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Category: Middle East

  • MIL-OSI USA: New Jersey Man Admits to Concealing Material Support and Resources to ISIS

    Source: US State of California

    Kyse S. Abushanab, 27, of Budd Lake, New Jersey, pleaded guilty today to a one-count information charging him with concealing material support and resources to a designated foreign terrorist organization.

    According to court documents, between in or around March 2021 and in or around January 2022, Abushanab compiled resources, including information pertaining to the manufacture and use of weapons of mass destruction, with the aim of providing members of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS or the Islamic State), a designated foreign terrorist organization, and its supporters with a repository of information and resources to help carry out ISIS’s mission. This material included, among other things, videos and documents showing step-by-step instructions on how to make suicide belts or vests, detonators and timers, improvised bombs, and other explosives and incendiary devices. In an effort to evade detection by law enforcement, Abushanab took steps to conceal his efforts to assist ISIS by, among other things, using encrypted applications, untraceable email accounts, and a secured cloud storage space to gather and store information on how to make a variety of weapons of mass destruction.

    The charge of concealment of provision of material support carries a maximum penalty of 10 years in prison and a fine of up to $250,000. Sentencing is scheduled for Sept. 24.

    Sue Bai, head of the Justice Department’s National Security Division; Acting U.S. Attorney Vikas Khanna for the District of New Jersey; Assistant Director David J. Scott of the FBI’s Counterterrorism Division; and Acting Special Agent in Charge Terence G. Reilly of the FBI Newark Field Office made the announcement.

    The FBI is investigating the case, with valuable assistance provided by the Morris County Sheriff’s Office.

    Assistant U.S. Attorney Sammi Malek for the District of New Jersey and Trial Attorney Ryan White of the National Security Division’s Counterterrorism Section are prosecuting the case.

    MIL OSI USA News –

    March 6, 2025
  • MIL-OSI USA: PREPARED REMARKS: Sanders, Democratic Senators Force Republicans to Confront Hypocrisy on Ukraine and Putin

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Vermont – Bernie Sanders

    WASHINGTON, March 5 – Sen. Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.), alongside Sens. Chuck Schumer (D-N.Y.), Dick Durbin (D-Ill.), Chris Van Hollen (D-Md.), Richard Blumenthal (D-Conn.), Peter Welch (D-Vt.) and Michael Bennet (D-Colo.), today asked for unanimous consent on the Senate floor to pass a series of straightforward resolutions condemning Russia’s illegal, unprovoked invasion of Ukraine. The senators offered six resolutions clarifying that the United States stands with the people of Ukraine in defense of their democracy and condemns the dictator Vladimir Putin’s crimes against humanity. Republicans rose in opposition to every one. 

    The senators’ resolutions are statements of fact and principle, backed by evidence and long-standing American foreign policy, including:

    • Clarifying that Russia started the war against Ukraine.
    • Condemning Putin and Russian forces for their widespread war crimes and crimes against humanity in Ukraine.
    • Condemning Russia’s forcible abduction of at least 20,000 Ukrainian children and calls for their return to their families.
    • Reaffirming the support of the United States for Ukraine’s sovereignty in the face of Russia’s invasion.
    • Restating a simple but fundamental principle of international law and global stability: that you do not take the territory of another country by force.
    • Demanding that Putin immediately withdraw Russian forces from Ukraine, cease his attacks, and end this terrible war.

    Sanders’ remarks on the Senate floor were livestreamed here and are available below. 

    I am here tonight with colleagues who have worked extremely hard to protect the sovereignty of Ukraine and to defend democracy in that country and, in fact, throughout the world. 

    And I thank my colleagues for getting on the floor this evening and for the resolutions that they will be bringing forth. 

    M. President, I am not a historian. But I do know that for the last 250 years, since the inception of our great country, despite our imperfections, the United States has stood in the world as a symbol of democracy. And all over the world people have looked to our country as an example of freedom and self-governance to which the rest of the world could aspire. People have long looked to our Declaration of Independence and Constitution as blueprints for how to establish governments of the people, by the people and for the people. 

    M. President, tragically, all of that is now changing. As President Trump moves this country towards authoritarianism, he is aligning himself with dictators and despots who share his disdain for democracy and the rule of law. 

    Just last week, in a radical departure from long-standing U.S. policy, the Trump administration voted against a United Nations resolution which clearly stated that Russia began the horrific war in Ukraine. 

    That U.N. resolution also called on Russia to withdraw its forces from occupied Ukraine, in line with international law. The resolution was brought forward by our closest allies, including the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan and dozens of other democratic nations. Ninety-three countries at the U.N. voted YES on that resolution. 

    Rather than side with our long-standing allies to preserve democracy and uphold international law, President Trump voted with authoritarian nations like Russia, North Korea, Iran and Belarus to oppose the resolution. Many of the other opponents of that resolution are undemocratic nations propped up by Russian military aid. 

    But it wasn’t just the U.N. vote. Pathetically, President Trump also told an outrageous lie, claiming that it was Ukraine that started the war, not Russia. He also called President Zelensky a dictator, rather than the leader of a democratic nation, as he is. 

    M. President, as we discuss Ukraine tonight, it is terribly important that we not forget who Vladimir Putin is and why he is no friend of the United States, and why we should not be in an alliance with him against Ukraine. 

    Putin is the man who crushed Russia’s movement towards democracy after the end of the Cold War. Putin is a man who steals elections, murders political dissidents and crushes freedom of the press. He has maintained control in Russia by offering the oligarchs there a simple deal: If they grant him absolute power and share the spoils, he would let them steal as much as they wanted from the Russian people. The result: while the vast majority of the Russian population struggles economically, Putin and his fellow oligarchs stash trillions of dollars in offshore tax havens. 

    And so today, 26 years after he took power, Putin is the absolute ruler of Russia. And I think as everyone knows, Russia’s elections are blatantly fraudulent. A sham. 

    And Putin is the man who sparked the bloodiest war in Europe since World War II. 

    More than three years ago, on February 24, 2022, Putin ordered a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, in clear violation of the Charter of the United Nations and international law. Russian land, air and naval forces have attacked and occupied territory across Ukraine. 

    Since that terrible day, more than a million people have been killed or injured because of Putin’s war. Putin’s forces have massacred civilians and kidnapped thousands of Ukrainian children, bringing them back to Russian “re-education” camps. These atrocities led the International Criminal Court to issue an arrest warrant for Putin in 2023 as a war criminal. That’s who we are allying ourselves with. 

    And still, today, Russia continues its attacks, raining down hundreds of missiles and drones on Ukrainian cities. Russian forces illegally occupy about 20 percent of Ukraine’s sovereign territory. 

    M. President, this war could end today if Putin gave up his outrageous effort to conquer a neighboring country. The war could end today. The killing could stop right now, if Putin gave that order. 

    And that, simply, M. President, is what my resolution says to Vladimir Putin: Stop the killing. Obey international law. Withdraw your forces and cease your attacks on Ukraine. And I, honestly, don’t understand how anyone in the United States Senate could object to that simple demand. 

    M. President, now, more than at any time in recent history, it is imperative that the Senate come together in a bipartisan manner to make it clear that we stand for democracy, not authoritarianism; that we stand for international law, not conquest by force; and that we stand with Ukraine and fellow democracies throughout the world, and not with the murderous dictator of Russia. 

    MIL OSI USA News –

    March 6, 2025
  • MIL-OSI USA: Europe Subcommittee Chairman Self Delivers Opening Remarks at Hearing on Turkey

    Source: US House Committee on Foreign Affairs

    Media Contact 202-226-8467

    WASHINGTON, D.C. – Today, House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe Chairman Keith Self delivered opening remarks at subcommittee hearing titled, “Bridging the Gap: Turkey Between East and West.”

    WATCH HERE

    -Remarks-

    I welcome everyone to the first Europe subcommittee hearing. It is an honor to chair this subcommittee that deals with a dynamic and potentially dangerous environment in a crucial region for U.S. national interests. I look forward to our work as a subcommittee.

    Today, our objective is to examine Turkey’s roles in NATO and necessarily the Middle East, even though this is the Europe Subcommittee.  It will be necessary to look at Turkey’s track record in NATO and the Middle East, in order to gain perspective on their role going forward in both regions. As a NATO member, historically Turkey has operated as a member of the NATO alliance, often aligning their foreign policy interests with the goals of NATO, but in the last decade there have been some actions that don’t line up with the NATO goals.  

    Take for example the invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and the barbaric October 7th attacks on Israel in 2023. While Turkey supports most of the agenda within the NATO alliance, it did operate as NATO’s lone member refusing to condemn the actions of nefarious players in the Middle East. The world is changing quickly and Turkey’s geographic location places it at the epicenter of the most tumultuous regions as conflicts rage in Europe and the Middle East. Turkey has also assumed the position of power broker in the vacuum created by Syria’s regime change but is vexed by their unresolved issues with the Kurds going forward. The world, particularly the United States, is watching closely as Turkey decides rather or not to ease tensions with the Kurds.  America has relied on the Kurds partnership in the region and opposition to their success will be a major sticking point in Turkey’s relationship with the United States. 

    Turkey is also unique in that geographically it straddles both Europe and Asia.  It is a prominent member of the Minerals Security Partnership and could be a strategic partner for the West by operating as an alternative to Beijing. Recently, Turkey laid claim to one of the largest rare-earth element reserves in the world with a rare earth 694-million ton deposit.

    Historically, Turkey was the anchor for NATO’s Southeast corner against the old Soviet Union, but over the past decade Turkey’s commitment to anchoring that region has begun to crack. They have the second largest military in NATO – only behind the United States – which makes Turkey a key asset to the alliance, but their geographic location also makes them vulnerable to bad actors in the region. 

    I look forward to hearing testimony from our three experts today as they share their views on Turkey’s role in both Europe and the Middle East.

    ###

    MIL OSI USA News –

    March 6, 2025
  • MIL-Evening Report: OPINION: Keith Rankin – Germany’s Election 2025: Far Establishment-Right versus Far Non-Establishment-Right?

    Opinion/Analysis by Keith Rankin.

    Keith Rankin, trained as an economic historian, is a retired lecturer in Economics and Statistics. He lives in Auckland, New Zealand.

    Germany’s important election last week struggled to make the news cycle, even on Germany’s own Deutsche Welle(DW), Germany’s equivalent of Britain’s BBC. Especially (but not only) in the international media, most of the focus was on a single party (AFD, Alliance for Germany) that was never going to have the most votes and was (almost) never going to become part of the resulting government.

    Germany is the world’s third largest national economy, and traditionally dominates the politics of the European Union; an important example of this dominance was the Eurozone financial crisis of the first-half of the 2010s; a crisis that was (unsatisfactorily) resolved, thanks to a problematic and controversial program of fiscal austerity.

    At present, Germany, like New Zealand, is experiencing an economic recession. (Provisional annual economic growthwas -0.2% in 2024 and -0.3% in 2023.) The cause is similar, too, in both countries: the same ‘balance the Budget’ mentality that gave the world the Great Depression in the 1930s.

    Election Result

    The ‘winner’ of the German election was the CDU/CSU Alliance (see Wikipedia for a better presentation of the results), which works a bit like the Liberal/National Coalition in Australia. (The Christian Social Union functions in Bavaria much like Australia’s National Party functions in rural Queensland.) CDU/CSU (like National in New Zealand) comfortably prevailed with 28.5 percent of the vote, entitling that alliance to 33 percent of the seats in the Bundestag (Parliament).

    The new Chancellor (equivalent to Prime Minister) will be Friedrich Merz; a 69-year-old version of our own Christopher Luxon, as far as I can tell. He is strongly anti-Putin and pro-Israel. He has come to power well and truly under the international media radar; and will be in a strong position to exert near-absolute power, given that he will always be able to turn to the AFD (who got more votes than the Social Democrats; 20.8%) for support in the Bundestag for any measure that is not palatable to Olaf Scholz’s Social Democrats. In the new Parliament, the Greens and the Left merely make up the numbers.

    Merz’s Christian Democrats will form a coalition government with the losing SPD (Social Democratic Party, like Labour in New Zealand) who came third with 16.4 percent of the vote; 19 percent of the seats. Together these two parties of the establishment centre hold 52% of the new parliament, despite having less than 45% of the vote. (The outgoing minority government was a centrist coalition of the SPD and the Greens; the election was held early because the ACT-like Liberal Party – the FPD, Free Democrats – withdrew from the coalition. The FPD vote shrunk from 11.4 percent in 2021 to just 4.3 percent of the vote this time.)

    The result in Germany proved to be very much like that of the United Kingdom in 2024: a slide in support for the two major parties (‘the establishment centre’), a consolidation of power to the self-same establishment centre, and a shift of that establishment centre to the right. (See my chart in Germany’s stale (and still pale) political mainstream, Evening Report 27 February 2025, for a timeline of decline.) While both countries technically underwent a change of government, in both countries the establishment has entrenched its power, and in both countries the political assumptions of the power centre have shifted to the right.

    Clearly this is problematic for democracy, because historically disastrous popular support for the ‘broad church’ parties of the establishment centre has coincided with increased power to those parties, as well as policy convergence between them. Further, based on legislative electoral requirements, neither Germany nor the United Kingdom (nor the United States for that matter) will have a new government until 2029. At a time when a week is a long time in international politics, 208 weeks is an eternity. World War Three, a distinct possibility, may be in its second or third year by then.

    Voting System

    Germany represents the prototype upon which New Zealand’s MMP voting system is based. There are some differences though, and some recent changes.

    Germany calls its all-important ‘party vote’ the ‘second vote’, disguising its importance. It is possible that many German voters do not fully appreciate its significance. The electorate vote is called ‘first vote’, and winners (by a plurality, not necessarily a majority) are elected ‘directly’. The second (party) vote is understood as a top-up vote to ensure proportionality.

    Party lists are regional in Germany. And ‘ethnic parties’ may get special privileges.

    In one respect the German version is more proportional than the New Zealand version of MMP, in that it no longer allows overhang MPs. (However, the most recent result is not proportional in the important sense that two parties together with less than 45% of the vote have 52% of the seats.) In MMP, one can easily imagine an overhang situation being frequent if the ‘major’ parties, which win most electorates, only get between 16% and 29% of the party vote.

    In 2013, Germany’s Federal Constitutional Court decided that overhang seats were too big a threat to proportionality. So, they introduced ‘levelling seats’. In effect, it meant that if one party gets an overhang, then all parties get an overhang. The result was, in 2013, that a parliament that should have had 598 members (Deputies) ended up with 631, an effective overhang of 33. In 2017 that effective overhang grew to 111, and to 137 in 2021.

    For 2025, they decided to abandon overhang representation altogether, by not guaranteeing direct election through the first vote. And they fixed the size of the Bundestag to 630 Deputies, up from a base-size of 598.

    If the new German system was in place in New Zealand in 2023, then two of the Te Pati Māori electorate seats from 2023 would have been forfeit, going instead to second placed candidates; proportionality in 2023 entitled Te Pati Māori to four seats, not the six which they have. However, we should note that, if New Zealand was using the present German version of MMP, there would be no special Māori electorates, but the Māori Party would be exempt the five percent party threshold. Ethnic-privileged parties in Germany are incentivised to focus on the party vote, not the electorate vote. In Germany there is a Danish ethnic party (South Schleswig Voters’ Association) which is exempt the threshold. Its leader, Stefan Seidler, did not win his electorate. But his party got 0.15% of the nationwide vote, meaning it qualified for 0.15% of the 630 places in the Bundestag; one seat, for him.

    New Zealand voters seem to have more tactical and strategic political nous than do German voters. Thus, it has been very rare for a party in New Zealand to miss out qualifying for Parliament because of getting between 4% and 5% of the party votes (noting that both countries operate a 5% disqualification threshold). In Germany, party-vote percentages just below 5% are not uncommon. In New Zealand, voters, conscious that they want to play a role in coalition-building, actively help parties near the threshold to get over the line. (Indeed, I voted New Zealand First in 2023, because I was 99.9% sure that the only post-election coalition options would be National/ACT or National/ACT/NZF; I favoured the three-party alternative, so I used my vote strategically to help block a National/ACT government.)

    Indeed the latest German result was a bit like the latest New Zealand result, but with a party resembling New Zealand First (BSW) getting 4.972% of the vote, so getting no seats at all. BSW getting just a few more votes would have meant a substantial erosion of the two-party power result which eventuated. It is extremely difficult for new non-ethnic parties to get elected in Germany.

    In 2025, two parties scored just under five percent of the vote. As well as the BSW, the (ACT-like) Free Democrats who had been part of the previous government, and who had indeed precipitated the early election, scored 4.3%. Indeed, fifteen percent of the votes were ‘wasted’ – that is, cast for ultimately unsuccessful parties. In New Zealand the wasted vote is typically around four percent. Indeed, this high wasted vote turns out to be a more serious challenge to proportionality in German than uncompensated overhang seats.

    Both Germany and New Zealand have the contentious (in New Zealand) ‘electorate MP’ rule; the rule that’s misleadingly dubbed in New Zealand as the ‘coat-tail’ rule. (Misleading, because most MPs come in on the coat-tails of their party leadership, and always have.) In Germany the rule is stricter than in New Zealand. In order to avoid disqualification by getting less than 5% of the party vote, New Zealand requires that the party get one electorate MP. In Germany the rule (initially the same as New Zealand), since 1957 has been a requirement for three electorate MPs. In Germany in 2021, the Left Party got 4.87% of the vote and three electorate MPs; they just squeezed in, on both criteria!

    Overall, United States’ Vice-President JD Vance’s pre-election comments about democracy in Germany were valid. German politics continues to exclude the non-establishment parties of both the right and the left, despite support for these parties having been increasing for a while, and now representing the majority of German voters.

    Media Framing

    German television electoral coverage, if DW is anything to go by, is superficial; indeed, is quite insensitive to the national and local dramas taking place. I watched the coverage live. In the hour before the Exit Poll results were announced, the discussion barely mentioned the potential dramas taking place, despite both the BSW and FDP parties pre-polling only just under the five percent threshold. The state of the economy was mentioned in a perfunctory way; clearly it was not a big issue for the political class on display.

    At 6 o’clock exactly, the exit-poll results were read out, as if they were the election result. As indeed they turned out to be, more-or-less; the same as the pre-election polls. The subsequent uninterested attitude towards the actual counting of the votes was disappointing. There had been a bit of this in the 2024 UK election as well; as if the exit poll was the election result. In the UK case, Labour’s actual result (for the popular vote) was well under the exit poll result, while the Conservatives did significantly better than their exit poll tally; those facts, though, were for the nerds and psephologists.

    In my observation, early votes and exit polls favour the parties supported by the political class; election day votes much less so. So, in New Zealand in 2023 it was initially looking like there would be a two-party coalition of the right. But, to the attentive, as the night wore on, the National Party percentage fell from 41% to 38%, meaning that NZF would have to be included in any resulting coalition.

    I suspected something quite similar would happen in Germany, and I was only partially wrong. The exit poll results, and the subsequent counts, were presented to just one decimal place; indeed, the presentation of the numbers was very poor throughout. So, it was hard to see to what extent BSW was improving as the votes were counted.

    In the exit poll, two parties – FPD and BSW – were shown as being on 4.7%, and the AFD was on 19.5%. So, the two 4.7% parties were largely written out of the subsequent discussion. We did see an early concession by the FPD, who – representing a segment of the political class – understood the polling dynamics rather well. And we did see the AFD’s Alice Weidel being asked if she was disappointed to get under 20%. Ms Weidel put on a brave face, but she did seem disappointed. When the votes were actually counted, her party got 20.8% exactly on Weidel’s prior expectations.

    BSW was completely ignored. There was simply no interest in the possibility that they might reach the 5% threshold, even when the vote count had them upto 4.9%. In the end BSW reached 4.972%; so close! Out of sight, out of mind! In the official results the BSW were lumped with ‘Other Parties’. The DW election panel were too unaware to make any comments about the party itself, its philosophies, or how its possible success might influence the process of forming a coalition government. (Of particular importance was that, with just a few more votes, BSW might have given Eastern Germany a voice in a three-way coalition government.)

    For DW, their perennial concern is the place of Germany within Europe and the World; they had little time to give the outside world a glimpse into the domestic lives and politics of ordinary Germans. And we heard nothing about the ‘ethnic vote’, the privileged Denmark Party notwithstanding. I suspect that many if not most of the recent immigrants who do much of the work in Germany either could not vote or did not vote. The election was about them, not for them; denizens, not citizens.

    However, DW did invite on a gentleman who mildly focussed the attention of the discussants by suggesting that one of the priorities of the new Chancellor – Friedrich Merz – would be to acquire nuclear weapons! I don’t think the rest of the world had any prior insights into that; ordinary Germans were probably equally in the dark.

    Who is Friedrich Merz? Who knows? It turns out that he dropped out of politics for a while, to play a leading role in BlackRock, the international acquisitions company which until recently owned New Zealand’s SolarZero (refer Update on SolarZero Liquidation by BlackRock, Scoop, 29 January 2025). Our media told us that the election was all about the “far-right” AFD Party; that is, the far non-establishment-right. We in New Zealand heard nothing about the far establishment-right; the shadowy man (or his party). Some now fear Merz will be an out-and-out warmonger. Even Al Jazeera, which can be relied upon to cover many stories about places New Zealand’s media barely touches (and in a bit more depth), had the portraits of Olaf Scholz and Alice Weidel on the screen, on 22 February, the day before the election, despite the certainty that Merz world become the new Chancellor.

    In that vein, I heard a German woman interviewed in Christchurch, on RNZ on 25 February. She, disappointed with the election result, spent her whole edited four minutes railing about the AFD, as if the AFD had won. There was no useful commentary, by her or RNZ, of the actual result of Germany’s election.

    Are we so shallow that we don’t care; that some of us with the loudest voices only want to rail against a non-establishment party, and to see the democratic support for alternative parties as being somehow anti-democratic?

    East Germany

    People of a certain age in New Zealand will remember the former East Germany; the DDR, German ‘Democratic’ Republic. Most people in Germany itself will have had knowledge of it, including the Berlin-based political staff of DW who were mostly in their thirties, forties and fifties. But the ongoing issues of Eastern Germany were barely in their mindframes.

    In Eastern Germany – the former DDR – (especially outside of Berlin), support for the AFD was close to 40%, for BSW over 10%, and the Left much higher than in Western Germany. In the former East Berlin (which I visited in 1974), the Left seems to have been the most popular party. Support in the East for the establishment parties combined was between 25% and 30%, and with a lower turnout.

    BSW, it turns out, is Left on economic policy and Right on social policy. And, in the German discourse, is categorised by the political class as ‘pro-Putin’. If BSW had got 5% of the vote, Merz could have tried to bring them into his government; or Merz might have turned to the Green Party instead of a ‘pro-Putin’ party. But I cannot see even the German Greens being able to govern as a junior partner to a belligerent establishment-right CDU-led government. BSW’s failure to get 5% of the vote may turn out to be one of the great ‘might-have-beens’ of Germany’s future history.

    As JD Vance stated, this Eastern German situation poses a danger for democracy in Germany and in Europe. Eastern Germany is where the German state is at its most vulnerable. The majority of voters there have voted for ‘pro-Putin’ parties; and, significantly, parties prioritising the problems of economic failure over the big-politics of extranational power-plays.

    The new German government, it would seem, is set to aggravate (or, at best, ignore) the problems of Germany’s ‘near-East’, while setting out to inflame the problems of Europe’s ‘far-East’.

    The Debt Brake

    This is Germany’s equivalent of Ruth Richardson’s 1994 ‘Fiscal Responsibility Act’ (now entrenched in New Zealand law and lore). This is the major single reason why New Zealand has had so many infrastructure problems this century, and why so many young men and families emigrated to Australia in the 1990s, with some of these emigrants coming back to New Zealand in recent years as ‘501s’.

    The Merkel debt-brake is the self-inflicted single major reason why many European economies are in such a mess today; and Germany in particular. Germany is congenitally deeply committed to all kinds of financial austerity, with government financial austerity being the most ingrained. Rather than circulating as it should, money is concentrating. The debt-brake is “a German constitutional rule introduced [in 2009] during the Global Financial crisis to enforce budget discipline and reduce [public] debt loads in the country” (see Berlin Briefing, below).

    Germany still has a parliamentary session under the old Parliament, before the new parliament convenes. Michaela Küfner (see Berlin Briefing, below) suggests the possibility that the old “lame duck” Parliament could remove the debt-brake from the German constitution, because she sees the make-up of the new more right-wing parliament as being less amenable to address this ‘elephant in the room’. Seems democratically dodgy to me, even talking about pushing dramatic constitutional legislation through a ‘lame duck’ parliament; like Robert Muldoon, pushing through a two-year parliamentary term for New Zealand in the week after the 1984 election!

    (Two-year parliamentary terms are not unknown, by the way; the United States has a two-year term for its Congress. This is almost never mentioned when we discuss the parliamentary term in New Zealand. In the United States at present, there will be many people for whom the 2026 election cannot come fast enough; an opportunity to reign-in Donald Trump.)

    Future German relations with the United States

    On 27 February (28 Feb, New Zealand time) – before the fiasco in the White House on 28 February – I watched Berlin Briefing on DW. This programme is a regular panel discussion of the political editorship of Deutsche Welle.

    The context here is that Friedrich Merz made an important speech the evening after the election; a speech that had the Berlin beltway – “people behind the scenes here in Berlin” – all agog. Merz said: “For me the absolute priority will be strengthening Germany so much so that we can achieve [defence] independence from the United States.”

    The discussion proceeded as follows:

    “How important is this anchoring in Nato of the idea of the United States as ‘The Great Protector’?” Nina Haase, DW political correspondent: “I don’t think there’s a word, ‘massive’ is not enough; people behind the scenes here in Berlin … they talk about are we going to part with the United States amicably or are we going to become enemies [my emphasis] … Europe has relied on the US so much since the Second World War is completely new thinking; just to prepare for a scenario with, if you will, would-be enemies on two sides; in the East with Russia launching a hybrid attack     and then [an enemy] in the West as well.” They go on to talk about the possible need for conscription in Germany.

    The political correspondents were talking like bourgeois brat adult children who had expected that they should be able to enjoy a power-lifestyle underwritten by ‘big daddy’ always there as a financial and security backstop; and just realising that the rug of entitlement might be being pulled from under them. Michaela Küfner (Chief Political Editor of DW) goes on to talk about an “existential threat from the United States”, meaning the withdrawal (and potential enmity) of the great protector. “Like your Rich Uncle from across the ocean turning against you”, she said.

    Nina Haase: “Pacifism, the very word, needs to be redefined in Germany … Germans are only now able to understand that you have to have weapons in order not to use them.” She was referring to earlier generations of pacifists (like me) who saw weapons as the problem, not the solution.

    Ulrike Franke: “Everything needs to change for everything to stay the same”, basically saying Germany itself may have to pursue domestic Rich Uncle policies to maintain the lifestyles of the (entitled) ten percenters.

    Michaela Küfner, towards the end of the discussion: “The AFD is framing [the supporters of] the parties which will make up the coming coalition as the political class who we will challenge”. And she noted, but only at the very end of the long discussion, that the effectively disenfranchised people in Eastern Germany are “a lot more Russia-friendly”.

    Maybe Merz has a plan to build employment-rich munitions factories in Eastern Germany, to address both his security concerns and the obvious political discontent arising from unemployment and fast-eroding living standards? But Merz will have to abandon his innate fiscal conservatism before he can even contemplate that; can he do a Hoover to Hitler transition? Rearmament was Hitler’s game; his means to full employment after the Depression.

    Implications for Democracy

    I sense that Friedrich Merz will become the face of coming German politics, just as Angela Merkel once was, and as Trump and Starmer are very much the faces of government in their countries; becoming – albeit through democratic means – similar to the autocrats that, in Eastern and Middle-Eastern countries, they [maybe not Trump] rail against.

    We might note that if we look carefully at World War One and World War Two, the core conflict was Germany versus Russia. Will World War Three be the same? And which side will ‘we’ (or ‘US’) be on? In WW1 and WW2, we were on Russia’s side. (Hopefully, in the future, we can be neutral with respect to other countries’ conflicts.)

    Democracy is under strain worldwide. The diminishing establishment-centre – the political and economic elites and the people with secure employment and housing who still vote for familiar major parties – is clinging on to power, and for the time-being remains more powerful than ever in Europe.

    In the Europe of the early 1930s, it was the Great Depression as a period of abject political failure that resulted in the suspension of democracy. All the signs are that the same failures of democratic leadership – worldwide from the 1920s – will bring about similar consequences.

    For democracies to save themselves, they should bring non-establishment voices to the table. In 2025. Germany will be another important test case, already sowing the seeds of political failure. We should be wary of demonising the far non-establishment-right while lionising the far establishment-right.

    *******

    Keith Rankin (keith at rankin dot nz), trained as an economic historian, is a retired lecturer in Economics and Statistics. He lives in Auckland, New Zealand.

    Ref.

    MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

    March 6, 2025
  • MIL-Evening Report: Australian university workers: ‘We will not be silenced over Palestine’

    SPECIAL REPORT: By Markela Panegyres and Jonathan Strauss in Sydney

    The new Universities Australia (UA) definition of antisemitism, endorsed last month for adoption by 39 Australian universities, is an ugly attempt to quash the pro-Palestine solidarity movement on campuses and to silence academics, university workers and students who critique Israel and Zionism.

    While the Scott Morrison Coalition government first proposed tightening the definition, and a recent joint Labor-Coalition parliamentary committee recommended the same, it is yet another example of the Labor government’s overreach.

    It seeks to mould discussion in universities to one that suits its pro-US and pro-Zionist imperialist agenda, while shielding Israel from accountability.

    So far, the UA definition has been widely condemned.

    Nasser Mashni, of Australia Palestine Advocacy Network, has slammed it as “McCarthyism reborn”.

    The Jewish Council of Australia (JCA) has criticised it as “dangerous, politicised and unworkable”. The NSW Council of Civil Liberties said it poses “serious risks to freedom of expression and academic freedom”.

    The UA definition comes in the context of a war against Palestinian activism on campuses.

    The false claim that antisemitism is “rampant” across universities has been weaponised to subdue the Palestinian solidarity movement within higher education and, particularly, to snuff out any repeat of the student-led Gaza solidarity encampments, which sprung up on campuses across the country last year.

    Some students and staff who have been protesting against the genocide since October 2023 have come under attack by university managements.

    Some students have been threatened with suspension and many universities are giving themselves, through new policies, more powers to liaise with police and surveil students and staff.

    Palestinian, Arab and Muslim academics, as well as other anti-racist scholars, have been silenced and disciplined, or face legal action on false counts of antisemitism, merely for criticising Israel’s genocidal war on Palestine.

    Randa Abdel-Fattah, for example, has become the target of a Zionist smear campaign that has successfully managed to strip her of Australian Research Council funding.

    Intensify repression
    The UA definition will further intensify the ongoing repression of people’s rights on campuses to discuss racism, apartheid and occupation in historic Palestine.

    By its own admission, UA acknowledges that its definition is informed by the antisemitism taskforces at Columbia University, Stanford University, Harvard University and New York University, which have meted out draconian and violent repression of pro-Palestine activism.

    The catalyst for the new definition was the February 12 report tabled by Labor MP Josh Burns on antisemitism on Australian campuses. That urged universities to adopt a definition of antisemitism that “closely aligns” with the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) definition.

    It should be noted that the controversial IHRA definition has been opposed by the National Tertiary Education Union (NTEU) for its serious challenge to academic freedom.

    As many leading academics and university workers, including Jewish academics, have repeatedly stressed, criticism of Israel and criticism of Zionism is not antisemitic.

    UA’s definition is arguably more detrimental to freedom of speech and pro-Palestine activism and scholarship than the IHRA definition.

    In the vague IHRA definition, a number of examples of antisemitism are given that conflate criticism of Israel with antisemitism, but not the main text itself.

    By contrast, the new UA definition overtly equates criticism of Israel and Zionism with antisemitism and claims Zionist ideology is a component part of Jewish identity.

    The definition states that “criticism of Israel can be anti-Semitic . . . when it calls for the elimination of the State of Israel”.

    Dangerously, anyone advocating for a single bi-national democratic state in historic Palestine will be labelled antisemitic under this new definition.

    Anyone who justifiably questions the right of the ethnonationalist, apartheid and genocidal state of Israel to exist will be accused of antisemitism.

    Sweeping claims
    The UA definition also makes the sweeping claim that “for most, but not all Jewish Australians, Zionism is a core part of their Jewish identity”.

    But, as the JCA points out, Zionism is a national political ideology and is not a core part of Jewish identity historically or today, since many Jews do not support Zionism. The JCA warns that the UA definition “risks fomenting harmful stereotypes that all Jewish people think in a certain way”.

    Moreover, JCA said, Jewish identities are already “a rightly protected category under all racial discrimination laws, whereas political ideologies such as Zionism and support for Israel are not”.

    Like other aspects of politics, political ideologies, such as Zionism, and political stances, such as support for Israel, should be able to be discussed critically.

    According to the UA definition, criticism of Israel can be antisemitic “when it holds Jewish individuals or communities responsible for Israel’s actions”.

    While it would be wrong for any individual or community, because they are Jewish, to be held responsible for Israel’s actions, it is a fact that the International Criminal Court (ICC) has issued arrest warrants for Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his former  minister Yoav Gallant for Israel’s war crimes and crimes against humanity.

    But under the UA definition, since Netanyahu and Gallant are Jewish, would holding them responsible be considered antisemitic?

    Is the ICC antisemitic? According to Israel it is.

    The implication of the definition for universities, which teach law and jurisprudence, is that international law should not be applied to the Israeli state, because it is antisemitic to do so.

    The UA’s definition is vague enough to have a chilling effect on any academic who wants to teach about genocide, apartheid and settler-colonialism. It states that “criticism of Israel can be antisemitic when it is grounded in harmful tropes, stereotypes or assumptions”.

    What these are is not defined.

    Anti-racism challenge
    Within the academy, there is a strong tradition of anti-racism and decolonial scholarship, particularly the concept of settler colonialism, which, by definition, calls into question the very notion of “statehood”.

    With this new definition of antisemitism, will academics be prevented from teaching students the works of Chelsea Watego, Patrick Wolfe or Edward Said?

    The definition will have serious and damaging repercussions for decolonial scholars and severely impinges the rights of scholars, in particular First Nations scholars and students, to critique empire and colonisation.

    UA is the “peak body” for higher education in Australia, and represents and lobbies for capitalist class interests in higher education.

    It is therefore not surprising that it has developed this particular definition, given its strong bilateral relations with Israeli higher education, including signing a 2013 memorandum of understanding with Association of University Heads, Israel.

    It should be noted that the NTEU National Council last October called on UA to withdraw from this as part of its Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions resolution.

    All university students and staff committed to anti-racism, academic freedom and freedom of speech should join the campaign against the UA definition.

    Local NTEU branches and student groups are discussing and passing motions rejecting the new definition and NTEU for Palestine has called a National Day of Action for March 26 with that as one of its key demands.

    We will not be silenced on Palestine.

    Jonathan Strauss and Markela Panegyres are members of the National Tertiary Education Union and the Socialist Alliance. Republished from Green Left with permission.

    MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

    March 6, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Security: New Jersey Man Admits to Concealing Material Support and Resources to ISIS

    Source: United States Attorneys General 7

    Kyse S. Abushanab, 27, of Budd Lake, New Jersey, pleaded guilty today to a one-count information charging him with concealing material support and resources to a designated foreign terrorist organization.

    According to court documents, between in or around March 2021 and in or around January 2022, Abushanab compiled resources, including information pertaining to the manufacture and use of weapons of mass destruction, with the aim of providing members of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS or the Islamic State), a designated foreign terrorist organization, and its supporters with a repository of information and resources to help carry out ISIS’s mission. This material included, among other things, videos and documents showing step-by-step instructions on how to make suicide belts or vests, detonators and timers, improvised bombs, and other explosives and incendiary devices. In an effort to evade detection by law enforcement, Abushanab took steps to conceal his efforts to assist ISIS by, among other things, using encrypted applications, untraceable email accounts, and a secured cloud storage space to gather and store information on how to make a variety of weapons of mass destruction.

    The charge of concealment of provision of material support carries a maximum penalty of 10 years in prison and a fine of up to $250,000. Sentencing is scheduled for Sept. 24.

    Sue Bai, head of the Justice Department’s National Security Division; Acting U.S. Attorney Vikas Khanna for the District of New Jersey; Assistant Director David J. Scott of the FBI’s Counterterrorism Division; and Acting Special Agent in Charge Terence G. Reilly of the FBI Newark Field Office made the announcement.

    The FBI is investigating the case, with valuable assistance provided by the Morris County Sheriff’s Office.

    Assistant U.S. Attorney Sammi Malek for the District of New Jersey and Trial Attorney Ryan White of the National Security Division’s Counterterrorism Section are prosecuting the case.

    MIL Security OSI –

    March 6, 2025
  • MIL-Evening Report: Elon Musk thinks the US should leave the UN – what if Trump does it?

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Chris Ogden, Associate Professor in Global Studies, University of Auckland, Waipapa Taumata Rau

    Getty Images

    When Donald Trump’s benefactor and cost-cutter-in-chief Elon Musk recently supported a call for the United States to quit NATO and the United Nations, it should perhaps have been more surprising.

    But the first months of the second Trump presidency have already seen key parts of the current international order undermined. Musk’s position fits a general pattern.

    Aside from the tilt towards a multipolar world order, the US now refuses to recognise the International Criminal Court, has slashed its foreign aid contributions, and has withdrawn from the World Health Organization, the UN Human Rights Council and the Palestinian relief agency UNRWA.

    With Trump’s domestic politics displaying a clear autocratic edge, the rejection of the founding principles and ideals of the UN comes into sharper relief. The intolerant and impatient negotiating approach he displayed with Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky also belies a disregard for cooperative and consensus-based diplomacy.

    The drive to slash the federal deficit dovetails with this general abandonment of expensive international commitments. If the Trump regime follows through on its apparent strategy of manufacturing crises to advance its agenda, then leaving the UN entirely is a logical next step.

    Undermined ideals

    This is all in stark contrast to the central role the UN has traditionally played within the US-led international order since 1945.

    Along with other institutions, the UN allowed the US to shape the international system in its own image and spread its domestic values and interests across the world. Along with NATO, the UN was designed as a global security institution to produce global stability.

    In theory at least, the political and economic values of the US and other democracies enabled the construction of the postwar order. According to political scientist John Ikenberry, this was based on “multilateralism, alliance partnerships, strategic restraint, cooperative security, and institutional and rule-based relationships”.

    But by the 21st century, US actions had undermined many of these principles. The US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 bypassed the authority of the UN, causing then secretary-general Kofi Annan to declare that “from the charter point of view [the invasion] was illegal”.

    This undermined the legitimacy of the UN and America’s place within it. But it also diminished the organisation as a force for maintaining international security and national sovereignty in global affairs.

    The subsequent human rights violations by the US through its use of rendition, torture and detention at facilities such as Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib further weakened the UN’s credibility as a protector of liberal international values.

    The US has also been a regular non-payer of UN fees, owing US$2.8 billion in early 2025. And it is one of the lowest contribtuors of military and police personnel to UN peacekeeping operations, despite paying nearly 27% of the overall budget.

    US versus UN

    Since the 1990s, several Republican politicians have argued for the US to withdraw entirely from the UN. In 1997, senator Ron Paul introduced the American Sovereignty Restoration Act, aimed at ending UN membership, expelling the UN headquarters from New York and ending US funding.

    Although it received minimal support and never reached committee hearings, Paul reintroduced the act in every congressional session until his 2011 retirement. It was then taken up by other Republicans, including Paul Broun and Mike Rogers.

    In December 2023, senator Mike Lee and representative Chip Roy led the introduction of the “Disengaging Entirely from the United Nations Debacle (DEFUND) Act”.

    Roy referenced the perceived negative treatment of Israel, the promotion of China, “the propagation of climate hysteria” and the US$12.5 billion in annual payments. Lee added:

    Americans’ hard-earned dollars have been funnelled into initiatives that fly in the face of our values – enabling tyrants, betraying allies, and spreading bigotry.

    Public polling in 2024 also showed only 52% of Americans had a favourable view of the UN. This opposition has deeper historical roots, too.

    In 1920, US isolationists blocked the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles, and with it US participation in the League of Nations (the predecessor to the United Nations). Although the US would interact with the League of Nations until the UN’s formation in 1945, it never became an official member.

    Criticism of the UN also has a bipartisan angle, with the US withdrawing funding of UNRWA in 2024 during Joe Biden’s presidency after Israel accused the agency of links to Hamas.

    A diminished UN

    If Trump harnesses these historical and modern forces to pull the US out of the UN, it would fundamentally – and likely irrevocably – undermine what has been a central pillar of the current international order.

    It would also increase US isolationism, reduce Western influence, and legitimise alternative security bodies. These include the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, which the US could potentially join, especially given Russia and India are both members.

    More broadly, the reduced influence of the UN will endanger general peace and security in the international sphere, and the wider protection and promotion of human rights.

    There would be greater unpredictability in global affairs, and the world would be a more dangerous place. For countries big and small, a UN without the US will force new strategic calculations and create new alliances and blocs, as the world leaps into the unknown.

    Chris Ogden is a Senior Research Fellow with The Foreign Policy Centre, London.

    – ref. Elon Musk thinks the US should leave the UN – what if Trump does it? – https://theconversation.com/elon-musk-thinks-the-us-should-leave-the-un-what-if-trump-does-it-251483

    MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

    March 6, 2025
  • MIL-OSI: Descartes Announces Fiscal 2025 Fourth Quarter and Annual Financial Results

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Record Income from Operations

    WATERLOO, Ontario and ATLANTA, March 05, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — The Descartes Systems Group Inc. (TSX:DSG) (Nasdaq:DSGX) announced its financial results for its fiscal 2025 fourth quarter (Q4FY25) and year (FY25) ended January 31, 2025. All financial results referenced are in United States (US) currency and, unless otherwise indicated, are determined in accordance with US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP).

    “Fiscal 2025 was another year of growth for Descartes, highlighted by the addition of numerous complementary services to the Global Logistics Network,” said Edward J. Ryan, Descartes’ CEO. “We believe these investments can help shippers, carriers, and logistics services providers manage the increased uncertainty and complexity that’s recently been introduced to the global trade environment. Our customers benefit from our diversity in international and domestic supply chains, our expertise with tariffs, sanctions and other global trade issues, and our expansive roster of connected trading partners as they navigate a quickly evolving trade landscape.”

    FY25 Financial Results
    As described in more detail below, key financial highlights for Descartes’ FY25 included:

    • Revenues of $651.0 million, up 14% from $572.9 million in the same period a year ago (FY24);
    • Revenues were comprised of services revenues of $590.2 million (91% of total revenues), professional services and other revenues of $55.1 million (8% of total revenues) and license revenues of $5.7 million (1% of total revenues). Services revenues were up 13% from $520.9 million in FY24;
    • Cash provided by operating activities of $219.3 million, up 6% from $207.7 million in FY24. Cash provided by operating activities was negatively impacted in FY25 by the payment of $25.0 million in contingent acquisition consideration for previously completed deals, which was not accrued for at the time of acquisition;
    • Income from operations of $181.1 million, up 27% from $142.8 million in FY24;
    • Net income of $143.3 million, up 24% from $115.9 million in FY24. Net income as a percentage of revenues was 22%, compared to 20% in FY24;
    • Earnings per share on a diluted basis of $1.64, up 22% from $1.34 in FY24; and
    • Adjusted EBITDA of $284.7 million, up 15% from $247.5 million in FY24. Adjusted EBITDA as a percentage of revenues was 44%, compared to 43% in FY24.

    Adjusted EBITDA and Adjusted EBITDA as a percentage of revenues are non-GAAP financial measures provided as a complement to financial results presented in accordance with GAAP. We define Adjusted EBITDA as earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, amortization, stock-based compensation (for which we include related fees and taxes) and other charges (for which we include restructuring charges, acquisition-related expenses, and contingent consideration incurred due to better-than-expected performance from acquisitions). These items are considered by management to be outside Descartes’ ongoing operational results. We define Adjusted EBITDA as a percentage of revenues as the quotient, expressed as a percentage, from dividing Adjusted EBITDA for a period by revenues for the corresponding period. A reconciliation of Adjusted EBITDA and Adjusted EBITDA as a percentage of revenues to net income determined in accordance with GAAP is provided later in this release.

    The following table summarizes Descartes’ results in the categories specified below over FY25 and FY24 (dollar amounts in millions):

      FY25
      FY24  
    Revenues 651.0   572.9  
    Services revenues 590.2   520.9  
    Gross margin 76 % 76 %
    Cash provided by operating activities* 219.3   207.7  
    Income from operations 181.1   142.8  
    Net income 143.3   115.9  
    Net income as a % of revenues 22 % 20 %
    Earnings per diluted share 1.64   1.34  
    Adjusted EBITDA 284.7   247.5  
    Adjusted EBITDA as a % of revenues 44 % 43 %
             

    (*) FY25 cash provided by operating activities was negatively impacted by the payment of $25.0 million in contingent acquisition consideration for previously completed deals, which was not accrued for at the time of acquisition but was paid due to post-acquisition performance exceeding expectations at the time of acquisition

    Q4FY25 Financial Results
    As described in more detail below, key financial highlights for Q4FY25 included:

    • Revenues of $167.5 million, up 13% from $148.2 million in the fourth quarter of fiscal 2024 (Q4FY24) and down from $168.8 million in the previous quarter (Q3FY25);
    • Revenues were comprised of services revenues of $156.5 million (93% of total revenues), professional services and other revenues of $10.7 million (6% of total revenues) and license revenues of $0.3 million (1% of total revenues). Services revenues were up 15% from $135.7 million in Q4FY24 and up 5% from $149.7 million in Q3FY25;
    • Cash provided by operating activities of $60.7 million, up 19% from $50.8 million in Q4FY24 and up 1% from $60.1 million in Q3FY25;
    • Income from operations of $47.1 million, up 27% from $37.0 million in Q4FY24 and up 3% from $45.8 million in Q3FY25;
    • Net income of $37.4 million, up 18% from $31.8 million in Q4FY24 and up 2% from $36.6 million in Q3FY25. Net income as a percentage of revenues was 22%, compared to 21% in Q4FY24 and 22% in Q3FY25;
    • Earnings per share on a diluted basis of $0.43, up 16% from $0.37 in Q4FY24 and up 2% from $0.42 in Q3FY25; and
    • Adjusted EBITDA of $75.0 million, up 14% from $65.7 million in Q4FY24 and up 4% from $72.1 million in Q3FY25. Adjusted EBITDA as a percentage of revenues was 45%, compared to 44% in Q4FY24 and 43% in Q3FY25, respectively.

    The following table summarizes Descartes’ results in the categories specified below over the past 5 fiscal quarters (unaudited; dollar amounts, other than per share amounts, in millions):

      Q4
    FY25
      Q3
    FY25
      Q2
    FY25
      Q1
    FY25
      Q4
    FY24
     
    Revenues 167.5   168.8   163.4   151.3   148.2  
    Services revenues 156.5   149.7   146.2   137.8   135.7  
    Gross margin 76 % 74 % 75 % 77 % 76 %
    Cash provided by operating activities* 60.7   60.1   34.7   63.7   50.8  
    Income from operations 47.1   45.8   45.9   42.4   37.0  
    Net income 37.4   36.6   34.7   34.7   31.8  
    Net income as a % of revenues 22 % 22 % 21 % 23 % 21 %
    Earnings per diluted share 0.43   0.42   0.40   0.40   0.37  
    Adjusted EBITDA 75.0   72.1   70.6   67.0   65.7  
    Adjusted EBITDA as a % of revenues 45 % 43 % 43 % 44 % 44 %
                         

    (*) Q2FY25 cash provided by operating activities was negatively impacted by the payment of $25.0 million in contingent acquisition consideration for previously completed deals, which was not accrued for at the time of acquisition but was paid due to post-acquisition performance exceeding expectations at the time of acquisition

    Cash Position
    At January 31, 2025, Descartes had $236.1 million in cash. Cash increased by $54.8 million in Q4FY25 and decreased by $84.9 million in FY25. The table set forth below provides a summary of cash flows for Q4FY25 and FY25 in millions of dollars:

      Q4FY25   FY25  
    Cash provided by operating activities 60.7   219.3  
    Additions to property and equipment (2.1 ) (6.8 )
    Acquisitions of subsidiaries, net of cash acquired (3.7 ) (290.2 )
    Payment of debt issuance costs   (0.1 )
    Issuances of common shares, net of issuance costs 2.5   12.4  
    Payment of withholding taxes on net share settlements –   (6.7 )
    Payment of contingent consideration –   (9.2 )
    Effect of foreign exchange rate on cash (2.6 ) (3.6 )
    Net change in cash 54.8   (84.9 )
    Cash, beginning of period 181.3   321.0  
    Cash, end of period 236.1   236.1  
             

    Conference Call
    Descartes’ executive management team will hold a conference call to discuss the company’s financial results at 5:30 PM ET on Wednesday, March 5. Designated numbers are +1 289 514 5100 or +1 800 717 1738 for North America Toll-Free, using Passcode 45440#.

    The company will simultaneously conduct an audio webcast on the Descartes website at https://www.descartes.com/who-we-are/investor-relations/financial-information. Phone conference dial-in or webcast login is required approximately 10 minutes beforehand.

    Replays of the conference call will be available until March 12, 2025, by dialing +1 289 819 1325 or Toll-Free for North America using +1 888 660 6264 with Playback Passcode: 45440#. An archived replay of the webcast will be available at https://www.descartes.com/who-we-are/investor-relations/financial-information.

    About Descartes

    Descartes (Nasdaq:DSGX) (TSX:DSG) is the global leader in providing on-demand, software-as-a-service solutions focused on improving the productivity, security and sustainability of logistics-intensive businesses. Customers use our modular, software-as-a-service solutions to route, track and help improve the safety, performance and compliance of delivery resources; plan, allocate and execute shipments; rate, audit and pay transportation invoices; access global trade data; file customs and security documents for imports and exports; and complete numerous other logistics processes by participating in the world’s largest, collaborative multimodal logistics community. Our headquarters are in Waterloo, Ontario, Canada and we have offices and partners around the world. Learn more at www.descartes.com, and connect with us on LinkedIn and X (Twitter).

    Descartes Investor Contact
    Laurie McCauley
    (519) 746-2969
    investor@descartes.com

    Cautionary Statement Regarding Forward-Looking Statements

    This release may contain forward-looking information within the meaning of applicable securities laws (“forward-looking statements”) that relates to Descartes’ expectations concerning future revenues and earnings, and our projections for any future reductions in expenses or growth in margins and generation of cash; our assessment of the potential impact of geopolitical events, such as the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine (the “Russia-Ukraine Conflict”), and between Israel and Hamas (“Israel-Hamas Conflict”), or other potentially catastrophic events, on our business, results of operations and financial condition; continued growth and acquisitions including our assessment of any increased opportunity for our products and services as a result of trends in the logistics and supply chain industries; rate of profitable growth and Adjusted EBITDA margin operating range; demand for Descartes’ solutions; growth of Descartes’ Global Logistics Network (“GLN”); customer buying patterns; customer expectations of Descartes; development of the GLN and the benefits thereof to customers; and other matters. These forward-looking statements are based on certain assumptions including the following: global shipment volumes continuing at levels generally consistent with those experienced historically; the Russia-Ukraine Conflict and Israel-Hamas Conflict not having a material negative impact on shipment volumes or on the demand for the products and services of Descartes by its customers and the ability of those customers to continue to pay for those products and services; countries continuing to implement and enforce existing and additional customs and security regulations relating to the provision of electronic information for imports and exports; countries continuing to implement and enforce existing and additional trade restrictions and sanctioned party lists with respect to doing business with certain countries, organizations, entities and individuals; Descartes’ continued operation of a secure and reliable business network; the stability of general economic and market conditions, currency exchange rates, and interest rates; equity and debt markets continuing to provide Descartes with access to capital; Descartes’ continued ability to identify and source attractive and executable business combination opportunities; Descartes’ ability to develop solutions that keep pace with the continuing changes in technology, and our continued compliance with third party intellectual property rights. These assumptions may prove to be inaccurate. Such forward-looking statements involve known and unknown risks, uncertainties and other factors that may cause the actual results, performance or achievements of Descartes, or developments in Descartes’ business or industry, to differ materially from the anticipated results, performance or achievements or developments expressed or implied by such forward-looking statements. Such factors include, but are not limited to, Descartes’ ability to successfully identify and execute on acquisitions and to integrate acquired businesses and assets, and to predict expenses associated with and revenues from acquisitions; the impact of network failures, information security breaches or other cyber-security threats; disruptions in the movement of freight and a decline in shipment volumes including as a result of contagious illness outbreaks; a deterioration of general economic conditions or instability in the financial markets accompanied by a decrease in spending by our customers; the ability to attract and retain key personnel and the ability to manage the departure of key personnel and the transition of our executive management team; changes in trade or transportation regulations that currently require customers to use services such as those offered by Descartes; changes in customer behaviour and expectations; Descartes’ ability to successfully design and develop enhancements to our products and solutions; departures of key customers; the impact of foreign currency exchange rates; Descartes’ ability to retain or obtain sufficient capital in addition to its debt facility to execute on its business strategy, including its acquisition strategy; disruptions in the movement of freight; the potential for future goodwill or intangible asset impairment as a result of other-than-temporary decreases in Descartes’ market capitalization; and other factors and assumptions discussed in the section entitled, “Certain Factors That May Affect Future Results” in documents filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Ontario Securities Commission and other securities commissions across Canada, including Descartes’ most recently filed Management’s Discussion and Analysis. If any such risks actually occur, they could materially adversely affect our business, financial condition or results of operations. In that case, the trading price of our common shares could decline, perhaps materially. Readers are cautioned not to place undue reliance upon any such forward-looking statements, which speak only as of the date made. Forward-looking statements are provided for the purpose of providing information about management’s current expectations and plans relating to the future. Readers are cautioned that such information may not be appropriate for other purposes. We do not undertake or accept any obligation or undertaking to release publicly any updates or revisions to any forward-looking statements to reflect any change in our expectations or any change in events, conditions or circumstances on which any such statement is based, except as required by law.

    Reconciliation of Non-GAAP Financial Measures – Adjusted EBITDA and Adjusted EBITDA as a percentage of revenues

    We prepare and release quarterly unaudited and annual audited financial statements prepared in accordance with GAAP. We also disclose and discuss certain non-GAAP financial information, used to evaluate our performance, in this and other earnings releases and investor conference calls as a complement to results provided in accordance with GAAP. We believe that current shareholders and potential investors in our company use non-GAAP financial measures, such as Adjusted EBITDA and Adjusted EBITDA as a percentage of revenues, in making investment decisions about our company and measuring our operational results.

    The term “Adjusted EBITDA” refers to a financial measure that we define as earnings before certain charges that management considers to be non-operating expenses and which consist of interest, taxes, depreciation, amortization, stock-based compensation (for which we include related fees and taxes) and other charges (for which we include restructuring charges, acquisition-related expenses, and contingent consideration incurred due to better-than-expected performance from acquisitions). Adjusted EBITDA as a percentage of revenues divides Adjusted EBITDA for a period by the revenues for the corresponding period and expresses the quotient as a percentage.

    Management considers these non-operating expenses to be outside the scope of Descartes’ ongoing operations and the related expenses are not used by management to measure operations. Accordingly, these expenses are excluded from Adjusted EBITDA, which we reference to both measure our operations and as a basis of comparison of our operations from period-to-period. Management believes that investors and financial analysts measure our business on the same basis, and we are providing the Adjusted EBITDA financial metric to assist in this evaluation and to provide a higher level of transparency into how we measure our own business. However, Adjusted EBITDA and Adjusted EBITDA as a percentage of revenues are non-GAAP financial measures and may not be comparable to similarly titled measures reported by other companies. Adjusted EBITDA and Adjusted EBITDA as a percentage of revenues should not be construed as a substitute for net income determined in accordance with GAAP or other non-GAAP measures that may be used by other companies, such as EBITDA. The use of Adjusted EBITDA and Adjusted EBITDA as a percentage of revenues does have limitations. In particular, we have completed seven acquisitions since the beginning of fiscal 2024 and may complete additional acquisitions in the future that will result in acquisition-related expenses and restructuring charges. As these acquisition-related expenses and restructuring charges may continue as we pursue our consolidation strategy, some investors may consider these charges and expenses as a recurring part of operations rather than expenses that are not part of operations.

    The table below reconciles Adjusted EBITDA and Adjusted EBITDA as a percentage of revenues to net income reported in our audited Consolidated Statements of Operations for FY25 and FY24, which we believe is the most directly comparable GAAP measure.

    (US dollars in millions) FY25   FY24  
    Net income, as reported on Consolidated Statements of Operations 143.3   115.9  
    Adjustments to reconcile to Adjusted EBITDA:    
    Interest expense 1.0   1.4  
    Investment income (11.5 ) (9.7 )
    Income tax expense 48.3   35.2  
    Depreciation expense 5.6   5.5  
    Amortization of intangible assets 69.4   60.5  
    Stock-based compensation and related taxes 21.1   17.1  
    Other charges 7.5   21.6  
    Adjusted EBITDA 284.7   247.5  
         
    Revenues 651.0   572.9  
    Net income as % of revenues 22 % 20 %
    Adjusted EBITDA as % of revenues 44 % 43 %
             

    The table below reconciles Adjusted EBITDA and Adjusted EBITDA as a percentage of revenues to net income reported in our unaudited Consolidated Statements of Operations for Q4FY25, Q3FY25, Q2FY25, Q1FY25, and Q4FY24, which we believe is the most directly comparable GAAP measure.

    (US dollars in millions) Q4FY25   Q3FY25   Q2FY25   Q1FY25   Q4FY24  
    Net income, as reported on Consolidated Statements of Operations 37.4   36.6   34.7   34.7   31.8  
    Adjustments to reconcile to Adjusted EBITDA:          
    Interest expense 0.2   0.2   0.2   0.3   0.3  
    Investment income (1.9 ) (2.9 ) (2.7 ) (4.1 ) (3.4 )
    Income tax expense 11.4   11.9   13.6   11.5   8.3  
    Depreciation expense 1.5   1.4   1.4   1.4   1.4  
    Amortization of intangible assets 19.4   17.5   17.4   15.0   15.1  
    Stock-based compensation and related taxes 5.4   5.6   5.8   4.3   4.7  
    Other charges 1.6   1.8   0.2   3.9   7.5  
    Adjusted EBITDA 75.0   72.1   70.6   67.0   65.7  
               
    Revenues 167.5   168.8   163.4   151.3   148.2  
    Net income as % of revenues 22 % 22 % 21 % 23 % 21 %
    Adjusted EBITDA as % of revenues 45 % 43 % 43 % 44 % 44 %
               

    The Descartes Systems Group Inc.
    Consolidated Balance Sheets
    (US dollars in thousands; US GAAP)

      January 31,   January 31,  
      2025   2024  
    ASSETS    
    CURRENT ASSETS    
    Cash 236,138   320,952  
    Accounts receivable (net)    
    Trade 53,953   51,569  
    Other 16,931   12,193  
    Prepaid expenses and other 45,544   33,468  
      352,566   418,182  
    OTHER LONG-TERM ASSETS 24,887   24,737  
    PROPERTY AND EQUIPMENT, NET 12,481   11,552  
    RIGHT-OF-USE ASSETS 7,623   6,257  
    DEFERRED INCOME TAXES 3,802   2,097  
    INTANGIBLE ASSETS, NET 321,270   251,047  
    GOODWILL 924,755   760,413  
      1,647,384   1,474,285  
    LIABILITIES AND SHAREHOLDERS’ EQUITY    
    CURRENT LIABILITIES    
    Accounts payable 20,650   17,484  
    Accrued liabilities 79,656   91,824  
    Lease obligations 3,178   3,075  
    Income taxes payable 9,313   6,734  
    Deferred revenue 104,230   84,513  
      217,027   203,630  
    LEASE OBLIGATIONS 4,718   3,903  
    DEFERRED REVENUE 978   1,464  
    INCOME TAXES PAYABLE 5,531   6,153  
    DEFERRED INCOME TAXES 34,127   21,101  
      262,381   236,251  
         
    SHAREHOLDERS’ EQUITY    
    Common shares – unlimited shares authorized; Shares issued and outstanding totaled 85,605,969 at January 31, 2025 (January 31, 2024 – 85,183,455) 568,339   551,164  
    Additional paid-in capital 503,133   494,701  
    Accumulated other comprehensive loss (50,497 ) (28,586 )
    Retained earnings 364,028   220,755  
      1,385,003   1,238,034  
      1,647,384   1,474,285  
             

    The Descartes Systems Group Inc.
    Consolidated Statements of Operations
    (US dollars in thousands, except per share and weighted average share amounts; US GAAP)

      January 31,   January 31,   January 31,  
    Year Ended 2025   2024   2023  
           
    REVENUES 651,000   572,931   486,014  
    COST OF REVENUES 158,574   138,295   113,326  
    GROSS MARGIN 492,426   434,636   372,688  
    EXPENSES      
    Sales and marketing 73,692   68,161   56,573  
    Research and development 95,497   84,103   70,353  
    General and administrative 65,248   57,373   49,710  
    Other charges 7,466   21,649   5,441  
    Amortization of intangible assets 69,399   60,501   60,177  
      311,302   291,787   242,254  
    INCOME FROM OPERATIONS 181,124   142,849   130,434  
    INTEREST EXPENSE (1,004 ) (1,363 ) (1,167 )
    INVESTMENT INCOME 11,513   9,666   4,461  
    INCOME BEFORE INCOME TAXES 191,633   151,152   133,728  
    INCOME TAX EXPENSE (RECOVERY)      
    Current 53,402   41,223   28,248  
    Deferred (5,042 ) (5,978 ) 3,244  
      48,360   35,245   31,492  
    NET INCOME 143,273   115,907   102,236  
    EARNINGS PER SHARE      
    Basic 1.68   1.36   1.21  
    Diluted 1.64   1.34   1.18  
    WEIGHTED AVERAGE SHARES OUTSTANDING (thousands)      
    Basic 85,443   85,068   84,791  
    Diluted 87,323   86,818   86,451  
                 

    The Descartes Systems Group Inc.
    Consolidated Statements of Cash Flows
    (US dollars in thousands; US GAAP)

    Year Ended January 31,   January 31,   January 31,  
      2025   2024   2023  
    OPERATING ACTIVITIES            
    Net income 143,273   115,907   102,236  
    Adjustments to reconcile net income to cash provided by operating activities:      
    Depreciation 5,589   5,474   5,225  
    Amortization of intangible assets 69,399   60,501   60,177  
    Stock-based compensation expense 19,962   16,480   13,667  
    Other non-cash operating activities 23   114   53  
    Deferred tax expense (recovery) (5,042 ) (5,978 ) 3,244  
    Changes in operating assets and liabilities (13,932 ) 15,182   7,793  
    Cash provided by operating activities 219,272   207,680   192,395  
    INVESTING ACTIVITIES      
    Additions to property and equipment (6,743 ) (5,563 ) (6,071 )
    Acquisition of subsidiaries, net of cash acquired (290,204 ) (142,700 ) (115,561 )
    Cash used in investing activities (296,947 ) (148,263 ) (121,632 )
    FINANCING ACTIVITIES      
    Payment of debt issuance costs (53 ) (43 ) (1,118 )
    Issuance of common shares for cash, net of issuance costs 12,391   9,272   1,730  
    Payment of withholding taxes on net share settlements (6,745 ) (4,886 ) –  
    Payment of contingent consideration (9,223 ) (19,084 ) (5,215 )
    Cash used in financing activities (3,630 ) (14,741 ) (4,603 )
    Effect of foreign exchange rate changes on cash (3,509 ) (109 ) (3,212 )
    Increase (decrease) in cash (84,814 ) 44,567   62,948  
    Cash, beginning of year 320,952   276,385   213,437  
    Cash, end of year 236,138   320,952   276,385  
                 

    The MIL Network –

    March 6, 2025
  • MIL-OSI USA: DOE Issues Export Approval to Golden Pass LNG, Accelerating President Trump’s Pledge to Restore American Energy Dominance

    Source: US Department of Energy

    WASHINGTON—U.S. Secretary of Energy Chris Wright today approved an LNG export permit extension for Golden Pass LNG Terminal LLC (Golden Pass), marking yet another step toward meeting President Trump’s and Secretary Wright’s commitment to unleash American energy dominance and restore regular order to liquefied natural gas (LNG) export reviews. The approval will grant additional time to begin LNG exports from the Golden Pass LNG Terminal, currently under construction in Sabine Pass, Texas.

    “Exporting U.S. LNG supports American jobs, bolsters our national security and strengthens America’s position as a world energy leader. President Trump has pledged to restore energy dominance for the American people, and I am proud to help deliver on that agenda with today’s permit extension,” said Secretary Wright.

    The issuance to Golden Pass marks the third LNG-related approval from DOE since President Trump took office, following an export approval to Commonwealth LNG on February 14 and an order on rehearing removing barriers for the use of LNG as bunkering fuel announced on February 28. “Golden Pass was the first project approved for exports to non-free trade agreement countries by DOE during the first Trump Administration, and it is gratifying that this project is so close to being able to deliver its first LNG,” said Tala Goudarzi, Acting Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Office of Fossil Energy and Carbon Management.

    Golden Pass, owned by QatarEnergy and ExxonMobil, is set to begin exporting as early as later this year, and once operational, will become the ninth large-scale export terminal operating in the United States. Once completed, Golden Pass will be able to export up to 2.57 billion cubic feet per day (Bcf/d) of natural gas as LNG and will bring unprecedented levels of LNG exports from the United States. 

    MIL OSI USA News –

    March 6, 2025
  • MIL-OSI: Rigetti Computing Reports Fourth Quarter and Full-Year 2024 Results

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    BERKELEY, Calif., March 05, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Rigetti Computing, Inc. (Nasdaq: RGTI) (“Rigetti” or the “Company”), a pioneer in full-stack quantum-classical computing, today announced its financial results for the fourth quarter and year ended December 31, 2024.

    Fourth Quarter and Full-Year 2024 Financial Highlights

    • Revenues for the three months ended December 31, 2024 were $2.3 million
    • Operating expenses for the three months ended December 31, 2024 were $19.5 million
    • Operating loss for the three months ended December 31, 2024 was $18.5 million
    • Net loss for the three months ended December 31, 2024 was $153.0 million, including $135.1 million of non-cash charges for the fair value change in the earn-out and derivative warrant liabilities
    • For the year ended December 31, 2024, revenues were $10.8 million, operating expenses were $74.2 million, operating loss was $68.5 million and net loss was $201.0 million, including $133.9 million of non-cash charges for the fair value change in the earn-out and derivative warrant liabilities
    • As of December 31, 2024 cash, cash equivalents and available-for-sale securities totaled $217.2 million
    • Received net proceeds of $153.3 million during the three months ended December 31, 2024 from the sale of 88.1 million shares of common stock through a registered direct offering and completion of our at-the-market equity offering
    • Prepaid in full all remaining amounts owed under our loan agreement with Trinity Capital, Inc.

    Business & Strategic Collaboration Updates

    New strategic collaboration with Quanta Computer
    Rigetti has entered into a strategic collaboration agreement with Quanta Computer, Inc. (“Quanta”), a Taiwan-based Global Fortune 500 company and the global leader of computer server manufacturing, with the goal of accelerating the development and commercialization of superconducting quantum computing. The companies have committed to investing more than $100 million each over the next five years pursuant to the collaboration agreement, with both sides focusing on their complementary strengths to develop superconducting quantum computing technologies. In addition, pursuant to a securities purchase agreement, Quanta will invest $35 million to purchase shares of Rigetti common stock, subject to regulatory clearance. The agreements were signed on February 27, 2025.

    “Quanta’s collaboration with Rigetti is designed to strengthen our position in this flourishing market. Our companies’ complementary strengths — Rigetti as a pioneer in superconducting quantum technology, with open, modular architecture enabling integration of innovative solutions across the stack, and Quanta as the world’s leading notebook/server manufacturer with $43 billion in annual sales — will support us in our goal to be at the forefront of the quantum computing industry,” says Dr. Subodh Kulkarni, Rigetti CEO.

    Montana State University purchases a Novera QPU
    Rigetti sold a Novera QPU to Montana State University (MSU) in December 2024, which was the Company’s first QPU sale to an academic institution. The Novera will be located at MSU’s QCORE to educate and train scientists and engineers on quantum computing technologies, in addition to being used to create a testbed for quantum computing R&D. MSU’s QCORE is a new center of excellence for quantum enabling technologies established to accelerate workforce development and the regional quantum innovation ecosystem.

    Technology Milestones

    84-qubit Ankaa-3 system launches with record high fidelity
    Rigetti launched its 84-qubit Ankaa™-3 system in December 2024. Ankaa-3 features an extensive hardware redesign that enables superior performance. Rigetti achieved major two-qubit gate fidelity milestones with Ankaa-3: successfully halving error rates in 2024 to achieve a 99.0% median iSWAP gate fidelity and demonstrating 99.5% median fidelity with fSim gates. Rigetti’s newest flagship quantum computer continues to feature Rigetti’s scalable, industry-leading chip architecture with 3D signal delivery while incorporating major enhancements to key technologies.

    Ankaa-3 is available to Rigetti’s partners via the Rigetti Quantum Cloud Services platform (QCS®) and to the general public via Microsoft Azure and Amazon Braket.

    “We believe that superconducting qubits are the winning modality for quantum computers given their fast gate speeds and scalability. We’ve developed critical IP to scale our systems and remain confident in our plans to scale to 100+ qubits by the end of the year with a targeted 2x reduction in error rates from the error rates we achieved at the end of 2024. We believe our leadership in superconducting quantum computing continues to be reinforced as we push the boundaries of our system performance, as evidenced by the success of Ankaa-3,” says Dr. Kulkarni.

    Successful AI-powered calibration of a Rigetti QPU
    AI-powered tools from Quantum Elements and Qruise remotely automated the calibration of a Rigetti QPU integrated with Quantum Machines’ control system. This work was part of the “AI for Quantum Calibration Challenge” (the “Challenge”) hosted at the Israeli Quantum Computing Center. The two companies participating in the Challenge, Quantum Elements and Qruise, automated the calibration of a 9-qubit Rigetti Novera™ QPU integrated with Quantum Machines’ advanced OPX1000 control system and NVIDIA DGX Quantum, a unified system for quantum-classical computing that NVIDIA built with Quantum Machines. This achievement showcases the potential of AI in quantum computer calibration and also highlights the growing collaboration within the quantum computing ecosystem.

    Quantum Elements, Cruise, and Quantum Machines are members of Rigetti’s Novera QPU Partner Program — an ecosystem of quantum computing hardware, software, and service providers who build and offer integral components of a functional quantum computing system.

    “We believe that another advantage we leverage is our modular approach to developing our technology. By enabling our partners to integrate their technology with ours, we can explore and advance creative and flexible ways to improve quantum computing capabilities,” says Dr. Kulkarni.

    Research demonstrating optical reading technique published in Nature Physics
    Joint research with QphoX and Qblox demonstrating the ability to readout superconducting qubits with an optical transducer was recently published in Nature Physics. This approach to qubit signal processing could have benefits in building scalable quantum computers as it could be a more compact, modular approach for measuring qubit performance in quantum computing systems that rely on microwave amplification. Current qubit readout techniques used by superconducting quantum computer systems in cryogenic environments can be resource intensive from a thermal and power usage perspective. A potential solution to this problem may be to replace coaxial cables and other cryogenic components with optical fibers, which have a considerably smaller footprint and negligible thermal conductivity. To demonstrate the potential of this technology, QphoX, Rigetti and Qblox connected a transducer to a superconducting qubit, with the goal of measuring its state using light transmitted through an optical fiber. It was discovered that the transducer is capable of converting the signal that reads out the qubit and the qubit can also be sufficiently protected from decoherence introduced by thermal noise or stray optical photons from the transducer during operation.

    Conference Call and Webcast
    Rigetti will host a conference call later today, March 5, 2025, at 5:00 pm ET, or 2:00 pm PT, to discuss its fourth quarter and full-year 2024 financial results.

    You can listen to a live audio webcast of the conference call at https://edge.media-server.com/mmc/p/5jaikwa8/ or the “Events & Presentations” section of the Company’s Investor Relations website at https://investors.rigetti.com/. A replay of the conference call will be available at the same locations following the conclusion of the call for one year.

    To participate in the live call, you must register using the following link: https://register.vevent.com/register/BIc3642ee5e70e4bea9d3311a88c4e128a. Once registered, you will receive dial-in numbers and a unique PIN number. When you dial in, you will input your PIN and be routed into the call. If you register and forget your PIN, or lose the registration confirmation email, simply re-register to receive a new PIN.

    About Rigetti
    Rigetti is a pioneer in full-stack quantum computing. The Company has operated quantum computers over the cloud since 2017 and serves global enterprise, government, and research clients through its Rigetti Quantum Cloud Services platform. In 2021, Rigetti began selling on-premises quantum computing systems with qubit counts between 24 and 84 qubits, supporting national laboratories and quantum computing centers. Rigetti’s 9-qubit Novera QPU was introduced in 2023 supporting a broader R&D community with a high-performance, on-premises QPU designed to plug into a customer’s existing cryogenic and control systems. The Company’s proprietary quantum-classical infrastructure provides high-performance integration with public and private clouds for practical quantum computing. Rigetti has developed the industry’s first multi-chip quantum processor for scalable quantum computing systems. The Company designs and manufactures its chips in-house at Fab-1, the industry’s first dedicated and integrated quantum device manufacturing facility. Learn more at https://www.rigetti.com/.

    Contacts

    Rigetti Computing Investor Contact:
    IR@Rigetti.com

    Rigetti Computing Media Contact:
    press@rigetti.com

    Cautionary Language Concerning Forward-Looking Statements
    Certain statements in this communication may be considered “forward-looking statements” within the meaning of the federal securities laws, including statements with respect to the Company’s future success and performance, including expectations with respect to future revenues and the timing, availability and impact of government programs relating to quantum information science; expectations regarding the advantages and impact of the strategic collaboration agreement with Quanta Computer on our operations, technology roadmap, milestones, and our position in the industry; the expectation that Rigetti and Quanta will each invest more than $100 million over the next five years; expectations regarding Quanta’s anticipated $35 million investment in Rigetti through a purchase of Rigetti’s common stock; anticipated regulatory clearance; expectations related to the Company’s ability to achieve milestones including the development of future generations of hardware, including any future generations developed to achieve our targeted fidelities and qubit counts, or to demonstrate narrow quantum advantage or broad quantum advantage, each of which is an important anticipated milestone for our technology roadmap and commercialization of our quantum computers; expectations with respect to scaling to create larger qubit systems without sacrificing gate performance using the Company’s modular chip architecture, including expectations with respect to the Company’s anticipated systems and targeted error rate reduction; expectations with respect to future sales or leases of the Novera QPU, customer adoption of the Ankaa-3 systems and Novera QPU; the possibility that reading out superconducting qubits with an optical transducer could have benefits in building scalable quantum computers; the possibility that replacing coaxial cables and other cryogenic components with optical fibers could result in less thermal and power usage; expectations with respect to the Company’s partners and customers and the quantum computing plans and activities thereof; and expectations with respect to the anticipated stages of quantum technology maturation, including the Company’s ability to develop a quantum computer that is able to solve practical, operationally relevant problems significantly better, faster, or cheaper than a current classical solution and achieve quantum advantage on the anticipated timing or at all. These forward-looking statements are based upon estimates and assumptions that, while considered reasonable by the Company and its management, are inherently uncertain. Factors that may cause actual results to differ materially from current expectations include, but are not limited to: the Company’s ability to achieve milestones, technological advancements, including with respect to its technology roadmap; the ability of the Company to obtain government contracts successfully and in a timely manner and the availability of government funding; the potential of quantum computing; the ability of the Company to expand its QPU sales and the Novera QPU Partnership Program; the success of the Company’s partnerships and collaborations, including the strategic collaboration with Quanta Computer; the Company’s ability to accelerate its development of multiple generations of quantum processors; the outcome of any legal proceedings that may be instituted against the Company or others; the ability to maintain relationships with customers and suppliers and attract and retain management and key employees; costs related to operating as a public company; changes in applicable laws or regulations; the possibility that the Company may be adversely affected by other economic, business, or competitive factors; the Company’s estimates of expenses and profitability; the evolution of the markets in which the Company competes; the ability of the Company to implement its strategic initiatives and expansion plans; the expected use of proceeds from the Company’s past and future financings or other capital; the sufficiency of the Company’s cash resources; unfavorable conditions in the Company’s industry, the global economy or global supply chain, including rising inflation and interest rates, deteriorating international trade relations, political turmoil, natural catastrophes, warfare and terrorist attacks; and other risks and uncertainties set forth in the section entitled “Risk Factors” and “Cautionary Note Regarding Forward-Looking Statements” in the Company’s Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2023 and Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended September 30, 2024, and other documents filed by the Company from time to time with the SEC. These filings identify and address other important risks and uncertainties that could cause actual events and results to differ materially from those contained in the forward-looking statements. Forward-looking statements speak only as of the date they are made. Readers are cautioned not to put undue reliance on forward-looking statements, and the Company assumes no obligation and does not intend to update or revise these forward-looking statements other than as required by applicable law. The Company does not give any assurance that it will achieve its expectations.

    RIGETTI COMPUTING, INC.
    CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS
    (in thousands, except number of shares and par value)
               
      December 31,   December 31,
      2024   2023
    Assets          
    Current assets:          
    Cash and cash equivalents $ 67,674     $ 21,392  
    Available-for-sale investments – short-term   124,420       78,537  
    Accounts receivable   2,427       5,029  
    Prepaid expenses   3,156       1,938  
    Other current assets   9,081       771  
    Total current assets   206,758       107,667  
    Available-for-sale investments – long-term   25,068       —  
    Property and equipment, net   44,643       44,483  
    Operating lease right-of-use assets   7,993       7,634  
    Other assets   325       129  
    Total assets $ 284,787     $ 159,913  
               
    Liabilities and Stockholders’ Equity          
    Current liabilities:          
    Accounts payable $ 1,590     $ 5,772  
    Accrued expenses and other current liabilities   8,005       8,563  
    Current portion of deferred revenue   113       343  
    Current portion of debt   —       12,164  
    Current portion of operating lease liabilities   2,159       2,210  
    Total current liabilities   11,867       29,052  
    Debt, less current portion   —       9,894  
    Deferred revenue, less current portion   698       —  
    Operating lease liabilities, less current portion   6,641       6,297  
    Derivative warrant liabilities   93,095       2,927  
    Earn-out liabilities   45,897       2,155  
    Total liabilities   158,198       50,325  
    Commitments and contingencies          
    Stockholders’ equity:          
    Preferred stock, par value $0.0001 per share, 10,000,000 shares authorized, none outstanding   —       —  
    Common stock, par value $0.0001 per share, 1,000,000,000 shares authorized, 283,546,871 shares issued and outstanding at December 31, 2024 and 147,066,336 shares issued and outstanding at December 31, 2023   29       14  
    Additional paid-in capital   681,202       463,089  
    Accumulated other comprehensive income   105       244  
    Accumulated deficit   (554,747 )     (353,759 )
    Total stockholders’ equity   126,589       109,588  
    Total liabilities and stockholders’ equity $ 284,787     $ 159,913  
                   
    RIGETTI COMPUTING, INC.
    CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF OPERATIONS
    (in thousands, except per share data)
     
                   
      Three Months Ended December 31,   Year Ended December 31,
      2024   2023   2024   2023
    Revenue $ 2,274     $ 3,376     $ 10,790     $ 12,008  
    Cost of revenue   1,271       860       5,093       2,800  
    Total gross profit   1,003       2,516       5,697       9,208  
    Operating expenses:                      
    Research and development   13,657       12,787       49,750       52,768  
    Selling, general and administrative   5,840       6,936       24,457       27,744  
    Restructuring   —       —       —       991  
    Total operating expenses   19,497       19,723       74,207       81,503  
    Loss from operations   (18,494 )     (17,207 )     (68,510 )     (72,295 )
    Other income (expense), net                      
    Interest expense   (446 )     (1,268 )     (3,255 )     (5,779 )
    Interest income   1,546       1,330       5,113       5,076  
    Change in fair value of derivative warrant liabilities   (90,885 )     3,160       (90,168 )     (1,160 )
    Change in fair value of earn-out liabilities   (44,256 )     1,413       (43,742 )     (949 )
    Loss on extinguishment of debt   (426 )     —       (426 )     —  
    Total other expense, net   (134,467 )     4,635       (132,478 )     (2,812 )
    Net loss before provision for income taxes   (152,961 )     (12,572 )     (200,988 )     (75,107 )
    Provision for income taxes   —       —       —       —  
    Net loss $ (152,961 )   $ (12,572 )   $ (200,988 )   $ (75,107 )
    Net loss per share attributable to common stockholders – basic and diluted $ (0.68 )   $ (0.09 )   $ (1.09 )   $ (0.57 )
    Weighted average shares used in computing net loss per share attributable to common stockholders – basic and diluted   226,364       140,537       184,666       131,977  
                                   
    RIGETTI COMPUTING INC.
    CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF CASH FLOW
    (in thousands)
       
      Year Ended December 31,
      2024   2023
    Cash flows from operating activities:          
    Net loss $ (200,988 )   $ (75,107 )
    Adjustments to reconcile net loss to net cash used in operating activities:          
    Depreciation and amortization   6,906       7,426  
    Stock-based compensation   13,069       12,409  
    Change in fair value of earn-out liabilities   43,742       949  
    Change in fair value of derivative warrant liabilities   90,168       1,160  
    Change in fair value of forward contract   —       2,229  
    Impairment of deferred offering costs   —       836  
    Accretion of available-for-sale securities   (3,622 )     (3,121 )
    Loss on extinguishment of debt   426       —  
    Amortization of debt issuance costs, commitment fees and accretion of final payment fees   844       1,453  
    Non-cash lease expense   1,909       1,682  
    Changes in operating assets and liabilities:          
    Accounts receivable   2,602       1,206  
    Prepaid expenses, other current assets and other assets   (2,434 )     (259 )
    Deferred revenue   468       (618 )
    Accounts payable   (1,036 )     895  
    Accrued expenses and operating lease liabilities   (2,681 )     (1,719 )
    Net cash used in operating activities   (50,627 )     (50,579 )
    Cash flows from investing activities:          
    Purchases of property and equipment   (11,098 )     (9,059 )
    Purchases of available-for-sale securities   (224,764 )     (109,252 )
    Maturities of available-for-sale securities   157,500       119,084  
    Net cash (used in) provided by investing activities   (78,362 )     773  
    Cash flows from financing activities:          
    Principal repayments and prepayment and final payment fees of notes payable   (23,328 )     (8,333 )
    Net payments of tax withholdings on sell-to-cover equity award transactions   (6,272 )     —  
    Proceeds from sale of common stock through Common Stock Purchase Agreement   12,838       20,544  
    Proceeds from sale of common stock through At-The-Market (ATM) Offering   97,500       —  
    Proceeds from sale of common stock through registered direct offering   96,000       —  
    Payments of offering costs   (1,833 )     (107 )
    Proceeds from issuance of common stock upon exercise of stock options and warrants   554       1,126  
    Net cash provided by financing activities   175,459       13,230  
    Effects of exchange rate changes on cash and cash equivalents   (188 )     80  
    Net increase (decrease) in cash and cash equivalents   46,282       (36,496 )
    Cash and cash equivalents – beginning of period   21,392       57,888  
    Cash and cash equivalents – end of period $ 67,674     $ 21,392  
    Supplemental disclosures of other cash flow information:          
    Cash paid for interest $ 2,350     $ 4,340  
    Non-cash investing and financing activities:          
    Capitalization of deferred costs to equity upon share issuance   —       13  
    Purchases of property and equipment recorded in accounts payable   466       3,612  
    Purchases of property and equipment recorded in accrued expenses   150       1,019  
    Non-cash addition to operating lease right-of-use assets and lease liability   2,268       —  
    Unrealized gain on short term investments   66       325  

    The MIL Network –

    March 6, 2025
  • MIL-OSI: Amplify Energy Announces Fourth Quarter and Full-Year 2024 Results, Year-End 2024 Proved Reserves, Juniper Capital Acquisition Update and Standalone Full-Year 2025 Guidance

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    HOUSTON, March 05, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Amplify Energy Corp. (NYSE: AMPY) (“Amplify,” the “Company,” “us,” or “our”) announced today its operating and financial results for the fourth quarter and full-year 2024, year-end 2024 proved reserves, Juniper Capital (“Juniper”) acquisition update and full-year 2025 standalone guidance for the Company.

    Key Highlights

    • 2025 strategic initiatives include:
      • Completing the previously announced transformational combination with certain Juniper portfolio companies which own substantial oil-weighted producing assets and significant leasehold interests in the DJ and Powder River Basins (the “Transaction”) and integrating such assets into our operations
      • Continuing the Beta development program with six completions planned for 2025 including the C-48 and the A-45 which were deferred from the 2024 program
      • Expanding Magnify Energy Services, a wholly owned subsidiary of Amplify (“Magnify”), to enhance Amplify’s competitive advantage in operating our mature assets located in East Texas and Oklahoma
      • Creating incremental value in East Texas by monetizing portions of our portfolio and/or participating in joint development opportunities focused within the Haynesville formation
    • During the fourth quarter of 2024, the Company:
      • Achieved average total production of 18.5 MBoepd
      • Generated net cash provided by operating activities of $12.5 million and a net loss of $7.4 million
      • Delivered Adjusted EBITDA of $21.8 million and Adjusted Net Income of $5.1 million
      • Generated $2.9 million of free cash flow
      • Completed the sale of undeveloped Haynesville acreage in East Texas for $1.4 million
    • For full-year 2024, the Company:
      • Achieved average total production of 19.5 MBoepd
      • Generated net cash provided by operating activities of $51.3 million and net income of $12.9 million
      • Delivered Adjusted EBITDA of $103.0 million and Adjusted Net Income of $35.8 million
      • Generated $18.0 million of free cash flow
      • Renegotiated prior surety bonds and reduced sinking fund payments by approximately $7.0 million per year
      • Initiated development drilling program at Beta, with the completion of two wells, which outperformed type curves
      • Generated $3.1 million of Adjusted EBITDA at Magnify
      • Renegotiated the iodine contract in Oklahoma, increasing annual Adjusted EBITDA by $2.4 million
    • Amplify’s year-end 2024 total proved reserves, utilizing Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) pricing of $75.48/Bbl for oil and NGLs and $2.13/MMBtu for natural gas, totaled 93 MMBoe and had a PV-10 value of approximately $736 million
    • As of December 31, 2024, Amplify had $127.0 million outstanding under the revolving credit facility
      • Net Debt to Last Twelve Months (“LTM”) Adjusted EBITDA of 1.2x1
         
      (1) Net debt as of December 31, 2024, consisting of $127 MM outstanding under its revolving credit facility with ~$0.0 MM of cash and cash equivalents, and LTM Adjusted EBITDA as of the fourth quarter of 2024.
         

    Martyn Willsher, Amplify’s President and Chief Executive Officer, commented, “In early 2024, we told stakeholders that 2024 had the potential to be a transformative year for the Company, and we believe that we delivered on that expectation throughout the year. The recently announced transaction with Juniper Capital expands our operations into the DJ and Powder River Basins, increases our scale, operating efficiency and margins, improves our inventory of attractive drilling locations, and provides us with a new core area for potential M&A activity. The transaction also resulted in a new long-term partnership with Juniper Capital, who have a long history of delivering substantial value to shareholders. At Beta, we safely and successfully initiated a drilling program, which has increased our confidence regarding the future inventory of the field and has enabled us to expand our development plans for this prolific asset in 2025 and beyond.”

    Mr. Willsher continued, “While we have focused our attention and resources on these two significant initiatives, our team has also delivered value to stockholders by pursuing opportunities to reduce operating expenses and maximize the value of our existing asset base. For example, Magnify Energy Services, our wholly owned subsidiary that provides oilfield services to Amplify-operated wells, expanded meaningfully in scope, realizing a significant increase in revenue and efficiency and reducing operating costs in East Texas and Oklahoma. We also renegotiated several existing contracts, like our iodine extraction contract, to receive improved economics. Although smaller in scope, these efforts have demonstrated management’s commitment to identifying areas to improve our operations and deliver value to stockholders. On the value maximizing front, we were able to monetize a portion of our acreage with Haynesville rights for several million dollars, while retaining an interest to realize upside value.”

    Mr. Willsher concluded, “We believe that our strategic and operational accomplishments in 2024 set the foundation for Amplify’s future and that in 2025 we will begin to capitalize on the growth potential of this significantly enhanced asset base.  By delivering on our 2025 strategic initiatives, we believe we can create immediate and long-term value for Amplify’s stockholders.”

    Juniper Capital Rocky Mountain Assets Update

    On January 15, 2025, Amplify announced that it has entered into a definitive merger agreement with privately held Juniper to combine with certain Juniper portfolio companies owning assets and leasehold interests in the DJ and Powder River Basins. Such portfolio companies are oil-weighted and include approximately 287,000 net acres. We expect to close the acquisition in the second quarter of 2025. Amplify has provided more information on the portfolio companies and their assets and the value potential of the Transaction in its latest investor presentation, available on its investor relations website.

    On March 4, 2025, a definitive proxy statement was filed providing additional details on the Transaction. A special meeting of stockholders, to be held virtually, has been scheduled for April 14, 2025, at 9:00 am Central Time, where stockholders of record as of March 3, 2025 can vote to approve the issuance of common stock, par value $0.01 per share (the “Common Stock”) (as described in more detail in the definitive proxy statement) in connection with the Transaction. In order to virtually attend, stockholders must register in advance at www.cesonlineservices.com/ampysm_vm prior to April 13, 2025 at 9:00 a.m. Central Time. More information can be found in the definitive proxy statement on the SEC’s website at www.sec.gov and the Company’s website, www.amplifyenergy.com, under the Investor Relations section. Upon approval from our stockholders of the issuance of Common Stock and the resulting closing of the Transaction, Amplify and Juniper are expected to own approximately 61% and 39%, respectively, of the combined company’s outstanding equity.

    In anticipation of closing, Amplify is currently working with Juniper and its portfolio companies on integrating the Juniper assets into the Amplify organization. Furthermore, the Company expects to refinance a substantial portion of its outstanding debt and approximately $133 million in principal amount of the portfolio companies’ outstanding debt prior to closing the Transaction. Amplify intends to update the market with developments of the Transaction as they progress.

    East Texas Haynesville Monetization Update

    Starting in 2024, several operators expressed increased interest in buying or partnering with Amplify on our East Texas Haynesville interests. In December 2024, Amplify monetized ninety percent (90%) of its interests in certain units with Haynesville rights in Panola and Shelby Counties, while retaining a ten percent (10%) working interest and the ability to participate in any well drilled within the boundary of such units. Upon closing, such transaction generated approximately $1.4 million in proceeds.

    In January 2025, Amplify completed a second transaction with a separate counterparty. Amplify sold ninety percent (90%) of its interest in certain units with Haynesville rights in Harrison County, Texas, in addition to 11 gross operated wells. This transaction also established an Area of Mutual Interest (“AMI”) with the counterparty covering 10,000 gross acres. Amplify retained a ten percent (10%) working interest in the units it divested and purchased a ten percent (10%) working interest in the counterparty’s acreage. Amplify generated net proceeds of $6.2 million from these transactions and estimates the AMI has more than 30 potential gross drilling locations.

    2024 Year-End Proved Reserve Update

    The Company’s estimated proved reserves at SEC pricing for year-end 2024 totaled 93.0 MMBoe, which consisted of 82.2 MMBoe of proved developed reserves and 10.8 MMBoe of proved undeveloped reserves. Proved developed reserves were lower year-over-year, primarily due to lower SEC pricing for oil and natural gas, which fell from $78.22 to $75.48 for oil and from $2.64 to $2.13 for natural gas, and the impact of 2024 production roll-off. Total proved reserves were comprised of 44% oil, 19% NGLs, and 37% natural gas.

    At year-end 2024, Amplify’s total proved reserves and proved developed reserves had PV-10 values of approximately $736 million and $507 million, respectively, using SEC pricing. Proved developed reserve value at Bairoil was lower than 2023 due to a combination of SEC pricing, production performance and higher operating cost assumptions due to significant increases in regulated electricity rates. Proved undeveloped reserves have increased materially as a result of the successful 2024 Beta development program, with the Company adding 23 additional locations and approximately $200 million in PV-10 value. The initial production rates for the two Beta wells brought on-line in 2024 exceeded the type-curves included in our year-end reserve report, and Amplify will consider increasing the type curve assumptions for Beta development wells after evaluating results from the 2025 development program. Detail on the Company’s reserves by asset is provided in the table below. Additionally, Amplify has provided more information on its Beta development program and the substantial value potential of the field in its latest investor presentation, available on its investor relations website.

      Estimated Net Reserves1
    Region MMBoe % Oil and NGL Proved Developed PV-10 Proved Undeveloped PV-10 Total Proved PV-10
          (in millions)
               
    Beta 19.1 100% $144 $214 $358
    Oklahoma 27.0 46% 138 – 138
    Bairoil 16.4 100% 118 – 118
    East Texas/ North Louisiana 28.0 30% 75 4 79
    Eagle Ford (Non-op) 2.5 90% 32 11 43
               
    Total 93.0 63% $507 $229 $736
    (1) Amplify’s year-end 2024 total proved reserves, utilizing SEC pricing of $75.48/Bbl for oil and NGLs and $2.13/MMBtu for natural gas.
       

    Amplify’s reserves estimates were prepared by its third-party independent reserve consultant, Cawley, Gillespie & Associates, Inc.

    Key Financial Results

    During the fourth quarter of 2024, the Company reported a net loss of approximately $7.4 million. The net loss was primarily attributable to a non-cash unrealized loss on commodity derivatives during the period. Excluding the impact of the non-cash unrealized loss on commodity derivatives in addition to other one-time impacts, Amplify generated Adjusted Net Income of $5.1 million in the fourth quarter of 2024.

    Fourth quarter Adjusted EBITDA was $21.8 million, a decrease of approximately $3.7 million from $25.5 million in the prior quarter. The decrease was primarily due to lower realized oil prices (net of hedges) in the fourth quarter compared to the prior quarter.

    Free cash flow was $2.9 million for the fourth quarter, a decrease of $0.7 million compared to the prior quarter. Amplify has now generated positive free cash flow in 18 of the last 19 fiscal quarters.

      Fourth Quarter Third Quarter
    $ in millions 2024   2024  
    Net income (loss)   ($7.4 )   $22.7  
    Net cash provided by operating activities   $12.5     $15.7  
    Average daily production (MBoe/d)   18.5     19.0  
    Total revenues excluding hedges   $69.0     $69.9  
    Adjusted EBITDA (a non-GAAP financial measure)   $21.8     $25.5  
    Adjusted net income (loss), (a non-GAAP financial measure)   $5.1     $9.8  
    Total capital   $15.3     $18.2  
    Free Cash Flow (a non-GAAP financial measure)   $2.9     $3.6  
         

    Revolving Credit Facility

    As of December 31, 2024, Amplify had $127.0 million outstanding under its revolving credit facility, and net debt to LTM Adjusted EBITDA was 1.2x (net debt as of December 31, 2024 and 4Q24 LTM Adjusted EBITDA). Fourth quarter net debt increased from the prior quarter due to expected changes in working capital and increased development activity, primarily at Beta.

    Corporate Production and Pricing

    During the fourth quarter of 2024, average daily production was approximately 18.5 Mboepd, a decrease of 0.5 Mboepd from the prior quarter. The decrease in production was driven by gas volumes, which were impacted by gas plant realizations in East Texas. Our oil volumes, although slightly higher compared to the prior quarter, were impacted by platform shutdowns following the completion of the emission reduction and electrification facility projects and several unexpected well failures and subsequent interventions at Beta. With the successful completion of the electrification and emissions reduction project in the fourth quarter 2024 and the intervention projects completed by end of January 2025, we are projecting Beta production to be significantly higher than the fourth quarter, before the impact of the 2025 drilling program. As of March 2, 2025, current 7-day average production rates at Beta were 4,834 gross Bopd (3,635 net Bopd), representing an approximate 9% increase from fourth quarter 2024 volumes, with minimal contribution from the recently completed C48 well, which we continue to draw down since completing in mid-February.

    The Company’s product mix for the quarter was 45% crude oil, 17% NGLs, and 38% natural gas.

      Three Months   Three Months
      Ended   Ended
      December 31, 2024   September 30, 2024
           
    Production volumes – MBOE:      
    Bairoil   293       294  
    Beta   308       304  
    Oklahoma   436       454  
    East Texas / North Louisiana   609       638  
    Eagle Ford (Non-op)   60       62  
    Total – MBoe   1,706       1,752  
    Total – MBoe/d   18.5       19.0  
    % – Liquids   62 %     60 %
           

    Total oil, natural gas and NGL revenues for the fourth quarter of 2024 were approximately $67.2 million, before the impact of derivatives. The Company realized a net gain on commodity derivatives of $4.1 million during the fourth quarter. Oil, natural gas and NGL revenues, net of realized hedges, decreased $3.3 million for the fourth quarter compared to the prior quarter.

    The following table sets forth information regarding average realized sales prices for the periods indicated:

      Crude Oil ($/Bbl) NGLs ($/Bbl) Natural Gas ($/Mcf)
                           
      Three Months Ended December 31, 2024   Three Months Ended September 30, 2024   Three Months Ended December 31, 2024   Three Months Ended September 30, 2024   Three Months Ended December 31, 2024   Three Months Ended September 30, 2024
                           
    Average sales price exclusive of realized derivatives and certain deductions from revenue $ 66.82     $ 71.74     $ 23.46     $ 21.63     $ 2.52     $ 1.84  
    Realized derivatives   1.43       (0.24 )     –       –       0.76       1.38  
                           
    Average sales price with realized derivatives exclusive of certain deductions from revenue $ 68.25     $ 71.50     $ 23.46     $ 21.63     $ 3.28     $ 3.22  
    Certain deductions from revenue   –       –       (1.37 )     (1.33 )     (0.01 )     0.00  
                           
    Average sales price inclusive of realized derivatives and certain deductions from revenue $ 68.25     $ 71.50     $ 22.09     $ 20.30     $ 3.27     $ 3.22  
                           

    Costs and Expenses

    Lease operating expenses in the fourth quarter of 2024 were approximately $35.1 million, or $20.57 per Boe, a $1.8 million increase compared to the prior quarter. Due to increased well failures in the fourth quarter, Beta lease operating costs were higher compared to the prior quarter. Lease operating expenses do not reflect $0.9 million of income generated by Magnify in the fourth quarter.

    Severance and ad valorem taxes in the fourth quarter were approximately $5.4 million, a decrease of $0.6 million compared to $6.0 million in the prior quarter, and in line with expectations. Severance and ad valorem taxes as a percentage of revenue were approximately 8.0% in the fourth quarter.

    Amplify incurred $4.5 million, or $2.62 per Boe, of gathering, processing and transportation expenses in the fourth quarter, compared to $4.3 million, or $2.45 per Boe, in the prior quarter.

    Cash G&A expenses in the fourth quarter were $6.3 million, an increase of $0.1 million compared to the prior quarter and in-line with expectations.

    Depreciation, depletion and amortization expense in the fourth quarter totaled $8.4 million, or $4.93 per Boe, compared to $8.1 million, or $4.62 per Boe, in the prior quarter.

    Net interest expense was $3.7 million in the fourth quarter, a decrease of $0.1 million compared to $3.8 million in the prior quarter.

    Amplify recorded a current income tax benefit of $2.1 million in the fourth quarter.

    Fourth Quarter and Full-Year Capital Investments

    Cash capital investment during the fourth quarter of 2024 was approximately $15.3 million. During the fourth quarter, the Company’s capital allocation was approximately 65% for Beta development drilling and facility projects, with the remainder distributed across the Company’s other assets.

    The following table details Amplify’s capital invested during the fourth quarter of 2024:

      Fourth Quarter   Full-Year
      2024 Capital   2024 Capital
      ($ MM)   ($ MM)
    Bairoil $ 0.2     $ 2.9  
    Beta $ 10.0     $ 53.7  
    Oklahoma $ 0.1     $ 3.2  
    East Texas / North Louisiana $ 2.8     $ 5.6  
    Eagle Ford (Non-op) $ 2.1     $ 4.1  
    Magnify Energy Services $ 0.1     $ 1.1  
    Total Capital Invested $ 15.3     $ 70.6  
           

    2025 Operations & Development Plan

    The following table details Amplify’s 2025 projected capital investments of $70 – $80 million:

    Capital Investment by Type (% of Total):  
    Beta Development 41 %
    Beta Facility 16 %
    Workovers & Other Facilities 25 %
    Non-op Development 18 %
    Total Capital Investments: 100 %
         

    Amplify’s 2025 operations and development plan is designed to continue unlocking the underlying value of the Company’s assets. To achieve this goal, we intend to 1) continue our development program at Beta, 2) execute on low-cost, high-return workover projects, and 3) reduce operating costs by increasing activity at Magnify.

    At Beta, Amplify intends to complete six wells in 2025. The C48 well, the first of the six wells to be completed in 2025, was drilled in the fourth quarter of 2024 and completed in mid-February. Similar to the A50 and C59 wells drilled in 2024, the completion of the C48 well was initially designed to target the D-sand. However, drilling conditions encountered in the D-sand and the quality of the C-Sand observed while drilling through the formation, led the team to alter the completion design and target the C-sand instead. The C48 will be the first test of the horizontal potential of the C-sand and we will share the results of the C48 well after obtaining sufficient initial production data.

    In 2024 Amplify brought online two new wells at Beta, the A50 well (brought online in June) and the C59 well (brought online in October), both of which exceeded internal projections and increased Beta’s overall production approximately 15% in January 2025 compared to January of 2024. Similarly, the six Beta completions planned in 2025 are expected to significantly increase Amplify’s oil production year-over-year. Additional information regarding the Beta development plan can be found in the investor presentation on the Company’s investor relations website.

    In addition to drilling and completing the six wells, Amplify intends to make continued investments in Beta’s facilities. In 2025, the Company expects to invest approximately $8 million to upgrade a 2-mile pipeline that ships all produced fluid from platform Eureka to platform Elly.

    At Bairoil, we continue to focus on enhancing water-alternating-gas injection performance through targeted well recompletions and conversions, which helps offset the asset’s nominal production declines. Our plan also includes an investment at our CO2 gas plant intended to reduce overall power usage and lease operating expenses in the second half of 2025.

    Amplify’s operating strategy in Oklahoma remains focused on prioritizing a stable free cash flow profile by managing production through an active workover program, artificial lift enhancements, extending well run-times and continuing to reduce operating costs.

    In East Texas, we are participating in the completion of four non-operated development projects, which we expect to be online by mid-year. The Company also continues to focus on prudent management of the field, such as optimizing field compression, artificial lift enhancement, and equipment insourcing, which is expected to improve the production profile and lower lease operating costs.

    In late 2023, we formed Magnify to in-source specific oilfield services to improve service reliability and to reduce overall operating expenses for the Company. Since its inception, Magnify has generated $3.7 million of Adjusted EBITDA with a capital investment of only $1.7 million. In 2025, we expect to invest an additional $1.4 million of capital in Magnify and project 2025 Adjusted EBITDA of approximately $5 million (with an annualized run rate of $6 million by year-end). We are evaluating additional accretive services for Magnify to service Amplify operated assets.

    In the Eagle Ford, we are participating in 14 gross (0.7 net) new development wells and two gross (0.4 net) recompletion projects. These non-operated wells, with highly accretive returns, are currently scheduled to be completed in the first half of 2025.

    Full-Year 2025 Guidance

    The following standalone guidance is subject to the cautionary statements and limitations described under the “Forward-Looking Statements” caption at the end of this press release. Amplify’s 2025 guidance is based on its current expectations regarding capital investment levels and flat commodity prices for crude oil of $71/Bbl (WTI) and natural gas of $3.75/MMBtu (Henry Hub), and on the assumption that market demand and prices for oil and natural gas will continue at levels that allow for economic production of these products. Additionally, the Company expects to invest approximately 90% of its capital in the first three quarters of the year primarily in connection with the Beta development program. Upon closing of the Transaction with Juniper, the Company will provide updated guidance to include the acquired assets.

    A summary of the standalone guidance is presented below:

      FY 2025E
           
      Low   High
           
    Net Average Daily Production      
    Oil (MBbls/d) 8.5 – 9.4
    NGL (MBbls/d) 3.0 – 3.3
    Natural Gas (MMcf/d) 45.0 – 51.0
    Total (MBoe/d) 19.0 – 21.0
           
    Commodity Price Differential / Realizations (Unhedged)      
    Oil Differential ($ / Bbl) ($3.25) – ($4.25)
    NGL Realized Price (% of WTI NYMEX) 27% – 31%
    Natural Gas Realized Price (% of Henry Hub) 85% – 92%
           
    Other Revenue      
    Magnify Energy Services ($ MM) $4 – $6
    Other ($ MM) $2 – $3
    Total ($ MM) $6 – $9
           
    Gathering, Processing and Transportation Costs      
    Oil ($ / Bbl) $0.65 – $0.85
    NGL ($ / Bbl) $2.75 – $4.00
    Natural Gas ($ / Mcf) $0.55 – $0.75
    Total ($ / Boe) $2.25 – $2.85
           
    Average Costs      
    Lease Operating ($ / Boe) $18.50 – $20.50
    Taxes (% of Revenue) (1) 6.0% – 7.0%
    Cash General and Administrative ($ / Boe) (2)(3) $3.40 – $3.90
           
    Adjusted EBITDA ($ MM) (2)(3) $100 – $120
    Cash Interest Expense ($ MM) $12 – $18
    Capital Expenditures ($ MM) $70 – $80
    Free Cash Flow ($ MM) (2)(3) $10 – $30
           
    (1) Includes production, ad valorem and franchise taxes
    (2) Refer to “Use of Non-GAAP Financial Measures” for Amplify’s definition and use of Cash G&A, Adjusted EBITDA and free cash flow, non-GAAP measures (cash income taxes, which are not included in free cash flow, are expected to range between $0 – $2 million for the year)
    (3) Amplify believes that a quantitative reconciliation of such forward-looking information to the most comparable financial measure calculated and presented in accordance with GAAP cannot be made available without unreasonable efforts. A reconciliation of these non-GAAP financial measures would require Amplify to predict the timing and likelihood of future transactions and other items that are difficult to accurately predict. Neither of these forward-looking measures, nor their probable significance, can be quantified with a reasonable degree of accuracy. Accordingly, a reconciliation of the most directly comparable forward-looking GAAP measures is not provided.
     

    Hedging

    Recently, the Company took advantage of volatility in the futures market to add to its hedge position, further protecting future cash flows. Amplify executed crude oil swaps covering the second half of 2025 through year-end 2026 at a weighted average price of $68.10. The Company also added natural gas collars for a portion of 2027 with a weighted average floor of $3.63 per MMBtu and a weighted average ceiling of $3.98 per MMBtu.

    The following table reflects the hedged volumes under Amplify’s commodity derivative contracts and the average fixed floor and ceiling prices at which production is hedged for January 2025 through December 2027, as of March 4, 2025:

        2025       2026       2027  
               
    Natural Gas Swaps:          
    Average Monthly Volume (MMBtu)   585,000       500,000       87,500  
    Weighted Average Fixed Price ($) $ 3.75     $ 3.79     $ 3.76  
               
    Natural Gas Collars:          
    Two-way collars          
    Average Monthly Volume (MMBtu)   500,000       500,000       87,500  
    Weighted Average Ceiling Price ($) $ 3.90     $ 4.06     $ 4.20  
    Weighted Average Floor Price ($) $ 3.50     $ 3.55     $ 3.50  
               
    Oil Swaps:          
    Average Monthly Volume (Bbls)   128,583       72,750      
    Weighted Average Fixed Price ($) $ 70.85     $ 69.19      
               
    Oil Collars:          
    Two-way collars          
    Average Monthly Volume (Bbls)   59,500          
    Weighted Average Ceiling Price ($) $ 80.20          
    Weighted Average Floor Price ($) $ 70.00          
               

    Amplify has posted an updated investor presentation containing additional hedging information on its website, www.amplifyenergy.com, under the Investor Relations section.

    Annual Report on Form 10-K

    Amplify’s financial statements and related footnotes will be available in its Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2024, which Amplify expects to file with the SEC on March 5, 2025.

    About Amplify Energy

    Amplify Energy Corp. is an independent oil and natural gas company engaged in the acquisition, development, exploitation and production of oil and natural gas properties. Amplify’s operations are focused in Oklahoma, the Rockies (Bairoil), federal waters offshore Southern California (Beta), East Texas / North Louisiana, and the Eagle Ford (Non-op). For more information, visit www.amplifyenergy.com.

    Conference Call

    Amplify will host an investor teleconference tomorrow at 10 a.m. Central Time to discuss these operating and financial results. Interested parties may join the call by dialing (888) 999-5318 at least 15 minutes before the call begins and providing the Conference ID: AEC4Q24. A telephonic replay will be available for fourteen days following the call by dialing (800) 654-1563 and providing the Access Code: 71724906. A transcript and a recorded replay of the call will also be available on our website after the call.

    Forward-Looking Statements

    This press release includes “forward-looking statements” within the meaning of Section 27A of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, and Section 21E of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended. All statements, other than statements of historical fact, included in this press release that address activities, events or developments that the Company expects, believes or anticipates will or may occur in the future are forward-looking statements. Terminology such as “may,” “will,” “would,” “should,” “expect,” “plan,” “project,” “intend,” “anticipate,” “believe,” “estimate,” “predict,” “potential,” “pursue,” “target,” “outlook,” “continue,” the negative of such terms or other comparable terminology are intended to identify forward-looking statements. These statements include, but are not limited to, statements about the Company’s expectations of plans, goals, strategies (including measures to implement strategies), objectives and anticipated results with respect thereto. These statements address activities, events or developments that we expect or anticipate will or may occur in the future, including things such as projections of results of operations, plans for growth, goals, future capital expenditures, competitive strengths, references to future intentions and other such references. These forward-looking statements involve risks and uncertainties and other factors that could cause the Company’s actual results or financial condition to differ materially from those expressed or implied by forward-looking statements. These include risks and uncertainties relating to, among other things: the Company’s ability to successfully complete the proposed business combination between the Company and certain of Juniper’s portfolio companies, or the “Mergers”; the Company’s evaluation and implementation of strategic alternatives; risks related to the redetermination of the borrowing base under the Company’s revolving credit facility; the Company’s ability to satisfy debt obligations; the Company’s need to make accretive acquisitions or substantial capital expenditures to maintain its declining asset base, including the existence of unanticipated liabilities or problems relating to acquired or divested business or properties; volatility in the prices for oil, natural gas and NGLs; the Company’s ability to access funds on acceptable terms, if at all, because of the terms and conditions governing the Company’s indebtedness, including financial covenants; general political and economic conditions, globally and in the jurisdictions in which we operate, including the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and ongoing conflicts in the Middle East, and the potential destabilizing effect such conflicts may pose for the global oil and natural gas markets; expectations regarding general economic conditions, including inflation; and the impact of local, state and federal governmental regulations, including those related to climate change and hydraulic fracturing, and the current administration’s potential reversal thereof. Please read the Company’s filings with the SEC, including “Risk Factors” in the Company’s Annual Report on Form 10-K, and if applicable, the Company’s Quarterly Reports on Form 10-Q and Current Reports on Form 8-K, which are available on the Company’s Investor Relations website at https://www.amplifyenergy.com/investor-relations/sec-filings/default.aspx or on the SEC’s website at http://www.sec.gov, for a discussion of risks and uncertainties that could cause actual results to differ from those in such forward-looking statements. You are cautioned not to place undue reliance on these forward-looking statements, which speak only as of the date of this press release. All forward-looking statements in this press release are qualified in their entirety by these cautionary statements. Except as required by law, the Company undertakes no obligation and does not intend to update or revise any forward-looking statements, whether as a result of new information, future results or otherwise.

    No Offer or Solicitation

    A portion of this press release relates to a proposed business combination transaction between the Company and certain Juniper portfolio companies. This communication is for informational purposes only and does not constitute an offer to sell or the solicitation of an offer to buy any securities or a solicitation of any vote or approval, in any jurisdiction, pursuant to the proposed business combination transaction or otherwise, nor shall there be any sale, issuance, exchange or transfer of the securities referred to in this document in any jurisdiction in contravention of applicable law. No offer of securities shall be made except by means of a prospectus meeting the requirements of Section 10 of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended.

    Important Additional Information Regarding the Mergers Will Be Filed With the SEC

    In connection with the proposed transaction, the Company has filed a definitive proxy statement. The definitive proxy statement will be sent to the stockholders of the Company. The Company may also file other documents with the SEC regarding the proposed transaction. INVESTORS AND SECURITY HOLDERS OF AMPLIFY ARE ADVISED TO CAREFULLY READ THE DEFINITIVE PROXY STATEMENT AND ANY OTHER RELEVANT MATERIALS FILED WITH THE SEC WHEN THEY BECOME AVAILABLE BECAUSE THEY WILL CONTAIN IMPORTANT INFORMATION ABOUT THE MERGERS, THE PARTIES TO THE MERGERS AND THE RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH THE MERGERS. Investors and security holders may obtain a free copy of the definitive proxy statement and other relevant documents filed by Amplify with the SEC from the SEC’s website at www.sec.gov. Security holders and other interested parties will also be able to obtain, without charge, a copy of the definitive proxy statement and other relevant documents (when available) by (1) directing your written request to: 500 Dallas Street, Suite 1700, Houston, Texas or (2) contacting our Investor Relations department by telephone at (832) 219-9044 or (832) 219-9051. Copies of the documents filed by the Company with the SEC will be available free of charge on the Company’s website at http://www.amplifyenergy.com.

    Participants in the Solicitation

    Amplify and certain of its respective directors, executive officers and employees may be considered participants in the solicitation of proxies in connection with the proposed transaction. Information regarding the persons who may, under the rules of the SEC, be deemed participants in the solicitation of the stockholders of Amplify in connection with the proposed transaction, including a description of their respective direct or indirect interests, by security holdings or otherwise, is included in the definitive proxy statement filed with the SEC. Additional information regarding the Company’s directors and executive officers is also included in Amplify’s Notice of Annual Meeting of Stockholders and 2024 Proxy Statement, which was filed with the SEC on April 5, 2024. These documents are available free of charge as described above.

    Use of Non-GAAP Financial Measures

    This press release and accompanying schedules include the non-GAAP financial measures of Adjusted EBITDA, Adjusted net income, free cash flow, net debt, PV-10 and cash G&A. The accompanying schedules provide a reconciliation of these non-GAAP financial measures to their most directly comparable financial measures calculated and presented in accordance with GAAP. Amplify’s non-GAAP financial measures should not be considered as alternatives to GAAP measures such as net income, operating income, net cash flows provided by operating activities, standardized measure of discounted future net cash flows, or any other measure of financial performance calculated and presented in accordance with GAAP. Amplify’s non-GAAP financial measures may not be comparable to similarly titled measures of other companies because they may not calculate such measures in the same manner as Amplify does.

    Adjusted EBITDA. Amplify defines Adjusted EBITDA as net income (loss) plus Interest expense; Income tax expense (benefit); DD&A; Impairment of goodwill and long-lived assets (including oil and natural gas properties); Accretion of AROs; Loss or (gain) on commodity derivative instruments; Cash settlements received or (paid) on expired commodity derivative instruments; Amortization of gain associated with terminated commodity derivatives; Losses or (gains) on sale of assets and other, net; Share-based compensation expenses; Exploration costs; Acquisition and divestiture related expenses; Reorganization items, net; Severance payments; and Other non-routine items that we deem appropriate. Adjusted EBITDA is commonly used as a supplemental financial measure by management and external users of Amplify’s financial statements, such as investors, research analysts and rating agencies, to assess: (1) its operating performance as compared to other companies in Amplify’s industry without regard to financing methods, capital structures or historical cost basis; (2) the ability of its assets to generate cash sufficient to pay interest and support Amplify’s indebtedness; and (3) the viability of projects and the overall rates of return on alternative investment opportunities. Since Adjusted EBITDA excludes some, but not all, items that affect net income or loss and because these measures may vary among other companies, the Adjusted EBITDA data presented in this press release may not be comparable to similarly titled measures of other companies. The GAAP measures most directly comparable to Adjusted EBITDA are net income and net cash provided by operating activities.

    Adjusted Net Income. Amplify defines Adjusted Net Income as net income (loss) adjusted for loss (gain) on commodity derivative instruments, acquisition & divestiture related expenses, unusual and infrequent items, and the income tax expense or benefit of these adjustments using our federal statutory tax rate. Adjusted Net Income (Loss) excludes the impact of unusual and infrequent items affecting earnings that vary widely and unpredictably, including derivative gains and losses. This measure is not meant to disassociate these items from management’s performance but rather is intended to provide helpful information to investors interested in comparing our performance between periods. Adjusted net income (loss) is not considered to be an alternative to net income (loss) reported in accordance with GAAP.

    Free cash flow. Amplify defines free cash flow as Adjusted EBITDA, less cash interest expense and capital expenditures. Free cash flow is an important non-GAAP financial measure for Amplify’s investors since it serves as an indicator of the Company’s success in providing a cash return on investment. The GAAP measures most directly comparable to free cash flow are net income and net cash provided by operating activities.

    Net debt. Amplify defines net debt as the total principal amount drawn on the revolving credit facility less cash and cash equivalents. The Company uses net debt as a measure of financial position and believes this measure provides useful additional information to investors to evaluate the Company’s capital structure and financial leverage.

    PV-10. PV-10 is a non-GAAP financial measure that represents the present value of estimated future cash inflows from proved oil and natural gas reserves that are calculated using the unweighted arithmetic average first-day-of-the-month prices for the prior 12 months, less future development and operating costs, discounted at 10% per annum to reflect the timing of future cash flows. The most directly comparable GAAP measure to PV-10 is standardized measure. PV-10 differs from standardized measure in its treatment of estimated future income taxes, which are excluded from PV-10. Amplify believes the presentation of PV-10 provides useful information because it is widely used by investors in evaluating oil and natural gas companies without regard to specific income tax characteristics of such entities. PV-10 is not intended to represent the current market value of our estimated proved reserves. PV-10 should not be considered in isolation or as a substitute for the standardized measure as defined under GAAP.

    Cash G&A. Amplify defines cash G&A as general and administrative expense, less share-based compensation expense; acquisition and divestiture costs; bad debt expense; and severance payments. Cash G&A is an important non-GAAP financial measure for Amplify’s investors since it allows for analysis of G&A spend without regard to share-based compensation and other non-recurring expenses which can vary substantially from company to company. The GAAP measures most directly comparable to cash G&A is total G&A expenses.

    Contacts

    Jim Frew — Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
    (832) 219-9044
    jim.frew@amplifyenergy.com

    Michael Jordan — Director, Finance and Treasurer
    (832) 219-9051
    michael.jordan@amplifyenergy.com


    Selected Operating and Financial Data (Tables)

    Amplify Energy Corp.
    Selected Financial Data – Unaudited
    Statements of Operations Data
           
      Three Months   Three Months
      Ended   Ended
    (Amounts in $000s, except per share data) December 31, 2024   September 30, 2024
           
    Revenues:      
    Oil and natural gas sales $ 67,189     $ 68,135  
    Other revenues   1,832       1,723  
    Total revenues   69,021       69,858  
           
    Costs and Expenses:      
    Lease operating expense   35,100       33,255  
    Pipeline incident loss   2,405       247  
    Gathering, processing and transportation   4,468       4,290  
    Exploration   10       –  
    Taxes other than income   5,356       5,997  
    Depreciation, depletion and amortization   8,418       8,102  
    General and administrative expense   9,486       8,251  
    Accretion of asset retirement obligations   2,156       2,125  
    Realized (gain) loss on commodity derivatives   (4,052 )     (6,375 )
    Unrealized (gain) loss on commodity derivatives   13,357       (18,672 )
    (Gain) loss on sale of properties   (1,367 )     –  
    Other, net   334       38  
    Total costs and expenses   75,671       37,258  
           
    Operating Income (loss)   (6,650 )     32,600  
           
    Other Income (Expense):      
    Interest expense, net   (3,684 )     (3,756 )
    Other income (expense)   (113 )     (130 )
    Total other income (expense)   (3,797 )     (3,886 )
           
    Income (loss) before reorganization items, net and income taxes   (10,447 )     28,714  
           
    Income tax benefit (expense) – current   2,132       (412 )
    Income tax benefit (expense) – deferred   886       (5,650 )
           
    Net income (loss) $ (7,429 )   $ 22,652  
           
    Earnings per share:      
    Basic and diluted earnings (loss) per share $ (0.19 )   $ 0.54  
           
    Selected Financial Data – Unaudited      
    Operating Statistics      
           
      Three Months   Three Months
      Ended   Ended
    (Amounts in $000s, except per unit data) December 31, 2024   September 30, 2024
           
    Oil and natural gas revenue:      
    Oil Sales $ 50,817     $ 54,353  
    NGL Sales   6,602       6,096  
    Natural Gas Sales   9,770       7,686  
    Total oil and natural gas sales – Unhedged $ 67,189     $ 68,135  
           
    Production volumes:      
    Oil Sales – MBbls   760       758  
    NGL Sales – MBbls   299       301  
    Natural Gas Sales – MMcf   3,883       4,165  
    Total – MBoe   1,706       1,752  
    Total – MBoe/d   18.5       19.0  
           
    Average sales price (excluding commodity derivatives):      
    Oil – per Bbl $ 66.82     $ 71.74  
    NGL – per Bbl $ 22.09     $ 20.29  
    Natural gas – per Mcf $ 2.52     $ 1.85  
    Total – per Boe $ 39.37     $ 38.88  
           
    Average unit costs per Boe:      
    Lease operating expense $ 20.57     $ 18.98  
    Gathering, processing and transportation $ 2.62     $ 2.45  
    Taxes other than income $ 3.14     $ 3.42  
    General and administrative expense $ 5.56     $ 4.71  
    Realized gain/(loss) on commodity derivatives $ 2.38     $ 3.64  
    Depletion, depreciation, and amortization $ 4.93     $ 4.62  
           
    Selected Financial Data – Unaudited      
    Asset Operating Statistics      
           
      Three Months   Three Months
      Ended   Ended
      December 31, 2024   September 30, 2024
           
    Production volumes – MBOE:      
    Bairoil   293       294  
    Beta   308       304  
    Oklahoma   436       454  
    East Texas / North Louisiana   609       638  
    Eagle Ford (Non-op)   60       62  
    Total – MBoe   1,706       1,752  
    Total – MBoe/d   18.5       19.0  
    % – Liquids   62 %     60 %
           
    Lease operating expense – $M:      
    Bairoil $ 11,800     $ 13,164  
    Beta   12,113       9,520  
    Oklahoma   3,948       3,644  
    East Texas / North Louisiana   5,887       5,592  
    Eagle Ford (Non-op)   1,351       1,335  
    Total Lease operating expense: $ 35,099     $ 33,255  
           
    Capital expenditures – $M:      
    Bairoil $ 190     $ 1,224  
    Beta   10,001       12,047  
    Oklahoma   168       1,449  
    East Texas / North Louisiana   2,758       2,303  
    Eagle Ford (Non-op)   2,125       1,157  
    Magnify Energy Services   82       44  
    Total Capital expenditures: $ 15,324     $ 18,224  
           
    Selected Financial Data – Unaudited              
    Balance Sheet Data              
                   
    (Amounts in $000s) December 31, 2024   September 30, 2024
                   
    Assets              
    Cash and Cash Equivalents $ –     $ –  
    Accounts Receivable   39,713       32,295  
    Other Current Assets   32,064       37,862  
    Total Current Assets $ 71,777     $ 70,157  
                   
    Net Oil and Gas Properties $ 386,218     $ 378,871  
    Other Long-Term Assets   289,081       290,188  
    Total Assets $ 747,076     $ 739,216  
                   
    Liabilities              
    Accounts Payable $ 13,231     $ 18,107  
    Accrued Liabilities   43,413       36,699  
    Other Current Liabilities   11,494       11,362  
    Total Current Liabilities $ 68,138     $ 66,168  
                   
    Long-Term Debt $ 127,000     $ 120,000  
    Asset Retirement Obligation   129,700       127,556  
    Other Long-Term Liabilities   13,326       10,822  
    Total Liabilities $ 338,164     $ 324,546  
                   
    Shareholders’ Equity              
    Common Stock & APIC $ 440,380     $ 438,709  
    Accumulated Earnings (Deficit)   (31,468 )     (24,039 )
    Total Shareholders’ Equity $ 408,912     $ 414,670  
                   
    Selected Financial Data – Unaudited      
    Statements of Cash Flows Data      
           
      Three Months   Three Months
      Ended   Ended
    (Amounts in $000s) December 31, 2024   September 30, 2024
           
           
    Net cash provided by (used in) operating activities $ 12,455     $ 15,737  
    Net cash provided by (used in) investing activities   (19,379 )     (18,078 )
    Net cash provided by (used in) financing activities   6,924       1,839  
           
    Selected Operating and Financial Data (Tables)
    Reconciliation of Unaudited GAAP Financial Measures to Non-GAAP Financial Measures
    Adjusted EBITDA and Free Cash Flow
           
      Three Months   Three Months
      Ended   Ended
    (Amounts in $000s) December 31, 2024   September 30, 2024
           
    Reconciliation of Adjusted EBITDA to Net Cash Provided from Operating Activities:    
    Net cash provided by operating activities $ 12,455     $ 15,737  
    Changes in working capital   4,770       5,937  
    Interest expense, net   3,684       3,756  
    Cash settlements received on terminated commodity derivatives   –       (793 )
    Amortization of gain associated with terminated commodity derivatives   159       –  
    Amortization and write-off of deferred financing fees   (315 )     (310 )
    Exploration costs   10       –  
    Acquisition and divestiture related costs   1,424       186  
    Plugging and abandonment cost   754       372  
    Current income tax expense (benefit)   (2,132 )     412  
    Pipeline incident loss   2,405       247  
    (Gain) loss on sale of properties   (1,367 )     –  
    Adjusted EBITDA: $ 21,847     $ 25,544  
           
    Reconciliation of Free Cash Flow to Net Cash Provided from Operating Activities:    
    Adjusted EBITDA: $ 21,847     $ 25,544  
    Less: Cash interest expense   3,598       3,721  
    Less: Capital expenditures   15,324       18,224  
    Free Cash Flow: $ 2,925     $ 3,599  
           
    Selected Operating and Financial Data (Tables)
    Reconciliation of Unaudited GAAP Financial Measures to Non-GAAP Financial Measures
    Adjusted EBITDA and Free Cash Flow
           
           
      Twelve Months   Twelve Months
      Ended   Ended
    (Amounts in $000s, except per share data) December 31, 2024   December 31, 2023
           
    Reconciliation of Adjusted EBITDA1to Net Cash Provided from Operating Activities:    
    Net cash provided by operating activities $ 51,293     $ 141,590  
    Changes in working capital   32,272       (8,517 )
    Interest expense, net   14,599       17,719  
    Cash settlements received on terminated commodity derivatives   (793 )     (658 )
    Amortization of gain associated with terminated commodity derivatives   159       658  
    Amortization and write-off of deferred financing fees   (1,233 )     (1,980 )
    Exploration costs   61       57  
    Acquisition and divestiture related costs   1,633       219  
    Plugging and abandonment cost   1,640       2,239  
    Current income tax expense (benefit)   232       4,817  
    Pipeline incident loss   3,859       19,981  
    (Gain) loss on sale of properties   (1,367 )     –  
    LOPI – timing differences   –       (4,636 )
    Litigation settlement   –       (84,875 )
    Other   686       1,418  
    Adjusted EBITDA: $ 103,041     $ 88,032  
           
    Reconciliation of Free Cash Flow to Net Cash Provided from Operating Activities:    
    Adjusted EBITDA1: $ 103,041     $ 88,032  
    Less: Cash interest expense   14,438       16,263  
    Less: Capital expenditures   70,644       33,744  
    Free Cash Flow: $ 17,959     $ 38,025  
      (1) Adjusted EBITDA includes a revenue suspense release of $8.4 million for the twelve months ended December 31, 2024. See “Revenue Payables in Suspense” table for additional information.
         
    Selected Operating and Financial Data (Tables)
    Reconciliation of Unaudited GAAP Financial Measures to Non-GAAP Financial Measures
    Adjusted EBITDA1 and Free Cash Flow
           
      Three Months   Three Months
      Ended   Ended
    (Amounts in $000s) December 31, 2024   September 30, 2024
           
    Reconciliation of Adjusted EBITDA to Net Income (Loss):      
    Net income (loss) $ (7,429 )   $ 22,652  
    Interest expense, net   3,684       3,756  
    Income tax expense (benefit) – current   (2,132 )     412  
    Income tax expense (benefit) – deferred   (886 )     5,650  
    Depreciation, depletion and amortization   8,418       8,102  
    Accretion of asset retirement obligations   2,156       2,125  
    (Gains) losses on commodity derivatives   9,305       (25,047 )
    Cash settlements received (paid) on expired commodity derivative instruments   4,052       5,582  
    Amortization of gain associated with terminated commodity derivatives   159       –  
    Acquisition and divestiture related costs   1,424       186  
    Share-based compensation expense   1,686       1,815  
    (Gain) loss on sale of properties   (1,367 )     –  
    Exploration costs   10       –  
    Loss on settlement of AROs   334       38  
    Bad debt expense   28       26  
    Pipeline incident loss   2,405       247  
    Adjusted EBITDA1: $ 21,847     $ 25,544  
           
    Reconciliation of Free Cash Flow to Net Income (Loss):      
    Adjusted EBITDA: $ 21,847     $ 25,544  
    Less: Cash interest expense   3,598       3,721  
    Less: Capital expenditures   15,324       18,224  
    Free Cash Flow: $ 2,925     $ 3,599  
           
    Selected Operating and Financial Data (Tables)
    Reconciliation of Unaudited GAAP Financial Measures to Non-GAAP Financial Measures
    Adjusted EBITDA and Free Cash Flow
           
           
      Twelve Months   Twelve Months
      Ended   Ended
    (Amounts in $000s, except per share data) December 31, 2024   December 31, 2023
           
           
    Reconciliation of Adjusted EBITDA1to Net Income (Loss):      
    Net income (loss) $ 12,946     $ 392,750  
    Interest expense, net   14,599       17,719  
    Income tax expense (benefit) – current   232       4,817  
    Income tax expense (benefit) – deferred   2,196       (253,796 )
    Depreciation, depletion and amortization   32,586       28,004  
    Accretion of asset retirement obligations   8,438       7,951  
    (Gains) losses on commodity derivatives   2,047       (40,343 )
    Cash settlements received (paid) on expired commodity derivative instruments   17,617       (8,273 )
    Amortization of gain associated with terminated commodity derivatives   159       658  
    Acquisition and divestiture related costs   1,633       219  
    Share-based compensation expense   6,799       5,280  
    (Gain) loss on sale of properties   (1,367 )     –  
    Exploration costs   61       57  
    Loss on settlement of AROs   470       1,003  
    Bad debt expense   80       98  
    Pipeline incident loss   3,859       19,981  
    LOPI – timing differences   –       (4,636 )
    Litigation settlement   –       (84,875 )
    Other   686       1,418  
    Adjusted EBITDA: $ 103,041     $ 88,032  
           
    Reconciliation of Free Cash Flow to Net Income (Loss):      
    Adjusted EBITDA1: $ 103,041     $ 88,032  
    Less: Cash interest expense   14,438       16,263  
    Less: Capital expenditures   70,644       33,744  
    Free Cash Flow: $ 17,959     $ 38,025  
      (1) Adjusted EBITDA includes a revenue suspense release of $8.4 million for the twelve months ended December 31, 2024. See “Revenue Payables in Suspense” table for additional information.
         
    Selected Operating and Financial Data (Tables)
    Reconciliation of Unaudited GAAP Financial Measures to Non-GAAP Financial Measures
    Net Income (Loss) to Adjusted Net Income (Loss)
           
      Three Months   Three Months
      Ended   Ended
    (Amounts in $000s, except per share data) December 31, 2024   September 30, 2024
           
    Reconciliation of Adjusted Net Income (Loss):      
    Net income (loss) $ (7,429 )   $ 22,652  
    Unrealized (gain) loss on commodity derivatives   13,357       (18,672 )
    Acquisition and divestiture related costs   1,424       186  
    Non-recurring costs:      
    Income tax expense (benefit) – deferred   (886 )     5,650  
    Gain on sale of properties   (1,367 )     –  
    Litigation settlement   –       –  
    Tax effect of adjustments   (12 )     (39 )
    Adjusted net income (loss) $ 5,087     $ 9,777  
           
    Selected Operating and Financial Data (Tables)
    Reconciliation of Unaudited GAAP Financial Measures to Non-GAAP Financial Measures
    Net Income (Loss) to Adjusted Net Income (Loss)
           
      Twelve Months   Twelve Months
      Ended   Ended
    (Amounts in $000s, except per share data) December 31, 2024   December 31, 2023
           
    Reconciliation of Adjusted Net Income (Loss):      
    Net income (loss) $ 12,946     $ 392,750  
    Unrealized (gain) loss on commodity derivatives   20,457       (47,958 )
    Acquisition and divestiture related costs   1,633       219  
    Non-recurring costs:      
    Income tax expense (benefit) – deferred1   2,196       (253,796 )
    Gain on sale of properties   (1,367 )     –  
    Litigation settlement2   –       (84,875 )
    Tax effect of adjustments3   (56 )     17,778  
    Adjusted net income (loss) $ 35,809     $ 24,118  
      (1) In 2023, we achieved three years of cumulative book income which resulted in the release of our valuation allowance of $284.9 million.
      (2) In 2023, non-recurring costs included a litigation settlement with the shipping companies and the containerships whose anchors struck the Company’s pipeline.
      (3) The federal statutory rates were utilized for all periods presented.
         
    Selected Operating and Financial Data (Tables)
    Reconciliation of Unaudited GAAP Financial Measures to Non-GAAP Financial Measures
    Cash General and Administrative Expenses
                   
      Three Months      Three Months
      Ended   Ended
    (Amounts in $000s) December 31, 2024   September 30, 2024
                   
    General and administrative expense $ 9,486     $ 8,251  
    Less: Share-based compensation expense   1,686       1,815  
    Less: Acquisition and divestiture costs   1,424       186  
    Less: Bad debt expense   28       26  
    Less: Severance payments   —       —  
    Total Cash General and Administrative Expense $ 6,348     $ 6,224  
                   
    Selected Operating and Financial Data (Tables)
    Reconciliation of Unaudited GAAP Financial Measures to Non-GAAP Financial Measures
    Cash General and Administrative Expenses
                   
      Twelve Months      Twelve Months
      Ended   Ended
    (Amounts in $000s) December 31, 2024   December 31, 2023
                   
    General and administrative expense $ 35,895     $ 32,984  
    Less: Share-based compensation expense   6,799       5,280  
    Less: Acquisition and divestiture costs   1,633       219  
    Less: Bad debt expense   80       98  
    Less: Severance payments   344       965  
    Total Cash General and Administrative Expense $ 27,039     $ 26,422  
                   
    Selected Operating and Financial Data (Tables)
    Reconciliation of Unaudited GAAP Financial Measures to Non-GAAP Financial Measures
    Revenue Payables in Suspense
           
      Three Months      Twelve Months
      Ended   Ended
    (Amounts in $000s) December 31, 2024   December 31, 2024
           
           
    Oil and natural gas sales $ –     $ 4,023  
    Other revenues   –       4,829  
    Severance tax and other deducts   –       (433 )
    Total net revenue $ –     $ 8,419  
           
    Production volumes:      
    Oil (MBbls)   –       33  
    NGLs (MBbls)   –       31  
    Natural gas (MMcf)   –       441  
    Total (Mboe)   –       138  
    Total (Mboe/d)   –       0.38  
           
        As of       As of  
      December 31,       December 31,  
      2024       2023  
    Standardized measure of future net cash flows, discounted at 10% ($ M)   $608,239       $626,131  
    Add: PV of future income tax, discounted at 10% ($ M)   $127,526       $130,882  
    PV-10 ($ M)   $735,765       $757,013  
                   

    The MIL Network –

    March 6, 2025
  • MIL-OSI: Silvaco Reports Fourth Quarter and Full Year 2024 Financial Results

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Achieved record gross bookings of $65.8 million and revenue of $59.7 million in full-year 2024

    Signed 46 new customers in 2024 and expanded relationship with existing customers across key markets including power, automotive, memory, foundry, and display

    Expanded Product Portfolio with the Acquisition of Cadence’s Process Proximity Compensation Product Line

    SANTA CLARA, Calif., March 05, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Silvaco Group, Inc. (Nasdaq: SVCO) (“Silvaco” or the “Company”), a provider of TCAD, EDA software, and SIP solutions that enable innovative semiconductor design and digital twin modeling through AI software and automation, today announced its fourth quarter and full year 2024 results.

    “We are proud to close out the year with strong momentum and growing customer traction, including 46 new customer wins in 2024 and multiple bookings on our AI based, flagship FTCO platform,” said Dr. Babak Taheri, Silvaco’s Chief Executive Officer. Dr. Taheri continued, “Our first acquisition as a public company marks a significant milestone in executing our M&A strategy for talent, technology and expanding through inorganic growth. With a continued focus on innovation and execution, we are well-positioned to build on this success and drive further growth in 2025 for our EDA and TCAD product lines.”

    Fourth Quarter 2024 and Recent Business Highlights

    • Acquired 13 new customers across key markets including Photonics, Power, Automotive, Memory, and Foundry, which represented approximately 9% of gross bookings for the quarter.
    • Announced a partnership with Micon Global to expand Silvaco’s reach across the EMEA market, leveraging Micon’s expertise to deliver cutting-edge TCAD, EDA, and SIP solutions to new customers.
    • Joined the SMART USA Institute under the CHIPS Manufacturing USA program to advance digital twin technologies in semiconductor manufacturing, reinforcing Silvaco’s leadership in innovation. We received our first booking from this program.
    • Received a $5.0 million follow-on order for FTCO™ digital-twin modeling product from a strategic memory customer. This order extends the footprint of our FTCO™ product line and further validates our strategic focus on this unique technology.
    • Achieved ISO 9001 certification, underscoring Silvaco’s commitment to quality and continuous improvement across its TCAD, EDA, and SIP product portfolio.
    • On March 4, 2025, Silvaco closed the acquisition of the Process Proximity Compensation (PPC) product line from Cadence Design Systems, Inc. The addition, an optical proximity correction suite of tools, is highly complementary to Silvaco’s EDA and TCAD tool suites.

    Full Year 2024 Business Highlights

    • Acquired 46 new customers across key markets including Power, Automotive, Government/Mil-Aero, Photonics, IOT, 5G/6G, Memory, and Foundry, which represented approximately 10% of gross bookings for the year.
    • Expanded Victory TCAD and Digital Twin Modeling Platform to Planar CMOS, FinFET and Advanced CMOS Technologies which is a necessary step to enable FTCO for Advanced Process.
    • Silvaco Announced that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of all claims against Silvaco brought by Aldini AG.
    • Silvaco was added to the Russell 2000®, Russell 3000®, and Russell Microcap® indexes in September 2024.
    • Completed initial public offering in May 2024, raising $106 million net of underwriters’ fees.

    Fourth Quarter 2024 Financial Results

    GAAP Financial Results

    • Revenue of $17.9 million, up 43% year-over-year and up 63% quarter-over-quarter.
      • TCAD revenue of $12.7 million, up 65% year-over-year.
      • EDA revenue of $4.2 million, up 57% year-over-year.
      • SIP revenue of $0.9 million, down 57% year-over-year.
    • GAAP gross profit and GAAP gross margin were $15.4 million and 86%, respectively, which includes the impact of $194,000 stock-based compensation expense, $249,000 amortization of acquired intangible assets, and $80,000 payroll taxes from the RSU lockup release, up from $9.8 million and 79% in Q4 2023.
    • GAAP net income of $4.2 million, compared to a GAAP net loss of $2.2 million in Q4 2023.
    • GAAP basic and diluted net income per share of $0.14, compared to GAAP basic and diluted net loss per share of $(0.11) in Q4 2023.
    • As of December 31, 2024, cash and cash equivalents and marketable securities totaled $87.5 million.

    Key Operating Indicators and Non-GAAP Financial Results:

    • Gross bookings were $20.3 million, up 30% year-over-year.
    • As of December 31, 2024, the remaining performance obligation balance of $34.3 million, 46% of which is expected to be recognized as revenue in the next 12 months.
    • Non-GAAP gross profit and non-GAAP gross margin were $16.0 million and 89%, respectively, up from $9.8 million and 79% year-over-year.
    • Non-GAAP net income of $4.3 million, compared to Non-GAAP net loss of $(1.6) million in Q4 2023.
    • Non-GAAP diluted net income per share of $0.15, compared to Non-GAAP diluted net loss per share of $(0.08) in Q4 2023.

    Full Year 2024 Financial Results

    GAAP Financial Results

    • Revenue of $59.7 million, up 10% year-over-year.
      • TCAD revenue of $40.2 million, up 25% year-over-year.
      • EDA revenue of $14.6 million, up 4% year-over-year.
      • SIP revenue of $4.9 million, down 40% year-over-year.
    • GAAP gross profit and GAAP gross margin were $47.6 million and 80%, respectively, which includes the impact of $3.0 million stock-based compensation expense, $747,000 amortization of acquired intangible assets, and $80,000 payroll taxes from the RSU lockup release, up from $44.9 million and down from 83% in 2023.
    • GAAP net loss of $(39.4) million, compared to $(0.3) million in 2023.
    • GAAP basic and diluted net loss per share of $(1.53), compared to $(0.02) in 2023.

    Key Operating Indicators and Non-GAAP Financial Results:

    • Gross bookings were $65.8 million, up 13% year-over-year.
    • Non-GAAP gross profit and non-GAAP gross margin were $51.4 million and 86%, respectively, up from $44.9 million and 83% year over year.
    • Non-GAAP net income of $6.7 million, compared to $3.4 million in 2023.
    • Non-GAAP diluted net income per share of $0.25, compared to $0.17 in 2023.

    For a discussion of the non-GAAP metrics presented in this press release, as well as a reconciliation of non-GAAP metrics to the nearest comparable GAAP metric, see “Discussion of Non-GAAP Financial Measures” and “GAAP to Non-GAAP Reconciliation” in the accompanying tables below.

    Supplementary materials to this press release, including our fourth quarter 2024 financial results, can be found at https://investors.silvaco.com/financial-information/quarterly-results.

    First Quarter and Full Year 2025 Financial Outlook

    As of March 5, 2025, Silvaco is providing guidance for its first quarter of 2025 and its full-year 2025, which represents Silvaco’s current estimates on its operations and financial results. The financial information below represents forward-looking financial information and in some instances forward-looking, non-GAAP financial information, including estimates of non-GAAP gross margin, non-GAAP operating income (loss) and non-GAAP diluted net income (loss) per share. GAAP gross margin is the most comparable GAAP measure to non-GAAP gross margin, GAAP operating income (loss) is the most comparable GAAP measure to non-GAAP operating income (loss). GAAP diluted net income (loss) per share is the most comparable GAAP measure to non-GAAP diluted net income (loss) per share. Non-GAAP gross margin differs from GAAP gross margin in that it excludes items such as stock-based compensation expense, amortization of acquired intangible assets, and payroll tax from the IPO lock-up release. Non-GAAP operating income (loss) differs from GAAP operating income (loss) in that it excludes items such as acquisition-related estimated litigation claim and legal costs, stock-based compensation expense, amortization of acquired intangible assets, payroll tax from the IPO lock-up release, IPO preparation costs, and executive severance costs. Non-GAAP diluted net income (loss) per share differs from GAAP diluted net income (loss) per share in that it excludes certain costs, including IPO preparation costs, acquisition-related estimated litigation claim and legal costs, stock-based compensation expense, amortization of acquired intangible assets, payroll tax from the IPO lock-up release, executive severance costs, change in fair value of contingent consideration, foreign exchange (gain) loss, loss on debt extinguishment, and the income tax effect on non-GAAP items. Silvaco is unable to predict with reasonable certainty the ultimate outcome of these exclusions without unreasonable effort. Therefore, Silvaco has not provided guidance for GAAP gross margin, GAAP operating income or GAAP diluted net income (loss) per share or a reconciliation of the forward-looking non-GAAP gross margin or non-GAAP operating income or non-GAAP diluted net income (loss) per share guidance to GAAP gross margin or GAAP operating income or GAAP diluted net income (loss) per share, respectively. However, it is important to note that these excluded items could be material to our results computed in accordance with GAAP in future periods.

    Based on current business trends and conditions, the Company expects for first quarter 2025 the following:

    • Gross bookings in the range of $16.0 million to $19.0 million, which would compare to $16.1 million in the first quarter of 2024.
    • Revenue in the range of $14.5 million to $17.0 million, which would compare to $15.9 million in the first quarter of 2024.
    • Non-GAAP gross margin in the range of 84% to 87%, which would compare to 88% in the first quarter of 2024.
    • Non-GAAP operating income in the range of ($1.0) million loss to $1.0 million income, compared to $3.3 million in the first quarter of 2024.
    • Non-GAAP diluted net income per share in the range of ($0.03) loss to $0.03, compared to $0.12 in the first quarter of 2024.

    For full year 2025, the Company expects:

    • Gross bookings in the range of $72.0 million to $79.0 million, which would represent a 9% to 20% increase from $65.8 million in 2024.
    • Revenue in the range of $66.0 million to $72.0 million, which would represent a 11% to 21% increase from $59.7 million in 2024.
    • Non-GAAP gross margin in the range of 84.0% to 89.0%, which would compare to 86% in 2024.
    • Non-GAAP operating income in the range of $2.0 million to $7.0 million, which would compare to $5.5 million in 2024.
    • Non-GAAP diluted net income per share in the range of $0.07 to $0.19, compared to $0.25 in 2024.

    Q4 2024 Conference Call Details

    A press release highlighting the Company’s results along with supplemental financial results will be available at https://investors.silvaco.com/ along with an earnings presentation to accompany management’s prepared remarks on the day of the conference call, after market close. An archived replay of the conference call will be available on this website for a limited time after the call. Participants who want to join the call and ask a question may register for the call here to receive the dial-in numbers and unique PIN.

    Date: Wednesday, March 5, 2025
    Time: 5:00 p.m. Eastern time
    Webcast: Here (live and replay)

    About Silvaco

    Silvaco is a provider of TCAD, EDA software, and SIP solutions that enable semiconductor design and digital twin modeling through AI software and innovation. Silvaco’s solutions are used for semiconductor and photonics processes, devices, and systems development across display, power devices, automotive, memory, high performance compute, foundries, photonics, internet of things, and 5G/6G mobile markets for complex SoC design. Silvaco is headquartered in Santa Clara, California, and has a global presence with offices located in North America, Europe, Brazil, China, Japan, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan.

    Safe Harbor Statement

    This press release contains forward-looking statements based on Silvaco’s current expectations. The words “believe”, “estimate”, “expect”, “intend”, “anticipate”, “plan”, “project”, “will”, and similar phrases as they relate to Silvaco are intended to identify such forward-looking statements. These forward-looking statements reflect the current views and assumptions of Silvaco and are subject to various risks and uncertainties that could cause actual results to differ materially from expectations.

    These forward-looking statements include but are not limited to, statements regarding our future operating results, financial position, and guidance, our business strategy and plans, our objectives for future operations, our development or delivery of new or enhanced products, and anticipated results of those products for our customers, our competitive positioning, projected costs, technological capabilities, and plans, and macroeconomic trends.

    A variety of risks and factors that are beyond our control could cause actual results to differ materially from those in the forward-looking statements including, without limitation, the following: (a) market conditions; (b) anticipated trends, challenges and growth in our business and the markets in which we operate; (c) our ability to appropriately respond to changing technologies on a timely and cost-effective basis; (d) the size and growth potential of the markets for our software solutions, and our ability to serve those markets; (e) our expectations regarding competition in our existing and new markets; (f) the level of demand in our customers’ end markets; (g) regulatory developments in the United States and foreign countries; (h) changes in trade policies, including the imposition of tariffs; (i) proposed new software solutions, services or developments; (j) our ability to attract and retain key management personnel; (k) our customer relationships and our ability to retain and expand our customer relationships; (l) our ability to diversify our customer base and develop relationships in new markets; (m) the strategies, prospects, plans, expectations, and objectives of management for future operations; (n) public health crises, pandemics, and epidemics and their effects on our business and our customers’ businesses; (o) the impact of the current conflicts between Ukraine and Russia and Israel and Hamas and the ongoing trade disputes among the United States and China on our business, financial condition or prospects, including extreme volatility in the global capital markets making debt or equity financing more difficult to obtain, more costly or more dilutive, delays and disruptions of the global supply chains and the business activities of our suppliers, distributors, customers and other business partners; (p) changes in general economic or business conditions or economic or demographic trends in the United States and foreign countries including changes in tariffs, interest rates and inflation; (q) our ability to raise additional capital; (r) our ability to accurately forecast demand for our software solutions; (s) our expectations regarding the outcome of any ongoing litigation; (t) our expectations regarding the period during which we qualify as an emerging growth company under the JOBS Act and as a smaller reporting company under the Exchange Act; (u) our expectations regarding our ability to obtain, maintain, protect and enforce intellectual property protection for our technology; (v) our status as a controlled company; (w) our use of the net proceeds from our initial public offering, and (x) our ability to successfully integrate, retain key personnel, and realize the anticipated benefits of the acquisition of Cadence’s PPC product line.

    It is not possible for us to predict all risks, nor can we assess the impact of all factors on our business or the extent to which any factor, or combination of factors, may cause actual results or outcomes to differ materially from those contained in any forward-looking statements we may make. Accordingly, you should not rely on any of the forward-looking statements. Additional information relating to the uncertainty affecting the Silvaco’s business is contained in Silvaco’s filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission. These documents are available on the SEC Filings section of the Investor Relations section of Silvaco’s website at http://investors.silvaco.com/. These forward-looking statements represent Silvaco’s expectations as of the date of this press release. Subsequent events may cause these expectations to change, and Silvaco disclaims any obligations to update or alter these forward-looking statements in the future, whether as a result of new information, future events or otherwise.

    Discussion of Non-GAAP Financial Measures

    We use certain non-GAAP financial measures to supplement the performance measures in our consolidated financial statements, which are presented in accordance with GAAP. These non-GAAP financial measures include non-GAAP gross profit, non-GAAP gross margin, non-GAAP operating income (loss), non-GAAP net income (loss), and non-GAAP diluted net income (loss) per share. We use these non-GAAP financial measures for financial and operational decision-making and as a mean to assist us in evaluating period-to-period comparisons.

    We define non-GAAP gross profit and non-GAAP gross margin as our GAAP gross profit and GAAP gross margin adjusted to exclude certain costs, including stock-based compensation expense, amortization of acquired intangible assets and payroll tax from the IPO lock-up release. We define non-GAAP operating income (loss), as our GAAP operating income (loss) adjusted to exclude certain costs, including IPO preparation costs, acquisition-related estimated litigation claim and legal costs, stock-based compensation expense, amortization of acquired intangible assets, payroll tax from the IPO lock-up release, and executive severance costs. We define non-GAAP net income (loss) as our GAAP net income (loss) adjusted to exclude certain costs, including IPO preparation costs, acquisition-related estimated litigation claim and legal costs, stock-based compensation expense, amortization of acquired intangible assets, payroll tax from the IPO lock-up release, executive severance costs, change in fair value of contingent consideration, foreign exchange (gain) loss, loss on debt extinguishment, and the income tax effect on non-GAAP items. Our non-GAAP diluted net income (loss) per share is calculated in the same way as our non-GAAP net income (loss), but on a per share basis. We monitor non-GAAP gross profit, non-GAAP gross margin, non-GAAP operating income (loss), non-GAAP net income (loss) and non-GAAP diluted net income (loss) per share as non-GAAP financial measures to supplement the financial information we present in accordance with GAAP to provide investors with additional information regarding our financial results.

    Certain items are excluded from our non-GAAP gross profit, non-GAAP gross margin, non-GAAP operating income (loss), non-GAAP net income (loss) and non-GAAP diluted net income (loss) per share because these items are non-cash in nature or are not indicative of our core operating performance and render comparisons with prior periods and competitors less meaningful. We adjust GAAP gross profit, GAAP gross margin, GAAP operating income (loss), GAAP net income (loss), and GAAP diluted net income (loss) per share for these items to arrive at non-GAAP gross profit, non-GAAP gross margin, non-GAAP operating income (loss), non-GAAP net income (loss), and non-GAAP diluted net income (loss) per share because these amounts can vary substantially from company to company within our industry depending upon accounting methods and book values of assets, capital structure and the method by which the assets were acquired. By excluding certain items that may not be indicative of our recurring core operating results, we believe that non-GAAP gross profit, non-GAAP gross margin, non-GAAP operating income (loss), non-GAAP net income (loss) and non-GAAP diluted net income (loss) per share provide meaningful supplemental information regarding our performance.

    We believe these non-GAAP financial measures are useful to investors and others because they allow for additional information with respect to financial measures used by management in its financial and operational decision-making and they may be used by our institutional investors and the analyst community to help them analyze our financial performance and the health of our business. However, there are a number of limitations related to the use of non-GAAP financial measures, and these non-GAAP measures should be considered in addition to, not as a substitute for or in isolation from, our financial results prepared in accordance with GAAP. Other companies, including companies in our industry, may calculate these non-GAAP financial measures differently or not at all, which reduces their usefulness as comparative measures.

           
    SILVACO GROUP, INC.
    CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS
    (Unaudited, in thousands except share and par value amounts)
      December 31,   December 31,
      2024   2023
           
    ASSETS      
    Current assets:      
    Cash and cash equivalents $ 19,606     $ 4,421  
    Short-term marketable securities   63,071       –  
    Accounts receivable, net   9,211       4,006  
    Contract assets, net   11,932       8,749  
    Prepaid expenses and other current assets   3,460       2,549  
    Deferred transaction costs   –       1,163  
    Total current assets   107,280       20,888  
    Non-current assets:      
    Non-current marketable securities   4,785       –  
    Property and equipment, net   865       591  
    Operating lease right-of-use assets, net   1,711       1,963  
    Intangible assets, net   4,369       342  
    Goodwill   9,026       9,026  
    Non-current portion of contract assets, net   12,611       6,250  
    Other assets   1,698       1,825  
    Total non-current assets   35,065       19,997  
    Total assets $ 142,345     $ 40,885  
           
    Liabilities and stockholders’ equity      
    Current liabilities:      
    Accounts payable $ 3,316     $ 2,495  
    Accrued expenses and other current liabilities   19,801       10,255  
    Accrued income taxes   1,668       1,626  
    Deferred revenue, current   7,497       7,882  
    Operating lease liabilities, current   744       735  
    Related party line of credit   –       2,000  
    Vendor financing obligations, current   1,462       –  
    Total current liabilities   34,488       24,993  
    Non-current liabilities:      
    Deferred revenue, non-current   3,593       5,071  
    Operating lease liabilities, non-current   946       1,198  
    Vendor financing obligations, non-current   2,928       –  
    Other non-current liabilities   307       221  
    Total liabilities   42,262       31,483  
    Commitments and contingencies      
    Stockholders’ equity      
    Preferred stock, $0.0001 par value; 10,000,000 shares authorized, no shares issued and outstanding as of December 31, 2024; no shares authorized as of December 31, 2023   –       –  
    Common stock, $0.0001 par value; 500,000,000 shares authorized; 28,526,615 shares issued and outstanding as of December 31, 2024; 25,000,000 shares authorized; 20,000,000 shares issued and outstanding as of December 31, 2023   3       2  
    Additional paid-in capital   130,360       –  
    (Accumulated deficit) Retained earnings   (28,012 )     11,392  
    Accumulated other comprehensive loss   (2,268 )     (1,992 )
    Total stockholders’ equity   100,083       9,402  
    Total liabilities and stockholders’ equity $ 142,345     $ 40,885  
           
    SILVACO GROUP, INC.
    CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF INCOME
    (Unaudited, in thousands except share and per share amounts)
                   
      Three months Ended December 31,   Twelve months Ended December 31,
        2024       2023       2024       2023  
                   
    Revenue:              
    Software license revenue $ 13,870     $ 8,738     $ 43,991     $ 39,331  
    Maintenance and service   3,989       3,748       15,689       14,915  
    Total revenue   17,859       12,486       59,680       54,246  
    Cost of revenue   2,422       2,682       12,042       9,354  
    Gross profit   15,437       9,804       47,638       44,892  
    Operating expenses:              
    Research and development   5,283       3,337       20,740       13,170  
    Selling and marketing   3,983       3,833       18,300       12,707  
    General and administrative   7,529       4,570       37,571       17,881  
    Estimated litigation claim   (3,782 )     –       11,306       –  
    Total operating expenses   13,013       11,740       87,917       43,758  
    Operating (loss) income   2,424       (1,936 )     (40,279 )     1,134  
    Loss on debt extinguishment   –       –       (718 )     –  
    Interest income   1,077       2       2,976       6  
    Interest and other expenses, net   (67 )     (95 )     (899 )     (630 )
    (Loss) income before income tax provision   3,434       (2,029 )     (38,920 )     510  
    Income tax provision (benefit)   (723 )     218       484       826  
    Net (loss) income $ 4,157     $ (2,247 )   $ (39,404 )   $ (316 )
    (Loss) earnings per share attributable to common stockholders:              
    Basic and diluted $ 0.14     $ (0.11 )   $ (1.53 )   $ (0.02 )
    Weighted average shares used in computing per share amounts:              
    Basic and diluted   28,734,082       20,000,000       25,672,845       20,000,000  
                   
    SILVACO GROUP, INC.
    CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF CASH FLOWS
    (Unaudited, in thousands)
      Year Ended December 31
        2024       2023  
    Cash flows from operating activities:      
    Net loss $ (39,404 )   $ (316 )
    Adjustments to reconcile net loss to net cash (used in) provided by operating activities:      
    Depreciation and amortization   1,285       601  
    Stock-based compensation expense   26,915       –  
    Provision for credit losses   351       220  
    Accretion of discount on marketable securities, net   (1,685 )     –  
    Estimated litigation claim   11,306       –  
    Loss on debt extinguishment   718       –  
    Change in fair value of contingent consideration   (27 )     325  
    Changes in operating assets and liabilities:      
    Accounts receivable   (5,971 )     1,378  
    Contract assets   (10,293 )     (5,208 )
    Prepaid expense and other current assets   (790 )     133  
    Other assets   57       (267 )
    Accounts payable   1,326       156  
    Accrued expenses and other current liabilities   (2,160 )     2,015  
    Accrued income taxes   74       (23 )
    Deferred revenue   (1,585 )     2,268  
    Other non-current liabilities   109       (102 )
    Net cash (used in) provided by operating activities   (19,774 )     1,180  
    Cash flows from investing activities:      
    Purchases of marketable securities   (99,630 )     –  
    Maturities of marketable securities   33,600       –  
    Purchases of property and equipment   (505 )     (339 )
    Net cash used in investing activities   (66,535 )     (339 )
    Cash flows from financing activities:      
    Proceeds from initial public offering, net of underwriting fees   106,020       –  
    Proceeds from issuance of convertible note, net of debt issuance costs   4,852       –  
    Proceeds from loan facility   4,250       –  
    Repayment of loan facility   (4,250 )     –  
    Proceeds from related party line of credit   –       1,000  
    Repayment of related party line of credit   (2,000 )     (1,000 )
    Proceeds from issuance of common stock for share-based awards   315       –  
    Payroll taxes related to shares withheld from employees   (4,575 )     –  
    Deferred transaction costs   (2,649 )     (650 )
    Contingent consideration   (74 )     (1,002 )
    Payments of vendor financing obligation   (588 )     –  
    Net cash provided by (used in) financing activities   101,301       (1,652 )
    Effect of exchange rate fluctuations on cash and cash equivalents   193       (246 )
    Net increase (decrease) in cash and cash equivalents   15,185       (1,057 )
    Cash and cash equivalents, beginning of period   4,421       5,478  
    Cash and cash equivalents, end of period $ 19,606     $ 4,421  
           
    SILVACO GROUP, INC.
    REVENUE
    (Unaudited)
                             
        2023   2024
        Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Year   Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Year
    Revenue by Region:                        
    Americas   35 % 29 % 31 % 29 % 31 %   27 % 51 % 31 % 40 % 38 %
    APAC   51 % 62 % 61 % 63 % 59 %   62 % 41 % 58 % 52 % 53 %
    EMEA   14 % 9 % 8 % 8 % 10 %   11 % 8 % 11 % 8 % 9 %
    Total revenue   100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 %   100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 %
                             
    Revenue by Product Line:                        
    TCAD   62 % 62 % 52 % 62 % 59 %   66 % 69 % 59 % 71 % 68 %
    EDA   29 % 20 % 31 % 22 % 26 %   30 % 20 % 24 % 24 % 24 %
    SIP   9 % 18 % 17 % 16 % 15 %   4 % 11 % 17 % 5 % 8 %
    Total revenue   100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 %   100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 %
                             
    Revenue Item Category:                        
    Software license revenue   75 % 71 % 74 % 70 % 73 %   77 % 74 % 62 % 78 % 74 %
    Maintenance and service   25 % 29 % 26 % 30 % 27 %   23 % 26 % 38 % 22 % 26 %
    Total revenue   100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 %   100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 %
                             
    Revenue by Country:                        
    United States   34 % 28 % 28 % 28 % 30 %   51 % 30 % 39 % 39 % 37 %
    China   19 % 29 % 16 % 29 % 23 %   17 % 25 % 23 % 23 % 18 %
    Other   47 % 43 % 56 % 43 % 47 %   32 % 45 % 38 % 38 % 45 %
    Total revenue   100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 %   100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 %
    SILVACO GROUP, INC.
    GAAP to Non-GAAP Reconciliation
    (Unaudited, in thousands except per share amounts)
                   
      Three Months Ended   Twelve Months Ended
      12/31/2024   12/31/2023   12/31/2024   12/31/2023
                   
    GAAP Cost of revenue $ 2,422     $ 2,682     $ 12,042     $ 9,354  
    Less: Stock-based compensation expense   (194 )     –       (2,974 )     –  
    Less: Amortization of acquired intangible assets   (249 )     –       (747 )     –  
    Less: Payroll tax from the IPO lock-up release   (80 )     –       (80 )     –  
    Non-GAAP Cost of revenue $ 1,899     $ 2,682     $ 8,241     $ 9,354  
    GAAP Gross profit $ 15,437     $ 9,804     $ 47,638     $ 44,892  
    Add: Stock-based compensation expense   194       –       2,974       –  
    Add: Amortization of acquired intangible assets   249       –       747       –  
    Add: Payroll tax from the IPO lockup release   80       –       80       –  
    Non-GAAP Gross profit $ 15,960     $ 9,804     $ 51,439     $ 44,892  
    GAAP Research and development $ 5,283     $ 3,337     $ 20,740     $ 13,170  
    Less: Stock-based compensation expense   (535 )     –       (5,091 )     –  
    Less: Executive severance   (215 )     –       (215 )     –  
    Less: Payroll tax from the IPO lock-up release   (397 )     –       (397 )     –  
    Less: Amortization of acquired intangible assets   (43 )     (82 )     (206 )     (339 )
    Non-GAAP Research and development $ 4,093     $ 3,255     $ 14,831     $ 12,831  
    GAAP Sales and marketing $ 3,983     $ 3,833     $ 18,300     $ 12,707  
    Less: Stock-based compensation expense   (388 )     –       (4,319 )     –  
    Less: Payroll tax from the IPO lock-up release   (85 )     –       (85 )     –  
    Less: IPO preparation costs   –       –       (178 )     –  
    Non-GAAP Sales and marketing $ 3,510     $ 3,833     $ 13,718     $ 12,707  
    GAAP General and administrative $ 7,529     $ 4,570     $ 37,571     $ 17,881  
    Less: Stock-based compensation expense   (1,410 )     –       (14,531 )     –  
    Less: Acquisition-related estimated litigation claim and legal costs   (523 )     (515 )     (4,629 )     (1,707 )
    Less: Executive severance   (200 )     –       (200 )     –  
    Less: Payroll tax from the IPO lock-up release   (163 )     –       (163 )     –  
    Less: IPO preparation costs   –       (45 )     (695 )     (1,221 )
    Non-GAAP General and administrative $ 5,233     $ 4,010     $ 17,353     $ 14,953  
    GAAP Estimated Litigation claim $ (3,782 )   $ –     $ 11,306     $ –  
    Add (Less): Acquisition-related estimated litigation claim and legal costs   3,782       –       (11,306 )     –  
    Non-GAAP Litigation claim $ –     $ –     $ –     $ –  
    GAAP Operating expenses $ 13,013     $ 11,740     $ 87,917     $ 43,758  
    Less: Stock-based compensation expense   (2,333 )     –       (23,941 )     –  
    Less: Acquisition-related estimated litigation claim and legal costs   3,259       (515 )     (15,935 )     (1,707 )
    Less: Executive severance   (415 )     –       (415 )     –  
    Less: Payroll tax from the IPO lock-up release   (645 )     –       (645 )     –  
    Less: IPO preparation costs   –       (45 )     (873 )     (1,221 )
    Less: Amortization of acquired intangible assets   (43 )     (82 )     (206 )     (339 )
    Non-GAAP Operating expenses $ 12,836     $ 11,098     $ 45,902     $ 40,491  
    GAAP Operating (loss) income $ 2,424     $ (1,936 )   $ (40,279 )   $ 1,134  
    Add: Stock-based compensation expense   2,527       –       26,915       –  
    Add (Less): Acquisition-related estimated litigation claim and legal costs   (3,259 )     515       15,935       1,707  
    Add: Payroll tax from the IPO lockup release   725       –       725       –  
    Add: Executive severance   415       –       415       –  
    Add: IPO preparation costs   –       45       873       1,221  
    Add: Amortization of acquired intangible assets   292       82       953       339  
    Non-GAAP Operating (loss) income $ 3,124     $ (1,294 )   $ 5,537     $ 4,401  
    GAAP Net (loss) income $ 4,157     $ (2,247 )   $ (39,404 )   $ (316 )
    Add: Stock-based compensation expense   2,527       –       26,915       –  
    Add: Amortization of acquired intangible assets   292       82       953       339  
    Add (Less): Acquisition-related estimated litigation claim and legal costs   (3,259 )     515       15,935       1,707  
    Add: Payroll tax from the IPO lockup release   725       –       725       –  
    Add: Executive Severance   415       –       415       –  
    Add: IPO preparation costs   –       45       873       1,221  
    Add: Loss on debt extinguishment   –       –       718       –  
    Add (Less): Change in fair value of contingent consideration   (9 )     (7 )     (27 )     325  
    Add (Less): Foreign exchange (gain) loss   (14 )     (3 )     404       335  
    Add: Income tax effect of non-GAAP adjustment   (566 )     (27 )     (831 )     (169 )
    Non-GAAP Net (loss) income $ 4,268     $ (1,642 )   $ 6,676     $ 3,442  
    GAAP Net income (loss) per share:              
    Basic and diluted: $ 0.14     $ (0.11 )   $ (1.53 )   $ (0.02 )
    Non-GAAP Net income (loss) per share:              
    Basic $ 0.15     $ (0.08 )   $ 0.26     $ 0.17  
    Diluted $ 0.15     $ (0.08 )   $ 0.25     $ 0.17  
    Weighted average shares used in GAAP and non-GAAP net income (loss) per share:              
    Basic   28,734,082       20,000,000       25,672,845       20,000,000  
    Diluted   28,849,041       20,000,000       26,841,901       20,000,000  
                   

    Investor Contact:
    Greg McNiff
    investors@silvaco.com

    Media Contact:
    Farhad Hayat
    press@silvaco.com

    The MIL Network –

    March 6, 2025
  • MIL-OSI United Nations: World News in Brief: Guterres convenes Cyprus summit, violence continues in southern Lebanon, UN aid hub in Chad expands

    Source: United Nations 2

    5 March 2025 Humanitarian Aid

    The UN Secretary-General on Wednesday announced a fresh bid to end the decades-long division of Cyprus through informal talks scheduled to take place over two days from 17 March.

    UN Spokesperson Stéphane Dujarric told journalists at the regular daily briefing in New York that the leaders of both the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot communities would join UN chief António Guterres along with guarantors Greece, Türkiye and the United Kingdom, at the UN in Geneva.

    The Mediterranean island was divided between north and south in 1974 after years of hostilities. The UN has led negotiations towards a settlement, with the Security Council authorising a peacekeeping force in 1964, UNFICYP.

    In the absence of a lasting agreement, the force remains on the island to supervise ceasefire lines, a buffer zone and to support humanitarian activities.

    Previous talks

    Mr. Guterres attempted to bring the two sides together in 2017 at the Swiss Alpine resort of Crans-Montana but talks ultimately broke down. A further push was made in 2021.

    The meeting later this month will take place “in the context of the Secretary-General’s good offices’ efforts on the Cyprus issue,” in in line with his commitment to continue efforts made last October. 

    “The informal meeting will provide an opportunity for a meaningful discussion on the way forward on the Cyprus issue,” Mr Dujarric said.

    “The United Nations remains committed to supporting the Cypriot leaders and all Cypriots.”

    Lebanon: Fighting continues in peacekeepers’ area of operations

    The UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) reported more gunfire in their area of operations on Wednesday, as well as sporadic military activity by Israeli forces, the UN Spokesperson said on Wednesday.

    As of now, the Lebanese army have deployed to more than 100 locations in southern Lebanon – between the Litani River and the ‘Blue Line’ of separation between the two countries – with the support of UN peacekeepers.

    Unexploded ordnance

    The latest conflict has left south Lebanon, especially areas close to the Blue Line, heavily littered with unexploded ordnances, “posing very serious risks to civilians”.

    The UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) deminers continue to assist Lebanese authorities in finding and destroying these explosive remnants. 

    “Our peacekeepers have continued to discover caches of unauthorised weapons and ammunitions, including yesterday, a number of them in our Sector West, and all of them were duly reported to the Lebanese Armed Forces,” Mr. Dujarric explained.

    Between 21 October 2024 and 26 February, 44 unexploded ordnances and six improvised explosive devices were discovered and destroyed.

    Humanitarian work continues

    At the same time, UNIFIL continues to facilitate humanitarian missions in their areas of operation, with over 60 missions having taken place since the cessation of hostilities, facilitating the return of displaced people.

    Separately, the mission reports that 31 arrests have been made in connection with the attack on 14 February on a convoy near the Beirut airport. 

    Mr. Dujarric emphasised the importance that “those responsible for that attack are brought to justice”, with the attack targeting the then Deputy Force Commander of UNIFIL and a number of his companions.

    IOM expands humanitarian hub in Chad to aid 220,000 amid Sudan crisis

    The International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the International Humanitarian Partnership (IHP) have completed the expansion of a key aid hub in Chad, in a move that will enable aid teams to reach up to 220,000 more in need.

    The expanded operational capacity at the hub in Farchana will strengthen cross-border interagency humanitarian operations for Sudan – the world’s worst displacement crisis. 

    Since April 2023, more than 11.5 million people have been displaced within Sudan and an additional 3.5 million have fled across borders, including an estimated 930,000 who have crossed from Sudan into Chad.

    Nine million in need across Darfur

    According to recent figures, nearly nine million people in the Darfur region alone require immediate assistance.

    “With the strengthened cross-border operations, IOM has already reached over 82,000 people in Darfur with critical humanitarian aid, and with the expansion of the Farchana hub, we are poised to provide life-saving assistance to an additional 220,000 people in the coming months,” explained Pascal Reyntjens, IOM Chief of Mission in Chad.

    “The hub also enables greater collaboration between humanitarian actors, development agencies and the government, which is essential for a comprehensive and sustainable response,” he continued.

    The expansion includes office space, living quarters and other infrastructure that will help improve the effectiveness of aid work in hard-to-reach field locations in Sudan.

    These enhancements will also enable international and national NGOs and UN agencies to further scale up cross-border operations from Chad into Darfur, where humanitarian needs are rapidly escalating.

    MIL OSI United Nations News –

    March 6, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Security: Southwest Nova — Southwest Nova District RCMP charge several people, seize drugs and weapons in multiple drug trafficking investigations

    Source: Royal Canadian Mounted Police

    Southwest Nova District RCMP seizes illicit drugs, including suspected fentanyl and 3 kgs of cocaine, and charges several people after executing four search warrants between February 26 and 28 as part of ongoing, individual drug trafficking investigations.

    “Our teams are continuing their strategic work to address drug trafficking in communities across Southwest Nova,” says Supt. Jason Popik, District Policing Officer, Southwest Nova District RCMP. “Whether it’s to address trafficking in illicit drugs and substances or the illegal sale of cannabis, we’re committed to enforcement that helps make our communities safer.”

    On February 26, the Southwest Nova Street Crime Enforcement Unit (SCEU), with assistance of Meteghan RCMP Detachment, executed a search warrant at a home on Hwy. 1 in Salmon River. RCMP officers seized pre-filled syringes containing suspected fentanyl and two firearms. Two men were safely arrested inside the residence.

    Jordan Louis Comeau, 26, of Salmon River, has been charged with Possession for the Purpose of Trafficking (fentanyl), and Kim Louis Comeau has been charged with Unsafe Storage of a Firearm, Unauthorized Possession of a Firearm and Possession of a Firearm Knowing its Possession is Unauthorized.

    On February 27, Digby RCMP Detachment, with assistance of RCMP Police Dog Services and Yarmouth Rural RCMP, executed a search warrant at two apartments on Prince William St. in Digby. Officers seized a quantity of crack cocaine and cash. Three men were safely arrested inside the apartments.

    Roy Charles McCullough, 51, and Brian Kelly Height, both of Digby, and Xander Jordan, 25, of Falmouth, have each been charged with Possession of the Purpose of Trafficking (cocaine) and Possession of Property Obtained by Crime. Height has also been charged with Failure to Comply with Order (two counts).

    On February 28, the Southwest Nova SCEU, with assistance of the RCMP/HRP Integrated Criminal Investigation Division, West Hants RCMP, East Hants District RCMP, RCMP Emergency Response Team, RCMP Police Dog Services and Forensic Identification Services, and RCMP Synthetic Drug Section, executed search warrants at a home in South Rawdon and a home in Bramber. Officers safely arrested a woman and man at the residence in South Rawdon.

    Officers seized a quantity of cocaine (approx. 3 kgs), methamphetamines, cannabis edibles, dried cannabis (approx. 1 kg), unstamped tobacco, and cash; imitation handgun; brass knuckles; and a travel trailer.

    Melissa Sharon Millett, 40, of South Rawdon, and Marshall Garwin Burgess, 32, of Lower Burlington, have each been charged with:

    · Possession for the Purpose of Trafficking (cocaine)

    · Possession for the Purpose of Trafficking (methamphetamine)

    · Possession of Property Obtained by Crime

    · Possession of Unstamped Tobacco

    · Unlawful Possession of Tobacco Products for Sale or Distribution

    Burgess has also been charged with Possession of Cannabis for the Purpose of Selling, Prohibited Possession of Cannabis for the Purpose of Distribution, and Possession of Prohibited Weapon.

    All accused have been released pending upcoming court appearances.

    Nova Scotians are encouraged to contact their nearest RCMP detachment or local police to report crime, including the illegal sale of drugs, in their communities. Anonymous tips can be made by calling Nova Scotia Crime Stoppers, toll-free, at 1-800-222-TIPS (8477), submitting a secure web tip at www.crimestoppers.ns.ca, or using the P3 Tips app.

    File #s: 2025-249648, 2024-996125, 2025-151939

    MIL Security OSI –

    March 6, 2025
  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Experts of the Human Rights Committee Commend Montenegro’s Measures Preventing Violence against Women, Raise Issues Concerning Corruption and Historic Human Rights Violations

    Source: United Nations – Geneva

    The Human Rights Committee today concluded its consideration of the second periodic report of Montenegro on how it implements the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.  Committee Experts commended the State for its measures preventing violence against women, while raising issues concerning historic human rights violations committed during the armed conflict in the former Yugoslavia and corruption.

    One Committee Expert said the State Party had made notable progress in addressing violence against women, including adopting the Protocol on Prevention and Treatment in Cases of Domestic Violence and the National Plan for the Implementation of the Istanbul Convention.  What measures were in place to ensure that legal reforms translated into effective enforcement and that penalties reflected the severity of the crimes?

    Regarding serious human rights violations committed during the armed conflict in the former Yugoslavia, one Committee Expert expressed concern that impunity seemed to persist in many aspects.  There was increased negationist discourse, including denial of the Srebrenica genocide. Could the State party shed light on the fight against denialist discourse?  What measures were being taken to speed up investigations and prosecutions?

    Another Expert said that in Montenegro, corruption was perceived as an aspect of great concern for citizens.  What concrete measures had been put in place to ensure that cases of corruption by high-level officials resulted in appropriate convictions and penalties?

    Introducing the report, Bojan Božović, Minister of Justice of Montenegro and head of the delegation, said implementing the Covenant’s standards was of great importance to Montenegro, which was now striving for membership in the community of developed European democracies.

    Regarding violence against women, the delegation said that, in 2023, in addition to legal amendments, a mandatory instruction was adopted mandating all prosecutors to act proactively in cases of domestic violence and to apply the Istanbul Convention. Some 622 final judgements had been enacted on domestic violence cases in 2024, with the majority being convictions.

    Mr. Božović said Montenegro had placed the prevention and suppression of corruption at the top of the policy and law enforcement agenda.  In 2024, shortcomings identified in previous law enforcement practices were eliminated.  There were also plans to adopt new legal amendments to enable the Agency for the Prevention of Corruption to have direct access to public officials’ accounts. Through the adoption of the Law on Lobbying, the State aimed to prevent undue influence in legislative processes.

    Regarding historic human rights violations, the delegation said the most senior members of Government made efforts to memorialise the day of the Srebrenica genocide. Inappropriate statements would be sanctioned when made during elections.  There had also been a resolution adopted in Parliament on the genocide in Srebrenica.  There would no longer be impunity for war crimes in Montenegro and proactive action had been taken in this regard, the delegation said.  Cases which had been finalised would be reopened and thoroughly examined.  The strategy to combat war crimes was adopted in June 2024, which had resulted in four cases previously considered to be finalised being reopened.

    In concluding remarks, Blagoje Gledović, Director General of the Directorate for the International Cooperation and International Legal Aid, Ministry of Justice of Montenegro, and alternative head of the delegation, said that over the reporting period, the State party had undertaken several reforms to promote civil and political rights and to meet the requirements for accession to the European Union.  Montenegro remained committed to the implementation of the Covenant through national legislation and all other available measures.

    Changrok Soh, Committee Chairperson, said in concluding remarks that the dialogue had covered a wide range of topics related to the implementation of the Covenant by the State party, highlighting the progress made and challenges faced.  The Committee was committed to fulfilling its mandate to ensure the highest standard of implementation of the Covenant in Montenegro.

    The delegation of Montenegro was made up of representatives of the Ministry of Justice; the Ministry of Human and Minority Rights; the Ministry of the Interior; the Supreme State Prosecutor’s Office; the Supreme Court; the Police Directorate; the Parliament of Montenegro; and the Permanent Mission of Montenegro to the United Nations Office at Geneva.

    The Human Rights Committee’s one hundred and forty-third session is being held from 3 to 28 March 2025. All the documents relating to the Committee’s work, including reports submitted by States parties, can be found on the session’s webpage.  Meeting summary releases can be found here.  The webcast of the Committee’s public meetings can be accessed via the UN Web TV webpage.

    The Committee will next meet in public at 3 p.m. on Wednesday, 5 March, to begin its consideration of the second periodic report of Burkina Faso (CCPR/C/BFA/2).

    Report

    The Committee has before it the second periodic report of Montenegro (CCPR/C/MNE/2).

    Presentation of Report

    BOJAN BOŽOVIĆ, Minister of Justice of Montenegro and head of the delegation, said implementing the Covenant’s standards was of great importance to Montenegro as a relatively young United Nations member but an old European state, now striving for membership in the community of developed European democracies.

    Montenegro had placed the prevention and suppression of corruption at the top of the policy and law enforcement agenda.  In 2024, through amendments to the Law on the Prevention of Corruption, the work of the Agency for the Prevention of Corruption was enhanced, and shortcomings identified in previous law enforcement practices were eliminated.  The State had continued to strengthen the anti-corruption framework in 2025, with plans to adopt new amendments to the law that would enable the Agency for the Prevention of Corruption to have direct access to public officials’ accounts. Through the adoption of the Law on Lobbying, the State aimed to prevent undue influence in legislative processes, increase institutional transparency, and increase the number of certified lobbyists registered in the official registry.

    Amendments to the Law on the Judicial Council and Judges were adopted in 2024, improving provisions related to the functioning of the Judicial Council, the system of ethical and disciplinary responsibility for judges and their evaluation.  Amendments to the Law on the State Prosecutor’s Office had also been enacted to enhance the autonomy, accountability, and efficiency of the Office and the Prosecutorial Council. In May 2024, the Government of Montenegro adopted the Judicial Reform Strategy 2024- 2027, accompanied by an action plan.  Efforts were also being made to ensure the judiciary’s efficiency and sustainability through the Judicial Network Rationalisation Plan, which provided for the reorganisation of Montenegro’s court network. 

    Regarding domestic violence, Montenegro had largely harmonised its domestic legislation with international standards, with a goal of zero tolerance and maximum protection for vulnerable groups.  The law amending the Law on Legal Aid, enacted in December 2024, guaranteed the right to legal aid for victims of torture, sexual offences, and children initiating proceedings to protect their rights.  The Law on Protection from Domestic Violence would be aligned with the Istanbul Convention, refining the definition of violence and granting victims individual rights.

    In the fight against human trafficking, amendments to the Criminal Code introduced abduction as one of the methods of committing the offence, as well as a non-punishment clause for victims.  For the first time, child trafficking was established as a distinct criminal offence. Montenegro had developed a comprehensive system covering the entire process of trafficking, from victim identification to full integration or reintegration into society.  This system was reinforced by strong and effective cooperation between competent State authorities and civil society organizations and steered by the Strategy for Combating Human Trafficking 2019–2024. Since its adoption, six annual action plans had been implemented.  Following evaluation of the strategy, a new Strategy for 2025–2028 was currently being drafted alongside an action plan.

    In 2023, Montenegro amended its Criminal Code to make the prosecution and execution of sentences for the criminal offence of torture no longer subject to any statute of limitations.  Sentencing guidelines had been tightened, particularly for offences committed by officials.  Additionally, activities had been carried out to improve accommodation capacities, living conditions, and the infrastructure of prison institutions.

    The implementation of the National Strategy for Gender Equality 2021-2025 and its accompanying action plans was progressing successfully, with a focus on promoting gender equality, strengthening the legal framework for gender policies, and preventing discrimination based on sex and gender.  The Ministry of Justice had significantly reinforced criminal law protections for journalists by introducing stricter penalties for attacks on journalists and other media workers.

    In 2024, the Ministry of Justice adopted key amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code, allowing for the unimpeded use of evidence gathered within the framework of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals in The Hague.  The Supreme State Prosecutor’s Office adopted the 2024-2027 Strategy for Investigating War Crimes, accompanied by an action plan.  As a result, new criminal cases were reopened concerning war crimes in countries such as Croatia, with the goal of delivering justice in cases linked to Montenegro.

    Questions by Committee Experts

    A Committee Expert said the Committee would like to receive more information on the various strategies mentioned in the report, as well as specific information on their implementation.  The State had launched a vast movement of reforms to strengthen human rights and the rule of law over the past ten years.  While the European Commission’s 2024 reports issued in the run-up to European Union accession were rather positive on issues including judicial independence, the fight against corruption, equality and non-discrimination, some of the reforms reportedly remained superficial, were not always coherent, and did not include civil society.  For example, there was no real human rights education and civic education was no longer compulsory.  Could information be provided on the inclusion of civil society in the reform process?  How was the second report prepared?  What measures were envisaged to strengthen the independence, impartiality and the effective and efficient functioning of the Ombudsperson?

    The issue of access to justice, truth and reparation for victims of serious human rights violations committed in the 1990s during the armed conflict in the former Yugoslavia was very complex.  The Committee took note of the information provided by the State on ongoing investigations and trials, however impunity seemed to persist in many aspects, which was concerning.  There was increased negationist discourse, including denial of the Srebrenica genocide.  The exercise of criminal justice was said to have been marked by numerous dysfunctions and obstacles, which cast doubt on the State’s willingness to establish responsibility for the commission of these war crimes and crimes against humanity.  There had been no proactive policy to establish criminal responsibility, not only for the direct perpetrators of war crimes but also for those responsible in the chain of command.  A low number of remains of disappeared people had been found and returned to their families.

    Could the State party shed light on the fight against denialist discourse and the policy of preserving memory, an important pillar of transitional justice?  What were the reasons for the persistent legal obstacles, including to the extradition to States requesting it?  What measures were being taken to strengthen the Special State Prosecutor’s Office to speed up investigations and prosecutions?  Was there any specialised training for judges in international human rights law?  What efforts were being undertaken to locate victims of enforced disappearance? Was enforced disappearance criminalised in domestic law in line with the United Nations Convention on Enforced Disappearance?

    A Committee Expert asked if the State party could provide details on the content of the training sessions organised by the Training Centre of the Judiciary, Public Prosecutor’s Office and the Human Resources Management Authority on the Covenant? How many judges, prosecutors, lawyers and parliamentarians had participated in these trainings?  Were these trainings compulsory or voluntary? Had there been specific modules focusing on the direct applicability of the Covenant in domestic law?  Could the State party provide specific examples of domestic courts directly invoking or applying the Covenant in their decisions? Were there any initiatives to raise awareness of the Covenant among the public, civil society or law enforcement officials?  How was it ensured that judges and legal practitioners actively implemented the Covenant in their professional practice?

    The Committee welcomed the State party’s efforts to establish a comprehensive reparations programme for victims of war crimes, which had led to financial compensation for nearly 200 cases up to September 2018 and more than 60 additional decisions from 2018 to 2022.  However, had the State party developed a comprehensive reparations programme that included restitution, rehabilitation, satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition?  If such a programme had been drawn up, would these measures also be offered retroactively to victims who had already received financial compensation but who had not had access to these types of measures?  Had victims been provided with legal assistance to file their claims for reparations and, if not, did the Government plan to provide such assistance?  What measures were in place to ensure legal and comprehensive support for victims and their families?  What safeguards had been put in place to ensure that such crimes did not happen again? What steps have been taken to ensure that victims of war crimes in vulnerable situations had equal access to justice and redress mechanisms?

    Another Expert said the Committee had learned that in Montenegro, corruption was perceived as an aspect of great concern for citizens.  What concrete measures had been put in place to ensure that cases of corruption by high-level officials resulted in appropriate convictions and penalties?  What measures were being implemented to strengthen the effectiveness of the Anti-Corruption Agency to ensure that it was not pressured by political influences?  In 2022 and 2023, accusations against a former President of the Supreme Court and a former President of the Commercial Court, as well as two high-ranking prosecutors, highlighted the possible penetration of organised crime into judicial structures.  The positive action that those unfortunate incidents generated attested to Montenegro’s progress in its fight against organised crime and corruption.  Was Montenegro planning to improve the mechanisms for monitoring and accountability of judges and prosecutors to avoid conflicts of interest and increase public confidence in the judiciary?  What were the real quantities recovered for corruption cases?  Did the company “13.Jul-Plantaže” pay all the compensation to which it was sentenced?  What efforts had been made to increase public education on corruption perception and prevention?

    What specific mechanisms were in place to monitor and evaluate the implementation of the Law on the Prohibition of Discrimination, particularly regarding discrimination against the Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian communities?  What measures had been taken to ensure the long-term sustainability of the enjoyment of decent housing for these groups, and to address the factors that led to Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian children dropping out of school? What steps were being taken to ensure the inclusion of these groups in high-level political positions and structures? In Montenegro, there was an increase in hate speech directed at minorities.  Was the State aware of this phenomenon?  What measures were being implemented to prevent, control and punish it?

    Another Committee Expert asked about the strategy to improve the quality of life of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons, implemented in the periods 2013-2018 and 2019-2023.  It was alleged that there was limited implementation of this Strategy and that most of the actions were carried out by civil society.  Could more information on the strategy and its results be provided? Could the Committee have more information on the draft Law on the Legal Recognition of Gender Identity Based on Self-Determination, the approval of which was initially scheduled for the end of 2023 and then delayed until the end of 2024?

    In July 2020, the Law on Civil Unions of Persons of the Same Sex was adopted and began to be implemented in July 2021.  Since then, more than 20 civil unions had been registered.  Could the delegation comment on information that amendments to the regulations necessary for the proper implementation of the Law had not been made?  What measures had the State party taken to investigate attacks on lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons and punish those responsible?  What was being done to prevent these from reoccurring?

    What had the Strategy for the Execution of Criminal Sanctions 2023-2026 achieved?  Did changes to the Criminal Code bring its definition of torture in line with that of the Convention Against Torture?  Was the Istanbul Protocol being properly applied in places of deprivation of liberty?  It had been alleged that the medical reports issued in these facilities did not properly document traces of torture or ill-treatment in the manner envisaged in the Protocol.  Why was this the case?  Was it due to a lack of staff?  Could the delegation provide updated official figures on the criminal investigations carried out and their results, including the number of officials convicted, for cases of torture and ill-treatment during the period covered by the report?

    A Committee Expert said the State Party had made notable progress in addressing violence against women, including adopting the Protocol on Prevention and Treatment in Cases of Domestic Violence and the National Plan for the Implementation of the Istanbul Convention (2023-2027), as well as amending its Criminal Code to introduce new offences such as stalking and enhanced penalties for domestic violence. Despite these advances, significant gaps in implementation remained.  Could the delegation provide updated data on the classification and prosecution of violence against women, particularly distinguishing between misdemeanours and criminal offences?  What measures were in place to ensure that legal reforms translated into effective enforcement and that penalties reflected the severity of the crimes? What reforms had been undertaken to eliminate harmful usage of confrontation techniques?

    Reports indicated that between 2020 and 2024, four out of six femicides involved victims who had previously sought help.  It was noted with satisfaction that there were plans to recognise femicide as a separate criminal offence.  What were the plans to ensure successful implementation of such a law?  While the State Party had established shelters and helplines for domestic violence victims, these services remained underfunded and insufficient.  Could the delegation provide updated figures on current shelter capacity and measures taken to ensure adequate and sustainable funding for these services? Could the delegation elaborate on plans to expand specialised services, such as psychological and legal assistance, across all regions?  Could an update be provided on the full implementation of the sex offender registry and the enforcement of post-sentence monitoring measures?  What were the main challenges in implementing the 2017-2021 Strategy on Prevention and Protection of Children from Violence and how were these challenges being addressed in the 2025-2029 Strategy? What legislative and policy measures were in place to combat online grooming and digital exploitation of children? How was it ensured that child victims of violence received adequate support?

    Responses by the Delegation 

    The delegation said upon the initiative of the non-governmental organisation Human Rights Action, a new criminal offence of enforced disappearance had been introduced and would be recognised as an offence in the Criminal Code.  The Law on the Prevention of Corruption was being amended, and two-thirds of recommendations from the civil sector had been accepted in this regard.  In Montenegro, there had been three Federal Governments over the past three years, which had led to a large number of decisions enacted in a short period of time.  There had been no intention to leave the civil and non-governmental organisation sector aside.  It was common that the most senior members of Government made efforts to memorialise the day of the Srebrenica genocide.  Sometimes, there were inappropriate statements made. However, it was hoped there would be less of these situations in the future and such statements would be sanctioned when made during elections.  There had also been a resolution adopted in Parliament on the genocide in Srebrenica.

    There would no longer be impunity for war crimes in Montenegro and proactive action had been taken in this regard.  Cases which had been finalised would be reopened, and thoroughly examined.  The strategy to combat war crimes was adopted in June 2024, which had resulted in four cases previously considered to be finalised being reopened.  In addition to this, the Special Case Prosecutor Service would look into other cases which had ended in a final judgement.  The Criminal Procedure Code was amended in June 2024, which had resulted in the inditement of a person for acts against humanity.  Two criminal cases were currently before the courts for alleged war crimes committed on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. These cases were treated as a priority and were given special consideration by judges.  All victims of war crimes and their families were guaranteed access to justice and reparations.  Concrete examples could be provided of cases where courts had already awarded damages.

    In 2024, meetings had been held with the Chief Prosecutor in The Hague, and an initiative had been implemented to ensure training for Montenegro’s judges and prosecutors, based on the practices of The Hague.  Montenegro had signed the Ljubljana Hague Convention on war crimes last year.

    In 2023, the Criminal Code was amended to define the actions which constituted the criminal offence of domestic violence, as well as those who could receive safeguards under the law.  Sanctions for this offence were also increased and verbal threats were criminalised. A mandatory instruction was also adopted, mandating all prosecutors to act proactively in cases of domestic violence and to apply the Istanbul Convention.  A coordinator had been appointed at the level of the Supreme State Prosecutor and across local offices, providing periodic reporting and ensuring the speedy administration of justice.  Some 622 final judgements had been enacted on domestic violence cases in 2024, with the majority being convictions.

    There had been 364 applications for legal aid last year, and 318 of those cases were granted. A campaign had been developed to increase awareness of the availability of legal aid for all victims of domestic violence.  There were also information bulletins on trafficking in human beings available in five languages at legal aid clinics.

    Femicide was a serious, complex and tragic occurrence which needed to be tackled through various sectors.  Monitoring this criminal offence was a key challenge for Montenegro institutions. Special focus was devoted to victims, survivors and surviving family members.  In one case of femicide, the offender had been sentenced to 40 years imprisonment.

    The Judicial Council recently appointed ten judges of the High Court, which was a positive step forward.  The procedure was now simplified for recruiting new officers in the Anti-Corruption Agency.  There were now sixteen prosecutors in the Special Prosecutor’s Office, compared to six a few years ago.  The Centre for Training of Judges and Prosecutors tailored their training programmes annually.  Through the legislation harmonised with the Covenant, Montenegro aimed to implement the top international standards, including those enshrined within the Covenant.

    The Ministry of Human and Minority Rights focused on the protection of vulnerable groups, and the prevention of discrimination and inequality.  There was now a new strategy in place until 2028, focusing on the legislative framework.  This year, two million euros had been allocated for achieving non-governmental organisations’ projects.  During the last Pride event, the organisers had commended the Ministry for its contribution.  The Ministry was currently working on four important laws which addressed discrimination against the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex community, defined hate speech, and the forms of punishable behaviour, among other elements.

    Official political representatives and the public shared the view that forced sterilisation and removal of reproductive organs was an inhumane practice which the State needed to do away with. A law had been developed in this regard, which would be enacted in the first quarter of 2025.

    Work was being done to harmonise laws regarding the judiciary and healthcare.  The new law on protecting human rights and freedoms would ensure the Ombudsman would receive “A” status and be in line with the Paris Principles.  There had been imprisonment terms of between four to six months for those who committed attacks against transgender people.  In most cases, courts primarily referred to the European Convention of Human Rights, thereby invoking relevant international standards.  There had also been references to the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women.  International treaties had supremacy over domestic legislation. 

    Pride events took place in Montenegro’s capital each year.  Last year, the event was held the day before an important local election. In the past, this could have been seen as an opportunity to radicalise the environment, however the event was held in complete peace.  It was hoped this would continue, and that the Pride Festival could be an event of freedom.

    There was zero tolerance for any form of torture and any officer reported was promptly investigated. In 2024, there were 21 cases against 38 police officers, with four resulting in convictions.

    Follow-Up Questions by Committee Experts

    An Expert asked about changes that the State party had observed regarding perceptions of stereotypes. The Committee was pleased that there were awareness campaigns and education initiatives around child marriages, but it was not clear if there had been a documented fall in child marriage. There had been legislative changes for the participation of women; had they given rise to the political participation of women in senior positions or in the Parliament?  When would the next parliamentary elections be held?  Would the State seek to ensure female representation was achieved?  What had been done to monitor and prevent selective abortion practices?

    A Committee Expert said the bill of law on gender determination could be adopted this year. When would it enter into force? Could more information on the restrictions in the bill be provided?  The medical reports issued in detention centres did not faithfully report on allegations of torture following instructions contained in the Istanbul Protocol.  Could the delegation elaborate on this?

    Another Committee Expert asked whether a national mechanism responsible for enacting the recommendations of United Nations treaty bodies existed in Montenegro.

    A Committee Expert asked what was being done to strengthen the institution of the Ombudsperson.

    Another Expert asked if more information could be provided on measures to combat violence against children.

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said there were many politicians who believed that there needed to be a mandatory quota of 50 per cent of women represented in politics.  This was now in the stage of negotiations.  Women were the most active within the judiciary and the State was proud of this.  There were 169 female judges within the Montenegro judiciary, accounting for 64 per cent of all judges.  An association had been established to promote the role of women in the judiciary.

    The Supreme Court had supported analysis of the data, politics and practices in the fight against the exploitation of children.  One of the recommendations of this analysis was for the Supreme Court to adopt guidelines on assessing the trust environment, which would be implemented in all cases of violence against children, including cases of online violence. Courts avoided secondary victimisation of children.  Montenegro foresaw implementation of the Barnahus model, with the support of the United Nations Children’s Fund and the European Union. 

    Parliament made efforts to raise awareness on gender equality issues and to introduce its own gender equality mechanisms.

    ### Day 2

    In 2024, the Government adopted a strategy for the protection of children against violence for 2025 to 2029, promoting a zero tolerance of violence against children. The State party planned to implement recommendations from the Global Status Report on Violence Against Children, and United Nations mechanisms under the strategy, which also aimed to improve the legislative framework and change conservative societal norms that denied children rights.

    The national mechanism for the prevention of torture monitored torture at all levels, including in places of detention.  The State party had accepted Universal Periodic Review recommendations and had established a body for their implementation.

    There were restrictions within the law on self-determination of gender identity, but these were necessary to protect the rights of families.  The law was applicable to Montenegro nationals only and had been well-received by members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex community.

    The State party had mechanisms to prevent the misuse and abuse of laws on child marriage. There were exceptions allowing for child marriage, but several conditions needed to be fulfilled for such marriages to be permitted.  In all other cases, child marriage was criminalised.

    The mechanism for the protection of privacy rights in the health sector protected the privacy of patients.  The Government could not access certain information on health cards, such as information on surgeries and abortions.  The Government carried out awareness raising campaigns aiming to stop the practice of selective abortions.

    New legislation was being developed that aimed to bring the Office of the Ombudsman in line with the Paris Principles.

    Questions by Committee Experts

    A Committee Expert said a deinstitutionalisation strategy had been adopted to tackle overcrowding in psychiatric hospitals. Had the Government devoted sufficient resources to the strategy, and did it promote community care?  Detention facilities in police stations reportedly lacked natural light and did not have open-air spaces.  What measures were planned to address this situation?

    One of the judges of the Constitutional Court had reportedly been forced to resign due to a decision that was allegedly not in line with the Constitution.  Was the independence of judges guaranteed by law?  How did the State party prevent interference in the judiciary?  There was a lack of hearing chambers and judicial staff, contributing to a backlog in cases.  What measures were in place to address the backlog?  Did the 2024 changes made to the law on the council of the judiciary help judges with their work?  There were currently two Presidents of first instance courts who were on their third mandates, contrary to the law limiting tenures to two mandates. Why was this?  What measures were in place to raise awareness about the availability of free legal aid?

    Another Committee Expert welcomed the evaluation of the strategy for tackling trafficking in persons and the current strategy and national action plan.  Some improvements had been made in trafficking policies, but significant gaps reportedly remained, including in relation to the identification of victims. The anti-trafficking unit was severely under-resourced and the labour inspection unit lacked the capacity to identify labour exploitation effectively.  What measures would the State party take to strengthen the capacities of these units to better identify victims?  There was only one shelter for women victims of trafficking and none for men. Psychosocial assistance for victims was limited and no victims had received financial compensation.  What measures had the State party taken to separate child and adult victims in shelters, and to fund reintegration programmes for victims?

    The Committee welcomed training initiatives on data protection and privacy rights, but public awareness of privacy issues remained low.  What measures were in place to improve awareness and training for State officials on privacy issues?  How many privacy complaints had been investigated?  Were there plans to develop a data protection law?  One State official had been indicted for ordering the surveillance of 15 members of civil society.  The National Security Agency could access private data without court authorisation.  Were there plans to introduce judicial authorisation for such access?  What measures would the State party take to increase data protections and introduce remedies for victims of unauthorised data access?

    There had been 92 attacks against journalists between 2021 and 2024, a 200 per cent increase from the previous period.  What steps had been taken to enhance the safety of journalists, ensure accountability and prevent future attacks? What work was done by the commission monitoring attacks on journalists?  Recent legal amendments had strengthened protections for journalists, but strategic lawsuits against public participation remained a major concern. How would concerns related to these lawsuits be addressed?  Had the State party consulted with civil society concerning amendments to media regulations?

    A Committee Expert noted laws and other measures implemented to protect the rights of asylum seekers and refugees, which seemed to be in line with European Union laws and policies.  However, there were reports of increasing pushbacks at the border, deportation to unsafe countries and ill-treatment and detention of asylum seekers at the border for up to 28 days.  How was the State party preventing refoulement and protecting asylum seekers’ rights at the border?  Why were persons undergoing legal procedures related to statelessness not eligible for free legal aid?  Reported restrictions on access to healthcare and other State services for stateless persons were worrying.  The Committee welcomed that the State party had provided more than 16,000 Ukrainian refugees with temporary protection, but there were reports of Ukrainian children living in precarious circumstances and not being able to access State services. Could the delegation comment on these issues?

    The environment for non-governmental organizations was reportedly hostile, with some persons who criticised members of the Government or denounced corruption reportedly subjected to reprisals.  There was discourse related to a proposed “foreign agent law”, which would infringe freedom of expression.  Would such a law be implemented?  What measures were in place to protect whistleblowers?

    One Committee Expert welcomed the efforts of the State party to revise its law on access to information in line with international standards.  How did the law promote inclusion and accountability?  There was reportedly a growing trend in classifying public information as restricted.  What measures were in place to prevent the abuse of legislation on restricted information? What independent monitoring bodies could individuals appeal to regarding the restriction of information?

    What measures had the State party taken to ensure that the implementation of legislation on religious practices promoted freedom of religion?  Were the views of religious communities on these laws taken into account?  What measures were in place to punish hate speech, particularly Islamophobic hate speech?  What mechanisms existed to ensure transparency in the moderation of disputes between religious communities, and to protect the rights of minority religious communities?

    A Committee Expert noted progress in the appointment of the Anti-Corruption Agency, which had released reports related to the financing of electoral campaigns.  In the most recent election, regulations aiming to prevent corruption had reportedly not required candidates to record personal expenditure or spending on online advertising.  The Agency had issued 46 proposals to improve measures for the prevention of corruption. How did the State party ensure that these reforms were effectively implemented?  There had been accusations of vote buying; had these been investigated and the perpetrators punished?

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said a strategy for the enforcement of criminal sanctions was in place to prevent acts of torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, and to promote the resocialisation of detainees.  Reforms had been developed to prevent the abuse of prisoners, in line with the recommendations of the European Court of Human Rights.  Construction had started on a special unit at a psychiatric hospital to resolve the issue of overcrowding.  The necessary resources would be devoted to ensuring the proper functioning of this unit.

    In 2023, based on the recommendations of the United Nations Subcommittee for the Prevention of Torture, the State party had approved measures to record the activities of police officers and the transfer of detainees, and to improve facilities for detainees in police stations. The deadline for implementing these was 2026.

    The Government had adopted a judicial reform strategy in 2024, which aimed to strengthen independence, accountability, transparency and trust in the judiciary.  Comprehensive legal reforms undertaken in 2024 had aligned the State’s judicial legislation with that of the European Union.  The Justice Minister was a member of the Judicial Council, but only had limited powers; he did not participate in matters concerning the election, discipline and dismissal of judges and could not be the Chair of the Council.  The participation of the Minister in this body did not affect the independence of the judiciary.  Future amendments to the Constitution would remove the Justice Minister from the Judicial Council.  When appointing Presidents of Courts, the Judicial Council took due care to assess whether the candidate had formerly been a President.  Recent reforms called for the work of Supreme Court judges to be evaluated every five years.  Restrictions were placed on the roles that judges could play when they were subject to disciplinary proceedings.  A working group had been set up to regulate the employment rights of judges, including their wages.  There were plans to increase the salaries of judges to ensure their independence.

    The Supreme Court had taken several actions to reduce the backlog of cases and to speed up proceedings.  There had been an increase in cases related to access to information; one individual had lodged 11,000 such cases.  The State party had streamlined proceedings related to the assessment of access to information cases.

    An amendment to the law on free legal aid was adopted in 2024.  It provided for free legal aid for vulnerable persons and persons who lodged claims in specified fields, including domestic violence and child protection.  The Government was implementing training to increase the number of legal aid practitioners, who needed to have specialised knowledge.  An awareness raising campaign on free legal aid had been implemented, targeting victims of domestic violence.  It had led to an increase in applications for legal aid.

    The Government was implementing several measures to combat trafficking in persons.  It had amended the Criminal Code to strengthen its response to trafficking. Abduction had been defined as a means of committing trafficking, and penalties for harming children and the sale of children had been increased.  In 2024, the Supreme State Prosecutor’s Office implemented measures to improve the identification of trafficking victims, including through information exchanges with neighbouring countries.  There had been an increase in the number of criminal offences of trafficking prosecuted in 2024.  Some 14 charges were issued against 25 individuals in 2024 for crimes of trafficking for the purposes of forced labour and sexual exploitation.

    The Ministry of Interior had undertaken several activities to strengthen the capacities of police officers and social and healthcare workers, to identify and support trafficking victims.  The system for the protection of victims of trafficking had been improved, thanks to the establishment of a State-funded shelter for women victims of trafficking in 2024.  Another shelter specifically prepared to house children was also operational; it had facilities for children with disabilities.

    Courts had made progress in prosecuting trafficking cases. Imprisonment terms of at least 15 years had recently been issued for two persons found guilty of trafficking, and other persons had received shorter prison terms for trafficking offences. When Montenegro entered the European Union, a law on compensation for victims of trafficking would enter into force. Guidelines had been issued to judges on compensation for victims.

    The Government strongly denied any allegations of violations of the rights of asylum seekers.  Border officials had received training on identifying trafficking victims.  A new law on the international protection of foreign nationals had been adopted in 2018, to increase the protection of their rights and the efficiency of the asylum process.  This law was fully aligned with relevant European Union Directives.  It ensured that decisions on asylum cases were reached within six months.

    A draft law on data protection had been prepared and was currently being assessed.  There were safeguards in place for the protection of personal data, including the personal data protection agency, which was mandated to regulate the processing of personal data by Government bodies.  The law on the National Security Agency required records to be kept of officers who had accessed personal data.  An amendment to the law had been approved by the Parliamentary Committee, which could visit the Agency and conduct checks on its practices.  The new law aimed to increase the transparency of the Agency’s activities.  Three charges had been lodged against the former Director of the Agency and another officer regarding unauthorised surveillance.  These cases were currently pending.

    The Government was promoting freedom of expression and strengthening legislation to protect journalists from attacks.  A commission dedicated to monitoring attacks against journalists had been set up and was operational.  It published reports and held regular meetings with officials on protection measures.  The law on the national public broadcaster was amended in 2024 to prevent undue political interference in its activities and in the election of its members, in line with the recommendations of the Venice Commission.  Prosecution teams had been set up to investigate the murders of three journalists.

    The Parliament organised public hearings and debates on proposed legislation, including the draft law on free access to information.  The Government would prioritise adoption of this law, which would promote transparency in access to information.

    Judges’ terms ceased when they reached statutory retirement age.  The Constitutional Court had failed to inform the Parliament that one of its judges had reached retirement age; the Parliament had issued a statement informing the Court of this fact.  The judge in question had filed a complaint with the Constitutional Court regarding her removal from the Court, but this had been rejected.

    The law on freedom of religious belief was amended in 2021; religious communities were not involved in this process, though they had been involved in drafting of the initial law.  The restitution of property to religious communities would be addressed in a forthcoming law.  Montenegro was committed to promoting the rights of religious communities.

    Follow-Up Questions by Committee Experts

    Committee Experts asked follow-up questions on the State’s response to reports of excessive use of force at the borders and an increase in pushbacks; the availability of legal aid for asylum seekers; how Montenegro prevented third-party actors from influencing political processes; reasons for delays in prosecuting hate crimes; measures to address the low representation of women in political bodies; plans to address the Supreme Court’s case backlog; measures to prevent delayed responses to requests for information; and steps taken to open inquiries into religious hate speech and to punish these acts.

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said the State had not received any allegations of pushbacks at the border.  All individuals who entered the territory of Montenegro had the right to request international protection.  The law on international protection guaranteed legal aid for all asylum seekers, which was provided through a non-governmental organization, financed by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.  Legal aid was also guaranteed by law for victims of trafficking, domestic violence and sexual offences.  The State party was developing case management mechanisms to address the Supreme Court’s case backlog.

    One deputy prime minister needed to be of an underrepresented gender.  A women’s club was in place, as well as a quota system, for the management boards of public companies.

    Criticism of public officials was permitted, as long as it did not constitute hate speech.  A law was being drafted that would implement sanctions for hate speech. The Government sought to lift the immunity of one mayor who had discriminated against a religious group in public speeches, so that he could be prosecuted.

    A committee had been set up to develop amendments to legislation on elections and campaign financing.  Its work had been delayed, but it was due to develop this legislation by the end of this year.  Its membership had also been expanded.

    The fourth strategy on deinstitutionalisation was adopted in December 2024, along with its action plan.  Funding was provided for social care under the strategy, which envisaged licencing and training of social service providers, and setting norms and standards for social work.

    Complaints of hate speech against religious communities were handled by the Ombudsperson’s Office.  The State party was currently negotiating agreements with several religious communities.

    Although public statements related to laws on foreign agents had been made, no draft laws on foreign agents had been submitted to Parliament.  The State party promoted freedom of expression.

    Closing Statements

    BLAGOJE GLEDOVIĆ, Director General of the Directorate for the International Cooperation and International Legal Aid, Ministry of Justice of Montenegro, and alternative head of the delegation, said the exchange with the Committee had been lively and exhaustive.  Over the reporting period, the State party had undertaken several reforms to promote civil and political rights and to meet the requirements for accession to the European Union.  Significant efforts had been made by public servants and civil society to achieve Montenegro’s membership of the Union.  Montenegro remained committed to the implementation of the Covenant through national legislation and all other available measures.  The State party looked forward to receiving the Committee’s recommendations, which it would carefully consider and strive to implement.

    CHANGROK SOH, Committee Chairperson, thanked the delegation for engaging in dialogue with the Committee.  Discussions had covered a wide range of topics related to the implementation of the Covenant by the State party, highlighting the progress made and challenges faced.  The Committee was committed to fulfilling its mandate to ensure the highest standard of implementation of the Covenant in Montenegro.  Mr. Soh thanked all persons who had contributed to the dialogue.

     

    Produced by the United Nations Information Service in Geneva for use of the media; 
    not an official record. English and French versions of our releases are different as they are the product of two separate coverage teams that work independently.

     

     

    CCPR25.002E

    MIL OSI United Nations News –

    March 6, 2025
  • MIL-OSI USA: Senator Hassan Statement Ahead of President Trump’s Address to the Joint Session of Congress

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for New Hampshire Maggie Hassan
    WASHINGTON – U.S. Senator Maggie Hassan (D-NH) released the following statement ahead of President Trump’s address to the Joint Session of Congress:
    “No matter what President Trump says, boasts, or promises tonight, the past six weeks have made the President’s priorities painfully clear. At a time when American families are struggling to keep up with high costs, the President has endorsed a budget that would end Medicaid as we know it and increase costs on Americans in order to pay for more tax breaks for corporate special interests and billionaires. I remain ready to work with the President and my Republican colleagues to lower costs. But the President has shown that his focus instead is on making families pay more for home heating oil, cutting veterans services, and appeasing brutal dictators like Vladimir Putin. It is long past time for this Administration to get serious and get to work on bringing down prices, bringing the country together, and delivering for the American people.”
    Senator Hassan’s guest of honor for the President’s address this year is Cheri Bryer of Lebanon. Eleven years ago, Cheri was battling addiction and other mental health challenges. Thankfully, Cheri was eligible for Medicaid, which allowed her to access residential addiction treatment and enter recovery. Because of the care that Cheri got through Medicaid, she was able to return to work and now gets her health insurance coverage through her employer. Today, Cheri works as a senior perinatal peer support educator and coordinator in the Maternal Health Innovations grant on Dartmouth Health’s Population Health team. The budget proposal from President Trump and Congressional Republicans, which guts Medicaid to pay for tax giveaways for corporate special interests and billionaires, threatens the care for 180,000 Granite Staters – care that helped Cheri enter recovery and re-enter the workforce.

    MIL OSI USA News –

    March 6, 2025
  • MIL-OSI USA: Chairman Aguilar: Democrats are on the side of working people

    Source: US House of Representatives – Democratic Caucus

    The following text contains opinion that is not, or not necessarily, that of MIL-OSI – March 04, 2025

    WASHINGTON, D.C. — Today, House Democratic Caucus Chair Pete Aguilar and Vice Chair Ted Lieu were joined by Congressional Progressive Caucus Chair Greg Casar and New Democrat Coalition Chair Brad Schneider for a press conference highlighting House Democrats’ unity against the Republican Budget that cuts Medicaid to pay for tax cuts for billionaires. 

    CHAIRMAN AGUILAR: Good morning. Pleased to be joined with my colleague Ted Lieu, Vice Chair of the Democratic Caucus, as well as Greg Casar, the Chair of the Congressional Progressive Caucus and the Chair of the New Democratic Coalition, Brad Schneider.

    Last week, House Democrats from every corner of our Caucus voted against the House Republican Budget, which cut Medicaid $880 billion to pay for tax cuts for billionaires. We want to make health care more affordable and more available to the American people. This is in stark contrast to Republicans who voted to kick children off their health care and to put seniors at risk.

    As President Trump prepares for tonight’s speech, it’s clear that Democrats are on the side of working people, while Republicans are only looking out for their billionaire friends. Trump and Republicans have broken their promise to lower costs on day one, which was his commitment, to focus on tax giveaways for corporations and billionaires who don’t need any more help. In fact, Trump’s reckless tariffs, just announced last night, will raise prices on gas, produce at grocery stores, beer, lumber to build homes, crude oil and parts that make cars.

    As families struggle to make ends meet, Democrats are united against Trump and Elon Musk dismantling the services that families rely on, while steering more taxpayer dollars to themselves and their billionaire friends. They’re dismantling the VA health care and laying off thousands of veterans, as Trump stands with Putin and risks our national security. Tonight, we expect the President to put on a master class in dishonesty. We expect the President will focus not on everyday Americans, but on his friends and his ego. No matter what he says, he cannot change the damage he’s done already and the fact that his agenda is going to raise prices for everyday Americans. 

    Vice Chair Ted Lieu.

    VICE CHAIR LIEU: Thank you, Chairman Aguilar. Honored to be here with Representatives Greg Casar and Brad Schneider. I want to tell you about a meeting I had today with Vote Vets. They brought in a number of veterans who were fired, and I want to tell you a story about one of them. Her name is Eileen. She is an Air Force veteran. She then went to work for FEMA. She’s in a rural part of Alabama. She was one of the first to volunteer with FEMA to deploy to Hurricane Helene. On President’s Day, she got an email firing her with no notice, and she couldn’t even go back to her office. They sent her UPS boxes saying, ‘You put your government cell phone and laptop in this box and you ship it back to us.’ A few days later, she had to go out to a field where her supervisor from FEMA had to walk out and give her her box from her items at her office. She has two kids, four and 10. She now has no job. 

    This is not how we should treat veterans, not how we should treat federal employees, not how we should treat any American. And this is what Donald Trump did to her. And he’s done that to a large number of federal employees. And if you look at the federal workforce, about one in four are veterans. This is not how they should be treated, and most of these actions are simply brazenly illegal. We have a number of court cases being filed. We’re winning a number of those cases. Others are going to go into litigation, and I call on the Administration to stop illegally firing our veterans and other federal employees. 

    I also now want to touch on the subject of tariffs. You’ve seen with the indiscriminate tariffs that the President has both imposed and threatened to impose, that not only is the stock market tanking, but also inflation is up, consumer sentiment is down, and the Atlanta Fed has now predicted that we’re going to contract this quarter in terms of GDP. That is shocking, and that is all because of actions of one person, the President, who is massively harming our economy. 

    And then, I’d like to conclude now on Ukraine. I don’t know why Donald Trump is scared of Putin. He clearly is. He acts like he’s scared of Putin. And right now, with his pause in funding to Ukraine, I just want to let Ukrainians know to please hang in there. The President of the United States cannot extend that pause because it would be illegal. Congress, on a bipartisan basis, appropriated that funding to Ukraine. Ukraine is going to get that funding. And with that, I’d like to introduce our amazing Representative from Austin, Texas, Greg Casar. He has done a fantastic job as leader of the Congressional Progressive Caucus.

    REP. CASAR: Thank you so much Vice Chair Lieu and Chairman Aguilar. I also want to thank New Dems Chairman Brad Schneider, who I’m proud to call a partner in the fight to protect Medicare, Medicaid, Social Security and the American people.

    Tonight, millions of Americans will tune in to watch the President address a Joint Session of Congress. I do not know what Trump will say, but I can guarantee you that he is going to lie to the American people and not tell the truth about what MAGA Republicans in Congress want to do to you right now. So let me say it clearly, whatever political games that Donald Trump plays tonight, whatever lies he tells and whatever show he puts on, people watching at home should know that Trump and House Republicans want to steal your health care, steal your taxpayer money and hand it over to their billionaire buddies and to their donors.

    In Congress, Republicans are advancing a budget that would end Medicaid as we know it. And Elon Musk is trying to cut your Medicare and your Social Security. Social Security that seniors earned throughout their lifetime is what Elon Musk just recently called a ‘Ponzi scheme.’ I’ll say it again. Elon Musk just called Social Security, ‘the biggest Ponzi scheme of all time.’ That’s right, a guy that makes $8 million per day from federal government contracts thinks that seniors getting $65 a day from Social Security is a ‘Ponzi scheme.’ Their plan is plain and simple: guys like Elon Musk get richer and you get screwed. 

    But here’s the good news, Democrats are united and fighting back to protect your Social Security, your Medicare and your Medicaid. New Democrats, Congressional Progressive Caucus Democrats, the two biggest ideological caucuses here in the Congress, have put out a joint letter that includes 100% of our members from our two Coalitions saying we will not vote to cut your Medicare, your Medicaid and your Social Security. Over 200 House Democrats showed just in a matter of days that we are united with the American people in this fight. So while we may not all agree on every single issue, we are saying with one voice, hands off Medicare, hands off Medicaid and hands off of Americans’ Social Security.

    So now the question becomes: will any three House Republicans grow a backbone? Will any three House Republicans do the right thing and act like U.S. Representatives instead of like Trump employees, and join us? Because if three Congressional House Republicans join together with Democrats to do the right thing, there will be no Social Security cuts. We can prevent cuts to Medicaid and Medicare and to Social Security. But if House Republicans choose instead unanimously to come after Social Security and Medicaid and Medicare, then they will own the terrible consequences for working people.

    Thank you so much. And now I’d like to hand this over to my partner, the Chairman of the New Democratic Coalition, Brad Schneider.

    REP. SCHNEIDER: Thank you Chair Casar, Chairman Aguilar, Vice Chair Lieu. It’s good to be standing here with you in one common voice. 

    Before I read my prepared remarks and talk about our joint letter, I want to touch on what Vice Chair Lieu talked about, veterans. I have the privilege of representing Naval Station Great Lakes in North Chicago, Illinois. Every single sailor, recruit, who enlists in the Navy shows up in North Chicago for 10 weeks of basic training. I’ve had the privilege of attending those graduations. I see those 17-, 18-, and 19-year-old young people, men and women, who say, ‘I want to serve my country. I want to put on the uniform of the United States, go to places I do not know, do things I have no idea if I’ll be able to do, to protect the American people and the American way of life.’ Many of those people serve two years, four years. Many serve 20 years or more. All of them, committed and dedicated to bettering our country. And many of them, when they finish their service, are not done serving our country. They go to work with the federal government. 

    They’re dedicated federal workers who are serving their nation in their local communities, many here in Washington. They’re the people who work in Social Security, the Forest Rangers in our national parks, the folks who provide care at VA hospitals, and they are the ones who are getting the letters from Elon Musk and DOGE in the middle of the night saying, ‘Your service is no longer desired and we no longer value your performance.’ 

    This is wrong, and this is weakening our country, and this is why we are standing before you united to say it has to stop. I’m very proud that the CPC, Congressional Progressive Caucus, New Democrat Coalition, others have come together. We’ve made a very strong statement. I’m proud to lead 110 members of the New Democrat Coalition in joining in that statement, saying, ‘We cannot allow dangerous cuts to programs that Americans have actually paid for out of their hard earned dollars.’ Medicare, Medicaid, Social Security. 

    The headline is and should be, House Democrats are united, in deep contrast to what we’re seeing from our Republican colleagues. While the Democrats are focused on lowering costs, Republicans are pushing a budget that will result in cuts to health care and benefits that have been earned by hard working Americans. While Democrats are focused on making our community safe, Musk and DOGE are firing thousands of employees who help keep planes in the sky, prevent diseases like bird flu and measles from spreading and serve our veterans after they complete their service to our nation. 

    Democrats are working tirelessly to bring down prices of everyday products, while President Trump, just today, levied 25% taxes on the American consumer that will raise costs for groceries, for cars and trucks, gasoline, new construction for houses and many other everyday products. Meanwhile, President Trump and Congressional Republicans are doing everything they can to give a free ride to oligarchs like Elon Musk and his wealthy billionaire friends, and they’re putting the burden for all of this on our seniors, our children, our first responders, on people who educate our children, build our houses, work on the factory floor, who take care of our communities and tend to us when we are sick. It is these hard working people who are in the crosshairs of the Republicans’ actions. 

    One of these people is my guest tonight. Adam Mulvey is a 20-year Army veteran who served three tours in Iraq and one in Afghanistan. He’s one of 6,000 of these veterans we’ve talked about who was fired between February 13th and 24th. He works, or worked, at Lovell Federal Health Care Center. James A. Lovell Center is the only hospital in our country that serves both veterans and active military and every one of those recruits I just mentioned. His job was to help provide emergency management services, planning and preparing in the case of a tornado or another emergency or even an active shooter. He served 35,000 veterans in our area, tens of thousands of active duty sailors and other military members and the 40- to 50,000 people each year who go through Naval Station Great Lakes. 

    We all believe government should be efficient, but Trump and Musk are taking a sledgehammer to Americans’ lives and our livelihoods. And I am proud to stand with all of my colleagues here today saying it has to stop. Thank you, and I am proud to yield back to Chairman Aguilar. 

    Video of the full press conference can be viewed here.

    ###

    MIL OSI USA News –

    March 6, 2025
  • MIL-Evening Report: Consumer resistance is rising in the age of Trump. History shows how boycotts can be effective

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Garritt C. Van Dyk, Senior Lecturer in History, University of Waikato

    Justin Sullivan/Getty Images

    Boycotts are back. With people worried about everything from labour practices and human rights to tariffs and equal opportunity initiatives, collective consumer resistance has been rising globally.

    Right now, there are several month-long boycotts of Target underway in the United States due to the company abandoning its diversity, equity and inclusion (DEI) programme. Longer boycotts of specific corporations, beginning with Amazon, are scheduled for March and April.

    Last week, the non-partisan, grassroots People’s Union USA organised a “national economic blackout” by urging consumers to avoid buying anything beyond essentials. The inaugural event was, in part, spurred by anger at government cuts being made in the US by President Donald Trump and Elon Musk, with organisers saying:

    Our strength lies in economic power. If corporations control politicians through money, then we control corporations by withholding ours. Targeted boycotts, economic blackouts, and financial pressure will make them listen.

    More widely, the Palestinian-led Boycott, Divestiture, and Sanction (BDS) campaign against Israeli goods and companies has been operating for years now. And anti-American boycotts are underway in Canada as increased tariffs take effect .

    As these campaigns gain momentum, some consumers will question how effective boycotts are at changing corporate behaviour. But there is a long history of ordinary citizens successfully “voting with their wallets”, even before the term “boycott” was coined.

    Origins of the boycott

    In 1792, a British campaign to stop buying sugar produced by enslaved Africans in the West Indies began. This originated in the American colonies with Quakers rejecting sugar in the 1750s. They viewed enslaved Africans as stolen people, and therefore slave products as stolen goods.

    In Britain, the abolitionist movement appealed to women as household managers to give up slave products and sign a petition to end slavery. The power of this ethical consumerism gave women, not yet allowed to vote, a voice to parliament and a tangible way to participate in the cause.

    The word “boycott” itself originated during the 1880 Irish Land Wars, and referred to the resistance to English land agent and former army officer Captain Charles Boycott. Tenants of the absentee landlord he represented complained he “treated his cattle better than he did us”.

    Protests outside the gates of Captain Boycott’s residence during the Land League boycott in Ireland in 1880.
    Hulton Archive/Getty Images

    After Boycott imposed fines and employed police to attempt evictions, the Irish Land League responded with a campaign to ostracise him. Crowds intimidated workers so his crops would not be harvested, local shops refused to sell to him, and the post boy was threatened to stop deliveries.

    The parish priest, Father John O’Malley, adopted the term “boycott” for this collective action because he thought the County Mayo locals wouldn’t remember the word “ostracise”. Boycott was forced to flee Ireland, and the new term spread across the country.

    Some 75 years later, across the Atlantic, Rosa Parks was arrested for refusing to give up her seat to a white woman, as required by Alabama’s racial segregation laws. In 1955, the Montgomery Improvement Association organised a 13-month long boycott of the city’s buses, led by Martin Luther King Jr.

    African-Americans, who made up 75% of passengers, refused to ride the buses. In 1956, the US Supreme Court ruled segregated public buses were unconstitutional.

    American civil rights activist Rosa Parks sparked the 381 day Montgomery bus boycott, part of the wider civil rights movement in the US.
    Underwood Archives/Getty Images

    Can boycotts work in the 21st century?

    Boycotts are not the exclusive province of progressive activists. Across the political spectrum, the rejection of brands because of corporate behaviour has had moments of significant traction.

    In 2023, beer company Bud Light collaborated with transgender influencer Dylan Mulvaney as a brand ambassador. A backlash from conservative consumers saw the boycott cost parent company Anheuser-Busch Inbev an estimated US$1 billion.

    Bud Light also lost is status as the best-selling beer in the US to Mexican import Modelo. The brand then tried to back away from its marketing strategy, which only alienated the LGBTQIA+ community.

    Broad campaigns, such as the historical ones mentioned here, can be successful. But specifically targeted boycotts tend to be more effective in attracting media attention and sustaining momentum in the modern consumer age.

    This is especially true if consumers have a wide range of alternative goods or outlets that make it easier to avoid a brand or retailer.

    The most recent economic data show US consumer confidence is faltering, with its biggest drop since the summer of 2021. Inflation and the potential impact of a trade war are dampening retail sentiment.

    This fragile economic environment may amplify the effects of boycotts, if not in terms of profit, then in terms of brand reputation. As messaging becomes more common in the news and on social media, the current consumer boycotts in the US will be a test of how effective the strategy still is.

    Garritt C. Van Dyk has received funding from the Getty Research Institute.

    – ref. Consumer resistance is rising in the age of Trump. History shows how boycotts can be effective – https://theconversation.com/consumer-resistance-is-rising-in-the-age-of-trump-history-shows-how-boycotts-can-be-effective-251448

    MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

    March 6, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Replacement of Ukraine with Türkiye as Russian gas transit hub – E-000818/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-000818/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Emmanouil Fragkos (ECR)

    In January, Russia exported record volumes of natural gas to Europe via the TurkStream pipeline, exceeding 50 million cubic metres (mcm) a day, following the closure of the gas corridor through Ukraine. Türkiye is now the only transit route for Russian gas to Europe after the five-year transit agreement between Russia and Ukraine expired on 1 January and was not renewed. According to data from the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Gas (ENTSOG), in January, Russian gas exports via the TurkStream pipeline increased by 26.8 % year on year. They now stand at 50.6 mcm/day, up from 39.9 mcm/day in January 2024. According to Gazprom data and Reuters calculations, Russia supplied Europe with a total of around 63.8 billion cubic metres (bcm) of natural gas via various routes in 2022. This dropped to 28.3 bcm in 2023 before rising again to around 32 bcm in 2024.

    Türkiye is a dictatorial country that is illegally occupying the northern part of the Republic of Cyprus, it attacks neighbouring countries and is responsible for the ethnic cleansing of Christians and Kurds.

    In view of the above, can the Commission answer the following:

    • 1.Was it its intention from the start to give Türkiye a strategic boost?
    • 2.Does it not consider that the non-renewal of routes for the transit of Russian natural gas through Ukraine has harmed the Ukrainian economy?

    Submitted: 23.2.2025

    Last updated: 5 March 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    March 6, 2025
  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Syrians’ hopes for a better future depend on justice for the disappeared, Human Rights Council hears

    Source: United Nations 2

    5 March 2025 Human Rights

    The people of Syria’s painful search for a peaceful future took centre stage at the UN on Wednesday as one leading representative of the families of the country’s forcibly disappeared spoke of the continuing pain of not knowing their fate.

    Yasmen Almashan, a founding member of the Caesar Families Association, lost five of her six brothers between 2012 and 2014 during the early years of the Syrian civil war.

    Today, Ms. Almashan advocates for the truth about what happened to Syria’s more than 130,000 missing persons. This quest would be greatly helped by the creation of a national transitional justice policy for Syria, by the country’s caretaker authorities, she told the Human Rights Council in Geneva.

    “Participation of victims is key for transition justice programmes to succeed and reinforce a culture of human rights in countries which suffer from dictatorships, or which go through transition periods,” she said.

    “The victims can facilitate contacts between parts of society and assure an environment of peace and justice in Syria,” she insisted.

    A decade ago, the Assad regime refused to allow an exhibition of photos from the infamous Caesar Files to go ahead on the sidelines of the Human Rights Council, which featured graphic images smuggled out of Syria of prisoners who had been tortured.  

    Ms. Almashan has previously explained how her second brother was arrested in March 2012 and then tortured in a detention centre. He was identified in the Caesar Files – named after a former Syrian military photographer codenamed Caesar.

    It was in part thanks to the Syrian NGO’s persistent lobbying that the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 77/301 in June 2023, establishing the Independent Institution for the Missing in Syria and ensuring victim participation in its work.

    Addressing past atrocities 

    Spearheading renewed calls for transitional justice, UN human rights chief Volker Türk welcomed efforts by Member States to address past atrocities to benefit future generations.

    In Guatemala, victim-driven coalitions have secured the conviction of 31 military and paramilitary personnel for crimes against humanity and genocide.

    The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights also stressed the importance of an inclusive approach to transitional justice which should be victim-centered, inclusive, gender-responsive and innovative.

    Reminding the Council that 2024 saw the highest number of active conflicts since the Second World War, Mr. Türk also welcomed Colombia’s efforts to resolve animosity between parties formerly involved in the country’s decades-long civil war. Measures include offering psychosocial support for victims, addressing land distribution problems, promoting rural development and restoring indigenous territories’ ecosystems.

    In Kenya, survivors of sexual violence can advocate for justice through a national network for reparations, the High Commissioner added, while in Chad, victims last year received reparations thanks to the perseverance of civil society groups.

    UN Human Rights Council /Marie Bambi

    Sofija Todorović, Programme Director, Youth Initiative for Human Rights (YIHR), Serbia, address the Human Rights Council meeting on transitional justice.

    Empowering young people

    Echoing that message, Sofija Todorovic, Programme Director of Serbian NGO Youth Initiative for Human Rights, insisted that young people should not be left out of conversations about building a more just future for their countries.

    “It is our duty to stand behind them. We must equip them with the tools and opportunities to create the future they deserve. The rest, they will do themselves,” Ms. Todorovic said.

    Genocide prevention calls

    Also at the Council on Wednesday, UN human rights deputy chief Nada Al-Nashif warned Member States that international law principles protecting humanity from atrocities were under threat. 

    “We are living through dangerous times as deep divisions and extreme views feed both conflict and violence” in several regions of the world, Ms. Al-Nashif said.  

    Genocide is preceded by “clear patterns of discrimination of exclusion and incitement to hatred based on race, ethnicity, religion or other characteristics,” she said.

    Strained global norms

    “The global norms that protect us all, starting with the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, are under unprecedented strain,” she continued, stressing that the UN was set up in the aftermath of the Holocaust to avoid another genocide.

    Arms sales and transfers, the provision of military, logistical or financial support to parties to conflicts violating international law are “obvious examples” of indicators that states may be contributing to such crimes, she stressed.

    “Genocide happens when humanity’s moral compass fails, when hateful ideologies proliferate, and when the dehumanization of an entire group of people is allowed to take root and to spread,” Ms. Al-Nashif said.  

    “Together, let’s move towards a world in which genocide, and other atrocity crimes are inconceivable. Or if all else fails, then they are punished.” 

    MIL OSI United Nations News –

    March 6, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Global: What’s behind Erdoğan’s calculated shift on Kurds and its potential consequences

    Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Spyros A. Sofos, Assistant Professor in Global Humanities, Simon Fraser University

    On March 1, the start of the holy month of Ramadan — observed by most of Turkey’s Sunni population — the imprisoned leader of the banned Kurdistan Workers’ Party, Abdullah Öcalan, made a historic call for the party to disarm and end its 40-year-long armed struggle against the Turkish state.

    Though seemingly unexpected, this call for peace — made a few weeks before Nowruz, the Kurdish New Year, on March 20 — followed months of negotiations between Turkey’s ruling coalition made up of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP), Devlet Bahçeli’s Nationalist Action Party (MHP) and Kurdish officials.

    In a political landscape long shaped by conflict, Erdoğan’s recent overtures to Kurdish political forces mark a striking shift. In his speech during his party’s congress in Trabzon earlier this year, Erdoğan emphasized the unity and shared history among Turks and Kurds — the latter of whom have long been victims of imperialist designs of dividing the region and have been a mainstay of his populist rhetoric.

    Change of course on the Kurds

    Erdoğan’s speech suggested not only a willingness to re-engage with Kurds but also the possibility of a broader political compromise.

    In October 2024, Erdoğan ally and MHP leader Bahçeli, in a move carefully choreographed with the Turkish president’s change of course, opened the way to such a rapprochement by inviting Öcalan to parliament. Bahçeli also proposed Öcalan’s release in exchange for a ceasefire.

    This is not Erdoğan’s first attempt to resolve the Kurdish issue. In 2009, he launched the “Kurdish Opening,” aimed at ending the conflict through dialogue. Similar initiatives followed in 2008–11 and 2013–15.

    But all initiatives ultimately collapsed due to political disagreements, shifting alliances and Erdoğan’s increasingly authoritarian approach to governance.

    This latest initiative follows the same transactional logic that marked the earlier processes. Erdoğan’s renewed interest in engaging with the Kurds appears driven less by a desire for peace-making and more by political necessity.

    Domestically, Erdoğan’s AKP has grown increasingly reliant on its alliance with ultra-nationalist MHP. While this partnership secured his 2023 re-election as president, its fragility became evident in the country’s 2024 local elections, when opposition candidates won key mayoral races throughout the country. They were aided by the tacit support of the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM.)




    Read more:
    What’s next for Turkey after local elections put Erdoğan on notice


    Destabilizing the opposition

    The process that led to Öcalan’s statement from prison is quite likely to bring significant realignments to Turkish politics.

    By engaging with the broader Kurdish movement, Erdoğan seeks to destabilize the fragile and fractured opposition coalition, whose unity hinged on their shared opposition to him. Their continued relevance also depends on the tacit support of DEM and its Kurdish voters.

    By opening a new dialogue, Erdoğan may tip the balance in his favour by positioning DEM as a privileged negotiating partner. Drawing Kurdish political support away from the opposition and securing Kurdish backing for constitutional reforms would allow him to seek another presidential term.

    With 57 parliamentary seats, DEM holds significant sway and can make all the difference if Erdoğan initiates a constitutional amendment process.

    Regional and strategic implications

    Erdoğan’s overtures also carry significant regional implications. Turkey’s military operations in Syria and Iraq have strained relations with Kurdish factions across the region.

    At the same time, Turkey has strengthened ties with Iraq’s Kurdistan Regional Government, highlighting Erdoğan’s pragmatism when dealing with Kurdish entities.

    By addressing the Kurdish issue domestically, Erdoğan could strengthen his hand regionally, perhaps replicating his co-operation with Iraq in relations with the Democratic Union Party in Northern Syria, positioning Turkey as a stabilizing force in both Iraq and Syria.

    What comes next?

    Despite Erdoğan’s conciliatory tone, the future of this peace process remains highly uncertain. Previous negotiations unravelled due to unresolved questions about Kurdish political autonomy, cultural rights and power-sharing.

    The AKP’s emphasis on disarmament without addressing broader Kurdish political demands resulted in the eventual breakdown of dialogue.

    Internal divisions within Kurdish political forces also complicate the process. While Öcalan’s influence remains strong, some Kurdish factions may resist concessions without meaningful political guarantees. And despite Bahçeli’s recent statements, Erdoğan’s MHP allies remain deeply skeptical of any reconciliation efforts.

    As Nowruz approaches, Erdoğan’s engagement with Kurdish political forces could culminate in a new phase of dialogue — or serve as a strategic manoeuvre to consolidate power ahead of the next election cycle.

    Whether his shift leads to genuine reconciliation or remains a political gambit will depend on Erdoğan’s willingness to address Kurdish demands for autonomy and cultural recognition.

    If the past is any indicator, pro-Kurdish parties and civil society organizations currently engaged in negotiations may once again be discarded if they no longer serve Erdoğan’s interests. For now, the Kurdish question remains one of the most critical — and volatile — fault lines in Turkish politics.

    Whether lasting peace is on the horizon, or another cycle of repression and conflict, will depend on how any potential peace process unfolds in the coming months.

    Spyros A. Sofos receives funding from SSHRC and SFU.

    – ref. What’s behind Erdoğan’s calculated shift on Kurds and its potential consequences – https://theconversation.com/whats-behind-erdogans-calculated-shift-on-kurds-and-its-potential-consequences-246879

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

    March 6, 2025
  • MIL-OSI USA: U.S. Justice Department Launches Investigation of University of California Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

    Source: US State of North Dakota

    The Federal Task Force to Combat Anti-Semitism announced that the Justice Department has opened a civil pattern or practice investigation into the University of California (UC) under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The investigation will assess whether UC has engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination based on race, religion and national origin against its professors, staff and other employees by allowing an Antisemitic hostile work environment to exist on its campuses.

    “This Department of Justice will always defend Jewish Americans, protect civil rights, and leverage our resources to eradicate institutional Antisemitism in our nation’s universities,” said Attorney General Pamela Bondi.

    “Our country has witnessed a disturbing rise of Antisemitism at educational institutions in California and nationwide,” said Acting Associate Attorney General and Department of Justice Chief of Staff Chad Mizelle. “The Department of Justice is committed to upholding Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and protecting Jewish Americans as we investigate this potential pattern of discrimination.”

    Leading Task Force member and Senior Counsel to the Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights Leo Terrell said, “Following the October 7, 2023 Hamas terror attacks in Israel, there has been an outbreak of antisemitic incidents at leading institutions of higher education in America, including at my own alma mater at the UCLA campus of UC. The impact upon UC’s students has been the subject of considerable media attention and multiple federal investigations. But these campuses are also workplaces, and the Jewish faculty and staff employed there deserve a working environment free of antisemitic hostility and hate. The President, the Attorney General and this Task Force are committed to combatting antisemitism for all Jewish Americans.”

    The employment discrimination investigation will be conducted pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, national origin, sex, and religion. Under Title VII, the Justice Department has the authority to initiate investigations against state and local government employers where it has reason to believe that a “pattern or practice” of employment discrimination exists.

    Collaboration between the Justice Department and other federal agencies plays an important role in combating antisemitism in schools and college campuses. The Department coordinates with other federal agencies as part of the multi-agency Task Force to Combat Anti-Semitism, as well as when sharing enforcement jurisdiction with other agencies. For state and local governments and related entities like public universities, the Department of Justice shares enforcement authority under Title VII with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The EEOC receives, investigates, and conciliates EEOC charges against state- and local-government employers, before referring those charges to the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice for potential litigation.

    “The EEOC is committed to partnering with the Department of Justice to stamp out the scourge of anti-Semitism on campus workplaces,” said EEOC Acting Chair Andrea Lucas.

    If you have been discriminated against, you can file a complaint with the Civil Rights Division, at Contact the Civil Rights Division | Department of Justice (https://civilrights.justice.gov). If you work for an university or college and have experienced anti-Semitic harassment at work, you can file a charge with the EEOC, at How to File a Charge of Employment Discrimination | U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (https://www.eeoc.gov/how-file-charge-employment-discrimination). Learn more about addressing anti-Semitism at work here: What To Do If You Face Antisemitism at Work.

    President Trump’s Executive Order can be found here: Additional Measures to Combat Anti-Semitism – The White House.

    MIL OSI USA News –

    March 6, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Security: U.S. Justice Department Launches Investigation of University of California Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

    Source: United States Attorneys General 2

    The Federal Task Force to Combat Anti-Semitism announced that the Justice Department has opened a civil pattern or practice investigation into the University of California (UC) under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The investigation will assess whether UC has engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination based on race, religion and national origin against its professors, staff and other employees by allowing an Antisemitic hostile work environment to exist on its campuses.

    “This Department of Justice will always defend Jewish Americans, protect civil rights, and leverage our resources to eradicate institutional Antisemitism in our nation’s universities,” said Attorney General Pamela Bondi.

    “Our country has witnessed a disturbing rise of Antisemitism at educational institutions in California and nationwide,” said Acting Associate Attorney General and Department of Justice Chief of Staff Chad Mizelle. “The Department of Justice is committed to upholding Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and protecting Jewish Americans as we investigate this potential pattern of discrimination.”

    Leading Task Force member and Senior Counsel to the Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights Leo Terrell said, “Following the October 7, 2023 Hamas terror attacks in Israel, there has been an outbreak of antisemitic incidents at leading institutions of higher education in America, including at my own alma mater at the UCLA campus of UC. The impact upon UC’s students has been the subject of considerable media attention and multiple federal investigations. But these campuses are also workplaces, and the Jewish faculty and staff employed there deserve a working environment free of antisemitic hostility and hate. The President, the Attorney General and this Task Force are committed to combatting antisemitism for all Jewish Americans.”

    The employment discrimination investigation will be conducted pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, national origin, sex, and religion. Under Title VII, the Justice Department has the authority to initiate investigations against state and local government employers where it has reason to believe that a “pattern or practice” of employment discrimination exists.

    Collaboration between the Justice Department and other federal agencies plays an important role in combating antisemitism in schools and college campuses. The Department coordinates with other federal agencies as part of the multi-agency Task Force to Combat Anti-Semitism, as well as when sharing enforcement jurisdiction with other agencies. For state and local governments and related entities like public universities, the Department of Justice shares enforcement authority under Title VII with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The EEOC receives, investigates, and conciliates EEOC charges against state- and local-government employers, before referring those charges to the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice for potential litigation.

    “The EEOC is committed to partnering with the Department of Justice to stamp out the scourge of anti-Semitism on campus workplaces,” said EEOC Acting Chair Andrea Lucas.

    If you have been discriminated against, you can file a complaint with the Civil Rights Division, at Contact the Civil Rights Division | Department of Justice (https://civilrights.justice.gov). If you work for an university or college and have experienced anti-Semitic harassment at work, you can file a charge with the EEOC, at How to File a Charge of Employment Discrimination | U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (https://www.eeoc.gov/how-file-charge-employment-discrimination). Learn more about addressing anti-Semitism at work here: What To Do If You Face Antisemitism at Work.

    President Trump’s Executive Order can be found here: Additional Measures to Combat Anti-Semitism – The White House.

    MIL Security OSI –

    March 6, 2025
  • MIL-OSI USA: Chairman Wicker Leads SASC Hearing on Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Nominee Elbridge Colby

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Mississippi Roger Wicker

    WASHINGTON – U.S. Senator Roger Wicker, R-Miss., the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, today chaired a hearing reviewing the nomination of Mr. Elbridge A. Colby to be Under Secretary of Defense for Policy at the Department of Defense.

    In his opening statement, Chairman Wicker raised the need for a program of rapid reform at the Pentagon to improve deterrence against the complex threat environment posted by China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran. Chairman Wicker noted that Mr. Colby shares a common understanding of the dangerous security situation in the Western Pacific. Wicker also commended Colby’s exhortations to improve the defense industrial base.

    In examining Colby’s previous writings, however, Chairman Wicker noted the importance of remaining active in multiple theaters where threats against American national security have manifested, and asked Colby to offer his grand strategic vision for the U.S. in years ahead. Chairman Wicker also asked Colby to comment on his major reports to rebuild the military and reform the Pentagon as well, which Colby offered strong concurrence with.

    “Senator…I’ve had the pleasure of reviewing [your Peace Through Strength plan], and I think we’re keying off exactly. And I am a big supporter of that kind of perspective: restoring American strength, industrial might, and getting our allies to do more, which seems to me is also the perspective of the president and the Secretary of Defense…part of that plan [for deterrence] is greater resources, like, Mr. Chairman, you have advocated for,” Colby said. “I commit to advocating for the higher defense levels that I think are consistent with what our security dictates.”

    Read Senator Wicker’s hearing opening statement as delivered below.

    The hearing will come to order.

    Thank you all for being here this morning. The committee meets to consider the nomination of Mr. Elbridge Colby to be Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

    I want to thank Mr. Colby for his willingness to serve again. I want to thank his wife, Susanna, and their children for being here today. It also says a lot that Mr. Colby will be introduced today by two distinguished friends: Vice President JD Vance and Senator Banks.

    We are informed that the vice president is in traffic, and so after consulting to my right and left, we will proceed again because there are time constraints. And when the vice president arrives – I think he’ll be arriving just in time, so proceeding on.

    If confirmed, Mr. Colby would oversee the developments of policy and strategy for the Department of Defense. He would assume these responsibilities during the most dangerous security environment since World War II. The deepening military cooperation between China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea represents a complex and far-reaching set of threats. These threats demand a generational investment to revitalize America’s military strength. They demand rapid Pentagon reform. And they demand a fresh look at strategies needed to achieve our national security objectives.

    The American people need to understand what is at stake. We should help the country appreciate the risks imposed to our way of life. Beijing is leading an emerging alliance of countries with one clear objective: to use their economic and military power to tear down the United States and impose their will on global affairs. The new Axis of Aggressors is a greater menace than we have faced in decades.

    Under Xi Jinping’s leadership the Chinese Communist Party has undertaken one of the largest and most aggressive military buildups in history. Their speed has been astounding. In just a few short years, China has built more nuclear intercontinental ballistic missiles than the U.S. has in decades. They have tested orbital bombardment weapons and unveiled what may be the world’s first sixth-generation fighter aircraft. China possesses a ship building capacity over 230 times that of the United States – over 230 times. That’s almost inconceivable.

    Over three years ago, Vladimir Putin launched the first invasion of a European country since World War II. He has barraged the Ukrainian people with constant missile and drone attacks. The Kremlin has developed a variety of new weapons capabilities, including nuclear-armed satellites. Meanwhile Russia actively provides enriched uranium to China to support Beijing’s nuclear buildup. Putin has also been suspected of aiding North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs.

    Moving on to North Korea, nuclear arsenal there continues to advance unchecked. Kim Jong-Un has been aiding Russia’s war machine as it terrorizes Europe. Pyongyang’s missiles could soon be capable of overwhelming our defenses – North Korea’s – especially if reports of Russian assistance are accurate.

    In the Middle East, Israel has successfully crippled Iran’s proxies in the region, but these setbacks may spur Tehran to take the final step: to build a nuclear weapon, permanently altering the balance of power in that region.

    Few really understand how this axis of aggressors is working to make Americans less safe. If confirmed, I hope Mr. Colby can help Secretary Hegseth as he makes sure the public sees these threats for what they are.

    During Secretary Hegseth’s hearing, I spoke about the importance of building a motivated and highly competent team of professionals at the Pentagon. In this regard Mr. Colby is certainly qualified for the role to which President Trump has nominated him.

    For more than two decades, he has worked on defense policy. Mr. Colby previously served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary Defense for Strategy and Force Development. In that role, Mr. Colby played a pivotal role in the formulation of the 2018 National Defense Strategy – the first real strategy in years. His leadership was crucial in helping the United States articulate the need for a new defense posture, one focused on strategic competition with China and Russia, and the overdue modernization of our military.

    Mr. Colby and I have been ringing the same bell on military unpreparedness for years, particularly as it relates to China. This committee would echo exhortations on defense policy in the Western Pacific. We should make Taiwan a porcupine and Taipei is sprinting in that direction. We should build a larger US military footprint in East Asia, and we should accelerate the most important weapons programs to deter China.

    President Trump has made it clear that he intends to rebuild the military and reform the Pentagon. He campaigned on peace through strength. We all want to keep America safe and prosperous. To secure that peace, we will enable a Golden Age for America, but we do not now have the strength that can guarantee us the peace.

    Given the threat environment facing us, I strongly believe that we cannot simply pivot our attention and resources from one threat to another. That is an approach the Obama administration tried, and it did fail. We must be focused and strategic, but we need to be clear Beijing sees its fight against America as a global fight.

    Beijing is not pivoting between theaters or among theaters. Significant American withdrawal in Europe, Africa, South America, or the Middle East will allow the Chinese Communist Party to overcome us strategically, even if we are able to prevent military conflict in East Asia in the near term.

    In the past few weeks, President Trump has killed five top Al-Qaeda and ISIS terrorists. Good for him. He’s green lit more aggressive campaigning against the Houthis, and promised to support Israel to the hilt. All these policies are in line with the president’s desire for lasting peace and prosperity in the United States, and Mr. Colby, I’m sure that is your desire too.

    Now, Mr. Colby, your views on each theater have seemingly evolved since 2018, and I’m sure there’ll be discussions about that which are worth exploring. It goes without saying that the elephant in this hearing room today is the recent developments with regard to Ukraine and Russia and this administration.

    I was disappointed and dismayed as I watched the televised meeting involving the President of the United States and President Zelenskyy. And I was distressed that the White House meeting ended without the signing of the minerals agreement, which was there to be signed, as I understand it.

    This was followed by a television appearance by President Zelenskyy, and then a visit to some of our friends in Europe, where there’s much concern about the failure of that agreement to be signed.

    It was also followed that weekend by Mr. Putin’s continued barrage of attacking apartments, civilian targets, and other areas in Ukraine. Not a good weekend for peace in Ukraine or world peace.

    The president is trying to get a peace deal in Ukraine, and I certainly hope we’ll be able to get this back on the rails. I would like to hear your views on the potential there. Your views on President Trump’s crystal-clear Iran policy seem to have hardened considerably, yet your views on Taiwan’s importance to the United States seems to have softened considerably. I hope we can clarify those views today. And your views on the relevance of nuclear weapons in the next decade remain unclear to me. I would appreciate your comments on each of those issues.

    Mr. Colby, you’ve spoken frequently to audiences who are skeptical of the idea that U.S, peace and prosperity require us to wield U.S. power abroad. I’m grateful that you have led those discussions that U.S. foreign policy professionals do not like having. I expect your points on the limits of U.S. power remain nuanced, and complimentary to the president’s peace through strength agenda. And it will be crystal clear that you will speak for the president in this regard.

    If you’re focused on finding innovative ways to blend America’s comparative advantages in this global fight against Chinese Communists, then I strongly believe you will be a boon to the president and to the United States of America. I’d like to hear your strategic vision for the next four years. I’d like to hear your comments on the plans I have released for rebuilding and reforming the military. In confirming Secretary Hegseth, we charged him with focusing on four guiding principles as he assumed office: lethality, efficiency, speed, and accountability. I also appreciate the ease of access that he and I have had in conversations with each other since his confirmation.

    As Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, I’d like to know how you plan to execute in these four areas to support President Trump’s peace through strength agenda. So, thank you very much for being here, we look forward to your testimony, and I now recognize Ranking Member Reed for his opening remarks.

    MIL OSI USA News –

    March 6, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Security: Security News: U.S. Justice Department Launches Investigation of University of California Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

    Source: United States Department of Justice 2

    The Federal Task Force to Combat Anti-Semitism announced that the Justice Department has opened a civil pattern or practice investigation into the University of California (UC) under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The investigation will assess whether UC has engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination based on race, religion and national origin against its professors, staff and other employees by allowing an Antisemitic hostile work environment to exist on its campuses.

    “This Department of Justice will always defend Jewish Americans, protect civil rights, and leverage our resources to eradicate institutional Antisemitism in our nation’s universities,” said Attorney General Pamela Bondi.

    “Our country has witnessed a disturbing rise of Antisemitism at educational institutions in California and nationwide,” said Acting Associate Attorney General and Department of Justice Chief of Staff Chad Mizelle. “The Department of Justice is committed to upholding Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and protecting Jewish Americans as we investigate this potential pattern of discrimination.”

    Leading Task Force member and Senior Counsel to the Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights Leo Terrell said, “Following the October 7, 2023 Hamas terror attacks in Israel, there has been an outbreak of antisemitic incidents at leading institutions of higher education in America, including at my own alma mater at the UCLA campus of UC. The impact upon UC’s students has been the subject of considerable media attention and multiple federal investigations. But these campuses are also workplaces, and the Jewish faculty and staff employed there deserve a working environment free of antisemitic hostility and hate. The President, the Attorney General and this Task Force are committed to combatting antisemitism for all Jewish Americans.”

    The employment discrimination investigation will be conducted pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, national origin, sex, and religion. Under Title VII, the Justice Department has the authority to initiate investigations against state and local government employers where it has reason to believe that a “pattern or practice” of employment discrimination exists.

    Collaboration between the Justice Department and other federal agencies plays an important role in combating antisemitism in schools and college campuses. The Department coordinates with other federal agencies as part of the multi-agency Task Force to Combat Anti-Semitism, as well as when sharing enforcement jurisdiction with other agencies. For state and local governments and related entities like public universities, the Department of Justice shares enforcement authority under Title VII with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The EEOC receives, investigates, and conciliates EEOC charges against state- and local-government employers, before referring those charges to the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice for potential litigation.

    “The EEOC is committed to partnering with the Department of Justice to stamp out the scourge of anti-Semitism on campus workplaces,” said EEOC Acting Chair Andrea Lucas.

    If you have been discriminated against, you can file a complaint with the Civil Rights Division, at Contact the Civil Rights Division | Department of Justice (https://civilrights.justice.gov). If you work for an university or college and have experienced anti-Semitic harassment at work, you can file a charge with the EEOC, at How to File a Charge of Employment Discrimination | U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (https://www.eeoc.gov/how-file-charge-employment-discrimination). Learn more about addressing anti-Semitism at work here: What To Do If You Face Antisemitism at Work.

    President Trump’s Executive Order can be found here: Additional Measures to Combat Anti-Semitism – The White House.

    MIL Security OSI –

    March 6, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Global: Growing Trump-Putin detente could spell trouble for the Arctic

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Duncan Depledge, Senior Lecturer in Geopolitics and Security, Loughborough University

    vitstudio/Shutterstock

    During a wide-ranging 90-minute speech to the US congress of March 4, Donald Trump revisited his determination to “get” Greenland “one way or the other”. Trump said his country needed Greenland “for national security”. While he said he and his government “strongly support your right to determine your own future” he added that “if you choose, we welcome you into the United States of America”.

    Trump’s ambitions regarding Greenland and its considerable mineral wealth are just one of a raft of issues in the first six weeks of his second term that have plunged European global politics into disarray.

    As the White House ramps up the pressure on Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, to allow the US access to Ukraine’s mineral wealth, the US president is also talking about “cutting a deal” with Russian president Vladimir Putin. That deal would not only mean territorial losses for Kyiv, but would prepare the ground for a potentially far-reaching economic partnership between the White House and the Kremlin.

    Currently, Trump and Putin are primarily focused on Ukrainian territory and mineral assets. But discussions have also begun on where else “deals” might be made, including in the Arctic.

    A carve up of the Arctic is an attractive proposition for the two countries given the importance both leaders attach to mineral resource wealth. As in the case of Ukraine, such an approach would reflect Trump’s predisposition for transactional geopolitics at the expense of multilateral approaches.

    In the Arctic, any deal would effectively end the principle of “circumpolar cooperation”. This has, since the end of the cold war, upheld the regional primacy of the eight Arctic states (A8) that have cooperated to solve common challenges.

    Since the Arctic Council was established in 1996, the A8 has worked on issues of environmental protection, sustainable development, human security and scientific collaboration. That harmony has been crucial in an era in which climate change is causing the rapid melting of Arctic ice.

    Notably, the Arctic Council played an instrumental role in negotiating several legally binding treaties. These include agreements on search and rescue (2011), marine oil pollution preparedness (2013) and scientific cooperation (2017). It also supported the Central Arctic Ocean fisheries agreement (CAO) signed in 2018 by the Arctic Ocean states with Iceland, the EU, China, Japan and South Korea.

    The Arctic Council – and more broadly, circumpolar cooperation – withstood the geopolitical aftershocks of Russia’s seizure of Crimea and parts of eastern Ukraine between 2014 and 2015. But Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine left trust teetering on the precipice.

    Within a month, European and North American members had pressed pause on regular meetings of the Arctic Council and its scientific working groups, isolating Moscow. Some activity eventually resumed at the working group level in virtual formats, but full engagement with Russia has remained conditional on a military withdrawal from Ukraine. Meanwhile, hefty sanctions were imposed by the US and Europe, including targeting Russian Arctic energy projects.

    Russia’s response was to enhance its relationships with others. Countries such as Brazil, India, Turkey and Saudi Arabia now work with Russia in the Arctic on commercial and scientific projects. This pivot raised concerns among Nato allies about a stronger and challenging Russia-China presence across the Arctic. But the second Trump administration has changed the calculus. There’s now the threat of a new Arctic order based on the primacy – not of the A8 – but on a reset of US-Russia relations.

    Change of focus

    Trump’s signing of an executive order on February 4 to determine whether to withdraw support from international institutions may lead the White House to conclude there is no place for the Arctic Council. Its longstanding focus on climate change and environmental protection is anathema to the Trump administration, which has already withdrawn from the Paris agreement and is destroying domestic climate-related science programmes.

    Climate change is bringing increased competition for access to valuable resources.
    Peter Hermes Furian/Shutterstock

    The longstanding commitment of the A8 to circumpolar cooperation, or even a narrow A5 (Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia and the US) view of the primacy of the Arctic Ocean coastal states, is likely to be dismissed by the White House, which favours the embrace of great power politics. While many have warned that the Arctic Council can’t survive without Russia, losing US interest and support would surely be its death knell.

    In this landscape of “America first”, the prospect of Washington and Moscow dividing the Arctic and its resources seems increasingly realistic. In such a situation, the international treaties signed by the A8, and the CAO may also be at risk. Denmark may find itself excluded altogether from Arctic affairs if Trump gets his way over Greenland. At any rate, all the Nordic Arctic states are likely to struggle to make their voices in the region heard.

    A key question for European Nato and EU members is whether Trump would worry about Russian dominance in the European Arctic if it brought US-Russia economic cooperation to extract the region’s wealth? Might Trump even be supportive of Russian attempts to revisit the terms of the 1920 Spitsbergen Treaty, which ultimately gave Norway sovereignty over the Arctic archipelago (albeit with some limitations), if that too meant jointly unlocking Svalbard’s mineral resources let alone the wealth of the Arctic seabed?

    What room, if any, would a deal leave for Indigenous people to be heard, or for international scientific collaboration on critical challenges related to climate and biodiversity?

    If we have learned anything in the tumult of recent weeks, it is that European countries, individually and collectively, struggle to exercise strategic influence over contemporary geopolitical events. If Trump and Putin do begin negotiations over the Arctic, Europe may simply have to accept the end of the Arctic Council and circumpolar cooperation.

    Climate science, environmental protection, sustainable development and the ability of Indigenous people to decide their future would all suffer. The UK and Europe meanwhile will be left to consider what, if anything, can be done to defend Arctic interests.

    The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Growing Trump-Putin detente could spell trouble for the Arctic – https://theconversation.com/growing-trump-putin-detente-could-spell-trouble-for-the-arctic-251386

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

    March 6, 2025
  • MIL-OSI USA: Grassley Report Reveals Obama-Biden State Department’s Refusal to Exact Justice Against Iranian Terrorists

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Iowa Chuck Grassley
    WASHINGTON – Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Chuck Grassley (R-Iowa) today released investigative findings detailing the full scope of the Obama-Biden State Department’s pervasive obstruction of FBI law enforcement efforts before, during and after the Iran Nuclear Deal negotiations. According to legally protected whistleblower disclosures, FBI arrest efforts against high-level Iranian targets were severely hampered until President Trump took office in 2016; Trump’s election “result[ed] in an immediate move back toward normal enforcement of the law against the Iran regime and its supporters.”
    “This report offers chilling evidence the Obama-Biden administration jeopardized our national security and demoralized the morale of FBI agents who were working to keep Americans safe,” Grassley said. “Democrats’ historic refusal to get tough on Iran emboldened its regime and allowed Tehran to continue funding global acts of terrorism, like what we saw on October 7, 2023. We should all be breathing a sigh of relief President Trump is back in the White House to restore American strength on the world stage and hold Iran accountable for its evil acts.”
    Per a legally protected whistleblower disclosure: “The State Department and Obama-Biden administration officials persistently and systematically derailed criminal and national security investigations, creating a shadow amnesty program that protected scores of additional Iranian criminals. FBI offices abandoned dozens of Iran-related investigations and U.S. Attorneys shut down prosecutions after recognizing the State Department and DOJ obstruction would thwart effective enforcement efforts.”
    Read Grassley’s staff report HERE.
    Findings:
    Unclassified FBI email records show the State Department, under the leadership of then-Secretary of State John Kerry, repeatedly blocked FBI officials from executing arrests on individuals involved in Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs. Per an FBI official, in at least once instance, “Secretary of State [Kerry] personally told DOJ officials that they were to stand down on an arrest.” Kerry’s actions flew in the face of his sworn testimony to Congress; ahead of the Iran Nuclear Deal’s signing, Kerry promised Congress the deal would not prevent the U.S. from using its authorities to hold Iran accountable “for terrorism, human rights, missiles or any other non-nuclear reason.” 

    FBI officials elevated their concerns regarding the State Department’s obstruction to the highest rungs of DOJ leadership – including then-Attorney General Loretta Lynch – to no avail. As arrest opportunities passed, one FBI official wrote, “We are all beside ourselves on asking the field to stand down on a layup arrest, however as it stands right now we all have to sit back and wait until all the US and Iran negotiations resolve themselves.”

    A State Department official characterized the absurdity of the Obama-Biden administration’s inactive law enforcement posture, writing to an FBI official, “it’s a little like WTF that [the arrest is] being held up (if you’ll excuse the phrasing). However it is what it is.”

    Ultimately, FBI officials resigned to take steps documenting the State Department’s stonewalling “should there ever be a special investigation/hearing etc. on why FBI could not action law, and potentially prevent [a] national security incident.”

    The Biden-Harris administration last year failed to muster a response to Grassley’s initial findings regarding this obstruction. Today’s report provides the fullest public account of the Obama-Biden State Department’s unlawful actions.
    -30-

    MIL OSI USA News –

    March 6, 2025
  • MIL-OSI USA: Trump’s Dismantling of USAID is Anarchy Masquerading as Efficiency

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Hawaii Brian Schatz
    Nothing about Donald Trump’s hasty and illegal attempted dismantling of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID)—and with it, the decapitation of American power—is remotely efficient. Just this week, USAID’s now-former Inspector General found that there is currently half a billion dollars’ worth of American-grown food stranded at ports and warehouses across the country, on the verge of spoiling. That’s corn and rice and lentils and soybeans, grown in Iowa and Kansas and Texas and Oklahoma, that would have otherwise fed children in a school in Bangladesh or famished refugees at a camp in war-torn Sudan. (The Inspector General was subsequently fired for disclosing this information.)
    Similarly, there’s no efficiency being achieved by obstructing one of the most successful global health programs in history—the President’s Emergency Program for AIDS Relief—which has saved 26 million lives over the past two decades. PEPFAR currently provides HIV treatment to over 20 million people around the world, meaning every day aid isn’t flowing inches us closer to the very outbreaks we’ve worked so hard to prevent.
    Whether it’s delivering clean water to communities across Africa; or promoting economic development through education in Mali and small business support in El Salvador; or providing life-saving care in Thailand and Syria; or fighting human trafficking in Nepal and Liberia, thousands of USAID workers and contractors make miracles big and small happen every day.
    But USAID succeeds as more than just a moral matter. Each year, it pours billions of dollars back into the U.S. economy, supporting farmers and businesses that provide food and other supplies. It also helps fight terrorist groups and drug cartels that endanger Americans, while deepening American values and interests in every corner of the globe. But perhaps the most underappreciated aspect of USAID’s work is its singular ability to forge relationships with unlikely partners which help combat the harmful influence of adversaries like China and Russia.
    It’s no surprise, then, that Beijing and Moscow are now cheering on our sudden retreat. They’re not wasting any time filling the void, either. Within days of USAID’s closure, China sent aid and dispatched workers to take on projects we’ve abandoned in the Indo Pacific and Africa. Intended or not, that will be the enduring consequence of this episode of chaos: an emboldened China, all-too-eager to exploit American isolation to grow its own power and influence.
    Like any organization, USAID is not perfect. There are inefficiencies and redundancies, and evolving challenges and emerging technologies present opportunities for improvement. It’s also entirely legitimate to question whether U.S. funding is aligned with our current priorities and interests and seek to adjust it as needed within the four corners of the law. Doing that is one of Congress’ most fundamental responsibilities—and something I was eager to work on when I became the lead Democrat on the Senate Appropriations subcommittee overseeing foreign aid last month.
    But the abrupt and total shutdown of USAID—in defiance of multiple federal laws through which it was codified and funded—reveals a simple truth: The Department of Government Efficiency is not actually about achieving efficiency. Rather, it’s about Trump trying to wish away whichever parts of the government he doesn’t like. Were a purge of this nature to happen in a country halfway around the world, we would rightly call it an authoritarian takeover. The fact that it’s happening at our own doorstep doesn’t change that.
    Much of what DOGE claims to have newly unearthed are either outright lies or were already publicly available for all to see. Worse, there’s no telling what funding they deem unnecessary—except for vague, baseless descriptions like “woke” and “radical” and “criminal.”
    The way to make reforms is through the lawmaking process—not the lawbreaking process. If you believe that a program needs to be narrowed in scope, reformed a great deal, or even eliminated altogether, the way to do that is by proposing a law—not by rampaging the federal government and stripping it for parts. Our government with three separate but co-equal branches exists precisely to prevent this kind of anarchy operating under a thin veneer of fiscal responsibility and shrewd cost-cutting.
    Moving fast and breaking things may be an acceptable way to conduct business at a tech company. But a break now, fix later strategy doesn’t work when you’re the leader of the free world. What’s on the line is not advertising revenue and the user experience, but lives and livelihoods. Hundreds of millions of them, in fact. People will die, diseases will spread, and famine will grow. Trump is trying to hoodwink Americans into thinking the only way to achieve efficiency is by exacting maximum chaos and cruelty. It’s a false choice and we must reject it.

    MIL OSI USA News –

    March 6, 2025
  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: NPT Safeguards Agreement with Iran: Quad statement to the IAEA Board, March 2025

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments 3

    Speech

    NPT Safeguards Agreement with Iran: Quad statement to the IAEA Board, March 2025

    UK Ambassador Corinne Kitsell’s statement on behalf of France, Germany, the UK and United States (the Quad) to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board meeting about Iran’s implementation of its obligations under its Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Safeguards Agreement

    Chair,

    France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States commend the Agency for its continued efforts to engage Iran to clarify the outstanding issues related to the implementation of Iran’s NPT-required Safeguards Agreement.  We thank the Director General for his report on these issues, which are critical to understanding the nature of Iran’s nuclear programme.

    We deeply regret that, for more than five years, Iran has refused to provide required clarifications regarding nuclear material detected at multiple undeclared locations in Iran. The Director General and the Board have made clear repeatedly that Iran is legally required to provide this cooperation.  Iran has failed to do so despite the concerted efforts of the Director General and this Board to provide Iran every opportunity.  As a result of Iran’s longstanding denials, the Agency is still unable to provide critical assurances that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively peaceful and that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities in Iran.  These issues are fundamental to Iran’s safeguards obligations and the broader non-proliferation regime.  No State can be allowed to violate its safeguards obligations with impunity.  Iran must fully cooperate, or the Board must be prepared to find Iran in noncompliance.  Until now, Iran has made its choice.  Let us be clear: unless Iran changes course, it will force the Board to make its own choice.  Time is not on Iran’s side.

    This report recalls the IAEA’s assessment of some of the deeply concerning activities that Iran did not declare, at Turquzabad, Varamin, Marivan and Lavisan-Shian.  It is of significant concern that due to the lack of information being provided by Iran, the IAEA concluded it would be unable to continue its efforts to resolve the safeguards issues at Lavisan-Shian.  We note that the IAEA’s technical assessment of the activities at Marivan has not changed, that Iran has not provided technically credible information, and therefore the issue remains unresolved.  We also want to highlight the lack of progress towards resolving the discrepancy issue at Jaber Ibn Hayan Laboratory, which still has to be explained by Iran.  Iran continues to reject and challenge the IAEA’s technical assessment of the activities at these undeclared sites rather than engaging the IAEA constructively towards resolving the outstanding issues.  We reiterate our support for the IAEA’s critical work.  We underscore the value of the IAEA’s technical expertise and authority to investigate these issues to address concerns around the possibility of undeclared nuclear material and activity in Iran today.  

    Chair,

    In his latest report, the Director General reiterates that Iran continues to refuse to provide design information for new nuclear facilities as legally required under modified Code 3.1.  This is in contravention of Iran’s safeguards agreement.  Iran’s unwillingness to provide the Agency with this information should be especially concerning given Iran’s history of building covert nuclear facilities.  We also note that Iran has refused to accept the designation of four additional experienced inspectors.  We recall the Director General’s statement that Iran’s previous decision to withdraw the designations of inspectors seriously affects the Agency’s ability to conduct its verification activities in Iran.  We echo his deep regret that Iran did not accept these new designations.

    Iran’s refusal to cooperate with the IAEA and its refusal to abide by its obligations under its safeguards agreement is deeply concerning in the context of Iran’s continuous escalation of its nuclear programme to levels with no credible civilian justification.  Our concern is intensified by the increasing number of senior Iranian officials who have publicly claimed that Iran has the technical capability to build a nuclear weapon and called for a change to Iran’s so-called “nuclear doctrine”.  We recall that the Director General assessed in his report in May 2024 that such remarks increased his concerns about the correctness and completeness of Iran’s safeguards declarations.

    We commend the Agency’s efforts to engage Iran to seek progress.  However, after years of delay, Iran must finally and fully meet its commitments and obligations rather than dangle promises of discussions in the future which we have heard many times before.

    Chair,

    It is important that the Board supports the IAEA by the strongest means necessary to pursue clarity on the nature of Iran’s nuclear programme.  The Board adopted two resolutions in 2024, which once again urged Iran to cooperate.  Iran ignored these, as it has ignored opportunities in previous years.  We reiterate our call on Iran to resume urgently full cooperation with the IAEA and to implement fully its safeguards agreement.  

    We recall that this Board, in its last resolution of November 2024, mandated the Director General to produce a comprehensive and updated assessment of the possible presence or use of undeclared nuclear material in Iran in connection with past and present outstanding issues.  This document will provide a clear, technical and objective foundation to assess Iran’s compliance with its safeguards agreement.  As the resolution sets out, it will include the Agency’s assessment of its ability to verify the implementation of Iran’s safeguards obligations and the non-diversion of nuclear material.  The assessment will also include a full account of Iran’s cooperation with the Agency on the issues to date.

    It is up to Iran to provide the technically credible explanations and substantive cooperation needed to inform the Agency.  We regret that despite having the time and opportunity to do so, Iran has not made any progress in the four months since this resolution was adopted.  In recognition of the Director General’s last report, which states that “the Agency is at an impasse” with regard to resolving these issues, we believe the comprehensive assessment should be delivered as soon as possible.  It should be based on all information available to the Agency to provide the full picture, in order to inform the Board’s next steps on these issues.  Iran has had many opportunities to resolve the issues.

    Chair,

    Our patience has been long, but it is not unlimited.  We underscore, if there is no concrete, technically credible progress reported by the Director General, the Board must be prepared to consider finding Iran in non-compliance with its safeguards agreement.

    We do not take such a course lightly.  We reiterate that our efforts are intended to provide resolute support to the Agency in its safeguards investigations in Iran, for the sake of international security and the integrity of the global non-proliferation architecture.

    More than ever, there is an urgent need to address the lack of transparency and assurances on the nature of Iran’s advancing nuclear programme.  Iran’s full cooperation with the IAEA on its safeguards obligations is long overdue.  Iran has had many chances over many years to cooperate, but Iran has instead chosen a path of escalation, obfuscation, and delay.  Iran must be held to account if it continues along this path.  

    We again express our thanks for the IAEA’s continued efforts and ask for the report to be made public.

    Thank you, Chair.

    Updates to this page

    Published 5 March 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

    March 6, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Global: Why Trump’s plan to cut national debt by selling ‘gold card’ visas for US$5 million each won’t work

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Amalendu Misra, Professor of International Politics, Lancaster University

    The US president, Donald Trump, is set to introduce a “gold card” visa that would allow wealthy foreigners to buy permanent US residency – and a path to citizenship – for US$5 million (£3.9 million).

    Speaking at the Oval Office on February 25, Trump said: “I think it’s going to be very treasured. I think it’s going to do very well. And we’re going to start selling, hopefully, in about two weeks.”

    US commerce secretary Howard Lutnick has touted the plan as a way to raise revenue to bring down US national debt, which currently stands at over US$36 trillion. As Trump put it when answering questions from reporters at the White House: “We’ll be able to sell maybe a million of these cards, maybe more than that. And if you add up the numbers, they’re pretty good. As an example, a million cards would be worth US$5 trillion.”

    Trump has also suggested that the gold-card holders can help stimulate the US economy. “They’ll be wealthy, and they’ll be successful, and they’ll be spending a lot of money and paying a lot of taxes,” he said. When asked whether Russian oligarchs would qualify for the visa, Trump responded: “Hey, I know some Russian oligarchs that are very nice people. It’s possible.”

    The idea that wealthy foreigners can address a nation’s faltering economy is not new. Trump’s gold visas will themselves replace the current EB-5 immigrant investor visa, which offers permanent US residency in return for job-creating investments of at least US$1 million.

    In the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis, various European nations also floated similar golden visa schemes as a means of reversing their economic downturns. The visas offered by Spain, Greece, Hungary and Portugal, for example, all cost significantly less than Trump’s proposed scheme.

    A Spanish gold visa, which will no longer be available from April 2025, is granted in return for €500,000 (£417,000) in real estate investment. The required investment in Greece and Hungary is €250,000. And people looking to obtain a gold visa in Portugal have two options: a €250,000 donation to the restoration of national heritage, or a €500,000 property investment.

    There is little data to support the argument that such policies boost the national coffers. Some experts have suggested that golden visa schemes typically bring in no more than 0.3% of GDP in revenue. So, it’s no surprise that there is plenty of scepticism around whether Trump’s gold card scheme can reduce US national debt.

    Critics of the plan argue that the scheme will not add trillions of US dollars to the economy, as Trump has claimed. This is because demand for any such programme is likely to be limited to thousands of people.

    In a recent poll conducted by Forbes, 18 billionaires were asked if they would like to take advantage of an American gold card visa. Most of them (13) said they would not be interested. Many of the ultra-rich foreigners interviewed simply did not think they needed American citizenship and don’t want it.

    “If you’re a billionaire, you don’t need it,” said one Canadian billionaire. “I don’t have to come to the United States to invest in the United States.”

    Marginal benefits

    The global rich are unlikely to be queuing up for Trump’s gold cards. At about US$5 million per application, it is “the most expensive” golden visa option in the world. Any potential buyer will carry out cost-benefit analysis prior to committing to such a deal.

    Two reasons a wealthy person might invest in a second or third passport are to ensure greater mobility and protect their wealth.

    US tax laws have traditionally reduced the attractiveness of American residency or citizenship for the global rich. American citizens and residents are required to pay income tax on their US earnings as well as any income they earn overseas.

    Trump has said that gold-card holders would not be subject to taxes on their overseas income. This tax loophole could open the door to more wealthy foreigners looking to protect their wealth. However, many details about the scheme remain unclear.

    Notwithstanding this, golden visas in many other nations provide better opportunities than those offered by a Trump gold card. In terms of mobility, the US passport ranks eighth on an index of 198 different passports. American passport holders can travel to 171 countries without needing a visa.

    Spain ranks second, with a Spanish passport allowing access to 177 countries without a visa. And Portugal, Greece and a host of other European nations follow closely behind, with their passports allowing visa-free travel to 176 countries.

    The most powerful passport in the world is offered by the United Arab Emirates (UAE), allowing access to 179 countries visa-free. The UAE government introduced a golden visa in 2019, offering long-term residence in exchange for roughly US$550,000 of investment.

    The US passport is ranked eight in the world by the 2025 Passport Index.
    KieferPix / Shutterstock

    An American passport also has its own inherent limitations and hazards. A US-born colleague of mine who acquired Irish citizenship through lineage has never used his American passport while out of the country.

    He believed that in a crisis situation, such as being taken hostage, a US citizen was far more vulnerable and exposed to danger than a non-American counterpart. In his opinion, people were far more prejudiced and hostile towards a US citizen than those belonging to other nations.

    The return on investment of a Trump gold card remains unpredictable. The asking price is extremely high and the benefits it promises buyers are – at best – marginal. The offer comes with enough holes to sink a ship.

    Amalendu Misra is a recipient of British Academy and Nuffield Foundation fellowships.

    – ref. Why Trump’s plan to cut national debt by selling ‘gold card’ visas for US$5 million each won’t work – https://theconversation.com/why-trumps-plan-to-cut-national-debt-by-selling-gold-card-visas-for-us-5-million-each-wont-work-251183

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

    March 6, 2025
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