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Category: Military Intelligence

  • MIL-OSI USA: Army announces upcoming deployments

    Source: United States Army

    WASHINGTON –The Department of the Army announced today the spring deployments of the following units:

    The 2nd Mobile Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), to Europe to replace the 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division, as part of a regular rotation of forces to support the United States’ commitment to NATO allies and partners. For more information, please contact the 101st Airborne Division public affairs officer, Lt. Col. Martin Meiners, at martin.j.meiners.mil@army.mil or 270-798-3468.

    The 1st Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division, to Korea to replace the 1st Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 2nd Infantry Division, as part of a regular rotation of forces to support the United States’ commitment to the Republic of Korea. For more information, please contact the 4th Infantry Division public affairs officer, Lt. Col. Joseph Payton, at joseph.w.payton.mil@army.mil or 719-526-7525.

    The 83rd Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Battalion, 20th Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, Explosives Command, to U.S. Central Command to replace the 22nd CBRN Battalion as part of a regular rotation of forces. For more information, please contact the 20th CBRNE Command public affairs officer, Maj. Steven Modugno, at steven.m.modugno.mil@army.mil or 312-306-2718.

    The 4th Division Sustainment Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, to U.S. Central Command to replace the 17th Sustainment Brigade, Nevada Army National Guard, as part of a regular rotation of forces. For more information, please contact the 4th Infantry Division public affairs officer, Lt. Col. Joseph Payton, at joseph.w.payton.mil@army.mil or 719-526-7525.

    MIL OSI USA News –

    January 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI USA: Capito Votes to Confirm Ratcliffe for CIA Director

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for West Virginia Shelley Moore Capito

    WASHINGTON, D.C. – U.S. Senator Shelley Moore Capito (R-W.Va.), a member of the Senate Appropriations Defense Subcommittee, issued the following statement after voting to confirm John Ratcliffe to serve as Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director. Ratcliffe was confirmed by a vote of 74 to 25.

    “John Ratcliffe is a strong choice by President Trump to serve as CIA Director. The men and women of the CIA have some of the most difficult, most impactful jobs in our government. They need a leader to provide a steady hand as they carry out the dangerous work that keeps Americans safe. I have confidence that Mr. Ratcliffe will bring his valuable experience as Director of National Intelligence to this role, empowering our CIA to excel in its operations while trimming any bureaucratic hurdles that detract from its core missions. As a member of the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, I look forward to working with him to provide the CIA with the resources it needs to protect the American people,” Senator Capito said.

    Senator Capito previously met with Ratcliffe in December of 2024 to discuss his nomination and learn more about his vision to lead the agency.

    MIL OSI USA News –

    January 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI USA: Chairman Capito Votes Yes on Zeldin to be EPA Administrator, Nomination Passes EPW Committee

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for West Virginia Shelley Moore Capito

    [embedded content]

    To watch Chairman Capito’s opening statement, click here or the image above.

    WASHINGTON, D.C. – U.S. Senator Shelley Moore Capito (R-W.Va.), Chairman of the Senate Environment and Public Works (EPW) Committee, today voted to advance the nomination of Lee Zeldin to be the administrator of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Zeldin’s nomination was favorably reported by the EPW Committee with a bipartisan vote of 11-8, and now heads to the full U.S. Senate for consideration.

    Below is the opening statement of Chairman Shelley Moore Capito (R-W.Va.) as delivered.

    “Last week we heard from Congressman Zeldin on his plans for the Agency and his views on the EPA’s role in protecting public health and the environment, and how the Agency’s actions intersect with our economy.

    “Congressman Zeldin, I think, was an excellent witness. He described his intent to take a collaborative approach both as Administrator, and demonstrated also through his work with Congress, and this Committee, and all its members to address the pressing issues of environmental needs that our nation faces in this moment.

    “In particular, I deeply appreciated Congressman Zeldin’s efforts to meet with all members of the Committee prior to his hearing and his commitment to work with all of us to address the issues we have raised that impact our constituents, states, and our country.

    “If he said it once, he said it probably a dozen times that transparency is going to be one of the hallmarks of his service.

    “I believe he is well qualified for the position of Administrator and will be an excellent addition to the President’s Cabinet.

    “His past experience as the Congressman representing New York’s 1st Congressional District gives him a unique understanding of how Congress makes laws, oversees the Executive Branch, and what is expected when it gives a mandate to federal agencies. 

    “As a Representative from a northeastern state and a district with a diverse set of political views, he understands what it means to build consensus to achieve durable results.

    “He also has the necessary experience and integrity as a veteran of the war of terrorism, a Lieutenant Colonel in the Army reserve, an attorney, and a former Congressman to implement the President’s agenda at the Agency pursuant to congressionally provided authority. 

    “Finally, I was very pleased during his testimony to see how he intends to run the Agency in line with the laws that Congress has passed, with the goal of prioritizing EPA’s actions on the core responsibilities of the Agency that are essential to protecting health and our land, air, and water.

    “As we have seen over the past 25 years, the policies of the EPA can have a significant impact on not just the environment, but our economy.

    “The EPA should support policies and set rules that improve the environment while allowing innovators to grow the economy and protecting the pocketbook of American families. I believe that’s a win-win.

    “Unfortunately, too often the EPA has strayed from its mission, instead smothered small businesses and communities, I can speak from experience – my state of West Virginia, with red tape and forced higher costs on our constituents, a lose-lose. 

    “My home state of West Virginia, as I stated, has felt the negative impacts of EPA’s regulatory overreach in [recent] years, devastating portions of the State’s economy and putting my constituents out of work.

    “Congressman Zeldin has shown that he understands the importance of striking the right balance to improve the lives of Americans across the country and to protect the environment, while also uplifting communities and cities across the nation.

    “I urge our colleagues to support Congressman Zeldin’s nomination so we can get the EPA back to the basics of improving the air we breathe, the water we drink, and the land that we use.”

    MIL OSI USA News –

    January 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Security: Comm, Clear and Connected: The 8th Communication Squadron keeps Beverly Pack 25-1 connected

    Source: United States INDO PACIFIC COMMAND

    KUNSAN AIR BASE, Republic of Korea  –  

    Secure and seamless communication is important to complete day-to-day military operations. It’s required when they are executed from afar.

    The 8th Communications Squadron successfully tested their extended capabilities for the first time during Exercise Beverly Pack 25-1, simultaneously connecting operations at Kunsan Air Base and a simulated forward operating base through an expeditionary communications team Jan. 12-16. The exercise marks the largest-scale agile combat employment generation, deployment, and sustainment exercise within Seventh Air Force.

    “The 8th expeditionary communications team consists of four AFSCs within the communications career field who are dedicated to providing ACE support and capability,” said 1st Lt. Mackenzie Clay, 8th CS operations flight commander. “They were given orders to provide C4I (command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence) for the wing, simulating and testing all the equipment in the flyaway kits to ensure constant communication between operational forces and wing leadership.”
    The Communication Flyaway Kits, consisting of tactical satellite communications and network devices, are designed by coordinating with other units and assessing deployment requirements to sustain operations at Kunsan and at simulated locations. They are imperative to integrate plans and agencies during exercises and any potential contingency operations.

    “The team operates on mission-type orders to provide C4I, communicating through the Emergency Operations Center via the primary, alternate, contingency and emergency (PACE) plan,” said SrA Luis Del Carmen Diaz, expeditionary communications operator. “Through the use of the Communication Flyaway Kit package, the 8 CS can provide short and long range Non-Classified and Secret Internet Protocol Router (NIPR and SIPR) Networks as well as mission partner environment communication capabilities.”

    Expeditionary communications teams and other CS assets are necessary for ACE operations: they help provide integral information regarding locations and statuses of adversaries and friendly forces. Providing the fullest picture of the operational scenario, they are a necessary component for quality decision-making which enables dispersed forces to adapt and prevail.

    “We are continuously testing our equipment and ideas to bring faster speeds, options, and sizes to support ourselves and our allies,’ said SSgt Guillerma Khan, expeditionary communications NCOIC. “Mobility is essential, and our assets are the glue between us and any given location. The ability to communicate on-the-go pushes us further ahead of our adversaries.”

    MIL Security OSI –

    January 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI USA: 01.23.2025 Sen. Cruz Introduces MEDAL Act to Decrease Financial Burden on Medal of Honor Recipients

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Texas Ted Cruz
    WASHINGTON, D.C. – U.S. Sen. Ted Cruz (R-Texas) today introduced the Monetary Enhancement for Distinguished Active Legends (MEDAL) Act. The legislation increases the monthly pension for living Medal of Honor recipients to $100,000 annually. The Medal of Honor is the highest military decoration bestowed by the United States. There are only 61 living Medal of Honor recipients.
    Upon introduction, Sen. Cruz said, “Our Medal of Honor recipients are heroes who embody the highest ideals of courage, sacrifice, and selflessness. They continue to serve our nation by sharing their stories, inspiring generations, and encouraging the next wave of America’s heroes. Yet, they often lack the resources for these activities. The MEDAL Act addresses those shortfalls. Congress should act swiftly to advance and pass this badly needed fix.”
    Sen. Cruz was joined by Sen. Tom Cotton (R-Ark.) in introducing the legislation.
    Reps. Troy Nehls (R-Texas-22) and Chris Pappas (D-N.H.-01) introduced the companion legislation in the House of Representatives.
    Read the MEDAL Act here.
    BACKGROUND
    Medal of Honor recipients are often neither formerly nor medically retired from the United States Military, and cannot be compensated for the financial burdens of public engagements. In these engagements, they share stories of their heroism, which directly and significantly influence military recruiting and retention, as well as more broadly enhancing American life and public memory. Increasing the monthly pensions for living Medal of Honor recipients is essential to reducing the financial burden on their families.

    MIL OSI USA News –

    January 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI USA: On Senate Floor, Shaheen Raises National Security Concerns with Nomination of Pete Hegseth to be Secretary of Defense, Announces She Will Vote Against His Confirmation

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for New Hampshire Jeanne Shaheen

    (Washington, DC) – U.S. Senator Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH), a senior member of the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC), took to the Senate floor to outline her concerns for our national security ahead of the possible confirmation of Pete Hegseth as the next U.S. Secretary of Defense. Specifically, Shaheen addressed Hegseth’s inconsistencies on various foreign policy issues, including respect for the norms of armed conflict, support for our alliances like NATO and Putin’s war on Ukraine. At the conclusion of her remarks, Senator Shaheen announced she will vote against the Secretary of Defense nominee—the first time she’s done so since joining the U.S. Senate. You can watch the Senator’s full remarks here.

    Key quotes from Senator Shaheen:

    • “The almost three million men and women who serve our nation in uniform deserve a Secretary of Defense who will not needlessly throw them in harm’s way or seek to divide them with partisan politics.”
    • “Just as America’s national security interests are not to be trifled with, neither is our commitment to defending democracy and the international world order. And any inconsistency in our commitment to support our allies and partners, to support democracy around the world, to support the international world order is going to be seen and exploited by our adversaries.”
    • “And again, I think it’s very important that we stand by our ally Ukraine, because of the message it sends not just to the Russians and Vladimir Putin, but because of the message it sends to Xi in China, to the Iranians, to the North Koreans, to anyone who is an adversary of the United States. If they think we’re going to walk away from our allies, they’re going to do everything they can to divide us.”
    • “He [Mr. Hegseth] has a documented history of supporting individuals who have violated military and international law by committing war crimes […] I don’t think we can afford to entrust the safety and success of our men and women in uniform to a man who would himself disregard the laws of armed conflict and leave American credibility and moral authority in tatters on the world stage.”  
    • “I am very concerned that Mr. Hegseth lacks the consistency and the moral clarity to lead the most combat-credible military in the world […] Our men and women in uniform deserve better. And therefore, the first time since I was elected to represent the people of New Hampshire in the United States Senate, I plan to vote against this nominee for Secretary of Defense.”   

    Remarks as delivered can be found below:

    Mr. President, I come to the floor today to address some of my concerns about the qualifications of the President’s nominee to lead the Department of Defense, Mr. Pete Hegseth. 

    Like many of my colleagues on the Armed Services Committee, I left Mr. Hegseth’s hearing last week with a number of unanswered questions and some real concerns about his qualifications and abilities to serve in the role of Secretary of Defense. 

    Now, every single nominee for Secretary of Defense—from both Democrat and Republican administrations—have met with me and other members from both sides of the aisle on the committee before their confirmation hearings.  

    And I voted for every one of those nominees from both Democrat and Republican administrations: Secretaries Panetta, Hagel, Carter, Mattis, Esper and Austin.  

    I didn’t always agree with their views or their policies, but I felt that they had the qualifications and the temperament to be Secretary of Defense, so I supported their confirmations. 

    But Mr. Hegseth chose not to meet with me or any other Senate Democrats, except the Ranking Member, Jack Reed. And he broke with strong, longstanding tradition to ensure that our work on national security remains free from partisanship.

    And I think that’s the important point: we are stronger as Senators, as Congress, as a nation if we are acting together.

    The Committee unfortunately was not afforded the opportunity to ask a number of rounds of questions, and so there were a number of questions about his views, particularly regarding foreign policy and military policy that we did not get an answer to.

    I’ve become the Ranking Member on the Foreign Relations Committee, and so I’m very concerned about the role of the United States in the world.

    I think the American people expect transparency regarding Mr. Hegseth’s ability to stand by our allies and partners, to uphold international agreements, to abide by rules of engagement and the bottom line—support the men and women in the military in a way that not only keeps us safe, but protects them as well.

    The almost three million men and women who serve our nation in uniform deserve a Secretary of Defense who will not needlessly throw them in harm’s way or seek to divide them with partisan politics. 

    So, I’d like to address a few issues now that we were not able to get to at the hearing, because we were not able to ask more than one round of questions. And I want to start with the role alliances and that our allies and partners play in our own national security.

    I believe – and we’ve seen it many times since the start of this nation – that we are stronger and safer when we lead together with our allies. 

    And we’re fortunate, because we have strong allies and partners. We don’t see that coming from Vladimir Putin, from Xi in China, we don’t see it from the North Koreans or the Iranians, but the United States has strong allies who can stand with us.

    The most important security agreement we’ve had, I think any time in our nation’s history, is NATO.

    It is a critical, indispensable part of our national security, and yet, the President’s nominee for Secretary of Defense wrote in his book, American Crusade, that NATO is quote “a relic” and quote that it “should be scrapped.”

    Now since his nomination, Mr. Hegseth has tried to walk back his opposition to one of our key international alliances, to NATO. 

    In advance policy questions for the Committee, he calls NATO a quote, “vital U.S. interest” in defending Europe and American interests from Russia and Vladimir Putin. 

    This sudden reversal is welcome, because I think it’s very important that our Secretary of Defense understand how critical NATO is, and that it’s stronger now than it was any time since it was formed, probably. We now have 32 members of NATO.

    But Mr. Hegseth’s 11th hour conversion to understanding the importance of our allies and partners raises questions about what he really believes.

    We asked on our questions for the record about NATO, and we didn’t get much of a response.

    Now, if I had had the opportunity, I would have brought up Ukraine and Mr. Hegseth’s head-spinning contradictions on this matter.

    Just as America’s national security interests are not to be trifled with, neither is our commitment to defending democracy and the international world order. 

    And any inconsistency in our commitment to support our allies and partners, to support democracy around the world, to support the international world order, that is going to be seen and exploited by our adversaries. 

    So again, I’m puzzled about how we should think about Mr. Hegseth’s contradictory positions on a variety of national security and foreign policy issues.

    For example, he was critical of the Biden administration—as have many of us on both sides of the aisle been in this chamber—for not moving fast enough to aid Ukraine. But then question the wisdom of sending any U.S. assistance to Ukraine at all. 

    In 2022, Mr. Hegseth called Vladimir Putin a “war criminal” and called for faster U.S. aid to Ukraine. Now, he says the idea of Russia launching a nuclear war is “over-inflated” and plays down the severity of the conflict as merely Putin’s “give-me-my-shit-back war.”

    Well, I don’t think that our NATO allies, those in the Baltics and Poland and Eastern Europe, think Vladmir Putin’s nuclear ambitions are “over inflated.”

    They know the threat he poses to their countries and the world.

    And to be flippant about the threat of nuclear war, I think is beneath the office of the Secretary of Defense, who will have to engage with those partners on a regular basis. 

    Now, I agree with President Trump that the American people want to see a resolution to this years-long war. I’m sure that’s true of the Ukrainians as well.

    But Mr. Hegseth has not, either in his hearing nor in response to the questions that we submitted to him for the record, expanded on what the Department of Defense’s role should be with respect to Ukraine, even though we have already invested $66 billion in military assistance.

    And again, I think it’s very important that we stand by our ally Ukraine, because of the message it sends not just to the Russians and Vladimir Putin, but because of the message it sends to Xi in China, to the Iranians, to the North Koreans, to anyone who is an adversary of the United States.

    If they think we’re going to walk away from our allies, they’re going to do everything they can to divide us.

    Now, on Afghanistan, Mr. Hegseth has also been inconsistent on his views of the President’s foreign policy.

    Actually, he’s been inconsistent in general on the President’s foreign policies.

    In the lead up to the 2016 election, Mr. Hegseth was highly critical of then-candidate Trump’s foreign policy stances, particularly on Iraq and Afghanistan. 

    Mr. Hegseth called Mr. Trump, who was a candidate at the time, and I quote “all bluster, very little substance” and again quoting, “an armchair tough guy.” 

    He criticized then-candidate Trump in 2015 for advocating for the withdrawal of forces from Afghanistan, but then he took the criticism back. 

    He sharply criticized the 2021 Afghanistan withdrawal, as did I, but he’s failed to publicly comment on President Trump’s 2020 deal with the Taliban, which is what set the date certain for withdrawal in 2021 that then the Biden administration was actually tied to.

    Now, I agree. I agree that that withdrawal was not what I wanted to see. I didn’t support it.

    But they were terms that President Trump, in his first term, set with the Taliban. 

    Terms that I thought gave away the store to the Taliban. Because there were no concessions from them, on what we were to get from the United States. The Government of Afghanistan was not at the table and now we’re seeing the fallout from that.  

    And I know that no one is watching for gaps in U.S. national security policy more closely than President Xi and the People’s Republic of China. 

    Now Mr. Hegseth identifies China as our peer competitor, something that I think all of us on the Armed Services Committee and probably everyone this chamber agree with.

    But if Mr. Hegseth is so concerned about China, then he should realize that nothing will encourage President Xi’s aggression more than seeing America abandon our allies and partners. 

    Mr. Hegseth sees China’s ambitions as, quote, “a fait accompli,” and yet, he does not seem to recognize that his own inconsistencies on all these foreign policy positions could contribute to this.

    A question I would like Mr. Hegseth to attempt to answer is: What message would it send to our adversaries if the U.S. ceases its support not just for Ukraine, but for the international rules and norms that underpin the global order?

    Now, I’m also concerned about that with respect to the conduct of conflict. In his book “The War on Warriors,” Mr. Hegseth argued, and again I’m quoting, “our boys should not fight by rules written by dignified men in mahogany rooms eighty years ago. America should fight by its own rules.”  

    Well, the rules that he’s talking about are the Geneva Conventions—which established bare minimum protections against violence, torture and inhumane treatments.

    And they don’t just protect those people we’re fighting on the battlefield, they protect American soldiers.

    During his hearing, he even doubled down to say, quote, “restrictive rules of engagement” have “made it more difficult to defeat our enemies,” and that it would be his priority, quote, “that lawyers aren’t getting in the way.”

    Unfortunately—and dangerously—this appears to be the few issues that Mr. Hegseth is consistent on. 

    He has a documented history of supporting individuals who have violated military and international law by committing war crimes.  

    These are individuals who were turned in not by our enemies, but by members of their own units who were convicted of crimes by military juries. Individuals for whom Mr. Hegseth lobbied to get pardons.  

    I don’t think we can afford to entrust the safety and success of our men and women in uniform to a man who would himself disregard the laws of armed conflict and leave American credibility and moral authority in tatters on the world stage.  

    Now, while embracing officers convicted of war crimes, Mr. Hegseth has stated it is his intent to review all general officers currently serving in the Department of Defense. 

    And when asked if he would remove the current chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Mr. Hegseth responded, on the record, that, quote, “all senior officers will be reviewed.”

    So, let’s just think about what that means – subjecting our general officers, in our military that is not politicized, to a political litmus test is not only unprecedented, it is dangerous. 

    It will convey to the American public that their leadership is political. 

    One of the most important roles of the Secretary of Defense is to seek out and consider open, honest and direct military advice from the senior officers in charge of our forces.  

    I don’t know how Mr. Hegseth expects to receive open and honest advice from his commanders when he is advocating for a purge of anyone who disagrees with him. 

      

    And I am also deeply troubled by the idea that Mr. Hegseth would act as a “yes man” himself, putting his own personal political interests above the wellbeing of our military men and women.

    At Mr. Hegseth’s confirmation hearing, when asked what he would do if he received orders from President Trump that he knew to be illegal or unconstitutional, Mr. Hegseth wouldn’t give a straight answer. All he could do was deny that President Trump was capable of giving an illegal order.

    And just for the record, to be clear: in his first term, President Trump did give an illegal order that then-Secretary Esper refused to follow. 

    And for that, Secretary Esper was fired by the President. 

    So, Mr. President, I am very concerned that Mr. Hegseth lacks the consistency and the moral clarity to lead the most combat-credible military in the world. 

    And I’m very disappointed that this body would put a nominee on the floor without the due process of advise-and-consent that the position of the Secretary of Defense deserves. 

    Our men and women in uniform deserve better. 

    And therefore, the first time since I was elected to represent the people of New Hampshire in the United States Senate, I plan to vote against this nominee for Secretary of Defense.  

    Thank you, I yield the floor.

    As the second-ranking Democrat on the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, Senator Shaheen is instrumental in helping to accomplish top national security objectives and enhancing New Hampshire’s role in support of America’s national defense. A member of the Committee since 2011, Shaheen has voted to confirm multiple nominees from both parties under multiple administrations. During his confirmation hearing, Shaheen questioned Hegseth about his support for women service members and the Shaheen-led Women, Peace and Security law. The bipartisan Women, Peace and Security Act, was signed into law by President Donald Trump, which Shaheen leads with Senator Shelley Moore Capito (R-WV), was signed into law in 2017 and requires the U.S. Government to strengthen the meaningful participation of women in conflict prevention and peace negotiations. 

    Senator Shaheen is the top Democrat on the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee and also serves on the U.S. Senate Appropriations Subcommittees on State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs and Defense. In 2018, Shaheen re-established the bipartisan U.S. Senate NATO Observer Group with U.S. Senator Tillis (R-NC). Senator Shaheen believes that a strong and active United States is fundamental to securing our national interests at home and abroad. She also believes that U.S. global leadership is directly tied to the strength of our ideals, our alliances and our diplomacy, and she is constantly working to ensure our national security policies reflect our broader democratic values. 

    MIL OSI USA News –

    January 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Security: COMLOG WESTPAC Sailors take E-7 Navy-wide advancement exam. [Image 4 of 5]

    Source: United States Navy (Logistics Group Western Pacific)

    Issued by: on


    SINGAPORE (Jan. 16, 2025) Hospital Corpsman 1st Class Jeffrey Bowman, attached to Motor Vessel Carolyn Chouest, participates in the E-7 Navy-wide advancement exam at Sembawang Naval Installation, Jan. 16, 2025. COMLOG WESTPAC supports deployed surface units and aircraft carriers, along with regional partners, to facilitate patrols in the South China Sea, participation in Naval exercises and responses to natural disasters. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Jordan Jennings/Released)

    Date Taken: 01.16.2025
    Date Posted: 01.21.2025 03:35
    Photo ID: 8836748
    VIRIN: 250116-N-YV347-1036
    Resolution: 8256×5504
    Size: 6.73 MB
    Location: SG

    Web Views: 11
    Downloads: 2

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    January 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Security: Chief of Staff, NAVELSG Visits COMLOG WESTPAC, January 23, 2025 [Image 1 of 3]

    Source: United States Navy (Logistics Group Western Pacific)

    Issued by: on


    SINGAPORE (Jan. 23, 2025) Capt. James Bach, left of center, Chief of Staff, Navy Expeditionary Logistics Support Group, delivers a command capabilities brief to staff and personnel assigned to Commander, Logistics Group Western Pacific/ Task Force 73 (COMLOGWESTPAC/CTF 73), during a scheduled visit to Sembawang Naval Installation, Jan. 23, 2025. COMLOG WESTPAC supports deployed surface units and aircraft carriers, along with regional Allies and partners, to facilitate patrols in the South China Sea, participation in naval exercises and responses to natural disasters. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Moises Sandoval/Released)

    Date Taken: 01.23.2025
    Date Posted: 01.23.2025 22:49
    Photo ID: 8840610
    VIRIN: 250123-N-ED646-1007
    Resolution: 8256×5504
    Size: 4.11 MB
    Location: SG

    Web Views: 1
    Downloads: 0

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    January 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Africa: DRC has created a reserve force to fight the M23 – why this may backfire

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Judith Verweijen, Assistant professor, Utrecht University

    After nearly three decades of warfare, armed conflict in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) seems only to intensify. The Rwanda-backed M23 rebellion has been at the centre of attention in recent years. However, eastern DRC is home to more than 100 other armed groups, which are a major source of instability too. The question of their demobilisation has haunted the country ever since the end of the Second Congo War in 2003.

    A new chapter in this long-standing conundrum seems to have started. In 2022, the government decided to form an alliance with armed groups to fight their common enemy, the M23 and its Rwandan backers. At around the same time, it launched an initiative to create an army reserve, known as the Reserve armée de la défense (RAD). This formalised the Congolese army’s established practice of using armed groups as auxiliaries.

    The creation of the reserve army allows the government to reward armed group allies with integration while bringing them under institutionalised control. But will this actually work?

    Our past and ongoing research on army integration and demobilisation in eastern DRC casts doubt on the plan, for three reasons.

    The first risk is that armed groups will boost their numbers to gain a stronger bargaining position once integration does occur.

    Secondly, reservist forces may compete with the army over territorial control and limited resources and turn against those who created them.

    Finally, merely absorbing armed groups into a reserve force does little to address the long-standing grievances that underlie conflict in the east.

    The Wazalendo: eastern DRC’s predatory patriots

    On 9 May 2022, in a secretive meeting in the town of Pinga in North Kivu, the Congolese armed forces and several Congolese armed groups agreed to cease hostilities against each other and instead form an alliance to fight their common enemy, the M23.

    As a result, these groups became quasi-official and increasingly presented themselves as defenders of Congo’s territorial integrity. They started to call themselves Wazalendo or patriots in Kiswahili. Fuelled by President Félix Tshisekedi’s supportive rhetoric, the Wazalendo became symbols of Congolese resistance against foreign aggression. This benefited the president’s 2023 electoral campaign.

    Across North and South Kivu provinces, armed groups have rebranded themselves Wazalendo, even when not part of the coalition fighting the M23.

    As the Congolese army’s attention is on the M23, these armed groups have benefited from the lull in operations against them. Most Wazalendo groups are allowed to roam around freely and have dramatically expanded their zones of influence and violent systems of revenue generation.

    This includes taxation at markets and rapidly proliferating roadblocks, but also ransom kidnappings and contract killings. There is also evidence that Wazalendo groups are engaged in torture, sexual violence and arbitrary arrests, and frequently recruit child soldiers.

    Chequered history of integration

    A few months after the Pinga meeting, Congo’s government launched a new national defence policy that mentioned the establishment of the reserve army. Though it was passed unanimously in parliament in April 2023, MPs voiced concerns that the new army reserve risked repeating mistakes of the past.

    The army is itself the product of the painstaking integration of former belligerents after the Second Congo War (1998-2003). But rebel-military integration became an open-ended process. Armed group officers alternately integrated into and deserted from the army in the hope of gaining higher ranks and positions in a next round of integration.

    Unending rebel integration also weakened the national army. It reinforced parallel command chains, facilitated intelligence leaks and created a lopsided hierarchy.

    The first iteration of the M23 rebellion in 2012 was the result of rebel integration gone wrong. In its aftermath, the Congolese government banned the wholesale negotiated integration of armed groups into the army.

    Hurdles to integration

    The reserve army risks unleashing the same dynamics of rewarding rebellion by doling out positions to armed group leaders and granting them impunity for past violence. In April 2024, the leaders of many Wazalendo groups were flown to Kinshasa where the army reserve leadership told them to start preparing lists of their combatants ahead of their integration.

    This has prompted numerous armed groups to step up recruitment.

    The prospect of integration has also triggered fierce competition for positions between Wazalendo commanders. This risks worsening animosities between groups.

    Other hurdles, some of which have been faced before, include:

    Unity of command. Forcing smaller armed groups into a hierarchical mould doesn’t always work. Most have deep local roots, with their recruitment and influence limited to a relatively small area. Used to calling the shots in their home areas, these commanders tend to be reluctant to take orders from higher-placed outsiders.

    Ethnic competition. Armed groups may resist full integration if they feel their rank and positions in the reserve army will be lower and that this will hamper their ability to protect members of their ethnic community. Such “local security dilemmas” have obstructed army integration and demobilisation efforts in the past.

    Resources. Armed groups currently enjoy substantial income, and considerable freedom in obtaining it. Will the reserve army command allow its members to engage in illegal taxation, kidnapping for ransom, robbery and ambushes? If not, how will it compensate for their lost opportunities? In addition, the reserve army is likely to compete with the army over revenue-generating opportunities. And some of its members may leak intelligence to fellow armed groups.

    Painkiller or cure?

    The army reserve may be read as the latest attempt at solving the decades-old problem of getting rid of the many armed groups in eastern DRC, this time by bringing them into the fold of the state yet not into the army.

    However, this solution does risk unleashing many of the same detrimental dynamics as army integration. It may fuel armed mobilisation and militarisation rather than contain it.

    Wazalendo groups are currently in a comfortable position and there are no repercussions for not integrating the reserve force. To contain them, both the DRC’s army and the military justice system would need to be professionalised.

    Even if the reserve army did not have negative ripple effects, it would be an unlikely cure for armed mobilisation. That requires comprehensive, bottom-up peace efforts that tackle deep-seated grievances related to past violence and conflict over belonging, territory and local authority. Barring such efforts, the reserve force will remain a painkiller at best.

    – DRC has created a reserve force to fight the M23 – why this may backfire
    – https://theconversation.com/drc-has-created-a-reserve-force-to-fight-the-m23-why-this-may-backfire-247476

    MIL OSI Africa –

    January 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Global: DRC has created a reserve force to fight the M23 – why this may backfire

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Judith Verweijen, Assistant professor, Utrecht University

    After nearly three decades of warfare, armed conflict in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) seems only to intensify. The Rwanda-backed M23 rebellion has been at the centre of attention in recent years. However, eastern DRC is home to more than 100 other armed groups, which are a major source of instability too. The question of their demobilisation has haunted the country ever since the end of the Second Congo War in 2003.

    A new chapter in this long-standing conundrum seems to have started. In 2022, the government decided to form an alliance with armed groups to fight their common enemy, the M23 and its Rwandan backers. At around the same time, it launched an initiative to create an army reserve, known as the Reserve armée de la défense (RAD). This formalised the Congolese army’s established practice of using armed groups as auxiliaries.

    The creation of the reserve army allows the government to reward armed group allies with integration while bringing them under institutionalised control. But will this actually work?

    Our past and ongoing research on army integration and demobilisation in eastern DRC casts doubt on the plan, for three reasons.

    The first risk is that armed groups will boost their numbers to gain a stronger bargaining position once integration does occur.

    Secondly, reservist forces may compete with the army over territorial control and limited resources and turn against those who created them.

    Finally, merely absorbing armed groups into a reserve force does little to address the long-standing grievances that underlie conflict in the east.

    The Wazalendo: eastern DRC’s predatory patriots

    On 9 May 2022, in a secretive meeting in the town of Pinga in North Kivu, the Congolese armed forces and several Congolese armed groups agreed to cease hostilities against each other and instead form an alliance to fight their common enemy, the M23.

    As a result, these groups became quasi-official and increasingly presented themselves as defenders of Congo’s territorial integrity. They started to call themselves Wazalendo or patriots in Kiswahili. Fuelled by President Félix Tshisekedi’s supportive rhetoric, the Wazalendo became symbols of Congolese resistance against foreign aggression. This benefited the president’s 2023 electoral campaign.

    Across North and South Kivu provinces, armed groups have rebranded themselves Wazalendo, even when not part of the coalition fighting the M23.

    As the Congolese army’s attention is on the M23, these armed groups have benefited from the lull in operations against them. Most Wazalendo groups are allowed to roam around freely and have dramatically expanded their zones of influence and violent systems of revenue generation.

    This includes taxation at markets and rapidly proliferating roadblocks, but also ransom kidnappings and contract killings. There is also evidence that Wazalendo groups are engaged in torture, sexual violence and arbitrary arrests, and frequently recruit child soldiers.

    Chequered history of integration

    A few months after the Pinga meeting, Congo’s government launched a new national defence policy that mentioned the establishment of the reserve army. Though it was passed unanimously in parliament in April 2023, MPs voiced concerns that the new army reserve risked repeating mistakes of the past.

    The army is itself the product of the painstaking integration of former belligerents after the Second Congo War (1998-2003). But rebel-military integration became an open-ended process. Armed group officers alternately integrated into and deserted from the army in the hope of gaining higher ranks and positions in a next round of integration.

    Unending rebel integration also weakened the national army. It reinforced parallel command chains, facilitated intelligence leaks and created a lopsided hierarchy.

    The first iteration of the M23 rebellion in 2012 was the result of rebel integration gone wrong. In its aftermath, the Congolese government banned the wholesale negotiated integration of armed groups into the army.

    Hurdles to integration

    The reserve army risks unleashing the same dynamics of rewarding rebellion by doling out positions to armed group leaders and granting them impunity for past violence. In April 2024, the leaders of many Wazalendo groups were flown to Kinshasa where the army reserve leadership told them to start preparing lists of their combatants ahead of their integration.

    This has prompted numerous armed groups to step up recruitment.

    The prospect of integration has also triggered fierce competition for positions between Wazalendo commanders. This risks worsening animosities between groups.

    Other hurdles, some of which have been faced before, include:

    Unity of command. Forcing smaller armed groups into a hierarchical mould doesn’t always work. Most have deep local roots, with their recruitment and influence limited to a relatively small area. Used to calling the shots in their home areas, these commanders tend to be reluctant to take orders from higher-placed outsiders.

    Ethnic competition. Armed groups may resist full integration if they feel their rank and positions in the reserve army will be lower and that this will hamper their ability to protect members of their ethnic community. Such “local security dilemmas” have obstructed army integration and demobilisation efforts in the past.

    Resources. Armed groups currently enjoy substantial income, and considerable freedom in obtaining it. Will the reserve army command allow its members to engage in illegal taxation, kidnapping for ransom, robbery and ambushes? If not, how will it compensate for their lost opportunities? In addition, the reserve army is likely to compete with the army over revenue-generating opportunities. And some of its members may leak intelligence to fellow armed groups.

    Painkiller or cure?

    The army reserve may be read as the latest attempt at solving the decades-old problem of getting rid of the many armed groups in eastern DRC, this time by bringing them into the fold of the state yet not into the army.

    However, this solution does risk unleashing many of the same detrimental dynamics as army integration. It may fuel armed mobilisation and militarisation rather than contain it.

    Wazalendo groups are currently in a comfortable position and there are no repercussions for not integrating the reserve force. To contain them, both the DRC’s army and the military justice system would need to be professionalised.

    Even if the reserve army did not have negative ripple effects, it would be an unlikely cure for armed mobilisation. That requires comprehensive, bottom-up peace efforts that tackle deep-seated grievances related to past violence and conflict over belonging, territory and local authority. Barring such efforts, the reserve force will remain a painkiller at best.

    Michel Thill is a Senior Program Officer for swisspeace, a Basel University affiliated practice and research institute dedicated to advancing effective peacebuilding. swisspeace receives funding from research funding bodies, and bilateral and multilateral organizations. Michel is also a Fellow of the Rift Valley Institute.

    Judith Verweijen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. DRC has created a reserve force to fight the M23 – why this may backfire – https://theconversation.com/drc-has-created-a-reserve-force-to-fight-the-m23-why-this-may-backfire-247476

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

    January 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI China: Xi lauds China’s solid progress despite challenges in Year of Dragon

    Source: China State Council Information Office 2

    Chinese President Xi Jinping on Monday noted solid progress the country has made in advancing Chinese modernization amid “complex and challenging” situations over the past twelve months at a high-level reception to ring in the Chinese New Year.
    “In the Year of the Dragon, we demonstrated vitality and a can-do spirit. We endured storms and saw the rainbow,” said Xi, who is also general secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee and chairman of the Central Military Commission.
    Faced with complex and challenging situations, China responded with composure and implemented a range of comprehensive measures, overcame difficulties and forged ahead with determination, Xi said at the reception held by the CPC Central Committee and the State Council to usher in the Year of the Snake, which begins on Jan. 29.

    MIL OSI China News –

    January 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Africa: DRC creates a reserve force to fight the M23 – why this may backfire

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Judith Verweijen, Assistant professor, Utrecht University

    After nearly three decades of warfare, armed conflict in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) seems only to intensify. The Rwanda-backed M23 rebellion has been at the centre of attention in recent years. However, eastern DRC is home to more than 100 other armed groups, which are a major source of instability too. The question of their demobilisation has haunted the country ever since the end of the Second Congo War in 2003.

    A new chapter in this long-standing conundrum seems to have started. In 2022, the government decided to form an alliance with armed groups to fight their common enemy, the M23 and its Rwandan backers. At around the same time, it launched an initiative to create an army reserve, known as the Reserve armée de la défense (RAD). This formalised the Congolese army’s established practice of using armed groups as auxiliaries.

    The creation of the reserve army allows the government to reward armed group allies with integration while bringing them under institutionalised control. But will this actually work?

    Our past and ongoing research on army integration and demobilisation in eastern DRC casts doubt on the plan, for three reasons.

    The first risk is that armed groups will boost their numbers to gain a stronger bargaining position once integration does occur.

    Secondly, reservist forces may compete with the army over territorial control and limited resources and turn against those who created them.

    Finally, merely absorbing armed groups into a reserve force does little to address the long-standing grievances that underlie conflict in the east.

    The Wazalendo: eastern DRC’s predatory patriots

    On 9 May 2022, in a secretive meeting in the town of Pinga in North Kivu, the Congolese armed forces and several Congolese armed groups agreed to cease hostilities against each other and instead form an alliance to fight their common enemy, the M23.

    As a result, these groups became quasi-official and increasingly presented themselves as defenders of Congo’s territorial integrity. They started to call themselves Wazalendo or patriots in Kiswahili. Fuelled by President Félix Tshisekedi’s supportive rhetoric, the Wazalendo became symbols of Congolese resistance against foreign aggression. This benefited the president’s 2023 electoral campaign.

    Across North and South Kivu provinces, armed groups have rebranded themselves Wazalendo, even when not part of the coalition fighting the M23.

    As the Congolese army’s attention is on the M23, these armed groups have benefited from the lull in operations against them. Most Wazalendo groups are allowed to roam around freely and have dramatically expanded their zones of influence and violent systems of revenue generation.

    This includes taxation at markets and rapidly proliferating roadblocks, but also ransom kidnappings and contract killings. There is also evidence that Wazalendo groups are engaged in torture, sexual violence and arbitrary arrests, and frequently recruit child soldiers.

    Chequered history of integration

    A few months after the Pinga meeting, Congo’s government launched a new national defence policy that mentioned the establishment of the reserve army. Though it was passed unanimously in parliament in April 2023, MPs voiced concerns that the new army reserve risked repeating mistakes of the past.

    The army is itself the product of the painstaking integration of former belligerents after the Second Congo War (1998-2003). But rebel-military integration became an open-ended process. Armed group officers alternately integrated into and deserted from the army in the hope of gaining higher ranks and positions in a next round of integration.

    Unending rebel integration also weakened the national army. It reinforced parallel command chains, facilitated intelligence leaks and created a lopsided hierarchy.

    The first iteration of the M23 rebellion in 2012 was the result of rebel integration gone wrong. In its aftermath, the Congolese government banned the wholesale negotiated integration of armed groups into the army.

    Hurdles to integration

    The reserve army risks unleashing the same dynamics of rewarding rebellion by doling out positions to armed group leaders and granting them impunity for past violence. In April 2024, the leaders of many Wazalendo groups were flown to Kinshasa where the army reserve leadership told them to start preparing lists of their combatants ahead of their integration.

    This has prompted numerous armed groups to step up recruitment.

    The prospect of integration has also triggered fierce competition for positions between Wazalendo commanders. This risks worsening animosities between groups.

    Other hurdles, some of which have been faced before, include:

    Unity of command. Forcing smaller armed groups into a hierarchical mould doesn’t always work. Most have deep local roots, with their recruitment and influence limited to a relatively small area. Used to calling the shots in their home areas, these commanders tend to be reluctant to take orders from higher-placed outsiders.

    Ethnic competition. Armed groups may resist full integration if they feel their rank and positions in the reserve army will be lower and that this will hamper their ability to protect members of their ethnic community. Such “local security dilemmas” have obstructed army integration and demobilisation efforts in the past.

    Resources. Armed groups currently enjoy substantial income, and considerable freedom in obtaining it. Will the reserve army command allow its members to engage in illegal taxation, kidnapping for ransom, robbery and ambushes? If not, how will it compensate for their lost opportunities? In addition, the reserve army is likely to compete with the army over revenue-generating opportunities. And some of its members may leak intelligence to fellow armed groups.

    Painkiller or cure?

    The army reserve may be read as the latest attempt at solving the decades-old problem of getting rid of the many armed groups in eastern DRC, this time by bringing them into the fold of the state yet not into the army.

    However, this solution does risk unleashing many of the same detrimental dynamics as army integration. It may fuel armed mobilisation and militarisation rather than contain it.

    Wazalendo groups are currently in a comfortable position and there are no repercussions for not integrating the reserve force. To contain them, both the DRC’s army and the military justice system would need to be professionalised.

    Even if the reserve army did not have negative ripple effects, it would be an unlikely cure for armed mobilisation. That requires comprehensive, bottom-up peace efforts that tackle deep-seated grievances related to past violence and conflict over belonging, territory and local authority. Barring such efforts, the reserve force will remain a painkiller at best.

    – DRC creates a reserve force to fight the M23 – why this may backfire
    – https://theconversation.com/drc-creates-a-reserve-force-to-fight-the-m23-why-this-may-backfire-247476

    MIL OSI Africa –

    January 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Global: DRC creates a reserve force to fight the M23 – why this may backfire

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Judith Verweijen, Assistant professor, Utrecht University

    After nearly three decades of warfare, armed conflict in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) seems only to intensify. The Rwanda-backed M23 rebellion has been at the centre of attention in recent years. However, eastern DRC is home to more than 100 other armed groups, which are a major source of instability too. The question of their demobilisation has haunted the country ever since the end of the Second Congo War in 2003.

    A new chapter in this long-standing conundrum seems to have started. In 2022, the government decided to form an alliance with armed groups to fight their common enemy, the M23 and its Rwandan backers. At around the same time, it launched an initiative to create an army reserve, known as the Reserve armée de la défense (RAD). This formalised the Congolese army’s established practice of using armed groups as auxiliaries.

    The creation of the reserve army allows the government to reward armed group allies with integration while bringing them under institutionalised control. But will this actually work?

    Our past and ongoing research on army integration and demobilisation in eastern DRC casts doubt on the plan, for three reasons.

    The first risk is that armed groups will boost their numbers to gain a stronger bargaining position once integration does occur.

    Secondly, reservist forces may compete with the army over territorial control and limited resources and turn against those who created them.

    Finally, merely absorbing armed groups into a reserve force does little to address the long-standing grievances that underlie conflict in the east.

    The Wazalendo: eastern DRC’s predatory patriots

    On 9 May 2022, in a secretive meeting in the town of Pinga in North Kivu, the Congolese armed forces and several Congolese armed groups agreed to cease hostilities against each other and instead form an alliance to fight their common enemy, the M23.

    As a result, these groups became quasi-official and increasingly presented themselves as defenders of Congo’s territorial integrity. They started to call themselves Wazalendo or patriots in Kiswahili. Fuelled by President Félix Tshisekedi’s supportive rhetoric, the Wazalendo became symbols of Congolese resistance against foreign aggression. This benefited the president’s 2023 electoral campaign.

    Across North and South Kivu provinces, armed groups have rebranded themselves Wazalendo, even when not part of the coalition fighting the M23.

    As the Congolese army’s attention is on the M23, these armed groups have benefited from the lull in operations against them. Most Wazalendo groups are allowed to roam around freely and have dramatically expanded their zones of influence and violent systems of revenue generation.

    This includes taxation at markets and rapidly proliferating roadblocks, but also ransom kidnappings and contract killings. There is also evidence that Wazalendo groups are engaged in torture, sexual violence and arbitrary arrests, and frequently recruit child soldiers.

    Chequered history of integration

    A few months after the Pinga meeting, Congo’s government launched a new national defence policy that mentioned the establishment of the reserve army. Though it was passed unanimously in parliament in April 2023, MPs voiced concerns that the new army reserve risked repeating mistakes of the past.

    The army is itself the product of the painstaking integration of former belligerents after the Second Congo War (1998-2003). But rebel-military integration became an open-ended process. Armed group officers alternately integrated into and deserted from the army in the hope of gaining higher ranks and positions in a next round of integration.

    Unending rebel integration also weakened the national army. It reinforced parallel command chains, facilitated intelligence leaks and created a lopsided hierarchy.

    The first iteration of the M23 rebellion in 2012 was the result of rebel integration gone wrong. In its aftermath, the Congolese government banned the wholesale negotiated integration of armed groups into the army.

    Hurdles to integration

    The reserve army risks unleashing the same dynamics of rewarding rebellion by doling out positions to armed group leaders and granting them impunity for past violence. In April 2024, the leaders of many Wazalendo groups were flown to Kinshasa where the army reserve leadership told them to start preparing lists of their combatants ahead of their integration.

    This has prompted numerous armed groups to step up recruitment.

    The prospect of integration has also triggered fierce competition for positions between Wazalendo commanders. This risks worsening animosities between groups.

    Other hurdles, some of which have been faced before, include:

    Unity of command. Forcing smaller armed groups into a hierarchical mould doesn’t always work. Most have deep local roots, with their recruitment and influence limited to a relatively small area. Used to calling the shots in their home areas, these commanders tend to be reluctant to take orders from higher-placed outsiders.

    Ethnic competition. Armed groups may resist full integration if they feel their rank and positions in the reserve army will be lower and that this will hamper their ability to protect members of their ethnic community. Such “local security dilemmas” have obstructed army integration and demobilisation efforts in the past.

    Resources. Armed groups currently enjoy substantial income, and considerable freedom in obtaining it. Will the reserve army command allow its members to engage in illegal taxation, kidnapping for ransom, robbery and ambushes? If not, how will it compensate for their lost opportunities? In addition, the reserve army is likely to compete with the army over revenue-generating opportunities. And some of its members may leak intelligence to fellow armed groups.

    Painkiller or cure?

    The army reserve may be read as the latest attempt at solving the decades-old problem of getting rid of the many armed groups in eastern DRC, this time by bringing them into the fold of the state yet not into the army.

    However, this solution does risk unleashing many of the same detrimental dynamics as army integration. It may fuel armed mobilisation and militarisation rather than contain it.

    Wazalendo groups are currently in a comfortable position and there are no repercussions for not integrating the reserve force. To contain them, both the DRC’s army and the military justice system would need to be professionalised.

    Even if the reserve army did not have negative ripple effects, it would be an unlikely cure for armed mobilisation. That requires comprehensive, bottom-up peace efforts that tackle deep-seated grievances related to past violence and conflict over belonging, territory and local authority. Barring such efforts, the reserve force will remain a painkiller at best.

    Michel Thill is a Senior Program Officer for swisspeace, a Basel University affiliated practice and research institute dedicated to advancing effective peacebuilding. swisspeace receives funding from research funding bodies, and bilateral and multilateral organizations. Michel is also a Fellow of the Rift Valley Institute.

    Judith Verweijen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. DRC creates a reserve force to fight the M23 – why this may backfire – https://theconversation.com/drc-creates-a-reserve-force-to-fight-the-m23-why-this-may-backfire-247476

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

    January 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Security Council Press Statement on Situation in Democratic Republic of Congo

    Source: United Nations General Assembly and Security Council

    The following Security Council press statement was issued today by Council President Amar Bendjama (Algeria):

    The members of the Security Council condemned in the strongest terms ongoing advances by the M23 in North-Kivu, including the control of Masisi centre on 4 January 2025 and of Sake on 23 January 2025, and expressed serious concerns regarding imminent threats against Goma, which are putting hundreds of thousands of civilians at heightened risk. These advances represent a serious violation of the ceasefire, exacerbate the grave humanitarian and displacement crisis in the Eastern DRC and undermine efforts to reach a lasting peaceful and political solution to the conflict through the Luanda process. The members of the Security Council echoed the statement by the Secretary-General dated 26 January 2025 and demanded that the ongoing offensive and advances towards Goma immediately stop. They further called on the M23 to reverse its territorial expansion without delay.

    The members of the Security Council reiterated their full support to MONUSCO, which is acting within its mandate and doing essential work in the DRC, including near Goma, and expressed their strong commitment to the safety and security of its peacekeepers. They paid tribute to all peacekeepers who risk their lives. They expressed their deepest condolences and sympathy to the families of the peacekeepers killed, as well as to South Africa, Malawi and Uruguay.  They also expressed their condolences to the United Nations. They wished a speedy and full recovery to the peacekeepers injured. They reiterated that attacks against peacekeepers may constitute war crimes. They stressed that involvement in planning, directing, sponsoring or conducting attacks against MONUSCO peacekeepers constitutes a basis for sanctions designations pursuant to United Nations Security Council resolutions.

    The members of the Security Council condemned the ongoing flagrant disregard for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the DRC, including the unauthorized presence in the Eastern DRC of external Forces as reported by the Group of Experts and demanded that these forces withdraw immediately and that the M23 put an end to the establishment of parallel administrations in the DRC territory. They urged all parties to scrupulously abide by the ceasefire. They further reiterated their condemnation of the systematic illicit exploitation of the natural resources in eastern DRC, noting that these actions fuel the conflict. 

    They urged Rwanda and the DRC to return to diplomatic talks to achieve a lasting and peaceful resolution of the protracted conflict in the region including by addressing respective issues pertaining to the presence of Rwanda Defence Forces in the Eastern DRC and DRC support to the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR) respectively, as reported by the Group of Experts. The members of the Security Council reaffirmed their unwavering support for the ongoing mediation efforts between the DRC and Rwanda through the Luanda Process led by the AU -designated mediator President João Manuel Gonçalves Lourenço of Angola.

    The members of the Security Council are also deeply alarmed by continued occurrences of GPS jamming and spoofing activities in support of M23 operations in North Kivu, which represent imminent risk to civil aviation safety and negatively impact the delivery of humanitarian assistance to populations in need. They called for an end to reported GPS jamming and spoofing and deployment of Surface to Air Missiles, which threaten the safety and security of UN peacekeepers, and impede the implementation of their Protection of Civilians mandate.

    The members of the Security Council condemned persistent violations of international humanitarian law and violations and abuses of human rights in the eastern part of the DRC, including sexual and gender-based violence, the recruitment and use of child soldiers, and summary killings by armed groups. The members of the Security Council called for all perpetrators to be held accountable. They urged both parties to fully and rapidly implement their commitments agreed under the Luanda process, and to fully cooperate in good faith with Angola in order to accelerate the implementation of the harmonized plan for the neutralization of the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR) and the disengagement of Forces. Council members also stressed the importance of resuming consultations under the Nairobi Process under the guidance of former President Uhuru Kenyatta to address the protracted issue of armed groups, including the M23, operating in the DRC, and to identify pathways to peace and stability in the region.

    The members of the Security Council reaffirmed their strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity, and territorial integrity of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as well as all States in the region. They recalled resolution 2765 (2024) and expressed their full support to the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) and the Office of the Special Envoy for the Great Lakes.

    MIL OSI United Nations News –

    January 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI China: Iranian drones equipped with homegrown AI-powered missiles

    Source: China State Council Information Office

    A top Iranian military commander said Sunday the country’s drones have been equipped with homegrown missiles that employ artificial intelligence (AI) technology, the official news agency IRNA reported.

    Commander of the Navy of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) Alireza Tangsiri made the remarks in an address to reporters in the southern Iranian province of Bushehr while he was elaborating on a two-day large-scale naval drill held by his forces in Iran’s southern waters.

    He said the IRGC Navy equipped two homegrown combat drones Mohajer-6 and Ababil-5 with the domestically developed “Qaem and Almas” missiles incorporating AI technology.

    Tangsiri added the IRGC Navy and Iran’s Defense Ministry are developing AI-empowered cruise missiles with operational ranges of over 1,000 km and the ability to hit targets at different altitudes.

    According to Tangsiri, the drill starting on Friday off the coasts of Bushehr and Khuzestan provinces aimed to show “peace and friendship” to neighbors and show that Iran and regional states could ensure security and confront any threat.

    MIL OSI China News –

    January 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI China: S. Korean prosecution indicts President Yoon on insurrection charge

    Source: China State Council Information Office

    South Korea’s prosecution indicted arrested President Yoon Suk-yeol on an insurrection charge, multiple media outlets reported on Sunday.

    Yoon was put on trial in custody as the suspected ringleader of insurrection, becoming the country’s first incumbent president to be formally arrested and indicted.

    Yoon was accused of conspiring with former Defense Minister Kim Yong-hyun, who had already been indicted under detention, to declare unconstitutional, illegal martial law and dispatch armed forces into the National Assembly.

    After receiving Yoon’s case from the anti-corruption agency, the prosecution requested Yoon’s extended arrest twice for supplementary investigation, but the Seoul Central District Court repeatedly rejected it to bring Yoon to trial as early as possible.

    A warrant to keep Yoon in custody for up to 20 days, including the arrest period, was issued by another Seoul court on Jan. 19.

    Yoon was apprehended in the presidential office on Jan. 15.

    The motion to impeach Yoon was passed through the National Assembly on Dec. 14 last year and was delivered to the constitutional court to deliberate it for up to 180 days, during which Yoon’s presidential power is suspended.

    Yoon declared an emergency martial law on the night of Dec. 3. It was revoked by the National Assembly hours later. 

    MIL OSI China News –

    January 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI USA: Council to Assess the Federal Emergency Management Agency

    US Senate News:

    Source: The White House
    By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered as follows:
    Section 1.  Purpose and Policy.  The Federal responses to Hurricane Helene and other recent disasters demonstrate the need to drastically improve the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (“FEMA’s) efficacy, priorities, and competence, including evaluating whether FEMA’s bureaucracy in disaster response ultimately harms the agency’s ability to successfully respond.  Despite obligating nearly $30 billion in disaster aid each of the past three years, FEMA has managed to leave vulnerable Americans without the resources or support they need when they need it most.
    There are serious concerns of political bias in FEMA.  Indeed, at least one former FEMA responder has stated that FEMA managers directed her to avoid homes of individuals supporting the campaign of Donald J. Trump for President.  And it has lost mission focus, diverting limited staff and resources to support missions beyond its scope and authority, spending well over a billion dollars to welcome illegal aliens.
    Americans deserve an immediate, effective, and impartial response to and recovery from disasters.  FEMA therefore requires a full-scale review, by individuals highly experienced at effective disaster response and recovery, who shall recommend to the President improvements or structural changes to promote the national interest and enable national resilience.
    Sec. 2.  Establishment.  (a)  There is hereby established the Federal Emergency Management Agency Review Council (“Council”).
    (b)  The Council shall be composed of not more than 20 members.  The Secretary of Homeland Security and the Secretary of Defense shall be members of the Council.  The remaining members shall include relevant agency heads and distinguished individuals and representatives from sectors outside of the Federal Government appointed by the President.  These non-Federal members shall have diverse perspectives and expertise in disaster relief and assistance, emergency preparedness, natural disasters, Federal-State relationships, and budget management.
    (c)  The Secretary of Homeland Security and the Secretary of Defense shall serve as Co-Chairs of the Council.  The Co-Chairs may designate up to two Vice Chairs of the Council from among the non-Federal members of the Council, to support the Co-Chairs in the leadership and organization of the Council.
    Sec. 3.  Functions.  (a)  The Council shall advise the President, through the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security, and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, on the existing ability of FEMA to capably and impartially address disasters occurring within the United States and shall advise the President on all recommended changes related to FEMA to best serve the national interest.
    (b)  The Council shall meet regularly and shall:
    (i)   respond to requests from the President, through the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security Affairs, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, or the Co-Chairs for information, analysis, evaluation, or advice;
    (ii)  solicit information and ideas from a broad range of stakeholders, including Americans affected by natural disasters; the research community; the private sector; State, local, and Tribal governments; foundations; and nonprofit organizations;
    (c)  The Council shall produce a report for the President that includes the following:
    (i)     An assessment of the adequacy of FEMA’s response to disasters during the previous 4 years, including sufficiency of staffing;
    (ii)    A comparison of the FEMA responses with State, local, and private sector responses — including timeliness of response, supplies provided, efficacy, and services (including communications and electricity) provided — during the same period;
    (iii)   An account of the commentary and debate about the role and operation of FEMA in our Federal system and about the functioning of disaster relief, assistance, and preparedness in the United States;
    (iv)    The historical background of other periods in the Nation’s history both before FEMA was part of DHS and before FEMA existed and methods by which disaster aid and relief were then provided;
    (v)     The traditional role of States and their coordination with the Federal Government in securing the life, liberty, and property of their citizens in preparation for, during, and after disasters;
    (vi)    An evaluation of whether FEMA can serve its functions as a support agency, providing supplemental Federal assistance, to the States rather than supplanting State control of disaster relief;
    (vii)   Other recommended improvements to FEMA in the current statutory structure; and
    (viii)  An analysis of the principal arguments in the public debate for and against FEMA reform, including an appraisal of the merits and legality of particular reform proposals.
    (d)  The Council shall solicit public comment, including other expert views, to ensure that its work is informed by a broad spectrum of ideas.
    (e)  The Council shall hold its first public meeting within 90 days of the date of this order and submit its report to the President within 180 days of the date of the Council’s first public meeting.
    Sec. 4.  Administration.  (a)  The heads of executive departments and agencies shall, to the extent permitted by law, provide the Council with information concerning disaster preparedness and relief matters when requested by the Council Co-Chairs and as required for the purpose of carrying out the Council’s functions.
    (b)  In consultation with the Co-Chairs, the Council is authorized to create standing subcommittees and ad hoc groups, including technical advisory groups, to assist the Council and provide preliminary information directly to the Council.
    (c)  The Department of Homeland Security shall provide such funding and administrative and technical support as the Council may require, to the extent permitted by law and as authorized by existing appropriations.
    (d)  Members of the Council shall serve without any compensation for their work on the Council, but may receive travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, as authorized by law for persons serving intermittently in the government service (5 U.S.C. 5701-5707).
    (e)  Insofar as the Federal Advisory Committee Act, as amended (5 U.S.C. App.), may apply to the Council, any functions of the President under that Act, except that of reporting to the Congress, shall be performed by the Secretary of Homeland Security, in accordance with the guidelines and procedures established by the Administrator of General Services.
    Sec. 5.  Termination.  The Council shall terminate 1 year from the date of this order unless extended by the President.
    Sec. 6.  General Provisions.  (a)  Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:
    (i)   the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or
    (ii)  the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.
    (b)  This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.
    (c)  This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.
    THE WHITE HOUSE,
        January 24, 2025.

    MIL OSI USA News –

    January 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI USA: Emergency Measures to Provide Water Resources in California and Improve Disaster Response in Certain Areas

    US Senate News:

    Source: The White House
    By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered:
    Section 1.  Policy.  For weeks, residents of the Los Angeles area have watched raging fires consume their homes, belongings, beloved pets, and childhood memories.  Almost immediately, firefighters were unable to fight the blaze due to dry hydrants, empty reservoirs, and inadequate water infrastructure.  Today, at least 28 people have lost their lives and thousands more have lost everything else, with some damage estimates calculating hundreds of billions of dollars in damage.
    This tragedy affects the entire Nation, so it is in the Nation’s interest to ensure that California has what it needs to prevent and fight these fires and others in the future.  Therefore, it is the policy of the United States to provide Southern California with necessary water resources, notwithstanding actively harmful State or local policies.  And it is the policy of the United States to assist Americans in disaster areas through responsive policies that more effectively empower them to rebuild and regain their livelihoods.
    Sec. 2.  Overriding Disastrous California Policies.  (a)  The Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of the Interior, and the Secretary of Agriculture shall expeditiously take all measures, consistent with all applicable authorities, to ensure adequate water resources in Southern California.  Each shall report to me within 15 days on all authorities, including emergency authorities, available to ensure, require, maintain, or use infrastructure necessary to fight and prevent massive wildfires in Southern California. 
    (b)  In particular, the Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of Commerce shall immediately take actions to override existing activities that unduly burden efforts to maximize water deliveries.  The Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of Commerce shall consider actions including those consistent with the “No Action Alternative” in the Final Environmental Impact Statement issued November 15, 2024, by the Bureau of Reclamation on Long-term Operation of the Central Valley Project and State Water Project.
    (c)  The Secretary of the Interior, including through the Bureau of Reclamation, shall utilize his discretion to operate the CVP to deliver more water and produce additional hydropower, including by increasing storage and conveyance, and jointly operating federal and state facilities, to high-need communities, notwithstanding any contrary State or local laws.  The Bureau of Reclamation shall take all available measures to ensure that State agencies — including the California Department of Water Resources — do not interfere with the Bureau of Reclamation’s operation of the project to maximize water delivery to high-need communities or otherwise, including but not limited to the issuance of a new Record of Decision maximizing water deliveries and consistent with the 2020 Record of Decision.
    (d)  In accordance with section 6 of the Executive Order of January 20, 2025 (Declaring a National Energy Emergency), the Secretary of the Interior, through the Bureau of Reclamation, and in accordance with section 1536 of title 16 United States Code, shall expedite action related to any exemption under the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA), 16 U.S.C. 1531 et seq., for the Long-Term Operation of the CVP and the State Water Project for all applicable threatened and endangered species.
    (e)  The Secretary of the Interior shall promptly review, revise, or rescind any regulations or procedures specific to implementation of section 1536 of title 16 United States Code, as needed and consistent with applicable law, to conform with the plain meaning of the statute.
    (f)  The Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of Commerce shall identify all ongoing or potential major water-supply and storage projects within the State of California for which they have joint responsibility under the ESA or individual responsibilities under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.
    (g)  For each such project identified under subsection (f), the Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of Commerce shall each designate one federal official to coordinate each agency’s respective NEPA and ESA compliance responsibilities. Within 30 days from the date of this order, each designated official shall identify any regulatory hurdles that unduly burden each respective water project, identify any recent changes in state or Federal law that may impact such projects from a regulatory perspective (including Public Law 118-5), and shall develop a proposed plan, for review by the Secretaries, to appropriately suspend, revise, or rescind any regulations or procedures that unduly burden such projects and are not necessary to protect the public interest or otherwise comply with the law.  In so doing, each designated federal official will coordinate and share all appropriate information that will enable improved efficiencies.  For the purposes of this order, “unduly burden” means to unnecessarily obstruct, delay, curtail, impede or otherwise impose significant costs on the permitting, utilization, transmission, delivery, or supply of water resources and water infrastructure.
    Sec. 3.  Ending the Subsidization of California’s Mismanagement.  (a) The Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) shall review all Federal programs, projects, and activities for all relevant agencies that impact land management, water availability, water supply, water storage and delivery, water infrastructure, and disaster preparedness and response.
    (b)  Within 30 days of the date of this order, to ensure that State and local jurisdictions promote sensible land management practices and reliable water supply for all Americans, the Secretary of the Interior, the Secretary of Agriculture, and the Secretary of Commerce shall jointly report to the President, through the Assistant to the President for Domestic Policy and Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, regarding California State and local policies or practices inconsistent with sound disaster prevention and response.
    (c)  The Director of OMB, in consultation with the Assistant to the President for Domestic Policy and Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, shall recommend appropriate action to the President, regarding:
    (i)   any lack of compliance by California with the terms of existing Federal grants, contracts, or other financial assistance to States or localities; and
    (ii)  beneficial additional terms that may be added with respect to any future Federal programs, projects, or activities to ensure sound disaster prevention and response.
    Sec. 4.  Additional Actions to Help Los Angeles Families.  (a)  Housing Displaced Families.  The Secretary of Housing and Urban Development and the Secretary of Homeland Security, through the Administrator of FEMA, shall expeditiously provide an Integrated Federal Housing Strategy and Implementation Plan to the Director of OMB and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs that expedites options for housing relief to survivors displaced by wildfires in California. 
    (b)  Expediting Waste Removal.  Within 5 days from the date of this order, to accelerate the rebuilding of areas devastated by the recent Los Angeles wildfires, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Homeland Security, through the Administrator of FEMA, and the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency shall develop and execute a plan to expedite the bulk removal of contaminated and general debris.
    (c)  Effectively Using Grants to Improve Fire Preparedness.  The Secretary of Homeland Security, through the Administrator of FEMA, shall immediately implement a plan to enable the timely and appropriate use of Federal preparedness grants for the City of Los Angeles.  As of the date of this order, the city has yet to use the majority of its $213 million allotment that has accrued since fiscal year 2021.  These Federal preparedness grants shall not be used to support illegal aliens.  The Attorney General, in coordination with the FEMA Administrator, shall investigate the misuse of these grants by the City of Los Angeles and take appropriate action to address such misuse.
    Sec. 5.  Additional Actions to Help North Carolina Families.  (a)  Clearing Roads.  To accelerate rebuilding and community recovery, the Secretary of Transportation, the Secretary of Homeland Security, acting through the Administrator of FEMA, and the Administrator of the Small Business Administration shall immediately take all necessary and appropriate measures, including through direct assistance, loans, and other available means, to expedite roadway clearance or rebuilding, including the section of Interstate 40 in North Carolina that remains closed, and the repair or rebuilding of roads and bridges on private property in areas of North Carolina affected by Hurricane Helene.
    (b)  Housing Displaced Families.  The Secretary of Housing and Urban Development and the Secretary of Homeland Security, through the Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, shall immediately provide an Integrated Federal Housing Strategy and Implementation Plan to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs that expedites options for housing relief to survivors displaced by Hurricane Helene.
    Sec. 6. General Provisions.  (a)  Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:
    (i)   the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or
    (ii)  the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.
    (b)  This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.
    (c)  This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.
    THE WHITE HOUSE,
        January 24, 2025.

    MIL OSI USA News –

    January 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Australia: Building Western Australia’s future

    Source: Australian Ministers for Regional Development

    The Albanese and Cook Governments are building Western Australia’s future, driving economic growth and delivering benefits for commuters with a partnership to deliver a $700 million upgrade to the Kwinana Freeway.

    The Albanese Government will invest $350 million to ensure this important work gets delivered.

    Widening the Kwinana Freeway will add around 50 per cent capacity to the upgraded sections, easing congestion for motorists and improving the efficiency of moving freight on a road that typically carries 100,000 vehicles every day.

    This investment will also support the operations of the future Westport project, while improving safety and delivering congestion relief for commuters.

    The upgrades to road infrastructure will also support the growing industrial areas and Defence Assets on the Western Trade Coast.

    The Westport project is the linchpin for future trade growth in Western Australia, supporting local jobs and WA’s economy for the long term.

    This new funding builds on the previous $67 million joint commitment towards planning and scoping of landside enabling infrastructure for the Westport project.

    The Albanese and Cook Governments are working together to build Western Australia’s future, with major projects underway including METRONET, upgrades to the Tonkin Highway and the Outback Way.

    The Albanese Government is investing $9.7 billion towards transport infrastructure projects in Western Australia.

    Quotes attributable to Prime Minister of Australia Anthony Albanese:

    “We’re working with the Cook Labor Government to build Western Australia’s future.

    “Western Australia is an economic powerhouse, and we want to make sure we are investing in future job creating projects like Westport, while still delivering the immediate congestion benefits for commuters now.

    “This project will support jobs, improve safety and ease congestion for the 100,000 commuters who use the Kwinana Freeway each day.

    “Only Labor has a plan to build Australia’s future.”

    Quotes attributable to Premier of Western Australia Roger Cook:

    “As a Kwinana local, I know how important this project is for our State.

    “Western Australia is the economic engine room of Australia, with Westport and the Western Trade Coast critical to keeping our economy strong and creating the local jobs of the future in WA.

    “My WA Labor Government is partnering with the Albanese Government to do what’s right for WA.”

    Quotes attributable to Federal Minister for Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Local Government Catherine King:

    “The Australian Government remains dedicated to working for all Australians by delivering nationally significant infrastructure projects that enhance productivity and resilience, improve liveability and promote sustainability.

    “We are getting on with delivering a better future for all Australians, and this project will increase opportunities and connections, build communities and improve safety.”

    Quotes attributable to WA Minister for Transport Rita Saffioti:

    “We welcome this critical investment by the Albanese Labor Government.

    “The investment will ensure we can continue our Government’s major transformation of the Kwinana Freeway, which has seen the installation of smart freeway technology, the Armadale Road to North Lake Road Bridge Project and widening to large sections.

    “The Western Australian Government is working in partnership with the Australian Government on these and other growth-area roads, including the Stephenson Avenue Extension and Tonkin Highway extension.”

    MIL OSI News –

    January 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI USA: Readout of Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth’s Call With Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu

    Source: United States Department of Defense

    A Senior Defense Official provided the following readout:

    Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu held an introductory call today to discuss the unbreakable bond that exists between the United States and Israel. Both leaders discussed the importance of advancing mutual security interests and priorities, especially in the face of persistent threats. The Secretary stressed that the United States is fully committed, under President Trump’s leadership, to ensure that Israel has the capabilities it needs to defend itself. Both leaders agreed to remain in close contact.

    MIL OSI USA News –

    January 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: The UK is deeply concerned by the scale and pace of recent M23 and Rwandan Defence Forces advances in eastern DRC: UK statement at the UN Security Council

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    Statement by Ambassador James Kariuki, UK Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN, at the UN Security Council meeting on the Democratic Republic of Congo.

    President, MONUSCO peacekeepers and personnel work bravely to deliver this Council’s mandate in the most difficult of circumstances.

    The United Kingdom reiterates clearly today that attacks on UN peacekeepers are absolutely unacceptable, and may constitute war crimes. 

    We also recall that planning, directing, sponsoring or conducting attacks against MONUSCO peacekeepers may constitute a basis for UN sanctions designations.

    The UK extends its sympathies to the families of the Blue Helmets from South Africa and Uruguay who have lost their lives serving in MONUSCO, and we extend our best wishes for a full recovery to those peacekeepers who have been injured.

    The UK also extends its condolences to the families of all troops from the Southern African Development Community Mission in DRC who have lost their lives in support of DRC’s stability and security.

    As we do so, we fully acknowledge that the numbers of those lost and injured is changing by the hour. It is a critical moment for DRC and for the region.

    President, I would now like to make three points.

    First, the United Kingdom once again condemns the violent actions of all armed groups, including FDLR and M23.

    We are deeply concerned by the scale and pace of recent M23 and Rwandan Defence Forces advances in eastern DRC.

    In December this Council renewed MONUSCO’s mandate. And in the four weeks since, M23’s unacceptable offensive, and that of the Rwanda Defence Forces, through North and South Kivu, has resulted in the capture of several towns and villages.

    As we’ve heard, hundreds of thousands of civilians have been displaced, and violence has intensified as a result.

    We are also deeply alarmed by M23’s declaration that they intend to take Goma, a city where the humanitarian situation is already catastrophic.

    The rising number of displaced people resulting from M23’s territorial expansion has placed further pressure on crowded IDP camps and exacerbates the challenges faced by humanitarian actors.

    This morning, the UK Foreign Secretary spoke with President Kagame and called for urgent de-escalation, outlining the need for Rwanda and the DRC to urgently return to the negotiating table.

    Now, more than ever, it is critical that MONUSCO is able to deliver its mandate. M23 attacks on peacekeepers, with support from the RDF, must stop immediately.

    These attacks prevent the force from being able to discharge its Security Council-mandated mission to protect civilians.

    Rwandan spoofing and jamming of GPS signals, which obstruct UN and humanitarian operations, must also stop.

    We urge all parties to remember their obligations under international humanitarian law.

    Finally, President, the United Kingdom once again extends its thanks to Angola for its leadership on mediation efforts.

    We encourage DRC and Rwanda to return to the negotiating table and to focus on making tangible progress on delivering on their commitments under the concept of operations.

    There can be no military solution. Fighting must stop. Civilians must be protected. And the parties should engage in good faith in the political process.

    Updates to this page

    Published 26 January 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

    January 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI United Nations: UN officials call for ceasefire compliance after 15 people killed in Lebanon

    Source: United Nations 4

    26 January 2025 Peace and Security

    Top UN officials in Lebanon are calling for compliance with the ongoing ceasefire after reports that Israeli forces killed 15 people, including a Lebanese soldier, along the buffer zone with Israel, which Israel was due to withdraw from on Sunday under the agreement.

    The timelines envisaged in the November ceasefire agreement “have not been met”, according to a joint statement by UN Special Coordinator for Lebanon Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert and head of the UN peacekeeping mission, UNIFIL, and force commander Aroldo Lázaro.

    The agreement between Israel and armed group Hezbollah had been reached after more than a year of fighting, stemming from the Israeli war in Gaza.

    “As seen tragically this morning, conditions are not yet in place for the safe return of citizens to their villages along the Blue Line,” they said, referring to the buffer zone between Israel and Lebanon.

    Israel warned Lebanese civilians not to return to their homes in the south this weekend, stating it would not withdraw due to alleged violations of ceasefire terms. 

    Violations of resolution 1701 recorded daily

    “Displaced communities, already facing a long road to recovery and reconstruction, are therefore once again being called on to exercise caution. Also, violations of UN Security Council resolution 1701 continue to be recorded daily.”

    That landmark resolution, adopted in 2006, called for the creation of a buffer zone between the countries and the withdrawal of Israeli forces.

    By the terms of the November ceasefire agreement, Israel was meant to have fully withdrawn its forces from the area by Sunday.

    ‘So much at stake’

    The Special Coordinator and UNIFIL chief said “compliance by both parties with their obligations under the November agreement and the full implementation of resolution 1701 constitute the only way to bring closure to the recent, dark chapter of conflict and open a new one, heralding security, stability and prosperity on both sides of the Blue Line.”

    At the same time, the UN will continue to engage all actors towards this end and remains ready to support any action consistent with resolution 1701 and the efforts of the Implementation Mechanism to achieve the objectives of the November Understanding. 

    “With so much at stake for both Lebanon and Israel, recommitment is urgently needed from all sides,” they said in the statement.

    Much has changed since ceasefire

    The UN officials said much has changed in Lebanon since the Cessation of Hostilities Understanding came into force on 27 November 2024.

    Violence has dramatically decreased, and in many areas of southern Lebanon, hundreds of thousands of people have been able to return to their towns and villages.

    The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) have shown resolve in deploying to positions from which the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) are withdrawing, the UN officials said.

    Supported by UNIFIL, the Lebanese forces are helping to restore services and facilitating humanitarian access to communities most affected by conflict, they said.

    The ongoing government formation process, following the election of a president and the designation of a prime minister, is a critical step in building trust between Lebanese citizens and the State, they explained. These developments also augur well for prospective support to the full extension of state authority over all Lebanese territory and for the country’s recovery, reconstruction and growth.

    UNIFIL troops stand ready

    The UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) remains very concerned about reports of Lebanese civilians returning to villages where Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) are still present and of casualties due to Israeli fire, according to a statement by the mission on Sunday.

    At Lebanese Armed Forces request, UNIFIL peacekeepers are deploying to areas indicated by the Lebanese forces across the mission’s area of operations to monitor the situation and help prevent any further escalation.

    “However, the management of crowds remains outside our mandate,” according to UNFIL, which is tasked with supporting the implementation of resolution 1701.

    ‘IDF must stop firing on civilians in Lebanon’

    “It is imperative to avoid further deterioration of the situation,” the UN peacekeeping mission said, calling on the Lebanese population to adhere to the directives of the LAF, which aim to protect lives and prevent an escalation of violence in southern Lebanon.

    “The IDF must avoid firing at civilians within Lebanese territory. Further violence risks undermining the fragile security situation in the area and prospects for stability ushered in by the cessation of hostilities and the formation of a Government in Lebanon,” UNIFIL said.

    The UN mission emphasised the critical importance of fully implementing resolution 1701 and the cessation of hostilities arrangements through established mechanisms, which includes the complete withdrawal of the IDF from Lebanon, the removal of any unauthorised weapons and assets south of the Litani river, the redeployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces in all of south Lebanon and ensuring the safe and dignified return of displaced civilians on both sides of the Blue Line.

    MIL OSI United Nations News –

    January 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Global: How Jan. 27 came to be International Day of Commemoration in Memory of the Victims of the Holocaust

    Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Robert Jan van Pelt, Professor, School of Architecture, University of Waterloo

    When, in the late 1980s, I began my research on the architectural history of the Auschwitz death camp, Jan. 27 wasn’t marked on any official calendar as a special day of commemoration.

    Since then, as a historian who has focused on the history of the Holocaust in general and the history of Auschwitz in particular, and who has with collaborators curated the Auschwitz exhibition now showing in Toronto, I have seen changes in terms of how the Holocaust generally, and Auschwitz in particular, is publicly remembered and commemorated.

    Jan. 27 is now identified as an annual International Day of Commemoration in Memory of the Victims of the Holocaust. On Jan. 27 1945, the Red Army liberated some 7,000 remaining prisoners in Auschwitz, located in south-central Poland. How was this date chosen, and what issues or reflection might it raise?

    Poland

    With 1.1 million murdered victims — of whom one million were Jews — Auschwitz was the most murderous of the German death camps. It had already become by the mid-1970s a powerful symbol of the Holocaust.

    Yet during the Cold War, European nations commemorated the dead of the Second World War on dates that were anniversaries of the end of the war. In Poland, a profoundly Roman Catholic country, the observances of the victims of the war were held on All Saints Day or, since 1955, the Sunday closest to the Ides of April, not Jan. 27.

    In the early 1990s, the Polish government led by President Lech Walesa decided to make the 50th anniversary of the arrival of the liberating Red Army at the gates of Auschwitz into a major international commemoration in 1995.

    Seventeen heads of state, including German Federal President Roman Herzog, attended the occasion on Jan. 27, 1995. It was, in a sense, a “coming-out” of the now firmly democratic Polish Republic. At that time, Warsaw was eyeing membership of NATO and the EU, which had been formally established by means of the Maastricht Treaty two years earlier.

    In the 1995 commemoration, Jews were largely invisible — in fact, Walesa forgot to mention the Jews in his speech.

    Dates in the Hebrew calendar

    Among Jews, primarily in North America and Israel, Holocaust commemorations are typically associated with three dates in the Hebrew (lunar) calendar:

    1. The ninth day of the Jewish month of Av: Since time immemorial, Jews commemorated on this day the destruction of the First Temple (in 586 BCE) and the destruction of the Second Temple (in 70 CE).

    2. The 10th day of the Jewish month of Tevet: This day, King Nebuchadnezzar II began the siege of Jerusalem that was to lead to the destruction of the First Temple. Traditionally on this day, Jews say the prayer of the dead for family members whose date of death is unknown. As the date of death of most of the Jews murdered in the Holocaust is indeed unknown, the 10th of Tevet became quite prominent in Israel as a date of Holocaust commemoration.

    3. The 27th day of the Jewish month of Nisan: This day, established in 1953 as Yom Hashoah (Shoah Day) by the Israeli government, coincides with the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, which is a point of great pride to Jews. Thus, Yom Hashoah was meant to commemorate not only the depth of the catastrophe, but at the same time one of the few points of light within the Holocaust.

    In American society, a custom arose in the 1980s to hold a commemorative day of the Holocaust in the period that stretches from the Sunday preceding Yom Hashoah to the Sunday following Yom Hashoah, creating a clear link with the Jewish practice. In Canada, Jews mobilized to introduce provincial days of remembrance, insisting that they would follow Jewish practice and be held on Yom Hashoah.

    Germany

    Months after the 1995 Polish commemoration, the leaders of the allied nations and Germany gathered in Berlin on May 8, 1995 to observe the 50th anniversary of the end of the Second World War. German President Herzog noted that while many Germans still remembered May 8 as a day of defeat, in fact that day had opened a door to a future of peace and co-operation in Europe.

    However, some Germans believed that it was now time to move on and stop talking about the the Nazis, the war and the Holocaust.

    Herzog decided something had to be done to force continued engagement with the Nazi past, and to shut up revisionists who stressed German victimhood. He proclaimed Jan. 27 as Day of Commemoration of the Victims of National Socialism. It was a politically astute move. He knew that in any discussion about the meaning of the Third Reich, the name “Auschwitz” was the ultimate trump card that could not be beaten.

    Sweden, U.K., EU, UN

    In 1998, Swedish Prime Minister Göran Persson declared Jan. 27 to be an official day of Holocaust Remembrance. This move was to lay the groundwork for a larger Swedish-led inter-governmental educational initiative founded to combat rising antisemitism.

    In support of this project, which lead to the Stockholm Declaration and the establishment of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA), the British and Italian governments adopted Jan. 27 as a day of commemoration in 1999 and 2000.

    A few years later, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia — plus Malta and Cyprus — joined the EU. Until then, it had consisted of countries that had been either stable liberal democracies since 1945, or had become such in the 1970s.

    Most of the new members had been communist-ruled. There was nervousness about the baggage they would bring — especially persistent antisemitism. On Jan. 27, 2005, the European Parliament called on the European Council, Commission and member states to make Jan. 27 European Holocaust Memorial Day, to be observed across the EU.

    The effects were profound: Aleida Assmann, a prominent historian of collective memory, observed that pan-European importance of the Jan. 27 day of commemoration since 2005 confirmed the Holocaust as a common “europäischer Gründungsmythos” or European foundation narrative

    Later in 2005, the General Assembly of the United Nations made Jan. 27 an annual International Day of Commemoration in Memory of the Victims of the Holocaust. The resolution establishing the date invoked the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and reaffirmed “that the Holocaust, which resulted in the murder of one third of the Jewish people, along with countless members of other minorities, will forever be a warning to all people of the dangers of hatred, bigotry, racism and prejudice.”

    What to think of Jan. 27?

    While deeply committed to the study of the history of Auschwitz and profoundly engaged with the commemoration of both the Holocaust in general and Auschwitz in particular, if forced to choose, I have a clear preference for Yom Hashoah over Jan. 27.

    Jan. 27 as a day of commemoration emerged from initiatives taken by non-Jews at the highest political level, without much consultation with Jews.

    A few of my now-deceased Auschwitz survivor friends told me that the entire Jan. 27 date should be cancelled as it has no or little meaning for Jews, and it certainly had no meaning for them as Auschwitz survivors, because they had been taken away from Auschwitz in a death march before the arrival of the Red Army.

    Yet now it exists, and better to work with it. All the good reasons why Auschwitz became a symbol of the Holocaust are still valid — especially the fact that it ties a very complex series of events to a real place that everyone can visit.

    But I would like to invite all who gather on Jan. 27 to remember the Holocaust to consider also its profoundly political origins. And I hope that they will decide to also attend a similar event a few months later, on Yom Hashoah.

    Robert Jan van Pelt is curator for the Auschwitz exhibit at the ROM.

    – ref. How Jan. 27 came to be International Day of Commemoration in Memory of the Victims of the Holocaust – https://theconversation.com/how-jan-27-came-to-be-international-day-of-commemoration-in-memory-of-the-victims-of-the-holocaust-248104

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

    January 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Africa: What France loses by closing its military bases in Africa

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Thierry Vircoulon, Coordinateur de l’Observatoire pour l’Afrique centrale et australe de l’Institut Français des Relations Internationales, membre du Groupe de Recherche sur l’Eugénisme et le Racisme, Université Paris Cité

    Senegalese president Bassirou Diomaye Faye announced on 31 December 2024 that all foreign military bases in his country would close by 2025. On the same day, the Ivorian president said France would hand over control of the Abidjan military base to his country’s army.

    These announcements followed the planned withdrawal of French forces from Chad, Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. Researcher Thierry Vircoulon discusses the potential implications of these decisions for France.

    What advantages could France lose by withdrawing its troops from African countries?

    France’s military presence in French-speaking Africa has evolved in strategic importance over the past 65 years. Over time, the significance of this presence has diminished. By the end of the 20th century, some French military bases had been closed and the number of pre-positioned troops had reduced from 20,000 in 1970 to 6,000 in 2022.

    Military bases have been a strategic asset for France, initially securing newly independent and fragile regimes in the aftermath of independence. They also played a key role in conducting external operations. These bases served as logistical hubs that enabled French military interventions and the evacuation of French nationals during crises.

    For instance, Operation Sagittarius, which evacuated European nationals from Sudan at the start of the war in April 2023, relied on the resources of the French base in Djibouti.

    Without these logistical points, projecting military strength becomes much more challenging and, in some cases, impossible. The closure of these military bases implies the end of major French military interventions, such as Operation Licorne (2002-2015) or Barkhane (2014-2022).

    In recent years, the cost-benefit analysis of these bases has been questioned in Paris. They have become a political and strategic issue. On one hand, these bases symbolise the old post-independence security pact between Paris and the leaders of some countries, making them appear as a legacy of neocolonialism.

    On the other hand, from a strategic point of view, having a pre-positioned military presence in Africa serves little purpose when the main threats to France come from elsewhere (for instance, eastern Europe and the Middle East). As a result, the strategic value of France’s military bases in Africa has diminished in recent years.

    What impact could military withdrawal have on France’s political and diplomatic influence in its former African colonies?

    The closure of the bases would signal the end of France’s capacity to intervene – whether justified or not – in certain conflicts across Africa.

    This would weaken its influence in the region, particularly as conflicts intensify across the continent, with more and more African countries seeking security providers. Addressing, stabilising or resolving these conflicts requires a combination of diplomacy and military intervention.

    It’s important to distinguish between countries that have chosen to sever military cooperation agreements with Paris (such as Chad and Senegal) and those that have simply closed military bases but maintained the military cooperation (like Ivory Coast).

    The announcement of base closures by African leaders, rather than by Paris, symbolises a rejection of French policy. This marks a significant loss of influence for France in the countries involved.

    Could this withdrawal reduce France’s influence in managing security crises in Africa?

    As part of the informal division of security responsibilities among western nations, France has long been considered the “gendarme of Africa”.

    Between 1964 and 2014, France conducted no fewer than 52 military operations across the continent. At the start of the 21st century, it played the role of lead nation in European military interventions in Africa. Other western powers recognised France’s expertise in managing African crises. In most cases, they either supported or simply followed its policies.

    This was reflected in France’s diplomatic responsibilities within the European Union and at the United Nations. French diplomacy is well represented in the Africa division of the European External Action Service. The French delegation is tasked with drafting UN security council resolutions on Africa. The peacekeeping department at the UN is led by a French diplomat.

    People protest against the presence of French soldiers in Mali, and more broadly in west Africa, as part of Operation Barkhane in Toulouse in 2021. Alain Pitton/NurPhoto via Getty Images

    The end of France’s military interventionism will have diplomatic repercussions beyond Africa. They are already being felt in Brussels, Washington and New York.

    In Niger, the United States did not follow France’s hard line stance after the coup that ousted President Mohamed Bazoum in 2023. Instead it attempted to engage with the junta. This effort ultimately failed.

    In Chad, while Paris was complacent towards the dynastic succession from Idriss Déby to his son, Berlin took a critical stance. This led to a diplomatic crisis and the expulsion of ambassadors from Chad and Germany in 2023. In Italy, prime minister Giorgia Meloni publicly criticised French policy in Africa, causing tensions between Paris and Rome.

    How will the reduction in military presence affect France’s ability to protect its economic interests, particularly in the mining and energy sectors?

    In 2023, Africa accounted for only 1.9% of France’s foreign trade, 15% of its supply of strategic minerals, and 11.6% of its oil and gas supply.

    France’s top two trading partners in sub-Saharan Africa are Nigeria and South Africa – former British colonies which have never hosted a French military base.

    Since the beginning of the century, relations between France and African countries have been marked by a clear separation between economic and military interests. France not only has diminishing economic interests in Africa, but these are concentrated in countries that do not host French military bases.

    – What France loses by closing its military bases in Africa
    – https://theconversation.com/what-france-loses-by-closing-its-military-bases-in-africa-247898

    MIL OSI Africa –

    January 26, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Global: What France loses by closing its military bases in Africa

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Thierry Vircoulon, Coordinateur de l’Observatoire pour l’Afrique centrale et australe de l’Institut Français des Relations Internationales, membre du Groupe de Recherche sur l’Eugénisme et le Racisme, Université Paris Cité

    Senegalese president Bassirou Diomaye Faye announced on 31 December 2024 that all foreign military bases in his country would close by 2025. On the same day, the Ivorian president said France would hand over control of the Abidjan military base to his country’s army.

    These announcements followed the planned withdrawal of French forces from Chad, Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. Researcher Thierry Vircoulon discusses the potential implications of these decisions for France.

    What advantages could France lose by withdrawing its troops from African countries?

    France’s military presence in French-speaking Africa has evolved in strategic importance over the past 65 years. Over time, the significance of this presence has diminished. By the end of the 20th century, some French military bases had been closed and the number of pre-positioned troops had reduced from 20,000 in 1970 to 6,000 in 2022.

    Military bases have been a strategic asset for France, initially securing newly independent and fragile regimes in the aftermath of independence. They also played a key role in conducting external operations. These bases served as logistical hubs that enabled French military interventions and the evacuation of French nationals during crises.

    For instance, Operation Sagittarius, which evacuated European nationals from Sudan at the start of the war in April 2023, relied on the resources of the French base in Djibouti.

    Without these logistical points, projecting military strength becomes much more challenging and, in some cases, impossible. The closure of these military bases implies the end of major French military interventions, such as Operation Licorne (2002-2015) or Barkhane (2014-2022).

    In recent years, the cost-benefit analysis of these bases has been questioned in Paris. They have become a political and strategic issue. On one hand, these bases symbolise the old post-independence security pact between Paris and the leaders of some countries, making them appear as a legacy of neocolonialism.

    On the other hand, from a strategic point of view, having a pre-positioned military presence in Africa serves little purpose when the main threats to France come from elsewhere (for instance, eastern Europe and the Middle East). As a result, the strategic value of France’s military bases in Africa has diminished in recent years.

    What impact could military withdrawal have on France’s political and diplomatic influence in its former African colonies?

    The closure of the bases would signal the end of France’s capacity to intervene – whether justified or not – in certain conflicts across Africa.

    This would weaken its influence in the region, particularly as conflicts intensify across the continent, with more and more African countries seeking security providers. Addressing, stabilising or resolving these conflicts requires a combination of diplomacy and military intervention.

    It’s important to distinguish between countries that have chosen to sever military cooperation agreements with Paris (such as Chad and Senegal) and those that have simply closed military bases but maintained the military cooperation (like Ivory Coast).

    The announcement of base closures by African leaders, rather than by Paris, symbolises a rejection of French policy. This marks a significant loss of influence for France in the countries involved.

    Could this withdrawal reduce France’s influence in managing security crises in Africa?

    As part of the informal division of security responsibilities among western nations, France has long been considered the “gendarme of Africa”.

    Between 1964 and 2014, France conducted no fewer than 52 military operations across the continent. At the start of the 21st century, it played the role of lead nation in European military interventions in Africa. Other western powers recognised France’s expertise in managing African crises. In most cases, they either supported or simply followed its policies.

    This was reflected in France’s diplomatic responsibilities within the European Union and at the United Nations. French diplomacy is well represented in the Africa division of the European External Action Service. The French delegation is tasked with drafting UN security council resolutions on Africa. The peacekeeping department at the UN is led by a French diplomat.

    The end of France’s military interventionism will have diplomatic repercussions beyond Africa. They are already being felt in Brussels, Washington and New York.

    In Niger, the United States did not follow France’s hard line stance after the coup that ousted President Mohamed Bazoum in 2023. Instead it attempted to engage with the junta. This effort ultimately failed.

    In Chad, while Paris was complacent towards the dynastic succession from Idriss Déby to his son, Berlin took a critical stance. This led to a diplomatic crisis and the expulsion of ambassadors from Chad and Germany in 2023. In Italy, prime minister Giorgia Meloni publicly criticised French policy in Africa, causing tensions between Paris and Rome.

    How will the reduction in military presence affect France’s ability to protect its economic interests, particularly in the mining and energy sectors?

    In 2023, Africa accounted for only 1.9% of France’s foreign trade, 15% of its supply of strategic minerals, and 11.6% of its oil and gas supply.

    France’s top two trading partners in sub-Saharan Africa are Nigeria and South Africa – former British colonies which have never hosted a French military base.

    Since the beginning of the century, relations between France and African countries have been marked by a clear separation between economic and military interests. France not only has diminishing economic interests in Africa, but these are concentrated in countries that do not host French military bases.

    Thierry Vircoulon is a research associate at the Institut Français des Relations Internationales and an expert on the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime.

    – ref. What France loses by closing its military bases in Africa – https://theconversation.com/what-france-loses-by-closing-its-military-bases-in-africa-247898

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

    January 26, 2025
  • MIL-OSI China: Chinese leaders extend Spring Festival greetings to retired senior officials

    Source: China State Council Information Office 2

    President Xi Jinping and other Chinese leaders have visited or entrusted others to visit retired senior officials to extend greetings ahead of the Spring Festival, which falls on Jan. 29 this year.
    Xi, also general secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee and chairman of the Central Military Commission, and other leaders wished the retired senior officials a happy Spring Festival, good health and longevity.
    The retired senior officials spoke highly of the CPC Central Committee’s work over the past year and voiced wholehearted support for Xi’s core position on the CPC Central Committee and in the Party as a whole.
    They expressed the hope that the Party, the military and the people of all ethnic groups will unite even more closely around the Party Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping at its core to build China into a stronger country and achieve national rejuvenation through a Chinese path to modernization.

    MIL OSI China News –

    January 26, 2025
  • MIL-OSI China: 4 Israeli hostages arrive in Israel after released by Hamas in Gaza

    Source: China State Council Information Office

    Four Israeli hostages are seen during the ceremony of their release in Palestine Square in Gaza City on Jan. 25, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]

    Four female Israeli soldier hostages held in Gaza were transferred to the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and the Israel Security Agency (ISA) on Saturday and crossed the border into Israel, the IDF and the ISA said in a joint statement.

    Liri Albag, Karina Ariev, Daniella Gilboa, and Naama Levy, army observers aged between 19 and 20, were abducted by Hamas from the Israeli army’s surveillance base at Nahal Oz on Oct. 7, 2023, near the Gaza Strip border.

    “The four returning hostages were accompanied by IDF special forces and ISA forces on their return to Israeli territory, where they will undergo an initial medical assessment,” the statement reads.

    The four are scheduled to meet their families at the IDF’s Reim camp, near the Gaza Strip border, and from there they will be transferred by helicopter to Beilinson Hospital in central Israel.

    The transfer of the four soldiers from Hamas to the Red Cross in Gaza was broadcast live. The four appeared to be in good health, walking and smiling.

    The hostage release is part of the second phase of a prisoner-hostage exchange between Hamas and Israel, implemented under the initial terms of a ceasefire agreement.

    The first stage of the six-week ceasefire took effect on Jan. 19.

    The ceasefire agreement between Hamas and Israel was reached after 15 months of intense fighting, as a result of negotiations mediated by Egypt, Qatar and the United States.

    MIL OSI China News –

    January 26, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Global: No, America’s battery plant boom isn’t going bust – construction is on track for the biggest factories, with thousands of jobs planned

    Source: The Conversation – USA – By James Morton Turner, Professor of Environmental Studies, Wellesley College

    Workers install battery packs in a BMW X5 in South Carolina. A new battery plant under construction nearby will supply BMW factories. BMW

    The United States is in the midst of the biggest boom in clean energy manufacturing investments in history, spurred by laws like the bipartisan Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act and the Inflation Reduction Act.

    These laws have leveraged billions of dollars in government support to drive private sector investments in clean energy supply chains across the country.

    For several years, one of us, Jay Turner, and his students at Wellesley College have been tracking clean energy investments in the U.S. and sharing the data at The Big Green Machine website. That research shows that companies have announced 225 projects, totaling US$127 billion in investment, and more than 131,000 new jobs since the Inflation Reduction Act became law in 2022.

    You may have seen news stories that said these projects are at risk of failure or significant delays. In August 2024, the Financial Times reported that 40% of more than 100 projects it evaluated were delayed. These included battery manufacturing, renewable energy projects and metals and hydrogen projects, as well as semiconductor manufacturing plants. More recently, The Information, which covers the technology industry, warned that 1 in 4 companies were walking away from government-supported grants for battery investments.

    Workers assemble battery packs for electric vehicles in Spartanburg, S.C. New battery plants in the state will help move the supply chain closer to U.S. EV factories.
    BMW

    We checked up on all 23 battery cell factories announced or expanded since the Inflation Reduction Act was signed – almost all of them gigafactories, which are designed to produce over 1 gigawatt-hour of battery cell capacity. These factories have some of the largest employment potential of any project supported by the act.

    We wanted to find out if the boom in U.S.-based clean energy manufacturing is about to go bust. What we have learned is mostly reassuring.

    The biggest battery factories are on track

    While the exact investment totals are challenging to pin down, our research shows that planned capital expenditures add up to $52 billion, which would support 490 gigawatt-hours of battery manufacturing capacity per year – enough to put roughly 5 million new electric vehicles on the road.

    While not all 23 companies have announced their hiring plans, these facilities are expected to support nearly 30,000 new jobs, with projects mostly in the U.S. Southeast, Midwest and Southwest.

    We wanted to know if these projects are on track or experiencing delays or problems.

    To do that, we first reached out to local and state economic development agencies. In many instances, local and state tax incentives are supporting these projects. Where possible, we sought to confirm the project’s status through public data or formal announcements. In other instances, we looked for news stories to see if there is evidence of construction or hiring.

    Of the 23 projects, our research shows that 13 appear to be on track, with total planned capital investments in excess of $40 billion and nearly 352 gigawatt-hours per year of capacity. Importantly, these include most of the biggest projects with the largest investments and projected production.

    By our count, 77% of the total planned capital investment, 79% of the proposed jobs and 72% of the planned battery production are on track, which means that a project is likely to happen, roughly on time, and generally with their expected level of investment and employment.

    Three projects are on the bubble. These have shown progress but experienced delays in construction or financing.

    Five others show deeper signs of distress. We don’t yet have enough information to draw a conclusion on two projects.

    An example of a project that is on track is Envision AESC’s battery factory in Florence, South Carolina. Its scale has been expanded twice since it was first announced in December 2022. It is now a $3 billion investment intended to manufacture 30 gigawatt-hours of batteries annually to supply BMW’s factory in Woodruff, South Carolina.

    In early October 2024, South Carolina Secretary of Commerce Harry Lightsey conducted a tour of the Envision site and posted a video. Construction on the plant started in February 2024, and 850 workers are working six days a week to finish the 1.4 million-square-foot facility by August 2025. Once it goes into full production, the project is expected to employ 2,700 people.

    2024 election could end or accelerate the boom

    But a lot hinges on what happens in the upcoming elections.

    Our data suggests the real risk that these projects and projects like them face isn’t slow demand for electric vehicles, as some people have suggested – in fact, demand continues to climb. Nor is it local opposition, which has slowed only a few projects.

    The biggest risk is policy change. Many of these projects are counting on Advanced Manufacturing Tax Credits authorized by the Inflation Reduction Act through 2032.

    On the campaign trail, Republicans up and down the ticket are promising to repeal key Biden-led legislation, including the Inflation Reduction Act, which includes grant funding and loans to support clean energy as well as tax incentives to support domestic manufacturing.

    While full repeal of the act may be unlikely, an administration hostile to clean energy could divert its unspent funds to other purposes, slow the pace of grants or loans by slow-walking project approvals, or find other ways to make the tax incentives harder to get. While our research has focused on the battery industry, this concern extends to investments in wind and solar power too.

    So, is the big boom in U.S.-based clean energy manufacturing about to go bust? Our data is optimistic, but the politics is uncertain.

    Joshua Busby receives funding from the U.S. Department of Defense. He is affiliated with the Center for Climate and Security and the Chicago Council on Global Affairs.

    James Morton Turner and Nathan Jensen do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. No, America’s battery plant boom isn’t going bust – construction is on track for the biggest factories, with thousands of jobs planned – https://theconversation.com/no-americas-battery-plant-boom-isnt-going-bust-construction-is-on-track-for-the-biggest-factories-with-thousands-of-jobs-planned-242567

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

    January 26, 2025
  • MIL-OSI New Zealand: Base Woodbourne resolution with Kurahaupō Iwi

    Source: New Zealand Government

    The Government and three Kurahaupō Iwi have signed a $25.2million agreement to resolve the post-Treaty settlement issue of contaminated land at RNZAF Base Woodbourne. 

    Ngāti Apa ki te Rā Tō Trust, Rangitāne o Wairau Settlement Trust, and Te Rūnanga o Ngāti Kuia each received $8.4 million after contaminated soil at Base Woodbourne near Blenheim prevented the three Iwi from purchasing a substantial part of the site as originally intended in their Treaty settlement redress.

    The NZDF as the landholding agency and Te Arawhiti, as the responsible agency to ensure the durability of Treaty settlements, worked together to resolve the issue and an agreement was signed with Iwi on 14 October 2024.

    Māori Crown Relations Minister Tama Potaka praised the three Iwi for their ongoing commitment to resolving the issue.

    “I know this mahi has presented everyone involved with challenges, and I particularly want to acknowledge and thank the Iwi for their resolution to move forward.

    “Upholding Treaty settlement commitments is a priority for this government. In this case, the negotiated settlement redress could not be delivered as intended and it was incumbent on us to work with Iwi to find a mutually agreeable solution.”

    Contamination from per- and poly-fluoroalkyl substances (PFAS) contained in firefighting foams, was found in the soil at Woodbourne as part of the Crown’s ‘due diligence’ phase of engagement between the Iwi and the New Zealand Defence Force in 2019.

    PFAS can accumulate in the human body and does not break down in the environment, posing potential health and environmental risks.

    “The $25.2m confirmed in Budget 2024 compensates the Iwi for being unable to purchase the remainder of the site due to the extent of the contamination, which includes the operational land and housing block as intended,” Mr Potaka says.

    “National has a proud history of delivering settlements with Iwi and we will continue to build on that legacy.”

    Kua ea te take e pā ana ki te whenua o Base Woodbourne ki te taha o ngā iwi o Kurahaupō

    Kua hainatia e te Kāwanatanga me ngā iwi e toru o te waka o Kurahaupō tētahi whakaaetanga e $25.2 miriona te nui o te pūtea, hei whakaea i tētahi take e pā ana ki ngā matū kino kei te whenua o RNZAF Base Woodbourne.

    E $8.4 miriona te nui o te pūtea i whakawhiwhia ki ia iwi, arā, ki a Ngāti Apa ki te Rā Tō Trust, ki a Rangitāne o Wairau Settlement Trust, ki Te Rūnanga o Ngāti Kuia hoki i te mea kāore rātou i āhei ki te hoko i tētahi wāhi nui o ngā whenua i tāpuia mā ngā iwi e toru nei i raro i tō rātou whakataunga Tiriti nā te whakakinotanga o te one ki Base Woodbourne e pātata ana ki Te Waiharakeke.

    I mahitahi Te Ope Kātua o Aotearoa i raro i tōna tūranga hei kaipupuri whenua me Te Arawhiti hei kaiwhakapūmau o ngā whakataunga Tiriti ki te whakatutuki i te kaupapa, ā, ka hainatia tētahi whakaaetanga ki te taha o ngā iwi i te 14 o Oketopa i te tau 2024.

    Ka mihia ngā iwi e toru e te Minita o Te Arawhiti, e Tama Potaka i tō rātou manawanui ki te whakatutuki i tēnei take.

    “Kei te mōhio au ki ngā uauatanga i tau atu ki runga i ngā tāngata katoa i whai wāhi mai ki tēnei mahi, ā, kei te mihi atu au ki ngā iwi i tō rātou whakaae ki te ahu whakamua.

    “Ko te whakamanatanga o ngā whakataunga Tiriti tētahi o ngā whāinga matua a tēnei kāwanatanga. Kāore mātou i āhei ki te hoatu i te paremata i whiriwhiringia i roto i te whakataunga, nō reira nō mātou anō te haepapa ki te mahi ngātahi ki ngā iwi ki te kimi i tētahi whakautu e pai ana ki ngā rōpū e rua.”

    I kitea ngā paitini nā ngā matū kino o te pāhuka patu ahi, e kīia ana ko te PFAS, ki roto i te one ki Woodbourne i te Karauna e takatū ana mō ngā whakawhitinga kōrero i waenga i ngā iwi me Te Ope Kātua o Aotearoa i te tau 2019.

    Ka noho tonu te PFAS ki roto i te tinana, ā, e kore hoki e popo i te au tūroa, nā reira he matū mōrearea rawa tēnei ki te tangata me te taiao.

    “I tohua te $25.2m i te Tahua Pūtea o te tau 2024 hei utu paremata ki te iwi i te mea kāore rātou i āhei ki te hoko i te toenga o te whenua nā te nui o ngā matū kino ki reira, arā, e kapi katoa ana tērā i te whenua e whakamahia ana e Te Ope Kātua me tētahi huinga whare i tāpaea i mua,” te kī a Mr Potaka.

    “E tū whakahīhī ana a Nāhinara i te whakatutukinga o te huhua o ngā whakataunga ki te taha o ngā iwi i roto i ngā tau, ā, ka haere tonu tērā mahi.”

    MIL OSI New Zealand News –

    January 26, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Canada: Ensuring fair electoral representation for Albertans

    Source: Government of Canada regional news

    .
    .

    [embedded content]

    The Justice Statutes Amendment Act, 2024, would amend several pieces of legislation, including the Electoral Boundaries Commission Act, the Public’s Right to Know Act, the Critical Infrastructure Defence Act and the Alberta Evidence Act. Proposed amendments would increase access to justice and address the current needs of Albertans.  

    Electoral Boundaries Commission Act

    If passed, amendments to the Electoral Boundaries Commission Act would direct the commission to increase the number of electoral divisions in Alberta from 87 to 89 and clarify the list of factors the commission may consider when drawing up the new electoral boundaries.

    Under the Electoral Boundaries Commission Act, the population of each electoral division in Alberta must not be more than 25 per cent above or more than 25 per cent below the average population of all the proposed electoral divisions. Currently, the populations of nine electoral divisions in Alberta are greater than 25 per cent of the average electoral division population. 

    Proposed amendments would help address the significant increase in Alberta’s population since the most recent provincial election, and ensure Albertans have effective representation in the legislature.

    “The amendments we are proposing are essential to keeping up with Alberta’s significant population growth and ensuring fair, effective representation for all Albertans in the legislature. By increasing the number of electoral divisions, we demonstrate our commitment to balanced and equitable representation for all Albertans.”

    Mickey Amery, Minister of Justice and Attorney General

    Public’s Right to Know Act

    The Public’s Right to Know Act legislates public reporting of crime data to make it easier for Albertans to know what’s happening in their community. Proposed amendments would allow the minister of justice to require government departments, municipalities and police services to provide up-to-date data, which will foster greater sharing of information and a better understanding of the criminal justice system.

    Critical Infrastructure Defence Act

    The Critical Infrastructure Defence Act protects essential infrastructure by creating offences for trespassing, interfering with operations or causing damage. Proposed amendments would incorporate the health care facilities currently identified in the regulation into the act, ensuring the definition of essential infrastructure is contained in one place. The definition of essential infrastructure is currently contained in both the act and the Critical Infrastructure Defence Regulation. With this amendment, the Critical Infrastructure Defence Regulation, which initially added “prescribed health care facilities” into the definition of essential infrastructure, will no longer be needed and will be repealed.  

    Alberta Evidence Act

    The Alberta Evidence Act sets out a process for individuals to give evidence to the court either orally or in writing. Proposed amendments would give Albertans simpler and more modern processes for confirming the truth of the information they provide to the courts. These amendments would save Albertans time and money by allowing them to certify information electronically rather than visiting a courthouse or paying to swear or affirm an oath in person. Processes will still be available for those who prefer in-person and paper-based execution of documents. 

    Quick facts

    • Between July 1, 2023 and July 1, 2024, Alberta’s population grew by around 204,000 people or 4.4 per cent. This is the highest annual growth rate since 1981 and the highest among all provinces.
    • The populations of nine electoral divisions currently exceed 25 per cent of the average population of each electoral division, which is the maximum deviation allowed under the legislation. 
    • An Electoral Boundaries Commission reviews existing electoral boundaries and makes proposals to the legislative assembly about area, boundaries and names of the electoral divisions.
    • A new Electoral Boundaries Commission is appointed eight to ten years after the appointment of the previous commission.
    • When drawing up the new electoral boundaries, the commission must consider the requirement for effective representation for all Albertans. In addition, the commission may consider:
      • The sparsity and density of population.
      • Communities of interest, including municipalities, regional and rural communities, Indian reserves and Metis settlements.
      • Geographical features, including the availability and means of communication and transportation between various parts of Alberta.
      • The desirability of understandable and clear boundaries.
      • The rate of population growth.
      • Any other factors the commission considers appropriate.

    Related information

    • Ensuring fair electoral representation
    • Bill 31: Justice Statutes Amendment Act, 2024

    Multimedia

    • Watch the news conference
    • Listen to the news conference


    MIL OSI Canada News –

    January 26, 2025
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