malyarenko does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Europe-Nato ‘coalition of the willing’ scrambles for collective response to hostility from Trump and threat from Putin – https://theconversation.com/europe-nato-coalition-of-the-willing-scrambles-for-collective-response-to-hostility-from-trump-and-threat-from-putin-251332

MIL OSI – Global Reports –

March 7, 2025
MIL-OSI United Kingdom: The UK fully supports the UN’s decision to pause humanitarian operations in Saada: UK statement at the UN Security Council

Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

Speech

The UK fully supports the UN’s decision to pause humanitarian operations in Saada: UK statement at the UN Security Council

Statement by Ambassador James Kariuki, UK Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN, at the UN Security Council meeting on Yemen.

First, the UK welcomes the Council’s strong and united condemnation of the ongoing detentions by the Houthis and the tragic death of a World Food Programme member of staff in Houthi captivity.

Continued Council unity sends a clear and unequivocal message to the Houthis that they must unconditionally and immediately release those detained.

We fully support the UN’s decision to pause humanitarian operations in Saada.

This pause is a direct consequence of the Houthi threat undermining the security and safety of aid workers.

Miss Ali and this morning’s press stakeout have again highlighted how this already dire humanitarian situation is exacerbated by climate change, intensifying existing issues such as water and food security.

Second, the Yemen Coast Guard’s announcement of their interdiction of a dhow containing advanced weapon components, reportedly destined for Hodeida port, is more evidence of a clear violation of the arms embargo contained in UNSC Resolution 2216.

We reiterate our call for all UN Member States to ensure full compliance with the arms embargo. In particular, we call for the Iranian Government to cease its destabilising activity in the region.

UNVIM remains critical to preventing the smuggling of illicit arms.

The UK calls on the international community to provide unwavering support to UNVIM and to ensure it has the funding necessary to fulfil its obligations.

We also continue to support Yemen’s Coast Guard as it looks to strengthen its capacities to protect Yemen’s maritime borders.

In partnership with the Government of Yemen, and international partners, we look forward to the launch of the Yemen Maritime Security Partnership later this year.

Finally, President, the UK remains committed to achieving lasting peace in Yemen and the broader region.

Ultimately, long-term stability and security in Yemen can only be achieved through a UN-led inclusive political settlement.

We will continue to give our full support of Special Envoy Grundberg in this effort.

Updates to this page

Published 6 March 2025

MIL OSI United Kingdom –

March 7, 2025
MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Update on Syria: Lifting asset freezes on 24 entities
Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments 3

Government response

Update on Syria: Lifting asset freezes on 24 entities

The UK has lifted asset freezes on 24 Syrian entities, underscoring our commitment to help Syrians rebuild their country and economy
An FCDO spokesperson said:

“We are lifting asset freezes on 24 Syrian entities that were previously used by the Assad regime to fund the oppression of the Syrian people, including the Central Bank of Syria, Syrian Arab Airlines, and energy companies.

“At the same time, sanctions on members of the Assad regime and those involved in the illicit trade in captagon remain in place.

“This approach underscores our commitment to help the people of Syria rebuild their country and economy, including through support for a Syrian-led and Syrian-owned political transition process. We will continue to judge Syria’s interim authorities by their actions, not their words.”

Media enquiries

Email newsdesk@fcdo.gov.uk

Telephone 020 7008 3100

Contact the FCDO Communication Team via email (monitored 24 hours a day) in the first instance, and we will respond as soon as possible.

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Updates to this page

Published 6 March 2025
MIL OSI United Kingdom –
March 7, 2025
MIL-OSI Economics: Estimating Fiscal Multiplier for Qatar: Qatar

Source: International Monetary Fund

Summary

Econometric results suggest that Qatar’s strong capital spending multiplier became less impactful as the stock of capital rose to a high level, likely as the marginal impact declined. This supports Qatar’s strategy to shifts the State’s role to an enabler of private sector-led growth, focusing on expenditure to support build human capital and implementation of broader reform guided by the Third National Development Strategy.

Subject: Capital spending, Central government spending, Current spending, Expenditure, Financial institutions, Fiscal multipliers, Fiscal policy, Infrastructure, National accounts, Oil prices, Prices, Public financial management (PFM), Public investment spending, Stocks, Total expenditures

Keywords: Capital spending, Capital spending, Central government spending, Current spending, Expenditure composition, Fiscal multiplier, Fiscal multipliers, GCC, Infrastructure, Oil prices, Public investment spending, Qatar, Sectoral analysis, Stocks, Total expenditures

MIL OSI Economics –

March 7, 2025
MIL-OSI Economics: Artificial Intelligence in Qatar: Assessing the Potential Economic Impacts

Source: International Monetary Fund

Summary

Qatar has been actively preparing to embrace the transformative potential of artificial intelligence (AI), allowing it to lead its Emerging Market peers in AI readiness. Qatar’s AI exposure has increased significantly over the years, and increasing AI adoption is assessed to yield more opportunities than risks for the country’s labor force, thanks to the private sector’s contribution in increasing jobs that are more likely to benefit from AI-driven productivity gains. Scenario analyses suggest that increasing AI adoption, supported by policy reforms to boost human capital, innovation and domestic knowledge spillovers, could generate sizeable labor productivity gains over the medium term.

Subject: Agroindustries, Digitalization, Economic sectors, Human capital, Labor, Labor force, Labor markets, Labor productivity, Production, Productivity, Public sector, Technology

Keywords: Agroindustries, Artificial Intelligence (AI), Digitalization, Employment, Human capital, Labor demand, Labor force, Labor markets, Labor productivity, Productivity, Productivity, Public sector, Qatar, Skills, Technology

MIL OSI Economics –

March 7, 2025
MIL-OSI Economics: Building a Knowledge-Based Economy to Boost Growth: The Role of Export Diversification in Qatar

Source: International Monetary Fund

Summary

Motivated by Qatar’s Third National Development Strategy, this note discusses ingredients for boosting export diversification and growth potential. Drawing on cross-country experiences and empirical analyses, we shed light on how successful policies supported building human capital and economic complexity, the type of strategy that could best suite Qatar’s circumstances, and pitfalls to avoid.

Subject: Balance of payments, Comparative advantage, Economic sectors, Export diversification, Export performance, Exports, Foreign direct investment, Human capital, International trade, Labor, Manufacturing, Service exports

Keywords: Comparative advantage, Competition, Economic complexity, Export diversification, Export diversification, Export performance, Exports, Foreign direct investment, Human capital, Human capital, Innovation, Manufacturing, Productivity, Qatar, Service exports, Third National Development Strategy

MIL OSI Economics –

March 7, 2025
MIL-OSI Economics: Financial Conditions and Their Growth Implications for Qatar: Qatar

Source: International Monetary Fund

Summary

This paper develops a Financial Conditions Index (FCI) for Qatar and uses the Growth-at-Risk (GaR) framework to examine the impact of financial conditions on Qatar’s non-hydrocarbon growth. The analysis shows that the FCI is an important leading indicator of Qatar’s non-hydrocarbon growth, highlighting its predictive potential for future economic performance. The GaR framework suggests that overall, the current downside risks to Qatar’s baseline non-hydrocarbon growth projections are relatively mild.

Subject: Central bank policy rate, Credit, Deposit rates, Economic sectors, Financial conditions index, Financial Sector, Financial sector policy and analysis, Financial services, Foreign exchange, Growth-at-risk assessment, Money, Nominal effective exchange rate, Oil prices, Post-clearance customs audit, Prices, Real estate prices, Revenue administration

Keywords: Bank credit, Central bank policy rate, Credit, Deposit rates, Financial conditions, Financial conditions index, Financial sector, Financial statistics, Growth-at-risk assessment, Nominal effective exchange rate, Non-hydrocarbon growth, Oil prices, Post-clearance customs audit, Qatar, Real estate prices

MIL OSI Economics –

March 7, 2025
MIL-OSI Global: Why global firms are pushed to take sides in wars, and how they can avoid it

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Stephan Manning, Professor of Strategy and Innovation, University of Sussex Business School, University of Sussex

Virrage Images/Shutterstock

Russia’s war against Ukraine has changed how global firms respond to geopolitical events. Whereas in the past foreign companies often preferred to stay neutral in times of war, now they increasingly take sides.

When Russia invaded Ukraine three years ago, global firms like Google and Amazon were swift to offer support to Ukraine with donations and supplies. Others, like Renault and Deutsche Bank, harmed the Russian economy by suspending operations and investment.

Overall, more than 1,000 foreign companies reduced their activity in Russia, with nearly 300 of them leaving the country completely. These firms acted in line with the geopolitical position of their home countries, but often did so before their governments had issued any official policy.

In our study of corporate responses to the Russia-Ukraine war, we call this
“partisan behavior” – as it supports one side, while harming the other.

But taking sides often comes at a cost. Shell, for example, lost almost US$5 billion (£3.9 million) by leaving a joint venture with Russia’s energy giant Gazprom, and the US digital communication company Cisco lost almost £200 million from pausing its operations in Russia.

Supporting one side over another has also backfired for many firms in the conflict between Israel and Gaza. For example, McDonald’s restaurants in Israel (then owned by a franchise group) donated free food to Israeli soldiers, while Ben & Jerry’s sought to stop sales to Israelis in the West Bank.

Both actions led to a considerable backlash, mostly in the form of consumer boycotts, which led to reduced growth for McDonald’s, and big losses for Ben & Jerry’s parent company, Unilever.

So why do companies take such economic and reputational risks? One reason could be that geopolitical divides along with ongoing culture wars, amplified by social media outrage, have increased public pressure on large multinational firms to take a political stance.

Yet continuing with business as usual does not seem to be an option either. After Coca-Cola continued to operate as normal during the Israel-Gaza conflict, it was accused by one Palestinian-led movement of being “complicit in a war crime”.

Firms that maintained operations in Russia, such as Carlsberg and Unilever, were not only criticised for doing so by their home countries, but also faced the prospect of a takeover by the Russian state – since their western influence was perceived as threatening. In comparison, many Chinese firms took the opportunity and expanded operations in Russia – supported by the Russian government.

A survey by the American thinktank the Conference Board confirms that western companies find it increasingly challenging to “maintain neutrality” in times of conflict. Yet geopolitical conflicts are on the rise, and multinational firms will continue to feel pressure to respond.

Of course, sometimes foreign firms have little choice about what to do. For example their home governments may issue sanctions on a conflict party, making it difficult to continue business. This was the situation for many foreign firms operating in Russia during the war.

Focus on the victims

But often, foreign firms can choose how to respond. In those cases, our research suggests that they should take a non-partisan humanitarian position, and focus on supporting the victims of a conflict – on both sides – as much as possible.

For example, two large US companies, Comcast (media) and Verizon (telecommunications), each committed US$1.5 Million to support humanitarian efforts, such as the charity Doctors Without Borders, in both Israel and Gaza. Neither firm has faced criticism or any kind of backlash.

Humanitarian aid arriving in Gaza, February 2025.
Anas-Mohammed/Shutterstock

A further step would be for large corporations to develop a shared code of conduct which focuses entirely on non-partisan humanitarian measures in line with international law.

Under this law, conflicting parties have an obligation to ensure passage of humanitarian aid, freedom of movement of humanitarian workers and the protection of civilians, refugees, prisoners and the wounded.

Multinationals could play a constructive role in this effort. They could partner with NGOs and charities to finance essential services, provide logistical support and ensure the continuous flow of aid.

Such a shared commitment to the humanitarian cause could also be a useful approach for other organisations, like universities. The resignations of US university presidents after they criticised pro-Palestinian campus protests could have been prevented with a clearer non-partisan approach.

A politically polarised world can be difficult to navigate, and one that global businesses should be increasingly wary of. But a non-partisan humanitarian approach, which helps those who suffer the most, offers a balanced and ethical alternative.

The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Why global firms are pushed to take sides in wars, and how they can avoid it – https://theconversation.com/why-global-firms-are-pushed-to-take-sides-in-wars-and-how-they-can-avoid-it-249409

MIL OSI – Global Reports –

March 7, 2025
MIL-OSI Global: The king has a tricky diplomatic role to play in inviting Trump for a state visit

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Francesca Jackson, PhD candidate, Lancaster Law School, Lancaster University

As monarch, King Charles III is bound by constitutional convention to remain politically neutral. But that hasn’t stopped the UK government from deploying the king to advance its foreign policy agenda.

During their inaugural meeting, Keir Starmer presented Donald Trump with a letter from the king, inviting the president for a “truly historic” and “unprecedented” second state visit to the UK and a visit to the monarch’s private Balmoral residence.

Later that week, the government arranged for the king to meet Volodymyr Zelensky at the royal countryside retreat of Sandringham, to show support for the Ukrainian leader following his disastrous meeting with Trump.

The government is walking a tightrope: it wants to avoid tariffs from Trump, while continuing to support Zelensky and Ukraine. And it is using the king to help it do so.

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It is not unusual for governments to use monarchs to boost international relations, particularly through state visits. The monarch has a huge amount of soft power and the pomp and ceremony of a state visit can help governments achieve their foreign affairs aims.

State visits differ from regular diplomatic visits: they are the most formal way in which a foreign head of state can come to the UK, and happen just once or twice a year.

Visitors are greeted by the king and other members of the royal family with a ceremonial welcome accompanied by gun salutes on the Horse Guards Parade ground in London. They then travel back to Buckingham Palace in a carriage procession, where they enjoy a formal state banquet at which the monarch toasts the visiting head of state.

State visits are not cheap: Trump’s first visit cost £3.5 million in policing alone. But they can play a key role in diplomacy.

A state visit to France by Queen Elizabeth II in 1972 helped seal the deal on the UK’s third attempt at joining the the European Economic Community. And in 2024, the UK’s defence partnership with Qatar was “strengthened” following the state visit of the Qatari emir.

There is a danger that the monarch’s reputation is affected by hosting controversial heads of state. No doubt the palace PR team is less than enthused about the prospect of Charles being seen wining and dining Trump. The optics of hosting Trump during his first state visit reportedly put the late Queen Elizabeth in a “very difficult position”.

But monarchs have little (if any) influence over who they host for a state visit. Charles will have been advised by the government to invite Trump in accordance with the cardinal convention. This fundamental constitutional principle requires the monarch to act on the advice of the government.

Constitutional conventions are not legally binding. But in the UK’s constitutional monarchy, the monarch reigns but does not rule and power is exercised by democratically-elected ministers rather than the sovereign. Failure by the monarch to follow convention could spark a constitutional crisis, as fictional plays and dramas have long imagined.

A royal invitation.
Number 10 Flickr, CC BY-ND

This is why the late queen had to host some controversial and less-than-democratic figures. It even once led her to hide in a bush to avoid encountering Romanian dictator Nicolae Ceaușescu in the Buckingham Palace gardens.

And it is why Charles, on the government’s advice, will host Trump.

Laying on the royal charm

Usually, the public doesn’t see invitations for state visits, but we did see this particular letter. Signed “Yours most sincerely, Charles”, it feels particularly personal and designed to charm Trump, whose love of the British royal family is well known. The offer of an additional visit to Balmoral is a nod to the president’s mother, who was born in Scotland.

The king’s invitation seems to have done the diplomatic trick. Trump ended his meeting with Starmer by stating: “I think we could very well end up with a real trade deal where the tariffs wouldn’t be necessary”.

But the visit won’t be without controversy. In the days since, a petition asking for Trump’s invitation to be withdrawn has reached nearly 200,000 signatures. But Starmer has publicly dismissed calls to withdraw the invitation.

No doubt Charles himself is less than thrilled to invite the president, both after his recent behaviour towards Zelensky and his decision to pull the US from the Paris agreement, given the king’s advocacy on environmental issues.

Could the king raise such issues with Trump? Charles is bound by the doctrine of political neutrality: he must refrain from acting on political opinions. But that doesn’t mean there won’t be room for other senior royals not bound by the convention, like William, from doing so.

Indeed, as prince of wales, Charles himself showed opposition to controversial leaders, effectively boycotting Chinese state visits in 1999 and 2015 allegedly in support for the exiled Tibetan leader, the Dalai Lama.

The monarch plays an important diplomatic role, especially during state visits. While the leaders they host may be controversial, the monarch must respect constitutional boundaries. Nevertheless, with an outspoken king and heir, this visit could prove to be even more unprecedented than it already is.

Francesca Jackson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. The king has a tricky diplomatic role to play in inviting Trump for a state visit – https://theconversation.com/the-king-has-a-tricky-diplomatic-role-to-play-in-inviting-trump-for-a-state-visit-251308

MIL OSI – Global Reports –

March 7, 2025
MIL-OSI Africa: KCB Group and Bank of Kigali launch Pan-African Payment and Settlement System (PAPSS), enabling seamless and affordable cross-border payments across Africa

Source: Africa Press Organisation – English (2) – Report:

CAIRO, Egypt, March 6, 2025/APO Group/ —

The Pan-African Payment and Settlement System (PAPSS), launched by African Export-Import Bank (Afreximbank) (www.Afreximbank.com) in collaboration with the African Union Commission (AUC) and the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) Secretariat, has recorded a significant milestone in its journey towards enhancing financial integration and economic prosperity across Africa with the official launch of the platform by KCB Group in Kenya and Bank of Kigali in Rwanda.

The launches, by the Bank of Kigali in Kigali on 26^th February and KCB in Nairobi on 27^th February, made the two banks the first in their respective countries to integrate the transformative system into their operations, underscoring their commitment to championing intra-African trade and supporting the efforts of the AfCFTA.

KCB and Bank of Kigali customers will now be able to send and receive cross-border payments using PAPSS. The service is fully operational and accessible via the banks’ mobile applications and branch networks, enabling seamless transactions across African borders. With this launch, businesses and individuals can benefit from faster, more cost-effective, and secure payments without relying on correspondent banks or third-party currencies.

Highlighting the benefits of PAPSS to customers of KCB and Bank of Kigali, Mike Ogbalu III, CEO of PAPSS, said, “The customers will experience faster, more cost-effective, and secure cross-border transactions from the comfort of their banks’ mobile applications or through their branches. Businesses can trade more freely and competitively by eliminating the need for correspondent banks outside the continent and removing dependencies on third-party currencies. This transformation is set to unlock new opportunities for trade and investment, allowing African SMEs to access broader markets and contribute to local economies.”

Mr. Ogbalu III expressed deep gratitude to KCB and Bank of Kigali for their pioneering roles in adopting the PAPSS initiative and commended Paul Russo, KCB Group CEO, and Dr. Diane Karusisi, CEO of Bank of Kigali, “for their “visionary leadership and unwavering commitment”.

He noted that the PAPSS network, which began in 2022 in a pilot phase across the West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ), had successfully grown to include 15 central banks, over 150 commercial banks, and 14 switches, adding that the current “expansion marks a significant stride toward our goal of connecting the entire continent, ensuring that every African citizen can benefit from seamless, cost-effective cross-border transactions”.

“With only 16 per cent of Africa’s total trade occurring intra-regionally, the launch of PAPSS in Kenya and Rwanda is a significant step in unlocking the continent’s potential,” continued Mr. Ogbalu III. “We believe that this innovative financial market infrastructure will facilitate greater trade opportunities, economic growth, and financial empowerment between the Eastern African countries and the rest of Africa.”

He called on other central and commercial banks in Eastern Africa to join the PAPSS family in order to play a pivotal role in the AfCFTA as it worked to build a more prosperous and unified Africa.

Speaking on the milestone, KCB Group CEO, Paul Russo, said: “We want to play a bigger role in catalyzing trade and payments in Africa and beyond, leveraging our digital capabilities and regional footprint. Our entry into PAPSS aligns perfectly with our strategy of supporting economic growth in Kenya and across Africa by facilitating seamless financial transactions.”

Dr. Diane Karusisi, CEO of Bank of Kigali, highlighted the significance of the partnership: “This system allows people to send money quickly. For example, if someone sends Rwandan francs from Rwanda, it can reach Ghana in their local currency. The system converts the currency to meet the local requirements. Entrepreneurs in Rwanda can now receive payments instantly in Rwandan francs or USD from any member country. This service is fast, affordable, and reliable.”

MIL OSI Africa –

March 7, 2025