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Category: Military Intelligence

  • MIL-OSI USA: H.R. 3132, Certified Help Options in Claims Expertise for Veterans Act of 2025

    Source: US Congressional Budget Office

    Bill Summary

    H.R. 3132 would require the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) to inform veterans and their survivors about organizations and people, such as attorneys and agents, that are accredited by the department to help them claim VA benefits. The bill also would establish a new accreditation process for people who assist applicants with filing claims for VA benefits. Finally, the bill would extend the reduction of pension payments for veterans and survivors who reside in Medicaid nursing homes.

    Estimated Federal Cost

    The estimated budgetary effects of H.R. 3132 are shown in Table 1. The costs of the legislation fall within budget functions 550 (health) and 700 (veterans benefits and services).

    Table 1.

    Estimated Budgetary Effects of H.R. 3132
     

    By Fiscal Year, Millions of Dollars

    		    
     

    2025

    2026

    2027

    2028

    2029

    2030

    2031

    2032

    2033

    2034

    2035

    2025-2030

    2025-2035
     

    Increases or Decreases (-) in Direct Spending

    		    

    Estimated Budget Authority

    *

    1

    *

    1

    *

    *

    1

    -20

    *

    *

    1

    2

    -16

    Estimated Outlays

    *

    1

    *

    1

    *

    *

    1

    -20

    *

    *

    1

    2

    -16
     

    Increases in Spending Subject to Appropriation

    		    

    Estimated Authorization

    *

    6

    1

    *

    1

    1

    *

    1

    1

    1

    *

    9

    12

    Estimated Outlays

    *

    4

    3

    *

    1

    1

    *

    1

    1

    1

    *

    9

    12

    Basis of Estimate

    For this estimate, CBO assumes that H.R. 3132 will be enacted in fiscal year 2025 and that outlays will follow historical spending patterns for affected programs.

    Provisions that Affect Spending Subject to Appropriation and Direct Spending

    Section 2 would require VA to provide additional information about organizations and people that are accredited by the department to help veterans and their survivors claim benefits. Specifically, VA must:

    • Notify applicants about VA-accredited representation if their initial applications do not indicate that they have such representation,
    • Provide information about limitations on fees that potential representatives may charge applicants on each VA web page through which those applicants may file benefit claims, and
    • Maintain an online tool that allows people claiming VA benefits to search for accredited representatives who may assist with those claims.

    CBO anticipates that VA would require additional information technology (IT) resources to notify claimants who lack representation that such assistance is available and to update the department’s website with information about fee limitations. Using information from VA, CBO estimates that it would cost $15 million over the 2025-2035 period to upgrade and maintain the department’s IT system. VA maintains a web portal through which claimants can search for accredited representation for benefit claims. Thus, that requirement would have no budgetary effect.

    CBO expects that some of the costs of implementing the bill would be paid from the Toxic Exposures Fund (TEF) established by Public Law 117-168, the Honoring our PACT Act. The TEF is a mandatory appropriation that VA uses to pay for health care, disability claims processing, medical research, and IT modernization that benefit veterans who were exposed to environmental hazards. Additional spending from the TEF would occur if legislation increases the costs of similar activities that benefit veterans with such exposure. Thus, in addition to increasing spending subject to appropriation, enacting section 2 would increase amounts paid from the TEF, which are classified as direct spending.

    CBO projects that the proportion of costs paid by the TEF will grow over time based on the amount of formerly discretionary appropriations that CBO expects will be provided through the mandatory appropriation as specified in the Honoring our PACT Act. CBO estimates that over the 2025-2035 period, implementing section 2 would increase spending subject to appropriation by $11 million and direct spending by $4 million. Most of those costs would occur within a few years of the bill’s enactment.

    Direct Spending and Revenues

    In addition to expanding benefits that would partly be covered by the TEF, the bill would affect direct spending by reducing pension payments to veterans and survivors who reside in Medicaid nursing homes. The bill also would establish a new accreditation program for organizations and people that help claimants for VA benefits. In total, the bill would decrease net direct spending by $16 million over the 2025-2035 period (See Table 2).

    Table 2.

    Estimated Changes in Direct Spending and Revenues Under H.R. 3132
     

    By Fiscal Year, Millions of Dollars

    		    
     

    2025

    2026

    2027

    2028

    2029

    2030

    2031

    2032

    2033

    2034

    2035

    2025-2030

    2025-2035

    Information Technology Improvements

    		                      

    Estimated Budget Authority

    *

    1

    *

    1

    *

    *

    1

    *

    *

    *

    1

    2

    4

    Estimated Outlays

    *

    1

    *

    1

    *

    *

    1

    *

    *

    *

    1

    2

    4

    Pensions

    		                      

    Estimated Budget Authority

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    -20

    0

    0

    0

    0

    -20

    Estimated Outlays

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    -20

    0

    0

    0

    0

    -20

    Total Changes

    		                        

    Estimated Budget Authority

    *

    1

    *

    1

    *

    *

    1

    -20

    *

    *

    1

    2

    -16

    Estimated Outlays

    *

    1

    *

    1

    *

    *

    1

    -20

    *

    *

    1

    2

    -16

    Pensions. Under current law, VA reduces pension payments to veterans and survivors who reside in Medicaid nursing homes to $90 per month. That required reduction expires November 30, 2031. Section 8 would extend that reduction for five months, through April 30, 2032. CBO estimates that extending that requirement would reduce VA benefits by $10 million per month. (Those benefits are paid from mandatory appropriations and are therefore considered direct spending.) As a result of that reduction in beneficiaries’ income, Medicaid would pay more of the cost of their care, increasing spending for that program by $6 million per month. Thus, enacting section 8 would reduce net direct spending by $20 million over the 2025-2035 period.

    Accreditation Process. H.R. 3132 would establish a new process for accrediting attorneys and agents to represent veterans and survivors who claim VA benefits. Under the bill, VA would be required to process applications within 180 days or temporarily accredit people whose applications are not processed in that time frame. The bill would authorize VA to charge applicants a fee of up to $500 for processing the application. Under current law, no guidelines exist concerning the time allotted to process applications for accreditation, and VA does not charge application fees.

    Application fees would be available to cover the costs of administering the accreditation program. Because collecting and spending those fees would not require further appropriation, they would be classified as decreases and increases in direct spending. CBO estimates that fee receipts would offset spending for the administration of the program. Thus, administering the new accreditation program would decrease net direct spending by less than $500,000 over the 2025-2035 period, CBO estimates.

    Fines. H.R. 3132 would permit accredited attorneys and agents to collect fees from veterans and their survivors for helping them file initial claims for benefits. Under current law, representatives may charge fees only to help appeal VA’s initial decision on a claim. The bill also would set limits on the fee amounts.

    Section 4 would establish fines for unaccredited people who charge fees for assisting with VA benefits claims and for people who charge fees that exceed permitted amounts. The section also would establish fines of up to $50,000 for people who are conditionally accredited by VA to assist with claims for benefits that violate any laws concerning those claims. The bill would make those fines available for expenditure without further appropriation. Collected fines would be recorded as revenues and the subsequent spending would be classified as direct spending. Based on information from VA, CBO estimates that few people would pay fines under the bill. As a result, CBO estimates that enacting section 4 would increase revenues and direct spending by insignificant amounts and, on net, decrease deficits by less than $500,000 over the 2025‑2035 period.

    Spending Subject to Appropriation

    In addition to the $11 million in spending subject to appropriation for information technology improvements discussed above under the heading “Provisions that Affect Spending Subject to Appropriation and Direct Spending,” section 5 of the bill would require the Government Accountability Office to report to the Congress on VA’s processes for accrediting attorneys and agents. The report would be due within one year of enactment. Based on the cost of similar studies, CBO estimates that the report would cost $1 million to complete. Thus, implementing the bill would cost $12 million over the 2025-2035 period, subject to the appropriation of the estimated amounts.

    Pay-As-You-Go Considerations

    The Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act of 2010 establishes budget-reporting and enforcement procedures for legislation affecting direct spending or revenues. The net changes in outlays and revenues that are subject to those pay-as-you-go procedures are shown in Table 1.

    Increase in Long-Term Net Direct Spending and Deficits

    CBO estimates that enacting H.R. 3132 would not increase net direct spending by more than $2.5 billion in any of the four consecutive 10-year periods beginning in 2036.

    CBO estimates that enacting H.R. 3132 would not increase on‑budget deficits by more than $5 billion in any of the four consecutive 10-year periods beginning in 2036.

    Mandates

    H.R. 3132 would impose an intergovernmental mandate as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA) by preempting state laws that regulate representation for veterans filing initial claims for benefits. CBO estimates that because the preemption would not result in additional expenditures or losses in revenues, it would not exceed the threshold established in UMRA for intergovernmental mandates ($103 million in 2025, adjusted annually for inflation). The legislation does not contain private-sector mandates as defined in UMRA.

    Previous CBO Estimate

    On May 16, 2025, CBO transmitted a cost estimate for H.R. 1578, the Veterans Claims Education Act of 2025, as ordered reported by the House Committee on Veterans’ Affairs on May 6, 2025. Section 2 of H.R. 3132 is similar to section 2 of H.R. 1578 and CBO’s estimates for both are the same.

    Federal Costs: Logan Smith

    Mandates: Brandon Lever

    Estimate Reviewed By

    David Newman
    Chief, Defense, International Affairs, and Veterans’ Affairs Cost Estimates Unit

    Kathleen FitzGerald 
    Chief, Public and Private Mandates Unit

    Christina Hawley Anthony
    Deputy Director of Budget Analysis

    Phillip L. Swagel

    Director, Congressional Budget Office

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Rep. Mike Levin Introduces Bipartisan Legislation to Support Access to Affordable Military Housing

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Representative Mike Levin (CA-49)

    June 20, 2025

    Washington, D.C.—Today, Reps. Mike Levin (CA-49) and Jen Kiggans (VA-02) introduced the bipartisan Service Member Housing Relief Act, which would give the Secretary of Defense greater flexibility to respond to cost-of-living spikes in Military Housing Areas (MHAs) nationwide. This would help service members afford to live in San Diego and Orange counties.

    In recent years, the Secretary of Defense has been temporarily authorized to increase the basic allowance for housing (BAH) where cost of living rises more than 20% over the previous year. Yet, service members and their families continue to report significant cost-of-living spikes at their assigned duty stations around the country, often with some costs rising more quickly and frequently than BAH can account for.

    The bill would reduce the threshold for granting mid-year temporary BAH increases from 20% to 15% of the overall increase in cost of living from the previous year. It also makes the Secretary of Defense’s authority permanent. In effect, the bill would give service members and their families more affordable and accessible housing options to avoid excessively long commutes, potentially hazardous living conditions, and ultimately better fit their needs.

    “This bipartisan bill addresses housing affordability issues facing service members across the country, including those stationed at Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton,” said Rep. Levin. “It increases the resources available to pay for housing and expands military housing options to ensure service members and their families are able to live and work in close proximity. I look forward to pushing this bill through the legislative process and garnering more bipartisan support for our men and women in uniform.”

    “As a Navy veteran, I know firsthand how critical stable, affordable housing is to our military families’ quality of life and mission readiness,” said Rep. Kiggans. “The Service Member Housing Relief Act is a commonsense, bipartisan solution to address the rising cost of living in many military communities. By lowering the threshold for BAH adjustments and making DoD’s authority permanent, we can ensure our servicemembers aren’t forced to choose between safe housing and supporting their families. I’m proud to support this bill because our military families deserve better—and we owe them nothing less.”

    “MFAN’s research—alongside data from the Department of Defense and other leading organizations—consistently demonstrates that the Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH) falls short in many housing markets across the country,” said Shannon Razsadin, CEO of the Military Family Advisory Network (MFAN). “In fact, our 2023 Military Family Support Programming Survey found that 52.5% of active-duty families spent more than $250 out-of-pocket each month beyond their housing allowance. The data makes clear: housing insecurity is directly linked to broader challenges, including food insecurity, mental health, retention, and propensity to recommend military service. We applaud this bipartisan initiative. Military families don’t get to choose when or where they move—those decisions are made for them in service to our country. The very least we can do is ensure their compensation keeps pace with the real costs of providing a safe place for their family to call home.”

    The bill is supported by: Military Family Advisory Network (MFAN).

    Full text of the bill can be found here.

    ##

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Justice Department Secures Denaturalization of Convicted Distributor of Child Sexual Abuse Material Who Fraudulently Obtained U.S. Citizenship

    Source: US State Government of Utah

    On June 13, 2025, the Justice Department secured the denaturalization of a convicted collector and distributor of child sexual abuse material.

    While still a citizen of the United Kingdom, Elliott Duke enlisted in the U.S. Army. In 2012, while serving in Germany, Duke began receiving and distributing child sexual abuse material via email and the internet.

    In November 13, 2012, Duke applied for citizenship under a provision that permits U.S. servicemembers to obtain U.S. citizenship. When asked on his naturalization application if he had “ever committed a crime or offense for which you were not arrested,” Duke listed only a speeding ticket. On January 18, 2013, a U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services officer interviewed Duke, and Duke, once more, orally testified that he had never committed a crime or offense for which he had not been arrested. On January 18, 2013, Duke took the Oath of Allegiance and was granted U.S. citizenship.

    On May 14, 2013, police officers in Louisiana arrested Duke and charged him with receipt and distribution of child pornography. During a police interview and in his plea agreement, Duke confessed to downloading, possessing, and distributing child pornography via his email account and the internet on dates both before and after his naturalization. Law enforcement officers from Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Homeland Security Investigations (“HSI”) later found 168 videos and 187 still images on Duke’s computer depicting minor boys and girls engaged in the lascivious display of sexual activity and bestiality. On January 23, 2014, Duke was convicted of receipt and possession of child pornography.

    On February 19, 2025, the Justice Department filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana seeking Duke’s denaturalization based on his crimes and his failure to disclose them during his naturalization process. On June 13, 2025, the Honorable James D. Cain, Jr, United States District Judge, entered an order revoking Duke’s U.S. citizenship.

    “The laws intended to facilitate citizenship for brave men and women who join our nation’s armed forces will not shield individuals who have fraudulently obtained U.S. citizenship by concealing their crimes,” said Assistant Attorney General Brett A. Shumate. “If you commit serious crimes before you become a U.S. citizen and then lie about them during your naturalization process, the Justice Department will discover the truth and come after you.”

    The case was investigated as part of Operation Prison Lookout, an ongoing national initiative involving the Justice Department and ICE to identify and prosecute sex offenders who have fraudulently obtained United States citizenship. This case was prosecuted by Deputy Chief Hans H. Chen of the Justice Department’s Office of Immigration Litigation, General Litigation and Appeals Section, Affirmative Litigation Unit, with assistance from HSI, ICE’s Office of the Principal Legal Advisor, and Assistant U.S. Attorney Shannon Smitherman of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Western District of Louisiana. 

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI Security: Justice Department Secures Denaturalization of Convicted Distributor of Child Sexual Abuse Material Who Fraudulently Obtained U.S. Citizenship

    Source: United States Attorneys General

    On June 13, 2025, the Justice Department secured the denaturalization of a convicted collector and distributor of child sexual abuse material.

    While still a citizen of the United Kingdom, Elliott Duke enlisted in the U.S. Army. In 2012, while serving in Germany, Duke began receiving and distributing child sexual abuse material via email and the internet.

    In November 13, 2012, Duke applied for citizenship under a provision that permits U.S. servicemembers to obtain U.S. citizenship. When asked on his naturalization application if he had “ever committed a crime or offense for which you were not arrested,” Duke listed only a speeding ticket. On January 18, 2013, a U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services officer interviewed Duke, and Duke, once more, orally testified that he had never committed a crime or offense for which he had not been arrested. On January 18, 2013, Duke took the Oath of Allegiance and was granted U.S. citizenship.

    On May 14, 2013, police officers in Louisiana arrested Duke and charged him with receipt and distribution of child pornography. During a police interview and in his plea agreement, Duke confessed to downloading, possessing, and distributing child pornography via his email account and the internet on dates both before and after his naturalization. Law enforcement officers from Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Homeland Security Investigations (“HSI”) later found 168 videos and 187 still images on Duke’s computer depicting minor boys and girls engaged in the lascivious display of sexual activity and bestiality. On January 23, 2014, Duke was convicted of receipt and possession of child pornography.

    On February 19, 2025, the Justice Department filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana seeking Duke’s denaturalization based on his crimes and his failure to disclose them during his naturalization process. On June 13, 2025, the Honorable James D. Cain, Jr, United States District Judge, entered an order revoking Duke’s U.S. citizenship.

    “The laws intended to facilitate citizenship for brave men and women who join our nation’s armed forces will not shield individuals who have fraudulently obtained U.S. citizenship by concealing their crimes,” said Assistant Attorney General Brett A. Shumate. “If you commit serious crimes before you become a U.S. citizen and then lie about them during your naturalization process, the Justice Department will discover the truth and come after you.”

    The case was investigated as part of Operation Prison Lookout, an ongoing national initiative involving the Justice Department and ICE to identify and prosecute sex offenders who have fraudulently obtained United States citizenship. This case was prosecuted by Deputy Chief Hans H. Chen of the Justice Department’s Office of Immigration Litigation, General Litigation and Appeals Section, Affirmative Litigation Unit, with assistance from HSI, ICE’s Office of the Principal Legal Advisor, and Assistant U.S. Attorney Shannon Smitherman of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Western District of Louisiana. 

    MIL Security OSI –

  • MIL-OSI Security: Justice Department Secures Denaturalization of Convicted Distributor of Child Sexual Abuse Material Who Fraudulently Obtained U.S. Citizenship

    Source: United States Attorneys General

    On June 13, 2025, the Justice Department secured the denaturalization of a convicted collector and distributor of child sexual abuse material.

    While still a citizen of the United Kingdom, Elliott Duke enlisted in the U.S. Army. In 2012, while serving in Germany, Duke began receiving and distributing child sexual abuse material via email and the internet.

    In November 13, 2012, Duke applied for citizenship under a provision that permits U.S. servicemembers to obtain U.S. citizenship. When asked on his naturalization application if he had “ever committed a crime or offense for which you were not arrested,” Duke listed only a speeding ticket. On January 18, 2013, a U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services officer interviewed Duke, and Duke, once more, orally testified that he had never committed a crime or offense for which he had not been arrested. On January 18, 2013, Duke took the Oath of Allegiance and was granted U.S. citizenship.

    On May 14, 2013, police officers in Louisiana arrested Duke and charged him with receipt and distribution of child pornography. During a police interview and in his plea agreement, Duke confessed to downloading, possessing, and distributing child pornography via his email account and the internet on dates both before and after his naturalization. Law enforcement officers from Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Homeland Security Investigations (“HSI”) later found 168 videos and 187 still images on Duke’s computer depicting minor boys and girls engaged in the lascivious display of sexual activity and bestiality. On January 23, 2014, Duke was convicted of receipt and possession of child pornography.

    On February 19, 2025, the Justice Department filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana seeking Duke’s denaturalization based on his crimes and his failure to disclose them during his naturalization process. On June 13, 2025, the Honorable James D. Cain, Jr, United States District Judge, entered an order revoking Duke’s U.S. citizenship.

    “The laws intended to facilitate citizenship for brave men and women who join our nation’s armed forces will not shield individuals who have fraudulently obtained U.S. citizenship by concealing their crimes,” said Assistant Attorney General Brett A. Shumate. “If you commit serious crimes before you become a U.S. citizen and then lie about them during your naturalization process, the Justice Department will discover the truth and come after you.”

    The case was investigated as part of Operation Prison Lookout, an ongoing national initiative involving the Justice Department and ICE to identify and prosecute sex offenders who have fraudulently obtained United States citizenship. This case was prosecuted by Deputy Chief Hans H. Chen of the Justice Department’s Office of Immigration Litigation, General Litigation and Appeals Section, Affirmative Litigation Unit, with assistance from HSI, ICE’s Office of the Principal Legal Advisor, and Assistant U.S. Attorney Shannon Smitherman of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Western District of Louisiana. 

    MIL Security OSI –

  • MIL-OSI NGOs: IAEA Director General Grossi’s Statement to UNSC on Situation in Iran

    Source: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) –

    (As prepared for delivery)

    Attacks on nuclear sites in the Islamic Republic of Iran have caused a sharp degradation in nuclear safety and security in Iran. Though they have not so far led to a radiological release affecting the public, there is a danger this could occur.

    The International Atomic Energy Agency has been monitoring closely the situation at Iran’s nuclear sites since Israel began its attacks a week ago. As part of its mission, the IAEA is the global nerve centre for information on nuclear and radiological safety, and we can respond to any nuclear or radiological emergency.

    Based on information available to the IAEA, the following is the current situation at Iran’s nuclear sites. Which I offer as a follow up to my most recent report to this Security Council.

    The Natanz enrichment site contains two facilities. The first is the main Fuel Enrichment Plant. Initial attacks on the 13th of June targeted and destroyed electricity infrastructure at the facility, including an electrical sub-station, the main electric power supply building, and emergency power supply and back-up generators. On the same day, the main cascade hall appears to have been attacked using ground-penetrating munitions.

    The second facility at Natanz is the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant. It consists of aboveground and underground cascade halls. On the 13th of June the above-ground part was functionally destroyed and the strikes on the underground cascade halls were seriously damaging.

    The level of radioactivity outside the Natanz site has remained unchanged and at normal levels, indicating no external radiological impact on the population or the environment.

    However, within the Natanz facility there is both radiological and chemical contamination. It is possible that Uranium isotopes contained in Uranium Hexafluoride, Uranyl Fluoride and Hydrogen Fluoride are dispersed inside the facility. The radiation, primarily consisting of alpha particles, poses a significant danger if inhaled or ingested. This risk can be effectively managed with appropriate protective measures, such as using respiratory devices. The main concern inside the facility is chemical toxicity.

    Fordow is Iran’s main enrichment location for enriching uranium to 60%. The Agency is not aware of any damage at Fordow at this time.

    At the Esfahan nuclear site, four buildings were damaged in last Friday’s attack: the central chemical laboratory, a uranium conversion plant, the Tehran reactor-fuel manufacturing plant, and the enriched uranium metal processing facility, which was under construction.

    No increase of off-site radiation levels was reported. As in Natanz, the main concern is chemical toxicity.  

    The Khondab Heavy Water Research Reactor under construction in Arak, was hit on the 19th of June. As the reactor was not operational and did not contain any nuclear material, no radiological consequence is expected. The nearby Heavy Water Production Plant is also assessed to have been hit, and similarly no radiological consequence is expected.

    As stated in the IAEA’s update of the 18th of June, at the Tehran Research Center, one building, where advanced centrifuge rotors were manufactured and tested, was hit. At the Karaj workshop, two buildings, where different centrifuge components were manufactured, were destroyed. There was no radiological impact, internally or externally.

    Let me now refer to the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant. This is the nuclear site in Iran where the consequences of an attack could be most serious. It is an operating nuclear power plant and as such it hosts thousands of kilograms of nuclear material. Countries of the region have reached out directly to me over the past few hours to express their concerns, and I want to make it absolutely and completely clear: In case of an attack on the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant a direct hit could result in a very high release of radioactivity to the environment.

    Similarly, a hit that disabled the only two lines supplying electrical power to the plant could cause its reactor’s core to melt, which could result in a high release of radioactivity to the environment. In their worst-case, both scenarios would necessitate protective actions, such as evacuations and sheltering of the population or the need to take stable iodine, with the reach extending to distances from a few to several hundred kilometres. Radiation monitoring would need to cover distances of several hundred kilometres and food restrictions may need to be implemented.

    Any action against the Tehran Nuclear Research Reactor could also have severe consequences, potentially for large areas of the city of Tehran and its inhabitants. In such a case, protective actions would need to be taken.

    I will continue to provide public updates about the developments at all these sites and their possible health and environmental consequences.

    The Agency is, as madame Undersecretary kindly reminded, and will remain present in Iran and inspections there will resume, as required by Iran’s safeguards obligations under its NPT Safeguards Agreement, as soon as safety and security conditions allow.

    In this context, let me restate that the safety of our inspectors is of utmost importance. The host country has a responsibility in this regard, and we expect every effort to be made to ensure that their security and their communication lines with the IAEA headquarters will be maintained.

    As stated in my most recent report to the Agency’s Board of Governors and based on inspections conducted at the relevant facilities since then, Iran’s uranium stockpiles remain under safeguards in accordance with Iran’s comprehensive safeguards agreement. You may recall that more than 400kg of this stockpile is uranium enriched up to 60% U-235. It is essential that the Agency resumes inspections as soon as possible to provide credible assurances that none of it has been diverted.

    Importantly, any special measures by Iran to protect its nuclear materials and equipment must be done in accordance with Iran’s safeguards obligations and the Agency.  

    Therefore, it is of paramount importance that the Agency’s inspectors are allowed to verify that all relevant materials, especially those enriched to 60%, are accounted for. Beyond the potential radiological risks, attacks on such materials would make this effort of course more difficult.

    Madame President,

    The IAEA has consistently underlined, as stated in its General Conference resolution, that armed attacks on nuclear facilities should never take place, and could result in radioactive releases with grave consequences within and beyond the boundaries of the State which has been attacked.

    I therefore again call on maximum restraint. Military escalation threatens lives and delays indispensable work towards a diplomatic solution for the long-term assurance that Iran does not acquire a nuclear weapon.

    Madame President,

    The presence, support, analysis and inspections of technical experts are crucial to mitigating risks to nuclear safety and security – that is true during peacetime and even more so during military conflict.

    For the second time in three years, we are witnessing a dramatic conflict between two UN and IAEA Member States in which nuclear installations are coming under fire and nuclear safety is being compromised. The IAEA, just as has been the case with the military conflict between the Russian Federation and Ukraine, will not stand idle during this conflict.

    As I stated in this chamber just a few days ago, I am ready to travel immediately and to engage with all relevant parties to help ensure the protection of nuclear facilities and the continued peaceful use of nuclear technology in accordance with the Agency mandate, including by deploying Agency nuclear safety and security experts, in addition to our safeguards inspectors in Iran, wherever necessary.

    For the IAEA to act, a constructive, professional dialogue is needed. I urge the Members of this Council to support us in making it happen sooner rather than later.

    The IAEA must receive timely and regular technical information about affected nuclear facilities and their respective sites. I urge in this regard the Iranian regulatory authorities to continue a constructive dialogue with the IAEA Incident and Emergency Centre, which has been operating 24/7 since the beginning of this conflict.

    Nuclear facilities and material must not be shrouded by the fog of war.

    Yesterday there was an incorrect statement to the media by an Israeli military official that Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant had been attacked. Though the mistake was quickly identified and the statement retracted, the situation underscored the vital need for clear and accurate communication, and the Agency’s unique role in providing it in a technically accurate and politically impartial way is obvious.

    Let me conclude by assuring the international community of the IAEA’s continued support at this very grave time.

    A diplomatic solution is within reach if the necessary political will is there. Elements for an agreement have been discussed. The IAEA can guarantee, through a watertight inspections system, that nuclear weapons will not be developed in Iran.  They can form the basis of a long-standing agreement that brings peace and avoids a nuclear crisis in the Middle East. This opportunity should not be missed. The alternative would be a protracted conflict and a looming threat of nuclear proliferation that, while emanating from the Middle East, would effectively erode the NPT and the non-proliferation regime as a whole.

    MIL OSI NGO –

  • MIL-OSI Security: IAEA Director General Grossi’s Statement to UNSC on Situation in Iran

    Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

    (As prepared for delivery)

    Attacks on nuclear sites in the Islamic Republic of Iran have caused a sharp degradation in nuclear safety and security in Iran. Though they have not so far led to a radiological release affecting the public, there is a danger this could occur.

    The International Atomic Energy Agency has been monitoring closely the situation at Iran’s nuclear sites since Israel began its attacks a week ago. As part of its mission, the IAEA is the global nerve centre for information on nuclear and radiological safety, and we can respond to any nuclear or radiological emergency.

    Based on information available to the IAEA, the following is the current situation at Iran’s nuclear sites. Which I offer as a follow up to my most recent report to this Security Council.

    The Natanz enrichment site contains two facilities. The first is the main Fuel Enrichment Plant. Initial attacks on the 13th of June targeted and destroyed electricity infrastructure at the facility, including an electrical sub-station, the main electric power supply building, and emergency power supply and back-up generators. On the same day, the main cascade hall appears to have been attacked using ground-penetrating munitions.

    The second facility at Natanz is the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant. It consists of aboveground and underground cascade halls. On the 13th of June the above-ground part was functionally destroyed and the strikes on the underground cascade halls were seriously damaging.

    The level of radioactivity outside the Natanz site has remained unchanged and at normal levels, indicating no external radiological impact on the population or the environment.

    However, within the Natanz facility there is both radiological and chemical contamination. It is possible that Uranium isotopes contained in Uranium Hexafluoride, Uranyl Fluoride and Hydrogen Fluoride are dispersed inside the facility. The radiation, primarily consisting of alpha particles, poses a significant danger if inhaled or ingested. This risk can be effectively managed with appropriate protective measures, such as using respiratory devices. The main concern inside the facility is chemical toxicity.

    Fordow is Iran’s main enrichment location for enriching uranium to 60%. The Agency is not aware of any damage at Fordow at this time.

    At the Esfahan nuclear site, four buildings were damaged in last Friday’s attack: the central chemical laboratory, a uranium conversion plant, the Tehran reactor-fuel manufacturing plant, and the enriched uranium metal processing facility, which was under construction.

    No increase of off-site radiation levels was reported. As in Natanz, the main concern is chemical toxicity.  

    The Khondab Heavy Water Research Reactor under construction in Arak, was hit on the 19th of June. As the reactor was not operational and did not contain any nuclear material, no radiological consequence is expected. The nearby Heavy Water Production Plant is also assessed to have been hit, and similarly no radiological consequence is expected.

    As stated in the IAEA’s update of the 18th of June, at the Tehran Research Center, one building, where advanced centrifuge rotors were manufactured and tested, was hit. At the Karaj workshop, two buildings, where different centrifuge components were manufactured, were destroyed. There was no radiological impact, internally or externally.

    Let me now refer to the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant. This is the nuclear site in Iran where the consequences of an attack could be most serious. It is an operating nuclear power plant and as such it hosts thousands of kilograms of nuclear material. Countries of the region have reached out directly to me over the past few hours to express their concerns, and I want to make it absolutely and completely clear: In case of an attack on the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant a direct hit could result in a very high release of radioactivity to the environment.

    Similarly, a hit that disabled the only two lines supplying electrical power to the plant could cause its reactor’s core to melt, which could result in a high release of radioactivity to the environment. In their worst-case, both scenarios would necessitate protective actions, such as evacuations and sheltering of the population or the need to take stable iodine, with the reach extending to distances from a few to several hundred kilometres. Radiation monitoring would need to cover distances of several hundred kilometres and food restrictions may need to be implemented.

    Any action against the Tehran Nuclear Research Reactor could also have severe consequences, potentially for large areas of the city of Tehran and its inhabitants. In such a case, protective actions would need to be taken.

    I will continue to provide public updates about the developments at all these sites and their possible health and environmental consequences.

    The Agency is, as madame Undersecretary kindly reminded, and will remain present in Iran and inspections there will resume, as required by Iran’s safeguards obligations under its NPT Safeguards Agreement, as soon as safety and security conditions allow.

    In this context, let me restate that the safety of our inspectors is of utmost importance. The host country has a responsibility in this regard, and we expect every effort to be made to ensure that their security and their communication lines with the IAEA headquarters will be maintained.

    As stated in my most recent report to the Agency’s Board of Governors and based on inspections conducted at the relevant facilities since then, Iran’s uranium stockpiles remain under safeguards in accordance with Iran’s comprehensive safeguards agreement. You may recall that more than 400kg of this stockpile is uranium enriched up to 60% U-235. It is essential that the Agency resumes inspections as soon as possible to provide credible assurances that none of it has been diverted.

    Importantly, any special measures by Iran to protect its nuclear materials and equipment must be done in accordance with Iran’s safeguards obligations and the Agency.  

    Therefore, it is of paramount importance that the Agency’s inspectors are allowed to verify that all relevant materials, especially those enriched to 60%, are accounted for. Beyond the potential radiological risks, attacks on such materials would make this effort of course more difficult.

    Madame President,

    The IAEA has consistently underlined, as stated in its General Conference resolution, that armed attacks on nuclear facilities should never take place, and could result in radioactive releases with grave consequences within and beyond the boundaries of the State which has been attacked.

    I therefore again call on maximum restraint. Military escalation threatens lives and delays indispensable work towards a diplomatic solution for the long-term assurance that Iran does not acquire a nuclear weapon.

    Madame President,

    The presence, support, analysis and inspections of technical experts are crucial to mitigating risks to nuclear safety and security – that is true during peacetime and even more so during military conflict.

    For the second time in three years, we are witnessing a dramatic conflict between two UN and IAEA Member States in which nuclear installations are coming under fire and nuclear safety is being compromised. The IAEA, just as has been the case with the military conflict between the Russian Federation and Ukraine, will not stand idle during this conflict.

    As I stated in this chamber just a few days ago, I am ready to travel immediately and to engage with all relevant parties to help ensure the protection of nuclear facilities and the continued peaceful use of nuclear technology in accordance with the Agency mandate, including by deploying Agency nuclear safety and security experts, in addition to our safeguards inspectors in Iran, wherever necessary.

    For the IAEA to act, a constructive, professional dialogue is needed. I urge the Members of this Council to support us in making it happen sooner rather than later.

    The IAEA must receive timely and regular technical information about affected nuclear facilities and their respective sites. I urge in this regard the Iranian regulatory authorities to continue a constructive dialogue with the IAEA Incident and Emergency Centre, which has been operating 24/7 since the beginning of this conflict.

    Nuclear facilities and material must not be shrouded by the fog of war.

    Yesterday there was an incorrect statement to the media by an Israeli military official that Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant had been attacked. Though the mistake was quickly identified and the statement retracted, the situation underscored the vital need for clear and accurate communication, and the Agency’s unique role in providing it in a technically accurate and politically impartial way is obvious.

    Let me conclude by assuring the international community of the IAEA’s continued support at this very grave time.

    A diplomatic solution is within reach if the necessary political will is there. Elements for an agreement have been discussed. The IAEA can guarantee, through a watertight inspections system, that nuclear weapons will not be developed in Iran.  They can form the basis of a long-standing agreement that brings peace and avoids a nuclear crisis in the Middle East. This opportunity should not be missed. The alternative would be a protracted conflict and a looming threat of nuclear proliferation that, while emanating from the Middle East, would effectively erode the NPT and the non-proliferation regime as a whole.

    MIL Security OSI –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Crapo Welcomes Summer 2025 Interns

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Idaho Mike Crapo

    Washington, D.C.–Eight interns joined U.S. Senator Mike Crapo’s (R-Idaho) offices in Washington, D.C., and Boise for the Summer 2025 term.

    “These young individuals joining my office for the summer will directly experience the inner workings of the U.S. Senate during President Trump’s historic second term,” said Crapo.  “They will actively engage with Idaho’s constituents, expand their knowledge of the federal policymaking process and grow hard and soft skills important for their next career step.  I am delighted to have them on board for this summer and look forward to their success.”

    Five interns are serving in the Washington, D.C., Office:

    1. Erika Amaral-Pelayo is a native of Kuna, Idaho, entering her junior year at the University of Idaho.  She is majoring in political science with minors in Spanish and business economics. 
    1. Jaden Tilley is a native of Orofino, Idaho, and a student at Brigham Young University.  He is majoring in political science.
    1. Ethan Gilpin is a native of Montana and is currently attending Montana State University.  He is studying economics and finance.
    1. Kylie Keysor is a native of north California and is enrolled at Brigham Young University.  She is majoring in business.
    1. Catherine Lucia is a native of Virginia with family in Preston, Idaho.  She is a junior at Brigham Young University, studying communication disorders with a political science minor.

    Three interns are serving in the Boise Office:

    1. Lucy Ford is a native of Hailey, Idaho, starting her junior year at Boise State University.  She is studying government with aspirations of attending graduate school. 
    1. Michael McCurry is a native of Boise, Idaho, and a U.S. Army veteran, entering his senior year at Boise State University.  He is majoring in political science.
    1. Ryan Collins is a native of Kuna, Idaho, and a U.S. Marine Corps veteran.  He earned his B.S. in political science from Arizona State University and is interested in attending law school.

    Crapo hosts interns in his Washington, D.C., office as well as in the various regional offices throughout Idaho.  The applications for the spring 2026 term close on October 15, 2025.  Students interested in positions for the spring, summer or fall semesters can find more information about the application process, internship expectations and deadlines for applying on the Senator’s official website at: https://www.crapo.senate.gov/services/for-students/internships.

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Cramer, Colleagues Lead Effort to Strengthen Review of Foreign Land Purchases Near Military Sites

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator Kevin Cramer (R-ND)

    BISMARCK, N.D. – In 2021, the Chinese Fufeng Group purchased 370 acres of land for a wet-corn milling plant 12 miles from Grand Forks Air Force Base (GFAFB), alarming the community. U.S. Senator Kevin Cramer (R-ND) was a vocal opponent of the purchase due to national security concerns, given the food manufacturer’s ties to the Chinese Communist Party and the sensitive work performed at the base. He requested the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) review the investment. The committee ultimately concluded it lacked the legal jurisdiction to make a determination, regardless of the merits of the case. In a January 2023 letter, the U.S. Air Force officially asserted the Fufeng project “presents a significant threat to national security with both near- and long-term risks of significant impacts to our operations in the area.”

    In the years since, Cramer has been at the forefront of expanding CFIUS’ jurisdiction. He joined fellow Senate Banking Committee members U.S. Senators Tim Scott (R-SC), Mike Crapo (R-ID), Mike Rounds (R-SD), Thom Tillis (R-NC), John Kennedy (R-LA), Bill Hagerty (R-TN), Katie Britt (R-AL), Pete Ricketts (R-NE), Jim Banks (R-IN), Bernie Moreno (R-OH), and Dave McCormick (R-PA) in introducing the Protect Our Bases Act to update records of military, intelligence, and national laboratory facilities, which should be designated as sensitive sites for national security purposes.

    “Every time a foreign adversary acquires land near U.S. military installations and sensitive sites, the safety and security of our nation is at risk,” said Cramer. “The Protect our Bases Act will allow CFIUS to make necessary updates to hold our adversaries accountable, protect us from potential national security threats, and bring much-needed transparency and clarity to the table. We should discourage land being sold to bad people.”

    The Protect Our Bases Act provides CFIUS with streamlined authority to address foreign adversary investment near sensitive national security sites in the United States rather than rely on member agencies to maintain updated lists of sensitive sites. These lists are used as the basis to review transactions. The legislation will consolidate statutory authorities for CFIUS to utilize its list of sensitive national security sites, including U.S. military installations, intelligence facilities, and national laboratories. It also requires committee members to update their equities on the list annually and reporting to Congress on CFIUS actions and reviews related to listed sites.

    Following the Fufeng controversy, CFIUS expanded jurisdiction over GFAFB and seven other bases. Cramer cosponsored amendments included in the Fiscal Year 2024 National Defense Authorization Act to defend national security against these concerning investments. The Fiscal Year 2024 Appropriations minibus included language Cramer supported to add the Secretary of Agriculture to CFIUS to review foreign agricultural and biotechnology purchases of national concern. He also introduced legislation empowering governors to proactively ask CFIUS whether a proposed transaction would warrant or trigger a review prior to the project’s development.

    Click here for bill text.

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Digging Out of Our Fiscal Hole

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Wisconsin Ron Johnson

    Neither Congress, the Administration, nor the public at large has fully acknowledged the depth of the fiscal hole we have dug, or what it will take to dig ourselves out of it. This is why I am releasing my report “FY 2025 Budget Reconciliation: Facts, Figures, and Analysis.”

    My report provides an analysis of different scenarios using various growth rates and spending levels to prove that, without returning to a much lower pre-pandemic spending level, there is virtually no hope of achieving a balanced budget. Republican leaders have repeatedly stated, “We don’t have a revenue problem; we have a spending problem.” It’s time to find out if they’re willing to fix it.

    Republicans must ask themselves whether they’re willing to address this spending problem. I hope the answer is yes — and I will continue doing everything I can to ensure it is.

    Access the entire 30-page report: The primary purpose of this report is to graphically show what so many Republican leaders have repeatedly stated, including President Trump in his November 2, 2011 tweet, “Washington has a spending problem, not a revenue problem.” 

    As outlined in this report, the House bill will not reduce the deficit — the numbers simply don’t support that claim. This is our once in a lifetime opportunity to balance the federal budget and reset spending. We have to clean up the enormous mess that Biden and the Democrats left for us.

    We are all committed to helping the President and America succeed. My higher loyalty is to my children and grandchildren. We are immorally mortgaging their future. It’s time to take a businesslike approach and work seriously to reduce spending and deficits.

    READ: Washington Examiner —> Ron Johnson ramps up “Big, Beautiful Bill” opposition with release of deficit report

    READ: The Daily Signal —>  Sen. Ron Johnson Proposes Alternative to “Big, Beautiful Bill”

    WATCH: Clay & Buck —> Senator Ron Johnson Brings His Charts to the D.C. Studio to Talk Cutting the Budget

    WATCH: Fox Business interview clip —> “We have to clean up the enormous mess that Biden and the Democrats left for us.”

    READ: Badger Institute —>  At center of America’s essential debate, Johnson says resist spending frenzy

     

    I’ve been holding regular telephone town halls this month. The next one is Monday, June 23 at 2pm CT.

    I hope all subscribers to my newsletter have signed up, but if not, here is the form. 

    You can always listen to the telephone town halls live online or on X and Facebook. 

    I appreciate everyone who takes the time to listen and ask thoughtful questions, even if we disagree. We have thousands of people on these calls and try to answer questions on a wide array of topics.

    Here are the time codes and topics covered during the June 16 telephone town hall. 

    8:55       Telephone Town Hall #122 begins
    10:30     Thoughts on Sen. Alex Padilla at DHS Sec. Noem press conference
    11:20     Will Trump’s bill get passed by July 4?
    12:15     Are you concerned Republicans are on the wrong track?
    14:30     How will you vote on funding for public television and radio?
    15:35     Will Trump’s cuts hurt constituents?
    19:30     Taxes on Social Security
    22:13     Abortion
    23:50     Affordable Care Act vs. Obamacare
    25:58     VA care and government run health care
    29:30     Why democrats are protesting
    32:40     Illegal immigrants
    35:20     National debt
    38:11     China owning farmland near military bases
    40:00     Federal budget and how to limit spending
    42:35     Spending for Veterans
    45:05     Israel/Iran war
    47:50     Holding people accountable for illegal immigration
    51:28     Army parade
    53:20     Taxing the rich
    56:25     Social Security and taxes
    58:55     Revenue from tariffs
    1:02:43  Closing remarks

    Congratulations to Matt Pronovost from Homestead High School in Mequon for earning a spot in the U.S. Senate Page Program this summer.

    Pages play an important role in the daily operation of the Senate. They live in Washington, D.C. and attend Page School while working in the U.S. Senate. Pages deliver correspondence and legislative material within the Capitol and Senate office buildings, prepare the Chamber for Senate sessions, and work on the Senate floor.

    Contact my office and the Senate Page Coordinator for more information on the program for 16 or 17-year-olds in their junior year of high school. We are now taking applications for Spring 2026.

    It was great to meet five homeschool families from the Richfield area who were touring Washington, D.C. this week. 

    Our office can help you book several different tours for your upcoming trip to make it truly special. From the Capitol to the White House to the FBI, check out my Visiting DCwebpage for more information. 

    Our staff presented a Certificate of Special Senatorial Recognition to the Executive Director of Community Action for the organization’s 60th anniversary. The group fights poverty in Rock and Walworth counties. 
     

    The Spirit Cultural Exchange visits Madison each year with J-1 visa participants (also known as the Exchange Visitor Visa) to tour the State Capitol. 

    My staff met with these students from around the world to talk about United States government at the state and federal level. 

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI NGOs: Wrecking the future: The Trump war on the ocean, climate, and communities

    Source: Greenpeace Statement –

    During his first 100 days President Trump has been actively working to dismantle and weaken environmental protections and attack those who fight to protect nature and our shared climate, putting the corporate profits of his billionaire friends ahead of people and the planet. © Saf Suleyman / Greenpeace

    President Trump’s second term

    The first months of any administration are often dedicated to setting the tone of what constituents can expect for the next four years. For Trump’s second term, that message is clear: let it all burn. 

    Drastic agency cuts, reckless executive orders, and blatant industry giveaways promise devastating immediate and long-term consequences for our oceans, our climate, and our communities. 

    Dismantling climate defense 

    NOAA, the nation’s premier science agency for understanding, monitoring, and protecting our oceans, atmosphere, and climate, plays an essential role in safeguarding ecosystems and communities. Its data, forecasts, scientific expertise, and stewardship also support major sectors like tourism, transportation, food, and retail that rely on NOAA’s services to operate safely, efficiently, and sustainably.

    Yet the Trump Administration has moved aggressively to gut NOAA’s capacity–firing scientists, defunding critical research, and shutting down its extreme weather database, a vital tool that has tracked the financial toll of climate disasters since the 1980s. These cuts come as extreme weather events are becoming more intense and frequent. In 2024 alone, Americans faced at least $182.7 billion in damages from 27 weather and climate disasters. Undermining NOAA’s ability to forecast threats, inform the American and global public, and support disaster response endangers lives while ensuring greater loss and damage, higher costs, and deep suffering as the climate crisis accelerates.  

    Among NOAA Fisheries’ vital programs is the Seafood Import Monitoring Program (SIMP), the nation’s primary line of defense against seafood linked to fraud, forced labor, and environmental harm. With more than 80% of the seafood consumed in the U.S. imported and the global seafood supply chain riddled with these problems, SIMP plays a crucial role in ensuring the integrity of what ends up on American plates. Cuts to NOAA directly harm domestic fisheries as well, which rely on the agency to provide weather and pollution alerts. 

    These efforts have been further supported by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Department of Labor’s Bureau of International Labor Affairs (ILAB), whose programs help combat child labor, forced labor, and human trafficking around the world. 

    So while Americans have made it clear that they want to know where their food comes from and to trust that it is safe, ethical, and sustainable, the Trump administration is undermining the very systems that deliver these safeguards. By weakening SIMP and cancelling $500 million in ILAB grants, it is putting seafood workers at greater risk of abuse and exploitation, and exposing Americans to products tainted by these harms.

    Endangering ocean futures

    While more countries move towards a ban, moratorium, or pause on deep sea mining, the Trump Administration is charging in the opposite direction– reviving a cold war-era law, the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, to launch an unnecessary industry that threatens irreversible harm to fragile ecosystems we are only beginning to understand.

    Trump’s executive order “Unleashing America’s Offshore Critical Minerals and Resources” directs federal agencies to fast-track permits for seabed mining in both U.S. and international waters. Widely condemned as environmentally reckless and politically explosive, the move is a direct attempt to sidestep the International Seabed Authority (ISA)—the UN body charged with protecting the deep ocean as the “common heritage of humankind.” In doing so, it threatens to unravel global cooperation, weaken environmental oversight, and set a dangerous precedent for the exploitation of one of Earth’s last untouched frontiers. The order, while lining up another ‘get richer scheme’ for the billionaire broligarchy, also ignores calls from over 35 countries for a moratorium, disregards the voices of Pacific Island communities, and pushes forward despite overwhelming ecological, legal, and moral objections. 

    The push is further reinforced by a pair of sweeping executive orders that aim to bulldoze environmental safeguards in the name of “energy dominance.” One declares a so-called “national energy emergency,” suspending key regulatory safeguards under bedrock environmental laws like the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the Endangered Species Act, and the Clean Water Act. 

    Together, these orders will not just fast-tack deep sea mining but also accelerate offshore drilling, fracking infrastructure, and fossil fuel exports. This isn’t just deregulation—it’s a declaration of open season on the ocean. 

    All this comes as cobalt and nickel prices are plummeting, further undermining the already shaky economic case for mining the seafloor. Meanwhile, safer, cleaner, and more cost-effective alternatives, such as mineral recycling and domestic refining efforts, many of which are backed by the U.S. Department of Defense, are gaining momentum. But instead of investing in these sustainable solutions, the White House is reaching into the past to gamble with the future of our oceans and our planet. 

    ‘Unleashing’ America’s fishing industry into collapse

    In another destructive move, the Trump Administration has targeted New England’s fishing industry by opening the Northeast Canyons and Seamounts National Marine Monument–the first and only National Marine Monument in the U.S. Atlantic–to commercial fishing. This follows similar rollbacks opening the Pacific Islands Heritage Marine National Monument–long considered off-limits due to its ecological significance–to commercial fishing and broader dismantling of domestic fishing regulations.  

    There is no evidence that these protected areas harmed the fishing economy. But opening them to industrial fishing will cause irreversible damage, from increased bycatch and habitat destruction to plastic pollution from fishing gear, undoing decades of progress to end overfishing, rebuild fish stocks, and restore America’s fisheries. 

    At the same time, the earlier-mentioned cuts to NOAA will also hurt domestic fishing by leaving fishers without vital scientific insight needed for planning and responding to changing ocean conditions. This approach paves the way for overfishing and fishery collapse–again, directly contradicting the Trump Administration’s stated goal of supporting American fishing communities. 

    Scientists agree that protecting at least 30% of the world’s oceans by 2030 is essential to help marine ecosystems recover and thrive. When fish populations collapse, so do fishing jobs and fishing communities. Yet with these actions, the Trump Administration is again steering the US in the wrong direction—sidelining science, sustainability, and long-term economic resilience by jeopardizing the entire industry and the coastal communities it supports. 

    Taxing our health

    Trump’s chaotic tariff edicts have strained relationships with several key allies and raised costs for average Americans, all while giving fossil fuel interests a free pass. By exempting petrochemicals and polymers, the Administration has ensured that plastic packaging will remain cheap, abundant, and toxic. Companies like Coca-Cola, already the largest global producer of plastic packaging and the biggest source of branded plastic waste, are planning to ramp up plastic production in response to the tariffs on aluminum.  

    At the same time, the Administration issued yet another executive order, accompanied by a 36-page report, aimed at “bringing America back” to plastic straws. So, while more Americans struggle to make ends meet, they can be sure of one thing: there will be plenty of microplastics to go around.

    Plastics are not just a pollution problem; they are a public health crisis. Over 3,200 chemicals in plastics have been linked to a host of serious health conditions, including cancer, hormone disruption, reproductive problems, metabolic changes, obesity, premature births, neurological disorders, and learning disabilities. Toxic chemicals in plastic already cost Americans nearly $250 billion in healthcare expenses each year.

    And that burden is not shared equally. BIPOC and low-income communities face disproportionate exposure to pollution from plastic production, disposal, and incineration infrastructure, which are often located in or near their communities. These facilities poison the air, the water, and their bodies. While oil and gas companies rake in record profits and their billionaire CEO’s grow richer, these communities and working families across America are left paying the price. 

    Voters across the political spectrum – Democrats and Republicans alike– support strong action to reduce plastic pollution and protect public health. Yet, without pause at the staggering irony, the Trump Administration is slashing Medicaid, gutting personnel and budget from the Department of Health and Human Services, and increasing our exposure to toxic plastic— all while touting a “Make America Healthy Again” agenda. But even in an era of  “alternative facts” and the attempted erasure of diversity, equity, and inclusion, the truth is impossible to ignore. There is nothing left to sacrifice. 

    Time to resist 

    While the pace and scale of recent changes can seem overwhelming, it is worth remembering that part of this administration’s strategy is to flood the zone and try to get ahead of legal challenges and other obstacles to their agenda. The Trump Administration, like the “tech bros” who fell in line behind the President, is moving fast and breaking things. But there is growing resistance to their actions. In the last few weeks, especially, the number of new and successful legal challenges has been growing, with some law firms and academic institutions pushing back against the administration’s demands. This includes EarthJustice, Greenpeace, and allies in a joint litigation against Trump’s attempt to continue offshore drilling. 

    Meanwhile, millions of Americans—across generations, faiths, races, genders, and political ideologies—have been hitting the streets to defend their human rights, their environment, and their democracy. These peaceful protests have made one thing clear: We will not be silenced. We won’t back down. We won’t stop defending our communities in the face of government corruption and corporate greed. 

    MIL OSI NGO –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Warren Demands Answers on Trump’s Potential Contract with Shadowy Humanitarian Group, Urges More Aid to Gaza Through Responsible Partners

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Massachusetts – Elizabeth Warren

    June 20, 2025

    Letter follows reports that Secretary of State Marco Rubio is considering giving GHF $500 million despite concerns about its funding sources, neutrality, basic competence in providing aid, and more

    “It is critical that the United States stop the humanitarian disaster in Gaza. But that must be done through funding professional humanitarian organizations.”

    Text of Letter (PDF)

    Washington, D.C. — In a new letter to the Secretary of State and the United States Agency for International Aid (USAID), U.S. Senator Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.) raised her concerns about the Department of State’s reported plan to give $500 million to the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF). 

    “Reports of deadly violence against starving Palestinians connected with the GHF’s aid network are deeply troubling, as are reports of the organization’s ties to the Israeli government, and the lack of financial transparency regarding its donors, and its new connections – via its executive director – to the Trump administration and campaign,” said Senator Warren. 

    In May 2025, the World Health Organization and its partners determined that “Nineteen months into the conflict, the Gaza Strip is still confronted with a critical risk of Famine,” with over 2 million people facing high levels of acute food insecurity. This includes 71,000 cases of acute malnutrition among children and 17,000 pregnant women who will “need treatment for acute malnutrition.”

    Before the blockade in March 2025, food aid was distributed in Gaza at 400 locations through experienced humanitarian organizations, many of whom worked in the region for decades. After the blockade was partially lifted in May, the Israeli government only allowed aid to resume under a distribution network managed by the newly-created GHF. 

    From the beginning, GHF limited distribution of aid to four hubs in southern Gaza, under the watch of private security contractors. Additionally, it agreed to let the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to take position up to 1000 feet of GHF distribution sites, where it attacks Gazans who step out of the zone designated for waiting for aid collection. In its first three weeks of operation, more than 200 people seeking aid were killed and thousands wounded near GHF distribution sites. 

    Senator Warren also raised concerns about the GHF’s funding and ownership. Humanitarian groups typically report clear expenditure reports and disclosure requirements surrounding all aid distribution. GHF has, to date, refused to disclose its funding sources or its total budget. Israeli media recently reported that around $200 million was quietly reapportioned from the Israeli government’s budget towards the aid effort in Gaza and another $100 million came from an anonymous “Western European nation”.

    “This raises questions around the lack of impartiality, and neutrality, of GHF’s operations in Gaza,” said Senator Warren. 

    GHF’s leadership has also been marked by turmoil. The founder and first executive director of the GHF, Jake Wood, quit hours before the organization was supposed to start distributing aid on May 26th, claiming “it is not possible to implement this plan while also strictly adhering to the humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality, and independence.” He was replaced by Reverend Johnnie Moore, who served as co-chair for President Trump’s presidential campaign’s evangelical advisory board. 

    Just three months after the launch of the organization, the GHF’s Swiss affiliate was shut down by Switzerland’s government for “not fulfilling various legal obligations.” 

    “It is critical that the United States stop the humanitarian disaster in Gaza. But that must be done through funding professional humanitarian organizations,” wrote Senator Warren. 

    “The questions surrounding GHF – its funding sources and connection to the Trump Administration, its use of private contractors, its ability to serve and be seen as a neutral entity, its abandonment by its founders, and its basic competence in providing aid – must be answered before the State Department commits any funding to the organization,” concluded Senator Warren. 

    Senator Warren asked the State Department and USAID to provide clarity on its potential plans to use GHF, how the agencies plan to measure success for the distribution of aid, and their plans to ensure contractors follow U.S. law when distributing aid by July 2, 2025. 

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI Africa: United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)-supported General Court Martial launches in Wau

    A military court has officially begun in Wau, the capital of South Sudan’s Western Bahr El Ghazal, to hear cases related to allegations of serious misconduct by uniformed personnel from the South Sudan’s Peoples Defense Forces (SSPDF).

    As judges and legal officers stood to take their oaths, marking the official opening of the proceedings, silence washed over community members. In a country where access to justice is often not available for many people in remote locations, this quiet moment speaks volumes – it’s pregnant with hope that even though justice has been delayed, it won’t be denied.

    For Major General Marech Chietak from this young nation’s National Prisons Service, the message is clear. “Noone is above the law, irrespective of the uniform they wear.”

    As the general court martial began hearing cases on 18 July, the emphasis remains on fairness, accountability and transparency.

    “The overarching principle governing these proceedings is respect for the rule of law,” says Justice Yai Anyuon Akot, a high court judge in Wau.

    “Military courts aren’t merely about meting out punishments but rather ensuring that people who have been wronged can receive the reparations they deserve, thereby restoring public faith in the justice system,” he added. “It’s about building trust between uniformed personnel and community members.”

    For their part, community members, while optimistic, still have concerns, reveals Stephen Musa, a civil society representative.  

    “There is a lot of doubt among people about what will happen if they come forward and report cases,” he said. “People are worried about their safety, confidentiality and some fear retaliation if the verdict doesn’t go in their favour,” he stated. “It is our shared responsibility to build trust and ensure survivors are protected and I hope the final outcome of this court will shore up public trust in the system.”

    Sam Muhumure, Head of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan’s (UNMISS) Field Office in Western Bahr El Ghazal, is keenly aware of community sentiment.

    “With years of conflict and struggles under their belt, it’s understandable that people are apprehensive. Our hope, as UNMISS, is that supporting such military courts is the first step to creating mutual understanding and respect among civilians and military personnel. It’s one of the many steps that collectively contribute towards building a lasting peace in South Sudan,” he explains.

    The Wau general court martial is expected to hear a total of 28 cases, 15 of which relate to serious crimes such as rape and murder. These proceedings will conclude on 6 July, with judgments and sentencing, followed by a civilian-military dialogue on 7 July to reinforce public understanding of the process and promote trust between communities and the armed forces.

    Distributed by APO Group on behalf of United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS).

    MIL OSI Africa –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: EIB backs new military base in Lithuania with €540 million loan

    Source: European Investment Bank

    • EIB approves €540 million loan for Lithuanian military base in Rūdninkai to strengthen NATO defence capabilities.
    • Base near border with Belarus to host German military brigade, feature training, medical and housing facilities.
    • EIB financing reflects commitment to European security and defence.

    The European Investment Bank (EIB) plans to lend €540 million for Lithuania to build a military base south of the capital Vilnius, highlighting Europe’s collective commitment to bolster its defence infrastructure and deterrence capacity. The new base in Rūdninkai will host a German brigade, strengthening the rapid-response capabilities of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the region.

    Construction of the Rūdninkai military site, which will be located 35 kilometres from the border with Belarus, is due to begin in 2026. The project will span 170 hectares, lay out 11 kilometres of roads and feature around 150 buildings including medical centres, residential units, training facilities, warehouses, hangars and helipads.

    “This is a landmark step in how we support Europe’s security,” EIB Group President Nadia Calviño said in Luxembourg where she met Lithuanian Finance Minister Rimantas Šadžius. “By financing large-scale military infrastructure, we’re demonstrating our readiness to meet the region’s evolving defence needs. It reflects the EIB’s growing role in safeguarding stability across the European Union.”

    The initiative is strategically important for NATO’s eastern defence. Rūdninkai is near a narrow corridor that represents the only land route between the Baltic states and the rest of NATO as well as of the EU. The corridor, known as the Suwałki Gap, is bordered by Belarus to the southeast and Russia’s Kaliningrad exclave to the northwest.

    The financing from the EIB is part of its recently expanded scope of activities in the areas of security and defence to include military investments that align with the EU’s goals of bolstering preparedness and crisis management. The approved EIB loan will be to private partners to be selected by the Lithuanian Ministry of Defence to carry out the project.

    “I greatly appreciate the invaluable expertise and financial support from the EIB in implementing the Rūdninkai project that will strengthen Lithuania’s defense capabilities,” said Lithuanian Finance Minister Šadžius. “We are already seeing the results of financial diplomacy and we can confidently state that the EIB’s involvement will contribute not only to Lithuania’s debt sustainability and stronger fiscal stance but also to the security of our country.”

    The EIB Board of Directors approved the €540 million loan at a meeting on 19 June in Luxembourg. The endorsement paves the way for legal and financial negotiations over the loan that are expected to be completed in the coming months. 

    “This investment marks a historic milestone for Lithuania’s national security and NATO’s collective defence,” said Lithuanian Minister of National Defence Dovilė Šakalienė. “The Rūdninkai military base will not only strengthen our defence posture but also serve as a permanent home for the German brigade – a cornerstone of NATO’s deterrence in the region. The EIB’s support is a clear sign that European resilience begins with shared responsibility.”

    The EIB backing for the Rūdninkai military site will help spread the costs of the project, easing the burden on Lithuanian finances and on companies involved in an initiative that takes the form of a public-private partnership (PPP). The EIB is also providing advisory services to ensure that the PPP agreements meet market standards and follow best practices.

    The Rūdninkai base will accommodate around 4,000 German troops and 750 civilian personnel.

    In April 2025 Germany activated the 45th Panzer Brigade of the German Armed Forces (Bundeswehr), also known as the Lithuania Brigade. For Germany, it`s the first brigade-sized unit to be based abroad permanently since World War II.

    Background information   

    EIB Group

    The European Investment Bank (ElB) is the long-term lending institution of the European Union, owned by its Member States. Built around eight core priorities, the EIB finances investments that contribute to EU policy objectives by bolstering climate action and the environment, digitalisation and technological innovation, security and defence, cohesion, agriculture and the bioeconomy, social infrastructure, the capital markets union and a stronger Europe in a more peaceful and prosperous world.  

    The EIB Group, which also includes the European Investment Fund (EIF), signed nearly €89 billion in new financing for over 900 high-impact projects in 2024, boosting Europe’s competitiveness and security.    

    The EIB Group stepped up its support to Europe’s security and defence industry by expanding the scope of projects eligible for financing and setting up a one-stop shop to streamline processes, doubling investment to €1 billion in 2024. The EIB Group expects to multiply this amount in 2025 to new record.

    The Board of Directors in March approved a series of additional measures to further contribute to European peace and included peace and security as a cross-cutting Public Policy Goal to finance large-scale strategic projects in areas such as land-border protection, military mobility, critical infrastructure, military transport, space, cybersecurity, anti-jamming technologies, radar systems, military equipment and facilities, drones, bio-hazard and seabed infrastructure protection, critical raw materials and research. 

    High-quality, up-to-date photos of the EIB Group’s headquarters for media use are available here. 

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI NGOs: Iran: Growing fears over torture and executions of individuals accused of ‘espionage’ for Israel

    Source: Amnesty International –

    The Iranian authorities must halt all plans to carry out arbitrary executions and protect all those arrested over accusations of espionage for Israel from enforced disappearance, torture and other ill-treatment, Amnesty International said today.

    Since Israel’s attacks on Iran began on 13 June, Iranian authorities have arrested scores of people over accusations of “collaboration” with Israel, made chilling calls for expedited trials and executions, and executed one man on 16 June.

    There are also grave concerns for those who were already on death row, including at least eight men sentenced to death for such accusations following unfair trials.

    “Official calls for expediated trials and executions of those arrested for alleged collaboration with Israel show how the Iranian authorities weaponize the death penalty to assert control and instil fear among the people of Iran. The authorities must ensure all those detained are protected from enforced disappearance, torture and other ill-treatment, and afforded fair trials at all times, including during armed conflict,” said Hussein Baoumi, Deputy Regional Director for the Middle East and North Africa at Amnesty International.

    “The death penalty is the ultimate cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment and it should not be used under any circumstances. Its use for espionage or other related offences that do not involve intentional killing is particularly prohibited under international law. A rush to execute people after torture-tainted ‘confessions’ and grossly unfair trials would be a horrifying abuse of power and a blatant assault on the right to life. The authorities must immediately halt all plans to carry out further executions or to impose death sentences and urgently establish a moratorium on all executions.”

    The authorities must ensure all those detained are protected from enforced disappearance, torture and other ill-treatment, and afforded fair trials at all times, including during armed conflict

    Hussein Baoumi, Deputy Regional Director for MENA

    Alarming calls for expedited trials and executions

    Fears of arbitrary executions have mounted following alarming official statements,reviewed by Amnesty International, announcing scores of arrests across the country for alleged “espionage” or “collaboration” with Israel, along with orders for expedited trials and executions.

    On 15 June, the Head of Iran’s Judiciary, Gholamhossein Mohseni Eje’i, instructed the country’s Prosecutor General and provincial prosecutors to punish “elements who disturb the peace and security of the people” or “collaborate” with Israel. He said expedited proceedings will “deter” people and ordered individuals be tried, convicted, and punished “extremely quickly.”

    The same day, the Supreme Council of National Security, Iran’s highest decision-making body, announced that so-called actions “in favour of Israel would be met with a decisive response and the harshest punishment” of execution under the charges of “enmity against God” (moharebeh) and “corruption on earth” (efsad fel-arz), which incur the death penalty under Iranian law.

    The statement explained that the actions, which the Supreme Council of National Security deems as falling under these two capital charges, include efforts to: “legitimize or sanitize the image of the Zionist regime”; “disseminate rumors or false information”; “incite or encourage individuals or groups to act against national security”; or “sow division among the segments of society, ethnicities, and religious sects of the country”.

    The statement underscores long-standing concerns about the overly broad charges of “enmity against God” (moharebeh) and “corruption on earth” (efsad fel-arz), which under Iranian law permit use of the death penalty to punish the exercise of the right to freedom of expression, which should never be criminalized, and for internationally recognizable offences such as espionage that, while criminal, do not meet the threshold of “most serious crimes” involving intentional killing required under international law for the application of the death penalty.

    On 17 June 2025, Iran’s parliament also approved a motion to fast-track a bill which facilitates greater use of the death penalty for “espionage” or “cooperation with hostile governments”, including Israel and the United States. Currently, the punishment for the charge of espionage is imprisonment; therefore, to pursue the death penalty, prosecutors must combine various different acts to argue that they collectively amount to “corruption on earth” (efsad fel-arz). Under this bill, “espionage” or “cooperation with hostile governments” will automatically fall under the charge of “corruption on earth” (efsad fel-arz) and incur the death penalty.

    Given the Iranian authorities’ long and harrowing record of violating the rights of those detained on national security charges, Amnesty International renews its urgent calls on them to ensure that all those recently arrested are protected from enforced disappearance, torture and other ill-treatment. All people deprived of their liberty must be granted access to lawyers of their choosing from the time of arrest and provided fair trials in line with international law, without resort to the death penalty. Those detained for their peaceful exercise of the right to freedom of expression must be released immediately and unconditionally.

    Heightened risk of execution for those already on death row

    Following the execution of one man, Esmail Fekri, on 16 June, in Ghezel Hesar prison in Karaj, Alborz province, after a grossly unfair trial, Amnesty International is concerned that in a misguided attempt to project strength, the authorities may execute at least eight other individuals sentenced to death in separate cases on accusations of espionage or collaboration with Israel following grossly unfair trials.

    Amongst them is Swedish-Iranian academic Ahmadreza Djalali, held in Tehran’s Evin prison, who has been arbitrarily detained since 2016. A Revolutionary Court sentenced him to death for “corruption on earth” (efsad-e fel-arz) in October 2017 following a grossly unfair trial based on forced “confessions” made under torture and other ill-treatment, including threats to execute him and kill or otherwise harm his family.

    Others at risk include Afshin Ghorbani Meyshani, Azad Shojaei, Edris Aali, and Iraqi national Rasoul Ahmad Rasoul, all held in Urumieh Central prison, West Azerbaijan province; Mohammad Amin Mahdavi Shayesteh, held in Ghezal Hesar prison, Alborz province; Rouzbeh Vadi, held in Evin prison, Tehran province; and Shahin Basami, held in Adel Abad prison, Fars province.

    Ahmadreza Djalali, Afshin Ghorbani Mishani, Azad Shojaie, Edris Aali, and Mohammad Amin Mahdavi Shayesteh are all at imminent risk of execution as the Supreme Court has upheld their death sentences.

    Amnesty International opposes the death penalty without exception, regardless of who is accused, the nature or circumstances of the crime, guilt or innocence, or the method of execution.

    Background

    Since the escalation of hostilities between Israel and Iran began on 13 June, at least 224 people have been killed in Iran, including 74 women and children according to an Iranian government spokesperson. Meanwhile, at least 24 people, including women and children, have been killed in Israel, according to the Israeli Military Home Front.

    MIL OSI NGO –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – 2023 and 2024 reports on Montenegro – P10_TA(2025)0130 – Wednesday, 18 June 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Montenegro, of the other part(1), which entered into force on 1 May 2010,

    –  having regard to Montenegro’s application for membership of the European Union of 15 December 2008,

    –  having regard to the Commission opinion of 9 November 2010 on Montenegro’s application for membership of the European Union (COM(2010)0670), the European Council’s decision of 16-17 December 2010 to grant Montenegro candidate status and the European Council’s decision of 29 June 2012 to open EU accession negotiations with Montenegro,

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1529 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 September 2021 establishing the Instrument for Pre-Accession assistance (IPA III)(2),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1449 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans(3),

    –  having regard to the Presidency conclusions of the Thessaloniki European Council meeting of 19-20 June 2003,

    –  having regard to the Sofia Declaration of the EU-Western Balkans summit of 17 May 2018 and the Sofia Priority Agenda annexed thereto,

    –  having regard to the declarations of the EU-Western Balkans summits of 13 December 2023 in Brussels, and of 18 December 2024 in Brussels,

    –  having regard to the Berlin Process launched on 28 August 2014,

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 6 October 2020 entitled ‘An Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2020)0641),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘2023 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy’ (COM(2023)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Montenegro 2023 Report’ (SWD(2023)0694),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘New growth plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2023)0691),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 20 March 2024 on pre-enlargement reforms and policy reviews (COM(2024)0146),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 24 July 2024 entitled ‘2024 Rule of Law Report’ (COM(2024)0800), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘2024 Rule of Law Report – The rule of law situation in the European Union: Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Montenegro’ (SWD(2024)0829),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘2024 Communication on EU enlargement policy’ (COM(2024)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Montenegro 2024 Report’ (SWD(2024)0694),

    –  having regard to the Commission’s overview and country assessments of 31 May 2023 and of 13 June 2024 of the economic reform programme of Montenegro, and to the joint conclusions of the Economic and Financial Dialogue between the EU and the Western Balkans and Türkiye adopted by the Council on 16 May 2023 and to the joint conclusions of the Economic and Financial Dialogue between the EU and the Western Balkans Partners, Türkiye, Georgia, Republic of Moldova and Ukraine adopted by the Council on 14 May 2024,

    –  having regard to the EU-Montenegro Intergovernmental Accession Conferences of 22 June 2021, 13 December 2021, 29 January 2024, 26 June 2024 and 16 December 2024,

    –  having regard to the 11th EU-Montenegro Stabilisation and Association Council on 14 July 2022,

    –  having regard to the declaration and recommendations adopted at the 22nd meeting of the EU-Montenegro Stabilisation and Association Parliamentary Committee, held on 31 October and 1 November 2024,

    –  having regard to Montenegro’s accession to NATO on 5 June 2017,

    –  having regard to Special Report 01/2022 of the European Court of Auditors of 10 January 2022 entitled ‘EU support for the rule of law in the Western Balkans: despite efforts, fundamental problems persist’,

    –  having regard to the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (the Istanbul Convention), ratified by Montenegro in 2013, and to the recommendations of the Commission on gender equality and combating gender-based violence,

    –  having regard to the World Press Freedom Index report published annually by Reporters Without Borders,

    –  having regard to the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) data on the Ukraine Refugee Situation as of April 2025,

    –  having regard to its recommendation of 23 November 2022 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy concerning the new EU strategy for enlargement(4),

    –  having regard to its previous resolutions on Montenegro,

    –  having regard to its resolution of 29 February 2024 on deepening EU integration in view of future enlargement(5),

    –  having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0093/2025),

    A.  whereas enlargement is a key EU foreign policy tool and a strategic geopolitical investment in peace, stability, security and prosperity;

    B.  whereas the new enlargement momentum, sparked by the changing geopolitical reality and the EU membership applications by several Eastern Partnership countries, has prompted the EU to accelerate its efforts towards delivering on its long-overdue commitments to the Western Balkans; whereas the future of the Western Balkan countries lies within the EU;

    C.  whereas each country is judged on its own merits in fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria, including full respect for democracy, the rule of law, good governance, fundamental EU values and alignment with EU foreign and security policy; whereas the implementation of necessary reforms in the area of ‘fundamentals’ determines the timetable and progress in the accession process;

    D.  whereas Montenegro has gone furthest in the accession process, with all 33 chapters of the EU acquis open and six provisionally closed, and has significant public support therefor;

    E.  whereas the EU is Montenegro’s largest trading partner, investor and provider of financial assistance;

    F.  whereas Montenegro is exposed to malign foreign influence, disinformation campaigns and other forms of influence, including election meddling, hybrid warfare strategies and unfavourable investments from non-EU actors, particularly Russia and China, which are trying to influence Montenegro’s political, economic and strategic trajectory and threaten democratic processes and media integrity, jeopardising the country’s prospects for EU accession;

    G.  whereas on 8 June 2024, an ‘All-Serb Assembly’ took place in Belgrade with the participation of high-ranking parliamentarians under the slogan ‘One people, one Assembly’;

    Commitment to EU accession

    1.  Recognises Montenegro’s firm commitment to EU accession and reaffirms its full support for the country’s future EU membership; welcomes Montenegro’s leading regional position in the EU accession process as well as the overwhelming support of Montenegro’s citizens and the majority of political actors for joining the EU in 2028;

    2.  Welcomes Montenegro’s positive progress in enacting EU-related reforms and measures, underpinned by an ambitious timeline and calls for collective efforts of political actors, civil society and citizens; commends Montenegro for meeting the interim benchmarks for Chapters 23 and 24, which continue to determine the overall pace of negotiations, and for receiving a positive Interim Benchmark Assessment Report; welcomes the closure of three more negotiating chapters, bringing the total to six;

    3.  Encourages all political actors to stay focused on EU integration and the required reforms; stresses the need for political stability, commitment and constructive engagement in consensus building across party lines in order to move swiftly and more effectively towards closing additional chapters in 2025, so as to achieve the country’s ambitious timeline; stresses that the reforms adopted must be implemented effectively and consistently to ensure genuine progress and full alignment with EU legislation; calls for a strengthening of the functioning of, and coordination between, state institutions in order to achieve political stability and advance the country’s substantial progress in implementing key EU-related reforms, in particular electoral and judicial reforms and the fight against organised crime and corruption;

    4.  Underlines that the credibility of the EU, including its enlargement policy as a whole, would be affected if tangible progress achieved by certain Western Balkan countries does not translate into clear advancements on the EU accession path;

    5.  Welcomes Montenegro’s sustained full alignment with the EU’s common foreign and security policy (CFSP), including EU restrictive measures, inter alia, those related to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and those targeted against cyberattacks, as well as its support for the international rules-based order at UN level; encourages Montenegro to strengthen the enforcement of restrictive measures and avoid their circumvention and to seize the assets of those sanctioned; calls on all government representatives to respect and promote CFSP alignment and EU values and refrain from any activities that may threaten Montenegro’s strategic path towards EU membership and its sovereignty; is highly concerned, in this context, by public high officials’ statements in support of the President of the Republika Srpska entity, Milorad Dodik, who is undermining the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina; regrets the participation of high-ranking parliamentarians from Montenegro in the ‘All-Serbian Assembly’ in Belgrade as well as their support for the declaration adopted on that occasion undermining the sovereignty of Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo;

    6.  Underlines the strategic importance of Montenegro’s NATO membership and welcomes its active involvement in EU common security and defence policy missions and operations, such as EU Naval Force Operation Atalanta, and in NATO and other international and multilateral missions; welcomes the decision of Montenegro’s Council for Defence and Security to approve the participation of its armed forces in the EU Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine and NATO’s Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine and calls on the Montenegrin Parliament to adopt these decisions, thereby reinforcing the country’s commitment to collective security;

    7.  Commends Montenegro for its humanitarian and material support to Ukraine and for extending the temporary protection mechanism that grants persons fleeing Ukraine the right to stay in Montenegro for one year; recalls that Montenegro is among the Western Balkan countries hosting the largest number of Ukrainian refugees, with over 18 800 refugees from Ukraine registered in Montenegro as of 31 January 2025, according to UNHCR statistics;

    8.  Remains seriously concerned by malign foreign interference, destabilisation efforts, cyberattacks, hybrid threats and disinformation campaigns, including attempts to influence political processes and public opinion, by third-country actors, which discredit the EU and undermine Montenegro’s progress on its accession path; urges Montenegro to adopt countermeasures in stronger cooperation with the EU and NATO and through increased regional cooperation among the Western Balkan countries; notes that religious institutions can be used as a tool for external influence and condemns any undue interference by the Serbian Orthodox Church in this regard; reiterates the importance of building resilience capacity against foreign information manipulation and interference, including through greater oversight of the media landscape, public awareness campaigns and media literacy programmes; recommends that Montenegro establish a dedicated hybrid threat task force;

    9.  Urges the Commission, the European External Action Service (EEAS), the Delegation of the EU to Montenegro and the Montenegrin authorities to boost strategic communication to Montenegrin citizens on the benefits of the enlargement process and EU membership, as well as on the concrete accession criteria that Montenegro still needs to fulfil to align with EU requirements; urges them, furthermore, to improve the EU’s visibility in the country, including as regards EU-funded projects; calls for StratCom monitoring to be expanded in order to concentrate on cross-border disinformation threats in the Western Balkan countries and their neighbours; calls on the Commission to further support the efforts of the EEAS and the Western Balkans Task Force so as to expand outreach activities by increasing visibility in local media, fact-checking reports and partnering with civil society organisations to counter false narratives more effectively;

    10.  Welcomes the Montenegrin Parliament’s renewed engagement in the Stabilisation and Association Parliamentary Committee;

    Democracy and the rule of law

    11.  Recognises the Montenegrin Parliament’s key role in the accession process, notably as regards passing accession-related legislation, and underlines the importance of parliamentary cooperation in this regard; reiterates the European Parliament’s readiness to use its political and technical resources to advance the EU-related reform agenda, including through democracy support activities; notes, with concern, the re-emerging tensions and ethnic polarisation, which are slowing the reform process; calls for constructive dialogue and consensus building across the political spectrum, prioritising legislative quality, and strongly urges that solutions be found through parliamentary dialogue; calls for preventing identity politics from diverting attention from the EU agenda or straining relations with its neighbours, ensuring that Montenegro remains firmly on the EU path; welcomes the agreement between the Montenegrin Prime Minister and opposition leaders to request an opinion from the Venice Commission regarding the termination of the mandate of Constitutional Court judge Dragana Đuranović and for the opposition to return to the parliament;

    12.  Expresses its concern about attempts to amend the law on Montenegrin citizenship in the Montenegrin Parliament, which could have serious and long-term implications for the country’s decision-making processes and identity, while emphasising that any discussions on identity politics must be handled with the utmost sensitivity to avoid further polarisation and should aim for broad societal consensus; encourages the Montenegrin authorities to consult and coordinate with the EU on any possible changes to the law on citizenship and stresses the importance of achieving consensus on any matters relating to this subject of crucial importance for the identity and independence of Montenegro;

    13.  Strongly encourages the Montenegrin Parliament to hold inclusive and transparent public consultations and regular and meaningful engagement with civil society in decision-making from an early stage in the legislative process, notably for key legislation in the EU reform process; encourages a more active role for the Montenegrin Parliamentary Women’s Club;

    14.  Calls on Montenegro to fully align its electoral legal framework with EU standards, notably as regards harmonising electoral legislation, voting and candidacy rights restrictions, transparency, dispute resolution mechanisms, campaign and media oversight, and political party and election campaign financing, and to implement the recommendations of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights(6); urges Montenegro to increase transparency and control of political party spending and prevent the abuse of state resources by bringing the relevant legislation into line with EU standards, as well as enhancing the enforcement of third-party financing rules and strengthening sanctions for violations; highlights the role of the Agency for Prevention of Corruption (APC) in this regard, and calls for increased cooperation between the APC and financial intelligence authorities to detect and prevent foreign influence in political campaigns; calls, furthermore, on Montenegro to implement the recommendations of the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) on gender parity on electoral lists;

    15.  Reiterates its call on the Montenegrin authorities to establish a single nationwide municipal election day, as provided for in the Law on Local Self-Government, in order to enhance governance efficiency, reduce political tensions and strengthen the stability and effectiveness of municipal and state institutions; recalls that future disbursement of funds under the Reform and Growth Facility is contingent on the fulfilment of this reform, in line with Montenegro’s commitments in its reform agenda, and should be pursued as a matter of priority; welcomes the fact that, in 2022, elections in 14 municipalities were held on the same day; calls for a robust legislative framework in this regard; is concerned by the misconduct of the electoral process in the municipality of Šavnik;

    16.  Calls on the Montenegrin authorities to adopt the Law on Government that should enable an improved governance framework and the optimisation of public administration;

    17.  Underlines the importance of a professional, merit-based, transparent and depoliticised civil service; calls on Montenegro to amend and implement the relevant legislation to provide a framework for the professionalisation, optimisation and rationalisation of state administration, including procedural safeguards against politically motivated decisions on appointments and dismissals, as well as high standards for managerial positions; regrets the lack of significant progress in adopting and effectively implementing such legislation and highlights that this allows for public service recruitment to remain subject to political influence;

    18.  Welcomes Montenegro’s inclusion in the Commission’s 2024 Rule of Law Report; notes, with concern, the identified deficiencies, including judicial appointments and the independence of the prosecutor’s office;

    19.  Welcomes the progress made in implementing key judicial reforms, adopting a new strategic framework and completing long-outstanding judicial appointments; calls on Montenegro to fill the remaining high-level judicial positions;

    20.  Urges Montenegro to further align its legal framework, including the constitution, in particular on the composition and decision-making process of the Judicial Council, with EU laws and standards on the independence, accountability, impartiality, integrity and professionalism of the judiciary, and to further depoliticise appointments to bolster independence, implement outstanding international recommendations, and determine criteria for the retirement of judges and prosecutors in line with European standards and in full compliance with the Constitution; regrets the pending case backlog and calls on Montenegro to take measures to reduce the duration of legal proceedings, particularly for serious and organised crime cases, notably on money laundering; recommends that Montenegro adopt the amendments to the Constitution in the final stage of the country’s EU accession negotiations;

    21.  Notes the steps taken in the fight against corruption, including new laws and provisions on the protection of whistleblowers, the creation of a new National Council for the fight against corruption and a new anti-corruption strategy for 2024-2028; encourages Montenegro to further align with the EU acquis and EU standards and address recommendations by the Commission, the Venice Commission and the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO); encourages the Montenegrin authorities to continue addressing existing deficiencies in the handling of organised crime cases and the seizure and confiscation of criminal assets;

    22.  Urges Montenegro to step up its criminal justice response to high-level corruption, including by strengthening the effective enforcement of existing criminal legislation and imposing effective and deterrent penalties, and to create conditions for judicial institutions and independent bodies dealing with corruption to function effectively, free from political influence;

    23.  Notes the work of the Agency for Prevention of Corruption and calls for it to be provided with sufficient funding and for it to be depoliticised; expects the Agency to deliver tangible results and act non-selectively to strengthen its integrity and enhance its authority in carrying out its competences effectively; calls for a stronger corruption prevention framework;

    24.  Urges Montenegro to align its weapons legislation with EU law and international standards, particularly as regards technical standards for firearm markings, deactivation procedures and regulations for alarm and signal weapons, as well as to establish a standardised and effective data collection and reporting system for firearms; is appalled by the tragic mass shooting in Cetinje and expresses its condolences to the victims’ families; expresses its concern over the exploitation of this tragedy for disinformation and ethnic polarisation; urges Montenegro to strengthen its crisis communication to counter disinformation and ensure responsible media reporting in the aftermath of violent incidents; calls for systematic actions in the areas of security, mental well-being and institutional transparency, as well as in civic education and public awareness, outreach and educational initiatives, on the dangers and risks of firearms, in line with citizens’ expectations and societal needs;

    25.  Calls on Montenegro to urgently fully align its visa policy with that of the EU, especially as regards countries posing irregular migration or security risks to the EU; expresses its concern that, contrary to expectations, two additional countries have been added to the visa-free regime and that Russian and Belarusian passport holders continue to benefit from a visa-free regime; notes that the harmonisation of the visa policy is also provided for in Montenegro’s reform agenda under the Reform and Growth Facility;

    26.  Welcomes the ongoing cooperation between Montenegro and the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex), Europol, Eurojust and the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training (CEPOL), and notes the importance of this cooperation in tackling cross-border crime, including the trafficking of weapons, drugs and human beings, and in combating terrorism and extremism; welcomes the entry into force of the upgraded agreement on operational cooperation in border management with Frontex on 1 July 2023 and encourages further cooperation between Montenegro and Frontex to strengthen border management, support asylum procedures, fight smuggling and enhance readmission;

    Fundamental freedoms and human rights

    27.  Regrets that the most vulnerable groups in society still face discrimination; calls on Montenegro to adopt a new anti-discrimination law and relevant strategies, through an inclusive, transparent and meaningful process that actively involves those most affected, to improve vulnerable groups’ access to rights; underlines that respect for the rights of all national minorities is an integral part of the EU acquis; calls for stronger implementation to ensure equal treatment of all ethnic, religious, national and social groups so that they are guaranteed equal rights and opportunities and can fully participate in social, political and economic life;

    28.  Welcomes Montenegro’s multi-ethnic identity and calls for the further promotion of and respect for the languages, cultural heritage and traditions of local communities and national minorities, as this is closely intertwined with Montenegro’s European perspective;

    29.  Underlines the multi-ethnic identity of the Bay of Kotor; stresses that Montenegro’s European perspective is closely intertwined with the protection of minorities and their cultural heritage; calls on the Montenegrin authorities to nurture the multi-ethnic nature of the state, including the traditions and cultural heritage of the Croatian community in the Bay of Kotor;

    30.  Expresses its grave concern over the endangered heritage sites in Montenegro such as the Bay of Kotor and Sveti Stefan; stresses that Sveti Stefan, along with Miločer Park, was listed among the ‘7 Most Endangered heritage sites in Europe’ for 2023;

    31.  Calls on the Montenegrin authorities to address the difficult living conditions of Roma people in Montenegro and the discrimination they face, and calls for more measures to promote intercultural understanding in schools; calls on the Montenegrin authorities to also take measures to improve the climate of societal inclusion for LGBTI persons;

    32.  Welcomes that Montenegro has aligned its legislative and institutional framework with the EU acquis and international human rights standards regarding compliance with the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and its optional protocols; urges the authorities to address shortcomings in implementation, namely related to accountability and monitoring;

    33.  Calls for the effective implementation of strategies to uphold the rights of persons with disabilities across all sectors and policies;

    34.  Condemns all hate speech, including online and gender-based hate speech, and hate crimes; welcomes the criminalisation of racism and hate speech;

    35.  Emphasises the need to strengthen institutional mechanisms for gender quality and calls on the Montenegrin authorities to address the gender pay gap, to improve women’s participation in decision-making – in both the public domain, particularly public administration, and judicial and security sectors, and in business – to ensure the increased political participation of women, to introduce gender responsive budgeting, and to combat gender stereotypes and strengthen efforts to combat discrimination against women, particularly in rural areas; welcomes recent efforts aimed at boosting women’s representation in science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) and encourages further efforts in technology sectors;

    36.  Is deeply concerned by the high rates of gender-based violence, including domestic violence and femicide; calls on Montenegro to fully align its definitions of gender-based violence and domestic violence with the Istanbul Convention, and with recommendations of international bodies, and to set up effective protection and prevention mechanisms and support centres, and ensure effective judicial follow-up for victims of domestic and sexual violence as well as a more robust penal policy towards perpetrators; calls for the collection of disaggregated data on gender-based violence and gender disparities to improve policy responses;

    37.  Regrets that the draft law on legal gender recognition was not adopted in 2024, despite it being a measure under Montenegro’s EU accession programme; urges Montenegro to adopt the law without delay;

    38.  Welcomes Montenegro’s new media laws and its strategy for media policy aimed at strengthening the legal framework to effectively protect journalists and other media workers; insists on a zero-tolerance policy with regard to pressure on, harassment of, or violence against journalists, particularly by public figures; underlines the need for effective investigations, the prosecution of all instances of hate speech, smear campaigns and strategic lawsuits against journalists, and follow-up of past cases; stresses the need to ensure journalists’ rights to access information and maintain a critical stance; notes a significant improvement in Montenegro’s press freedom, demonstrated by its progress on the World Press Freedom Index;

    39.  Expresses its concern over cases where journalists, academics and civil society organisations have faced pressure for exercising free speech, including instances where the police have initiated misdemeanour proceedings against them; is concerned by the use of strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs) to target journalists;

    40.  Regrets the prevailing high level of polarisation in the media and its vulnerability to political interests and foreign influence as well as foreign and domestic disinformation campaigns that spread narratives that negatively impact democratic processes in the country and endanger Montenegro’s European perspective; calls on Montenegro to further develop improved media literacy programmes and include them as a core subject in education; calls on the Montenegrin authorities to ensure the editorial, institutional and financial independence of the public service broadcaster RTCG, as well as the legality of the appointment of its management and full respect for court rulings concerning RTCG; recalls that it needs to comply with the law and the highest standards of accountability and integrity; regrets that the independence of public media is being weakened and undermined; calls on all media entities to comply with legal requirements on public funding transparency;

    41.  Welcomes the publication of the 2023 population census results; calls on the authorities to avoid any politicisation of the process; encourages stakeholders to use these results in a non-discriminatory manner;

    42.  Welcomes Montenegro’s vibrant and constructive civil society and underlines its importance in fostering democracy and pluralism and in promoting good governance and social progress; expresses its concern over the shrinking space for civil society organisations with a critical stance, and condemns all smear campaigns, intimidation and attacks against civil society organisations, notably by political figures in the context of proposals for a ‘foreign agent law’; notes that such laws have the potential to undermine fundamental freedoms and the functioning of civil society and are inconsistent with EU values and standards; calls for a supportive legal framework and clear and fair selection criteria in relation to public funding; calls for the Council for Cooperation between the Government and non-governmental organisations to resume work; underlines the importance of building collaborative relationships and genuinely consulting civil society on draft legislation from an early stage onwards;

    Reconciliation, good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation

    43.  Recalls that good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation are essential elements of the enlargement process; commends Montenegro’s active involvement in regional cooperation initiatives; recalls that good neighbourly relations are key for advancing in the accession process;

    44.  Regrets that Chapter 31 could not be closed in December 2024; calls on all engaged parties to find solutions to outstanding bilateral issues in a constructive and neighbourly manner and prioritise the future interests of citizens in the Western Balkans; recalls that using unresolved bilateral and regional disputes to block candidate countries’ accession processes should be avoided; welcomes bilateral consultations between the Republic of Croatia and Montenegro on the status of unresolved bilateral issues; encourages the authorities to continue pursuing confidence-building measures;

    45.  Notes Montenegro’s amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code to address legal and practical obstacles to the effective investigation, prosecution, trial and punishment of war crimes in line with relevant recommendations; calls on Montenegro to apply a proactive approach to handling war crimes cases, in line with international law and standards, to identify, prosecute and punish the perpetrators and the glorification of war crimes and ensure access to, and delivery of justice, redress and reparations for victims, and clarify the fate of missing persons; calls on Montenegro to allocate sufficient resources to specialised prosecutors and courts and proactively investigate all war crime allegations and raise issues of command responsibility, as well as to review past cases that were not prosecuted in line with international or domestic law; calls for regional cooperation in the investigation and prosecution of individuals indicted for war crimes; recognises that addressing these issues and safeguarding court-based facts are an important foundation for trust, democratic values, reconciliation and strengthening bilateral relations with neighbouring countries, and encourages Montenegro to step up these efforts;

    46.  Warns against the dangers of political revisionism, which distorts historical facts for political purposes, undermines accountability and deepens societal divisions; strongly condemns the glorification of war criminals and widespread public denial of international verdicts for war crimes, including by the Montenegrin authorities; considers that President Jakov Milatović’s statement expressing regret over the participation of Montenegrin forces in the bombardment of the city of Dubrovnik was a valuable contribution to regional peace and reconciliation;

    47.  Reiterates its support for the initiative to establish the Regional Commission for the establishment of facts about war crimes and other gross human rights violations on the territory of the former Yugoslavia (RECOM);

    48.  Reiterates its call for the archives that concern the former republics of Yugoslavia to be opened and for access to be granted to the files of the former Yugoslav Secret Service and the Yugoslav People’s Army Secret Service in order to thoroughly research and address communist-era crimes;

    Socio-economic reforms

    49.  Welcomes Montenegro’s inclusion in SEPA payment schemes, lowering costs for citizens and businesses; underlines that this opens up opportunities for business expansion, increased competitiveness, innovation and improved access to foreign direct investments;

    50.  Welcomes the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans, which aims to integrate the region into the EU’s single market, promote regional economic cooperation and deepen EU-related reforms, and which includes the EUR 6 billion Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans; welcomes Montenegro’s adoption of a reform agenda and encourages its full implementation; notes that the implementation of the defined reform measures under Montenegro’s reform agenda for the Growth Plan would provide access to over EUR 380 million in grants and favourable loans, subject to successful implementation; stresses the importance of inclusive stakeholder consultations, including local and regional authorities, social partners and civil society, in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation phases;

    51.  Encourages Montenegro to make best use of all EU funding available under the Pre-accession Assistance Instrument (IPA III), the Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans, the IPARD programme and the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans, to accelerate socio-economic convergence with the EU and further align its legislation with the EU on fraud prevention; recalls the conditionality of EU funding, which may be modulated or suspended in the event of significant regression or persistent lack of progress on fundamentals;

    52.  Calls for the EU and the Western Balkan countries to establish a framework for effective cooperation between the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) and the accession countries in order to facilitate close cooperation and the prosecution of the misuse of EU funds, including through the secondment of national liaison officers to the EPPO; encourages Montenegro to fully implement working arrangements with the EPPO; calls for the EU to make the necessary legal and political arrangements to extend the jurisdiction of the EPPO to EU funds devoted to Montenegro as a candidate country;

    53.  Positively notes Montenegro’s economic growth; calls for more steps to reduce the budget deficit and public debt, and to further remove indirect tax exemptions that do not align with the EU acquis; welcomes the efforts to reduce these fiscal vulnerabilities; reiterates the need for increased public investment in the education system for sustainable social and economic development;

    54.  Notes Montenegro’s public debt to foreign financial institutions and companies that can be used as a tool to influence its policy decisions, in particular those related to China and Russia; welcomes the efforts to reduce these vulnerabilities and calls on the authorities to further reduce economic dependence on China and to continue making use of the Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans, the EU Global Gateway initiative and the Reform and Growth Facility, with a view to finding greener and more transparent alternatives for financing infrastructure projects; calls on Montenegro to increase transparency in future infrastructure projects, ensure competitive bidding and avoid excessive debt dependence on foreign creditors;

    55.  Calls on the Montenegrin authorities to take measures to counter depopulation and emigration, in particular through investments in education and healthcare, especially in the north of the country, as well as through decentralisation by investing in medium-sized cities;

    56.  Encourages the Montenegrin authorities to boost the digital transformation and pursue evidence-based labour market policies to address the persistently high unemployment rate, in particular among women and young people, while bolstering institutional capacity and enhancing the underlying digital policy framework, and to effectively implement the Youth Guarantee and the new Youth Strategy; urges the authorities to address brain drain as a matter of urgency; encourages the development of targeted preventive measures and incentives to legalise informal businesses and employees, as a large informal sector continues to hinder economic and social development in Montenegro;

    57.  Welcomes the calls for the prompt integration of all Western Balkan countries into the EU’s digital single market before actual EU membership, which would crucially enable the creation of a digitally safe environment;

    58.  Calls for more transparency in public procurement, notably for procedures via intergovernmental agreements, and for full compliance with EU rules and principles; calls on Montenegro to reduce the number of public procurement procedures without notices; expresses its concern over the financial burden and lack of transparency surrounding the construction of the Bar-Boljare motorway financed by a Chinese loan; stresses that the secrecy surrounding loan agreements and construction contracts raises accountability concerns;

    59.  Expresses its concern over any agreements or projects that circumvent public procurement rules, transparency obligations and public consultation requirements, as set out in national legislation and EU standards; calls on the Government of Montenegro to ensure full respect for the principles of transparency, accountability, inclusive decision-making and the rule of law in all public infrastructure and development initiatives;

    Energy, the environment, biodiversity and connectivity

    60.  Urges Montenegro to advance the green transition, with the support of EU funding, improve its institutional and regulatory framework and enhance energy resilience by finally adopting and implementing the long-overdue National Energy and Climate Plan, adopting energy efficiency laws and integrating further with EU energy markets; calls for all new green transition projects to be implemented in line with EU standards on the environment, State aid and concessions;

    61.  Regrets the lack of progress on key sector reforms in the area of transport policy; calls on the Montenegrin authorities to align the country’s transport development with the Sustainable and Smart Mobility Strategy for the Western Balkans, focusing on railways, multimodality and reducing CO2 emissions and other environmental impacts, and to further implement its Transport Development Strategy and strengthen administrative capacities for the implementation of trans-European transport networks;

    62.  Welcomes the reduction of data roaming charges between the EU and the Western Balkan countries and calls on the authorities, private actors and all stakeholders to take all necessary steps towards the goal of bringing data roaming prices close to domestic prices by 2028; welcomes the entry into force of the first phase of the implementation of the roadmap for roaming between the Western Balkans and the EU;

    63.  Encourages the adoption of sectoral strategies for waste management, air and water quality, nature protection and climate change, ensuring strategic planning for investments; notes the lack of progress and associated rising costs in building essential waste water treatment plants to prevent sewage pollution in rivers and the sea in seven municipalities;

    o
    o   o

    64.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Commissioner for Enlargement, the Commissioner for the Mediterranean, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, and to the President, Government and Parliament of Montenegro, and to have it translated and published in Montenegrin.

    (1) OJ L 108, 29.4.2010, p. 3, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_internation/2010/224/oj.
    (2) OJ L 330, 20.9.2021, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1529/oj.
    (3) OJ L, 2024/1449, 24.5.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1449/oj.
    (4) OJ C 167, 11.5.2023, p. 105.
    (5) OJ C, C/2024/6746, 26.11.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6746/oj.
    (6) https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/montenegro.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – 2023 and 2024 reports on Moldova – P10_TA(2025)0131 – Wednesday, 18 June 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘2024 Communication on EU enlargement policy’ (COM(2024)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Republic of Moldova 2024 Report’ (SWD(2024)0698),

    –  having regard to the Commission opinion of 17 June 2022 on the application by the Republic of Moldova (hereinafter ‘Moldova’) for membership of the European Union (COM(2022)0406) and the joint staff working document of 6 February 2023 entitled ‘Association Implementation Report on the Republic of Moldova’ (SWD(2023)0041),

    –   having regard to Regulation (EU) 2025/535 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 March 2025 on establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Republic of Moldova(1),

    –  having regard to its previous resolutions on Moldova,

    –  having regard to the Commission analytical report of 1 February 2023 on Moldova’s alignment with the EU acquis (SWD(2023)0032),

    –  having regard to the proposal of 9 October 2024 for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Republic of Moldova (COM/2024/0469),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 9 October 2024 on the Moldova Growth Plan (COM/2024/0470),

    –  having regard to the Council conclusions of 17 December 2024 on enlargement,

    –  having regard to the visit of the delegation of the Committee on Foreign Affairs to Moldova on 25-27 February 2025,

    –  having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0096/2025),

    A.  whereas, following Moldova’s application for EU membership of 3 March 2022, the European Council granted it candidate status on 23 June 2022 and subsequently decided to open accession negotiations on 14 December 2023;

    B.  whereas in June 2024 negotiations on Moldova’s EU accession started;

    C.  whereas Moldova held a referendum on 20 October 2024, the outcome of which confirmed the embedding of EU accession into its Constitution, despite various forms of manipulative interference to destabilise the country, illicit financing of political actors, disinformation campaigns and cyberattacks;

    D.  whereas the Association Agreement(2), which includes a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (AA/DCFTA), remains the basis for political association and economic integration between the EU and Moldova, and a regular political and economic dialogue is ongoing between the two sides;

    Progress with EU accession-related reforms, in particular on the rule of law and governance

    1.  Commends Moldova’s exemplary commitment and steady progress with EU accession-related reforms despite significant internal and external challenges – such as Russia’s full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine – which made it possible for accession negotiations to start in June 2024, half a year after the relevant decision by the European Council on 14 December 2023 and less than two years after the country’s application for EU membership on 3 March 2022;

    2.  Recognises that EU-Moldova relations have entered into a new phase, with intensifying cooperation, gradual alignment across all policy areas of the EU acquis and advancement on the EU integration path; welcomes the progress achieved in the bilateral screening process since it started in July 2024 and the recent closing of screening for cluster 1 (fundamentals) and cluster 2 (internal market); commends and supports the ambition of the Moldovan Government to open negotiations on cluster 1 (fundamentals), cluster 2 (internal market) and cluster 6 (external relations) in the coming months, as well as completing the screening process for all clusters by the end of 2025; calls on the Commission to enhance its support to the Moldovan Government in order to ensure the successful achievement of these key objectives; encourages the Council to take a merit-based approach in its decisions on Moldova’s negotiation process; deplores the bilateralisation and instrumentalisation of the EU accession process, such as the opposition of the Hungarian Government to opening negotiations on clusters 1, 2 and 6, which has led to a delay and serves Russia’s objective of obstructing the European integration of the region;

    3.  Believes that Moldova’s capacity to consolidate its current progress with EU accession-related reforms and sustain the ambitious pace towards EU membership will require the strong and genuine support of a parliamentary majority after the elections in autumn 2025;

    4.  Notes that the outcomes of both the constitutional referendum on EU accession, held on 20 October 2024, and the presidential election, held on 20 October 2024 and 3 November 2024, confirmed the support of a majority of the people of Moldova for the country’s goal of EU membership and the required pro-EU reforms; underlines that this referendum and election were held professionally and with an extraordinary sense of duty and dedication, despite a massive hybrid campaign by Russia and its proxies which used various tools, such as the strategic exploitation of social media, AI-generated content, ‘leaks’ of fake documents, intimidation, which entailed various forms of manipulative interference to destabilise the country, illicit financing of political actors, vote-buying, including by Russia’s instrumentalisation of parts of the clergy from the Metropolis of Chisinau and All Moldova, disinformation campaigns and cyberattacks; recalls that these attacks had four key strategies: divide society, delegitimise institutions, discredit democratic actors and promote Russian influence; welcomes the outcome of the 2024 constitutional referendum which enshrined the commitment to joining the EU in the country’s constitution; strongly condemns the increasing attempts by Russia, pro-Russian oligarchs and Russian-sponsored local proxies to destabilise Moldova, sow divisions within Moldovan society and derail the country’s pro-EU direction through hybrid attacks, the instrumentalisation of energy supplies, disinformation, manipulation and intimidation campaigns targeting civil society organisations and independent media;

    5.  Notes that the upcoming parliamentary elections on 28 September 2025 will be of crucial importance for the continuation of Moldova’s pro-EU trajectory; is concerned about the likely intensification of foreign, in particular Russian, malign interference and hybrid attacks ahead of the elections; calls for the EU to increase its support, including financial and technical support, for the Moldovan Government’s efforts to counter such interference in the country’s democratic process, including through additional sanctions listings, an extension and consolidation of the mandate and resources of the EU Partnership Mission (EUPM) in Moldova and the granting of additional support thereto, and the sharing of expertise in foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), countering hybrid threats and strengthening resilience; calls similarly for an increase in efforts by the Moldovan authorities and the EU in support of independent media and pro-democracy civil society, in order to enable journalists at national and regional level to counter FIMI and to strengthen digital literacy;

    6.  Stresses the importance of strategic communication, debunking and combating false, Russia-promoted narratives about the EU and its policies and of highlighting the concrete short- and long-term benefits of EU accession for the people of all of Moldova, with a special focus on regions such as Gagauzia as well as socio-economically disadvantaged communities in rural areas; calls for the EU to step up its support for Moldova in this regard;

    Socio-economic reforms

    7.  Welcomes the Commission’s Moldova Growth Plan, which is aimed at supporting Moldova’s socio-economic and fundamental reforms and enhancing access to the EU’s single market; welcomes the Reform and Growth Facility for Moldova, which underpins the Growth Plan and is worth EUR 2,02 billion, making it the largest EU financial support package for Moldova since its independence; underlines that this facility provides Moldova with EUR 520 million in non-repayable support and a maximum amount of EUR 1,5 billion in loans, with an 18 % pre-financing rate, demonstrating the EU’s recognition of the urgency of supporting Moldova’s reforms and resilience; calls on the Commission to support the Moldovan authorities in implementing the necessary Reform Agenda for the effective absorption of funds from this facility, ensuring that the benefits of this support are promptly felt by Moldova’s citizens; looks forward to the announced impact assessment of the Reform and Growth Facility for Moldova in the form of a Commission staff working document within three months of the adoption of the corresponding regulation;

    8.  Calls on the Commission to include adequate dedicated pre-accession funds for Moldova in the EU’s next multiannual financial framework, and to begin preparing Moldova for the efficient use of future pre-accession funds as a newly designated EU candidate country;

    9.  Reiterates that the support of the people of Moldova for European integration can be strengthened with a tangible improvement in their livelihoods, by strengthening state institutions and public administration in order to use project funding effectively and to implement and enforce the EU acquis, ensuring a robust welfare system and fighting corruption and oligarchic influence and ensuring accountability; calls on the Moldovan authorities to continue to ensure the meaningful involvement of civil society organisations, diaspora, vulnerable groups and social partners, including trade unions, in order to strengthen trust in democratic institutions and processes and boost public support for EU accession-related reforms;

    10.  Stresses the importance of civil society organisations in monitoring governance and progress with EU-related reforms, promoting transparency, defending human rights and countering disinformation and external malign influence by anti-reform political actors and Russian proxies;

    11.  Calls for comprehensive social policy reforms to address poverty and persistent large-scale emigration, increase healthcare coverage, strengthen public education, improve working conditions and develop adequate social protection systems; emphasises that economic development must be inclusive and sustainable, with opportunities for small and medium-sized enterprises; stresses the need for targeted social investment in Moldova’s young people and rural areas to reduce regional disparities and safeguard social cohesion;

    12.  Calls for special emphasis on Moldova’s participation in EU social, educational, and cultural programmes in order to promote social convergence, innovation and technological advancement;

    13.  Calls on Moldova to implement the Reform Agenda, which outlines the key socio-economic and fundamental reforms to accelerate the growth and competitiveness of Moldova’s economy and its convergence with the EU on the basis of enhanced implementation of the AA/DCFTA;

    14.  Strongly calls for the acceleration of Moldova’s gradual integration into the EU and the single market by continuing to align its legal and regulatory framework with the EU acquis and associating the country to more EU programmes and initiatives, including through the granting of observer status to Moldovan officials and experts in relevant EU bodies, which would deliver tangible socio-economic benefits even before the country formally joins the EU; congratulates Moldova on its inclusion in the geographical scope of the Single Euro Payments Area payment schemes, facilitating transfers in euro and reducing costs for Moldova’s citizens and businesses; commends the inclusion of roaming liberalisation in the updated EU–Moldova Association Agreement; welcomes Moldova’s recent progress in the transposition of the EU’s roaming and telecommunications acquis and expresses support for a swift decision on the inclusion of Moldova into the EU ‘roam like at home’ area; calls on the service providers to cooperate in good faith with the Moldovan authorities on implementing ‘roam like at home’;

    15.  Welcomes the renewal of the EU’s temporary trade liberalisation measures in July 2024 in order to support Moldova’s economy, substituting the loss of trade caused by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and its unfriendly policies towards Moldova; calls for the EU to take swift and significant steps towards the permanent liberalisation of its tariff-rate quotas, in order to ensure predictability and increase the country’s attractiveness to investors;

    16.  Notes that the recent decision of the US administration to suspend support for civil society, independent media, key reforms and infrastructure projects has created additional urgent needs in Moldova, regarding which the EU should step in; calls on the Commission, in this regard, to increase its funding for EU instruments supporting democracy, such as the European Endowment for Democracy, and for other key projects that had until recently been funded by the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and other US agencies;

    Human rights

    17.  Notes Moldova’s progress towards achieving gender equality, including its adoption of the Programme for Promoting and Ensuring Equality between Women and Men for the 2023-2027 period, and calls for its continued efforts in this regard, particularly to reduce the gender pay gap, fight against stereotypes, discrimination and gender-based violence, and to increase the representation of women in politics and business;

    18.  Welcomes the efforts by the Moldovan authorities to combat violence against women and improve protection for survivors, in particular the adoption of the National Programme on Preventing and Combatting Violence against Women and Domestic Violence for the 2023-2027 period; notes that the impact of this, however, is still lacking and therefore calls for the establishment of more shelters for survivors of domestic violence, for adequate attention by the justice system to violence against women and for policy changes and increased awareness-raising among men regarding gender-based violence;

    19.  Calls on the Moldovan Government to strengthen its efforts, including the effective implementation of its legislative framework, to combat racial discrimination, marginalisation, racist hate speech and hate crimes targeting members of ethnic minority groups, including the Roma;

    20.  Commends Moldova’s efforts to improve the rights of the LGBTIQ+ community in recent years;

    21.  Calls on the Moldovan Government to fully align its legislation on the rights of persons with disabilities with the EU acquis and to tackle the systemic problem of children with intellectual disabilities being placed in psychiatric institutions;

    Energy, environment and connectivity

    22.  Condemns Russia’s instrumentalisation of energy against Moldova, most recently by halting gas supplies to the Transnistrian region on 1 January 2025, in violation of contractual obligations, and thereby provoking a serious crisis in the region; applauds the Commission’s swift proposal of a Comprehensive Strategy for Energy Independence and Resilience and its support package worth EUR 250 million, which will reduce the energy bills of Moldovan consumers, including in the Transnistrian region, support Moldova’s decoupling from Russia’s energy supplies and integrate Moldova into the EU energy market; emphasises the need for the EU and the Moldovan authorities to effectively communicate about the substantial EU support package aimed at addressing Moldova’s energy crisis;

    23.  Commends the alignment of the Moldovan energy sector with the EU acquis; calls on the Moldovan Government to continue its efforts, with EU support that includes the tools available from the Reform and Growth Facility for Moldova, to diversify gas and electricity supply routes, develop connectivity, increase energy efficiency and its internal production and storage capacity, as well as advance its full integration into the EU energy market in order to ensure Moldova’s energy security and resilience; stresses the importance of the completion of the Vulcanesti-Chisinau 400 kV overhead power line by the end of 2025 in order to reduce Moldova’s reliance on energy infrastructure in the Transnistrian region; calls on the EU to mobilise the necessary resources to help compensate for the withdrawal of USAID support for Moldova’s energy sector;

    24.  Commends the Moldovan Government for its progress on decarbonisation, energy efficiency and transitioning to a green economy, including doubling the share of renewable energy to 30 % by 2030; encourages the EU and its Member States to continue to provide financial support and expertise to Moldovan counterparts in this area; welcomes the adoption in 2023 of Moldova’s National Climate Change Adaptation Programme until 2030 and its Action Plan for this purpose; calls on the Moldovan Government to adopt and begin implementing its National Energy and Climate Plan for the 2025-2030 period; notes the importance of implementing the commitments of the Energy Community’s Decarbonisation Roadmap, and implementing the Monitoring, Reporting, Verification and Accreditation package with a view to introducing carbon pricing and aligning with the EU emissions trading system;

    25.  Believes that an extension of the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T) corridor Baltic Sea-Black Sea-Aegean Sea (Corridor IX) to include the route of Chisinau-Constanta-Varna-Bourgas would be a strategic investment in the region’s transport infrastructure, enhancing connectivity and promoting economic growth, in view of the enlargement of the EU to the east and the potential positive impact of this extension on the region’s security and stability, serving as a key logistics route for NATO and enhancing the EU’s geostrategic autonomy;

    Rule of law and good governance

    26.  Underlines that comprehensive justice reform remains key for the success of Moldova’s democratic and EU accession-related reforms; recognises Moldova’s sustained efforts to build an independent, impartial, accountable and professional judicial system and conclude the vetting process by the end of 2026; calls, therefore, for the EU to continue actively supporting the justice reform and the process of vetting both judges and prosecutors, including the attraction, training and recruitment of qualified judicial personnel and increase in judicial capacity;

    27.  Notes that Moldova has achieved progress in the fight against and prevention of corruption, but stresses the need to continue the fight against money laundering; welcomes the entry into force in February 2024 of Moldova’s National Integrity and Anti-Corruption Programme for 2024-2028; highlights the need to ensure enhanced coordination among all key anti-corruption and justice institutions in order to implement comprehensive reforms and to ensure that they have adequate resources and capacities; stresses that results in terms of prosecution and conviction in corruption cases need to be delivered in order to ensure public trust in the ongoing reforms;

    28.  Recalls the importance of continuing the investigation and bringing to justice those responsible for the 2014 bank fraud; welcomes the fact that, after long efforts by the Moldovan authorities, Interpol has finally added one of the alleged perpetrators, Vladimir Plahotniuc, to its list of internationally wanted persons;

    29.  Welcomes the adoption by Moldova in 2023 of a new national strategy for preventing and combating human trafficking, aligned with the EU acquis, and the cooperation of Moldova with Europol in combating drug trafficking;

    30.  Expresses its readiness to continue supporting the Parliament of Moldova through mutually agreed democracy support activities that respond to the needs of the institution, its elected members and staff; underlines the importance of the Parliament of Moldova in fostering public debate about the country’s European future and achieving a broad consensus over, and democratic legitimacy of, EU accession-related reforms across political parties and among broader society; highlights the decision of 10 March 2025 to open a European Parliament office in Chisinau to further strengthen Parliament’s engagement with the Eastern Partnership region;

    Cooperation in the field of common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and progress on resolving the Transnistrian conflict

    31.  Welcomes Moldova’s consistent cooperation on foreign policy issues and the significantly increased rate, notably from 54 % in 2022 to 86 % in 2024, of its alignment with the EU’s CFSP positions and restrictive measures; invites it to continue to improve this alignment, including on restrictive measures against Russia, and to continue cooperation on preventing the circumvention of sanctions against Russia and Belarus related to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine;

    32.  Underlines that Moldova is a key contributor to the regional and European security, including through its unwavering support to Ukraine since the start of Russia’s war of aggression, for example by welcoming Ukrainian war refugees, and through its contributions to the EU Civil Protection Mechanism, for example by deploying firefighting teams to tackle severe wildfires in Greece;

    33.  Expresses its support for the EUPM in Moldova and calls on the Member States to contribute the necessary experts and financial resources, in anticipation of a potential intensification of hybrid threats; welcomes the recent extension of the EUPM’s mandate until April 2026; encourages the Moldovan authorities to make full use of the EUPM’s expertise to enhance its preparedness, particularly in view of repeated electoral interference ahead of the parliamentary elections on 28 September 2025; calls for the EU to draw from the experience gained in Moldova in protecting the electoral process and democratic institutions in the EU itself; encourages the European External Action Service and the Commission to use all available EU instruments in the area of countering hybrid threats, in order to continue to support Moldova, including by swiftly deploying a Hybrid Rapid Response Team; welcomes the establishment of Moldova’s Centre for Strategic Communications and Countering Disinformation, as a means of coordinating the fight against foreign interference among the various Moldovan institutions, and of the National Agency for Cyber Security and the National Institute for Cyber Security Innovations; notes that Moldova’s National Security Strategy, adopted in December 2023, highlights EU accession as a key objective and for the first time identifies Russia as the source of major threats to Moldova’s security; stresses the importance of improving information sharing and intelligence cooperation between Moldova and the EU and its Member States on security threats;

    34.  Reiterates its full commitment to Moldova’s territorial integrity and to the peaceful resolution of the conflict, based on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Moldova in its internationally recognised borders;

    35.  Welcomes the Commission’s initiatives to include proactive support for the Transnistrian region in its energy emergency support packages, and exchange of information and practical cooperation between the Moldovan Government and the de facto authorities of the Transnistrian region throughout the energy crisis caused by Russia; welcomes the progress regarding the conditionalities for Tiraspol in light of the recent gas transit agreement and calls for the full implementation of these conditionalities, including the release of all political prisoners by Tiraspol and the dismantling of the remaining illegal checkpoints;

    36.  Welcomes Moldova’s keen interest in contributing to the EU’s common security and defence policy (CSDP) and the fact that Moldova is the first country to sign a security and defence partnership with the EU; welcomes Moldova’s continued active participation in EU missions and operations under the CSDP, namely the EU Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Operation Althea) and the EU Training Mission in Somalia, its interest in participation in PESCO projects and the ongoing negotiations on a framework agreement with the European Defence Agency; calls on the EU to include Moldova in the EU security and defence programmes and related budget allocations, including the European Defence Industry Programme and Readiness 2030, allowing the country to participate in joint procurement alongside the Member States;

    37.  Welcomes the allocation of EUR 50 million to modernise the defence capacities of the Moldovan Armed Forces in the context of the current security challenges through the European Peace Facility (EPF) for 2024; notes that Moldova is the second-largest EPF beneficiary after Ukraine, with a total of EUR 137 million allocated since 2021; welcomes the announced support of EUR 60 million to be provided to Moldova from the EPF budget in 2025; calls on the Member States to progressively increase the EPF funding for Moldova to further enhance the country’s defence capabilities;

    o
    o   o

    38.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and to the President, Government and Parliament of the Republic of Moldova.

    (1) OJ L, 2025/535, 21.3.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/535/oj.
    (2) Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Moldova, of the other part (OJ L 260, 30.8.2014, p. 4, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_internation/2014/492/oj).

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Senators Warner, Coons, Schumer, Murray, Reed Statement on President Trump’s Actions in the Middle East

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Commonwealth of Virginia Mark R Warner
    WASHINGTON – Senate Intelligence Committee Vice Chairman Mark Warner (D-VA), Ranking Senate Defense Appropriator Chris Coons (D-DE), Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer (D-NY), Senate Appropriations Ranking Member Patty Murray (D-WA), and Senate Armed Services Ranking Member Jack Reed (D-RI) today released the following statement as President Trump considers taking additional action in the Middle East:
    “Intensifying military actions between Israel and Iran represent a dangerous escalation that risks igniting a broader regional war. Iran poses a risk to the United States and our allies and must not be allowed to attain a nuclear weapon. The United States stands firm in our support for the continued defense of Israel, our partner and ally. Our commitment to Israel remains ironclad and we urge the administration to defend Israel against the barrage of Iranian airstrikes, including through the provision of additional air defense capabilities. We urge President Trump to prioritize diplomacy and pursue a binding agreement that can prevent a nuclear-armed Iran and reduce the risk to our diplomats, our service members, and the hundreds of thousands of Americans living in the Middle East.
    “As President Trump reportedly considers expanding U.S. engagement in the war, we are deeply concerned about a lack of preparation, strategy, and clearly defined objectives, and the enormous risk to Americans and civilians in the region. Iran has signaled that it would retaliate against American personnel if the United States participates in military strikes. More than 40,000 U.S. servicemembers are stationed in more than a dozen countries around the Middle East, all within striking distance of Iran and its proxies.
    “We are alarmed by the Trump administration’s failure to provide answers to fundamental questions. By law, the president must consult Congress and seek authorization if he is considering taking the country to war. He owes Congress and the American people a strategy for U.S. engagement in the region. We need a clear, detailed plan outlining the goals, risks, cost, and timeline for any proposed mission, as well as how he will ensure the safe evacuation of Americans in harm’s way all across the region. We demand immediate, detailed answers on these and other urgent matters to determine the way forward, including:
    What more needs to be done to resupply and bolster the defense of Israel and our interests in the region? What additional resources are required to maintain and supplement those defenses? 
    What is the Intelligence Community’s current assessment of Iran’s nuclear program, its leaders’ intent, and its capabilities? Following nearly a week of Israeli strikes, what remains of Iran’s conventional military capabilities and nuclear enrichment?
    What would be the objective of U.S. military intervention against Iran? President Trump has called for Iran’s “unconditional surrender” – what does that mean?
    If there was a military intervention, what would be the estimated scope and duration of any such campaign? How many U.S. servicemembers would be involved? What resources and munitions would be required? What would such an operation cost?
    What would be the risk to U.S. forces across our bases in the region, both today and in the long term, and what steps is the administration prepared to take to protect our servicemembers?
    How many American citizens reside in Israel and surrounding countries, and what is the U.S. plan to facilitate evacuations?
    What constitutional or statutory authority would underpin this intervention?
    “Congress is an equal partner in preserving and defending U.S. national security around the world, and Congress has not provided authorization for military action against Iran – we will not rubberstamp military intervention that puts the United States at risk. Our foremost duty is to safeguard American citizens wherever they reside and to protect our troops serving on the front lines. The United States cannot sleepwalk into a third war in as many decades. Congress has a critical role to play in this moment.” 
     

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Strong touts North Alabama’s nationally-ranked U.S. service academy appointments

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Representative Dale Strong (Alabama)

    WASHINGTON — Today, Representative Dale Strong (AL-05) announced the appointments of 22 students from Alabama’s Fifth Congressional District to attend U.S. service academies. 

    The Fifth District tied fourth nationally for the total number of accepted West Point candidates from a single congressional district and second in the Southeast region.  

    Bob Jones High School tied first nationally and ranked first overall in the Southeast region for the number of West Point appointments from a single high school.  

    “Each year, North Alabama produces young, patriotic leaders who are willing to answer the call and lead the next generation of our Armed Forces,” said Rep. Dale Strong. “It is one of my greatest honors as a member of Congress to nominate students across the Tennessee Valley to attend our nation’s prestigious service academies. I extend my gratitude to the cadets, midshipmen, and families in the Class of 2029 for their commitment and service to our nation.”

    Fifth District students who have accepted appointments to U.S. service academies: 

    U.S. Military Academy at West Point 

    •  Matthew Buhl, Harvest, Westminster Christian Academy 

    •  Charlotte Droege, Madison, Bob Jones High School 

    •  Molly Halter, Madison, Bob Jones High School 

    •  Charles Jacobs, Decatur, Providence Classical School 

    •  Kricket Johnston, Madison, Bob Jones High School 

    •  Nicholas Lozano, Madison, Bob Jones High School 

    •  Naeem Miller, Madison, Sparkman High School 

    •  William Mitchell, Huntsville, Alabama School of Cyber Technology and Engineering 

    •  Juliann Reid, Huntsville, St. John Paul II Catholic High School 

    •  Jacob Sigler, Madison, Bob Jones High School 

    •  Thomas Sigler, Madison, Bob Jones High School  

    •  Thomas Von Eschenbach, Madison, St. John Paul II Catholic High School 

    U.S. Air Force Academy  

    •  Isaac Achenbach, Madison, James Clemens High School 

    •  Jack Messervy, Owens Cross Roads, Huntsville High School 

    •  Jason Park, Madison, James Clemens High School 

    •  Logan Jackson, Madison, Bob Jones High School 

    •  Brendan Martin, Huntsville, Grissom High School 

    U.S. Naval Academy 

    • Colton Burton, Huntsville, Alabama School of Cyber Technology and Engineering 

    • Joshua DeFour, Madison, Sparkman High School 

    • David Hudry, Decatur, Decatur Heritage Christian Academy 

    • Heinrich Hanada, Huntsville, German International School of Tokyo 

    • Ellen Vegerita, Brownsboro, Huntsville High School 

     

    Representative Strong hosts an Academy Day annually, which features recruiters from every branch of service and admissions representatives from each service academy.  

    Information for Representative Strong’s 2025 Academy Day: 

     WHERE: Huntsville High School Gymnasium 

    2304 Billie Watkins Ave, Huntsville, AL 35801 

     WHEN: Saturday, August 2, 2025 
                10:00 AM – 1:00 PM 
     
      

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: ICYMI: Warren Gains Commitment from Hegseth to Follow Supreme Court Orders on Deploying Troops to American Cities

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Massachusetts – Elizabeth Warren

    June 20, 2025

    Trump has already ordered 4,000 National Guard troops and 700 Marines to L.A.

    Hegseth: “We’ve got contingencies and plans for any number of capabilities should governors be unable…to actually secure (their) own federal agents in their cities.”

    Video of Exchange (YouTube)

    Washington, D.C. – At a hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee, U.S. Senator Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.) pressed Department of Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth on her concerns with President Trump’s deployment of the National Guard and U.S. Marines to Los Angeles despite state and local officials’ objections. 

    On June 7, President Trump announced he was deploying the National Guard and the Marines to Los Angeles (L.A.). As of April 2025, the Department of Defense reported there are about 167,951 Marines, 451,024 soldiers in the Army, and 433,000 members of the National Guard. About 4,000 National Guard troops and 700 Marines have been sent to L.A., including about 500 National Guard troops who have been trained to accompany Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents on immigration operations.

    Senator Warren questioned Secretary Hegseth on the deployment of troops to Los Angeles over state and local officials’ objections, citing President Trump’s threat to deploy ICE agents to other cities, and whether troops would be deployed to cities like Chicago and New York if the President ordered it. Secretary Hegseth refused to answer whether he would send more Marines to other cities if President Trump ordered it. Senator Warren also asked for an analysis of the number of troops that can be deployed domestically without undermining readiness internationally, but Secretary Hegseth avoided providing specific numbers.

    On June 12, U.S. District Judge Charles Breyer ruled that the Guard deployment was illegal and violated the 10th Amendment, as the protests in LA “fall far short of a rebellion” that would authorize the President to call them up for federal service.

    Secretary Hegseth committed that he would follow Supreme Court orders if they ruled for troops to be removed from American cities, saying, “If the Supreme Court rules on a topic, we will abide by that.” 

    Last week, Department of Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem made remarks during a press conference, saying, “We are not going away. We are staying here to liberate the society from the socialists and the burdensome leadership that this governor and that this mayor have placed on this country and what they have tried to insert into the city.” Senator Warren criticized Secretary Noem’s comments, highlighting that both the mayor and the governor were democratically elected by a majority of voters in the city. 

    “This is un-American, and it makes us unsafe. I wish our Republican colleagues would speak up,” concluded Senator Warren.

    Transcript: Hearings to examine the President’s proposed budget request for fiscal year 2026 and the Future Years Defense Program for the Department of Defense
    Senate Armed Services Committee
    June 18, 2025

    Senator Elizabeth Warren: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. So, President Trump has deployed the National Guard and then the U.S. Marines to Los Angeles, over the objections of state and local officials, saying that the troops are needed to support immigration detention operations that are being carried out by ICE. On Sunday night, the president threatened to deploy ICE agents to other cities around the country that he sees as “the core of the Democrat power center,” specifically mentioning Chicago and New York. 

    Secretary Hegseth, if the President wanted to deploy Marines to Chicago and New York City like he did in Los Angeles, would you carry out that order, even if the local governors and mayors objected?

    Honorable Peter B. Hegseth, Secretary of Defense: Well, Senator, because Governor Newsom was unwilling to address protecting federal law enforcement agents in Los Angeles, President Trump had all the authorities, and the Defense Department happily supported defending our ICE agents in the conduct of their job. They have the right as Americans to be able to do their job without being attacked by mobs, and we will protect them in that process. And if others needed it, we would provide that.

    Senator Warren: I know that you heard my question, so you would be willing to send troops if the President ordered it to Chicago, New York City, is that right? 

    Secretary Hegseth: Well, thankfully, New York City, unlike California, unlike Gavin Newsom, is willing to step up and address the issue with their local law enforcement.

    Senator Warren: I will take that as a yes. How about if the President says he wants to send troops to 15 cities? Would you be willing to do that?

    Secretary Hegseth: Senator, I don’t accept your hypothetical, because it’s—

    Senator Warren: That’s a hypothetical. That’s the question. You’re the Secretary of Defense, would you send troops to 15 cities? If the President thought it, said, “Do it.” Would you do it? 15 cities?

    Secretary Hegseth: Again, Senator, it’s a complete hypothetical, lacking any context at all. 

    Senator Warren: Look, you’re the Secretary of Defense —

    Secretary Hegseth: I refuse to box myself in based on questioning, on a hypothetical.

    Senator Warren: Well, you can refuse, but you’re here asking for a trillion dollars, and I want to know how you’re going to spend it. And so my question is, if Donald Trump tells you to send troops to 15 American cities, are you going to spend the money and send the troops?

    Secretary Hegseth: Thankfully, we’re spending money on securing our southern border. A way the previous administration abandoned and allowed 21 million illegals to enter our country. So defending our homeland is a real, serious priority under this administration, and we’re doing it.

    Senator Warren: I understand the question about defense. Secretary Hegseth, about 4000 National Guard troops and 700 Marines have been sent to LA. Is there a number of troops deployed to American cities over the objections of governors and mayors, at which you would be concerned that we are undermining our national defense? 

    Secretary Hegseth: Senator, we’ve spent two decades guarding other people’s borders. We think at the Defense Department it’s about time we shore up ours. 

    Senator Warren: So, that’s my question. Is there a number at which sending those troops to Los Angeles or Chicago or New York starts to undermine our ability to defend ourselves around the globe? Is there a number?

    Secretary Hegseth: Senator, we look at capabilities and readiness around the globe all the time, and we’re quite satisfied with our capabilities to defend the homeland, and we’ll provide more if and when it’s necessary. 

    Senator Warren: So, you are satisfied with our capabilities? Let me just ask, have you actually done the analysis and figured out how many troops you can deploy domestically before you start to undermine readiness around the world? Have you done that analysis? 

    Secretary Hegseth: Yes, ma’am. 

    Senator Warren: Then would you let the rest of us in on it? We are the Senate Armed Services Committee, and you’re here to ask for a trillion dollars. What’s the number?

    Secretary Hegseth: We’ve got contingencies and plans for any number of capabilities should governors be unable, as Governor Gavin Newsom has been, to actually secure his own federal agents in their cities.

    Senator Warren: But can you give us a ballpark on what that number is? How many troops can you deploy domestically before you start to cut into our readiness internationally?

    Secretary Hegseth: As I said, previous administrations deployed our National Guard all around the globe in numbers far beyond what we were capable of supporting, so limited contingencies inside the United States to protect federal law enforcement is doable. 

    Senator Warren: You have a number, but you’re just not going to tell us? So, let me ask you one more question, if the Supreme Court orders you to remove troops from American city streets. Will you do so?

    Secretary Hegseth: Can you repeat the question, please? 

    Senator Warren: Yes. If the Supreme Court orders you to remove troops from American cities. Will you do so? 

    Secretary Hegseth: As I’ve said, Senator, I don’t believe district courts should determine national security policy, but if the Supreme Court rules on a topic, we will abide by that. 

    Senator Warren: Okay. You know, during her press conference last week, Secretary Noem said, “We are staying here to liberate the city from its mayor and its governor,” people who were elected by a majority of voters. Secretary Hegseth is saying he is ready to deploy more troops and won’t tell us what the implications are for our national defense. This is un-American, and it makes us unsafe. I wish our Republican colleagues would speak up.

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: USGS Releases Report on Oil and Gas Potential Beneath U.S. Public Lands

    Source: US Geological Survey

    If produced, that would be enough oil to supply all of the nation’s needs for 4 years at the current rate of consumption, and enough natural gas to meet the nation’s needs for nearly 12 years.  

    The onshore public lands of the U.S. included in the report are those administered by the Departments of Agriculture, Defense, Energy and Interior and the Tennessee Valley Authority. 

    The undiscovered oil and gas resource estimates are both significant increases from the most recent USGS estimates in 1998.These increases are due not to any change in the subsurface but to the revolution in energy production since the previous USGS estimates of undiscovered oil and gas resources on public lands in 1998, when the USGS estimated 7.86 billion barrels of oil and 201.1 trillion cubic feet of gas.  Those estimates focused on conventional oil and gas accumulations and did not include all unconventional resources such as shale oil, tight oil and tight gas (oil and gas trapped in impermeable rock), and coal-bed gas, which are routinely produced using fracking and are now part of USGS oil and gas assessments. 

    “The USGS assesses the potential for energy resources where science tells us there may be a resource that hasn’t been discovered yet,” said Sarah Ryker, acting director of the USGS. “In this report, we leveraged our extensive existing data to estimate oil and gas resources on federally managed public lands.  We expect these estimates to be useful for state and national land management, energy futures analysis, and economic development planning.”  

    The estimates were produced by compiling previously published reports that included 579 assessment units, subdivisions of the nation’s 69 geologic provinces that the USGS assesses for undiscovered, technically recoverable oil and gas. Resources were then allocated to public lands proportionally based on the percentage of public land in each defined assessment unit. 

    ###

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Reed, Schumer, Murray, Warner, Coons Joint Statement on President Trump’s Actions in the Middle East

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Rhode Island Jack Reed

    WASHINGTON, DC – Today, U.S. Senator Jack Reed (D-RI), Ranking Member of the Senate Armed Services Committee joined with Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer (D-NY), Senate Appropriations Committee Vice Chair Patty Murray (D-WA), Senate Intelligence Committee Vice Chairman Mark Warner (D-VA), and Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense Ranking Member Chris Coons (D-DE) in issuing the following joint statement as President Trump considers taking additional action in the Middle East:

    “Intensifying military actions between Israel and Iran represent a dangerous escalation that risks igniting a broader regional war. Iran poses a risk to the United States and our allies and must not be allowed to attain a nuclear weapon. The United States stands firm in our support for the continued defense of Israel, our partner and ally. Our commitment to Israel remains ironclad and we urge the administration to defend Israel against the barrage of Iranian airstrikes, including through the provision of additional air defense capabilities. We urge President Trump to prioritize diplomacy and pursue a binding agreement that can prevent a nuclear-armed Iran and reduce the risk to our diplomats, our service members, and the hundreds of thousands of Americans living in the Middle East.

    “As President Trump reportedly considers expanding U.S. engagement in the war, we are deeply concerned about a lack of preparation, strategy, and clearly defined objectives, and the enormous risk to Americans and civilians in the region. Iran has signaled that it would retaliate against American personnel if the United States participates in military strikes. More than 40,000 U.S. servicemembers are stationed in more than a dozen countries around the Middle East, all within striking distance of Iran and its proxies.

    “We are alarmed by the Trump administration’s failure to provide answers to fundamental questions. By law, the president must consult Congress and seek authorization if he is considering taking the country to war. He owes Congress and the American people a strategy for U.S. engagement in the region. We need a clear, detailed plan outlining the goals, risks, cost, and timeline for any proposed mission, as well as how he will ensure the safe evacuation of Americans in harm’s way all across the region. We demand immediate, detailed answers on these and other urgent matters to determine the way forward, including:

    •           What more needs to be done to resupply and bolster the defense of Israel and our interests in the region? What additional resources are required to maintain and supplement those defenses?

    •           What is the Intelligence Community’s current assessment of Iran’s nuclear program, its leaders’ intent, and its capabilities? Following nearly a week of Israeli strikes, what remains of Iran’s conventional military capabilities and nuclear enrichment?

    •           What would be the objective of U.S. military intervention against Iran? President Trump has called for Iran’s “unconditional surrender” – what does that mean?

    •           If there was a military intervention, what would be the estimated scope and duration of any such campaign? How many U.S. servicemembers would be involved? What resources and munitions would be required? What would such an operation cost?

    •           What would be the risk to U.S. forces across our bases in the region, both today and in the long term, and what steps is the administration prepared to take to protect our servicemembers?

    •           How many American citizens reside in Israel and surrounding countries, and what is the U.S. plan to facilitate evacuations?

    •           What constitutional or statutory authority would underpin this intervention?

    “Congress is an equal partner in preserving and defending U.S. national security around the world, and Congress has not provided authorization for military action against Iran – we will not rubberstamp military intervention that puts the United States at risk. Our foremost duty is to safeguard American citizens wherever they reside and to protect our troops serving on the front lines. The United States cannot sleepwalk into a third war in as many decades. Congress has a critical role to play in this moment.”

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: GAD’s first Public Service Pensions conference

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    News story

    GAD’s first Public Service Pensions conference

    Pensions professionals from across the public sector networked, and contributed to discussions, at GAD’s first pensions conference.

    Credit: Crown copyright

    More than 100 professionals from across the sector attended the Government Actuary’s Department’s (GAD) first public service pensions conference on Thursday 19 June 2025. The event brought together representatives from the pension schemes for all 8 public service workforces, across all 4 nations.

    Reflect and Connect

    The theme of the conference was ‘Reflect and Connect’. Opening the event, the Government Actuary highlighted a key objective for the day was providing an opportunity for those working in public service schemes to meet others doing similar work, encourage knowledge sharing and greater collaboration.

    The conference included a keynote address from Siobhan Amutharasan (HM Treasury) and Jan Claisse (GAD) and inspiring plenaries on pensions dashboards and pension board governance.

    Delegates also attended discussions on a wide range of topics including the McCloud remedy, AI opportunities and the gender pensions gap. The Office for Budget Responsibility, The Pensions Ombudsman and The Pensions Regulator also provided engaging and thought-provoking sessions.

    Energising and interesting

    Greg Ceely from the Office for National Statistics presented a session on Healthy Life Expectancy and the State Pension age review. Commenting on the event, he said: “It’s been very energising and interesting to find out how various pension elements fit together. It has been refreshing to know that people are thinking about pensions in a multifaceted way.”

    Claire Neale, the Head of Police Pensions from the National Police Chiefs Council noted: “It’s been a fabulous networking opportunity, and a real pleasure to connect with new people.”

    Clair Alcock, Head of Pensions at the Local Government Association remarked: “It was brilliantly put together and all the topics were really relevant.”

    Phil Bassingham-Searle, the Head of Armed Forces remuneration at the Ministry of Defence also noted: “It has been thought provoking and has brought together a group of people who don’t normally come together, who’ve got shared interests.”

    It was an inspiring and energising day that captured the spirit of collaboration and shared purpose at the heart of public service pensions. #ReflectAndConnect

    Updates to this page

    Published 20 June 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Read More (U.S. Rep. Greg Steube Announces Veterans History Project Interview Featuring Private First Class David Endean, United States Army)

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Congressman Greg Steube (FL-17)

    June 20, 2025 | Press Releases

    View the Video Here
    SARASOTA – U.S. Representative Greg Steube (R‑Fla.) today released the latest installment in the Veterans History Project Series, honoring the service and sacrifice of veterans from Florida’s 17th District. The interview features Private First Class David Endean, a Vietnam War veteran who served in the U.S. Army from September 25, 1968, to September 25, 1970.
    “Private First Class David Endean’s service during the Vietnam War is a testament to the courage, perseverance, and camaraderie of our men and women in uniform,” said Rep. Steube. “Through intense combat and heartbreaking loss, his reflections are a moving account of a soldier’s experiences in war. We are honored that he shared his journey so that his fellow citizens may pay tribute to his legacy. Sadly, not all who served in Vietnam were met with the respect and care they deserved when they returned home. PFC Endean’s story reminds us why honoring and preserving the history of our veterans is so important.”
    In his interview, Endean reflects on the physical and emotional toll of combat, the lasting brotherhood forged with fellow soldiers, and the challenges of returning to a country that didn’t always understand or appreciate their service. “Try going to work one day and carry a 70-pound backpack,” said Endean.“Now imagine walking around with it all day, knowing at any moment you could step on a booby trap or be ambushed. Try doing that for a year. That was our life.”
    He also shares how his service deepened his faith and taught him lifelong lessons in discipline, respect, and commitment—values that carried over into his civilian life and career in electrical engineering.
    Please click here to watch the full interview.
    Be sure to check Congressman Steube’s YouTube channel in the future for upcoming interviews.The Office of Congressman Greg Steube will submit the interview to the Veterans History Project, an initiative of the Library of Congress’s American Folklife Center to collect and retain the oral histories of our nation’s veterans.Initially started in 2000, the Veterans History Project aims to collect, preserve, and make accessible the personal accounts of the United States military veterans and Gold Star Families so that future generations may hear directly from the veterans and better understand their service. Researchers, scholars, and educators rely upon VHP collections as a primary source. The oral histories, photographs, manuscripts, and other original materials supplement historical texts and valued cultural resources. Veterans from all branches and ranks of the United States military who served in World War I through the more recent conflicts are eligible to participate. For more information on the VHP, please visit https://www.loc.gov/vets/.If you live in Florida’s 17th Congressional district, please visit https://steube.house.gov/services/vhp to participate.

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • Iran rejects nuclear talks as West Asia conflict enters second week

    Source: Government of India

    Source: Government of India (4)

    As the war between Israel and Iran enters its eighth day, European foreign ministers are meeting with Iranian officials in Geneva in a last-ditch effort to de-escalate tensions that have already begun to rattle global energy markets and regional stability. The E3 bloc—comprising France, Britain, and Germany—has resumed high-level negotiations with Iran, amid what diplomats are calling the most dangerous security crisis in the region in over a decade.

    Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi, addressing the United Nations in Geneva ahead of the talks, strongly condemned Israel’s recent missile attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities. He labeled the strikes as “serious war crimes” and “an act of betrayal of diplomacy,” revealing that Iran had been on the verge of finalizing a nuclear agreement with the United States, originally scheduled for June 15. According to Araqchi, the Israeli raids derailed what he described as a “very promising agreement,” and he categorically ruled out any further nuclear discussions with Washington while Israeli attacks continue.

    “There is no room for negotiations under the shadow of missiles,” Araqchi declared, asserting that Iran will not return to the table unless Israeli aggression ceases.

    The latest surge in violence began when Iran launched missile strikes into northern, central, and southern Israel, including the port city of Haifa, early Friday morning. The attacks triggered air raid sirens across Israel, prompting widespread panic and sending civilians into bomb shelters. In retaliation, Israeli forces carried out overnight airstrikes on multiple Iranian military installations, including missile production centers and a nuclear warhead development site in Tehran.

    The conflict has rapidly expanded beyond a military confrontation. In Qatar, emergency meetings are being held with major energy companies after Israeli strikes targeted the South Pars/North Dome gas field—the largest known natural gas reserve, jointly shared by Iran and Qatar. The attacks have raised serious alarms over the stability of regional energy infrastructure, with global oil markets on edge over the possibility of further disruption to Gulf energy supplies.

    Qatar now finds itself in a precarious diplomatic position. While it maintains a close strategic partnership with the United States, it also shares vital economic interests with Iran. Balancing these competing pressures will be critical as tensions continue to escalate.

    International responses remain cautious but increasingly urgent. The United States has bolstered its military presence in the region, describing the move as a precautionary measure. A third U.S. Navy destroyer has entered the eastern Mediterranean, and the USS Nimitz carrier strike group is en route to the Arabian Sea.

    Russia has issued a stark warning, stating it would respond “very negatively” if Israel—particularly with U.S. support—attempts any strike against Iran’s supreme leader.

    Inside Iran, mass protests have erupted in Tehran and other cities. Thousands of demonstrators have taken to the streets, condemning Israeli actions and carrying portraits of Iranian commanders killed in the fighting. The protests reflect mounting domestic pressure on Iranian leadership to respond decisively to Israeli attacks.

    The renewed European diplomatic push comes amid growing concern that the conflict could spiral further out of control. The E3 foreign ministers are urging Iran to return to the negotiating table, emphasizing that diplomacy remains the only viable path to de-escalation. However, with both sides entrenched in their positions, the window for diplomatic resolution is narrowing rapidly.

    The timing of the Geneva talks is also shaped by a two-week deadline set by former U.S. President Donald Trump, who remains a key political figure and has called for immediate diplomatic movement or face potential military escalation.

    With war threatening to destabilize not only the wider West Asian region but also international energy markets, the outcome of the current diplomatic effort may prove critical for global stability.

  • MIL-OSI Analysis: Elio: Disney’s enjoyable new animation may be an original story – but it’s also a forgettable one

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Laura O’Flanagan, PhD Candidate, School of English, Dublin City University

    In a summer cinema release schedule filled with sequels, remakes and franchise instalments, Disney’s latest animation Elio is a rare original story.

    Recently, much has been written and hands been wrung about the lack of original films in Hollywood. Indeed, Disney CEO Bob Iger announced in 2024 that the studio’s output would primarily be sequels, saying: “There’s a lot of value in the sequels obviously because they’re known and it takes less in terms of marketing”. At least he’s honest.

    Elio is an unknown entity for the studio and indeed for 2025’s cinema goers. Fittingly, the film tackles the most unknown entities of all: outer space and life beyond Earth. What does this new story have to offer today’s cinema audiences who are accustomed to characters they already know and onscreen worlds that they have already visited?

    Elio tells the story of Elio Solis (Yonas Kibreab), a lonely newly orphaned boy who is fascinated with space and aliens. He lives in California with his Aunt Olga (Zoe Saldana), a major in the US Air Force.

    Looking for something good? Cut through the noise with a carefully curated selection of the latest releases, live events and exhibitions, straight to your inbox every fortnight, on Fridays. Sign up here.

    When aliens make contact one night, Elio secretly answers their call and is brought to the “Communiverse” in outer space, a brightly coloured world that is populated with aliens. Mistakenly identified as Earth’s leader, Elio is tasked with solving an intergalactic crisis in this new alien world – a world in which he increasingly feels he belongs. Elio needs to decide whether to leave Earth forever, or if there is no place like home.

    Characteristic of Disney (Pixar), the film’s visuals are audaciously stunning. Space is depicted as a twinkling magical canvas upon which Elio can dream, and sweeping, majestic images of Earth beg to be seen on a large cinema screen. The Communiverse is depicted beautifully in iridescent colours. But, against this spectacular setting, the characters ring a little hollow.

    Elio is given little emotional depth, and in the Communiverse there are simply too many aliens for an audience to connect with. Elio’s new friend Glorgon is the exception here, and his open-hearted comedic wonder will certainly appeal to younger viewers. Aunt Olga is disappointingly underdeveloped and her status as a military major is presented as at odds with her new role as Elio’s caregiver.

    The film forgoes much of Olga’s story in favour of a zany subplot between Glorgon and his alien father who need to reconnect. This feels like a missed opportunity and a superficial effort to depict a female character of high military rank that falls short of giving her any real agency or power in the film.

    Strikingly, the filmmakers use audio clips of Carl Sagan’s Cosmos to amplify the film’s message about life and connection. These are accompanied with spectacular visuals of space and constellations. But these audio clips have a solemnity that seems out of place alongside an alien blob called Glorgon who has daddy issues.

    This oddness of tone is woven throughout the film, laced with peril that feels unthreatening, comedic moments which stop before the belly laugh, and sentimental scenes that cut before the tears flow. Characters and plotlines are plentiful but consequently, the film spreads itself too thin, leaving the entire story feeling underdeveloped and somewhat shallow.

    There is a lot of everything in this film, and certainly something for everyone. And maybe that’s the point. In the past two decades, we’ve moved from a shared cultural canon to a stratified ecosystem of personalised content streams.

    In this entertainment landscape, a film like Elio could appeal to everyone a little bit, rather than become anyone’s firm favourite. Everyone in the family will enjoy a part of this film, albeit different parts. I particularly enjoyed the scenes where Elio’s clone is living on Earth.

    This may well be Disney’s strategy: to release an original story with broad appeal in order to mitigate the risks associated with untested stories and characters. This may prove financially viable initially, but will it create films with enduring legacies that generate franchises and spawn sequels?

    I fear Elio will not. The film provides little more than a passable afternoon at the cinema. It is pleasant, forgettable and safe – unlikely to live in the memory to “infinity and beyond”, like previous Disney releases.

    Laura O’Flanagan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Elio: Disney’s enjoyable new animation may be an original story – but it’s also a forgettable one – https://theconversation.com/elio-disneys-enjoyable-new-animation-may-be-an-original-story-but-its-also-a-forgettable-one-259213

    MIL OSI Analysis –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Mrvan Honors Nominees Accepted into the U.S. Military Service Academies

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Congressman Frank J. Mrvan (IN)

    Washington, DC – Rep. Frank J. Mrvan is pleased to announce the nominees that have accepted their appointment to the U.S. Military Service Academies from Indiana’s First Congressional District.  

    Military Service Academy Nominations are recommended to Congressman Mrvan by his Military Service Academy Board, which includes veterans, community leaders, and active duty and retired servicemembers from across Indiana’s First Congressional District.

    Members of Congress may nominate candidates for appointment to four of the five U.S. service academies: U.S. Military Academy (USMA), West Point, NY; the U.S. Naval Academy (USNA), Annapolis, MD; the U.S. Air Force Academy (USAFA), Colorado Springs, CO; and the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy (USMMA), Kings Point, NY.  The fifth service academy, the U.S. Coast Guard Academy (USCGA), New London, CT, does not require a congressional nomination for appointment.

    Congressman Mrvan stated, “It is my honor to nominate these brave and selfless individuals from Indiana’s First Congressional District to join the United States Military Service Academies for the Class of 2029.  I thank all the members of the Military Service Academy Board for their thoughtful participation in this process, and encourage all students who are interested in being part of the Class of 2030 to contact my office for additional information.”  

    The following students received a nomination from Congressman Mrvan and have accepted their appointment: 

    Grant Best, Mount Carmel High School – U.S. Air Force Academy Preparatory School

    Cooper Burton, Wheeler High School – U.S. Air Force Academy

    Talina Cisneros, Hammond Central High School – U.S. Naval Academy Preparatory School

    Shane Conroy, Portage High School – U.S. Naval Academy

    Luke Granzow, Hobart High School/Air Force Prep – U.S. Air Force Academy

    Maverick Markos, Westville High School – U.S. Military Academy at West Point

    Brayden Mercier, Chesterton High School – U.S. Merchant Marine Academy

    Damian Resendez, Mount Carmel High School/West Point Prep – U.S. Military Academy at West Point

    Madalyn Richardson, Washington Township High School – U.S. Merchant Marine Academy

    Students in Indiana’s First Congressional District who are interested in seeking a nomination to the U.S. Military Service Academies can find more information on Congressman Mrvan’s website at https://mrvan.house.gov/services/military-academy-nominations or by calling (219) 795-1844. 

    ###

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: St. Louis District 837 Kicks Off Vital Negotiations with Boeing Defense

    Source: US GOIAM Union

    Approximately 3,200 members of IAM District 837 recently began non-economic contract negotiations with Boeing Defense. These highly skilled union members are spread across Boeing facilities in St. Louis and St. Charles, Mo., and Mascoutah, Ill., where they help produce some of the most advanced military aircraft and missile systems in the world.

    The negotiations will address several essential priorities, including wages, benefits, and working conditions.

    “Our members at District 837 are the heart of Boeing’s defense production,” said IAM  International President Brian Bryant. “They deserve a contract that reflects their unmatched skill, dedication, and contribution to our nation’s security.”

    “Our members are the reason Boeing Defense delivers world-class military aircraft,” said IAM Resident General Vice President Jody Bennett. “This contract must reflect their value not just on the shop floor, but in every phase of life, including retirement.”

    These negotiations are about protecting what our members have earned and strengthening the foundation for future generations,” said IAM Midwest Territory General Vice President Sam Cicinelli. “The IAM will stand with District 837 every step of the way.”

    “Our members give 100% every day to deliver for Boeing and the country,” said IAM District 837 President and Directing Business Representative Tom Boelling. “They deserve a contract that gives them security, respect, and a future they can count on.” 

    “Our work powers the mission,” said IAM Aerospace Coordinator Bobby Barnwell. “Now it’s time for Boeing to step up and match that commitment with a fair contract that protects our families and their future.”

    “We’re not just negotiating numbers,” said IAM Aerospace Coordinator Stephen Jordan. “We’re fighting for the dignity and future of every worker who keeps these critical defense programs running.”

    District 837 members play a critical role in building key defense platforms, including the F-15 and F/A-18 fighter jets, the T-7A Red Hawk trainer, and the MQ-25 Stingray unmanned refueler. Their craftsmanship and dedication are vital to Boeing’s ability to meet national security needs and lead in aerospace innovation.

    The current agreement is set to expire on July 27, 2025, with a contract vote scheduled for the same day. As negotiations continue, IAM District 837 remains united in its mission to secure a fair contract that honors the value and contributions of every member.

    The post St. Louis District 837 Kicks Off Vital Negotiations with Boeing Defense appeared first on IAM Union.

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Appointment of UK Special Envoy to Afghanistan

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    Press release

    Appointment of UK Special Envoy to Afghanistan

    Mr Richard Lindsay has been appointed the United Kingdom’s Special Envoy to Afghanistan. Mr Lindsay will take up his appointment during June 2025.

    Curriculum Vitae           

    Full name                                Richard Stephen Lindsay

    Year Role
    2022 to Present FCDO, Deputy Director, Afghanistan and Pakistan
    2020 to 2021 FCDO, Head of Strategic Engagement Department
    2017 to 2020 Brunei Darussalam, British High Commissioner
    2014 to 2016 FCO, Head of Security Policy Department
    2014 FCO, Head of Crisis Management Department
    2013 to 2014 Brasilia, Prosperity Counsellor
    2010 to 2013 FCO, Deputy Head, Security Policy Department
    2009 to 2010 FCO, Conflict Group
    2006 to 2009 Canberra, First Secretary, Foreign and Security Policy
    2003 to 2005 FCO, Head, Pakistan and India-Pakistan Relations Team, South Asia Group
    2001 to 2003 FCO, Head, Economic Summits (G8) and Institutions (OECD) Team, Economic Policy Department
    2001 FCO, Political/Military Team, Afghanistan Emergency Unit
    1998 to 2001 Harare, Second Secretary, Political
    1996 to 1998 FCO, Resource Planning Department

    Media enquiries

    Email newsdesk@fcdo.gov.uk

    Telephone 020 7008 3100

    Email the FCDO Newsdesk (monitored 24 hours a day) in the first instance, and we will respond as soon as possible.

    Updates to this page

    Published 20 June 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Ukraine and Russia again exchange prisoners within the framework of the Istanbul agreements

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    Kyiv, June 20 /Xinhua/ – Ukraine and Russia held a prisoner exchange on Friday, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said on Telegram.

    According to him, during this procedure, Kyiv managed to secure the release of a group of Ukrainian servicemen, most of whom had been in Russian captivity for over two years. These are representatives of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the National Guard and the State Border Service.

    The head of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, Kirill Budanov, in turn, reported that this was the next stage of the exchange of prisoners within the framework of the agreements reached at the beginning of the month in Istanbul.

    On June 2, peace talks between Ukraine and the Russian Federation took place in Istanbul. The parties agreed to exchange prisoners according to the formula “all for all” for two categories of servicemen – seriously ill and those aged 18 to 25.

    The exact number of released persons will be announced after all stages of the exchange are completed. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News –