Category: Military Intelligence

MIL-OSI Europe: MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the white paper on the future of European defence – B10-0146/2025

Source: European Parliament

Rasa Juknevičienė, Nicolás Pascual de la Parte, Riho Terras, Michael Gahler, David McAllister, Sebastião Bugalho, Andrzej Halicki
on behalf of the PPE Group

B10‑0146/2025

European Parliament resolution on the white paper on the future of European defence

(2025/2565(RSP))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

– having regard to Title V of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), in particular Chapter Two, Section Two thereof on provisions on the common security and defence policy (CSDP),

– having regard to the Versailles Declaration adopted on 11 March 2022 at the informal meeting of Heads of State or Government,

– having regard to the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence – For a European Union that protects its citizens, values and interests and contributes to international peace and security, which was approved by the Council on 21 March 2022 and endorsed by the European Council on 24 March 2022,

– having regard to the national security strategies of the Member States,

– having regard to the Civilian CSDP Compact – Towards more effective civilian missions, approved by the Council on 22 May 2023,

– having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/1968 of 17 October 2022 on a European Union Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine (EUMAM Ukraine)[1],

– having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/890 of 18 March 2024 amending Decision (CFSP) 2021/509 establishing a European Peace Facility [2],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2019/452 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 March 2019 establishing a framework for the screening of foreign direct investments into the Union [3],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/697 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2021 establishing the European Defence Fund and repealing Regulation (EU) 2018/1092 [4],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2023/1525 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 July 2023 on supporting ammunition production (ASAP)[5],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2023/2418 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 October 2023 on establishing an instrument for the reinforcement of the European defence industry through common procurement (EDIRPA)[6],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1252 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 establishing a framework for ensuring a secure and sustainable supply of critical raw materials and amending Regulations (EU) No 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, (EU) 2018/1724 and (EU) 2019/1020 [7],

– having regard to the Commission proposal of 18 April 2023 for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down measures to strengthen solidarity and capacities in the Union to detect, prepare for and respond to cybersecurity threats and incidents (COM(2023)0209),

– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 21 February 2025 on an EU Action Plan on Cable Security (JOIN(2025)0009),

– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 10 March 2023 on a European Union Space Strategy for Security and Defence (JOIN(2023)0009),

– having regard to Commission Recommendation (EU) 2023/2113 of 3 October 2023 on critical technology areas for the EU’s economic security for further risk assessment with Member States [8],

– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 10 November 2022 entitled ‘Action plan on military mobility 2.0’ (JOIN(2022)0048),

– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 18 May 2022 on the Defence Investment Gaps Analysis and Way Forward (JOIN(2022)0024),

– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 10 March 2023 on the update of the EU Maritime Security Strategy and its Action Plan entitled ‘An enhanced EU Maritime Security Strategy for evolving maritime threats’ (JOIN(2023)0008),

– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 5 March 2024 entitled ‘A new European Defence Industrial Strategy: Achieving EU readiness through a responsive and resilient European Defence Industry’ (JOIN(2024)0010),

– having regard to the report by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 20 June 2024 entitled ‘Common Foreign and Security Policy Report – Our priorities in 2024’,

– having regard to the political guidelines for the next European Commission 2024-2029 by Ursula von der Leyen entitled ‘Europe’s choice’, published on 18 July 2024,

– having regard to the report by Enrico Letta entitled ‘Much more than a market’, published in April 2024, and in particular the section thereof entitled ‘Promoting peace and enhancing security: towards a Common Market for the defence industry’,

– having regard to the report by Mario Draghi of 9 September 2024 on the future of European competitiveness and in particular Chapter Four thereof on increasing security and reducing dependencies,

– having regard to the report by Sauli Niinistö of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘Safer Together: Strengthening Europe’s Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness’,

– having regard to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949,

– having regard to the Madrid Summit Declaration adopted by NATO heads of state and government at the North Atlantic Council meeting in Madrid on 29 June 2022,

– having regard to the NATO 2022 Strategic Concept and to the NATO Vilnius Summit Communiqué issued by NATO heads of state and government at the North Atlantic Council meeting in Vilnius on 11 July 2023,

– having regard to the joint declarations on EU-NATO cooperation signed on 8 July 2016, 10 July 2018 and 10 January 2023,

– having regard to the ninth progress report on the implementation of the common set of proposals endorsed by EU and NATO Councils on 6 December 2016 and 5 December 2017, submitted jointly by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the NATO Secretary General to the Council of the EU and the NATO Council on 13 June 2024,

– having regard to the Washington Summit Declaration issued by the NATO heads of state and government participating in the North Atlantic Council meeting in Washington on 10 July 2024,

– having regard to Ukraine’s victory plan presented by the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, to the European Council on 17 October 2024,

– having regard to the speeches and statements made at the Munich Security Conference on 14-16 February 2025,

– having regard to the statements made at the Leaders Meeting on Ukraine, held in London on 2 March 2025,

– having regard to the temporary halt of all United States military aid to Ukraine,

– having regard to the statement by the President of the Commission of 4 March 2025 on the defence package, the ReArm Europe Plan,

– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas the security situation in Europe has seen an unprecedented deterioration over the past years; whereas there is a common understanding that Europe needs to be able to effectively address European security challenges and achieve a state of defence readiness;

B. whereas Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has been a watershed moment in European history; whereas Putin’s war of aggression against Ukraine is widely recognised as an attack on the European peace order established after the Second World War and on the global order as a whole;

C. whereas despite previous signs and warnings, many countries have not taken the necessary defence measures; whereas the goal of committing 2 % of gross domestic product (GDP) to defence spending agreed by NATO members in 2014 is still not being met by all NATO members in the EU; whereas the gap between the 2 % goal and the actual defence spending by EU Member States amounts to EUR 1 770 billion over the 2006-2022 period [9]; whereas in 2024, 16 EU Member States that are also NATO allies were expected to exceed NATO’s 2 % defence investment guideline, compared to only nine in 2023;

D. whereas as a result of these investment gaps, numerous reports, notably the Defence Investment Gaps Analysis of May 2022, have analysed a worrying capability gap in European defence;

E. whereas the Draghi report highlighted a funding need of EUR 500 billion in European defence for the next decade and highlights a combination of structural weaknesses affecting the competitiveness of the EU’s defence technological and industrial base (EDTIB), and identifies fragmentation, insufficient public defence investment and limited access to financing as obstacles to a capable EDTIB; whereas the lending policy of the European Investment Bank (EIB) excludes the financing of ammunition and weapons, as well as equipment or infrastructure exclusively dedicated to military and police use;

F. whereas the Niinistö report underlines the fact that the EU and its Member States are not yet fully prepared for the most severe cross-sectoral or multidimensional crisis scenarios, especially given the further deteriorating environment outside of the EU; whereas it insists that this preparedness is necessary for the EU and its Member States to signal to potential adversaries that they will not be able to outlast the EU; whereas it deplores the fact that the EU lacks a common plan in the event of armed aggression and underlines that the EU needs to rethink the way it defines its security;

G. whereas Russia’s continued armament efforts and its cooperation with other authoritarian powers on armaments, vastly surpassing European stocks and production capacities, pose the most serious and unprecedented threat to world peace as well as to the security and territory of the EU and its Member States; whereas the Russian regime is strengthening its ties in particular with the autocratic leaderships of China, Iran and North Korea in order to achieve its objectives;

H. whereas the EU is also facing the most diverse and complex range of non-military threats since its creation, exacerbated by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, including foreign information manipulation and interference, cyberattacks, attacks against underwater infrastructure, economic pressures, food and energy blackmailing, instrumentalisation of migration and subversive political influence; whereas the EU should take these kind of threats seriously in its defence and security policies;

I. whereas the recent actions and statements by the US administration have further increased concerns about the future stance of the US vis-à-vis Russia, NATO and the security of Europe;

J. whereas the EU’s security environment has deteriorated not only in eastern Europe, but also in countries in the EU’s southern neighbourhood partnership and beyond;

K. whereas the disastrous impact of past or ongoing wars, instability, insecurity, poverty and climate change in the Sahel region, north-eastern Africa and Libya poses serious risks to the EU’s security and its economic and trade interests; whereas the instability and insecurity in the southern neighbourhood and the Sahel region are closely interlinked with and remain an ongoing challenge for EU external border management and mitigation of illegal migration;

L. whereas European security is linked to stability on the African continent, and the growing presence of non-European actors is testament to the lack of sufficient security and diplomatic engagement in the region to effectively counter the challenges and protect its strategic interests;

M. whereas the Black Sea has shifted from a secondary to a primary military theatre for the EU and NATO, and, alongside the Baltic Sea, has become a pivotal strategic region for European security in countering the Russian threat;

N. whereas the Arctic region is becoming increasingly important in terms of economic development and transport, while at the same time facing challenges linked to climate change and militarisation, as well as those resulting from increasing geopolitical competition and migration;

O. whereas China, driven by the ambition to become a global superpower, is eroding the rules-based international order by increasingly pursuing assertive foreign and hostile economic and competition policies and exporting dual-use goods deployed by Russia on the battlefield against Ukraine, thereby threatening European security and interests; whereas China is also investing tremendously in its armed forces, using its economic power to quash criticism worldwide, and is striving to assert itself as the dominant power in the Indo-Pacific region; whereas China, by intensifying its confrontational, aggressive and intimidating actions against some of its neighbours, particularly in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, poses a risk to regional and global security as well as to the EU’s economic interests; whereas China has promoted an alternative narrative for many years, challenging human rights, democratic values and open markets in multilateral and international forums; whereas China’s increasing influence in international organisations has impeded positive progress and further excluded Taiwan from rightful and meaningful participation in these organisations;

P. whereas in 2023, Parliament and the Council concluded agreements on the European defence industry reinforcement through common procurement act (EDIRPA) and the Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP), which, as short-term and emergency measures, aim to encourage the joint procurement of defence products, ramp up the European defence industry’s production capacity, and replenish depleted stocks;

Q. whereas in 2024, the Commission proposed the establishment of a European defence industrial strategy (EDIS) and a European defence industry programme (EDIP), addressing, in particular, the improvement of EU defence capabilities and the governance, security of supply and integration of the Ukrainian defence technological and industrial base (DTIB) into its EU counterpart, the EDTIB;

R. whereas building defence capabilities and adapting them to military needs requires a common strategic culture and shared threat perception and assessment, as well as the development of solutions to be combined in doctrine and concepts;

S. whereas in the light of the above challenges and analyses, the President of the European Commission tasked the Commissioner for Defence and Space and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy with drafting a white paper on the future of European defence, which is due to be published on 19 March 2025;

1. Believes that the white paper on the future of European defence must put forward concrete measures and options to the members of the European Council so that truly groundbreaking and much needed efforts can be made, in the shortest possible time frames, which must address the following pressing needs: to urgently and substantially increase defence capabilities, overcome fragmentation in the European defence industry market, enhance the capacity of the EDTIB, promptly identify and implement pragmatic solutions for the considerable funding needs, deepen EU-NATO cooperation through a robust European pillar in NATO, and ensure an increase in our military support to Ukraine and other neighbouring countries that share our European values;

2. Calls on Council President António Costa to immediately convene the European Council, based on the conclusions of the white paper, so that EU leaders can agree on immediate and far-reaching decisions to implement the European Defence Union as laid out in Article 42(2) TEU and elaborate on the measures identified in the white paper; urges both the Council and the Commission to identify clear and concrete priorities for the short, medium and long term, with a corresponding timeline of actions;

3. Reiterates its previous calls to take seriously the direct and indirect threat of a Russian attack against the EU and to prepare urgently, without any further delay, to do the utmost to improve European military capacities in order to ensure that Europe is ready for the most extreme military contingencies; calls therefore for the threat analysis of the EU’s Strategic Compass to be updated and upgraded to a threat assessment and for the measures within the compass to be adapted accordingly, in order to reflect the threat magnitude in our threat environment;

4. Strongly believes that Europeans must take on greater responsibility within NATO, especially when it comes to ensuring security on the European continent, and hence underlines that a strong and robust European pillar in NATO is the best way to foster our transatlantic security and ensure the security of all Europeans; recalls that a true transatlantic partnership means shared responsibility, joint efforts and equal burden-sharing;

5. Stresses the importance of learning from Ukraine’s experience in countering Russian aggression and calls for immediate measures to enhance the security and defence of the EU’s north-eastern border with Russia and Belarus by establishing a comprehensive and resilient defence line across land, air and maritime domains to counter military and hybrid threats; emphasises the need to coordinate and integrate national efforts through EU regulatory and financial instruments to accelerate implementation;

6. Stresses that Europe continues to stand firmly on the side of Ukraine as it courageously fights for our European way of life, and recalls its conviction that it is on the Ukrainian battlefields that the future of Europe will be decided; reiterates thus that the EU will support Ukraine for as long as it takes for Ukraine to win this war, as a forced surrender by Ukraine and acceptance of a ‘peace’ treaty on Putin’s terms could accelerate the timeline for Russia to shift its aggression toward the EU or NATO; urges the EU, accordingly, to develop a ‘Ukraine strategy’, outlining clear objectives for the support of Ukraine’s defence capabilities and the integration of the Ukrainian DTIB into the EDTIB, and to find the necessary resources to implement such a strategy, while supporting European defence industry activities in Ukraine in order to ramp up local production and enhance cooperation between Ukrainian and EU defence companies; underscores that such a Ukraine strategy must be an integral part of a ‘European defence’ strategy; calls on the EU Member States to commit at least 0.25 % of their GDP to military aid for Ukraine;

7. Emphasises the need for a holistic approach to European security, ensuring that all EU policies incorporate defence and security dimensions, supported by both regulatory and financial instruments;

8. Believes that the EU should develop economic cooperation contingency plans to prepare for mutual support in the event of large-scale security crises, and should deepen economic and defence industrial dialogues in relation to early warnings of hard, hybrid and cyberthreats, in order to foster mutual support planning, protection of critical infrastructure, maritime and underwater safety, and other forms of deeper defence industrial cooperation; calls, in cooperation with NATO, for an enhanced response to Russia’s hybrid war that aims at destabilising not only Ukraine but the whole European continent;

Addressing capability gaps

9. Underlines the need to urgently address the gaps in military equipment and ammunition by building on the success of the EDIRPA and ASAP programmes and to swiftly finalise EDIP so that, through common procurement, our common European and Ukrainian capabilities are increased and our stocks of crucial defence equipment and ammunition are replenished; welcomes EDIP’s potential to improve the defence capabilities of the EU and its Member States, to strengthen security of supply and to improve the effectiveness and coherence of EU efforts through new governance structures; stresses that EDIP’s financial envelope will fall well short of meeting the ambitions laid out in EDIP and calls, therefore, for additional funding sources to be identified immediately and to include exploring the possibility of reallocations within the current multiannual financial framework (MFF), notably with regard to European defence projects of common interest and to the Ukraine support instrument that currently lacks any funding; stresses, with regard to the threat assessment of a possible Russian attack on EU and NATO territory within the next few years, the urgent need for EDIP to be implemented swiftly and for additional and substantial funding to be provided for joint European defence efforts before the next MFF;

10. Calls for the need for a significant increase in availability of strategic enablers in the air, maritime, underwater, space and cyber domains to be addressed without delay;

11. Suggests that successful Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and European Defence Fund (EDF) projects be prioritised along the lines of known capability gaps and that sufficient funding be ensured for projects that have proven to deliver; calls for the closure of PESCO projects that do not deliver results and/or do not provide added value in the closing of capability gaps and/or European defence readiness; stresses, in the light of the limited financial envelope of the EDF, that duplicated efforts, especially in crucial capability areas such as the hypersonic interceptor or future main battle tank systems, waste EU tax payers’ money, will prolong development efforts and thus increase the probability of procurement of such capabilities from the US, thus undermining the ambition laid out in EDIS;

12. Calls for the architecture of the EU Defence Industrial Toolbox to be rationalised, as more financial resources alone will not ensure success, since it is even more important that these resources are spent in a more efficient and effective manner;

13. Underlines the need to ensure coherence of output between the EU’s Capability Development Plan (CDP) and Coordinated Annual Review on Defence and the NATO capability targets, without delay, to foster complementarity and to prevent dysfunctional duplications; calls for a concrete action plan to be drawn up, including a clear timeline for each priority in line with both the CDP and the NATO Defence Planning Process;

14. Welcomes the proposal for European defence projects of common interest on the development of common capabilities which go beyond the financial means of an individual Member State, such as a European air shield, autonomous space access and space surveillance, transport and communication capabilities, sovereign digital infrastructures, sovereign cloud infrastructure, long-range precision strike capabilities and integrated air defence, as well as complex maritime and underwater protective assets; stresses that the EU’s efforts in missile defence need to be aligned and integrated with NATO support for the European Sky Shield Initiative, driven by EU Member States; stresses the need to ensure adequate funding, to be established well before 2028, in order to deliver results with regard to the threat analyses of a possible Russian attack against EU and NATO territory within the next few years;

15. Calls for the establishment of EU-specific rapid response strategies for underwater infrastructure protection operating in alignment with NATO while maintaining EU autonomy; encourages investment in advanced detection and surveillance systems for underwater infrastructure monitoring;

16. Calls for the EU to further accelerate the implementation of military mobility; believes that the EU has to move from ‘mobility’ to ‘military logistics’; stresses the need for significant investment in military mobility infrastructure to enhance cargo airlift capabilities, camps, fuel infrastructure through depots, ports, air, sea and rail transport platforms, railway lines, waterways, roads, bridges and logistic hubs; stresses that this must be done in cooperation with NATO by drafting a strategic plan for developing mobility;

17. Underlines the need to quickly agree on additional common European military forces, given that the Rapid Deployment Capacity (RDC) designed as a crisis management instrument provides only a limited European capability to react and support NATO efforts in the event of Russian aggression against EU and NATO territory; recommends, therefore, that the Helsinki Headline Goal of 1999 be revived and that the RDC be gradually extended to ultimately establish a European corps of 60 000 troops, which should be part of a permanent EU structure while being integrated into NATO’s force model;

18. Recommends the establishment of a security of supply regime, including joint strategic stocks of raw materials and critical parts, to ensure the availability of raw materials and components needed for the production of defence products, and to allow production cycles to be ramped up faster and shortened;

Fostering the EU’s defence technological and industrial base (EDTIB)

19. Calls for a significant increase in common procurement by EU Member States of required European defence equipment and capabilities; calls on the Member States to aggregate demand by procuring defence equipment jointly, with the possibility of granting the Commission a mandate to procure on their behalf, ideally ensuring a long-term planning horizon for the EDTIB, thus improving the EDTIB’s production capacities and the interoperability of the European armed forces, and making efficient use of taxpayers’ money through economies of scale;

20. Underlines the outstanding success of the EU’s first joint procurement instrument, EDIRPA, by incentivising joint procurement by Member States; believes that there is a need to continue mechanisms similar to EDIRPA and ASAP while increasing the share of funding for joint procurements compared to support measures for research and development;

21. Believes that the development of the EU’s joint capability should be based on risk analysis provided in threat assessments and on the impact of projects on mitigating the EU’s joint security risks;

22. Believes that it is necessary to conduct systematic analyses of lessons learned from the war in Ukraine from a technology usage perspective, and analyses of the necessity of EU and NATO standards in comparison to how they affect the cost of technology and products compared to their usage effectiveness;

23. Stresses that EDIP must actively facilitate the participation of small and medium-sized enterprises and new market entrants through simplified access to funding, reduced regulatory barriers, and dedicated support mechanisms for scaling up operations; emphasises that EDIP should be designed as a stepping stone towards greater European sovereignty in defence production;

24. Highlights the need to support the development of pan-European value chains in EU defence cooperation by involving companies throughout the EU in the production of defence equipment and by distributing production facilities throughout the EU in order to improve security of supply, increase attractiveness of EU defence cooperation and, above all, enhance the resilience of the supply network, thus reducing our vulnerability in the event of an armed attack;

25. Calls for the review and adaptation of current and future legislation with regard to negative effects on the EDTIB, especially concerning production capacities and security of supply; calls for an extended mapping, in cooperation with the EDTIB, to identify all horizontal hindrances in the current legislation; calls for a detailed action plan to be developed to resolve the issues as soon as possible; underlines the need to review, simplify and harmonise the current framework for export licences and intra-EU transfer licences, as well as for cross-certification of equipment, as one of the priorities to foster better cooperation within the market and among Member States;

26. Strongly underlines the need to significantly increase our investment in emerging and disruptive technologies and structures in defence, taking care not to disperse our resources across too many projects, including cyber defence, outer space, complex underwater protective assets, novel materials and manufacturing, artificial intelligence, quantum computing, cloud computing and sovereign cloud infrastructure, high-performance computing, the internet of things, robotics, biotechnology and nanotechnology;

27. Calls on the Commission to leverage the full dual-use potential of space technologies, considering space as both a new operating domain and a critical enabler of multi-domain operations; underlines that the EU currently has a substantial gap in space capabilities compared to its main competitors and stresses that, in order to address this gap in space technologies, already existing flagship projects (i.e. Copernicus and Galileo) should be enhanced for defence applications; suggests, furthermore, that the EU should urgently pursue the development of its IRIS2 constellation, together with the development of further EU common projects, for example, for space domain awareness and space-based missile early-warning applications;

28. Recalls the increasing threats of cyber warfare and underlines the need for the EU to establish an EU cyber defence coordination centre to monitor, detect and respond to cyberthreats in real time;

29. Highlights the importance of the involvement of other industrial actors that do not undertake defence-related activities as potential partners in scaling up production when necessary;

30. Calls for the EU to foster stronger collaboration between our armed forces, academia, industries and investors;

Ensuring pragmatic sources of finance

31. Calls on the Commission to bring forward a legislative proposal containing a binding commitment for Member States to reach a minimum threshold of 3 % of their GDP on defence expenditure by 2026, with the need to further increase it to 4 % by 2028 and to commit at least 0.5 % of their GDP to EU common defence; stresses that, in the light of three decades of underinvestment, the current threat to the EU requires much higher defence investment, while underlining that the EU budget can only complement but can never replace the efforts of the Member States in that regard; emphasises that national defence investment by Member States will continue to serve as the backbone of defence readiness, while EU funding and its role in harmonising and streamlining the processes may have an important impact in enhancing and multiplying these efforts; calls for the EU and its Member States to work and agree on specific ways and means to achieve a short- to long-term substantial increase in public and private investment in defence and security on the national and European levels;

32. Welcomes the Commission’s announcement on the ReArm Europe Plan;

33. Welcomes the Commission’s proposal to activate the national escape clause of the Stability and Growth Pact;

34. Welcomes the Commission’s proposal for a new instrument providing EUR 150 billion in loans to Member States for joint defence investment;

35. Welcomes the Commission’s announcement of its plans to direct more funds towards defence-related investment, including making it possible for cohesion policy programmes to be used;

36. Calls for a system of European defence bonds to be explored for financing large-scale military investments up front, ensuring urgent capability development; calls for clear allocation criteria prioritising joint capability development, research and innovation, and military mobility infrastructure; calls, along the same lines, for the use of unused ‘coronabonds’ for defence instruments to be explored;

37. Underlines the role of public-private partnerships which are essential to finance defence investment; proposes, therefore, a dedicated EU instrument incentivising private investment in defence following the example of InvestEU;

38. Welcomes the Commission’s announcement of its plans to take action to mobilise private capital through an acceleration of the Savings and Investment Union and through the EIB; calls for an urgent revision of the EIB’s lending policy and immediate flexibility to remove current restrictions on financing ammunition, weapons and equipment or infrastructure dedicated to military use; stresses that this fundamental reform is necessary to unlock significant investment potential for the European defence sector, and to foster risk-sharing instruments to facilitate commercial bank lending to the sector; urges the EIB to take the necessary steps to facilitate private investment in defence, ensuring that the financial landscape supports the growing needs of the industry;

39. Demands a review of past and new legislation and taxonomy to ensure that they are best suited to advance our European defence industry;

40. Believes that environmental, social and governance criteria and taxonomy rules and their interpretation by rating agencies are an obstacle to ensuring increased public finance for defence and hence calls on the Commission to address this issue by, among other things, adapting the regulation on sustainability‐related disclosures in the financial services sector [10] with a view to explicitly ruling out a classification of the defence industry as sustainably or socially harmful;

Supporting innovation

41. Calls for the establishment of an EU agency, inspired by the US’s Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, as part of the European Defence Agency, which should be solely responsible for supporting research in emerging and disruptive technologies, equipped with an adequate amount of venture capital; emphasises the need for expanded research and development funding to ensure participation by all Member States through the creation of specialised ‘hubs’;

42. Believes in the need to increase the funding for academic research programmes to cooperate with the defence industry to ensure long-term in-depth research in defence;

Finalising the common market for defence

43. Urges Member States to stop invoking Article 346 TFEU as a means of avoiding the application of the Procurement Directive [11], thus undermining the common market for defence; calls on the Commission to close this loophole by immediately launching a review of this directive, as well as of the Intra-Community Transfer Directive [12], which is scheduled for the second half of 2025, and to recast both regulations as soon as possible with a view to strengthening the common market for defence, as well as to introducing flexibility with regard to crisis situations like those we are currently facing;

44. Calls for the transformation of NATO standards into EU legislation in order to facilitate the interoperability of European armed forces while strengthening our capacity to negotiate these standards within NATO and to enforce the consistent implementation of these standard in practice;

45. Presses for a common European certification scheme for weapons systems and a move beyond the current system of national certification in order to speed up the introduction of weapons systems into the armed forces of Member States;

Fostering effective governance

46. Deplores the lack of cohesion and effectiveness of EU defence structures and instruments resulting from the loose institutional connection between the Council and the Commission, which not only significantly limits the added value and the effectiveness of cooperation in the EU framework but also results in the ineffective use of taxpayers’ money;

47. Calls for the creation of a permanent Council of EU defence ministers;

48. Suggests that the Commissioner for Defence and Space should become the head of the European Defence Agency and should also be nominated as the coordinator for PESCO projects by recasting the respective Council decisions;

49. Encourages the creation of a ‘defence readiness board’ as proposed in EDIP, led by the Defence Commissioner, which should meet frequently in different configurations, for example, EU defence ministers, national procurement directors and industry representatives;

50. Believes that the Defence Commissioner should exercise supervision over the EU Military Committee, the EU Military Staff and military operations;

51. Suggests that the funding for PESCO and the European Defence Agency be transferred into the common EU budget;

52. Highlights the need for enhanced and effective parliamentary scrutiny in the area of defence, given its importance and the effects on other areas of increasing investment in defence; calls, therefore, for the establishment of an interinstitutional agreement ensuring Parliament’s access to classified information and the provision of physical infrastructure to that end, allowing for committee meetings to be conducted under the classification of EU restricted, or an even higher security classification;

Fostering EU-NATO complementarity

53. Calls for a true strategic partnership between the EU and NATO, in full respect of the agreed guiding principles of cooperation, as well as the decision-making autonomy of both organisations, and underlines that only together can we ensure our security and long-term prosperity;

54. Underlines the need for an agreement on the exchange of classified information between the EU and NATO;

55. Calls for the establishment of a regular joint armament conference between the EU and NATO in order to coordinate and align efforts with regard to capability development;

56. Recalls the need to ensure frequent EU-NATO meetings and summits on political and experts levels, in an inclusive, non-discriminatory and reciprocal manner;

57. Calls for the EU to reinforce the Structured Dialogue with NATO on the defence industry in order to enhance cooperation in key areas such as interoperability and standardisation;

Fostering cooperation with non-EU partners

58. Recalls that there is no alternative to strong and sustainable transatlantic cooperation and thus believes that every effort must be made to foster transatlantic cooperation in every field of the military and defence sectors, while recalling the need to foster European defence and develop our sovereignty;

59. Underlines the need to enhance our partnership with like-minded countries, particularly those in Europe, such as the UK and Norway; calls for an EU-UK broad security pact, also covering key subjects such as energy, migration and critical minerals; points to the added value of fostering our relationships with global partners such as the US, Japan and Australia;

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60. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the parliaments and governments of the EU Member States and NATO member countries.

MIL OSI Europe News –

March 7, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the white paper on the future of European defence – B10-0150/2025

Source: European Parliament

B10‑0150/2025

European Parliament resolution on the white paper on the future of European defence

(2025/2565(RSP))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas the EU is currently under attack, with hybrid incidents inside its borders, a large-scale war in its neighbourhood, and a realignment of global powers, all presenting real risks to the security of the EU and its citizens and requiring immediate, ambitious and decisive action;

B. whereas the Commissioner for Defence and Space and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy are expected to present a white paper on the future of European defence on 19 March 2025, which should serve as a roadmap for such action;

1. Urges the EU to act immediately to ensure its ability to protect its citizens, deter its enemies, support its allies and become a powerful defender of the rules-based international order and the principles of the European security architecture; urges the EU and its Member States to define a coherent, comprehensive and actionable strategy to achieve this; expects the Commission to present a proposal for such a strategy in its white paper on the future of European defence;

2. Is firmly convinced that a united EU can overcome all the challenges it faces and become a global power for peace, security, human rights and sustainable development, but that this requires a strong EU budget or additional European financial instruments, a reliable and sovereign industrial basis, a full spectrum of European military capabilities, including strategic enablers, and an integrated command allowing all national forces to act under a unified structure at the service of the EU, alone or in complementarity with other allied forces;

3. Believes that the strategy must include a renewed threat assessment, reflecting the recent unprecedented changes in the EU’s geopolitical context, a plan for supporting Ukraine against Russia’s war of aggression, as a key action to defend the EU’s values and protect its citizens and territory, a roadmap to close the capability gap, restore deterrence and enable autonomous EU action, and a plan to finance such vital transformations in the EU’s capacity to act;

4. Stresses its firm commitment to continued close cooperation with NATO to reinforce deterrence, collective defence and interoperability; calls nonetheless for the development of a fully-capable European Pillar of NATO able to act autonomously whenever necessary;

Assessing our threats and challenges

5. Is convinced that the EU needs to define its foreign policy goals and strategic defence doctrine, identifying the most pressing challenges, systemic threats and rival actors, and to shape its defence strategy accordingly;

6. Strongly believes that Europe is today facing the most profound military threat to its territorial integrity since the Second World War; believes that Russia and its allies are currently the most significant threat to our security and that of EU candidate countries and partners, and reiterates its condemnation in the strongest terms of Russia’s unprovoked, illegal and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine; notes, however, that the instability in our southern neighbourhood, the rise in Chinese military power, the increased aggressiveness of some middle powers and the behaviour of the Trump administration, which appears ready to jeopardise transatlantic cooperation on common security and make a deal with the Russian aggressor at the expense of Ukrainian and European security, which are one and the same, must also be fully taken into consideration;

7. Highlights the fact that on assessments by several European intelligence services, Russia will be ready to attack EU territory within 3 to 10 years, particularly if there is a ceasefire in its aggression against Ukraine that does not lead to a just and lasting peace; notes with deep concern that the Russian armed forces have grown in size and gained valuable battlefield experience, unlike any European forces with the exception of those of Ukraine, aims to have a 1.5 million-strong military by 2026 and has significantly ramped up its armaments production, making it an extremely worrisome threat for the EU’s security and for peace in Europe and globally;

8. Strongly condemns Russia’s escalating hybrid warfare tactics within the EU and its neighbourhood, which encompass both non-physical and physical actions, including attacks on critical infrastructure and disruption of elections; highlights that Russia’s strategic doctrine includes significant conventional conflict in its conception and execution of hybrid war and conceives hybrid wars as the main line of future military development, rather than a temporary phenomenon; calls for the EU to immediately and significantly step up its ability to defend, attribute and punish hybrid warfare waged within its territory and that of candidate countries;

9. Condemns all countries that are providing military equipment, financial support or any other form of assistance to Russia, thereby enabling and intensifying its ongoing aggression; warns of the very serious risks resulting from a widening of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine; is deeply concerned that the involvement of Iran and North Korea will provide them with important lessons to modernise their military capabilities, and may accelerate their paths towards nuclearisation;

10. Reaffirms its grave concerns about China’s increasing military investments and capabilities; expresses serious concerns about the renewed Chinese and Russian commitment to further strengthen their military ties and condemns China’s supplying of components and equipment to Moscow’s military industry;

11. Notes with concern the increase in both intra and inter-state conflicts in the EU’s wider neighbourhood, in part driven by the hegemonic ambitions of several middle powers, the presence of aggressive non-state actors and by the fragility of several states; also notes that this leads to clear threats to the EU’s security, namely by fostering terrorism and increasing the destabilisation of populations, often forcing their displacement;

12. Is deeply concerned by the recent actions of the Trump administration, which distance it from the values that have been at the core of its relationship with the EU, namely democracy, the rule of law, freedom of speech and support for the rules-based international order; regrets, in this regard, the votes of the US Government, aligned with the Russian Government, in the UN General Assembly and the UN Security Council on resolutions about the third anniversary of Russia’s war of aggression, as well as the unilateral decision to end Russia’s international isolation and to propose a normalisation of relations between them; strongly condemns any attempt to blame Ukraine, the victim, for the actions of the aggressor, Russia; urges the US Government to maintain maximum pressure on Russia until the latter agrees to a just and lasting peace for Ukraine; rejects any attempt by the US Government to impose a new security architecture on the EU and its Member States, and reiterates that any negotiation of such a security architecture must take place with the EU at the table; is deeply concerned by the actions of the US Government towards NATO and the doubts raised regarding the United States’ commitment to the security of the European continent; supports the peace process for Ukraine launched by European leaders, together with Ukraine, on 2 March 2025 in London, which seeks a just and lasting peace for Ukraine, and must be based on full respect for Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, the principles of international law, accountability for Russia’s war crimes and crime of aggression, Russian payments for the massive damage caused in Ukraine and credible security guarantees for Ukraine;

13. Concurs with the assessment of the Strategic Compass that the EU is surrounded by instability and conflicts, but notes that in the meantime the situation has changed dramatically; believes that, altogether, these developments produce an encirclement of Europe that reduces its scope for the pursuit of democratically defined and autonomous interests and values, and that this requires an immediate response; recognises the evolving nature of global security threats and therefore calls for the EU to conduct more frequent threat assessments, as they are the precondition for a realistic and successful planning of capabilities and operations;

Supporting Ukraine

14. Urges the EU and its Member States, together with international partners and NATO allies, to immediately increase their military support to Ukraine in order to assist it in exercising its legitimate right to self-defence against the Russian war of aggression according to Article 51 of the UN Charter; calls, in this regard, for the swift adoption of the next military aid package, which should be the largest to date and reflect the level of ambition this juncture calls for; calls on the Member States, international partners and NATO allies to lift all restrictions on the use of Western weapons systems delivered to Ukraine against military targets in Russian territory; calls for a significant increase in the financing of military support to Ukraine; calls on the Member States, together with their G7 partners, to immediately seize all frozen Russian assets in order to maintain and step up the EU’s response to Ukraine’s military needs;

15. Urges the Member States to immediately engage in joint procurement of additional capabilities, in particular ammunition for air defence and artillery, as well as any capabilities in which US assistance has played a key role thus far; further urges them to plan in advance for a possible sudden stop in US military assistance;

16. Welcomes the continued support for the Ukrainian Armed Forces through the EU Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine, which has already trained more than 60 000 Ukrainian troops, and calls on the mission to continue training as many troops as possible; stresses the importance of specific training modules aimed at developing the capacities of existing and future officers of the Ukrainian Armed Forces across all levels and in accordance with their needs; emphasises that the mission should also act as a platform for the exchange of best practices that would ensure that European forces also benefit from the lessons learnt on the battlefield by the Ukrainian Armed Forces; calls on the Member States to further expand training operations for the Ukrainian Armed Forces, including training operations in Ukrainian territory;

17. Insists on the paramount importance of cooperation with, and the integration of, the Ukrainian defence industry into the EU’s defence technological and industrial base (EDTIB), which offers clear advantages for both sides, and calls for speedier integration of the Ukrainian defence industry; recalls the importance of the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP) to that effect, and highlights the urgency of properly financing EDIP’s Ukraine Support Instrument, which is currently not budgeted; calls on the Commission to include Ukraine and its defence industry in all its defence industrial programmes;

18. Praises the ‘Danish Model’ for support to Ukraine, which consists of procuring defence capabilities produced directly in Ukraine; urges the EU and its Member States to strongly support this model and to make full use of its potential, as there is an underutilisation of Ukraine’s defence industrial capacity, estimated at around 50 %, and it brings many advantages to both sides, such as cheaper equipment, speedier and safer logistics as well as greater ease of training and maintenance;

19. Calls for the EU and its Member States to actively work towards maintaining and achieving the broadest possible international support for Ukraine and identifying a peaceful solution to the war that must be based on full respect for Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, the principles of international law, accountability for Russia’s war crimes and the crime of aggression, and Russian payments for the massive damage caused in Ukraine; urges the EU and its Member States to participate in establishing robust future security guarantees for Ukraine;

Closing the capabilities gap and restoring deterrence

20. Strongly believes that strengthening Europe’s security and defence requires not just a simple increase in ambition and action, but a complete overhaul of the way we act and invest in our security and defence, such that from now on we plan, innovate, develop, purchase, maintain and deploy capabilities together, in a coordinated and integrated fashion, while making full use of the complementary competences of all actors in Europe, including NATO;

21. Calls on the Commission to come up with a complete programme for defence, including against hybrid attacks, ensuring that planning, research, development, procurement and management of capabilities are all done through a European lens, and that all EU funds are used as a stimulus to joint EU action, instead of perpetuating the present state of market fragmentation, divergent and incompatible capabilities, and superfluous and wasteful investments; considers EDIP to be a good step forward and as such calls for its swift adoption;

22. Recognises that the starting point must be a realistic assessment of the current capabilities and capability gap; calls on the Commission, with the support of the European Defence Agency and in cooperation with NATO, to identify critical defence capability gaps and shortfalls in the EU, in particular for strategic enablers, where the Member States have fallen behind and become dependent on non-European allies; furthermore, calls on the Commission to transform the capability gaps into clear industrial targets that can be the object of planning and programming and benefit from an industrial policy;

23. Declares the EDTIB to be a strategic asset of the EU, and as such considers that the Commission should be tasked with its mapping and monitoring, so as to safeguard the EU’s strengths, reduce its vulnerabilities, avoid crises, and provide it with an effective and efficient industrial policy; calls on the Commission to draw on the EU Military Committee’s expertise in the definition of defence industries’ priorities and the formulation of defence initiatives in order to ensure alignment between industrial capabilities and military needs; recalls the importance of ensuring that the EDTIB is present in all Member States, distributing the burden and the benefits equitably, and preventing its disruption by a targeted attack on a particular area;

24. Strongly believes that EU support for the production and procurement of defence products should focus on stimulating the EDTIB, increasing production volumes and ensuring the development of native European solutions for key capabilities, in particular for domains of action where we have so far relied on support from allies, and thus be oriented towards EU-based companies; rejects a scenario in which EU funds contribute to perpetuating or deepening dependences on non-European actors, whether for production of capabilities or their deployment; notes with concern that the vast majority of EU defence investment is diverted to defence industry players outside the EU; highlights that our investments should also contribute to bringing our European allies closer together, first and foremost Ukraine, but also Norway and the UK, finding synergies between complementary industrial strengths and bolstering the interoperability of our fighting forces; states, however, that joining common projects in defence and security requires a steadfast commitment to the EU’s values and norms and demands that any industrial partnerships with non-EU allies include strong safeguards on technology transfer and design authority, ensuring that we do not face restrictions on the use of the capabilities acquired; highlights that EU funds will provide opportunities for the defence industry, but also require a commitment to give priority to orders linked to ensuring European security and defence, in particular in times of crisis;

25. Urges the Member States to radically change the way they procure defence products, choosing common procurement by default, and to consider tasking the Commission with undertaking joint procurement on their behalf; considers that all products procured in the EU, particularly those supported by EU funds, must respect strong safeguards on technology transfer and design authority;

26. Welcomes all measures that allow a faster and more effective ramp-up of production of defence products in Europe, in particular those that are most needed for a land war; calls for a change in paradigm from a ‘flow’ approach to a ‘stock’ approach, with stock piles of materiel ready for a sustained increase in demand; notes, in this regard, the advantages offered by mechanisms such as advance purchase agreements, the establishment of ‘ever-warm’ facilities and the creation of defence readiness pools; calls on the Commission to support the Member States in developing wartime economic cooperation contingency plans with close partners to prepare for mutual support in the case of large-scale security crises involving them directly, and to deepen wartime economic dialogues with European and global partners;

27. Highlights that the EDTIB cannot thrive without a true single market for defence; emphasises, in this regard, the need for an effective regulatory framework aimed at encouraging innovation and cross-border cooperation in production, procurement and investment; insists on the need to remove barriers to market entry for defence products across the EU and calls on the Commission to act upon the results of the reviews of the Directives on the transfer of defence-related products [1] and defence procurement [2], considering the obstacles and costs imposed by the current fragmented framework for certification of defence products; calls on the Commission to propose a regulation for common rules on the certification of defence products and the creation of a European defence certification authority; underlines at the same time the importance of maintaining fruitful competition between different undertakings in the single market for defence; calls on the Commission to propose a regulation on the standardisation of defence products with binding industrial standards, taking advantage of the lessons learnt from the implementation of NATO defence standards;

28. Stresses the need for greater transparency and convergence at the national and European levels on arms exports; points out the need for the Member States to respect the EU Common Position on Arms Exports, while acknowledging their competences in their defence acquisition policies;

29. Underlines the importance of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) in improving and harmonising the EU’s defence capabilities; reiterates its regret that Member States continue to not make full use of the PESCO framework; reiterates its call on the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Member States, and with the involvement of the Commission, to assess projects and their potential regularly and comprehensively with a view to streamlining the current set of projects to a small set of priority projects; believes that priority projects must focus on reducing our dependencies regarding strategic enablers, such as battlefield command and control (C2), aerial and satellite intelligence, surveillance and recognition, satellite communication, air defence and suppression of enemy air defences, military mobility, strategic and tactical air transport and aerial refuelling, missile and deep strike capabilities, drone and anti-drone technologies, combat engineering and wet-gap crossing, and airborne electronic attack; believes that these could be European Defence Projects of Common Interest (EDPCI); regrets that Parliament is not in a position to properly scrutinise PESCO projects and calls for a change of paradigm for the governance of EDPCIs, such that Parliament is adequately involved; reiterates its call on the Member States to provide an implementation report on PESCO projects to Parliament at least twice a year;

30. Calls on the Commission to propose an EU drones package, focusing on drone and anti-drone systems and auxiliary capabilities, containing plans and funds to stimulate research and development, which should learn from the Ukrainian experience and be open to the participation of Ukraine’s highly innovative companies, as well as an industrial programme dedicated to the joint development, production and procurement of drones and anti-drone systems, and a regulation on the use of drones in civilian and military contexts;

31. Calls on the Commission to step up the ambition of the European Defence Fund, both quantitatively and qualitatively, and to better align its work programme with the capability planning exercises; recalls that the EU’s investment in defence research and innovation is much lower than that of its industrial competitors; considers that part of the investment from the European Defence Fund (EDF) should be designed to foster partnerships between academia, ministries of defence and the defence industry, and to the creation of dedicated research centres for defence; highlights the importance of promoting the participation of the most innovative high-tech companies from the civilian sector in the EDF;

32. Recalls that the EDTIB is currently facing a shortage of skilled workers, and calls on the Commission and the Member States to develop a strategy to train, upskill and reskill workers; considers that funding from defence programmes must be paired with requirements regarding benefits for workers and communities where the investments are located, making the European defence industry a source of high-quality jobs and earning the EDTIB broad support from the population;

33. Calls for the EU and its Member States to quickly improve the state of military mobility and logistics, removing all unnecessary obstacles that slow down the speed at which the EU can react to threats and deploy its forces;

34. Calls for the EU to develop a comprehensive set of instruments to detect, prevent and react to hybrid attacks and threats and protect the Union’s citizens and assets, including critical infrastructure, but also democratic institutions and processes; reiterates its call on the Member States, the European External Action Service and the Commission to consider the creation of a well-resourced and independent structure tasked with identifying, analysing and documenting foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) threats against the EU as a whole to increase situational awareness and threat intelligence sharing, and develop attribution capabilities and countermeasures in relation to FIMI;

35. Stresses the importance of enhanced intelligence sharing and information exchange among the Member States and EU institutions, including Parliament, to improve situational awareness and to be able to better anticipate and counter threats to collective security and define common lines of action under the common security and defence policy (CSDP), particularly in the area of crisis management; calls on the Member States to use the EU Intelligence Analysis Centre (EU INTCEN) as an effective intelligence-sharing body to share intelligence securely, formulate a common strategic culture and provide strategic information to better anticipate and respond to crises within and outside the EU; reiterates its call for the deployment of intelligence-gathering capacities in all CSDP missions and operations, which would provide information to the EU INTCEN, EU military staff, the EU’s Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) and the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability;

36. Welcomes the Niinistö report and its recommendations for strengthening Europe’s civilian and military preparedness and resilience; supports the adoption of a whole-of-society approach to resilience, involving the active engagement of the EU institutions, the Member States, civil society and individual citizens in strengthening the Union’s security framework; urges the EU to increase the alignment of existing EU instruments and policies, as well as that between EU and national policies, pioneering a ‘preparedness in all policies’ approach to security and defence, ensuring they do not generate contradictory obligations or jeopardise overall defence objectives, especially during a security crisis; expects the upcoming EU strategy on preparedness to offer details of the implementation of the report;

Enabling autonomous EU action

37. Recalls that the Strategic Compass provides the EU and its Member States with a framework for strengthening the EU’s security and defence and for advancing towards a common forward-looking strategic culture; reiterates that the Strategic Compass’s ambitious aims and milestones can only be achieved with the corresponding political will, adequate financial contributions and openness to cooperation where necessary; calls for the Member States to take all the necessary steps and decisions and fully implement the Strategic Compass; reiterates its call to strengthen the EU-s MPCC, establishing it as the preferred command and control structure for EU military operations and providing it with adequate premises, staff, enhanced command and control, and effective communication and information systems for all CSDP missions and operations, including those of the Rapid Deployment Capacity; insists that the Rapid Deployment Capacity must achieve full operational capability in the first half of 2025 at the latest, with at least 5 000 troops; calls on the Member States to urgently pursue a more ambitious pace and scale of command integration and joint operational capability, with the goal of enabling the EU to conduct large-scale operations independently, without reliance on non-EU countries for any capability, including strategic enablers; stresses that the EU and its Member States cannot develop consistent foreign and defence policies without strong support for democratic and agile structures and decision-making processes; underlines that further institutional discussions on removing the unanimity requirement to enhance cooperation should be explored;

38. Underlines that in the current geopolitical context, the need for continuing to operationalise Article 42(7) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) on mutual assistance, ensuring solidarity among Member States, especially those whose geographical position leaves them directly exposed to imminent threats and challenges, regardless of whether or not they are NATO members, is of utmost importance; calls on the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to present concrete steps towards developing a true EU solidarity policy, including by clarifying the practical arrangements in the event of a Member State triggering Article 42(7) TEU;

39. Notes that EU candidate countries are frequently the target of destabilisation campaigns, and thus calls for the EU to ensure them greater support, in order to preserve stability and security and increase defence cooperation, especially in the fight against disinformation and hybrid warfare; is concerned that otherwise it will act as an invitation to Russia to invade them before they finally join the EU;

40. Reiterates the importance of EU-NATO cooperation, as NATO remains, for those states that are members of it, an important pillar of their collective defence, such that EU-NATO cooperation should continue, in particular in areas such as information exchange, planning, military mobility and exchange of best practices; highlights that all EU-NATO cooperation must be mutually beneficial and inclusive and respect the EU’s capacity to act autonomously; remains concerned, in this respect, that Türkiye, a NATO member and EU candidate country, excludes Cyprus from cooperation with NATO, hampering an enhanced relationship between the EU and NATO;

41. Underlines the need for a strong EU defence pillar within NATO, able to act autonomously from, and in complementarity with, NATO, turning the transatlantic alliance into a more equal partnership, and granting the necessary security guarantees to the EU, its Member States and whoever else they deem it necessary to extend them to;

42. Considers it essential to formalise a security and defence partnership with the United Kingdom as a means of strengthening European security and the European pillar of NATO, in particular in the context of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; underlines, in this regard, the importance of closer cooperation on information and intelligence sharing, military mobility, security and defence initiatives, crisis management, cyber defence, hybrid threats, FIMI and in jointly addressing shared threats;

43. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to ensure that all instruments of external action, including development aid and cooperation, are aligned with the EU’s security objectives, fostering resilient societies by promoting inclusive economic growth, good governance and human rights; emphasises the crucial role that diplomacy and development cooperation play alongside military efforts in ensuring long-term international security; underscores that sustainable peace cannot be achieved through military measures alone, but requires comprehensive strategies that address the root causes of instability, such as poverty, inequality, governance failures and climate change;

Financing our security and defence

44. Considers that, in order to be able to protect its citizens, deter its enemies, support its allies and become a powerful actor in the defence of a rules-based international order, the EU requires an immediate, substantial and sustained investment in security and defence, in particular at EU level, using a mix of public and private funds and incentivising better spending and better collective action; calls for the EU and the Member States to urgently agree on concrete financial solutions to finance security and defence-related investments; welcomes the ReArmEU initiative by the Commission as an important first step towards swift action;

45. Recalls that the Commission has estimated the funding needed at EUR 500 billion over the next 10 years (2025-2034), including EUR 400 billion to strengthen Member States’ defence capabilities and EUR 100 billion to support Ukraine; notes higher estimates, such as a Bruegel study referring to EUR 250 billion annually in the event that the United States withdraws its military presence from Europe; highlights that the cost of isolated action is much higher than the cost of joint action, and that the EU and its Member states can also increase their preparedness by making current investment more efficient and coordinated; highlights that the cost of non-preparedness and the consequent loss of autonomy and potential military defeat is much higher than the cost of acting decisively now;

46. Strongly supports increased investments in our security and defence to ensure that the EU and its Member States are able to face all types of threats, from hybrid to conventional, and establish strong deterrence, while reducing dependences; notes that insecurity, social exclusion and poverty are persistently weaponised by our enemies, as they make large swaths of people more vulnerable to hostile propaganda and anti-democratic narratives; demands therefore that the increased investments in our security and defence come on top of the important investments in social cohesion and welfare, and not instead of them; calls instead for a comprehensive EU investment strategy, based on a permanent fiscal capacity that addresses both vulnerabilities in military capabilities and in the social fabric, empowering us to fight all threats to our values, social model, security and defence; underlines that this pressing investment requires raising public financial resources quickly and in substantial volumes and that this should be based on the principle of social solidarity and a fair redistribution of wealth within our European societies; calls therefore on the Commission to propose new own resources and taxes on the stakeholders benefiting from the current economic and security situation, notably through windfall profits, in order to ensure a fair and sustainable contribution to our collective resilience; recalls that investing in security and defence brings many additional benefits for European society besides greater security and autonomy, and contributes to the desire to make the EU’s economy more competitive;

47. Warns that simply increasing national defence spending without addressing coordination issues, redundant efforts, and misaligned strategies could be counterproductive as it may exacerbate force integration challenges and drive up procurement costs for all Member States by intensifying competition between them; is therefore concerned by the Commission’s proposals in ReArmEU to activate the escape clause of the Stability and Growth Pact for defence investments, which would change the fiscal rules without creating more fiscal space and without accompanying it with proposals for increased coordinated or joint spending; recalls that any exemption should take into account the need to avoid moral hazard and avoid rewarding countries with long-standing inadequacies in their security and defence spending; demands that the Commission and the Member States design any exemptions for defence spending ramp-up in a way that incentivises coordinated spending and ensures the definition of such investments takes into account all threats, including hybrid, and the need to improve military mobility, resilience and security of communications and the availability of skilled workers;

48. Calls therefore for the bulk of the effort to serve EU-level action; regrets that the Commission’s ReArmEU initiative is mostly based on national expenditure; furthermore calls for the EU and its Member States to give prominent coordination roles to the Commission and the European Defence Agency in new financing instruments, which should be coupled with a complete programme for defence, including against hybrid attacks, ensuring that planning, development, procurement and management of capabilities is done together, in groupings of significant numbers of Member States, and often with the Commission and the European Defence Agency acting on their behalf;

49. Recognises that the present multiannual financial framework (MFF) is unable to provide sufficient resources for security and defence, and rejects any increases in security and defence spending in the present and future MFFs at the expense of cohesion policy funds, as proposed by the Commission in its ReArmEU initiative; calls on the Commission and the Member States to adapt the cohesion policy funds to a new geopolitical reality, shifting from a reactive, crisis-response stance to a more proactive policy focused on resilience; underlines that the EU budget alone cannot fill the defence spending gap, but has an important role to play; calls for additional EU-wide and European solutions to bridge the gap until the next MFF; highlights the importance of future MFFs in transforming the current immediate increases in security and defence into structural and sustainable EU-level efforts to ensure the EU’s security and defence;

50. Notes the proposals to make use of readily available sources of capital to finance security and defence, namely the unspent funds of NextGenerationEU and potential financial lines from the European Stability Mechanism, similar to the programme put together during the response to the COVID-19 pandemic; believes that these options could be explored, but would fall short of the needs estimated by the Commission;

51. Calls therefore on the Commission to raise common debt to provide the Union with the fiscal capacity to borrow in exceptional and crises situations, present and future, taking into account the experience and lessons learnt from NextGenerationEU, as we are now experiencing a pressing need to boost security and defence to protect the EU’s citizens, restore deterrence and support our allies, first and foremost Ukraine; notes additional ideas to create a rearmament bank or a special purpose vehicle with pooled national guarantees to ensure Member States have easier access to markets; underlines that the meaningful involvement of Parliament as one arm of the budgetary authority in the governance of future EU defence spending is a sine qua non; reiterates that the governance of whatever instrument is used should be such that it gives rise to a European defence programme that uses the funds to solve coordination problems in planning, developing, procuring, maintaining and deploying capabilities, reduces dependencies from non-European countries, supports the EDTIB and ultimately enables the EU and its close allies to act autonomously and in a coordinated manner;

52. Recognises the importance of mobilising private capital into security and defence; recalls, however, that, as governments remain the sole procurers of military capabilities, private capital will not replace public capital in the security and defence sector; calls on the Commission and the European Investment Bank (EIB) to consider an investment guarantee programme, similar to InvestEU, to assist in this effort; calls on the EIB to re-evaluate the list of excluded activities, to adjust its lending policy to increase the volume of available funding in the field of security and defence, and to investigate earmarked debt issuance for funding security and defence projects; calls for more consistent support for companies by reducing unnecessary administrative burdens and simplifying procedures, in particular by increasing information-sharing between public authorities, upholding the once-only principle and making full use of digital technologies; calls for the EU to start preparing emergency procedures for projects established in response to major crises or wars;

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53. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the European Council, the Council, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the President of the Commission and competent Commissioners, the EU security and defence agencies, and the governments and parliaments of the Member States.

MIL OSI Europe News –

March 7, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the white paper on the future of European defence – B10-0147/2025

Source: European Parliament

Reinier Van Lanschot, Mārtiņš Staķis, Ville Niinistö, Damian Boeselager, Hannah Neumann, Maria Ohisalo, Sergey Lagodinsky, Virginijus Sinkevičius
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

B10‑0147/2025

European Parliament resolution on the white paper on the future of European defence

(2025/2565(RSP))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine,

– having regard its recommendation of 8 June 2022 to the Council and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the EU’s Foreign, Security and Defence Policy after the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine [1],

– having regard to the UN Charter,

– having regard to the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence, adopted by the Council on 21 March 2022,

– having regard to the report by Sauli Niinistö, Special Adviser to the President of the European Commission, of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘Safer Together – Strengthening Europe’s Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness’,

– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas the President of the European Commission tasked the Commissioner for Defence and Space and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy with presenting a white paper on the future of European defence;

B. whereas Parliament and experts have called for a white paper on defence for more than a decade;

C. whereas the Strategic Compass was mainly drafted and negotiated before 24 February 2022; whereas the Strategic Compass is a very broad strategy that provides little guidance with regards to the urgent need to accomplish defence readiness and provide deterrence and defence capabilities to prepare for the most urgent military contingency;

D. whereas there is an urgent need to strengthen parliamentary oversight of European defence in order to guarantee a sound democratic basis for this crucial policy area;

E. whereas the European defence industrial actors not only face challenges but have also been able to profit from a much higher demand for defence products since February 2022, which has led to record profits, especially among prime contractors;

F. whereas innovative defence and dual-use start-ups and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) have not, in a comparable manner, been able to profit from relevant EU funds or orders from and funding by national governments compared to prime contractors;

G. whereas the combined military spending efforts of EU Member States already exceed that of Russia but suffer from a lack of economies of scale and focus, highlighting the need for more efficiency and the streamlining of military expenses, in addition to the need for fresh investment;

H. whereas the many concrete recommendations contained in the Niinistö report should guide the work on the white paper also because the report presents a comprehensive and holistic approach to preparedness and readiness that encompasses all civilian and military aspects; whereas the report underlines that the EU does not have a plan on what to do in the event of an armed attack against a Member State and that the EU currently lacks the comprehensive capacity to bring all necessary EU resources together in a coordinated manner across institutional and operational silos;

I. whereas hybrid threats are designed to operate in the grey zone between peace and war, combining conventional and unconventional methods such as sabotage, espionage and political infiltration to undermine the EU’s stability and resilience; whereas cyberattacks have become a central element of these campaigns, exploiting the increasing digitalisation of critical sectors such as healthcare, finance and energy, causing cascading disruptions with potentially severe economic and societal consequences; whereas foreign information manipulation and interference complements these operations through the spreading of disinformation and propaganda to erode trust in democratic institutions and polarise public opinion; whereas the growing complexity, frequency and intensity of these threats underscore the pressing need to identify and implement effective solutions for safeguarding the EU’s security and resilience;

J. whereas the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine is a wake-up call for the EU, presenting an immediate threat to the European and global security order and to the security of the EU and its Member States; whereas this conflict shows the urgent need for the Member States to define a common perception of threats and demonstrate genuine solidarity with the frontline Member States;

K. whereas the EU’s ability to take decisive action in response to external threats has been repeatedly hampered by the requirement for unanimity, with certain Member States blocking or delaying critical military aid to Ukraine and hence undermining European security;

L. whereas the Trump administration is proposing a normalisation of ties with Russia, and has threatened to withdraw the US military from the European continent; whereas it appears that the US administration has ceased to be a reliable ally within NATO, which has negative repercussions for the collective territorial defence of its members;

1. Stresses the seriousness of the threats to the security of the European continent, which have reached a level unprecedented since the Second World War; expresses deep concern at the rise of geopolitical fractures, also within the West, new and renewed imperialist ambitions for domination by authoritarian powers, systemic rivalry between great powers, nationalist unilateralism, the primary and growing use of force, and violence by certain states and non-state actors in order to promote their political and economic interests or to resolve disputes;

2. Recalls that the EU is a peace project and should strive towards peace and stability while condemning aggression; underlines that, in order to achieve peace and stability, we must support Ukraine and become more resilient ourselves;

3. Believes that the war of aggression against Ukraine was part of Putin’s plan to reshape the Euro-Atlantic security architecture and that this plan has been thwarted thanks to the Ukrainian people’s heroic defence;

4. Underlines that Russian acts of sabotage against critical European infrastructure, and Russia’s manipulation of and interference in EU and NATO countries, have significantly increased; stresses that experts believe that Russia might further escalate its aggressive acts and also attack EU Member States with conventional armed forces during the coming years;

5. Deplores the fact that the President of the United States has suggested that the US may attempt to annex Greenland, which would be in breach of international law, create considerable instability for the Greenland Government and people and the whole region, further exacerbating the deterioration of relations within the Atlantic Alliance;

6. Calls, therefore, for the EU to increase its efforts to shift the trajectory of Russia’s war against Ukraine and set the conditions for a just, comprehensive and lasting peace on Ukraine’s terms; underlines that defeating Russia in Ukraine and ensuring Ukraine’s future success are the most effective and cost-efficient investments in European security for the short and medium term;

7. Urges the Member States to provide more arms and ammunition to Ukraine, in as large quantities and as quickly as possible, to enable Ukraine to liberate its territory and deter further Russian attacks;

8. Calls for making a fast and significant increase in the financing of military support for Ukraine a key and structural component of the white paper; calls on the Member States to scale up direct investments in the capacity of the Ukrainian defence industry to mass-produce essential defence products (Danish model), specifically drones, air defence systems, artillery and long-range strike capabilities; proposes the allocation of a specific multibillion euro budget to the European Defence Industry Programme’s (EDIP) Ukraine Support Instrument reserved exactly for this purpose; stresses the need to explore legal avenues for fully seizing the frozen assets of sanctioned Russian individuals and the Russian Central Bank for use as grants for Ukraine’s expenditure on its defence and resilience needs and its reconstruction, in accordance with international law; condemns the veto imposed by the Hungarian Government on the European Peace Facility (EPF), which blocks more than EUR 6 billion and renders the EPF almost useless; stresses, further, the urgent need also to consider the option of creating an alternative ad hoc arrangement for those European countries that wish to support Ukraine militarily and finance that aid jointly;

9. Demands the inclusion of a plan in the white paper that describes how the integration of the Ukrainian defence industry into the EU defence technological and industrial base (EDTIB) can be operationalised in the fastest and most efficient manner; recalls the urgency to properly finance EDIP’s Ukraine instrument; further proposes the provision of war insurance for critical EDTIB projects inside Ukraine; proposes the regular inclusion of Ukrainian Defence Ministry officials with observer status at meetings of relevant Council configurations;

10. Expects the white paper on EU defence to define a new framework and the extent to which the EU must accomplish defence readiness and preparedness, in view of the most severe military contingencies, deter potential aggressors and defend itself also to assist NATO allies that are also EU Member States to become a credible European pillar in NATO;

11. Stresses that the time has come to use the white paper process to clearly define what is meant by a true European defence union; recalls that the adoption of the Strategic Compass was only a starting point, but that its implementation remains necessary and requires an update to reflect the goals of deterrence and defence readiness;

12. Deplores the reluctance of the Council and the EU Member States when it comes to addressing deep structural challenges of the European defence industrial landscape and the lack of ambition as regards cooperation between their armed forces at EU level; calls on the Member States to join forces and support a quantum leap towards a very ambitious and comprehensive framework on defence;

13. Welcomes in principle the announcements made by the President of the Commission on 4 March 2025 regarding a ‘re-arm Europe’ initiative; stresses, however, that the planned investments should address the lack of cooperation and coordination between Member States, including measures guaranteeing full interoperability and making joint procurement the rule;

14. Urges the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) and the Member States to use the white paper process for outlining a comprehensive framework that is composed of at least the following key components:

(a) a precise description of scenarios in which the EU and its Member States would use security and military instruments that include the latest risk and threat assessments and range from the most extreme military contingencies to crisis management abroad,

(b) elements of a military doctrine which describe in detail the military tasks related to the different scenarios, including cooperation with NATO, in particular through a more precise operationalisation and routine exercises for scenarios under Article 42(7) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU),

(c) revised and adapted military headline goals, closely coordinated with the NATO Defence Planning Process, and a precise description of the necessary quantity and quality of military personnel, including training requirements and key military capabilities that are fully synchronised with the new NATO Force Model as regards EU NATO countries, such as strategic enablers, but also ammunition stocks, in order to fulfil current force generation targets,

(d) proposals regarding armed forces cooperation structures that go beyond ad hoc arrangements, such as EU Battlegroups, including a strengthened Rapid Deployment Capacity (RDC), multinationally crewed strategic enablers (based on the Airborne Warning and Control System – AWACS – model) at EU level and additional permanent multinational military units with sufficient capabilities to provide deterrence and defence,

(e) a description of the key parameters necessary for the establishment of an efficient and competitive single market for defence that would help Member States to reach the capability headline goals necessary for full defence readiness and equip our closest allies, such as Ukraine;

15. Underlines that the EU must adopt a holistic and horizontal approach to security and defence by taking into account the many societal and systemic challenges it faces, such as climate change; emphasises the need for an impact assessment of current and future EU policies in order to find out how they can better support EU security and defence, including through other strategic objectives of the Union, especially the transition to a green, digital and just economy;

16. States that major geopolitical shifts, amplified by the return of large-scale wars in our neighbourhood, have threatened and keep threatening the security of the EU and its citizens, that ‘business as usual’ is not an option, and that, to face the threats, the EU and its Member States must make EU-level cooperation of their armed forces and their defence industry the rule in order to create a capabilities-based EU defence union which can overcome threats and attacks against EU security;

17. Strongly believes that more substantial progress needs to be made in operationalising Article 42(7) TEU and that a plan is needed on how to operationalise this solidarity policy in the white paper with respect to the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States;

18. Insists on the need to ensure better cooperation and coordination by taking stock of the will of the EU and the UK to become closer security partners; calls strongly for the creation of a European security council to coordinate actions between like-minded countries willing to form a vanguard in European defence cooperation and integration; calls for this European security council to serve as the foundation for a new European defence union, bringing together like-minded Member States and strategic partners that share a common security vision and mutual trust;

19. Considers that current strategic documents, legislative proposals and studies such as the Strategic Compass, the European defence industrial strategy and the Niinistö report should finally inspire a concrete and comprehensive vision for the future of European defence, including specific goals, targets and roadmaps, which the white paper should constitute;

20. Calls for the EU to better link common security and defence policy (CSDP) instruments with internal security tools and to strengthen dual-use and civil-military cooperation at EU level;

21. Strongly supports the many good recommendations put forward by the Niinistö report; fully supports the report’s aim, which is ‘not to limit our level of preparedness to what is politically convenient’ but to address what is needed in order to cope with the most severe scenarios; insists on the importance of the upcoming preparedness Union strategy to put the EU on track for comprehensive preparedness, including a definition of EU-level vital societal and governmental functions, the development of EU-level preparedness baseline requirements for these functions, and ensuring the coherence of sectoral crisis plans at EU level; recommends, in particular, the Niinistö report recommendations aimed at empowering citizens to make societal resilience work, inspired by the Finnish concept of total defence;

22. Calls for the EU to develop an EU risk assessment to identify cross-sectoral threats and the risks facing the EU as a whole, and supports the embedding of the ‘preparedness by design’ principle across the EU; insists on the need to develop a mandatory ‘security and preparedness check’ for future impact assessments and ‘stress-tests’ for current legislation as proposed by Niinistö; believes that there is a need to assess whether there are specific challenges that undermine the timely completion of projects identified as critical for effective military deterrence and the rapid arrival of capabilities to the eastern flank for military contingency;

23. Invites the Commission and the Member States to explore the feasibility of an EU preparedness act to align EU and national efforts when possible;

24. Calls for the EU and the Member States to set up and conduct an EU comprehensive preparedness exercise to test high-level decision-making and operational coordination;

25. Calls for the CSDP to be guided by a human security approach and committed to the Women, Peace and Security Agenda; underlines the importance of other multilateral frameworks that strive to build a peaceful and stable future;

26. Calls on the Member States to push for the deletion of the unanimity rule in foreign and security policy in the Council; asks for an amendment to Article 46(6) TEU to allow for qualified majority voting instead of unanimity in the management of permanent structured cooperation, with the exception of decisions leading to the creation of military missions or operations with an executive mandate under the CSDP, which must remain under unanimity;

27. Proposes the strengthening of Parliament’s oversight and scrutiny role in line with the EU expanding its role in defence, including via delegated acts for the work programmes of the current and future defence industrial programmes and instruments that would allow for their implementation to be scrutinised, in particular the priorities set by the Commission concerning projects on priority capabilities; calls for a Parliament representative to be appointed to the new defence industrial readiness board proposed in EDIP, where currently none is provided for;

28. Believes that the EU must acquire a clear understanding of what the actual gap is between the capability targets and defence capabilities of the Member States; stresses the need to ramp up defence industry production, as well as to have ever-ready production units to respond to foreign attacks or specific needs of its strategic partners;

29. Considers regular threat analyses to be an absolute necessity and proposes synchronising their planning cycle with similar regular threat analyses within NATO and by key non-NATO partners;

30. Reiterates its call to strengthen EU-NATO cooperation in order to build a more European NATO, particularly by fully aligning the EU’s Strategic Compass and NATO’s strategic concept, the EU’s Capability Development Plan and NATO’s Defence Planning Process capability targets, except for areas where there are clear special interests for the EU only; proposes the appointment of a permanent EU representative to NATO, including to the military committee on information exchange and the respective military operations;

31. Calls for the EU to address the critical defence capability gaps and shortfalls and focus efforts on specific projects of common European interest that are too expensive for a single Member State to procure, in particular strategic enablers, but also large stockpiles of critical equipment, in order to provide genuine EU added value, which could most efficiently be jointly procured and managed by an EU framework through a special off-budget instrument; proposes, in particular, the establishment of the following capabilities:

(a) integrated air defence and long-range strike systems, optimally by coordinating the ongoing development of the European Sky Shield Initiative (ESSI) with the European Long Range Strike Approach (ELSA),

(b) suppression of enemy air defences,

(c) multi-type drone force,

(d) electronic warfare,

(e) defensive and offensive cyber systems,

(f) AWACS, aerial refuelling and long-range transport,

(g) Command, control, communications and computers (C4) and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities and space assets critical for early warning, navigation, observation and communication,

(h) Main Ground Combat System (MGCS),

(i) Future Combat Aircraft System (FCAS);

32. Urges the EU and the Member States to move from a ‘flow’ approach to a ‘stock’ approach, with mandatory targets for critical defence equipment; points to the need to ensure the socially and environmentally sustainable provision of relevant raw materials and to implement policies to close gaps in production and the labour market; stresses the urgent need to make defence production and stocking of ammunition and other products more security-relevant by developing plans on how to have a more decentralised and resilient network and joint stocks building on ‘readiness pools’ in regions facing a higher threat level and the possibility of large-scale conventional warfare;

33. Calls for the EU to urgently adapt its tools to new realities by designing an administrative capacity to move much faster when faced with wars or other large-scale crises; stresses that this can be done by designing and putting in place binding rules, which can be triggered in emergency situations to accelerate administrative and legal procedures, and taking measures in the input side of the supply chain, for the quick production and delivery of military goods, or the construction of infrastructure projects for European mobility, identified as critical for defence;

34. Urges the EU to take immediate action to pool resources and expertise in the field of cybersecurity, recognising that individual Member States face limited capabilities in this domain; strongly advocates for the development of a unified European approach to cyber forces; further insists on the swift creation of joint European cyber capabilities to effectively address the common challenges faced by all Member States in the rapidly evolving threat landscape, thereby strengthening the EU’s collective resilience and strategic autonomy in the digital realm;

35. Calls for the EU to use the white paper to describe a plan that helps to remove unnecessary national regulatory obstacles that slow down military mobility without undermining public security; considers that the definition of military mobility should apply to dual-use infrastructures that cover all logistical aspects of mobility, and that for dual-use projects, adequate criteria should be properly applied in terms of funding provisions, in particular at EU level; stresses the need for significant investments in military mobility infrastructures to enhance cargo airlift capabilities, camps, depots, ports, air, sea and rail platforms, railway lines, railroad terminals, waterways, roads and bridges;

36. Reiterates its full support for the RDC to achieve full operational capability at the latest by mid-2025, with at least 5 000 troops available for rescue and evacuation tasks, initial entry and stabilisation operations or temporary reinforcement of missions; proposes upgrading the RDC by transforming it into a permanent multinational force with its own strategic enablers and command and control, learning from the failed experience of the ad hoc EU Battlegroups;

37. Calls on the VP/HR to launch a discussion with Member States in order to create additional permanent multinational units to respond to the changed threat landscape for the EU since the decision to create the RDC, especially in the light of Trump’s recent rapprochement towards Putin and comments regarding Greenland, which have increased the need for effective European deterrence and defence in line with the most extreme military contingencies;

38. Proposes strengthening the current Eurocorps and making it a multinational corps with its own strategic enablers and command and control to which national brigades can be permanently attached with standardised, jointly procured equipment; stresses that such a multinational European corps can enable smaller Member States to fulfil their current force-generation targets, provide industry with aggregate demand through standardised, large-scale equipment orders and provide the EU with its own capability focused on deterrence and defence, including for candidate countries;

39. Proposes the joint creation of crewed and owned strategic enablers at EU level, based on the model of NATO’s AWACS, which are too expensive for individual Member States and important for the security of the EU as a whole;

40. Calls for the European Air Transport Command to be transformed into an ‘EU crisis-response air fleet’ comprising military transport aircraft held at European level and made available to Member States for deployments of equipment or troops, emergency evacuations or civil security missions;

41. Reiterates its call for the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) to benefit from adequate premises, staff, enhanced planning, command and control, and effective communication and information systems;

42. Calls for a more ambitious concept for military training and relevant planning, command and control elements at EU level to be part of the white paper action plan, such as a fully equipped and well-staffed MPCC; believes that the EU must expand the training of Ukrainian forces in line with Ukrainian needs to enable a higher level of operational coordination between units, allow for the most effective force generation possible, and create conditions for European armed forces to learn lessons from them;

43. Urges the EU Member States to decide on a united and clear medium- and long-term vision for the European defence industry aimed at helping to meet the capability headline goals;

44. Stresses the urgent need to change the way defence industrial programmes are implemented across the EU; believes that it is of crucial importance to synchronise their work programmes with the revised headline goals in order to be able to focus on the most urgent and militarily important capability gaps; underlines the importance of overcoming a very broad distribution of scarce financial resources and the need to prevent any further ‘dual sourcing’ or similar duplications at EU level that would add to a high amount of duplications in Europe and to the low efficiency rate of the defence industrial base, which is still characterised by fragmentation;

45. Stresses that capabilities and resources must be increased, and that the fragmentation of the defence market must be overcome via the creation of a single market for defence, where binding common rules apply guaranteeing fair competition and full interoperability of defence products; shares the view contained in Mario Draghi’s report on the future of European competitiveness that the EU must urgently boost competitiveness in the sector by various means, such as mergers (inspired by best practice, such as that of Airbus), and more competition between traditionally nationally entrenched defence firms, and decide on incentives directed towards the EU defence industry for sufficiently large public and private investments in security and defence;

46. Believes that the white paper should build on the European defence industrial strategy (EDIS), in particular EDIP, and also develop a concept for a wartime economic cooperation contingency plan to prepare for mutual support in case of large-scale security crises, and deepen wartime economic communication to provide early warnings of hard, hybrid and cyber threats;

47. Stresses that a single European defence market is a priority, as fragmentation and a lack of competitiveness hamper the capacity of the EU to assume more responsibility as a security provider; deplores the fact that neither the EU defence industrial programmes nor the increasing national defence budgets have led to a surge in EU-level defence industrial cooperation that would have allowed Member States to reach their own 2007 cooperation targets as set in the European Defence Agency (EDA) framework; recalls the persistent low levels of European collaboration since 24 February 2022, which, for research and development (R&D), were 14 % in 2022 and 6 % in 2023, and for joint procurement 18 % in 2023, while the EDA was unable to provide data for 2023 (but stressed that there was ‘a temporary slowdown’); stresses the urgent need to analyse the reasons for the unwillingness of Member States to use EU-level cooperation and see it as the main tool for defence investment;

48. Strongly supports the idea to make EU-level cooperation the rule in the European defence industrial sector and commit to concrete numerical targets for cooperation as presented in EDIS, which focus in particular on joint procurement (at least 40 % by 2030), intra-EU trade (at least 35 % by 2030), and procurement of EU-made defence products (at least 50 % by 2030 and 60 % by 2035);

49. Urges the Commission and the Council to address the dual challenge of joint military equipment production and its effective utilisation across Member States; calls for a comprehensive strategy to guarantee increased interoperability through the promotion of agreed civil and military standards, such as NATO standardisation agreements, within EU defence industrial programmes; demands a commitment to tying the funding of current and future instruments to the standardisation of and convergence on certification by NATO allies and to make current standards more precise; calls on the Commission to present concrete plans to overcome interoperability obstacles and ensure the efficient utilisation of jointly produced equipment by all participating Member States;

50. Insists on the importance of European defence projects of common interest as presented in EDIP, which are critical to European defence readiness and preparedness; believes that these should support the industrial and technological capacities that underpin common capability priorities and that cannot be implemented alone, such as strategic enablers; proposes that, based on the capabilities’ headline goals, the Commissioner for Defence create a clear ‘output plan’ listing relevant quantified targets not just for strategic enablers but also for the most critical large-scale equipment needs, such as MGCS, FCAS and ESSI and ELSA, which would then be jointly procured and maintained throughout the life cycle of the product in order to achieve economies of scale and interoperability in the most effective and fastest way;

51. Believes that a competitive and resilient European defence industry will also lead to a restructuring of the industrial landscape, including through mergers, which would also reduce the number of parallel programmes that waste financial resources, as well as a better regional distribution of production sites; considers that our defence policies should encourage the growth of EU centres of excellence, also according to the criteria of decentralisation, security and resilience; stresses the need to massively boost start-ups, scale-ups and SMEs in the sector as a priority and as a structural element of the section of the white paper pertaining to the single market for defence; stresses that for well-established or systemic actors in the defence sector, public investment should be accompanied by additional safeguards to ensure that public money is reinvested and not used for the purpose of generating profits for their shareholders, such as by windfall profit taxes;

52. Proposes to create European regional EDTIB clusters uniting research, development, production and maintenance facilities to create regional economies of scale and focus areas of technological specialisation; calls for these clusters to be strategically spread throughout the EU to allow for continued manufacturing in times of crisis and to more evenly distribute the economic opportunities for SMEs and Member States with relatively small defence industries; calls for these clusters to be aligned with EDIP’s proposal for the Structure for European Armament Programme;

53. Calls for more coherence in support of companies by reducing unnecessary administrative burdens and cutting red tape, and ensuring much easier access for small- and mid-cap companies within the defence sector;

54. Calls for a comprehensive strategy to leverage current instruments such as the Defence Equity Facility and new initiatives such as EDIP’s Fund to Accelerate Defence Supply Chain Transformation; demands concrete commitments to increase the amount of funding per SME while ensuring transparency and accountability; requests the implementation of robust monitoring mechanisms to ensure that funds drive innovation and competitiveness among SMEs without distorting the market; demands, further, regular reporting on the impact and effectiveness of these financial instruments in supporting start-ups and SMEs in the defence industry and dual-use sector;

55. Calls on the Commission to design a successor to the European Defence Fund (EDF) that supports common research and innovation all along the supply chain and lay the conditions to address technological challenges and provide European solutions to key capabilities gaps; calls for the establishment of a Commission agency with a specific focus on R&D with dual-use potential, taking inspiration from the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency; stresses the need to put a strong emphasis on EU-level support for the most disruptive and innovative technology via the creation of an accelerator hub for researching, developing and testing new breakthrough defence technologies, which would also contribute to economic competitiveness, bringing together industry, governments and the expert community; underlines that this organisation should nurture a risk-taking culture and be highly flexible by design; proposes, as a first step, that funding allocation should focus on a limited number of critical projects, including decarbonised defence and novel deterrence capabilities;

56. Calls for the strengthening of energy resilience and the climate and environmental transition dimension under the successor to the EDF, and for the climate-proofing and decarbonisation (covering both adaptation and mitigation) of EU defence by design and across the five dimensions: operational, capability planning and development, multi-stakeholder engagement, governance, and R&D, for the benefit of the performance of military capabilities, the resilience of armed forces, and thus the competitiveness of the EDTIB;

57. Is deeply convinced that the EU-level instruments should prioritise and massively increase support for SMEs and start-ups in the dual-use and defence sector; stresses the need to support SMEs and start-ups in bringing successfully tested prototypes to the market, including the scaling up of production; underlines the need to bridge the current funding gap as regards these important steps that would strengthen the EDTIB, including in close cooperation with the Ukrainian technological and defence industrial base;

58. Insists on the need to remove barriers to market entry for defence products across the EU by reviewing the directives on the transfer of defence-related products and defence procurement; calls on the Commission to propose actions for better market access, smoother cross-border cooperation and increased security of supply, including by harmonising national export policies;

59. Stresses the need to develop an effective EU-level armaments policy that includes the establishment of a functioning and effective external trade dimension that aims to support partners that face threats from aggressive authoritarian regimes and prevents arms deliveries to undemocratic aggressive regimes and regimes that make illegal use of them as assessed under the relevant international human rights and humanitarian law, in line with the current eight criteria under the Council Common Position on arms exports [2]; stresses the need to overcome the very narrow and national interpretation of Article 346 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) in this respect;

60. Invites the Member States to actively participate in a priority-ordering mechanism for defence production which builds on security and defence capability mapping to help prioritise orders, contracts and the recruitment of employees in emergency situations;

61. Strongly believes that a European preference must be the cornerstone of EU policies related to the European defence market, as a strategic imperative aimed at protecting European know-how; underlines that the European preference principle must be reflected in EU defence regulations in clear and unambiguous eligibility criteria; underlines, however, that exceptions for emergency military contingencies and projects critical for ensuring defence readiness should be built into these criteria;

62. Calls for a crisis response instrument for securing European sovereignty based on the model of the US Defense Production Act, so that the EU has a tool which can be activated to react quickly to emergency wartime or crisis needs; calls for such a tool to include the following key components:

(a) joint procurement of specific defence products,

(b) prioritising the provision of critical materials, and prioritising orders, for specific supply chains, such as artillery munitions,

(c) fast-tracking administrative and legal procedures for moving military equipment and troops, and where possible the construction of (infrastructure) projects critical for military mobility or other military readiness priority areas, while avoiding the circumvention of environmental protection provisions and building in necessary safeguards;

63. Deplores the lack of willingness by Member States to invest in EU-level cooperation and urges them to reach the EU objectives on security and defence; highlights the fact that the cost of non-preparedness for the most extreme military contingencies would be higher than the cost of decisive EU preparedness; recalls that aggregate EU defence spending is insufficient and that very little national defence spending is coordinated or even pooled with other Member States or invested in European collaborative projects; calls for the EU and the Member States to work and agree on concrete measures and means for short- to long-term public and private investment;

64. Notes that, according to the Commission President, the defence spending gap currently stands at EUR 500 billion for the next decade, but that, if the EU needs to develop its own military capabilities, experts estimate that this amount will have to rise significantly; underlines that the EU budget alone cannot fill the gap, but has an important role to play;

65. Underlines that increases in defence investment should not compete with other public investment priorities, including social expenditure, territorial cohesion and climate transition, which are all relevant to our European security; reiterates that the most effective way to maintain such priorities is to release fresh investment for defence rather than repurpose already earmarked funding; further recalls that financing orientations should be anchored in a whole-of-society approach to resilience and therefore need to be broadly supported by European citizens, and that this support needs to be sustainable in the long term;

66. Opposes any proposal aimed at repurposing cohesion policy funds from their long-term objectives and recalls that only strengthening Europe’s social and economic fabric and reducing territorial disparities will contribute to the balanced development and stability of all EU regions, and will ultimately reinforce the EU’s ability to defend itself against disinformation and foreign influence;

67. Supports the Commission President’s announcement to create a new EU financial instrument to assist Member States in increasing their defence spending through loans backed by the EU budget; takes note of the intention to establish such a new instrument under Article 122 TFEU; recalls that while the EU Recovery Instrument, which allocated borrowed funds to various EU programmes, was established by a Council regulation under Article 122 TFEU, various EU programmes to which the resources were allocated, including the Recovery and Resilience Facility, were adopted through ‘codecision’, relying on Article 175 TFEU; calls on the Commission to adopt a similar legal structure, respecting the ordinary legislative procedure and ensuring the democratic legitimacy of any new EU financing instrument for defence;

68. Welcomes the further extension of the European Investment Bank (EIB) Group’s eligibility criteria to dual-use goods; welcomes the EIB Group’s 2022 Strategic European Security Initiative aimed at supporting innovation in dual-use technology; stresses that EIB investments should focus on innovative projects, but not expendable products such as ammunition; stresses that greater EIB investment in the defence sector can encourage commercial banks’ investment in the sector; calls on the EIB Group to review the impact of the extension of its new dual-use goods policy and insists that any further extension of lending in the sector should only take place if it has no negative impact on the overall financing costs of the bank or its investment pipeline, or on the contribution to financing the investment needed for enabling the EU to reach its climate goals;

69. Considers that, complementing joint debt, further defence lending should be dealt with in a separate bank, as investment in defence cannot in principle be considered an environmental, social and governance investment; calls, therefore, on the Commission and the Member States to establish, as a matter of urgency, a new defence bank modelled on the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development that could address the global perspective of securing defence lending, while protecting other investment and allowing for allies to join;

70. Takes note of the Commission President’s announcement on ‘activating the escape clause for defence investments’; underlines that, in view of other pressing policy priorities, the escape clause must be applied in a way that ensures that increases in defence expenditure do not lead to cuts in other areas and is conditional on being spent on developing common EU projects, including dual-use infrastructure such as railways, satellite systems and resilient power grids;

71. Stresses that the current political context demonstrates that the recently adopted EU economic governance framework deprives governments of the financial resources needed to respond to current and new challenges; underlines that prioritising one policy area over another exacerbates rather than mitigates the multiple crises the EU is facing; calls for a review of the EU fiscal rules framework that would provide the long-term funding certainty required for investment in promoting the just transition, expanding European defence production capabilities and developing dual-use infrastructure, thereby underpinning a truly coordinated EU approach to investment policy;

72. Insists that urgent needs cannot wait for the next multiannual financial framework (MMF); believes that, as long as Member States refuse to allocate more resources to a higher overall EU budget, including the creation of new own resources, and given the unanimity requirement to change both the MMF Regulation [3] and the Council’s Own-Resources Decision [4], and given the urgency, solutions for alternative funding must be considered without delay, including:

(a) the urgent launch of a discussion with a view to establishing another off-budget financial facility [5] which would sufficiently pool and Europeanise parts of national defence budgets at EU level and address the entire life cycle of military capabilities, from collaborative R&D and joint procurement to joint maintenance, training and security of supply, and which is, like the current off-budget EPF, open to non-EU countries such as Norway and the UK; stresses therefore the need to improve decision-making and oversight procedures compared to the current EPF governance model,

(b) the issuance of EU risk guarantees by the Commission to lower interest rates for participants in EU-level projects identified as critical for defence readiness,

(c) a new EU debt programme along the lines of the NextGenerationEU backed by genuine own resources to repay the borrowed funds,

(d) the creation of new genuine EU own resources to create additional revenue flows to finance security- and defence-related investments at EU level,

(e) greater mobilisation of equity and private capital; reiterates therefore its call for more private investment in EU defence,

(f) the creation of specific financial products so that private banks invest more in the defence sector,

(g) the development of emergency procedures for projects established in response to major crises or wars;

73. Believes that the next MFF should have a greater allocation of funds for common security and be more flexible in order to react to unforeseen crises and emergencies;

74. Welcomes the proposals made in the recent Niinistö report as regards the financing of European defence; supports the setting up of a defending Europe facility and a securing Europe facility; equally welcomes and supports the proposal to establish an investment guarantee programme based on the model of InvestEU with open architecture to trigger private sector investment and to issue a ‘European preparedness bond standard’;

75. Insists that robust mechanisms be implemented to ensure the efficient use of scarce EU budget resources and prevent any duplication of efforts in defence projects; requests a comprehensive review of current oversight procedures and the development of a transparent framework for monitoring and evaluating the effectiveness of EU-funded defence initiatives;

76. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commissioner for Defence and Space, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Council and the Commission.

MIL OSI Europe News –

March 7, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the white paper on the future of European defence – B10-0145/2025

Source: European Parliament

B10‑0145/2025

European Parliament resolution on the white paper on the future of European defence

(2025/2565(RSP))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to Articles 24(1), 42, 43 and 45 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU),

– having regard to the national security strategies of the Member States,

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2023/1525 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 July 2023 on supporting ammunition production (ASAP)[1],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2023/2418 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 October 2023 on establishing an instrument for the reinforcement of the European defence industry through common procurement (EDIRPA)[2],

– having regard to the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence,

– having regard to Commission Recommendation (EU) 2023/2113 of 3 October 2023 on critical technology areas for the EU’s economic security for further risk assessment with Member States [3],

– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 10 March 2023 entitled ‘European Union Space Strategy for Security and Defence’ (JOIN(2023)0009),

– having regard to the report by Sauli Niinistö of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘Safer Together – Strengthening Europe’s Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness’,

– having regard to the report by Mario Draghi of 9 September 2024 entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness’,

– having regard to Special Report 04/2025 of the European Court of Auditors of 5 February 2025 entitled ‘EU military mobility: Full speed not reached due to design weaknesses and obstacles en route’,

– having regard to the three Joint Declarations on EU-NATO cooperation signed on 8 July 2016, 10 July 2018 and 10 January 2023,

– having regard to the Madrid Summit Declaration adopted by the NATO heads of state and government at the North Atlantic Council meeting in Madrid on 29 June 2022,

– having regard to the NATO 2022 Strategic Concept and the 2023 NATO Summit in Vilnius,

– having regard to the opening remarks made by US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth in Brussels at the Ukraine Defense Contact Group meeting of 12 February 2025,

– having regard to the talks held in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, on 18 February 2025 between US and Russian negotiators,

– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas the Commission announced the release of a white paper on the future of European defence, co-authored by Commissioner for Defence and Space Andrius Kubilius and Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas, by 19 March 2025; whereas this document will be the first of its kind produced by the EU and emulates similar documents published by Member States;

B. whereas the white paper must respect the limits set by the TEU in terms of foreign policy and defence and it must take note of the international context and the strategic environment in order to provide a perspective and proposals that will enable the strengthening of Europe’s security;

C. whereas the white paper on the future of European defence will provide the framework for future defence projects and regulations and will be a key point of reference for incoming negotiations on the next multiannual financial framework;

D. whereas the international order is profoundly destabilised and is restructuring; whereas the international rules and organisations that emerged from the Second World War and then from the end of the Cold War are in crisis; whereas international relations are increasingly characterised by uncertainty, and the tendency to resort to armed force to resolve international disagreements is growing;

E. whereas Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has profoundly destabilised the security order in Europe; whereas this unilateral aggression has accelerated the integration of Sweden and Finland into NATO; whereas this war has considerably deteriorated relations and exchanges between Russia and the countries of Europe;

F. whereas the war in Ukraine has highlighted the chronic underinvestment by Member States in their armed forces; whereas the stocks of arms and ammunition in Europe are largely insufficient; whereas certain critical military capabilities are not possessed by any European military; whereas the infrastructure that is essential for the security and proper functioning of European societies and economies is vulnerable; whereas some Member States have encountered significant difficulties in deploying and transporting military resources within the EU itself;

G. whereas the relations between the United States and China will structure, to a large extent, the future of international relations in the 21st century; whereas the United States no longer has the will to maintain the same level of military involvement in Europe; whereas the US Secretary of Defence has expressly spoken of a ‘division of labour’ between allies, with the Americans prioritising the Pacific region, while emphasising that Europeans must be responsible for the defence of Europe and must increase their capabilities accordingly;

H. whereas the European Union is composed of 27 sovereign states, with each having the sovereign right to determine its own foreign and defence policy;

I. whereas it is in the interest of the Member States to adopt a common policy on matters of common interest to them; whereas enhanced cooperation on defence matters is mutually beneficial if it improves the security of the Member States against any direct aggression or if it increases their capacity to respond to any threat to their territorial integrity, sovereignty or prosperity;

J. whereas the European defence market is too fragmented; whereas for a single armament type, there can be several or even dozens of different varieties of equipment in the EU, representing a collective loss of resources because of duplication, and preventing economies of scale;

K. whereas Article 24(1) TEU stipulates that decisions related to the common foreign and security policy and the common security and defence policy are taken unanimously by the Council; whereas Article 24(1) TEU also stipulates that the EU cannot adopt legislative acts on foreign affairs and defence; whereas Article 36 TEU stipulates that Parliament has a consultative role;

L. whereas, on 30 January 2025, 19 EU countries sent a letter to the European Investment Bank calling for it ‘to play an even stronger role in providing investment funding and leveraging private funding for the security and defence sector’;

1. Stresses that diplomatic and defence policy issues are primarily the prerogative of the Member States, which remain the most relevant and the only legitimate political units in the international order; respects the right of every Member State to determine its own foreign and security policy; insists on the importance of maintaining the principle of unanimity in the Council for all decisions related to the common foreign and security policy and the common security and defence policy;

2. Underlines that strengthening the Member States’ militaries, based on threats, is necessary to compensate for the security deficit caused by decades of underinvestment and the gradual disengagement of the United States; emphasises that this rearmament policy led by the Member States must not aim to escalate tensions in Europe, but rather aim to reach a level that will deter any hostile actions, establish a continental balance and maintain peace;

3. Notes that the United States remains the EU’s main military ally and is an essential member of NATO; insists that, irrespective of the political orientation of the White House, US foreign policy will continue to make the Asia-Pacific region a geostrategic priority and to perceive Europe as a secondary theatre; stresses that Member States must no longer subcontract their security and defence to other powers;

4. Underlines that NATO is a crucial partner in the collective defence architecture in Europe; takes note of the ambition of building a European pillar within NATO; considers that a greater contribution from European states within the alliance must, for the sake of consistency, result in a more balanced distribution of command posts in favour of European military personnel; stresses that stepping up the defence capabilities of European states can go hand in hand with the deepening of EU-NATO cooperation with due respect for the neutrality of the EU Member States that are not part of the NATO alliance;

5. Highlights the need to overcome the fragmentation of the EU’s internal market for defence products through greater cooperation between Member States and to collectively work on the interoperability of military capabilities; calls on the Member States to encourage cross-border defence procurement in order to strengthen intra-European industrial cooperation and achieve the objective of European strategic autonomy;

6. Stresses that greater cooperation in the defence sector must actively involve defence SMEs, not only large defence actors, and serve as a platform for SME development, providing greater opportunities for them to contribute to the EU’s technological base and enhance European strategic autonomy;

7. Notes, however, that the strengthening of the European defence industry must not result in the attribution of new competences to the Commission, which would be in breach of the Treaties and would undermine the sovereignty of Member States without increasing efficacy; reiterates, therefore, that decision-making regarding military requirements, the prioritisation of capability development and the purchase of defence products should remain within the remit of Member States; underlines that, despite the need for increased cooperation in the field of defence, such as on joint procurement and joint production, the Member States must retain full sovereignty over their arms export policies;

8. Calls for the co-legislators to establish the principle of a European preference in future European defence regulations, including in the European defence industrial plan, so that European funds benefit European companies on European soil, which will enhance our industrial defence capabilities and will reduce our dependences on non-EU countries; recalls that this regulation must in no way restrict the freedom of the Member States to determine their own arms procurement and import/export policy;

9. Calls on the NATO-affiliated Member States to cooperate in order to identify and fill critical capability gaps by building on and complementing NATO’s Defence Planning Process targets, which are required for sustained full-spectrum operations, including space systems and launchers, long-range missiles, integrated air and missile defence systems, ammunition production, artificial intelligence (AI), maritime drone capability, command and control capability, electronic warfare systems and air-to-air refuelling capacity;

10. Calls on non-neutral Member States to adequately invest in their infrastructure to guarantee optimal military mobility across Europe in line with their respective military agreements and alliances;

11. Emphasises the importance for European states to have the capacity and a framework to act independently within the NATO framework where possible and outside of the NATO framework if necessary; points out that the Rapid Deployment Capacity, an inter-state initiative under the control of the Member States, only comprised of 5 000 troops, does not allow for the possibility of engagement in a context of intense combat; reaffirms that it is in the Member States’ interest to strengthen their ability to fight together by conducting joint training and exercises that enhance the interoperability of the various national instruments;

12. Expresses the need to consider European defence in all its dimensions, including land, air, naval, space and cybernetic; notes that contemporary strategic issues have a growing naval dimension and that the powers challenging the international order are deploying naval capabilities at regional level; stresses the importance of European cooperation at sea and welcomes the current progress of Operation Aspides, the lessons from which must be put to good use; stresses that European strategic autonomy has a maritime and naval dimension, and that European navies should cooperate more closely to ensure the protection of their maritime areas, as well as their underwater or surface infrastructure; stresses that the principle of freedom of navigation must be protected and calls, therefore, for an increase in surveillance and the ability to react quickly in the event of threats arising in European seas;

13. Notes that space will increasingly become a key aspect of power and sovereignty; underlines that the Member States must maintain and guarantee their independent access to space; welcomes the launch of Ariane 6, but is concerned by the accumulated delays; draws attention to the need for the space sector to be industrialised to increase the number of rockets launched to put European satellites into orbit; welcomes the launch of the European satellite constellation IRIS², which should enable secure communications solutions for sovereign and military issues by 2030; emphasises the need for the future EU space law not to hamper the competitiveness of European companies and to apply constraints on non-EU players; notes the importance of Galileo, Europe’s global navigation satellite system;

14. Underlines that, unlike the United States (Buy America Act) and China (Government Procurement Law), the European space industry is not shielded from international competition and does not benefit from a European preference; calls on the Member States and the Commission to implement a European preference in space industry procurement and promote innovation, research and development; stresses that the European Space Agency’s principle of geographical return hampers innovative European SMEs and start-ups from receiving adequate funding and contributes to the fragmentation of the European space industry; calls on the European Space Agency to abolish the principle of geographical return and adopt an innovative and efficiency-based approach to space procurement rather than a geographically driven one;

15. Underlines that the strengthening of European defence capabilities will require significant financing; calls on banks, pension funds, insurance companies and other actors in the Member States to simplify and significantly increase the financing of projects and companies operating in the field of defence; insists that in the context of the urgent need to increase defence spending, financial institutions should not consider investments in the field of defence to be damaging for their reputation; rejects, however, the idea of issuing joint debt, such as defence Eurobonds, to support defence spending;

16. Notes the growing importance of AI in warfare, particularly in the development of drones and autonomous weapons; recognises the indigenous AI advances in warfare made by Ukraine and Israel, demonstrating that the Member States are equally capable of developing similar capabilities; highlights that recent breakthroughs, such as the one made by the Chinese AI computing start-up DeepSeek, demonstrate the feasibility of cost-competitive AI systems; calls on the Member States to accelerate the development of AI capabilities; underlines that the AI Act [4], set to be implemented in 2025, creates uncertainty regarding the production and development of dual-use AI systems, an ambiguity that could hinder the development of essential defence industry products; calls for this issue to be clarified to ensure that the European defence industry is not disadvantaged compared to its American and Chinese counterparts;

17. Stresses that a strong civilian manufacturing industry, particularly in the steelmaking, automotive, aerospace and shipbuilding sectors, is essential for deterrence and for maintaining long-term military and industrial capabilities in the event of conflict; notes the decline of these industries since the 1990s, especially in western Europe; calls on the Commission and the Council to safeguard the manufacturing industries that are vital to national security, including through the use of tariffs; urges the Commission to revise the Green Deal and revoke the net-neutrality goal, since it destroys manufacturing competitiveness and is responsible for the deindustrialisation of key industries in the Member States; stresses that the relocation of essential manufacturing industries to non-EU countries is counterproductive both in terms of global environmental impact and national security;

18. Expresses concern over the growing dependence of the European defence industry on foreign components, particularly rare earths and semiconductors, which are essential for advanced military technologies; calls on the Member States to intensify efforts to develop domestic rare earth mining and semiconductor manufacturing capabilities to safeguard the autonomy of the European defence industry in the event of conflicts or severe supply chain disruptions;

19. Welcomes the Dutch Government’s decision to tighten export control rules on advanced lithography systems, which are essential for semiconductor production; stresses that EU technological transfers to non-EU countries have significantly contributed to the rise of foreign competition and the deindustrialisation of Europe; encourages the Member States to impose stricter export controls on critical dual-use technologies and manufacturing products;

20. Notes that 80 % of EU data is stored and managed in the United States and other non-EU countries, where it may be subject to extraterritorial intervention under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, the CLOUD Act, or China’s Data Security Law; stresses that protecting critical industrial and government data is essential to ensuring national security; welcomes the Swiss Government Cloud programme as a step toward cloud sovereignty and encourages the Member States to implement similar initiatives; encourages the Member States to strengthen regulations on telecommunications service providers, which are predominantly based outside Europe, creating a significant dependence on external actors;

21. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to Commissioner for Defence and Space Andrius Kubilius, Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas, the Commission, the European Council and the parliaments and governments of the Member States.

MIL OSI Europe News –

March 7, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the white paper on the future of European defence – B10-0148/2025

Source: European Parliament

Nathalie Loiseau, Petras Auštrevičius, Dan Barna, Helmut Brandstätter, Engin Eroglu, Bernard Guetta, Urmas Paet, Marie‑Agnes Strack‑Zimmermann, Hilde Vautmans, Dainius Žalimas, Michał Kobosko
on behalf of the Renew Group

B10‑0148/2025

European Parliament resolution on the white paper on the future of European defence

(2025/2565(RSP))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas over the last decade, major geopolitical shifts, amplified by the return of large-scale wars in the EU’s neighbourhood, have threatened the security of the EU, its Member States and its citizens;

B. whereas the global order is fragmenting and is increasingly characterised by complex and entrenched instabilities;

C. whereas the EU cannot be secure without security in its immediate neighbourhood; whereas Ukraine’s capacity to resist Russia’s war of aggression is vital to EU security;

D. whereas recent statements by members of the US Administration, accompanied by the behaviour of the US leadership towards President Zelenskyy, reflect a shift in US foreign policy; whereas it is becoming increasingly clear that Europe needs to strengthen its own security and defence and must be in a position to help Ukraine win the war;

E. whereas the biggest and fastest growth in Russia’s military capabilities is taking place close to Russia’s borders with the West, while the EU is taking its time to enhance its defence capacity;

F. whereas there is an urgent need to further reform and strengthen the EU’s defence policy in the light of Ukraine’s recent war experience and the use of new war technologies;

G. whereas it is in the EU’s interest to see Ukraine as an integral part of a genuine European security system;

H. whereas, in their mission letters from the President of the European Commission, the Commissioner for Defence and Space and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy were tasked with presenting a white paper on the future of European defence within the first 100 days of their mandate;

1. Considers that the EU must take urgent action to ensure its own autonomous security, strengthen useful partnerships with like-minded partners and significantly reduce its dependencies on other countries; stresses, therefore, that the EU is now facing a turning point in its history and construction; insists that ‘business as usual’ is no longer an option as it would mean the end of a safe and secure Europe; considers that the EU and its Member States have to choose between pulling together in a synchronised way and joining forces to overcome the threats and attacks against EU security, or standing alone at the mercy of aggressive adversaries and unreliable partners; recalls that Russia is the most significant direct threat to Europe’s security; emphasises, however, the fact that the instability in the EU’s Southern Neighbourhood must also be fully taken into consideration;

2. Underlines that the EU must now adopt a holistic and cross-cutting approach, integrating a defence and security dimension into most European policies, including adequate regulatory and financial instruments to address identified capability needs and gaps;

3. Believes therefore that the time has come for renewed political ambition to act and turn the EU into a genuine security provider, increase the EU’s defence readiness and build a true European Defence Union; recalls that the adoption of the Strategic Compass was a good starting point, but that it must still be implemented in a timely manner; welcomes the recent EU defence instruments; insists on the urgent need to change scale, as EU defence efforts cannot remain limited in size, fragmented in scope and lengthy in delivery; calls for a quantum leap and a new approach on defence, accompanied by strong choices and decisions, an action plan and a short-to-long-term defence investment plan to enhance the bloc’s security infrastructure, improve deterrence, respond to hybrid threats and attacks, guarantee the mobilisation of equity and private capital and develop strategic enablers and strategic weapons systems to enhance Europe’s collective military power and thus reduce its dependency on others;

4. Urges the EU to adopt a coherent, robust and comprehensive framework to strengthen its security and the security of its partners, to better identify potential future breaking points and prevent further crises, and, together with the Member States, to marshal responses similar to those required in times of war;

5. Expects the white paper on European defence to define this new framework and the extent to which the EU can help Europe anticipate and ready itself for the most extreme military contingencies, deter potential aggressors and defend itself both in the short and long term with a view to becoming a credible power and a European pillar within NATO;

6. Considers that common foreign and security policy (CSDP) missions and operations have to be reassessed and reviewed with this perspective in mind; insists that, to fulﬁl its role as an insurance policy for Europe’s security, the CSDP must become stronger and more agile, including by becoming the EU’s instrument to fight against hybrid warfare;

7. Stresses that capabilities and resources must be increased, and that the fragmentation of the defence market must be overcome; fully agrees with and shares the Draghi report’s [1] view that the EU and its Member States must urgently decide on incentives directed towards the EU defence industry and find creative solutions for large-scale public and private investments in security and defence;

8. Urges the EU and its Member States to significantly increase their efforts to decisively shift the trajectory of Russia’s war against Ukraine; underlines that such a shift depends now almost entirely on Europeans; urges the Member States, therefore, to provide more arms and ammunition to Ukraine; warns, ahead of any negotiations, that if the EU should fail in its support, and if Ukraine were to be forced to surrender, Russia would turn against other countries, including possibly EU Member States; calls on the Council to work with Ukraine to identify a peaceful solution to the war, and to actively engage in implementing Ukraine’s Peace Formula; urges the EU and its Member States, first and foremost, to participate in establishing robust future security guarantees for Ukraine;

9. Believes that the EU can play a crucial role in identifying the gap between Ukraine’s military capabilities and its needs, after three years of war, as well as in identifying the available defence capabilities of the Member States, with a view to coordinating the ramping up of defence industry production as well as ensuring the constant production of certain equipment in order to respond to foreign aggressions or the specific needs of its strategic partners;

10. Calls for a significant increase in the financing of military support to Ukraine; condemns the veto imposed by one Member State on the functioning of the European Peace Facility; calls on the Member States to take the decision, together with their G7 partners, to use frozen assets as a basis for a substantial grant and loan to Ukraine, as a legally robust and financially substantial way to maintain and increase Europe’s response to Ukraine’s military needs;

11. Urges the Council and the Member States to review and strengthen the enforcement of existing sanctions, and to adopt and strictly implement restrictive measures against all entities and countries facilitating the circumvention of sanctions and helping to provide Russia’s military complex with military and dual-use technologies and equipment;

12. Insists on the paramount importance of cooperation with the Ukrainian defence industry and its integration, in the long term, into the EU’s defence technological and industrial base; recalls the urgency to properly finance the Ukraine instrument under the European Defence Industrial Programme (EDIP), which is not currently budgeted for;

13. Strongly believes that the EU must further expand and improve its tailor-made training operations to respond to the needs of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and, in return, create the conditions for European armed forces to learn lessons and strategic practices from them;

14. Calls for the EU and its Members States to facilitate the use of CSDP instruments to complement national security tools in the immediate vicinity of the EU’s territory and territorial waters, and to strengthen dual-use and civilian-military cooperation at EU level, based on a whole-of-government approach; reiterates its call for the protection of critical underwater infrastructure and the development of protective countermeasures;

15. Calls for the EU to develop a comprehensive EU risk assessment to help identify the major cross-sectoral threats and hazards and the concrete risks facing the EU as a whole, building on current sector-specific risk assessment processes;

16. Insists on the importance of using the upcoming Preparedness Union strategy to put the EU on track towards comprehensive preparedness;

17. Calls for a principle of ‘preparedness by design’ to be embedded consistently in a cross-cutting way across the EU institutions, bodies, and agencies; insists on the need to develop a mandatory security and preparedness check for future impact assessments and stress-tests of existing legislation; stresses the need to reduce the obstacles in current EU legislation that undermine the efficiency of European defence and security;

18. Invites the Commission and the Member States to explore the feasibility of an EU preparedness act, setting joint standards and long-term guidelines, to align EU and national efforts wherever possible;

19. Calls for the EU and its Member States to set up and regularly conduct an EU comprehensive preparedness exercise to test both high-level decision-making and operational coordination, in order to encourage the building of strong horizontal links between actors and across sectors;

20. Calls for the EU to urgently adapt its tools to new realities by designing an administrative capacity to fast-track procedures during wars or other large-scale crises, and to adopt the appropriate tools;

21. Considers regular threat analyses, like the one that was first conducted in the Strategic Compass, to be an absolute necessity; considers that the Strategic Compass, the CSDP, the white paper and the European defence industrial strategy should form the basis of a comprehensive vision for European defence;

22. Recalls that the Strategic Compass provides the EU with necessary propositions; urges the Member States to take urgent decisions to ensure its full implementation; reiterates its call for the Military Planning and Conduct Capability to finally benefit from adequate premises and staff, enhanced command and control, and effective communication and information systems for all CSDP missions and operations; insists on the fact that the Rapid Deployment Capacity has to achieve full operational capability in 2025; strongly believes that more substantial progress must be made in bringing Article 42(7) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) into operation;

23. Reiterates its call to strengthen EU-NATO cooperation with actions and not only words, including in the domains of information exchange, planning coordination, improved cooperation on their respective military operations, and joint efforts to significantly improve on military mobility initiatives, building on lessons learnt from military assistance to Ukraine;

24. Invites the Member States to actively participate in a priority ordering mechanism for defence production to help prioritise orders, contracts and the recruitment of employees in emergency situations; underlines that such a mechanism should apply beyond current defence applications to encompass other essential resilience-building infrastructure such as energy, transport and telecommunications;

25. Calls for the EU, in cooperation with NATO and with the support of the European Defence Agency (EDA), to identify and address the critical defence capability gaps and shortfalls in the EU and focus efforts on European strategic enablers to provide genuine EU added value; notes that in order to address the most extreme military contingencies, the EU must use the same force requirements as those set by NATO for critical military capabilities, particularly for air defence, ammunition, long-range fire capabilities, logistics and enablement;

26. Urges the EU and its Member States to move from a ‘flow’ approach to their military capabilities, which has prevailed during peacetime, to a ‘stock’ approach, with stockpiles of defence equipment ready for a sustained increase in demand; believes that the Commission should take all possible action to increase trust between Member States and encourage greater exchange and transparency on long-term planning, more proactive measures aimed at securing raw materials, and policies to close gaps in production processes and on the labour market;

27. Calls for the EU to adopt a global and coherent approach to external aid in all its aspects, with much closer alignment between the common foreign and security policy and the objectives and instruments of the CSDP;

28. Considers that the CSDP must become the EU’s armed wing in the fight against the hybrid war being waged against it, its Member States and its partners, in particular candidate countries; is deeply worried by the sharp increase in hybrid attacks including sabotage, cyberattacks, information manipulation and interference in elections, with the objective of weakening the EU and candidate countries; calls on the Member States to consider appropriate forms of deterrence and countermeasures, including the use of Article 42(7) TEU; insists on the need to improve the CSDP’s ability to identify, prevent and counter information manipulation aimed at hindering the EU’s external action; reiterates its call to establish an effective horizontal strategic communications strategy adapted to all EU communication channels;

29. Calls for the creation, under the CSDP, of an EU crisis response air fleet comprising military transport aircraft held at EU level and made available to Member States for EU deployments, transport of equipment or troops (military mobility), or emergency evacuation – the need for which was demonstrated by the capability gap during the withdrawal from Afghanistan – as well as for civilian security missions, based on the model of the European Air Transport Command;

30. Expects the European External Action Service to carry out comprehensive and uncompromising reviews of CSDP missions and operations taking into account, in particular, the realism of their respective mandates in relation to the resources allocated, the recruitment method for the staff of missions and operations, particularly with regard to the link between the skills required and the different profiles, the rationalisation of resources and the management of missions and operations, the transparency of calls for tender, activities and results obtained, best practice and lessons learned, and difficulties encountered; asks the Council, on the basis of these reviews, to take the decisions required to adapt or abandon ineffective missions and to strengthen the most useful missions; believes that the evaluation and control of CSDP missions and operations must be improved;

31. Believes that the EU should develop wartime economic cooperation contingency plans with close partners to prepare for mutual support in the case of large-scale security crises involving them directly, and deepen wartime economic dialogues with European and global partners to provide early warning of hard, hybrid, and cyber threats, to foster mutual support planning, protection of critical infrastructure and maritime safety;

32. Calls for the EU and its Member States, in cooperation with NATO, to remove all unnecessary regulatory obstacles that slow down the speed at which Europe is able to develop its military mobility; believes that the EU has to move from the logic of ‘mobility’ to that of ‘military logistics’; considers that the definition of military mobility should apply to infrastructure that covers all logistical aspects of mobility, including but not limited to logistics hubs, fuel, spare parts, repair capacity and ammunition; stresses the need for significant investments in military mobility infrastructure to enhance cargo airlift capabilities, for increased development of logistical infrastructure such as camps, depots, ports, air, sea and rail platforms, railways, waterways, roads and bridges; insists on the need to adapt regulations with the rapid implementation of the technical arrangement signed under the aegis of the EDA Cross Border Movement Permission, the harmonisation of customs formalities and the preparation of a centralised and reasoned lifting of road and rail traffic standards in the event of a crisis situation;

33. Believes that, in order to build a favourable ecosystem for the European defence industry, the EU must provide it with a united and clear long-term vision, giving it visibility and ensuring that priority needs are addressed;

34. Urges the EU to increase the coherence between existing and future EU instruments, in particular between Permanent Structured Cooperation on demand consolidation, and the European Defence Fund (EDF) on programmatic roadmaps, between the European defence industry reinforcement through common procurement act (EDIRPA) on joint procurement, and the Act in support of ammunition production (ASAP) on industrial ramp-up, between the EDIP on identification of dependencies, and the EDF on the resolution of identified dependencies; and within the EDIP itself on the coherence of actions related to the consolidation of demand and supply;

35. Insists on the importance of EU ﬂagship projects, in the form of European Defence Projects of Common Interest (EDPCI), which are critical to the European defence industry; believes that EDPCIs should be used to support the industrial and technological capacities underpinning major priorities shared by several Member States and in fields such as strategic enablers – particularly in space and European air defence – so as to act on the whole spectrum of threats, develop military mobility, in particular strategic and tactical air transport, deep strike capabilities, drone and anti-drone technologies, missiles and munitions, and artificial intelligence, as well as to develop sovereign infrastructure and critical enablers; emphasises that realism must prevail in view of the sheer number of priorities and the need to mobilise new resources; considers, in that regard, that the EU should focus on rapidly available and proven European technologies that reduce its dependencies and improve its security; calls for the creation of European defence industry champions as an objective to consolidate the EU’s defence technological and industrial base (EDTIB) and increase its global competitiveness; considers, furthermore, that instead of focusing on fair returns, EU defence policies should encourage the growth of European centres of excellence;

36. Calls on the further development of the EU defence industrial policy to improve existing defence-speciﬁc instruments and develop new instruments where necessary, and to optimise the use of non-defence-speciﬁc instruments for the purposes of the EDTIB;

37. Recalls the need to ensure the consistency of EU public policies, which must not generate obligations contradictory to the overall defence objectives, especially in a period of security crisis where the concept of ‘strategic exception’ should be introduced; calls for the creation of a genuine defence environment that supports industrial ramp-up efforts by taking better advantage of the Commission’s existing multi-sectoral instruments, screening, reviewing and, where needed, revising them to ensure that they do not undermine EU defence policy objectives;

38. Proposes that relevant defence-related entities/activities be allowed access to InvestEU, and other EU funds taking advantage of the EU defence industry as a job creator; insists on the prioritising of defence-related entities/activities as appropriate with the support of the Chips Act, and the Critical Raw Materials Act; believes that simplification efforts announced by the Commission must fully encompass the defence sector;

39. Insists on the need to ensure geographical coherence by taking stock of the will of the EU and the UK to work together, first and foremost to build security guarantees for Ukraine and to become closer security partners, but also to sign a joint declaration with concrete commitments and structured dialogue to strengthen EU-UK cooperation on the full range of foreign and security challenges the continent faces, the budgetary and regulatory conditions of which remain to be negotiated, and keeping in mind the importance of the EU’s decision-making autonomy;

40. Calls for the coherence of the support offered to companies to be improved by reducing unnecessary administrative burdens and cutting red tape, and ensuring much easier access to support for small and mid-cap companies;

41. Calls for greater coherence in governance, as the CSDP must become the instrument of a powerful Europe; considers that this requires a real link in governance between the Member States, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the other European Commissioners; urges the Member States to overcome the complexity of decision-making on European defence; calls for the creation of a Council of defence ministers and the move from unanimity to qualified majority voting for decisions in the European Council, the Council of Ministers and EU agencies such as the EDA, except for those on military operations with an executive mandate; until then, calls for the use of Article 44 TEU and the creation of a cross-sectoral task force on defence in the Commission; calls for increased democratic accountability through enhanced control by Parliament;

42. Stresses that the creation of a single European defence market is a priority as the fragmentation and lack of competitiveness of the European defence industry have so far hampered the capacity of the EU to take more responsibility as a security provider; recalls that the notion of a ‘defence market’ implies a full recognition of its specificity and an appropriate and consistent application of EU public policies; recalls that this single market should aim for European preference by strictly linking it to territoriality and added-value generated in the EU;

43. Strongly believes that European preference should be the cornerstone of EU policies related to the European defence market, as a strategic imperative aimed at protecting European know-how and strengthening European defence capabilities on a long-term basis, and to ensure that EU taxpayer money is used to create added value on EU territory;

44. Calls for the notion of the internal market to be linked to that of territoriality, as defence is driven by Member State policy rather than the market, and as the defence industry is under authorisation to produce and under exemption to sell;

45. Insists on the need to remove barriers to market entry for defence products across the EU by reviewing the directives on the transfer of defence-related products and defence procurement;

46. Underlines that the European preference principle must be reflected in EU defence regulations by clear and unambiguous eligibility criteria both for entities and for products;

47. Calls on the Commission to design a better resourced, more strategic and more efficient successor to the EDF that supports common research and innovation in defence all along the supply chain and lays down the conditions for addressing technological challenges such as advanced persistent threats, artificial intelligence and machine learning, quantum computing, military internet of things, security, supply chain attacks, zero-day exploits and cloud security; calls for the establishment of an EU agency inspired by the American Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), adapted to the EU’s specific characteristics, in order to fund strategic, groundbreaking projects designed to promote European technological and economic superiority;

48. Is concerned that, without a substantial increase in investment in defence, the EU will not reach its objectives on security and defence, either for military support to Ukraine or to bolster the EU’s common security; highlights that the cost of non-preparedness for most extreme military contingencies would then be much higher than the cost of decisive EU preparedness; recalls that aggregate EU defence spending is inadequate and lacks sufficient focus on innovation; calls for the EU and the Member States to work and agree on the concrete ways and means for short- to long-term massive public and private investments in defence and security; recalls that the Commission has estimated the funding needed at EUR 500 billion over the next 10 years (2025-2034), including EUR 400 billion to strengthen Member States’ defence capabilities and EUR 100 billion to support Ukraine;

49. Considers that, in the next EU multiannual financial framework (MFF), defence spending lines will have to reflect the new priority of being ‘ready for the most extreme military contingencies’ and include ambitious financing for military mobility, counter-mobility measures and defence industrial capacity building;

50. Strongly supports the five-point Re-Arm Europe plan proposed by the Commissions President on 4 February 2025, which includes the possibility of triggering the escape clause of the Stability and Growth Pact for defence investments in order to allow Member States to increase their defence spending, a new instrument to provide EUR 150 billion of loans to Member States for defence investment, possibilities and incentives for Member States that choose to use cohesion policy programmes to increase defence spending, as well as the mobilisation of private capital through the completion of the capital markets union and the widening of the scope of the European Investment Bank (EIB); urges the Member States to support this plan;

51. Strongly supports the notion that Member States must increase financing for their defence and security to new levels; notes that some Member States are already increasing their defence spending to 5 % of GDP and insists that the current security environment and multiple, complex and evolving security threats require Member States to spend at least 3 % of GDP on defence;

52. Insists that urgent needs cannot wait for the next MFF; insists that innovative solutions for finding additional funding must be considered without delay, including:

(a) re-prioritising existing EU funds,

(b) investing in the defence sector by making it explicitly eligible under the European Regional Development Fund and the Cohesion Fund, while leaving the regions and Member States free to decide whether to make it a priority according to local needs;

(c) making it easier and faster to re-purpose funds from one project to another,

(d) exploring the possibility of adjusting EU funding criteria to give new prominence to security criteria in allocating spending;

53. Underlines that a ‘popular loan’ would not only mobilise the European families’ savings, but also unify the 450 million European citizens around the need to improve our collective security; stresses that this popular loan should be organised with the same rules and advantages in all the 27 Member States and could give a common sense of belonging to the nations of the EU;

54. Is of the opinion that national recovery and resilience plans should be amended to allow for new defence funding;

55. Recommends the identification of new resources that could require contributions from the Member States as part of a new EU debt programme along the lines of the NextGenerationEU plan, following on from the idea of ‘defence bonds’, to complement the Commission’s Re-Arm Europe plan, if necessary;

56. Reiterates, in line with the Commission’s Re-Arm Europe plan, its call for the EIB, other international financial institutions and private banks in Europe to invest more actively in the European defence industry, as speeding up security and defence investments in the EU would leverage private funding and have a strong signalling effect as regards other investors and market operators;

57. Calls on the EIB in particular to re-evaluate its list of excluded activities, to adjust its lending policy to increase the volume of available funding in the field of security and defence, and to investigate the possibility of issuing earmarked debt for funding security and defence projects;

58. Calls for the development of emergency procedures for projects established in response to major crises or wars whereby the EU, jointly with the EIB, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the Council of Europe Development Bank, can enable banks to use faster processes to support projects necessary in crises or wars; calls for the EU also to consider amending the Treaties to allow the use of capital from the European Stability Mechanism for Europe’s war economy;

59. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the European Council, the Council, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the President of the Commission and competent Commissioners, the EU security and defence agencies and the governments and parliaments of the Member States.

MIL OSI Europe News –

March 7, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the white paper on the future of European defence – B10-0144/2025

Source: European Parliament

B10‑0144/2025

European Parliament resolution on the white paper on the future of European defence

(2025/2565(RSP))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the common security and defence policy (CSDP) and the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) of the EU,

– having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 42 thereof,

– having regard to Title III, Article 3 of the Protocol on the concerns of the Irish people on the Treaty of Lisbon,

– having regard to the announced publication of the white paper on the future of European defence on 19 March 2025,

– having regard to the Helsinki Accords,

– having regard to the various European defence projects of recent years,

– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas, in line with the Treaties, the CSDP is part of the CFSP and is considered a policy framework through which Member States can develop a European strategic culture of security and defence, address conflicts and crises together, protect the Union and its citizens and strengthen international peace and security;

B. whereas Article 42(2) TEU states that the Union’s CSDP must be compatible with the common security and defence policy established within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), under the North Atlantic Treaty;

C. whereas NATO is largely dominated by the United States, and NATO membership entails a mandatory complementarity and compatibility of European weapons systems with US systems, hence impeding the strategic and operational autonomy of Member States and other European countries;

D. whereas at the NATO Summit in Bucharest in 2008, the US Government pushed for Ukrainian NATO membership against the opinion of several Member States; whereas following the Russian invasion, the United States pushed EU Member States to systematically increase the quantity and quality of arms deliveries to Ukraine;

E. whereas different Member States have different military and security policies, including policies of military neutrality;

F. whereas the United States saw windfall benefits from the Ukraine war through an increase of US shale gas exports to the European Union; whereas the US Government now unjustly wishes to control Ukrainian mineral resources and negotiate an end to the war in Ukraine with Putin, without involving Ukraine and the European Union;

G. whereas unlike nuclear weapon states such as India and the People’s Republic of China, NATO and Russia refuse to commit to a ‘no first use’ policy, whereby they would formally refrain from using nuclear weapons, except in retaliation to an attack by an enemy power using weapons of mass destruction;

H. whereas the US Government has launched a high number of wars and military operations that violated international law and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations; whereas, in light of 2024 advisory opinions of the International Court of Justice, the United States’ ongoing military support for Israel might make it complicit in genocide and illegal occupation; whereas the participation of EU Member States in violations of international law, including in wars of aggression and military invasions contrary to international law against countries such as the former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya, have undermined global adherence to the principles of international law;

I. whereas the United States has forwardly deployed new B61-12 gravity bombs on the territory of EU Member States, increasing the risk that these Member States will fall victim to preventive or retaliatory strikes related to US foreign policy;

J. whereas Russia’s repeated acts of war and aggression, starting with the war against Georgia in 2008, the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the ongoing illegal war of aggression against Ukraine, as well as an increasing number of acts of sabotage on critical infrastructure, have been factors in creating and exacerbating tensions;

K. whereas Article 41(2) TEU prohibits charging expenditure arising from operations with military or defence implications to the Union budget;

L. whereas the Commission has nevertheless launched several European defence projects over the last few years, including the European Defence Industrial Development Programme (EDIDP), the Preparatory Action on Defence Research (PADR), the European Defence Fund (EDF), the European Defence Industry Reinforcement through common Procurement Act (EDIRPA), the Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP) and, most recently, the European Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS) and the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP);

M. whereas according to 2023 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute figures, EU Member States, together with the United Kingdom, already spend more nominally on defence than all other countries in the world combined, with the exception of the United States;

N. whereas in April 2021, the Commission estimated that increased cooperation between Member States in the field of security and defence could save between EUR 25 billion and EUR 100 billion every year;

O. whereas the Commission’s Directorate-General for International Partnerships (DG INTPA) is planning to shut down more than four out of five of its hubs worldwide, reducing its diplomatic presence from around 100 delegations to 18 hubs;

P. whereas in 2024, EU leaders agreed to cut EUR 2 billion from the EU’s external action budget in the multiannual financial framework for 2021-2027; whereas several Member States, such as France and Belgium, have also made cuts and reforms to their diplomacy services;

Q. whereas Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has proposed a new common instrument to boost military spending across the EU to unlock up to EUR 800 billion of additional defence spending over the coming years;

R. whereas even the military spending of the United States, which maintains over 700 military installations in over 70 countries, does not exceed 3.46 % of its GDP;

S. whereas, nevertheless, the US Government, certain Member States and NATO and Commission officials are pushing for a further massive increase in defence expenditure, from an average of 1.9 % of GDP to 5 %;

T. whereas even the military-oriented Niinisto Report, entitled ‘Safer Together –Strengthening Europe’s Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness’ highlights the fact that threats to the security of European citizens, including increasingly frequent and intense extreme weather events, such as megadroughts, floods and heatwaves, and the risk of new pandemics, would require massive investment in public services;

U. whereas while the Draghi report on the future of European competitiveness highlights the need for massive investment in a variety of sectors, including energy, pharmaceuticals and transport, the Commission has placed seven Member States under an excessive deficit procedure, pushing for harsh austerity and structural reforms in social and public expenses;

V. whereas a further massive increase in military expenditure will instead lead to cuts in public services, and in social, climate and environmental spending throughout Europe, endangering the social and human security of European citizens;

W. whereas the Commission is nonetheless considering the suspension of economic governance rules for military expenses;

X. whereas the Commission has failed to present a fully autonomous assessment of European defence needs and priorities, relying instead on NATO assessments of critical gaps in defence capability;

Y. whereas Türkiye, a NATO member, illegally occupies 37 % of Cyprus, an EU Member State;

Z. whereas in international relations theory the ‘security dilemma’ refers to a phenomenon whereby actions, such as arms procurement, taken by a state actor to increase its own security provokes reactions from other states, such as increased arms procurement or preventive attacks, that ultimately lead to a decrease rather than an increase in the original state’s security;

AA. whereas the 1975 Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, concluded in Helsinki between the United States, Canada, the Soviet Union and all of the countries of Europe, except Albania, played an important role in easing tensions between East and West during the Cold War;

AB. whereas the Cold War collective security acquis has been systematically undermined by the United States’ withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM), the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) and the Open Skies Treaty, systematically followed by Russian withdrawals, and by the Russian withdrawal from the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and from the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty;

AC. whereas a new European security architecture will have to apply the principles of peaceful coexistence between countries with different political systems and offer security guarantees to all parties in order to avoid Europe being divided once again into two diametrically opposed blocs;

Towards a European collective security architecture

1. Recalls that the Treaties consider the CSDP part of the CFSP; asks, therefore, that any defence initiative at EU level be subordinated to a clear foreign and security policy and strategy for peace on the European continent;

2. Rejects the militarisation of the EU and any belligerent objectives of the CSDP;

3. Notes with great concern the diminishing respect for international and humanitarian law by parties all around the world, with Israel, Russia and the United States being flagrant examples; reiterates the need for European independence in shaping foreign and defence policy;

4. Considers that in light of the United States’ past and ongoing violations of international law and the negative impact of US military interventions on neighbouring regions, the foreign, security and defence policy of the Union and Member States can no longer be aligned with the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO); calls, therefore, on the European Council to start the process of revising the EU Treaties to remove this requirement from the TEU;

5. Recalls that NATO and the EU are distinct organisations which serve very different purposes and whose membership is not even identical; regrets the conflation of NATO, a military alliance, with the EU;

6. Is extremely worried by the fact that there are still more than 13 000 nuclear weapons scattered around the world, many of which can be deployed within minutes and could cause the end of humankind; notes with concern that despite a stated commitment to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, NATO’s nuclear member states invested USD 271 billion in nuclear weapons modernisation and maintenance between 2019 and 2023, while in 2023 China and Russia were the second and third largest spenders, with budgets of USD 11.9 billion and USD 8.3 billion respectively;

7. Believes that NATO’s refusal to commit to a ‘no first use’ policy on nuclear weapons and the forward deployment of US nuclear weapons in Europe increases the risk of Europe becoming a target of nuclear strikes; demands, therefore, the withdrawal of US nuclear weapons from the territory of Member States; is deeply concerned about nuclear threats to European security, including veiled warnings about the use of tactical nuclear weapons and Russia’s lowering of its threshold for using nuclear weapons;

8. Urges the Member States to work on a new long-term collective security architecture for Europe inspired by the principles of the Helsinki process and including the concept of mutual security guarantees; notes that a fundamental aspect of such an approach is respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations and a commitment to international law;

9. Insists that a new European security architecture apply the principles of peaceful coexistence between countries with different political systems, and offer security guarantees to all parties;

10. Calls on the Commission, in light of multiple threats ranging from climate-related catastrophes to pandemics, to abandon a narrow focus on military security and develop a policy centred on human security as defined in United Nations General Assembly resolution 66/290, which states that ‘human security is an approach to assist Member States in identifying and addressing widespread and cross-cutting challenges to the survival, livelihood and dignity of their people’ and calls for ‘people-centred, comprehensive, context-specific and prevention-oriented responses that strengthen the protection and empowerment of all people’;

11. Calls on the Commission and Member States to seek inspiration from Austria, which has enshrined neutrality in its constitution, committing not to join military alliances and not to permit the establishment of any foreign military bases on its territory;

12. Calls on the Commission and Member States to also look to the example set by Ireland, with its tradition of military neutrality; recalls that this tradition includes an active approach towards peace support operations and crisis management, contributions to conflict resolution and peacebuilding, work for human rights and development, and efforts to promote disarmament and the elimination of weapons of mass destruction;

13. Regrets the attacks on Irish neutrality and recalls that the people of Ireland were guaranteed continued military neutrality, underpinned by a commitment to only undertake operations with a United Nations mandate, ahead of their ratification of the Lisbon Treaty;

14. Reiterates its call on Türkiye, a NATO member, to withdraw its troops from Cyprus, an EU Member State, and to work constructively towards finding a viable and peaceful solution based on the relevant UN resolutions;

15. Calls for unanimity voting on defence issues to be maintained within the Council to promote consensus-based solutions that foster much-needed unity;

Diplomacy as the cornerstone of European security

16. Believes that diplomacy should remain a cornerstone of EU foreign policy;

17. Recalls that conflict prevention is paramount to any security and defence strategy; underlines the fact that diplomacy prevents and ends wars, and that every euro invested in conflict prevention saves around EUR 16 later on;

18. Believes that, given the deteriorating security situation on several fronts and increasing geopolitical tensions, preventive diplomacy requires sustained and enhanced attention; calls, therefore, on the Commission and Member States to immediately reverse the cutbacks made to diplomatic representations;

19. Believes that its systematic alignment with US foreign policy, most recently with regard to Israeli war crimes, ethnic cleansing and genocidal practices against Palestinians, has dramatically reduced the EU’s global diplomatic credibility and therefore worsened its security situation;

20. Recalls that the participation of EU Member States in illegal military operations and the support for violations of international law abroad gravely endangers the security of EU citizens; urges the Commission and Member States to explore a non-aligned foreign and security policy stance based on the principles of the UN Charter, including peaceful conflict resolution, diplomacy and multilateralism;

21. Believes that Europe has much to gain from diversifying its relations and maintaining diplomatic connections with as many countries as possible around the world;

Arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation

22. Is deeply concerned that world military expenditure continues to rise to new record levels; highlights the fact that an arms race will not create security for European citizens, but instead, in line with the security dilemma, heighten the risk of violent conflict; calls on the Commission to actively promote new arms control treaties;

23. Recalls that the EU strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction made non-proliferation a central goal of the EU’s CFSP, stating that ‘our objective is to prevent, deter, halt and, where possible, eliminate proliferation of concern worldwide’; calls, therefore, on Member States to sign and ratify the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons;

24. Notes that arms exports, also of small and light weapons, can fuel conflict and global terrorism and destabilise entire regions, states and societies, thereby thwarting sustainable development and crisis management efforts; calls on the Commission and Member States to strictly apply Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008 defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment in order to avoid a worsening of the security situation in the EU’s immediate neighbourhood;

25. Calls for the creation of a Directorate-General for Disarmament and Arms Control at the Commission;

26. Demands an immediate arms embargo against Israel and any other country directly or indirectly involved in armed conflict, except in the case of those that are the victim of invasion by others, in order to stop EU complicity in war crimes, ethnic cleansing and genocidal practices, whether perpetrated by Israel or any other country; calls on the Commission and Member States to base their foreign and security policy on the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and international law;

Defence expenditure

27. Urges the Commission and Member States to offer full transparency and a critical audit of the current defence expenditure within the Union, detailing why it estimates that European countries would be unable to defend themselves with budgets already vastly superior to those of most of the world’s countries;

28. Notes with concern that the Commission has presented a new EUR 150 billion common defence fund; believes that an increase in defence spending is not the solution to finding a lasting peace and that cuts in the EU structural funds should not be used for this purpose, given how vital these funds are to the development of local communities across the EU;

29. Notes that the share of GDP is not an adequate measure for the efficiency and impact of defence expenditure; calls on the Commission and Member States not to enter an arms race through a massive increase in defence budgets at the expense of both human and social security;

30. Regards the NATO demand for complementarity and compatibility of European weapons systems with US systems as incompatible with European strategic autonomy; regrets that the Commission and the Council have failed to present a detailed assessment of European critical defence capability gaps; calls on both institutions to present such an assessment, including specific priorities, before considering increased defence expenditure; recalls that these should focus on defensive tasks, not on building capacities for military intervention all over the world;

31. Recalls Commission estimates that increased cooperation between Member States in the field of security and defence could save up to EUR 100 billion every year; calls, in this regard, for inspiration to be drawn from existing intra-European cooperation structures, such as BACA, the Belgian-Dutch Naval cooperation BeNeSam and the Nordic Defence Cooperation, including Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden, which have increased the efficiency of the participating nations’ national defence, and to explore common synergies and facilitate efficient common solutions;

32. Considers that the military cooperation commitments that may be assumed in collective security organisations should be considered in light of strict respect for the UN Charter;

33. Rejects the allocation of appropriations on the EU budget to the EU’s militarisation; calls for the reallocation of EU budget funds earmarked for the ongoing militarisation of the EU and its programmes to respond to the social and economic needs of citizens and promote cohesion between Member States;

34. Highlights the fact that there can be neither autonomy nor security without digital sovereignty; calls on the Commission to prioritise the development of a democratic, public-led digital stack that includes digital infrastructure as a service, and universal platforms, such as search engines and foundation AI models, governed by new public institutions with public and civil society representation;

35. Calls for heightened cooperation between Member States on sectoral issues of critical infrastructure protection, such as submarine cables;

Defence industry

36. Recalls that over the past three years, the EU has adopted a number of new initiatives on defence, and that the new Commissioner for Defence and Space believes that an additional investment of EUR 500 billion is needed in the coming decade, though other sources speak of EUR 700 billion;

37. Recalls that the previous EU programmes have been implemented with a lack of transparency with regard to the application of EU ethical guidelines, and that decision-making is extremely opaque and heavily influenced by arms industry lobbyists;

38. States that without ethics in investment choices, the EU will contribute to the creation of a more dangerous and lawless world order, where imperialist powers can disregard international law without facing consequences, while countries of the global south are exploited for their resources;

39. Calls, in addition, for the EU to adopt a policy of transparent, mission-oriented military spending, with more conscious spending at the service of a defined foreign policy to ensure greater efficiency;

40. Recalls that under Article 41(2) TEU expenditure arising from operations having military or defence implications may not be charged to the EU budget; calls for a strict application of this article; demands a retroactive review of corresponding defence funds and budget lines and for their termination where needed;

41. Expresses deep concern about the increased subsidies and public support for the military-industrial complex amid record total global military expenditure of USD 2 443 billion in 2023, making 2023 the ninth consecutive year in which military expenditure increased;

42. Demands that European public money go to European companies and emphasises that public European companies should, by definition, remain in Europe, while private companies can relocate their activities if they so wish;

43. Observes that leading arms companies have benefited shamelessly from the war in Ukraine; notes that Lockheed Martin alone distributed USD 6.8 billion of cash to shareholders in dividends and share repurchases in 2024; demands that windfall profits be taxed to finance climate adaptation, public health and housing, which are also components of a broader understanding of security;

44. Considers that the use of public money should systematically correspond to a proportional public return on investment and not finance corporate profit;

45. Stresses that focusing our resources, notably research and development spending, on the military sector will also slow down the development of other strategic industries with civilian purposes, such as renewable energy or pharmaceuticals;

46. Adds that military spending does not address any of the major social or environmental challenges, and that, worse still, it reinforces polluting and energy-consuming industrial models, thus increasing pressure on resources and the climate, particularly critical materials;

47. Believes that a massive increase in purchases of US-made goods would not only be detrimental to the European economy but would equally prolong Europe’s military dependence on the United States, while creating new industrial and technological constraints;

48. Demands that the defence industry continue to be excluded from qualifying for the sustainability criteria with regard to investment;

49. Calls for EIB financing to be strictly limited to civilian projects, excluding dual-use items;

Reprioritising public services and social spending

50. Is deeply concerned that militarisation, and specifically the ReArm Europe plan, is being used to further attack public services across the EU, which are already facing the suffocating effects of austerity measures imposed by the Commission;

51. Is appalled by the fact that the Commission is willing to bend fiscal rules such as the Stability and Growth Pact to finance military spending, but considers it impossible to raise spending to fund crumbling public services and support social and economic upward convergence in Member States;

52. Firmly insists that health, education, green mobility, climate adaptation, climate mitigation, biodiversity, food security and digital transition are elements of human security and should be considered priorities that require investments rather than budgetary cuts;

53. Calls, in line with the concept of human security, for a reprioritisation of public services and social welfare spending, as well as for investments in fighting climate change, as imperative prerequisites for guaranteeing that people live in a safe and secure environment;

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54. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the European External Action Service.

MIL OSI Europe News –

March 7, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Proposals by former Commissioner for Economy Paolo Gentiloni on a debt-financed EU Defence Fund and ending the veto on new Eurobonds – E-000874/2025
Source: European Parliament
Question for written answer E-000874/2025
to the Commission
Rule 144
Petra Steger (PfE)

Former Commissioner for Economy Paolo Gentiloni has publicly called for the creation of a debt-financed EU Defence Fund. This would constitute a second step after Commission President von der Leyen already announced that Member States would be allowed greater flexibility in debt reduction to increase military spending. Consequently, according to Gentiloni, the existing veto against new Eurobonds should also be reconsidered. However, this mutualisation of debt rewards poorly performing countries at the expense of the few remaining net contributor countries. This creates a completely wrong incentive for the future – ‘bad economic management pays and is rewarded’. Making this madness permanent would mean the economic deathblow for the net contributor states and would be nothing other than a centralist wealth redistribution programme that would undermine national sovereignty and make the debt and transfer union a reality once and for all.

1.What is the Commission’s assessment of Gentiloni’s proposals, in particular with regard to a debt-financed EU Defence Fund and an end to the veto on new Eurobonds?

2.Can the Commission exclude the use of new debt-financed financial instruments, such as a new debt fund, during the current legislative term?

3.What measures does the Commission intend to take to safeguard the national budgetary autonomy of the Member States and to prevent net contributors, such as Austria, from having to pay for the mistakes of states with irresponsible budgetary policies?

Submitted: 27.2.2025
Last updated: 6 March 2025
MIL OSI Europe News –
March 7, 2025

MIL-OSI Security: Defense News: Amphibious Transport Dock – LPD

Source: United States Navy

Description Amphibious transport dock ships are warships that embark, transport and land elements of a landing force for a variety of expeditionary warfare missions.

Features LPDs are used to transport and land Marines, their equipment, and supplies by embarked Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC) or conventional landing craft and amphibious assault vehicles (AAV) augmented by helicopters or vertical take-off and landing aircraft (MV 22). These ships support amphibious assault, special operations, or expeditionary warfare missions and serve as secondary aviation platforms for amphibious operations.

Background The LPD 17 San Antonio class is the functional replacement for over 41 ships including the LPD 4 Austin class, LSD 36 Anchorage class, LKA 113 Charleston class, and LST 1179 Newport class amphibious ships. The newly designated LPD Flight II ships (formerly LX(R)) will be the functional replacement for the LSD 41/49 Whidbey Island Class. The San Antonio class provides the Navy and Marine Corps with modern, sea-based platforms that are networked, survivable, and built to operate in the 21st century, with the MV-22 Osprey, the upgraded Amphibious Assault Vehicle, and future means by which Marines are delivered ashore. Construction on USS San Antonio (LPD 17), the first ship of the class, commenced in June 2000 and was delivered to the Navy in July 2005. USS New York (LPD 21) was the first of three LPD 17class ships built in honor of the victims of the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. The ship’s bow stem was cast using 7.5 tons of steel salvaged from the World Trade Center. The Navy named the eighth and ninth ships of the class Arlington and Somerset, in honor of the victims of the attacks on the Pentagon and United Flight 93, respectively. Materials from those sites were also incorporated into the construction of each ship. USS Portland (LPD 27), the eleventh ship of the class, delivered in 2017. LPDs 28 and 29 are currently under construction at Huntington Ingalls Industries (HII) on the Gulf Coast. As the 12th and 13th San Antonio class ships, LPDs 28 and 29 will perform the same missions as the previous 11 ships of the class while incorporating technically feasible cost reduction initiatives and class lessons learned. In 2018, the Navy made the decision to transition the LX(R) effort to a second flight of the LPD 17 design. LPD 30 will be the first of 13 planned LPD Flight II ships, for a total complement of 26 ships in the LPD 17 class.

General Characteristics, San Antonio Class LPD Flights I and II

Builder: Huntington Ingalls Industries

Propulsion: Four sequentially turbocharged marine Colt-Pielstick Diesels, two shafts, 41,600 shaft horsepower

Length: 684 feet

Beam: 105 feet

Displacement: Approximately 24,900 long tons (25,300 metric tons) full load

Draft: 23 feet

Speed: In excess of 22 knots (24.2 mph, 38.7 kph)

Crew: Ship’s Company: 383 Sailors and 3 Marines. Embarked Landing Force: Flight I: 699 with surge capacity of 800; LPD 28/29:650; Flight II: 631.

Armament: Two Mk 46 30 mm Close in Guns, fore and aft; two Rolling Airframe Missile launchers, fore and aft: ten .50 caliber machine guns

Aircraft: Launch or land two CH-53E Super Stallion helicopters or two MV-22 Osprey tilt rotor aircraft or up to four AH-1Z or UH-1Y or MH-60 helicopters

Landing/Attack Craft: Two LCACs or one LCU; and 14 Amphibious Assault Vehicles

Ships:

USS San Antonio (LPD 17), Norfolk, Virginia

USS New Orleans (LPD 18), Sasebo, Japan

USS Mesa Verde (LPD 19), Norfolk, Virginia

USS Green Bay (LPD 20), Sasebo, Japan

USS New York (LPD 21), Mayport, Florida

USS San Diego (LPD 22), San Diego, California

USS Anchorage (LPD 23), San Diego, California

USS Arlington (LPD 24), Norfolk, Virginia

USS Somerset (LPD 25), San Diego, California

USS John P. Murtha (LPD 26), San Diego, California

USS Portland (LPD 27), San Diego, California

Fort Lauderdale (LPD 28) – Under construction

Richard M. McCool (LPD 29) – Under construction

Harrisburg (LPD 30) – Under construction

Pittsburgh (LPD 31)

MIL Security OSI –

March 7, 2025

MIL-OSI New Zealand: Things to do in Tāmaki Makaurau this Autumn

Source: Auckland Council

Autumn is here, but there’s still a few more days before the golden weather is set to end, and the good news is you don’t have to spend a lot of money to have a memorable time in Tāmaki Makaurau. As the leaves turn golden and the air gets crisp, there’s no better time to embrace the beauty of the season.

From breathtaking walking trails and cosy indoor experiences for the odd rainy day, to playgrounds that offer more than just swings and slides, Auckland Council has your ultimate autumn bucket list sorted for you and your whānau.

Explore our stunning regional parks and pathways

Autumn is the perfect season to venture into Auckland’s 28 regional parks, where you can witness nature’s changing colours and soak up some of the best views in the region. A few of the top activities to enjoy include:

Have your pick of scenic trails at Atiu Creek Regional Park.

Our regional park picks for autumn:

Ātiu Creek Regional Park Bike tracks and a stunning view of the Kaipara Harbour make this a must visit.

Shakespear Regional Park Perfect for scenic hikes and birdwatching, this open sanctuary is accessible via Whangaparāoa Road in Army Bay.

Waharau Regional Park Enjoy farmland, river banks and forest for camping, picnics, walking and mountain biking.

Some tracks in regional parks might be closed to help stop Kauri Dieback. Be sure to check the Auckland Council website before you go to see if your destination is affected.

Take in the breath-taking landscapes of Waharau Regional Park.

Playgrounds closer to home

Before the days get too short, make the most of letting the kids run wild at some of Auckland’s best playgrounds. Whether they love climbing, sliding, or biking, these spots have something for all ages:

Waterview Reserve – Waterview Reserve is a fantastic park to visit with a range of activities for kids of all ages. Nestled in between West and Central Auckland, it features a basketball court, playground and water play area.

Birkenhead War Memorial Park – For all your extreme sports enthusiasts, this awesome park features a skate park and BMX pump track. Additionally, there are picnic tables for a family get together, and walking tracks inside the park as well.

Aorere Park – Located in the heart of Māngere East, Aorere Park playground is divided into separate areas for children of different age groups. There is also a basketball court and fitness equipment to enjoy while the kids are playing.

Read about our upgraded South Auckland playgrounds, or some hidden parks in the Central Auckland area.

Kids will love playing in the revamped Aorere Park playground.

See Tāmaki Makaurau from our gorgeous cycle paths

Autumn’s cooler weather is the perfect time to get on a bike and enjoy the scenic views from our many cycle paths. From the Te Ara Tahuna path to Narrow Neck’s costal scenery, there is plenty to enjoy on your travels.

Discover more of the best family-friendly bike rides in Auckland.

Te Ara Tahuna Ōrewa Estuary Path.

Try a new hobby

Autumn represents the change from old to new, and so can you by starting a new hobby or learning a new skill.

From participating in one of the many music workshops run at our community centres across Auckland, or learning to repurpose your used items into new treasures via the Re-Creators workshops, there is plenty to learn in the Autumn season.

Find workshops, courses, and other ways to upskill on OurAuckland.

Join in to learn Ukulele at one of our community centres across Auckland.

Embrace the new season and learn new skills with services provided by Auckland Council.

Indoor escapes for chilly days

In the (hopefully unlikely!) event the weather turns cool and rainy as we move into Autumn, there are plenty of indoor activities to keep the whānau entertained:

Life drawing at Auckland Art Gallery Toi o Tāmaki.

New Lynn Library.

Check out free & affordable events

Auckland is packed with free and budget-friendly events throughout autumn. Keep an eye out for food markets, cultural festivals, and live performances that make the most of the cooler season via OurAuckland.

Embrace the colours of autumn!

With so many activities to choose from, there’s no shortage of ways to enjoy autumn in Tāmaki Makaurau. Whether you’re looking for adventure, relaxation, or family fun, get out there and make the most of this beautiful season!

MIL OSI New Zealand News –

March 7, 2025

MIL-OSI USA: What You Need to Know about NASA’s SpaceX Crew-10 Mission

Source: NASA

Four crew members are preparing to launch to the International Space Station as part of NASA’s SpaceX Crew-10 mission to perform research, technology demonstrations, and maintenance activities aboard the microgravity laboratory.
NASA astronauts Anne McClain, Nichole Ayers, JAXA (Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency) astronaut Takuya Onishi, and Roscosmos cosmonaut Kirill Peskov will lift off from Launch Complex 39A at NASA’s Kennedy Space Center in Florida.
The flight is the 10th crew rotation mission with SpaceX to the space station, and the 11th human spaceflight as part of NASA’s Commercial Crew Program.
As teams progress through Dragon spacecraft milestones for Crew-10, they also are preparing a second-flight Falcon 9 booster for the mission. Once all rocket and spacecraft system checkouts are complete and all components are certified for flight, teams will mate Dragon to the Falcon 9 rocket in SpaceX’s hangar at the launch site. The integrated spacecraft and rocket will then be rolled to the pad and raised to vertical for a dry dress rehearsal with the crew and an integrated static fire test prior to launch.

Selected by NASA as an astronaut in 2013, this will be McClain’s second spaceflight. A colonel in the U.S. Army, she earned her bachelor’s degree in Mechanical Engineering from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, New York, and holds master’s degrees in Aerospace Engineering, International Security, and Strategic Studies. The Spokane, Washington, native was an instructor pilot in the OH-58D Kiowa Warrior helicopter and is a graduate of the U.S. Naval Test Pilot School in Patuxent River, Maryland. McClain has more than 2,300 flight hours in 24 rotary and fixed-wing aircraft, including more than 800 in combat, and was a member of the U.S. Women’s National Rugby Team. On her first spaceflight, McClain spent 204 days as a flight engineer during Expeditions 58 and 59 and completed two spacewalks, totaling 13 hours and 8 minutes. Since then, she has served in various roles, including branch chief and space station assistant to the chief of NASA’s Astronaut Office. Follow @astroannimal on X and @astro_annimal on Instagram.
This mission will be the first spaceflight for Ayers, who was selected as a NASA astronaut in 2021. Ayers is a major in the U.S. Air Force and the first member of NASA’s 2021 astronaut class named to a crew. The Colorado native graduated from the Air Force Academy in Colorado Springs with a bachelor’s degree in Mathematics and a minor in Russian, and was a member of the academy’s varsity volleyball team. She later earned a master’s in Computational and Applied Mathematics from Rice University in Houston. Ayers served as an instructor pilot and mission commander in the T-38 ADAIR and F-22 Raptor, leading multinational and multiservice missions worldwide. She has more than 1,400 total flight hours, including more than 200 in combat. Follow @astro_ayers on X and @astro_ayers on Instagram.
With 113 days in space, Crew-10 will mark Onishi’s second trip to the space station. After being selected as an astronaut by JAXA in 2009, he flew as a flight engineer for Expeditions 48 and 49, becoming the first Japanese astronaut to robotically capture the Cygnus spacecraft. He also constructed a new experimental environment aboard Kibo, the station’s Japanese experiment module. After his first spaceflight, Onishi became certified as a JAXA flight director, leading the team responsible for operating Kibo from JAXA Mission Control in Tsukuba, Japan. He holds a bachelor’s degree in Aeronautics and Astronautics from the University of Tokyo, and was a pilot for All Nippon Airways, flying more than 3,700 flight hours in the Boeing 767. Follow astro_onishi on X.
The Crew-10 mission also will be Peskov’s first spaceflight. Before his selection as a cosmonaut in 2018, he earned a degree in Engineering from the Ulyanovsk Civil Aviation School and was a co-pilot on the Boeing 757 and 767 aircraft for airlines Nordwind and Ikar. Assigned as a test cosmonaut in 2020, he has additional experience in skydiving, zero-gravity training, scuba diving, and wilderness survival.

Following liftoff, the Falcon 9 rocket will accelerate Dragon to approximately 17,500 mph. Once in orbit, the crew and SpaceX mission control in Hawthorne, California, will monitor a series of maneuvers that will guide Dragon to the forward-facing port of the station’s Harmony module. The spacecraft is designed to dock autonomously, but the crew can take control and pilot manually, if necessary.
After docking, Crew-10 will be welcomed aboard the station by the seven-member crew of Expedition 72 and conduct a short handover period on science and maintenance activities with the departing Crew-9 crew members. Then, NASA astronauts Nick Hague, Suni Williams, Butch Wilmore, and Roscosmos cosmonaut Aleksandr Gorbunov will undock from the space station and return to Earth. Ahead of Crew-9 return, mission teams will review weather conditions at the splashdown sites off the coast of Florida prior to departure from station.
Crew-10 will conduct new scientific research to prepare for human exploration beyond low Earth orbit and benefit humanity on Earth. The crew is scheduled to conduct material flammability tests for future spacecraft designs, engage with students via ham radio and use its existing hardware to test a backup lunar navigation solution, and participate in an integrated study to better understand physiological and psychological changes to the human body to provide valuable insights for future deep space missions.
These are just a few of the more than 200 scientific experiments and technology demonstrations taking place during the mission.
While aboard the orbiting laboratory, Crew-10 will welcome a Soyuz spacecraft with three new crew members, including NASA astronaut Jonny Kim, and they will bid farewell to the Soyuz carrying NASA astronaut Don Pettit. The crew also is expected to see the arrival of the SpaceX Dragon, Roscosmos Progress, and Northrop Grumman’s Cygnus cargo spacecraft, as well as the short-duration private Axiom Mission 4 crew.
The cadre will fly aboard the SpaceX Dragon spacecraft, named Endurance, which previously flew NASA’s SpaceX Crew-3, Crew-5, and Crew-7 missions.
Commercial crew missions enable NASA to maximize use of the space station, where astronauts have lived and worked continuously for more than 24 years, testing technologies, performing research, and developing the skills needed to operate future commercial destinations in low Earth orbit, and explore farther from Earth. Research conducted on the space station benefits people on Earth and paves the way for future long-duration missions to the Moon and beyond through NASA’s Artemis missions.
Learn more about the space station, its research, and crew, at: https://www.nasa.gov/station

MIL OSI USA News –

March 7, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: 2024 Associate Administrator Awards Honorees

Source: NASA

The ARMD 2024 Associate Administrator Awards were presented to NASA employees, contractors, and students or interns who distinguished themselves, either individually or as part of a group, through their overall approach to their work and through results they achieved during the award year.
LEGEND: ARMD NASA CENTERSARC = Ames Research CenterAFRC = Armstrong Flight Research CenterGRC = Glenn Research CenterHQ = HeadquartersLaRC = Langley Research Center

Honoree (Individual)Kenneth R. Lyons, ARCKenneth R. Lyons made significant contributions this past year that were successfully applied in advancing NASA’s state-of-the-art unsteady Pressure Sensitive Paint (uPSP) experimental measurement in NASA’s wind tunnels. Lyons was key to the development of innovative data processing capabilities such as custom software drivers necessary to transfer the high-speed uPSP data from NASA’s wind tunnels to its High-End Computer facility – as well as other data management and methodologies overall. The uPSP development team’s principal investigator referred to his work on replacing older legacy systems as a “masterpiece.”
Honoree (Group)NASA GRX-810 Licensing TeamNASA’s GRX-810 Licensing Team demonstrated exemplary performance by developing a technologically significant new material, meeting community demands for rapid evaluation, and enabling broad industry availability through timely commercialization. The team’s efforts led to successful licensing to multiple parties, pioneering a novel approach for NASA by using co-exclusive licenses, and the negotiation of four co-exclusive licenses with commercial partners. This license structure will increase competition within the marketplace and provide incentive for each company to fast-track product development.Team Lead: Dr. Timothy M. Smith, GRCView Group Honorees
Honorable MentionShishir Pandya, ARCShishir Pandya’s exemplary actions as the formulation and technical lead for the Propulsion/Airframe Integration (PAI) emerging technical challenge were instrumental in creating an actionable project plan that will examine complex aerodynamic interactions between sustainable propulsor technologies – such as open rotor concepts envisioned in programs like General Electric’s Revolutionary Innovation for Sustainable Engines (RISE). Pandya was instrumental in classifying the current PAI analysis capabilities at NASA, and scoping NASA’s, GE’s, and Boeing’s roles and responsibilities for open fan integration studies, both computational and experimental.
Honorable Mention (Group)Electric Vertical Takeoff and Landing (eVTOL) Propulsion TeamThe Revolutionary Vertical Lift and Technology project’s Electric Propulsion Team achieved major accomplishments – successfully completing a technical challenge to improve propulsion system component reliability by demonstrating significant improvements in 100-kilowatt electric motors. Through an integrated interdisciplinary approach including external partner collaborations, the team produced six major technological capabilities towards further development of NASA’s Advanced Air Mobility mission.Team Lead: Mark Valco, GRCView Honorable Mention Group Honorees
Honorable Mention (Group)Self-Aligned Focusing Schlieren TeamThe Self-Aligned Focusing Schlieren Team developed a highly innovative and impactful Schlieren system that revolutionizes high-speed flow visualization in aeronautics research by enabling the use of a highly efficient, non-intrusive optical measurement technique in physically constrained environments. This new approach drastically improves efficiency in accurately capturing and analyzing complex, high-speed airflows around advanced aerospace vehicles in a non-intrusive manner – providing precise visualization without requiring the cumbersome alignment procedures of traditional Schlieren systems.Team Lead: Brett Bathel, LaRCView Honorable Mention Group Honorees

HonoreeAnthony Nerone, GRCAnthony Nerone demonstrated strong leadership in formulating and leading the implementation of the Hybrid Thermally Efficient Core project. He has successfully set up a framework to establish a high-performing project team that has been an example for other Aeronautics projects. Nerone’s strong project management has led industry to accelerate the development of advanced engine technologies which have started to see infusion into products – continuing United States leadership in sustainable aviation.

HonoreeDiana Fitzgerald, LaRC (Booz Allen Hamilton)Diana Fitzgerald has demonstrated innovation, responsiveness, and impact in her contributions to the Transformational Tools and Technologies (TTT) project. Her creative and comprehensive approach to enhancing TTT’s communication processes has significantly improved the efficiency and effectiveness of the project’s operations, enabling ARMD to advance critical strategic capabilities and partnerships. Her dedication has garnered widespread recognition from colleagues and leadership and has had a substantial and measurable impact.
Honoree (Group)Airspace Operations Safety Program (AOSP) Resource Analyst GroupThe AOSP Resource Analyst Group worked tirelessly to skillfully review and analyze the NASA Aeronautics budget – preparing programs and projects for planning, budget, and execution inputs. Their extraordinary performance in numerous AOSP activities building, tracking, and executing milestones resulted in a smooth and transparent execution of the program’s annual budget. The group has gone beyond the call of duty and their hard work and dedication is reflected in their discipline and commitment to NASA through critical, time-sensitive attention to detail and solution-focused problem solving.Team Leads: Michele Dodson, HQ and Jeffrey Farlin, HQView Group Honorees
Honorable Mention (Individual)Shannon Eichorn, GRCShannon Eichorn developed and authored a compelling, creative vision for the future of aeronautics research and of NASA’s working environment. She envisioned and described a future in which NASA’s aeronautics research goals, future technologies, workforce, and capabilities are in synergy to maximize research quality and impact. Eichorn presented this vision to numerous leaders and groups at NASA, and the excitement in the room at each presentation led to engaging follow-on discussions and several workstream groups requested Eichorn to present to their full group. Her efforts inspire not only ARMD, but the entire agency.

HonoreeMatthew Webster, LaRCMatthew Webster has had significant impact and contributions to meeting goals in the Convergent Aeronautics Solutions and Transformational Tools and Technologies projects. In his short time at NASA, he has rapidly demonstrated exceptional ability to adapt and apply technical expertise across multiple NASA projects to advance towards project technical goals. Webster has shown his leadership ability, providing exceptional skills at creating a healthy team environment enabling the group to successfully meet project goals.
Honorable MentionDahlia Pham, ARCDhalia Pham’s contributions as a system analyst, researcher, and teammate in support of NASA’s efforts in electrified aircraft propulsion have shown an ability to creatively solve problems, analyze impacts, present results with strong communication skills, and collaborate with and mentor others. Her technical acumen and leadership ability raise the bar, making her an established leader amongst her peers.

HonoreeSalvatore Buccellato, LaRCSalvatore Buccellato identified collaborative opportunities in hypersonics research that were mutually beneficial to NASA, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), and other non-NASA entities through his program management experience and knowledge of NASA people and capabilities. Buccellato was able to leverage NASA and non-NASA expertise and capabilities, along with DARPA funding, to further mature and advance hypersonic technologies via ground and flight tests with the goal of enabling operational flight systems. His exemplary work helped to significantly advanced hypersonic technologies and its workforce, and are expected to lead to further partnered activities for NASA.

Honoree (Group)Advanced Power Electronics Team, GRCThe Advanced Power Electronics Team of the Advanced Air Transport Technology project completed an ambitious design of a prototype flight-packaged, altitude-capable electric motor drive for aviation. Their work pushed past the state of the art in flight motor drives in several areas including power density, efficiency, and power quality – and is a steppingstone towards megawatt-level, cryogenically cooled motor drives. The electric motor design underwent many successful tests and exercises, and the team’s subsequent publications and expertise help the electrified aircraft industry push past several barriers. Team Leads: Matthew G. Granger, GRCView Group Honorees

2024 AA Award Honorees PDF
ARMD Associate Administrator Award

MIL OSI USA News –

March 7, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: 03.06.2025 Senate Approves Coast Guard Authorization Act Unanimously

US Senate News:

Source: United States Senator for Texas Ted Cruz

WASHINGTON, D.C. – U.S. Senator Ted Cruz (R-Texas), Chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee, Ranking Member Maria Cantwell (D-Wash.), and Sens. Dan Sullivan (R-Alaska) and Tammy Baldwin (D-Wis.), introduced the Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2025, and it passed the Senate by unanimous consent. The bipartisan measure was agreed to at the end of last year by leaders of both the Senate Commerce Committee and House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, but the session ended before final passage could occur. The bill authorizes funding to strengthen the Coast Guard’s ability to protect our borders, facilitate maritime commerce, unleash American energy, bolster deterrence efforts, and improve support for Coast Guard personnel and their families.
Sen. Cruz delivered the following remarks on the Senate floor regarding the Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2025:
“The United States Coast Guard is essential to protecting our Nation’s maritime borders from threats like illegal drugs, illegal immigration, and transnational crime. The Coast Guard saves American lives and ensures that commerce flows smoothly at our ports.
“The Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2025 is bipartisan legislation that Senator Cantwell and I negotiated and agreed to with House Transportation & Infrastructure Committee Chairman Sam Graves and Ranking Member Rick Larsen. It authorizes funding to bolster the Coast Guard’s critical missions of border security, facilitating maritime commerce, and enforcing the rule of law in domestic and international waters.
“I want to draw attention to several key provisions in this bill.
“Last year, the Coast Guard seized over 106 metric tons of cocaine. Unfortunately, cartels are now using technology like miniature, remote-controlled drone ships to smuggle drugs across our maritime border. Without this legislation, the Coast Guard would remain unable to prosecute criminals using these remote-controlled, autonomous vessels.
“The Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2025 expands the Coast Guard’s and Customs and Border Protection’s use of cutting-edge tools like Tactical Maritime Surveillance Systems, which are blimp-based radar systems—to find and interdict drug runners, poachers, and human traffickers at the Texas-Mexico border in the Gulf of America, in San Diego, Key West, and San Juan Puerto Rico.
“I ask my colleagues to stand with me and support President Trump’s vision of protecting our borders from drugs and illegal immigrants and of building ships to revitalize the Coast Guard’s fleet. I urge my colleagues to support the Coast Guard Authorization Act.”
Read the bill text here.
BACKGROUND
The Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2025 makes several enhancements to the Coast Guard’s operations by:

Expanding efforts to interdict and prosecute illicit drug trafficking. The Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act will now ensure the United States can prosecute drug traffickers who utilize remote-controlled or autonomous vessels to smuggle illegal narcotics.

Protecting personnel from illicit drug exposure. All Coast Guard installations will be required to maintain a supply of medication to treat opioid overdoses, including fentanyl.

Upgrading icebreaker fleet. The bill directs the Coast Guard to establish a replacement plan for aging icebreaking tug fleets and expedite the delivery of new icebreakers.

Addressing grossly negligent operations of vessels. With the steady rise of vessel traffic on U.S. waterways, individuals who operate a vessel in a grossly negligent manner and cause serious bodily injury will be held accountable with appropriate criminal penalties.

Mapping Arctic maritime routes. The Arctic Circle has strategic economic and military significance for the United States. This provision would promote American interests in the region and improve emergency response capabilities and infrastructure needed to support vessel traffic.

Increasing the Coast Guard’s deterrence capabilities. With increased instances of illegal fishing operations and illicit drug trafficking in the South China Sea, it is critical that the United States Coast Guard and Taiwan Coast Guard Administration conduct joint and integrated maritime operational and leadership training to combat violations of maritime law and threats to our national security.

Improving the livelihoods of Coast Guard families. The Coast Guard will grant a cash allowance to pregnant officers to purchase maternity-related uniform items, allow the Coast Guard to acquire more housing, and identify Coast Guard duty locations in which there is a misalignment between the basic allowance for housing and prevailing housing costs.

Refining procedures to prevent and respond to sexual assaults. The Coast Guard will establish confidential reporting for sexual harassment, strengthen protective orders for victims, and provide access to the Department of Defense’s Defense Sexual Assault Incident Database. The bill also overhauls the transfer process for victims and allows victims of sex-related offenses to request temporary separation.

Requiring the Coast Guard Academy to study its safety infrastructure. The Coast Guard Academy will be required to modify policy related to sexual assault matters, install electronic locking mechanisms to secure cadet rooms and common spaces, and update the Academy’s Board of Visitors to ensure better Congressional oversight and engagement.

Adding units to the Coast Guard’s Junior Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (JROTC) program. The bill will increase the number of units from 14 to 20 to better recruit and retain a robust and well-qualified Coast Guard officer corps.

With about 2,000 Coast Guard personnel stationed in Texas, the Service’s men and women have contributed significantly to Texas’s border security and economy. The Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2025 will specifically help Texans by:

Allowing the Coast Guard to use a proven, performance-driven approach for inspecting foreign flag tank vessels.An overwhelming majority of the Coast Guard’s gas carrier compliance exams are conducted in Texas. Performance-driven examinations will allow the Coast Guard to work more efficiently and advance President Trump’s direction to ‘Unleash American Energy.’

Establishing safety zones for space activities and offshore energy development activities. Texas is home to a robust commercial space and energy industry, and this authority allows the Coast Guard to establish safety zones in support of space launches and recovery, as well as offshore energy development activities, ensuring more job growth and greater energy security.

Streamlining the process of data sharing between the Coast Guard and U.S. Customs and Border Protection.Tactical maritime surveillance systems (TMSS) at the Coast Guard Station on South Padre Island will be used for the purposes of data integration and information sharing with U.S. Customs and Border Protection to aid in the detection and interdiction of illegal aliens and fish poachers.

Upgrading Coast Guard facilities to support border security operations and future aviation missions. The bill specifically requires studies on improving Texas-based Coast Guard Stations on South Padre Island, Port Aransas, and Port O’Connor, as well as the Coast Guard Air Station in Corpus Christi.

MIL OSI USA News –

March 7, 2025
MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: DIALOGUE, COOPERATION AND MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING ARE THE KEYS IN AN INCREASINGLY INTERCONNECTED WORLD FOR RESOLVING CONFLICTS AND FOSTERING GLOBAL HARMONY: LOK SABHA SPEAKER

Source: Government of India

DIALOGUE, COOPERATION AND MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING ARE THE KEYS IN AN INCREASINGLY INTERCONNECTED WORLD FOR RESOLVING CONFLICTS AND FOSTERING GLOBAL HARMONY: LOK SABHA SPEAKER

LOK SABHA SPEAKER EMPHASIZES THE CRITICAL ROLE OF CIVIL SERVANTS AND MILITARY LEADERSHIP IN SHAPING NATION’S PROGRESS

PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY IS ROBUST AND IDEAL MECHANISM FOR INDIA’S DIVERSITY: LOK SABHA SPEAKER

LOK SABHA SPEAKER ADDRESSES OFFICERS OF NATIONAL DEFENCE COLLEGE IN PARLIAMENT PREMISES

Posted On: 06 MAR 2025 8:37PM by PIB Delhi

New Delhi; 6 March, 2025: Lok Sabha Speaker Shri Om Birla today said that the Constitution of India has time and again proven to be a guiding light for the nation, shaping its democratic ethos and governance through the ideals enshrined in it. Shri Birla made these observations while addressing the Course Members of the 65th batch of the National Defence College (NDC), New Delhi. The event saw the participation of 124 officers from India and 32 friendly foreign countries.

आज संसद भवन के स्टडी विज़िट पर आए National Defence College (NDC), नई दिल्ली के course members को संबोधित किया।
साढ़े सात दशकों की अपनी लोकतांत्रिक यात्रा में हमारे राष्ट्र ने अनेक चुनौतियों का समाधान किया है, तथा कई उपलब्धियां हासिल की है। इस दौरान देश की सीमाओं को सुरक्षित कर… pic.twitter.com/GYlFOK4tSp

— Om Birla (@ombirlakota) March 6, 2025

Shri Birla underscored the critical role of civil servants and military leadership in shaping the nation’s progress. He urged them to leverage their training and expertise to understand India’s diverse social fabric and work towards the upliftment of society. Shri Birla observed that capacity-building of stakeholders in governance could be enhanced significantly through effective use of technology.

Highlighting the 75th year of the adoption of Indian Constitution, Shri Birla recalled the rigorous deliberations and debates that shaped the document over a three-year period. He lauded the vision and dedication of the members of the Constituent Assembly, who crafted a constitution that continues to guide the nation’s democratic framework. He reiterated that India’s parliamentary democracy—as envisioned in the Constitution—is a strong, inclusive and well-suited for a diverse nation like India.

Shri Birla advised the participants to embrace the philosophy of “Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam” (The world is one family). He emphasized that dialogue, cooperation, and mutual understanding are the keys in an increasingly interconnected world for resolving conflicts and fostering global harmony. He lauded Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi’s vision and leadership in positioning India as a world leader at different global fora including G-20, International Solar Alliance for a sustainable future.

Referring to several initiatives being taken to facilitate the work of Members of Parliament and in the larger interest of the people, Shri Birla applauded the digitization exercise aimed at preserving and making accessible parliamentary debates and historical records. He highlighted how technology is being utilized to modernize governance and ensure transparency. He also mentioned about different steps being taken for making Parliament of India a digital organisation and efficient source of information for all stakeholders.

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AM

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MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

March 7, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Hoeven Meets With North Dakota’s U.S. Senate Youth Program Delegates

US Senate News:

Source: United States Senator for North Dakota John Hoeven
03.06.25
WASHINGTON — Senator John Hoeven this week met with Martin Bergstedt, a senior at Enderlin High School, and Cady Wang, a senior at Davies High School in Fargo, who were chosen to represent North Dakota as delegates to the 63rd annual United States Senate Youth Program (USSYP). The program brings students from across the country to Washington, D.C. to meet with senators, the president, a Supreme Court Justice and cabinet officials.
“We congratulate Martin and Cady on being selected as North Dakota’s Senate Youth Program delegates and commend their dedication to academics and community service,” said Hoeven. “This prestigious, merit-based program offers students a unique opportunity to learn about the federal government while also providing scholarships to support their education.”
Martin Bergstedt
Martin Bergstedt, a senior at Enderlin High School, is president of the Future Business Leaders of America chapter. He also serves as FCCLA vice president, a National Honor Society member, yearbook editor and pep club leader. A National Merit semifinalist and accomplished speaker, he is a three-time state champion and two-time national qualifier in Speech and Debate. Actively involved in the Enderlin Endowment Fund, he plans to pursue a career in corporate finance.
Cady Wang
Cady Wang, a senior at Davies High School in Fargo, advises the North Dakota Health and Human Services Youth Advisory Board, representing nearly 200,000 youth statewide. She promotes health care equipment recycling and supports True Friends summer camp for individuals with disabilities. As a Research Science Institute participant, she now interns at North Dakota State University, working with local farms on sustainable agriculture. She plans to study environmental engineering and public policy at MIT, followed by a master’s in public policy focused on climate change and sustainability.
About USSYP
Created in 1962 by Senate Resolution 324, the USSYP has been sponsored by the Senate and fully funded by The Hearst Foundations since the program’s inception. Senate testimony states that the impetus for the program is “to increase young Americans’ understanding of the interrelationships of the three branches of government, learn the caliber and responsibilities of federally elected and appointed officials, and emphasize the vital importance of democratic decision making not only for America but for people around the world.”
Each year, this competitive, merit-based program brings 104 of the most outstanding high school students — two from each state, the District of Columbia and the Department of Defense Education Activity — to Washington, D.C. for an intensive week-long study of the federal government and those who lead it. The program’s mission is to help instill within each student delegate a more profound knowledge of the American political process and a lifelong commitment to public service.
In addition to the program week, the Hearst Foundations provides each student with a $10,000 undergraduate college scholarship with encouragement to continue coursework in government, history and public affairs. Transportation and all expenses for Washington Week are also provided by The Hearst Foundations because, as stipulated in S.Res.324, no government funds are utilized.
The chief educational officer in each state selects the delegates after nomination by teachers and principals. This year’s delegates were designated by Kirsten Baesler, North Dakota Superintendent of Public Instruction.

MIL OSI USA News –

March 7, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Crapo Reintroduces Legislation to Preserve Idaho’s 190th Fighter Squadron

US Senate News:

Source: United States Senator for Idaho Mike Crapo
Washington, D.C.–Since 1991, the U.S. Air Force fighter fleet has been severely reduced. U.S. Senators Mike Crapo (R-Idaho) and John Hickenlooper (D-Colorado) reintroduced the Fighter Force Preservation and Recapitalization Act, S. 873, to preserve U.S. Air Force (USAF) fighter force structure and prioritize the recapitalization of the 39 service-retained, combat-coded fighter squadrons available to the U.S. Secretary of Defense to respond globally to world events.
“Highly-trained, experienced and prepared forces are a key component of our country’s national defense,” said Crapo. “Closures of fighter squadrons within the U.S. Air Force’s Reserve component mean a permanent loss of these experienced pilot and maintainers. We must preserve and protect National Guard fighter squadrons, like the Idaho Air National Guard’s 190th Fighter Squadron, from force reductions that could harm our national security. This is a critical priority as we continue to face threats from foreign adversaries like Russia, China and Iran.”
“A strategy for the future of our Air National Guard fighter fleets strengthens our national security,” said Hickenlooper. “Our bipartisan bill directs the Air Force to update all National Guard fighter squadrons, including the Buckley-based 140th Wing, in order to preserve their flying missions and retain their experienced pilots.”
“Passage of the Fighter Force Preservation and Recapitalization Act of 2025 is crucial to ensuring our Air Force remains ready and lethal,” said Major General Tim Donnellan, Adjutant General of Idaho and Commander of the Idaho National Guard. “The Idaho Air National Guard’s 190th Fighter Squadron has a long history of operational excellence, and sustaining its capabilities and the expertise of its pilots is vital to protecting and defending America and its interests. As threats continue to evolve, maintaining a modernized and fully equipped fighter fleet is critical to preventing conflict and winning wars. We appreciate the continued support of our leaders in Congress who recognize the indispensable role the Air National Guard plays in delivering security around the globe.”
“Air National Guard fighter wings operate at 1/3rd the cost of their active-duty counterparts but still provide the same ‘fight-tonight’ capability,” said Major General Laura Clellan, Adjutant General of Colorado. “By acting as a retention net for talent exiting active duty and serving as a cost-effective model to both develop and retain fighter pilots, the Air National Guard presents the nation with an unrivaled value proposition. Throw in the secondary uses of Air Guardsman domestically such as wildfire mitigation, homeland airspace defense, and manpower for civil support all for a fraction of the cost of an active-duty Wing; the Air Guard’s value proposition truly is unparallelled. By providing 30% of the fighter force, for 1/3rd the cost, Air National Guard fighter wings operate as a shining example of efficient and effective use of taxpayer dollars. It’s simple, we provide more for less, without sacrificing capability.”
“Our ability to fight and win the wars of the future will require robust combat air power,” said Major General Francis McGinn (Ret.), National Guard Association of the United States President. “The Air National Guard is a critical part of that equation, making up 30 percent of USAF combat air power with only 7 percent of the total Air Force budget. The Fighter Force Preservation and Recapitalization Act will ensure the Air National Guard, the USAF reserve, and the active component have the modernized fleet they need to deter and deny our enemies. I thank Sen. Crapo, Sen. Hickenlooper, and their colleagues for their continued support of our the National Guard community.”
Idaho’s 190th Fighter Squadron has deployed frequently, supporting combat operations across Southwest Asia. Notable missions include its largest deployments, which occurred in 2020 in support of Operation Freedom’s Sentinel and in 2016 in support of Operation Inherent Resolve, as well as past support for Operations Enduring Freedom (2008), Iraqi Freedom (2007, 2003) and Southern Watch (2003). The unit is set to deploy again in 2025.
Crapo and Hickenlooper led introduction of the bill in the 118th Congress. The Fiscal Year 2025 National Defense Authorization Act contained a portion of the previous version of the Fighter Force Preservation and Recapitalization Act that requires the U.S. Air Force to develop a plan to sustain and recapitalize fighter fleets for the Air National Guard.
Of the 25 ANG Fighter Squadrons in existence today, 15 do not have a recapitalization or modernization plan to replace retiring legacy fighters. The Fighter Force Preservation and Recapitalization Act would:
Raise the minimum number of fighters in the Air Force inventory, requiring nearly two-thirds of aircraft to be combat capable;
Establish a robust reporter requirement to track Air Force Fighter force structure, giving Congress oversight authority of force structure modifications;
Prioritize recapitalization of Active Duty, Reserve and ANG units that are “service-retained” (i.e. not assigned to combatant commander) to maximize fighter assets; and
Require a report on recapitalization of ANG fighter squadrons.
Senators Jim Risch (R-Idaho), Mark Kelly (D-Arizona), Jim Banks (R-Indiana), Elissa Slotkin (D-Michigan), Rick Scott (R-Florida), Gary Peters (D-Michigan), Todd Young (R-Indiana), Angela Alsobrooks (D-Maryland), Ted Cruz (R-Texas), Chris Van Hollen (D-Maryland), Amy Klobuchar (D-Minnesota), Michael Bennet (D-Colorado), Alex Padilla (D-California), Tina Smith (D-Minnesota) and Ruben Gallego (D-Arizona) joined as original co-sponsors.
Representatives Don Bacon (R-Nebraska) and Jason Crow (D-Colorado) are leading identical companion legislation in the U.S. House of Representatives.
The Fighter Force Preservation and Recapitalization Act is supported by the National Guard Association of the Untied States (NGAUS) and the Enlisted Association of the National Guard of the United States (EANGUS).
Bill text available HERE.

MIL OSI USA News –

March 7, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Hickenlooper, Colleagues Call on Pres. Trump to Reinstate Fired Veterans

US Senate News:

Source: United States Senator for Colorado John Hickenlooper
30% of federal workforce pre-Trump admin were veterans
WASHINGTON – U.S. Senator John Hickenlooper, along with 20 of his Senate colleagues, called on President Donald Trump to reinstate veterans that the administration illegally fired. More than 640,000 veterans work for federal agencies, approximately 30% of the federal workforce. The Trump administration has fired an estimated 5,800 veterans so far.
“Your Administration’s actions are damaging the economic security and morale of our military and veteran families, the federal government’s ability to recruit and retain high-quality talent, and ultimately, our national security,” wrote the senators. “We demand that you cease your attacks on our nation’s heroes, who have already given so much in defense of our country, and immediately reinstate those who have been illegally fired with their full back pay and benefits.”
Veterans perform crucial work for American people, our national security, and our way of life. Specifically, veterans make up 50% of the Department of Defense (DOD) workforce and 30% of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) workforce. Colorado is home to over 400,000 veterans.
Yesterday, it was reported that the Trump administration has plans to fire over 80,000 employees, including veterans, from the Department of Veterans Affairs.
The senators continued: “Among those fired are veterans, military spouses, caregivers, survivors, and Guard and Reserve members with exemplary performance reviews – including 2,400 employees at the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) and thousands of employees at the Department of Defense (DOD). These men and women have dedicated their careers to serving veterans and their nation.”
Full text of the letter is available HERE and below.
Dear President Trump,
We are increasingly concerned by the real-life negative impacts your Administration’s directives are having on our nation’s military and veteran community. This includes the abrupt and indiscriminate termination of more than 30,000 employees across the federal government. Among those fired are veterans, military spouses, caregivers, survivors, and Guard and Reserve members with exemplary performance reviews – including 2,400 employees at the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) and thousands of employees at the Department of Defense (DOD). These men and women have dedicated their careers to serving veterans and their nation. In return, your Administration has upended their lives and casually discarded their service without any notice or justification – all for a statistic on a press release.
Federal civil service has long been a preferred path for military-affiliated populations, allowing them to continue serving our country while offering competitive wages, benefits, and much-needed stability. In return, every single agency in our government and every single taxpayer benefits from these experienced, talented, and dedicated employees. Across the federal government, veterans make up approximately 30 percent of the workforce – more than 640,000 veterans. At DOD, where you have announced the imminent firing of 5,400 employees, with plans to cut anywhere from 35,000 to 56,000 in the near future – the percentage of veterans is nearly 50 percent. And at VA, where veterans are able to do work directly impacting their fellow veterans, the percentage of veteran employees is nearly 30 percent. Each and every day, these veterans perform duties vital to the American people, our national security and our way of life.
Rather than leading these employees and utilizing their talents to better serve veterans and taxpayers, you have chosen to fire them in an abrupt, inconsistent, unjustified, and unlawful way with no consultation with Congress and absolutely no transparency or accountability to the American people. Your Administration’s actions are damaging the economic security and morale of our military and veteran families, the federal government’s ability to recruit and retain high-quality talent, and ultimately, our national security. We demand that you cease your attacks on our nation’s heroes, who have already given so much in defense of our country, and immediately reinstate those who have been illegally fired with their full back pay and benefits.
Sincerely,

MIL OSI USA News –

March 7, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: ICYMI: At Hearing, Military Transportation Command Chief Agrees with Warren: Right-To-Repair is Crucial for National Security

US Senate News:

Source: United States Senator for Massachusetts – Elizabeth Warren
March 06, 2025
“[T]he last thing our troops should be doing is waiting around for contractors who charge more for slower repairs.”
Video of Exchange (YouTube)
Washington, D.C. – At a hearing of the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support, U.S. Senator Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.) questioned General Randall Reed, Commander for Transportation Command (TRANSCOM), about the importance of the military’s ability to have the right to repair its own equipment.
TRANSCOM is responsible for air, land, and sea transportation that provides logistical support for troops around the world but is facing increasing challenges receiving the parts and supplies they need, which becomes even more concerning in a wartime scenario.
General Reed testified that even after Congress provided the Air Force with $10 billion to increase the availability of the C-5, one of its aircraft that carries cargo and personnel, its ability to complete missions dropped from 52% to 46% between 2022 and 2023.
The Air Force blamed the low C-5 availability on a lack of parts. Defense contractors often include restrictions in their contracts that deny the military the technical data needed to make these parts and repairs itself, which would often be cheaper and faster. General Reed agreed that providing the military with more flexibility to repair parts would increase the military’s ability to respond to threats.
Last year, Senator Warren and Senator Charles Grassley secured a provision in the fiscal year 2025 National Defense Authorization Act to create pilot programs for the services to reverse-engineer the parts they need. In an effort to further address this national security risk, Senator Warren introduced the Servicemember Right-to-Repair Act, which would improve the military’s ability to repair their equipment faster, easier, and at a lower cost to taxpayers.
Transcript: Hearing to examine the posture of the United States Transportation Command in review of the Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2026 and the Future Years Defense ProgramSenate Armed Services Subcommittee on Readiness and Management SupportMarch 5, 2025
Senator Elizabeth Warren: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for holding this hearing. TRANSCOM is responsible for making sure that our military and our allies get everything they need to win on the battlefield, whether it is a new engine for a fighter jet in the Middle East or a missile battery in the Philippines. And that means that TRANSCOM knows better than anyone why it is a very big problem if the military doesn’t have the right to repair its own equipment.
General Reed, one of TRANSCOM’s major workhorses, is the C-5M Super Galaxy, a strategic transport aircraft that carries cargo and DOD’s personnel around the world. But in 2022, it was only able to fly its mission only 52 percent of the time. That means nearly half of the time commanders needed it, it wasn’t there. Congress saw this, said that is not acceptable, and gave the Air Force $10 billion to fix that problem.
General Reed, about how often was the C-5 mission-ready the next year after you got the money?
General Randall Reed, United States Air Force Commander, United States Transportation Command: What I can tell you is that, in 2023, the mission-capable rate of the C-5 was about 46%.
Senator Warren: About 46%. So, it went from 52% to 46%. We could reasonably ask, what happened? Well, the Air Force said the supply chain for replacement parts had dried up, and when companies can’t or won’t meet DoD’s needs, one option is for the military to actually make the parts themselves so you can get things up and running. It’s often cheaper and faster anyway, but you can’t do that if big defense contractors slip restrictions into their contracts that deny the military the technical data that they need to be able to make these repairs.
General Reed, it’s your responsibility to make sure the warfighter gets everything they need. How important is it to national security for C-5s to be ready to respond to commanders’ requests to carry cargo and personnel?
General Reed: The C-5 is a key aircraft for us, and some of the things that we may be asked to do in the future. It would actually produce about 20% of the lift for us.
Senator Warren: So, you need this thing ready to go?
General Reed: Yes, we do.
Senator Warren: So, TRANSCOM’s job is getting harder here because our enemies are making it more difficult to send ships and planes to our troops. As Senator Wicker was talking about a minute ago, this is contested logistics, and TRANSCOM models show that the “fight to get into the fight” means that getting critical materials to our troops is only going to get harder over time. That means the last thing our troops should be doing is waiting around for contractors who charge more for slower repairs.
General Reed, do you agree that giving the military more flexibility to repair parts in the field will increase our military readiness?
General Reed: I do, Senator.
Senator Warren: Good. Thank you, General Reed. Senator Grassley and I got a provision into last year’s NDAA for the military to start a pilot program to reverse engineer parts for sole source programs. It’s a good start, but it is a backstop, because reverse engineering can actually take years to get done, but if DoD negotiates with contractors for the right to repair from the start, that means our men and women in uniform get their equipment faster and at a lower cost to the taxpayers.
That’s exactly what my Servicemember Right-to-Repair Act does. It has bipartisan support here in the Senate. What’s happening right now is fundamentally wrong and we can put a stop to it.

MIL OSI USA News –

March 7, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: 2 Mexican nationals, defendants in ICE cases secured in Arizona

Source: US Immigration and Customs Enforcement

PHOENIX, Ariz. – Two Mexican nationals who are targets of an ongoing U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement investigation appeared for their initial appearances Feb. 28, after they were secured from Mexico the previous day.

Jose Bibiano Cabrera-Cabrera, 37 and Jesus Humberto Limon-Lopez, 43, were taken into U.S. custody after members of drug cartels were recently designated as Foreign Terrorist Organizations and Specially Designated Global Terrorists, such as the Sinaloa Cartel, Cártel de Jalisco Nueva Generación, Cártel del Noreste, La Nueva Familia Michoacana, and Cártel de Golfo.

These defendants are collectively alleged to have been responsible for the importation into the United States of massive quantities of poison, including cocaine, methamphetamine, fentanyl, and heroin, as well as associated acts of violence.

Limon-Lopez is charged with Continuing Criminal Enterprise; Conspiracy to Distribute Methamphetamine, Fentanyl, Heroin, and Cocaine; Conspiracy to Import Methamphetamine, Fentanyl, Heroin, and Cocaine; Distribution of Methamphetamine; Distribution of Fentanyl; Distribution of Heroin; Distribution of Cocaine; and Conspiracy to Unlawfully Export Firearms and Ammunition. He faces up to life imprisonment.

Cabrera-Cabrera is charged with Conspiracy to Distribute Methamphetamine, Fentanyl, Heroin, and Cocaine; Conspiracy to Import Methamphetamine, Fentanyl, Heroin, and Cocaine; and Conspiracy to Unlawfully Export Firearms and Ammunition. He faces up to life imprisonment.

An indictment is merely an allegation of criminal conduct, not evidence. An individual is presumed innocent until evidence is presented to a jury that establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

This prosecution is part of an Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces Strike Force Initiative, which provides for the establishment of permanent multi-agency task force teams that work side-by-side in the same location. This co-located model enables agents from different agencies to collaborate on intelligence-driven, multi-jurisdictional operations to disrupt and dismantle the most significant drug traffickers, money launderers, gangs, and transnational criminal organizations.

The OCDETF Arizona Strike Force is comprised of agents and officers from Customs and Border Protection, the Department of Homeland Security, ICE Homeland Security Investigations, the Drug Enforcement Administration, FBI, the Internal Revenue Service, Criminal Investigations, the United States Marshals Service, the United States Postal Service, United States Postal Inspection Service, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, the Arizona Army National Guard, the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office, the Pima County Sheriff’s Office, and the Scottsdale Police Department.

The prosecution is being handled by the United States Attorney Office for the District of Arizona.

MIL OSI USA News –

March 7, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Attorney General Bonta, Newsom Administration: La Cañada Flintridge Agrees to End Legal Battle Over Affordable Housing Project

Source: US State of California

Thursday, March 6, 2025

Contact: (916) 210-6000, agpressoffice@doj.ca.gov

OAKLAND — California Attorney General Rob Bonta and California Department of Housing and Community Development (HCD) Director Gustavo Velasquez released the following statements in response to the City of La Cañada Flintridge’s request to dismiss its appeal concerning a mixed-use affordable housing project that would bring 80 mixed-income residential dwelling units, 14 hotel units, and 7,791 square feet of office space to the community.

“Subject to court approval, our legal battle against La Cañada Flintridge has come to an end for now. It should not have taken them this long to follow the law,” said Attorney General Rob Bonta. “California desperately needs more affordable housing, and every city and county must be part of the solution — no exceptions. If La Cañada Flintridge tries to illegally delay this project any further, we will not hesitate to hold them accountable once again.”

“We are pleased to hear that La Cañada Flintridge leaders made the right choice to end these costly legal delays,” said HCD Director Gustavo Velasquez. “In the end, we were able to hold the city accountable to state housing law and to its constituents at a time when the region needs new housing more than ever to help so many neighbors displaced by fire.”

On December 12, 2023, Attorney General Bonta, Governor Gavin Newsom, and HCD Director Velasquez requested that the court allow them to intervene in the case originally brought by California Housing Defense Fund to uphold California’s housing laws and reverse La Cañada Flintridge’s illegal denial of the mixed-use affordable housing project. On March 4, 2024, the Los Angeles County Superior Court held that La Cañada Flintridge unlawfully denied the project. The city decided to appeal the decision. On June 17, 2024, Attorney General Bonta filed a brief in support of the right of project applicants under the Housing Accountability Act (HAA) to secure a bond pending appeal, writing that “[l]engthy litigation, even if it is meritless, can result in the cancelation of a housing development due to inflation, changing interest rates, carrying costs, and expiring affordability funding.” On February 28, 2025, the Los Angeles County Superior Court ordered La Cañada Flintridge to “post a bond of $14 million within thirty (30) days or to dismiss its appeal” and the La Cañada Flintridge City Council voted to dismiss its appeal.

A copy of the city’s dismissal can be found here.

# # #

MIL OSI USA News –

March 7, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Health Care Providers and Laboratory Marketers Agree to Pay Over $1.9 Million to Settle Kickback Allegations
Source: US State of California

Gerald Congdon, M.D., of Pawleys Island, South Carolina; Gbenga Aluko, M.D., of Charlotte, North Carolina; and Anup Banerjee, M.D., of Gastonia, North Carolina, and their medical practices; as well as Curis Healthcare Inc., of Chicago, Illinois, Omar Hussain, of South Miami, Florida, and Saeed Medical Group Ltd. doing business as Alliance Immediate and Primary Care of Chicago, Illinois, agreed to pay a total of $1,913,808 to resolve alleged False Claims Act violations arising from their involvement in laboratory kickback schemes. The parties have agreed to cooperate with the Department of Justice’s investigations of other participants in the alleged schemes.

“We will continue to hold accountable individuals and entities that accept money to steer federal health care beneficiaries to a particular laboratory for testing,” said Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Brett A. Shumate of the Justice Department’s Civil Division. “Kickbacks can undermine the integrity of taxpayer-funded health care programs, distort medical decisions, and result in unnecessary services.”

The Anti-Kickback Statute prohibits offering, paying, soliciting, or receiving remuneration to induce referrals of items or services covered by Medicare, TRICARE, and other federally funded health care programs. The Anti-Kickback Statute is intended to ensure that medical providers’ judgments are not compromised by improper financial incentives and are instead based on the best interests of their patients.

The settlements announced today resolve allegations that health care providers received kickbacks in return for their referrals to a laboratory in Anderson, South Carolina, and that a marketer and his marketing company received kickbacks from that South Carolina laboratory to arrange for laboratory testing referrals, in violation of the Anti-Kickback Statute. The kickbacks allegedly resulted in the submission of false or fraudulent laboratory testing claims to Medicare and TRICARE in violation of the False Claims Act.
- Dr. Gerald Congdon, Coastal Urgent Care LLC, and Coastal Wellness Center LLC. Dr. Congdon and his medical practices in Pawleys Island and Myrtle Beach, South Carolina, agreed to pay $400,000 to resolve allegations that from May 2016 to November 2021, they received thousands of dollars in remuneration disguised as purported office space rental and phlebotomy payments from the South Carolina laboratory in return for ordering testing.
- Dr. Gbenga Aluko and Eagle Medical Center PC. Dr. Aluko and his medical practice in Charlotte, North Carolina, agreed to pay $250,000 to resolve allegations that from May 2016 to November 2021, they received thousands of dollars in remuneration disguised as purported office space rental, phlebotomy, and toxicology payments from the South Carolina laboratory in return for ordering testing.
- Dr. Anup Banerjee and Gastonia Medical Specialty Clinic P.A. Dr. Banerjee and his medical practice in Gastonia, North Carolina, agreed to pay $206,000 to resolve allegations that from April 2017 to November 2021, they received thousands of dollars in remuneration disguised as purported office space rental and phlebotomy payments from the South Carolina laboratory in return for ordering testing.
- Omar Hussain and Curis Healthcare Inc. Hussain and his marketing company agreed to pay $817,808 to resolve allegations that from April 2020 to August 2021, Hussain and his company received commissions from the South Carolina laboratory as independent contractors based on the volume and value of the Medicare and TRICARE referrals for laboratory testing that they arranged for and recommended.
- Saeed Medical Group Ltd., Omar Hussain, and Curis Healthcare Inc. Saeed Medical Group and Hussain and his marketing company agreed to pay $240,000 to resolve allegations that from April 2020 to August 2021, Saeed Medical Group received thousands of dollars in remuneration in the form of cash payments from Hussain and his company in return for ordering testing from the South Carolina laboratory.
“Integrity must be the standard in our health care system,” said Acting U.S. Attorney Brook B. Andrews for the District of South Carolina. “Kickback schemes divert funds and focus away from patients and their medical needs.”

“The public puts immense trust in medical professionals, and disdain for the rule of law damages that trust and erodes their credibility,” said Special Agent in Charge Steve Jensen of the FBI Columbia Field Office. “These settlements should serve as a reminder that the FBI and its partners are committed to holding medical practitioners accountable for kickbacks.”

“Kickback schemes undermine medical decision-making and jeopardize the integrity of federally funded health care programs,” said Special Agent in Charge Kelly Blackmon of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General (HHS-OIG). “Our commitment is to safeguard taxpayer-funded health care and the patients who rely on it, and we will rigorously pursue any allegations of False Claims Act violations.”

“The trust of the American taxpayer and the wellbeing of our service members are undermined when laboratories and physicians engage in collusive financial relationships,” said Special Agent in Charge Christopher Dillard of the Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS) Mid-Atlantic Field Office. “DCIS will continue to work with our law enforcement partners to bring to justice medical providers who illegally enrich themselves by prioritizing kickbacks over patient care.”

The settlements were the result of a coordinated effort between the Civil Division’s Commercial Litigation Branch, Fraud Section and the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of South Carolina, with assistance from HHS-OIG, DCIS, and the FBI. The settlements announced today were handled by Senior Trial Counsel Christopher Terranova in the Civil Division’s Commercial Litigation Branch, Fraud Section and Assistant U.S. Attorney Beth C. Warren for the District of South Carolina. The United States previously resolved allegations that physicians in South Carolina, North Carolina, and Texas received kickbacks from the same South Carolina laboratory.

The government’s pursuit of this matter illustrates the government’s emphasis on combating health care fraud. One of the most powerful tools in this effort is the False Claims Act. Tips and complaints from all sources about potential fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement can be reported to the Department of Health and Human Services, at 1-800-HHS-TIPS (800-447-8477).

The claims resolved by the settlements are allegations only, and there has been no determination of liability.

MIL OSI USA News –
March 7, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: Health Care Providers and Laboratory Marketers Agree to Pay Over $1.9 Million to Settle Kickback Allegations
Source: United States Attorneys General

Gerald Congdon, M.D., of Pawleys Island, South Carolina; Gbenga Aluko, M.D., of Charlotte, North Carolina; and Anup Banerjee, M.D., of Gastonia, North Carolina, and their medical practices; as well as Curis Healthcare Inc., of Chicago, Illinois, Omar Hussain, of South Miami, Florida, and Saeed Medical Group Ltd. doing business as Alliance Immediate and Primary Care of Chicago, Illinois, agreed to pay a total of $1,913,808 to resolve alleged False Claims Act violations arising from their involvement in laboratory kickback schemes. The parties have agreed to cooperate with the Department of Justice’s investigations of other participants in the alleged schemes.

“We will continue to hold accountable individuals and entities that accept money to steer federal health care beneficiaries to a particular laboratory for testing,” said Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Brett A. Shumate of the Justice Department’s Civil Division. “Kickbacks can undermine the integrity of taxpayer-funded health care programs, distort medical decisions, and result in unnecessary services.”

The Anti-Kickback Statute prohibits offering, paying, soliciting, or receiving remuneration to induce referrals of items or services covered by Medicare, TRICARE, and other federally funded health care programs. The Anti-Kickback Statute is intended to ensure that medical providers’ judgments are not compromised by improper financial incentives and are instead based on the best interests of their patients.

The settlements announced today resolve allegations that health care providers received kickbacks in return for their referrals to a laboratory in Anderson, South Carolina, and that a marketer and his marketing company received kickbacks from that South Carolina laboratory to arrange for laboratory testing referrals, in violation of the Anti-Kickback Statute. The kickbacks allegedly resulted in the submission of false or fraudulent laboratory testing claims to Medicare and TRICARE in violation of the False Claims Act.
- Dr. Gerald Congdon, Coastal Urgent Care LLC, and Coastal Wellness Center LLC. Dr. Congdon and his medical practices in Pawleys Island and Myrtle Beach, South Carolina, agreed to pay $400,000 to resolve allegations that from May 2016 to November 2021, they received thousands of dollars in remuneration disguised as purported office space rental and phlebotomy payments from the South Carolina laboratory in return for ordering testing.
- Dr. Gbenga Aluko and Eagle Medical Center PC. Dr. Aluko and his medical practice in Charlotte, North Carolina, agreed to pay $250,000 to resolve allegations that from May 2016 to November 2021, they received thousands of dollars in remuneration disguised as purported office space rental, phlebotomy, and toxicology payments from the South Carolina laboratory in return for ordering testing.
- Dr. Anup Banerjee and Gastonia Medical Specialty Clinic P.A. Dr. Banerjee and his medical practice in Gastonia, North Carolina, agreed to pay $206,000 to resolve allegations that from April 2017 to November 2021, they received thousands of dollars in remuneration disguised as purported office space rental and phlebotomy payments from the South Carolina laboratory in return for ordering testing.
- Omar Hussain and Curis Healthcare Inc. Hussain and his marketing company agreed to pay $817,808 to resolve allegations that from April 2020 to August 2021, Hussain and his company received commissions from the South Carolina laboratory as independent contractors based on the volume and value of the Medicare and TRICARE referrals for laboratory testing that they arranged for and recommended.
- Saeed Medical Group Ltd., Omar Hussain, and Curis Healthcare Inc. Saeed Medical Group and Hussain and his marketing company agreed to pay $240,000 to resolve allegations that from April 2020 to August 2021, Saeed Medical Group received thousands of dollars in remuneration in the form of cash payments from Hussain and his company in return for ordering testing from the South Carolina laboratory.
“Integrity must be the standard in our health care system,” said Acting U.S. Attorney Brook B. Andrews for the District of South Carolina. “Kickback schemes divert funds and focus away from patients and their medical needs.”

“The public puts immense trust in medical professionals, and disdain for the rule of law damages that trust and erodes their credibility,” said Special Agent in Charge Steve Jensen of the FBI Columbia Field Office. “These settlements should serve as a reminder that the FBI and its partners are committed to holding medical practitioners accountable for kickbacks.”

“Kickback schemes undermine medical decision-making and jeopardize the integrity of federally funded health care programs,” said Special Agent in Charge Kelly Blackmon of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General (HHS-OIG). “Our commitment is to safeguard taxpayer-funded health care and the patients who rely on it, and we will rigorously pursue any allegations of False Claims Act violations.”

“The trust of the American taxpayer and the wellbeing of our service members are undermined when laboratories and physicians engage in collusive financial relationships,” said Special Agent in Charge Christopher Dillard of the Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS) Mid-Atlantic Field Office. “DCIS will continue to work with our law enforcement partners to bring to justice medical providers who illegally enrich themselves by prioritizing kickbacks over patient care.”

The settlements were the result of a coordinated effort between the Civil Division’s Commercial Litigation Branch, Fraud Section and the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of South Carolina, with assistance from HHS-OIG, DCIS, and the FBI. The settlements announced today were handled by Senior Trial Counsel Christopher Terranova in the Civil Division’s Commercial Litigation Branch, Fraud Section and Assistant U.S. Attorney Beth C. Warren for the District of South Carolina. The United States previously resolved allegations that physicians in South Carolina, North Carolina, and Texas received kickbacks from the same South Carolina laboratory.

The government’s pursuit of this matter illustrates the government’s emphasis on combating health care fraud. One of the most powerful tools in this effort is the False Claims Act. Tips and complaints from all sources about potential fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement can be reported to the Department of Health and Human Services, at 1-800-HHS-TIPS (800-447-8477).

The claims resolved by the settlements are allegations only, and there has been no determination of liability.

MIL Security OSI –
March 7, 2025
MIL-Evening Report: Russia launching ‘suicide missions’ across strategic Dnipro river as pause in US aid hampers defence

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Veronika Poniscjakova, Deputy Director, Porstmouth Military Education Team, University of Portsmouth

After publicly belittling Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky in a White House meeting, Donald Trump has suspended US military aid to Ukraine and paused intelligence sharing. It is now clear that Ukraine is in trouble in both its political and military situations, and the latter will only worsen as the effects of the US aid suspension hit.

Trump’s outburst has, to some extent, reinvigorated European support for the war-torn country. But Zelensky’s recent statement that “Ukraine is ready to negotiate about an end to the conflict” suggests that he recognises how precarious the situation has become.

In Trump’s address to the US Congress on February 4, the US president welcomed this shift, and claimed that Russia was also ready for a truce.

What would a negotiated peace look like? The side that holds the upper hand, both politically and militarily, will have a stronger position at the negotiating table.

At the moment, the advantage is overwhelmingly with Russia, which is striving to press home its battlefield advantage and occupy as much territory as it can before a potential ceasefire. This is likely to mean a freezing of the conflict on its current lines of contact.

The war has now lasted more than three years, and since Ukraine’s failed summer 2023 counteroffensive, there have been no major changes on the battlefield, except for Ukraine’s incursion into Russia’s Kursk region in August 2024. Kyiv had hoped that seizing this territory could serve as a bargaining chip in future peace negotiations.

But even this has not gone according to plan, as Russia has been steadily reclaiming the area, aided by North Korean troops.

Recent battlefield developments reaffirm the ongoing stalemate. According to the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) (as of March 4), Russian forces continued offensives along various key strategic points in the east and south. While Russian advances continue to be slow, it’s a situation that could change quickly, particularly with the dramatic shutdown of US assistance.

One of the key areas where Russia is now putting intense pressure on Ukrainian troops is in the Kherson oblast in the south of the country. Russian forces are reportedly attempting to cross the Dnipro river, aiming to establish footholds on the west (right) bank at four locations to allow them a clear run at the strategically important port city of Kherson.

Russia has successfully negotiated river crossings during the three-year war, but this time, the situation seems more challenging. Recent reporting from the frontlines has described Russian assaults on Dnipro crossings as “suicide missions”, causing heavy Russian casualties.

A high Russian body count is nothing new in this conflict. But why is Russia willing to sacrifice so many of its soldiers, particularly when the political prospects favour Putin and the Russians?

Oleksandr Prokudin, the governor of Kherson, suggests that Russia is desperate to establish a foothold as crossing the Dnipro would open up Kherson oblast for further advances and could be used in negotiations to strengthen Russia’s claim over the entire region. The occupation of Kherson was listed by Russian defence minister, Andrei Belousov, as a key strategic goal for 2025.

Strategic barrier

Crossing the Dnipro will not be easy. Ukraine has tried and failed in the opposite direction on several occasions for example, in April and August 2023.

At that stage, as part of the (ultimately unsuccessful) spring-summer offensive, Kyiv hoped crossing the river would be a major breakthrough that would lead to easier access to Crimea. This now looks like a lost cause – at least militarily.

State of the conflict in Ukraine, March 5 2024.
Institute for the Study of War

The Dnipro is not only a natural barrier dividing the country into two parts. It’s also vital as a transport artery through the country and its dams provide energy.

Russia realises this, and it has seen the river as one of Ukraine’s “centres of gravity”. On day one of the invasion, Russian forces made a beeline for the Dnipro, crossing and taking up positions that they were later forced to abandon as Ukraine fought back.

Now, as Prokudin observed, Russia is once again throwing its troops at the river. A series of assaults in December 2024 were successfully repelled, but things have changed even in the few months since. Ukraine is in an increasingly difficult position.

Ukraine’s military is facing increasingly critical troop shortages and has a far smaller population to draw on than Russia – something which is beginning to tell.

And each day seems to bring further bad news. The US decision to pause intelligence sharing will mean its forces in the field will be virtually deaf and blind and at the mercy of Russian attacks on their positions (although there is reason to believe the pause may be reasonably shortlived).

But, with the decision to halt military aid, it’s an indication of the Trump administration’s determination to force Kyiv into a peace deal – whether or not it’s acceptable to Ukraine.

At this stage it looks almost inevitable that Ukraine will be unable to reclaim all the territory it has lost to Russia since 2014. Its best chance may be to secure what it still does control and go all-out to prevent further Russian advances. One of the ways it needs to do that right now is to ensure Russia does not establish a foothold across the Dnipro river.

Veronika Poniscjakova does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Russia launching ‘suicide missions’ across strategic Dnipro river as pause in US aid hampers defence – https://theconversation.com/russia-launching-suicide-missions-across-strategic-dnipro-river-as-pause-in-us-aid-hampers-defence-251439

MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

March 7, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: A Risk Communication Point at NHB

Source: United States Navy (Medical)

By Douglas H Stutz, NHB/NMRTC Bremerton public affairs officer — Risk communication skills were pointedly providing recently at Naval Hospital Bremerton.

NHB staff members were emphatically directed on risk communication principles and practices in a recent workshop from Navy and Marine Corps Force Health Protection Command public health communication experts, including Sandy Martinez, Fulton Communication chief executive officer.

Martinez actively engaged with a few staff in attendance, such as Senior Chief Hospital Corpsman John Buxton, a St. Louis native, on understanding the basic concepts of risk communication which requires skill in three [overlapping] arenas; Perception of risk, based on science, data, and facts; Agendas, which range from personal, economic, and political to cultural, social, historical and more; Emotions such as anger and fear.

The workshop, specifically tailored for the healthcare environment of Navy Medicine and Defense Health Agency, covered topical concerns on how to prepare for difficult – and demanding – questions or statements in a healthcare crisis; non-verbal communication awareness, and how to craft messaging and talking points.

There were also simulated interactive exercises designed to put staff under the spotlight glare of responding to a variety of queries from awkward to anxious to angry.

Martinez, along with Paul Gillooly, Navy Public Health risk assessor and risk communicator, ensured active duty and civil service personnel received the “tools needed to successfully communicate with [internal and external] stakeholders in a variety of situation.”

MIL Security OSI –

March 7, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: Defense News: Amphibious Assault Ships – LHD/LHA(R)

Source: United States Navy

Description

Amphibious warships are designed to support the Marine Corps tenets of Operational Maneuver From the Sea (OMFTS) and Ship to Objective Maneuver (STOM). They must be capable of sailing in harm’s way and enable rapid combat power buildup ashore in the face of opposition. Because of their inherent capabilities, these ships have been and will continue to be called upon to also support humanitarian and other contingency missions on short notice. The United States maintains the largest and most capable amphibious force in the world.

LHAs are the largest of all amphibious warfare ships, resembling a small aircraft carrier. They are capable of Vertical/Short Take-Off and Landing (V/STOL), Short Take-Off Vertical Landing (STOVL), Vertical Take-Off and Landing (VTOL) tilt-rotor and Rotary Wing (RW) aircraft operations. LHA Flight 0 will enhance Marine Corp aviation with greater maintenance capability and JP-5 fuel capacity in lieu of a well deck. LHA Flight 1 will reincorporate a well deck to enhance expeditionary war fighting capabilities while maintaining the principal aviation characteristics of the Flight 0.

Features
Modern U.S. Navy Amphibious Assault Ships project power and maintain presence by serving as the cornerstone of the amphibious ready group (ARG) or expeditionary strike group (ESG). These ships transport and land elements of the Marine expeditionary unit (MEU) or Marine expeditionary brigade (MEB) with a combination of aircraft and landing craft.

Background
The America-class LHAs and Wasp-class LHDs provide the Marine Corps with a means of ship-to-shore movement by helicopter in addition to movement by landing craft. LHAs (and later LHDs) have been participants in major humanitarian-assistance, occupation and combat operations in which the United States has been involved. Such operations have included participating as launch platforms for Marine Corps expeditionary forces into Afghanistan during Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001 and 2002, Iraq in Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003 and humanitarian support after the catastrophic Tsunami in 2004. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, two LHDs served as “Harrier carriers,” launching an air group of AV-8B attack aircraft against targets inside Iraq. In 2004, LHDs were used to transport thousands of Marines and their equipment to Iraq and Afghanistan for combat operations. Post Hurricane Katrina support was provided in New Orleans by LHD 7 (Iwo Jima) where thousands of police, fire and rescue personnel were hosted onboard during recovery operations and Iwo Jima operated as the central command and control hub.

The lead ship, USS WASP (LHD 1) was commissioned in July 1989 in Norfolk, Virginia. The delivery of LHA AMERICA Class ships is the next step in the incremental development of the “Big Deck Amphib.”

LHAs are the largest of all amphibious warfare ships, resembling a small aircraft carrier. They are capable of Vertical/Short Take-Off and Landing (V/STOL), Short Take-Off Vertical Landing (STOVL), Vertical Take-Off and Landing (VTOL) tilt-rotor and Rotary Wing (RW) aircraft operations.

The current LHA Class (AMERICA Class) consists of two Flights: Flight 0 (USS AMERICA (LHA 6), USS TRIPOLI (LHA 7) and Flight 1 (PCU BOUGAINVILLE (LHA 8), PCU FALLUJAH (LHA 9), PCU HELMAND PROVINCE (LHA 10).

The AMERICA Class LHAs ships replace the original TARAWA-Class LHAs, which have now all been decommissioned. The AMERICA Class LHAs are LHD variants designed to accommodate the Marine Corps’ future Air Combat Element (ACE) including F-35B Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) and MV-22 Osprey.

The AMERICA Class LHAs incorporate the gas turbine propulsion plant, electrical distribution and auxiliary systems designed and built for USS MAKIN ISLAND (LHD 8). Flight 0 AMERICA Class ships contain key differences from the LHD Class to include: an enlarged hangar deck, enhanced aviation maintenance facilities, increased aviation fuel capacity, additional aviation storerooms, removal of the well deck, and an electronically reconfigurable C4ISR suite. PCU BOUGAINVILLE (LHA 8) will be the first of the Flight 1 ships and will reincorporate a well deck to enhance expeditionary war fighting capabilities while maintaining the principal aviation characteristics of Flight 0 via a reduced island structure.

USS AMERICA (LHA 6) and USS TRIPOLI (LHA 7) were commissioned on October 11, 2014, and July 15, 2020, respectively. PCU BOUGAINVILLE (LHA 8) and PCU FALLUJAH (LHA 9) are currently under construction at Huntington Ingalls Industries (HII) in Pascagoula, Mississippi. PCU BOUGAINVILLE (LHA 8) is scheduled to deliver to the Navy in 2026, and PCU FALLUJAH (LHA 9) is scheduled to launch in 2027. PCU HELMAND PROVINCE (LHA 10) is under contract for the advanced procurement of long lead items and advanced planning and engineering to support a planned start of construction at HII in 2026.

General Characteristics, America Class LHA(R) Flight 0
Builder: Huntington Ingalls Industries Inc., Ingalls Operations, Pascagoula, Mississippi
Date Deployed: July 7, 2017 (USS America)
Propulsion: Two marine gas turbines, two shafts, 70,000 total brake horsepower, two 5,000 horsepower auxiliary propulsion motors.
Length: 855 feet (260.7 meters)
Beam: 106 feet (32.3 meters)
Displacement: Approximately 43,745 long tons full load (44,449 metric tons)
Speed: 20+ knots.
Crew: 1204 (102 officers)
Load: 1,687 troops (plus 184 surge)
Armament: Two RAM launchers; two NATO Sea Sparrow launchers (with Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM)); two 20mm Phalanx CIWS mounts; seven twin .50 cal. machine guns.
Aircraft: A mix of: F-35B Joint Strike Fighters (JSF) STOVL aircraft; MV-22 Osprey VTOL tiltrotors; CH-53E Sea Stallion helicopters; UH-1Y Huey helicopters; AH-1Z Super Cobra helicopters; MH-60S Sea Hawk helicopter
Ships:
USS America (LHA 6), Sasebo, Japan
USS Tripoli (LHA 7), San Diego, California

General Characteristics, America Class LHA(R) Flight 1 Builder: Huntington Ingalls Industries Inc., Ingalls Operations, Pascagoula, Mississippi
Propulsion: Two marine gas turbines, two shafts, 59,000 total brake horsepower, two 5,000 horsepower auxiliary propulsion motors.
Length: 855 feet (260.7 meters).
Beam: 106 feet (32.3 meters).
Displacement: Approximately 43,335 long tons full load (44,030 metric tons).
Speed: 20+ knots.
Crew: 1204 (102 officers)
Load: 1462 (150 surge)
Armament: Two RAM launchers; two NATO Sea Sparrow launchers (with Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM)); two 20mm Phalanx CIWS mounts; seven twin .50 cal. machine guns.
Aircraft: A mix of: F-35B Joint Strike Fighters (JSF) STOVL aircraft; MV-22 Osprey VTOL tiltrotors; CH-53E Sea Stallion helicopters; UH-1Y Huey helicopters; AH-1Z Super Cobra helicopters; MH-60S Sea Hawk helicopters.
Landing/Attack Craft: A mix of: Landing Craft, Air Cushion (LCAC) and Landing Craft Utility (LCU)
Ships:
PCU Bougainville (LHA 8) – Under Construction
PCU Fallujah (LHA 9) – Under Construction
PCU Helmand Province (LHA 10) – LLTM Under Procurement

General Characteristics, Wasp Class Builder: Northrop Grumman Ship Systems Ingalls Operations, Pascagoula, Mississippi
Date Deployed: July 29, 1989 (USS Wasp)
Propulsion: (LHDs 1-7) two boilers, two geared steam turbines, two shafts, 70,000 total brake horsepower; (LHD 8) two gas turbines, two shafts; 70,000 total shaft horsepower, two 5,000 horsepower auxiliary propulsion motors
Length: 844 feet (253.2 meters)
Beam: 106 feet (31.8 meters)
Displacement: LHDs 1-4: 40,650 tons full load (41,302.3 metric tons)
LHDs 5-7: 40,358 tons full load (41,005.6 metric tons)
LHD 8: 41,772 tons full load (42,442.3 metric tons)
Speed: 20+ knots (23.5+ miles per hour)
Crew: Ships Company: 66 officers, 1,004 enlisted
LHD 8: 65 officers, 994 enlisted
Marine Detachment: 1,687 troops (plus 184 surge)
Armament: Two RAM launchers; two NATO Sea Sparrow launchers; three 20 mm Phalanx CIWS mounts (two on LHD 5-8); four .50 cal. machine guns; four 25 mm Mk 38 machine guns (LHD 5-8 have three 25 mm Mk 38 machine guns)
Aircraft: 12 CH-46 Sea Knight helicopters; 4 CH-53E Sea Stallion helicopters; 6 AV-8B Harrier attack aircraft; 3 UH-1N Huey helicopters; 4 AH-1W Super Cobra helicopters (planned capability to embark MV-22 Osprey VTOL tilt-rotors) and F-35B Joint Strike Fighters (JSF) STOVL aircraft)
Landing/Attack Craft: 3 LCACs or 2 LCUs
Ships:
USS Wasp (LHD 1), Norfolk, Virginia
USS Essex (LHD 2), San Diego, California
USS Kearsarge (LHD 3), Norfolk, Virginia
USS Boxer (LHD 4), San Diego, California
USS Bataan (LHD 5), Norfolk, Virginia
USS Iwo Jima (LHD 7), Norfolk, Virginia
USS Makin Island (LHD 8), San Diego, California

MIL Security OSI –

March 7, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: President Trump’s Deregulation Effort Has Already Saved Families Thousands of Dollars

US Senate News:

Source: The White House
TO: WHITE HOUSE COMMS STAFFFROM: CEA STAFFSUBJECT: PRESIDENT TRUMP SAVES AMERICAN FAMILIES $2,100 EACH BY HALTING COSTLY BIDEN REGULATIONS
SummaryPresident Biden piled on nearly $2 trillion in new regulations over his four years in office, dramatically increasing costs for everyday working people and businesses — and left billions of dollars more in proposed rules still in the pipeline. Upon taking office, President Trump immediately blocked these proposed rules and has initiated an aggressive deregulatory agenda that requires substantial cuts in existing regulations for each new agency rule. President Trump is committed to cutting senseless red tape that will lower costs, lead to higher growth, and usher America into its Golden Age.
Since returning to office, President Trump has saved Americans over $180 billion, or $2,100 per family of four, by halting proposed Biden-era regulations.
The Biden Administration added more than $1.8 trillion, or $21,090 per family of four, in new regulatory costs, far surpassing any other administration on record.
72% of these new regulatory burdens ($1.3 trillion or $15,457 per family of four) were the result of new EPA rules.
Rolling back just automobile-related rules will save consumers over $1.134 trillion.
In 2024, the Biden Administration set an all-time record by publishing 107,262 pages of final rules, proposed rules, and other public notices in the Federal Register.
This stands in stark contrast to President Trump, who recently announced a bold deregulation initiative that requires the elimination of ten existing rules or guidance documents for every new regulation.
Details
Notable regulatory actions by President Trump via executive order include:
Among finalized Biden EPA rules, the following edicts were the most expensive:
$870 billion: Mandated reductions in greenhouse gas emissions and a 50% reduction in other pollutant emissions from light-duty and medium-duty vehicles for model years 2027 and beyond.
$180 billion: Mandated reductions in greenhouse gas emissions in passenger cars and light trucks for model years 2023 and beyond.
$106.19 billion: Unnecessary water regulations.
$39 billion: Mandated the reduction of nitrogen oxides (NOx) and particulate matter emissions in heavy-duty engines.

Other notable costly Biden Administration regulations include:
Department of the Treasury
$84.1 billion: New mandates that certain entities disclose their beneficial owners to the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN).

Department of Transportation
$45.2 billion: New mandates for increased fuel efficiency in passenger cars and light trucks for model years 2027 and beyond, and increased fuel efficiency for vans and heavy-duty pickups for model years 2030 and beyond.

Department of Health and Human Services
$43.15 billion: New mandates for Medicare and Medicaid Programs, increased nursing staffing levels in nursing homes, and additional reporting requirements for certain institutional services.
$27.77 billion: New Medicaid and CHIP Program mandates

Department of Defense
$42.26 billion: New mandates to protect Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) and Federal Contract Information (FCI).

In addition to the expensive regulations highlighted above, the Biden Administration also excelled at producing ridiculous regulations:
A U.S. Postal Service regulation “requiring mailers to solely use the Cremated Remains shipping supplies provided by the Postal Service when mailing human or animal cremated remains, also referred to as cremains or ashes, domestically or internationally.”
A Federal Trade Commission regulation “requiring manufacturers of home audio amplifiers making power-related claims to calculate power output using uniform testing methods to allow consumers to easily compare amplifier sound quality.

MIL OSI USA News –

March 7, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: INTERPOL General Assembly provides roadmap for Organization’s future

Source: Interpol (news and events)

24 October 2013

CARTAGENA DE INDIAS, Colombia – The 82nd session of the INTERPOL General Assembly closed today with strong foundations in place for the Organization’s future to better support all 190 member countries in tackling transnational crime and terrorism.

Mick O’Connell, INTERPOL’s Director of Operational Support, gives an update on the activities of the Organization’s Integrated Border Management Task Force.

Delegates attending the General Assembly meeting.

Ralph Market, INTERPOL’s Assistant Director for Strategic Partnerships and Development, briefs the General Assembly on plans for new public-private initiatives.

A number of Resolutions were passed, along with cooperation agreements with other organizations.

Delegates attending the General Assembly meeting.

Eugene Kaspersky, CEO of Kasperky Lab, addresses delegates on the subject of international police and private companies in the age of cybercrime.

Igor Shunevich, Belarus’s Minister of Internal Affairs (left) and INTERPOL Secretary General Ronald K. Noble sign an agreement for an INTERPOL team to support security for the 2014 Ice Hockey World Championship.

Minister Shunevich (right) and Mr Noble discuss how the INTERPOL team can detect potential threats of terrorism, hooliganism and serious crime, and secure Belarus’s borders during the Ice Hockey Championship.

The General Assembly endorsed INTERPOL’s new e-extradition initiative which will significantly speed up and facilitate extradition requests through the Organization’s secure communications channels.

Rwanda was chosen as the host country for the 84th session of the INTERPOL General Assembly in 2015.

Every year, a technology exhibition allows private sector companies to showcase their latest innovations to the global police community. This year’s participants were recognized in a special ceremony.

Colombia became the 64th member country to recognize the INTERPOL Travel Document.

Colombia hands over the INTERPOL flag to Monaco, the hosts of next year’s General Assembly meeting.

INTERPOL President Mireille Ballestrazzi delivers her closing remarks.

Monaco will host the 83rd General Assembly exactly 100 years after it held the first International Criminal Police Congress in 1914, where the idea of INTERPOL was born.

Secretary General Noble thanks Giuliano Zaccardelli, INTERPOL’s Director of Strategic Planning.

‘Dios y Patria’ was written by Dutch police officers as a testimony to Erazo’s dedication to the police and as an inspiration to all those around the world who fight against crime and terrorism.

Colombian police officer Sergeant Luis Erazo Maya (left) was held hostage by the FARC for almost 12 years. A book launched at the 82nd session of the INTERPOL General Assembly tells his story.

Luiz Fernando Corrêa, Rio 2016 Security Director (left) and INTERPOL Secretary General Ronald K. Noble sign an agreement for the world police body to provide additional support to Brazilian authorities for the upcoming Games.

The General Assembly is INTERPOL’s supreme governing body. It meets once a year and takes all major decisions affecting policy, resources, working methods, finances and activities.

INTERPOL President, Mireille Ballestrazzi, speaking at the press conference.

Some 630 police chiefs and senior law enforcement officials attended the event in Cartagena de Indias, Colombia.

A total of 144 countries were represented at the conference.

Delegates attending the General Assembly meeting.

Delegates attending the General Assembly meeting.

Among the topics discussed were illicit goods, counterfeiting and pharmaceutical crime.

Delegates attending the General Assembly meeting.

With the four-day (21-24 October) conference coming just one month after the Westgate shopping centre attacks in Nairobi, Kenya, senior police officials discussed the Organization’s priorities and strategic roadmap for the next three years, focusing on policing needs in the field addressing threats ranging from terrorism to cybercrime.

INTERPOL’s new e-extradition initiative, a technical platform which will significantly speed up and facilitate extradition requests through the world police body’s secure communications channels, was strongly endorsed as a ground-breaking initiative by delegates.

“The resolutions adopted by this General Assembly will develop and further strengthen the partnerships between INTERPOL and other international organizations,” said INTERPOL President Mireille Ballestrazzi.

“The various discussions and debates during the past four days reflect the collective experience of member countries and the INTERPOL General Secretariat, and will enable us all to continue to develop initiatives to enhance the safety of all citizens throughout the world,” concluded the President.

A key decision by delegates was the endorsement of a resolution for extrabudgetary resources to be identified in order to provide long-term financial assistance towards INTERPOL’s activities and operational support to all member countries in combating transnational crime and terrorism.

INTERPOL Secretary General Ronald K. Noble said the decisions taken by the General Assembly paved the way for the Organization to plan for its future and provide additional assistance to member countries.

“As the world’s largest police organization we must ensure that all of our 190 member countries can count on our support whenever and wherever needed,” said Secretary General Noble.

“Many of the decisions taken during this General Assembly will provide us with an even stronger framework to address the various transnational crime challenges facing the global law enforcement community,” concluded the INTERPOL Chief.

Strengthening relationships between police and prosecutorial authorities was also an important element during the conference, with the approval of a Memorandum of Understanding between INTERPOL and Eurojust.

At the conclusion of the conference Juan Carlos Pinzón Bueno, Minister of National Defence, announced Colombia’s recognition of the INTERPOL Travel Document (ITD) thereby significantly speeding up the ability for INTERPOL officials to respond to any calls for assistance or support. To date, 64 INTERPOL member countries have officially recognized the ITD.

The 83rd INTERPOL General Assembly will be held in Monaco, 100 years after the country hosted the first International Criminal Police Congress in 1914, where the idea of INTERPOL was born.

MIL Security OSI –

March 7, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: Trilateral Maritime Exercise Supports Allied Interoperability

Source: United States SOUTHERN COMMAND

CARIBBEAN SEA –

Showing the benefits of maritime presence in the Caribbean, three warships and one aircraft from three allies conducted a passing exercise (PASSEX) on Mar. 3 designed to increase interoperability and enhance capability.

The U.S. Navy Ticonderoga-class guided-missile cruiser USS Normandy (CG-60) and Arleigh Burke-class guided missile destroyer USS Thomas Hudner (DDG-116) joined the United Kingdom (U.K.) Royal Navy River-class offshore patrol vessel HMS Medway (P223) and a NH90 Neptune helicopter assigned to the Royal Netherlands Navy Holland-class offshore patrol vessel HNLMS Groningen (P843) for the PASSEX.

The trilateral maritime PASSEX is part of U.S. and allied collaboration in the Western Hemisphere. Adopted in 2023, allies and partners from the U.K., Canada, France, the Netherlands, and the United States committed to more frequently share information and work more closely together on aligned strategic interests, specifically in the U.S. Southern Command Area of Responsibility (AOR). The collaboration includes maritime operations and exercises at sea and Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) port visits designed to meet that commitment.

“One of the best ways to address today’s security challenges is with shared maritime presence in our region, operating at sea with our allies and partners,” said Rear Adm. Carlos Sardiello, commander of U.S. Naval Forces Southern Command/U.S. 4th Fleet, the operational commander of the trilateral maritime exercise. “We know that through operations and exercises like this one in coordination with committed allies, we strengthen U.S. and regional security.”

A PASSEX is an exercise conducted between two or more navies to ensure best practices for communicate and cooperation and normally include communication and maneuvering drills. This trilateral maritime PASSEX also included an air defense event, a low-slow flyer event, and Sailor crossdecks among the four warships.

“We always look forward to any opportunity to operate alongside partners and allies like the Royal Navy and the Royal Netherlands Navy,” said Capt. Nathan Diaz, USS Normandy Commanding Officer. “Maritime exercises such as these provide a great opportunity for Normandy Sailors to improve their skills and work closely with their counterparts from partnered and allied naval forces.”

“We relish at sea exercises as they allow us to build our team as we operate with allies and partners,” said Cmdr. Cameron Ingram, USS Thomas Hudner Commanding Officer. “It was an honor to meet, operate and collaborate with the other commands’ leadership and teams, and a reassurance of our collaborative capabilities and resolve.”

U.S. Naval Forces Southern Command/U.S. 4th Fleet serves as a trusted maritime partner for Caribbean, Central and South American maritime forces, promoting unity, security, and stability in the region.

MIL Security OSI –

March 7, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Cortez Masto Leads Colleagues in Demanding Answers on National Security Impacts of Trump’s Tariffs on Canadian Goods

US Senate News:

Source: United States Senator for Nevada Cortez Masto
Washington, D.C. – U.S. Senator Catherine Cortez Masto (D-Nev.) led five of her Senate colleagues in a letter to U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth and U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent demanding answers on the national security impacts on President Donald Trump’s tariffs on Canadian goods. On Tuesday, the Trump Administration implemented a 25 percent tariff on all goods imported from Canada, taxing working families for their food, energy, and car purchases.
“By targeting a partner that is critical to U.S. mineral, food, and energy security, these measures threaten to undermine American national security,” wrote the Senators. “Canada provides essential minerals that power our weapons systems, nourish our crops, and heat our homes. Blanket tariffs that restrict our ability to source these minerals and make us more reliant on adversarial partners like Venezuela, China, and Russia raise fundamental national security questions.”
Specifically, the Senators demanded answers to the following questions:
How will the administration ensure that the additional 10 percent tariff on Canadian critical minerals does not increase costs and lead to shortages or reduced supply?
How will the administration ensure that the additional 25 percent tariff on Canadian minerals such as potash [common in agricultural fertilizer] does not increase the cost of food production and impair the ability of American farmers to fill our dinner tables with affordable and abundant food?
How will the administration ensure that new tariffs on Canadian minerals and energy products do not lead the United States to increase our sourcing from China, Russia, Belarus, and Venezuela?
Are there any precautionary or preemptive actions that the administration has taken or plans to take to ensure that potential Canadian restrictions or bans on the export of critical minerals do not impair U.S. national security?
How will the administration ensure that the additional 10 percent tariff on nickel imports from Canada does not lead additional Western miners to shutter and increase U.S. reliance on Chinese companies?
How will the administration ensure that new tariffs on Canada do not work counter to delivering affordable, reliable energy to U.S. consumers?
In 2023, the United States imported $47 billion in minerals from Canada, like the nickel alloys necessary for the production of military equipment and weapons. Canadian minerals help reduce America’s reliance on trade with China.
Canada is also the world’s largest producer and exporter of potash, a critical component for fertilizer. More than 90 percent of the potash imported for use by American farmers comes from Canada, and a decrease in trade with Canada likely results in increased trade with Russia, Belarus, and China – the world’s next three largest potash producers.
Additionally, the United States relies on Canadian crude oil imports to supplement its own energy production. Reducing the importation of Canadian crude oil increases America’s reliance on less friendly foreign oil sources, such as Venezuela.
Additional signatories to the letter include Senators John Hickenlooper (D-Colo.), Jacky Rosen (D-Nev.), Adam Schiff (D-Calif.), Jeanne Shaheen (D-N.H.), and Chris Van Hollen (D-Md.).
Read the full letter here.
Senator Cortez Masto has led efforts in Congress to strengthen our national security and supply chains. She has consistently blocked burdensome taxes on mining and wrote important provisions of the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law to bolster Nevada’s critical mineral supply chain. She’s also introduced bipartisan legislation to strengthen the domestic supply chain for rare-earth magnets, which are critical components of cell phones, computers, defense systems, and electric vehicles, but are almost exclusively made in China.

MIL OSI USA News –

March 7, 2025
MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Minister of State for Defence Procurement and Industry RUSI Speech

Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

Speech

Minister of State for Defence Procurement and Industry RUSI Speech

Minister of State for Defence Procurement and Industry: RUSI/IFRI Speech “Enhancing UK-France Defence Industrial cooperation”

Esteemed colleagues. Distinguished Guests. Chers amis.

I’m sure I speak for us all in thanking RUSI and IFRI for bringing us together at this pivotal moment for European security. And for all they do to advance Defence in our countries. As Putin continues to wage his unprovoked and illegal war against Ukraine amidst fierce debate about how best to end the conflict the common refrain coming from both sides of the Channel and both sides of the Atlantic is that Europe needs to step-up and take more responsibility for its own security. As our Prime Minister did again last week, by setting a path that will lift our defence spending from 2.3%, to 2.5% by 2027, and 3% in the next parliament.

Amidst the uncertainty surrounding European security the one thing that is certain and that’s a fighting force is only as strong as the industrial base that stands behind it. So transforming European defence industrial capabilities and boosting capacity are going to be integral to this defining mission of our time. And I hope we all leave here today agreeing that as Europe’s most powerful military forces with two of its most advanced defence sectors the UK and France must spearhead this mission. Strengthening an alliance that has achieved so much since we struck the Entente Cordiale back in 1904.

A military alliance that’s twice been pivotal in securing European freedoms. And an industrial alliance that has connected our electricity grids…

shrunk our skies and tunnelled under the channel. Making it possible to enjoy a late morning croissant in Paris followed almost seamlessly, by mid-afternoon tea in London and more easily done than getting back to my constituency in Liverpool and faster most of the time.

For the last fifteen years the Lancaster House Treaties have been our guiding light as our Armed Forces and our nations have again stood united in support of democracy and against the common threats of terrorism, tyranny, and hybrid warfare both in Europe and further afield. And as we gather today to discuss the next chapter of our Defence industrial partnership I believe that the overwhelming majority of not just British and French people but the vast majority of Europeans are looking to our respective governments to provide leadership by doing more together in recognition that our combined military capabilities are the most significant stabilising force in European security.

And as we step forward to help Europe step-up to the challenge we will be building on solid foundations. Our combined nuclear deterrents underpin Europe’s security. Our Combined Joint Expeditionary Force is on stand-by to respond swiftly to crises giving us a level of interoperability with the French Armed Forces, beyond anything we have with any other European allies. And our Industrial sector is also increasingly integrated.

Through ‘One MBDA’ we’ve help safeguard European missile production capabilities and delivered innovative defensive and offensive systems…

including Meteor and SCALP/Storm Shadow. Together we are co-developing powerful Future Cruise and Anti-Ship Weapons a sovereign capability that boosts our industrial resilience and will deliver the most advanced deep-strike weapons in Europe. And as part of our Maritime Mine Counter-Measures Project with Thales the UK will soon take delivery of our first set of autonomous mine hunting equipment marking an important new phase in that particular programme.

But if we are to re-establish security across the European continent and dissuade Putin from coming back again to invade one of his sovereign neighbours we need to use our Summit in June to broaden our defence industrial collaboration beyond complex weapons. Putting something of an ‘Entente Industrielle’ at the heart to the UK-France Defence partnership that delivers more from our existing programmes that intensifies our cooperation in the most decisive domains and capabilities – including space, AI, and defeating hybrid grey-zone warfare and provides leadership to European Partners, including within NATO.

For both our countries the need to significantly strengthen European deterrence represents a significant economic opportunity.

And it can be a virtuous circle of enhanced capabilities, stronger deterrence, and economic growth that I believe can be mutually beneficial as we expand the range of our cooperation supporting a growing number of Defence jobs in both France and the UK.

Last week marked the end of our public consultation on the UK’s forthcoming Defence Industrial Strategy I am glad to say because I was visiting every corner of the UK speaking to people about it, so I get a little bit of rest from travel. But that strategy will guide our approach to the sector.

It is a strategy that will set out our wish to create new research and industrial ventures with international allies like France in order to broaden our capabilities, enhance standardisation, and boost interoperability whilst supporting our respective strengths across the defence value chain.

We know the EU has a role to play in building a larger, more innovative, and more responsive European defence sector. And we would welcome French support as we seek an ambitious new UK-EU security pact. Continued coordination through NATO is also crucially important,

in setting capability targets and standards, and making our collective defence industrial bases more coherent. We also know, a more resilient and responsive industrial base, requires a fundamentally closer relationship between governments and industry, hence adding that “industry” to the end of my title. I am not just in charge with procurement I am in charge of our relationship with defence industries as well. And we are recruiting a National Armaments Director, who will be held accountable for delivering that, alongside procurement reform.

At the last UK-France Summit, our countries signed up to a closer industrial relationship. We agreed to strengthen supply chains and industrial resilience and facilitate reciprocal market access and exports. I think that recent geopolitical developments, have injected urgency into that work…

and the need to strengthen European and NATO industrial and procurement initiatives is also apparent and that includes: the European Long-Range Strike Approach the DIAMOND integrated air and missile defence initiative and NATO’s Defence Production Action Plan and Multinational Procurement initiatives. Collective procurement will deliver more of the capabilities we need across the continent to deter Putin…

and deliver more bang for our Pounds and Euros.

Whilst UK and French visions for Europe’s security architecture haven’t always aligned during the Entente Cordiale era, UK and French values and interests overwhelmingly have and it is vital for European Security that we talk, and build on that unity.

Our cooperation has long been a powerful force-for-good that has brought our people closer together and helped overcome tyranny and preserve freedoms. And we can do it again.

So I will work closely with my counterpart Délégué Emmanuel Chiva…who I am going to be seeing tomorrow at the High-Level UK-France Working Group to put our defence capabilities and industrial cooperation at the top of the agenda of our Summit in June at the heart of our Lancaster House Treaties refresh and at the centre of our shared mission to bolster European security

Because like our predecessors who built the Entente Cordiale to secure peace in their time we must now build an Entente Industrielle to guarantee European security in ours.

Updates to this page

Published 6 March 2025

MIL OSI United Kingdom –

March 7, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: UConn Assessing Impacts of Federal Directives
Source: US State of Connecticut

Dear Faculty and Staff Colleagues,

We write to update you on several significant issues related to actions taken by the federal government in recent weeks, share how we are planning to contend with potential impacts, and to reiterate our ongoing commitment to our mission.

RESEARCH FUNDING AND ADMINISTRATION

We have seen a significant reduction in new awards to UConn and UConn Health from federal agencies so far this calendar year. Typically, we would expect to receive a combined new award total of approximately $38 million through February; this year, we have received approximately $24 million during this time period.

We are receiving questions with respect to the expenses of research staff and research-focused graduate students should this persist. Administrative and academic leadership teams continue to work actively to plan for contingencies in affected areas. We will provide specific guidance on this issue to the deans and are also working with them on mitigation strategies.

We are seeing significant changes to the administration and funding from many of our federal sponsors to include USAID, Sea Grant/NOAA, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the National Institutes of Health (NIH), the Centers for Disease Control (CDC), the National Science Foundation (NSF), the Department of Energy (DoE), and the Department of Education (DoEd).

Additionally, there have also been leadership changes at agencies which focus on high-risk, high-impact technology translation such as DARPA, ARPA-E, and ARPA-H.

The reduction of indirect cost returns from NIH to academic institutions — which would reduce the current negotiated, approved rates for UConn and UConn Health from 61% and 66% respectively to 15% — remains on hold after a federal judge temporarily blocked it from taking effect.

RESEARCH FUNDING OPPORTUNITIES

We are a public, R1 land, sea, and space grant university. Our mission is based on serving the needs of our communities, providing excellent education, and advancing the causes of research and scholarship to bring about positive impacts statewide, nationally, and globally. We provide the R&D needed by our industries, including defense/national security, finance, insurance, biotech, and health sectors. Our mission is not going to change.

At the same time, we understand that every change in administration comes with challenges and opportunities as there are priorities that every new administration would like to enact which may differ from the previous administration. Knowing that, we have adjusted with every new administration.

Areas that we believe the new administration will concentrate on are below. These are the fields that are most likely to be prioritized to receive federal support and thus represent the most significant funding opportunities for faculty in the coming years.
- Energy independence
- AI and quantum technologies
- Defense, national security
- Manufacturing, supply chain, and project management
- Healthy living
- Cancer
- Genetics/genomics
- Technology development/deployment in all areas of R&D
- Workforce development
- Community impact through broadening participation in higher education, R&D, innovation, entrepreneurship
In anticipation of this new landscape, OVPR has been working non-stop since Nov. 6 and has been engaged daily with the Office of the Provost, Governmental Relations, and the General Counsel. We are also briefing UConn’s senior leadership team, research deans, center and institute directors, and our faculty/staff task forces on a weekly basis.

What can you do:
- OVPR has created task forces focused on helping investigators pursue non-federal sources of research funding, supporting the UConn research infrastructure during these volatile times, and strategic communication to advocate for the value of research in our society. If you would like to join a task force, e-mail research@uconn.edu
- Keep us updated on anything you may be hearing, also via research@uconn.edu.
- Visit our FAQs page, which is regularly monitored and updated: research.uconn.edu.
- Please remain connected, help and support each other, be kind to each other.
“DEAR COLLEAGUE” LETTER AND EXECUTIVE ORDERS

On Feb. 14, the U.S. Department of Education released what is known as a “Dear Colleague letter” to educational institutions with guidance regarding federal laws that prohibit discrimination. On March 1, the department followed-up with an FAQ on the letter.

The core message of the Dear Colleague letter is that educational institutions must fully comply with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, a federal law that prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, or national origin. As with all state and federal laws, UConn has always continually worked to ensure we are in compliance with Title VI, and that remains the case today. In fact, UConn has long had an appointed Title VI Coordinator in the Office of Institutional Equity. UConn’s OIE and ODI train, educate, and address issues on matters related to discrimination on the basis of many factors, and not just those under Title VI, but all applicable federal law.

The letter states: “… colleges, universities, and K-12 schools have routinely used race as a factor in admissions, financial aid, hiring, training, and other institutional programming.”

In each of these areas, we believe the university is compliant with the law, including following the recent Supreme Court decision surrounding the use of race in admissions.

The letter also states: “…many American schools and universities even encourage segregation by race at graduation ceremonies and in dormitories and other facilities.”

UConn does not encourage segregation and while there are numerous affinity groups on campus and related programming, events, activities, and housing, none are in violation of Title VI provided that, regardless of the affinity group who may be the organizers or audience, the programming, events, activities, and housing are open to anyone — meaning no one is excluded on the basis of race or any other aspect of identity.

As always, should the university identify an area where we need to make a change or an adjustment to ensure legal compliance, we will do so.

If you have questions about Title VI and UConn’s obligations under it or want to ensure that language, programming, or practices in your area are compliant with it, please contact equity@uconn.edu. Please do not make changes to the language, programming, or practices without consultation.

In addition, UConn is home to an Office of Diversity and Inclusion, cultural centers, and learning communities. Their existence and programming are compliant with the law and consistent with UConn’s overall mission as a Land Grant institution created to expand access and opportunity and to serve all people from every walk of life.

COMMUNICATIONS

We have also been working with offices of research in the Northeast and beyond as well as the Council on Governmental Relations, the APLU, and other national entities. We are receiving strong support from state leaders, our federal governmental relations representatives in Washington, and Connecticut’s congressional delegation. UConn leaders are also in close, regular contact with our colleagues at other institutions and contacts within the federal government.

Finally, as we have seen in recent weeks, Executive Orders and other directives have been released by the federal government at a fast pace. In at least one case, a directive was rescinded a day later and in other cases, they have been the subject of legal action that has in some cases prevented them from taking effect.

In this very hectic and unpredictable environment, once something is released the relevant UConn leaders and offices immediately begin the process of analyzing it to determine its meaning and potential impact on the university. This involves not only working with colleagues at UConn, but consulting with colleagues at other institutions, and state and federal contacts. Often the meaning and impact of something is not clear or immediately understood.

This work is time-consuming, and accuracy is critical. On occasion, even after a thorough analysis has been conducted, clear answers and understanding have not been forthcoming. When we believe we have solid answers and information, we want to share it with the community. In the interim, as this analysis is taking place, it may appear that maybe nothing is happening, when in fact, considerable work is taking place behind the scenes.

In addition, we are also offering faculty and staff the opportunity to ask questions of and hear directly from leadership during upcoming bi-weekly check-in meetings beginning this Friday at noon. It will be available on livestream to faculty and staff at all campuses. Please email your questions in advance or during the session to communications@uconn.edu with the subject line: “Questions for Leadership.”

These issues are of the utmost importance to UConn and we want to share accurate information as soon as we can, but must be deliberate in doing so. Thank you for your patience and understanding.

Sincerely,

Anne D’Alleva
Provost and Executive Vice President for Academic Affairs

Pamir Alpay
Vice President for Research, Innovation, and Entrepreneurship

Nicole Gelston
General Counsel

Jeffrey Hines
Interim Vice President and Chief Diversity Officer

MIL OSI USA News –
March 7, 2025

Category: Military Intelligence

Explore our stunning regional parks and pathways

Our regional park picks for autumn:

Playgrounds closer to home

See Tāmaki Makaurau from our gorgeous cycle paths

Try a new hobby

Indoor escapes for chilly days

Check out free & affordable events

Embrace the colours of autumn!

DIALOGUE, COOPERATION AND MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING ARE THE KEYS IN AN INCREASINGLY INTERCONNECTED WORLD FOR RESOLVING CONFLICTS AND FOSTERING GLOBAL HARMONY: LOK SABHA SPEAKERLOK SABHA SPEAKER EMPHASIZES THE CRITICAL ROLE OF CIVIL SERVANTS AND MILITARY LEADERSHIP IN SHAPING NATION’S PROGRESS

Strategic barrier

Minister of State for Defence Procurement and Industry RUSI Speech

Updates to this page

DIALOGUE, COOPERATION AND MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING ARE THE KEYS IN AN INCREASINGLY INTERCONNECTED WORLD FOR RESOLVING CONFLICTS AND FOSTERING GLOBAL HARMONY: LOK SABHA SPEAKER

LOK SABHA SPEAKER EMPHASIZES THE CRITICAL ROLE OF CIVIL SERVANTS AND MILITARY LEADERSHIP IN SHAPING NATION’S PROGRESS